

ANGOLA

A MODERN MILITARY HISTORY, 1961-2002

STEPHEN L. WEIGERT



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The author is an employee in the U.S. Department of State. Any views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.

For David, Eleanor, Vaughan, and Erich and Lissa

Rebellion itself only aspires to the relative and can only promise an assured dignity coupled with relative justice. It supposes a limit at which the community of man is established. Its universe is the universe of relative values. Instead of saying, with Hegel and Marx, that all is necessary, it only repeats that all is possible and that, at a certain point on the farthest frontier, it is worth making the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the possible... it opens a difficult path where contradictions may exist and thrive.

—Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt* (1956)


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Cabinda (Angola)



503482 11-77 (543461)
Scale 1:1,500,000
International boundary
Capital of Cabinda Province

Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
Airport (runway over 1370 m)

CHAPTER 1



INTRODUCTION

Angola's modern military history is a study in ambivalence. Observers alternately praised and condemned warfare during the forty years of anticolonial and civil conflict that ravaged the nation. When insurgents launched their campaign to end more than four centuries of Portuguese rule, in early 1961, it appeared to be a striking, albeit unexpectedly violent, example of the admirable "wind of change," which British prime minister Harold Macmillan previously had observed sweeping across Africa. White-ruled governments in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa soon allied with Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique to foster a countervailing "change of wind."¹ Civil war blighted Angola's independence in 1975, however, and many analysts quickly cast subsequent hostilities into the zero-sum calculus of the Cold War, further complicating the still-unresolved struggle against white rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Combatants in Angola and elsewhere in Africa were labeled "freedom fighters" or "terrorists" according to ideological or racial criteria. When warfare in Angola persisted, beyond the conclusion of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in South Africa, a growing chorus of states and international organizations denounced hostilities as a senseless pursuit in which neither side's goals appeared just or compelling.² Decisive military victories and durable negotiated settlements seemed equally elusive as Angola's decades-long civil war inflicted a mounting toll of death and destruction. Some observers hoped that numerous rounds of talking and fighting would ultimately bring the two sides to a negotiated settlement and assure each a share of the nation's political power and economic wealth. Presumably, war weariness would eventually counterbalance pride, ideological rigidity, and other obstacles to peace.³

Those who emphasized the futility of Angola's protracted conflict frequently failed to persuade combatants determined to achieve an advantageous military position prior to resuming negotiations. Moreover, at key points in Angola's military history one or both sides expected a decisive military victory to end the war. Such an outcome would have been typical of the

course followed in many modern conflicts. During the past century, some 85 percent of the world's civil wars ended when one combatant achieved a military victory; only 15 percent of these wars were resolved through negotiations.⁴ This statistic had sobering implications for advocates of peacekeeping operations, particularly in Angola where, by late 1998, three United Nations peacekeeping missions had ended in failure. In the Angolan context, significant battles seemed to lead only to negotiated settlements that suspended conflict rather than precluded war as an option for either side.

Both sides' reluctance to renounce warfare proved particularly frustrating to an international community that had expected Angola to become a peaceful member of the post-Cold War new world order. Two years after Cuba and South Africa had agreed to withdraw their troops from Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) representatives met at Bicesse, Portugal, in May 1991, to sign an accord calling for a UN-supervised election and the integration of their forces into a national army. The Bicesse Accord provided for an election in which the winning party would exercise exclusive power and the loser would form a "loyal opposition." Both UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and MPLA president Jose Eduardo dos Santos promised, prior to Angola's first postindependence ballot, that they would form a coalition government with their opponents. These pledges suggested that both sides would strive for accommodation rather than risk polarization and renewed hostilities, regardless of the outcome at the ballot box. The September 1992 elections, however, resulted in the worst possible outcome for a society already torn apart by 17 years of civil war and foreign military intervention. Neither presidential candidate received a majority of the votes cast. As President dos Santos and Savimbi maneuvered to negotiate a runoff election, the Bicesse Accord collapsed amid recriminations and accusations of bad faith on both sides, leading to a resumption of the Angolan civil war.⁵

After some of the war's most devastating battles, fought for control of large urban centers, UNITA and MPLA representatives signed the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. The Lusaka Protocol appeared to build upon lessons learned from the failed Bicesse Accord. Rather than risk another winner-take-all election, the two sides agreed to create a government of national unity. Their commitment to power sharing envisioned a vice-presidential position for Jonas Savimbi and several cabinet positions for UNITA members in a government led by President dos Santos. New national elections were to be held several years later, thereby giving both sides an opportunity to govern collaboratively and establish a level of mutual trust greater than that which had developed in the months prior to the 1992 election. Once again, most observers concluded that two years of horrific combat had resulted in a military stalemate convincing both sides they were left only with diplomatic options. UNITA's generals presumably realized that they could not win, quickly or cheaply, what had become a devastating "war of the cities."⁶ The MPLA, likewise, chose to sign the Lusaka Protocol, because it, too, understood that it could not defeat UNITA in a protracted

counterinsurgency campaign, much of which would have to be fought in the country's vast rural areas.

Unlike the Bicesse Accord, which collapsed quickly after the 1992 election, the Lusaka Protocol came apart slowly due to numerous disputes, reflecting a persistent and profound level of mutual mistrust. The MPLA believed that UNITA's refusal to send all its armed members to cantonment sites, and its unwillingness to turn over a significant portion of its weapons, betrayed a lingering intention to seize power by force. UNITA leaders likewise suspected that the MPLA never intended to share power. They denounced the largely superficial roles assigned to the vice-presidential position reserved for Jonas Savimbi and highlighted evidence that newly appointed UNITA cabinet members were undermined by MPLA loyalists. The government's extension of state administration to rural areas previously held by UNITA was equally alarming. UN observers repeatedly noted instances of assault and harassment of UNITA party members and civilian sympathizers by Angolan police and army personnel.

Even more fundamental flaws, however, plagued both the Bicesse and Lusaka accords. The international peacekeeping contingent had allowed political activities to resume without resolving critical military issues in the first stages of the peace process, such as the comprehensive disarmament and demobilization of combatants. UN observers were unable to persuade the opposing forces to integrate their armies. Consequently, Angola's belligerents failed to establish the bipartisan military and police forces necessary for a stable government to keep the peace. Both sides knew they could pursue military options when they suspected their opponents were engaged in treacherous behavior.⁷

The collapse of two peace agreements and, by late 1998, the inability of international peacekeeping contingents to successfully conclude their missions did not shake the faith of those who insisted that a renewed Angolan civil war was militarily unwinnable.⁸ As the opening rounds of hostilities in Angola's central plateau stretched from weeks to months, prospects for renewed negotiations faded and government hopes for the rapid seizure of UNITA's key bases dimmed. By early 1999, government officials clearly believed not only that the Angolan Army could but indeed that they must attain a decisive military outcome. This outlook was matched by an equally sanguine UNITA assessment of their military prospects. Savimbi's forces showed no sign of collapsing in the face of government assaults by air, armor, and artillery units. UNITA forces fought successfully in conventional formations and employed effective guerrilla warfare tactics. In the absence of a new round of negotiations, those who still believed in the inevitability of peace through attrition presumed both sides were deluding themselves if they expected to prevail on the battlefield.

INDECISIVE LEADERSHIP AND PROTRACTED WARFARE

The combatants in Angola's protracted civil war did not share the international consensus that emerged in the early 1990s calling for an end to war in the post-Cold War world. They disputed not only the outside world's view of why the war was fought; they also were internally divided in their preferences for appropriate military strategies. These disputes pitted factions that insisted on the necessity of a decisive military victory against those that advocated a negotiated settlement. Both the MPLA's and UNITA's ambivalent views of the peace accords they had signed were matched by equally indecisive attitudes toward the strategies they had chosen in the early years of Angola's modern military history. A persistent lack of consensus in the selection and application of military strategy probably contributed as much as ideological rigidity and mistrust to prolonging Angola's civil war. The roots of this crippling ambivalence were apparent in the earliest years of Angola's anticolonial wars. Most accounts of Angola's struggle for independence from Portugal provide scant evidence that guerrilla strategies and tactics were effectively implemented by the MPLA, UNITA, or the initially dominant National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). As their wars for independence dragged on indecisively in the 1960s and early 1970s, all three movements drew on almost mythical interpretations of their accomplishments, and often, a highly exaggerated evaluation of the advantages their insurgent counterparts derived from external support. Although insurgencies challenged Lisbon in five African colonies, only the war waged by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) ever threatened to inflict a decisive military defeat on Portuguese forces in Guinea-Bissau. Angolan and Mozambican insurgencies had made modest progress, after more than ten years of low-level combat, but did not pose a serious threat to Portugal's hold over its southern African colonies. Military demoralization, and a growing conviction in Lisbon that the nation's future lay with the European Common Market and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rather than an "unholy alliance" with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, were ultimately more influential in ending Portuguese colonialism.

Although Angola's three insurgent movements could rightfully take credit for contributing to their nation's independence, none could point to a single large battle or protracted campaign to justify a distinguished place in their country's military history. Along with their colleagues elsewhere in Lusophone Africa, however, they had contributed to the erosion of Portugal's political will to maintain an overseas empire. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974 had spared all three Angolan combatants from critically examining their adaptation of Chinese, Cuban, Algerian, or Vietnamese inspired guerrilla strategies, which had promised a decisive military victory and a revolutionary social-political transformation.

The Cold War phase of the Angolan civil war intensified hostilities but failed to resolve debates concerning the choice of an appropriate military strategy. Cuban and Soviet Bloc support for the MPLA's fledgling armed forces

and the South African, U.S., and Zairian intervention on behalf of the FNLA, and later UNITA, gradually masked, and occasionally distorted, the military capability of all three Angolan contestants. Critics of the Angolan government argued that a Cuban force, which eventually grew to some fifty thousand troops, buttressed by more than two thousand Russian and Soviet Bloc advisors, was an indispensable factor in Angola's ability to prevent UNITA from infiltrating and overrunning its capital and large urban centers. This perspective was echoed by those who questioned UNITA's ability to defend occupied territory or large bases in southeastern Angola without South African troops, long range artillery, and occasional air support.

Throughout most of the 1980s each side advocated a strategy aimed at undermining the support of their opponent's foreign patrons, and eventually, a negotiated settlement. Some observers thought that the neutralization or withdrawal of outside powers, supplemented by diplomatic mediation, would permit one of the combatants to attain a favorable bargaining position. This premise was a major consideration in at least three long campaigns for control of Mavinga, a small village in southeastern Angola and the site of some of the war's most protracted battles. The Angolan Army's disastrous 1989-90 Mavinga offensive enabled UNITA to pursue a negotiated settlement from a clearly advantageous military position. UNITA forces, however, did not contemplate a march on Luanda and the MPLA government seemed to be in no danger of imploding. Government forces still held all the nation's provincial capitals as well as vital offshore oil fields, which provided most of the nation's revenue. Both sides, however, signed the 1991 Bicesse Accord harboring doubts that they had made concessions that might have been unnecessary had they continued to fight just a little longer. Likewise, at the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, at least one Angolan military commander claimed that government forces could have decisively defeated UNITA, given additional time.

Although the last phase of the Angolan civil war was initially described by many as a life and death struggle, it ended in 2002 with a recapitulation of the 1994 Lusaka Accord. The MPLA and UNITA agreed to share power. The MPLA celebrated Jonas Savimbi's death in February 2002 but played down talk of victory while UNITA's commanders refused to acknowledge defeat. The final battles of the 27-year civil war merely determined that the government's share of power would be substantially greater than the portion it had ceded to UNITA in the 1990s. A commitment to future national elections left open the possibility that power would be redivided according to a formula decided at the ballot box rather than on the battlefield.

THEORIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: ADAPTED AND ADULTERATED

UNITA and Luanda's pursuit of strategies that stopped short of, but never conclusively ruled out, a decisive military victory, represented half-hearted adaptations of orthodox principles of twentieth-century guerrilla and

counterinsurgency warfare. The history of debates over military strategy within the Angolan government's inner circle is fairly well known. Within a few years after Angola's independence, observers frequently described the existence of "hard-line" or "moderate" factions with competing views on military strategy, ideology, and foreign and domestic policy. At times these factions also debated whether Jonas Savimbi's death, capture, or exile would suffice to end the UNITA threat. Eventually, the MPLA opted for a counterinsurgency strategy and tactics that had been applied, with a modicum of short-term success, in World War II and the latter years of the colonial era. Luanda's choices, in fact, reflected a fairly orthodox adaptation of techniques its former Portuguese colonial masters had employed in the 1960s and 1970s.

The extent and intensity of similar divisions inside UNITA, however, often has been minimized or overlooked by those who were obsessed with Savimbi's charisma and insisted that he exercised an iron grip on the party and its military wing. The reality of UNITA's inner workings was far more complex. Savimbi's decision to opt for peace in 1991 and 1994 and again shortly before his death in 2002 represented a significant modification of the guerrilla warfare strategy espoused by his most prominent mentor, Mao Zedong, and other influential practitioners of twentieth-century insurgency. These diplomatic initiatives also masked long-standing but fragile compromises between UNITA militants and moderates whose polarized positions frequently had resulted in direct challenges to Savimbi's leadership.

At the height of the Cold War phase of the Angolan civil war, Savimbi provided occasional, but usually opaque, hints of the protracted political and military debates inside UNITA. In 1986, he sought to reassure prospective Western sympathizers eager to support UNITA against the Soviet-backed MPLA regime, but wary of his well-documented, Maoist-inspired sentiments during the war against Portuguese colonialism in the 1960s. Accordingly, he declared, "from Mao and the Communists I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or a nation."⁹ This superficially simple reply lulled anxious Western sympathizers who were not already comforted by apartheid South Africa's support for UNITA.

Savimbi's previous links to Maoist China did not concern South Africa because its ties to UNITA were based on expediency not ideology. Despite the existence of a well-established double standard for many African nations and leaders linked to Pretoria, Savimbi had a much more difficult time persuading the international community that his relationship with South Africa did not make him an ardent supporter, or at least a willing puppet, of the Pretoria government. The moral ambiguity of ties between progressive governments and Pretoria was never more explicit than in March 1984, when Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. In exchange for a promise to end South Africa's support to the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency, the Maputo government agreed to cease nearly all its assistance to Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC). While the world praised President Samora Machel's statesmanship in negotiating a treaty that eventually led to even closer Mozambican political

and military ties to South Africa's apartheid regime,¹⁰ many continued to denounce Jonas Savimbi as a base and vulgar opportunist for less formal links to the same government. This contradiction often was overlooked by those more eager to pass moral judgment than to analyze Jonas Savimbi's options in his contemporary political and military context.

The ambivalence inherent in Savimbi's geopolitically determined ties to South Africa and his distinction between Maoist-inspired warfare and governance obscured as much as it revealed about UNITA's choice of strategy and tactics. Mao's contribution to the theory of modern warfare often is distinguished by describing it as "revolutionary" guerrilla warfare. The body of Mao's thoughts on guerrilla war emphasized radical political as well as military considerations. Savimbi's 1980s reaffirmation of his reliance on Mao's military precepts can be seen as a restatement of UNITA's dedication to military victory and, only implicitly, a sociopolitical revolution in the governance of Angola. His distinction between Mao's military and political credos presumably meant that he was committed to a less extreme political outcome. Savimbi repeatedly articulated a preference for western democracy and capitalist economic development in the 1980s and 1990s. UNITA's participation in the 1992 elections and a 1996 unity government were further evidence that he had discarded Mao's radical political goals.

Those who still harbored reservations about Savimbi's and UNITA's political aspirations would have been better served had they asked if he still was a "revolutionary." When Savimbi and his counterparts—Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA, and Agostinho Neto, head of the MPLA—launched their respective guerrilla campaigns against Portuguese colonialism, each could convincingly claim that he sought a revolutionary outcome, namely, the end of colonial rule. In the aftermath of Angola's emergence, in 1975, as an independent nation-state, it was the ruling MPLA's adherence to Marxism-Leninism, its denunciation of Western imperialism and its affiliation with the Soviet Bloc and Cuba, which justified its posture as a genuinely revolutionary regime. Savimbi, abandoned by the United States and other Western allies, slowly drifting into a closer relationship with South Africa, was much more likely to be described as a reactionary or counterrevolutionary figure.¹¹

Viewed in an Angolan context, however, Savimbi and his UNITA supporters' political goals could be considered consistently revolutionary throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century. For most of the nearly five hundred years of Portugal's colonial presence, Angola was administered primarily from political and military centers on the Atlantic coast. In the final decades of Portuguese rule, incremental efforts to share limited elements of local power were largely confined to the minority mestizo and, to a lesser extent, the Mbundu peoples, living along the coast and in areas immediately to the east of Luanda. The suppression of early twentieth-century Cuanhama, Bakongo, and Ovimbundu uprisings, and military resistance by other peoples in the interior, was followed by their political and economic oppression in the latter years of Portuguese colonialism. This legacy was compounded by the political marginalization of many of the same groups at the hands of the

Russian- and Cuban-backed MPLA in the early stages of Angola's independence. By the late 1980s, those who recognized UNITA as a genuine nationalist movement believed that its members stood, if not for a Maoist-inspired revolution, at the very least for free and fair elections and more equitably distributed political and economic power.¹²

If a UNITA battlefield victory or triumph at the ballot box had provided its Ovimbundu and other politically dispossessed supporters a substantial or even dominant role in their nation's political life, the outcome could possibly have been described as "revolutionary." A UNITA-led government that overturned the racially and ethnically defined exercise of power and distribution of wealth that prevailed in the late 1970s would at the very least have been described as radical, if not revolutionary. In a February 5, 1990, address to UNITA members, Jonas Savimbi exhorted his audience to note "the importance of the second phase of the *revolution*," thereby implying a distinction between UNITA's campaign against Portuguese colonial forces and the more recent war against Cuban troops and Russian advisors. After urging his supporters to resist an ongoing government offensive, Savimbi concluded his speech with the following phrases: "Strong and united we shall win. Forward with our revolution."¹³ Aware of his earlier rejection of a Maoist political agenda, skeptics frequently offered the facile explanation that Savimbi was always willing to say what he thought his audience wanted to hear. In the same speech, however, Savimbi reaffirmed UNITA's preference for a negotiated settlement when he asserted "we still believe in cease fire, national reconciliation, peace and elections."¹⁴

UNITA: ARDENT REFORMERS OR AMBIVALENT REVOLUTIONARIES?

In a more revealing fashion than his 1986 distinction between Maoist military and political guidelines, Savimbi's 1990 remarks acknowledged a long-running, unresolved debate inside UNITA regarding appropriate political/military strategies. Serious disputes already had erupted in significant challenges to Savimbi's leadership during the anticolonial phase of UNITA's guerrilla campaign but were downplayed or overlooked during the Cold War. The fissure to which Savimbi referred had been publicly described by UNITA representative Ernesto Mulato, as early as 1979, when he admitted that some of his colleagues "do not want to make any compromises with the MPLA. They feel we have suffered enough and should fight for total power."¹⁵ Mulato also characterized Savimbi as a figure who sought to reconcile UNITA moderates who still believed that the postindependence civil war could be ended by a negotiated settlement and militants who presumably rejected a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA.

For the next 27 years, Savimbi attempted, with ever more difficulty and varying degrees of success, to reconcile these increasingly polarized views. For those who questioned Savimbi's avowed determination to "change an established regime by democratic means," he appealed, in 1990, to "those

who fought with me in the old [pre-1975] and new armies to continue to trust me. I am a socialist because I want the most educated to help those who have not studied or gained expertise," implying a commitment to radical if not revolutionary change in the Angolan status quo.¹⁶

On the eve of independent Angola's first democratic elections, Savimbi continued to grapple with the intraparty ferment that challenged his leadership and UNITA's cohesiveness. For the next two years, after the indecisive 1992 presidential election led to the collapse of the Bicesse Accord, UNITA's militant/revolutionary wing dominated the party's approach to matters of war and peace. In 1994, when UNITA and the MPLA signed the Lusaka Protocol, pledging their faith in power sharing, the old divisions reemerged. In a January 1995 address to UNITA supporters, Savimbi hinted at acrimonious intraparty debates about the wisdom of signing the Lusaka Protocol. He acknowledged that "within a movement like UNITA, there is not only one opinion, but currents of opinion." Noting that Angolan forces continued to attack after Luanda had agreed to a November 15, 1994, truce and signed the November 20 peace accord, Savimbi declared, "I have many reservations about the Lusaka Protocol because it has many weaknesses," adding that he and his colleagues "as UNITA leaders . . . freely expressed our different views, but we undertook to try to adhere to the Lusaka Protocol. We also clearly stated our immense reservations."¹⁷ Savimbi had also told a Portuguese journalist, on December 31, 1994, "When the Lusaka Protocol was published certain flaws in the protocol became evident. Nobody could deny this. All of this forced me to become an apprentice of the art of reconciling varying viewpoints."¹⁸

Five weeks later, after the conclusion of UNITA's eighth party congress in late 1994, Savimbi noted "Both the military and the politicians made concessions to achieve consensus on the Lusaka Protocol." Alluding to some of the debates that preoccupied the congress, Savimbi admitted, "I am often surprised to see some of our cadres approach democracy in Africa as though they were in Europe. African democracies are only budding now. The MPLA has trouble behaving like a democratic party. In turn we find it tough to integrate this process. However, this problem does not apply to Angola alone. It has been a new experience for all of Africa." Savimbi then cautioned that "we must take note of the fact that our party's military problem is immensely delicate. If we fail to take this point into consideration, we will have trouble understanding our brethren who have carried their weapons all their lives . . . If we stand divided, no one will listen to us. Divisiveness will not allow us to defend the interest of UNITA and the people it represents. Only unity will allow our voices to be heard where they must be heard." Comparing the party to a ship, Savimbi asserted, "We must make each of our officials believe that the boat remains on the right course. We must also pay attention to those cadres' situation and their political preparation so we are able to say quite soon that our party does indeed exist. We have no doubt whatever that our army exists. That is why I said the military situation is immensely delicate."¹⁹

As the Lusaka peace process dragged on, long past the 18-month schedule for the disarmament of combatants and the creation of a government of national unity originally envisioned in 1994, doubts about UNITA's commitment to the accord, as well as its internal cohesion, continued to surface. In a 1997 interview, Abel Chivukuvuku, leader of a UNITA parliamentarians group elected to the Angolan legislature five years earlier, acknowledged that "UNITA is run through with a multiplicity of different attitudes, approaches and manners of speaking. I believe all of this is good for the actual development of UNITA because it supposes that there is an internal ideological debate and development at the ideas level." Chivukuvuku elaborated on what his interviewer described as a "structural transition," saying, "I certainly do not think that the process of transition from a primitive political-military organization into a purely political one has been at all as easy as we might have imagined. This is precisely because of the multiplicity of points of view that we find in UNITA."²⁰

Regardless of the political aim that might have been ascribed to UNITA's militant faction—revolutionary, radical, socialist—by late 1997 or early 1998, it was increasingly clear that some members did not intend to fully demobilize or disarm. These intentions were rationalized by UNITA allegations of bad faith, government violations of the letter and/or spirit of the Lusaka Protocol, and complaints about the partiality of the U.S., Russian, and Portuguese mediators, which cumulatively perpetuated a climate of profound mistrust that had undermined previous efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Luanda finally decided to militarily exploit UNITA's internal divisions and their ambivalent response to a flawed peace treaty rather than pursue a more durable, mutually acceptable accommodation. The government's late 1998 decision to label Savimbi a "war criminal" proved to be the crossing of a rhetorical Rubicon that eventually led to three more years of brutal hostilities, ending shortly after Savimbi's death in early 2002. Throughout the last years of the war, Savimbi and moderate UNITA members argued that they still were firmly committed to democracy and a moderate form of socialism.

FIGHTING TO WIN: MAO'S AMBIVALENT LEGACY

It would be easy, but fundamentally misguided, to highlight Maoist perspectives as the primary factor shaping the views of UNITA's most militant members. Ultimately, Mao Zedong proved to be neither the sole source of Savimbi's inspiration as a military strategist nor an exclusive guide to political thought in UNITA's inner circle. Mao often underscored the virtues of flexibility and adaptability and advised his students to recall Carl von Clausewitz's observation that "[w]ars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and therefore every period must have its independent theory of war."²¹ This lesson also was not lost on Mao's Angolan pupils. When a journalist, in 1988, asked Savimbi what he had learned from Mao when he went to China in the mid-1960s to study guerrilla warfare, he replied, "Mao taught me one fundamental thing. He told me that what

we were there to learn constituted merely a frame of reference. When we returned to Angola, we would have to take the reality into account, and above all, we could not come back here and apply what we had learned there in indiscriminate fashion.”²²

By the early 1960s, Mao’s general outline for a successful protracted war had been applied, and challenged, on battlefields throughout the Third World. Historians differ, however, regarding the salience of Mao’s strategy or other key variables in shaping the outcome of the Chinese civil war. Some have concluded that the Japanese invasion of China evoked an anti-imperialist sentiment that provided a more compelling reason for people to join or support the Red Army than Mao’s Communist Party platform and political agenda.²³ Mao also seems to have been sensitive to this difference, as demonstrated by his 1938 observation that “logically, a national war should win broader mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war.”²⁴ Savimbi too was well aware that UNITA’s anti-Cuban, anti-Soviet appeals were more potent than its stated political vision for postwar Angola and that UNITA might not be assured of a military victory in a conflict that endured after Cuban troops and Soviet advisors departed in the early 1990s. He often pressed the same view on his militant colleagues in 1993–94 when UNITA agreed to the Lusaka Accord.

FIGHTING TO TALK: GRIVAS’S AMBIVALENT LEGACY

The last 11 years of the Angolan civil war exposed fault lines even more subtle than those dividing UNITA’s militant and moderate factions. Savimbi’s ambivalent comments on revolution and reform also hinted at competing influences in his own selection of relevant guerrilla strategies. His search for a unique synthesis appropriate to the Angolan context relied on a fragile, and often unstable, combination of influential perspectives. In his early years as a guerrilla leader, Savimbi often cited several prominent figures in military history as role models, including George Grivas, leader of the 1955–59 *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA—National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) insurgency against British colonial rule in Cyprus. In the early 1970s, when UNITA had much less support and fewer foreign patrons than the FNLA or the MPLA, Savimbi said that he admired Grivas because he “fought a protracted campaign in restricted terrain, with virtually no external aid, against a vastly superior adversary.”²⁵ Superficially this reference seemed limited to an often emphasized theme of insurgent self-reliance that Mao also had stressed in his published analyses of guerrilla warfare. Grivas’s approach to insurgency, however, also seems to have had equally significant political implications that became increasingly relevant in the last years of Savimbi’s life.

It would be difficult to imagine a more dissimilar pair of mentors than Grivas and Mao. The latter waged a successful guerrilla war in one of the world’s largest nations, covering an expanse of some nine million square kilometers. Grivas conducted an anticolonial campaign inside one of the smallest nations, confined to an area of roughly nine thousand square kilometers. Mao and Grivas had radically different personal and professional histories. Mao was an

active and fervent revolutionary from his earliest adult years. Grivas was 56 years old when he launched EOKA's guerrilla campaign. He had spent the first decades of his adult life as a soldier in the Greek Army in World War I and World War II. Grivas emerged at the end of World War II as the leader of X (*Khi*), a right-wing organization whose members often were described as "reactionary thugs." Grivas's main political interest was irredentist. He made his motives quite explicit in repeated references to "Greater Greece," a vision that included the restoration of territories lost in the nineteenth century or the acquisition of lands with large Greek communities, particularly Cyprus.²⁶

At the conclusion of the Chinese civil war, Mao's Red Army could claim hundreds of thousands of combatants. Grivas's EOKA never managed to arm more than a few hundred guerrillas. Unlike Mao, Grivas did not consider military victory against British forces a realistic aim. In his "General Plan" for insurrectionary action, Grivas sought a "moral victory through a process of attrition" leading to international diplomatic pressure on London to end colonial rule.²⁷ Grivas rejected Mao's military experience as a relevant model. He chose instead to compare EOKA's campaign to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) struggle against French colonial rule in the 1950s, where Grivas noted, "[T]here were neither victors nor conquered, only casualties and attrition which finally obliged the French to give way to the Algerians' persistent demand."²⁸ As he later noted in his memoirs, "I could not hope to win a military victory; it was rather a question of raising a force and keeping it in being no matter what the enemy did to destroy it."²⁹ EOKA survived four years of counterinsurgency operations by a British force that grew from four thousand in 1955 to some thirty-six thousand by 1959.

Grivas's success as a guerrilla leader stemmed, in part, from a variety of well-developed tactical skills. A historian of the Cyprus revolt noted that Grivas "managed to dragoon groups of enthusiastic but incompetent amateurs into a compact and effective guerrilla organization . . . He . . . was highly skilled in making the best use of limited resources . . . a meticulous planner, he left nothing to chance down to the smallest detail. His organization of hideouts and storage places for weapons and, above all, his courier system were brilliantly conceived."³⁰ His ability to evade capture for more than four years, without ever leaving the island, burnished Grivas's heroic image in the eyes of many mainland Greeks.

Grivas's virtues as a guerrilla leader were overshadowed, however, by the political consequences of EOKA's military campaign. While Grivas's struggle unquestionably hastened the end of British colonial rule, London already was increasingly inclined to grant Cyprus its independence in reaction to radically altered geopolitical circumstances in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean regions in the late 1950s. EOKA's attacks on Turkish Cypriot communities in 1958, however, set the stage for a civil war within the larger context of the island's anticolonial struggle.³¹ The euphoria over Cyprus's 1960 independence was quickly dampened by Greek and Turkish interference in the island's political affairs, violent communal clashes, and eventually the July 1974 invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops.

A United Nations force has monitored a truce for the past four decades but has failed to resolve a conflict that still divides the island. Grivas's dream that Cypriot independence would be followed by a national referendum leading to *Enosis* (Union) with Greece remains unrealized. Notwithstanding Grivas's successful campaign to end British colonial rule, EOKA's struggle also left an ambivalent political legacy. Grivas failed to anticipate, and subsequently was unable to mitigate, the consequences of communal violence and the subsequent reluctance of Turkish Cypriots to accept the island's union with Greece. Grivas and his supporters likewise underestimated Turkey's will to intervene and radically alter the political/military balance of forces on the island.

Both Mao and Grivas had lessons to impart but Savimbi and UNITA had to filter their perspectives in order to make them relevant to the Angolan context. Savimbi had a thorough appreciation of his mentors' virtues and shortcomings. In the last stages of his military career he appeared to realize that the political contradictions inherent in a juxtaposition of Mao's and Grivas's guerrilla strategies made a successful synthesis of these two traditions unlikely, if not impossible, in the Angolan context. His unwillingness, however, to abandon the rhetoric of revolution, combined with a reluctance to undertake bold, and potentially costly, military initiatives, reflected an indecisiveness that ultimately cost him his life.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE AND A REINTERPRETED PAST

Ultimately the MPLA and UNITA's mutual pursuit of a strategy of attrition, without a decisive military victory, resulted in what Tacitus described, in recording imperial Roman campaigns against defiant British tribes, as "making a desolation and calling it peace."³² The power the MPLA and UNITA have shared since 2002 has yet to be fully legitimized by undisputed presidential and local elections. Recent controversial constitutional reforms and lingering social discontent leave open the possibility that Angola has yet to attain a durable peace; instead the nation may be in the midst of another protracted, but ultimately unstable, truce. The MPLA's assimilation of UNITA combatants into the ranks of the Angolan army and its willingness to share a limited degree of power with UNITA leaders tacitly acknowledged an ambiguous outcome to the 27-year civil war. UNITA's survival as a viable political party and the MPLA's legitimacy as a ruling party have yet to be fully tested.

An extensive review of Angola's military history amply demonstrates that ambivalence, in the form of protracted debates over strategy and tactics, is as likely as impulse to turn charismatic heroes into martyrs or villains, and turn brief outbursts of violence into prolonged wars. Nearly a decade of peace should facilitate a dispassionate reassessment of warfare in Angola, which offers a reasonable alternative to earlier, polarized accounts based on rigid ideological criteria or nationalist allegiances that often described one side or the other as villainous or saintly. A conclusive assessment of Jonas Savimbi's political legacy awaits the judgment of future generations, but his departure from the stage of Angolan politics does permit a first attempt at

a comprehensive, if not necessarily definitive, study of his role in Angola's military history. A reexamination of Jonas Savimbi's career as a guerrilla commander suggests a complex picture of military leadership that requires more than simplistic references to personality traits such as charisma or megalomania. Charismatic insurgent leaders predictably galvanize as well as polarize supporters and opponents. Charisma, however, provides no guarantee of absolute authority or unchallenged rule, and an excessive preoccupation with it sometimes thwarts an appreciation of ultimately more significant debates over appropriate military strategies and political goals.

CHAPTER 2



THE QUEST FOR A STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE (1961–65)

Mao Zedong's political/military career provided a definitive model to emulate for many Africans who aspired to take part in an anticolonial independence movement in the 1950s. China's emergence as a world power and Mao's eagerness to promote his views on Marxism, revolution, and economic development made Beijing a focal point for Third World political and military leaders seeking inspiration as well as material support. Beijing offered military aid as well as sympathetic pronouncements in various international fora and supportive statements in newspapers and other media.¹

Although many insurgents looked to Beijing for support in the early years of African independence struggles, only a few guerrilla leaders ever made the pilgrimage to China for extensive instruction in Mao's precepts of revolutionary guerrilla war.² Ernest Ouandie, vice president of the Cameroonian Peoples Union (UPC), visited China in 1958, two years after his colleagues launched their anticolonial insurgency. Dr. Felix Moumie, the UPC president, followed in 1959. In the early 1950s Moumie had been instrumental in transforming the UPC from a reformist party to a revolutionary party, often expressing his admiration for Mao and Marxist rhetoric. In 1961 a handful of UPC insurgents reportedly traveled to China, where they received a ten-week course that included classroom work as well as field training focused on guerrilla tactics. All six UPC trainees were captured by Cameroonian security forces shortly after their return from China.³

The ill-fated UPC students were followed by combatants from the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), established in 1956, sent a small contingent to China in late 1961 for training; within a year PAIGC launched its independence struggle.⁴ Amílcar Cabral, secretary general of PAIGC, probably was among the first African insurgent leaders to acknowledge, in 1964, a critical limitation of Mao's approach to guerrilla warfare when applied to the context of Guinea-Bissau. According to Cabral,

[O]ne key problem, which is of enormous importance for us . . . is the problem of whether or not the peasantry represents the main revolutionary force. I shall confine myself to my own country, Guinea, where it must be said at once that the peasantry is not a revolutionary force—which may seem strange, particularly as we have based the whole of our armed liberation struggle on the peasantry to fight . . . The conditions in China were different; the peasantry had a history of revolt, but this was not the case in Guinea, and so it was not possible for our party militants and propaganda workers to find the same welcome among the peasantry of Guinea for the idea of national liberation as the ideas found in China.⁵

Cabral's assessment echoed an unresolved debate over the conservative nature and/or revolutionary potential of rural Africans, which had also surfaced in contemporary insurgencies elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. This dispute was probably never resolved to anyone's satisfaction in the 1960s, nor in subsequent decades.

MAO'S AFRICAN DISCIPLES

In the 1960s, at the height of Mao's influence as a guide to guerrilla warfare, China offered training to insurgents from more than a dozen African nations.⁶ Pierre Mulele of the newly independent Congo (Leopoldville/Kinshasa) and Angola's Jonas Savimbi were among the most prominent alumni of the Nanjing Military Academy. Mulele returned from China to find Congolese dissidents prepared to wage what became known as a "second war of independence." Savimbi likewise was welcomed by Angolan colleagues impatient with regionally and ethnically constrained insurgencies whose campaigns had been blunted by Portuguese counterinsurgency offensives. Within several years of their matriculation it was clear that one student's inspiration had become adulterated, while the other had successfully adapted his mentor's teachings.

PIERRE MULELE AND THE KWILU REBELLION (1963–68)

Increasingly strident demands for Congolese independence had prompted Belgium to embark on a rapid decolonization process, commencing in 1959. A large field of contenders prepared to compete in national elections due to be held shortly before independence in June 1960. One of the most prominent of these new parties emerged on February 1, 1959, when a group of Kwango and Kwilu district residents living in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) established the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA). Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele served as the PSA's president and vice president.⁷

At the inception of Congo's independence in mid-1960, the PSA was the country's third-most-popular party, out-polling at least nine other parties in the first national election. Because none of the parties gained a clear majority,

a coalition government was formed. Antoine Gizenga became deputy prime minister and Pierre Mulele was appointed minister of national education and fine arts in the newly independent nation led by President Kasavubu. The coalition rapidly disintegrated, however. Less than two weeks after independence, a nationwide army mutiny pitted enlisted personnel against the predominantly Belgian officer corps, which had remained to train a new Congolese military force. The mutiny was sparked by a realization that independence would not lead to rapid promotions or the "Africanization" of an army still dominated by seconded Belgian general officers. Shortly after the outbreak of the mutiny, Katanga Province, acting on threats made by local representatives prior to independence, declared its secession. One month later, the province of South Kasai also seceded.

Disputes over an appropriate response to these crises led to mutually ineffective efforts by President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to revoke each other's powers. Lumumba had appealed to the Soviet Union and radical African states for assistance. Kasavubu acquired the support of Western powers and the United Nations for a peacekeeping force. Kasavubu gained the upper hand after several months and Lumumba was subsequently placed under house arrest. Vice Prime Minister Gizenga fled to Stanleyville in eastern Congo to establish a pro-Lumumba opposition government. Lumumba was later murdered after attempting to escape from Leopoldville and join his supporters in the east. By late 1962, command and control of the Congolese Army had been reestablished and the new government of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula successfully negotiated an end to secession in the provinces of Katanga and South Kasai.⁸

Pierre Mulele had sided with Premier Lumumba against President Kasavubu in the initial postindependence crises. By March 1962, Mulele had resigned his cabinet post in the Kasavubu government and traveled to the People's Republic of China, via Prague and Moscow. While in China, he received training in Maoist precepts of guerrilla warfare. When he returned to Kwilu Province in mid-1963, Mulele found dissatisfied and dissident residents eager to hear the ideological and strategic insights he had gleaned during his travels.⁹ Mulele never published a manifesto or program. According to statements from supporters who heard his speeches, Mulele spoke of two kinds of struggle—"reformist," which was not desirable, and "revolutionary," which gave power to the masses. Reflecting on his experiences in Maoist China, Mulele also asserted that revolution had to be conducted by insurgents supported by local villagers "as fish in water."¹⁰ Notebooks subsequently taken from captured insurgents revealed the war was waged for a radical but nonetheless ill-defined future. The guerrillas were told, "[W]hen the government is overthrown, we will establish a new regime in which all must and will work in order to eat, in which foreigners can not come to take the wealth of the country, and in which we can not steal the wealth of others either. A beautiful house, complete with furniture will be built for each person by the new government."¹¹ Notes that his supporters took during the course of Mulele's speeches hint that postrevolutionary Congo would seek

help from "another country" for assistance in the establishment of a manufacturing and industrial sector.¹² This agenda evidently evoked an immediate response from Kwilu residents, whose previous political interests already had primed them to support an uprising.

Mulele established three camps in different areas of Kwilu Province (later renamed Bandundu Province) and, by August 1963, the movement had over 550 members.¹³ In January 1964, after a determined effort to recruit additional members, Mulele's forces launched widespread attacks against government outposts, missionary stations, palm oil mills, bridges, ferries, and telephone lines. The insurgents isolated an area of about 350 kilometers by 150 kilometers, roughly the size of Belgium, within weeks after the start of their insurrection.¹⁴

The scale and coordination evident in the attacks staged by Mulele's combatants reflected the formation of a guerrilla force that drew its inspiration from modern military principles. Between September and December 1963, Mulele and his commanders established a table of organizations, which included "zones," "subdirections," "brigades" and "equips," or "cells." Captured documents later revealed references to a "military academy," a "department of archives," a "paracommando department," a "military affairs department," "medical affairs," "social affairs," and "popular masses."¹⁵ While Maoist influences on Mulele's ideology and organizational preferences were readily apparent, the Kwilu insurgents' traditional religious worldviews ultimately had an even greater impact on their military tactics and soon overshadowed the Maoist guidelines for the conduct of guerrilla warfare that had been discovered in captured documents. Mulele quickly acquired a reputation for being bulletproof, a notion he reportedly fostered by staging occasional demonstrations in which he would point a revolver (loaded with blanks) at his head, pull the trigger, and then walk away. Before long, many supporters claimed that Mulele had supernatural powers, which enabled him to move through government lines by making himself invisible.¹⁶ In addition to attributing special powers to Mulele, sympathetic traditional religious leaders also established numerous taboos for his military forces to observe. Prior to combat, the guerrillas were ordered to (1) not eat certain foods, such as the liver, heart, or head of specific animals, (2) avoid using or touching objects belonging to Europeans, (3) avoid washing or cutting their hair until final victory, (4) enter battle bare-chested, (5) never retreat or stop advancing in battle, and (6) never pronounce Mulele's name.¹⁷ In battle, the insurgents were to advance shouting "Mai, Mai" ("Water, Water"), which was expected to turn their enemies' bullets into balls of mud. The guerrillas also rubbed their torsos with red clay and adorned their bodies with amulets to make them bulletproof.¹⁸

Mulele's association with traditional magico-religious precepts and their application to military operations elevated him to the status of a national leader. His influence, and that of his "bulletproof" troops, soon spread to supporters of the National Liberation Council (CNL) insurgency. In early 1964, the CNL rebellion had advanced rapidly through Congo's eastern

provinces, where rebel groups reportedly were chanting “Mulele mai” as they charged into battle. This occurred despite their leaders’ efforts to change the chant to “Lumumba mai” to reflect local loyalties to the murdered prime minister.¹⁹ Mulele reportedly opposed the rebellion in the east and especially the local insurgents’ August 1964 occupation of Stanleyville. In an apparent reflection of the texts he had studied in China, Mulele evidently considered this a strategically inappropriate move for an insurgency that had only begun to mobilize popular support.²⁰ Mulele’s own military judgment was equally questionable, however. Encouraged by their initial successes in January 1964, Mulele’s partisans launched several ill-conceived attacks on some of the largest towns in Kwilu Province. Thwarted by the defenders’ superior firepower, these assaults proved disastrous to Mulele’s forces, which suffered more than one thousand casualties by early February 1964. Undeterred by their previous losses, Mulele’s forces again staged several additional large but unsuccessful attacks against sizeable government garrisons. The insurgents’ last major assault occurred in May 1965. Weakened by the cumulative impact of the previous year’s costly attacks, the insurgents gradually began to avoid major engagements with large Congolese National Army (ANC) units.²¹ This reflected a reluctance to risk additional high casualties as well as a critical inability to acquire a reliable supply of weapons.

The Congolese military gradually overcame Mulele’s early gains. Helicopters carried additional troops to Kwilu Province in February 1964. Within months, the government had deployed three companies of gendarmes, a commando battalion from Katanga Province, and an ANC infantry battalion. After April 1964, the ANC slowly regained the tactical initiative. Government forces launched a “pacification” program in June and began to register significant progress by December 1964. Government delegations entered the forests and negotiated agreements with civilians who had fled their villages in the early months of the rebellion, permitting them to return to villages reoccupied by government forces. Village residents were offered better food and medical care than they had received at Mulele’s camps. By February 1965 the ANC had reopened major roads and secured numerous strongholds in Kwilu Province. Efforts to entice villagers out of the forests became more successful as the ANC began to demonstrate that it could protect them against insurgent reprisals.²²

Mulele’s forces were beginning what Mao would have described as the first stage in a three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war. Many of Mulele’s early advances had occurred in a military vacuum. The Kwilu insurgents never had the firepower necessary to mount an effective challenge to government forces. Throughout the insurgency the ANC never conducted more than battalion-sized sweep operations. Despite their rapid gains in the early months of the insurgency, by 1966 the guerrillas had killed less than twenty soldiers, wounded a few dozen and captured only three. Mulele’s combatants had fewer than one hundred modern rifles; the rest of their armory consisted of bows, poison arrows, clubs, machetes, homemade rifles, and Molotov cocktails.²³ The guerrillas’ rapid loss of the tactical initiative, their

abandonment of large-scale offensive operations, and later, their self-imposed geographic isolation, had severely limited the number of weapons they could capture.²⁴ As the ANC pressed its advantage and the insurgency imploded, Mulele lost the sympathy of ethnic groups whose support for the guerrillas had not been consolidated in the first year of the rebellion. Likewise, ethnic groups whose initial response to the insurgents was ambivalent gradually rallied to the government.²⁵

Finally, Mulele's inability to reestablish command and control of his forces exacerbated the guerrillas' shortcomings. According to a late 1965 account, "as time went on, the Kwilu Rebellion seemed to become more destructive and less subject to the influence and control of the values, beliefs and norms of Mulelism, or to the authority of its chiefs. Burning, pillaging, attacking women, and murdering became more and more widespread. This was especially true once the majority of the Europeans had been evacuated from Kwilu and the Congolese Army had arrived."²⁶ Despite indications that Mulele and his cohorts denounced the rebellion's vindictive tendencies, they repeatedly failed to prevent reprisals against villagers and local leaders who did not rally to their cause.²⁷

With the gradual loss of his military commanders, due to defections, casualties, and the evaporation of civilian support throughout most of Kwilu Province, Mulele grudgingly abandoned the armed struggle. In early September 1968, he traveled to Brazzaville, capital of the neighboring Congo Republic. After several meetings with government emissaries from Kinshasa, Mulele returned on September 29, 1968, believing that he would be eligible for an amnesty decreed by President Mobutu. At a reception held in his honor by the commander in chief of the ANC, Mulele reportedly said he was convinced that President Mobutu was carrying out the policy of the late Patrice Lumumba. Mulele asserted that he himself had not fought for power but for an ideology. As this ideology had now been upheld, Mulele conceded there was no point in further struggle. Nevertheless, on October 2, Mobutu announced that Mulele would be tried as a war criminal and pointed out that the amnesty applied to "political prisoners," not "war criminals." Mulele was brought before a military tribunal on October 7, 1968, and executed the following day.²⁸

The failure of the Kwilu Rebellion has been attributed to flaws in Mulele's leadership and the guerrillas' excessive reliance on traditional religious views. Che Guevara's own brief encounter in 1965 with the ethnic and magico-religious dimensions of insurgency in eastern Congo had convinced him that these factors made effective guerrilla warfare in sub-Saharan Africa impossible.²⁹ Mulele was faulted because he did not effectively communicate to his forces his Maoist teachings. As one critic observed, the "pronouncements of the forest camps were not put into practice in the brief period the rebels controlled parts of Kwilu."³⁰ Mulele never established a "revolutionary" political organization charged with educating peasants and coordinating their actions. He did not appreciate the need for a vanguard political wing to lead the insurgency; his colleagues failed to understand the proper relationship

between political and military struggles; and they did not prepare the masses for a long war as suggested in Mao's description of a three-stage strategy.³¹ Alternatively, Mulele's intentional exploitation of traditional theology suggests he must have known that he was compromising the Maoist principles he initially brought to Kwilu Province in 1963.

While personal and political factors undeniably contributed to the character and course of the rebellion, the guerrillas' lack of supplies and outside support was critical in accounting for their eventual failure. Because Mulele strongly emphasized self-sufficiency, his forces made no concerted efforts to procure external assistance. Mulele's opposition to obtaining outside aid, particularly in the early years of the insurgency, stemmed from a belief that such support would force him to accommodate external patrons who would eventually dictate policy to the insurgents. His fear of a neocolonial conclusion to a successful rebellion led Mulele to avoid promising his followers any great riches after their victory. Instead, he told the insurgents they were fighting for a future in which they would have the possibility to make—by themselves—those things that the masses truly needed.³²

While Mulele's reasons for isolating his insurgency may have seemed politically sound, they proved to be militarily disastrous. His unwillingness to actively pursue the creation of an alliance with guerrilla movements in the east stunted his forces' political and military growth and further limited their progress. Between 1963 and 1965, a handful of Mulele's colleagues made half-hearted attempts to contact insurgent groups active in Congo's eastern districts. For a brief moment, at a conference held in Cairo in April 1965, Congolese dissidents from the east and Kwilu nearly succeeded in establishing a "Supreme Council of the Revolution," for which Mulele was designated as a ranking officer. Factionalism within the ranks of the eastern Congolese insurgency quickly subverted this undertaking.³³ The collapse of Mulele's rebellion underscored a contemporary observer's judgment that it exemplified "a social movement which had revolutionary tactics, but lacked a revolutionary strategy . . . a program for consolidating victory and providing purpose for revolt was absent."³⁴ By the mid-1960s the Congo had proven to be an unsatisfactory laboratory in which to test either Mao's or Guevara's strategies of guerrilla warfare.

ANGOLA'S WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE DEBATE OVER APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES

The opening rounds of Angola's anticolonial struggle were fired in early 1961, and Mulele's career eventually provided a cautionary tale to some of his Angolan counterparts in the early years of their campaign. A diverse array of political activists and military leaders failed to unite Angolan insurgent forces into a cohesive coalition. Ideological, racial, ethnic, and personality disputes all contributed to a weakening of guerrilla operations, which were limited primarily to northwestern Angola for the first five years of the war.³⁵ Jonas Savimbi's decision, in 1965, to seek instruction in China reflected a

growing sense of disappointment in the leadership styles and military strategy Angolan colleagues had chosen from among the many models available in other Third World insurgencies.

Advocates of Angolan independence already had begun organizing for action in the late 1940s. A small group of intellectuals and students, based in Luanda, founded the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) on December 10, 1956. Many of the MPLA's earliest members were mestizos and *assimilados*, whose privileged status enabled them to pursue advanced academic studies in Portugal. Some had been influenced and inspired by members of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP).³⁶ Early MPLA proclamations called on Portugal to negotiate an end to colonial rule and permit the formation of political parties in Angola.³⁷ The MPLA's largely urban, intellectual, progressive appeals for Angolan independence were paralleled, in the early 1950s, by the Angolan Peoples Union (UPA). Some of UPA's earliest leaders emerged from a Bakongo-based secessionist movement. Their original goal was to place a preferred candidate on the vacant throne of the Kongo kingdom in northwestern Angola. UPA officials argued that Portugal had illegally annexed the ancient Kongo kingdom in the nineteenth century and that the kingdom (Kongo) ought to be granted independence. Contacts with other African nationalist movements in the late 1950s convinced Bakongo separatists to abandon their secessionist cause and pursue a broader Angolan national agenda. In 1960, sympathetic members of the newly independent Congo government permitted UPA to establish a headquarters in the capital city of Leopoldville (later Kinshasa), where the organization issued statements calling for independence and a program emphasizing land reform.³⁸

The earliest battles of the Angolan struggle for independence bore some resemblance to the initial phases of modern nationalist insurrections in Madagascar (1947), Kenya (Mau Mau in 1950s) and neighboring Congo in the early 1960s. Intellectual, urban-based elites repeatedly found themselves following rather than leading radical peasants eager to act first and theorize later.³⁹ Contrary to Amílcar Cabral's observations on the conservative nature of the peasantry in Guinea-Bissau, rural Angolans demonstrated, in 1961, what Mao had realized in 1927 when he acknowledged, "The poor peasants [are] the most revolutionary group" and "without the peasant there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny the revolution."⁴⁰ This did not necessarily mean Chinese peasants had devised a revolutionary theory of social behavior or an elaborate political agenda that envisioned a sudden transformation of society. They were, however, prepared to act, violently and precipitously, against individuals and institutions responsible for what they considered unjust conditions. Mao realized, as did some of his African disciples, that this willingness to act had potentially revolutionary consequences.

REVOLUTIONARY ANGOLAN PRECEDENTS

Members of a Christian sect called "Maria" began an economic sabotage campaign in north-central Angola in January 1961. The participants in this revolt were poorly armed. They initially disrupted farming activities on Portuguese-owned plantations, where the work force comprised contract laborers who, traditionally, were forcibly conscripted by colonial administrators.⁴¹ Maria supporters refused to plant seeds or help cut local roads and river crossings, and killed cattle and stole supplies from stores and Catholic missions. European settlers fled an insurrection whose participants sang the praises of the newly formed UPA and Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba. Portugal deployed air and ground forces as the insurrection spread. "Maria's War" ended two months later, after a devastating counterinsurgency offensive, which may have killed some seven thousand Africans.⁴² Limited accounts of the war leave many unanswered political and military questions. Little is known about the combatants' strategy and tactics. The identity of their leaders, their military strategy, and the agenda that motivated the insurgents all remain obscure. Evidence that they were inspired by Lumumba and the UPA hinted at the existence of a movement whose supporters, armed only with muzzle loading rifles and farm implements, spontaneously acted before their exiled leaders in Leopoldville, Congo were prepared to launch a more carefully planned insurgency.

Similar features characterized anticolonial attacks in Luanda and northern Angola, which began while Portuguese forces were still coping with Maria's War. On February 4, 1961, hundreds of poorly armed insurgents attacked a prison, a radio station and an army barracks in Luanda. Fighting lasted for several days. Portuguese military personnel and armed civilians brutally and indiscriminately retaliated against known or suspected sympathizers, killing an estimated three thousand Angolans.⁴³ Exiled MPLA leaders immediately claimed responsibility for the failed attack, and the events of February 4 have since been regarded as the official beginning of Angola's war for independence. Some accounts indicate that participants in the uprising included UPA as well as MPLA supporters.⁴⁴ Like Maria's War, the Luanda uprising appears to have been a spontaneous event. The combatants were too few and too poorly armed to have succeeded; nor is it clear that the MPLA/UPA participants had long-term military plans. The selection of targets had more in common with the tactics of a coup d'état than an insurgency inspired by a strategy of guerrilla war.⁴⁵ MPLA leaders displayed little additional evidence that they had carefully planned a protracted war against Portuguese rule. The movement did not relocate its West African headquarters from Conakry, Guinea to neighboring Brazzaville, Congo, until October 30, 1961, eight months after the Luanda attacks.⁴⁶

Impulse and spontaneity also characterized UPA's early military efforts. One month after the February 1961 Luanda uprising, UPA planned a series of strikes by contract workers on coffee plantations in northwestern Angola. Emphasizing tactics reminiscent of those employed in Maria's War, workers

were expected to limit their activity to the destruction of crops, buildings and bridges; and they were to refrain from attacks on personnel. This plan was quickly abandoned, perhaps intentionally, but possibly due to the provocation of plantation owners who shot at striking workers. Violence escalated rapidly, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of colonial settlers and thousands of Africans. Unarmed civilians on both sides were slaughtered over the next eight months. A ruthless Portuguese counterinsurgency campaign, employing air and ground forces, drove poorly armed UPA combatants and local civilians out of larger towns and villages, killing perhaps as many as fifty thousand.⁴⁷ UPA leader Holden Roberto initially denied complicity in the March events, but other members later took responsibility for what they subsequently described as the start of their struggle for Angolan independence. Pressure on MPLA and UPA officials to respond to their supporters' immediate needs for weapons and supplies quickly outpaced their ability to devise a guerrilla strategy. Months before the events of early 1961, both organizations had still hoped for a favorable response to demands for independence expressed through large popular demonstrations in Luanda, similar to the brief 1959 outbursts in Leopoldville that persuaded Belgium to end its colonial rule.

By late 1960, UPA leaders had taken only limited steps to establish a military wing prepared for armed struggle. The party's leadership approved the formation of a "Revolutionary Commission," whose members included Portuguese Army deserters. A Tunisian military officer serving with United Nations peacekeeping forces in Congo began to train commission members in January 1961.⁴⁸ Sympathetic North African states provided some of UPA's initial military supplies. Tunisian contacts also brokered ties to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), whose protracted guerrilla war against French colonial forces was about to lead to Algerian independence. Ahmed Ben Bella, a prominent FLN leader, and Frantz Fanon, unofficial ideologue of the Algerian struggle, encouraged UPA's transition from an aspiring political party to an organized insurgency. Tunisian-based FLN cadres offered supplies and training to UPA members in late 1961.⁴⁹ When UPA merged with another Bakongo party to form the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in early March 1962, Algerian president Ben Bella provided the fledgling insurgent force and their self-proclaimed Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) one hundred tons of weapons.⁵⁰

REAL OR IMAGINED ROLE MODELS: FRANTZ FANON AND THE FNLA

The largely spontaneous and brutal nature of the March 1961 UPA attacks strongly hinted at the influence of Frantz Fanon's views on the revolutionary potential of peasant violence in Third World uprisings.⁵¹ At the All-African Peoples Conference held in Tunis in January 1960, Fanon had urged both UPA and MPLA representatives to pursue an armed struggle for independence.⁵² The indiscriminate terror associated with UPA attacks in 1961 might have been linked to Fanon's notions that downtrodden peasants could achieve

psychological emancipation when they finally lashed out against their colonial oppressors. It is equally apparent, however, that Fanon did not provide a theory, and that UPA had not fully prepared a strategy of guerrilla warfare. Beyond his belief in the "revolutionary potential" inherent in spontaneous peasant violence harnessed by urban nationalist leaders who provide "clear objectives" and a precise methodology, Fanon's writing offered a sociological hypothesis rather than a strategy of guerrilla war.⁵³ Mao anticipated a revolution that would bring about societal transformation; Fanon looked forward to an emotional revolution in the minds of the colonized. Holden Roberto's belated acknowledgment of UPA responsibility for a poorly prepared campaign hinted at a rationale which Fanon might have inspired. Roberto suggested that Angola's oppressed people had now been further emboldened to challenge a Portuguese colonial power whose supporters would never fully recover from the shock of being challenged by a long docile population. Portugal's international reputation presumably would suffer and the combined pressures of moral outrage expressed in the United Nations and an insurrectionary Angolan population would force Lisbon to abandon its colony.⁵⁴

The UPA's weaknesses and Portugal's stubbornness soon made it clear that Angolan insurgents would need more than Fanon's limited inspiration and they likely would have to emulate their Algerian patron's determination to fight a brutal protracted war in order to prevail. Most of the estimated four thousand to five thousand UPA participants in the March 1961 revolt were armed primarily with machetes. Some UPA insurgents also may have acquired a limited number of weapons from participants in Maria's War. A modest number of weapons had been bought, stolen, or, in some instances, donated by members of the UN contingent deployed to neighboring Congo. Many UPA combatants reportedly went into battle believing that magic had made them bulletproof, a view that foreshadowed the Kwilu Rebellion as well as echoing earlier insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa.

Fanon also explicitly criticized the UPA's 1961 attacks, declaring that "we should make it quite clear that this spontaneous impetuosity which is determined to settle the fate of the colonial system immediately is condemned . . . The hard lesson of facts, the bodies mown down by machine guns: these call forth a complete reinterpretation of events . . . This modification in fighting techniques characterized the first months of the war of liberation . . . It did not take long for the leaders of the Angolan rising to realize that they must find some other methods if they really wanted to free their country . . . using the experience in various other wars of liberation, and employing guerrilla techniques."⁵⁵ Fanon did not mention Algeria or provide specific examples of a "war of liberation" and he did not cite any particular theorist of guerrilla warfare whose "techniques" could have inspired UPA.

International sympathy and subsequent Pan-African support from the newly established Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not suffice to turn the FNLA into a more effective guerrilla movement. Although it had recruited additional members, perhaps nearly doubling its combatant force to some seven thousand, the FNLA's main base in Congo (Kinshasa)

reportedly often suffered food shortages. Doubts about Holden Roberto's motives and leadership abilities and the competence of his Bakongo colleagues grew. The FNLA's cancellation of plans to conduct guerrilla operations from bases in the southern Congolese province of Katanga, out of deference to the Adoula government, further alienated the FNLA's Ovimbundu members who wanted to recruit sympathizers in central Angola.⁵⁶ Jonas Savimbi, who had been appointed UPA's secretary general in 1961 and subsequently became the FNLA/GRAE foreign minister, delivered a scathing public critique of the organization in 1964. Savimbi, the organization's most prominent Ovimbundu member and one whose rank presumably signified the FNLA's commitment to a pan-Angolan national cause, complained that FNLA combatants received no political training at their rear base. Insurgents who engaged in commercial activities for personal profit or sabotaged military objectives were not disciplined or punished.⁵⁷ Convinced that growing FNLA ties with the U.S.-backed Congolese government made him ideologically suspect, Savimbi and several other Ovimbundu members broke with Roberto. Savimbi announced his resignation at the July 1964 OAU conference in Cairo, Egypt.

FROM FANON TO GUEVARA TO MAO

Savimbi had briefly contemplated joining the MPLA before accepting a position with UPA in 1961. After his resignation from the FNLA, he again considered rallying to the Brazzaville-based MPLA, which also had received military training from Algerian instructors as well as offers of equipment and even volunteers from Premier Ben Bella.⁵⁸ Moreover, the MPLA had survived the ruthless Portuguese suppression of the 1961 uprising. A small but tenacious group of supporters managed to conduct limited guerrilla operations in the Dembos Forest some 125 kilometers northeast of Luanda. In early 1964, MPLA guerrillas also opened a second front, staging shallow raids into the Cabinda enclave.⁵⁹ Modest amounts of aid had begun to arrive from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and MPLA members were also sent to the Soviet Bloc for training.⁶⁰ MPLA cadres in Algerian camps also had come in contact with Cuban military trainers whom Fidel Castro had sent to Algiers in 1963 to support the FLN's anticolonial struggle. Cuban relations with the MPLA deepened during the course of Che Guevara's December 1964–March 1965 visit to central Africa and his meetings with MPLA leaders in Brazzaville, where Cubans trained MPLA insurgents from 1965 to 1967.⁶¹

The Cuban guerrilla warfare experience offered an alternative model for Angolan insurgents who had questioned the relevance of the Algerian struggle and the inferences that Fanon had drawn from it. Che Guevara's views on guerrilla warfare provided a potential alternative for African insurgents wary of Cold War era ideological debates, which threatened to further fragment guerrilla movements already straining to heal other divisive tendencies. By 1964 Guevara already was convinced that Cuba's military experience was relevant not only to Latin America but also to aspiring revolutionaries elsewhere

in the Third World.⁶² Like Mao Zedong, Guevara advised would-be guerrillas to anticipate a “long and difficult struggle” and, mimicking his Chinese predecessor, anticipated a three-stage process that included a “strategic defensive” and a “stage of equilibrium.”⁶³ Guevara, at least in some of his writings, appears to have taken a middle ground in the debate on the political outlook of peasants and their role in revolutionary guerrilla war. Unlike Mao’s assertion of their revolutionary potential or Amílcar Cabral’s assessment of their stubborn conservative views, Guevara’s experience led him to generalize about the need for ongoing dialogue between radical urban leaders and reluctant rural civilians, which could lead to what Guevara described as “progressive radicalization.”⁶⁴ Guevara evidently was not consistent in his articulation of this view. Savimbi claimed Guevara emphasized the leadership role of an urban proletariat during the first of two visits to Africa in early 1964; a view that Savimbi disputed because it underestimated the importance of rural residents in most contemporary African societies.⁶⁵

The Cuban model and Guevara’s analyses had other, more obvious limitations in their appeal to African insurgents. The two-year Cuban guerrilla campaign had little to offer Angolans in the way of relevant military lessons. A relatively small group of Cuban guerrillas, initially numbering only in the hundreds, managed to topple a corrupt regime supported by forty thousand troops. There were few large battles, except in the closing stages of the war.⁶⁶ Although the Cuban example of a rapidly successful campaign offered hope to those inspired by Castro and Guevara, this was a slender foundation on which to build a theoretical edifice as Régis Debray, a French admirer, tried to do in the mid-1960s. Debray dramatized the catalytic role of the guerrilla *foco* in mobilizing peasant supporters and hastening the demise of a corrupt regime after a brief challenge by dedicated revolutionaries. Debray’s efforts, however, were focused on demonstrating the relevance of Cuba’s experience to Latin America, not Africa. Beyond their abbreviated advice and observations on guerrilla warfare already available in Mao’s more extensive publications, Guevara and Debray minimized the importance of forming a political party operating alongside, and providing critical guidance to, a guerrilla army. Guevara and Debray seemed to have assumed that the revolutionary zeal of guerrilla leaders would suffice to encourage peasants and, eventually, urban populations to rise against an oppressive regime.⁶⁷ In their emphasis on the emotionally beneficial impact of violence, Guevara and Debray did not differ radically from the views expressed earlier by Fanon.⁶⁸

Savimbi would have been aware, by mid-1964, that neither the FNLA nor the MPLA could achieve a rapid victory over Portugal. The MPLA’s weaknesses, however, proved to be no less glaring than those that Savimbi had detected in the FNLA. After he broke with the FNLA, Savimbi was invited to visit the MPLA in Congo (Brazzaville). Savimbi’s observations of the MPLA’s base camp at Dolisie erased any thought he may have given to joining the guerrillas led by Agostinho Neto. MPLA communiqués recounting significant operations in Cabinda proved to be gross exaggerations.⁶⁹ Cabindan residents, some of whom had already joined the ranks of the *Mouvement*

de Liberation de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC) in 1961, were not rallying to the MPLA, and by 1963, a small separatist movement known as the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) had emerged to challenge MPLA and FNLA claims to lead or speak for the enclave's sixty thousand inhabitants. A French analyst observed that the FNLA's and MPLA's shortcomings persisted long after Savimbi's initial criticisms and faulted both movements for their continued "neglect of the need to win over the peasantry . . . because they have lacked political control over local villages. Angolan guerrillas have feared and avoided an indigenous peasantry."⁷⁰

Convinced that neither the MPLA nor the FNLA could devise an effective strategy for achieving Angolan independence, Savimbi resolved to establish an alternative movement. He embarked on an international journey, in late 1964, similar to the path Pierre Mulele had taken two years earlier. Savimbi acknowledged meeting Mulele, after the latter's training in China, and probably before Savimbi began his own course of Chinese instruction. Mulele had been introduced to Savimbi as someone who could be helpful to Angola's cause if the Congo insurgency were to prevail.⁷¹ Mulele's initial success in early 1964 may have enhanced the appeal of Mao's guerrilla strategy as a viable alternative to the Algerian and Cuban models that had failed to take root in Angola.

Savimbi began his travels by contacting a Chinese government agent in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where he expressed an initial interest in Beijing's aid. He then traveled to Zambia and met with Angolan exile groups to recruit supporters for a new nationalist movement, while awaiting China's response to his request for assistance. Smart Chata, leader of the Angolan Chokwe Association, was sympathetic and offered to mobilize supporters in anticipation of Savimbi's efforts to raise funds and acquire weapons. Savimbi also visited Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, in 1964, to solicit support but found his hosts already committed to the MPLA. Only China was receptive, though somewhat wary, due to the FNLA's, and presumably Savimbi's, links to the United States. China agreed to provide training and modest financial assistance to Savimbi's colleagues. Savimbi returned to China in early 1965 to plan a training schedule for members of his new movement. Beijing provided \$15,000 for a party and program that Savimbi and a colleague, Tony Fernandez, had drafted only a few months earlier. Savimbi completed his academic studies in political and legal sciences at the Lausanne University, Switzerland in July 1965, and once again traveled to China, where he participated in an extended training program at Nanjing. Eleven Angolans, recruited from among the ranks of exiles in Zambia earlier that year, joined Savimbi in September where they began a course of studies in guerrilla warfare, which lasted until May 1966.⁷²

Savimbi returned to Angola in early 1966, at a time when the prospects of other Chinese-trained African insurgents such as Mulele and the Cameroonian UPC, looked increasingly dim. Some analysts soon suggested that the "guerrilla myth" perpetrated by Mao, Fanon, Guevara and others had evolved into a guerrilla "fantasy," more likely to delude than inspire their

would-be apostles.⁷³ Upon returning to Angola, one of Savimbi's principal challenges would be to prove that five years of largely unsuccessful insurgency in Angola could become dramatically more effective if it were tied to the disciplined and methodical application of a comprehensive strategy of guerrilla warfare.

CHAPTER 3



ASIAN STRATEGIES AND ANGOLAN REALITIES (1966–77)

Angola's history is replete with examples of anticolonial wars that provided inspiration, if not strategies, to twentieth-century guerrillas. From 1500 to the early 1900s, Portuguese forces successfully countered uprisings throughout the Angolan countryside. Regardless of the Asian or Latin American inspired strategies they preferred, the foremost challenge faced by twentieth-century Angolan nationalists was to demonstrate to their fellow citizens that, despite the shortcomings of earlier rebellions, any military struggle for independence could ultimately be victorious. As the Portuguese colonial era drew to a close, debates over the relevance of foreign strategies were overshadowed by the far more controversial intervention of foreign powers. During the 1960s, Angolan insurgent leaders had lost valuable time in internecine battles and the erratic application of Maoist and other guerrilla warfare strategies. Their military failures persisted in the tumultuous transition to independence, condemning Angolan combatants to relearn, at a greater cost, the lessons their leaders had failed to appreciate in the anticolonial struggle.

HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

Modern nationalists had many heroic, albeit often tragic, historic figures whose struggles still lived in the memories of contemporary Angolans. The heroes and heroines of previous wars could be recalled to inspire and improve morale but they could also highlight key obstacles to effective insurrection. Like their political/military ancestors, all modern Angolan guerrilla leaders found that their initial appeals for support evoked a limited popular response. They led combatants drawn from a relatively narrow ethnically, linguistically, or geographically defined segment of the population at a time when the concept of a "nation-state" had not yet been carefully defined or thoroughly articulated in the minds of many Angolans. This should not have

been surprising in a colony whose internationally recognized boundaries were not established until the second decade of the twentieth century.

