Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century

Edited by
JOST DÜLFFER and MARC FREY



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List of Abbreviations

AB	Archives of the Afrikaner Broederbond
AIU	Archives of the Alliance israélite universelle, Paris
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris
ANC	African National Congress
ANC	Assemblée Nationale Constituante
AML	Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté
ANF	Archives Nationales Françaises
AOF	Afrique occidentale française
AS	Archives du Sénégal
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAG	Bloc Africain de Guinée
BDEEP	British Documents on the End of Empire
BNP	Basuto National Party
CAOM	Centre des archives d'outre-mer
CGT	Conseil Général du Travail
CO	Colonial Office
FCB	Fabian Colonial Bureau
FEC	Archives of the Collège français du Sacré-Cœur, Beirut
FO	Foreign Office
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party
KVP	Katholieke Volkspartij
LAZ	Archives of the Lazarists Paris
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MRLA	Malayan Races' Liberation Army
NP	National Party
OS	Organisation Spéciale
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PDG	Parti Démocratique de la Guinée
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia
PPA	Parti du Peuple Algérien
PRA	Parti du Regroupement Africain
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
SHA	Service Historique de l'Armée

SJA	Archives of the school of the sœurs de Saint-Joseph de l'Apparition, Beirut
SJJ	Archives of the Jesuit Collège de Jamhour
SJV	Jesuit Archives, Vanves
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TANU	Tanganyika National African Union
TNA	The National Archives, United Kingdom
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UGTAN	Union Générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire

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Introduction

Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey

The dissolution of European empires and the formation of independent states in Africa and Asia is one of the most important historical processes of the twentieth century. Decolonization changed the spatial order of the globe, the imagination of men and women around the world and the established images of the globe. In South and Southeast Asia, almost all colonial territories achieved independence within the short time of one decade. In most of Africa, this process was even shorter. From the late 1950s until the early 1960s, more than 40 states emerged. However, the territories of Lusophone Africa, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia were not swept by the "winds of change" (Harold Macmillan) and the tide of history, only to become independent or free from the chains of apartheid and racial suppression in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively.

But what is "decolonization"? As both term and concept it has many meanings, and its origin dates back to the interwar period. This was a time when nationalism in the "global South" was on the rise and when colonial regimes, though expanding, came under pressure from both nationalists in the "global South" and critics of colonialism in the metropoles. From a legal perspective, decolonization denotes a transfer of sovereignty, whereby the authority over a territory passes from a foreign, culturally different regime, to indigenous groups who take over the government under the banner of national self-determination. But decolonization is more than just a sequence of political events and a change of status in terms of international law. Decolonization, as John Darwin and others suggest, not only means the devolution of sovereignty but also the dissolution of a "global colonial order," which, since the second half of the nineteenth century, had characterized relations between European powers and much of the non-European

world.[1] Colonialism meant asymmetrical relations in military, political, economic, and cultural terms. These were reinforced by structural dependencies, racisms, civilizing missions, and cultural arrogance. Decolonization thus refers to a multifaceted process of the dissolution of old, colonial, structures, institutions, and ideas, and the development of new ones over an extended period of time. It can best be described as a transformative process operating in almost all spheres of life and on all levels of society.

The field of decolonization studies has undergone significant changes in recent years. As new approaches have proliferated and research interests have expanded, it has become one of the most vibrant fields of historical inquiry – always in flux and constantly yielding new perspectives and surprising insights. It is sufficient here to name but a few of the fascinating trends visible in contemporary decolonization studies: the fruitful integration of "orientalist" as well as postmodern approaches into political, social, economic, and cultural history; the appropriation of "subaltern" perspectives by imperial historians; and a general understanding of the importance to conceive of decolonization as not simply a transfer of power.[2] Last but not least, studies of decolonization are beginning to regard this transformation as not just a phenomenon pertinent to African and Asian societies. It is now taken as a process which also affected European societies, in terms of international relations, domestic politics, identity, and social relations.[3]

A key to understanding the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial is agency. Individuals and social groups shaped decolonization. Actors struggled and fought for independence, others tried to retard or suppress it, while still others simply tried to accommodate to the fundamental changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural realms as best as possible. This volume puts agency squarely at the center of debate. More specifically, the chapters in this volume look at elites, leaders, and social groups who changed the course of history. Elites are conceptualized here as social groups who command certain resources in a given social entity. These can be political support, economic power, or symbolic resources such as communication or knowledge.[4] Elites were vital in mediating and driving the complex processes which ultimately led to decolonization. At the same time there were also elite groups who lost influence and power or who were deprived of old privileges while others had to re-invent themselves in new surroundings. Whatever the fate of these elites, they were instrumental to the decolonization process: they were actors who made decolonization possible, even if some were used as European instruments to "organize" independence in ways

conducive to European interests. Given the diversity of elite groups and their actions within different settings and regions, it is difficult to suggest a clear-cut classification. However, for conceptual purposes, the following ideas are suggested.

Indigenous elites in colonial contexts emerged in the context of a complex interplay of conflicting promises and constraints of the colonial project. They were confronted with ambivalences, contradictions, and paradoxes in the field of governance, the economy, education, religion, and social organization. Over time, the so-called civilizing missions of the colonial powers came to be exposed as self-serving ideologies which de-legitimized, rather than consolidated, imperial rule.[5] Co-opted traditional elites, whose social background was usually grounded in regional hierarchies, competed for influence with newly emerging anti-colonialist elites, who were largely Western-educated and situated within an urban environment. They were anything but a socially coherent group; however they were usually united in their aim to achieve independence.

What form independence should take and in which spatial configuration the independent country should materialize was, however, not so clear. In French Africa, for instance, the debate about future African states oscillated between smaller units and larger ones. The visions of West African political elites did not center at all on the compartmentalized spatial order that came into being with independence. But in other parts of Africa, and in most of Asia, nationalist leaders and elites accepted the spatial order colonialism had imposed. For instance, modernizers (again, with the exception of French West Africa) responded perhaps most immediately to the contractions and paradoxes of colonial rule. Originally politically marginalized and suppressed by colonial powers, and oftentimes by co-opted indigenous elites as well, nationalist modernizers came to embody the very contradictions they addressed: they aimed at a revolution in a political and institutional sense, thus overcoming European-imposed structures. At the same time they wanted to create "nation" states in the European sense; that is, forge states that based their legitimacy on the notion of a unity of culture and territory. This, in turn, required the re-invention of tradition. Cultural and historical markers of identification were necessary in order to broaden the social basis of nationalist modernizers and to mobilize largely rural populations for the nationalist cause. Strangely enough, nationalist modernizers rarely opted for a social revolution as well.

Ethnic nationalists, usually active alongside or in opposition to nationalist modernizers, frequently opted for the "return" to an imagined

past. While nationalist modernizers were overwhelmingly in favor of a strong, centralized state, ethnic nationalists were federalists. Some envisioned the creation of states based on notions of common ethnicity, language or culture. Everywhere in Asia and Africa, they remained unsuccessful, because they were not able to overcome the contradiction between an "imagined tradition" and the realities of spatial and political units created by the colonial state.

Finally, there were the traditional elite or various groups of the nobility who had been designated as traditional elites by the colonial powers. Traditional elites wielded great influence in the late colonial period and during decolonization. This often overlooked influence was, however, attacked from two angles. While colonial powers grudgingly realized that they had bet on the wrong horse, nationalist modernizers were able to identify the nobility as collaborators, thus eroding, sooner or later, their power base – their close connection with rural populations. Nevertheless, the fact that social revolutions did not occur testifies in many locales and settings to the continuing influence of the nobility as representatives and legitimizing groups of national discourses. Quite often, they continued to serve as symbols of "invented traditions," and thus facilitated the construction of modern states and societies. Their importance as providers of spiritual security in a time of revolutionary political change was likewise considerable.

Not everywhere, but throughout most of the colonial world economic elites had been either of European descent or diaspora groups: Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, Greeks and merchants from the Levant in West Central Africa. Diaspora economic elites were usually merchants. They were not owners of the means of production. Ethnic and functional dispositions posed dual challenges for economic elites and nationalist elites: would economic elites be loyal to the nationalist cause? How did they envision their future in postcolonial states? And did newly independent states pose restrictions on economic elites?

A central feature of colonialism was the imposition of foreign rule. Foreign functional elites took over government control, either by force and conquest or by negotiations and unequal treaties. During decolonization, these functional elites, mostly of European descent, found themselves in positions where they were no longer needed. Neither nationalist modernizers nor, on the whole, European societies needed the expertise and the manpower of these elites any more. They became, with very few exceptions, redundant. Migration was in most cases the only option available, and indeed happened in numerous cases.

This volume addresses these issues from different angles and perspectives. Its emphasis is on the various elites of the "global South," ranging from Southeast Asia to India and Sub-Saharan Africa. Two chapters, however, deal with metropolitan elites in the colonial setting and in Europe, with a particular focus on the Netherlands. Two other chapters cover the international level by addressing elite cooperation in the context of decolonization and the Cold War.

The first chapter, written by Martin Thomas, draws our attention to an elite group without which the colonial state could not have functioned: the intelligence providers. By the early twentieth century information collection and covert policing were well established as building blocks of colonial control. Colonial security services were also in rapid, if uneven, evolution. Their development as distinct elites dispensing state violence was generally contingent on the scale of local resistance to colonial control and the perceptions of threat among governing agencies and settler groups. The result was that numerous colonial governments extended the operational range and jurisdictional roles of their police forces, and bureaucratized processes of record-keeping, information collection, and intelligence sharing about indigenous populations. The growth of colonial security services in the British and French Empires was further catalyzed by the local disruption and political destabilization consequent upon the impact of World War and, more broadly, by diffusion of social pressures among which iniquitous, often highly coercive labor regimes, widespread labor militancy, and proto-nationalist organization stand out.

Paul Kratoska then follows with a chapter on elites in Southeast Asia and their notions of the "nation." In Southeast Asia the contexts in which elite groups emerged changed following the introduction of colonial rule, and again with the transition to independence. In each case certain elements within the existing elite group survived the change while others did not, and each transition brought the emergence of new elites. Under colonial rule, the region's nobilities lost much of their influence, and the transition to independence reduced them to the status of ordinary citizens. An administrative elite created under colonial rule did survive the transition, although after independence it was subject to the authority of a new local political elite. Trans-national business activity flourished before and during colonial rule and the mercantile class was a powerful elite group; however, with independence they were supplanted by national business elites. The chapter focuses on ideas the elites had of the "nation, and it follows the paths by which elites constructed notions of the "nation" in the various countries of Southeast Asia.

The third chapter, written by Marc Frey, complements Thomas's chapter on colonial elites and connects to the discussion of Southeast Asian elites in that it discusses the role of Dutch political, business, and functional elites in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies/ Indonesia. It explains political elites' behavior, thoughts, and actions in terms of the Dutch model of "consensus democracy" and of socio-cultural "pillarization." Business elites took a somewhat different perspective from the ones of the political elites in that they accommodated earlier to decolonization. Finally, the chapter looks at functional elites, which played an important role in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial. While drawing on the Dutch case, the chapter invites comparisons with British and French cases, and it complements the discussion of emerging business elites in Indonesia in the fourth chapter.

Economic decolonization in Indonesia and the role of Chinese and Indonesian business elites is discussed by J. Thomas Lindblad in Chapter 4. He identifies the business elites that emerged in the wake of the Indonesian Revolution and that were eventually to replace the European, primarily Dutch business elites, which had also retained their dominant position in Indonesia after independence had been achieved. The transition of economic power is reviewed in a wider context of macroeconomic development and economic policy-making.

The volume now leaves Southeast Asia and moves on to the Middle East. In her chapter on the French schools in interwar Lebanon, Esther Möller skillfully uses the concept of the civilizing mission to look into the role of the French schools for the colonial, and indeed postcolonial, project. By moving to the micro-level of colonial governance, Möller analyzes school records located in remote archives in France and Beirut. The chapter shows how important the French schools were in forging elites conducive to the French mandate and to the long-term affiliation of Lebanese elites with France.

The political imagination of elites in French West Africa is the topic of Chapter 6, written by Frederick Cooper. He argues that ideas of political emancipation were more diverse than the claim to a singular state for each nation or people. Political leaders were trying to imagine for themselves different political forms that would turn the inequalities of colonial empire into something else. Some doubted whether the territorial state, in the context of extreme poverty, offered much of a solution to colonized people. Among political leaders in French-speaking West Africa, there was a frank recognition of hierarchy in the global order and an attempt to turn the very connections that led to exploitation and disempowerment into the means to overcome poverty

and inequality. For many Africans, such claims were not incompatible with a sense of cultural distinction and cultural assertiveness, but when it came to defining what the unit of affinity should be, there was considerable uncertainty until the very moment of independence. Did the "nation" lie in the numerous and diverse units of African society? Could it be found in the territorial boundaries imposed by colonization less than a century ago? Was the "nation" in larger units of cooperation and potential solidarity, such as French West Africa, in a pan-African vision of solidarity, or in a French nationality and citizenship, purged of invidious inequality? The chapter discusses the complex discourse of African political elites in the context of multiple identities and invites for comparisons with the cases outlined by Paul Kratoska.

An intriguing case of the interaction between colonial and native elites is presented in the chapter on South African apartheid and African political elites in South Africa by Christoph Marx. Apartheid confronted African elites with two alternatives. If they became protagonists of African nationalism and were active in political organizations like the African National Congress, they had to reckon with state repression. Legal prosecution of such leaders intensified since the early 1950s and culminated in 1960 in the banning of the nationalist organizations. The alternative was to work within the system, which restricted the room for political activities to the framework of apartheid. The chapter takes a closer look at those politicians who used the context of Verwoerd's homeland policy to further their own political careers.

Spatially moving up a little to the North, but remaining thematically in the context of South African decolonization, Michael Bollig addresses the role and position of chiefs in northern Namibia from a long-term perspective. Chiefs, in academic literature often addressed as neo-traditional chiefs, traditional authorities, or intermediaries of power, are popular topics of research. It may be because of their ambiguous and almost paradoxical stand within a modern setting. They are legitimized through ancient genealogies, patronage, and accumulation of power and yet many see them as essential for the establishment of a civil society based on democratic rules. Others argue it is because of the astounding resilience of the institutions of chieftaincy: although firmly established only through colonial administrations, and co-opted by colonial administrations in the 1950s and 1960s for their projects of modernization, chiefs successfully integrated themselves into postcolonial states and are nowadays well-fettered partners of nongovernmental organizations. It seems that especially in southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) traditional authorities are

strong and have successfully bolstered their elite position in the process of decolonization. This chapter shows how chiefs in north-western Namibia established themselves in a first phase of decolonization leading to the establishment of a separate homeland as partners of the colonial administration in the 1950s and 1960s. The chapter also shows how they nowadays act as self-confident partners of governmental administrations and internationally funded nongovernmental organizations alike.

The next three chapters focus on the role of individuals in decolonization processes. Judith Brown takes us back to Asia, more specifically to India. Her chapter addresses the important issue of leadership in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial. It examines the experience of Jawaharlal Nehru in the process of decolonization, and it focuses mainly on the 1930s through the 1950s, the transitional period of the end of British rule in India and the making of a new nation state. Brown calls this period the "the long decolonization," as the British devolved power constitutionally to Indian politicians and began to appoint Indians to senior roles in the civil service and the army. At the same time much that was colonial in origin remained even after formal independence. Contrary to his popular image as a member of India's political elite who moved seamlessly as Gandhi's heir to become India's first Prime Minister – much admired for maintaining India's stability and for successfully establishing her as a world player – the chapter probes some of the problems of Nehru's role, particularly the dilemmas of his colonial inheritance.

A second case of leadership is presented by Mairi S. MacDonald in her chapter on the African and Guinean nationalist Ahmed Sékou Touré. As leader of the dominant party in Guinea 1952 until his death in 1984, Touré's hold on power was more often than not the result of a balancing act. Sometimes the balance called for finesse; more frequently and notoriously, the party and state leadership opted for "frontal attacks" of varying degrees of physical or psychological brutality. A charismatic, self-made man with family ties to two of Guinea's three largest ethnic groups, Sékou Touré's longevity resulted from the unusual monopoly that Guinea's political elite exercised over power in the state. The kernel of this state of affairs were actions that Sékou Touré and his party took in the years leading up to independence; but it took the self-interested reactions of the colonial power and of other international players to germinate it and bring it to fruition in the postcolonial period.

The final chapter on leadership, written by Andreas Eckert, deals with the equally charismatic Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Nyerere and

his impact on his country can best be understood by an analysis of three intertwined elements. First he possessed a perspective of where he wanted to go in the long term. Second, a realism and feel for tactics in the short term and, last, an imagination and common touch in his speeches and writing, which earned him the respect even of those who did not agree with him. This unusual combination of talents was even more effective in the specific political and cultural context of the 1960s and 1970s and the role Africa played in Cold War strategies and Western "tiers mondisme." His political thinking absorbed some quite diverse influences that are not often explicitly mentioned in his writings. This thinking, in turn, had a considerable impact upon both the nationalist movement in the late colonial period and political development in independent Tanzania. What is striking in the case of Nyerere's political activities (as with many other politicians of his generation), is the somewhat eclectic combination of elements of African "tradition" and European "modernity," whereby much of what is presented as "tradition" is the product of the same modernity to which this "tradition" seems to be opposed.

The last two chapters move from the local and the metropolitan level to the international and global dimension, and address issues of elite behavior and elite formation from the perspective of the nexus between decolonization and the Cold War. Corinna Unger looks at American non-state actors and their efforts to forge nationalist elites who were ideologically and socially aligned to the wider causes of US policies vis-à-vis the "global South" during the Cold War. Educating elites in the decolonized regions featured prominently in private and public American development policies. Large amounts of money were invested into establishing universities, libraries, research institutes, and exchange programs to bring forth "the best and the brightest" of the newly independent Asian and African nations. Framed by modernization theory and Cold War liberalism, the support of elites through higher education seemed to offer a peaceful, constructive way of furthering indigenous as well as American interests in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. The chapter focuses on the activities of the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation in Africa. Their staff, considering themselves part of an elite, took a leading role in identifying problems related to decolonization, and they sought solutions to alleviate and/or solve these problems.

From the perspective of the "other side" of the Cold War, Andreas Hilger draws our attention to Soviet efforts to create elites in the "global South" that were conducive to its policies and aims during the 1950s and

1960s. The chapter looks at various development initiatives – knowledge transfers, support for universities, student exchange programs, and so forth – and interprets them in light of communist development theories and practices. India as an example is singled out, as it was the most important recipient country of Soviet foreign aid.

While the volume cannot claim to be truly comprehensive – gender, for instance, is a sadly neglected issue – it addresses the fate of elites, and the ways elites and nationalist elite leaders shaped decolonization processes. The book charts the complex interplay between the local, the metropolitan, and the international and it helps to appreciate the fundamental changes which decolonization brought about. Conceptions of the nation, of identity, and of political leadership, and the economic and social transformations of decolonization cannot be understood without an analysis of those leaders and social groups who were instrumental in shaping the multifaceted process from the colonial to the postcolonial.

Notes

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1

Intelligence Providers and the Fabric of the Late Colonial State

Martin Thomas

Introduction

By the early twentieth century information collection and covert policing were well established as building blocks of colonial control. As the social anthropologist Benoît de l'Estoile notes, "administering conquered territories called for the establishment of a colonial order in both the cognitive and political senses of the word 'order.'"[1] Colonial security services were also in rapid, if uneven, evolution. Their development as distinct elites dispensing state violence was generally contingent on the scale of local resistance to colonial control and the perceptions of threat among governing agencies and settler groups. The result was that numerous colonial governments extended the operational range and jurisdictional roles of their police forces, and bureaucratized processes of record keeping, information collection, and intelligence sharing about indigenous populations. Many adapted metropolitan models of police organization to individual colonies and frequently imported domestic security specialists or police and military officers with recent, cognate experience in other dependencies.[2] The growth of colonial security services in the British and French Empires was further catalyzed by the local disruption and political destabilization resulting from the impact of world war and, more broadly, by diffuse social pressures among which iniquitous, often highly coercive labor regimes and more widespread labor militancy and proto-nationalist organization stand out.[3]

Intelligence providers in the interwar period stood at the interface between European imperial authority and indigenous elite opinion. Police officers, gendarmes, district officials, and the local intermediaries on whom they depended for information about subject populations, opinion trends, and potential threats were the face of the colonial

state in what remained overwhelmingly rural societies tied to cycles of agricultural production or a narrow range of primary industries.[4] Those interested in knowing what dependent populations thought and who intended worked within highly iniquitous, exploitative economic structures in which indigenous majorities were systematically denied the civil rights and economic advantages of their European overseers. With no equality before the law, or between local variants of customary law and imported European legal codes, colonial populations had little incentive to confide in the state officials that enforced that law.[5] Aside from the obvious difficulties of gathering information from hostile subjects in the first place, intelligence providers were confronted with difficult choices in matters of source selection and threat assessment. All such choices were informed by a peculiar combination of available information and the prevailing attitudes of European officials that determined how such information would be interpreted and exploited.[6] The creation of new institutional apparatuses, the allocation of limited governmental resources, and decisions about whom to work with and who to exclude, shared a common basis. All derived from that admixture of underlying assumptions, accumulated evidence, and projected outcomes that informed policy-making. The information presented to governments national, colonial, and local by their administrative services was integral to the choices made.

This chapter focuses on discrete, but often large, groups whose occupation it was to address these concerns: the providers of intelligence to governmental authorities about internal social conditions within the colonial empires of Britain and France. These were communities with privileged access to information and, more importantly, to its analysis and transformation into policy outcomes. The term "community" is selected here because membership indicated commonalities of political outlook, but not necessarily of cultural background or shared economic interest. Indeed, in its local informants and junior functionaries, this intelligence community had its own subalterns, people who were frozen out of policy analysis but who nonetheless exerted influence from below through the social constructions and interpretive readings they attached to the information they supplied. The European officials, policemen, and soldiers above them could more properly be called an elite, a distinct group both in terms of political function and social status, whose identity as "intelligence providers" stemmed from the fact that they ascribed value to policy advice on the grounds of how far it was – or was not – rooted in intelligence-derived information.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first reviews the nature, composition, and role of these intelligence-providing elites. The second considers a series of examples from the post-1945 decade illustrating how intelligence provision was organized and acted upon, sometimes with success, sometimes without. Taken together, these case studies suggest that intelligence provision may help us understand late colonial states as "intelligence states" in which effective exploitation of political information became increasingly critical to the survival of colonial rule.

Intelligence providers and the colonial state

In a landmark article in 1989, Ann Laura Stoler warned of the methodological problems inherent in treating colonial power as something absolute or homogenous:

> The terms *colonial state, colonial policy, foreign capital,* and the *white enclave* are often used interchangeably ... colonizers and their communities are frequently treated as diverse but unproblematic, viewed as unified in a fashion that would disturb our ethnographic sensibilities if applied to ruling elites of the colonized ... the assumption that colonial political agendas are self-evident precludes our examination of the cultural politics of the communities in which the colonizers lived.[7]

Developing Stoler's ideas, Nicholas Thomas connected the diversity of European colonialism to the limited reach of imperial rule.[8] In his eyes, colonial administration was marked by efforts to instil "an appearance of dominance and order ... that was matched neither by practical control nor by more than a limited transformation of indigenous life." Colonial states were therefore "haunted by a sense of insecurity, terrified by the obscurity of 'the native mentality' and overwhelmed by indigenous societies' apparent intractability in the face of government." While these scholars were primarily concerned with the cultural manifestations of colonialism, each discerned that fear of imminent disorder and violence underpinned the attitudes and actions of European elites, whether in government or outside it.

Those same agencies of the colonial state that amassed information about indigenous populations in order to cope with these perceived threats also sought to control the movement of knowledge within local society.[9] Their aim was to mold popular opinion, or, at the very least, shape the views of local "vernacular" elites. Colonial security certainly required a measure of control over the ebb and flow of political

debate, but it was just as essential to know what was being discussed in mosques, markets, communal washhouses, clan gatherings, and village meetings, as it was to uncover the plans of nationalist organizations operating at the margins of legality. Only then could local authorities set about influencing these differing forums of opinion to European advantage. Legislative proscription of subversive groups was too blunt a weapon. If used indiscriminately it was likely to undermine those institutions of civil society – tribal and village councils, educational establishments, professional associations, trade guilds, and business networks – that Western rule claimed to promote. Governments required information from within such forums in order to anticipate the causes of dissent. Intelligence elites generally preferred to monitor, infiltrate, and, they hoped, control, rather than to ban and risk driving their opponents underground beyond the reach of information collection. Administrators, police, and other security agencies therefore exploited the formal, increasingly bureaucratized information systems of the colonial state to exert influence over autonomous networks of social communication within colonial societies – local language media, religious forums and mass social gatherings, indigenous market places, and meeting places of key groups and individuals.[10]

Efforts to understand the social, and so manipulate the social environment, quickly collapsed into a broader security strategy. Furthermore, in most contexts in which European intelligence providers formulated threat assessments about non-European colonial subjects or regional rivals, prevailing racial attitudes inevitably affected intelligence analysis. The operating assumption of "threat" in intelligence analysis implies that an individual or group exhibit both the intention to act and the capacity to do so in ways prejudicial to state security. Yet intelligence analysts had little truck with detailed consideration of changing levels of support for hostile political groups. More sweeping generalizations took precedence instead. British and French colonial threat assessments assumed that political disorders were likely to begin in urban or tribal settings. It was further calculated that the peasant majority in the countryside were easily led into dissent by their own community leaders or, more simply, by a sense of having little to lose. Furthermore, a common security service belief that Muslim subjects in particular were predisposed to religious fanaticism or political extremism obviated the need for careful evaluation of their grievances. Since these complaints were typically a product of colonialism itself – racial exclusion, economic marginalization, and affronts to culture – it was perhaps inevitable that colonial intelligence analysts were, on occasion, deaf to them.

Put simply, intelligence assessments characterized colonial subjects as putty in the hands of shrewd political manipulators, whether European or indigenous.

The result was that, even in relatively tranquil colonies, alarmist threat assessments could gain credibility without much corroborative evidence. Conversely, in areas of intense anticolonial activity, such as French Vietnam, security services typically found it harder to process and analyze sensitive political intelligence than to gather such information in the first place. This was a phenomenon apparent from the outset of organized nationalist opposition to colonial rule. The outbreak of rebellion in French Indochina in early 1930 proved the point.[11] From 1925 onward Sûreté and military security agencies in Hanoi and Saigon had collated detailed police reports on Vietnamese communist activity, including the organization of the first Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) cadres. But in processing their intelligence on communist organizational structures, tracking the movements of known activists, and compiling profiles of ICP leaders, Sûreté staff lost sight of the ideological underpinnings, fixity of purpose, and unique popular appeal of Vietnamese communism to an impoverished peasantry.[12] The mutiny of Vietnamese infantry at Yen Bay in February 1930, which, in turn, catalyzed more widespread civil unrest in Tonkin and communist-backed rebellions in northern Annam thus came as a shock.[13]

Another apparent oddity is that many within these intelligence elites that supplied information to higher authorities in British and French colonial territories did not see themselves as part of a colonial security service establishment. Most were regional administrators, preoccupied by the daily tasks of local government. These tasks nevertheless tied them to the bureaucracy of colonial state surveillance. Imperial authorities always considered early indications of any shifts in public opinion fundamental to their capacity to maintain control. In one key respect, however, the surveillance of dependent populations was less ambitious than its metropolitan equivalent. Within the colonies, before 1945, information on the popular mood was generally used to uphold imperial power rather than to adjust policies to meet the demands of the indigenous population. The rigid confinement of indigenous staff to junior positions makes it difficult to speak of genuinely mixed, hybridized European-indigenous intelligence communities rather than European-controlled intelligence systems employing local subordinates. But greater reliance on these junior functionaries in the provision of agents' reports and in the maintenance of public order also altered the nature of intelligence gathering and assessment, something that would become more

apparent in the postwar empires as developmentalism, reform plans, and the pressure of popular opposition gathered momentum.

Much of the daily work for those gathering information about dependent populations was routine, a cycle of clerical record keeping and statistical returns, provincial tours, meetings with local dignitaries, and the arbitration of minor disputes. These accumulated tasks were typically registered in summary reports of past activity. Details of public works inspections, meetings with settlers, traders, and mission staff, discussions with lowly village headmen or chiefly rulers: all were distilled into written record.[14] Individual events, discussions, or observations of particular importance might justify a letter, telegram, or telegraphic dispatch to the governor's office or the local military headquarters. But this was the exception, not the rule. In general, the more prosaic records of local administration were the stuff of intelligence assessment. The paper chain of regional bureaucracy passed up the line of imperial authority was the raw material of the colonial information order.

Across colonial territories this summary information was codified in similar ways. District commissioners' monthly or weekly reports, regional governors' summaries of local conditions, or more specialist departmental surveys of policy options typically divided their analyses of the colonial situation into what could be classified as administrative intelligence, environmental intelligence, and political intelligence.[15]

Administrative intelligence related to matters such as taxation systems, judicial proceedings, public health, economic migration, and tribal affairs. Environmental intelligence was primarily a matter of communications and agronomy. It described the state of the internal infrastructure, soil conditions, the crop cycle and pests, market prices and foodstuff shortages, meteorological data and water resources, and the size and condition of national livestock herds. Political intelligence reported local disputes, the reaction of community leaders to policy changes or significant political developments, and the activities of organized political groups, whether parties, tribal confederations, or labor organizations. Where comments on public opinion were made, they were typically deduced by reference to issues of the day in the vernacular press and any major public gatherings whether oppositional, ceremonial, or commercial.[16]

The proportion of incoming reportage devoted to administrative matters remained broadly constant, a reflection of the perennial nature of the issues discussed. Taxes, criminal proceedings, and variable public health were permanent preoccupations of colonial government. By contrast, the volume of reportage on environmental topics and

political affairs varied in response to the most pressing concerns of the colonial authorities at the time. District officials and garrison commanders paid closer attention to severe agricultural problems such as harvest failure, drought, labor shortages, or crop infestations because of their adverse impact on the local economy and society. And political intelligence was most fulsome when dominated by "bad news" of local violence or mounting threats to the colonial state.[17]

The obverse was that in more tranquil political conditions, district commissioners, police captains, and even regional governors were content to pass over the local political scene with little comment. Prevailing assumptions about the corruptive potential of urban politics on otherwise compliant peasant cultivators and tribal populations compounded this tendency to report on rural political developments in terms of the disruptive presence of external elements from the towns, whether politicians, absentee landlords, religious scholars, or resentful junior functionaries.[18] It was a stock feature of British and French political intelligence especially to write extensively on political issues only in response to tangible evidence of local instability provoked by such "outsiders." In more placid conditions, political officers simply noted that there had been no important developments in the period under review.[19]

Intelligence providers in the age of decolonization

Preoccupation with external agitation was a constant feature of colonial intelligence communities, but increased markedly as the unresolved issues of World War II hardened into Cold War antagonism. Moreover, human intelligence remained supreme in the postwar colonial world as it had done before 1939. The quest for reliable informants and the identification of flashpoints liable to escalate into political violence placed the onus on colonial officials and security force personnel to seek out indigenous clients from whom to obtain early warning of unrest. When this proved impossible as, for example, occurred in British India, Burma, and Palestine during 1945–6,[20] in the Gold Coast in 1947–8,[21] and in French Madagascar in early 1947,[22] "net assessment" – based on the comparative evaluation of diverse intelligence material – broke down entirely. The proliferation of mass protests, major industrial disputes, and outright rebellions in other European colonial territories between 1945 and 1950 suggested either that intelligence collection was failing or that information gathered was not analyzed and exploited in sufficient time to be useful to state agencies. The rest of this chapter

considers this proposition by reference to a series of examples from the British and French Empires in the decade after 1945.

One measure of the effectiveness of government in coping with challenges to colonial authority was the quality of the information of all types fed through bureaucratic channels to policy-making elites. Where state authorities operate without the assent of the great majority of the subject population, the usefulness of that information – its source, its breadth, and its interpretation – may be critical to their very survival. Such was increasingly the case in the French and British Empires in the era of decolonization that began in earnest immediately after World War II.[23] It was no coincidence that French, British, Belgian, and Dutch colonial officials in Africa and Southeast Asia and their ministerial bosses back home became increasingly receptive to intelligence sharing over the course of the late 1940s.[24] Security intelligence featured high on the list of desirable information, notably in Southeast Asia and the Middle East where major uprisings broke out in the immediate aftermath of the War.[25] There were also obvious benefits to pooling sensitive intelligence about insurgent groups with transnational contacts, foreign bases and regional networks of funding and supply. Hence, for example, British eagerness for any French intelligence about Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood was matched by French requests for information about contacts between Maghreb nationalist groups and the Cairo-based Arab League.[26] It was significant that Quai d'Orsay proposals, first put forward in 1932 to share political intelligence about the Arab world with their Foreign Office counterparts were finally taken up by the Attlee government in February 1949 when earlier, bitter acrimony between the Entente partners over their respective withdrawals from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine was beginning to soften.[27] That said, some of the most useful material gathered, particularly in relation to black African territories, was open source reportage about routine administrative processes and longer-term government plans.[28] In London and, more especially, Paris there was immediate recognition that details of everything from available medical facilities to median colonial incomes was critical to assessments of the probability and likely locations of internal unrest.[29]

After 1945 the British and French governmental establishments thus remained epicenters of discrete, but sometimes overlapping imperial information orders. The rapid transmission of political, military, and economic intelligence about dependent territories was as pivotal to colonial policy in the age of decolonization as it had been in the earlier period of imperial conquest.[30] In another sense, however, the focal point of imperial intelligence analysis was shifting fundamentally.[31]

Ministries in London and Paris recognized the requirement for more precise information about colonial social conditions to maximize the effectiveness of planned reforms, whether small-scale and regional or intended to culminate in some form of controlled devolution of power to the indigenous majority.[32]

As a result, imperial governments and their colonial satellites posed an additional question to their information providers and policy analysts: were long-term "transfers of power" feasible, or would the imperial masters face civil unrest, armed resistance, or forced eviction if they tried to cling on? As I have suggested elsewhere, by the late 1940s colonial intelligence analysis became a matter of processing decolonization, trying to make sense of indigenous social movements, the influence of external forces and ideologies, and the power of organized anticolonial nationalism in order to assist a regulated transformation in the relationship between the mother country and its colonies.[33] A network of political reportage, security intelligence, and policy appreciations originally developed to consolidate colonial power was now employed to help ensure that the continuation, adaptation, or abandonment of British and French imperial authority took place as far as possible on European terms. Failing to achieve this, in practice intelligence communities took a more repressive turn, a shift illustrated by the examples below.

Intelligence providers and state repression: The Algerian example

Postwar Algeria offers evidence of a highly authoritarian and communally divided society in which elite intelligence provision altered the complexion of the late colonial state. Two related examples, one from 1945, the other from 1948–50 should prove the point. As is well known, eastern Algeria erupted into horrendous violence on the very day that World War II ended in Europe.[34] While historical debate has tended to center on whether or not the Sétif uprising signified the real start of Algeria's war of independence, the massive state repression which followed placed intelligence providers at the heart of state action. Intelligence practices were therefore instrumental to the ensuing forms of state violence. Security analysis of various strands of Algerian nationalist activity in early 1945 demonstrates how intelligence provision determined particular representations of indigenous opposition with appalling consequences. In early 1945 the authorities in Algiers, their political masters in the Paris Interior Ministry, and premier General de Gaulle's Hôtel Matignon staff received intelligence on internal

conditions in eastern Algeria from the Constantine prefecture's Centre d'information et d'études (CIE – Information Analysis Center), from Renseignements Généraux (RG) secret police personnel, from army garrison headquarters in Algiers, and, finally, from the Algeria gendarmerie command. Often sharing their findings, these distinct information providers, collectively, an intelligence elite, gathered, collated, and summarized intelligence about economic conditions, public mood, and Algerian political activity.[35]

There was consensus between them in the weeks preceding Sétif that a working political alliance had been formed between the Association of Reformist 'Ulama, the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML), and the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).[36] Accounts of 'ulama sermons and speeches, informants' reports of AML meetings, and intensive surveillance of known PPA sympathizers suggested to Algeria's intelligence community that the integral nationalists of the PPA (then still a banned party) had successfully mobilized these client groups to prepare a mass uprising, probably in the Constantine region of eastern Algeria, the AML heartland.[37]

The cumulative result of these gathering threat perceptions was that by March 1945 the Constantine prefecture had been identified as the epicenter of a tripartite menace to French rule in Algeria. Linking these readings of nationalist activity and Algerian cultural behavior to the repressive actions pursued after 8 May is less straightforward. If there was little doubt over the nature of the threat posed, politicians, officials, policemen, and gendarmes were less certain about how to tackle it. One thing was clear: reliance on predictive information to contain dissent placed intelligence gatherers alongside security forces as central components of state control. The logic of violent response as an instrument of colonial power dictated what was to follow. Just as before the uprising, so after it, intelligence reports were read in particular ways that shaped security force repression. Almost without exception French intelligence providers in Algeria objectified the Muslim population as inherently prone to a depraved cruelty that combined primal instinct with the uncompromising radicalism of integral nationalism and the cultural exclusivity of *Salafi* teaching.[38] These intelligence assumptions were reinforced as evidence accumulated that many of the settlers and local officials killed in the original outbreaks in and around Sétif and Guèlma were victims of mob lynching, sexual violence, and posthumous mutilation. But the suggestion that the brutality of Muslim collective violence confirmed its instinctual, recidivist character was mistaken. The Sétif killings were forms of cultural resistance triggered by incipient famine

and long-standing bitterness about ethnic discrimination. Mistaken maybe, but depersonalization of the indigenous population served two instrumental purposes for the colonial state: it denied agency to the Algerian population as autonomous political actors and it dismissed socioeconomic factors as causes of the violence. Depersonalization also enabled a weakened intelligence state to ascribe collective guilt – and so act more rapidly to recover its authority – because it rendered subtler distinctions and finer judgments irrelevant.[39] This ascription became the escalatory dynamic for the retributive violence unleashed by local officials, security forces, and vigilantes, particularly in and around Guèlma.[40] What bears emphasis here is that intelligence provision shaped both the initial repression of the 1945 uprising and the longer-term reaction of the French colonial state to all forms of organized nationalist opposition in Algeria.

This point was brought home in 1948–50 in our second Algerian example: the renewed crackdown against the PPA and its affiliated armed youth wing, the Organisation Spéciale (OS). In the late 1940s most key intelligence "breakthroughs" regarding PPA strategy and planned OS attacks came from three sources: informants' reports, tailing of suspects and intercepts of their mail, and information extracted under police interrogation, the precise circumstances of which remain largely obscure but in which torture was almost certainly habitual.[41] By April 1948 an OS network was established throughout the Algiers department, and some groups were also established in the western Oranie region and the eastern department of Constantine. The OS modelled itself on communist and French resistance networks with a cellular structure designed to preserve anonymity and limit the potential for intelligence leaks should individual organizers be caught. Each local cell was made up of a head and three subordinates – a system termed "Quatre-quatre," all of which were responsible to a "general staff" charged with providing training, equipment and instructions. Some of the members of this general staff were senior MTLD politicians, such as Mohammed Ben Bella, then a senior MTLD member and OS organizer in Oranie. Perhaps inevitably, Algiers police, security force personnel, and the intelligence personnel of the Information Study Committees (Comités d'Informations et d'études) attached to the three Algerian prefectures all used the language and terminology of the French resistance to describe the OS and its relationship with the banned PPA. Thus PPA activists were identified as "*contrôleurs*," and OS paramilitaries as "*maquisards*." More discomfiting was police resort to Gestapo-type interrogations to extract names, addresses, and plans from detainees.

The discourse of resistance and an acceptance of ruthless methods to counter the PPA-OS threat also permeated French government as revealed when the Algiers authorities organized a nationwide swoop against OS cells in March 1950.[42]

On 18 February the police made the first in a sequence of arrests of known PPA activists, many of whom then provided the names of others under interrogation. As the scale of OS activity became apparent, the Algiers government warned Paris that an uprising was planned to coincide with the March anniversary of the PPA's founding. The behavior of two PPA couriers arrested on 25 February, one of whom allegedly threw himself from a moving train to avoid further police questioning, led Governor Naegelen to authorize a series of coordinated raids against known safe-houses, PPA organizers, and OS cells. The Algiers CIE summed up colonial government thinking in a report to the French Interior Ministry on the March clampdown:

> The minute organizational details of the PPA-MTLD are being uncovered day by day, and each interrogation adds another link in the chain of what we know so far. [In the Algiers department] there are "wilaya" networks in Algiers, Médéa, Blida, and Kabylia, each with their own sections or local committees, sub-groups and cells. These last are the paramilitary formations of the "OS," which, in ultra-secrecy (*superclandestinité*) form the vanguard of the Party, those who, remote from ordinary political activity, are merely anonymous pawns who will be put to work for the decisive blows (*coups durs*) of tomorrow.[43]

The Algiers authorities claimed to have known since investigating a spate of assassinations in the aftermath of the Sétif clampdown that the MTLD provided cover for PPA subversion and OS violence in Kabylia, in Médéa, and in the Algiers casbah. When Ahmed Bouda, an MTLD delegate to the Algiers Assembly was accused of arms trafficking in November 1949, Algiers security elites were able to persuade the Paris government that it was pointless to make any intelligence distinctions between MTLD "moderates" and PPA-OS "radicals." Thereafter Algeria's intelligence community identified all strains of Algerian nationalism as seditionist. Intelligence providers thus reverted to the language of the Sétif repression, insisting that the colonial state faced a colony-wide underground "resistance" funded by nationalist party subscriptions and dedicated to revolutionary violence. However, the underlying logic of this intelligence reportage – namely, that the Algerian war had already begun – was not acknowledged. Quite the reverse: the devastating

impact on the OS of the 1950 crackdown persuaded security force elites that the work of repression begun in May 1945 had finally yielded decisive results.[44]

Intelligence providers and communist insurgency: Southeast Asian examples

In the postwar decade, intelligence analysis in the conventional military sense of reviewing covert information to extract tactical or strategic advantage expanded most rapidly in the colonies of Southeast Asia. Britain, the Netherlands, and, above all, France faced well-organized armed insurgencies that, to varying extents, capitalized upon popular nationalism, economic resentments, and ethnic discrimination to meld together powerful anticolonial coalitions. In British Malaya and French Vietnam the insurgents' Communist doctrine gave pre-existing communal hostility to imperial rule a sharper edge and ensured that anticolonial rebellion would become enmeshed with East Asia's Cold War rivalries.[45]

The intrusion of Cold War calculations into the politics of anticolonial revolt also presented state intelligence agencies with new dilemmas. One was administrative. The outbreak of the Indochina War in December 1946 and the eruption of the Malayan Emergency in June 1948 necessitated urgent reappraisals of the jurisdictional boundaries between civil and military intelligence agencies.[46] At the most basic level, additional personnel with intelligence experience and particular linguistic skills were urgently required. In the French case, most were found within the ranks of the armed forces. In French Vietnam, the army's deuxième bureaux, technically responsible for military intelligence gathering, collation, and analysis, quickly consolidated its hold over political intelligence processing as well. Deuxième bureau staff serving with the French Expeditionary Force became the foremost analysts of all aspects of Vietminh activity, whether operational, political, or ideological. By contrast, in British Malaya, the Special Branch police intelligence agency, initially embarrassed by its predictive failings, would re-emerge as a core component of a more united civil-military approach to intelligence gathering in which local Chinese would play the vital role.

Changes to the management of colonial intelligence also took place at the apex of government in London and Paris. Throughout the years 1945–55 the British and French governments and their colonial administrations struggled to navigate a course between their theoretical

commitment to gradual transfers of power in Malaya and Indochina, the insistence of Asian client parties that this process be accelerated, and the abiding Western fear of communist encroachment into Southeast Asia. As a result, those policy advisory committees on both sides of the English Channel with greatest access to incoming political intelligence were among the first to suggest that colonial counter-insurgency was better construed as part of the wider Western Cold War struggle against Asian communism. In France, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Indochina (COMININDO), a ministerial "inner Cabinet" that accrued executive power steadily in the years 1946–50, took Vietnam down the road of the Bao Daï solution, and pressed for greater US military support for the fight against the Vietminh. Meanwhile, in Britain, from 1949 two key Whitehall intelligence analysis committees urged their political masters to seek American and Commonwealth backing for a common front to oppose any further communist encroachment into South or Southeast Asia.[47] The first of these was the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee (PUSC), which grouped Foreign Office department heads under the chairmanship of permanent under-secretary Sir William Strang. Created in February 1949, the PUSC modelled itself on George Kennan's State Department Policy Planning Staff. Little wonder, then, that Strang's committee used intelligence of left-wing sedition from Burma to Vietnam in an effort to persuade the Truman administration to lend stronger support to the remaining colonial powers in Southeast Asia.[48] PUSC arguments were echoed by a second intelligence analysis group, the British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East). Based in Singapore, this committee encouraged Britain's service establishment to forge links with its French, Indian, and Commonwealth counterparts, pooling intelligence and exchanging information about common strategic threats.[49]

Both the PUSC and the Defence Coordination Committee drew upon a wealth of political and military intelligence relayed from overseas posts up the Whitehall bureaucratic ladder through specialist ministry departments to government planners.[50] Situation reports based on human intelligence gathered locally by consular staff, military attachés, and liaison officers provided the greatest detail about the course of anticolonial insurgencies – more so than the occasional intercepts of insurgent communications. Colonial government officials and regional Embassy staff, in turn, compiled political intelligence summaries, generally fortnightly, in which probable events and longer-term trends were discerned. Across Southeast Asia as a whole the balance of intelligence power in the late 1940s shifted from Colonial and India Offices to the

Foreign Office and service ministries.[51] In part, this reflected British withdrawal from the Indian Subcontinent; in part, it mirrored Foreign Office and armed forces primacy in matters of Cold War strategic planning. Put simply, colonial officials increasingly focused on the local, the diplomats and "brass hats" on the international.[52]

Beyond these administrative upheavals were other, more abstract dilemmas for the intelligence providers. One was a matter of identity: were the anticolonial forces in Malaya and Vietnam – the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) and the Vietminh – primarily communist or nationalist? The question was important not least because a central plank of the British and French political response to colonial rebellions was the attempt to delegitimize the insurgents by depicting them as tools of foreign communist powers, thus dissociating them from a wider population that was allegedly reconciled to imperial oversight. Intelligence communities attached high priority to information proving either direct foreign communist interference or, at least, external ideological inspiration. The objective was to assist a widening propaganda war that portrayed leftist rebellion as unrepresentative of the popular will. Colonial intelligence grew increasingly politicized as a result. But those providing, reading, and analyzing any such raw data did not subordinate their own judgments to the primordial requirements of anti-insurgent propaganda; far from it. While accumulating evidence of communist involvement in colonial unrest, Southeast Asia's intelligence providers inevitably confronted the underlying factors critical to the original outbreaks. The first was whether rebellion was, in fact, the product of external influences or internal problems, and the second was whether the sponsors of violence were likely to win popular backing or not. Alongside these questions of internal colonial politics was a broader international dilemma: how far would Cold War alignments determine what could and could not be done to stifle internal dissent? Not surprisingly, then, a recurrent preoccupation in British and French intelligence elites' assessments of the Malayan Emergency and the Indochina War was whether the problems at hand could be handled on anything resembling colonial terms at all.

Ironically, one reason for Britain's greater success in first containing, then isolating, and finally defeating the MRLA was the embarrassment suffered by the Malayan Security Service (MSS) in failing to anticipate the Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) shift from urban strike action towards rural insurgency. Government complaints about the Security Service's poor performance at the outset of the Malayan Emergency in mid-June 1948 led to a complete overhaul of local police practice,

MSS security assumptions and intelligence collection.[53] Once it became apparent that one of the British Empire's larger security services knew relatively little about indigenous opinion, Labour's Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, instructed all colonial governments to review their local intelligence planning, focusing in particular on the threat assessments on which it was based and the consequent centers of effort in intelligence collection.[54] This time the MSS led the way. A reorganized Malayan Special Branch and the military authorities that worked alongside them exploited their knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the MCP to maximum effect. Stung by its earlier shortcomings, the Special Branch employed more indigenous Chinese speakers better attuned to picking up rumors and tidbits of information about MCP discussions and MRLA movements.[55] Such material was pivotal in at least two respects other than its well-known contribution to the disruption of MRLA supplies and the isolation of armed bands from a rural Chinese population strictly monitored under the Briggs Plan's forcible resettlement program. If this was the major coercive and practical aspect to intelligence gathering, much else was more detached and analytical.[56] For one thing, from 1950 onwards informants' reports, intercepted correspondence, and detainee interrogations confirmed that communist China was unlikely to proffer material aid to the MCP on anything like the scale witnessed in northern Vietnam. For another, police employment of increasing numbers of Chinese speakers and increased governmental data collection about local economic conditions added to the authorities' knowledge of the profound social and cultural differences within Malaya's Chinese community, making it easier to devise political solutions designed to win over discrete strata of opinion. Feeding communities of resettled rural squatters, improving the economic outlook for Chinese laborers, and providing more visible security force protection in the resettlement zones were the building blocks of colonial state control. They also severed the previous ties between the rural Chinese immigrant community and MCP recruiters.[57] Correctly estimating how indigenous populations would respond to such government initiatives depended on a constant flow of HUMINT about pressing local needs and likely popular responses to state action. Reliable intelligence was thus a cornerstone of effective psychological warfare, or "heart and minds" policies.[58]

Conclusion

Information collection by colonial states about the interracial frontiers within them highlights the degree to which they differed from the

metropolitan governments to which they were subordinate. Concepts of social theory help illustrate these differences. Bureaucratic surveillance of national populations provided the administrative foundation for the operation of the modern state, its armed forces, police agencies, and security services. Max Weber's theory of the institutionalization of rationality posits that the state, the armed forces, and large business organizations take decisions on the basis of knowledge acquired by bureaucracy – a rational *modus operandi*. Bureaucratic control was viewed positively by some as a rational, progressive response to the technical requirements of capitalist organization, negatively by others as a means to enforce the power of privileged elites.[59] Weber's interest in the asymmetric relationships between strong and weak states is also pertinent. A hegemonic power may enjoy a sufficient margin of economic, military, and technological superiority to impose its control over weaker societies. Even so, as John Ikenberry puts it, the central dilemma of politics remains: "turning raw power into legitimate authority."[60] None of these social theories were developed with colonial states in mind. But they raise a key point pertinent to us here: relative to the Western political systems to which they were subordinate, colonial states achieved only limited political institutionalization. Their state institutions and bureaucratic structures were generally far more basic and less deeply embedded in indigenous society.[61] But there is an important caveat. A central argument of this chapter is that colonial security agencies defied this general rule of bureaucratic underdevelopment. There was an exceptionally high degree of institutionalization of intelligence services, police, and security forces in colonial states that were, in other respects, bureaucratically rudimentary.[62] Intelligence providers could be, and often were, everywhere. Colonial states may, as a result, be usefully thought of as "intelligence states."

It fell to intelligence providers, whether dedicated security service personnel, indigenous informants, or civil administrators, to advise imperial governments of the day-to-day workings of the patron–client relationships on which local government administration was based. Their reports on the constant cycle of competition for influence, resources, and power between an alien administration and its indigenous auxiliaries were integral to the capacity of the colonial state either to forestall violent conflict or to suppress it. Inevitably, then, the security services were both part of the imperial policing apparatus and its elite component. It was this latter aspect that became more manifest as the pressures of decolonization mounted.[63]

In other respects, though, colonial intelligence provision after World War II was much as it had been before it. After 1945, the security services

still played a more active role than merely gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence within the state apparatus – the classic "intelligence cycle".[64] They strove to control political participation, sometimes using their powers of arrest and detention for the purpose. They regulated public political conduct by enforcing restrictions on freedom of association or prohibitions on political or trade union organization. And they manipulated the local political process by covert surveillance and coercive intervention when the colonial order appeared to be under threat.[65] But intelligence providers were rarely in control of events; more often they responded to them. In this sense, they conformed to wider patterns of decolonization: intelligence communities were part of an embattled governing elite gradually losing control. Even high quality intelligence made available quickly could not prevent the growth of indigenous opposition. This, however, was not its primary purpose. Security policy was more about containment than prevention. It was a compensatory strategy designed to overcome the inability of colonial states to impose their authority either by coercion or consent. Colonial intelligence providers were increasingly relied upon to plug the gaps in European administrative authority. It was a hopeless task. The prevailing trajectories of decolonization would reveal how limited was colonial intelligence power.

Notes

1. Benoît de l'Estoile (2005: 36).
2. For British examples, see David Arnold (1986: 122–8, 138–9), Keith Jeffery (1996: 94–122), Richard Popplewell (1988: 56–8) and Charles Townshend (1992: 22–41). For a broader survey of empire wide trends, see Georgina Sinclair (2007).
3. Again, British examples of this process are explored by John Gallagher (1981: 355–68), Gyanesh Kudaisya (2004: 41–68) and Tim Moreman (1996: 105–31).
4. Martin Thomas (2005: 1033–60).
5. It is, of course, impossible to speak generically of "colonial law," but there are obvious similarities in the ways in which subject populations strove either to manipulate it, to escape it, or to adapt it to pre-existing juridical practices. For background, see Kristen Mann and Richard L. Roberts (1991) and Lauren Benton (2002). For excellent studies of French African territories, see Richard L. Roberts (2005) and Mary Dewhurst Lewis (2008: 791–830).
6. An excellent recent study of these factors in action is by Priya Satia (2008: 59–136).
7. Ann Stoler (1989: 135–6) and Nicholas Thomas (1994: 13).
8. Nicholas Thomas (1994).

9. The remainder of this section draws upon Martin Thomas (2007), especially Chapter 1.
10. C. A. Bayly (1999: 3–6 and 365).
11. Service Historique de l'Armée (SHA), Vincennes, Moscow files, C623/D1419, SCR memo., "Troupes du groupe de l'Indochine, rapport annuel 1930."
12. SHA, Moscow, C623/D1419, EMA-2 memo., "Note au sujet du projet d'organization d'un S. R. militaire en Indochine," 31 March 1931; Huynh Kim Khánh (1982: 25–6).
13. Archives Départementales de l'Aude, Carcassonne, Albert Sarraut Papers, 12J307/Dossier: Événements de Yen Bay, Pierre Pasquier preliminary report on the Yen Bay uprising, 6 June 1930; 12J301, "État des incidents survenus en Indochine depuis le 10 février 1930," and Unsigned Sûreté intelligence report, "Localisation de l'agitation," 21 November 1930. See also Huynh Kim Khánh (1982: 150–5) and Pierre Brocheux (1977: 49–74).
14. Provincial tours remained popular in British Middle Eastern territories during the 1920s: The National Archives (TNA), UK, Foreign Office general correspondence, FO 371/13841, enclosures 1–4 in R. H. Hoare (Cairo) to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 1 March 1929.
15. See, for example, TNA, War Office papers, WO 33/999, Sudan monthly intelligence reports, 1922–5; FO 371/4984, Egypt Intelligence Staff reports summarizing provincial intelligence, 1920; India Office Archive, Political and Secret Department files for Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, 1917–22: L/PS/10/621-2, L/PS/10/762, L/PS/10/781-2. Periodic intelligence summaries compiled by the native affairs sections in the French North African administrations were similarly structured; see Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer (CAOM), Aix-en-Provence, GGA, sous-série 11H: Service des affaires indigenes, "Rapports politiques périodiques."
16. TNA, WO 33/999, Sudan monthly intelligence reports, nos. 342–61 (January 1923–August 1924) covering the development of the White Flag League and the 1924 army mutinies. For a comparable French example, see the Algiers native affairs bureau reports on support for Emir Khaled and his program of limited democratization, or "Khalédisme": CAOM, GGA, 11H46, Direction des affaires indigènes, Rapports mensuels, 1919–21.
17. See, for instance, the varying content in the native affairs division reports submitted to Algeria's prefectures before the Second World War: SHA, Moscow, C223/D123, Prefecture d'Oran affaires indigènes, Centre d'informations et d'études, "Bulletins mensuels d'informations concernant la politique indigène dans le département d'Oran," monthly political reports, 1937–9.
18. In the context of the Iraq mandate, Toby Dodge refers to this tendency presciently as "the divided social imagination of late colonialism,", see Toby Dodge (2003: 63–82).
19. As examples: CAOM, Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie (GGA), 11H46, Direction des affaires indigènes, "Rapport mensuel sur la situation politique des indigènes," reports for July 1918, and March and November 1919.
20. TNA, Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee files, CAB 158/1, JIC(47)2, "India-Organization for Intelligence," 4 January 1947; Calder Walton (2008: 435–62). The Indian case is especially striking. Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff intelligence planners were restricted to use of monthly India Command

surveys, summary reports from the India Office Information Department, and occasional appreciations from the Director of the India Political Intelligence Department. Lower level regional reports, particularly from the Tribal Territories and other Muslim-majority areas, were largely discontinued.

21. TNA, CO 537/2760, Minute by J. C. Morgan, 20 May 1948.
22. TNA, FO 371/67721, Consul-General, Tananarive, reports, "Madagascar rebellion," 1 and 7 July 1947.
23. This and the subsequent paragraph are drawn from Martin Thomas (2007), especially Chapter 4.
24. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Paris, série Z: Europe 1944–9, sous-série Grande-Bretagne, vol. 40, "Note sur la mission de M. Siriex à Londres," 14 May 1945; Direction d'Afrique-Levant, "Note pour le Secrétaire général, Conversations coloniales franco-britannique des 19–24 Novembre 1945"; Direction Afrique memo., "Memorandum des conversations Franco-Anglo-Belges des 20–22 Mai 1947."
25. TNA, CO 537/3550, Malcolm MacDonald, UK Commissioner general in Southeast Asia memo, "Anglo-French-Dutch collaboration in South East Asia," 26 July 1948.
26. MAE, série Z: Europe 1944–9, sous-série Grande-Bretagne, vol. 40, no. 41, Athens Military Attaché Dorange to EMGDN Paris, 10 February 1947.
27. MAE, série Z: Europe 1944–9, sous-série Grande-Bretagne, vol. 40, Secrétariat général note, Paris, 17 February 1949.
28. The fullest account of the development of this cooperation remains that by John Kent (1988: 55–82).
29. MAE, série Z: Europe 1944–9, sous-série Grande-Bretagne, vol. 40, Foreign Ministry note, "Extension de la coopération franco-britannique sur le plan politique," n.d., June 1948.
30. Regarding the "information order" in nineteenth-century India, see C. A. Bayly (1999).
31. A point made in the context of Southeast Asia by Karl Hack (1992: 321–2).
32. Outstanding surveys that explore this shift in expectations include those by John Darwin (1988), R. J. Butler (2002: 63–96), Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (1982) and William Roger Louis (1999: 329–56). For Colonial Office policy in Southeast Asia, see Simon C. Smith (1995) and A. J. Stockwell (1984: 68–87). For sub-Saharan Africa, see John Flint (1983: 389–411) and Ronald Hyam (1988: 148–72). For Labour policy in the Middle East, see William Roger Louis (1984) and Nicholas Owen (1998: 3–22). For the continuation of self-government thinking under the Conservatives, see David Goldsworthy (1990: 81–108).
33. Martin Thomas (forthcoming).
34. Annie Rey-Goldseiguer (2002), part III, Jean-Louis Planche (2006), particularly Chapters 6–10, and Anthony Clayton (1992: 1–21).
35. Correspondence files of these three sources are available respectively in CAOM, GGA, Cabinet civil du gouverneur général Yves Chataigneau, sous-série 8CAB, especially 8CAB 88 and 8CAB 118; CAOM, Fonds de la prefecture de Constantine, série B3, Cabinet du Préfet files; Archives Nationales (AN), Paris, Secrétariat-Général du Gouvernement et Services du Premier Ministre, files F60/871–F60/874; AN, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Cabinet du Ministre files, F/1a/3292–F/1a/3298; and Service Historique de la Gendarmerie Nationale

(SHGN), Commandement Général de la Gendarmerie en Afrique du Nord, Corréspondance Algérie, R/2, Cartons 140–4. The following authors consulted these records extensively: Benoît Haberbusch (2004) and Jean-Louis Planche (2006).

36. AN, F60/871, no. 1345/CAB/C, and no. 1395/CAB/C, two reports sent by Algiers Prefect report to Governor Chataigneau, same title: "A/S collusion entre le P.P.A. et les 'Amis du Manifeste,'" 21 March and 7 April 1945; no. 1485/CAB/C, further Algiers Prefect report, "A/S collusion entre le P.P.A. et les 'Amis du Manifeste,'" 1 May 1945.
37. AN, F60/871, no. 847/ Centre d'Information et d'études (CIE) Algiers renseignement, "Activité des Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté," 17 April 1945.
38. The echoes of contemporary depictions of Islamist violence are apparent here. On this subject, see Dag Tuastad (2003: 591–3).
39. It is worth noting here the accounts of French conscripts called up to serve in Algeria after 1956, some of whom acknowledged the speed with which they became acculturated to viewing Algerians as collectively guilty, see Stathis Kalyvas (2006: 56).
40. Jean-Pierre Peyroulou (2009), part II.
41. MAE, série Afrique-Levant, sous-série Algérie 1944–52, vol. 6, No. 309, Tunis Residency, Jean Mons to Robert Schuman/Direction Afrique-Levant, 1 March 1949. "Renseignement, 24 February 1949."
42. MAE, série Afrique-Levant, sous-série Algérie, 1944–52, vol. 6, Algiers prefecture CIE, "Note sur l'activité subversive du PPA-MTLD dans le Département d'Alger," n. d., 1950.
43. MAE, série Afrique-Levant, sous-série Algérie, 1944–52, vol. 6, Algiers prefecture CIE, "Note sur l'activité subversive du PPA-MTLD dans le Département d'Alger," n. d. 1950.
44. MAE, série Afrique-Levant, sous-série Algérie, 1944–52, vol. 6, Algiers prefecture CIE, "Note sur l'activité subversive du PPA-MTLD dans le Département d'Alger," n. d. 1950.
45. It bears emphasis that both colonial powers were increasingly preoccupied with Communist infiltration of Africa. See, for instance, the contents of TNA, CO 537/5269: Communism in the Colonies: Mediterranean; and CO 537/5263: Communist Influence in the African Continent, both compiled in 1950.
46. TNA, CAB 158/6, JIC(49)18, COS committee, JIC, "Organisation of Intelligence: Far East," 19 February 1949.
47. Mark Lawrence (2007: 120–5).
48. Richard Aldrich (1992: 22–3).
49. Ritchie Ovendale (1982: 447–64) and Karl Hack (1999: 325–6).
50. TNA, CAB 158/7, JIC(49)59/Annex I: JIC report, "Intelligence Organization in the Far East," 1949.
51. For an interesting survey of Foreign Office attitudes to the early stages of the Indochina war, informed by Saigon consular reports, see Martin Shipway (1995: 83–96).
52. It is worth noting here that the status of the Malaya civil service and the Colonial Office Eastern Department to which they reported suffered because they neither prevented nor predicted the MCP revolt. See British Documents on the End of Empire (BDEEP): Malaya, II, doc. 139, note by W. Linehan

on the Malay dimension, 2 March 1948; doc. 146, CO minutes on internal security, 28–31 May 1948.

53. BDEEP: Malaya, II, doc. 160, Malayan Security Service pol/intell. journal 15/48, 15 August 1948.
54. TNA, Colonial Office confidential original correspondence, CO 537/2793, Arthur Creech Jones circular to colonial governments, "Colonial Office review of colonial police and security forces following communist infiltration in Malaya," 5 August 1948.
55. TNA, CAB 158/8, JIC(49)82FINAL, JIC report, "Intelligence organization in the Far East – comment on Sir Henry Gurney despatch," 20 October 1949.
56. Karl Hack (1999: 126) identifies The Briggs Plan's coercive "population control" as vital to British success against the MRLA.
57. Kumar Ramakrishna (2002b: 159, 204–5).
58. Simon C. Smith (2001: 62–75), and Kumar Ramakrishna (2001: 79–92) and (2002a: 332–53).
59. Christopher Dandeker (1990: 4–29).
60. John Ikenberry (2001: 17).
61. An argument clearly expounded in Patrick Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloz (1999), especially Chapters 1 and 10.
62. Police agencies dedicated to the consolidation of state governance rather than to the preservation of a distinct corpus of law remain a common feature of postcolonial regimes in Africa; see Alice Hills (1996: 273–83).
63. Martin Thomas (2007), especially the conclusion.
64. Michael Herman (1996: 284–7).
65. The comments here follow Alice Hills (1996: 273).

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2

Elites and the Construction of the Nation in Southeast Asia

Paul H. Kratoska

The features that set elites apart from the mass of the population, be they power, wealth, piety, athletic ability, artistic skill, or something else, exist and are valued within specific geographical and social contexts. In Southeast Asia these contexts changed following the introduction of colonial rule, and again with the transition to independence. In each case some elements of the existing elite group survived the change but others did not, and each transition brought the emergence of new elites.

