Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century

Richard Ivan Jobs
and
David M. Pomfret

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TRANSNATIONAL HISTORIES OF YOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century

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

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For Greta, Ezra, Damon and Neve

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Series Editors' Preface

'Youth is like early spring, like the rising sun, like trees and grass in bud, like a newly sharpened blade. It is the most valuable period of life.' So wrote the Chinese political thinker Chen Duxiu, a future founder of the Chinese Communist Party, in 1915. His words expressed a feeling that was in some ways new and exciting in the China of the early twentieth century, that it might not be in the venerable Confucian elders of the country that salvation lay, but rather in the contributions of the next generation. That sense of excitement runs through this groundbreaking collection of essays which gives a powerful and often surprising view of the power of youth to shape modern history. The transnational element is at the heart of the enterprise, and as the editors point out, youth often considered *itself* more transnational than the older generations, with dreams and aspirations that pointed to mobility and possibility. Transnational organizations, of course, were also central to the idea of youth self-actualization, the Boy Scouts being among the groups that found a place in locations as far apart as Japan and Belgium. But flows were not always structured in terms of organizations; music was a force for youthful encounter, as was fashion. (The *stilyagi* (hipsters) of the mid-Cold War period who caused such a stir in buttoned-up Moscow made enough of a splash to be remembered decades later in a hit 2008 Russian film.) Many of the key themes of modern social history are here, race and gender among them. For young women and men also imagined themselves in a whole variety of ways, some sharing similarity of taste and preference across cultural and geographical boundaries, others tied up in phenomena deeply shaped by their own location. For transnational youth, the global and the local came together in powerful and often unexpected ways.

The study of youth is a field still in formation. What youth is, when it begins, and when it ends, remain questions yet to be fully answered. In our own century, when medical advances and hygiene have meant that it is commoner to live into later decades than our ancestors could have imagined, we should remember that the idea of a lengthy youth lasting into one's 20s might have seemed odd to generations who might expect to live only into their 40s or a little beyond. The twentieth century marks the first historical occasion when large swathes of youth around the globe, even in parts of the world where life expectancy had been low, were able to conduct lives long enough to make youth a topic worthy of study. Despite the wars and destruction that marked that last century, the emergence of youth as a subject of enquiry should be a cause for celebration. That a collection such as this could exist, showing connection, flow and influence between youth in different places and different times, should also be celebrated.

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This book developed out of a four-panel strand organized at the Society for the History of Childhood and Youth (SCHY) conference 'The State of Children: Politics and Policies of Childhood in Global Perspective', held at Columbia University in June 2011. At this meeting we were able to identify 14 participants for our larger project, then called 'A Transnational Age'. We then invited those selected to participate in a dedicated workshop held at the University of Hong Kong in June 2012. We also hosted a panel entitled 'Transnational Histories of Youth' at the snowswept January 2014 meeting of the American Historical Association.

We would like to thank all of the 2011 SHCY panelists, commentators, and audiences for their input, the 2012 Hong Kong workshop participants for their productive effort, and the volume's final contributors for their cooperation, good humor, and support throughout the project. We would also like to thank the series editors Professor Akira Iriye and Professor Rana Mitter for their enthusiasm and support and the editorial staff at Palgrave Macmillan, particularly Jen McCall, for their expert help in preparing the book for publication. This book benefited greatly from the input of anonymous reviewers and we would like to take this opportunity to thank both for their comments on the original manuscript.

As we put together the final manuscript – in the midst of the dramatic early days of the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests of 2014 – the assitance of Zardas Lee Shuk-man, Research Associate for the Transnational Histories of Youth project, was invaluable. We should also like to thank Ruby Leung Nga-ching for her able assistance in the organization of the Columbia conference strand, the running of the workshop at The University of Hong Kong in 2012 and the preparation of the index for this book. We thank Wilhelmina Ko Yuk-hang for the superb artwork created to publicize the Hong Kong workshop, and for the production and maintenance of the 'Transnational Age' project website.

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The Transnationality of Youth

Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret

In the early twenty-first century, the world witnessed an extraordinary spate of protests led by young people acting within and across transnational networks. More adept at manipulating social media and less invested in the status quo than older cohorts, youth emerged at the forefront of a series of attacks upon conventional paradigms, standard models and established political, economic, and social hierarchies. While their character and content defied easy description or analysis, these events appeared to some commentators to underline the significance of youth not only as a media-ready concept and political category but as a social group capable of giving expression to distinctively new, transnational ways of thinking and acting.[1]

In this book we argue that these recent developments should be recognized less as the genesis and more as the latest stage in the development of the transnational practices of the young. While it has been well-established that the invention of youth as both a life-stage and a social group is a component of industrial modernity, it should be emphasized that this, too, was a transnational process. Whether we consider the association of the young and youth with radical ideas of revolution in the late eighteenth century, or the efforts to define adolescence in the late nineteenth century, or a discernible pop culture based on leisure and consumption in the late twentieth century, the history of youth is a transnational one.

Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century investigates these historical roots, by examining the connections between youth, both as a cultural category and social body, and the forging of the modern world order. Given that a striking feature of the previous century was the sociological fact of young people on the move, studying youth as they reached across national borders and boundaries brings together two of the most remarkable historical phenomena of the century. Young people embodied and exploited the global shifts and flows that accompanied the acceleration of commercial and cultural exchange defined through trading networks, the expansion of empires, or the mastery of new technologies of travel

and communication. Meanwhile, it was in modern cultures and contexts of transfer and exchange that new understandings of youth took shape, both as an individual life-stage distinct from that of childhood or adulthood and as a social collective distinguished from the larger 'adult' social order. This book considers how locales such as clubs, hostels, and ocean liners, as well as specific formal and informal practices, from dancing and hiking to writing and protesting to musical production and consumption, were all implicated in this process. How did they connect with, and define new meanings of, youthful transnationality? And to what extent was youth intertwined with forms of social ordering, such as cultures of colonialism or even the disciplinary organization of new professional bodies for scientific study?

This book elaborates on the mutual idioms of youth and 'the modern', with their common focus upon mobility, malleability, transition and transformation, as they challenged and informed debates about citizenship, nationhood, and cosmopolitanism, and inspired new rationales for the reorganization of society. The young themselves fashioned and disseminated ideas about being or becoming modern as part of this global process. Although these ideas and identities, as well as the sites upon which they were elaborated and contested, were often ephemeral, this book reveals the enduring significance of young people's contributions as social actors defined in terms of age and connected across distinctively youthful networks. It explores such connections through a number of case studies addressing these key themes in different settings.

To engage the global dimensions of youth transnationality, this volume draws together essays dealing with a variety of settings and the movements of young people within and between them. It features research with a truly global reach. By setting this global history in and between local contexts, it reveals China, the Middle East, South America, Asia and Africa, as well as Europe and the United States, as critical sites in this modern history. Through an interdisciplinary crossing of scholarly fields and geographical specialty, our aim is to rethink approaches to the social practices and symbolic meanings of youth and the youthful mobilities that defined and redefined it. The book contributes to scholarly debates on globalization, transnationality, and cosmopolitanism not only by bringing new perspectives defined in terms of age to bear upon the literature, but by also drawing from different locales to those more commonly considered.

There is good reason to trace the global genealogies of youth cultural practices as they manifested themselves locally. Youthful activities, mobilities, and identities were produced in a complex dynamic between local and national contexts, and across trans-colonial and metropolitan networks, sometimes affirming but often also challenging ideas of 'youth' as a coherent category or experience. Studying the young can reveal the significance of age to the complex valences of transnationality. Moreover, the use

of a transnational approach can reveal the unexamined but fundamental ways in which the accelerated contacts and interactions of the twentieth-century world had a profound impact on the lives of the young and the formation of youth as a social body. Notions of youth had different meanings in different global contexts, in large part because these ideas were inflected in new directions by the crossing of borders. Thus, not only were young people on the move, so too were conceptualizations about what it meant to be young.

Moving formations: defining youth in the modern world

This raises the question of what, specifically, counts as 'youth'. The field of the history of children and youth is now well established and a rich body of historical scholarship exists documenting the emergence and development of youth both as a symbolic and a sociological component of industrial modernity.[2] This literature shows that the ways in which youth was culturally constructed and performed remained highly varied over time and space. Youth's own boundaries remained rather dynamic. The contributions collected here deal mainly with individuals and groups who were biologically young, but sit between childhood and adulthood. They do not rely upon some a priori, sociological definition of 'youth' or a legalistic or biological one that affixes a determined age. Instead what counts as youth here is whatever contemporary actors understood that category to mean. While youth was often biologically determined, it is always historically so. Even those who were not biologically young, in their thirties say, could also at times lay claim to membership of youth by embodying its symbolic qualities, as we shall see.

While a vast literature has exposed the shifting constructedness of 'youth', this volume demonstrates that transnationality was essential in distinguishing youth as a social group from that of children and adults.[3] In much of the scholarship dealing with the subject of youth in the twentieth century the emphasis has remained on national or state-centered perspectives. Many studies have focused on adult agents who sought to channel, contain, and direct flows of youthful activity. In most cultures and societies, the modern era brought a finer segmentation of life stages for those approaching adulthood. The 'discovery of adolescence' in the nineteenth century culminated in its gradual extension across class lines. Young people's growing visibility and social differentiation in urbanizing milieux made youth valuable as a concept enhancing the legibility of populations in the eyes of modernizing states. But in this period young people were also often assigned distinct roles with a view to tapping the vibrancy and dynamism they were assumed to possess by virtue of their age. Youth was often conceived of as a vanguard, and could be called upon to embody or serve a variety of ideologies, political projects, and aspirations.[4] Whether

the vision of the nation was imperial, socialist, or nationalist, 'youth' was heralded across the twentieth century as a salve for social pathologies such as cultural fragmentation, individualism, or racial degeneration, among others.

While one of the striking features of the twentieth century was the investment in youth of a remarkable degree of redemptive coherence and agency, as several chapters in this volume demonstrate, an equally striking feature of even such 'national' youth movements was how quickly they exceeded such confines and traveled along global networks. Youth movements quickly transgressed the boundaries of the nation-state, as well as those delimiting race, class, and (though less often) gender. So it was that 'Scoutey Boys', for example, and other equivalents of Robert Baden-Powell's import to Britain from its empire were re-exported to the world, to the extent that by 1922, in a little over a decade, the first world census of the Boy Scout Association could claim over one million members for the organization.[5] That this movement quickly exceeded national bounds was amply demonstrated by the vast public celebrations such as the international jamborees that drew young people together across borders in unprecedented ways, and the variety of meanings that they ascribed to these new forms of transnational sociability. In recent years, the history of children and childhood has also experienced a 'global turn' but there has not yet been any equivalent 'turn' in relation to youth.[6] While acknowledging the relational and interconnected nature of histories of youth, children, and adults it is our contention that the betwixt and betweenness of youth – those neither wholly child nor adult but somewhere in between – merits study. Examining the transnationality of youth can help historians to reflect in more sophisticated, fine-grained ways upon such differences, for an important distinction setting these three life stages apart is the comparative autonomy, freedom from adult responsibility and flux of youthful agency, as expressed through the transnational activities, mobilities, and identities that this collection explores.

Transnational maneuvers: toward new histories of youth

In the last two decades the concept of the transnational has come into academic vogue as a means to explain the present condition and/or process of globalization. Across a variety of disciplines, scholars have found the dislocations and transferals inherent to transnationality valuable as an analytical tool. They have, for example, used this perspective to question identity and to critique the binarisms of colonial discourse. Historians, in particular, continue to write primarily within well-established national paradigms, but they have also begun to address the question of how moving beyond the singular nation-state as the primary category of analysis can enhance our understanding of the past.[7] Conceptions of transnational history vary but most examine units smaller or larger than nations that extend across and

pervade national borderlines.[8] Although transnational history has grown from the roots of national history and a critique of the comparative method, it affords a perspective allowing nations to be seen as 'fragile, constructed, imagined'.[9] The advantage of this approach is to bring out connections, reveal heterogeneity, and lay bare intricate processes and negotiations.

World history and global history differ in important ways from the transnational perspective. Where global history seeks to explore the main problems of global change over time with a particular line of inquiry concerned with the diverse histories of globalization, transnational history seeks to decenter the nation as the primary frame of historical inquiry by studying the movements and flows of people, ideas, things, and institutions across national or other defined borders. The modern nation-state remains an essential component in this history, but one which cannot contain or exclude dynamic historical phenomena at its borders. Transnational history differs from international history where the relationship between nation-states is the primary focus of study as well as comparative history which seeks to explore similar historical developments in different societies (often nations) in search of revealing patterns. While the individual essays in this volume each adopt a transnational perspective, considering the collection together as a whole reveals interesting comparative and global dimensions.[10]

While transnational studies and the study of youth have both been areas generating substantial interest among researchers, students, and lay readers in recent years, very few have yet brought together youth and transnationality as the starting point for historical investigation. By placing youth at the center of the transnational dynamic, these essays move discussion beyond existing scholarship, which tends toward a top-down, institutional approach often defined by the organizing paradigm of the nation. By revealing the diversity of experiences and strategies uncontained by national boundaries (which nevertheless gave meaning to the category of youth and the lives of young people) this book sets out to offer a useful complement, and corrective, to established national histories of youth. It aims to examine the symbolism and mobile agency of youth both as a social body and as a cultural concept from a transnational historical perspective. It provides new insight into the study of transnationality and the study of youth through a coherent methodological approach foregrounding concern for context, continuity, and change while emphasizing particularity rather than universality and utilizing an archival evidentiary base. To achieve this, we reevaluate the role of young people, youth, and youth cultures in the temporally – and geographically – specific past processes which have produced the globalized present. This book, by analyzing the meaning of youth embedded within transnational social and cultural systems, reveals important historical contingencies of the twentieth century.

Locating youthfulness in transnational mobility

Making a case for age as a useful analytic tool on the grounds of global ubiquity is an important contribution of this book. However, it is not our contention that twentieth-century youth, as a group, were somehow 'uniquely' transnational. Empirical data quantifying youthful transnational mobility that might support such a claim is lacking. The twentieth century began and ended with an unprecedented global movement of peoples, not only of the young. But studies of the waves of migration that bookended the century do suggest that transnational movement by young people formed part of a more general explosion of migratory movement that characterized its first decade.[11]

We know remarkably little of how these waves of migration intersected with experiences of youth or age, even though many of the migrants were young. Remarkably enough, in spite of the recognized importance of youthfulness to twentieth-century international migrations, whether occasioned by war, trans-oceanic travel, indentured or bonded labor, seasonal work or the fragmentation of vast empires, one contributor to scholarship on migration studies has observed, 'it is rare to find this key factor the focus of debate'.[12] Earlier studies of transnationality neglected age, focusing mainly upon the structural factors driving global movements of populations and capital.[13] In recent years, scholars, notably anthropologists such as Cati Coe and her collaborators, have identified this lacuna and interest in a new research agenda foregrounding age has begun to grow.[14] But among those interested in the histories of children and youth in migration movements the tendency has still been to deal more specifically with children within the institution of the family, rather than youth beyond it.[15] For this reason, when Akira Iriye looked to set down an agenda for future research in his *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present and Future* (2013) he identified the need for studies of youth and age as a way of moving the field forward.[16]

The work of scholars of migratory movements usefully raises the question of what was distinctive about youth transnational mobility in the twentieth century. Earlier work suggests that as societies modernized from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, if anything, mobility appears to have become more evenly spread across the age spectrum. This was especially evident in the twentieth century when rising life expectancy put older cohorts on the move. But what the twentieth century did bring, in contrast to earlier periods, was opportunities to move both more swiftly and more frequently across borders and over much larger distances. Where previously migratory movements tended to be over shorter distances, from countryside to cities, for example, the application of new technologies to transport inspired a sense that the world was both becoming a smaller place and that it was spinning faster on its axis.

Gradually and unevenly, to be sure, a variety of other changes brought a finer segmentation of age, while travel and mobility also put youth on the move, helping to disseminate and increase the visibility of taxonomies distinguishing the young from adults. Mass education provided an essential basis in which this sense of difference was grounded, not only in that it delayed young people's entry to the workplace but also because it encouraged the deferral of marriage until later in life. Meanwhile the nation-state's intervention would serve in this century to fix and institutionalize life stages and boundaries in law with greater consistency across national lines. This process was accompanied by economic and social changes that disrupted older notions of a 'life cycle', and these transformative shifts reinforced associations of youth with independence and access to a less spatially constrained world.

Thus in certain times and places it does appear that younger people displayed a more pronounced tendency toward transnational mobility. Efforts to assemble large conscript armies in the century's two great wars from 1914–18 and 1937–45, for example, triggered the transnational and global mobility of large numbers of male youth on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, the scale of this warfare and the exposure and involvement of noncombatant populations in it blurred boundaries between civilians and soldiers and thus also awareness of wartime mobility as a distinctively 'youthful' experience. While soldiers were often young, war tended to flatten out and obscure the particular youthfulness of this mobility because the exigencies of conflicts often put older people and a broad array of adult institutions on the move as well.

While youth did not necessarily move *more*, neither did they necessarily possess some essential tendency to develop transnational imaginaries more readily or enthusiastically than did others. Instead, what the essays here reveal is that young people often saw themselves as being *especially* transnational. They were therefore inclined to configure their own mobility as a special and distinct privilege of their age. In this way age made an important difference to what they saw as the quality of their own activity, mobility, and identity. Youth who made a break from their families and *pays nataux* stood at a temporal juncture *before* what they often imagined to be the greater confinement of marriage, family formation, and career. This encouraged them to explore the possibility of configuring transnationality in terms of quite different relations and obligations, beyond the family and other adult institutions, for example, to peer groups of a similar age. It also allowed them to envisage their actions in the present as being both somehow 'freer' and as possessing greater potential historical weight and momentum. In these ways young people imagined their transnationality as distinctive to other varieties lived and articulated by children and adults, as many of the contributions to this volume show.

From the early twentieth century, youth already inhabited a life stage associated, in many cultures, with 'transition', 'preparation', or 'education'. This was a period in which private benefactors devoted substantial levels of funding to providing larger numbers of young people with 'international experience'. The late nineteenth century had already seen experiments setting youth on the move for the purpose of study abroad. Chinese students enrolled in universities in the United States, Cambodian and Vietnamese students visited France to study at the Ecole Coloniale, Malayan students holding Straits Settlements scholarships enrolled in British universities. However, these were small beginnings compared with what the study abroad movement would grow into in the twentieth century.[17] In affluent societies and among the more affluent sections of less wealthy societies, travel abroad organized by schools or other institutions came to be regarded as affording young people an experience that derived its value in large part from the age of those involved. By this time with the adaptation of steam technology to maritime transport the costs of long distance travel were falling. As travel became more affordable it came to be seen not only as a practice of the rich, but as one that might also enrich youthful minds. The crossing of borders during youth began to be defined in terms of an essential 'preparation' for the crossing of thresholds in adulthood.

In the first half of the century these transfers occurred in a world still defined by the global phenomenon of empire. But the postwar process of decolonization shattered these fragile and increasingly anachronistic unities and brought new nations into being. Often, it was those who had explored opportunities available to them in their youth to travel to metropoles via imperial networks who were in the vanguard of fashioning these new nation-states. Men such as Lee Kwan Yew, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Tunku Abdul Rahman acquired what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has referred to as 'cultural capital', in the educational institutions of former colonizing powers and drew upon this as they moved into high office. They did so at a time when the Cold War was dramatically reshaping transnational mobility.

In much literature on globalization this geo-political shift has been configured in terms of attenuating flows of capital and cross-border movement, literally and symbolically. But it hardly put an end to migration. And as we shall see, in many ways the Cold War stimulated the elaboration of new networks of youth transnationality.[18] On either side of the Iron Curtain desires that youth should substantiate ideological affiliations animated a variety of official and unofficial projects.[19] As we shall see, youth cultures continued to cross borders, flowing through the narrowest of conduits and stimulating new, multivalent subcultural styles. By the time the Communist hegemon collapsed the freer movement of people and capital brought a vast upsurge in transnational mobility. In an era of global backpacking, youth circulated through the old heartlands of the Soviet Union's Eastern Empire

clutching rail passes and guide books. Young people continued to be specifically associated, in particular times and places, with the pleasures and possibilities of transnationalism, defined as distinct from those available to or useful for children or adults.

Chimeric freedoms: youth identities and sensibilities in practice

It may not initially appear likely that people separated in space, living in and formed by vastly diverse cultures and entirely different societies, whose lives were striated by multiple boundaries, might be capable of forging a sense of shared identity around a category as transient as age. It is our contention that by focusing upon the 'what' and the 'where' of these practices, sensibilities, and communities, and in the historical specificity of their interconnections, we are able to raise a notion as seemingly nebulous as 'youth transnationality' to the status of a governing paradigm for this project. In this book, cities represent important contexts for the development of such social and cultural systems, as well as nodes or stopping points linking networks within which the young elaborated transnational practices. Recently, scholars working in urban studies have begun to track the connections between categories and cultural representations of age, class, gender, and sexuality, and also young people's roles in the socio-political affiliations of modern cities.[20] However, less attention has yet been given to the flows between such sites. These essays engage with the role and meaning of specific places within networks of transnational youth that have rarely been considered, but which linked Washington, DC with Dar es Salaam, Leningrad with London, or Hanoi with Saigon, Canton, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, and Paris. They also, as in the case of the essays by Chatani and Manzano, investigate networked links forged by young people between rural and urban space. Such an approach brings to bear a new perspective upon engagements with the social and cultural history of urban networks, 'global cities' and their hinterlands, which have almost entirely overlooked the variable of age.[21]

The essays collected here also reveal how the ethos of a transnational and diasporic way of life could, when put into practice, run up against and become enmeshed with other social values related to social class, gender, sexuality, and generation. One important advantage of the transnational perspective is that it may throw the emphasis onto the agency of the individual and group, and this brings into focus the fault lines of identity, and the social categories upon which power relations are defined and played out. Scholars have tended to overlook age as a variable compared with other standard analytic categories.[22] However, by focusing on the category of youth alongside nation, race, class, and gender as an explanatory variable, *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century* aims to unsettle those categories by exploring new dimensions of them. Such a maneuver is

potentially productive in that it can reveal the importance of age as a variable working in tandem with these others to reproduce or challenge power relations, and it can bring to light connections between cultures, life-stages, and life trajectories.

Transnationality, rather like 'youth', has often been associated with practices conceived of as liberatory and 'counter-hegemonic'.[23] As the contributors show, scores of young people drew inspiration from the notion that through a transnationality of age they might join larger unities, and network themselves into larger, global, and even epochal shifts. And yet, very often such hopes were dashed as the idea of a broader transnational youth sensibility, and more especially its associated freedoms, proved to be chimeric. In some cases, as several of the essays collected here reveal, youth institutional practices reinforced or reproduced the nation even as those manipulating them were tantalized by the prospect that it might be exceeded. 'Youth' represented an ideal of modernity, a category upon which nationhood *and* projects explicitly transgressing its borders were structured. Quite often, as the contributors to this volume show, it was those young people who were particularly adept at crossing boundaries who devoted themselves to imagining new national futures, and to putting them into practice.[24] These kinds of contradictions and their capacity to destabilize are foregrounded in this volume, both with reference to the actions of individual young people and representations of them as a collective.

Reconnecting other dimensions of identity with those of age, this history of young people shows how, on the one hand, transnational practices of youth might promote new forms of solidarity challenging dominant narratives of class, race, gender, or nation, but often enough they failed to undermine or reduce asymmetries of power, and simply reinscribed them. Globe-spanning transnational networks of connection between people of different cultural backgrounds did not automatically produce the same kinds of 'cosmopolitan' openness, and the result of these engagements was not, in the end, the untrammeled transfer of homogeneous (counter) cultural regimes.[25]

This gap is especially noticeable in relation to power asymmetries structured upon gender. While youth offered a terrain upon which young women might carve out pioneering roles and contest profoundly unbalanced power relations, this book shows that the broader picture was one in which the activities, mobilities and also the identities of transnational youth of the twentieth century were (with some notable exceptions) overwhelmingly gendered male. In cultures and practices of youth, young men dominated. In the historical record the agency of male youth is often easier to detect than that of female youth. Even today the very term 'youth' retains a strong masculine resonance. While gender is foregrounded in several chapters of this book and young men and women appear throughout it, this volume shows that the category 'youth' was more often invoked in an exclusionary

way, one which circumscribed women and girls' access to what power could be eked from it. Thus, while transnationality has often been conceived of as liberatory and 'counter-hegemonic', rarely did those who acted in the name of the young live up to such high-flown ideals.[26]

Such asymmetries also developed along class lines. In 1903 *The Straits Chinese Magazine*, published in Singapore, could inquire on behalf of its upwardly mobile, English-speaking, readership, 'Which is the better educator? Travel or Universities'.[27] In spite of what the magazine described at the start of the new century as the spread of 'fast and comfortable and comparatively cheap locomotion', opportunities for young people to directly experience transnationality through travel grew only gradually and unevenly across the period. Travel remained in many respects an elite practice, even if at certain times and places, as Valeria Manzano points out with reference to southern Latin America in the 1960s, young people remained deeply reluctant to identify it in such terms.

While mobility was a key dimension of twentieth-century youth transnationality, not all of those who participated could travel in a literal sense. The fact that many young people were unable to directly access travel networks themselves brings to the fore an issue that has less often been emphasized in studies of transnational mobility, which is immobility, and the local. This collection pays attention to the multivalent ways in which, on a material level, the literature, symbolism, and imagery of youth transnationality was accessed even by those who, by definition, lacked mobility. Ideas of youth, youth culture, and youth practice circulated throughout the twentieth century, evolving in close relation to commercial culture and the technologies through which it was delivered. This allowed even those young people who were not literally on the move, to write and re-write, imagine and re-imagine the meanings of youthfulness on their own terms, participating in a global conversation of ideas and practices related to being young. As the contributions of Lanza and Silverstein show, in the late twentieth century, when young people exploited wider access to the networked technologies of media and music to articulate visions of their transnational youth, they did so without necessarily needing to leave their immediate locale.

Activities, mobilities, and identities: constituting transnationality

The book is organized into three parts. In Part I, 'Activities', the focus is on young people's encounters with transnationality through the structures of organized leisure and professional associations, themselves an endemic feature of modern times. In much existing scholarship these institutions are usually studied for what they reveal about visions of the nation, or of the young as articulated by the organizers rather than the young participants themselves.[28] However, the chapters included here

explore the extent to which young people themselves developed and engaged with transnationality through a variety of institutional activities and practices.

Sayaka Chatani demonstrates how through the *seinendan* (state-run village youth groups) peasant youth came to represent the model national citizen throughout the growing Japanese empire. She argues that this privileged position created a space in which rural youth could pursue their own agendas and desires, notably by exploring ties with foreign counterparts, and developing networked connections across borders through an ersatz 4-H club. In her chapter on Mexican youth in the Boy Scout movement, Elena Jackson Albarrán argues that through cross-border travels, the uniformed young emerged as the healthy, active, moral embodiment of the modernizing, post-revolutionary nation. The boys involved saw their participation both as a way of engaging with a global, transnational youth culture and of redefining or rejecting visions of Mexican society as static and old fashioned, even as, in many ways, Scouting reinforced them. Examining the transnational agenda of the Girl Guide movement from the perspective of Malayan girls, Jilian Christina Wu argues that in colonial and postcolonial Singapore, Guiding activities provided valuable resources from which new models of 'modern' girlhood could be fashioned and lived out. Finally, Heather Ellis shows in her chapter how the young leftist scientists of the British Association for the Advancement of Science imagined the internationalism of their scientific endeavor to be intricately tied to the internationalism of Marxism. She shows how science and communism were seen at the time to be ideologically suited for one another through the shared emphasis on youth and internationalism. Moreover, she argues that these young British scientists came to imagine a militarized masculinity as central to their professional identity which emerged through the transnational contacts of scientific networks.

The chapters in Part II, 'Mobilities', consider the movement of the young across national and regional boundaries for a host of purposes – work, leisure, settlement, or activism – and in a variety of contexts. Together, the chapters in this section reveal the profound political ramifications of the circulations, flows, and relocations of mobile youth. Whether as students and intellectuals traveling across imperial networks, as backpackers or revolutionaries, the mobility of the young across national and regional boundaries called into question (if only in many cases to reaffirm) the social and political integrity of the nation-state.

Taking up the case of young Vietnamese traveling to France in the interwar period, David M. Pomfret argues that this group identified travel as essential to achieving the personal and political transformations necessary to bring about an end to French colonial rule. Focusing upon 'circularity' and the spaces in between departure and arrival, he shows that youth-on-the-move conceived of themselves and were so conceived, on account of

their age and mobility, as embodying a kind of nation-in-waiting. Richard Ivan Jobs examines the interpersonal interactions of the European youth who traveled abroad in the context of postwar reconstruction. Imagined as 'cultural ambassadors' effecting national reconciliation, he argues that their informal interactions gave rise to a youth travel culture constitutive of a new, democratic 'Western' Europe. Valeria Manzano shows how in the 1960s young women and men from Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay followed a new 'revolutionary road' that took them to the most impoverished regions of South America. In the process, she argues, they engaged directly with the meanings of their own youthfulness, rejecting contemporaneous 'Western-led' transnational variants and fashioning alternatives to which mobility was essential. Andrew Ivaska focuses on the everyday, affective life of young people in the 'global sixties' hub of Dar es Salaam, arguing that while the networks of political activists crisscrossing this African site were interconnected, transnational, and young, such traits were also central to the political opportunities they opened up, the challenges they posed, and the complications and limits they faced.

Part III of the volume, 'Identities', examines the self-image of the young and the ways in which the production and representation of youth drew upon transnational understandings of age articulated and circulated within global networks of migration, popular culture, and media. The chapters reveal the ways such ideas and practices of youth interacted with local contexts and norms, and show how complicated such cultural transfers were on the ground, as the young manipulated and adapted discourses of youth to their own specific needs and purposes.

Adriana Brodsky examines how Sephardi youth in Argentina, ascribed a central place in the Zionist project during the 1960s, lived in, navigated, shaped, and interpreted multiple diasporas. The result of their cross-border mobility was the sense of being part of a diasporic community of youth capable of residing in multiple spaces – an Israeli in Argentina as much as an Argentinian in Israel. Coherent national identities were not found on site but made on the move; and even then, they were not essential but rather improvised and contested. Juliane Fürst traces youth cultures across the Iron Curtain to examine what happened when transnational flows of information and youth cultural practice broke down or were stymied. Focusing on the case of the *stiliagi* of the 1940s and 1950s and the hippie movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, she shows how 'youth' as an idea was transformed in the Soviet Union through the process of cultural transfer, and mutated under local conditions, often from an imaginary template, into new, hybrid forms. Fabio Lanza traces the development of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 from initial protests to a global media event. He argues that, in the process of staging their 'youth' before a global audience and through engagements with transnational pasts, the very concept of 'youth' was vulnerable to reinterpretation in ways that diverged from the meanings

which the young protestors themselves preferred. Finally, Paul Silverstein focuses upon the emerging musical genres of new Berber folksong, Arabic raï, rock, and rap to show how youth in North Africa and France utilized musical production and consumption to map out alternate political solidarities transcending the nation-state, across the Mediterranean as well as across the Atlantic, so much so that their strategic transnationalism became a kind of everyday commonplace.

Locating youth transnationality

Notwithstanding the book's thematic organization, its chapters intersect in terms of theoretical approach and focus. These contrast with other transnational histories that have often tended to focus upon state-level strategies of rule.[29] They contrast also with earlier transnational histories that tended to focus upon obviously international organizations, such as the United Nations.[30] A particular emphasis throughout this collection is on the micro-level engagements of individuals – bridging across contexts and institutions, and engaged with broader social, political, and economic processes.[31] The chapters privilege interpersonal relationships and highlight the close and emotion-laden personal ties connecting individuals within and across space. The contributions illustrate how individual experiences, their continuities and discontinuities, relate to interpretations, however fragile and ephemeral, of communities built around age. Such an approach chimes with recent calls for studies adopting a global purview, but integrating both micro- and macro-determinants into their analysis.

The production of youth as a concept and social body was fraught with tensions and contradictions between ideology and practical exigencies, between state and non-state actors, local and central government, indigenous resistance and colonial indigenization. A consequence of this, and another key theme explored in many of the chapters, is the instability of the very category 'youth'. As several chapters contend in this volume, exploring the shifting relationship between institutional spaces and the 'field' becomes a way of highlighting the unstable frameworks governing youthful identities. Fabio Lanza and Paul Silverstein, in particular, pick up on the themes of the uncertainty of youth. Though the notion of youth as homogeneous remained enduringly attractive, not least to young people themselves, several of the chapters in this volume suggest how it proved fundamentally flawed as it presupposed in theory a uniformity of meaning that was often absent and a shared sensibility that ran up against a variety of obstacles in practice.

By tracking the way young people reinterpreted imported ideas and styles associated with youth and recounted experiences of mobility, *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century* emphasizes that youth cultures were never simply diffused from the West or imposed, even in colonial

contexts, in any straightforward way. Many of the chapters offer an examination of how the young contributed to processes of globalization that transcended Western culture and contexts. They bring to light more varied entanglements of individuals and groups across national boundaries: from Vietnamese students' engagements with a Gallic-inflected modernity in Paris, Hanoi, and Haiphong; to African youth socializing with African American youth in Dar es Salaam; to the tensions aroused by young middle-class Argentinians engaging with the impoverished indigenous peoples of the Andes. This book thus draws attention to the complex outcomes of the situated encounters between Western and non-Western knowledge initiated by young people. As Juliane Fürst makes clear in the case of the Soviet Union, these practices had a much wider impact than their rather small membership would immediately suggest, not only because the young generation aged and acceded to positions of social and political power in post-Soviet times, but because at the very moment of their inception they provided bridges of cultural knowledge and common understanding for a generation engaged in the process of transforming what it meant to be Soviet.

There is much to be gained by looking at the young on their own terms, as active historical agents, engaged in processes enmeshed with the adult world and adult-created institutions, in ways that do not simply emphasize being young as a phase preparatory to being adult. In this view, as Mary Bucholz has pointed out, youth becomes less of a trajectory and more of a practice of age.[32] This book aims to move beyond a tendency evident within humanities and social sciences research more broadly to identify youth, and especially adolescence, as a mere staging ground for adulthood, a preliminary phase, rather than a definitive category of experience in its own right.

Young people institutionalized and expressed youthfulness through patterns of behavior and ways of being, all of which tended to take place in specific spaces. This process of defining and enacting youthfulness often corresponded to the creation of defined and enacted spaces as well, exemplified perhaps by the youth hostel. Within such spaces, the young constituted youth as a set of practices, not merely ideas, calling boundaries into question even as they were drawn into existence. In order to examine this relationship more closely many of the contributors grapple with the issue of what constituted transnational space. They engage with the key question of not only what but *where* was youthful transnationality.

Accordingly, some of the contributions make the point that youthful mobility and sociability were not defined only by points of origin, destinations or even by nodes in the transnational networks across which young people moved, but sometimes by the spaces in between. As transnational agents, the young participated in a reconfiguring of the relation between center and periphery. Though they started off in particular locales, they

were defined and defined themselves by their movement into others, thereby breaking with stable connections between space and identity. As several chapters show, the problems of nation-building proved so intractable that transnationality gave rise to the sense of being part of a 'third culture', somewhere between origin and destination. From this perspective, spaces of youthful transnationality could appear at best a haven, at worst as some kind of halfway house. This was often the case in colonial contexts, where nationalism often depended upon the reassertion and exploration of age as a manifestly fluid rather than fixed identity, and the boundaries of the nation that young people drew were, in consequence, fleeting, informal and lacking in political status. A key consequence was the early affirmation and subsequent development of a kind of 'enclavism' of age, that was often as much defensive and discreet as it was aggressive or provocative.

Together, the essays in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century* provide a comparative, transnational framework for rethinking youth, the nation, mobility, and modernity in the twentieth-century world, thereby extending the scope of previous scholarship, which has tended to focus on discrete regions, empires, or national contexts. By adopting a global, transnational, and comparative perspective, a key aim of this project is to reveal the varied ways in which the emergence of international youth cultures and transnational globalization have been, and remain, mutually constitutive. The outcome, a history of youth and transnationality during the twentieth century, can help us begin to understand young people's roles as agents of change in the shaping of the modern world.

We hope that this book may point the way toward a future agenda in research. While our concern has been to ensure that this volume is expansive a volume as possible in its scope, its subject matter is so broad and diverse that it is not possible to treat it comprehensively. Moreover, the exigencies of publishing meant that we were unable to include many aspects that we originally had hoped to address. A variety of important topics and issues in the history of youth transnationality are not discussed here in depth such as war and work or religion and spirituality or crime and justice. There is much more to be said about migration and passage, technology and communication, sex and gender, or race and class, for example. And although we have striven to ensure that a variety of nations and regions are represented herein, many parts of the world have not been included or have been addressed only tangentially. Notwithstanding these inevitable omissions and underemphases, we hope that this volume may serve as a provocation to future historical work in these and other salient areas. Such new studies will help to further illuminate the rich and mutually constitutive histories of youth and transnationalism.

Notes

1. P. Mason (2012) *Why It's all Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (London: Verso); B. T. Williams and A. A. Zenger (eds) (2012) *New Media Literacies and Participatory Popular Culture Across Borders* (New York: Routledge); B. Loader, A. Vromen, and M. A. Xenos (eds) (2014) *The Networked Young Citizen: Social Media, Political Participation, and Civic Engagement* (New York: Routledge).
2. Classic studies include P. Ariès (1962) *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf); J. R. Gillis (1974) *Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations* (New York: Academic Press); V. Zelizer (1985) *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (New York: Basic Books); P. Fass (1977) *The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s* (New York: Oxford University Press).
3. J. Cole and D. Durham (eds) (2007) *Generations and Globalisation* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press).
4. Recent examples include: C. Heywood (2007) *Growing up in France : From the Ancien Régime to the Third Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); L. Paris (2008) *Children's Nature: The Rise of the American Summer Camp* (New York: New York University Press); M. E. P. De Ras (2008) *Body, Femininity and Nationalism: Girls in the German Youth Movement 1900–1934* (London: Routledge), S. Mintz (2005) *Huck's Raft: A History of American Childhood* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap). Though this comment also applies, of course, to the second half of the twentieth century. See, for example, R. I. Jobs (2007) *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press); A. Saunders (2007) *Honecker's Children: Youth and Patriotism in East(ern) Germany, 1979–2002* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
5. While scouting in Britain was a response to imperial decline, it is significant that early advocates, for example, Stead, defined it in terms of a British response to the Japanese bushido movement. R. H. MacDonald (1993) *Sons of the Empire: The Frontier and the Boy Scout Movement, 1890–1918* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 135.
6. See, for example, H. Morrison (ed.) (2012) *The Global History of Childhood Reader* (New York: Routledge); P. Fass (2007) *Children of a New World: Society, Culture and Globalization* (New York: New York University Press); P. Fass (ed.) *The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World* (New York: Routledge); P. N. Stearns (2005) *Childhood in World History* (New York: Routledge); J. Helgren and C. Vasconcellos (eds) *Girlhood: A Global History* (New Brusnwick: Rutgers University Press); C. Heywood (2001) *A History of Childhood: Children and Childhood in the West from Medieval to Modern Times* (Cambridge: Polity).
7. 'AHR Conversation: On Transnational History', *American Historical Review* 111 (5) (December 2006); P. Clavin (2005) 'Defining Transnationalism', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (4), 421–39. For a thorough discussion of this see A. Iriye (2012) *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pivot).
8. M. Seigel (2005) 'Beyond Compare: Comparative Method After the Transnational Turn', *Radical History Review*, 91, 63.
9. D. Thelen (1999) 'The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History', *Journal of American History*, 86, 965.
10. A good place to find a succinct explanation of transnational history is P. Saunier (2013) *Transnational History: Theory and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

11. This current had commenced much earlier from Europe, where the Great European Migration lasted from 1815 to 1914. During this time around 60 million Europeans left Europe. Their destination was often the Americas, and other 'New Worlds'. But the early years of the century also saw the continued rise in out-migration from China and a shift from 'sojourning' to settlement by Chinese in the Americas as well as in South-East Asia. Wang Gungwu (2001) *Don't Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese* (Singapore: Times Academic Press); E. Sinn (2013) *Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration and the Making of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press); J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen (eds) (1997) *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern: Peter Lang).
12. M. Byron and S. Condon (2008) *Migration in Comparative Perspective: Caribbean Communities in Britain and France* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 12.
13. Age has attracted greater scholarly attention in other disciplines among those adopting the 'life course' approach and examining migrant assimilation. For example, debates in sociology and cultural studies have flared around the question of whether transnationalism is a 'one generation phenomenon'. D. A. Boehm (2012) *Intimate Migrations: Gender, Family and Illegality among Transnational Mexicans* (New York: New York University Press), pp. 111–42; R. C. Smith (2002) 'Life Course, Generation and Social Location as Factors Shaping Second Generation Transnational Life' in P. Levitt and M. Waters (eds) *The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), pp. 145–67; A. Portes (1997) *Globalisation from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities* (Oxford: University of Oxford Transnational Communities Programme); A. Ong (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), pp. 8–12.
14. C. Coe, R. R. Reynolds, D. A. Boehm, J. Meredith Hess and H. Rae-Espinoza (2011) *Everyday Ruptures: Children, Youth and Migration in Global Perspective* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press).
15. See, for example, H. Goulbourne et al. (2010) *Transnational Families: Ethnicities, Identities and Social Capital* (New York: Routledge); M. Harper and S. Constantine (2010) *Migration and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 247–72; D. Bryceston and U. Vuorela (eds) (2002) *The Transnational Family: New European Frontiers and Global Networks* (Oxford: Berg); N. Foner (2009) *Across Generations: Immigrant Families in America* (New York: New York University Press).
16. A. Iriye (2013) *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Pivot), pp. 70–1. See also the recent 'Transnational Generations' special issue of *Diplomatic History,* 38:2 (2014).
17. W. Walton (2010) *Internationalism, National Identities, and Study Abroad: France and the United States, 1890–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
18. See, for example, the essays in the special forum, 'Transnational Generations: Organizing Youth in the Cold War' edited by M. Honeck and G. Rosenberg (2014) *Diplomatic History*, 38 (2), pp. 233–98.
19. See, for example, A. E. Gorsuch and D. P. Koenker (eds) (2013) *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
20. A. Davies (2008) *Gangs of Manchester: The Story of the Scuttlers* (Preston: Milo); B. Goldson (ed.) (2011) *Youth in Crisis?: Gangs, Territoriality and Violence* (New York: Routledge); K. Schrum (2004) *Some Wore Bobby Sox: The Emergence of Teenage Girls' Culture, 1920–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); D. M. Pomfret (2004) *Young People and the European City* (Aldershot: Ashgate); D. Fowler (1995) *The First*

Teenagers: The Lifestyle of Young Wage-Earners in Interwar Britain (London: Woburn Press).

21. P. Saunier and S. Ewen (eds) (2008) *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); A. Cliff, P. Haggett, and M. Smallman-Raynor (1998) *Deciphering Global Epidemics: Analytical Approaches to the Disease Records of World Cities, 1888–1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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24. M. P. Guterl (2013) 'The Futures of Transnational History', *American Historical Review*, 118 (1), 139.
25. There has been much debate about the role of youth as a counter-cultural force in the second half of the century. Research in this area was pioneered in the 1970s by John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and others associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Scholars have subsequently critiqued the work of the Birmingham School, for example, A. McRobbie (2000) *Feminism and Youth Culture* (New York: Routledge); S. Thornton (1996) *Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press); T. Frank (1997) *The Conquest of Cool* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Historians have also begun to engage with questions of youth cultural and countercultural roles. See, for example, U. Poiger (2000) *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press); J. Fürst (2010) *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-war Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Q. Slobodian (2011) 'Communist Youth Groups and Rock Music in Greece in the late 1970s' in T. Brown and L. Anton (eds) *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn).
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27. 'Which Is the Better Educator? Travel or Universities', *The Straits Chinese Magazine*, VII (1), March 1903, 6.
28. See, for example, A. Iriye (2002) *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press); T. M. Proctor (2009) *Scouting for Girls: A Century of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts* (Santa Barbara: Praeger).
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Part I

Activities

1
Youth and Rural Modernity in Japan, 1900s–20s

Sayaka Chatani

At the turn of the twentieth century, social leaders in Japan and around the world saw the development of youth movements as having an essential role to play in the creation of modern society. In their eyes, youth represented the potentiality of modernity. An industrializing Japanese society ushered youth to the fore in a variety of ways. By the 1920s, elite students in the modern school system, highly trained in Western knowledge and destined for careers as bureaucrats, were referred to as 'the engine of the nation'. Other students led socialist and communist movements as self-styled 'vanguards' of society. On the street, an increasing number of culturally subversive urban youth – sometimes called '*moga*' (modern girls) and '*mobo*' (modern boys) – embodied modern consumer culture and urban decadence. But while these archetypes of youth prevailed in big cities, the countryside also witnessed the rise of youth – pure, strong, and hardworking agrarian youth came to symbolize Japan's masculine empire.

While the image of rural youth usually does not connote cosmopolitanism, the birth of 'rural youth' as a social category reflected a dynamic interaction between local and transnational contexts in many of the same ways that 'students' or 'urban youth' did. Although historian Louise Young claims that big cities, particularly Tokyo, were the face of modernity while rural areas became 'modernity's Other', the majority of people in this era interpreted and experienced 'modernity' from the perspective of the countryside.[1] 'Rural youth' was the central protagonist in public imaginings of rural-based modernity.

The key institution responsible for fashioning 'rural youth' into pillars of the nation was the *seinendan*, or village youth association.[2] Because almost all rural villages had for centuries used youth associations in the organization of labor, reformers in the Meiji period (1868–1911) could quickly organize them into *seinendan* that bore 'native Japanese' characteristics. Although the Boy Scouts became popular among middle-class families in the cities in the early twentieth century, the much longer history and extent of village youth associations meant that they better served the goal

of nation-building in the eyes of state bureaucrats. At the same time, like the Boy Scouts, the *seinendan* were participants in transnational movements. Their organizers eagerly incorporated Western models of youth training, and their members regarded themselves as a modern force. In effect, the *seinendan* played a similar role to the Boy Scouts in Mexico and the Girl Guides in British Malaya as discussed by Elena Albarrán and Jialin Christina Wu in this volume. They shaped a new nationalism and citizenship, linked transnational movements with national and local contexts, and established the category of youth as a new social identity.

Because the *seinendan* played a pivotal role in nation-building they attracted the attention of policymakers and bureaucrats. State officials expected village-level *seinendan* to revitalize the rural economy and spread national consciousness among the masses after the war against Russia in 1904–5. Between 1915 and 1941, the state centralized and strengthened the national network of *seinendan*.[3] As the Japanese army expanded its conquest of China in the 1930s, youth in the *seinendan,* together with ex-soldiers in the reservist groups, came to be identified as a domestic stronghold, both of nationalist ideology and military personnel. With their close links to the military, 'rural youth' embodied by the *seinendan* were a predominantly male-gendered category.[4] Indeed, the historian Richard Smethurst and many Japanese scholars have viewed the *seinendan* movement primarily in terms of its relationship with the military.[5] For these scholars, the spread of the *seinendan* in the 1910s and 1920s indicated a growing militarism in the countryside while Japanese cities became key sites in the development of contentious liberal politics.

Is it possible to identify young men's individual subject positions within the state-led *seinendan* mobilization? Should their participation in these institutions necessarily be viewed as a form of indoctrination by the state and the army? Tackling these questions brings the historian face-to-face with a number of methodological challenges. The voices of village youth are often submerged in the historical record beneath the clamor of nationalistic propaganda. The majority of *seinendan* members were young farmers who did not have the means to leave their home villages – they had no choice but to join the village *seinendan*, so pervasive and influential were these organizations at the local level. The difficulty in locating their voices has led many scholars to view these youth as obedient subjects fixed within tight and deeply conservative hamlet orders, easily manipulated by village administration and army officials.

I argue in this chapter that, on the contrary, the popularity of the *seinendan* derived from the hopes village youth harbored that they might alter their social statuses and allow for the achievement of a 'rural modernity' – defined fluidly in terms of the denial, transformation, or imitation of urban modernity. Rural youth were aware of the power of state propaganda and global trends, and they used both eagerly to pursue their own agendas. The intentions of village youth can be traced in their writings and private activities – particularly in the

ways they defined the categories of 'youth' and 'rural youth', their decisions to adopt, or not, the state's rhetoric, and their techniques of interpreting and utilizing transnational forces for their local and personal agendas. For many of them, the *seinendan* provided an alternative to the school-based career path. They reimagined Meiji's popular idea of '*risshin shusse*' ('rising in the world'), which usually implied that urban careers based on a school diploma were something only hardworking rural youth could achieve. They turned nationalism and transnationalism, both considered specifically 'youthful' traits, into a weapon to fight social battles. They tactfully used the discursive value of rural youth to increase their political leverage with (and against) the social establishment. Like those to whom Richard Jobs and David Pomfret refer in the introduction to this volume, Japanese village youth viewed themselves as *especially* transnational. As possessors of this self-image, these young people embarked upon travels in a space of the transnational imagination and transgressed various bonds and borders in spite of their limited geographical mobility.

One example, that of a young man named Katô Einojô, who lived in a farming village named Aratanome in Miyagi prefecture in northern Japan, shows us how village youth invested in notions of the 'rise' of rural youth as a rebellious act. As a landlord's son, Katô enjoyed wealth and status that were not available to the average village youth. He used it to attempt to create a group based on the generational identity of youth, named the Aratanome 4-H club. The club was a product of the complex interactions between Katô, the family and hamlet orders, and the national *seinendan* movement, within a wider, global context marked by the growing prominence of youth. As is generally the case with social histories, individual examples cannot be seen as 'representative' – but privately formed youth groups like the Aratanome 4-H club were certainly not unusual in other parts of Japan. Katô Einojô's is just one story among many, but it reveals how young men in the countryside had the motivation and in some cases also the means to take advantage of state mobilization for their own benefit. By the 1920s, the discursive rise of 'rural youth' and the spread of the *seinendan* paradoxically created a space of freedom for village youth and provided them with a kind of moral capital which they deployed against urban youth and older generations.

Yamamoto Takinosuke's *Inaka seinen*

The modern rural youth group movement in Japan started in the area around Hiroshima. In 1896, Yamamoto Takinosuke, a 24-year-old schoolteacher, self-published a book entitled *Inaka seinen* (*Rural Youth*). Like many of the young male population of his time, Yamamoto had evaded conscription, probably because of his poor eyesight.[6] Poverty forced him to abandon his dream to continue his studies in middle school or to go to Tokyo. Instead, he had to count himself lucky to be able to work within the

village-level administration and a local elementary school. *Inaka seinen* was a desperate lament about the life of youth in the countryside, giving voice to Yamamoto's growing frustrations. In the previous six years he had striven to inject life into local youth groups:

> Although [the youth of the city and the country] are both youth, one kind is embraced warmly and another is abandoned on the street. The so-called 'country youth' are the ones who have been abandoned. They are without school name or school diploma ... Despite the fact that they are the majority of the youth of the nation, they are neglected and left out of the discussion.[7]

Yamamoto was reacting against what he viewed as a growing imbalance between the attention devoted to youth in urban areas (particularly students) and in the countryside. The late 1880s and early 1890s saw the burgeoning of magazine publications targeting urban youth. The scholar Kimura Naoe argues that *seinen* (youth) became a new category in opposition to *sôshi*, the mob-like violent youth who had engaged in radical political demonstrations during the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement of the 1880s. The most powerful source for the new idea of *seinen* was Tokutomi Sohô and his magazine, *Kokumin no tomo* (*The Nation's Friend*). In 1887, the magazine featured a series of articles entitled 'The Youth of New Japan and the Politics of New Japan', which Kimura calls 'a manifesto for the magazine'.[8] In these articles, Tokutomi Sohô, who was only 24 years old at the time, assigned responsibility to (college and high school) students to become the engine of a new Japanese politics.[9] He named the magazine after the American publication, *The Nation*, which he read avidly while attending the Dôshisha English School in Kyoto. Tokutomi became a widely read journalist who introduced Western thought to Japan through magazines and other outlets.[10] The voice of *Kokumin no tomo* echoed around the country and reached far beyond urban intellectuals. Many young men formed associations in cities and provincial towns, ranging from small groups of 10–15 to larger ones with thousands of members. They produced youth magazines, many of which imitated the design, format, and language of *Kokumin no tomo*.[11]

Yamamoto Takinosuke was one of many inspired by the new discourse on *seinen* defined by urban intellectuals. Tokutomi and other young writers revamped the image of 'youth', which had been an inferior category within the rigid age hierarchy of the Confucian social order, into a protean force capable of shaping modern Japan. But by the time Yamamoto wrote *Inaka seinen* the widening gap in status between urban and rural youth made this discourse appear hypocritical: 'Most of the so-called youth magazines published in the cities have no argument, use beautiful and well-crafted language, and yet do not convey sincerity or inspiration', Yamamoto complained. 'They use the phrase "for the sake of the youth of the whole

nation", but only consider their [urban] consumers ... no one is really passionate about inspiring the youth in the countryside'.[12]

For the frustrated Yamamoto, 'youth' was a generational category and an identity that transcended the social divide between urban and rural. He called on the reader neither to detest nor fear urban youth. The real cleavage he perceived was the one between the young, 'progressive reformers by nature', and the old (*rôbutsu,* or literally 'old things'), who were 'backward, lazy, corrupt, and indecisive'.[13] In order to fulfill their responsibility together with urban youth, rural youth themselves were in need of reform and guidance. In his eyes, rural youth lacked a national consciousness and were 'wasteful, lazy, weak, sly, obscene, servile, undetermined, reckless, and irresponsible', though he thought that the social circumstances of farming villages had made them that way.[14] Yamamoto advocated reorganizing traditional hamlet youth groups, which had existed all over the country for more than a few centuries, in order that they might reclaim their much-diminished functions as educators and moralizers of young people.[15] According to Yamamoto, by helping to disseminate simple but important practices – such as rising early, climbing mountains, taking cold baths, wearing only cotton clothes, reading newspapers, and avoiding early marriage – youth groups could reinvigorate rural youth.

Yamamoto's lament about rural life stood in sharp contrast to Meiji fiction, which romanticized rustic life and waxed poetic about the superiority of farming villages over cities. Tokutomi Roka, Miyazaki Koshoshi, and Kunikida Doppo exalted the pure and moral life of rural society in opposition to the emptiness of urban life. 'Freedom is found in the mountains and forests', Kunikida Doppo wrote in 1897.[16] Yanagita Kunio, the founder of modern Japanese ethnology, also viewed the countryside as the repository of Japan's native culture. Yanagita, then a bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, was alarmed by the widening gap between urban and rural society in terms of material development. His agrarian romanticism grew stronger as he went on a 'pilgrimage' to rural villages and began to write more as a folklorist.[17]

For Yamamoto, the discourse of a morally superior countryside had done little to boost the self-confidence of the rural population. He described the mindset of villagers who detested everything 'rural':

> The worship of cities among country people has remained unchanged now and in the past ... People consider it the greatest shame to be called 'country bumpkins (*inaka mono*);' they have changed the name from *inaka* (countryside) to *chihô* (local) without notice, and avoid uttering the word *inaka* ... When discussing the budget for the education of a village I know, some argued that, in determining the qualifications of elementary school teachers, since local teachers do not use the correct pronunciation, we should abolish [the recruitment of local people] and recruit

> teachers from Tokyo. Our language in the countryside has been gradually corroded by shallow urban language – no *inaka* language, no *inaka* morals, and in the end they even deny being *inaka*.[18]

The feeling of being left behind was exacerbated by the extreme poverty of many rural areas. Famine repeatedly struck Japan's northern regions, where poverty was widespread.[19] Although conditions in Hiroshima, where Yamamoto lived and wrote, were not as severe as those in northern Japan, nation-wide deflation during the 1880s had already forced many small farmers to sell their land and revert to tenancy.[20] The impoverishment of farming villages alarmed the government, especially after the Russo–Japanese War in 1904–5 drained national resources. In addition to measures taken by the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, the powerful Home Ministry launched the Local Improvement Movement (1906–18) and implemented a number of programs to raise agricultural productivity and farmers' morale.

Inaka seinen revealed that young people in the countryside recognized the urban orientation of Japan's modernization. In his work Yamamoto struggled to redirect attention toward impoverished rural peripheries. The greatest potential outlet for agrarian youth's desire to be modern found expression in Japan's concurrent effort to build a world-class empire. The *seinendan* movement grew by collaborating with national leaders, who demanded that youth become healthy, hardworking, and patriotic imperial forces. 'The youth are the source of dynamism of nation and society, therefore the *seinendan* are the source of social activities', argued *Guidelines for Local Youth* in 1912, one of many almost identical publications contributing to the discursive valorization of rural youth.[21] It continued by arguing that, in 'the international competition [that had been] increasingly harsh', rural youth were supposed to emerge as a symbol of the Japanese empire, which was 'a small island country, but was never humiliated by foreign countries and just defeated a global power'.[22] By 1910, when Japan colonized the Korean peninsula, most policymakers and bureaucrats viewed their nation as a full-fledged competitor in a world of aggressive empires. The *seinendan*, like the Boy Scouts in the British colonies, started to spread in newly obtained colonies, championing imperial and militaristic power among a new generation. Rural youth served the new self-image of an emerging transnational empire by publicly symbolizing Japan's competitiveness in a global struggle.

The *seinendan* as an alternative path

In the course of the 1900s and 1910s, *seinendan* advocates gained popular support. For Japan's national leaders, eager to demonstrate an alternative to Western civilization and an Asian model of imperial power, the dual character of an organization with 'premodern' roots enrolling 'modern' rural youth suited their purpose. They found the *seinendan* an ideal form of mass

mobilization equivalent to the Boy Scouts in larger cities. The *seinendan* provided the overarching structure within which apparently contradictory goals could be accommodated. They kept young people in the remote countryside while fostering their desire to connect with the global community of modern youth. They taught the young self-discipline while allowing them to rebel against the establishment. They engaged youth in military preparation while de-emphasizing the presence of the army.

However much their interests may have varied, *seinendan* advocates shared an interest in preventing the urbanization of village youth by emphasizing moral training (*shûyô*). One of the major concerns for national and local leaders alike was the mass migration of young people to big cities. This was seen as particularly alarming because of the way in which urban life changed the body and personality of the migrant. One author on youth education described:

> Those who migrate to cities soon experience a deterioration of their health ... Moreover, those who have already acquired the taste for urban life do not return to the village no matter how difficult their lives are, and even if they move back, there is little possibility that they will become good farmers.[23]

Commentators who discussed rural youth often voiced concern over their movement from the countryside into urban centers. But how could this be stopped? Many argued that the *seinendan,* defined as an institution for *shûyô* of the young, would serve this goal by offering moral guidance. By awakening a spirit of communal service, youth would remain in the villages. *Guidelines for Local Youth* argued, 'the youth must rouse awareness and valor, discipline themselves, and willingly devote themselves to local development. Here what is needed is the training of young talent'. Exemplary *seinendan* activities included putting up bulletin boards that advocated frugality, punctuality, the correct use of the Japanese language, and education. It argued that youth training should share the same spirit as national conscription – 'the spirit of sacrifice, beautiful morals of obedience, good customs of simplicity and thrift, and an ethic of discipline and moderation'.[24] Public morality and love for the nation would offer young men a sense of fulfillment and prevent them from fleeing to cities.

The moral training offered by the *seinendan* served the goals of various government ministries. The main strategy of the Home Ministry in the Local Improvement Movement was to boost the morale of farming youth and guide them toward the better management of agriculture and household industries. The Ministry depended on the voluntary labor of local youth to build basic infrastructure and also counted upon them to reform old customs that appeared irrational and wasteful.[25] The Ministry of Education sought to extend its influence over youth by institutionalizing graduates

of elementary schools. After conducting a survey of the academic achievements of elementary school students in Tokyo in March 1905, education officials realized how quickly their abilities deteriorated after they graduated from school and how low their success rate was in the conscription exam. The *seinendan* appeared to offer a viable institutional format through which the state might prolong graduates' association with the school system.[26]

World War I gave a new incentive to Japanese military officials to promote the *seinendan*. Under the initiative of Tanaka Giichi, then the chief of Administration Bureau of the Army Ministry, the government standardized local youth groups and established a nation-wide *seinendan* association in 1915.[27] Tanaka witnessed the mobilization of various youth groups in Europe during the Great War, and was convinced that a firm grip on youth was important if the nation was to avoid a major ideological upheaval during any future conflict. The strength of German troops, in particular, left a deep impression on him and other government leaders despite their eventual defeat and Japan's own confrontation with them in China. Norisugi Yoshihisa, a top government official specializing in youth education, was in awe of the degree of mobilization of students and youth in Germany. 'In the prewar period, there were 60,346 college students [in Germany], of which 38,400 went to war. Moreover, most of these students volunteered to join the military', he stated. In contrast, in Japan during the wars of 1894 and 1904, 'college students who volunteered to fight were extremely few'. In Germany, even elementary school students became 'soldiers fighting in the farming fields'. Norisugi quoted a German slogan, 'the ridges of the farming fields are your trench, the potatoes that you plant are your supply, the weeds in the fields are your enemies to defeat, and we are German soldiers knowing no fatigue!'[28] Officials such as Tanaka and Norisugi envisioned that the network of *seinendan,* along with the army reservist associations, would undergird nationalism and produce healthy soldiers in the countryside per the German example.[29] Economic, academic, military, and governing needs converged upon the moral training of young men in the countryside who had graduated from elementary school and were soon to take the conscription exam.

