Britain and Wellington's Army

Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807-15

Kevin Linch

War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850

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For everyone who has supported and nurtured me:
For mum and dad
For my brothers, family and friends
For those that have taught me and from whom I have learnt
And most of all, for Gayle

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The Peninsular War of 1808–1814 and the Waterloo campaign of 1815 almost immediately captured popular attention, and these wars continue to generate publications. The literature on British involvement in the Napoleonic Wars is so vast that it would be prudent to offer an explanation as to why another monograph is necessary. Scholarly work over the past 30 years, particularly on continental Europe, has greatly enhanced historical understanding of the multifaceted impact of these wars. States across Europe had to respond to a new intensity in warfare. Mostly, this response was to introduce conscription and expand state bureaucracy and power, a case of having to adopt French practices to beat the French. Furthermore, the intensity of warfare in Europe between 1792 and 1815 had a complex and enduring impact on European society and culture well into the nineteenth century. Britain, however, appears to be an exception. It never introduced conscription and did not do so until 1916 in the midst of the next Great War, and the British Army stagnated until the Crimean War provided a sharp lesson in the realities of modern warfare. This assessment, however, is largely impressionistic and anecdotal and not based on comprehensive research. This work investigates the overlooked history of how Britain was able to sustain an almost continuous, seven-year commitment to fighting the French in continental Europe and the lasting impact that these wars had on Britain and its army.

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Kevin Linch
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Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BL	British Library
CHA	Claydon House archives
CJ	*Commons Journal*
ERO	extra recruiting officer
HO	Home Office papers
IFO	inspecting field officer
KGL	King's German Legion
MP	Member of Parliament
NAM	National Army Museum
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
UKNA	The National Archives
WO	War Office papers

References to regiment of foot (infantry) take the form of battalion number/regiment number, e.g. 1/4th is the first battalion of the 4th Foot; 4/1st is fourth battalion of the 1st Foot.

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Introduction

On 4 May 1817, the second battalion the 73rd Regiment of Foot was assembled in Chelmsford in Essex for its final parade, as the battalion had received orders to be disbanded. While some men were selected for the regiment's first battalion, then stationed in Ceylon, the rest were to be discharged. Alongside these purely functional matters, this parade was also a symbolic and emotional moment. One of the soldiers in the ranks on that day, Thomas Morris, who joined the 2/73rd in 1812, recounted that moment:

> . . . after parade, the major formed us into a square, and after a very impressive speech, in reference to our past services, the order for disbandment was read, the colours, under which we had fought so often, were taken from their staff (the men presenting arms during the ceremony) and carefully placed in a box, and afterwards forwarded to London. There was scarcely a man among us, who did not shed a tear at the separation.[1]

Although raised in 1808, the men of the 2/73rd had seen some action in the battalion's short life. The unit was sent to Stralsund in 1813 and it took part in the Wars of Liberation in Germany, fighting at Gorde in 1813 and Antwerp in 1814. The battalion remained on the continent through 1814 and 1815, formed part of Wellington's Anglo-Allied army in 1815, and fought at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Consequently, the 73rd was entitled to the Waterloo battle honour on its colours, even though the first battalion was far away in Ceylon. During the Battle of Waterloo, the battalion was in the thick of the fighting and it particularly suffered during the great French cavalry attack. Over a third of the battalion's 562 men who had started the campaign became casualties:

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43 rank and file were killed and 160 wounded.[2] The 2/73rd then formed part of the Army of Occupation that remained in France in 1815 and returned to Britain in the winter of 1815–1816.

Although not typical of many units of the British Army as it never fought in the Peninsular campaign between 1808 and 1814, the 2/73rd does stand as a useful illustration of the changes the army underwent during this period and the themes of this book. This unit encapsulates the overlooked history of recruitment and the impact of the War on the army and Britain. In terms of the recruitment of the army, the 2/73rd was created to support the regiment's first battalion whilst the latter served overseas, part of a policy to meet the demands of the Peninsular War and Britain's worldwide military commitments. Initially, the 2/73rd had an establishment of four companies of 100 men, but it was soon enlarged due to successful recruitment by enlistment and men transferring from the English, Irish and Scottish militias, replicating the twin means Britain used to maintain the strength of its army. This mixture of manpower sources was reflected in individual stories too: Thomas Morris' brother joined the 2/73rd by transferring from the militia, whereas Thomas Morris was enlisted by a recruiting party.[3]

The regiment also had to adapt and redefine itself during the period. In 1809, the regiment was 'de-kilted' and lost its 'Highland' title because the army determined that the population of the Scottish Highlands could not support all the highland regiments in the British Army. Furthermore, the Highland uniform was seen as a barrier to recruitment. Despite these changes and the 2/73rd's short existence, by 1817 the evidence from Thomas Morris suggests that it had developed an identity and *esprit du corps* which, although cut short by the battalion's disbandment in 1817, lived on in the 73rd regiment as a whole. Even if doubts can be cast over the veracity of Thomas Morris' reconstructed autobiography of his time in the army, as an author he felt his audience would want to read of his close identification with the unit in which he served. The annals of the 2/73rd went on to be recorded in the 73rd's regimental history published in 1851.[4]

The wars between 1807 and 1815, and the previous short account of one battalion in the British Army during the period, demonstrate the hiatus in British military history and the emphasis of this work. The British Army's operations have been well documented and continue to be discussed, but there is much more to explore. This book will analyse the army's efforts to increase recruiting and supply the necessary manpower to fight the war. It will explore how, why and from where the soldiers joined the army. Finally it will show how these wars had

a lasting impact on the British Army and its relationship to the state and society.

British military history and the Peninsular War

It is telling that an analysis of the recruitment of the British Army during its longest war is still needed 200 years after the event. Largely, this can be attributed to the focus and methods of British military history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and a concentration on British political and social history. Both these tendencies are reflected in one, often misquoted, remark by the Duke of Wellington who described the common soldier as 'the scum of the earth'.[5] Although Wellington qualified this statement by emphasizing that they made good soldiers, his judgement has been repeated in the history of the British Army between 1793 and 1815,[6] and set a historical framework that has only just started to change.

Until quite recently, the history of the British Army has largely been divorced from the context of British social, political and cultural history. Britain's wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been described as 'a remote theatre in which spectators and actors were forever separated',[7] an argument that has resulted in a consensus in which the British Army is a peripheral feature in the broader historical issues of the period. The emphasis of British history has been towards politics, society, the economy and culture. Work on this has produced some epic historical writing and continues to generate debate,[8] but this has resulted in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars being subsumed into a non-military framework. These conflicts are often included in the 1783–1832 era, if they are mentioned at all, encasing them in a political periodization. As a result, the political impact of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in Britain has received more attention than the almost continuous wars that Britain experienced between 1793 and 1815.[9]

The concentration on social and political history is easy to understand. Anti-military attitudes have a long history in Britain, and from the seventeenth century any army was labelled an offensive and absolutist weapon.[10] Compared with the massive physical and cultural military presence in continental states such as France and Prussia,[11] the presence of the military in Britain was deliberately ignored and marginalized. Furthermore, the avenues of enquiry for the political, social or cultural historian are distractingly abundant in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Britain underwent the upheavals

of the Industrial Revolution, and radical politics were forced under-ground by a 'white terror' that transformed it into a revolutionary threat, all of which suggested a bigger threat from inside Britain than from outside its borders.[12] Consequently, the emphasis of historical work has often been on radical politics, peace movements and the tax burden.[13]

British military history has developed largely untouched by the broader trends in British history, and kept within two strands. The first tradition of military history of the period 1688–1815 has focused on narrative accounts of campaigns, of which John Fortescue's *History of the British Army* and Sir Charles Oman's *History of the Peninsular War* remain classics. Although important works, they do not make reference to British society in general or to the problems and themes underlying Britain's prosecution of wars during a period of dramatic change in mil-itary organization across Europe. Nowhere is this tradition more appar-ent than with the continuing concentration on the campaign and battle of Waterloo, and the seemingly endless re-evaluations of these events.[14]

Biographies of generals, particularly Wellington, form the second thread to the historiography of British military history.[15] Although use-ful in their own right, they do little to develop an understanding of Britain and its military organizations.[16] There is an abundance of biogra-phies studying individuals involved in the wars between 1793 and 1815. These wars produced some epic national heroes who died in their hours of greatest triumph, such as Nelson and Sir John Moore. To some extent William Pitt also falls into this category: although not directly involved in combat he died when it was apparent that Britain was safe from invasion.[17] Regimental history, often combing the two traditions of operational military history and biography, forms a third element in British military accounts and has further deflected military history away from wider contexts.

As a result, Britain's military machine has lacked an appropriate degree of investigation. The worst example of this is the often-recited fact that the number of troops needed to suppress the Luddite riots in 1812 equalled the size of the army Wellington controlled in the Peninsula. This betrays a lack of comprehension of Britain's military structure.[18] Some 12,000 men were deployed to put down the Luddite disturbances (on a par with the size of the force sent to Portugal in 1808), but by 1812 the British Army had 50,000 men in the Peninsula. Admittedly, Wellington's Peninsular army included foreign regiments in British ser-vice, such as the King's German Legion, but equally the troops used in the Luddite disturbances were mainly militia regiments that could not

be sent overseas. Any comparison between the troops used against the Luddites and the force under Wellington is misleading.

Such details are to be bemoaned, but there is much more to this than inaccurate and misinterpreted information. Studies of continental powers during the Napoleonic Wars have tackled the impact of war in all its various guises – social, political and cultural.[19] Conscription took huge numbers of young men into the armed forces. Large tracts of central Europe were constantly fought over and ravaged by campaigning armies, virtually removing normal government from parts of Europe. Rebellions broke out against central authority in some regions, caused by the state's seemingly endless demands and invasive penetration of traditional society. This resulted in enclaves of guerrilla warfare across Europe as well as less violent local resistance, which, in some cases, have been given the status of national liberation movements and have been the subject of considerable historical attention.[20]

It is undeniable that there was a military transformation created by the French Revolution, which engulfed both France and the other European continental powers.[21] Yet the British Army (and Royal Navy) are considered exceptions and generally regarded as unchanging,[22] with those adaptations that took place attributed to different factors from those that influenced continental states. It is difficult to comprehend, however, that an army that stood at 40,000 men in 1792 and expanded to a quarter of a million by 1813 (mirroring the growth of military forces across Europe) did not experience any changes in management and policy, and that its social composition could still be categorized, without further examination, as 'the lowest classes of British society'.[23] Denying any alteration in Britain's military structure has also precluded any study of the politics of army recruitment, the essential question that all European states had to address, yet it took up considerable parliamentary time in Britain. Contemporaries recognized that a radical change had happened in warfare, particularly in the state's ability to mobilize its manpower. Mr Law, speaking in Parliament in 1813, urged the government to follow the example of the continent:

> It was his firm opinion that without a radical change in our military system, millions might be thrown away without producing any benefit. A general change of military system has taken place in Europe during the last twenty years. Almost all the other powers had introduced conscription instead of enlistment. Was it possible that our system could proceed successfully against this change? We might as well say that the militia could contend against a regular army.[24]

Modern historical research has echoed the sentiments expressed in Mr Law's speech and broadened the analysis of British military history, taking a cue from the 'war and society' studies that emerged after the Second World War.[25] Within this framework accounts have explored the fiscal power of the British state and its startling ability to acquire money to finance its armed forces and those of others, of which John Brewer's *The Sinews of Power* still retains its primacy.[26] Furthermore, the interaction between war, culture and power has been investigated. Tim Blanning examined the relationship between the public sphere and the credibility of the British government, an interaction that underpinned the government's ability to extract resources for wars.[27] Such studies, however, further demote the role of Britain's army. This is also reflected in strategic studies which argue that Britain did (and should) eschew continental commitments, subsidize allies and concentrate on oceanic and colonial warfare.[28]

   Juxtaposed against this form of military history, which concentrates on government structures, resources, society and politics, other scholars have championed a return to studying the armed forces in their own right, a sentiment summed up in Jeremy Black's statement that 'Military history is more than the account of the accountants'.[29] Recent analytical studies of the British Army on campaign have tackled strategic decision-making and examined its training and operations. Christopher Hall's *British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars* and Rory Muir's *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon* focus on the underlying themes and problems of Britain's military effort. Hall concentrates on the limiting influences on British strategy, while Muir explores the government's diplomatic challenges and policies, and the cabinet discussions over the deployment of the 'disposable force' (the troops available for active operations) of the British Army.[30] David Gates' *The British Light Infantry Arm, c. 1790–1815: Its Creation, Training and Operational Role* provides an examination of the regiments created in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars specifically to counter tactical innovations of the period, while Richard Glover's *Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of the British Army, 1795–1809* details the Duke of York's transformation of the British Army from a ramshackle collection of regiments into a efficient modern fighting machine.[31] More detailed examinations have also emerged in this genre, including a study of Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War.[32] Such studies of strategy and tactics of the British Army have necessarily broken the traditional limitations of campaign narratives and regimental parochialism. They have expanded the horizons of British military history, placed it in a European context and join a growing list of detailed

studies of tactics in the Napoleonic Wars that have exposed many myths and greatly added to a historical understanding of the battles of the period.[33]

These works largely preserve the distinction between army and society, yet other historians have redressed aspects of the interface between the two. The work of John Western on the militia showed that military concerns did occupy the minds of the British during the eighteenth century,[34] a theme taken up and enlarged in Ian Beckett's *The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945*. Beckett's work placed government and local responses to wars into a wide time frame, concluding, as the title suggests, that Britain developed a tradition of raising part-time forces to counter external threats. The massive expansion of part-time auxiliary soldiers in Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has caught the attention of scholars.[35] John Cookson's *The British Armed Nation 1793–1815* reveals much about the changes in British society in the period 1793–1815. Furthermore, Linda Colley has argued, in *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 to 1837*, that the experience of the Napoleonic Wars was instrumental in the development of national consciousness in Britain, particularly the volunteer movement, which mobilized 450,000 men between 1803 and 1805.

Only two of these modern works mention the recruitment of the army. Hall devotes nine pages to the manpower demands and responses of the government, and so merely provides an outline of recruitment policy. *The British Armed Nation* is the other work to consider army recruitment and although it provides a detailed introduction to the subject, it is firmly in the context of Britain's mobilization at every level. It demonstrates that the British government had to emulate France and other governments on the continent to meet the massive manpower demands of the wars.

As both Colley and Cookson point out, very little is known about the character of the army between 1793 and 1815, a gap I shall attempt to fill in the present book. Wellington's description of the army has often been taken to imply that most soldiers were criminals and, hence, studying their recruitment would serve little purpose. Studies of military recruitment in the eighteenth century, however, suggest that the soldiers were representative of the social structure of the country at that time.[36] In spite of Wellington's attitude, contemporaries also showed that they did not agree with the perception of the soldier as a social misfit, motivated solely by the lash. Within the army a new spirit was emerging that regarded the soldier as capable of independent thought, and urged that officers should be closer to their men, an approach

embodied particularly in the light infantry regiments such as the 95th. Soldiers were encouraged to perform their duty, with tangible rewards for good conduct,[37] and officers were expected to be positive examples to the men under their charge, in keeping with the evangelical revival that stressed moral leadership.[38] It must be emphasized, though, that such attitudes were not universal. If the 95th was a modern, progressive regiment, an inspection of the 1/96th, whilst it was stationed in the West Indies, testifies to the continuing existence of outlooks at a regimental level that viewed the soldier as worth very little:

> No less than 30,000 lashes appear to have been sentenced on 106 persons, of which 10,163 have been actually inflicted; the men appear to have grown callous even to corporal punishment from its extreme frequency; [they] go from punishment to drunkenness and from drunkenness back to punishment.[39]

The recruitment of the army is also important in the wider context of war and society studies. In France during this period, as Alan Forrest demonstrates in *Conscripts and Deserters*, conscription was the arena where state and local interests clashed,[40] and the recruitment of the army in Britain was of similar significance, particularly as objections to, and debates on, the government's military policy could be openly aired in Parliament.

Structure, methods and sources

This book is situated within a fairly well-defined historiographical framework and it seeks to transcribe some of the issues that have influenced histories of continental Europe during the Napoleonic Wars into the British context. Manpower was just as essential as money or political capital to Britain's war effort, and the structure and management of recruitment was equally as significant as the training the soldiers received or the strategic and tactical decisions that were made by ministers and generals. Viewed in this context, the recruitment of the British Army was a crucial hinge between resources and the troops on campaign and must lie at the core of an analysis of British military power.

Some parameters have to be set and choices made when studying military recruitment and manpower issues. This work concentrates on the troops in Britain and those in the British Army. As mentioned above, there are plenty of operational histories of the Peninsular War and new, more analytical, histories of the British soldier on campaign between

1808 and 1815 are appearing.[41] In terms of social history and identity, I shall focus mainly on the initial transition from civilian to soldier, because covering the entire lifecycle of a soldier would be too vast an enterprise and would come at the expense of studying the politics of army recruitment. Furthermore, studies are opening up this field and providing a broader social history of the army through the eighteenth century, such as Richard Holmes's *Redcoat*, Edward Coss' *All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808–1814* (which examines the campaign and battle experiences of the British soldier in the Peninsular War), and John Cookson's analysis of group identity in the regiments of the British Army.[42]

The 'British Army' is in itself a loose term. Britain had a variety of military forces and not all of them were under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief and the military administration based at Horse Guards in London. For the context of this study, the British Army refers to the Household regiments (formally the troops that the monarch maintained) and the established British regiments of cavalry and infantry, often referred to as regiments of the line or the regulars. This does mean excluding the foreign and colonial corps in British pay. Although they accounted for 52,000 men by 1813, they were not recruited from Britain's population.[43]

One other component of Britain's military forces not covered here are those troops under the supervision of the Board of Ordnance, chiefly comprising the Royal Artillery and Royal Horse Artillery but also other ancillary services such as the engineers. Their numbers were small, barely over 25,000 from a total of 255,867 in 1813, and they did not feature in the policy debates on recruitment. We may judge from their omission from these discussions that they were able to find the men they needed without too much trouble. In part, this is attributable to the limited service they undertook as only a few artillery units were actively on campaign. In 1813, Wellington just managed to allocate one or two batteries to each of the eight infantry divisions he commanded in the Peninsula and to form a small reserve. Even then, this strength was achieved by supplementing British gunners with Hanoverian and Portuguese batteries.[44]

As part of any study of recruitment in this period, it is necessary to delve into the militia, a locally raised force for home defence, which had complicated lines of authority. Each county had a militia and so aspects of its administration fell under the remit of the Home Secretary. Once mobilized, the militia units were placed under the command of the Horse Guards in matters of inspection, discipline and general

administration, but the local county authorities remained responsible for replenishing their ranks.

A major theme of this study is the political significance of the recruitment issue, a debate that has been hitherto ignored by historians. This debate went to the heart of some key issues in eighteenth-century politics about the role of government, its relationship with the army and the constitutional position of Britain's military forces. A central, recurring theme is the efforts by the government and the Horse Guards to make better use of the men already in uniform, particularly the militia, for the wider war effort. Yet this had to be negotiated and implemented in the face of considerable political objections, often based upon principles and constitutional ideology.

Individuals appear as important agents in shaping recruitment policy and enacting changes. In a time of small government, personal relationships were significant factors in the smooth running of government. The army's Commander-in-Chief (the Duke of York through all of the period, apart from one brief hiatus) and the Adjutant General (Sir Harry Calvert) based at Horse Guards were instrumental in ensuring that Britain was able to continue the war. Moreover, they oversaw a radical change in the relationship between the army and the government, whereby the Horse Guards became an effective administrative agency of the state, with a consequent expansion in their responsibilities. Rather than in preparing the army for the Peninsular War, as Glover has argued, this pair's greatest work was carried out during the Peninsular War itself.

The respective roles of the government, the army and society in determining how to recruit men to the ranks of the British Army necessarily form the core of this work, occupying three chapters. They include one on high-level political issues, focusing on the formulation, debate and change in government policy between 1808 and 1815; another chapter analyses national, regional and local responses, while a third studies the individuals who joined the army. Preceding this, Chapter 1 looks at the broader context of Britain's numerous wars with France in the eighteenth century, and provides a historical contextualization to the recruitment issue.

For the bulk of these chapters, there is an abundant range of sources which give an accurate account of the events and decisions of the time, alongside quite robust statistical information bearing in mind the technology available to compile such material. Studying Britain in this period is a fortunate choice, as Parliament developed a particular appetite for information with regular demands for returns on such matters as the strength of the army, number of men enlisted and losses on

campaign.[45] The parliamentary discussions generated ample matter for public consumption such as semi-official reports, newspaper copy and pamphlets. Such sources have to be treated a little more cautiously, particularly the reporting of debates. These accounts are sufficiently clear to provide the various viewpoints of key members of both chambers in Parliament and, in some cases, opinion outside it. Finally, government business became increasingly methodical during the Napoleonic War, partly as a result of improved administrative efficiency but also due to the continuity of personnel in key offices. The regularity of government business has resulted in a large body of material being preserved in the War Office and Home Office papers in the National Archives.

There is one exception to this abundance of documentation, and that is Ireland. Although Ireland formally became part of the UK with the 1801 Act of Union, many aspects of the union were left incomplete. For example, there were separate British and Irish militias and it required special legislative powers for British militia units to serve in Ireland and vice versa. The Irish military establishment also maintained a separate Commander of the Forces who also had his own Adjutant General's department (which looked after discipline, training, inspection and recruiting). Unfortunately, all the military administration records relating to these departments were destroyed in a fire in 1922, so what remains is a one-sided set of correspondence from officers in Ireland to the authorities in London.[46]

The administrative records of the army contain significant amounts of data. Particularly useful are the inspection reports conducted during the Napoleonic Wars which cover the nationality, age and service of Britain's soldiers organized by unit. This material has been sampled in Cookson's *British Armed Nation*,[47] but in this book I shall examine these records in a more thorough and systematic way than before. The biannual inspections were one of the bureaucratic checks on the army performed by the Horse Guards, and from 1798 standardized forms were introduced. These pro formas present the data in a consistent fashion, replacing the earlier letters from the inspecting general officer that were predictably more personal and subjective.[48] Although every unit in the British Army was expected to be reviewed twice a year, in the spring and the autumn, this was never achieved in practice. It is worth noting that the regiments in the Peninsula, and others engaged in protracted campaigns, were often not inspected. To ensure a balanced representation of the army, the inspection returns have been sampled to match the structure of the army in terms of infantry, cavalry, light or heavy troops, and units based at home or overseas. The unnumbered and foreign corps

have been ignored, reflecting the focus of this work on recruitment from the British Isles. The army always had a small proportion of foreigners in its ranks (besides the foreign regiments), and removing these gives a total sample of just over 180,000 men across the period 1807 to 1815.[49] A similar technique has been used to select the inspection returns of the militia regiments. Full details are provided in Table A.1.

Perhaps the trickiest sources utilized are the soldier autobiographies. As Charles Oman noted, the Peninsular War generated an abundance of diaries, memoirs and accounts in comparison with previous conflicts, with many of these accounts emanating from the ranks.[50] Using these sources carefully can reveal much, even in the inaccuracies or exaggerations. To take the example of the disbandment of the 2/73rd used above, it may be prudent to treat with some caution the statement that there was not a dry eye in the ranks during the battalion's final parade. On the other hand, Thomas Morris may have felt this when writing his recollections or thought that this was a sentiment that his readers would expect to be expressed on the demise of a unit. Such considerations are particularly pertinent to Chapters 5, 6 and 7, where personal and autobiographical sources are used significantly.

The political solution to Britain's manpower issues was the closer integration of Britain's military forces, but this also fundamentally altered the position of the British government to its armed forces. The final third of this book takes up this theme and examines the impact and legacy of Britain's military reforms. Chapter 6 explores the army's relationship with British governments, demonstrating how the Duke of York and Harry Calvert gained control of all Britain's various armed forces and fundamentally altered the position of the Horse Guards in relation to the War Office. These changes heralded the end of the eighteenth-century preoccupation with distinct services under separate control.

Chapter 7 offers a more holistic approach to the study of military recruitment, by looking not just at the political, social and military aspects but also at its cultural significance. The Peninsular War had a significant and long-lasting legacy upon the British Army and its interaction with society. This analysis would seem to stray some way from the actual fighting of the Peninsular War, but it permits an examination of how the impact of recruitment during these wars echoed on through the nineteenth century. The study of the influence of the Peninsular War shows just how far the ethos of regimental identity and traditions was strengthened in this period, as typified by the vignette of the disbandment of the 2/73rd and its publication in a soldier autobiography. This

burgeoning regimental identity was no accident, as it was the deliberate policy of the Horse Guards, although it took some time to come to fruition. In contradistinction to the emphasis placed in other works on the role of the wars in fostering national identity, most notably in Linda Colley's *Britons*, it is my contention that the way that Britons thought of the army was clearly based around regimental communities.

Taken together, the three themes of recruitment, society and tradition show not only how Britain was able to prosecute the war against France but also the significant changes it brought in its wake. It altered the way Britain thought about, discussed and organized its armed forces; it transformed the relationship between the army and the government; and it established regimental identities as the cornerstone of British military identity.

2
Britain's Struggle with France

When Sir Arthur Wellesley and a small British force landed in Mondego Bay just outside Lisbon in August 1808, there was little thought about what the consequences might be. This was the first act of Britain's Peninsular War and the next few years turned out to be very unlike the previous century of intermittent conflict between Britain and France. By 1809 the British government had developed a peninsular strategy, whereby it sought to continue the war against Napoleon by supporting the Portuguese and Spanish whilst gradually building up its military presence in Iberia. It was a long struggle, and British, Portuguese and Spanish troops finally entered France in early 1814, five and a half years after the Mondego landing.[1]

Fighting the French was not a new experience for Britain. Between 1688 and 1815, Britain and France were at war on eight occasions and for over 50 years, so it is not surprising that the period has been dubbed the Second Hundred Years War.[2] Moreover, most of these wars were condensed into the second half of this period. This phase of intense warfare began in 1742 with the War of Austrian Succession, when British troops fought as part of the Pragmatic Army against the French, a result of George II's position as Elector of Hanover, before the openly Anglo-French war of 1744–1748.[3] This was soon followed by the Seven Years War, 1756–1763, although hostilities had again commenced before the declaration of war, this time in North America.[4] Not long after the end of this conflict, political and constitutional wrangling led to the American War of Independence, and France, seeing the opportunity to inflict a defeat on Britain, declared war in 1778. The Peace of Paris in 1783 promised a lasting peace, yet a decade later hostilities had broken out once more. Besides the short-lived Amiens peace

and the interlude between Napoleon's first and second abdication, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars lasted almost continuously for 20 years.

During the seven decades leading up to 1815, Britain and France were at peace for only 34 years, with the longest period of relative tranquility between the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 and the French declaration of war in 1778. Even in these periods of peace, there could be hostility if not conflict. In 1768 there were acute tensions over the French build-up in the Indian Ocean, which threatened the position of the British East India Company.[5] From 1774, the French were supplying war materials to the American rebel colonists and were mobilizing their navy in preparation for war.[6] Britain and France competed in others ways too, such as the unofficial war in India from 1751 to 1754 fought between the French and British East India Companies,[7] as well as economically and culturally.

This pattern of constant hostility is a generalization and does not completely reflect the diplomatic and political nuances of the eighteenth century, something that cannot be fully discussed in this book. The complexity of Britain's relationship with France, and the tensions within it, are traceable in attitudes towards French culture, which retained its pre-eminence despite common Francophobia so that, although it became patriotic to be anti-French, it was not always fashionable to be so.[8] Yet, even when Britain and France were allies from 1715 to 1731, and despite Jeremy Black's argument that this was a genuine alliance, it is difficult to ignore contemporary British popular opinion that viewed cordial Anglo-French relations as 'unnatural' or a marriage of convenience.[9] Such attitudes were also reciprocated on the other side of the Channel. The British ambassador to France during the period of the Anglo-French alliance, the 2nd Earl Stair, reported that the French court considered Britain as their 'natural and necessary enemies'.[10]

By the time the British Army landed in Portugal in 1808 there was already a considerable history of conflict with France, which had created a British war machine and fostered a nascent British strategy. For example, it was not the first time that British troops had fought in Portugal, as a force had been sent there during the Seven Years War.[11] Key features in Britain's war effort, its military power and strategy can be distinguished from the 1740s onwards and set the context for the Peninsular War. Yet, an examination of this period also highlights the ways in which Britain's campaigns against France between 1808 and 1815 differed from the wars that preceded them.

The development of British military power

The size of the forces Britain committed to fighting in Europe between 1807 and 1815 were extraordinary, if not unique, in British history. The number of troops that Britain sent to fight in Portugal and Spain were considerably higher than those it had overseas in any previous conflict. At its peak in October 1813, just over 73,000 men of the British Army were deployed in Iberia, of whom 62,000 were under Wellington and another 11,000 men were campaigning in eastern Spain under Lieutenant-General Frederick Maitland.[12] Nor was this influx of manpower unusual. Britain's commitment to Iberia had been substantial in the previous two years – 65,000 in November 1812 and 57,000 in November 1811 (including 4300 men under siege at Cadiz).[13] The Peninsular War saw the sustained deployment of a very large part of the army to the continent, something that had not been undertaken since the days of Marlborough in the War of Spanish Succession.[14] Seen from this perspective, Britain's determination to fight in Iberia was unlike any other of its previous campaigns, either in the Revolutionary or Napoleonic Wars, or the four wars it had fought against France since the 1740s.

Blow-by-blow narratives of the operations of the British Army up to 1815 abound, and there is no need to rehearse these accounts.[15] It is worth, however, outlining the significant similarities and themes that run throughout this period. The first among these is the development of British military power in response to its conflicts with France and the consequent changes in the machinery of government. A second strand to this period is the sometimes stormy relationship between the armed forces and the population of Britain. Additionally, it is worth taking an overview of the presence of the military in British society and culture. Such themes underpin the unity of the period, and validate the concept of a second Hundred Years War between Britain and France.

One of the most straightforward characteristics of British military power during the period 1688 and 1815 was the growth of the armed forces, if only because it is a measurable and definable entity. Although the British Army was subject to savage cutbacks in peacetime, for example from 144,000 to 43,000 after the American War of Independence,[16] during each conflict between 1740 and 1815 the size of the army voted for by Parliament was larger than previous totals. These wars also witnessed a new maximum size of the British Army: 64,000 in the last year of the Austrian War of Succession; 93,000 in 1762 during the Seven Years War; 112,000 in the American War of Independence; and, its zenith,

245,000 men in 1813.[17] This pattern of mobilization was mirrored in the navy.[18]

Alongside this expansion, the waxing and waning of the size of the British Army was one of the hallmarks of the Anglo-French conflict in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This was more than simply a question of numbers. To increase its strength at the start of each conflict, the British Army was usually forced to adopt short-term boosts to its ranks which were not necessarily militarily beneficial. Plus, there was often too little time for training or coordination, resulting in duplication of effort and poor results. Therefore, the initial stages of wars for Britain were rarely successful, Braddock's defeat in North America in 1755 during the Seven Years War[19] and the paucity of troops available to be sent to the continent in 1793 being but two examples.[20]

At the end of every conflict, the army had to contend with a Parliament that wanted the size of the army reduced to its pre-war establishment, and the post-Napoleonic War period was not an exception in this regard. In 1814, there were calls to reduce the army to its 1780s establishment,[21] showing a total incomprehension of Britain's new position as the world's imperial power. Thomas Grenville, Lord Grenville's brother, declared that 'No one can have proposed a peace establishment of 19 millions but with the intention of changing the constitution of the country in such sort [*sic*], that it shall no longer continue a free country – to make this nation rank among the great military nations of Europe'.[22]

The effect of spurts of growth followed by harsh cutbacks on the British Army can be traced through its regiments. After each war the number of regiments that remained was higher than the previous peacetime establishments, but there was always a flurry of new units at the start of a conflict and a wholesale dissolution of corps at the end. This instability in the composition of the army resulted in officers often scrambling to get into the lowest numbered, and therefore most senior, regiment so that they could avoid being discharged, whilst men were transferred between units.[23] At the commencement of a war, often the opposite happened and units were created solely to recruit and then broken up. This pattern was not conducive to simple administration, let alone the development of tradition or *esprit du corps*. Despite Sylvia Frey's argument that regimental identity bound men together in the American War of Independence,[24] it is clear that such ties could be ephemeral and, given the considerable variation in the size of the British Army between peace and war, these bonds rarely lasted into periods of peace.

The increasing manpower demands reflected the intensification and diversification of warfare in Europe during the eighteenth century, caused by the rise of Prussia and Russia as continental military powers and the importance of overseas colonies for trade and finance.[25] In particular, the size of the Prussian army in relation to its small state and its performance during the Seven Years War launched enquires, notably in France, into improving the armed forces.[26] The British Army was, to some extent, immune from this rivalry during peacetime, as governments viewed the Royal Navy as its primary means of defence and so had no need to engage in a land-based arms race. Britain was nevertheless under pressure to expand its manpower in response to the development of continental military power and so that multiple theatres of war could be sustained. For example, in the War of Austrian Succession not only were British troops fighting in Flanders but they also had to face the Jacobite rebellion; in the Seven Years War British troops in Europe were fighting in Germany, Iberia and North America, as well as conducting raids on the French coast.

The expansion of the British Army was also a product of the globalization of European warfare. The great powers that had access to the Atlantic – Britain, France and Spain – fought each other across the world over for a range of reasons, such as lucrative sugar islands, geopolitical considerations and the interaction with local politics. Primarily, this can be shown by the steady growth in the Royal Navy and Britain's investment in naval infrastructure. Although harder to quantify, a trend of extra-European military growth is discernible for the British Army too. During the War of Austrian Succession, conflict outside Europe was small scale, whereas in the Seven Years War Britain committed most of its active units to the conflict in North America and, to a lesser extent, India. In the American War of Independence, there were no land battles in Europe, except the siege of Gibraltar. This tendency culminated in the ambitious expedition to the West Indies undertaken during the French Revolutionary War in 1795, when 35,000 men were assembled for a descent on the French Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique.[27]

The diverse theatres of war reflected the complexities of the international situation in the eighteenth century and drove the expansion of the British Army, albeit in different ways. During the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, not only did Britain have to look to its own war aims, but its objectives were also bound to those of its allies, and hence forces were required in north Germany and Portugal. Conversely, in the American War of Independence, Britain was without allies

and so its military forces needed to be sufficiently numerous to combat the American Continental Army and invasion threats from France, Spain and Holland, albeit not all from the start of the war in 1774.

The demands of war inevitably resulted in clashes between the army and society. There was a deep-seated suspicion of the army stemming from the English Civil War and the New Model Army. The rapid expansion of the armed forces at the opening of hostilities resulted in underhand recruiting methods, and confirmed the mistrust of the army and the antipathy of the populace towards it.[28] Riots against recruiting parties, and particularly 'crimps' (recruiting entrepreneurs who utilized all of the tricks so despised by the populace), were commonplace especially at the start of a war.[29] Moreover, the government was prepared to take emergency measures in order to fill a rapidly expanding army. A 1756 act pressed able-bodied men into the army who did not 'follow or exercise any lawful calling or employment',[30] and such emergency laws were repeated during the American War of Independence.[31] However, these powers were not used extensively by the government and local authorities and were instead principally employed to bulk up regiments before going on campaign. Such legislation did represent an intrusion of the military into wider society, but it was not a solution to Britain's increasing manpower demands.[32]

It is not surprising, then, that the growth of the British Army resulted in a significant geographical expansion of recruitment. Probably the most famous, and often cited, example of this is the Scottish highlanders, who went from rebel in the War of Austrian Succession to hero of the Seven Years War. This remarkable turnaround within a decade displays the state's willingness and ability to co-opt the clans into the British military system.[33] This was also an equally rapid cultural transformation, which generated some understandable fears in contemporaries of despotism and outright anti-Scottish feeling.[34]

Ireland, particularly Irish Catholics, went through a similar process of incorporation into the army, although not quite so dramatic. Technically it was illegal to recruit Irish Catholics,[35] and they also lacked a distinct military identity. Although there were two officially titled Irish regiments, the 18th Royal Irish and 27th Inniskillings, they were without the specific military dress that distinguished the highlanders. Moreover, Irish recruits were distributed throughout the army and recruiting from Ireland was soon established as a means of boosting numbers in units about to embark on campaign.[36] This more clandestine expansion did not cause quite so much general concern, although the presence of Catholics in the armed forces was a much more explosive

issue. When it did arise, the commotion it caused was fearsome. The Gordon Riots of 1781 in London, the most destructive in the eighteenth century, were a response to proposals for Catholic relief and testifies to the intensity of anti-Catholicism during tense political situations.[37]

Alongside the growth in size and composition of the British Army, other military forces were developed to contribute to the defence of Britain and its empire. In part, this was also a response to the globalization of warfare. As the British Army became 'empire winners' campaigning in far-flung lands, so there needed to be troops to defend Britain's expanding territories and safeguard the British Isles from invasion. Although the population of Britain was increasing and colonial growth provided a further pool of potential soldiers, the escalation of warfare required an even larger proportion of men in the armed forces. Stephen Conway has calculated that the military participation ratio rose from between one in 14 and one in 15 in the War of Austrian Succession, to one in nine for the Seven Years War.[38] One of the primary ways that this was achieved was by the rejuvenation of the militia (a force produced and maintained by English and Welsh counties for home defence) during the 1750s.

The recasting of the militia in the Seven Years War provides an excellent case study of the complexities and consequences of Britain's military growth. Firstly, it had a long political gestation, despite the wartime situation. Secondly, it established the militia as a counterbalance to the British Army, so much so that it was referred to by some contemporaries as the 'Constitutional Force', a military force that was truer to the politics and sensibilities of the political nation.[39] Militia reforms gave significant political power to county elites and those involved in its administration. These people coalesced into an interest group whose voice in Parliament could be very loud and, given the increasing manpower demands of the wars with France, difficult to ignore. Having created a new political arena, the militia laws had to be enacted and the men recruited by ballots. Militia recruitment brought out the traditional and popular mistrust of military service such that a riot at Hexham, Northumbria, against the militia was the bloodiest of the eighteenth century. It was not to be the last anti-militia disturbance and there was a spate of commotions as the militia was enlarged in the 1790s and expanded to Scotland and Ireland.[40]

The example of the militia was not unique and there were often political consequences to the expansion of the armed forces. In the Seven Years War, the raising of provincial units in America recruited from the colonists brought these men into contact with British officers. These two

groups had different ideas about military service and, although certainly not the cause of the revolution that followed shortly afterwards, it did highlight one aspect of the divergence between colony and metropole in the British Empire.[41] The Irish volunteers in the American War of Independence provided a similar warning on the dangers of mobilization. Without a militia in Ireland during the 1770s, the government encouraged part-time soldiering to shore up the defences of the British Isles. The volunteer movement soon became a political force and, with the government conducting a desperate war, the Irish volunteers were able to extract significant political concessions. From the volunteers' perspective, their greatest achievement was strengthened Irish political independence through enhanced powers for the Irish Parliament.[42]

Less controversial was the intensification and consolidation of Britain's financial power that underpinned its armed forces.[43] The wars with France simply could not be funded from in-year revenues, as the cost of war far outstripped revenues from taxes; therefore, Britain paid for these wars through debts.[44] Britain's governments retained the capacity to acquire the funds for war during peacetime through the system of national debt and the institution of the Bank of England. Britain's financial institutions became the envy of Europe and the bedrock of its military power, to the point that money was used as a weapon in itself. Britain bankrolled other countries that fought France, with subsidiaries to Prussia in the Seven Years War and massive contributions to the continental powers during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.[45]

Unlike the expansion of the armed forces, the increasing taxation of the population did not result in serious clashes between the government, the political elite and the population at large; so much so that Britain was the most heavily taxed European nation, yet had none of the problems that beleaguered France in terms of tax evasion or outright resistance to collection.[46] The stability of Britain's tax revenues was buttressed by a relatively transparent parliament, which approved taxation and ensured that this burden was not so objectionable, excepting, of course, the disputes with the American colonies after the Seven Years War.

There is an element of historical hindsight within this survey, and it is too easy to accept that Britain was financially secure. Contemporaries were concerned with the size of the national debt, especially after the American War of Independence, and this became all the more worrisome as the wars with France went on and debts built up. After a small French force of prisoners and deserters landed in Pembroke in

early 1797, there was a run on the Bank of England and it was forced to suspend cash payments, a telling reminder that Britons living through the wars sometimes doubted Britain's financial strength.[47]

The development of British military power up to 1815 was generally linear when analysing the building blocks of military force in the period: the army and navy swelled with each war, more and more was borrowed to pay for Britain's armed forces, and taxation increased to service this debt. As has been shown with the militia, this resulted in the political and administrative aspects of war becoming more complex, and this was also true of British strategy. Translating Britain's growing military force into effective military power involved Britain's governments broadening their mental horizons and taking unprecedented decisions. A growing range of theatres of war multiplied choices about where to send troops, which consequently made transportation and logistics a significant factor in Britain's strategy. Equally, the importance of the interaction with war overseas and the 'home front' grew as wars became more demanding on the population.

Warfare's economic aspects were emphasized by the struggle with France outside Europe. The Royal Navy was costly and required complex fiscal arrangements to make it work.[48] A large measure of the confidence in Britain's financial system rested on trade which, in turn, required protection from the Royal Navy and security from attack overseas.[49] The interaction of the navy, trade and finance had a huge impact on the strategic alternatives available to the British governments during the wars, in terms of their conceptions of what was possible and appropriate for their political survival. This naval–fiscal complex has also coloured the way that their actions have been interpreted.

The study of Britain's decisions during the wars of the eighteenth century has led to the argument that British strategy, and political opinion, was split between a concentration on either Europe or the rest of the world. British governments came to realize that the financial pay-offs from seizing colonies and protecting trade meant that Britain could sustain a war longer than France, as well as paying continental allies to keep France occupied in Europe – a 'blue-water' policy.[50] The classic case study cited for this analysis is the Seven Years War when Britain, largely free from continental fighting, went on to secure French colonies, notably Canada, and destroy the French presence in India. Abstracting this into a strategy of 'indirect approach', whilst a powerful analysis, does not do the international situation, nor the decision-making process, justice.[51]

It is important at this stage to remember Britain's system of cabinet government and, in particular, the fact that there was no general staff

to which strategic matters could be referred to or where records were kept. Individuals in government, particularly prime ministers, had a key role in the use and development of Britain's military power. The Seven Years War serves as a good example, and William Pitt the Elder was able to grasp Britain's strategic options in a manner unlike any previous minister.[52] Although the debate continues on the importance of Pitt compared with other senior ministers and military officers, such as Lord Anson in the navy, the knowledge and understanding of these key figures was not absorbed or recorded in any systematic way. As a result, future governments often repeated the same mistakes or defaulted to a tried and tested course of action without a deeper understanding of the underlying principles that had contributed to that decision originally.[53]

Furthermore, the growth of the armed forces via the militia and other military forces, coupled with escalating levels of taxation, meant that governments were required to take into consideration the domestic situation too. Although Britain's wars with France in the 1700s were some way from mass mobilization, Stephen Conway has shown that during the American War of Independence the 'home front' became a significant factor in policy-making. The pseudo-civil war character of the conflict forced the British government to contemplate its military actions in the light of political responses, whilst it was facing more than one great power and without allies.[54]

The extemporized deployment and development of British military power can also be shown through the specific example of Britain's amphibious operations. During the Seven Years War, British officers attained a level of sophistication in these kinds of actions that was second to none with a string of successful landings from Canada in 1759, the sugar islands of the Caribbean in 1760, to Havana and the Philippines in 1762. Much of this knowledge, though, remained personal and the lack of similar combined operations during the American War of Independence meant that this expertise was lost. As a result, when Britain went to war with France in 1793, men and officers had to re-educate themselves often through trial and error. It was not until 1801, with the landings in Egypt, that Britain regained it amphibious capability, and it was able to conduct a large-scale landing whilst under fire and then beat the French in the immediate battle that followed.[55]

Viewed in this light, the choices made by the British government were largely *ad hoc*, going as much on its understanding of the situation, political considerations at the time, and the means that it had to hand. In essence, British military power was reactive. This led to a pattern of bolstering the armed forces, seeking an opportunity and then directing a

force to it, often without too much consideration of the longer term. The pattern of short-term expeditions is repeated through the eighteenth century with varying degrees of success – Canada and North America, the Caribbean, Egypt, Flanders, north Germany, South America, Cape Town – and none were the length of the campaign Britain embarked upon in the Iberian Peninsula in 1808.

The challenge of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars

Britain's previous conflicts with France, and other powers, from the 1740s demonstrated that it was a major European state but not a significant land-based power. Britain's navy was well funded and the British government was able to mobilize its ships of the line quickly and, once war had been declared in February 1793, the Royal Navy re-established patrol of the French Channel ports as well as sending naval forces to the Mediterranean.[56] The army, on the other hand, had to go through the painful process of switching from a peacetime to a wartime establishment. This meant expanding the 38,079 infantry and 4589 cavalry that it had on its books, of which just 22,000 were stationed in the UK.[57] This force compared with the several hundred thousand men that French revolutionary armies soon had in the field.

The situation, however, was not that dissimilar to what British governments had faced in prior wars against France, as described above. Nor did many contemporaries appreciate the changes in warfare that were being wrought across the Channel. As the French Revolution turned into the French Revolutionary War between 1789 and 1792, France's domestic situation was followed with some interest and considerable comment. Although David Bell has shown that the different tenor in the rhetoric and the military objectives of the French revolutionaries heralded a new conception of war,[58] this was not quite so readily appreciated in Britain. Edmund Burke's prophetic *Reflection on the Revolution in France*, a prediction of the destructive path that the French Revolution would take and the calamitous consequences for Europe, caused outrage when it was published, most notably amongst the Whigs.

Initially, the British government was not expecting war. The French Revolution crippled France militarily – its army descended into mutinies and the French Navy was shattered by purges – and Britain did not have the same gradual shift to outright war with France as it had experienced in preceding conflicts. Once France declared war on Austria and Prussia in April 1792, events moved rapidly and Britain engaged in the conflict

as the Revolutionary armies swiftly threatened the Austrian Netherlands and Dutch Republic, geopolitically key areas of concern and guaranteed by Britain.

There was a sense that the war with France in the early 1790s could be thought about and fought like earlier conflicts with France. This was reflected in the initial strategic choices made by the British government. Three battalions of the King's Foot Guards, which was all that Britain could muster at the start of the war, were dispatched to an allied army in the Low Countries. Combined with Hanoverians, Dutch and other German troops, the small British force operated alongside an Austrian army. Placed under the command of Frederick, Duke of York, the King's second son who had been groomed for military service from an early age, the Anglo-Allied army was further reinforced until it contained 26,000 British troops. The campaign, however, was poorly managed and coordinated, and ended in a costly retreat across north Germany and an evacuation via Bremen.[59] Alongside this commitment, an army was sent to San Domingo in the Caribbean in 1793, a dreadfully fever-ridden island, with further forces being sent to capture the French colonies of Martinique, St Lucia and Guadeloupe in 1794. Once the Dutch Republic was overrun by the French in the winter of 1794–1795, so Britain eyed Dutch overseas colonies, and a force captured the Cape of Good Hope in 1795.[60]

In many ways, British strategy in the first phase of the Revolutionary War echoed the Seven Years War: it sent some troops to the continent to supplement allied forces and occupy the French, whilst conducting a transoceanic campaign against France's colonies. The results, however, were completely the reverse, and British troops in Europe were forced to withdraw from Europe in 1795 whilst the overseas campaign in the Caribbean resulted in fearsome casualties. The combination of these two military commitments almost destroyed the British Army as an effective military force.