Queen Nzinga Mbandi, who ruled as an Mbundu sovereign from 1624 to 1663, was one of the first to personify a spirit of resistance with widespread appeal in the early centuries of Portuguese occupation. She inspired a forceful response to several decades of Portuguese conquest and infiltration of northwestern Angola. Nzinga's impressive character and her conversion to Christianity initially persuaded Portuguese colonialists to pursue peaceful relations, but as these contacts gradually shifted from amity to enmity, she formed military alliances with several neighboring kingdoms. Nzinga further capitalized on the short-lived Dutch conquest and occupation of Luanda (1641–48). By forging ties with Dutch officials Nzinga prevented residual Portuguese forces from making additional forays into the interior. Nzinga mobilized an army of some eight thousand troops and thwarted repeated campaigns to kill or capture her. As the creator of an effective anticolonial coalition, her accomplishments laid the foundation for a larger national identity. Her political and military successes suggested to some that she be viewed as an African Joan of Arc. By the mid-twentieth century, Nzinga's character traits of dignity, resistance, and valor were recounted by Angolan nationalists regardless of parochial, regional, or ethnic roots.¹

Long after Nzinga's death, Angolans continued to resist Portuguese colonialism, often in response to Lisbon's oppressive land and labor policies. Portugal eventually had yielded to nineteenth-century international demands to abolish slavery, only to replace it with an equally onerous and brutal contract labor policy that prompted several early twentieth-century uprisings. Bakongo residents in the northwest rebelled in 1913 against the forced relocation of laborers to the island colony of Sao Tome, where Lisbon operated cocoa and coffee plantations. Tulante Alvaro Bula, who attempted to inspire a pan-Bakongo revolt, led the insurgency until 1915. Lisbon raised some 1,200 troops, equipped with artillery, and eventually overwhelmed Bula's estimated 1,000–2,000 insurgents, although small guerrilla bands continued to fight on until 1918.² Miguel Nekaka, maternal grandfather of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola's (FNLA's) Holden Roberto, was one of many refugees who fled to the neighboring Belgian Congo following Tulante Bula's defeat.³

Remembered with pride as well as bitterness, a similar revolt linked Jonas Savimbi and some of his Ovimbundu colleagues who had family ties to participants in the 1902 Bailundo Rebellion. Several Ovimbundu kings previously had resisted Portuguese settlement in the central highlands since the late seventeenth century, and continued to rebel, sporadically, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bailundo, Bie, and Ndulu were among the most prominent Ovimbundu kingdoms that challenged Portuguese intrusion into the highlands.⁴ Like the Bakongo who rallied to Tulante Bula, many Ovimbundu were subjected to the contract labor system, which annually shipped several thousand workers to cocoa plantations in Sao Tome. Resentment against what a contemporary British author characterized as "modern slavery" was

compounded by Portuguese traders' predatory expansion of the rum trade in Ovimbundu territory. Finally, a collapse in the world rubber market, one of several cash crops in which the Ovimbundu had invested heavily during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, exacerbated growing social and economic tensions.⁵

In early 1902 Mutu ya Kavela, a councilor to the Bailundu kingdom, launched an uprising eventually supported by several Ovimbundu kingdoms and a combined force of some three thousand to six thousand combatants.⁶ Three Portuguese columns, comprising eight hundred troops and one thousand porters, advanced from the Atlantic coast and achieved several significant victories in the early months of the rebellion. Relying principally on the firepower of repeating rifles and a battery of four mountain guns, Portuguese soldiers overpowered insurgents armed mainly with muzzle loading rifles. The Ovimbundu initially had used wooden fortifications for both offensive and defensive operations and creatively exploited local terrain features to conduct successful ambushes. Ovimbundu resistance surprised the Portuguese, who were obliged to pursue residual insurgent forces into remote hills and mountains for the next two years. The Portuguese governor general's postwar account of the uprising referred to the Bailundu "revolution," a tacit acknowledgment of Mutu ya Kavela's plans to end Portugal's political and commercial presence in the Ovimbundu kingdoms.⁷

Jonas Savimbi's grandfather Sakaita participated in the Bailundu Rebellion, but his reminiscences imparted a slightly different analysis of the insurgency's most decisive factors. Sakaita insisted that an inadequate supply of gunpowder ultimately undermined the revolt, not Portuguese firepower.⁸ The 1902–4 rebellion remained a vibrant reference point in the memories of subsequent Ovimbundu generations. In 1957, a Portuguese police unit's discovery of an arms cache in a village of the Bimbe people, one of the last clans to be defeated, had prompted a wave of rumors that the Bimbe would soon lead a new Ovimbundu rebellion.⁹ Combined with the memory of other twentieth-century revolts, particularly in south-central and southwestern Angola, most of the colony's inhabitants had a heritage that modern Angolan nationalists could call on to inspire a new generation of militants. Savimbi and his contemporaries could readily have evoked the memories of Queen Nzinga, Tulante Bula, Mutu ya Kavela and others, much as Mao Zedong sought to arouse his contemporaries when he reminded them that China "with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the . . . forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered the . . . people."¹⁰

Upon his return to Angola in 1966, Jonas Savimbi could also have usefully echoed Mao's characterization of China as "a vast country with great resources . . . a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All these factors favor a protracted war; they all favor the application of mobile warfare and guerrilla operations."¹¹ Like their Chinese mentors, Angolan insurgents operated in a large country whose boundaries contained an area of some 1,246,700 square kilometers,

a territory with the combined size of Belgium, France, and Spain. With 4,830,440 inhabitants in 1960, however, it was lightly populated with an overall density of less than ten people per square kilometer.¹² Stretching across more than ten degrees of latitude, the country contained tropical rain forests in the northwest and Cabinda. Angola's central plateau consisted of highland savannas and steppes, while large tracts of sandy soils and scattered thin forests covered much of the southeast.¹³ The country's vast and sparsely populated interior was distant and difficult to reach from its coastal cities. Using forced labor and little heavy equipment, Portuguese administrators had managed to develop a 33,000-kilometer road network by the middle of the twentieth century but, by 1960, only 725 kilometers were paved. An additional 3,000 miles of unpaved "first class highway" were unusable during the October to May rainy season.¹⁴ The country's rail system had 3,670 kilometers of track dedicated primarily to three major rail lines running east from Luanda, Benguela, and Mocamedes (later Namibe). Only the Benguela line connected Angola to another nation's rail system, linking it to Congo (Kinshasa).¹⁵

Five years after they launched their campaigns, FNLA and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerrillas had failed to fully exploit the opportunities that Angola's terrain offered. Insurgent activity had a direct impact on only some 20 percent of Angola's national territory by 1965. FNLA combatants operated in a 250-by-330-kilometer zone in the northwest.¹⁶ MPLA insurgents' hit and run raids barely reached several kilometers inside Cabinda. The secessionist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) further complicated already problematic MPLA and FNLA relations with their Congolese patrons in Kinshasa and Brazzaville.¹⁷ FLEC's low-level campaign seemed to enjoy greater popular support than either of its nationalist rivals but also posed no serious threat to Portuguese rule. The Cabindan separatist cause also suffered from some of the same factional tendencies that undermined the FNLA and MPLA.¹⁸ Portugal's ability to geographically confine their opponents' military operations reduced the guerrillas' access to densely populated regions where they would ultimately have to mobilize and recruit supporters if they hoped to alter a military balance that consistently favored Lisbon in the mid-1960s.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

Savimbi's plans to establish the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola's easternmost regions coincided with favorable geopolitical trends elsewhere in Africa, particularly the defeat of Moïse Tshombé's two-year Katangan secession campaign in southern Congo and the independence of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). The emergence of new African governments sympathetic to Angola's struggle for independence offered the possibility of extending rear bases and supply lines previously limited to Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Not surprisingly, the MPLA and FNLA also perceived an opportunity to expand their area of operations.¹⁹

Savimbi had laid the groundwork for new military fronts in eastern Angola before he resigned his position as the FNLA's foreign secretary. Upon the completion of his Chinese training, Savimbi established a "Direct Action Preparatory Committee" in January 1966. Based in Lusaka, Zambia, Savimbi drew early support from Angolan students, disaffected Ovimbundu members of the FNLA, and members of several ethnic self-help associations who represented eastern Angola's Chokwe, Luena, and Luchaze peoples, some of whom previously had affiliated with the Angolan Peoples Union (UPA) and FNLA. Building on this core group, Savimbi and 67 supporters left Zambia and walked some 250 kilometers into eastern Angola to meet with other sympathizers, near the village of Muangai where UNITA was established on March 13, 1966. During the Muangai Conference, which lasted nearly three weeks, UNITA members agreed on a constitution and selected a provisional central committee that laid the groundwork for a general assembly whose members elected a permanent national central committee.²⁰

Before they could launch a "revolutionary" guerrilla war, UNITA's founding members had to answer Mao's question: "How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war?"²¹ Participants at the Muangai Conference emphasized independence, anticolonialism, and anti-imperialism. Neither the MPLA nor FNLA would likely have challenged these goals. Comparable commitments to economic and social reform also should have motivated their fellow Angolans equally to join or support UNITA, MPLA, and FNLA in their campaign to spark a popular war for independence. Bridging the gap between ideas and action, however, proved as difficult for UNITA as it had for the MPLA and FNLA. Unlike the initial intensity of the Congolese rebellion launched by Pierre Mulele, the spark Savimbi hoped would ignite a similar bonfire of guerrilla warfare barely yielded a smoldering flame in Angola's remote forests for the next seven years.

In the first six months after the Muangai meetings, UNITA combatants sabotaged only a handful of small economic targets in remote rural areas.²² UNITA eventually launched a strenuous military campaign nine months after its formal establishment. Their delay partially reflected a decision to prepare a formally armed and trained military wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA), buttressed by politically motivated civilian supporters. UNITA's belated entry into the struggle for Angolan independence was not deemed worthy of support by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU's African Liberation Committee alternately backed the FNLA and MPLA as their politico-military fortunes waxed and waned in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although UNITA press statements announcing early military operations revealed an eagerness to portray their insurgency as a genuine Angolan nationalist movement, this fervor was not always matched by a competent implementation of the lessons they had learned in China.

By December 1966, UNITA had managed to arm only a few hundred guerrillas. On December 4, 1966, Savimbi led some sixty insurgents in an attack on Cassamba, a small but well-defended logging town in eastern Angola. The guerrillas had not gathered accurate intelligence concerning the perimeter

defenses and stormed a position whose several hundred occupants outnumbered and outgunned their attackers. Savimbi pressed the assault despite last-minute reservations by one of his Chinese-trained colleagues who cited Mao to support his argument that they disengage. UNITA withdrew after both sides had sustained limited casualties. Savimbi later acknowledged that the failed attack violated many of the precepts he and his commanders had studied in China.²³ UNITA's next large operation, on December 25, 1966, targeted Teixeira de Sousa (renamed Luau after independence), a Portuguese outpost on the Angola-Zaire border. Like the battle at Cassamba, however, the insurgents' enthusiasm was not matched by a comparable degree of forethought. Two of Savimbi's Chinese-trained commanders committed several hundred combatants, perhaps a majority of the five hundred to one thousand armed insurgents available to UNITA at that time. The garrison's defenders repulsed UNITA, killing some one hundred to three hundred guerrillas.²⁴ Some of UNITA's early military operations resembled those undertaken by Mulele's insurgents, who also were gunned down in large assaults on well-defended garrisons and towns.

UNITA also struggled, in its first year, with the same challenge of adapting rather than compromising Mao's guerrilla war precepts. Savimbi's emphasis on independence, "revolution," and anti-imperialism were tempered, in a sometimes awkward manner, by an accommodation of magico-religious traditions. UNITA combatants involved in some of the earliest attacks relied on rituals designed to make participants bulletproof.²⁵ Similarly, UNITA's December 1966 attack at Teixeira de Sousa reminded at least one observer of UPA's operations five years earlier, when Holden Roberto's forces allegedly were drugged and led into battle by a "woman witch doctor."²⁶

Some of Savimbi's early supporters credited him with "magical powers," including the ability to fly or "touch his beard and make the Portuguese disappear," among others.²⁷ Savimbi, unlike Mulele, did not seem to promote these impressions, nor did they ever assume a central role in accounting for the charismatic image Savimbi enjoyed over the following decades.²⁸ Rather than exaggerate or suppress it, Savimbi's accommodation of traditional culture and religion was designed to supplement the imported notion of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. In UNITA's early years, Savimbi and his colleagues used traditional cultural and social references primarily to facilitate political communications with rural Angolans who originally might have been wary of UNITA's Maoist-inspired messages. His synthesis of traditional beliefs and an imported modern strategy nevertheless proved to be a fragile blend that Savimbi could not take for granted, and sustaining that balance ultimately proved to be one of many critical challenges to his leadership in the postcolonial era.

The acquisition of adequate arms and funds posed an equally daunting challenge for Savimbi in the early phases of UNITA's guerrilla campaign. Savimbi's meetings with Egypt's Gamal Nasser, prior to UNITA's establishment in 1966, led to contacts with the Aref regime, which ruled Iraq from 1963 to 1968. President Aref provided a modest quantity of arms, ammunition, and funds to UNITA.²⁹ China likewise made a limited financial contribution, perhaps less

than \$20,000 between 1966 and the early 1970s.³⁰ UNITA nonetheless faced chronic weapons shortages throughout the late 1960s; their early efforts to mobilize supporters in eastern Angola were frustrated, in part, because they could not provide weapons to civilians sympathetic to UNITA's program.³¹

Command and control problems compounded the logistic shortfalls that plagued UNITA's early operations. UNITA's late 1966 defeat at Teixeira de Sousa forced the guerrillas to modify their tactics and concentrate on smaller targets. The Benguela railroad, which transported Zambian and Congolese copper to the port of Lobito, could more easily be attacked by lightly armed insurgents but it also held political risks for UNITA. During a February 1967 visit to Zambia, President Kaunda told Savimbi that he would officially recognize UNITA if the insurgents agreed not to sabotage the Benguela rail line. Kaunda also insisted that UNITA not operate political cells in Zambia and that both Angolan refugees and Zambian citizens should be excluded from UNITA activities inside Zambia. Savimbi accepted Kaunda's terms but asked for a three-month grace period so that couriers could deliver these orders to UNITA's main base in western Moxico Province.³²

Savimbi then departed Zambia to attend a conference in Egypt. One month later, UNITA forces struck the Benguela rail line twice, derauling trains and blocking Zambian mineral exports. Portuguese officials closed the line for several weeks, indicating they might consider even longer shutdowns if additional attacks occurred. Lisbon's threat to Zambia had immediate consequences for UNITA. In June 1967, Zambian officials arrested Savimbi when he revisited Lusaka. Kaunda ordered Savimbi's expulsion from Zambia after six days in prison, forcing him to return to Egypt where he remained until 1968. Savimbi secretly returned to Angola, via Zambia, in June 1968 with the assistance of South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) members who, in 1966, also had begun to rely on Zambia as a rear base for their war against the South African-administered former German colony South West Africa.³³

Savimbi's brief exile and UNITA's difficult relationship with Zambia exacerbated the insurgents' weapons and supply shortages. UNITA was unable to provide weapons for nearly half of its armed wing that purportedly had grown to include several thousand members, although Portuguese officials estimated the force may have comprised as few as three hundred guerrillas.³⁴ By late 1968, logistics shortfalls began to undermine the morale of its combatants, some of whom questioned Savimbi's leadership. Shortly after returning to Angola from his year in exile, in mid-1968, he found UNITA divided into three loosely aligned groups of combatants led by Samuel Chiwale, Paulino Moises, and Samuel "Kafundanga" Chingungi. Savimbi's return was not universally welcomed. Although he did not publicly identify his assailants, or the reason for their attack, Savimbi belatedly acknowledged that three shots were fired at him in September 1968, in an apparent assassination attempt. Savimbi survived the challenge to his leadership, but subsequent setbacks further delayed his efforts to address UNITA's serious organizational and material shortcomings.³⁵ In November 1968, UNITA commander Samuel Chyala and

some 150 armed insurgents defected to FNLA guerrillas who recently had launched operations along the Angola-Zaire border. This was a particularly embarrassing loss to Savimbi. Chyala originally had trained with the FNLA and Savimbi had included Chyala in the initial contingents he sent to China for training.³⁶ In April 1969, yet another commander, Tiago Sachilombo, and a small group of UNITA guerrillas defected to the Portuguese. Sachilombo also had been part of the original Chinese-trained UNITA contingent.³⁷

Savimbi gradually reorganized his dispirited colleagues and by late 1969, after a few successful attacks on Portuguese military convoys, UNITA's survival seemed assured. Savimbi's yearlong exile from Angola had included a brief visit to China, where Mao offered advice on establishing a base of operations that eventually proved to be critical to UNITA's long term survival. Mao persuaded his Angolan student to select a base camp in eastern Angola that contained rivers, streams, forests, and ready access to the Zairian and Zambian borders. He insisted that an insurgent leader always needed to be based near an international frontier. Mao argued against Savimbi's initial inclination to move into the mountainous areas of Angola's more densely populated central highlands because he anticipated Portugal's ability to encircle the insurgents and cut them off from cross border havens. Adhering to his mentor's advice, Savimbi established a secure base in the remote Lungue Bungo River valley area of western Moxico Province less than a year after his return to Angola.³⁸

Savimbi's forces nonetheless remained poorly armed, with a mixture of Belgian FN, Portuguese manufactured G3s, antiquated Mauser rifles, and, like Pierre Mulele's Kwilu insurgents, were required to supplement their armories with bows and arrows. Moreover, betrayals and defections by a few key leaders continued to undermine the group. A commander who opted to become a Portuguese police informant, in 1970, enabled colonial authorities to disrupt and arrest a clandestine network of several hundred UNITA supporters in Nova Lisboa (later renamed Huambo) and Luso (renamed Luena). In 1972, Samuel Muanangola, another of the 12 original Nanjing Academy trainees, defected to the FNLA.³⁹

Deprived of OAU assistance and precluded from operating out of Zambia, UNITA increasingly emphasized a strategy of political mobilization and economic self-sufficiency. From 1969 to 1974, UNITA leaders focused on building a more elaborate organizational structure and the propagation of its message to potential supporters. The movement's Second (1969) and Third Party Congress (1973) organized village level councils into larger groupings (sectors), which composed an overarching "People's Assembly." Party branches and military zones likewise formed part of what several authors described as a "pyramidal" structure capped by a Central Committee and a Political Bureau. UNITA eventually established a women's organization and a youth branch, as well as operating modest collective agriculture programs, health clinics, and schools, all of which suggested a faithful, if rather modest, application of the Maoist model of guerrilla warfare.⁴⁰ Although internal opposition to Savimbi's

leadership slowly subsided, UNITA nevertheless faced mounting challenges from fellow Angolan nationalists as well as Portuguese authorities.

COMPETITION IN A VACUUM

The Zambian and Tanzanian governments had encouraged all three Angolan insurgent movements to expand their logistics networks and areas of operation. The prospective advantages of diversified supply lines were significantly offset, however, by eastern Angola's sparse population, leaving a large but very shallow "sea" in which guerrilla "fish" could swim. Moxico, Cuando Cubango, and Lunda Provinces made up nearly half of Angola's land mass but contained less than 20 percent of its population. All three insurgencies had vast areas through which they could move forces and establish remote base camps far from Portuguese military garrisons. While these large regions, with their rudimentary road system and infrastructures, permitted guerrilla units almost unfettered mobility, the footpaths that traversed the local forests and savannas usually led to very small groups of potential members and sympathizers.

MPLA guerrillas launched their first military operations in eastern Angola on May 18, 1966. Agostinho Neto and other MPLA officials had painstakingly established a logistics network leading from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania west through Lusaka, Zambia. Zambian president Kaunda and Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere eventually permitted MPLA recruits to transit Lusaka and Dar es Salaam to and from Eastern Europe for training. MPLA political cadres found many willing recruits and, by 1968, the party's military wing, the *Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (EPLA) had deployed some five hundred combatants, armed with rifles, machine guns, and land mines, into eastern Angola.⁴¹

EPLA operations gradually spread to the west and south, emphasizing attacks on small Portuguese convoys and the cutting of roads and bridges. Organizing their combatants into regions, zones, sectors, and groups, some 1,000 MPLA insurgents had built 95 bases in Moxico Province while another 895 guerrillas were operating out of 68 bases in Cuando Cubango Province. MPLA forces had pushed west to the Cuanza River in Bie Province, by 1970, at the edge of the central highlands. Additional cadres advanced to the Cubango River, on the eastern reaches of Huila and Cunene Provinces.⁴² The MPLA's 2,000 combatants had enlarged their "Eastern Front" to an area of more than 166,000 square kilometers, reaching some 580 kilometers inside eastern Angola.⁴³

MPLA successes reflected a series of effective organizational reforms in the late 1960s, which stressed a close coordination of political and military functions at the upper levels of the movement's command structure.⁴⁴ Portuguese troops captured training films that indicated Asian rather than Latin American models of guerrilla warfare were guiding the MPLA's emergence as the most potent insurgency threatening Lisbon's control of Angola. Their celebrated 1965 meeting with Che Guevara notwithstanding, MPLA leader

Lucio Lara later acknowledged that the "MPLA programme, [was] strongly influenced by the Vietnamese experience. Obviously we also studied their military tactics, their concepts of peoples' war."⁴⁵

MPLA commanders probably found the treatises of General Vo Nguyen Giap to be among the most influential accounts of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. Giap's writings on insurgency, much like Guevara's, reveal a pervasive Maoist influence. General Giap emphasized the importance of "long term resistance" and the necessity of mobilizing and organizing "the masses."⁴⁶ Giap's experience nevertheless held out the hope of a relatively rapid and decisive implementation of guerrilla strategy and tactics. The Viet Minh's stunning 1954 victory over French colonial forces at Dien Bien Phu demonstrated that a single large battle could significantly shorten a protracted war of attrition. Giap also was aware of Dien Bien Phu's wider significance, noting in 1961 that "history will record it as one of the crucial events in the great movement of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who are rising up to liberate themselves."⁴⁷

The MPLA's increasingly successful eastern campaign, and the 1968 announcement that Marcello Caetano would replace Portugal's ailing prime minister Salazar, engendered expectations of a near-term political/military resolution of the nine-year war.⁴⁸ The MPLA's progress heartened its supporters and alarmed Portuguese officials, who acknowledged in 1970 that guerrilla operations were occurring in 40 percent of Angola, a significant rise from 1965–66 estimates that less than 20 percent of the colony's territory was affected. Daniel Chipenda, commander of MPLA forces in the east, claimed in 1969 that the party's armed wing, EPLA, had begun to operate as a semiconventional force, organized into columns of 150 combatants. Chipenda anticipated the imminent deployment of conventional units and advocated a strategy of nationwide military activity rather than the consolidation of the MPLA's gains in the east. Emphasizing the necessity of a generalized struggle that took advantage of Angola's huge rural areas, Chipenda warned that "if we prematurely concentrate our forces in one or two regions, it will be very difficult for us."⁴⁹ Chipenda's reasoning evidently persuaded EPLA commanders who committed more than a thousand insurgents, in late 1971, to an offensive designed to expand their area of operations north into Lunda Province and west toward Bie Province.⁵⁰

The MPLA campaign followed the Vietnamese model to a point where Giap's views on warfare diverged from those of Mao Zedong. Giap and Mao placed strikingly different emphases on the relationship between offensive and defensive operations. Mao had highlighted the importance of "strategic withdrawal" and the need for a guerrilla leader to know when to shift from offensive to defensive measures.⁵¹ Giap placed much less emphasis on defense; instead he repeatedly preferred to underscore "the strategic offensive ideology . . . in revolutionary war." Although he briefly conceded that revolutionary war "may be in a defensive position . . . this defensive position is only partial and temporary."⁵² Giap frequently stressed the notion that "our military art is permeated with the idea of active attack" and "in the

adoption of different forms of fighting, including offensive and defensive, major attention is given to offense . . . the defense is merely a function to insure that the majority of our forces carry out the offensive."⁵³

The MPLA's efforts to emulate the Viet Minh experience of the early 1950s did not achieve a comparable degree of success. Questionable tactics during their 1971 offensive and a stiff Portuguese response resulted in the death of some 1,500 to 2,000 EPLA combatants and, by late 1972, colonial officials estimated that insurgent strength in eastern Angola was less than half of the total recorded in 1970. A late 1973 Russian assessment by an official involved in Moscow's aid program for the MPLA, likewise estimated the insurgents' force had fallen from 5,000 to 3,000 troops.⁵⁴ Arguably, the MPLA had succumbed to what Mao Zedong had called "military adventurism" or the error of underestimating the enemy.⁵⁵ MPLA political and military fortunes declined significantly after 1972.

The movement's military failings were compounded by additional internal crises. Desertions and the defection of at least one commander revealed persistent administrative and other problems, some of which already had surfaced in the Giboia Revolt of 1969, when several hundred MPLA guerrillas deserted their Angolan camps and reappeared at Zambian bases. The mutineers protested arbitrary executions of civilians on allegations of treason and witchcraft as well as other abuses by EPLA field commanders.⁵⁶ Unresolved personal and ideological disputes prompted Daniel Chipenda to break with Agostinho Neto in late 1972 and lead 1,500 followers into what became known as the "Eastern Revolt." In an effort to stabilize what remained of the MPLA, Neto transferred some 800 loyalists from eastern Angola to Brazzaville, Congo, but subsequent efforts to reinforce MPLA units in Cabinda and northwestern Angola failed. As a result, EPLA commanders restricted their campaign in the east to limited operations along the Zambian border. Disappointed by the MPLA's military shortcomings and its internal collapse, the Soviet Union and the OAU suspended their military and financial aid programs.⁵⁷

Holden Roberto's effort to open up a second front in Angola's vast eastern regions ultimately proved equally as fruitless as that of the MPLA. By 1968 FNLA cadres had established a base in Zaire's Shaba Province and began cross border operations into northern Moxico and Lunda Provinces. Roberto's forces failed to establish a network of bases as extensive as those employed by UNITA or the MPLA, however, and they remained overly reliant on their rear base in Zaire. FNLA guerrillas were forced to use increasingly long and vulnerable logistics lines, which enabled them to support only three hundred insurgents inside eastern Angola by 1970. A brief surge of activity in northeastern diamond mining areas and the appearance of FNLA cadres in Bie and Malanje Provinces signaled the emergence of a more potent force, but expectations of a large FNLA 1970 campaign proved to be short-lived. Beset by some of the same leadership and logistics problems that had prompted Savimbi's 1964 split, FNLA commanders in Zaire staged a brief rebellion against Roberto in early 1972, requiring the intercession of his patron, President Mobutu, before it was finally squelched.⁵⁸

The FNLA's hopes revived slightly in mid-1972, due largely to a reorganization and resupply of Roberto's forces. However, most FNLA cadres remained at their base at Kinkuzu, Zaire, rather than operating inside Angola. After 12 years of insurgency, only two thousand FNLA guerrillas were regularly active in northwestern Angola, while Roberto may have held as many as four thousand more in reserve in Zaire.⁵⁹ A renewed Chinese interest in Angola, spurred largely by shifting relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, briefly benefited the FNLA. Roberto's newfound fondness for Beijing, however, was motivated by the promise of Chinese weapons and supplies, not by Maoist theories of guerrilla warfare. By the early 1970s all three Angolan insurgencies had managed only a rudimentary implementation of the guerrilla warfare doctrines offered by a variety of mentors, espousing complementary or competing strategies.

A STUBBORN OPPONENT

The time and place of UPA's and MPLA's early 1961 attacks may have surprised Portuguese colonial authorities, but Lisbon was not entirely unprepared for a military challenge. Alarmed by the potential spillover effect of large protests and political rallies in the Belgian Congo in early 1959, Portugal deployed a small air force contingent and some two thousand soldiers to Angola. These contingents supplemented a modest one-thousand-troop garrison in a colony whose security forces had not engaged in serious combat since World War I.⁶⁰ Nervous European settlers also had armed themselves. In 1959 Angola imported 156 tons of arms and ammunition. One year later, the figure had grown to 953 tons.⁶¹ Vengeance and retaliation, more than a carefully designed counterinsurgency strategy, dictated the initial response to the 1961 attacks in Luanda and UPA's incursions into northwestern Angola. Portuguese air strikes, coupled with repeated counterinsurgency sweeps, gradually reestablished colonial administration, limiting the areas within which guerrillas could operate. Some 150,000 Angolans fled to neighboring Congo. The Portuguese settlers' and soldiers' brutal counterresponse was conducted with no thought given to winning the hearts and minds of local civilians, and inflicted death and destruction on many innocent residents of the northwest.

Portuguese security forces had many approaches to choose from in responding to the threat of guerrilla warfare and eventually managed to devise a fairly comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. A handful of Portuguese military officers, invited to attend British and French training courses in 1959, had absorbed the lessons of their host's recent military experiences in Malaya and Algeria. Mao Zedong's and Giap's writings on guerrilla war were carefully studied and assessed in Portuguese Army training manuals.⁶² Che Guevara's thoughts on guerrilla warfare also were avidly read and, in Angola, observers noted the emergence of an admiring "Guevara cult" among some Portuguese soldiers.⁶³ Portuguese officers also maintained that they had gained valuable insights by examining earlier counterinsurgency campaigns

in the Philippines. Demonstrating an appreciation for the “eternal” strategic and tactical lessons to be derived from military history, a Portuguese colonel declared to a journalist, “Nothing which [guerrillas] propagate at present was not known or put into operation in some earlier war. Read Ptolemy and Caesar and you will see what I mean. Che Guevara, for instance, knew nothing which T. E. Lawrence did not record in his subsequent writings about his own experiences in the desert war or what was practiced against Napoleon by the Spanish guerrillas a hundred years before.”⁶⁴

On the eve of the 1961 UPA offensive, Portugal’s colonial garrisons contained some 6,500 soldiers, including 1,500 Europeans and 5,000 locally recruited Angolan troops.⁶⁵ Field commanders abandoned outlying Angolan settlements and fell back to more defensible towns and district capitals in the first weeks of the insurgency. Nearly two months passed before Lisbon sent reinforcements to Angola to support a counteroffensive. In mid-May 1961, two Portuguese battalions, augmented by volunteer colonial militias, pushed east and north from Luanda. By October 7, 1961, all the major towns previously overrun by UPA forces had been reoccupied and the governor-general claimed the reassertion of colonial control over northwestern Angola.⁶⁶

Portugal’s military offensive had more in common with nineteenth-century campaigns of occupation and colonization than they shared with modern French or British counterinsurgency warfare. Newly arrived Portuguese troops had no previous combat experience. Their commanders’ principal aim was to relieve encircled garrisons still anticipating renewed UPA assaults. Colonial forces initially lacked the capability to pursue insurgents into the surrounding countryside. The troop strength necessary to protect some 1,500 plantations required the mustering of volunteer paramilitary forces to perform this duty on an ad hoc basis.

As they gradually advanced into the northwest, reinforced conventional forces destroyed numerous villages suspected of harboring UPA sympathizers. Ground attack aircraft indiscriminately fired rockets and dropped napalm on guerrilla camps as well as refugees. Portuguese officers had to restrain some local settlers who sought the slaughter of nearly all Africans they encountered.⁶⁷ Portugal opted for superior firepower, principally artillery and air strikes, against lightly armed insurgents, rather than innovative counterinsurgency tactics in order to regain lost ground. Portuguese losses included 134 killed, out of a force that had grown to nearly forty thousand by the end of 1961. Residual UPA insurgents fled to Congo (Kinshasa) or slipped into the forests to resume sporadic, low-level, hit-and-run attacks.⁶⁸

UPA’s lack of a well-thought-out guerrilla strategy eased Portugal’s task of reoccupying the northwest. Lisbon denounced UPA as an invading force and challenged its identity as an insurgent movement with political roots in the Angolan countryside. Portuguese officials also exhibited a blunt and one-dimensional response to the threat. Newly appointed governor general Deslandes declared, on June 17 1961, “[W]e can offer one alternative to the terrorist hordes—either unconditional surrender or they will be annihilated.”⁶⁹ A military spokesman later acknowledged that he and his colleagues

“have taken our lessons not only from the French experience in Indochina and North Africa, but also from the methods used by the German Army in combating the resistance movements in France and Russia” during World War II.⁷⁰

The Salazar regime nevertheless felt compelled to introduce a limited number of cosmetic reforms in the aftermath of its successful offensive. Skeptics argued that Lisbon was primarily concerned with deflecting adverse international opinion and a growing sentiment in the United Nations calling for more pressure on Portugal to grant independence to its colonies. Lisbon abolished the mandatory planting of cotton in the Cassange area where “Maria’s War” had erupted in early 1961. The metropole scrapped legislation that had distinguished between *indigenas* and Portuguese citizens. Angolans who previously had been differentiated by labels such as “civilized” and “uncivilized” were suddenly made equal under a series of new laws ending the practice of forced labor that had replaced the contract labor of earlier decades. Planned reforms called for an enlarged education system to benefit a broader spectrum of the student population. Colonial authority was, nominally, decentralized and three additional Angolan representatives were added to the National Assembly.⁷¹

Portugal also continued low-level military operations against suspected infiltration routes across the Congo (Kinshasa) border. In 1963, evidence that the FNLA had trained new recruits for a possible large-scale offensive obliged Portuguese officials to implement a more elaborate political/military strategy. Lisbon’s military planners grudgingly applied some of the lessons learned from their British and French colleagues. Colonial officials authorized the construction of new villages that contained medical and educational facilities. Some of the estimated 270,000 inhabitants who had fled into nearby forests rather than seek exile in Congo (Kinshasa) decided to return, enticed by offers of land and supplemental agricultural assistance. Moreover, local officials ensured that returnees were paid prices for their commodities equal to those offered to Portuguese settlers. Although doubts remained about the sincerity of Portugal’s commitment to reform, the social and economic programs of the early 1960s contributed to a rapid improvement of the security situation in the north.⁷²

Portuguese colonists, however, still articulated attitudes that echoed World War II German strategies rather than British and French approaches to guerrilla warfare. In 1966 Portuguese settlers claimed that departing governor general Silvino Silverio Marques had been too sympathetic to the African population.⁷³ Similar opinions prevailed when UNITA and MPLA opened up their new eastern Angolan fronts in late 1966. As fighting spread, local inhabitants fled to Zambia and Botswana. Fearing that the refugees, as well as inhabitants who stayed behind, would provide additional recruits for both insurgencies, Portuguese troops began, sometimes forcibly, to resettle the widely dispersed population into *aldeamentos* (“strategic villages”). These projects were inspired by the “New Villages” built by British forces during the Malay insurgency and the “Strategic Hamlets” constructed by American forces in South Vietnam.

By the early 1970s, more than one million Angolans, nearly one-fifth of the population, had been gathered inside these rural settlements.⁷⁴

Portuguese officers had learned from French manuals, based on 1950s counterinsurgency campaigns in Algeria, the need for “psychological action” to cultivate civilian loyalty. Strategy dictated that the insulation of civilians from contact with guerrillas must be combined with the delivery of food, medicine, education and other social services.⁷⁵ Lisbon proclaimed its intention to provide these services and also sought to organize self-defense forces in newly built villages. Colonial authorities also deployed mobile health units to provide supplementary preventive medical assistance.⁷⁶

Portugal’s strategic planners experienced critical gaps between the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Civic action programs in the *aldeamentos* suffered from quantitative as well as qualitative deficiencies. The number of civil servants available to serve in Angola’s remote eastern districts declined after 1961. More than half of Angola’s villages had no schools in 1971 and many schools were empty due to personnel shortages. Medical programs also suffered from a lack of health care professionals available for assignments to eastern Angola. Moreover, soil and water pollution, combined with other poor sanitation practices, led to diminished rather than improved health in many strategic villages. The displacement of eastern Angola’s rural population also removed residents from farms where they had raised subsistence and commercial crops. Agricultural output in the fortified settlements never matched earlier yields and, by the early 1970s, the civilian population’s food shortages were becoming as severe as their medical and educational needs.⁷⁷

Portugal’s weak demographic and financial position did not deter the Salazar regime from pursuing even more grandiose plans to enhance its counterinsurgency strategy. The rapid construction, beginning in 1967, of *aldeamentos* was matched by an equally extensive development of *reordenamentos rural* (rural resettlements), primarily in central Angola. These settlements sought to promote economic development and, because they were distant from active insurgent areas, generally served limited military purposes beyond the immediate aim of regrouping potentially targeted populations in more easily controlled areas. Portugal hoped to add *colonatos de soldados* (soldier settlements) for ex-servicemen on contiguous farms in areas considered to be strategically vital, as a third critical layer in this counterinsurgent infrastructure.⁷⁸ Discouraged by the fact that only some 4,800 Portuguese ex-soldiers had settled in Angola between 1962 and 1967,⁷⁹ the Salazar government sought to make the colony more alluring to its military veterans and others who had resisted earlier programs aimed at enlarging Angola’s white population.

Lisbon also solicited South African support to realize the hydroelectric and agricultural potential of the Cunene River that flowed south from Angola’s central highlands to form the western end of the border with South West Africa (later Namibia). South African studies of the Cunene area, conducted in the early 1960s, had indicated that nearby irrigation schemes could create conditions suitable for large livestock ventures comparable to those found in Argentina. Additional studies revealed that the northern reaches of the

Cunene offered an excellent environment for a forestation program large enough to support a paper industry.⁸⁰ Pretoria and Lisbon signed preliminary agreements in 1967 and 1968, followed by a formal treaty in 1969, containing elaborate plans for the development of the Cunene River valley. A key feature of the scheme called for the construction of the Gove Dam on the Cunene just south of Nova Lisboa (later Huambo), which would create a reservoir seventy kilometers long and thirty kilometers wide to regulate the water flow along the length of the Cunene, a distance of approximately seven hundred kilometers. The dam was to be the foundation of a larger system of 28 hydroelectric power stations that would support economic development plans in South West Africa and south central Angola. The first phase of the project, scheduled for completion in the mid-1970s, also called for the construction of a dam at Calueque and a hydroelectric power station at the Ruacana Falls, along the South West African–Angolan border.⁸¹

The Cunene project was expected to promote agriculture in an often drought-stricken area the size of Portugal. In the zones designated for eventual irrigation, roughly 150,000 hectares were to be utilized for mixed farming and another 350,000 hectares for cattle grazing areas. The most optimistic projections for this scheme anticipated it could draw as many as 500,000 Portuguese settlers.⁸² On the South West African side, canals from the Cunene would irrigate some 5.6 million hectares in the thickly settled Ovambo “homelands,” whose 270,000 inhabitants comprised more than a third of the territory’s population.⁸³ Timetables eventually lagged far behind plans for the Cunene River development scheme. Its potential contribution to Portugal’s counterinsurgency strategy gradually diminished in both significance and urgency, largely because the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA proved incapable of mounting a sustained military threat. Lisbon instead grew increasingly reliant on an approach to guerrilla warfare, which emphasized coercing rather than co-opting its opponents.

AUXILIARIES AND ALLIES

Portugal had successfully enlisted a substantial number of Angolans, persuading many to serve in the ranks of the colony’s security forces. Ethnic, ideological, and racial divisions within and between the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA also alienated a large portion of Angola’s indigenous population. The guerrillas thereby limited their pool of potential combatants and frequently enabled Portugal to recruit additional African troops. Military forces in the colony grew from less than 10,000 to some 70,000 by 1970, which included 10,000–15,000 African conscripts. A police force variously estimated at 7,000–10,000 and at least 3,500 paramilitary volunteers supplemented the colony’s conventional forces. After the Angolan insurgent threat stalled in the early 1970s, Portugal redeployed several thousand troops to Mozambique, which faced a growing threat from the insurgent Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Additional African troops partially offset the loss of Portuguese contingents, and by 1973, Angola’s

60,000-member army included 34,500 African conscripts, supplemented by an additional 30,000 paramilitary members drawn from many of the strategic villages and rural settlements.⁸⁴

Defections from the ranks of all three Angolan guerrilla movements also provided additional recruits for the colonial forces. Portuguese officials assimilated some of these recruits into unique and highly trained units. These troops supplemented a small cadre of special purpose forces whose value the Salazar regime had anticipated long before the insurgents launched their initial attacks. French campaigns in Algeria had inspired Portugal to begin training *Commandos* or *Commandos Africanos*. In 1960, three *Companhias de Caçadores Especiais* (Special Hunter Companies) were trained and deployed to Angola.⁸⁵ These units eventually were supplemented, in 1965, when the FNLA's armaments minister, Alexander Taty, defected along with some 1,200 combatants. Portuguese authorities enlisted half of this contingent and established the first *Tropas Especiais* (Special Troops, or TE). The TE units were outfitted as lightly armed forces and equipped with Soviet Bloc weapons. Their operations initially were confined to the northwestern provinces of Uige and Zaire and the Cabinda enclave. A TE battalion also was deployed to the eastern front after 1966 and additional recruits enlarged the ranks of the TEs, which were formed into four battalions, each with five hundred troops, by the early 1970s. Units comprising defectors or guerrilla prisoners who agreed to serve their captors also had deployed to active military fronts throughout Angola in the late 1960s. These contingents, known as *Grupos Especiais* (Special Groups, or GE) were officially included into the ranks of the Angolan Army in 1972. By 1974, ninety-nine distinct groups provided a supplemental force of slightly more than three thousand troops. Lisbon also created an elite commando unit of *flechas* (arrows) deployed in small platoon-sized formations as trackers or reconnaissance elements in Portuguese Army units. Guerrilla defectors eventually augmented this unit and, by 1974, some one thousand *flechas* had been trained.⁸⁶

Portugal enhanced its counterinsurgent capabilities by exploiting turmoil in neighboring Congo (Kinshasa). The Salazar government had expressed sympathy for Moïse Tshombe's Katangan secessionist movement almost immediately after Belgium granted independence to the Congo in June 1960. Tshombe went into exile in Spain after a United Nations peacekeeping contingent helped the Kinshasa government defeat the Katangan separatists by January 1963. In a shocking reversal of fortune, Tshombe returned to Kinshasa from exile in June 1964 to serve as Congo's prime minister. Portugal then revived its contacts with Tshombe, who agreed to constrain the FNLA's activities in its Congolese rear areas. This Portuguese-Congolese *modus vivendi* ended abruptly when General Mobutu ousted Tshombe in a late 1965 coup. Mobutu's subsequent repression of Katangan and other regionally based dissidents finally forced some 4,600 Katangan secessionists, in 1967, to cross the border and resettle in eastern Angola. Portuguese authorities organized an estimated 2,300 Katangan refugees into a three-battalion force. Each unit had a base in eastern Angola and the Katangans provided their own officers under

the leadership of General Nathaniel Mbumba. The local Portuguese commander directed their operations, many of which provided security for road-building teams. The Katangan force attracted additional recruits from the Congolese refugee population, and by 1974 at least 3,000 so-called Katangan *Feis* (faithful ones) served the cause of Portuguese colonialism.⁸⁷

The civil war and secession crises sparked by the independence of the Belgian Congo had been matched by a gradual crescendo of insurgent activity throughout southern Africa. This included African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) insurgencies in South Africa, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwean African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in Southern Rhodesia, SWAPO in South West Africa, and FRELIMO in Mozambique. Lisbon found common cause with white settlers in the Federation of Rhodesias (originally Northern and Southern Rhodesia—later Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (later Malawi), as well as white-ruled South Africa. Shared security concerns gradually led to military collaboration that augmented each regime's ability to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.

Portuguese prime minister Salazar met with Federation leader Roy Welensky and South African defense minister Fouché in July 1961, barely five months after the beginning of the MPLA and UPA's independence struggle.⁸⁸ The Federation's defense minister visited Luanda and Lisbon the following year. In April 1962 Kenneth Kaunda, head of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Northern Rhodesia, claimed that southern Africa's white regimes had signed a secret defense agreement. Pretoria denied the charge and Welensky argued that his administration could not enter into such an alliance without Britain's consent.⁸⁹ By 1963, South African Defense Force (SADF) and Portuguese personnel in Angola were exchanging intelligence and Lisbon subsequently appealed to Pretoria for military aid. South Africa agreed to loan limited quantities of military matériel.⁹⁰ Portuguese, South African, and Rhodesian police also collaborated "in the arrest and extradition of African students . . . Students from Angola and Mozambique [were] arrested and returned to Portuguese jails by agents of PIDE [Portuguese secret police] operating in the Rhodesias" and "Southern Rhodesian police . . . delivered 'illegal immigrants' back to South African authorities."⁹¹

Shortly after SWAPO launched its war for Namibian independence in August 1966, Portuguese security forces and PIDE operatives initiated joint operations with SADF and South African Police (SAP) personnel along the Angolan–South West African border. Portugal granted an SAP request for permission to conduct hot pursuit operations across the Angolan border, and by 1967 South African Air Force (SAAF) helicopters were flying from Angolan air bases.⁹² South Africa established a facility in Rundu, South West Africa, in May 1968 to coordinate air operations on behalf of SAP and Portuguese forces. An SAAF officer was assigned to Cuito Cuanavale, in southeastern Angola, to operate a joint air command post, and a liaison officer also served in Serpa Pinto (later Menongue) to facilitate air-to-ground operations with Portuguese units.⁹³ Portuguese and South African officers met frequently

after 1968. South Africa announced an agreement, shortly after a 1969 meeting between the Portuguese and South African defense ministers, to finance and augment Portuguese defenses around the Cunene River Dam project on the Angolan side of the border. In late 1970 and early 1971, Portuguese and South African troops deployed to the area in response to reports of a growing threat posed by Angolan-based insurgents.⁹⁴

From 1970 to 1974, allies, auxiliaries, and retrained defectors enabled Portugal to pursue counterinsurgency operations, which exploited its quantitative edge over Angola's three insurgent movements and partially compensated for the shortcomings of its *aldeamentos* program. General Costa Gomes was appointed the colony's new commander in chief, and General Bettencourt Rodrigues was put in command of the Eastern Military Zone. Gomes and Bettencourt Rodrigues implemented far-reaching reforms in the colony's security forces. The new generals emphasized a more aggressive strategy, which included annual dry season offensives and an increased reliance on air mobile operations supported by ground attack aircraft strikes against MPLA bases in eastern Angola. A 1970 campaign destroyed a key FNLA headquarters base in northern Angola, and a dry season offensive called *Siroco* inflicted significant casualties on MPLA combatants in eastern Angola. Additional aircraft were transferred to the east in 1972 to help ground forces counter larger, semiconventional MPLA units. Portuguese forces launched Operation Attila and several additional successful offensives against MPLA logistics lines in Moxico and Cuando Cubango Provinces. Aircraft dropped herbicides and defoliants on crops planted by the insurgents or their civilian sympathizers. Special force units overran a vital MPLA base in the northwestern Dombos Forest. Counterinsurgency operations also continued into the rainy season, pressing the harried insurgents even harder. Colonial authorities claimed, by late 1972, to have killed twelve thousand insurgents, whereas Portugal acknowledged a loss of slightly more than one thousand soldiers.⁹⁵

An aggressive engineering effort also had improved the mobility of Portuguese forces. By 1974, road crews had completed approximately eight thousand kilometers of paved roads, linking all the colony's provincial capitals. Angola's road network had grown to nearly seventy thousand kilometers. This expansion included a nearly tenfold increase in the colony's paved roads and was almost twice the size of the entire road network in the early 1960s, enabling mechanized colonial forces to move more rapidly to Angola's remote eastern districts.⁹⁶ Lisbon also made greater use of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to deploy troops. Portugal's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allowed the Salazar regime to obtain aircraft from numerous suppliers. Between 1961 and 1964 the Portuguese air force acquired 150 Auster light aircraft from England. The West German government sold Portugal forty Fiat G91 fighter-bombers in 1966, as well as several dozen DO-27 reconnaissance and Noratlas transport planes between 1967 and 1969. Portugal also had acquired nearly 100 helicopters from France by 1969.⁹⁷ In the mid-1960s, Portugal had a fleet of more than 50 fixed-wing aircraft in Angola; the growing reliance on helicopters in the late

1960s probably enlarged the inventory to nearly a hundred aircraft.⁹⁸ None of Angola's three insurgent movements ever challenged Portugal's control of the skies and by 1974, Lisbon had lost only a few aircraft to ground fire.

PORTUGAL AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

The April 1974 coup in Lisbon, which ended nearly fifty years of authoritarian rule and led to the independence of Portugal's African colonies, has been described as the denouement of a typical "asymmetric conflict." Such struggles often pitted colonial powers against insurgent opponents throughout much of the Third World after World War II. The most noteworthy feature in such conflicts was "that although the metropolitan powers did not *win* militarily neither were they *defeated* militarily . . . In every case success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory . . . though military success may have been a contributory cause—but rather from a progressive attrition of their opponents' *political* capability to wage war. In such asymmetric conflicts insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate *or even defeat*."⁹⁹ Moreover, "the process of political attrition of the metropolitan power's capability to continue to wage war is *not* the consequence of errors of generalship . . . Rather . . . the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over the goals pursued by factions within the government . . . competing for state resources."¹⁰⁰

From this perspective, the April 1974 coup should not have come as a surprise, except perhaps in its timing. The roots of dissension inside Portugal could be traced back beyond the earliest stages of Angola's war for independence. The Salazar regime had already passed a key turning point in the 1958 presidential elections when its traditionally weak opposition, led by General Humberto Delgado, received a surprising 25 percent of the vote. The government reacted by abolishing direct suffrage in presidential elections. Shortly after the Angolan war erupted in 1961, students began to rally to the ranks of the opposition and Portugal soon experienced university student unrest, an almost unheard-of phenomenon in the previous 25 years of Salazar's rule.¹⁰¹ In March 1963, a new opposition group emerged under the banner of the Patriotic Front of National Liberation, with headquarters in Algiers. Nominally led by General Delgado, the front included a coalition of Portuguese exiles representing monarchist, republican, Roman Catholic, socialist, and Communist factions. Subsequent claims that the Patriotic Front had come to an understanding with the MPLA were quickly superseded, in 1964, by reports that the front had split into pro- and anti-Delgado factions.¹⁰²

Throughout the mid-1960s, internal opposition languished and hopes for gradual reform began to fade after the 1968 transfer of power from the aging and infirm Salazar to Marcello Caetano. Civilian and military dissent, however, slowly increased. Disaffected military personnel, in early 1971, probably assisted in the sabotage of an air force hanger at the Tancos Air Base, north of Lisbon, destroying 12 aircraft. This attack matched Lisbon's total aircraft

losses to insurgent ground fire in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau during the previous ten years.¹⁰³ The air base attack was the most dramatic incident in a series of subversive initiatives, dating from 1970, which included the setting of fires on troop and supply ships. Observers suspected disgruntled military or police personnel involvement.¹⁰⁴

Dissent also began to permeate the upper ranks of the Portuguese military. General Kaulza de Arriaga, former commander of forces in Mozambique, was implicated in an abortive coup attempt in early 1974. A last minute tip from General Antonio Spínola to Army Commander General Costa Gomes reportedly foiled the plot. The publication on February 22, 1974, of General Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future*, generated even more profound shock waves. Spínola was the first high-ranking Portuguese military officer to publicly state that the colonial wars could not be won militarily. He advocated a long-term political strategy that envisioned progressive autonomy for Portugal's colonies. The Caetano regime responded to the uproar caused by Spínola's book and, on March 15, demanded the sworn loyalty of its military forces. All ranking officers appeared publicly to pledge their loyalty, except for Spínola and Costa Gomes, who were promptly dismissed from their posts. Some two hundred Portuguese troops mutinied the following day. Loyal forces surrounded and captured the mutineers before they could march on Lisbon. Spínola and Costa Gomes subsequently rallied support from dissident elements in all branches of the military that recently had organized, under the leadership of midlevel officers, as the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). The MFA staged a rapid, almost bloodless, coup d'état on April 25, 1974.¹⁰⁵

The domestic political asymmetry that eventually eroded Portugal's will to retain its colonies contrasted sharply with a military asymmetry in Angola notably more pronounced than that which prevailed in Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau. Angolan nationalists were heavily outnumbered as well as outgunned, after nearly 14 years of guerrilla warfare, notwithstanding the opening of new fronts in remote eastern and southern districts. Mao's observation that an "anti-imperialist" cause presumably should attract more recruits than a civil war was not borne out in Angola. Angolans who fought for Portugal significantly outnumbered those who fought for their nation's independence. The three Angolan nationalist movements may, at most, have recruited some 10,000 to 15,000 combatants by the early 1970s. Portugal deployed over 60,000 troops in Angola, at least half of which were Africans. The addition of another 30,000 Angolans willing to join the colony's paramilitary units gave Lisbon an overwhelming numerical advantage. Desertion rates also favored Portugal, whose units lost far fewer African conscripts than their guerrilla opponents. Moreover, no African units ever mutinied or defected throughout the course of the war.¹⁰⁶ Lisbon also seemed to experience less difficulty than their insurgent opponents in replacing killed and wounded troops.¹⁰⁷

By the early 1970s, Angolan insurgents had resigned themselves to a long war possibly requiring additional decades of combat. This expectation, in part, reflected a recognition that none of the three movements had yet to

recruit effectively from among the Ovimbundu, who comprised some 38 percent of Angola's five million residents. Economic trends predating the war should have generated widespread dissatisfaction and prompted many to join the nationalist cause. An expanding Ovimbundu population, combined with declining agricultural output, forced removals from farmland to accommodate an influx of Portuguese settlers, and an absence of additional acreage on which to relocate displaced Ovimbundu's increased numbers had driven many to become migrant workers. By the early 1960s, Ovimbundus constituted two-thirds of the colony's migrant contract laborers, many of whom were employed on coffee plantations in the northwest.¹⁰⁸ UPA's slaughter of thousands of Ovimbundu workers, some of whom had fought to defend their Portuguese employers, proved to be one of the most critical blunders of the March 1961 campaign, gradually turning the uprising into a civil war as well as an anticolonial struggle.¹⁰⁹

Compounding their tactical failures, UPA and its competitors missed additional opportunities to supplement their ranks by appealing to prospective supporters inside and outside Angola. Many Ovimbundus worked as miners in the Belgian Congo, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. As the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA opened fronts along Angola's eastern borders, they could have recruited heavily from among Ovimbundu laborers who constituted a substantial portion of the half million Angolans employed throughout southern Africa. Nationalists might also have elicited support from among the estimated 65,000 Ovimbundus who had migrated to Luanda and other large urban centers in the 1940s and 1950s. An influx of Portuguese settlers had displaced many of the Ovimbundus who established niches in the urban economy as craftsmen, providers of professional services such as education and medicine, or as small entrepreneurs.¹¹⁰ Portugal's determination, after 1968, to relocate Ovimbundu farmers from the central highlands into *reordenamentos rural* (rural resettlements), allegedly as a preemptive measure against insurgent infiltrations, seemed little more than a thinly disguised effort to confiscate fertile African lands. However, none of the three nationalist movements was able to exploit the resentment these programs engendered.¹¹¹

Jonas Savimbi, Daniel Chipenda, and other Ovimbundus who rallied to the struggle for Angolan independence were living proof that the Ovimbundu were not completely indifferent to, or isolated from, nationalist appeals. The insurgents also were aware that many Angolans were dissatisfied with Portuguese rule and ripe for recruitment. UNITA communiqués, in 1970, began to emphasize the necessity of penetrating large urban areas in the populous, largely Ovimbundu highlands.¹¹² In 1971, the MPLA's Eastern Front commander told visiting journalists that "the Portuguese try to convince the Ovimbundu that they are better off than other Angolan peoples, that life isn't so bad, etc., but I think this has failed. The Ovimbundu know they must now fight . . . I believe these people will join us in the struggle."¹¹³ By 1974, however, all three nationalist movements had failed to attract significant numbers of Ovimbundu recruits.

ORIGINS OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

Their inability to create a united front also was a critical factor in accounting for the poor results all three Angolan insurgencies achieved, compared to their counterparts in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. A united front would have facilitated combined military operations across a broad expanse of the Angolan countryside. Resources could have been shared. Greater quantities of external financial and matériel support might have been acquired. All three guerrilla groups made repeated efforts to establish a united front, but inter-insurgent battles and accusations of betrayal undermined these initiatives. Most contemporary accounts refer to battles fought in 1975, on the eve of the colony's independence, as the opening rounds of the Angolan civil war. The first skirmishes of Angola's fratricidal conflict, however, commenced as early as 1961 and, in a sporadic fashion, paralleled the next 14 years of the anti-Portuguese struggle. The ensuing clashes laid the foundation for an atmosphere of profound mistrust that weakened the independence movements and discredited them in the eyes of Angolan civilians who might have joined their ranks.

Competition for supplies, access to territory, and popular support fueled some of the earliest UPA-MPLA confrontations. In November 1961, UPA insurgents killed twenty MPLA guerrillas marching to the relief of beleaguered colleagues in the Dembos Forest. In addition to direct military competition, UPA also played on the sympathies of the Congo (Kinshasa) government to prevent the MPLA from deploying forces into northwestern Angola. In 1962, Congolese security forces apprehended two MPLA columns as they moved south across the Angolan border, seized their weapons and passed them to UPA personnel. Holden Roberto subsequently ordered UPA contingents to attack northern villages controlled by a local MPLA commander. UPA/FNLA combatants, on April 28, 1963, killed more than half of a 21-member MPLA column crossing the Loge River to deliver arms and medicine to a guerrilla base camp.¹¹⁴

MPLA members retaliated in November 1965 with the assistance of the Congo (Brazzaville) government, when they arrested and executed two ranking FNLA members, Matias Migueis and Jose Miguel. Both were former MPLA members who had defected to the FNLA. FNLA forces reciprocated in March 1967 when they captured twenty MPLA members traveling to Congo (Kinshasa) from northern Angola. Deolinda Rodrigues, a member of the MPLA executive committee, was among those imprisoned in Kinshasa and later executed with other previously detained MPLA cadres. FNLA guerrillas also intercepted an MPLA column in late 1967, seized their supplies and forced them to return to Brazzaville. For the remainder of the 1960s, FNLA contingents frequently sought to encircle MPLA forces in the northwest.¹¹⁵

Fratricidal battles continued in the late 1960s as all three insurgents attempted to establish new bases in eastern Angola. MPLA forces engaged FNLA contingents and UNITA reported frequent MPLA ambushes of its forces after December 1966. Between 1968 and 1970, MPLA commanders

recorded numerous skirmishes with UNITA contingents. Ammunition and supplies that the MPLA had hoped to move west of the Cuanza River, into central Angola, were exhausted in efforts to fend off UNITA attacks as well as Portuguese counterinsurgency sweeps.¹¹⁶ By 1971, UNITA was “at war” with both the FNLA and the MPLA, according to Savimbi, suggesting that hostilities between the three groups had escalated.¹¹⁷ In May 1974, shortly after the Portuguese Army coup, FNLA guerrillas decimated a large MPLA force as it crossed the Zaire border into Angola. This attack brought about the dissolution of a recent, carefully crafted MPLA/FNLA coalition forged by the intervention and encouragement of Zaire’s president Mobutu, Congolese president Ngouabi, Tanzanian president Nyerere, and President Kaunda of Zambia.¹¹⁸

Allegations of collaboration with Portugal compounded the damage done by intermittent battles. Not long after the start of the anticolonial campaign, MPLA dissidents, on July 5, 1963, led by Viriato da Cruz, Matias Migueis, and Jose Miguel accused Agostinho Neto of “suspect relations” with unidentified Portuguese individuals. Neto’s nationalist credentials were subjected to further scrutiny several days later, on July 10, when he announced the formation of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola (FDLA). Neto proposed linking the MPLA with several smaller Angolan political parties, at least two of which had collaborated with Portuguese colonial authorities.¹¹⁹ The FDLA soon collapsed and the MPLA gradually reestablished its credentials as a legitimate nationalist movement.

Mutual mistrust deepened, however, in the following years, and the Portuguese frequently employed divide-and-conquer tactics in their counterinsurgency operations. Portuguese officers indicated, in the late 1960s, that MPLA members often provided them information about FNLA positions. FNLA informants likewise passed intelligence concerning MPLA combatants to colonial authorities.¹²⁰ These betrayals contributed to a growing skepticism of both movements’ ability to implement an effective guerrilla strategy and undermined their domestic and international credibility. None of these revelations, however, was as extensive as a series of documents, first published in early 1974, in a pro-MPLA journal, *Afrique-Asie*, alleging UNITA-Portuguese collaboration between 1971 and 1973. During the course of a covert operation known as Operation Timber, Savimbi and Portuguese military interlocutors corresponded, using local Portuguese timber merchants as couriers, and agreed to secretly collaborate against MPLA insurgents in eastern Angola. In exchange, Portuguese forces provided supplies to Savimbi and refrained from attacking UNITA.¹²¹

Savimbi dismissed the documents as forgeries immediately after their publication. Unlike earlier reports of FNLA and MPLA collaboration with Portugal, however, the Operation Timber allegations did not fade nearly as quickly from subsequent assessments of Savimbi’s credibility or integrity. Tony da Costa Fernandes, one of UNITA’s founding members, offered a detailed alternative explanation to a Portuguese journalist. Fernandes acknowledged UNITA’s contact with timber merchants but insisted that this was only an

arrangement whereby the loggers paid UNITA a tax in exchange for access to the forests near UNITA bases, provided they were not escorted by security forces. Furthermore, Fernandes speculated that the documents published in 1974 had been printed on UNITA stationery using a typewriter, rubber stamps, and letterhead paper seized in a 1973 Portuguese attack on a base that Savimbi had recently occupied.¹²² Still other skeptics have suggested that the MPLA used the Operation Timber documents to account for their military failures in eastern Angola and the subsequent emergence of the dissident "Eastern" and "Active" Revolt factions.¹²³ If UNITA did, in fact, collaborate with Portuguese forces in the early 1970s, by this stage of the anticolonial war, it was the last, not the first, of the three guerrilla movements to engage in a treacherous process that already had tainted the FNLA and MPLA.

The attacks and betrayals of the 1960s and early 1970s also exacerbated internal splits in each of the three movements, further diminishing the prospects for a united front. UNITA commander Samuel Muanangola, one of the 11 cadres originally trained in China, defected to the FNLA in 1972. Jose Calundungo, a former FNLA commander who had joined UNITA and also trained in China, was imprisoned by UNITA for six months in 1972 on charges of plotting to assassinate Savimbi.¹²⁴ MPLA officials, in 1973, accused their Ovimbundu Eastern Front military commander, Daniel Chipenda, of conspiring to assassinate Agostinho Neto with the assistance of other Ovimbundu members. Neto also claimed Chipenda had secretly supplied UNITA with weapons, purportedly out of sympathy for Savimbi's Ovimbundu supporters.¹²⁵ These charges bore out, in a peculiar way, an earlier assessment by Chipenda as to why a united front of Angolan insurgents was unlikely. Chipenda had asserted, in 1971, that "[t]he main thing which distinguishes the MPLA from puppet groups such as the GRAE [Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, FNLA,] and UNITA is that the MPLA is concerned with Angolan *national* liberation, while these other groups are fighting to advance the cause of tribalism, regionalism, and racism."¹²⁶ FNLA and UNITA members rejected these characterizations but also stereotyped the MPLA as a movement beholden to Communist masters in the Soviet Bloc. Years of mutual mistrust were only briefly set aside after the 1974 Portuguese coup. A new generation of leaders in Lisbon promised a rapid end to a war in which the three nationalist movements had found it increasingly difficult to successfully implement a coherent strategy of guerrilla warfare.

ALVOR AND THE AUGMENTATION OF INSURGENT FORCES

Debates on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare were set aside as the three insurgent movements maneuvered for advantage in a tumultuous transition period, which eventually yielded a Portuguese MFA commitment to independence for Angola. UNITA announced, on June 14, 1974, that it had agreed to a cease-fire. The UPA/FNLA continued to fight, sending additional insurgents into northern Angola from their base at Kinkuzu, Zaire.

Holden Roberto, bolstered by support from Zairian president Mobutu, expected the MFA to succumb to political/military pressures and choose the FNLA to lead the transition to independence.¹²⁷ Roberto's patrons calculated that the FNLA's paramount position as the largest of the three guerrilla forces favored it over the still obscure and small UNITA force. The MPLA likewise lost considerable ground to the FNLA in the months following the MFA coup. Daniel Chipenda's Eastern Revolt faction continued to challenge Agostinho Neto's leadership and, in May 1974, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade led the *Revolta Activa* (Active Revolt) faction in opposition to Neto. After several failed attempts at reconciliation, Neto's status as the MPLA's president was reaffirmed at a September 1974 party conference held in eastern Angola. The FNLA and MPLA's consolidation of their positions coincided with an acrimonious debate in Lisbon, where militant MFA members rejected reformist proposals to establish a neocolonialist Lusophone commonwealth retaining Portugal's links to her African empire. The FNLA signed a cease-fire with Portugal on October 15; the MPLA followed suit five days later.¹²⁸

Prospects for healing some of the deepest wounds of the anticolonial struggle briefly improved. In early November 1974 Lucio Lara, one of the MPLA's founding members, proclaimed that "it is necessary to affirm that the MPLA entertains with sufficient sympathy the peaceful words of a brother who also was in the forest . . . I refer to the president of UNITA, Dr. Jonas Savimbi . . . because from all his messages we could always discern the desire which it seemed to us sincere to contribute towards . . . the peaceful solution of all our national problems."¹²⁹ Suggestions that the bitter allegations of the Operation Timber dossier and other claims of betrayal might be reevaluated held out hope that the combatants could devise a smooth transition to independence. Insurgents began to collaborate with Portuguese military personnel to maintain order and later quelled riots by white settlers who had not yet resigned themselves to the end of colonialism. Portuguese troops cooperated with MPLA forces in preventing the secessionist-FLEC from mobilizing civilian support in Cabinda. All three movements opened offices in Angola's larger cities, enlisting new party members and supporters.

Encouraged by numerous African leaders Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi agreed to hold talks at Mombasa, Kenya in early January 1975. The FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA leaders recognized each other as equal participants in a transition process that would include general elections and independence by November 11, 1975. The insurgents ratified these agreements on January 15, 1975, at Alvor, Portugal. The Alvor Accord called for a transitional government with representatives from each movement, as well as Portuguese participation, to assure an orderly transfer of power. Lisbon intended to supervise the integration of all three movements' armed forces into a new Angolan Army. Daniel Chipenda's MPLA Eastern Revolt faction and FLEC representatives were excluded from all political and military deliberations, a questionable decision that added to a list of contentious political/military issues that gradually undermined the Alvor Accord.¹³⁰

The early 1975 agreements encouraged and, in some respects obliged, all three movements to augment their military power as well as designating members to assume civilian positions in the government designed at Alvor. The insurgent leaders had agreed that independent Angola would field a twenty-four-thousand-member army. Each movement was to contribute eight thousand soldiers to a force supplemented by twenty-four thousand Portuguese troops during the transition phase. Lisbon expected to withdraw its forces gradually, with the last troops due to leave approximately three months after the November 11, 1975, independence date.

At the signing of the Alvor Accord only the FNLA had a force large enough to meet its commitment to a postcolonial security force. Holden Roberto commanded some 21,000 combatants, of which 9,000 allegedly were in northern Angola and 12,000, held in reserve, in Zaire.¹³¹ Agostinho Neto's MPLA had recovered from its 1973 intraparty splits, managing to enlarge its armed wing to 5,500–8,000 guerrillas, in part by appealing to former members of the colonial army. MPLA cadres also began to organize and arm an urban militia—the *Poder Popular*—in Luanda, a force that grew to several thousand in the months prior to independence.¹³² UNITA recruitment efforts likewise succeeded in augmenting its military wing to include at least 3,000 and possibly as many as 8,000 troops. Many new recruits came from the ranks of Ovimbundu coffee plantation workers who had returned to central Angola from the northwest, intimidated by the FNLA's force expansion in mid-1974. UNITA also attracted hundreds of prospective combatants from Luanda and a substantial number of the 1,000 *flechas* who had served as some of Portugal's most effective counterinsurgency special force units.¹³³

A DISASTROUS CHAIN REACTION

The rapid influx of weapons and funds from numerous external sources dramatically amplified the capability of all three nationalist movements. This trend set the stage for a shift from guerrilla to conventional combat in 1975, as the Alvor Accord collapsed, leading to the most devastating decades of Angola's civil war. This process fueled acrimonious debates in which the United States and South Africa, or Russia and Cuba, were blamed for setting Angola on a disastrous course. All four nations certainly fueled the crisis but a detailed review of the transition suggests that Zaire's president Mobutu and his client, FNLA leader Holden Roberto, were principally responsible for undermining Angola's transition from colonialism to independence. Their aggressive initiatives set off a chain reaction that lured outside patrons to augment the armed forces of all three parties, fostering a climate in which suspicion and mistrust overwhelmed tentative gestures of compromise that briefly had flowered at Alvor.

One of the earliest recorded arms transfers to an Angolan combatant force, immediately after the April 25, 1974, coup in Lisbon, originally had been intended to support the anticolonial insurgency. However, these weapons did not arrive until after the MFA had ousted the Caetano regime and began to

negotiate separate cease-fires with the insurgent movements. Between May and September 1974 China sent 112 military advisors and 450 tons of weapons to FNLA camps in Zaire.¹³⁴ In July 1974, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to provide financial support to Holden Roberto and, by late August, the Romanian Communist Party also had sent military equipment to the FNLA. Five months later, on January 15, 1975, the CIA transferred an additional \$300,000 to the FNLA.¹³⁵

Even before the MPLA had resolved the challenges posed by its dissident factions, the Portuguese Communist Party appealed to the Soviet Union in April 1974 to renew the supply of weapons that previously had been suspended due to Moscow's frustration with the MPLA's internal disarray. This appeal evidently was successful; Russian arms were again shipped to the MPLA in August and October 1974. By December 1974 some two hundred MPLA members had traveled to Moscow for military training and, by January 1975 the Soviet Union had delivered enough weapons to arm five thousand to seven thousand MPLA combatants.¹³⁶ Soviet officials, in early December 1974, also arranged to equip the MPLA's recently renamed armed wing, the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), with heavy weapons and ammunition. These supplies were to be transshipped via Brazzaville, Congo.¹³⁷

Emboldened by arms deliveries and commitments of additional support, the MPLA and FNLA moved forcefully to eliminate the threat posed by the marginal factions that had been excluded from the Alvor Accord. In early November 1974 several hundred FAPLA members, assisted by Portuguese troops at a nearby garrison, drove FLEC out of Cabinda city and subsequently pushed them out of the northern town of Massabi. FLEC's modest military capability, recently augmented when several hundred former *flechas* rallied to the secessionist movement, proved no match for the FAPLA.¹³⁸ In early February 1975, less than a month after the signing of the Alvor Accord, MPLA cadres twice attacked MPLA Eastern Revolt leader Daniel Chipenda's office in Luanda. Chipenda subsequently relocated to Kinshasa, Zaire and, by April, he and most of his two thousand to three thousand troops had joined the FNLA.¹³⁹

Portugal proved incapable of restraining the more aggressive nationalist movements, particularly during the tenure of High Commissioner Admiral Rosa Coutinho who openly supported the MPLA. The former guerrillas' unwillingness to commit their combatants to a national army encouraged further international intervention by patrons pursuing larger ideological and geopolitical aims. Angola's instability was compounded by a failure to implement article 39 of the Alvor Accord, which called for the creation of a national police force to maintain law and order in Luanda and other large cities during the transition to independence. Consequently, ever more lethal urban guerrilla warfare soon dominated the escalating hostilities, which eroded the accomplishments attained at Alvor.