Southeast Asian societies before Western colonialism consisted of small groups linked through patron–client relations. Control over labor, a scarce resource in a region with abundant land and small populations, was the economic basis of patronage and underpinned elite status, which was in many societies buttressed by religious and secular ideologies that imbued elites with royal or aristocratic standing. Although these clusters sometimes formed large agglomerates, as in Burma, Siam, and Java, in much of the region (the Shan-Lao complex, the Malay Peninsula and most of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos) this did not happen.

Colonialism in Southeast Asia was built on territorial spheres of influence formed with little regard for existing social, political, cultural, or economic units. Colonial bureaucracies operated alongside existing aristocratic patronage systems, and eventually overrode them as colonial structures and procedures became more proficient. However, colonial control was uneven, strong in places crucial to the economic or strategic concerns of colonial interests such as trading ports and areas producing goods for export, but weak elsewhere.

Colonialism linked Southeast Asian societies with distant cultures, and embedded them in a world economy. The British and French

empires were global systems that operated across vast parts of Asia and Africa. The US and the Netherlands, while controlling less territory, functioned in a similar fashion. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonial administrations maintained laissez-faire economic regimes that facilitated commercial activity by external trading communities, which in Southeast Asia tended to be European, American, Chinese, Indian, Arab, Jewish, Armenian, and Bugis. The region had a venerable tradition of long distance trade, moving goods by sea within and through maritime Asia, and overland into the Asian mainland. Colonial law codes regulating contracts and commercial activity, a banking system, improved port facilities, stable currencies, and an enduring peace allowed merchant communities to flourish.

The Depression of the 1930s produced significant changes. The British and French territories in Southeast Asia were fragments of empires controlled by colonial offices that answered to their respective parliaments but enjoyed considerable local autonomy. By the 1920s and 1930s colonialism was evolving into a global system with a broad range of activities that transcended individual colonial territories, ranging from medical and scientific research in tropical areas to regional trading networks to art and culture and religion. Groups such as the Royal Colonial Institute in Britain who called for more unification and closer integration of the British Empire produced little in the way of concrete results, and the French concept of assimilating colonial territories into a single meta-nation had given way to a policy of association earlier in the century. During the Depression, initiatives such as the Ottawa Conference sought to promote empire solidarity but provided few benefits for colonies in Asia, which became more self-sufficient than before and took on new roles, particularly in the area of economic planning.[1] Preparations for war were carried out on an empire basis and to some extent restored metropolitan control, but the failure of the colonial powers to defend Southeast Asia against the Japanese invasion caused irreparable damage to what remained of their imperial aspirations.

Japan's thrust into the region in the early 1940s was an anachronistic attempt to create a new imperial system at a time when colonialism was faltering, and the idea of an Asian co-prosperity sphere perpetuated the globalizing style of earlier empires. The Japanese exploited nationalist sentiment to attract support during the invasion of Southeast Asia, but quickly marginalized nationalist elements once the conquest was complete. However, they were unable to realize the vision of a pan-Asian state and identity and, as the war turned against them, the Japanese

cultivated nationalist feeling within the territories they controlled, hoping to use these sentiments against the Allied powers.

Following Japan's surrender, it quickly became apparent that the atmosphere had changed within Southeast Asia. Britain acknowledged the altered circumstances and the futility of attempting to restore the status quo ante and set in motion a transition to independence. Malaya and the British territories in northern Borneo passed through a prolonged transition to independence, but the Burmese leadership rejected even this degree of control and declared independence in 1947. The Netherlands and France attempted to reassert authority over their colonies and responded with military force when their efforts generated resistance, setting off extended armed conflicts. The US had initiated a move toward Philippine independence before the war and this process resumed.

The states of postwar Southeast Asia retain the boundaries of pre-war colonial territories and bear a superficial resemblance to them, but there are crucial differences. After independence, these territories were no longer part of global empires, and their boundaries defined the limits of economic, political and social activity to an unprecedented degree. In place of the regional and global cooperation and reach characteristic of colonialism, the countries of independent Southeast Asia emphasized political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency. They centralized power to a much greater extent than their colonial predecessors, creating a much stronger presence in outlying areas. The final decades of colonial rule had brought increased government activity in social services such as education and health care, and colonial administrations responded to economic downturns in the 1920s and the 1930s by engaging in economic planning and introducing protectionist legislation. These activities would continue and intensify, but they now took place within the context of competing national states rather than cooperating global empires. Elites, once either local or global, now operated on an intermediate national stage.

Collaborating elites in colonial Southeast Asia

In 1972 Ronald Robinson published a seminal article entitled "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in which he argued that "imperialism was as much a function of its victims' collaboration or non-collaboration – of their indigenous politics, as it was of European expansion." He went on to say, "As the agents of large-scale industrial civilization invaded small-scale agrarian societies, the allure of what the big society had

to offer in trade, capital, technology, military or diplomatic aid, or the fear of its vengeance, elicited indigenous political and economic 'collaborators.'"[2]

Robinsonian collaborators are easily identified in colonial Southeast Asia, and they constituted a key part of Southeast Asia's elite. Western administrations formed alliances with royalty and the aristocracy, with "transnational" trading communities, and with ethnic minorities. As bureaucratic administrations took shape, an additional elite element emerged in the form of civil servants – clerks, translators, and lower-level administrators – along with members of quasi-political councils and legislative bodies (such as the Volksraad in the Netherlands Indies, and Federal and State councils in Malaya). Colonial regimes responded to the needs or wishes of local populations in various ways, but were particularly attentive to those who collaborated with them.

Aristocracies in many parts of Southeast Asia were in a weak position during the nineteenth century, facing challenges arising from the wealth of trading communities and the moral or mystical authority of religious leaders, and lacking resources and strategies that might have allowed them to resist incursions by the West.[3] The alliance between colonial administrations and local aristocracies began with colonial authorities shoring up the position of ruling elements in order to exercise authority through them, but over time the colonial bureaucracies offered many of the services formerly provided by the indigenous ruling class and much more besides, and introduced laws that undercut prerogatives such as control over manpower that were the central feature of aristocratic influence. However, in peripheral areas there was little colonial presence and traditional authorities maintained their positions.

Trading minorities were ubiquitous across Southeast Asia. Economically strong but politically weak, they were vulnerable because their business ventures could only operate with government consent, and their immovable property, stocks of goods, and capital could be destroyed or seized. Colonial governments created positive business environments, providing peaceful conditions, legal codes regulating business transactions, and reliable court systems. Accordingly, resident trading communities with foreign origins generally supported the colonial regimes.

Indigenous ethnic or religious minorities, many of whom had suffered oppression or exploitation at the hands of dominant majority groups in the past, also became colonial collaborators, receiving support in the form of protective legislation and special administrative areas. The military and police forces created by colonial administrations drew extensively on ethnic minorities.

The civil service was a vital part of colonial rule, the central element of the administration, and a crucial channel to local populations. Senior posts remained in the hands of outsiders, but lower-level positions offered upward mobility to local people who had no means of rising within traditional society. Members of various colonial councils likewise provided links with local society, but were more independent in their thinking and actions than civil servants, who were employed to carry out government policy and whose livelihood was based on their government salaries.

The Japanese occupation

The Japanese invasion placed colonial collaborators in an invidious situation because their arrangements of convenience now took on global geo-political implications, and positioned them as friends of Japan's enemies.[4] The Japanese confronted the same issue as their colonial predecessors, a problem Robinson summed up when he wrote that "no society, however dominant, can man-handle arcane, densely-peopled civilisations ... simply by projecting its own main force upon them."[5] Japan had in fact anticipated this situation and laid the groundwork for recruiting a set of collaborators with some care, drawing on the knowledge and experience of large numbers of Japanese who had lived in Southeast Asia and on research into the economies and societies of the region.[6] In practice this information was not used effectively because many of the Japanese soldiers and officials who served as part of garrison forces or staffed the civilian administrations neither understood nor respected the societies they ruled, and lacked language skills to communicate effectively with local residents.

At the start of the occupation Japan promoted a pan-Asian identity as part of the concept of a Greater East Asia, a zone of trade and production that would draw together the raw materials of Southeast Asia, the vast workforce and huge markets of China and the industrial capacity of Northeastern Asia. There was an emphasis on Asia as a totality (Britain and America had "fostered communal illwill among people enjoying a common heritage")[7] and on an Asian identity, as reflected in slogans such as "Asia for Asians." Sukarno described the new model in June 1943 when he said: "Indonesia was formerly the appendage of a small monarchy in a corner somewhere on the European continent. Now Indonesia has become part of the great family of Asian peoples."[8] This family, however, had a distinctly Japanese look to it, and Japan's emphasis on Japanese language and Japanese culture worked against the effort to develop local allies.

In general the Japanese avoided working with the collaborators used by Western administrations, but there were two exceptions. The cooperation of civil servants was essential if the administrative apparatus was to function, and the Japanese ordered them to return to their jobs and to maintain existing regulations and administrative procedures. Japan's planning documents stated: "The purpose of the administration of the occupied area is ... to restore public security and order swiftly by once again setting up administrative organizations along the existing structure and custom."[9] Wartime administrators, like those in the colonial governments Japan replaced, enjoyed elite status because of the posts they occupied and not owing to their individual qualities, apart from educational backgrounds that equipped them to function within a bureaucratic setting.

The second group was Indians, both those resident in the region before the war and the Indian soldiers Britain sent to fight against the Japanese. Indians faced strong pressure to participate in the activities of the Indian Independence League and support the Indian National Army, with the objective of driving the British out of India.

Japan attempted to develop new sets of collaborating elites by creating a wide range of civic and business organizations. At the start of the occupation, the emphasis was on organizations with a pan-Asian appeal, such as the Triple-A Movement in Java (Gerakan 3-A; the name is derived from a propaganda slogan stating that Japan was Asia's Light, Asia's Leader, and Asia's Protector), but such groups aroused little enthusiasm and their leaders did not command popular support. A second initiative involved developing collaborationist ethnic, religious, and business organizations. In Indonesia, for example, ethnic bodies included the Hua Chiao Tsung Hui (HCTH, or Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations) for Chinese, the *Arabujin Shidô Iinkai* for the Arabs, the Indian Independence League for Indians, and the *Konketsu Jûmin Iinkai* for Eurasians,[10] while in Malaya there was an Oversea Chinese Association, an Indian Independence League, an All-Malayan (Eurasian) Association, and a Malay Welfare Association.[11] For businesses, the Japanese organized *kumiai*, groupings of firms that held quasi-monopolies over certain types of wholesale and retail trade.[12] Japanese administrations tried to forge ties with religious leaders, but in this area they acted cautiously and enjoyed little success.

Efforts to develop new elites that would support Japan's activities also included leadership training schemes (Koa Kunrenjo). For example, the Syonan (Singapore) Koa Kunrenjo, which began operations in May 1942, was set up to train prospective civil servants. "One of the main

aims of the course is to give the cadets a complete course in Nippon-Go [Japanese language], develop a spiritual outlook, and a general Nippon education."[13] In addition, there were programs that sent promising young students to Japan to pursue their studies, arranged tours for local journalists, and conducted a wide range of training programs.

These initiatives were hampered by Japan's lack of military success after the initial push into Southeast Asia, and by economic collapse. With shipping to a great extent requisitioned for military use and always subject to attack, trade dwindled, and as a consequence production for export collapsed, leaving wartime administrations without financial resources because they had no tax base. Severe shortages of food, clothing, fuel, spare parts, and other basic goods produced widespread black market activity, and the Japanese military's practice of printing money to cover expenses caused severe inflation. Pre-war business elites fared very badly in this environment, with the Chinese in particular attracting Japanese hostility because of their support for China during the Sino-Japanese war, although this was more the case in Malaya and Singapore than in Indonesia.

Nationalists greeted the Japanese with enthusiasm and in some cases actively supported the invading forces in the expectation that Japan would be transferring power to them. It soon became apparent that Japan had other plans in mind, and pre-war nationalist leaders were marginalized in the early stages of the occupation. In 1943, as Allied military successes mounted and economic conditions in the occupied territories deteriorated, Japan shifted course and began to promote local nationalisms in the hope that people who were clearly unwilling to endure hardships and danger for Japan might do so in defense of their own nation or state. Nationalist aspirations were not entirely in harmony with Japanese goals, and theocratic or aristocratic leaderships might have served the purpose equally well. However, Japan's relations with both aristocratic and religious elites were problematic, and power eventually did go to people claiming nationalist credentials, although with strong safeguards to protect Japan's interests.

The frontline states of the Philippines and Burma received independence in 1943 under what are usually described as "puppet" governments. A similar arrangement took shape in Indonesia during the final months of the war, although a declaration of independence there came only after the Japanese surrender, a circumstance that allowed nationalist leaders there to claim that they had seized independence rather than having it given to them by the Japanese. In granting independence to Burma and the Philippines, the Japanese sought to place power in the

hands of elite elements who would be reliable allies. After the war, the European powers would adopt a similar strategy and, like the Japanese, they considered that groups promoting a secular nationalist vision offered the best prospects.

In a classic study of the Philippine elite, the *principalia*, Dante Simbulan notes that the Japanese regime "was not basically hostile to the elite," and for the most part the same was true elsewhere in the region. Dominant political elements, Simbulan notes, "generally collaborate with a victorious regime, whether domestic or foreign, in order to maintain their dominant position and to safeguard their interests."[14] The war and occupation damaged some elite interests but did not overturn established patterns of wealth and power. The Japanese demanded compliance with their administrations and penalties for resistance were draconian. The Allied powers had been decisively defeated and in the early stages their return was far from guaranteed. Reaching an accommodation with the new order was only sensible, although many of those who did so would later claim that they had acted under duress.

The defeat of the European colonial powers was greeted with euphoria in some quarters, but the war inevitably disrupted trade and, as the new regime settled in, the population began to experience shortages and economic difficulties. By the end of the occupation, the Japanese were deeply disliked and this fact undoubtedly colored post-war interpretations of the period. On their return the Allied powers presented the Japanese and their collaborators in a very negative light, and in places wartime collaborators were shunned or even killed. Young Malays who took part in a pro-Japanese independence organization called the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (the Young Malays Union) were met with hostility when they returned to their villages after the war, and the movement's principle leader, Ibrahim Yaacob, left the country for Indonesia.[15] However, throughout the occupied territories nearly the entire population had either actively or passively collaborated with the Japanese – members of the elite more than most by virtue of their prominence.

Independence in Southeast Asia

After the war, power in much of Southeast Asia passed to people who defined themselves as "nationalists," and for the most part adopted secular modernizing agendas within a framework that was capitalist and at least nominally democratic. There were two principle alternatives to secular nationalism, one based on religion, the other on communism,

and the nationalist approach to independence did not go unchallenged. Religious parties failed to gain traction, possibly because they tended to focus on religious matters and did not address questions of economic development or the supply of basic services in ways that appealed to the general public. The contest, then, was effectively between a secular nationalism that built on the existing order derived from the colonial experience, and a communist transformation of that order. Britain and the US set in motion a transition to independence during which they forged alliances with their one-time nationalist opponents, and in doing so blunted the communist appeal. France and the Netherlands attempted to overcome nationalist movements in their former colonies, and in doing so provided a cause that helped communism flourish in the former French Indochina and in Indonesia, although a strong undercurrent of national feeling tempered communist internationalism in both places.

With the shift from colonialism to independence, the colonial powers needed to establish a new set of relations with their former colonies, and this required a new set of alliances. Among the three groupings contending for power, the nationalists offered far better prospects for productive relations than a theocratic or communist leadership. Many key nationalist figures were tainted by their association with the Japanese, but the line between collaborators and non-collaborators was never entirely clear, and events quickly overtook the effort to pass judgment on wartime behavior.

The position of the Allies' Southeast Asia Command was that "Pro-Japanese and anti-Allied opinions expressed publicly by prominent citizens during the Japanese Occupation should not be taken invariably at face value. Many such individuals have co-operated under pressure, and have acted as intermediaries on behalf of their respected communities."[16] The British Civil Affairs Directive on the subject stated:

> It is the aim of His Majesty's Government to dissipate as speedily as possible whatever pro-Japanese sentiments may still remain, and to promote conditions under which the territories concerned may resume their position in the Empire on the basis of goodwill. To this end, ... treatment of those who have collaborated with the enemy should be founded on a tolerant view of their conduct, if this will encourage the loyal support of men on whom (by reason of their administrative qualities) we must necessarily depend, but who in view of their position have in the past been employed by the Japanese.[17]

The American approach was less forgiving and called for removal of those who collaborated from positions of authority and influence over political and economic affairs. However, weakening existing elites would have played into the hands of left-wing elements who were challenging the established order. The struggle against communism became the dominant focus of the US after the war, and prosecution of collaborators was not vigorously pursued.

The argument that wartime leaders cooperated with the Japanese to protect their people suited the needs of former collaborators very well, as did the idea that they worked with the Japanese in order to promote the nationalist cause. Their political opponents, on the other hand, resisted this sort of rehabilitation. For example, a 1946 book entitled *Betrayal in the Philippines* dismissed the argument that wartime leaders such as Jorge Vargas and Jose P. Laurel were simply acting on instructions from President Manuel L. Quezon to minimize the suffering of the Filipino people. The author, Hernando J. Abaya, argued that Vargas and Laurel actively supported the Japanese cause[18] and that Manuel Roxas, who emerged as a strongman under the patronage of Douglas MacArthur, was "inextricably linked" with them. In 1946 a number of prominent collaborators won election victories, an outcome that brought strong condemnation from the US and a suggestion that collaborators should be removed from the government. This was a challenge to the elite oligarchy, a group that included Roxas and most other political leaders, and Roxas disposed of the collaboration issue early in January 1948 by proclaiming an amnesty, a measure approved by both houses of Congress the following month.[19]

In 1949, the postwar Minister for Information for Burma, U Tun Pe, published a very strong critique of the wartime elite there. Ba Maw, he said, "fell out with his sincere but critical friends, those used to calling him affectionately 'Maw', and took to strange companions for reasons which baffled the mind," collecting about him "a ring of satellites, who cringed before him and were unquestioningly loyal to him ... Hangers-on of clubs, gangsters with criminal obsessions idiotic ex-phongyis [monks] and notorious touts looked up to him with gaping mouths; dismissed government servants, men of shady character and credulous simpletons were around him perpetually. No wonder that he chose to be a proud dictator rather than a magnanimous democrat."[20]

The Dutch believed that collaboration would be a major issue in post-war Indonesia and that the population would reject leaders such as Sukarno who were tainted by cooperation with the Japanese. While feeling against collaboration did bring down Sukarno's first cabinet and

brought to the forefront non-collaborating figures such as Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, Sukarno himself and many others who had cooperated with the Japanese drew on their nationalist credentials and proceeded with their political careers. In Malaya the struggle against the Malayan Union offered opportunities to identify with nationalist sentiments, while the decision of the Burma Independence Army to change sides and support the Allied cause a few months before the end of the war positioned its leaders as nationalists rather than collaborators.

Embracing nationalism solved a knotty problem for individuals who had worked with the Japanese needed to reposition themselves. National revolutions in Indonesia and Burma facilitated this process by creating opportunities to express appropriate sentiments and participate in an unambiguous nationalist cause. The opposition to Britain's scheme for a Malayan Union served a similar purpose in Malaya. In the Philippines wartime collaborators faced a more difficult challenge because the Japanese had interfered with a transition to independence that was already underway.

There were, however, two new elements to consider. One was a rising generation of nationalists who challenged their predecessors for leadership positions, often by adopting even more radical positions. Many of them offered enthusiasm and ambition but lacked education, in part owing to the disruptions of the occupation, and administrative skills. The other was the military bodies that took shape in the newly independent states, hybrid organizations with roots in both pre-war colonial military forces and in military groups set up by the Japanese. In much of Southeast Asia, the military would play a prominent role in post-war politics, and senior officers constituted a new elite group.

Few of the figures who took a leading role in the political arrangements of Southeast Asia after 1945 would have been identified as "elites" before the war except in one matter. In every case they obtained exceptional, Western-style educations. Their educational achievements set them apart from the general public, but counted for little in traditional Asian societies, while within colonial society their opportunities to advance were limited. However, they had the knowledge and skills to understand and operate a Western-style bureaucratic administration, and this background was crucial to the shaping of Southeast Asia after independence.

The new order in postwar Southeast Asia was in many respects an extension of the colonial administrative system, with local staff taking over the apparatus of government, to which parliamentary bodies were added. The territorial framework established under colonial rule

survived, and because the newly independent countries were not based on cultural or ethnic groupings, their populations were not in any objective sense "nations." However, the new states defined themselves as nations, and they attempted to conform to the expectations that this definition raised.

On the face of it, the need for Robinsonian collaborators came to an end with the formation of governments run by local people who spoke the same language as those they governed, practiced the same religions, and shared the same customs and traditions. Such, at least, was the image projected by nationalists as they embarked on nation-building exercises, centralizing administrations far beyond anything introduced by colonial governments, promoting "national" languages and cultures, and seeking to develop national identities. The reality was that nationalist administrations still needed collaborators, and for many of the same reasons as their colonial predecessors. Post-war leaders were as remote from the people they ruled as the foreigners they replaced, set apart by their educations, their Western proclivities, and their life experiences. Moreover, behind the facades of national unity lay societies that did not share any common language, culture, religion, history, or tradition, and in some cases were historical enemies.

Members of the Civil Services across the region proved willing to work for nationalist regimes and were as crucial to the national project as they had been to the colonial, operating in national languages, making national culture and concepts part of the education system, and creating administrative uniformity. To some extent they created bridges to local communities, but they suffered many of the same liabilities as the political leadership because their educations and the nature of the bureaucracies they served in some respects put them at odds with local populations.

Some members of the pre-war collaborating groups, particularly the Chinese in their role as part of a national community, became collaborators in this setting and prospered as a result, but they were controversial figures and by no means a bridge to local communities. There was a need for new sets of collaborators, and in most cases they were supplied by political parties. Political parties also provided a channel for the patronage that was barred under civil service rules, thus fulfilling social expectations. Politicians, largely absent under colonial rule, quickly became a dominant elite group.

During the transition to independence the colonial powers abandoned many old alliances in an attempt to build positive relationships for the future.[21] The former colonial rulers had little to offer ethnic

minorities or transnational business figures, and apart from providing a refuge for some individuals facing persecution they could do little to assist either group. Both had to reach an accommodation with the changed circumstances, and in most instances decided that the solution lay in defining themselves as national minorities, a strategy whose success depended on the receptivity of the nationalist authorities. For some people, such as the Karen of Burma, the Pattani Malays and the Moros of the Mindanao, assimilation was either unattractive or unavailable, and the new situation gave rise to long-term simmering conflicts.

Although anti-Japanese resistance movements were strongly rooted in local communities, resistance fighters did not figure in post-war Southeast Asian politics. Leaders such as Manuel Roxas, Ferdinand Marcos and Suharto made their resistance activities part of their political resumes, but their post-war success did not grow out of the war years. On the whole, resistance fighters simply faded away, or went into ultimately futile opposition. In Burma much resistance activity took place among minority communities in the hill regions, and their relations with the politically dominant Burmans were tense after the war. The main guerrilla organization in Malaya, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, was largely Chinese and because of its ties with the Communist Party was antipathetic toward British rule. The Philippine resistance also included leftist elements and in general did not attract members of the oligarchy that dominated political and economic affairs in the country.

Aristocratic influence, greatly weakened before the war, all but disappeared. In parts of Indonesia, particularly Sumatra, rulers and their families were assassinated. Rulers in Malaysia and Thailand retained substantial influence, although constitutionally mandated parliamentary bodies held legislative and executive responsibilities. Elsewhere aristocratic status became insignificant.

Transnational trading elites experienced a severe reversal of fortune. Seriously weakened by the breakdown in international commerce, they found it difficult to recover in the face of nationalist economic policies designed to promote locally based economic development. Chinese, Indian, Arab, and other "foreign" elements responded by identifying with national states and playing down their international linkages. The Chinese, for example, became Malayan Chinese, Sino-Thai, Indonesian Chinese, and so on. Some ultimately assimilated with the dominant local community while others, despite abandoning their international ties and losing touch with the language and culture of their place of origin, remained or were kept distinct. Assimilation took place with

varying degrees of success, and as a Chinese-dominated state with transnational connections, Singapore became a refuge for ethnic Chinese who chose to relocate.

Explaining and justifying changed circumstances

To legitimize their accession to power, postwar elites needed a restatement and reassessment of past events. Accordingly, most countries promoted the development of national histories that recast the colonial experience and explained and justified the new nationalist order.[22] These accounts appear in school textbooks and also in the work of professional historians seeking alternatives to colonial histories, who present more sophisticated but surprisingly uncritical versions of the same explanations. Textbook accounts are particularly significant because they are the only exposure many people in the region have to past events, and in many countries they are controlled or even written by government agencies. Typically, school textbooks glorify the activities of leaders of the independence struggle, and portray subsequent national leaders as defenders of the new order these pioneers created.

In the Philippines, where a Filipino-run Commonwealth government was already in place during the late 1930s, history textbooks explain that Japan attacked both the Philippines and America. The wartime Second Republic was a "puppet government".[23] The Philippine situation was complicated by the presence of a Filipino government in exile, but few members of the pre-war government managed to flee the country and there was resentment against people who had not endured the hardships of the occupation but wanted to move from a comfortable life in exile into positions of power and authority within the country. On the other hand, because the Japanese had displaced a Filipino government, collaboration was a more contentious issue there than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and those members of the elite who had remained in the country were vulnerable to this charge. The collaboration issue was resolved when the government of President Osmena issued an amnesty in 1948, noting that some collaborators were forced to behave as they did and others acted "in the sincere belief that it was their patriotic duty."[24] Sonia M. Zaide's *The Philippines: A Unique Nation*, a revised and expanded version of her father's classic textbook, *History of the Republic of the Philippines*, offers this explanation:

> It should be noted that Vargas, Laurel, [Benigno S.] Aquino, [Claro M.] Recto, and other Filipino leaders who were compelled to serve in

> the puppet civil government (Executive Commission) established by the Japanese conquerors were not "collaborators" as many postwar writers erroneously and unfairly called them. These writers, particularly Americans, had not witnessed or experienced the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese during their occupation of the Philippines and thus did not know actually that these Filipino leaders risked their lives to protect the defenceless people from enemy brutalities and that they secretly supported the guerrilla movement against Japan.[25]

Quezon, another textbook explains, felt it was better "that these men, members of the prewar elite, kept their places in the government, rather than let perceived die-hard pro-Japanese or radical personalities like Artemio Ricarte [a Philippine-American War general who refused to accept U.S. rule and went into voluntary exile in Japan] and Benigno Ramos, charismatic leader of the peasant Sakdal party, take over."[26]

Behind these events lay the successful effort of the dominant landed elite to preserve their interests. The wartime resistance included a peasant-based guerrilla army, the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon – People's Army against the Japanese), while the dominant elite had cooperated with the Japanese regime. However, the Hukbalahap leadership came from socialist and communist backgrounds and threatened both elite and American interests, while members of the landed elite provided support for American policies. The outcome was a triumph for traditional elite political groupings.[27]

Indonesian school textbooks explain that it was not the Japanese who attacked Indonesia but the Dutch, who were the enemy of the nationalist cause. Indonesian nationalists anticipated that Japan would help them fulfill their political ambitions and so participated in organizations created by the Japanese, but became disillusioned early in the Occupation when the Japanese shut them out of the administration in favor of pre-war civil servants. Japan ultimately gave at least nominal support to the cause of independence, but the occupation brought considerable hardship arising from shortages of food and clothing, and from unemployment and inflation. Encounters between the Japanese and the local population were often unpleasant, and the harsh treatment of forced laborers (*romusha*), many of whom perished, left a residue of hostility, and made collaboration a sensitive issue in the postwar period.[28]

Local leaders (including Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta) took part in Japanese-sponsored organizations to protect the local population. They were aware of the cruelties that "fascist" Japan had inflicted on Korea, China, Manchuria, and Taiwan, and wanted to prevent a similar fate for Indonesia, even though working with the Japanese meant abandoning the policy of passive or non-cooperative resistance to foreign rule they had adopted in dealing with the Dutch. The collaborating elite elements recognized that political objectives needed to be pursued by a number of different routes, and the Japanese occupation presented a favorable opportunity to work for unity.[29]

Conclusion

Support for nationalism solved problems for many different groups and individuals, and buttressed support for what was in other respects a fairly unlikely set of countries. Southeast Asia is home to nationalisms without nations. Post-war governments have devoted decades of propaganda to forging national identities and at one level these identities exist and have power. Governments have also pursued policies that identify and often favor certain dominant groups: Central Thai, Javanese, Bumiputera Malaysians, Pribumi Indonesians, ethnic Burmans, and so on, and they have given cautious support to subnational identities – Lanna Thai, the Balinese, the Ifugao – often to encourage tourism. At the same time, there has been support for "Asian values" and other indicators of a supranational identity reminiscent of the pan-Asianism promoted by wartime Japan, although the resemblance is rarely discussed. The late twentieth century brought yet another complication to the ethnic mix of Asia, the migration of hundreds of thousands of contract workers from the poorer to the relatively prosperous countries of the region, a process that diluted local identities and disseminated urban values and lifestyles throughout rural areas.[30]

National identities remain powerful, and while the people of France or Germany have begun to identify themselves as Europeans, the people of Southeast Asia have shown no inclination to see themselves as ASEANs. They do, however, identify to a degree with a broader Asian identity. A tourist campaign in Malaysia describes the country as "Truly Asia," while questions are sometimes asked in Singapore about whether the country is in fact Asian. It is not clear what being Asian means in these contexts, and it would be rash to predict the emergence of an

Asian identity, but discussions of Asian regionalism and of the concept of an Asian community are taking place, and could offer a solution to some of the issues that plague the continent.[31]

In Southeast Asia, school textbooks, museum displays, and media presentations present colonial rule as something imposed on the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and Vietnam,[32] and nationalism as the force that enabled these countries to free themselves from foreign rule. Inspiring stories based on this model are deeply embedded in school textbooks, where they serve as the basis for patriotic appeals to support the achievements of heroes who stood up to colonial rule, and the governments that uphold and extend what these men and women accomplished. Such versions of the past have the odd effect of reducing the achievement of post-independence leaders but they also have the virtue of placing the process of shaping postcolonial states in local rather than foreign hands and of providing historical legitimacy to governments that would otherwise have to trace their origins to activities of the Western powers.

Notes

1. This issue is discussed in Paul H. Kratoska (2006: 1–19).
2. Ronald Robinson (1972: 129, 131). The article was reprinted as (1976) "Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration," in William Roger Louis (ed.) *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York, London: New Viewpoints) and this version is used here.
3. See, for example, Tran My-Van (1992).
4. For an insightful discussion of the wartime period, see Ken'ichi Goto (2003).
5. Ronald Robinson (1976).
6. See, for example, Netherlands Information Bureau (1944), Eric Robertson (1979), and Akashi Yoji (2008: 158–77).
7. Opinion column published on Imperial Rescript Day, *Syonan Sinbun*, 8 June 2603.
8. W. H. J Elias (1947: 103).
9. "The Draft outline of Administration of the Occupied Areas of the Southern Operation," Administrative Policy No. 1. The point was repeated in the "Major Points for Implementing the Administration of the Southern Occupied Areas" drawn up 18 days before the war began. Ken'ichi Goto (1997: 111).
10. Didi Kwartanada (2002: 65–80).
11. Paul H. Kratoska (1998: 92–115).
12. Annual Report, Department of Commerce and Industry, 2602 (1942), National Archives of Malaysia, Selangor Kanbo 26/2603.

13. *Syonan Times*, 22 May 2602 . See also Akashi Yoji (1976: 1–46).
14. Dante C. Simbulan (2005: 166–70).
15. Cheah Boon Kheng (2003: 123, 127).
16. Security Intelligence for Planning Section of SACSEA (Supreme Allied Command, South East Asia), Proforma "B" – Tactical: Malacca, US National Archives and Records Administration, RG226 21414. The same wording appeared in planning documents for other locations.
17. "Memorandum on Treatment of Renegades and Quislings, and Policy Regarding the Trial and Punishment of Disloyal Persons in Malaya Who Collaborated with the Enemy," The National Archives (TNA), UK, WO203/4203A.
18. Abaya, Hernando J., Betrayal in the Philippines, with an introduction by Harold L. Ickes. New York, A.A. Wyn, inc., 1946.
19. In Cortes, Boncan, and Jose, *The Filipino Saga*, collaboration is mentioned in passing but in retrospect it has become something of a non-issue. For a classic account of the collaboration issue, see David Joel Steinberg (1967: 108–12).
20. U Tun Pe (1949: 53).
21. Ronald Robinson (1984) commented on this phenomenon.
22. The clearest example is the work on Indonesian history associated with Nugroho Notosusanto. See Katharine E. McGregor (2007).
23. For example, Sonia M. Zaide (1999: 340) and Alberto S. Abeleda, Jr. (1997: 122).
24. Alberto S. Abeleda, Jr. (1997: 131). The amnesty did not apply to those who fought against the Allies or acted as Japanese spies.
25. Sonia M. Zaide (1999: 340–1).
26. Rosario Mendeoza Cortes (2000: 359).
27. Dante Simbulan (2005: 169–70).
28. Dra Waridahm Siti, Drs J. Soekardi and Drs P. Sunarto (1997: 93–4).
29. Tugiyono Ks, Syafei Suparmo and Z. H. Idris (1989: 136–54).
30. See, for example, Eric Thompson (2007).
31. The idea of an Asian community has become a major topic of discussion. See, for example, Ellen L. Frost (2008) and Kazuko Mori and Kenichiro Hirano (2007).
32. One Indonesian school textbook described the advent of colonialism and Western imperialism as "Proses Masuknya Kekuasaan Asing ke Wilayah Indonesia" (the process of foreign powers entering Indonesian territory). Tim Sejarah (1995), especially Chapter 1, Part C.

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3
Dutch Elites and Decolonization

Marc Frey

Introduction

Historians and contemporary witnesses of the decolonization of Indonesia alike draw similar conclusions about the end of the Dutch empire in Southeast Asia. The events of the time have been combined and characterized as a moment of singular importance. The transfer of power, past and present commentators agree, not only brought an end to 350 years of Dutch presence in the Indonesian archipelago but also brought out features of what the Dutch believed to be their "shared identity": stubbornness and legalistic conceptions of property and sovereignty. Good intentions and interplay of adverse factors have been held accountable for the resistance with which the small European country responded to the demand of a majority of the Indonesian population for sovereignty, independence, and national freedom.

"The Indies lost, misfortune born" ("Indie verloren, rampspoed geboren") – such went the popular saying at the time. As in a classic tragedy, a reversal of fortunes and good intentions compromised by mistakes eventually led to disaster. It is here, however, that the consensus of contemporaries and retrospective observers ends. Historians continue to debate Dutch policies vis-à-vis the Indonesian Republic. One school argues that Dutch policies in the formative period between 1945 and 1947 entailed a sincere vision of an equal partnership designed to promote the common good of both the Netherlands and Indonesia.[1] Others argue that ill-fated, uncompromising, and disingenuous Dutch policies, meant to isolate and eventually crush the Indonesian nationalists, resulted in an international crisis and a military confrontation the Netherlands could not win.[2]

At the center of the debate, then, is the problem of political management and leadership. Historians of Dutch decolonization have dealt with

individual politicians, decision-makers and decision-making processes in the Netherlands.[3] They have researched the course of the Indonesian Revolution and the struggle for independence.[4] They have probed the complex interplay of Dutch, Indonesian, and external actors,[5] and they have begun to explore the history of Dutch–Indonesian relations in the aftermath of the transfer of sovereignty.[6] Historians have focused on agency – but mainly on individual agency. Social groups such as elites have received less attention.

This chapter explores the motivations, aims, interests, and behavior of the Dutch political, economic, administrative, and academic elites during and following the decolonization process of Indonesia. Elites are here understood as small groups of people who exert power and influence over political decisions and the public. Their influence is based on the possession and control of resources such as political support (political elites), means of production and capital (economic elites), control of institutions (administrative elites or functional elites), or symbolic means such as information or knowledge (educational elites, functional elites).[7]

Political elites and decolonization

The decolonization of Indonesia came via a correlation of factors operating on a local (Indonesian) and international level. The Dutch metropolitan elite in Indonesia played an important role as well, but not in the sense that the Dutch government, other actors or the public became wary of their struggle in Indonesia. Dutch public opinion polls at the time reveal a high support for the political elite, which made every effort to retain the colonial empire, and this is not surprising. The vast majority of the Dutch felt that the Indonesian Republic's declaration of independence (17 August 1945) was unlawful and somehow a continuation of Fascist wartime policies both in Europe and Southeast Asia. Economic concerns also played an important role for both the elites and the public at large. In 1945, two economists, Jan Tinbergen and J. B. D. Derksen, calculated that the combination of the returns from trade and investments made in Indonesia had contributed to about 14 percent of the Dutch gross national product in 1938. The retention of the colonial empire was thus seen as an important requirement for the economic reconstruction and progress of the Netherlands. Furthermore, elites and the public feared a loss of prestige in international affairs and regarded decolonization as a severe threat to Dutch identity; a nation of seafarers and merchants, great trading companies,

and shipping lines would be reduced to a country of cheese makers and vegetable growers. "Denmarkization," in reference to the empire, was the catchword of the time, dominating the discourse among the political elites, the media, and the public at large.[8] What was at stake for the political and administrative elites, then, was the perceived "great power" status of the Netherlands.

Stages along the way towards decolonization, such as the negotiations leading up to the de facto recognition of the Indonesian Republic by the Dutch (November 1946), the first military offensive into the plantation belts of Java and Sumatra in July 1947 (appropriately termed Operation "Produce"), and the Renville-Agreement of January 1948, forced upon the conflicting parties by the US, did not erode popular support for the retention of the empire. Furthermore, public protest against the largest military operation in Dutch history – the deployment of 170,000 soldiers, including conscripts, to Indonesia three years after the end of World War II – remained muted.[9] Only 19 percent of the Dutch disapproved of the second military offensive against the Indonesian nationalists in December of 1948, while 62 percent approved of this unprecedented national show of strength. Four years after the transfer of power, 59 percent of the Dutch claimed that decolonization and the loss of the empire had not been in the best interest of the Netherlands.[10]

American and British observers at the time were puzzled by what they regarded as Dutch intransigence and stubbornness.[11] Historians have come to the same questions: why did the Dutch government remain so committed to the retention of the empire for so long? Why did they not pursue compromise solutions? Why only after the international community and particularly the US threat to withdraw Marshall Plan aid in early 1949 did the Dutch enter into serious negotiations about a transfer of power? How could Dutch leaders persuade their constituency to spend large amounts of taxpayers' money, consent to conscription, and, as long as possible, ignore the international community? Or were the Dutch leaders simply executing the will of the Dutch people? The key to the answers to these questions lie in two phenomena: the character of the Dutch political system and the Dutch social system, respectively.

The Dutch case can best be described as a political system evincing a high degree of political and socio-cultural cooperation and integration working both horizontally and vertically. In the immediate post-war period (and beyond), the political system was characterized by a strong determination among the political parties (except the small Communist Party) and their leadership to cooperate, compromise, and, in case of disagreements, subordinate contested issues to what was then perceived

as the common good. Political scientists term this horizontal integration "consensus democracy."[12] On an operational level, "consensus democracy" inhibits the debate of controversial issues and instead promotes power sharing. Consensus and integration were of particular relevance for two reasons: one is historical and is related to water management and the need for large-scale irrigation, while the other is a more recent twentieth-century desire to prevent the domination of one or more cultural group(s) over the others in the political process.

Dutch post-war governments consisted of a coalition of Social Democrats and the newly formed Catholic Peoples' Party. Other parties represented were smaller Protestant parties (until 1963) and, at times, the Liberals. Protestant parties, strong in the pre-war period, were on the decline in the post-war period, but as coalition partners and traditional colonial hardliners they insisted unequivocally on the retention of the empire. Social Democrats were ambivalent about the decolonization process, and there was a considerable degree of protest against the government course of action. For instance, following the first military offensive against the Indonesian Republic in the summer of 1947, and again after the second military offensive of December 1948, around 5 percent of the party members (4000 out of 114,000) returned their party books to protest against their leaders' decision to resort to military action.[13] There were yet still more who did not consent with the leadership but refrained from opting out. Party leaders argued that they also felt uneasy about overall government policies, but they convinced their constituency and the rank-and-file members to support the coalition and the Social-Democratic prime minister whose position at the time was less one of the leader of a government and more one of a *primus inter pares*. Some of the arguments used to bring the constituency in line were the Cold War and the need for governmental support, interest in promoting the welfare state, and the general idea that being part of the executive served the party's interests better than the more passive role of opposition.

This left the conduct of the Dutch imperial policies mainly in the hands of the Catholic Peoples' Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP). The KVP was a post-war foundation designed to serve as the political representation of all Catholic groups, including the relatively strong Catholic unions.[14] It was the largest party in the early post-war period, and its leaders were determined to overcome what they perceived as an injustice of historical dimensions. Relatively speaking, Catholics made up the largest denomination in the Netherlands (around 40 percent), but Protestant denominations, groups, or parties had politically or culturally

marginalized them. Colonization and empire building had been a quintessential Protestant project, and the leadership of the Catholic party did not want to ruin what a Protestant polity and culture had achieved. Resistance to decolonization thus meant correcting a historic misperception (that it was a Protestant nation which had conquered a territory 50 times larger than the Netherlands), demonstrate responsibility for the Dutch nation and its heritage, achieve equality, and end the many small discriminations the Catholic Dutch faced in public life. The two Protestant parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the more bourgeois Christian-Historic Union with their strong traditions of social imperialism, a near monopolization of the highest colonial posts in the past, and support for the monarchy and the unity of the empire were thus prevented from accusing the Catholics of trying to destroy what they had created. This unhappy correlation of party concerns, historic traditions, and tactical considerations made it very difficult for the Dutch political elites to consider alternatives to the course of action that was ultimately chosen. In the interest of party politics, power sharing and consensus democracy, Dutch political elites felt they had little choice but to display what contemporaries and historians alike have described as stubbornness.

Apart from horizontal cooperation and integration, there was also a vertical integration among the Dutch elites and the public at large. Dutch sociologists have named this socio-cultural phenomenon "pillarization" (verzuiling).[15] This refers to a complex social process in which certain milieus evolve along denominational and/or ideological lines. These milieus shape the lives of their members from birth to death, offer spiritual or ideological guidance, provide education and jobs, and mediate political interests and decisions. Since their emergence in the second half of the nineteenth century, these "pillars" (liberal, social-democratic, catholic and protestant) slowly consolidated. In the post-war period, "pillarization" reached its zenith before swiftly eroding in the 1960s.[16] There were "pillarized" kindergartens and undertakers, labor unions and neighborhood groups, schools and universities, insurance companies, banks, newspapers, radio stations, and so forth – it is no coincidence that the only Dutch term which entered the English language is the word "Apartheid."

The highly segmented Dutch society of the post-war years was not only governed by a consensus democracy, the leaders of the four pillars constantly mediated conflicts within their sphere and listened closely to what their constituency had to say. The system offered possibilities of upward mobility and politicization, and it led to a remarkably diverse

spectrum of newspapers and media. However, as milieu managers controlled input and output, communication and debate within one pillar was more pronounced than between the pillars. In the case of decolonization, the outcome of this vertical communication and integration was the marginalization of dissenters and conformity of the opinion of the elite and the general public.

Dutch business elites

During the initial phase of the conflict, the Dutch business elite both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands shared a common outlook with the Dutch political elite. The balance sheet the economists Tinbergen and Derksen had presented in 1945 left a deep imprint on the perception of the conflict. The retention of the empire was seen as a vital precondition for the reconstruction of the country. Even more than the business leaders of the large trading and shipping companies and the managers of financial institutions in the Netherlands, the business leaders of the Dutch East Indies wanted to restore the status quo of the pre-war years. Throughout 1945 and 1946, the Dutch-Indies business association, which represented a few thousand planters as well as the local managers of the banks and trading companies, pressed for military action against the Indonesian Republic and demanded an end to the negotiations Lieutenant-General Hubertus van Mook conducted with the Indonesian nationalist leaders. "Tranquility and order" was to be restored as soon as possible in order to resume production and trade.[17] But following the first military offensive against the Republican forces in the summer of 1947, the perception began to change. As the Dutch military proved unable to pacify Java and Sumatra, the more the Dutch managers of large corporations began to warm to an eventual transfer of power. As a result, during the negotiations leading to the transfer of power, business leaders in the Netherlands and in Indonesia vigorously lobbied for safeguards against unfavorable taxation and economic restraints in independent Indonesia while at the same time warning the Dutch government of the dangers and potential crises involved in the retention of West New Guinea.[18] Territorial control and national sovereignty were no longer considered to be prerequisites for a favorable business climate. In the future, the integrating world market would set the norms and conditions under which businesses operated. For instance, already at the end of 1949 – the official transfer of power had not yet taken place – the managers of the Delhi Maatschappij, a leading rubber producer, issued a statement arguing that security had increased and that

business prospects were positive. The Bandar Rubbermaatschappij and other large companies felt similarly.[19]

Business prospects in the new Indonesia deteriorated rapidly, however. Soon after the transfer of sovereignty, President Sukarno and successive Indonesian governments unilaterally abrogated the financial and economic agreements which infringed upon the new nation's sovereignty. The business climate for Dutch companies continued to deteriorate until December 1957 when the Indonesian government, under pressure from the army and the trade unions, nationalized all the remaining Dutch businesses.[20]

Dutch business leaders both at home and in Indonesia responded differently to the unfolding crisis. In particular, many of the family-led plantation companies were not able to find alternative locations and as a whole were not successful in integrating or reintegrating into the networks of the business elites in the Netherlands. Most of the individual planters dropped out of business, and migrated to the Netherlands to find work in an economy which was rapidly expanding in the 1950s. Leaders of the large mining, trade, and shipping companies, like the Billiton Company, the Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij, and the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, were able to integrate into the Dutch business elite centered in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. As a general rule, the more international a company and the more significant its Dutch branch, the easier it was for the business leaders of the company to link up with the business networks in the Netherlands.[21]

For the business elite already residing in the Netherlands, the loss of the Indonesian market did not, with few exceptions, threaten or endanger their role and position in society. The European integration process, the recovery of the transit trade to West Germany, transatlantic economic integration, and the multiplier effects associated with the construction of the large steel plant Hoogovens in Ijmuiden more than offset all losses incurred by the nationalization of all the Dutch businesses in Indonesia. Overall, the Dutch business elite accommodated quite easily to the loss of empire.

Functional elites

A diverse group of elites immediately confronted by Indonesian decolonization were the colonial administrators and the Dutch experts working in Indonesia as engineers, doctors, and agricultural specialists, as well as various other professionals. At the time of the transfer of sovereignty (December 1949), this group numbered about 16,000

persons – not all of them, of course, serving in the higher echelons of the colonial administration. The treaty regulating the transfer of power (the Round Table Accords) stipulated that all Dutch administrators and experts would remain in Indonesia and serve under the new government, and their privileges such as high earnings were to be continued. Many felt that the change of sovereignty would not significantly affect their position. There was a widespread conviction that Indonesia depended on Dutch expertise. Many felt that they would be needed in order to avert chaos and facilitate economic development, and many harbored paternalistic notions of Indonesians and perceived themselves as guardians of a superior and progressive Dutch civilizing mission.[22] As the *New York Times* reported from Jakarta in March 1950, the Dutch "did not behave as people who would leave by the end of the year."[23]

A reformist group (de Stuw), consisting of leading colonial administrators, lawyers, and intellectuals had already criticized this paternalistic outlook during the pre-war period as being dangerous to the colonial project. Among them was the last lieutenant-general of the Dutch East Indies and wartime Minister of the Colonies, Hubertus van Mook. Until 1942, this group was unable to change much,[24] but in the immediate post-war period, Van Mook and a few other high colonial officials pressed for fundamental administrative changes in order to give substance to Queen Wilhelmina's wartime vision of relations between equal partners. In 1947, Van Mook decreed that older high civil servants could no longer serve under his direction. This concerned all the so-called Indologists who had been trained at Leiden and Utrecht (see below) and had graduated in 1922 or before. Acutely aware of widespread paternalism, conservatism, and racism among many of the older Indologists, Van Mook wanted to execute his new colonial policy with as many fresh administrators as possible. As Van Mook had been born in Indonesia, he was aware of Indonesian nationalist sentiments and wanted fewer metropolitan Dutch and more Indonesian-born Dutch as well as Indonesians serving in the administration.[25] In 1947, his reformist impulses were met with mixed success. Eventually, following the transfer of power, the newly independent Indonesian government implemented an all-out program of Indonesianization. From mid-1950 on, many Dutch administrators and experts left Indonesia more or less involuntarily. Affected were some 1200 physicists, 800 lawyers, 1000 engineers, and 600 agricultural experts. The administrators in particular were quickly pushed aside by their Indonesian counterparts or lost their jobs entirely. By the end of 1952 there were only a little more than 2000 Dutch administrators left, and by 1955 only some 600.

The last remaining administrators, together with planters, engineers, technicians, and businessmen, were forced to leave in 1957, when the Indonesian government nationalized (with few exceptions) the remaining Dutch enterprises.[26]

During the period between 1949 and 1958, the Dutch government and the political elites regarded the exodus of Dutch administrators, businessmen, and technical experts as a grave problem. On the one hand, each Dutch emigrant contributed to the erosion of Dutch influence in independent Indonesia. On the other hand, they put a burden on the metropolitan job market in the Netherlands.[27] Until the economic boom of the early 1950s, prospects for finding suitable work in the Netherlands seemed bleak. Therefore, the government tried to negotiate labor deals with Australia, Canada, the US, and South Africa, and a few thousand Dutch migrated. Between 1950 and 1953, many colonial technical experts, with the assistance of the Dutch government, found employment in the newly formed United Nations Program of Technical Assistance. As Dutch economic growth accelerated during the second half of the 1950s, more former planters, technical experts, and administrators found jobs at home. Of the remaining 9000 persons repatriated in 1958, about 70 percent easily integrated into the Dutch job market within a few months.[28] There was thus, with the exception of the war veterans, at no time a sizeable group of dissatisfied former members of the colonial elite who formed a pressure group strong enough to make its imprint felt on Dutch society.[29]

A case study of a functional elite: The "Indologists"

The case of the "Indologists," in the context of Dutch elites and decolonization, is particularly revealing.[30] It gives evidence of the slow nature with which Dutch elites grasped the power of Indonesian nationalism and the fragility of the colonial system. The case of the Indologists also demonstrates the personal, ideological, and institutional continuities between the old colonial system and the newly emerging ideas and practices associated with Indonesian development. Indologists were the high colonial administrators educated at the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht. The curriculum entailed language studies (usually Javanese), public administration, law, and history. At the beginning of World War II, around 600 men (women were prohibited from pursuing this career) with a background in Indology administered the so-called European Domestic Administration (Europese Binnenlands Bestuur). Functions included administrative affairs of the Dutch East Indies,

the administration of the various colonial departments, local administration, "advisory" functions to indigenous rulers, and managing the affairs of the Dutch community in the colony. These Indologists governed an administration which was responsible for a territory 50 times larger than the Netherlands.

Each year during the pre-war period around 50 students had completed a degree at Leiden and Utrecht. War and occupation, first of the Netherlands, then of Indonesia, brought a temporary halt to the education of future Indologists. But already in July 1943, the colonial administration in-exile resumed the education of future chief administrators in Melbourne and for the first time included Indonesian students. Courses resumed during the war in the Netherlands as well, in order to have a trained body of administrators ready once the war ended. By early 1947, a group of 183 future Indologists, selected from hundreds of applications, pursued their studies. Some dropped their studies due to the uncertain developments in the colony, but most looked forward to careers as top civil servants in a reformed empire.

As soon as the war ended, Van Mook, the minister for the colonies and, from September 1945 to the summer of 1948, lieutenant-general of the Dutch East Indies, pressed for an early implementation of the Queen's war-time promise of an equal partnership in the future.[31] This had significant consequences for many of the Indologists. Of the 600 who had served in the higher administration in 1940, some 150 had not survived the Japanese camps and their positions had to be filled. He also decreed, as mentioned above, that older civil servants should no longer direct the affairs of the colony. Moreover, without prior consultation of the metropolitan government, Van Mook ordered the Batavia Law School (University of Batavia from 1947 on) to set up a public administration program for Indonesian and Dutch students in Indonesia. His desire to change the personnel of the colonial administration was part of his vision of a reformed Dutch empire. This empire would not yet be a true partnership of equals but it would be a reformist empire, in which the Dutch, as Van Mook saw it, would prepare the Indonesians for self-government.

The program in public administration offered by the new University of Batavia increased tensions with the metropolitan colonial administration and with the Leiden and Utrecht universities. Faculty members and university leadership were already shaken by status anxieties acerbated by the political developments in Indonesia. Tensions and uncertainties reflected themselves in what from today's perspective appear to be half-hearted, though frantic efforts to conform the Indologists' program of

study to the rapidly changing conditions in Indonesia. A case in point was the language program at Utrecht University. Utrecht, whose underlying value continued to be the "unity of the empire", held a belief in the "upbringing, civilizing mission of a Christian western people like the Dutch in the East" and refused to drop its Javanese language program and transition, as Leiden University did, to offer the newly emerging "national" language of Indonesia, Bahasa.

The death knell for a metropolitan-trained group of high civil servants came towards the end of 1947, when the University of Batavia – again with the support of Van Mook – declared that the new Indonesia no longer needed any metropolitan Indologists. What the country needed, the reform-minded Van Mook thought, were specialists with a background in sociology, law, and economics. The broad education of the Indologists had served the old empire well, but in the new, "developmentalist empire," experts were needed who could help transform the country and demonstrate in a technocratic and non-politicized way the need for a continuing partnership between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

All these reforms were soon overtaken by the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence in December of 1949. The bilateral treaty envisaged, among other things, a union over which the Queen would preside, and the retention of the Dutch administrative corps, but these regulations were soon sidestepped by the Indonesian republic. As of 1 September 1950, all graduating Dutch-born administrators (some 130) were denied entry into the Indonesian civil service, and eventually all remaining Dutch Indologists were phased out.

From empire to development

The loss of the Indonesian job market had three main repercussions for students, faculty members, and Dutch educational institutions. First, most students enrolled in the Indology programs at Leiden and Utrecht changed programs and went on to study ethnology, sociology, anthropology, or law. Interest in Indonesian affairs declined significantly and no more than 50 students enrolled in Indonesian language programs between 1950 and 1968. Second, Indologists teaching at Leiden were incorporated into other faculties, and upon retirement their chairs and professorships were rededicated to other areas of interest. A few language professorships (Javanese, Bahasa, Austronesian linguistics) were retained despite the lack of students, and in 1956 Utrecht had to close its Indology program altogether. Third, with the demise of the empire, administrators, academics and politicians turned their attention to

Indonesian development. The continuity of personnel and ideas is indeed striking, and the discovery of the "Third World" in the early 1950s is intimately related to decolonization.[32]

The first initiatives towards a Dutch program of development cooperation were taken by colonial administrators who in 1949 were employed by the ministries of foreign affairs and by the Union and Overseas dependencies ministry (ministerie van Uniezaken en Overzeese Rijksdelen) in The Hague. For these officials, the new field of development cooperation was an alternative to and compensation for the loss of the empire.[33] A committee to review study programs, labor concerns, and the future prospects of colonial experts was set up in 1949 under the chairmanship of Egbert de Vries, a professor of tropical agriculture at Wageningen, the most prestigious College for Agriculture in the Netherlands.[34]

De Vries personified the continuity of colonialism and developmentalism, as did many of the high Dutch colonial experts and administrators like Van Mook, W. F. Wertheim, J. H. A. Logemann, and yet others more.[35] De Vries had launched his career in the 1930s in Indonesia, where he devised a migration program ("transmigrasi," taken up by subsequent Indonesian administrations) and conducted applied research at the College in Batavia.[36] After a tenure at Wageningen and a short stint at the World Bank, he became a founding member (and subsequently the rector between 1956 and 1966) of the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague, a research institute and graduate school for development studies. Following Suharto's coup against Sukarno in 1965, he frequently served as an advisor to the Indonesian government.[37]

The questions the committee addressed were the following: what should be done with the students enrolled in the programs for colonial public administration? What should be done with the existing university structures? What should be done with the returning Dutch academics? De Vries recommended reorganizing programs so that colonial administrators would no longer be trained. He also recommended offering experts to the new international institutions in the field of development (the Technical Program of the UN and the World Bank). Essentially, he called for the decolonization of significant institutions of the Dutch colonial infrastructure. One important outcome was the founding of the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague. Another outcome was the renaming of the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam in 1950 to the Royal Institute for the Tropics.

The new enthusiasm for development issues was sparked as much by the loss of the empire as it was by a determination to hold on to what

was left. In particular, West New Guinea became the focus for many who had worked as colonial administrators or who had somehow been involved in the education of colonial experts. During the negotiations leading up to the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Dutch had demanded to treat West New Guinea separately. With the support of Australia and the US, the Dutch retained control of the divided island; future negotiations with Indonesia would ultimately determine its status. As relations with Indonesia deteriorated, the Dutch government violently resisted all calls for a joint administration of the island and an eventual transfer of sovereignty. West New Guinea, populated by some 700,000 people who at the time were regarded as either backward or unspoiled children of nature, became the focal point of continued Dutch colonial prospects. The colonial administration was too small to make good for the losses incurred by the decolonization of Indonesia, but those who were left hoped to stay as long as possible. In 1957, Governor J. van Baal assumed that a transfer of power to a local administration would eventually be feasible sometime around 1980.[38] A range of social scientists, engineers, and agricultural experts, most of them with experience gained in colonial times, went to West New Guinea during the 1950s. In the end, more than half of all Dutch development assistance (in total 760 million guilders) during the period between 1950 and 1962 went to Dutch West New Guinea.

Imperial fragments

In collective memory as well as in the historiography of decolonization, the Dutch colonies in the Caribbean, Surinam, Curacao, and Aruba do not play a significant role. They are troublesome and fascinating objects of research in connection with the late abolition of slavery in 1863, the large-scale migration of Indonesian and Indian contract workers in the late nineteenth century as well as in Diaspora studies, multicultural societies, or multilingualism. But in the post-war period they were relatively insignificant. After the devolution of political power and the granting of internal Indonesian self-government in 1954, Dutch elites did not concern themselves with these remnants of the Dutch colonial empire. It seemed as if the Dutch political elite as well as the public at large were waiting for an opportunity to get rid of what had become over time an increasingly expensive burden.[39]

Following the transfer of sovereignty in West New Guinea in 1963 and continuing until 1973, some 20 percent of the Dutch development aid (a total of 240 million guilders) went to Surinam, Curacao and Aruba.

During the early 1970s, ethnic conflicts in Surinam led to a large-scale migration to the Netherlands. The Social Democratic government under Joop den Uyl strongly supported the principle of self-determination, but was equally attuned to a public which harbored ambivalent notions about the arrival of 115,000 Surinamers (1975) in the Netherlands; this amounted to some 25 percent of the total Surinamese population. Public opinion polls conducted in 1973 revealed that 78 percent of the respondents wanted independence for Suriname, with 56 percent being in favor of independence as soon as possible. A year later, in 1974, negotiations between The Hague and Paramaribo ended in a compromise which suited both parties: the Netherlands would extend some 3.2 billion Guilders in development assistance until 1980, while the government in Paramaribo promised to end the exodus of its people to the Netherlands. The transfer of power, which came in 1975, was regarded by both political elites as a generous and mutually advantageous deal.[40]

Conclusions

The discussion has shown that during the decolonization of Indonesia, Dutch political, administrative, and economic elites were united in their aim to retain the empire. The actions of the Dutch political elites were interpreted as a reflection of consensus democracy as well as pillarization, creating the Dutch elites' inability to consider other alternative approaches to decolonization. Business elites went along with the politicians, but not before pressing for even more determined action against the Indonesian nationalists. Once this proved futile, Dutch business elites in Indonesia and especially in the Netherlands called for a compromise in order to salvage their interests. While most administrative and functional elites eventually found jobs in the Netherlands, overall they found it difficult to adapt to conditions in the aftermath of decolonization. The chapter has also pointed to the personal and ideational continuities between colonialism and development.

Notes

1. J. J. P. de Jong (1988).
2. H. W. van den Doel (2001).
3. Marc Frey (2003b: 83–104).
4. Benedict Anderson (1972), William H. Frederick (1989), George McTurnan Kahin (1952) and Anthony Reid (1974).

5. Marc Frey (2006), Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg (2002) and Robert J. McMahon (1981).
6. Hans Meijer (1994).
7. For a further exploration, see Eva Etzioni-Halevy (2004: 4420–24).
8. H. W. van den Doel (2001: 371–82).
9. Jaap R. Bruijn and Cees Wiebes (2003: 233–44) and Petra M. H. Groen (1993: 30–44).
10. Maarten Kuitenbrouwer (1994: 30).
11. Marc Frey (2006: 44–53).
12. Arend Lijphart (1999).
13. Jos Perry (1994: 159).
14. J. A. Bornewasser (1995) and Tom Duffhues, Albert Felling, and Jan Roes (1985).
15. The classic study is Arend Lijphart (1968).
16. Thomas Erdman (2000: 155–80), Rob van der Laarse (1989), P. Pennings (1991), S. Stuurman (1983), Hans Verhage (2003) and Dierk Jan Wolffram (1993).
17. "Notulen van de 32ste vergadering van de commissie-generaal met leden van de Indische ondernemersbond," 19 November 1946, in: Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945–1950, eds. S. L. van der Wal, P. J. Drooglever and M. J. B. Schouten, 20 vols, 's-Gravenhage 1971–1996, vol. 6, 315–21; "Verslag van de door de minister-president en de minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen verleende autientie aan een deputatie van de Indische Ondernemersbond," 16 May 1947, in: ibid., vol. 8, 711–12.
18. The Round Table Agreements of 1949 prohibited nationalizations of companies and envisaged Dutch advice in the event that Indonesian financial and economic policies would change the status of Dutch-owned businesses. See George McTarnan Kahin (1952: 438–40).
19. H. Baudet (1983: 154).
20. Marc Frey (2002: 403–15) and J. Thomas Lindblad (2009).
21. Joris Nobel and Meindert Fennema (2004: 15–38).
22. F. J. Goedhart (1953: 16–23).
23. *New York Times*, 6 March 1950.
24. H. W. van den Doel (2001: 43–4).
25. Cees Fasseur (1994: 460).
26. Herbert Feith (1962: 373–8) and Hans Meijer (1994: 655).
27. As this chapter discusses Dutch elites, it does not consider the many more Dutch of Indonesian or Dutch-Indonesian descent who migrated to the Netherlands in the 1950s. See Ulbe Bosma, Remco Raben and Wim Willens (2006) and Vincent J. H. Houben (2008: 66–106).
28. F. H. Peters (1999: 91–3).
29. For a broader discussion of the migration from former colonies to Europe, see Pamela Ballinger (2007: 713–41), Elizabeth Buettner (forthcoming), Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois (1994), Griselda Molemans (2004) and Andrea L. Smith (2003).
30. The following draws on Cees Fasseur (1994: 455–83).
31. Yong Mun Cheong (1982).
32. J. J. P de Jong (1999: 61–81) and Maarten Kuitenbrouwer (1994: 24–63). See also Joseph Hodge (2007) and Joseph Hodge (forthcoming).

33. For an account of earlier development policies in Dutch Indonesia, see Marc Frey (2003a: 395–412) and Suzanne Moon (2007).
34. The "Working Commission for Technical Assistance to Lowly Developed Countries" (Werkcommissie inzake Technische Hulp aan Laag-ontwikkelde Landen, Withall).
35. Van Mook became a high UN official working in the field of development; Wertheim, a prominent Dutch sociologist and specialist in Indonesian and Third World issues, began his career at the Law School in Batavia; Logemann was professor of law at Batavia prior to the war. After 1945, he became minister of the colonies, and subsequently professor of law at Leiden.
36. On Dutch development initiatives from the early twentieth century to 1950, see Marc Frey (2003a: 395–412).
37. http://www.iss.nl/About-ISS/History/Egbert-de-Vries.
38. Maarten Kuitenbrouwer (1994: 39).
39. Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers (2003).
40. Maarten Kuitenbrouwer (1994: 57–60).