The British government, and the army's chiefs, can be forgiven for following established strategy as initially there was little indication that the Revolutionary Wars were different from Britain's other conflicts with France. There were no great technological changes in the 1780s, and Britain's early reflection on the conflict with Revolutionary France focused on tactical innovations. Much has been made of these develop-ments, particularly the use of light infantry and loose formations, but Britain already had experience of this way of fighting from its overseas conflicts in the Seven Years War and American War of Independence.[61] Drawing upon this experience Britain modernized its light infantry

arm into a highly trained professional force, eschewing the massed, patriotic, untrained but instinctual skirmishers of French Revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary necessity.[62]

Although the tactical changes were obvious, it was the alteration in the political context and the accepted restricted parameters of war that were more significant. This transformation was about aims rather than means, and realizing this took some time in the British government and political circles. One who did recognize the change early on was William Wyndham Grenville, Britain's Foreign Secretary who was part of a triumvirate with the Prime Minister and Treasurer, William Pitt, and Henry Dundas, the Secretary for War and the Colonies, which steered Britain through the French Revolutionary Wars. As early as 1794, Grenville thought that peace with Revolutionary France's unstable governments was impossible, which, consequently, meant a European settlement depended upon overthrowing the French revolutionaries and installing a stable government.[63] Grenville also had every personal reason to dislike French Revolutionary principles. Not only was he from a powerful aristocratic and landed family – he had an estate of 20,000 acres – but he and his family did well out of the sinecures that went with power, estimated at £30,000 per annum. Grenville was astute enough to comprehend the challenge the French Revolution presented to someone in his situation.[64]

It took some time for others in the cabinet to be fully convinced of Grenville's viewpoint and, to be fair, it took a while for the Foreign Secretary himself to completely articulate his ideas. Yet there were hints of a more ruthless approach to war during the early stages of the French Revolutionary Wars. Firstly, Britain supported the Federalist revolt in Toulon and sent troops and ships to assist the rebellion, notwithstanding the fact that the government misinterpreted the political situation and enforced a French royalist political stance on the Toulon federalists, a gift to the Revolutionary propaganda machine. Secondly, Britain took advantage of the political instability in Corsica and captured the island, but was forced to abandon it when the Royal Navy had to withdraw from the Mediterranean in the wake of the Franco-Spanish Alliance of late 1796. Thirdly, it made use of French émigré Royalist troops, particularly in 1795. The operations with the émigré units, who were sent to Brittany with the aim of bolstering another rebellion against the revolutionary government, proved disastrous. Still, within all of these proceedings there were elements of traditional strategic considerations, as well as simple opportunism. Toulon represented a gilt-edged opportunity to reduce, if not destroy, French naval power in the Mediterranean;

Corsica provided a supply base for the British Mediterranean fleet; and French Royalists provided manpower that Britain was only too willing to accept.

Britain's attempts to take advantage of the rebellions in France catalysed by the French Revolution were a manifestation of the intensification of warfare in these years. Britain also faced the threat of internal rebellion. In response to the French Revolution, there was an upsurge in radical activity in Britain, a combination of the revival of an older, indigenous radical tradition that stretched back to the English Civil War with the French Revolution's concept of human rights that transcended national boundaries. Throughout the early 1790s, radical organizations mushroomed across the country and, more worryingly for the government, began corresponding with each other and forging links across the Channel. This was coupled with a massive outpouring of radical literature, especially cheap works that expanded Britain's political society, of which Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man* remains the most famous.

During the sudden shift to war in 1792–1793, these radical groups were categorized by the government as unpatriotic if not treasonable. In recognition of this, the government took action on a number of fronts. It began repressing these organizations, eventually suspending *habeas corpus* in 1795.[65] It promoted societies championing loyalism, and supported and encouraged the production of cheap literature of its own to counter that of the radicals, with Hannah Moore's *Cheap Repository Tracts* being the equally famous riposte to *The Rights of Man*.[66]

Alongside these actions, the government also bolstered the internal security of the country. Firstly, it mobilized the militia in 1792, the first time this had been done during peace. Secondly, the government embarked on a massive barrack-building programme so that troops could be stationed outside of, but near to, potentially 'disaffected' communities. The government also encouraged the creation of local part-time forces for defence and police roles to supplement the army and militia.[67] Although there is considerable historical debate about the extent of popular support for these movements, ranging from Linda Colley's assertion that the British state rested on the actual consent of most of its inhabitants, to E. P. Thompson's equally strident view to the contrary, it is undoubted that these actions served to radicalize the reform movement further, so that what remained became a revolutionary underground and one that periodically reappeared up until 1803, most significantly in Ireland in 1798.[68]

This was not, however, the first time Britain had faced internal rebellion, or that France had sought to take advantage of these revolts,

the most significant of which were the Jacobite rebellions of the early eighteenth century culminating in the revolt of 1745. Furthermore, there was nothing new about disturbances in Ireland and each conflict with France resurrected the spectre of the Catholic population rising up in the event of a Bourbon invasion. What was different about the nature of the internal threat to Britain from the 1790s onwards, however, was the outright sympathy of radicals for an external power and that, if successful, this coupling would mean a complete transformation of the British social order. The Jacobite threat was a dynastic one, and the problems in Ireland stemmed from the religious and political settlement there; an insurrection in Britain with the aid of the French meant an overhaul of society. The evidence for this was all too clear, as the Revolutionary Wars went on and states around France were transformed into republics or annexed.

Only with the building of a second coalition against France, from 1798, was Grenville able to translate his strategic vision into reality. In an alliance with Russia and Austria, a coordinated war plan was developed to invade France along two axes, one via Switzerland and Jura combining a Russian and Austrian army, and an Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland to advance through the Low Countries. Both attacks followed the pattern of the previous six years of conflict and ended in defeat, with Britain exhausted and diplomatically isolated as France beat back the armies of the continental powers and the alliance broke up in a series of unilateral peace treaties. Preliminaries of peace between Britain and France were signed on 1 October 1801 with a final deal, the treaty of Amiens, signed in March 1802.

The period 1798–1801 was also an important period for the British Army. The ramshackle administration of the army, which had clearly not been up to the task it faced in the early 1790s, began to be examined and reformed. Although the Duke of York had been ridiculed for his generalship in the 1793–1795 campaign in Flanders, he turned out to be an able military administrator and, as a Royal Duke, one with considerable authority. His appointment to the position of Commander-in-Chief in 1798 began the reinvigoration of the army, and he initially focused on the selection of officers, training and discipline. Just as important to the Duke's success were the officers who joined him in key roles in the military administration. Within a year, Sir Harry Calvert was appointed Adjutant General of the forces. Calvert had served with the Duke of York in the Coldstream Guards and on York's staff during the Flanders campaign, and clearly shared the same ideas on reforming the army as the Duke. Robert Brownrigg continued to be the Duke's military secretary,

promoted to Quarter-Master General of the forces in 1803, and was able to oversee the Duke's ideas on officer appointments and promotions. York and Calvert were to have a profound influence over the army and, as their reforms took hold on the basic day-to-day operation of the army, they were able to examine bigger policy areas, particularly recruitment. Moreover, Britain's governments (and there were several changes in the period) began to listen to their ideas, and later rely on their expertise and experience. As such, the roles of Commander-in-Chief and Adjutant General expanded considerably.

The government needed such military counsel. Alongside the realization that the aims of the war with Revolutionary France had altered, was a transformation in the sheer magnitude of the armed forces now involved in the conflict. The French Revolutionary armies received a massive influx of men as a result of the Revolutionary government's *levée en masse* and, as the size of France's armies dwindled during the war, so the French government's attention turned to maintaining the French army. Its answer was conscription, the *loi Jourdan*, by which France was not only able to raise a larger army than had been seen before in Europe but, crucially, had a mechanism to maintain its strength over a number of campaigns in a systematic way. The full impact of this would be felt after 1803.

The resumption of the war with France in 1803 saw Britain once more fighting alone against the French, which necessitated a defensive strategy whilst it sought allies on the continent. A new coalition was formed in 1805, the third, with Austria and Russia. By the time Britain had managed to assemble a force and dispatch it to north Germany, the coalition had already been smashed by the French victory over the Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz. A year later, the fourth coalition, this time allied to Russia and Prussia, resulted in crippling defeats for Prussia at the twin battle of Jena-Auerstadt.

Although the campaign dragged on into Poland in 1807, it is easy to understand why, in Britain, the short-lived Ministry of the Talents that took office in 1806 looked towards defence in Europe and expansion overseas, with expeditions to South America and other grand plans for colonial conquest.[69] The Talents' doubts over the longevity of the fourth coalition were confirmed by the French victories in Poland in 1807 and the Treaty of Tilsit which, again, left Britain bereft of allies and the likelihood of any potential allies in the future: all the major European powers had been humbled by Napoleon's *Grande Armée*. Worse was to follow, as Napoleon set about tightening his grip on Europe by setting up the continental system, a blockade in reverse, excluding British trade from

mainland Europe. Napoleon used this to extend French power further, particularly in north Germany, Scandinavia (where Russia declared war on Sweden in 1809, one of Britain's last potential allies) and Iberia.

From 1807 until 1812, Britain was essentially the major European power fighting the French, and this resulted in Britain becoming the chief protagonist in the war against France. The initial response to this was to return to a defensive strategy whilst it sought alliances with smaller powers, such as Sweden and Portugal. The Portland government of 1807–1809 that replaced the Ministry of the Talents was prepared to be more active but had limited opportunities to do so; consequently, it mainly sought to limit or forestall the growth of French naval power, hence the British invasion and bombardment of Copenhagen. Austria took up arms against the French again in 1809, but the fifth coalition proved to be one of the shortest in a lengthening line of failures, lasting from just April to October 1809. By the time Britain had deployed troops to the continent, in this case sending a force to Walcheren, it was too late.

Napoleon continued to present British governments with new opportunities to engage with the French army, albeit in limited ways that merely permitted short-term expeditions for the British Army. The withdrawal of forces from Italy to fight against Austrian and then Prussia allowed forces from Sicily to inflict a defeat on the French at the battle of Maida in 1806. This battle is often given a significance vastly out of proportion to its numbers, because it was the first incident of a British infantry in line beating off an attack by French infantry in a column, a tactic that became one of the hallmarks of the Peninsular War.[70]

Shortly after the Copenhagen expedition, Napoleon's meddling in Iberian affairs presented another opening to Britain. Wild predictions and enthusiasm greeted the Spanish insurrection in opposition to French rule, and the Portland government decided to seize this chance and send troops to Portugal. An initial force was dispatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley, with further reinforcements coming from other expeditions. Major-General Brent Spencer's troops, hovering around Cadiz after being sent there to bolster the revolt, were shifted to join Wellesley, while a much larger force under Sir John Moore was ordered to Portugal too. Moore's army had a convoluted journey to Portugal. Returning from Sweden, where it was sent in response to the Russo-Swedish war but was refused permission to land, it was then dispatched to the Mediterranean, all the while missing messages from the government contravening orders it already had received and some it had not. By the time Moore reached Portugal, the French had been defeated and then

evacuated under the controversial terms of the Convention of Cintra, and an advance into Spain was being planned.[71]

Although Wellesley's victories in August 1808 are often cited as the start of the Peninsular War, at that moment it was not intended to be an open-ended commitment that would last until the war's end. Short-term goals of harnessing Portuguese naval power and Lisbon harbour figured highly in the cabinet's thoughts.[72] In fact, it soon resembled many of Britain's earlier continental excursions of the previous 15 years, as the British advance into Spain was checked by Napoleon's counteroffensive in 1808 and 1809, which then resulted in a tortuous retreat of the British Army through north Spain during the winter. Although the British Army scored a notable victory over the French at Corunna, it served simply to ensure the evacuation of the British Army. Having rebuilt the army, most of it was sent across the Channel to Walcheren in late 1809, yet again to face retreat, this time in the face of a deadly fever.[73]

Whilst this was going on, the Portland government reinforced Wellesley's army. He cleared Portugal of French forces and advanced into Spain once more, inflicting a defeat on the French at Talavera in July 1809. Soon after, the government grasped that a sustained commitment to Portugal could have important consequences and, after Walcheren, saw it as the sole major military commitment.[74] There were moments when it looked like this expedition would end prematurely, such as in 1810, yet Wellesley demonstrated that having a secure base around Lisbon, defended by the fortified Lines of Torres Vedras, meant that Britain could continue to have a military presence fighting the French. However, this strategy required the supply of money and, crucially, men.

The recruitment issue

The British Army and the government faced a huge task in bringing the army up to wartime strength. Matching the numbers the army had in the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence would be an achievement in itself, but, as touched on above, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars saw a step-change in the size of the armed forces fighting on the continent, something that Britain had to counter. Not only was this caused by actually fighting on the continent, but also by periods when Britain faced France without allies and was often threatened with invasion, as in 1797–1798, 1801, 1803–1805 and 1807–1812 (ignoring the Franco-Austrian war in the summer of 1809).

In the first instance, the British Army needed to expand from its 1793 peacetime establishment of 42,000 men, but the early stages of the war proved to be the worst in terms of recruitment. Men were enlisted certainly, but the methods caused riots in London, duplication of effort and unnecessary competition. For example, fencible regiments, created just for home defence, competed at the same time with the recruitment of the existing regiments of the British Army, and ephemeral regiments were founded and then broken up, often causing more trouble and perpetrating the worst abuses that the recruiting system had to offer. By the end of 1796, recruitment had all but dried up, yet the army was incapacitated from its campaigns in the West Indies and the retreat across north Germany.[75] It is indicative of the administrative chaos that it is difficult to obtain reasonable figures about the size of Britain's military forces in this phase of the war.

Diplomatically, Britain was also entering a period of isolation and, with that, came the threat of an invasion. Therefore, the government's immediate attention was drawn to increasing the size of the force available to defend Great Britain should an invasion occur. Enlarging Britain's military force was done outside of the British Army, with the creation of a supplementary militia in 1797 and a significant expansion of the part-time home defence army though local volunteer units.[76]

This proved to be particularly successful, setting a pattern and a dilemma for the British government for the next ten years. Britain was able to enroll significant numbers for defensive purposes, mostly outside of the regulars, but not immediately for offensive operations. So, as Britain gained allies or saw opportunities, the challenge was to transfer these numbers to the British Army thus providing soldiers available for active operations overseas. In part, the sheer size of the home defence forces permitted a larger proportion of the British Army to be sent overseas for short-term expeditions, as it gave Britain an improved degree of security. Longer-term or larger-scale commitments were a different matter, and the Peninsular War particularly highlighted this conundrum of the balance between defensive and offensive military forces.

This did not mean that British governments, and the British Army, did not try to address the issue, and before 1807 there had already been several attempts to bolster the regular troops. Briefly, the Addington government established an Army of Reserve in 1803 for service in the UK, a force created and maintained by ballots and organized initially into new units, which were later integrated into the regular army as second battalions of regiments. Pitt's government of 1804–1806 passed the Permanent Additional Force Act, which placed the onus on raising men on

parish officials, each parish having a quota to fulfil, again for service in the UK and incorporated into the second battalions. During Pitt's ministry, the government tried transferring men from the militia to the regular army, endeavouring to make better use of Britain's differing military forces. The militia transfer of 1805 was overseen by the Secretary for War, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, and he also set up a yearly transfer from the Irish militia. The Talents Ministry tried to encourage recruitment by introducing short service of seven-year periods, a graduated pay scale and a guaranteed pension.[77]

None of these proved to be the answer to Britain's manpower requirements; fortunately, however, Britain did not have a sustained military commitment anywhere and so the manpower shortage was not pressing. This changed from 1808 with Britain's involvement in Spain and Portugal. Direct recruitment into the army (known as ordinary recruitment) was much improved under the watchful eye of the Duke of York and yielded much better and consistent figures, a process that is discussed more fully in Chapter 5. These internal reforms were not enough to match the casualties (death, desertions and those discharged from the army as unfit) that the army was sustaining.

Only in 1807 did recruitment by the army cover the casualties it suffered, and the scale of the manpower shortfall nearly doubled from around 6000 in the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars to consistently over 10,000 from 1809 to 1812 (the figures for 1814 and 1815 include the discharge of troops as a result of peace), as Table 2.1 demonstrates. This reflects the sharp rise in the number of deaths the army suffered, caused by campaigning, being more regularly engaged with the French in Iberia, and the larger scale of the battles fought from 1808.

As a continuous string of campaigns and battles, the Peninsular War necessarily caused the casualty rates of the British Army to increase; but more importantly, the army lost men year-on-year at a far higher rate than it had previously. This was a different pattern of casualties from the period prior to 1808 where, although there might have been heavy losses due to an expedition, these losses could be made good when that part of the army returned to the British Isles and was relatively inactive. Also, the shortfalls in the years 1803–1806 were covered by the raising of the Army of Reserve, the Permanent Additional Forces Act and the transfers from the militia in 1805. However, none of these expedients outlasted the governments that introduced them, except Castlereagh's annual transfer from the Irish militia.

It was the constant manpower shortages in ordinary recruitment during the Peninsular War that required the British government to provide a

Table 2.1   Breakdown of casualties in the British Army compared with recruits, 1803–1815

Year	Deaths	Discharges	Desertions	Total casualties	Recruits	Difference (recruits – total casualties)
1803	5,208	6,458	4,404	16,070	9,267	−6,803
1804	6,119	4,598	5,468	16,185	9,630	−6,555
1805	6,833	4,329	7,081	18,243	11,718	−6,525
1806	6,495	4,688	5,748	16,931	11,862	−5,069
1807	7,932	3,878	5,728	17,538	19,114	1,576
1808	9,285	4,990	6,611	20,886	12,963	−7,923
1809	16,343	3,323	4,901	24,567	11,780	−12,787
1810	13,597	4,627	4,729	22,953	9,095	−13,858
1811	13,448	3,986	5,026	22,460	11,772	−10,688
1812	15,842	3,733	5,918	25,493	14,756	−10,737
1813	15,012	3,621	5,822	24,455	14,647	−9,808
1814	12,502	34,293	8,857	55,652	7,911	−47,741
1815	8,124	29,342	7,403	44,869	15,237	−29,632

NB: These figures exclude 9,700 men struck off the strength of regiments in 1809, 1811 and 1812 that were left sick during retreats or captured as prisoners of war.

UKNA, WO1/946, Return of Recruits raised since 1803, 21 March 1811; WO25/3224, Casualty Return for 1810, AG, 15 November 1811; WO25/3224, Casualty return for 1807 to 1810, 5 April 1811; WO25/3225, Casualty Return, for 1811 to 1813, AG 24 September 1813; WO162/326, Return of Casualties from 25 December 1812, AG's Office, 17 February 1814; WO162/326, Number of Desertions from the Regular Army, 5 April 1814; WO162/326, return of Casualties from 25 December 1813 to 24 December 1814, AG 14 March 1815; WO162/326, return of Casualties from 25 December 1814 to 24 December 1815. AG 6 March 1816; *Commons Journal*, 1813–1814, 261 & 1814–1815, 309, Return of Recruiting 1814 & 1816, 423, Return of Recruiting, 1815.

solution to the dilemma. Put quite simply, the army's established methods of maintaining itself were not sufficient to meet the requirement of the British government's strategy and its commitment to the Peninsular War, let alone provide for an expansion of the military. This sustained manpower problem between 1808 and 1814 could not be addressed solely by the army relying on traditional recruiting methods or small-scale reforms. The issue of the recruitment of the army became a political one, which would entail legislation from the government. Politically, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were unlike any it had fought before. During the Peninsular War, the government faced a new military challenge over the recruitment of the army too.

3
Ballots and Bounties: The Politics of Recruitment

In 1807, William Windham, the ex-Secretary for War of the Talents government,[1] declared that the recruitment of the army was an issue that 'naturally branched into a variety of views, that it might well serve as a *standing dish* to the House for some time, and that they would always find plenty to say on it'.[2] Although said in jest, and was well received as such in the House of Commons, his jibe was an accurate reflection of the parliamentary debates on recruitment from 1807 to the end of the war. Government intervention to maintain the army meant that politics and party circumstances influenced policy. Between 1803 and 1811, the UK's various ministries tried five different methods to strengthen the army and replace the mounting casualties, symptomatic of the fact that finding men for the army was a divisive issue during the Napoleonic Wars.

The controversy over recruitment echoed the unstable political situation that existed between 1803 and 1812, contrasting with the general de-politicization of the military and the development of a service-based ethos during the Hanoverian era.[3] There was more to these disputes than just party politics. Britain had considerably different alternatives regarding the way it recruited its army and these options were still under scrutiny well into the Peninsular War period. Even as late as 1812, Marquess Wellesley (Arthur Wellesley's older brother) testified to the importance of the politics of army recruitment by leaving the Perceval ministry because, amongst the well-known personal pique he felt about not being made Prime Minister, he claimed that the government's efforts in the Peninsula were conducted 'on an inadequate and imperfect scale'.[4]

The deliberations in Parliament were not limited to the political elite, and were of wider public interest. Speeches made by the main

protagonists were often printed in full by newspapers to the extent
that, during the most contentious discussions, they received consid-
erable coverage. In January 1807, Castlereagh's confrontation of the
Talents government's short-service scheme (which reduced the length
of enlistment in the army to seven years) and Windham's rebuttal
took up nearly two densely printed pages in *The Times*.[5] The follow-
ing day's issue devoted an equal amount of space to Windham and
Castlereagh's clashes.[6] Later that year, Henry Addington, recently enno-
bled as Viscount Sidmouth, published his address on the second reading
of the Militia Transfer Bill.[7] Nor were the public passive listeners to the
debates, as the various ministers responsible for army recruitment some-
times received detailed plans that onlookers believed would solve the
recruitment problem. For the most part these suggestions were treated
with polite silence, and it was the strategic situation and parliamentary
circumstances that influenced the government's deliberations on how to
expand the army. Even still, this ensured that the politics of recruiting
for the British Army was a complex matter.

The political situation

During the eighteenth century anything to do with the military was
closely inspected in the Houses of Parliament. The British Army was
always regarded with some degree of suspicion, born of Britain's experi-
ences of military rule under Cromwell and, later, James II. Permanent,
or standing, armies were regarded as the tool of despots and a threat
to British liberty and the constitution.[8] The intellectual objections to a
large army naturally abated during wars. Some, though, were prepared
to challenge the expansion of the army, most commonly through assert-
ing the effectiveness of alternative military forces, such as the militia,
and advocating a policy of defensive war if not pacifism.[9] Besides ide-
ologically inspired scrutiny, enquiries were also made into the army
because it was one of the major expenses of any government in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the Napoleonic Wars,
expenditure on the military exceeded all previous totals and, in 1814,
the cost of the army and ordnance was double that of the Royal Navy
and over three times what it had been in 1804.[10]

Even during the war, many members of Parliament still felt duty
bound to examine the minutiae of army accounts, to ensure that no
more was paid than was necessary. This ethos had a powerful influence
over what government ministers, and the army, regarded as possible.
Every year the Secretary at War presented the army estimates for the

forthcoming 12 months to the House of Commons, in which he had to demonstrate that the funds were essential. This was no formality: in 1807, George Johnston questioned the large sums that the government had asked for the army when he thought that the figures did not go into enough detail.[11] In 1810, with the war showing no signs of ending, the government embarked on a retrenchment programme to reduce outgoings and curtail the crippling drain on specie. As a result, the establishments of some regiments were reduced and 20 men per cavalry troop were dismounted, the latter saving a miserly £100,000 per annum out of a budget of £28.9 million.[12] Further parliamentary concern about the army, its cost and its workings was demonstrated in a series of largely forgotten Commissions of Military Enquiry, which looked into all aspects of military bureaucracy. These 19 reports were presented between 1806 and 1812, and some of them were hundreds of pages long with extensive appendices. They probed almost every aspect of military administration searching for waste, duplication and inefficiencies.[13]

Parliament's control over the army was particularly demonstrated in 1809, with the removal of the Duke of York from his position as Commander-in-Chief after an official inquiry into perceived abuses and influence of the Duke's mistress regarding the purchase of commissions.[14] Although never judged guilty, he was forced into resigning and was replaced by the aged Sir David Dundas. The allegations turned out to be a complete fabrication, and the Duke returned to his position. This interlude, however, resulted in Britain's military stagnating without any major innovations between 1809 and 1811. During 1810, the army decreased in numbers for the first time since the resumption of the war in 1803.

Parliamentary nervousness about the use of foreign troops provides another example of political intrusion into the management of the military, and this led to particularly acrimonious debates on foreigners in the army during 1812 and 1813. Although this was a partisan attack on the government, it emphasized the constitutional objections to a standing army. The army was permitted to have foreigners and station them on British soil only with permission from Parliament. This law dated back to the Act of Settlement in 1701, which forbade William of Orange to keep his Dutch troops and, like so much from the revolutionary settlement, it became a cornerstone of the British constitution. In previous wars the government had been allowed to recruit foreigners, and from the 1780s the army had one specifically foreign regiment, the 60th (Royal Americans), to which was added another in the 1790s, the 97th or Queen's Germans (itself in the process of transformation from

a foreign regiment to a British regiment between 1803 to 1808). During the Napoleonic Wars, however, the numbers of non-British soldiers in the army soared. By 1813, this was considered a threat to the constitution and tolerated as a temporary measure.[15] Lord Palmerston, then Secretary at War, declared:

> He knew that many had an objection to employing foreign soldiers on constitutional principles. He thought however, of the times, as well as the constitution of the country, would not object to their being employed at present. If any man would look at the map of Europe, and see what a proportion of its population the enemy had forced into hostility against this country, if he were also to consider the limited population of these two islands, and the extensive colonies we had to defend, and the navy we had to support, it appeared to him hardly possible that such a man could now adhere to the idea of not employing foreigners in our service.[16]

Despite his rhetoric, Palmerston had to placate the House of Commons and, each year afterwards, presented details of the number of foreigners in British regular regiments.[17]

Political uneasiness with the military was reflected in the diverse and disparate control of the armed forces that had developed since 1688. The army was headed by the Commander-in-Chief and under his direct command were two executive officers, the Adjutant General and Quarter-Master General. Collectively known as Horse Guards, they were responsible for the daily running of the army, officer appointments and promotions, maintaining discipline and training in the army. Over the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the roles and responsibilities of the Horse Guards grew. The Quarter-Master General began collecting military intelligence and maps, for example. More importantly, in 1807 the Adjutant General became responsible for recruitment when the office of the Inspector General of Recruiting was abolished. The tiny staff of the Horse Guards did not expand to match its enlarged remit, however. In 1810, the Adjutant General's office had just 14 clerks and two officers, although their influence was out of proportion to their numbers. The chief clerk, Richard Cannon, was to play a particularly significant role in the development of regimental traditions after the war.

The Horse Guards had only an advisory role to government on military policy, as any further powers had been stripped from the Crown and placed under parliamentary control in 1688.[18] However, the policy areas on which the Horse Guards could offer advice expanded considerably.

This was not only through formal changes in the structure of army administration but also through the Horse Guards' growing professionalism and expertise, an important transformation that is examined in more detail in Chapter 6.

Broader control of Britain's armed forces was diffuse and often unclear. Strategy was left to the cabinet, with the Secretary for War and Colonies (created in 1794 and more usually known as the Secretary of War) particularly concerned with the army. The government gained financial control of enlistment from colonels by the 1783 Pay Office Act, which accordingly expanded the concerns of the Secretary of War into recruitment policy.[19] Alongside this, the Secretary of War directed the deployment of the army on active campaigns which required cooperation with the Foreign Secretary, generals on campaign and colonial governors. The Secretary of State for the Home Department had an involvement in military matters too as his portfolio included 'internal defence', both in terms of anti-invasion plans and policing the country. After reforms in 1782–1783, the main tasks of the Secretary at War related to military finance, but he was also generally the point of contact between civilians and the army establishment, and had to sanction all troop movements within the UK.[20]

There were also a host of other government departments involved in Britain's armed forces, such as the Transport Board which oversaw the procurement of shipping, and other autonomous military establishments, like the Board of Ordnance (whose Master General was also a cabinet member). The ill-defined post-Union military establishment in Ireland compounded this lack of central military authority. A separate Commander of the Forces in Ireland was created as part of the Act of Union after the separate Irish establishment and Commander-in-Chief were suppressed in 1801. He reported both to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, who in turn answered to the Home Secretary, and to the military hierarchy based on the Horse Guards. Inevitably, this structure resulted in conflicts between military and civil interests.[21] Such diversity meant that wide consultation was needed in government, even before issues were brought before Parliament, and ensured that no one department or person could have total control of the armed forces. This 'dual control' of the army was considered an essential part of Britain's constitution, but it prohibited the army from implementing purely military solutions to its problems, and made the execution of strategy, and the running of the army, personal and informal.[22]

Because military policy was not concentrated in a single office, any solution to Britain's manpower problems was heavily influenced by

political considerations. This situation was made more complicated as Britain's governments were generally weak and had uncertain tenures for most of the Peninsular War. The Portland government gained ground as a result of the election of 1807 and swelled its majority to 106 from a 'sure majority' of 23 votes[23] and, after the election of 1812, the Liverpool government's overall majority rose to 142.[24] By contrast, this was barely half the majority Pitt commanded during the Revolutionary Wars.[25]

The political instability of the period derived from the collapse of the coalition built up under Pitt in the 1790s. This formidable phalanx began to break down in 1801 after the Act of Union with Ireland. Pitt, and some members of the government, wanted Catholic emancipation as a component part of the Act of Union, but the King refused to sanction this after strong representations to his already receptive ears, and so Pitt resigned.[26] The government then passed to Addington, but this generated new political rifts and created a precarious parliamentary situation. Some pro-Catholic members of Pitt's governments, such as Castlereagh,[27] continued to work under Addington whilst others, such as Grenville, who had been uncertain over the issue, resigned with Pitt. This state of affairs became more volatile when Grenville and his followers joined Charles James Fox and the Whig party in active opposition to the government.

Such diverse elements in the conservative-minded MPs, and a resurgent opposition, meant there was consistent parliamentary instability. Between 1807 and 1815 there were four different ministries within five years, with periods when Britain was without a government, such as the two weeks in 1812 after Spencer Perceval was assassinated.[28] There were also moments of high political drama.[29] The duel between George Canning and Castlereagh after Portland's death in 1809 further fragmented the nascent Tory party. Their departure from the government, each with a small following of MPs, made the new Perceval ministry appear impotent.[30] Perceval even doubted that he could carry on any business and so opened negotiations with other groups, first with Sidmouth,[31] and then with the Whigs and Grenvillites, to form a broader government, all of which failed.[32] It was clear that Perceval's government would have a difficult time in the Commons and, soon after the opening of the 1810 session, a motion was passed for an investigation into the abortive and costly expedition to Walcheren on the Dutch coast in 1809.[33] The government then faced a new crisis caused by the continuing illness of George III. The prospect of establishing the Prince of Wales as a regent went to the very heart of the status of Parliament in the constitution and generated further uncertainty in both chambers.

Governments could influence the Commons either by political management or, as in 1807, by having an election. Additionally, although many MPs were not committed to a party, most were party orientated and very few were independents that voted outside party voting patterns.[34] Furthermore, if the Tories were split, so too was the opposition, who had the additional obstacle that antagonism to the government during wartime was always awkward and often seen as unpatriotic.[35] The death of Fox in 1806 ushered in an era of weak leadership in the Whig party, and the failure to inaugurate any major reforms during the Talents government caused some Whigs to lose their seats to radicals. The demands for reforms, which got louder from 1809, did not sit well with the aristocratic Grenville wing of the opposition who gradually drifted from their alliance with the Whigs.[36]

The House of Lords was also a concern for British governments, especially after Grenville, one of the ablest debaters in the Lords, joined the opposition. During Perceval's calculations of the government's majorities, he estimated that there were 110 lords in opposition to government, whilst a list of 1807 gave the government only 176 supporters.[37] The character of the Lords had changed dramatically since 1784, however, with many creations and promotions (known as Pitt's peers). Despite the party splits from 1801, the House of Lords was an inherently conservative body. Provided the government was competent, and crucially had the King's backing, governments were not likely to be challenged there.

Looking beyond the broad political situation, the government also had to consider specific groups within Parliament and outside it when it sought solutions to Britain's manpower shortfall. This was particularly the case with the substantial militia interest, whose sensibilities had to be acknowledged whilst framing policy that affected the militia. Although the ideological basis for the force had diminished, some of those involved in officering and administrating the militia felt that it should be upheld as a separate force, particularly as the county administration had to meet the cost of raising and maintaining it.[38] The militia regiments were a nexus of local patronage to the Lord Lieutenants and the militia colonels. Alongside having a distinct agenda, the militia interest was also numerically significant,[39] with over 300 MPs who were militia officers between 1790 and 1820.[40] Furthermore, their main strength resided in the House of Lords where the Lord Lieutenants had a forum and many other peers who were connected with the militia could also speak out. As the guardians of the constitution, the Lords viewed any alterations to the balance of political power extremely suspiciously,

and they were especially concerned with the militia. Often, they did not have to challenge the government openly in Parliament as many had direct access to members of the government and the King.[41] If their views were still not taken into consideration, individual lords could wield their patronage of MPs in the Commons, potentially upsetting government majorities.

The strength of the militia interest was demonstrated in 1798, when it obstructed the plans of the government to create composite battalions of the grenadier and light companies from each militia regiment, without the issue ever being discussed in public. A more damaging incident occurred when the government proposed to fill up vacant militia officers in the same year. Besides rousing some lords who were often outspoken about the militia, such as Lords Carnarvon and Radnor, Grenville's brother-in-law Earl Fortescue and Lords Sydney and Powis, both ministerial stalwarts, also objected.[42] The first transfer of militiamen to the regular army in 1799 horrified some militia colonels who had no wish to be 'drill sergeants' for the army.[43] Additionally, if the matter could not be stopped in Parliament, the Lord Lieutenants also had substantial influence over the militia officers, without whom no government legislation on the militia could be enforced.

As with all coalitions of interest, those involved in the militia were neither politically homogenous nor a wholly obstructive group. Within their ranks were men of considerable expertise who actively encouraged reforms of the militia to make it effective,[44] and the government relied on militia officers as vital sources of information about the force and its composition.[45] The varying opinions within the militia interest were shown in the responses to Castlereagh's suggestion of an annual draft from the militia to the army in 1807. For example, Baron Grantley, Colonel of the 1st Surrey Militia, was listed as an opposition peer, but he agreed with Castlereagh's annual draft, yet the Earl of Mansfield, Colonel of the Perth Militia and usually a government supporter, disagreed with Castlereagh.

Two particular examples serve to emphasize the diversity in militia officers. Earl Fitzwilliam was practically the defender of the militia interest. As heir, both literally and politically, of the Marquis of Rockingham, he upheld the virtues of the militia as a counterpoise to the executive and the army.[46] As a committed Whig, he opposed the Tory governments anyway, but his rhetoric was particularly vociferous when it was clear that the government intended to use the militia to remedy Britain's manpower shortage. In contrast to Fitzwilliam was Lord Seaforth, Colonel of the Ross Militia, who was made a Baron as one of

Pitt's peers in the 1790s. Seaforth's ancestors had forfeited their estates in 1716 for complicity in the Jacobite rebellion and, as part of his reconciliation to the government, he had raised regiments in 1777 and in the 1790s, and was a firm government supporter from the start of the Revolutionary Wars.[47]

Theoretically there should also have been an army interest for the government to contend with, as there were large numbers of MPs who were or had been army officers. Between 1790 and 1820, one fifth of all MPs had military experience in the regulars and 135 military members were added between 1793 and 1815. Political affiliations for these MPs usually came before any considerations as military men and, given the length of the war, many of these MPs were on active duty. A hundred members went to the Peninsula at some stage, to which should be added those who served in the army at home and elsewhere overseas. One third of the military members spoke in Parliament, and one third of these spoke only once or twice, often to acknowledge the thanks of the House.[48] As such, their influence on the political situation was minimal.

The final factor for any government in deciding policy was the attitude of the King. Having caused two governments to collapse over Catholic relief, once in 1801 and again in 1807, it is clear he was still a force in British politics. The army had always been a particular interest of the Hanoverian dynasty, and George III was no different in this respect.[49] In the early years of the War of American Independence, army mobilization had been slowed by George III's reluctance to create any new regiments.[50] Needless to say, the Tory governments of the Peninsular War period were ideologically committed to the authority of the King and so were bound to listen to his opinions.

Despite such political turbulence, there was some continuity in personnel within the governments from 1807 and they all had a core of ministers who continued to work in various capacities, some of whom had worked in Addington's or Pitt's governments. Lord Hawkesbury, the future 2nd Earl Liverpool, had a vast experience of government by the time he became Prime Minister in 1812 and was particularly able to direct the war. He was Addington's Foreign Secretary, moved to the Home Office in Pitt's 1804 ministry, returned as Home Secretary with the Portland government and was Perceval's Secretary of War.[51] Castlereagh had a similar pattern of service, although he was out of government between 1809 and 1812. He was twice the Secretary of War, from 1805 to 1806, and again in the Portland ministry, and ably directed British foreign policy during the final coalition against Napoleon between 1812 and 1815.[52]

The combination of political weakness in both houses of Parliament, the militia interest and the King meant that government legislation on military policy often had a long gestation. For example, during 1807, even though Castlereagh was advocating that the cabinet take immediate measures to strengthen the army, it was not until four months, and an election, later that a Militia Transfer Bill was introduced. It is not surprising that during 1810 the Perceval ministry hardly considered the army, as it was preoccupied with its own survival, but this had a significant impact on the strength of Britain's army during that year.

Recruitment policy

When the Portland ministry came to power in 1807, Britain had already tried three different schemes for sustaining and expanding the army: raising men by some form of compulsion; changing the conditions of service to improve ordinary recruitment; and making better use of the military forces of the UK, in particular by transferring men from the militia to the line. In addition to revisiting these policies, the new administration could also consider more radical reforms of the army. In the immediate political circumstances of 1807 to 1809, however, the government's choices were restricted by the need for a speedy boost to the army and the recent political history of failed recruitment policy.

One of the key means of improving the conditions in the army (and therefore, it was hoped, recruitment) was by enlisting men for short service of a number of years. This was an established means of boosting recruitment in wartime, but it had already been effectively dismissed by 1807 because it had been the recruitment policy of the Talents government.[53] Whilst in opposition, the Portland government had already shown its aversion to the Talents' short-service scheme. During the passage of the 1807 Mutiny Act, Castlereagh proposed that enlistment for life be reintroduced, challenging the Talents' army recruitment system.[54] Although the motion was defeated by 179 votes to 60,[55] the intent was quite clear: Castlereagh had rejected short service as a means to augment the army. Of course, this was partly party politics, but Castlereagh also had other reasons to reject it.

Militarily, short service did not provide a suitable solution to Britain's manpower requirements. In 1806, there was a deficiency of 37,000 men from the army's establishment of 293,000, and Castlereagh further argued that the strength of the army was preserved during 1806 by measures introduced in Pitt's previous government (the Permanent Additional Force Act, which was in operation in early 1806, and the annual

Irish militia transfers) rather than the introduction of short service.[56] Castlereagh also had powerful allies in rejecting short service. In 1808, the Duke of York informed Castlereagh that, although recruiting in the last quarter of 1806 was generally better and there was a reduction in the number of desertions, the system of pensions and pay that also accompanied Windham's new military system proved almost impossible to administer. The automatic right to a pension removed a powerful encouragement for a soldier to be obedient. Overall, the Duke thought 18 months was a long enough trial and summarized short service as 'incompetent to the purpose for which it was enacted' and 'replete with inconvenience and detriment to His Majesty's service'.[57] The King, who had a longstanding dislike of short service, eagerly agreed with his son.[58] Additionally, Castlereagh disliked the 'prescriptive nature of Windham's system, which enforced limited service even when the men were perfectly satisfied and desirous to enter without limitation'. Consequently, in 1808 unlimited service was reintroduced into the army.[59]

Castlereagh outlined the two remaining options for army recruitment to the cabinet in May 1807, and his analysis generally shaped the debate for the next seven years. They could either 'ballot for men direct for the regular army, or submit to a ballot for men for the militia, with the view of our drawing from the militia that aid which the incomplete regiments of the line required'.[60] In these initial stages of the discussion, recruitment policy was viewed by ministers as temporary augmentations to the army. They were necessary to restore the strength of the regiments rather than a permanent reform in the way the army was recruited. So, in 1807, one of the arguments used by Castlereagh both to his cabinet colleagues and to Parliament was the state of the second battalions of many regiments. The army was 35,000 men below the funds voted for it and the second battalions were particularly weak, with 54 battalions mustering 14,098 men, an average of 260 men apiece. This was not just a concern about unfilled ranks, as it was also expensive. These battalions had a full complement of officers, which cost the government £911,869 annually, yet they had an average of only 16,000 recruits added to them each year, equating to an extra £55 per recruit. In addition, the number of second battalions ensured that these 16,000 men were useless as a military force because the men were dispersed into small units.[61] This was a recurrent structural problem and, in December 1810, Dundas again presented the prospect of having to reduce the second battalions because of their slender numbers.[62]

Viewed in this light, the immediate strategic and military demands of the army, which were often intertwined in cabinet decisions, took

precedence over the long-term sustainability of its numbers. The withdrawal of 16,000 troops from the UK for the expedition against Copenhagen in 1807 made the situation in the second battalions even worse, as men were drafted from them to top up units in the expedition.[63] In 1807, the combination of improving the UK's offensive capabilities, restoring the second battalions and the dispatch of forces overseas meant Castlereagh had to introduce 'some decisive measure for the augmentation of our Army'.[64] This sense of urgency was echoed by Lord Mulgrave, who thought that there was 'no room to hesitate between the two plans' (militia transfers and direct balloting).[65] Other immediate factors also influenced the development of Britain's recruitment policy. In 1807, Castlereagh was keen to tempt into the army the militiamen who were due discharges. These men had been under arms since 1803 and represented a potentially valuable addition to the army: during the debates on the 1807 militia transfer, General William Loftus declared that the militiamen had provided the army with some of its best NCOs and adjutants.[66]

Castlereagh had shown his preference for using the militia to supplement the army during his last tenure as Secretary of War, overseeing a large militia transfer in 1805 and, in 1806, introducing an annual draft to the line from Irish militia regiments that accepted an augmentation of 15 men per company.[67] Castlereagh's reasoning was well substantiated and often repeated by future Secretaries of War, as there were particular advantages to drawing men from the militia rather than balloting directly for the line. Firstly, it enlarged the disposable force within a few weeks as the militiamen were all well trained, both crucial considerations when expeditions were being planned. Secondly, balloting for the militia, as opposed to balloting for the line, 'had become congenial to the habits of the country'.[68] The same logic applied in 1809 and in 1811, and militia transfers were seen as the best solution to Britain's manpower problem. When Palmerston introduced the 1811 Militia Transfer Bill to the Commons, he declared that 'it would be advisable to recur to the means which experience had shewn [*sic*] to be so successful, namely to allow a certain proportion of the militia to volunteer into the line';[69] and, in a memorandum on the manpower shortfall in 1811, Liverpool stated that 'No other means present themselves but drafts from the Militia'.[70]

This is not to say, however, that all militia transfers were the same. Over time the requisite legislation developed in terms of details, but a more fundamental shift occurred in 1811 when militia transfers became annual and a recurrent means of addressing the shortfall in recruitment. Castlereagh had considered the idea of permanent militia transfers in

1807,[71] but thought he would not have been able to convince Parliament at the time. At that stage in the war, the government hoped that the one-off boost from the militia would put the army on a surer footing. Liverpool returned to the idea of a continual system of militia transfers in 1811 and his proposals were very similar to Castlereagh's, inasmuch as he proposed to reduce the militia to 60,000 and allow one sixth to volunteer each year. Castlereagh modelled this plan upon the successful Irish annual militia transfer, in which 15 men from each company of 100 men could volunteer for the line. The Irish system had also demonstrated the success of allowing militia regiments to recruit by enlistment perpetually to replace the volunteers. As Liverpool developed his ideas, they came even closer to Castlereagh's 1807 plan, by reducing the militia to 70,000 and allowing 10,000 men to transfer each year.[72]

A second development was in the size of the drafts, which echoed the shift from *ad hoc* but large-scale transfers to systematic drafts to cover casualties in the army. The manpower injections from the militia of 1807 and 1809 called for two-fifths of the British militia to join the regulars but, from 1811, a much smaller proportion was required. Initially, Liverpool's 1811 plan stipulated that the army's annual shortfall of around 8000 men to be taken from the militia, but this was later raised to 10,000. Still, this was a significantly smaller proportion than the 1807 and 1809 transfers.

As the British governments settled on militia transfers as a means of supplying the army, so the cabinet's attention had to turn to maintaining the militia. The militia had an important role in the defence of the UK that needed to be considered, but careful management was also required due to the politics of the militia and its close ties with county patronage and local government. Any militia transfer needed the support of most of the militia officers and administration to work effectively. In doing this, the government was mindful that large-scale militia balloting could affect ordinary recruitment, a cost to set against the transfer of men from the militia. In 1807, the government decided upon a large augmentation to the militia, raising 30,000 men for the British militia and 5000 for the Irish. It was thought that this would be sufficient to cover the transfers from the militia and leave some supernumerary men to cover casualties for a few years.

By 1809, Castlereagh had developed his ideas and proposed to allow the British militia to recruit in the same fashion as the army, allowing the militia regiments to send out recruiting parties and enlist men for a bounty. By permitting this before resorting to a ballot, Castlereagh hoped to avoid the detrimental effects of balloting on recruiting and lessen the burden on county authorities.[73] This had been accepted

practice in the Irish militia (Castlereagh was Colonel of the County Down Militia), and Castlereagh had initially advocated the extension of this scheme to the British militia in 1807.[74] In 1811, a similar tack was adopted to ensure that the militia was prepared for annual drafts and that it was not too onerous to make up the numbers. The militia was asked to obtain the 12,395 men required to bring it up to its establishment of 96,715, and then the establishment would be reduced to 76,000 gradually through drafts to the regulars. Consequently, the militia would not have to ballot for at least three years, during which time they would be allowed to recruit as they had done in 1809, thus avoiding ballots and not impairing ordinary recruiting of the regulars.[75]

Although the government quickly settled on the militia transfers as a means to boost the army, and by 1811 established it as the means to support the army, the debate about the options for army recruitment did not entirely go away. The immediate political and strategic needs of 1807 to 1809 drove Castlereagh to pursue militia transfers but, as the war went on, the options for the recruitment of the army were discussed again. With the watchful and thoughtful eyes of the Duke of York and Adjutant General Harry Calvert, Horse Guards noticed other ways in which the terms and conditions of service could be improved. In part, this was tied to the policy of militia transfers, when it was realized that a major stumbling block to the success of the transfers was the militiaman's family allowance. This scheme provided 2s 6d for a militiaman's wife and 1s for each child when he was stationed outside the regiment's county. The army did not have a similar provision, yet the financial and social cost of losing the family allowance meant that many militiamen would not transfer to the army. Furthermore, though balloting directly for the army was dismissed in 1807, as the war went on consideration was given to such a scheme again. Regular ideas and memoranda about direct balloting and large-scale reforms were presented by the Horse Guards between 1809 and 1814, and are covered in more detail in Chapter 6. The government, looking at its immediate strategic needs, what was politically viable, and coupled with the advisory position held by the Horse Guards, could choose to ignore the Horse Guards' recommendations. Having decided on a policy, the government still had to obtain the assent of Parliament.

Enacting policy

Whilst in opposition, Portland and his followers, especially Castlereagh, had chastised the Talents government for the ineffectiveness of their

military policies. This meant that the Portland government and those that followed could expect equal treatment during the Peninsular War and needed to manage the politics of it. Moreover, in utilizing the manpower of the militia and the resources of the county administration to supply the army, the government had to deal with the militia interest to enact its policies. Although the government was generally assured of gaining a majority for its bills, it was viewed as important by contemporaries that any major policy was not too divisive or seen as controversial. In this respect, the government did have some problems. These occurred whilst obtaining parliamentary approval for its plans for militia transfers, and also when MPs examined how the government had utilized its soldiers as part of a more general examination of government wartime strategy. There was, of course, an element of party politics in all these debates, although the prosecution of the war was a serious subject for parliamentary scrutiny.

The Portland government did not make a good start, as the demands of organizing the Copenhagen expedition took up all of Castlereagh's attention during June 1807 and so it was not until July that the details of the militia transfer were finalized, three months after the Portland ministry came to power.[76] The cabinet discussions, coupled with organizing the expeditions to the Baltic and an unsure political situation, ensured that there was no mention of a plan for increasing the strength of the army in the King's speech at the opening of Parliament. There was a feeling in the Commons that this omission was deliberate, in order to ensure that some interested parties would be absent and so unable to dispute the proposals.[77] In this atmosphere, it was inevitable that the 1807 Militia Transfer Bill would be contested.