Encouraged by Mobutu and the prevailing military balance, Holden Roberto's FNLA attacked MPLA contingents in Luanda in late March 1975.

Roberto sent 500 additional troops to reinforce FNLA units inside Luanda. Increasingly intense rounds of fighting erupted in late April and early May 1975. After the failure of several short-lived truces, combat resumed in late May and eventually targeted UNITA personnel, setting the stage for a widening war. On June 4, 1975, MPLA members killed some 260 UNITA recruits in Luanda's Pica Pau neighborhood. In a desperate attempt to salvage Angola's deteriorating transition to independence, Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta hosted a mid-June conference at Nakuru, Kenya, calling on all three movements to revive their commitment to the Alvor Accord. Fighting resumed, however, within days after the June 21, 1975, signing of the Nakuru Agreement. A large column of UNITA supporters fled Luanda. MPLA contingents attacked the column at Dondo on July 2, killing hundreds, and by some accounts, perhaps more than a thousand, UNITA personnel as they attempted to cross the Cuanza River and flee south to the central highlands. One week later, MPLA leaders deployed FAPLA and *Poder Popular* militia forces in an offensive that took some three thousand lives and expelled nearly all remaining FNLA and UNITA supporters from the capital. By late July 1975 the previous five months' fighting had resulted in some forty thousand deaths.¹⁴⁰ MPLA supporters extended their control over provincial capitals in Malanje and Lunda Provinces as well as moving forces south, along the Atlantic coast, to Lobito and Mocamedes (later Namibe).

Additional arms shipments from various allies gradually had made each of the nationalist forces increasingly more lethal. In mid-March 1975 Soviet arms delivered to Brazzaville, Congo were subsequently transshipped to MPLA forces in Luanda. The Soviet Union provided an additional \$30 million worth of weapons to the MPLA in the next three months.¹⁴¹ The Portuguese High Commissioner's decision, in April 1975, to disband a large colonial era paramilitary force, resulted in the plundering of an arsenal of 40,000 weapons, which found their way into the hands of all three movements.¹⁴² The MPLA, in April, also persuaded some 3,000 Katangan gendarmes, who previously had fought for Portugal, to cast their lot with Agostinho Neto. In May, President Mobutu sent 1,200 Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) troops into northern Angola to supplement Holden Roberto's estimated 10,000 FNLA combatants.¹⁴³

Havana responded to Agostinho Neto's July 1974 and January 1975 letters, urgently appealing for weapons and financial aid, by sending some 230 Cuban military advisors to Angola in May 1975. This contingent arrived during the initial stages of a sea lift of Soviet Bloc arms, lasting from April to June. In late July 1975, Washington authorized the CIA to commit \$14 million worth of weapons and supplies to the FNLA and UNITA. In August 1975 an additional 200 Cuban troops arrived to train FAPLA forces in the use of newly acquired weapons, including armored cars and crew-served mortars.¹⁴⁴

The MPLA's inventory expanded exponentially as Moscow supported a more elaborate military pipeline. Between April and October 1975, some two dozen shiploads of weapons and supplies, supplemented by numerous AN-22 transport aircraft flights carrying military cargos, helped the MPLA

keep pace with, and eventually surpass, its opponents.¹⁴⁵ From August to November, American officials also authorized additional funds, eventually totaling at least \$31.7 million, to support the FNLA and UNITA. U.S. aid to the FNLA and UNITA included more than forty thousand rifles, some four hundred mortars, and millions of rounds of ammunition.¹⁴⁶

As the scheduled date of Angola's independence approached, the FNLA launched a new campaign to reestablish a political/military presence in Luanda. FNLA and MPLA forces fought repeated battles between August and October 1975 for control of several small towns situated at key road junctions 40 to 65 kilometers from Luanda. The MPLA employed heavier weapons, particularly BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, on what became the northern theater of a two-front war, which challenged the MPLA and its Soviet/Cuban allies' hold over the capital.¹⁴⁷ The MPLA's success against the FNLA on the outskirts of Luanda encouraged Neto's forces to attack UNITA positions in central and eastern Angola, including an early August attempt to ambush Savimbi at Silva Porto (later Bie).¹⁴⁸ MPLA troops also had pushed UNITA sympathizers out of Lobito, Benguela, Mocamedes, and Luso (later Luena) by September 1975.

Savimbi and FNLA commander, Daniel Chipenda, had anticipated a shifting balance of power several months earlier and gradually began to rely on South African troops and supplies to supplement U.S. aid to stall the MPLA's drive into the central highlands. Savimbi and Chipenda initially met with South African representatives in May 1975, probably to discuss their respective ties to SWAPO and a prospective Angolan coalition government's relationship with the South West African insurgents.¹⁴⁹ Some SWAPO insurgent base camps already had relocated from Zambia to southern Angola.¹⁵⁰ In response, South African troops had moved across the Cunene River to Ruacana Falls, just a few kilometers north of the Angolan border, in early June 1975. Two months later, in early August, SADF personnel advanced several kilometers further north to secure the Cunene River hydroelectric facilities at Calueque. Savimbi paid a second visit to South Africa in August and elicited Pretoria's agreement to establish a UNITA training camp south of Bie and another facility for Chipenda's forces in southern Cunene Province.

UNITA's ten-year-old ties to SWAPO were severed as Savimbi's forces aligned with South Africa and SWAPO moved into the MPLA's increasingly complex network of regional and international allies. On September 21, 1975, a small SADF contingent deployed to central Angola. Two weeks later, in early October, a mechanized SADF force, equipped with 22 armored vehicles, and a smaller contingent of newly arrived FAZ troops joined UNITA in repelling an MPLA attack north of Nova Lisboa (later Huambo).¹⁵¹ Angola's immediate future as an independent African nation clearly was set to be decided on the battlefield rather than the ballot box anticipated at Alvor, 11 months earlier.

THE RACE FOR LUANDA

Portuguese settlers and military personnel departed Angola in ever larger numbers as Zairian, South African, Cuban, and other forces began to fill Angola's political/military vacuum. A last-minute OAU proposal to send a peacekeeping force was never seriously considered by any of the combatants, all of whom were determined to control Luanda by independence day, November 11, 1975. Their principal allies had a variety of motives, beyond determining the date and time of Angola's emergence on the world stage as a new nation-state. The Soviet Union and Cuba sought to consolidate the power of a nationalist movement, the MPLA, which they had long, if somewhat erratically, viewed as an ally. The United States and Zaire similarly perceived the FNLA as a party sympathetic to their global and regional interests. South Africa likewise saw in UNITA and the FNLA an opportunity to install a coalition government in Luanda that would cut off, or at least cut back, support to SWAPO's campaign for Namibian independence and the ANC's antiapartheid struggle.

The onset of the rainy season, in late September 1975, further confined an increasingly conventional war to a series of brief battles for major road junctions, bridges, and towns. Cuban transport ships ferried some 1,100-1,500 troops equipped with heavy weapons, via the port of Pointe Noire, Congo and smaller northern Angolan ports, between late September and early October.¹⁵² SADF forces, supplemented by Chipenda's FNLA combatants, launched Operation Savannah on October 11, when a 1,000-member contingent named "Battle Group Zulu" moved into Angola from Rundu, South West Africa/Namibia. In less than two weeks, this force overran numerous MPLA garrisons and occupied Sá da Bandeira (later Lubango), the capital of Huila Province. A second battle group, "Foxbat," a SADF-led force of UNITA personnel organized in Huambo, moved north on October 26 against Cuban-backed MPLA troops that had slowly been advancing south from Dondo. Battle Group Zulu had meanwhile marched west from Sá da Bandeira to the Atlantic coast port of Mocamedes, which fell after a short battle. The Zulu force then continued a rapid advance to the north where it encountered a determined Cuban/FAPLA garrison at Catengue, some 75 kilometers south of Benguela. After a nine-hour battle, Zulu troops overcame the defenders and quickly pressed on to take Benguela and Lobito by November 7.¹⁵³ Gradually stiffening FAPLA resistance and longer supply lines combined to slow the advance of both South African battle groups. On November 10, 1975, Portugal's last colonial governor general sailed out of Luanda harbor, turning an independent country over to the people of Angola rather than designating any of the three contending forces as the nation's new official leaders. The international community's ambivalent response to the MPLA's self-proclaimed governance of independent Angola encouraged the FNLA and UNITA's allies to persist in their efforts to push the MPLA out of the capital. Battle Group Zulu renewed its northward drive and seized

the port of Novo Redondo (later Ngunza) on November 13, while Foxbat advanced to the Quibala area, 200 kilometers southeast of Luanda.¹⁵⁴

The SADF-led, FNLA/Chipenda, UNITA offensive elicited a determined response from the MPLA's Cuban and Soviet allies. Havana's decision on November 5 to send additional troops eventually proved to be decisive on the fronts north and south of Luanda. Aircraft ferrying Cuban troops arrived in Luanda on November 7, marking the start of Operation Carlota, which included a large air and sea lift of troops, weapons, and supplies. Cuban forces in Angola numbered some four thousand to six thousand by late December 1975 and grew to twelve thousand to fourteen thousand by February 1976.¹⁵⁵ This surge in military power was supplemented by a comparably large Soviet matériel commitment employing at least 19 shiploads and 70 cargo flights in support of the MPLA. Between November 1975 and April 1976, Moscow delivered an estimated \$200 million worth of military aid, including several hundred tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and a squadron of MiG-21 aircraft.¹⁵⁶

Augmented and increasingly better armed also bolstered the MPLA's southern defenses and finally helped route a late October, SADF, U.S., Zairian-backed, FNLA northern offensive that brought Roberto's forces to within 25 kilometers of Luanda. In what may have been a preliminary attempt to divert FAPLA forces at Luanda, a Zairian offensive into Cabinda, launched by a combined FAZ and FLEC force on November 2, 1975, was blunted after several days of combat with a Cuban-backed FAPLA battalion. Roberto, Mobutu, and their allies then renewed their focus on Luanda. On November 8, in an attempt to break through Luanda's defenses before additional Cuban and Soviet reinforcements could arrive, a composite force including six hundred FNLA, seven hundred FAZ, a small contingent of former Portuguese Army members, and a limited number of South African armored cars and artillery pieces marched toward the capital. Two days later, when this coalition crossed a flat marshy area at Quifangando, twenty kilometers from Luanda, FAPLA, Cuban, and pro-MPLA Katangan defenders unleashed a rocket and artillery barrage decimating the attacking column, forcing a hasty and disorderly retreat. FAPLA and Cuban forces followed up on their successful defense of the capital and launched a counteroffensive on December 5. Roberto soon abandoned his headquarters at the northern Angolan port of Ambriz and withdrew to Zaire.¹⁵⁷

HAVANA, MOSCOW, AND THE MPLA PREVAIL

Cuban troops foiled a late November effort by combined elements of the Foxbat and Zulu columns to break through the defenses on the southern approaches to Luanda. SADF/UNITA/FNLA forces counterattacked in mid-December, striking FAPLA/Cuban positions north of Quibala and Cela, most notably at the battle of Bridge 14, near Catofe, where they destroyed armor and artillery assets as well as killing or wounding dozens of Cuban and FAPLA troops. By mid- to late December, 1975 Cuban forces,

supplemented by T-34 and T-55 tanks and 122 mm guns, which outranged South African artillery, gradually began to bring more firepower to bear against Pretoria's lightly armored forces. Foxbat and Zulu columns were compelled to shift from a war of mobility to one of position, a campaign they were unequipped to conduct and that Pretoria had not anticipated. This shortcoming was underscored in eastern Angola where a third column, designated X-Ray, comprising SADF armored cars and a UNITA battalion, had moved east from Huambo to Luena. After a three-day December 8-11 battle, X-Ray routed a MPLA/Katangan garrison. A smaller MPLA force successfully defended Luau (formerly Teixeira de Sousa), however, preventing UNITA and its SADF ally from establishing complete control of the Benguela railroad.¹⁵⁸

The persistent Cuban/Soviet arms and troop buildup decisively turned the tide of conventional warfare throughout Angola in the first weeks of 1976. FAPLA and Cuban troops reoccupied the provincial capital of Uíge. FNLA and FAZ troops melted into the surrounding forests, mounting no serious resistance. A Cuban/FAPLA column attacked Soyo on February 6, 1976, chasing the last FNLA forces, as well as a handful of belatedly deployed British and American mercenaries, out of Angola. Cuban forces in Cabinda also had been augmented, numbering some five thousand by February 1976, when they launched Operation *Panuelo Blanco* (White Handkerchief) against an estimated seven hundred FLEC insurgents. This offensive succeeded in killing or capturing nearly half of the FLEC force and significantly reduced the threat they posed to the government's hold over the enclave.¹⁵⁹ Agostinho Neto's government, bolstered by a rising tide of international diplomatic recognition, achieved similar breakthroughs south of the capital. The U.S. decision to cease all aid to the FNLA and UNITA in January 1976 persuaded South Africa's leaders that they could not match Moscow and Havana's military commitment. Pretoria began to pull SADF troops out of central Angola in late January, leaving some three thousand to five thousand troops to occupy a limited zone, eighty kilometers north of the Angola-South West African border, near the Calueque dam and hydroelectric facility on the Cunene River.¹⁶⁰

UNITA was unable to compensate for the loss of SADF troops and the termination of U.S. aid meant the end of a vital arms pipeline. A Chinese promise, made in early 1975, to deliver seventy tons of weapons was thwarted when Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, outraged by UNITA's collaboration with South Africa, impounded the shipment and turned it over to the MPLA. Chipenda's FNLA faction, plagued by poor command and control, already had turned on UNITA in December 1975, looting shops and banks in the central highlands before joining SADF forces as they retreated. Some 1,600 UNITA troops fought brief battles north of Huambo in early February 1976, trying to stall 3,500 Cubans and several thousand FAPLA troops supported by fighter aircraft and transport helicopters. Savimbi ordered his forces to abandon Huambo on February 9 after a battle with Cuban/FAPLA units, which cost the lives of 600 UNITA defenders. Savimbi later told a

journalist that his commanders, encouraged by several African leaders and U.S./French promises to provide four helicopter gunships, had overruled his inclination to abandon Angola's cities in January and return to the bush. The helicopters never materialized and, as Savimbi had anticipated, UNITA's residual capability to fight conventional battles soon dissipated.¹⁶¹ Angolan government forces continued their southern advance and, by mid-February, they had reoccupied Lobito, Bie, Luena, Namibe, and Lubango.

Savimbi attempted to relocate UNITA headquarters to more defensible positions, retreating to Menongue in late February 1976 and further east to Lumbala N'Guimbo (formerly Gago Coutinho) in early March. Savimbi stayed at Lumbala N'Guimbo long enough to receive the last \$9 million of the CIA's \$31 million aid package. Aircraft flew to Lumbala N'Guimbo from Zambia, carrying mortars and antitank weapons.¹⁶² Although Savimbi had ordered all his forces, on February 10, 1976, to retreat from Angola's cities and launch a guerrilla war, UNITA's combatants still were scattered across a broad expanse of central Angola and eventually required several months to regroup and reorganize. Savimbi and his supporters soon would be driven deep into the country's most remote corners, where UNITA would face the same challenge its founders confronted in the late 1960s—the necessity to redefine itself militarily and politically.

RELEARNING MAO'S MILITARY LESSONS

Cuban and FAPLA forces gave UNITA only a brief respite at Lumbala N'Guimbo. Air strikes on insurgent positions marked the first significant use of Russian-supplied MiGs. A renewed government advance forced the hasty departure of a small group of French mercenaries still assisting Savimbi's forces. Approximately 4,000 UNITA combatants abandoned Lumbala N'Guimbo. Savimbi dispersed most of his forces, ordering 1,500 insurgents to move west toward Angola's central highlands. One hundred guerrillas were sent to the southeast to establish camps near the Zambian border. Accompanied by 600 combatants and 400 civilians, Savimbi withdrew into the heavily forested areas of western Moxico province.¹⁶³

Savimbi briefly regrouped half of his forces at the village of Sandona in late April 1976. After a four-day conference, on May 10, 1976, the guerrillas issued a proclamation entitled the "Cuanza River Manifesto." This tract offered a political/military assessment of Angola and included assertions that a protracted guerrilla war eventually would prevail over the MPLA's Cuban-Soviet allies. Reality did not immediately correspond to UNITA's rhetoric. Angolan and Cuban troops, accompanied by Katangan auxiliaries, launched a large counterinsurgency campaign, Operation *Tigre*, on May 12, 1976. Battalions were deployed south from Munhango and west from Lumbala N'Guimbo. Blocking positions also were set up along the Benguela railroad and the Munhango-Lumbala N'Guimbo road to prevent UNITA from slipping through to the north or south of a slowly tightening circle of forces. A combination of luck, determination, and assistance from sympathetic

civilians enabled Savimbi to conduct a successful forced march east and then south, slipping through the government's heavily armed net. Savimbi then led a steadily shrinking column of UNITA members west across Moxico into eastern Bie province. When they finally arrived on August 28, 1976, at Cuelei and established a secure base, less than one hundred remained of the one thousand UNITA members who had departed Lumbala N'Guimbo with Savimbi in mid-March.¹⁶⁴ Government and Cuban forces continued to pursue UNITA, launching at least three counterinsurgency campaigns after the unsuccessful attempt to encircle Savimbi at Sandona. The onset of the rainy season slowed down FAPLA forces and their last offensive of the year concluded by late November 1976.

Holden Roberto's forces also were pursued by government and Cuban forces. Most of the FNLA's combatants retreated across the Zaire border, leaving only a few small contingents behind. Unlike their erstwhile UNITA allies, FNLA leaders did not seem to consider the option of mounting a sustained insurgency. President Mobutu agreed, in late April 1976, to cease all aid to the FNLA and UNITA, thereby setting the stage for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new MPLA government. Angered by Holden Roberto's subsequent assertion that Mobutu was largely responsible for the FNLA's failure, Mobutu closed the FNLA's Kinshasa offices and destroyed its records. Roberto was allowed to reside in the Zairian capital but his stature as a nationalist gradually faded. Fidel Castro confidently proclaimed in 1976 that "the FNLA and UNITA are completely demoralized and will never again be back on their feet."¹⁶⁵ Daniel Chipenda's FNLA-affiliated supporters likewise ceased to function as an insurgent force. They joined SADF troops in their withdrawal to South West Africa/Namibia, where they were absorbed into the ranks of SADF's special force units and reorganized as the 32nd ("Buffalo") Battalion.¹⁶⁶ These seasoned combatants frequently joined SADF troops in cross border raids against SWAPO base camps in southwestern Angola.

UNITA's widely dispersed guerrillas, increasingly isolated from regional allies and dismissed as an insignificant political/military force, gradually began to regain the tactical initiative. Less than a year after Angola's independence, small insurgent groups launched repeated attacks on remote villages and government outposts in Bie and Huambo Provinces. The insurgents exploited the government's diminished ability to maneuver in the rainy season but were not yet holding territory in the central highlands, nor were they always able to capture weapons and supplies.¹⁶⁷ In March 1977, at UNITA's Fourth Congress, held in Huambo Province, the party formulated the components of a new strategy. Several hundred delegates, drawn from Angola's central and southern provinces, addressed problems of administration and the mobilization of civilian support. Although they lacked adequate weapons and matériel, UNITA had regrouped the four thousand insurgents that retreated from Lumbala N'Guimbo and recruited thousands of additional combatants. This surge in personnel enabled UNITA to consider the formation of larger units as well as more far-flung operations. Savimbi proposed the formation of

semiconventional units, organized as three battalions, each with five hundred troops, whose principal mission would be to seize and hold territory.¹⁶⁸

Nearly simultaneous developments in neighboring Zaire unexpectedly assisted UNITA's realization of the goals set at its 1977 party congress. In early March 1977 an estimated 1,000–1,500 Congolese combatants invaded Zaire's Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province. These were the political heirs to the secessionist Katangan gendarmes who left Congo (Kinshasa) in the 1960s, fought for the Portuguese, and eventually reconstituted their forces as the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC). Zaire's security forces failed to blunt the FLNC invasion, prompting Mobutu to appeal to African and European allies. French aircraft and advisors, several hundred Egyptian technicians and 1,500 Moroccan troops flew to Zaire and restored Mobutu's control of Shaba Province by May 1977. FLNC combatants pulled back to Angola and Moroccan forces were withdrawn several months later. FAZ troops terrorized the local population as they reestablished control, driving 50,000–70,000 refugees into Angola, sowing the seeds for a second invasion of Zaire 14 months later.¹⁶⁹

Luanda and its Soviet/Cuban patrons denied responsibility for the 1977 Shaba Crisis. Some African states nevertheless suspected the FLNC's invasion was the latest manifestation of an expansionist Soviet and Cuban policy linked to a larger Cold War competition in key sectors of the Third World. Savimbi also saw an opportunity to appeal for support from those who perceived a Soviet/Cuban backed MPLA as a threat to its central and southern African neighbors, regardless of real or imagined links to the Shaba Crisis. With the assistance of a SADF military liaison team, which Pretoria had reestablished in May 1977, Savimbi traveled to Zaire, Senegal, and Morocco from September to December 1977. In exchange for Savimbi's offer to help defend Zaire against future FLNC invasion threats, Mobutu promised little more than sympathy and the facilitation of Savimbi's onward travel. Senegal's president Leopold Senghor provided Senegalese passports to UNITA's external representatives. Morocco's King Hassan agreed to establish a training facility for UNITA recruits and donated arms and uniforms for five hundred trainees. Hassan also indicated he could raise additional funds from sympathetic North African and Middle Eastern governments.¹⁷⁰

Morocco had a variety of motives for extending aid to UNITA. The Luanda government was the only African regime that had publicly condemned Rabat's deployment of troops on Mobutu's behalf during the Shaba Crisis. Moreover Mobutu was sympathetic to Morocco's controversial 1975 occupation of the Western Sahara, formerly the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro et Saguia el Hamra. The MPLA's long-standing ties to Algeria, whose government supported the Polisario (Political Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) insurgents fighting for an independent Western Saharan state, deepened the rift between Rabat and Luanda.¹⁷¹ King Hassan presumably viewed support to Savimbi as a potential extra layer of defense for Mobutu against future Katangan threats. Mobutu, in return, could be

expected to continue supporting the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara against challenges in the OAU, UN, and other international fora.

If Savimbi needed to justify the material aid UNITA would soon receive from Morocco and other patrons, at this stage of his struggle he likely would have found comfort in Mao Zedong's discussion of the "three stages of the protracted war." UNITA clearly was once again in the first stage, during which Mao noted, "[T]he insurgents' military strength is inferior and . . . is compounded by losses of territory, popular support, economic assets and military capability. If the insurgents are adaptable, these losses are offset by gains in morale and combat experience, the mobilization of new supporters and the acquisition of international aid."¹⁷² A related, and more subtle, appreciation of Mao's military analyses entailed an understanding of "encirclement and counter encirclement."¹⁷³ Demonstrating his application of Mao's insights, in late 1976 Savimbi described UNITA's tactics to a foreign journalist. UNITA's aim, he said, was to keep Cuban and government troops off balance so they would not know where to concentrate their forces. The guerrillas wanted, at all costs, to avoid committing forces to fixed "fronts."¹⁷⁴ After they survived the government's 1976 offensives, they could begin to "counter encircle" isolated FAPLA garrisons. Mao also had reminded his students to apply the concept of "counter-encirclement" to the world stage. The guerrillas' cause is furthered, he noted, if they can forge counteralliances to offset their opponent's patrons. Savimbi's outreach to Morocco and Senegal ultimately would prove to be as important to UNITA's successful strategy of counterencirclement as his February 1976 decision to disperse his forces and begin their long march.

Nevertheless, although he had adapted many of Mao's ideas, Savimbi did not share his mentor's Marxist perspective on world history. Mao Zedong's explication of guerrilla strategy had anticipated the inevitable emergence of a sympathetic international alliance. Mao had viewed the Chinese civil war as merely the latest "development of the general crisis of world capitalism which began with World War I" and would soon drive "the capitalist countries into a new war" that would result in the collapse of capitalism and eventually a postcapitalist era of "perpetual peace."¹⁷⁵ In mid-1976, Savimbi had little reason to adopt Mao's historiography in addition to his military advice. UNITA's allies had included China, Zaire, Zambia, South Africa, France, and the United States. Most if not all of these ties were more accurately described as opportunistic rather than inevitable. Every one of these links was disrupted by radical shifts in domestic, African, or global circumstances.

The MPLA also had reason to question the durability of its alliance with Moscow and Havana. These ties were tested during the bloody Nito Alves coup attempt, launched on May 27, 1977. Alves had risen through the MPLA ranks, during the late 1960s, as a guerrilla commander in the Dembos Forest northeast of Luanda. With the advent of Angolan independence, Alves emerged as the spokesman of a faction motivated by militant racial and ideological perspectives that challenged Agostinho Neto's leadership. In the first days of the Alves coup attempt, which resulted in the death

of seven high-ranking MPLA officials, Cuban military personnel helped government security forces thwart the uprising. Numerous press reports suggested that Moscow, however, briefly hesitated to denounce the coup, presumably because its representatives initially considered an Alves-led government might bring Angola more firmly into the Soviet camp. Moscow and Luanda denied this view and at least one Russian analyst believes this was a rumor deliberately spread by Western intelligence services to undermine Soviet-Angolan relations.¹⁷⁶

A more recent assessment suggests that the events of May 27, 1977, may have been a military mutiny and/or civilian demonstration that government officials opportunistically characterized as the opening rounds of a coup.¹⁷⁷ In a matter of weeks, after a widespread intra-MPLA purge that may have killed thousands, Alves and the last of his supporters were hunted down, arrested, and executed in July 1977.¹⁷⁸ Still reeling from the challenge posed by Alves and his compatriots, the Neto government must have been further dismayed by unconfirmed November 1977 press reports alleging that Soviet representatives had contacted UNITA to propose a coalition government in which they could possibly play a modest role. Such rumors probably reminded at least some MPLA members of Moscow's decision, in early 1974, to suspend all aid to an increasingly faction-ridden MPLA.¹⁷⁹ The Angolan civil war, in late 1977, was about to move from the margins back to center stage in the Cold War though UNITA already had learned, and the MPLA may have suspected, that such a shift was neither inevitable nor likely to be permanent.

CHAPTER 4



GUERRILLA AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE (1978–90)

International and regional intervention in the Angolan civil war added layers of complexity to the military strategy Luanda and its opponents employed. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola's (UNITA's) renewed conduct of a Maoist-inspired guerrilla war challenged Luanda and its patrons to devise a counterinsurgency strategy. Neither Moscow nor Havana responded successfully, in part because they also faced a South African military challenge that combined conventional military operations with support for UNITA's guerrillas. The intensification of hostilities, and the extension of combat to Angola's 18 provinces, made the next phase of the war much more destructive than the 14-year anticolonial struggle. The war to end Portuguese colonialism had been limited to remote and sparsely populated regions and casualties, by the early 1970s, numbered in the thousands. The postindependence war devastated a much larger portion of Angola's infrastructure and inflicted many more military and civilian casualties, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths by the late 1980s.

ESCALATING GUERRILLA WARFARE AND CROSS BORDER COMBAT

The politically and militarily redefined Southern African region of the late 1970s forced military planners to concentrate on Angola's southern and eastern borders. Members of the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) had deployed to Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) garrisons in Cunene Province, after officially severing all ties to UNITA in February 1976, and assisted government troops in locating UNITA bases in exchange for Angolan government logistic support and training camps.¹ By late 1977, reinvigorated UNITA forces were threatening government positions along the Angolan/South West African border. South African Defense Force (SADF) officers perceived a mutual interest

in collaborating with UNITA to attack Calai, Dirico, Mucusso, and other vulnerable border posts. A series of short battles cleared FAPLA from these beleaguered garrisons, securing South African logistic lines to UNITA bases and providing a shallow buffer zone against SWAPO infiltration into South West Africa/Namibia.²

Concerned by signs of a resurgent UNITA and a more aggressive South Africa, Luanda launched two large offensives in March and June 1978. Several thousand Cuban and one thousand SWAPO combatants participated in each campaign. Ground attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, reportedly piloted by East German officers, provided additional firepower for operations in Cunene, Cuando Cubango, Bie, and Huambo Provinces. These campaigns had limited success, particularly those targeting Savimbi who, on several occasions in 1978, was falsely reported to have been killed, captured, or placed under house arrest. A third offensive in August 1978 drove UNITA out of Calai and Dirico, partially restoring government control over its southern border.³

Renewed hostilities on the Angola-Zaire border led to UNITA battles with their colonial-era nemesis, the Katangan gendarmes. Several thousand Katangans, under the new banner of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), commanded by General Nathaniel Mbumba, infiltrated Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province in early May 1978, their second incursion in 14 months. FLNC combatants had seized Kolwezi, in the heart of Zaire's copper/cobalt mining region, overwhelming the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) once again and forcing Kinshasa to appeal for external support. The Shaba II Crisis gave Savimbi an opportunity to deliver on his 1977 promise to assist President Mobutu. General Mbumba's forces encountered UNITA personnel during a May 12, 1978, battle for Kolwezi, a key mining center. A small UNITA contingent remained with the town's defenders for the next three days, giving Kinshasa additional time to elicit international assistance. By mid-May, lead elements of a French relief force arrived in Shaba Province.⁴

Paris deployed 600 Foreign Legion troops and the United States airlifted 1,700 Belgian infantry and support personnel to Kamina, approximately two hundred kilometers north of Kolwezi. The coalition force pushed FLNC elements out of Kolwezi, driving them back across the Angolan and Zambian borders by late May 1978 after a series of brief skirmishes, resulting in hundreds of casualties. French and Belgian forces pulled back several months later as FAZ troops reestablished a semblance of authority. A newly created "Inter African Force" consisting of 1,500 Moroccans, 600 Senegalese, and small contingents from Togo, Gabon, and Ivory Coast supplemented Mobutu's weak army. The Inter African Force remained until August 1978 when the last Moroccan and Senegalese units departed, one month after President Mobutu and Angolan president Neto agreed to restrain the remnants of General Mbumba's FLNC and Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).⁵

The FLNC's crude strategy prompted speculation that Mbumba's troops were merely operating as an auxiliary force trained by Luanda, Cuba, or

possibly East Germany, whose aims purportedly were more narrowly focused than Mbumba's. A March 26, 1976, agreement between Mobutu and West German rocket scientist Dr. Lutz Kayser allegedly had alarmed the East German government. Mobutu offered to lease one hundred thousand square kilometers in northern Shaba Province to Kayser's *Orbital Transport und Raketen Aktien Gesellschaft* (OTRAG) for the development of rocket-launched reconnaissance satellites. Soviet and other press sources reported allegations by Mbumba and other informants that the contract contained secret clauses pertaining to the development of cruise missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles. OTRAG managed to launch three test vehicles at the Shaba range between May 1977 and June 1978. The contract with Zaire was terminated in April 1979. Kayser subsequently relocated to Libya, amid continuing controversy over OTRAG's commercial and scientific motives.⁶ UNITA's small contribution to Mobutu's defense had meanwhile provided the guerrillas an opportunity to expand a regional support network that eventually would enable Savimbi to diminish his reliance on South Africa.

UNITA's immediate military fortunes, however, were greatly enhanced by Pretoria's pursuit of an increasingly aggressive regional military policy. South Africa had recovered from the setbacks of its 1975-76 Angolan intervention and designed a new "total strategy" to counter what Pretoria described as a "total onslaught" of Soviet- and Cuban-backed governments and insurgents throughout southern Africa. This "total strategy" relied on a mobile warfare doctrine emphasizing preemptive strikes against guerrilla base camps in Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique.⁷ A May 4, 1978, offensive, code-named "Operation Reindeer," provided an early indication of the SADF's new approach to regional warfare. Pretoria committed at least two SADF battalions and the newly formed 32 Battalion, staffed largely by Daniel Chipenda's former FNLA members, to the campaign. SADF airborne troops concentrated on Kassinga, 250 kilometers inside Angola, the site of SWAPO's main base complex, containing its headquarters, logistics, and training facilities. SADF heliborne and mechanized units simultaneously struck smaller SWAPO base camps 17-25 kilometers from the Angolan-South West African (Namibian) border and a FAPLA/Cuban relief convoy dispatched from nearby Techamutete. Cuban forces lost 150 troops in the airstrike on their convoy, their largest single loss of personnel since Havana's forces had deployed to Angola. South African military officers claimed more than 600 SWAPO insurgents were killed and several hundred wounded. SADF spokesmen denied reports that the death toll was even higher and that most victims were Namibian refugees. Humanitarian organizations, however, already had established that Kassinga contained both a military base and a refugee camp.⁸ Pretoria's forces acknowledged only six SADF killed and thirty wounded during the weeklong operation.⁹

Pretoria's "total strategy" subsequently evolved to include augmented support to UNITA, thereby creating a stronger buffer zone against SWAPO infiltration routes. In late 1978, Pretoria sent a SADF commando team to a UNITA base to provide training in sabotage operations and basic infantry

skills. During the course of several March 1979 meetings with Savimbi, South African officers outlined a program, code-named "Operation Silwer," that would support UNITA efforts to secure bases in Cuando Cubango Province. SADF personnel also trained UNITA officers in conventional warfare strategy and command and control principles relevant to the deployment of UNITA's newly formed light infantry battalions. Some SADF officers, however, had questioned the wisdom of Savimbi's decision to form such units, arguing that UNITA should continue operating as a mobile guerrilla force unburdened by the defense of territory or large bases.¹⁰ Skeptical South African advisors reluctantly acceded to Savimbi's plan for a mixed force. Savimbi also irritated South African advisors by offering his unsolicited political advice that Pretoria should release the African National Congress's (ANC's) Nelson Mandela from prison, but their political and military differences of opinion did not undermine a burgeoning relationship.¹¹

PATRONS AND ENHANCED POWER

In addition to the direct support they provided, South Africa and Zaire also funneled third-party aid to UNITA. Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia in 1978 and Moscow's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan had evoked a counterreaction from numerous governments determined to check what they perceived as an increasingly aggressive Soviet Bloc. This response benefited UNITA as well as other insurgent movements in Africa and Latin America. Although the People's Republic of China (PRC) had officially washed its hands of the Angola crisis when it abandoned the FNLA in July 1976, Savimbi hinted at lingering ties when he acknowledged sending a final group of UNITA trainees to the PRC in 1978.¹² A 1979 delivery of 550–600 tons of weapons from the PRC, via South West Africa/Namibia, gave UNITA the arsenal its fledgling semiconventional forces needed to conduct operations against larger government garrisons.¹³ Financial aid from sympathetic governments supplemented the 1979 Chinese arms deliveries. France, Iran, and Saudi Arabia established an \$18 million fund to augment support from Morocco, South Africa, and Zaire.¹⁴ South African officials also arranged black market arms sales and helped transship Bulgarian, Czech, and Polish weapons to UNITA. Some of these shipments involved Austrian and West German brokers who facilitated multimillion-dollar contracts.¹⁵ The rising tide of international opposition to Soviet-Cuban gains in Angola briefly was bolstered by rumors that Luanda had considered renewed negotiations with UNITA. This speculation ceased with Agostinho Neto's death in September 1979 and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA's) rapid selection of Jose Eduardo dos Santos as his successor.

UNITA's ability to arm larger forces soon facilitated more frequent attacks on the Benguela railroad, particularly in Bie and Moxico Province. By late 1979, rail traffic had almost completely halted after UNITA targeted key bridges. UNITA also intensified guerrilla operations in Cuando Cubango Province. On October 3, 1979, UNITA forces stormed and briefly occupied

Mavinga, an attack that proved to be a harbinger of much larger battles for a small town situated at an isolated road junction. As a further sign of the insurgents' growing confidence, Savimbi established UNITA headquarters at Jamba, which soon became the core of a large complex of training and logistics bases, near the Zambian and South West African/Namibian borders, supporting thousands of combatants and civilians.¹⁶

UNITA's deployment of semiconventional forces in mid-1980 enabled the insurgents to bring larger areas of southeastern Angola under their control. Between April and July 1980 UNITA routed FAPLA troops from the border towns of Cuangar, Savate, Luengue, Rito, Chirundo, and Dirico.¹⁷ On September 11, 1980, UNITA deployed three battalions in their first large conventional operation against 1,200 FAPLA defenders at Mavinga. UNITA prevailed and the insurgents added the town to an expanding logistics network that supported smaller guerrilla units in the central highlands.¹⁸

UNITA's organizational structure also grew larger and became more elaborate, reflecting the successful mobilization of a displaced population that one observer estimated at "several hundred thousand civilians [who] followed UNITA into the bush voluntarily in the face of the MPLA/Cuban advance in the late 1970s."¹⁹ In late 1981, Savimbi claimed UNITA had grouped some 8,000 troops into 11 infantry battalions equipped with mortars, rocket launchers, and light artillery. He also asserted that UNITA had an additional 20,000 irregular forces comprising guerrillas and village militia units. The combatant units were further organized into Three "Fronts" (Western, Northern and Eastern), which were subdivided into 22 "military regions" encompassing most of southeastern and central Angola.²⁰ UNITA clearly had a force capable of moving to Mao's "second phase" of revolutionary guerrilla war in which insurgents operated both as semiconventional and guerrilla forces. Savimbi had modified his mentor's teaching, however, and consistently indicated that he did not anticipate shifting to a militarily decisive "third phase." In 1979, he told a journalist "if UNITA does not succeed in forcing the MPLA to negotiate by 1990 it has no chance to succeed at all."²¹ Two years later, Savimbi told correspondents, "[T]here is no military victory to be won here. We believe the MPLA will eventually enter into negotiations with us. It is a question of forcing their hand—though it will take a lot of fighting."²²

Savimbi's preference for a favorable negotiating position rather than a military victory reflected a sober assessment of the forces UNITA faced. In 1981, FAPLA had an estimated 35,000 troops equipped with nearly 300 Soviet tanks, 350 armored vehicles, 120 artillery pieces and 110 multiple rocket launchers. The 3,500-member Angolan Air Force had more than 30 combat aircraft, primarily MiG-17s and MiG-21s, as well as some two dozen transport planes and 50 helicopters. An estimated 18,000 Cuban troops, 2,000 Soviet advisors, and hundreds of East Germans augmented Luanda's security forces.²³ FAPLA also could draw on support from its border guard force and a large militia with a cumulative total of approximately 150,000 lightly armed members.²⁴

EXPANSION AND ELABORATION

Savimbi's strategy emphasized the dispersal of the government's army across a broad expanse of Angola's countryside. In late 1981 and early 1982 UNITA moved forces further north, extending their supply lines across most of the Angola-Zambia border, a trend the Lusaka government was powerless to prevent. From mid-September to late December 1981 UNITA battalions combined with large guerrilla contingents to overrun government positions at Lupire, Cassamba, and Ninda in eastern Angola.²⁵ Smaller insurgent forces staged hit-and-run attacks in Benguela and Huila Province, pushing the war further into western and central Angola.²⁶

At its Fifth Party Congress, held in late July 1982, the party's leadership ordered insurgent forces to deploy to Malanje, Cuanza Sul, and Lunda Provinces, where they struck valuable economic targets in north-central Angola.²⁷ In late 1982, UNITA commandos also launched several raids on military and economic targets in Huambo Province, disrupting traffic on vital highways and trains on the Benguela rail line. On December 24, 1982, a small UNITA team infiltrated a Huambo suburb where they damaged fuel tanks and a large factory, signaling the start of a low-level urban guerrilla warfare campaign.²⁸ Insurgent forces maintained a brisk operational tempo during the first half of 1983 and UNITA gradually committed over ten thousand troops to its first nearly nationwide offensive. Guerrillas attacked in Bie, Huila, Moxico, Lunda, Malanje, Huambo, Cuanza Sul, Cuanza Norte, and Benguela Provinces.²⁹

UNITA's gains along the eastern half of the Benguela rail line and elsewhere in Moxico Province enabled the insurgents to move larger quantities of supplies by truck, rather than relying on porters, to support guerrillas recently deployed to northern Angola. By mid-1983, UNITA logisticians claimed a fleet of two hundred trucks consisting largely of captured Soviet Bloc vehicles.³⁰ UNITA also had trained additional troops, increasing its armed forces to nearly thirty-five thousand guerrillas. Some reports suggested the insurgents were recruiting two thousand new members a year.³¹ Savimbi's commanders also placed a further emphasis on urban guerrilla warfare, training a small cadre of militant party members who had operated in Angola's large provincial capitals since the late 1970s.³²

Alarmed by the rapid expansion and intensification of UNITA operations, the Angolan Army committed twenty thousand troops, supplemented by eight thousand Cubans, three thousand SWAPO, and one thousand FLNC combatants to an elaborate counterinsurgency campaign in mid-1983. Government and allied forces were arrayed against a mobile force of four thousand to five thousand insurgents in what proved to be a fruitless offensive. As Luanda pursued UNITA in the central highlands, Savimbi moved several thousand insurgents into northeastern Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte Provinces. This initiative had significant short- and long-term consequences for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in Angola. A permanent guerrilla presence in the northeast obliged Luanda to spread its increasingly harried forces

over a larger portion of the Angolan countryside. UNITA's penetration of the northeast enabled the insurgents to smuggle additional supplies across Zaire's poorly patrolled 1,200-kilometer border with Angola. Of even greater importance was UNITA's access to a large supply of alluvial, gem quality diamonds that would provide the funds for a larger and better armed and equipped insurgency, less dependent on external patrons.³³

Shortly after Luanda's 1983 offensive concluded, UNITA redoubled its efforts to put semiconventional forces into the field. On August 3, 1983, 3,000 UNITA troops, supported by 50-60 artillery pieces, attacked Cangamba, one of the few towns still occupied by government troops in Cuando Cubango Province. A small contingent of South African military personnel served as artillery spotters and also supported UNITA's logistics and intelligence operations. Approximately 800 government troops and 82 Cuban soldiers held out for nine days. Dozens of Cuban airstrikes and the arrival of heliborne reinforcements, including 77 Cuban commandos and 140 FAPLA troops, disrupted UNITA's rear lines and slowed their advance. UNITA artillery fired several thousand rounds while its infantry gradually moved through minefields that killed or wounded hundreds of advancing troops. The assault on Cangamba set off loud alarms in Havana and Luanda as the town's defensive lines slowly shrank to a small one-hundred-meter by one-hundred-meter area surrounding the airport. Cuban officials feared that UNITA might kill or capture a large number of their troops. The political and psychological impact of such losses, as well as the prospect that they might have to negotiate a prisoner exchange directly with Savimbi, heightened anxiety in the upper ranks of Cuban commanders as well as political leaders in Havana. General Leopoldo Cintra Frias flew to Menongue from his headquarters in Luanda to oversee the reinforcement, and eventually a rescue operation, of Cuban forces at Cangamba. Fidel Castro also deemed it necessary to directly supervise efforts to send relief columns from Menongue and Huambo. These operations failed. UNITA closed in on the encircled garrison as Cuban piloted MiG-21s and helicopter gunships flew dozens of missions against forces whose positions were so close to one another that pilots occasionally risked firing on their own troops. South African advisors also authorized helicopter flights to provide UNITA with additional supplies as well as evacuating seriously wounded combatants. Subsequent flights delivered SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and a C-130 also was used to para-drop ammunition for UNITA.³⁴

By August 10, after more than five days of constant Cuban air raids, UNITA fell back from positions inside Cangamba to regroup. Cuban and FAPLA officers assured their troops they had defeated UNITA. A company of FAPLA's 54th Brigade was flown in to reoccupy some of the town's outermost defenses. Fidel Castro and the Cuban high command nevertheless decided that the cost of defending Cangamba against a likely future UNITA attack was prohibitive. Cangamba's distance from provincial capitals, the local terrain, and the presence of UNITA guerrillas in the surrounding districts made overland supply columns unreliable. An air bridge would be too costly

due to aircraft fuel and logistics requirements. Consequently, Cuban commanders notified President dos Santos and his Soviet advisors that Cuban troops were to be withdrawn from Cangamba as the pending rainy season would make it even more difficult to defend the town. Over the objections of Cuban officers, Russian advisors urged dos Santos to keep FAPLA troops at Cangamba. President dos Santos postponed a final decision and FAPLA officers failed to arrive at a consensus. Cuba flew additional helicopters to Cangamba and the last of its troops departed by August 12, having suffered 18 killed and 28 wounded during the nine-day battle. Cangamba's defense was left to a slightly reinforced FAPLA garrison.³⁵

The FAPLA headquarters at Cangamba was situated in heavily fortified bunkers. Savimbi had not expected a protracted battle and, concerned by rising UNITA casualties and the prospect of having to call off the siege, asked his South African allies to conduct an air raid on the garrison. The South African government agreed to an unprecedented escalation of support for UNITA, and on August 14, four Buccaneer and four Canberra Bombers dropped 24 one-thousand-pound bombs and 36 five-hundred-pound bombs on FAPLA's bunkers.³⁶ UNITA forces subsequently breached the garrisons' last lines of defense and, within a matter of several hours, secured control of a town almost completely destroyed by more than a week of artillery fire, Cuban air raids, and protracted infantry battles in the town center. Casualty counts vary but both sides likely sustained several hundred dead or wounded. The siege of Cangamba was not strategically significant for Luanda, Havana, or UNITA, but the August 1983 battle did introduce a new phase of intense combat that ultimately would draw Havana and Pretoria more deeply into the Angolan civil war.

Savimbi and his South African advisors may have questioned whether UNITA was ready to conduct additional semiconventional military operations. One month later, however, UNITA sustained the momentum generated by its victory at Cangamba, routing smaller government garrisons at Calulo and Mussende, less than 225 kilometers from Luanda. The government gradually regained the tactical initiative by mustering ten FAPLA brigades to reoccupy the two towns and followed up with yet another ineffective counterinsurgency campaign that lasted until October 1983.

By late 1983, Savimbi had created units that were fully engaged in what Mao Zedong had described as a form of "warfare [whose] content is quick decision offensive warfare . . . [whose] characteristics are regular armies . . . and fluidity . . . which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides."³⁷ Savimbi continued to remind outside observers, however, that he was pursuing a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory. In a mid-1983 interview he insisted that "we are not trying to establish a conventional army. Our main strength is to concentrate on developing a well-trained highly mobile guerrilla force."³⁸

UNITA's military evolution was politically embellished with frequent communiqués bearing the motto "Socialism, *Negritude*, Democracy and Nonalignment." The reference to "Negritude" was perhaps the most

problematic in what it might have implied about UNITA's domestic policy preferences, since it alienated some Angolans while appealing to others. As it emerged in the 1950s, *negritude* frequently was associated with prominent African literary figures, including Senegal's first president Leopold Senghor, and emphasized a sense of pride in the accomplishments and institutions of Africa's precolonial culture. In its more extreme expression, it was viewed by some as a form of benign racism meant to compensate for centuries of European denigration of African civilization. Alternatively, some proponents of *negritude* saw it as a vehicle for promoting antiwhite, antiEuropean sentiments as well as a rejection of those Africans who had adopted the lifestyles of colonial rulers. For some mestizo MPLA members and others who had enjoyed the status of *assimilado* in the colonial era, UNITA's official espousal of *negritude* was regarded as further evidence that there could be no negotiated settlement between the two sides.³⁹

In early 1983, prior to the Cangamba debacle, Angolan officials sought further support from Moscow and Havana resulting in the arrival of more Russian advisors and five thousand additional Cuban troops. The Angolan Defense Ministry also had initiated a major reform of the nation's military establishment. FAPLA officers formulated new counterinsurgency operations in a series of zones extending from the Atlantic coast to the Zambian border. The government issued a decree authorizing President dos Santos to establish regional councils responsible for conducting military operations as well as determining political and economic policies in threatened areas. Although they answered to the president, the councils had extensive powers, including the ability to control and requisition personnel and matériel, as well as the right to conduct trials for crimes deemed a threat to state security.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, quantity rather than quality seemed to dominate strategic thought in Moscow, Havana, and Luanda. There is little evidence that Angola or its allies felt obliged to radically redesign the strategy or tactics of periodic campaigns to retake territory or disperse insurgent forces.

The lack of a sharper focus on UNITA was partially due to the unanticipated resurgence of guerrilla campaigns in northwestern Angola and the Cabinda enclave. Neither Holden Roberto's FNLA nor the secessionist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) had yet recovered from their 1975-76 military defeats when Zaire's president Mobutu reconciled with Angolan president Neto months after the 1978 Shaba II Crisis. Mobutu ordered Roberto and FNLA and FLEC leaders to leave Zaire by November 11, 1978. Both movements splintered in the aftermath of the expulsion order. Several FNLA leaders returned to Luanda and aligned themselves with the MPLA. Disgruntled FLEC leaders regrouped and reappeared in several factions defined by policy and personal disputes.⁴¹ By the late 1970s, however, it was clear neither FNLA nor FLEC combatants had forsaken their cause. A Gulf Oil Company official acknowledged in late 1980 that FLEC insurgents had sabotaged the company's onshore oil pipeline in Cabinda on four occasions between 1976 and 1979.⁴² By mid-1983, a FLEC spokesman claimed his forces controlled two-thirds of the 7,300-square-kilometer

enclave. In reality FLEC forces, comprising only several hundred lightly armed insurgents, moved relatively freely through, but did not control, the enclave's interior. In 1983 FLEC's growing self-confidence also led the guerrillas to request Cuban mediation in opening negotiations with the MPLA; initial contacts subsequently took place inside Cabinda in 1984, but made no progress toward a peaceful resolution.⁴³

The FNLA likewise had renewed a limited guerrilla campaign in Angola's northwestern provinces in 1979. In late 1982 and early 1983, a series of attacks on small villages and military convoys reflected the emergence of an insurgent force, led by former Roberto lieutenants, known as the Military Committee of Resistance in Angola (COMIRA).⁴⁴ Like their FLEC colleagues, FNLA/COMIRA guerrillas, probably numbering no more than 1,000–1,500 combatants equipped with limited quantities of weapons, controlled little, if any, territory. Nevertheless, their presence diverted FAPLA brigades and probably several thousand Cuban troops that could have been deployed against the growing UNITA threat in central and northeastern Angola.

PRETORIA'S WIDENING WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST

Neither the COMIRA nor the Cabindan insurgency had nearly the distracting military impact of South African military operations. In the early 1980s, repeated large-scale South African incursions against SWAPO's base camps forced Luanda increasingly to shift its military focus, and more of its troops, to the defense of the country's southwestern border. In the wake of Operation Reindeer (1978), subsequent cross border operations thoroughly disrupted SWAPO's bases and infiltration routes. They also took a mounting toll on Angolan government garrisons, and damaged vital elements of the country's infrastructure. Between 1978 and 1983, the SADF staged at least two large offensives annually into southwestern Angola. From late May to mid-June 1980 Pretoria committed two thousand troops to overlapping operations code-named "Sceptic" and "Smokeshell," attacking SWAPO camps more than one hundred kilometers inside Angola.⁴⁵ In mid-August 1981, a brigade-sized SADF force launched Operation Protea, directed at FAPLA and SWAPO bases in N'Giva and Xangongo, which also housed several Russian advisors who had arrived recently to establish a forward air defense position. Government and SWAPO positions collapsed quickly. By the time Operation Protea ended, in early September 1981, SADF troops had captured three thousand to four thousand tons of military equipment including small arms, tanks, armored cars, antiaircraft guns, artillery, and two hundred trucks. Pretoria subsequently opted to maintain a permanent SADF presence at Xangongo and N'Giva to prevent SWAPO from reestablishing their bases, thereby forcing the insurgents to establish camps further north of the Namibian border.⁴⁶

International condemnation failed to sway Pretoria, and in early November 1981 South Africa deployed another mechanized force to attack a SWAPO base containing more than one thousand insurgents. SADF troops moved

240 kilometers inside Angola during Operation Daisy, their deepest drive across the border since the 1975 Operation Savannah campaign.⁴⁷ SADF further eroded their adversary's supply lines by launching smaller, more frequent, and more daring raids deep inside Angola. In late November 1981, commandos staged from South African naval vessels off the Angolan coast infiltrated Luanda's harbor and sabotaged a large oil refinery complex.⁴⁸ Between late December 1981 and January 1982 South African Air Force (SAAF) aircraft struck targets more than 350 kilometers north of the Angolan border.⁴⁹ On October 4, 1982, Angolan officials claimed that South African forces, during the preceding nine months, had landed heliborne troops in Angola on 96 occasions, and had conducted 18 air strikes and nearly 600 reconnaissance flights.⁵⁰

SWAPO commanders and their Angolan hosts were undeterred by the SADF campaigns. In late 1983, SADF acquired intelligence indicating a SWAPO plan to infiltrate one thousand guerrillas into northern Namibia. Pretoria launched Operation Askari on December 20, 1983, sending five combat groups, roughly battalion-sized forces, toward Cahama and Cuvélai in southwestern Angola where they soon encountered a brigade-sized force comprising SWAPO, FAPLA, and Cuban troops. The first SADF-Cuban conventional battle since 1975 lasted two days before the latter and their FAPLA and SWAPO allies broke off the engagement. South African reinforcements arrived in early January and SADF troops occupied Cuvélai on January 5, 1984.⁵¹ Moscow's reaction to Pretoria's offensive briefly threatened to turn southwestern Angola into a more significant Cold War battlefield. Soviet officials had previously informed their South African counterparts at the United Nations, in November 1983, that they were aware of Pretoria's plans to launch Operation Askari and implied that they would respond forcefully to a South African offensive. As a further signal of Moscow's determination to stand by the MPLA, a Soviet aircraft carrier and three combatant surface vessels deployed to the South Atlantic. As SADF forces closed in on Cuvélai, Soviet officials issued additional public statements vaguely warning South Africa of unspecified adverse consequences if their offensive continued.⁵²

A DIPLOMATIC RESPITE

A series of diplomatic initiatives abruptly diminished the threat that regional tensions might become a global crisis. South Africa launched a diplomatic offensive that paralleled the SADF's Operation Askari. Pretoria offered, in late December 1983, to pull its troops out of the Angolan territory over which its forces had established *de facto* control since Operation Protea. South African officials indicated they would allow FAPLA to reestablish a military presence if Luanda agreed to control SWAPO movements north of Cunene Province, thereby turning most of southwestern Angola into a "no go" area. Subsequent contacts between Angolan officials, South African representatives, and U.S. mediators culminated in the February 16, 1984, signing of the Lusaka Accord. The agreement provided for the phased

withdrawal of SADF troops and the reintroduction of FAPLA forces in a sector of Cunene Province, referred to as "the area in question" (AIQ). Pretoria and Luanda established a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to verify the completion of the predetermined withdrawal phases. The Lusaka Accord briefly raised hopes for the resumption of long-stalled efforts to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) calling for Namibian independence and subsequently linked U.S.–South African demands for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Angolan officials, for the first time, agreed to consider such a linkage, but Luanda's and South Africa's initial bargaining positions for Cuban troop withdrawal timetables and Namibian independence remained far apart.⁵³

Negotiations designed to build on the initial benefits of the JMC stalled amid growing recriminations concerning clandestine SWAPO and SADF operations in the southwest. South African and Angolan members of the JMC recorded nearly one hundred alleged violations in 1984. Despite the SADF's gradual withdrawal, and FAPLA's reoccupation of the AIQ, the Lusaka Accord slowly collapsed over the next 14 months. The last South African troops pulled out of Cunene Province on April 17, 1985.⁵⁴ On May 22, 1985, Angolan forces apprehended a SADF commando unit that had infiltrated Cabinda to destroy several oil storage tanks. SADF officers intended to give FLEC or UNITA credit for the attack had it succeeded. The FAPLA capture of a SADF captain and the death of two other commandos exposed Pretoria's role in the operation.⁵⁵ The Cabinda raid proved to be the undoing of the Lusaka Accord. Pretoria was temporarily discredited as a reliable interlocutor in regional negotiations. Developments in Washington compounded the diplomatic damage done in Cabinda. The U.S. Congress's decision in June 1985 to repeal the 1975 Clark Amendment, which prohibited U.S. aid to any combatants in the Angolan civil war, allowed President Reagan to follow through on earlier proposals to resume military support for UNITA.

UNITA's ties to South Africa continued to be a mixed blessing in the aftermath of Pretoria's repeated drives into southwestern Angola. Savimbi's ability to equip some of his forces as semiconventional units had been fueled, in part, by SADF training and support. Moreover Pretoria had turned over many of the arms and other supplies its forces seized from SWAPO camps during operations "Protea" and "Askari." These sources represented a significant portion of UNITA's arsenals; but evidence that SADF had attributed commando raids to UNITA, whether against oil facilities in Cabinda or other economic targets in Angola, eroded the credibility of UNITA's claim to represent a genuine nationalist movement. Notwithstanding UNITA's military accomplishments during the early 1980s, an American academic authority observed in late 1985 that "it is virtually impossible to determine to what extent UNITA's military successes of recent years are due to UNITA's own or South African prowess."⁵⁶ These doubts lingered and were later amplified as the conventional combat that dominated the next four years of the civil war shifted the world's attention from the southwestern to the southeastern corner of Angola.

MAVINGA: MILITARY FOCAL POINT OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

In the early 1980s, FAPLA's counterinsurgency campaigns occasionally dispersed UNITA guerrillas but offered no hope of achieving a decisive victory. Luanda concluded that the most likely way to alter the prevailing military balance was to concentrate on UNITA's semiconventional forces, their logistics network, and Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba. Regaining control of Mavinga was clearly a critical factor in realizing these goals. The augmentation of FAPLA's arsenals, supported by a contingent of Russian advisors that had grown to 2,500 members and a Cuban force that steadily climbed to 37,500 by 1987, encouraged Luanda to conduct six large offensives directed at Mavinga in the 1980s. Soviet Bloc suppliers had delivered an estimated \$1 billion worth of military hardware to Angola between 1977 and 1982. From 1982 to 1984, Luanda received arms deliveries worth \$2 billion. An additional \$2 billion worth of military aid arrived by 1988.⁵⁷ Combatants on both sides committed successively larger numbers of troops, weapons, and matériel. The losses they sustained in the Mavinga campaigns ultimately constituted a sizeable portion of the total number of fatalities suffered by Angolans and their allies during the civil war.

There is considerable literature available that discusses the importance of the 1987 offensive, which is frequently described as the opening round in a series of battles that eventually shifted the regional military balance in favor of Luanda and its SWAPO allies. Alternatively, the 1987 campaign and subsequent battles in 1988 are portrayed as military turning points that finally persuaded Havana to accept the controversial negotiating option of "linkage" between the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and a South African departure leading to Namibian independence.⁵⁸ The military ramifications of the Mavinga campaigns have received less attention than their political and diplomatic consequences. Some accounts of the Angolan civil war tend to lump the large battles at Mavinga, particularly the 1987 offensive, into catchall accounts of Soviet misadventures in Third World counterinsurgency warfare. Russian military advisors, however, may have viewed the Angolan battlefield as a military laboratory in which to test weapons and tactics. The major offensives focused on Mavinga in the late 1980s indicated that Soviet tacticians and their Angolan clients progressively learned some valuable military lessons, although these insights proved to be too few and too late to reverse the trends set in motion at the beginning of the decade.

EARLY EBB AND FLOW

After its September 1980 loss of Mavinga, Luanda was determined to prevent UNITA from utilizing the town as a supply base on an expanding network of roads and footpaths that reinforced guerrillas in central Angola. Between March and May 1981 FAPLA attempted, on two occasions, to move south from Cuito Cuanavale to retake Mavinga. The March campaign failed as

UNITA forces dug in north of the town pushed government troops back.⁵⁹ Two FAPLA brigades participated in the May 1981 offensive and both were stalled on the banks of the Lomba River by a UNITA battalion and affiliated guerrilla columns. The insurgents deployed four additional battalions and finally forced a FAPLA retreat to Cuito Cuanavale.⁶⁰ In July 1982, FAPLA committed at least six brigades to a more ambitious offensive directed at Mavinga, Luengue, Ninda, and other UNITA-held towns in the southeast. UNITA communiqués claimed they faced twelve thousand FAPLA and five hundred Cuban troops. This campaign also fell short of its goals, ending in early October 1982 and leaving UNITA in possession of Mavinga and other previously held territory.⁶¹

UNITA's subsequent northern drive into provinces along the Zambian and Zairian border, the August 1983 victory at Cangamba, the December 1983 seizure of Cazombo, and the SADF's Operation Askari cumulatively drew FAPLA's attention from Mavinga for the next two years. Luanda also needed additional time to absorb new weapons Moscow had provided to reequip an increasingly demoralized FAPLA, including T-62 main battle tanks, MI-25 helicopter gunships, and MiG-23 jet fighters. Angola's armor and air inventories increased by 20 to 30 percent between 1981 and 1983 reflecting the arrival of 90 tanks, 26 aircraft, and 14 helicopters, which augmented an existing inventory of 285 tanks, 41 aircraft and 37 helicopters.⁶² Two large UNITA attacks in early 1984 underscored the urgency of assimilating this equipment. A UNITA brigade, comprised of 2,500 combatants, assaulted the FAPLA garrison at Cafunfo, a large diamond mining center in northeastern Angola, on February 23, 1984. The guerrillas captured more than 100 expatriates, including British, Portuguese, and Filipino citizens employed in nearby mining operations. Several weeks later, UNITA troops, variously estimated at between 1,500 and 5,000, attacked and briefly occupied Sumbe (formerly Novo Redondo), capital of Cuanza Sul Province. The guerrillas abducted four Bulgarian and ten Portuguese citizens and marched them back to their base at Jamba, where they joined a growing number of expatriates captured in attacks throughout the Angolan interior.⁶³ UNITA followed up these operations with a general offensive, emphasizing assaults on smaller targets in six provinces including a commando raid on a small oil refinery at Galinda, ninety kilometers south of Luanda.⁶⁴

Determined to stem the rising tide of UNITA operations in north-central Angola, Luanda deployed 13 brigades, backed by newly acquired MiG aircraft and helicopter gunships, against the UNITA-held town of Cazombo and other bases along the Zambian border. Fighting lasted from April 7 to July 27, 1984, as the insurgents gradually prevented government columns south of Luena from pushing into the southeast. UNITA combatants had stalled the lead FAPLA elements and the gradual failure of the government's logistic lines ended the offensive. Government forces regrouped and committed some 15,000 troops to a second offensive. From August to October 1984, 12 brigades operated on two axes in order to push UNITA forces out of western Moxico and eastern Bie Province and retake towns along roads

leading to Mavinga. UNITA counterattacks once again exploited weaknesses in FAPLA's logistics lines and compounded related command and control problems. The FAPLA campaign ended in late October 1984.

Neither of the two 1984 campaigns had managed to move troops more than fifty kilometers from the garrisons at which they commenced.⁶⁵ UNITA had committed 16 semiconventional battalions to stop FAPLA's second 1984 campaign. The FAPLA's Mi-25 Hinds targeted some of these formations, forcing Savimbi to break them down into smaller units. These compact insurgent groups subsequently relied on hit-and-run attacks rather than meeting FAPLA brigades head on. UNITA lost several hundred combatants and suffered more than 1,100 wounded in the 1984 offensives.⁶⁶

THE 1985 CAMPAIGN (OPERATION SECOND CONGRESS): TECHNICAL AND QUANTITATIVE MODIFICATIONS

Luanda deployed 22 brigades to a two-front offensive code-named "Operation Second Congress" in July 1985. Commanders seemed certain that a substantial numerical advantage, greater firepower, and operations across a broad front would assure success. Nine brigades, supplemented by tanks, moved into easternmost Angola intent on pushing UNITA out of Cazombo. The use of tanks represented a departure from past campaigns and prompted UNITA to search the international arms market for antiarmor weapons more potent than the B-10 recoilless rifles and RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers they previously had employed. As Luena-based government forces advanced to the east, FAPLA launched a nearly simultaneous drive to the south to prevent UNITA from shifting forces between the two fronts, as they had in the 1984 campaign. Eleven infantry brigades, following two approaches, moved south from Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga. One contingent marched east along the road between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga and then turned due south, paralleling the road, to avoid large minefields as it approached the outskirts of Mavinga. The second FAPLA column deployed from Cuito Cuanavale and moved south to the headwaters of the Lomba River, intending to reach Mavinga from the west. By September 7, 1985, FAPLA's two-front strategy appeared to be on the verge of success. UNITA's forces had been divided and weakened by their efforts to block government forces on both fronts. FAPLA troops had reached Mavinga's outer defenses, and were roughly forty kilometers short of their goal.⁶⁷

UNITA commanders were forced to abandon territory in the Cazombo salient and transfer troops south to bolster their defense of Mavinga. SAAF transports played a critical support role in this redeployment, ferrying two thousand UNITA troops from the Cazombo salient to the Mavinga front in four days.⁶⁸ Pretoria also decided to substantially expand its assistance to UNITA, which, with the exception of the 1983 air raid on Cangamba, had consisted primarily of arms, fuel, and other matériel. A SADF multiple rocket launcher battery deployed to the Mavinga area. SAAF Impala and Mirage

aircraft flew at least six combat missions in support of UNITA, shooting down an Angolan MiG-21 jet fighter and six MI-8 Hip transport helicopters.⁶⁹ By early October 1985, nearly ninety days after it began, the FAPLA drive on Mavinga had been stopped less than twenty kilometers outside the town. The 4,000-man FAPLA force lost some 1,000 killed and 1,300 wounded. UNITA sustained 1,500 casualties, including killed and wounded personnel, a significant loss for the estimated 5,500 defenders. Operation Second Congress was, at best, a mixed success for both sides. FAPLA commanders had hoped to capture Mavinga during the MPLA's Second Party Congress in October 1985 but had to settle for retaking Cazombo. UNITA had succeeded in retaining Mavinga but Savimbi realized that Luanda was determined, and sufficiently well armed, to prevent the movement of the insurgents' semiconventional forces into northern Angola.

In a subsequent assessment of the 1985 campaign, Savimbi acknowledged that "the Soviet-Cuban strategy was a radical departure from past offensives. The Soviet-Cuban and MPLA troops brought a much larger number of trucks and armored cars with them and so they were able to carry much larger supplies of food, fuel and ammunition. They were able to move faster and farther without leaving vulnerable supply lines in their wake." Moreover, Savimbi had observed, "a change in tactics, weapons and intensity," particularly as demonstrated by the government troops' "surround[ing] their 'soft trucks' with armored trucks so that we could not destroy their supplies, and then moved forward with armor in flanking moves attempting to surround our defensive positions." He also acknowledged that "helicopter gun ships would arrive within fifteen minutes of each engagement to provide air cover. Artillery shelling was also better coordinated and more accurate" and concluded, "It was a completely different war than we had fought in the offensives of 1982 through 1984."⁷⁰

FAPLA commanders and their Soviet-Cuban advisors drew slightly different conclusions whose validity they were determined to test for the remainder of the decade. They were confident that UNITA's semiconventional forces at Mavinga, relying solely on tactics of attrition, could not withstand one or more large, Cuban-backed columns. Russian advisors also decided that any future campaign would require the deployment of a force capable of neutralizing South African air power.

OPERATION IRON FIST (1986)

Although Russian military advisors shared Luanda's enthusiasm for renewed and even more ambitious campaigns in the southeast, successful UNITA operations in north-central Angola provided a one-year respite to Savimbi's forces at Mavinga. Between January and March 1986 UNITA struck numerous villages and several FAPLA garrisons in Cuanza Norte, Uige, Huila, and Lunda Provinces. UNITA forces also attacked and occupied Munhango, a small town on the Benguela rail line, where Savimbi subsequently held a press conference for foreign correspondents, further embarrassing Luanda.