It is hard to know, and impossible to generalize, about how young people in the countryside viewed the heightening ideological and political interests that concentrated around the village *seinendan*. But one observable fact is that the number of youth groups skyrocketed after 1905. Youth groups increased by about 1,000 every year and numbered more than 7,000 by 1912.[30] In 1918, the Ministry of Education recorded the total number of youth groups as 18,482, with their members reaching almost 2.9 million – the *seinendan* expansion reached its peak and remained at the same scale until the end of World War II.[31]

The rapidity and scale of the expansion of the *seinendan* cannot be explained merely by the fact that the army and state officials encouraged

the formation of these groups. One major catalyst was the widespread excitement about Japan's hard-won victory against Russia in 1905. Exhilaration at this outcome spread across the country and encouraged youth to pass the conscription exam. Joining the *seinendan* and attending study sessions raised their chances of becoming successful conscripts. The rapid rise in the number of *seinendan* groups also reflected the strength of the roots that they shared with pre-Meiji hamlet youth groups. Although Yamamoto Takinosuke had argued that traditional youth groups no longer functioned, they were still the most important governing institutions in rural hamlets. In fact, the Meiji government initially banned the traditional hamlet youth groups because they appeared too autonomous, and were not only in charge of community policing, village festivals, and fire control, but were also sometimes engaging in violent mob-like, politically motivated acts. These hamlet-based youth groups did not suddenly disappear, but instead changed their names and adjusted their activities in accordance with the new policies of the Meiji state.[32]

On the surface, *seinendan* groups that had formed in the countryside appeared to share a uniform set of activities and purposes. They typically consisted of elementary school graduates and were headed by schoolteachers. Around 1910, the Ministry of Education started to gather information on various youth group activities and published lists of 'model *seinendan*'. Its 'Report on Conditions of Youth Groups in Western Prefectures' (1910) argued that all of the 56 selected groups had similar programs: study sessions, monthly meetings, competitive production of agricultural goods, physical exercise, and improvement of public morals.[33] Other lists of 'model *seinendan*' also gave standard goals: study sessions aimed at improving the success rate at the conscription examination and regular meetings intended to improve community spirit.[34]

These national surveys, however, failed to register the popularity of one particular activity promoted by *seinendan*: night study groups, or *yagakkai*. Gunma prefecture alone, where the total population was less than one million, counted 11,061 night study groups in 1909.[35] A booklet of night study group regulations from Shinjô in Akita in the northeast region from the same year, written with brush and ink, provides a glimpse of its goals and study plan. As new form of the Shinjô *seinendan*, this *yagakkai* unanimously agreed to impose mandatory participation upon all male residents under 20 years of age in the village. It had two teachers: one was responsible for teaching classical Chinese texts and composition, and another who taught arithmetic. Twelve organizing members took responsibility for management, and another twenty-one members co-signed the new regulations. The *yagakkai* functioned almost as a regular school, except that it adjusted its hours to the farmers' schedule. The teachers offered 48 hours of classes per month, dividing students into three levels: preparatory, regular first-year, and regular second-year. The regulations required members to

take graduation exams and expelled them if they missed classes more than three times a year. Members had to pay a form of tuition every month, consisting of either a batch of homespun straw rope or six pairs of straw sandals.[36]

None of the standard reasons given in the national surveys to explain youth group activity appeared in these *yagakkai* regulations – there was no mention of conscription or public morals – although the age limit matching the conscription age corresponded to the military's need. The Shinjô *yagakkai*'s goal was phrased in broader terms: to catch up with the trends of the time and to prepare for Japan's exposure to external influences. The section of the regulations that outlined its main purpose indicated that, 'together with the post [Russo–Japanese] war development, the need for learning is even more evident. Despite that, what is this condition in which we still cling to the obsolete system?'[37] Transforming the youth group into a study group was a way to bring modernity to the village. For youth in Shinjô, the goals that government officials envisioned, such as improving the conscription rate and abandoning old customs, were the means to an end: the achievement of rural modernity. They considered that the key to modernity lay in opportunities to learn. Education defined success in Meiji society, which drove many rural youth to migrate to the cities in the first place. Youth studied classical Chinese texts. Despite such limits to their conceptualization of what constituted 'modern', the night study group provided the possibility – no matter how slight it might have been – that those who did not have time or money to continue attending school might pursue an alternative path toward becoming educated.

This aspiration to succeed remained the main source of energy animating many *seinendan* groups in the 1920s. Youth in the countryside criticized the prevalent 'city fever' because the 'real road to success' was hard work, not formal schooling. 'I would like to say to youth who study by themselves [without going to school] – Never despair, carry out your original goal!' One town *seinendan* newsletter in Akita quoted the politician Nagai Ryûtarô, who pointed to the biographies of such well-known figures as Lenin, James MacDonald, and Mussolini as evidence that youth could become powerful politicians by working hard, even if they could not attain a formal higher education.[38] Rural youth wrote many essays that called for patience and diligence. Titles such as 'A Youth's Roar: Life is Effort' and 'Success Comes from Hard Work' appeared in almost every issue of their newsletters.[39]

Rural youth reimagined '*risshin shusse*' ('rising in the world'), a phrase often used to describe mobility pursued through education and accession to bureaucratic positions in the cities, in terms of their own path toward becoming modern farmers and villagers. Career success while living in rural villages was no mere fantasy. They saw real models of farming youth climbing a social hierarchy traditionally determined by family pedigree or wealth. Military service was one of the main sources of such new opportunities.

Conscripts acquired a more complete education in writing and reading, and were also trained in more advanced techniques of surveying and map reading. For many young men the army offered opportunities for promotions based on their abilities, which often gave them a greater sense of self-achievement than a patriotic sense of serving the nation. Moreover, soldiers who went abroad to fight in northern China or were stationed in Taiwan and Korea could revel on return in their new status as the most cosmopolitan figures in the village. Their achievements while in service helped returned soldiers secure positions in local offices and other institutions. Agricultural schools to which mid-level farmers could send their sons also expanded during the course of the 1920s. The graduates of these schools rose in the social hierarchy, becoming agricultural experts and teachers.[40] These model figures showed young men in the countryside that 'rural youth', defined by their specialized knowledge in agriculture and military training, could pursue new career paths of their own. The *seinendan* was the first step on this path to success.

Youth identity and rural modernity

World War I marked the start of the rapid centralization of village *seinendan* groups. Government officials supervised their training methods, ideologies, awards, and communication across the country. But, as in the spontaneous nature of the night study groups phenomenon before the war, the standardization of *seinendan* did not mean that youth blindly succumbed to state-centered mobilization. Quite the contrary, many young people continued to undertake their own activities, often beyond the scope of officials' control. The young took advantage of national networks and the improving status of youth in village affairs, even though they were still constrained by the boundaries of village society. For them, youth group activities provided a window onto national and global spaces beyond their own villages.

Centralizing forces grew stronger over the course of the 1910s and 1920s. Yamamoto Takinosuke, Tanaka Giichi, and officials of the Home and Education ministries reorganized the locally formed youth groups into a national network. Government funding encouraged many youth groups to adjust their goals to closely match those proclaimed at the national level, especially the goal of improving success rates in the conscription exam.[41] *Shûyôdan* (The Moral Training Group), a rapidly expanding network of educators led by Hasunuma Monzô, offered blueprints of youth training programs for *seinendan* activities. In August 1915, for example, *shûyôdan* gathered 83 young people and conducted the first 'mock self-rule village' training at Lake Habara in Fukushima for eight days. The participants were assigned to small tents representing households and ran both the households and the village through consensus-building exercises. The *shûyôdan* educators adopted the use of tents from German *Wandervogel* activities and

torches from the British Boy Scouts, and also taught Shinto-style *misogi* prayers in the water.[42] Tazawa Yoshiharu ('father of the *seinendan*'), the first director of the Greater Japan National Seinendan Association founded in 1924, enthusiastically incorporated the training of *shûyôdan*. Their methods of teaching frugality, hard work, and a communal spirit became the mainstream of training throughout the prewar period, to the extent that Yamamoto Takinosuke argued that *shûyôdan* were the executive leaders of *seinendan*.[43]

While the impact of these forces of standardization on the life of rural youth varied, one phenomenon stood out: young people in the villages began writing. *Seinendan* members all over the country produced an enormous number of newsletters (*seinendanpô*) during the 1920s and 1930s. These took different formats; some were collections of handwritten essays, while others were well-formatted works obviously edited by professional publishing companies. Some had a larger number of essays written by youth themselves compared to others that mainly served the function of a news bulletin board. Around 1.3 million issues of the newsletters produced in various locations have been deposited in archives today.[44]

The medium of *seinendan* newsletters gave rise to new practices of identity construction among 'rural youth'. The phenomenon was analogous to the proliferation of youth magazines in the 1890s. Kimura Naoe points out the importance of the act of writing in the creation of youth (*seinen*) in Meiji, arguing that for *seinen*, the act of writing itself – filling the easily accessible media with youthful slogans – rather than the content of their writing, nurtured youth identity.[45] Similarly, *seinendan* members used the act of writing and the space of newsletters to define and practice their identity as 'rural youth'. One commonality in their writings was to regard youth as a distinctive group that had always existed in history. One newsletter put it in the following terms: 'now society, which had forgotten about *seinen* for a long time, has recognized the power of *seinen* again. Whether it was thanks to the *seinen*'s own power or the force of the time, either way the *seinen* who have been quietly thinking and quietly disciplining themselves are now expected to take the grave responsibility of carrying out social reforms'.[46] They also used *seinendan* newsletters to develop more abstract philosophies. The appearance of essays like 'Why Thou Dost Live' and 'Hope is the Life of Youth', which had no reference to practical problems, revealed that, in addition to the act of writing, acts of philosophizing became another interest of rural youth.[47]

Knowledge of foreign counterparts also became an important attribute of *seinendan* members. Leaders and bureaucrats in Tokyo often introduced German and other European youth groups in the national *seinendan* journal *Teikoku seinen* (*Imperial Youth*), flooding almost every issue with their feelings of admiration for and rivalry with these groups. The hierarchical passage of information from the center to localities was not the only path

of foreign influence. Many rural youth spontaneously learned about and adopted foreign movements at the grassroots level. Another youth newsletter in Akita, for example, published a letter from Mussolini addressed to Japanese youth. Mussolini praised the Japanese empire for absorbing Western culture and introduced the Blackshirt Fascist youth to the reader.[48] Youth often used expressions from foreign literature. Goethe and Tolstoy were two of their favorites: 'As Goethe says, the fate of Germany rests on the shoulders of German youth ... The development of our desperate village now rests on our shoulders, the shoulders of youth', wrote a *seinendan* member.[49] Youth absorbed the information filtering through from outside their actual living space – whether national or transnational – with considerable eagerness.

Another factor that helped their identity as a distinctly rural youth to gain coherence was the destruction of the urban capital in the Kantô Great Earthquake of 1923. Witnessing the devastation of metropolitan Tokyo, many observers questioned the value of material wealth and the definition of national strength. One young farmer recorded his belief in his diary that this natural disaster had been destined to happen to punish sinful urban culture:

> Of late the vainglorious striving of [those] city people had reached extremes that caused poor, simple farmers no end of anxiety. With their elegant clothes and their gold teeth, gold rings and gold watch chains, they flitted from one lavish social affair to another. They would go off on trips to the seashore or the mountains to escape the heat ... and tour the famous sites. But now all that has vanished as if in a dream, consumed by fire, and suddenly they find themselves reduced to misery. It seems that Heaven found it necessary to chastise them with a natural disaster in order to protect the nation.[50]

The government policy of *seinendan* standardization, the destruction of urban modernity in the earthquake, and the ability of young people to make contact with the outside world gave rural youth a sense of belonging to the national and global stage. This expanded the space of imagination for rural youth far beyond the hamlet boundaries. Many other elements associated with centralization affected this new identity. New military-like uniforms, flags, and *seinendan* songs created by nationally famous composers symbolized the network of modern youth. Although the earlier youth groups had struggled to bring modernity to the countryside, by the 1920s their communications took on a new assertiveness as they inflected the definition of 'success' – even 'modernity' – away from an urban-centered one hinging upon higher education toward a rural-based lifestyle instead.

Katô Einojô's 4-H club: rural youth and social tensions

The discursive importance of rural youth peaked in the 1920s. At this time the heightening attention paid to youth mobilization appears to have influenced the regulation of the lives of *seinendan* members, or so village leaders, army officers, and state officials intended. But, paradoxically, as the authorities increasingly relied on young men in the countryside to achieve administrative goals, the young found more leverage and freedom, rather than constraints, allowing them to pursue their personal agendas. Many took advantage of the national *seinendan* network and the improving status of youth in village affairs. In some cases, the young operated outside the realm of *seinendan* and engaged in activities that appeared subversive in officials' eyes. To be sure, most of their private activities, while rebellious in intent, did not necessarily contradict state goals. Nevertheless, their relationship with the state should not be portrayed merely in terms of obedience within a process of top-down mobilization. In fact, we find members skillfully negotiating and manipulating the idea of 'rural youth' to increase their status in local contexts.

To be sure the sons of relatively wealthy families could use their new leverage as 'rural youth' more readily than the average farm youth. Katô Einojô's private youth group in the Aratanome hamlet, Shida village in Miyagi prefecture of northern Japan, is a good example of how youthful rebelliousness could be disguised by participation in state youth mobilization. Born in 1904, Katô Einojô was the first son of the second largest landlord family in the village, holding more than 40 *ha* in 1928.[51] Shida village was in the middle of a massive rice producing center of Japan, and more than 90 per cent of its arable land was paddy. In 1926, Katô Einojô formed a youth group with around a dozen neighborhood youth between the ages of 15 and 26, including among them several family apprentices and some young women. Katô always wanted to study in Tokyo and 'fly unto the larger world', according to his son. However, because his father expected him to take over as the head of family, Katô was not allowed to pursue college education in Tokyo as his two younger brothers did. Instead he was sent to an agricultural school in Sendai after graduating from the local elementary school. His father Katô Hisanosuke was a leader in agricultural innovation in the region and an admired notable.

Rejecting Hisanosuke's hope that he follow in his footsteps, Einojô ran away from home and enrolled in the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages while living with his sister, who was married to an aircraft engineer. After a few years, Katô Hisanosuke came to Tokyo and forced Einojô to go back to Miyagi. Katô Einojô remained bitter about his father's actions throughout his life. But back in Shida, his youthful rebelliousness had no other outlet than the establishment of a new youth group.

Katô's wide knowledge of art, literature, foreign affairs, and agriculture intrigued his peers in Aratanome. So too did his knowledge of how to use Western cutlery and play golf. If Katô's charisma was attractive, so too was the fact that he provided a free space for the neighborhood youth to hang out. His parents resided separately in nearby Nakaniida hamlet, where they started a new rice threshing and carrying company. The Katô family's original house in Aratanome, with its spacious garden, became a perfect place for the neighborhood youth to gather and play various sports.[52]

The most intriguing aspect of Katô's youth group was its name, 'the Aratanome 4-H club'. When Katô discussed with his friends the question of what to name their gatherings, he remembered that his teacher in the upper-level elementary school, Takahashi Gunji, had once made mention of the American 4-H club, which put a strong emphasis on youth training through rural life. Takahashi was a young intellectual who had just graduated from normal school. Katô deliberately avoided using the common nomenclature, *seinenkai* or *seinendan*. For him, it was the initiative of the young themselves, not its affiliation to the government, which characterized the group. He also felt alienated from the official purpose of *seinendan* training because his short stature had prevented him from passing the conscription exam. The '4-H club' expressed his connection to the outside world and his liberation from the rules of a landlord family and hamlet. It also symbolized the cultural leadership of a non-militaristic figure with agrarian ideals. The members held evening gatherings more than 60 times within the first 14 months. Katô often gave lectures on scientific developments, international affairs, architecture in Tokyo, Japanese economic policies, and social issues. He also assigned two members to give a speech at every gathering. For many members, this was their first experience of speaking in front of an audience. After sharing knowledge and practicing public speeches, they played cards and listened to music on Katô's gramophone, a rare possession in those days.

After five years of these activities, Katô wanted to start a new group project: publishing a journal. He picked the title, *Omoto* (*Rhodea*), an evergreen plant that represented eternal youth. At one gathering, Katô suggested that the members write essays together and watched them struggling with paper and pen. 'I feel sorry hearing them sighing deeply in front of the distributed paper', he wrote in his own essay, 'but it is "spare the rod and spoil the child." Opportunities do not come twice. Without struggle, we do not become men with humanity'.[53] Group members wrote poems and essays about their work, families, gardens, and daily lives. One member who spelled his name Naoji in Roman characters wrote about the 4-H club. 'Writing an essay is not easy ... The leader said, "try writing anything that comes to your mind as it is" ... what on earth should I write about? ... Since the inauguration of the club, the knowledge of the members improved a lot. We take turns to

give speeches, and now we have come to write essays for a journal. It feels delightful, as if we had become big scholars or something'.[54]

Katô Einojô's lack of interest in the Shida village *seinendan* did not mean that the 4-H club was antagonistic to the hamlet and village order. In *Omoto*, he expressed strong agrarian ideals and respect for those who performed military service in the same way the *seinendan* did. One of the group's first activities was to save money through collective labor, such as selling eggs. The government had been campaigning to promote savings around the country, and Katô believed that labor and savings projects would allow youth to discipline themselves as well as help the national economy. The organization of the 4-H club also followed the standard format of government-led *seinendan* despite its more voluntary nature. The members agreed on formal regulations and rules, elected executive members with limited tenure, and held three kinds of meetings (regular, convened, and executive). They also worked closely with the patrolling group of Aratanome hamlet. The patrolling group consisted of the heads of households in Aratanome, who traditionally supervised the premodern youth group and hamlet affairs in general.[55] Katô's leadership position replicated the teacher's role in the village *seinendan*. Although the 4-H club was no doubt fun and accessible for the members, relationships within it were undeniably hierarchical, with Katô positioned at the very top. As such, the 4-H club in Aratanome was a new phenomenon that occurred outside official purview, but it combined many features of the old hamlet youth group and the new *seinendan*.

The 4-H club showed how young men like Katô incorporated the global and nation-wide discourse of rural youth and attempted to create their own groups. In its social context, the club mirrored the changing position of landlord classes. After a series of famines during the Meiji era, agricultural production steadily increased during the 1920s and the fortunes of the middling farmers (who cultivated between one and five *ha* of rice paddies either as land-owning farmers or better-off tenants) improved. Unlike in the Meiji era, agricultural advancement relied less on the initiative of landlords, and more on public research centers and government investment in larger-scale irrigation and land reforms. It was not a coincidence that Katô Hisanosuke, observing the changing status of his family, felt compelled to start a new rice distribution business. Furthermore, starting from the mid-1920s, tenant farmers organized large-scale disputes all over the country to secure tenancy rights. Many of them won permanent cultivation rights, which dramatically limited the power of landlords, and virtually ended the tight control of landlords over village affairs.[56]

Katô Einojô had a stake in this changing environment. Holding a grudge against the older landlord system that forced him to abandon his dream of moving to the city, he might have felt that he was a participant in this new rural dynamism. The 4-H club's strong emphasis on youthfulness provided him with a new community replacing the old landlord–tenant hierarchy

that had previously dictated hamlet affairs. Perhaps he felt proud of creating new ties with villagers when his father had a harder time maintaining the old ones. Yet, at the same time, Katô's new leadership in the 4-H club relied on urban experiences that were only available to the sons of landlords' families. Regardless of Katô's intentions, the club helped the village administration mitigate confrontation between different classes and secure the overall status of the landlord class.

The 4-H club's detachment from class confrontation stands out in light of the involvement of rural youth in tenant disputes in the 1920s. Many historians have previously viewed rural villages as preserving the premodern 'feudal' characteristics, which in turn nurtured Japan's militarism and fascism in the 1930s.[57] In reality, villages experienced dynamic social transformations in labor and class relationships during this period. Tenant disputes manifested the reconfiguration of power relationships in the villages. Many *seinendan* groups and their members got involved in the disputes against state officials' expectations. In Toyosato village in the same Miyagi prefecture, the *seinendan* leader played an active part in bringing the tenants' demands to the village assembly in 1927.[58] In some cases, rural youth became leftist activists. Inomata Yûjirô, once famous as a model farmer who won a public speaking contest for youth in the early 1910s in another village in Miyagi, turned to socialist activities in the 1920s. Inspired by activists' calls for a peasant uprising, he started a tenant union in his home village. He was arrested and tortured repeatedly during the police crackdown on Communist Party members in 1928.[59] The unpredictable nature of youth had already surprised the officials during the rice riots in 1918, sparked by the skyrocketing price of rice. Top government officials like Tanaka Giichi and Tazawa Yoshiharu expected the *seinendan* and army reservist groups to help the government maintain social order during the chaos. Yet more than 10 per cent of the 8,000 arrests turned out to be of members of these groups.[60]

The Shida region was relatively slow in joining these movements, but by 1930, even Shida village, where Katô Einojô lived, had experienced two major disputes with more to follow in subsequent years.[61] Before the tenant disputes spread, the region was already a site of contentious politics. Various political parties rallied in adjacent Furukawa town in the 1920s.[62] Furukawa was home to the nationally famous liberal thinker, Yoshino Sakuzô. The same town also elected Akamatsu Katsumaro, a Socialist Party leader, to the House of Representatives in 1928.[63] It is hard to imagine that Katô Einojô accidentally avoided these lively political movements in neighboring Furukawa. He seems to have deliberately maintained his youth group as a circle of neighborhood young people and avoided getting involved in 'class struggle' of any kind.

Katô's 4-H club reminds us that social change occurred not only through the transformation of class relationships – the generational identity of

'youth' constituted another important element within the emerging challenge to the established order. Katô was rebelling against his own environment, except that his rebellion took the form of the deployment of modern knowledge and the creation of a strong generational community, rather than engagement in political demonstrations. Those who challenged the capitalist establishment by joining leftist activism also regarded generational conflicts in their families and hamlets as one of their major concerns.[64] Based on their social identity as 'rural youth', youth groups of quite different political inclinations grew together and shared a sense of moral superiority defined against urban students and older generations. The discursive rise of rural youth became a force of its own, separate from political goals, giving agrarian youth confidence to claim to be the engine of social change of one kind or another – or a 'rural modernity' of the 1920s.

Conclusion

Through their engagement with transnationality, or what we might call the 'transnational imagination' youth in the countryside became key protagonists in the fashioning of modern Japanese society. By more closely examining the motivations of the young in local and personal contexts, we can move away from top down views of the village youth of the *seinendan* as mere cogs in a vast state-run machine. The *seinendan* were, for many young people, the first rung on the ladder of social mobility in rural villages and a tool which they used to pursue their own goals and agendas. The fact that the government ministries and the army relied heavily on *seinendan* members to achieve national goals presented these young people with an opportunity to extract resources from the state as well as to confirm their moral superiority vis-à-vis urban youth and older generations. Imagined ties with foreign counterparts helped them foster a strong generational identity as youth. International influence did not always come through national intermediaries. Some young people in the countryside had no problem digesting Goethe's poems and quotes from Tolstoy's stories to reflect upon their own youthfulness and agrarian supremacy. Even members of a small night study group providing tuition in making sandals out of straw dreamed of modernity after Japan's confrontation with Russia, and a private youth group in Miyagi adopted the name of the American 4-H movement.

The example of Katô Einojô shows us that, in the 1920s, the space of youth activism became more expansive than ever. Katô, unable to pursue his dream of living in Tokyo, explored a wider degree of freedom through the leadership of his youth group. His desire to be connected to the outside world was fulfilled in part through the activities of the 4-H club. Practicing public speaking and writing essays were steps toward that goal. For agrarian youth in the farming villages of Miyagi who spoke in the strong dialect of the Tôhoku region, using standard Japanese was a new challenge. But they had the ability and confidence

to communicate with global youth culture, and in Katô's mind this was essential to achieving a rural modernity. Such connectivity with the outside world provided him with a weapon to fight his father's authority without directly disturbing the order of the household or the hamlet. In very intricate ways, Katô's new cultural leadership combined pro-establishment elements with others of a more rebellious and progressive character.

The space opening up for youth activism developed into more politically diverse movements through communication with national and transnational forces. Many rural youth participated in tenant disputes which were regarded as highly subversive acts by government officials. Behind what has been viewed as their politicization, however, the expression of a generational and geographical identity, 'rural youth', was often an important driver of young people's involvement in such activities. Regardless of their political orientations, these young country-dwellers embraced anti-capitalist, anti-urban feelings and laid the foundations for the fascist agrarianism of 1930s Japan.

Notes

1. L. Young (2013) *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 84. The number of people living in rural areas differs depending on how one defines 'rural' areas. According to the national census, about 49 million (76 per cent) lived in '*gun-bu*' and 15.4 million (24 per cent) lived in '*shi-bu*' even in 1930, when urban migration was a dominant social phenomenon. In a different measure, those living in villages and towns under the population size of 20,000 also constituted 76 per cent.
2. There were various names for village youth groups, such as *seinenkai* and *dôsôkai,* especially before the government standardized these institutions. They were not limited to the countryside, but urban *seinendan* were not as active. In this chapter, for the sake of consistency, I use '*seinendan*' to refer to agrarian youth groups of various names.
3. The first national network was established in 1915. State bureaucrats established the national headquarters, the Japan Youth Club [*Nihon seinenkan*], in Tokyo in 1921. The national network was amalgamated into the Greater Japan Seinendan Federation in 1924, which absorbed the *seinendan* federations in Taiwan and Korea in 1938. It was renamed the Greater Japan Seinendan the following year, and was merged with similar national organizations of young women and boys to form the Greater Japan Seishônendan in 1941. On these formal changes in institutions, see T. Kumagai (1942) *Dai Nihon Seinendanshi* (Tokyo: Nihon Seinenkan) and various other publications by the Japan Youth Club. The *seinendan* were reduced back to village-centered organizations (although still headed by the Japan Youth Club) after the end of World War II.
4. Associations for young women also spread, although on a much smaller scale. For discussion on young women's groups in the Japanese countryside, see Y. Watanabe (1997) *Kindai Nihon joshi shakai kyôiku seiritsushi* (Tokyo: Akashi shoten).
5. The most comprehensive accounts of this include K. Hirayama (1978) *Seinen shûdanshi kenkyû josetsu*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Shinsensha) and R. Smethurst (1974) *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

6. Only 20 per cent of the young male population passed the conscription exam during Meiji, and it only increased to 40–50 per cent during the Taisho (1912–26) and early Showa periods (1926–89). See Y. Katô (1996) *Chôheisei to kindai Nihon* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kôbunkan), pp. 65–7. Y. Okada (1985) ‘Seinendan undô no haha, Yamamoto Takinosuke no shôgai to shisô’ in T. Yamamoto, *Yamamoto Takinosuke zenshû* (Tokyo: Nihon seinenkan), p. 1; T. Tani (2011) *Yamamoto Takinosuke no shôgai to shakai kyôiku jissen* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan), pp. 22–50.
7. T. Yamamoto (1985, originally 1896) ‘Inaka seinen’ in T. Yamamoto, *Yamamoto Takinosuke zenshû*, p. 1.
8. N. Kimura (1998) *<Seinen> no tanjô: Meiji Nihon ni okeru seijiteki jissen no tankan* (Tokyo: Shinyôsha), p. 43.
9. S. Tokutomi (1887) ‘Shin Nihon no seinen oyobi shin nihon no seiji’, *Kokumin no tomo,* July–October, 6–9.
10. K. Yonehara (2003) *Tokutomi Sohô* (Tokyo: Chûô kôron sinsha), pp. 61–81. Tokutomi originally emphasized the importance of the ‘country gentlemen (*inaka shinshi*)’, but the main audience were those in school in larger cities and towns.
11. N. Kimura, *<Seinen> no tanjô*, pp. 131–205.
12. Yamamoto, *Yamamoto Takinosuke zenshû*, p. 3.
13. Ibid., pp. 6 and 9
14. Ibid., p. 17.
15. Yamamoto’s understanding of pre-Meiji youth groups was not based on historical studies. But throughout Japan, rural hamlets were organized into age and gender groups and a set function was assigned to each group. Youth groups for male residents (sometimes called ‘wakashû gumi’ or ‘wakamono gumi’) usually took charge of labor sharing, seasonal festivals, and various supportive roles to household heads. See T. Tani (1984) *Wakamono nakama no rekishi* (Tokyo: Nihon seinenkan) on the pre-Meiji youth groups.
16. C. Gluck (1985) *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 182. See also pp. 178–86.
17. See Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, pp. 178–86.
18. Yamamoto, *Yamamoto Takinosuke zenshû*, p. 9.
19. During Meiji, villages in Tôhoku had very low crop yields in 1869, 1875, 1876, 1879, 1886 1888, 1889, 1890, 1902, 1905, 1910, 1913, and 1914. Shida sonshi hensan iinkai (1950) *Shida sonshi* (Miyagi: Shida son), pp. 143–54.
20. Tenancy had increased from about 27 per cent of arable land in 1868 to 45 per cent in 1908. Okada, ‘Seinendan undô no haha, Yamamoto Takinosuke no shôgai to shisô’, p. 2; A. Waswo (1988) ‘The Transformation of Rural Society 1900–1950’ in P. Duus (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6: The Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 543.
21. U. Maeda (1912) *Chihô seinen no tebiki* (Tokyo: Taiseikai Shuppanbu), p. 6.
22. Maeda, *Chihô seinen no tebiki*, pp. 9–10.
23. Ryôminsha (1911) *Chihô seinen no jikaku* (Tokyo: Rakuyûdô), p. 9. A similar argument appears in Maeda, *Chihô seinen no tebiki*, pp. 11–14.
24. Maeda, *Chihô seinen no tebiki*, pp. 17, 84–5, 88–9.
25. See K. Pyle (1973) ‘The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918’, *Journal of Asian Studies*, 33 (1), 51–65, for more detail on the Local Improvement Movement.
26. K. Kasama (2003) *Chihô kairyô undôki ni okeru shôgakkô to chiiki shakai: kyôka no chûshin toshite no shôgakkô* (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentâ), pp. 113–15.
27. Tanaka Giichi was a leading figure in the national politics and the army. He was the Army Minister (1918–21, 1923–4), Prime Minister (1927–9), and held other cabinet positions.

28. Y. Norisugi (1917) ‘Senji ni okeru doitsu seinen wo ronjite wagakuni no seinen ni oyobu’, *Miyagi kyôiku*, 235, 16–20.
29. Y. Kawai (1929) *Tanaka Giichi den* (Tokyo: Tanaka Giichi den hensansho), p. 306; G. Tanaka (1918) *Ôshû taisen no kyôkun to seinen shidô* (Tokyo: Shingetsusha). See Hirayama, *Seinen shûdanshi kenkyû josetsu*, pp. 21–30 for Tanaka Giichi’s intervention into *seinendan* policies. See also Smethurst, *A Social Basis For Prewar Japanese Militarism*, pp. 1–49.
30. Maeda, *Chihô seinen no tebiki*, p. 190.
31. Monbushô futsû gakumu-kyoku (1921) *Zenkoku seinendan no jissai* (Tokyo: Monbushô), p. 32.
32. See Tani, *Wakamono nakama no rekishi*, on the pre-Meiji youth groups. H. Onizuka (1995) ‘Seinen shûdan ni miru chiiki shakai no tôsei to minshû niyoru sono juyô no katei’, *Rekishigaku kenkyû*, 669, 19–36 examines the transition from the traditional youth group to a modern one in Shimoina village, Nagano.
33. Monbushô (1910) *Kansai shokenka seinenkai jôkyô torishirabesho* (Tokyo: Monbushô).
34. See Hiroshima-ken (1910) *Hiroshima-kenka seinendantai jôkkô torishirabesho* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima-ken naimu-bu). K. Matsuo (1911) *Mohan seinendan no soshiki to shisetsu* (Tokyo: Kaihatsusha).
35. Gunma-ken (1909) *Gunma-ken seinen yagakkai jôkyô shirabe* (Maebashi: Gunma-ken naimubu). Gunma-ken (1926) *Gunma-ken tôkeisho 1911–1925* (Maebashi: Gunma-ken), Part III: Population and Others, p. 9.
36. Y. Shinjô (1909) ‘Seinen yagaku kaisoku’ from the private archive ‘Seinendanpō ākaibusu’, material number: Akita 022.
37. Shinjô, ‘Seinen yagaku kaisoku’.
38. ‘Gendai seinen yo!’ *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 30, 1 July 1927, 1–2.
39. ‘Aru seinen no otakebi jinsei ha doryoku’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 32, 1 September 1927, 1–2. Nakano sei, ‘Seikô wa doryoku kara’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 33, 1 October 1927, 1–2.
40. Waswo, ‘The Transformation of Rural Society 1900–1905’, pp. 561–2.
41. T. Tani (2003) *Seinen no seiki* (Tokyo: Dôseisha), pp. 60–85.
42. Tani, *Seinen no seiki*, pp. 86–9; Shûyôdan (1985) *Shûyôdan undô hachijûnenshi gaishi* (Tokyo: Shûyôdan), pp. 76–82, 106–8.
43. T. Yamamoto (1922) ‘Ryôsha no kankei’, *Kôjô*, pp. 15–19.
44. The scholar Tani Teruhito digitized the newsletters and made available at the Seinendanpô âkaibusu, Tsuruga College, Fukushima. Now housed in the Japan Youth Club in Tokyo.
45. Kimura, *<Seinen> no tanjô*, p. 173.
46. R. Tahata, ‘Itoshiki kora no tameni 7’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 19, 25 August 1926, p. 1.
47. Ishigaki Yûki sei ‘Seikatsu no igi: Nanji wa nazeni ikite irunoka’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 19, 15 August 1926, p. 1; Suzuki Jôichi ‘Kibô wa seinen no inochi’, *Akitashi seinendan danpô*, 3, 20 November 1926, p. 1.
48. ‘Itari shushô Musisorîni shi yori Nihon seinen danjo ni okurareshi meshisçji’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 19, 25 August 1926, p. 2.
49. R. Kimura, ‘Nôson seinen no shinro’, *Yamane seishi kaihô*, 23, 5 December 1926, pp. 3–4.
50. Quoted in M. Suzuki (1977) ‘Taishôki nômin seiji shisô no ichi sokumen-jô’, *Nihonshi kenkyû*, 174, 13, in Waswo, ‘The Transformation of Rural Society 1900–1905’, pp. 592–3.
51. Furukawa shishi hensan iinkai (2005) *Furukawa shishi dai-9 kan shiryô IV: kindai, gendai* (Miyagi: Furukawa-shi), p. 470. 40 *ha* is equivalent of 0.4 km$_2$.

52. Personal information about Katô Einojô is drawn from an interview with Katô Haruhiko, 24 April 2012 in Ôsaki city, Miyagi, and Katô Einojô's memoirs: H. Katô (ed.) (year unknown, probably around 1987) *Jinsei sanmyaku yume bôbô: Katô Einojô ikôshû* (Ôsaki city: Self-published). See also I. Gotô (1990) *Eien nari mura no kokoro* (Tokyo: Fumin kyôkai), pp. 110–30. Shida sonshi hensan iinkai, *Shida sonshi*, pp. 289–90.
53. E. Katô, 'Buttsukaranakyâ', *Omoto*, 1 December 1931, pp. 6–10.
54. Naoji, 'Yabuhebi', *Omoto*, 1 December 1931, pp. 20–1.
55. Gotô, *Eien nari mura no kokoro*, pp. 121–2.
56. For the development of labor relationships and agricultural politics in this region, see S. Sunaga (ed.) (1966) *Kindai Nihon no jinushi to nômin* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobô), pp. 303–83.
57. See R. Smethurst and R. P. Dore and T. Ôuchi (1971) 'Rural Origins of Japanese Fascism' in J. W. Morley (ed.) *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 181–209.
58. T. Yonekura (1984) *Miyagi kusa no ne undô no gunzô* (Sendai: Azuma shobô), p. 80.
59. Yonekura, *Miyagi kusa no ne undô no gunzô*, pp. 104–14; Y. Saitô (1985) *Monogatari Miyagi-ken nômin undôshi chû* (Sendai: Hikari shobô), pp. 7–32.
60. H. Kataguchi, 'Kome sôdô to seinendan', *Seikei daigaku seiji keizai ronsô shûkan kinen ronbunshû jôkan*, November 1968, pp. 208–32.
61. Furukawa shishi hensan iinkai, *Furukawa shishi dai-9 kan shiryô IV*, pp. 110–15.
62. For example, 'Shamintô enzetsukai', *Kahoku shinpô*, 13 August 1928, p. 6.
63. Furukawa shishi hensan iinkai, *Furukawa shishi dai-9 kan shiryô IV*, pp. 102–11.
64. Hirayama Kazuhiko gives an elaborate examination of how *seinendan* turned to leftist activities in various social tensions in Shimoina village, Nagano prefecture. See Hirayama, *Seinen shûdanshi kenkyû josetsu*, pp. 108–257.

2

Boy Scouts under the Aztec Sun: Mexican Youth and the Transnational Construction of Identity, 1917–40

Elena Jackson Albarrán

Within a year from 1927 to 1928, a minor flurry of press coverage documented two occasions in which three Mexican Boy Scouts walked from Mexico City to New York City. This isolated and seemingly incidental set of events illuminated the complex intersections of Mexican cultural nationalism and modern transnational youth identity. The phenomenon illustrates the disjuncture between how young people growing up in Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s envisioned themselves, how they translated and exported that vision abroad, and how other countries like the United States continued to view them. The overlapping national, global, and youth identities expressed by the Boy Scout protagonists of this history perfectly capture the imperfect – indeed, often confusing – relationships between local, national, and transnational identities that concern historians.

The Washington Post and the *New York Times* reported, in a smattering of articles, on the curious phenomenon of Mexican Boy Scouts making pilgrimages on foot between their nation's capital and that of the United States, continuing their sojourn north to the US cultural capital. In May 1927, two young men named José Escobar and Gregorio García, arrived in Washington, DC, en route to New York, ostensibly with the sole mission of extending fraternal greetings to their brothers, the American Boy Scouts.[1] The following year, 18-year-old Robert Domínguez, another Mexican Boy Scout, followed in their footsteps, and earned national attention by collecting autographs of local governmental authorities along the way. Like his predecessors, Robert continued on to New York, impressing American observers with his stamina, charm, and good will, as he exported a vision of modern Mexican youth that competed with that of a nation of savage atavists. These young men acted as ambassadors of modernity, in their capacity as members of an internationally recognized organization. Their presence in the United States press complicated the vision of ancient Mexico for American readers, and served as a cultural symbol of international

solidarity in peacetime years. Nevertheless, they fought an uphill battle, as a view of the barbaric Mexico remained firmly entrenched in the international collective imaginary.

This chapter presents a dual-pronged narrative of the Mexican Boy Scouts at home and abroad. It first explores the emergence of a highly modern, Western-oriented organization – the Boy Scouts – at a curious moment in Mexico's history: the nexus of a centralized cultural nationalist project. The exercise of 'confronting the national state at its high point', in this case, reveals broader transnational influences that came to bear upon the construction of citizenship practice among a subset of the nation's youth.[2] That the Boy Scouts garnered such enthusiasm among its members and supporters at a time when most officially recognized cultural referents were local may surprise historians bent on privileging a nation-centered narrative. By the early 1920s, revolutionary officials in Mexico City sought to permanently define – for Mexicans and outsiders alike – the parameters of the nation, down to the details of such personal preferences as music, dance, and dress styles. A transnational approach allows us to understand that these national cultural imaginations were always informed by, adapted from, and engaging with other actors, intellectuals, trends, and cultures from around the world, despite the prevailing 'self-narrative of autonomous production' promoted by the nation-state.[3] This approach allows us to see the phenomenon of the Mexican Boy Scouts as a process in which national identity becomes a 'contingent concept' – an identity option, adopted or discarded at the whim of the young themselves.[4]

Second, concurrent with and contradictory to the rise of a modern Boy Scout subculture in Mexico, this chapter demonstrates the persistence of a barbaric caricature of Mexico in American popular youth culture. Even as Mexico underwent radical restructuring to modernize following its decade-long revolution, American popular youth literature – including the *Junior Red Cross News*, Boy Scout publications, and short adventure novels – persisted in their portrayal of a rural, Aztec Mexico. Meanwhile, comparable Mexican youth publications – *Tihui*, *El Scout*, and the *Manual del Explorador* – reinforced the ways that membership in extracurricular organizations heralded the emergence of a modern nation based on the healthy, active, moral bodies of its youth. The tension between these two visions of Mexico form the core of this chapter, and the Mexican youth are the protagonists, situated at the crossroads between their experiences growing up in a modernizing nation, and the rest of the world's old-fashioned vision of Mexicans as a static people.

Taking the perspective of the young, we begin to see frustrations emerge as Mexico attempts to insert itself on par with modern nations through its Boy Scout ambassadors. On the one hand, youthful participants in Scout culture saw themselves as members of a 'transnational zone', to borrow a concept from Aihwa Ong: a modern pan-youth identity that transcended

the specificities and constraints of national and local culture.[5] On the other hand, youth inserted themselves as purveyors of Mexican modernity in an international milieu that persisted in seeing Mexicans as relics of an infantilized yet barbaric past. As scholars of youth have argued, a shift in historical perspective to situate the young as protagonists in their histories (rather than as products or indicators of them) can radically upend official history.[6]

That youth should be charged – by their contemporary cultural authorities and by present-day historians alike – with the task of embodying ideal citizenship in a national community provides as many opportunities as challenges. In the case of the Mexican Boy Scouts, despite the transnational context in which their organization was steeped, and despite increasing encounters and exchanges across borders and between nations, the international perception of Mexico remained static. Only within this 'transnational youth zone' that the Mexican Boy Scout youth sometimes inhabited could they convey the uniquely cosmopolitan brand of Mexican modernity. The young emerged as agents attempting to learn and export a rather new brand of cultural national identity as Mexican youth – especially to the United States, their most immediate cultural referent; while in the international sphere, old ideas about backward Mexico seemed permanently entrenched and difficult to dislodge.

Transnationalism, age, and race

An analysis of the Boy Scouts in Mexico provides perhaps exemplary illustrations of some of the questions raised in the burgeoning comparative scholarship of the international Boy Scout movement. Three identity-related concepts sit at the core of this study: the articulation of (trans)national modern identities, the fluidity between social categories of childhood and youth, and the troubled inclusion of the indigenous past in Boy Scout lore.

First, the phenomenon of the Mexican Boy Scouts emerged in the context of Mexican revolutionary cultural nationalism and in the shadow of modern global citizenship that infused youth organizations the world over. The Mexican Boy Scouts were a dynamic combination of national and global influences – a truly transnational identity constructed multilaterally through the 'movements, flows, and circulations' of youth and youth culture that the organization facilitated.[7] The internationalism that arose out of World War I opened avenues for participation in civic life to political minors the world over. The professionalization of child-related fields such as puericulture, pedagogy, and pediatric medicine led to the Pan American Child Congresses (1916 to present), which placed children and youth at the center of discussions of public policy, politics, and education. The Boy Scouts, founded in England by Major-General Robert Baden-Powell following the experimental island camp at Brownsea in 1907, became a global phenomenon by 1908 with the publication of the manual *Scouting for Boys*.[8]

The Boy Scouts (and later, to a lesser extent, Girl Guides) served as a tool of nation-building wherever in the world they were set up. Although Baden-Powell initially intended to prepare a generation of men to fight in the service of the British Empire, the methods of instruction, training, and socialization that he implemented proved adaptable to a variety of national contexts. The 'primitive', back-to-nature survivalist strategies provided middle-class British boys with a roots-based love of their homeland.[9] When these youth-based organizations were transplanted outside of the Empire, they almost always enjoyed the endorsement of a nationalist ruling regime, and quickly absorbed the particular nationalist (and racial) discourses of the area.[10] In Mexico, as in other emerging nations, the Boy Scouts became a transnational composite of intersecting influences. The imperial undertones of Baden-Powell's organization did not necessarily apply to the Mexican case, and therefore preparation for warfare was understated. For Mexican Scouts, the most immediate inspiration and audience was the American Scouts; it was with their northern counterparts that they had the greatest likelihood of actual exchange, and emulation was heightened by proximity. As we shall see, the discourse of national inclusion, steeped within the indigenist language then in vogue among revolutionary intellectuals, became one of the organization's most visible features. Thus, the form that Scouting took in Mexico, as in other nations, was the result of transnational cultural transfer.

Though the middle-class stratum was overrepresented, children and youth contributed to global youth movements through organizations like the Boy Scouts. Individually and collectively, as part of a growing self-awareness as members of a transnational community of their peers, Mexican youth sought membership in organizations such as the Junior Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, and to an extent, the Girl Scouts, beginning in the 1920s and 1930s. Fortuitously, the apparent universality of the Scouts' moral code corresponded with the model practice of revolutionary citizenship imagined by those consciously molding a modern Mexican nation-state. Although the norms, codes, and aesthetics of these organizations were imported to Mexico from abroad – namely Great Britain and the United States – the Mexican national chapters quickly subverted much of the foreign content and adopted distinctly local characteristics. Yet as recent comparative studies have indicated, the uneven participation in and reception of an 'ideal youth' (constructed largely in the industrialized Western world) indicate that this was far from a universal concept.[11]

Second, the Mexican political culture of the 1920s and 1930s valorized childhood and youth above other categories as a metaphor for the nation's moral renewal. This allowed for those from very young children to young adults in their early twenties to claim membership of the same social space. Historians have emphasized the fluidity of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, as these are defined by the historical moment, the cultural context, and the assumptions of contemporary intellectuals as historical

producers of knowledge in each instant.[12] Most of the 'children' that appear in the documents, photos, and articles of Boy Scout popular media outlets are between the ages of 7 and 18 years. In many cases, the terms 'child', 'boy/girl', and 'youth' are used interchangeably without making biological distinctions regarding the subjects in question. Young men in their early 20s often formed the ranks of the 'boys', especially in international events. The modern-day concept of 'adolescence' did not gain currency in Mexico until the middle of the twentieth century.[13] Hence, for older youth, whose day-to-day lives otherwise might have been indistinguishable from that of adults, the opportunity to participate in a *children's* organization allowed them the possibility of a new social identity.

Notwithstanding this slippage the overwhelming surge in civic participation among young people in revolutionary Mexico suggests that 'childhood' and 'youth' both emerged as viable categories for social identity beyond the traditional family sphere. Children and youth began to enact citizenship in ways that were recognized by their social and political seniors, and saw these actions reinforced in an international climate of youth movements. Adopting a youth-centered analysis of transnational organizations allows us to see the degree to which this nebulous social category allowed individuals more agency. As probationary political citizens, the young men considered here were not restrained by the strictures of official diplomatic roles; their membership in a transnational 'youth zone' allowed them to act as agents presenting their own interpretations of cultural nationalism to their generation. In fact, the rhetorical shift from the late nineteenth century, when children were referred to as 'future citizens', to the early twentieth century, when they became 'little citizens', demonstrates the degree of investiture in children's active participation in forging national peace, solidarity, and modernity. As a result of the 1910 Mexican Revolution, children and youth were folded into a more participatory democracy (relatively speaking); they became visible agents of civic action, political mobilization, and national and international charity as never before in the country's history. Their visibility contributed to an expanded definition of 'citizenship', as youth became the ideal models to which all Mexicans should aspire, rather than merely citizens-in-training. The young people of Mexico were at the forefront of a country reinventing itself as a nation of literate, productive, modern, citizens.[14] Once this process was underway, the young members of the Boy Scouts were poised to project this identity abroad.

Third, citizens of both Mexico and the United States relied on the myth of an idealized Aztec past in the construction of their respective visions of Mexico, but each construed that past in different ways. United States media outlets conflated a mythic past with a stagnant present. Conversely, Mexican counterparts sought to relegate indigeneity to the past, and project a whiter version of Mexico as the modern present. The two countries' contentious history and respective narratives of barbarism focused in particular on the US–Mexico border. At the time of the emergence of the Boy Scouts, the

geopolitical boundary had only been in place for about 60 years (Mexico lost California and most of the US Southwest in 1848; a final strategic strip of land in southern Arizona was negotiated in 1854). Many residents of territories formerly part of Mexico still rankled generations later at the imposed transfer of their citizenship. Meanwhile, despite the incorporation of those territories, Anglo-Americans persisted in viewing darker-skinned residents of the region as anchored to an uncivilized heritage that strained at them from the other side of the border. The 1910 Mexican Revolution did little to dispel such racialized notions within the northern states; many United States news outlets reported the war as a disorganized series of skirmishes among savages.[15] Mexico's postrevolutionary regimes sought fervently (and often futilely) to restore the country's reputation and to demonstrate to the United States (first) and the rest of the world (second) that it was a modern, progressive, productive nation interested in diplomacy and seeking a shared destiny with the industrialized world. The Boy Scouts were the ideal evangelists of the new global citizens that Mexico wanted to promote. When they crossed the border – on foot, wearing the insignia of a globally recognized youth organization – they did not come as savages to pillage the north, but as peaceful ambassadors.

During the decades with which this study is concerned, racial discourses were unfolding as part of a transnational collaboration that featured prominent intellectuals in both Mexico and the United States. They drew from their conversations quite disparate conclusions about race and brought them home to their respective countries.[16] Both approaches can be indicted for their oversight, to the point of neglect, of the real and living native populations of Mexico. Mexican Boy Scouts passed over indigenous neighbors, and even members of their ranks, in favor of the noble savage trope from which they extracted symbolic power and aesthetic tokens. And despite the modernizing overtures projected by Mexican youth, Americans persisted in seeing their counterparts south of the border as bronzed vestiges of a pre-Colombian storybook civilization, fixed in a rural and romantic past. The stark disjuncture between symbolic and real native Mexicans manifests itself clearly in the mission and actions of these transnational organizations, and takes on a different hue whether viewed through a Mexican or American lens.[17] These three categories – transnationalism, age, and race – thread in and out of the broader discussion of Mexican cultural nationalism as it was learned, expressed, exported, and received by members of transnational youth organizations in the 1920s and 1930s.

Boy Scouts at home: the construction of the modern Mexican man

The Mexican Boy Scouts, inaugurated in 1917 as the Corps of Mexican Explorers, and later the Tribes of Mexican Explorers (*Tribus de Exploradores*

Mexicanos), grew under the direction of German-born Mexican citizen Federico Clarck. Clarck had dedicated years to the observation of Boy Scouts organizations in 18 countries around the world. He modeled his vision directly on the international Boy Scout organization, but it quickly adopted a distinctly nationalist hue. Clarck published a four-volume manual entitled *El Explorador Mexicano*, versions and excerpts of which appeared in related popular children's magazines published by the Boy Scouts, *Tihui* and *El Scout*. These publications, based heavily on the United States' magazine *Boys' Life*, were edited to include references to national history, geography, and heroes. The combination of foreign elements and national symbols lent a gravitas to the patriotism that these publications inspired in their boy readers, all of which reflected Baden-Powell's philosophy that nationalism and internationalism ought not to be mutually exclusive categories. Organized Scout activity began in earnest in the calendar year of 1928; in September of that year, the First National Congress of the Tribes of Mexican Explorers met to assess their labors nationwide. At this meeting, sponsored in part by the Ministry of Education, 122 Scout delegates representing 48 institutions nationwide convened under the direction of José U. Escobar, National Director of the Explorers (this was not the same José Escobar as the Boy Scout trekker introduced in the opening).[18]

The Mexican Boy Scouts took many forms and never consolidated under one official organization. All of the manifestations of the group followed the structure of the Boy Scouts, but the publication of various manuals and the existence of various directors suggest that often they were divided into local and regional organizations. For example, one group was called the Tequihuas de México, another was the Amigos del Bosque (Friends of the Forest), and another was the Boy Scouts de México. At one point, many groups united under the name Consejo Nacional Escultista (National Scouting Organization). The Mexican Boy Scouts are most commonly referred to in Mexican literature and history as the Exploradores Mexicanos, or Mexican Explorers.[19] Much as Sayaka Chatani has demonstrated in her discussion in this volume of Japanese *seinendan*, or village youth groups, the sheer variety of informal, derivative, and local versions of an international organization across the country demonstrates a surge in the 'transnational imagination'.

Mexican boys responded overwhelmingly to this new social option. At the 1928 meeting, a year after the formalization of Explorer activities, Mexico City alone boasted 20 'tribes' of Explorers that served 700 members, with another 150 in San Luis Potosí, 90 in Puebla, and 120 in Chihuahua. Representatives from many other states in the republic had written to the national headquarters either expressing interest in forming a nationally recognized chapter, or announcing that Scout mobilization had already taken place.[20] One enthusiastic prospective Explorer named Jorge Enríquez from the provincial city of Morelia wrote in to the magazine *Tihui* immediately upon the publication of its first issue requesting a subscription and

information about forming a troop; he claimed to know little about the movement, but had already formed a group of interested peers and sought some guidance.[21] Between 1921 and 1938, the number of Mexican Boy Scouts had gone from 876 to 11,724 members across the republic, not including the uncounted numbers of affiliated and unofficial groups.[22] Escobar enthused that the only limitation on Scout membership was the availability of qualified directors, since boys everywhere were anxious to join. To that end, the Ministry of Education founded an Academy for Scout Leaders as part of the National Preparatory School, which by 1928 had enrolled 90 young men in training to lead future troops.[23]

Notwithstanding the foreign inspiration that led to the foundation of the Mexican Boy Scouts, Clarck and the other coordinators moved rapidly to infuse the corps with identifiably national content. The name of the organization, 'Explorers', evoked its principal purpose: to explore the country and learn its geography in order to foment an understanding of what it meant to be Mexican based on the physical experiences of the group members. Through their apprenticeships and excursions, the youngsters learned to emulate national military heroes, learned the names and properties of native plants and animals, and became familiar with the geographical features of the national landscape. They took hiking trips to the iconic volcanoes Popocatépetl and Orizaba, and other sites around the republic. In this sense, the Explorers, or Scouts, reaffirmed the geopolitical boundaries of the nation through their explorations of its limits. At the 1928 national meeting, the executive committee and members voted overwhelmingly that the Explorers would be a *nationalist* organization, and not simply a Mexican mimicry of a foreign institution.[24] To that end, delegates proposed incorporating Boy Scout activities more seamlessly into the primary and secondary education curriculum. As *Tihui* announced:

> The Tribes of Mexican Explorers are inspired by the best teachings of Baden Powell, and recognize as brothers all of the members of the Great International Brotherhood of Explorers; but our institution possesses a unique program, adapted to our needs, that has not been copied from other foreign organizations, and that has as a base the heritage of the great founders of our country.[25]

Through survival techniques learned in the open air, physical challenges to strengthen the body, and practical exercises in the natural sciences, the boys learned a brand of civics that converted the rather abstract revolutionary nationalism into a set of basic, tangible techniques that became the indispensible toolkit for initiation into citizenry. One of the highlights was 'Boy Scout Week' (*Semana del Explorador*), a reunion of Scouts from around the country in the nation's capital during the month of November (to coincide with the celebration commemorating the start of the Mexican Revolution).

Figure 2.1 The Aztec calendar and the Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos logo that it inspired

Source: From Federico Clarck, El Explorador Mexicano (México: Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos, 1921): 160.

In 1929, the event included an open house at the national headquarters to showcase their activity space to family and friends, a *vivac* (campfire activity with dramatic presentations) in Chapultepec Park, a pet exhibition and contest, assembly of troops and awards ceremony, an excursion to a nursery on the outskirts of the city, a night of theater with presentations by various Boy Scouts, a day of visitations to prisons, hospitals and correctional schools, and a vigil in honor of the heroes of independence.[26] For Scouts from outside of Mexico City, this week of activities forged in them a sense of community with their compatriots, and coming to the capital city gave them an idea of the grandeur of the country that they represented and protected through membership in the organization.[27] But the presence of so many uniformed Scouts all over the city also served to make them more visible to the rest of the nation as a source of pride and honor, cloaked in modern uniforms based on European models. The Boy Scouts thus underscored *mexicanidad*, or Mexicanness, even as they emblematized the international youth movement.

As events such as these brought together far-flung branches of the Boy Scouts, the organization grappled with a troubled relationship with its regional – primarily indigenous – membership. Scout officials took ambivalent approaches to the symbolic and real treatment of indigenous representation in the organization. At the suggestion of the Ministry of Education, Explorer culture projected nativism through many elements which reinforced the unifying myth that all Mexicans boast an Aztec heritage. In fact, the Aztecs were only the last of many great and overlapping dynasties across the modern Mexican territory, and were the group that held power – not

uncontested by rival ethnic groups – upon the arrival of the Spanish. The linguistic and cultural diversity that characterizes the Mexican population was only marginally represented in most popular treatments of a romanticized, Aztec past.[28] The youth adorned their uniforms with an eight-point badge in a motif inspired by the Aztec calendar stone. Corporate structure divided the members along hierarchal groups denominated 'tribes', as if to underscore the ancestral nature of groupings of young men to learn about nature, survival, and warfare. Hierarchical titles all derived from Nahuatl, the language of the Aztec empire, and corresponded to levels of the pre-Colombian government. The individual members of each tribe were called *tequihua* ('explorer' in Nahuatl); the leaders of the troops at different levels all had corresponding Nahua names: *tepushtlato*, *tecuhtli*, *tlacatecuhtli*, and *tacatecatecuhtli*, in order of rank.[29] The indigenous names of the various groups had no relationship to the ethnicity of the membership; to the contrary, indigenous people served as more of a mascot to the organization than as a meaningful cultural representation.

The cases of the Girl Guides in England, Canada, and India during the same decades proves instructive; in these organizations, the noted under-representation of local ethnic and indigenous groups among Guide membership signaled a 'tension between the ideal of inclusiveness and the reality of exclusiveness'.[30] In Mexico, despite the fact that many Scouts hailed from white, middle-class backgrounds – a trend reflected in the photos published in the manual and in *Tihui* – Scout culture fostered a brand of national pride based on an idealized indigenous past. The phenomenon of nativism in nature-based organizations characterized the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts in the United States as well; titles and camps named after tribes were more symbolic than anything, and reflected little measure of educational or cultural content.[31] The relationship between the Mexican Scouts and their supposed ancestors manifested itself in much the same way. Rhetorically, the Scouts celebrated 'the virtues of audacity, fortitude, bravery, ingenuity, knowledge of the secrets of natural life', characteristics ascribed to the ancient native tribes; they aspired to embody these virtues that 'abounded in those men'. For Scouts, the pre-Colombian 'bronzed race' was the fountain of their appreciation of nature. Regardless, Scout officials made it quite clear that, despite having derived from ancient civilizations' 'most noble and fertile elements', the organization did not intend for youth to regress to savagery. In reality, living native groups still bore the stigma of atavism in relationship to the modern world.[32] Scout culture relegated indigenous groups so far to the distant past that it overlooked their rich potential to contribute to the Scouts' natural science education in life. Rather than acknowledge the millions of living native people that populated the country, the editors of *Tihui* encouraged their young readers to 'love that which sleeps in the silence of death, to comprehend that which palpitates in the throngs of life'.[33]

Scouts learned, then, that indigenous culture was best understood as a historical echo, rather than a vibrant source from which to learn modern-day

lessons. Notwithstanding the copious references to an idealized past within the Scout program, little evidence exists to suggest that the Scouts fought to rectify the miserable political, social, and economic conditions suffered by the actual indigenous people of revolutionary Mexico. To be sure, in some cases, Scouts made an effort to improve the lives of their indigenous countrymen, albeit with a measure of condescension. Fleeting references to the Tribes of Explorers assuming the 'lofty social mission in favor of the redemption of our Indians', reveal no further details.[34] Ignacio Acosta, one of the 'Distinguished Boys' of the Scouting group named 'The Maya Tribe', carried out social projects in the states of Tlaxcala and Morelos, and claimed that his personal mission was to 'civilize the Indians',[35] further evidence that he and his peers likely did not consider them to be on par with the expectations of modernity espoused by the organization, and also that he had absorbed the official indigenist rhetoric of his time.

In addition to the indisputable national content, the Mexican Scout organization remained faithful to European and United States models. The international visibility of the Mexican members broadcast to the world the message that Mexico had completed its civilizing mission among the revolutionary generation and boasted a modern young population. Postrevolutionary historiography has not traditionally characterized Mexico as an exporter of culture but rather as a country that absorbed and modified international modes and norms within a nationalist framework. Historian Joanne Hershfield suggests that postrevolutionary Mexico was characterized by a version of modernity that combined and confused foreign influences with newly constructed forms of nationalist expression, thus allowing traditional and modern hallmarks of culture to coexist.[36] The case of the Boy Scouts in the international arena demonstrates that Mexico not only projected global modernity outward through its participation in international youth organizations, but it did so by making explicit references to a recently articulated set of distinctly national cultural symbols. By considering the perspective of the young people involved, it becomes clear that they responded ambivalently to the dueling nationalist and international influences that infused the organization at the level of the tribes. These diverse influences did not flow unilaterally from Mexico's cultural core, nor were they transmitted unchecked from imperial Great Britain or from the United States. The Mexican Boy Scouts emerged as a 'transnational zone' in which national and global paradigms mingled until unique balances emerged to characterize each local troupe.

Boy Scout uniforms: a racial equalizer?

One of the much-publicized advantages of being a Scout was membership in a brotherhood; the ability to identify each other through a mutual understanding of commonly shared signs, codes, symbols, and basic techniques that were hallmarks of Baden-Powell's founding organization. Scout

brothers were to sacrifice themselves for each other, and with open arms receive each other in any corner of the globe.[37] Allegedly, or ideally, Scouts learned Esperanto as a universal language to be able to communicate with their brothers abroad. All Scouts used the international slogan 'Be Prepared' (*Siempre Listos*).[38] But above all, the uniform stood out as the most conspicuous stamp of international Scout culture. Not unlike the case of the Girl Guides in British Malaya discussed by Jialin Christina Wu in this volume, the uniforms provided Mexican boys with the allure of membership in a modern, global youth movement. These material vestments provided as much incentive for joining, if not more so, than the promise of communing with like-minded peers under a single moral code.

The modernity aspired to by the meticulously dressed Scout came at a cost: the abandonment of Code Six in the *Manual del Explorador*, which read: 'The Explorer is a friend to all and considers all other Explorers to be his brother, without class distinction'.[39] Technically, the manual stipulated the uniform as a requirement, a measure designed both to avoid 'disorder', as well as to maintain 'the respect that our Institution deserves'.[40] Ostensibly, the uniform also served to erase class differences, and therefore to allow the boys to focus on forging brotherly bonds based on character. Scout officials made an effort – at least in the manual – to maintain democracy among the organization's membership. Any corps of Explorers that wanted to make the uniform obligatory had to first ensure that no prospective member would be excluded due to lack of resources. Clarck did his best to disabuse boys of the apparent conventional wisdom that the most 'basic' kit for the Scout ought to include 'at least one gendarme suit, traffic police gaiters, a canteen imported from Boston or Saint Louis, an American camp tent, and an assortment of other things that would allow only the most well-off boys, those capable of spending seventy or eight pesos in vanities, to become Explorers'.[41] Clarck's declaration, reiterated in *Tihui*, suggested that many boys still perceived exclusivity among the ranks of the Explorers, and that lack of access to a uniform still kept some boys away.

Yet this equalizing rhetoric contradicted the commercial flurry in which Boy Scouts often found themselves caught up; children's magazines, daily newspapers, and pamphlets featured advertisements for Boy Scout paraphernalia that suggested that, in addition to demonstrating their service to the nation, the boy Explorers were expected to support the national economy as well, through the purchase of their uniforms, accessories, and related goods in Mexican stores, approved official outlets of Boy Scout accessories. A template of the ideal Explorer's accoutrements printed in the manual demonstrates that a boy would need to be well outfitted in order to fulfill expectations.[42] From an early age, then, Mexican boys learned the value of economic nationalism, and its physical manifestation through the standardization of uniforms. The uniform was a symbol of modernity and economic prosperity, a luxury out of the reach of many boys, and one



Figure 2.2 Template of the uniform and equipment for an ideal Explorer

Source: In Federico Clarck, El Explorador Mexicano (México: Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos, 1921): 73.

that attested globally that Mexico was capable of participating on an international level in Scout culture. The child defender of the homeland, then, was a middle-class boy, one who stood apart from the average boy (a glaring contrast to the proletarian model upheld by education officials in other realms).[43]

Individual Scouts' physical appearances and the details of their uniforms received special attention in the Scout cultural media outlets, earning praise when they conformed to international standards. Authenticity mattered. In 1921, Clarck petitioned the Calles government to fund a shopping trip to New York, so that he could purchase 100 official Boy Scout uniforms and accessories (hunting jersey, riding pants, silk kerchiefs, tents, cots, hatchets, and first aid kits). Clarck procured gymnastic equipment from Hamburg, in his native country, so that the boys' exercise and routine could be structured and yield the same results as for young German boys.[44] For Clarck, the correct official trappings would help to ensure that Mexicans be perceived as authentic members of global Scouting culture.