The 1807 debates exposed the criticisms of militia transfers as a way of supplying the army. Those in Parliament who upheld the virtues of the militia as counterpoise to the army and the executive decried any tampering with the militia or its closer integration into Britain's armed forces. In recognition of their views, Castlereagh smoothed the passage of the 1807 bill by declaring that this militia draft would be unique: 'The ordinary recruiting, with the aid of the improvements now in progress, may, during the war, preserve them [the second battalions] in a state of efficiency, and, through them, the Army at large'.[78] This argument assured the support of some wavering MPs, such as Whitshed Keene.[79] Although the measures passed through the Commons, it was voted upon, with 187 to 90 votes in the first reading, 76 to 19 in the second and 42 to 15 in the Lords.[80] Windham recognized the significance of the ratification of the 1807 measures: 'If it was once admitted

that we had a right to plundering the Militia, it was a mere mockery to say that a recurrence of the assured necessity of plunder would not happen'.[81] Within 18 months he was proved right, and the government would have cause to use the militia again.

After the passage of the 1807 Militia Transfer Act, the further use of the militia to supplement the army was not quite so divisive. By early 1809 it was apparent to the government that they needed to go back to Parliament for new militia transfer legislation to make up for the losses in 1808 and early 1809, especially as the government was planning another expedition in support of Austria's stand against Napoleon. Some MPs, however, objected to the government's proposals. The changes suggested in the recruitment of the militia inflamed the opposition of the militia purists, as much as the misuse of the constitutional force to provide men for the regulars. What also incensed the militia supporters at this stage was that Castlereagh had broken his pledge that militia transfers would not become a regular system to supply the army, yet, within six months of the end of the 1807 militia draft, he was asking again for more men through the same means. A division on the first reading was forced by the overzealous Lord Milton, son of the militia stalwart Earl Fitzwilliam, which was duly defeated by 77 votes to 26. After that, the proposals passed through parliamentary stages unopposed, although not without comment.[82]

There were friends of the militia who always raised objections to changes, principally militia officers who sat in the House such as William Frankland, a Grenvillite, Earl Fitzwilliam's son Lord Milton and the tenaciously independent John Pollexfen Bastard, Colonel of the East Devon Militia. Lord Milton and Sir Thomas Turton also declared their objections, with Milton commenting that it appeared that militia drafts were being adopted 'as a regular system for supplying the army',[83] and Turton stating that it was 'changing constitutional principals [*sic*] of the militia of the country'.[84] In the Lords, Earl Fitzwilliam went further, expressing 'considerable regret, that the principle of the militia had in modern times been so much departed from, and that the militia regiments should have been made a recruiting, or perhaps, if he might use the expression, a crimping fund for the supply of the army'.[85]

The government had to engage with the issues of patronage and county administration to make the militia transfers more acceptable. This was not just to ensure a straightforward journey through Parliament, but also so that laws were acted upon by county authorities and the powerful militia colonels. The principal mechanism to encourage their cooperation was by addressing the size of the militia and the means

by which it was recruited. During the 1807 debates, Castlereagh brought in a parallel bill alongside the transfer legislation to massively augment the militia by ballot, hoping that this would placate the militia and county interests as it would provide some compensation for the transfer. Raising such large numbers of men would conciliate the militia interest in two ways: firstly, by ensuring that ballots would not be necessary for several years and,[86] secondly, by increasing the size of the militia regiments resulting in more patronage for the militia colonels.[87] The result was two complicated, separate bills: the militia transfer itself (two-fifths of the British militia and one half of the Irish), and an act balloting for 36,000 men in Britain and 8000 in Ireland.

Some MPs and Lords doubted the necessity of the government's measures. As time went on, they also began to question the government's strategy that was leading to such demands being placed on the militia. In late 1807, it appeared that Britain's last continental allies were on the verge of making peace with Napoleon and so fears of an invasion were again aroused. In the eyes of some MPs, a draft from the militia to the line implied that the militia was not sufficient for home defence and would disrupt a major proportion of the forces in the UK.[88] This view was confirmed by the fact that the previous militia transfers had been used to add to the disposable force for specific, offensive operations (in 1799 for the invasion of Holland, and in 1805 to land a force in north Germany); however, in 1807 the government had neither allies to help nor any expeditions to launch.[89] Dr Lawrence's speech went even further as he was convinced the government was being devious. He disagreed that there was any emergency and accused the government of having a practice whereby they 'set forward some cry or other' to get what they wanted; he said that it was 'the church is in danger' during the election while now they had moved on to 'the country is in danger'.[90]

When the opposition had the chance to debate recruitment policy during the 1809 transfer bill debates, their rhetoric also encompassed considerations about the effectiveness of the militia drafting system. The government almost undermined themselves in 1809, as part of the King's speech stated that the army's strength would be improved without impairing home defence. Some Opposition MPs pointed out that a draft from the militia hardly met these criteria.[91] Castlereagh, supported by his brother-in-law Thomas Wood, Colonel of the East Middlesex Militia, who was becoming the pro-government militia representative, declared that militia transfers were 'the most effectual, and by far the most expeditious means of supplying a deficiency in the regular

military forces of the country' and that 'it would give the country in the least possible time the largest possible force'.[92] Taking soldiers from the militia did create a temporary weakness in the defensive force, but this was acceptable. Castlereagh pre-empted those who advocated direct balloting by stating that such a force would do the opposite, as it would massively enlarge the defensive force whilst reducing the efficiency of the offensive troops.

Also in 1809, the opposition from the militia interest was bolstered by demands to know what the government had done with the men who transferred from the militia in 1807. Calcraft accused the government of wasting the huge force that it had in 1808 (some 239,000 compared with 210,000 in 1809), yet the government claimed only 4000 men were lost in the recent Corunna campaign.[93] George Tierney, one of the opposition's principal spokesmen, simply wanted to know what had happened to the force given to Castlereagh in 1807.[94] Earl Temple concurred with Windham's appraisal of two years earlier, and decried the use of militia drafts in anticipation of an emergency, 'So that this was now to become a regular system from year to year'.[95]

A final area of discussion about militia transfers was the impact of the accompanying acts to fill up the ranks of the militia. As this was focused on administration, those who spoke on this issue encompassed a range of views. A militia ballot entailed a considerable amount of work for the county Lieutenancies, and undoubtedly encouraged some MPs, such as George Henry Fitzroy, Earl Euston and Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk, to support the opposition in 1807.[96] Charles Philip Yorke agreed to the militia transfer and recognized the need to supply the army by some form of compulsion, but objected to the large ballot. Sir Thomas Turton saw the ballot as a tax and wanted the disparity of uneven county militia quotas to be remedied first. The supporters of short service felt that ballots would destroy Windham's system, as they raised the price for substitutes in the militia and therefore the lower bounties offered for short service would not be able to compete.[97] Windham had the last word in the debates in the Commons, accusing Castlereagh of fattening up the militia for his own use: 'Ballot and bounty were indeed the only resources that seemed ever to have been thought of.'[98]

The question of balloting was particularly prominent in the debates on the 1811 Militia Transfer Bill. Parliament was concerned with the permanency of the proposed laws, which gave the government the authority to call for ballots to fill the ranks of the militia whenever it wanted. Daniel Giles declared that he would accept a single draft from the militia to reduce it to its new establishment, but objected to giving

the government 10,000 men annually, especially when it was not clear how these vacancies were to be filled,[99] a point he reiterated in its first debate on the Militia Enlistment Bill.[100] The proposals also incensed the supporters of Windham's short-service system. William Eliot declared that 'If Mr. Windham's system had been preserved in, they would not now have occasion to resort to such a measure as this. It could not but disgust the militia officers, who were converted into instruments for recruiting the regular army'. He conceded that if the laws were temporary he would probably allow it to pass, but urged the House to pause before they 'placed in the hands of ministers a power of perpetual balloting'.[101]

The fears regarding the future ballots required some management by the government. Ellison declared that he would vote against the bill if ballots were held for the militia, and Henry Banks proposed that no ballots should take place until 1813. Castlereagh answered these concerns by highlighting the large numbers of supernumerary men in the militia who would be kept, so obviating the need for ballots. To placate such views, the act specified that militia ballots would be suspended until 1 July 1813.[102] Colonel Wood again supported his brother-in-law Castlereagh and the government, declaring that it would be easy for the militia to recruit the seventh of their strength that would be drafted each year into the line. Castlereagh also answered the silent supporters of balloting directly for the line, as 'the militia gave habits which prepared men for entering the line, and that it was the natural colour of the mind of man to prefer home service'.[103]

Enacting new laws for the recruitment of the army was helped along by supporters beyond the government benches. In 1807, Colonel Wood, and Thomas Hamilton, Lord Binning, spoke in favour of the government.[104] Furthermore, as the discussion often centred on means, the army's urgent need for men depressed opposition and encouraged undecided MPs to acquiesce. In 1807, the independents Henry Willoughby, John Ingram Lockhart and Baron John Henniker all spoke in support of the measure.[105] Thomas Babington spoke for the 'Saints', who had decided to judge the Portland ministry on each measure, indicating that Wilberforce's followers approved of the militia transfer.[106]

The government could also rely on the MPs' desire to perform their patriotic duty and acquiesce in the government's plans. Moderate views were voiced from Davis Giddy, who supported the 1807 legislation because the majority of the House did, and Henry Bankes, who proclaimed that he was not blind to its inconveniences 'but did not feel it warranted opposing'.[107] Even Colonel Stanley went as far as to say that

'If, however, the bill should pass into a law, he would not throw any impediment in the way of its operation', although this statement turned out not to be strictly true.[108] The Whig–Grenville alliance was not united in opposing militia transfers, and Earl Temple and Thomas Grenville were conspicuously absent from the first division on the proposals.[109]

Debates on government recruitment policy also permitted the government benches to engage and persuade MPs and Lords with their oratory. This should not be considered an insignificant factor in helping the militia transfer measures and their sibling bills augmenting the militia to become law. Castlereagh gave a magnificent speech to the house that certainly eased the passage of the 1809 Militia Transfer Bill, in which he silenced many avenues of attack:

> It had been mentioned that large armies were dangerous to civil liberty. Gracious God! Could any rational man now suppose, that the liberties of this country were in any danger from any regular army that it was judged proper to raise, balanced as that army must be by an immense force of Militia, Local Militia, and other armed descriptions of force, and still more balanced by those constitutional feelings which animated no description of his Majesty's subjects more strongly that it did our gallant armies, which had so often and so recently acquired immortal honours for themselves and their country.

Finally, the enacting of the militia transfer bills was sometimes aided by other parliamentary business; for example, in 1809 the scandal and inquiry into the Duke of York resulted in the government's military proposals not being given as much parliamentary time as it could have. Windham hoped that Castlereagh would postpone the debates whilst Mrs Clarke, the Duke's former mistress, diverted the House's attention, but the government refused to delay such crucial legislation.[110]

It is unsurprising in an era of high political drama that the relatively technical history of recruitment policy has been overlooked. Making military policy a humdrum affair appears to be one of the aims of the post-Talents governments, as they sought to prosecute the war as effectively as possible and stay in office. At first glance, the decline in debates and divisions in the commons about how to strengthen the army supports the idea that the military issues became increasingly apolitical. However, a closer examination of the politics involved in supplying the army with men in this short period shows that this is simplistic and, in fact, military politics followed the peaks and troughs of politics more

generally. The particularly fractious months of 1807 surrounding the collapse of the Talents and the accession of the Portland government were reflected in the lengthy speeches and debates on military policy in that year. The downturn in political activity on recruitment during and after the 1811 Militia Transfer Act mirrored a general trend of political consensus towards the end of the war, epitomized by the Prince Regent keeping Liverpool in office.

There was always an undercurrent of political tension over the recruitment of the army, as evidenced by the continual reiterations of the same positions about militia transfers after 1807. The political debate about the structure and means of supporting the army could have consistently been as prominent as it was in 1807 if there had been sufficient political strength to reopen the debate. Despite their shaky appearance, the governments of 1807 onwards were stronger than they thought. The Opposition refused to tackle the government about the army when they knew the government could always make appeals to patriotism and service. Besides, between 1809 and 1812, there were much more tempting political openings for the Opposition to damage the government: the Duke of York, Walcheren and the Regency. Even with these political considerations in mind, it is still clear that that way in which men were obtained for the army was a serious political issue.

4
Patterns of Recruitment: The Regional Response

The recruitment of the British Army, and of the militia that was used to supplement the strength of British forces, was not uniformly spread between 1807 and 1815. There were significant yearly variations in yield and in the location of enlistments. The system of combining ordinary recruiting by bounty with militia transfers to support the army did not draw evenly upon the male population of the United Kingdom. This is unsurprising as, having established a recruitment policy through militia transfers and seen it pass through Parliament, these policies then had to be implemented at a local level. At the same time, the army was still finding men in its traditional way, using recruiting parties offering bounties to enlist, and had considerable latitude about where these parties were sent. In effect, there was a pattern of mobilization which demonstrated the success, or otherwise, of the government's recruitment policy and the efforts of the Horse Guards to fill the ranks of the army. This manifested itself in the national composition of the army – the proportions from England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland – and in regional responses to the call for men to join up.

The national picture

Examining recruitment into the army and militia at a national level provides an outline of the upshot to the demands for men and the implementation of the militia transfers. During the Peninsular War and Waterloo period, the British Army acquired 117,275 men from ordinary recruitment. The militia raised almost the same number, with 51,373 recruited by enlistment and 56,873 by ballots, giving a total of 108,246 men. Some 94,179 militiamen transferred their services to the line. In round figures, 200,000 men were taken into the

British Army from 1807 to 1815, which compares to its peak size of 250,000 in 1813.

Obviously, these men did not enlist into the army in fixed numbers each year and there were peaks and troughs during the period. John Cookson has argued that the average level of recruitment throughout the Napoleonic Wars demonstrated that the army was finding men from a fixed base of society and, therefore, unable to expand its manpower,[1] but there is significant variation in ordinary recruitment during the Peninsular War period, which suggests otherwise. An analysis of army recruitment, provided in Table 4.1, shows that there were spectacular results in 1807, and a good yield in 1812 to 1813; 1810 stood out as a very poor year, recruiting 10,000 men fewer than in 1807, half of what was managed in that bumper year.

There are both specific and general reasons that explain the diversity in enlistment data. The last two years of the conflict with Napoleonic France were exceptional because of the onset of peace, at least in Europe. In 1814, recruiting was massively cut back and then there was a sudden mobilization for the 1815 campaign. This difference is revealed by looking at the monthly figures for 1814 and 1815. The first six months of 1814 averaged 1023 recruits per month, which is comparable to the

Table 4.1   Total recruits raised by the army and the militia

Year	Army recruits	Militia recruits	Total raised by voluntary enlistment	Militia ballots	Total
1807	19,114	–	19,114	41,305	60,419
1808	12,963	–	12,963	–	12,963
1809	11,780	9,635	21,415	377	21,792
1810	9,095	11,214	20,309	10,524	30,833
1811	11,772	4,796	16,568	3,994	20,562
1812	14,756	9,564	24,320	417	24,737
1813	14,647	10,705	25,352	253	25,607
1814	7,911	5,428	13,339	–	13,339
1815	15,237	–	15,237	–	15,237
Total	117,275	51,342	168,617	56,870	225,489

Sources: UKNA, WO1/946, Return of Recruits raised since 1803, 21 March 1811; *Commons Journal*, 1813–1814, 261 and 1814–1815, 309, Return of Recruiting 1814 and 1816, 423, Return of Recruiting, 1815; UKNA, WO1/904, Memorandum, AG, 10 May 1808; WO162/326, Return of Men raised by the Militia; *CJ*, 1813–1814, XI, 154, Militia recruits raised by Beat of Drum, May 1809 to October 1813, 1814–1815, IX, 323, Militia recruits raised by Beat of Drum, 25 December 1813 to December 1814.

average figure of 1190 men enlisted between January and June in 1812 and 1813. For the second half of 1814, the average fell to 295 recruits a month, and 1815 produced similar but reversed figures.[2]

The exceptionally high numbers of men recruited into the army in 1807 represent a concerted effort by the Talents government to boost recruitment. This was in reply to the shortfall between the size of the army voted for by Parliament and the actual numbers of men under the colours, a matter to which Castlereagh was keen to draw attention in the House of Commons. In December 1806, all officers who were not on active regimental duty received instructions to be sent out to recruit. Furthermore, battalions of fewer than 600 men were ordered to obtain 200 men or else the battalion would be reduced, effectively forcing officers to recruit to keep their rank. This incentive proved to be particularly successful and the 54 second battalions alone obtained 8035 men, which more than accounts for the variation between the figures for 1807 and the average figure of 12,502 men per annum between 1808 and 1813.[3]

The dip in 1810 was caused by the militia's quest for men. As discussed in Chapter 3, militia regiments were allowed to recruit by bounty while the transfer to the line was in operation during 1809 and 1810, and this generated competition with the regulars. In the second half of 1810, there was a ballot for the militia which also hampered the ability of the army to enlist men. Militia recruiting was initially unsupervised but, from 1811 onwards, it is clear from the figures that the army gained control over militia practices and lessened the impact on regimental recruiting parties. Balloting for the militia, or for any force, had a significant impact on the figures because those who were balloted were allowed to purchase a substitute to serve for them. The price for a substitute competed with the bounties that were offered by the army and, in most cases, outstripped them. During the 1808 ballot, the average price for a militia substitute was £26 15s contrasting with the £16 6s on offer as a bounty to join the army. The highest bounties offered were in Monmouthshire, with an average of £45 (nearly three times the army bounty); only three counties in England and Wales offered less than the army's bounty and, in these cases, they were not substantially smaller.[4] The militia also had the additional attractions of a family allowance and being restricted to service in the UK. The effect of the militia ballots reduced the monthly average to 942 recruits between 1803 and 1813, an eighth lower than the figure of 1073 men per month in the absence of ballots. The poor results obtained for the army in 1803 and 1804, when a total of only 19,257 men were added directly to the army, demonstrate

the detrimental combination of ballots for the militia and the Army of Reserve at the same time.

When these specific reasons are taken into account, it is clear that there was an improvement in ordinary recruitment figures. For the years 1808 and 1809, and from 1811 to 1813, a total of 13,184 recruits per year were gained, representing a 7 per cent improvement above the average yearly recruits for 1803–1815. By studying 1812 and 1813, this improvement is brought into sharper focus as both years produced close to 15,000 men, and the first six months of 1814 generated a similar number proportionally. Although the worsening economic conditions may have contributed to these returns, the consistency of the results and the poorer results in 1811 – a worse year economically – point to the effectiveness of the Horse Guards' efforts to improve and better control recruiting, which are detailed in Chapter 5.

The numbers of recruits is only part of the story, and there was a significant variation in the geographic origins of the men who joined the army. Contemporary opinion asserted that the army did not reflect the population of the UK and that the Scots and Irish were overrepresented in the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars. John Cookson has reaffirmed this and highlighted the fact that one of the distinctions of the post-Waterloo army was the size of the 'Celtic' component, particularly the number of Scots in the army. This was a change from the pre-1793 army, which was principally Anglo-Scottish, and reflected the massive recruitment in Ireland and Scotland, especially during the Revolutionary Wars.[5]

Contemporary opinion and Cookson's argument on the Celtic component in the army is confirmed by contemporary recruitment records. An 1809 return outlined the number of recruits provided by the 27 different recruiting districts (regional administrative units for the recruitment process) in the UK during the last six months of 1808 and first half of 1809. This period is instructive, as only the army was recruiting and there was no competition with the militia. During this 12-month period, 7081 recruits came from England, equating to 49 per cent of the total and less than England and Wales' proportion of the UK, which stood at 57 per cent. 266 men came from Wales (including the counties of Herefordshire and Shropshire, as they were part of the recruiting districts that covered Wales), or 2 per cent of the total. Another 1429 men were from Scotland, matching its proportion of the population of the UK, and 5621 from Ireland (39 per cent compared with 33 per cent of the total population). Overall, the figures suggest heavier recruitment in Ireland and less in England and Wales.[6]

What is just as interesting regarding these figures is where the army sought to obtain men, and there was a massively disproportionate effort to recruit in Scotland. Out of 819 recruiting parties, 181 were operating in Scotland in the second half of 1808, equivalent to 22 per cent of the total, and a similar number were recruiting north of the border in the first part of 1809. It is little wonder the Castlereagh, in his considerations on recruitment policy, was looking for 'some arrangement which will cover the country more generally, which may enable us to draw a supply of men from those parts of it which are less frequented by recruiting parties'.[7]

Ordinary recruitment, however, provided just over half the manpower to the British Army and the rest came from the militia. The full picture of the national composition of the British Army can be gauged from the biannual inspection returns discussed in Chapter 1, which list the nationality of the men – English, Scots, Irish or foreign – when the unit was inspected. Unfortunately, the printed inspection returns do not make a separate entry for Wales (it is included in England) and so only a comparison can be made between England, Scotland and Ireland.

From the units sampled in the period from 1807 to 1815, the results, presented in Table 4.2, show a striking similarity between the UK population and the national composition of the army. Scotland is slightly over-represented – on average it made up 13 per cent of the army and 10 per cent of the UK, whilst the Irish contingent was less than its proportion of the population (a quarter of the army and a third of the UK). The figures in Table 4.2 do have some caveats; the sample does not include troops stationed in Ireland as they were administered

Table 4.2   Nationality of rank and file in the British army

Year	English (%)		Scottish (%)		Irish (%)		Total sample
1807	12,837	(55)	2,444	(10)	8,036	(34)	23,317
1808	17,634	(67)	2,174	(8)	6,452	(25)	26,260
1809	16,672	(64)	4,331	(17)	4,911	(19)	25,914
1810	9,542	(51)	2,473	(13)	6,710	(36)	18,725
1811	12,918	(59)	2,607	(12)	6,401	(29)	21,926
1812	12,527	(59)	3,133	(15)	5,587	(26)	21,247
1813	10,616	(61)	3,179	(18)	3,467	(20)	17,262
1814	6,376	(52)	1,726	(14)	4,162	(34)	12,264
1815	9,493	(58)	1,643	(10)	5,274	(32)	16,410
Total	108,615	(59)	23,710	(13)	51,000	(28)	183,325

Source: UKNA, WO27 Sample.

by the Irish Adjutant General's office, and these papers no longer survive. Ireland's garrison, however, was not exclusively composed of men recruited from there. In fact, it was government policy to reduce the proportion of Irish soldiers in Ireland.[8] Also, as the figures are a sample of the British Army, they do not cover every regiment and there were some 'national' units, at least in their title. The four specifically titled Irish regiments, the 18th, 27th, 87th and 88th, spent most of their time outside the UK and so they were not inspected often. For instance, the 27th had two battalions in Sicily, where inspections were almost non-existent, and its third battalion was in Ireland. Only when the 3/27th moved to Canada in 1815 does an inspection return exist for the regiment. The 18th and 88th appear only three times in the sample. Where unit statistics exist, they confirm that they were overwhelmingly Irish. In 1811, 90 per cent of the 2/18th were Irish, and the figures for the 2/88th are equally high at 95 per cent in 1810 and 87 per cent in 1812. Even with these cautions, the nationalities in the British Army were representative of the UK, as the odd missing 'national' regiment of around 800 men from the WO27 sample would not be sufficient to upset the broad picture of the national breakdown of the British Army.

The representative balance of the British Army was due to the influx of men from the militia transfers detailed in Table 4.3, which counterbalanced the geographical pattern and predilection of ordinary

Table 4.3 Militia transfer acts and their yield

Years	Act	British militia volunteers	Irish militia volunteers	Total for each Act
1807–1808	47 Geo. III, c. 55	18,784		
	47 Geo. III, c. 57		8,353	27,137
1808	48 Geo. III, c. 64		3,378	3,378
1809–1810	49 Geo. III, c. 4	15,974		
	49 Geo. III, c. 5		4,879	20,853
1810	49 Geo. III, c. 56		2,914	2,914
1811–1814	51 Geo. III, c. 20	21,579		30,294
	51 Geo. III, c. 30		8,715	
1814	54 Geo. III, c. 1	8,285	1,318	9,603
Total		64,622	29,557	94,179

Sources: UKNA, WO1/904, Volunteers from the Militia, 1 July 1808; WO1/946, Return of Militia Volunteers, 24 May 1810 (which gives 17,612 from the British Militia in 1807 and 1808); WO25/3225, Return of Men volunteered from the Militia, 15 October 1813; *CJ*, 1814–1815, IX, 327, Return of Militia volunteers for 1814, 14 March 1815.

recruitment. The militia transfers aimed to take a large number of men from English and Scottish militia regiments. Consequently, in 1810 and 1815, when there were no transfers from the British militia, the proportion of Irishmen in the army was higher. In these years, the army's strength was maintained by ordinary recruiting, which was particularly successful in Ireland; moreover, in 1810, Irish militiamen were still allowed to volunteer under the terms of an 1806 act.

The militia transfers were not uniformly successful across the three kingdoms. In 1809, 69 per cent of the militiamen who volunteered were English, whilst only 8 per cent were Scottish and 23 per cent were Irish. Although the Scottish militia rallied in 1811 and provided 15 per cent of the volunteers, Ireland still underperformed, providing only 24 per cent of the intake that year. The balancing effect of the militia volunteers also explains the large 'Celtic' presence in the army in the post-Waterloo period. A large number of militia volunteers, especially Englishmen, chose short service for seven years or the duration of the war. These men were discharged first in 1814 and 1815, and so the army was left with ordinary recruits and militiamen who had chosen unlimited service. In both categories, the Irish and Scottish predominated.

This pattern of the militia transfers counterbalancing ordinary recruitment is also confirmed by an examination of individual regiments. Each militia unit was expected to be recruited from its county, and the militia transfer acts specified a quota of men who could transfer to the line regiments. The deficiency in meeting these quotas, which is abstracted in Table 4.4, demonstrates the success of the English militia regiments in providing men for the army, unlike the relatively poor performance of Scotland, Ireland and Wales. In 1807, the Irish and Scottish militias had a higher deficiency rate than the total English figures (8 per cent and 12 per cent compared with 3 per cent, respectively), and the Welsh militia regiments were as tardy as the Irish units. The cumulative effects of the quota deficiencies, whereby unfilled quotas from previous years were added to next year's demands, exaggerated this pattern. The English militia had a 20 per cent deficiency in 1812, whilst the Irish militia only filled half of its volunteer quota.[9] The performance of all the UK's militias at meeting their targets during the war deteriorated, yet their relative positions remained the same. The Scottish militia was worse than the Welsh regiments, and the Welsh regiments continued to be worse than the English units.

There were also national differences in the way these deficiencies were spread across individual units. Generally, most of the Scottish and Irish militia units were unable to meet their allocation of men to transfer,

Table 4.4   Militia quotas and deficiencies, 1807–1813

Years	England Quota		Wales Quota (%)		Scotland Quota (%)		Ireland Quota (%)		Total Quota (%)	
1807–1808	15,101	(3)	1,297	(7)	4,156	(12)	8,689	(8)	29,243	(6)
1809–1810	16,776	(10)	1,331	(16)	3,654	(56)	6,708	(27)	28,469	(20)
1811	7,199	(12)	653	(18)	3,192	(44)	5,096	(46)	16,140	(29)
1812	6,477	(20)	557	(32)	2,551	(63)	6,543	(51)	16,128	(39)
1813	6,668	(25)	622	(36)	2,745	(77)	7,546	N/A	N/A	N/A
Average (%)		20		29		61		49		35

Sources: UKNA, HO51/25, Instructions for militia transfer, 17 August 1807; WO1/612, Arrangement for the Inspection of Volunteers from the Irish Militia, 23 September 1807; WO1/904, List of Regiments not furnished quota, 25 April and 1 June 1808; HO51/26, Militia Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809; HO50/416, Return of Militia Volunteers, 10 July 1810; HO51/28, Militia Volunteer Instructions, 27 April 1811; WO3/585, Circular, by Darling, 25 April 1812; WO3/585, Special Instructions on Militia volunteering, 1 March 1813; HO51/28, Circular, by Sidmouth, 24 March 1814.

whilst there were only a few intractable English regiments. In 1807 over half of the Scottish regiments, a third of the Irish corps and a quarter of the Welsh units did not fulfil their targets, whereas only one eighth of the English regiments failed to meet the government's requirements.[10] In 1809, 14 out of 15 Scottish militia regiments did not fulfil their quota, whilst only a quarter of the English and Welsh regiments were deficient. These different figures, each representing a different county, demonstrate a local response to the call for men, which underpinned the national picture.

The regional response

At a national level, then, ordinary recruitment and the militia transfers provided a means of fulfilling the army and the government's ambition to 'spread the recruiting system over the Kingdom generally'.[11] Direct enlistment into the army was focused on and produced more men from Ireland and Scotland, whilst the militia transfers proved more prolific in England. This national picture is an abstraction, as the machinery of recruitment was based on two methods: recruiting parties from the army's regiments and transfers from the militia. Both sources represented a local and community response to the appeals of the bounty and military service during the Peninsular War, albeit in slightly different forms. The men who were enlisted by recruiting parties came directly from their communities, but the men from the militia were slightly

different. Although representing a selection of the counties that they were from, the militiamen were a distinct group resulting from their time in the militia regiments and their experiences garrisoning Britain and Ireland.

The regional basis of ordinary recruitment was the individual regimental recruiting parties, and the spectacular results in 1807 showed what could be achieved. There were, however, limits to this form of recruitment before it duplicated effort or affected the recruiting party's parent unit. In 1807, over 1100 parties provided the 19,114 recruits, but this effort was judged 'highly injurious to the Service and Expensive', and took NCOs and officers from duty with their units.[12] In 1809, the 84th was prohibited from adding to the 14 recruiting parties it already had scattered across the UK as its discipline was suffering.[13]

In order to recruit, a presence in the British Isles was needed. One of the key benefits of the depots and second battalions established during the wars and stationed in the UK was that the regiments had a source for recruiting parties and a receptacle for recruits. The army depot on the Isle of Wight provided a similar if less formal function for regiments without such a presence, and there a unit could station a few officers and NCOs to be in charge of recruitment.[14] As an example, in 1807 all spare officers at the army depot from the 19th Light Dragoons, 75th, 77th and 94th were sent out recruiting before these regiments returned from East India.[15] Conversely, regiments without any recruiting establishment suffered severely. The 16th, 46th, 54th, 55th and 70th, all wasting away overseas, had little success in enlisting men because of the lack of soldiers from these units stationed in the UK. Consequently, the rank and file of these corps were consolidated into six companies, and the remaining skeleton companies of NCOs and officers were ordered home to form recruiting parties and regimental depots.[16]

Besides a presence in the UK, the establishment of a unit could also be critical to the success of the regiment, as spare officers and NCOs could be utilized on the recruiting service. The successful enlistment of men was rewarded by the augmentation of a regiment, which necessarily resulted in promotions and the creation of new vacancies. After an earlier request to augment the 1st was refused, its fourth battalion was enlarged to 1200 rank and file six months later 'to ensure the success of recruiting', with a concomitant number of new officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) positions.[17] However, bloated establishments conflicted with the government's financial strictures on the army, explaining the Horse Guards' rejection of requests to have

establishments increased when there were vacancies in the regiment's battalion overseas.[18]

The location of parties could be very important to its success in enlisting men. Under the recruiting regulations, officers had the power to take a party to any 'Fair, Wake or Place of Public resort within 25 miles of their station' that 'in general, are supposed to hold out the best prospects of success'. Recruitment was thought likely to prosper if it was linked to specific regions. It was recommended that parties were sent to the county that the regiment was named after, if it had a county designation, where the unit was originally raised, or where it had been stationed for a length of time; in essence, anywhere that it might have established a permanent interest with the local inhabitants. Moreover, if officers had any particular influence in certain areas, they could go there. Likewise, it was suggested that the men composing the party should also have similar connections with the region, so as to be well acquainted with the country and general character of the inhabitants 'whom they should endeavour to conciliate by their conduct, so as to gain their good opinion and confidence'.[19] This resulted in the dispersal of regimental recruiting parties across the county. For example, the 2/45th's depot was aptly stationed in Nottingham but in 1808 it had recruiting parties in the nearby towns of Newark, Burton, Mansfield and Derby, as well as further afield in Stafford, Preston, Spalding, Clonmill and Dublin in Ireland, and at one stage a party in Aberdeen.[20]

The geographical spread of recruiting parties reflected the need to maintain connections in an effort to attract men to the unit. So when the depot companies of regiments were ordered into barracks in 1811, they were also instructed to leave a party behind 'with a view to preserving the interest which it is presumed the Corps has established from its long residence in that place'.[21] Such local links could radically bolster enlistments. The 14th was particularly successful and expanded from one to three battalions as a result of its association with Buckinghamshire under the astute guidance of its colonel, Harry Calvert, and managed through the influence of the Marquess of Buckingham (the Lord Lieutenant) and the county gentry.[22] No doubt Harry Calvert's role as Adjutant General, and thus in overall charge of recruitment in the UK, played its part in the success of the 14th.

Alongside establishing and promoting local roots, the army also concentrated its recruiting parties in the growing urban areas of Manchester, Birmingham and London, as Table 4.5 shows, whether a unit was known there or not. These districts were recognized as successful recruiting areas because of the large towns within them. This concentration resulted

Table 4.5   Recruits per recruiting district compared with male population

Recruiting district	Recruits	ERO* recruits	Total recruits (A)	1804 list, 1st Class (B)	Recruits per 1000 (A/B)	Recruiting parties
Manchester	1,806	150	1,956	50,127	39.0	77
Inverness	371	12	383	11,455	33.4	44
Birmingham	740	42	782	30,694	25.5	51
London	1,197	5	1,202	52,021	23.1	27
Edinburgh	491	5	496	31,433	15.8	56
Aberdeen	224	0	224	14,312	15.7	32
Carlisle	112	15	127	8,494	15.0	7
Bury	450	3	453	33,110	13.7	23
Nottingham	380	4	384	29,246	13.1	39
Glasgow	311	4	315	24,628	12.8	48
Leeds	545	7	552	48,401	11.4	51
Wells	461	24	485	44,778	10.8	40
Gloucester	376	4	380	37,812	10.0	27
Bedford	221	1	222	23,625	9.4	12
Durham	87	13	100	12,629	7.9	10
Southampton	230	42	272	34,858	7.8	25
Maidstone	99	56	155	22,055	7.0	12
Hereford	134	15	149	26,815	5.6	15
Shrewsbury	117	0	117	26,108	4.5	14
Total/Average			8,754	562,601	15.6	

*ERO: Extra Recruiting Officer.
Sources: UKNA, WO25/3224, Return of average number of regimental parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809; House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1803–1804 (93(2)). An account, presented to the House of Commons, of the abstracts of the subdivision rolls, returned for the several counties, districts, and places in Great Britain, pursuant to the provisions of the act, 43 Geo. III. cap. 96; as far as the same can be made up. Thomas Dix, *A Complete Atlas of English Counties* (London: William Darton, 1822).

in the urban areas actually producing fewer recruits per party than rural areas, but overall yielding more men. The recruiting parties in the Carlisle district that covered Cumberland and Westmoreland were particularly successful, obtaining 112 recruits from seven parties and, although Leeds' parties achieved less individually, the district recruited 545 men, dwarfing Carlisle's contribution. Ireland had a high yield per party, and although Scotland was targeted for recruitment, as noted earlier, it was not very productive. On average, Ireland had 217 parties, broadly equivalent to the proportion of the Irish population to the UK, producing an average of 22 recruits per party a year. Scotland had 181 parties, over double the number of parties to population ratio, yet they only recruited eight men per party. Wales and the bordering counties did not produce many men per party nor see much effort to enlist men.[23]

This pattern is confirmed when contrasting recruits obtained from the population of the different recruiting districts, as shown in Map 4.1. This

Recruits per 1,000 men
50

25

0

Map 4.1   Recruitment districts and their yield, 1808–1809

regional pattern of recruitment, created from the Adjutant General's 1809 returns, requires some explanation about its calculation. Although there is no population data for 1809, the recruitment statistics can be evaluated against the 1804 list of men created under the Defence Acts of 1803. These records broke the male population down into 'classes', of which the first – men between 17 and 30 with no children – is as close as Britain got to a figure for men of military age. The 1811 Census provides only the total number of men and so, although there is five years' worth of population change to bear in mind when using the 1804 lists

alongside the recruiting survey of 1808–1809, the 1804 figures provide a more secure demographic base for comparison.[24]

Sadly, the recruitment and population data are not sufficiently detailed for Ireland to make a similar comparison, although its position between the yield from Edinburgh and the London recruiting districts can be asserted. There are only estimates and reconstructions of population for Ireland at the time; however, taking these and assuming that a similar proportion of the population would have been in the 17–30 and childless 'first class' bracket, as in Britain, produces a total of 271,307 men. Utilizing this figure generates a ratio of 20.8 recruits per 1000 men. There is a considerable margin of error in this proportion, due both to the lack of population figures and the likely different demographic structure in Ireland. Its ranking, however, can be established by calculating the population required to change Ireland's position within the figures in Table 4.5. To be as productive as Birmingham would require 50,000 fewer first class men in Ireland, a fifth lower that the ratio in Britain. If the actual number of men in the first class was higher than the calculated 271,000, it would require an additional 86,000 Irishmen in the 'first class', 30 per cent more than the average, to place Ireland's recruitment on a par with the Edinburgh district. To summarize, if Ireland's first class male population numbered between 226,000 and 357,000, then Ireland's productivity in recruitment would still rank between London and Edinburgh.

Even considering the inaccuracies and problems with the data, the figures highlight the productivity of England's urban areas for the army. Not only were they producing large numbers of recruits, but they were also extracting a high proportion of the male population. The poor results in the south of England – the Southampton and Maidstone districts – can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, the south had a seafaring tradition and so naval recruitment was probably extensive in the area, a feature that was also probably true in the Durham district, a deduction supported by the small number of recruiting parties deployed in these districts. Secondly, 3576 recruits who joined at regimental headquarters are not included in the figures, and many of these headquarters were in the south-east. Thirdly, the proximity of London may have encouraged migration to the metropolis where the men subsequently enlisted. Finally, agricultural wages rose during the wars,[25] and the south probably experienced the greatest growth because of the demands of London and the large military presence in the region. The last two factors may also explain the slightly poorer results in the Bedford district too.

The few recruiting parties in Wales and the Welsh border counties were unproductive, resulting in a very small proportion of the male population of the Hereford and Shrewsbury districts joining the army. It appears that the army gave up recruiting in Wales as only one recruiting party per 2000 men was sent there, half the average figure for Britain. There is no stated explanation for the meagre results from Wales or the decision to withdraw resources from there, but several aspects distinct to Wales would have contributed. For example, there were the obvious physical difficulties. Large areas were mountainous in which communications were poor and society organized around subsistence farming.[26] Just as important, virtually the whole of Wales was Welsh speaking at this time,[27] with only a narrow bilingual zone along the borders and the south and north coasts. Also, Welsh culture and language was being reinforced under the influence of a religious revival and internal migration from the rural Welsh-speaking areas to the bilingual industrial zone.[28] It is little surprise that the culturally English army found it almost impossible to build relationships in this area effectively. Furthermore, only the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers had an outwardly Welsh title. Tellingly, an inspection return of the 1/23rd in 1808 listed the number of Welshmen in the unit and, despite its title, only 200 out of 1077 men were Welsh, while the most prominent nationality was English, with 634 men.[29]

The same can be said about communications, language and culture for Scotland, in particular in relation to the Highlands. Here, impressive results were achieved, although it came at considerable effort. Large numbers of recruits were obtained from its dwindling population, but the ratio of enlistments to parties was not as high as other areas. Each party in the Inverness district enlisted nine recruits compared with an average of over 14 for Great Britain and 44 for the London district. The major difference between Scotland, especially the Highlands, and Wales was the tradition of military service that had been harnessed by the British government since 1755, and particularly in the Seven Years War.[30] This had created a relationship between the army and Scottish society, and one that was maintained by a prominent military presence in the country in the form of regimental depots, something never achieved in Wales. Previous recruitment also ensured that there was a pool of Gaelic-speaking officers and NCOs from north of the border able to obtain recruits. Furthermore, in response to the Jacobite threat of the early 1700s, communications had been much improved in Scotland making the region much more accessible.[31]

These territorial differences highlighted the need for the army to foster close connections with communities to overcome traditional anti-army prejudices and to obtain the men it needed. As noted above, massively increasing the number of recruiting parties was not sustainable as it drained units of officers and NCOs who were needed elsewhere once the Peninsular War became an established strategic commitment. Alongside promoting the connections that units had with particular areas, the government also sought other means of recruiting for the army by making use of people in communities that had links to the armed forces. As well as tapping into local society, using resident men also bypassed the problem of staffing recruiting parties.

The Talents government allowed half-pay and volunteer officers to recruit, establishing them as extra recruiting officers (EROs), while the Portland government permitted volunteer NCOs to do the same.[32] There were high hopes for these initiatives but they were generally unsuccessful. By June 1807 there were 449 EROs yet, by December 1807, they had obtained only 1869 men, and figures for 1808–1809 show that, on average, 603 EROs had enlisted only 1174 men, reiterating their ineffectiveness. Only two recruiting districts stand out as having useful EROs: the Manchester district, where 150 recruits were obtained from 11 officers in the second half of 1808 and seven officers in the first half of 1809, a ratio of 17:1; and in the Birmingham district, where five officers recruited 42 men, a ratio of 9:1. Both these areas were prolific anyway, and their results skew the average somewhat, such that the government was lucky to see two recruits per extra recruiting officer in the rest of the UK. The army anticipated good results from the Highlands, and established 49 extra recruiting officers there. Following the pattern of the recruiting parties, however, they were not very productive and found just 12 recruits in one year.[33] The results for the 2081 NCOs from volunteer corps were even worse, as they managed to enlist only 605 men.[34]

From the outset, these initiatives caused problems that may have been counterproductive. Some EROs complained that they were not given due respect from officers under them, whilst the Horse Guards had to tell another officer that they would not tolerate EROs interfering with regimental recruiting parties.[35] Beating orders were misused, and one ERO was jailed after taking £50 from a man and promising to provide him with two militia substitutes, yet neither men nor money were forthcoming.[36] Similar followed with the volunteer NCOs as the Horse Guards had no powers to discipline them, yet it was feared that they were 'Introducing the Spirit of Crimping into the Country'.[37]

When Adjutant General Calvert reviewed these figures he thought the failure of these efforts was due to 'A want of exertion',[38] but its major flaw was financial. From the outset, high bounties were expected and sometimes paid, yet remuneration was not forthcoming despite a warning that 'without which, the Recruiting Service cannot be carried on with even a chance of a successful result'.[39] As the EROs worked on their own, they were inconvenienced when they did recruit someone, as they then had to take him to the district headquarters, which could be some distance away.[40] Colonel Robinson, the inspecting field officer (IFO) for the London recruiting district, summarized the effort: 'We only increase the number of Recruiters and decrease the benefit expected from the Bringing Money; Officers and Gentlemen are entirely dependent on the lower classes for every recruit'. Although Colonel Robinson, and others, suggested some reforms,[41] the government began retracting beating orders from those who had not enlisted any recruits and so the effort slowly died.[42] Fortunately, the EROs were not paid, receiving a reward per recruit, and so the experiment was not too expensive for the government.

The idea of using members of communities who were in local military forces to recruit for the army was invigorated by the establishment of the local militia to replace the volunteer corps in 1808. It was hoped that the local militia would 'become a permanent source of Recruiting our Regular Armies'.[43] The Duke of York shared this opinion and, in 1811, suggested that adjutants of the local militia be allowed to enlist men, which 'if zealously directed, may prove extremely advantageous in obtaining recruits for the army'. As they, and their sergeants, were part of the permanent staff of the local militia, they already received pay, had no need for securities and were subject to military discipline.[44]

In an effort to build regimental connections through the local militia, it was later suggested that the adjutants should recruit for regiments named after their respective county, and also for any of the light regiments or rifle corps, which were gaining considerable reputations from their exploits in the Peninsula.[45] Hence, the Lincolnshire local militia regiments were allocated the 10th (North Lincoln) and 69th (South Lincolnshire) regiments, while the Nottinghamshire local militias were given the 45th (Nottinghamshire) and 59th (2nd Nottinghamshire). Some counties were also allocated non-county titled corps; for example, the Derbyshire local militias were allocated the 2nd (Queen's Royal) and 4th (King's Own Lancaster).[46] To encourage enlistments by these methods, ensigncies in the regulars were offered when 50 local militiamen transferred, the colonel of the regiment having the patronage

to name an officer to be commissioned.[47] Nevertheless, it was finances that scuppered the initiative as the local militiamen had to pay back the bounty they received for joining the local militia before they joined the regulars.[48] Consequently, only a few thousand a year volunteered for the line.[49] This showed that, despite their experience as part-time soldiers, local military forces remained remarkably impervious to attempts to recruit from them, and so the government concentrated its efforts on other men in uniform.

The reaction from the militia

It was the transfers from the militia that enabled the sustained prosecution of the war in the Peninsula. The government's and the Horse Guards' attempts to establish connections between the army's regiments and localities met with mixed success. In the militia, however, the army generally found a more receptive community to its call for men, from both the officers who encouraged the men to join the regulars and the militiamen themselves who had become accustomed to military life. The results from the militia were not uniform, however, and provide another layer of regionalism in analysing the response of the UK to the demands of war. In part, it followed the pattern already established by ordinary recruitment directly into the army, but another dimension was added by the politics of the militia, as the militia colonels could, and did, hamper the recruitment of men from the militia to the army. A further element in the equation was the complex interaction between the loss of men to the army and recruitment by the militia to restore the size of their units.

  Several militia regiments stand out as consistent and substantial defaulters that did not complete their quotas of men for the army. For the Welsh regiments these were the Cardigan, Carmarthen and Pembroke militias, all counties in the far west of the principality. Of the English regiments, Cumberland, Westmoreland, East and North Devon, East Norfolk, 1st Tower Hamlets and the 1st and 3rd Yorkshire West Riding were all recalcitrant units. In examining the Scottish militia regiments, it is simpler to highlight those units that did meet the demands from government for men for the army; only the Ayrshire Militia had a perfect record, although the Fife regiment and the combined regiment of Berwick, Haddington, Linlithgow and Peebles performed well too. For Ireland, figures exist only for the 1807 Transfer Act, so establishing a clear pattern during the Peninsular War period is not so certain; however, the Armagh, Fermanagh, Kerry, Leitrim, Longford

and Sligo regiments had significant shortfalls in providing men for the regulars.

One explanation for the varying pattern of volunteering from the militia is the complex mathematics of the quotas set by the government and their interaction with the actual number of men in a militia regiment. The strength of a militia unit was tied to its immediate record in previous instances of volunteering to the line, and to its ability to maintain its numbers after 1803. In the orders executing the 1807 Transfer Act, the quota for volunteers was set at two-fifths of a militia regiment's establishment (the size of the regiment laid out by the government),[50] but not every regiment was up to this figure. In fact, some were above their establishment and so what was demanded of them was less of a burden. The 1807 quotas represent a varied proportion of each regiment's actual strength and provide one reason why some regiments failed to meet their obligations. On average, 38 per cent of a militia regiment's rank and file were requested, but the liability fell most heavily on the Scottish militia, which had to provide 44 per cent of its men. The highest proportion demanded was 55 per cent expected from the Forfar and Kincardine Militia, whilst the lowest was the 2nd Surrey Militia's 14 per cent.[51] This variation in strength of the militia regiments had a number of causes. In 1806, the Talents government suspended ballots for the militia so regiments had no means of replacing any casualties suffered.[52] Just before this, however, there was a militia transfer act along with a reduction in the establishment of the militia.[53] So, if a regiment did not complete its quota in 1805, in 1807 it was likely to be over its establishment. It also worked the other way. Lord Fortescue informed the government that little could be expected beyond the 80 men obtained from the South Devon Militia in 1807 because he had found a considerable number of volunteers in 1805 and, consequently, the regiment was much reduced in strength.[54]

The quota system became more complicated as the militia transfer continued during the Peninsular War. It became an established principle of the government to consider the quota a 'charge against the regiment, til the whole number are completely supplied'.[55] Despite attempts in 1809 to readjust the figures demanded in the light of actual strengths, in most cases the government simply set the quota at two-fifths of a militia unit's establishment. Using returns from a few weeks before the transfer, it appears that only 14 regiments had the number of men required adjusted because their strength was over their establishment.[56] Nine militia regiments were under their 1805 establishments and, as a result, had to furnish over two-fifths of their men.[57] Through such maths, the

Carmarthen Militia suffered for its poor performance in 1807 and its quota rose from 134 men in 1807 (of whom only 66 men were supplied) to 170 in 1809. The highest proportion demanded was from the Cardigan Militia, which was due to provide 48 per cent of its strength to the regulars.