These bold strikes in central Angola were matched by UNITA's escalating operations in Uíge and elsewhere in the northwest where the insurgents successfully recruited among local Kimbundu and Bakongo populations. This pool of recruits already had been supplemented by the 1984 collapse of the COMIRA insurgency, largely due to an understanding between President dos Santos and Zaire's president Mobutu that had left at least several hundred COMIRA guerrillas without support or leadership.⁷¹ In a tacit exchange for Mobutu's pressure on Zaire-based COMIRA leaders to return to Angola, dos Santos relocated FLNC combatants from eastern Angola to camps in the northwest where they posed no immediate threat to Zaire's southeastern Shaba Province. While many Kinshasa-based COMIRA leaders and several thousand civilian supporters in northwestern Angola rallied to Luanda, some COMIRA combatants decided to join UNITA's ranks.⁷² Zaire's expulsion of residual COMIRA forces failed to improve relations with Angola. Mobutu continued to collaborate with UNITA. Moreover, after they had concluded a 1985 agreement to begin training Cabindan insurgents, UNITA forces transited Zaire in early 1986 to jointly conduct low-level operations with FLEC guerrillas in Cabinda. Luanda responded to the growing northern threat by deploying an additional two thousand FAPLA troops to Cabinda.⁷³

UNITA's intensified operations in central and northwestern Angola successfully diluted the impact of the Operation Iron Fist offensive that FAPLA launched on May 27, 1986. Two large columns advanced from Luena; one headed west toward Munhango while the other advanced south to Lum-bala N'Guimbo. A third column deployed from Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga. UNITA ordered small units to harass FAPLA rather than commit semiconventional battalions to large battles. The insurgents also used U.S.-supplied Stinger surface-to-air missiles and antitank weapons that Washington had delivered shortly before Iron Fist began. Russian planners had expected to rapidly direct matériel and combat air support from front to front, as needed. This premise proved faulty, as SADF and UNITA struck key blows that undermined some of the operation's supply lines. A South African naval commando raid at the port of Namibe on June 5, 1986, destroyed several oil storage tanks, sank a freighter, and seriously damaged two Russian cargo vessels. UNITA forces further crippled FAPLA's logistics network by repeatedly attacking vehicle convoys moving east from Menongue.⁷⁴

On August 9, 1986, UNITA and South African forces unexpectedly seized the tactical initiative and attacked Cuito Cuanavale. South African artillery, aircraft, and a limited number of infantry supported an estimated four thousand UNITA troops. The attackers briefly pushed FAPLA troops back from defensive positions on the town's outskirts, damaged the airport's radar installations, and sabotaged the vital road bridge over the Cuito River. Whether Savimbi and his allies intended to occupy the town or merely destroy critical facilities at Cuito Cuanavale is uncertain, but the attack critically undermined the FAPLA drive into the southeast.⁷⁵

By early August, government advances on two of the three fronts had stalled. The UNITA/SADF threat to its rear bases forced FAPLA troops to

suspend their drive on Mavinga, fall back to relieve their colleagues, and repair the damage to facilities at Cuito Cuanavale. The FAPLA advance toward Lumbala N'Guimbo also had bogged down by late August, near Lucusse, eighty kilometers south of their launching point at Luena. Only the FAPLA march on Munhango succeeded; government forces finally reoccupied the town on August 28, 1986. UNITA had abandoned Munhango several days earlier, rather than risk large losses defending territory whose political significance they already had exploited by staging Savimbi's press conference. Their need to replenish the supplies used in the three-month campaign and the imminent onset of the rainy season gradually sapped FAPLA officers' and their Russian advisors' enthusiasm for further offensive operations in the remaining months of 1986.⁷⁶

"THE RETURN OF THE ELEPHANTS": THE 1987 MAVINGA CAMPAIGN

After the 1985 Mavinga offensive, Savimbi had compared Angola's Russian advisors to "elephants who come and go on the same track" and indicated that he expected additional assaults on Mavinga.⁷⁷ The "elephants" confirmed his analysis in 1987. After only a year's respite, FAPLA's Soviet and Cuban advisors redirected their attention to Mavinga.⁷⁸ Moscow delivered additional arms including jet aircraft, attack helicopters, and BMP armored personnel carriers that enhanced the arsenals of an army whose ranks had more than doubled, since the early 1980s, to a force of 120,000 troops organized into 72 brigades.⁷⁹

By mid-1987, Luanda had deployed eight FAPLA brigades to the Cuito Cuanavale area. Soviet advisors urged Luanda to pursue a broader, more elaborate campaign. Luanda committed five brigades from Luena to seize Cangamba and Lumbala N'Guimbo. Three brigades deployed to Munhango to cut UNITA logistic lines intersecting the Benguela rail line. Mavinga however, remained the principle objective. In August 1987, four brigades—the 16th, 21st, 47th, and 59th—accompanied by newly created Tactical Groups—moved toward the headwaters of the Cunzumbia and Lomba Rivers north of Mavinga.⁸⁰ "Tactical Groups" were described as "multibattalion forces smaller than brigade strength, grouped for a particular operation or task."⁸¹ Whether the appearance of Tactical Groups heralded a tactical innovation or an unorthodox unit formation was still uncertain.

The tactical initiative shifted less than a month after the 1987 offensive began. South African forces, committed to Operation Modular, had arrived at UNITA base camps in the Jamba area by early August. On September 10, 1987, several UNITA battalions and a SADF force comprising troops from the 101st Battalion, armored vehicles from the 61st Mechanized Battalion, and a battery of 155-mm (G5) artillery repulsed the FAPLA 21st Brigade's attempt to establish a bridgehead across the Lomba River, west of Mavinga. UNITA/SADF forces also attacked the 59th Brigade on the north bank of the Lomba three days later, forcing Angolan troops to retreat. For the next

nine days, SADF artillery barrages and SAAF bombing raids gradually decimated the 59th Brigade as well as the 47th, whose rate of advance toward Mavinga along the southern bank of the Lomba had slowed to less than one kilometer per day. The turning point in the offensive occurred on October 3, when SADF/UNITA elements attacked the 47th Brigade as it sought to link up with the 21st and 59th Brigades. The FAPLA's rising casualties, the loss of dozens of tanks and armored vehicles, and repeated UNITA attacks on their logistics lines, finally caused government troops to fall back to Cuito Cuanavale rather than attempt a renewed push on Mavinga.⁸²

By late October, after additional UNITA/SADF counterattacks, FAPLA had suffered losses of some 3,600 killed and 10,000 wounded out of an estimated 18,000 deployed at the start of the campaign. These figures continued to rise as UNITA and SADF troops pursued the retreating FAPLA units.⁸³ Shifting from Operation Modular to Operation Hooper, Pretoria decided in early October to commit Olifant tanks and G-6 self-propelled 155-mm howitzers, augmenting an infantry force of 3,000-4,000 SADF troops. The aim of Operation Hooper was to thwart a FAPLA effort to regroup at the headwaters of the Chambinga River, approximately half the distance between Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale. South African air raids and the SADF's more potent artillery threat to Cuito Cuanavale forced Cuban- and Angolan-piloted aircraft to abandon the local airbase and relocate to Menongue, significantly diminishing the Angolan Air Force's ability to stop the SADF/UNITA counteroffensive.

Despite the introduction of several new weapons systems and novel unit formations in the 1987 offensive, Angolan forces were overwhelmed as quickly as they had been two years earlier during Operation Second Congress. The introduction of SA-8 GECKO and SA-13 GASKIN mobile surface-to-air missile launchers probably was the most unique feature of the 1987 campaign. Both systems were new to the Angolan inventory and the delivery of the SA-8 marked its initial appearance in sub-Saharan Africa.⁸⁴ While the SA-8 deployment had a somewhat chilling effect on South African pilots, FAPLA's augmented air defense units failed to prevent SAAF aircraft from dominating the skies over Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga. A SADF officer observed that FAPLA brigades approached Mavinga in a roughly five kilometer square formation, a vulnerable target for SAAF pilots who routinely dropped 450-kilogram high-explosive bombs with little apparent concern for FAPLA's air defense systems.⁸⁵ Ultimately, Pretoria's early October deployment of self-propelled 155-mm artillery and Olifant tanks had an even more devastating effect on Angolan army units as they retreated from the Lomba River.⁸⁶

A UNITA-SADF pursuit inflicted a steadily mounting number of casualties and the cohesiveness of virtually all FAPLA units suffered. By early November 1987 one of the Tactical Groups acknowledged that it had exhausted its supplies. The unit's strength had been reduced to little more than a battalion of officers due to large numbers of casualties and desertions.⁸⁷ On November 11, 1987, SADF/UNITA forces pushed FAPLA troops further west, back across the Cuito River, shrinking Cuito Cuanavale's defensive perimeter.

South African airstrikes and artillery fire pinned the garrison down through December while SADF rotated infantry units and consolidated recent gains. A January 13, 1988, night attack drove the FAPLA 21st Brigade back from positions on the outskirts of Cuito Cuanavale, leaving UNITA forces within 12 kilometers of the central FAPLA base while South African guns fired 200 rounds a day on government positions. On February 14, UNITA and SADF forces attacked the FAPLA 21st and 59th Brigades respectively. The SADF 32nd Battalion launched a simultaneous attack on Menongue to prevent Angolan government aircraft from flying combat missions over Cuito Cuanavale, where FAPLA units had pulled back to a defensive perimeter only eight kilometers outside the town. A large, indecisive battle on February 25, 1988, pitted SADF/UNITA forces against elements of the 21st, 25th, and 59th Brigades. The attackers failed to seize a large logistics base but the defenders withdrew to even more constricted defensive lines. Confident that FAPLA forces would not regroup their forces for a renewed drive on Mavinga, SADF commanders concluded Operation Hooper and commenced Operation Packer, which called for a tactical disengagement and withdrawal of 1,500 SADF forces from southeastern Angola.

The 1987–88 Mavinga campaign and its aftermath had been disastrous for Luanda, which suffered some 4,700 killed, the loss of at least 61 tanks, 12 combat aircraft, nearly 400 logistics vehicles, more than 80 armored personnel carriers, and numerous artillery pieces. SADF officers acknowledged 30 killed; 90 wounded; the loss of 2 Mirage aircraft, 3 Olifant tanks, and 4 armored vehicles; and a modest number of logistics vehicles damaged.⁸⁸ UNITA claimed 20 Cubans died and 70 were wounded and also alleged that 4 Soviet military personnel were killed and 31 wounded during the offensive.⁸⁹ UNITA also sustained substantial losses, with possibly as many 3,000 combatants killed and likely many more wounded between the 1987 Mavinga and 1988 Cuito Cuanavale battles.⁹⁰

By late February 1988, when FAPLA began to consolidate defensive lines around Cuito Cuanavale, the armor component of at least one Tactical Group had been significantly reorganized and now included a tank battalion staffed with a mixture of Cuban and Angolan personnel.⁹¹ The restructuring of the Tactical Group was one of the more glaring indications of Havana's growing concern about the regional military balance and Fidel Castro's recent decision to deploy an additional ten thousand troops to augment the forty thousand Cuban soldiers already in Angola.⁹² The first few hundred Cuban troops had arrived in Cuito Cuanavale in December 1987 and were followed shortly thereafter by a Cuban infantry regiment and a tank company.⁹³ The augmented Cuban contingent at Cuito Cuanavale and the gradual drawdown of SADF forces coincided with a gradual reduction in the scale and frequency of combat. UNITA/SADF forces made one final attempt, on March 23, 1988, to push FAPLA forces, located west of the Cuito River, into a smaller defensive perimeter around Cuito Cuanavale. This drive failed and effectively marked the end of the 1987–88 campaign. SADF General Geldenhuys announced, on

April 18, that the ongoing SADF tactical withdrawal had reduced his forces inside southeastern Angola to some one thousand troops.⁹⁴

THE BRAZZAVILLE ACCORD AND A REDEFINITION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

The disastrous battle at Mavinga and the protracted siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced Angolan combatants and their patrons to reassess their military and diplomatic options. Soviet officials had grown increasingly concerned, since the early 1980s, about the stability of Third World client regimes facing indigenous challenges that threatened to reverse the gains Moscow had made in the previous decade. As these threats grew, in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Russian military analysts questioned the advisability of offering additional economic and military aid to their embattled clients.⁹⁵ Moscow's perestroika (restructuring) policy increasingly had emphasized collaboration over confrontation with the West in resolving geopolitically less-significant Third World disputes. By early November 1987, Soviet leaders expressed growing enthusiasm for a political settlement in Angola. U.S. officials encouraged this reassessment but acknowledged that Moscow had offered no detailed diplomatic strategy for coping with the immediate military crisis confronting Luanda in late 1987.⁹⁶

Fidel Castro, however, had perceived an opportunity to relocate the focal point of the military crisis from southeastern to southwestern Angola, thereby setting the stage for a U.S.-brokered exit strategy that accommodated both Havana's and Pretoria's diplomatic and military requirements. After they had overruled a late 1987 Angolan decision to abandon Cuito Cuanavale and retreat to Menongue, Cuban officers under Fidel Castro's direct supervision took command of Cuito Cuanavale's defense in late January 1988. By early February 1988, an estimated 3,500 Cuban troops had moved into Cunene Province. Additional forces arrived during the next three months, and by late May, 11,000-12,000 Cuban troops were deployed along a four-hundred-kilometer front with several positions situated near the Namibian border. Cuban engineering units upgraded Angolan airfields at Cahama and Xangongo, enabling them to support MiG-23 Floggers and helicopter gunships. Two hundred tanks and additional artillery batteries also augmented Havana's front line forces in the southwest.⁹⁷

Fidel Castro made numerous public pronouncements in early 1988, describing Cuba's move into the southwest as part of an aggressive strategy to force South Africa to leave Angola and grant independence to South West Africa/Namibia.⁹⁸ Military and diplomatic evidence, however, indicate that Castro's primary aim was to provide Havana an honorable exit from an unwinnable war. Cuba never seriously contemplated a decisive military showdown with Pretoria. The rate at which Cuban forces advanced was extraordinarily slow, taking several months to move troops less than three hundred kilometers south of the Namibe-Menongue rail line. This cautious pace strongly suggested an ardent desire to avoid provoking a large scale South

African counterattack. Moreover, in January 1988, months before Cuban troops had reached the Angolan-Namibian border, Cuba already had agreed, for the first time, to discuss a total withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola as part of a negotiated Angolan/Southwest African settlement. Havana's previous expressions of interest in a Cuban troop withdrawal had been limited to heavily conditioned, partial drawdowns. In March 1988, as Cuban forces had moved closer to the Angola-South West African border, Havana's representatives agreed that a total troop withdrawal from Angola was a necessary component of any diplomatic settlement.⁹⁹ Furthermore, unbeknownst to South African officials and U.S. mediators, Castro had secretly agreed with Moscow that Cuban troops would not cross the Angolan/Namibian border.¹⁰⁰

Castro's plan to stage-manage Cuba's exit from Angola was not risk free. South Africa was equally determined to avoid the appearance of negotiating from a position of weakness. In late May 1988, after Havana refused South African demands for public assurances that Cuban forces would not move south of the Angolan border, Pretoria moved reinforcements to northern South West Africa/Namibia and called up additional units of its 140,000 member Citizen Force. SADF and Cuban troops had skirmished briefly as Havana's forces approached the border. On June 26 1988, South African armor and artillery engaged Cuban mechanized forces at Techipa, some fifty kilometers north of the border, killing several hundred Cuban troops. Cuba retaliated with an air strike, the next day, against SADF positions at the Calueque hydroelectric facility. Fighters bombed a bridge and the dam, killing nearly a dozen South African troops as well as damaging the pumping station and water facilities. Both sides quickly pulled back to avoid an escalation of hostilities and, more importantly, to permit ongoing diplomatic efforts to craft a negotiated settlement.¹⁰¹

In early May 1988, shortly before the clash at Techipa, U.S., Angolan, Cuban, and South African representatives met in London to begin the first in a series of negotiating sessions. South African, Cuban, and Angolan representatives signed protocols in Geneva, Switzerland on August 5, 1988, and Brazzaville, Congo on December 13, 1988. The Geneva Protocol required SADF to begin pulling troops out of Angola on August 10, 1988, and anticipated their complete withdrawal in the following month. The Brazzaville Protocol called for the UN to verify commitments concerning Cuban troop withdrawals and Namibian independence. On December 22, 1988, Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral agreement in New York that provided for the "Termination of the Internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent." The protocol outlined a phased redeployment schedule for fifty thousand Cuban troops in Angola, whereby Havana would move its forces back from Angola's southern border, initially to the fifteenth parallel and subsequently to the thirteenth parallel. A final withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola was to be completed by July 1, 1991. Angolan, Cuban and South African officials also signed a tripartite agreement on December 22, 1988, calling on the UN secretary general to implement, beginning on April 1, 1989, UN Security Council Resolution 435/1978 that required South African military forces

to leave South West Africa/Namibia. The UN also was asked to verify the Cuban troop withdrawal plan contained in the bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba.¹⁰² In the interval between the Brazzaville and New York signing ceremonies, Luanda and Pretoria also concluded an informal "gentleman's agreement." Under the terms of this "side deal," Angola agreed to close ANC training bases and cease all matériel support to the South African insurgents. Pretoria promised to reciprocate by terminating all military aid to UNITA. However, both sides could still provide political and financial aid to their allies.¹⁰³ South West Africa was expected to become independent Namibia on March 21, 1990.¹⁰⁴

While most observers agreed that the Brazzaville and New York protocols were noteworthy diplomatic accomplishments, the military context from which they emerged, particularly the early 1988 battles fought near Cuito Cuanavale, remains the subject of a protracted debate. Those who portrayed the Angolan-Cuban performance at Cuito Cuanavale as a military victory insisted that SADF troops originally intended to occupy the town or prevent Angolan and Cuban aircraft from using it as a forward staging base. South African officials insist, however, they never planned to seize the town. Pretoria's goal, at the Lomba River in late 1987 and at Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988, was to help UNITA stop an offensive aimed at retaking Mavinga.¹⁰⁵

Controversy also surrounds the claim that Cuba's early 1988 advance into southwestern Angola represented a bold move that gave Havana air superiority along the border where Cuban- and Angolan-piloted combat aircraft flew brief, usually high-altitude, missions into Namibian/South West African airspace. SADF personnel were not equipped with surface-to-air missiles capable of challenging these flights and South African Mirages could potentially have been out-maneuvered by Angola's newly acquired MiG-23s. SAAF officers, however, offered a different interpretation of cross border overflights and the significance of an improved Angolan/Cuban air defense network. A late 1988 SAAF study distinguished between "freedom of the air" and "domination" of the airspace over southern Angola. SAAF officers claimed their aircraft enjoyed the freedom they needed to operate against all important military targets inside Angola. The country's size, however, had always made it impractical to consider total domination. Since the early 1980s, SAAF officers had concentrated on planning missions that minimized the possibility of contact with hostile aircraft and air defenses. The aircraft losses sustained by both sides in the 1987-88 campaign validated SAAF's strategy. Only one SAAF Mirage F-1 and one Bosbok, a light spotter aircraft, were shot down and two Mirage F-1s were damaged. Cuban and Angolan aircraft losses included nine MiG-23s, three MiG-21s and three Su-22 combat aircraft. Angola-based ground forces had fired 111 confirmed surface-to-air missiles at SAAF aircraft, yielding a success rate of less than 5 percent.¹⁰⁶ The 1987-88 campaign is more accurately described as one in which SADF/UNITA forces won a tactical military victory in the southeast, while Cuban and Angolan troops achieved a tactically advantageous military position in the southwest. Havana and

Pretoria subsequently acknowledged a strategic military stalemate, which then permitted diplomats to fashion a negotiated settlement.

GBADOLITE AND THE "FOG" OF DIPLOMACY

The prospect of Cuban and South African forces leaving the regional battlefield initially led Savimbi and dos Santos to radically different conclusions. Luanda was not inclined to offer more than amnesty for individual members of a "bandit" organization. Savimbi, however, perceived the imminent shift in the military balance as an opportunity to renew earlier proposals for peace talks. A UNITA delegation met Cuban representatives in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, on August 27, 1988, where they handed over Lieutenant Colonel Garcia and Captain Aguilar, their highest-ranking Cuban prisoners of war. UNITA officials also asked the released prisoners to deliver a letter from Savimbi to Fidel Castro. The contents of the letter have not been published but it may have included an appeal to Castro to "play a positive role" in the promotion of national reconciliation.¹⁰⁷ President dos Santos claimed, in October 1988, that "unless there is a massive intervention of South African forces, UNITA cannot last very long . . . [f]rom a strategic point of view, UNITA is militarily defeated and the weak don't dictate the political rules of the game."¹⁰⁸ Undeterred, Savimbi reportedly claimed that he was prepared to temporarily step down as UNITA's leader, refuse any position in a transitional government, and recognize the MPLA government for four years, after which time elections should be held. On December 16, 1988, the UNITA leader pledged that his forces would not attack Cuban troops as they withdrew and called for a nationwide cease-fire, followed by direct talks with the Luanda government.¹⁰⁹ Savimbi subsequently announced, on March 13, 1989, a unilateral, four-month moratorium on major military operations and promised to release FAPLA prisoners.¹¹⁰

In early 1989, newly elected president George H. W. Bush pledged continued U.S. support to UNITA. This commitment, coupled with diplomatic pressure from several African heads of state, persuaded the dos Santos government to abandon its earlier hard-line approach. On May 16, 1989, dos Santos hosted a summit of eight African heads of state, presenting a peace plan that proposed national reconciliation, a significant concession to UNITA. However, dos Santos also expected Savimbi to go into exile, UNITA's integration into the MPLA, and UNITA's acceptance of Angola's constitution, which called for a Marxist one-party state. The African heads of state attending the summit selected Zaire's president Mobutu to present the plan to UNITA.

Mobutu hosted a summit of 18 African heads of state on June 22, 1989, at Gbadolite, his presidential retreat in northern Zaire. After two days of deliberation the summit concluded with a historic handshake between Savimbi and dos Santos. There was no written record of any general consensus, however; only a communiqué that announced three agreed-on principles: a mutual desire for peace and national reconciliation, a cease-fire to begin on June 24, and the creation of a UNITA-MPLA commission to conduct

further negotiations. Luanda, however, claimed there was an unpublished agreement that contained provisions for Savimbi's exile, UNITA's integration into the MPLA, and the continuation of Angola's Marxist one-party state. Zambia's president Kaunda further muddled the diplomatic waters by announcing that Savimbi would be temporarily exiled. UNITA spokesmen rejected all these interpretations and insisted that the only agreements reached at Gbadolite were reflected in the published communiqué.¹¹¹

Several additional negotiating sessions in Kinshasa made no headway. MPLA officials refused to meet in the same room with UNITA representatives and indirect talks failed to end the impasse. An eight-nation summit met in Harare, Zimbabwe on August 18, 1989, where the participants endorsed the MPLA's original plan, including the requirement of Savimbi's exile. Savimbi refused to attend a subsequent heads of state meeting in Kinshasa on September 18, but sent a UNITA delegation whose Zairian hosts would not permit them to speak. The summit once again endorsed the MPLA peace plan. Savimbi issued a public proposal for the creation of a multinational force to monitor the cease-fire and subsequent national elections. Mobutu responded to Savimbi's snub of the Kinshasa summit by announcing an immediate and indefinite suspension of U.S. military supplies for UNITA transshipped through Zairian territory. U.S. interlocutors interceded, healing the UNITA-Zaire breach in a meeting held at Mobutu's French villa in mid-October 1989. A large government military campaign that began on the same day as the Harare summit already had undermined the credibility of Luanda's commitment to a negotiated settlement. In subsequent months, diplomatic momentum weakened amid signs that Luanda was preparing for yet another large offensive directed at Mavinga.¹¹²

Dos Santos's earlier view, that UNITA was not a serious military threat, particularly without South African support, had clearly been the dominant perspective behind the series of negotiations that began in early 1989. Luanda's demands reflected a firm conviction that it could negotiate from an overwhelming position of diplomatic and military strength. The fact that a substantial number of Cuban troops would remain in Angola for another two years allowed FAPLA commanders to plan an offensive that relied on Havana's forces relieving Angolan troops from the exclusive defense of many large cities and provincial capitals. Moscow's willingness to continue providing military material also bolstered Luanda's optimistic strategic assessment. Consequently, the government could safely calculate that it had at least another year to test the hypothesis that UNITA's forces, deprived of South African assistance, could be dealt a decisive military blow.

AN UNRESOLVED DEBATE: ONE FRONT OR TWO?

Luanda's decision to opt for a single theater of operations distinguishes the last of two Mavinga campaigns, the 1989-90 from the 1985, 1986, and 1987 offensives that sought to overwhelm the insurgents by tying them down on two or more fronts simultaneously. The dos Santos government's

renewed focus on Mavinga in mid-1989 appears to have marked the end of a long-standing dispute between Russian, Cuban, and Angolan officers over the most appropriate response to UNITA's growing control of rural Angolan territory. General Rafael del Pino, who had served with Cuban forces in Angola prior to his 1987 defection, also acknowledged frequent disagreements in the mid-1980s between Cuban, Soviet, and Angolan officers regarding the correct counterinsurgency campaign strategy. Some accounts have suggested that debates were occasionally quite heated, particularly between Russian and Cuban advisors. The latter argued strongly in favor of a one-front campaign.¹¹³

In the months prior to Luanda's 1989 offensive against Mavinga, however, it was still unclear whether the one-front versus two-front debates had been resolved. The size and deployment of FAPLA units to forward bases in central and southern Angola initially suggested one final attempt to implement Moscow's long-standing preference for a two-front strategy. On August 18, 1989, government forces commenced an offensive in the southeast that advanced along three axes. Starting at Caiundo, three FAPLA brigades launched the westernmost approach to Mavinga ever attempted by government forces; one that required protracted travel over nearly three hundred kilometers across savannas and sandy soil.¹¹⁴ This operation represented a radical departure from the 1985 and 1987 campaigns when FAPLA forces approached Mavinga from the north to distract UNITA's attention from their main force advancing from the northwest along tributaries of the Lomba River. In August 1989 FAPLA evidently operated on the assumption that UNITA could be drawn off even further toward Caiundo in the west while its primary force once again attacked from the northwest—following the Cunzumbia River and other small tributaries of the Lomba River. As in the 1985 and 1987 offensives, the main axis began from forward positions at Cuito Cuanavale, led by four FAPLA brigades and three Tactical Groups. The three Tactical Groups in the 1989 campaign resembled "reinforced mechanized infantry brigades."¹¹⁵ Several weeks after the opening of the Mavinga "front," troops on FAPLA's second front, which included two brigades and four Tactical Groups, commenced a drive from Munhango, aimed at the UNITA-held towns of Tempue and Cangamba in western Moxico Province.

UNITA forces resisted, stopping FAPLA's forward motion on both fronts. The insurgents frequently ambushed the FAPLA column from Caiundo days after it began moving east in the direction of Mavinga. FAPLA units exhausted their supplies and the garrison at Caiundo proved unable to move additional material forward. By August 23, 1989, only five days after they had departed Caiundo, FAPLA units were in retreat. Four days later, UNITA unleashed an intense artillery barrage against a FAPLA brigade as it tried to cross the Cunzumbia River toward UNITA's forward defenses at the Lomba River north of Mavinga. UNITA's attack destroyed 28 vehicles and subsequent clashes forced government troops to retreat by September 1, 1989. Three days later, FAPLA troops returned to Cuito Cuanavale. Only a combined force of several FAPLA brigades and Tactical Groups had

managed to sustain operations on the second front in central Angolan and advanced sixty kilometers into UNITA-held territory south of Munhango. Like their colleagues on the Mavinga front, FAPLA's inability to prevent repeated UNITA attacks on supply convoys gradually weakened the government's lead units before they could seriously threaten Tempue or Cangamba. By September 28, 1989, many FAPLA troops also had retreated to their base at Munhango—barely four weeks after they had launched their campaign.¹¹⁶

Even if these setbacks had not persuaded FAPLA commanders of the futility of a two-front strategy, those who favored a one-front campaign may have been making a virtue of necessity in late 1989 when they opted to launch yet another Mavinga offensive. Approximately half of Cuba's fifty thousand troops already had departed and many more were pulling back from southern and central Angola in compliance with the terms of the 1988 Brazzaville Accord. FAPLA commanders were well aware that any future campaigns against UNITA would have to be conducted without the substantial Cuban assistance that previously had made Luanda's forces much more potent. Angolan troops would now have to accomplish more with less.

FAPLA's selection of strategy and tactics for the second 1989 Mavinga campaign seemed to be informed more by desperation than inspiration. FAPLA deployed five motorized infantry brigades, two mechanized battalions and an artillery brigade, representing some 12,000 troops, to Cuito Cuanavale in November 1989. This force was supplemented by an additional 1,800 troops deployed as six lightly armored Tactical Groups.¹¹⁷ A limited number of tanks and the absence of mobile air defense equipment, combined with FAPLA's heavy reliance on BMP infantry fighting vehicles, underscored an increased emphasis on speed and mobility. More importantly, however, FAPLA commanders and their Soviet advisors were reacting to changing regional political circumstances rather than capitalizing on an insightful appreciation of military factors unique to the battlefields around Mavinga. In addition to removing Cuban troops as a significant force in southeastern Angola, the Brazzaville Accord also had obligated Pretoria to end all military assistance to UNITA. Consequently, FAPLA officers launched an offensive confident that they would not face South African air power, armor, or heavy artillery. Although UNITA had a modest number of field artillery pieces, most of these were captured Soviet D-30s and M-46s; they posed less of a threat than the highly touted SADF 155-mm guns that were accurate at a much greater range.¹¹⁸

True to its Soviet-inspired military doctrine, Luanda reverted to the oldest and most simple solution to the problem posed by UNITA's semiconventional military forces, expecting large numbers of troops to overwhelm the insurgents in a pitched battle at or near Mavinga. By late 1989, FAPLA repeatedly had lost the advantage of surprise in most of its large annual offensives. Savimbi had pointed out, in 1985, his opponents kept to the same "elephant tracks." On December 23, 1989, FAPLA's infantry brigades and Tactical Groups advanced toward Mavinga along routes their predecessors had traveled in 1985 and 1987. The numerous feints that several Tactical

Groups executed represented a noteworthy modification of previous tactics. FAPLA's circuitous northern route to Mavinga often included marches around rather than across the headwaters of several streams and rivers. A sympathetic account of the FAPLA campaign might have described this as an inspired effort to outflank UNITA. These maneuvers however, were generally a colossal waste of fuel, supplies, and, most importantly, time.¹¹⁹

FAPLA's heavy reliance on Tactical Groups was probably one of the most novel features of the last battle for Mavinga, although the deployment of these units represented little in the way of tactical innovations. In 1987 FAPLA brigades and Tactical Groups had advanced in five-kilometer-square formations as they approached Mavinga.¹²⁰ During the early stage of the 1989-90 campaign, UNITA's forward observers reported that Tactical Groups moved in 2 by 2.2 square kilometer formations.¹²¹ South African artillerymen found the 1987 five-by-five kilometer formation an easy target. UNITA also considered FAPLA's 1989 formation an equally inviting target for their field guns and heavy mortars.

Nearly six weeks after they commenced their campaign, and after an extremely complicated series of forward, lateral, and occasionally reverse movements, FAPLA forces finally reached Mavinga, seizing the airfield on February 2, 1990. Before they abandoned it, UNITA had cratered the runway, thereby preventing FAPLA from using it to fly in fresh supplies and lay the groundwork for a subsequent push toward UNITA's headquarters at Jamba some 240 kilometers to the southeast. As government forces dug in at Mavinga in late February 1990, FAPLA's Tactical Groups steadily lost the advantages of speed and mobility they had enjoyed in the relatively open terrain between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga. The Tactical Groups soon devolved into the inept and vulnerable force that all their predecessors had become in previous campaigns. Luanda put aside plans to use Mavinga as a forward staging base and reluctantly settled for a weaker, tactically insignificant aerial campaign in southeastern Angola. This consisted of a few ineffectual high-altitude bombing raids, launched from Menongue in late February 1990, striking the insurgents' logistics hub at Licua and their Jamba base. Although Luanda no longer faced a South African air threat, UNITA's surface-to-air missiles kept government aircraft from conducting potentially more damaging, low-altitude attacks.

UNITA eventually encircled the several thousand FAPLA forces that had managed to reach Mavinga. Over the next three months, the insurgents directed regular mortar and artillery barrages at government positions. UNITA's guerrilla forces repeatedly thwarted government efforts to send relief columns forward from Cuito Cuanavale. The insurgents' air defense weapons also prevented government ground attack helicopters from relieving pressure on the garrison and deterred many transport helicopters from providing additional supplies. Faced with the prospect that their forces might soon surrender or be decimated in a UNITA assault, Luanda issued orders for a retreat, which began on May 8, 1990. One week later all FAPLA units finally returned to Cuito Cuanavale, marking the end of Luanda's Operation

Final Assault.¹²² UNITA communiqués claimed that its forces killed some eight thousand to ten thousand FAPLA troops while the insurgents acknowledged the loss of two thousand combatants. The guerrillas also reported the destruction or damage of over 200 BMP-1 armored vehicles, 72 T-55 main battle tanks, and 260 logistics vehicles.¹²³ Colonel Joao de Matos, who had commanded government forces in the latter weeks of the campaign, offered slightly different statistics, claiming that some 4,700 UNITA were killed, but did not provide figures for government losses. The FAPLA commander also alleged that his forces had captured more than 2,000 weapons, as well as 10 tanks and 15 armored vehicles.¹²⁴

INNOVATIVE PATHS NOT TAKEN

After more than a decade in Luanda, the strategy and tactics that Russian advisors had crafted for their Angolan clients rarely advanced far beyond the legacy of World War II. Although they acquired several helicopter squadrons, Luanda seemed reluctant to consider air mobile operations deep inside UNITA territory, whether at Mavinga where heliborne forces might have disrupted the guerrillas' interior lines, or elsewhere in Angola. This reluctance dated from the late 1970s and persisted long after the insurgents had acquired increasingly more effective surface-to-air missiles in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, SAAF officers had drawn up a harsh assessment of Angolan flight standards, concluding that "their navigation abilities were extremely weak, and it was noted they always used physical features such as river lines and roads to enable them to reach their destinations. They would seldom fly a direct route to any point . . . Furthermore, because their missions tended to be planned for the same time of day our intelligence community was able to easily predict their sorties. Radio discipline and procedures were poor . . . Night operations were not flown, helicopters returned to base before dusk."¹²⁵ These and a host of related shortcomings confirmed Savimbi's early observation, in the late 1970s, that "the Cubans and the Russians don't know how to fight an anti-guerrilla war . . . The bigger the military machine the easier it is to escape. They should use smaller groups, but they don't have the morale. The Cubans will not accept twenty of their men to be dropped here in the bush [on a search and destroy mission]. The MPLA soldiers are too poorly trained to do it."¹²⁶

By the late 1980s, Mavinga's political and military importance on UNITA's map of "liberated Angola" was undeniable. Moreover, it was widely known that UNITA arms and other supplies were temporarily stored in the Mavinga area before they moved north to support UNITA forces in central Angola. The large storage complex at Mavinga area should have provided a target-rich sector for heavy bombers carrying sufficient ordnance to disrupt the insurgents' depots and supply lines. Yet Moscow never considered selling Angola some of its older generations of bombers, capable of flying above the range of UNITA's surface-to-air missiles, perhaps out of a concern that SAAF fighters would intercept and defeat an aerial campaign against UNITA's large bases. Soviet advisors instead opted to introduce ever more sophisticated

surface-to-air missile systems in a futile attempt to keep South African aircraft from flying combat and transport operations for UNITA. Soviet officers certainly knew how to adapt new weapons before they arrived in Angola; but inadequate logistics and leadership and poor tactical execution were among numerous stumbling blocks on the path to any strategy that might have synthesized past insights and contemporary technology.¹²⁷

Ultimately, the inadequacy of the Soviet Union's advice in matters of counterinsurgency warfare was demonstrated in various corners of the African continent, most notably Ethiopia and Mozambique where client governments also repeatedly staged large but ineffective offensives against insurgent-held towns. Collectively, these experiences tended to confirm a late 1988 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study of Soviet military literature and the performance of Moscow's military advisors in Africa, concluding that the "Soviets have not formulated a distinct military doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare, . . . the Soviets seem to have said little to their African clients about social and political aspects of counterinsurgency operations, . . . there are no indications they have advised their clients to institute any programs designed to 'win the hearts and minds' of the local population."¹²⁸ The study also noted that "on the military side Soviet advisors have consistently advocated large combined arms sweep operations reminiscent of battle plans for Europe instead of small unit tactics recommended by Western theory."¹²⁹

Cuban advisors likewise seemed to have only limited insight to offer their Angolan clients. Cuban advisors in Angola sometimes wavered between bluster and denial. Initially, Cuban officers dismissed UNITA as an insignificant guerrilla force, comparing their operations to the lackluster campaign waged, in 1961, by anti-Castro insurgents in Cuba's Escambray Mountains. As the UNITA threat grew in the mid-1980s, and Russian advisors dominated military planning, Cuban officers boasted, "[i]f we had decided to fight UNITA they would have been out of business long ago."¹³⁰ Early Cuban involvement in counterinsurgency operations, however, displayed little imagination or innovation. One author characterized their reliance on 122-mm rocket launchers as a "central element in Cuban military tactics, in which a disruptive rocket attack would be followed by a methodical tank advance."¹³¹ Although Cuban forces began to make greater use of helicopters and adopted more aggressive tactics in the early 1980s, their approach to counterinsurgency warfare still appeared tentative. According to UNITA's then-foreign minister, Pedro Ngueve Jonatao Chingungi, "The Cubans were fighting the illusion of their success in the Sierra Maestra. They were playing the big winners, the conquerors, emphasizing big weapons and not really knowing guerrilla warfare. The Cubans, when they were flying in Angola, were following the rivers . . . And we . . . were beginning to fight the real guerrilla wars."¹³²

An occasionally inadequate logistics system also drove some Cuban troops onto the Angolan black market for basic commodities. Eventually some of their commanders, including General Ochoa, succumbed to the lure of the black market and, in the last years of their deployment to Angola, they began trading in ivory, diamonds, exotic hardwoods, and other luxury items.¹³³

Combined with the lack of a well-thought-out strategy, their weak supply chain and other deficiencies contributed to the high price Cuban forces eventually paid in counterinsurgency campaigns against UNITA and conventional combat with SADF units. Official Cuban figures released in December 1989 acknowledged 2,016 Cubans deaths in Angola, of which nearly 40 percent were killed in combat. Subsequently, Cuban sources indicated that some 3,800 had been killed and perhaps 10,000 were wounded. The latter figures match those from a variety of informed observers who estimate that Havana sustained some 10,000-12,000 casualties, a figure that included both killed and wounded, among the 375,000 Cuban troops who served in Angola between 1975 and 1989.¹³⁴ By the late 1980s, Havana had redefined its strategic aims in Angola and focused almost entirely on defending its Angolan allies against South African incursions. Cuban officers otherwise limited their role to advising Angolan commanders engaged in guerrilla warfare against UNITA. Cuban troops were ordered to fight UNITA only when attacked.¹³⁵

FROM WAR TO DIPLOMACY

Luanda was unable to fully recover from the early May 1990 defeat at Mavinga and UNITA's subsequent counteroffensive in central and northwestern Angola. A shifting balance of forces inside Angola had grown increasingly advantageous for UNITA. This shift became even more pronounced as the last Cuban troops prepared to depart Angola, leaving behind the government's 80,000 FAPLA troops and 50,000 militias. Luanda had nearly doubled the size of its army since the beginning of the decade. UNITA's forces, meanwhile, had grown from 20,000 in 1981 to some 65,000 troops by the late 1980s, and consisted of 37,000 guerrillas and 28,000 combatants organized into semiconventional battalion or company-sized formations. A fleet of trucks, which had grown from several hundred in the early 1980s to nearly 1,000 by 1989, facilitated the movement of insurgents and supplies to the north.¹³⁶ South African officers also had overcome their initial doubts about the wisdom of Savimbi's decision, in the late 1970s, to train UNITA forces for conventional operations. By 1988, UNITA had captured several dozen T-55 tanks and Savimbi subsequently asked South African advisors for training needed to operate and maintain them. SADF officers agreed and, by the end of the decade, UNITA had deployed a limited number of tanks during the latter stages of the 1990 battle for Mavinga.¹³⁷ Angolan government forces launched several counterinsurgency sweeps out of Luanda and other northern provincial capitals in mid-1990, hoping to stem the rising UNITA tide. UNITA forces thwarted each operation and had pushed most FAPLA units back to their main bases by the end of the year. Desertions also undermined FAPLA; possibly as many as 60 percent of deserting government troops in the north allegedly joined UNITA.¹³⁸

The last large battles of the Cold War phase in Angola's civil war were fought in the central highlands and east central Angola. UNITA's semiconventional units, augmented with a handful of T-55 tanks, captured Munhango for the

third time on January 1, 1991. The insurgents followed up this victory with the January 29 seizure of Cuemba. UNITA began to challenge government positions in the Luena area on April 1, 1991, and eventually cut off supply flights to the city. For the next six weeks, the FAPLA garrison relied on relief convoys from Saurimo. Government forces mounted a successful defense of Luena until a long-awaited cease-fire was declared on May 16, 1991.¹³⁹

The May 1991 cease-fire was the result of numerous diplomatic initiatives, compromises by both sides, and critical support from various interlocutors during the previous 12 months. In April 1990 Portugal had hosted the first in a series of six meetings between Angolan and UNITA representatives. Several weeks after UNITA pushed FAPLA troops back from Mavinga, Savimbi announced plans to declare a unilateral cease-fire on June 22, 1990.¹⁴⁰ The UNITA leader also told interviewers, "We must accept the fact that neither does UNITA have the capability to defeat the MPLA . . . we have never dreamed of doing so—nor can they defeat us."¹⁴¹ Portuguese officials endorsed this perspective and Angolan president dos Santos also was inclined to solicit the assistance of a new mediator to revive the 1989 diplomatic initiatives hosted by Zaire's president Mobutu.

After September 1990, U.S. and USSR observers began to attend these Portuguese-hosted sessions. In December 1990 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met with Angola's foreign minister and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze likewise consulted with Savimbi. These unprecedented encounters revived a flagging diplomatic process and facilitated a December 1990 meeting cosponsored by Washington and Moscow, attended by Angolan, UNITA, and Portuguese representatives. Significant changes inside Angola's ruling MPLA party also dramatically improved prospects for peace. At the December 1990 MPLA Party Congress, leaders announced the termination of Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology and removed numerous "hardline" Central Committee members. The MPLA also renounced the concept of a one-party state and called for the creation of a multiparty system. At the sixth round of Portuguese-sponsored talks, UNITA and MPLA officials discussed an election timetable, the creation of a new national army, and the deployment of an international cease-fire monitoring force. On May 31, 1991 Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi signed the Bicesse Accord. UNITA agreed to recognize the Angolan government and dos Santos as president, prior to the holding of national elections. Luanda acknowledged UNITA's right to participate in a multiparty democracy. The signatories agreed to internationally supervised elections and the establishment of a new national security force with each side contributing an equal number of combatants.¹⁴²

LINGERING DOUBTS AND SIGNS OF UNITA FACTIONALISM

Savimbi's repeated assertion that UNITA could not be defeated finally was considered compelling by many observers, particularly as the last battle for

Mavinga had ended in a rout of government forces. Some skeptics, however, remained unconvinced, attributing greater weight to the withdrawal of fifty thousand Cuban troops and Moscow's pressure on Luanda to negotiate. An alternative view stressed the impact of South Africa's projection of overwhelming military power in support of UNITA, with one skeptical observer noting that "Savimbi is an interesting figure—but only in so far as he is represented within the context of the 'South African connection' . . . Savimbi . . . would have flickered out like a glow worm in the Angolan dusk but for South African support."¹⁴³ UNITA's ties to South Africa had long been a political curse as well as a military blessing for Savimbi. In the eyes of many African governments Savimbi's links to the *apartheid* government made him a "traitor to Africa," much as he had been portrayed in the 1974 Operation Timber documents as a collaborator with Portuguese colonial forces. Doubts about UNITA's military capability not surprisingly colored some observers' judgments regarding their political credibility.

Throughout much of the Cold War era, as international interests in the outcome of the Angolan civil war shifted, UNITA experienced considerable internal political stress. These pressures undermined UNITA on the eve of Angola's emergence as a multiparty democracy and its first democratic elections. UNITA kept some of the earliest fissures hidden from Angolan and international public scrutiny for several years. Savimbi had ordered the public beating of several high ranking UNITA members at the Fifth Party Congress in 1982, including founding members Samuel Chiwale and Tony Fernandes. Savimbi accused Chiwale, former foreign secretary Jorge Sangumbe, and Valdemar Chindondo, UNITA's chief of staff, of plotting to topple him. Sangumbe and Chindondo were subsequently executed and Chiwale was demoted from brigadier to the rank of private. An even more traumatic expression of UNITA's intraparty turmoil, and to this day an event still mired in controversy, occurred on September 7, 1983, when more than a dozen people accused of witchcraft were burned at the stake. Savimbi ordered their execution in a public ceremony at the insurgents' headquarters. Whether the charge of witchcraft was a pretext for murdering political dissidents or represented a genuine belief that party members had engaged in disruptive acts of sorcery is still unclear. In 1986, Savimbi ordered the arrest of UNITA general Geraldo Nunda, who had challenged Savimbi's leadership as well as his ties to unspecified foreign leaders.¹⁴⁴ Intraparty problems became increasingly difficult to conceal in late 1987 and early 1988. Younger members of the party, linked to UNITA foreign secretary "Tito" Chingungi, had espoused a negotiated settlement while Savimbi and his veteran colleagues called for continuous military struggle. In October 1988 government press reports indicated that Chingungi had been recalled to UNITA headquarters where he was tortured and executed for advocating peace talks on terms that Savimbi opposed. Chingungi's appearance and interview with a foreign correspondent in March 1989 temporarily deflected public attention to these charges and briefly gave a modicum of credence to UNITA claims that earlier reports of beatings and executions represented a government disinformation campaign.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, as the distances between UNITA and the government's negotiating stances narrowed during the final battle for Mavinga, Savimbi acknowledged that UNITA struggled to cope with serious disagreements over appropriate military and diplomatic strategies. In a February 1990 communiqué, Savimbi called on the insurgents not to "accept those who wish to create a contradiction between the first [anticolonial] and second phases [civil war]" of UNITA's struggle.¹⁴⁶ Savimbi acknowledged, in a June 1990 interview, that there were dissenting opinions within UNITA's ranks. He admitted that some UNITA members challenged the wisdom of his proposal to recognize dos Santos as head of state and cease UNITA radio broadcasts critical of the MPLA. Dissenting members, according to Savimbi, were only willing to pursue these options on a limited trial basis and insisted that they be subject to review if the government did not soon reciprocate.¹⁴⁷ In early August 1990, as Portuguese and other mediators slowly began to craft the proposals that led to the 1991 Bicesse Accord, Savimbi hinted at continued internal divisions when he told a reporter that "it is when a movement believes that it is going to win that it must be very careful. Both friends and enemies form splinter groups. On the eve of victory you find discord."¹⁴⁸

UNITA's enhanced financial position, in the early 1990s, combined with its greatest military accomplishments, distracted many observers from a careful examination of its political fissures. Economic trends gradually had made the insurgents more independent, lessening the significance of curtailed U.S. and South African aid as the Cold War drew to a close. Throughout the mid- to late 1980s, the insurgents had conducted a thriving trade in diamonds, ivory, animal skins, and timber, most of which was shipped out through South West Africa. This exchange funded UNITA's purchase of 30,000 metric tons of food annually as well as tools, clothing, and weapons. Farmers in UNITA-controlled territory reportedly produced 20,000 tons of cereals and large quantities of beans, rice, cassava, and sunflower. The guerrillas also claimed herds of livestock amounting to some 250,000 head of cattle.¹⁴⁹

Except for diamonds, many of these assets declined steeply by the late 1980s. The global ivory trade collapsed after the international imposition of a ban on the sale of ivory. Namibian independence threatened to disrupt the timber trade. These economic downturns were exacerbated by a severe drought. By 1990, roughly 80 percent of UNITA's farm crops had been lost while its cattle herds also were slightly depleted due to water shortages. The output of the insurgents' sawmill near Jamba had fallen, from 150,000 cubic meters in 1988 to some 5,000 cubic meters in 1990.¹⁵⁰ Diamond revenues continued to be a key element in assuring their survival beyond the end of the Cold War. Control of several large diamond fields enhanced their confidence that they could make the transition from a well-supplied military movement to a well-funded political party able to compete in a democratic election. UNITA's exploitation of rich diamond fields in the Cuango River valley had allowed them to increase their exports from six thousand carats a year at the beginning of the decade to one hundred thousand carats by 1990.¹⁵¹

As the May 1991 Bicesse Accord took hold, Savimbi appeared to have proven, to the satisfaction of many observers, that he had successfully adapted Mao's military principles to an African context. Nevertheless, the fact that the civil war had ended at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield left lingering doubts in the minds of combatants on both sides. Savimbi's continued reference to a "revolution" seemed, to some, an inappropriate description of goals that UNITA now aspired to achieve by means of ballots rather than bullets. To the MPLA, reference to a "revolution" hinted at the possible emergence of a tyrannical majority that would eventually rule at their expense. Only Savimbi's persistent assertion that a negotiated settlement was inevitable seemed indisputable as the last rounds of combat ended in 1991, after the loss of an estimated nine hundred thousand Angolan lives, the vast majority of which were civilians.¹⁵² Angola finally ceased being a Cold War battlefield, and an arena in the larger regional struggle against *apartheid*, after May 1991 when the seventy-member United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) confirmed the departure of all fifty thousand Cuban troops from Angola.

CHAPTER 5



FROM PEACE TO WAR AND BACK (1991–2002)

As Angola emerged from the ideological morass of the Cold War, competing strategies of guerrilla warfare were eclipsed by debates concerning appropriate techniques of conflict resolution. External actors who had deployed combatants and intensified hostilities were replaced by foreign troops who arrived to monitor a cease-fire and support a peace process. As the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and UNITA/FALA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) tentatively cantoned their forces and discussed the creation of a new national army, a multitude of Angolan political parties emerged, expressing views that broadened the political discourse previously defined by dos Santos and Savimbi. However, the optimism of the post-Cold War era soon dissipated and doubts were raised about the capability of United Nations peacekeeping forces. International observers voiced increasingly serious concerns that neither the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) nor UNITA were committed to free and fair elections. Moreover, neither party had abandoned military options in the event of a new political crisis. Independent Angola's first national elections, in late 1992, ushered in a new round of civil war, abruptly shattering the peace so enthusiastically anticipated only 18 months earlier. The ensuing hostilities proved to be very different in their tactics and more devastating in their impact than the battles waged in the late colonial or Cold War eras.

BICESSE AND ITS FLAWS

UN Security Council Resolution 696, approved on May 30, 1991, transformed the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) into UNAVEM II. UN contingents were expected to monitor the cease-fire and participate in several key organs. The Bicesse Accord established a Joint Political Military Commission (CCPM), the subordinate Joint Verification and

Monitoring Commission (CMVF), and a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA). The work of these organs was to be supported by the so-called "troika" of Portuguese, U.S., and Russian observers who could consult with but not overrule UNITA or government members. The MPLA and UNITA also anticipated UN involvement in commission meetings. The UN's role, however, was explicitly limited to observing and verifying progress toward the creation of a national army and national elections. The Bicesse Accord provided for UNITA members to be integrated into the Angolan National Police (ANP), making government and former insurgent members jointly responsible for maintaining law and order. Final responsibility for the accord's success or failure, however, remained with monitoring teams comprising government and UNITA personnel.¹

The international community's willingness to trust both sides, coupled with the UN's desire to minimize the cost of the operation, yielded a weak monitoring mission of only 350 unarmed military observers, 126 police observers, and some 200 additional support staff expected to assist in the elections. UNAVEM II was an austere counterpoint to the 1989 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which had deployed 4,650 troops, 1,500 police monitors, and 900 election supervisors to assist South West Africa/Namibia's one million residents—barely a tenth of Angola's population. The UN had spent about \$400 million for South West Africa/Namibia whereas it budgeted only \$132 million for a 17-month UNAVEM II operation. UNAVEM II election monitors were often limited to teams of less than five observers in Angolan districts with as many as eighty polling stations.²

UNAVEM II and its affiliated "troika" observers ultimately were unable to prevent the Bicesse Accord's unraveling. Combatants failed to fully demobilize and create a functioning military or police force. The creation of a national police force also was tainted by ulterior motives having little to do with the maintenance of law and order. A failure to extend central government administration to the interior adversely affected the voter registration process and cast a further pall over an election seriously marred by doubts about either side's commitment to reconciliation.

Delays in the formation of a new national army were among the earliest indications that neither side would fulfill pledges made in May 1991. Luanda had agreed to demobilize 114,000 troops while UNITA would demobilize 37,000. Each side offered 20,000 soldiers to a new 40,000-strong Angolan Army, while the government would staff a 6,000-member air force and a 4,000-member navy. The cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of forces were to have begun with the commencement of a cease-fire and be completed by the September 1992 elections. Inadequate funds and supplies delayed the construction of assembly sites for both sides. FAPLA and UNITA commanders postponed the deployment of their forces to the cantonment sites. Both sides also began to reserve or redesignate forces. The government deployed 15,000 troops to Cabinda, arguing they were required to thwart secession threats by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Luanda steadfastly refused to consider this contingent as

part of the forces to be accounted for under the terms of the Bicesse Accord.³ Savimbi likewise elicited skeptical responses when he asserted UNITA only had 37,330 guerrillas available to deploy to cantonment sites or to contribute to the new Angolan Army. The UNITA leader claimed that the “missing” 10,000–12,000 troops had ended their service as FALA combatants and already were working in UNITA’s political wing. Luanda likewise asserted that many FAPLA troops had deserted and were unavailable for integration into the new army or assembly at cantonment sites for formal demobilization procedures. According to UN accounts, in mid-1992, approximately 85 percent of UNITA’s combatants were at assembly points but a mere 4 percent had demobilized, whereas 37 percent of government forces had been cantoned and only half of these had been demobilized. Shortly before the September 1992 elections, approximately 96,000 government troops were demobilized, representing 80 percent of FAPLA’s strength; whereas 10,000–15,000, or roughly one third, of UNITA’s combatants had been demobilized.⁴ UNAVEM II officials repeatedly underscored the inherent dangers of a flawed demobilization process, as well as early 1992 reports of a proliferation of weapons in the hands of many progovernment civilians.⁵

The threats posed by large numbers of armed deserters, cantonments full of armed combatants awaiting demobilization, and additional troops still outside the assembly points were compounded by equally disturbing developments in the postwar police force. Government officials had flatly rejected UNITA’s demand that 7,000–8,000 guerrillas be included in the new police force. In March 1992, the MPLA transferred more than 1,000 demobilized FAPLA commandos to a newly created special riot police unit frequently referred to as “Ninjas.” Luanda also subsequently acknowledged integrating 4,000 former FAPLA troops into regular police units, which had grown to nearly 40,000 by mid-1992.⁶ UNITA denounced these deployments as gross violations of the Bicesse Accord. Government officials dismissed the UNITA charges. Instead, Luanda reaffirmed its original agreement to accept only 1,200 insurgents. Several months after the creation of the “Ninjas,” however, Luanda accepted only 39 newly trained members, of an initial 183-member UNITA contingent, into the ranks of the police force, arguing that the 144 rejected cadets had inadequate academic credentials.⁷ In early 1992, the “Ninja” element of the police force also was implicated in alleged government plots to assassinate Savimbi. On August 6, 1992, a police scuffle with UNITA personnel outside Savimbi’s residence in Huambo lent further credence to UNITA fears that the MPLA intended to decapitate their organization prior to the elections. UNITA also denounced a Spanish shipment of small arms to the riot police as a violation of the Bicesse Accord’s “triple zero clause,” which prohibited both sides from importing weapons for use in Angola. UNAVEM expressions of concern, however, failed to persuade the government to return the arms or to reform the police that subsequently received additional arms from Israeli suppliers.⁸

Equally serious political and administrative failures complicated UN efforts to restore the faith undermined by both sides’ inadequate contribution to a

reconstituted army and police force. The Bicesse Accord required the extension of government administration to all Angolan provinces and principal population centers. UNITA reluctantly permitted FAPLA officials to return to areas that had been under insurgent control since the 1980s. By June 1992 government representatives had reoccupied 164 of the country's 165 major municipalities and more than 500 of the estimated 600 communes. In early September 1992 UNITA still retained control over 52 communes, awaiting the extension of government administration.⁹ A critical shortcoming linked to this process was an unsatisfactory voter registration drive, a responsibility that the Bicesse Accord had delegated to Luanda. Voter registration efforts were flawed in Moxico, Cuando Cubango, and Uíge Province. Government troops and FLEC intimidation prevented an estimated two-thirds of the eligible residents in Cabinda from registering. Moreover, a shortage of election materials prompted the National Election Commission to forego the registration of an estimated five hundred thousand Angolan citizens living abroad. Efforts to hold a summit of MPLA, UNITA, and FLEC factions to address long-standing disagreements over Cabinda's future also proved fruitless.¹⁰

UNITA: FURTHER FISSURES IN THE MONOLITH

The intraparty debates, which Savimbi previously acknowledged, remained unresolved prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accord. At UNITA's Seventh Party Congress, on March 12, 1991, Savimbi again confirmed but played down reports of dissent, insisting that "there are no problems. Dissent is part and parcel of the general political movement . . . UNITA is not worried about any dissident faction. It's normal." Nevertheless, Savimbi also conceded that the transition from war to peace would confront UNITA "with two different problems. First it will have to organize itself for peace. Second, it must ensure a clear transition of the Angolan society into a multiparty democracy, and the creation of a state of law. This includes concessions on the part of UNITA and the MPLA, as well as a revolution within our ranks, and a political revolution within our society."¹¹

In early 1992, however, intraparty disputes exacerbated an already tense atmosphere. Tony Fernandes and Miguel Puna, UNITA's foreign minister and interior minister, respectively, fled from party headquarters at Jamba to Lisbon where, in March 1992, they formally announced their defection. UNITA spokesmen initially blamed MPLA provocateurs for the Fernandes and Puna defections. Their break from UNITA's ranks followed shortly after reports that Tito Chingunji, UNITA's former Washington representative, as well as his wife and children, had been brutally executed in August 1991.¹²

Faced with mounting international criticism, UNITA formed a "Commission of Inquiry" to investigate the deaths of Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos, UNITA's former representative in Portugal. On April 14, 1992, the commission reported that Chingunji and dos Santos had been found guilty, in February 1989, of acts of "high treason," including efforts to oust Savimbi as UNITA's president either by "defaming him abroad" or by "attempting

to poison him in Jamba.” The commission also claimed that Miguel Puna had ignored a decision by UNITA leaders, presumably including Savimbi, to “rehabilitate” both members. Puna reportedly had ordered four subordinates to execute Chingunji, Wilson dos Santos, and nine family members on November 12–13, 1991, near Jamba, while Savimbi and other leaders were in Luanda. Fernandes was cleared of charges that he had played a role in the executions. Savimbi and other UNITA officials also were not found culpable but did officially accept “moral responsibility” for the deaths of Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos.¹³ The commission’s findings probably contributed to a significant division of loyalties within the ranks of UNITA supporters that would soon be manifested at the ballot box, particularly between those who stood by Savimbi and those who pledged their allegiance solely to the party.

As UN observers and Angola’s 16 political parties stumbled toward the late September 1992 election finish line, Savimbi voiced premonitions about an ambiguous electoral outcome. In a June 1992 interview he stated, “[I]t is not enough to proclaim that elections will be held on September 30 for all this to end. There are resentments that must be taken into account. From this perspective, we would wish that whoever wins the elections receives a majority, in order to be able to govern; otherwise our country could be paralyzed. But also that whoever wins the elections would assume responsibility for national reconciliation and, to this end, would form a government that includes ministers from other political parties.”¹⁴ UN and U.S. interlocutors shared this view and persuaded Savimbi and dos Santos to issue public statements, weeks before the election, pledging to form a coalition government, regardless of the electoral outcome.¹⁵ Hopes for a smooth postelection transition were further buoyed by a Savimbi-dos Santos meeting on September 7, 1992, resulting in an agreement that FAPLA and FALA should be dismantled by September 27 and officially replaced by the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Savimbi, meanwhile, continued to restrain militant UNITA elements. On September 9, Savimbi assured a U.S. government official that he had dissuaded unidentified military commanders who had argued that UNITA should abort the election process and seize power by force.¹⁶ Both sides kept to their September 7 promise, and on September 27 issued proclamations disbanding their two armies, establishing a new national force, and appointing one officer from each side to be chief of general staff.¹⁷ The newly created FAA, with only eight thousand troops, was in no condition to defend Angola from external threats or to assist police forces in the event of a widespread collapse of law and order.

AN AMBIGUOUS ELECTION OUTCOME AND THE RETURN TO WAR

Last minute efforts to minimize the impact of flaws in the registration process, the incomplete demobilization of combatants, and the controversial formation of a new police force, ultimately were not reassuring. UN secretary general Boutros Ghali issued a report, published just weeks before

the election, indicating significant erosion in the peace process. MPLA and UNITA supporters were blamed for incidents of intimidation and provocation in large urban centers, including Huambo, Malanje, and Saurimo.¹⁸ Glowing early press reports of Angola's September 29–30, 1992, election quickly were overtaken by a series of rapidly escalating charges and countercharges alleging MPLA electoral fraud and UNITA's positioning of armed personnel at various locations. UNITA supporters claimed MPLA members had smuggled in stuffed ballot boxes and set up as many as 55 unauthorized polling places in Huila Province. Elsewhere, government members allegedly failed to open polling sites or prematurely closed others. Pro-MPLA Namibians were allowed or encouraged to cross the border to vote at polling sites in Cuando Cubango Province.¹⁹ Government spokesmen rebutted these claims and countered with accusations of subversive UNITA behavior. UNITA reportedly thwarted investigations of several violent incidents, including an attack on the national radio station and the murder of a police officer in the vicinity of Savimbi's Luanda residence. Armed UNITA members were sighted in Moxico and Malanje Provinces where, in some instances, they disrupted the collection of ballot boxes.²⁰

UNITA officials denounced media reports of initial ballot counts, showing sizeable MPLA leads in the presidential and legislative vote, as evidence of massive electoral fraud. The final tallies, announced several weeks later, did little to reassure UNITA that the vote had not been subverted. Jose Eduardo dos Santos received 1,953,335 votes, or 49.56 percent of the total. Savimbi garnered 1,579,298 votes, amounting to 40.07 percent. The outcome required a runoff presidential election. The MPLA received 53.74 percent of the votes cast in the legislative elections; UNITA contenders tallied 34.09 percent, giving the ruling party a substantial majority in the parliament. However, the discrepancy between the votes cast for Savimbi and those credited to UNITA seemed more difficult to explain than the vote counts separating the two parties and their presidential candidates. Savimbi out-pollled his party's candidates in all 18 Angolan provinces. In the four provinces (Huambo, Bie, Benguela, and Cuando Cubango), which election monitors described as "core" UNITA areas, Savimbi received 16 percent more of the total vote than UNITA members campaigning for legislative positions—a larger margin than that separating Savimbi from his colleagues in 14 other provinces. Although Jose Eduardo dos Santos's and MPLA's vote counts were less discrepant, generally less than 3–4 percent apart, it is noteworthy that the Angolan president was out-pollled by his MPLA colleagues in 14 of Angola's 18 provinces.²¹ If the difference between Savimbi's and his party colleagues' vote tally did not bespeak electoral fraud, at the very least it should have put to rest the notion that Savimbi exercised an iron grip on a highly regimented and disciplined political party.

TALKING AND FIGHTING

As the international community struggled to organize a new presidential election, Angola slipped back to the brink of civil war. Savimbi attempted, with increasing difficulty, to maintain authority over an organization whose members were torn between war and peace. On October 5, 1992, a day after Savimbi publicly denounced preliminary vote tallies as fraudulent, 11 UNITA generals announced they were withdrawing their forces from the recently established FAA. Government officials had described Savimbi's October 4, 1992, "address to the nation" as ominous, and the UNITA generals' withdrawal from the FAA was denounced as an act of war. Savimbi's subsequent public statements, on October 5, 1992, emphatically rejected this option, and in his closing remarks he called on Angolans to remain "calm," "serene," and "confident," asserting, "We want neither the MPLA nor UNITA, nor any party to dare plunge this country into misery and war yet again."²² UNITA's 11 generals likewise stated explicitly that they did not want to resume hostilities. They also announced three preconditions for their return to the FAA ranks—a review of the electoral process, an assessment of complaints by UNITA and other political parties prior to the publication of official election results, and an accounting of reports that riot police had intimidated many voters.²³

Before these issues could be addressed, both sides had been implicated in a series of incidents that threatened to undermine efforts by UN secretary general special representative Margaret Anstee and South African foreign minister Pik Botha to repair the crumbling peace process. On October 8, 1992, armed UNITA forces reoccupied Caconda in Huila Province. Three days later, a car bomb exploded outside a Luanda hotel housing UNITA officials. Government officials denied responsibility for the blast but it quickly led to confrontations between UNITA, MPLA supporters, and "Ninja" police elements at various locations in the capital. On October 17, UN officials announced that the September presidential and legislative elections had been "generally free and fair." Instances of electoral fraud and irregularities were described as minor, committed by both sides, and ultimately unlikely to have had a significant effect on the final outcome. This announcement coincided with an October 17–18 UNITA attack on government positions in Huambo.²⁴

Two days after the UN announcement, Savimbi gave another radio "address to the nation." His October 19 speech rejected the UN's characterization of the elections as "free and fair" but nevertheless reemphasized his desire "to talk to the MPLA government in order to find appropriate solutions to the bad situation in which Angola lives" and advised his audience "to pray to God that the Angolan leaders should have the capacity and resolve to find . . . appropriate solutions to Angola without the need for a new war."²⁵ On October 23, UNITA and MPLA representatives engaged in a series of joint commission meetings lasting nearly a week.

Tentative progress toward the creation of an interim government, with positions reserved for UNITA, ground to a halt due to what subsequently became known as the "All Saints Massacre." Angolan government officials claim a

UNITA demonstration at the Luanda airport on October 31, 1992, signaled the start of a coup d'état. UNITA countered with claims that the MPLA used this incident as an excuse to implement a premeditated slaughter of UNITA cadres. Initial combat between "Ninja" police elements and UNITA members at the airport quickly spread throughout the capital. MPLA and UNITA members fought devastating but ultimately one-sided battles in and around Luanda between October 31 and November 1, 1992. The dos Santos government previously had distributed thousands of weapons to MPLA supporters throughout the city. Joined by progovernment police forces, MPLA loyalists gunned down armed and unarmed UNITA members. By the time the fighting subsided on November 1, at least 1,200 and possibly several thousand UNITA members in Luanda were dead, including UNITA's vice president Jeremias Chitunda and Savimbi's nephew, Elias Salupeto Pena, head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Political and Military Commission.²⁶ Many of UNITA's surviving members were arrested or fled Luanda to insurgent-held areas. UNITA guerrillas reacted to the Luanda debacle by seizing control of several provincial capitals, including Ndalatando and Mbanza Congo in the northwest. Meanwhile Savimbi's Huambo headquarters had been subjected to government small arms and artillery fire for more than a day.²⁷

FROM NAMIBE TO ADDIS ABABA AND ALL-OUT WAR

UN representative Margaret Anstee redoubled her efforts to revive the ailing Bicesse Accord as government forces and UNITA skirmished throughout Angola. By mid-November 1992, UNITA had seized 50 of the nation's 164 municipalities. Anstee's intercessions finally persuaded both sides to meet on November 26 at Namibe on Angola's southwestern coast. Government and UNITA representatives renewed their commitment to the Bicesse Accord, pledged to observe a cease-fire, and sought an enlarged UNAVEM II mandate, including a significantly expanded international role in the peace process. In a November 28, 1992, speech Savimbi insisted that UNITA supporters must accept the official September 30 election results and that party members must take their allotted positions in the parliament and government.²⁸ On November 29, before the promise of Namibe could be fulfilled, UNITA forces occupied Uige and Negage, claiming they were responding to MPLA provocations in both cities. Savimbi quickly sought to restore the momentum of the peace process, informing Anstee on December 1 that he was prepared to return Uige and Negage to government control.²⁹ MPLA officials refused to accompany UNAVEM personnel to Uige or Negage to confirm UNITA's claim that its forces had withdrawn from both cities. On December 2, 1992, President dos Santos announced the formation of Angola's Second Republic and the creation of a government of national unity in which he reserved one ministerial and four vice ministerial positions for UNITA. Savimbi accepted the offer and nominated UNITA members for each of the positions. The Luanda government replied that UNITA could only fill these positions when the insurgents had fully complied with the

Bicesse Accord's terms, including the extension of central administration to all areas of the countryside.

UNITA forces, in late November, had already seized 90 of Angola's 164 municipalities. By late December, the insurgents had occupied two-thirds of the nation's major urban centers. Luanda meanwhile prepared for a counter-offensive, sending large numbers of armed civilians, police, and FAA troops to beleaguered government positions at Malanje, Benguela, Kuito (formerly Bie), Huambo, and Luena. An estimated ten thousand Angolans had died in the fighting between October and December 1992.³⁰

On December 28, 1992, FAA attacked UNITA positions at Caxito to reduce the threat of an attack on Luanda. Within a few days, the government had deployed units to several fronts as well as attacking UNITA's headquarters in Huambo on January 3, 1993. Hostilities erupted at 10 of Angola's 18 provincial capitals including Lubango, where FAA troops slaughtered hundreds of unarmed UNITA party officials. On January 5, 1993, President dos Santos informed UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee that "the country is at war" but acknowledged that neither side would win, suggesting that he wanted a more advantageous military position prior to entering a second round of UNAVEM-sponsored negotiations.³¹

Early results of the government's campaign seemed to favor dos Santos's plan. FAA troops forced UNITA out of Huambo on January 9, 1993. Four days later UNITA and MPLA agreed to resume negotiations at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Delegations did not arrive in Addis Ababa until January 26, by which time UNITA forces had regained an advantage on several fronts. Guerrilla forces sabotaged hydroelectric facilities near Luanda, disrupting a significant source of the city's water and power and reviving the threat of a UNITA assault on the city. Prospects for successful talks at Addis Ababa also were undermined by the January 22–23, 1993, slaughter by MPLA supporters of hundreds, and perhaps as many as a thousand, unarmed Kikongo speakers and Zairian expatriates living in northwest Angola. This apparently spontaneous outburst may have been prompted by a series of earlier government pronouncements alleging President Mobutu's involvement in UNITA's recent military gains in the northwest, including the early January seizure of oil production facilities at Soyo. The Soyo attack had destroyed a loading terminal and other nearby equipment, causing Angola's oil production to slump briefly by almost 15 percent—from 550,000 to 474,000 barrels per day.³²

Although both sides made tentative commitments to a cease-fire at Addis Ababa, in early February 1993, subsequent rounds of negotiations failed to make progress. UNITA called for the cantonment of the riot police and made other political and military demands that Luanda deemed unacceptable. Talks at Addis Ababa collapsed in late February as UNITA officials repeatedly claimed their delegation was unable to travel safely from Angola to Ethiopia. UNITA representatives at Addis Ababa had become increasingly intransigent as the insurgents counterattacked and tightened their siege of Huambo. UNITA had interdicted supply lines leading to Huambo shortly after government forces had expelled the insurgents from the city

on January 9, 1993. By the end of the month UNITA had regrouped and launched an all-out assault on the FAA garrison, relying largely on persistent artillery barrages to subdue the defenders. UNITA's heavy weapons closed the airport, preventing government aircraft from flying relief supplies to the beleaguered FAA troops. Government commanders attempted to move a motorized column overland from Benguela. UNITA guerrillas harassed this force while semiconventional units intensified the pressure on Huambo's defensive perimeter. FAA officers finally decided, on March 8, 1993, to abandon their positions and retreat to government-held territory on the Atlantic coast. UNITA attacked the column as it fled Huambo. An estimated 10,000–15,000 troops and civilians died by the time the 55-day battle for Angola's second largest city had ended.³³

Savimbi broadcast a long rambling speech one day after Huambo fell, and acknowledged that the siege was a substantially more devastating battle than any of the 1980s confrontations at Mavinga. Moreover, Savimbi felt the Huambo battle should be regarded as politically rather than militarily decisive and put this view forward succinctly, proclaiming that "we are ready to resume negotiations at once."³⁴ Savimbi's call for peace talks conformed to his past strategic preferences and also implicitly recognized that UNITA's military fortunes might soon reach their zenith.