Clearly, the average Mexican boy struggled to keep up with these aesthetic standards. One photograph of the Telpatl Tribe, a recently founded corps in the state of Veracruz, depicts its humble members with straw sombreros making an excursion by foot from their school, because they did not have the money to pay for the train fare. Only the kerchiefs tied at their necks identify them as Explorers.[45] In another photograph of the same 'tribe', the small country boys can be seen on the peak of a local hill, near where they live. They are wearing the same sombreros, white tunics customary among indigenous people, and they carry woven satchels instead of the manufactured backpacks advertised for sale at official Scout stores.[46] Official Scout publications, sponsored by the Association of Mexican Scouts (*Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos*), tried to promote Scout membership as within reach of all Mexican boys. Nevertheless, the uniform and its accessories distinguished a first-rate Scout from his peers.[47]

Tihui published articles and photos of exemplary Scouts, praising them in all aspects from the cleanliness of their uniforms to their acts of charity in a section of the magazine entitled 'Distinguished Boys'. Not surprisingly, none of the humble *tequihuas* in the photograph from Veracruz received special mention in this section; the poorer troops only appeared depicted in groups. The distinguished boys – a quick overview of their photographs indicate that they were overwhelmingly light-skinned, and at least one boy, Shafick Kaim, was foreign-born – enjoyed a featured profile in the magazine that instructed readers on exemplary Scout behavior. Readers learned, for example, that young Nicolás Carmona was fastidious in the care of his uniform, so much so that he chose to wear white pants on rural excursions to demonstrate his dedication to cleanliness; Janet del Castillo liked to wear his boots in the style of the Three Musketeers, and both boys earned an official Scout kerchief for their charity work.[48] These personal details

underscore the observation that the ideal young citizen was also a child of means.

The introduction of the Boy Scouts to Mexico met with resistance from various individuals. The Mexican consul in Texas reported that first generation Mexican American families' greatest fear of impending cultural decay was to see sons dressed in a Boy Scout uniform, saluting the American flag.[49] One vocal critic of the organization warned that even if children could afford the uniforms and accessories – including the 20-cent monthly *Tihui* – the brown-skinned little Explorers would never blend with the blond-haired, blue-eyed Scouts abroad.[50] These varied critiques point to a critical subtext: the Mexican nation was a malleable concept built on shifting ground. The Boy Scouts, with whatever membership they might achieve, could not fully embody or interpret as provisional a concept as that of the nation. At this critical moment in Mexico's national formation, and amidst a richly confusing relationship between the nation and its indigeneity, it was the middle-class version of Mexican youth, armed with a readily identifiable uniform and a confident affability, which Mexico exported to the world.

Modern Mexico meets Old Mexico in the eyes of American popular youth media

Long before the Mexican Boy Scouts made their forays onto the international stage, the American collective imaginary was already saturated with a monolithic version of Mexico and its inhabitants. Popular children's literature from the early twentieth century reduced the country's diversity to descriptions of encounters with renegade border types like Pancho Villa and the Mexican Rangers. One such novel, *The Boy Scouts under Fire in Mexico*, published in 1914, depicts American Boy Scouts Rob and Tubby, who find themselves in Mexico during the revolution. Excited by the possibility of participating in the crossfire, the young characters express the hope that they will even come across some real-live 'Indian' insurgents.[51] In such novels, Mexico appears barbaric, uncivilized, and lawless: a place for adventuresome American Scouts to try out their survival skills before escaping back across the border to the order of the modern world.

Some youth media correspondents grappled with Mexico's emerging modernity. While the authors lauded the creativity with which Mexican educational officials expanded the rural education curriculum – lending equal importance to crop planning and literacy, for example – they consistently framed educational advances in the language of retention of ancient lifeways. American observers expressed optimism that despite the incorporation of rural villages into Mexican national life, they would be able to 'salvage those ways of life which are beautiful and conducive to their happiness';[52] at the same time, they noted that Mexico's rural school system offered 'the only road to nationhood'.[53] Their narratives charged indigenous

children with the task of carrying ancestral qualities into the modern age. Speaking of the mystical ruins that would be disturbed to allow the Pan American highway to bisect Mexico and connect the two continents, Anna Milo Upjohn wrote of a young boy in the rural school system, 'Manuel's hands may some day grasp pick and shovel to unearth those ruins. But may those slim, dark fingers never lose the magic touch of the past through modern tools'.[54]

American children living abroad contributed prolifically to the consolidation of these national types in children's media. On a fall day in 1928, the middle-school children of The Stevens Practice School at the Philadelphia Normal School delighted at the arrival of a package from Tampico, Mexico. It was a school correspondence album, arranged through the international exchange program of the American Junior Red Cross, from the American School at Tampico, attended largely by children of expatriates relocated to the region to manage US-owned oil companies, and living in an enclave there. The pictures, letters, dolls, and miniature objects that accompanied the album spoke of a rural, romantic, Aztec Mexico; the young correspondents privileged a precolonial past, and highlighted moments of imperial splendor, as they introduced Mexico to the young American recipients. In their narratives, ancient Aztecs hurled their beautiful princesses bedecked in the storied gold of the New World from towering pyramids to appease the 'idols' that they worshipped. The dolls that accompanied the album – by request of the Junior Red Cross to depict the most 'typical' costume worn by Mexicans – featured the male and female 'types' quickly becoming the country's national emblem: the *charro* and the *china poblana*. This hispanophile pair, a construction of the nation's revolutionary cultural nationalism, had only recently entered into Mexico's purview, but underwent rapid acceptance, commodification, and international dissemination.[55] Other cultural artifacts included in the album further underscored a romantic image of a rural society based on subsistence agriculture and artisanry: a decorated sombrero, a woven rug bearing a vaguely indigenous motif, a flat mortar for grinding corn, a wooden whisk for whipping hot chocolate, a clay grill and a fan to keep the embers alive.[56] Overall, the Mexico received by this group of American youngsters bore no distinct features of modern democratic society, but rather perpetuated a caricature long established in American lore of a barbaric, romantic, ancient land south of the border.

The school correspondence album introduced or reiterated the *charro* and the *china poblana* as the typical Mexican costume, emblazoning in American children's imaginations a single image of the racial type, social class, and disposition of the Mexican child. In the *Junior Red Cross* magazines, accompanying illustrations unfailingly depicted Mexican boys in sombreros with a bright, stylized *sarape* popularized in the northern weaving city of Saltillo draped over one shoulder, and girls in lush dark braids with flowery skirts and a woven shawl, both often in the company of animals in their care.

The magazine published one set of letters of American children living in a mining camp in San Luis Potosí, which described in detail the *charro* and *china poblana* costumes, and included photographs of the young correspondents wearing the costumes.[57]

The pervasiveness of this monolithic visual treatment of Mexican children caused American children to replicate it as the only authentic representation. In a May 1938 celebration of 'Junior Red Cross around the World', a classroom of California children dressed as representatives of many nations; prominently featured in the front row, a young blond boy donned a sombrero and a carefully slung *sarape* over his shoulder, next to his braided girl counterpart, perhaps the most readily identifiable national types in the group.[58] (Just a few years later, Walt Disney's Mexican-based rooster Panchito Pistoles would instruct all American children that 'snappy serapes' [*sic*] formed a requisite element of Mexican costume).[59] In another event, schoolchildren from Grand Rapids, Michigan, staged a mock 'international convention' of Red Cross member nations, and dressed as delegates; the photograph accompanying the news brief pictures two pairs of identically dressed boys and girls, dressed in the expected costumes (though notably, their versions of the costumes appear to be particularly tourist-oriented, as the *sarapes* are

Figure 2.3 American children dressed as 'typical' Mexicans, 1941
Source: Junior Red Cross News (April 1941).

imprinted with the word 'Mexico', and the hats have decorative fringe on them).[60] Interestingly, this particular pair of tropes – the *charro* and the *china poblana* – was probably the whitest available stereotype of Mexicans reproduced in most cultural outlets at the time. Even in its commodified exported manifestation, Mexican national identity underplayed the real indigenous roots. Into this cultural milieu marched a handful of intrepid Mexican Scouts, not quite children but not yet identifying themselves as men, who brazenly disregarded the antiquated tropes constructed for them in the United States and instead embraced modernity.

Boy Scouts abroad: straddling modernity and tradition

Young cultural ambassadors like the long-distance walker Scouts José, Gregorio and Robert literally transported an alternate vision of their country into the United States. Their presence in the United States press helped to counter, however moderately, antiquated notions of Mexico. The role of individual travelers as cultural intermediators, or agents of the forces of transnationalism, has been theorized in terms of their role as 'human connectors' – individuals who, through their chosen performance of identity and physical mobility across geopolitical boundaries, contributed to reformulating contemporary understandings of home and abroad, national and global.[61] The identification of the Mexican trekkers in the US press as both purveyors of middle-class modernity and as Boy Scouts complicates the customary coupling of youth and inferiority. These three young men were far from children – they were between 18 and 20 years of age at the time of their excursions – yet they chose to travel as emissaries of the Boy Scouts organization of their country, not as private citizens, or students in the national education system, or any of the other multiple identities from which they may have been able to choose. In his photograph in the *Post*, Robert was the picture of the modern Boy Scout: his uniform appeared pressed, his hair neatly combed, his face tanned from the long journey, and his smile amicable and confident. He wore the trademark kerchief of the Boy Scouts in a knot tied neatly at his throat.[62] That he and others traveled *as Scouts*, universally recognizable by the kerchief and the standard-issue equipment that they bore on the trip, suggests that these young men were tapping into a social domain only recently availed to them in order to embark on such an adventure. International experience might only have previously been available to young men of their age through membership in the military. Their Boy Scout identity now allowed them to enter into a transnational realm, one already validated in the eyes of the United States and the international milieu. Furthermore, it allowed them to extend their membership in the amorphous social category of childhood, thereby recusing themselves from any potentially contentious political discourse.

All three of the boys demonstrated acuity in their choice of public stops along the route from Mexico City. Along the way, the boys collected signatures of the highest-ranking public official that would receive them in each state. Robert's travel diary boasted signatures from the governors of Texas, Oklahoma, Illinois, Ohio, and Maryland. He even stopped by Chicago's Hull House – an immigrant settlement house that had become a hallmark of multicultural identity – to obtain the signature of co-founder Jane Addams as well, a choice that suggested Robert's interest in international solidarity over monolithic nationalist fictions.[63]

Both of the trips had as their final destination not Washington, DC (though both trips featured stopovers in the White House and impressively garnered private audiences with the First Family), but New York City. New York's cultural significance as the emerging center of the modern world trumped the geopolitical importance that Washington, DC, the nation's capital, would have had as a logical end point for young men departing from their own country's federal district. The young men all astutely made an appearance at the *New York Times'* corporate headquarters, thus ensuring the broadest possible dissemination of their otherwise quite private feat. This pit stop in particular indicates that Robert, Gregorio, and José all demonstrated awareness of the corporate solidarity that their sojourn represented; they did not travel as individuals, but as de facto goodwill representatives of both their national culture and the international brotherhood to which they must have felt strong fraternal affinity. They expressed individual desires that departed from what would have been official diplomatic positions, such as the moment in which Robert marveled at New York's glistening skyscrapers, followed by a musing that he wished that his own city were more developed – a passing comment that became the subtitle for the newspaper's article about his journey.[64]

Mexican Scouts quickly gained a footing in the international arena, and in the process found that they had to negotiate the difference between their modern version of *mexicanidad* and that imposed from abroad. Whereas at home, Mexican Scouts learned to eschew indigenous identity in all but symbolic realms, when abroad, they found idealized nativism to be imbued with positive characteristics. As we have seen, in Mexico, Boy Scouts aspiring to the national ideal avoided clothing and accessories considered to bear ethnic markers (white muslin tunics, sombreros, *sarapes*, brightly woven satchels). Once abroad, whether through peer pressure to conform to an international stereotype, or through a sense of nostalgia rooted in ancestral or nativist tropes, many young Mexicans demonstrated pride in 'dressing Mexican'. Some evidence suggests that, through their engagement with transnational organizations, Mexican youth more openly adopted ethnic cultural markers, thus subverting the cultural imperialism built into the Scout organization. Perhaps they welcomed the opportunity to perform a

version of their national identity that could be recognized by their peers, however false that may have been to the individual Scouts' backgrounds.

In 1937, at an international Boy Scouts conference held in Washington, DC, the Mexican delegation called the attention of the press by setting up camp directly beneath the Washington monument. They proudly raised the Mexican flag over their camp, and lest there be any doubt as to their provenance, wore brightly colored woven *sarapes* from Saltillo, the 'Mexican blanket' that adorned nearly every popular depiction of Mexicans in American culture. The boys hailed from Monterrey, Mexico City, Torreón, and Puebla (among the country's most modern cities), and camped between peers from Lithuania and the Netherlands.[65] In Mexico, the ideal Scout would avoid accoutrements that associated him with the popular classes, and would opt instead for the European-style militarized uniform. But in the United States, and under an international spotlight, Mexican Scouts faced the challenge of presenting themselves as distinctly Mexican; they turned to the imagery codified in American popular culture and embraced it as their own.

As if to demonstrate their deft ability to navigate the muddy waters of exported national identity, after the conference, *los boys mexicanos* (as the Mexican national press dubbed them, Anglicized by virtue of their presence in Gringolandia), went to New York City to tour the Empire State Building and the offices of the upcoming World's Fair (where technological, architectural, and scientific feats would be showcased as accomplishments of distinct nations). There, retired Marine chief of the United States military William H. Standley received the young men, and remarked that they were the most virile and distinguished group of Boy Scouts he had ever met. The photo that accompanied the article affirmed that Mexico had sent its most masculine youth on the international tour; some of the 'boys' competed with Standley in height, and a few showed the furtive signs of moustaches. In this encounter, the attention received by the Explorers in the Mexican national press affirmed the relationship between Scouting and militarized masculinity, as well as their role as cultural ambassadors finessing the line between nationalism and internationalism.

Conclusion

While the Explorers cultivated outward physical signs that corresponded to the national – and international – ideal when one takes into consideration the overlapping national and international contexts that informed the development of Scout identity for Mexican youth, the 'transnational zone' emerges as the most useful category for analyzing their experiences.[66] Even as Mexican Scouts adapted their country's unique brand of nativism to the tenets of modernity set forth by the Boy Scouts, the international brotherhood of the Scouts incorporated the customs and traditions of its varied

members – however stylized or constructed these might have been – into its identity. Scout culture transcended conventional definitions of citizenship, and created a global space within which young people performed, transformed, and articulated identities that fused national and international norms of behavior.

The generation of young men described here learned to export nationalism to countries abroad, due to the growth and popularity of internationally recognized organizations like the Boy Scouts in Mexico. They learned to be citizens of the Mexican Republic, and at the same time to transcend the geopolitical boundaries that justified nationalist sentiments in the first place. Sometimes identity performance brought those young actors a distance from their authentic selves, and more in line with international tropes constructed upon stereotypes, ignorance, and cultural misunderstanding. The young men's willingness to don a sombrero and a *sarape* might suggest to us two things: the very fragile state of Mexican national identity as being constructed from within, or the very powerful sway of American and world popular culture in constructing a monolithic image of other nations. If their actions didn't appear altogether noble, or if their representations of 'Mexicanness' seemed fickle, that only further underscores the fact that agency need not only be about resistance. Historiographical treatments of youth agency have privileged the transformative, anti-systemic, rebellious power ascribed to young people. But participation in an organization like the Boy Scouts, and ambivalent performance of national identity at home and abroad, still constitutes a kind of historical agency, even if it is not subversive. After all, ambivalence is more typical of youthful agency than organized, thoughtful pursuit of change. Children and young people rarely respond according to top-down scripts, and any history that suggests otherwise might benefit from a fuller exploration of childhood and youth studies.

National identity is a concept that is constantly in flux, but each expression of it can be linked to an official project. In this case, the intersections between the State's education program and institutionalized internationalism reflected in the daily activities of a generation of children. Media reports of these activities helped to define the ideal of what it meant to be Mexican, not only for the participants, but also for their peers who observed the actions of 'distinguished' young citizens through the press. Children enacted an 'invented' Mexican national tableau in their representations of national identity.[67] Nevertheless, the majority of lower-class and indigenous children did not contribute with equal weight to the production of cultural nationalism; if anything, they served primarily as symbols and targets of these projects. Although children from humble origins did form their own *tribus* with great enthusiasm, they did not enjoy the same visibility nor did they possess economic resources to travel abroad dressed in the Scout uniform. Even so, the transnational nature of the Boy Scouts

served to elevate the importance that children lent to their daily activities. It also placed Mexico in the international eye as a modern country exporting its own version of nationalism, albeit a constructed and superficial version of the country's actual population and social situation. These young people's expressions of nationalism, as reflected in historical documents from the 1920s and 1930s, suggest at once a heightened civic presence and the construction of a 'democratic' state that continued to exclude the majority of its citizens.

Notes

1. 'Boy Scouts', *The Washington Post*, 15 May 1927; 'Boy Scouts Walk from Mexico City', *New York Times*, 29 May 1927.
2. P-Y. Saunier (2013) *Transnational History: Theory and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 7.
3. Saunier, *Transnational History*, p. 7.
4. D. Thelen (1999) 'The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History', *The Journal of American History*, 86 (3), The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue, 965–75; L. Briggs, G. McCormick, and J. T. Way (2008) 'Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis', *American Quarterly*, 60 (3), 637.
5. Aihwa Ong's discussion of these transnational 'zones' that articulate with national and transnational forces is nicely summarized in Briggs (et al.) 'Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis', 634–5.
6. M. Bucholz (2002) 'Youth and Cultural Practice', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 31, 525.
7. C. A. Bayly, S. Beckert, M. Connelly, I. Hofmeyr, W. Kozol, and P. Seed (2006) 'AHR Conversation: On Transnational History', *The American Historical Review*, 111 (5), 1444.
8. W. Hillcourt (1992) *Baden-Powell: The Two Lives of a Hero* (New York: Gilwellian Press).
9. B. Sundmark (2009) 'Citizenship and Children's Identity in *The Wonderful Adventures of Nils and Scouting for Boys*', *Children's Literature in Education*, 40, 117–18.
10. K. Alexander (2009) 'The Girl Guide Movement and Imperial Internationalism during the 1920s and 1930s', *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 2 (1), 37–63; T. Parsons (2009) 'The Limits of Sisterhood: The Evolution of the Girl Guide Movement in Colonial Kenya' in N. R. Block and T. M. Proctor (eds) *Scouting Frontiers: Youth and the Scout Movement's First Century* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishers), pp. 143–56.
11. See Alexander, 'The Girl Guide Movement', 37–63. Among others, see: Block and Proctor (eds) *Scouting Frontiers*; J. Mechling (2001) *On My Honor: Boy Scouts and the Making of American Youth* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press); T. H. Parsons (2004) *Race, Resistance and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press).
12. S. Mintz (2008) 'Reflections on Age as a Category of Historical Analysis', *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 1 (1), 91–4; L. Paris (2008) 'Through the Looking Glass: Age, Stages, and Historical Analysis', *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 1 (1), 106–13.

13. K. E. Bliss and A. S. Blum (2007) 'Dangerous Driving: Adolescence, Sex, and the Gendered Experience of Public Space in Mexico City' in W. E. French and K. E. Bliss (eds) *Gender, Sexuality, and Power in Latin America since Independence* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), pp. 165–6.
14. E. J. Albarrán (2015) *Seen and Heard in Mexico: Children and Revolutionary Cultural Nationalism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).
15. A notable exception is J. Reed (1914; repr. 1969) *Insurgent Mexico* (New York: International Publishers).
16. M. Tenorio-Trillo (1999) 'Stereophonic Scientific Modernisms: Social Science between Mexico and the United States, 1880s–1930s', *The Journal of American History*, 86 (3), The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue, 1179–80.
17. A similar process, the tension between 'play' and 'real' Indians in the United States, is addressed in P. J. Deloria (1998) *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
18. Two years earlier, Explorer leaders hosted the First National Congress of Explorers (*Primer Congreso Nacional de Exploradores*), but the 1928 conference distinguished itself by its marked nationalism, established in part by the slight change of the name of the organization to include references to 'tribes' and 'Mexico'. See *Tihui* n. 1, December 1926, 14–15. J. U. Escobar (1928) *Informe del Trabajo de las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos* (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación), pp. 5–6.
19. For the sake of clarity, in this chapter I usually refer to the Mexican corps as Boy Scouts. 'Ciencia del Explorador: Origen de los Exploradores', *El Univesal Gráfico*, 3 October 1941. Clarck was a professor of Geography, National Economy, and Languages. He spoke eight languages. Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (hereafter AGN), Ramo Presidenciales, Fondo Obregón-Calles, (O-C) 816-E-17, 1921; F. Clarck (1921) *El Explorador Mexicano* (México: Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos).
20. Escobar, *Informe del Trabajo de las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos*, 11.
21. *Tihui* n. 2, January 1927, 2.
22. AGN, O-C 816-E-17; 'Oficina de Acción Social', *Memoria de la Secretaría de Educación Pública*, Tomo II (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1938–1939), pp. 315–17.
23. Escobar, *Informe del Trabajo de las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos*, pp. 10.
24. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
25. '¿Qué son las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos?' *Tihui* n. 2, January 1927, 15–16.
26. *Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos: Semana del Explorador, del 20 al 27 de noviembre de 1929* (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1929).
27. Clarck, *El Explorador Mexicano*, pp. 191–2.
28. R. Pérez-Montfort (2003) 'El estereotipo del indio en la expresión popular urbana, 1920–1940', *Estampas de Nacionalismo Popular Mexicano: Diez Ensayos Sobre Cultura Popular y Nacionalismo*, 2nd edn (México: CIESAS), p. 183.
29. J. U. Escobar (1929) *Las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos* (México: Silbarios de la SEP).
30. L. J. Rupp, cited in Alexander, 'The Girl Guide Movement', 49.
31. In the northeast of the United States during the first decades of the twentieth century, the Camp Fire Girls promoted a nativist aesthetic in the girls' uniforms (a simple vest adorned with colored beads that corresponded to the different 'honors' or duties that the girls completed). The girls also received ceremonial

names derived from indigenous languages. S. A. Miller (2007) *Growing Girls: The Natural Origins of Girls' Organizations in America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), pp. 14–23.
32. '¿Qué son las Tribus de Exploradores Mexicanos?' *Tihui* n. 2, January 1927, 16.
33. Ibid.
34. 'Charla de tecuthli [sic] cronista', *Tihui* n. 3–4, March 1927, 28.
35. 'Muchachos distinguidos', *Tihui* n. 2, January 1927, 31.
36. J. Hershfield (2008) *Imagining the Chica Moderna: Women, Nation, and Visual Culture in Mexico, 1917–1936* (Durham: Duke University Press), p. 11.
37. Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Mexico, Caja 22, Exp. 2 fols 4–45, Subsecretaría de Educación Pública, 1938.
38. Clarck, *El Explorador Mexicano*, p. 160.
39. Ibid., p. 64.
40. Ibid., p. 172.
41. Ibid., p. 172.
42. Ibid., pp. 172–4.
43. I explore the phenomenon of the 'proletarian child' as a national trope in E. J. Albarrán (forthcoming 2015) '*El niño proletario*: Jesús Sansón Flores and the New Revolutionary Redeemer, 1935–1938' in S. Neufeld and M. Matthews (eds) *Mexico in Verse* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press).
44. AGN, O-C 816-E-17, 1921, 6. Mexico aspired to a standard of modernity accelerated in 1920s Germany, which branded civilization and progress on the gendered bodies of its youth on display. See E. N. Jensen (2010) *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press).
45. 'Charla del tecuthli [sic] cronista', *Tihui* n. 5–6, June 1927, 34.
46. *Tihui*, n. 5–6, June 1927, 28.
47. Another inconsistency can be seen in that the Asociación de Exploradores Mexicanos boasted three 'classes' of Scouts, based on experiences and requirements that boys had to achieve in order to pass to the next level. Far from being a socialist organization that minimized class distinction, the Explorers established a rather rigid hierarchy within its organization. Clarck, *El Explorador Mexicano*, pp. 165–8.
48. 'Muchachos distinguidos', *Tihui* n. 2, January 1927, 30–1.
49. AHSRE IV-276–28, 1933.
50. O. Alfredo Sánchez, 'Los Niños Legionarios Mexicanos', *El Universal Gráfico*, 5 October 1925, 6.
51. H. Payson (1914) *The Boy Scouts under Fire in Mexico* (New York: A. L. Burt Company), 91. See also F. B. Deering (n/d) *Border Boys with the Mexican Rangers*, Border Boys Series (New York: A. L. Burt Company).
52. C. Beals, 'Those Mexicans', *Junior Red Cross Journal*, VIII (4), December 1931, 80.
53. C. Beals, 'Going to School in Mexico', *Junior Red Cross Journal*, VIII (9), May 1932, 198.
54. A. M. Upjohn, 'Manuel of Mexico', *Junior Red Cross Journal*, VII (2), October 1930, 38.
55. R. Pérez-Montfort, 'Una región inventada desde el centro: la consolidación del cuadro estereotípico nacional, 1921–1937', *Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano*, p. 134.
56. 'About a Next Door Neighbor', *Junior Red Cross News*, 10 (3), November 1928, 46–7.

57. 'A Letter from Mexico', *Junior Red Cross News*, February 1941, 167. See also 'A Children's Fiesta', *Junior Red Cross News*, January 1942, 136–7, and accompanying photos of young children dressed up in indigenous 'costume'.
58. Photo, *Junior Red Cross News*, May 1938, n/p.
59. *The Three Caballeros* (1944), Dir. Norman Ferguson, Prod. Walt Disney, Walt Disney Productions.
60. 'Working Together', *Junior Red Cross News*, April 1941, 218–19.
61. Saunier, *Transnational History*, p. 37.
62. 'Student Hikes to Washington from his Mexico City Home', *The Washington Post*, 2 September 1928; 'Mexican Boy Scout Hiker Received by Mrs Coolidge', *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1928.
63. 'Mexican Scout Hiker Here: 18-Year-Old Boy Impressed by Sky-Scrapers after 8 Months' Walk', *New York Times*, 7 October 1928.
64. 'Mexican Scout Hiker Here', *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1928.
65. 'Llegaron los Exploradores a Washington', *El Universal*, 1 July 1937. See also 'Convención de "Boys-Scouts" en los EE.UU', *El Nacional*, 13 February 1937.
66. The experiences of the Mexican Explorers reflect the scholarship on the respective missions, activities and customs of the Boy Scouts in the Western world. S. Wittemans (2009) 'The Double Concept of Citizen and Subject at the Heart of Guiding and Scouting' in Block and Proctor (eds) *Scouting Frontiers*, pp. 56–71.
67. Pérez-Montfort, 'Una region inventada desde el centro', 122.

3
'These Heroic Days': Marxist Internationalism, Masculinity, and Young British Scientists, 1930s–40s

Heather Ellis

While both youth and internationalism have, for many years, been seen as vital hallmarks of the interwar period by historians, studies have tended to focus on particular youth movements, youth subcultures and attempts by national governments or other agencies to organize young people. Such movements are almost always identified with strict age cohorts and leave less room for investigating the broader cultural significance of both the idea and discourse of 'youth' in society.[1] The growing public role and prominence of science and technology, which provides the focus for this chapter, is another major feature of the interwar years and of studies of internationalism in this period; yet it is a topic rarely examined in the context of the history of childhood and youth. In the course of this chapter, I want to explore for what purposes, with what effects and by whom the idea and discourse of youth, rather than 'youth' as a narrowly defined social population, were deployed within the complex and shifting world of British science in the 1930s and early 1940s.

From its emergence in the early 1830s, the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS),[2] which provides the institutional context for this chapter, defined itself and science as both inherently youthful (in the sense of modern, forward-facing, dynamic) and international. These emphases became particularly sharp during the interwar years, when British science, along with many other areas of national life, experienced a key generational shift. The emotional, cultural, and political caesura of World War I provided the spur for a perhaps unprecedented focus in Britain upon the importance of breaking with the systems, ideas, and assumptions of the past.

While this chapter explores the importance of the idea of youthfulness as a cultural resource for the rising generation of British scientists in the 1930s and early 1940s, it also makes a case for broadening our understanding of those who ought to be included within the social category of 'youth'. As

Hugh Cunningham and others have pointed out, historically, terms which we today translate as 'youth', have offered very wide chronological definitions of the social population they represent, with the Latin term, *iuventus*, for example, covering any individual between the ages of 20 and 45.[3] With the exception perhaps of the science students at Oxford and Cambridge, there is little doubt that the scientists focused on in this chapter would not traditionally be considered as belonging to the social category of 'youth', being in their late 20s and even 30s. However, when we expand our conceptualization of youth to include everyone who identifies as 'young', who draws on the language of 'youthfulness', who offers an idea of 'youth' as key to their aims and identity, then our historical understandings of childhood and youth are themselves expanded, in particular, our appreciation of the intellectual history of youth.

This chapter seeks to contribute not only to the history of youth, but also to transnational history, or, more specifically, to the history of internationalism in the interwar period and early years of World War II. While studies of scientific, communist, and youth internationalism are fairly common for this period, they tend to be studied in isolation,[4] when there are many productive points of contact which could be brought out. A focus on both youth and transnationalism can open up hitherto unseen connections between a wide range of other, often isolated, social categories, such as gender, class, ethnicity, and religion. Both are inherently flexible concepts, functioning as Rick Jobs has highlighted in the case of youth as 'mediators' between different and more bounded social and cultural categories.[5] Thus, in this chapter, I aim to show the complex interactions, entanglements, and relationships between ideas of 'youthfulness', communism, and science in interwar Britain, as a way of shedding new light upon all three. These ideas, after all, have much in common, all representing (and representing themselves as) quintessential ideologies of young, future-oriented modernity.

Just as few historians have considered connections between the idea of youth and the rise of science in the 1930s and 1940s, little attention has been paid to the enormous influence which Marxist internationalism and the young scientific left in the USSR exercised upon the rising generation of British scientists (both students and young graduates) in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The importance of this influence becomes clear when we consider that the institution at the heart of this development was one of the most traditional, elite bastions of British science, the BAAS, whose entire activities during the war years were effectively taken over by an influential group of young scientists and their followers, determined to lead Britain in the direction of USSR-style scientific socialism.

While this might seem, at first glance, surprising, if we consider the crucial characteristics of both science and communism as movements or ideologies in the interwar years, it becomes clear that they had much in

common. In the context of this edited volume, the two features which stand out most clearly, are their youthfulness and their international character. The stress which socialism, particularly in the USSR, placed on both youth and internationalism is axiomatic.[6] In order to make a case for increased government funding of, and popular interest in, science, it was its young, dynamic nature which the British Association, from its foundation in 1831, had always stressed. Science and its practitioners were contrasted with the tired and traditional scholarship of classics and theology. Six years after its foundation, in 1837, the then president of the BAAS, Thomas Stewart Traill declared that 'the British Association ... [could] scarcely reckon a period of infancy; it sprang at once from the conception of its founders, like Pallas from the head of Jove, in the perfection of youthful vigor'.[7] The other crucial feature of science that was emphasized was its international nature, its inability to be constrained or tied down within national boundaries. From the very beginning of the BAAS, in its constitution, its duty to promote 'intercourse with foreign philosophers' and to support the 'international republic' of science was given pride of place.[8] Indeed, when the shared emphasis on youthfulness, dynamic change and transnationalism is highlighted, science and communism do not seem strange bedfellows at all.

But where does military masculinity enter the story? In many ways, this kind of discourse might seem antithetical to the peaceful language of international cooperation often stressed by proponents of both science and communism. The simple answer is against the background of war. World War I had seen the Western imperial states fully mobilize science and scientists for the war effort. The devastating human impact of modern scientific discoveries adapted for military purposes (in particular, the use of poison gas) became clear as never before. In the early- to mid-1930s, as the threat of a second world war loomed, the internationalism of science was once more put to the test. The young scientific left in Britain found itself forced into the rather paradoxical position of having to adopt an aggressive, almost nationalistic and militaristic tone, in order to defend the peaceful internationalism of science. This is just one example of the complex interconnections between the scales of the national and international, which historians too frequently and artificially separate. Young British scientists, like many other groups in this period struggled to reconcile conflicting impulses and loyalties which prompted them to operate at and identify with, at one time, the national, at another, the international, and at another, the transnational.[9] As we will go on to examine in more detail, many young British scientists came to view themselves as 'freedom's warriors', fighting as part of a 'world legion of science',[10] led and inspired by scientists in the USSR. That they came to assume such a stance has arguably much to do with the unprecedented social, economic, and political importance which science and technology came to assume in the interwar years.

Economic depression and the formation of the young scientific left

Another significant development in the 1920s and 1930s, a particular effect of the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression, was the emergence of a significant breach in generational experience and attitudes between scientists trained in a pre-war environment and those who completed their education in the interwar years. This breach was described well by Bertrand Russell in 1931. In general, he commented, 'older, more prominent scientists had become more and more determined supporters of the injustice and obscurantism upon which our social system is based'.[11] Such expressions tapped into a much larger view held by many at the time that there was something essentially 'youthful' about the period they were living in.

Social activism and an interest in communism was almost exclusively reserved for the rising generation of scientists, those Gary Werskey has accurately described as 'the children of the disillusioned and modernist twenties'.[12] As far back as 1933, in his Huxley Memorial Lecture, Sir A.V. Hill, Secretary of the Royal Society, stressed the need to maintain the old traditions of freedom in science 'in spite of all our young communists and fascists'.[13] Younger scientific and technical graduates suffered particularly in the difficult years of the 1930s. In comparison with the previous decade, economic depression led to severe cuts in student grants, studentships, and research funding. Combined with this was rising unemployment, particularly in industries requiring highly skilled workers such as engineering and pharmaceuticals, and the looming prospect of a second European war which threatened to interrupt or prematurely end the careers of those lucky enough to find work after leaving university.

In the face of the depression, rising unemployment, and government cuts at home, the remarkable achievement of the Soviet Union, which managed to consistently grow its economy in the worst years of the global recession and seemingly enjoy full employment, had an almost talismanic hold upon a generation of young British scientists. Remarkably, industrial production in the Soviet Union more than trebled between 1929 and 1940 and by 1938 made up 18 per cent of global manufacturing output. As well as feeling increasingly dissatisfied with the efforts of the British government to combat the depression and increase employment opportunities, the rising generation of scientists were more self-aware and confident than older colleagues trained in the pre-war years. After 1918, despite difficult economic conditions, greater importance continued to be placed on technical and scientific knowledge by the British government. In the words of Gary Werskey, the interwar years witnessed the establishment of 'a largely State-directed military-industrial complex ... accounting for a third or more of all publicly funded R&D [Research and Development] and facilitating increasingly important networks and research projects spanning academic, industrial,

and state scientific bodies'.[14] Despite rising unemployment among scientific and technical graduates, there was actually a significant expansion in the number of young people being trained as scientists in Britain in the interwar period. State-funded technical and scientific education grew considerably in these years, leading to a trebling of the number of science graduates to some 28,000 by 1939. Sharing a greater sense of professional and collegial identity, these younger scientists tended to play a more active role in professional bodies such as the National Union of Scientific Workers (NUSW), founded at the end of World War I in 1918.

The beating heart of the new scientific left in Britain in the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1939 was located in the Cavendish Laboratory and the Dunn Biochemical Institute at Cambridge University. Here, a group of young scientists, in their early- to mid-30s at the time of the Great Depression, spearheaded the formation of a vast and influential young scientific left in Britain. Most importantly, the group included the molecular biologist, J.D. Bernal (1901–71), the geneticist, J.B.S. Haldane (1892–1964), the experimental physicist, P.M.S. Blackett (1897–1974), and the biochemist, Joseph Needham (1900–95).[15] Both Blackett and Bernal were based at the Cavendish Laboratory until their departures for Birkbeck College, London, in 1933 and 1937 respectively, while Needham and Haldane (until 1932) were located at the Dunn Laboratory. The group also had bases at the Scottish and London universities. Although educated at Cambridge, another prominent figure, the zoologist, Lancelot Hogben (1895–1975), made his career as a young professor of Social Biology at the London School of Economics in the 1930s, while the experimental physicist, Hyman Levy (1889–1975), was educated at Edinburgh University and Göttingen in Germany before taking up a physics post at the Royal College of Science, part of Imperial College, London, in 1920, where he remained throughout the interwar years.

These young scientists first encountered the ideas of 'scientific socialism' through contact with a Soviet delegation at the 1931 International Congress of the History of Science and Technology held in London. The delegation was made up of leading researchers from Moscow University's History of Science Institute and was headed by the leading Bolshevik revolutionary and Marxist theorist, Nikolai Bukharin.[16] According to Gary Werskey, 'it positively electrified some of the Congress's younger organizers and participants', in particular, Bernal, Hogben, Levy, and Needham.[17] With the help of the journalist, J.G. Crowther, they helped the Soviet researchers translate and publish their papers, and afterwards publicized their arguments both in the English press and among their university-based colleagues. Shortly afterwards, Bernal declared the Congress to have been 'the most important meeting of ideas since the [Russian] Revolution'. A telegram sent by the Soviet delegation back to Moscow recorded a similarly enthusiastic response from the young men. Its members 'were impressed by [a] minority of younger delegates, particularly Hogben [and] Needham'. 'Possibly', they prophesied,

'scientific congress [will] become historic in sense that it ... provided tremendous impetus [to the] study [of] dialectical materialism [in] England among the growing generation of scientific workers'.[18]

Within Cambridge, the young scientific left, led by Bernal, was hugely successful in recruiting both undergraduates and postgraduate students to its cause. Over a thousand undergraduates may be identified as supporters by the outbreak of war in 1939 with a hard core of a hundred or so becoming members of the Communist party. To cite the Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm, 'In the 1930s the left attracted the intellectually brightest members of the student generation in the country's elite universities'.[19] Here, also, masculine identities had an important role to play. It was, in most cases, the personal charisma of Bernal, Haldane, Hogben, Levy, and Needham which was crucial in winning over young science students to scientific socialism. These were prominent, celebrated young scientists, considered by their peers to be at the very forefront of their fields; to some they were geniuses. They had arguably greater public profiles than any scientists before them, producing numerous newspaper articles, popular books, and radio broadcasts. Their professional reputations contributed considerably to the influence of their political opinions among their even younger followers. One, the biologist and geneticist, C.D. Darlington, recalled Haldane's influence over him in his formative years as follows: 'For about seven years I regarded him as my infallible mentor. He took the place of my father ... in my still immature mind'.[20] The historian, Oren Solomon Harman, describes him similarly: 'At 34 Haldane was Olympian in form and manner, the idol of the forward looking, emancipated, protesting intellectual youth of the time, and the model of the scientist of the future'.[21] On 7 May 1959, during the course of that year's Rede Lecture in Cambridge, the novelist, C.P. Snow, looked back to the mid-1930s and described them as a group of young men who had had 'the future in their bones'.[22] This phrase captured neatly much of the spirit of the age, a feeling that the era itself was imbued with new and youthful ideas. As Raymond Fosdick, the American Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations remarked, it was a time which recognized that the future 'belonged to new creative ideas and not to men whose eyes are bloodshot from the past'.[23]

Bernal was also active in promoting left-wing politics at Cambridge by founding the 'Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group' in 1932. The group organized local protests against what it saw as the warmongering of the British government and published pamphlets emphasizing the evils it believed to arise from the large-scale harnessing of science and scientists for the purposes of war.[24] In 1935, Bernal was once again active in setting up a society at Cambridge, this time with the name, 'For Intellectual Liberty' (FIL). It was most nearly concerned with providing support for academic refugees who had fled Nazi Germany for Britain and with countering (through conferences, pamphlets and articles) the pseudo-science

of eugenics so favored by the fascist regimes of Europe. In early January 1936, Bernal, along with Margaret Gardiner, and Kingsley Martin attended an international antifascist rally in Paris on behalf of FIL.[25] On a national level, Bernal and his associates played a crucial role in the transformation of the National Union of Scientific Workers, originally founded in 1918, into a full-fledged trade union, the Association of Scientific Workers. By removing the national label from the title of the organization, they signaled its reorientation toward a Soviet-Marxist international agenda and toward a much younger, student-based following.

The outbreak of war and the development of a new concept of scientific masculinity

However, the most important and influential activities of the young scientific left were to take place after the outbreak of World War II under the auspices of the British Association's Division for the Social and International Relations of Science which was founded in 1938. Although the Division is fairly well known within the history of science in Britain, as Patrick Petitjean has commented, it is the 'social' aspect which has received most attention. This is not the case for the 'international function', he writes, 'neither for the participation of progressive scientists in international science'.[26] Yet this constituted at least an equally important part of the Division's work in its first years of existence. In particular, it established contact and cooperated with the French scientific Left, whose leading figures included Jean Perrin, Paul Langevin, and Frederic Joliot-Curie. Relations with left-wing scientists in America were also important and here Bernal and his supporters played a significant role in supporting the founding of the US's leading Marxist journal, *Science and Society*. Likewise, the Division cultivated closer relations with its sister organization, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). One result of this increasing cooperation was the decision of the AAAS's council at the end of December 1937 to adopt the following resolution stressing a new emphasis on transnational cooperation and the study of science's impact on society:

> *Whereas*, science is wholly independent of national boundaries and races and creeds and can flourish permanently only where there is peace and intellectual freedom ... *Therefore*, be it resolved by the Council on this thirtieth day of December, 1937, that the American Association for the Advancement of Science makes as one of its objectives an examination of the profound effects of science upon society; and that the Association extends to its prototype, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and to all other scientific organizations with similar aims throughout the world, an invitation to cooperate not only in advancing the interests of science but also in promoting peace among nations and

> intellectual freedom in order that science may continue to advance and to spread more abundantly its benefits to all mankind. [original emphasis][27]

Other connections were established with left-wing scientific movements in the Netherlands, and, of course, in the USSR. In his treatise, *The Social Function of Science*, which appeared in 1939 and functioned as a sort of bible for the Social Relations of Science movement in the early years of World War II, Bernal declared 'the internationalism of science' to be 'one of its most specific characteristics'.[28]

By the end of the 1930s, Bernal and his supporters were increasingly mixing with other groups of young radical scientists in England with international leanings, above all the London-based 'Tots and Quots' dining club convened by the zoologist, Solly Zuckerman. Founded in 1931 to discuss the general significance of science to society and the role which science might play in social development, the club, which was also composed mostly of Oxbridge-educated science graduates, had lapsed into decline following Zuckerman's departure to conduct research in the United States in 1934. Under the influence of Bernal, Blackett, and Zuckerman, however, it was revived in late 1939 after the outbreak of World War II. The members of the 'Tots and Quots' soon became heavily involved in supporting the activities of the BAAS's Division for the Social and International Relations of Science.[29]

With the outbreak of war, the Division's work was accorded a new significance. The normal business of the BAAS including its annual meetings was suspended and, as C.H. Desch has pointed out, 'the work of the Division became the main activity of the Association'.[30] It also became closely identified with the voice and position of younger scientists. In a published memo written shortly after the outbreak of war, the evolutionary biologist, J.S. Huxley, described 'the position of the younger scientific research workers' as very 'unsatisfactory' and sought to compile and publish a list of the 'hardships' faced by junior research scientists:

> The number of junior grants available from all the sources represents only 5.6 per cent of the number of those taking degrees in science each year and a large number of people fail to receive them who would make good research workers…The greatest objection, however, lies in the complete uncertainty of continued employment which junior research workers have to face…little provision is made for the subsequent careers of their holders, who are then in a less favourable position than those taking up business, civil service, or teaching posts on graduation. The resultant insecurity inevitably interferes with the quality of the work carried out.[31]

They endeavored to create a vision of science which appealed to the younger generation of researchers, many of whom felt excluded from the

traditional, secure world of the older scientists educated and trained before World War I.

In a 'Charter of Scientific Fellowship', a document drawn up jointly with the AAAS, in February 1941, and designed to spell out the necessity for scientists to work together against the Nazis, a similar, inclusive approach to young scientists was adopted by the Division. 'All groups of scientific workers', it began, 'are united in the Fellowship of the Commonwealth of Science, which has the world as its province, and service to man, through the discovery of truth, as its highest aim'.[32] Against the background of war, a new and impressive masculine role for the scientist was put forward. He was to become a warrior for freedom, whose efforts were considered vital, if not decisive, in the fight for democracy and human civilization. Although this was the first time that such claims were made for scientists publicly, the document sought to portray this role as a traditional, historical one, in order to increase its legitimacy and appeal for the (mainly) young audience it was targeting. 'Intellectual freedom', it began,

> is an essential condition of a progressive human development. Throughout the ages, individual scientific workers have been forced to fight and suffer for the release of life and intellect from unreasoning prejudice, stagnation and repression. Today they must proclaim their special responsibility in the struggle against any slavery of the spirit which would lead to the betrayal of democratic freedom.[33]

The Charter and much of the language of the Division during the war years was peppered with an ideal of the young male scientist which stressed a new sense of generational consciousness and drew heavily on popular masculine ideals of the young soldier-hero. 'Liberal minds of the last generation imagined that the battle for freedom of thought and for free expression of opinion was finally won', the Charter declared. 'This conviction is today being violently attacked ... We are all called upon for an intense mental effort, coupled with clear vision of the field of action'.[34] These were the words of H.G. Wells, the science fiction writer, who revived the old nineteenth-century term 'man of science', and insisted on its incorporation in the Charter's preamble. Throughout the document traces of an older discourse of imperial scientific masculinity, where scientists were called upon to work hard for the maintenance and extension of the British Empire with its perceived moral mission to civilize the world, are visible. This was precisely the kind of messianic language, reworked and adapted for a new context, that infused the Charter of Scientific Fellowship: 'Today the utmost freedom of thought and the interchange of knowledge, opinion, criticism are our supreme necessities', it declared,

> This full freedom of expression is the very essence both of science and of democracy ... It behoves men of science to declare clearly and emphatically these principles which inform their beliefs and guide the lives of all who accept them ... Men of science are among the trustees of each generation's inheritance of ascertained knowledge. It is their function to foster and increase this heritage by faithful service to high ideals.[35]

Military masculinity and the influence of the Soviet Union

The kind of masculine ideal being put forward here for scientists was, however, influenced by a complex range of preexisting discourses. The traditional ideal of the imperialist explorer-scientist was one such influence; yet, there was also a clear sense in which a modern forward-looking, Soviet-inspired ideal of collective communist masculinity is also at work. In Wells's preamble, along with the language of 'service to high ideals' which smacks of old imperialism, we find an insistence on the absolute independence of the scientist and a commitment to an internationalism which seems almost to align what Wells terms 'the democracy of science' with communism. 'In the democracy of science', he wrote, 'no external authority can be endured, which would place racial, geographical or national limitations upon its fellowship or spheres of activity. It is international in its constitution and outlook'.[36]

Other leaders of the young scientific left were to go further. As early as 1939, Bernal had declared in his ground-breaking study, *The Social Function of Science*, that 'already we have in the practice of science the prototype for all human common action. The task which the scientists have undertaken – the understanding and control of nature and of man himself – is merely the conscious expression of human society. ... In its endeavor, science is communism'.[37] Although this kind of language became much more pronounced after the outbreak of war in 1939, there is evidence to suggest that it began earlier, in the early- to mid-1930s, as contact between the young scientific left in Britain and scientists in the Soviet Union increased in frequency following the meeting at the conference in London in 1931. Upon his return to London in the mid-1930s, the historian of science, Benjamin Farrington, expressed surprise that

> at least half the Marxists whom I met were scientists. But ... their Marxism was of a peculiar brand. They seemed to be under the impression that Marxism had originated from ... the physical sciences, and not to be so much aware of the social and philosophical background. ... I found a complete optimism about Marxism [as] ... the theory which gave science its opportunity. ... And it seemed as if science and Marxism had absolutely been married to one another – that they were the same kind of thing.[38]

Accompanying the tendency to align science with communism was an increasingly militaristic tone which appeared somewhat awkwardly alongside the insistence on the peaceful internationalism of the young British scientific left. This paradox did not escape the attention of the drafters of the Charter of Scientific Fellowship in 1941. Indeed, when the Charter was being drawn up in February 1941, Liverpool-based social scientist, Caradog Jones remarked that, 'Pure science is based on the use of our powers of reasoning, whereas reason in war is abrogated and force takes first place'.[39] However, as H.G. Wells explained, resorting to his favorite language of sacrifice and duty,

> Science would be false to its traditions, and unworthy of the esteem in which its methods and achievements are now held, if it failed to defend itself against the aggressive forces which now assail it. Science has provided mankind with forces and resources by which the human race can increase in greatness, and it is insulted by the use of them by temporal powers to assert overlordship in cultural spheres. It stands for the democracy of knowledge, and with other bodies of free peoples, is confident in its power to meet, and repel the assaults now being made upon its citadels.[40]

It is my contention that this increasing use of militaristic language can be explained through the growing contact between the leaders of the young scientific left in Britain and scientists in the Soviet Union. Upon the establishment of the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science in 1938, the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings make clear that enthusiasm for Soviet science was high; in particular, the 'exchange of personal letters between members of the Association and scientists in the Soviet Union' was encouraged.[41] In the frequent appeals which Soviet scientists made to their colleagues abroad for support in the war against Nazi Germany, issued through the All Union Society for Cultural Relations and the Soviet Academy of Science, militaristic language is a key feature. 'All the scientists of the Soviet Union', one such appeal made to the BAAS from late 1941 began, 'side by side with all the peoples and the Red Army of our country are fighting against Hitlerite aggression giving their strength for the speediest extermination of the danger menacing the whole world'.[42]

If we examine the correspondence engaged in between leading members of the young scientific left and their colleagues in the USSR, there is clear evidence that this militaristic tone was being adopted. The Germans are increasingly referred to as 'the enemy' and ever more emotional language is used to describe the role and duty of scientists in fighting the Nazis and to express admiration for the sacrifices and achievements of scientists in the USSR. In a reply to one of the appeals for support by Soviet scientists, the Division was able to report in early 1941 that every young scientist in Britain

> rejoices that the services of science in both countries [Britain and the USSR] are now being utilized to compass the defeat of the common enemy, and expresses the fervent hope that British and Russian science may in the near future be united in application to the establishment of a new and happier ordering of the affairs of mankind.[43]

One of the most extreme examples of this kind of sentiment came from the pen of the British astronomer, Richard Gregory, who declared the following in his own personal (and published) message to Soviet colleagues in 1941,

> Soviet Russia is now undergoing martyrdom in the defense of those fundamental rights and every throbbing human heart is stilled with admiration of its strength and sacrifice. Whatever British men of science can do to support the cause of truth and justice for which civilization is now fighting is gladly offered to their colleagues in Russia.[44]

The members of the young scientific left in Britain were also increasingly exposed to Soviet scientific publications lionizing leading Soviet scientists as masculine war heroes. In the published results of a General Meeting of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (held between 25 and 30 September 1943) in Moscow, sent to the Division for distribution among its younger members, the naval engineer Aleksey Krylov, for example, is presented as the ideal active, masculine war hero. While other scientists are presented as effeminate, interested only in the technical aspects of their discoveries, Krylov's enthusiasm and involvement in the design and development of war technology are praised. 'Magnetologists gaze at him with a thrilled and worshipping look', the Report stated. 'He cracks jokes with them, convincing them that ships are built not merely for the sake of having somewhere to install compasses…And now here he is, supervising the design of new dreadnoughts'.[45] It is his war work and his ability to show how science can be adapted for nationally important military aims that render him a masculine hero. He is amply rewarded with the greatest honor the USSR can bestow, the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. To establish a connection with Britain (and with the young scientific left in particular), the reader is told that Krylov has 'also [been] honored by the British Institution of Naval Architects which awarded him a gold medal and later made him an honorary fellow'. More than this, Krylov's great scientific inspiration, we read, was none other than Isaac Newton. He was responsible for translating Newton's works into Russian and introducing them to Russian scientists. Newton is lionized as a masculine hero in a similar way to Krylov himself. 'Once having taken up Newton', we read, 'you are for ever held captive by the thoughts and ideas propounded by this genius'.[46]

The report likewise attempts to build an alliance between the young scientific left in Britain and the USSR through the use of gendered rhetoric

emphasizing that through being harnessed to a just war effort, scientific research, becomes a masculine enterprise *par excellence*. 'Any big scientific congress constitutes an event', the report concludes.

> But if the city lives a vigorous life, with a pulsating heart that stops neither day or night, if it be such a city as Moscow, or London, in such a time as ours, then any major scientific gathering is an event doubly so. Surely it is long since common knowledge that successful action of armies is likewise prepared and planned in Scientific Headquarters ... It is war. The Academy of Sciences is working for its country's defence. ... the corridors were thronged with men in frock-coats and in military uniform of generals.[47]

In the same report, examples of the gendered insults made against Russian scientists by Germans are included ('they are effeminate and indolent') and are stoutly rebuffed by the USSR Academy of Sciences. 'Russians have more than amply proved their manliness and activity' in the field of science, we are told.[48]

Strategies for recruiting young people to the scientific left

One of the most important methods which the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science employed in order to convince other young scientists of the rightness of their ideas was the assiduous promotion of international exchange where young research scientists from other countries could spend time in Britain and imbibe the principles of Soviet scientific socialism. Likewise, within Britain the Division wanted 'many young scientists' to learn Russian and arranged special classes to enable them to do so.[49] Of all the student exchange and mobility schemes proposed and supported by the Division none was more popular than that which encouraged young British science students, known as 'Exhibitioners', to spend time studying in the USSR.[50]

However, the Division felt itself to have a wider remit than this and set up a subcommittee 'to consider methods of bringing the work of the Division within the knowledge of education authorities, teachers, and schools'.[51] In other words, we are not just looking at the involvement of youth in terms of the rising generation of British scientists, but also at their deliberate attempts to spread their ideas and priorities to a much wider cross-section of young people in schools and universities. One of the most popular methods discussed and pursued in this context was a partnership with the BBC where certain 'instructional films' would be made and shown to schoolchildren up and down Britain.[52] A cooperation with the Central Council for School Broadcasting in the UK was also proposed.[53] More traditional methods were also employed including the regular provision of talks and lectures on the

Division's philosophy and activities by leading members of the scientific left to student societies.[54] Indeed, just as they attempted increasingly to speak for the 'young scientific research worker', so the Division also claimed to represent the general student interest in the UK. Just as they spoke out against what they saw as the unacceptably insecure conditions under which young scientific researchers were employed in Britain, so they regularly criticized the University Grants Committee for its failure to provide sufficient financial support to science students during their studies. Indeed, they went so far as to claim that a general lack of coordination and the fact that grants provided by the Board of Education generally did 'not go beyond one year after a student of promise has taken his degree' led to a precarious and financially dependent existence for many science students. Providing a better, more generous grant-giving system through the activities of the Division was a key aim of the young scientific left in the early 1940s as they felt this to be an excellent way to win students for their cause.[55] It would, they argued, prevent students from becoming what they termed 'destructive agitators', and instead render them useful and productive members of the international, scientific community, led by Britain and the USSR.[56]

Nor were they shy of admitting the clear socializing aims behind such schemes. As Maxwell Garnett made clear in an unpublished memo to the BA Subcommittee on postwar university reconstruction, dated 14 March 1942, the aim of student exchange schemes would not be limited to offering students from countries devastated by the war state-of-the-art training and facilities; there would also be a strong ideological agenda, involving the exposure of students to the ideas of scientific socialism by a direct appeal to their emotions. 'The object', he wrote, 'would be to pick candidates, not only for their knowledge, but also for their purposes and sentiments. In fact I want to take into account the emotional and creative as well as the cognitive elements in the make-up of their minds', he declared.[57]

In order to appeal to the emotions of young people, similar techniques were employed to those which the leaders of the young scientific left themselves had been exposed to in their youth to win them for the cause of the British Empire and Commonwealth. The emotional significance of empire and the heavy burden of duty and moral responsibility to be borne by British children were strongly impressed upon children from all backgrounds during their primary and secondary education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In order to appeal to young men brought up under such an education system, Bernal and other prominent left-wing scientists would often identify the British Commonwealth with the USSR and stress what they saw as the strong similarities between the two organizations. In particular, British scientists stressed the fact that both the Commonwealth and the USSR sought to provide a workable framework in which the national and the transnational could be successfully combined, one which recognized the multiple connections existing between the two spatial scales. In

a letter written on behalf of the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science to Joffe, the Chairman of the Science Bureau Voks in Moscow, dated 18 January 1943, we can see a good example of this kind of ideological and emotional identification of the Commonwealth with the USSR. ‘From a scientific point of view’, the letter begins,

> the world is a single unit and all peoples are citizens of it…but the tendency towards federation of national groups, such as are constituted in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the British Commonwealth gives reason to hope for, and expect, that out of the present welter of blood and ashes there will arise a new world in which the forces of science will be used for the well-being of citizens and all communities. This is the moral message of science.[58]

It had also been the ‘moral message’ of the British Empire, used carefully, yet decisively to appeal to generations of British schoolchildren including those individuals who went on to lead the young scientific left in the 1930s and early 1940s.

Clearly, the devising of strategies for harnessing education in order to pass on their enthusiasm about scientific socialism and Marxist internationalism to the next generation formed a vital part of the activities of the young scientific left in the UK. When the ‘Science and World Order’ conference, organized by the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science, was announced on 17 July 1941, one of the three major discussions and foci of the conference was ‘Science and Education’. In particular, they were keen to stress the socialist message that science is most important in its impact on society and its capacity for improving social conditions. In this vein, Professor Hogben was to give a talk ‘On the Method and Outlook of Science in Training for Citizenship’.[59] That this was to be closely connected to the ideology of scientific socialism on the model of the USSR is clear. Professor Hogben was to stress ‘the important role which science has played in the development of the USSR’. ‘Examples will be given’, he continued, ‘of the great work which the Russians did in sending out scientific missions to all parts of the world’.[60]

The ‘Science and World Order’ conference, held in London on 26–8 September 1941 attracted a great deal of press attention. Once again it was the transnational perspective of the organizers and delegates which was most commented on by journalists and reviewers. ‘The presence of so many foreign men of science in this country made it possible to give the conference an international character’, wrote C.H. Desch, himself a prominent metallurgist and recipient of a German PhD. ‘Both allies and refugees [were] among the speakers’, he continued, ‘The fact that the chairmen at several sessions included the American, Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors and the Czechoslovak President…emphasized this international aspect’.[61]

However, the main significance of the conference was its function as a forum for enthusing the youth of science about the value of the alliance with the USSR, the importance of communism and the need to cultivate a style of military masculinity after the model of Soviet scientists for the sake of winning the war. In many of the speeches, whose content was preserved and published in detail in the conference proceedings, there was a distinctly militaristic tone. Bernal's own paper referred to the moral duty of scientists to fight fascism 'in this heroic hour'.[62] Even A.V. Hill, who, back in 1933, had criticized the tendency of young scientists to adopt extreme political opinions, both right wing and left wing, used his opportunity to urge the scientific youth to emulate and support the Soviet Union. 'Today', he declared,

> all our skill, our knowledge, our energy and our patience, our powers of working with each other, must be used without reserve in the greatest of all adventures – the preservation of the common basis of civilization. As Pavlov wrote for his young countrymen just before he died – 'Science demands from a man all his life. If you had two lives that would not be enough for you'. With no less devotion now, science must be applied to war.[63]

In the words of A.V. Hill, just quoted, science almost becomes a metaphor for the young men themselves: 'As a tool…for human culture and human happiness', he continued, 'it [science] will surely emerge again some day hardened and tempered from the effort and sacrifice of these heroic days'. In other words, the young scientists themselves would emerge 'hardened and tempered', more manly, for their experience of, and contribution to, the war effort.[64]

So strong was the emphasis on enthusing the rising generation with the principles of scientific socialism and a USSR-style military scientific masculinity that a number of delegates at the conference criticized it as nothing more than a youth rally for Soviet communism. The Society for Freedom in Science (SFS)[65] were particularly vocal in this regard and in the reviews of the conference which their members published in leading newspapers and scientific journals denounced the attempts of the leaders of the scientific left, Bernal, in particular, to corrupt young scientists. A good impression can be gained from the report of one of the founders of the SFS, John R. Baker, the Oxford zoologist, who attended the conference and recorded his feelings about the sentiments expressed by some of the speakers:

> His [Robert Boyle's] eulogy of the USSR was received with loud applause…The atmosphere had no resemblance to that of a scientific meeting. Every phrase charged with emotional or political content (e.g., dialectical materialism; the ascendancy of the claims of those who work; getting rid of capitalism lock, stock and barrel; the Association of

> Scientific Workers; the viewpoint of the new generation) was received with sudden and violent applause. Riley spoke for the Association of Scientific Workers. He said it was more important for modern chemists to learn Russian than German, and that it was the young research workers who do the hack-work in science (forgetting that it is open to every young research-worker in a scientific department of a British university to be a second Cavendish if he has the ability).[66]

It was the paper given by the cell biologist, Michael Swann, however, which struck Baker most clearly as targeting the young delegates. 'Swann', he wrote,

> who appeared to be in a condition of cold hate as a result of the intolerable conditions under which young scientists work made a Trades-Union speech on behalf of the Association of Scientific Workers. He told of a member of the Association who had recently been dismissed from his job. Members of the audience gasped audibly with horror, without deeming it expedient to wait for the evidence of those who dismissed him. He scorned 'selfish individualism' and was rewarded with prolonged cheers.

His 'only interest in the conference', Baker concluded, 'was to put forward Communist ideas'.[67]

The conference's organizers and supporters, by contrast, praised it as an unprecedented coming together of young scientists from all around the world which helped to define a new role and profile for the scientist at a time of war. The conference was no doubt international with delegates from some 22 countries taking part. Following sessions on topics as diverse as the relationship between science and government, possible ways of encouraging international academic exchange, and strategies for addressing the problems of organizing post-war relief in Europe and Asia, the conference adopted a declaration of scientific principles which was clearly Marxist-inspired, emphasizing the fact that all nations and classes have made a contribution to scientific knowledge and insisting that the successful pursuit of scientific inquiry requires complete intellectual freedom and the unrestricted international exchange of ideas. One favorable reviewer praised the conference as being 'truly international'. 'It is free from any trammels on the expression of opinion'. Moreover, he continued, it should be recognized as forming part of a series of events in London which had been organized with a view to promoting international cooperation and understanding between young people, and between nations:

> One similarly free and international conference has just been held here under the auspices of the P.E.N. [Poets' Essayists and Novelists] Club.[68] Another, the International Youth Rally at the Albert Hall, is due to take

> place next month. Taken together, these conferences are solid evidence of the new position which this country is rapidly assuming as a center – one might almost say the center – of leadership in international affairs, both political and cultural.[69]

Conclusion

The importance of youth and internationalism in the history of 1930s and 1940s Britain is often underestimated, particularly in the history of British science, which has traditionally been treated as a conservative bastion of elite masculinity. What this chapter has aimed to do, is to extend this picture, and to highlight the importance of Marxist internationalism, based on the Soviet model, in shaping the new scientific left in interwar Britain. In particular, it has sought to explore the important role of youthfulness and an ideal of young masculinity, inspired by the role of young men in war, to the self-fashioning and self-understanding of the rising generation of left-wing scientists in Britain during this period.