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4

Emerging Business Elites in Newly Independent Indonesia

J. Thomas Lindblad

Introduction

In her penetrating analysis of colonial legacies in Asia, economic historian Anne Booth comes to the startling discovery that indigenous Indonesians, prior to independence, constituted a larger proportion of the non-agricultural labor force than their counterparts in British or even Japanese colonies in Southeast and East Asia. "It would appear," she writes, "that many indigenous Indonesians were availing themselves of a greater range of economic opportunities than were other Southeast Asians, or indeed the indigenous populations of Taiwan and Korea."[1] Such an observation is at variance with the received view that economic decolonization was severely delayed in Indonesia because of the extreme shortage of qualified indigenous Indonesians capable of taking up management and supervisory functions in the economy. Was newly independent Indonesia indeed lagging behind its neighbors in terms of gaining control of its economic resources? What did the business elites look like that came to the fore during the crucial, formative years in the 1950s, when at long last international recognition of Indonesian independence had been attained and the emphasis in the decolonization process could shift from politics to economics? This will be the main question addressed in this chapter.[2]

It has much to do with imagery. Popular conceptions invariably depict indigenous Indonesians as unsuitable for business endeavors and, in the words of a Dutch expert on colonial economy, "further removed from the classical *homo economicus* than the Westerner."[3] This obviously did not change overnight when Indonesia became independent. The entire Sukarno era has similarly acquired a bad reputation for economic performance; it was the time when Indonesia gained notoriety as an

underachiever or "the chronic dropout" among Third World nations.[4] Yet this verdict does not stand up to careful examination of the statistical evidence: the record for a substantial part of the 1950s was better than the subsequent steep deterioration of the economy would suggest. It is an auxiliary purpose of this chapter to venture beyond commonly held stereotypes about agents and achievements of economic decolonization in Indonesia during the 1950s.

The argument in this chapter is arranged according to both chronological and thematic principles. The following section offers a brief account of developments during the late colonial period, the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian Revolution, and the 1950s. Next comes a separate section identifying indigenous businessmen who played a prominent role in the national economy of the 1950s. A final section, preceding the conclusion, shifts attention to successful businessmen of Chinese origin.

From pioneering to policy

In 1912 three Javanese gentlemen, namely Raden Ng Dwidosewojo, a Javanese aristocrat, M. K. H. Soebroto and M. Adimidjojo, took a remarkable initiative. Together they established the life insurance company Boemipoetra 1912 (Bumiputra 1912 in current spelling), which still exists. This was a rare example of indigenous Indonesians not only being enterprising, but also deliberately choosing a form of Western-styled incorporation that in colonial Indonesia was virtually the exclusive domain of European and ethnic Chinese business firms. At around the same time, another enterprising Javanese, Nitisemito (born in 1881), began producing *kretek* (clove) cigarettes in Central Java. In 1934, he opened a large factory named Nojorono in Kudus, a small town with the characteristics of an industrial settlement, a highly unusual feature in the calm countryside of Central Java. The Nojorono factory was reported to employ more than 10,000 laborers, but its decline had set in already before the Pacific War.[5] There was increasing competition from Chinese *kretek* producers with more ready access to investment capital. One of the old-timers among the Chinese *kretek*-producing firms, Sampoerna in Surabaya, still maintains a high profile in Indonesia today, but its owner is now Philip Morris.

Our focus here is on the way by which indigenous entrepreneurs merged into modern business and business elite formation, notably in rubber in Sumatra and Kalimantan and in copra in Sulawesi, during the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, rather than on the eruption of indigenous

entrepreneurship in small-scale export agriculture.[6] Whatever the merits of such manifestations of indigenous entrepreneurship in terms of producing quick responses to market signals and generating income, their success remained confined to short-run cash flows and did not translate into political leverage. Institutionalized forms of capital accumulation for the benefit of long-term investment remained few and chronologically distant from each other among indigenous Indonesians under Dutch colonial rule. However, some pioneering efforts *did* materialize, nonetheless remaining in the shadow of the European and Chinese enterprises, literally and figuratively speaking.

The *kretek* industry, first in Kudus and later also in East Java, was the most obvious example of early successful Javanese entrepreneurship other than cottage industry and petty trading in rural areas, which in turn may have accounted for the high indigenous share in non-agricultural labor spotted by Booth. Textile manufacturing was another branch of early industrialization and again we encounter instances of successful indigenous entrepreneurship, with Sundanese pioneers applying mechanization on an appreciable scale in weaving in West Java. The center of activities was the tiny town of Majalaya near Bandung, and its surroundings, where by the late 1930s almost 90 percent of all weaving enterprises in Java were located.[7] But here, also, competition between indigenous and Chinese producers stiffened and by the 1940s many of the Sundanese producers were in fact working as sub-contractors of ethnic Chinese factory-owners. Other isolated instances of industrial production controlled by indigenous businessmen in the 1930s included the rice-wine distillery Bapak Djenggot, which later developed into the ABC business group, as well as the agro-industrial plant Sekar Djaja in Surabaya, the beginnings of the later Sekar Company.

Initiatives were, however, not confined to the secondary sector. In the tertiary sector, finance and trading both offered opportunities for indigenous pioneers. The first indigenously owned private bank, Bank Nasional Indonesia, was called into existence in Surabaya in 1928 and was followed by the Bank Nasional Boekittinggi (later Bukittinggi) in West Sumatra in 1930. Both operated on a modest scale and aimed at reducing the dependence of indigenous entrepreneurs on Chinese creditors backed up by the Dutch banks.

Trading also offered an avenue to contest the rigid segregation on the basis of ethnicity in the late colonial economy. Indigenous trading was often explicitly designed to reduce dependence on Chinese intermediaries in a way reminiscent of the initial economic ambitions of the nationalist political movement *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union), not coincidentally

at first named *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic Union of Trade). Sumatran traders were at the forefront of new initiatives taken during the 1920s and 1930s and it is instructive to look at some examples.

Agoes Moessin Dasaad (born in 1905) already competed successfully with Chinese rivals throughout all of Southeast Asia in his early twenties. He used Palembang in South Sumatra as his base, from where he shipped coffee, rubber, rattan, copra, and pepper to Singapore and Batavia. In 1930, Rahman Tamin (born in 1907) moved from his textile shop in Padang in West Sumatra to Batavia, and soon managed to run an office and a warehouse right in the middle of the capital's Chinese business district. The trading partnership of Soetan Soelaiman Djohan (born in 1896) and Soetan Perpatih Djohor (born in 1902) in Padang used its business contacts with Japanese exporters to divert portions of the Sumatran import trade away from Chinese firms. Haji Abdul Ghany Aziz (born in 1896) inherited a trading company from his father in Palembang and specialized in exchanging batik textiles from Java against forest produce from South Sumatra. And finally, Haji Sukar Sjamsoeddin (born in 1902) was well established in trading and rubber remilling in Palembang by the end of the 1930s.[8] The embryo of an indigenous business elite was already laid in Java and Sumatra during the late colonial period.

Japanese occupation

With the Japanese occupation (March 1942–August 1945), the economic situation in the Dutch East Indies changed dramatically. Dutch managers were literally pushed aside and often interned, many Chinese suffered from distrust by both the Japanese and Indonesians, and the entire production apparatus was integrated into the war economy of Japan. Although there was little doubt about whose priorities were served, the new constellation in the economy *did* present chances for enterprising Indonesians, especially when pursuing private interests while collaborating, at least on the surface, with the Japanese. Dasaad, for instance, worked for a Japanese-controlled association of Indonesian merchants and regularly figured as spokesman for the community of Javanese businessmen. His own business expanded rapidly. Just before the attack on Pearl Harbor he had purchased the textile factory Kantjil Mas near Pasuruan in East Java, which developed into the single largest plant in the Indonesian textile industry. A young fellow Sumatran, Achmad Bakrie from Lampung (born in 1916), ran a trading firm together with his brother Abuyamin, exchanging agricultural products

from Sumatra against sugar and consumer goods from Java. Dasaad and Bakrie were, together with Abdul Ghany Aziz, among the representatives of indigenous businessmen in an organization set up in April 1945 by the Japanese authorities to design the future "people's economy" in independent Indonesia.[9] A Javanese gentleman of social consequence, Raden Mas Soedarmo, even managed to obtain Japanese money for building a factory producing ropes and sacks in a suburb of Batavia only months before the capitulation of the Imperial forces in August 1945.

What then were the prospects for *indonesianisasi* of the economy when Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed independence in August 1945? Not too good, one is tempted to say. The foremost obstacle was obviously the Dutch refusal to acknowledge Indonesian independence, which necessitated a drawn-out struggle, the Indonesian Revolution. During four-and-a-half years, up to the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, economics clearly took the backseat behind politics. In addition, there was an extreme shortage of qualified Indonesians capable of taking over management and supervisory functions fulfilled by Dutchmen in particular and assisted by ethnic Chinese. This structural bottleneck was part of the colonial legacy. In terms of educational enrollment, Indonesia at independence was lagging far behind virtually all other countries in Southeast and East Asia.[10] Moderate nationalist leaders, such as Vice President Hatta, appreciated this and attempted to temper the aspirations of fervent economic nationalists on more than one occasion. At the same time, as is shown above, the seeds of a future indigenous business elite had been sown. Pioneers were in place and ready to benefit from more favorable conditions.

Indonesian revolution

There was, understandably, very limited scope for new successful ventures of indigenous businessmen during the tumultuous years of the Indonesian Revolution (August 1945–December 1949) when the archipelago was for all intents and purposes divided into two countries. The newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia, with its capital temporarily moved to Yogyakarta, retained control over most of Java and Sumatra, whereas the territory under restored Dutch rule embraced all other islands to which substantial areas in Java and Sumatra were added by military force in mid-1947 and late 1948.[11] Yet the vacuum that emerged when the Japanese had left and the Dutch had not yet returned provided opportunities for Indonesians to function as managers of productive assets, albeit usually at levels of operation far below capacity and only for a short period of time.

Some of the pioneers from the late colonial period and the Japanese occupation were highly active in Republican territory during the Indonesian Revolution. Dasaad, for instance, became a major supplier of weapons, tires, and medicine to the Indonesian armed forces, TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*). He belonged to the inner circle of President Sukarno's personal friends. And again businessmen from West Sumatra played the leading part. In 1948, Vice President Hatta himself took the initiative to the Central Trading Corporation (CTC) in Bukittinggi, which was explicitly designed to challenge the supremacy of the leading Dutch trading companies. Hatta's choice of executive directors is worth noting: First, two Acehnese, then an Indonesian of Chinese descent. Another Minangkabau businessman, Soetan Sjahsam, younger brother of Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, ran a lucrative business. Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta the government itself operated a cigar factory whose Dutch owners were not welcome in the Republic's capital. A nexus between private economic activity and political power was evolving very soon after Indonesian independence had been declared.

Another important nexus in the territory of the Republic was that between the economy and the military. The TNI formed the nation's strategic spearhead during the revolution, often taking command when the Japanese administrators had departed and no Allied or Dutch forces had yet arrived. Transport companies, mines, and estates fell under direct military supervision and in Sumatra many officers were reportedly more busy with trading and smuggling than with fighting. A separate body, called Usaha Muda (literally "Young Effort"), was created in Bukittinggi for junior officers wishing to pursue a commercial career.[12] Oil exports, often clandestine to evade the Dutch naval blockade, were crucial in generating cash flows for the guerilla warfare against the Dutch, and again the TNI was heavily involved, both as an institution and through enterprising individuals, for instance A. K. Gani in Palembang, a former actor in charge of coordination of oil deliveries. In West Java the rehabilitation of the textile industry was undertaken jointly by Chinese factory-owners and the so-called Garuda Hitam ("Black Garuda") battalion.[13]

In the Dutch-controlled area, supervision shifted back to returning Dutch owners and managers, especially after the second military campaign (December 1948–January 1949), which brought large parts of the estate areas in Java and Sumatra under Dutch jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it became a professed aim of various administrations in the Dutch-controlled territories to further indigenous participation in economic life. Exporters could on occasion get priority access to foreign

exchange, a prelude to the policy of systematic positive discrimination pursued in the 1950s. A small number of new indigenous enterprises were set up under Dutch rule, notably in strongholds of Dutch commerce outside Java such as Medan and Makassar. An Ambonese private bank was established in 1947 and the Dutch-controlled puppet state Negara Pasoendan ("Sundanese Nation") offered protection to indigenous textile producers in 1948 after large parts of West Java had been conquered anew by Dutch forces. The overriding concern of the Dutch in economic matters, however, was how to safeguard continued operations by Dutch private companies after the transfer of sovereignty, which was increasingly appearing inevitable. The resulting Financial and Economic Agreement (*Finec*), reached at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in early November 1949, offered sufficient guarantees for Dutch business for the time being, but the continued predominance of Dutch capital in the Indonesian economy remained an affront to economic nationalists.

The early independence period

During the first half of the 1950s, the Indonesian economy benefited from the general expansion in world trade driven by the Korean War boom, in particular since Indonesia was a major supplier of petroleum and rubber. Favorable external conditions were accompanied at home by the high expectations of a nation whose sovereignty had just been universally acknowledged and by a new feeling of optimism. Foreign capital, especially Dutch capital, still dominated the "modern" sector of the economy, unilaterally accounting for one-quarter of national income, and branches such as inter-island shipping and import trading continued to be virtually monopolized by Dutch companies.[14] Nevertheless, the surge of establishments of new private companies by indigenous Indonesians was of such dimensions that one can speak of a new dawn in business.

According to John O. Sutter, who introduced the term *indonesianisasi* (Indonesianization) into the international discourse, an estimated 500 new companies were established each year in the early 1950s, 40 percent of which were founded by indigenous businessmen.[15] By implication, at least one-third of the 4200 business firms legally incorporated in Indonesia as of 1953 had been set up in the preceding couple of years. Interestingly, 40 percent of the trading firms and one-third of the manufacturing enterprises registered in 1953 were held by indigenous businessmen, judging from the very name of the enterprise.[16] In a sample of

new business enterprises set up in the 1950s in Central Java, more than 50 percent of the firms had Javanese owners and/or managers, whereas one firm in ten was run as a joint venture with ethnic Chinese. It is worth noting here that the share of Chinese companies declined while that of Javanese firms rose as the decade progressed.[17] These statistics testify to a new elan or spirit in indigenous business during the years following the transfer of sovereignty.

Undeniably, however, the vast majority of the newly established enterprises was small in scale concerning both capital endowment and employment, and only provided an economic basis for business elites on the local level. The many small companies, 1500 newcomers in Central Java alone, formed an urban complement to the several thousand cooperatives in rural areas, extending credit facilities and offering shared centralized facilities in production and distribution; the type of compromise between private capitalism and socialist idealism that was above all propagated by Vice President Hatta.

Postive discriminiation

The ill-fated *Benteng* (fortress) program executed by successive cabinets in Indonesia during the 1950s was a tangible manifestation of economic nationalism and a political reaction to the continuing prolonged predominance of Dutch capital in vital sectors of the Indonesian economy after the transfer of sovereignty. It was essentially a policy of positive discrimination favoring Indonesian, in particular indigenous Indonesian import traders. Import trading was chosen as a field of operations since it required little technological knowhow and was known to be lucrative, as testified by the high market share held by the leading Dutch trading firms, especially the "Big Five" (Borsumij, Internatio, Jacobson van den Berg, Lindeteves, and Geo. Wehry). The *Benteng* program was launched in 1950 and officially abandoned in 1957. Its essence was to offer preferential access to foreign exchange and reserve certain categories of import goods for traders officially registered as "national importers." It became a national scandal.[18]

The criteria to qualify as a "national importer" were altered several times and the list of goods reserved for such traders also underwent numerous revisions. This policy was most vigorously executed by Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, the nationalist Minister of Finance in the (first) cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953–July 1955). The number of "national importers" increased rapidly from only 250 in 1950 to 4300 in late 1954. In 1954 it was admitted by both Deputy Prime Minister

Wongsonegoro and Vice President Hatta that a vast majority of the "national importers" were in fact serving as front men for Chinese traders and Dutch companies, selling their licenses to the highest bidder. The program offered ample opportunities for corruption and even its most fervent proponent, Iskaq, was prematurely removed from office on charges of bribery. In 1956, the economic nationalism associated with the *Benteng* program fostered a militant anti-Chinese movement led by the nationalist Assaat that, however, soon evaporated.[19]

When assessing the impact of the *Benteng* program on the Indonesian economy in the 1950s, it is useful to distinguish between immediate and long-term effects. Judged against its professed aims, the program was obviously a failure. It did not create the intended middle class of indigenous entrepreneurs. At the same time, it is also worth noting that the indigenous share in incorporated firms in 1953, as mentioned above, scarcely differed between a sector where positive discrimination was applied, namely trading, and a sector where it did not apply, manufacturing. The intended detrimental impact on trading by Dutch and Chinese firms seems to have been very limited. In a longer time perspective, the nurturing of corruption was clearly a negative outcome. The failure of the *Benteng* program might even have undermined Indonesian confidence in the system of private capitalism, thus paving the way for the transition to Sukarno's "Guided Economy" (*Ekonomi Terpimpin*) in 1959.

How can we reconcile the new elan in Indonesian business during the 1950s with the failure of promoting such entrepreneurship by means of positive discrimination? Did the many new businesses emerge despite or because of the *Benteng* program? Perhaps there was not so much of a causal relationship between the two, but rather a common underlying force expressing a new optimism and urge to change economic life now that the political constellation had radically improved.

Quite a different kind of favored treatment in business applied to the military. There was continuity between the heavy involvement of the armed forces in business during the Indonesian Revolution and the takeover of private Dutch enterprises in 1957. One of the most widely publicized examples of military involvement in business is the large investment accumulated by a foundation run by future President Suharto when serving as a military commander in Central Java in the mid-1950s.[20] The Dutch companies were taken over by local trade unions in December 1957 but almost immediately placed under military supervision by the government, which retroactively legalized the actions but also did not wish vital economic assets to stay under control of communist-inspired trade unionists.

Indigenous success

The most salient features of private firms with regard to the formation of an indigenous business elite were size and long-run viability. Regrettably, there are no statistics whatsoever on turnover or assets, or even numbers of employees for the foremost indigenous enterprises in Indonesia in the 1950s. The researcher has to rely on qualitative assessments by later scholars that presumably reflect the importance of individual firms, or on recent information about the main business groups in Indonesia, which by definition conveys survival rates. Observations from these two sources are discussed in separate sections below.

There exists a list of new indigenous Indonesian businessmen in the 1950s, which, although not exhaustive, offers a birds' eye impression of the 22 men – no women involved – who were thought to have figured prominently in the national economy at the time.[21] Sumatrans are well represented, accounting for at least half of the persons on the list, with several names familiar from the late colonial period, the Japanese occupation or the Indonesian Revolution. Already in 1947, Agoes Dasaad had reconstituted his trading firm into a company consisting of six separate business units. The reorganization facilitated a diversification into manufacturing of textiles and radios as well as the operation of a major warehouse. At its apex, the Dasaad Musin Company was said to have 1900 employees, but after the fall of Sukarno most of the productive assets were taken over by Chinese competitors.[22] Abdul Ghany Aziz gained much from serving as the sole agent for International Harvester on the Indonesian market whereas Rahman Tamin owned both a printing press and a large textile factory in East Java. Haji Sukar Sjamsoeddin was said to benefit considerably from government protection for import trading and played a leading role in the country's national organization of economists. Djohan & Djohor and Soetan Sjahsam were still highly active in trading.[23]

Five or six fellow Sumatrans of a slightly younger generation joined the seven or so "old-timers" among the Sumatran businessmen.[24] Best known was Hasjim Ning from Padang, who gave up his position as personal assistant to Vice President Hatta, his uncle, and ventured into motorcar assembly. Hasjim Ning held the lucrative sole agency for General Motors cars and was jokingly referred to as the "Henry Ford of Indonesia" in the press. As the Vice President's nephew, he was a highly public figure and was soon appointed chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta.[25] Leading indigenous businessman in North Sumatra was T. D. (Tumpul Dorianus) Pardede from Tapanuli, who

founded a knitting factory in downtown Medan in 1953. Pardede was the very first to attach the label "Made in Indonesia" to singlets and socks produced for export. His factory employed 3000 persons, and the owner himself became a public figure not only in Medan but also in Jakarta. Towards the very end the of the Sukarno period in 1965 he held a post as cabinet minister, however without receiving a salary.[26] Omar Tusin focused on investment and eventually, in 1959, founded an industrial credit bank, Bank Pembangunan Swasta, whereas Sidi Tando ran a paint factory. Finally, Wahab Affan diverged from trading into shipping and banking, and was, like Omar Tusin, appointed into high-ranking positions in the national organization of economists. Wahab was exceptionally well connected as a relative of the President's second official wife Fatmawati, from Bencoolen in southwestern Sumatra.[27]

A striking omission in the list of prominent businessmen is Achmad Bakrie.[28] In the 1950s, Bakrie obtained sole agencies for a whole host of consumer goods imported from Europe, but, significantly, not from the Netherlands. In 1957, Bakrie got a considerable loan from the central bank, Bank Indonesia, which he used to convert an old, previously Dutch-owned factory in Jakarta into a modern plant for manufacturing pipes. This was the starting-point of one of most astounding success stories of indigenous Indonesian business within the Suharto era.[29]

Few of the Javanese pioneers of an older generation seem to have played an important role in the national economy during the 1950s. The list used here only gives a reference to Bumiputra 1912, represented by its president-director Raden Rudjito from the Semarang region in Central Java, who had already reached the age of 60 at the time of the transfer of sovereignty. Nitisemito in Kudus, who was even older but still alive, is not mentioned at all, arguably on account of the steep decline of his *kretek* empire after independence.[30]

Six or seven businessmen from Java, often of younger generations, rose to prominence within the indigenous economic elite of the 1950s.[31] Foremost among them was without doubt Soedarpo Sastosatomo (born in 1920), who is said to be the single most successful indigenous capitalist of the Sukarno period. He was of Javanese origin, but grew up in North Sumatra and worked with Hasjim Ning for a while before starting his own business in Jakarta in the early 1950s. He had priority access to foreign exchange for imports, delivered vehicles to the army and borrowed money from Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta. His flagship firm was the Indonesian Shipping and Transport Agency (ISTA), which he had purchased from the Dutch trading firm Jacobson van den Berg. ISTA obtained sole agencies for German and Japanese shipping

lines and developed into the Samudra (Ocean) Indonesia shipping line, the heart of a subsequent business empire. Soedarpo was well connected, not only through his friendship with Sultan Hamengku Buwono, but also through his own brother, who chaired a faction of the Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*) in parliament.[32]

Other indigenous businessmen from Java included Sosrohadikoesoemo, an engineer specializing in the distribution of electrical appliances from Philips through his trading firm Intraport, and Raden Mas Koesmoeljono (born in 1905 and a former law student in the Netherlands), who delivered pencils and pumps to various government offices. Koesmoeljono benefited from close contacts with the Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*). Raden Mardanus, also of aristocratic Javanese lineage, established a shipbuilding firm with generous credits from the government, and eventually became a cabinet minister for naval construction. Eddy Kowara from Banten (born in 1919) ran the trading company Teknik Umum, and was especially favored in gaining access to credits from the government.[33] The Madurese Moh Tabrani (born in 1902) and Herling Laoh had both on occasion represented the PNI in cabinet before concentrating on business, the former in construction and the latter by holding a franchise for bottling Coca Cola.[34] Next to Javanese and Sumatrans, the list of 22 prominent indigenous businessmen includes one person from Manado in North Sulawesi, Frits Eman (born in 1917), whose firm Udatin held the exclusive license to assemble Holden motorcars in Indonesia.

These indigenous businessmen were by definition potential beneficiaries of the *Benteng* program, although the most successful individual of them all, Soedarpo, described the policy of positive discrimination as a "disaster," claiming that he himself did not profit from it.[35] With regard to several others, it is known that they made extensive use of licenses given out under the *Benteng* program.[36] It is also worth noting that several of these indigenous businessmen had conspicuously good connections with high government officials and political parties. The nexus between private capitalism and political power was reinforced during the 1950s.

In the late 1980s, two private initiatives were taken to provide detailed information about the leading business groups and conglomerates that predominated in the Indonesian economy under Suharto. They resulted in highly useful surveys that have been used relatively little by scholars, probably because the publications are prohibitively priced.[37] This source offers a retrospective view allowing us, as it were, to observe the business elite of Sukarno's Indonesia by looking backwards from a point in time several decades later.

Only seven of the 24 prominent indigenous businessmen in the 1950s (including Bakrie and Nitisemito) show up on the list of the 200 top conglomerates around 1990. These are: Hasjim Ning, Soedarpo, Pardede, Eddy Kowara, Fritz Eman, Bakrie & Bros. and Bumiputra 1912 (represented on the older list by its president-director). Such a score is unimpressive and underscores the high extent to which members of the indigenous business elite in the 1950s depended on political patronage and privileged access to credit and government orders. They experienced difficulties in retaining their prominent positions in the economy when the political constellation changed with the transition from Sukarno's "Old Order" (*Orde Lama*) to Suharto's "New Order" (*Orde Baru*) in 1966.

Out of the 200 conglomerates identified as leading in Indonesia around 1990, about 40 had been in operation already in the 1950s, and of these about half were run by indigenous businessmen. This testifies to an unmistakable long-term continuity in indigenous Indonesian business. Thirteen of the later prominent indigenous conglomerates with roots in the 1950s, or even before, had apparently been operating at a modest scale at the time, only reaching maturity during the "New Order" period. This applied for instance to Haji Kalla, who played a role in Makassar, Sulawesi, akin to that of Soedarpo in Jakarta or Pardede in Medan. His company, established in 1952, underwent rapid expansion after it started to manufacture and distribute electrical as well as vehicle components under the brand name "Bukaka." In 2004, the founder's son, Yusuf Kalla, was elected Vice President. The cabinet installed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 also included Aburizal Bakrie, second son of Achmad Bakrie.

The group of newcomers rising to prominence at a later stage also included the engineer Thayeb Muh. Gobel, whose highly successful conglomerate, National Gobel, cooperated closely with the Japanese electronics company Matsushita, as well as the Ambonese Julis Tahija, a onetime associate of Soedarpo and founder of Indonesia's third largest bank (Bank Niaga), who eventually was appointed as chairman of the board of the Indonesian subsidiaries of the American investors Freeport and Caltex. Political connections were noticeably present in the case of Poleko Trading, established in 1959 in Makasssar by Arnold Baramuli, then governor of South Sulawesi.

Few details are known about the early activities of another ten indigenous conglomerates identified by 1990, and it shall suffice here to give their names: the newspaper company Merdeka set up by Burhanuddin Muh. Diah, the Sukun group of *kretek* manufacturer Wartono, the Galva

group of Kentjana Widjaja, Pioneer Trading based on a sole agency for Yanmar diesel engines, the Ambonese Panatraco, the Javanese hotel chain Sahid, Djawa Indah, Tunggal, and finally Wirontono, and the Sundanese Sukabumi. The very fact that a fair number of indigenous conglomerates had had their beginnings, however embryonic, in the 1950s is yet another manifestation of the new elan found in Indonesian business immediately after the transfer of sovereignty. There was a surge of new companies, many of which clearly did not survive for very long, but some possessing a solid enough basis to play an important role in the Indonesian economy decades later.

Chinese success

Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurship had played an absolutely essential role in the colonial economy. The most widely publicized success story was that of Oei Tiong Ham in Semarang (died in 1924), who counted as one of the richest men in the Netherlands Indies. His business empire crumbled after independence, and in 1961 the government appropriated the assets of the flagship firm Kian Gwan Indonesia on charges of involvement in smuggling. But there were others who often played a key role in the local or regional economy, such as Kwik Hoo Tong Trding in Java sugar, or Tjong A Fie in Medan.[38] The situation was precarious for the Chinese businessmen during the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution because of the strong allegiance of many Chinese with the Dutch. The *Benteng* program in the 1950s was, as said above, designed to further indigenous participation in trading at the expense of Chinese firms. In reality this policy generated "Ali Baba"-constructions (Ali = indigenous front, Baba = Chinese in the back) and there is little evidence that Chinese traders suffered any substantial damage from this strategy of positive discrimination. Outbursts of anti-Chinese sentiment did occur, notably in 1956 and again in 1959, and it does not appear coincidental that the share of ethnic Chinese in newly established firms, as illustrated by Central Java, dropped in the course of the decade, whereas the share of indigenous starters increased. The large-scale takeover and subsequent nationalization of Dutch-owned firms in 1957 and 1959 respectively offered unique opportunities for well-qualified Chinese managers to step in, which is not the same as to say that the Chinese were the sole beneficiaries of the expulsion of the Dutch. In short, there were both strong positive and strong negative currents in the underlying conditions for business activities by ethnic Chinese in the 1950s.

The rather complex and multifaceted situation is reflected in the information about the emerging Chinese business elite. There is, to my knowledge, no qualitative assessment available similar to the list of 22 used extensively here to outline the contours of the indigenous business elite. The sole possibility is to again apply the method of retroactive observation using the detailed survey of the top 200 conglomerates compiled around 1990.[39]

Half of the 40 odd conglomerates with roots in the 1950s or before had Chinese owners. Oldest among them was the Sampoerna cigarette company dating back to 1913, which stayed in the Liem family for about 90 years before passing into American hands. The rest all dated from after 1945. Five firms were established very soon after the transfer of sovereignty, three of which were especially successful in manufacturing and distributing cigarettes: Djarum of Oei Wie oan (Hartono) in Kudus, the country's second largest producer; Bentoel of Budhiwidjaja Kusumanegara (Tjioe Yan Hwie) in Malang, East Java; and the Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company (STTC) of Ng Chin Ton in Pematang Sianter, North Sumatra. Meanwhile, Lautan Luas of Ng Adyansjah Masrin (Ng Kee Chun) focused on marketing chemical goods whereas Gayah Tunggal of Sjamsul Nursalim (Lim Tak Siong) went into banking in North Sumatra.

Rising anti-Chinese sentiments in the mid-1950s did not discourage enterprising ethnic Chinese from setting up new businesses which soon underwent rapid expansion. The most spectacular success story was that of William Soeryadjaya (Tjia Kian Liong), whose firm for distributing construction materials developed into Astra International, a huge company including joint ventures with Toyota and Honda. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Astra International counted as Indonesia's second largest conglomerate, encompassing several hundreds of subsidiaries. Astra International stands out among Chinese conglomerates for its policy of consistently appointing indigenous Indonesians in leading positions and refraining from blatantly corrupt practices.[40] It was a contemporary of the modest beginnings of the Hero supermarket company, the first of its kind in the Indonesian market, run by Moh. Saleh Kurnia (Wu Lai Chang), and the Mansur trading firm of Soehargo Gondokusumo (Go Ka Him) with a specialization in agricultural goods.

The origins of the Salim group may be traced to the acquisition of Bank Central Asia by Liem Sioe Liong in 1957. Rapid expansion came soon after the ascension to power of Suharto, a personal friend of Liem, and by the late 1980s the many hundred subsidiaries of the Salim group taken together employed at least 135,000 Indonesians. In the historiography, this success story became synonymous with the nexus

between private capitalism and political power in Indonesia. However, recent in-depth studies have drawn attention to the high managerial quality of the business group.[41]

The expulsion of virtually all remaining private Dutch companies from Indonesia in the late 1950s was without doubt highly beneficial to the ethnic Chinese. Some were quick to replace departing Dutchmen as managers in the companies now owned by the Indonesian state and officially under supervision of the armed forces. Others gained in particular from buying up assets of seized Dutch companies, possibly at a discount price, and continuing operations as before. Mantrust, founded in Bandung in 1958 by Tegoeh Soetantyo (Tan Kiong Liep), based its success on outlets previously owned by two of the Dutch "Big Five," Borsumij and Geo. Wehry. Dwi Satrya Utama of Gunawan Tjiptobiantoro (Tjoa To Hing) took over contracts and contacts from a formerly Dutch construction company. Rodamas, Sinar Mas, and Sinar Mas Tunggal all started precisely at the time when their Dutch predecessors in business were asked to leave the country. Information is scarce about several other ethnic Chinese firms, which were all founded in the 1950s and later counted among the top 200 conglomerates. Again, let it suffice to mention some of their names: Mugi (cosmetics), Ometraco, Satya Djaya Raya, Gunung Agung owned by Masagung (Tjio Wie Thay), and Sinar Sahabat.

The ethnic distribution of the 40-odd companies that later became leading conglomerates was, as mentioned, rather even with an equal number, or even slightly more, Chinese firms than indigenous ones. Three or four decades later, the balance had shifted decisively to the advantage of the Chinese. Out of the top 200 conglomerates, at least 120 had Chinese owners. More importantly still, Chinese conglomerates accounted for two-thirds of total sales and assets out of all of the 200 conglomerates and the top 20 ranks were almost exclusively occupied by ethnic Chinese.[42] The Suharto era had clearly been more conducive to Chinese business than the Sukarno period.

Conclusion

Who replaced the Dutch in Indonesia when decolonization was extended from the political into the economic sphere? What did the new business elites look like? These questions are addressed in this chapter. The following six observations are due:

1. The roots of an indigenous business elite may be traced to the late colonial period, although initiatives were scarce and largely confined

to a few branches of manufacturing such as *kretek*, cigarettes, and textiles, as well as banking and trading in the service sector.

2. The Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution opened up unexpected opportunities for enterprising indigenous businessmen, often acting in concert with, respectively, the Japanese authorities and the Indonesian armed forces.
3. The 1950s saw a new elan in Indonesian business, with numerous indigenous and Chinese businessmen establishing firms that were generally small in scale, but displaying much variation in terms of activities. These developments reflected rather a general, optimistic mood following international recognition of Indonesian independence than the effects of a policy of positive discrimination as manifest in the *Benteng* program.
4. An indigenous business elite did emerge in the course of the 1950s. It was of unprecedented dimensions, highly diversified, and had a considerable regional spread. Members of this elite were strikingly often very well connected politically, and some benefited from cooperation with the military.
5. A new ethnic Chinese business elite also emerged in the course of the 1950s, despite policies of discrimination and anti-Chinese sentiments. The basis of this elite strikingly often lay in the takeover of formerly Dutch-owned economic niches and, again, some members gained from participating in the commercial activities of the armed forces.
6. Both the indigenous and the new Chinese business elite survived to an appreciable extent into the Soeharto era, but the Chinese proved to be more resilient to changes in the political system.

With regard to stereotyped images of aptness for business, the history of economic decolonization in Indonesia necessitates a revision of the older image of indigenous entrepreneurship, whereas the image of the Chinese variant is reinforced.

Notes

1. Anne Booth (2007: 120).
2. This chapter draws on J. Thomas Lindblad (2008).
3. J. van Gelderen (1927/1961: 144).
4. Benjamin Higgins (1968: 678).
5. Peter Post (1997: 94).
6. For more detail, see Jeroen Touwen (2001: 163–223).
7. Peter Keppy (2001: 52).

8. Peter Post (1997: 93–101).
9. Peter Post (1997: 105–6).
10. Anne Booth (2007: 138).
11. Robert Cribb (2000: 157–61).
12. Bambang Purwanto (2005: 261) and Mestika Zed (2003: 361) "Economic decolonization and the rise of Indonesian military business," paper presented at an international conference on "The economic decolonization of Indonesia in regional perspective," sponsored by IIAS (Leiden), 18–19 November.
13. Peter Keppy (2001: 100, 288).
14. Howard Dick et al. (2002: 174).
15. John O. Sutter (1959: 1307).
16. J. Thomas Lindblad (2002: 62–5).
17. J. Thomas Lindblad (2004: 93–7).
18. Kian Wie Thee (1996: 316–18), Jeroen Touwen (1999: 227–9) and J. Thomas Lindblad (2004: 86–9).
19. The relationship between the *Benteng* program and the ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian economy is a very complex matter. The degree to which the policy actually discriminated against the Chinese varied a great deal over time. Also, the issue of the dual citizenship of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had at that time not yet been resolved, so that many Chinese could be considered as either Indonesians or foreigners.
20. Robert Edward Elson (2001: 62).
21. The list also includes one amalgamation of business interests, the Association of Indonesian Batik Cooperatives, GKBI (*Gabungan Koperasi Batik Indonesia*). See Richard Robison (1986: 51).
22. Richard Robison (1986: 51–4, 331).
23. Richard Robison (1986: 52–3).
24. Information in some detail is available about the five Sumatrans discussed here but no data is known about Umar Zahiruddin, who possibly originated from Jambi in South Sumatra.
25. A. A. Navis (1986) and Richard Robison (1986: 54–5).
26. Tridah Bangun (1983).
27. Richard Robison (1986: 53, 83).
28. Achmad Bakrie was, together with his relative Aslam Bakrie, added to the list in an updated and improved version by Peter Post (1997: 93–4).
29. Nasir Tamara (1998).
30. Nitisemito was, just like Bakrie, later added to the list Peter Post (1997: 93–4).
31. Of the businessmen discussed here, five are known to originate from the island of Java proper, and one (Moh. Tabrani) from the adjacent island of Madura. The provenance of Herling Laoh is not known with certainty.
32. Richard Robison (1986: 55–6) and Kian Wie Thee (2003: 148–57).
33. Richard Robison (1986: 54, 90, 335–6).
34. Richard Robison (1986: 50, 54, 90, 335–6).
35. Kian Wie Thee (2003: 154–5).
36. Richard Robison (1986: 42–6, 49, 55).
37. CISI (1990), Data Consult (1991) and J. Thomas Lindblad (2007: 65–85).
38. Alexander Claver (2006: 292–349, 366–7).

39. CISI (1990) and Data Consult (1991).
40. Amir Usin Daulay (1993) and Leo Suryadinata (1997: 42–4).
41. Richard Robison (1986: 296–315), Leo Suryadinata (1997: 38–40), Michael Backman (1999: 113–17) and Marleen Dieleman (2007).
42. J. Thomas Lindblad (2007: 74, 78).

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5

Elites as the Least Common Denominator: The Ambivalent Place of French Schools in Lebanon in the Process of Decolonization

Esther Möller

Introduction

When the first Lebanese government, still under the French mandate, was constituted in 1926, the director of the Jesuit school in Beirut stated: "the (...) government (...) was quite luckily constituted: four former students."[1] In the following decades, six of the seven first prime ministers of Lebanon were alumni of French schools, mainly the Jesuit schools.[2] Did the French schools in Lebanon thus support Lebanese decolonization? Or was their only interest to maintain their influence in the country? How did they situate themselves at the crossroads of French authority and Lebanese society in the process of decolonization? This chapter will argue that French schools defended French domination in Lebanon as well as provided space for Lebanese expressions of nationalistic claims. Yet it was precisely the concept of the elite that enabled the French schools to maintain their position in times of political changes and to keep it even after the Lebanese independence.

After a short introduction to the historical context and place of the French schools in mandated Lebanon, their interaction with the French authorities and Lebanese society concerning the question of elites will be analyzed. I will take into consideration the expectations of the French government and the Lebanese population regarding these schools as well as the manner by which the schools remained linked to Lebanese elites even after their school days. Finally, the positions and destinations the alumni of the French schools eventually chose and received will be analyzed. Throughout the chapter, I will frequently use comparison with other countries under French domination in order to determine the specificity of the Lebanese case.

Historical context

Can one speak of decolonization in French mandated Lebanon at all? In fact, Lebanon was never a part of French territory, and the mandate on Lebanon given to France by the League of Nations from 1920 to 1943 was meant to foster Lebanon's independence.[3] Nonetheless, the French High Commission, the French government's representative in Lebanon, installed colonial structures in this former part of the Ottoman Empire because despite a Lebanese government from 1926 on the French High Commission continued to take all decisions concerning Lebanon's military, politics, economics, and culture.[4] In doing so, French officials massively relied on the collaboration of local elites. Early on, these were mainly the notables of the different Christian communities, especially the Maronites, the largest Lebanese Christian community. For centuries, the Maronites had claimed very close links to France.[5] After the end of World War I, the Maronites supported the idea of a French mandate in Lebanon. In order to reward them for this engagement, but also to be able to rely on a privileged group, the mandate government gave Maronites the most important positions in the newly created state of Greater Lebanon.[6] Yet the French mandate power also tried to get in contact with the other communities that had deep roots in the country. As the Arab nationalist movement was gaining influence, French officials started to get in touch with the elites of Muslim communities as well, in particular with the Sunni, who provided the traditional elite in the towns. Some of the Lebanese Sunni families were ready to cooperate with the French from the mid-1920s on, because the mandate regime increased their wealth and strengthened their social position.[7]

Despite French support of the country's elite's positions, the dissatisfaction of many Lebanese with the mandate regime grew. An important group of mainly Muslim Lebanese expressed their criticism from the 1920s on, demanding either a Lebanese union with Syria or with all Arab states.[8] Maronite dissatisfaction occurred only in the 1930s, mainly as a result of the French autocratic policy in economical issues. The Maronites thus followed their patriarch's more nationalist orientation, but their political conclusions were divergent. One faction, the "Constitutional Bloc" led by by Bishara al-Khuri, demanded the country's independence. It emphasized the cooperation of all Lebanese communities and the country's partnership with its surrounding neighbors. At the other end of the spectrum, the "National Bloc" around Emile Iddi favored the Maronite's primacy and proclaimed the importance of maintaining Lebanon's links with France.[9] There were even more radical

Christian groups with proto-fascist orientations like the Kata'ib or Phalanges. Although Maronite-dominated and French-educated, they became very nationalistic and called on the French to leave Lebanon.[10] These nationalistic movements evolved for different reasons. As in other colonial regions, since the end of World War I nationalist movements in Lebanon claimed liberation from foreign domination. During the 1930s, to a certain extent, the influence of German fascism encouraged them to view colonialism as anachronistic, weak, and out of touch with the demands of modernity.[11] In addition, the League of Nations' Mandate Commission's expectation of a delayed withdrawal of the French provided these groups with additional arguments. From 1940 on, the internal French conflicts between the Vichy government and the Free French movement of de Gaulle weakened the French position in Lebanon. Finally, Franco-British rivalry for influence in the Middle East allowed local actors to claim independence as soon as possible.[12]

In the face of rising nationalist pressures, the French government was very reluctant to give up its power in Lebanon. The first Lebanese Republic, proclaimed in 1926, remained completely dependent on the French mandate government. A Franco-Lebanese treaty from 1936 was never ratified by the French parliament. The declaration of Lebanese independence by General Catroux in November 1941 did not change anything. It was only in November 1943 that the French accepted a Lebanese government, the consequence of a National Pact between the different communities.[13] Three years later, French (and British) troops left the country.

The role of French schools in Lebanese society

The different positions of the Lebanese and the French led to conflicts in many parts of public life. One important domain where they became obvious was French schools. In fact, for both the French and Lebanese the question of the education of young Lebanese was most important, because they were both aware of the schools' impact on the students' identity.[14] This also explains the reason for the French government's massive funding of French schools in Lebanon as well as for some local schools that seemed conducive to spreading French influence.[15] The schools represented diverse ideological and religious currents, but one thing they had in common was their explicit or implicit aim of spreading the French civilizing mission. While the schools all undertook to spread French culture and language, their objectives varied.

The largest group was constituted by different French Catholic schools. They were mainly attended by Lebanese Christians and only

very few students of the Muslim communities. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a French secular organization, the "Mission laïque française" also set up its first schools in Beirut. As they excluded any religious teaching, many non-Catholic communities sent their children to them, mainly Sunni Muslim, Greek-Orthodox, and Jews, all forming the traditional population of Beirut.[16] The French government, deeply associated with the Lebanese Catholics, had remained relatively aloof from this organization. From the mid-1920s on, however, French officials intensified their relations with these schools, as they were attracting a population which in the past had escaped French influence. These groups, moreover, were close to Arab nationalist milieus. In addition, there were some French Jewish schools which had been established at the end of the nineteenth century. Finally, from 1927 on, a French Protestant school for girls opened its doors to Lebanese minority communities.[17] Despite their differences these French schools were bound by many common aspects. To varying degrees they were spaces of French domination as well as spaces of expression of Lebanese nationalistic claims.

Spaces of defending French domination

As French schools in Lebanon received not only most of their financial means from the government but were also dependent on the cooperation of the French ministry of education – in particular in regard to the recruitment of teachers and the licensing of diplomas – they invariably became an instrument of the French mandate system. Many of the schools' teachers remained personally committed to justifying the French government and the maintenance of the mandate system. As a Jesuit put it: "The French language is the best medium for civilizing."[18] While many teachers voiced their understanding for the growing Lebanese dissatisfaction with French rule, they nevertheless aimed at upholding French influence from the mid-1930s on.[19] Next to the teachers, Lebanese students and their parents made similar statements. Many of them stressed the superiority of French culture and their pride in belonging to it. While some may have earnestly believed in this notion, many may have used praise of French culture as a means to receive a reduction of the school fees or similar favours for their children. Discursive and non-discursive practices of defending French control varied greatly. For example, on the occasion of school festivities and ceremonies, French officials were invited and the French national anthem was played. Performances like these continued even after the transfer of power. Official French representatives used

these opportunities to reinforce the notion of being representatives of a superior culture.[20] Although the climax had been reached during the mandate, the French government continued to financially support the schools after the Lebanese independence. The French schools thus were looked after by the "Mission culturelle française," the cultural department of the French Embassy which revealed many continuitues with the High Commission.[21]

Spaces of expression of nationalistic claims

By the end of the mandate period, nationalist sentiments existed in all the schools. For instance, the archives of the schools of the Mission laïque française reveal a growing self- confidence on the part of the Arabic teachers. Already during the 1920s they had claimed better remuneration and equality of their status with those of the French teachers. As one of them put it in 1925: "We want the status of real 'collaborateurs.'"[22] The organization in France, however, was slow to satisfy these demands, thereby increasing dissatisfaction with the colonial order. Apart from Lebanese teachers working in the French schools, students too became receptive to the growing nationalist climate in Lebanese society. For instance, a student of the Jesuit school in 1931 wrote an essay arguing that the French should pay more respect for Lebanese culture.[23] A few years later, Maronite Christians associated with the nationalist (and proto-fascist) Kata'ib assembled in front of a school and shouted "French go home!"[24] The French schools partly supported these movements.[25] By 1940, swastikas could be found on school walls. These represented both sympathy with Nazi-Germany but also protest against the French presence.[26] Archives have also preserved expressions of dissatisfaction with French control by parents. The parents' committee of the Mission laïque française, for example, contained members who were actively involved in nationalist movements and the quest for Lebanese independence, like Riad al-Sulh. They placed emphasis on respect for Arab culture in the classroom. As the director of the Mission laïque française reported to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1936, Muslim nationalists started to prefer the American school in Beirut, which they considered to be politically more neutral.[27]

Spaces of ensuring the education of the Lebanese state elite

Educating an elite conducive to long-term French interests was a prime objective of both the French administration and the schools. The French

understood the concept of elite to be rather broad, encompassing senior groups within the business community, politics, and society at large.[28] Directors and teachers of the French schools stated clearly that one of their major aims was to "form an elite."[29] Students were addressed as the "hope of our society" whose work was to continue and even to exceed the work of their elders.[30]

Yet, the different French schools also had diverging perceptions of what the notion "elite" might mean. While the Catholic schools were advocating the notion of a "Catholic elite,"[31] the secular schools of the Mission laïque were much more divided concerning this idea. Director Ruche, for example, expressed his embarrassment when he arrived in 1925 and found that there was no plan as to which group to attract. He himself propagated a republican understanding of elite, that is, gathering the best students of all social layers in a unique school. He thereby referred to the "école unique"-model, which had been developed in France by the defenders of a republican, egalitarian, secular school.[32] This policy apparently contradicted the former director's way of recruiting mainly among the Lebanese upper class. Finally, Ruche decided to open the school doors to students from both the "Lebanese aristocracy"[33] and more modest milieus. Yet, none of the French schools could deny a strong link with the financial elite of the region, as they were private schools with high school fees. Although there were some grants for poor, brilliant, or "politically interested"[34] students, most of the parents had to pay high tuition fees. A slightly different case was the one of the Jewish Schools of the Alliance israélite universelle. Although these schools differentiated themselves from the local Jewish schools, which they considered as poor, they themselves had a clientele of rather modest income and social status.[35]

The French schools' perception of educating the country's elite also corresponded with the expectations of parents.[36] They sent their children to French schools to ensure that they would one day be part of the country's elite, either in an effort to retain a privileged position or to climb up the social ladder. In this sense the parents' committee of the Mission laïque française, when asked by the director in 1929 if they were afraid of a cultural uprooting of their children, replied that they rather feared a social uprooting.[37] Yet other parents from more modest families also invested in the French schools. In a time of consolidation of French colonial structures, knowing French became a precondition for obtaining a good job. In this sense parents used the schools as a "social elevator."[38] In an effort to co-opt not only "friends" but also enemies, the mandate government provided scholarships also for nationalist families.[39]

Important instruments of the schools for forging a lasting relation with members of the Lebanese elite were alumni and alumni associations. From their beginnings, the schools had cared for their former students, but in times of political change their role became even more important. That is why, at the beginning of the mandate, the Jesuits emphasized the position of alumni as a link between the new political regime and Lebanese society. In his letter to the High Commissioner Gouraud Jesuit director Cattin wrote:

> The Alumni are very important in number in Beirut, constituting the directing and influential part of society ... nearly all of them have the best feelings for France and general Gouraud ... my project is to bring these French and indigenous elements more and more together.[40]

Routinely, alumni were invited to concerts, conferences and theater plays.[41] The schools' magazines regularly reported on the activities and positions of former pupils.[42] Moreover, the alumni provided prizes for competitions on certain topics, especially concerning the French and Arabic languages.[43]

Equally important were the alumni associations. Most commonly, they had been founded on the initiative of the school's leadership. The French schools created these networks not only for the benefit of their students but also for their own sake. Alumni associations could function as vehicles of life-long learning and as means to become exposed to French culture on a long-term basis. Moreover, they provided networks through which collaborators could be attracted and problems be solved in an unofficial way. As "better-offs" their task was precisely to "help those who wait, who desire an employment, a place under the sun."[44] Associations were meant to develop a sociability which corresponded to the French concepts of "cercle de sociabilité," and they conformed with the formation of small groups of intellectuals in Lebanon and Syria.[45] In this sense, associations as representatives of the civil society were strategic partners of the colonial project.

In practice, though, only the Catholic schools' alumni associations succeeded, while the one of the secular schools failed because the Lebanese benefited more extensively from the former. First of all, the Catholic schools, and in particular the Lazarists and the Jesuits, were known for their proximity to the mandate government. Moreover, the Catholic schools shared the religion of their majoritarian Catholic students and could thus develop religious activities within their alumni associations. Interestingly, this domain provided female alumni with

rare opportunities. The former students of the girls' school of the Sœurs de Saint Joseph de l'Apparition in Beirut, for example, were assembled in the "Congrégation Mariale," the congregation for Mary, where they accomplished both pious and charitable activities. Their report book does not indicate any rupture at the end of the mandate, and the only reference to the conflicts between France and Lebanon over the latter's independence is indicated by the statement that the meeting in November 1943 was postponed because of "the events."[46] While this religious element was important for the religious French schools, the Mission laïque did not want or was not able to provide such kind of activities. This might have been the reason why their alumni work was developing poorly: the alumni of the secular schools had their own religious circles and affinities which were not those of the schools.[47] Finally, the alumni of the religious schools, except for the French Protestant schools, were religiously speaking much more homogenous than their colleagues from the Mission laïque.

Did the object of reciprocal aid work out? Which positions did alumni occupy? Were there any differences between the different French schools? In June 1941, in a time of external and internal political instability, the journal of the French Catholic school Collège français du Sacré-Cœur, *L'Essor*, published an article listing the different careers the students may embrace after their studies. Although there is no explicit hierarchy, the placement of the different careers seems to translate a mixture of the order's own preferences and the popularity of the careers within Lebanese society: after the military, medicine, administration, jurisprudence, and agriculture, came finally "fisher of men" which meant priest or monk.[48] The reality was still slightly different. Nonetheless, the careers embraced by the French schools' alumni clearly marked them as belonging to the Lebanese political, economical, and social elite. One important way to obtain such a position was to study at the Jesuit University Saint Joseph in Beirut. Although it was in theory possible for candidates from outside to pass the entrance exams of Saint Joseph, students who had already done their schooling at one of the Jesuit schools, especially the one in Beirut linked to the university, were much more advantaged. That is why one of the most important wishes of the parents whose children attended the Mission laïque française was to facilitate their children's possibilities to enter the Jesuit University.[49] In fact most of the French secondary schools' alumni went to university. For women this situation was more difficult, although there were also female university students. If students did not study at the Jesuit University, they went to France to study a part or the whole of their

studies in a city of "the hexagon" and then came back to Lebanon.[50] This practice continued after independence. Students thus perpetuated the tradition of the journey to Europe as part of their education which had been popular among upper-class men since the nineteenth century.[51] Hence, the majority came back to Lebanon, because "only the poor emigrate," as an interview partner told me.[52]

Nonetheless, a few students attended the American University in Beirut. In the last decade of the mandate this institution became more and more popular among Muslim and non-Catholic families, because they considered it to be more independent from the mandate power and less based on religion.[53] Moreover, the American University of Beirut disposed of generous financial means by the Missionary Board located in the US.[54] The French were well aware of this competition and tried to fight it. This competition between France and the US continued into the independence period. When an American team came to Lebanon in 1946 in order to study local cultures they concluded that for a long time to come French culture would remain prominent:

> The French, having lost Lebanon, are still exerting great efforts through the Œuvres françaises and through their schools to maintain their cultural influence. There is no doubt that in this they have the support of a section of the Christian population which has been brought up along French lines and is loath to see this influence weaken. Already, however, a perceptible shift towards English and a demand for it are noticeable. Nevertheless ... French cultural influence will probably remain strong for a long time to come.[55]

After university, many students of the French schools took over the businesses or professions of their fathers or families. Hence they reproduced the marks of their distinction as members of the elite.[56] Other former students of French schools studied either medicine or law. These professions had a long tradition, leading back to the Ottoman Empire, and were much respected.[57] The jurists became politicians or bank managers, or worked in the administration, which had been completely reorganized by the French after World War I.[58] The Lazarists' alumni magazine listed them among "our alumni in the service of our country."[59] Concerning Beirut and its traditional elite of merchants and businessmen, industry and commerce was very attractive too. Those alumni who did not or could not continue a family's business opened new enterprises or entered international companies.[60] Still others embraced careers as politicians and diplomats. During mandate times

this necessarily meant a close cooperation with the mandate power. But, following independence, many of these politicians remained in power. The political career also offered possibilities for new elites to emerge. A case in point might be Khalil Taqi al-Din, a descendant of a Druze family from the Chouf: he was a writer and worked for the Ministry of Education during mandate times, and was later a Lebanese diplomat.[61] He had probably been one of the "politically interested" Lebanese for the French. An alumnus of the Mission laïque française, he was the association's president for many years in the 1930's. Salim Taqla, from a Greek-Catholic family, who went to the French Catholic schools and university and later became an important politician, is another example.[62] Quite a few alumni of the French schools became journalists. This field corresponded with the rise of a press scene in Lebanon. Yet journalism was also closely linked to the political sphere, as the mandate regime was censoring the press.[63] Moreover, many politicians either owned or were writing for a newspaper. Writing for a journal thus meant belonging to a certain political field, and quite a few of the French-language, but also Arabic newspapers were founded by alumni of French schools, expressing different political opinions.[64] Some alumni of the French schools also became writers.[65] The important place of cultural activities such as theater in the French schools might have influenced this choice as well as the possibility of expressing themselves and their experiences through literature. A significant number of alumni became teachers themselves. They either taught in their old school or in one of the private or public institutions in the country.[66] However, becoming a teacher was not a highly regarded career option. Local teachers' training was not well organized during the mandate, neither by the French nor by the Lebanese government. As this situation continued after independence, the teaching profession did not become more attractive. In the case of Catholic schools, becoming a teacher also meant becoming a member of the order. As this was socially more respected and could, moreover, look back on a long tradition, a considerable number of alumni chose this way. Thus, the Catholic orders could realize their primary objective, which was to recruit new members. Yet choosing this profession was less influenced by external, political circumstances than the other careers.

Conclusion

The analysis has revealed the crucial place of French schools in Lebanon in the process of decolonization. Many of the Lebanese citizens who

had started their careers under the French mandate and who pursued them after the country's independence had received their education from a French institution. Although the American and local schools had gained strength and popularity as institutions that were not linked with the colonial power, the French schools were able to retain an important clientele that claimed their elitist education. By promising this connection to the elite, the French schools were able to reinforce their attractiveness. The striking continuity in many fields of public life in Lebanon distinguishes this country from other regions under (former) French domination, especially Syria. As scholars have shown, this continuity was the result of an important Christian community in Lebanon which wanted to remain close to France and its culture. Moreover, Lebanese independence had been prepared, conducted and put into postcolonial practice by a small elite anchored in the Maronite and Sunni communities.[67]

As the analysis of the French schools has made clear, these institutions had reinforced this evolution by relying mainly on the Maronite, for the Christian, especially the Jesuit schools, and on the Sunni, for the Mission laïque française. The schools' emphasis on elite building served the existing power relations and the interests of Maronite establishment. Yet the schools also enabled (limited) access of middle- and lower-class students to central positions in the state. Moreover, the French schools benefited from the strong interest the French government showed in maintaining its close ties with Lebanon. As both during and before the mandate, these ties relied on cultural cooperation, confirmed in the institutionalization of the "Francophonie."[68] In addition, Paris sought to maintain the close relations in the political and economical sphere in order to make Lebanon part of its informal empire in the aftermath of its decolonization. Thus, the elites were one of the least common denominators between the French authorities, the Lebanese notables, and the French schools, which ensured the strong position of each of these actors in Lebanon – with few exceptions until today.

Notes

1. Jesuit Archives, Vanves (SJV), "Fonds Jalabert," Letter from Chanteur to Jalabert, Beirut, 3 June 1926.
2. Youssef Mouawad (2005: 191–210).
3. Nadine Méouchy (2002b: 421–7).
4. Philip Khoury (1987: 619) and Elizabeth Thompson (2000: 250).
5. Nasri Salhab (1997: 60).

6. Gérard Khoury (1993: 186–7) and Fawwaz Traboulsi (2007: 93).
7. Meir Zamir (1997: 31).
8. For the different political orientations, see Kais Firro (2003: 23–41) and Fawwaz Traboulsi (2007: 82–5).
9. Eyal Zisser (2000: 33–4).
10. Concerning the parties' ideology, see Asher Kaufman (2004: 127–8, 180–1).
11. Götz Nordbruch (2009), for German and Italian fascist cultural projects that sought to compete with the French, see Jennifer Dueck (2010), Chapter 2.
12. Henry Laurens (2003: 310).
13. Zisser (2000: 41–82).
14. Jennifer Dueck (2006: 442–59) and (2010), Chapter 1.
15. Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Nantes (MAE), "Service des Œuvres françaises à l'ètranger," "Levant" (164–206).
16. Carla Eddé (2001: 79–102).
17. Jean-Paul Eyrard and Georges Krebs (2007: 131–2).
18. SJV, "Fonds Jalabert," 7-1B, letter from Jalabert to Sautier, 19 May 1939.
19. Archives of the Alliance israélite universelle, Paris (AIU), "Liban 1 C 1," letter from Penso to the president of the Alliance israélite universelle, 19 June 1936.
20. See, for example, Nicola Cooper (2004: 131–47).
21. For example, before becoming the Chef of the "Mission culturelle française" in 1943, Bounoure was the director of the Mandate education department in Lebanon. For his biography, see Gérard Khoury (2004a).
22. Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), 60 AJ: "Mission laïque française," 131, letter from 9 January 1925.
23. SJV, RPO 62, P. J. Honiskiss, 30 October 1931.
24. Interview with Father Michel of the "Collège français du Sacré-Cœur," Beirut, 17 December 2007.
25. In 1939 the direction of the Jesuit school in Beirut banned political activities of the Kata'ib in the school yard, but allowed its students to wear the party's signs in order to show that the school did not have any hostility towards the group. SJV, 11.D.14, "Participation aux Phalanges libanaises."
26. MAE, "Syrie Liban Mandat/ Instruction Publique," 162: report from Grandjouan to Bounoure, 29 May 1940.
27. MAE, "Service des Œuvres françaises à l'étranger," 378, letter from Besnard to the Foreign Minister, Paris, 4 April 1936.
28. Paris's attitude towards Lebanese society differed from the one it had towards colonial education in North Africa. The High Commission quickly abandonned its idea to apply the North African model of schools for the "fils de chefs." These schools for the sons of the Muslim notables attended French schools with the aim to turn them the mediators between France and the indigenous society. See Pascal Le Pautremat (2003).
29. AN, 60 AJ 127, "Comité de patronage," 4 October 1925.
30. Archives of the Collège français du Sacré-Cœur, Beirut (FEC), "L'essor," July 1924, p. 17.
31. SJV, RPO 62, Collège secondaire, "du P. Roebe novembre 1934."
32. AN, 60, AJ 129, "Budet recapitulatif 1926–1927." On the intense discussion in France at the time, see Jean-François Condette (2007: 149–51).
33. AN 60, AJ 129, "Budet recapitulatif 1926–1927."

34. This term is frequently used in the correspondence of the schools with the French authorities. See for example AN 60, AJ 133, letter from Ruche to Besnard, Beirut, 9 April 1931.
35. Kirsten Schulze (2008).
36. The discussion in the parents' committee reflected a general discussion among Arab intellectuals in the interwar period: was it better to provide education to the masses or only to an elite? See Dagmar Glaß (2004), vol. 2: 623–8.
37. AN 60, AJ 132, "Comité de patronage," 7 February 1929.
38. Yet these efforts were not always successful. In his memoirs, Michel Ghorayib, a former student of the secular school who had only been able to bypass the school fees because his brother was teaching there, also complained about this "school for the rich," where the son of a wealthy man with bad marks became minister and he himself, the best of the class, only became a simple teacher. See Michel Ghorayib (1984: 35–7).
39. Eddé (2001: 84).
40. SJV, 11.D.14, letter from Cattin to Gouraud, 23 June 1920.
41. See, for example, AN 60, AJ 130, "Amicale des Anciens élèves 1928."
42. For the school of the Frères des écoles chrétiennes, see for example FEC, "Palmarès," 1924–5, p. 20: "Page des Anciens."
43. Archives of the Jesuit Collège de Jamhour (SJJ), "Distribution de Prix."
44. Archives of the Lazarists Paris (LAZ), "Association Amicale des Anciens Élèves d'Antoura," 1938.
45. For France, see Jean-Pierre Chaline (2003: 21–31). For Lebanon, see Leyla Dakhli (2009: 302).
46. See Archives of the school of the sœurs de Saint-Joseph de l'Apparition, Beirut (SJA), the congregation report book, "Rapport du mois de novembre 1943."
47. Yet there were also families frequenting both kinds of schools, like 'Umar Da'uq, a Sunni notable who was member of the parents' commitee of the Mission laïque, but also president of the alumni association of the Lazarist school in Antoura. On Da'uq, see Michael Johnson (1985: 65–7).
48. FEC, *L'Essor*, June 1941, pp. 24–9.
49. AN 60, AJ 127, "Comité de patronage," 21 November 1925.
50. See the memoires of the diplomat Nicolas de Bustros (1983: 35) and Igor Timofeev (2000: 42).
51. Nazik Saba Yared (1996) and Bernard Heyberger and Carsten Walbiner (2002).
52. Interview with Camille Héchaïme, Beirut, 24 October 2008.
53. Interview with May Saikali, Beirut, 13 November 2008.
54. Dueck (2010: 168).
55. Roderic D. Matthews and Mattna Akrawi (1949: 465).
56. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1970: 165). As an example, take Michel Chiha, an alumnus from the Jesuit school who took over the family's bank. See Kamal A. Salibi (1988: 184–5).
57. Jean Ducruet and Henri Awit (2006).
58. Nadine Méouchy (2006: 359–82).
59. LAZ, "Association Amicale des Anciens éléves d'Antoura," 1939, p. 37.

60. AN 60, AJ 132, "Rapports mensuels," December 1929/January 1930. For the process of economic growth and development, see Edmond Chidiac (2002: 340).
61. Julie Meisani and Paul Starkey (1998: 758).
62. Gérard Khoury (2004b).
63. Nadine Méouchy (2002a: 55–70).
64. The pro-French *L'Orient* was founded in 1923 by Gabriel Khabbaz and Georges Naccache, both alumni of the Jesuit school; *Le Jour*, founded in 1934 by another alumnus of the Jesuits, Michel Chiha, was more critical towards France. See Kaufman (2004: 160). Interestingly, alumni of the Mission laïque founded blatantly anti-French newspapers, like *al-Nida*, published between 1932 and 1935 by Taqi al-Din al Sulh. See Ami Ayalonn (1995: 89).
65. Take Khalil Taqi al-Din, a student at the Mission laïque in the 1920s; Chucri Ghanem, a student at the Lazarist school in Antoura; Charles Corm, an alumnus from the Jesuit school in Beirut.
66. For the Jesuits, see SJV, RPO 21, "La Mission de Syrie, environ 1927"; for the Mission laïque française, see AN, 60 AJ 137, "Rapports mensuels," June 1935.
67. Johnson (1985: 117–22).
68. Gabrielle Parker (2002: 11–33).

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6

Alternatives to Nationalism in French Africa, 1945–60

Frederick Cooper

At first glance, the decades after World War II constituted the great period of nationalism in the Third World. Yet ideas of political emancipation were more diverse than the claim to a singular state for each nation or people: political leaders were trying to imagine for themselves different political forms that would turn the inequalities of colonial empire into something else. Some doubted whether the territorial state, in the context of extreme poverty, offered much of a solution to colonized people. They recognized the colonial empires were vulnerable and that they had a chance to make good their claims both to political voice and to entitlement to the resources of empire, not as supplicants but as citizens.