Early signs of a UNITA "high tide" already were apparent elsewhere in central Angola. UNITA had committed thousands of troops to the battle for Kuito (formerly Bie) as its forces intensified their siege of Huambo in early 1993. Kuito was the sole remaining large government-held urban center in the central highlands, after the fall of Huambo. UNITA artillery had periodically closed the airport, forcing the government to airdrop supplies to the encircled garrison. Growing food and medical shortages subjected the city's civilian population to increasingly severe hardships.³⁵ Although UNITA managed to occupy portions of the city, FAA retained key districts inside Kuito and nearby suburbs. The FAA's valiant resistance provided the government a respite and an opportunity to recoup losses elsewhere in Angola.

In an ironic reversal of its 1975 experience, when the MPLA opposed and defeated "soldiers of fortune" who had joined their enemies, Luanda's reliance on mercenaries, in early 1993, briefly improved the government's military prospects. Luanda contracted with Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based "private security firm." EO provided a five-hundred-member force consisting of South African, Namibian, and Angolan veterans that had fought on both sides of the Angola-Namibia border in the 1980s. Most of the company's cadres served as advisors and trainers for newly recruited FAA troops and a few also piloted government aircraft.³⁶ On March 13, 1993, a combined FAA/EO force launched a seaborne assault from Cabinda to reoccupy Soyo. The FAA/EO operation was poorly executed and nearly became a disaster for the attackers. The FAA/EO team failed to direct adequate preparatory mortar or artillery fire at insurgent positions and rapidly lost the element of surprise. UNITA chose to abandon their positions at Soyo rather than conduct a pitched battle and risk large casualties. Government officials

later acknowledged that if UNITA defenders had held their positions a few minutes longer, the FAA/EO troops would have called off their assault.³⁷

FAA's defense of Kuito and reoccupation of Soyo partially revived Luanda's morale and encouraged the MPLA to consider another round of negotiations, held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. From April 9 to May 21, 1993, government and UNITA representatives, assisted by UN interlocutors, crafted and finally agreed to 38 of 39 articles of a proposed "Abidjan Protocol." Negotiations eventually ground to a halt due to UNITA's insistence on a mutual withdrawal of forces from several contested cities. Moreover, UN officials proved unwilling to accommodate both sides' plea for an international peacekeeping contingent to oversee areas from which UNITA agreed to withdraw its combatants. UN representatives demanded that both sides implement a cease-fire *prior* to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, which, they also noted, was not likely to arrive for several months after the signing of any agreement. The UN's reluctance to make a more rapid commitment to Angola, comparable to its 1989 and 1992 deployments, was due to both the increasingly complex nature of the Angolan crisis as well as growing demands for UN contingents elsewhere, particularly Somalia and Mozambique. Within weeks after the collapse of the Abidjan talks, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 834 condemning UNITA for the failure of the peace process. Shortly thereafter, Margaret Anstee completed her tour as UN special representative to Angola and handed over her responsibilities to former Malian government minister Alioun Blondin Beye.³⁸

Government forces had launched offensives on several fronts in early May 1993, as the Abidjan negotiations lost momentum. FAA commanders deployed three thousand troops, supplemented by Katangan auxiliaries, against UNITA positions at Ambriz on the Atlantic coast and the insurgent-held provincial capital, Ndalatando. The government also sought to open road links to Malanje. As the government's offensive in the northwest began to falter in the face of insurgent resistance, Luanda commenced an EO-assisted airborne commando operation in the northeast. FAA troops landed at Cafunfo, Lussamba, and Cuango to reoccupy diamond fields in the Cuango River valley. UNITA's surface-to-air missiles prevented Luanda from maintaining a reliable air bridge to these outposts and, by late May, government forces had been confined to increasingly vulnerable positions at Cafunfo, which fell to UNITA at the end of the month. Despite the government campaign, UNITA claimed its diamond mining activities in the Cuango River area had not been disturbed. In a further blow to EO's reputation as a "force multiplier," UNITA commandos recaptured Soyo on May 24, 1993, forcing government troops and mercenaries to evacuate by air and sea to Cabinda. UNITA followed these gains with a successful counteroffensive in June, including attacks in Bengo and Cuanza Norte Provinces as well as an effort to besiege Malanje. FAA contingents retreated from small towns in Bengo and Cuanza Norte but held their ground at Malanje.³⁹ President dos Santos told the UN's special representative to Angola, in early July 1993, he

hoped to pursue military options that would "bring about a draw," presumably to allow for another round of negotiations.⁴⁰

Luanda's military prospects had benefited significantly from the radically changed composition of UNITA's leadership after 1992. The Puna and Fernandes defections were followed by even more damaging desertions of high ranking UNITA officers who chose to serve with the FAA. Some of UNITA's most accomplished commanders, including generals Peregrino Huambo, Adriano Mackenzie, Geraldo Nunda, Renato Mateus, and others were awarded similar or nearly comparable ranks in the FAA. By 1993 they were leading government troops against their former colleagues. Although these high-level defections forced Savimbi to rely on a second tier of military leadership, they did not spark large-scale desertions from UNITA's middle or lower ranks. Nevertheless, the defectors' knowledge of Savimbi's strategy and tactics and the inner workings of UNITA's logistics, communications, and intelligence systems undoubtedly provided the government valuable advantages in subsequent rounds of hostilities.⁴¹

LUANDA REGAINS THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE

UNITA's March 1993 victory at Huambo, much like the insurgents' hold over Mavinga in the 1980s, became the focal point of combat in Angola for the next 18 months. In June 1993, Luanda marshaled ten thousand troops at bases in Benguela and Lobito. The forces were divided equally and moved along two major roads leading to Huambo. Smaller government contingents deployed to Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces to distract UNITA from the northern and southern flanks of the two columns as they advanced. Government aircraft struck UNITA positions in Huambo and elsewhere in the highlands. Luanda made more frequent use of heliborne commandos to supplement their mechanized infantry units. UNITA implemented tactics of delay and disruption, attacking supply lines and cutting vital bridges, rather than confronting large FAA contingents.

As FAA forces advanced toward Huambo, gradually regaining the military initiative, UNITA responded with a diplomatic offensive. The insurgents still controlled an estimated 70 percent of the Angolan countryside when UNITA general Arlindo Chenda Pena announced on September 12, 1993, a unilateral cease-fire that would take effect eight days later. UNITA's proposal also was meant to preempt threats of further international sanctions and the disruption of supply lines that had significantly contracted since 1991. UN Security Council Resolution 864, adopted on September 15, 1993, threatened an arms and oil embargo against UNITA in ten days unless a cease-fire had taken hold and the combatants reaffirmed their commitment to the Bicesse Accord. UNITA's Political Commission missed the UN deadline but issued a seven-point communiqué on October 6, 1993, reaffirming its commitment to the Bicesse Accord and its acceptance of the September 1992 election results.⁴²

By early November 1993, nearly four months after the government offensive started, FAA columns approached the western boundaries of Huambo Province. Although UNITA still controlled large portions of the Angolan interior, Savimbi's forces no longer posed an immediate threat to Luanda or other government centers on the Atlantic coast.⁴³ After a preliminary round of talks in Lusaka, Zambia, in late October 1993 chaired by UN Special Representative Alioun Blondin Beye and supported by U.S. Special Representative Ambassador Paul Hare, both sides opted for additional meetings. UNITA's representatives agreed "in principle" to canton their troops in exchange for a government cessation of all offensive military operations. Each party agreed to resume formal negotiations on November 15, 1993. Although they failed to formulate mutually acceptable cease-fire terms, both sides consented to additional contacts. Subsequent discussions focused on the size and composition of integrated military and police forces. From February through September 1994 UNITA and government officials haggled over controversial political issues such as the number of government ministries, provincial governorships, and other positions to be given to UNITA as part of a "government of national unity."⁴⁴ Whereas UNITA had stalled the early 1993 Addis Ababa talks while its forces besieged Huambo, the government, in 1994, likewise delayed negotiations as its troops advanced toward Huambo and other provincial capitals.

UNITA had reached the limits of its ability to fight as a semiconventional force in early 1993, after their victory at Huambo. Lacking the funds and matériel support previously provided by South Africa and the United States, UNITA relied increasingly on diamond sales.⁴⁵ UNITA recently had sold diamonds worth \$4–5 million, which funded the acquisition of mortar rounds, antitank and anti-aircraft weapons, small arms, medicines, and other supplies. UNITA purchased most of this equipment in Eastern European arms markets awash in huge Cold War–era surplus stockpiles. Many of these weapons were shipped to UNITA-held towns, often with the assistance of several South African arms brokers and diamond traders, via remote and often marginally supervised airfields in South Africa.⁴⁶

Luanda's oil revenues easily surpassed UNITA's ability to finance escalating military operations. UNITA's failure to mount a serious threat to Angola's oil fields was an enduring weakness in their strategy throughout the 27-year civil war. Luanda exploited its resource advantage repeatedly in the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1994, the government purchased arms worth \$3–4 billion.⁴⁷ The government found ready arms suppliers in North Korea, Russia, and several Eastern European states.⁴⁸ Some transactions involved intricate commercial networks and included sales arranged by two international corporate executives, Franco-Brazilian Pierre Falcone and Russian Arkady Gaydamak, who had ties to politically well-connected private firms in Paris where they were contacted by Angola's ambassador to France. Falcone, Gaydamak, and the Angolan ambassador collaborated in some of Luanda's largest arms transactions of the mid-1990s, working principally through a Slovak weapons manufacturer, ZTS-Osos. In 1993–94 Falcone and several

associates facilitated the sale of \$33 million worth of arms to the government. ZTZ-*Osos* and other firms augmented Angola's arsenals with at least thirty T-62 tanks, forty armored vehicles, two dozen self-propelled howitzers, and dozens of artillery pieces.⁴⁹

FAA officers and their EO advisors quickly put these and other multimillion-dollar arms purchases to use. Angola's armed forces launched several multi-front offensives to supplement the gains made in their drive on Huambo and weaken UNITA's hold over other areas. FAA contingents had made slow but substantial progress by late February 1994 when insurgent counterattacks in the northwest stalled their advance and forced them to consolidate their gains. Before UNITA could move reinforcements to support a counterattack in the northwest, Luanda launched another offensive into north-central Angola in early March 1994, sending two thousand troops toward the insurgent-occupied provincial capital of Ndalatando. UNITA mounted a stiff resistance on March 26, 1994, forcing FAA units to briefly regroup before resuming their eastward push in early April. Several weeks later, government troops fought their way to the outskirts of Ndalatando. Additional armor and artillery units augmented government forces and, combined with airstrikes, drove UNITA from the city on May 4. Meanwhile, government forces also had broken UNITA's siege of Malanje and, in early May, linked up with FAA troops moving east from Ndalatando. FAA contingents converged at the key crossroads town of Lucala prior to moving north into Uige Province to outflank UNITA forces blocking the government's earlier advance from positions north of Luanda. By mid-1994 the combined FAA advances into northwestern and north-central provinces threatened to interdict vital supply lines linking UNITA combatants in the northwest with guerrilla bases in the central highlands.⁵⁰

Luanda launched a third offensive in March 1994 to loosen the insurgents' grip on diamond mines in the northeast. Augmented forces at Saurimo commenced counterinsurgency sweeps targeting a network of nearby UNITA positions. Government operations, aided by EO personnel, made effective use of heliborne commandos and airstrikes by fighter-bombers. FAA troops reoccupied Lussamba, Cafunfo, and several other villages in the Cuango River valley by early August 1994. UNITA counterattacked and surrounded government forces at Cafunfo, forcing Luanda to resupply its troops by airdrops because incoming artillery fire prevented cargo planes from using the nearby airfield. In mid-August a large UNITA counteroffensive enjoyed only limited success. The guerrillas recaptured a few small towns but government units held on at Cafunfo and thwarted insurgent efforts to close down the Saurimo airfield. In a further demonstration of its revived military fortune, FAA troops also conducted an August 1994 counteroffensive in response to a recent UNITA-FLEC campaign in northern Cabinda where the guerrillas had hoped to tie down 15,000 government soldiers and weaken FAA's efforts in central Angola. By mid- to late 1994, FAA's offensives had reduced the portion of Angola's interior under UNITA control from 60 to 40 percent.⁵¹ The core of UNITA's strength remained in

the central highlands, where the insurgents had an estimated 20,000 combatants in control of Huambo, still surrounded Kuito, and maintained an extensive logistics network throughout the countryside.

The military balance in central Angola was only beginning to shift in Luanda's favor. In early July 1994, after stopping a renewed insurgent drive to seize Kuito, FAA pushed UNITA forces beyond the city limits and launched air raids on a large guerrilla base twenty kilometers from the city. In August government forces conducted an intense aerial campaign against UNITA positions across a broad swath of territory. By September, Luanda had deployed troops to several forward bases in support of offensives in central and southern Angola. FAA commanders, on September 15, 1994, committed 25,000 troops, more than twice the number deployed in their 1993 campaign, to reoccupy Huambo from the west. An additional government column advanced into Huila Province to protect FAA's southern flanks. Government troops also launched secondary drives from bases near Kuito. UNITA efforts to stall the government's advance with harassing attacks and small ambushes, followed by an October counteroffensive, slowed but did not stop the FAA's relentless drive. By November 4, 1994, government forces were only a day's march from Huambo.⁵²

Concurrent campaigns in the northwest were nearly as successful as the central highlands offensive. On September 18, 1994, FAA troops drove north from Ambriz toward Soyo. On a second axis, five thousand to seven thousand troops moved northeast from Bengo Province against UNITA bases in Uige Province. Insurgent counterattacks stalled the drive to push UNITA out of the provincial capital of Uige and nearby Negage airfield. The Atlantic coast campaign, however, was more effective. Government troops reached the outskirts of Soyo on October 27, 1994. FAA troops made comparable gains in Cabinda, where UNITA forces occasionally had collaborated with FLEC-FAC (Cabindan Armed Forces) guerrillas. The latter faction had emerged, ten years earlier, along with FLEC-Renovada after the original FLEC suffered irreparable internal divisions. UNITA and FLEC-FAC had seized several villages in early 1994. By late October 1994, government forces counterattacked and forced UNITA and FLEC-FAC back toward the enclaves' northern borders.⁵³

THE LUSAKA ACCORD: A POISONED PEACE

In late 1993, UNITA had eschewed large conventional battles in order to minimize casualties and retain the advantageous mobility of its smaller units. Savimbi opted for the same tactics in 1994 but for different reasons. Rather than trade territory for military mobility, his forces slowly but steadily yielded territory to give their external representatives time to consolidate diplomatic gains. Several preliminary negotiations in Lusaka, Zambia had begun to produce the general principles of an overarching peace process. Key elements of the 1991 Bicesse Accord were retained while others were modified. UNITA agreed to the cantonment and disarmament of its forces. Luanda insisted on

a postwar army of 120,000, rather than the 50,000 anticipated in the Bicesse Accord. This raised the specter of an armed force that would swallow up the 20,000 UNITA participants allotted under the Bicesse Accord. In partial compensation, Luanda offered UNITA an additional 6,000 army billets and 5,000 positions in a new police force, more than twice the number the government provided in 1992. The two sides had accepted 17 of 18 principles of a final settlement by mid-June 1994 while combat continued in 11 of Angola's 18 provinces.⁵⁴

Convinced that they had resolved the most difficult issues, government and UNITA representatives, on October 31, 1994, initialed a draft of what eventually became the Lusaka Accord. The signing of an official document was scheduled for November 15, 1994, to be followed by a cease-fire two days later. Immediately after signing the draft treaty, Luanda reversed its public and private assurances that it did not intend to launch additional offensive military operations. FAA commanders claimed continued UNITA attacks required the pursuit of additional military objectives. Government troops occupied Soyo on November 4. Two days later, FAA contingents drove into Huambo. UNITA troops abandoned the city on November 9. MPLA officials announced, on November 13, they would observe a nationwide truce. Military representatives from both sides met in Lusaka on November 14 and proclaimed a revised timetable anticipating a truce that would commence on November 16 and a formal signing ceremony on November 20. Despite UN Security Council condemnations, government troops again resumed offensive operations, seizing UNITA-held Uige and Cuito Cuanavale on November 17, shortly after the truce had commenced. FAA troops had reoccupied all the nation's provincial capitals except for Mbanza Congo in Zaire Province.⁵⁵

UNITA representative Eugenio Manuvakola denounced the government's November 17 reoccupation of Uige and notified international mediators at Lusaka that the insurgents were suspending their participation in further discussions with FAA officers until further notice from UNITA headquarters. In a revealing comment on the mood of UNITA's inner circle, Manuvakola informed journalists, "If the government wants to follow the military option, we seriously need to think about a military option as well . . . so far we have been using a conventional war to defend cities and towns, which is not our specialty. Our specialty is bush war. That is our war. We think we are not on a path of weakness, but a path of strength. We can adapt ourselves to the new situation quickly and we will see whether Angola will have peace or war for a few more years."⁵⁶

Manuvakola's remarks barely concealed some of the deepest fissures that ever threatened UNITA's political and military cohesion. According to Manuvakola, after the FAA seizures of Uige and Cuito Cuanavale, Savimbi had secretly ordered him, on November 17, to leave Lusaka immediately without informing anyone of his departure or destination. Manuvakola refused Savimbi's order and remained in Lusaka. Torn between moderate elements of his party eager to revive the peace process and militants who felt betrayed by persistent FAA military seizures of insurgent-held territory,

Savimbi relented and sent the necessary credentials authorizing Manuvakola to represent UNITA.⁵⁷ Although UNITA accepted the Lusaka Accord, Savimbi refused to attend the November 20, 1994, signing ceremony, allegedly due to concerns for his personal safety. Eugenio Manuvakola signed for UNITA. President dos Santos attended the ceremony but had his foreign minister, Venancio da Moura, sign on behalf of the Angolan government. On November 22, 1994, both sides declared a truce, ending two years of combat in which an estimated three hundred thousand Angolans had died.⁵⁸

UN Special Representative Beye ordered the deployment of UNAVEM observers to several Angolan cities in late November. On December 4, 1994, a UNITA delegation arrived in Luanda to discuss the creation of a new Angolan Army, as well as the quartering, disarmament, and demobilization of excess forces. Delays and mistrust undermined the efforts of UN, U.S., and other negotiators to implement the Lusaka Accord. The UN announced that the deployment of peacekeeping forces would not occur until early February 1995. Persistent low-level FAA operations convinced some UNITA leaders that Luanda would not abide by the terms of the peace process.

The divisions that first appeared in UNITA's ranks in the late 1980s had become even more pronounced after the Lusaka Accord was signed. In a December 21, 1994, interview, Savimbi acknowledged "UNITA is experiencing its most severe crisis since it was established twenty eight years ago. In a victorious guerrilla war, you have a single path which everyone follows. But in times of adversity, there are many paths, different groups. Today, my path is not the only one in UNITA's ranks."⁵⁹ Ten days later, Savimbi elaborated on the complex issues confronting UNITA's leaders. In a December 31, 1994, interview he asserted, "[W]e do not have in UNITA a unified stance regarding the Lusaka Protocol. We have various stances. This does not mean we have factions in our midst; we simply have currents of opinion regarding Lusaka." Savimbi also outlined a distinction between his personal views and his stance as a UNITA party leader, suggesting that he thought the Lusaka Accord was deeply flawed but that in his capacity as UNITA's president he had to urge the party to give the peace process a chance to succeed.⁶⁰

UNITA's decision to abandon Huambo and sign the Lusaka Accord reaffirmed Mao's early advice to his Angolan students that, for guerrillas "to lose territory is of no importance . . . It is altogether improper to defend cities to the utmost, for this merely leads to sacrificing our own effective strength."⁶¹ UNITA found it more challenging, however, to adhere to Mao's famous, but often incompletely quoted, dictum that "[p]olitical power comes out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, **and** the gun will never be allowed to command the Party."⁶² At UNITA's February 1995 Party Congress, UNITA spokesmen indicated ongoing debates and ambivalent commitments to the Lusaka Accord.⁶³ In addition to the "moderates" represented by Manuvakola, observers also noted a "Huambo wing" including generals Paulo Lukamba "Gato" and Demostenes Amos Chilingutila. The "Huambo wing" reportedly had rivals in a Bie/Benguela faction that included Savimbi's nephew, General Arlindo Chenda Pena "Ben Ben,"

General Benjamin Esteveao Ekuikui “Beija,” and head of intelligence Altino Bango Sapalalo “Bock.” The two factions traded recriminations over controversial tactics in the 1993–94 Kuito battles and debated the diplomatic initiatives leading to the Lusaka Accord.⁶⁴ MPLA leaders and FAA commanders also had to cope with similar civilian and military tensions. Some Angolan military commanders had their doubts about the Lusaka Accord and, on at least one occasion, expressed them openly. In mid-February 1995, FAA chief of staff general de Matos told journalists that “only the total defeat of Savimbi can ensure peace . . . strictly from the military point of view it was a mistake [to have signed the Lusaka Accord].”⁶⁵

After numerous accusations of cease-fire violations nearly ended the Lusaka peace process, the UN Security Council finally passed, on February 8, 1995, Resolution 976 authorizing a peacekeeping mission—UNAVEM III—with 7,000 military personnel as well as 350 military and 260 police observers. The Security Council insisted that UN troops would not deploy prior to a cessation of hostilities and the designation of quartering areas for the combatants. Progresses was slowed, however, as both sides disrupted UNAVEM efforts to access sensitive military bases and have the two sides disengage from tense combat zones near Huambo and Uige. Government commanders continued to deploy FAA personnel throughout Angola without prior authorization, as required by the Lusaka Accord.⁶⁶

Over the next two months, the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust dissipated due to strenuous diplomatic initiatives. UN Special Representative Beye persuaded President dos Santos and Savimbi to meet in Lusaka on May 5, 1995. At the conclusion of a ninety-minute conference, dos Santos publicly exclaimed, “[W]e have been able to overcome our difficulties, to discuss our differences . . . and to reach agreement on all the issues that were raised . . . We are partners who have decided to work together to ensure that all of the Lusaka Protocol’s clauses are implemented.” Savimbi reciprocated with comparable sentiments, declaring, “This is an historic occasion . . . We spoke as brothers . . . I told the President that he is the president of my country and therefore my President.”⁶⁷ One month later, the MPLA proposed a constitutional revision that established two vice presidential positions. Savimbi would be offered one while the other would be held by Fernando Jose Franca van Dunem, president of the National Assembly. In late June 1995, Savimbi indicated he would accept the offer and publicly declared that Angola’s civil war had ended. Dos Santos and Savimbi met again in August 1995 in Franceville, Gabon. Savimbi asked that the government formally offer the vice presidential position to UNITA. The government agreed to do so but official duties of the office as well as the terms of presidential succession were not specified. Luanda also announced, in September, that it had signed a four-month cease-fire with FLEC-Renovada. This announcement was hailed by some as the precursor to negotiations with other FLEC factions, which could end hostilities throughout Cabinda.⁶⁸

STEPS FORWARD, STEPS BACK

Both sides continued to violate the cease-fire and miss important deadlines, as did the UN, in implementing Resolution 976. Initial UNAVEM III contingents from Uruguay, India, and Zimbabwe did not arrive until late June 1995 and the last of the seven thousand peacekeeping troops did not reach Angola until November 1995.⁶⁹ Financial and logistical hurdles also impeded the construction of several troop quartering areas, further delaying plans for the cantonment of UNITA's combatants. In the intervening months, government and UNITA representatives repeatedly accused each other of further cease-fire violations. Whether these incidents reflected intentional efforts to subvert the peace process or a loss of command and control by both sides often was uncertain. By late 1995 UNAVEM monitors had recorded almost 1,500 cease-fire violations. Although both parties had agreed on 14 of the 15 troop quartering sites anticipated by the Lusaka Accord, only four sites were functioning in January 1996, accounting for a mere 4,300 UNITA troops. One month later, the pace had accelerated slightly and cantonment sites accounted for 8,200 insurgents, far less than the 16,500 Savimbi had promised to send by February 8, 1996. The government also stubbornly retained the services of several hundred EO employees despite the Lusaka Accord's requirement to repatriate all mercenaries.⁷⁰ International pressure eventually persuaded the government to terminate its EO contract. The South African firm announced on January 2, 1996, that it had begun withdrawing its personnel from Angola. Subsequent reports, however, indicated that Luanda had disguised the continued presence of mercenaries in Angola by having other firms hire them. Saracen International, Branch Energy, Alpha 5 and other companies employed some of the same EO personnel to secure oil facilities and diamond mining sites.⁷¹ Government and UNITA leadership also had authorized the acquisition of arms throughout 1995, in violation of UN Resolution 976 requiring both sides to cease further weapons purchases. Angolan government acquisitions worth more than \$40 million were traced to Russia and Ukraine in fulfillment of contracts signed shortly before, or not long after, the ratification of the Lusaka Accord.⁷² UNITA likewise arranged weapons and supplies flights to airfields in central Angola. With the aid of government officials enticed by diamonds, cash, and a share of the arms UNITA purchased, Congo, Togo, and Zaire provided end-user certificates to facilitate arms sales from several Eastern European suppliers.⁷³

Another Savimbi-dos Santos meeting, in Libreville, Gabon in early March 1996 breathed new life into a faltering peace process. The two leaders agreed to form a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (subsequently referred to as the GURN) to be established three months later. Savimbi provided dos Santos the names of 170 UNITA officials who were to occupy cabinet, provincial, and local positions agreed to in the Lusaka Accord. President dos Santos reciprocated with a formal invitation to have Savimbi serve as a vice president. This offer reignited some of the same tensions that had shaken UNITA's ranks 18 months earlier. Shortly after his meeting with dos Santos,

Savimbi returned to UNITA headquarters at Bailundo where he addressed a party rally. In what was clearly a shocking gesture of conciliation to the party's most militant members, Savimbi declared, "I would like to make it clear that one of our greatest errors was to sign the Bicesse Accord in 1991. It was a major error and I am here to admit that error. UNITA had everything to continue its unstoppable struggle. It was an error and I fully admit it. Right now UNITA is in one of its tightest corners ever." After raising personal doubts about the government's offer of a vice presidential position, Savimbi concluded that "ultimately what matters most is the opinion of my party and of the Angolan people. Angolans are greatly divided in their opinions. I have received hundreds of letters from Luanda and many other parts of the country urging me to accept the post. Conversely other people tell me to reject it because they think it is a trap. I do not know what you want any more. I will not do anything that goes against my conscience, my party, or the Angolan people."⁷⁴

Savimbi's startling concession to party militants was more than a rhetorical flourish. It hinted at a significant loss of confidence in his leadership, a loss on which he elaborated five days later. On March 18, Savimbi invited UN Special Representative Maitre Beye and the U.S., Russian, and Portuguese ambassadors to Angola and a UN delegation to his headquarters in Bailundo. Savimbi began the meeting with a lengthy monologue, stating,

I gave my word of honor to proceed with quartering and disarmament. I did not know how hard it would be to disarm my people. I risk assassination by my own people. My sister came to me last week and said, "You are risking your life. Your own people will kill you. You told them victory would come and now you tell them to give up their weapons" . . . Before I had prestige to protect me, but it is being lost . . . Our troops are ready to go into quartering camps. They will then move to the FAA or be demobilized. I am their father—I need to be sure the world provides resources for soldiers who leave . . . My troops are not defeated soldiers; they will not be treated like second class citizens. . . . This must occur quickly; I cannot leave my troops in the quartering sites too long.

Savimbi's guests variously sought to assure or pressure him to reaffirm his commitment to the demobilization process and all agreed to defer further discussion of the vice-presidential position.⁷⁵

Although the dos Santos-Savimbi meeting in Libreville had not settled the debate over Savimbi's role in a postwar Angola, it did yield an agreement on the details of a new national army. UNITA and government officials decided that the insurgents would appoint 18 generals in the new FAA. Nine of these officers would serve in the army. The other nine generals would hold positions in a vaguely defined "fourth branch," proposed in earlier discussions, which might engage in civil affairs and public works. UNITA also was expected to merge 26,300 of its 62,000 combatants into FAA ranks. By early April 1996 UNITA had quartered 17,566 troops and the government had confined 3,367 Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) members to barracks in six provinces.⁷⁶

The UN nevertheless remained suspicious of both sides' commitment to the Lusaka Accord due to continued delays in the implementation of various obligations. Consequently, in May 1996 the Security Council agreed only to a two-month renewal of the UNAVEM III mandate. Both parties took additional steps, again persuading skeptics that progress was still possible. The Angolan National Assembly approved a law in May that offered amnesty for all crimes against state security since the signing of the Bicesse Accord. Savimbi also pledged in mid-May that 50,000 UNITA troops would be cantoned by June 15, 1996. The two parties also completed a plan to integrate UNITA personnel into the FAA and agreed that the selection of troops for the new national army would begin on June 1.⁷⁷ The UN's Special Representative to Angola announced on June 17, 1996, that UNITA had quartered 49,200 troops, leaving only 12,500 insurgents to report to cantonments. Beye expected the remaining UNITA combatants to report by late July. Encouraged by the generally favorable trends of the previous months the UN, in July 1996, renewed the UNAVEM III mandate for an additional ninety days.

SAVIMBI'S POLITICAL STATUS, DIAMONDS, AND OIL

The last half of 1996 and the early months of 1997 witnessed a further oscillation between hope and despair for the prospects of a durable peace in Angola. Unceasing turmoil inside UNITA's ranks compounded Savimbi's suspicion that Luanda's offer of a largely ceremonial vice presidential position was meant to drive a deep wedge between him and his party. In an early July 1996 interview, Savimbi remarked,

I have said it before, and my position remains unchanged: I wish to serve. I wish to serve Angola. But I am a party man. So it will be up to my party to decide. If the party decides that I must become vice president of the republic, then I shall step forward. But in that event I cannot remain as party leader. Because the party, UNITA, must rebuild itself. We have had our disasters—military, political, diplomatic. Someone must lead the party for a prolonged period of time so that we can rebuild our values. This cannot be done by someone being both vice president and party leader.⁷⁸

At the conclusion of UNITA's Third Special Congress in late August 1996, a communiqué declined Savimbi's appointment to the office of vice president and did not name an alternative UNITA member to occupy the position. One month later, the government voided its offer to Savimbi. The UN Security Council threatened, in October 1996, to impose sanctions on UNITA if the movement failed to canton 12,500 additional combatants and identify those who were to join the ranks of the FAA by late November.⁷⁹

A tentative agreement, in early November 1996, to share some of Angola's mineral wealth promised to partially compensate for aborted efforts to have dos Santos and Savimbi share the nation's political power. At previous meetings, in Zambia and Gabon, the two leaders had addressed the possibility of allowing

UNITA to retain some of the diamond mining sites it controlled. In the mid-1990s, UNITA's mining operations employed one hundred thousand miners and produced diamonds worth an estimated \$600 million a year. The insurgents also derived revenue from the mining, sale, and taxation of diamonds from other mining sites throughout the northeast.⁸⁰

Each side had public or private reasons for arranging a "diamond deal" outside the parameters of the Lusaka Accord. Those who favored the agreement argued that UNITA needed a guaranteed source of finances if it hoped to compete effectively as a political party. The government's decision to accept a revenue sharing arrangement seemed to have more to do with extrajudicial features of the Angolan diamond industry. Notwithstanding Luanda's previous efforts to reform the process of granting mining concessions, critics claimed the government frequently offered mining licenses to FAA generals and other ranking officials. These grants presumably were to assure their continued loyalty rather than acknowledge their skills or expertise in the mining industry. Moreover, in the two years since the signing of the Lusaka Accord, FAA and UNITA commanders had arranged mutually profitable collaborative arrangements at several mines in the northeast. Diamond sales and other transactions occurred across military lines at mining sites unofficially divided between FAA and UNITA combatants.⁸¹

Expediency, the unauthorized fraternization of opposing forces, and perhaps a vague hope that a formal arrangement to share revenues would have a confidence-building effect cumulatively promoted a "gentleman's agreement." On November 14, 1996, a representative of the state's diamond company—*Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola* (ENDIAMA)—and FAA general Higino Carneiro met in Luanda with Abel Chivukuvuku and Isaias Samakuva who represented the UNITA operated Mining Management Company, *Sociedade Gestora Mineira* (SGM). The two parties agreed, in principle, to have UNITA's SGM partake in a joint venture known as the Diamond Mining Company—*Sociedade Diamantifera Mineira* (SDM), including ENDIAMA and other foreign partners. The negotiators also tentatively agreed to have UNITA collaborate in similar ventures to exploit two additional diamond mining concessions. However, a final agreement would require UNITA to withdraw combatants from diamond mining sites in the northeast. Negotiations on this critical clause dragged on into early 1997.⁸²

UNITA had grown increasingly reluctant to surrender substantial diamond revenues as their loss of Cold War-era patrons had forced the insurgents to become increasingly self-sufficient. Their stubborn retention of mineral resources was matched by equally determined government initiatives to secure funds from highly profitable oil exports, which provided more than 90 percent of Luanda's revenues. Luanda earned between \$1.8 and \$3 billion per year from its oil industry in the mid-1990s and even higher sums were expected in the coming decade. Angola's budget, however, labored under the persistent burden of a Cold War-era debt to Russia estimated at \$5 billion. Pierre Falcone and Arkady Gaydamak, who previously had brokered arms deals for Angola, once again came to Luanda's rescue in late 1996. Relying on oil

industry, banking, and other contacts in Western Europe, Falcone and Gaydamak negotiated the sale of Angola's Russian debt at a significantly discounted price. Moscow reportedly accepted a \$1.5 billion payoff, to be funded by future Angolan oil sales. Falcone, Gaydamak, and Angolan and Russian officials profited handsomely from the transaction.⁸³ Much like the prospect of a diamond revenue-sharing deal with UNITA, this complex arrangement promised to make more funds available for economic development and social welfare programs. As long as the Lusaka peace process held, both sides' tentative efforts to expand and apportion the nation's wealth held out hope that political power also could be shared in a mutually acceptable manner.

HOPE REALIZED, TRUST BETRAYED

In the months following the second anniversary of the Lusaka Accord, progress toward critical military and political milestones suggested that goodwill and patience could overcome remaining flaws in the peace process. In December 1996 UNAVEM III officials announced that 70,336 UNITA combatants had arrived at cantonment sites since the start of the demobilization process. This good news was tempered by reports that 15,706 UNITA personnel subsequently had deserted the camps. Some observers also claimed that UNITA operated military outposts and retained an estimated 15,000 troops dispersed throughout the nation's central and northeastern provinces.⁸⁴ Optimists balanced this disappointing news with progress reports on the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the ranks of the FAA, including 9 UNITA generals, 8 colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, and 19 majors. By January 7, 1997, nearly 19,000 UNITA troops had been selected to join the FAA and by January 22 over 5,500 were officially integrated into the armed forces.⁸⁵

In January 1997, President dos Santos announced his acceptance of UNITA nominees to the GURN. The unresolved problem of determining Savimbi's political status kept UNITA's elected deputies from reporting for duty in the National Assembly, forcing the postponement of the GURN's inauguration scheduled for January 25, 1997. The South African government had repeatedly encouraged both sides to devise alternative solutions. President Nelson Mandela met with Savimbi in South Africa and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki traveled to Luanda to visit President dos Santos in January 1997.⁸⁶

Two months of contentious bargaining finally yielded a workable compromise. The government initially had turned down a UNITA proposal, in February, that Savimbi be appointed "chief advisor" to the president as an alternative to the previous offer of a vice presidential position. The government also rejected UNITA's precondition that Luanda negotiate a basic political platform for the GURN to avoid the impression that the MPLA's preexisting foreign and domestic policy would be grafted onto the new unity government. By early April the two sides broke the political logjam and agreed to a policy agenda for the GURN as well as a special status for Savimbi, giving him the title of "leader of the opposition." This position

would give Savimbi "[t]he right to regular consultation with the President and members of the government, and the right to publish messages in the state owned press. The government will also provide Savimbi a residence in Luanda, a team of body guards and an undisclosed salary befitting his status."⁸⁷ UNITA's parliamentarians and nominees for government positions (four ministers and seven deputy ministers), arrived in Luanda to participate in the GURN's inauguration on April 11, 1997. Savimbi, however, chose not to attend, claiming that Luanda was not a safe city, since neither government nor peacekeeping forces had managed to retrieve more than a few hundred weapons from the many thousands still held by civilians in the violent aftermath of the 1992 elections. Skeptics saw this as a further indication that Savimbi needed to placate UNITA militants reluctant to fully implement the Lusaka Accord without further assurance on critical issues such as the sharing of diamond revenues. Despite Savimbi's absence, UNITA's participation in a national government promoted progress on the extension of state authority to areas still held by guerrillas. On April 30, 1997, UNITA yielded control of Mbanza Congo, the last provincial capital occupied by its forces.

A NEW REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER

The newly formed government soon faced an escalating crisis in central Africa that eventually spilled over into eastern Angola, eroding the GURN's already limited cohesion. Rwandan and Ugandan troops had invaded eastern Zaire in the closing months of 1996. These forces initially hid behind the smokescreen of a nascent insurgent coalition of several small Zairian guerrilla groups whose previous military accomplishments had not yet roused the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) from its chronically lethargic state. Several hundred guerrillas, organized under the banner of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), led by Laurent Kabila, attacked a small FAZ outpost at Lamera on October 4, 1996. Within a matter of weeks, Rwanda's decision to commit some of the five thousand troops it had recently deployed along the Zaire border rapidly changed the character of combat in the region.

Kigali previously had threatened to conduct preemptive attacks against thirty thousand to forty thousand Hutu militia and/or members of the former Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR). These troops had fled to eastern Zaire after the 1994 Rwandan genocide and their subsequent defeat by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) insurgency led by Paul Kagame. Between October 10 and November 1, 1996, ADFL and RPF forces overran the border towns of Uvira, Bukavu, and Goma. By early December, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni also had deployed troops to north-eastern Zaire where President Mobutu had long turned a blind eye toward Zairian-based Ugandan insurgents. As FAZ troops rapidly fell back in the face of earlier ADFL/RPF attacks, Museveni saw an opportunity to secure Uganda's western border.

By late December 1996 the ADFL/Rwanda/Uganda coalition had seized additional territory in northeastern Zaire and seemed poised to move on Kisangani, the nation's third largest city. FAZ deserters and additional recruits swelled the ADFL's ranks to an estimated six thousand troops as insurgent columns advanced into Zaire's northern and southern provinces.⁸⁸ Mobutu tried to launch a counteroffensive, with the assistance of a few dozen mercenaries and an undetermined number of ex-FAR troops. By late January–early February 1997 a feeble effort by several FAZ battalions to regain the tactical initiative had been turned back in battles at the Oso River and the town of Watsa, east of Kisangani.

At this critical juncture in the war, Angola intervened on the side of Mobutu's opponents. The dos Santos government had reassessed the ADFL's prospects after coolly receiving several Zairian demarches in late 1996, seeking Angola's neutrality in the rebellion/invasion. Luanda perceived a strategic national interest in the emergence of a government potentially more sympathetic to the MPLA.⁸⁹ In mid- to late January 1997 Luanda deployed the FAA's 24th Regiment to eastern Zaire. The regiment had an estimated two thousand troops drawn largely from the ranks of Katangan conscripts who had served Angola since the failed 1970s Shaba invasions. The addition of artillery and armored vehicles drawn from other FAA units made them a more potent force. Additional Angolan troops, flown from the FAA base at Cabo Ledo south of Luanda, arrived at Bukavu in mid-February. The Angolan impact on the military balance became apparent in early March 1997 when the ADFL insurgents and its regional patrons renewed an advance on Kisangani. The battle for the city began on March 13 and ended two days later. Angolan artillery provided the attackers a significant edge, enabling them quickly to undermine the morale of FAZ defenders. Armored vehicles, most likely those provided by Angola, provided the lead element for the column that entered Kisangani on March 15. The ADFL's advance into central and western Zaire accelerated after the fall of Kisangani. By late April 1997 several additional provincial capitals, including Lubumbashi, quickly changed hands and in early May the insurgents and their allies were only 160 kilometers from Kinshasa.

Imminent revolutionary change in Zaire forced UNITA and the Angolan government to consider previously unanticipated political/military options. UNITA leaders had realized the immediate threat posed to its logistics caches in southwestern Zaire and briefly aided retreating FAZ troops. On May 5 a FAZ contingent, reinforced by a UNITA company, engaged and briefly stalled the ADFL at the Kwango River Bridge west of Kenge. Kabila's forces regrouped and outflanked the FAZ/UNITA troops on the following day, renewing their drive on the capital. UNITA forces joined elements of Mobutu's Special Presidential Division (DSP) in another holding action at the Nsele River Bridge forty kilometers from Kinshasa on May 15–16. This engagement slowed the ADFL's advance, but by May 17 the insurgents had reached the outskirts of Kinshasa.⁹⁰ The dos Santos government cited the combat and chaos on the Angolan/Zaire border, following Mobutu's mid-May flight into exile, to justify

FAA military operations in northeast Angola that almost ended the Lusaka peace process. On May 18, 1997, FAA armored units returning from Zaire launched an offensive in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Province, seizing several UNITA diamond mining sites. Within weeks, heavy fighting had displaced several thousand Angolan citizens. Luanda claimed FAA units were securing the northeastern border against a threat posed by large numbers of troops, still loyal to Mobutu, who were fleeing from Kabila's advancing forces. UNITA denounced the FAA offensive as a transparent violation of the Lusaka Accord and suspended its participation in the extension of state administration to other areas under UNITA control. The UN secretary general's special representative, Alioun Blondin Beye, held urgent meetings between UNITA and government officials that resolved the crisis on June 27, 1997. President dos Santos agreed to cease all military operations in the Lundas in exchange for Savimbi's commitment to demobilize all UNITA combatants in the affected areas.⁹¹

A DIMINISHED UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND AN EMBOLDENED ANGOLAN ARMY

Heartened by the generally positive achievements of previous months, and convinced that the FAA offensive in Angola's diamond fields was a brief aberration, the UN Security Council voted, on June 30, 1997, to disband UNAVEM III and replace it with a smaller contingent labelled the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). UNAVEM III already had drawn down from 7,000 to roughly 5,000 members. The new 950-member MONUA mission was expected to oversee the disarmament of UNITA's combatants and the extension of state authority to areas still controlled by the insurgents. The UN expected this process to be completed in seven months.⁹² In late July 1997, MONUA issued a deadline, calling for the disarmament of UNITA's residual forces and the extension of state administration into areas still under UNITA's control by August 15, 1997. Angolan government officials claimed UNITA still had an estimated 25,000–35,000 combatants, while Savimbi's representatives insisted they retained only a 2,963 member police force charged with securing UNITA-operated diamond mines. Citing numerous government cease-fire violations and attacks on UNITA party members in areas under government control, UNITA continued to delay the disarmament and extension of state administration processes.

The September 9, 1997, signing of yet another "gentleman's agreement" between UNITA and MPLA representatives seemed to reassure Savimbi that UNITA would continue to receive diamond mining revenues to fund their transformation from an armed force to a political party. UNITA would retain key sites still under its control in the Lundas until at least December 1997. The revenues from these mines also would permit UNITA to invest in the mining sites reserved for them, in principle, under the terms of the initial November 1996 "gentleman's agreement."⁹³

While UNITA and the government further redefined the domestic balance of power, developments outside Angola provided Luanda an additional

opportunity to reconfigure the regional political/military landscape. Replicating its early 1997 Zairian initiatives, the dos Santos government intervened in the neighboring Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) to install a sympathetic regime willing to apply pressure on UNITA in a manner that supplemented the threat of UN sanctions. After a brief respite from a civil conflict that destabilized Brazzaville between late 1993 and early 1994, hostilities had resumed in June 1997. The Republic of Congo's armed forces fragmented and troops offered their support to party militias loyal to President Lissouba, Brazzaville's mayor Bernard Kolelas, or former president Sassou-Nguesso. The three-way struggle became a two-party conflict when Lissouba and Kolelas forged an alliance. However, the military balance shifted decisively when Angola chose, in late September, to intervene on behalf of Sassou-Nguesso. FAA mechanized forces, estimated at three thousand to five thousand troops, crossed the Cabindan border and overwhelmed Lissouba's loyalists at Point Noire on October 15, 1997. Angola's support to Sassou Nguesso's "Cobra" militias enabled them to overcome Lissouba's "Cocoye" and Kolelas's "Ninja" militia forces in Brazzaville.⁹⁴ Sassou-Nguesso's triumph closed off still another critical safe haven and conduit for arms to UNITA and FLEC.⁹⁵

Luanda followed up its successful 1997 interventions in Zaire and Congo with additional regional pressure on UNITA to complete the peace process on terms more favorable to the government. Soon after Sassou-Nguesso consolidated his power in Brazzaville, Angola issued a communiqué warning neighboring Zambia that Luanda would not tolerate the continued use of Zambian territory for arms transshipments to UNITA and raised the prospect of military intervention, as a last resort, to prevent further cross border arms flows.⁹⁶

LUSAKA'S LAST GASPS

The international community remained unmoved by UNITA's arguments that they were judged unfairly in meeting the requirements of the Lusaka Accord. Luanda was verbally denounced for its May 1997 offensive in the Lundas. UNITA, however, was materially sanctioned for failing to meet deadlines for troop demobilization and delaying the transfer of territorial control to government officials. UNITA's surrender of its diamond mining sites, however, was not an issue explicitly addressed by the Lusaka Accord and therefore they had no legal basis for claiming Luanda "owed" them assured revenues. UNITA's reluctance to completely disarm or surrender all its territory was a clear violation of the accord used to justify punitive international sanctions. Equally egregious, but not comparably punished, was the government's failure to retrieve an estimated five hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand weapons that had been handed out in 1992 to civilian supporters in Luanda, many of which were still unaccounted for. Nor were penalties ever imposed for the government's persistent harassment of UNITA party personnel or attacks on UNITA-sponsored medical clinics and other facilities.⁹⁷ Similarly, UNITA's complaints that neither its members of the GURN nor the Angolan National Assembly were ever consulted about,

or consented to, the deployment of FAA troops to Zaire or Congo (Brazzaville), fell on deaf ears. These breaches of trust were largely described as violations of the "spirit" rather than the letter of the Lusaka Accord. While some analysts criticized Angola's intervention in Zaire and the toppling of Congo/Brazzaville's democratically elected government as violations of the UN Charter, Luanda was never seriously threatened with sanctions. UNITA, however, was once again sanctioned by the UN on October 31, 1997, for failing to meet MONUA's most recent deadlines on disarmament and territorial transfers. UNITA officials were banned from international travel, UNITA's overseas offices were ordered closed, and all flights into UNITA-held territory were forbidden, unless previously approved by Luanda.⁹⁸

Underscoring the growing atmosphere of mistrust, a pattern of increased cease-fire violations was recorded throughout 1997. Additional FAA troops had been deployed to the periphery of UNITA-held areas since February 1997. An international observer noted, "by September [1997] the military situation was characterized by persistent tensions affecting almost the entire country, but particularly the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Malanje . . . On November 28, 1997, government troops also forcibly took control of a number of small diamond areas held by UNITA."⁹⁹ These trends gradually undermined the significant progress achieved since the Lusaka Accord had been signed. UNITA had transferred control of more than 230 towns and villages, in 15 of 18 provinces, to Luanda. The insurgents also had demobilized an additional seven thousand troops and transferred personnel and equipment from its clandestine radio station—*VORGAN* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockrel*)—to Luanda to establish an officially sanctioned station—*Despertar* ("Awake").

The government's reluctance to implement the November 1996 and September 1997 diamond revenue-sharing agreements and Luanda's disconcertingly large defense budgets in the mid- to late 1990s convinced the insurgents' military wing that UNITA still needed to import additional arms and supplies in the event of renewed hostilities. Most of the hundreds of recorded flights, in 1997 and 1998, to UNITA-held territory were thought to be carrying primarily food, fuel, and mining equipment, though weapons certainly also continued to arrive. UNITA had retained or expanded a large network of supply depots in eastern Angola.¹⁰⁰ The deliveries to UNITA, however, did not match the scale of arms transfers to Luanda. The Angolan government allocated between \$400 million and \$1 billion per year to military expenditures from 1995 to 1998. Russian T-55 tanks and M-46 130-mm artillery arrived in Luanda in March 1995, apparently in fulfillment of contracts signed after the November 1994 Lusaka Accord. The Angolan government reportedly spent \$40 million on Russian armaments in 1995, including MI-35 helicopter gunships. The Angolan Air Force received a dozen MiG jets and 360 Ural trucks as part of a March 1996 \$75 million credit arrangement with Moscow. Luanda also signed a contract worth \$230 million in 1996 that included the delivery of Su-24 fighter bombers. Additional contracts signed in late 1997 and early 1998 provided for the overhaul of MiG-23s and other Russian weapons in the

Angolan inventory. In April 1998, several dozen BMP-2 armored personnel carriers arrived in Luanda aboard freighters. More ships arrived in July and August 1998 carrying Russian-manufactured arms. Brazil, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Israel, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe also delivered smaller quantities of weapons or arranged for the overhaul of Angolan arms.¹⁰¹

In a desperate effort to salvage the eroding peace process, UNITA and the MPLA arranged what appeared to be a simultaneous breakthrough on the critical issues of territorial control and revenue sharing. In January 1998, UNITA voluntarily evacuated its Cuango River diamond mining operations in Lunda Norte Province. Additional negotiations followed, extending the deadline for the completion of the peace process to mid-March 1998. In early March, after some 2,500 “residual” troops demobilized, UNITA announced that it had thereby demobilized the last of its combatants. Luanda responded by recognizing UNITA as a legal political party. By late March 1998 the government had implemented earlier agreements confirming Savimbi’s special status and introduced legislation permitting him to retain a four-hundred-member bodyguard.¹⁰² These gestures marked the last hopeful phase of the Lusaka peace process.

The late 1996 and late 1997 “gentleman’s agreements” had failed to produce a formal arrangement for the apportionment of diamond mining revenues. In April 1998 Luanda withdrew its earlier offer of a UNITA share in the revenues from the Cuango River valley mining sites.¹⁰³ Some UNITA leaders assessed the cancelled revenue sharing proposal as a devastating betrayal. Many of Savimbi’s lieutenants concluded that the MPLA no longer intended to share political power or a significant portion of the nation’s economic assets. UNITA hardliners now believed their organization faced a threat to its very survival.

A growing number of UNITA members were convinced that Luanda had devised a cunning three-pronged strategy that steadily undermined the mutually accepted goal of power sharing by increasing UNITA’s diplomatic isolation, depriving it economically, and manipulating intra-UNITA political divisions. The 1997 FAA incursions into Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) and Congo (Brazzaville) were internationally controversial initiatives but did not constitute violations of the Lusaka Accord. Angolan officials instead portrayed these incursions as efforts to thwart UNITA’s continued violation of the Lusaka Accord and subsequent UN resolutions calling for an end to the insurgents’ arms purchases. The diamond revenue sharing arrangements likewise fell outside the terms of the peace process. By scuttling the “gentleman’s agreements” after UNITA had turned over its principal diamond mining sites, Luanda effectively threatened to undercut both the insurgents’ ability to wage guerrilla warfare and campaign as a peacetime political party. The often heavy-handed extension of state administration to UNITA-controlled territory had further underscored the MPLA’s determination to weaken UNITA’s political as well as its military structure. By March 1998, state administration had been extended to 272 cities, towns,

and villages formerly held by UNITA. Only ten locations remained to be turned over to Luanda. Of these, however, Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo, and Nharea in the central highlands were the most important. Savimbi retained his headquarters at Bailundo and the other three towns were vital nodes in UNITA's logistics network. Savimbi repeatedly postponed the handover of these towns, and his anticipated relocation to Luanda, as UNITA negotiators sought to revive a diamond revenue sharing arrangement and relief from the pressure Luanda placed on the party's infrastructure.

Signs of an imminent resumption of civil war increasingly outweighed futile efforts to conclude the peace process. Renewed initiatives by the UN's special representative to have UNITA evacuate Bailundo, and persuade Savimbi to move to Luanda in exchange for government pledges to disarm tens of thousands of civilians, succeeded only in extending MONUA's ineffectual presence in Angola. Maitre Beye's meetings with Savimbi, dos Santos, and other representatives resulted in little more than proposals to prolong the extension of state administration process, initially to May 31, and subsequently to June 25, 1998.

In a late June assessment the UN secretary general acknowledged "a dangerous deterioration of the security situation in various parts of the country. Armed attacks against villages, local government authorities, as well as United Nations and other international personnel, have become an almost permanent feature in the reports received from MONUA. Acts of banditry, new mine laying activities, and troop movements have also increased . . . These worrisome developments now affect eight out of eighteen Angolan provinces and have seriously undermined the progress achieved in the peace process."¹⁰⁴ The secretary general's report blamed the government and UNITA, tacitly acknowledging the unofficial resumption of civil war since early April 1998. The UN noted that

although UNITA continues to deny its involvement in these often well documented attacks, it is clear that many of them were conducted by armed elements that have remained directly or indirectly under UNITA's control . . . In addition, during several recent attacks . . . MONUA team sites were directly targeted . . . Some of the localities where State administration was recently established have been abandoned . . . for fear of attack by UNITA elements . . . MONUA reported that the normalization of state administration has been reversed in over 30 localities and that the Government publicly acknowledged that 17 localities had been re-occupied by elements allegedly belonging to UNITA . . . At the same time, MONUA had confirmed the presence of armed "residual" UNITA troops deployed in formations in . . . seven provinces.¹⁰⁵

Luanda likewise bore a significant responsibility for the unraveling of the peace process, according to the same UN report, which concluded that "some acts of violence could also be attributed . . . to harassment by the ANP. Some UNITA officials and sympathizers have also been affected by numerous acts of violence . . . In many instances, gross human rights abuses,

including the killing of UNITA functionaries in Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte and Lunda Norte Provinces and harassment of UNITA members, have been confirmed by MONUA. UNITA representatives have abandoned their offices in some areas because of . . . persecution by the ANP.”¹⁰⁶

MONUA, by late May 1998, was no longer capable of sustaining the peace process. The UN instead had become a pawn in an increasingly lethal Angolan game. Luanda was determined to have UNITA abandon all military options in exchange for what Savimbi and his colleagues viewed as a veneer of shared political and economic power. MONUA officials played the only card remaining in their increasingly weak hand. The peacekeeping force continued to draw down its troops. A Zambian infantry company was repatriated, leaving only 414 troops, supplemented by an additional 90 military observers and 336 police observers. The UN evidently hoped that the prospect of MONUA’s departure would force both sides to come to their senses and realize they needed the peacekeepers to reverse a process of mutual intimidation that now dominated Angolan political life. In the midst of still another desperate diplomatic initiative to rescue the faltering peace process, the United Nations Special Representative Alioun Blondin Beye died in a June 27, 1998, plane crash outside Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Beye’s last efforts failed to persuade Savimbi to turn over his central highland redoubt to Angolan officials, prompting an exasperated UN Security Council vote, on June 30, 1998, subjecting UNITA to additional sanctions. These measures called on the international community to freeze UNITA bank accounts and ban the sale of diamonds mined in UNITA territory. The Angolan government also indicated that it saw little hope of successfully concluding the Lusaka Accord. On June 23, 1998, as Maitre Beye was making his final effort to save the peace process, President dos Santos traveled to Moscow to conclude a multimillion-dollar weapons contract that included the purchase of 12 MI-25 Hind helicopter gunships and ten transport aircraft. In July 1998 the first of three Russian cargo vessels arrived in Luanda to offload arms.¹⁰⁷

UNITA officials continued to denounce what they viewed as the UN’s unbalanced oversight of the Lusaka peace process, particularly the failure to disarm pro-MPLA civilians and MONUA’s inability to stop the persistent violence against UNITA supporters. In a July 22, 1998, communiqué UNITA’s secretary general Lukamba Gato claimed that FAA and ANP personnel had driven UNITA unarmed party members from virtually all the 272 villages and localities that had been turned over to state administration.¹⁰⁸ Both sides deployed additional forces to key positions in central and southern Angola. FAA infantry and armor units in Huambo and Saurimo were poised to move against UNITA bases at Andulo, Bailundo, and diamond mining sites in the Lundas. UNITA combatants were active in the Andulo/Bailundo area and a large guerrilla force of several thousand was sighted near Menongue. The old headquarters at Jamba also was reactivated.¹⁰⁹ Informed observers concluded in July 1998 “that Savimbi has few illusions about his ability to dissuade or restrain Luanda’s generals in their determination to

seek a military solution to the political impasse. All indications are that the 'hawks' have won their argument with President dos Santos and that a return to full scale hostilities is imminent."¹¹⁰

Once again, dramatic developments in Central Africa, in early August 1998, briefly distracted Angola and MONUA from the peace process. On August 2–3, 1998, less than two years after Laurent Kabila's ascent to power, Rwanda and Uganda launched a second intervention/rebellion against a Congolese government. The mid- to late August deployment of several thousand Angolan troops to Kinshasa, supplemented by a Zimbabwean Defense Force (ZDF) battalion, thwarted an assault by Rwandan troops that had flown from Kigali, across the width of the country, to Kitona just west of the Congolese capital. Two Rwandan battalions were pushed back from Kinshasa. The Rwandan invaders subsequently were forced to flee into northern Angolan territory still controlled by UNITA. Rwandan forces eventually were evacuated by air after receiving UNITA's permission and assistance to repatriate their troops to Kigali. The ensuing DROC political/military crisis led to a radical restructuring of regional alliances, pitting Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, which also provided troops to defend Kabila, against Rwanda, Uganda, and at least two insurgent groups, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Unconfirmed rumors that UNITA's vice president Antonio Dembo had traveled to Rwanda, and that Savimbi had visited Uganda, fueled suspicions in Luanda that UNITA sought to exploit the Congolese crisis by developing additional logistics networks and external support.¹¹¹

As FAA forces gradually reduced the threat of chaos on its eastern border, the dos Santos government applied further domestic political pressures on UNITA. Luanda issued an ultimatum, with an August 20, 1998, deadline, requiring UNITA to turn over its remaining bases to government administrators and complete the disarmament of its residual forces. On August 30, 1998, after UNITA missed the deadline, Luanda announced that it had suspended UNITA's government and parliamentary representatives from their official positions. On September 3, 1998, five UNITA officials, led by Jorge Valentim (the suspended minister of tourism) and Eugenio Manuvakola, issued a proclamation suspending Savimbi as UNITA's president and calling for his replacement by an interim leadership until a party congress could be convened. This proclamation was issued in the name of UNITA-Renovada (UNITA-R), a faction that drew little support from UNITA's rank and file and was denounced by moderate UNITA members in Luanda as well as militants outside the capital. The Angolan government promptly recognized the new faction as UNITA's "sole and legitimate" representative in negotiations on residual phases of the Lusaka Accord. The government also expelled UNITA officials from their Luanda offices and offered them to Valentim and his UNITA-R colleagues. In a gesture of gratitude for Luanda's support to the beleaguered DROC government, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) passed a resolution on September 16, 1998, that condemned Savimbi as a war criminal and officially recognized UNITA-R.¹¹²

Luanda also constricted UNITA's diplomatic options. In early September 1998, Issa Diallo, named by the UN secretary general to replace the late Maitre Beye, tried to revive the peace process by renewing contacts with both sides. Shortly after he had arranged to meet Savimbi on September 21, 1998, the government announced it could not assure Diallo's security during his planned trip to Bailundo and warned Diallo that Luanda would sever all contacts with him if he attempted to meet Savimbi.¹¹³ In October, the MPLA-dominated National Assembly revoked Savimbi's "special status" as leader of the largest opposition party. A UNITA-R effort to name its own candidate as head of UNITA's seated parliamentarians was rebuffed by the reelection of Abel Chivukuvuku as their chairman. Although Chivukuvuku did not acknowledge any allegiance to Savimbi, he opposed UNITA-R's claims to legitimacy, suggesting the possible fragmentation of UNITA into three factions: UNITA-R, UNITA parliamentarians, and UNITA combatants.

Convinced that they had isolated Savimbi internationally and weakened him domestically, the MPLA devoted itself to political and military preparations for a party congress. The dos Santos government expected to use this occasion to announce decisive measures that would finally attain the goals set out at Lusaka in 1994. Luanda, meanwhile, had some internal controversies of its own that, while perhaps not as severe as those plaguing UNITA, nonetheless had to be resolved. Foremost among them was a dispute between MPLA party leaders and FAA officers concerning the exploitation of diamonds. An Angolan press report in late October 1998 had alluded to a government requirement that FAA generals involved in diamond mining operations observe a previously agreed moratorium on such ventures that was due to take effect at the end of the month. Some FAA officers allegedly lobbied for an extension of the moratorium while other members of the dos Santos government reiterated concerns that these operations were undermining the FAA's combat capability.¹¹⁴

As both sides sought to rally and reconcile their ranks, the latest UN reports described a tattered peace process, graphically underscoring FAA general Higinio Carneiro's mid-November 1998 blunt statement that the Lusaka Accord should be "nullified."¹¹⁵ A November 23, 1998, UN secretary general's report on MONUA, described Angola's security situation as "precarious," referring to significant combat and military operations by both sides in six provinces. An additional 150,000 civilians had been internally displaced by fighting in the previous two months, bringing the total to 331,000 since the beginning of the year. While the secretary general's report repeated earlier characterizations of Savimbi and UNITA as "mainly responsible" for the crisis, it also chastised the government, noting that "there has been no progress in the implementation of the important task of disarming the civilian population which is vital to the consolidation of peace and security."¹¹⁶

ANGOLA'S THIRD CIVIL WAR (1998–2002)

On December 4, 1998, General Carneiro confirmed that Angolan air and ground forces had launched military operations to seize Bailundo and other UNITA bases. The offensive began on the eve of the MPLA's fourth party congress. President dos Santos' opening remarks, on December 5, 1998, outlined the government's goals. Dos Santos emphatically stated that

it is indispensable that definitive peace is achieved and national reconciliation consolidated—a goal that has never been as close as it is now . . . As we develop the capacity to successfully fight against the enemies of peace beyond our borders, we create the domestic condition to defeat the agents of foreign interest who, for a long time now, have been used to dominate the Angolan people and to continue plundering their wealth. The running dog of these agents is Jonas Savimbi—a man who only knows to kill, destroy, and divide. All attempts that we have made to integrate him in normal life have been fruitless . . . The only way to attain definitive peace today is to isolate Dr. Savimbi . . . domestically and internationally as well as to neutralize him politically and militarily.¹¹⁷

On December 8, 1998, government spokesmen claimed that the Angolan flag had been raised over Bailundo. Three FAA regiments reportedly had broken through UNITA's defenses. UNITA allegedly also had pulled its forces out of Andulo. Two motorized FAA columns had occupied the abandoned positions at Andulo.¹¹⁸

Luanda's claims of success were false. By December 14, 1998, it was clear that neither Bailundo nor Andulo had fallen. UNITA forces at Bailundo had held their lines and pushed back FAA's 19th Regiment as it attempted to cross the Queve River several days earlier. The insurgents subsequently mounted a counteroffensive, firing artillery barrages at FAA units on the outskirts of Kuito and by December 14, rounds were striking the airport and other city districts. UNITA also had attacked FAA positions thirty to forty kilometers from Huambo. Government officials almost immediately attributed the military fiasco to an intelligence failure, claiming that FAA generals were unaware that UNITA had purchased substantial quantities of arms in 1998, allegedly including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and multiple rocket launchers.¹¹⁹ Many accepted this explanation but it is more likely to have been a cover-up for other failings on the part of FAA commanders. Three weeks before the FAA offensive began, an Angolan newspaper, on November 17, 1998, published the confessions of two recent midlevel UNITA defectors. The two officers indicated that Savimbi had purchased a "great deal of weapons" in the past four years and that UNITA "has a well equipped army."¹²⁰

In their zeal to push FAA forces back, however, it soon became clear that at least one of UNITA's most militant commanders had overplayed his hand. A UNITA communiqué acknowledged that "one unit . . . by error of judgment strolled into an enemy minefield located between the Commune of Kunje and the River Kuito . . . on the 16th December 1998."¹²¹ Subsequent accounts suggested a more serious setback, including over two hundred

UNITA killed and ten armored personnel carriers lost. Military sources in Luanda alleged that three UNITA special force units had been “destroyed” in fighting around Kuito, leading to the demotion of UNITA’s general Sapalalo (“Bock”).¹²²

Like his FAA counterparts at Bailundo, General “Bock” may have expected that rapid success at Kunje would lead to a decisive victory at Kuito. Kunje is located on a hill that provides a commanding view of Kuito. Whether UNITA’s defeat at Kunje represented a costly tactical blunder or an act of insubordination is unclear. While Savimbi clearly agreed that UNITA had no choice but to fight, his demotion of “Bock” in mid-December 1998 ultimately was based on his often articulated preference for a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory. Between December 18 and 30, 1998, UNITA officials, on at least three occasions, publicly indicated that they expected peace talks to resume as soon as Luanda realized the futility of a military option.¹²³

In the course of its mid-December 1998 counteroffensive, UNITA seized 15 small towns in an area that spread across Bie, Huambo, and Cuanza Sul Provinces. UNITA subjected Kuito to protracted artillery barrages for several weeks. By the end of the month, UNITA reportedly had concentrated 9,000 combatants around Kuito. The city was defended by approximately 10,000 FAA troops. UN peacekeepers also were caught up in the escalating hostilities. In late December, two UN-chartered C-130 transport aircraft were shot down over Huambo Province, with each side blaming the other for the crashes. FAA officers claimed they had killed over 800 insurgents as 1998 drew to a close. UNITA spokesmen declared their forces had killed 1,100 government troops. Fighting in the countryside had driven tens of thousands to seek refuge in Kuito.¹²⁴

Over the following months, it was clear UNITA’s leaders had abandoned the strategy employed in the 1992–94 round of warfare. Angola’s key provincial capitals were to be isolated rather than assaulted. UNITA generally retained the tactical initiative from January to September of 1999. Their semiconventional forces used artillery and mortar fire to confine FAA units to Huambo and Kuito. They also applied similar pressure to the city of Malanje after overwhelming many small government outposts elsewhere in Malanje Province. UNITA’s guerrilla forces also moved into the northwest toward Mbanza Congo in Zaire Province as well as attacking government positions in the northeast, focusing on towns associated with diamond mining activities. Mobile guerrilla units interdicted logistics lines supporting Luena in easternmost Moxico Province and similarly menaced government positions in the west-central provinces of Benguela and Cuanza Norte.¹²⁵

The Angolan domestic political climate and international diplomatic atmosphere both deteriorated as hostilities spread. In early January 1999, the government newspaper *Jornal de Angola* published a full page advertisement in the form of a police poster describing Jonas Savimbi as a “war criminal.” Shortly thereafter, Luanda publicly denounced Uganda, Rwanda, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Zambia for having helped UNITA arm its forces prior to the renewal of hostilities.¹²⁶ If Angola was an “orphan of the Cold

War,” as UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee had noted several years earlier, it was soon to become an orphan of the “New World Order” so highly touted in the early 1990s. On January 19, 1999, UN secretary general Kofi Annan issued a report to the Security Council recommending that remaining MONUA contingents be withdrawn from Angola when the mission’s mandate expired on February 26, 1999. Annan’s report added Angola to a growing list of African “orphans,” most notably Rwanda and Somalia.

UNITA continued to exploit its previous military gains. On January 26, 1999, guerrillas overwhelmed two government regiments at Mbanza Congo and briefly held the city against a government counteroffensive.¹²⁷ UNITA forces also renewed protracted artillery barrages tying down FAA troops at Malanje, thereby hampering government efforts to support renewed offensive operations directed at Andulo and Bailundo. President dos Santos and the FAA general staff urgently sought to reverse their recent setbacks. In mid-January 1999 the government reintroduced conscription, obliging all men between 18 and 20 to register for military service and denying them permission to leave Angola.¹²⁸ On January 30, President dos Santos assumed the mantle of commander in chief of the nation’s armed forces and promised his new cabinet that “there will be a change in the method and style of government . . . Our first priority is the final fight for peace. In other words: We must make war in order to have the conquest of peace.”¹²⁹

The president’s confidence in his government’s short-term prospects was well founded. In early 1999 neither UNITA nor world markets posed a threat to the nation’s oil production, Angola’s financial lifeblood. Industry analysts expected production to rise from eight hundred thousand barrels per day (bpd) to two million bpd by 2000. Oil companies also were willing to pay one-time “signature bonuses” for exploitation rights in several promising ultradeep offshore sites. These bonuses were expected to yield as much as \$900 million, a financial windfall that would compensate Luanda for lost revenues due to a 1998 slump in world oil prices. Moreover, Sonangol, the state-owned oil company, had begun negotiations with a European bank syndicate to obtain a \$500 million loan.¹³⁰ Assured of the financial wherewithal to pay the armed forces and purchase the necessary weapons and supplies, the dos Santos government made plans for a rigorous military campaign.