Although at first science and communism may have seemed to be something of an odd combination this chapter has argued that they shared marked similarities as ideological movements in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, in particular in their shared emphasis on youthfulness and internationalism. A new and vocal group of young scientists emerged from Britain's elite universities in the interwar years, strongly influenced by the 'scientific socialism' of the Soviet Union, whose ideas they encountered through participation in international conferences. By focusing on the activities undertaken by this group under the auspices of the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science (part of the British Association) which they were instrumental in founding just before the outbreak of war in 1938, we have seen how a new masculine role for scientists developed against the background of war. Increased contact between members of the Division and scientific colleagues in the USSR led to increasingly militaristic language being used to describe the position and responsibilities of scientists.

As well as exploring the ways in which both youthfulness and internationalism were drawn upon as cultural resources by Britain's young scientists in fashioning a new role for themselves in the challenging years of the 1930s and 1940s, this chapter also examined the ways in which the Division came increasingly to speak for and represent the interests of young science students and schoolchildren within Britain. As well as encouraging personal correspondence with Soviet scientists and participation in international conferences and rallies, they worked hard to spread their ideas and ideals via the modern media of radio and television as well as through visits to schools and student societies. Perhaps the most significant event they organized of this kind was the 1941 conference on Science and World

Order, held in London. So unrestrained were the endorsements of Soviet communism and the role of young scientists in spreading the message of USSR-style scientific socialism and the harnessing of science for war that many delegates (in particular, those belonging to the Society for Freedom in Science) denounced it as a simple political event for rallying the educated youth of Britain to the cause of communism.

Although there has been increasing interest from historians in recent years in the influence of Soviet communist ideas upon scientists in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, there has been little attention paid to the significance of young people and to the rhetoric of youth, generational conflict and scientific masculinity which was crucial in shaping the identity and make-up of the scientific left in this period. By focusing on the key themes of youth and transnationalism, a different view of the role of the USSR and scientific socialism in the development of the modern scientific community in Britain emerges. In the same way, engaging with the field of science and technology, a somewhat neglected area in the history of childhood and youth, provides new insights into the ways in which youthfulness has been drawn on historically as a cultural resource and how battles over which groups were to be included within the social category of 'youth' were won.

Notes

1. Good examples of such studies include M. Tebbutt (2012) *Being Boys: Youth, Leisure and Identity in the Inter-War Years* (Manchester: Manchester University Press); S. Whitney (2009) *Mobilizing Youth: Communists and Catholics in Interwar France* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press); M. Neumann (2011) *The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917–32* (Abingdon: Routledge); S. Mills (2011) 'Be Prepared: Communism and the Politics of Scouting in 1950s Britain', *Contemporary British History*, 25 (3), 429–50; K. Alexander (2009), 'The Girl Guide Movement and Imperial Internationalism During the 1920s and 1930s', *The Journal for the History of Childhood and Youth*, 2 (1), 37–63.
2. The British Association for the Advancement of Science (hereafter BAAS) was founded in 1831 to promote the development and to raise the profile of all branches of the natural and physical sciences. The Association's annual meetings were held in a different city in Britain every year. For more on the BAAS, see R. M. McLeod and P. D. B. Collins (1981) *The Parliament of Science: The British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1831–1981* (Northwood: Science Reviews).
3. H. Cunningham (2012) 'Youth in the Life Course – A History' in F. Coussé, G. Verschelden and H. Williamson (eds) *The History of Youth Work in Europe: Relevance for Youth Policy Today* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe), p. 14.
4. The internationalism of Soviet science has, for example, received particular attention in recent years. See, for example, S. G. Solomon (ed.) (2006) *Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia between the Wars* (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press); N. Krementsov and S. G. Solomon (2001), 'Giving and Taking across Borders: The Rockefeller Foundation and Russia, 1919–1928', *Minerva*, 39 (3), 265–98.

5. R. I. Jobs (2007) *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), p. 11; See, by way of comparison, the comments of Patricia Clavin: 'Part of transnational history's undoubted appeal is its capacity to connect and absorb fields of historical enquiry that were hitherto discrete'. P. Clavin (2011) 'Introduction: Conceptualising Internationalism between the World Wars' in D. Laqua (ed.) *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars* (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 1–14.
6. See, for example, Neumann (1917) *The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union*; J. O. Finkenauer and L. Kelly (eds) (1992) 'Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Subcultures in the Former Soviet Union', 2 special issues of *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 16 (1–2), 247–61.
7. J. Morell and A. Thackray (1981) *Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 127.
8. BAAS, *First Report of the Proceedings, Recommendations and Transactions of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (York: T. Wilson, 1832), p. 10.
9. As Patricia Clavin reminds us, it is necessary for historians to work harder to 'distinguish effectively between, inter-, trans- and supranational relations'. See Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', p. 424. I would add to this the equal need for recognition of the fluid boundaries and numerous, complex connections between these different sets of spatial relationships.
10. Bodleian Library, Oxford (hereafter BL), Dep. BAAS 390, p. 33, R. Gregory 'Charter of Scientific Fellowship', 1941.
11. B. Russell (1931) *The Scientific Outlook* (London: Macmillan), p. 99.
12. G. Werskey (2007) 'The Marxist Critique of Capitalist Science: A History in Three Movements?' *Science as Culture*, 11.
13. A. V. Hill (1933) 'The International Status and Obligations of Science', *Nature*, 132, 952.
14. Werskey, 'The Marxist Critique of Capitalist Science', 4.
15. Gary Werskey has referred to this group of men as the 'Visible College'. See G. Werskey (1978) *The Visible College*: *A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s* (London: Allen Lane).
16. Bukharin had himself been viewed at the time as one of the greatest 'young heroes' of the Russian revolution. In his testament, Lenin described him as one of 'the most outstanding figures (among the youngest ones)'. See T. Cliff (1989) *Trotsky: The Sword of the Revolution, 1917–1923,* Vol. 2 (London: Bookmarks), p. 259.
17. Werskey, 'The Marxist Critique of Capitalist Science', 7.
18. C. A. J. Chilvers (2003) 'The Dilemmas of Seditious Men: The Crowther–Hessen Correspondence in the 1930s', *British Journal for the History of Science*, 36, 417–35.
19. E. J. Hobsbawm (2003) *Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life* (London: Abacus), p. 117.
20. S. Harman (2003) 'C. D. Darlington and the British and American Reaction to Lysenko and the Soviet Conception of Science', *Journal of the History of Biology*, 36, 327.
21. Harman, 'C. D. Darlington', 327.
22. S. Collini (2008) *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 172.

23. Clavin, 'Introduction: Conceptualising Internationalism between the World Wars', p. 6.
24. For the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Society, see, for example, H. Rose (1994) *Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist Transformation of the Sciences* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 156.
25. For more on Bernal's role in the establishment and activities of 'For Intellectual Liberty', see A. Brown (2005) *J. D. Bernal: The Sage of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
26. P. Petitjean (2005) 'The Joint Establishment of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and of UNESCO after World War II', XXIInd International Congress of the History of Science, Beijing, July 2005 (unpublished paper), p. 1.
27. Cited in W. McGucken (1979) 'The Social Relations of Science: The British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1931–1946', *Proceedings, American Philosophical Society*, 123 (4), 251.
28. J. D. Bernal (1939) *The Social Function of Science* (London: G. Routledge & Sons), p. 191.
29. G. Werskey (1971) 'British Scientists and "Outsider" Politics, 1931–1945', *Social Studies of Science,* 1, 69.
30. C. H. Desch (1943) 'The British Association Conferences on the Social and International Relations of Science', *International Affairs Review Supplement,* 19 (12), 617.
31. BL, BAAS Dep. 383, p. 56, J. S. Huxley and J. D. Bernal, 'Memo', 1938.
32. Ibid., p. 96, 'A Charter of Scientific Fellowship', 21 February 1941.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 34, H. G. Wells (1941) 'Draft Preamble and Charter of Scientific Fellowship, with suggested amendments'.
37. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, p. 415.
38. Cited in Werskey, 'The Marxist Critique of Capitalist Science', 21.
39. BL, BAAS Dep. 390, pp. 62–3.
40. Ibid., p. 34.
41. BL, BAAS Dep. 403, p. 161.
42. Ibid., p. 17, 'Appeal from the Scientists of the U.S.S.R. to the Scientists of the Whole World', 1941.
43. Ibid., p. 164.
44. Ibid., p. 19.
45. Ibid., p. 304.
46. Ibid., p. 305.
47. Ibid., p. 304.
48. Ibid., pp. 316–17.
49. Ibid., p. 41.
50. Ibid., p. 214. See, by comparison, in particular, the chapter in this volume by David M. Pomfret which examines the experiences of Vietnamese students traveling to France and engaging with Western-derived concepts of modernity during the interwar period.
51. BL, BAAS Dep. 383, p. 11.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 5.

54. Ibid., p. 12 – A communication from the Secretary of the Students' Sociological Society (LSE) dated 28 November 1938 asking if the Division for the Social and International Relations of Science could send a speaker to give an informal address on their philosophy and aims. Dr O. J. R. Howarth agreed to speak.
55. Ibid., p. 32.
56. Ibid., p. 10.
57. Ibid., p. 30.
58. BL, BAAS Dep. 403, p. 53.
59. BL, BAAS Dep. 383, p. 101.
60. Ibid., p. 107.
61. Desch, 'The British Association Conferences on the Social and International Relations of Science', 617.
62. BL, BAAS Dep. 403, p. 165.
63. Ibid., p. 166.
64. Ibid.
65. The Society for Freedom in Science (SFS) was a society which began to form in the late 1930s around the Oxford zoologist, John R. Baker, and the physical chemist, Michael Polanyi.
66. BL, BAAS Dep. 390, pp. 260–1.
67. Ibid.
68. The first PEN [Poets' Essayists and Novelists'] Club was founded in London in 1921 by Catherine Amy Dawson Scott; its goal was to promote friendship and intellectual cooperation among writers everywhere in the world.
69. 'Science and World Order', *Science*, 31 October 1941, 415. Compare a similar review by Ritchie Calder, 'Science and World Order', *The New Statesman and Nation*, 4 October 1941, 323.

4

'A Malayan Girlhood on Parade': Colonial Femininities, Transnational Mobilities, and the Girl Guide Movement in British Malaya

Jialin Christina Wu

In 1938, news of a group of Malayan-Chinese Scouts venturing to China to aid the wounded during the Sino-Japanese War made the headlines in the English and the Chinese press in British Malaya.[1] *The Singapore Free Press* described the 'supreme sacrifice' of these 'doomed youths' in the following manner:

> The highest traditions of the Scout movement have been heroically fulfilled by 16 overseas Chinese Scouts from the Straits Settlements, ten of whom have been killed, two wounded and the remaining four reported missing while engaged in front-line service with the Chinese armies ... Most of them came from families of high standing in the Peninsula. Led by capable and beautiful Miss Mack Swee Cheng, the only daughter of a wealthy Chinese sugar merchant in Singapore, the group reached Canton on Oct. 1, where they were sent for further first-aid and army training by the Overseas Affairs Commission Officials there ... four remaining girls actually took part in guerrilla warfare while the Scouts were again occupied in dispatch-running and rescuing the wounded.[2]

This extract is intriguing on many levels. First, it commemorates the vigor of Chinese youth despite concurrent fears in what was at the time still a British colony over 'the superfluous energy of Straits-born Chinese'.[3] Second, the extract above draws attention to the ways in which youth movements facilitated the increasingly visible participation of the young in international events. But perhaps the most arresting aspect of this report is its generally supportive view of female participation in the front line. The article

identified an adolescent Girl Guide as the leader of this gender-mixed group of Scouts and Guides. Among them were girls who had even engaged in combat. How, then, can we reconcile these examples of youthful feminine agency with colonial frameworks and the often contradictory gender conventions of the interwar period which dictated that Chinese girls were 'not allowed out...had to stay at home and were not seen?'[4]

This chapter argues that transnational youth movements such as Guiding opened up spaces for alternative expression and forms of girlhood and womanhood for indigenous girls and women in British Malaya.[5] Initially established in Britain in 1910, Guiding quickly extended its reach beyond the metropole. By 1917, women educators and church workers, inspired by Guiding's development and impact in Britain, had already started up the movement in Malaya.[6] As Guiding grew in strength and importance here, the movement introduced alternative social and cultural references to concepts such as the body, leisure activities, 'proper' womanhood and age – all of which had bearings upon indigenous girlhood. The flow and exchange of ideas concerning 'proper' girlhood and activities for Malayan girls was not unidirectional, however. Guiding's perspectives on 'proper' girlhood were also open to interpretation and used as tools by Malayans to further their own purposes and aspirations.

In adopting a transnational approach concentrating upon the flows of ideas about girlhood through Guiding in Malaya, this chapter adds to existing literature on gender and colonial studies. The first part of this essay studies Guiding's impact on concepts of 'proper' womanhood and girlhood. This contributes toward furthering our understanding of power relations between colonials and colonized in Malaya. Specifically, this section analyzes colonial aims of introducing and positioning Guiding, a 'western' activity for girls, as an 'emancipatory' and a 'wholesome' activity juxtaposed against other 'unsavory' and traditional or 'oriental' forms of indigenous girlhood. In doing so, this essay extends and builds upon the work of researchers such as Janice Brownfoot, who has argued that women educators (or 'sisters under the skin', as Brownfoot puts it) used Guiding to 'emancipate local girls within a "traditional" framework by schooling them to be competent, healthy future wives and mothers, able to run hygienic homes'.[7] However, this essay diverges from Brownfoot's analysis by underlining how these colonial uses of Guiding could 'penetrate into the social and economic lives of the indigenous population' as well as the domestic spheres of Malayans.[8] Power relations between colonials and colonized, as well as *amongst* indigenous girls, were also negotiated through Guiding. As the oral histories of indigenous Guides in the second section of this chapter illustrates, Malayan Guides asserted themselves as the equals of European or British Guides/Guiders through Guiding. Through their status as Guides, some indigenous girls also positioned themselves as elites vis-à-vis contemporaries who did not have the opportunity to become Guides.

Focusing on the negotiation and construction of girlhood in Malaya as transnational processes enables us to develop a more nuanced analysis of the similarities and differences between gender norms and women's activities amongst colonial and colonized girls in Britain and the colonies. Consider, as a case in point, Guiding's introduction of 'mothercraft' and its impact upon indigenous girlhood in Malaya. While scholars have asserted that these elements of guide training were locked within a '"traditional" framework' and that in contrast, some '[British] girls wanted adventure, not "home training"', oral accounts of indigenous Guides challenge such a viewpoint.[9] Indigenous Guides interpreted and considered 'mothercraft' not as a form of 'traditional' training, but as one of the many 'skills' which 'proficiency badges' proved they had mastered. The label 'traditional' also becomes problematic in the colonial context as Guiding's 'mothercraft' training in Malaya consisted of unconventional and nontraditional instructions such as preparing 'English tea' with tea cozies and the 'British style' of bed-making with several sheets – even though most Malayans slept on mats in the equatorial heat.[10] Seen in this light, the use of a transnational approach – one encompassing the perspectives of indigenous girls – leads us toward a more careful and nuanced analysis of Guiding's program of 'mothercraft' and the movement's 'pervasive appeal across British imperial culture and throughout the empire'.[11]

The connections between Malayan Guiding and transnational events are explored further in the third section of this chapter. This discusses Malayan Guiding's development amongst girls of different ethnicities by analyzing the movement's connections with international political developments, such as World War II and the rise of Communism in Southeast Asia. In particular, this section concentrates upon Malayan Chinese girls as a case study to illustrate the *unevenness* of Guiding's influence amongst indigenous girls of a 'diasporic' and multiethnic Malaya. Regional politics complemented the changes that Guiding brought to Malayan girlhood. However, wider events also challenged the ideals or values that Guiding aimed to inculcate. Nevertheless, in many ways, I argue, Guiding proved to be at the heart of negotiations and conceptions of femininity and indigenous girlhood in Malaya.

'Emerging from their seclusion': colonial girlhood(s) and the introduction of Guiding in Malaya

Guiding's establishment in Britain in 1910 had an immediate ripple effect throughout the empire. In British Malaya, colonial society was quick to follow the movement's developments at 'Home' in the metropole.[12] Newspapers in the colony kept abreast of debates in England over the 'appropriateness' of a youth movement for girls. For instance, in 1910, *The Straits Times* published Agnes Baden-Powell's (co-founder of the Girl Guides) rebuttal of a series

of angry criticisms made by Violet Markham in Britain over 'this rapidly growing army of young women'.[13] Other reports and editorials on Guiding soon followed. By the early 1920s, one newspaper observed that Guiding had generated such interest amongst the general public that 'many in Singapore have wished to know the aims and ideals of the Girl Guide movement'.[14] International events and developments beyond Malaya motivated colonial officials and members of the English-speaking community to encourage Malayan Guiding in its early days. Metropolitan attitudes to the benefits of women's work in 'building up resources after the havoc of the [First World] War', as well as concurrent beliefs that Guiding could train girls to become 'worthy and useful citizeness[es]' by imparting the 'art of womanliness' convinced colonials that 'the necessity for such [Guide] training [was] urgent and pressing' in the colony.[15] Some declared their desire to 'unblushingly commend' Guiding as an '[object] to be supported'.[16] Official endorsement also came in 1920 when the Foreign Office urged that '[a]ll possible encouragement and support' should be given to the Guide movement in order 'to foster a greater spirit of solidarity amongst the British communities in foreign countries and to make British ideals more generally known and appreciated by foreign nations'.[17]

Other than the target of creating useful 'citizenesses' and propagating British ideals for the purposes of empire, many also supported the movement because it represented a 'British ideal' of girlhood that was 'modern' and 'progressive'. To them, Guiding's 'western' or British version of girlhood was 'emancipatory', whereas indigenous girlhood was framed as 'conservative' and 'shackled by age-old traditions and customs'.[18] One example of this colonial positioning of British/Guiding's version of girlhood as 'modern' and superior can be seen in the use of quasi-technical terms such as 'mothercraft' and 'domestic science' to describe Guide training.[19] In relation, colonial assumptions that Guide training in 'mothercraft' would liberate indigenous girls because it 'would at least be teaching the present generation how to look after their homes and babies',[20] presupposed that indigenous women were incapable of doing so themselves. For these reasons, advocates of Guiding stressed the value of introducing 'a movement so wholesome, absorbing and useful' because 'a broader and healthier view of life and its possibilities is at once opened up'.[21] Guiding thus brought about novel notions of a 'modern' and 'progressive' girlhood for indigenous girls in Malaya. As one writer opined in *The Malayan Saturday Post* in 1925:

> It is of course traditional that women in the East have long suffered from disabilities from which their sisters in other parts of the world have long been free. This is due to the inert conservatism of the Chinese and of the other races which form the bulk of our populations; but that conservatism is steadily giving place to more free thought and to a wider idea of the possibilities of women's emancipation ... when women become fully

> enfranchised ... there will be less chance of the growing scandal which has been the subject of so much Press comment lately – we refer of course to the question of prostitution, etc. There is, however, a very fine training ground for women of which they may take full advantage, and which is at present of topical interest. We refer to the question of the Girl Guides.[22]

The 'question of prostitution' evoked above unveiled another motive of the movement's promoters. Guiding could help curb unsavory, sexualized forms of indigenous girlhood which threatened 'social hygiene'.[23] As the Social Hygiene Advisory Committee urged in 1925, 'in the case of the Chinese child, who is said to have full knowledge of sex matters at a comparatively early age ... the Committee refers to the value of recreation as the best antidote to sexual temptation; the provision of recreational facilities; the value of Boy Scouts, Girl Guides and the YMCA'.[24] Indeed, colonials were alarmed that Malayan children were both physically and sexually at risk because they could be forced to become child prostitutes, bondmaids, or *mui tsais*, as well as child brides or 'child-mothers'.[25] As one writer publicly complained to *The Straits Times* in 1924, the colony was 'full of this sort of thing ... A few months ago the courts were filled with girls of all ages suffering from venereal diseases raked out from all sorts of nooks and corners'.[26] Others were equally shocked by cases of cruelty to *mui tsais*, such as in 1929 'when a terrified young Chinese girl [was discovered] hiding under [a Chinese man's] bed and bleeding from a nasty wound on the head'.[27] Since colonials believed that 'the domestic servitude of girls (the '*Mui Tsai* system') has been a recognized institution of Chinese life', in which it was difficult for officials to intervene, some thus urged that Guiding might serve as a bridge allowing Western women to get closer to Asian women and effect change.[28] One journalist openly appealed to Western women in this fashion in 1940: 'A characteristic which is as strong in Asiatic people as in Europeans is the dislike of being interfered with in the home', noted the author. 'But perhaps one of the best ways of doing welfare work is indirectly through the children. An excellent medium is by means of "Brownie" packs and companies of "Girl Guides"'.[29]

Women educators, missionaries and the wives of planters and other colonials did come into closer contact with indigenous women and girls through Guiding. This was mainly due to the movement's policy to admit all girls, 'of any religion, race or nation'.[30] For instance, one Girl Guide Report noted with approval in 1922 that '[in] Perak is one of the most cosmopolitan companies to be found anywhere, one company in Taiping consisting of English, Malay, Chinese, Tamil, Cingalese [Sinhalese], Sikh and Eurasian girls, all of whom work happily together'.[31] When some indigenous girls in the Malay States were unable to join the movement due to technical obstacles such as Guiding's proviso that girls had to be British subjects, pioneering Guiders assisted the training of indigenous leaders and units

which later independently mushroomed in vernacular schools throughout these states.[32] As Malayan Chief Commissioner Cavendish enthusiastically elaborated in her report on 'Training Week' at Penang in 1926, 'everyone told us it was too big a risk to collect 45 girls of so many different Nationalities together. This, however, proved nonsense ... It was really wonderful how all these girls of so many different nationalities and creeds mixed together, and were all so happy and friendly'. Thus concluded Cavendish: 'It is only through Guiding that this could have been made possible, for they would never dream in their ordinary life before they became Guides of eating or sleeping together as they did [in camp]'.[33] However, while British Guiders such as Cavendish considered contact between European and indigenous Guides as a manifestation of Guiding's ideals of *equality*, Malayan Guides had different, but equally profound interpretations of this aspect of Guiding. As we shall see, Guiding's vision of establishing an 'international sisterhood' by enabling a girl to 'not only [be] a Girl Guide of Penang or Province Wellesley, but a member of the big Sisterhood which is spread all over the world',[34] would also be utilized by indigenous Guides as a step up the colonial social ladder.

Despite colonial support, many indigenous parents were initially reluctant to allow their daughters and wards to join the movement. Myna Segeram, a Sinhalese Guide in Singapore during the 1930s, recalled her childhood struggle to join the Guides. '[My] aunty said: "Oh, no no no – you can't join *that,* those are not the right things for you to join. We are Sinhalese girls". We had to be quite sedate about these things. I was quite young and I couldn't fight against it'. According to Segeram, girls of her community were 'very strictly brought up ... so [by joining the movement] I would probably be betraying the Sinhalese trust'. More importantly, emphasized Segeram, 'there might be people making remarks about it – that she [Segeram's aunt] wasn't bringing me up properly. Any *outside movement* wasn't seen as proper'.[35]

Segeram's use of the word 'proper' is especially illustrative of the views held by some indigenous parents. To begin with, some labeled Guiding as 'improper' because of its 'Christian' and British connotations. In particular, they were wary that the movement would encroach into the privacy of their domestic spheres by converting their daughters to Christianity and jeopardizing their daughters' religious faith. As Zanan binte Suleiman, the first Malay Guide, recalled: 'Everybody was against my father [who sent her to an English school, where she became a Guide]. They said I would be spoilt and become a Christian ... No other Malay girls were allowed to play with me'.[36] Second, Malayan parents and adults also felt that Guiding was not 'proper' because they believed Guiding was 'tom-boyish' and 'un-ladylike'. Indeed, as Segeram's memories illustrate, Guide activities harbored connotations of danger and inappropriate masculinity:

> When I used to take my Guides out on a nature ramble, the person-in-charge would always howl out to me and say: 'Bring them back alive!' ... Every time we went out we had wolf whistles and things, especially if we were going to camp with our knapsacks on ... but we enjoyed ourselves and we didn't bother about all that ... My servants, when I used to go to camp, for instance, [would say] 'Oh I know, now you're a young soldier and you go to camp'.[37]

Certainly, these labels contradicted indigenous ideals of girlhood and early Guiders felt pressured to counter these allegations. To assuage Malay parents wary of Guiding's 'Christian values', Guiders stressed that Malay Guides would 'conform to Muslim religion where dress is concerned. Their uniforms will have long sleeves, keep their heads covered with berets and [the Guides will] wear long stockings'.[38] Similarly, in order to play down Guiding's 'masculine' qualities, Chief Guide Lady Olave Baden-Powell urged the intervention of Guiders who, 'knowing the customs and traditions of the people, could put our case tactfully before [Malayans], giving most especially the point of view that we are a women's movement for girls, designed for developing health and homemaking'.[39] Newspapers published articles in Guiding's favor, emphasizing that 'there is nothing military about [Guiding] and the girls are trained to become future women citizens, home-keepers and mothers'.[40] Others persuaded parents not to 'run away with the idea that the Girl Guides are pert young persons who look out for strangers' – as 'amongst the Girl Guides they were teaching mothercraft, teaching the girls to look after children, their health, and above all, their moral training'.[41]

Although colonials and Guiders took pains to convince indigenous parents of the benefits of Guiding's 'modern training', certain parents remained hesitant because some of these activities, though purportedly beneficial for future womanhood, clashed with indigenous notions of age-appropriate activities for girls at their physical stage of life. These activities not only included stereotypically 'masculine' physical tasks such as drills, sports, and exercise but also various aspects of Guiding's 'modern feminine training', such as the use of sewing machines, which some parents considered to be physically debilitating and age-inappropriate because the machines implicitly 'excited' or stimulated sexual precocity in girls.[42] As Segeram explained:

> In former days, ten-and-a-half to about thirteen were the very crucial years in a girl's life, [because of] puberty and things. Very often, conservative parents would say: 'Now, it's finished, that's finished. Now, it's risky for you to be out. Now you stay at home ... No more jumping around, it's bad for the girl'. We were discouraged from using treadle [sewing] machines, for instance. Because apparently the pelvis – the pelvic region – shouldn't

> be all 'excited' ... That was discouraged, [people were] saying: 'It's very bad for the girls. That's for men to use'.[43]

Segeram's account draws our attention to another manner in which Guide training ran contrary to local conventions on the (female) body and age-appropriate activities. Since girls usually first enrolled as Guides at this particular age (10–13), Guiding directly competed with other traditional paths of girlhood such as 'child-marriages', which were often sanctioned by local religious beliefs that determined puberty as the threshold for womanhood – and marriage. According to Segeram, this explained why '[w]e used to have scores, thousands of [younger] Brownies, but the Guides were always *depleted*'.[44] At the same time, while Guiding was not completely accepted by Malayan parents in the beginning, the movement did introduce new visions of alternative girlhood in the colony early on, as it opened up possibilities of recreation and activity for Malayan girls at a critical physical age, or stage of life. On top of the introduction of Guiding as an alternative to child-marriages for some Malayan girls, the movement also had a more *immediate* impact upon child-marriages. For instance, in the 1940s, Singapore's first Malay District Guide Commissioner encouraged parents to let their daughters become Guides so that they could be taught 'mothercraft' – according to the Commissioner, Malay girls could 'learn to be good wives and mothers so as to make their homes more secure and cut down the high Malay divorce rate' which was believed to be linked to the prevalence of child-marriages in the colony.[45] In this way, Guiding gradually introduced not only new concepts of girlhood and age, but its agenda of 'mothercraft', as discussed earlier, was also (re)interpreted and appropriated by some Malayans for the interests of their community.

Indigenous parental suspicions slowly eroded as prominent indigenous leaders, such as Malay Royalty, openly embraced Guiding. As some Malayan Guiders have explained, 'women of the Sultans' household in the Malaya states took to the Guide Movement enthusiastically', thereby giving 'a fillip to other Muslim women and girls' to join Guiding.[46] One striking gesture of Royal support followed in 1934, when the Sultana of Johore crafted and embroidered a flag in order to '[present] it personally to the First Johore Bahru Girl Guide Company'. At the meeting, the Sultana also 'entertained those present to a Malay *makan* [meal] following which the Johore National Anthem was sung'.[47] Malay Royals viewed Guiding positively as they believed the movement was also training girls to become loyal Malayan citizens. Indeed, many interpreted Guiding's lofty claims to be creating 'citizenesses' for their own purposes. As the above anecdote demonstrates, indigenous rulers did not see any contradiction in supporting a 'British method' to promote faithful Malayan citizens. Malay Guides and Brownies sang the Johore National Anthem in the presence of the Sultana, thereby pledging their loyalty to their State and monarchy. Such examples of Royal

acceptance of Guide methods also occurred earlier, as in 1931, when the Sultan of Selangor, along with his entourage of equally esteemed Malay dignitaries, personally attended the enrollment of Malay Brownies gathered 'in a fairy ring'.[48] Through these Royal endorsements, some Malay parents came to accept Guiding as a legitimate activity for their daughters.

'Being somebody grand'? Indigenous perspectives of Malayan Guiding

If Malayan parents may have been initially doubtful about Guiding, many indigenous girls seemed to have needed little persuasion to join the Guides. First, indigenous girls considered Guiding to be special or even 'elite' because prominent leaders and personalities were actively involved. We see this in the two examples cited above where Malay Guides and Brownies had the opportunity to interact with Malay Royalty. Similarly, as Chan Siok Fong, a Chinese Guide in Kuala Lumpur in the late 1940s reminisced, Guiding enabled her to interact with 'high society women' and the wives of 'high-ranking [British] officials' such as the Chief Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur. According to Chan, her involvement with Guiding also permitted her to enter colonial spaces otherwise restricted to her in the 1940s. As Chan explains, she was able to 'hike along the Lake Gardens path, a very famous place in K.L. [Kuala Lumpur], with [the Chief Commissioner's] permission…It made me think at that time – "Wow, as Guides you really get special privileges to be able to walk on the fields of this *posh* Lake Gardens"'.[49]

Malayan girls considered Guiding to be an elite activity because each Guide became 'part of a great sisterhood' after having 'made the same promises of service and friendship'.[50] Paradoxically, Guiding's nonsectarian claims to operate on the basis of equality, 'applying equally to the children of our manufacturing towns, to the native girls of India and to the girls of the feminine equivalents of Eton and Harrow' reinforced Malayan Guides elite coding because they were ostensibly drawn onto an equal footing with European girls.[51] One example of how indigenous girls perceived the social elevation that Guiding offered them can be seen in the memories of Elizabeth Choy, who became a Guide in Sandakan (and later, in Singapore) in 1925. Choy described herself as 'the first wild woman from Borneo [who was] given a private audience with the Queen' when she was in London to accept the Girl Guide's Bronze Cross for her wartime efforts from Lady Baden-Powell herself.[52] To Choy, such an honor would not have been possible but for the fact that she was a Guide. Another example of how Guiding also emboldened Malayan girls as equal partners can be seen in Chan's experiences. In the capacity of the first Chief Commissioner for Singapore in the 1950s, Chan had to test some British girls on their outdoor cooking. She recalled:

> Now, British girls, they were so used to being superior, the boss…, because they were the colonialists. Asians, somehow, [were] second grade to them. But I went down to test these girls and I remember these girls took their test along Changi Beach. And one blast of wind came along. The sand went into her food. And secondly, by the side of her fire, there were bushes of lalang [tall weeds] – it was very dangerous. I learnt that when I was a Guide…So I failed her. When I failed her there was a big hullabaloo that I failed the British girls. It went right up to England. The Chief Commissioner of England wrote to me, want[ing] me to write a report [on] why I failed these girls, so I wrote a report and they were satisfied…I laid out every point and said: 'Now, you tell me, do you think these girls can be passed?' So she [the Chief Commissioner of England] wrote back a letter to apologise.[53]

Chan's choice of words is particularly illuminating. First, we observe that even as late as the 1960s, some Guiders felt they were treated as 'second grade' despite the movement's nonsectarian claims. Yet, importantly, Guides such as Chan were able to rise through the ranks and were even able to use their experience in Guide training (note her expression: 'I learnt that when I was a Guide') to assert her authority *within* the organizational framework of Guiding.

The Girl Guide uniform was another aspect of the movement which attracted Malayan girls. As Myna Segeram puts it: 'I wanted very much to be a Brownie…they were playing games, they were singing, they had a uniform on and that *really* got me'.[54] Her choice of words reveals the priority and importance of the uniform in comparison to other alluring aspects of the movement. Through the recollections of other Guides, we also note that the uniform was important because it made local Guides feel important – or, as one Guide put it, 'somebody grand'.[55] Myra Cresson, a Eurasian Guide in the 1920s, recalled her childlike excitement:

> when we had this Girl Guide uniform – this Brownie uniform – we thought it was fantastic: Oh! We were somebody grand, we were always looking forward to be dressed up…When you come to think about it you'll laugh instead – these big shore hats turned up one side, we had stockings and we had these big sand shoes…when we came home it [our feet were] all stuck to this rubber – oh it was horrible – Ah! [But] sure, we loved our uniform, we thought we were grand.[56]

Indigenous girls regarded Guiding as exclusive as not every girl had the chance to become a Guide. However, girls who did not become Guides still coveted Guiding. As Rani Arumugam, an Indian schoolgirl growing up in Johor Bahru (Selangor) in the 1930s, admitted:

> I didn't have the opportunity to join the Girl Guides or the Brownies…Fortunately, my sister was also very keen. She managed to get into one of the Malay schools in the neighborhood and she became a Guide. I used to follow her sometimes and envy her secretly. I wished, one day, that I too would be a Guide…Though I was not in the Guides, I was so keen to have a copy of the photo [of the Guides] that I ordered it.[57]

'Envy', the word used by Arumugam to describe her disappointment in not being able to become a Guide, also appears in Segeram's recollections and impressions of how her other non-Guide schoolmates regarded Guiding:

> in fact they looked up to us, because they thought we were special…In school we had quite a number of girls who were not allowed to join Guides…They were probably from more conservative families. [Their parents] said: 'No, you can't go, you go to school and you come back. That's quite enough'.…So in that way, we felt that those girls sort of envied us. And they sort of felt they were losing out on something…now that I look back, I feel that we were privileged because we were able to do a lot of things that they weren't able to do.[58]

The accounts above also demonstrate that Malayan girls were aware that Guiding opened new avenues and possibilities for indigenous girls. As Segeram declared, Guides 'were able to do a lot of things that they [non-Guides] weren't able to do'. Indeed, she also stressed Guiding's unique position and capacity in enabling girls to do what they wished:

> Our proficiency badges ran to about a hundred, and all sorts of abilities were stressed there – which [we] could acquire according to our own wishes – [there were] girls who took the astronomer's badge…or the nature badge; tree cutting, felling trees and things. That wouldn't be the usual thing that women would go for. But they are available to the Guide…you could do what you felt…There wasn't any other place where you could do that…I think to an adolescent girl, you want to do things, at their own level, and still feel that you're being rewarded for that.[59]

Similarly, we observe this sentiment through the memories of Elizabeth Choy, who recalled with admiration how her fellow Guide Isabel Low, 'who was a slave girl who was redeemed from the *towkay* [boss]' had 'earned so many badges…learned how to play the piano…and tennis' through the movement.[60] For these Guides, the movement empowered them to reach goals which would have otherwise been unattainable.

In relation to the above, some Malayan Guides also believed that Guide activities made them stronger women. Through Guide training, they

could be 'proud to be a woman, [for] you are able to look after yourself and others – not necessarily being envious that the males, the boys, had all the privileges – [as] you could make a stand for yourself and enjoy living'.[61] Indeed, it is striking that indigenous Guides saw the movement's goals of teaching girls to be 'home-keepers and mothers' not as limiting them to 'female subordinate roles' – but simply or quite practically, as one among the many training opportunities through which they might 'prove their efficiency' and climb up the Guide hierarchy. As Segeram elucidates, 'it was grand that in Guides, we were taught how to sweep and how to dust [and] how to wash clothes – [it was] all part of our training, our proficiency badges'. When questioned if the Guides were thus conforming to 'female subordinate stereotypes' because of the emphasis on 'good housekeeping', Segeram interjected: '*that* wasn't the idea in our minds, as girls, when we joined. You got that badge, and that other badge, so you were *efficient* in that. It's a *proficiency* badge – that means you're *proficient* in it'. To Guides such as Segeram, it was the act of obtaining a badge and recognition, as well as proving one's capabilities (*proficiencies*) which mattered. Furthermore, Segeram adds:

> [Homemaking] wasn't the only quality we emphasised. We emphasised also the outdoor... Although some people sort of looked at us and said: 'Now, those are the tomboys going about', there were others who said, 'Well, they are not doing anything bad – it's much better doing that rather than going to a cabaret or something like that'. So there were people who were getting a bit more broad minded and now, of course, it's the accepted thing that a Guide – that a girl – can just go off on her own... But it was something that was developed, [it] was new. Doors were being opened to feminists.[62]

Her experiences also reveal to us how some indigenous girls saw Guiding retrospectively as a driver of 'broad-mindedness' and 'feminism' in the colony. As Segeram emphasized, members of the public gradually came to defend Guide activities previously denigrated as 'tom-boyish'. Furthermore, her account of how some Malayans commented that 'it's much better doing that [Guiding] rather than going to a cabaret' also reflects her impressions of Guiding's growing reputation as a 'wholesome' activity as compared to other undesirable or 'vulgar' and sexualized forms of girlhood or womanhood. More importantly, as Segeram highlights in her account, some of these changes in public attitudes also extended to other non-Guide indigenous girls. Indeed, some in the colony praised a new image of 'modern Malayan girlhood', emphasizing that 'women [had] left the seclusion of their homes, throwing off the dusty and heavy mantle of tradition, to enter a new world just as their Western sisters had done'.[63] As the recollections of Malayan Guides demonstrate, Guiding created space for the

negotiation of indigenous girlhood and introduced new possibilities for change.

'If you wear khaki you are less likely to see red': international politics and the case of Malayan Chinese Guiding (1930s–60s)

As Guiding made inroads in Malaya, its development was uneven among the diverse ethnicities in the colony. This unevenness was especially acute amongst girls in vernacular (non English-medium) schools, since Malayan girls in English schools had more opportunities to become Guides. While Chinese vernacular schools formed their first Guide company in 1938, their Malay counterparts had already started Guiding in 1931 – almost a decade earlier.[64] To understand these discrepancies in Guiding's progress, it is essential to keep in mind that many in Malaya identified themselves along racial and religious lines. Consequently, ethnic communities in Malaya had different motivations, attitudes, and interests in Guiding and girlhood-at-large. Furthermore, the 'diasporic' nature of some important Malayan towns (such as Singapore) also meant that the various ethnic communities were intimately aware of and connected to Malaya's bigger and more influential regional neighbors such as India, Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), and China – where many had emigrated from.[65] Thus, besides differences of culture and traditions between these ethnic groups, political events related to India, Indonesia, and China also influenced Guiding's growth in Malaya.

World War II illustrated well the dissimilar impacts wider events might have upon Guides of various ethnicities in Malaya. The war had less immediate influence upon Malay girls, but Malayan Chinese girls were profoundly affected because they were given more freedom, visibility, and importance as China became increasingly involved in the war (or the Sino-Japanese War).[66] Some of these new liberties for Malayan Chinese girls came with the inauguration of Nationalist China's 'New Life Movement' (新生活运动) in 1938 in Malaya.[67] Chinese girls and womanhood were thrown into the spotlight as influential figures such as Madame Chiang Kai-Shek (Song Meiling) who spearheaded the Movement, reported that 'many girl students [were] receiving military training' and 'lead[ing] the life of a soldier ... All this was just only a fraction of what the women of China have done for their country during the war'.[68]

Malayan Chinese Guides were directly influenced by the growing attention and rising expectations of Chinese girlhood amid the exigencies of war. These Guides were prominent in the colony because of their uniforms and the fact that they were organized into collective units or 'companies'. Their visibility thus made it easy for others to point them out as a representative body for Chinese girls in the colony. Furthermore, in their capacity as visible ambassadors of Malayan Chinese girlhood, Guides were targets for rousing nationalistic slogans, which emphasized good citizenship and

'loyalty to their country' – basic tenets in Guiding's Promise and Laws. Guides were thus implicated in the war. As one Malayan newspaper put it: 'The [Chinese] Girl Guides are also playing their part in the war. Of the 78,793 Girl Guides enrolled in China, 241 are giving service at the front'.[69]

Second, Malayan Chinese Guides were also influenced by their sister Guides in China, who were under the immediate control of Chiang Kai-Shek's Guomintang (国民党) as early as 1927.[70] An example of this influence, as well as the close connection between Malayan Chinese and Chinese Guides, can be seen in the warm reception in Malaya of Yang Hui Min, a Shanghainese Girl Guide who had 'risked her life ... while the Japanese were still firing' to smuggle a Republic of China flag and other essential supplies to besieged soldiers.[71] While some would have considered Yang's front-line exploits as inappropriately dangerous and 'masculine' before the war, Malayans now held up the Shanghainese Guide as a model of 'modern' Chinese womanhood. Through the Guide movement, Yang, much like her fellow Malayan Chinese Guides (such as Mack Swee Cheng and her comrades in our opening example), were active agents at the forefront of this shift in traditional cultural norms and ideals of womanhood in Malaya.

The rise of Communism in Asia also had profound, albeit different, repercussions for Malayan Chinese Guides and Chinese girlhood-at-large. Once again, Malayan Chinese girls appear to be more affected by this regional development as compared to girls of other ethnicities. For one, Communism's expansion in the region, which culminated in the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1949, inspired Malayan Chinese nationalists and fired the imaginations of the impressionable Malayan Chinese youth of a future Communist Malaya. British colonials were acutely sensitive to this politicization of youth in postwar Malaya. Indeed, on top of Communism's quick progress amongst young Malayans, colonials were aware that their authority had been shaken by their defeat at the hands of an Asian power, Japan, during World War II in Asia. In these circumstances, colonials saw the latent potential of youth as twofold: the young could either help the empire to stymie the tide of Communism, or they would be manipulated and turn into the vanguard of Malayan Communism.

To many colonials, Communism's spread in Malaya gave rise to another type of girlhood diametrically opposed to Guiding's ideals. One difference was the 'morally corrupt' nature of Communism's vision of girlhood or womanhood, which contained 'unsavory' sexualized undertones. Indeed, while Guiding was presented as a moral compass for girls, Communism was branded as an 'evil influence ... who seek[s] to corrupt the minds of young children and use them as tools for their own purposes',[72] such as by indoctrinating Malayan Chinese girls to seduce men over to the Communist camp. An example of these purported 'Malayan Communist femme fatale' ensnarements was reported in 1950, when Wong Ong Kee, 'a frail, bespectacled 19-year-old schoolgirl ... used her wiles to win men over to

the Communist Party' and 'smiled cynically [as she] received a maximum sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment'.[73] Whether real or imagined, colonials dreaded this 'moral decay', pointing out that 'this is the type of intelligent girl who is fostering this insidious propaganda amongst our school children'. Another similar case was taken up by the press barely a month after Wong's trial, when one of Wong's comrades, described as 'a small, bright and quite attractive schoolgirl ... was placed in a Girls' Home as an "experiment" [which] failed, for she became an extremely evil influence in the Home, and in every way unmanageable'.[74]

Other than Communism's undesirable sexualized connotations and influence on Malayan girls, some also regarded the ideology as morally corrupt as it had 'no respect for filial piety' – a cornerstone of Confucian teachings.[75] This emphasis on Communism's irreverence for parental authority was starkly juxtaposed with Guiding, a movement training girls to be future good mothers and homemakers and active, disciplined youths through drills, exercise, and 'mothercraft'. Newspapers whipped up parental anxieties, warning parents that Communism developed 'stonehearted-ness' in their children by enticing them to coldly forsake their families to further the Communist agenda.[76] For instance, one article in 1957 featured a moving photograph of a tearful Chinese mother with the arresting and ominous caption: 'This mother was too late to stop her son from sailing to Red China'.[77] Yet another newspaper informed readers:

> The drama at the Singapore dockside on Wednesday, when a father strove desperately to prevent his daughter vanishing forever behind the Bamboo Curtain, serves to remind us that the first aim of international Communism is the smashing of family ties. Communism demands complete and unswerving loyalty to the State; there must be *no loyalty left over to give to the home*. When the girl's father pleaded with his daughter to return home, she abused him. She had heard that life in China was wonderful and she wanted to go there, even if it meant saying *goodbye to her family forever*. Poor misled girl! ... The party newspaper, Kwangming Daily of Peking, admits that the Chinese authorities have encouraged students to *denounce parents and relatives* ... The seed of evil has been planted.[78] (Emphasis mine)

The emotive language employed here illustrates the extent of anxieties over Communism's 'evil' subversive effects upon the family unit. In the midst of these uncertainties, Guiders declared they would 'stress the family and international aspects of Guiding'.[79] Thus, while the internationalism of Communism 'smashed' family ties by imposing ideology and State as priorities, the internationalism of Guiding aimed to create a peaceful 'global sisterhood' (which, subtly, capitalized on the metaphor of family) and to reinforce the family unit by 'mak[ing] efficient women citizens, good homemakers and mothers'.[80]

Communism also directly threatened Guiding as colonial authorities believed that 'red cells' in Chinese schools were clandestinely recruiting school children under the guise of Guiding. Indeed, as in the case of the Vietnamese Scouts discussed by David M. Pomfret in this volume, some officials were afraid that Guiding could provide a blanket of legitimacy for 'politically sponsored Chinese bodies aping the BP [Baden-Powell] Movement'.[81] Others identified school and after-school activities as breeding grounds for Communism,[82] pointing out that 'real danger lies in the fact that these rebellious students are ready modeling clay [because older students] are able to influence the younger students'.[83] These suspicions eventually pushed colonial authorities to preemptively 'shut down' Guiding in Chinese schools for a brief period in 1948.[84] At the same time, in order to counter the 'diabolical cleverness in the utilization of youth for the purposes of the Malayan Communist Party',[85] some colonials put forward the utility of Scouting and Guiding in this 'struggle for the mind of youth'.[86] This strategy was hardly new. As early as 1929, some had already proposed both movements as effective counterweights against Communism, declaring that 'if you wear khaki you are less likely to see red' since the '[u]niformity of clothing may lead to uniformity of action and ideas'.[87]

While it is difficult to pinpoint 'youth agency' or to quantify how much of their actions were self-motivated or adult-initiated, we find a poignant example of Scout and Guide agency in Singapore in 1950. Despite Communist threats and reports of intimidation in schools, scores of young people, led by 500 Scouts, participated in the Education Week parade 'guarded by the strongest police contingent ever seen'.[88] Through this emphatic public display, we can infer that the movement made Scouts and Guides the foremost representatives of youth by giving them opportunities to act and express themselves visibly. Indeed, in the postcolonial era, they would continue to occupy these prominent roles for the purposes of nation-building.

Conclusion: guiding and the 'youthfulness of Asia'

In 1950, dressed in Guide uniform, Tungku Budriah, the Raja Perempuan (Queen Consort) of Perlis, gingerly embarked the ship *Gorgon* along with 'three Malay Princesses and two Sherifahs (descendants of Prophet Mohammed)' and 41 other Malayan Girl Guides in order to represent Malaya at the Guide Jamboree in Australia. The 26-year-old Queen, was 'leaving seven children behind with her husband' had 'confided that she was a little afraid of being sea-sick as it was her first journey outside Malaya'. In contrast, 'little 17-year-old Teh Khoon Tseng, of Ipoh, Leader of the Robin Patrol and proud holder of the First-Class Badge and eight Proficiency Badges', chirped: 'I have been excited for weeks'. In the presence of the crowd which 'thronged the quayside' to bid them a safe journey, Lady Gimson, wife of the Governor and a Guide herself, delivered a speech reminding the contingent that '[we]

in the Girl Guide Association are all members of one large family, and you, fortunate ones, are going to visit relations within the family circle in their own land. Make friends with them, learn all you can while you are away [and] let others learn through you the finest characteristics of your own homeland'.[89]

This scene encapsulates what Guiding meant for very different groups of people in Malaya. For colonial authorities, European Guiders and indigenous leaders, the movement was a force for peace and a 'teen-age League of Nations' which allowed the young to 'represent their country' in a 'happy, youthful gathering, where they made many deep friendships with girls of every creed and color'.[90] Guiding was flexible and malleable enough to be (re)interpreted and (re)appropriated by adults to direct the young for the purposes of empire, ideology, or nation-building.[91] Furthermore, the movement's nonsectarian internationalism meant that colonials could legitimately claim they were equal partners in a sisterhood where colonials effectively played the role of 'Big Sister'. This same understanding meant that indigenous leaders could also employ youth as an ideal ambassador to represent their new, fledging postcolonial nation-states on an equal footing with other countries upon the international stage. On the other hand, Malayan Guides were more motivated by the freedom that Guiding offered them. Many were interested in the movement's exciting promise of 'a life-time of adventure' and the prospect of gaining recognition or 'proving themselves'. In these many ways, Guiding introduced and established alternative visions of indigenous girlhood for different groups and communities in the colony. While it broke down certain traditions of girlhood and womanhood, age and the body, the movement also oriented Malayan girlhood in the direction of internationalism and the transnational agenda of creating a 'universal sisterhood'.

Guiding's transnational agenda and reputation as a credible training method for girls and young women also captured the attention of Malayan politicians in the postcolonial period. Other than the movement's crucial role in 'the tug-of-war' against Communism, local leaders were also keen on the movement's utility as a rallying point and training ground. This is perhaps unsurprising given that half of the Malayan population was under the age of 21.[92] In the unsteady political climate of postwar reconstruction and Communist agitation many deliberated whether youth would prove to be 'a keg of dynamite or a symbolic dynamo geared to future good citizenship'.[93] To some extent, these questions over Malayan youth on the eve of independence were inspired by 'the very youthfulness of Asia, [which] makes it more and more susceptible to the influence and pressures of our young people'.[94] In these circumstances, the Guide movement positioned itself as a leading organization for youth, stressing that 'greater emphasis is being placed on the training of youths than ever before'.[95] It established itself as an 'incubator' for future Malayan leaders and played an essential

part in establishing relations with other young people in the region through activities such as Jamborees, which promoted regional peace and cooperation. Through the movement the Girl Guides continued to be active, visible participants in Malayan social life as leaders and representatives of a strong, dependable force for the future – a position they would attempt to maintain in the transition from colonial times into a postcolonial future.

Notes

1. 'Supreme Sacrifice of Singapore Boy Scouts', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 7 July 1941, 12; 'Xingzhou huatong zhandi fuwutuan: shiliu ren zhong – shisi ren yixunguo星州华童战地服务团: 十六人中 – 十四人已殉国', Sin Chew Jit Poh [星洲日报]', 9 June 1937, unnumbered. One journalist, Edna Lee Booker, who was based in China during the war, was so inspired by the actions of these 'ardent young patriots' that she 'left the hospital [where she had interviewed one 'Boy Scout hero'] sick at heart, bitter against war, but thrilled over the heroism of Young China'. E. L. Booker (1940) *News Is My Job: A Correspondent in War-Torn China* (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 331. Local newspapers in the neighboring British colony of Hong Kong also featured this story. P. Kua (2011) *Scouting in Hong Kong 1910–2010* (Hong Kong: Scout Association of Hong Kong), pp. 200–1.
2. 'Singapore Scouts and Guides Die For China', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 13 June 1938, 9.
3. 'Boys' Club for Straits Chinese Youths Urged', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 26 September 1940, 2.
4. J. Brownfoot (1990) 'Sisters under the Skin: Imperialism and the Emancipation of Women in Malaya, c. 1891–1941' in J. A. Mangan (ed.) *Making Imperial Mentalities: Socialization and British Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 55.
5. Throughout this essay, I use the term 'British Malaya' to refer to three administrative entities, also known as the Straits Settlements (comprising Singapore, Penang, Malacca), the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang) and the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu).
6. *The Straits Times* informs us that Guiding was inaugurated in October 1914. See 'General Notices', *The Straits Times*, 14 March 1925, 8. However, most sources indicate that Guiding was established in Malaya in 1917. See A. Abd. Malek and A. H. Hamsah (2007) *Persatuan Pandu Puteri Malaysia* (Selangor: PTS Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd), p. 13; and S. F. Chan, C. Alvis and M. R. Segeram (2001) *Guiding in Singapore: A Chronology of Guide Events 1917–1990* (Singapore: Landmark Books), p. 11.
7. Brownfoot, 'Sisters under the skin', p. 53.
8. F. A. Noor (2002) 'Commémorer les femmes, oblitérer l'Empire' L. Chamlou (trans.) in M-E. Palmier-Chatelain and P. Lavagne d'Ortigue (eds) *L'Orient des femmes* (Lyon: ENS Editions), p. 252.
9. Brownfoot, 'Sisters under the skin', p. 53; T. Proctor (2005) '"Something for the Girls": Organised Leisure in Europe, 1890–1939' in M. J. Maynes, B. Søland and C. Benninghaus (eds) *Secret Gardens, Satanic Mills: Placing Girls in European History, 1750–1960* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 245.

10. Oral History Center, National Archives of Singapore (hereafter OHC), S. F. Chan, interviewed by J. Chan, A/N: 002842, 21 February 2004.
11. C. Devereux (2005) *Growing a Race: Nellie L. McClung and the Fiction of Eugenic Feminism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press), p. 39.
12. The growing popularity of the Boy Scouts in the early 1910s also helped cut a path of entry for Guiding since both movements shared similar aims. See K. Y. L. Tan and M. H. Wan (2002) *Scouting in Singapore: 1910–2000* (Singapore: Singapore Scout Association & National Archives of Singapore), pp. 13–15.
13. 'Girl Scouts: Miss Baden-Powell's Defence of the Movement', *The Straits Times*, 12 January 1910, 2. For further information on Agnes Baden-Powell and the movement in Britain, see H. D. Gardner (2011) *The First Girl Guide: The Story of Agnes Baden-Powell* (Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing); T. Proctor (2002) *On My Honour: Guides and Scouts in Interwar Britain* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society), p. 26.
14. 'The Girl Guides', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 7 October 1924, 6.
15. 'Girl Scouts', *The Straits Times*, 12 January 1910, 2; 'The Girl Guides: Singapore Headquarters', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 12 March 1925, 7; 'The Girl Guides', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 9 January 1919, 22.
16. 'A Phrase of Education', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 23 February 1923, 6.
17. 'British Subjects Abroad', *The Straits Times*, 4 May 1920, 9.
18. 'Malay Girls "Surprise" Guide Commissioner: Mrs Heath (M. B. E.) Looks Back' in *The Straits Times*, 2 January 1958, 4.
19. 'Malayan Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 14 January 1921, 9; 'A Generation of Adventure', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 4 July 1932, 4; 'The Girl Guides', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 7 October 1924, 6.
20. 'Should Planters' Wives Do Welfare Work?' *The Straits Times*, 1 February 1940, 1.
21. 'The Girl Guides: Singapore Company', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 13 July 1920, 7.
22. 'Women and the State', *The Malayan Saturday Post*, 25 July 1925, 14.
23. 'Social Hygiene', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 1 May 1929, 10.
24. Ibid., 27 August 1925, 14.
25. For reasons of brevity, this article will not go into details. See S. Pedersen (2001) 'The Maternalist Moment in British Colonial Policy: The Controversy over "Child Slavery" in Hong Kong 1917–1941', *Past & Present*, 171, 161–202; K. Yuen (2004) 'Theorizing the Chinese: The Mui Tsai Controversy and Constructions of Transnational Chineseness in Hong Kong and British Malaya', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, 6 (2), 95–110; J. Brownfoot (1992) 'Emancipation, Exercise and Imperialism: Girls and the Games Ethic in Colonial Malaya' in J. A. Mangan (ed.) *The Cultural Bond: Sport, Empire, Society* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd), p. 87.
26. 'Help for Young Girls', *The Straits Times*, 31 July 1924, 10.
27. 'Cruelty to Mui Tsai: Heavy Sentence For Chinese Woman', *The Straits Times*, 9 November 1929, 11.
28. 'Mui Tsai Commission's Report', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 1 March 1937, 3; Brownfoot, 'Emancipation, Exercise and Imperialism', pp. 86–7.
29. 'Should Planters' Wives Do Welfare Work?' *The Straits Times*, 1 February 1940, 1.
30. 'Guides – What Are They?', *The Straits Times*, 2 October 1924, 9.
31. 'Girl Guides in Malaya', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 5 May 1923, 7.

32. 'The Girl Guides: Singapore Company', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 13 July 1920, 7.
33. 'Malaya Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 27 February 1926, 11.
34. 'Girl Guides Rally', *The Straits Times*, 17 January 1923, 2.
35. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
36. 'Malaya's Joan of Arc', *The Straits Times*, 30 July 1933, 10.
37. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
38. 'Malay Girls Can Help Cut Divorce', *The Straits Times*, 11 February 1949, 3.
39. 'Malaya's Women Emerging From Their Seclusion: Lady Baden Powell's Message', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 18 January 1935, 6.
40. 'Guides – What Are They?' *The Straits Times*, 2 October 1924, 9.
41. 'Malayan Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 14 January 1921, 9.
42. British Guiders such as Agnes Baden-Powell also shared similar fears about exercise as appropriate activities for girls. In particular, she warned that 'violent jerks and jars' could 'fatally damage a woman's interior economy' and that 'too much exercise led to girls growing moustaches'. J. Hampton (2010) *How the Girl Guides Won the War* (London: HarperPress), p. 4.
43. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
44. Ibid.
45. 'Malay Girls Can Help Cut Divorce', *The Straits Times*, 11 February 1949, 3. Also see 'The Good Mother is a Good Citizen', *The Straits Times*, 8 August 1962, 9.
46. Chan, Alvis and Segeram, *Guiding in Singapore*, p. 14.
47. 'Johore Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 22 February 1934, 12; 'For Girl Guides: Flag Made by Sultana of Johore', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 23 February 1934, 3.
48. 'First Malay Brownies: Enrolled in the Presence of Sultan of Selangor', *The Straits Times*, 18 May 1931, 17.
49. OHC, S. F. Chan, interviewed by J. Chan, A/N: 002842, 21 February 2004.
50. 'Guides – What Are They?' *The Straits Times*, 2 October 1924, 9.
51. 'Malayan Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 14 January 1921, 9.
52. OHC, E. Choy interviewed by S. Sng, A/N: 002827, 23 April 2004.
53. OHC, S. F. Chan interviewed by J. Chan, A/N: 002842, 21 February 2004.
54. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
55. 'Schoolday Memories', *The Singapore Free Press*, 14 October 1959, 7.
56. OHC, M. Cresson interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000594, 28 August 1985.
57. OHC, R. Arumugam interviewed by S. Sng, A/N: 002837, 6 May 2004.
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59. Ibid.
60. OHC, E. Choy interviewed by S. Sng, A/N: 002837, 6 May 2004.
61. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
62. Ibid.
63. 'Chinese Women in Field of Athletics', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 11 August 1937, 15.
64. 'Chinese Girl Guides', *The Straits Times*, 25 April 1938, 7. Note that we are referring here to vernacular schools which often only admitted girls of one specific ethnicity.
65. See T. Harper (1997) 'Globalism and the Pursuit of Authenticity: The Making of a Diasporic Public Sphere in Singapore', *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, 22 (2), 261–92.
66. See T. Harper (1999) *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 33; C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna (1990) *The*

Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949 (Singapore: Singapore University Press).
67. 'Chinese Educated Women Want Own Club', *The Straits Times*, 22 May 1938, 5.
68. 'Madame Chiang on Women's Heroism', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 10 January 1939, 4.
69. 'China's Womanhood', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 2 April 1941, 5.
70. J. Wasserstrom (1991) *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 160.
71. 'Doomed Battalion Girl's Big Singapore Reception: Heroic Life Dash to Troops Recalled', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 21 July 1938, 2.
72. 'Join "War" Against Subversion – Chew', *The Straits Times*, 30 October 1956, 7.
73. 'Red Cell in Local School', *The Straits Times*, 17 May 1950, 1.
74. 'Girl Sent Back to Peking', *The Straits Times*, 7 June 1950, 7.
75. 'Modern Youth Need Religion and Morals', *The Singapore Free Press*, 15 March 1957, 5.
76. 'Opinion: Hearts of Stone', *The Singapore Free Press*, 11 March 1957, 4.
77. 'Modern Youth Need Religion and Morals', *The Singapore Free Press*, 15 March 1957, 5.
78. 'We Think', *The Straits Times*, 27 February 1955, 10.
79. 'Guides Leave on Trip to Perth', *The Straits Times*, 19 July 1950, 7.
80. Singapore Girl Guides Association (1968) *Golden Jubilee Souvenir Magazine, 1917–1967* (Singapore: Singapore Girl Guides Association), p. 29.
81. 'Big Scope for Chinese Scouting', *The Straits Times*, 16 April 1948, 5.
82. OHC, A. L. Cheng interviewed by B. L. Tan, A/N: 000088, 7 May 1982.
83. 'Inside the Mind of a Rioting Student', *The Straits Times*, 31 October 1956, 4.
84. OHC, M. R. Segeram, interviewed by C. Chiang, A/N: 000586, 16–30 July 1985.
85. 'Malayan Communists a Serious Problem: Seeking to Hinder Britain in Prosecution of War. Chinese Patriotism Being Used to Disguise Work', *The Straits Times*, 11 March 1940, 10.
86. 'Criminals or Good Citizens?' *The Straits Times*, 20 January 1939, 10.
87. 'Politicians in Uniform', *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 7 February 1929, 6.
88. 'Students Turn Against The Reds', *The Straits Times*, 15 October 1955, 7; 'Schools War is on', *The Singapore Free Press*, 17 May 1956, 3; 'Historic Day on Crowded Padang', *The Straits Times*, 14 May 1950, 1. The festivities essentially celebrated colonialism, as students took part in a 'pageant depicting the landing of Sir Stamford Raffles [founder of the colony] in Singapore in January 1819'.
89. 'Guides Leave On Trip To Perth', *The Straits Times*, 19 July 1950, 7; 'Malay Royalty Goes to Australia With Party of Malayan Guides', *The Straits Times*, 18 July 1950, 4.
90. 'Zailan, Lilian Found It Cold But Fascinating', *The Straits Times*, 31 August 1952, 4.
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93. 'Our Youths Dismal Face Fate', *The Singapore Free Press*, 20 August 1957, 4.
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95. Singapore Girl Guides Association, *Golden Jubilee Souvenir Magazine*, 14.