Among political leaders in French-speaking West Africa, such a political vision was a frank recognition of hierarchy in the global order and an attempt to turn the very connections that led to exploitation and disempowerment into the means to overcome poverty and inequality. For many Africans, such claims were not incompatible with a sense of cultural distinction and cultural assertiveness. But when it came to defining what the unit of affinity should be, there was considerable uncertainty until the very moment of "les indépendances." Did the "nation" lie in the numerous and diverse units of African society, in the territorial boundaries imposed by colonization less than a century previously, in larger units of cooperation and potential solidarity, such as French West Africa, in a pan-African vision of solidarity, or in a French nationality and citizenship, purged of invidious inequality?

Take the 1953 statement of the Mouvement des Indépendants de l'Outre-Mer, a major grouping of African politicians. The group called for political emancipation and "economic and social democracy." Their declaration added a warning that the "temptation of narrow nationalisms

represent a grave danger in a world in which independence risks being only an illusion." The leaders sought at the same time unity among Africans and "vertical solidarity" with France – recognition that inequality could be overcome only by a continued but altered relationship with the once-domineering partner.[1]

Or take the statement of a leading Senegalese political activist, Mamadou Dia, two years later: "It is necessary that in the final analysis the imperialist conception of the nation-state give way to the modern conception of the multinational state."[2] The nation-state, which today appears as both inevitable and modern, appeared to Dia as neither, while the multinational state, which now evokes memories of seemingly antiquated polities like the Austro-Hungarian empire, appears to be both modern and desirable. Dia also used the metaphor of vertical and horizontal connections to advocate the simultaneous expression of an African personality and African solidarity, and a connection with France that was both historical and pragmatic.[3]

The conventional narrative of growing African nationalism triumphing over stolid colonialism can be saved from the evidence of such political formulations by positing that some French Africans were so bamboozled by the pretensions of French culture and the seductions of limited participation in French institutions that they can be written off as reactionaries. But that is to presume the very narrative one should be examining. Perhaps the IOM and Dia represent a point of view that was not only coherent, but an effective challenge to older patterns of French rule. It is only hindsight that makes the territorial state seem like the wave of the future, and even greater hindsight has led some observers to question whether the nation-state was such a positive objective after all.[4]

African political actors were organizing themselves in a world that had just witnessed a titanic clash of empires: the colonial empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands had been shaken by the takeover by the Japanese Empire of Southeast Asian colonies as well as by the ravages of the Nazi Empire in Europe. The Soviet Union and the US seemed to be extending their imperial reach at the expense of Western European empires. No one could be sure at war's end whether inter-empire conflict would give rise to a different sort of global order. But wherever politics might be headed in 1945, it was coming out of a system of conflicting empires, of complex polities that were highly differentiated and unequal internally and part of a system containing non-equivalent parts – colonies, protectorates, national republics, and dominions, related by various ties of affiliation and subordination.[5]

My goal in this chapter is not to defend any one position in regard to the desirability of the nation-state as a political form or whether colonialism was a reformable object after all. Rather, I wish to argue that the position articulated by the IOM and Dia was critical to framing debates about politics in the period 1945–60. Most significant political figures in French West Africa were trying to navigate the uncertain waters between colonial rule and territorial independence, searching for ways by which French-speaking Africans could govern themselves together and in relation to France, avoiding both domination by Paris and what they described as "balkanization" or "emiettement" (making into crumbs). Only after the fact was the story of such attempts reconstructed as the triumph of nation over empire.

A new framework for empire: A constitution for the French Union

In the moment of uncertainty after World War II, what was France? In law and state practice, it was not a binary structure of metropole and colony, but something more complex: The French Union, as the Empire was renamed, had six components:[6]

1. European France, divided into departments;
2. "Old" colonies, notably those of the Caribbean that became departments in 1946, plus the enclaves of Senegal (the Quatres Communes), whose inhabitants were citizens;
3. "New" colonies, including most of French Africa, renamed overseas territories, whose inhabitants were mostly subjects;
4. Algeria, whose territory was integral to the French Republic but whose people were divided into citizens, mostly of European origin, and subjects with diminished civil and political rights, the category into which most Muslim Algerians fell.
5. Protectorates, which had come under French rule by treaty, which had their own nationalities, and whose rulers were considered sovereign, including Morocco, Tunisia, and most of Indochina;
6. Mandates, such as Cameroon and Togo, which were inherited by the UN from the League of Nations, and which France ruled as a trustee, not a sovereign, and which could potentially acquire their own nationalities.

As French leaders realized the extent to which French power and authority had been damaged by the war – especially as France proved unable to

regain full control over Indochina – they accepted that something had to be done to include elites from the colonies in the process of reconstituting the French republic. Their unquestioned assumption – reinforced by vivid experience of the fascist alternative – was that the new French order would be democratic. The question was how to define the people who would be sovereign. The uncertainty of the times provided an opening for African political leaders to turn a small opening into a larger one. Once deputies from the colonies took their seats in the Assemblée Nationale Constituante late in 1945, their acquiescence – at least – to constitutional provisions of most concern to them was so vital that they had room to assert themselves. At the same time, these deputies put long-maintained colonial practices such as *travail forcé* and the *indigénat* under the kind of public scrutiny that they could not sustain; within months of the new legislature these exploitative and humiliating regimes were voted out of existence.

The earliest draft of the new French constitution debated in 1946 had the provision that "All members of the Union have the quality of citizen and enjoy all rights attached to that quality."[7] For the first time, the exercise of citizenship rights throughout overseas France would be independent of civil status, that is a Muslim could marry or inherit property under the Sharia, vote in elections, and claim the same right to live in and work in European France as anyone else.

As a deputy to the constitutional assembly writing a report for the Commission de la Constitution of which he was a member, Léopold Senghor of Senegal put the citizenship provisions in historical context. He had the year before published a chapter in a book entitled *The French Imperial Community*, and he saw Africans as part of a community constructed out of coercion and inequality, but which he sought to transform. In what became a famous formulation, he called on Africans to "assimilate, don't be assimilated," insisting that they could take what French civilization had to offer while still being true to themselves, and he told his French audience that they had much to learn from the African members of their imperial community.[8] Bringing these ideas to the constitutional commission, Senghor invoked the precedent of the moment in the French revolution when all people in the colonies, including enslaved Africans, were freed and made citizens "enjoying all the rights assured by the Constitution." Lamenting Napoleon's re-enslavement of these citizens (which had led the Saint Domingue revolution to turn from reforming empire to exiting from it), he now saw the task as freeing "l'homme d'outre-mer" from the new forms of slavery erected under colonialism. But now, he went on, the "Jacobin tradition"

of a unitary republic – assuming that its citizens were assimilated to French civilization – had been made obsolete by greater understanding of the civilizations of the Arab world, China, Indochina, India, and Africa. From here he argued for the proposal declaring all inhabitants of the overseas territories to be citizens while recognizing their social and cultural diversity in the form of multiple civil status regimes.[9]

There seemed for a time to be a consensus on such a principle. The center-right deputy Paul Coste-Floret, claiming to speak of French opinion generally, asserted, "We are partisans today of a pluralist democracy, that is a democracy of groups." Senghor, speaking of the Senegalese who had elected him, stated, "If they are politically French, they are not culturally French."[10] Institutionalizing such principles brought out uncertainty and anxiety about how far an empire could redefine itself in an egalitarian direction. Some feared that the overseas French – more numerous than those of Europe – would have too much power at the center, making France the "colony of its former colonies," in the notorious words of deputy Edouard Herriot.[11] Other French deputies feared that too loose a federal structure would encourage secession. Deputies questioned the state of "evolution" of colonial peoples, particularly Africans. In the end, the deputies compromised on a proposed constitution that promised citizenship to all but was vague about exactly what people were citizens of – the French Republic or the French Union – and vague on the details of the conditions under which overseas citizens could vote.

The draft constitution was opposed by much of the French right. Fearing that the draft constitution might be defeated in the referendum scheduled for 5 May 1946, the Senegalese deputy Lamine Guèye asked the assembly to put into an ordinary law the draft constitution's provisions in citizenship. The bill passed unanimously.

When the referendum on the constitution was defeated, a second constituent assembly was elected, and this one was more conservative. Defenders of old-style colonialism mobilized, attacking the extension of citizenship except individual by individual. A strong center with a small minority of overseas deputies and weak institutions at the territorial level emerged as an alternative to the more federalist early proposition. Worst of all for the African deputies, the majority was on the verge of entrenching in the constitution the temporary division of the electorate into citizens and subjects (two electoral colleges), giving whites in the overseas territories disproportionate power. The government party insisted that it still supported a federal France formed of "nations et peoples," and "equality of rights without distinction of race

or religion," but it now proposed a dual form of citizenship, one of the "French Union," the other of "France." African deputies feared that despite government denials the new version of the constitution would lack the clarity necessary to define citizenship and protect rights.[12]

Overseas deputies had to work together and fight hard to maintain a minimum of protections and rights of the early draft. The government's insistence on second-class Union citizenship and unequal representation led them to walk out of the meetings and refuse to lend their names to the constitution. Their decisive action worked.[13] The government had to back down. European French people overseas would continue for a time to elect their own representatives – the dual college – and the representation of overseas territories would not be proportional to population, but such provisions were not written into the constitution. On the question of citizenship, the ultimate demands of African and other overseas deputies were met, with studiously ambiguous language close to what Senghor originally suggested – inhabitants of the overseas territory would get the "qualities du citoyen," but it was left open exactly what they were citizens of. They could exercise these rights while keeping their own civil status, unless they chose to renounce it. Together, these clauses allowed the French Overseas Ministry to claim, "the legislator wanted to mark the perfect equality of all in public like, but not the perfect identity of the French of the metropole and the overseas French."[14]

Using citizenship, reforming institutions

I am not arguing that France in 1946 became a paradise of multiculturalism and equality. The government could be ruthless in the suppression of political movements that strayed beyond unclearly specified limits. The component parts of the French Union never got the administrative or political autonomy they were promised. The franchise was only gradually extended, reaching universal suffrage in 1956. The National Assembly included delegates from the overseas territories and Algeria, but not in proportion to population and elected in separate colleges for citizens of French civil status and citizens of particular civil status (including Islamic). The assembly of the Union, with both metropolitan and overseas delegates, was consultative only. The President of the Republic was also President of the French Union, but in the latter capacity he had no cabinet – ministers were responsible only to the Assemblée Nationale. It was an inconsistent institutional structure for a state that was neither federal nor unitary.[15]

In Vietnam and Algeria, imperial citizenship came too late and was an inadequate alternative to both sides in increasingly polarized conflicts. But in West Africa, citizenship became a claim-making construct, and African legislators, trade unions, veterans groups, and political movements made it hard to resist pressure for equality in labor legislation or access to education, which became increasingly expensive for European France. The volatility of the politics of citizenship stemmed from its linkage of rights with obligations; the state that wanted to enforce citizens' obligations could not easily dismiss claims to rights without undermining the terms in which it articulated its own legitimacy.

Social citizenship meant a great deal more in European France after the war than it had before, as social entitlements were expanded and consolidated into a welfare state. I have argued elsewhere that the escalation of claims for social and economic equality among French citizens overseas and in the metropole put the French government in a bind: not only had it made "development" the cornerstone of its political ideology, but its own aspirations for economic growth drew on the notion that Africans could become productive and orderly participants in a "modern" economy.[16] By the mid-1950s, the claims kept coming in, but the evidence for a breakthrough in Africa's contribution to the French economy was much less clear. The "progressive" colonialism of the post-war era began to look increasingly costly.

Meanwhile, African political activists were working within the framework that emerged from the constitutional debates, trying to remedy the manifest flaws of the institutions of the French Union – the double college, lack of universal suffrage, weak Union assembly and territorial legislatures – and to turn its incoherent structures into a federal or confederal system that allowed for both the expression of an African political personality and a claim on resources of the imperial system as a whole. Senghor's political movement founded a new journal, *La Condition Humaine*, in 1948, and proclaimed in its first issue, "We say revolution, but not revolt," and "We say autonomy, not independence." The inaugural statement declared assimilation to be "an illusion in a world where people have become conscious of their personality," while "independence is a dream in a world where the interdependence of peoples manifestly affirms itself." In using the word "revolution" the editors made clear "we have in mind a new economic and social order desired by the people."[17]

For Senghor, ending the "pacte coloniale" – the economic dominance of Europe and the poverty of Africa – implied the kind of "social conquest grabbed in the metropole from the French bourgeoisie," a struggle

against "indigenous feudalities" as well as colonial exploitation. He saw social rights – not just political ones – as flowing from the French constitution, and he specified what this meant: full access for overseas citizens to civil service jobs, equal wages, equal pensions, and other benefits, and administration of enterprises by both metropolitan and indigenous people. None of this, he argued, had been realized, and funding for French development programs, while a good idea, was "ridiculously low."[18]

In the light of such aspirations for social and economic equality, Senghor wrote on behalf of his political party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), "indigenous nationalism" was "like an old hunting rifle." The materiel available in the colonies was "inadequate," while technology in the metropole was "more and more advanced." This led him to his central theme: "Yes, it is good that the Constitution of the French Union allows us to help ourselves with the experience and resources of France, to develop at the same time, with our economic potential, our own Negro-African personality." Such a vision, he insisted, was consistent with the constitution's insistence on equality of race and religion: "We are no more racist than regionalist or nationalist. The BDS in defending the Senegalese and African man defends the man of the French Union and the universal man. The 'Human Condition' remains our definitive objective."[19]

He was equally emphatic about what the movement was not about: "Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, I affirm once again, is not affected by Senegality." He reminded his readers that he had "many times publicly condemned nationalism as an infantile illness which we have to cure."[20]

Turning his agenda into practice required action on different fronts. Although he did not have a specifically working class base in Senegal, Senghor joined other African politicians in pushing for a color-blind labor code for the overseas territories. In the end, and after a general strike across all of French West Africa in 1952, the French legislature passed a code that required equal wages for equal work, the 40-hour week, paid vacations, the right to organize and strike, and other newly standard provisions of labor legislation to wage workers – but only wage workers – in the overseas territories. Even more focused on this campaign was Sékou Touré of Guinée, who came into politics by way of the labor movement. He led a successful strike for the faithful implementation of the labor code in 1953. The labor movement's principal slogan – "Equal pay and equal benefits for equal work" – drew on both the rhetoric of citizenship and solidarity among workers.[21] One can

follow analogous claim-making processes, although not all with the same success, in other social domains – for equal benefits to veterans, for easier access to high level civil positions, for agricultural development, and for improved health and educational facilities.[22] These escalating demands for the social and economic equality of all citizens were both unanticipated by French leaders and a costly proposition.

At the same time, African political movements were focused on the flaws of Title VIII of the Constitution, which concerned the institutions of the French Union. In the early 1950s, African deputies submitted bills and resolutions amending Title VIII "in a federative sense." Crucial to this goal was the devolution of more power to territorial assemblies, so that each territory could run its own affairs. The deputies sought to hasten the steady but gradual increase in African voter rolls by taking the final steps to universal suffrage. And they wanted the federal domain not only to be limited – to issues such as defense, foreign affairs, communications, and monetary policy – but to be governed in a much more democratic way than was then the case.

The argument for federation was running into the basic problem of how far an empire of citizens could evolve in the direction not just of universal rights, but of universal political participation. The federal institutions of the Fourth Republic, almost everyone admitted, were working badly. The old colonies – mainly in the Caribbean – were now French départments, theoretically equivalent to any other, but diluted politically in the very structures into which they had been assimilated. Algerian Muslims, who now had the rights of citizens and could come and go freely in metropolitan France, were still marginalized in their own territory, as French settlers manipulated political institutions, notably the separate voter rolls for citizens of "French" civil status and of "Muslim" civil status, to keep their hands on power.[23] The former protectorates, now called Associated States, were able to make more of the sovereignty which they had always theoretically retained. Morocco and Tunisia refused to participate in the institutions designed for Associated States, but their status – "protected" by but outside the French Republic – made it easier for French officials to accept their drift toward full independence. Laos and Cambodia were more cooperative, but the war in Vietnam made the Indochinese Federation unworkable.[24] West Africans, as citizens living in overseas territories, retaining *both* a sense of territorial distinctiveness and citizenship status within the French Republic, were getting their voices heard in the National Assembly and Assembly of the French Union, but they were a minority there and did not have the final say over policies in their own territories. Any plan

for changing the federal (central) components of such a structure had to tack between becoming too unitary or too decentralized.

Senghor and his colleagues understood the dilemmas quite well. A commission headed by Senghor pointed out the consequence of a unitary state in which overseas and metropolitan voters participated on the same basis: "The metropole would without doubt have the impression of losing its sovereignty, submerging by the political rights of the overseas territories, and becoming, in the words of President Herriot, 'the colony of its colonies.'"[25] The solution, for Senghor, was to stress that the French Republic, like any of the overseas components of France, would be self-governing. He saw the end point less as a federal structure than a confederal one: an assemblage of nations, each autonomous in most of its political actions, each with its sense of personality, but acting together for the common good. He and his colleagues kept returning to the metaphor of horizontal and vertical integration, horizontal to emphasize African commonality, vertical to emphasize the historical basis of one relationship – conquest and colonization – giving way to a developmentally oriented relationship, based on the use of French resources and expertise for the benefit of African territories. Africans would remain rights-bearing citizens of the confederal France. They would not be supplicants for aid, but people with a claim on the confederation's resources.[26]

The possibilities and dangers of federation and territorial autonomy

Here we come to the way in which two sets of agendas, of African and French political leaders, overlapped in a way which produced a political dynamic, but not exactly what either party wanted. The French government wanted to maintain sovereignty while shedding some of the financial burdens of development-oriented empire. African politicians were being increasingly absorbed in the territorial base of electoral constituencies, but some of them – Senghor most prominently – kept the federal and confederal options in relief. All African parties favored immediate moves to universal suffrage, the end of the double college, and genuine legislative and executive autonomy for territorial governments, including cabinet posts. French officials were especially leery of the latter claim, fearing loss of clarity in administration, but by 1954 and 1955 they were well aware that they had to do *something* to make good on the implicit bargain of 1946 that Africans would have a real voice in governing themselves within their territories.[27] To this was

added the government's worries about escalating demands on French resources from African political and social movements, especially civil service unions. They were all too aware that their own insistence on France as an indivisible state and as social model for the French Union was translating into demands for social and economic equality among all citizens.

Seeking to deflect the French reference point towards territories, government officials turned towards two concepts that went against the past direction of French ideology and policy: territorialization and delinkage (*décrochage*). The first meant acceptance of Africans' demands for greater autonomy, while the second implied that the terms of service of civil servants in overseas territories should be separated from those in France. The administration began to look towards the devolution of budgetary authority over internal affairs within each territory to governments (*conseils de gouvernement*) elected under universal suffrage, then made sure that the costs of social services and civil service salaries would be the responsibility of each government, and of the taxpayers of each territory.[28]

There were considerable misgivings within the administration about territorialization and delinkage, for many advisors to the French government did not think that the territories had the resources to function on their own this way – even if the center would (on its own terms) help them out. In particular, the poorer territories of Afrique occidentale française (AOF), such as Upper Volta and Niger, would be hurt by the decentralization of economic planning and resources.[29] Despite officials' reluctance to permit Conseils de gouvernement in the territories, in the end that is what they did, and they did so largely because the only way they could divest themselves of the burdens of centralized social and economic policy was by giving Africans a real stake in administration at the territorial level.

Africans had reason to fear that territorial autonomy would contain a poison pill – what Senghor referred to as Balkanization, the devolution of power to units too small and too poor to function effectively. But African politicians saw in the proposals that some of their most central demands were being met: universal suffrage, the end of the double college, and Conseils de gouvernement at the territorial level. The danger was that the loi cadre would end the federalism debate before it had truly taken place. In the end, Senghor and his colleagues tried to work with and against the loi cadre, striving to keep federalism alive. But they now faced the fact that the loi cadre had made power at the territorial level a reality, and it was a reality that African politicians did not want

to give up. Mamadou Dia later recognized the extent of the defeat, expressing his "profound and sad conviction of committing one of those major historical errors that can inflect the destiny of a people .... In spite of us, West Africa was balkanized, cut into fragments."[30]

French officials' political calculations were, for once, correct. After the first elections, in 1957, under the loi cadre reforms, African political parties won power in each of the territories, organizing a Government Council in each, under a sort of junior prime minister entitled Vice President du Conseil (the governor, appointed as before, presided over council meetings). Each jealously guarded power. As predicted in Paris, once African politicians – including some who came out of the trade union movement – had to balance the concerns of voting taxpayers in their territory against demands of civil servants' unions, the Government Councils were soon taking positions on labor questions rather more firm than those of the French administration. And as several labor leaders – Sékou Touré most prominent among them – saw the possibilities of political office before them, they started to use the labor movement more as a springboard for a wider constituency than as a means of furthering class interest. This was top-down trade unionism – there is no evidence that the rank and file of the major unions wanted to abandon the politics of escalating wage and benefit claims that had brought them a measure of success since 1945 – but the trend was noted with grudging admiration by French officials.[31]

But where did the advent of African elected governments, with real budgetary authority, patronage, and resources at their disposal, leave the quest for self-expression, dignity, and authority pursued by leading West African political actors? The autonomy of the government councils in 1957 was still limited by a French constitution that placed undivided sovereignty and ultimate power in the National Assembly, by the presence of High Commissioners appointed by Paris to represent the Republic, and by the uncertain legal basis of existing authority – which presumably could be taken away by the National Assembly that had provided it. So the debates over constitutional revision continued into 1957 and 1958. And at the core of debate in party conferences and journals like *L'Afrique Nouvelle* was still the concept of federalism – a concept whose meaning was becoming less and less clear. Let us begin with the most consistent and explicit advocates of federation and confederation, Senghor and Dia. Even before the new governments were in place, Dia warned of the dangers of "electionism" – of political leaders more concerned with offices than mobilizing the newly enfranchised voters. Thinking of the international context, he declared the Bandung

conference – where the heads of newly independent states put on the table the possibility of a "Third World" bloc – to be "perhaps the most important event of the last ten years," out of which the poor would unite to address the rich, avoiding both "western hegemony" and Stalinism. For the French territories, there was one "last chance and the solution of the future: federalism." The ways in which the government had applied the loi cadre was a big step away from this goal. The only solution was revising the constitution, creating "a free association" of France, the Maghreb, and "autonomous African territories." In reaction to the Algerian war and "overseas nationalisms," France was itself developing a "neo-nationalism, worthy of Maurras and his epoch .... Only informed overseas opinion, resolute, unanimous, can save the situation by imposing a necessary revolution in French politics."[32]

That was easier to say than to do, especially after the March elections put Africans in positions of power within the territories. In some of them, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) – the party founded in 1946 – had decisive majorities. The RDA was itself an expression of the cross-territorial nature of post-war African politics, for it had branches in all the territories and sought to face the French government with a united African front. In Senegal, most notably, a territorially specific party won power. The Grand Conseil – the legislative body that was to govern AOF as a whole – had an RDA plurality, but not a majority. It plunged into a debate over an issue on the table since 1946 – the desire for a federal executive. The Grand Conseil, in turn, would become a federal parliament. But such a goal, pushed by Senghor, was not universally shared, and opposition to the federal executive came from among others the Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, and Dahomey.[33] There was division within the RDA on this subject – Houphouët-Boigny against the federal executive, Sékou Touré for it. But it was clear that the largest party in the AOF could not be the basis for unification. Attempts throughout 1957 and early 1958, including a series of conferences, failed to produce either fusion or a common front among African political parties.[34]

That left the non-RDA parties, with Senghor and Dia playing a prominent role, to try to put together their own version of an AOF-wide political grouping, baptized the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA). The PRA carried on the push for the federal executive and parliament. The AOF would then become a constituent part of a confederal France.

RDA politicians continued to disagree with each other. Houphouët-Boigny was pushing for a "direct liaison" of the territories with France, "with no intermediate échelon." At the RDA Congress in Bamako in

September-October 1957, Sékou Touré made a major effort to get agreement on a compromise text agreeing upon "the democratization of the already-existing federal institutions." In his speech, the emphasized, "We are decided to build the Franco-African Community, while maintaining the unity of Africa which is dear to it." The constitution had to be revised: "The metropole and the overseas territories should become a grand FEDERAL STATE, including a FEDERAL PARLIAMENT, a FEDERAL GOVERNMENT and AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS." The relationship between territories and metropole "will be on an egalitarian basis or they will not be."[35]

Advocates of federalism saw the RDA conference as a victory. Nazi Boni of the RDA branch in Upper Volta called the idea of small states being linked directly to France rather than with each other a "compartmentalized federalism." Suspicious of French political machinations, he saw federalism as the alternative to both French domination and territorial independence. "The people of Black Africa aren't thinking of secession," he concluded. But if the links to France dissolved, "It would be necessary to look for the causes in Paris."[36]

Sékou Touré continued to preach for a "Franco-African Community on an egalitarian basis," solidly anchored with federal institutions. In front of the Minister of Overseas France, visiting Guinea, he called for "the integral decolonization of Africa: its people, its inhabitants, its economy, its administrative organization, in order to build a solid Franco-African Community whose endurance will be guaranteed only if within it there no longer is the phenomena of injustice, discrimination or any form of depersonalization and indignity." Making clear the relevance of political institutions to economic possibilities, he pointed out "There is no Guinean market, no Senegalese market, no Ivoirien market, but an African market, common to all the African territories of French influence." He underscored that he was both rejecting colonialism and advocating a "free association with France." But he warned that should the French government hesitate, it would lose "its best chance of the century and place the overseas territories at risk of changing their political direction." Failure would push the people of Africa toward independence, which "for us" would be a "jump into the unknown."[37]

Houphouët-Boigny also continued to push for a "Franco-African Community." His version would have no African federal executive, but only "a certain economic coordination through Dakar." He considered – unlike Nazi Boni – this position consistent with the RDA's vote for democratized federal institutions. But, he insisted, the Côte d'Ivoire had made its choice. It would adhere directly to the Franco-African Community.

The other territories, as far as he was concerned, were free to group themselves as they saw fit. "African unity is not in question. We have realized unity among our tribes of the interior in our territories. Just as Brittany has found its own unity within the French ensemble, we will realize African unity in the vast framework of the federation." An African federal executive would not favor the bigger project of federalism. "Federal executive? Yes, but in Paris, not in Dakar."[38]

The territory–Paris connection was exactly what Sékou Touré, like Senghor and Dia, thought "a dangerous formula." It would stand in the way of African unity and favor "egotisms and particularisms."[39]

If the RDA was divided over having an African federation, the PRA was becoming frazzled over the order in which to proceed toward the shared goal of African federation and confederation with France: independence first, then larger groupings? African federation first, then independence as a federation? Senghor, faced with radical positions, reminded his collaborators of the practical situation: the per capita GNP of European France was 20 times that of African France, and he distinguished between "real" and "nominal independence" that would only perpetual poverty. He insisted "We want the African community before the Franco-African community."[40]

Africa and the French community

We are now in the summer of 1958, when the crisis in Algeria brought Charles de Gaulle to power and when the rewriting of Title VIII of the constitution was subsumed under the writing of an entire new constitution for what would become the Fifth Republic. African leaders had both hopes and fears in this process – which was less transparent than the writing of the constitution of 1946 in which they had played a high-stakes game to positive effect. Africans were distressed at the early drafts of the constitution even though de Gaulle used – as he had in 1946 – the term "federal."

With the text still up in the air, they put in their claims. Sékou Touré wanted a "multinational federal community," with the federal (French) government's roles limited to defense, monetary police, foreign relations, and higher education. The constitution should recognize the right of independence, even if African territories did not choose to exercise it. He wanted to keep open the role of AOF. Dia went to Paris and returned pessimistic. He insisted that no African political party would accept a constitution not in "a federalist perspective," including "juridical equality, free determination and recognition of the national fact."

Metropolitan France and the overseas departments and territories would be "one and the other autonomous states entering on equal footing in the same Federal Republic having the same President." There would be a federal parliament, an outgrowth of the current upper chamber (the Conseil de la République) and each state would have its own national assembly elected under universal suffrage. But Africans had to recognize that they would not longer be represented in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house), for if they did on an equitable basis they would "in their turn colonize the Metropole." Dia – with his bitter experience of the loi cadre – did not expect the new constitution to recognize an African federation, but he insisted that it leave the door open to autonomous states constituting such a federation within the larger French federation. And he warned "Outside of this process which alone allows the sincere realization of a Federation, on a basis of equality, lies – I say this with profound sadness – sooner or later, secession."[41]

The constitution that emerged did in fact bear African influence. It was on the suggestion of the President of Madagascar that de Gaulle used the term "French Community" to replace "French Union," which had in turn replaced "French Empire."[42] More substantively, the constitution redefined overseas territories as Member States and gave them what the second draft of the 1946 constitution had denied – the right to independence if they so chose. As Dia had envisioned, Africans were no longer represented in the National Assembly in Paris, but the heads of state of the Member States became part of an Executive Council that met with the President of France regularly to decide matters common to the Community. It did not repair one of the fundamental anomalies of the earlier constitution: the Community had a president (none other than the President of the French Republic) but there was no federal cabinet, and no federal bureaucracy, military, and treasury to implement the Executive Council's decisions.

Africans had a choice of whether to accept this constitutional proposal. But de Gaulle insisted that the choice was either to take the constitution as it was or secession. Senghor and others saw the constitution as a compromise they could live with, thinking that although it did not recognize any African federation, nothing prevented Member States from federating themselves and participating through the new unit in the French Community. The new constitution would thus bring about yet another phase of the struggle against balkanization. And it did give the right to Member States to opt for independence. African politicians were divided. The Parti Africain d'Indépendence contested Senghor's position within Senegal. Most famously, Sékou Touré and the Guinean

branch of the RDA separated from Houphouet-Boigny, and the Ivorian branch (among others) confronted de Gaulle about the weaknesses of the constitutional proposal, and when de Gaulle huffily refused to change anything, opted to lead the charge for a "no" vote.

Elizabeth Schmidt has argued that the no campaign did not stem from willfulness on the part of Sékou Touré but from grass-roots pressure on him from radical militants of his party, in both rural and urban areas of Guinea. In any case, the position of the Guinean RDA was a nuanced one, and Sékou Touré and the leadership of his party, as we have seen, were not singularly focused on detaching Guinea from France, but on finding an alternative to actually existing colonialism, one which would give Africans means both to assert their dignity in international circles and to better their conditions of life.[43]

The vote on the Constitution of the Fifth Republic took Guinea out of the French empire-Community and left everyone else trying to figure out how to function in a new structure that was neither quite colonial nor quite anything else. As African politicians settled into running their governments, with their important budgetary authority, no issue was more contentious than the still ongoing possibility of forming an African – some called it "primary" – federation with the French community. The Côte d'Ivoire remained opposed, and the question was whether others could build a federation without this territory – the wealthiest of French West Africa. Long discussions among leaders from Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, ensued in late 1958 and 1959.

The arguments that we have already seen were deployed in new form: a block of territories, dividing sovereign prerogatives between individual territory and federation, would be in a stronger position to work with European France in a confederation, to coordinate economic policy, and to express what Senghor insisted was "Negro-African" culture and society. For Senghor an African federation would cut across lines of tribe, caste, class, and religion: "From the states of Africa, today disunited, the Federation will make a single people with a single culture, renovated (rénovée) by French culture, a single people animated by the same faith and reaching toward the same goal, which is the realization of its collective personality."[44] Gabriel d'Arboussier, an RDA stalwart and a jurist, saw the proposed federation as "a state, which over and above the states which compose it, has its own resources."[45] The party configuration was changed once again with the creation of the Parti de la Fédération Africaine, whose goal was to work towards a federal republic and "the creation of a Negro-African nation."[46]

To make a long story short, only a truncated federalism became a reality, the union of Senegal and its inland neighbor, French Sudan, creating the Mali Federation in 1959. Although Dahomey and Upper Volta came close to joining, in the end most West African leaders feared that larger or wealthier units might overwhelm them or that poorer units would claim a share of the resources of the more affluent; and they feared the power and influence of the Côte d'Ivoire. Mali made a serious attempt to make a go of it. Senghor and Dia from Senegal and Modibo Keita from Sudan, and others worked out arrangement for sharing "competences" between Mali and its member states. They wrote a constitution for the new entity.[47]

Although Senegal and Sudan were represented in the Executive Council as Member States of the French Community, Mali's leaders got the French government to accept Mali as its interlocutor in negotiating a future status. During 1959 and the first half of 1960, Malian leaders made clear that the federation was the focus of their aspirations for "national construction." As Mamadou Dia put it, "That is how Mali will build itself, and how we can best demonstrate our consciousness, or Malian national will; I do not say Senegalese or Sudanese, because there cannot be a nation at the level of our states – I say our Malian will, and we have the steady conviction that the cause which we serve is the Malian cause, and through it the cause of Africa."[48]

French leaders had seemingly preferred the Houphouët-Boigny approach to that of Senghor, Dia, or Sékou Touré – for just the reasons that the latter leaders favored an African federation. But as African leaders failed to reach agreement with each other, the French government saw the danger heightened that each territory would go its separate way. In a remarkable admission, the French High Commissioner in AOF saw Mamadou Dia as "perhaps the only statesman in French-speaking West Africa capable at the same time of moderating or slowing down Soudanese impatience, stimulated by Guinean pressures, and to look for and find a terrain of compromise if not agreement between Mali and the Conseil d'Entente [the pro-Ivorian territories]. And I would add that President Dia has the deep conviction that his intervention is the only means to save the Community."[49]

Nationalities in question

We see here an important aspect of the politics of the postwar years, easily overlooked if it is seen as a determined nationalism confronted by a rigid colonialism. French and African political leaders were working not

on common but on overlapping ground. Both were being pushed into frameworks that were not what they initially had in mind.

So late in 1959, Mali, unable to capture aspirations to African unity, began to negotiate with France over independence. And France not only accepted the federation as its negotiating partner, but agreed to modify its definition of Community to suit Malian conditions. It would – finessing the constitution it had only just adapted – continue to regard Mali as part of the Community even when it became independent. It would guarantee Malians coming to European France the rights of the French citizen, if Mali would reciprocate.

The Executive Council became a new venue where African leaders could try to shape "the egalitarian character" of the Community – including the notion that nationality was not an attribute unique to European France.[50] In looking at the way the Council dealt with the delicate question of defining nationality, we see how the French government's acute desire to keep the Community alive led it to yield to an African conception on a matter important to African leaders. The 1958 Constitution stated explicitly that there was only one citizenship and that was "of the French Republic and of the Community." All citizens could exercise their rights in the territory of any Member State. But the Constitution said nothing about nationality.

At the February 1959 meeting of the Executive Council, a decision was taken that there was only one nationality in the Community. It appears that de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, Michel Debré, gave the other heads of state little chance to debate the issue in any depth.[51] But the African leaders were not happy with the decision, and at the July meeting they insisted on further consideration of the question of single or multiple nationalities within the French Community. The Council accepted "the need to respect, on the one hand, the existence of growing national sentiment in each state, and on the other hand, the unity of all members of the Community in relation to the exterior."[52]

French leaders saw nationality as implying a political entity whose personality was recognized by the community of already existing nations; overseas territories had no such status except through the French state. African leaders thought of nationality as coming from within, as a sense of collective purpose and action. Senghor distinguished "nation" from "patrie," the latter a given attribute of language and common customs, the former a construction coming out of a common project. "State," on the other hand, was a mechanism, a means by which nationality shaped itself and through which nationality was projected.[53]

In such terms, the insistence that France had nationality while African Member States did not was demeaning. French leaders, including Prime Minister Debré, got the point and backed off from the position that there was only a single, French, nationality within the Community. A committee of "experts" was called in to come up with a new synthesis. They advanced the idea of "superposed" nationality. Each Member State would have its own nationality; it would write its own nationality legislation and decide whom to consider a national. The nationality conferred by an individual state would automatically confer nationality at the level of the Community. Inside the Community, there would be many nationalities, but the outside world would see only one, that of "The French Republic and of the Community." The committee's version of superposed nationality was accepted by the Conseil Exécutif in December 1959.[54] Here we see a remarkable admission on the part of the French government of how far it would go to preserve the French Community: accepting that African officials in Abidjan or Dakar could decide who had the nationality of the Community and could therefore exercise the rights of the citizen – in European France as much as anywhere else.

But the discussion of "superposed" nationality, so heated in November 1959, was gone by March 1960, as Mali was clearly about to acquire its own personality as an independent nation-state. Senghor still wanted to retain Community citizenship, but Modibo Keita of Sudan did not, apparently because he sought a less layered notion of sovereignty and a more unitary state – internally as well as in relation to France.[55] As negotiations went on, they focused less on the Community as a political entity and more on the bilateral relationship between France and Mali.

The agreements signed alongside the transfer of sovereignty to Mali defined by treaty what membership and citizenship in the Community had been supposed to do for all its citizens. They guaranteed that Malian and French citizens in the territory of the other state would enjoy the same rights and social services as any resident of the territory in which they were residing, including the right to enter and leave each other's territory.[56] French officials were more anxious to preserve the ability of European French people to reside in and do business in Mali than they were to limit the ability of Malians to come to France.[57]

The attraction of the Community was, for African leaders like Senghor (and earlier Sékou Touré), linked to the possibility of an African federation within it; it provided an umbrella under which French-speaking Africans could work with each other as fellow-citizens.[58] Using Community-wide citizenship as a basis for African claims to social and

economic equivalence with European France had already been made more difficult. Once the possibilities of wider African union faded, then the reality of the situation was bilateral: the supra-sovereignty of Community offered less than the reciprocal rights (and the possibilities of aid) that could be negotiated as a sovereign state with France.[59]

Becoming independent in June 1960, Mali remained in the French Community, but with the rights of citizens of France in Mali and citizens of Mali in France now regulated by bilateral treaty and Mali taking on all the international attributes of a state, the significance of the Community was fading away.[60] With the Algerian war still going on, France would have to face each pattern of devolving power in all its particularity.

Now Mali had to define how one acquired Malian nationality. Its leaders worked on such a law during the summer of 1960. In keeping with a broadly African conception of nationality, they tried to leave room for citizens of other states of the Franco-African Community – plus Guinea – to obtain Malian citizenship.[61] There are some hints of less inclusive attitudes, mainly concern among ministers about Guineans or Dahomeans who had been civil servants for the government of French West Africa and continued to live in Senegal or Sudan without necessarily indicating loyalty to them.[62] But the federation came apart before the law was passed.

Nationality issues were not why the Mali Federation split up in August 1960. Senghor and Dia on the one hand and Keita on the other were both colleagues in government and political rivals, both fearing that – having built up political bases in their territories – they were at risk in a federation of having the rival undermine the political base. The populations of Senegal and Sudan were sufficiently overlapping and interacting and political affiliations sufficiently uncertain that fears of cross-state poaching were realistic. Senghor later portrayed Keita as a dogmatic socialist, willing to use totalitarian methods and threatening to outflank Senghor in Senegal from the left, while Keita may have thought Senghor too cozy with French leaders and a threat to use resources from that connection to co-opt Sudanese.[63]

After rejecting the notion of "Senegality," Senghor, Dia, and other leaders from Senegal ended up with just that.[64] Within half a year of the collapse of the Mali Federation, Senegal had passed a nationality act. The nationality law defined how one was attributed, acquired, and lost Senegalese nationality. Its central provision, as in much of the world, was filiation and residence: one became Senegalese by being born there or having a father or mother who was born there. The law

initially opened Senegalese nationality to people from neighboring territories who were contributing to the Senegalese economy and who had revealed their attachment to Senegal by residing there, but that door soon closed, placing a line between Senegalese and other Africans. The nationality law was portrayed as an expression of Senegal's desire to place itself as a full and equal member of the community of nations.[65]

The politics of the bounded nation-state were to become important in independent Africa, sometimes carried to xenophobic levels. An extreme manifestation is in the Côte d'Ivoire, where the government has deployed the concept of "ivoirité" to distinguish what it regards as true nationals from people from elsewhere, mainly from countries to the north, despite the fact that such people had long contributed to the Ivorian economy and become closely integrated into Ivorian institutions and communities.

European France also became more national. When African deputies left the Assemblée Nationale in 1958 and as their Algerian colleagues departed in 1962 with the coming of independence, they left the legislature the kind of franco-French institution of which people complain today. Africans from former colonies who had after 1946 come to European France as citizens were gradually redefined as "immigrants" and from the 1970s barriers to their entering France grew higher.[66]

Conclusion

Tracing the views of French West African political leaders in the 15 years after World War II allows us to see possibility and uncertainty. Rather than a "modular" nationalism – as in the formulation of Benedict Anderson – posing as the alternative to empire, we see people working towards ways of reconciling African particularity with efforts to attain economic and social security, of repudiating a colonial past without rejecting everything that was French.[67] This shows that the idea of "nation" was both powerful and deeply uncertain, as African political actors and political parties debated, without fully resolving, the question of whether the nation was French, African, or else Senegalese, Dahomean, or Ivorian. That the projects of building a West African Federation and a French Community failed do not so much reflect the inherent attractiveness of nationalism as a much more contingent process, in which political actors jockeyed for advantage, made decisions in light of circumstances and conflicts, and then reconstructed retrospectively their own tenuous positions as both just and inevitable.

The Dean of the law faculty at the University of Dakar, Roger Decottignies, in a perceptive article published in 1959 when these

issues were still quite open, asked why the concept of citizenship, with its colonial roots, was so appealing to African activists. He thought that citizenship was being used in a new way – "it is to push back the colonial fact" (le fait colonial). What African leaders sought was an "intercitizenship" that recognized both local citizenships and a wider community citizenship. Africans were creating new citizenships and new nationalities – but exactly what they were remained uncertain. But France was being transformed too, for it was becoming part of a "plurinational entity" – just as Dia had demanded a few years earlier.[68]

In the end, African federation and French Community failed, and they failed together. Whether they *had* to fail is a question that has no evident answer. The attempt to make them work reflects the acceptance, on the part of French officials, that however much they wanted to conserve power, they could not do so as they had done in the past, and once that point was accepted, they were caught up in a political dynamic pushing them into positions they did not always want to take: from abandoning attempts to dilute citizenship rights in 1946 to accepting the multinational nature of the French Community in 1959. African leaders, however painful and bitter their experience of colonization, were accepting not only that they had practical needs of France – the "vertical" ties of which Senghor and Dia spoke – but that the connection with France was an historical one, and that Africans' connection with each other was a product of both "Negro-African culture" and French colonization.

Senghor and Dia's suspicion of territorial nationalism proved all too valid, and they themselves could not escape its consequences or its temptations. They had feared that in states that had little but sovereignty to offer – nominal independence as Senghor called it – officials would have little but their offices. They would be tempted to keep them at all costs and to seek clients within their territories and patrons abroad. Anxiety to protect a fragile political base was the major reason the Mali Federation failed, but Senegal, as a nation-state, was at least as vulnerable to this kind of politics: when Senghor fell out with Dia in 1962, expelled him from the government, and had him imprisoned, it was clear that he was playing the kind of politics he himself had feared. One can say the same about Sékou Touré, who had once warned of the dangers of "egotisms and particularisms" in territorial politics. Much as "African unity" had been set by political activists against subservience to France, the first casualty of territorial independence in Africa was the connection among Africans, as each territorial leadership sought to develop its own connections to patrons overseas.[69]

By focusing on the dynamics of politics, we avoid the temptation of projecting backward our present condition into an inevitable pathway. Just what "France" was had not been decided in 1959, just as the "national" character of Senegal or Côte d'Ivoire was not a precondition of the process described in these pages, but its consequence. The alternatives to the territorial nation-state put forth by French West African leaders between 1945 and 1960 did not come into being, but it is worth remembering the political imagination and energy that went into the effort to explore and develop them. Africa – and France – could use such imagination and energy today.

Notes

1. *La Condition Humaine*, 25 February 1953.
2. *La Condition Humaine*, 29 August 1955.
3. *La Condition Humaine*, 31 May 1956: "VIIIème Congrès Annuel du BDS," "Rapport Moral" by Mamadou Dia.
4. Basil Davidson (1992).
5. On the historical context, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010).
6. This section summarizes my own work (2009: 94–123).
7. Assemblée Nationale Constituante (ANC), Commission de la Constitution, Comptes Rendus Analytiques, session of 25 January 1946: 261.
8. Robert Lemaignen, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Prince Sisonath Youtévong (1945).
9. ANC, Rapport Supplementaire of Commission de la Constitution sur l'Union Française, Léopold Senghor, reporter, 5 April 1946, in ANC, Documents, Report #885.
10. Coste-Floret, ANC, Débats, 9 April 1946: 1640, and Senghor, ANC, Commission de la Constitution, Comptes Rendus, 12 February 1946: 443.
11. ANC, Débats, 27 August 1946: 3334.
12. Documents de l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante, Rapport de la Commission de la Constitution, Annexe II-350, séance du 2 août 1946: 295–8.
13. Libération, 21 September 1946, Lamine Guèye (1966: 161–2) and Bruce Marshall (1973: 286–9).
14. AOF, Directeur Général des Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales, note, July 1946, 17G 152, Archives du Sénégal (AS).
15. François Borella (1958).
16. Frederick Cooper (1996).
17. *La Condition Humaine*, 11 February 1948.
18. *La Condition Humaine*, 11 July 1948.
19. Senghor, "Rapport sur le méthode du Parti," to Congress of BDS, 15–17 April 1949 and *La Condition Humaine*, 26 April 1949.
20. *La Condition Humaine*, 29 November 1951.
21. Frederick Cooper (1996).
22. See, for the example of veterans' benefits, Gregory Mann (2006).
23. Todd Shepard (2006).

24. Gérard Peureux (1960).
25. "Note sur les modifications à apporter à la constitution de la République Française," June 1955, commission headed by Senghor, 4AG 528, Archives Nationales Françaises (ANF).
26. Mamadou Dia, "Rapport Moral" to VIIIème Congrès Annuel du BDS, reprinted in *La Condition Humaine*, 31 May 1956.
27. Senghor in 1953 and 1954 submitted proposals for giving more power to territorial assemblies and for creating cabinets (Conseils de gouvernment). "Note au sujet de la modification des attributions des Grands Conseils et des Assemblées des territoires groupes, 13 July 1954," notes on "assemblées locales et du statut financier des groupes de l'AOF," 12 May 1954, "Mémoire sur la réforme des structures de l'AOF," 11 July 1955, AP 491, Centre Archives d'Outre-Mer (CAOM).
28. Frederick Cooper (1996), especially Chapters 10 and 11.
29. Affaires Politique, section d'études, note pour M. le Ministre, 27 November 1953, AP 217/4, CAOM; Mission d'Etude d'une reorganisation administrative eventuelle de l'AOF, 1953–1954, and comments of High Commissioner on this report, 19 July 1954, AP 491, CAOM.
30. "Discours d'ouverture du President Mamadou Dia au premier seminaire national d'études pour les responsables politiques, parlementaires, gouvernementaux," 26 October 1959, "sur la construction nationale," VP 93, AS.
31. This theme is developed in Frederick Cooper (1996), Chapter 11.
32. Mamadou Dia, *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 15 January 1957.
33. The most thorough narrative to date of this period is Joseph Roger de Benoist (1982). See also Ruth Schachter Morgenthau (1964) and Tony Chafer (2002).
34. Joseph Roger De Benoist (1982: 354–8).
35. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 1 October 1957.
36. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 19 November 1957.
37. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 7 March 1958.
38. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 18 April 1958.
39. *L'Afrique Novuelle*, 6 June 1958.
40. These were debated at the congress on 25–27 July 1958. See *L'Afrique Novuelle*, 1 August 1958 and Joseph Roger de Benoist (1982: 404–8).
41. *L'Afrique Novuelle*, 18 July 1958.
42. Prime Minister's office, "La France, L'afrique noire et Madagascar," February 1961, in papers of Michel Debré, Fondation Nationale de Science Politique, 2DE 34.
43. Elizabeth Schmidt (2007), especially Chapter 6.
44. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 23 January 1959.
45. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 23 January 1959.
46. *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 3 July 1959.
47. The best study to date is William Foltz (1965). But the opening of the federation archives in Dakar (Fond FM of the Archives du Sénégal) now allows a deeper examination.
48. Opening and closing speeches of Mamadou Dia to first national study seminar for political, parliamentary, and government leaders, "on national construction," 26 October, 1959, VP 93, AS.

49. High Commissioner to Secretary General of the Community, 20 August 1959, AP 221/3, CAOM.
50. Dossier in preparation for meeting of Conseil Executif, 2–3 February 1959, VP 133, AS.
51. There is a hand-written account of the meeting taken by Jacques Foccart in his papers, FPR 105, ANF. For Senegalese concern about defining their own nationality, see Paper of President du Conseil de Gouvernment du Sénégal for HC de la Communauté auprès de l'Etat du Senegal, 5 January 1959, VP 133, AS.
52. Communiqué of Conseil Exécutif, *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 18 September 1959.
53. Senghor, speech as President of the Assemblée Fédérale du Mali, to that assembly, Dakar, 6 April 1959, copy in FPR 238, ANF.
54. Conseil Exécutif de la Communauté, "Comité des experts chargés de l'étude des problèmes de la nationalité et de la citoyenneté," transcript of meetings of 16 and 18 November 1959, FPU 215, ANF. The committee included representatives from the overseas territories. For the approval of this report, see Conseil Exécutif de la Communauté, 11–12 December 1959, "Relève des décisions qui resultent de l'approbation du rapport sur la nationalité et la citoyenneté par le Conseil Exécutif," ibid.
55. Note d'information concernant les institutions de la Communauté, n. d. [December 1959], FPU 198; Haut Commissaire, Bamako, telegram to Secretariat General of Community, 14 April 1960, 5 May 1960, FPU 1677; "note à l'attention de M. Le Président de la Communauté," 21 March 1960, FPR 106, all in ANF.
56. See the papers in the file "citoyenneté: négociations Mali 10–15 Mars 1960," in FPU 201, ANF.
57. Officials in charge of Community affairs noted that Africans, as French citizens, already had the right to enter France and they thought that since France was growing economically and Mali was underpopulated, guaranteeing Malians the right to enter France freely and reside and work there would cause no difficulties. "Note relative à la nationalité," 9 January 1960, FPU 218. On French desires to preserve Community citizenship and protect the rights of French nationals in Mali, see "note, projet de convention franco-malienne d'établissement," 24 March 1960, and Prime Minister Michel Debré to President de Gaulle, 19 March 1960, FPR 106, ANF.
58. On thinking within the Parti de la Fédération Africaine on the relationship of nationality, citizenship, independence, and the goal of "regrouping of African States," see Boissier Palun, report on "Condition des personnes dans la perspective de l'indépendance du Mali," discussed at meeting of PFA, 7 December 1959, and enclosed in Haut Commissaire, Dakar, to President of Community, 8 December 1959, FPU 198, ANF.
59. A leading Malian negotiator, Madeira Keita, later put it this way: "Mali intended to be tied only by bilateral accords that it freely negotiated with France, because the Malian delegation negotiated in the name of an absolutely independent state." Address to meeting of Union Soudanaise, 28–31 May 1960, FPU 1677, ANF.
60. Secretariat General for the Community, "Note Relative aux transfers des competences en matière de politique étrangère," n. d. [March 1960], FPU 201, ANF.

61. Ministre de la Justice (Boubakar Guèye) to President of Government of Mali, 10 June 1960, submitting report on the activities of the ministry, FM 159, AS. While I have seen references to the drafting of a nationalities law and to the fact that it was not implemented, I have yet to find the text of the draft.
62. Minute of Council of Ministers of Mali Federation, 22 October, 19 November 1959, FM 37, AS.
63. William Foltz (1965).
64. Senghor himself, after the collapse, pointed this out, noting that for 15 years he had campaigned against "a certain malady, innoculated by colonialism, and which I called senegality. It was a complex of superiority." But now he claimed "Senegalese independence is an African necessity." *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, 14 September 1960.
65. Law No. 61-10 of 7 March 1961, "déterminant la nationalité sénégalaise," reprinted in Roger Decottignies and Marc de Biéville (1963) *Les nationalités africaines* (Paris: Pedone): 300–06. See reports on the rationale and contents of this law in ibid. 226 and VP 121, AS.
66. This side of the story is brought out in Frederick Cooper (forthcoming).
67. Benedict Anderson (1983).
68. Roger Decottignies (1959: 41–71).
69. I have developed these themes in Fredrick Cooper (2002) and Fredrick Cooper (2008).

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7

Verwoerdian Apartheid and African Political Elites in South Africa, 1950–68

Christoph Marx

Afrikaner nationalism became an organized movement in 1914 when the National Party was founded and began to provide a platform for everybody who was dissatisfied with the politics of the day. The Party's followers were largely rural farmers who suffered economically in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War and World War I. Only in 1918 did Afrikaner nationalism become an urban phenomenon when a small group of railway employees founded the Afrikaner Broederbond in Johannesburg. When its efforts as a cultural organization bore little fruit, the Broederbond decided in 1921 to become a secret society and went underground. It used a clandestine cell structure whereby the communication channels were controlled by a powerful leadership, the Uitvoerende Raad (Executive Council). Its elitist character became even more pronounced after a number of academics, mostly from the Calvinist University of Potchefstroom, joined the organization in about 1927 and henceforth largely dominated the leadership structure. The Broederbond started to recruit persons who already were in key positions in public service and in Afrikaans cultural organizations, and it infiltrated other institutions and organizations. During the 1930s and 1940s the Broederbond became increasingly influential as the guiding force of Afrikaans cultural nationalism.[1] When in 1948 the National Party came to power, the secret society wholeheartedly supported the policy of apartheid and started to look for potential partners among African elites. This chapter will look into the way this elitist Afrikaner organization supported and manipulated the emergence of an African political elite in the orbit of South African power, which includes those neighboring regions which were more or less dependent on South Africa economically as well as militarily.[2]

Apartheid and the Verwoerdian framework

Apartheid as a policy of radicalized racial segregation entrenched white South Africans as a privileged class subsidized by the exploitation of the indigenous majority whose chances for economic advancement were drastically curbed through political arrangements and legal restrictions. This process was legitimized on the one hand by racist assumptions about biologically inherited abilities or disabilities and on the other hand by a radicalized cultural relativism which pretended that apartheid aimed primarily at the preservation of indigenous cultures and ways of life.

When Hendrik Verwoerd was appointed Minister of Native Affairs in 1950 probably the most dynamic South African politician of the twentieth century moved into the center of politics. Within eight years he changed Native Affairs from a second rate department into *the* key institution of the apartheid state. He moved on several fronts simultaneously, implementing apartheid at the same time in rural and urban areas,[3] turning everyday life for many Africans into a nightmare and transforming the political system in an attempt to submit state and society to the principles of racial separation. The Department of Native Affairs became a state within the state as it usurped one field of "native" administration after the other. This enabled Verwoerd in 1958 to become Prime Minister of South Africa, which he remained for another eight years until his assassination in 1966. During this period he changed South Africa's constitutional make-up by turning it into a republic, by leaving the Commonwealth, and by the implementation of a new phase of apartheid, the so-called homeland policy, which aimed at the independence of the former African reserves, transforming African city dwellers into foreign migrant workers without rights. Since Verwoerd was the main protagonist of apartheid, I speak of a Verwoerdian framework within which African political elites found themselves after 1948.

Apartheid implied the projection of Afrikaner nationalism onto the black majority, which was reconceptualized in cultural terms as a group of distinct African nations. The insistence on "objective" criteria to distinguish nations as cultural units was an answer to the voluntarist African nationalism of the African National Congress (ANC) and other political organizations. African nationalism was the consequence of the historical development of a society becoming integrated through industrialization, whereas apartheid insisted on the timeless existence of cultures. For this reason Verwoerd rejected a Western-educated elite, which could only be seen as a historical result of societal developments.

Instead he favored chiefs as a traditional elite, which represented the timeless values of African culture. Verwoerd's program was based on rejuvenating tribalism within the African majority, culminating in his so-called homeland policy. This was a major deviation from post-war developments elsewhere on the continent, where the Western-educated elites were integrated into colonial administration and the influence of the chiefs was reduced.[4]

In 1959 Verwoerd used his first parliamentary session as prime minister to announce his intention to prepare the black reserves for independence. Some years before, in 1951, he had already changed the situation for the chiefs profoundly when he steered the Bantu Authorities Act through parliament. In some areas, particularly in the Transkei, the chiefs had largely lost their power since the late nineteenth century. Up to 1951 the administrative system in the Transkei had been one of direct rule by Native Commissioners, who were assisted on the local level by appointed village headmen, but not by the chiefs who were excluded from this system. By bringing the chiefs back into the center of rural administration, Verwoerd hoped to achieve a return towards the tradition of the homelands. To him chiefs were the legitimate political leaders of the "Bantu," as South African blacks were now called. This perception of the chiefs and the new terminology were part of a pseudo-scientific approach to African administration by a minister who surrounded himself with a number of ethnologists, most prominent among them the secretary for native affairs, Werner Eiselen.[5]

Apartheid confronted African elites with two alternatives. If they became protagonists of African nationalism and were active in political organizations like the ANC, they had to reckon with state repression. Legal prosecution of such leaders intensified since the early 1950s and culminated in 1960 in the banning of the nationalist organizations. The alternative was to work within the system, which restricted the room for political activities to the Verwoerdian framework of apartheid.[6] I want to take a closer look at those politicians who used the context of Verwoerd's homeland policy to further their own political careers. This chapter will focus on the first elections in the Transkei in 1963, which were something of a model case for the other homelands, and on the elections in Basutoland in 1965, the last step for this British colony towards independence.

In both territories South Africa could not act openly because of the implications this could have had. Public knowledge of South African interference would have proved counterproductive insofar as it might have diminished the election chances of the very parties and politicians

the white state supported. The peculiar way in which South African influences and attempts at manipulation of African elites were applied was through the Broederbond. The secret society had close connections to Prime Minister Verwoerd, who served in the Uitvoerende Raad (Executive Council) from 1940 to 1950. During his term of office the Broederbond reached the apex of its influence when Verwoerd cooperated closely with the Broederbond chairman Piet Meyer, who was at the same time the head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, using the state-owned media for apartheid propaganda.

Transkei: Chiefs and the "model" homeland

Transkei was the most cohesive of the homeland territories and the most likely candidate for becoming the vanguard of territorial apartheid. It was the region with the longest colonial history, because it had been involved in a century of frontier wars with the expanding Cape Colony, which led to the piecemeal incorporation of the territory up to 1877. Given its long colonial history and the early missionary activities the Eastern Cape region – part of which was the Transkei – developed into a hotbed for African nationalism.

Before 1951 chiefs were able to conserve their prestige and authority for the very reason that they were excluded from the state administration.[7] But with integration into the state machinery they had to redirect their loyalties away from the population and towards the state and became part of an administrative hierarchy.[8] When many of them started to exploit an already impoverished population in order to build posh houses and buy expensive cars and other status symbols, their newly won political power waned.[9]

The Transkei was one of the major recruitment fields for migrant labor and many young men had built their own organizational structures and social networks in the Witwatersrand and in other cities. They developed radical political views and escaped from the authority of the chiefs. Rural discontent erupted in a series of popular uprisings, which were quelled by the South African police.[10] With the beginning of the early 1960s Poqo, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), began its military activities in the territory. In this historical situation Verwoerd decided to give Transkei more autonomy and to allow the emergence of political parties in order to intensify indirect control over the black population. The South African government was interested in involving the chiefs in the political system, and for this reason it looked for chiefs who were eager to play the dual role of traditional leaders

and modern party politicians. Transkei was to be a model that would prove to the world that an African state could combine modernity with traditionalism and the conservation of "Bantu culture." Verwoerd's main interest was the intensification of control and the fostering of authoritarian structures, while economic development and ecological conservation in the Transkei moved to the background during his term of office, with disastrous long-term consequences.[11]

In the light of the apartheid perception of African traditionalism it does not come as a surprise that the white state supported Chief Kaiser Matanzima, an initially not very prominent and neither very powerful chief of one branch of the Tembu, the so-called Emigrant Tembu. These lived in the far west of a territory where the Tembu were only one among a whole number of different ethnic groups, which were artificially homogenized by being called Xhosa.[12]

Like many other ruling dynasties the Matanzimas, as chiefs of the Emigrant Tembu, were related to the Paramount Chief of the Tembu, Dalindyebo Sabata, who was a known critic of the homeland policy and had sympathies for the banned ANC. Sabata's Cousin was the incarcerated leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, who, in turn, was Kaiser Matanzima's uncle. Matanzima never practiced as a lawyer because he became chief after he finished his studies in 1940. His rise in Transkeian politics began when he entered the Bunga, the parliament, in 1955 and when he was appointed Regional Chief of Emigrant Tembuland against the expressed wish of Paramount Chief Sabata. The South African government appreciated his services and promoted him to Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembuland in 1966, which placed him on an equal footing with Sabata. In 1961 Matanzima became Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority and was, as such, the most likely candidate for the newly created office of Chief Minister, to which he was duly elected in 1963.[13]

His rise was possible because the Broederbond lent him a helping hand through those of its members who were state officers of the homeland administration. A special commission consisting of ethnologists and experts on reserves and the "Bantu" became active in the Transkei. Its organizer, a leading official of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK),[14] the "visible arm" of the Broederbond, established confidential contact with Matanzima.[15] This initiative was closely coordinated with "highly placed friends in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development"; even the Minister was informed.[16] On top of his list was the founding of a Xhosa cultural organization after the model of the FAK, which was to be used foremost to create a power basis for Matanzima in the whole Transkei.

The Broederbond concept of nation was closely connected to "race." It was formulated as the primary goal of a Xhosa cultural organization and reads as if it was copied from the constitution of the Broederbond or the FAK: "Only a well-organized cultural association with the aims of making the Transkeian proud of his own history, his lovely country, his heritage, his religions, his traditions and culture, can fulfill this need and sponsor the love of the present and of the rising generations."[17] However, a culture could only grow when it was actively fostered by a smoothly operating organization.

In a first step Matazima was to "rise to become the cultural leader of the region,"[18] and then use his newly won prestige to become a political leader as well. During Matanzima's discussions with Broederbond emissaries at the beginning of July 1963 the plans were worked out, and shortly afterwards local African notables founded the cultural organization in Emigrant Tembuland.[19] Broederbond efforts went so far that the Commissioner General and Broederbond member Hans Abraham even penned speeches for Matanzima.[20] The secret society developed a program for him, including the agenda for the initial meeting of the cultural organization, suggested specific dates, slogans and who was to be invited, to ensure the success with the Transkei population.[21] The Broederbond even provided the chief with the addresses of journalists with whom he should cooperate.[22]

The timing was circumspect, since the founding of the cultural organization in Emigrant Tembuland "put Kaiser into the limelight at the very moment when the English press announced that Poto was the only possible Chief Minister."[23] The launch of the different branches of the cultural organization in 19 different districts gave "Kaizer 19 opportunities to appear in public on behalf of his political program."[24] On the 9 November a huge mass meeting was planned for the whole Transkei, with the support of the South African Department of Information and Commissioner General Hans Abraham, who tried his best to neutralize the political efforts of Liberal and Progressive Parties in Transkei and to support Matanzima's election campaign financially.[25]

Broederbond activists realized that the aims of retraditionalizing the Transkei and promoting elections to a modern parliament were contradictory, especially since the small educated elite in the Transkei consisted mostly of teachers, who would be a crucial factor if cultural nationalism should be spread successfully. This elite saw their ambitions frustrated when South Africa intensified traditional power structures. Matanzima himself could be sure of the support of the older rural elite only, but he hoped to win over the elected representatives in the

Transkei parliament to his side. A handwritten note reveals that the Broederbond was aware of the problem: "be aware of weak chiefs and strong elected candidates."[26]

Matanzima, who at that time did not have his own political party, always had financial problems. The Broederbond gave priority to funding his campaign, covering his printing costs (5000 Rand for 650,000 pamphlets), travel expenses, and so on.[27] It also financed the training of two organizers, who were to launch the election campaign among the migrant workers on the Witwatersrand and in the Free State. Those Xhosa from the Transkei who lived in "white" South Africa were to be targeted by the campaign, and a list including all the registered voters living in different towns in South Africa, as well as local Broederbond members, usually teachers or pastors, who were expected to help in this matter, was created.[28] "The names of 45 candidates as on the enclosed list, who all are supporters of Kaizer, have been transmitted to friends who are in control positions over c. 106,000 voters on the Rand and in the Free State." Without their own organizational efforts, which the Broederbond resumed afterwards, the election results would have been even less in their favor.[29]

After the elections, Matanzima rejoiced about his "victory," which actually was rather doubtful, since he had to count on the chiefs as *ex officio* members of parliament: "I am determined to go all out in getting those Chiefs who supported Poto back. The opposition consists of extremists who want to assist Congress and UNO against South Africa. They pretend to be for a peaceful, multiracial society, and yet they are really agitators of the first degree."[30] Although the administration had obstructed their election campaign[31] the opposition against Matanzima had the support of 28 as against Matanzima's 17 elected members of parliament and Poto could count on the support of 22 of the appointed chiefs, while 42 of them voted for Matanzima.