While guerrilla forces pushed further north, seizing Maquela do Zombo and several smaller towns in Uige and Zaire Province in early February 1999, UNITA leaders responded to dos Santos’s bellicose statements with renewed appeals for peace talks. UNITA’s representative in Rome called on members of the Angolan Catholic Church as well as Vatican officials to act as mediators.¹³¹ On February 18, 1999, Savimbi sent a letter to UN secretary general Kofi Annan asserting “that in UNITA’s view, the current conflict will never be resolved by military means” and asked the “international community [to] support Angolans in their efforts to achieve a dignified, just, and lasting peace.”¹³²

Days before Savimbi’s letter arrived in New York, however, Luanda had launched a second large offensive. By February 17, 1999, FAA troops had

advanced to within 23 kilometers of Andulo. Aircraft bombarded nearby UNITA positions while government officials predicted the town's imminent occupation.¹³³ UNITA personnel stood their ground at the southern approaches to Andulo. Although FAA units had covered the first 75 kilometers from Kuito to Andulo in less than a week, by late March they still had not breached UNITA's defenses.

In a departure from previous efforts, the FAA's early 1999 campaign may also have included a clandestine operation designed to intimidate UNITA sympathizers in neighboring Zambia. On February 28, 1999, 14 bombs exploded at various sites in Lusaka, including facilities supplying water and electrical power to the city. Though no one claimed responsibility, UNITA spokesmen insisted that Angolan government agents had planted the bombs. An explosion at the Angolan Embassy in Lusaka, killing one individual, may have been the result of an agent's mishandling of the device, but the blast also encouraged more wide-ranging speculation as to the perpetrators. Occurring only weeks after General Paihama's threat of hot pursuit and retaliation against neighboring states supporting UNITA, the detonations strongly suggested that Luanda had opted for a more ambitious offensive, simultaneously targeting UNITA's internal and external networks.¹³⁴

The FAA's 1999 Andulo offensive proved to be more complex than the December 1998 campaign against Bailundo and forced UNITA to respond on numerous fronts. UNITA counterattacked, intensifying pressure on Malanje to prevent FAA commanders from reinforcing troops near Andulo. From February 23 to March 3, 1999, UNITA mortars and artillery struck Malanje and its suburbs on an almost daily basis. In late February guerrillas destroyed key bridges on roads ten kilometers south of Malanje.¹³⁵ UNITA, meanwhile, had regrouped and, on March 3, 1999, attacked four FAA Tactical Groups—the 1st, 2nd, 18th, and 170th—and a reinforced commando battalion. After a five-hour battle, forty kilometers south of Andulo, UNITA claimed its combatants had killed over two hundred FAA troops and destroyed nearly thirty vehicles including BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, vehicle mounted antiaircraft guns, and several self-propelled artillery pieces. UNITA's battle account was not independently corroborated and government officials acknowledged only that FAA contingents had undertaken a "strategic withdrawal" from the Andulo area.¹³⁶

Few additional details on the December 1998 Bailundo offensive and the February 1999 Andulo campaign are available. It is likely that FAA commanders failed to address, or chose to downplay, key battlefield challenges. Two South African scholars had identified these issues in mid-1998, months before hostilities resumed, noting that

the terrain in the central highlands offers many advantages to a UNITA defense. Lines of advance will be easy to identify and obscure, and the mountain defiles have undoubtedly been prepared for demolitions and artillery targets registered. This region poses some unusual tactical problems for the attacking commander. Although the FAA has a monopoly of air power, it probably has

insufficient equipment to make a decisive difference. On the ground, the FAA superiority in armor must be balanced against the nature of the terrain in which it will have to fight. The approaches to Bailundo and Andulo are enclosed. The high ground will be occupied by UNITA strong points and will channel an attacking force, restricting its mobility and exposing it to tank-hunting teams and guerrilla style operations on their flanks and in the rear areas.¹³⁷

After its victory south of Andulo, UNITA launched a counteroffensive that bottled-up government forces in provincial capitals. From early to mid-March, UNITA gunners continued to subject Malanje to almost daily artillery fire. UNITA's siege of the city, beginning in February, had killed 800 and wounded another 1,500 residents after more than two months of persistent barrages, according to press reports. Insurgents units also seized Catabola and Cunhinga, respectively fifty kilometers and thirty kilometers distant from Kuito, setting off a civilian panic. Humanitarian, nongovernment organizations' (NGO) personnel and two thousand refugees fled Kuito at the prospect of an imminent UNITA assault. Many escaped westward to Huambo, where in mid-March UNITA also had stepped up pressure on nearby garrisons.¹³⁸ Meanwhile UNITA had attacked small outposts in Lunda Norte, Uíge, and Zaire Provinces. Additional insurgent forces had moved from Malanje Province to neighboring Cuanza Norte, Bengo, and Cuanza Sul Provinces. UNITA combatants also were sighted approximately one hundred kilometers from Luanda and thirty kilometers from the port of Lobito.¹³⁹

Nearly four months of hostilities had displaced 600,000–630,000 civilians who joined a preexisting total of more than a million Angolans displaced by combat in the early 1990s, who had yet to be resettled. The early March kidnapping of two French and two Portuguese oil workers in Cabinda hinted at the revival of FLEC insurgent operations. In late March 1999, unconfirmed reports indicated UNITA had moved 1,500 combatants into Cabinda, possibly to merge with a FLEC faction. The prospect of an intensified insurgency in Cabinda threatened to distract even more FAA units from their focus on UNITA headquarters at Bailundo.¹⁴⁰ From March 24 to 26, UNITA forces also repeatedly shelled Kuito and Malanje, heightening the panic generated earlier in the month.¹⁴¹

UNITA communiqués in April and May 1999 described scores of small-scale operations across 13 Angolan provinces. Most incidents involved attacks on isolated FAA garrisons, supply convoys, the sabotage of key bridges, and other economic targets. The size of the opposing forces and the scale of hostilities were limited. The remote southern provinces of Namibe and Cunene remained largely untouched by warfare, and while UNITA may have reached the margins of Cabinda and Luanda Province, they had not commenced significant military operations.¹⁴²

Reports that government and police officials were collaborating with UNITA further threatened to undermine the FAA's already plunging morale. Police officers in Cuanza Norte Province allegedly sold fuel to UNITA's motorized units operating along roads between N'Dalatando and Negage.

Similar accounts in early May 1999 indicated that civilians in Huambo Province and military personnel in Uíge Province sold fuel to insurgents. Diesel fuel and related products also were bought or stolen from Sonangol depots in Lobito and subsequently sold to UNITA personnel by independent dealers.¹⁴³

Much like the “second” civil war of 1992–94, combat occurred largely along or north of the Benguela railroad. Luanda and UNITA often issued competing and contradictory communiqués reporting tactical gains and losses near the beleaguered capitals of Malanje, Huambo, and Kuito. However, as FAA units gradually regrouped and consolidated their defensive positions, the frequency of UNITA bombardments diminished in April and May 1999. Government and civilian relief flights began to reach the cities more frequently as FAA troops slowly expanded their security perimeters.¹⁴⁴

Each side’s assessment of the military balance, in late April and early May 1999, indicated that another offensive in the central highlands was unlikely to yield decisive results. In an April 25, 1999, communiqué, UNITA officials claimed their forces controlled nearly 70 percent of the countryside, including the entirety of Angola’s border with Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as 75 percent of the Namibian border. UNITA cadres recently had infiltrated Luanda and Bengo Provinces. UNITA also claimed that its anti-aircraft weapons had prevented government aircraft from supporting ground troops. In a somewhat obtuse reference to splits within their ranks, the insurgents acknowledged that “UNITA has slowly overcome its internal difficulties by reinventing itself,” although the communiqué provided no additional information. The insurgents also revealed that “UNITA was originally prepared to lose Andulo and Bailundo and harass occupying government forces from surrounding positions. Now its strategy has firmly shifted towards defending them. They have become bait.” Alluding to earlier reports of collaboration with government personnel, UNITA also noted that “as long as there is oil in Angola, greedy FAA officers and the right amount of dollars in UNITA hands fuel will not pose a strategic problem” and “Finally, UNITA still retains the ability to revert to guerrilla warfare in the now unlikely event of things becoming difficult conventionally.” This confidence, however, did not signify a shift in UNITA’s larger political-military strategy. The memorandum discussed “prospects” confirming that “UNITA has been putting out ideas that could be a good basis to resume talks . . . There is a need to find a ‘live and let live’ solution . . . The Angolan Catholic and other churches could be invited to participate in such a debate to make it a national effort in which all would save face . . . The international community can . . . engage and seek a realistic solution, namely urging the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos to return to dialogue.”¹⁴⁵

Two weeks later, on May 7, 1999, an Angolan officer provided a similarly comprehensive evaluation, but did not address the diplomatic initiatives proposed in UNITA’s communiqué. FAA’s chief of staff operations lieutenant general Jose Ribeiro Neco’s briefing to the Angolan National Assembly began with a detailed description of UNITA’s order of battle. According to General Neco, UNITA had an estimated 60,000 combatants deployed

on three "fronts" and two "regions." On the "Northern Military Front," which included Uige, Cuanza Norte, Malanje, and Zaire Provinces, UNITA had assigned 12,000 troops organized into 15 to 16 battalions and a variety of smaller "groups." On the "Northwestern Military Front," which focused on oil facilities at Soyo and operations in Zaire and Bengo Provinces, approximately 3,500–4,000 insurgents were grouped into six battalions and seven tactical groups. UNITA's "Eastern Military Region/Front" contained some 7,000–7,500 soldiers organized as 12 semiconventional battalions and numerous smaller units. The "Eastern Military Region/Front" included Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico Provinces. The "Central Military Region" contained UNITA's largest concentration of forces with upward of 20,000 combatants. General Neco did not fully delineate this region's area of operations. Presumably it included 2,000 insurgents in Benguela Province, as well as 8,000 in Huambo Province, and 10,000 in Bie Province. UNITA forces in these provinces reportedly included three armored infantry brigades designated as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades as well as four "groups." Each brigade had roughly 2,500 troops and each group had approximately 1,100. In the Central Region UNITA also deployed a T-64 tank battalion, 80 BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored vehicles, 60 T-62 tanks, and 8 to 10 D-30 self-propelled guns. On the "Southern Military Front," UNITA had committed 1,500–2,000 guerrillas, primarily in Huila Province and to a lesser extent in Cuando Cubango Province.¹⁴⁶

General Neco concluded that "[a]lthough the scale has tipped in favor of Jonas Malheiro Sidonio Savimbi's forces, FAA have launched defensive operations permitting the government to control large areas of the country including the main provincial capitals . . . Right now our forces are not engaged in offensive operations."¹⁴⁷ General Neco also offered a casualty count stemming from hostilities during the previous five months. Without distinguishing between killed and wounded, UNITA had "lost" 1,749 combatants, while government and police forces had combined losses of nearly 500 dead and 1,100 wounded. General Neco also anticipated a further weakening of the government's position, noting that Savimbi had contacted FLEC-FAC guerrillas in Cabinda to discuss the possibility of deploying UNITA combatants to the enclave. The delivery of supplies to UNITA—transported by way of Togo, Zambia, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon—led FAA officers to anticipate imminent insurgent operations in Cabinda.¹⁴⁸

The government's assessment appears to have combined intelligence and propaganda. The latter clearly was designed to shift the blame for FAA's failed offensive, from incompetent officers and poorly prepared troops, to huge numbers of insurgents, fully equipped as a conventional force and larger than most in sub-Saharan Africa. UNITA may well have restored its troop strength to their early 1990s levels—approximately 60,000–65,000 combatants. General Neco's account clearly inflated the size of UNITA's armor inventory. UNITA had not previously deployed large numbers of tanks or armored vehicles, lacking the personnel and equipment required to operate and maintain such an arsenal. Reports that UNITA acquired fuel

and lubricants inside Angola more likely reflected the insurgents' continued use of trucks to move troops and supplies around the countryside to support guerrilla operations rather than set piece tank battles for large cities.¹⁴⁹

LESS FIGHTING, MORE TALKING

From May until early September 1999 UNITA staged low-level attacks throughout much of northern and central Angola. These operations included occasional artillery and mortar barrages directed at Malanje, Kuito, and Huambo demonstrating that FAA's "extended security" perimeters were still porous. From the government's perspective, worrisome incidents also occurred in other, previously quiet areas. On June 12, 1999, FLEC insurgents attacked a Cabindan village just ten kilometers from the Congo (Brazzaville) border, near Dolisie. An Angolan press report insisted FLEC had established ties with nearby Congolese dissidents loyal to former president Lissouba and Brazzaville's ex-mayor Kolelas.¹⁵⁰ In early July, FLEC commanders reportedly received \$500,000 in exchange for the release of two French and two Portuguese expatriates captured in March. FLEC commanders claimed they would use the funds to purchase additional weapons.¹⁵¹

UNITA guerrilla and commando units also conducted occasional large-scale operations with dramatic military or political effect. On July 18, 1999, insurgents attacked a 58-vehicle FAA supply convoy as it traveled from Luanda to Uíge. An insurgent communiqué claimed all 58 vehicles had been destroyed and over one hundred government troops were killed.¹⁵² On July 20, a three-hundred- to four-hundred-member UNITA force attacked Catete, birthplace of independent Angola's first president, Agostinho Neto. The insurgent assault on Catete, located less than 60 kilometers east of Luanda, began at four in the morning and the ensuing battle lasted more than five hours. UNITA briefly occupied the town before reinforced government units rallied and pushed the guerrillas out. The following day, guerrillas destroyed two electricity pylons near Kifangondo, 20 kilometers northeast of Luanda, briefly shutting down a water treatment plant and disrupting the capital's water supply.¹⁵³ In early August 1999, UNITA forces attacked Kuvango and additional small towns in Huila Province, suggesting the opening of a new "front" in the war. Within a matter of weeks UNITA personnel had moved further west, threatening villages 150 kilometers from the Huila Province capital, Lubango, before government forces responded and began stabilizing the area.¹⁵⁴

Reports in August and early September indicated that hostilities slowly were moving further south and could soon spill over the Namibian border. On August 2, 1999, a small group of secessionist Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) insurgents attacked a Namibian outpost at Katima Mulilo, close to the Angolan border. Mishake Muyongo, a dissident Namibian politician, had established the CLA in late 1998. Namibian Defense Force (NDF) troops captured several CLA combatants after the attack and claimed that a few prisoners spoke only Portuguese. This fuelled speculation that UNITA not

only supported but also participated in CLA military operations. UNITA presumably expected an allied insurgency in northern Namibia would facilitate the movement of weapons and other contraband across the border. CLA leader Muyongo and UNITA spokesmen vehemently denied any UNITA connection to the CLA but these denials were never completely convincing.¹⁵⁵ UNITA forces remained active along the border and in late August a UNITA contingent briefly skirmished with NDF forces near Rundu.¹⁵⁶

As the Angolan dry season drew to a close, UNITA intensified operations in the northwest and resumed pressure on cities in central Angola. In late August 1999 thousands of refugees sought aid in Uige and Negage following UNITA attacks on towns located sixty to ninety kilometers from Uige.¹⁵⁷ Two weeks later UNITA gunners shelled Kuito, leading to a new wave of panic in the city. Faced with reports that UNITA personnel were moving closer to the city, aid workers—for the third time since December 1998—were ordered to leave Kuito.

Confronted by persistent UNITA operations across large areas of the countryside, FAA commanders drew up plans for more elaborate offensives than those they had devised for the disastrous December 1998 and March 1999 campaigns. Luanda had received large quantities of tanks, artillery, and armored infantry fighting vehicles between May and September 1999. Belarus and Ukraine delivered 30 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and 15 SU-27 fighter bombers. The government also purchased radar systems that were installed at airports in Luanda, Kuito, Huambo, and other cities to track and intercept aircraft delivering supplies to UNITA bases.¹⁵⁸ However Luanda still needed time to come to grips with critical personnel issues. FAA had to absorb the large quantities of equipment it had received. Air force pilots and technicians, as well as armor and artillery units, required training in the use of weapons such as the 2S1 self-propelled gun, which government forces had not previously employed. The government had to pre-position spare parts and maintenance personnel at forward bases in the central highlands and the eastern and southern provinces. In addition to training skilled personnel, Luanda also sought to conscript additional troops. A recruitment drive launched in the early months of 1999 had lost momentum, after taking in only a fifth of those who were eligible for service. By mid-May, FAA troops were reportedly crossing the DROC border to forcibly conscript Angolan males in refugee camps in order to meet government quotas.¹⁵⁹

Luanda's delayed resumption of large-scale offensives allowed UNITA to exploit its tactical advantage for several months and prompted Angolan political figures to speak out, once again, in favor of a negotiated settlement. On June 8, 1999, a coalition, known as "The Parties of Civilian Democratic Opposition," addressed an open letter to President dos Santos calling for an immediate cease-fire and the resumption of peace talks.¹⁶⁰ One week later, the UN's Special Representative to Angola Issa Diallo returned to Luanda to propose a new round of negotiations. On July 3, 1999, Marcolino Moco, former Angolan prime minister and MPLA politburo member, addressed an audience in Lisbon advocating a negotiated settlement. Two weeks later,

civil society members affiliated with a newly established Angolan Group of Reflection for Peace (GARP) published a “Manifesto for Peace in Angola” demanding that “the Government and UNITA agree to an immediate cease fire” as well as “the urgent opening of formal communication channels . . . between the warring parties.”¹⁶¹ The government seemed to express its disdain for such options when it published, on July 23, 1999, an arrest warrant for “Citizen Jonas Malheiro Sidonio Savimbi” charging him with “the crimes of armed rebellion, sabotage, distribution of weapons and devices, incitement to collective disobedience and homicide.”¹⁶²

Jonas Savimbi tried on two occasions in August 1999 to clarify what he believed to be one of the critical reasons for the Lusaka Accord’s collapse and offered an assessment of fundamental issues that had torn Angolan society apart. In an August 11, 1999, interview Savimbi highlighted the significance of the reintegration phase of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process required by the Lusaka Accord. He reaffirmed the position he had adopted in March 1995 when he told an audience of UNITA members and international interlocutors,

[I]t is hard to accept, after the Lusaka Agreement was signed, that individuals who have fought since the time of the colony . . . [that] UNITA soldiers are placed in the lower ranks . . . in the Army and are sent to work on farms. I did not and will not accept this. I told President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Libreville and the negotiators that this is treason. Why should those who spent their life in combat, only because some of them were uneducated, be treated as servants? Where is justice, where is the vision of Angola’s future? What is the point of being an independent country, which [sic] is the point of sacrifice if those who are uneducated are going to be treated as servants? Aren’t war veterans entitled to live, to enjoy a worthy life? I believe these are irrevocable basic principles.¹⁶³

Two weeks later, on August 27, 1999, Savimbi addressed a statement to MPLA party members. Responding to indications that the ruling party might be experiencing significant internal debates over political and military strategies, Savimbi sought to reorient the government’s relentless focus on his leadership and any possible role he might play in Angola’s future. Savimbi offered a view of the conflict from a perspective that transcended personality or individual ambition, asserting that

UNITA’s struggle is neither against Luanda nor MPLA militants. It is against social injustice, misery, and the tyranny of an elitist and unpatriotic regime. It is a struggle for the freedom and dignity of all Angolans . . . I agree with historians and analysts who regard the conflict as institutional and that its root causes are historic and cultural . . . I also believe that Portugal’s assimilation and labor policies of the 1930s had a marked impact on the national liberation movement. It transformed the creole culture into a standard culture for every Angolan, and limited the thought and attitude of an entire generation, both along the coastal region and in the hinterland. Thus Portugal succeeded in dividing

us into 'civilized', 'assimilated', and 'backward' Angolans. In a way we are all a product of that complex division, either as direct contributors, or as victims, conscientiously [sic] or otherwise . . . Angola is still dancing to Portugal's tune. Decolonization is yet to take place . . . The cycle of violence merely serves to remind us that the discussion of the major institutional issues and their cultural implications has been set aside. A solution to the conflict calls for the adoption of a new state model that emphasizes the benefits of regional government . . . It demands of us that we introduce forms of freeing, enriching and dignifying Angolans, notably those who have been excluded and impoverished, the combatants, and to cite President Neto, the 'most exploited layers' of society.¹⁶⁴

MPLA members made no public reply to this message and shortly thereafter Luanda opted for a military response that indicated clearly that the government was uninterested in any debate or dialogue with Savimbi.

FAA TURNS THE TIDE: OPERATION *RESTAURO*

In early September 1999 FAA commanders opened a four-front offensive with intense artillery and air-to-ground attacks as soldiers advanced from garrisons at Huambo and Kuito toward UNITA-held Bailundo and Andulo. Additional units moved south from Malanje in the direction of Andulo. Government forces in Uige also commenced an offensive aimed at Maquela do Zombo and several large UNITA bases in the northwest. UNITA resisted the government's initial deployments. Government and insurgent forces clashed south of Malanje; uncorroborated press reports claimed FAA troops drove the defenders from the battlefield. FAA officers also reported incremental gains on the road from Huambo to Bailundo in the first week of the offensive.¹⁶⁵

By late September the proverbial "fog of war" had descended on central Angola and reporting on the governments' Operation *Restauro* (Restoration) campaign was marked by occasionally bombastic but unsubstantiated claims of success by both sides. UNITA announced on September 24, 1999, that lead FAA units had reached Bailundo's defensive perimeter. The insurgents counterattacked and defeated the FAA's 60th motorized infantry regiment, which suffered 250 casualties and lost numerous armored personnel carriers. On September 28, a UNITA communiqué acknowledged that government forces comprising the FAA's 17th motorized infantry regiment, as well as the 5th and 21st mechanized brigades, were five to eight kilometers from Bailundo.¹⁶⁶

FAA commanders revived their stalled campaign with a new wave of intense air strikes and artillery barrages. Using SU-27 ground attack aircraft equipped for night missions, UNITA forces were targeted with fuel air explosives and cluster munitions. The FAA's self-propelled artillery, particularly its newly acquired 2S1 that could fire from well out of range of any UNITA field guns, subjected the insurgents to more intense pressure than they had faced in previous years. FAA units slowly advanced, seizing positions that cut the roads linking Andulo to Bailundo and gradually enabling numerically

superior government forces to begin encircling Bailundo. UNITA secretary general Paulo Lukamba Gato acknowledged, on October 6, 1999, the heaviest fighting since the offensive began, and confirmed ongoing combat less than six to eight kilometers from Bailundo. UNITA repositioned some of its semiconventional units, suggesting that Savimbi and his commanders reevaluated their strategy and were preparing to abandon their headquarters. One of UNITA's motorized brigades moved north of Andulo, another brigade marched east toward Moxico Province, while the third redeployed to southern Malanje Province to protect supply lines supporting insurgents in Uíge Province.¹⁶⁷

Between October 16 and 20, 1999, FAA forces finally breached UNITA's lines around Bailundo and Andulo. FAA commanders now had the option of assaulting UNITA bases from all points on the compass. Once government forces threatened to encircle both bases, UNITA realized the increased threat of a crushing defeat. Neither town was deemed so politically significant as to warrant the risk of a potentially disastrous last-ditch defense. UNITA officials claimed, on October 21, 1999, their troops had withdrawn from Andulo and Bailundo in an "organized and orderly" manner, and asserted they had lost neither men nor matériel in the process. Only unserviceable weapons were left behind. A subsequent UNITA communiqué alleged that one of its own officers, General Diogenes Malaquias, was suspected of having collaborated with Lieutenant General Simione Mucune, the FAA commander advancing north from Kuito. Malaquias's purported decision to facilitate FAA's advance at a critical junction in the campaign had nearly allowed government forces to capture Savimbi in a surprise attack at Andulo.¹⁶⁸

While defections and betrayal may have played nearly as critical a role as air power and artillery in forcing UNITA to abandon its bases, Luanda offered scant evidence to support initial reports of a decisive battle. Government televised accounts showed only limited quantities of captured armaments and supplies; no wounded or captured insurgents were displayed, leading to speculation that no prisoners were taken or that captured combatants had been executed. The scale and intensity of combat in central Angola was difficult to gauge. UNITA reports gave a vague sense of the hostility levels, claiming that the mid-October battles prior to the fall of Andulo and Bailundo had resulted in the deaths of 112 insurgents, 198 wounded, and the loss of 558 FAA troops out of some six thousand committed to Operation *Restauró*. One of the last casualties of the campaign occurred on October 23, 1999, when FAA commander Lieutenant General Mucune died in an antitank mine explosion while touring recently reoccupied Andulo.¹⁶⁹ The demoralizing loss of a highly regarded commander was offset by what soon proved to be one of the government's most successful campaigns of the civil war.

Luanda's forces pushed further into central Angola and also made important gains in northern and eastern provinces. On October 21, 1999, FAA officials announced the capture of Sanza Pombo, 150 kilometers east of the city of Uíge. Government troops also advanced on UNITA positions at Buengas, 90 kilometers east of Sanza Pombo, threatening to isolate UNITA forces in

the northern reaches of Uige Province.¹⁷⁰ In Moxico Province, Luena-based FAA battalions occupied Luau, Lucusse, Lumbala N'Guimbo, and several other small towns. By late October 1999 government aircraft had bombed UNITA positions at Cazombo. The government's successes on these peripheral "fronts" significantly improved Luanda's prospects for gradually regaining control over its eastern borders. After shutting down UNITA's airports at Bailundo and Andulo, Luanda moved forces into areas where they might also interdict UNITA's overland supply routes, especially those crossing the Zambian border.¹⁷¹

A subsequent diplomatic initiative successfully exploited FAA's recent military gains. After a November 22–23, 1999, visit to Lusaka by Angola's foreign minister, an Angolan official announced "we received full guarantees from President Frederick Chiluba that Zambia will not be a [weapons] transit for UNITA. Zambia will also not be a transit [sic] for Savimbi if he runs away [from Angola]." ¹⁷² Skeptics questioned Lusaka's ability to seal its border or to prevent sympathetic Zambian government officials from supporting UNITA. Lusaka's public concessions nevertheless signaled yet another setback for UNITA in a regional environment that already had become increasingly hostile to the insurgents since the 1997 collapse of the Mobutu and Lissouba governments.

A series of defections in late October and early November 1999, including that of a general and other senior officers, represented a further blow to UNITA after the Bailundo and Andulo battles. General Jacinto Bandua, Colonel Alcides Lucas Kangunga, Colonel Joao Antonio Gil, Colonel Aristedes Kangunga, Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Geronimo Gango, and Major Quito Chingufo occupied sensitive positions responsible for arms purchases, intelligence, communications, and logistics. Collectively they provided Luanda with a wealth of information concerning UNITA's military infrastructure. The defection—or, according to UNITA the abduction—of Araujo Sakaita, one of Savimbi's sons, from his residence in Lome, Togo also offered Luanda a propaganda victory that the government exploited to suggest that Savimbi was increasingly isolated from the world, the region, fellow Angolans, and even his own family.¹⁷³

Despite numerous government claims of great victories in central Angola, it was soon clear that the Angolan military had lost Savimbi's trail. The government's failure to locate him enticed mercenaries of various nationalities to offer their services. Detailed proposals to find Savimbi allegedly were put forth by Portuguese military veterans as well as Israeli Mossad reserve officers.¹⁷⁴

In late 1999, Luanda seemed determined to open still another "front" in the country's southernmost reaches to further isolate UNITA before the guerrillas could regain their balance. In mid-November 1999, FAA troops advanced into the southern districts of Cuando Cubango Province, reoccupying Cuanagar, on the Namibian border. After honoring a Namibian government request that FAA briefly suspend operations while President Nujoma's government conducted national elections, FAA soldiers renewed their offensive in early December using artillery barrages and infantry assaults to push UNITA out of

Calai, just north of the border.¹⁷⁵ Although Namibian officials initially denied that their government would become involved in the Angolan civil war, by mid-December President Nujoma had permitted some 1,600 Angolan troops to use northern Namibian air bases and offered the assistance of NDF troops in unloading supplies from Angolan aircraft. Acting on earlier threats to retaliate if Namibia chose sides in the conflict, UNITA insurgents attacked a Namibian security contingent approximately eighty kilometers west of Rundu on December 14, 1999. Shortly thereafter, Angolan government troops deployed artillery batteries to northern Namibia, where they shelled UNITA positions at the small border town of Mucusso. FAA officers also began recruiting Namibians to serve in the Angolan armed forces.¹⁷⁶ By late December, Namibian troops also were shelling UNITA positions in the Mucusso area, and at least on one occasion had crossed the border to attack UNITA forces inside Angola.¹⁷⁷ As the year ended, Luanda announced that FAA units had reoccupied Mucusso and UNITA's Cold War-era headquarters at Jamba.

In a late December 1999 partial accounting of hostilities during the past year, Luanda acknowledged that some 2,500 government forces died and more than 7,000 had been wounded. More than 6,000 armed UNITA personnel surrendered, according to government reports, and Luanda alleged that UNITA's capacity to wage conventional war had been reduced by 80 percent.¹⁷⁸ Warfare also had devastated Angola's civilian population, with widely fluctuating estimates that between 1.5 and 4 million Angolans were internally displaced by late 1999. Some observers maintained that UNITA had departed from its Maoist-inspired strategy and intentionally drove rural civilians into government-controlled areas to overwhelm Luanda's ability to provide food and other services, thereby undermining its legitimacy and ultimately its stability. A related explanation proposed that the insurgents had driven farmers from the countryside, shortly after the 1998–99 planting season, to acquire food supplies. UNITA officials countered these accusations with allegations that government troops had forced civilians into large cities to deprive the insurgents of popular support and additional recruits.¹⁷⁹

Faced with increasingly heavy rains and a lack of troops prepared for mobile counterinsurgency warfare, Luanda concluded Operation *Restauró* in mid-January 2000. FAA commanders had made additional minor gains in the offensive's final weeks, reoccupying Maquela do Zombo and some UNITA-held small towns, lending credence to claims that the government now controlled 14 of 16 districts in Uíge Province.¹⁸⁰ Government troops also reported finding over one hundred metric tons of weapons in UNITA caches outside of Andulo. FAA commanders also announced, in early January 2000, the "discovery" of a 4,500 meter long airfield, still under construction, near the Cutato River in a remote area eighty kilometers north of Andulo. Earlier Angolan press reports, however, indicated that government sources were aware of construction efforts at this site as early as August 1999. This airfield would have accommodated some of the largest transport aircraft previously associated with clandestine arms deliveries to UNITA. The construction site also contained barrels with an estimated one hundred metric tons of asphalt

intended to pave the runway.¹⁸¹ UNITA's plans for this airfield are unknown. UNITA's decision to begin construction may have been prompted by their inability to use Zairian airfields after the mid-1997 collapse of the Mobutu regime. The project probably began prior to the renewal of hostilities in December 1998. The government's seizure of this runway and other small airfields in Moxico Province represented a substantial loss of UNITA funds and matériel. As its conclusion Operation *Restauro* had successfully dispersed many of UNITA's forces and severely damaged their logistics network.

UNITA REGROUPS AND SAVIMBI VANISHES

Officials in Luanda frequently asserted that Operation *Restauro*'s most important achievement was the elimination of UNITA's semiconventional military capability. However, UNITA's loss of its political/military headquarters at Bailundo, briefly comparable to Jamba in the 1980s, and Huambo in the 1990s, was probably a more significant outcome of the late 1999 campaign. UNITA's former headquarters had been portrayed as "liberated" territories and served as critical delivery points for arms and supplies. After October 15, 1999, UNITA no longer had a stable political/military center from which it could claim to "control" or administer areas inhabited by civilian supporters. The loss of Cuangar, Mucusso, and Dirico ended an insurgent occupation of areas that, since the 1980s, had delineated some of UNITA's earliest "liberated" territories.

In many respects, Operation *Restauro* and Namibia's entrance into the war had turned UNITA's strategic "clock" back to the late 1960s. Savimbi and UNITA were now nearly as isolated as they had been during their anticolonial campaign when they could rely only on the porous Zambian and Zairian borders to resupply their forces. UNITA spokesman Alcides Sakala acknowledged the impact of Operation *Restauro* in a January 21, 2000, interview, telling reporters "the fall of Bailundo and Andulo does not have any impact on our global military strategy, but I must admit it has both psychological and political significance." Sakala insisted, however, that UNITA was "recovering as a military machine. We have revived important military structures and we are almost ready for war . . . The results of our military reorganization are going to be felt very soon. Our presence across Angola is going to be visible through our actions. But we are also ready to talk."¹⁸² Subsequently, UNITA officially confirmed that heavy rains and intense air and ground pressure from government forces had restricted the insurgents to nighttime movements as they withdrew from the central highlands.

Savimbi and UNITA's senior commanders had drawn significant strategic conclusions from Operation *Restauro* a month before it ended. At a late December 1999 meeting held at a game park in southern Malanje Province, UNITA's leadership decided to restructure and redeploy its forces. Some lightly armed units were sent to Cuando Cubango Province to oppose Angolan and Namibian forces. UNITA's motorized semiconventional formations, aided by a late December shipment of diesel fuel smuggled across the

Zambian border, moved north of the Cuanza River into Malanje Province. The insurgents also agreed to decentralize command and control of their operations. Regional commanders permitted local leaders to initiate military operations. By early January 2000, small-scale UNITA attacks resumed in northern and central provinces, some of which occurred less than five kilometers from Bailundo and Andulo. Guerrillas also attacked in Moxico Province where they recaptured Cangamba, site of the large 1983 battle.¹⁸³

From mid-January to mid-March 2000, UNITA communiqués recorded operations in a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11 provinces. Bie, Huambo, and Benguela Provinces were among the most active insurgent zones. Repeated attacks within ten kilometers of Andulo and Bailundo underscored the limits of Luanda's military gains in the central highlands. Diamond mining operations in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces were subjected to occasional attacks while Uige Province remained the focus of guerrilla raids in the northwest. Attacks in Cuanza Sul, Cuanza Norte, Malanje, Huila, and Cuando Cubango Provinces reinforced earlier impressions that Operation *Restauro* had dispersed but certainly not defeated UNITA.¹⁸⁴

By mid-March 2000, however, it was clear that UNITA's military operations bore no resemblance to the coordinated regional or national campaigns conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many insurgent attacks were brief and opportunistic, designed mainly to help local units fend for themselves by capturing arms and supplies from government outposts. Nevertheless, UNITA's ability to transform most of its semiconventional units into a classic light guerrilla force, emphasizing speed and flexibility, bought the insurgents time to readjust their supply lines, communications network, and command structure. Before Luanda could realign its force structure and tactics, UNITA was active almost everywhere and Savimbi was nowhere to be found, at least not as readily as he had been when he operated from headquarters such as Jamba, Huambo, and Bailundo.

UNITA devised a further restructuring of its forces after their late 1999 retreat from Andulo and Bailundo. Insurgent commanders assembled in Cazombo in March 2000 where they defined five new "zones." The northwestern zone contained some 1,800 guerrillas operating in Luanda, Bengo, Uige, and Zaire Provinces. A northeastern zone consisted of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico Provinces and an estimated 2,000 UNITA combatants. A third, central zone focused on Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Malanje, Huambo, and Bie Provinces and probably included 5,000–10,000 combatants. Cuando Cubango Province boundaries defined the fourth zone and accounted for 10,000 guerrillas. The fifth zone included Huila, Namibe, and Cunene Provinces and 1,000–2,000 insurgents.¹⁸⁵

OPERATION *HEXAGONO*

The prospect of a protracted conflict against a widely dispersed insurgency prompted FAA officers to formulate a strategy for the simultaneous conduct of two campaigns, one for the immediate pursuit of Savimbi and the other

designed to gradually weaken UNITA's far-flung military forces. By late March 2000, FAA had relocated its field headquarters from Catumbela on the Atlantic coast to Luena, Angola's easternmost provincial capital. Angolan Air Force SU-27 ground attack aircraft and enhanced communications gear also were deployed to Luena. This shift was expected to facilitate the implementation of new tactics, supported by technical assistance from Portuguese military advisors and former UNITA combatants newly assimilated into FAA units.¹⁸⁶ FAA troops in Cabinda expected to benefit from a similar training program to cope with FLEC insurgents whose spokesman recently had warned foreign workers to leave prior to an imminent escalation of hostilities.¹⁸⁷ The Angolan government also had signed multimillion-dollar contracts with Israeli suppliers to deliver arms and train FAA troops.¹⁸⁸

In late April 2000, as the rainy season ended, FAA commanders launched a multipronged offensive—Operation *Hexagono*. Ground forces moved east from Kuito and west from Luena to confine Savimbi to an ever smaller area of eastern Bie Province, south of the Cuanza River headwaters. Ground attack aircraft flew sorties from Saurimo and Menongue. The FAA's 5th and 20th Brigades figured prominently in reports that UNITA-held Munhango and Cangumbe had been reoccupied. Additional FAA operations along the Namibian and Zambian borders further disrupted UNITA's external supply lines. In the early months of Operation *Hexagono* Luanda frequently used air power to retaliate for UNITA attacks and support FAA troops in pursuit of Savimbi. UNITA communiqués reported the indiscriminate bombing of areas in Cuanza Sul, Cuanza Norte, Moxico, Bie, Cuando Cubango, and Lunda Norte, destroying dozens of villages and killing hundreds of civilians. By mid-May, FAA troops reached Cuemba, at the eastern edge of Bie Province, against slowly mounting UNITA resistance. FAA officers believed that UNITA's key commanders had regrouped at or near Cuemba after their late 1999 withdrawal from Andulo and Bailundo. Government pronouncements had scant details on casualties suffered by either side and, by mid-June, Luanda's spokesmen provided only vague announcements claiming the capture of "large" weapons caches in the Cuemba area. UNITA had chosen not to take a stand at Cuemba, however. Savimbi opted instead to rely on a more mobile command post and press reports speculated that he had steadily moved further south and east to heavily forested areas in or near the Lungue-Bungo River valley.¹⁸⁹

The FAA's ability to keep Savimbi on the run indicated that Luanda had regained the tactical initiative, if not a strategic advantage, in central Angola. Savimbi no longer had a territorial podium from which to address foreign journalists or visiting officials. His headquarters had been driven from the politically important central highlands and his freedom of movement increasingly was confined to remote and sparsely populated areas of southeastern Angola. Savimbi's retreat south of the Benguela railway also weakened his links with guerrillas operating in northwestern Angola.

UNITA's ability to sustain mobile guerrilla operations nevertheless contradicted government claims of great success in Operation *Hexagono*.

Throughout the April–July 2000 government offensive, UNITA communiqués reported attacks against military and economic targets in at least four and as many as nine provinces. In an early May announcement, the insurgents asserted they had deployed personnel to all Angolan provinces except Cabinda and Namibe. UNITA combatants continued to strike FAA positions in or near Bailundo, Andulo, and Cuemba in Bie Province. Elsewhere guerrilla forces initiated operations at numerous locations in Huila, Cuando Cubango, Uige, Lunda Sul, and Lunda Norte.

On May 28, 2000, guerrilla spokesmen issued a communiqué declaring yet another reorganization of their forces, including recent appointments to UNITA's general staff and new regional operational commands. Each command was to have greater autonomy and the general staff was to delegate some of its responsibilities to each operational command, suggesting a further loosening of Savimbi's command and control over his dispersed forces. The late May announcement also echoed earlier UNITA calls for renewed negotiations and acknowledged "there can be no military solution to the conflict."¹⁹⁰

As Operation *Hexagono* drew to an indecisive close, Angolan officials conceded that UNITA's reorganization and revised tactics had made the insurgency a more formidable challenge. Some acknowledged the need for a more complex strategy. In a late June 2000 interview, FAA chief of staff general Joao de Matos had confirmed that in Operation *Hexagono* UNITA's

command posts are the main targets . . . including that of Jonas Savimbi. We have been quite close on two or three occasions . . . Today it is even harder to capture Jonas Savimbi than it was a year ago . . . A year ago we knew that he was moving about with . . . a large military staff with vehicles, sophisticated communications and therefore it was easier to locate him and to try to target him. Now there is a great difference between what Jonas Savimbi is today and what he was six months ago. He was a king six months ago and now he is a serf. At this point Jonas Savimbi is somewhere in Angola with a very reduced group of people, without all the important equipment. He has satellite equipment with which he can make some contact abroad and some radio equipment with which he can communicate internally. He has nothing else . . . Thus he is more mobile today than before. He can camouflage himself perfectly, and hide in the forests in the east and southeast of Angola. A short while ago he practically passed by our units without us noticing.

General de Matos also offered what proved to be a prophetic opinion that a proper mix of political, military, administrative, and social efforts could end the war in 12 to 18 months.¹⁹¹ Several weeks later FAA general Armando da Cruz Neto assured delegates to the Angolan National Assembly that the military had developed a comprehensive strategy that departed from previous disjointed efforts. General Neto described Operation *Hexagono* as "part of a strategy that has the following objectives; firstly destroy the command posts as well as its [UNITA] guerrilla units . . . Secondly destroy its material reserves. Third control the borders. Four withhold the population's support. Fifth confine Savimbi's troops to hostile areas."¹⁹²

Angolan civilian officials may not have been entirely persuaded by General Neto's presentation. Luanda launched tentative political initiatives suggesting a willingness to consider alternatives to a decisive military campaign. On June 20, 2000, President dos Santos told a public audience that he might offer Savimbi and his colleagues a pardon if they "repented." The president's hint at a departure from the inflexible political and military policy of the previous two years reflected a degree of frustration with the lack of progress made since the capture of Bailundo and Andulo. Government doubts about the FAA's counterinsurgency capabilities probably were amplified by continued insecurity in Cabinda, where FLEC-FAC guerrillas took three Portuguese expatriate workers hostage, attacked an FAA reconnaissance squad, and killed a government health worker between late May and early June 2000.¹⁹³ Luanda also dangled the Lusaka Accord "carrot," indicating that the government still considered it a valid document and implied its central role in any future peace talks. UNITA spokesmen rejected these overtures as yet another thinly disguised effort to divide and weaken the insurgency because Savimbi still was not deemed an acceptable interlocutor in this process.¹⁹⁴

While Operation *Hexagono* had diminished Savimbi's stature as a "king," the government's campaign had barely ended when UNITA launched a series of offensive operations, which belied General de Mato's characterization of Savimbi as a "serf." From late July to August 2000, UNITA forces struck FAA convoys, small garrisons, and numerous towns and villages, in 11 Angolan provinces. On August 7, 2000, UNITA again struck Catete, barely sixty kilometers from the capital. Some two hundred insurgents occupied the town for several hours, targeting government, police, and FAA installations, killing over fifty armed defenders. UNITA lost ten members. As they withdrew, the guerrillas hauled off the contents of three arms depots and two warehouses. Government press reports claimed that UNITA had conscripted several thousand civilians, forcing them to carry weapons to insurgent base camps scattered across Huila and Cuando Cubango Province. In the aftermath of the Catete raid, UNITA's leadership taunted the government in a communiqué admiringly quoting Ho Chi Minh's observation that "[w]e will be like the elephant and the tiger. When the elephant feels strong and at ease near its base, we will withdraw. Whenever the tiger hesitates, the elephant will wait for it with its powerful clutches. Yet the tiger will not hesitate, and the elephant will die from exhaustion and loss of blood."¹⁹⁵

OPERATION TRIANGULO

UNITA's renewed sense of self-confidence was short-lived. FAA commanders responded more vigorously than Ho Chi Minh's elephant. On September 10, 2000, government forces launched a series of counterinsurgency operations in northern and eastern Angola to further disrupt UNITA's logistics network and destroy small base camps. Luanda also committed two brigades, FAA's elite 20th Brigade lead by Brigadier Eugenio Wala, the 5th Brigade, augmented by elements of a motorized regiment, and a police unit, to

Operation *Triangulo*. This offensive focused on the shared boundary of Bie, Moxico, and Cuando Cubango Province. Luanda also deployed a squadron of jet fighters and eight transport helicopters, flying from airfields in Luanda, Menongue, and Saurimo.¹⁹⁶

During the course of the preceding Operation *Hexagono* Savimbi repeatedly had eluded FAA units by moving across or around the headwaters of numerous rivers in southern Malanje, eastern Bie, and western Moxico Province.¹⁹⁷ Although they were unable to overtake Savimbi, government forces did attain modest success in the opening rounds of the “*Triangulo*” offensive. In late September, FAA units had reoccupied Beu and Quimbele, some of the last towns UNITA still held in Uige Province. FAA’s 21st Brigade also drove UNITA out of Alto Zambeze and Cazombo, the only municipalities the insurgents occupied in the country’s easternmost districts. UNITA had used the airfields at Quimbele and Cazombo—the latter had a three-thousand-meter runway—to export diamonds and import supplies. The loss of two important airfields, in northern and eastern Angola, added credibility to reports that UNITA’s revenues, derived from diamond smuggling, had shrunk considerably. According to some experts, the insurgents’ profit from the diamond trade had fallen from \$300 million in 1999 to \$100 million in 2000.¹⁹⁸ The loss of these facilities made UNITA increasingly reliant on a few, smaller airfields including Mavinga and Likua in the southeast.¹⁹⁹

By late September 2000, UNITA forces began to stand their ground and, for the first time since they had been driven out of Bailundo and Andulo, pushed FAA units back on several “fronts.” On September 26, 2000, UNITA’s semiconventional “3 August Brigade” assaulted the government garrison at Cangamba. After a four-hour battle, UNITA seized hundreds of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition. Unlike the 1983 battle for the same garrison, however, UNITA did not intend to occupy Cangamba, but rather to diminish pressure on the southern axis of Operation *Triangulo*, where FAA units were in hot pursuit of Savimbi and UNITA’s leadership as they sought a secure base area in western Moxico Province.²⁰⁰

Some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign occurred around Umpulo, approximately 185 kilometers south of Kuito, on the east bank of the Cuanza River. The town changed hands several times between September and November 2000. Acting on reports that Savimbi and other UNITA leaders were nearby, FAA troops occupied Umpulo in the early weeks of Operation *Triangulo*. UNITA counterattacked and occupied the town on September 30. FAA units fought their way back into Umpulo by October 20 only to lose it to UNITA again eight days later. Government forces regrouped in early November and drove the insurgents out by November 8. Heavy fighting at locations between Cuemba and Umpulo continued until early December when government spokesmen claimed the FAA had seized three large UNITA bases containing substantial quantities of ammunition and large farms that provided food for the insurgents.²⁰¹

Unlike Operation *Hexagono*, the *Triangulo* campaign failed to push Savimbi and his staff further south or east, although it did force them periodically to

relocate their base camps in densely forested areas of western Moxico Province. From late September until mid-October 2000, guerrilla units were active in 15 provinces. The great majority of insurgent attacks struck government and civilian commercial convoys, disrupting traffic between cities and small towns.²⁰² By early November, UNITA forces had infiltrated Kuito, stormed a police station, and attacked several nearby towns.²⁰³ A UNITA campaign to regain control over mining operations in northwestern Lunda Sul Province drove several thousand refugees into Saurimo by mid-November.²⁰⁴

The onset of the rainy season barely slowed either side's operational tempo. UNITA communiqués in December 2000 claimed attacks in eight provinces. On December 1, 2000, insurgents engaged a large FAA supply column 150 kilometers west of Malanje, seizing several truck loads of ammunition and fuel, two armored vehicles, a field gun, and a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher.²⁰⁵ Ten days later, UNITA overran the garrison at Puri in Uíge Province. On December 12, UNITA commandos destroyed six pylons in Bengo Province, cutting electrical power to Luanda. Five days later, insurgents assaulted Quibala in Cuanza Sul Province, killing thirty-one government soldiers, capturing several armored vehicles, artillery pieces, trucks, twenty thousand liters of diesel fuel, and several warehouses of industrial equipment. Government forces offset these losses somewhat when they repulsed UNITA attacks on Cangamba and Lumbala N'Guimbo in mid-December. UNITA's failure to occupy the two towns was a significant setback. If UNITA had reoccupied Cangamba and Lumbala N'Guimbo, Savimbi and his staff might have established a more stable headquarters in Moxico Province. Control of both towns would have permitted the insurgents to improve their weakened logistics network by providing UNITA with additional airfields supporting the movement of supplies between southeastern and central Angola. More importantly, if UNITA had held both towns they would have set back FAA efforts to contain Savimbi and UNITA's commanders inside a smaller segment of western Moxico Province.

The insurgents still retained the tactical initiative in large areas of the country, underscoring this fact with a December 28, 2000, midnight attack on the airport at Benguela. Government and insurgent spokesmen issued competing claims and descriptions of the damage done to the airfield.²⁰⁶ UNITA's threat to key facilities on the Atlantic coast represented the culmination of a months-long effort to relocate guerrillas from the central highlands. Possibly as many as five thousand insurgents had moved into western Benguela Province. Their mission was to acquire arms and supplies for insurgents in the interior, as well as staging attacks that would oblige Luanda to redeploy FAA forces from eastern provinces, thereby reducing pressure on Savimbi and UNITA contingents in the northwest.²⁰⁷

AMBIVALENCE, REGIONAL DISTRACTIONS, AND PERSISTENCE

UNITA's retention of the tactical initiative in many rural areas, and Savimbi's successful evasion of two government offensives, prompted Luanda once again, to reassess its diplomatic options and military strategy. The government sent a variety of ambivalent signals to the insurgents and the international community. In early January 2001, the government issued a statement indicating that the 1994 Lusaka Accord could provide the basis for resumed negotiations with UNITA. Angola's defense minister general Paihama, however, reiterated earlier government positions distinguishing between UNITA and its leader, when he told a Cuban audience on January 27, 2001, "No matter what the circumstances, we will never negotiate with Savimbi."²⁰⁸

In mid-January, the government selected new armed forces commanders. On January 17, 2001, President dos Santos dismissed FAA chief of general staff general Joao de Matos and General Luis Faceira, chief of the armed forces. The circumstances surrounding de Matos's dismissal fuelled speculation hinting at personal and political tensions.²⁰⁹ De Matos's preference for a political rather than a military resolution of the civil war, not long after UNITA's retreat from Andulo and Bailundo, was seen by some as a hint of disloyalty to the government. His dismissal also raised doubts about the capability of other demoralized FAA officers.

The early January 2001 assassination of Congolese president Laurent Kabila and its regional consequences further complicated Luanda's choice of political and military options. Angola's decision to augment several thousand FAA troops previously deployed to Kinshasa, on behalf of Joseph Kabila, the late president's son and successor, added additional burdens on Angola's security establishment at a time of significant flux in its upper ranks. As FAA troops became increasingly involved in stabilizing Kabila's government, Namibian military units likewise appeared to be drawn more deeply into the Angolan civil war. In late January 2001, Namibian government officials acknowledged that NDF soldiers had attacked a UNITA camp at Licua, some 180 kilometers inside Angola, retrieving several tons of munitions.²¹⁰ Luanda, Kinshasa, and Windhoek had gradually become more deeply enmeshed in a growing number of overlapping conflicts extending from northern Namibia through Angola, DROC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This series of geographically linked conflicts was sometimes misleadingly dubbed "Africa's World War I"—a confounding of geography and geopolitics.²¹¹ As numerous neighboring countries deployed troops to DROC, a military equilibrium slowly was reestablished, setting the stage for South African-brokered negotiations and finally a UN peacekeeping mission.

UNITA had meanwhile exploited the disruptions stemming from FAA's transition to new leadership and the distraction of events in the DROC. Insurgent forces attacked FAA garrisons, diamond mining facilities and towns in rural areas extending from Uige Province in the northwest to Cunene and Cuando Cubango Province in the south. Most attacks were small-scale

operations with the guerrillas intent mainly on seizing arms, ammunition, and food. The guerrillas staged occasional commando raids in large provincial capitals as well, including late February and early March attacks on Uige, Huambo, and Ndalatando.²¹² UNITA had emphasized self-sufficiency since early 2000 but occasional reports revealed glimpses of a logistics system that adroitly combined a resourceful access to domestic supplies and increasingly limited external sources. In early February 2001, a government report claimed that UNITA supporters, posing as internally displaced civilians, had purchased donkeys and cows at local markets in Huila Province. The donkeys hauled carts full of supplies to the guerrillas, substituting for some of the truck fleet formerly available to UNITA.²¹³ Several weeks later, government officials acknowledged that aircraft of "unidentified type and origin" continued to violate Angolan airspace over eastern Cuando Cubango Province. These violations occurred at the outer edge of the FAA's radar and air defense system and on the margin of areas patrolled by Angolan fighter aircraft.²¹⁴

FLEC guerrilla operations in Cabinda in early 2001 also continued to thwart Luanda's efforts to manipulate insurgent factions and minimize the military distraction of events in the enclave. A late 2000 appeal from the Catholic archbishop of Cabinda, Paulino Maceda, advocating a referendum to let residents decide whether or not to pursue independence, encouraged some FLEC insurgents who claimed in mid-January 2001 that they were preparing an urban guerrilla campaign. A FLEC spokesman also alleged that officials would file a complaint against President dos Santos and General Joao de Matos before the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, charging them with "crimes against the Cabindan nation." On February 10, 2001, FAA troops skirmished with FLEC combatants twenty kilometers northeast of Cabinda city. Two weeks later, FLEC-FAC troops ambushed a vehicle carrying nurses engaged in a measles vaccination campaign at a site two hundred kilometers from the provincial capital. The guerrillas took a district health official hostage. On March 9, 2001, five Portuguese expatriates were kidnapped in Cabinda city by guerrillas linked to the FLEC-Renovada faction. When a FLEC-R official, based in Strasbourg, France, was asked if his faction would hold their hostages for terms similar to those set for Portuguese workers taken by FLEC-FAC ten months earlier, he replied "there is only one FLEC." This response suggested that the FLEC factions informally had arranged a military division of labor. FLEC-FAC tended to be active in northern districts while FLEC-R operated primarily in the south, including Cabinda city.²¹⁵

SIMULTANEOUS OFFENSIVES

As the 2000–2001 rainy season drew to a close, both the FAA and UNITA launched large offensives. UNITA's campaign began in early March 2001 with initial attacks in four provinces. During the following months, the insurgents conducted military operations in nine provinces. Insurgent communiqués issued after March 13, 2001, noted that the ongoing offensive

was meant to commemorate UNITA's thirty-fifth anniversary. The 2001 campaign also was notable for several surprise attacks on significant military targets. UNITA's assertion of a first great "victory" singled out a March 12, 2001, raid on the Catumbela air base, where UNITA claimed its commandos damaged several aircraft and destroyed structures containing arms and other supplies. Luanda denied the UNITA claim and asserted the guerrillas had managed only to infiltrate a nearby suburb of Benguela. On March 14, 2001, some three hundred UNITA combatants overran the Calombo-loca garrison, one hundred kilometers southeast of Luanda, seizing arms and supplies. Twelve days later, UNITA commandos staged a night attack on Uige airport, damaging nearby fuel tanks. On March 26, 2001, a large UNITA force overwhelmed FAA positions at Caripande, near the Zambian border, while other guerrillas stormed the town of Dirico on the Namibian border, chasing a joint FAA-NDF garrison across the Cubango River into Namibia. Three days later, insurgents struck a guard post at the airport 12 kilometers from Andulo. Shortly thereafter UNITA forces attacked police posts in Bailundo.²¹⁶

On April 5, 2001, UNITA forces struck three villages near Luena, the forward command post of FAA's general staff. Three days later guerrillas stormed Samba Caju, killing 120 FAA troops including General Recordacao, military commander of Cuanza Norte Province. In mid-April, guerrillas seized Calandula in Malanje Province, hauling off several artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns and small arms. Two weeks later, insurgents made off with a similar collection of weapons after overwhelming FAA outposts in Cuanza Sul Province. On May 5, 2001, UNITA stunned FAA troops at Caxito, sixty kilometers northeast of Luanda. Approximately two hundred UNITA combatants staged the Caxito raid, ransacking food supplies and seizing weapons. Two days after the Caxito attack, UNITA commandos infiltrated Uige city, attacking FAA installations and Angolan police stations, once again escaping with captured weapons after inflicting dozens of casualties. In late May, UNITA forces also assaulted government-held towns in Zaire and Bengo Provinces.²¹⁷

UNITA continued to select the time and place of combat in June, launching another series of widespread, low-level operations. On June 2, 2001, UNITA combatants raided the airport and an FAA training facility at Ambriz, in Bengo Province. Four days later, insurgents struck a joint FAA-NDF column near Mucusso. On June 7, UNITA soldiers occupied Namacunde, several kilometers from N'Giva, capital of Cunene Province. On the following day, commandos infiltrated Benguela and raided a military academy. In mid-June, insurgents disrupted diamond mining operations in Lunda Sul, fired mortar rounds at FAA positions in Kuito, and ambushed government camps outside Luena. UNITA did not formally announce the conclusion of its offensive, but a late June attack on Uige seemed to signal the end of their campaign. In the early hours of June 26, approximately one thousand insurgents infiltrated several urban districts. UNITA claimed its forces had destroyed numerous armored

vehicles and artillery pieces. Casualty reports from the six-hour battle indicated that losses numbered in the dozens for both sides.²¹⁸

The government response to UNITA's March–June offensive reflected significant departures from previous campaigns such as Operations *Hexagono* and *Triangulo*, which had focused on Savimbi as he moved southeast from Bie to Moxico Province. On March 8, 2001, FAA's offensive began in Malanje Province and, within a matter of days, government forces in Cuanza Sul, Huambo, Bie, Huila, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Cuando Cubango Provinces also had launched sweep operations aimed at several concentrations of guerrilla forces. UNITA officials estimated that the government committed 7,800 FAA troops, supplemented by police and local militia units as well as armor, artillery, and ground attack aircraft.²¹⁹

The FAA's focal shift from Savimbi to "UNITA-at-large" may partially have stemmed from the sweeping change in command that followed the replacement of General Joao de Matos by General Armando da Cruz Neto in January 2001. By early March, President dos Santos had appointed a new chief of staff of the Angolan Army, commander of the navy, and head of Military Security Services. Frustrated by the indecisive results of previous campaigns, General Neto also reportedly considered replacing regional level FAA commanders.²²⁰ Changes in the FAA's upper ranks, combined with an unanticipated disruption in overseas arms deliveries and unauthorized diversion of army supplies into the Angolan black market, probably had delayed the start of FAA's nearly nationwide campaign. In early March 2001, Spanish authorities in the Canary Islands impounded a ship, the Ukrainian-owned *Anastasia*, registered in the Republic of Georgia, carrying cargo bound for Angola. A forged cargo manifesto indicated the ship was transporting car parts, but Spanish officials determined it carried 636 metric tons of military supplies, including antitank and antipersonnel mines. After a brief delay, and presumably the payment of fines, the *Anastasia* was released and resumed its voyage to Angola. In late March, Defense Minister Kundi Paihama also confirmed earlier reports that food, medicines, and equipment from FAA logistics units had found their way to the Angolan "informal" market. Paihama also alluded to reports that high-ranking FAA officers had been engaging in illegal diamond trafficking through Luanda's military air terminal and other military air bases.²²¹ These delays and distractions proved to be short-lived and ultimately did not significantly erode the FAA's growing firepower advantage.

By early April 2001, FAA troops were making notable gains in some UNITA-controlled areas. Government soldiers occupied a large UNITA base in the Cuemba district of eastern Bie Province on April 2, 2001. FAA's 20th Motorized Brigade fought for five hours before UNITA withdrew, leaving a base that consisted of five hundred huts in a heavily forested area. Several days later, government forces claimed they had seized a UNITA arsenal in northern Bie Province containing nearly 8,000 60-mm mortars, 370 cases of light weapons, 1,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and additional military hardware. In mid-April, FAA officers reported the capture of numerous vehicle-mounted antiaircraft guns and many UNITA insurgents killed at Marimba

in northern Malanje Province. With the FAA's occupation of Marimba, the Angolan government asserted it now controlled all 14 of the key municipalities in Malanje Province. On May 4, 2001, Luanda announced its forces had regained two insurgent-held districts in Huila Province, thereby extending its control to all provincial districts. Further to the southeast, government forces also had reclaimed Mavinga. While Mavinga no longer had the military significance attributed to it in the 1980s, the base still contained substantial arsenals, which fell into government hands.²²²

The late April and early May 2001 battle for Umpulo probably was one of the more significant points of convergence in the simultaneous FAA/UNITA offensives. After weeks of heavy fighting, the insurgents occupied Umpulo on April 20. Four days later, FAA successfully counterattacked and drove UNITA back. In early May, the insurgents again tried to force government troops from Umpulo. FAA defenses held, however, and any thought UNITA might have given to reestablishing a fixed central command post resembling Bailundo or Andulo was abandoned as Savimbi's troops resumed the mobile, decentralized insurgency that they had conducted since early 2000.²²³

Corruption and leadership problems continued to undermine government efforts to reform the Angolan military and limited some of FAA's hard-fought gains. In late May 2001, government officials again acknowledged that extensive black market activities in central and southern provinces were supplying food to UNITA and that a rising number of attacks on civilian convoys reflected criminal activity rather than guerrilla operations. In late June, an MPLA spokesman announced the dismissal of Flavio Fernandes, governor of Malanje Province, for "damaging the party's image." Press reports suggested that Fernandes had been involved in the trafficking of unspecified goods with UNITA personnel. Unnamed government officials also repeatedly accused FAA commanders of "negligence" linked to militarily unstable situations in several provinces.²²⁴

The simultaneous escalation of hostilities, which lasted from March to June 2001, was echoed faintly by reports of renewed combat and related rhetoric linking the Cabindan insurgency to the larger Angolan civil war. Although they disagreed on the scale and intensity of the fighting, both FAA and FLEC-Renovada officials acknowledged ongoing military encounters in southwestern Cabinda. In late March, Joao Vahekeny, a UNITA overseas representative, responded to a recent FLEC-FAC communiqué that revealed 1999 correspondence between FLEC-FAC and Savimbi. Vahekeny did not confirm the FLEC-Savimbi contacts but instead emphasized UNITA policy statements issued in 2000, advocating a negotiated settlement and a referendum allowing Cabindan residents to vote for autonomy or independence. Without pausing to address the diplomatic complexities of the enclave's status, the FAA launched more extensive counterinsurgency sweeps in early April, directed at FLEC-FAC base camps in northern Cabinda. FLEC-FAC also released one of eight Portuguese expatriates captured in the previous year and an insurgent representative claimed the guerrillas would take no further hostages. The fate of those still in their hands remained uncertain. In an attempt to outflank

FLEC combatants, in May 2001, FAA pre-positioned troops in the DROC (Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) from which they struck insurgent bases. FLEC-FAC spokesmen protested the tactics and threatened, in early June, to order Cabindan insurgents to operate as far as fifty kilometers inside their Congolese neighbors' borders.²²⁵

SAVIMBI SPEAKS, UNITA CONVENES

As hostilities slowly intensified and spread throughout the countryside in early 2001, Jonas Savimbi ended an 18-month silence with remarks, startling and ambivalent, intended for domestic and international audiences. On March 22, 2001, he unexpectedly phoned the Voice of America Portuguese Service in Washington. Most of Savimbi's initial comments stressed the need for renewed dialogue and reconciliation with the government. Although he considered the 1994 Lusaka Accord defective, he conceded that it could be implemented. Underscoring his eagerness to resume peace talks, Savimbi also hinted at recent communications with several African leaders who might facilitate renewed negotiations. Subsequent Angolan press reports claimed Savimbi had contacted Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, and possibly four other African heads of state.²²⁶

Although Savimbi offered a confident assessment of UNITA's current military position, he tempered it with an ambivalent evaluation of the setbacks suffered in Operation *Restauração*. UNITA communiqués in late October 1999 had downplayed the significance of Bailundo and Andulo or had partially blamed their loss on the defection of General Diogenes Malaquias "Implacavel." These interpretations had been set aside in subsequent assessments conducted by UNITA's high command between November 1999 and February 2000. According to Savimbi, UNITA had concluded that General Altino Sapalalo "Bock" "was the main person responsible for the tragic change in our strategy."²²⁷ This was a surprising revelation since Bock's role during Operation *Restauração* previously was thought to be extremely limited. Savimbi acknowledged that "Bock" had been stripped of his military command at an unspecified date, which seemed to confirm earlier reporting that General "Bock" had been demoted immediately after the UNITA debacle at Kunje in December 1998—long before the start of Operation *Restauração*, one year later. Without addressing the apparent contradiction or inconsistencies in earlier explanations of UNITA's defeats, Savimbi also denied widely accepted press reports that "Bock" had been executed, in March or April 2000, on his orders. Savimbi also was evasive when asked about his own role in UNITA's 1999 setbacks, saying only that he accepted partial responsibility for UNITA's past failings as well as its survival.

Acknowledging that the loss of Andulo and Bailundo had indeed knocked UNITA off balance, Savimbi emphasized that although "we might have lost our strongholds . . . we gained our freedom of movement, because now they [FAA] lost their target and the target became the whole country." He likewise seemed confident about his own safety, but resigned to the fact that

“there is a permanent objective and that is to capture me. But the truth is that they have never even been close. If they had been they would have had better information, but they are still looking. In any case I’m not too worried. After a little over a year we have found ways to avoid such a catastrophe . . . We’ve been through the worst. Now UNITA’s armed forces are coming back. We aren’t living the same traumatic situation that we had in 1998 and 1999.”²²⁸

Savimbi’s decision to end his long silence, albeit laden with equivocation, set the stage for UNITA’s Sixteenth Annual Ordinary Conference, held from April 5 to 15, 2001, at an undisclosed location south of the headwaters of the Lungue-Bungo River in Moxico Province. Savimbi gave a five-hour address. Available excerpts indicated that Savimbi exhorted his commanders to undertake a critical examination of UNITA’s history as well as its current performance. He reminded his audience, “Our negative points are not a recent development, and we must trace them back to our party’s foundation . . . we were guilty of errors that must now be examined in depth so that they will be expunged. Our aim in talking openly about our faults is to strengthen our unity . . . so we do not repeat deeds that have hurt people—sometimes UNITA militants—in the past . . . The errors of each individual, of the UNITA leadership, and of the armed forces, must be examined with courage so we accept them.”²²⁹

The extent to which UNITA’s leaders and members engaged in self-criticism or a soul-searching assessment of the organization’s shortcomings is uncertain. A UNITA commander belatedly revealed that Savimbi had acknowledged the witch burnings at Jamba in 1983 as a “mistake” and that he accepted responsibility for the incident.²³⁰ UNITA did not widely publicize the conference or its outcome. A subsequent announcement of resolutions adopted at the conference revealed no dramatic findings or any condemnation of individual or collective failures. Instead, the party leadership chose to endorse recent calls by members of Angola’s civil society and the clergy for renewed peace talks.²³¹

Although UNITA’s widely dispersed forces had demonstrated their ability to conduct a Maoist-inspired protracted guerrilla war, Savimbi and some of his chief officers had not been nearly as successful. FAA’s 1999–2000 offensives had kept them on the run and the government’s early 2001 campaign had again prevented them from establishing a fixed headquarters at Umpulo. Increasingly, Savimbi’s military position came to bear a greater resemblance to that of his Cypriot inspiration, Colonel Grivas, than that of his Chinese mentor, Mao Zedong. Like Grivas, Savimbi constantly had to hide and frequently was forced to move to new hiding places.

FLEXIBILITY AND RIGIDITY

In mid-2001 both sides again took tentative diplomatic steps to revive peace talks. Luanda and UNITA indicated a willingness to reconsider earlier preconditions. These hints of greater flexibility were offset by rigid rejections of specific individuals or organizations as participants in any negotiations.

In a June 13, 2001, telephone interview, Savimbi suggested the possibility of unidentified West or Southern African governments serving as mediators in a revival of the 1994 Lusaka Accord. In the same interview, however, Savimbi rejected the idea of UNITA declaring a unilateral cease-fire, since neither the UN nor any regional organization was available to monitor such an arrangement. He likewise discounted a proposal to unilaterally disarm and demobilize his troops. Savimbi also declined to serve as one of two Angolan vice presidents, noting that the role that Luanda offered was largely ceremonial. Moreover, the dos Santos government had further circumscribed the powers of the office by precluding the vice president from serving as "acting" president while the head of state was out of the country, or succeeding to the office in the event of the president's death. Savimbi skeptically recalled the precedent set by such a "solution" as it had been applied in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union (ZAPU) had accepted a largely ceremonial vice president's position after a brutal military campaign, led by North Korean-trained government troops, against his Ndebele supporters. Nkomo's political eclipse, as well as that of ZAPU, followed soon thereafter, at the hands of President Robert Mugabe's Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).²³²

Less than 24 hours after his telephone interview, Angolan government officials rejected Savimbi's proposal of an African mediator. In doing so, they explicitly spurned an earlier June 5, 2001, revelation by South African defense minister Mosiuoa Lekota that his government had recently tried to contact both sides to promote renewed negotiations. The dos Santos government only agreed with Savimbi's view that future negotiations would have to be based on an implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Accord, but neither side seemed ready to move beyond a general consensus on the need for power sharing.