Part II

Mobilities

5

'Colonial Circulations': Vietnamese Youth, Travel, and Empire, 1919–40

David M. Pomfret

'Dear friend, we understand each other, and our hearts beat in unison' wrote Vu Hien, a young Vietnamese student of medicine at the University of Hanoi to his friend Hoàng Văn Bích, a student at the University of Nancy, France, late in the summer of 1926. 'My decision is irreversible', he informed his correspondent, 'and that is why I have already made all of the necessary arrangements'. The arrangements to which Vu Hien referred involved travel. He planned to discontinue his studies in Hanoi (the main center of the 'protectorate' Tonkin and capital of French Indochina), cross the Chinese border clandestinely to reach the leftist stronghold of Canton and then head on to Europe to rejoin his friend in France.[1]

Like many other young Vietnamese of his generation Vu Hien was determined to play his part in bringing French colonial overlordship to an end. The colonial era had begun in 1858 with the occupation of Saigon and by the 1880s the French had incorporated the central and northern parts of what had formerly been the Nguyễn kingdom into a *Union Indochinoise*. Intellectuals and schoolteachers with a stake in pre-colonial hierarchies orchestrated resistance to these incursions. However, in the early twentieth century the colonial government used education reform to weaken the hold of the culturally Sino-centric imperial court of Annam upon the loyalty of young subjects, scrapping the civil service examination system drawn upon the Chinese imperial model during World War I. By expanding 'Franco-Annamite' schooling from 1918 which provided teaching in French and *Quốc ngữ* (the romanized Vietnamese writing system) the colonial government created a linguistic distance between older Vietnamese who were able to read Chinese characters and a younger generation exposed to new forms of schooling who were not.[2] However, this linguistic break failed to attenuate anticolonial resistance. A new, youthful Vietnamese elite drew upon radical European political literature to confront the French colonial government between the wars as the latter defaulted upon promises of political liberalization held out during

the Great War. The sense that youth had a special reforming role to play in Vietnam was both reflected in and inspired by a wave of strikes led by schoolchildren from 1926 and 1927.

The trigger for these strikes was the coercive response of authorities to students' efforts to mourn the death of the Vietnamese patriot, Phan Chu Trinh.[3] These protests suggested to young observers such as Vu Hien that youthful compatriots had now 'opened their eyes' to the need to sweep away the colonial system altogether. Moreover, as French authorities took reprisals against students who had gone on strike the sense grew that travel was essential to the achievement of this broader aim. Study abroad had also been an ambition of the pre-war anticolonial elite but they had mainly traveled to China and Japan. The youthful elite of the 20s, being less proficient in Chinese, looked toward Europe instead. In this febrile atmosphere, Vu Hien, who had yet to depart Vietnam, wrote in *Quốc ngữ* to Hoàng Văn Bích to emphasize his own contribution to this noble cause ('I object, I agitate in a thousand ways'.) Fortunately, as he put it, 'my parents have not hunted me down, they have only taken away my allowance'. This left him relatively free to make preparations not to strike a blow directly against the 'Colonial Bastille', but to exchange a life of intrigue in Indochina for one of itinerant activism.[4]

Interpretations of Vietnamese students' travels between Indochina and France have often emphasized a 'leftward journey' ending in ideological affiliation with the Vietnamese Communist movement. For one historian this, 'closed the curtain on the concept of *franco-annamite* collaboration' as early as 1918.[5] The history of youthful agency in this period has often been read against the eventual outcome of Communist victory and ultimately the emergence of Marxist-Leninism as the principal ideology around which anticolonial resistance crystallized.[6] Undoubtedly this 'leftward turn' can be read off the life stories of many of those Vietnamese who traveled to Europe. However, such a teleology, positing travel to Europe as a way-stage on the path to a Communist takeover has obscured many other meanings ascribed to youth's liminal, interstitial movements. A transnational perspective, emphasizing the role of ordinary individuals, can begin to shed light upon how travel, ostensibly for the purpose of study, was constitutive of young colonial subjects' attempts to forge a variety of new subjectivities. In this picture, class was sometimes reinforced but so too was a sense of difference articulated along the lines of nation and age.

Recently, scholars have begun to address the importance of study abroad to the wider history of internationalism and transnationality. In her analysis of American students in France and French students in the United States, Whitney Walton has described study abroad as an 'important vector of transnational cultural exchange' and an experience which played a key part in the development of 'cultural internationalism' during the interwar era.[7] Such an argument, linking individual experiences to the history of

international relations, raises important questions of how mobility affirmed and undermined understandings of the nation.

By shifting the focus to youth traveling from colonial contexts in this period it is possible to see that as colonial subjects, not citizens, their 'starting points' were markedly different to many other students in France. While some developed an optimistic, internationalist outlook this view was complicated by personal experiences of colonial violence in its more or less subtle forms. Travel did not unsettle stable or static notions of the nation in any straightforward way. To even speak of the nation of Vietnam was, in a sense, anachronistic while national liberty remained a distant dream. These circumstances led Vietnamese students to invest heavily in transnational practice as a means of opening up new spaces in which expressions of nationhood could be framed in opposition to colonial race discrimination. By overturning the familiar etiologies of East to West, colony to metropole, some young people on the move conceived of agency in the spaces in between 'departure' and 'arrival' as distinctively youthful. In their writings young travelers made transnationality integral to the fashioning of a truly modern 'youth'.

By adopting a youth-centered analysis of transnationality to examine these colonial circulations we can begin to see the importance of this nebulous social category to individuals' efforts to define new forms of agency. However, a concomitant of mobility was, as we shall see, an often burdensome sense of probationary responsibility. This predicament led to youth being conceived of both as a kind of nation-in-waiting and as a focus for voluntary and state-led attempts to reform colonialism in Indochina through 'Franco-Annamite' collaboration into the late 1930s.

Raising the youth of empire: colonial contagions

Following the establishment of the École Coloniale Indigène in Paris in 1885, authorities in France and Indochina actively sought to draw Vietnamese youth into circulation between 'center' and 'periphery'. This promised to solve a core problem of colonial governance – the need to fashion a collaborationist indigenous elite. It also reinforced French claims upon international prestige, which had faltered since defeat against Prussia in 1870–1. As small numbers of Indochinese traveled to Paris, metropolitan observers read their movement as a virtuous exchange.

The students represented a small number of participants in what was then becoming a far larger movement. In the so-called golden age of travel, new advances in steam technology reduced journey times and costs and brought increased opportunities for travel for the purpose of leisure and study.[8] Young Americans flocked to Europe to enroll in educational institutions, in particular those in Germany. Young Chinese embarked upon study trips to the United States.[9] Those traveling were participants in a movement through

which study abroad was coming to be regarded not just as an academic pursuit but a special privilege of the educated young. This would soon come to be enshrined in practices such as the 'junior year abroad'.[10]

As Whitney Walton has shown, in France during this period the ability to attract students was refashioned into a matter of high political importance.[11] State-level support helped to bring greater recognition of France as an important destination for study abroad. Among those studying at *lycées*, colleges and universities were an increasing number of young people from the rebuilt French empire, and notably from Indochina.[12] From the outset French officials invested the transnationality of young Vietnamese with a distinct, age-related significance. Empire builders had interpreted their movement as evidence for French overlordship as a kind of tutelary nurturance. In colonial discourse Indochina, like other colonies, was depicted as a 'child' of France. But the populations of Vietnam and Cambodia, cast as sites of formerly great civilizations that had stalled and become decrepit were regarded as somewhat more advanced than other colonized peoples. The French occupation had supposedly 'restarted' these stalled Asian civilizations. Through contact with Europe these peoples were now advancing toward 'maturity' in contiguity with the foreign presence. The youth who traveled from Vietnam to France to study at the *École Coloniale* were understood to be recapitulating precisely the same accelerated trajectory along an evolutionary path from backwardness to modernity, albeit at an individual level.[13]

After the poisoning of the Hanoi garrison in 1908, an incident that capped a rising tide of insurrectionary activity led by young intellectuals, a growing number of dissenting voices warned that the flow of Vietnamese youth across empires' inner borders, far from being a virtuous exchange, was instead becoming a dangerous contagion. Jules Harmand, the influential principal theorist of French colonial policy, warned in *Domination et colonisation* (1910), a highly influential work of colonial theory, that only 'grown men' should be sent over from Indochina to Europe. Those sent too young would, he argued, 'become, sure fire, the most irreconcilable adversaries of our civilization and the worst enemies of our domination'. Harmand linked youthfulness to this unfortunate process of *détournement*. The study abroad experience pushed those who moved to compare their own and others' societies. Within an imperial framework, Harmand feared young Vietnamese might draw contrasts between the relative liberty of France and the coercion they experienced at home, becoming, 'moral and intellectual *métis*, delinquents, rejects, corrupt to the marrow, embittered and hateful to the bottom of their hearts, shunned by both societies'.[14]

Thousands of miles away from France in Indochina the wealthy parents of elite Vietnamese youth appeared less concerned about 'deracination' than their own children's ability to access the upper echelons of the colonial education system. This offered access to positions within the colonial state through which privilege was defined. During World War I they petitioned

the colonial government to widen access to the higher levels of the stunted colonial education system, offering millions of piasters in exchange for a firm commitment. Governor Albert Sarraut raised their hopes in 1918 when he spelled out a 'politics of adaptation and collaboration' in 19 points. These included the promise that no limit would be set upon the acquisition of educational qualifications other than the student's own intelligence. Yet, rather than deliver on this and risk the emergence of 'surefire adversaries' Sarraut, like most of his successors, acted instead to gradually curtail the mobility of Vietnamese youth.[15]

Lacking separate *lycées* (until 1927) French residents pressured colonial authorities to restrict Vietnamese children's access to elite French schools in Vietnam.[16] From the early 1920s the Office of Public Instruction began to squeeze young Vietnamese out of French schools in Indochina leading on to a high school diploma and thus access to French higher education.[17] In spite of the promises of Alexandre Varenne (the reformist governor of Indochina from 1925 to 1927) to raise the standards of colonial education generally and despite the opening of the Lycée Pétrus Trương Vĩnh Ký in Saigon in September 1928, the mood among students was one of disgruntlement.[18] Young Vietnamese complained that they found it difficult to pursue their studies beyond elementary level and that the promises made by Sarraut and Varenne in particular had not been kept.[19]

As frustration built around these new restrictions, colonial authorities were also working to reduce Vietnamese youth's access to metropolitan education. In 1921 the government decreed that students had to obtain the consent of the governor general himself in order to study in France. By 1924 any would-be student had to collect a dauntingly long list of official documents as part of the application process.[20] In the face of the unrest of 1926 the colonial authorities issued an *arrêté* stipulating that the *livret scolaire* would not be delivered to students who had been expelled from any public education establishment.[21] Protests against exclusion thus justified further exclusions. In his letter to Hoàng Văn Bích, Vu Hien described the case of a friend who had been forbidden to depart from Indochina to take up studies in France on account of his having taken part in school strikes in 1923. As another student named Ca Văn Thỉnh observed, by 1927 it was getting harder to enter University and, 'if anything happens they accuse us of being revolutionaries'.[22]

For decades young Vietnamese had been traveling to France in the hope of securing salaried positions within the expanding colonial state on return. This undoubtedly remained the hope of many of the parents of those sent abroad in the late 1920s. Those on the move remained a small elite of self-consciously urban and mostly male French-speaking colonial subjects interested in articulating their 'modernness'. They were especially concerned with the French colonial state and were implicated in it, for they tended to be from families whose affluence derived from the stake they held in

the established order. But while many continued to be interested primarily in ensuring they could gain access to lucrative positions within the colonial economy on return, as the colonial government stymied access, young people began to ascribe new meanings to their movement across borders. For many, frustration with the French colonial state provided an important stimulus to leave.

Impatient itinerants: Vietnamese youth on the move

'How', asked 'H.T.T.' in *L'Avenir de l'Annam*, 'might we escape from this Indochinese Bastille?'[23] Those who no longer believed that national rebirth could be achieved within the colonial system drew upon a variety of sources of radical ideology for inspiration. Some revived older links with China. In June of the previous year French courts had handed down custodial sentences of several years to 15 young Vietnamese caught at the Chinese border attempting to make the overland journey to study in Canton. As the difficulty of surmounting challenges to mobility grew, young Vietnamese ascribed greater theoretical importance to border crossing agency. H.T.T. argued that, 'travel broadens our knowledge' but also that:

> We acquire a sense of initiative so rare among our compatriots. We observe new institutions which could in part replace our old ones. And far from our land each of us feels his soul invaded by a vague sentiment of sadness, and the need to share his difficulties and to meet with compatriots to get back in touch with, to some extent, [a sense of] the natal *milieu*. We learn how to struggle and how to improve ourselves, morally. We begin to breathe this free air of foreign lands and we are drawn, in spite of ourselves, toward the political, civil and moral liberty that is natural to man. From this is born in our hearts ... an intense love for our own land ... [and] repugnance for these political institutions that [the French] have imposed upon us.[24]

Mobility in this view was essential to the intensification of patriotic sentiments but it was also crucial to the development of a reasoning elite. To stay in Indochina was, in effect, to remain cut off from reason. As H.T.T. put it, colonial schools produced only 'intellectual backwardness', and, 'a mentality that is not easily adapted to politics'.[25] Young, reform-minded Vietnamese underscored the importance of travel as the key to restarting a stalled process of development. If a sufficient number could be put on the move, political transformation might follow.

In this way, young writers and intellectuals theorized transnational movement as both a practice and resource of youth acting in the service of the nation. Moreover, the effects of mobility were interpreted specifically in terms of *maturation* or the crossing of a threshold of age. The act of

boundary crossing bestowed upon young travelers the sense that they were somehow *older* than those of the same age whom they had left behind.[26] However, for young Vietnamese the desire to elide travel with maturation arose not only from exposure to new knowledge and experience abroad but from the sense of emerging from an enforced backwardness. In colonial Vietnam the prevailing discourse of empire as a kind of tutelary kinship powerfully reinforced young people's perception of themselves as part of a society that was paradoxically both 'old' *and* trapped in infancy. French imagery posited the colonized as childish wards learning at the feet of the *mère patrie*. This imagery proliferated upon the surfaces of colonialism's material culture, on banknotes, textbooks, and posters. Within Indochina's schools such imagery conveyed the sense that Vietnam was a backward, dependent, and childlike society altruistically raised by French 'genius' to a productive modernness.[27]

While signs of Vietnam's 'infancy' were abundant, education reform made young people increasingly aware of the fact of their own biological age. A firm association between age and schooling had been lacking in Vietnamese society in pre-colonial times. Into the 1920s some Vietnamese students who accessed *collèges* and *lycées* in Indochina often did so at more advanced ages than French children. This age gap sometimes occurred because some students continued to take the opportunity to study Chinese in Sino-Vietnamese schools before entering French or so called Franco-Annamite schools run under the auspices of the French state. But since those who entered the Franco-Annamite schools directly had to learn *Quốc ngữ* as well as French this left many at least three years older than French classmates if they were eventually admitted into a *collège* or *lycée*.

In the school strikes of the 1920s older students, generally, took the lead. Authorities therefore introduced new restrictions on the age of admission to schools to squeeze older youth out of the upper echelons of the education system, in private as well as government-run schools. Those young Vietnamese who sought to evade such obstacles by applying to study in France found their applications delayed by a swathe of administrative red tape. And, because – until 1930 – the colonial *baccalauréate* was not accepted in France, those who were accepted to study abroad had to make up courses. As one observer noted, this could 'keep [the Vietnamese student] from arriving at the doctorate until he is almost thirty-five'.[28]

It was not only those whose encounters with such processes made them feel prematurely old who associated transnational mobility with maturation. Others who failed to depart and were thus, in a sense, 'left behind', did so too. They confronted the sense of failed maturation, of a perpetual 'childishness' foisted upon them by the colonial condition. As Trình Xuân Nhạc, an assistant teacher at the École Supérieure de l'Agriculture du Tonkin in Hanoi put it in his private correspondence with Nguyễn Thiện Chí, a student at the Grand Lycée de Bordeaux:

> I have been back with my pupils in Hanoi since 15 July, I am now lodging at the Foyer des Étudiants waiting for the classes to start again – [on] 1 October –... Twice a day I go to my 'office' – the Botanical Garden – to do nothing... You will laugh at me when I say that at 27 years old I am still like a child.[29]

Those like Trình Xuân Nhạc who were 'left behind' were gripped by a sense of enforced redundancy. In the gulf between unrealized ideals of the future and the stopped political clock of the colonial present, youth dragged on unnaturally into adulthood or old age.

Even such 'left behind' youth, however, had an important role to play in the working up of a distinctively youthful transnational agency. They participated in the process of writing back from empire to young friends in Europe and overseas. Even if only as correspondents they affirmed transnational agency through such practices as a function of youthfulness (distinguished from *childishness*). They also gave expression to a powerful sense of 'immobility' as a failed transition or stymied development. This manifested itself in an intense yearning for travel. Such feelings were evident in a letter Vũ Tiến Huân, a young secretary working in Hanoi's education bureau, received from a 20-year-old Saigon-based correspondent in March 1927:

> Young in body, I am virile in spirit... Will I allow this lethargic and listless youth to drag on into adulthood, until old age and the end of my life, in obscurity and silence?... No!!! a thousand times, no!!!!... Around us peoples are crossing thresholds, marching in giant steps along the path to progress. Young India is agitating, the young Javanese are rising up against the Dutch ogres, young China, in a superb spirit of patriotism, is working for national liberation, throwing down the most tremendous challenge to European imperialism. And me, a young Annamite, I am doing nothing.[30]

Vu Tiến Huân's fear was of a youth left unrealized *because* it was immobile, of virility staunched and stemmed through the inability to cross thresholds. This fear of being left behind sharpened when it was counterposed not only with the mobility of friends but also with neighboring peoples. In this sense transnationality as a set of practices paved the way for the potential achievement of modernness defined in terms of a fraternal, inter-ethnic bonding across borders.

Participation was skewed along lines of gender. In colonial centers female students had been notable participants in the school strikes of 1926–7. Many of the girls of the Saigon Native Girls College, discussed by Gail Kelly, pursued quite different models of girlhoods to those defined as 'traditional' through their participation in these protests.[31] Elite schooling, radical student-led activism and urban commercial culture all afforded new forms

of public and private agency to young females as well as males. In the 1920s and 1930s newspapers and journals in Vietnam debated the emergence of an apparently more 'Westernized' model of femininity, the 'new girl' or those who identified with feminism (*chủ nghĩa phu nu*). But while gender roles were quite evidently in flux and some girls were able to challenge older conventions and constraints on their mobility throughout the period under discussion, the vast majority of those students and youth who traveled were male. In the home, gendered stereotypes and deeply conservative conventions continued to undercut parents' willingness to fund the movement of their daughters to study in France. Young males were overwhelmingly the principal beneficiaries of foreign travel. Few girls figured among the 1,556 students estimated by police to be present in France early in 1930.[32] This fact reinforced the association of travel overseas and 'youth' with deeply masculine connotations.[33]

The 'old youth' of Indochina had often theorized travel in terms of their own transgressive – if not ideologically coherent – pursuit of liberation from colonialism, but they also interpreted it as a kind of freedom from the artificial conventions of their parents' more status-bound or 'traditional' society. In a context shaped by two millennia of direct and indirect Chinese influence, legal and cultural structures drawn upon Sino-Vietnamese Confucian teaching still informed attitudes to age and informed definitions of 'tradition' in Vietnam. Age was venerated and assigned considerable authority at the level of the state, commune, and individual family. Youth, by contrast, was defined less by its social role – there was, for example, no formal age of majority in indigenous law codes. Indeed, because 'youth' was often seen in terms of anthropological constants such as vigor, it was assumed to require instruction and control.

But as hopes for political change under colonial rule faltered between the wars, traveling youth came to represent an unbound potential in the eyes of elite sections of society, and a 'modernity' that the nation-in-waiting of Vietnam had yet to achieve. Precisely because elite youth had been liberated through travel from the cloying grip of 'tradition' and the denial of the individual within the authoritarian structure of the family it could also function as a potent symbol of social disorder. While travel appeared vital to the reproduction of elite identity its 'maturation effects' accentuated what observers identified as a growing generational divide.

This tendency was markedly evident in the rash of firebrand publications proliferating in the 1920s. For instance, the intellectuals who wrote for the radical newspaper *La Jeune Indochine* ventured onto such ground, claiming that the collective failure of youth was, 'to assume that those who had lived longer knew best'. *La Jeune Indochine* demanded the formation of 'a national party, the party of the youth' ranged against the parties of the 'old'.[34] As colonial authorities clamped down upon nationalist organizations recruiting the *retours de France* ('returned from France', or 'returnees')

such as the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDD), founded on Christmas Eve 1927, the youth-led struggle for the nation became deeply marked by a sense of generational struggle not only between older and younger activists but also between worried elite fathers and their sons.

Radicalized returnees from France, such as Dương Văn Gien (who returned in January 1928) regretted this emerging generational clash. He demanded that young travelers avoid confrontation and seek to mediate instead between what he referred to as the 'classes' of 'youth' and the 'old'. Rather than deepening the divide between the two, Dương Văn Gien proposed that a *mature* youth was better equipped to speak across the gulf between tradition and modernity, and to close this generational gap. Such an approach, fusing past and future, seemed more likely in his eyes to secure autonomy, independence, and modernness.[35]

Still, among a significant number of those attracted by leftist thinking, youth appeared to be the only group capable of ushering the mass toward emancipation. 'Poor Indochina', wrote Nguyễn Hữu Ninh in *L'Avenir de l'Annam*, paraphrasing Nguyễn Ái Quốc ('Nguyễn the Patriot', or Hồ Chí Minh as he would be known from the 1940s) 'you will die unless your old youth does not revive you'.[36] By invoking the image 'old youth' Nguyễn hinted at the enduring significance of young intellectuals' networks linking Indochina to China and in particular linking Hanoi to Canton. Indeed in summoning upon the figure of 'old youth' it seems that Nguyễn Ái Quốc, who lived in Canton from November 1924 to April 1927, may have had in mind Wu Jianren's well-known character 'Old Youth' from the *New Story of the Stone* (*Xin shitou ji*) in *The South Gazette* (*Nanfang bao*) of 1905 (which the author signed off with the pseudonym, 'Old Youth'). Wu's work was a response to the famous essay of the exiled reformer Liang Qiqao, 'Discourse on Young China' (1900) which inspired many reform-minded young intellectuals in the years before the Chinese revolution of 1911. In his reference to 'old youth' Nguyễn Ái Quốc, who had founded the Viêt Nam Thanh Niên Kách Menh Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association) in 1925, grasped the cultural currency of youth in China, and the sense that it was vital to reform.[37] However, he also worried that generational fractures might curb the unificatory potential of class within a youth-led anticolonial movement.

By the late 1920s though few of those who returned from France remained unaware of the political questions surrounding colonialism this did not necessarily lead them to adopt a clear position upon how to 'save Vietnam'. Nor did all take up this challenge with enthusiasm. Many were acutely aware of the weight of expectation attaching to the privilege of mobility. As Ca Văn Thỉnh, a student at the École de Pédagogie in Hanoi put it in a letter to a friend studying in Toulouse, 'in our day, the position of the student is very delicate, because we are the hope of an entire people'.[38] Those who stayed behind were only too eager to remind peers of their responsibilities. Trình

Xuân Nhạc, an assistant teacher at the École Supérieure de l'Agriculture in Hanoi in 1928 wrote to Nguyễn Thiên Chí, a student at the Grand Lycée de Bordeaux, explaining:

> The condition *sine qua non* [of going out] is to make yourself useful to your compatriots who are counting on you! You will return motivated by the sentiments that would honour a father, a people, and I will be the first to throw myself in the dust before you if I see you as worthy.[39]

In a similar vein, Vu Hien, whilst still in Hanoi, informed Hoàng Văn Bích, 'if you remain in France without a clear goal, you will provide no service to your homeland'.[40] As such comments suggest, departure presupposed return. And thereon the returnees were expected to take up leadership of movements for national liberation, uniting insurgents.

As successive waves of returnees disembarked in Saigon they were confronted with the difficulty not only of reintegrating into colonial society but also of negotiating the demands and confinements placed upon them by family, society, and the colonial state. As the carceral machinery of the colonial state began to more vigorously repress efflorescences of youthful insurrection, returnees struggled to build wider political networks. The French secret police, the *Sûreté*, censored radical newspapers and harried reformers. Nguyễn Ái Quốc's extreme left Thanh Niên organization dispersed and most of its members fled to Hong Kong. There, the group fragmented into three factions over the question of whether or not to follow the Comintern line.

In spite of this confusion returnees still sought leadership positions within 'modernizing' groups and insurrectionary cells. But as higher standards were expected of them, they often found their credentials questioned. A commonly heard complaint was that expectations of 'worthiness' had not been fulfilled. Another was that *les retours de France* were snobbish, deracinated 'traitors' to their land. Journalists and writers such as Hanoi-based Vũ Trọng Phụng lampooned the returnees in their work.[41] In some cases their own families ostracized them. As the American journalist Virginia Thompson observed whilst visiting Indochina:

> The trials of the Annamite student are not over when he receives his hard-won diploma. He is treated with suspicion upon his return to the colony by the authorities and by his family alike. They fear him as a potential revolutionary or dislike him as a conceited prig.[42]

As this evidence suggests, though transnationality could sometimes foster community it was also often experienced in terms of isolation.

Facing colonial violence and the weighty duty of fashioning an as-yet unrealized future it is perhaps unsurprising that young returnees such as H.T.T., expressed the view that it seemed possible neither to remain

in France nor to return to Indochina. The writings of politicized youth convey a sense of placelessness, expressed in terms of 'wandering' or 'liberty', in a limbo between a nation-in-waiting trapped within the French empire and the imagined independent nation of the future. If a sense of 'freedom' existed this derived less from the prospect of bringing a certificate home from provincial France than from the sense that *by traveling* the present and the much-anticipated future could somehow be connected. By telescoping the temporality of historical evolution into the geographical landscape of travel, the boundaries between colonialism and freedom could be willed out of existence. The journey between Saigon and Marseilles, between borders was perhaps the only time when Vietnamese youth might feel relatively free of both the impositions of the colonial state and the weighty duties of taking a position, of agitating, accepting, and in some cases eschewing responsibility for the future of 'an entire people'.

Transgressive maturations: 'old youth' and new technologies

In their writings young Vietnamese often claimed that travel created within them a stronger sense of attachment to, or fondness for, the distant homeland. Travel in effect facilitated the emergence of a shared set of referents, aspirations, and practices. Youth came to self-awareness *as youth* by learning how to employ modern technologies and to exploit trans-regional networks for their own ends; that is through their actions as technological adepts. Chief among the ends they pursued was movement, both of sensitive information and of themselves. In the process the infrastructures established by the French in Indochina and vaunted as supreme referents of modernity became a resource for these young people and a source of what French police condemned as a 'contagion'. An example was the postal system.

A key problem, as Vu Hien knew well, was that the French police were scrutinizing the 'suspect' correspondence. But he and his friends knew how to circumvent such tactics. The letter that Vu Hien wrote to Hoàng Văn Bích was passed on to a friend, who delivered it to its intended recipient by hand on a trip to France.[43] Europe-based correspondents also evaded postal police by sending letters and packages directly to high-end boutiques patronized by their wealthy parents, such as one French outlet at 57 rue des Teinturiers in Hanoi, mentioned by Vu Hien. It was through such means that young radicals in Hanoi received copies of Nguyễn Ái Quốc's pamphlet, *Le Procès de la colonisation française*.[44]

The imperative to mobility inspired the manipulation of other essential networked technologies of empire, notably maritime travel, exemplified by the ocean liner. The students of *Avenir de l'Annam*, avid readers of Nguyễn

Ái Quốc's work (in particular, *Le Procès*) advised likeminded compatriots of a variety of methods they might use to travel. They could:

> Enrol as a voluntary soldier to leave for France. After your service is complete request permission to remain. Become a cook, or a waiter on the liners to France. Don't hesitate to accept professions that to the vulgar eye appear base; for here are the means of escaping detection by the bloodhounds.[45]

Insurgents advised students that on arrival in the metropole they should seek work in menial positions by day, while studying by night. Cells breeding contagion could thus travel undetected within the arteries of empire. Such tactics depended upon the separation and sometimes the concealment of separate categories such as 'student' and 'worker'. But travel also created contexts and opportunities in which such identities blurred and sociability at times proceeded across class lines, under the flag of 'youth'.[46] The sense of being young, being Vietnamese, and being on the move contributed to the breaking down of more ossified social hierarchies such as those of class, if only temporarily and in intermediate spaces. Some captured this sense in personal correspondence. In January 1927, for example, the young student Nguyễn Thế Đốc, on return from Le Havre described having:

> met up with compatriots who travelled on board liners. They are very numerous in this city. We don't find annamite students there. These 'workers' (annamites) detest the French worse than dogs, because the journeys that they make give them much experience.[47]

When students wrote they usually did so quite self-consciously, concerned as they were to live up to expectations of 'worthiness'. But at times their writings also offer raw and quite immediate reflections upon city living, reading Paris and other centers as sites of sexual permissiveness, showcases of fascinating technological advances and also of surprising encounters with backwardness and poverty. Young Vietnamese drew a sense of empowerment from such insights, as they did from their privileged access to modern technologies. Some reflected upon the prospect that technology might allow their own relative powerlessness to be reversed and the shallowness of French claims to 'superiority' to be revealed. Nguyễn Thế Đốc, a young student applying to study at the prestigious Lycée Henri IV, in January 1927, wrote in *Quốc ngữ* to his friend Lê Văn Nham, a boarder at the Lycée Albert Sarraut in Hanoi, to confess:

> Since my arrival in France, I could not resist, in spite of my best efforts, considering the French 'dogs'. You yourself, when you have the

> opportunity to travel, you will find that overseas the French are considered to be 'savages' (lacking civilisation). Here we (Annamites) could not fight them (the French) because we are too small, but with a good pistol we could beat them. Right now I have a German-made revolver which can fire nine shots. It is hardly any bigger than a box of matches.[48]

In a period when France was already losing its international prominence some young Vietnamese seized gleefully upon evidence that France, compared with other powers, notably the United States, had already been outstripped. Technology presented Nguyễn Thế Đốc with the means by which he could overcome assertions of physical and moral inferiority upon which the colonial order rested. For many students in Paris the act of traveling disrupted accepted standards of civilization but for young visitors from Indochina it supported efforts to reimagine the colonial present as the past, to claim liberty and to condemn the French in lieu of themselves to the condition of the 'savage'.

Vanguard mobility: theorizing youth transnationality

During the early twentieth century young Vietnamese had begun to identify the category 'youth' with certain shared references rooted in practical experiences of travel and its associated technologies. The sense of a shared youthful identity *ideally* cutting across class allowed the emergence of a common critical anticolonial focus based around shared generational experiences: notably encounters with the colonial education system and study abroad. Between the desired nation-to-be and the reality of a dominated Vietnam, embedded within French Indochina, youth functioned as a something of a symbolic 'placemarker' for a nation-in-waiting, or its mobile embodiment. Colonial conditions dictated that the nation had to be realized through the spatialities of travel, beyond the geographical confines of the homeland. There, within the ever-shifting spaces of transnational mobility, the imposed racial order of the colonial state could be temporarily eluded. So, as the arch-advocate of travel, 'H.T.T.' put it, 'the government has the force of arms but we, we have the ardor of our youth. They can take everything away, except the spirits of our hearts'.[49]

However, beyond transnational practices this shared sentiment and experience could not easily be translated into concerted action. Surveying the scene in 1928, *L'Avenir de l'Annam* observed, 'the various political and social ideas of this youth ... have been, until the present day, rather confused and ... have need of greater clarity and precision'.[50] In Paris, the feminist and pacifist Camille Drevet captured the sense that young Vietnamese saw time spent abroad as an opportunity for ideological experimentation. For her the sheer variety of youthful ideological affinities was striking. 'I have seen young annamites of varied tendencies', she admitted:

> A certain number of students renounce all politics and simply undertake their studies ... Some are partisans of a collaboration with the French on lines of absolute equality: it is quite difficult to imagine this kind of regime emerging from the colonial system. Some are nationalists, patriots, double patriots and double nationalists, because they speak of annamite nationality supported by French nationalism. Some even go as far as becoming royalists of the 'Action Française'.

By 1928, Drevet was certain that a new phase of youthful engagement had arrived. Fewer and fewer students, she noted, still believed their aims could be achieved within the colonial system. Moreover, they perceived Indochina to be only one part of a question of global import: the emancipation of the oppressed races.[51] For many there no longer appeared to be much point in negotiating with an obdurate French administration, via an older generation of Vietnamese ensconced within or indebted to the colonial edifice. Instead, the question of how colonialism itself could be done away with was at issue.

Two years later, on 10 February 1930, Camille Drevet's words appeared prophetic. The VNQDD led an abortive uprising that saw Vietnamese soldiers' mutiny at Yên Bái and kill their French officers. When news of the uprising spread it triggered a violent response from a range of other insurrectionary groups. In Hanoi bombs were thrown at the Police Commissariat. In Vĩnh Bảo a subprefect was assassinated. In Bến Thuỷ, hundreds of match workers attempted to burn down the factory in which they worked. Thousands of peasants protested. The ensuing backlash saw wholesale arrests and executions. In response to these anti-insurrectionary reprisals Vietnamese students in Paris launched protests. They defended those sentenced to death for their part in the uprising and condemned the bombardment of villages. They petitioned the Minister of Colonies for redress and on 22 March 1930 launched a protest at the inauguration of the Maison des Étudiants Indochinoise in the presence of the President of the French Republic. Before long the French parliament was discussing the 'Indochinese problem' and in 1931 Vietnamese students in Paris again succeeded in attracting further attention to their cause as *L'Humanité* highlighted the plight of one of their number, Nguyễn Văn Tạo, who had been placed under arrest and threatened with deportation from France. The incident also drew support from the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière.[52]

Within Indochina, these events compelled high-ranking administrators to face the question of why the offspring of those who had profited under the French administration were now rebelling.[53] The answer appeared to lie within the 'abrupt' transitions experienced by returnees on return to colonial society. 'In France', argued 'A.P.I.' in *L'Opinion*, 'among the French, they are free men', but on return, 'without any other adaptation than the

trip from Marseille to Saigon they find themselves rejected in most of the French *milieux* of the Colony'.[54] A.P.I. elaborated:

> They treat them with respect in France, here, however high their status, they will be *tutoyered*, even slapped by the first newly arrived European. They know what awaits them, and that is why some do not come back. Others are called back by their families, they come back with regret, hoping that they will find a better situation. In this way extremist doctrines find fertile ground. In France the awareness of losing the liberties they enjoy, here, the chagrin of losing them, pushes our *protégés* to join, at least unofficially, Lenin's church.[55]

'Old youth', however mature they felt themselves to be, would, on return, be *tutoyered* and treated like children.[56]

To ward off unrest and create a vent for such frustrations more liberal-minded commentators, both French (such as Louis Roubaud) and Vietnamese (such as Hoàng Xuân Nhị) urged the expansion of the blocked colonial education system.[57] However, in the early 1930s within the French Colonial state, as others have shown, Yên Bái was interpreted not as the symptom of an insufficiently liberal, but rather an insufficiently repressive, governance.[58] While bloodily putting down the insurrections of 1930, Governor General Pierre Pasquier also sought to exploit the drama of 'generational' discord within the home. In a circular he warned Vietnamese fathers of the, 'dangers of a moral and material kind which these young people encounter' in the metropole.[59] The Office of Public Instruction published a pamphlet in French and *Quốc ngữ* urging parents not to send their children to France.[60] The pamphlet invoked all kinds of threats, from tricksters in Marseille to the vices of gambling and debauchery. Governor Pasquier thus made use of a set of assumptions about Vietnamese youth in France that was remarkably similar in some respects to cautionary tales in circulation among young activists themselves. Here was a vision of a lapsed youth that had given in to material temptations. Colonial authorities and radicalized youth *both* condemned the materialism of young epicureans who sought not enlightenment through travel but more earthly pleasures.[61]

Pasquier went so far as to depict fathers who permitted their sons to be educated in France as guilty of neglect, advising: 'dutiful parents should not allow their children to be separated from them by such a great distance and for such a long time'.[62] However, he assured worried fathers that the plight that would befall their sons in France could easily be avoided by keeping them in Indochina. At the University in Hanoi, he contended, the discipline was 'paternal' and the surveillance 'minimal'.[63] This was a persuasive line at a time when the dual legal system meant that fathers were still held responsible for the actions of their children 10,000 leagues away.

Re-routing the 'deracinated'

In the late 1930s one young Saigon-based writer, Nguyễn Trung Thữ asked, 'where are the leaders?' and complained that the youth, 'instead of being formed by [other] youth they form themselves, in isolation'.[64] As young intellectuals struggled with the problem of where to position themselves ideologically they found it difficult to carve out alliances within existing power structures. Carrying the expectations of a nation and facing the aggression of the colonial state, radicalized young returnees struggled to fend off assertions that they were simply victims of 'deracination'. As the young writer, Cung Giũ Nguyên, remarked in a French-Vietnamese collaborative journal, *Cahiers de la Jeunesse*:

> Everyone imagined that this studious youth would conquer the secret of western science. Everyone awaited prodigies. They believed these young people would transform, on their return, our old world from one day to the next…The enthusiasm of the crowd however was soon replaced by surprise, mixed with alarm.[65]

Older nationalists, such as the neo-Confucian traditionalist Phạm Quỳnh, minister at the court of Hué from 1934 and chargé of the department de l'Education Nationale, added their voices to this alarm. Phạm Quỳnh had developed a *doctrine nationale* which he articulated in a series of essays from 1930 in the hope that it would save Vietnamese civilization. He condemned an over-hasty Europeanization primarily affecting youth that threatened to destroy the 'germ of the race'. Phạm Quỳnh reserved especially strong criticism for Vietnamese returnees from Europe, whom he saw, citing Abel Bonnard's writings on deracination, as having been torn from one world without truly being implanted in another.[66] This youth was an 'abomination', he argued, since it had been detached from its family and its race and had instead placed itself at the 'center of the universe'. However, for this high-profile collaborator with the French state, the reversal of this process could still be potentially achieved under colonialism's prevailing framework.

This debate acquired new piquancy during the Great Depression as the narrowing of access to positions within the state left elite families haunted by the specter of downward social mobility. This experience marked the influential and much reviewed book, *Sourires et larmes d'une jeunesse*, published in 1937 by the writer Nguyễn Mạnh Tường. In it the author highlighted the spiritual and material plight of Vietnamese youth. He described the, 'curious, paradoxical' situation where, 'leaders and public opinion speak of the virtues of youth in deferential terms, exalting its innate honor and generosity' while at the same time 'youth suffered unemployment, underemployment, and was also perceived as a public enemy'. Nguyễn exposed

what he saw as a 'skilfully manipulated politics of denigration'. Meanwhile the depression sapped youth's energy and its capacity to lead, leaving it 'nothing more than a living cadaver'.[67]

However, Nguyễn also attacked those who promulgated the Barrèsien notion that Annamite youth were suffering a crisis of deracination. Instead he made a spirited defense of youthful itinerancy, declaring, 'man does not have roots, he has feet…Man cannot be deracinated as he has no roots'.[68] He countered claims that mobility was damaging youth with the argument that:

> Life is movement, perpetual flux, perpetual becoming. It is not only mobility but also flexibility, originality, novelty, adaptation. Moving with the current of life, man is not a dead weight left at a standstill…To claim that deracination is contrary to human nature, is to forget that life flows and that man adapts… it is, moreover, a condition for progress… [so] how, in such conditions…can they claim deracination to be cause of the moral crisis from which youth is suffering?[69]

In Nguyễn's view the task facing young Vietnamese intellectuals was a difficult one. Posted at the confluence of civilizations, they:

> Must assume the infinitely delicate task of dominating two worlds, to try to realize a difficult *entente*. To strive to adapt a demoded society to the exigencies of modern life! [Youth] must travel the lands, visit the people, discover the nations, familiarize itself with cultures, travel across ideas, amass the necessary materials.[70]

Given this, the writer cautioned against blaming Vietnamese youth for their perceived failure to become 'worthy' leaders in the midst of a crisis with global dimensions. This youth, after all, was:

> emerging into the world at the exact moment when the meeting of civilisations is occurring, as principles are coming into conflict, the annamite youth today is in a sort of whirlwind…The work of adaptation is in progress, the time of synthesis has commenced. But while the effort of mastery continues, so persists uncertainty, indecision, disarray, fear, doubt, states of mind which pave the way for peace of mind.[71]

In this reading the failure of the home society to comprehend its own young was only to be expected since the young were engaged in the 'perpetual revision of values that the mobile existence requires'. Moreover, for Nguyễn, the solution to the problem of youth's 'failure of mastery' was 'synthesis', and none were better placed to realize this than those who possessed a 'double *patrie*'. The returnees had attended *lycées* in France and in some cases felt

themselves to *be* French. They went to study in France in the provinces, and thus understood 'the true heart of France'.[72]

It was only in the mid-1930s that more optimistic reflections upon the political potential of such a synthesis returned to the official agenda. The advent of the Popular Front government in 1936 brought more reform-minded officials and experts to the Colonial Ministry in Paris and the colonial state in Indochina. The possibility of moving 'beyond deracination' came under careful consideration. During investigations undertaken by the Pargoire Committee into social conditions in Indochina the editor of *La Patrie Annamite*, Phạm Lê Bổng, argued that the young would determine the outcome of human 'evolution'.[73] The notion that youth could potentially operate at the interstices of, or between, 'civilizations' had long featured in French colonial discourse in Asia. The revival of such ideas in official circles – referred to in terms of establishing 'points of contact' – occurred as economic conditions finally improved and as the Popular Front government ushered in the sense of a new beginning.

Beyond official circles, in Nha Trang and Saigon, notably, small groups of young intellectuals from affluent backgrounds had already begun to grapple with the possibility of 'synthesis'. Participants in this movement included Cung Giũ Nguyên who, with Raoul Sérene, built a new collaborationist venture around an affiliation with or affinity for the Catholic faith in the form of the journal, *Cahiers de la Jeunesse*. Founded in 1935, *Cahiers de la Jeunesse* was created with a view to evoking a sense of cordial relations and contact between French and Vietnamese, not on the revolutionary basis of class but of a shared faith. Members of the *Cahiers* group took up the task of identifying elements of 'disorder' and elaborating a completely new order built on 'true' values, belonging neither to 'East' nor 'West' but to all civilizations.[74] One of their aims was to reconcile science and technology with spirituality. The number involved was small. This led participants to complain that by the late 1930s few other young Vietnamese were interested in such collaborative work. Nevertheless, within the group returnees from France were well represented and those who contributed articles sought to theorize ways in which a new synthesis of age might be achieved under colonial conditions.

Essential to such thinking was the view that the category of youth connected with a set of shared experiences allowing friendship to be forged across lines of race, class, and gender. The group debated whether *in youth* regenerative fraternal relations could be fostered across colonialism's racial divide. Moreover, they agreed that travel constituted a rare shared ground upon which an inter-ethnic sense of youth fraternity might develop. In this vein, the co-editor, Raoul Sérene, wrote: 'Travel is not something superfluous, or [merely] entertaining, which we can enjoy – but a necessary element that must serve as the basis of all true knowledge of the world'.[75] He summoned what he considered, 'the old commonplace: "travel *forms* youth"'.[76] The

practice of border crossing, from metropole to colonies, offered a shared basis upon which a new 'franco-annamite' society might be built.

It was clear, however, to those involved that there were many problems to surmount before a transnational youth might forge the relations of the mind and spirit necessary to prepare the way for a new society. Sérene listed the difficulties: 'language, customs, morals, character, prejudice (the old ones first and foremost, those of Europe)'.[77] The problem, for him, lay in the shortcomings of the schools, as institutions that socialized youth by *stopping* them in their tracks.

> In France if there was contact between students, let us not mislead ourselves, it never went very far. We can see that when we encounter it today; professional contacts between students of law or medicine, there is some camaraderie, but not the great friendships of youth, those great friendships that bond youth together and forge a generation; [a generation] of men embarking together on the same adventure to change, however minutely, the face of an era.[78]

In Vietnam, the colonial condition proved a powerful inhibitor of affective sentiments that might have flourished between youth from different ethnic backgrounds whilst in France.[79] But as these works reveal, condemnation of tradition did not always go 'hand in hand with a militant approach to anti-colonialism'.[80]

As the *Cahiers* group struggled with these issues, its own readers complained that their work was overly intellectual and not sufficiently committed to any coherent plan of action. These critics might also perhaps have added that the group was not even particularly 'youthful'. Sérene, like Cung, was already in his late 20s when he set up the journal. The work of the *Cahiers* group reflects a more general tendency in the interwar era for intellectuals to impose a remarkable elasticity upon their interpretations of youth as a political category in relation to biological age. By the mid-1930s these intellectuals increasingly looked to younger cohorts to put the principles they had elaborated into action. They pinned their hopes in particular upon the burgeoning Scout movement of Indochina.[81]

Scouting across the divide

With interest growing in youthful itinerancy both as a potential means of overthrowing or conversely shoring up the colonial state, the Scout movement in Indochina came under close scrutiny during the 1930s. Having emerged in Britain in 1907 under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Robert Baden Powell, the Scout movement flourished across the globe during the interwar years, as several of the chapters in this book show.[82] According to the historian David Marr the first Scout troop had been set up in 1930

in Hanoi. More followed in other major centers soon after and Guide units were also in evidence by 1936.[83] Historians of Scouting in colonial contexts have often pointed to the tendency for Scouting to be viewed as a kind of Trojan horse, or 'school of patriotism'.[84] Certainly, officials in Indochina were wary of the movement, and suspected it might become a cover for insurrectionary training, rather as did those commenting on equivalent groups in British Malaya discussed by Jialin Christina Wu in this volume. However, some officials also held out the hope that the Scouts might act as a brake upon the proliferation of leftist sentiment in Vietnam, instilling a sense of traditional moral values in those it reached.

Governor General Pasquier therefore adopted a rather ambivalent approach to the Scouting movement in Indochina. He informed administrators on 12 June 1933 that it would simply not be possible to prevent, generally speaking, the formation of Boy Scout troops. However, he warned that these groups would need to be attentively watched. Colonial police, struggling against suspect circulations, voiced misgivings over this approach. Even prior to the advent of the Popular Front youth in this mode for these critics represented less the potential for 'synthesis' than for dangerous instability. Police feared the potential for the fast-growing Scout movement to connect youth not with moderates like the soon-to-be-established *Cahiers* group, but with the infectious agency of internationally networked left-wing extremists.[85]

Fears over the expansion of networks of youth insurgency crystalized in a number of incidents in the years that followed. One illustrative example occurred in the port city of Haiphong less than a year after the Governor's warning. On 8 April 1934 Alfred Bouchet, the administrator mayor of Haiphong, hosted a ceremony to mark the occasion of the departure for France of the director of the Bureau d'Hygiene, Dr Bodros. Bouchet's intention was to publicly recognize the doctor's contribution and he agreed to the inclusion in the schedule of a 'short speech' on behalf of the Haiphong Scouts. Mayor Bouchet was no doubt expecting a brief, platitudinous interjection (and later admitted that he had intended to slip away at this point) but instead he stood aghast as what had begun as a *petite causerie* turned into a 90-minute monologue containing thinly veiled criticisms of the colonial government and a rallying call to indigenous youth.

The speaker was 'Trần Văn Phúc' aka 'Paul Schneider', a 22-year-old Scout and law student, of mixed-race background. Speaking by heart, surrounded by 50 of his fellow Scouts, Trần Văn Phúc used this opportunity to urge his peers to learn Esperanto. Unlike French, he argued, this auxiliary language would allow direct, 'unmediated' exposure to the world, would help to overcome prejudice, and make the individual a 'citizen of the universe'. Being an Esperanto speaker, he suggested, was akin to being a brother of all other Scouts, who loved each other without distinction of race, religion, or other social conditions. The result would be, 'to destroy the barriers separating the different people of the land and realize one day the great dream of concord

between all men' through a 'combat elite' which could easily be armed. Trần Văn Phúc *dit* Schneider urged his friends to become Esperantists in advance of a great gathering of youth, a Scout rally, to be held in July of next year in Huế.[86]

Taking back the floor, the flustered Mayor hastily urged the Scouts to disregard what they had just heard and to learn only their maternal language and French.[87] Having served as an expert translator in his early years as a civil servant in Indochina, Bouchet was only too well aware of the potential political dangers of the diffusion of the transnational language of Esperanto among Vietnamese Scouts.[88] The Haiphong incident led one Police Agent to draw up a report in which he advised superiors, 'Scouting is a field of action which will inevitably produce Indochinese propagandists formed in the University of Stalin in Moscow'.[89] The High Resident of Tonkin, Auguste Tholance, warned senior police agents that while high-level support meant the Scout movement could not be shut down it certainly should not be looked upon with favor.

Mayor Bouchet harbored similar reservations. In correspondence with the President of the Société d'enseignement mutuel in Haiphong (an organization set up to provide elite Vietnamese with access to French courses and lectures) he warned his compatriot that the youthful agency of Scouting would only stir hopes and dreams 'leading men to transgress borders'. Bouchet complained, 'this is madness'. From his perspective, stability in troubled times depended upon *manly* discipline and not the disturbing, ambiguous, unbounded aspirations of youthful 'dreamers'. As the mayor explained, 'it is by forging, as the old French proverb has it, that one becomes a forger, and one cannot become a good forger other than by growing old'.[90]

Conclusion

In September 1926, before he had even had time to respond to Vu Hien, Hoàng Văn Bích had been arrested in the streets of Marseille. Police suspicion of the young student's involvement in seditious activities led to this particular circuit of youthful transnational agency being broken. But as in many other instances the squelching of a single protagonist served only to stimulate myriad new connections and 'workarounds'. In the end such seizures often merely helped to highlight just how deep, dense, and interconnected were the networks allowing the borders set in place by the French colonial state to be circumvented. In the interwar years, even after the dismantling of the VNQDD and after repeated efforts to liquidate Communist cells and disrupt insurrectionary activities, the boundaries between virtuous exchange and dangerous contagion appeared worryingly vague and fragile.

From metropole to mobile periphery the ambiguous life stage of 'youth', and those who inhabited it, defined by metamorphosis, flux and flow, continually unsettled the projects of colonial authorities. The military

and commercial imperatives that produced empire also produced the transnational youth agent as an ambiguous and crisis-ridden figure. As this chapter has sought to show in the interwar years youth-on-the-move, of whom most were male, were read as a threat to European colonial authority and Vietnamese patriarchal authority and became the focus of a variety of prescriptive interventions and norms. The case of young Vietnamese, traveling to and from France, and especially students who lived in *and between* colonial and metropolitan centers – onboard ocean-going vessels, reveals how 'youth' in its modern guise was profoundly shaped by the exigencies and flows of empire, by anxieties surrounding Europe's imperial future and aspirations for national emancipation. But it also reveals that those who self-identified as youth were also busy redefining what it meant to travel on their own terms.

Through travel some young people developed a sense of membership of a distinctively youthful transnational group – though one oriented toward a wide and multilayered variety of political interests or ends. A culture of movement flourished and was given expression in literal movement across space, in time spent on sealanes and liners, and in self-fashioning through writing and a host of other practices that fluid and transgressive behaviors invited. Contemporaries came to understand youthful mobility as integral, in symbolism and practice, to the making of the nation. This group, by virtue of the privilege of being able to transcend the geopolitical boundaries against which nationalist sentiment was framed, assumed a special role in ideas about nation-building. Youth was crucial to readings of itinerancy, and itinerancy was an important influence upon generational identity. Before the anticipated 'arrival' of national liberation, young people practiced and wrote about a notional state of revolution from a privileged position of intermediacy. In the spaces in between colony and metropole, within the *trans-nation*, new youthful subjectivities flourished.

Conquest and colonialism brought in their wake flows and exchanges, or perhaps 'contagions', of seditious literature, and intellectual and moral 'miscegenations' embodied by figures such as Vu Hien and Trần Văn Phúc *dit* Paul Schneider. This history involved more than just a 'leftward journey', a linear movement from East to West, childhood to maturation, backwardness to modernity. It involved, rather, a set of colonial circulations which official efforts never staunched. By the mid-1930s the French state responded to the anticolonial threat by reluctantly drawing mobile youth toward the epicenter of colonial cultures of planning. The policy of developing 'points of contact' proceeded upon the extension of support for youth movements, notably Scouting. But these circulations also appeared suspect owing to their potential to open new channels of communication and to absorb and channel dangerous desires among new collectives.

By the end of the period, youthful activists had generally failed to live up to the hopes invested in them. Even so, those who continued their struggle

could at least, like protagonists in earlier times, continue to draw succor from circularity. In the final, tragic line of his ill-fated letter to Hoàng Văn Bích of 1926, Vu Hien reminded his friend that the crucial thing, whether or not the two completed their 'revolutionary education' in France was to ensure that the next generation of youth could enter the network, master its technologies and breathe the free air of foreign lands.[91]

Notes

1. Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (hereafter ANOM) RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Vu Hien to Hoàng Văn Bích, 3 August 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 10 February 1927.
2. On the earlier influence of the Chinese examination system in Vietnam see A. B. Woodside (1971) *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). On colonial-era language policy in Indochina see B. Anderson (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso), pp. 125–30.
3. G. P. Kelly (1987) 'Conflict in the Classroom: A Case Study from Vietnam, 1918–38', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 8 (2), 191–212.
4. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Vu Hien to Hoàng Văn Bích, 3 August 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 10 February 1927; D. G. Marr (1981) *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), pp. 35–44.
5. The term 'Annamite' was used by the French in the period under discussion to refer to Vietnamese. S. McConnell (1989) *Leftward Journey: The Education of Vietnamese Students in France 1919–1939* (New Brunswick: Transaction), pp. 171–3.
6. Kim Khánh Huỳnh (1982) *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
7. Walton, *Internationalism*, p. 4.
8. See for example P. Fussell (1988) 'Travel, Tourism and "International Understanding"' in *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (New York: Summit Books), pp. 151–76; L. Coons (2003) *Tourist Third Cabin: Steamship Travel in the Interwar Years* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); E. J. Leed (1991) *The Mind of the Traveler: From Gilgamesh to Global Tourism* (New York: Basic Books); H. Levenstein (1998), *Seductive Journey: American Tourism in France from Jefferson to the Jazz Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); H. Levenstein (2004), *We'll Always Have Paris: American Tourists in France since 1930* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
9. When turn-of-the-century immigration restrictions obstructed pathways into America they traveled to Japan and, to a lesser extent, Europe instead. Hongshan Li (2008) *U.S.–China Educational Exchange: State, Society and Intercultural Relations, 1905–1950* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press); Zhang Yufa, 'Returned Chinese Students from America and the Chinese Leadership (1846–1949)', *Chinese Studies in History*, 35 (3), 52–86.
10. On the year abroad see Walton, *Internationalism*, pp. 62–84.
11. Walton, *Internationalism*, pp. 12–38.

12. Nearly 6,200 foreign students were in attendance at French Universities by 1914 (and they comprised 19 per cent of the estimated total student population of Paris). Walton, *Internationalism*, p. 26.
13. By March 1909 approximately 80 students from Indochina were studying in France and 37 of them were affiliated with the Comité Paul Bert. This committee had been established two years earlier under the auspices of the Alliance Française to keep a paternal eye over students from Indochina in particular. ANOM Indochine X10(2) AF Carton 315, letter, Pupils of Comité Paul Bert to Minister of Colonies, 1 June 1909.
14. J. Harmand (1910) *Domination et colonisation* (Paris: Flammarion), p. 274; The former colonial administrator Louis Salaün also criticized the move from the *rizière paternelle* to dismal boarding schools in France for producing among the expatriated student a 'sort of malaise that gets even worse on his return', when the returnee 'found himself, agitated and discontented, on the margins of a French society of which he was no longer part, and on the margins of an Asian society to which he hardly [belonged] any longer'. L. Salaün (1903) *L'Indochine* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale), pp. 348–9.
15. G. Pelletier and L. Roubaud (c. 1931) *Images et réalités coloniales* (Paris: Tournon), p. 301.
16. On the opening of the *Petit Lycée* see D. M. Pomfret (2013) '"Beyond Risk of Contagion": Childhood, Hill Stations, and the Planning of British and French Colonial Cities' in R. Peckham and D. M. Pomfret (eds) *Imperial Contagions: Medicine, Hygiene and Cultures of Planning in Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press), pp. 81–104.
17. As a consequence, by 1927 only 341 of the 731 students enrolled at the Lycée Sarraut in Hanoi were Vietnamese. In 1925 only 25 BAs graduated from Hanoi University, and in 1926 only nine. V. Thompson (1937) *French Indochina* (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited), pp. 295–6; G. P. Kelly (1982) *Franco-Vietnamese Schools, 1918–1938: Regional Development and Implications for National Integration* (Madison, WI: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin), p. 64; H. Lebovics (1992) *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 114.
18. Phạm Văn Kỳ, 'La vie Saigonnaise', *L'Impartial*, 18 January 1935, 2.
19. Đoàn Kim Vân, 'La comédie humaine', *L'Avenir de l'Annam* 2, 1 April 1928, 22.
20. To go to France young Indochinese required a *livret universitaire* from local education chiefs, authorization to leave from the chef de l'administration, an Immigration Service passport, and a ticket. To get hold of a *livret universitaire* students had to produce a stamped request note from the chef de l'administration locale; two photographs; part of their birth certificate; proof of their parents' address; a certificate proving good life and morals; a *certificat de scolarité*; a copy of their diplomas; a declaration proving that the student had benefited from a *bourse scolaire*; a form indicating the kind of studies to be undertaken in France, and the city to which the student would travel; the address of contacts in France; and a certificate of vaccination.
21. C. Drevet (1928) *Les Annamites chez eux* (Paris: Imprimerie de la Société Nouvelle d'editions Franco-Slaves), p. 22.
22. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Ca Văn Thỉnh to Nguyễn Văn Ất, 18 January 1927, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 29 January 1927.
23. H.T.T., 'L'Emigration en Indochine', *L'Avenir de l'Annam* 2, 1 May 1928, 12.

24. H.T.T., 'L'Emigration', 11.
25. Ibid.
26. American youth studying in Paris between the wars gave expression to a similar sensibility. Walton, *Internationalism*, p. 89.
27. P. Edwards (2002) '"Propagender": Marianne, Joan of Arc, and the Export of French Gender Ideology to Colonial Cambodia (1863–1954)' in T. Chafer and A. Sackur (eds) *Promoting the Colonial Idea* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 116–30.
28. Thompson, *French Indochina*, p. 299.
29. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Trình Xuân Nhạc, to Nguyễn Thiện Chí, 26 August 1926 Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 11 September 1926.
30. The original letter was written in French. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter to Vu Tiến Huân, 28 February 1927, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 5 March 1927.
31. Kelly, 'Conflict', p. 201.
32. Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition*, p. 40.
33. As Shawn McHale notes, 'quite clearly, women had made strides since 1918, but they were still seen as lamps which shone best inside the home'. S. McHale (1995) 'Printing and Power: Vietnamese Debates over Women's Place in Society, 1918–1934' in K. W. Taylor and J. K. Whitmore (eds) *Essays into Vietnamese Pasts* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program), pp. 174–5, 179. See also Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition*, p. 191.
34. J. L. 'Appel à la jeunesse Annamite', *La Jeune Indochine*, 10 November 1927, 1; 'Profession de Foi', *La Jeune Indochine*, 10 November 1927, 1. On the contempt of younger activists for older anticolonialists who preferred a more gradualist approach, see Huỳnh Kim Khánh, *Vietnamese Communism*, pp. 38–9.
35. 'Pour l'Union Nationale', *La Jeune Indochine*, January 1928, 1.
36. Peasant rebels formerly organized by scholars were in the 1930s organized by insurgents with Communist sympathies, some of whom had been educated in France. The most famous, Nguyễn Ái Quốc was in France from 1917 to 1923, where he mingled in union and leftist circles. At the Congress of Tours, when Communists and Socialists split, he followed the Communist line, because of the latter's position on imperialism. In the 1920s he, like many others, went to Canton, which had become, in David Marr's words, a kind of 'anti-imperialist mecca'. Nguyễn ai Quoc, as quoted in Nguyễn Hữu Ninh (1928)'Notre journal', *L'Avenir de l'Annam* 1, 1 March 1928, 1; D. G. Marr (1971) *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), pp. 256–9.
37. The 'old youth' of the serialized novel was a well-traveled individual, and a guide to the 'Civilized World'. Liang Qichao influenced by Guiseppe Mazzini's program, 'La Giovine Italia' (Young Italy). Fabio Lanza (2012) 'Springtime and Morning Suns: "Youth" as a Political Category in Twentieth-Century China', *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 5 (1), 31–51.
38. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Ca Văn Thỉnh to Nguyễn Văn Ất 3 Rue Peyras, Toulouse, 18 January 1927, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 29 January 1927.
39. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Trình Xuân Nhạc to Nguyên Thiên Chí, 26 August 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 11 September 1926.

40. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Vu Hien to Hoàng Văn Bích, September 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 10 February 1927.
41. In the novel, *Dumb Luck*, Vũ Trọng Phụng refers to a 'contempt for foreign diplomas common among Vietnamese students who had returned from six or seven years in France without ever actually earning one'. Vũ Trọng Phụng (2002) *Dumb Luck, A Novel by Vũ Trọng Phụng*, P. Zinoman (ed.), Trans. Nguyên Nguyệt Cầm and P. Zinoman (trans.) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), p. 39.
42. Thompson, *French Indochina*, p. 299.
43. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Vu Hien to Hoàng Văn Bích, September 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 10 February 1927.
44. On receiving the pamphlets from Hoàng Văn Bích, Vu Hien promptly distributed them at the University of Hanoi (though, to his chagrin, police quickly seized all copies).
45. H.T.T., 'L'Emigration', 14.
46. In 1928 Binh Dang addressed the subject of the Vietnamese in France. He wrote, 'we don't see a clear dividing line between the Annamite students' grievances and those of the Annamite workers…So why not join forces with the Annamite workers?…Instead of a thousand students advancing our cause we could be reinforced by 3,000 Annamite workers'. Though some were not convinced this was a good idea owing to the workers 'lack of culture', 'happily the majority of Annamite students in France did not share this aristocratic opinion'. Binh Dang, 'Congrès des annamites en France', *L'Annam de demain: Organe mensuel de la jeunesse annamite* 3, 15 November 1928, 8.
47. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Nguyễn Thế Đốc to Lê Văn Nham, 2 January 1927, Rigal, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 17 February 1927.
48. RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Nguyễn Thế Đốc to Lê Văn Nham, 2 January 1927, Rigal, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 17 February 1927.
49. H.T.T., 'L'Emigration en Indochine', 13.
50. Nguyễn Hữu Ninh (1928) 'Nôtre journal', *L'Avenir de l'Annam* 1, 1 March 1928, 5.
51. Drevet, *Les Annamites chez eux*, pp. 29–30.
52. Vietnamese National Archives I, Hanoi (hereafter VNNAI) Residence Superieure de Tonkin Q.69 S.6 43958. 78.938.
53. ANOM RSTNF F73, F79 06771, letter, Resident Mayor, Haiphong to Governor General, 24 July 1930.
54. Cited in N.A., 'Les annamites en France', *L'Echo du Peuple*, 29 May 1930, 1.
55. N.A. 'Les annamites', 1.
56. Gaston Pelletier explained, 'these new generations when they return home are nothing; they cannot participate in the administration of their land except in subaltern employment. Thus we have created the greatest discontent'. Pelletier and Roubaud, *Images et réalités*, p. 298.
57. Pelletier and Roubaud, *Images et réalités*, p. 296.
58. P. Zinoman (2001) *The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 200–40.