In 1811, relating the number of volunteers required to establishment rather than actual numbers became an open, strictly applied policy that partly explains the differing responses from militia regiments. The annual volunteer quota was set at one seventh of a militia regiment's 1802 establishment, plus any shortfalls from the previous years and any men due from the 1809 act.[58] By compounding the arrears year on year, some regiments incurred very large quotas as the annual transfers progressed, which inevitably resulted in their poor performance. The Cumberland Militia's was, perhaps, the worst case. Out of its establishment of 615 privates it was expected to supply 255 men in 1811 (88 men as one seventh of the 1802 militia establishment, plus 167 men deficient from 1809), which rose to 262 in 1812, 335 in 1813 and to 346 in 1814. By then, the Forfar and Kincardine Militia was expected to furnish 70 per cent of its 1802 establishment to the regulars, which can be attributed to the regiment's large numbers in 1807,[59] as well as its failure to fulfil its volunteer quotas. By 1814, the Pembroke Militia was in the exasperating situation of its volunteer quota exceeding its establishment: 127 men were due yet its 1802 establishment was only 101 privates.

Another facet of the contrasting results from individual units was the ability of a militia regiment to maintain its strength. Basing transfers on the 1802 establishment benefited those regiments that were successful in recruiting from their home county, whilst corps that had difficulties in obtaining men found the demands of the transfer acts an increasing predicament. The inequity of this was apparent to many, and when Lieutenant-Colonel Mulberry of the Sussex Militia – a regiment that always furnished its requisite number of men – complained about this system, the Home Office replied that the quota was made with 'no reference to present numbers'.[60] The fixed quota system from 1811 meant that maintaining the strength of the regiment became even more critical than before.

Overall the militia proved adept at recruiting, but there were huge variations between individual regiments. This provides a second layer to the regional response to the demands of war, as militia regiments were meant to recruit from their home counties. To cover the transfer of men to the line between the end of the 1809 act and the end of 1813, each

militia regiment should have enlisted a total equating nearly to its 1802 establishment.[61] Most units found the men required, but some stand out particularly badly. The Forfar and Kincardine Militia and the Aberdeen Militia managed to recruit just 45 per cent of the men necessary, while the next worst was the Cumberland Militia at 54 per cent. Countering these, other regiments were particularly successful at obtaining men, which made the loss of volunteers to the line less of a problem. The West Kent Militia recruited 1121 men between May 1809 and October 1813, 378 more than it needed to cover the loss of men to the regulars.[62] In recognition of overly successful recruiting, some militia regiments had strict limits placed on the numbers they could enlist.[63]

Sometimes poor recruiting results by the militia were not down to factors in their home counties. Clearly, some regiments did not know what they were doing when it came to enlisting men. In 1813, several corps were warned that they were not maintaining their strength and were advised to have one recruiting party per company selected from their best men. If the party failed to enlist men, Sidmouth suggested the rather obvious action of recalling it. He also recommended that any militiaman on furlough who enlisted a man should have his leave extended.[64] Such, almost patronizing, instruction was necessary. The Pembroke Militia did not even have a recruiting party in 1813.[65]

Recruiting and volunteering interacted with each other and, in some cases, militia regiments stagnated, filled with older soldiers and without a regular turnover in men. In such circumstances, men that had already decided not to transfer to the army were unlikely to do so at a later date. Enlistments into the Forfar and Kincardine Militias were low at the end of 1813, yet it was well above its establishment because it had not filled its volunteer quotas, and the same can be said for the Aberdeen Militia. The Cumberland Militia was in the dire position of having poor recruiting results and a low strength, whilst also not filling its volunteer quotas. By the end of 1813, it had 572 rank and file out of its establishment of 645.[66]

The tangled mathematics of the militia's strength, its recruiting yield and transfers to the regulars goes some way to explaining some of the patterns of militia volunteering, but this is not the complete picture. It was not always the case that poorly recruited regiments failed to meet their volunteer quotas, nor did it mean that inadequate enlistment into their ranks was due to its numbers being capped as a result of the failure to meet its draft for the regulars. The Perth Militia illustrates this point. It met its quota in 1807, but managed 72 per cent of its quota in 1809, met this shortfall and its target in 1811, but after that slid to fulfilling

57 per cent in 1813. Overall, the Irish militia proved the most successful in obtaining men, but this did not translate into good volunteering results.[67]

This highlights the final factor in the success, or otherwise, of militiamen volunteering for the line: the men themselves. The militia officers were particularly important in fulfilling volunteer quotas. Besides parliamentary opposition, any militia transfer required the militia officers' acquiescence to work. In most cases, the government could rely on the public spirit of the officers to execute any law that had been debated and properly approved, and the government was keen to convey its congratulations to regiments that filled their volunteer quotas quickly.[68] Relying on such methods has been demonstrated as fundamental to the workings of the British state,[69] but the army also encouraged volunteering with more tangible rewards, compensating the militia officers and accommodating their concerns.

Some militia officers did not accept the terms of the militia transfers, and this was reflected in their regiment's performance. As every volunteer needed the commanding officer's permission to enlist, if the latter did not agree with the militia being used in this way he could cripple the transfer. When the idea of transfers was suggested to the militia colonels in 1807, some were against the measure and later demonstrated their objections by not fulfilling the quotas.[70] The 1st Yorkshire West Riding Militia is a particular example of this, where Fitzwilliam's objections ensured that it was one of the worst performers in providing men to the regulars.

The obstacles that could be thrown up by a commanding officer were demonstrated by Lord Stanley and the 2nd Lancashire Militia. During the 1807 volunteering, Lord Stanley refused to discharge militiamen until the quota had been filled. Whilst they were waiting for this, 42 men withdrew their offer. He also rejected one volunteer because he was drunk, improperly dressed and appeared with a sergeant of the 84th.[71] After the furore with Lord Stanley, Hawkesbury made an inquiry to the law office about the colonel's right to refuse to discharge militia volunteers. Their opinion was that the clause was unclear, but a militiaman was 'entitled to his discharge as soon as he has notified his intention to enlist'.[72]

The East Devon Militia demonstrated a different means of obstructing the execution of the transfer, as the officers were told not to assemble the men and read out the volunteering instruction.[73] Other militia commanders were not above interpreting legislation in their own way. During the 1812 volunteering it was discovered that the Colonel of

the Waterford Militia, the Marquis of Waterford, was allowing men to volunteer into the 88th only, which was 'attended with the most serious consequences to the public service', and so an explanation was demanded.[74]

Besides obstructionism, there are glimpses of the paternal community which some still cherished as an ideal for the militia. This could prove difficult, if not damaging, for the army to break. When the East Devon Militia, a unit noted for defaulting on its volunteering quota, was inspected, what struck the general was 'the attachment the men appear to feel towards it [the battalion], which must certainly spring from the care and attention bestowed upon them by those in the government of it'.[75]

Conversely, the officers could cajole the men into volunteering. One Irish militiaman recollected the day the volunteer instructions were received:

> The militia would be drawn up in line, and the officers of the regiments requiring volunteers would give a glowing description of their several corps, describing the victories they had gained, and the honours they had acquired, and conclude by offering the bounty. If these inducements were not effectual in getting men, coercive methods were adopted. The militia colonel would put on heavy and long drills and field exercises that were so tedious and oppressive that many men would embrace the alternative and volunteer for the regulars.[76]

The militia officers had reason to persuade their men into volunteering as the army and government courted them as part of the transfer acts, negotiating with the militia community to get what it needed. Recognizing that the system drew so much from the militia, it was, as Calvert put it in 1808, 'necessary that the feelings of the officers in the command of the militia regiments should be consulted as far as circumstances will admit'.[77] It soon became established practice to allow the militia colonels to nominate a proportion of their officers for commissions in the regulars, in effect giving them a useful source of patronage. This compensated the militia colonels for the loss of investment in the militia that occurred when the regiments had their establishment reduced.[78] Castlereagh considered such recommendations as compensation for 'their exertions in promoting this levy'.[79] Not all military opinion was so generous, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Torrens, the Duke of York's military secretary from 1809, considered it 'an evil by which the great

and acknowledged advantages of the Volunteering System have been purchased'.[80]

The usual ratio for officer recommendations was one ensigncy in the line for every 50 men who volunteered, but the army was not above using officer nominations to reward some militia colonels. The North Lincoln Militia received such bonuses in 1807, when three officers were nominated for 138 men, [81] and in 1809 when another extra officer recommendation was given as a reward for the speed at which the regiment had completed its quota.[82] The Earl of Berkeley (Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire) was given a similar reward for the performance of the South Gloucester Militia.[83] When the government asked for the final sixth of the volunteer quotas in 1807,[84] Lieutenant-Colonel Firth of the North Hampshire Militia was reminded that completing the full quota would allow him to recommend another officer.[85]

To placate the militia interest further, the transfers of 1807 and 1809 were accompanied by larger augmentations to the militia, allowing the militia colonels to appoint more officers and to keep any officers and NCOs above the establishment as supernumeraries, thus preserving the colonel's 'interest'.[86] In addition, clerks, drummers and members of bands were not allowed to volunteer to the line without the explicit consent of the colonel, thus maintaining any arrangements that had been made to fill these posts.[87] This inevitably resulted in the army investigating the strength of bands, where it was feared the militia colonels were concealing men above the establishment, and strict orders were sent out to district general officers to stop this practice.[88]

Equally, the government could make life difficult for defaulting regiments by managing a unit's establishment. The militia stalwart Earl Fitzwilliam was informed that the new arrangements for the West Riding's regiments were approved on the supposition that 244 men would volunteer for the line. As all three regiments did not furnish their quotas, the regiments were always over establishment and so Fitzwilliam's organization of companies, officers and NCOs were temporary.[89] Fitzwilliam's request for another regiment was consequently rejected and, although he was allowed to appoint a second lieutenant-colonel,[90] in 1809 he was refused a second adjutant for the 3rd West Yorkshire Militia, a crucial position in maintaining the regiment's efficiency.[91] Similar treatment was given to the Forfar Militia in 1811. The regiment's strength considerably exceeded its establishment because men had not volunteered for the line, but it was denied an expansion to ten companies.[92] These refusals to extend the establishment of a regiment to match its strength resulted in particularly large and unwieldy companies

without sufficient numbers of officers and NCOs, impairing the regiment's efficiency and a constant prick to the pride of the regiment.

In placating the militia interest, the government also addressed practical concerns expressed by militia officers, particularly regarding the efficiency of their regiments and the commotion caused by the militia transfers. Many militia officers took pride in the martial spirit of their regiments, invested considerable time in obtaining the best staff and developed their units' discipline, training and drill. The government was keen to emphasize that 'It has been the anxious endeavour of His Majesty's Ministers so to frame this law in all parts as to protect the Discipline of the Militia, and to consult the feelings of that service, as far as appeared to them compatible to rendering the proposed measure effectual to its purpose'.[93] Between 1807 and 1811, a system was developed for the enrolment of militia volunteers that minimized disorder in both the militia and the regulars.

Firstly, the government sought to reduce the disruption to the militia through the actual timescales for transfers, as the volunteering process had the potential to interfere with the day-to-day running of the unit. Consequently, the militia transfer laws shifted from a 30-day period for volunteering in 1807 followed by a further ten days of potential distraction if quotas were not met,[94] to a much shorter period of seven days by 1811, with ten days' grace between the next volunteering week if the quota was not met.[95]

Secondly, the government curbed the worst excesses of militia volunteering caused by recruiting parties from the line descending on militia regiments in order to obtain men. Utilizing recruiting parties engendered competition and brought with it all the tricks and abuses of the recruiting sergeant, much to the annoyance of the militia officers.[96] The Londonderry Militia witnessed 42 recruiting parties competing for 150 men, and Castlereagh, as its colonel, had first-hand experience of the detrimental effects of this free-for-all. In his plans for the 1807 transfer, he arranged for each militia regiment to be allocated particular line regiments. This system had several advantages. It removed the inconvenience of creating extra recruiting parties or withdrawing existing recruiting parties from their stations, and allowed the army to target particular units to receive militiamen.[97]

This did not stop the abuses by recruiting parties, however. The 48th offered some financial inducements to militiamen,[98] and the Horse Guards' carefully constructed matching of militia units and regiments of the line were ignored. An officer of the 11th, which was not allocated to the 1st Lancashire, tried to tempt men to join his regiment by

offering them drink and suggesting that they wait 30 days until volunteering, after which the 11th might be added to Lancashire's list. On account of this interference, the 11th was banned from enlisting men from the 1st Lancashire Militia. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief apologized to officers of the 1st Lancashire Militia,[99] and asked its commanding officer to name the line regiments to which he would like to send men.[100] This incident was not unique. The 11th was also barred from receiving militiamen from the South and East Devon Militias, by which time Calvert was becoming exasperated with the commanding officer's 'want of information and anxiety to complete his regiment'.[101] The 11th was then reassigned to receive Irish militia volunteers, as their actions had ruined any chance of it being completed from English militia regiments.[102] These sorts of problems did not abate and so, in the instructions issued from 1811, recruiting parties were removed from the process and the enlistment of militia volunteers was placed in the hands of the generals commanding the military districts.[103] No officer was to enlist, or persuade a man, without the commanding officer's permission, and 'No parties of the line (were) to interfere, if they do they will be held to account as disobeying orders'.[104] To underscore the malign effect that recruiting parties could have on militia regiments, they were subsequently used as a threat. In 1813, defaulting militia units were informed that recruiting parties would have free access to them.[105]

Castlereagh and the Horse Guards attempted to forge closer links between the militia units and particular regiments of the line, in the hope of creating better connections between the two communities and so facilitate the transfers. Much like the efforts to establish territorial links for ordinary recruiting, there were mixed results and, overall, the manpower demands took precedence. During the 1807 transfer, it was apparent that restricting the choice of regiments that militiamen (and the officers recommended by their colonels) could join was harming the speed and success of the transfer. After two months, the army was 8071 men short of its target of militia volunteers.[106] As a result, the army asked the militia units to suggest the regiments to which their men would like to transfer,[107] and canvassed the line regiments for lists of militia regiments where they thought they might do well. The commander of the 75th asked to be allocated to the Berwick Militia, as they were quartered together and the commander had a personal interest in the county.[108] The men of the Renfrew Militia wanted to join the 94th,[109] and the 43rd thought that it might have some success in the West Riding regiments, as they had done well in the 2nd regiment and had established an interest there. The 81st had similar

hopes in the Cardigan Militia.[110] The Duke of Kent was keen to get the 1st assigned to as many militia regiments as possible.[111] Consequently, by early 1808, an extra 440 regimental recruiting parties had been sent out to the militia regiments.[112] The pressing need for men led to the militiamen from deficient regiments being allowed the privilege of volunteering into the better-paid Royal Artillery, Royal Staff Corps and the Royal Marines.[113] This still was not enough and, in 1808, militiamen were permitted to volunteer for any line regiment, except the 60th and 98th to 101st.[114] As a result, by April, the deficiency of volunteers had been reduced to 1725 men from the British militia regiments, but Castlereagh's arrangement of line and militia regiments was in tatters.[115]

The failure to create systematic links between the militia and the army was confirmed in the 1809 act. This did not specify which regiments that militia volunteers could join, but reversed the logic and legislated which units were not allowed to receive volunteers, namely the 1st, 27th, 30th, 48th, 53rd, 60th, 83rd and 98th to 103rd. [116] A second restriction was that once a line regiment was complete, it was not permitted to receive any more militiamen. Popular corps completed their establishments quickly.[117] The overall quota of volunteers, however, was not being met and so, in October 1809, restrictions on the units that received militiamen were completely abandoned.[118] A result of this was that the 95th received so many volunteers that it formed an additional battalion.[119] Opening up the choice of line regiments to the militia inevitably resulted in popular corps receiving large numbers of volunteers, thus ruining Castleragh's hopes of a methodical connection between the line and the militia and the mechanism of directing militia volunteers to where they were needed.

Contrasting with contemporary opinion and Cookson's figures, the pattern of recruitment, combing militia transfers and direct enlistment into the regulars, was broadly equal across the three kingdoms. The militia transfers were more successful from the English militia regiments than the Scottish or Irish. Ordinary recruitment was more productive in Ireland and Scotland, although the latter was at the expense of enormous effort by the army. As a result, the army's rank and file reflected the national breakdown of the UK.

This even distribution was not reflected at a regional level, where there was a wide variation in response to manpower demands. The government attempted to forge better territorial connections between the army and society, and the army and the militia, in order to boost recruitment. Although there were some notable successes, for the most part these efforts failed. The drive for manpower and practicalities of managing

the militia interest were the primary explanations for the disparity in results. Ordinary recruiting was only really effective in a few, mostly urban, areas – London, Birmingham and Manchester – with Inverness an anomaly caused by the huge recruiting effort directed at that region. Additionally, the government had to contend with some militia regiments that regularly did not meet their quotas, a result of the transfer system itself and the individual views of militia officers and men.

Within this system, though, the use of the militia (or misuse of it, as some contemporaries asserted) did substantially increase the number of men available to the army and, crucially, tap into sources of manpower that the army was incapable of reaching. Equally, the army managed to make some improvement in the number of men enlisted, especially between 1810 and 1813, and ensure that filling the ranks of the militia did not substantially damage direct recruitment to the army. Wales, however, remained impervious to the Horse Guards' efforts, either through ordinary recruitment or transfers from the militia. The Highlands, which had been so productive for the army in the past, were clearly exhausted although, judging by the effort the army put into the region, this had not been realized. The army had a patchwork that included some successful and large units supported by a core of productive areas for recruiting, and militia regiments that, year-on-year, met their quota of volunteers. This pattern of recruitment was just enough to meet the manpower needs of the army.

5
Making Soldiers

The use of statistics to analyse army recruitment is only part of the story, and the regional picture discussed in the previous chapter was the sum of individual decisions to enter military service in the British Army. These personal choices were all the more significant as enlistment into the line regiments was a voluntary process. Only in the ballots for the militia was their some form of compulsion and, even then, those men who were balloted had some options. Joining the army, whether it was directly via recruiting parties or by volunteering from the militia, was an active process and one for which there were a number of motives. The soldiers who fought in the Peninsular War had different paths to the army but there were also similarities, as becoming a soldier was a complex process binding together a legal framework, customs and expectations.

The recruitment system

The system of voluntary recruitment on which the army relied to fill its ranks had changed little since the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was infamous for the recruiting sergeant's dastardly methods, and synonymous with drunkenness.[1] Recruitment was conducted by parties – a small detachment from a regiment – and was sanctioned by a Beating Order which allowed the officers and men to recruit and request billets. The parties were usually composed of a subaltern, a NCO (stereotypically a convivial sergeant with quick wits and a silver tongue), occasionally a few heroic privates with tall stories of a soldier's life, and some drummers who added a musical facet to this travelling advertisement for the army. Alongside this visible demonstration of the virtues

of a soldier's life to any would-be soldier, there was the material benefit of a substantial sum of cash, up front, termed the 'bounty'.

The mechanics of turning a civilian into a soldier were fixed by the annual Mutiny Act, tradition and edicts from the Horse Guards. The symbolic moment that a potential recruit became a soldier was when he took the 'King's shilling' from a member of the party, in essence the first part of his bounty. At least 24 hours later, he would then be brought before a magistrate to be attested, where the recruit had the right to change his mind, either by proving he was an apprentice or repaying the party. Once attested, he would receive a medical examination and then, if he passed the medical, he became a member of the regiment and subject to the Mutiny Act. For each recruit the party was issued levy money, usually in advance from the regimental agents, most of which went to the recruit as a bounty, but some of which went to the party itself.

The recruit would probably remain with the party for some time, either until they all returned to the regiment or there were sufficient numbers to warrant sending a detachment back to the parent unit. The Horse Guards encouraged the practice of keeping recruits with parties so that they would spend their bounties before they reached their regiments.[2] Recently attested soldiers might even find themselves raising men; for example, a militia volunteer enlisted a man whilst he was still with a party of the 95th and received £2 as the 'bringer', a massive rise in his income from his meagre pay of one shilling a week.[3] Recruiting, then, was primarily a regimental affair and driven by money. In peacetime, when there was less demand for men, this system worked well and was largely self-regulating, so if a regiment needed to be brought up to strength it would send out parties until its establishment was complete and then recall them.[4] Best of all, it worked with minimum disruption to society and the government.

Wartime, however, changed this dramatically. The initial phases of Britain's conflicts in the eighteenth century were always accompanied by a rapid expansion of the army. This was matched by a torrent of abuses in recruiting as parties competed with one another, encouraged the use of crimps, offered bounties above the level fixed by government, ignored the set physical standards and simply embezzled funds. Such a flurry of activity resulted in trickery, false attestations, pressing men and even conflict with society. In the early 1790s, resentment against these abuses coupled with the government's poor handling of the situation resulted in the breakdown of any trust between the army and society, which exploded into anti-crimp riots in London.[5]

On his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York set about overhauling the system of recruitment to break the tradition of dishonesty. He reformed ordinary recruitment, in effect nationalizing it and placed it firmly under the rigorous control of the Horse Guards. The basis of this process was the establishment of recruiting districts in the UK in 1796, each with a commanding officer (the inspecting field officer), an adjutant, two staff sergeants and medical officers. This team held the physical examinations for all recruits and generally supervised recruitment in their districts.[6] Initially, they only held jurisdiction over recruiting parties from regiments that were overseas, but later their authority was extended to all parties. Further powers were granted to the inspecting field officers in 1807, when they became the senior officers in the area and no officer in their jurisdiction could leave without their permission. Eventually, in 1812, inspecting field officers were given command of all parties in their district and the regimental officers were returned to their units. This meant that recruitment was overseen by men 'well calculated for that service...instead of young officers who accepted the task rather as a leave of absence than a service'. More importantly, the inspecting field officers were now running the enlistment process themselves and the regiments were relegated to providing manpower for this task.

The recruitment system needed some adjustment to accommodate the establishment of recruiting districts, and a new stage in the process was introduced between taking the King's shilling and joining the regiment, during which the Horse Guards could examine all recruits. In this 'intermediate approval' phase, the district staff accepted all recruits, gave them a portion of their bounty and a medical examination before they went to their regiments where, if approved by the regiment, they received the rest of their bounty.[7] In 1798, a district paymaster was added to each recruiting district, which improved the financial accounting of these arrangements and widened the remit of the organization.[8]

Further reforms came in 1807 when the office of Inspector General of Recruiting was abolished. His original role of inspecting recruits for regiments abroad, commanding the infamous Chatham barracks where recruits were sent before going overseas, and making up the muster rolls for them, was superseded by the district inspecting field officers. The rest of the work was transferred to '2–3 clerks in the Quarter-Master-General's department'.[9] More importantly, overseeing recruitment was added to Adjutant General Harry Calvert's portfolio of roles, which also meant all the inspecting field officers reported to him.

Just as important as the new recruiting processes was the fact that the Horse Guards now had the means to monitor recruitment through the Adjutant General's office. In 1812, inspecting field officers were asked to report on substandard recruiting officers and NCOs,[10] which formalized an *ad hoc* practice that had been in operation since 1807. For example, Lieutenant Andrews of the 53rd received particular attention in 1808 as he was recruiting at Richmond whilst on leave, but had only obtained two recruits who immediately deserted. Calvert judged that he had no claim to an extension of his leave, and he was ordered to the Isle of Wight to be transported to his regiment in India.[11]

The tightening up of the regulations governing the recruiting service also extended to the parties themselves. In 1810, detailed instructions were given to each regiment, which required officers to pay particular attention to the selection of personnel for the recruiting party. The soldiers had to be fit, not only because ill men created a bad impression (seeing a wounded soldier was hardly likely to encourage enlistment) but also because recruiting required activity and exertion.[12] In 1813, married men were disqualified from the recruiting service, probably because they would not give their full attention to recruiting,[13] and by 1814 the inspecting field officers had the power to reject any man they thought unfit to form part of a party.[14]

The Horse Guards scrutinized the recruiting service much more closely. In 1807, Calvert wanted to know why the recruiting parties of the 2/45th employed so many privates.[15] Calvert also upheld a complaint from a recruit that he had been enlisted under undue pressure from a recruiting party.[16] Other, well-established, misdemeanours also caught the Duke of York's attention. NCOs were forbidden to keep shops for the sale of equipment for recruits, another source of income for the recruiting party.[17] This was a particular enterprise in the cavalry, as kitting out a trooper cost much more than an infantryman, and some men of the 1st Dragoons were actually in debt before they joined the regiment,[18] a situation that encouraged desertion.

With increasing authority came mounting responsibility. In 1812, the inspecting field officers had to be permanently at their headquarters and needed the Commander-in-Chief's permission to leave their post, thus ensuring that recruits could be brought to them at any time.[19] Furthermore, Inspecting Field Officers were called to account if irregularities occurred under their supervision. The inspecting field officer at Nottingham had to explain why a 36-year-old man who was only 5′ 4″ was enlisted in 1807, as he was one inch under the height standard and six years above the maximum age.[20] The commanding officer

of the London district caught the attention of Calvert after he approved a wounded ex-marine.[21] Even the inspecting field officers themselves were not above being investigated by the watchful Adjutant General. Colonel Dacres, commanding the Athlone district, was warned that if he continued to ignore the recruiting regulations, the Commander-in-Chief would order an investigation 'which will produce embarrassing results' for him.[22] Lieutenant-Colonel Clay (Manchester district) also found himself under scrutiny after passing 20 men for the 1st Foot who were not strictly up to standard, although with the colonel's approval.[23] The regimental surgeon, who obviously did not know of the deal, later rejected them, and Clay was called to explain himself to the Duke of York.[24] Clay later approved a recruit that the surgeon refused to pass on medical grounds, but again was fully supported by the Duke of Kent.[25] Collusion between Clay and the Duke of Kent was commonplace, as Clay obtained an ensigncy for his Sergeant-Major after he recruited 100 men for the 1st,[26] which suggests the possibility that such extensions of patronage were prevalent throughout the UK. Clay also received particular attention over his claims for allowances.[27]

Naturally the recruiting district staff and the regiments sometimes disagreed over the definition of a fit soldier, and inspecting field officers had discretionary powers to enlist lads and boys within half an inch of the height standard (5′ 5″ for the line regiments until 1812, when it was reduced to 5′ 4″),[28] and undoubtedly if a young recruit was slightly under standard with regular meals and exercise he might be fit enough to become a soldier.[29] Differences in opinion often led to disputes, particularly in the cavalry, which had stricter minimum height standards. In the Gloucester district, three men were accepted by the district surgeon but were later rejected by the regimental medical officers.[30] Frederick Hildebrand proved to be unfit to be a dragoon but was deemed suitable for the infantry. He was determined to join the army and, at his request, he was transferred to the 20th Foot.[31]

Not all such incidents were as easily resolved, and so it was decided that, if a man was approved who later failed the physical examination, those responsible for his enlistment would have to bear the costs.[32] If a recruit was found to be ill, he was usually assessed at the York Hospital to ascertain whether he was unfit when intermediately approved, so blame could be apportioned to the recruiting district staff or the regiment.[33] This was not just a threat to enthusiastic recruiting sergeants, as Lieutenant-Colonel Belson found to his cost after he overrode the opinion of a surgeon and approved a man but later had to repay his bounty as the recruit was unfit.[34]

Despite all the efforts of the Horse Guards, the recruiting regulations were still ignored and often there was some distance between what the army wanted and what it obtained. The final and long-standing security against irregularities in the recruitment system was the biannual regimental inspections, conducted by general officers and military medical officers of high rank. The Duke of York was astonished that men 'being evidently incapable of actual service' got into the 2/23rd in 1807 and then, even more remarkably, were transferred into the first battalion.[35] When eight men of the 2/87th were discharged in 1808, an investigation was demanded as the medical complaints of the men pre-dated their enlistment into the army,[36] and there was a similar report on the 2/84th that year.[37] More remarkable were the cases in the 2/50th of a 60-year-old who had only served just one year and nine months, and a soldier with an ulcer of four years' standing yet who had been in the army for only three.[38] The 2/25th received attention in 1808 because of its large number of invalids, and the Duke of York ordered an enquiry into their enlistments.[39]

The reason for the continued flouting of regulations and standards was simple: the army's reforms had not changed the underlying financial arrangement, which created different priorities between the parties and the army. For those enlisting men, the more men they obtained the more money they made, whilst the army wanted recruits fit enough to undergo training immediately and become soldiers in as short a time as possible. This inevitably resulted in the parties ignoring or trying to circumvent the system. The 1st Foot was a particularly bad example. Among its various irregularities, it ignored the opinion of the London district surgeon in 1807 and approved two men.[40] More often, individuals simply ignored rules. Corporal Norman enlisted four men in the Taunton district, two of whom paid smart money (paying money direct to the party before the recruit was attested so that he could leave, a trick prohibited in 1807), while the other two proved unfit.

The profit motive also encouraged collusion between the party and the recruits, and many young men were enlisted as boys because they were not tall enough. One sergeant recalled being told by the recruiting sergeant to lie about his age, so he could enlist as a 'lad' in the light dragoons.[41] Accordingly, the inspecting field officers were told to examine recruits 'entirely apart from the Bringer and Party enlisting them'.[42] By 1814, they could reject any recruit they suspected of lying about his age.[43]

The inspection returns provide the raw data to examine the extent of evasion of recruiting standards. Although the age of soldiers is given in these returns, the figures are aggregated and so cannot be used to examine the age of recruits. Physical standards, as measured by the height of the men, provide a more suitable statistic. Evidence from the sample of inspection returns shows that the army was under severe pressure regarding physical standards, a fact reflected in 1812 when the Horse Guards reminded recruiting parties that physical standards (outlined in Table B.1) were at a minimum, but they were still being ignored.[44]

Generally the heavy cavalry and Foot Guards were able to be more selective in their recruiting and maintain their quite stringent physical standards. Some 52 per cent of the Foot Guards sampled were over 5′ 8″, as were 65 per cent of the heavy cavalrymen, so these units would have stood tall compared with the average height of 5′ 5″ at the time. The light cavalry and infantry tended to have most of their men at the lower end of the physical standards. Only 38 per cent of the light cavalry were over 5′ 8″, as were a measly 27 per cent of the infantry.[45] As Table 5.1 shows, the army continued to have a proportion of undersized men, particularly in the infantry regiments. The physical standards of the army were regularly evaded, despite the efforts of the Adjutant General to supervise and improve the process of recruitment.[46]

Table 5.1 Percentage of soldiers under minimum height standard

Year	Heavy cavalry	Light cavalry	Foot Guards	Infantry
1807	4.8	5.3	N/A	21.1
1808	5.1	5.5	N/A	19.1
1809	3.8	2.6	1.5	18.1
1810	2.0	6.6	2.7	17.9
1811	2.9	5.5	1.0	20.6
1812	0.3	1.4	1.7	17.6
1813	6.8	4.3	3.5	13.3
1814	0.1	13.0	0.1	23.0
1815	5.0	1.8	19.1	16.7
Average	3.4	5.1	4.2	18.6

Note: See Table B.1 for recruiting standards.
Source: UKNA, WO27 Sample.

The individual reasons why

There is no escaping the fact that money played a very large part in the decision to enlist in the army. In 1808, an infantry recruit received £16 6s as a bounty for unlimited service or £11 11s for short service, which rose to £23 and £16 14s, respectively in 1813,[47] undoubtedly contributing to the improvement in recruiting during the last years of the Peninsular War.[48] The influence that bounties had on enlistments was demonstrated during 1814 and 1815. Immediately the war had finished in 1814, bounties were reduced to £4 4s for the cavalry and £6 6s for the infantry, and the number of men who joined the army plummeted from 6081 in the last six months of the war to 2537 for the six months after the war. When men were needed in early 1815, the Horse Guards increased bounties by half, with a commensurate improvement in recruiting.[49] Further rises in the bounty during the Peninsular War, however, were ruled out for fear of stimulating desertion.

The importance of the financial circumstances in the individual's decision to become a soldier is confirmed by other data. Although testimonies about the motives for joining the army are rare, it can be inferred from other facts. Most obvious is the occupations that soldiers gave at enlistment, which generally reflected livelihoods that were economically perilous. From a sample of 1011 men in regimental books of the 20th Light Dragoons, 3rd Foot Guards, 3 and 4/1st, 2/6th and 2/32nd, the rank and file of the army shows a high proportion of labourers at 54 per cent; however, equally as large is the presence of artisans who make up the rest.[50]

In some cases, artisans predominate. Such artisans cannot be characterized as the 'scum of the earth' as they were men who once had some degree of independence, but could fall prey to economic circumstances. This is evident in the 3rd Foot Guards and 2/6th and reflects the areas where they sent their recruiting parties. The 3rd Foot Guards recruited in the Nottingham district and so their ranks were filled with men who were in the stocking weaving trade, including framework knitters. They were artisans with a high status, but a skill that was under threat due to changes in their working practices, transformations that were to lead to the Luddite disturbances. The 2/6th, which was created in 1804 from Lancashire's Army of Reserve men, received most of its recruits from the Manchester district, and this was mirrored in the many ex-weavers in its ranks. During 1807 and 1808, there was a strike in Lancashire by the weavers, and large numbers of them joined the army as the industrial action continued without any result. Over

half of the men enlisted into the 2/6th between 1 January 1807 and the end of 1808 were weavers. The 1st and 2/32nd recruited extensively in the West Country, explaining the high proportion of labourers in these units. The area's predominantly agricultural economy was stagnating, leaving many agricultural labourers without employment. For these men, the army, and navy no doubt, were obvious choices by which to escape poverty.

The bounty was an attraction to the labourers and poor artisans who made up the army, but the decision to enlist was not solely based on financial considerations. Many did not automatically choose the closest recruiting party, nor take the highest bounty. Very few soldiers' biographies mention the bounty, although this might be because it was spent so quickly. William Lawrence, who recounted his life in *A Dorset Soldier*, was offered a bounty of 16 guineas, which he thought a great deal of money, and took it believing that he 'would not want for money for a long time'.[51] Edward Costello asked how much bounty he would get, but he was more attracted to the uniform initially.[52] Like Costello, most soldiers had other reasons for joining the army besides a temporary financial gain.

The importance of other factors beyond financial gain is demonstrated by the recruitment of militiamen. The 50,000 men who chose to join the militia were making an informed choice between an easy, unexciting service but low bounty, and the army's larger bounty with a more extensive, potentially glamorous but often lethal service. It is possible that these men were using the system of militia volunteering to gain two bounties, but militiamen were more likely to enlist for limited terms of service than ordinary recruits, again for a lower bounty, showing that immediate financial attractions were not the only lure. The bounties for militia volunteers were always less than those available from recruiting parties. In 1807, a militia volunteer received 14 guineas for unlimited service and ten guineas for short service if they were in the militia before the passing of the act, and four guineas less if he joined afterwards.[53] These terms were repeated in 1809 and 1811 in an attempt to encourage experienced militiamen to volunteer and stop men joining the militia and immediately volunteering, thus getting two bounties.[54] This distinction had to be abandoned in the face of the mounting shortfalls discussed in Chapter 4 because men were holding back from volunteering until they could get the full bounty, and so in 1812 the militia volunteer bounty grew to 15 guineas (unlimited service) and ten guineas (short service).[55] Even still, this was seven guineas less than on offer from the army's recruiting parties.

Table 5.2 Comparison of percentage of militiamen and line recruits who chose limited service

	Year		
	1807	**1809**	**1811**
British militia volunteers	86	78	65
Irish militia volunteers	70	8	4
Line recruits	100	27	17

Sources: WO1/904, Volunteers from the Militia, 1 July 1808; WO1/904, Return of Volunteers from the Militia, 5 August 1809; WO1/946, Abstract of Militia Volunteers, 21 September 1811; WO25/3224, Recruiting return 1807 to 1810, 5 April 1811; WO25/3225, Recruiting return for 1810 to 1812, 31 December 1812.

There were substantial numbers of men who chose smaller bounties by signing up for limited service. As Table 5.2 shows, over three-quarters of volunteers from the British militia chose limited service, but Irish militiamen were less likely to choose limited service than even recruits for the regulars. It may be that some married men were transferring from the militia and so were unwilling to sign up for life, or perhaps recognized the benefits of limited service, which included a guaranteed pension. The mechanism for militia volunteering may have given potential recruits time for reflection without the persuasion of a recruiting party. Thomas Morris enlisted for limited service, despite pressure from the recruiting sergeant to enlist for life, because he thought seven years 'quite long enough for a trial',[56] a sentiment echoed by George Calladine when he volunteered into the 19th from the Derbyshire Militia.[57]

Recent research has suggested that soldiering became more attractive than civilian employment as the wars went on. The length of the Napoleonic Wars increased inflation and raised prices, but pay generally failed to match these changes. In such circumstances the life of a soldier, with accommodation, food, regular pay (at least when stationed at home), basic medical care, chances of promotion, and possibly a pension, were incentives to enlist.[58] Besides tangible benefits, there was 'a glitter in the life of a soldier unknown to every other profession',[59] and 'the roll of the spirit-stirring drum, the glittering file of bayonets, with the pomp and circumstance of military parade' inspired men, particularly young men, to enlist. Many envied the 'apparent freedom, the frankness and gaiety of an open-hearted soldier's holiday life'.[60]

Personal circumstances often influenced men to join the army, usually providing an escape from difficult circumstances. A manuscript biography of a soldier of the 38th details his journey to taking the

bounty. He was a pious youth, who could read by the age of six but, after being apprenticed, his world fell apart when the independent chapel he attended split after the minister died. He was in an 'agitated state' until, at the age of 16, he moved to Leicester and, after a year there, he enlisted.[61] One soldier obtained a position in a theatre when his father became ill, horrifying his parents. To compound his humiliation, he froze with stage fright on his first night and the next day joined a recruiting party at Leith on its way to the Isle of Wight.[62] Stephen Morley transferred from the Army of Reserve after his pay-sergeant's wife made him do chores for her.[63]

More often it was a desire for a more exciting life. Edward Costello lived with an old soldier who had fought in Egypt in 1801 and 'became red hot for a soldier's life, and although rejected as to [*sic*] young for the Regulars I "listed"...in the Dublin Militia' and later volunteered into the 95th.[64] James Anton always wanted to be a soldier, but initially failed the physical examination; like Costello he eventually got into the 42nd via the militia.[65] A future Chelsea pensioner who joined the cavalry was perhaps more typical of the sudden and immediate decision to enlist, after taking the 'profession of the quill' and then working as a watchmaker in London:

> It was in the month of January 1806, that happening to be on a stroll through Westminster, I forget with what object in view, I was attracted by a huge placard on which was emblazoned the figure of a light dragoon, mounted on a dashing steed and brandishing a sabre. I felt a tap on the shoulder and looking round I was accosted, with a wink meant to be particularly knowing, by a swaggering blade of a light horseman in full fig of the very costume which I had been admiring.

After the recruiter found out that he could write, he was soon 'under his fascination' and joined up.[66]

Wanderlust appears particularly conspicuous in the accounts of some soldiers' biographies coupled with a desire to escape parental control, which eventually led them into the army. George Calladine was apprenticed as a framework knitter and had a happy life but he 'had an inclination for roving, so it came to my mind to enlist for a soldier'.[67] Joseph Donaldson often played truant at school and even tried to run away to Surinam when he was only thirteen. After the shock of a short time at sea, he returned to Glasgow but, whilst walking home from school one night, he met a soldier and asked to join the army.[68] Charles

O'Neil was apprenticed to a carpenter, 'but the quiet habits, constant labour, – destitute of an exciting or romantic incident – of a mechanics life, ill suited the tastes I had already formed'.[69]

Boredom was not limited to civilian life and militiamen could find the excitement, and potential promotions, of the regulars alluring. James Hale volunteered from the North Gloucester Militia and states that:

> There was no hopes of peace, I was rather inclined to extend my service, so that I might have opportunity of seeing some other country, for I was then quite tired of rambling about England, although the militia service is nothing but a mere pleasure.[70]

Similar feelings could influence members of part-time forces. Thomas Morris decided to leave the Loyal Volunteer of St. George's Middlesex after reading of 'the heart-stirring accounts of sieges and battles; and the glorious achievements of the British troops in Spain, following each other in rapid succession' which left him feeling ashamed of being only a part-time soldier.[71]

Enlistment into the army from migrant workers – or, perhaps more accurately, migrant populations in Britain – is supported by a comparison of the place of birth and the location of enlistment. Using a sample from regimental books, 721 soldiers have a place of birth and a place of enlistment that can be identified, and there are often significant distances between these two points.[72] Of the 36 soldiers enlisted in London, only six were natives of the metropolis and the rest were from 16 different recruiting districts, demonstrating that recruits obtained in London were mostly migrants from other regions. The same can be said of the Maidstone district, where only 2 of the 65 men recruited in the district were born there. Of course, some of these soldiers were born in adjacent districts, such as the 13 soldiers enlisted in London from the Bedford, Maidstone, Southampton and Gloucester districts.

Alongside these relatively short migrations, there were some very long journeys involved before some men joined the army in London. It is difficult to imagine the voyage that took Charles Archibald from Roxburgh and Alexander Adam from Lanarkshire in Scotland to enlist in the 3rd Foot Guards in London, or Thomas Savage, born in Kerry, to join the 4/1st in London, potentially the longest possible journey in the UK. Such movement is supported by the autobiographical evidence of an anonymous soldier, who went on to record his army career, who moved from 'never-mind-where' in Shropshire to London before enlisting.[73] The recruiting party of the 2/6th stationed at Great Baddow, just outside

Chelmsford, took full advantage of the migrant population in London and the regiment obtained 60 men in the Maidstone district, the largest total obtained by its recruiting parties in any district.

Recruiting from men who had moved around the country was limited to certain districts. In the rural Bury St. Edmunds district covering East Anglia, 11 out of the 12 recruits were born in Norfolk, Suffolk or Cambridge. Similarly, in the Nottingham district, only one of its 11 recruits was not from the district and he was a framework knitter from nearby Leicestershire. Such small figures may mean that the statistics are anomalous; however, 74 per cent of the 91 enlistments recorded in the data for the Manchester district were born in Lancashire or Cheshire. Thirteen of the 24 men from outside the Manchester district were born in adjacent recruiting districts, indicating some migration to the industrial towns in Lancashire from which the army obtained its men, but only at a regional scale. The Gloucester district provides similar figures to those of Manchester, as 95 per cent of recruits were born in the district or adjacent districts. The results from Newry and Dublin show a similar pattern, but counting adjacent districts engulfs vast areas of Ireland; for example, only the Cork, Newry and Belfast districts were not adjacent to Athlone.

Recruits from the Wells district form the bulk of the sample of the regimental books and show the limitations of the data. Examining the birth district of the men enlisted in the south-west presents a pattern closer to London than the results obtained from the rest of England. Only 39 per cent of the recruits were born in the West Country and the remainder came from 18 different districts. However, the 2/32nd's regimental book does not indicate whether a soldier was a militia volunteer, and almost certainly some of the 69 men recruited by that regiment were transfers from the militia corps stationed in the south-west's important naval ports. Out of the 171 men with a place of enlistment in the Wells district, 12 were recruited at Pendennis, probably meaning the castle near Plymouth, another 12 at Falmouth, 14 at Berryhead barracks and 48 at Plymouth. Therefore, potentially half the recruits from the Wells district were militiamen. Furthermore, there was not much outward migration from the Wells district, as only 22 out of the 82 future soldiers born in the south-west moved before they joined the army, some of whom were probably militiamen.

Migration as a factor in enlistment was pushed to extremes by the Horse Guards. In 1813, the Duke of York was desperate to improve the number of volunteers from the Scottish militia, and proposed that they should be allowed to volunteer for units in Canada because of 'The

known inclination of the Scotch Population to emigrate to America will probably overcome the repugnance which has hitherto been manifested by the militia of that country to volunteer their services to the Line'.[74] Although the Home Office objected to these special terms, the needs of the army were more important.[75] So when the annual volunteering for 1813 began in May, all the Scottish militias, except the Ayr Militia, were allowed to volunteer to the 49th then stationed in Canada. The volunteers were to serve in North America only and, six months after peace, they would be discharged and receive a grant of land (50 acres for a private, 60 for a corporal and 75 for a sergeant) and subsistence for a year. As a further incentive, their wives and children were shipped to Quebec. In recognition of all these benefits, those who volunteered under these terms received half the normal bounty.[76]

The army mainly recruited from Britain's transient society, both militiamen and civilian. This social group was the preserve of young men and was reflected in the age of recruits. The average age of those listed in the regimental books that were sampled is 23,[77] and another calculation, obtained from the larger inspection returns sample by subtracting the average length of service from the average age when inspected, suggests an age of 21 at enlistment. These two results are tolerably close enough to be certain that the typical recruit found his way into the army in his early twenties. Yet the average age of privates in the army was relatively steady at 27 or 28 for the Peninsular War period; this contrasted with France where, by 1814, the army was mostly composed of teenage conscripts, the notorious 'Marie-Louises'.[78] The demographic stability of the army was maintained by the militia volunteers. The militiamen tended to be older anyway, the average militiaman was in his late twenties and, in 1807, it would have been unlikely for any militia volunteer to have been younger than 22, even if he had joined the militia in 1803 as an 18-year-old. The transfer of these men to the line helped to balance the influx of recruits in their early twenties.

The slightly older men from the militia brought a different set of issues for the army to address, however, as many of them were married. In fact, one of the biggest obstacles in volunteering from the militia was the fact that a militiaman received a family allowance of 2s 6d for his wife and 1s for each child when he was stationed outside the regiment's county, but as soon as the man enlisted into the regulars he lost the entitlement. It was repeatedly highlighted how injurious this was to militia volunteering.[79] The Duke of Kent believed that it would 'prevent the volunteering more than anything else' although, in a telling line about the militia officers, he believed that the militia colonels would not confirm

this point.[80] The Duke of Kent's concerns were echoed by Castlereagh in his 1807 memorandum on militia volunteering. Without a general family allowance he argued, 'The militia regiments will consist of married men who will be deterred from entering the Line'.[81] The evidence from the falling yield of volunteers from the Scottish and Irish militia vindicates Castlereagh's arguments, as do those regiments that did not meet their volunteer quotas and so could not recruit. As a result, these militia regiments were filled with men, often married, who had already decided not to join the regulars.