Faced with a diplomatic logjam, Luanda began to supplement its military efforts with programs designed to co-opt insurgents by offering financial incentives to recent or prospective defectors. In early July 2001, the government announced that former UNITA general Diogenes Raul Malaquias "Implacavel" had been given a house and truck, making him the first beneficiary of a recently established \$20 million Peace and National Reconciliation Support Fund.²³³ Officials in Huambo Province acknowledged, in July, that they had provided housing and other assistance to some 4,500 former UNITA troops and 55,000 civilians who had surrendered to authorities since the December 2000 promulgation of an amnesty law. Interior minister Fernando Piedade dos Santos also indicated that the government might adopt a more lenient attitude toward Savimbi, claiming that the warrant for Savimbi's arrest would be withdrawn if he ceased hostilities, agreed to disarm, and complied with the terms of the Lusaka Accord.²³⁴

Tentative signs of benevolence on both sides promised no immediate relief for most Angolans. In the first eight months of 2001, humanitarian workers estimated that 323,000 civilians had been forced to leave their area of origin,

bringing the total of internally displaced people (IDP) to approximately three million since 1998. Provinces with the highest number of IDPs included Bie, Huambo, Uige, Moxico, and Huila.²³⁵ A late 2001 United Nations study revealed that UNITA's 1999 military retreat from Andulo and Bailundo had included a disciplined relocation of sympathetic civilians, initially to Moxico Province. Those UNITA members and sympathizers who chose not to join the IDP ranks opted for refugee camps in DROC, Namibia, and Zambia. In late 2000 and early 2001, a growing number of civilians abandoned Moxico Province for Zambian refugee camps. UNITA's Sixteenth Annual Conference, in April 2001, roughly coincided with reports that the spouses and family members of some high ranking UNITA leaders had arrived in Zambian refugee camps. In subsequent months, UNITA intelligence and political cadres were suspected of exercising significant influence over some of the large Zambian refugee camps, raising concerns that UNITA might be using the camps as a source of logistic support.²³⁶

A SECOND ROUND OF CONCURRENT CAMPAIGNS

The intensification of hostilities in mid- and late 2001 drove more civilians to IDP and refugee camps. FAA commanders launched an offensive that simultaneously pushed UNITA out of large base camps in the north while mounting additional pressure on Savimbi in the southeast. In early July 2001 FAA troops initiated counterinsurgency sweeps in Uige, Bie, Moxico, and Cuando Cubango, using each of the provincial capitals as forward command posts.²³⁷ By early August 2001, FAA had committed an estimated four thousand troops to the Moxico Province campaign. UNITA commanders also observed government forces in the southeast employing more sophisticated signals intelligence, disinformation, and better encryption of their communications. FAA troops also made more frequent use of long-range reconnaissance units rather than relying on helicopters to fly troops into areas near suspected UNITA positions. These modifications deprived the guerrillas of some early warning indicators and forced them to rely on more extensive local patrols and enhanced human intelligence collection. The deployment of additional troops from Saurimo to Moxico Province further circumscribed Savimbi's freedom of mobility. Earlier FAA campaigns had blocked his northward movement at Umpulo and Luená. The mid-2001 operations narrowed his southern and eastern options when FAA reinforced Cangamba, several positions north of the Cuando River, Lucusse, and the road leading to Lumabala N'Guimbo and Chiume, near the Zambian border.²³⁸

UNITA responded to the FAA offensive with a campaign that gradually spread to almost all 18 Angolan provinces. Between mid-July and late August 2001, guerrillas struck numerous government hamlets and FAA military convoys. UNITA communiquéés claimed the offensive was intended, in part, to commemorate Savimbi's sixty-seventh birthday on August 3, 2001. By late August, the guerrilla offensive had included more than ninety attacks. UNITA claimed more than five hundred government troops and police personnel

were killed and that guerrillas had captured large numbers of weapons. One of UNITA's military victories in this campaign, however, also proved to be a significant public relations defeat. On August 10, 2001, guerrillas attacked a train on the Luanda-Malanje rail line, roughly 150 kilometers southeast of Luanda. UNITA reported 26 FAA troops and 11 police officers had been killed. The train carried fuel, ammunition, and food for an FAA garrison at Dondo. Government and journalists' accounts described a large number of civilian casualties—by some estimates well over 150 of the more than 400 passengers died, many gunned down as they fled the burning train when its fuel caught fire. An increasingly skeptical international community, already inclined to brand UNITA a "terrorist" organization, generally accepted the government's report of an attack on defenseless civilians. UNITA spokesmen acknowledged a lower number of civilian casualties in what they insisted was a train carrying FAA passengers and military cargo. UNITA efforts to portray an international double standard toward Angola, by reminding overseas observers of repeated indiscriminate government air raids on civilian villages in UNITA-held areas, did little to blunt the overseas outrage and condemnation evoked by the attack.²³⁹

The Angolan government rarely confirmed UNITA operations during their "commemorative" campaign. Humanitarian workers, however, tacitly acknowledged the impact of UNITA's offensive. The United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Office in Angola (OCHA) reported "security problems" in 11 of 18 provinces and noted their concern that combat had occurred in areas "previously considered to be secure."²⁴⁰ UNITA's operational tempo slowly subsided in September 2001; insurgent communiqués recorded low-level attacks in only nine provinces. Guerrilla forces also fired mortars at Benguela, Kuito, and Menongue and as evidence that they still could strike almost anywhere, at midnight on September 24, 2001, comandos destroyed three transformers in Viana, 15 kilometers from Luanda, briefly cutting water and power supplies to much of the capital.²⁴¹

UNITA's mid- to late 2001 offensive made a significant impression on Angola's political and military leaders. Although the insurgents were not on the verge of toppling the MPLA, nor were they likely to win a decisive battle against the FAA, they had proven they could not easily be defeated. A steadily growing international and domestic chorus of civil society and church leaders renewed calls for a negotiated settlement. In late September 2001 an unidentified high-ranking MPLA official secretly met, in Paris, with Isaias Samakuva, UNITA's principal overseas representative. The MPLA representative solicited UNITA's views on the ruling party's elite and their financial fortunes, presumably to assess UNITA's willingness to accommodate their political and economic concerns. UNITA leaders, including Savimbi, viewed this inquiry as a significant indication of a favorable shift in Luanda's political climate. Savimbi expected a more productive diplomatic atmosphere to prevail by early 2002. In early October 2001, Savimbi contacted Dom Franklin Damiao, archbishop of Luanda, and Dom Matteo of the Society of San Egidio, a Catholic charitable organization based in Rome,

which had facilitated negotiations leading to the end of Mozambique's civil war in the early 1990s. Savimbi asked the two prelates to assist both belligerents in the resumption of negotiations.²⁴²

During the following five months, Luanda's response to UNITA's proposals combined a military offensive with diplomatic initiatives, much like the process that had led to the signing of the 1994 Lusaka Accord. UNITA also made additional diplomatic contacts with various third parties interested in reviving peace talks. The refrain of "power sharing" echoed the talking points of the mid-1990s but with one significant difference. Although the MPLA once again resigned itself to including UNITA in a postwar government, in a notable departure from the previous decade, Luanda was equally determined to exclude Jonas Savimbi from any postwar political equation.

OPERATION *QUISSONDE* (BRAVE ANT)

In early October 2001, FAA launched a counterinsurgency campaign in central Moxico Province. Portuguese-trained commandos, taught to fight like their *cacadores* (hunters) predecessors in the 1960s colonial wars, as well as additional special police units, deployed to support nine thousand FAA troops operating along roads near the Zambian border. Government forces moved from east to west in an area bounded by the Luanguinga and Luio Rivers. Savimbi and UNITA's first generation of combatants knew this area well and initially outmaneuvered their pursuers by adroit movements across and around the multitude of rivers and streams that flowed into the larger Lungue-Bungo River watershed.²⁴³

The FAA's luck changed in November when an Israeli advisory team, contracted to assist Luanda several months earlier, obtained vital UNITA signals intelligence. After determining Savimbi's personal telephone number, the Israeli team intercepted a call Savimbi made on November 13, 2001, providing FAA a more precise location of his Moxico Province base. Subsequent data, derived from a second call, to Savimbi from Paris, on November 21, 2001, enabled the Israeli team to determine Savimbi's position within an area of five hundred meters in circumference.²⁴⁴ This information enabled FAA units to overtake some of the dispersed UNITA contingents traveling at the outer edges of Savimbi's main military columns, which had taken a series of evasive actions, relocating to new base camps every four to five days. By November 19, 2001, government forces had captured the family members of several high-ranking UNITA leaders, including Pena Gato, the wife of UNITA's secretary general Paulo Lukamba Gato.²⁴⁵ On December 6, 2001, a communications specialist deserted UNITA's mobile headquarters unit and subsequently provided valuable intelligence to FAA units tracking Savimbi. On December 17, 2001, government forces engaged elements of a force providing a security perimeter only a few kilometers from Savimbi's camp. The guerrilla column already had been drastically weakened by a severe shortage of food and medicine when FAA attacked. Numerous insurgents were killed or captured or deserted. The December 17 FAA attack temporarily

severed communications between Savimbi and his overseas representatives and disrupted a UNITA plan to declare a unilateral cease-fire lasting ninety days, provided that serious negotiations commenced after the truce began.²⁴⁶

Incremental diplomatic progress in late November and early December had paralleled FAA's military gains, restoring Luanda's confidence, as well as UNITA's earlier optimism, concerning the near-term prospects of renewed peace talks. Although the government had shown signs of flexibility toward UNITA, Savimbi was offered no role in any negotiated settlement. President dos Santos made this clear in a December 15, 2001, statement that the UNITA leader had only three choices, "surrender, capture or death.," but three days later, Luanda agreed to renewed United Nations' contact with UNITA to discuss the modalities of a cease-fire. A government advisory council also had persuaded President dos Santos to permit members of Angola's civil society and church leaders to assist the UN in facilitating a cease-fire and reestablishing contact with Savimbi.²⁴⁷ In early January 2002 the UN's special representative to Angola, Mussagy Jeichande, met with UNITA officials in Paris to follow up on these auspicious developments. Savimbi also had authorized his overseas representatives to speak for the insurgents without seeking additional approval from UNITA's military commanders.²⁴⁸

The atmosphere of benevolence also briefly extended to Cabinda where hostilities had previously intensified. From October to December 2001, seven thousand to eight thousand government troops attempted to clear the guerrillas from the enclave. In late December, a FLEC-FAC official announced that the insurgents had initiated exploratory contacts with the Angolan government. These meetings were expected to lead to additional negotiations in early 2002 in Portugal, although the Portuguese government was not expected to mediate. A FLEC-FAC spokesman also expressed a willingness to contact FLEC-R representatives, presumably to prepare for more inclusive negotiations.²⁴⁹

SAVIMBI'S LAST DAYS

The Angolan government's plan to militarily isolate Savimbi and exclude him from a peace settlement ultimately relied on a crude adaptation of the counterinsurgency strategy that Portuguese forces had employed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A strategy aimed at "draining the water" in which Maoist-inspired guerrilla "fish" swam, ultimately turning an ocean into a desert, had enabled Portugal to prevent Angolan insurgents from mounting a serious military threat to colonial rule. Japan had employed this approach in China against Mao Zedong, the United States used it in Vietnam with its strategic hamlet program, and Portugal adopted it by constructing "*aldeamentos*" in the 1960s.²⁵⁰ The Angolan government, however, focused almost solely on forcing as many civilians as possible out of rural areas in which UNITA might obtain food, medicine, recruits, and other forms of support. Very little effort was made to establish alternative hamlets or desirable residential areas. Instead, the rural populations were pushed into the ranks of the 3.4 million

citizens previously displaced by hostilities, either in large cities or in IDP camps on the outskirts of urban areas. Humanitarian aid workers reported meetings with FAA officers who told them, prior to military operations, where to expect displaced civilians and told them to be prepared to cope with new arrivals at IDP camps. Government campaigns to “cleanse” villages of suspected UNITA supporters in late 2001 were estimated to be responsible for 60 percent of newly displaced populations in Angola, while UNITA presumably accounted for the remaining 40 percent. Despite government claims that it had regained control over 90 percent of Angola’s territory, the FAA could provide security assurances to international relief workers only in the southwestern corner of the country and isolated pockets elsewhere. UN officials recorded more than forty incidents in the last half of 2001 in which government forces harassed humanitarian aid personnel or looted humanitarian supplies. As of late 2001, aid had been delivered only to some 1.3 million of the 4.1 million Angolan IDPs. Between December 2001 and February 2002, civilians reportedly had been displaced at a rate of fifty thousand per month. Many displaced persons were driven from farms and villages in Moxico and neighboring Bie Province, leaving Savimbi and his guerrillas to maneuver through an increasingly barren and empty countryside.²⁵¹

By late December 2001, as heliborne FAA commando units continued to close in on his forces, Savimbi split his staff into two columns, sending them in separate directions along the banks of smaller rivers south of the Lungue-Bungo. On January 6, 2002, FAA troops attacked one of UNITA’s two command columns, forcing them to relocate and seek shelter in a remote river valley. FAA units had also occupied positions on the Zambian side of the border, confining the insurgents to an ever smaller area of south central Moxico Province. As UNITA’s position grew increasingly difficult, unconfirmed press reports indicated that officials in Pretoria had proposed to allow Savimbi to seek exile in South Africa.²⁵² On January 17, 2002, FAA soldiers again caught up with one of Savimbi’s columns near Cassamba, briefly engaging some insurgents at almost point-blank range. Savimbi and other commanders narrowly escaped and Luanda publicly displayed some of Savimbi’s personal possessions captured after the encounter. Government troops again overtook some forces attached to Savimbi’s column on January 30, 2002, capturing a communications specialist in Savimbi’s inner circle.²⁵³

FAA commanders intensified their pursuit in early February. From February 8–14, 2002, government security forces harried increasingly weaker and smaller insurgent units on the periphery of Savimbi’s position. After several brief skirmishes, Luanda publicly announced, on February 17 and 18, 2002, the capture or death of five UNITA generals, including General Gabiano da Silva e Sousa (“Bula Matadi”), UNITA’s national political commissioner, and General Almeida Ezequiel Chissonde (“Buffalo Bill”). Government forces also captured Amelia Isabel Dachala, the wife of UNITA’s Secretary for Information Marcial Dachala, Dorez Chipenda, the wife of UNITA’s vice president Antonio Dembo, Beatriz Marcolino, the spouse of the deceased General “Bock,” and Tita Miranda, General Numa

Camalata's wife. Some of the captured spouses and other family members were part of a UNITA column fleeing to refugee camps in Zambia. The multiple layers of security surrounding Savimbi finally had been eroded by FAA's relentless pursuit, critical defections, and the death by starvation or disease of numerous members in his protective columns. Information derived by Israeli technicians from intercepted phone calls on February 13 and 21 finally led government forces, commanded by his long-term nemesis Brigadier Simao Wala, to Savimbi's base camp near the Luveí River, south of Lucusse on February 22, 2002. FAA attacks during the previous week had forced Savimbi to further divide his column into smaller units in an increasingly desperate attempt to evade his pursuers. By the time FAA troops had reached Savimbi, he had paused to rest, accompanied by only 13 additional UNITA members. Government soldiers, only hours earlier, had captured a UNITA officer who subsequently led them to Savimbi's camp. Savimbi had a rifle in his hands when he was struck by 15 bullets.²⁵⁴

UNITA's surviving leaders had barely begun to absorb the impact of Savimbi's death when they learned their vice president, Antonio Dembo, had perished on March 4, 2002, due to complications from a protracted illness. Dembo and Savimbi previously had separated, accompanied by drastically reduced units, after a February 18, 2002, FAA attack devastated a UNITA column of some five hundred combatants, reducing it to nearly half its original size. Dembo's companions buried him on the banks of the Lumai River, in Moxico Province, not far from where Savimbi had died.²⁵⁵

A period of confusion and uncertainty ensued in the week following Dembo's death. UNITA's surviving commanders and senior officials regrouped and rallied around Secretary General Paulo Lukamba Gato. UNITA's overseas representatives, led by Isaias Samakuva, responded tentatively to government and civil society proposals for renewed peace talks. Relying on contingency plans Savimbi drafted in 1997, the internal and external wings of the organization collaborated to create a Management Commission headed by Gato, comprising 13 members, including 9 UNITA generals, Foreign Secretary Alcides Sakala, external representative Isaias Samakuva, and Ernesto Mulato.²⁵⁶ The Management Commission decided to act on one of Savimbi's last official messages, sent to his commanders on February 20, 2002, which reiterated Savimbi's desire to resume peace talks and called on them to suspend hostilities as a prelude to peace talks. UNITA's Management Commission agreed to implement the bequeathed political mandate and contacted Angolan government officials. FAA's chief of staff general Armando da Cruz Neto also had sent a message to the Management Commission shortly after it was established, proposing to discuss an end to hostilities.²⁵⁷

FROM WAR TO PEACE

Communications between UNITA and FAA commanders, in early March, were mutually well received. UNITA announced a suspension of hostilities as of midnight, March 13, 2002. Luanda offered to make a reciprocal

announcement and both sides agreed to meet, several days later, at the village of Cassamba, the site of UNITA's first large military operation against Portuguese colonial forces in December 1967. The Angolan government also issued a declaration on March 13 signaling its acceptance of a UNITA list identifying key issues that would have to be addressed in any negotiated settlement. With slightly different emphases on the importance of some factors, the government described "the demilitarization of UNITA as fundamental and decisive." The government also agreed to "propose to the National Assembly the approval of an amnesty for all crimes committed during the course of the armed conflict." In order to implement the 1994 Lusaka Accord, the government stated it "would be necessary to complete the reinstatement of state administration throughout the country" and finally, Luanda acknowledged "it would be necessary to find a political and legal solution to the electoral process that was interrupted in 1992."²⁵⁸

Both sides agreed that the Cassamba meeting had laid a solid foundation for further discussions and decided to reconvene at Luena on March 18, 2002. The Luena talks included numerous officials from both sides, and by March 23, 2002, UNITA generals from northern, central, and southern military regions were participating in negotiations with their FAA counterparts. These discussions led to the signing of a "Memorandum of Understanding" on March 30, 2002, which declared that an official cease-fire would take effect on April 4, 2002. The memorandum also provided for the cantonment of some 50,000 UNITA combatants beginning on April 4, 2002, in 27 temporary military camps. Family members of the combatants were to be accommodated at nearby locations. Eventually, 5,077 UNITA personnel would be selected for positions, including generals and other officers, in the Angolan armed forces. On April 2, 2002, the Angolan National Assembly unanimously voted into law a general amnesty for UNITA forces "covering all crimes against state security during the war."²⁵⁹

On April 4, 2002, military commanders and civilian representatives met in Luanda's Palace of Congress to sign a letter of intent announcing the start of an official cease-fire. FAA general Neto and UNITA general Kamorteiro addressed the National Assembly. The American, Russian, and Portuguese ambassadors, members of Angola's civil society, church leaders, and chiefs of staff of the armed forces of nine African countries also attended. General Neto praised President dos Santos for his supportive role in the negotiations. General Kamorteiro, without mentioning Savimbi's name, repeated the late UNITA president's enduring concern for his troops' welfare when he noted that "what worries me most is what will come after the demilitarization and demobilization of the vast number of combatants that will not be integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces and the National Police. We would like, on behalf of these combatants, to appeal to the Government of Angola and the international community to pay special attention to these combatants, providing them with technical and professional training so that they may be reintegrated into society and enter the labor market in a dignified manner."²⁶⁰

Both sides were determined to implement the accords. Almost immediately after the cease-fire was announced, UNITA forces proceeded to the agreed-on assembly points. By early May 2002 a joint FAA-UNITA military commission had recorded the arrival of 42,928 UNITA troops. An additional 78,564 family members and relatives had occupied nearby camps. The military commission estimated that 78 percent of UNITA's 50,000 combatants had been accounted for, including 12 generals, 47 brigadiers, 1,700 senior officials, 17,350 captains and commissioned officers, an estimated 3,130 sergeants, and 27,740 soldiers.²⁶¹ Inadequate food supplies, medicine, and clothing briefly threatened to undermine the demobilization process. However, government and international relief organizations responded in a relatively timely manner to meet most of these shortfalls.

UNITA and the MPLA also chose to stifle a controversy reminiscent of the Operation Timber documents whose publication had poisoned Angola's political atmosphere in 1974–75. An Angolan journal claimed, in late April 2002, that notes had been recovered, after Savimbi's death, containing an extensive list of government officials, parliamentarians, FAA officers, private businessmen, and journalists, all of whom had received financial payments from UNITA. Marcial Dachala, a member of UNITA's Management Commission, told a reporter in early May 2002 that he had "no comment" on the matter and would neither confirm nor deny the existence of "lists." A government spokesman, Information Minister Norberto dos Santos, denied allegations that MPLA members or others had been on Savimbi's payroll and while he implied that documents existed, he emphasized that "no one can prove that the documents are authentic."²⁶² This issue and related speculation, concerning the residual revenues UNITA had derived from diamond mining, ultimately had no significant impact on the peace process.

By early June 2002, 79,776 UNITA soldiers had arrived at demobilization sites where they surrendered approximately 25,000 weapons. One month later, an additional 5,000 combatants appeared and 3,000 weapons were turned over to the government. The revised weapons total included more than four hundred mortars and over sixty artillery pieces. Discrepancies between the number of combatants and the weapons registered were partly due to the fact that many of those who reported to the camps were older, retired troops or underage youths seeking the benefits available at cantonment sites.²⁶³

On August 2, 2002, FAA officers, government officials, and a UNITA delegation met in Luanda to declare an official end to the Angolan civil war. On August 7, 2002, UNITA's Management Commission disbanded and was replaced by a Standing Political Committee. The former would be reconstituted as the executive branch of the party's Political Commission and prepare for the party's next congress so that members could vote for candidates vying for leadership positions. Angolan government and UNITA officials met again on August 24, 2002, to sign an agreement obligating both sides to conclude the 1994 Lusaka Accord within 45 days. On November 20, 2002, the joint commission originally established by the Lusaka Accord, including the UN secretary general's special representative, Ibrahim Gambari, Angolan

officials, UNITA representatives, and the “Troika” observers (Portugal, the United States, and Russia) held its last meeting. The Joint Commission was formally dissolved and the occasion marked by a declaration that “this body considers all matters essential for peace in Angola as concluded.”²⁶⁴

Most Angolans seemed willing to forego a celebration of war heroes, or the holding of victory parades. FAA brigadier Simao Wala and 25 officers who had participated in the offensive that ended Savimbi’s life were quietly sent off to Russia, in early September 2002, for a five-year leadership training course. Whether reluctantly or enthusiastically, many Angolans agreed with the protagonist in a novel by their countryman and noted author, Sousa Jamba, who remarked that, ultimately “there is no difference between the MPLA soldier and the UNITA soldier. We are all patriots. We all love Angola.”²⁶⁵ The “wind of change,” which forty years earlier brought the promise of independence but instead yielded the blight of civil war, finally began to give way to a “wind of reconciliation,” which offered a hope of peace and reconstruction.

CHAPTER 6



CONCLUSION

The rapid end of hostilities after Jonas Savimbi's death in February 2002 barely masked the fragility of the peace so solemnly announced several months later. Angolans chose amnesty over accountability as a guiding principle, unlike their counterparts in war-torn Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda. Emphasizing forgiveness rather than justice seemed shortsighted to those who insisted there could be no lasting peace without the punishment of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Angolans opted for a peace process inspired, in part, by their Mozambican colleagues who, in 1992, also chose amnesty rather than accountability as their guiding principle to conclude a brutal 15-year civil war. In partial recognition of demands for a modicum of accountability, a National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) official, Abilio Camalata "Numa" issued a conciliatory statement in early January 2003. UNITA's former chief of staff diminished Savimbi's role in the insurgency and insisted that his colleagues "wanted a society that is more democratic and fair and this is what made us go to war. It was not one person's adventure. It was a political project that made people go to war. It is in this framework that UNITA come before the people to ask for forgiveness for the lives lost. We take responsibility for our mistakes. We are asking forgiveness about [sic] the period of war which took place in this country since 1975."¹

Nevertheless it seems premature to suggest that Angolans will never again consider the use of force. The protracted disarmament of Angolan society, still incomplete eight years after Savimbi's death, provides ample evidence for concerns that war might still be regarded as a viable option for those who are dissatisfied with the prevailing political and economic order. Moreover, the persistence of a low-level insurgency in Cabinda reminds her neighbors that Angola is still not entirely at peace. It also would be presumptuous to offer a definitive assessment of Jonas Savimbi's place in Angola's military and political history. His political legacy—as measured by UNITA's performance as a political party—seems likely to be more durable than his influence as a

guerrilla strategist and military commander. In either case, decades likely will pass before a clear and consistent judgment is passed by his fellow Angolans or foreign observers.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Estimates of the total number of land mines still scattered across Angola in 2002 varied from half a million to more than six million. In the early years of Angola's peace process, international organizations focused on the removal of these mines and other unexploded ordnance as a critical precondition to the nation's reconstruction and development. The seizure or voluntary handover of small arms and light weapons was an equally vital factor in assuring the political stability necessary for the conduct of legislative elections in 2008 and a subsequent presidential ballot. The absence of a corroborated figure for the number of weapons still hidden in arms caches or intentionally retained by Angola's civilian population undermines any evaluation of long-term prospects for peace. Over the past eight years, press accounts have not always specified whether recovered weapons were from residual UNITA arms caches or if they were some of the hundreds of thousands of weapons handed out to the MPLA's civilian supporters in the violent aftermath of the 1992 elections. In February 2003 Angolan police officials estimated that a third of Angola's 12–13 million citizens were still armed—suggesting a staggering figure of more than four million weapons readily available in civilian hands.² During the following years, government efforts to disarm its civilian population indicated that while the 2003 figure may have been exaggerated, the number of weapons unaccounted for was indeed ominously large. By late October 2005, newspaper accounts indicated some 150,000 weapons had been collected from civilians but did not specify the number attributed to former insurgent arsenals or progovernment civilian caches.³ Between July 2006 and July 2007, the government reportedly had destroyed 327 metric tons of weapons and 281 metric tons of explosive devices.⁴ In April 2007 police officials announced they had collected 1,000 weapons from Luanda's nine districts during the previous five weeks.⁵ In November 2007, police reported the seizure of over 900 firearms in Cuando Cubango and Cunene Provinces. These finds were described as part of a larger ongoing Operation Mandume, a collaborative effort involving Namibian and South African police units that also had turned up 4,000 weapons in areas near the Angolan-Namibian border.⁶

Persistent discoveries and seizures indicated that the number of weapons still available remained uncomfortably large for a government committed to holding its first peace-time legislative elections in 16 years. In January 2008, Angola's interior minister claimed the government had seized eight thousand firearms during the previous 12 months.⁷ On March 8, 2008, officials announced that President dos Santos had established a National Civil Disarmament Commission to oversee the nation's disarmament process.⁸ Several days later, police representatives reported the discovery, in Cuando Cubango Province, of eleven arms caches at former UNITA bases.⁹ One month later,

the commission announced that it had registered seven thousand firearms; of which more than two thousand were found in Huila Province.¹⁰

The commission declared a three-month voluntary handover phase lasting from May to July 2008, to be followed by a compulsory arms surrender phase. In early June 2008, police spokesmen claimed they had collected 18,000 firearms in the previous three months. Police officials also affirmed that 200,000 weapons had been collected from civilians since 2002 and suspected there were some 300,000 weapons yet to be collected in Angola.¹¹ This mildly reassuring news was followed, several days later, by an uncorroborated press report that an arms cache containing more than 300,000 weapons had been discovered in Zaire Province.¹² Even if the figure for Zaire Province represented a gross exaggeration, it nevertheless raised doubts about the earlier police estimate of the number of weapons still available in Angola. Official data released in mid-2010 indicated the government had collected approximately 275,000 small arms and light weapons, of which 75,000 were taken from civilians.¹³ The number of weapons still in civilian hands or former insurgent arms caches remains uncertain.

The reluctance of many Angolans to turn over weapons, as well as the widespread use of private security firms after 2002, belied claims that Angola did not face a serious organized crime threat or a potential new insurgent challenge. In recent years, these concerns occasionally have resurfaced, albeit in a sketchy and incomplete manner, confounding efforts to assess the stability of Angolan society. In July 2007, government officials accused UNITA of having retained over 1,000 combatants in remote areas, presumably to provide the core of a force on which to build a new guerrilla army. These troops allegedly had been drawn from the ranks of former insurgents who had left their demobilization centers earlier in the year. UNITA spokesmen conceded that some guerrillas might not have registered at camps in 2002 and challenged the government to carry out a proper census of demobilized combatants.¹⁴ In November 2007 police detained 60 members of a paramilitary group calling itself Armed Forces for the Strategic Security and Defense of Angola (FASEDA). Its leaders and adherents reportedly consisted of discharged or retired Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) veterans, possibly numbering as many as 3,000. Although it subsequently faded from public view, FASEDA's vague political aims briefly were described by the press as potentially threatening to the state.¹⁵ In July 2008, as the government moved from the voluntary to the compulsory phase of its disarmament program, Luanda announced that all private security firms would be required to hand in their firearms. These security companies purportedly possessed an estimated twenty thousand weapons. The National Disarmament Commission intended to select new companies that would be responsible for importing weapons to replace those currently in use by the private security firms.¹⁶

Disarmament was a still more remote consideration in Cabinda where low-level hostilities persisted. Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) insurgents doggedly pursued their secessionist struggle. A growing number of the enclave's residents may be prepared to accept autonomy rather

than continue supporting what seemed an increasingly hopeless struggle for independence. The secessionist guerrillas remain divided by issues of personality, tactics, and ethnicity, which complicated government efforts to attain either a decisive military victory or a comprehensive political settlement.

In the early months of 2002, Cabindan insurgents launched attacks at widely scattered locations throughout the enclave. Between January and April 2002, FLEC-FAC (Cabindan Armed Forces) officials claimed to have killed seventy government troops while sustaining only a handful of casualties in their own ranks. FLEC-FAC spokesmen alleged they were facing eleven thousand troops.¹⁷ Luanda chose to ignore a late April FLEC-FAC proposal for both a cease-fire and a Portuguese-mediated negotiating process centered on a vague reference to "progressive autonomy" for Cabinda.¹⁸

FAA counterinsurgency operations slowly intensified in July 2002 and gradually marginalized insurgent forces thought to number no more than 1,000–2,500. Government assessments, leaked to the press in mid-2002, portrayed two small insurgent groups, FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R, operating a limited but functional logistic network inside the enclave. Low-level gold mining, drug trafficking, subsistence farming, fishing, and hunting sustained the insurgents. They also smuggled contraband across the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) borders.¹⁹

Luanda steadfastly sought to overwhelm the insurgents. In June and July 2002, Luanda spurned renewed FLEC-FAC proposals to resume peace talks. Angolan forces prepared for a large offensive and deployed additional troops to support ongoing counterinsurgency operations.²⁰ In early August 2002, FLEC-FAC officials claimed their counterattacks had inflicted over one hundred casualties on an estimated three thousand FAA troops operating in the enclave's northern reaches.²¹ Insurgent resistance had little impact. By October 2002, government forces, supported by helicopter gunships and armored vehicles, had pushed further north into some of Cabinda's most remote and difficult terrain, seizing FLEC-FAC's main base deep in the Maiombe Forest near Bucu Zau. Shortly before government forces arrived, the guerrillas abandoned a camp that had been in continuous use since 1979. In late December 2002, government spokesmen announced the capture of several FLEC-R bases as well as large weapons stockpiles. In March 2003, FAA troops conducted hot-pursuit operations thirty kilometers inside the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). In a manner reminiscent of the government's 2001–2 campaign against UNITA, FAA troops reportedly destroyed the homes of some seven thousand families on both sides of the Cabinda/DROC border, forcibly relocating refugees into government controlled areas.²² Three months later, in early June 2003, the Angolan press announced the surrender of six high-ranking FLEC-FAC officers, leading Luanda to make the first of many, ultimately premature assertions that the war in Cabinda was over.²³

From July 2003 to mid-2006, hostilities in Cabinda dramatically subsided. Occasional Angolan or Portuguese press accounts recorded a handful of small attacks, usually attributed to FLEC-FAC. By late 2005, Angolan government

forces in Cabinda had been reduced to an estimated 8,000 troops and FAA commanders claimed the enclave now required only a concerted police action against mainly “criminal” elements. Between 2004 and 2005, an estimated 100,000 Cabindan refugees reportedly returned to Cabinda. Nonetheless, the combat-related death toll steadily mounted. An estimated 30,000 had died between 1978 and 2003, although most of these fatalities were thought to have occurred prior to 1994. Combat-related losses from 1994 to 2003 reportedly numbered between 1,000 and 1,500.²⁴

Luanda seemed in no hurry to conduct negotiations with exiled FLEC leaders or to hold a referendum on some form of autonomy or a vote for independence.²⁵ In 2004, as the Cabindan insurgents were still reeling from their military setbacks, FLEC-FAC, led by N’zita Tiago, and FLEC-R, headed by Antonio Bento Bembe, met with several Cabindan civil society groups in the Netherlands, and established the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD). The founders hoped that the FCD could negotiate a peaceful settlement. Tiago and Bembe, however, soon found themselves in an irreconcilable dispute and, in February 2006, Tiago dismissed Bembe from the FCD’s presidency. Luanda saw an opportunity to undermine the weakened FCD coalition and initiated secret negotiations with Bembe. In June 2006, Bembe announced that the FCD coalition would agree to a cease-fire in exchange for limited administrative autonomy for Cabinda. On July 18, 2006, Bembe agreed to a cease-fire with Luanda. On August 1, 2006, Bembe and several Angolan government officials met in the Atlantic coast port of Namibe to sign a “Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation.” The document provided for a Joint Military Commission to supervise the reintegration of 1,600 FLEC combatants into the ranks of the FAA, the National Police, the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), the Cabindan provincial government, diplomatic missions, and public companies.²⁶

N’zita Tiago and several Cabindan civil society organizations initially denounced the cease-fire agreement and rejected the memorandum, insisting that Bembe had not been authorized to negotiate on their behalf. FLEC guerrillas loyal to Tiago conducted small-scale attacks on a weekly basis from mid-July to late August 2006. The FAA responded with stepped-up counterinsurgency operations. Government administrators clamped down on civil society and human rights activists who had staged protests and publicly condemned the peace accord. Luanda also announced the appointment of Brigadier General Wala, who led the 2001–2 campaign against Savimbi, as commander of the Cabindan theater of military operations. In early September 2006, Angolan civilian and military officials met, in Brazzaville, with their Congolese counterparts to discuss enhanced border security to thwart FLEC’s cross border movements.

For the next three years, FLEC-FAC spokesmen issued communiqués describing sporadic skirmishes with government troops. These incidents usually numbered no more than five or six per year. An unsuccessful 2009 attack on Chinese expatriate workers briefly raised fears that the insurgents might begin taking hostages or murdering foreign workers to put more pressure

on the government to renew negotiations with those who had rejected the 2006 accord. Luanda continued to insist that the 2006 memorandum had ended the secessionist struggle, suggesting that the few hundred combatants still operating deep inside the enclave represented neither a significant military organization nor a political force. On July 8, 2010, FLEC leader N'zita Tiago publicly announced his colleagues were prepared to cease fighting and proposed yet another Lisbon-hosted round of negotiations. Angolan officials indicated a willingness to talk but also insisted that guerrillas could still be held accountable for recent "terrorist" attacks, specifically an early January 2010 ambush that killed two members of the Togolese national soccer team passing through Cabinda on their way to the 2010 African Nations Cup.

Much like the debates between revolutionaries and reformers that so often fractured UNITA, Cabindan insurgents also suffered divisions engendered by debates between secessionists and advocates of autonomy. Lacking a dominant leader with Jonas Savimbi's stature, who occasionally could forge consensus, these debates chronically hamstrung the Cabindan cause. Moreover, some accounts indicated that additional ethnic and religious issues divided Cabinda more deeply than the rest of Angola. A 2002 progovernment journalist's account had suggested that Cabinda's majority Bayombe people did not want independence and would settle for improved living conditions. According to this view, the cause of independence had been foisted on them by a handful of politicians from the ranks of the Bawoyo people. The Bawoyo had historically provided a disproportionate number of members of the provincial government and they presumably expected to dominate an independent Cabinda. An independent enclave would perpetuate Bayombe poverty and the Bawoyos' monopoly of power and, at worst, would lead to the bloody suppression of the Bayombe. This analysis betrayed a progovernment perspective on the secessionist struggle but also may have revealed a previously less visible cleavage that had weakened the cause of Cabindans who sought greater freedom from Luanda.²⁷ A split in the enclave's Catholic Church further complicated the Cabindan political discourse. In late 2007, the newly appointed bishop of Cabinda, Dom Filomeno Vieira Dias, and several priests endorsed the 2006 Memorandum of Peace and Understanding. The previous bishop, Dom Paulino Maceda and a majority of the enclave's priests, however, had opposed the 2006 accord and since more than 70 percent of the enclave's population are Catholic, Maceda may have articulated a strong residual sympathy for autonomy, if not secession.²⁸ Without a referendum offering a choice between autonomy and independence, the influence and the political legitimacy of the Cabindan insurgency remains untested.

LEADERSHIP: LEGACY AND STRATEGY

Jonas Savimbi bequeathed an ambiguous legacy to his fellow Angolans. At its military high-water mark, UNITA had created a guerrilla force larger than any raised in the history of Angola's resistance to colonial rule or foreign intervention. UNITA's sixty thousand troops surpassed those of

any comparable insurgency in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of the Ethiopian/Eritrean guerrillas who initially opposed Emperor Haile Selassie and ultimately toppled Colonel Mengistu's military dictatorship in the early 1990s.

Savimbi's efforts to blend the guerrilla strategies of Mao and Grivas ultimately left him in an untenable position, caught between revolutionary rhetoric and pragmatic political and military goals. At various stages of the civil war his oscillation between these two poles seems to have generated or reflected deep divisions inside UNITA. Over time, these splits afflicted UNITA with greater frequency and finally broke the organization into increasingly rigid factions. By shifting his military strategy, in the latter years of the war, to one favoring Grivas's approach over that of Mao, Savimbi must have known that he would be obliged to compromise his political principles. Savimbi seems to have appreciated a wide variety of views on the relationship between leadership and the selection of an appropriate strategy that transcended the particular ideological or political considerations of mentors such as Mao or Grivas. Various observers noted his expressed admiration for the works of General Helmuth Von Moltke and Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery. The insights he derived from these studies was not always recorded but it is likely he drew several conclusions regarding the nature and challenges of military command. In the early 1980s, Savimbi told a reporter he appreciated the memoirs of Viscount Bernard Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., particularly his definition of leadership as "the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose."²⁹ Savimbi likely also would have noted Montgomery's emphases on invaluable, albeit intangible, features of leadership. Montgomery stressed the importance of a leader's personality, "the incandescence of which he is capable, the flame which burns within him, the magnetism which will draw the hearts of men towards him."³⁰ Even more critical, in Montgomery's view, was the realization that "to exercise high command successfully one has to have an infinite capacity for taking pains and for careful preparation, and has also to have an inner conviction which at times will transcend reason. Having fought, possibly over a prolonged period, for the advantage and gained it, there comes the moment for boldness. When that moment comes will you . . . soar from the known to seize the unknown? In the answer to that question lies the supreme test of generalship in high command."³¹ Savimbi seemed to have publicly acknowledged, on the occasion of UNITA's thirtieth anniversary on March 13 1996, that he had failed "the supreme test" to which Montgomery referred by signing the Bicesse Accord in 1991. In retrospect, Savimbi implied that UNITA should have pressed its clear military advantage after Luanda's disastrous 1990 Mavinga offensive, and pursued an outright military victory.

Qualities of leadership defined by an emphasis on intelligence, charisma, or force of will ultimately lead to the further consideration of whether or not any commander is irreplaceable. Reflecting on Fidel Castro's role in the Cuban revolution, Che Guevara acknowledged that "our path, our struggle and our triumph we owed to his views. We cannot say that without him

the victory of the people would not have been achieved; but that victory would certainly have cost much more and would have been less complete.”³² Clausewitz, however, had challenged this view, noting that out of all the relations between warring parties, each side eventually defines a “certain center of gravity . . . on which everything depends; and against this center of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed.” Delineating different types of conflict, Clausewitz identified the “center of gravity . . . in a national insurrection, in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion.”³³ The FAA’s deputy chief of staff, General Geraldo Nunda, reaffirmed the accuracy of Clausewitz’s perspective in an August 2002 interview. Nunda and his FAA colleagues had concluded, several years earlier, that “if we fought the guerrillas globally, without choosing specific objectives we could prolong the conflict for many years. We needed to choose a main objective, UNITA’s leadership, . . . There was no military defeat, but there was a determining factor; there are organizations like UNITA, with leaders who have a great amount of power and a decisive role within the movement. And the death of Jonas Savimbi effectively brought an end to the war.”³⁴

LEADERSHIP: LIONIZED AND DEMONIZED

Insurgent leaders are equally subject to being lionized or demonized, as Clausewitz implied, on the battlefield or in the court of public opinion. For all the praise heaped on Savimbi’s charismatic qualities, oratorical skills, political insights, and military accomplishments, much of his career also was tainted by charges of treason or betrayal. In 1977 an American journalist described him as “an enigma, a man on whom many labels can stick – brilliant, charismatic, affable, unyielding, forgiving, temporizing, Machiavellian, opportunistic, lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-Western and socialist.”³⁵ The alleged cooperation with Portuguese colonial forces in Operation Timber, his collaboration with *apartheid* South Africa, and his actions following the 1991 Bicesse Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Accord marked him for vilification that matched or eventually exceeded the adulation he previously had elicited.³⁶

Days after Savimbi’s death, a journalist described surviving UNITA members as “slaves to a messianic personality cult . . . in thrall to one man’s dream of absolute power,” a fairly common characterization often applied to Savimbi and his supporters in the last years of the war.³⁷ These hyperbolic assessments, however, often overshadowed a more balanced appreciation of Savimbi’s leadership. Evaluations offered, over the years, by former comrades, his party, and other Angolan political leaders reflected a more complex view. Several years prior to Savimbi’s death, UNITA’s former secretary general, Miguel N’zau Puna, presented a surprisingly positive assessment. In an April 1996 interview, four years after he defected from UNITA and subsequently had been implicated in Tito Chingunji’s brutal murder, Puna described UNITA’s anticolonial campaign as one that “must have been one of the best guerrilla campaigns Africa has ever experienced.” Puna also

emphasized that “President Savimbi may have committed certain mistakes but in the most essential matter—to mobilize the people, to lead the people and to live with the people—he was outstanding.”³⁸

On February 22, 2003, UNITA’s Permanent Committee announced the end of a one-year mourning period for Jonas Savimbi. A published communiqué paid tribute to their deceased commander. The party’s leadership described “the work done by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, over forty years, as a legacy of an unwavering will given for the ideals of a truly independent Angola, a nation for all that is more equal, plural, responsible and makes economic social progress.”³⁹ Party loyalists would be expected to offer such a positive judgment, but other Angolans also had expressed views that emphasized attributes other than delusional or psychotic personality traits. Several weeks prior to the publication of the UNITA communiqué, Analia de Victoria Pereira, President of the Liberal Party that had struggled for years to offer Angolans an alternative to UNITA and the MPLA, said, “we have to admit that Dr. Savimbi was a real leader. He was a disciplined leader, an individual who initiated a revolution in his own country and had an objective. He had his own objectives to force change; a change that would mean equality and justice for all citizens, regardless from which [sic] province they came and I therefore think had a very positive ideal . . . We do not really know how Dr. Savimbi would have governed, but I am convinced that Dr. Savimbi had rules and principles. He had extraordinarily important virtues. He was not prone to corruption.”⁴⁰

SAVIMBI IN THE MIRROR

Over the course of several decades, Savimbi received numerous requests to reflect on the significance of his leadership and his place in Angolan history. As he aged, he redefined his ambition and his expectations for UNITA as a political party. Although his views on leadership and UNITA’s capability remained fairly consistent, he continued to hint at an unresolved tension between revolutionary aspirations and moderate expectations in the last years of his life.

The significance of Savimbi’s charismatic leadership in defining UNITA’s political identity was not lost on some of the movement’s earliest observers. In 1977, Austrian journalist Fritz Sitte asked Savimbi if UNITA could survive the death of its top three commanders. Savimbi expressed confidence that the party already had trained a sufficiently large cadre of midlevel and junior officers capable of assuming top tier leadership positions and assuring UNITA’s survival.⁴¹ Fifteen years later, on the eve of what seemed to be the triumphant culmination of his political and military career, Savimbi surprisingly suggested that he already had attained his greatest goals during the anticolonial and Cold War phases of the Angolan civil war. Three months before the disastrous September 1992 elections, Savimbi told Angolan journalists “The future of Angola belongs to the young people. At age 57, God willing, I can live a few more years, but the future of Angola does not belong to me. The past yes, and the present. But the future belongs to the youth.”⁴²

Several years later, shortly after UNITA had signed the 1994 Lusaka Accord, Savimbi repeated similar sentiments indicating he had passed his political prime and that UNITA's political destiny would have to be measured in decades rather than years. Asked by a skeptical Angolan journalist whether his appreciation of international relations was perhaps somewhat naive, Savimbi responded,

No. But even if it were, there is something I am adamant about: In Angola, the Angolans should rule, and if they say this is what led to UNITA's defeat, so be it. It is not enough to be leader in Futungo [the President's Residence], it is necessary to be a symbol. Perhaps to be a leader in Futungo is not much—anyone could do the job—but to be a symbol it is more important. We represent the wish of the Angolan people to be completely free and independent and to relate with other nations with dignity . . . If this means we have to postpone ruling the country for fifty years, then we prefer to be a symbol and not a caricature . . . I am not one of those African politicians who want things to happen today so they can put up their statue; I am just an individual who wants to conceive Angola in ten, twenty years time. In thirty years time this country will be something.⁴³

Several months later, Savimbi reiterated sentiments he had expressed in 1992, as to whether or not he was indispensable, saying,

When I feel that the time has come for me to go, I will go. There will be other cadres to carry on the leadership of the party . . . I have my personal deadlines as UNITA leader but I want UNITA to preserve its vitality . . . I have been discussing this with the cadre, they must not think that they can count on me forever. I will have to go one day . . . My ambition is to contribute to stability . . . So I believe that this is precisely the area in which I can play a role. But there are also limits that I must not overstep. I am totally at peace with myself. I will do my very best within a certain period of time, then the others must carry on.⁴⁴

In 1996, as the luster of the Lusaka Accord slowly faded, Savimbi grew even more pessimistic about the duration of Angola's political paralysis and how best to cure it, asserting that "UNITA and the MPLA cannot solve Angola's economic and social problems. They cannot. It will take a long time, spanning generations. Because the country's infrastructures have rotted away. But not just the infrastructures, there is also the question of the bad habits acquired during this period . . . the most important thing is to give the Angolan people the certainty that dialogue is possible, that we are all brothers."⁴⁵

In 1997, a journalist prompted Savimbi to reflect on his past and speculate on how he might be remembered upon his eventual departure from the Angolan political stage. Acknowledging a degree of frustration about the fact that he had spent more than half of his 63 years engaged in military combat, he insisted, nonetheless, that "one must not be pessimistic. I must be confident and assure myself that my forty years spent in the struggle have borne fruits and served younger generations and that I have created a notion of life, values

and courage. It will be up to future generations to judge.”⁴⁶ Although the precise date is uncertain, Savimbi also deemed it appropriate, in 1997, to draft a secret succession plan to be implemented upon his death. Details of this plan were not made public, but allegedly it was designed to permit UNITA to function for two to three months without any contact between the party’s top leadership tiers. Military commanders would operate independently in their respective zones and acquire their own resources. This plan reportedly was rewritten several times over the next few years to account for the death or defection of various UNITA members. Savimbi did not name a successor in any of these plans, trusting his political heirs collectively to reestablish the party’s leadership.⁴⁷

Unaware that he had written, at least partially, a “last will and testament,” journalists continued to coax Savimbi to articulate his personal political ambitions. In August 1999, eight months after the MPLA had abandoned the Lusaka Accord and renewed all-out war against UNITA, an interviewer asked Savimbi if he still believed, at the age of 65, in the idea of becoming Angola’s next president. Savimbi claimed,

My underlying motivation is to achieve something for my people; those who have placed their trust in me . . . I would like people to remember me; what I have said and written, what I have done, obstinately, without losing my course . . . when UNITA takes power in this country—some young person aged 40 or 50 will have to take up the enormous task of governing and rebuilding a completely destroyed country. I am no longer of the right age for that . . . So I will stay here. At home, in order to give advice. I do not think of myself but of our party, UNITA, which has the historical right to govern this country.⁴⁸

This modest self-evaluation was not expressed merely to impress foreign audiences. Several months earlier, in April 1999, Savimbi had shocked some of his key commanders when he told them “my end is in sight. Secure the party . . . because tomorrow perhaps I will not be with you.” In December 1999, he repeated this warning, telling some of his closest colleagues “My time has come” and admonishing them “to save the party.”⁴⁹

Although he was increasingly lucid about his personal prospects, in his last years Savimbi still appeared unable to resolve the contradictions that he had frequently articulated but never managed completely to push out of the Angolan political arena. In a late-May 2000 interview he once again asserted that “one should realize that there are millions of Angolans who are taking part in a revolution and I am one of them.” Yet in nearly the same breath he concluded that the war would end only through negotiations—hardly the formula for a revolution, given Angola’s previous experience with negotiated settlements.⁵⁰

Aside from his rather rigid commitment to goals he defined as “revolutionary,” his refusal to accept exile from Angola remained one of Savimbi’s most consistent demonstrations of loyalty, both to his supporters and the cause they shared. Throughout the 27-year Angolan civil war, Savimbi rejected

numerous offers of a comfortable life in exile. French advisors offered to fly him out of Angola in 1975 as he and his troops retreated in the face of a Cuban-backed government offensive. The late Zairian president Mobutu and other African heads of state made similar offers, in the latter years of the Cold War, to host or finance a safe refuge far from the dangers of guerrilla war in Angola. After the Lusaka Accord collapsed and hostilities resumed in 1998, European and Angolan officials again suggested exile for Savimbi as part of a negotiated settlement. Savimbi always rejected exile as an option and repeatedly promised that he would die with his troops rather than flee Angola.⁵¹

Savimbi also seemed uninterested in accumulating great wealth in the course of his political career. There currently is no evidence that Savimbi, his wives, or their children ever derived significant financial benefits from the hundreds of millions of dollars in diamond revenues that UNITA accumulated from mining operations in eastern Angola. Observers speculated that Savimbi carried substantial quantities of valuable diamonds as he moved about in Angola. Others surmised that he and several UNITA party leaders had caches in Angola or secret accounts elsewhere in sympathetic African capitals. These are reasonable, if still uncorroborated, speculations but, to date, the case for assertions of Savimbi's venality seems even weaker than allegations of a megalomaniacal character.

SAVIMBI'S HEIRS AND THEIR POLITICAL MILITARY OPTIONS

The signing of the Luena Memorandum in 2002 ended a decades-long debate over appropriate military strategies that had troubled Savimbi and fragmented UNITA. With Savimbi's death UNITA faced the equally daunting crisis of naming a successor amid widespread doubts about the movement's ability to survive the man who had founded and largely defined it for more than three decades. A satisfactory resolution was vital to ensuring UNITA's legitimacy as a political party, not only for those of its remaining members, but also as a credible partner with which the MPLA government could share the powers allocated by the Lusaka and Luena accords. Parliamentary elections were delayed several times and UNITA's weak performance, dropping from over 30 percent of the 1992 vote to barely 10 percent in 2008, underscored Savimbi's earlier prognosis that it might take several decades before UNITA governed Angola. The government's continued reluctance to conduct legally required presidential and local elections delayed a full test of its own legitimacy, and eventually, the MPLA's capacity to survive an inevitable succession crisis following President dos Santos' death or retirement.⁵²

Extensive economic deprivation and postponed tests of the governments' legitimacy left lingering doubts about the durability of peace in Angola. UNITA parliamentarian Lukamba Gato told a journalist, in early April 2009,

[s]even years have passed but widespread consensus has not been achieved yet in respect of the Angolan fatherland, the Nation, the State, and the way

to achieve social and economic progress among other issues pertaining to the national interest. There has been no investment at all yet in the creation of the groundwork for a real culture of dialogue and coexistence against the backdrop of our diversity. We still have not moved from the beginnings of the national liberation struggle . . . In truth one is unable to talk seriously about social peace in a country where certain people eat three times a day and others go three days without eating a single meal even though they are the children of the same fatherland.⁵³

Gato, however, emphasized UNITA's need to learn from its 2008 electoral setback and the opportunity presented by the prospect of regularly scheduled elections in the years ahead.

Younger generations of Angolans lacking any personal experience of the previous civil war years might be less patient and more willing to consider warfare as an acceptable option in the pursuit of social justice. No matter how unthinkable warfare seems to current generations, several African nations, notably Sudan, Chad, and a handful of others offer stark examples of brutal civil wars followed by years of peace that fail to heal old wounds or to prevent additional grievances from igniting another round of conflict.

A new generation of combatants likely will not be inspired or divided by debates over Mao's or Grivas's views on guerrilla warfare. During the past two decades, insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa suggest that Che Guevara, absent his ideology, and Franz Fanon, stripped of his notions of psychotherapy, are more likely to be implicit sources of inspiration. Guevara seems an apt role model. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, insurgents rapidly seized the capital of a corrupt regime with little more than lip service offered to the virtues of politically mobilizing or indoctrinating the civilian population. A "blitzkrieg" approach to insurgency also seemed particularly apt in Chad (1990), where opposition forces fought their way from the nation's distant borders to the capital in less than a year. Even in a hybrid conflict combining unconventional and conventional warfare, the late president Mobutu was toppled by externally backed guerrillas whose leaders placed more emphasis on a rapid advance to Kinshasa and spent little time on the politicization of the rural population. In less than a year, Laurent Kabila's insurgents and their Rwandan/Ugandan/Angolan allies fought their way across territory roughly equivalent to the distance between Kiev and Paris. In virtually all these recent sub-Saharan African conflicts, indiscriminate violence perpetrated against soldiers and civilians tended to reflect pathological criminal tendencies, rather than providing the emotional or political catharsis that Fanon might have envisioned.

MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY MYTHOLOGY

Memories of warfare, and the lessons they offer future students of military history, can often be dramatically revised in the course of one or two generations. Recent Cuban accounts of the Angolan civil war have celebrated the

twenty-fifth and twentieth anniversaries, respectively, of the battles at Cangamba (1983) and Cuito Cuanavale (1988). The siege at Cangamba is now portrayed as a heroic, if ultimately futile, defense against overwhelming odds, rather than a narrow escape from a doomed garrison on the eve of a military debacle. The Cuito Cuanavale battle is likewise described as a singular victory in the greater struggle to save Angola, achieve Namibian independence, and end South African *apartheid*.⁵⁴ These accounts often fail to acknowledge the defenders' devastating losses and studiously avoid a more plausible alternative conclusion that Cuba manipulated public perceptions of a military disaster, portraying it as the prelude to a brilliant diplomatic resolution of an African crisis. This partly fanciful characterization enabled Havana to implement an honorable exit strategy after 15 years of indecisive civil war. Occasional claims that the latter phases of the 1987–88 battle for Cuito Cuanavale included the largest conventional or armored force encounter in Africa since World War II also are debatable, though they have been subjected to even less scrutiny than the battle's alleged political implications. The 1977–78 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia probably involved larger air and ground forces than those engaged in southern Angola in the following decade. Somalia committed 70,000 troops, 40 fighter aircraft, 250 tanks, 350 armored personnel carriers, and 600 artillery pieces to its invasion of the contested Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia. In August 1977 a Somali tank battalion and a mechanized infantry brigade sustained substantial losses in an attack on Ethiopian positions at Dire Dawa. More than half of the three Somali tank battalions, each of which had 30 tanks, were decimated in a battle against Ethiopian forces at Jijiga that same month. Ethiopian air power and the timely deployment of 15,000 Cuban troops played crucial roles in reinforcing 50,000 Ethiopian troops and turning the tide in Addis Ababa's favor.⁵⁵

A reevaluation of military leaders is as inevitable as a political/military reassessment of key battles. Like Che Guevara, Jonas Savimbi might one day be resurrected as an icon of rebellion rather than a doctrinaire source of guerrilla strategy and tactics in some future Angolan or sub-Saharan African insurgency. Relying on him as an exemplar of insurgent leadership, future combatants likely will diminish or altogether lose sight of Savimbi's self-doubts or unresolved internal conflicts. Whether memories of his charisma, his speeches, or his political and military accomplishments are singled out in defining his relevance to future generations is uncertain. A fixation on charisma frequently leads to an exaggerated concern with a leader's need for unlimited authority or his followers' capacity for complete devotion.⁵⁶ A chronic emphasis on the importance of charismatic leadership in insurgency, however, betrays a residual but evidently unavoidable form of "hero worship" that produces demagogues as readily as it spawns great patriots. Drawn like moths to the ephemeral flame of a leader's charisma, outside observers often unwittingly diminish their capacity to objectively assess more subtle debates over political goals and military strategies that variously motivate or torment guerrilla leaders and their supporters. When these debates remain unresolved opponents often risk a costly but indecisive war and an equally uncertain peace.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Salazar skeptically anticipated Macmillan's observation in 1956 when he noted, "A wind of rebellion is blowing in various parts of Africa, fanned by certain powers in obedience to certain interests and ambitions. This wind seems to justify the anti-colonialism which is in vogue and to feed off it." See Gail-Maryse Cockram, *Vorster's Foreign Policy* (Pretoria: H & R Academia, Ltd., 1970), 13. An early reference to a "change of wind" appears in Clive Cowley, "Change of Wind in Southern Africa," *The Star*, January 27, 1967, 20.
2. Human Rights Watch, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (London: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 2–3. In "Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 26, no. 81 (September 1999): 367–84 Chris Allen suggests that by the 1990s violence in many war-torn African states had "become an end in itself" (369).
3. Norrie MacQueen, "Peacekeeping by Attrition: The United Nations in Angola," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 3 (1998): 418. See also pages 399–422.
4. Stephen John Stedman, Thomas Olson, and Robert Davies, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 77; Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 1, 3–22.
5. Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–1993* (London: Macmillan, 1996). See pages 48–49 for some of the earliest warning signs of the accords' demise.
6. Victoria Brittain, *The Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 58.
7. Paul Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insiders' Account of the Peace Process* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1998). See pages 104–5 and 129.
8. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Angola's Future: War or Peace?," *Journal of the Third World Spectrum* 6, no.1 (1999): 1–32. See page 26. See also Carrie Manning, "The Collapse of Peace in Angola," *Current History* 98, no. 628 (May 1999): 208–12.
9. Jonas Savimbi, "The War Against Soviet Colonialism: The Strategy and Tactics of Anti-Communist Resistance," *Policy Review*, no. 35 (Winter 1986): 18–24. See page 19.

10. Christopher S. Wren, "Pretoria Aids Mozambique's Military," *New York Times*, May 18, 1986, 18.
11. William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London: Zed Books, 1994); see also Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), 352. Davidson described UNITA as a "movement largely created to oppose MPLA" and asserts that it did not have "any of the attributes of a movement of national liberation."
12. Linda M. Heywood, "UNITA and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no.1 (1989): 47-66.
13. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, February 5, 1990. Italics added.
14. Ibid.
15. Ernesto Mulato, "A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato: The Political and Military Struggle in Angola," held on March 2, 1979 at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington, DC. Washington: The Institute, 1979), 23.
16. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, February 5, 1990, 19.
17. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, January 1, 1995.
18. Jose Manuel Batata-Feyo, "Interview with UNITA's Savimbi," transcript, RTP-2 Television Network, January 11, 1995.
19. Jonas Savimbi, "Closing Address at Bailundo Congress," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (VORGAN; *Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, February 13, 1995.
20. Luis Alberto Ferreira, "Interview with Abel Chivukuvuku," *Jornal de Noticias*, June 19, 1997.
21. Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, translated by Brigadier-General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (ret.) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 49.
22. *Expresso*, "Interview with Jonas Savimbi: From Civil War to a Peaceful Solution," n.p., February 20, 1988, 44R-45R.
23. In Mao Zedong's *Basic Tactics*, translated and with an introduction by Stuart R. Schram (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), Schram cites Chalmers Johnson's *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* in his introduction (27) for the emphasis on nationalism rather than land reform in accounting for Mao's success.
24. Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," in *Strategy for Conquest: Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Jay Mallin (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), 98.
25. Maria Joao Saldhana and Marco Vinicius, *Jonas Savimbi: um desafio a ditadura comunista em Angola* (Lisbon: Edicoes Armasilde, 1977), 62.
26. Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 91-92.
27. George Grivas, *General George Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 5.
28. Ibid., 78.

29. George Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, ed. Charles Foley (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 47.
30. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 348–49.
31. *Ibid.*, 350–51.
32. Tacitus, *Agricola* (London: Penguin, 1964), chap. 31, 79.

CHAPTER 2

1. John K. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa: Red China's African Offensive* (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), 14–22.
2. Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 179.
3. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa*, 101. In *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 102, Richard Gibson recounts the disastrous fate of a reportedly Chinese-trained Pan-African Congress (PAC) contingent ambushed in 1968 by Portuguese forces in Mozambique as they sought to make their way from Zambia to South Africa.
4. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa*, 130.
5. Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, 254–55.
6. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970*, 186. According to reports of varying credibility, Beijing trained guerrillas from Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Gabon, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Niger, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania. In *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997), 78–9, Dan Connell notes China trained Eritrean Liberation Front members from 1967 to 1968, including Isaias Afewerki, who later became the secretary general of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in 1987 and independent Eritrea's first president. See also Kenneth W. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle In Africa: An Analysis and Preview* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971), 51. An estimated 400 to 600 Africans may have traveled to China for guerrilla training.
7. Herbert F. Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).
8. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 307–43.
9. M. Crawford Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," in, *Protest and Power in Black Africa*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1970), 968–1011. See especially 971. See also Ludo Martens, *Pierre Mulele, ou la seconde vie de Patrice Lumumba* (Berchem, Belgium: Editions EPO, 1985), 97, 132. According to Martens, Felix Mukulubundu, one of Mulele's key commanders, attended guerrilla warfare classes in March 1961. Mulele began his course of instruction in April 1962.
10. Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 992.
11. Renee C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and Jean Marie Ribaucourt, "The 'Second Independence': A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 8, no. 1 (1965): 78–109. See 96.

12. Renee C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and Jean Marie Ribeaucourt, "The 'Second Independence': A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 8, no. 1 (1965): 78–109. See page 96.
13. Benoit Verhaegen, "La rebellion muleliste au Kwilu: chronologie des evenements et essai d'interpretation (janvier 1962–juillet 1964)," in *Rebellion-Revolution au Zaïre, 1963–1965. Tome I*, ed. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris: Harmattan Editions, 1987), 120–167. See page 128. See also *Rebellions au Congo* (Brussels, Belgium: CRISP, 1965), 107.
14. Claude E. Welch Jr., *Anatomy of Rebellion* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1980), 304. See also Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 971.
15. Claude E. Welch Jr., "Ideological Foundations of Revolution in Kwilu," *African Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (1975): 116–28. See pages 122–23. See also Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politique (CRISP), *Congo, 1965: Political Documents of a Developing Nation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 91–93. See also Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 208–22.
16. Verhaegen, *Rebellions au Congo*, 126–27. See also Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 989. See also Fox, Craemer, and Ribeaucourt, "The 'Second Independence,'" 98. For a critique of this widely held view, see Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 230–32. Martens claims that only some of the movement's early members believed in "magic" and fetishes. He asserts that Mulele himself did not advocate a traditional religious worldview and told his followers as much. According to Martens, the story of Mulele shooting himself with blanks was propagated by ANC officers to convince credulous troops that Mulele was not invulnerable.
17. Welch Jr., "Ideological Foundations of Revolution in Kwilu," 120–21. See also Fox, Craemer, and Ribeaucourt, "The 'Second Independence,'" 100.
18. Verhaegen, *Rebellions au Congo*, 124–26.
19. Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 1001.
20. CRISP, *Congo, 1965*, 107.
21. Welch Jr., *Anatomy of Rebellion*, 344.
22. Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 971; see also CRISP, *Congo, 1965*, 18–19, 24.
23. CRISP, *Congo, 1965*, 89, 91, 120, 128–130; see also Welch Jr., *Anatomy of Rebellion*, 305–6; Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 206, 276, and 282.
24. Welch Jr., *Anatomy of Rebellion*, 305; see also CRISP, *Congo, 1965*, 119.
25. Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," 1002.
26. Fox, Craemer, and Ribeaucourt, "The 'Second Independence,'" 107.
27. Benoit Verhaegen, "La rebellion muleliste au Kwilu: chronologie des evenements et essai d'interpretation (janvier 1962–juillet 1964)," in *Rebellion-Revolution au Zaïre, 1963–1965. Tome I*, ed. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forest (Paris, France: Harmattan Editions, 1987), 147–167. See especially page 155.
28. Colin Legum and John Drysdale, "Congo Democratic Republic (Kinshasa)," *Africa Contemporary Record; Annual Survey and Documents, 1968–1969* (London: Africa Research Limited, 1970), 441–45; see also *Keesing's Contemporary Archive*, 18 (1967–1968). (London: Keesings, 1968), 229–58; see also Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 331–33 in which Martens offers a very different account of Mulele's death, including graphic details of torture and dismemberment.
29. Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964–1974* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1983), 4.

30. Welch Jr., "Ideological Foundations of Revolution in Kwilu," 123.
31. Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 255–59, 264–68.
32. Verhaegen, "Le role de l'ethnie," 162.
33. Martens, *Pierre Mulele*, 156–157, 308, 318–24.
34. M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," *Africa Report* 10, no. 4, (April 1965): 6–11.
35. W. G. Clarence Smith, "Class Structure and Class Struggles in Angola in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (October 1980): 109–26. Clarence-Smith argues that "the Angolan liberation movements were all coalitions of class and regional interests, which tended to vary over time and which used ethnic and ideological appeals only to a limited extent" (116).
36. Fernando Andresen Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 37–48. A recent revisionist account suggests the MPLA was not formally established until late 1959. For a discussion of the role of *assimilados* in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Angolan politics, see Douglas L. Wheeler, "'Angola is Whose House?': Early Stirrings of Angolan Nationalism and Protest: 1822–1910," *African Historical Studies* 2, no. 1 (1969): 1–22. See pages 9–14.
37. George M. Houser, "Nationalist Organizations in Angola: Status of the Revolt," in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. John A. Davis and James (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 157–79. See page 164.
38. *Ibid.*, 169.
39. Stephen L. Weigert, *Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa* (Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 55–64.
40. Mao Zedong, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," March 1927, quoted in M. Rejai, ed., *Mao Tse Tung on Revolution and War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 150–51.
41. Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1972), 126–28.
42. John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962)* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 48, 124–126.
43. Houser, "Nationalist Organizations in Angola," 164.
44. Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 45.
45. Glyn Stone, "Britain and the Angolan Revolt of 1961," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 27, no. 1 (January 1999): 109–137.
46. Houser, "Nationalist Organizations in Angola," 164.
47. Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 53.
48. John A. Marcum and Allard K. Lowenstein, "Force: Its Thrust and Prognosis," in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. Davis and Baker, 247–77. See pages 248–49.
49. Michael A. Samuels, "The Nationalist Parties," *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, ed. David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (New York, NY: Praeger, 1969), 389–405. See page 392.
50. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 211.
51. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1968), 61.
52. Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 57.
53. B. Marie Perinbam, "Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry—the Algerian Case," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11, no. 3 (1973): 427–45.

54. Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 53.
55. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 134.
56. John Marcum, "Three Revolutions," *Africa Report* 12, no. 8 (November 1967): 9–22. See page 10.
57. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 235–36.
58. Houser, "Nationalist Organizations in Angola," 167.
59. George Martelli, "Conflict in Portuguese Africa," in *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, ed. David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), 411.
60. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 234. Moscow's financial aid to the MPLA is detailed in Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 15.
61. Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 32–43.
62. Che Guevara, "Cuba, Exceptional Case or Vanguard in the Struggle against Colonialism?," in *Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara*, repr. Rolando E. Bonachea and ed. Nelson P. Valdes (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1969), 57–70.
63. Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 93 and 96; see also Cecil Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America, 1959–1967* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1970), 104. Johnson notes, "Guevara denied at least three times that the Cubans were influenced by the Chinese example . . . he asserted that they knew nothing about Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare while they were actually fighting Batista. But during an interview granted in June 1959 to Chinese journalists in Havana, he admitted that guerrilla commanders had studied Mao's works."
64. Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 45.
65. Fred Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key To Africa* (New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 59–60.
66. Walter Laquer, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), 299–302, 337–38, and 340.
67. Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution; Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 23–24; see also Laquer, *Guerrilla*, 33–338. For an extensive critique of Debray's work, see Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, *Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
68. Perinbam, "Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry," 437.
69. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 64–65.
70. Marcum, "Three Revolutions," 18.
71. Yves Loiseau and Pierre Guillaume de Roux, *Portrait d'un Revolutionnaire en General: Jonas Savimbi* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1987), 140.
72. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 65–67.
73. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 42–43.

CHAPTER 3

1. The details of Nzinga's career are drawn from Mario de Souza Clington, *Angola libre?* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 43–54; John K. Thornton, "The Art

- of War in Angola, 1575–680,” in *Warfare and Empires: Contact and Conflict between European and non-European military and Maritime Forces and Cultures*, ed. Douglas M. Peers (Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate, 1997), 81–99. See page 86; and Ronald H. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), 67–70; see also Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *African Women: A Modern History*, trans. Beth Gillian Rops (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 40–42; and David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (London: James Currey, 1992), 9–10. For a less sympathetic account, see Joseph C. Miller, “Nzinga of Matamba in a New Perspective,” *Journal of African History* 16, no. 2 (1975): 201–16. For an account of the political context in which she operated, see John K. Thornton, “Legitimacy and Political Power: Queen Njinga, 1624–1663,” *Journal of African History*, 32, 1991, 25–40; John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976)* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), 401. On December 23, 1974, the MPLA dedicated the Rainha Nzinga Library in Luanda.
2. Walter Rodney, “European Activity and African Reaction in Angola,” in *Aspects of Central African History*, ed. T. O. Ranger (London: Heinemann, 1968), 49–70. See pages 64–65. René Pélissier, *Les Guerres Grises: Résistance et révolte en Angola (1845–1941)* (Montamets: Orgeval, 1977), 232–51.
 3. Clington, *Angola libre*, 189.
 4. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa*, 71–73.
 5. Douglas L. Wheeler and C. Diane Christensen, “To Rise With One Mind: The Bailundu War of 1902,” in *Social Change in Angola*, ed. Franz Wilhelm Heimer (Munich: Welt Forum Verlag, 1973), 53–92. See pages 66–69; Henry W. Nevins, *A Modern Slavery* (New York: Schocken, 1968).
 6. Wheeler and Christensen, “To Rise with One Mind,” 76.
 7. *Ibid.*, 70–71, 76–78. For additional details on the 1902 uprising see Fola Soremekun, “The Bailundu Revolt, 1902,” *African Social Research*, December 16, 1973, 447–73.
 8. Fred Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 28–29.
 9. Rodney, “European Activity and African Reaction in Angola,” 68. Pélissier challenges this view and doubts that the rebellion inspired later generations, noting that Ovimbundus often collaborated with Portugal in suppressing other rebellions (*Les Guerres Grises* 351–52, 371). More likely, some were inspired, others were not. In *Angola: 20 Ans de Guerre Civile* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), Dia Kasembe suggests Tula Bula’s legacy lived on in Bakongo circles during the 1950s and 1960s. See page 31.
 10. Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Writings* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1963), 197.
 11. Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Brigadier-General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (ret.) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 68; see also Mao Zedong’s, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” *Selected Military Writings* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1963), 77–152. See pages 94–95.
 12. Irene S. Van Dongen, “Physical, Human and Economic Setting,” *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, ed. David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), 1–20. See page 5.