59. P. Pasquier (1930) *Circulaire aux familles au sujet de l'envoi des étudiants indochinois en France* (Hanoi: Lê Van Tân), pp. 2–3.
60. Lebovics, *True France*, p. 116.
61. Nguyễn Hữu Ninh 'Notre journal', *L'Avenir de l'Annam*, 1 March 1928, 8.
62. Pasquier, *Circulaire*, pp. 2–3.
63. Ibid., p. 9.
64. Nguyễn Trung Thu (1938) 'Collaboration', *Les Cahiers de la jeunesse*, 15, January 1938, 214.
65. Cung Giũ Nguyên (1938), 'Jeunesses', *Cahiers de la jeunesse*, 19, May 1938, 378.
66. Cited in Dr P-H. Tribouillet, 'Essais Franco-annamites', *Les Cahiers de la jeunesse* 15, January 1938, 227.
67. Nguyễn Mạnh Tướng (1937) *Sourires et larmes d'une jeunesse* (Hanoi: Trung-Bac Tan-Van), pp. 90–1, 105.
68. Nguyễn Mạnh Tướng, *Sourires*, pp. 90–1, 93.
69. Ibid., pp. 94–5.
70. Ibid., p. 132.
71. Ibid., p. 99.
72. Ibid., pp. 100–1, 104, 108.
73. ANOM FM 79 Carton 24 B d Cochinchine Pargoire, Voeu number 4 Avis du Résident Supérieur d'Annam, 'Condition de la femme et de l'enfant (en Cochinchine)', 1937.
74. The group quoted extensively from their main influences in their journal: notably Gide, Mounier, Rougement, Simon, and Daniel-Rops. The main contributors to *Les Cahiers de la Jeunesse* were Raoul Serène, Cung Giũ Nguyên, Pierre Do Dinh, and Nguyễn Thị Châu.
75. R. Serène (1938) 'A propos de l'Indochine', *Les Cahiers de la jeunesse* 19, May 1938, 359.
76. Serène, 'A propos', 360–1.
77. Ibid., 363.
78. R. Sérene (1937) 'Elites intellectuelles de l'Indochine', *Les Cahiers de la jeunesse* 10, July 1937, 581.
79. Sérene, 'Elites', 581.
80. Huỳnh Kim Khánh, *Vietnamese Communism*, p. 51.
81. At the Fourth Congress of Childhood in Saigon in 1940 Cung Giũ Nguyên presented a paper on 'Scouting Applied to Annamite Children'. Cung Giũ Nguyên (1940) 'Scoutisme, application à l'enfance annamite', *Rapports présentés au 4è congrès de l'enfance 1940. Publiés sous les auspices du Comité central d'aide mutuelle et d'assistance sociale de Cochinchine* (Saigon: Imprimerie de l'Union), p. 69.
82. A substantial body of scholarly work dealing with the Scout movement in colonial contexts has appeared in recent years. See, for example, M. Derouiche (1985) *Scoutisme école du patriotisme* (Alger: Enterprise Nationale du Livre); T. H. Parsons (2004) *Race, Resistance and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press); T. M. Proctor (2000) '"A Separate Path", Scouting and Guiding in Interwar South Africa', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 42 (3), 605–31; C. A. Watt (1999) 'The Promise of "Character" and the Spectre of Sedition: The Boy Scout Movement and Colonial Consternation in India, 1908–1921', *South Asia*, XII (2), 37–62; K. Y. L. Tan and M. Wan (2002), *Scouting in Singapore, 1910–2000* (Singapore: Singapore Scout Association), and the chapter by Christina Wu in this volume.
83. Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition*, pp. 80–1.

84. In relation to French Indochina, Ann Raffin's and Eric Jennings's work has illuminated the history of uniformed youth movements during the Vichy period, and a set of reflections has shed light upon youthful experiences in the Scout movement during the 1930s. N. Bancel, D. Denis and Y. Fates (eds) (2003) *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie: la Jeunesse en mouvements des deux côtés du mirroir colonial, 1940–1962* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte); A. Raffin (2005) *Youth Mobilization in Vichy Indochina and its Legacies, 1940–1970* (Lanham: Lexington Books); E. Jennings (2001) *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–44* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
85. ANOM RSTNF D621 00672, Arnoux, Controleur General de la Sûreté, Chef des Services de Police du Tonkin, to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 21 March 1934.
86. ANOM RSTNF D621 00672 Groupements Scouts, 1934–6, letter, A. Bouchet, Administrator Mayor of Haiphong to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, Hanoi, 9 April 1934.
87. ANOM RSTNF D621 00672, Confidential note, Boubal, for Controleur General de la Sûreté, Chef des Services de Police, 'Activité de la section des eclaireurs de la société d'enseignement mutuel de Haiphong', 10 April 1934.
88. In the months that followed the police of the Contrôle Postal anxiously tracked and translated a growing volume of letters written in Esperanto sent by Young Communists in Soviet Russia and Spain to correspondents in Vietnam. See correspondence at ANOM RSTNF D621 00674.
89. ANOM RSTNF D621 00672, Boubal, 'Activité', 10 April 1934.
90. ANOM RSTNF D621 00672, letter, A. Bouchet, Administrator Mayor, to President de la Société d'Enseignement Mutuel, Haiphong, 9 April 1934.
91. ANOM RSTNF R74, R1, R2 07033, letter, Vu Hien to Hoàng Văn Bích, September 1926, Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin to Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 10 February 1927.

6
Youth Mobility and the Making of Europe, 1945–60

Richard Ivan Jobs

Odette Lesley, a young Londoner, marveled at all the people she had met from around the world during World War II. She found that these encounters gave her a profound desire to travel when the conflict was over, and this was something she felt she shared with others her age. 'We realized that there was a very big new world out there, that we knew nothing about at all. All I knew, for instance, was my little bit of north London, where I'd been brought up: the local streets, my neighbors, and the local dance hall. But I was hearing these marvelous stories, and they opened up horizons to such an extent that I thought I might even see those places one day. I might go there. And I felt a strong sense of independence as a girl that I'd never felt before. It was so exciting, I felt anything was possible'.[1] Lesley's enthusiastic expression of liberation and autonomy tied to mobility and international travel was typical for the period and for her age as young Europeans began to travel on an unprecedented scale in the years following the war.

Meanwhile, Anne O'Hare McCormick, the respected foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, wrote in her column 'Abroad' about the need for clarity in the European postwar settlement. She thought that some form of European unity was in order, which was rightly being demanded by the young in particular. What they wanted was 'A large world like yours', she quoted a young Frenchman, 'where you can move freely across State lines and feel at home anywhere'. McCormick claimed that the young envisioned a continent 'not without nations ... but without customs or passports'. However, this was in jeopardy, she insisted. As the Allies divided Germany and the continent into rigid zones of influence, there was a danger of young Europeans becoming part of the problem rather than the solution. 'These citizens of tomorrow are no longer the material for unity, within their own country, with neighboring countries, or in the United Nations'.[2] To her mind, the internationalism of European youth, expressed through their desire for unfettered mobility, was essential to Europe's peaceful future, the problem of Germany, and of recovery in general. If Odette Lesley expressed

a youthful desire for independence and mobility to explore the world and meet new people, Anne McCormick advocated a rationale for state policies to harness this mobility to serve the purpose of stabilizing postwar Europe.

In the years following World War II, Western Europeans, through private and public initiatives, invested significant resources to send the young across national borders and to welcome young travelers from abroad. They did this in a variety of ways: the establishment, expansion, and transformation of their national youth hostel networks away from domestic and toward international travel; the proliferation of international work camps for the young to labor for the reconstruction of Europe in fraternal camaraderie; and the European Youth Campaign to unite the continent through the abolition of border controls. In short, the young of Europe were encouraged to travel abroad, to visit, encounter, and engage other nations and nationalities, a marked contrast to the heightened, and now discredited, nationalism of the 1930s. All of these endeavors were intended to help Western Europe recover from the violent hostility of the recent past by facilitating youth mobility across national borders.

This cultural internationalism had its roots in the interwar period and was focused on reconciliation between belligerent nations and premised on the interpersonal interaction of the young.[3] As part of postwar reconstruction in Western Europe, international gatherings of young people labored to restore and build hostels, railways, parks, and schools. As a component of this, the international travel of European youth was promoted generally, but Germany and young Germans were targeted specifically in an attempt to integrate them into a broader European community by bringing western youth to occupied Germany and by encouraging travel outside the occupied zones by young Germans. Indeed, in the decades after World War II, many young Germans, who had a rather troubled relationship with nationality, used travel as a means to Europeanize themselves.

Meanwhile, the young themselves began to travel in greater and greater numbers, utilizing and shaping the development of a vast infrastructure to support youth mobility. The frequency of their travels and the routes of their itineraries brought them in contact with one another through a transnational expansion of social space that was regionally limited to the western half of the continent. As organized exchange groups or as independent hitchhikers, these young travelers began to recognize themselves as a cohort with shared interests via their circuits of travel in Western Europe. The informality of these social relations made them indirect as well as largely imagined, yet powerful nonetheless. Thus, in the postwar period there was a complex top-down and bottom-up process of policies and demand regarding youth mobility which led to the emergence by the 1960s of a vast new travel culture; this, in turn, helped give shape to Western Europe as a democratic and 'Europeanized' social space.

The cultural internationalism of hosteling

Under the leadership of Jack Catchpool, the International Youth Hostel Federation (IYHF) would see its task in the postwar period to be not simply to promote hosteling, but in doing so to rebuild Europe and serve the international community more broadly by promoting friendship and cooperation in the face of chauvinist nationalism. In his 1946 presidential address to the IYHF conference, the first to take place in eight years, Catchpool proclaimed that, 'with the help of our organization ... bonds of friendship and understanding may do more to prevent future wars than the work of statesmen and diplomats. We must work single-mindedly to reestablish the facilities which existed before the war and to extend them enormously .... We must encourage young people to regard a holiday abroad as their right and privilege', because '[w]e have an apparatus in our hands which may do much to heal the wounds of our broken world'.[4]

Indeed, internationalism became the animating force undergirding the expansion of hosteling in the postwar period, which was a considerable contrast to the way hostel associations had been promoted in the interwar period, when a more domestic emphasis had been paramount. A new, profoundly idealistic and egalitarian optimism governed the hostel movement and was represented publicly by the indefatigable Catchpool, who said, 'We strive to bring together the peoples of the world, so that around the common-room fire, or sharing a common meal, or wandering along the trail, they may learn to appreciate each other's viewpoint and outlook, and realize that we are a world brotherhood'.[5] In 1946 each hostel began hosting an annual 'International Weekend' to give full attention to the international character of youth hosteling.[6] In response to the growing demand by the young for international travel, IYHF Secretary Leo Meilink, a Dutchman, stated plainly that in the new postwar order 'We will all have to live in an international way'.[7]

In 1948, Catchpool implied that the new internationalist impulse of hosteling was its most compelling and significant feature; indeed, it was its greatest contribution to humanity.[8] Because of the successful efforts he witnessed in the years immediately following the war, Catchpool grew increasingly emboldened in his vision of hosteling to serve internationalism. He described hostelers as 'youthful ambassadors' and speculated that the IYHF, in the years to come, would be a worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.[9] He concluded that 'Today, all nations are interdependent, and to attain lasting liberty and equality, we must practise fraternity too, on an international scale'.[10] The new IYHF constitution stated plainly that its purpose was 'to foster understanding and goodwill between nations, particularly by facilitating international travel'.[11] By the end of the 1950s, the cultural internationalism of hosteling was viewed to be a resounding success in bringing the young of Western Europe closer

together and, in turn, bringing the countries of Western Europe closer together as well.[12]

World War II had taken a terrible toll on the continental hostel networks. In the summer of 1939, there had been 4,600 youth hostels recording over 11 million overnights, with 40 per cent of the total number of hostels in Germany alone. Demand for accommodation that summer far exceeded supply.[13] During the war, most hostels were raided for equipment, others were taken over to be used as soldiers' barracks, while many were destroyed outright. In 1946, there were 1,822 youth hostels with 2.3 million overnights, with most of these outside continental Europe.[14] Where combat had taken place, the numbers were grim. There were nine youth hostels remaining in the Netherlands, France had fewer than 50, and Germany had been reduced from over 2,000 to a few hundred.[15]

Voluntary international work camps served the double purpose of building, repairing, and improving hostels while simultaneously promoting international camaraderie among the young volunteers. Youth Service Camps sprung up all over Europe in the wake of the war. Financed by voluntary contributions and organized by a wide variety of associations, the camps recruited young men and women to spend anywhere from a few weeks to a few months laboring in the reconstruction of, usually, cultural and educational resources such as hostels, parks, and schools, but also sometimes infrastructure such as railways and roads. The mobilized labor, however, was secondary to the primary goal of 'strengthening the democratic goodwill and human solidarity' of the young. Thus while the task might be the completion of a structure, the focus was on the endeavor of good citizenship within an international community.[16]

Already in the summer of 1946, 400 English hostelers worked on seven projects stretching from Norway to Italy. There were dozens of projects to build or repair hostels each year. In the summer of 1949, a group of 30 young people from 11 countries ventured to the island of Ameland off the Dutch coast to turn the ruins of a German radar station into a youth hostel. In a 20-minute documentary, 'A Song for Ameland', they were promoted as part of a 'youthful army' of international volunteers mobilized across Europe to rebuild the continent as part of a hopeful future of peace and camaraderie.[17]

Governments varied in their explicit support, but were on the whole quite keen to develop their hostel networks in the postwar era. The IYHF was successful in lobbying European governments to reduce barriers to youth travel between countries by the abolition or modification of passport, visa, and currency requirements, to provide travel facilities and transportation at reduced cost to the young, and to invest in the reconstruction and expansion of hostel networks. The Italian government, for example, not only officially recognized the new Italian Youth Hostel Association, but provided start-up grants and funding.[18] The British government paid 50 per cent of the cost

of new hostels, the Norwegian government provided interest-free loans, the Dutch government gave grants, and the new West German government made the construction of youth hostels a centerpiece of its 1950 Youth Plan (*Bundesjungenplan*), easily outpacing the government funding of any other hostel association.[19]

Unsurprisingly, conditions immediately after the war had been most dire in Germany. The widespread destruction, conditions of supply, and division of the country into zones of Allied occupation made typical youth travel there a near impossibility. Initially, those youth hostels that remained intact were being used for more urgent needs as hospitals, schools, or refugee housing. At first, the Allied powers occupying Germany viewed the hostel system as part of the Nazi infrastructure and were not keen on revitalizing it.[20]

Beginning in the fall of 1945, the leaders of the American, British, and French hosteling associations urged their respective military governments occupying zones of Germany to restore the existing hostel buildings to their original purpose. They argued that hosteling could be a powerful tool in the Allied program of reeducation aimed at denazifying and democratizing Germany.[21] They set up a special committee to advise the Western occupying powers about the vital part that hostels could play in the reeducation of German youth, particularly through international contact with other young people.[22] The Allied Control Council was convinced, and assisted the IYHF endeavors with funding and logistical support.[23]

International work party volunteers paid their own expenses and brought their own tools, food, sleeping bags, and other equipment.[24] The military governments provided indispensable equipment for the refurbished hostels by donating field beds, tents, blankets, and kitchen utensils.[25] By the end of 1948, 339 youth hostels were operating in the Western Zones of occupation, with 1.5 million overnights. In 1949, with the approval of the occupying powers, the German Youth Hostel Association was reestablished, and in 1950 readmitted to membership in the IYHF, though lingering animus meant that German would not be restored as the official language of the IYHF, a point insisted on by many as a matter of principle.[26]

Looking back, leaders of the youth hostel movement found that 'the social changes brought about by the war had, in general, a favorable effect on the youth hostel movement in Europe'.[27] It is not hard to see why. At the first postwar meeting of the Executive Committee, the IYHF made it clear that it wanted to stimulate international travel as soon as possible because it saw within this a mechanism of not only restoring usage to hostel systems but, more importantly, as a means to establish common goodwill in the wake of the war. To get around currency restrictions, the IYHF set up an exchange coupon system whereby a hosteler could buy vouchers in his or her own country to be exchanged for staying overnight in another.[28] Next, they lobbied governments to ease passport and visa controls for the young.

As a result, during the reconstruction period, a time of continuing hardship and austerity, there was a sharp increase in the use of hostels by foreign visitors in Western Europe generally. For example, the total numbers of foreign overnights for Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland increased 600 per cent from 64,496 in 1946 to 387,761 in 1949. A quarter of this international usage was attributable to British hostelers who remained the most active until young Germans were able to travel in large numbers in the 1950s.

In 1946 there were 1,816 youth hostels worldwide; in 1960 there were 3,713. In 1946 there were 49,360 beds and 403,699 members; in 1960 there were 221,008 beds and 1,293,531 members. In 1946 there were 2,295,392 overnights with 75,853 of those by foreigners; in 1960 there were 14,687,338 total overnights with 3,129,100 of those by foreigners.[29] International usage of hostels grew 237 per cent in the 1950s. As each year a new record for foreign overnights in hostels was established, it was recognized how this helped bring international experience even to those who did not or could not travel abroad. That is, by the end of the 1950s a clear trend had emerged – hostels were becoming predominantly international spaces.[30] This change could happen quite rapidly: in France in 1952, foreigners made up only 25 per cent of hostel overnights, yet by 1954 they made up 59 per cent.[31] Confined by the geopolitical limitations of the Cold War, young people from all around Northern and Western Europe comprised a kind of itinerant community of transnational travelers moving about within the spatial confines of the hostel networks located there. While hostels hosted a great variety of nationalities, young Germans quickly became the most avid travelers of all.

The problem of Germany

West German officials consciously used travel as a tool to reconcile Germans with their European neighbors in the aftermath of the war by promoting tourism to West Germany. Likewise, West German tourist associations saw travel abroad as a way to integrate Germans into the larger European community. The rising number of German tourists was not always so welcome. Complaints of Germans 'occupying' beaches abounded, particularly given the German habit of demarking territory in the sand, often with the use of a flag; and the French were much less enthusiastic about bilateral youth exchange programs than were the West Germans.[32] West Germans, meanwhile, actively sought to attract western tourists to dispel what they saw as unfair prejudice against them due to Nazism and the war.[33] In the first six months of 1952, for example, West Germany had one million foreign visitors, almost entirely made up of Westerners.[34] By 1953, West German hostels already had the largest number of incoming and outgoing international travelers.[35] In 1957, a Munich youth hostel hosted young people from 61

different countries.[36] At the same time, not only did young West Germans record the most youth hostel overnights abroad, but they nearly doubled the next highest in number (the UK).[37] Among all Germans, those under 21 traveled the most.[38] The personal encounters through the transnational practices of travel in the postwar decades helped to foster a westernization and internationalization of young Germans.[39] Indeed it was intended to do so. These transnational experiences had a profound effect on the worldview of many of these young people.[40] For West German youth in particular, travel was a means to become European.

Though the desire was strong, few people could actually travel abroad during the Allied occupation.[41] In the summer of 1949 a group set out for Rome but was stymied at the border because they had no papers. They wanted to get abroad to see what was going on there, but to do so independently rather than as part of some organized exchange. One young man of a group of five who managed to get across the border in the summer of 1947 explained it this way: 'Every one of us endeavors, wherever he stands, to win space, to widen horizons, to meet people and to argue with them .... Our great longing is to leap over the borders to get in touch with the outside world'.[42] As Gertrude Hertling, a young German volunteer at an international work camp near Stockholm, said 'You cannot imagine how isolated the German youth are. First, as a result of the Nazi regime, then during the war, our youth have been cut off. Now the occupation forces allow us to take no more than five dollars out of the country. You can't go far with that. How can our German youth, locked into occupied Germany, learn the meaning of democratic ways?' Doris Ackermann was 15 years old in 1949 when she went to Denmark with 24 other young boys and girls from Düsseldorf. As she said, 'We were ready to make international friends' by spreading goodwill in the wake of the war. The Danish grandmother of her host family said to her, 'I never wanted to speak or see German again, but then you are such a sweet girl'. Ackermann was overwhelmed by the possibilities of reconciliation that international contact offered to her as a young German. She became active in internationalist meetings and conferences for young Europeans. 'We became richer', she said. 'We Düsseldorfers learned a lot that year, including about democracy'.[43]

In 1950 the borders of West Germany were opened and large numbers of young people began to go on tramping expeditions abroad. Importantly, however, their possibilities for travel were circumscribed as the eastern border of West Germany remained closed; thus the Cold War division of Germany and Europe did much to determine their direction of travel which was circumscribed to the western half of the continent and even a bit beyond, such as North Africa. In 1952, a dozen-strong group, aged 13–22, tramped across France to Algeria. 'We went because we were fascinated by France and wanted to build bridges with the young French and Muslims'.[44]

This desire for international contact with other young people was typical at the end of the war. For example, Günther Birkenfeld wrote an editorial, 'What We Want to Do', claiming that what the young in Germany wanted more than anything was to meet and understand the young of other countries because they felt so isolated and cut off.[45]

Once the occupation ended, young Germans began traveling abroad independently in large numbers. Hitchhiking was common; indeed the 'autostop' had been a common practice for getting around within Germany during the years of occupation, so for large numbers of the young to take it up as a means to travel outside Germany was no great surprise. In many ways it came to characterize the new culture of German youth travel in the 1950s. While their parents might head south for a relaxing vacation, the young tended to travel north and west as part of a self-conscious *bildungsreisen*, or coming-of-age journey, which kept them on the move.[46]

For some, this travel became a means of atonement, a way to distance themselves from the Nazism of their parents, but at the same time to learn about it and reach out to their generational comrades across the border.[47] Bernward Vesper, the son of a Nazi poet, recounted just such an impulse and his encounters in his autobiography, *The Trip* (*Die Reise*): 'I met on the streets, in the youth hostels, in the cars, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, English, Americans, and French. And while I set out with the angst of being humiliated, which I felt as a German whose land was occupied, humbled, and hated by the enemy, I found myself instead in an international brotherhood'. Vesper made a point of visiting sites of Nazi aggression across Europe as a kind of penance: 'And what was revealed precisely before the monument for the Danish resistance fighters murdered by the Germans, and later in Coventry and Oradour, was that all of us viewed the war as a matter of the older generation'.[48] Vesper had discovered a generational and international camaraderie through his travels that helped him both to understand and displace the war's legacy.

For many young West Germans in the 1950s and 1960s, nationality was a dilemma, but one that they could circumvent through internationality.[49] This had been encouraged as a matter of official policy. For example, an internal report of the French Occupation Authorities in the 1940s concluded that there was a general lack of faith in democracy among German youth and that communism held a significant appeal to them. However, so did Europeanism. The report suggested that international reconstruction camps, hosteling, and youth exchanges could be a means by which to encourage this Europeanism, and, through that, to develop democratic tendencies among German youth.[50] Even the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer felt similarly: 'the people must be given a new ideology', he said to his cabinet, 'it can only be a European one'.[51] The idea of Europe, Adenauer and others hoped, could supplant the void left by the collapse of German nationalism while challenging the appeal of communism. One way to accomplish this

was to encourage and support the demand for transnational travel by the young.

The European promise of youth mobility

For young advocates of European integration, German or not, the free mobility of youth across the borders of Western Europe held the promise of uniting Europe. The Western European Union looked to the effectiveness of youth travel as a form of international relations 'breaking down the frontiers between young people' and thus creating a common European cohort.[52] The international travel of the young on a massive scale could help render the borders of European nation-states inconsequential, they felt. In this way, transnational cultural contact through travel became a means of activism for young enthusiasts of European integration.[53]

Youth mobility was a key component of the 1950s European Youth Campaign, an umbrella organization that coordinated and funded multiple independent youth groups favorable to integration run for and by young people who desired a united Europe.[54] The European Youth Campaign was a key component of the European Movement, a high-profile, international political group promoting and lobbying for integration. The European Youth Campaign's newspaper, published in four languages with shared but not identical editorial content, promoted international travel by the young. It described programs, camps, offices, and contact information, featured travelogs on various countries, profiled the experiences of individual travelers to encourage interest, and advocated for the freedom of movement through its editorial content, such as the front-page story celebrating the 1952 removal of passport controls between Scandinavian countries. Another article imagined a 'Europe without frontiers' ten years in the future, or the words of a young Frenchwoman, who, when asked what a united Europe would mean to her, answered 'the ability to travel more easily ... no more customs barriers, no more visas or passports, no more currency limitations'.[55]

This promotion of mobility was part of a larger effort to unite Europe by uniting the young through personal interaction. The European Youth Campaign and the Young European Federalists sponsored pen pal schemes, international friendship programs, the twinning of towns, rallies, conferences, international caravans, and essay contests that asked contestants to address a welcome letter to a young European visitor to their country.[56] A 1954 flyer from West Germany made an appeal in this way: 'Youth calls out to you from across the border: You are from Europe. You are still in Europe. Welcome as you visit us. You are one of us! Bon voyage to you as you move on. There also you'll find people like us, like you: European!'[57] Their goal was to raise a European consciousness among the young of Europe, particularly through interpersonal interaction, while advocating for policies in the interest of youth generally. The European Youth Campaign's international

membership peaked in the mid-1950s at tens of thousands while they maintained a substantial annual budget of several hundred thousand dollars, the bulk of which came, unbeknownst to them, from the CIA, which hoped the youthful appeal of Europeanism might counter that of Communism.[58]

In the early 1950s, the European Youth Campaign, including particularly the Young European Federalists, conducted a publicity campaign demanding the abolition of borders and the freedom of travel for the young in the name of building a united youth and a united Europe. In December 1952, 300 students from ten countries burned a border post on the Franco-Italian border while demanding a Europe with unfettered mobility.[59] This was one of dozens of similar protests taking place on the shared borders of Western Europe in the early 1950s. The first was at Wissembourg on the Franco-German border in August 1950 where hundreds of youth from nine countries converged on the border post from both sides, dismantled the frontier barriers, and built a bonfire while customs officials looked on. In their official statement they demanded 'a European passport giving freedom of travel throughout Europe' while noting that 'Europeans have marched to the frontier, not to fight each other, but unified in their desire to abolish frontiers'. In January 1952 at Wyler on the Dutch border with Germany, hundreds of Dutch and German youth gathered to celebrate the passage of the Schuman Plan. They lit the border gate on fire while brandishing placards stating 'Away with borders!' and 'Long Live Europe!' In May of 1953 in Liege, hundreds of Belgian, Dutch, and German youth went as far as to burn an effigy of a border-customs official as a symbolic auto-da-fé before proceeding the next morning to demonstrate at the triangulated point of their shared borders. At the European Youth Assembly at The Hague in October 1953, the young brought their own border markers with them to toss onto a massive bonfire while thousands chanted 'Eu-ro-pa!', 'En Avant!', 'Vorwärts!', 'Vooruit!', 'Avanti!'[60]

Border controls emphasized to the young Europeanist that a united Europe was yet to be created, and thus the shared borders became a strategic point of political protest, a territorial space ideally suited for collective or individual political action. Some considered the illegal transgression of borders to be an effective means to undermine and perhaps dismantle frontiers altogether by demonstrating their absurdity. *Jugend Europas*, the German newspaper of the European Youth Campaign, celebrated young travelers who were arrested for illegal border crossings as 'courageous demonstrators for a United Europe'. This sort of travel behavior was interpreted as direct political action: 'Border, passport, visa? There are no such obstacles to a true European!'[61] The promotion of youth mobility, illegal or not, was a central tactic of the young Europeanists who sought to unify the western half of the continent.

Perhaps the most substantive endeavor in this regard was the European Youth Campaign's effort to harmonize international rail travel for the

young, laying the groundwork for the future Eurail and InterRail passes. At the European Youth Assembly at The Hague in October 1953, the delegates passed a unanimous resolution advocating a common European passport for the young with harmonized and reduced rail fares for their international travel. They claimed this to be elemental to the free circulation of ideas and peoples, which was itself, they said, fundamental to a democratic Europe.[62] This resulted in prolonged negotiations with national railways to standardize reduced fares for international rail travel by European youth.[63]

Not surprisingly, getting the national railways to accommodate requests to reduce fares for all international youth travel and to do so in a common, harmonized fashion was difficult. However, incremental progress was made, such as new rail-passes and more readily available information about such fares, as well as the introduction of standardized student and youth identity cards to qualify for these reductions.[64] Meanwhile the committee lobbied the Council of Europe for reforms as well, and, in December 1961, the member states of the Council of Europe, 16 countries in all, agreed to allow young persons to travel on collective passports due to the Council's desire to promote youth travel between their countries.[65]

The merit of independent youth travel

Others were not so sanguine about the benefits of independent youth travel. Winfried Böll, a West German Social Democrat, wrote an article in *Jugend Europas* in which he criticized in no uncertain terms the supposed moral benefit of youth mobility. He was particularly concerned with the emergent trend of the youthful style of independent travel, that of tramping about without sufficient financial means. He recognized that those doing so considered themselves to be 'poor Germans' but 'good Europeans'. Yet this practice smacked too much of vagabondage, and rather than building character and independence, it denoted instead an overreliance on the benevolence of others. Böll complained about scantily clad young women hitchhiking in Italy who unwittingly got themselves into trouble; likewise, he was scandalized by young men and women traveling and camping together. How, he wondered, could these 'free riders' be a moral good for the young or for Europe? This form of travel was dangerous for both, he wrote. Youth travel, he thought, needed to be structured and pedagogical for the benefit of both the young and Europe.[66]

The West German Catholic Church agreed. They were quite concerned about the emerging trends in youth travel and referred to hitchhiking in the 1950s as 'degenerate'; to hitchhike was to indulge in selfish individualism, and to do so abroad, they thought, was the height of egoism. In this, they had the support of Pope Pius XII who issued a statement to the West German Church in 1959 called 'Christian Conceptions of Travel' in which he condemned the young who traveled for amusement as troublingly self-

indulgent.[67] Indeed, West German Catholic organizations had been pushing back against international youth exchange since the mid-1940s when a host of such programs had been set up with France.[68] Others were much less moralizing, but still questioned whether travel in general led to a European consciousness or if only specific forms of organized, pedagogic travel did so, something that would come under much greater scrutiny in the 1960s.[69]

Meanwhile the sense of self-liberation and independence that backpacking or rail travel or hitchhiking seemed to offer to the young was, for many of them, the whole point. As Bernhard Vesper remarked, 'This feeling of being really alone ... freed me'. Hans-Christian Kirsch's 1961 novel *Mit Haut und Haar* described young hitchhikers as having coming from 'bombed cities, between borders and in escape' but now 'awake, free, and unbound'.[70] One can appreciate the bold exhilaration of 17-year-old Julie Thomas from the southern coast of England, who spent the summer of 1950 hitchhiking around France and staying in youth hostels while her parents thought she was working as a fruit-picker in the foothills of the Alps. The following summer, she hitchhiked across France to Spain and back again. At one point, she joined over 30 other young hitchhikers riding south in the back of an empty melon truck. She was part of a society of young travelers whose numbers seemed to grow each summer. The sense of adventure and community among the young travelers who would assemble and disperse astonished her in retrospect, and she continued to hitchhike in Western Europe throughout the 1950s. As she said, 'in those days not long after the war, we didn't worry about a thing'.[71]

In the early 1950s, the American Express office in Paris had to enlarge its public bathroom to accommodate the growing number of young Americans tramping through Europe who would use it as a washroom. In 1960, a US Foreign Service officer complained that young Americans out of cash and in need of a loan to get home were now showing up daily.[72] By 1960, exchange programs that promoted group travel were finding more and more that the young traveler 'does not want to be "organized". He wants to have his independence and his private sphere safeguarded'.[73]

A Dutch study showed that freedom, comfort, and a good hot meal were most appreciated by young travelers while a clear, substantial majority disliked the leadership of adults. The independence and freedom offered by hosteling was its most desirable quality to them.[74] The Danish, for example, worked hard to establish a 'friendly atmosphere' in its hostels that would 'avoid any kind of authority' which might alienate visiting hostelers.[75] A German study confirmed that making new friends with other young people while keeping on the move rather than staying put were the two top travel preferences of the vast majority of young travelers.[76] By 1962, three-quarters of all German youth travel abroad was being done independently.[77] The postwar years in Western Europe gave birth to a profound new phenomenon of independent youth travel that developed fully on a massive scale in the

1960s and 1970s with the most desirable aspect not being a particular destination but rather experiences and encounters with other young people.

Youth mobility and the making of Europe

Ronald Inglehart, an American political scientist, conducted a series of studies in the mid- to late-1960s that shed light on the matters of youth, mobility, and European internationalism. He found that internationalism did not diminish commitment to the nation-state. Expecting to find a positive correlation between a general internationalism and support for European integration, which he did, he also learned a great deal more. Overall, Germans were the most favorable to internationalism, followed closely by the Dutch, then the French, with the British further behind the others.[78] But he also found a significant gap between adults and youth in their degree of Europeanness, with the young of the three European Economic Community (EEC) countries under study 'about as near to a unanimous verdict as one is likely to come in survey research'. When the data was broken down by age cohort, Inglehart discovered that the younger one went, the greater the Europeanism. Importantly, Inglehart concluded that it was not their youth, per se, that had made them more European, but the specific context within which they had been young, namely the postwar climate of internationalism and cooperative endeavor, the expansion of secondary and higher education, and the increase in trade and exchange of persons. The specific circumstances of their socialization, Inglehart said, accounted for the markedly different attitude from the older cohorts.[79]

With further study, Inglehart found that foreign travel was an even greater predictor of support for European integration than was age cohort. Nor was it simply that one was more likely to travel if already pro-European, but that foreign travel itself generated internationalist sentiment. As one might expect, affluence and education were factors – the higher the social class or educational degree, the more likely one was to be pro-European – yet this was not as strong an indicator as was foreign travel or age. He concluded that the younger and more traveled one was, the more likely to be pro-Europe. Foreign travel had increased dramatically among nearly all segments of the European populations with the advent of mass tourism in the 1960s, but it was particularly profound among the younger cohorts. Despite the shorter number of years which they had lived, the 20- to 24-year-old cohort had already done more total foreign travel than those older than 55. Inglehart's study showed that an astonishing 74 per cent of German respondents aged 21 to 24 had visited two or more foreign countries, for the young Belgians the number was 69 per cent, the Dutch 65 per cent, the French 48 per cent, and the Italians 29 per cent.[80] While Italy might seem to be a discrepancy from the others, that over a quarter of the young Italian respondents had visited two or more countries by the

mid-1960s is itself remarkable and indicative of a dramatic cultural shift underway since there had been virtually no independent tourist travel by young Italians whatsoever until the 1950s.

The response to the 1966 flood of Florence demonstrates these changes. On 4 and 5 November, the Arno River flooded Florence, leaving behind a ton of mud for every person in the city and devastating the artistic and historical patrimony there. The churches, museums, and libraries, all filled with invaluable Renaissance treasures, were completely inundated with mud, in some places as deep as 22 feet. Immediately thereafter, young people began showing up to help; they became known to Florentines as *gli angeli del fango*, 'the Mud Angels'. Over the winter of 1966–7, young volunteers spontaneously arrived to help clean up Florence. Most were Italian, but there was a significant number who came from much further abroad. There they were, cleaning mud out of the Basilica di Santa Croce or carrying priceless paintings out of the Uffizi galleries or bringing food and fresh water to the elderly still in their upper-floor apartments. These youthful workers were not organized nor had they been recruited. They simply showed up. Young Europeans dropped what they were doing and boarded trains or hitchhiked or drove south. Many had already been on the road, and simply shifted their itinerary to gravitate toward Tuscany. Mayor Piero Bargellini, already overwhelmed with the disastrous state of his city, had to scramble to accommodate them. He arranged to house them in idle sleeping cars and coaches in the Florence rail yard, set up a central office at the Uffizi to dispatch them daily to the places where they were needed, and managed to organize a canteen to feed them in the kitchen at the Accademia Gallery.[81] One Florentine commented that even before soldiers arrived as part of the official governmental response, 'the city was already in the hands of the young'.[82]

There was tremendous turnover in the winter months, as some Mud Angels would stay a few days, others a few weeks. They listened to music while working, smoked cigarettes on breaks, and had only a little energy left for carousing at night. Because of the polyglot nature of the young workers, the archivists and preservationists had to devise a visually color-coded card system to track and process each item. In total, it is unclear how many Mud Angels there were or even exactly where they had come from. There were likely at most only a couple thousand in total, yet given their mythic status in Italy, one would think it was ten times that.[83]

In London, when Mark Bradley and a friend saw the harrowing images of Florence on the BBC, they took two hours to load up a car and then spent two days on the road, arriving to work for two weeks as part of a human chain passing texts and documents up out of the cellar stacks of the Biblioteca Nazionale. 'We didn't understand much', he later recalled, 'but there was great excitement'. Pietro di Muccio de Quattro was a 20-year-old law student in Rome who spent seven days working in Florence and was

dumbfounded by the collection of young people there from so far away: 'My right hand held a Japanese hand, the left an American one. It was the fourteenth or fifteenth of November. How the hell did they get here from all over the world so soon?' Mireille Bazin from Reims came down with 30 other art students during their holiday break. William Michaut commented that 'despite the language barrier, we lived in intense communion'.[84] Ignacio Serrano Garcia from Valladolid said that he and the other Mud Angels came to Florence out of a sense of duty to the European patrimony there, while Riccardo Lanza from Milan explained the harmony among the young Mud Angels by saying that 'it was something already present in our generation ... with more or less means, [we] had travelled in Italy and abroad and had often relied on the solidarity between us'.[85] The Mud Angels of 1966 were an expression of the internationalist instincts, transnational travel, and generational solidarity that had developed out of the postwar mobility of youth.

Youth mobility and transnational Europeanization

Nongovernmental actors, in addition to nations and states, have played a profound role in the evolution of postwar international relations, and the young have been central to such endeavors.[86] A preoccupation with state-centered activities limits our understanding of European integration, as does a teleological vision that sees the history of integration as leading inexorably to the political or economic European Union.[87] Europeanization and integration have taken many forms.[88] Transnational networks of shared interests and practices, among them independent youth travel, have played a profound role in the cultural integration of Europe. Hosteling underwent a form of harmonization and integration as it reoriented itself in the postwar period toward an emphasis on building transnational networks of youth travel inspired by an ideological cultural internationalism meant to reconcile the peoples of Western Europe. That is, the institution of hosteling was meaningfully Europeanized in this era. Meanwhile, by providing cheap accommodation and thousands of facilities, international hosteling played an important part in the democratization of travel and the emergence of mass European tourism in the years of postwar prosperity.

Of course, Western Europe as a whole underwent a process of political, economic, and cultural Europeanization in the postwar period.[89] The member countries of the Common Market recognized that the mass tourism of intra-European travel in the early 1960s was 'one of the principal forces forging the New Europe', and that, given the projected growth, 'no corner of Europe' was potentially 'immune to this form of Europeanization'. Thus the EEC itself expected travel and tourism to expand 'Europe' beyond the original six of the Common Market through the transnational contact of its young peoples.[90] In the mid-1960s the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD, formerly OEEC) had ongoing discussions about the explosion in independent youth travel. They were thrilled with the exponential growth and value of youth tourism for developing a 'European consciousness', but they also recognized it as being a phenomenon quite distinct from mass tourism in general. The habits, attitudes, destinations, and means of travel were distinctive for the young who moved more frequently in less-planned itineraries. The OECD openly pondered how they might help develop infrastructure to accommodate the predicted territorial expansion of youth travel outward, potentially helping to expand the integration of Europe to new member-states in their wake, perhaps even eastward.[91]

In the summer of 1962, Diethard Erbslöh and his friend Rolf departed Mainz, West Germany in an old rusted car and set out for the Balkans in search of adventure. They looked for other young European travelers to hang out with, but only began to encounter them once they reached the beaches of Greece.[92] While there were certainly some young people, like Diethard and Rolf themselves, traveling about the East, the culture of youth travel, as such, was confined to the areas considered to be Western. Diethard and Rolf were the exceptions that proved the rule. Such circuits of travel have a long history. For example, as Thomas Nugent's 1756 guidebook indicates, the spatial pattern of the aristocratic Grand Tour was limited even then to what would eventually become the six original members of the European Community – Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy.[93] Likewise, these same eighteenth-century circulations were what gave rise originally to the very concepts of a Western and Eastern Europe.[94] Diethard and Rolf had chosen to travel through Yugoslavia, which was a desirable option for independent youth travel in part because the rest of Eastern Europe had largely been closed off, but also because it occupied a kind of privileged position as a legitimate (non-Soviet) communist country open to exploration.[95] It was a place where 'Western' Europeans could go to explore 'Eastern' Europe without great difficulty, while the sparse number of young travelers there was yet another indication of its difference from the West.

Pierre-Yves Saunier has written that the transnational approach to history is particularly useful for thinking about the entangled connections and linkages that help generate human circulations and flows across national borders. The social relations that emerge from such encounters often lead to new social, economic, political, or cultural formations, something demonstrated very well by several contributions to this volume.[96] In the postwar period, the cultural practice and social relations of youth mobility, constrained by the geopolitical limits of the Cold War, geographic proximity, and institutional infrastructure conducive to their travel, helped constitute the social space of Western Europe. The French theorist Henri Lefebvre has talked about how space is not an inert, natural, or pre-existing given, but

rather an ongoing production of social relations. That is, our conceptual understanding of space is not simply an agglomeration of peoples and things spread across a territory, but instead it is produced by the cultural practices that emerge through interpersonal interaction. This is particularly so when symbolic meanings develop through the spatial relationships of human activity.[97] Fernand Braudel asserted something similar in his epic study of the Mediterranean when he wrote that 'The Mediterranean has no unity but that created by the movements of men, the relationships they imply, and the routes they follow'.[98] The travel of the young described herein had very similar effects.

The postwar transnational practice of youth travel helped to 'Europeanize' Western Europe and Western Europeans through the interpenetration of a circumscribed geographic space that was increasingly seen to stand for Europe as a whole. This is true even though many of these travelers were not themselves members of the Common Market or even from Europe; the growing number of young North American, South American, and Australian travelers, for example, were helping to generate a European social space through the patterns and frequency of their itineraries. These were highly determined circuits of travel through hostel networks, reconstruction camps, and border controls, which all largely served to limit and circumscribe where one could and would travel, who one would meet, and what one might do. As David Pomfret has shown in his chapter, the act of traveling in and of itself was a productive activity generating new understandings and meanings for youth. Yet while the patterns of youth mobility might be structured by social class, gender, or nationality, at the same time they were not fixed nor predestined; it was a flexible and inconsistent mobility that emphasized freedom, independence, improvisation, and individual agency.

Of course the social configuration of geographic space does not necessarily correspond to the territoriality of nations.[99] The growing youth circulation across national borders expanded the social space of 'European' activity even though it did not comprise the entirety of the continent.[100] This process of Europeanization was not uniform nor even necessarily intentional.[101] It, too, was flexible and inconsistent. As a cultural practice, it had the quality of a 'transnational socialization' leading young travelers to be increasingly favorable toward integration, as Ronald Inglehart's research had shown.[102] This Europeanization relied on transnational structures, movements, and practices, such as hostel networks or Federalism or hitchhiking, while transnational mobility itself was often influenced by varied understandings of internationalism that were together helping to generate a new, integrated social space.[103] As Mitch Perko from Essex described his teenage years of travel in the 1950s: 'it was an awakening and an education – a wide-eyed look at the world, albeit geographically limited [but with] a very European feel'.[104]

Notes

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5. As quoted in A. Grassl and G. Heath (1982) *The Magic Triangle: A Short History of the World Youth Hostel Movement* (International Youth Hostel Federation), pp. 89–90.
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7. As quoted in H. Q. Röling (1979) *Idealisme en toerisme: 50 jaar jeugdherbergen 1929–1979* (Amsterdam: Uitgave NJHC), p. 27.
8. HIA, J. Catchpool, Presidential Address from 'Report of the Tenth Conference of the International Youth Hostel Federation', 1948, 9.
9. HIA, J. Catchpool, 'Presidential Address', from 'Report of the Eleventh Conference of the International Youth Hostel Federation', August 1949, 2.
10. HIA, J. Catchpool, 'Presidential Address', August 1949, 5.
11. HIA, 'Constitution of the International Youth Hostel Federation', from 'Report of the Twelfth Conference of the International Youth Hostel Federation', 1950, 65.
12. HIA, 'Working Paper for the Commission on "How Can the Youth Hostels Movement Serve Humanity?"' from 'Documents for the Nineteenth International Youth Hostel Federation Conference', 1958, 82–3.
13. Grassl and Heath, *The Magic Triangle*, pp. 78–81.
14. HIA, 'Statistical Report 1946 & 1947'.
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16. UNESCO REC/01, 'Youth Service Camps' (1947), *Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Newsletter*, 1 (3), 1–2.
17. 'A Song for Ameland' *UNESCO Courier*, 3 (6–7), July–August 1950, 12; 'A Song for Ameland' *Impetus*, 4 (5), May 1950, 12–13.
18. HIA, A. Pessina, 'Italian Youth Hostels Association Report', 'Report of the 10th Conference of the IYHF 1948', 1.
19. Grassl and Heath, *The Magic Triangle*, pp. 96, 144.
20. Ibid., pp. 102–3.
21. See S. Stubbe (2009) 'Der Wiederbeginn des Jugendherbergswesens nach 1945' in J. Reulecke and B. Stambolis (eds) *100 Jahre Jugendherbergen 1909–2009* (Essen: Klartext Verlag), pp. 223–37.
22. HIA, 'Minutes of the First Post-war Conference of the International Youth Hostel Federation', Loch Lomond, 4–6 September 1946, 4. See also, S. Stubbe (2009) 'Die internationale Arbeit des Jugendherbergswerks in der frühen Nachkriegszeit' in J. Reulecke and B. Stambolis (eds) *100 Jahre Jugendherbergen 1909–2009* (Essen: Klartext Verlag), pp. 241–50.

23. See Archives françaises de l'Occupation en Allemagne et en Autriche à Colmar (hereafter AFOAA) AC 347/4, J. Catchpool and L. Meilink, 'A L'Allied Control Council: Mémoire concernant l'activité international des Auberges de la Jeunesse et la renaissance de l'activité des A.J. en Allemagne', 1946; AFOAA AC 69/3, 'Rapport sur la rencontre Interalliée des Officiers de Jeunesse à Dusseldorf, les 30 et 31 Janvier 1949'.
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25. HIA, 'Report on the German Hostels 1948' from 'Report of the Tenth Conference of the International Youth Hostel Association', 1948.
26. Grassl and Heath, *The Magic Triangle*, p. 104.
27. G. Heath (1954) 'The Growth of the Youth Hostel Movement' in G. Heath (ed.) *The International Youth Hostel Manual* (Copenhagen: International Youth Hostel Federation), p. 16.
28. HIA, 'Report of the Meeting of the Committee of the International Youth Hostels Association', Paris, 3–4 February 1946, 2.
29. HIA, 'Total Worldwide Figures'.
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35. Grassl and Heath, *The Magic Triangle*, p. 134.
36. HIA, A. Grassl, 'Working Paper for the Commission on "Training of Wardens for their International Function"' from 'Documents for the Nineteenth International Youth Hostel Federation Conference', 1958, 85.
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39. K. Jarausch (2006) *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 105, 110.
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42. 'Dokumente: Fahrtensommer 1947' in J. Reulecke, *Rückkehr in die Ferne*, p. 188.
43. 'Zeitzeugenbericht: Doris Ackermann, Düsseldorf' in J. Reulecke, *Rückkehr in die Ferne*, pp. 37–44.
44. N. Schwarte and J. Reulecke (1997) 'Fernweh und Großfahrten in der Bündischen Jugend der Nachkriegszeit' in J. Reulecke (ed.) *Rückkehr in die Ferne*, pp. 151–68, quotation 162.
45. G. Birkenfeld, 'Was wir wollen', *Horizont*, 9 December 1945.
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47. Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, 250.
48. As quoted in Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, 250.
49. See K. Jarausch (1995) 'Postnationale Nation: Zum Identitätswandel der Deutschen 1945–1995', *Historicum: Zeitschrift für Geschicte*, 30, 30–5; H. Schissler (1997) 'Postnationality – Luxury of the Privileged? A West German Generational Perspective', *German Politics and Society*, 15 (2), 8–27.
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7

On the Revolutionary Road: Youth, Displacements, and Politics in the 'Long' Latin American Sixties

Valeria Manzano

In late 1975, the Argentine *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP, Revolutionary Army of the People), one of the largest guerrilla groups in South America, informed its members of the death of their comrade Hugo Macchi at the hands of a paramilitary organization. Born in 1951 to a middle-class family, Macchi had initially wanted to pursue his father's profession, civil engineering. However, as soon as he arrived at the National University of Córdoba he engaged in political and social activism, and participated in the popular mobilizations during the Argentine May of 1969 in reaction against the authoritarian political regime of General Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–70). Perhaps as a corollary of his political engagement, at the end of the academic year Macchi embarked on a five-month voyage through northwestern Argentina and the neighboring Andean countries, Bolivia and Peru. Upon his return, Macchi came to repudiate his 'prior individualistic life', and he decided to drop out of college and join the ERP.[1] As many other young men and women did in the Latin American 'long sixties', Macchi used his journey to both 'corroborate' previous knowledge and to discover new feelings, notably indignation toward social oppression as well as shame regarding his own privileged middle-class background in a modernizing country. Like many other young people, Macchi concluded that his own country belonged in fact to a Third World geography where revolutionaries foresaw only one political road: the waging of a popular war to forge 'liberated' and classless nations.

As elsewhere in the world, the yearning for and the anxieties about change in both its collective and individual senses pervaded the Latin American 'long sixties'. From the entry of Fidel Castro's troops into Havana in 1959 until the US-backed coup d'état that overthrew the socialist experiment led by Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the Latin American 'long sixties' transpired in projects aiming at social transformation. These took the form of accelerated economic development (a key term for the era) or

of all-encompassing revolutions that would ideally revamp Latin American societies completely, dismantling the 'neocolonial' links to economic superpowers and even, as Che Guevara mandated, making an entirely 'new man'. Willing to learn from and lead 'the people' and eager to get rid of the hedonism of bourgeois societies, the self-sacrificing 'new man' would remake himself through his effort to build a socialist society.[2] Scores of middle-class, educated youth experimented with ethical, cultural, political, and generational displacements. Like many of their European counterparts, they entwined their desire for social and political change with practical efforts to 'change themselves'. Importantly, such efforts frequently included geographical displacements as well, in the form of travel practices that afforded them the chance of 'seeing other worlds'.[3] The 'worlds' that young people like Macchi experienced were those showing an impoverished and socially oppressed Latin America, the so-called backside of the modernizing dynamics unfolding in the 'long sixties'. Seeing those 'worlds' helped mobilize new emotional ties and feelings, as well as beliefs in the need of urgent action. Such travels were intended to radicalize.

Travel as a practice of consciousness-raising helped young people delineate a revolutionary road purportedly necessary to the achievement of urgent action. As cultural critic Diana Sorensen has argued, the Latin American 1960s were pervaded by a feeling of imminence, 'of arrival about to take place, or to be voluntaristically ushered in'.[4] That feeling also stemmed from and was shaped through politico-cultural practices such as travel. Historians of the 'long sixties' in the subcontinent have thus far looked at travel practices undertaken by leftwing intellectuals – chiefly to Cuba – and by the self-recognized vanguards of revolutionary movements. These studies have shown the importance of travel to the creation of political networks, but they have barely looked at their generational dimensions.[5]

As part of the emergent subfield of history of youth in Latin America, this essay focuses less on political and intellectual vanguards and more on 'ordinary' young women and men.[6] It argues that traveling to encounter a 'real' Latin America was a significant step in the political coming of age of scores of young people who, like Macchi, benefited from the expanded educational and cultural possibilities in the supposedly more modern and socially homogeneous Latin American countries of the 1960s: the Southern Cone of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Through their travel practices, these young people had the chance to contrast their life experiences with what they regarded as the 'real' Latin America, which in their opinion had been 'masked' by modernization.

The experiences of what traveling youth identified as the 'real' Latin America produced feelings of indignation. As some anthropologists and cultural historians have argued, indignation – an emotion that potentially fuels action – relates to how social groups define the limits of 'the unbearable'. That definition involves the certainty that any or some perceived

fundamental rights are being violated, thus creating a situation that requires urgent redress.[7] The political construction of the unbearable and the ensuing configuration of indignation implied contrasting two Latin Americas, one epitomized by the urban, white, and cosmopolitan cities of the Southern Cone countries (such as Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, and Montevideo) and the other – the 'real' Latin America – hidden in the grievous living and working conditions of the Andean peoples. The gap between the two became unbearable to these radicalized youth. Although only a small number of politicized young people actually took up arms to accelerate political change many others supported armed struggle to reverse centuries of colonization and neocolonization exemplified by the disentitlement and social oppression of the Andean peoples.

Politicized youth from the Southern Cone imagined their travel practices as a movement, both literally and figuratively, toward 'the people'. Rather than engaging in the staged authenticity that, as Dean MacCannell argues, represents the knot of the tourist experience, these young travelers focused on making visible the 'real' behind the postcard – for example, the social oppression behind landmarks such as the archeological sites of Macchu Picchu.[8] These sites were less important to the young travelers than their interactions with the women and men whom they felt embodied the past and future of Latin America. Assuming that those peoples represented the 'real' Latin America involved these observers in a critique of their own social and cultural conditions as mostly middle-class, educated, and white youth. Indeed, geographical displacements aimed at producing social displacements as well, by ideally blurring and erasing social differences. Through their travel choices, furthermore, the young challenged established patterns of cultural and political comings of age for middle- and upper-class South Americans who had habitually looked toward, and eventually visited, Europe. By contrast, young people in the 'long sixties' proudly rejected Europe as a cradle of civilization and instead sought to create a new Latin American sense of identity by focusing on the seemingly hidden threads joining the 'modern' with the most socially disadvantaged regions and peoples.[9]

In carving out a transnational identity premised on mobility, the travel practices of young South Americans resembled those performed by their European counterparts as discussed by Rick Jobs in this volume. Yet unlike their European peers, they seemed less interested in articulating an age-based community than in solidifying networks of friendship and political comradeship.[10] In doing so, young South Americans produced still one more layer of displacement through their attempts to move away from associations with 'youth' – a concept loaded with meanings linked to cultural rebellion. For the most part rejecting age markers as signs of identity, traveling young South Americans sought out encounters with their ethnic, social, and cultural 'others', attempting to create links with them. In doing so, their practices were closer to the ones performed by scores of white,

college-educated, and middle-class youth in the United States. As historian Van Gosse has shown, many of those who made the ranks of the North American 'new left' had experimented with a 'movement towards the people', generally in the form of travel practices to the Jim-Crow South, the result of which was the 'discovery' of the Third World within the so-called First World.[11]

Young South Americans supplemented their literal 'movement towards the people' with the adoption of new patterns of cultural consumption. After reconstructing the characteristics and meanings attributed to travel practices, this chapter focuses on changes in reading habits and music preferences to show how politicized youth aimed to draw the 'real' Latin America back toward the urban and cosmopolitan centers. Through these dynamics they not only questioned key elements of a transnational youth culture, but also challenged interpretations focusing on the social and cultural process of modernization during the 'long sixties'. Most importantly of all they politicized cultural practices related to travel, reading, and music consumption and fashioned a particular revolutionary road, one that they hoped would lead to the erasure of neocolonialism and dependency, and to the creation of new men and women.

The road toward the wretched of the earth

In the introduction to his *Sociology of Modernization* (1971), Gino Germani challenged those who identified the Southern Cone of Latin America with the Third World. He argued that, in contrast to countries in Asia and Africa – his shorthand for Third Worldliness – the Southern Cone countries were 'middle-class' nations on an international scale of development and modernization'.[12] The founder of so-called scientific sociology in 1950s Argentina, Germani also popularized some of the most significant concepts through which many citizens of those 'middle-class nations' grasped the sociocultural transformations that they lived through, such as modernization. By 1970, Germani might have felt satisfied: signs of modernization seemed to be evident among the Southern Cone's expanding middle classes for example in the form of rising literacy rates, and ongoing growth of enrollment in secondary schools and universities. The women and men who, in the 'long sixties', occupied the category of youth benefited from those modernizing signs at the same time as they questioned the optimistic narratives of social homogenization and criticized their own status as middle-class, educated, and young. As part of their critique, politicizing youth sought to delineate a revolutionary road whose first step consisted of meeting the most impoverished and disentitled inhabitants of South America, that is, those whose life experiences differed the most.

Young people, chiefly in their role as students, were at the forefront of the dynamic of sociocultural modernization that swept across the Southern

Cone countries. Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina were, in 1970, the Latin American countries with the largest percentages of the age group 14–18 enrolled in secondary schools.[13] Meanwhile, Argentina had the highest percentage of youth enrolled in higher education. In the early 1960s, the country ranked third in the world with regard to the number of university students vis-à-vis the total population (there were 756 university students for each 100,000 inhabitants).[14] Although still a minority, the percentage of university students among the 20 to 24 age group steadily grew: in 1950, 5 per cent of that age group was enrolled; in 1960, the figure jumped to 11 per cent; and, in 1972, it rose to 20 per cent. In Argentina, the university penetrated deep into the middle class and gradually incorporated children of small traders, clerks, teachers, and highly qualified manual workers. In the mid-1960s, 70 per cent of college students were first-generation.[15]

Elites also projected onto the droves of first-generation students hopes for the achievement of collective and individual betterment. One of the prime examples of so-called developmentalist policies, Argentine President Arturo Frondizi (1958–62), for example, referred to the young students as the 'fuel' that might help produce the 'takeoff' that the country needed to develop economically and socially. Similarly, in one key manifesto of the 1960s modernizing elites, *The Charter of Punta del Este* that launched the Alliance for Progress, an agreement spearheaded by the President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to enhance economic cooperation between the United States and Latin America Frondizi and his peers from all over the Americas agreed on prioritizing the enhancement of funding to secondary and higher level education. Their intention was to 'provide the competent personnel required for rapidly-growing societies'.[16] Those expectations were partially fulfilled throughout the 1960s. Census data for 1970 in the three Southern Cone countries revealed that women and men alike joined the labor market later and better prepared than their parents, and that their first jobs were in the ever-expanding tertiary sector of the economy.[17]

In Argentina, for example, that was certainly the case of young people like Mabel, daughter to a working-class family in an industrial suburb of Buenos Aires. Both of her parents had primary schooling and worked in a textile factory. Mabel not only graduated from secondary school but also went to college, while she worked as a secretary in the company where her parents performed blue-collar jobs. Mabel recalls having been 'the source of the family's pride'. Her family had good reason to feel that way, especially in a country where the educational ladder was regarded as the most respectable source of social mobility. In the event, Mabel was uncomfortable with the rapid social mobility she experienced, and the meanings that rising segments of youth attached to it as the 'long sixties' progressed. As with many of her age peers, Mabel recalls that she 'got tired of that *caminito arriba* [upwards little road]' at a time when 'so many things seemed more pressing than earning a degree and making money'.[18] Along with many other young

people who, like her, had benefited from educational and job opportunities, Mabel joined the *Juventud Peronista* (Peronist Youth), a revolutionary organization linked to the Montoneros, a leftist urban guerrilla group. She understood the movement led by Juan Perón to be the best conduit for 'connecting with the people' in the road toward a 'liberated' nation.[19]

Politically minded youth contrasted the little road (*caminito*) with the road (*camino*). That was the case with the winners of a 1970 essay contest on youth and politics organized by a major publishing house. The main prize went to Antonio Brailovsky, aged 22, who, in both his essay and his acceptance address, argued that young people 'have two options: either following the *caminito* that an unjust system has traced for us, or following the *camino* towards a different, new society'.[20] The belittled *caminito* implied pursuing a university career and the possibility of upward mobility and integration into a bourgeois life, which modernizing thinkers such as Germani and many other South Americans thought desirable and possible in the 1960s. Needless to say, perhaps the majority of young women and men opted for the *caminito*. In doing so, they also participated in a burgeoning youth-oriented market dominated by new clothing fads and leisure patterns that juvenilized mass consumption entirely.[21] Radicalized youth viewed the affirmation of a mass-culture based on youth identity as still one more layer of the belittled *caminito* that ultimately helped solidify class inequalities. The *camino*, in contrast, was the promise of a different and allegedly better future society. 'I felt confused', wrote Viviana, aged 16, 'but I learned that the Revolution is the only possible *camino*'.[22]

In rejecting the *caminito*, though, politicizing young South Americans did not rid themselves of such advantages but aimed to use them to broaden the *camino*. As middle-class, educated youths, for example, they were part of the expanded and increasingly ideological audience that drove the success of the publishing industry in the 1960s, which in turn made possible the 'boom' in the Latin American literature that transformed the image of the subcontinent at home and abroad.[23] Besides reading the major writers of that literary 'boom' – Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, and Julio Cortázar, to mention a few – radicalized youth were also the privileged readers of an increasingly transnational political library. That library included, for example, Mao Tse Tung's *Red Book*, whose reading became mandatory for those who filled the ranks of a 'new left' then questioning the preeminence of the pro-Soviet Communist parties in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay and who, by the late 1960s, were embracing theories and practices of popular insurrection.[24]

The ideological transformations of the left in the Southern Cone encompassed the vindication of the Cuban process and, especially, of armed action as a means of starting the construction of socialist projects. Che Guevara's political writings, in this respect, also became best-sellers among radicalized youth, chiefly those that depicted his theories on the role of the

vanguards in generating the 'subjective' conditions for revolutionary processes through the creation of armed *focos* (foci). Whether *foquista* or *insurrectionalista*, pro-Cuban or pro-Chinese, supporters of national roads toward socialism or of internationalist endeavors, most radical youth were familiar with Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* and his ideas on the subjectivity of the colonizer and (neo) colonized in the Third World.[25] In one of the few common themes that cut across different ideological and political trends, these young people firmly believed that South America was part of a geography of oppression and rebellion marked by a 'neocolonial' system of power exemplified in the living conditions of the Andean peoples.

The identification of the Andes as a site for encountering the 'real' Latin America – that is, the impoverished peoples who suffered most of all from neocolonial power – stemmed from many politico-cultural endeavors. Perhaps no other endeavor was as significant as the documentaries produced by the group *Cine Liberación*, especially Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino's *La hora de los hornos* (1966–7). The filmmakers were themselves young men in the process of becoming politically engaged – in their case, with revolutionary Peronist groups. They intended to create a 'Third Cinema', distinct from the Hollywood-oriented paradigm as much as from the European cinema *de auteur*. Solanas and Getino's main goal with *La hora de los hornos* was to produce a consciousness-raising tool.[26] According to the filmmakers, in only six months during 1970 about 25,000 people (chiefly college students) in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay had watched the film in clandestine viewings and they had used it to discuss 'why our America is ready to act'.[27] The film was constructed to generate debate, especially as its aesthetic strategy drew on montage modeled after a 'contrasting effect' technique. They mixed, for example, images of the skyline of Buenos Aires city with the shacks of rural workers in the Andean portions of Argentina and thus produced a critique to the modernizing narrative that 'hid' the social effects of dependent capitalism.

In the first and most widely watched part of the three-part film, Solanas and Getino recounted how 'neocolonialism' produced violence through multiple means. In depicting violence as it materialized in land-tenure patterns and racism, for example, they focused on the sufferings of the Andean rural population. A voice-over comments that 90 per cent of these workers, 'live in shacks equal to the ones of the pre-Columbian era', while the camera gives close-ups of an unidentified indigenous community. Voiceless and evoking the 'real conditions of most Latin Americans', the landless peasants represented the 'wretched of the earth'. Myriad young South Americans joined the *camino* through their involvement in student, party, and guerrilla groups that promised to erode the conditions that made the existence of the 'wretched of the earth' possible. Many of them carved out their *camino* in more literal and geographical terms, that is, through travel practices.