For those militiamen that did decide to volunteer, they had to make a further choice about which regiment they wanted to join, a decision that was a mixture of the personal and the practical. Some volunteers from the Derbyshire Militia went to the 19th because its depot was at Hull and they 'wished to have a long march through the country'.[82] The militia volunteers preferred the light regiments, indicating that their martial reputation and their progressive attitudes towards soldiers were more important than joining particular county regiments. In 1809, the 2nd West Yorkshire Militia witnessed 61 men opt for the 43rd, 39 for the 52nd, 58 for the 68th, 5 for the 85th and 34 for the 95th; in total, 197 of the 313 who transferred to the line selected light regiments. Only two other regiments, the 2nd and 50th, received militiamen in large numbers from the 2nd West Yorkshire. The Royal Carnarvon Militia was trained as light infantry and consequently 29 of its 46 volunteers chose the 52nd, and 128 men from the South Lincoln Militia joined the 95th, probably because they were stationed at Hythe barracks with them. The 95th was particularly popular in 1809 and, by May, had attracted 1286 volunteers.[83]

There were a multitude of other events and influences that could affect militia volunteering. In 1807, a ship carrying 300 Irish militia volunteers and their families from the South Mayo and South Cork Militias to their new units was wrecked off Dublin. Their bodies were washed up on the beaches around the city, a grim reminder of the risks of joining the line.[84] Some regiments in the south-west of England during 1809 had the misfortune to catch typhus from the army returning from Corunna, an occurrence that was hardly likely to encourage militiamen to join these regiments.[85]

Counteracting these discouragements to volunteer was peer and public pressure, and sometimes volunteering was a very public affair. The 1st Royal Surrey Militia, stationed in the citadel on Dover heights, paraded in August 1807 not only in front of a large crowd but also under the scrutiny of a reporter for *The Times* who recorded that 'It was a most

gratifying sight on the word of command being given for all men wishing to volunteer to advance in front, to see 300 as fine fellows as ever took a musket in hand come forward'.[86] To reduce the numbers to the quota of 154, the surgeon then went through the ranks and chose the fittest men, who were then enlisted in the 56th Foot. It would have taken a strong character not to have answered such a public demonstration of a soldier's loyalty to their officers, the King and their comrades, not forgetting the entreaties of the two officers who received commissions into the regulars, and the remaining staff who would have had no wish for their regiment to been seen publicly as backward and unpatriotic.

For the militiamen, equally worth exploring were the factors that kept men in the ranks of the militia regiments despite the enticements of active service and a bounty. The variation in the number of volunteers in relation to quotas has already been explored in Chapter 4, and the family allowance played a large part too. Alongside this, a regiment's proximity to the soldiers' homes undoubtedly affected fulfilment of quotas. This was exemplified by the Irish and Scottish militias who did not serve outside their own country until the Militia Interchange Act of 1813. The Devon militias, along with all the other factors that influenced volunteering performance, were stationed in Devon during 1807 and 1809.[87] The army also found that the Irish militia regiments provided more volunteers if they were posted away from their counties, but when they were close to home they recruited better.[88]

A benefit of the Militia Interchange Act was that it moved Irish militia regiments to Britain, where it was hoped that volunteering would improve, and that more would come from the Scottish regiments if they were stationed outside Scotland.[89] Ties to home go some way to explaining the poor volunteering results from the Tower Hamlets Militia, as their service was limited to London.[90] In recognition of the effect of location on the militia, an anonymous letter to the War Office suggested that the deficient regiments should be stationed as far away as possible from their counties and put on prison duty, whilst 'Those who readily furnish their quota go to their county for a time'.[91]

From recruits to soldiers

Whatever the reasons for taking the bounty, be it either directly joining a recruiting party or volunteering from the militia, this was the first stage in the process of the transformation into a soldier. A large part

of the training of soldiers has been covered in John Houlding's *Fit for Service* and Richard Glover's *Peninsular Preparation* and, although these provide information about the mechanics of training, there is another side to this story about individual adjustment and the efforts of the Horse Guards to preserve its meagre manpower resources.

It is worth reiterating the fact that men joined regiments, not the army. Although the recruiting districts and their staff added a measure of centralized control over the enlistment and approval procedure, the focus of the new soldier was his regiment. This inevitably posed problems for the Horse Guards as every unit needed its own means to process new recruits. The solution for most infantry regiments was the creation of second battalions, which, ideally, would be based in the UK to provide a defensive force and supply drafts to the first battalions as and when needed. In 1803 and 1804, the Army of Reserve Act swelled the ranks of the army allowing the Duke of York to create additional battalions for many regiments. After this initial augmentation, new battalions continued to be added to sustain the strength of units overseas.[92] This principle was extended further with the establishment of recruiting companies for corps that were ordered out of the country, which enabled them to keep up their strength when they did not have enough men to justify a second battalion. The organization of the cavalry also copied this, and depot squadrons were left behind when cavalry units were ordered overseas. Not all regiments could furnish a second battalion, depot company or squadron, and for these units the Horse Guards set up collective establishments, namely an army depot on the Isle of Wight and the Radipole cavalry depot.

Even with these facilities, often a new recruit would have to spend time travelling to his unit or to the army's depots. It was during this phase, however, that the commitment the recruit had made to being a soldier would often be most tested, both because of the experience of these first few weeks but also since he had the chance to do something about it. Although the recruit joined a regiment, often he was not with his unit. Usually he would find himself under the command of NCOs and officers from another regiment, bundled up as a small unit for the purpose of moving soldiers to where they needed to be. These were more like groups of travelling companions rather than functioning military units, and it was difficult to maintain discipline in them. Nor were the commanders of these *ad hoc* units the best ones for the task in hand. The story of Private George Farmer, who enlisted in the 11th Light Dragoons in 1808, may well be typical, as his unit was in Ireland but he enlisted in London. He had a short march to the cavalry

depot at Maidstone, where he spent some time before being sent to Ireland. As George described after receiving his bounty:

> The society into which I was thrown bore no resemblance at all to a well-regulated regiment. The barracks were filled with small detachments from a countless variety of corps, and the sergeants and corporals, on whom the internal discipline both of regiments and depots mainly depends seem to me, at this distance of time, to have been selected from the very scum of the earth.

Corporal Gorman received particular damnation due to his treatment of the detachment George was in whilst on their way to Ireland, as Gorman extracted loans from the new recruits of whatever remained of their bounty and defrauded them of their marching money.[93]

In this context, it is not surprising that desertion was a problem amongst new recruits. In those first few months, the truth of military life was very different from the stories of the recruiting sergeant, yet the new soldier often had the opportunity to leave before he reached the regiment, where he would be subject to more rigorous discipline and organization. The Duke of York estimated that one in ten recruits deserted.[94] William Windham went even further in the strength of his views on the relationship between desertion and recruitment, and part of the motive behind the seven-year short service plan he introduced in 1807 was to decrease desertions by reducing the bounty. Desertion, he believed, 'did not proceed so much from the desire to get free from the restraints of a soldier's life, as from the temptation of a fresh bounty in another corps'.[95] A sample of deserter returns from 1812 onwards supports the Duke of York's and Windham's opinion, as one in seven desertions occurred within a month of enlistment and half of all desertions happened within a year. This evidence is echoed in the geography of desertion, where the headquarters of recruiting districts, such as Exeter for the south-west and Nottingham for the east midlands, feature prominently in the places where soldiers absconded. From 651 desertions that provide a location, top of the list is London with 61, and Nottingham, Exeter and Dublin each had over 20 desertions.[96]

Not surprisingly, these kinds of activities caught the attention of the Horse Guards. Recruits became progressively more supervised, and the time they spent travelling overland was reduced. The overall aim was to remove a new soldier from familiar surroundings as speedily as possible. For instance, recruits for the 20th, 32nd, 38th, 61st, 72nd, 76th and 90th from the north-west of England were sent to their regiments

in Ireland via Liverpool, not the army depot.[97] There were also specific problem areas that needed separate treatment, particularly Ireland and London. Irish militia volunteers for the line were not allowed to join corps in Ireland because it was feared they would desert from them;[98] as a result, the single-battalion regiments in Ireland were shipped over to Britain, allowing Irish militiamen to join them there.[99] Recruits for other regiments were sent to the army depot and shipped to their battalions overseas at the earliest opportunity.[100] It was suggested that the recruiting districts in Ireland should be changed because recruits in the Limerick district had to march up to 60 miles to the nearest port, giving them ample opportunity to reconsider their situation and leave the army.[101] The answer for London, and later the whole south-east,[102] was to establish a depot at Tilbury fort, from which recruits were shipped to the army depot on the Isle of Wight. The fort was used in this way temporarily in 1807 and proved so effective in reducing desertion that it was given a permanent staff.[103] The need to address desertion in London was heightened by the reintroduction of unlimited service and higher bounties, which would only make the situation worse.[104] Shipping of recruits soon became standard practice; a depot was established at Cork in Ireland and one at Leith in Scotland for the transport of recruits by sea.[105]

Provided a new soldier made it to his unit, he would then start to learn basic drill and small arms exercise. The basic building blocks of the training regime that the new recruit experienced had three distinct levels: the individual, small units of men and larger forces, and it was in that order that a recruit was taught. This system had developed over the eighteenth century, and was formally codified the *1792 Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise, and Movements, of His Majesty's Forces* written by David Dundas. The first phase of training was introductory and the soldier learnt to handle a musket in set movements, march in step and practise the basic movement of drill. The second phase brought a group of men into a formal unit, fixed them in ranks and taught them to march and manoeuvre together. The final level brought these subunits together into larger formations, usually battalion-sized of between 500 and 1000 men, to operate together in a force large enough for the battlefield. The latter two stages were repetitive and ongoing and formed part of the day-to-day routine of soldiers.[106]

A new recruit could expect to spend some time in a second battalion or depot company before being sent on active service, often as much as two years. This can be seen broadly by the different ages of the men in the first and second battalions abstracted from the inspection returns.

The average age of a soldier in a first battalion was 29 years, whilst in the second battalions the average was 26, a difference of three years.[107] This picture is borne out by more detailed figures on length of service given in the inspection returns. For example, in 1807 the rank and file and NCOs of the 1/24th averaged 12 years' service compared with nine years for the 2/24th. Moreover, 296 privates of the 2/24th had been in the army for less than a year, whilst every private in the 1/24th had served for at least two years. The two battalions of the 8th in 1810 show a similar pattern: the men of the 1/8th averaged seven years' service and all except five privates had been soldiers for two years, whilst the mean length of service for the 2/8th was three years and 297 men had yet to make it to their first anniversary of joining the army.[108]

Time in the militia would also provide the basics on military life, not just in training but also in the routine of serving in a regiment. Unfortunately, the militiamen's service before they volunteered was not counted in the inspection returns. Sadly for the militiamen, the army did not act upon the suggestion that their spell in the militia be recognized so they would be entitled to higher rates of pay. The officer who suggested the idea knew of men who had been in the militia for ten or twelve years but probably would not volunteer otherwise.[109] In the 1807 transfer from the militia, it is very likely that every volunteer had three years' experience as a soldier, because there had been no ballots for the militia since 1804. During the annual militia transfers from 1811, evidence suggests that militiamen had been in the military for about a year before they volunteered for the line, although as the war went on the length of time spent in the militia declined. Between 1811 and 1813, the volunteers from the Sussex Militia had on average 14 months' service, whilst those listed parish men, presumably those balloted, had served for three and a half years before volunteering.[110] Furthermore, only 6 per cent had served less than 12 months in 1811, whilst 81 per cent of those who transferred had been with the Sussex Militia for over a year. By 1813, this pattern had altered, and 51 per cent of the volunteers had less than a year's experience as a soldier (and 36 per cent had not been in the unit six months before leaving), whilst only a tenth of Sussex's militia volunteers had served for at least two years. Although for just one county, these figures suggest that many militiamen who transferred from 1811 had a reasonable amount of military training and experience of military life.

A stage to adjust and be trained was all the more necessary, as the first few months as a new soldier could be the most disruptive and bewildering. Recruits often became ill as a result of army life, either whilst

with their recruiting party or once they had arrived in their regiments. An investigation was ordered into the 13th to ascertain whether two men who were discharged were unfit when they enlisted or whether their ailments resulted from 'improper Medical treatment since their reception into the 13th Regiment'.[111] In 1811, the Army Medical Board issued an instruction on the treatment of recruits prompted by high levels of illness at Radipole cavalry depot, where all cavalry recruits were sent if their regiments were overseas:

> Young men are often first weakened by this new life, ... and extremely susceptible of the slightest impression capable of producing derangement in the system, and it is their seasoning, as it were, to the habits they must acquire as soldiers, the training to which requires the nicest management both by the Military and medical officers. [They are] not to be made tender by too much care and confinement, while at the same time the discipline should be mild and conciliatory, and the men at first as little exposed to sudden changes and crowding together.[112]

This was the human face of the process by which a civilian became a soldier, and only when a recruit joined the regular and ordered life of his regiment did he usually begin to be well treated. On arrival at the army depot, Dr Lamprice, the physician to the forces, recommended that recruits should be stripped, washed, receive new clothes and be kept in separate barracks, as 'frequently young soldiers arrive there after long marches in a dirty condition'.[113]

  Having taken the King's shilling, sometimes motivated by wanderlust, the realities of army life could prove quite a shock. In the remarkable story of Charles O'Neil, who deserted twice and enlisted in three different regiments yet was never caught, he recounts his burning desire for the life of a soldier, fuelled by stories of adventure. After he joined the 8th at Belfast, however, he found that the 'rigid life of discipline baulked', especially as he had enlisted to escape the constraints of home. More common was homesickness, exacerbated in some cases by disobeying their parents' wishes. Sergeant Greenleigh recollected 'the dagger that pierced me to my heart' because he had rebelled against his parents' wishes and enlisted.[114] A sergeant of the 43rd described his first night in barracks shortly after he enlisted:

> [my] memory began to be busy. I could not help thinking of the peaceful fire-side I had left; and in spite of my most vigorous effort

to shake off the intrusion, conscience would not be denied, and the image of my mother, deserted at her utmost need, and pinched perhaps by want, was a source of great uneasiness. But having passed the Rubicon, retreat I knew was out of the question.[115]

Thomas Morris also had a similar experience in his first few nights and, like the sergeant of the 43rd, felt he could not go back.[116]

The Horse Guards' efforts to improve the recruiting system and enforce its rules and regulations were an attempt to impose a bureaucratic structure on an individual and idiosyncratic transformation that turned a civilian into a soldier. Although quite successful at removing the worst abuses of the recruiting process, the Horse Guards' reforms went only so far. Men that were unfit, too old or too short still found their way into the army. Nevertheless, despite the dodging of its recruiting rules and regulations, the army did manage to arrest widespread evasion of its recruiting regulations and maintain standards to a tolerable level: an impressive achievement, given the pressure it was under to obtain men.

Examining the reasons why men joined the army shows that there were a variety of factors beyond purely financial that were influential, whether he was a civilian who enlisted or a militiaman that volunteered. Broadly, they can be categorized as 'push' and 'pull' factors. The pull of a soldier's life could be the desire to travel or the attractions of military uniforms; what could push a man to join could be boredom with his current situation or economic pressures. These were interconnected and there was a shifting balance between them due to personal circumstances, societal pressures and the economic situation, whereby a moment occurred when a man made up his mind to join the army.

The reputation of the regiment figures highly in the decision to join up. This could be founded on its exploits in the Peninsular, or through a more personal connection such as regional links or, in the case of the militia, being stationed with the unit. The light infantry regiments, with their more enlightened approach to soldiering, proved particularly attractive. Equally, the Lancashire men recruited by the 2/6th in the Maidstone district ignored the numerous recruiting parties and regimental depots in London and the surrounding area and were attracted by a recruiting party that championed their Lancashire roots. A Scottish soldier of the 71st specifically chose that corps because of its name and because it already included so many of his fellow townsmen.[117] As such, potential soldiers were operating in a pseudo-market where reputation and connection was just as important as

financial gain, an echo of the artisan culture from which many of the men came. So, although structured territorial links may have failed, as was seen in Chapter 4, the army managed to establish connections to individuals via a growing regimental culture.

Just as important, the Horse Guards tried to improve the lot of the new soldier and to ensure it kept its precious investment. The key aim was to get the recruits into regular military life – their regiment – as soon as possible by reducing the time spent with recruiting parties or other *ad hoc* military units. Where this was not possible, the Horse Guards put in place depots for new recruits that were firmly under its control and observation. Through the process of improving the recruiting system and examining what it did with its new soldiers, the Horse Guards also demonstrated how it was investigating and learning about its operations, and changed the way it did things accordingly. It began to understand what influenced men to join different regiments and used this intelligence. Such information included links to where the men originally came from, even though they might be enlisted in a different region, as in the case of Lancashire men in the 2/6th who were recruited in London, or shifting militia regiments away from their home to encourage volunteering. Making civilians into soldiers showed how the Horse Guards became aware of what it was doing and began to understand recruitment and adjust accordingly.

6
The British Government and Its Armies

Something of the complexities of Britain's armed forces is indicated in the title to this chapter, as Britain did not have one army but several. During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars there was a substantial diversification in the terms of service for the men in uniform in the UK. Alongside the militia and part-time volunteer units, British governments also experimented with other means of raising men between 1803 and 1807. It is understandable, then, that in its quest for manpower to sustain Wellington's army the government should look at its other military forces and consider how they could be better used. In doing this, however, it was bringing about significant changes to the 'military constitution' of the UK and, more importantly, changing the relationship between the army and government, and the army and society.

Furthermore, the military forces of the British Empire grew in size and significance in this period. For example, the East India Company's army expanded massively, reflecting the company's growing militarism. In 1805, the East India Company controlled 150,000 men and, by 1813, there were approximately 300,000 troops in the subcontinent, with the British Army accounting for only 40,000 men.[1] Such a mobilization was exceptional and unlikely elsewhere because of local hostility to the raising of native troops, but there were colonial militias scattered across the globe.[2] Alongside these were multitudes of 'provincial' troops, often established as the UK conquered new territories, such as the Greek Light Infantry, levied in 1810, or the Bourbon Regiment formed in Mauritius in the same year. Interesting as these forces are, because of their corporate status and the complexities of the relationship between the British and colonial governments, this chapter will mainly focus on the forces under the direct command of the British government.

The integration of Britain's military forces

It was the Duke of York's firm belief that 'Great difficulty has always been made to make a man first engage in a military life, after which he is easily induced to extend his services unlimitedly'.[3] Besides reiterating this point in correspondence with government ministers, this thought underpinned the attempts of the government and the Horse Guards to integrate Britain's multifarious military forces. In part, these efforts were also prompted by the military heirlooms from previous administrations, which the government was keen to retain and exploit. For example, the militiamen due for discharge in 1807 caught Castlereagh's eye in his plans for the militia transfer of that year, as these trained men would be a useful addition to the line regiments.[4]

Britain had already experimented with alternative ways of obtaining men for the army between 1803 and 1806. The Portland government inherited the men balloted under the Army of Reserve and Permanent Additional Force, which had raised 53,700 men (38,000 and 15,700, respectively) for service in the UK only but, crucially, with the option to volunteer for overseas service at any time.[5] By the start of the Peninsular War, most of these men had already volunteered to serve outside the UK but those that remained in the garrison battalions, which were established to administer these men, were a pool of potentially trained soldiers for the regulars. In July 1806, a further inducement of a bounty of ten guineas was offered to these men if they extended their services and, a year later, a total of 15,913 had taken the opportunity to join the regulars, leaving only 6242 still serving on geographically limited terms. By 1808, only 4218 were in the garrison battalions.[6] The 1st and 2nd Garrison Battalions were particularly prolific in the number of men who extended their service, which turned the army's attention to the lacklustre performance of the 3rd Garrison Battalion. It had orders to go to Ireland and, like later considerations about movement of the Irish and Scottish militias, Calvert expected that the move from England to Irish garrison duty would encourage men to transfer.[7]

Although men were no longer enlisted under geographically limited terms, some whole units offered to extend their services too. These proposals vindicate the Duke of York's opinion that, once in some form of military service, men would see the attractions of life as a 'full' soldier, but they were often also a testament to their sense of regimental identity (or, at least, the commanding officer's view of it). The Buckingham Militia's offer stated they would not be separated from their officers or

their colours.[8] Inspired by the patriotic reporting of the stand of the Spanish against Napoleon, some militia regiments offered to serve in the Iberian Peninsula.[9] These offers were rejected, as many of them had provisions attached. Previously, the British Army had experienced difficulties over non-standard terms of service as they inevitably resulted in misunderstandings, with the troubled history of some Highland regiments a particular case in point.[10] The stipulations in the offers from militia regiments could be quite specific. For instance, the Flintshire and Pembroke Militias only wanted to serve with the 2/43rd, virtually unworkable given the way the Horse Guards shunted battalions around as it reinforced Wellington in the Peninsular.[11]

To have any chance of acceptance, schemes to transfer whole units to the line had to align with the Horse Guards' policies. When Colonel Imhoff proposed to extend the service of the 4th Garrison Battalion in 1811, he thought that it would be more successful if it formed a new regiment, thus preserving its identity. The Horse Guards wanted it to be a second battalion, confirming its aversion to the raising of any more new regiments throughout the period. Although the soldiers had a high opinion of Colonel Imhoff because of his care and attention to their families, the general commanding them was unsure whether 'it will have sufficient influence to gain the extension of their services'. His uncertainties were proved correct: only 21 privates, four corporals and seven sergeants came forward from a total of 680 men.[12]

One important aspect of the integration of Britain's military forces was the establishment of a monopoly of recruitment by the army, which was jealously guarded by both the government and the Horse Guards, despite the opportunities that were presented to them. Between 1807 and 1815, the government was bombarded with schemes from individuals for new regiments. These ranged from a corps of riflemen to serve in South America,[13] a company from Scotland for service in America[14] and a more serious plan for an Irish fencible legion of two battalions and four cavalry troops, which Sir Arthur Wellesley endorsed whilst he was military secretary to the Irish Lord Lieutenant.[15] Using civilian contractors to obtain men had been used extensively in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars, and Pitt was a particular advocate of such methods, yet Horse Guards stubbornly refused to accept any such offers. This is all the more surprising considering the manpower pressures the army faced, but the Duke of York felt that handing over recruitment to civilians seriously undermined the officer corps and diminished the army's control of recruiting, as a typical rejection from the undersecretary of War made clear:

It is not the intention of HM government to avail themselves of offers of this description, as the raising of such corps would create a competition in the recruiting for the Regular Army, and be attended with many other objections which it is unnecessary to detail.[16]

Similar words were used in the dismissal of other proposals.[17]

To help preserve its recruitment monopoly, the army also established a system of general service recruits, by which men were enlisted but not for a specific regiment. They were particularly useful to the army as it could send them to whatever unit it felt was necessary. For instance, in 1807, all general service recruits at the army depot were ordered to join the 2nd Foot and,[18] in 1810, 40 general service recruits were selected to be NCOs in the 4th Ceylon Regiment.[19] The origins of the scheme lay in the 1790s, when the East India Company lost its authority to enlist men yet needed some means to maintain the strength of its European regiments. So the recruiting district headquarters were permitted to accept men for general service and most of them were sent to the East India Company, for a fee.[20] Between 1807 and 1811, 4619 men were transferred to the East India Company, with the Company paying £40 per man.[21]

By rejecting private offers of new units and maintaining its management of recruitment, the army reduced competition for men between 1807 and 1815 except, crucially, with the militia. As was seen in Chapter 4, the militia obtained almost as many men as the army acquired between 1807 and 1815. A total of 108,000 men joined the militia, almost half of whom were enlisted by recruiting parties offering a cash bounty, just as the army did. Allowing the militia to recruit men looks odd at first glance, as the Horse Guards had been so determined to stop all other forms of rivalry for manpower. However, by committing to militia transfers to fill the manpower shortfall, the government needed some way of preserving the strength of the militia.

According to the militia laws as they stood in 1807, the only means of replacing losses in the militia was by a ballot, but this approach had a particularly detrimental effect on the recruitment of the army. In the 1807 militia transfer, 36,000 men were due to be found by the British militia regiments and 8000 by the Irish. As a man balloted for the militia could purchase a substitute to serve in his stead, an unregulated market for suitable militiamen was unavoidable, and the cash a man could get to become a militia substitute easily outstripped what the army offered.[22] In 1808, figures presented to Parliament on the average cost of a substitute for the militia show that the mean price across Britain

was £26 15s, over £10 above the bounty offered by the army. Moreover, this average figure hides some significant regional differences. In the counties of Anglesea, Cardigan, Monmouth, Northumberland and the North Riding of Yorkshire, the price for a substitute was over £40. Only in three counties (Rutland, Montgomery and the Isle of Wight) did militia substitutes insist on less than the £16 6s on offer to a recruit to the army, the most likely factor for their lower market value being the fact that these counties had small militia units and so demand was low.[23] The effect of balloting for the militia can be seen in the recruiting figures too, and recruitment dropped by one eighth when ballots were being held.[24] It was logical that when Castlereagh began framing a new militia transfer in late 1808 and early 1809 he proposed that militia regiments should be allowed to recruit men to maintain their strength instead of balloting. This idea had long been in Castlereagh's mind, as it had always been an accepted fact in the Irish militia and he had initially advocated the extension of this scheme to the British militia in 1807.[25]

Having chosen the lesser evil of allowing the militia to enlist men, the Horse Guards then set about regulating it. The law fixed a bounty for militia recruits and stated that militia regiments could recruit only in their home county. Initially, supervision of these regulations was inadequate, and some militia regiments recruited in the more productive urban areas outside their counties under various pretences. The London regiments (the Middlesex and Tower Hamlets Militias) were particularly bad in this respect, as the ballot was never used there and their men were routinely enlisted by cash bounties in London. In 1808 and 1809, there were reports that the Middlesex Militia was recruiting in Manchester, 'To the prejudice of the Recruiting of the Regular Army', as well as in the Marlborough, Leeds and Birmingham districts. The inspecting field officer at Leeds confined James Holmes, a private of the West Middlesex Militia, and 'On examining Holmes' pass it appeared very irregular one and he manifested much reluctance in shewing [*sic*] it to me'. It was, in fact, a pass to look for deserters.[26] The army gradually improved supervision over militia recruitment, but occasionally the rules were still ignored. Complaints came from Coventry, Nottingham and Leicester, where it 'In a great measure account[ed] for the difficulty we have experienced for some time past to obtain recruits'.[27] Eventually, the army made an example of the Colonel of the Tower Hamlets Militia because of his repeated disregard for the regulations on militia recruiting, amongst other misdemeanours, and dismissed him from the service, an extremely unusual and drastic deed.[28]

As these problems began to wane, militia recruitment furnished the Horse Guards with a mechanism that harnessed manpower from across the country more evenly. It also had the advantage of being subject to some compulsion, because if militia regiments were not kept up to establishment then ballots could be ordered to fill their ranks. Wales provides a good example of this. Wales made up approximately 8 per cent of the UK's population, yet in one year it produced just 266 recruits for the army out of 14,405, fewer than 2 per cent of the total. Wales produced a much more respectable 5 per cent of the total militia recruits, and the proportion rises to 6 per cent when balloted men are included. Given that the number the militia could enlist was directly tied to its performance in the militia transfers and, as seen in Chapter 4, that Welsh regiments often did not fulfil their quotas, the difference is even more startling. Allowing the militia to enlist men backed by ballots proved a very effective means of swelling the number of soldiers Britain recruited.

Increasing the size of the army, or maintaining it, was only one way of improving Britain's military force. As the war wore on, the Liverpool government set about the better integration of Britain's military forces by establishing a system that was more able to cope with the scale of Napoleonic conflict. The need was all the more pressing considering the various duties that the British Army had to perform across the globe and at home as garrisons. Geography had a huge impact on British strategy and the massive transportation costs, both in terms of money and time, meant that Britain had to retain a large force in the UK permanently, as it was not a simple matter to return troops to the British Isles in the event of an invasion. It has often been assumed that, after Trafalgar, there was no invasion threat. Although Nelson's victory, the building of the Martello towers and other improvements in fortification removed the immediate threat of an attack by French invasion barges,[29] it did not eradicate the possibility of a later invasion. While Britain forestalled Napoleon's plans to unite the fleets of Europe by the expedition to Copenhagen, and the Peninsular War effectively removed the Spanish and Portuguese navies from his control, France was still able to concentrate the resources of the continent into a massive naval building programme, both of ships of the line and bases.[30]

The fear of an invasion was particularly acute in 1811. Napoleon's domination of Europe was absolute as he had annexed Holland and the north German coast, placing it under the direct control of France, and boldly announced that very soon France would be able to command 150 ships of the line, 50 above Britain's fleet.[31] Moreover, Britain's foothold in the Peninsula, the only scene of major combat for the French, seemed

a lost cause as Wellington retired behind the fortified lines outside Lisbon in the face of a large French army. In January 1811, the Horse Guards prepared a report on the need to reform the army, with the aim of countering a French invasion force estimated at 160,000 men. As the author put it, 'until an invasion is attempted he [Napoleon] will never rest'.[32] France's deteriorating relations with Russia and the subsequent disastrous campaign for the French in 1812 removed the direct threat to the British Isles, allowing Wellington's army to be reinforced in 1813 and the dispatch of troops to north Germany and Holland.[33]

The militia, local military forces and, of course, the navy, augmented the counter-invasion force, allowing a consistent reduction in the proportion of line troops retained in the UK. In 1804, when the possibility of an invasion was at its greatest, the Duke of York estimated that the British Isles needed 143,000 regular troops, with the added proviso that the 30,000 regulars in Ireland should not be Irish because of fears about their loyalty. With the militia, the UK would be defended by 205,000 men, which included a proportion to provide drafts for colonial garrisons and permit the army to continue its policy of rotating units between the UK and overseas garrison duty.[34]

The war also brought more mundane and debilitating tasks for the army, including guarding the increasing number of prisoners of war, both on ships and at the two large camps at Norman Cross and Dartmoor. Fortunately, after some debate, it was ruled that militia regiments could serve on prison ships, thereby overcoming objections that this duty was not permitted by the militia laws.[35] The UK also became a depot for the army overseas, and retained many of the soldiers that were in no fit state for active duty, especially the long-term sick. At acute periods, such as after the Walcheren expedition, there could be huge numbers of troops in Britain who were too ill to do anything. In the winter of 1810, 4766 men out of 25,237 were ill.[36] From 1808 there were also outbreaks of ophthalmia, and the fears of spreading it through the population forced the army to remove afflicted regiments, for instance the move of the 1/88th to Maldon barracks in May 1808.[37] Soon after, a specialist hospital at Selsea was established and all cases were sent there.[38]

With these factors in mind, it is understandable that the government sought other ways to utilize the militia besides transferring men to the line, looking to gain more flexibility in its deployment. One obvious anomaly was that the UK had separate militias for Ireland and Britain. During the Irish rebellion of 1798, some British militia regiments volunteered to serve in Ireland and, after the Act of Union in 1801, there

were calls to make this a permanent arrangement by having a single UK militia. As with much of the Act of Union, particularly relating to the military, the matter was left unresolved and the UK continued to have two militias.[39] Initially, suggestions for reform came from outside the government. Henry Arthur Herbert consistently championed the idea of a united militia in the Commons during the first decade of the nineteenth century.[40] His cause received powerful support in 1811, when Castlereagh also suggested an integrated militia in discussions on the permanent militia transfer, as he felt that this was the only point where the military system was failing.

The army also supported such a measure, from both the Irish militia's detractors and supporters. One of the former, an anonymous staff officer at Athlone, informed Windham in 1807 that he did not 'consider them a force fit to be entrusted with the defence of *this part* [author's italics] of the United Kingdom, either for the purpose of repelling a foreign foe, or for the purpose of crushing internal rebellions'. By interchanging them with British regiments, the Irish militia 'when in England, separated from their priests, would make, what they will never prove here, *good soldiers* [author's italics]'.[41] In a memorandum of 1810, the Horse Guards agreed with the sentiment that the Irish militia would be better out of Ireland, and it also intimated that such an arrangement would have important political results as it 'would unquestionably lead to an *acknowledgement of each other as part of the same Empire* [author's italics]; which is not generally admitted either in England or in Ireland at present!!!'[42]

The government adopted the Horse Guards' scheme for the unification of the militias and created a militia of the United Kingdom, into which all new militia recruits were sworn. Those already in the militia could volunteer for the new force and receive a small bounty. The militia interchange allowed the deployment of a larger force in the Peninsula, as the English and Scottish militias replaced the role of the regulars in Ireland. This was facilitated by the terms of the act that allowed up to a quarter of the British militia to go to Ireland (approximately 18,000 men), whilst a third of the Irish militia could cross the Irish Sea (7500 men), releasing over 10,000 regulars.[43]

The interchange between the Irish and British militias broached the thorny problem of Catholics in an avowedly Protestant army, as many of the Irish militia regiments were overwhelmingly Catholic. MPs who supported the abolition of anti-Catholic legislation, or at least espoused a reduction in its severity, saw the militia interchange as a means to give permanent legality to Catholic worship in Britain. William Tighe

first mentioned this matter in the Commons, and he was soon fol-
lowed by speeches from Sir John Cox Hipperley, Sir John Newport and
Henry Grattan. Even the Home Secretary, Richard Ryder, conceded that
a clause should be inserted allowing Catholic worship into the Mili-
tia Interchange Bill. Lords Stanhope, Moira and Buckingham pressed
Catholic claims in the Lords but the clause was rejected.[44] Catholic wor-
ship had been permitted in the army since 1806, and it was through this
mechanism that the government diffused the issue.[45]

In 1813, the Liverpool government returned to the idea of the better
utilization of Britain's military forces as the strategic and political situa-
tion did appear to be the end game of the Napoleonic Wars. The Duke
of York warned that the novelty of militia volunteering had ended but
the demands for men in the army had grown; worryingly, he predicted
a deficiency of 10,500 men.[46] Once again, the government turned to the
militia to make the final sacrifice to achieve victory. The undersecretary
for war outlined the problem and a possible solution:

> The means of the Regular Army are exhausted (at least in the
> Infantry). The volunteering of the militia into the Regular regiments
> has become extremely slack, and any measure for augmenting the
> militia, with a view to subsequent volunteering into the line requires
> so much time that the season of action would be lost. At the same
> time it is believed that a great Enthusiasm exists in the country: –
> and that the old militia would freely extend their service if they
> were employed with their own officers and to retain their peculiar
> advantages.[47]

So the quota of volunteers for the line was doubled for that year and,
with the arrears due, 26,000 men would be added to the regulars, but
the militiamen were given a variety of options. Firstly, men could vol-
unteer as before for service in the line and a proportion of militia officers
would receive commissions. Secondly, militiamen could volunteer in
whole companies and be formed into provisional battalions under the
command of militia officers for service in Europe. Finally, up to three-
quarters of a militia regiment could offer as a complete and separate
unit, again restricted to deployment in Europe. In the last two options,
the men would still be militiamen and so retain the privileges of the
force, crucially the family allowance. As part of this 'New Military Sys-
tem', the government also received powers to call out the local militia
for 28 days and send it outside of its own county to provide for home
defence.[48] It became law in late November 1813 and was implemented

in 1814, a demonstration of how far Parliament was willing to admit to changes to Britain's military constitution, albeit that it had taken six years to get to this stage.

The militiaman's family allowance demonstrated the limits of the integration of Britain's military forces. This payment of 2s 6d for a wife and 1s for each child when he was stationed outside the regiment's county was lost if a militiamen transferred to the line. Despite the obvious inequities it created, and the impact it had on volunteering from the militia, this distinction between militiamen and the regulars remained throughout the war regardless of the significant support for the implementation of the scheme to the army from the Horse Guards. Extending the family allowance would not only have improved militia volunteering, but was also indicative of more humane attitudes within the Horse Guards, mirroring the efforts of the Royal Navy to support families through the reallocation of pay to home.[49] Within the Duke of York's dismissal of the Talents' short service scheme was a counter-proposal to improve the service, which was reiterated to the Portland cabinet in March 1808. In the Duke's plan, short service should be replaced by other benefits: a family allowance to a soldier's wife of 2s 6d, and 6d per child under seven (less per child than the militiaman's allowance, it should be noted) if they remained at home whilst he was sent abroad; an extra two pence a day after 14 years' good service and a pension at full rate after 18 (but with a liability to serve in the veteran battalions).[50] Such proposals were not only an attempt to improve recruiting, but they were part of the efforts by the Horse Guards to make soldiering a respectable profession.[51]

Sir Henry Clinton echoed the Duke's views in a comprehensive memorandum of 1810 whilst he was Adjutant General in Ireland, and shortly before going on to a prominent role in the Peninsular War as commander of the 6th Division. He had served under Sir John Moore as his adjutant general whilst on campaign and held the same opinions as Moore on the better treatment of soldiers and their kin, and direct experience of the impact of families on the army. Clinton believed that a family allowance would have the benefit of stopping wives accompanying men on campaign, with all the advantages that this would bring. It would reduce the tonnage required to transport the troops abroad. Families on active service made the situation worse when provisions were short on campaign, and they often resorted to plundering, as well as being 'exposed to the miseries of active service'. Yet if wives and children remained at home under the current regulations they would be faced with similar wretchedness. They had to rely on other relatives or

the poor rates to support them, whilst in Scotland and Ireland, where there was no parochial assistance for the destitute, many were reduced to begging.[52] This was certainly one cause in the reluctance of Irish and Scottish militiamen to volunteer. The family allowance to these men was crucial, whilst an English militiaman might have taken a little comfort from the fact that, should his family return to his parish, they would not be completely impoverished.

The Duke of York was convinced a family allowance was 'Absolutely necessary to give popularity among the men of the Militia to the service of the Line'. The improvement for soldiers' wives and children would also enhance the popularity of the army generally by removing the sight of wives begging just because their husbands had enlisted.[53] Calvert actually derived a plan for its administration, in which regimental depots were to be established where wives could receive assistance and the boys learn military habits at a regimental school. It would also provide a 'Real and intimate connection to the Regiments with the county of which they bear the name'.[54] Clinton went as far as to work out the cost after analysing the number of wives and children from a sample of different battalions. From this he calculated that it would cost £85,371 for an army of 50,000. Later estimates put the figure at £8580 per 1000 men per annum if an allowance was given solely to militiamen who transferred to the line, or £216,112 per annum for a general provision for wives and children.[55] Despite widespread support at the Horse Guards, these proposals were never adopted. A limited extension of the provision only to militiamen who had volunteered would have been unfair and it would have encouraged men to join the militia first then volunteer for the army, so reducing ordinary recruiting. A general extension of the family allowance was too costly, especially given the government's retrenchment programme of the early 1810s, and the arrangements to send militia regiments to Europe in 1813 neatly avoided the issue.

Military governance

The government's rejection of the Horse Guards' call for a family allowance is indicative of increasing government control over the military. This shift in the management of the army and its relationship with governments is also apparent when examining the decisions by government about the deployment of forces overseas. The size of the army that could be employed for active campaigning was constrained by the forces the Horse Guards believed were required for garrison duty at home and abroad. Nevertheless, ministers were keen to have an active

military force for a number of reasons: in aid of its allies, for example the expedition to Stralsund in 1807; or to maintain its naval predominance such as the Copenhagen operation; or a combination of both like the Walcheren campaign.[56]

Providing an active force seriously compromised the strength of the home and colonial garrisons. In 1807, a memorandum presented to the cabinet from the Horse Guards highlighted that sending a relatively small force of 16,000 to the continent would leave only eight battalions of over 500 men in Britain (totalling 7787 men, including the always large Foot Guards battalions) and 16 battalions in Ireland (10,966 men). At the same time, the colonial garrisons were 10,000 men short of what was necessary,[57] which had to be remedied from the home army. At the end of 1807, the disposable force had been reduced to 10,077 men, of whom 3909 were Foot Guards.[58]

The size of any British army deployed on the continent was, therefore, a political decision, judged on the advantages gained versus the risks involved in reducing garrisons. In this framework, the Horse Guards became progressively more like a ministry of the government, providing figures and opinions upon which the cabinet made its decisions. Needless to say, the information given by the Horse Guards was always hedged with provisos and warnings.[59] For example, in 1812 the Horse Guards transmitted a return of the number of men available in an emergency, but the Duke of York's military secretary, Henry Torrens, warned: 'In returning these numbers, His Royal Highness has not been guided in any degree by the necessity of reinforcing troops for the defence of this country and Ireland. It will therefore remain for the government to consider how far any contingency would warrant the embarkation of the whole effective force now disposable for service'.[60] At one point, the Duke of York questioned the wisdom of the commitment to Portugal as, although it tied down a French army, it had reduced the home garrison by 63,000 men, which might not compensate for Napoleon's expansion into northern Europe and the threat that this posed to Britain.[61]

From 1809 a system of consultation emerged between the army and government to establish what troops could be sent to reinforce Wellington's growing army. In that year, conversations were held between Torrens and Sir Henry Edward Bunbury, the military under-secretary for war (a junior ministerial appointment). Torrens provided the necessary details of the state of troops regarding their strength, efficiency, training and officers, all gathered from the inspection returns, which Bunbury then used to decide what units were to be sent to the Peninsula. In 1809, they had no difficulty finding the 5000 infantry and

a cavalry regiment that had been requested by Wellington.[62] It was not, however, always that simple. In February 1810, two units were selected as potential reinforcements to Wellington, but the 2/67th was about to make a draft to its second battalion in India, and the other corps, the 2/38th, had only 500 men, which Torrens thought would be totally inefficient after six weeks' service. Consequently, Torrens recommended that the 2/38th be kept at home.[63]

Similar consultations occurred when the French army under Massena advanced against Wellington in 1810, and Wellington's army retired to the lines of Torres Vedras. This time, the government and the army contemplated the total force available in an emergency. In August 1810, five units were considered fit for field service in an emergency (4th, 5th, 50th, 68th, totalling 2750 men plus the Brunswick corps).[64] By November 1810, the list of units available had been revised and preparations were made to assemble them around Portsmouth and Cork.[65] A week later, orders were given for the concentration of a force at Portsmouth, consisting of the 2nd, 1/36th, 51st, 2/52nd, 68th, 85th and 1st and 2nd KGL Light Dragoons, to which Torrens added that the Guards could possibly provide another 1000 men. These were ready by early December, a quite creditable achievement.[66]

The discussions held in 1811 about units available in the UK for over-seas service demonstrated the benefit of the militia interchange. Torrens calculated that, in England and the Channel Islands, 9562 men were available, in Scotland 2977 and Ireland 2702, excluding the Foot Guards. In this memorandum, he also drew the distinction between units that could go without any inconvenience (5600 men) and those that could be used in an emergency (an additional 9450). Once again, however, he warned that using these units would leave two weak battalions, 'none of which could be rendered available to service abroad at present'.[67] The development of these meetings between the army and government enabled Britain to respond more effectively to crises and opportunities, but it placed control over the size and deployment of Britain's disposable force firmly in the hands of the government.

Government direction of the British Army meant that the Horse Guards' ideal arrangement of a regiment, whereby the first battalion served overseas and was supplied by drafts from the second battalion at home, was not always maintained, further exacerbating structural problems in the army. During 1809 and 1810, many of the first battalions were incapacitated from their participation in the Corunna and Walcheren campaigns, and so second battalions were sent to rein-force Wellington in the Peninsula.[68] This created problems later as the

Horse Guards wanted to adhere to its model deployment of a regiment, whilst Wellington wanted to retain second battalions as they were seasoned and experienced. A compromise was agreed and, if the regiment was sufficiently strong (1600 men for a two-battalion regiment), the Commander-in-Chief would allow both battalions to be on active service. So, in 1808, the 2/5th and 2/40th remained in the Peninsula whilst the 2/38th and 2/71st came back to the UK.[69] Often, when the first battalions were sufficiently recovered, they were sent to the Peninsula and the men of the second battalion were drafted into the first, whilst the skeleton of the second battalion was sent back to recruit in the UK.

This was not the end of the matter, though. In 1811, the Duke of York requested that all second battalions should be returned to recruit in Britain, and the number of squadrons in cavalry regiments in the Peninsula should be reduced so that they could have a good depot in the UK.[70] Some second battalions also belonged to regiments with battalions on colonial duty, and they were needed at home to preserve the efficiency of their first battalions (namely the 2/24th, 2/30th and 2/53rd). The Duke of York also wanted single-battalion regiments to be sent home to recruit when they were reduced in numbers, and advised against dividing them into two and leaving a part overseas and the other portion at home after the experience of the 85th had resulted in 'A degree of irregularity, contention and every species of indiscipline'.[71]Although Wellington complied with the request to reorganize the cavalry, he formed small second battalions and single-battalion units into provisional battalions and kept them for the duration of the Peninsular War, in spite of the Duke of York's requests to send them to the UK.

This tussle between the Duke of York and Wellington reflected the growing competence of the Horse Guards in the administration of Britain's armed forces and its management of information. It highlights how the Horse Guards had become a functioning bureaucracy and part of the operations of the state, rather than simply a military headquarters. This was unmistakably shown in the *Eleventh Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry*, published in 1810, which examined the Adjutant General's and Quarter-Master General's departments. Under questioning by the commissioners, Calvert could confidently assert that a new military system had been introduced into the army, characterized as:

> The uniformity of regulations established in and extended to every description of the Military Force of the Empire, on whatever station employed, as applicable to the clothing and arming of troops, to their

field exercise and discipline, and to the interior economy of the several Corps, and the immediate and personal superintendence of the whole Army, exercised by His Royal Highness, founded on special and confidential Reports and accurate Returns of every description, whereby the actual state of the Army as consisting one great aggregate body, and of every distinct part of it, were constantly under his observation.[72]

Compared with the dire administration of the army before 1795, Calvert was right to be proud of the achievement. Moreover, this was much more than simply the efficient running of the armed forces. As highlighted in the quote above, the Adjutant General's department was called upon again and again to furnish detailed statistics on the state of the armed forces, either for Parliament or latterly as part of a routine of business.

The report also underscored how the Adjutant General's and Quarter-Master General's departments went from being passive producers of information to actively examining and analysing this information. In the case of the Quarter-Master General, this included the establishment of a 'depot of military knowledge',[73] containing key policy documents and discursive memoranda, maps and plans, all of which could be utilized in a much more proactive way than before. Many of the War Office papers were considered as a library for any future Commander in Chief or Secretary of War to relay the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and they now form WO30 in the National Archives. In the case of the Adjutant General's department, Calvert and his deputies began looking much more closely at how the British Army could be supported and developed and proposed others ways of maintaining the strength of the British Army.

Alternative recruitment policy

The militia transfers and the better integration of Britain's military forces under the overall supervision of the cabinet provided the means for the government to be able to prosecute the war. There were, however, calls for more radical reforms of recruitment to meet the demands of the Peninsular War. Criticisms of the militia transfer system became allied with suggestions being mooted in Parliament to adopt some form of compulsion into recruitment. As the political debates about militia volunteering shifted between 1807 and 1811, many MPs noted that the militia transfer system sometimes acquired men by compulsion from the

counties for the militia, only to tempt them into the army with boun-
ties. From 1811, when the militia were recruiting through parties and
cash bounties, the cost of this government policy reinforced the criti-
cisms. In the debates on the 1811 Militia Transfer Bill, both Daniel Giles
and Samuel Whitbread questioned the 'double jump' system it would
set up, whereby a man could enlist into the militia for one bounty then
soon after transfer to the line and receive another.[74] In essence, most in
Parliament had accepted the need for compulsion somewhere in recruit-
ment policy, but the question was at what point. During his brief tenure
as Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval felt this was the real question to
debate.[75]

The flaw in the militia transfer system was its voluntary nature, which
made predictions about outcomes, and so the strength of regiments,
difficult to determine. Accepting volunteers from the militia for the reg-
ulars were seen by many as a temporary measure and, perhaps, not very
well conceived, and the deliberations in Parliament also highlighted the
fact that they were altering the constitutional arrangement of the mil-
itary forces of the country in a way that left many questions about the
new arrangements unresolved. As John Cartwig observed in a letter to
the Secretary of War, 'It is not possible for me to conceive you can rest
satisfied with our present system of Defence:- if system that can be called
which equally violates constitutional and military principals [*sic*] and for
its inefficiency is a disgrace to the councils of our country'.[76] Examining
the alternatives reveals the reasons why the government chose to use
the militia rather than implement any radical reform of the army.