Matanzima founded his own party after the elections. Its structure and program revealed the influence of the Broederbond, since the ideas of "traditional" forms of politics among the Bantu reflected the authoritarian hierarchical structure. The party leader was not to be elected, but it is emphasized that the chairpersons of local and regional branches were appointed and not voted into office. If possible chiefs should be won for these posts. The General Assembly, with "limited powers," could only indirectly influence the composition of the Executive Council, the highest policy-making body.[32] It looked as if the main problem, the lack of a political program and a stable party structure, finally had been solved. But Matanzima's party would never develop into a mass party

because he continued to use the chiefs as his main powerbase, and he suppressed any possible source of opposition, even within the ranks of his own party.[33] Since he was elected by a majority of appointed members, he remained an ardent advocate of the political role of the chiefs.

Matanzima tried to make himself indispensable to the South Africans by affirming their fears about communist influences, alleging that his political adversaries were sympathizers of the ANC and the Communists.[34] He became captive to the homeland policy and learned later on to his own frustration how limited his space for autonomous agency really was. The "traditional" form of government, which Verwoerd had chosen for the Xhosa, developed rapidly into a quagmire of corruption and violence. After 1963 the political elite of the Transkei led a parasitic life of affluence, which stood in stark contrast with the poverty of the population.

Lesotho

The linchpin around which political life in Basotoland revolved, even in the 1960s, was the figure of the founder king Moshoeshoe (c. 1790–1871). Besides founding the kingdom he came to be praised as its defender when in 1868 he succeeded in having it declared a British protectorate, after it had been threatened by the growing military strength of its white neighbor, the Boer republic of the Orange Free State. From the founding of the Union of South Africa up until the 1960s politicians repeatedly tried to annex the three High Commission Territories Betchuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), and Swaziland, which, at the time, were still under British rule. For the African inhabitants of these countries this would have meant being subjected to South Africa's segregation policy, which many of them knew from their experiences as migrant workers. The monarchy subsequently became the crystallization point of Basuto nationalism as a fundamental consensus was built on the defense of the territory and the avoidance of being absorbed by South Africa.[35]

Although the country was ruled indirectly, the British intervened in two fields in particular, both of which alienated the chiefs from the population. On the one hand the tradition of the *pitso*, popular meetings, which gave an opportunity for open critique of chiefs, was increasingly undermined. The *pitso* became perverted in that the population could only listen to the proclamations of the authorities. On the other hand the chiefs became integrated into the colonial administration and their accountability was redirected from the people to the higher echelons of

the colonial bureaucracy. As a result, the problem of corruption became a major source of dissatisfaction among the rural population, because chiefs were increasingly perceived less as defenders of African rights and more as the colonial government's stooges, mainly interested in self-enrichment. The colonial administration reacted to the growing corruption among chiefs with two new laws in 1938. They aimed at a reform of the central institutions, but instead of enhancing their legitimacy these laws contributed to the erosion of the very authority of the chiefs, on which the whole edifice of indirect rule was erected. The Native Administration Proclamation (No. 61 of 1938) gave power to the British colonial administration to depose or appoint chiefs and further integrate them into the state bureaucracy. Proclamation No. 62 allowed interventions into the traditional law system, which was one of the main sources of authority for the chiefs. In the eyes of many Basuto both laws meddled with the prestige and authority of the chiefs and displayed disregard for African traditions.[36]

Lekhotla la Bafo (Council of Commoners), an organization that wanted to represent the interest of Commoners and Chiefs against the British, criticized the chiefs openly for their misuse of power. At the same time they were regarded as victims of British machinations, so Lekhotla's goal was not so much to take power away from them but rather to restore the office of chief to what it had been in precolonial times.[37] The educated elite also criticized the chiefs, but in much more fundamental ways. In a system of indirect rule the educated saw themselves being excluded from political influence. Most of them had attended schools of the French protestant mission, which had been active in Lesotho since the days of Moshoeshoe. Later they studied at the college of Fort Hare in South Africa, where they came into contact with South Africans and the political ideas of an emergent African nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. Back in Lesotho they worked as teachers, but some of them were suspended because of their political activism. They developed a particular dislike for the powerful and very conservative Catholic Church, a dislike that was mutual.

When the National Party came to power in South Africa in 1948 this gave a boost to politicization in Basutoland because fears of incorporation by the apartheid state increased. In 1952 the Basutoland African Congress was founded as the first party with a mass base among both migrant workers and the educated elite. Its leader, Ntsu Mokhele, had been a member of the ANC Youth League during his study at Fort Hare, but his Africanist convictions led to his support for and cooperation with South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress.[38]

The Basutoland African Congress, renamed Basutoland Congress Party in 1960, proved to be the most dynamic political force in the protectorate, pressuring for decolonization and the democratization of political institutions. Because the representatives in the National Council were elected only indirectly, the Congress Party won 32 out of 40 seats in 1960 despite unfavorable conditions.[39] However, since the franchise was very restricted before Lesotho became independent, the party's real strength was yet to be tested. After the first stunning successes the party neglected its organizational groundwork. The antagonism towards the powerful Catholic Church escalated and the chiefs proved inimical, too, because they were alarmed by news of the financial support the Congress was receiving from radical countries like Egypt and Ghana, and they feared communist undermining.

Mokhele's sympathies for the PAC led to criticism, as did his style of leadership, which was characterized by an observer as "increasingly dictatorial."[40] In 1960 part of his leadership personnel left and joined the Marematlou Freedom Party, the most important opposition group of the time. This group enjoyed the open sympathy of the crown prince, and it had been founded to strengthen the role of the monarchy. Monarchism in this case was not just tribal conservatism; the party regarded the monarchy as a vital institution for the preservation of Lesotho's independence from South Africa. The former BCP leaders who joined the Marematlou Freedom Party had strong sympathies for the ANC, and even for communism. These left-wing leanings, however, could not easily be harmonized with the monarchist orientation, and thus prevented the party from developing a clear political profile.[41]

Afrikaner nationalists were alarmed by these developments and began to influence the political landscape in Basutoland, initially with little knowledge about the situation. Two Broederbond members in the small border town of Ficksburg were responsible for the contacts, but their names were kept secret even in the Broederbond correspondence itself.[42] Broederbond activities were, however, closely coordinated with the state bureaucracy: three members of the special Committee on Bantu Affairs[43] of the Broederbond met with Minister "M. C. B." on 17 September 1963. This person was almost certainly M. C. Botha, who, at the time, was Deputy Minister for Bantu Administration and Development. The Secretary General of the Broederbond and a number of experts were present at the meeting, too.

During the whole year of 1963 the Broederbond championed the Basutoland Labor Party, a rather obscure group, which had been founded in February 1962 by Elliot Lethata. Lethata targeted Basuto

migrant workers in South African industrial areas as his political constituency. Since July 1962, the Broederbond had financed the printing of pamphlets, membership cards, and party constitutions. Lethata proved eager to cooperate with Afrikaner nationalists and received a car with loudspeakers, as well as media assistance by South African conservative newspapers and financial support.[44] As an advocate of friendship with South Africa and an avowed anti-communist, he fumed against the ANC, especially Joe Matthews, the ANC's main representative in Lesotho, and against the PAC, whose leader, Leballo, lived in Lesotho as a refugee.[45] By this he probably made some friends in white South Africa, but certainly not in Lesotho. The Broederbond came to the conclusion, that he was "definitely anti-communist, pro-apartheid and fights for the incorporation in the republic."[46]

Broederbond leaders were apparently somewhat naive when they took Lethata's reports at face value. He obviously exaggerated the impact his party had, as well as its number of members. His reports stand in stark contrast to the absolute obscurity of his party in the following years.[47] Since his rallies were announced in the South African radio[48] and were relatively well attended, this may have nourished the illusion that the Broederbon leadership had found some popular figure for their purposes. Obviously they learned quickly enough about the reality of Lethata's "successes" and started to look for alternatives. The most promising candidate was the Basuto National Party (BNP), led by Chief Leabua Jonathan. Although he had criticized South Africa and its apartheid policy several times, he stood for what Afrikaner nationalists regarded as "Bantu" politics, since his party represented Basuto traditionalism and the interests of the chiefs.[49] In contrast to Mokhele, Chief Jonathan did not belong to the educated elite, which the Afrikaner nationalists despised. This great-grandson of Moshoeshoe was a chief, although not a very powerful or prominent one, and as a Catholic he could count on the support of the conservative clergy. He played on the fears of his chiefly colleagues who were alarmed by the rhetoric of the BCP and expected a loss of their privileges should this party come to power.

Even though the party was mainly Catholic,[50] which didn't go down easily with the staunch Calvinists of the Broederbond, the fact that it was lead by a traditionally legitimized chief who was open for cooperation convinced apartheid politicians that this party could become a partner. Jonathan and his colleagues in the BNP presented themselves as champions of Basuto traditionalism and were conservative with regard to women's rights, modernization of the economy, and democratization of Basuto society.

The Broederbond succeeded in establishing links with the BNP, and the records of the meetings make it pretty clear that Jonathan and his lieutenants knew quite well with whom they were dealing. On 20 September 1963 Jonathan, together with Moshesh[51] and Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane, an important leader of the BNP, met one or several unnamed members of the Broederbond. The visitors told their white hosts that the Leramatlou Freedom Party had gained importance, which was due to funding through ANC stalwart Joe Matthews. "The communists said that they would break the BNP."[52] In this manner Jonathan and the other BNP leaders posed as the main target of a communist conspiracy and presented themselves as natural partners of white South Africans. Jonathan even alleged that his life was in danger.

The BCP had used donations from Egypt and Ghana to buy cars, which could be used to reach even the remote mountain regions of Lesotho during the election campaign.[53] BNP organizing secretary Emmanuel Letete pleaded for help by emphasizing the advantage the Congress Party already had: "Our request is that we should be provided with financial assistance to enable two of our members to fly to West Germany, Nigeria, England and the Americas, for the purpose of raising funds." To give his appeal the necessary air of urgency, the party secretary pointed to the strategic importance Lesotho had for South Africa: "It may be used as the springboard of communism and we are trying to avoid this."[54]

The BNP even alleged that the Congress Party received funding from communist China and that it had been launched by Ghana.[55] The Broederbond itself solidified the rumors about the communist connections of the Marematlou Freedom Party, its information probably coming from intelligence sources.[56] This alleged danger of a communist takeover explains the urgency of the Broederbond's involvement and interest in the political affairs of Lesotho. They emphasized "that the Basuto are a Christian people and that the powers of darkness are busy to subdue them and that we as a Christian people must help them."[57] The BNP successfully played the game of Cold War politics with their South African counterparts and received the support they wanted. But although they proved to be shrewd politicians, the balance of power was very asymmetrical, and remained so.

In the early 1960s Verwoerd made several advances for the incorporation of the High Commission territories as part of his homeland policy. The partition of an enlarged South Africa would then have given blacks a much larger part of the country. This in turn would have looked much more justifiable than the 13 percent they were to get of South Africa's

territory.[58] In 1963 Verwoerd went public with the suggestion that the British government should give him the opportunity to explain to the inhabitants of the three territories what advantages incorporation and integration into South Africa's homeland policy would give to them. It certainly was no coincidence that he did so just at the time when the Broederbond activities reached a climax.[59] Verwoerd's suggestions lead to great unease in Basutoland and had the unintended consequence that any party that dared even to discuss incorporation would have committed political suicide.

Jonathan was obviously walking a tightrope at the time, criticizing South Africa publicly and at the same time cooperating with the Broederbond, known as the most sinister political force in South Africa. During his meeting with the Broederbond agents, Jonathan apologized sheepishly for his public utterances on South Africa. If he as the leader of the party "would not criticize the republic now and then – then he would not be a good leader."[60] The BNP acted skillfully, because Jonathan earned the reputation of being an independent politician when he criticized South Africa. He confessed much later that he had received support from South Africa, but it did him just as little harm as the revelation that the money came from the Broederbond.[61]

The Broederbond subsequently provided the BNP with two cars including loudspeakers. Later Jonathan was even transported to his election rallies by helicopter.[62] White businessmen in Lesotho donated to the BNP as well.[63] Because of its pathetic organization the BNP had experienced a heavy defeat at the polls three years before, which affirmed prejudices within the Broederbond: "Our finding is that the Bantu are not able to launch an efficient party organization and to spread this."[64] For this reason six party functionaries were sent to Johannesburg for training "in political organization" in 1963.[65] The next year the number grew to nine, among them party secretary C. D. Molapo and the organizational secretary E. D. Letete, who attended a training course in Johannesburg in January 1964. The training was comprehensive and included propaganda techniques, administrative organization, and the planning of election campaigns. Broederbond representatives helped with the planning and calculated budgets for funds needed for staff, furniture and typewriters.[66]

The South African government allowed the BNP only to conduct an election campaign among migrant workers within the Republic.[67] South African media, especially the Afrikaans press, openly supported the BNP.[68] Jonathan won the 1965 election by a small margin.[69] But the result was only partially due to South African help since both the

delimitation of the constituencies and the voting system were advantageous towards the BNP compared to other parties.

The manipulation was a two-way street, as the BNP in turn used the Broederbond for its own ends, playing the tune of anti-communism. Jonathan, in the end, got what he wanted: political power as Prime Minister of Lesotho. He was always aware that his country was extremely dependent on its powerful neighbor. So he used the support of the South African government for his own ends. With him furthermore being a chief and the head of a party with a traditionalist outlook, it would have seemed as if he fitted nicely into South African perceptions of how African politics should be. Yet Jonathan proved to be a politician with neither scruples nor ideological commitments. This became obvious in 1970, when he could avoid defeat in the next elections only by coup. Afterwards he tried to win legitimacy through leftist populist politics and by trying to play the anti-apartheid tune to get support from the international community.[70] But his change of sides led South Africa to switch alliance partners as well. Pretoria henceforth supported Mukhele and his party, and during the 1980s used increasingly violent means, which culminated in brutal intervention, forcing Lesotho to toe the line.

Matanzima, for his part, also tried to escape the political cage he found himself in, especially after his attempts to incorporate Ciskei were unsuccessful. But he could not do much more than verbally attack apartheid and boast the independence of Transkei after 1976. His room for maneuver was so restricted that he could not find allies, and subsequently was ousted by his own brother in 1986.

Lesotho was in a better position than the Transkei, because it found international recognition as an independent state and had contacts to other African states. But even then the small country had only a very limited scope for an independent course. The arguments with which these African politicians convinced the Broederbond, that their country could become a springboard for communism, would come to haunt them.

Comparisons

What do both cases have in common? In Transkei as well as in Lesotho the political empowerment of an African elite followed a certain pattern. White South Africa used all the means at its disposal, especially the informal channels of the Broederbond, to influence the emergence of a new power elite and to prevent the rise of mass democracy on a broad scale. Instead, the main aim was to keep so-called traditional leaders in power, since this coincided with Verwoerd's understanding of African political

traditions. Matanzima as well as Jonathan, the champions of White South Africa, built their political power on traditional leadership, but in both cases they antagonized important groups and persons among the traditional leaders, Sabata Dalindyebo in the case of Transkei, the crown prince and later king Moshoeshoe II in Lesotho. This reveals the dialectics of apartheid: apartheid strove to preserve traditional structures by manipulating them. The manipulation in turn undermined the very tradition on which the political edifice had been erected.

In both cases the larger context of East–West confrontation played its role too, since South Africa intervened not only to keep cheap labor reservoirs at its borders, but also to prevent countries in its neighborhood from becoming bastions of the banned South African opposition, which had been equated with communism. By playing out anti-communism in order to get support from the apartheid state, the power elites in Transkei and Lesotho limited their room for political autonomy even further.

It is one of the ironies of colonial history and of decolonization in Africa that organizations like the Broederbond and the National Party, although regarding themselves as vanguards of decolonization, erected one of the most repressive regimes. Because of their racist convictions they denied to Africans what they had demanded for themselves. Like Verwoerd, most whites in South Africa were convinced that Africans were not able to develop modern states and that democracy and Western-style politics were not for them. This is why they manipulated and fostered "Bantu politics" in their immediate neighborhood.

The picture is on the whole rather contradictory and does not fit easily into the history of decolonization. Verwoerd's homeland policy certainly was a reaction to decolonization on the African continent, but the sham independence of the Transkei and other "homelands" came down to an internal colonialism in a country that had been a sovereign state since 1931. South Africa advertised the "independence" of Transkei as a voluntary decolonization, but in reality it installed a kind of puppet regime, completely dependent on South Africa. Matanzima and other homeland politicians received their limited share of power, which was not enough to improve the situation of their people and their countries but just sufficient to abuse it.

Kwame Nkrumah once characterized the way European and American business interests prevented Africa from moving beyond the political kingdom as neo-colonialism. Southern Africa is clearly an example of neo-colonialism since African politicians were free to develop patronage structures and indulge in an orgy of self-enrichment, but their possibilities to develop their countries economically and to pursue an independent

political course were much more limited than in other parts of the continent. This structure remained intact, at least until the end of apartheid, but South African interventions became bloodier with each decade.

Notes

1. Christoph Marx (2008: 256–68).
2. This chapter is based on original Broederbond documents, to which I had access in the Archives of the Broederbond in Pretoria.
3. Ivan Evans (1997).
4. See, for instance, Michael Bollig in this volume and Andreas Eckert (2007).
5. On Eiselen and other government ethnologists, see W. D. Hammond-Tooke (1997: 53–69, and Chapter 6).
6. During the early 1970s there were heated discussions among imprisoned ANC leaders on the role of the chiefs, Christoph Marx (2002: 452–69).
7. On direct rule in Transkei before 1951, see W. D. Hammond-Tooke (1975: 77ff.) and Philip Mayer (1966: 288–9).
8. W. D. Hammond-Tooke (1975: 206ff.) and Newell M. Stultz (1980: 50ff.).
9. Philip Mayer (1966: 294).
10. Govan Mbeki (1984).
11. Fred T. Hendricks (1989: 306–25).
12. Newell Stultz (1980: 26) with basic information on the Transkei.
13. On the biographies of the Matanzima brothers, see Barry Streek (1981) Chapter 2.
14. Memorandum with a lot of handwritten notes, Archive of the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), Pretoria, 1/1/52/4.
15. This went so far that he signed his letters to Matanzima with "a vriend."
16. Verslag van werksaamhede in Transkei 1 July 1963–6. Des. 1963, AB 1/1/52/1.
17. Notes for interview on 10 July 1963, annex 3(i) to Verslag van aksie in Bantoegebiede, AB 1/1/52/1.
18. Verslag van werksaamhede in Transkei, 1.7.63-6.12.63: AB 1/1/52/1.
19. Kort verlag oor die stigting van kultuurvereinigings in Transkei, 1: AB 1/1/52/4.
20. Verslag van werksaamhede in transkei, 1.7.63-6.12.63: AB 1/1/52/1. Victor Poto was Matanzima's main opponent and a critic of South Africa's homeland policy.
21. Verslag van werksaamhede in Transkei, 1.7.63-6.12.63, appendices 4 and 5: AB 1/1/52/1.
22. Ibid., appendix 7; this letter is undated but was sent before 3 August 1963, because on this day the foundation meeting should take place. also Posisie tot dusver Dinsdag 16 July 1963; typed notes with handwritten additions: AB 1/1/52/5.
23. Verslag vir 3 December 1963: AB 1/1/52/2.
24. Kort verslag oor die stigting van kultuurvereinigings in Transkei, 1: AB 1/1/52/4.
25. Verslag van werksaamhede in Transkei, 1.7.63-6.12.63, appendix 10(1): Verslag Transkei: AB 1/1/52/1. Handwritten Notes: "Oom Hans [het] my gevra dat ek weer in Januarie moet afkom om alles af te handel": AB 1/1/52/5.

On the financial support: Botha Sigcau to Abraham, 10 December 1963 and Godlwana to Abraham, 11 November 1963 and 9 December 1963.

26. Handwritten synopsis on election prognosis for Transkei: AB 1/1/52/5.
27. Matanzima to Broederbond agent (Johannesburg), 17 December 1963: AB 1/1/52/1.
28. Geregistreerde Transkei kiesers: AB 1/1/52/5. Some of the names of these contacts could be traced in the members list, appendix to Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom (1980).
29. Quotation from Verslag vir 3 December 1963, S. 1: AB 1/1/52/2.
30. Matanzima to Broederbond agent (Johannesburg), 17 December 1963: AB 1/1/52/1.
31. Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed (1981: 10, 20).
32. Political Organisation and Planning: AB 1/1/52/1.
33. Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed (1981: 29–30).
34. Matanzima to "my dear friend," 11 January 1964: AB 1/1/52/1.
35. Scott Rosenberg (1999: 49–74).
36. On both laws and the changes of chieftaincy since Moshoeshoe, see L. B. B. J. Machobane (1986), also Lord Hailey (1953: 79–87).
37. Robert Edgar (1987: 10ff.).
38. On his biography, see Bernard Leeman (1985: 66–7).
39. Richard F. Weisfelder (2002: 18).
40. Peter Sanders (2000: 98).
41. Richard Weisfelder (2002: 37ff.).
42. Verslag van aksie in Bantoegebiede, undated (1963), 1: AB 1/1/52/1 Basoetolandse Aksie, Verslag: AB 1/1/52/2. Interestingly the general secretary of the BNP lived close to the border town of Ficksburg, Bernard Leeman (1985: 178, fn. 300). In Ficksburg the Commissioner-General for the South Sotho had his residence as well: ibid., 120.
43. Verslag van werksaamhede in Transkei (persoonlik en vertroulik) for the time period from 1 July 1963 until 6 December 1963: AB 1/1/52/1. Also the complete membership list of the "Taakgroep oor ons verhouding tot die nie-blankes" from 8 February 1964 in: AB 1/1/52/5. Members of this group were the ethnologist Prof. J. P. Bruwer, M. C. Botha (Minister for Bantu Administration), Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen (former Secretary for Native Affairs), J. P. Doods, Prof. Dr. E. F. Potgieter, Dr. H. J. van Zyl, Ds. C. W. H. Boshoff (later chairman of SABRA), Dr. P. Koornhof (Minister during the 1970s and 1980s), Prof. Dr. G. van N. Viljoen (later Broederbond Chairman and Cabinet Minister), M. T. de Waal, F. S. Steyn, J. H. T. Mills, S. F. Kingsley, P. J. Riekert and Prof. Dr. P. F. D. Weiss. The Executive Council of the Broederbond had set up this commission in the early 1960s, "to plan the activities in the Bantu areas and S. W. A."
44. Verslag vir 3 December 1963, AB 1/1/52/2.
45. Press statements by the BLP, esp. 12: AB 1/1/52/2.
46. Memorandum, undated (c. October 1963): AB 1/1/52/2.
47. "Basoeto's wil meer weet van Dr. Verwoerd se aanbod" and attached reports and self-fabricated interviews of the BLP: AB 1/1/52/2. The Basutoland Labour Party obviously dissolved before the elections of 1965 and its members joined the BNP; Bernard Leeman (1985: 178, fn. 296).
48. Copies of BLP press statements, 7. AB 1/1/52/2.
49. On the election program 1965 Richard Weisfelder (2002: 88ff.).
50. The pioneers of Christianization had been the missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Mission Society. Catholics only arrived three decades later, but

were much more successful, especially from the early twentieth century, when King Griffith converted to Catholicism in 1912. The progressive educated elite largely came from the Protestant mission schools, even though the very conservative Catholic mission was also active and successful in education work; Robert Edgar (1987: 28).

51. He was probably Chief Makhabana Garvin King Moshesh, who came from the Sotho minority in Transkei and who worked for the Department of Justice in Basutoland. Obviously he had excellent connections to the South African administration, since he gave a message from Verwoerd to Mokhele. Verwoerd promised to support Mokhele under the condition that he stopped criticizing South Africa; Bernard Leeman (1985: 120).
52. Notes of meeting, 20 September 1963, AB 1/1/52/2.
53. Richard Weisfelder (2002: 17).
54. E. D. Letete: Basutoland National Party, 1: AB 1/1/52/2.
55. Ibid.
56. Memorandum "Morema [*sic*] Tlou Freedom Party" Basoetoland, n. d.: AB 1/1/52/2.
57. Basoetoland. Kort verslag vir 5 February 1964: AB 1/1/52/3.
58. Newell Stultz (1980: 140).
59. Hendrik F. Verwoerd (1963), Jack Spence (1975: 477–527, especially 500–1).
60. Notes about a meeting: 20 September 1963: AB 1/1/52/2.
61. Richard Weisfelder (2002: 36–7).
62. Note, 28 November 1963: "Kry geskapte voertui by Verdeiging vir Bas": AB 1/1/52/2. On the helicopter and the reaction of the public Weisfelder, *Contention*, 67–8.
63. Kowet, *Land*, 170.
64. Memorandum, undated (October 1963): AB 1/1/52/2.
65. Verslag van aksie in Bantoegebiede, undated (1963), 1: AB 1/1/52/1.
66. Ibid. appendix 2.
67. On the complaints of all the parties about preferences given to their adversaries, see the memoirs of the Chief Election Officer Peter Sanders, *Last of the Queen's Men*, 101ff. British colonial authorities did not prefer one of the parties over others: Richard Weisfelder (2002: 69).
68. Richard Weisfelder (2002: 56).
69. Memorandum (handwritten marked as "secret"), 2: AB 1/1/52/4: The election results for the constituencies can be found in detail in Bernard Leeman (1985: 135–49).
70. On further developments in Lesotho, see Roger Southall (2003: 115–33, especially 121ff.).

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8

Chieftaincies and Chiefs in Northern Namibia: Intermediaries of Power between Traditionalism, Modernization, and Democratization

Michael Bollig

Chiefs, in academic literature often addressed as neo-traditional chiefs, traditional authorities, or intermediaries of power, have been popular topics of research among social anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists, and perhaps to a lesser extent also among historians since the 1990s.[1] One might wonder justifiably why they have stirred such interest among social scientists. It may be because of their ambiguous and almost paradoxical stand within a modern setting, as chiefs are legitimized through ancient genealogies, networks of patronage, and accumulation of power and often of property. Yet many still see them as essential for the establishment of a civil society based on democratic principles in rural Africa. Or maybe it is because of the astounding resilience of the institutions of chieftaincy. Although firmly established only through colonial administrations in many parts of rural Africa, and co-opted by colonial administrations in the 1950s and 1960s for colonial projects of modernization, they have successfully integrated themselves into postcolonial states and are nowadays well-fettered partners of governmental, non-governmental organizations, and political parties. Chiefs are highly influential in all matters pertaining to land tenure, the regulation of social relations and social security legislation in the rural communities. It seems that especially in southern Africa traditional authorities are strong and have successfully bolstered their elite position in the process of decolonization.[2]

Before going into more detail and entering into a more ethnographic analysis of a specific case, however, I would like to raise two questions. First, do chiefs in the colonial and postcolonial set-up count as elite? How

this question is answered depends to some degree on the disciplinary vantage point. Historians and political scientists tend to treat chiefs as separate from emergent national elites. Social anthropologists, not having a strong tradition in elite research, often consider chiefs to be a local elite, prominent in a restricted regional context but detached from the larger political set-up. There are three good reasons for treating chiefs as an elite: (1) the decisions of chiefs directly affect the rural populace as they control the land allocation and thereby impact on rural economies. Furthermore, they act as local level jurisdiction making judgments on matters such as marriage, divorce, petty theft and property rights issues; (2) they often constitute a small group of people, dominant in economic terms; and (3) they are often well connected through kinship or patronage networks to elite members acting at the national level. It is especially these three points – political influence, economic dominance, and strong external ties – on which I will focus this exploration of chieftaincy in northwestern Namibia. More problematic is the question of whether or not chiefs perceive themselves as a corporate elite group with a social identity of their own. I would argue for the northwest Namibian case that I present here that chiefs rather see themselves in a categorically similar position and not so much as a group of itself.

The second question I would like to address arises here: how are chiefs affected by and how do they shape the processes of decolonization, modernization, and globalization? In social anthropological and sociological accounts they are generally dealt with as intermediaries of power and in the colonial setting as very much dependent on the ideological legitimization, aid, and material rewards of the colonial regime. However, since at least the 1990s chiefs have resurged and have forcefully entered debates on decentralization, democratization, and the sustainable use of land.

The chapter attempts to show that chiefs, by emphasizing their autonomy through the state and without propagating any concrete political program, successfully maintained an extremely influential position as gatekeepers between rural communities and the state. Without them neither the state nor contemporary non-governmental organizations would have easy access to local communities. At the same time, chiefs have linked their local communities to national politics and opened up new resources for their communities. By virtue of the fact that they are enmeshed in extensive clientele networks, they are to some extent dependent on delivering "developmental advantages" (for example infrastructure, food aid) to their communities.

I will tell my story using material from northwestern Namibia, where I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork since 1994. My main argument

is not focused on chiefs as crucial to an understanding of how decolonization impacted societies; others have made this argument. In his widely discussed seminal contribution "Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism," Mahmood Mamdani argues that the very structures of "decentralized despotism" hinged upon the establishment of chieftaincies under colonial rule and the confirmation of these structures under postcolonial regimes.[3] He argues that the weakness of democracies in Africa is linked to the continued existence of this colonial construct where urban citizens and rural subjects are differentiated. While I agree with Mamdani on the relevance of chieftaincy for the understanding of contemporary African societies, I will focus on a different aspect here. I am less interested in whether or not traditional authorities enhance or hinder democracy and more in the interplay between traditional authorities and national governments as well as the space of agency traditional authorities created for themselves by making use of resources offered to them by successive governments.[4]

The installation of chiefs and the emergence of the colonial administration

The engagement of the northwestern Namibian population with the world system predates the establishment of colonial rule by several decades. I will have to cut this story short: the migration of Bantu speaking pastoralists into the region – addressed as Kaokoveld and later in the homeland context as Kaokoland – was a likely consequence of slave raiding in eighteenth-century southwestern Angola.[5] In the second half of the nineteenth century northwest Namibia's pastoralists were targets of cattle raiders operating at the fringes of the Cape-based trade system (Lau, 2007). By the 1880s at the latest, most herders had fled from Kaokoveld to southern Angola.[6] There the refugees came into close contact with the Portuguese colonial economy which had rapidly developed after 1830. Following the independence of Brazil in 1822, numerous rich Portuguese settlers left their plantations in Brazil to establish new enterprises in southern Angola.[7] As of the 1870s, commercial hunters also operated in the Kunene basin to procure ivory, ostrich feathers and other tropical commodities for the world market.[8] After 1890 the single most important employer for the refugees was the Portuguese colonial army.[9] Year after year so-called punitive expeditions were sent out against "rebellious natives." Refugees from northern Namibia – Himba and Herero alike but also communities of Africans who settled with the Dorsland Trekkers in the Lubango region as

dependants – participated as mercenaries in these raids. Especially after the Rinderpest of 1897, the refugees saw the income and livestock generated from commercial soldiering as a way to curb their personal losses. Mercenary leaders received substantial rewards for their participation in punitive expeditions. They were usually entitled to half of the loot, and many contemporary commentators alleged that punitive expeditions were primarily about looting the native populations.[10]

The liberal revolution in Portugal in 1910 greatly changed the conditions of the former refugees in southwestern Angola.[11] The military administration changed to a civil administration. There was no longer a need for mercenaries and soon former mercenary leaders had criminal charges running against them. Many again left, moving from the Portuguese territory to the hardly administered northwestern part of Namibia, where the German colonial administration had wielded very little factual influence.[12]

The encapsulation of northwestern Namibia during the 1920s and 1930s

When the South African army first entered Kaokoveld in 1917, many pastoralists crossed the Kunene River once again. The South African government immediately disarmed the pastoralists and decided to put them under the control of three chiefs, Vita Tom, Muhonakatiti and Kakurukouye. From the beginning, the South African administration based its government of the vast northern areas on whom they perceived to be the local elite. All three chiefs appointed in 1920 had careers as war lords or mercenary leaders and had only vague claims to traditional forms of leadership. The three chiefs were wealthy big-men and in 1923 the administration allotted them three separate reserves to administer.

The policy of the South African administration for Kaokoveld from the 1920s to the 1940s aimed to encapsulate the area.[13] The intention of this policy was twofold. On the one hand restrictions on mobility and trade enhanced the control over this peripheral area. On the other hand, the denial of a potential expansion of farming settlers into the area left options for later state-controlled settlement projects. The policy of encapsulation had specific consequences for local elites. It restricted venues for accumulation and limited the options to transfer wealth from livestock into other forms of property. It also curtailed the contact of the elites beyond Kaokoveld. There is ample evidence that Kaokoveld's emergent elite attempted to circumvent both restrictions. Local leaders were involved in cases of illegal livestock sales beyond

the borders of Kaokoveld and in instances of poaching during the Truppenspieler Movement.[14] In the 1930s, Kaokoveld's Herero leaders were also involved in a wider network of exchanges reaching far beyond the area. All through the 1920s the colonial government implemented and enforced boundaries around Kaokoveld and virtually closed off the region. Mobility was additionally curtailed by interior boundaries between chiefdoms. All trade activities, from livestock husbandry (live animals, skins, meat), to the crossing of national (to Ovamboland and to the commercial ranching area) and international (to Portuguese Angola) boundaries, were categorically prohibited. Kaokoveld became isolated with very little contact to the outside world. Visitors had to undergo a lengthy process of applying for permits, and missionaries were not allowed to operate in the area. Local leaders complained bitterly in letters or oral statements to leading colonial officers that the governmentally imposed isolation was threatening their very livelihoods.[15]

The embargo on any trade beyond Kaokoveld severely restricted opportunities for local elites. Colonial files make it clear that during the 1920s and 1930s it was especially chiefs and councilors who tried to circumvent the strict trade regulations and either tried to barter ivory to Angola or clandestinely sell livestock to commercial ranchers and traders. While there was definitely some amount of smuggling going on, in general the chances to engage in business operations with the outside world remained severely restricted. This changed only after World War II. Political changes in South Africa – the election of the National Party (NP) and its Apartheid program in 1948 – brought about new administrative practices in northwestern Namibia, although not before an eight-year lag.

In 1949 there was not a single store in Kaokoveld, and people had to travel several hundred kilometers to Kamanjab, Outjo, or Ondangwa to obtain goods. Ovambo petty traders sometimes came to Kaokoland with donkeys to barter tobacco from local herders in exchange for beads and other commodities.[16] Laws prohibiting barter between natives and white or black traders further hampered trade. However, this legal act was propagated as an initiative to protect local producers against unfavorable trading.

The modernization of colonial administration and post-independence dynamics

In 1954 Kaokoveld was placed under the Ministry of Bantu Administration and became the administrative unit "Kaokoland." Already in the late 1950s the local council of chiefs became fairly influential in making

decisions at the district headquarters, Opuwo. The native commissioner regularly consulted with them and – as will be shown later – they wielded quite a degree of influence. Their influence became even more salient when in the 1960s administrative reforms (the Odendaal plan) were implemented, guaranteeing local traditional authorities more say in administrative matters and issues pertaining to development. At the same time the number of chiefs was gradually extended – at the end of the 1980s there were 36 salaried chiefs, each accompanied by a number of equally salaried councilors. Each chief was designated a ward, and although boundaries were not clearly fixed on maps,[17] chiefs and administration developed a very clear understanding on the delineations of such chieftaincies.

It is noteworthy – especially in the context of this volume – that other kinds of elites were hampered in their attempt to create wealth and political influence for themselves. Although the South African administration relaxed its stand on trade with Southern Angola in the 1950s, there were still many restrictions and the emergence of a local trader elite was inhibited.[18] Only in the late 1960s were several shops opened in Kaokoland. However, it was mainly the parastatal Bantoe Beleggingskorporasie (BBK) that handled livestock sales and effectively took the majority of business out of the hands of locals.

In 1989 troops of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) were stationed in the region; in 1990 Namibia gained independence and established a new administrative structure. The former homeland Kaokoland was abolished, and in 1992 the region became part of the larger administrative unit, the Kunene Region. Traditional authorities did not have a place in the administrative structure of the Kunene Region. Initially, the South West Africa People's Organizations' (SWAPO) government was reluctant to give them a fixed place in the administration of the region. Officials, many of them from other parts of the country, established the administration. However, chiefly power was not broken. They still allocated land and grazing rights according to previous legislation, while they also expressed opposition towards many governmental initiatives in the region, thereby establishing their own political portfolio. Whereas the politics of traditional authorities had previously been geared towards internal solutions, they now often made use of links to politicians operating at the national level. While legislation in the early 1990s had been somewhat reluctant to sustain chiefly power, between 1996 and 2003 a number of legal changes pertaining to natural resource tenure in the rural areas of former homelands emphasized the central role of chiefs in the allocation and control of tenure

rights. NGOs operating in the region set up a number of development orientated, cooperative entities and invited traditional authorities to collaborate in these projects.

Agency and control: Adaptations of a regional elite to changing political circumstances

I will now discuss how the local political elite – chiefs and their entourage of councilors – dealt with the establishment of their homelands under South African tutelage in the 1950s/1960s and the challenges of late decolonization in the 1990s. In both phases traditional authorities adapted swiftly to the changing political tides. They succeeded in defining a realm of political influence for themselves and offered themselves as partners in projects of modernization and development. In both instances they re-established themselves successfully as gatekeepers to their respective rural communities.

After the official introduction of Apartheid in 1948 policy toward the African reserves changed profoundly. Economic conditions in African reserves were identified as developmental problems, and relations between traditional authorities and local officers were to be reorganized along patterns of modern administration. In 1948, the Long-Term Agricultural Commission (LAPC) working on rural conditions in South Africa and Namibia found that "the limit of carrying capacity ... has been reached."[19] The commission recommended modernization, soil conservation, appropriating stocking rates, and improved livestock breeds on both the freehold farmland and the African reserves. Reports of catastrophic degradation of southern African savannahs due to overexploitation haunted the public media.[20] Reserve economies were to be modernized so as to produce enough food for a growing population.[21] Bortha reports, "the local administration began greatly to expand their managerial, developmental, and research capacities. The aim was to impose total rationality and control. Modernization theory ruled and went with disdain for any form of local, especially African, knowledge." Traditional authorities were regarded as important partners in the policy of modernization.[22] As opposed to new elites who were regarded as potentially oppositional, traditional elites were seen as "natural" allies of the administration. It was also deemed that traditional authorities could be modernized in the course of developmental projects. Local chiefs were to be transformed into elites. They were legitimized on account of genealogies and tribal lore, and they were also familiar with the obligations of local leaders, thus linking the administration with

the rural population. In order to do so, chiefs were more carefully scrutinized in annual reports. In reports of the years 1946 to 1952, the performance of chiefs from Kaokoveld was reviewed extensively and their contribution to governmental administration reflected.[23]

While the decisions regarding how and where to start the modernization programs were firmly centered with the experts (for example, the decision over whether to invest in boreholes or in other programs), traditional authorities steered much of the program on the ground. After 1950, a number of scientific studies were undertaken in the area – geology,[24] anthropology,[25] and zoology.[26] In 1957, Kaokoveld became an "independent" reserve (Kaokoland) under the direct authority of the Chief Native Affairs Commissioner in Windhoek.[27] This legislative change had a number of direct consequences. The tribal council had to be heard regularly by the local administration and the council was encouraged to establish its own revenue through so-called *stamfonds* (tribal trust fund) to which every head of household had to contribute on an annual basis.[28] Eager traditional authorities developed ties beyond the confines of Kaokoland. I recorded several accounts of visits of Kaokoveld's leaders to the Herero paramount chief in Aminuis some 1200 km away. These visits were used symbolically to "unite" separate units of what was progressively being perceived as a single nation (*otjiwana*). Apparently such visits were also used to express and communicate an anti-government position (Freda Troup, 1950). The extent to which the reunion of traditional authorities was linked by a growing political dissent at the center with the formation of political parties is an issue that needs further research.

Especially after the drought of 1959–62 experts were invited to comment on the situation (Republic of South Africa, 1964).[29] Geologists and agriculturalists became influential and grounded much of the political decision making process with data. While in the 1930s only a few waterholes had been blasted, a regular borehole program was launched in the mid 1950s. In a letter to the Native Commissioners the Chief Bantu Commissioner in Windhoek argued that "*ontwikkeling*" (development) in reserve areas was necessary and that borehole drilling was an important step in that direction.[30] He asked Commissioners to identify areas that could be opened for human exploitation by boreholes. The letter required Native Commissioners to specify where boreholes could be drilled and to consult with tribal leaders. This, however, proved to be a major obstacle, as Kaokoveld's chiefs had apparently decided to challenge the government on this development initiative.[31] In a meeting with the Odendaal Commission Native Commissioner Ben van Zyl

reports that local leaders had rejected the government donation of 25,000 Rand, which was intended to spur the borehole program. Already in 1955 an inoculation campaign had been brought to a halt by local opposition. In 1962 the confrontation between local leaders and the administration reached a climax and two letters full of serious complaints against acting commissioner Marais led to his removal from office.[32] Local resistance to government initiatives was increasingly linked to oppositional activities at the national level. On the demand of Hosea Kutako, the Herero paramount chief, Kaokoland's Herero and Himba contributed cattle and money to the protest campaign against the South African occupation of Namibia and the visit of a UN diplomat to Kaokoveld to record the opinions of local leaders. Hence, the local administration was cornered between two challenges. While development initiatives were to be carried out swiftly in order to show the wider world that South Africa as mandate power actively developed African reserves, traditional authorities rejected most government-led programs. The only way the South African administration managed to operate under these difficult circumstances was to concede more powers to local leaders.

There was no longer any argument about the contributions of the "stamfonds," as the government was prepared to shoulder the costs of drilling and borehole fitting. With an upcoming internal political opposition and the claim of the UN that South Africa's mandate was to be revoked,[33] the implementation of the borehole program was to fit two purposes. It was to modernize local livestock husbandry and at the same time win the hearts and minds of local leaders.[34] The government obviously felt pressured to deliver. In order to woo traditional authorities successfully local leaders were given a decisive say in the location of the boreholes. They were seen, and successfully presented themselves, as gatekeepers to their rural communities.

In 1963 the Odendaal commission went into Kaokoland with the mandate to prepare plans for the semi-independence of the region. I would like to take a closer look at the discussions that took place in Opuwo and Orumana over a two-day period.[35] The commission sat for several hours with the local chiefs who were directly asked to forward their ideas regarding the economic development of the area. The traditional leaders listed the lack of education and the lack of market access as major development problems. The traditional authorities criticized the government for taking away land from the pastoral communities. The white official chairing the meeting repeatedly went back to the issue of the boreholes. He propagated development (*ontwikkeling*) as a

depoliticized concept of technical input to improve the output of local agriculture and promised schools and hospitals paid for by the government. Alexander has aptly dubbed this attitude "innovative paternalism."[36] While local leaders agreed that more boreholes were indeed necessary, they were rather firmly set on a general critique of the government. However, the final recommendation of the Odendaal Report was that boreholes should be drilled in order to spur economic development. Great hopes were placed on technical innovation as many South African officers had witnessed the modernization of the South African landscape through extensive borehole drilling.[37]

Chiefs were given a major say in the actual location of the boreholes. Generally a chief would apply with the administration for a borehole in a specific place and a hydrologist was then sent to check on the feasibility of the location. The administration usually consented to the applications of the chiefs and I have come across communication regarding a borehole being drilled despite the critical stand of the hydrologist simply to please the local chiefs.

Boreholes were the first enduring physical evidence of the government in much of Kaokoveld. Of course, Opuwo had been built as an administrative center, but the area is as big as Switzerland, and a dozen brick houses do not feature prominently. The boreholes, on the other hand, were placed in many areas and were immediately integrated into the economic and political system. This horizontal extension of the state penetrated the local economy effectively and irrevocably. In the 1950s, some 43 boreholes were drilled, all around Opuwo. During the 1960s, 136 were drilled, and in the 1970s, another 128. The area was now full of boreholes: some were wind-driven pumps, some motor-driven, and some were operated manually. In the 1980s another 57 boreholes were added and in the 1990s some 40. Expansion of the boreholes also meant an expansion of chiefly control. Elsewhere, I have shown that the drilling of boreholes and the opening up of new pastures brought about the need for more rules of resource utilization.[38] Whereas before large parts of the country had simply fallen dry after the rainy season and were no longer suited for use, now many pastures could be used all year round. This increased the potential for competition and conflict. Quickly a department of regulation developed which local herders addressed as *ondunino yomaryo*, the rules of good grazing. A number of sanctions for non-adherence of rules were laid out, and a so-called *ovapolise vomaryo* – grazing police – was installed and accountable to the chief and his councilors. The emergence of such a grazing police may be interpreted as an effort to enlarge the authority of the chiefs by allotting them a

small department for the purpose of monitoring the community and sanctioning community members.

For the first time chiefs were given the control of an enormously valuable resource. Many grazing areas could only be used once a borehole was drilled there. In some instances the location of a borehole in a specific place even allowed for the establishment of small villages. Of course, the decision of where to locate a borehole directly affected the economic prospects of nearby households, and chiefs could reward trustful clients with the decision to locate a borehole in their vicinity and/or they could increase the potential for their own herds tremendously. Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s chiefs were usually enormously wealthy herders. While regional herd numbers increased throughout this period, it was the herds of the chiefs that increased the most. For instance, Munimuhoro, a senior Himba chief, was said to own some 10,000 heads of cattle spread over a great number of camps. The increase of herds made possible through the borehole drilling program furthered the extension of the chiefs' clientele networks. Chiefs loaned herds of cattle to clients in many different locations, and the scope of their exchange networks reached far into southwestern Angola.

While traditional authorities in the 1960s and 1970s had generally been critical of government initiatives, in the 1970s and 1980s local administration and the council of chiefs closely collaborated. The Namibian war of independence furthered close relations: traditional authorities in northwestern Namibia sided with the South West African Defense Force (SWATEF) and their paramilitary wing (Koevoet). In several cases, chiefs were directly involved in so-called anti-terrorist measures. I know of at least one instance when military medals were given to a chief for delivering opposition fighters to the South African army. SWATEF and the local administration developed a real cult around chiefs. The first colonial chief of the area, Vita Tom, who had died in 1936 in distant Ondangwa, was reburied in Opuwo, and the South African administration sponsored a major monument for the prominent leader. Streets and schools were named after other leaders. Chiefs were depicted as being vested with an aura of natural authority, and a number of wandering myths developed around tribal leaders such as the historical Vita Tom and Muhona Katiti and the contemporary Munimuhoro and Vetamuna. While these leaders were attributed an almost sacred power, they were also rendered as brave supporters of the administration.

Since the late 1960s, chiefs became tightly integrated into the overall administrative structure. Chiefs who maintained a highly critical position of the government in the late 1950s and early 1960s, were co-opted with

a number of privileges.[39] For example, already in 1968 they were exempt from laws passed and could travel freely. They also enjoyed wholesale prices at the government shop in Opuwo. From 1967 onwards chiefs received a salary of 120 Rand per year, with a bonus of 60 Rand if they worked according to government expectations. In 1979 headmen received 900 Rand per annum. By that time they were also given semi-automatic attack weapons, allegedly to protect themselves against insurgents.

Chiefs as traditional authorities after independence

Namibian independence in 1990 brought a set of new challenges for traditional authorities. During the 1970s and 1980s they had sided with the South African administration, and some chiefs had actively participated in the fight of the South African army against the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, SWAPO's military wing. A SWAPO publication from 1987 claims that "in the north, the traditional leadership has sold out totally to the occupation regime."[40] When SWAPO came to power in 1990 many traditional authorities in former Kaokoland worked closely with the oppositional Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) – and until today northwestern Namibia has remained a stronghold of the opposition party. Before 1990, in former Kaokoland 36 chiefs "ruled" the area; of these, only two were acknowledged by the new government in 1995 (Republic of Namibia, 1997). The period of 1994–8 was marked by the fight of local communities and the government plans to build a large hydropower project at the Kunene. While some traditional authorities initially wavered and were unsure whether or not to side with the chiefs directly affected by the building of the dam, they soon realized that the issue offered itself as a platform to reach an international audience and to recover international legitimacy. Traditional authorities from former Kaokoland engaged in manifold contacts with international minority rights groups and went as far as Great Britain, Germany, Norway, and Sweden to make their claim against the dam. At the same time other government programs were rejected. The branding of cattle after vaccinations had been planned by the Veterinary Office but was summarily rejected by the chiefs, who claimed that the branding of cattle "was not according to custom." Demonstrations in the region's small capital Opuwo were staged to urge the administration preferentially to employ people from the region.

In their anti-government position, traditional authorities could make use of new legislation in the fields of wildlife and conservation, water management, and land tenure. In all three fields measures of

decentralization and sustainable resource management instituted local communities as the champions of natural resource management. In order to launch and conduct the ambitious program successfully the state was – once again – dependent on the traditional authorities as gatekeepers to the wider rural population. Communities were encouraged to form legal entities with registered membership, elected steering committees and clearly defined spatial boundaries. Decentralization and the need for well-defined local institutions created new spaces of negotiating power at the local level. Whereas before the 1990s, the colonial state had controlled and policed all matters pertaining to natural resource management, after decentralization and the search for more sustainable approaches to resource management dictated that local communities should have a major say in the control and management of natural resources. In the 1990s such a stand was very well compatible with international donor policies. In the Namibian case decolonization occurred at the same time as the policies of structural adjustment propagated through decentralization and environmentalist organizations were getting a major say in the formulation of development policies. Despite the ruling party's generally critical position toward traditional authorities, international obligations created new spaces for traditional authorities. In 1995 the Namibian Parliament passed the Traditional Authorities Act, which reframed the relation between the state and traditional authorities and gave them a fixed position within the overall administrative structure. The position of traditional authorities was furthered by the establishment of a Council of Traditional Leaders and the reformulation of the Act of 1995 in 2000.

Most states in the southern African region (Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe) introduced Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in the 1990s as a new form of natural resource management in rural communities with the aim of linking economic development and sustainable resource management.[41] Local communities were encouraged to establish community-based organizations with transparent ways of decision-making, detailed management plans, fixed membership and representative and democratically elected leadership. In return the government delegated the rights in game and territorial authority to the local communities. Next to a quota of game which is left to the community, the "conservancy" is allotted the right to negotiate with potential investors (such as tourist operators) and to retain the gains from such agreements.[42] In late 2007 there were already 50 registered conservancies and many more were in the process of applying for registration with the Ministry of Environment and

Tourism. They managed some 118,704 km^2 of communal land, more than double the size of Switzerland, with about 220,600 residents, roughly 20 percent of Namibia's rural population. Formally, traditional authorities did not feature importantly in the administrative structure of the conservancies themselves. However, in many instances I observed that chiefs were crucial in early discussions regarding the boundaries of the conservancies. They were also engaged in discussions on where the core conservation areas should be placed and how the remainder of the conservancy area should be used. In many instances chiefs were involved in the negotiations between investors and the conservancies. In a key law case in the Otjikoto Region, the traditional authority contested to right of the local conservancy to allot land to a tourist entrepreneur wanting to build a hotel worth millions in the area. He did this with good reason, as under the previous legal framework it fell to the traditional authorities to sign the so-called Permissions to Occupy (PTOs) when outside investors wanted to occupy ground on communal lands. Whereas the case underlined that the sole right to enter into such negotiations was factually with the conservancy, the conservancy committee had to agree that a sizeable sum of the gains had to be transferred to the traditional authority.

Many conservancies in the Kunene Region are cut along the boundaries of chieftaincies. For one thing, it was much easier to resort to former chieftaincy boundaries than to define completely new ones when negotiating boundaries with neighboring communities. Second, traditional elites were keen to see the territorial structures they were relating to being transformed into entities of natural resource management. In order to prepare the documents for registration, the boundaries of conservancies were to be clearly marked with the use of modern mapping equipment. Traditional authorities frequently mentioned this process of successful boundary demarcation of the conservancies as something beneficial. While traditional authorities had comparatively little say in governmental administrative procedures, they had now become partners of non-governmental organizations. While the participation of modern elites – traders, teachers and other salaried workers – was taken for granted, traditional authorities were actively wooed.

The first issue a conservancy has to solve is defining the relation of its elected committee with the traditional authorities in the area. Conservancies in northwest Namibia have solved this issue with great enthusiasm for constitutional experiments. Conservancy constitutions have found very different ways to define the linkage to traditional authorities. In some committees the traditional authorities are *ex officio*

members, in others they are allowed to send representatives and in yet others they establish a sort of second chamber together with their councilors. It is worth noting, however, that there is not one constitution where traditional authorities are not of decisive relevance.[43]

Alongside changing laws in nature conservation, the legislation pertaining to rural water supply and forests was also profoundly changed. Local communities were urged to form accountable organizational structures around boreholes. For example, for each well a water-point committee had to be established. This committee is formally entitled to take fees from all those using the well. Again traditional authorities feature significantly in the structure of such committees either by directly being members of these bodies or by sending delegates.

In the long run the reconfirmation of the central role of traditional authorities in communal land tenure through the Communal Land Reform Act of 2003 may be of even more significance than legal changes in the fields of water management and livestock conservation. Land tenure reform was one major step towards increasing the chances for development and to lower vulnerability. Along with tenure insecurity Namibia's rural areas are beset with many other developmental problems: poverty, increasing degrees of stratification, and elite control of resources. The marginalization of impoverished ethnic communities, female heads of households, and the poor in general present fundamental developmental problems through their use of rural resources and degradation of natural resources. Land tenure security and options for gaining more secure individual tenure rights are also important aims of communal land reform. The Communal Land Reform Act of 2003 changed power structures within rural areas and defined access to new resources. A major step was the establishment of Communal Land Boards (CLBs), which, in consultation with traditional authorities, control and allocate access to natural resources. Traditional authorities were assigned to register all users. This was an attempt to integrate traditional authorities into an emergent rural administrative structure. Their engagement in the process of land allocation is thought to be a major step in lending legitimacy to land tenure. Land boards and traditional authorities in correspondence also establish modalities of use. The tasks of the land board pertain to the allocation and cancellation of customary land rights by Chiefs or Traditional Authorities and to the creation and maintenance of the registers for the allocation, transfer, and cancellation of customary land rights and rights of leasehold.[44] The Communal Land Reform Act enshrines the rights of traditional authorities, and despite the fact that, for example in Kaokoveld, only two of

them are acknowledged and salaried by the state, they are all involved in the control of tenure rights and will be so in the foreseeable future. The Communal Land Reform Act underlines the important position chiefs are able to maintain between governmental administration and local communities.

Summary

Chiefs were installed in northwestern Namibia in the 1920s in an effort to build up administrative structures where until then no definite hierarchies had existed. Since then the institution of chieftainship has mastered many challenges and has cleverly used new legislations and new administrative structures to its advantage. In both political processes described in this chapter (homelandization in the 1960s and decolonization and reformation of resource tenure in the 1990s) chiefs skillfully designed themselves as the best and in a sense the most legitimate and effective institution with which to work. Despite profound competition between chiefs they found a common answer to the challenges that were put forth by successive administrations.[45] In the 1960s and 1970s they presented themselves as trustworthy guardians of tribal interests and as active collaborators in developmental projects. The establishment of a homeland in northwestern Namibia gave them the opportunity to widen their political portfolios and to foster their elite position in political and economic terms. Since the second half of the 1990s they have eagerly collaborated with NGOs and present themselves as gatekeepers to their respective communities. In both historical episodes they succeeded in making good use of their bargaining powers and at the same time openly expressed dissent against the colonial administration in the 1960s and against politicians of the ruling party in the 1990s. These striking similarities should not, however, cloud the differences between both periods. Whereas the South African administration one-sidedly fostered the interests of traditional authorities, the present government has taken care to build up a regional administrative elite, encourage schooling, and foster trade. These incipient elites have at various points tried to form a common platform. The Kaoko Development League was such an attempt. During the controversial debate on the Epupa dam, which the traditional authorities fought hard against, the modernist elite openly voted for the dam. The future will show if the modernist elite and the traditional authorities will strike deals or if one side will attempt to overrule the other; the former seems more likely. As long as traditional authorities can maintain the

structural position of gatekeepers between state and rural community they will most likely be able to maintain their elite position.

Notes

1. E. A. B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1999: 21–48), Peter Skalnik (2004: 76–98), Barbara Oomen (2005), Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Trutz von Trotha (1996: 79–107), Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Oomen (1999: 155–80), Helene Maria Kyed and Lars Buur (2007) and Cyprian Fisiy (1995: 49–62).
2. Cyprian Fisiy (1995) and Barbara Oomen (2005: 23–52).
3. Mahmood Mamdani (1996).
4. For more information, see Michael Bollig (1998a: 175–93). For more information on the earlier colonial history of the region see Michael Bollig (1998b: 4) and Steven van Wolputte (2004:151–73). For more information on the colonial history of the 1950s and 1960s, see Michael Bollig (2007: 17–35). For more information on the history of chiefship, see John Friedman (2005).
5. Michael Bollig (2006: 39–40).
6. Michael Bollig (2006: 40).
7. M. Esser (1897: 103–13) and Michael Bollig (2006: 97).
8. Michael Bollig (1998c) and Harri Siiskonen (1990: 136ff.).
9. Michael Bollig (2006: 99).
10. William G. Clarence-Smith (1978: 163–76), Michael Bollig (1997), Michael Bollig (1998d) and Michael Bollig (2002).
11. William G. Clarence-Smith (1978: 168).
12. Michael Bollig and Heike Heinemann (2002: 267–312) and Michael Bollig (2006).
13. Patricia Hayes et al. (1998: 16ff.).
14. Wolfgang Werner (1990: 476–502) and Michael Bollig (1998c).
15. NAN SWAA 2513 A552/1 Inspection Report: Kaokoveld Native Reserve, 10 October 1949, Native Commissioner Ovamboland to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek.
16. NAN NAO 29 Officer-in-charge, Native Affairs, Ohopoho to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek 22 December 1945.
17. Despite extensive searches in Namibia's National Archive I was unable to trace a map of wards. Boundaries between chiefdoms, however, were very clear from the perspective of local actors.
18. NA BOP N 1/15/6/1 Annual Report for the Year 1959.
19. Christo Botha (2005: 177).
20. Christo Botha (2005: 176).
21. Christo Botha (2005: 170–71).
22. For similar developments in Zimbabwe see J. Alexander (2001: 216).
23. NAN NAO 61 9/1, Annual Reports 1946–1952 Officer in Charge, Ohopoho to Chief Native Commissioner Windhoek.
24. Herbert Abel (1954: 1–2).
25. Nicolaas Jacobus van Warmelo (1952), Johannes Stefanus Malan (1973: 81–112), Johannes Stefanus Malan (1974: 113–29) and Helmut Walter Hitzeroth (1976: 209–26).
26. P. J. Viljoen (1988).

27. J. Alexander (2001) describes similar processes in former Southern Rhodesia and reports that Native commissioners often felt overwhelmed by external experts. Depoliticization and scientization of the development discourse also featured important there. See Steven van Wolputte (2004: 163).
28. The *stamfonds*, however, never became an effective financial instrument and already during the drought of 1959–1962 the *fond* became severely indebted to the government. The government had decided that food-relief had to be bought by the tribal council.
29. Christo Botha (2005: 177).
30. NA SWAA (Kantoor van die Hoofnaturellekomissaris, Windhoek SWA Naturellesake Omsendbrief Nr 17/1955; 26 August 1955).
31. Steven van Wolputte (2004: 152).
32. Steven van Wolputte (2004: 163).
33. Tony Emmett (1999).
34. NAN BAC HN5/1/3/18 Hoofbantoekommissaris van SWA an Administratiewe Beampte Ohopoho, 27 August 1962.
35. I would like to thank Christo Botha for a hint about the file and the permission to copy part of the files from his data set.
36. J. Alexander (2001: 218).
37. Sean Archer (2002: 122).
38. Michael Bollig (2007).
39. See also Steven van Wolputte (2004: 165).
40. SWAPO (1987: 274).
41. Brian T. B. Jones (1999).
42. Corbett and Jones (2000: 25).
43. For examples see Manfred Hinz (2003).
44. Legal Assistance Centre (2003: 2–3).
45. John Friedman (2005).

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9

Nehru – the Dilemmas of a Colonial Inheritance

Judith M. Brown

Introduction

This chapter examines the experience of Jawaharlal Nehru in the processes of decolonization. It focuses mainly on the 1930s–1950s, the transitional period of the end of British rule in India and the making of a new nation-state in India. We might call this phase "the long decolonization," as the British devolved power constitutionally to Indian politicians and began to appoint Indians to senior roles in the civil service and the army, while at the same time much that was colonial in origin remained even after formal independence. Contrary to his popular image as a member of India's political elite who moved seamlessly as Gandhi's heir to become India's first Prime Minister – much admired, successful at integrating India and maintaining her stability and establishing her as a world player – this chapter probes some of the problems of his role, particularly the dilemmas of his colonial inheritance.

This inheritance was both personal and institutional. In many ways it made his experience of the time of transformation from the colonial to the postcolonial problematic and often frustrating, though he had longed for just this chance to help create a new and free India. As he had confided to his diary while in prison in 1942, "I hunger for constructive work on a vast scale."[1] Nehru's colonial inheritance indelibly marked him as a person and helped to form the values that he tried to bring to his prime ministerial role – often in contrast to those held by others who were prominent in public life at all-India and regional levels. Nehru also had an institutional inheritance from the days of the raj. This took the form of a political party fashioned by the politics of confrontation, and a formal framework of political life which was little altered by the post-independence constitution,[2] as well as the tools of

governance. He had to work with and within these and from his perspective they often constrained him unbearably. The chapter makes two further more general contributions to our enquiries into elites in the processes of decolonization, which may be significant for other countries. Drawing on the evidence of a particular life in India, it asks if elite status in the context of imperial rule was dysfunctional under the new dispensation, and whether colonial nationalist elites had to transform and retrain themselves to succeed in the new situation of independence. It also underlines the variety of elites in India, and the difficulties facing an all-India elite in particular after the end of empire.

Nehru and his personal colonial inheritance

Nobody could doubt Nehru's elite status and the exceptional opportunities he had within the politics of nationalism. He came from a family of Kashmiri Brahmins who had settled in Allahabad, a major city in northern India in the United Provinces, and had invested heavily in the sort of education and professional work which the British raj made possible. His father was one of the most successful and wealthiest lawyers in India, and he gave his son the best education money could buy in the British imperial world – a British public school and Cambridge University.[3] The young Jawaharlal emerged as a cosmopolitan young man, well used to associating with his country's rulers, with the education and skills which were creating a Westernized elite in India, as well as being endowed more traditional social status in the context of caste society. His father's local standing in Allahabad eased the young man into political life, as did the family wealth, which meant that for many years he did not have to earn his living. However, it was Gandhi's dramatic intervention in nationalist politics in 1920, advocating withdrawal of cooperation from the British raj, which inspired Nehru and made politics central to his life.[4] It was Gandhi's patronage which took Jawaharlal into the heart of the Indian National Congress, gave him experience as a key administrative figure within the party, and eventually positioned him to be his so-called heir as the power of the raj ebbed away and the Congress prepared to take over the reins of power.

So Nehru was inducted into a continental nationalist elite in a unique way. He was never a serious provincial or local politician, and did not come up through the provincial ranks the hard way, as did many of those who composed the all-Indian nationalist leadership.[5] This was to be in many ways a disadvantage when it came to wielding power in the political life of India after independence. He could not rely on a local

faction or cluster of supporters bound together by ideology or patronage, and was ill at ease in the rough and tumble of provincial political life. However, he had serious strengths and skills, which confirmed his all-India position during the 1920s and 1930s and established his position apart from Gandhi's patronage. His education had given him literary skills in English and a familiarity with the British that were of considerable value to other Congress leaders without such skills. He became a skilled drafter of resolutions and electoral manifestoes, an effective negotiator, and could bring to bear on the political situation the weight of his numerous global friendships and connections. Despite his initial hesitations in speaking with ordinary Indian people, which he later noted with some shame,[6] he became a great vote-winner, a skill which was increasingly important to Congress as the franchise was enlarged in 1919 and then again in 1935. Not only did he carry in the eyes of the public the Mahatma's blessing, but he was clearly developing a rather different charisma of his own.[7] Moreover, he had an understanding of the international situation and its impact on India and the British Empire that few other Congressmen had.

Nehru therefore came to possess an amalgam of statuses and roles that was unique among the all-India leadership, and was effective in continental politics when their main driver was confrontation with the raj. But was this peculiar position in the politics of the last decades of the raj one which would persist after 1947? Would the skills and practices he had developed before 1947 serve him in good stead after independence? For after 1947 the loose alliance of groups which made up the Congress, bound together by opposition to the British, would become the party of government. Those schooled in the politics of confrontation and constitutional self-denial would have to handle power and manage the divisiveness which accompanies the use of power. A foretaste of the politics of power had briefly occurred in 1937–9, when Congress swept to power in five of the provinces as a result of elections held under the 1935 constitution. Nehru personally had been very wary of Congress taking office in the legislatures and in effect becoming provincial governments as part of the imperial regime. He rightly feared what power might do to the party, attracting into its ranks men on the make who shared no ideological commitments towards India's future, diverting its time and resources to the minutiae of administration, and tempting its members who had become Legislators and Ministers to follow their imperial predecessors in attitudes and habits. He personally stood aside from the processes of governance and was deeply relieved when the Congress governments resigned soon after the outbreak of

war.[8] In 1947 there could be no such standing aside and Nehru would have to confront the realities of power and the relevance of his personal political skills and experience.