In 1970, the Argentine historian and journalist Félix Luna wrote about what he termed 'neo-tourism' by commenting on how many young people had broken with the 'family-vacation paradigm' to explore unconventional destinations. Luna believed that the drive fueling the 'tide of young pilgrims' was their 'willingness to know our country, assume that it is theirs, and try to change it'.[28] The figure of the backpacker typified that 'pilgrim'. Already in 1966, journalistic reports informed readers that 50,000 backpackers, largely young men aged between 15 and 25, had overwhelmed the country's limited camping facilities and were demanding a 'backpacker identification card' to assist in the practice of 'safe hitchhiking'.[29] A 1970 government study indicated that 10 per cent of young women and men in the age group 18–25 that traveled that year were not 'in company of family members'; the study further noted that half of them went to destinations other than the conventional ones (in Argentina: the Atlantic Coast and Córdoba), and contrasted those 'traditional' tourism practices with the images of the backpacker jumping from trains in Tucumán, the Argentine province acting as the entry point to the Andes.[30] In the Andes, young Argentine travelers had the chance of meeting some Southern Cone peers and, most fundamentally, of meeting what they took as the 'real' Latin America and their peoples.

The southern fraction of the Andes (stretching through Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) had long served as a tourist destination. Beginning in the 1930s, the elites of some Argentine provinces, such as Tucumán, promoted the region as a point of overlap between the 'white' and Atlantic-oriented urban regions and the 'darker' Latin American-oriented Andes. More actively, in the 1950s the governments of Peru and Bolivia started international campaigns to promote the archeological sites of their countries (especially those related to the Inca Empire, such as Macchu Picchu) and to attract European and North American visitors.[31] In their efforts to attract domestic and international travelers, the Argentine elites and their Peruvian and Bolivian counterparts publicized the indigenous glorious past of the southern Andes as well as the agrarian and 'postcard' components of the indigenous populations in the mid twentieth century. The actual living and working conditions of the Andean peasants and workers, of course, went unmentioned in the promotional literature. However, alongside conceiving of the Andes as the repository of a pre-colonial Latin American identity, some unconventional travelers in the 1950s and many more young people in the 1960s sought out this 'social element' of Andean life.

It was precisely the social element of the Andes that attracted a soon-to-be famous visitor in the early 1950s, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, whose travels would be emulated by countless South American youth in the 'long sixties'. Che Guevara visited the Andean provinces of Argentina in 1950 and, more notoriously, the whole Andean corridor during his memorable continental trip in 1953. In both occasions, he was fueled by the desire to find 'revelations of hidden aspects of social reality'.[32] Traveling alone in 1950, Guevara

stopped in little villages and offered the rural dwellers his medical knowledge. He used his second trip to deepen his appreciation of the political realities of the countries he was visiting – and was naively disillusioned with the outcomes of the 1952 'national revolution' in Bolivia, a country where he would come back to fight and die in 1967. In that year, illustrating the increasingly radical political overtones of the left in the Southern Cone, groups of young people in Argentina and Uruguay were ready to cross the border and help revitalize Guevara's failed guerrilla project in the Bolivian forests, although only a few actually did so.[33] Many more young people instead replicated Guevara's other travel practices in their search for the 'real' Latin America that they linked to the Andes.

The *camino* either started or was consolidated by the travel practices to Andean or other unconventional destinations where the young encountered what they viewed as the 'real' Latin America. Those encounters took place during the summer vacations of college and secondary school students, who traveled in small groups and, by and large, outside hostel or camping networks. In this respect their travel experiences contrasted markedly with those of their European counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s.[34] In 1968, Luis Muñoz, for example, was already committed to political activism in the radical left of Santiago de Chile. Along with his brother, he decided to take the summer season to travel north along the Chilean portion of the Andes. They hitchhiked and reached their desired destination: the Antofagasta Desert, where they observed the 'miserable conditions of the workers'.[35] That same year, one female history student from the University of Buenos Aires shared a similar drive. She noted that visiting the southern Andes had broadened her knowledge of the country and 'its most humble people'. In 1971, a group of university students from La Plata concurred when describing their journey, which included stops in 'each single village from Tucumán to Jujuy' in Northern Argentina, where they encountered 'levels of poverty we did not think existed in South America'.[36]

For these young people, their travel experiences were eye-opening: although all picked their destinations and trajectories in order to find 'real' people and their living and working conditions, they all professed surprise at the depths of misery and oppression in which those peoples lived. What many of these young people had read and eventually heard from other travelers seemingly did little to prepare them for their face-to-face encounters with the 'real' people. To draw upon the terms used by the historian Joan Scott in her discussion of the epistemological status of 'experience' in the context of modernity, these youth assumed an inexorable liaison between 'experiencing' and 'seeing'.[37] Seeing was their means of approaching their 'other'. As in *La hora de los hornos*, so in young people's recollections, they 'saw' the Andean peasants, but the latter again remained largely voiceless.

Through their direct encounter with the Andean peoples, middle-class, educated travelers produced an ethical displacement in the form of a

'contrasting effect' – akin to what filmmakers Solanas and Getino proposed in their documentary. That displacement generated feelings of indignation and shame regarding their own class and cultural backgrounds, usually narrated in terms of a 'shock'. According to the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT, or Workers' Revolutionary Party) obituary, Hugo Macchi experienced a shock in his journey through Bolivia and Peru, when he 'immersed himself into conditions of suffering of the people'. Similarly, Cacho Narzole recalls that, along with his girlfriend, he made two trips to the Andes: 'while discovering the beauty of the landscapes', he wrote, 'we were shocked by the social reality of extreme poverty and the inhuman exploitation'.[38] Juan and María E., two former students at the University of Buenos Aires, brought up similar memories when recalling their 1972 four-week trip from Tucumán to Bolivia: 'We discovered how beautiful but how poor these countries were', Juan recalls. María E. supplements this memory by pointing out that, upon their return to Buenos Aires, 'we felt ashamed of how luxurious our lives looked like in comparison with those people's'.[39] For them, as surely for many other middle-class youth, that experience of travel and the contrast they established between their everyday lives and those of the Andean peoples were integral to a broader discovery. Indignation and shame propelled many young people to engage with or commit to political activism.

The political dimension was evident in the second kind of travel undertaken by the young. In a climate marked by the rising commitment of Catholics to social justice, scores of youth – sometimes immediately following their graduation from secondary school – carried out social work in the most impoverished regions of the Southern Cone countries. All three countries felt the effects of the Second Vatican Council (1962–5), which paved the way for a broad political, and generational, questioning of the Church's hierarchy and most conservative groups. The discussions set in motion by the Council, chiefly those related to the Church's privileged 'option for the poor', provided the framework for the emergence of new forms of action. These coincided with, and were reinforced by, the imposition of authoritarian regimes in Argentina (1966) and Uruguay (1968) as well as the erosion of the legitimacy of Christian Democracy in Chile (which paved the way for the Socialist victory in 1970). In those contexts, the organizational networks of the Catholic Church became increasingly politicized and afforded young women and men safe places to gather (parishes) and written materials to discuss (initially, the Council's documents), alongside new repertoires of action.[40]

Crossing the borders from Argentina to its neighboring countries, for example, the journal *Cristianismo y Revolución* appealed to, and politically radicalized, scores of Catholic youth. Launched in 1966 by the former seminarian Juan García Elorrio, its first editorial noted that the journal would reflect 'the feeling, the urgency, the forms, and the moments of Christians commitment to the revolution'.[41] The journal – whose readership soon rose

to 40,000 – published frequent reports on the situation in war-torn Vietnam because, as one editorial predicted, 'we, the oppressed in Latin America, will be the 1970s Vietnam'.[42] It also promoted materials authored by local clerics who, in 1967, founded the Third World Priests Movement and by those who, in 1968, fully endorsed the conclusions of the Conference of Archbishops in Medellín, which set the scene for the spread of Liberation Theology. The journal likewise served as the nexus for two-dozen activists who, also in 1967, founded the Camilo Torres Commando – an armed group that would later create the Montoneros guerrilla group. The Commando was named for the Colombian priest turned guerrilla (assassinated in 1966), who was an inspirational figure for the journal's staff and followers.[43] In its second issue, for example, *Cristianismo y Revolución* published a letter addressed to university students, wherein Torres reminded them that, in 'underdeveloped societies', they were privileged. If they wanted to become revolutionary, Torres asked them to 'ascend to the masses, share their poverty and persecution'.[44] As much as it resulted in new ethical and political moves, that mandate sometimes took the form of literal movements 'to the people'.

Catholic networks were crucial to the organization of groups who traveled to conduct social work in slums in the urban areas of Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo as well as in the rural areas of their respective countries – including the Andes in Argentina and in Chile. One of those groups was the Argentine Camilo Torres Commando, which was composed of two dozen young women and men from middle-class homes from Buenos Aires. In the summer of 1966, when most were only starting their political consciousness, they spent time in a small town in northern Santa Fe, conducting literary campaigns, teaching the gospel to children, and helping workers with their daily chores.[45] In the same region, a Catholic student group named Movimiento Ateneísta not only performed similar tasks but also produced a sociological report recounting their experiences with their province's woodcutters (*hacheros*). This report posited that those crossing the threshold of the forest gained access to a world dominated by the crudest social exploitation and collected data on the *hacheros*' malnutrition, illiteracy, and peonage. For these students, sharing the *hacheros*' daily life constituted 'an accelerated class on the nature of dependency and neocolonialism'. Other student groups carried out social work with cotton and cane cutters. The Movimiento Ateneísta took the most impoverished workers as the people's synecdoche and viewed in their 'reality' the most significant proof that the 'real' country lay far from the city ports and universities.[46]

Those travel experiences, however, were not restricted to Catholic, middle-class university youth. On one side of the social spectrum, Alejandro, a former upper-class youth from Córdoba, recalls that when he was a secondary school student he used to spend the weekdays and most of his time in the company of his 'social equals' – playing rugby, attending parties, or simply hanging out. When he began to develop a 'social consciousness',

and despite being 'secular', he decided that upon graduation in the summer of 1967 he would go with a priest to undertake social work in a little town in Misiones: 'witnessing so much poverty and suffering', he wrote, 'basically drove me crazy'. He abandoned his life of leisure and joined the PRT.[47] On the other side of the social spectrum, José, a former working-class boy who in 1970 went with his parish fellows to Santiago del Estero, recalled, 'That little town did not have anything: no doctor, no potable water, no gas or power. People worked hard for not having anything to feed their children with'. Along with other former travelers, José depicted this as an eye-opening experience: 'We took a practical class on social injustice, to say the least'.[48] For them, such journeys served both as a political-pedagogical initiative and as evidence of South America's Third World condition.

Travel practices allowed radicalized young people to come into direct contact with what they claimed was hidden behind the modernizing dynamics of the 'long sixties'. The contrast between their own urban, mostly middle-class experiences and the ones of the most impoverished workers of the rural areas inspired new feelings, and raised new questions. How could they remain indifferent vis-à-vis those realities? Either on their own or through Catholic networks, the travels that youth carried out were crucial to the shaping of a collective indignation. This was in turn an emotional resource that helped make 'an ideological and political perspective effective and convincing'.[49] The knot of that perspective was the 'revolutionary road', one that promised to 'de-colonize' South America and erode the social and economic bases of oppression. Many of these radicalized young people thought following that road was a matter of urgency. Alongside their travel practices, their consumption of a whole range of politico-cultural materials contributed to shaping the *camino* and led them to question their own status as 'youth'.

Youth and the consumption of the revolutionary road

This literal movement toward 'the people' was complemented by a profound transformation of patterns of cultural consumption among educated sections of South American society. While they chose Latin America over Europe as their preferred traveling destination, these young people eagerly participated in the global phenomenon of admiration for and consumption of so-called Third World political and cultural materials. Throughout the 1960s, 'new lefts' in Italy and France opened up their agendas to address anti-imperialism and racism in displays of solidarity with the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[50] Politicized youth in the Southern Cone not only aimed at expressing solidarity with these peoples but also sought to convince audiences at home and abroad that their region belonged to the Third World in its own right. This politico-cultural project required sustained and creative intellectual effort to dismantle the basic tenets of

the narrative of modernization that Germani, among others, had popularized. As a project, it crystallized in forms of cultural consumption that were intrinsic to the revolutionary road and to encounters with 'the people'. Radical youth both departed from the prevailing tastes of a transnational youth counterculture at the same time as they shifted away from the traditionally European-oriented cultural milieu of South America.

For a growing minority of university students, the encounter with the 'people' could take place as part of their formal curricular studies, particularly if they majored in the social sciences. Whether in public or private universities, during the 'long sixties' enrollment in social science departments grew steadily and at a faster pace than in other disciplines in the three countries of the Southern Cone. In these three countries, moreover, challenges to modernization theories proliferated in the late 1960s.[51] For instance, a cohort of professors at the Sociology Department of the University of Buenos Aires taught undergraduate-level courses and created the journal *Antropología 3er Mundo* with the explicit goal of questioning Eurocentric cultural orientations and methodologies for understanding Latin America. Professors taught classes on the 'history of the popular struggles', where they exposed students to the works of Franz Fanon and 'national thinkers', such as Juan Perón. In 1969, a professor explained that the goal was to produce the 'mental liberation' of the 'ideological vanguard of the middle classes' (i.e., students), and he viewed the outcome so far in positive terms, since 'they have begun to conceive of our country as a Third World nation'.[52] Similarly, another professor taught a seminar in the 1971 school year on the choice between rural or urban guerrilla in Latin America, for which he made works by Che Guevara and interviews with the Uruguayan guerrilla Tupamaros required reading.[53] Social science students, thus, were familiar with theoretical and political frameworks for approaching the 'real Latin American peoples'. According to one survey conducted in bookstores in Buenos Aires, however, college students at large – and not only social science majors – privileged essays such as *The Open Veins of Latin America* (1971), by the Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano. Aimed at unraveling the effects of colonialism and neocolonialism, this essay endowed its readers with powerful tools to grasp why the 'real' Latin America suffered from so much oppression, poverty, and disentitlement.[54]

In terms of cultural consumption, attempts to encounter 'the real' Latin American peoples went far beyond the written word and encompassed numerous styles of music. In the three Southern Cone countries, the so-called New Song movement acquired prominence. Although it had variegated roots, the recognized forerunners of what came to be known as the 'New Song', namely the Argentine Atahualpa Yupanqui and the Chilean Violeta Parra, shared a willingness to represent 'the people' usually in their song lyrics and in their use of certain musical instruments of indigenous origin.[55] In blending poetic and musical indigeneity with a celebration of

the culture of the poor Andean peasants and workers, Yupanqui paved the way for the renovation of the so-called folk music that permeated the 'New Song' movement in the 'long sixties'. In 1971, a business report showed that the records by groups and singers who expressly tried to reflect the experiences and struggles of the 'real' Latin American peoples (such as the Chilean Inti Illymani and Quilapayún, and the Uruguayan Daniel Viglietti) had become especially popular among one segment of the Argentine public: college students in the age group 18–24.[56]

The same held true for Chile. Upon the electoral triumph of socialist Salvador Allende in September of 1970, Chile became the epicenter of musical production related to the 'real' Latin American peoples and a Mecca for young artists and musicians from the Southern Cone countries. As in Cuba throughout the 1960s, the Chilean government also endorsed a cultural politics geared to celebrate an assumed popular culture associated with the indigenous peoples of South America. That politics transpired in the funding of musical schools as well as in the organization of festivals combining a vindication of popular culture with overtly radicalized and anti-imperialistic political overtones. Both onstage and off stage, these festivals gathered thousands of youth eager to encounter 'the people'.[57]

The stress on encountering and engaging with 'the people' sometimes led to either an overt rejection or a practical erasure of certain markers of a transnational youth culture. Many left-wing intellectuals and young activists, for example, plainly rejected what they regarded as the hippie phenomenon. Intellectuals in Chile and Argentina thought that the hippies in the 'central countries' represented a progressive movement against consumerism and bureaucratization but that their counterparts in the periphery were a bad copy: 'what *there* means healthy unconformity', an essayist wrote, '*here* is alienating marginality'.[58] Two other intellectuals explained that 'the Latin American hippie movement is fueled by clothing firms', and argued that pacifist slogans just distracted youth from 'more effective rebellions'.[59] These intellectuals viewed the local hippies as emulative and politically demobilizing, a belief shared among many politicized youth as well. In 1972, in a roundtable with secondary-school students in Buenos Aires, for example, a young woman argued that the local hippies were 'all snobs, the product of the *cipaya* [pro-imperialist] propaganda'. A Trotskyist boy, aged 16, said that through the hippies 'the *yanquis* colonized youth and make them drowsy'.[60]

Stereotypical representations of the hippie phenomenon in turn pervaded the representations of the so-called generation gap and ultimately of youth. Beginning in the late 1960s, especially in Argentina and Chile, young left-wing intellectuals and writers discussed the meanings of the 'generation gap'. Some understood that it did exist in the 'central countries' propelled by 'the hippies and other groups that contest the prevalent mores of "dead" societies'.[61] However, most refused to conceive

of a 'gap' occurring in Latin America. As the 1960s went on and ideas of 'generational struggle' informed some interpretations of revolts worldwide, leftist intellectuals and writers came to oppose it to 'class struggle'. After the publication of Armand and Michelle Mattelart's study on Chilean youth's political opinions and cultural preferences, for example, a debate unfolded as to whether a focus on 'generation and youth' was valid in a 'class-divided society'. Critics accused the Mattelarts of helping solidify the 'myth of youth', that is, 'the belief that a unified youth experience is as important as class contradictions'.[62] The scorn of generation and of 'youth' as politically mobilizing categories was based upon the assumption that they were both bourgeois par excellence. As writer Ricardo Piglia put it, 'youth', is a 'prorogue in life to which only the children of the bourgeoisie have access'. Thus, Piglia wrote, 'defining youth means denying youth: accepting that mask implies helping with mystifications with the postponement of decisions'. He thought that it was vital to 'repudiate the irresponsible age in which the rules of the game are (delicately) learnt'.[63] Piglia captured the most persistent tensions surrounding young people's organized involvement in radical politics, including the conception of youth as a mask obliterating class-based dynamics and the concern that accepting the 'mystification' that youth entailed diverted energies from more pressing political initiatives.

In their engagement with revolutionary politics young South Americans tried to erase markers of youthfulness from themselves in order to merge into the broader 'people'. This move conditioned the ways in which young activists and militants perceived the global revolts unleashed in '1968'. Sharing similar perceptions with left-wing students in Mexico and Brazil, the Argentine and Uruguayan students did not take heed of the notion that their European equivalents also tried to 'bridge the gaps' with the working classes, as was evident in the demonstrations in Paris and in the occupations of university and factory buildings in Turin.[64] Hence, when in 1968 a popular magazine surveyed Argentine youth about their opinions of the 'youth revolt' in Europe many responded that they did not agree with demands 'centered on their problems'. Another survey, seeking to elucidate the circulation of Herbert Marcuse's ideas, showed that 'his influence is minimal'. Most disagreed with Marcuse's statement regarding the revolutionary status of the student in societies where the workers had presumably lost their vanguard role, due to the attendant effects of rising consumerism and technocracy. 'If that thesis works for Europe, it does not for us', one student argued.[65] As they became leading actors in domestic politics, middle-class and educated students tried to differentiate their engagement from that of their European counterparts. One Argentine student group, for example, posited that by only 'truly blurring our class origins' could they instantiate 'our encounter with the Latin American peoples and their struggles'.[66]

Politicized young South Americans not only downplayed their 'student condition' but also other markers of youthfulness. The tendency of many to caricature the 'hippie phenomenon' suggested their view of it as an individualistic, hedonist, and ultimately senseless genre of youth rebellion – a criticism common among many other youth-based political movements across the globe at that time.[67] However, their political and cultural options were also, unavoidably, filtered through the prism of consumption practices. The political debates and multilayered displacements (ethical, cultural, and geographical) that made the 'revolutionary road' were nurtured by new practices of cultural consumption. The young women and men who, as students, benefited the most from the modernizing dynamics that they questioned, learned how to imagine and delineate their *camino*. They drew upon a variety of politico-cultural materials that focused on a Latin American identity with the 'real' people at its heart – and foregrounded them to efface other possible identities, such as those associated with age. At the same time that they were becoming key political and cultural actors young women and men in the Southern Cone countries refused to conceive of themselves primarily as 'youth' and instead chose to inhabit the more all-embracing identity of the 'people'.

In Argentina, if there was a political movement that 'benefited' most from the politicization of young people, it was Peronism. It was within this political space that young people were more forcefully framed as political actors and youth as a political category, and it was within Peronism that a generational language served to codify and enact ideological and political disputes. The young who strove to 'connect with the people' believed that Peronism was the natural venue for that encounter. Yet the engagement of young people with revolutionary trends within Peronism was anything but natural. At its most basic level, Perón understood that 'youth' represented the possibility that his movement might transcend its generational limits. Since the mid-1960s he had called for *trasvasamiento generacional* (generational transference) and insisted that young people should prepare to infuse new blood into his movement. To that end, they were to forge a 'just political line' by developing an 'anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-oligarchic attitude' and understanding that 'coexistence between the exploiters and the exploited' was impossible. From Perón's perspective, youth should prepare to fight against the exploiters 'even if they were infiltrated within our movement'.[68] For many young people, that call for ideological and generational change implied the chance of conceiving of Peronism as the incarnation of a 'national liberation' movement and as the national road toward socialism. In the early 1970s, a generational language served to codify political and ideological battles within Peronism, where 'youth' denoted the radicalized left-wing sectors (whether they were young or not). Those battles turned more dramatic once elections were held in March of 1973 and Perón was given a last chance to make his comeback as president until his death

in July 1974. As I have argued elsewhere, in those years when the 'national revolution' seemed to many young people to be close at hand, the disputes within Peronism were shaped like a dramatic family romance, in which the 'young' would try to share power with the 'old' – the right-wing factions – while everyone depended on the authority emanating from the father-like figure, namely Perón himself.[69] When Perón died, he left to the 'old' the task of embarking upon a project to reconstitute social hierarchies and politico-cultural 'order'. The horror of this increasingly dreadful project reached new heights during Argentina's last military dictatorship (1976–83). As the Report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People showed, 70 per cent of the 20,000 victims of state terrorism were between 16 and 30 years old at the time they were kidnapped.[70] Most of those young women and men had traveled the 'revolutionary road' that helped define the contours of the 'long sixties' and, with their deaths, that era reached a tragic end.

Conclusion

In carving out their version of the revolutionary road, *el camino*, politicized young South Americans sought out what they identified as the hidden side – and the 'real' side – of the modernizing 1960s. Produced through localized travel practices and cultural patterns of consumption, the movement toward 'the people' left its mark on both the Southern Cone's political culture and youth culture. Those who occupied the category of youth in the 'long sixties' in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay entered *en masse* in the political arena, usually by pursuing the most radical political options. In Argentina and Uruguay, those options entailed the active support of guerrilla activities as a means of speeding up political change in order to shift the socio-economic and political bases of those countries toward the ideal classless societies of the future. The allure of guerrilla activities and the notion of 'popular war' crystallized in the organization of the largest guerrilla groups in Latin America, the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros. Both groups (and the myriad student organizations that supported them) were overwhelmingly composed of young women and men who had come to believe that the 'revolutionary road' offered the only chance of overcoming 'neocolonialism' and of reversing the conditions that made what they thought of as the 'real' South America possible. The 'revolutionary road', for many young people, had started with geographical displacements toward the supposed heart of South America: the Andes. Rather than conventional tourism focusing on the sights elicited by the mountains and on the archeological sites related to the pre-Spanish era, politicized youth sought to encounter the 'real' people. The indigenous peoples of the Andes, hence, came to embody the effects of centuries of colonialism and neocolonialism: socio-economic oppression, cultural neglect, and political disentitlement. For droves of middle-class youth, the experience of 'discovering' the life and

working conditions of the peasants and workers in the Andes also contributed to the shaping of certain emotions, such as indignation and shame, which eventually inspired them to engage with revolutionary politics.

When joining the *camino*, young women and men also questioned the cultural category of youth that throughout the 1960s evoked rebellion. In the new political culture that radical youth configured, 'rebellion' was not enough. The 'revolutionary road' required the pursuit of other means to oppose a social order that most young women and men dubbed unjust – however modernizing it might be. Moreover, joining the 'revolutionary road' also required subtler displacements than alternative touristic practices. In producing their own identities based upon mobility, these young people forged a transnational network associated with the imagery of the Third World. This was ideally to help them to produce cultural and social displacements and to allow them to merge into 'the people'. In doing so, politicized young South Americans opted, perhaps unsuccessfully, to erase their student condition as well as other possible markers of youthfulness (as incarnated in their contemporaneous transnational youth culture) and to occupy the same category as the very 'people' that they were imagining.

Notes

1. 'Hugo Macchi', *Estrella Roja*, No. 64, 17 November 1975, 4.
2. E. Che Guevara (1997) 'Socialism and Man in Cuba [1965]' in D. Deutschmann (ed.) *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics, and Revolution* (Melbourne: Ocean Press), pp. 196–8.
3. B. Davis (2010) 'A Whole World Opening Up: Transcultural Contact, Difference, and the Politicization of New Left Activists' in B. Davis et al. (ed.) *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the US in the 1960s and 1970s* (New York: Berghahn), pp. 255–73.
4. D. Sorensen (2007) *A Turbulent Decade Remembered: Scenes from the Latin American Sixties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 7.
5. See, for example, C. Gilman (2003) *Entre la pluma y el fusil: Debates y dilemas del escritor revolucionario en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI); A. Marchesi (2009) 'Geografías de la protesta armada: Nueva izquierda y latinoamericanismo en el Cono Sur', *Sociohistórica*, 25, 41–72.
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8. D. MacCannell (1999) *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisured Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
9. See especially M. J. S. Portillo (2003) *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas in the Age of Development* (Durham: Duke University Press).
10. R. I. Jobs (2009) 'Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968', *American Historical Review*, 114 (2), 376–404.
11. V. Gosse (1993) *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of a New Left* (New York: Verso).
12. G. Germani (1971) *Sociología de la modernización: estudios teóricos, metodológicos y aplicados a América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Paidós), pp. 12, 14.
13. G. Rama (1972) 'Educación media y estructura social en América Latina', *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales*, 4 (3), 109.
14. G. Germani and R. Sautu (1965) *Regularidad y origen social de los estudiantes universitarios* (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Sociología), p. 14.
15. D. Cano (1985) *La educación superior en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano), p. 46; D. Kublitshko (1980) *El origen social de los estudiantes de la Universidad de Buenos Aires* (Washington: PNUD–CEPAL), p. 19.
16. A. Frondizi (1978) *Mensajes presidenciales*, Vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Nacionales), p. 18; 'Charter of Punta del Este' (1961), *The Department of State Bulletin*, 45 (1159), 468.
17. For Argentina, see *Censo Nacional de Población y Viviendas* (1964), 1960, Vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía), pp. 68–9; *Censo Nacional de Población, Familias y Viviendas (1974)*, 1970, Vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía), pp. 38–9.
18. S. Mabel (b. in 1951 in Valentín Alsina, Buenos Aires), interviewed by author, 13 September 2007.
19. On the Peronist Youth, see R. Gillespie (1982) *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros* (New York: Clarendon Press).
20. 'Crítico pájaro de juventud', *Análisis*, No. 458, 23 December 1969, 42; see also Brailovsky (1970) 'Cuestionamiento de la Argentina contemporánea' in *México y Argentina visto por sus jóvenes* (México: Siglo XXI, 1970), p. 21.
21. See Manzano, *The Age of Youth in Argentina*, chapter 3.
22. 'Cartas', *Nuevo Hombre*, No. 25, March 1972, 12.
23. On the political and cultural dimensions of that boom, see J. Franco (2003) *The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
24. See I. Gilbert (2008) *La Fede: Alistándose para la revolución* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana), pp. 535–40; V. Markarian (2012) *El 68' Uruguayo: entre cócteles Molotov y música beat* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes), pp. 105–7.
25. A. Cattaruzza (1997) 'Un mundo por hacer: una propuesta para el análisis de la cultura juvenil en la década del setenta', *Entrepasados*, 13.
26. See F. Solanas and O. Getino (1997) 'Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World (1971)' in M. T. Martin (ed.) *New Latin American Cinema*, Vol. 1 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press), pp. 33–58. For an overview on the aesthetics of the social and political documentary in the 1960s, see E. Bernini (2007) 'El documental político argentino: una lectura' in J. Sartora and S. Rival (eds) *Imágenes de lo real: la representación de lo político en el documental argentino* (Buenos Aires: Libraria), pp. 21–34.
27. F. Solanas and O. Getino (1973) *Cine, cultura y descolonización* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI), p. 84.
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8

Movement Youth in a Global Sixties Hub: The Everyday Lives of Transnational Activists in Postcolonial Dar es Salaam

Andrew Ivaska

Writing in a mimeographed student journal in 1970, long before he would become a household name across Africa as president of Uganda, a young Yoweri Museveni reflected on his undergraduate years away from home at the University of Dar es Salaam in neighboring Tanzania. He explained how the choice to leave Uganda for university abroad but not in the West was a natural one at the time for any young East African with leftist political leanings. Tanzania's capital city, after all, had developed an unparalleled 'atmosphere of freedom fighters, socialists, nationalizations [and] anti-imperialism', Museveni recalled, one which he was determined to join 'at any cost'.[1] By the time Museveni arrived in 1967, Dar es Salaam had already seen Che Guevara and Malcolm X come through town on tours of this 'revolutionary' capital. Over the course of the next several years, many more leading lights of a 'global sixties' left would follow: Stokely Carmichael, C.L.R. James, Angela Davis, Giovanni Arrighi, Eldridge Cleaver, Walter Rodney, Amiri Baraka, Robert F. Williams, Ruth First – to name but a selection. As one of Museveni's peers at the university would remark, in Dar es Salaam 'you could not help but be infected by the liberation bug'.[2]

The 1960s and early 1970s did indeed see Dar es Salaam emerge as a key nodal point for transnational political activism. Developing in counterpoint to dramas of armed movements against the colonial holdouts of Southern Africa, a shifting US civil rights struggle, Cold War geopolitics, and student movements on campuses worldwide, this 'Dar scene' was composed of a few distinct strands. First, there were the thousands of political refugees attached to the several Southern African liberation movements in exile there. The major nationalist movements battling colonialism's holdouts in

Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, and Apartheid South Africa all established their headquarters-in-exile at one point or another in Dar es Salaam, drawn by President Julius Nyerere's commitment to make his newly independent Tanzania a key 'frontline state' in the push against white settler regimes further south. They were joined by well over a thousand African American activists, including scores of Black Panthers fleeing FBI harassment, who saw the country as an exciting site for political engagement with the continent and, in many cases, long-term settlement there. Competing Chinese, Soviet, and Cuban government interests were active too. And then there were the many other fellow travelers from around the world, including such prominent figures on the left as Walter Rodney and Giovanni Arrighi, who were drawn to live and work in Tanzania by Nyerere's experiments in *ujamaa* socialism. The university (hereafter UDSM), where Arrighi and Rodney were mainstays of a small but very visible group of international socialist faculty, also saw the emergence of a vocal student left drawing from across East Africa – one which Museveni not only joined, as he had hoped, but in which he ended up playing a central role.[3]

These networks may have been distinct, following differing paths to Dar es Salaam, but once there they intersected and overlapped with one another. Many young African Americans in Tanzania, for instance, had a whole political world open up to them through contact with members of the Southern African liberation movements in the capital. For their part, these latter movements used the occasion of the Sixth Pan-African Congress – held in Dar es Salaam in 1974 as a marker of the city's prominent place on the landscape of transnational black politics – as an opportunity to make connections with a new potential set of North American allies in the struggle against colonialism. The university student and faculty left – hosting prominent speakers from a global black diaspora, taking trips to volunteer with the Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO, at their frontlines in Southern Tanzania – often served as a medium for these contacts between liberation movement partisans and recently arrived African Americans. With these multilateral connections playing out spatially across a relatively small set of sites – downtown hotel bars, university lecture halls, liberation movement offices, parties at the Cuban or Algerian embassies – they formed a critical mass that could rightly be called a scene. Bringing together the worlds of globally oriented Marxists, black diasporic politics in both Marxist and Black Power forms, campus radicals, and international antiapartheid campaigners, Dar es Salaam was uncontested among African cities of the time as a hub for a transnational, global 1960s left. This status, while looming large in the memories of many activists of the period, has received surprisingly little attention in histories of either the movements involved or of Dar es Salaam itself.

As was the case for many other global 1960s hubs, a vast majority of the activists passing through or settling in Dar es Salaam in this period were

young, in their 20s or very early 30s.[4] They were also young in social terms. Most were unmarried, either still in school or only recently out of it, and had yet to establish themselves materially or in secure careers. This youthfulness, and the heightened mobility, affective intensity, and curiosity that often attended it, was a critical factor shaping the trajectories of activist experience in the city. 'Youth' was also at work across Dar es Salaam's activist landscape as a discursive category. The meanings of youth were multiple and contested: these meanings arrived in Dar es Salaam through varied paths, emerging from different, if overlapping, contexts in which the confluence of politics and youth was a force to be reckoned with. Nor do these meanings fall easily into 'Western' and 'African' boxes; rather, such categories were cross-cut and exceeded by competing notions of youth. For instance, in the case of the young African Americans signing up for the Pan-African Skills Project (PAS) (a volunteer program matching recent college graduates from the diaspora with Tanzanian ministries in need of skilled public-sector workers), one notion of youth oriented around service intersected uneasily with a spirit of youth adventurism. In contrast to both, the 'youth' of the black activists arriving in Tanzania to work on the preparations for the Sixth Pan-African Congress (like the core of the transnational student left on UDSM's campus) operated as a much more vanguardist and self-consciously political category. These strands from abroad met still other battles over the meaning of youth with roots in Dar es Salaam itself. As I have illustrated elsewhere, the Tanzanian capital in those early postcolonial years was the site of a struggle between ruling party attempts to harness youth into a potent but pliant political force and challenges to this effort by young people carving out new ways of being in the city. Tanzanian government rhetoric alternately portrayed youth as heroes of rural development or decadent saboteurs of this process; young Tanzanians in Dar es Salaam opposed the state's repeated bans on 'indecent' music and dress by articulating oppositional urban identities as 'new teenagers'.[5] Both as ontological condition and discursive category, then, youth was a force to be reckoned with in the city's world of activists, in ways that included but also exceeded the moments when it was an explicit focus of political action.

If, descriptively speaking, the networks of political activists crisscrossing Dar es Salaam were interconnected, transnational, and young, these traits also were central in the political opportunities they opened up, the challenges they posed, and the complications and limits they faced. This chapter proceeds by tracing some of the key patterns and defining character of Dar's transnational activist scene, focusing in particular on African American activists in town and their intersections with the university left and Southern African liberation movement cadres in exile. The relationships of these networks to both transnationality and youth were key to the way they built a vibrant political scene – one sustained through everyday affective connections and productive of political openings that exceeded

the nation-based visions of both the Tanzanian state and many of the liberation movements it hosted. Alongside the lively solidarities forged between its young activists, however, the Dar scene was also the site of significant tensions, disconnects, frictions, and ruptures between would-be comrades. And, if its transnationality and youth shaped the conditions of possibility for the scene's vibrancy, they also were important factors in its moments of strife.

'Returnees', refugees, and campus radicals: everyday routes to and through Dar es Salaam

Black America, through its people, politics, and aesthetics, made a significant impact in Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Especially after the military coup overthrowing Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, Tanzania became the main African destination for black diasporic intellectuals and activists seeking to develop personal and political linkages between civil rights struggles in North America and liberation movements on the African continent.[6] Such visits were varied in both motivation and form. With many on the left attracted by Nyerere's commitment to 'African socialism' and pan-African liberation, others with more cultural nationalist leanings were drawn by 'back to Africa' sentiments that connected powerfully with *ujamaa*'s declared basis in idealized African cultural norms. For some, such as the many Black Panthers for whom Nyerere provided a haven from harassment by the FBI, there were also pressing personal situations. Others came as part of volunteer programs like the PAS, a project founded by a handful of high-profile civil rights leaders from the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to 'gather the much needed technical skills of Afro-Americans to assist in the internal development of *our Motherland*, Africa' and to 'help bridge a gap, brought about through years of deliberate misinformation on the part of others, between Afro-Americans and our African Brothers and Sisters'.[7] By the time Dar es Salaam played host to the Sixth Pan-African Congress in 1974, this community of *wawereaji*, or 'returnees', constituted a significant presence across the capital's everyday social landscape.

New arrivals, nearly all in their 20s, sometimes landed in Dar es Salaam with only a latent sense of political commitment. For those who were already budding activists in the US, their politics was almost always of national scope, engagements focused on campus protests and the civil rights struggles dominating news back home.[8] In Dar, however, African American newcomers found it easy to connect to one another and to the various strands of political work happening in the city through a web of associations in which youthful social life and political activism fed easily into one another. In this way, the process of negotiating a new city – with all the everyday contingencies that went along with it – was often simultaneously

an expansion of political sensibilities. Prexy Nesbitt's story illustrates this well. Born into a Chicago family with a tradition of union organizing, Nesbitt first came to Tanzania as a 21-year-old undergraduate studying abroad for a year at UDSM on a program arranged by Antioch College, his home campus. He had already been involved at Antioch in an effort to desegregate the local barbershop, but it was in Dar that his exposure to the community of activists around the Southern African liberation movements there would spark what would become a lifetime of political engagement with Africa. As Nesbitt recounts, a series of quotidian connections – some fortuitous, others built – facilitated this exposure:

> [Ed and Gretchen Hawley] were already in Dar es Salaam and drove up to Nairobi, Kenya to meet me. Ed was working already then as the pastor to refugees in '65 in Tanzania. And he had left our family's church. And Ed was a great friend to our family, and we were a great friend to Ed. So Ed and Gretchen drive up to Nairobi and meet me, and we drive back from Nairobi to Dar in some old Peugeot. And immediately, the community that I become a part of is some of the ANC [African National Congress] refugees, who, a couple of them, are attending school at the University of Dar es Salaam. Through them I then meet the Harvard Tanganyika group. And through the Harvard Tanganyika group, and particularly though seeing a woman named Mary Yarwood, I would get introduced to the Mozambique Institute, to the AAI [Africa-America Institute] school in Kurasini, and really get exposure to that whole community of Southern Africans living in Tanzania. So, I can remember, for example, going to speak to the Africa-America Institute refugees about Malcolm X.[9]

It is worth taking a close look at the specific associations that ended up linking Nesbitt to 'that whole community of Southern Africans' and beyond, for they shed fine-grained light on the ways in which the transnational political networks that made up Dar's activist scene could intersect and feed off one another. Ed Hawley (whom Nesbitt knew from his family's social justice-oriented church that Hawley led in Chicago) was a Protestant pastor who had been brought to Tanzania through his deep friendship with FRELIMO president Eduardo Mondlane. This relationship stretched back to 1951 when both were classmates at Oberlin College. Counting himself among the 'thousands of Americans, black and white, who first became aware of the aspirations to independence of colonial Africa through the speeches of Eduardo Mondlane during his 12 years in the United States', Hawley's relationship with Mondlane would propel him toward a lifelong career as a prominent antiapartheid activist.[10] If Hawley's work with political refugees from the liberation movements connected Nesbitt to the South African ANC students in Dar, it was these students' friends from UDSM – American exchange students themselves – who introduced Nesbitt to their

volunteer teaching sites, both of which were social centers for activists in town: FRELIMO's school and ideological training ground, the Mozambique Institute, and the Africa-America Institute school just outside the capital. Established as a nonprofit organization by a group of prominent African American professors in 1950s Washington, DC, the Africa-America Institute (AAI) ran education programs across independent Africa; its Tanzania project focused on Southern African political refugees. Closing the circle of connections linking Nesbitt through Dar's activist scene, the Mozambique Institute itself was run by Janet Mondlane, Eduardo's American wife whom he had met in 1951 while leading a workshop on Africa at a Midwestern church retreat. The two were married five years later in Chicago by Hawley, one of the couple's staunchest defenders against objections to their interracial romance from both Janet's suburban family and many of Eduardo's FRELIMO comrades-to-be.[11]

Nesbitt's year-abroad in Tanzania had a distinct impact on his political horizons. He returned to school in the US in 1966 and immediately founded the Antioch Committee for a Free South Africa to spearhead a campaign (successful ten years later) to pressure the College to divest its holdings in apartheid South Africa. The next year, having completed a senior thesis project in the form of a collaborative, student-taught course on the Third World (his contribution was a section on Tanzania's relationship to Southern African liberation movements), Nesbitt enrolled in a PhD program in African history at Columbia University. He soon found himself drawn to 'take some other options politically than anything that would be what Columbia could offer'.[12] These political alternatives ranged from playing a key role in the 1968 student uprising at Columbia, to pursuing a more formal involvement with FRELIMO. Beginning with protests led by black students over the terms of the university's expansion into Harlem, the Columbia occupation had quickly expanded into a broader student revolt over Vietnam War-related research being done on campus. Nesbitt, influenced by his time in Tanzania, was instrumental in coaxing his core of African American activists occupying Hamilton Hall to internationalize their struggle in this way.[13] His role in the protest also carried personal costs. One of a handful of graduate students arrested during the occupation, Nesbitt also had his fellowship revoked by Columbia, which he then left.[14]

Within a week he was drafted. Nesbitt had already approached Shafrudin Khan, FRELIMO's charismatic representative at the UN with an appeal to join the organization's military wing. It was when Khan, with the help of a timely phone conversation with Mondlane, convinced him to work for the Mozambique Institute instead, that Nesbitt, now 23 years old, ended up back in Dar es Salaam two years after leaving. Remembered even then by some of the students there for his AAI lectures on Malcolm X, the Mozambique Institute would become Nesbitt's home for the next two years as he taught and helped edit FRELIMO's English-language journal. Far from dropping

off his radar, the US political scene would continue to animate Nesbitt during his Tanzania years. In 1969, for instance, he publicly turned down his Selective Service deferment in a feature op-ed in one of Dar es Salaam's newspapers, an act he remembers for the shunning it earned him from US embassy personnel at the UDSM swimming pool.[15]

Several features of Nesbitt's trajectory and the web of connections linking him through Dar es Salaam's activist scene and beyond were common ones for young African Americans recently arrived in the capital. The place of the Mozambique Institute, the AAI school, and UDSM as mediums between new arrivals from the US and members of liberation movements in Dar was one. The AAI's links to the civil rights movement and the Mozambique Institute's connections through the Mondlanes to the budding world of US-based support for Southern African liberation movements made these two institutions ideal choices for African Americans seeking an affiliation in Dar es Salaam. Both schools had a constant (and, in the case of the Mozambique Institute, quite global) stream of volunteers through the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, it was no accident that young activists spending time in Tanzania connected with FRELIMO and South Africa's African National Congress (which, beginning in the late 1970s, had a school upcountry) far more than any of the other liberation movements with offices, but no schools, in town. Nor were transnational activists from afar the only young people in Dar connecting to FRELIMO through its institute. The heart of the university student left, a Museveni-founded group named USARF (itself a transnational organization, but of East African rather than global scale), made volunteering at the Institute a significant part of its program.[16] What began as fieldtrips to tutor there led to a substantial enough involvement with the movement to include the organization of a 'FRELIMO Day' on campus and month-long, quasi-military trips to the front in northern Mozambique for many USARF members during their vacation time.[17]

The multidirectional flow of knowledge and praxis that marked Nesbitt's route through the circuits crisscrossing Dar was another notable feature of many young activists' trajectories. As a number of the cases considered below suggest, many African American activists' experiences in Dar resulted, like Nesbitt's, in a broadening of political horizons that fed back into – and internationalized – their political interventions back in the US. But these were also often mirrored by flows in the other direction, ranging from the interest Nesbitt's lectures on Malcolm X sparked in young FRELIMO cadres, to the way Stokely Carmichael's visit to UDSM inspired the transnational student left there, to the way the Sixth Pan-African Congress expanded Southern African liberation movements' opportunities to build support in the black diaspora.[18]

Nesbitt's recollections are not alone in foregrounding the affective and quotidian manner in which connections in Dar – at parties or through chance meetings at local centers for expatriate activists like the AAI or the

Mozambique Institute, via introductions through roommates or lovers – were often made, cultivated, and remembered. Bill Sutherland, an African American Quaker who came to Tanzania from a political past in the US as a conscientious objector and civil rights campaigner and would go on to be a central hub for the activist community in Dar over the next 25 years, described meeting Malcolm X in 1964 at a party given by the Algerian Embassy in Tanzania:

> He had full participation in this party, without drinking, without dancing, but just fully enjoying others doing their thing. Malcolm remained out in the kitchen, but would talk to people as they came to refresh their drinks. He was perfectly at ease.
>
> My meeting with him there resulted in my being his chauffeur for the next week, because he was staying at the Deluxe Inn in Dar and didn't have transport. Although he had sessions with people in government, including President Nyerere, he apparently wasn't put in the category of V.I.P. official visitor... He also met with members of the African American community, and spent quite a bit of time with some Harvard volunteers who were teaching at a school for refugees near Dar. A lot of his most lively discussions were with these white folks from Harvard... Another session that I attended was at the Zahir Restaurant in Dar, with Chucha Hunonu [*sic*]. Chucha was a member of the Unity Movement of South Africa, which was one of the smaller revolutionary groups, closely associated with the Trotskyists. It was 3 o'clock in the morning and the animated discussions were carried over plates of shrimps and rice.[19]

The quotidian, even mundane character of Sutherland's recollections of his week with Malcolm convey in a compelling manner the everyday texture of the Dar scene (not to mention confirming key parts of the broad circuitry of connections worked through by Nesbitt a year later). Rather than being of peripheral importance to life in Dar's activist circles, a minor appendage to the 'real' political work being done, the affective quality of the connections being made there was a key element in the political 'coming of age' that many of Dar's young sojourners credit the city with sparking.[20]

Coming of age in the Dar Scene: affect and the political at the Sixth Pan-African Congress

By the early 1970s Dar es Salaam would become such a recognized center of black diasporic political activity that when discussions began among key Caribbean and North American black activists over holding a Sixth Pan-African Congress (6-PAC), this time on the continent of Africa, Tanzania was the first choice of venue. President Nyerere enthusiastically endorsed

the suggestion, and, after three years of sometimes fraught planning, the congress was held in Dar es Salaam in June 1974 with more than 600 young delegates from across the diaspora in attendance (over 200 from North America alone). They included some of the leading figures in diasporic politics of the time: Amiri Baraka, Haki Madhubuti, Owusu Sadaukai, Walter Rodney, Horace Campbell, and Courtland Cox, among others.[21]

Considering that '6-PAC' would serve as an exemplary site for the playing out of some of the key debates within black diasporic politics of the early 1970s (the cleavages between cultural nationalists and Marxists, for instance), it is somewhat curious that the event has been paid only slight attention in African American historiography.[22] In African studies it has yet to be considered. The few published analyses of the congress, whether at the time or more recently, center on the public and explicitly ideological contests between and among planners and hosts. Here I want instead to raise an aspect of the experience of the congress, which, while absent in analyses of it, looms large in participants' recollections: its character as a coming-of-age moment, lived through affective experiences infused with a youthful intensity.

One of the places where this comes through most powerfully is in the descriptions of 6-PAC by some of the women playing a crucial role in its organization. From the very beginning of the planning stages, female activists occupied central organizational places. These were largely in logistics (reflecting a division of labor typical of the time, even within politically progressive organizations), but were nonetheless key leadership positions. The advance team sent to oversee on-site preparation for 6-PAC, for instance, was almost entirely young and female. They included people like Sylvia Hill (a new teacher at Macalester College), Geri Augusto (a DC activist who had worked as the Washington correspondent for the Tanzanian *Nationalist*), Kathy Flewellen (a student of Hill's), and Mary Jane Patterson (an older civil rights activist who had worked in Kenya). The roles played by these women – all but one of them in their 20s and recently out of college – generally appeared in reports and accounts of the congress as much more marginal than they in fact were. In recalling 6-PAC in a 2003 interview, Hill makes central to her account a lengthy anecdote about this dynamic in relation to a meeting with President Nyerere on the eve of the congress:

> HILL: So another piece of this was President Nyerere and Bomani, Ambassador Bomani [Tanzanian ambassador to the United States]– President Nyerere wanted to meet with the leaders of the delegations. But he said five people…
>
> So we [the US delegation leaders] were meeting in a room. I will never forget Mary Jane Patterson for this, too.
>
> Q: Okay, so Nyerere is meeting with five people, and these are you –

HILL: No, no, no. [James] Turner proposed that the five be Baraka, Owusu Sadaukai, Haki Madhubuti, and Ed Vaughn, who ran a bookstore in Detroit. And himself, of course. The five were all men. So they excluded me. Now this is when – and of course, you develop yourself politically, but I've often looked back on that because I was so hurt, but I was hurt like a woman being hurt, who wanted people to appreciate her for her work.

Q: Rather than on principle.

HILL: Yeah, rather than on principle. Rather than on principle, so I felt wounded, as opposed to –

Q: Offended?

HILL: Offended, politically offended. So that was an important lesson. That's how you develop your political personality, really. But Mary Jane Patterson said, wait – because of course, she had functioned internationally in different arenas. So she had a sense of herself, as an older woman. And she said Sylvia has done all this organizing, she's been a political operative and so forth, and she should be part of this delegation. But they replied we only have five slots and these are the five people, who are national organizers, and she's not a – doesn't have a political constituency.

So that night, Ambassador Bomani came and said to me there will be a car to pick you up to take you to the president. You will meet with the president alone, and when the gentlemen get there you will already be there [*laughter*]. They have such a sense of humor [*laughter*]. So sure enough, the car was there. I was there like a half hour before they got there. I was already on my second cup of tea [*laughter*] when they walked in and they were so stunned to see me sitting there. It's just a perfect story, isn't it?

So that was one of these moments of coming of age politically, as well…[23]

Surrounding this scene in Hill's memories – and many others[24] – are stories of the everyday pressures, late-night joys, logistical nightmares, small triumphs, memorable environments and objects (a room, a typewriter, a runway), and, above all, people through which 6-PAC was experienced and remembered. This affective landscape is not divorced in these accounts from descriptions of the political controversies surrounding the congress, debates between cultural nationalism and Marxism, arguments between liberation movement factions, or trajectories of individual political commitment. Rather, they are interwoven in a manner that makes their disentanglement nearly impossible. This could, of course, be attributed to nostalgia, to a romantic register to be expected for activists reflecting on their early years

of political involvement. I would like to suggest something different: that it was in and through this affective and quotidian landscape, infused with a youthful intensity, that political action was being lived – and vice versa, that the emotional and visceral experience of these coming-of-age moments was shot through with the political, inextricable from one another. This inextricability is particularly important as one begins to track activists' political trajectories across time and space.

Not only does Hill regard her scene surrounding the meeting with Nyerere as 'one of those moments of coming of age politically'; she also credits her experiences organizing for 6-PAC with leading her to return to Washington, DC with co-organizer Kathy Flewellen to help found the Southern Africa Support Project (SASP) – a project which, among other actions, mobilized demonstrators to be arrested outside the South African Embassy every day for a year in 1984–5.[25] Geri Augusto, who worked along with Hill in the 6-PAC Secretariat as part of the advance-planning team, casts the congress as a transformative experience in even more visceral terms. After relating to her interviewer her sense of the contours of the congress' ideological fault lines, she continues,

> A peculiar thing happened to me. I was there surrounded by others, Tanzanians, and Dar es Salaam was the base for all the liberation movements. It didn't take more than six weeks for me to get caught in a completely different episteme, a completely different world that – I was very young. There were not a lot of other people with me.
>
> Part of my assignment was to work with the liberation movements to provide information to them and whatever, and they thought I was a nice little young girl who was educable. And they educated me. And it was also fortunate that Walter Rodney was teaching at the University of Dar es Salaam, and he too thought I was a nice little girl and he needed to educate me. He came to the house with a reading list and said to me – very nicely, I'll never forget – he said you're very bright and this is important work you're doing. I have some quarrels with it. I feel that you may not understand as much about imperialism as you would want to for the work you're doing, or some such –
>
> Q: I can see Walter saying that.
>
> AUGUSTO: – euphemistic thing for saying, well, you little African Americans think you all know the whole world and you're going to be the Messiahs to save Africa, and you don't know the A or B about imperialism. And he gave me a reading list, which I read through. The Cuban consul of the time was also assigned to work on Six-PAC by his ambassador, and he too brought things for me to read. And this is while all that – the brouhaha and the furor was going on with Owusu [Sadaukai] and the African American delegation, which sided more closely, one,

with some of the Caribbean comrades, because that makes sense. And in addition, the discussion – a lot of them were captured [enthralled] by UNITA[26] and –

Q: Yeah, I want to get into that argument, yeah.

AUGUSTO: I'm not the best person to tell you, because, as I said, a peculiar thing happened to me while I was on the way to the store. I got kidnapped by Africans and they changed my head around. By the time everybody showed up in June 1974 – I did my work. Kathy and I did our work. I did all my work, but I was already thinking like a Southern African, an Eastern or a Southern African, about the various political questions. By the time Walter Rodney got through with me, and Walter Bgoya [editor of the Tanzanian Publishing House] got through with me, and Ruhinda got through with me and the Cubans got through with me, and going around to all the liberation movements and visiting and doing journalistic things. By the time all that – and I'd learned my Kiswahili – I was a different person, really. Even my own mother, who came to the end of the conference, looked at me and she shook her head. She said, boy, you've changed. And I then could only see everything from the Southern African optic. So by the time my brothers and sisters got there with their arguments, I had to stand back, because I said to myself, this is an argument for the Western hemisphere. It is not an argument that fits here. To the extent that it fits, I think they're mistaken…

And so they had big fights and arguments in which I took absolutely no part. I would go off and be off in the streets at night in Dar es Salaam. I went with the OAU interpreters, who were Senegalese or whatever. We'd be stopping at places where you could have hot soup at midnight. That's up in some neighborhood in Dar es Salaam. I learned another point of view. I was then ready to cut loose every messianic impulse I may have ever had…And I decided, one, I wanted to stay for awhile. And two, I would integrate as closely as possible as I could. They had adopted me. I was everybody's little sister. I thought, just carry on in this same mode and see where it will take me.[27]

A close reading of Hill and Augusto's recollections reveals some small but interesting contrasts regarding the place of youth within each. If Augusto's narrative foregrounds youth more explicitly (arguably with a more masculinist tenor, with her as the 'little young girl' being educated by more experienced men), it also situates youth as something that needed to be outgrown for a more sophisticated political persona to develop. Hill narrates her experiences with less explicit stress on youth as an interpretive frame, yet she seems to dwell a little more thoroughly in it; youth here is not baggage to be outgrown, but rather a productive, generative force for her emergent, 'coming-of-age' moment. But over and above these differences, youth – both

as felt experience and interpretive device – emerges as a key driver in these and other activists' recollections of their time in Dar es Salaam.

Such recollections also begin to suggest a paradox embedded within 6-PAC and its afterlives. If the 'hard' political material produced by the congress – its debates and resolutions – form the grid through which the Congress has been regarded, its more lasting legacy may have lain in the fine-grained, micro terrain constituting the affective, everyday experience of the event for its young participants. Of the trajectories of Africa-interested activism in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, William Minter points out that 'the networks and nodes by which connections were made, sustained, or fell apart were more complex and diffuse, making their continuity from one period to another particularly difficult to trace'.[28] My suggestion here is that mapping the affective landscapes and following the everyday trails of young activists through a scene like Dar es Salaam's can be a critical aid not only in tracing this period's transnational political networks, but in understanding the conditions of possibility – and the place of youth in shaping those conditions – under which they came together or trailed off.

And trail off they sometimes did. For instance, 6-PAC is important not only for the way it illuminates the coming-of-age character of much transnational activist experience in Dar, but also because its conflicts cast light on some of the fault lines that marked those same experiences. Indeed, from very early in the planning stages, the congress had been plagued with internal controversy that, at one point, threatened to scuttle the event entirely. The most fraught of these struggles was a disjuncture between the goals of the organizers, who envisioned the congress as a gathering of revolutionary forces, and the Tanzanian government's concerns not to be perceived as fueling opposition movements to other independent governments. Threatening to boil over in the run-up to the congress, this divide crystallized around a struggle over whom to invite to represent the Caribbean, where governments in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad were facing organized opposition movements on the left with which 6-PAC organizers' sympathies lay. In the end, Tanzania insisted on inviting heads-of-state of these countries and excluding their opposition movements, giving the congress more of a 'mini-Organization of African Unity', in Sutherland's words, than organizers and more radical delegates had hoped.[29] C.L.R. James, who had been deeply involved in early planning for the event, boycotted it for this reason, and tensions between imperatives of state and revolution continued to run through the gathering. For instance, Tanzanian Vice-President Aboud Jumbe, who chaired the conference, was reported to have had a handful of attendees arrested for circulating 'subversive' leaflets between sessions.[30] Nor was this conflict around the politics of the conference the only way in which disjunctures between diasporic and Tanzanian experiences of 6-PAC manifested themselves. The strike, in the lead-up to the congress, by Tanzanian Swahili translators demanding international standards of pay on

a par with their peers, as well as the sensationalist rumors swirling in the local press of increases in prostitution accompanying the event, suggest that its local iterations were multiple and sometimes at great variance from its meanings for delegates.[31]

At home in exile?: ambivalence and contingency in a transnational hub

The tensions between Tanzanian officials and black diasporic activists emerging at 6-PAC had a history in the relationship between the ruling party the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the community of African Americans who had settled in-country. Indeed, this relationship had always been a complex one, with *wawereaji* at once being welcomed by the Tanzanian government and encountering the ambivalence of a political establishment that was crisscrossed by local rivalries, struggles, and agendas. Friction between Tanzanian officials and African American migrants emerged in radically different situations in the years leading up to 6-PAC; in most, though, youth and transnationality were bound together at the heart of what positioned *wawereaji* as a perceived threat.

At times it was the very popularity among young Tanzanians of African American cultural forms and practices that generated anxiety in official quarters. This was the case, for instance, with the government's 1969 ban on soul music.[32] Aided by the presence of the many African Americans passing through Dar who became fixtures on its social scene, the 1960s had seen the sounds, fashions, images, and icons of African American popular culture making their appearance in the capital, to be engaged and reworked alongside other transnational influences. Other elements of African American style – both wigs and the Afro, for example – were often publicly condemned by officials, but it was soul's perceived link with youth in specific urban spaces like nightclubs that earned it an official ban in November 1969 for the corruption of 'our young girls, especially school children' and the imperative to 'preserv[e] our national culture' against destructive foreign influence.[33] Many African Americans living in the capital at the time felt uniquely targeted by the soul ban. Some spoke out. In the midst of public debate over the ban, for instance, an African American working at UDSM named Bob Eubanks contributed a long missive giving voice to a common feeling of dismay among African Americans in Dar that Tanzanians treated them as equally foreign to the country as whites.[34] Addressing 'those who would say that soul music is foreign music to Tanzanian Wananchi [citizens]', Mr Eubanks discussed African Americans' roots in Africa, the destruction of their culture under slavery, and their continuing cultural separation from white America. Appropriating vocabulary from official national cultural rhetoric, Eubanks argued that in light of this history,

> soul music, soul dancing, blues music and jazz music are…the Afro-Americans' Ngoma ya Taifa [national dance]. They are no more foreign to Tanzania than music from the Congo or from Zambia. We understand that each nation has to make sure that its own Ngoma ya Taifa comes first before other music…But, to ban soul music and leave the music of the oppressor to be heard…brothers and sisters of Tanzania do not forsake your ancestors who died in that strange and foreign land of America; and we, the Afro-Americans of today are their children. All Power to the People, A Soul Brother.[35]

If the soul ban was driven by Tanzanian government anxieties about control over its urban youth, in other cases tension arose from the physical presence of young African Americans in *wawereaji*-led initiatives. This was the case with the PAS, mentioned earlier. Designed to provide opportunities for young African American volunteers to put their skills as nurses, teachers, mechanics, and engineers to work serving 'nation building' efforts in Tanzania, it was headed by prominent US-based activists, including Irving Davis and Fred Brooks, who were both high-up in the SNCC. As the project's head, Davis had initially received encouragement from key members of the Tanzanian political establishment, including President Nyerere, who had declared a 'deliberate policy…to recruit skilled personnel for service in Government among black Americans'.[36] Buoyed by this, PAS organizers set up operations with determined energy: conducting extensive recruiting sessions at Black Colleges and Universities as well as with Black Student Unions on 'white' campuses; shepherding suitable recruits through the process of placing them in positions in Tanzania, often in medicine, education, and urban planning; partnering with a New Jersey organization to conduct three-week 'Heritage Tours' of Tanzania; cultivating connections with the Tanzanian Embassy in Washington, DC and in the ministries in Dar; and, finally, setting up the PAS office in Dar – complete with an 'Afro Room' library that would become a social hub for African Americans in the city as well as representatives of the various Southern African liberation movements in exile there.[37] In spite of this early optimism, however, as the project played out it generated a complex field of solidarities as well as misunderstandings and mixed messages. Within four years it had all but collapsed amid mutual suspicion and accusations between its staff and Tanzanian partners.

Part of the reason for the demise of the project had to do with its taking on different meanings for different people. The stress on service to Africa's newly independent nations that was central to participants' vision of PAS was also frequently expressed through a narrative of African Americans as a technologically advanced population with a duty to help out their less-fortunate brothers on the continent. This framing was one shared by many Tanzanians, but it could also take on a tone that some found patronizing.

A report by Brooks on PAS enthusiasm for acquiring a 300-acre plot of land outside Dar to provide an 'example' to Tanzanians of how to run a profitable farm, for instance, prompted an official in the Tanzanian Embassy in Washington, DC to write in the margins, 'Do we need an example?'[38] Indeed, while some in Tanzania's political establishment were enthusiastic, others were more cautious. Foreign Minister Stephen Mhando, himself one of the Project's most supportive boosters, reported on this wariness in a letter to the Tanzanian Principal Secretary in PAS' first few months. 'Obviously', he wrote, 'this project will present some problems of its own…. A problem of particular interest is the one of adjustment to attitudes both for our guests and for ourselves; … this is a sensitive area and past experience in placing and settling down Afro-Americans in Tanzania has shown it to be particularly delicate'.[39] And while many PAS staff and volunteers in Dar saw themselves not as expatriates but as 'returnees', they often found themselves regarded as the former. Even Nyerere's initial decision to cooperate with PAS seemed to position them this way: 'If we recruit other expatriates, including white Americans, we can also recruit Afro-Americans'.[40] This only underlined the effect for African Americans of the rolling controversies in Dar over African American popular culture.