The Horse Guards consistently presented alternative plans to main-
tain the army. The principal measure advocated was to supply the army
by a mechanism similar to the Army of Reserve of 1803, and the Horse
Guards periodically gave detailed proposals for reintroducing ballots for
the regular army. In February 1807, the Duke of York proposed to the
Talents that a ballot should maintain the second battalions but the
men would limited to home service[77] and, in 1809, Calvert presented
a more detailed version of this in a memorandum for 'New Modelling
the Army'. He proposed to create a true territorial army of 100 regi-
ments, each of two battalions: the first battalions for unlimited service
geographically, thus providing a disposable force of 100,000 men, and
the second battalions maintained by ballot for service in the UK. The
rest of the military force would be in the local militia, volunteers and
yeomanry, all of whom were to be trained to be fit to function with the
regulars. These part-time troops would assume the identity – the name
and regimental distinctions – of the county regiment. In essence, the

plan would encourage enlistment into first battalions by establishing a real connection between regiments and counties, and the militia would be 'What it ought constitutionally to be, the Basis of our National Force'. He further warned that 'Every measure adopted for the Encrease [*sic*] of our Military Force, which does not place it on an assured and permanent Footing, is illusory and inadequate to the object'.[78] The plan appealed sufficiently to Castlereagh for him to present it to the King.[79]

In 1810, the same idea was presented to the Perceval government, prompted by the end of the militia volunteering and the need to 'take account of the military force and the means of supporting it'. The plan was a more refined version of Calvert's proposals of 1809. In this every regiment would have a second battalion, and with an eye on costs the existing second battalions were to be reduced to eight companies and one field officer, thereby providing the means for the army to receive 30,000 men. It was also apparent to the Adjutant General that compulsion was necessary, but this could be made less obnoxious by restricting it to service in the UK with the option to volunteer for duty overseas at any time.[80]

In the following year, the Adjutant General's department again advocated balloting for the army with a wide-ranging and comprehensive defence report, written at a time when it again appeared that Napoleon would turn his attention to invading Britain. It was recognized that Napoleon would only attempt an invasion with an overwhelming force, estimated at six armies of 40,000–50,000 (three against Kent and Sussex, two against the North and East and one against Ireland), with a smaller force of 20,000–25,000 against Cornwall and Devon. The prospect of such a massive force necessitated a major reform of the army. The militia would be disbanded, the men and officers going to the regular army as: 'In the old militia the original institution is completely worn out by the introduction of a general substitution, and by the term of enrolment having become indefinite namely the war, the great object of gradually training the population of the country to arms is entirely frustrated'. Consequently, the local militia would replace the militia as the constitutional force. Higher bounties would be given to recruits who agreed to serve in a separate, colonial army and, although recruiting would continue, a ballot would furnish any deficiency in the army. This draft would only be for the infantry and confined to unmarried men between 18 and 25. Significantly, substitution would not be allowed but there would be a system of fines, and each man would serve for five years in the UK unless he volunteered for service overseas. The author admitted that filling up second battalions with men that were restricted to service

in the UK would have its limitations, but felt that the only alternative was unrestricted conscription.[81]

Balloting for the line clearly had support from the army, which is predictable, but it also had political support. Members of the former Addington government, who introduced the Army of Reserve in 1803, advocated a return to it from 1807.[82] They feared leaving the completion of the army to chance, whilst at the same time disrupting a large part of the defensive force of the country. For example, in 1807 they draw attention to the transfer system in which 25,000 men would leave the militia for the line, and the remaining 50,000 militiamen would have 44,000 recruits grafted upon them. Lord Melville expressed succinctly the Sidmouthite view: 'It is astonishing to me that, among all the projects for keeping up the army, there never has been the good sense to revert back to the system of the Army of Reserve. By that system you could receive a supply of 30,000 men by *ballot*, which I am sure, is more than the most sanguine of you can look for from any new attempt upon the Militia'.[83]

Additionally, disgruntled MPs with militia interests also began to advocate larger-scale reforms, which produced unlikely rhetoric, particularly in the debates on the 1807 militia transfer. Colonel Edward Lord Stanley, a vociferous detractor of militia transfers, stated that 'he would rather the noble lord [Castlreagh] had brought forward a proposition for annihilating the militia altogether, than degrading it by making it subservient to the recruiting of the army'.[84] Samuel Whitbread went further by stating 'let us not practice it [conscription] indirectly but more partially and oppressively, by beating up the militia, and then allowing it to feed 'til it filled itself, in order to devour it"[85] Lord Henry Petty, John Bastard and John Calcraft also voiced similar sentiments in their speeches. This alliance of views was centred on the argument that taking volunteers from the militia would destroy the constitutional force altogether for an increase to the regulars of 28,000 men.[86]

These sorts of concerns were echoed throughout the Peninsular War period. Sidmouth admitted the necessity of militia drafts and did not oppose the militia transfer in 1809, but 'He could not approve of the practice of enlisting men for one species of service, and afterwards seducing them into another'.[87] Daniel Giles went further, observing that there were three modes of raising men: increasing the bounty, balloting or reducing service either in time or in space. The government had chosen none of these: 'He [Castlereagh] proposed to raise men first by ballot and then by bounty'. Additionally, he felt militia transfers and militia ballots were expensive and estimated that the last draft had cost

£726,000, a third each paid from general taxes, from the landed interest and from individuals subjected to the ballot.[88]

So why did the government ignore the plans of the army and the calls for more thorough reform? Taking volunteers from the militia held several attractions for the government. In 1807 and 1809, Castlereagh was particularly keen to get trained men into the army, whilst balloting for the line would take time and the men would need training.[89] Militia drafts did not affect ordinary recruiting as much as a ballot for the army.[90] Furthermore, the failure of the Army of Reserve, which had lapsed with the demise of the Addington ministry, was still a recent memory during the Portland government and so there were doubts about the possible success of a similar law. Castlereagh informed the cabinet in 1807 that:

> With respect to success of such a measure, had it even received the sanction of Parliament, very considerable doubts must be entertained, when the contempt into which fines have fallen, from their enforcement having always been neglected, and latterly wholly abandoned by an express enactment, is considered: and it is clear that a recurrence to such a system at present would be productive of the utmost resistance and dissatisfaction both in and out of Parliament.[91]

From a political perspective, a new Army of Reserve bill could not have been passed and implemented in 1807. The Portland government's weak successor, the Perceval ministry, made such an attempt even more unlikely, especially when it was preoccupied with the inquiry into the Walcheren expedition and then the establishment of the Regency.

Apart from these political considerations, there were other powerful reasons for the government's reluctance to consider conscription. Much has been made of two issues that were thought to stop direct balloting for the line: the administrative limits of the British state and the 'manpower ceiling'. It has been asserted that direct balloting for the armed forces would have been difficult, if not impossible, in Britain because its administrative machinery could not cope with its rapidly growing and mobile population. To some extent, this is true as the militia relied on the counties finding men, preferably by ballot, but other means were acceptable. This was particularly the case in Ireland where, in some places, there hardly existed the parish authorities needed to execute ballots, and in the large manufacturing districts of Britain, where dense populations precluded fair and quick ballots.[92] It is unlikely that the proponents of drafting for the army ever thought direct personal service

could be enforced, hence the use of the term 'balloting' rather than 'conscription' in their speeches and proposals, but it is clear that counties could be forced to find men. Soldiers could be obtained by more direct methods as the Army of Reserve had shown, but the government chose an indirect approach by raising men via the militia ballots and recruiting rather than direct intervention.

The 'manpower ceiling' has been put forward recently as an explanation,[93] and the argument has supporting evidence. Both Castlereagh and Liverpool believed that the army, navy and part-time forces were reaching the limits of what Britain could support from 1807. Castlereagh said as much in Parliament in 1807 and, when Liverpool was drawing up his plans for the annual militia transfers in 1811, he wrote that the army was 'as large a force, combined with the Regular Militia and Navy as the Population and Finances of the Country could well support'.[94]

Closer inspection shows that the 'manpower ceiling' was not a demographic limit, rather it was financial. In 1810, the government trimmed back Britain's finances in recognition that the war was likely to be sustained for some considerable time. Liverpool felt that the commitment to Portugal could be maintained indefinitely at a rate of £3,000,000 per annum. In 1810, when 10,000 men were sent to bolster Wellington during the French offensive of that year, it had cost £6,000,000, a massive escalation in expense for a relatively small reinforcement.[95] Although the financial situation improved from 1812, and Wellington was duly reinforced, the government could still not afford to expand the army by a sufficient level to justify the introduction of balloting for the armed forces.

The overriding concern from 1810 was to preserve Britain's military strength and to allow it to continue fighting until events in central Europe improved the prospect of a quick victory. In effect, the government imposed a manpower ceiling tailored to Britain's war aims and strategy. This explains why the government chose to ignore the plans emanating from the Horse Guards and Parliament. As Liverpool explained in a letter to Wellington on 10 September 1810:

> The question in short, must come to this. We must make an option between a steady and continued exertion upon a moderate scale, and a great and extraordinary effort for a limited time, which neither our means, military or financial, will enable us to maintain permanently.
>
> If it could be hoped that the latter would bring the contest to a speedy and successful conclusion, it would certainly be the wisest

course; but unfortunately, the experience of the last fifteen years is not encouraging in this respect.[96]

Liverpool had experienced several false dawns in his time in politics during the war and his knowledge clearly influenced the government's military policy. Furthermore, true to his word, Liverpool did enact extraordinary measures in 1813 through the new military system introduced in that year. Although Lord Palmerston somewhat prematurely claimed in 1810 that Britain's military forces had been 'consolidated into an impregnable military mass',[97] by late 1813 this was certainly a more realistic appraisal. The 1813 legislation, coupled with the new militia laws, had codified an integrated military system that combined part-time forces, the militia as a national defence force that could be deployed to fight in Europe, and a British Army at the peak of its numbers.

The relationship between the British government and the administration of the army became increasingly close during the Peninsular War, as both sought to eke out what they could from Britain's military forces. As part of this process, the Horse Guards began functioning as a pseudo-ministry for the government and, in many ways, the epitome of one. Elsewhere in the British government it has been shown that there were significant developments during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, with the introduction of modern bureaucratic methods, salaried officials and improved working arrangements.[98] All of these actions had their roots in the reforms of the 1780s but, whereas other aspects of this reforming drive stopped on the onset of war, particularly political reform,[99] reorganization and improvements in the military gathered pace. The abolition of the Inspector General of Recruiting in 1807 is an important point in the development of the army. Firstly, it removed one of the many sinecures existing in the army establishment, but it also had important repercussions for the administration of the army, and development of policy. The work of the Inspector General was transferred to the Horse Guards and, under Calvert, detailed statistics were collected on recruitment, information that was not easily available beforehand, but which have enabled a deeper understanding of the productivity of recruiting during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars.

These records were not intended for posterity, and the clear message behind the assiduous collection of data by the Adjutant General's department was that 'ordinary recruitment' was insufficient to meet the demands of the army. In this respect, the Horse Guards presaged the development of the professional civil service and a modern bureaucracy,

which provided information for relevant ministers to determine suitable policies.[100] Nowhere is this clearer than in the annual reports sent from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary for War. Without such intelligence it is difficult to see how the government could have successfully maintained the commitment in the Peninsula.

7
The Legacy of the Peninsular War

By the end of the Peninsular War, the British government and the military had changed significantly. It is often contended that this military machine was disbanded from 1815, albeit in a slightly drawn-out process with Wellington commanding an army of occupation in France and the war in North America.[1] This is certainly true in terms of the physical aspects of the army, namely the number of soldiers it had, but the transformation wrought by Britain's 20-year war with France, and particularly the Peninsular War, continued to influence the British Army and its place and standing in British society. This founded a long and enduring legacy from the Peninsular War, which affected the shape of the British Army and the way it was thought about and conceived from that point onwards into the Victorian era and beyond.

By looking at the strength of the army alone, there is an important difference between the post-Waterloo and pre-1793 British Army, as it never returned to the miniscule force of the 1780s. There was pressure for a massive reduction, though. At the end of 1815, Torrens informed the Duke of York: 'while you continue that paternal support of the great interests of the Army, you should anticipate at the same time the financial difficulties and objections which will come from Government'.[2] Yet the Duke of York and Calvert were able to preserve the army from the kind of savage pruning it had received in 1783, and the initial peacetime military estimates from the Horse Guards of 230,000 would have staggered politicians in 1783 or 1763.[3] Although they were ignored due to fiscal constraints, an omnipotent Treasury[4] and firm control over the military by politicians,[5] nevertheless the army estimates of 1815 provided for a force of 150,000. During the 1820s the army still counted 147,000 men,[6] three times larger than that of the period 1784–1792. Judged on numbers alone in the immediate aftermath of the

war, much had changed in the army and the army's relationship to society.

The structure of the army: regiments

Even with the discharge of 100,000 men after 1815, the structure of the army remained intact. Contrasting with the demobilization after the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence, the composition of the army was not radically altered and the number of regiments on its books remained largely the same. After the Seven Years War, 54 regiments were disbanded, condensing the line regiments from 124 to 70, and 34 regiments were broken up following the Peace of Paris in 1783, leaving 72 on the army's establishment.[7] Although men were shed from the army after 1815, the army did not suffer a similar massive restructuring. Of course, in this post-1815 demobilization, some units were taken off the lists but these were extraneous to the line regiments of the army. So units such as the King's German Legion were transferred back to Hanoverian service, or the foreign regiments, such as the Chassuers Britannique, were dispensed with. The core of 104 infantry regiments and 36 cavalry regiments formed the backbone of the army throughout the Victorian period and was only fundamentally altered by the Cardwell reforms of 1868 and 1872.[8]

Regiments were the building blocks of the British Army, and the Horse Guards became more aware of the importance of regimental identity to successful recruiting. For this reason, the Duke of York was reluctant to reduce substantially the establishment of corps that were under strength after they had returned from active service, as it threatened the preservation of any prestige they might have accumulated.[9] Accordingly, the 3rd and 7th Dragoon Guards and the 4th Dragoons were not reduced in 1811, despite pressure from the government to save money, as they were 'Looked to with that degree of national pride which has hitherto secured their popularity'.[10] It is clear that regimental identity aided recruiting. Some 3579 men were recruited at all the regimental headquarters in the UK between July 1808 and June 1809, testifying to the connections that these regiments had established in their local communities.[11]

Moreover, the preservation of regiments as cohesive communities became a cornerstone of Britain's military policy, sometimes to the detriment of raising men itself. Just as the number of regiments was protected after 1815, so during the war the Horse Guards was keen to maintain a stable structure in the army. Despite the massive expansion of the British Army during the Peninsular War, the number of regiments in the

army barely changed. Previously, the British government had pursued a policy of raising units specifically to draft the men into other regiments, with the number of line regiments peaking at 135, which were then cut back to 100 in the period 1795–1796. This reorganization led to some disturbances in the regiments that were drafted.[12] When the Duke of York became Commander-in-Chief he abandoned the system of recruiting regiments, not only because of the recent disturbances in 1795 but also because of his dislike of their unmilitary management and organization. Despite numerous offers to create more of these types of units during the Peninsular War, as examined in Chapter 6, which would have almost certainly boosted the size of the army, the army consistently rejected offers from private individuals to raise new regiments even though they would have undoubtedly been a valuable additional to its numbers.

Only three line regiments were added to the establishment between 1807 and 1815, namely the 102nd, 103rd and 104th. Even then, these cases were unnumbered units that were transferred to the line because it was considered inexpedient to draft them into other regiments. The 102nd was formed from the New South Wales Corps, a colonial garrison unit, when it was ordered back to the UK in 1808. The 103rd was created from the 9th Garrison Battalion after it also extended its services in 1808, and the 104th was established when the New Brunswick Fencibles, again a colonial unit, offered to operate anywhere in 1810.[13] In essence, adding new regiments to the line in these situations was the better option as it preserved them as units.

The Duke of York's innovation to solve the problem of expansion within a fixed regimental list was the widespread creation of second battalions, which permitted the army to expand, provided facilities for training and preserved and promoted regimental identity. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Army of Reserve Act and Permanent Additional Force Act allowed the Duke of York to add battalions to regiments between 1803 and 1805, and this augmentation continued afterwards, albeit on a smaller scale.[14] The widespread creation of second battalions was not without its own difficulties, and the divergent demands on these battalions meant that they often suffered for the first battalion and were not always effective units for Britain's defence. Some second battalions were reluctant to transfer men to their first battalions, seeing themselves as a separate corps.[15] In theory, the system for the multi-battalion regiment was quite simple. The second battalions would be based in the UK, contributing to the force available for the defence of Britain against invasion, alongside providing training centres for new recruits

and its traditional police role, and periodically supplying drafts to the first battalions overseas.

The reality of this system was somewhat different, with a good deal of misplaced battalions, for example, second battalions overseas in the fighting part of the army, whilst first battalions were in the UK recovering from previous campaigns, particularly at the beginning and the end of the Peninsular War. This was the result of the difficulties in overseeing the war, particularly the several episodes of damaging exertion, such as the Walcheren expedition of 1809–1810. Furthermore, as the war went on, a new element entered the management issues with the understandable desire of Wellington to cling onto seasoned units in the Peninsular army rather than have them replaced by fresh units from the UK, as has been examined in Chapter 6. Of course, one solution to this would have been to draft men from one unit to another, but this was never going to be countenanced by the Duke of York and the staff in the Horse Guards.

Regiments permeated the minds of the staff at the Horse Guards, and this outlook was exhibited in thoughts on other matters too. Expanding the role of regiments as organizational tools for the army was taken further and extended to Britain's other military forces. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Horse Guards made links between units of local militia and the line regiments in an effort to encourage recruiting, asking adjutants of the local militia to recruit for certain regiments, thus attaching particular areas to line regiments. Additionally, the army sought to establish ties between militia corps and line regiments as part of the 1807 Militia Transfer Act. Such was the success of the promotion of the line regiments in the army that these connections had to be broken in the militia transfers from 1809 onwards, with the 95th proving especially popular with militia volunteers. Furthermore, when Calvert presented plans for New Modelling the army in 1809 and 1810, once again regiments were at the core of his ideas in his proposal to create a genuine territorial army. In this there would be an extended regiment consisting of a front-line service battalion, a second battalion to receive recruits, with militia units and part-time corps forming reserve battalions.

The importance of regiments to the Horse Guards was replicated in the way they treated individual soldiers. There was the simple fact that it was a regiment that a soldier joined when he was recruited, not the army. Furthermore, individual soldiers looking to transfer between regiments had to seek the approval of the Horse Guards. Although they were usually sympathetic, for example Calvert endorsed the request of Robert Martin serving in the 43rd to have his brother David, then serving in the

1st, join him in the 43rd,[16] a point was being made through this process: regiments, and keeping soldiers together in them, were important to the army.

The Horse Guards' conception of the regimental system, many enhanced with two battalions, often superseded practical considerations. The divergent demands on the second battalions did not always result in effective units for Britain's defence. In 1807, the 2/78th wanted to retain part of the detachment about to go to the first battalion, but this request was denied, as the first battalion was 700 men under establishment.[17] The commanding officer of the 2/8th was in a similar situation in that he wanted to improve the second battalion, to which Calvert replied:

> The expediency of keeping the 1st battalion constantly in a state fit for immediate service is so obvious, that it is to be trusted, that the commanding officer of the 2nd battalion will never suffice his exertions, nor those the officers under his command, to relax in affording necessary aid to the 1st battalion, in which the general Reputation and Character of the regiment is so intimately concerned.[18]

The continual supply of drafts made many of the second battalions small and inefficient, a situation that worsened when first battalions were campaigning for any length of time. In 1810, with a large force deployed in Portugal, there were 39 line battalions in England (excluding the Guards, Kings German Legion, veteran and fencible battalions), totalling 24,764, an average of 635 men per battalion. Many of these men were recovering from Walcheren fever (7677 were sick), leaving only 17,087 men fit for duty.[19] The situation had worsened by 1811. Out of 55,938 men in the UK, there were only five battalions that could be sent to reinforce Wellington; the rest were weak second battalions, having transferred 6353 men to their first battalions. The eight second battalions in Jersey averaged a paltry 401 men per battalion.[20] Moreover, this was after the Irish and British militias had been permitted to serve throughout the UK, allowing a reduction of the regulars in Ireland.[21] Despite the recognized need to reinforce Wellington in 1813, the Duke of York reported that 'Little or nothing remains that could be available for its augmentation'.[22] Although there might be numbers, there were no units.

In 1807 it was suggested that second battalions should be disbanded. They did not fulfil home defence requirements, as they were of neither sufficient strength nor efficient enough to fight, and so were really

an expensive recruiting service because they had a full complement of officers.[23] This call was staved off by the introduction of the 1807 Militia Transfer Act, partly justified in Parliament by the need to augment the 56 second battalions to an effective fighting strength.[24] During the 1810 retrenchment in army spending, it was again suggested that second battalions should be dispensed with if they were not useful within six months.[25] The value of second battalions was acknowledged by the government but, with financial considerations harder to ignore, two-battalion regiments totalling fewer than 1000 men had their second battalion reduced from the standard ten companies to six, each of 33 men under the command of a major, which provided a reduction in officer and NCO salaries.[26]

Fiscal retrenchment did not stop the establishment of new battalions, though. As the war went on, and with a new source of recruits from the annual militia transfers instituted in 1811, the 12th, 14th, 22nd, 37th and 41st all received extra battalions.[27] Forming second battalions turned oversize recruiting companies into useful units. In the case of the 2/41st, whilst it was a recruiting company, it was 'In a state of disorganization from the great number of supernumeraries beyond the establishment'.[28] Lessons had been learnt from the 1790s, and the Commander-in-Chief always expanded new battalions gradually, augmenting them two companies at a time, avoiding the expense and confusion of placing an entirely new battalion on the establishment and appointing all the officers, whilst there were no men for them to command.[29]

The Horse Guards did experiment with a general service recruitment system that sidestepped the regimental system allowing the army to send them to whatever regiment it felt was necessary, but it was used only in a very limited fashion. Enlistment for general service was a means to support the East India Company's army and became a means of sub-standard recruiting due to its less demanding physical standards.[30] Additionally, recaptured deserters were allocated to general service, thus allowing the army to send these men to regiments in unhealthy stations, such as the Royal African Corps. Beyond these specific situations, general service never really achieved any great success, because it ran counter to the emerging ethos and primacy of regimental identity in the army. It often confused potential recruits too. When Kelsey, an extra recruiting officer (ERO) in Berkshire, tried to recruit a man for general service, the prospective recruit wanted to know what sort of regiment it was.[31] In effect, it only fulfilled its original function of recruiting for the East India Company, albeit with the

important advantage of helping to preserve the army's monopoly of recruitment.

The question from the recruit enquiring what sort of regiment the 'general service' was indicates that regimental identity went much further than officers and the Horse Guards, and was something that the wider British population understood. As examined in Chapter 5, the evidence that soldiers chose to join particular units demonstrates that these military communities were important within British society. Some regiments were very popular and caused administrative headaches for the Horse Guards. For example, the 27th recruited an average of 15 men per recruiting party per week in 1809, resulting in the depot company having an unwieldy 543 men. The 27th's colonel, the Earl of Moira, wanted a fourth battalion so that recruiting could continue as 'Many of these men ... would not enlist in any other Regiment, the Enniskillen being a popular Corps'. The 1st was in a comparable condition, but neither regiment was granted additional battalions.[32] Other regiments were granted the boon of an extra battalion. The 84th was rewarded with a second battalion in 1808, so it could continue recruiting otherwise its limited size would arrest 'that spirit of exertion in the Country where the men have been generally raised, which it would be difficult to revive'. Similar was said of the 11th, 56th and 1st Foot Guards although, in the latter's case, the companies were enlarged by 15 men rather than creating another battalion.[33]

Such a focus on regiments resulted in even more emphasis on the power and authority of the officer who commanded them: the colonel. Traditionally, the colonel of the regiment had held considerable sway in the politics of the army, and even by the Peninsular War period they still held vestiges of a proprietorial military system. Regimental colonels owned their regiments and received what were effectively grants from the government for various outgoings, but it was up to the colonel how, and with whom, he disbursed this money.[34] Even small encroachments on the traditional rights of the regimental colonels could arouse fierce opposition and suspicion. In 1808, the Duke of York received a curt letter from his brother the Duke of Kent, Colonel of the 1st Foot, after orders abolishing queues (the practice of powdering and tying back the long pigtail of hair hanging down the back) were sent direct to brigade generals and then to battalions, rather than passing through colonels. Although Adjutant General Harry Calvert replied that the Duke of York looked to general officers to implement most orders, he reaffirmed the army's commitment to the regimental system stating that it was not the Duke of York's intention 'to render regiments independent

of their Colonels, on the contrary it is His Royal Highness's wish, as far as circumstances will permit, to draw that connexion as close as possible'.[35]

Far more serious was the dispute between the Secretary at War, Viscount Palmerston, and the Commander in Chief in 1810. Palmerston proposed that instead of the allocation of an allowance to colonels for clothing, soldiers could receive uniforms from the government, a suggestion driven by the retrenchment policy of that year and the obvious economies of scale likely to result from contracting out clothing for the whole army.[36] Dundas immediately objected to this suggestion, perceiving this as an infringement of a colonel's rights. In the course of the argument, the debate escalated into a broader disagreement on the position of the Secretary at War. The Horse Guards considered him under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, whilst Palmerston and Parliament believed the post to be independent of army control.

The strength and widespread feelings of association and paternalism with the regiment were reinforced when the Duke of York returned to the position of Commander-in-Chief. In fact, the Duke was more entrenched in his opinions on the matter than Dundas and the quarrel was only resolved by the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool. The Secretary at War received a new warrant, which established him as the financial officer responsible to Parliament, and the expenses of the Commander-in-Chief's office were paid by an official budget, rather than from the army's extraordinaries account, thus subjecting the Commander-in-Chief to closer parliamentary control. The supply of clothing by government was left as voluntary.[37]

Up to this point, the importance of regiments can be seen as a military solution to the problems of recruitment. On balance, a constant number of regiments, with expansion undertaken via extra battalions, was more militarily efficient. Despite the effort of coordinating and managing the distribution of men between first and second, and sometimes third or fourth, battalions, the experience of the 1790s testified to the poor results and difficulties that went with 'recruiting' regiments. Perhaps the simplest of all reasons for remaining in a steady state was that a new regiment had a financial cost as it required a complete suite of officers and staff, all of whom had to be paid even before they might actually have any rank and file soldiers to command. Furthermore, a stable regimental list meant that those that existed could better establish themselves in the public consciousness, whilst the second battalions provided useful facilities to maintain units that were active overseas.

Regimental culture

As the Horse Guards' consciousness of the importance of regiments deepened, so over time their idea of regiments went beyond practical considerations on the organization of the army and recruitment to something more abstract. The Horse Guards began to comprehend regiments as communities of tradition that transcended individuals. They became concerned with preserving and promoting a broader conception of a regiment, one that should form the basis by which the army was understood by society. As part of this process of adapting the meaning of regiments, the Horse Guards became institutionally self-aware, seeking to record, preserve and propagate the ideas and culture of regiments for themselves and posterity. They looked back over their records to develop regimental histories and looked forward by digesting this information and publicizing it. The Peninsular War was a particularly auspicious time for doing this, and it provided much of the stock of regimental feats, actions and stories that endure to this day.

To some extent, regimental identity was emerging before the outbreak of war with France in 1793, most notably with the widespread adoption of titles in the 1780s, many of which were territorial and intended to link regiments to specific regions if not counties.[38] These connections, though, were mostly a fantasy, particularly for those regiments that were stationed in the East or West Indies and had no link with home. The 34th, which was styled the Cumberland regiment of foot, went to Canada in 1776 and did not return to the UK for another ten years.[39] Some titles, however, were an indication of a particular connection, or the hope of one. One example was the re-designation of the 35th from Dorset to Sussex in 1804, which reflected the influence of Charles Lennox, later the forth Duke of Richmond, who joined the regiment in 1789, became the regiment's Colonel in 1803 and made good use of the family's position in Sussex (he was MP for Sussex and his uncle, the third Duke, was Lord Lieutenant) to recruit local men into the regiment.[40]

How far these territorial titles represented the actual origins of the men in the regiment is not the most important point. Making these imagined connections through titles demonstrates that, in some minds, there was a notion that a regiment could be more than just a practical, military, administrative unit. The regiment could take on meaning that went beyond the men that composed it and transcended the inevitable consequences of war, such as deaths, discharges of men and simply time. This idea was embryonic in the 1780s and 1790s, testified by

the introduction of regimental numbers that entrenched the use of regiments for administrative convenience.

Regimental identity before the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was also fostered by the memorializing of the regiments' historical events, for example involvement in significant battles, particular feats during wars or noteworthy incidents. These could be acknowledged both officially, through the award of battle honours, which were instituted in 1768, or iconic devices added to flags or uniforms,[41] but also informally and transmitted through regimental traditions. These building blocks of regimental culture are almost too numerous to mention. Examples include the 3rd Foot's nickname the 'Buffs', which was semi-official and often used when referring to the regiment;[42] the 54th's nickname, the 'Flamers', was gained after they burnt a privateer in New London, Connecticut, during the American War of Independence, which was perhaps a little more obscure; and the 8th Foot's battle honours of Blenheim, Ramilles, Oudernarde, Malplaquet and Dettingen, displayed on its regimental colours.[43]

Although some regiments may have had traditions, and despite Sylvia Frey's attempt to portray burgeoning regimental identity in the British Army during the fighting in the American War of Independence,[44] the permanency of this culture is difficult to reconcile with the wholesale disbandment and redrafting of regiments during the war and the cutbacks that came with peace. As Stephen Brumwell has shown, not much regimental identity survived the reduction of the army at the end of the Seven Years War. The same can be argued for the American War of Independence, as the army shrunk from a peak of 90,000 infantry and cavalry to little over 34,000 in 1784, equivalent to two out of every three serving soldier leaving, and 34 regiments were disbanded.[45] With this ebb and flow in the size of the British Army it was difficult to propagate regimental identity beyond the end of a war.

With a war of such length as the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it was inevitable that traditions became more established in some regiments. Wars are by their nature eventful and the duration and extent of the conflict between 1793 and 1815 ensured that there were plenty of actions for the regiments of the British Army to draw upon, particularly those involved in the Peninsular War as the most actively engaged elements of the army. For example, between 1808 and 1815, 38 battle honours were added to the 68 that already existed,[46] and there was ample material for the generation of new traditions, many of which were recorded in regimental nicknames created in the period 1808 to 1815. The 9th Foot, for instance, gained the title The

Fighting Ninth, on account of their involvement in most of the battles in the Peninsular War, and was also known as the The Holy Boys, as the Spanish thought the figure of Britannia on their shako plate was the Virgin Mary. The 29th became The Firms for standing firm at Albuera, and the 58th the more dubious 'Honeysuckers' after they were caught stealing beehives.[47] Expressions of regimental custom and tradition were also built around artefacts from this period, particularly if they were captured from the French. The heirs to the 14th Light Dragoons still use a chamber pot that was captured from King Joseph's baggage at the battle of Vittoria in 1813 in their mess rituals.[48]

Until the early 1810s the creation and maintenance of regimental culture was haphazard, individual and personal. It relied upon the willingness of the commanding officer, and the rest of the officers and men, to enshrine such actions and notable feats into the regimental consciousness, usually by special parades or symbolic, stylized military events, and continue to rehearse them. Regimental tradition required a foundation of appropriate accomplishments, and the memory of them, within the unit. This was a particular problem for the regiments above the 70th Foot, which were continually created and disbanded during the second half of the eighteenth century and so were in effect new regiments with no continuity in personnel. Even with suitable material to create traditions, the people to promote and maintain any identity were not available.

During the latter stages of the Peninsular War, the Horse Guards changed this and instigated a process of creating and maintaining regimental traditions at an institutional level. They began to maintain records of units, and set about formally documenting these in a form of data collection that presaged much of the regimental histories that followed. In a set of volumes now comprising WO380 in the National Archives, the Horse Guards set about noting details of battle honours, engagements and any other particulars it felt were useful in providing a 'sense' of the regiment, including minutiae of the establishment of the regiment, its stations and spaces for any other remarks about the corps.

Alongside doing this at the highest level in the army, thus reducing the reliance on individuals for the maintenance of a regimental 'memory', these volumes also sought to diminish the personal and haphazard development of regimental culture by assigning space in its volumes for every regiment in the British Army. In the minds of the staff at the Horse Guards, who conceived of these volumes and set about filling them out, every regiment in the army was expected to develop a stock of historical

notes, feats, actions and awards that could form the core of its traditions and culture.

These volumes are a startling moment in the history of the British Army as, not only do they represent a fundamental shift in the mindset of the staff at the Horse Guards at the time, but they bequeathed this attitude to the future. It required two things: the idea and the means to do it. As seen above, the primacy of regiments had developed in the thoughts of the Duke of York and Adjutant General Calvert, until they saw in regiments practical applications – recruitment, organization and deployment – and also the psychological benefits of *esprit du corps* and 'connection'. To undertake the institutional creation and promotion of regimental traditions, the records were required. At this moment, the Horse Guards became historically aware of the British Army, looking at their paperwork not just as an account and reference of day-to-day business, but something from which meaningful information could be extracted and utilized for another purpose.

This development changed the agents of regimental traditions and culture from individuals to the institution of the British Army. This was a fundamental shift that became more apparent when the first official regimental histories appeared after the Napoleonic Wars, crucially published under the guidance of the Adjutant General's department. These were written by a former clerk, Richard Cannon, who served in the office from 1802 and was principal clerk from 1805.[49] This effort was much more formal than any previous regimental histories, and before this there had been only two published regimental histories: *A Short History of the Highland Regiment* in 1743;[50] and *An Historical Account of the British Regiments Employed Since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. in the Formation and Defence of the Dutch Republic, Particularly of the Scotch Brigade*.[51] The latter publication is especially interesting in relation to the creation of regimental identity. It sought to establish the connection between the 94th regiment and the Scotch Brigade, which had a long service outside the British Army, and actively to promote this link and the heritage attached to it. Thirteen years after the end of the Napoleonic War a history of the 26th Foot appeared entitled *Some Account of the Twenty-sixth, or Cameronian Regiment: From its Formation to the Present Period*,[52] but, like the two earlier accounts, this publication was fostered by an individual. A publication of 1790 sought to record the events of all Britain's military at war more formally in a strict narrative arrangement and which particularly focused on the Navy.[53] Compared with these, the regimental histories that appeared between 1830 and 1850 were something quite new.

The very public birth of a tradition in British military history – the regimental history – in 1835 of the first volume of Richard Cannon's *Historical Records of the British Army*, followed by 70 more over the next 18 years, marks a watershed in the history of British military culture. It had an ancestry in the Horse Guards' conscious record keeping during the latter stage of the Peninsular War to detail the activities and achievements of regiments and give them meaning beyond their administrative existence. In this context, it is worth recounting in full the order that established this series of regimental histories:

GENERAL ORDERS.

HORSE GUARDS, 1st January, 1836.

His Majesty has been pleased to command, that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.,

The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations, in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy.

The Names of the Officers, and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action.

The Names of those Officers, who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour.

The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates as may have specially signalized themselves in Action.

And,

The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted.

By Command of the Right Honourable

GENERAL LORD HILL[54]

This general order provided the template for many regimental histories to this day.

The timing of this order does require some explanation as, admittedly, it is not immediately apparent how this linked to the efforts of the Horse Guards to maintain regimental records during the Peninsular War. Fortunately for the historian, the project to produce these regimental histories soon ran into financial trouble, which then involved the offices of the Treasury and a substantial correspondence followed during the 1840s and 1850s until the matter was resolved.[55]

A key element in the publication of these works was the support of King William IV, and it was under his orders that material began to be gathered for the publications.[56] In the memorandum put forward in support of the claims for financial support for the publication of the regimental histories, the then Adjutant General, Sir John MacDonald, makes specific reference to the efforts of the Duke of York and Calvert. He stated that the idea for such an 'important National Work' was conceived by the Duke of York, and in 1811 orders were issued for the compilation of a 'Record Book' that should be kept by every regiment. Crucially, the material that the Duke of York wanted kept in this work matched that of Hill's general orders of 1836.

Further orders and inquiries were made on the progress of these records during the 1820s and 1830s, under the attention of both the Duke of York and George IV. It was when this project was handed over to Richard Cannon by William IV that significant progress was made. Up until then, much of the material collected by the regiments was 'frequently incorrect and loose', as MacDonald wryly observed, and it was Cannon who checked this material against the records in the Horse Guards.[57] Hill's general order of 1836, which became the front piece of the *Historical Records* series, was a direct descendant of the orders given in 1811. The delay in this material reaching the public was due, perhaps unsurprisingly, to the inability of the regiments themselves to complete this work.

An important element within the publication of the *Historical Records* was the thorough research of material for the publication, and it reflects a desire to base traditions on actual events and verify them by historical methods of enquiry. In doing this, Richard Cannon was particularly qualified with over 40 years' experience working in the Horse Guards. In fact, it was unlikely that anyone else could have done the work, but

it also suited his temperament and attributes. The same skill with which he produced the exacting returns of the British Army during the Peninsular War was directly relevant to amassing the material for the *Historical Records*. Such was his dedication that it was observed that 'Every accessible public record that could furnish any important fact relative to the original formation, to the subsequent changes in Regiments, or to their service at home or abroad, have been assiduously referred to by Mr Cannon'.[58]

Initially, the *Historical Records* were intended for only a small audience of interested military men and government officials, but later a reasonable public demand for the works developed. A complete set represented a considerable financial commitment, with the volume on the Life Guards costing 12s while most other volumes were 8s apiece.[59] Once the Secretary at War and the Stationary Office became involved, sales became much more important as a way of recouping the public investment. They were not disappointed in this, partly prompted by some astute advertising of the *Historical Records* to universities and other public bodies. By 1845, some 17,750 copies had been printed of which 7971 had been sold, and it is worth remembering at this stage that some volumes had not long been published. Furthermore, there were some noteworthy successes, with the volume of the Life Guards having been reprinted and the account of the 1st Dragoon Guards selling 678 of its 750 copies.[60]

This public demand for the *Historical Records* was coupled with a sudden burst of autobiographies from soldiers and officers recounting their experiences in the Peninsular War and at Waterloo. Almost immediately the war was over memoir literature appeared, with early examples including Thomas Pococke's *Journal of a Soldier of the Seventy-first, or Glasgow Regiment, Highland Light Infantry, from 1806 to 1815* and Stephen Morley's *Memoirs of a Serjeant of the 5th Regt. of Foot Containing an Account of his Service in Hanover, South America, and the Peninsular.*[61] Although the reasons for the sudden wealth of first-hand accounts of the Peninsular War are complex and, to some degree, impenetrable, the *Journal of a Soldier of the Seventy-First* offers some explanation for this phenomenon. The text includes a letter to the author's brother, which describes how he found resettling after the war difficult but wanted to record his service for posterity.[62] In this we can see an individual expression of the Horse Guards' efforts to promote regimental traditions and pride in the army as a whole. It is difficult to disentangle the element of agency within this body of memoir literature; some were clearly published to meet a particular perceived demand or to serve certain ends, whilst others have

a much clearer tone of simply seeking to tell the story of their lives through extraordinary events.

Even within these different forms and motives, the importance of the regiment is clear as is the soldiers' personal relationship to this imagined community. One man walked from Inverness to Edinburgh:

> With no other intention than to enlist in the 71st. His father had been a soldier in it, and was now living at home, after being discharged. Donald called it 'his' regiment, and would not have taken the bounty from any other.[63]

Regimental association, and the implication that this is understood by a wider audience, appears even in the most unlikely memoirs. Charles O'Neil, whose story of desertion and re-enlistment does not immediately suggest that it would contain strong connections to the regiments he passed through, still refers to each regiment individually, both in the British Army and the militia. Despite his fleeting time with some units, regiments, expressed through their number and title, meant something to him and were his frame of reference.

The interconnection between communities, regiments and soldiers engendered new expressions of regimental identity that went beyond local connections and internalized pride to something much more distinctive for each regiment. Some units had a head start in this process, most notably those that built upon and reinforced pre-existing cultures and communities, of which the Highland regiments are the classic example. During the Peninsular War period and the immediate aftermath, new identities were forged, a process that was accelerated after 1815 with the disbanding of second battalions. This largely removed the semi-permanent territorial aspects and features of regiments, and focus therefore shifted to the regiment itself in terms of its history and culture.

This combination of institutional preservation, unit-level culture and public contributions from the personnel of the unit, in the form of memoirs, reached its apogee in the 95th (Rifles) regiment. Firstly, from its inception it had a very different ethos from the standard infantry regiment, focusing on individual prowess and highly trained soldiering, a distinction further reflected in its green uniforms and, of course, its utilization of rifles. This was coupled with its wartime experiences that were well recounted in the press. As a result, it was hugely successful in attracting recruits, especially from the militia regiments. Secondly, a massive body of memoir literature poured out from its soldiers after

the war, totalling eight distinct accounts, such that it often provides the default soldier narrative of the Peninsular War, even though these represent an atypical experience.[64] As if to culminate all of these things, the regiment was 'taken out of the line', signifying the abandonment of the bureaucratic origins of its title as the 95th and it simply became the Rifle Brigade. Of course, not all regiments were as successful in this process as the Rifles, but it did set a model of a regiment and demonstrate the new meaning of the term, a process that owed much to the Peninsular War.

The culture of the British army

The fact that it was General Lord Hill, affectionately dubbed 'Daddy' Hill by soldiers, who inaugurated the regimental histories during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief illustrates the importance of the personnel holding high office in the army and what they did with their authority. This was an additional upshot of the Peninsular War period, as the Horse Guards from 1807 became increasingly aware of issues about the way the army was run and began to investigate and offer solutions to these questions. This changed the army into a more conscious, and even humanitarian, institution.

   Like the development of regimental traditions, the origin of this new attitude towards running the army was fostered by the drive to improve recruitment. Whilst considering ways to expand the army, the Duke of York and Adjutant General Calvert examined the way it conducted its business and its treatment of soldiers. Initially they focused on facilitating recruitment, but then broadened their view to much wider considerations about the service and the ethos that underpinned it. This professionalization, both in terms of the investigative approach and the actions they adopted, was reflected in several areas: desertion, religion and discipline.

   The professionalized administration of the Horse Guards is particularly apparent when examining their actions regarding the problem of desertion. Over the course of the Peninsular War period, and with the backdrop of increasing manpower demands, it is unsurprising that the Horse Guards sought to stem the flow of desertions from the army, as they were unnecessary casualties and potentially disruptive to the discipline of the army and it relationship to society. The Horse Guards' first efforts were largely remedial. It sought to remove recruits as quickly as possible from familiar surroundings and established recruiting depots for new soldiers, so that they adjusted to regular military life as quickly as possible.[65]

The next step was more remarkable. According to the letter of the law, punishment for desertion was severe, and any deserter faced the prospect of a general court martial that could impose the death penalty, amongst a whole range of options from transportation to a penal colony to service abroad. A soldier who deserted twice could be marked forever by a 'D' two inches below his left armpit.[66] Nor were these punishments theoretical. A deserter from the 37th was sentenced to 500 lashes and to be marked with the letter 'D' and, although the Prince Regent commuted the flogging, he was still branded.[67] In 1809, however, the Horse Guards introduced a policy that was much more sympathetic to desertion: if the desertion had 'no circumstances of aggravation', then the commanding officer of the unit could offer the deserter the choice of serving abroad or taking his chances with a trial.[68]

The numbers of deserters and other criminals led to the creation of specific penal corps (the Royal African Corps, Royal West Indian Rangers, the York Light Infantry Volunteers and later the York Chasseurs), composed of selected, often young, men from the prison ships.[69] They provided a useful addition to an overstretched army. After an order to turn over all 'disposable deserters' in the prison ships at the army depot in 1807,[70] 551 men were taken from the hulks to join the Royal West Indian Rangers.[71] Later, in 1808, 138 prisoners were selected from Woolwich and Portsmouth for the Royal York Rangers.[72] In 1809, more deserters were chosen for the newly formed Royal African Corps and, until its establishment of 800 rank and file was complete, all deserters arriving at the army depot were attached to the corps.[73] These units usually served in the most inhospitable garrisons where there was little chance of escape. Before they even got to their new stations, these men were treated with suspicion. They were sent to the army depot and still classed as deserters until they arrived there,[74] and then to the Channel Islands or the Scilly Islands, all bases that were difficult to escape from.[75]

Further recognition of the problem of desertion being related to the service itself was provided by the creation of the York Chasseurs. This unit was specifically established in 1813 from the 'better class of deserters',[76] after a suggestion that young lads 'whose only crime is perhaps that of inadvertently having left the recruiting party' should be removed from hardened criminals stationed in the hulks at the Isle of Wight.[77] By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Horse Guards had developed a reasonably sensible system for dealing with deserters, recognizing that in the majority of cases their desertion was underpinned by rational actions and should therefore be treated in a different way, allowing the soldier a chance at redemption through continued service.

Alongside efforts to punish and rehabilitate deserters, attention was also drawn more generally to the terms of service for soldiers. The Horse Guards advocated a family allowance for soldiers, as discussed in Chapter 6, although the government never introduced it. Where it did have control, the Horse Guards improved the lot of the soldiers. A better career structure for soldiers was introduced, culminating in the positions of sergeant major and colour sergeant, posts that carried prestige and benefits. More widely, positive rewards were offered for good soldiers.[78] Furthermore, the Horse Guards was not afraid to push its humanitarian ideals, even if it meant interfering in regimental matters. The commanding officer of the 2/47th was officially admonished for allowing a punishment of 800 lashes on a boy,[79] for example. The local general at Exeter was requested to make a private representation to an officer who punished a man for marrying without the commanding officer's consent, even though he was within his rights to do so.[80]

The Horse Guards' religious policies also demonstrated their forward-thinking attitude. Recruitment of Catholics had been explicit from 1793, yet there was no provision for their religious needs. Under Calvert, an evangelical, nondenominational religion was promoted in the army.[81] Catholic worship was permitted,[82] and the future of Christian soldiering was being laid. The Horse Guards also made active efforts to suppress sectarianism. When it emerged that there was an Orange Order Lodge in the 1st West Yorkshire Militia, after membership papers were discovered on a travelling razor grinder, the army ordered its activities to cease.[83] Such lodges were declared illegal on the grounds that they administered oaths. Banning these organizations in the army, despite their protestations of loyalty, shows that the army was particularly sensitive to the effect of religious division and fanaticism on a regiment.

The more enlightened attitude towards soldiers is at odds with the typecasting of the attitudes in the British Army at the time. This stereotype of an ultra-cautious, backward and authoritarian regime was a reality, but only after the Peninsular War. This was due to another consequence of the war, namely the towering authority of the Duke of Wellington as the architect of the victory against Napoleon. The campaigns in the Peninsula brought another school to the fore, led by the Duke of Wellington, typified by his often-used quote of soldiers being 'the scum of the earth'. Although the Duke of York and Calvert were able to stave off repressive forces for a while, York's death in 1827 removed this barrier. What was left of the army was soon dominated by the influence of Wellington. His conservative attitude, both politically and

towards the army, was to dominate the history of the army from the 1820s to the 1850s, except during Hill's brief tenure as Commander-in-Chief when the regimental histories were authorized. Any major reform was actively discouraged, and minor reforms, such as the institution of regimental libraries and savings accounts,[84] had to be quietly engineered by regimental officers. Policies like those seen during the Napoleonic Wars were not repeated.

Under Wellington's influence, and the deadening weight of victory, the army began to stagnate after 1827, and it was only during the 1840s and 1850s that the spirit of the 1810s began to resurface in the British Army. Even then, the army had lost too much time, as the national outcry about the inadequacies of Britain's military during the Crimean War revealed. Only after the obstacle of Wellington was removed by his death in 1852 did the progressive army re-establish itself, but it was soon cut short by the Crimean War, and *The Times*' burgeoning campaign for root and branch changes in the administration of the army.

What did survive into the 1820s and 1830s from the Peninsular War was the transformation and fixing of the idea and meaning of regiments to the army and society, an example of an 'invented tradition' that follows the form and process similar to that of the invention of Scottish Highland culture and the British monarchy.[85] The British Army had always been a collection of regiments but, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, this feature of the army was reinforced and institutionalized. Hitherto, the use of regiments had largely been a military term for the collection of soldiers organized into a discreet military unit both for administrative and military purposes, a term for the largest permanent military body in the UK.[86] Regiments went from being this rather dry administrative expression to having significant cultural meaning, imbued with traditions, memories and reflecting an imagined and real community that, although taking prompts from the high command of the army, had its own values.