13. William A. Hance, *The Geography of Modern Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 487.
14. Lawrence W. Henderson, *Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 126–27.
15. Van Dongen, “Physical, Human and Economic Setting,” 9.
16. Marcum and A. Lowenstein, “Force: Its Thrust and Prognosis,” in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. John A. Davis and James K. Baker (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 251. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 115.
17. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 124.
18. Charles K. Ebinger, “External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War,” *Orbis* 20, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 669–99. See page 677. Aside from encounters with Portuguese security forces, Ebinger claims there were little publicized but frequent skirmishes between MPLA and FLEC guerrillas between 1964 and 1968. In “The Cabinda Connection: An Historical Perspective,” *African Affairs* 76, no. 302 (January 1977): 47–59, Phyllis M. Martin insists that FLEC “never conducted military operations in the enclave” but does suggest that Cabindans did join “other Angolan liberation movements,” presumably the FNLA and MPLA in operations against Portugal. See page 58.
19. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 68–70.
20. *Ibid.*, 161–67.
21. Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan,” May 1938, *Selected Military Writings*, 153–86. See page 155.
22. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 166–67.
23. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 71–72.
24. *Ibid.*, 73–74; see also Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 191–92.
25. Samuel Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia* (Lisbon: Sextante Editora, 2008), 105–6.
26. Douglas Wheeler and Rene Pelissier, *Angola* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 225; Rene Pelissier, “La guerre en Angola oriental,” *Revue française d’études politiques africaines* (July 1974): 87–109. See page 98. Pelissier claims the attacking force numbered 243–95 and that a “feticheur” led them into battle.
27. Linda M. Heywood, “Towards an Understanding of Modern Political Ideology in Africa: The Case of the Ovimbundu in Angola,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 1 (1998): 139–67. See page 164; see also Linda M. Heywood, “UNITA and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola,” 54.
28. Some critics referred to UNITA’s alleged use of “magic, charms, spells” to denigrate their military capability or question the soundness of Savimbi’s judgment. Basil Davidson, “Angola in the Tenth Year,” *African Affairs* 270, no. 278 (January 1971): 37–49. See page 43.
29. Atsutse Kokouvi Agbobli, *Jonas Savimbi: combats pour l’Afrique et la démocratie* (Paris: Favre, 1997), 74.
30. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 230.
31. Davidson, “Angola in the Tenth Year,” 43.
32. W. S. Van der Waals, *Portugal’s War in Angola, 1961–1974* (Rivonia, South Africa: Ashanti, 1993), 165.
33. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 192–93. Savimbi acknowledged UNITA’s responsibility for the March 1967 attacks, according to almost all accounts. One author, however, has suggested that other forces—including the Portuguese, FNLA, or MPLA—might have staged the attacks to undermine

- Zambia's support for Savimbi. See Michael Morris, *Armed Conflict in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Jeremy Spence, 1974), 129.
34. Michael Morris, *Armed Conflict in Southern Africa*, 131. For the lower estimate, see Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Africa*, 166.
 35. Loiseau and de Roux, *Portrait d'un révolutionnaire en general*, 171–72. See also Leon Dash, *Savimbi's 1977 Campaign Against the Cubans and MPLA—Observed for 7½ Months, and Covering 2,100 Miles Inside Angola* (Pasadena, CA: Munger Africana Library Notes, 1977), 67, 113. Dash identifies Vasco Chinguar as the UNITA member who fired three shots at Savimbi in 1968. Chinguar allegedly was pardoned and remained with UNITA until 1973 by which time he reportedly had defected to the Portuguese. Dash also alludes to another assassination attempt, in 1968, by two unidentified assailants.
 36. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 214–16; see also Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 164.
 37. Jonas Savimbi, *Angola: a resistencia em busca de uma nova nacao* (Lisbon: Agencia Portuguesa de Revistas, 1979). See pages 21–23 for Savimbi's account of the defection, capture, or death in combat of most of the UNITA contingent initially trained in China.
 38. Loiseau and de Roux, *Portrait d'un révolutionnaire en general*, 146–47.
 39. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 86 and 89. Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia*, 138–39, 168, discusses the Muanangola defection and the break up of the clandestine urban support network.
 40. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 170; see also Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 196.
 41. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 177–78 and 212–13.
 42. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Africa*, 149–51.
 43. Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (London: Heinemann, 1978), 159.
 44. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Africa*, 143.
 45. Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 48.
 46. Vo Nguyen Giap, *Peoples War, Peoples Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 46, 77–78.
 47. *Ibid.*, 188.
 48. Marvin Howe, "Portugal at War: Hawks, Doves and Owls," *Africa Report*, November, 1969, 14, no. 7, 16–21.
 49. Al J. Venter, *The Zambezi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa* (Old Greenwich: Devin-Adair, 1974), 84, 151.
 50. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Africa*, 140–41, 152–54.
 51. Mao Zedong, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," 109–21.
 52. Giap, *Banner of Peoples War*, 64.
 53. *Ibid.*, 77.
 54. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Africa*, 154; Shubin provides the Soviet assessment of the MPLA's strength in 1973 (*The Hot "Cold War"* 27).
 55. Mao Zedong, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," 104.
 56. Inge Brinkman, "War, Witches and Traitors: Cases from the MPLA's Eastern Front in Angola (1966–975)," *Journal of African History* 44 (2003): 303–25. See page 312.
 57. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 154–56.
 58. *Ibid.*, 164–65.
 59. *Ibid.*, 159.

60. C. W. Petersen, "The Military Balance in Southern Africa," in *Southern Africa in Perspective*, ed. Christian Potholm and Richard Dale (New York: Free Press, 1972), 298–320. See page 305. See also Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 163–64.
61. Wheeler and Pellisier, *Angola*, 173.
62. John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 40–41, 47–49.
63. Al J. Venter, *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell, 1969), 103.
64. Al J. Venter, *Portugal's Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa* (Cape Town: Malherbe, 1973), 63–64.
65. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 62.
66. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 75–79.
67. Ibid., 70; see also Wheeler and Pellisier, *Angola*, 186–87.
68. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 78–79.
69. Ibid., 70.
70. Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique* (New York: The Third Press, 1974), 93.
71. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 70, 77.
72. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 115
73. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 171.
74. Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis* 21, no. 2, 395–412. See page 402.
75. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 144–45.
76. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa," 401.
77. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 172–77.
78. Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics* 4 (1972): 331–68. See pages 335–37.
79. Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, "The Present Role of the Portuguese Resettlement Policy," *Africa Today* 21 (Winter 1974): 47–55. See page 52.
80. Heinz Portmann, "Angola's Developing Economy," *Swiss Review of World Affairs* 23 (May 1973): 4–8. See page 6.
81. Ibid., 5; see also G. M. E. Leistner, "Cooperation for Development in Southern Africa," in *Accelerated Development in Southern Africa*, ed. John Barratt, Simon Brand, David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser (New York: St. Martins Press, 1974), 560–91. See page 577.
82. World Council of Churches. *The Cunene Dam Scheme and the Struggle for the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1971[0]), 23; see also Gail-Maryse Cockram, *Vorstens' Foreign Policy* (Pretoria: H & R Academia, Ltd., 1970), 167.
83. Portmann, "Angola's Developing Economy," 5–6; see also World Council of Churches, *The Cunene Dam Scheme*, 3.
84. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 193; Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 161.
85. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 99.
86. Ibid., 96–97, 101–2.
87. Ibid., 98–99; see also Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, where he cites a figure of 3,500 to 6,000 troops (135).
88. Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 222.

89. Rosalynde Ainslie, *The Unholy Alliance* (London: The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1962), 5.
90. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 133–34, 209.
91. Marcum and Lowenstein, "Force," 272
92. Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 137; Paul Whitaker, "The Revolutions of Portuguese Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (1970): 15–35. See page 31; Wheeler and Pelissier, *Angola*, 245; Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 208–9.
93. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 209.
94. J. E. Spence, "South Africa's Foreign Policy," in *Southern Africa in Perspective*, ed. C. Potholm and R. Dale (New York: Free Press, 1972), 46–58. See page 52; Russell Warren Howe, "War in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 48 (October 1969): 150–65. See page 153.
95. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 195–96; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 213; Humbaraci and Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars*, 42–43; and Morris, *Armed Conflict in Southern Africa*, 132–33.
96. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 219; and Venter, *The Zambezi Salient*, 143.
97. S. J. Bosgra and C. van Krimpen, *Portugal en de Nato* (Amsterdam: Angola Comite, 1971), 19, 24. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 282–83; and William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), 133. For details of additional Portuguese-West German transactions, see Luc Crollen, *Portugal, the U.S. and Nato* (Louvain, Belgium: Louvain University Press, 1973), 131–32.
98. Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola*, 112.
99. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27 (January 1975): 175–200. See page 177; italics in the original.
100. *Ibid.*, 185; italics in the original.
101. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa*, 22; see also Douglas Wheeler, "The Portuguese in Mozambique: The Past against the Future," in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. Davis and Baker (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 180–96. See page 183.
102. George Houser, "Nationalist Organization in Angola: Status of the Revolt," in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. Davis and Baker (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 183; and Wheeler and Pelissier, *Angola*, 213.
103. Venter, *Portugal's Guerrilla War*, 192; J. Hoagland, *South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 283.
104. Elizabeth Morris, "Portugal's Year in Africa," in *Africa Contemporary Record: 1972–1973*, ed. Colin Legum (London: Rex Collings, 1974), A110–15. See page A111.
105. Gerald J. Bender, "Portugal and Her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century" *Ufahamu* 4 (1974): 121–62; Neil Bruce, *Portugal: The Last Empire* (North Pomfret, VT: David and Charles, 1975); Walter C. Opello Jr., *Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 83–86.
106. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 103; Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa," 405. Henriksen credits the three insurgent movements with a total of less than 10,000 combatants by 1974. Fritz Sitte, *Flamenherd Angola* (Vienna: Kremsayr and Scheriau, 1972), 167. Savimbi claimed he had intelligence gathering agents inside the colonial army. Pyotr Yevsyukov et al., *Password "Anguimo"*:

- Reports from Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1974). Mikhalev interviewed several MPLA insurgents including a deserter from the ranks of the colonial force, as well as female combatants and child soldiers. See 109–14.
107. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 103–4; see also Wheeler and Pellissier, *Angola*, 226–30.
 108. Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, the Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 134–35; Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 148.
 109. Rene Pelissier, *Le Naufrage des Caravelles: etudes sur la fin de l'empire portugais (1961–1975)* (Montamets, France: Orgeval, 1979), 146.
 110. Linda Heywood, *Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2000), 75–79, 83–85.
 111. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 179–83.
 112. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 195.
 113. Don Barnett and Roy Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 255–56.
 114. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 43–45, 176; Anders Ehnmark and Per Wastberg, *Angola and Mozambique: The Case Against Portugal* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1963), 82. Ehnmark and Wastberg were probably among the earliest to observe “that civil war has started in Northern Angola and that the position of the rebels has seriously deteriorated.” Robert Davezies, *Les Angolais* (Paris: Les Edition de Minuit, 1965), 182–89. Holden Roberto acknowledged, in a 1965 interview, his forces’ earlier attacks against MPLA combatants.
 115. Wilfred Burchett, *Southern Africa Stands Up: The Revolutions in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa* (New York: Urizen, 1978), 36.
 116. Burchett, *Southern Africa Stands Up*, 37–38.
 117. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 211. For Savimbi’s assessment of MPLA and FNLA operations directed at UNITA, see Loiseau and de Roux, *Portrait d’un revolutionnaire en general*, 177. Samuel Chiwale says the MPLA first attacked UNITA forces on December 12, 1966 (*Cruzei-me com a Historia* 169).
 118. Ebinger, “External Intervention in Internal War,” 681.
 119. John Marcum, “The Angolan Rebellion: Status Report,” *Africa Report* 9, no. 2 (February 1964), 3–7. See pages 5–6.
 120. Venter, *The Terror Fighters*, 31; and Van der Waals, *Portugal’s War in Angola*, 153.
 121. William Minter, ed., *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988); Boris Vasilyev, “Dirty Deeds of the Black Cock,” *Asia and Africa Today*, no. 3 (1985): 19–21. See page 19. Vasilyev refers to “Operation Madeira” but is unclear as to whether this was a precursor to, or an alternative name for, “Operation Timber.” See also Augusta Conchiglia, *UNITA, Myth and Reality*, trans. Marga Holness (London: ECASAAMA, 1990).
 122. Maria Antonia Polla, “Interview with Tony Fernandes,” *Tempo*, November 24, 1988, 12–16. See page 14.
 123. Maria Joao Saldhana and Marco Vinicius, *Jonas Savimbi: um desafio a ditadura comunista em Angola* (Lisbon: Edicoes Armasilde, 1977), 65–73.
 124. Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia*, 168, refers to Muanangola’s defection; see also “Former Unita Rebels Say Savimbi Only One with ‘Good Physical Appearance

- ance," February 14, 2002, <http://www.jornaldeangola.com>, which refers to Kalundungo (the article provides a different spelling) and his alleged plot.
125. Heywood, *Contested Power in Angola*, 175.
 126. Barnett and Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola*, 259–60; italics in the original.
 127. F. W. Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola, 1974–1976: An Essay in Political Sociology* (Geneva: Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1979), 51.
 128. Ibid., 49–50.
 129. Fola Soremekun, *Angola: The Road to Independence* (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1983), 106–7.
 130. Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict*, 56–57.
 131. Ibid., 28; see also Thomas H. Henriksen, "Peoples War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 3 (1976): 377–99. Henriksen claims the MPLA had 3,000 combatants in 1974 while FNLA and UNITA together "probably" had less than 2,000 "full-time fighters." See page 394.
 132. Guimares, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 100.
 133. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 248; and Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola*, 68.
 134. Guimares, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 100–101.
 135. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 67.
 136. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 17, 21; and Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 162.
 137. Odd Arne Westad, *Moscow and the Angolan Crisis-1974–1976: A New Pattern in Intervention* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 8/9) (Winter 1996–1997): 6.
 138. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 254.
 139. Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, 15–16. In January, 1975 Agostinho Neto also proposed an MPLA-UNITA alliance against the FNLA. Savimbi rejected the offer, still holding out hope for a viable coalition as envisioned under the Alvor Accord, according to Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia*, 193.
 140. William G. Thom, "Angola's 1975–1976 Civil War: A Military Analysis," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 7, no. 2 (Autumn 1998): 1–44. See pages 19–20; Douglas Wheeler, "Portuguese Withdrawal from Angola," in *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, ed. John Seiler (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 3–24. See page 10. UNITA accounts of the massacre at Dondo claim that Portuguese troops also joined the MPLA in the attack. See for example, a UNITA "Statement" by the Standing Committee of the Political Commission, March 3, 1999. Internet version available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/unita/en0303991.htm>. Site visited on March 4, 1999.
 141. Porter, *The Soviet Union and Third World Conflicts*, 157; and Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, 27.
 142. Guimares, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 108.
 143. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2*, 259.
 144. Ibid., 279; Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,

- 2002), 243; see also Porter, *The Soviet Union and Third World Conflicts*, 165; and Piero Gleijeses, *Havana's Policy in Africa, 1959–1976: New Evidence from Cuban Archives* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Cold War International History Project. Bulletin 8/9, Winter, 1996–1997. 1–29. See 8–9, 18–19. Gleijeses insists that recently available Cuban documents contradict widely accepted reports that Cuban military personnel arrived in May, arguing instead that Havana did not send advisors and troops to Angola until October/November, 1975. Porter points out however that Cuba's Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodrigues admitted to journalists in January 1976 that Havana sent military advisors to Angola in the spring of 1975. Chiwale asserts that the first Cuban advisors arrived in January 1975.
145. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, 160.
 146. Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, 86, 206, 265–68; Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 348–50 also disputes Stockwell regarding the comparative quality as well as the quantity and cost of weapons provided to both sides. See also House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., May 25, 1978, "Statement of John Stockwell Former Chief, CIA Angola Task Force in *United States-Angolan Relations*," hearing before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 10–15. See page 13. Stockwell asserted, "We gave our allies obsolete carbines while the MPLA got Kalashnikovs. We delivered obsolete mortars while the MPLA received rockets with twice the range."
 147. Thom, "Angola's 1975–1976 Civil War," 22–23.
 148. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 127.
 149. Robin Hallet, "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975–1976," *African Affairs* 77, no. 308 (July 1978): 347–86. See pages 351–54.
 150. Daniel S. Papp, "The Angolan Civil War and Namibia," in *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, ed. David R. Smock (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 161–96. See page 165.
 151. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, Volume 2, 268–69.
 152. *Ibid.*, 273.
 153. Thom, "Angola's 1975–1976 Civil War," 24–25.
 154. *Ibid.*, 26.
 155. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, 167–68; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution Volume 2*, 274. Marcum cites figures of 7,000 and 10,000 to 12,000. The relevant circumstances influencing Cuba's decision to deploy combat troops and Fidel Castro's penchant for managing the smallest details of the campaign are dramatically described in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's "Operation Carlota," accessed September 12, 2002, <http://www.rhodesia.myweb.nl/marquez.html>. "Operation Carlota" is a serialized essay, which appeared in numerous newspapers and journals in 1976. A copy can also be found online at various websites.
 156. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, 160–61; Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, 27–28. Klinghoffer estimates the value of Soviet deliveries at \$90 million from November 1975 to January 1976 and \$100 million for the deliveries from January to February 1976. For additional details on Soviet-Cuban supplies provided to Angola and the \$200-million estimate, see Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice towards Third World Conflicts* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 82–83.
 157. Thom, "Angola's 1975–1976 Civil War," 27–28, 30. For additional details on the FAPLA-Cuban defense of Cabinda, see Eduard George, *The Cuban*

- Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 83–86; and Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War,”* 53–54. Shubin suggests that the defending force at Quifangando may have numbered less than 1,000.
158. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 39–48. A small UNITA/SADF force code named “Orange” also stalled after seizing the Salazar Bridge over the Cuanza River, which is south of the provincial capital, Malanje, according to Hallet, “The South African Intervention in Angola,” 375. For an official South African account of Operation Savannah, see the SADF “Nature and Extent of the SADF’s Involvement in the Angolan Conflict,” accessed September 12, 2002, <http://www.rhodesia.myweb.nl/sadfpres.html>.
 159. George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 117–19.
 160. Thom, “Angola’s 1975–1976 Civil War,” 32.
 161. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 176.
 162. Ibid., 182–83, 198; and Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, 234.
 163. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 200–201.
 164. Ibid., 202–3, 236.
 165. Olga Nazario, “Cuba’s Angolan Operation,” in *Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Sergio Diaz-Briquets (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1989), 102–23. See page 106.
 166. Jan Breytenbach, *Forged in Battle* (Cape Town: Saayman and Weber, 1986); Breytenbach describes the metamorphosis of Chipenda’s FNLA faction into SADF’s 32nd Battalion. See especially pages 113–14; Peter Stiff, *The Silent War: South African Recce Operations, 1969–1994* (Cape Town: Galago, 1999), 144, 186–92. In the late 1980s several dozen dissidents from Sao Tome e Principe who had illegally emigrated to South West Africa/Namibia were given the choice of prison or serving in the 32nd Battalion. See Gerhard Seibert, “Coup d’état in São Tomé e Príncipe: Domestic Causes, the role of oil and former ‘Buffalo’ Battalion soldiers” *Pretoria Institute for Security Studies: African Security Analysis Programme*, October 10, 2003, 5–6.
 167. Leon Dash, “Ambushing an Unwary Enemy,” *Washington Post*, August 7, 1977, 1, 22, and “War Without Frontiers, Battle Lines,” August 8, 1977, 1, 20; Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 239–40, 243–44.
 168. Leon Dash, “Self Criticism Deep in a Hidden Forest,” *Washington Post*, August 13, 1977; see also Dash, *Savimbi’s 1977 Campaign*, 23. Dash says UNITA officials claimed, in 1977, they had 23,000 guerrillas.
 169. Peter Mangold, “Shaba I and Shaba II,” *Survival* 21, no. 3 (May/June 1979): 107–15. See pages 108–10. Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–1998* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000), 118–19. Roger Glickson, “The Shaba Crises: Stumbling to Victory,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 180–200.
 170. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 256–57.
 171. Mario J. Azevedo, “Zambia, Zaire and the Angolan Crisis Reconsidered: From Alvor to Shaba,” *Journal of Southern African Affairs* 2, no. 3 (1977): 275–91. See page 291.
 172. Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” in *Strategy for Conquest: Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Jay Mallin (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), 210, 215.
 173. Ibid., 220.

174. Fritz Sitte, *Inferno Schwarz Afrika: der westen verliert einen kontinent* (Vienna: Kremayr und Scheriau, 1977), 140–41.
175. Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," 222–23.
176. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War,"* 70–71.
177. Lara Pawson, "The 27 May in Angola: A View from Below," *Revistas Relacoes Internacionais* (Instituto Portugais Relacoes Internacionais), no. 14 (June 2007).
178. Paul Fauvet, "The Rise and Fall of Nito Alves," *Review of African Political Economy* 9 (1978): 88–104; Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, 68–99; see also David Birmingham, "The Twenty-Seventh of May: An Historical Note on the Abortive 1977 Coup in Angola," *African Affairs* 77, no. 309 (October 1978): 554–64.
179. Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, no. 31 (Summer 1978): 3–30. See page 21.

CHAPTER 4

1. Ronald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa; Regional Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945–1990* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 102–3.
2. Peter Stiff, *The Silent War: South African Recce Operations, 1969–1994* (Cape Town: Galago, 1999), 201–3.
3. W. Martin James, *A Political History of the Angolan Civil War, 1974–1990* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 134, 195–199; Fred Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 268.
4. General Nathaniel Mbumba, "Special Interview: The War Has Not Ended," *New African*, no. 131 (July 1978): 15–16.
5. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–1998* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), 125–32; and Peter Mangold, "Shaba I and Shaba II." *Survival* 21, no. 3 (May/June 1979): 111–12.
6. Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Cuban Alliance in Africa and Future Prospects," in *Cuba in Africa*, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin (Pittsburgh: Center for Latin American Studies University Center for International Studies, 1982), 141–48. See page 144; Conrad Schneider, "OTRAG: Bold Pioneer Faces Hostile World," *L-5 News* 3, no. 2 (February 1978): 5–7.
7. James M. Roherty, *State Security in South Africa; Civil Military Relations under P. W. Botha* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 38–44, 101–11.
8. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, *Report*, vol. 2, October 29, 1998, 52–53, www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/final-report/.
9. Morgan Norval, *Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy* (Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press, 1989), 125–41.
10. Stiff, *The Silent War*, 234; see also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, *Report*, 57.
11. Samuel Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia* (Lisbon: Sextante Editora, 2008), 251–52.
12. Yves Loiseau and Pierre Guillaume de Roux, *Portrait d'un Revolutionnaire en General: Jonas Savimbi* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1987), 259; see also Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique," *The China Quarterly*, no. 142 (June 1995): 388–422.

13. Colin Legum, ed., "The Southern African Crisis: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel," *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1981–1982*, vol. 14 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), A3–A62. See page A38.
14. James, *A Political History of the Angolan Civil War*, 146 and 151; Richard Harwood, "Savimbi Defends Links With South Africans," *Washington Post*, July 24, 1981, A1, A15. Savimbi told Harwood that Qatar was one of his supporters but claimed that unspecified "Arab" money had dwindled since 1980, from millions to hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. An American business man who testified before the US Congress in 1987, indicated that Saudi Arabia may have continued to provide UNITA with financial assistance, possibly as much as \$15 million, at least until 1983. See Neil A. Lewis, "Saudis Linked to Donations to Angola Rebels," *New York Times*, July 2, 1987.
15. Fritz Sitte, *Flug in die Angola-Hölle: der vergessene Krieg*. Graz, Austria: Verlag Styria, 1981), 172–78. Lucy Mathiak, "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola," in *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trader in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, ed. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 81–97. Mathiak refers to reports of American weapons shipped, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, via Taiwan and Thailand to South Africa for eventual transshipment to Angola. See page 86.
16. John W. Turner, *Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa, 1960 to the Present* (London: Arms and Armor Press, 1998), 108–9.
17. Bernard Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi: Military Disciple to Mao, Part 1," *African Defense*, April, 1986), 58–64. See page 61; Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 293–94; and Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 109.
18. Sitte, *Flug in die Angola-Hölle*, 95–97.
19. William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 31.
20. Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," A38–39; Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 108.
21. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 286.
22. Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," A38.
23. Colin Legum, ed., "Angola," in *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979–1980*, vol. 13 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), B667–82. See pages B672, B675. See Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarov, "War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension," in *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (December 2001): 607–18. See page 615. See also Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 120. George claims there already were some 36,000–45,000 in 1977 and that Havana had deployed 80,000 troops to Angola by 1983. Cuban troop strength, according to George, began to decline by the late 1980s.
24. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 112.
25. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 339.
26. Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi," 61.
27. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 108; Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 352–53; and Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi," 61.
28. Colin Legum, ed., "Angola: The MPLA at the Nadir of its Fortunes," in *Africa Contemporary Record, 1983*, vol. 15 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984), B593–B611. See pages B595–B596.

29. Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi," 62; and Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 370–76, 400–401, 405.
30. Edward Girardet, "Angolan Rebels Go on Offensive against Soviet-Backed Regime," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 1983, 1, 12–13. See 13. This was Girardet's first of a four-part series on the war in Angola. Parts 2–4 also were serially published in *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 1–3, 1983.
31. Willem Steenkamp, "The Savimbi Connection," *The Cape Times* (Johannesburg), September 2, 1983, 6. This was the first of two Steenkamp articles on Savimbi, the second appeared in the same newspaper on September 7, 1983.
32. Amnesty International, *Peoples Republic of Angola: Background Briefing on Amnesty International's Concerns* (New York: Amnesty International, U.S. Section, 1982), 21–23. Government forces already had managed to interdict a few of these teams. Between 1980 and 1982 the government tried and convicted several dozen UNITA saboteurs for planting bombs in Luanda, Huambo, Kuito, and Lobito.
33. Bridgeland, "Jonas Savimbi, 400–403. Richard Helmore, "Efforts to Reduce Theft, Trafficking of Diamonds Noted," *West Africa*, October 31, 1983, 2508–9. Helmore notes that the Angolan government had made a concerted effort, in 1981–1982, to break up a large diamond smuggling network by arresting more than 400 *kamanguistas* whose illicit diamond activity had significantly reduced government revenues.
34. Jorge Martin Blandino, *Cangamba* (Havana: Casa Editorial Verde Olivo, 2006), offers the most detailed account of the battle available, as experienced from a primarily Cuban perspective. He also provides a day-by-day chronology of the battle. See pages 285–99. Joaquim Vieira, "Angola-The UNITA Challenge," *Expresso*, September 1, 1984. See pages 33R–37R. Francois Soudan, "Angola: The Hour of the Braziers," *Jeune Afrique*, no.1232/1233 (August, 15–22, 1984): 52–63; see also Eduard George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 166–70. For details on South Africa's support to UNITA see, Brig-Gen Dick Lord, *From Fledgling to Eagle: The South African Air Force During the Border War* (Johannesburg: 30 South Publishers [Pty] Ltd. 2008), 290.
35. Blandino, *Cangamba*, 247–59.
36. Lord, *From Fledgling to Eagle*, 291–93.
37. Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," in *Strategy for Conquest: Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Jay Mallin (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), 244–45.
38. Girardet, "Angolan Rebels Go on Offensive against Soviet-Backed Regime," 13.
39. For an effort to place the concept of negritude in the context of the final years of Angolan colonial history see Fernando Neves, *Negritude e revolucao em Angola* (Paris: Edicoes, Etc., 1974), 17–23. UNITA officially adopted negritude as part of the party's political program, at its 4th Party Congress in 1977. See Leon Dash, *Savimbi's 1977 Campaign Against the Cubans and MPLA-Observed for 7½ Months and Covering 2,100 Miles Inside Angola* (Pasadena CA: Munger Africana Library Notes, 1977), 100.
40. Colin Legum, ed., "Angola: The High Cost of Principles," *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1983–1984*, vol. 16 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), B597–B617. See pages B602 and B607.

41. Colin Legum, "Angola," *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979–1980*, vol. 12 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981,) B667–B682. See pages B674–B675.
42. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17 and 30, 1980, "Statement of Melvin J. Hill, President, Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Co. in *United States Policy toward Angola Update*," hearing before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).
43. *Tempo*. "Interview with Xavier Lubota," president of FLEC," July 7, 1983, 20–23. For an account of the early 1980s negotiations, see *Jornal Digital*, "FLEC, FLEC/FAC React to Statement by Angola's Lourenco on Cabinda," May 16, 2003, <http://www.jornaldigital.org>. Subsequent, but ultimately fruitless, meetings were hosted by the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and French officials in 1986, 1989, 1994, and 1996.
44. Susama Mohanty, *Political Development and Ethnic Identity in Africa: A Study of Angola Since 1960* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1992), 186–88; Pierre Gaillard, "With the Forgotten FNLA Partisans: A Tribe Made to Last," *Le Monde*, May 13, 1983, 6. Gaillard based his article on a two-month visit to northern Angola where he met and interviewed FNLA members.
45. Willem Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War, 1966–1989* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989), 92–93; see also Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, 39; and James, *A Political History of the Angolan Civil War*, 165.
46. Stiff, *The Silent War*, 352–57; see also Christopher Cocker, "South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa 1968–1982, *Survival* 25, no.2 (March/April 1983): 59–67. See pages 60–61.
47. Norval, *Death in the Desert*, 150.
48. Stiff, *The Silent War*, 357–58.
49. Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," B585.
50. Legum, "The MPLA at the Nadir of its Fortunes," B593.
51. Norval, *Death in the Desert*, 171–78; see also Stiff, *The Silent War*, 367–68.
52. Peter Vanneman, *Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's Pragmatic Approach* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 49–51.
53. Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 191–99; see also Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 272–83, 302–13, for a discussion of UNSCR 435 and US, Canadian, French and English mediators efforts to persuade South Africa to implement the resolution without reference to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
54. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 214–31.
55. Stiff, *The Silent War*, 457–70.
56. John A. Marcum, "United States Options in Angola," in *Angola, Mozambique and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1987), 36–53. See page 48. Savimbi and UNITA's growing popularity among zealous supporters of President Reagan's administration also led to speculation that UNITA's autonomy had been diminished by its inclusion in a global, American-sponsored, anti-Communist campaign. A mid-1985 conference at UNITA's Jamba base, sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, brought representatives of Laotian, Nicaraguan, Afghan and Cambodian anti-communist insurgencies together, leading to assertions that Savimbi had been enrolled

- in the World Anti Communist League. Delegates to the 1985 conference issued statements of mutual sympathy and support, but no tangible collaboration seems to have resulted. See George Wright, "US Foreign Policy and De-stabilization in Southern Africa," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 45/46 (1989): 159–68. See page 161.
57. Vanneman, *Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa*, 47–49.
 58. Stephen John Stedman et al., *The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 73–75, 101–5.
 59. Richard Harwood, "Angolan Rebels Precious Jewel," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1981, A1, A8.
 60. Helmoed Rohmer Heitman, *War in Angola: The Final South African Phase* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1990), 11–12; see also Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 331–34.
 61. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 353.
 62. S. Neil MacFarlane, "Soviet-Angolan Relations, 1975–1990," in *Soviet Policy in Africa*, ed. George W. Breslauer (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1992), 85–115. See page 95. While Luanda ran up an ever larger debt to Moscow in the 1980s, the Soviet Union reaped other, more immediate, benefits. By the mid-1980s, Luanda had become the principle support base for the Soviet Navy's West African Patrol. The Soviet Navy kept a floating dry dock and communications station in Luanda. The capital's airport supported occasional deployments of Tu-95 Bear D aircraft to conduct reconnaissance missions over the South Atlantic. See Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1986* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 131–32.
 63. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 428–49, claims the attacking force numbered 5,000 UNITA combatants. George estimates the attacking UNITA force at 1,500 and claims only Portuguese expatriates were captured. He also cites casualty figures of 100 guerrillas killed and a considerably smaller total for Cuban and government defenders (*The Cuban Intervention in Angola* 184–87).
 64. Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi," 62–63.
 65. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 12, Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 113–14, and Expedit, "Jonas Savimbi," 63.
 66. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 430–31.
 67. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 13–14.
 68. Patrick Tyler, "Rebels Success Turns on South African Aid," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1986, A1, A18. For a detailed account of the South African Air Force's Operations *Wallpaper and Weldmesh*, during the 1985 offensives in the Cazombo salient and Mavinga areas, see Lord, *From Fledgling to Eagle*, 351–58.
 69. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 15. Heitman states that as the 1985 campaign drew to a close, SAAF aircraft also shot down a transport plane carrying ten Soviet advisors to Cuito Cuanavale where they had intended to plan a renewed offensive.
 70. Jonas Savimbi, "The War against Soviet Colonialism," 23.
 71. John Marcum, "A Quarter Century of War," in *Angola, Mozambique and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1987), 17–35. See pages 23–24.
 72. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 470–71.
 73. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 141.

74. *Ibid.*, 143.
75. *Ibid.*, 142–43; see also Jan Breytenbach, *Eden's Exiles: One soldier's Fight for Paradise* (Cape Town: Queillerie, 1997), 245–46. The commander of 32 Battalion implies the original plan anticipated seizing the town and asserts that Savimbi and several of his brigadiers undermined the attack by a series of questionable tactical decisions.
76. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 144–45; see also Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 114–15.
77. Alan Cowell, "Enemy Blocked, Angolan Rebel Says," *New York Times*, October 9, 1985.
78. Fred Bridgeland, *The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1990), 62.
79. John Battersby, "Angola Lags in Drive on U.S.-Backed Rebels," *New York Times*, September 14, 1987), 1 and 14. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 113.
80. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 27, 43; Bridgeland, *The War for Africa*, 39–45.
81. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 366.
82. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 150–51.
83. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 70, 159; see also Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 152.
84. UNITA also issued controversial but inconclusive claims that FAPLA used chemical weapons (CW) during the 1987 campaign. The insurgents also denounced the use of what later examinations suggested were incendiary devices. Uncorroborated allegations of CW use predate the 1987 campaign. The following authors discussed one or more of UNITA's claims that chemical weapons were used in the 1987 campaign. Bridgeland discusses the "gas round" claim (*The War for Africa* 62). Branko Lazitch, *The Battle for Angola, 1974–1988* (London: Better Britain Society, 1988), 67. Lazitch contends that chemical weapons were initially used by Cuban troops on several other occasions in 1986. Al J. Venter, "The Angolan Cauldron Overflows into Its Second Decade," *International Defense Review*, no. 2 (1988): 121–25. See page 121. Venter claims a first-time use of chemical weapons on the northern axis of the 1987 campaign by both Cuban and Soviet personnel. Luanda also had made uncorroborated claims of SADF CW use in Angola. Barring further revelations from the combatants' archives, the best available evidence to date suggests only a one-time SADF CW use, but this occurred in Mozambique, not Angola, on January 16, 1992. See Robert E. McCreight and Stephen L. Weigert, "Up in Smoke: Political Realities and Chemical Weapons Use Allegations during Mozambique's Civil War," *International Politics* 38, no. 2 (June 2001): 253–72.
85. Bridgeland, *The War for Africa*, 116.
86. Heitman, *War in Angola*, 39–41, 49–50, 55, 58, 66.
87. *Ibid.*, 142, 146.
88. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 153–58; see also Lord, *From Fledgling to Eagle*, 446–47. Lord gives slightly higher figures for South African losses and offers a lower number of FAPLA tank losses.
89. Peter Vanneman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s: A Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa; The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, ed. Owen Ellison Kahn (London: Transaction, 1991), 69–94. See pages 76–77.

90. John Marcum, "Retrenchment and Recalculation: South Africa and the Angola-Namibia Agreements," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa*, ed. Owen Ellison Kahn (London: Transaction, 1991), 131–50. See pages 135–36.
91. Heitman, *War in Angola* 223.
92. *Ibid.*, 267.
93. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 366.
94. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War* 160–61.
95. Mark N. Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 149–50.
96. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 365.
97. *Ibid.*, 367; see also Heitman, *War in Angola*, 182.
98. Andres Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 82–87. Oppenheimer credits Cuban General Ochoa with planning the drive to the South West African border and claims that Ochoa wanted negotiations while Castro insisted on pursuing a military victory against the South Africans.
99. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 378–79.
100. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, 111. Shubin cites Soviet Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoly Adamishin's memoir *The White Sun of Angola*.
101. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 372. Roherty provides additional details on the Techipa battle and the Cuban counter attack at Calueque (*State Security in South Africa* 106–7).
102. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*. See 503–11 for the full text of the Geneva, Brazzaville, and New York agreements.
103. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 441–42.
104. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), 376–87.
105. W. Breytenbach, "Cuito Cuanavale Revisited: Same Outcomes, Different Consequences," *Africa Insight* 27, no. 1 (1997): 54–62; Horace Campbell, "The Military Defeat of the South Africans in Angola," *Monthly Review*, April, 1989. Campbell's article represents perhaps the most extreme assessment of the battle as a cataclysmic setback for Pretoria.
106. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 161–62.
107. Francois Soudan, "Angola: Savimbi Is Not Finished," *Jeune Afrique*, December 7, 1988, 28–31.
108. Constantine Menges, "The Angola/Namibia Agreements: Likely Results and Policy Implications," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa*, ed. Owen Ellison Kahn (London: Transaction, 1991), 151–66. See page 159.
109. Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War*, 175–76.
110. Herman J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000): 89–90.
111. *Ibid.*, 91–93; see also Abiodun Williams, "Negotiations and the End of the Angolan Civil War," in *Making War and Waging Peace*, ed. D. Smock pages (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 197–217. See pages 199–201 for a discussion of the Gbadolite and Harare talks.
112. *Ibid.*, 94–97. See also Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Disengagement," in *Foreign Military Intervention; The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, ed. Ariel Levitte, Bruce W.

- Jentleson, and Larry Berman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 165–207. See pages 194–98.
113. Rafael del Pino, *General del Pino Speaks* (Washington, DC: Cuban-American National Foundation, 1987), 25; see also Bridgeland, *The War for Africa*, 17.
 114. Jim Hooper, “Angola: The Ongoing Offensive,” *International Defense Review*, no. 2 (1990): 149–51.
 115. *Ibid.*, 150.
 116. *Ibid.*, 151.
 117. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 118–19.
 118. Luanda may also have believed that UNITA’s U.S. supply line was not operating at peak efficiency in light of Mobutu’s decision to temporarily deny permission for the trans-shipment of US supplies. See *Angola Peace Monitor* 2, no.2, February 2, 1990 (Washington, DC: International Freedom Foundation, 1990).
 119. Paulo Camacho, “FAPLA’s Last Assault Described,” *Expresso*, May 26, 1990, 1, 24. UNITA claimed that Portuguese Army reserve officers rather than Soviet military personnel had assisted FAPLA officers in designing the tactics used in the late 1989 Mavinga campaign.
 120. Bridgeland, *The War for Africa*, 116
 121. *Mavinga: A Battle That Changed Angolan History, December 1989-May, 1990*. n.p., pamphlet probably published by UNITA in 1990. See page 6. This pamphlet appeared in 1990. It contains no publication information.
 122. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 119.
 123. Jacques Baumgartner, “Angola’s Regime Increasing in Trouble: Military Defeats and Economic Chaos,” *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, July 8–9, 1990, 6. Chico Torres, “Unita Details FAPLA Battlefield Casualties,” *Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel* (VORGAN; *Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, April 9, 1990. For an additional critique of the last Mavinga campaign, see John W. Turner, “Angola: Unita’s Strategic Advantage,” *Southern African Freedom Review* 3, no. 3 (September 1990): 27–37. See pages 32–33.
 124. Senen Andriamirado, “Angola: A Truly Deadly Peace,” *Jeune Afrique*, April 16, 1990, 30–33.
 125. Lord, *From Fledgling to Eagle*, 354.
 126. Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, 236–37.
 127. For a mid-1970s assessment by Russian military officers of the use of helicopters in airmobile operations and the utility of new armored personnel carriers, see General-Lieutenant Vasily G. Reznichenko, “Tactics: Development Trends,” in *The Soviet Art of War, Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics*, ed. Harriet Fast Scott and William T. Scott (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); see also Viktor A. Merimsky, General Colonel, “The BMP in Combat,” in *The Soviet Art of War, Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics*, ed. Harriet Fast Scott and William T. Scott (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). See pages 280–83, 284–86.
 128. Central Intelligence Agency, *Supporting Allies under Insurgent Challenge: The Soviet Experience in Africa*, a research paper prepared by directorate of intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of Soviet Analysis and Office of Global Issues, 1988), v.
 129. *Ibid.*, 1.

130. Olga Nazario, "Cuba's Angolan Operation," in *Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Sergio Diaz-Briquet (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1989), 107–8.
131. Christopher Stevens, "The Soviet Role in Southern Africa," in *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, ed. John Seiler (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 45–60. See page 49.
132. Quoted in Georgie Ann Geyer, *Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991), 353.
133. Oppenheimer describes Cuban involvement in the Angolan black market (*Castro's Final Hour* 77–80). Rafael del Pino refers to assignments to Angola as a form of punishment for Cubans deemed politically suspect, leading to a growing number of demoralized officers and troops in the 1980s (*General del Pino Speaks* 12–13).
134. For the official Cuban casualty figures, see George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 267–68. For additional information on Cuba's mission in Angola, see William Ratliff, "Cuban Military Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Sergio Diaz Briquets (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1989), 29–47. See page 35. See also John Marcum, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Angola," *Survival* 30, no. 1 (January/February 1988): 3–13. Marcum notes that Cuba's expeditionary force, by the mid-1980s, cost the Angolan government an estimated \$400 to \$500 million annually to maintain 35,000 to 40,000 troops (10). Russian advisors suffered far fewer casualties. See *Interfax*, "Russian Veterans Union Official Reports on Soviet Losses in Angola too Low," May 6, 2006. The article cites "official figures" that indicate over 50 Russian advisors were killed between 1976 and 1991. A spokesman for Russia's Angolan War Veterans Union however voiced suspicions that the real figure was much higher. The Veterans Union official also estimated that as many as 30,000 Soviet military personnel served in Angola.
135. Armando Choi, Gustavo Chui, Moises Sio Wong, *Our History Is Still Being Written: The Story of Three Chinese-Cuban Generals in the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder, 2005), 92–93.
136. Jacques Baumgartner, "Unita's Military Strength Assessed," *Tempo*, November 17, 1988, 22.
137. Jannie Geldenhuys, *A General's Story: From an Era of War and Peace* (Johannesburg: Jonathon Ball, 1995), 217–18, 228.
138. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 120–21.
139. *Ibid.*, 121–22.
140. "Unita's Savimbi Discusses Decisive Battles," transcript, Johannesburg Television Service in Afrikaans, June 10, 1990.
141. Paulo Camacho, "Savimbi Interview: I am an Instrument of Peace," *Expresso*, June 2, 1990, 56–57.
142. For a fuller appreciation of Lisbon's role in the diplomatic process leading to the signing at Bicesse, see, Moises Venancio and Stephen Chan, *Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa; 1974–1994* (Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996). See pages 68–69, 74–75. See also Augusto Eduardo Kambwa, Daniel Mingas Casimiro, Ngongo Joao Pedro and Lucas Bhen-gui Ngonda, "Angola," in *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Government*, ed. Adebayo Adedeji

- (London: Zed, 1999), 55–79. See pages 70–71; see also Rothchild and Hartzell, “The Case of Angola,” 199–200.
143. John Keegan, “Savimbi and the Civil War in Angola,” *Washington Post*, September 20, 1987, 3.
 144. Severino Carlos, “Interview with General Geraldo Sachimpeno Nunda,” *Seminarario Angolense*, April 10, 2004, 7–11.
 145. Jean-Marc Kalfleche, *Jonas Savimbi: une autre voie pour l’Afrique*, Paris: Criterion, 1992. See pages 151–55. William Minter, “The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as Described by Ex-participants and Foreign Visitors,” Research Report Submitted to the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), March 1990. See page 13. See also Craig R. Whitney and Jill Jolliffe, “Ex-Allies Say Angola Rebels Torture and Slay Dissidents,” *New York Times*, March 11, 1989, accessed October 8, 2007, <http://nytimes.com>. According to Whitney and Jolliffe, the allegations of witch burnings initially were publicized in Lisbon in May 1988. A related assertion, by one of the UNITA dissidents—Dias Kanombo—that the MPLA also had engaged in unspecified witch burnings, received no attention in the subsequent flurry of news coverage devoted to UNITA. See also Chiwale, *Cruzei-me com a Historia*, 259–71. Chiwale was later exonerated in 1986 and Savimbi restored him to his former military rank. See also Henrique Monteiro, “Chitunda’s Final Days,” *Expresso*, December 13, 1992, 51–60. Monteiro refers to notebooks reportedly found in Luanda comprising the so-called diaries of Jeremias Chitunda. The article includes excerpts in which the UNITA vice president suggests Savimbi pardoned him in late May 1989 after previous accusations, and perhaps corporal punishment, stemming from Chitunda’s alleged links to plots attributed to Tito Chingungi in 1989.
 146. Jonas Savimbi, “Address to the Nation,” *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (VORGAN; *Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, February 5, 1990.
 147. Camacho, “Savimbi Interview,” 57.
 148. Joao Ladeiras, “Interview with Jonas Savimbi on the Occasion of his 56th Birthday,” *Tempo*, August 9–14, 1990, 6–7.
 149. Francois Misser, “UNITA’s Economic Self Sufficiency Examined,” *African Business*, October 1990. See pages 21–23. Eugenio Manuvakola, UNITA former Secretary General cited the annual figure of 30,000 metric tons of food stock worth \$200 million. See also Unattributed, “UNITA Dissident on Savimbi’s Prospects,” Angola News Agency, February 28, 2000, <http://angola.org/news/angop.html>; Breytenbach, *Eden’s Exiles*, 247, 250–55. Breytenbach also details UNITA trade in rhino horns with Far Eastern customers, and claims SADF-UNITA involvement in the slaughter of thousands of elephants to support the smuggling of ivory. See Christopher S. Wren, “Angola Rebels Accused of Elephant Kills,” *New York Times*, November 21, 1989, accessed October 8, 2007, www.nytimes.com.
 150. Misser, “UNITA’s Economic Self Sufficiency Examined.”
 151. Francois Misser, “UNITA’s Political, Military Edge Noted,” *New African*, November 1990, 9–12.
 152. Andrea E. Ostheimer, “Aid Agencies: Providers of Essential Resources?,” in *Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), 115–40. See pages 121–22.

CHAPTER 5

1. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), 388–405. See pages 392–93; see also Augusto Kambwa et al., "Angola," in *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Government*, ed. Adebayo Adedeji (London: Zed, 1999), 55–79.
2. Virginia Page Fortna, "Success and Failure in Southern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola," in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, ed. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martins, 1995), 282–99. See page 290; see also Keith Somerville, "The Failure of Democratic Reform in Angola and Zaire," *Survival* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 51–77. See page 61.
3. Manuel Antonio Africano, *L'Unita et la 2em guerre civil Angolaise* (Paris: Harmattan, 1995), 59–62.
4. Moises Venancio and Stephen Chan, *Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa: 1974–1994* (Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 80; and Fortna, "United Nations Verification Mission II," 400.
5. Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–1993* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 47–55.
6. *Ibid.*, 74.
7. Venancio and Chan, *Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa*, 80–81.
8. Manuel Antonio Africano, *L'Unita et la 2em guerre civil Angolaise*, 57–58. Israeli suppliers sold rifles, revolvers, and submachine guns to the Angolan police force between mid-1992 and late 1993. See Yosi Melman, "Israelis Interested Only in Diamonds, Arms and Oil," *Ha'Aretz*, March 19, 2001, A5.
9. Venancio and Chan, *Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa: 1974–1994*, 82.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to Unita's Seventh Congress at Nkrumah base on March 12, 1991," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro (Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel)*, transcript, UNITA Radio, March 12, 1991.
12. Dale Lautenbach, "A Moral Force or a Monster," *The Star*, March 24, 1992.
17. See also Radek Sikorski, "The Mystique of Savimbi," *National Review*, August 18, 1989, 34–37 for an earlier skeptical view of Savimbi and UNITA's internal politics.
13. UNITA, *Commission of Enquiry into the Deaths of the Chingunji and dos Santos Families, Summary of Findings* (Luanda: n.p., 1992). This document was signed by Chairman of the Commission Jeremias Kalandula Chitunda April 14, 1992. The author received a copy of the document. Savimbi also wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker who had demanded an explanation of the events surrounding Tito Chingunji's murder. See Clifford Krauss, "Angolan Rebel Lays Killings to a C.I.A. Plot," *New York Times*, May 5, 1992, accessed October 8, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/>. According to Krauss, Savimbi told Baker that Chingunji's alleged plotting against Savimbi may have had the tacit support of low-level CIA personnel.
14. Benjamin Formigo and Gustavo Costa, "Interview with Jonas Savimbi: 'For the Portuguese, the Advantage of Language is Enough,'" *Expresso*, June 20, 1992, 36–40.
15. Somerville, "The Failure of Democratic Reform in Angola and Zaire," 64.

16. H. J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), 116.
17. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 59.
18. *Ibid.*, 125.
19. Manuel Antonio Africano, *L'Unita et la 2em guerre civil Angolaise*, 96–106.
20. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 203.
21. These figures are drawn from a document containing vote counts by province for dos Santos, Savimbi, and their respective party's candidates. This three-page summary was generously provided by Professor Jerry Bender (University of Southern California), who served as a UN election observer in 1992.
22. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, January 1, 1995.
23. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 207.
24. Alex Vines, "La troisieme guerre angolaise," *Politique Africaine*, no. 57 (March 1995): 27–39. See pages 28–30.
25. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, October 19, 1992.
26. Vines, "La troisieme guerre," 29. Alfredo E Castro, "The Forgotten War of Angola," *America* 169, no. 19 (December 11, 1993): 6. Castro claims a total of 6,000 lives were lost.
27. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 276–79.
28. *Ibid.*, 330.
29. *Ibid.*, 330–32.
30. *Ibid.*, 387.
31. *Ibid.*, 353.
32. Jean Michel Mabeko Tali, "La chasse aux 'Zairois' a Luanda," *Politique Africaine*, no. 57 (March 1995): 71–84. See page 82 for an account of the UNITA raid on Soyo, see Jędrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, "Oil and War in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (December 2001): 587–606. See page 592.
33. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 153.
34. Jonas Savimbi, "Address to the Nation," *Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro* (*Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel*), transcript, UNITA Radio, March 9, 1993.
35. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 154.
36. P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003): 101–10. For details on the executive outcomes' contract with Luanda, see Sean Cleary, "Angola—a Case Study of Private Military Involvement," in *Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999): 141–74. See pages 156–57.
37. Al J. Venter, "Merc Work: Angola," *Soldier of Fortune*, August 1, 1993, 34–39, 72. See page 36. For an account of the Soyo battle, see Al J. Venter, *War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars, the Modern Mercenary in Combat* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006), 363–84; and Khareen Pech, "Executive Outcomes—a Corporate Conquest," in *Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, ed. Cilliers and Mason (Pretoria: Institute

- for Security Studies, 1999), 81–109. See page 85 and Anthony C. LoBaido, “Privatized Warfare,” *The New American*, September 4, 1995, 21–30. Executive Outcomes seems to have exaggerated its subsequent accomplishments in Sierra Leone against Revolutionary United Front (RUF) guerrillas. See Paul Richards, “West–African Warscapes: War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991–1992, 1994–95, 1995–6,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 377–402.
38. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 482–90. For a slightly different account of the Abidjan round of negotiations, see Christopher Pycroft, “Angola—the Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 2 (June 1994): 241–62. See page 256. Pycroft alludes to a problematic “point 11” of 47 points under discussion.
 39. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 154–55.
 40. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 512.
 41. Guilherme de Loanda, “La longue marche de l’Unita jusqu’à Luanda,” *Politique Africaine*, no. 57 (March 1995): 63–70. See pages 68–70.
 42. Hare, *Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace: An Outsider’s Account of the Peace Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998), 16–17.
 43. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 155–56.
 44. *Ibid.*, 29–33, 37–58.
 45. Filip de Boeck, “*Garimpeiro* Worlds: Digging, Dying and Hunting for Diamonds in Angola,” *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 90 (December 2001) 549–62.
 46. United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against Unita,” February 27, 2000, 9–10.
 47. Phillipe Le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975–2000,” *African Affairs* 100, 2001, 55–80, See page 64.
 48. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 157.
 49. Global Witness, *All the President’s Men* (London: Global Witness Limited, 2002), 5–15.
 50. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 158–60.
 51. *Ibid.*, 160–61. For additional detail on Executive Outcomes’ role in the Cuango River Valley campaign see Venter, *War Dog*, 430–44. See also Joao Gomes Porto, “Cabinda: Notes on a Soon-to-Be-Forgotten War,” *Institute for Strategic Studies* (South Africa), Security Analysis Program Occasional Paper, August 4, 2003, 10–11.
 52. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 161–62.
 53. *Ibid.*, 158–59, 161.
 54. U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II),” United Nations: New York, June 20, 1994. See page 2.
 55. Hare, *Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace*, 61–63.
 56. *Ibid.*, 64
 57. Manuvakola only publicly revealed this sequence of events several years later. See Jorge Heitor, “Interview with Unita Faction Leader Eugenio Manuvakola,” place and date not given, *Publico*, July 15, 1999.
 58. Alex Vines, “Between War and Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol,” *Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Human Rights Watch Africa* 8, no. 1 (February 1996): 1–43. See page 2.

59. Interview with Savimbi in the French journal *Liberation*, December 21, 1994, cited in de Loanda, "La longue marche de l'Unita," 69.
60. Jose Manuel Batata-Feyo, "Interview with Unita President Jonas Savimbi," transcript, RTP-2 Television Network, January 11, 1995. Unlike the Bicesse Accord, which required both sides to canton and disarm their forces, only UNITA was obligated to do so under the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. Some of Savimbi's commanders probably saw this as an unjustifiable concession. See Christine Messiant "Why did Bicesse and Lusaka Fail? A Critical Analysis," *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, no. 15 (October 14, 2004): 1–12, accessed November 2, 2004, <http://www.c-r.org/accord/ang/accord/15/>.
61. Mao Zedong, *Basic Tactics*, trans. and intro. Stuart R. Schram (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 67–68.
62. *Ibid.*, 6.
63. Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 76. Eugenio Manuvakola said he was tried at the UNITA Party Congress on February 14, 1995, convicted of treason for signing the Lusaka Accord and imprisoned by UNITA for more than two years. See Heitor, "Interview with Unita Faction Leader Eugenio Manuvakola."
64. Patrick Smith, ed., *Africa Confidential: Who's Who of Southern Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 14.
65. Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 17.
66. Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 78–79.
67. *Ibid.*, 85.
68. Joao Gomes Cravinho, "Angola: Recent History," *Africa South of the Sahara*, 28th ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1999). 150–59. See page 157.
69. Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 92.
70. Alex Vines, "Between War and Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since the Lusaka Protocol," *Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Human Rights Watch Africa* 8, no. 1 (February 1996): 3.
71. Global Witness, *All the President's Men*, 19–20. Luanda's use of "private security firm personnel" to secure diamond mines echoed a policy pursued by colonial officials in the 1920s when they allowed for a similar arrangement in the newly opened Lunda Province diamond fields. See Douglas L. Wheeler, "Jose Norton de Matos (1867–1955)," *African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa*, ed. in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 445–66. See page 453.
72. Global Witness, *All the President's Men*, 16–17.
73. *Ibid.*, 4, 1.
74. Jonas Savimbi, "Excerpts of a Speech by Unita President Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi at the 16th Unita Ordinary Annual Conference," July 15, 2001, <http://www.kwacha.org/>.
75. American Embassy Luanda, cable no. 000790, "Savimbi's March 18 Meeting with Mediation: Unitas' Growing Uneasiness as Deadlines Loom," March 19, 1996.
76. Cravinho, "Angola: Recent History," 157–58.
77. *Ibid.*, 158. Luanda also announced, in May, that government representatives and members of the FLEC-Forcass Armadas Cabindesas (FAC) had agreed on

- the terms of a cease-fire. Subsequent low level negotiations held in Libreville, Gabon, in late July 1996 failed to make further progress.
78. Mario Ribeiro, "Interview with UNITA Leader Savimbi," partial transcript, Radio Renascença, July 1, 1996.
 79. Cravinho, "Angola: Recent History," 158.
 80. Tony Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State* (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 176–77, 191.
 81. *Ibid.*, 189, 191.
 82. Antonio Aly Silva, "Shiny Enemies," *Jornal Lusofono*, April 30, 2004. See also Christian Dietrich, "Inventory of formal diamond mining in Angola," in *Angola's War Economy*, ed. Cilliers and Dietrich, 141–72. See page 149.
 83. Global Witness, *All the President's Men*, 9. See also Stephen Smith, "French Russian Deal to Arm Angola," *Liberation*, December 11, 1996, 9.
 84. Cravinho, "Recent History," 158.
 85. *Angola Peace Monitor* 3, no. 5, January 29, 1997, 1–7. See page 6
 86. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
 87. Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Angola-Complex Emergency, situation report no. 3, July 15, 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development [AID]), 1997, 2.
 88. William G. Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996–1997 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 93–123. See pages 102–8.
 89. Thomas Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War," in *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 78–103. See pages 81–82.
 90. W. Thom, "Congo/Zaire's 1996–1997 Civil War," 114–16.
 91. OFDA, Angola-Complex Emergency, 2–3.
 92. Cravinho, "Recent History," 158.
 93. Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 141–42.
 94. Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, "The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville," *African Affairs*, (1999) 98, 37–54. See pages 43–44.
 95. United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against Unita," 11–12.
 96. Cravinho, "Recent History," 159.
 97. Alex Vines, "Small Arms Proliferation: A Major Challenge for Post-Apartheid South and Southern Africa," in *South Africa in Southern Africa*, ed. David Simon (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 36–53. See pages 38–39.
 98. Cravinho, "Recent History," 159.
 99. Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 20–21.
 100. Vines, *Angola Unravels*, 99–107, 130. Luanda spent \$15 million on small arms between 1997 and 1999, according to David Carment and Aleisha Stevens, "Commerce and Conflict: Angola and Diamond Works; a Conflict Risk Assessment Report published as part of the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project," Carleton University: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, June 2005. See page 19. Richard Cornwell and Jakkie Potgieter, "Angola-Endgame or Stalemate?" *Institute for Security Studies*, no. 30 (April 1998): 1–12.

101. Hannalie de Beer and Virginia Gamba, "The Arms Dilemma: Resources for Arms or Arms for Resources," in *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, ed. Cilliers and Dietrich (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), 69–94. See page 87. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000, 70.
102. Cravinho, "Recent History," 159.
103. *Africa Confidential*, "Angola II: Talking Drums," 39, no. 10 (May 15, 1998): 6–7. See page 7.
104. United Nations, "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola," June 17, 1998, 1–11. See page 3. Available at <http://www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998524html>. Site visited on May 11, 1999.
105. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
106. *Ibid.*, 4.
107. Vines, *Angola Unravels*, 101.
108. Lukamba Paulo Gato, "The Truth about the Present Impasse," July 22, 1998. 1–3. The communiqué was available on UNITA, accessed February 24, 2000, <http://www.kwacha.com/en220798.1htm>. The website was no longer available in late 2002.
109. Jakkie Potgieter and Richard Cornwell, "Angola-at the Precipice," OASIS Programme, *Institute for Security Studies*, no. 3 2 (July 1998): 1–5. See pages 2–3.
110. *Ibid.*, 2.
111. Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War," 85–86. See also United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against Unita," 12 for the UNITA-Rwandan connection in the aftermath of Kigali's failed attack on Kinshasa.
112. Marek Garzdecki, "Angola: Recent History," *Africa South of the Sahara*, 31st ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 2002), 30–35. See page 34. See also Anna Richardson, "SADC Signals Angolan Intervention a Possibility," Reuters, September 30, 1998.
113. *Africa Recovery*, "Angola: The Syndrome of the Finish Line" 12, no. 2 (November 1998): 7, accessed March 10, 2005, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindex/122peac2.htm>.
114. *Noticias de Angola*, "MPLA Source Slams Army Generals Mining Diamonds," October 21, 1998.
115. Antoine Rozes, "Angolan Deadlock; Chronicle of a War with no Solution," *African Security Review* 10, no. 3 (2001): 1–19.
116. United Nations, "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola," November 23, 1998, 1–11. See especially 3–5 for the references to fighting in six provinces, the internally displaced population, and the civilian disarmament program. The report is available online: <http://www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1998/s19981110htm>. Site last visited on May 11, 1999.
117. Radio Nacional Network, "Angolan President Opens Party Congress," transcript, December 5, 1998, 1–8. See page 6. For General Carneiro's press statement see RTF Internacional Television, "Spokesman Confirms Anti-UNITA Offensive Underway," transcript, December 4, 1998.
118. *Noticias de Angola*, "Angola: Report Discusses Government Military Offensive," December 12, 1998.

119. Garztecki, "Recent History," 34.
120. *Jornal de Angola*, "Former Officers Say Unita 'Well Equipped,'" November 17, 1998.
121. UNITA Standing Committee of the Political Commission, 'Communiqué.' Available at <http://www.kwacha.com/cn301298.html>. Site last visited on October 3, 2000.
122. *Angola Peace Monitor* 5, no. 5, January 22, 1999. Washington, DC: International Freedom Foundation, 1999. Internet edition available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/urgent_action/apic_1299.html. Site last visited September 6, 2000.
123. UNITA Officials Isaias Samakuva and Secretary General Paulo Lukamba Gato told journalists they expected the eventual resumption of negotiations. See *Diário de Notícias*, "Unita Vows to Resist, Defend Itself," December 18, 1998; and UNITA, "The Standing Committee of the Permanent Commission, "1998 End of Year Message," Bailundo, December 30, 1998, available at <http://www.kwacha.com/cn0401991.html>. Site visited on March 10, 2000.
124. In "Angolan Rebels Strike Strategic City," Associated Press, December 22, 1998, Casimiro Siona provides figures for combatants and refugees massed at Kuito. In "Angola Pledges to find downed UN Planes," Reuters, January 6, 1999 Lara Pawson provides claims of FAA and UNITA losses.
125. *Angola Peace Monitor* 5, no. 5, 22 January 1999.
126. Richard Waddington, "Angola Accuses Five African States of Aiding Unita," Reuters, January 23, 1999.
127. Luke Baker, "Angola's UNITA says Captures Key Town," Reuters, January 27, 1999.
128. Luke Baker, "Diplomats Unclear over Cubans in Angola," Reuters, January 25, 1999.
129. Luke Baker, "Angola's UNITA Threatens Long War," Reuters, January 31, 1999.
130. Nicholas Shaxson, "Angola Can pay for War Despite Oil Crunch," Reuters, February 8, 1999.
131. Manuela Paixao, "Unita Advocates Vatican Mediation in the Conflict," *Diário de Notícias*, February 4, 1999.
132. Letter From UNITA President Jonas Savimbi to UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, posted on UNITA's web site in English, <http://www.kwacha.com> on February 21, 1999.
133. Lusa News Agency, "Armed Forces Capture Town Near Andulo," February 17, 1999, <http://www.lusa.pt/lusanews/>.
134. *Economist*, "Zambia's Mystery Bombs," March 13, 1999, 57. See also, Reuters, "Angola's UNITA Slams Zambia Blasts, Blames Luanda," March 2, 1999. The bomb blasts also lent credence to reports that Luanda had provided financial assistance to the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) a Zambian political party whose members advocated greater autonomy or secession for its Lozi members, possibly including the creation of a larger nation bringing together Lozi speakers in Namibia and Botswana. See Al Venter, "Barotses Threaten Secession," *New African*, March 1999.
135. Lara Pawson, "Unita Push to Open Corridor to North Angola," Reuters, March 1, 1999.
136. Luke Baker, "Unita Backs Up Claim of Big Angolan Defeat," Reuters, March 5, 1999. UNITA's Communiqué no. 5/CPA/99, March 5, 1999, provides

- additional details on the battle near Tunda Chisokokwa, 40 kilometers south of Andulo.
137. Potgieter and Cornwell, "Angola-at the Precipice," 3.
 138. Lara Pawson, "Tension Surrounds Besieged Angolan City," Reuters, March 14, 1999. See also Lara Pawson, "Angolan Fighting Displaces More People-Aid Workers," Reuters, March 13, 1999; Andrew Selsky, "Thousands of Refugees Face Being Cut Off from Food in Angolan Town," Associated Press, March 14, 1999; and Paulo Juliao, "Unita Attacks Kuito and Malanje," *Diario de Noticias*, March 19, 1999.
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 140. Rosa Inguane, "Two Portuguese, Two Frenchmen Missing in Angola," Associated Press, APTV, March 10, 1999; and Paulo Juliao, "Unita Might Attack Cabinda," *Diario de Noticias*, March 22, 1999.
 141. Lara Pawson, "Angola's UNITA Rebels Shell Key Government City," Reuters, March 25, 1999.
 142. See for example UNITA Communiqués no. 7, 12, 20–23, issued by the Standing Committee of the UNITA Political Commission, between April 12 and June 1, 1999. These were available on UNITA's former website <http://www.kwacha.com/>.
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 145. Standing Commission of the UNITA Political Commission, "Memorandum: The Present Military Situation," Bailundo, April 25, 1999.
 146. Lt. General Jose Ribeiro Neco, "Military Briefing by FAA Chief of Staff for Operations Lieutenant General Jose Ribeiro Neco before the National Assembly in Luanda on May 7, 1999," transcript, TPA Television Nacional, May 7, 1999.
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 151. Radio Ecclesia, "Cabinda Rebels to Buy Arms with Hostage Money," transcript, July 9, 1999.
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- Angolense*, "Second Segment of Interview with Bartolomeu Alicerces Neto 'Kate Hama' Former Unita Communications Chief," March 3, 2003, 10–11.
248. Mario Paiva, "Interview with Former Unita Foreign Mission Chief Isaias Samakuva," *Agora*, January 25, 2003, 14–16.
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 250. Chalmers Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," *World Politics* 14, no. 4, July 1962, 646–61. See pages 657–58. The Japanese referred to some of their north China operations as "draining the water."
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 252. Gustavo Costa, "Savimbi Surrounded in Moxico," *Expresso*, January 5, 2002, <http://www.atualizacaodiaria.expresso.pt/>; see also Sakala, *Memorias de um guerrilheiro* 400–420.
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- non-Ovimbundu UNITA members who challenged Dembo's killers reportedly were also executed. See *O Independente*, "Antonio Dembo was a Victim of His Own Companions," February 15, 2003. General Arlindo Samuel Kapinga, the UNITA officer who attended Dembo during his last days, denied the allegations.
256. Daniel Ribeiro, "A Sign Is Needed," *Expresso*, March 2, 2002, <http://www.atualizacaodiaria.expresso.pt>.
 257. Gustavo Costa and Fernando Jorge Perreira, "Peace on the Horizon," *Expresso*, March 9, 2002, <http://www.atualizacaodiario.expresso.pt>; see also Angola News Agency, "Armed Forces Communiqué Cites Captured UNITA Soldier on Dembo's Death," March 4, 2002, <http://www.angolapress-angop.ao>; Lusa News Agency, "UNITA Secretary General Reportedly Creates 'Management commission' for Talks," March 13, 2002; and RTP Africa Television, "UNITA Secgen Lukamba Gato on Negotiations for Cease-fire Accord," transcript, April 3, 2002; and Sakala, *Memórias de um guerrilheiro*, 431–32.
 258. *Jornal de Angola*, "Full Text of Declaration" issued by the Angolan Government in Luanda on March 13, 2002," March 14, 2002, <http://www.jornaldeangola.com>; see also Lusa News Agency, "Radio Ecclesia Announces Meeting between Army, UNITA in Cassamba," March 13, 2002.
 259. Reuters, "Angolan Parliament Unanimously Approves Amnesty Law," April 2, 2002; see also Angola News Agency, "Army Official reports UNITA Troop movements in Huambo Province," March 23, 2002; and Lusa News Agency, "UNITA Official: Everything Possible Will be Done to Bring Peace to Angola," April 3, 2002, <http://www.lusa.pt/lusa.com.html>; see also Jose Doria, "Angola: A Case Study in the Challenge of Achieving Peace and the Question of Amnesty or Prosecution of War Crimes in Mixed Armed Conflict," *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law* 5 (2002) 3–60. See pages 37–49 for a review of amnesties offered in previous Angolan peace settlements.
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 262. *Jornal de Angola*, "Official Denies government Members on Savimbi's Payroll," May 14, 2002; see also, EBONET Media, "UNITA Fails to Comment on List of Names Implicating government Officers," May 3, 2002, <http://www.ebonet.net> See also *Expresso*, "Jonas Savimbi Notes Implicate Government Officials," April 27, 2002.
 263. American Embassy Luanda, cable no.001476, "Angola-Participation in Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Program," June 10, 2002; and also RTP

- Internacional Television, "Angolan Army Officer on Peace Process, Weapons Received From UNITA soldiers," transcript, July 16, 2002.
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CHAPTER 6

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