However, Nehru's personal colonial inheritance was not just a matter of all-India political status and a portfolio of skills in the context of a nationalist movement. Growing up and maturing in an intellectual world brought into being by India's incorporation into the British Empire had made him a very particular kind of colonial intellectual. Passionate about his motherland and eager to understand more deeply his Indian inheritance,[9] he also valued deeply many insights gained from exposure to Western literature, philosophy, and politics, and became a serious thinker, as ideas and values from many sources engaged in a constant dialogue in his mind. Although on many issues he disagreed profoundly with his mentor, Gandhi, the latter seems to have recognized in him one who was personally and intellectually honest, and totally dedicated to creating a new India in which all her citizens would be valued.

Nehru thought widely and read voraciously.[10] He brought to the work of nationalist politics several core ideas that together formed a driving vision of the new Indian polity he hoped to help create, and sustained him through periods of considerable loneliness and frustration and energized him as a nationalist politician and then as India's first prime minister. He believed, as did most of his contemporaries, that the most natural large scale political community was the nation, and that its rightful political form was the nation-state. However, the idea of India was deeply contested in the early twentieth century, as it became clear that the British were devolving power and even preparing to give India dominion status. From many perspectives – the Congress claiming to speak for the whole of India, religious minorities, disadvantaged groups, and those with sectional ideologies – Indians debated what a future India might be like. Some were fearful of the prospect, others worked to gain control of the political structures they hoped to inherit and transform. Nehru was clear in his own mind that India was a nation which incorporated the whole of the geographical subcontinent south of the Himalayas, that it was bound together by geography, history, and culture, and formed by layers of history, which, like a palimpsest, had made it what it now was. Within it, and indeed central to its culture and genius, were many regional, linguistic, and religious groups, forming a composite nation. Any attempt to define India in terms of religious identity was anathema to him, and he decried such an approach as "medieval" and outmoded. Central to this vision of the nation was

the idea of equality (of men and women, and of different social groups) and of the need for India to find its own socialist path in order to create this equality and to redistribute resources of many kinds more fairly. Although Gandhi did not sympathize with Nehru's socialism and its ideological origins in Europe, they were united in a profound concern for the underprivileged and ill-treated in Indian society. For Nehru the nation-state had a critical role to play in creating such equality, whereas Gandhi believed that radical change would only stem from personal transformation. Nehru envisaged a transformative role for the state, through reformist legislation, management of the economy, and the creation of a democratic culture.[11] Like many of his generation who had seen what the Depression of the 1930s had done to Indian agriculturalists, he was determined that the new state should be strong enough to do for its citizens what the imperial state had never done for its subjects. Nehru had come to this vision of a new Indian national polity through a unique and privileged life which had broadened his horizons beyond India and introduced him to seminal political thinking abroad. They were the source of much of his personal strength and commitment, but even in the 1920s and 1930s these core values and commitments marked him out as different and potentially threatening to many within the nationalist movement and the Congress party. He could so easily have been a voice in the wilderness, a political figure on the edges of Congress. But it was Gandhi who worked to maintain his central position within the party, and who soothed over ideological differences between the younger man and some of the more conservative elements within the core Congress leadership. After Gandhi's assassination in 1948 removed this key figure in Nehru's relationship with Congress it became clear that Nehru's personal colonial inheritance might become deeply problematic, particularly as he now had to work within a political framework inherited from the raj.

An institutional colonial inheritance

Controversies about the nature of the Indian nation did not abate once the imperial enemy ruler had gone, and after partition had created the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent as a separate nation-state. As prime minister, Nehru was distressed at the tendency toward a majoritarian Hindu nationalism which survived independence and the shock of Gandhi's assassination. He was further concerned at the social conservatism which still prevailed in the country at large and among political activists – whether this concerned social reform or the use of

state power to ameliorate inequality. His capacity to tackle this range of issues and mold India in the image he had of his country was hindered by the very nature of the Congress party and his position within it, which were as much part of his imperial inheritance as the formal political structure. Moreover, because the Congress was the single most important political party in India, and one which went on winning elections throughout his life time, he could not turn his back on it but had to work within it, without the benefit of the mentor who had established and eased his position as a party leader. Congress was unlike a Western democratic party with a clear ideological position. As a nationalist movement it had welcomed into its ranks many people of different ideologies and interests, who had seen in it a route to power and the only credible mechanism for opposing the British. It had become what is often called an umbrella party, sheltering many different kinds of people, interests, and ideas.[12]

Nehru was initially in an ambiguous position in Congress – thrust into leadership by Gandhi and the requirements of a nationalist movement, but lacking a substantial power base within the party, and often ideologically at loggerheads with some of the powerful groups in the party. In 1950 P. D. Tandon, from his own UP, challenged him for the party presidency. His response to this was eventually to force a showdown in 1951 with those he considered to have a Hindu vision of India and to clarify his position of leadership within the party. As he had written to his challenger, he felt that Congress was "rapidly drifting away from its moorings and more and more the wrong kind of people, or rather people who have the wrong kind of ideas, are gaining influence in it."[13] After this his leadership was not seriously challenged in Congress, although later in the 1950s he delegated the presidency of the party to other colleagues. Some of those skills and qualities which had seemed valuable to Congress during the period of confrontation still helped to maintain his credentials as an all-India leader, particularly his link with Gandhi and his unrivalled public appeal. Just as few people had been prepared to challenge Gandhi, although they often grumbled in private about his priorities and strategies, in the 1950s few were prepared to challenge Nehru's position in public.

Nonetheless, Nehru found himself deeply frustrated by the party he ostensibly led. He took upon himself a pedagogical role in letters and speeches, trying to convince them of the magnificent task in which they should be engaged – creating a new and composite nation and striving for an egalitarian revolution through democratic means. At times he sounded critical and even hectoring, perhaps not unlike his imperial

predecessors in their criticisms of Indian character and political competence. Even more seriously, Nehru found that although Congressmen paid lip service to his ideas of unity and creative change, in daily practice they went their own ways, often ignoring his priorities. Disunity rather than unity was often the most obvious feature of Congress life in the provinces (now states within the Union), as Congressmen battled for local dominance and patronage. Even in his own UP the Congress split into factions once the powerful figure of Pant had been removed from provincial life to serve in Nehru's Delhi cabinet.[14] Neighboring Bihar's Congress party was debilitated by ruthless infighting as the 1957 election approached. Moreover local Congress groups seemed to ignore his priorities even when they had been established as all-India policy by the party. Various reforms designed to promote equality were initially blocked even by his own close colleagues in Delhi, as in the case of the Hindu Code Bill designed to give women greater equality before the law. One of his staunchest opponents on this issue was the former Bihar Congress leader, Rajendra Prasad, who was now the Indian President. Other reforms passed through the central legislature were almost dead letters on the ground in the localities – including the key abolition of untouchability in law in 1955. Although Congress claimed to speak for all Indians and to protect minorities, in provinces where Congress was the dominant political force the treatment of minorities caused Nehru grave concern. The position of Muslims in UP or Christians in Central Provinces were cases in point. In both he failed to be able to do anything about the problem because of the attitudes of his Congress colleagues.

The fundamental politico-social problem for Nehru was that he was a member of a small continental elite of leaders who had emerged during the nationalist movement under the aegis of Gandhi, whose standing and skills were related to enabling national unity in confrontation with the British. But now he found himself having to work with and through a lower layer of regional elites of different kinds who had found their way into Congress over several decades and often had more particular and sectional priorities. This had been a symbiotic process. Local elites sought political pathways to new kinds of power as the British gradually delegated local power to those who learned to win elections and to organize themselves into successful parties: while the provincial Congress parties needed the support of substantial local men who could attract votes and bring money into the party coffers.[15] The political vision and priorities of such local politicians, often working in the vernacular world of ideas, connections, and interests, had threatened the unity

of the nationalist movement and taxed the all-India leadership even before independence.[16] Now their pressures could not be held in check with an appeal to the priority of dealing with the British. Consequently the nature of all-India leadership was changing, and Nehru had to work in an environment which he found increasingly distasteful – managing or failing to manage locally dominant groups within the party whose values and priorities differed greatly from his own.

However, from the perspective of a prime minister with an all-India vision and mission, the nature of these local elites was even more problematic, because their influence over or outright control of the Congress at provincial level meant that they had become entrenched in the political structures inherited from the British. The former provincial legislatures were now crucial state legislatures, where the constitution gave power over key issues to this level in the federal political system. Although the balance of power lay with the center under the provisions of the Indian constitution, the division of powers (inherited from the 1935 Government of India Act) gave the states authority over such matters as public order and the police; health, welfare, and education; local government; and industry, agriculture, and land revenue.[17] Because of their repeated electoral successes[18] regional elites had effectively colonized this level of the political system – often to the detriment of all-India policies that Nehru saw as central to the creation of a new national community and polity.

In the years immediately after independence this became clear on several crucial matters. One of the earliest and most important was land reform – a policy the pre-independence Congress had formulated and which Nehru personally thought was critical to the national project of greater equality. However, the abolition of *zamindari*, a form of landlordism present in parts of northern India, was a state matter. In the two northern states most affected by the policy of abolition, UP and Bihar, landlords were often significant within Congress itself as well as outside it in provincial life, and able to wield political clout and to pay for good legal advice. They took every possible route open to them to challenge the provincial abolition legislation, to water it down, and to manipulate its provisions to secure their landholdings. The central government was in fact forced to amend the constitution itself when the legislation in these two states was challenged in the courts, to prevent this happening in the future. The upshot in both states, after prolonged politicking over provincial legislation to abolish *zamindari*, was certainly not a socio-agricultural revolution, or even the move to greater rural equality Nehru had envisaged. This is hardly surprising, given the socioeconomic

interests of Congress legislators. In UP, for example, nearly 39 percent of Congress members of the legislative assembly were of agricultural backgrounds. (This percentage rose thereafter to just over 42 percent after the 1962 election.)[19] Many former *zamindars* in the state retained significant land holdings, and as one prominent UP Congressman said, their policy had been driven not by egalitarianism but by a concern for rural stability. In his view strengthening the principle of private property within the countryside had created a solid group of middling landholding agriculturalists who would guarantee a stable rural society and be a barrier to political extremism.[20] The figures showed that significant landholding persisted. In 1953–4 in UP 1.12 percent of families still had holdings of 25 acres and over and this still constituted 11.51 percent of the land. In neighboring Bihar in Muzaffarpur district one former *zamindar* retained 500 acres, causing bitter disappointment to villagers who felt that "*zamindari* abolition" had meant nothing to them. The former *zamindar* was a Congress member of the state legislature.

This pattern of frustration of national policies by provincial elites entrenched in control of the political structures inherited from the raj was repeated time and again during Nehru's premiership. Not surprisingly his push to impose "ceilings," upper limits on landholdings, as part of the strategy of economic planning, yielded little practical policy in the states until after his death. Few states passed "ceiling legislation" until the 1960s. In Bihar a bill was proposed in 1955, but the Congress government was unable to pass the legislation because of the deep divisions within the state party.[21] The provision of education for India's children was a further example of the way the states' governments, even where they were controlled by Congress, blocked crucial policies. There had been no free education in British India, and access to education was one of the determining factors in poverty and powerlessness on the one hand, and wealth and influence on the other. The poor, and girls of poor families in particular, were the main victims of this lack of social provision that would do much to determine the quality of their later lives. Nehru of course knew from his own life (and that of his two well-educated sisters) what a good education meant, and the lifelong fruits it yielded. The constitution had directed that the state should try to provide free and compulsory education to all children up to the age of 14 within ten years. But through the 1950s little was done to achieve this goal, and clearly in the states education was a low priority for government spending, and a subject which Congress leaders did not feel they should push ahead as a means of winning votes or forging alliances and followings. Although male literacy had risen by nearly 10 percentage

points between 1951 and 1961 it only stood at 34.5 percent by the later date. In 1960 nearly 13 percent of women were literate compared with 8 percent in 1951. Moreover because the population was growing sharply the number of literates was actually rising during this decade. Very considerable political will and investment would have been needed to meet the aspirations of the constitution, and it was not forthcoming.

A rather different but telling example of the power of state Congress elites occurred in 1959 in Kerala. A communist government had come to power in the state two years earlier, and had determined to pursue radical policies in relation to land, to tenants' and workers' rights and to education. The Kerala Congress joined forces with disparate opponents of the regime, particularly on the issue of government control over private educational institutions – a provocative issue in an area with a considerable number of Christians for whom their schools were vital. Despite his deep democratic convictions, his dislike of the local allies of the Kerala Congress, and his admission that his party colleagues in the state did not have clean hands, Nehru eventually bowed to the profoundly unconstitutional pressure which built up against the duly elected government, and he and his cabinet in Delhi eventually agreed to recommend the constitutional provision of emergency President's rule in the state.[22] For Nehru the outcome of this crisis was shameful, but had he not taken this course he would have risked losing the loyalty of the whole local party, which was determined to get back into state government and to prevent its rivals from using the powers of that level of government to make potentially radical socioeconomic changes.

However, the Congress party and the formal institutions of political decision-making were only part of Nehru's institutional inheritance from the days of the raj. He and his government also inherited the administrative tools of the raj, particularly the higher civil service. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) had prided itself on being the "steel frame" of the raj. It was an elite administrative corps of general administrators who held the senior administrative posts in each province and in the provincial and national capitals. It was bound together by a professional ethos and a clear sense of corporate identity, drawn from the elite social nature of its members – many of whom were the sons of professional men, and had been to British public schools and thence to Oxford and Cambridge. Many had long-standing family connections with Indian service and had married women of similar families. As Indians were gradually admitted into the ICS, particularly after World War I, the service drew on Indians from the same kind of professional families.

Moreover, once in the service, they molded them in the same way as their British contemporaries. It was such men who became senior civil servants in India's civil service after 1947, and continued to recruit and train their compatriots in a very similar fashion.[23]

As a nationalist leader, Nehru had been deeply hostile to the ICS, seeing it as the core of imperial power throughout the subcontinent. He believed passionately that the new India would need a new kind of civil service. The main work of the ICS had been to collect revenue and to do the range of tasks which created law and order. They had little or no experience of instigating the sort of profound socioeconomic changes Nehru envisaged for the new India. However, he found that radical change in the nature of the administrative corps was impossible to effect. The service had strong political defenders within his own government, and significant change would have been deeply destabilizing in a situation where India desperately needed stability in the face of communal tension. So he had to work with a service which was elitist and still frankly imperial in ethos, despite the departure of the British members. They were hardly the sort of people with the vision and training to push through a social and economic transformation. As Nehru and others noted during the 1950s there often seemed little difference between Indian senior administrators and their imperial predecessors. One Congress Minister in UP told Nehru in 1951, "We inherited an administrative machinery which is not suited to present conditions. Individual exceptions apart, members of the Civil Services are strong repositories of conservatism. We have slipped into office routines which compel us to seek and rely upon their advice to a large extent. We have perpetuated the old type of Public Service Commission with the result that the new recruit to the services will be an almost exact replica of ... his predecessors in office."[24] Moreover they were a very small service when compared with the size of India, its growing population, and the range of tasks Nehru hoped it could perform. At its largest under imperial rule it was little more than 1000 men and nearly half of these left in 1947, leaving behind the Indian ICS men and a handful of British. Emergency recruitment began to rebuild the service, but recruitment was not stable until the mid-1950s. It is therefore not surprising that many of Nehru's hoped-for reforms foundered as much on lack of administrative manpower and expertise as on the lack of political will among regional elites. Land reform, for example, required meticulous and large-scale enquiries into records on a scale impossible for hard-pressed administrators. In the year he died Nehru is reported to have said, when asked what he thought was his greatest failure as

prime minister, that "I could not change the administration, it is still a colonial administration."[25]

At lower levels in the administrative structure old habits of bureaucratic inertia died hard and there was no incentive for change or initiative. Clerks continued to push files in their offices, and dared not challenge their seniors or the power of administrative tradition. Moreover in the ranks of the police, that other arm of law and order which was the face of government to so many ordinary Indians, there was little change in old habits. The police, as ill-paid as ever, tended to be corrupt, subservient to their patrons among the socially powerful in the localities, and imbued with older colonial attitudes to the general populace. Nehru noted in 1950 that the police as well as the civil service tended to act as they had under the British and

> looked down upon the public as some kind of enemy or opponent which had to be put down. This is a dangerous development, because it undermines the prestige of the Government with the people, apart from making our Services disliked. In the ultimate analysis we can only carry on with a large measure of public approval. We cannot function as the British Government did, nor can our officers or police function in the old way.[26]

Such ingrained attitudes not only risked alienating the national government from its own people, but also militated against radical social reforms, such as the abolition of untouchability. The implementation of this reformist legislation in 1955 would have needed active policing, backed by a committed magistracy, without fear of social pressure from the higher castes. But the police were unlikely to busy themselves collecting evidence of illegal actions by higher caste people who were probably their local patrons as well as lawyers hired by the locally powerful whom they would have to meet in court.

Global visions

In contrast, in the one area of policy where Nehru had virtually no colonial inheritance of political and governmental structures, he was able to make a very significant impact – creating a foreign policy for the new nation, and managing its foreign affairs. Moreover, it was here that his personal all-India elite status and his intellectual inheritance from the days of the raj proved of inestimable value to him and his country, rather than dysfunctional as it often did in domestic politics.

Nehru was one of the most cosmopolitan and well travelled among the all-India nationalist elite, and had been almost the only Congressman who had thought seriously about world events and patterns of global power, and how these affected India, and had pondered what international stance India should adopt after independence. Moreover he had many foreign friends whose affections he retained over the years and who were influential in establishing his standing abroad after 1947.[27] Gandhi admitted his own ignorance on many of these issues and saw Nehru as his foreign affairs advisor. After independence Nehru was his own Minister for External Affairs as well as Prime Minister.[28] This combination of roles enabled him to keep a grip on India's foreign policy, although it ultimately proved too great a burden for an ageing man, and the absence of a powerful colleague with possible alternative perspectives and the standing to challenge his Prime Minister proved disastrous in 1962 when Nehru and his government were totally unprepared for the Chinese invasion.

As part of the British Empire, India had had no independent foreign policy or foreign affairs administration, although it had begun to have representatives abroad and to be represented at international conferences. However, Nehru really had to start from scratch, building up a Ministry of External Affairs, recruiting to a new Foreign Service, establishing overseas missions, and of course formulating a vision of India's place in the world. His private papers through the late 1940s and 1950s show the energy and time he devoted to this huge project, even addressing minutiae like the decoration of foreign missions, whether Indian diplomats abroad should serve alcohol, what their dress uniform should be, and the lack of waste paper baskets in the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi. He also travelled widely throughout the world as a sort of Indian super-ambassador, making good use of the new facility of long-distance flight to get to know other world leaders and to establish a worldwide reputation for himself, particularly as a mentor and spokesman of leaders of newly independent countries. At last his global vision, forged in the dark times of the nationalist struggle, began to take a real and significant shape in a world polarized by the Cold War. Several themes which had molded his early global thinking persisted as he fashioned a foreign policy for India. He had long believed in the importance of India as an Asian power, and believed at least since the 1920s that China was the natural regional ally for India. He pursued this vision through the change of Chinese regime in 1949 and hoped for a continuing friendship with the People's Republic right up until the dashing of his hopes in 1962. But, more than that,

he retained a deep hostility to imperialism, which he saw combining with capitalism to prevent the sort of socialist transformations he hoped for. He began to formulate the notion of India as an enabler of a global bloc which refused to be allied to either the West or the Soviet Union, and which gathered together nations emerging from colonialism who did not wish to be enmeshed in reinventions of empire after formal decolonization. It was this which was at the heart of his commitment to a non-aligned movement which reached its apogee at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Despite this worldwide anticolonial vision, Nehru maintained close links with the West, particularly with Britain, where he had spent such formative years, and where he still had close friends. It was partly his willingness to continue a relationship of friendship and cooperation with Britain and the former Empire which led to the transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth linked by the symbol of the crown but in which republics like the new India also had an equal independent status. Nehru's personal positioning in such a number of cross-cutting international circles of association and alliance gave him a peculiarly influential role in the particular circumstances of the 1950s, despite international criticisms at various times – such as 1956, when he failed to criticize the Soviet invasion of Hungary with the same swiftness and severity as he levelled at Britain involvement in Suez. Moreover he had established India as a truly independent global player, despite her desperate economic circumstances at times and her dependence on foreign aid.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on one outstanding member of India's nationalist elite who made the transition to being prime minister of an independent, democratic nation-state. It has examined his personal inheritance from the days of colonial rule, and the institutional political and administrative inheritance from the raj within which he had to work. We have seen how the personal and institutional so often interacted to constrain and frustrate his vision of a new India. By contrast, where he had almost a blank sheet on which to write, foreign affairs, an area where Indians had little involvement in the processes of government and therefore had built up no vested interests or patterns of behavior, his personal inheritance proved a great enabling asset for him and his country.

Nehru's life suggests important questions for the study of other elites in the processes of decolonization. I highlight just two. One is the

question of whether the skills, roles, and elite standing which combine to create a nationalist leader in opposition to imperial rule prove equally important in the years following independence, or whether they can prove positively dysfunctional in the new situation. Are there new tasks to be performed, new roles to be filled, for which former leaders are less qualified? Do they in effect have to "re-train" to lead in the new political situation, and do they prove capable of this reinvention? Nehru's experience suggests that he struggled to adapt to being prime minister, even though he craved the post and the authority it gave him for what he had called constructive work on a vast scale. He found the political work of party management unpalatable, and preferred to exhort and even hector his compatriots about the importance of fundamental principles than work at the compromises necessary in politics. Moreover he was too overburdened by his own choice to be an effective administrator. His significance for Congress as a highly popular and unifying figure in a time of potential instability meant that he was never seriously challenged as prime minister, but he was opposed and undermined in numerous ways in the daily practice of government and politics, to his immense frustration.

His experience raises the second question, which is of more general importance. Few nations struggling for independence are homogenous, and most have a range of sectional, religious, class, or regional elites who to an extent come together under a common banner, bonded by hostility to the common enemy. After independence the realities of power and government can break up such nationalist alliances. In India's case regional and locally influential groups who had been grafted into the nationalist movement began to assert themselves, through the mechanism of an umbrella party and the provisions of a federal constitution. The diversity of these subnational elites at worst could threaten to undermine any all-India leadership, and at best required new forms of recognition and space within the political system if national unity was to be preserved.[29] In domestic politics India after 1947 clearly needed a national leadership that would recognize and welcome regional elites into the political structures and would be prepared to consider changes in the political system to reflect the realities of political power and aspiration. This has been a core theme of Indian politics through Nehru's premiership right to the end of the century. Nehru's "watch" as prime minister gave India much-needed stability and a growing unity, but it did not resolve the issue of the changing nature of effective pan-Indian leadership in a world of competing and multiple elites. This issue remained to plague (and ultimately destroy) his daughter as

prime minister, tear apart the Congress party, and eventually force it to learn to work in a world of regional parties and complex continental alliances. New sorts of political leaderships were emerging in the generation after Nehru, schooled in the realities of democratic politics in a large and complex society and polity, rather than relying on their credentials as "freedom fighters" and ideologues of national unity in a different political era.

Notes

1. Diary entry, 13 November 1942, J. Nehru (1972–82) *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st Series, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Orient Longman), vol. 13: 28. Henceforth *SWJN(1)*.
2. The 1950 Constitution borrowed very heavily from the Government of India Act of 1935, taking about 250 articles from it, thus building on the constitutional framework that the British had evolved through various stages of constitution reform, rather than undertaking any radical constitutional break, except that of universal suffrage.
3. On Nehru's most unusual and privileged upbringing and education, see Judith Brown (2003), especially Chapter 2.
4. Nehru wrote of this in his autobiography, describing his "intense joy of mental and spiritual deliverance from an intolerable burden" when Gandhi spoke of freedom and advocated non-cooperation with the British raj. Jawaharlal Nehru (1936: 67).
5. Nehru's career contrasted strongly with other UP politicians such as G. B. Pant, who rose to all-India eminence in the 1950s only after a lengthy provincial career, or other close allies of Gandhi who already had provincial status when they allied themselves with him. Nehru never contested an election in UP before independence or sat in the provincial legislature. His only experience of exercising local power was a brief stint as chairman of the municipality of his hometown from 1923, which he unexpectedly enjoyed.
6. In 1920 Nehru encountered India's rural folk for the first time and he recorded that they "took away my shyness ... and taught me to speak in public. Till then I hardly spoke at a public gathering; I was frightened at the prospect, especially if the speaking was to be done in Hindustani." Jawaharlal Nehru (1936: 57).
7. Nehru recognized this phenomenon when he wrote anonymously for a periodical, *The Modern Review*, about his growing popularity and its dangers. "The Rashtrapati," 5 October 1937, *SWJN(1)*, vol. 8: 520–53.
8. Nehru's reaction to the various issues arising from office acceptance are to be found in the relevant chronological volumes of *SWJN(1)*. See also an important analysis, "The Spider's Web: Congress and Provincial Office 1937–1939," in D. A. Low (1997), especially Chapter 8. On Congress, see Brian Roger Tomlinson (1976), especially Chapters 3 and 4.
9. See Jawaharlal Nehru (1946).
10. Nehru's personal library can still be seen in the building, now a museum, which was his home as prime minister, Teen Murti Bhavan, in New Delhi.

His diaries from his times in prison, found in the relevant chronological volumes of *SWJN(1)*, are full of the books he read as well as the astonishment of at least one of his British jailers at his literary consumption.

11. Nehru's ideas about the nation and the state can be seen in Jawaharlal Nehru (1936) and the very useful collection of his regular letters as Prime Minister to his Chief Ministers, G. Parathasarathi (ed.) (1985–90), 5 volumes.
12. On the emergence of Congress as a very particular kind of political party, see Brian Roger Tomlinson (1976) and Stanley A. Kochanek (1968).
13. Nehru to P. D. Tandon, 9 August 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru (1984) *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 2nd Series, eds. S. Gopal, R. Kumar, and H. Y. S. Prasad (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund), vol. 16, ii: 157–9. Henceforth *SWJN(2)*.
14. On UP, see the important early work based on research done towards the end of Nehru's premiership, Paul R. Brass (1965).
15. On this, see the case studies in Myron Weiner (1967).
16. See William Gould (2004).
17. The key text on the making of the constitution is Granville Austin (1966). Chapter 8 deals with the distribution of powers.
18. Although Congress gained less than half the votes cast in the Lok Sabha and state assembly elections in 1952, 1957, and 1962, it consistently won a majority of seats – well over 70 percent in the Lok Sabha and between 60 percent and 70 percent in the state assemblies.
19. Stanley A. Kochanek (1968, Table XV-1: 374).
20. Two excellent case studies on UP and Bihar are Peter Reeves (1987: 154–67) and F. Tomasson Jannuzi (1974).
21. See F. Tomasson Jannuzi (1974: 76–7). The Bihar Congress government's failure to proceed with ceiling legislation is a good example of Nehru's problems with an "umbrella party" mentioned earlier.
22. On this episode (which so distressed Nehru that he became physically ill), see Judith Brown (2003: 290–94).
23. The main study of this process is David C. Potter (1986). My own college in Oxford, Balliol College, was one of the most significant "suppliers" of men for the ICS. Its alumni records show that recruitment of Europeans dropped significantly after World War I, while the numbers of Indians going to Balliol who went into the ICS rose greatly. This supports Potter's more general assertions about recruitment patterns.
24. Sampurnanand to Nehru, 21 April 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers post-1947, 3rd Instalment, File No. 43. (These papers are held in the Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi, and I thank Mrs. S. Gandhi for kind permission to consult them.) An American academic expert on public administration who advised the Government of India reported in January 1953 on how the administration needed to be changed in terms of its outlook and methods.
25. Cited in David C. Potter (1986: 2).
26. Nehru to Patel, 4 March 1950, *SWJN(2)*, vol. 14, i: 462.
27. Foremost of these were of course the Mountbattens. He stayed with them at weekends in their country house, Broadlands, when he was visiting Britain, and maintained a close friendship with them through visits and correspondence. Because of the suppositions about an intimate relationship between Nehru and Edwina Mountbatten, most of their letters are not open to

scholars. However, those that are reported indicate how they discussed public affairs and how Edwina was a serious intellectual confidante.

28. For an introduction to Nehru's work to create an international identity for India, see Judith Brown (2003), Chapter 13.
29. An important example was the growing demand for the redrawing of state boundaries on linguistic lines in the 1950s in India, driven largely by local linguistic elites' aspirations and anxieties. Nehru very reluctantly agreed to this although he had initially argued that it would break up the unity of the new India.

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10

A "Frontal Attack on Irrational Elements": Sékou Touré and the Management of Elites in Guinea

Mairi S. MacDonald

> *It was, consequently, necessary to mount a frontal attack on the irrational elements that permitted ethnic groupings to develop and endure.*
>
> —*Ahmed Sékou Touré, 1959*[1]

As leader of the *Parti Démocratique de la Guinée* (PDG) from 1952 until his death in 1984, Ahmed Sékou Touré's hold on power was more often than not the result of a balancing act. Sometimes the balance called for finesse; more frequently and notoriously, the PDG leadership opted for "frontal attacks" of varying degrees of physical or psychological brutality. Sékou Touré's reign began when Guinea was still part of *Afrique Occidentale française* (AOF) and ended long after many of his contemporaries among Africa's champions of independence had been replaced or deposed, overthrown by *coup d'état* or killed by the assassin's bullet. A charismatic, self-made man with family ties to two of Guinea's three largest ethnic groups, Sékou Touré's longevity resulted from the unusual monopoly Guinea's political elite exercised over power in the state. The kernel of this state of affairs was actions that Sékou Touré and his Party took in the years leading up to independence; but it took the self-interested reactions of the colonial power and of other international players to germinate it and bring it to fruition. Three incidents – the elimination of Guinea's "traditional" chiefdoms in 1957, the teachers' plot in 1961, and the hunt for a "fifth column" in 1971 – show the path Guinea took towards a state in which non-political elites were most often identifiable at the point at which they were being dispossessed of the very characteristics – ethnocultural or religious authority, economic or intellectual position – that gave them status. The incidents also illustrate the changing nature, and broadening scope, of international

involvement in the political elite's reactions to domestic challenge. In the early years of his rule, Guinea's president could best secure international support for domestic repression by characterizing it as an attack on the "irrational," playing to stereotypes of Africa and the African postcolonial state in wide circulation during Guinea's First Republic. By 1970, the irrational *was* the international.

Colonial complicity: Eliminating the chiefs, 1957

By 1957, Sékou Touré had acquired all the power that holding elected office in Guinea could offer an African. Since 1952 he had been Secretary-General of the Guinean branch of the largest and strongest interterritorial alliance of political parties in AOF, the *Rassemblement démocratique Africain* (RDA).[2] He had represented Beyla in the Territorial Assembly since 1953 and, in January 1956, was elected to the French National Assembly as one of three *députés* from Guinea along with fellow RDA member Saïfoulaye Diallo and Barry Diawadou, who represented the rival *Bloc Africain de Guinée* (BAG). Because the RDA won 56 of 60 Territorial Assembly seats in the elections held on 31 March 1957, Sékou Touré was asked to form the government and accordingly added to his portfolio the highest position an African could hold in that Assembly as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. He was also, simultaneously, mayor of Conakry, the capital city and stronghold of the Party, and head of Guinea's largest alliance of trade unions, the *Union Générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire* (UGTAN), which aspired to unite all the workers of French Africa.[3]

Despite his multiple offices, there were limits to Sékou Touré's power. As a coalition of interests and groups across Guinean society including veterans, organized labor, peasants, women, and youth, the PDG itself was never as uniform nor as united as early descriptions of the Party suggested.[4] Sékou Touré's balancing act began with the challenge of keeping his own Party together and under the control of its central leadership. Disputes over policies and personalities overlapped with more fundamental disagreements, such as whether leadership over the coalition should be exercised by Guinea's "intellectuals" – the new elite the French called *évolués* – or could be entrusted to the less-educated labor leaders and militants represented by Sékou Touré himself.[5] There were ideological overtones to these debates. Many elements of the Guinean party were never reconciled to the 1950 decision of the RDA's leadership, dominated by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, to disaffiliate the alliance from the French Communist Party. Nor did

they approve of Sékou Touré's 1955 disaffiliation of the labor alliance from the Communist-influenced *Conseil Général du Travail* (CGT). Sékou Touré was in constant danger, both before and after independence, of being outflanked on his left.[6]

The existence of other, historically entrenched interests and conflicts added to the complexity of the PDG's power struggle. The territory that the French named Guinea contained many ethnocultural groups, of which three dominated: the Susu in the coastal region of Lower Guinea; the Fulbé, concentrated in Upper Guinea (especially the Fuuta Jaloo region); and the Maninka of the Upper Guinea region that stretches to the border with Mali. Multiple linguistic and cultural groups, including Kissi, Toma, Guerzé, Manon, and Kono-speakers as well as Maninka traders, populated the fourth region, the Forest zone. A fertile territory and the source of many of West Africa's great rivers, Guinea had a long history of warfare, conquest, and enslavement at the hands of competing empires stretching back to the tenth century C. E., which 60 years of French rule had done little to erase.[7] In fact, French colonial rule exacerbated many of the pre-existing divisions: the French administration relied upon so-called traditional chiefs to collect taxes and conscript labor, and where no such chiefs existed, as in Guinea's Forest region, they did not hesitate to create new "traditional" structures.[8] Colonial rule, therefore, contributed a fixed, institutional dimension to hierarchies within Guinea's many cultures as well as to the contests that continued between them. With the expansion of the African franchise in France's empire in 1946, these contests took on the lineaments of party politics. Social and cultural self-help organizations – *amicales* – developed within each of the major ethnic communities in Guinea, which corresponded roughly with its four distinct geographic zones, and acted as the first political organizations within the indigenous population of the territory. Their outlines were still visible in the more formal political parties of the 1950s, notably the BAG, which was dominated by the Fulbé.[9]

Finally, Sékou Touré's power was limited by colonial rule. Although France had delegated significant powers and responsibilities for internal matters to Territorial Assemblies across its African empire, Paris was by no means ready in 1957 to relinquish its African colonies. On the contrary: the 1956 *loi-cadre*, named for Overseas Minister Gaston Defferre, was meant to satisfy criticism from the colonies and the metropole, in the one case demands for independence and in the other demands to reduce the rising cost to France of maintaining its overseas empire.[10] Thus the power of the PDG leadership was capped by the fundamental

reality that Guinea remained a French colony; France was willing to interfere in local electoral matters to boost the chances of more conservative elements, such as the BAG, thought to be more reliable allies for the colonial power.[11] France would have the final say in how Sékou Touré and his government managed competing elites within the colony.

The most notorious incident of "management," and the one that Sékou Touré called a "frontal attack on irrational elements," was the abolition, in mid-1957, of the institution of the *chef de canton*. The attention that has been paid to this action has been influenced, above all, by hindsight. Had the chiefdoms not been abolished, would the PDG have been able to muster a "no" vote in the Referendum of 28 September 1958, thereby rejecting France's new Fifth Republic and its offer of membership in a renewed French Community and taking Guinea into sudden political independence? Early commentators such as Malagasy poet and politician Jacques Rabemananjara thought not: the conservatism of the chiefs and their ties to the French administration would have led them to influence their followers to vote "yes" and thereby to defeat the independence movement.[12] Elizabeth Schmidt concurs that active chiefs "could have forced a very different outcome in the September 1958 referendum."[13] Yet Schmidt also emphasizes, as does Jean Suret-Canale, that the abolition of the chiefdoms reflected the interests of peasants and others who were part of the PDG's broad coalition, and even resulted, in Suret-Canale's phrase, from "a profound popular movement."[14] The impulse here is to counter another reading based in hindsight: that the initiative resulted solely from Sékou Touré's will to power. Proponents of this view include Ibrahima Baba Kaké, who emphasizes the PDG's desire to eliminate all potential sources of challenge.[15]

Focusing on the role of elites in the circumstances of decolonization illuminates an important aspect of the abolition of the chiefdoms that is overlooked by these conflicting assessments of the venality and prescience of Sékou Touré. The initiative was intended to enhance the position of political parties, particularly the PDG, at the expense of a rival political elite. Moreover, both the PDG, which proposed the initiative, and the French, who accepted it, were acting on the understanding that it would modernize Guinea, taking it further away from its "irrational" African past. At the conference held in July 1957 to discuss the PDG proposal, Sékou Touré borrowed the language of Marxism to explain why abolition was historically inevitable. "The old feudal organization that lived incontestably in the person of the chief [...] has ceded its

place to new realities by the medium of the actions of the various political parties, which is to say that the peasants are now grouped on the basis of their political party," he argued. This form of organization was at once more modern and better adapted to the challenges the territory would face: the "root of the problem is firstly political, but also essentially economic [...] in the sense of the country's economic development which must be sought on all fronts if we do not want to fail," he said. With few exceptions, the French officials at the conference agreed with this logic. Governor Jean Ramadier set the tone for the conference by establishing a common understanding in his opening remarks: "we all know that the chieftaincy's role is finished."[16]

The main purpose of the conference was to decide what would replace the abolished institution. At the time, French officials put up little resistance to Sékou Touré's assertion that the PDG leadership must hold "the key to the masses."[17] In retrospect and from the physical and intellectual distance of Paris, the French Colonial Ministry expressed doubts that the result would, indeed, be acceptably modern. Its assessment one month after the chiefdoms were formally eliminated sought to measure the impact according to the most common categories of colonial thinking about Africa. Its most significant result, they thought, was tribal: eliminating the chieftaincies had increased the hostility of the Fulbé toward Sékou Touré personally and his party generally. Sékou Touré's real ambition was also familiar from colonial cliché: Sékou Touré was trying to "play the role of chief," which could be understood only in light of the basic principle "that the African conception of power is [itself] totalitarian." The Ministry acknowledged there were still significant sources of opposition to Sékou Touré's power, including rival union leaders, unions such as those representing teachers, and, above all, leaders from the Fuuta Jaloo, representing both the new elite now finding its expression in party politics and the older leadership of those recognized as chiefs. This opposition made it difficult to be certain about the political direction Sékou Touré would take, but the Ministry was convinced there was a danger that it would be extremist, both to serve his political interests and to "correspond more closely with his own temperament."[18] Even without chiefs, the Ministry believed Guinea would belong to an irrational Africa of "tribal" conflict and totalitarian rule.

By the end of 1957, Sékou Touré had successfully harnessed the power of the colonial state to achieve the destruction of its erstwhile middlemen by appealing to history – and to local conditions, in particular his Party's achievement in creating a structure for building popular consensus that extended to every village in Guinea, regardless of its

"traditional" authorities. Despite the misgivings expressed thousands of kilometers away in the colonial capital, French authority had been enlisted in the PDG's interest to eliminate one of Guinea's elites and, with it, a source of some ethnocultural authority that might oppose the PDG's political power.

Postcolonial power politics: Disciplining the intellectuals, 1961

Neither the PDG's ambition to monopolize power in Guinea nor its recourse to external power for additional resources changed with independence in October 1958. What did change was the nature and the source of external power the governing regime could use to control internal opposition. Political scientist Jean-François Bayart has coined the term "extraversion" to describe African state leaders' unusual degree of reliance on, and hence vulnerability to, extra-continental sources of power and wealth to reinforce their own power. Further, he argues that this neither began nor ended with decolonization.[19] The concept is useful for emphasizing both the pervasiveness and the historicity of such practices. A more detailed examination of the empirical record from Guinea, however, discloses that extraversion helped leaders not only to advance their own political and economic goals through clientelism, but also to block the competing claims of other existing and potential elites. This is particularly evident in the case of the so-called teachers' plot of November 1961.

At first, the events that led to the crisis seemed to foreign observers to be the most minor of local affairs. The French *Bureau de Sécurité* in Dakar reported in November that the annual return to school in Guinea was not going very well: because of a shortage of teachers, some classes had had to be merged and others postponed indefinitely, and there were more discipline problems than normal. Several students from the *lycée* in Donka, for instance, were incarcerated for 15 days in Camp Alpha Yaya, the military camp in the middle of Conakry, because they had "mutinied" in the face of a demand to free up space for the use of the Minister of National Education. The unrest was due to changes to the educational system that Sékou Touré had announced the previous summer. The teachers' union presented its case against the reforms in early November, explaining how they reduced the status – and the salaries – of Guinean teachers. The union's leader, Keïta Koumandian, spoke out against the changes during the Congress of the *Confédération nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée* (CNTG) on 18 November. Sékou Touré abruptly

shut down the Congress session and ejected Koumandian. Five union leaders were arrested two days later and put on trial before a special tribunal, ironically named the High Court of Justice, which was composed of members of the National Assembly and Party delegates. The leaders were convicted of subversion and sentenced to long periods of hard labor: Koumandian and Mamadou Traoré, known as Ray Autra, drew 10 years each; the historian D. T. Niane, physics professor Bah Ibrahima Kaba, and Seck Bahi were each sentenced to five years.[20]

On 23 November, students went out on strike in Conakry and Labé in support of their teachers. The French ambassador in Conakry described the effect of the news of the arrests as a "thunderclap": "The instant the sentences were pronounced within the walls [of the colleges and lycées], the blackboards in the classrooms were covered to the floor with words that were injurious to the regime and insulting to the Chief of State: 'Down with Sékou,' 'Sékou you lied to us,' 'down with the bourgeois government,' 'no more politics in the lycée or its courses,' 'free the detainees who are real revolutionaries,' 'you can't feed people with speeches.'" A number of the students – the French estimated 3000 – were again arrested and incarcerated in Camp Alpha Yaya; the *Bureau de Sécurité* reported that several were beaten, and all were held in the blazing sun for 36 hours without food or water before being sent home in trucks and in special trains, where many of them continued their protests.[21]

By early December, the PDG had more or less reasserted control across the country; but the serious business of defining and then excising the causes of this affront against the state's leadership had just begun. Even though Koumandian and Autra had been central figures in the challenge the Mamou branch of the PDG had mounted in 1957 to its central leadership, the Party newspaper, *Horoya*, chose to present the affair in the post-independence language of a "plot," rather than the pre-independence framework of a "deviation" from PDG doctrine and discipline. Even so, the editorialist who signed himself KEN described the new "plot" as a purely internal matter, a plan to "profit from the cover offered by union organizations to cause gangrene within the Party, inducing workers to oppose the government."[22] However, *Horoya* was quick to add that this was not to take away from the central role that the union movement had played in liberating Guinea from its colonial oppressors. A banner across the first page of *Horoya* for 5 and 7 December quoted Sékou Touré, reminding the audience of the movement's central importance in Guinean political culture: "The history of our union movement is inextricably linked with the struggles of our

people in its fight to rip its freedom from the forces of exploitation and oppression."[23] Yet the inconvenient fact remained that a union had questioned the wisdom of the governing party. Help was at hand in the form of a stand-by that had proven increasingly useful in the three years since independence: external subversion. Laying the groundwork, *Horoya* pointed out that at the same time that Guinea was dealing with its teachers, other so-called radical African states had also sustained "identical" subversive incidents: Morocco, where incidents had resulted in a number of deaths; Mali, where a subversive plot had been uncovered "just in time"; Ghana, where imperialism's foot-soldiers, "faithful imitators of the French OAS [*Organisation Armée secrète*]," had been caught dismantling what the state had been building up (this in reference to Nkrumah's decision to expel his British military advisers); and, worst of all, the United Arab Republic, where imperialism had forced the state itself apart.[24]

Sure enough, by 11 December Sékou Touré was announcing the discovery of a foreign plot. Its author was not clear at first. The links between the disgraced union leaders and their students, on the one hand, and exiles in Paris and Dakar, on the other, suggested initially that, as in 1959 and 1960, Paris might be the target of Guinea's accusations. However, on 13 December foreign news agencies reported that this time, certain embassies within the Communist bloc were thought to be undermining the PDG.[25] The Government of Guinea accordingly expelled the Soviet ambassador, Daniel Solod, who left Conakry on 15 December. *Horoya* closed the circle on 28 December, attributing to Niane, "that great Marxist theoretician," the type of clichés about African "congenital laziness," "mendacious mentality," "tendency towards theft," and general incapacity that Guineans were more used to associating with their former colonial masters. The PDG had once again successfully confronted the African "irrational."[26]

It is of course possible that the government of Guinea decided to expel the Soviet ambassador because it had proof that the embassy had been involved in a plot to overthrow the leadership of the PDG. It is even possible that the teachers' protest – a document which the French Foreign Ministry later described as "benign in appearance, perfidious in fact by the allusions it contained to the flaws of the regime"[27] – had real potential, with the support of the Soviets, to oust Sékou Touré and the rest of the PDG leadership. It seems more likely, though, that the Guinean president reacted to their protest as he had done to earlier instances of instability, and as he would continue to do for many years to come: rather than risking Guinean unity by blaming elements

within the country, whether rival ethnic groups or elements of the union movement, he sought an outside *agent provocateur.* In December 1961, all the components of his political and economic balancing act came together to suggest that the finger should point, this time at least, towards the Soviet Union.

Just as in the last years of French rule, Sékou Touré was threatened by challenges from the left. In fact, some of the same individuals were involved. With independence, though, the stakes had risen. For one thing, Guinea was now a single-party state, although the PDG continued to proclaim that its government was "democratic." In practice, this democracy consisted of an extensive system of local, regional, and national organizations which built consensus for the directions that emanated from the Party's central Political Bureau by holding frequent open meetings in each village and other administrative unit at which the decisions of the leadership were disseminated and discussed.[28] Nevertheless, in the absence of institutional means of expressing dissent or disagreement with the directions taken by the Government, such as the structure of opposition parties that had existed through the 1950s or the ethnic *amicales* of the post-war period, even apparently minor complaints suggested that the "democratic" process was not working. To a government trying to convince potential donors and supporters on both sides of the Cold War of its "positive neutralism," such dissent threatened a loss of face that could prove expensive.

The teachers' protest raised another matter that neither Sékou Touré nor the PDG could acknowledge, let alone address effectively: Guinea's increasingly precarious economic position. With independence, Guinea lost not only the foreign aid that France had provided to it as a colony, but also most members of its tiny economic elite. France's withdrawal from Guinea was extraordinarily swift and complete; it was intended to bring the newly independent country begging for readmission to the French Community or, even better, to spark an internal overthrow of Sékou Touré's regime.[29] Guinea faced hostility and total economic dislocation, not only from the metropole, but also from its neighbors, the former members of AOF which had elected to join Premier Charles de Gaulle's new French Community. To an economy that was overwhelmingly oriented towards colonial trade, this was devastating. The PDG responded by seeking support directly from more powerful external states. In the years between 1958 and 1961, the most generous offers of aid, arms, and technical assistance to rebuild and reorient the new state's economic infrastructure came from the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, although Guinea secured just enough aid from the

Federal Republic of Germany, the US and Western-dominated international sources to be able to support its claim to Cold War non-alignment. In these circumstances, the teachers' assertion that they should have priority in the disbursements from Guinea's dwindling treasury may well have been the most "perfidious" aspect of the entire affair.

The Cold War was a critical factor in the external balance that the Government of Guinea needed to achieve in the early 1960s. What Sékou Touré and his government accomplished in 1961 by expelling the Soviet ambassador was not merely the removal of an individual who, as the Yugoslav ambassador confided to his American counterpart over Christmas dinner that year, had been "too sure of himself" and "had underestimated Touré's determination to run his own show."[30] They also set in motion the rehabilitation of their regime in the eyes of the Americans, who were quick to claim this apparent realignment as a victory. The US ambassador was no less willing in 1961 than the French colonial authorities had been in 1957 to accept the PDG's position that its primary motivation was to modernize the country by forcing a turn away from unreason. In this case, the irrational was not only in the nature of "Africans": their suspicion of whites, inefficiency at levels "difficult to exaggerate," and the like. It was also the Soviet approach to aid, which "neglected basic needs in favor of politically motivated projects." By contrast, the US was "not interested in imposing any ideology on Guinea or in making it an American satellite."[31] By expelling the Soviet ambassador, the Americans believed, Guinea's regime had once again chosen the rational path.

Sékou Touré used external power very differently to control the intellectuals in 1961 than he had to eliminate the chiefdoms in 1957. By 1961, much of his prestige and, therefore, his ability to control discontented elites within Guinea was bound up in his achievement of Guinea's independence three years earlier. He derived even more respect by having successfully used the international system and Guinea's new powers as a sovereign state to face down challenges to its survival, first from its former colonial master and then from the political and economic realities of the times. Accordingly, Sékou Touré developed a pattern of using external relations to enhance his ability to deal with internal matters. In 1961, it seemed safe to risk a breach of relations with the Soviet Union to discipline his own left wing and ensure the defeat of the claim that Guinea's tiny intellectual elite was making upon its unhappy treasury. The gamble paid off: the Soviets continued to pay court to Guinea despite the latter's insults and apparent political reorientation; the Americans responded, eventually,

with both increased aid and diminished political opposition; and the intellectuals were muted.

The fruits of sovereignty: Hunting the "fifth column," 1970–71

In 1970 and 1971, Sékou Touré again took advantage of his powers and privileges as the unopposed leader of a sovereign state to attack and subdue Guinea's elites. This time, however, the dynamic of his use of external sources of power reflected the weakness of Guinea's isolation – and its increasingly horrifying strength. Guinea's top leadership devised a drama to rationalize their attack on the political elite itself while terrorizing the rest of Guinea's population; and in this drama, the role assigned to foreign powers was that of the irrational element to be attacked.

There was no doubt that the events that gave rise to the so-called fifth column purges of 1971 amounted to a genuine international incident.[32] Early in the morning of 22 November 1970, a force numbering between 350 and 400 men started to put ashore in Conakry from motor-boats that ferried them from five or six larger ships, including two troop-carriers. The invaders split up to attack a number of targets around the city: the Presidential palace and summer residence; the electric power station, airport and army camps; the Conakry headquarters of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Amilcar Cabral's PAIGC); and Camp Boiro, an army camp turned prison for Guinea's increasing number of political detainees. The raiders succeeded in destroying Sékou Touré's summer residence and in attacking several neighboring villas. They also succeeded in freeing a number of Portuguese prisoners from Camp Boiro, soldiers who had been captured in earlier fighting with the PAIGC. Fighting continued sporadically around the city until the morning of 23 November, when the invaders withdrew to their ships and left the area.[33]

Sékou Touré and the PDG leadership also had no doubt about the identity of the invader. The President spoke to his people over the radio station, the "Voice of the Revolution," at 9 a.m., telling them: "Since 2 a.m. this Sunday 22 November, you have been the victim, in your capital of Conakry, of aggression from imperialist forces. ... This aggression is part of the plan of foreign powers to reconquer the revolutionary countries of Africa. Portuguese colonialism is the bridgehead for this aggression."[34] What was unusual this time was that they had little difficulty in convincing the international community that Portugal had been

involved in the raid. One of the Guinean President's first reactions was to send a message to U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, requesting "the immediate intervention of airborne UN troops" to help the Guinean army to root out the remaining "Portuguese mercenaries" and to chase their supporting ships out of Guinea's territorial waters.[35] The Security Council met at 6 p.m. that evening, and decided instead to send a special mission to Conakry to investigate the incident. The mission's conclusions were that the evidence supported the contention of Guinea's government, not only that Portugal had commanded the troops and ships used in the attack, but also that the attack force included disaffected Guinean exiles. The mission noted that although there were several objectives, "one purpose of the attack was to overthrow the government and replace it with dissident elements."[36]

The PDG government's focus soon shifted away from trying to get the international community to come to Guinea's aid, towards arresting and punishing those within the state that it considered to be responsible for the outrage. The first to be interrogated were several Portuguese-speaking fighters captured during the invasion itself. Following the broadcast on 2 December of the testimony of one captive, João Lopez, who alleged that the 150 Guineans in the invading party carried green armbands "to enable them to make contact with collaborators in Conakry," the government began to look for the invaders' local contacts.[37] On 10 December, the American Ambassador in Conakry, Albert W. Sherer, Jr., reported that "a new wave of arrests and interrogations is in progress," affecting officials from the Secretary of State level down to civil servants and police officials. The only factor those affected had in common was the suspicion that they had "less than 100 percent loyalty to the Chief of State."[38]

This was the beginning of Guinea's most violent period since independence. Within a year, two major waves of arrests and "people's trials" had claimed hundreds of victims, female and male, prominent and obscure. Four men, including the Secretary of State for Financial Control, Barry Ibrahima (known as Barry III, leader of Guinea's third pre-independence political party, *Démocratie socialiste de Guinée*), were hanged from a bridge in central Conakry on 25 January 1971. Many more of the hundreds condemned to death that month by Guinea's National Assembly, sitting as the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, were shot or otherwise killed outside of the capital. The rest remained in abject conditions of torture, deliberate starvation, and neglect in a series of army camps around the country. The second wave of arrests began in June 1971 and went much further than the first. This time,

there was even less pretense of a trial. Accounts left by some of the survivors make it clear that prisoners were starved and often tortured into signing confessions in which they admitted to taking part in ever more elaborate and far-ranging conspiracies against Guinea and its leaders. The Commission of Inquiry would record each prisoner reading his or her "confession," then broadcast the recordings over the Voice of the Revolution. The results of this "trial by radio" were ultimately ratified by a series of Party meetings in late September and early October. Many of the detainees were shot on the night of 17 October 1971, others died slowly for want of adequate nutrition or medical care, and still others survived in prison camps for many years afterwards.[39]

The purges of 1971 had much in common with outbursts of repression that followed earlier "plots" against Guinea, including the "teacher's plot" a decade before and the so-called Petit Touré plot that resulted in the breach of diplomatic relations with France in November 1965. Once more, external interference with the state was the pretext for actions that would discipline a competing elite, thereby solidifying the political leadership's control of power. In the 1961 case, it was intellectuals; in 1965, the identity of the supposed opposition leader as a trader gave the signal for attacks against Guinea's limited economic elite. In 1971, however, it was much more difficult to tell who was the target of the PDG's wrath, if indeed there was a single target. Observers, whether domestic or foreign, were at a loss to discern a rationale for what seemed to signal the triumph of unreason in the actions of Guinea's leaders.

Some foreigners tried to rise to the challenge, deploying, once more, the old tropes of tribal strife and communist influence as the irrational influences at play. Journalist Graham Hovey, writing in the *New York Times* in late January 1971, saw in the first wave of repression a signal that Sékou Touré had "allowed" his alliance with Fulbé leaders "to disintegrate." Yet although Hovey was correct that politicians of Fulbé ethnicity were among the executed, so were leaders from other ethnic groups.[40] Former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo, himself arrested on 3 August 1971, noted that the authorities were careful to target victims from every prominent family in Guinea, but equally careful to leave some members and branches of each family intact. This even-handedness persisted right to the end of the terror. When Diallo, a Fulbé, was released from prison on 22 November 1980, a Susu and a Maninka were also liberated.[41] The regime was being no less careful to distinguish itself from the irrational, "tribal" past in 1971 than it had always been, which stood to reason: more than a decade after independence, its domestic legitimacy as well as its access to foreign

aid and its authority in the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations still depended upon its image as the creator of a modern nation-state.[42]

Diplomatic observers were also hard-put to decode the situation by resort to the dominant analytical trope of the 1960s – the Cold War struggle between the capitalist West and the communist East. This line of analysis seemed promising at first. Guinea broke off relations with the Federal Republic of Germany at the end of January 1971, citing the supposed complicity of two West German nationals in the Portuguese attack. The evidence for their guilt was so far-fetched that Bonn was able to argue, convincingly, that it must have originated with the German Democratic Republic and passed to Sékou Touré's Commission of Inquiry through the newly opened East German embassy in Conakry.[43] The Guinean government's switch in polarities between West and East Germany failed, however, to explain why it was targeting some members of its own political elite and not others. The US embassy at first thought that those most threatened were the ministers whose portfolios and political leanings inclined them toward "economic development" on the Western model and, therefore, toward better relations with the US itself. By the beginning of May, 1971, Ambassador Sherer and his team thought the government was split between "hardliners" – Ministers who shared their President's apparently exclusive attention to matters of security and to the quest to eliminate all internal subversive elements – and the increasingly embattled minority still trying to run the government efficiently. They attributed the hard-line position both to ideological conviction that one-man dictatorship was necessary and to sycophancy in view of the President's determination "not simply to stifle and discourage individual initiative but to eliminate any opposition, suspected and real, actual and potential."[44] As the second wave got under way in June, however, it became clear that the Guinean regime was not being guided by any ideological considerations that the US embassy could recognize.

For Guineans caught up in the purge, its logic was simple, if not particularly rational. After spending some time in custody, searching their memories for hints of what they had done to alienate Sékou Touré, his half-brother Ismaël who was in charge of the Commission of Inquiry, or any of the handful of other ministers and prominent politicians still in favor, most of the survivors came to recognize that the only logic at work, the only truth that was required, was what Jean-Paul Alata and Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo both called "*la vérité du Ministre.*" What was important was that each prominent prisoner publicly acknowledge and

broadcast his or her participation in the plots that had been "uncovered" by the PDG. This would "prove" the party's suspicions to be true, its leaders' paranoia to be well founded, and its monopoly over power to be in the interest of a public that would otherwise be vulnerable to foreign attack abetted by internal subversion.[45]

The broadcasts began on the evening of 29 July 1971. They told a tale of an anti-Guinean conspiracy backed up by a range of external powers. As usual, France was one of the backers, with the conspiracy variously said to originate in the office of Jacques Foccart, President Charles de Gaulle's African lieutenant, or in the *Service de Documentation extérieure et contre-espionage* (SDECE). A new element in 1971 was the allegation of a West German plot, usually called the "Nazi SS" network, which was said to have been run out of the Embassy and by two unfortunate German citizens: Hermann Seibold, a vocational training expert who died in Guinean custody sometime in late December or early January; and Adolf Marx, a technical expert with Guinea's national brewery, arrested on 29 December and held until 29 July 1974. Although foreign powers – which included the US and UK as well as Portugal – supposedly provided money in vast sums to corrupt them, the conspirators themselves were Guineans. Many came from Guinea's army and militia, as well as from the ranks of merchants and "technical cadres." Others were found in the highest reaches of the PDG: cabinet ministers, local party chairs and regional governors, and civil servants from a range of ministries. They acknowledged having been paid large sums of money – unimaginable wealth from the point of view of the Guinean masses, whose standard of living had barely increased in the 13 years since Independence. They admitted to taking part in many of the "plots" that had dogged the Republic during its short history, or, equally unacceptable, to not informing the PDG when they heard about a new threat to the president. The confessions purported to establish the foreign origins of two recent plots in particular: the 1965 "Petit" Touré plot which created the pretext for breach with France, and the 1969 attempt at a *coup d'état*, which had occasioned a purge of the army and the execution of its Deputy Chief of Staff, Kaman Diabi, and of Fodéba Keita, a minister in every Guinean cabinet since Independence and the founder of *Les Grands Ballets Africains*. The statements – some brief, some extraordinarily detailed, and all received by Guineans and outsiders alike with rising skepticism[46] – were taken as proof of guilt. What was left to "the people" was "the right to judge those who tried to assassinate them": the PDG's extensive network of local and district authorities would decide, at the end of September, on "verdicts" – in effect, sentences correlated to

"the gravity of the participation of each accused in the imperialist crime against Guinea."[47]

Even as this remarkable fiction was being created and played out before the "listening clubs" that PDG militants were instructed to assemble, Sékou Touré tried to construct an explanation that would present the purge as a rational response to unreasonable provocations. Guinea's president gave a lengthy interview to Togolese journalist Polycarpe Johnson that was published just as the "trial by radio" was getting underway. To Johnson's opening observation that "the recent arrests ... are troublesome, and somehow incredible," the Guinean president replied, "it is indeed incredible, but you know that man is either a 'known unknown' or an 'unknown known.'" Johnson pressed him to account for the "exaggerated" sums of money supposedly paid out to the plotters; Touré responded that the sums were "advances on account," promised by "imperialism ... in exchange for enabling imperialism to take over the immense wealth of the people of Guinea." People who had followed him for upwards of 20 years had "suddenly turn[ed] traitor" out of a "lack of ideological conviction and moral fibre, or out of greed." They had been defeated, however, by Guinea's "people's system": in "any elite culture" the treachery of people in such positions "would have been fatal."[48] By 1971, the very idea of an elite had become unreasonable. In the Orwellian world of Guinea's revolution, Sékou Touré continued to mount frontal attacks on irrational elements.

Conclusion: Independence, interdependence and management

Trying to explain Guinea's isolation and economic failure in December 1971, former US ambassadors William Attwood and James I. Loeb suggested that the reason might be that "President Sékou Touré's concept of independence was so total ... that it became both unrealistic and artificial in this modern world of interdependence."[49] The two Kennedy appointees were right to identify independence as a central element of both the state and the nation that Sékou Touré built. By blaming Guinea's isolation and poverty on its President's defense of the privilege of the sovereign state to manage its own affairs and dictate its economic and social policies, however, Attwood and Loeb deflected their readers' attention from the role the outside world had played in the country's sorry history. Foreign power was always a scapegoat for the PDG regime's pursuit of its own security and longevity; but it was also, frequently against the will and the interests of the power involved,

drawn in to Guinea's domestic drama in support of the regime's management of elites as potential sources of dissent. As a small country with few developed assets under the control of an increasingly murderous regime, Guinea may have played nothing more than a bit part on the global stage in the 1960s and 1970s; but Sékou Touré was a masterful actor, well able to steal the show by using the fruits of sovereignty in his own interests.

In October 1971, the US Embassy in Conakry finally realized what the Guinean President had accomplished by hunting the "Fifth Column":

> The current purge marks the culmination of the rise to power of a third political generation since World War II (following traditional notables and the first coterie of Independence era Ministers and politicians) – a remarkable achievement.

The violation of Guinea's territorial sovereignty had enabled Sékou Touré to destroy his rivals within the single elite remaining in the country to secure a degree of political control "perhaps [...] unmatched in any other African state."[50] It was a pyrrhic victory, to be sure: but it was, as Sherer observed, a remarkable achievement.

Notes

1. Fernand Gigon (1959: 21). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
2. The Guinean branch was expelled from the RDA following the Referendum of 28 September 1958 and became the PDG.
3. Frederick Cooper (1996: 407–8, 414–29).
4. Elizabeth Schmidt (2005).
5. R. W. Johnson (1970: 347–69).
6. The decision to disaffiliate and the backlash it occasioned in Guinea is explored in Elizabeth Schmidt (2007b: 95–121) and, at greater length, in Elizabeth Schmidt (2007a). Sékou Touré's vulnerability to the left was recognized as early as 1959: Fernand Gigon (1959: 39).
7. Claude Rivière (1977: 24–8); Lansiné Kaba (1989: 126–7).
8. The language here reflects Terence Ranger's famous notion of the invention (or imagination) of tradition: T. O. Ranger (1983: 211–62) and T. O. Ranger (1993: 62–111). Jean Suret-Canale recognized the phenomenon in the Guinean context (1966: 459–93).
9. Jean Suret-Canale (1966: 477) and Jean-Paul Alata (1976: 70–5).
10. It was also intended to amend the French Union without explicitly amending the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Tony Chafer emphasizes that the *Loi-cadre* was itself unconstitutional. Tony Chafer (2002: 165).
11. Elizabeth Schmidt (2007a: 80–4).

12. Jacques Rabemananjara (1958).
13. Elizabeth Schmidt (2007a: 125).
14. Jean Suret-Canale (1966: 460) and Elizabeth Schmidt (2005: 92).
15. Ibrahima Baba Kaké (1987: 54–9).
16. The transcript of the 25–27 July 1957 Conference is reproduced in Jacques Rabemananjara (1958), quotes from 24–9, 22, and 57.
17. Jacques Rabemananjara (1958: 147–8).
18. "Note d'Information: Sékou Touré," No. 82/BE, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer (MinFOM), Directorate of Political Affairs, 10 January 1958; Fonds Jacques Foccart, Fonds "Privé" 197, Archives Nationales de France (AN/AG5(FPR)/197). I am indebted to Alexander Keese for this reference.
19. Jean-François Bayart (2000: 217–67) and Jean-François Bayart (1993: 1–37).
20. Bureau de Sécurité, "Guinée – Ambiance dans les établissements scolaires," n. d.; Pons to MAE, "Mémoire sur le statut des enseignants guinéens," No. 716/AL, 5 December 1961; Carton 416, Série AL, Dakar – Ambassade (Dakar – Amb. 416); Centre d'Archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN). The sentences were reported in the PDG newspaper *Horoya* on 28 November 1961. The "Mémoire sur le status des enseignants de Guinée" is reproduced as an appendix to Thierno Bah (1996: 433–46).
21. Pons, "Mémoire," 5 December 1961; Bureau de Sécurité, "Guinée – Mésures prises envers les étudiants," n. d.; Bureau de Sécurité, "Guinée – Situation intérieure après l'affaire du syndicat des enseignants," 25 November 1961; Bureau de Sécurité, "Guinée," 2 December 1961; Bureau de Sécurité, "situation en Guinée," 13 December 1961; Dakar – Amb. 416, CADN.
22. "Complot général," *Horoya*, 23–25 November 1961, 1–2.
23. "La vérité sur le complot antisyndical et antinational," *Horoya*, 5–7 December 1961, 1.
24. "Complot général," *Horoya*, 23–25 November 1961, 2.
25. "Complot général," *Horoya*, 23–25 November 1961, 1–2; "C'est l'état permanent de notre vigilance qui nous permettra d'avoir raison de ces complots," *Horoya*, 13 December 1961, 1; "Le Président Sékou Touré évoque à Conakry la découverte d'un complot," Agence France-presse Nouvelles d'Afrique noire et de Madagascar, 13 December 1961, in Dakar – Amb. 416, CADN; Lebel (Washington) to MAE, No. 6864, 13 December 1961, Guinée 42, Série Direction Afrique-Levant (DAL), Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris (MAE).
26. "Vigilance et fermeté révolutionnaires," Editorial, *Horoya*, 28 December 1961, 1.
27. Note, MAE/AL, "Situation en Guinée," 9 January 1962; Guinée 44, DAL, MAE.
28. This process is described in Fernand Gigon (1959: 42–8) and in A. Yelin (1966).
29. Pierre Messmer to Min. de la France d'outre-mers (MinFOM), No. 2881/CAB/DIR/J, 27 October 1958; MinFOM to Messmer, 2 October 1958; Guinée 9; de Gaulle to Sékou Touré, 14 October 1958; Guinée 10, DAL, MAE.
30. William Attwood (1967: 64).
31. William Attwood (1967: 67–8, 75).
32. The term "fifth column" was first used in connection with the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s to denote a clandestine group working to undermine

or subvert the state by assisting its external enemies. This is precisely the sense in which it was used in Guinea in 1970–1, both by US observers (Sherer to State, No. 2010, 5 December 1970; POL Guin-Port; Central Subject-Numeric Files, 1970–1973 (SN 1970–73); Records of the Department of State (RG 59), National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP)) and by Sékou Touré (1971b).