8
Conclusion: Britain and Wellington's Army

The vignette of the reduction of the 2/73rd in 1817 recounted in Chapter 1 exemplifies how the history of the British Army of this period has been dominated by Wellington, the Peninsular War and Waterloo. This has come at the expense of an exploration of the fundamental elements of Britain's war machine and how they were adapted and supplemented to meet the demands of the Napoleonic Wars. In the particular case of the 73rd, although the 2/73rd's involvement in Waterloo (which earned the regiment the Waterloo battle honour) merited a separate paragraph in the 73rd's volume of the *Historical Records*, the disbanding of the second battalion receives merely a passing mention. It is only an aside in relation to the fact that the first battalion, then in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), was reinforced by its former members.[1]

The reality is that the manpower demands of the fight against Napoleonic France between 1807 and 1815 were a significant challenge for the British Army and the government. The basic matter of how to fill the ranks of the army had yet to be solved at the start of the Peninsular War. The Horse Guards' improvements to the army up to 1809 did not provide Wellington with a completed ready-made military machine, as Richard Glover argued in *Peninsular Preparation*. In fact, it was the commitment to support Wellington that drove the Horse Guards and the government to continue to refine Britain's military system and bring in important reforms.

Maintaining Britain's war effort presented governments with some tough choices; however, rather than military efficiency it was the immediate practicalities, both military and political, that determined government policy. Consequently, the government chose to use what it had: the militia. The militia transfers have the appearance of a short-term

remedy, but the UK's governments did not have the luxury of being able to plan ahead. The sustained fighting in Iberia meant that any restructuring or new initiatives that had the potential to disrupt ordinary recruiting for a significant period of time were too risky to adopt once they had resolved to sustain the war in Spain and Portugal.

Once the campaign in the Peninsula became a permanent fixture in British strategy, no major reforms in army recruitment were likely, as they would jeopardize the war effort in Iberia in the short term. The poor recruiting results in 1810 were sufficient to scare the government and army into returning to militia transfers, whilst the demands for compulsion to fill the ranks of the army in 1811 were based on the assumption that an invasion was imminent and so Britain would withdraw the majority of its forces from Iberia. After this report, the Duke of York produced a paper showing monthly recruiting from 1803, indicating when ballots were in operation, the clear message being that both could not coexist.[2] It was, therefore, necessary only to cover the gap between casualties and recruiting, and to do this with the least possible disruption. Strategically and politically, therefore, the militia transfers were an ideal solution.

Financial considerations also featured in the government's deliberations on military policy. Although the 1801 census, and subsequent investigations and calculations, demonstrated that the UK's population and economy was buoyant and expanding, and therefore capable of sustaining high levels of taxation, there were still limits on the Britain's military capacity.[3] The consequences of defeat were so dire that expansion of the military forces had to be circumspect, lest it unbalanced the economy too much and undermine Britain's ability to wage war. Liverpool and Wellington both understood that logistics played a crucial role in determining the size of the force in Iberia. Both were aware that even slight increases in the number of troops deployed overseas on active campaigns caused a disproportionate rise in the money and resources required.[4] In essence, it was possible for Britain to lose the war by overexertion, and the situation was not severe enough to justify radical acts.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that support for fundamental reforms in recruitment existed, particularly for the introduction of some compulsory means to maintain the regular troops. The army, and especially the Adjutant General's department, consistently pressed for some form of obligatory national military service. Although never stated in the various memoranda and letters sent on the issue, the implementation of these proposals would have entailed a massive increase in

state bureaucracy and a considerable enhancement to the state's power. Of course, compulsion was a soldier's answer to a military problem, but constitutional ideology, exemplified by Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, pervaded every gentleman in this period, regardless of his occupation. Even to suggest conscription was a decisive turning point in the development of the British Army. Some officers had accepted the 'French principle' and so unwittingly admitted that the British constitution would have to be changed to meet the demands of modern war. This echoes the development of new politics outside the framework of the Whig 1688 settlement and, in common with the radicals of the post-Waterloo period,[5] the army was suggesting rational and modern solutions to its problems.

It is interesting to speculate what might have been achieved had the UK introduced some form of compulsory military service for the army in the latter stages of the Napoleonic Wars. The militia lists of 1804 provide a reasonable breakdown of Britain's potential manpower in this period, and show that there were 562,601 men aged 18–30 without children. Taking the calculation further to model a French-style conscription system in Britain requires some assumptions, but if the unmarried, 18–30 year-old men were equally distributed by age then there would be 46,000 men aged 20. It would be improbable that all of these men would be eligible for military service, as many would not meet the required height and a large proportion of the population were in shockingly poor health. Equally, Britain's economy could not afford for all of its young men to be taken into the full-time armed forces. If a third of these men could not serve because they did not meet the physical standards,[6] we are left with 30,000 men that could have been added to the army by some form of conscription. This total would probably have been higher as it is likely that unmarried men would be younger, plus the figures do not include Ireland. As a further comparison, the Kingdom of Italy was expected to draft 15,000 men from its population of just under 6.5 million,[7] which would be the equivalent to the UK conscripting 41,000 men.

All of which suggests that the UK may have been able to call up around 35,000–40,000 men per year into the army, a total that is not such a significant variation from the 30,000 men that actually joined the British Army between 1807 and 1813 through ordinary recruitment and the militia transfers. In view of the success of Britain's recruitment policy and the disruption to society and the armed forces a compulsory recruitment system would entail, a severe military crisis and an exceptionally strong political mandate would have been required to permit the introduction of some form of conscription for the regulars.

   The politics of army recruitment show that this level of consent was not likely, and the government sought to depoliticize the issue during the Peninsular War because it understood the potential for it to cause problems in Parliament. The government knew that once militia transfers were passed they would not remain contentious. Furthermore, the debates that took place on military policy have been largely absent from history because the actions to assuage concerns about maintaining the army and normalize this business were so effective, a process that was furthered by the dismantling of the British military machine after 1815. The deliberations and acts of the governments that managed to sustain a war on the continent for seven years were, in some cases, literally left on the shelf of the Horse Guards' 'depot of military knowledge' and, when the debate was reopened in the mid-nineteenth century, warfare had entered the industrial age. The political story of military policy illustrates how the government steered a course between the obvious needs of the army and their equally obvious needs for political survival, and explains why utilizing the militia eventually triumphed over other options. In doing so, the government effectively depoliticized recruitment policy, whilst the opposition's attempts to turn militia transfers into a constitutional issue failed.

   Nevertheless, the UK's response to the demands of the Napoleonic Wars resulted in significant changes. In eking out every existing military resource for the war, the Horse Guards and the government set important precedents for the future. Although there was no fundamental reorganization of the relationships between the army, the militia and local part-time forces, they had been brought much closer together. At the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, the government quickly resorted to the expedients used in the Napoleonic Wars. By the end of the Crimean conflict, 33,000 militiamen had volunteered for the line and ten militia battalions had been sent to the Mediterranean. Just as significant was the fact that the government allowed the militia to be raised by voluntary enlistment, holding the ballot in reserve for counties that did not raise their quotas, just as it had done during the Peninsular War.[8]

   The apparently *ad hoc* nature of Britain's Napoleonic military system, composed of a whole series of different laws between 1807 and 1815, veils the progress that was made, and which presaged the later Cardwell reforms that created truly linked territorial units. Without the militia transfers of 1807, 1809 and 1811, the Militia Interchange Act of 1811 and the New Military System of 1813, Britain's post-Crimean governments would have had a much tougher parliamentary battle over recasting the army. After all, in the preamble to the 1811 Militia Transfer

Act, it was stated that militia volunteering was to be a permanent means of supplying the army. In this respect, the period 1807–1814 was a turning point for the history of the British Army. Future European wars were going to be larger and more demanding, and so the ideas espoused by the Horse Guards after 1809 would prove harder to ignore.

Britain's recruitment policy not only had long-term political and constitutional significance, but it was also crucial in the short term. The British government and the Horse Guards deserve a much higher prominence in the history of the Peninsular War, as they ensured that the British Army under Wellington in the Peninsular was not only maintained but also increased in strength between 1808 and 1814. The importance of recruitment policy and military organization was more than just simply numbers, though. The significance of the militia transfers and the Horse Guards regimental system helped Wellington in two ways.

Firstly, the army remained in good physical condition, all the more surprising given the manpower pressures the army faced. As shown in Chapter 5, although around one man in five in the infantry was under the height requirements, 80 per cent of Britain's soldiers met the army's standards. These criteria were not perfunctory or cosmetic either. They were a benchmark that ensured men were of sufficient physical ability to perform as a soldier. At a most basic level, the soldier had to be able to undertake complex manoeuvres, which required him to be a certain size, even before considering the physical attributes necessary to carry his kit and to endure long marches and the fatigues of campaigning.

Secondly, Wellington's army also benefited from having soldiers of appropriate age and, more importantly, service. The Horse Guards managed the British Army so that it avoided sending out young and inexperienced, or old and worn out, soldiers. As a result, the men with Wellington were Britain's most effective soldiers. Alongside usually having at least two years' experience in a second battalion before being dispatched overseas, many of Wellington's soldiers would have also served in the militia, in some cases for another few years. The spectacular endurance and successes of the British Army in the Peninsular War were in a large measure a result of the physical quality and martial skill of the rank and file, which was nothing to do with brilliant generalship and attention to detail, important though this was. The quality of Wellington's soldiers was due to the efforts of the government and the Horse Guards.

The exertions of the Horse Guards, and particularly the Adjutant General's department, demonstrate the importance of this organization

to the war effort. The often chastised Horse Guards was an effective part of the machinery of the British government. It supplied information, analysis and ideas to ministers. Although the British Army has been maligned for not developing a general staff during the period, in contrast to other countries (notably Prussia), clearly, Britain had a collective military intelligence located in the Horse Guards. Its focus, however, was on areas that later became the preserve of civilian war ministries: recruitment and military policy on organization. With the limited staff in the Horse Guards, it is understandable that they had little time to concentrate on operations. The British Army of the Peninsular War and Waterloo periods was not Wellington's army, but one that was managed by an effective administration in the Horse Guards that was closely aligned with the government. Wellington's successes as a general would have been improbable without the efforts of staff and ministers in the UK. The relationship, however, changed substantially after Waterloo. Following 1815, the British Army and Wellington's army began to merge, and the latter came to dominate.

The British Army's need to find men to meet the manpower shortfall meant that the military's interaction with British society became more intense. The need to obtain soldiers saw the recruiting service expand significantly and it was refined until it was nationalized in the later stages of the Peninsular War. This extended the presence of the military across Britain, but without a replication of the disturbances seen in the early 1790s and with none of the clashes seen in Napoleonic France, which Alan Forrest exposed in *Conscripts and Deserters*.

Moreover, an intricate relationship developed between the British state and its localities. This was quite deliberate. The militia transfers were an ideal solution for a number of reasons, but it was particularly attractive because the government could listen to an existing body of opinion and make deals with this group to obtain men. This was a subtle way of improving Britain's military effectiveness, but meant that the government had to accommodate perspectives that did not always align with its own. Although it is clear that in other areas of the military the government was prepared to increase state power, to solve the army's manpower shortage the government resorted to tried and tested methods of functioning, which involved using the counties to implement policy, and allowing them particular latitude in doing so. The importance of Parliament should also be stressed in allowing the government to proceed as it did, since it permitted militia stalwarts to express their views but, in the end, amplified the consensus that developed over using the militia to supply the army. As a result the UK avoided some of the

pitfalls of *ancient regime* states, and there was no provincial revolt caused by recruitment. The only opposition to the government's military policy came from the militiamen, who ignored the bounty being offered to them and remained in their regiments.

The regional and local response to the army's quest for men can also be seen in the mixed results of recruitment policy across the UK. The urban centres of London, Birmingham and Manchester were all successful areas for recruiting parties. The army committed substantial resources to enlist men from the Highlands of Scotland but with diminishing returns, and the region was exhausted. Juxtaposed against these districts were communities that were unresponsive. Although Lancashire and Cheshire may have provided substantial numbers of men for the army, the neighbouring counties of north Wales, the Welsh borders, Westmorland and Cumberland were quite different. The number of soldiers obtained from these areas, and the number of recruiting parties seen there, were drastically different.

Like much of the impact of the changes made to the British Army, the patchy response of Britain's recruitment on society was largely forgotten once Britain's fiscal–military juggernaut was dismantled after 1815. The regional response, both to ordinary recruiting and militia transfers, goes some way to explaining the different military traditions that emerged between England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The Scottish military tradition became intimately bound with an invented Highland tradition,[9] such that the British Army was willing to devote considerable resources to recruiting in the Inverness district, but with very poor results. The army was determined to preserve the Highland regiments at a very high cost. Conversely, Wales did not develop any kind of separate military identity, as the poor results from the few recruiting parties there provided no base for this to develop. In between these two extremes sit England and Ireland. For both, their manpower contribution was substantial but diffused across regions and a number of different regiments. Consequently, some regiments were able to create territorial relationships, such as the 14th and 27th, or strong military identities, such as the 95th, but others were equally amorphous and so a distinct Irish or English military tradition did not develop beyond the regiment.

This pattern was entirely in keeping with the ideology of the army. The idea of regiments as communities was at the heart of the Duke of York's tenure as Commander-in-Chief and laid a foundation for the British Army that it still with us today. The invention of tradition within the British Army was a crucial component in this attitude, and the Horse Guards historicized this process, endorsed it and then maintained it

within the administration of the British Army. There was a period of gestation before regimental culture came to fruition in public. In this period, the herculean efforts of Richard Cannon ought to be more fully recognized than currently. The traditions and history of the British Army owe him a great debt, far more than the £800 pension a year he finally received in 1854 after over 50 years of service.[10]

Regimental culture divorced the British Army from the alliance with nation building that was typical across continental Europe, and which resulted in European armed forces having a much more unstable relationship with their governments and societies. Notwithstanding the fact that the publication of the regimental histories was referred to as a great 'national work', the traditions and culture that these volumes represented were not nationalistic but rooted in regiments as communities. Although the British Army was the military force of the UK, it was not nationalistic.

A further feature of the legacy of the Duke of York and Calvert in promoting the idea of regiments was that this endeavour should be based on historical records. The power of this idea has been such that the core of military identity in the British Army continues to be regiments. Even though regiments may have been reinvented throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as David French explored in *Military Identities*, the concept retained its value to the army. Often, the first task of new or amalgamated units is to produce a history of that unit and its immediate predecessors, thus preserving a connection with the past and to the initiative and achievements of York and Calvert.[11] Their vision has survived for 200 years and the two total wars of the twentieth century. Judged on these grounds it ought to rank as one of the hallmarks of British culture, not always popular but ever present, and is the lasting impact of the recruitment of the British Army during the Peninsular War.

Appendices

Table A.1 Inspection returns sampled from UKNA, WO27

Corps	1807 (WO27/ 91)	1808 (WO27/ 92)	1809 (WO27/94, 96–97)	1810 (WO27/ 98–101)	1811 (WO27/ 102–105)	1812 (WO27/ 106–113)	1813 (WO27/ 116–123)	1814 (WO27/ 126–128)	1815 (WO27/ 134)
Royal Horse Guards	1/3/07		18/5/09						
Depot, Royal Horse Guards							22/10/13		
1st Dragoon Guards	1/3/07		31/7/09						
2nd Dragoon Guards			12/5/09				26/5/13		2/6/15
3rd Dragoon Guards	16/4/07	12/5/08							18/7/15
4th Dragoon Guards				15/11/10					
5th Dragoon Guards				13/6/10					
6th Dragoon Guards						16/7/12			
7th Dragoon Guards					16/10/11				

Table A.1 (Continued)

Corps	1807 (WO27/91)	1808 (WO27/92)	1809 (WO27/94, 96–97)	1810 (WO27/98–101)	1811 (WO27/102–105)	1812 (WO27/106–113)	1813 (WO27/116–123)	1814 (WO27/126–128)	1815 (WO27/134)
3rd Dragoons	1/4/07	6/5/08	5/5/09		7/5/11				
4th Dragoons	1/4/07	7/5/08							
6th Dragoons								15/6/14	
7th Light Dragoons	1/4/07	16/5/08					27/4/13		
8th Light Dragoons									9/5/15
10th Light Dragoons			26/5/09		4/7/11	15/5/12			
11th Light Dragoons								10/5/14	
13th Light Dragoons	28/4/07	11/7/08	30/5/09						
15th Light Dragoons				21/5/10					
18th Light Dragoons				12/5/10					
19th Light Dragoons		1/4/08							18/6/15
20th Light Dragoons		4/5/08							

21st Light Dragoons	1/3/07	6/5/08		8/5/10		21/5/12		23/5/14	
22nd Light Dragoons							25/3/13		
23rd Light Dragoons					14/5/11	11/5/12			
24th Light Dragoons			15/12/09		4/11/11		16/10/13		
1/1st Foot Guards					19/5/11				
2/1st Foot Guards				1/6/10					21/8/15
1/2nd Foot Guards								6/5/14	
1/3rd Foot Guards							15/8/13		
2/3rd Foot Guards			1/5/09			27/4/12			
1/1st Foot		14/5/08							
2/1st Foot									
3/1st Foot			1/5/09						
4/1st Foot	19/5/07		17/5/09	14/6/10		15/6/12			
2nd Foot		1/5/08				11/5/12			22/4/15
1/3rd Foot						13/5/12			
2/3rd Foot		19/4/08	1/5/09					21/5/14	
1/4th Foot				17/5/10					
2/4th Foot	11/3/07	1/5/08	27/5/09		14/5/11		5/7/13		
1/5th Foot							1/5/13		
1/6th Foot	1/4/07		14/5/09						24/4/15

Table A.1 (Continued)

Corps	1807 (WO27/ 91)	1808 (WO27/ 92)	1809 (WO27/94, 96–97)	1810 (WO27/ 98–101)	1811 (WO27/ 102–105)	1812 (WO27/ 106–113)	1813 (WO27/ 116–123)	1814 (WO27/ 126–128)	1815 (WO27/ 134)
2/6th Foot	1/4/07	23/5/08	1/5/09					2/5/14	
1/7th Foot			30/6/9	7/6/10			12/4/13		
1/8th Foot		27/6/08		4/7/10					
2/8th Foot				1/5/10	16/6/11				
2/9th Foot						11/5/12			
1/10th Foot	28/3/07								
2/10th Foot				10/7/10					
1/11th Foot	14/4/07								
2/11th Foot								11/5/14	
12th Foot					14/10/11				
13th Foot	18/4/07					25/5/12			25/5/15
1/14th Foot			7/4/09						
1/15th Foot		1/5/08		5/5/10					
16th Foot		24/5/08							
17th Foot					30/11/11				
1/18th Foot	28/5/07								
2/18th Foot					6/5/11				
20th Foot			25/5/09	19/5/10			12/4/13		
1/21st Foot									10/3/15
2/21st Foot						2/7/12			
22nd Foot			6/5/09						
1/23rd Foot		11/8/08				25/5/12	12/4/13		
1/24th Foot	29/4/07								

Unit									
2/24th Foot	1/4/07						8/10/13		
1/25th Foot		16/5/08		12/5/10			19/5/13		
2/25th Foot	10/5/07		1/5/09					27/4/14	
1/26th Foot				19/5/10	3/5/11	18/8/12		28/4/14	
3/27th Foot									18/5/15
1/28th Foot				21/6/10	21/5/11				
29th Foot					15/12/11				
1/30th Foot									30/6/15
2/31st Foot	5/4/07								
1/32nd Foot			11/5/09			11/5/12			
2/32nd Foot		5/5/08							
33rd Foot		15/6/08							
2/34th Foot		3/5/08	1/5/09			12/5/12			
2/35th Foot		23/5/08							
1/36th Foot			24/5/09			11/5/12			
2/36th Foot		8/6/08			26/4/11		7/5/13	3/5/14	
1/37th Foot		18/5/08							
2/38th Foot								23/5/14	
1/39th Foot	5/6/07						6/5/13		
2/39th Foot		21/4/08							
41st Foot									22/5/15
1/42nd Foot	16/3/07		1/5/09						
2/42nd Foot	27/5/07								
1/43rd Foot	25/4/07	10/5/08							
2/43rd Foot	23/4/07	5/5/08	25/5/09		30/5/11				
1/44th Foot	2/3/07								
2/44th Foot		5/5/08							
2/45th Foot		5/6/08			1/5/11				

Table A.1   (Continued)

Corps	1807 (WO27/91)	1808 (WO27/92)	1809 (WO27/94, 96–97)	1810 (WO27/98–101)	1811 (WO27/102–105)	1812 (WO27/106–113)	1813 (WO27/116–123)	1814 (WO27/126–128)	1815 (WO27/134)
2/47th Foot	11/6/07	11/6/08	9/5/09		26/5/11				
1/48th Foot	17/3/07		8/5/09						
49th Foot	17/3/07								
1/50th Foot						7/5/12			
2/50th Foot	20/3/07	23/5/08			14/5/11			19/5/14	
51st Foot		23/4/08				22/5/12			
2/52nd Foot				18/5/10				26/4/14	
1/53rd Foot		29/2/08							
2/53rd Foot									18/4/15
54th Foot	17/5/07							25/4/14	
55th Foot	9/3/07								
2/56th Foot				28/5/10			31/5/13		
3/56th Foot								17/5/14	
1/57th Foot						14/5/12			
2/57th Foot		8/5/08							
2/60th Foot				12/5/10		22/5/12		2/5/14	
5/60th Foot	5/5/07								
1/61st Foot			10/5/09			19/5/12			
2/61st Foot		6/5/08							
1/62nd Foot									12/6/15
2/62nd Foot		21/4/08							
1/63rd Foot					22/10/11				

Regiment									
64th Foot							22/9/13		
65th Foot				14/3/10					
2/66th Foot							10/5/13		
1/67th Foot								9/5/14	
68th Foot					31/5/11				
1/69th Foot									4/8/15
70th Foot					23/11/11				
1/71st Foot							22/4/13		
1/72nd Foot	1/3/07	13/5/08	19/5/09		16/7/11	10/5/12		2/5/14	
2/72nd Foot									
1/73rd Foot					28/9/11				1/6/15
74th Foot		12/7/08							
76th Foot		1/5/08							
1/78th Foot			10/5/09						
1/79th Foot				12/6/10					
80th Foot				17/5/10					
1/81st Foot									17/5/15
2/81st Foot					15/5/11			27/4/14	
1/82nd Foot					23/5/11	15/5/12			
1/83rd Foot	1/3/07				14/5/11			26/5/14	
1/84th Foot									28/6/15
85th Foot	7/4/07		9/5/09				31/5/13		
86th Foot			11/5/09		24/10/11				
2/87th Foot	11/4/07								
2/88th Foot				14/6/10		9/5/12			
2/89th Foot									16/5/15
1/90th Foot		6/5/08							
2/90th Foot	1/4/07								

Table A.1 (Continued)

Corps	1807 (WO27/ 91)	1808 (WO27/ 92)	1809 (WO27/94, 96–97)	1810 (WO27/ 98–101)	1811 (WO27/ 102–105)	1812 (WO27/ 106–113)	1813 (WO27/ 116–123)	1814 (WO27/ 126–128)	1815 (WO27/ 134)
1/91st Foot			19/5/09		24/4/11	2/5/12	26/11/13		
2/91st Foot									11/5/15
1/92nd Foot							23/4/13		
1/95th Foot								14/6/14 (depot)	
2/95th Foot		5/5/08				1/5/12		1/6/15 (depot)	
1/96th Foot					12/5/11				
97th Foot		1/5/08							
98th Foot	6/4/07								
101st Foot					22/1/11				
Royal West Indian Rangers									13/5/15

Table B.1   Recruiting standards

	Minimum height	Maximum height (if stated)	Maximum Age
Heavy Cavalry	5′7″		25
Light Cavalry	5′7″	5′10″	25
Infantry	5′5″		30
Infantry (from 1812)	5′4″		35
General Service	5′4″		30
General Service (from 1812)	5′3″		40

Note: The minimum height restriction for 'Lads' aged 16–18 was one inch below the figures given above.

Sources: 'Papers presented to the House of commons, by Mr. Secretary at War, relating to the recruiting service', *House of Commons Papers; Accounts and Papers*, 1806–1807 IV.167; TNA, WO25/3224, Standard of Recruits enlisted for the Regular Army, 19 October 1809; WO3/585, Circular on Recruiting, Adjutant General, 14 February 1812.

Notes

1 Introduction

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13. UKNA, WO25/3225, Return of the British Army, 13 February 1815; for details of the siege of Cadiz, 1810–1812, see Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, pp. 281–283.

14. Black, *Britain as a Military Power*, pp. 47–56.

15. The most complete survey is J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan, 1899–1930), 20 vols. More modern accounts include: M. S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748* (London: Longman, 1995); Matt Schumann and Karl W. Schweizer, *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History* (London: Routledge, 2007); Stephen Conway, *The War of American Independence 1775–1783* (London: Edward Arnold, 1995); T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802* (London; New York: Arnold, 1996); Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807–1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); D. R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). For the naval conflict, see N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*. Vol. 2, *A Naval History of Britain* (London: HarperCollins, 1997).

16. J. L. Pimlott, 'The Administration of the British Army, 1783–1793', PhD (University of Leicester, 1975), pp. 6–8.

17. Stephen Conway, 'The Mobilization of Manpower for Britain's Mid-Eighteenth-Century Wars', *Historical Research* 77 (2004): 377–404; Stephen Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 17–18; *Commons Journal*, 1813–1814, 155.

18. For a graphical representation of this, see figure 10 in Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People*, p. 629.

19. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 15–17.

20. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, vol. IV, pp. 65–66.

21. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1813–1814, XXVIII, 666.

22. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1814–1815, XXIX, 919.

23. Alan J. Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army 1714–63* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

24. Frey, *The British Soldier in America*.

25. M. S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789* (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), p. 160.

26. Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe*, p. 36; Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, c. 2003), pp. 52–63.

27. Michael Duffy, *Soldiers, Sugar, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

28. Schwoerer, *No Standing Armies*.

29. John Stevenson, 'The London "Crimp" Riots of 1794', *International Review of Social History* 16 (1971): 40–58.

30. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 63–66.
31. Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 117–118.
32. For the Seven Years War see Brumwell, *Redcoats*, p. 64.
33. Two battalions were raised in 1757 for service in America, Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 19–20, 273–278; Robert Clyde, *From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander, 1745–1830* (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, 1995).
34. Colley, *Britons*, pp. 117–132.
35. Paul E. Kopperman, 'Religion and Religious Policy in the British Army, c. 1700–1796', *Journal of Religious History* 14 (1987): 390–405.
36. See Houlding, *Fit for Service*, Appendix B, p. 413 for transfers from Britain to Ireland in 1775 and 1776.
37. Colin Haydon, *Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth-Century England, a Political and Social Study, c. 1714–80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
38. Conway, 'The Mobilization of Manpower', 388.
39. Schwoerer, *No Standing Armies*, p. 195.
40. Western, *The English Militia*; Tom Corfe, *Riot: The Hexham Militia riot, 1761* (Hexham: Hexham Community Partnership, 2004); David W Howell, 'Riots and Public Disorder in Eighteenth-Century Wales', in *Crime, Protest and Police in Modern British Society: Essays in Memory of David J.V. Jones*, eds David W. Howell and Kenneth Owen Morgan (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), pp. 42–72; D. Neave, 'Anti-Militia Riots in Lincolnshire, 1757 and 1796', *Lincolnshire History and Archaeology* 11 (1976): 21–27; Thomas Bartlett, 'An End to Moral Economy: The Irish Militia Disturbances of 1793', *Past and Present* 99 (1983): 41–64.
41. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 310–314.
42. R. B. McDowell, *Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution, 1760–1801* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 254–262; Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*, pp. 205–218.
43. The classic study of this remains John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
44. J. F. Wright, 'British Government Borrowing in Wartime, 1750–1815', *The Economic History Review* 52 (1999): 355–361; Patrick K. O'Brien, 'The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660–1815', *The Economic History Review* 41 (1988): 1–32.
45. Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder*.
46. Richard Bonney, 'Towards the Comparative Fiscal History of Britain and France during the "long" Eighteenth Century', in *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation: Britain and its European Rivals, 1688–1815*, ed. Leandro Prados de la Escosura (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 191–215.
47. Emsley, *British Society and the French Wars,* pp. 57–58.
48. Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, pp. 34–37; more generally see Clive Wilkinson, *The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century* (Rochester: The Boydell Press, 2004); Roger Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture, 1760–1850: Public Trust and Government Ideology* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
49. Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Fontana, 1991).
50. D. A. Baugh, 'Great Britain's "Blue-Water" Policy 1689–1815', *International History Review* 10 (1988): 33–58.

51. French, *The British Way in Warfare* is one of the latest in this tradition, with Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber, 1967) the most famous.

52. Richard Middleton, *The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years' War, 1757–1762* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marie Peters, 'Pitt, William, First Earl of Chatham [Pitt the elder] (1708–1778)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, September 2004; online edition, May 2008, <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk:80/view/article/22337> (21 July 2008).

53. Stephen Conway, 'British Governments and the Conduct of the American War', in *Britain and the American Revolution*, ed. Harry Thomas Dickinson (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), pp. 155–179.

54. Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*.

55. D. Syrett, 'The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations During the Seven Years and American Wars', *Mariner's Mirror* 48 (1972): 269–280; Richard Harding, 'Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional and Technical Problems Concerning the Conduct of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century', *The Historical Journal* 32 (1989): 35–55; Maurice Hutt, 'The British Government's Responsibility for the "Divided Command" of the Expedition to Quiberon, 1795', *The English Historical Review* 76 (1961): 479–489; Piers Mackesy, *British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's Conquest* (London: Routledge, 1995).

56. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, pp. 426–434.

57. UKNA, WO25/3225, return 8 February 1815.

58. David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007).

59. Fortescue, *History of the British* Army, vol. IV, pp. 296; Burne, *The Noble Duke of York*.

60. The only full account of these campaigns remains Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, vol. IV.

61. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 228–236; Matthew Spring, *With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).

62. Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm*; for France see Paddy Griffith, *The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789–1802* (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), pp. 207–214.

63. Piers Mackesy, *Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798–99* (London: Longman, 1974), p. 5.

64. P. J. Jupp, 'Grenville, William Wyndham, Baron Grenville (1759–1834)', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online edn, ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk:80/view/article/11501> (18 July 2008); Michael Roberts, *The Whig party, 1807–1812* (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 175.

65. Emsley, *British Society and the French Wars*.

66. Robert R. Dozier, *For King, Constitution, and Country: The English Loyalists and the French Revolution* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, c. 1983).

67. For more on the development of Britain's part-time and local forces see: Cookson, *The British Armed Nation*; Austin Gee, *The British Volunteer*

Movement 1794–1814 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Linch, 'A Geography of Loyalism', 1–21; Western, 'The Volunteer Movement', 603–614.

68. Marianne Elliott, *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Thompson, *The Making*; Wells, *Insurrection*.

69. C. D. Hall, *British Strategy in the Napoleonic War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 102–149.

70. Milton Finley, *The Most Monstrous of Wars: The Napoleonic Guerrilla War in Southern Italy, 1806–1811* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, c. 1994); James R. Arnold, 'A Reappraisal of Column versus Line in the Peninsular War', *The Journal of Military History* 68 (2004): 535–552; Mackesy, *The war in the Mediterranean*, pp. 121–148.

71. Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, p. 44.

72. For a more detailed discussion of British involvement in Portugal, see Martin Robson, 'British intervention in Portugal, 1793–1808', *Historical Research* 76 (2003): 93–107.

73. For a detailed account, see Bond, *The Grand Expedition*.

74. Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon*, pp. 114–115.

75. John Randle Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain, 1793–1799', PhD (University of Edinburgh, 1953), pp. 8–10.

76. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*; Gee, *British Volunteer Movement*, pp. 50–53.

77. J. W. Fortescue, *County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803–14* (London: Macmillan, 1909), pp. 27–30, 129–131, 159–165.

3   Ballots and Bounties: The Politics of Recruitment

1. David Wilkinson, 'Windham, William (1750–1810)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online edn, ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk:80/view/article/29725> (20 December 2007).

2. *The Times*, 6 August 1807.

3. See J. E. Cookson, 'Service without Politics? Army, Militia and Volunteers in Britain during the American and French Revolutionary Wars', *War in History* 10 (2003): 381–397.

4. C. A. Bayly, 'Wellesley, Richard, Marquess Wellesley (1760–1842)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, September 2004; online edn, May 2009), <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/29008> (26 August 2009); British Library, London (BL), Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38247, ff. 267–276, Minutes by Wellesley on a conversation with Liverpool, 17 May 1812.

5. *The Times*, 22 January 1807.

6. *The Times*, 23 January 1807.

7. Henry Addington Viscount Sidmouth, *Substance of the Speech of Lord Viscount Sidmouth, on the 10th of August 1807, upon the Motion for the Second Reading of the Militia Transfer Bill* (London: S. Gosnell, 1807).

8. Schwoerer, *No Standing Armies*.

9. Cookson, *Friends of Peace*, pp. 177–179.
10. B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 587.
11. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1806–1807, VIII, 453. In some respects this was a party tactic, as he agreed with the Pittites that the Talents had abandoned Windham's short service scheme and he believed full details of army expenditure would prove this. See entry in R. G. Thorne, *The House of Commons, 1790–1820*, 5 vols. (London: Published for the History of Parliament Trust by Secker and Warburg, 1986), vol. 4.
12. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810, XV, 608, 657–672; Mitchell and Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, p. 587.
13. W. H. Greenleaf, 'The Commission of Military Enquiry', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 41 (1963): 171–181.
14. For a detailed examination of the trial, see Burne, *The Noble Duke of York*.
15. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1812, XXI, 908–910, 1242–1249; 1812, XXII, 24–29; 1812–1813, XXIV, 258.
16. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1812–1813, XXIV, 258.
17. 'Return of the number of foreign officers and soldiers serving in British regiments at home; distinguishing the officers from the soldiers, and specifying the regiments in which they are serving', *House Of Commons Papers; Accounts And Papers*, 1812–1813, XIII.19 and 'Return of the number of foreign officers and soldiers serving in the British regiments, at home and abroad; distinguishing each corps, as well as the officers from the soldiers, to the latest period the same can be made up', 1814–1815, IX.317.
18. Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 44–47; K. J. Bartlett, , 'The Development of the British Army during the Wars with France, 1793–1815', PhD (University of Durham, 1997), pp. 35–38.
19. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', p. 111.
20. Pimlott, 'The Administration of the British Army, 1783-1793', pp. 121–208.
21. Blackstock, 'The Union and the Military, 1801-c.1830', 329–351.
22. Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, pp. 54–55; R. J. B. Muir and C. J. Esdaile, 'Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government: The Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 1793–1815', in *Wellington Studies I*, ed. C. M. Woolgar (Southampton: Hartley Institute, University of Southampton, 1996), pp. 3–79.
23. A. Aspinall (ed.), *The Later Correspondence of George III*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), vol. 4, p. 571, Portland to the King, 24 April 1807.
24. Thorne, *The Commons*, I, 185, 192, 199–202, 235. The 1806 list is as follows: Ministers 349 (including Sidmouthites), Opposition (Pittites) 92, Neutral 208, Independent 9. In 1807: Ministers 388, Opposition 224, Independent 29, Doubtfuls 17, Neutrals 12. In 1812: Ministers 400, Opposition 196, Independents 24, Neutral 1 (the Speaker).
25. In the 1796 general election Pitt had 424 supporters against which were 95 Whigs, and 39 independents or 'doubtfuls'; Thorne, *The Commons*, I, 149.
26. B. W. Hill, *British Parliamentary Parties 1742–1832: From the Fall of Walpole to the First Reform Act* (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 175–176.

27. Castlereagh had been instrumental in bringing about the Union with Ireland and, although he initially resigned with Pitt, returned to government in 1802 as President of the Board of Control; Hawkesbury, the future Lord Liverpool, also remained in government.
28. Hill, *British Parliamentary Parties*, pp. 197–198.
29. Hall, *British Strategy*, pp. 53–54.
30. Hill, *British Parliamentary Parties*, pp. 191–192.
31. J. E. Cookson, 'Addington, Henry, First Viscount Sidmouth (1757–1844)', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), online edn, ed. by Lawrence Goldman, May 2009, <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/150> (2 October 2009).
32. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, vol. 5, pp. 356–362, Perceval to the King, 18 September 1809; 391, Perceval to the King, 7 October 1809; 417, 421–422, Perceval to the King, 16 and 24 October.
33. Hill, *British Parliamentary Parties*, pp. 192–194.
34. Frank O'Gorman, 'Party Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century (1812–1832)', *English Historical Review* 102 (1987): 63–88.
35. Hill, *British Parliamentary Parties*, p. 196.
36. Ibid., pp. 190–191, 199.
37. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, vol. 5, pp. 356–362, Perceval to the King, 18 September 1809.
38. Western, *English Militia in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 438–440.
39. Bartlett, 'Development of the British Army', p. 113, considers them an insignificant political force, but has failed to understand where their strength lay.
40. Thorne, *The Commons*, I, 300. Two-thirds of them were either lieutenant colonels or colonels.
41. M. W. McCahil, *Order and Equipoise: The Peerage and the House of Lords, 1783–1806* (London: Royal Historical Society [distributed by] Swift Printers, 1978), pp. 168–174.
42. Ibid., p. 54.
43. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 118.
44. For instance, UKNA, Home Officer Papers, HO43/16, Hawkesbury to Marquess of Buckingham, 27 July 1807, thanking Buckingham for suggestions on the militia volunteer bill.
45. McCahil, *Order and Equipoise*, pp. 55, 171–173.
46. E. A. Smith, *Whig Principles and Party Politics: Earl Fitzwilliam and the Whig Party, 1748–1833* (Manchester; Totowa, NJ: Manchester University Press; Rowman and Littlefield, 1975).
47. In 1793 he raised the 78th. H. M. Chichester, 'Mackenzie, Francis Humberston, Baron Seaforth and Mackenzie of Kintail (1754–1815)', rev. Jonathan Spain, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), online edn, ed. Lawrence Goldman (May 2006), <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/14126> (2 October 2009).
48. Thorne, *The Commons*, I, 306–311.
49. The King had shown particular interest in reforming the East India Company Army and placing it under crown control, R. Callahan, *The East India*

Company and Army Reform, 1783–1798 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

50. Stephen Conway, 'The Politics of British Military and Naval Mobilisation, 1775–83', *English Historical Review* 112 (1997): 1182.

51. Norman Gash, *Lord Liverpool: The Life and Political Career of Robert Banks Jenkinson Second Earl Liverpool, 1770–1828* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, c. 1984).

52. Wendy Hinde, *Castlereagh* (London: Collins, 1981).

53. See Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 63–64; Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*, p. 34 for short service in the Seven Years War and American War of Independence.

54. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1806–1807, VIII, 472–507.

55. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1806–1807, VIII, 536–549; 1807, IX, 63, 102–105.

56. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1806–1807, VIII, 472–507.

57. UKNA, WO1/637, York to Stewart, 1 February 1808.

58. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, vol. 5, p. 26, Castlereagh to the King, 29 February 1808 and p. 27, King's reply.

59. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1808, X, 1179–1180.

60. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 862–863.

61. Charles William Vane (ed.), *Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry*, 8 vols. (London: H. Colburn, 1851), vol. 7, pp. 64–65, Memorandum respecting the State of the Military Force, 26 May 1807.

62. UKNA, WO1/644, Dundas to Liverpool, 30 December 1810. Another copy is in BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38378, ff. 106–107.

63. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, vol. 7, p. 62, Memorandum respecting the State of the Military Force, 26 May 1807.

64. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, vol. 7, pp. 53–54, Measures proposed for Improving the State of the Military Force, 12 May 1807.

65. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1183.

66. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1063.

67. 45 Geo. III, c. 31 and c. 38 (1805 militia transfers); 46 Geo. III, c. 124 (21 July 1806). The augmentation act was 44 Geo. III c. 33.

68. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 860–867 & 1106 (Hawkesbury repeating the arguments in the Lords).

69. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 194.

70. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 70–80, Memorandum on the demands of the Army, and Militia Transfers, 1810. It is likely this is from the summer of 1810, as it mentions calling on the counties to fulfil their militia quotas, i.e. it would be before the expiration of the 1809 Militia Completion Act.

71. UKNA, WO1/1116, Militia Transfer Plan, 5 June 1807. Twenty-one colonels supported the plan, 12 were against.

72. The Irish militia transfer took 15 per cent per year; the proposals by Liverpool 14.3 per cent. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65–69, Draft Measure for keeping up the Regular Army.

73. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, vol. 7, p. 127, Memorandum on increasing the Military Force. This memo is placed amongst the correspondence of 1807, but it should be dated late 1808. Firstly it mentions the 1806

militia transfer, when there was not one, and so this could refer to either 1805 or 1807. But as it also mentions a ballot as part of the transfer, this means Castlereagh must be referring to the 1807 transfer. He also mentions the local militia, which was not created until 1808 and, in the quote used above, mentions troops being in Spain, where British troops were not committed until 1808. The mention of a serious disaster befalling the army in Spain gives a likely date of late 1808, after Moore had begun his winter retreat to Corunna.

74. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, vol. 7, p. 59, Measures for Improving the state of the Military Force, 12 May 1807.
75. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65–69, Draft Measure for keeping up the Regular Army.
76. The King assented to the measure on 11 July, and the bills were presented on 22 July 1807, a month after the opening of the new Parliament. Castlereagh had planned to present them on 17 July, but was too exhausted to do so. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, vol. 4, p. 602, Castlereagh to King, 10 July 1807 and King's reply, 11 July 1807; pp. 605–606, Perceval to the King, 17 July 1807.
77. *The Times*, 4 August 1807, Mr Frankland commented on this.
78. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, vol. 7, p. 65, Memorandum on the military force, 26 May 1807.
79. *The Times*, 4 August 1807.
80. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 967, 1044, 1127. It became 47 Geo. III, session 2, c. 54 (for Britain) and c. 57 (Ireland), 13 August 1807. The Militia Completion Acts were 47 Geo. III c. 56 (for Ireland) and c. 71 (Britain).
81. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1065.
82. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George* III, vol. 5, p. 176, Perceval to the King, 25 January 1809. Some of the votes against the measure were only given out of duty to the Whig party. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 159–167.
83. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 163.
84. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 323.
85. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 805. The Marquis of Douglas supported him.
86. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 865–867.
87. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 117.
88. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 881, speech of Charles Bragge Bathurst (a Sidmouthite). Sir Robert Williams, a Grenvillite, said similar (1062).
89. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 873, speech of Sir George Warrender.
90. *The Times*, 4 August 1807.
91. *The Times*, 3 February 1809.
92. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 159–191; for Wood's speech supporting Castlereagh, 315–316.
93. *The Times*, 3 February 1809.
94. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 162. John Calcraft demanded details of the deficiency in the army, supporting Tierney's call to explain what had happened to the force raised in 1807–1808, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 165.
95. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 323.

96. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 933. He was also Colonel of the West Suffolk Militia, until 1808. His father, the 4th Duke of Grafton, originally supported Pitt, but came to terms with Grenville during the Talents ministry; Thorne, *The Commons*.
97. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1065, speech of Lord Folkestone.
98. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 883.
99. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 326.
100. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 665.
101. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 665.
102. 51 Geo. III c. 20, clause 22.
103. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 667, 670.
104. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1063.
105. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 932 (Willoughby), 934 (Lockhart), 964 (Henniker).
106. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 982.
107. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 980 (Giddy) and 1062 (Bankes). Both were independent, and Bankes was Chairman of the Committee of Public Expenditure, and had reformist views.
108. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 932. Mr Bastard said similar (940).
109. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, vol. 4, p. 610, Perceval to the King, 28 July 1807.
110. *The Times*, 15 February 1809.

4   Patterns of Recruitment: The Regional Response

1. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 100.
2. The figures for the first three months of 1815 are 533 recruits per month, 1586 for the second quarter, then 1482 and 1479.
3. *CJ*, 1807, IV, 332, Circular to Regiments below 600 men, 8 December 1806.
4. *House of Commons Papers; Accounts And Papers*, 1808, VII.205, 'An account of the sum fixed in each county or riding in England, as the average bounty for substitutes in the militia on the late ballot; as far as the same can be ascertained from the returns received at this office'; the three counties (and bounties) Rutland, £16 1s; Isle of Wight, £10; Montgomery £16. For bounties for the army: UKNA, WO3/585, Memo by Calvert, 10 February 1813.
5. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, pp. 126–128, 153–155.
6. WO25/3224, Return of Average number of Regimental Parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, Adjutant General, 19 October 1809.
7. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 2nd Series, 7, 49, Memorandum for Cabinet, March 1807.
8. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, pp. 153–155.
9. Ibid., p. 119, n. 119.
10. UKNA, WO1/904, List of Regiments not furnished quota, 25 April and 1 June 1808. It is possible that the some regiments gave the remaining volunteers before the expiration of the act in August 1808, but the total deficiency from the 1 June return is 1775 men, not substantially different

from the final deficiency of 1432. Also, the regiments still with a deficiency at the end of the volunteering had to be from this list.

11. UKNA, WO40/27, Circular, by Beckett, 23 May 1807.
12. *CJ*, 1808, VII, 163.
13. UKNA, WO3/47, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Bernard (C.O. 84th), 21 September 1809.
14. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Taylor, 17 August, 16 October, 21 November and 15 December 1807, etc.
15. UKNA, WO3/193, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 2 February 1807.
16. UKNA, WO3/197, Memorandum to York by Calvert, 9 October 1809; WO3/198, Wynyard to Torrens, 13 December 1809.
17. UKNA, WO3/47, Calvert to Kent, 18 January 1809.
18. For instance, UKNA, WO3/46, Calvert to Kent, 17 June 1808, rejecting an augmentation of the 1st, and WO3/49, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Fitzroy, 18 January 1809, for the 25th.
19. UKNA, WO3/584, Circular to Recruiting Service, 1 December 1810.
20. UKNA, WO17/157.
21. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular OC Depot companies, 3 September 1811.
22. Claydon House Archives, Claydon, Buckinghamshire (CHA), Calvert Papers, 9/101/1, Calvert to Buckingham, 29 October 1814.
23. Ireland's population amounted to 33 per cent of the UK's, and as there were a total of 832 parties in the UK, by Ireland's population it would have 217 parties. Scotland's population amounted to 10 per cent, so using this ratio it would have 83 parties. Wales (counted as the Hereford and Shrewsbury districts) had only 30 parties, which produced nine men per party per year. England had 405 parties, producing 17 recruits per party per year, roughly the average for the United Kingdom. UKNA, WO25/3224, Return of average number of regimental parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809.
24. There was another attempt at revising the Militia lists in 1807 for the Training Act but the survey was not completed; see UKNA, HO50/537, Proportion of Men liable to serve, February 1807.
25. E. L. Jones, 'The Agricultural Labour Market in England 1793–1872', *The Economic History Review* XVII (1964–1965): 323–324.
26. David W. Howell, *The Rural Poor in Eighteenth-Century Wales* (Cardiff 2000), pp. 2–13.
27. W. T. R. Price. 'Language Zones, Demographic Changes, and the Welsh Culture Area 1800–1911', in *The Welsh Language and its Social Domains 1801–1911*, ed. Geraint H. Jenkins (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), p. 39.
28. Brinley Thomas, 'A Cauldron of Rebirth: Population and the Welsh Language in the Nineteenth Century', in *The Welsh Language*, pp. 86–89.
29. UKNA, WO27/94, Inspection return of the 1/23rd, 11 August 1808.
30. For the Highland regiments in the Seven Years War see Brumwell, *Redcoats*, pp. 268–280.
31. For a general survey of road building and maintenance in Scotland see Owen Silver, 'The Roads of Scotland: From Statute Labour to Tolls the First Phase, 1700 to 1775', *Scottish Geographical Journal* 103 (1987): 141–149.