33. Findings of the United Nations Security Council mission to Guinea quoted in USUN (Yost) to State, No. 3530, 4 December 1970; POL Guin-Port; SN 1970–73; RG 59; NACP.
34. Sékou Touré (1971b: 9).
35. Sékou Touré (1971b: 10–11).
36. USUN (Yost) to State, No. 3530, 4 December 1970; POL Guin-Port, SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.
37. Conakry (Sherer) to State, No. 1985, 2 December 1970; POL Guin-Port, SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.
38. Conakry (Sherer) to State, No. 2046, 10 December 1970; POL Guin-Port, SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.
39. Several prison memoirs were subsequently published by survivors, commemorating the impact of the purge on Guineans and Europeans. Among them are Jean-Paul Alata (1976), Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo (1985) and Archbishop Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo (1987).
40. Graham Hovey (1971) section E4.
41. Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo (1985: 33–5, 195–200).
42. Several recent works have explored the impact of the Sékou Touré regime's iconoclastic campaigns to realign popular sentiment away from local religious/political practices and toward the new state of Guinea as defined by the PDG. See, in particular, Christian Kordt Hojberg (2007) and Michael McGovern (2004).
43. Christian Lankes, "Der Fall Guinea: Dokumentation des Verhältnisses der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Republik Guinea," attachment to Gehlhoff to Staatsekretär, "Dokumentation zum Fall Guinea," 15 February 1971; Referat IB3, B 34, Vol. 811, Auswärtiges Amt Politisches Archiv, Berlin (AA).
44. Sherer (Conakry), "Sékou Touré: A Status Report," No. A-42, 3 May 1971; POL 15-1 Guin, SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.
45. Jean-Paul Alata (1976: 138) and Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo (1985: 95).
46. Conakry (Norland) to State, No. 1481, 30 July 1971; POL 29 Guin; SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.
47. Transcripts of the broadcast confessions are contained in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, "Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa Series" (MESSA), 1971, beginning 29 July 1971 and ending on 26 September 1971 with Sékou Touré's announcement of a "program for sentencing subversives": FBIS, Daily Report, MESSA, V. 28 September 1971, W3-W4.
48. Lomé, Togo – Presse Denyioba, quoted in FBIS, Daily Report, MESSA, V. 1 September 1971, W1-W5.
49. William Attwood and James I. Loeb (1971).
50. "Prospects of Sékou Touré's Régime," Conakry A-103, 11 October 1971; POL 15 Guin, SN 1970–73, RG 59, NACP.

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11

Julius Nyerere, Tanzanian Elites, and the Project of African Socialism

Andreas Eckert

Introduction

In 1965, W. Arthur Lewis, one of the founders of the field of development economics and a consultant with numerous African governments, published a set of three lectures under the title *Politics in West Africa.*[1] This book was the fruit of his growing disillusionment with the politics of Africa's new leaders, among them Kwame Nkrumah, whose chief economic advisor Lewis had been in the late 1950s.[2] In fact, this book "was an indictment of the West African political institutions, which the political elites had used not to promote economic progress but to enhance their power and wealth at the expense of the rank and file of the population."[3] Lewis sharply criticized so-called charismatic leaders and the existence of one-party states. According to Lewis, responsibility for much of what went wrong in Africa came from the politicians, who, caught up in the struggle to achieve independence from colonial rule and feeling the necessity to demonstrate mass appeal, championed themselves and their close allies as the authentic voice of the people and their opponents as neo-colonialists. "For most of them independence merely means that they have succeeded to the autocracy vacated by the British and French civil servants. They model themselves on the arrogant and arbitrary patterns set by the Governors and district commissioners, if only because they know no better."[4]

In his book, Lewis, who went so far as to denounce some types of one-party states as fascism, argued with fervor against a widespread trend in the immediate postcolonial period in Africa to take the "socialist camp" as a model: at this time the language of socialism was attractive to nationalist elites and intellectuals in Africa as a means of further distancing themselves from the "imperialist system" from which they

had just won their independence. Often this reflected the belief that a socialist system not only promised a more just and humane society than any other likely alternative, but also offered an effective growth strategy in order to realize socioeconomic transformation.[5]

Tanzania soon after its independence in 1961 became a single-party state, too. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, the country enjoyed the reputation of offering the most sincere and well-developed of all variants of African socialism. This reputation was closely linked to the high reputation of Julius Nyerere (1922–99), who served as President of Tanzania from 1961 to 1985. His death in October 1999 was marked by worldwide expressions of respect and affection, but also by highly critical judgments. In Dar Es Salaam, an estimated one million mourners said goodbye to Nyerere, whose body was laid out in the national stadium before being buried in his home village of Butiama. Tanzania's then president, Benjamin Mpaka, one of Nyerere's political foster-sons, ordered a 30-day mourning period. Many commentators agreed that Nelson Mandela alone among African politicians surpassed Nyerere's reputation for integrity and independence. Numerous world leaders praised his statesmanship. According to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair: "The fact that Tanzania is today a country at peace with itself and its neighbours is in large part a tribute to Mwalimu."[6] US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, commented on the same line: "He labored all his days in fulfillment of the noble and life-giving ideal that people from different cultures and backgrounds can live and work together productively and in peace."[7] South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki characterized Nyerere as "a pillar of strength for oppressed people."[8] More critical obituaries, however, referred to the disastrous outcome of social experiments initiated by Nyerere which drove the country towards economic ruin. They also reminded the public of the violations of human rights which regularly took place during his rule.[9] In today's Tanzania, Nyerere is still a highly popular figure.

From his early career onwards, Nyerere attracted considerable attention from both journalists and scholars. However, among the huge amount of literature devoted to him and his activities, there is still no in-depth scholarly biography comparable to the excellent monograph that Janet G. Vaillant wrote about Senghor.[10] Much of the literature is even characterized by a rather hagiographic tone and one comes away with an impression of Nyerere as a far-seeing superman who could do little that was wrong. A typical example for this trend is the volume edited by Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari. The contributors uncritically imply that Nyerere alone was the driving, innovative force behind

overall policy in Tanzania between 1961 and 1985 (and to an extent after his retirement in 1985) and that his major policies were radical new departures. There is a striking reluctance to mention the gross failure of some policies and the cost of this failure for Tanzania. Blame falls on external circumstances, on the hostility of international institutions, or on the failures of other Tanzanians to live up to Nyerere's standards.[11]

For the fast-growing community of Africanist scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, Nyerere became an icon because he turned out to be the rare case of an anticolonial nationalist leader who, after independence and unlike most of his African counterparts, became a person of integrity and deeply principled head of state. His efforts to revitalize (or reinvent) what he labelled traditional African socialism and African democracy, to use supposedly "indigenous values" such as respect towards others, communal ownership of land and the duty to work in order to create a new Africa after the devastation caused by colonialism, met the concerns of many Western academics. Much historical writing of the 1960s looked, as Nyerere did, for a glorious past that pointed towards a rich future.[12] Although in the course of time, Tanzania's socialist experiments caused much frustration among formerly enthusiastic scholars, Nyerere's positive image suffered only insignificantly. His manner had always been so distant from the stereotype of the African dictator that he managed to avoid criticism for actions where others would have attracted general opprobrium. Consequently, the memorial of the North American African Studies Association, the largest worldwide professional organization of Africanist scholars, stated that "Mwalimu merited deep respect for the contributions he made to Africa and the world."[13]

How is it that, despite serious failings of his policies within Tanzania, Nyerere continues to be regarded with such affection and reverence by many people in Tanzania and around the world? What were the ingredients that made him in the eyes of many commentators not only "the father of the Tanzanian nation" but also a much respected "African statesman?" What were his main political aims and strategies and how did both change over time? To what extent did he manage and moderate the Tanzanian elites? And especially, how to understand and conceptualize his project of African socialism, which, for a while at least, was regarded as a model? These are the questions this chapter sets out to discuss. However, this is neither an attempt to write a short biography of Nyerere nor an effort to present a political history of Tanzania after 1945, mirrored in the activities of its arguably most

important politician. The main purpose of this chapter is instead to portray Nyerere as someone who personified in almost paradigmatic ways the transformation from an African administrative elite in colonial times to a ruling elite after independence.

Nyerere was one of those well-educated African men who served (albeit only briefly in his case) the colonial state and mission societies as clerks, teachers, and catechists. The importance of this small but heterogeneous group hails from the fact that its members became representatives of bureaucratic rule and political modernization and later champions of anti-colonial nationalism, before they inherited state power from the European rulers. This new "African elite" was, among other things, characterized by its position betwixt and between. School (sometimes university) education and their professions led them to the hinges between the local and the global, between old and new, to a position of "intermediary ambivalence." They acted as cultural brokers, as mediators between different worlds. This place did not necessarily mean to be torn between these worlds, but, as Frederick Cooper[14] rightly emphasized, "in between is as much a place to be home as any other." Their function as brokers created for these Africans new possibilities of influence, enabled them to play with different cultural registers and repertoires and to establish numerous networks. From that resulted, as the case of Nyerere may show, a specific understanding of authority, power, and culture, neither traditional nor modern, but rather a specific bricolage, which in turn had a strong influence on postcolonial African politics.[15]

Julius Nyerere as anti-colonial nationalist

Nyerere's educational and professional career during the colonial period displays patterns which numerous African bureaucrats and politicians of late colonial Tanganyika shared in one way or another.[16] The main elements of this career were training at a mission school, then Tabora school and Makerere College, before starting work as a clerk or teacher.[17] After he had obtained his Diploma in Education at Makerere College (Uganda) in 1945, Nyerere returned to Tanganyika, where he joined the staff of St. Mary's College, a new Catholic secondary school in Tabora, as a teacher for English and Biology. Soon he became secretary of the local branch of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and thus gained some experience in political practice. It was as Tabora's delegate that he made his first visit to Dar es Salaam when he attended the national conference of the TAA in April 1946.[18] This

meeting marked his entry into territorial politics. However, Nyerere still felt the urge to continue his studies and was awarded a scholarship. He enrolled at Edinburgh University for a general arts degree in 1949. The three-and-a-half years he spent in the UK[19] were critical in further forming his political attitudes. Although we only have sketchy information about Nyerere's stay, it seems quite probable that his decision to devote himself to the cause of Tanganyikan independence took shape in discussions with his fellow students, both African and European.[20] He also met British critics of colonialism, associated notably with the Labour Party and the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB, of which he became a member), and could start to establish a political network which proved to be very important for his nationalist cause. It was while still at Edinburgh that Nyerere wrote his first and quite radical essay, entitled "The Race Problem in Africa," in which he excoriated the colonial powers for their humiliating paternalism, for the "insults of foreign domination through a small white minority." The paper contained an explicit warning to the colonizers: "The sooner we will tell them that we will no longer tolerate such monstrous impudence the better for us all."[21] Alternatively, Nyerere already put forward a "non-racial doctrine," which eventually would become an essential element of his political agenda.

Back again in Tanganyika, Nyerere took a teaching position at St. Francis's College at Pugu near Dar Es Salaam, a secondary school run by the Roman Catholic Church. He was soon involved in politics. Unlike most other African politicians of the time, Nyerere did not build his career on the grassroots political problems. Instead his political concerns were the great issues of political morality. He was "no Nkrumah hungry for power."[22] Moreover he feared rushing into commitment and action.[23] Nevertheless, in April 1953 he accepted the election as TAA's President.[24] What followed was a remarkable chapter of African nationalism which has already been treated in detail elsewhere.[25] Within a few years, with the help of like-minded persons, Nyerere transformed the nearly moribund TAA into a powerful nationalist party called Tanganyika National African Union (TANU).[26] In a letter to Marjorie Nicholson of the FCB, he laid out the principal concerns of the new party and of himself: "Our aim is certainly self-government; when to attain it the people of Tanganyika will decide. We are not racial; but I have emphasized that we must aim at a democratic Tanganyika, and those who fear democracy in Tanganyika need not come or remain in the Territory – But at the moment our greatest concern is the educational and economic development of our people."[27] With its stress on

education and development, this could also have been written by the FCB headquarters.

Tanganyika's Governor, Edward Twining, sent the Colonial Office a dismissive account of the new organization: "Its useful purpose, if it is to have one, is likely to be that of providing a foil for the establishment of a party better able to represent moderate African opinion."[28] Officials in London proved themselves to be more flexible and perceptive and noted Nyerere's initial assurances of moderation: "He seems," one observed, "just the sort of 'pen-is-mightier-than-the-sword' African who could do his country, and us, a lot of good – if patiently handled and allowed to work off steam."[29] By and large, during the decolonization period, Nyerere's image among British officials both in Tanganyika and in London remained positive,[30] but Twining did not fail to miss a single opportunity to denounce Nyerere and TANU to the Colonial Office. The colonial government tried hard to discredit many of TANU's leaders and counter its popular appeal with propaganda, red tape, alternative local initiatives, and a rival "national" party – the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), which proved to be a complete failure. Twining's defensive strategies towards TANU included applying restrictive measures wherever possible, prohibiting certain publications, tightening laws such as the Incentive to Violence Bill, and refusing branch registration.[31] He was determined to "canalize nationalism into local or tribal patriotism" by "such means as producing popular tribal histories and by the further development of African councils and multi-racial local government bodies."[32]

In the end, however, Twining had to admit defeat. He could not carry through his program against TANU and Nyerere.[33] Nyerere had become a full time politician in March 1955 when he resigned from his teaching job.[34] The College authorities had asked him to choose between his career at the school and his membership of TANU. After the government decree of August 1953 which barred civil servants from joining political parties,[35] numerous educated Africans working for the administration had to remain – at least outwardly – apolitical. Only a few important leaders stayed outside the civil service in the 1950s to work full time for TANU; Nyerere and Oscar Kambona[36] were the most notable of these. This pattern left the rural branches of TANU – the key to its political success – in the hands of leaders who, for the most part, had not attended secondary school, while the "national leadership" more or less exclusively consisted of men who had had a good formal education.[37] TANU spread rapidly throughout much of Tanganyika between 1956 and 1958. In September 1958 the party won the election

in five of the territory's ten constituencies. TANU not only won all five African seats, but by throwing its 68 percent of the vote behind the most sympathetic European and Asian candidates, it won eight of their ten seats as well, the other two successful candidates being unopposed Europeans.[38] Within 39 months of this election Tanganyika achieved full and complete independence under African majority rule. This rapid pace resulted from a specific mix of factors: a strong nationalist party without serious competitors, with Nyerere as a widely acknowledged moderate, though resolute leader. A new Conservative Government in London (after October 1959) under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, determined to rid Britain of the remnants of an empire which had ceased to be profitable and had become during 1959 a major political liability. The position of Tanganyika within British East and Central Africa was viewed as the "weakest link" of the British "chain of imperialism."[39] Finally, there was the impact of international politics, notably the rapid decolonization in francophone Africa.[40] A general election was held in August 1960, in which TANU won 70 out of 71 seats. Nyerere was appointed chief minister. After a two-day constitutional conference in Dar es Salaam in March 1961, it was announced that Tanganyika would have internal self-government in May and independence in December of the same year. So it happened.

It would surely be wrong to reduce nationalist politics in late colonial Tanganyika to the activities and thoughts of Nyerere.[41] Still, there can be little doubt that he had a formative influence both on the TANU political program and on public opinion. From early on, distinguishing himself as a "thinker," he did not shy away from political "toil." Part of TANU's success in the countryside had been the numerous safaris Nyerere undertook in order to popularize the party and its central goals. On these occasions he apparently succeeded in speaking the language of the rural masses as he was able, for example in New York, to meet the moods of international diplomats. Good examples of Nyerere's ability to express complicated facts in understandable terms are the numerous articles he wrote in English and Swahili for the TANU journal *Sauti Ya TANU* ("Voice of TANU"). This journal, founded in 1957, was intended to be read both by Africans and Europeans.[42]

Among the many facets of his political agenda, two aspects seem central to me. First of all, there was Nyerere's emphasis on equality.[43] The most fundamental ground for his opposition to colonial rule was that it was, inherently and unavoidably, a denial of equality.

When Nyerere argued the nationalists' case for independence he referred far more frequently to the indignity and the humiliation of being ruled by others than to specific failings or injustices of colonial regimes. In December 1959 he stated in a speech to the Legislative Council on this matter:

> Our struggle has been, still is, and always will be a struggle for human rights. As a matter of principle we are opposed, and I hope we shall always be opposed, to one country ordering the affairs of another country against the wishes of the people of that other country. Equally, we are opposed to the idea of a small minority in any country appointing itself the masters of an unwilling majority. Our position is based on the belief in the equality of human beings, in their rights and duties as citizens [...]. We in Tanganyika believe, Sir, that only a wicked man can make colour the criterion for human rights. Here we intend to build a country in which the colour of a person's skin or the texture of his hair will be as irrelevant to his rights and his duties as a citizen as it is irrelevant to his value in the eyes of God.[44]

One has to add here that even before independence, Nyerere was always ready to battle fellow Africans who wished to deny equal rights to Europeans or Asians. For example, in September 1959, in an address to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, he insisted "that when we say we want to establish the rights of individuals in our countries, irrespective of race, we mean it."[45]

In Nyerere's view, chiefdom was incompatible with the equality of citizens. "This type of government," a TANU position paper of 1959 drafted by Nyerere, said, "is government by one person, not democracy. It is evident that a person who holds authority because of his birth from a particular father and mother and who cannot be removed except by death can, in the ordinary human way, be trusted only with difficulty to protect the freedom and equality of the citizens."[46] Although Nyerere apparently cooperated with chiefs – some of them, like Abdallah Fundikira and Adam Sapi, even became members of the TANU executive – he generally regarded them as obstacles on the way to building up a united nationalism, as potential catalysts of ethnic conflicts.

Secondly, the issue of education occupied a central place in Nyerere's political realm. Already in his first speech to the Legislative

Council in May 1954 he underlined his concern about this question.[47] Here, and on many other occasions, Nyerere attacked the British colonial administration of criminally neglecting education for Africans in Tanganyika. For instance, in his statement to the UN Fourth Committee in December 1956 he quite sarcastically commented on the situation:

> Only 40 per cent of the African children go to school. We are told that this is because there is not enough money in the country to give education to every child; and that unless Europeans can be sure that their children will receive education they will not come to Tanganyika, and the African will suffer. So this apparent injustice to the African, like so many others, is done for the good of the African ... Last year Government had £3,200,000 from the Custodian of Enemy Property fund to spend on education. After setting aside £800,000 for our future University, Government divided the rest equally between the three racial groups; the 25,000 Europeans, the 70,000 Asians, and the 8,000,000 Africans received each £800,000 to spend on the education of their children. This in Tanganyika is called racial equality. Needless to say, Madam, that it is an equality which may please the Governor of Tanganyika, but to the African it is slightly irritating.[48]

On many occasions during the late colonial period, Nyerere could rely on a quite distinct network of international political contacts. In fact, he was a man of many, sometimes overlapping, networks. Since his days in Edinburgh, he had established firm and ever-expanding ties with British critics of colonial rule.[49] He was probably intellectually and personally closer to these people than to any other group of intellectuals. Far from reacting negatively and with hostility to British traditions and values, he had drawn deeply from a major strand within these traditions and values. He acknowledged a continuing common cause with those in Britain who had sought to win British acceptance of majority rule in East and Central Africa.[50] Since his first trip to New York in 1955, Nyerere could also count on growing international support from a number of North American politicians. One of the first was Mason Spears, the US delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Committee.[51] Also, US media were sympathetic to him. For instance, the *New York Times* commented in 1961: "he will be guiding twenty-three million people of East Africa firmly down the path to stability and economic growth."

Elitist paternalism: Nyerere and Ujamaa socialism in independent Tanzania

In his "Independence message to TANU" Nyerere declared that

> this day has dawned because of the people of Tanganyika have worked together in unity ... All the time that TANU has been campaigning for Uhuru we have based our struggle on our belief in the equality and dignity of all mankind and on the Declaration of Human Rights ... Yet we know that on 9th December we shall not have achieved these objects. Poverty, ignorance, and disease must be overcome before we can really establish in this country the sort of society we have been dreaming of. These obstacles are not small ones, they are more difficult to overcome than any alien government. From now on we are fighting not man but nature.[52]

As Iliffe so aptly commented on this message, "it was more complicated than that."[53]

In the two decades following independence, Tanzania's government under Nyerere pursued a policy that was much celebrated by international observers for its commitment to "self-reliance."[54] Also it was greeted, at least from some corners, for its efforts to create and practice a specific "African Socialism." Nyerere himself became a world figure, a spokesman for the "poorest of the poor," demanding a new International Economic Order that would give those who suffer a greater share in the world's wealth, trying to ensure that the non-aligned countries acted as a kind of trade union, merging some of their individual interests to campaign on a common program. Nyerere's long-term vision was in many ways a familiar one to Western socialists: a perspective close to Fabian socialism, in which the state owns most of the means of production, equalizes income and provides a wide range of social services.[55] Tanzania became a main target for development aid. Western governments did not wish to be seen offering all their aid to avowedly right-wing regimes; "socialist" Tanzania was a useful corrective. Nyerere's numerous writings earned him much respect and admiration among Western intellectuals. However, the supposedly promising Tanzanian path was full of paradoxes: restricted freedom of expression, political prisoners, increasing power of state bureaucrats, and many economic failures stand, among other aspects, for the dark side of post-independence Tanzanian development.[56] As far as Nyerere's image is concerned, already in 1967 Ali A. Mazrui satirically criticized the

widespread "Tanzaphilia," which even was a Nyererephilia. According to him, intellectuals from Western countries liked Nyerere so much because here, finally, was a fellow intellectual in possession of political power. By studying Tanzania in general and Nyerere in particular, Western academics were thus in a way able to meet themselves, "but in ideal distancing."[57]

The political elite in early independent Tanzania consisted mainly of the small group of former colonial employees who had enjoyed a comparatively good professional training.[58] It is instructive to see that a considerable part of the Tanganyikan cabinet members in 1963 had worked for the colonial administration.[59] Survey research done in the 1960s clearly demonstrated that the rulers of independent Tanzania were overwhelmingly salaried administrators. A private research firm found that more than half of the members of the elite in 1967 listed "higher civil servant" as their primary occupation.[60] According to Feierman,[61] the salaried class with its roots in the colonial administrative service "was so powerful in the early years of independence that it was able to prevent the emergence of alternative nodes of power, whether among the traders [...] or among the trade unions." The African employees belonged to the first individuals who – at colonial schools and on the workplace – were familiarized with the values of the colonizers. In their new positions they spread what they had learnt. Moreover this group was at the center of British attempts to discipline in school and administration, to regulate time, space, clothing and food – of character training, as the British called it. Most of these employees, who occupied higher administrative posts after independence, shared the main goals of Nyerere. They wanted to fight poverty and diseases, and they wanted to avoid those forms of exploitation that went with the spread of large individual fortunes. The national goals of Tanzania as mainly defined by Nyerere were so important and humane that it seemed imperative to carry them through, if necessary, from above.[62]

Between 1961 and 1965, Nyerere and the TANU leadership recognized that their freedom was limited by the structural dependence of the economy and the shortage of trained Tanzanians. It began to lower the aspirations of those who thought that independence meant immediate prosperity, or even control of the economy.[63] As part of the process of transition, in January 1962, only one month after the triumphant handing-over of power, Nyerere resigned as prime minister, "to act as a bridge between the people and the new government by demonstrating in practical terms the importance of the Party."[64] Most observers now agree that this was "a shrewd tactical move in the nature of reculer pour

mieux sauter."[65] Rashidi Kawawa became prime minister. Nyerere spent some time reflecting and writing. He then began to travel widely within the country, explaining to enthusiastic audiences that independence was only the first step to full liberation, which could be achieved by self-help and hard work. He was becoming more and more the *Mwalimu*, the far-seeing moral teacher, who knew what was right for his subjects.[66] Not surprisingly, some years later, the cynical quote that "it is hard to build up socialism in a country where there is only one socialist" was attributed to him.[67]

One important product of this period was the well-known pamphlet "Ujamaa – the Basis of African Socialism,"[68] which was rewritten five years later to form the basis of agricultural policy following the Arusha Declaration (see below). Here Nyerere painted a fairly romantic and heavily essentialist picture of "traditional Africa." For the Swahili term "Ujamaa" there is no precise equivalent in European languages; "family," "brotherhood" or "familyhood" probably come closest.[69] According to Nyerere, there are three fundamental assumptions informing "traditional Ujamaa living."[70] First is the basic feeling of recognition and respect for one another. Second is the communal ownership of important commodities. The third of Ujamaa's constituent principles is the obligation to work. "Ujamaa then," Nyerere concluded his pamphlet, "describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our own past ... Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation ... Our recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended yet further – beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent – to embrace the whole of mankind."[71]

Before the concept of Ujamaa was transferred into policy, a number of important political events and transformations took place in Tanzania. After his "time out," Nyerere, who had been elected president in December 1962,[72] had to deal with a number of domestic crises and conflicts in foreign affairs. In January 1964, the army mutinied and after four days Nyerere called for British help. British marines quickly put down the mutiny.[73] After that the Tanzanian army was considerably

rebuilt. An almost completely new rank and file was recruited with no British officer left. Six weeks before these events, Zanzibar and Pemba had been given independence and the revolution of Zanzibar took place just one week before the army mutiny. A popular revolution led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), a long time ally of TANU, overthrew the ruling sultan and set up an ASP government under the leadership of Abeid Amani Karume. In April 1964 Karume and Nyerere signed "articles of union," under which Tanganyika and Zanzibar combined to form the United Republic of Tanzania.[74] In 1965, diplomatic disputes were to lead to the freezing of aid from Tanzania's three largest aid donors: West Germany, the US and Great Britain.[75] The effect of these episodes was to refine Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. It became clear that aid would be accepted from anyone who gave it on fair terms and without political strings – and that just as an aid donor was not expected to agree with every Tanzanian policy, so acceptance of aid by Tanzania did not imply approval of every policy of the donor. It was on these lines that Nyerere defended the increasing involvement of China.[76] However, the declining flow of foreign capital made Tanzania's economic situation highly precarious during this period.

As James Brennan rightly emphasizes, "there were a few chronological breaks in Tanzanian history as sharp as the army mutiny of January 1964."[77] During the first years of independence, the country's media and political culture still entertained political dissent, although TANU (already since 1959) was clearly drifting towards authoritarian rule. The mass arrests which followed the mutiny, including some 200 trade unionists, "effectively collapsed the thin space within the public sphere where politicians critical of TANU and the government could communicate, however inadequately, with an audience."[78] The mutiny laid bare the fragility of the postcolonial state and hastened the government's erratic drive towards eliminating formal political opposition.[79]

It was in this situation that the first general election under a new "one-party state" constitution took place in October 1965. In January 1963 Nyerere had announced that TANU would become a one-party state and made malicious remarks about the British two-party system:

> Now my argument is that a two-party system can be justified only when the parties are divided over some fundamental issue [...] If, on the other hand, you have a two-party system where the difference between the parties are not fundamental, then you immediately reduce politics to the level of a football match. A football match may, of course, attract some very able players; it may also be entertaining;

> but it is still only a game, and only the most ardent fans (which are not usually the most intelligent) take the game very seriously. This, in fact, is not unlike what has happened in many of the so-called democratic countries today, where some of the most intelligent members of society have become disgusted by the hypocrisy of the party games called politics, and take no interest in them.[80]

There had been virtually no opposition to TANU in the 1958, 1959, and 1960 elections, but Nyerere made it clear that when the next election was held, only candidates who had been pre-selected by the Party would be allowed to stand. Since more than one individual would be allowed to contest each seat, he claimed that this would still be democracy, in that it would allow the people to reject individuals they did not like.[81] This indeed happened in the 1965 election when two ministers, nine junior ministers, and half the sitting elected MPs were rejected in one way or another.[82] The election was a diplomatic success, being hailed by students of politics all over the world as "one party democracy." A few observers already got the feeling that they were present at the squaring of a circle. The non-democratic aspects tended to be glossed over – the detention of most of the trade-union leaders, and the lack of real power in parliament, as distinct from the party committees, where policy was debated before it came to parliament.[83]

In local government, the party also gained more power and influence.[84] Chieftaincy was abolished in 1963. The political commissioners of regions and districts were appointed secretaries of the party branches of their respective areas and correspondingly the party district chairman became, from 1966 onwards, the *ex officio* chairman of the district or urban council in his locality. All election candidates to the council had to be "pre-selected" by the party organization at district level, but with final approval from the national headquarters.[85] One effect of these administrative changes was probably the damping of potential ethnic conflicts, as it now became extremely difficult to pursue "tribal politics" in opposition to the party. The party, however, Nyerere in particular, always firmly rejected the "tribalization" of politics. His strong attitude had a lasting impact on public debates about this topic.

By 1967 the government of Tanzania was experiencing a severe crisis of political legitimacy. The peasants had benefited very little, if at all, from the economic growth that had taken place since independence. Widespread disillusion and discouragement seemed almost inevitable.[86] Tanzania's economy was in a state of crisis. The Arusha Declaration can be thus seen as a response to a difficult situation,

which Nyerere used to introduce policies that fitted his own philosophy. Although the declaration was amended by the National Executive Committee of TANU, which discussed and approved it a week before its publication on 5 February 1967, the draft was written by Nyerere; the ideas and strategies were largely his.[87] He had tied up a carefully balanced package. The declaration claimed that building a socialist state was TANU's central aim and emphasized the role of agriculture and rural development. It formulated five "leadership conditions," which included a whole series of limitations on freedom of state employees who benefited from their positions. The declaration became wildly popular all over the country. Everywhere Nyerere was the hero and the villains were the politicians and civil servants who had been growing fat at the expense of the masses. The publication of the Arusha Declaration was soon followed by the nationalization of key sectors in business, industry, and banking.[88]

When explaining his political program to students of the University of Dar Es Salaam, Nyerere once again referred to what he supposed to be "traditional African values." He urged "a full acceptance of our Africanness and a belief that in our past there is much that is useful in for our future ... We have to reactivate the philosophy of co-operation in production and sharing in distribution which was an essential part of traditional African society."[89] The Arusha Declaration must, incidentally, be seen alongside two other essays Nyerere wrote the same year. "Education for Self-Reliance"[90] was an attempt to reform the educational system so that it would provide useful training for the mass of population and not just to the few who would proceed to secondary education or university. In this area, Nyerere could claim considerable success. When he stepped down from the presidency in 1985, he declared that 91 percent of the adult population was literate.[91]

"Socialism and Rural Development,"[92] the second essay, was "a dream of an ideal world."[93] In this paper the idea of Ujamaa is married to the idea of villagization in the context of an ujamaa village. These villages would consist of small groups of politically committed farmers who worked together on a communal farm, using their savings to purchase equipment that would benefit the group. The efforts to implement this "dream" between 1967 and 1976 represent, without any doubt, one of the darkest chapters in Nyerere's career as a politician, showing a sometimes flagrant contradiction between his writings and his political decisions. Moreover, during this process Nyerere turned more and more into a paternalistic "know-all mwalimu."[94] Yet, as Schneider[95] has aptly observed, "when discussions move beyond a treatment of the

goals and ideals of Ujamaa, and toward its coercive realities, Nyerere typically recedes into the background of a stage that is taken over by anonymous 'officials', as well as 'policies' and 'campaigns' without authors or initiators. The effect is a tendency for Nyerere to emerge from these narratives as a tragically failing hero, whose attractive and hopeful visions for rural development were derailed or subverted in implementation."

Nyerere outlined the importance of village living as early as 1962, in his inaugural address to Tanzania's parliament: "And if you ask me why the government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple: unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living." He added: "The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation, is to begin in proper villages."[96] When, after the Arusha Declaration, the process of creating Ujamaa villages began, Nyerere at first insisted that it be gradual and completely voluntary. He imagined that a few families would move their houses to be closer together and would plant their crops nearby, after which they might open a communal plot. Success would attract others. "Socialist communities," he added, "cannot be established by compulsion ... [They] can only be established with willing members."[97] However, Nyerere's underlying conviction that the peasants did not know what was good for them was already perceptible. While disavowing "compulsion" he concedes in the same text, just some lines below: "It may be possible – and sometimes necessary – to insist that all farmers in a given area growing a certain acreage of a particular crop until they realise that this brings them a more secure living, and then do not have to be forced to grow it."[98] Thus, the bottom line was this: If the peasants could not be persuaded to act in their own interest, they might have to be coerced. In fact, the peasantry soon became the target for frustrated developers. Peter Kisumo, the Minister of Regional Administration and Local Development, complained in December 1970 that "there were many peasants who spent their time idle in the villages [...] If peasants in the rural areas spent their time wisely by engaging in economic and social development activities, the country's economic and social progress would have been easy."[99]

Although new villages and commercial farming had been an official policy priority since 1967, the results were disappointing. Frustrated with the peasantry's "failure" to consolidate their homesteads voluntarily, Nyerere declared in November 1973 that "to live in villages is an order." He placed the entire machinery of the state behind compulsory,

universal villagization. Whatever restraining influence his public disavowal of the use of force had provided was now nullified. It was replaced by the desire of the party and bureaucracy to produce the quick results he wanted. Nyerere claimed that it was now time to insist on village living as the only way to promote development and increased production.[100] The villagization campaign that followed was characterized by much coercion and brutality. Far from achieving populist legitimacy, it created only an alienated, skeptical, demoralized, and uncooperative peasantry for which Tanzania would pay a huge price, both financially and politically. One cannot help but conclude that the underlying premise of Nyerere's agrarian policy, for all its rhetorical flourishes in the direction of traditional culture and values, was little different from that of colonial agrarian policy. That premise was that the practices of African cultivators and pastoralists were backward, unscientific, inefficient, and ecologically irresponsible. Only close supervision, training, and, if necessary, coercion by specialists in scientific agriculture, could bring them and their practices in line with a modern Tanzania. The peasants were a problem for which the agricultural experts were the solution.[101]

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tanzania underwent the most dramatic economic crisis since independence, as a result of a number of coinciding factors such as the evidently disastrous economic outcomes of forced villagization (the total agricultural output declined drastically), soaring oil prices, the collapse of world commodity prices, and severe and extensive droughts, as well as the costly war with Uganda in 1978–9. In 1981, a hurriedly conceived National Economic Survival Programme failed to secure the necessary support from external sources that were demanding the reduction of state intervention in the economy. The government under Nyerere at first resisted these pressures, but finally capitulated as the economic crisis deepened. The first structural adjustment program was reluctantly adopted by Nyerere in 1982. Three years later he retired from the presidency. This step again promoted Nyerere's already somewhat clouded image as Africa's showpiece head of state. He was one of the very few examples among the first generation of African heads of states who voluntarily left office. Since then until his death, however, he retained his role as the very influential "Father of the Nation," as the "grey eminence" in Tanzanian politics. Moreover, he reinforced his international role as a "Third World spokesman," acting in various committees such as the South Commission and as a mediator, for example in the Burundi peace talks.

Conclusion: Nyerere and the ambiguities of Tanzanian politics

Nyerere as a politician can be characterized by three elements: he possessed a perspective of where he wanted to go in the long term, realism and feel for tactics in the short term, and an imagination and common touch in his speeches and writing which earned him the respect even of those who did not agree with him.[102] This unusual combination of talents was even more effective in the specific political and cultural context of the 1960s and 1970s and the role Africa played in cold war strategies and Western "tiers mondisme." His political thinking absorbed some quite diverse influences that are not often explicitly mentioned in his writings. This thinking, in turn, had a considerable impact upon both the nationalist movement in the late colonial period and political development in independent Tanzania. It does not make much sense, however, to try to trace which influences were "African" or "indigenous" and which were "Western."[103] What is striking in the case of Nyerere's political activities (as it is presumably with many other politicians of his generation), is rather the somewhat eclectic combination of elements of African "tradition" and European "modernity,"[104] whereby much of what is presented as "tradition" is the product of the same modernity this "tradition" seems to oppose. Nyerere the politician can even be seen in many ways as the product of the colonial state, which was an authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus of control and not a school of democracy. Its European officials believed themselves to be agents of a superior civilization with a right to rule over people of inferior cultures, paternally guiding them to a higher level of social development. However haphazard and ramshackle the reality of state power may have been, the colonial administrators struggled to maintain the facade of omnipotence and omniscience. Their sense of being a legitimate and uniquely capable ruling class was passed on through the elite secondary schools and, eventually, universities that trained cadres of potential African successors (like Nyerere) to run not capitalist enterprises but the apparatus of the bureaucratic state.

Notes

1. On Arthur Lewis (1965), see the excellent biography by Robert Tignor (2006).
2. Parts of the material and ideas presented here can already be found in Andreas Eckert (2001, 2007a).
3. Robert Tignor (2006: 263).

4. Arthur Lewis (1965: 32–3) and Robert Tignor (2006: 208).
5. John Saul (2005). One early example for a contemporary scholarly analysis is Friedland and Rosberg (1964).
6. Quoted by *The Independent*, 15 October 1999: 18. Since the 1950s, Nyerere was popularly referred to as Mwalimu (teacher).
7. Quoted by *International Herald Tribune*, 22 October 1999: 9.
8. Quoted by *The Guardian*, 15 October 1999: 2.
9. In an extremely tasteless article, a journalist went so far as to compare Nyerere to Augusto Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile, known for his extremely brutal regime. See P. J. O'Rourke (1999) "A Tale of Two Dictators," *Wall Street Journal*, European Edition, 22 October: 10.
10. Janet G. Vaillant (1990).
11. Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari (1995). For some earlier work along the same lines, see for example William Edgett Smith (1973), John Hatch (1976) and William Duggan and John Civille (1976).
12. Frederick Cooper (1999: 13–15).
13. Dean McHenry (2000). For two academic statements presenting an extremely positive image of Nyerere see Cranford Pratt (1999) and Peter Meyns (2000). In much recent scholarship, historians and political scientists paint a rather ambiguous picture of Nyerere without completely condemning him. See, for instance, Leander Schneider (2004).
14. Frederick Cooper (1994: 1539).
15. Andreas Eckert (2006, 2007a).
16. Andreas Eckert (2007a).
17. For details about this period of Nyerere's life, see Andreas Eckert (2001).
18. John Iliffe (1979: 431ff.).
19. Nyerere even applied for an extra fellowship to stay for a further year. This application was turned down. See correspondence in Tanzania National Archives (henceforth TNA) 23140, Vol. III.
20. John Hatch (1976: 26–31) and Viktoria Stöger-Eising (2000: 129).
21. According to Nyerere, this pamphlet was rejected by the organization to which it was submitted for publication (probably the Fabians, as suggested by John Iliffe (1979: 509)). He later included the piece in his first collection of essays and speeches; Julius Nyerere (1966: 23–9).
22. John Iliffe (1979: 509).
23. William Smith (1973: 50).
24. Judith Listowel (1965: 221).
25. Andrew Maguire (1969), Cranford Pratt (1976) and John Iliffe (1979).
26. TANU was founded on 7 July 1954. For the important role of Nyerere during this meeting see for example The National Archives of the UK, Kew (formerly PRO, henceforth TNA) CO 822/859: Summary of Territorial Conference of AA in Dar es Salaam, 6–10 July 1954; Interviews with Patrick Kunambi, 7 August 1999; Saadani Abdul Kandora, 9 August 1999.
27. Rhodes House library, Oxford (henceforth RH), MSS.Brit.Emp. s365, 121/3: Nyerere to Marjorie Nicholson, 15 September 1954.
28. TNA CO 822/859: Twining to Lennox-Boyd, 8 September 1954.
29. Ibid.: Barton, minute, 10 October 1955. See also John Iliffe (1997: 6).
30. There are numerous examples for this. To mention only two: Andrew Cohen, Britain's permanent representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, portrayed

Nyerere as "able and very intelligent" and continued: "I imagine that he [Nyerere] is likely to have a leading position for a long time ahead. He also struck me as essentially moderate in politics" (TNA CO 822/1361: Cohen to Twining, 28 June 1957). Ursula Birkett, a District Officer's wife, noted in a letter to her parents: "I'm impressed with Nyerere, a young man, sensible + well intentioned" (RH MSS.Afr. s.420: Ursula Birkett to her parents, 5 December 1958).

31. John Iliffe (1979).
32. See TNA CO 822/859: Twining to Lennox-Boyd, 31 October 1955.
33. For the details, see especially John Iliffe (1997).
34. See RH MSS.Brit.Emp. s.365, 121/3, for a copy of his letter of resignation.
35. See TNA 47/A.6: Government Circular N°14 of 1953: Membership of Political Associations, 15 December 1953.
36. Kambona, born in 1925, visited Tabora School and worked as a schoolteacher before he became general secretary of TANU. Between 1955 and 1959, he studied law in England. After independence he served, among others, as Minister for Foreign Affairs. In June 1967 he abruptly resigned from all his official posts and soon after exiled in London, from where he bitterly attacked the Tanzanian government and Nyerere in particular.
37. See for example TNA CO 822/859: Chief Secretary to Gorell-Barnes (Colonial Office): Short History of TANU, 26 November 1955, which contains brief portraits of leading TANU politicians. See Steven Feierman (1990).
38. On the 1958 elections, see G. W. Y. Hucks (1960).
39. John Iliffe (1997: 45).
40. The decolonization process in Africa is the subject of a fast-growing literature. For the basic constellations see John Hargreaves (1996). For a sophisticated interpretation of the process and its effects until today, see Frederick Cooper (2002). See Frederick Cooper (2008) for an elegant analysis of the long-term effects of decolonization in Africa.
41. Susan Geiger (1997, 2005) forcefully emphasizes the key role women played in the nationalist struggle in Tanganyika. She states, for instance, that "if Julius Nyerere was instrumental in convincing the UNO and much of the Western world that Tanganyikan people were a 'nation-in-the-making,' women activists were largely responsible for establishing and reconfiguring the grounds for this assertion," Susan Geiger (1997: 65). See also Ullrich Lohmann (2007) for examples of anti-colonialism and nationalism beyond the usual suspects of TANU activists.
42. I couldn't trace a complete set of the journal. Numerous items can be found at the University Library Dar es Salaam, East Africana Section, or in various TNA files, for example TNA 471/A6/14.
43. For the following remarks, see especially Cranford Pratt (1976: 63–71;1999: 144–5). See also Harvey Glickman (1967).
44. Julius Nyerere (1966: 76).
45. Julius Nyerere (1966: 70). For other examples see Cranford Pratt (1976: 64–5) and Judith Listowel (1965: XVIIff.). It should be added, however, that there is a tendency in the literature to underestimate TANU's robust racialism and to overstate the effect of Nyerere's anti-racialism. See James Brennan (2005: 273, fn. 66).
46. Quoted by Steven Feierman (1990: 227).

47. Julius Nyerere (1966: 31–2).
48. Julius Nyerere (1966: 42).
49. An excellent study of the British anticolonial left is provided by Stephen Howe (1993).
50. Cranford Pratt (1976: 88).
51. On Nyerere's promotion by Spears, see William Duggan and John Civille (1976). The Bulletin of the Institute of African American Relations (Washington) described him in December 1956 as "definitely a man to watch" (a copy of the Bulletin can be found in RH MSS.Brit.Emp. s.365, 123/1). Even the CIA, 1961, considered Nyerere to be "one of the most impressive nationalist figures on the African continent," characterized by "moderate and reasoned policies"; quoted by Walter Leimgruber (1990: 288).
52. Julius Nyerere (1966: 138–9).
53. John Iliffe (1979: 576).
54. Michael Jennings (2007).
55. Andrew Coulson (1982: 2, 327).
56. See, for example James Brennan (2005, 2006) and Andrew Burton (2007).
57. Franz Ansprenger (1980: 6).
58. For details, see Andreas Eckert (2007a), especially Chapter V: 2.
59. For details, see ibid.
60. Patrick McGowan and Patrick Bolland (1971).
61. Steven Feierman (1990: 240).
62. Andreas Eckert (2007a).
63. Cranford Pratt (1976), especially Chapter 7, and Andrew Coulson (1982), especially Chapter 16.
64. Julius Nyerere (1966: 157).
65. Randal Sadler (1999: 252).
66. Andrew Coulson (1982: 136) and John Hatch (1976: 180ff.).
67. Franz Ansprenger (1999: 90).
68. Julius Nyerere (1966: 162–71).
69. Goran Hyden (1980: 96–100).
70. Viktoria Stöger-Eiselen (2000: 130–1) and Henry Bienen (1967: 212ff.).
71. Julius Nyerere (1966: 170–1).
72. Nyerere only had one opponent in the presidential elections: Zuberi Mtemwu, leader of the tiny African National Congress. 1,123,535 voters were cast for Nyerere, against 21,279 for Mtemwu. See Judith Listowel (1965: 413). On the history of the ANC and on Mtemwu, see James Brennan (2005).
73. The most detailed account available on the mutiny is Tanzania People's Defence Forces 1993. See also Timothy Parsons (2003).
74. For the history of the Zanzibar revolution, see Anthony Clayton (1981), Hassan Mapuri (1996), and Thomas Burgess (2001).
75. For details, see Cranford Pratt (1976: 139ff.).
76. One spectacular project of China's involvement in Tanzania was an interest-free loan for the construction of the "Great Uhuru Railway" from Tanzania to Zambia. See Jamie Monson (2006, 2009).
77. James Brennan (2005: 267).
78. James Brennan (2005: 267).
79. For the wider context, see Frederick Cooper (2002).

80. Julius Nyerere (1966: 196–7).
81. Julius Nyerere (1966: 195–203).
82. Lionel Cliffe (1967), Henry Bienen (1967: 382–405) and William Tordoff (1967: 31–54).
83. Andrew Coulson (1982: 144).
84. Andreas Eckert (2007b).
85. William Tordoff (1967: 95ff.), Andreas Eckert (1999: 228–9) and (2007b).
86. Cranford Pratt (1976: 227).
87. Julius Nyerere (1968: 231–50).
88. On the Arusha declaration, see the good summary by Andrew Coulson (1982), especially Chapter 19.
89. Julius Nyerere (1968: 316, 325).
90. Julius Nyerere (1968: 267–90).
91. Viktoria Stöger-Eiselen (2000: 133). At least brief mention should be made of the related question of Swahili language. According to Nyerere, Swahili would be one of the main instruments in the transformation of the socialist state: it would facilitate the spread of Ujamaa ideas and values and it would allow maximum democratic participation of the masses in the process of decision-making. See on this aspect, Jan Blommaert (1999). On the Tanzanian state's interventions in cultural production in Swahili, see Kelly Askew (2002).
92. Julius Nyerere (1968: 337–66).
93. Andrew Coulson (1982: 240). The focus on rural development went along with a harsh anti-urban bias, mainly directed against Asians. See James Brennan (2006).
94. There is now an abundant literature on ujamaa and villagization. The following paragraphs rely on the analysis by James Scott (1998: 223–61). See also Leander Schneider (2004). For a critical evaluation of Ujamaa, see, among many others, Nancy Spalding (1996).
95. Leander Schneider (2004: 346).
96. Julius Nyerere (1966: 184).
97. Julius Nyerere (1968: 356).
98. Julius Nyerere (1968: 356).
99. Leander Schneider (2004: 363).
100. James Scott (1998: 234) and Denis-Constant Martin (1988: 110ff.).
101. Michael Jennings (2007), James Scott (1998) and Leander Schneider (2004).
102. Andrew Coulson (1982: 327).
103. Viktoria Stöger-Eiselen (2000) provides a good example for the limitations of such an approach.
104. The following remarks owe much to Bruce Berman (1998: 327ff.).

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12

The United States, Decolonization, and the Education of Third World Elites

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Introduction

From the 1950s until the 1970s, educating elites in the decolonized world featured prominently in private and public American development policies.[1] Large sums of money were invested into establishing universities, libraries, research institutes, and exchange programs to bring forth "the best and the brightest" of the newly independent Asian and African nations. As Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, put it in 1955, initiating and supporting education measures in the decolonized regions was expected to play a role in determining

> whether newly independent nations can erect a structure of government and public order under which peaceful development may proceed; whether public office can become a public trust, separate from private interest; whether national revolutions are to be diverted, by the colonial issue, away from their democratic base to become a source of energy and power for dictatorship; ... whether they will be "open" societies, in the humanistic tradition of the West, or closed by dogma or ideology.[2]

Framed by modernization theory and Cold War liberalism, the support of elites through higher education seemed to offer a peaceful, constructive way of furthering indigenous as well as American interests in the context of decolonization and the Cold War.

In the following, I will give a necessarily incomplete overview of American efforts to educate national elites in the Third World between ca. 1950 and 1975. To do so, I will focus on the activities of the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation in

Africa. As a continent, Africa gained immense strategic and political importance in the late 1950s and 1960s and received much attention from American observers. I focus on these foundations because they were among the first and most influential American institutions to engage in foreign aid. Their staff (rightly) considering themselves part of an elite, took a leading role in identifying problems related to decolonization and sought to come up with solutions to alleviate and/or solve these problems. Their activities abroad provided the testing ground for new methods and approaches to development aid and concepts of modernization. If their projects proved successful, the US government was likely to adopt them and to fund similar, larger programs with public money.

By focusing on these foundations, I am limiting my analysis to a small group of American actors. This implies following their largely Western-centered perspectives, and it does not do justice either to the new elites in Africa or to African societies in general. Although I am aware of these self-imposed limitations, I believe that the "foundation lens" offers valuable insights into the complexity of decolonization, the role of elites in the newly established nations, and the development of trans-national elite networks.

The chapter begins with a brief history of the philanthropic foundations' work before 1945 and in the postwar era. It will then portray their activities in Africa between the late 1940s and the late 1960s and briefly discuss the turn in their policies and programs since the early 1970s. I will then assess my findings in a short conclusion.

American philanthropic foundations' activities abroad

Philanthropic engagement has a long tradition in the US. Many successful entrepreneurs donated for religious reasons. Others valued the fact that giving money to charitable causes could improve company standing and heighten publicity.[3] To different degrees, industrialists like John D. Rockefeller (Standard Oil) and Andrew Carnegie (US Steel) felt a personal responsibility to improve the living conditions of those who carried the burden of industrialization, from which they had profited so immensely.[4] Charitable contributions to further education opportunities became very popular. Andrew Carnegie's project to establish public libraries in hundreds of small towns across the US is the most famous example of such efforts to support "the masses' self-improvement." Yet only a few philanthropists fully trusted their charities' recipients, and they carefully chose the means and methods of education they paid

for. Such paternalism continued to guide philanthropic engagement when the foundations decided to become active abroad.[5]

The Rockefeller Foundation, which had been founded in 1913, was the first to do so: in the 1920s, it sent doctors and public health specialists to Asia, the Americas, and Africa to help prevent the spread of diseases. In the 1930s and 1940s, agricultural experts were dispatched to teach Chinese and Mexican farmers how to increase their production.[6] With such projects the Rockefeller Foundation continued the efforts of European and American Christian groups in the nineteenth century, which had combined their religious mission with a "civilizing" one by establishing schools and hospitals. Twentieth-century philanthropy abroad remained a civilizing mission in the sense that it aimed to "improve" the living conditions of less fortunate societies by sharing with them the benefits of modern science and technology as well as the values linked to them.

The task of improving living standards gained immediate urgency in the postwar era. World War II had brought about dire conditions in many areas of the world. From the victorious nations' perspectives, helping countries recover from the hardships they had suffered during wartime (or that had become visible in the course of the war) presented a moral imperative. Yet, once more, altruism was not the only motive for humanitarian aid: strategic considerations loomed large in governments' and private actors' considerations regarding international activities to alleviate poverty. The war had made it obvious that a new global order was about to evolve. France and Great Britain had lost much of their traditional standing, whereas the US and the Soviet Union were about to become the new superpowers, keen to broaden their respective spheres of influence. From the American point of view, this meant establishing an international order based on liberal values, trade, and access to strategically important areas. Once European reconstruction was under way and Europe's partition a given, attention turned to the non-Western regions, most of which were still under colonial rule.

While many Americans shared anticolonial convictions and considered colonial rule outdated, US foreign policy experts were well aware of the danger of alienating their European allies by supporting independence movements in Asia or Africa. Furthermore, they were afraid that a power vacuum could emerge in the newly termed "Third World" if independence was acquired too soon. Without the necessary safeguards attached, leaders of national independence movements might turn to radically nationalist or socialist policies that presented a risk to the US geopolitical interests. Therefore, American diplomats stressed the

need for patience and gradual change instead of revolutionary struggle, portrayed communism as the "new and more potent form of colonialism," and cooperated closely with the European powers in trying to "de-radicalize" the transfers of power.[7]

Development assistance was considered one of the most valuable instruments in this situation. The US were careful not to interfere with the colonial powers' politics and therefore did not supply aid to colonies (except to Indochina). Yet once a former colony gained independence they jumped at the opportunity to try to influence the new nation's development. In a recommendation to the National Security Council the US Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs stated in early 1954: "As a means of diminishing the threat to Western interests posed by nationalist demands ... the United States should make the most practical use of economic, technical and where applicable military assistance so as to influence the process of political change to effect the best compromise of Western interests and to offer the maximum promise of stable non-Communist regimes."[8] Thus, development assistance in its many forms became a hard currency – and one the philanthropic foundations were eager to help supply.

In the foundations' offices adaptation of philanthropic policies and programs to the emerging political constellation had begun some time before the end of the war. Whereas many Americans believed that colonies would slowly but surely become less directly dependent on the European powers, few expected that this process would coincide with what was to become the Cold War. Together, decolonization, the struggle between the superpowers and their allies, and the expansion of the US sphere of influence defined the conditions under which American philanthropies tried to realize their programs abroad.

Having experienced World War II, most of the foundations' officers and board members agreed that it was most important to prevent the establishment of any kind of "totalitarian" order, and that the best way of doing so was by peacefully diminishing potential causes of unrest and violence in the world. Many of those who took leading positions within the foundations after the war were dyed-in-the-wool internationalists who had been socialized politically in the New Deal era. They believed in the possibility of socioeconomic progress by means of planned, technocratic interventions that would allow people in the non-Western parts of the world to enjoy the same fortunes the Western nations had profited from earlier in history. It is also important to remember that the foundations received their funds from private companies whose economic success depended on access to resources

and markets abroad. With decolonization, a new scramble for those assets set in, and it seemed only reasonable that the foundations should support a political framework that was in line with their companies' interests. Furthermore, the board members, department heads and officers of philanthropic foundations were well aware of the fact that their privileged status – both in American society and in the world – might be undermined if the new nations developed in a direction opposed to their interests as elites.

The solution seemed to lie in the speedy "modernization" of "underdeveloped" societies in the Western sense. This meant industrializing the economy, creating an economic surplus, doing away with traditional approaches with regard to ways of living, offering incentives for individual achievement through education, regular income, and health care, building efficient institutions and bureaucracies that would lay the ground for a non-collectivist political order modeled on the nation-state, and improving urban and rural infrastructures. Taken together, those efforts would neutralize the political instability resulting from the countries' overall "backwardness" and undermine the attraction of Soviet-style modernization, which promised rapid industrialization, political progress, and social equality all at once.

Creating a citizenry that functioned as a stronghold against collectivism was a major goal of American philanthropic engagement in the Third World. Among the factors that could help to "promote or maintain independent, stable and democratic nations," education was regarded as crucial, "not only in producing the skills needed for economic growth, but in influencing attitudes and habits – in developing 'modern' men to fit a modern economy." This implied the belief that there was a direct link between the level of education and "civic attitudes" like the "willingness to compromise and to see the other's point of view, to abide by majority decisions or 'due process,' as well as to understand and have some loyalty to national, as opposed to personal or group goals."[9] These principles were considered central to successful modernization and, consequently, to the political stability of the Third World. The "soft power" which foundations possessed thanks to their money, expertise, prestige, and institutional independence provided a useful point of entry into the highly contested colonial or newly postcolonial world. Establishing colleges, universities, and research institutes, and enabling students from the developing countries to study in the West were strategies designed to help win the Third World over for democracy.

Before looking more closely at educational policies and programs, it may be useful to offer a few conceptual suggestions: what comes to

mind when thinking about ways of influencing collective and individual political behavior is, of course, Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality – measures and practices that are supposed to assure that a specific political system works and that its members function in ways that are beneficial to the system. Education is one of the classic fields for studies of governmentality because it allows insights into ways in which the state's administrators as well as its subjects try to regulate discourse and behavior. Accordingly, one might regard the American foundations' efforts to educate elites in the Third World as an example of governmentality at play. I would like to suggest that such an approach allows us to better understand the manner in which a seemingly "technical" field like education became an eminently political phenomenon under the influence of decolonization, the Cold War, and the globalization of American power. What this meant for the ways in which education was promoted and which kinds of training programs were instituted will be considered next.

Educating elites in Africa

One of the first foundations to become active in educational matters abroad was the Carnegie Corporation, which had been established in 1915. Its founder, Scottish-born Andrew Carnegie, had provided money for projects outside the US on the condition that it would only be spent in territories under British rule. Accordingly, the Corporation's work in Africa focused on Kenya, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Nigeria, which received a quarter of the total funds.[10] In the 1920s, the foundation supported the so-called Jeanes Schools in Kenya. The Jeanes concept was based on the Tuskegee educational philosophy that had been formulated in the American South to improve the situation of freed slaves by teaching them vocational and agricultural skills.[11] The emancipatory potential inherent in this concept was complemented by its supporters' belief that the focus on practical skills – instead of secondary education – was "best suited to native needs."[12] Only a minority of Africans was to receive higher education. This policy mirrored the philanthropic policy of the Carnegie Corporation as well as the interests of the British Colonial Office, with which the foundation cooperated in planning and administering its programs (as it did with the US Department of State).[13] In 1943, the foundation's officers began to outline their institution's postwar activities. Fearing the dissolution of Western "civilization," they agreed that the Carnegie Corporation should establish "strong, independent centers of democratic, Western culture" abroad, and that

universities were destined to serve as such centers. As bearers and distributors of knowledge, universities could support the "preservation and adaptation of the Great Tradition of Western society to the conditions of a new world" that was about to evolve.[14] Educational exchanges with the US were supposed to create goodwill between nations.

While such policies were designed to conserve Western hegemony and to improve US standing in the world, the effects of decolonization began to leave an increasingly visible mark on foundation policies a decade later. A reorientation of the Dominions and Colonies Fund seemed due in 1954 when it became apparent that the Commonwealth was no longer ruled from the center and that "lines of influence and communication, official and unofficial, technical and cultural among the outer parts themselves, 'dominion' and colonial" were rapidly gaining importance. What added to this was the fact that "the web of relationships [included] a significant portion of the Eastern world." The Cold War had entered the scene through the back door: as more and more colonies began fighting for independence, the question to which bloc they would belong in the future gained urgency, as did the need to ensure that the new nations established a "sound social order" that provided a safeguard against socialist tendencies.[15] The Rockefeller Foundation's 1955 decision to appropriate $45 million for investments in "underdeveloped" areas of the world illustrates the sense of urgency many Americans shared at the time.[16]

Although they recognized the Commonwealth "as an effective element in the structure of free democratic society" and emphasized the great amount of practical experience the British had in matters of colonial administration, Carnegie Corporation officers did not hide their anticolonial position. They were convinced that "the African himself" was "the legitimate resident of the African continent," and that they, as Americans, had a responsibility to help them overcome the problems "caused by the conflict of values" between "traditional" and "modern" ways of life. This could best be achieved through "education of all levels and types."[17] With the foreseeable changes in the nature of colonial rule in mind, Carnegie Corporation personnel supported the concept of trusteeship – "[bringing] colonial subjects first into local government and then slowly, as they proved worthy, into territorial 'self-government' within the Commonwealth."[18] This implied the widespread belief that Africans "were backward and still incapable of governing themselves."[19] Like children, it was believed, they had to be taken by the hand until they were considered able to walk alone. Hence the creation of indigenous leadership was seen as "one of the critical problems in

the movement of the countries along the path to self-government and then independence."[20] In addition to educating Africans, the Carnegie Corporation thought it necessary to deepen Western knowledge about Africa in order to be able to alleviate conflicts and find solutions to the continent's problems. Consequently, the foundation supported local studies at African universities as well as African studies in the US and Great Britain.[21]

In 1958, the year after Ghana, as the first African colony, had become independent, the Carnegie Corporation organized a conference in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. At this meeting, representatives of British and American universities, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, US foundations, and private companies discussed Western interests in Africa and how they overlapped with African interests. To coordinate proposals for higher education in Africa, the participants founded the so-called Africa Liaison Committee, which served as the American connection to the British Inter-University Council; because it was attached to the American Council on Education it gained quasi-official status. A little later, the Carnegie Corporation supported the Ashby Commission on Nigerian education, which had strong influence on independent Nigeria's education planning. By institutionalizing the foundation's role in African education matters, its representatives hoped to anchor the American influence on the continent's intellectual and political developments.[22]

The organizational activities of the Carnegie Corporation also had a domestic motive that was linked to the American civil rights movement. With decolonization progressing, the fact that racial segregation was still being practiced in the nation that presented itself as the forerunner of egalitarian democracy severely burdened American foreign-policy makers. Recognizing the need to provide education opportunities to African Americans and Africans alike served to refute the Soviet critique of American racism and to strengthen American credibility in the world.[23]

As decolonization continued, Africa received more and more attention from the Carnegie Corporation, which, in those years, changed its character from "a philanthropic bank ... to ... an operating agency."[24] Between 1954 and 1960, $1,035,393 of the British Commonwealth Program's Emergent Countries fund went to African countries; Asia and the West Indies received only half of that sum.[25] The fact that the Corporation had been involved in African affairs for several decades promised privileged access to the African countries at a time of major change.[26] The institution's strategic advantage allowed it to

compete with much richer foundations like the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, which began to invest heavily in overseas development programs in the 1950s and 1960s. As a foundation officer noted matter-of-factly in 1963, from the Carnegie Corporation's point of view, "the political commitment to education in Africa and the sense of urgency on the part of individuals and governments alike make it the best buy, dollar for dollar, anywhere."[27]

In the early 1960s, the Corporation set aside $1,700,000 for Africa over a four-year period: Nearly $600,000 for university programs in teacher training and educational research, $451,000 for higher education and international aid to education, $358,000 for university programs in adult education, and more than $200,000 for library training and development.[28] American institutions and scholars received Carnegie money too: in 1960, the African-American Institute (an organization concerned with the relationship between the US and the new African nations) and Harvard University were given funding for a one-year inter-university undergraduate scholarship program for African students to study in the US. The American universities involved paid the tuition and fees; the US government covered the maintenance costs.[29] In addition, the Corporation funded studies on the structure and role of universities in underdeveloped countries. This was part of the foundation's effort to adapt British institutes of education "to the needs of the communities they are serving in Africa."[30]

The Afro-Anglo-American Program in Teacher Education was the most visible expression of the Carnegie Corporation's attempts to do justice to all parties involved in decolonization: the new nations as well as Great Britain and the US. Support for African independence movements, securing of American cooperation with the British, and prevention of the growth of the communist sphere of influence were combined in the tripartite program, which was administered in cooperation with Columbia University's Teacher College. The program, which "linked educational systems in the newly independent states in formerly British Africa with American educational philosophy and practices," became "an important vehicle for American influence" in Africa.[31]

Although lacking the Carnegie Corporation's international experience and its close relations to the British colonial administration, the Ford Foundation began to intensify its activities in Africa in the second half of the 1950s. One of its officers noted in 1958: "private foundations are especially well adapted to assisting newly emerging countries in developing educational and training institutions suited to their needs. ... Ideas and relatively small sums are the essentials at this stage."

Believing that the "development and operation of a modern industrial society, which is the goal of most if not of all newly emerging countries, requires the effective, coordinated use of an almost infinitive variety of knowledge and skills," training and education were the obvious choices for the Ford philanthropists.[32]

To find out more about the current situation in Africa and to define potential fields of action, the Ford Foundation sent a mission to the continent in early 1957. Its members recommended cooperation with the British in furthering education opportunities to develop "the intellectual leadership, the technical and administrative skills, and the basic social and economic data that are essential for the sound growth of these emerging African societies." Apart from providing the structural basis for independence, the Ford Foundation's commitment to African education matters would also entail possibilities to further American strategic interests, to improve the West's standing on the continent, and to bolster the economic interests of the Ford Company.[33]

The connection between philanthropic activities and the political situation in the newly independent nations becomes most visible in the case of Congo, the former Belgian colony. In July 1960, Congo became independent.[34] Alarmed by the possibility of a socialist system being established in Congo, the Ford Foundation decided to do its share in deepening the Western influence on the country by "replicating within the Third World setting the organizational patterns, professional activities, and criteria of academic excellence" that prevailed in the US.[35] The National Institute of Political Studies and the National School of Law and Administration, which the Ford Foundation founded in Congo, encompassed all of those hopes. The institutions were supposed to function as seedbeds for national elites that adhered to Western principles and favored a free economy.[36] Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania were given similar grants to further the education and training of administrative elites.[37] Between 1951 and 1961, the Ford Foundation invested over five million dollars in research, education, and training in Africa and of Africans, with even greater amounts of money being appropriated over the course of the 1960s.[38] Most of those activities were pursued in close cooperation with the national governments of the African countries. This had practical as well as political reasons, as nation-building was believed to be the greatest task lying ahead and strengthening state institutions was one of the strategies serving that purpose.

By the early 1960s, a consensus had formed among development experts that education was a critical instrument for achieving "modernization." "Human capital theory" supplied this belief with academic

credentials. The theory was first formulated by economist Theodore W. Schultz, who argued that investments in education were investments in human capital.[39] Such investments would increase labor productivity, encourage technological innovation and produce a higher rate of return than physical capital. The equation "education = economic growth = economic development = overall societal development and modernization" became part of official development aid policies. At the same time, social science research emphasized the importance of elites in the Third World, with influential scholars like Clark Kerr and Cyril Black arguing that elites provided "the critical variable in economic development." These findings helped to cement the foundations' practice of supporting selected universities to produce future leaders.[40]

The Rockefeller Foundation's African university program is a case in point. In 1963, at the foundation's fiftieth anniversary, its trustees named five fields of philanthropic action: world hunger, "overpopulation," equal opportunity, cultural development, and university development. As part of the University Development Program that was set up in response, universities in countries of "strategic importance" received financial and institutional support.[41] Rockefeller Foundation officers hoped that such assistance would "assure continuing leadership with benefits for the entire educational system as well as for economic and social progress."[42] The method of choice to achieve this goal was institution building, for which the University of East Africa (UEA) is an outstanding example. The UEA, which also received support from the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, consisted of the national universities of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. By the early 1970s, two-thirds of all East African faculty were Rockefeller Foundation scholars or held lectureships funded by the foundation.[43] In addition to serving as a training ground for administrative elites, the UEA was supposed to provide structural stability amidst the "changing social and political patterns in East Africa."[44] Simultaneously, the Rockefeller Foundation supported the African humanities in order to provide the new nations with some common ground because many of them seemed to lack consistent national cultures and appeared to be struggling to find their "true" identities. Historical, linguistic, and anthropological studies on tribes and territories that had been erased or suppressed by the colonial powers were supposed to spur the creation of a "modern" national identity that would also keep the countries from turning to communism as an ersatz identity.[45]

The philanthropists' focus on human capital and elites tended to relativize the importance of the character of the new nations' political

systems. In general, the foundations stressed their interest in furthering democratic values and practices (and they meant it), but they could be relatively tolerant with regard to the particular kind of political regime as long as it was not socialist. The Ford Foundation should be "primarily concerned with strengthening the underdeveloped areas, to put them in a better position to make free and independent choices of the governing principles for their peoples, and less concerned with political form," a foundation officer stated in 1966.[46] This position, which was shared by the American government, gained relevance when military regimes sprang up in many African nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1973, the US State Department argued that African "military governments" should not be "discounted on the basis of that catch phrase alone." One should remember that the African military "is one of the modernizing forces in most African countries by being above tribalism. African military establishments can assist African nations in integrating and unifying their societies," which, in turn, would provide regional stability. The author even speculated that military governments might present a stage of "development towards authentic African forms" of government.[47] Such ideas, which had already been formulated in the late 1950s with regard to Southeast Asia, gained popularity in the context of the Vietnam War, which seemed to support the claim that only the military could impose order in "chaotic" situations stemming from decolonization, and that it provided stability and room for modernization – something the African nations seemed to be in dire need of.[48] While the American foundations restricted their activities in the Third World to civilian projects, they did play a role in developing and popularizing theories about the military as a modernizing agency by supporting related research in the social sciences.

Revising the elite paradigm

The foundations' focus on elite education remained in place well into the second half of the 1960s. In 1967, the Ford Foundation still thought it to be the most important task "to increase the numbers and the ability of professional, managerial, and governmental leaders in the developing countries, and of the institutions – research and policy-making staff, planning units, key private organizations – which produce and support leaders and their ideas. What makes a country change and develop is the competence of its leaders," foundation officers were convinced.[49] This approach came under attack only a few years later. The "positivistic optimism, Western ethnocentrism, unilinear

determinism, and reductionist economism" inherent in modernization theory became the object of leftist critique that portrayed development aid as a "neocolonial" instrument aimed at enlarging the American empire.[50] The criticism was not restricted to specific programs but aimed at the foundations in general. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the foundations were accused of being elite institutions whose WASP trustees tried to strengthen the status quo instead of promoting social change. Elite education in the Third World seemed to mirror the narrow approach to development that American elites thought most useful to furthering their own interests.[51]

Apart from ideological strife, there was widespread disillusionment with the potential of development aid as a means to overcome economic inequalities. Instead of narrowing the gap between North and South, the difference was growing, and political turmoil in many Third World nations created a sense of general disorientation. The fact that university students – the supposed elite – in all parts of the world rebelled against "the system" helped to undermine the elite approach practiced by the development aid agencies. Members of the elites in the decolonized areas voiced dissatisfaction with existing projects. Decolonization as an ongoing process could not rely solely on education and training to fill the bureaucratic voids left by the colonial administrations. "No less important was promoting economic autonomy and development, transforming a national psychology of dependency, healing social divisions created by long-term foreign influence, fashioning programmes with popular appeal, and constituting a supportive international community of like-minded states."[52]

Although the foundations rejected the accusation that they helped the US government realize its foreign policy goals in strategically important areas of the world, they did react to the critique that their programs were too narrow in scope and perspective. Acknowledging that it had considered universities only "in terms of their administrators, faculties, and facilities," the Ford Foundation decided to pay more attention to the individual level of education. In the 1970s, the foundation, which (like many other philanthropic institutions) experienced severe budget cuts due to the worldwide economic downturn, replaced its institution-building approach with "capacity-building," while its cooperation with national governments gave way to the direct support for grassroots initiatives and NGOs.[53]

As a result, the elite-focused approach became undermined. A Carnegie Corporation officer stated in 1971 that "development of high level manpower and the modern sector are not the answer. There is

an increasing awareness that economic viability will depend on rapid development of rural areas." Instead of generating urban elites in Third World nations, the foundation should shift its emphasis to primary education in order to reach the largest number of people possible. More educational opportunities had to be made available in Africa itself instead of relying on overseas capacities and exchanges. In addition, he argued, the curricula would have to be "Africanized" to meet better the needs of the local populations.[54]

Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation, in re-evaluating its university development approach in 1970, concluded that its earlier belief that it was sufficient to educate a specific number of people had proven wrong, and that the trickle-down effect on the societies was not strong enough. It also took a critical look at the assumption that American models were universal in nature and could be exported to other countries without adaptation.[55] To overcome the shortcomings of earlier programs, a new approach was to be followed: "Indigenous problem-solving centers must be created in the local universities where existing knowledge can be adapted and new knowledge created while at the same time efforts are made to solve local problems and to educate future scientists and leaders."[56] Because there was a "serious maladjustment between educational systems and the aspirations of the universities they are designed to serve," the Rockefeller Foundation renamed its university program "Education for Development."[57] The focus on the developing countries' original needs implied in the new name and the effort to "localize" education both in the spatial and in the methodological sense became the leading principles of philanthropic activities in the field of education in the 1970s and 1980s. Funding for African studies at American universities declined, and new grants were to be reserved for activities "more directly relevant to African development needs."[58]

Conclusion

The foundations' practice of supporting elite education in Africa shows how, in the second half of the twentieth century, the transfer of knowledge became an integral part of the international power struggle. One might even regard it as a peaceful, yet powerful weapon in the conflict over the "new world order." Exporting the "right" kind of knowledge promised a chance to improve living conditions abroad and to secure one's own national interests at once. Seen through the lens of governmentality, the establishment of institutions of higher learning in the new nations provided the philanthropists with a unique chance to steer

those countries into a direction compatible with American/Western values and interests.

The attraction of the elite education approach lay on the one hand in its nature as an altruistic, genuinely progressive enlightenment project and in its promise of singular efficiency on the other: a relatively modest amount of money would suffice to create national elites that would function as catalysts for overall modernization in their respective societies, and the concept of "empowerment through knowledge" would solve the problem of indeterminate aid provisions. What the supporters of the elite education approach did not take into account, however, was its contrast to the democratic ideals inherent in modernization theory, as James Coleman has rightly noted.[59] One reason for the willful ignorance of "the masses" seems to have been that it was easier to focus on elites than to attempt to account for the diversity of Third World societies. Members of the American elite felt much closer to Africans who had attended British universities than to the rural populations. Exporting elite education also helped Western modernizers to navigate in unknown, potentially frightening territory. To follow James Scott, the establishment of American-style universities and research institutions in Africa helped to make the supposedly chaotic Third World "legible."[60]

Undoubtedly, the foundations' activities contained the sincere wish to help, and there was, indeed, much need for help. Once the colonial administrations pulled out, the new nations suffered from a vast lack of "manpower," rendering external expertise crucial. To be sure, American education programs did not come without political strings attached. Ironically, though, the proponents of elite education seem to have overlooked that knowledge can be used in many ways that differ from one's own intentions. The American foundations' apparent ignorance of the subversive potential of knowledge was part of a simplistic perspective of modernization that many philanthropists and administrators shared.[61] In asking for the reasons for this short-sighted view of development and decolonization, one could argue that, among other things, the stress brought on by the Cold War did not encourage long-term considerations of the possible effects of aid. Since the American foundations were in the fortunate situation of being able to spend large amounts of money freely, and their board members and program officers were convinced that the right combination of money and know-how were prone to success, they did not hesitate to do their share in keeping the "free world" free and proving their institutional expertise and influence.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Uta A. Balbier and the editors for their helpful comments and suggestions. Some of the findings presented here have appeared in another article of mine: Corinna R. Unger (2009).
2. Dean Rusk, Background for Proposal of Increased Program in Non-Western Underdeveloped Areas. Memorandum for the Trustees, 29 November 1955, 900 PRO Unar 6, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Rockefeller Foundation (RF), Record Group (RG) 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349. I would like to thank the Rockefeller Archive Center for giving me to access its holdings.
3. See Ben Whitaker (1974: 56).
4. See Judith Sealander (2003: 217–39, 218–26).
5. An overview is provided by Emily S. Rosenberg (2003: 241–57).
6. See Marcus Cueto (1994), William H. Schneider (2002), Leonard A. Gordon (1997: 104–16, 107–8), Deborah Fitzgerald (1994: 72–96), Corinne A. Pernet (2005: 311–33, 320–5) and Landrum R. Bolling with Craig Smith (1982: 46–60). On the history of the Rockefeller Foundation, see Waldemar A. Nielsen (1972: 47–69) and Roger L. Geiger (1988: 315–41, 317–25).
7. John Kent (2001: 168–87, 172). Also see Michael H. Hunt (2000: 207–29, 210), Marc Frey (2006) and Frederick Cooper (2002: 134).
8. Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (1983: 98–101), cited in Kent (2001: 173).
9. Carnegie Corporation, Draft Agenda Sheet, not dated (ca. 1963/64), Columbia University Libraries (CUL), Rare Book and Manuscript Library (RBML), Carnegie Corporation of New York Records (CCNY), Series III.A, Box 441, Folder 6. This concerned the appropriation of $170,000 over two years to the Brookings Institution for a comparative study on the role of education in political development in Latin America led by Kalman Silvert and Leonard Reissman. I would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York for giving me access to its holdings.
10. On the history of the Carnegie Corporation, see Ellen Clondiffe Lagemann (1989), Waldemar A. Nielsen (1972: 31–46) and Roger L. Geiger (1988: 317–23).
11. See E. Jefferson Murphy (1976: 21–3), Roy E. Finkenbine (2003: 161–78) and Edward H. Berman (1980a: 179–201).
12. Harvie Branscomb, "Memorandum on the Corporation Program in the British Dominions and Colonies," 18 October 1943, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 6.
13. See Edward H. Berman (1980a) and (1977: 71–85), Ellen Lagemann (1989: 125, 136–7), Emily Rosenberg (2003: 246–8) and E. Jefferson Murphy (1976: 24–5).
14. Harvie Branscomb (Carnegie Corporation), "Memorandum on the Corporation Program in the British Dominions and Colonies," 18 October 1943, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 6.
15. Carnegie Corporation, "Some Notes on Carnegie Corporation Grants in Africa," n. d. (April 1954), CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 5, Folder 4.
16. Rockefeller Foundation, Dean Rusk, "Background for Proposal of Increased Program in Non-Western Underdeveloped Areas, Memorandum to the

Trustees," 29 November 1955, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349 (900 Pro Unar 6).

17. Carnegie Corporation, "Some Notes on Carnegie Corporation Grants in Africa," n. d. (April 1954), CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 5, Folder 4.
18. Frederick Cooper (2002: 29). See also Marc Frey (2010).
19. John Kent (2001: 174).
20. Carnegie Corporation, "Memorandum: BDC [British Dominions and Colonies] – Main Fund Collaboration," 27 November 1957, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 7.
21. Carnegie Corporation, "Memorandum of Discussion on the Corporation's Program in the British Colonies," 19 July 1954, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 6. The Ford Foundation, too, funded African studies programs at American universities. Between 1951 and 1961, it injected more than eight million dollars into this field. See Kathleen D. McCarthy (1984: 3–24, 13), Ford Foundation, Melvin J. Fox to Cleon O. Swayzee, "Report on Africa," 4 April 1961, FFA, Report 002067. Other American universities received funds for research on Asia and the Middle East. See Landrum Bolling (1982: 65).
22. See Gary R. Hess (2003: 319–39, 327) and Edward Berman (1977: 76–80).
23. See Thomas Borstelmann (2007: 77–95).
24. Ellen Lagemann (1989: 261).
25. Carnegie Corporation, "Overview, British Commonwealth Program 1954–60," CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 7.
26. Carnegie Corporation, SHS, "Memorandum to JP, BDC Program," 11 May 1959, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 7.
27. Carnegie Corporation, "First Memorandum on Commonwealth Program for the period ahead," 18 September 1963, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 7.
28. See Carnegie Corporation, "First Memorandum on Commonwealth Program for the period ahead," 18 September 1963, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 7. Also see Edward Berman (1977: 78).
29. Carnegie Corporation, "For Agenda," 29 September 1960, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series III.A, Box 384, Folder 3.
30. Carnegie Corporation, Appropriation, 5 January 1961, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series III.A, Box 417, Folder 1.
31. Gary Hess (2003: 328). Also see Edward Berman (1977: 76–80).
32. F. F. Hill, "OD [Overseas Development] Policies and Organization – Discussion Memorandum. Confidential," 19 February1958, Ford Foundation Archives (FFA), Report 010460. I would like to thank the Ford Foundation Archives for allowing me to access its holdings.
33. William O. Brown, Melvin J. Fox, and John B. Howard, "Report of Ford Foundation Mission to Africa. Confidential," 16 January 1957, FFA, Report 000579.
34. See Frederick Cooper (2002: 163–6), Dietmar Rothermund (1999: 149–54), and Gerhard Th. Mollin (1996).
35. Robert F. Arnove (1980: 305–30, 307).
36. See Gary Hess (2003: 203–32, 214–9).
37. Grants for West African nations totaled $52,239 between 1958 and 1970, grants for East and Southern Africa $21,675. See Ford Foundation, "The Ford

Foundation and Sub-Sahara Africa: Information Paper. For Internal Use Only," December 1970, FFA, Report 002774; Melvin J. Fox to Cleon O. Swayzee, "Report on Africa," 4 April 1961, FFA, Report 002067.

38. Ford Foundation, Melvin J. Fox to Cleon O. Swayzee, "Report on Africa," 4 April 1961, FFA, Report 002067.
39. See Theodore W. Schultz (1961: 1–17).
40. James S. Coleman with David Court (1993: 7).
41. Rockefeller Foundation, "Strengthening Emerging Centers of Learning: Excerpt from 12/63 Report to Trustees," December 1963, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349 (900 Pro Unar 9a).
42. Rockefeller Foundation, J. George Harrar, "Proposed University Development Program, with Summary of Aids to Selected Institutions Abroad," 13 November 1961, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349 (900 Pro Unar 9).
43. Robert F. Arnove (1980: 306–7).
44. Rockefeller Foundation, "Strengthening Emerging Centers of Learning. Excerpt from 12/63 report to Trustees," December 1963, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349 (900 Pro Unar 9a).
45. Gary Hess (2003: 330–1).
46. Ford Foundation, "Ford Foundation Activities Indonesia, 1953–1966: 28 Questions for Representatives, with Responses. Done in Connection with Overseas Development Self-Study, August-September 1966. For Internal Use Only," 1966, FFA, Report 002715.
47. Department of State, Claude G. Ross to Dr. Tarr, "Security Assistance Presentation," 10 April 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e6/66443.htm. Last accessed 8 June 2009.
48. See, among others, Mark T. Berger (2003: 421–48, esp. 440–4) and Marc Frey (2006: 232–3, 249).
49. Robert F. Arnove (1977: 100–26, esp. 105).
50. James S. Coleman with David Court (1993: 4).
51. For example, Robert F. Arnove (1977: 106) stated in 1977 that the Ford Foundation's approach to development "has been systematically elitist and technocratic. This strategy coincides with its own self-interest in maintaining an international system which is orderly and predictable, and nonthreatening to the corporate and class interests of the individuals who run the foundation."
52. Micheal Hunt (2000: 22). Also see McCarthy (1984: 11–3).
53. Ford Foundation, John J. Bresnan, "The Foundation and the Universities: Changing Relationships in Asia," December 1969, FFA, Report 002695. Also see Kathleen McCarthy (1997: 129–56).
54. Carnegie Corporation, SHS, "Memorandum to DZR: Commonwealth Program," February 1971, CUL, RBML, CCNY, Series I.D, Box 4, Folder 8.
55. William J. Siffin (1977: 49–71, 50–3).
56. Rockefeller Foundation, "University Development: Directors' Statement on Program," April 1970, RAC, RF, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 69, Folder 349 (900 Pro Unar 11b).
57. Laurence D. Stifel, James S. Coleman, and Joseph E. Black (1997: 1–6). Also see Landrum R. Bolling with Craig Smith (1982: 62).

58. Ford Foundation, "The Ford Foundation and Sub-Sahara Africa: Information Paper. Draft. For Internal Use Only," December 1970, FFA, Report 002774.
59. James S. Coleman with David Court (1993: 8).
60. James C. Scott (1998).
61. On such unexpected, and unwanted, uses of knowledge, see Jeremi Suri (2007: 57–76).

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13

Building a Socialist Elite? – Khrushchev's Soviet Union and Elite Formation in India

Andreas Hilger

Introduction

On 13 June 1960, the Chairman of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), Alesandr Shelepin, informed the Soviet party leaders about "international reactions to the foundation of the Peoples' Friendship University" in Moscow. Shelepin registered great "enthusiasm" of "broad circles of world society." The KGB's self-congratulatory report explained this receptive mood by the hopes of the "progressive and patriotic" strata. According to Shelepin, these groups regarded the new Soviet institution as a golden opportunity for educating their "own national cadres who can take a leading position in the economic and political development of young countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." In contrast, the "reactionary" part of the world, "especially the highly developed capitalist countries," denounced the initiative as a crude attempt to extend Soviet influence. In Shelepin's eyes, the hostile "Western" propaganda campaign had already unsettled Third World governments:[1] "Under the influence of reactionary propaganda and due to the lack of necessary information of the Soviet side they have started to develop the familiar distrust regarding the true aims of the University's foundation." The Soviet Union's top security officer showed surprising understanding for Third World bureaucracies. From his point of view, these officials could not help but grow nervous about the fact that "a lot of people who want to study in the USSR directly contact Soviet representatives ... or the University, thus bypassing national governmental institutions which are responsible for matters of education." In fact, Shelepin nourished an unnatural skepticism and dutifully cautioned against the unforeseen dangers of rushed demands toward the Soviet home front: capitalist spies and agents might been

able to abuse too much Soviet hospitality for their sinister aims.[2] The project's shortcomings and uncertainties notwithstanding, neither the experienced *apparatchik*, nor members of the political leadership risked questioning at the time the general significance and prospects of Nikita Khrushchev's latest brainchild.

Four years later, Khrushchev's critics did take that risk. In preparing the showdown of October 1964, the conspirators also voiced criticism concerning Soviet activities in the Third World. Indeed, they upheld the Soviet "international duty" to support the "younger" states with material and ideological aid, and they pledged to continue Moscow's contributions to the education of "national cadres." Nevertheless, Khrushchev's former colleagues struck a more sober note:

> As a matter of fact, Americans, Frenchmen, English, and Germans for centuries have occupied dominant positions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They have built their bastions there, economic and military, they know the situation, manners and customs, the living conditions of these peoples well, and they have their cadres there. The people of the countries use their language. But we, without knowing anything about these countries, occasionally provide them with financial, technical-economic, military and other aid.

"The results," Khrushchev's would-be successors concluded, "often made us weep. ... The capitalists are laughing at us, and they are right to do so."[3]

Embedded in the logic of Soviet power struggles, confronted with mechanisms of Cold War zero-sum games, and mitigated by shared ideological convictions about socialist, self-sustaining progress in the world, even such sharp criticism would not necessarily lead to thorough course corrections. Therefore, the anti-Khrushchev argument should not be misread as an indicator for immediate fundamental changes of foreign policy strategies after Khrushchev's fall.[4] Instead, it may serve as an introduction to relevant specifics in the formulation, realization, focus, self-conception, and blind spots of Soviet education of Third World elites. The deliberations underline the importance of the Cold War for Soviet international educational, as well as broader cultural programs. Besides, they point to the dependence of corresponding Soviet undertakings on the goodwill of Third World audiences. For their part, these audiences did not constitute a monolithic, uniform addressee. Governments might have had other objectives than their citizens,

and future students bore a stratum of different social or cultural backgrounds and career designs.

The assessments of Soviet security and party officials alike demonstrated a certain, yet limited – and ineffective – sense for the relevance of Third World domestic constellations and perceptions for Soviet trans-boundary activities. For historians, the multidimensional reality of Soviet elite formation in Third World countries proves to be a promising field in which to test interdisciplinary approaches and methodical innovations for the exploration of Soviet international strategies towards – as well as of Soviet experiences of interconnected challenges of – the Cold War, postcolonial developments, and inter-cultural interactions.[5] Early scholarly observers used to discuss Soviet educational programs from the perspective of the East–West conflict. In contrast, more recent approaches have explored their cultural dimensions in some detail.[6] Obviously, the programs constituted a crucial intersection of foreign policy considerations and inter-cultural realities. The indissoluble interconnection of political, racial, social, and gender aspects requires a balanced combination of all relevant perspectives in order to acquire a comprehensive, differentiated picture of the possibilities and limits of Soviet international initiatives.

This chapter focuses on the constitutive phase under Khrushchev. During this era, already existing educational programs for foreigners were thematically and regionally expanded. The founding of the Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow in 1960 (named after Patrice Lumumba in 1961) signalled these new dimensions of Soviet activities. The expansion of traditional approaches and the adaptation to international constellations under Khrushchev predetermined the direction, as well as the problems of, the developments to come.[7]

In principle, Soviet educational agencies differentiated Third World countries in accordance with their – assumed – socialist maturation. Third World countries with an approved socialist order (like North Korea or Mongolia) were always entitled to vast Soviet commitments. Under Khrushchev, pure socio-political categorizations were no longer congruent with foreign-policy distinctions between aligned and non-aligned countries. Therefore, the relatively disparate "non-aligned movement" emerged as a second target group for Soviet educational offensives. In fact, Moscow's relations with non-socialist countries represented the real test of the attractiveness, applicability, and transferability of the Soviet model by peaceful means. Moscow regarded India as a key to gaining a foothold in the non-aligned Third World. India on her part was essentially disposed to absorb as much ingredients

of "modernization" and development as possible and seemed to be a promising partner for Moscow's offers.[8]

Incidentally, the Soviet educational initiatives in the Third World were to provide the model for later endeavors of the USSR's European allies.[9] Despite endless proclamations of successful socialist planning and development, the so-called Eastern bloc was, throughout its existence, characterized by sharp discrepancies in terms of industrialization, (higher) education, technology, and science.[10] Different "stages of development" led to specific national interests and varying possibilities for providing economic or educational support to Third World countries in the international arena (see Tables 13.1 and 13.2).

Comparative studies about socialist educational programs for foreign students represent one of the urgent research desiderata in Cold War historiography. The materials of responsible Comecon institutions reflect the ambivalence of joint efforts. Since 1961, the Comecon's Standing Committee for coordination of technical aid conscientiously enumerated "the coordination of the activities of the member-states of the Comecon with regard to ... the education of national cadres for developing countries" among its main tasks. Nevertheless, results kept falling short of expectations and promises.[13] Apart from shifts and rifts in Eastern Europe, open splits in the world communist movement caution against all generalizing assessments of a "socialist elite formation for the Third World." In the late 1970s, for example, Soviet authorities invested considerable energy into uncovering and eliminating "Maoist" tendencies among visiting students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[14]

First years

The Soviet offer of cooperation was not designed as a contribution to the formation of Third World elites. In fact, Soviet authorities described it as selfless assistance to the formation of national cadres, aimed at "strengthening the economic and political independence" of new states.[15] In Soviet interpretation, the term "cadre" described politically loyal professionals on all levels, including the economy, science, the police, the bureaucracy, the military, and the administration. Naturally, Indian as well as Soviet organizers attached special importance to the education of highly qualified cadres for future leadership positions.

The first Soviet attempt at building distinguished cadres for the so-called Peoples of the East took place in the early 1920s in the form of the "Communist University of the Toilers of the East" (KUTV). In 1925,

Table 13.1 Students from the Third World in Comecon countries, 1963–6[11]

	1963	1964	1965	Including from (by 1 Jan 1965):				1966
in:				Asia	India	Africa	Latin America	
Bulgaria	744	903	1059	519	0	492	48	1029
Hungary	258	390	496	199	7	259	38	539
GDR	1388	1582	2065	741	95	939	172	2298
Poland	452	465	917	354	13	481	82	1256
Romania	222	291	411	178	8	142	91	418
USSR	6054	6961	9049	4143	248	4029	877	9493
Czechoslovakia	1743	1947	1940	923	23	742	275	2059
In all	10861	12539	15937	7057	394	7084	1583	17092

Table 13.2 Students from the Third World in Comecon countries, by field of study, 1 Jan 1965[12]

	Total	including:						
Field of study:		Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania	USSR	Czechoslovakia
Industry, construction, transport, communication	5530	349	122	672	217	183	3303	684
Agriculture	1008	84	22	245	24	40	489	104
Economy and law	1670	82	43	205	207	38	774	321
Education, art, cinematography	1049	53	17	100	18	37	629	195
Health, sport	2927	272	116	366	151	113	1546	363
Preparatory	3579	258	176	264 (incl. mathematic and natural science)	300	?	2308	273
In all	15763	1098 (incl. 39 Cuban)	496	1852	917	411	9049	1940

Stalin, in a programmatic speech in front of a student audience, explained underlying Soviet motivations: "The task of the University of the Peoples [*sic*] is to forge them into genuine revolutionaries, armed with the theory of Leninism and capable of conscientiously fulfilling the immediate tasks facing the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries."[16] Obviously, the KUTV was part and parcel of the global revolutionary vision of the Moscow-dominated Comintern. Due partly to the fiasco of the Comintern's strategy in China and partly to power struggles in Moscow and to European developments, the revolutionary approach had lost its importance at the end of the 1920s. Finally, students and teachers alike perished during the Great Terror, and the KUTV was dissolved at the end of the 1930s.[17]

Altogether, the ambitious KUTV project was characterized by several distinguishing marks and undercurrents that would reveal its lasting impact on forthcoming Soviet designs of educational cooperation. First, Soviet programs were based on axiomatic assumptions of the inevitable attraction of the Soviet economic and social model. At the same time, they implied Moscow's claim to guidance or leadership with every right to control and regulate foreign citizens. As such, they were directly linked with the process of forging loyalty to the state and its leadership. The KUTV did not only care about the formation of powerful and effective revolutionary cadres for other countries, but also aimed to cement and enforce Soviet international influence as well. To put it another way: the KUTV's program aimed at supporting revolutionary-proletarian leadership on national levels and cementing the Soviet Communist Party's dominance in world communism.[18]

Post-Stalinism

Needless to say, the USSR of the 1950s/1960s hardly resembled the Soviet Union of the 1920s, and international structures and possibilities had fundamentally changed as well. In 1925, Stalin had described the immediate revolutionary tasks of dedicated fighters; Khrushchev's formation of cadres for the "Third World" took place under different international conditions as well as within changed Soviet ideological prescriptions and strategies. The new Soviet leadership had declared an overall peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism and wooed Third World countries as quasi-natural allies in the anti-imperialist struggle.[19] The necessary expansion of international relations, with its limited openings towards countries of the First and Third World, was to pose new challenges to Soviet economics, science, and culture.

The renowned Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSS in February 1956, apart from officially launching de-Stalinization, did not only adopt Khrushchev's guidelines for peaceful competition, but served as a wake-up call to Soviet specialists for countries of the Third World. Mikoyan's caustic criticism of the "dozing," ivory-tower oriental studies led to bustling activism in the floors of the Institute for Oriental studies of the Academy of Sciences (IVAN).[20] Soviet orientalists instantly adapted to the Communist Party's new foreign policy and ideological guidelines. At the same time, party authorities called upon their scholars to propagate the performance – in official parlance, the achievements – of Soviet science and technology both more intensively and more aggressively. In this context, Soviet political and scholarly agitators singled out education systems in Central Asian and trans-Caucasian republics to underline the positive effects of Moscow's rule under non-European conditions.[21]

Leading Soviet scholars in internal reports and official announcements again and again declared their full understanding of, and support for, the new Party line. The Director of IVAN, Bobodzhan Gafurov, for example now vehemently deplored the dependence of India's society on "Western," bourgeoisie mass media and propaganda for information about Soviet "achievements" and ideology.[22] A conference of representatives of Soviet Oriental studies, equipped with a clear understanding of political-ideological demands and having in mind future career prospects, followed suit by attacking the prevailing "monopolization" of Oriental Studies by the West.[23] The Academy of Science also pressed for Marxist-Leninist corrections of bourgeoisie interpretations of the Indian anti-British movement. Last, but not least, the Director of the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Anushavan A. Arzumanyan, summarized the Soviet scholars' responsibility as follows: "If Soviet scholars do not participate in the elaboration of a theory of industrialization for underdeveloped countries, the topic will pass completely into the hands of bourgeoisie scholars of the West."[24]

Thus the mobilization and internationalization of Soviet scholars remained interconnected with the global socialist struggle against world capitalism. Apart from the general expansion of Soviet academic-ideological influence, the professional qualification of national cadres by Soviet teachers furthermore constituted an integral part of the declared competition. It fitted into ideological undercurrents of Soviet economic aid towards developing countries, which was designed to "undermine the positions of Imperialism, to stimulate the national liberation movement, and to use all resources and possibilities for the formation of the most advantageous conditions for the maturation of the socialist revolution."[25]

While paying special attention to the peaceful restructuring of Third World societies, the Soviet State Party did not forget its parallel claim to international prominence. On 3 November 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSS, in anticipation of increasing numbers of Third World students in the USSR, issued a special order about the supervision these should receive. The Party leadership decreed that "every day, Party, Komsomol and Trade Union organizations as well as directors of universities have to pay attention to questions of training, education, and everyday life of foreign students, so that they leave the higher Soviet educational institutions not only as highly qualified specialists, but as people with progressive views, as sincere friends of the Soviet Union."[26] In this regard, the Soviet educational programs for Third World students directly took up the central motives of the pre-war institutions as well as those driving the extensive training of cadres for East European Peoples' Democracies since the late 1940s.[27]

As in the cases of KUTV and East European students, Soviet apparatuses continued to claim exclusive competence in judgments about the "sincerity," "progressiveness," and "loyalty" of Third World students.[28] So, Leningrad officials in 1962 felt annoyed by the "immoral" behavior of African and Asian guests and demanded "more intensive political education";[29] similar complaints were registered by CC-bureaucrats or KGB-observers during the 1960s and 1970s. Soviet perceptions were clearly framed by ideological categorizations which did not cover the complexities of the foreign students' experiences.

Overall, there is only scattered information about the alumni of the Peoples' Friendship University. Apart from Mahmud Abbas, who in 1982 wrote a dissertation about alleged secret connections between Nazi and Zionist leaders during World War II, leading personalities of the Third World are not known to hold degrees of the Peoples' Friendship University. Another famous student, "Carlos the jackal," was relegated after the first year because of hooliganism, defamation of the USSR, and molestation of fellow students.[30]

Soviet universities

Inner continuities of Soviet educational motivations notwithstanding, the late 1950s were marked by clear quantitative progress. The expansion of Soviet capacities for Third World students reflected the increasing effectiveness of the Soviet educational system as well as the offensive international spirit of the USSR's leadership. Besides, the "wind of change" in Africa added to the Soviet determination to make – after

Stalin's less successful handling of the initial steps of decolonization in Asia – the best of the worldwide anticolonial wave.

Purposeful debates about additional education facilities for Third World students at Soviet universities had started in the spring of 1959.[32] During the discussions, the Presidium of the CC (that is, the party's highest level) subjected to evaluation the deliberations of a certain I. S. Isakov, Admiral and Corresponding Member of the Academy of Science. In a letter to the CC Isakov had suggested several measures to intensify Soviet relations with the "negro" (!) population of the US. The competent CC-Departments preferred another regional focus – since "African negroes are building their own states" – and drafted recommendations for a new stage of Soviet relations with the Third World in general. The reception of students figured prominently in these papers. It was considered to be a multipurpose instrument: it would support the political and cultural development of new states in general and their struggle for independence in particular. At the same time, it would contribute to the popularization of Soviet achievements and would emphasize Soviet solidarity with the national liberation movement.[33] With his preference for quick and easy solutions for complex problems, Khrushchev, after a couple of weeks, officially announced Moscow's decision to establish the Peoples' Friendship University on 21 February 1960 during a visit to the Indonesian University of Yogyakarta.

From the very beginning, the Peoples' University suffered under the incompatibility between ambitious political designs and socialist – Soviet – limitations. Khrushchev's opening address (17 November 1960) contained the bombastic promise that the new university "with regard to working and living conditions will not lag behind universities of the US, of England, France, or West Germany."[34] Nevertheless, the protracted planning and construction process revealed all the imaginable problems of a Soviet-type planned economy. As late as 1963–4, the Lumumba university still lagged behind even Soviet universities.

Furthermore, to underline the worldwide symbolic significance of the anticolonial institution, drafts of the Soviet scholar-cultural establishment had suggested demonstrative generosity. They had envisioned a spacious campus with a kindergarten, a guest house, and splendid furnishings – to be imported from capitalist countries. The Council of Ministers – with Khrushchev as the chair – radically reduced these visions as "improper extravagance" and cut them down to usual Soviet standards. The hallmark of Soviet–Third World friendship symbolized neither socialist modernity nor its material abundance, but the limits of real existing socialism.

Shortcomings were not confined to the material world. The already mentioned complaints of Soviet officials testify to the general difficulties of Soviet society, science, and administration to adjust to non-European, non-socialist students. Official and internal statements underline the Soviet proclivity towards political-ideological assessments. In fact, Soviet authorities showed a disturbing tendency even to subsume foreign complaints about Soviet racist attitudes and misdeeds as "anti-Soviet" or "hooligan" behavior of the victims themselves.[35] At the bottom of the tensions more objective observers would find widespread student dissatisfaction with general living conditions in Russia's big cities. Some cases were based on Soviet-foreign clashes over petty – mutual – thefts or took place in the context of black marketing, others against the background of male – macho – infighting after drinking excesses. In addition, several incidents were colored – or caused – by open xenophobic hostility and the racist prejudices of Soviet citizens.[36] Ideological reservations against apolitical or "bourgeoisie" students from above could overlap with racist or patriarchal attitudes towards non-European foreigners and the bitterness of the ordinary rivalry for meager resources from below.[37] "As a rule," reads the conclusion of the KGB's analysis of Indian students' behavior in the 1970s, "they are only interested in their studies and in private matters. In general, these individuals keep themselves busy with speculation, drunkenness, and unmoral excesses."[38]

Indian responses

On the governmental level, Jawaharlal Nehru especially, on his long way to independence, had developed a clear interest in closer contacts with the Soviet Union. "We want to be specially friendly with Russia because we are convinced not only that we can learn much from her but also because she represents, in our view, in many ways the future pattern," Nehru informed his sister, the Indian ambassador to Moscow, V. L. Pandit, in early 1948.[39] Obviously, Nehru based his friendly curiosity on the Soviet esteem for scientific-technological solutions of economic and social problems on impressive increases in the USSR's industrial production, and on the propagated expansion of educational and living standards.[40] In short: Nehru isolated those aspects of Soviet reality which could be integrated into his own conception of modern development in India. Indian initiatives to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1946 were administered by Krishna Menon, a close confidant of Nehru with leftist leanings.[41] As early as 1946, Menon

considered dispatches of Indian students to the USSR as a contribution to the development of cordial relations between the two countries.[42] At this time, Indian explorations were met with no response by Stalin's Moscow. According to Molotov, until 1949 "material difficulties" prevented any Soviet reception of Indian students.[43] Stalin did not develop a sensibility for the opportunities of educational exchange programs in the following years either.[44] As late as 1955, Soviet authorities counted only "three to four" Indian students in the USSR (see Table 13.3).[45]

Although the conclusion of a first cultural agreement in 1960 contributed to a certain increase in Indian students in Moscow, Kiev, or Leningrad, their total number remained surprisingly limited (Table 13.4).[46] It was the Indian situation that proved to be somewhat counterproductive. Indeed, Nehru's modernization project was progressing slowly. The production of possible candidates for Soviet universities – with their focus on technological and engineering faculties – yielded only modest results until the beginning of the 1960s. The faculty-wide break-up of figures for university enrolment in India resembled the pattern of colonial universities: in 1960–1, among 103 million students, 487,000 were enrolled for Arts, 29,400 for science, and a meager 45,000 for engineering and technology. The corresponding figures for 1963–4 show only a slight shift in individual priorities.[47] Besides, the worsening of financial and economic conditions in India made the Government of India increasingly hesitant to invest large sums of foreign currency into an intensification of Indo-Soviet cultural and scientific relations;[48] incidentally, India preferred to spend some of her resources on Indian educational assistance to other Asian and African countries to substantiate India's aspirations for international standing.[49]

Besides, Nehru himself felt uneasy about communist activities in Asia and Europe. The intensified relations since the mid-1950s notwithstanding, the Indian prime minister remained doubtful about Moscow's long-term intentions and core values. In his conversations with the Soviet leadership in December 1955, Nehru had expressed his distrust concerning international activities of communist parties in general.[50] Just a few weeks after the dissolution of the suspicious Cominform, the Soviet handling of the Hungarian crisis once again cast doubt on the Kremlin's anticolonial merits and its devotion to non-interference in foreign countries' affairs. Throughout the whole period, the Indian Communist Party did nothing to improve the image of communism in official circles, and border clashes with China added fuel to the fire. Finally, while Nehru's dominance in principal questions of foreign policy was – at least until the end of 1962 – hardly disputed,

Table 13.3 Third World and Indian students in the USSR, 1956–66, 1978

Year	Students from				
	India			Asia	Africa, Asia, Latin America
		including:			
		Universities, colleges	Peoples' University Moscow (Lumumba-Univ.)		
18 Dec 1956	6				
20 Nov 1959	31			114	
8 Dec 1961	113	87	26		4864 ("developing countries"; incl. Cuba)
1962			30		
15 May 1962	183 (academic year 1962/3)	118	65		7397 (academic year 1962/3)
1 Jan 1965	248			4143	9049 (developing countries)
1 Jan 1966	265			4351	9493 (developing countries)
1978	395				

Table 13.4 Foreign students at the Peoples' University Moscow, 1960–66[31]

Year	In all*				
		Faculty			
		History/ Philology	Engineering	Medicine	Economics/ Law
1960	554 (all preparatory)	–	–	–	–
1961	1151	37	83	121	88
1962	1847	85	291	277	197
1963	2647	150	528	416	322
1964	3347	210	783	536	437
1965	3764	233	955	656	464
1966	3852	245	1002	655	470

*Total figure includes preparatory and others.

governmental decisions about students in the USSR and their bureaucratic implementation always had to reconcile (timit) supporters with (strict) adversaries of Indo-Soviet cooperation on all levels of Indian decision-making and -execution;[51] critics bolstered up their objections, for instance, with negative experiences of courses in Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s.[52]

Irrespective of their political susceptibility to future perspectives and the repercussions of Soviet-Indian collaboration, all governmental wings and senior bureaucrats agreed on the necessity to keep the whole process under constant surveillance and strict control. At least in the 1950s, the Indian candidates for Soviet universities were selected by an inner circle of the Indian Cabinet. Its proceedings were highly confidential, and its decisions were regarded as of the uppermost political importance. Hence even leading representatives of the Indian educational establishment were excluded from the deliberations.[53] According to later KGB sources, Indian students had to sign pledges of loyalty before being allowed to leave for Soviet universities. During their studies, the Indian embassy in Moscow maintained close contact with their compatriots. An additional annual grant courtesy of the Indian authorities certainly made everyday life as well as political steadfastness easier for the students concerned.[54] To sum up, India's fervor to control Indian students in the USSR corresponded to the Congress leadership's eagerness to determine the development of loyal scientific-technological elites in accordance with the needs and priorities formulated by Indian state authorities. Students' claims to self-determination, which did not fit into the official understanding of modernization or social order, evoked nothing but criticism from above.[55] Consequently, the Nehru government had no interest in opening gateways for possible, deviant Soviet indoctrination of its prospective leading cadres.

Irrespective of governmental deliberations, the majority of Indian students proved to be relatively unimpressed by Soviet possibilities as well. Under Indian conditions, it was first and foremost the existing social elites who could have perceived studies in the USSR as an alternative, additional chance for their offspring. Nevertheless, quantitative comparisons of Indian educational programs at Western European and/or American Universities with corresponding figures for the Soviet Union (and the Comecon, in this instance) testify[56] that the Indian established elites did not see any reason to substitute unknown perspectives in the USSR for proven certainties in the West. The students – and their families – saw exchange programs as additional instruments to strengthen individual (or family) positions and career chances in independent India. They did

not necessarily link up individual advancement with lofty ideas about national progress (or modernization, socialism, and development).[57] Objective problems with Soviet courses, such as longer stays due to necessary additional language courses or non-recognition of Soviet diplomas in India, amplified the inherent competitive advantage of the well-known Western institutions against their rising Soviet counterparts. English-based and capitalist-inspired education was expected to serve private Indian career patterns more successfully. Therefore, the educated circles in India did not press for a thorough re-orientation of Indian educational cooperation with foreign countries.

In the confrontation with the Indian combination of governmental sensitivities and widespread social preferences, alternative approaches like the Lumumba-University could hardly be expected to succeed. Indeed, the new foundation's explicit appeal to lower sections of society in 1960 elicited about 19,000 applications from India alone, thus suggesting a kind of international "market gap" in the education of non-elite Indians[58] – but, as mirrored in official statistics and internal reports, the Indian side preferred to continue its politically and socially selective exploitation of Soviet offers.[59] Against the background of similar recruitment difficulties in other parts of the Third World, the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Middle Education noted in January 1962 that Third World countries tended to send too many "bourgeoisie elites" to Soviet universities.[60] The correction of the social composition of foreign students in the USSR remained one of the main concerns of Soviet authorities in the years to come.

Indian experiences

Eventually, individual experiences of Indian students at Soviet universities constitute a more or less unknown chapter of history.[61] There is no reason to expect professional dissatisfaction with Soviet institutions. The immediate impact of concrete living (and climate) conditions on Indian students depended on their scholarly fervor and career aims, as well as on expectations and predispositions. It might be assumed that a part of individual frustrations with Soviet queues and assortments simply reflected the nebulous, uninformed hopes of Indian students, or constituted unexpected repercussions of simplistic Soviet foreign propaganda.[62]

Extended stays in the Soviet Union during the 1960s hardly transformed non-committed observers into true believers in communism. Even in the case of superficially more socialist tempered guests it

remained difficult to distinguish between Marxist and nationalist components of Soviet-educated anti-imperialists. This is exemplified by the report of a member of the Soviet Section of the Foreign Office's Research Department, R. A. Longmire, in May 1958, regarding a conversation with an Indian graduate from Moscow State University, Mr. Deshmut. According to the British official, Mr. Deshmut's personal "ideological" baggage expressed itself, above all, in an "emotional and anti-colonial nationalism ... He was, for instance, annoyed by such minutiae as the term "English tea," which he claimed to have heard used here for the Indian product, and the continued British possession of the Koh-I-Noor-diamond obviously rankled."[63]

On the other hand, since the late 1940s several Indian contemporary diplomatic and business travelers or journalists were allowing – or compelling – themselves to detect positive manifestations of the Soviet project that were relevant for Indian students as well. As for all Third World citizens, the question of Soviet racism played an important role in Indian descriptions. In contrast to the above-mentioned African experiences, a number of Indian accounts accentuated the absence of racist attitudes in the USSR during the 1950s and 1960s.[64] In 1964, the Moscow correspondent of the *Times of India* – a white American with "two daughters of Afro-American descent" – discussed at length recent clashes between police forces and African students after a Ghanaian demonstration on the Red Square.[65] He explained the bloody encounter as the result of a "combination of circumstance and the hysteria of a few malcontents" among the African students. Depicting Russians as "a reserved and sensitive people, formal in their manners and, particularly the women, extremely modest and insistent on respect," the journalist blamed unrealistic ideals and expectations on both sides (as evoked by the general "carnival spirit" during the Moscow Youth Festival in 1957), male Russian jealousy against foreigners, and African arrogance for the given escalation of inter-cultural communication problems. This contemporary analysis is not to be taken as an authoritative, generally valid explanation, and it barely conceals its social standards. Nevertheless, together with other evidence, such descriptions suggest that racial discrimination was not always and not inevitably part of Indians' experiences in Khrushchev's USSR.

Conclusion

Since Soviet designs ignored the starting positions of Indian participants and the real possibilities of the USSR, the education of Indian

students at Soviet universities constituted only a limited contribution to the formation of an Indian elite. At the same time, the achievement of far-reaching political Soviet aims were impeded by shortcomings and inner contradictions of the Soviet programs, which the classical remedies – propaganda, the mobilization of Party and State functionaries, and the search for scapegoats – could not solve. Obviously Soviet instruments were unable to exert any decisive influence on Indian structures, aims, and predispositions. Essentially, the Soviet venture had to operate within an Indian framework, thus continuing the interconnected history of foreign education of Indians.[66]

This was also true for other projects of Soviet cadre-formation. Apart from scholarships for Indian students in the USSR, the Soviet Union assisted educational endeavors in India. The most important and most ambitious undertaking in this field was the Soviet aid in building the Indian Institute for Technology in Bombay from 1955 onwards.[67] The original cooperation schemes had planned 15 Soviet professors and lectors in Bombay who were supposed to "popularize the achievements of Soviet science and technology." Soon, the responsible USSR Ministry for Education faced the bitter truth that the USSR was incapable of finding the necessary number of Soviet specialists with an appropriate knowledge of English or with at least approximate ideas about India and her role in Soviet international affairs. The deficit led to a sharp reduction in Soviet staff: India and the USSR agreed on having five Soviet teachers in Bombay, leading for the time being to the predominance of Western colleagues even in the Soviet-built institution.[68] Equally, Soviet plans for organized, officially approved, and high-level teaching of the Russian language in India by Soviet teachers continued to lag behind the entrenched range of English-speaking products in dimension and intensity.[69]

The sector of vocational education was characterized by similar blatant disproportions between Western and Soviet efforts as well, although the Soviet Union paid special attention to this form of technology transfer.[70] Since the success of Moscow-provided heavy industry plants depended to a certain degree on the creation of Indian skilled workers, the USSR took pains to provide for the education and training of Indian technicians, operators, and engineers. Starting with the famous Bhilai plant in 1955, the programs covered several thousand Indians who learned their new business on the spot or underwent comprehensive professional training in Soviet factories.[71] Unsurprisingly, quasi-official Soviet and Indian reports highlight the expertise and openness of Soviet overseers and the studiousness and talent of their Indian apprentices.[72] Careers

of former trainees in the Indian industry – including in companies of Western aid origin – seem to testify to the impeccable professional standards of Soviet instructions.[73] Again, long-term political effects are hard to determine. The Nehru-government and its successors did not question the loyalty of Soviet-educated technicians and engineers. Their careers point once again to the partial compatibility of Indian development and modernization plans with Soviet foreign aid imperatives.

Indian absorptions of the Soviet model remained selective. The Indian utilization of Soviet cooperation in the field of elite formation followed its own priorities. Indian development plans and ideas proved to have a decisive impact on the implementation of Soviet initiatives and did not fit into the conventional pattern of the East–West conflict. Nevertheless, from Moscow's point of view, the educational cooperation was an integral part of the global competition. In this context, the formation of an Indian elite demonstrated Khrushchev's objective inability to compete with the "West" under "Western" conditions – his successors were to face similar experiences. At the same time, existing official reservations on both sides and the complex impact of domestic frameworks in both societies served as relatively potent barriers for inter-cultural contacts. The social depth of the USSR's acclaimed international solidarity remained disputable. On the other hand, Indian (non-representative) surveys of 1961 highlighted the importance of the human factor, of direct contacts in shaping the Indian public perception of Soviet and "Western" actors. Here, representatives of the Soviet workers left a mixed impression within the Indian public: in comparison to Western competitors, Russians scored highly in the categories "industriousness" and "bravery," but were regarded to be more "fanatic" and "dominant" as well.[74] Indian approaches notwithstanding, the USSR's policy did not encourage real private contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners, neither abroad nor in the Soviet Union. The Soviet approach to elite formation in the Third World was characterized by a conscious disregard for the human dimension, thus impeding the creation of international social relations which would have substantiated pledges of common aims towards a new, socialist future.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the term "Third World," see Vijay Prashad (2007: XIVff.) and B. R. Tomlinson (2003: 307–21). For Soviet parlance, see Ragna Boden (2006: 99–100). In accordance with conventions of traditional Cold War historiography, the terms "First World" or "West" are used for the industrialized

North Atlantic community, "Second World" or "East" for its Cold War enemies, and Third World or "South" with regard to the (former) colonial or dependent countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

2. Information Shelepin to Central Committee (CC), 13 June 1960 in A. B. Davidson and S. V. Mazov (eds.) (1999: 316–18).
3. Draft Report Presidium CC CPSS, 13 October 1964 in A. N. Artizov et al. (eds.) (2007: 182ff., 200–1).
4. Andreas Hilger (2009b).
5. See the research reports by Tobias Rupprecht (2011) and Andreas Hilger (2009a).
6. For example, Seymour M. Rosen (1973) and Constantin Kastakioris (2007: 83–106).
7. In addition, the archival situation for the post-Khrushchev years is even worse than for the 1950s and early 1960s.
8. Benjamin Zachariah (2005) and Sunil Khilnani (2003).
9. Seymour Rosen (1973).
10. Comecon's passionate debates about the "socialist division of labor" in the 1960s prove to be a reliable indicator for unequal structural conditions. Ralf Ahrens (2000).
11. Statistical data Office Comecon, Department Coordination of technical aid, 1 January 1966, Bundesarch Berlin (BArch), DL 2, VA 6773, folder 677/66; Report Standing Commission Comecon for Coordination of technical aid, 1 January 1965, BArch, DL 2, VA 6770, folder 675/65 (by 1 January 1965).
12. Report Standing Commission Comecon for Coordination of technical aid, 1 January 1965, BArch, DL 2, VA 6770, folder 675/65.
13. Report Delegation GDR about 2nd session, 11–12 January 1962, BArch, DL 2, VA 6763, folder 24/62; Delegation GDR in Standing Commission for Coordination of technical aid, Information about implementation of recommendations of XVIII. Comecon-session, October 1963, BArch, DL 2, VA 6770, folder 615/65; Report Standing Commission for Coordination of technical aid to 10th Session Executive Committee Comecon, BArch, DL 2, VA 6770, folder 874/65.
14. 5th Department KGB, Information about "Maoist" subversion among students from developing countries, 1977, BStU Berlin, MfS-HA XX, No. 6179, pp. 1ff.
15. See Khrushchev's public announcement of the foundation of the Peoples' Friendship University, 21 February 1960, in Nikita Khrushchev (1961) O vneshnej politike Sovetskogo Sojuza. 1960 god, Vol. 1, (Moscow): 129–39.
16. The political task of the University of the Peoples of the East. Speech delivered at a meeting of students of the KUTV, 18 May 1925, Joseph Stalin (1947: 219).
17. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew (1996), Leonid G. Babitschenko (1993: 37–59) and N. N. Timofeeva (1976) "Kommunisticheskij universitet trudjashchikhsja vostoka (KUTV)," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2: 47–57 and (1979) No. 5: 30–42.
18. Report Political Referent ICCI (Comintern), Naumann, about "counterrevolutionary" activities in the South African Section of KUTV, 26 August 1936, A. B. Davidson and S. V. Mazov (1999: 334–5) and Michael Twaddle (1992: 1–22).

19. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (2006) and Vladislav M. Zubok (2007).
20. Director Institute for Orient Studies (IVAN), Gafurov, to CC, 1 July 1957, about Conference of Orientalists in Tashkent, 4–11 June 1957, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 56, pp. 51ff.; Gafurov to CC-Secretary Mukhitdinov, 21 February 1958, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 78, pp. 1ff. See Ragan Boden (2006: 233–40).
21. For example, Speech of Soviet Deputy Representative at the United Nations, Arkadev, at 1013rd session ECOSOC, 25 April 1958, in United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 25th session, 15 April–2 May 1958, New York.
22. Gafurov to CC, 22 April 1958, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 78, pp. 10–11.
23. Intellectual – direct or indirect – debts of Third World authors, including Edward Said, with Marxist/Soviet analyses are discussed by Vera Tolz (2008: 53–81).
24. Arzumanjan to CC-Secretary Mukhitdinov, 15 April 1959, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 115, p. 30.
25. Plenum CC, Report Kozlov about "Meeting of representatives of Communist and Working Parties in Bucharest," 16 July 1960, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 476, pp. 69ff., at p. 75.
26. Resolution CC KPSS, 3 November 1960 in A. B. Davidson and S. V. Mazov (1999: 326).
27. Patryk Babiracki (2007: 199–235).
28. In detail, Deputy Minister for Higher and Middle education, Prokof'ev, to CC, 9 August 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 14, d. 20, l. 27ff.
29. Oblast-Committee CK, to CC, 19 November 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 202, pp. 102ff.
30. Tobias Rupprecht, Progress – desarrollo – modernization. Konzepte von Fortschritt und Modernität in der geteilten sowjetisch-lateinamerikanischen Geschichte 1956–66, Thesis Tübingen 2007, p. 69. The dissertation is Makhmud Abbas, Svjazi mezhdu Sionizmom and Natsizmom 1933–1945, Moscow 1982.
31. Ustinov to Council of Ministers, 5 August 1964, GARF, f. 5446, op. 98, d. 1353.
32. Minutes CC-Commission for ideology, culture, and international party-relations, No. 29, 14–25 May 1959, RGANI, f. 11, op. 1, d. 118.
33. Head Science Department CC, Kirillin, and Deputy Head International Department CC, Tereshkin, to CC, 3 December 1959, RGANI, f. 11, op. 1, d. 452, pp. 35ff., 51–2.
34. Quoted in Report Mosgorispolkom, Promyslov, Ministry for Higher and middle education, Prokof'ev, and Lumumba-University, Rumyancev, to Council of Ministers, 8 May 1964, GARF, f. 5446, op. 98, d. 1353, pp. 12ff.
35. Oblast-Committee CP, Leningrad, to CC, 19 November 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 202, pp. 102ff.
36. Judith Hessler (2006: 33–64), Sergej Mazov (1999: 89–103) and Constantin Kastakioris (2007). The gender dimension is tentatively discussed by Elizabeth Bishop (2009) and Rossen Djagalov and Christine Evans (2009).
37. Member of the Committee of Ministry for Higher and Middle education, Kulikov, to CC (Suslov), 4 January 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 202, l. 1ff.
38. 5th Department KGB, Information about "Maoist" subversion among students from developing countries, 1977, BStU Berlin, MfS-HA XX, No. 6179.

39. Nehru to Pandit, 23 January 1948, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, Private Papers of V. L. Pandit, 1st Instalment, Subject File No. 54; Nehru during reception for Soviet delegation to the Indian Science Conference, 7 January 1947, quoted in Suslov, report to Molotov, 6 March 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1068, pp. 30ff. For Nehru's dominance in matters of Indian foreign policy, see, among others, Sarvepalli Gopal (1979–84).
40. See Press Conference Nehru in London, 19 December 1956, quoted in letter British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, 20 December 1956, National Archives Kew, FO 371/122404. The development of Nehru's worldview since the 1920s is documented by Sarvepalli Gopal (1976–84), Jawaharlal Nehru (1946) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1934–5).
41. K. T. Varkey (2002).
42. Menon to Nehru, 19 October 1946, National Archives of India, New Delhi (NAI), 20 (4) Eur (Secret).
43. V. L. Pandit, Memo about talk with Molotov, 10 February 1949, NAI, 1 (33)-Eur. II.
44. The limited and instrumental approach of Soviet politics is reflected, for instance, in Scientific Secretary-General Academy of Science, Siskyan, 24 August 1951 to Head Foreign Policy Commission, Grigoryan, about international relations of Academy of Science, 1945–1951, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 502, pp. 63–85; Degtyar to CC, Report about Soviet delegation to India, December 1953 until January 1954, n. d., RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 70, pp. 1ff.; President Academy of Science, Nesmeyanov, to CC, 12 July 1954, RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 71, pp. 114ff.
45. Memo regarding discussion with Counsellor Soviet Embassy East Berlin, Aschurow, 23 February 1956, Political Archive Auswärtiges Amt Berlin (PA AA), MfAA, A 13935, pp. 5–6.
46. Cultural Agreement 12 February 1960, PA AA, MfAA, A 13919, pp. 20–3.
47. University Grants Commission (ed.) (1965: 49–50, 107–8, 136). Dietmar Rothermund (1994: 205–43, esp. 237–8) and Eric Ashby (1966: 137–42). Analogous findings in UNESCO (ed.) (1965: 204–5).
48. Memo Nehru, 3 December 1955, about Indo-Soviet cultural cooperation, in Jawaharlal Nehru (2002: 326ff.).
49. Letter Nehru to Chief Ministers, 15 August 1949 in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) (1985: 430ff.). Foreign and security specialist Panjushkin, in a letter to the CC, 4 March 1959, criticized the low level of Soviet participation in United Nations programs: "even India" was sending more experts abroad than the USSR, he deplored. RGANI, f. 5, op. 14, d. 19, pp. 12ff.
50. Record of conversation Nehru – Bulganin/Khrushchev, 12 December 1955 in Jawaharlal Nehru (2002: 334ff.).
51. See Transcript of Oral History, No. 363: K. P. S. Menon, 8 November 1976, NMML.
52. Pandit to Nehru, 7 February 1949, NMML, Private Papers of V. L. Pandit, 1st Instalment, Subject File 57.
53. Memo regarding conversation with Counsellor Soviet Embassy East Berlin, Aschurow, 23 February 1956, PA AA, MfAA, A 13935, pp. 5–6; Official diary 1st Secretary Soviet Embassy New Delhi, Charchenko, 12 September 1957, to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kuznetsov, and Department South East Asia MID, Volkov, AVP, f. 90, op. 19, papka 22, d. 9, pp. 53–4.

54. 5th Department KGB, Information about "Maoist" subversion among students from developing countries, 1977, BStU Berlin, MfS-HA XX, No. 6179, Bl. 1 ff.
55. *Times of India* (1963) 17 October: 8, V. V. John, Student unrest – academic anarchy; *Times of India* (1964) 13 November: 1, Orissa students resumes stir; *The Hindustan Times* (1960), Delhi Edition, 5 January: 6, Tendency to stay abroad deplored. Nehru asks scientists to serve India; Letter Nehru to Chief Ministers, 16 April 1949, in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) (1985: 321ff.). R. Gulati and K. Gulati (1972).
56. In 1950–60, there were 929 foreign students (from developing countries) in the USSR, 12,254 in the US, Klaus-Dieter Müller (1988: 98–9). Until December 1964, the USSR had educated 5500 workers/specialists and 8000 students/postgraduate, while one source counted about 50,000 students alone in Western countries. Bajbakov et al., 17 January 1966 to CC, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 81, d. 1775, pp. 30ff. In 1968, the USSR counted 12,735 students from the Third World, the FRG 14825. Hans Siegfried Lamm and Siegfried Kupper (1976: 140). For the period 1954–75, Jiri Elias (1977: 182–3) has registered about 37,000 Third-World graduates from Soviet institutions.
57. See a series of articles of the *Times of India* about Indian students in Western Europe and the US; among others: *Times of India* (1962) 24 March: 6, and *Times of India* (1962) 25 March: 10.
58. Report Kukin to Ideological Commission CC, 17 September 1960, RGANI, f. 11, op. 1, d. 507, pp. 110ff.
59. Deputy Head Trade Agency New Delhi, Fischer, to 2nd Non-European Department MfAA, 25 April 1961, about conversation with 1st Secretary Soviet embassy, Khropov, PA AA, MfAA A 13978, pp. 74–5.
60. Member of the Committee of Ministry for Higher and Middle education, Kulikov, to CC (Suslov), 4 January 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 202, l. 1 ff.
61. A more detailed discussion of Indian experiences in the GDR in the 1960s is Johannes Voigt (2008: 609–21) and V. P. Verma (1998).
62. This is suggested by accounts of British experiences with Third World guests: A. T. Carey (1956) and J. M. Lee (2006: 1–24).
63. Longmire to Northern Department F.O., 30 May 1958, National Archives Kew, FO 371/135374.
64. As early as 1947, "junior members" of the new Embassy in Moscow, see British Embassy to Ernest Bevin, 12 September 1947, British Library, India Office Records, L/PS/12/4639A; Report Delegation Shri K. D. Malaviya, about visit to USSR and Switzerland in June 1960, January 1961, NAI 13 (47), EUR. E/60.
65. Ralph Parker (1964) "Moscow Fortnight," *Times of India*, 19 January: 8.
66. Lynn Zastoupil (2002: 5–32).
67. The Soviet aid was financed in cooperation with corresponding aid funds of the UN Deputy Head Gosplan, Strokin, 20 June 1958 to Council of Ministers, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 57, d. 385, pp. 104–5. For broader contextualization of Indian aims and background, see Srirupa Roy (2007: 117–29).
68. Panjushkin to CC, 4 March 1959, RGANI, f. 5, op. 14, d. 19, pp. 12ff.; Report about activities of Soviet group in the Institute for Technology, 1 January–30 June 1962, 10 July 1962, RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 187, pp. 121ff.
69. A. Lingajammanni (1979) An enquiry into the impact of foreign countries on the system of education in India since 1947 (Mysore): 95ff.

70. Bajbakov et al. to CC, 17 January 1966, RGAE, f. 4372, op. 81, d. 1775, pp. 30ff.
71. The data is incomplete; the figure of about 2000–3000 technical cadres seems to be appropriate. N. R. Srinivasan (1984: 114–16) and K. Krishna Moorthy (1987: 105–6, 120–1).
72. N. R. Srinivasan (1984) and K. Krishna Moorthy (1987: xxx).
73. K. Krishna Moorthy (1984: 93–4, 103–4, 108–10, 116–17).
74. Jan Bodo Sperling (1965: 84–5, 89).

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