32. UKNA, WO40/27, Circular, by Beckett, 23 May 1807.
33. UKNA, WO25/3224, Return of Average number of Regimental Parties from 25 June 1808 to 24 June 1809, AG, 19 October 1809.
34. *CJ*, 1808, VII, 175, Recruits raised, 7 March 1808.
35. UKNA, WO3/583, Whitelocke (Inspector-General) to Col. Loft, Louth, 20 January 1807; Pritzler to Richard Sanders, Colnbrook, 14 April 1807.
36. UKNA, WO1/638, Calvert to Stewart, 9 May 1808.
37. UKNA, WO1/636, Calvert to Stewart, September 1807.
38. UKNA, WO1/636, Calvert to Stewart, 6 July 1808.
39. UKNA, WO1/637, Calvert to Cooke, 4 January 1808, incl. John Grey (IFO Nottingham) to AG, 31 December 1812.
40. UKNA, WO1/1115, H. Kelsey to Windham, 2 January 1807.
41. UKNA, WO1/774, Powle (Lt. Col. 9th Battalion Norfolk Volunteer Infantry) to Hawkesbury, 26 May 1807; WO1/1116, Robinson to Castlereagh, 19 May 1807.
42. UKNA, WO1/639, Calvert to Stewart, 4 June & 6 July 1808; WO1/640, Calvert to Castlereagh, 11 January 1809; WO1/642, Calvert to Liverpool, 7 December 1809; WO3/585, Darling to Cathcart (AG of Scotland) and AG of Ireland, 20 September 1811.
43. UKNA, WO1/1118, William Stewart (Maj. 3rd) to Castlereagh, 15 May 1808.
44. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to IFOs, 30 March 1811.
45. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to York, 5 November 1811.
46. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular to IFOs, 2 July 1811.
47. UKNA, WO1/165, Bunbury to Goulburn, 3 May 1811.
48. UKNA, WO1/646, Calvert to Bunbury, 25 March 1811.
49. No precise figures are available, but Beckett, *Amateur Military Tradition*, gives a figure of 2600–4000 per year between 1809 and 1813. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', p. 125, gives 2700 to 3500 per year, or 15 men per local militia regiment.
50. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to Commanding Officers of Militia Regiments, 17 August 1807.
51. UKNA, HO51/25, Instructions for militia transfer, 17 August 1807; WO1/612, Arrangement for the Inspection of Volunteers from the Irish Militia, 23 September 1807; WO1/904, List of Regiments which have not furnished quota, 25 April and 1 June 1808. All the figures are calculated from the 1 June 1808 figures, the last available return before the act expired in August 1808.
52. 46 Geo. III, c. 91.
53. 45 Geo. III c. 31. The act allowed the excess above the 1802 militia quota to volunteer.
54. UKNA, HO51/26, Lord Fortescue to Hawkesbury, 15 December 1807. In fact, his regiment had to provide 37.7 per cent, compared with the East Devon's 50.5 per cent and the North Devon's 50.3 per cent.
55. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, p. 73, Heads of Plan for Increasing the Military Force, 12 July 1807.
56. UKNA, WO162/326, Return of the Effective Strength of the British Militia, 15 March 1810; HO51/26, Militia Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809. They were Denbigh, Flint, 2nd and 3rd Lancashire, Leicestershire, East Middlesex, Nottingham, Aberdeen, Argyll & Bute, Dumfries, Lanark, Perth

and Renfrew Militias. The Buckinghamshire Militia's quota of 289 is above 2/5ths of their 1805 establishment (252), but not equal to the excess above 3/5ths of their 1809 establishment (302).

57. UKNA, WO162/326, Return of the Effective Strength of the British Militia, 15 March 1810; HO51/26, Militia Transfer Instructions, 23 March 1809. They were Cardigan, West Kent, West Middlesex, 1st & 2nd Surrey, Sussex, 1st & 2nd Tower Hamlets.

58. UKNA, HO51/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 1811; HO51/28, Circular by Sidmouth, 27 January 1813.

59. On 20 May 1807 it had 864 privates and an establishment of 647 (UKNA, WO27/91).

60. UKNA, HO51/28, Goulburn to Lt. Col. Mulberry, 4 May 1812.

61. Thirteen-fourteenths precisely, one half raised in 1809–1810, and a seventh for each year from 1811 to 1813.

62. UKNA, WO162/326, Return of Men raised by the Militia, 13 December 1813.

63. UKNA, HO51/28, Circular, by Ryder, 26 December 1811.

64. UKNA, HO51/28, Circular, by Sidmouth, 12 January 1813. The regiments were East Middlesex, East and West Kent, Isle of Wight, East and West London, Oxford, Pembroke, Dumfries, Forfar, Lanark, Renfrew, East Suffolk and the Cornish Miners Militias.

65. UKNA, HO51/28, Bathurst to Col. Phillips, 5 August 1813.

66. UKNA, WO162/326, Return of the Size, Age and Height of the militia, 13 December 1813.

67. The Irish militia raised 98.6 per cent of its recruiting quota. UKNA, WO162/326, Return of Men raised by the Militia, 13 December 1813.

68. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of North Lincoln, West Middlesex, Westminster, 2nd Surrey and Hertford Militias, 4 September 1807 (three days after the transfer began); Hawkesbury to East Middlesex, 1st Surrey, Carnarvon and West Kent Militias, 21 October 1807; HO51/27, Goulburn to Maj. Boatin (North Hampshire Militia), 6 May 1811; HO51/28, Goulburn to Capt. McKell, 12 May 1812, and Goulburn to Lt. Col. White (East Suffolk), 8 May 1812.

69. Paul Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1698–1798* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

70. UKNA, WO1/1116, Memo, 5 June 1807.

71. UKNA, HO50/408, extract of Maj. Gen. Thornton to AG, 23 January 1808.

72. UKNA, HO51/26, Hawkesbury to Lord Stanley, 8 July 1808.

73. UKNA, HO51/26, Hawkesbury to Maj. Hayes, 22 July 1808.

74. UKNA, HO50/425, Calvert to Beckett, 21 December 1812.

75. UKNA, WO27/95, Inspection report of East Devon Militia, 27 April 1809.

76. Thomas Morris, *Recollections of Military Service, in 1813, 1814 & 1815, through Germany, Holland and France, Including Some Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo* (London: J. Madden, 1845), pp. 8–9.

77. UKNA, WO3/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Wenyss, 29 August 1807.

78. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 117.

79. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 62, Measures for Improving the State of the Military Force, 12 May 1807.

80. UKNA, WO3/604, Torrens to Addington, 28 December 1812.

81. UKNA, HO51/25, Beckett to Gordon, 10 September 1807.

82. UKNA, HO51/26, Beckett to Gordon, 7 April 1809 and Liverpool to Lord Milsintown, same date.

83. UKNA, HO51/26, Liverpool to Earl Berkeley, 11 April 1809 and 11 May 1809.

84. The request was sent on 22 March 1808 (UKNA, HO51/26, Circular, 22 March 1808).

85. UKNA, HO51/26, Beckett to Lt. Col. Firth, 3 April 1808.

86. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38191, f. 24, Castlereagh to Beckett, 20 September 1809; UKNA, HO51/27, Circular, by Ryder, 17 September 1811.

87. 47 Geo. III, sess. 2, c. 57, sec. 11; in 1809 this privilege was extended to armourers and artillerymen, 49 Geo. III c. 4, sec. 12; as a result of this, the number of men who could claim this exemption was fixed at 20 in 1811, 51 Geo. III, c. 20, sec. 12.

88. UKNA, WO3/49, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Nicholls, December 1809. Calvert was particularly referring to the Royal Buckingham, Warwick and Montgomery Militias.

89. UKNA, HO51/26, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam, 14 November 1807.

90. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam, 22 October 1807; HO51/26, Hawkesbury to Fitzwilliam, 18 January 1808.

91. UKNA, HO51/27, Ryder to Fitzwilliam, 1 July 1810. Lord Aboyne received a similar blunt reply to his request for extra NCOs, HO51/27, Ryder to Lord Aboyne, 13 October 1810.

92. UKNA, HO51/27, Ryder to Col. Douglas, 5 October 1811.

93. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807. Similar was written in the orders for the 1809 Transfer, HO51/26, Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809.

94. 47 Geo. III sess. 2, c. 57, sec. 5–7 (British Militia) and 47 Geo. III c. 55, sec. 5–7 (Irish Militia). Similar was in place for the 1809 transfer, 49 Geo. III c.4, sec. 6–8 (British Militia) and 49 Geo. III c. 5, sec. 3–8 (Irish Militia).

95. 51 Geo. III c. 20, sec. 6–8.

96. For the West Riding's militia regiments, see Sheffield City Archives, Sheffield (SCA), Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, Y16/59, Fawkes to Fitzwilliam, 29 September 1799; /60, 2 October; /62, 7 October; /73, Major Dixon to Fitzwilliam, 13 November 1799.

97. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 57, Measure proposed for improving the State of the Military Force, 12 May 1807; UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807; WO3/155, Calvert to Moore, 23 September 1807.

98. CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Fitzroy, 18 August 1807.

99. UKNA, HO50/406, Calvert to Beckett, 7 September 1807; WO3/44, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Sir George Nugent, 17 September 1807; HO50/406, Calvert to Beckett, 17 September 1807; HO51/25, Hawkesbury to Plumber, 18 September 1807; HO50/407, Gordon to Beckett, 3 October 1807.

100. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to Plumber, 8 September 1807.

101. UKNA, HO51/25, Beckett to Lord Rolle, 22 August 1807; WO3/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 19 August 1807.

102. CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Asgill, 29 August 1807.

103. UKNA, HO51/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 1811.
104. UKNA, WO3/585, General Orders for officers employed for militia volunteering, 20 April 1811. These were the standard orders for the next three years.
105. UKNA, HO50/428, Circular to militia regiments, by Darling, September 1813.
106. UKNA, WO1/636, Memo by Calvert, 20 November 1807.
107. For instance, UKNA, WO3/43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 31 August 1807; WO3/44, Calvert to England, 21 September 1807 and Calvert to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 29 August 1807.
108. UKNA, HO50/407, Calvert to Beckett, 20 November 1807.
109. UKNA, HO51/25, Beckett to Calvert, 19 August 1807; WO3/43, Calvert to Sussex district commander, 20 August 1807.
110. UKNA, WO3/44, Calvert to Gen. Smith (Col. 43rd), 21 September 1807; HO50/407, Calvert to Beckett, 25 November 1807, incl. Procter (Maj. 2/43rd) to AG; Wynyard to Beckett, 18 December 1807, incl. Lt. Kingsbury (81st) to Secretary at War, 12 December 1807.
111. UKNA, WO3/43, Calvert to Kent, 15 August 1807 (asking to be on the 3rd Lancashire's list); in 1809, the 1st was allowed to get volunteers from all deficient militia regiments, before the order allowing them to volunteer to any line regiment, WO3/48, Calvert to Kent, 4 August 1809.
112. Compiled from UKNA, HO50/406 and /407.
113. For volunteering into the Royal Marines, UKNA, HO51/36, Circular to deficient militia regiments, 22 March 1808. For the Royal Artillery, WO3/194, Calvert to Beckett, 2 April 1808 and HO51, Circular to militia regiments, 2 April 1808. The Aberdeen, Carmarthen, East Devon, Dumfries, Forfar, Lanark, 2nd Lancashire, Renfrew, Warwickshire and 1st West Yorkshire Militias were allowed this volunteer to the Royal Artillery but with a minimum height requirement of 5' 7" and under 30 years of age.
114. UKNA, HO51/26, Hawkesbury to deficient regiments, 4 January 1808; HO50/406, Calvert to Beckett, 15 February 1808. It was extended to the Irish Militia in August, HO50/409, Gordon to Jenkinson, 2 August 1808.
115. UKNA, WO1/904, List of regiments not yet furnished quota, 25 April 1808.
116. UKNA, WO3/47, Memorandum, 20 March 1809.
117. The 2nd, 4th, 7th, 13th, 14th, 20th, 24th and 95th were ordered not to receive any more volunteers within three weeks of the volunteering commencing, UKNA, WO3/47, Calvert to Cathcart, 5 and 12 April 1809; HO51/26, Beckett to officers commanding militia corps, 5 April, 1809.
118. UKNA, HO51/26, Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809.
119. UKNA, WO1/641, Dundas to Castlereagh, 3 May 1809. The regiment had 1282 volunteers by that time.

5   Making Soldiers

1. For examples from the eighteenth century generally see Holmes, *Redcoat*, pp. 144–145.
2. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular, by Darling, 16 December 1812.

3. Antony Brett-James (ed.), *Edward Costello: The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns* (London: Longmans, Greens and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 2.
4. This is more probably the explanation for the consistency of recruiting matching casualties in the post-Waterloo period, rather than the army recruiting from a fixed proportion of social misfits as argued in Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 100.
5. Stevenson, 'The London "crimp" riots of 1794'.
6. Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces', pp. 130–134.
7. *CJ*, 1806–1807, IV, 175; WO25/3224, Memorandum on Recruiting, 19 October 1809.
8. BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 194–199, Fitzpatrick to Windham, 25 March 1807.
9. Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore* (London: HMSO, 1892–1899), III, 185, Grenville to Windham, 1 January 1807.
10. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular to IFOs, by Calvert, 3 November 1812.
11. UKNA, WO3/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Abercromby, 24 November 1808.
12. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular to Regimental Officers, 1 December 1810.
13. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular by Darling, 1 December 1813.
14. National Army Museum, London (NAM), 6807/276, Circular, by Darling, 25 February 1814.
15. UKNA, WO3/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Pigot, 16 January 1807.
16. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Joseph Gascoigne, 12 September 1807.
17. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to IFOs, 26 March 1811.
18. UKNA, WO3/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Lord Cathcart, 16 January 1807.
19. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular to IFOs, by Calvert, 13 March 1812.
20. UKNA, WO3/192, Calvert to Inspector General of Recruiting, 16 January 1807.
21. UKNA, WO3/193, Calvert to Inspector General of Recruiting, 26 February 1807.
22. UKNA, WO35/24, Nicholls to Col. Dacres, IFO Athlone, 31 August 1812.
23. National Army Museum (NAM), London, Papers of John Granby Clay, IFO Manchester, 7409-8, Kent to Clay, 2 March; Clay to Kent, 13 December 1807.
24. NAM, 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 13 December 1807.
25. NAM, 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 13 November and Kent to Clay, 15 November 1811.
26. NAM, 7409-8, Clay to Kent, 5 November, Kent to Clay, 6 November 1813.
27. NAM, 7409-8, Darling to Clay, 6 December 1810.
28. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular, by Darling, 4 June 1812; see also Table B.1.
29. For instance, UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Taylor, 29 August 1808.
30. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Taylor, 16 August 1808; see also, Calvert to Taylor, 16 March and 3 August 1808.
31. UKNA, WO3/49, Calvert to Duke of Cambridge, 9 December 1809.
32. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Taylor, 2 September 1808.
33. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Col. Burnett, York Hospital, 29 March 1808.
34. UKNA, WO3/192, Wynyard to Inspector General of Recruiting, 27 January 1807.
35. UKNA, WO3/42, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Fisher, 12 February 1807.

36. UKNA, WO3/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Doyle, 17 May 1808.
37. UKNA, WO/46, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Vyse, 31 October 1808.
38. UKNA, WO3/47, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Campbell, 17 January 1809.
39. UKNA, WO3/44, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. F. Dundas, 9 January 1808.
40. W UKNA, O3/43, Calvert to Kent, 28 April 1807.
41. *Jottings from my Sabretasch, by a Chelsea Pensioner* (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street, 1847), p. 12.
42. NAM, 6807/276, Circular by Darling, 23 March 1814.
43. NAM, 6807/276, Circular by Darling, 1 January 1814.
44. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular by Darling, 4 June 1812 and 1 September 1812.
45. UKNA, WO27 sample.
46. Boys have been excluded from the calculation in Table 5.1.
47. UKNA, WO3/585, Memo by Calvert, 10 February 1813.
48. See Table 2.1.
49. UKNA, WO1/660, York to Bathurst, 22 March 1815; WO6/134, WO to Torrens, 26 March 1815; WO1/660, Bathurst to York, 27 March 1815.
50. UKNA, WO25/285, /287, /314, /316, /329, /368; WO67/1, /7, /14.
51. Eileen Hathaway (ed.), *A Dorset Soldier: The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence, 40th Regiment* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1995), p. 18.
52. Brett-James (ed.), *Edward Costello*, p. 2.
53. UKNA, HO51/25, Hawkesbury to commanding officers of militia, 17 August 1807.
54. UKNA, HO51/26, Circular to commanding officers of militia, 23 March 1809; HO50/416, Torrens to Goulburn, 13 August 1810; HO51/27, Circular by Ryder, 27 April 1811.
55. UKNA, HO50/427, Darling to Addington, 14 October 1813.
56. Selby (ed.), *Thomas Morris* (London, 1967), p. 7.
57. Maj. M. L. Ferrar (ed.), *The Diary of Colour-Serjeant George Calladine, 19th Foot, 1793–1837* (London: E. Fisher & Co. Ltd., 1922), p. 11.
58. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', pp. 131–138. One estimate cited by Bartlett gives a 65 per cent increase in the cost of living.
59. *The Veteran Soldier: An Interesting Narrative of the Life and Religious Experience of the Late Sergeant Greenleigh* (London: n.d., 1822), p. 26.
60. *Memoirs of a Sergeant Late in the Forty-Third Light Infantry Regiment, Previously to and During the Peninsular War, Including an Account of his Conversion from Popery to the Protestant Religion* (London: John Mason, 1835), p. 12.
61. NAM, 7912-21, Memoirs of an Unknown Soldier of the 38th.
62. Archibald Constable (ed.), *Memorials of the Late Wars* (Edinburgh: Constable & Co., 1828), pp. 23–25.
63. Stephen Morley, *Memoirs of a Sergeant of the 5th Regiment of Foot* (Cambridge: Ken Trotman, 1999), p. 6.
64. Brett-James (ed.), *Edward Costello*, p. 1.
65. James Anton, *Retrospective of a Military Life, During the Most Eventful Period of the Late War* (Edinburgh: W. H. Lizars, 1841), pp. 3, 39.
66. *Jottings from my Sabretasch*, p. 7.
67. Ferrar, *The Diary of Colour-Serjeant George Calladine*, p. 3.
68. Joseph Donaldson, *Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier, including the War in the Peninsula and Scenes and Sketches from Ireland* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2000), pp. 3–34.

69. Charles O'Neil, *The Military Adventures of Charles O'Neil* (Worcester: Published for the author by E. Livermore, 1851), p. 12.

70. James Hale, *Journal of James Hale, Late Sergeant 9th Foot* (London: Longman & Co., 1826), p. 5.

71. Selby (ed.), *Thomas Morris*, pp. 2, 5.

72. UKNA, WO25/285, /287, /314, /316, /329, /368; WO67/1, /7, /14.

73. *Jottings from my Sabretasch*, p. 5.

74. UKNA, HO50/427, York to Sidmouth, 2 May 1813. A second battalion for the 49th would be established.

75. UKNA, HO51/28, Addington to Goulburn, 22 March 1813.

76. UKNA, HO51/28, Circular, by Sidmouth, 14 May 1813; Sidmouth to Scottish militia regiments, 15 June 1813.

77. UKNA, WO25/285, /287, /314, /316, /329, /368; WO67/1, /7, /14.

78. Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*, p. 36.

79. UKNA, WO1/1116, memo, 5 June 1807; WO25/3224, Bgd. Gen. Clinton to Horse Guards, 2 April 1810; Memo on York's letter of 7 December 1811; WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 31 January and 20 October 1813.

80. UKNA, WO1/634, Gordon to Stewart, 8 August 1807.

81. UKNA, WO1/1116, Memo, 5 June 1807.

82. Ferrar, *The Diary of Colour-Serjeant George Calladine*, p. 10.

83. UKNA, WO1/904, Return of Militia Volunteers, 20 May 1809.

84. A. McAnally, *The Irish Militia, 1793–1816* (Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds, 1949), pp. 27–28.

85. UKNA, WO27/95, Inspection return of 1st West Yorkshire Militia, 1 May 1809; North Devon Militia, 4 May 1809; North Hampshire Militia, 6 April 1809; 1st Lancashire, 3 May 1809.

86. *The Times*, 1 September 1807.

87. UKNA, WO27/91, Inspection returns of East, North and South Devon Militias, 12 March, 15 and 16 April 1807 and /95, 27 April, 4 and 24 May 1809.

88. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38242, ff. 131–134, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 9 December 1807.

89. UKNA, WO25/3224, Memo on York's letter of 7 December 1811.

90. UKNA, HO51/28, Sidmouth to Earl Moira, 12 March 1813. The Tower Hamlets Militia was described as 'in a very inefficient state because of its limited service'.

91. UKNA, HO50/420, Merry to Goulburn, 11 June 1811, incl. extract of anonymous letter, 20 May 1811.

92. See UKNA, WO380/1, /2, /3 for details of the raising of second battalions.

93. G. R. Gleig, *The Light Dragoon* (London: Routledge & Co., 1850), pp. 5–6.

94. UKNA, WO1/637, York to Castlereagh, 22 January 1808.

95. UKNA, WO1/637, York to Castlereagh, 22 January 1808.

96. UKNA, WO27/2906–2907. The regiments sampled are 1st and 2nd Dragoon Guards, 7th–10th Light Dragoons, 1/1st Foot Guards, 2nd, 6th, 2/36th, 42nd, 2/88th.

97. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to receiving officer at Manchester, 6 May 1812.

98. UKNA, HO51/172, Beckett to Torrens, 5 July 1811.

99. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to York, 11 April 1811. The regiments were the 20th, 37th and 76th.

100. UKNA, WO3/585, Circular, by Calvert, 18 November 1811; Darling to Taylor, 13 April 1812.
101. UKNA, WO1/643, Calvert to Bunbury, 26 March 1810, incl. Clinton to Adjutant General.
102. UKNA, WO3/584, Wynyard to IFOs of London, Maidstone, Ipswich and Bedford districts, 5 December 1808; Calvert to Taylor, 20 August 1808.
103. UKNA, WO3/154, 30 April 1807, Calvert to Moore; WO3/584, Calvert to Carew, 16 May 1808; Calvert to Midgely, 1 July 1808.
104. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Capt. Midgely (new commandant of Tilbury fort); Calvert to Carew, 16 May 1808.
105. UKNA, WO3/584, Calvert to Taylor, 27 August and 26 September 1808.
106. For more details on training, see Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 257–321.
107. UKNA, WO27 sample.
108. UKNA, WO27/98 and /100.
109. UKNA, WO1/946, An officer to Beckett, n.d., probably 1811.
110. East Sussex County Record Office, Lewes (ESCRO), LCM/3/EW1, Casualty Returns, 1811–1814.
111. UKNA, WO3/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. England, 2 February 1808.
112. UKNA, WO7/107, Medical Board to Burrow, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, 31 December 1811.
113. UKNA, WO7/108, Dr. Lamprice, Physician to the Forces at the Army Depot, 16 July 1813.
114. *The Veteran Soldier*, p. 28.
115. *Memoirs of a Sergeant Late in the Forty-Third Light Infantry Regiment*, p. 14.
116. Selby (ed.), *Thomas Morris*, pp. 7–8.
117. *Vicissitudes in the Life of a Scottish Soldier, Written by Himself* (London: Henry Colburn, 1827), p. 2.

6   The British Government and Its Armies

1. Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London; New York: Longman, 1993), pp. 133–142. Put another way, the number of Sepoy infantry battalions increased from 85 in 1803 to 122 in 1813, T. A. Heathcote, *The Military in British India: The Development of British Land Forces in South Asia, 1600–1947* (Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 74.
2. For the West Indian interests objections, see Roger Norman Buckley, *Slaves in Redcoats: The British West India Regiments, 1795–1815* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1979), p. 105; Native Americans were used in Canada, but were not trained as an army, Hickey, *The War of 1812*; R. Allen, 'His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1775–1814', PhD (Aberystwyth, 1991).
3. UKNA, WO1/634, Memo by York, 15 February 1807.
4. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 860–867 and 1106.
5. UKNA, WO25/3225, Memorandum (no date, but probably 1808); Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, p. 115, gives the figures as 37,136 and 15,000, respectively.

6. *CJ*, 1806–1807, IV, 332, Circular to Gen. commanding districts, 12 July 1806; 1808, VII, 183, Return of men limited geographically, 10 August 1807; UKNA, WO25/3225, Memorandum (no date, but probably 1808).

7. UKNA, WO3/42, Calvert to Lt. Gen. England, 10 January 1807.

8. UKNA, HO50/409, Pulteney to Hawkesbury, 12 July 1808; HO50/420, Torrens to Bunbury, 11 June 1811.

9. The offers were Flintshire and Pembroke (UKNA, HO50/409, Pulteney to Hawkesbury, 12 July 1808), Merioneth (1 August 1808), Carnarvon (3 August 1808), Durham (16 August 1808). Royal Buckingham (HO50/420, Torrens to Bunbury, 11 June 1811).

10. John Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt, 1743–1804* (London: Penguin Books, 1977).

11. See Oman, *Wellington's Army*, pp. 180–187 for details.

12. UKNA, WO1/650, Torrens to Liverpool, 1 January 1812, incl. Doyle to Torrens, 25 November 1811; Imhoff (Col. 4th Garrison Battalion) to Doyle, 18 December 1811.

13. BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, ff. 28–30, Robert Johnson to Wynyard, 6 February 1807.

14. BL, Bathurst Papers, Loan 57/5, f. 476, Capt. MacDonald (Glengary Fencibles) to Bathurst, 26 June 1812.

15. UKNA, WO1/61, Sir A. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 18 December 1807 and HO50/406, WO to HO, 20 August 1807. Other offers were a regiment from Bristol and Ireland (WO1/1119, I. A. Vesey to Cooke, 19 August 1809); a general-service corps (WO6/120, Cooke to Maj. Parry, 29 April 1807); fencible regiment for Prince Edward Island (WO6/120, Cooke to Townsend, 29 January 1808); an offer from Col. Robinson (WO6/123, Bunbury to Col. Robinson, 31 August 1811); and an offer from Mr. MacDonald (WO6/133, Castlereagh to York, 24 May 1808).

16. UKNA, WO6/120, Stewart to Sir. A. Wellesley, 21 December 1807.

17. UKNA, WO3/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 22 November 1809.

18. UKNA, WO3.43, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Doyle, 25 June 1807.

19. UKNA, WO3/198, Calvert to Taylor, 27 April 1810.

20. UKNA, WO25/3224, Memorandum showing the manner in which ordinary recruiting works, 19 October 1809.

21. UKNA, WO1/654, Return of men transferred to East India Company, 24 December 1812.

22. For more on the substitute system see Fortescue, *County Lieutenancies*, pp. 16–18, 39–40 and Western, *The English Militia*, pp. 275–277.

23. *House of Commons Papers*, 1808, VII.205, 'An account of the sum fixed in each county or riding in England, as the average bounty for substitutes in the militia on the late ballot; as far as the same can be ascertained from the returns received at this office', <http://0-gateway.proquest.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:fulltext:1808-001698>.

24. The average whilst not balloting was 1073 men per month; during balloting 942; both calculations are based on the figures for 1803 to 1813. UKNA, WO1/946, Return of recruits raised since 1803, 21 March 1811; WO25/3225, Recruiting return for 1812 and 1813, August 1813;

CJ, 1814–1815, 301, Return of recruits for 1814; *CJ*, 1816, 423, Return of recruits for 1815.

25. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 2nd Series, 7, 127, Memorandum on increasing the Military Force. This memo is placed amongst the correspondence of 1807, but it should be dated late 1808. Firstly it mentions the 1806 militia transfer, when there was not one, and so this could refer to either 1805 or 1807. But as it also mentions a ballot as part of the transfer, this means Castlereagh must be referring to the 1807 transfer. He also mentions the local militia, which was not created until 1808, and troops being in Spain, where British troops were not committed until 1808. The mention of a serious disaster befalling the army in Spain suggests a date of late 1808, after Moore had begun his winter retreat to Corunna.

26. For Manchester, UKNA, WO1/637, Wynyard to Stewart, 9 March 1808; for Marlborough, WO1/637, Wynyard to Stewart, 15 March; for Leeds, WO1/638, Calvert to Stewart, 23 April 1808; for Birmingham, HO50/411, Gordon to Beckett, 20 May 1809.

27. For Coventry, UKNA, HO50/422, Gosselin (IFO) to AG, 15 October 1811; Nottingham, 2 November; for Leicester, 1 November, incl. Hayhide (Capt. 17th) to Gosselin, 29 October 1811.

28. UKNA, HO50/429, York to Sidmouth, 25 January 1814.

29. See N. Longmate, *Island Fortress: the Defence of Great Britain, 1603–1945* (London: Hutchinson, 1991), pp. 274–283.

30. R. Glover, 'The French Fleet, 1807–1814: Britain's Problem; and Madison's Opportunity', *Journal of Modern History* 39 (1967): 233–252.

31. Ibid., 235.

32. UKNA, WO30/80, Defence Report, 1st January 1811.

33. Hall, *British Strategy*, pp. 199–203.

34. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Lord Hobart (Secretary of War in the Addington government 1801 to 1804), 13 January 1804 (copy).

35. UKNA, WO3/45, Wynyard to Maj. Gen. Whetham and Lt. Gen. Sir George Ludlow, 5 April 1808.

36. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 22-23, Return of British Army, 28 November 1810.

37. UKNA, WO3/45, Calvert to Lt. Gen. Fitzroy, 31 May 1808.

38. UKNA, WO3/195, Wynyard to Bgd. Gen. Taylor (OC Army Depot), 30 July 1808; WO3/46, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Somerset, 10 September 1808.

39. Blackstock, 'The Union and the Military, 1801-c.1830', 329–351.

40. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 906; 1809, XII, 164.

41. BL, Windham papers, Add. Mss. 37886, f. 68, A Staff Officer (Athlone) to Windham, 20 February 1807.

42. UKNA, WO3/596, Memorandum on Irish and British Militia Interchange, 20 March 1810. No author is given, but it is likely to be from the Adjutant General's department. These views were repeated in the Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 218.

43. 51 Geo. III. C. 118.

44. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XX, 132–133, 329–332, 643–645. The issue had been debated earlier that year during the Mutiny Bill and rejected then, so it was unlikely to be passed in a separate clause specifically for the Irish Militia.

45. Michael Snape, *The Redcoat and Religion: The Forgotten History of the British Soldier from the Age of Marlborough to the Eve of the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 161–163.
46. UKNA, WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 31 January and 20 October 1813.
47. UKNA, WO25/3225, Bunbury to Bathurst, 30 August 1813.
48. 54 Geo. III c. 1 & c. 19.
49. Patricia Lin, 'Caring for the Nation's Families: British Soldiers' and Sailors' Families and the State, 1793–1815', in *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the French Wars, 1790–1820*, eds A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and J. Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 99–117.
50. UKNA, WO1/637, Memorandum by York, 25 February 1807 and 26 March 1808.
51. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, pp. 123–124.
52. UKNA, WO25/3224, Clinton to Horse Guards, 2 April 1810.
53. UKNA, WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 31 January and 20 October 1813.
54. UKNA, WO25/3224, Calvert to Clinton (extract), 8 December 1810.
55. UKNA, WO1/946, Memo (no date, but probably 1810).
56. Hall, *British Strategy*, pp. 154–155, 158–162, 177–179.
57. UKNA, WO1/903, Memorandum to the Cabinet on the Military Force, 26 May 1807.
58. UKNA, WO1/636, York to Castlereagh, 1 September 1807.
59. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 December 1811.
60. Historic Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst Preserved at Cirencester Park* (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1923), p. 186, Torrens to Bunbury, 15 July 1812.
61. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 December 1811.
62. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38244, f. 63, Bunbury to Liverpool, 2 December 1809.
63. UKNA, WO3/595, Torrens to Bunbury, 21 February 1810.
64. UKNA, WO3/597, Torrens to Bunbury, 2 August 1810.
65. UKNA, WO3/598, Torrens to Bunbury, 21 November 1810; they were 2nd, 1/26th, 1/32nd, 51st, 2/52nd, 68th, 75th and 77th from Britain; 1/5th, 1/38th and 76th from Ireland.
66. UKNA, WO3/598, Torrens to Bunbury, 27 November 1810 and 28 November 1810.
67. UKNA, WO3/599, Torrens to Liverpool, 23 May 1811.
68. For instance, the 2/34th and 2/39th went to Portugal in 1809, UKNA, WO1/641, Gordon to Robinson, 2 June 1809.
69. UKNA, WO1/637, Gordon to Stewart, 21 March 1808.
70. UKNA, WO1/647, Calvert to Bunbury, 1 May 1811; WO1/648, York to Wellington, 28 August 1811.
71. UKNA, WO1/654, York to Wellington, 13 January 1813.
72. *Eleventh Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry* (London: ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 1810), pp. 59–60.
73. *Eleventh Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry*, p. 14.
74. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XIX, 666, 668.
75. Aspinall (ed.), *Later Correspondence of George III*, IV, 609, Perceval to the King, 23 July 1807.

76. UKNA, WO1/1114, John Cartwig (Sussex) to Castlereagh, 10 July 1807.
77. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, pp. 83–84.
78. UKNA, WO25/3224, Scheme for New Modelling the Army by Calvert, November 1809.
79. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 2nd Series, 7, 193–197.
80. BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38244, ff. 207–210, Lt. Col. Theophilus Pritzler to Bunbury, with comments by Calvert, 24 February 1810.
81. UKNA, WO30/80, Defence Report, 1 January 1811.
82. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 1111–1117, speech of Sidmouth in the Lords.
83. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 2nd Series, 7, 79, Lord Melville to Castlereagh, 16 July 1807.
84. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 932, speech of Col. Stanley. He was colonel of the 2nd Lancashire Militia, son of 12th Earl Derby, and supported the Talents.
85. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 945, speech of Whitbread.
86. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 935–940 (Calcraft and Bastard), 962 (Lord Petty) and 1181 (Sidmouth).
87. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 841.
88. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1809, XII, 803.
89. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 863; 1809, XII, 159.
90. UKNA, WO1/906, Memorandum of Militia Volunteering, 1811.
91. Vane (ed.), *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 2nd Series, 7, 55; Measures proposed for Improving the State of the Military Force, 12 May 1807.
92. Western, *The English Militia*, pp. 277–285.
93. Cookson, *British Armed Nation*, particularly chapter 4, pp. 95–125.
94. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1807, IX, 864; BL, Liverpool papers, Add. Mss. 38361, ff. 65–69, Draft Measure for keeping up the Regular Army (late 1810?).
95. Charles Duke Young, *The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, Second Earl Liverpool* (London: Macmillan, 1868), pp. 364–367, Liverpool to Wellington, 20 February 1811.
96. Young, *Life of Liverpool*, p. 337, Liverpool to Wellington, 10 September 1810.
97. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XV, 613. Army Estimates, House of Commons, 26 February 1810 <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1810/feb/26/ammy-estimates>.
98. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', pp. 259–260.
99. Sir Norman Chester, *The English Administrative System 1780–1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 123–141.
100. Eastwood, ' "Amplifying the Province of the Legislature" ', 276–294.

7   The Legacy of the Peninsular War

1. Thomas Dwight Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992).
2. UKNA, WO3/610, Torrens to York, 30 December 1815.
3. UKNA, WO6/135, Bunbury to Torrens, 7 February 1815. WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 3 November 1815.
4. Chester, *The English Administrative System*, pp. 197–208.

5. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', pp. 255–258.

6. H. Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830–54* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 181.

7. For details see T. F. Mills, 'Regiments and Corps of the British Army 1759–1763' and 'Regiments and Corps of the British Army, 1781', *Land Forces of Britain, the Empire, and the Commonwealth* (n.d.) <http://web.archive.org/web/20060908203711/www.regiments.org/regiments/uk/lists/ba1760.htm> and <http://web.archive.org/web/20070415052200/www.regiments.org/regiments/uk/lists/ba1781.htm> (6 August 2009).

8. Holmes, *Redcoat*, p. 105.

9. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 25 December 1811.

10. UKNA, WO25/3224, Torrens to Bunbury, 10 January 1811.

11. UKNA, WO25/3224, Return of men raised at regimental headquarters, 19 October 1809.

12. All regiments above the 100th were drafted, which caused riots by soldiers at Cork, Dublin and Sheffield; McAnally, *The Irish Militia*, p. 85.

13. See entries in UKNA, WO380/3.

14. The Army of Reserve Act of 1803 intended to raise 50,000 men by ballot for service in the UK; the Permanent Additional Force Act of 1804 asked for 20,000 men to be raised by parish officials. Hall, *British Strategy*, pp. 3–5. See UKNA, WO380/1, /2, /3 for details of new battalions.

15. UKNA, WO3/44, Calvert to Maj. Gen. MacKenzie, 1 December 1807.

16. UKNA, WO3/46, Calvert to the Duke of Kent, 16 September 1808.

17. UKNA, WO3/44, Calvert to Maj. Gen. MacKenzie, 1 December 1807.

18. UKNA, WO3/44, Calvert to Gen. Dundas (col. 8th), 16 October 1807.

19. UKNA, WO25/3224, Return of British Army, 25 April 1810. Overall there were 69,280 soldiers in the UK (excluding artillery), of whom 11,832 were sick (17.1 per cent).

20. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 7 December 1811.

21. UKNA, WO25/3224, York to Liverpool, 27 September 1811. It released 3790 cavalry (from 9566) and 5140 infantry (from 17,450).

22. UKNA, WO25/3225, York to Bathurst, 30 August and 20 October 1813.

23. WO1/903, Memorandum to the Cabinet, 26 May 1807.

24. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords Debate 10 August 1807, vol. 9, cc. 1106–51, 'MILITIA TRANSFER BILL', <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1807/aug/10/militia-transfer-bill> (29 July 2009).

25. UKNA, WO1/645, Dundas to Liverpool, 30 December 1810; WO1/646, Lt. Col. Henry Torrens to Lt. Col. Henry Edward Bunbury, 10 January 1811.

26. UKNA, WO6/134, Bunbury to Torrens, 9 January 1811; WO1/646, Torrens to Bunbury, 10 January 1811.

27. UKNA, WO380/1–4.

28. UKNA, WO1/652, York to Bathurst, 17 July 1812.

29. This had been the problem in the early 1790s; see Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain', pp. 46–47.

30. UKNA, WO3/585, Memorandum by Calvert, 10 February 1813. The minimum height was 5' 3" (compared with 5' 4" for the line), and the recruit had to be under 40 (or 35 for the line), see Table B.1.

31. UKNA, WO1/1115, H. Kelsey (ERO, Whitchurch near Reading) to Windham, 2 January 1807.

32. UKNA, WO1/640, York to Castlereagh, 16 January 1809; WO6/133, Stewart to Gordon, 28 March 1809.

33. For 84th, UKNA, WO1/637, York to Castlereagh, 6 January 1808; for 11th, WO1/638, York to Castlereagh, 28 June 1808; for 56th, WO1/656, York to Bathurst, 30 September 1813; for 1st Foot Guards, WO1/651, Torrens to Bunbury, 2 June 1812.

34. Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, pp. 137–157.

35. UKNA, WO3/46, Calvert to Kent, 29 July 1808 and 1 August 1808.

36. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1810–1811, XV, 607 and particularly Mr Wardle's speech 627–628. House of Commons debate, 26 February 1810, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1810/feb/26/ammy-estimates>.

37. Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, pp. 54–55; Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', pp. 29–30.

38. G. H. Cleare, 'County Names for Regiments in 1782', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 38 (1962): 34–38.

39. T. F. Mills, '1st Battalion 34th Foot', *Land Forces of Britain, the Empire, and the Commonwealth* <http://web.archive.org/web/20070223024819/www.regiments.org/deploy/uk/reg-inf/034-1.htm> (6 August 2009).

40. T. F. Henderson, 'Lennox, Charles, Fourth Duke of Richmond and Fourth Duke of Lennox (1764–1819)', rev. Roger T. Stearn, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/16452> (29 July 2009); I. F. W. Beckett, *Discovering English County Regiments* (Princes Risborough: Shire, 2003), pp. 117–119.

41. Alexander Rodger, *Battle Honours of the British Empire and Commonwealth Land Forces, 1662–1991* (Ramsbury: Crowood, 2003).

42. See, for example, Lt. Gen. Dalyrmple's dispatch on the convention of Cintra in *The London Gazette*, 16182, 16 September 1808, p. 1257, <http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/16182/pages/1257> (7 August 2009) and Wellesley's dispatch on the passage of the Oporto, *The London Gazette*, 16259, 25 May 1809, p. 730, <http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/16259/pages/730> (7 August 2009).

43. Beckett, *Discovering English County Regiments*, pp. 33–34, 63–64.

44. Frey, *British Soldier in America*.

45. Brumwell, *Redcoats*, p. 293; Holmes, *Redcoat*, p. 105; 'Return of Effective Strength of British Army: 1775–82', *House of Commons Papers; Accounts And Papers*, 1806, X, p. 393, paper number 172; UKNA, WO25/3225, Return of the Effective Strength of the Army, 8 February 1815.

46. Rodger, *Battle honours*.

47. John Cook and Robert Burnham, 'Nicknames of British Units during the Napoleonic Wars', *The Napoleon Series* (2000), <http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_nickname.html> (6 August 2009).

48. 'King's Royal Hussars, History & Traditions, Battle Honours', *British Army Website*, <http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/15750.aspx> (7 August 2009).

49. James Lunt, 'Cannon, Richard (1779–1865)', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) <http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/4559> (28 November 2008).

50. *A Short History of the Highland Regiment; Interspersed with Some Occasional Observations as to the Present State of the Country, ...* (London: n.d., 1743).

51. *An Historical Account of the British Regiments Employed since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. in the Formation and Defence of the Dutch Republic, Particularly of the Scotch Brigade* (London: n.d., 1795).

52. *Some Account of the Twenty-sixth, or Cameronian Regiment: from its Formation to the Present Period* (London: printed by Gunnell and Shearman for G. Mills, 1828).

53. *Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from the Year 1727, to the Present Time. By R. Beatson, ...* (London: n.d., 1790) 3 vols.

54. Richard Cannon, *Historical Records of the Fourteenth, or the King's, Regiment Light Dragoons* (London: Parker, Furnivall & Parker, 1847), pp. i–ii.

55. The material now forms the file UKNA, WO43/759.

56. UKNA, WO43/759, MacDonald (Adjutant General) to Sulivan (Deputy Secretary at War), 7 November 1840.

57. UKNA, WO43/759, Memorandum relating to the Records of Regiments, Horse Guards, 30 April 1840.

58. UKNA, WO43/759, MacDonald to Sulivan, 21 March, 1842.

59. UKNA, WO43/759, ff. 90, Copies of Regimental Histories.

60. UKNA, WO43/759, Richard Cannon to MacDonald, 14 April 1845; MacDonald to Sulivan, 16 June 1845.

61. Thomas Pococke, *Journal of a Soldier of the Seventy-first, or Glasgow Regiment, Highland Light Infantry, from 1806 to 1815* (Edinburgh: W. and C. Tait, 1819); Stephen Morley's *Memoirs of a Serjeant of the 5th regt. of Foot Containing an Account of his Service in Hanover, South America, and the Peninsula* (Ashford: Printed by J. Elliott and Son [1818?]).

62. Pococke, *Journal of a Soldier of the Seventy-first*, pp. 231–232.

63. Archibald Constable (ed.), *Memorials of the Late Wars* (Edinburgh: Constable & Co., 1828), p. 29.

64. Edward Costello, *The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1968); Christopher Hibbert (ed.), *The Recollection of Rifleman Harris* (London: Leo Cooper, 1970); John Kincaid, *Adventures in the Rifle Brigade and Random Shots from a Rifleman* (Glasgow: Richard Drew Publishing, 1981); Jonathan Leach, *Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier* (Cambridge: Ken Trotman, 1986); George Simmons, *A British Rifleman: Journals and Correspondence during the Peninsular War and the Campaign of Wellington* (London: Greenhill, 1986); Harry Smith, *The Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith: 1787–1819* (London: Constable, 1999); William Surtees, *Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade* (London: Greenhill, 1996); John Teague and Dorothea Teague (eds.), *Where Duty Calls Me: The Experiences of William Green of Lutterworth in the Napoleonic Wars* (West Wickham: Synjon Books, 1975). See also C. A. Stevens, 'The Rifle Brigade 1800 to *c*.1870: A Study of Social, Cultural and Religious Attitudes', PhD (University of Sheffield, 1996).

65. UKNA, WO3/585, Darling to receiving officer at Manchester, 6 May 1812; For the establishment of a depot for the south-east at Tilbury fort see WO3/584, Wynyard to IFOs of London, Maidstone, Ipswich and Bedford districts, 5 December 1808; Calvert to Taylor, 20 August 1808.

66. 47 Geo. III, c32, sec. vi; Mutiny Act, 23 March 1807.

67. UKNA, WO3/159, Calvert to Deputy Secretary at War, 29 May 1813.

68. UKNA, WO3/49, 28 September 1809.
69. UKNA, WO1/774, Williams to Sir George Shee, 17 February 1807; WO1/638, Gordon to Stewart, 28 June 1808; WO3/158, Calvert to Merry, 13 February 1812 (for 103rd).
70. UKNA, WO3/193, Calvert to OC Army Depot, 9 July 1807.
71. UKNA, WO1/635, Gordon to Cooke, 25 July 1807; WO6/133, Stewart to Gordon, 20 January 1808; Gordon to Stewart, 9 April 1808.
72. UKNA, WO3/45, Wynyard to Bgd. Gen. Fraser, 18 March 1808.
73. UKNA, WO3/197, Calvert to OC Army Depot, 2 August 1809; Wynyard to Taylor, 26 August 1809.
74. UKNA, WO3/155, Wynyard to Moore, 17 March and 5 April 1808.
75. UKNA, WO1/634, Gordon to Cockburn, 2 March 1807, suggesting depot on the Scilly Isles.
76. UKNA, WO380/5, entry for York Chasseurs.
77. CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/1, Calvert to Taylor.
78. Bartlett, 'The Development of the British Army', p. 137.
79. UKNA, WO3/45, Wynyard to Lt. Gen. Lord Fitzroy (Ipswich), 15 March 1808.
80. UKNA, WO3/49, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Theter, 18 December 1809.
81. Calvert had an ally in Perceval, CHA, Calvert Papers, 9/101/2, Calvert to Perceval, 25 February 1808. See WO3/49, Calvert to Maj. Gen. Whetham, 30 December 1809, for holding divine service at all military stations; UKNA, WO3/49, Calvert to Duke of Cambridge, 15 January 1810, for arrangements for the Guards in London.
82. Charles O'Neil claimed to be responsible for this, after he complained to the Duke of York for being confined and receiving 300 lashes for refusing to attend a Church of England service. O'Neil, *The Military Adventures of Charles O'Neil*, pp. 44–48.
83. UKNA, HO50/413, Gordon to Jenkinson, 9 September 1809, incl. Deardon (Lt. Col. 1st West Yorkshire Militia) to Gordon, 6 September 1809; Gordon to Jenkinson, 19 September 1809; Torrens to Beckett, 5 October 1809, HO51/171, Jenkinson to Gordon, 18 September 1809.
84. E. and A. Linklater, *The Black Watch: The History of the Royal Highland Regiment* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1977), pp. 89–90.
85. Eric Hobsbawn and Terrence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), *passim*.
86. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 'Regiment, n. 8'.

8 Conclusion: Britain and Wellington's Army

1. Richard Cannon, *Historical Records of the Seventy-Third Foot* (London: Parker, Furnival & Parker, 1851), pp. 29–30.
2. UKNA, WO1/946, Return of Recruits raised from 1803, 21 March 1811.
3. J. E. Cookson, 'Political Arithmetic and War in Britain, 1793–1815', *War and Society* 1 (1983): 42.
4. A. D. Harvey, *Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793–1945* (London: Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 160–162.
5. W. D. Rubenstein, 'The End of "Old Corruption" in Britain', *Past and Present* 101 (1983): 81. Rubenstein also argues that 'Old Corruption' ended because

the aristocracy reformed British government itself, i.e. like the army, reform leadership emanated from the top.

6. In a French department in 1806, 37 per cent of the men liable for conscription were removed from the lists due to physical infirmities or not meeting the height requirement. Isser Woloch, 'Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society', *Past & present* 111 (1986): 128–129.

7. Alexander Grab, 'Army, State, and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)', *The Journal of Modern History* 67 (1995): 31.

8. Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 220.

9. For the importance of the Highland regiments in Scottish culture, particularly the relationship with tartar and kilts, see Hugh Trevor Roper 'The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland', in *The Invention of Tradition*, eds Eric Hobsbawn and Terrence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 25–26.

10. UKNA, WO43/759, Treasury Chambers note, 1 February 1854.

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