Against the backdrop of these mutual perceptions, relations between PAS and Tanzanian officials were a rollercoaster ride for the project's organizers. The early success in gaining government support generated considerable early optimism among PAS staff that they would have little trouble placing the hundreds of interested candidates deemed qualified. By the end the Project's second year, however, concerns about the slow pace of placements – only 25 of the candidates had been placed – had graduated to suspicions of bureaucratic sabotage by specific Tanzanian officials in the ministries whom Brooks, as head of the Dar office, heard 'did not like and distrusted Afro-Americans'.[41] More likely, a particular segment of functionaries in the bureaucracy had begun to view PAS volunteers – young, skilled, American-trained – as potential threats to positions just like their own. With independence still in the very recent past (1961), these were positions only just recently gained – or in some cases still sought – by Tanzanians through an 'Africanization' process that many found frustratingly slow and partial. The stakes for vigilance over state positions once acquired were therefore high indeed.[42]

The situation for PAS became increasingly tense. By the beginning of 1972 Brooks was reporting on an atmosphere of fear of 'internal sabotage and the need for vigilance' sweeping Dar es Salaam, a mood that seemed to be affecting PAS.[43] He pointed to an editorial broadside against African Americans in the capital, alluding to PAS specifically, which had appeared in the ruling party's newspaper, the *Nationalist*. Accusing some *wawereaji* of possessing 'coca-cola values', the piece harshly criticized 'reactionary militancy' as 'worse than a spy': 'black racists posing as ultra militants, who

spend their time exercising and instigating people and dividing ranks'.[44] Throughout 1972 and 1973 the signs continued to build that PAS was seen by many mid-level bureaucrats as a live wire, bound up with power struggles within the government itself. This sense culminated in an April 1973 meeting between Brooks and representatives from 12 ministries to discuss the fact that the processing of applications had all but ground to a halt. Addressing this concern, but blaming PAS for it, the representative from the Ministry of Defense was quoted in the minutes as 'saying that this recruitment drive had started three years ago and that the Government had expected by now there would be a well-organized system and machinery set up to deliver the people. He said that because this had not happened, there 'were certain elements in the government that were beginning to point the finger and we all know what that means'.[45] Indeed, PAS seems to have been caught up in a snowball effect. As Bill Sutherland recalled, PAS being perceived as a threat by particular bureaucrats was responsible for initial foot-dragging fueled by concerns for their own livelihood.[46] If this was the case early on, then the project's resulting lack of success in placing more of its candidates itself only increased suspicion as it came to be seen as a liability among bureaucrats further down the chain – bureaucrats for whom being implicated in a contested and weak initiative could spell trouble.

Building up through the early 1970s, these frictions culminated with the temporary arrest and detainment in 1974 of hundreds of African Americans in Tanzania following accusations that they were spying for the CIA. The 'Big Bust', as the event became known among *wawereaji*, began with the impounding by the Dar es Salaam port police of a shipment said to include guns and bound for an upcountry ujamaa village linked to two African Americans in the capital. Expanding over the next few months into a much broader surveillance of *wawereaji* across the country, the roundups ended only after vociferous personal appeals by prominent African Americans in Tanzania and abroad (including Bill Sutherland, who was a confidant of Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa). Beginning quietly on the eve of 6-PAC and picking up steam in the Congress' wake, the timing of the arrests could not have been more charged. Among *wawereaji* it was widely believed to be more than coincidental, with some seeing it as a putsch on the part of bureaucrats wary of African Americans' influence, others as a deliberate attempt to sabotage 6-PAC in the wake of the Tanzanian government's clash with activists over the presence of Caribbean opposition movements. Whatever the case, the event marked a watershed for the community of African Americans in Dar es Salaam. Coupled with a marked drop in enthusiasm for the Tanzanian project, many who had settled there left.[47]

Transnationality and youth were important aspects of what made Dar es Salaam's African American activists appear threatening in some quarters of Tanzanian officialdom, though not in any uniform way. In the case of PAS, it was the specter of hundreds of young African Americans taking

up positions within Tanzanian ministries that troubled recently 'arrived' bureaucrats. With the soul ban, by contrast, it was the perceived influence over Dar es Salaam's own youth of the cultural forms of black America that alarmed Tanzanian policymakers anxious to maintain control over the meanings and political valence of youth.

African American 'returnees' were not alone in this regard among the strands making up Dar's transnational activist scene. Both the UDSM student left and Southern African liberation movements in town also played out their own politics of transnationality and youth that were key sources of both their vibrancy and their difficulties. With its highly transnational membership and sense of itself as a youth vanguard, for instance, the USARF left (the core of UDSM leftwing activism) certainly drew a great deal of its energy and political importance from both of these elements. Committed to a political engagement of broad scope – 'within the University, Tanzania, Africa, and the world in general', as its mission statement declared – the group at its height managed to generate a visibility and prominence for an independent, internationalist left on campus that belied the group's relatively modest size.[48] Wielding this transnational commitment and profile, USARF built a collective scene on campus around its lectures and discussions, teach-ins, provocative actions, and its lively journal *Cheche*. Members voraciously read, swapped, and debated texts connecting them to international networks of left theory and praxis – networks whose representatives would frequently appear at UDSM, as if confirming the campus' connectedness to global movements for progressive change. As Karim Hirji, one of USARF's active core, put it: 'We are not alone. Around the globe, students pour into the streets. The present loci of the storm are in France and Pakistan. With them we share a common goal – a world devoid of injustice, hunger and misery'.[49]

But if USARF's characteristics as transnational and youthful were key factors in the vibrancy of a student left at UDSM, they also became central in its demise. For the Tanzanian government had limited tolerance for a group that took the rhetoric of a youth vanguard in an explicitly internationalist direction, as USARF did. The potency of youth as a political force was something the TANU ruling party sought to monopolize for its own purposes under the auspices of its Youth League, the TYL. After USARF published law student Issa Shivji's trenchant critique of the government's ostensibly socialist policies as constituting the 'triumph of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie', TANU officials moved swiftly, banning the group.[50] In subsequently subsuming the student left under the wing of the TYL, the government worked to reassert a *national* scope for campus activism and party control over the politics of youth – thus excluding from legitimate political activity at least half of USARF's core membership, founder and chair Museveni included, hailing as they did from countries across the region.[51]

Conclusion

In both its vibrant connections and its complicating disconnects, the transnational activism that developed in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s and early 1970s offers insights for broader understandings of the politics of transnationality and youth in a global 'long sixties' moment that was distinctive for both. First of all, the transnationalism of the Dar scene becomes important for the way it centered on connections that exceeded the dichotomies of host-guest relationships on which even some of the most groundbreaking efforts to transnationalize activist histories of this period have focused. The kinds of sophisticated contacts made by African American activists from an earlier fifties moment with Nkrumah-era Ghanaians (masterfully mapped out by Kevin Gaines) or by Third World students with German youth in shaping the politics of that country's 1960s politics (recently analyzed by Quinn Slobodian) are vital demonstrations of the quite global imbrications of movements previously regarded as Euro-American in inspiration.[52] However, the Dar scene brings to this effort an illustration of the ways in which some of the most important circulatory paths traveled by activist networks in this period saw people from multiple elsewheres connecting with *one another* – sometimes much more than with 'host' populations – on the terrain of a 'home in exile' that was a transit point for most of them.

Moreover, examined at close range, the Dar scene does more than just provide additional illustrations of the point that some of the most important transnational activist movements in this period were youth movements. It also suggests a complex, triangular dynamic between transnationality and twin manifestations of 'youth': its status as both an ideological category for political mobilization and, perhaps even more centrally to the stories here, an ontological condition that enabled practices that were crucial to the kind of transnational activist work being done in Dar es Salaam. The entwinement of transnationality with each of these faces of youth is showcased repeatedly in the 'Dar moments' of various activist networks. As a contested *category*, performances of, and claims upon, youth by these movements sometimes lay at the very heart of their challenge to political establishments with stakes in the national. Not only was the challenge posed by a transnational group like USARF to official control over youth activism important in its own right – it was also that this move sharpened the challenge inherent in the group's transnational character as well. Likewise, with regard to youth as an embodied *experience*, the transnationality of activist movement – the basic fact of travel upon which it depended – was enabled by activists' age and relative mobility (even as the mobility of most African Americans in Dar differed significantly from that of the political refugees of liberation movements in exile). And, for many young activists, it was through the transnational nature of their experience – traveling and connecting with

new people, networks, and worlds – that they came to understand their experiences as *youthful* ones, part of a 'coming-of-age'.

Of course, activists were not the only ones shaped by their time in Tanzania. In various ways, the influence of young *wawereaji* – from new arrivals offering lectures on African American politics, to volunteers working in ministries, to their simple presence in downtown clubs – could impact the capital's social and political landscape, though not always in ways they intended (as the soul ban illustrates). Youth agency, then, was both multidirectional and contingent in Dar's transnational activist scene. Moreover, some of the unanticipated trajectories that resulted from this contingency lay in the intersecting nature of transnationality and youth as critical components of the networks and encounters making up this scene. Indeed, if these two elements were key in shaping the political possibilities opened up by the solidarities bred in Dar es Salaam, they also lay at the heart of challenges posed to a postcolonial Tanzanian political establishment with deep investments in national frames and jurisdiction over the political power of youth.

Notes

1. Y. Museveni (1970) 'My Three Years in Tanzania', *Cheche*, July, 13.
2. A. Rice (2010) *The Teeth May Smile But the Heart Does Not Forget: Murder and Memory in Uganda* (New York: Picador), p. 96.
3. There is to date no comprehensive academic study of this scene. For published memoirs that touch on it, see J. S. Saul (2009) *Revolutionary Traveller: Freeze-Frames from a Life* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing); I. Shivji (1993) *Intellectuals at the Hill: Essays and Talks, 1969–1993* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press); K. F. Hirji (2010) *Cheche: Reminiscences of a Radical Magazine* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota); J. S. Saul (1973) 'Radicalism and the Hill' in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds) *Socialism in Tanzania: Vol. 2: Politics* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House); Museveni, 'My Three Years'.
4. Recent studies of transnational 1960s activism that foreground the youthful character of these nodes include Q. Slobodian (2012) *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham: Duke University Press); V. Langland (2013) *Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and the Making and Remembering of 1968 in Military Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press); J. Pensado (2013) *Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press); M. Klimke (2008) *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
5. A. Ivaska (2011) *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam* (Durham: Duke University Press).
6. For an insightful portrait of the African American expatriate community in Nkrumah's Ghana, see K. K. Gaines (2006) *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates in the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).

7. New York Public Library (hereafter NYPL), Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Irving Davis Papers, PAS poster (no date).
8. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, interviews with Prexy Nesbitt, Bill Sutherland, Jennifer Davis, Geri Augusto, Sylvia Hill. For extracts from the 'No Easy Victories', interviews, see W. Minter, G. Hovey, and C. Cobb Jr. (eds) (2007) *No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists Over Half a Century, 1950–2000* (Trenton: Africa World Press).
9. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Prexy Nesbitt, interviewed by William Minter, Chicago, 31 October 1998.
10. E. A. Hawley (1979) 'Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane (1920–1969): A Personal Memoir', *Africa Today*, 26 (1), 22.
11. Hawley, 'Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane (1920–1969)'; Prexy Nesbitt, interviewed by author, Chicago, 26 August 2011; H. Shore (1992) 'Remembering Eduardo: Reflections on the Life and Legacy of Eduardo Mondlane', *Africa Today*, 39 (1/2), 35–52.
12. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Prexy Nesbitt, interviewed by William Minter, Chicago, 31 October 1998.
13. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Robert Van Lierop, interviewed by William Minter, New York, 16 April 2004.
14. Prexy Nesbitt, interviewed by author, 26 August 2011, Chicago; Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Nesbitt, interviewed by William Minter, Chicago, 31 October 1998.
15. Nesbitt, interviewed by author 26 August 2011, Chicago; Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Nesbitt, interviewed by William Minter, Chicago, 31 October 1998.
16. USARF stood for University Students' African Revolutionary Front.
17. Shivji, *Intellectuals at the Hill*; Hirji (ed.) *Cheche*.
18. On Stokely Carmichael at UDSM, see Museveni, 'My Three Years'; on appeals by Southern African liberation movements at 6-PAC, see the addresses by Marcelino do Santos and Owusu Sadauki in H. Campbell (ed.) (1975) *Pan-Africanism: The Struggle Against Imperialism and Neo-Colonialism: Documents of the Sixth Pan-African Congress* (Toronto: Afro Carib Publishers).
19. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Bill Sutherland, interviewed by William Minter, Brooklyn, NY, 19 July 2003.
20. For usefully different meditations on the centrality of affective personal connections to the formation of political communities, movements, and networks, see L. Ghandi (2006) *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin de Siecle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press); R. I. Jobs and P. F. McDevitt (2005) 'Where the Hell Are the People?' *Journal of Social History*, 39 (2), 309–14; B. Latour (2005) *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
21. Campbell (ed.), *Pan-Africanism*.
22. See F. C. Wilkins (2010) '"A Line of Steel": The Organization of the Sixth Pan-African Congress and the Struggle for International Black Power, 1969–1974' in D. Berger (ed.) *The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press); B. G. Plummer (2013) *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956–1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
23. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Sylvia Hill, interview with William Minter, Washington, DC, 23 September 2003.

24. See, for instance, Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Geri Augusto, interview with Charles Cobb Jr, Providence, RI, 26 January 2005; L. Levy (2007) 'Remembering Sixth-PAC: Interviews with Sylvia Hill and Judy Claude', *The Black Scholar*, 37 (4); J. Claude (2007) 'Some Personal Reflections on the Sixth Pan-African Congress', *The Black Scholar*, 37 (4).
25. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Sylvia Hill, interviewed by William Minter, Washington, DC, 23 September 2003, p. 16.
26. In Angola's war for independence UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, was the US-supported rival to the more Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
27. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Geri Augusto, interview with Charles Cobb Jr., Providence, RI, 26 January 2005.
28. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, William Minter, introduction to interview with Geri Augusto.
29. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Bill Sutherland, interviewed by William Minter, Brooklyn, NY, 19 July 2003.
30. Campbell (ed.), *Pan-Africanism: Documents of the Sixth Pan African Congress*, p. 165.
31. Aluka archive, 'No Easy Victories' collection, Sylvia Hill, interviewed by William Minter, Washington, DC, 23 September 2003.
32. For an in-depth exploration of the soul ban and the decency campaigns more broadly (the most prominent target of which was the miniskirt), see Ivaska, *Cultured States*, chapters 1 and 2.
33. 'Songambele bans "soul" music', *Standard*, 13 November 1969; A. A. Riyami, letter to the *Standard*, 20 November 1969.
34. B. Eubanks, letter to the *Standard*, 20 November 1969; L. Levy (2008) 'Remembering Sixth-PAC: Interviews with Sylvia Hill and Judy Claude, Organizers of the Sixth Pan-African Congress', *The Black Scholar*, 37 (4), 44.
35. B. Eubanks, letter to the *Standard*, 20 November 1969.
36. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, S. Mhando, letter to Tanzanian Principal Secretary, 7 May 1970.
37. Culled from NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, PAS correspondence.
38. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, Special Report, Irving Davis to NCBC's Africa Commission, 6 June 1970.
39. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, S. Mhando, letter to Tanzanian Principal Secretary, 7 May 1970.
40. Ibid.
41. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, Fred Brooks to Irving Davis, End of Year Report and Analysis, 10 January 1973.
42. A. Coulson (1982) *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); J. Bayart (1993) *The State in Africa* (London: Longman).
43. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, Fred Brooks to Irving Davis, 19 January 1972.
44. 'Sound Off', Editorial in the *Nationalist*, 1971 (rest of date incomplete), reproduced in NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers.
45. NYPL, Schomburg Center, Irving Davis Papers, PAS minutes from meeting between Brooks and Ministry representatives, 12 April 1973.

46. B. Sutherland and M. Meyer (2006) *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press), p. 229.
47. This paragraph is drawn from the following sources: 'Two from U.S. held after police find guns and bullets', *Daily News*, 28 May 1974; 'Police probe packages from the U.S.', *Daily News*, 29 May 1974; 'Afros ready to help probe infiltration', *Daily News*, 17 June 1974; G. Mwakikagile (2006) *Relations Between Africans and African Americans* (New York: Continental Press), chapter 7.
48. I. Shivji, 'Rodney and Radicalism' in Shivji, *Intellectuals at the Hill*.
49. Adapted by Hirji from his journals of the time. K. F. Hirji, 'Tribulations of an Independent Magazine' in Hirji (ed.) *Cheche*, p. 44.
50. I. Shivji (1970) 'Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle', *Cheche* special issue.
51. For more on USARF and its relationship to UDSM and the Tanzanian state, see Hirji (ed.) *Cheche*; Ivaska, *Cultured States*, chapter 3; Shivji, 'Rodney and Radicalism'.
52. Gaines, *African Americans in Ghana*; Q. Slobodian (2012) *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham: Duke University Press).

Part III

Identities

9

'Belonging to Many Homes': Argentine Sephardi Youth in Buenos Aires and Israel, 1956–76

Adriana M. Brodsky

In 1956, a small number of young Argentine Sephardi men and women decided to 'take over' a building that belonged to *Or Torah* – the Congregation of Damascene origin in Barracas, a neighborhood in the south of Buenos Aires. One Saturday evening, they walked with enough supplies to last them a few days into a house used by older members to play dominos and cards. While one group remained in the building, a delegation walked around the neighborhood, including the coffee houses (the famous *Bar de los Turcos* among them) where many of the congregation's leaders sat discussing the events of the week, and distributed printed flyers with the words: 'We have taken over the club'. After spending the night in the building, and following a violent altercation with members of the communal leadership featuring flying chairs and the singing of the *Hatikva* (the Israeli national anthem), the youth group was granted permission to use the space for its own activities. 'We introduced Israel, Israeli dance, culture, and much more [to the young members of *Or Torah*]', said one of the rebels. 'In fact', another member recalls, 'we succeeded – through the activities we devised – in bringing back to Judaism a large number of people who had stopped attending the synagogue services all together'.[1]

What started as an act of rebellion against a communal leadership considered to be out of touch with the needs of young Argentine Sephardi Jews was transformed, in the following years, into a much larger movement that included young men and women from most Sephardi congregations in the city of Buenos Aires. Aided by support from the Jewish Agency, this group of young men and women developed a new framework that had several specific (and interrelated) objectives: to bring apathetic young Sephardim back into Judaism, modernize traditional Jewish practices, and instill the desire to migrate to Israel.[2]

Almost ten years later, a new cohort of Sephardi youth, members of *Baderej,* a self-identified left-wing Zionist youth organization, continued to

work in the same tradition, combining rebelliousness with a determination to keep the young faithful to Judaism. During the general strikes organized in Buenos Aires in May/June 1969, a leftist activist (who was not Jewish) was killed in a confrontation with the police. The exchange of gunshots took place very close to the Jewish Sports club Macabi, and M (a *Baderej* member) was a witness to the encounter. Politicized university students organized a meeting soon after the event; while some believed the police version of events, that the activist had first attacked the police and that the latter had only defended themselves, another group claimed that the victim had been specifically targeted and assassinated. Another member of *Baderej* who was a friend of M and was present at the meeting of university students claimed that he could bring witnesses who would testify to the falsity of the official version of events. The press conference took place, and the police arrested M the day after. He was jailed, interrogated and released after three weeks.[3] In the meantime, the Jewish youth group *Baderej* held a meeting to discuss the situation brought about by M's incarceration, and, after a tense meeting, they agreed that the objective of *Baderej* should be to bring about socialism in Israel, *not* in Argentina. A smaller fraction within *Baderej*, which had been advocating for a more extreme position regarding their political commitment in Argentine politics, and for whom *aliyah* (a term used to describe migration to Israel) was only a romantic distraction, lost out. The revolution, *Baderej* stressed, would only happen in the Promised Land.

Just as the young participants of the 1956 event viewed their actions as a step toward keeping Sephardi youth within the folds of Judaism, the young Zionist activists of the late 1960s and early 1970s continued to describe their objectives as saving Jewish youth from assimilation into Argentine society – in this case, radical activism in Argentine politics.[4] Zionism and Israel, then, appeared as the solutions that would allow Sephardim in particular and Jews in general to remain Jewish. Yet, after many members of both groups made *aliyah* and settled in *kibbutzim* (collective farms), their Argentineness was not lost; in fact, it became quite central to their new identity. As one member of *Baderej* recalls, 'while in Argentina, people called us Jews; in Israel, we became Argentines'.[5]

This chapter is situated in the theoretical context raised by recent studies of diaspora and transnationalism. Although it has been assumed that the Jewish diaspora is related almost exclusively to their expulsion from the biblical Israel and to the construction of an exilic identity that longed for that lost homeland, scholars have begun to demonstrate that Jews' lived diasporic experiences were shaped by connections to the lands they inhabited. Scholarship that stressed the image of the wandering Jew, unattached and unwanted, has been supplanted by more nuanced works that emphasize the loyalties that Jews built to their chosen destinations. And in many cases, as I shall argue here, Jews moved out of those spaces, in the process giving birth to new diasporic movements.[6] Homelands, then, multiply.[7]

Unless we are ready to zoom out of the nation, and follow these young men and women as they cross territorial borders and inhabit many overlapping cultural milieux, we will fail to recognize and do justice to the multilayered reality that informed their thoughts and actions and defined their identities.

The intention here is to shed new light upon transnationality and diaspora through focusing upon Sephardi youth in Argentina and the actions and words these young men and women used as they attempted to maintain and defend identities they thought were in grave danger of disappearing. While in Argentina, young Sephardim sought to form their own youth groups in order to avoid being absorbed by the larger Ashkenazi Jewish majority. They also found in these Zionist youth groups, whose focus became Israel and the preparation to migrate to it, the means with which to retain their Jewishness in the face of what they considered strong assimilationist forces. When they moved to Israel, they kept strong connections to Argentina, settled in *kibbutzim* that were labeled Argentine or Latin American and continued to maintain Argentine culture while also becoming Latin Americans. As Spanish speakers in Israel, this too contributed to their being Sephardized, given the historical and linguistic associations between Spain, the primary country of origin for the Sephardi diaspora, and Latin America.[8] And those who left Israel a few years after *aliyah* chose Argentina as the country to which to return. In short, they became Israeli ambassadors in Argentina, Sephardi, Argentine and Latin American representatives in Israel, defended their *sépharditè* in Argentina, and lived their Jewishness *en Argentino* and their Argentineness *en Judío*.

The diasporic reality in which these young people lived was multilayered. This context was the product, in part, of the interactions young men and women had with those who sought to mobilize them for their specific needs. The transcending of borders, then, was also the result of the presence and work of individuals who were themselves crossing borders with specific, and sometimes competing (national) intentions. For Sephardic youth in Argentina their diasporas were somebody else's national or ethnic projects.

Jewish historians have remarked upon the role assigned to youth in the construction of the Jewish nation, whether through the creation of overt imagery that privileged strong young bodies, or through the creation of explicit settlement projects in Palestine/Israel on communal lands that required the young to conquer the environment and defend it from others. In particular, historians have studied the transformative power of the pioneer program (*Hechalutz*), which introduced a new muscular Jew to efface the quintessential image of the persecuted and usually vulnerable *shtetl* peasant man.[9] The role of the young would continue to be central as the experience of the communal farms in Palestine and later Israel became experiments in living out not just the reality of their own homeland and the regeneration of the Jew, but, perhaps most importantly for those Latin

American Jews of the 1960s, the ideals of socialist revolution.[10] Historians of Latin America, like Valeria Manzano whose work appears in this volume, have also begun to study the Latin American construction of the category of youth, and the role this newly defined group played in the political realities of the continent and of the countries in which they lived.[11] Historians of the Argentine Jewish community, in particular, have noted the coming together of these two discourses regarding youth and their politicization, and have studied the ways in which the fear of their assimilation into Argentine society prompted important reconfigurations of Argentine Jewish identity during the 1960s and 1970s.[12]

A focus on youth also serves as a reminder that although we are talking about diasporic moves, each generation's lived experiences were different and their identities were constructed in these diverse contexts. The Argentine Sephardi group *Tejezakna* of the 1960s learned the ropes of leftist ideology as they became involved in the Argentine student movement and with the transnational youth group *Hashomer Hatzair*. What began as a rebellion against communal leadership was transformed, through their choices both within the Jewish world and the Argentine spaces they belonged to, into a more political stance regarding Israel, *aliyah*, and the roles of youth and ideology. The members of the youth group *Baderej*, on the other hand, were already much more politically committed; their teenage years were spent in highly politicized Argentine state-run schools and universities, and had grown up participating in events organized by the *Tejezakna* members, their first leaders. The post Six-Day War context also defined the limited possibilities for interaction within Argentine leftist groups. By paying attention to the young, we are reminded to historicize diasporic movements and to not assume commonalities among their members.

Sephardi youth, Zionism, and the threat of assimilation

The young Sephardim who became involved in Zionist youth groups were members of Sephardi congregations from various origins. A minority group in Argentina, Sephardim never accounted for more than 10 per cent of the Argentine Jewish community. Originally expelled from Spain in 1492, they then moved across the ocean from their places of settlement (former Ottoman lands and Northern African regions) to Argentina and other places in the globe, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Once in Argentina, these Sephardi groups, which also included Jews from Morocco, Turkey, and Arab-Jews from Aleppo and Damascus, initially maintained their particular local identities by each organizing their own immigrant associations (mutual aid societies, religious schools, synagogues, butchers, cemeteries, and so on) and settling in distinct Buenos Aires neighborhoods, rarely crossing paths. By the 1960s, however, new places of sociability, like

Argentine schools and the university system, brought these groups into greater contact with each other, as well as with Ashkenazim.

From very early on, the Zionist project of Sephardi immigrants in Argentina found in youth a reason for its existence. In 1925, in the first meeting of the *Centro Sionista Sefaradí* (CSS), an institution that oversaw Zionist activity among Sephardim, one of its founders argued that the Center was conceived of as a viable path, perhaps the only one, to keep the 'youth healthy and loyal to Judaism ... [in] ... liberal countries, where [it] slowly forgets its [Jewish] traditions'.[13] Zionism was then imagined as a possible defense against assimilation caused by the processes of modernization and secularization. Yet, in pre-1948, it was the *hope* for a homeland that brought youth together; after the creation of the state, youth would be increasingly asked to rethink what the concrete existence of the new nation meant in terms of their living outside of it.

Educating the young in the love of and fight for Zion before 1948 did not mean that Sephardim were ready to entrust the role of educator to others. The other alternative was the larger Zionist movement organized by Ashkenazi Jews imbued with characteristics the movement had acquired in their countries of origin. Some of its marked distinctions were the highly politicized structure that developed, ideological fractures, and the use of Yiddish as the lingua franca. Thus, Sephardim considered the Ashkenazi Zionist organizations to be rather foreign, and sought to keep Sephardi young men and women within the folds of the Sephardi movement.

The fear of assimilation, then, stemmed from two fronts. As Jews, Sephardim worried that the mandatory education in Argentine state schools, and the overall modernity of the nation, as compared to the somewhat more traditional environments from which they had migrated, would lead these young men and women away from Judaism. Equally important, though, was the concern that if Sephardim did not organize their own youth, Ashkenazim would get them involved in their own activities, pulling them away, eventually, from their communities and families. Zionist organizing, and youth's participation in it, would keep these young men and women Jewish *and* Sephardim. These two interrelated fears would continue well into the 1960s; indeed by then it was not only the older leadership who stressed such concerns, but the Sephardi young themselves who articulated a similar vision.

The CSS organized its own youth under their wings. They created the *Juventud Sionista Sefaradí* (JSS) in 1940, which became heavily involved in fund-raising and Zionist cultural events.[14] Their activities evolved over time. While at first the focus was on fund-raising and education, with classes in Hebrew, Jewish history, the history of Zionism, and so on, after the creation of the State of Israel, Sephardi youth developed a pioneer program that aimed to prepare young men and women for life in Israel. At a time when it was clear the new state needed young people's labor, the program proposed

the *kibbutz* as the idealized destination, and the pioneer (*chalutz/chalutza*) as the idealized settler.[15]

Training transnationals, preparing for kibbutzim

Pioneer Jewish youth movements, somewhat similar to the Scout movement discussed in the chapters by Elena Jackson Albarrán and Jialin Christina Wu, had started in Eastern Europe prior to World War II, but they had rarely reached the Sephardi world prior to the big migratory movement to America. In Argentina, the *Hashomer Hatzair*, *Hanoar Hatzioni*, and *Dror/Gordonia* had organized groups in the late 1920s, but participation in them by Sephardim was unusual.[16] In 1948, the youth of the CSS organized its own *Hechalutz* movement and its first *kibbutz*-style co-ed youth training camp, because, they claimed 'In general, the mass of our youth has stayed away from activities of the pioneer movement, and if in the past this was painful, today it is truly inconceivable'.[17]

The arrival of an emissary (*scheliaj*) from the State of Israel, sent specifically to work among Sephardim, was an important boost to Zionist activity among the young. By the time of Josef Meiujas' arrival in 1958, several youth groups had already formed in many Sephardi neighborhoods in Buenos Aires, and Meiujas' achievement was to aid them in their growth. Eventually, these small youth groups would come together under two big organizations: *Tejezakna*, which would join the socialist Zionist youth pioneer movement *Hashomer Hatzair* in 1964; and the *Movimiento Juvenil Sefaradí Sionista*, which worked with the support of, but was independent from, the *Movimiento Sefaradí Sionista*, another organization helped by Meiujas.[18] In the late 1960s, *Tejezakna* and *Movimiento Juvenil Sefaradí Sionista* would merge forming *Baderej*.[19]

A prominent concern among the young during the late 1950s and early 1960s was the type of Jewish education that Sephardim were receiving, and the consequences of that education for themselves and for the Jewish communities and organizations of which they were part. Yet, Sephardi youngsters were not the only ones criticizing the traditional character of their communal educational institutions. Valeria Manzano, in her fascinating study of youth culture in Argentina during this period, describes how secondary education in particular came under attack by both young people and adult specialists.[20] In particular, Argentine secondary education was criticized for its emphasis on encyclopedism, its focus on insignificant details, and repetition without analysis. Sephardi young men and women were, perhaps, more successful at reverting this trend in their institutions; while Argentine secondary school students had to continue to endure the existing system, these young Sephardim succeeded in presenting alternative educational plans that would define curricula for many years to come.

In a newspaper article that appeared in 1963, *Tejezakna* outlined their criticism of Sephardi religious schools. The piece began with a short vignette, in which two former classmates reminisced about their days at the religious school. 'Look', said one friend, 'the only thing I remember about the *kitá* ... is that I learned Hebrew like an automaton, and I still don't understand anything I read'.[21] The article went on to suggest that two issues plagued the current 'educational Jewish system: (a) its methods; (b) its essence'. When exploring the problem of methodology, the young men and women found the problem to be the traditional culture of their parents. '[Although] oriental customs are invaluable', they clarified, 'we should not forget that they come from underdeveloped nations, victims of great cultural backwardness'.[22] While *Tejezakna* echoed the issue of education in general, the specificity of the Sephardi and Jewish contexts in Argentina colored their interpretation. Sephardi young men and women regarded their parents' culture as the culprit, and celebrated Western pedagogy as the model to adopt. Argentina appeared, in the discourse used by these young men and women, as the 'modern' country to emulate. (It should also be pointed out that Ashkenazi schools in Argentina were also described as modern in the same article.)

The second issue identified as problematic for educating Sephardim also repeated some of the issues raised by both young people and scholars of education: the curriculum. As long as mindless repetition of prayers constituted the only teaching objective, *Tejezakna* claimed that young people would not remain within the folds of their communities. 'To deprive youth of a Jewish education [understood as more than just religious prayers], they argued, "is to force it to assimilate".[23] They found the religious leadership incapable of adapting to the times. Those few schools that had incorporated any changes had been able to implement them only "because of the death of the 'old timers'"'.[24]

In response to these concerns, *Tejezakna* initiated the practice of celebrating Friday night dinners (*Kabbalat Shabbat*) in their homes, and introduced the practice of the 'communal' Passover Seder with educational objectives in mind.[25] Besides the ritual retelling of the exodus from Egypt, and the ritual dinner, the members of these Sephardi youth groups created artistic shows that linked the biblical story to the Zionist ideal of the return to the homeland and the end of diasporic existence. The weekly activities carried out by *Tejezakna* suggest that the objective of avoiding mindless repetition was central. These youngsters felt, much like their non-Jewish counterparts, agents of (or at least the voice of) modernization, and unsurprisingly, of a conception of Judaism that centered on a Zionist message. 'We shaped the Jewishness of the community', claimed one of the young men who participated in these groups.[26]

Tejezakna members saw themselves as central to the process of modernization of the Sephardim living in Argentina, and ultimately, to the saving

Figure 9.1 Invitation to 3rd Seder, 1963
Source: Courtesy of Gazit Archives.

of youth from losing all contact with Judaism owing to the deficiencies of the older, traditionally minded leadership. Youth in general was lost without ideals. Sephardi youth in particular were unable to shake off the traditional baggage of their parents. Assimilation tempted the young from every corner. Because of this, those young Sephardim who had found ideals and discovered the answer to avoiding the loss of Jewish identity had to be at the forefront of change. In the first edition of their newspaper, *Tejezakna* members explained that 'Sephardim [*la colectividad sefaradí*] are wandering without horizons, without aims … Don't you see that now more than ever we need ideals to fight for? … We have understood that. Our movement [*movimiento*] *Tejezakna* is the response to the reality we are living in … Only a "movement", a term that means dynamism and contains the notion of an ideal, can help in these days of confusion. Only Sephardi youth can speak the same language to apathetic Sephardi youths'.[27] As well, in the proposal written to organize activities for the young members of one Sephardi congregation (AHAS Chalom), members of *Tejezakna* argued that 'because it is us, the youth, who will lead institutions like this one in the future, we have to be heard now! … Following the most modern pedagogical and organizational guidelines for Jewish education, we propose the creation of a dynamic group structure led by trained young leaders with vast knowledge of psychology, Jewish and Zionist culture, and well versed in the problems affecting Sephardi youth in general'.[28] And *Baderej* members, in 1970, continued to use the same language when describing the central role that Sephardi youth had in bringing about change to their communities:

> Sephardim have had a special migratory origin, and they have developed quite enclosed in themselves. The answers to that specificity can only

> come from within. Only those who understand the community can work among us. We are not outsiders; we emerged from within the community in order to provide a needed answer…We succeeded in introducing a vanguard Zionist movement in the Sephardi community, we sent several groups to the kibbutz, and we pushed aside those romantic notions about Zionism that were espoused by the Sephardi community and replaced them with those of a *sionismo realizador*. [*aliyah*-oriented Zionism][29]

Although the neighborhood youth groups had focused on education reform and on stressing the fact that Jewish youth had become disconnected from community life, the presence of emissaries from Israel, like Meiujas, helped these movements veer more dramatically toward preparation to make *aliyah* and settle in *kibbutzim* in Israel. *Tejezakna* and *Movimiento Juvenil Sefaradí Sionista* became much more organized. Leaders hosted weekly meetings to plan and coordinate activities, and created groups according to age (from 9 to 18 years) in many of the Sephardi congregations and social clubs, for example. Usually meeting once or twice a week during the academic year, these groups engaged in sporting events, cultural celebrations, Jewish dance, Jewish festivities and learned about Jewish history. During the summer months, they organized camps in the famous camping destinations of Argentina and Uruguay.

As *Tejezakna* boasted in their presentation to the Sephardi congregation AHAS Chalom quoted above, the leaders of these groups were trained for those roles. Israel had founded, in 1946, the Institute for Youth Leaders from Abroad, and they brought young men and women to Israel so they could learn Hebrew, Jewish history, and the history of Zionism, as well as experience, first hand, life in the *kibbutz*. Upon return to their countries of origin, these leaders (*madrichim*) were expected to organize the young and encourage, ultimately, immigration to Israel.[30] The image of the pioneer became central not just as the ideal immigrant, but as the only possible role that could lead to the realization of personal, communal, and national goals. *Madrichim* helped achieve these goals.

While Jewish education was paramount, *Sephardi* culture was an important component of the artistic representations organized by these groups. As early as 1940, when the Sephardi youth of the CSS organized a Cultural and Artistic Festival to raise money for the purchase of land in Israel, the program included the singing of a selection of Palestinian and Judeo-Spanish songs – Judeo-Spanish or *Ladino* is the language of the Sephardi diaspora.[31] In the late 1950s, members of the group in Barracas recall singing traditional Passover ladino songs, like *Un Cavritiko*, *Quien Supiense y Entendiense*, during the Third Seders; in 2010, during the 40th anniversary of the arrival of the first *Baderej* contingent to Israel, members sang *Kaminando por la Plasa*, *A la Una Yo Nací*, and *Una Iya Boba Tengo*.[32] Sephardi youth wished to retain these cultural traditions, even when the ultimate objective of *aliyah* stressed that the new state would end ethnic differences among Jews.[33]

Sephardi specificity was not only maintained by the use of traditional cultural elements when performing Zionist loyalty and Jewish belonging. Sephardi singularity was also aided by the Jewish Agency's decision to consider Sephardim as one collective. Meiujas' arrival in Argentina to work solely among Sephardim, and the arrival of other emissaries in 1962 and 1966, signaled the recognition by Israel that Sephardim wished to remain outside of party divisions. Within a bureaucratic structure that interacted with political parties, and with financial and logistic support allocated accordingly, Sephardim had found it very hard to participate. Zionist Youth groups, for example, were assigned a certain number of representatives in the meetings of the Argentine Zionist Youth Confederation by their political affiliation. Participation in the Institute for Youth Leaders from Abroad was also assigned by political affiliation. Meiujas was the first to obtain quotas for Sephardim as Sephardim, and not as representing political parties. These changes at the Jewish Agency legitimized Sephardim singularity.

Around 1963, *Tejezakna* leadership decided to become affiliated with the *Hashomer Hatzair,* the youth pioneer movement which joined the labor party in 1948 to create the Israeli socialist-Zionist party MAPAM. When asked why they chose *Hashomer Hatzair,* R.P. suggests three hypotheses: first, that previous emissaries of MAPAM, like Meiujas, had been very successful among Sephardim; second, *Tejezakna* leaders had been exposed to Marxism in their secondary schools and university settings; and last, the good rapport established with the *Hashomer Hatzair* emissary that met with them. This association meant the possibility of working with *Hashomer Hatzair* emissaries and their structures, yet *Tejezakna* (and later *Baderej*) remained somewhat independent from the larger movement. A member of *Baderej* later recalled that '[a]lthough we [*Hashomer Hatzair* and *Baderej*] both had a close relationship with *Kibbutz Artzí* [the federation of *kibbutzim* created by *Hashomer Hatzair*], we both supported *kibbutz*-oriented activities and shared the same emissary, within *Baderej* we felt more autonomous and with free will … Perhaps we relished in the image of being in nobody's pockets'.[34] This *Sephardi* group had joined a (mostly) Ashkenazi organization, but stressed the fact that they did not lose their singularity in doing so. Note, as well, the ways in which the Argentine political reality of the youth helped inform decisions that related to their ethnic concerns.

As an important objective of these groups was to 'educate for self-realization [in Israel]' – *Educación hacia la realización* – it was important to explain Israel and the *kibbutz* to parents.[35] The need to bring Israel closer to the older generations had started as soon as *Tejezakna* was organized. The youth opened up a *Café Israelí,* and hoped to involve the parents in the activities of the young ones.[36] The emissaries sent from Israel continued these practices: they set up Hebrew classes for the parents and met periodically with the parents of future migrants. Herbert Vasserman, one such emissary, suggested the need to publish a short newsletter for parents called *In Gazit,*

which would bring news about the group of young settlers already living in the *kibbutz*.[37] Later on, too, emissaries organized trips to Israel for parents to visit their children and participate in events organized by the Jewish Agency while there.[38]

Immigration to Israel (*aliyah*) was seen as the final realization of the Jewish young man and woman, who understood that their Jewish identity could only be fully realized there. It was never expected that they would migrate alongside their parents. On the one hand, life in the *kibbutz* was harsh, and required young bodies willing to put in the physical effort that agricultural work demanded. On the other hand, Zionist youth groups stressed this enterprise as a symbolic new beginning, an image that left no room for older generations. Young men and women who participated in these groups received new (Jewish) names – which they wanted their families to start using – and were expected to form families in Israel. Most of the Sephardi young men and women from these youth groups who made *aliyah* traveled as young married couples, some having been married only a few weeks before their trip. The magazine they created as soon as they settled in the *kibbutz* was called, tellingly, *Bereshit* (In the Beginning), and each arrival of a new (Israeli) baby was celebrated joyously, as indications of the 'realization' of this new vision for the Jewish people.[39]

Another way *Tejezakna* members found to highlight Israel – and to bridge the gap with their parents – was through the festivals they organized.[40] In December 1963, they put up an 'Artistic Israeli Festival' in the city of Buenos Aires in order to raise money for their impending move. They divided the evening into two acts, and they created five scenes (three in the first half, and two longer ones in the last one). Each scene used a different mode of expression in order to convey the variety of activities offered by the group: gymnastics, plastic arts, Israeli dances, and a play 'The Rebel' – written by Samuel Pecar, an Argentine Jewish author who had already made *aliyah*.

In 1966, however, for another edition of the 'Artistic Festival', *Tejezakna* chose to incorporate new elements into their show. Israel continued to figure prominently, through Israeli dances and songs, but Argentina and its culture made its debut. The festival was no longer just Israeli, but *Argentino-Israelí*, a change that denoted an effort to maintain these two spaces of belonging at the center of these representations of their work, commitment, and identity. A rejection of assimilation did not mean, they came to understand, only the adoption of Israeli culture – their country of destination, but the celebration and incorporation of Argentina – the country of their parents.

Why the choice of Argentine folkloric songs and dances as representative of Argentina? It was clear that Sephardi young men and women had learned Argentine folklore – and practiced it – before this 1966 festival. Oscar Chamosa, in his study of the folklore movement, details the ascendancy of this music genre during the first half of the twentieth century.[41] But it was during the Peronist era (1946–55), Chamosa argues, that 'the folklore

Figure 9.2 Israeli Festival, 1963
Source: Author's collection.

ARGENTINA

nuevo teatro apolo

G. A.
ARGENTINO

TIERRA Y COLOR
TUNANTE
GATO
PALITO
REMEDIO
CIELITO DEL PORTEÑO
MEDIA CAÑA

CANTOS DE AMOR
COSTERA
EL BURRITO CORDOBES
CAMINITO
ZAMBA PARA NO MORIR
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

FIESTA Y ESPERANZA
CIELITO
CHAYA
PALA-PALA

AMANECER CAMPERO
LOS AMORES
CHACARERA
ZAMBA
COPLA DEL PAYADOR PERSEGUIDO
EL ARRIERO
EL ARRIERO
ZAMBITA DEL MUSIQUERO
COPLA RIOJANA
ESCONDIDO
CIELITO DE TANDIL
MALAMBO

FESTIVAL ARTISTICO
ISRAELI

JASIDICO
PECH DANZ
POLKA
IESH LI GAN
DEFKA URIA
VAINIKEV

TEIMANI
MAAVAT HADASSA
IESH 'ET
DEFKA ALEL

VA REJOV
EIFO HAPRAJIM
HI VAREJOV
OI VANIA
ORA NIRKODA
IOM PANA
PIZMON HAGUEZ

SHIRU SHIR
BEMAJRASHTI
SHIR HAKOJAV
SHIR SANEAJ
SHIR ROIM

HA AVODA
ERETZ TZAVAT JALAV
KUMI URI
MAJOL HANOAR
ANU OLIM VESHARIM
NOSOTROS ASCENDEMOS Y CANTAMOS

COLABORACION DE LOS PROFESORES
CANATARO
SANTOS AMORES
VICTOR SHJEBAR
DAVID FEUER
SCHMUEL KATZ
Gentil participación de DINA ROTH

ISRAEL

Nº 1245

Figure 9.3 *Tejezakna's* Argentine-Israeli Festival, 1966
Source: Author's collection.

movement consolidated...as [a] popular culture phenomenon'.[42] It was precisely during this time that *Tejezakna* youth attended public schools and listened to the radio at home. There is ample evidence of Sephardi youth coalescing around this musical genre. R.P., an important *Tejezakna* leader, recalls that four friends from the Sephardi social club *Chalom* – including him – organized a folklore group with guitars and a *bombo legüero* (type of drum used in folklore) and performed famous Argentine folklore tunes.[43] The youth group of the Moroccan congregation dedicated one of their Sundays in May 1967, to Argentine folklore.[44] The Ottoman community in Colegiales announced, in a newsletter, that they had organized an Argentine Folkloric Festival.[45] This same congregation arranged, a few months later, a 'great dance', which included 'modern music bands, and Argentine folklore groups'.[46] Also, the Youth Department of the Club Oriente (Arab-Jews) offered classes in Israeli *and* Argentine folklore dances [emphasis mine].[47]

'The contribution of folklore to the [Argentine] nation-building process', explains Chamosa, 'was to recast the culture of rural workers as the authentic national culture, at a time in which Argentina was becoming predominantly an urban and cosmopolitan society'.[48] In the context of the recovery of the rural in the age of the urban, then, it is not surprising that Argentine folklore became the undisputed cultural counterpart of the Israeli folk dances (*rikudim*), invented as part of the cultural Zionist project. The Israeli dancers were not the *gauchos* of the land, but their simple dress and barefoot style

stressed the connection with the land so central to the pioneer project. These two symbols reinforced young people's connection to the pioneer imagery and role.[49]

The 1967 Six-Day War affected those who continued to make *aliyah*. The outcome of the conflict made many Jews realize that the transnational Left was unwilling to see them as peers. The New Left increasingly characterized Israel as an imperialist power, and their supporters as accomplices. The Argentine reality also helped many in these groups confirm their desire for *aliyah*. General Juan Carlos Onganía's *coup d'état* in 1966, characterized by a rabid nationalism and repressive measures against universities and young people, also reminded many of the dangers specifically awaiting Jews. The years after 1966 generated the conditions that culminated in the Argentine May (1969), after which youth became central political actors in Argentine politics.[50] The increased politicization of youth meant that many young Jews were swept up in this political climate but they did not find welcoming spaces to live out their commitment.

Baderej came to life in this context, with the merging of the younger members of *Tejezakna* and *Movimiento Juvenil Sionista Sefaradí*, after the older members had already left for Israel.[51] 'We seek to create a new society, one that is completely free', claimed G in an interview with *Raices*, an Argentine Jewish magazine.[52] 'Our struggle is carried out in the Jewish camp', she continued, 'since each of us should battle, first and foremost, for our own people'.[53] That this positioning, imbued with the ideology of the New Left but embedded in the specificity of the Jewish State, brought them in conflict with other leftist activists, who saw in their work as 'right-wing sectarianism' [*sectarismo reaccionario*], did not deter them.[54] 'Our *aliyah* is not sectarian', explained P; 'It is our way of making and of contributing to the revolution. Some day, they'll understand', he declared.[55]

Hashomer Hatzair continued to take advantage of this outward political commitment, but that outward political positioning caused *Baderej* many conflicts with the Sephardi congregations and social institutions *Tejezakna* and *Movimiento Juvenil Sefaradí Sionista* had worked in before. In 1970 *Baderej* was forced to buy a house for their activities, as they no longer had the support from the Sephardi institutions to meet in their communal spaces. *Baderej* maintained their separate status within *Hashomer Hatzair*, as they chose not to share the building where *Hashomer Hatzair* groups held their group activities. Yet, *Hashomer Hatzair* clearly defined the limits of the political commitment expressed by *Baderej* members. After the incident involving a *Baderej* member described at the beginning of the essay, they declared: 'the movement cannot accept any member who is active outside the structures of the movement'.[56] Political commitment could only exist within the Zionist structure.

Like *Tejezakna's*, the shape of *Baderej's* commitment to Israel was informed by the transnational and Argentine context within which they were

immersed. In the case of *Baderej*, Latin America's turn to Third Worldism and New Left culture defined which paths were open to them. Reading lists of *Baderej* members included not just Jewish ideologues (like Ber Borojov), but Albert Memmi, Georges Politzer, Hermann Hesse, and the writings of Colombian Catholic guerrilla priest Camilo Torres, among others. Summer camps (which usually included singing around the campfire) and protest songs from the New Song movement became much more prominent and were shared by all Argentine youth groups as noted by Valeria Manzano. Among them were songs by Quilapayún, Inti Illimany, Daniel Viglietti, and Mercedes Sosa, all folklore singers who had become central to the protest song movement.[57]

What became central to *Baderej's* identity – informed by their Jewish and Argentine realities – was their political stance and their belief in revolution as the only way to bring about that change. And although the original founders of *Baderej* imagined themselves as providing a space for Sephardi youth, their political commitment came to supersede ethnic affiliation. *Baderej* continued to exist, and it became *Hashomer Hatzair's* largest Argentine (not exclusively Sephardi) group, continuing to send *olim* to Israel until the mid-1970s.[58] *Baderej* members' decision to pursue their social revolution in Israel, saved those who left from the horrors unleashed by the 1976 *coup d'état*.

Argentine–Sephardi–Israelis: diasporic identities

The immigration of young people who took up new lives in *kibbutzim* was very successful, and it was in the hands of Zionist Youth Organizations, of which *Hashomer Hatzair* was one. *Hashomer Hatzair* claims to have been the organization that brought the largest number of Latin American young men and women to *kibbutzim*: for the years 1947 to 1951, 53 per cent of all the young Latin American immigrants belonged to this particular organization (out of a total of 1,450 people). From 1965 to 1976, *Hashomer Hatzair* numbers declined slightly, as a result of the larger number of Zionist youth organizations that competed to attract young people in that decade, but *Hashomer Hatzair* still asserts it brought the greatest number of immigrants, with an average of 32.6 per cent of the share of all young people from Latin America who settled in *kibbutzim* (9,174 people).[59] Although it is hard to estimate which Latin American country sent the greatest number of young men and women to *kibbutzim*, figures that estimate overall arrivals from Latin America list Argentina as the country with the largest number of immigrants to Israel (64 per cent for the whole period 1948–2004).[60] A new study that focuses on Argentine immigration to Israel from 1948 to 1967 also suggests that two-thirds of immigrants from that country settled in *kibbutzim*, and that 60 per cent of those arriving 'belonged to an age group where people were at the peak of their work capacity'.[61] It is safe to assume,

then, that the majority of Latin American young men and women immigrants to *kibbutzim* were Argentine.[62]

It is, of course, much harder to calculate the exact number of Sephardim from Argentina within the *aliyah* of young people from Zionist youth groups. An early Sephardi Zionist youth group sent approximately 30 to 35 young men and women (through the organization *Ijud Habonim*) in the early 1950s. *Tejezakna* sent two groups of pioneers; the first one, in 1964, was made up of six young men and women (one of whom was Ashkenazi), of which only one remained in the *kibbutz* after two years; the second group, larger and more successful than the first, was made up of 15 and migrated in 1966, with a small group of six traveling in 1967, right after the Six-Day War. After the group changed its name to *Baderej*, the first few groups that made *aliyah* (1970–2) had a large number of Sephardim (the total number of immigrants is around 65), but that number declined in later groups.

As members of a larger transnational youth organization, *Tejezakna* and *Baderej* members could not really control where to settle. All *kibbutzim* of the federation *Kibbutz Artzi* received groups from various countries, as they did not wish to create exclusive pockets of national groups. But it is also clear that they thought cultural cohesion could work toward making the settlement process a successful one. *Mefalsim*, a *kibbutz* that received Latin American members of the Zionist youth groups *Habonim-Dror* and *Hanoar Hatzioni*, among others, was originally founded by a group of Argentine youth in 1949 after they requested authorities not to send them to an already existing *kibbutz*.[63] *Ein Hashlosha*, the first Latin American kibbutz of the *Hanoar Hatzioni* movement, was created in 1950, and the *Hashomer Hatzair* founded kibbutz *Gaash*, their first Latin American *kibbutz*, in 1951.[64] Most of the members of *Tejezakna* and *Baderej* were sent to *kibbutz Gazit*, together with other non-Sephardi Argentine (and Latin American) young men and women who were also part of *Hashomer Hatzair*. After the group changed its name to *Baderej*, there were a few groups who settled in *Gazit*, but later contingents settled in *kibbutzim Iacum* and later *Carmia*. A former member of *Gazit* recalls that, around 1972, perhaps 60 per cent of inhabitants were *latinoamericanos*, the majority of which were Argentine.[65]

Although *Gazit* is remembered as an Argentine *kibbutz*, *Kibbutz Artzi* imagined these Argentines also as Latin Americans. This was evident not only in the decisions taken in relation to their placement within *kibbutzim*, but also in some of the activities devised to ease their transition to *kibbutz* life. Periodically, the Social Department of *Kibbutz Artzi* would organize seminars for all recent arrivals from Latin America and would hold those meetings in Spanish.[66] Additionally, a few members of *Tejezakna* were later sent to Mexico to become youth leaders and organize the Sephardi Zionist youth in that country.[67] *Kibbutz Artzi* assumed that there were sufficient commonalities among Latin Americans with regards to culture and language to

guarantee the success of these organizing efforts and to speak to common issues.

Their dual identity as Argentines and as Latin Americans was well understood by these youth groups. They clearly felt connected to Argentina, saw themselves as Argentines, and were seen by Argentine officials as such. But Israel had also turned them into Latin Americans. In 1966, a member of (Argentine) *kibbutz Mefalsim* recalls that the then Argentine ambassador to Israel, aware of the existence of a choir in the *kibbutz*, asked them to participate in the opening of the Argentine House in Jerusalem. But the ambassador, in fact, preferred a folklore quartet instead of the existing choir. This request by an Argentine authority to perform Argentine folklore music in the opening of an Argentine space in Israel led to the establishment of *Conjunto Mefalsim*, which continued to play in many venues throughout Israel. But what started as a purely Argentine band soon changed to include 'other Latin American songs ... as Israelis really like Latin American music'.[68] They performed on the radio, television and even recorded a few albums with two repertoires: 'one', they explained, 'for when we play for an Israel audience, which includes a little bit of everything ... the other for when we play among Argentines'.[69]

Similarly, the *Tejezakna* group that left Argentina for *Gazit* in 1966, and who had designed the festival described above, also performed their Argentine/Israeli/Sephardi show in Israel. In the magazine they created as soon as they arrived in the *kibbutz*, *Tejezakna* members described how popular their show had become, so popular they had to reject many invitations. The Argentine ambassador to Israel attended their presentation in Bat Iam, a city south of Tel Aviv with a large number of Sephardim, and invited them to join him later in his office.[70] Their decision to perform in Israel was based on '[their] desire to say: here we are, a Sephardi-Argentine youth group who have now decided to live in Israel'.[71]

Their intention to maintain Argentine traditions while in Israel through the use of language and the performance of cultural events was not the only way they hoped to stay connected to Argentina. These young men and women had left behind not only family, but also the younger members of the youth group they had trained. *Bereshit*, the magazine *Tejezakna* members created after their arrival in *Gazit*, 'makes real our wish to communicate with our families, members of *Tejezakna* [back home], the movement, and all those who have been close, in one way or another, to our struggle'.[72] They envisioned the newsletter as the means of preserving a connection that was altered – not severed – by migration. As such, the magazine proceeded to introduce *Gazit* to the readers, through photos, articles about the economy of the *kibbutz*, its geographical location and neighboring areas, biblical references, 'ideological material', as well as personal recollections written by members of the group, on the occasion of a birth, or memories of the trip. It was important to 'explain' Israel and the *kibbutz* to those in Argentina

because 'Israel', one of the members of *Tejezakna* said, 'was never imagined as a home'. Sephardim supported its creation, and contributed to its existence, but if people did not have 'a family member living there', it was not a place to which they could relate.[73]

The *Tejezakna* members of the second group that made *aliyah* were surprised by the outbreak of the Six-Day War a few months after their arrival. 'Can you imagine', said one of the informants, 'us, middle class kids, living in cardboard structures in the middle of a war?'[74] They became keenly aware of the role played by the war among those families and friends left behind in Argentina. 'We have received dear and long-awaited letters…', they wrote, 'which are the faithful reflection of what the [Jews in the] Diaspora lived through in these six days'. And they proceeded to quote excerpts from those who had learned important lessons from the distance. 'This war has made us all change our mind, since it caused a re-birth of Jewish love in each of us; that [feeling] that apparently did not exist before, since I know for a fact that Dad and Uncle J – who opposed your *aliyah* so strongly – are now proud that you are there, defending something that belongs to all of us'. 'We hope', another quoted section read, 'that the victory earned is reason enough for ever lasting peace, and that those who have caused so much admiration are respected above all; us, who are far away, have screamed to the top of our lungs who we are, so that humbly, we are also respected, just as you are, those building the safety of all Jews'. The war, according to another parent, made them realize their own Zionist feelings. 'Everything coming out of me now', the letter stated, 'is a feeling of admiration for the wonderful people of Israel, who have shown all the world their unity, ability and the love they profess for their land. In short, my dear children, I have never felt so happy, so much more Zionist than now. I wish, with all my heart, that that which was gained heroically by the military, the people, and the youth of Israel in the battleground is respected in the peace talks'.[75]

The *Tejezakna* members in *Gazit* were less critical of the reaction of their families than the members of *Tejezakna* who were still in Argentina, preparing for *their* aliyah. While those in Israel used the expression 'wake up' to refer to the communities in the Diaspora and their reaction to the armed conflict, those in Argentina expressed the view that 'we have to understand that we are not only Jews when a bomb goes off'.[76] In the speech given by one of the pioneers who traveled after the war to reunite with the rest of the group, they also used the image of the sleeping Jewish community who had woken up, but slightly elaborated on some of the reasons why they reacted in such a way. 'The community', explained the same young man, 'whose relationship with Israel was either religious or emotional, based on movies – now has a stronger connection; one built with blood, since their kids are leaving. The community feels that "there" is now part of its home; that "(over) there", across the ocean, is a part of what they had built back here'.[77] The connection they hoped would be established between diaspora

and Israel was made clear. The Sephardim in Argentina now felt they had (re)constructed, once more, and through the work of young people moving across borders, a diasporic community that resided in multiple spaces. Israel was in Argentina, as much as Argentina was in Israel.

Conclusion

The telling of this story of youth action, mobility and identity is only possible if we understand Jewish communities grounded not on a center/periphery dichotomy that defines the center as the ideal and permanent space, and the periphery as the temporary one, but rather on a more complex set of created relationships established between and within multiple spaces across borders and time. These young men and women participated in these Sephardi Zionist youth groups with an acute sense of belonging to a Sephardi cultural world that required their modernizing force and vision, even though they had grown up in Argentina and were planning their future lives in Israel. Zionism may have espoused the end of intra-ethnic differences, but these young men and women acted within this arena embedded in that culture, and even defended its right to exist. While they fought against the specter of assimilation and the threat of disappearance, they also deftly utilized the lessons and experiences learned in Argentina as they attended politically lively public schools and universities. While in Israel, these young men and women imagined themselves both as architects of the idea of a new Jew, initiating a new chapter in Jewish history, as well as maintaining links to Argentina and Latin America; they taught Israel while dancing Argentine folklore (in Argentina), and taught Argentina while also dancing Israeli folklore (in Israel).

The focus on young people within these diasporic communities also reminds us that youth is far from being static or unchanging; the youth of today are the adults of tomorrow, and the contexts in which they grow up affect the relationships formed with and within the multiple spaces they inhabit. This chapter has argued that the centrality afforded to young men and women within the Zionist project confirmed as well as helped constitute their youth. It was young men and women who were asked to leave their comfortable middle-class lives and help conquer the desert in order to live off the land. They were also entrusted with educating other young men and women so they in turn would do the same. And in the process young men and women went out and shaped not only the communities they were preparing to leave behind, and the ones they were moving to, but their own youth as well.

Notes

1. The recollection of the take over and the activities organized comes from interviews with the members of the youth group in question (May 2010 and May 2012).
2. The Jewish Agency, created in 1929, was the de facto government of pre-state Israel. After the creation of the state, it remained in charge of immigration, youth activity, land settlement, and relations with Jews outside of Israel.
3. While M was in prison, the government declared a state of siege after the assassination of a famous trade union leader and the violent reaction that ensued.
4. Although it is true that many members of *Baderej* continued doing both: preparing for *aliyah* and participating in Argentine student movements. SM and JG, interviewed by author, May 2012.
5. SM, personal communication, December 2012.
6. For a good summary of the discussion regarding the reconfiguration of Jewish diaspora, see R. Kobrin (2010) *Jewish Bialystok and Its Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 10–11.
7. J. Boyarin and D. Boyarin (2002) *Powers of Diaspora: Two Essays on the Relevance of Jewish Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
8. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this process was at play. Roniger and Babis suggest something similar in L. Roniger and D. Babis (2008) 'Latin American Israelis: The Collective Identity of an Invisible Community' in E. Ben-Rafael, J. B. Liwerant, Y. Gorny, and R. Rein (eds) *Identities in an Era of Globalization and Multiculturalism: Latin America in the Jewish World* (Leiden: Brill), p. 300.
9. M. Berkowitz (1993) *Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); T. Mayer (2000) 'From Zero to Hero: Masculinity in Jewish Nationalism' in T. Mayer (ed.) *Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation* (New York: Routledge).
10. H. Near (1992) *The Kibbutz Movement: A History*, 2 Vols (Oxford: Littman); Y. Riemer (1996) 'Interaction between Youth Movements and Kibbutz: The Case of Kfar Blum', *Journal of Israeli History* 17 (2).
11. The list is growing. In particular, I'd like to mention F. Barbosa (2006) 'Insurgent Youth: Culture and Memory in the Sandinista Student Movement', PhD diss., Indiana University; V. Langland (2004) 'Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and Collective Memory in Authoritarian Brazil', PhD diss., Yale University; V. Manzano (2009) 'The Making of Youth in Argentina: Culture, Politics and Sexuality, 1956–1976', PhD diss., Indiana University.
12. B. Gurwitz (2012) 'From the New World to the Third World: Generation, Politics, and the Making of Argentine-Jewish Identities', PhD diss., University of California at Berkeley.
13. Centro Sinista Setafaradí (hereafter CSS), Acta de Fundación, 25 April 1925.
14. CSS, Minute Books, 5 May 1940; CZA F26/18 Reunión del 14 de Julio de 1940. The Department of Youth was re-organized in December 1943. See Comité Provisorio Organizador de la Convención de la Juventud Sefaradí, Minute Books, 31 May 1945.
15. See Goren for a description of how the kibbutz and the pioneer became the central ideals of Zionism among American Jews. A. A. Goren (1999) *The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), chapter 8. There were, however, other Sephardi youth groups which did not insist on *aliyah* and on the pioneer experience. They still considered themselves Zionist (as they raised money to send to Israel and believed in the right of the

state of Israel to exist) but were not focused on migration. See, for example, 'Juventud D.E.S.A', *D.E.S.A Informa*, June 1952, 6.

16. For exceptions to the rule, see B. Elnecavé (1994) *Crisol De Vivencias Judías* (Buenos aires: Ediciones La Luz), p. 30.
17. 'La consigna de la hora: Moshavá Sefaradí', en *Hanoar Hasefaradí*, August 1948, 7.
18. Although the *Movimiento Sefaradí Sionista* would only officially be created in 1967, its origins can be traced to Meiujas' arrival in 1958. See EM, PM, RG, JA, Buenos Aires, interviewed by author, 18 May 2010.
19. A small group from Vicente Lopez (Prov. of Buenos Aires) also joined. SM, interviewed by author, May 2012.
20. See Manzano, 'The Making of Youth in Argentina', pp. 85–96.
21. 'La escuela Sefaradí en crisis', *Jazak*, August 1964, 2.
22. 'La escuela Sefaradí', *Jazak*, August 1964.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. The Third Seder was an event performed by Argentine (Askenazi) Zionist groups, like the Juventud Mordejai Anilevich. See D. B. Israel (1978) *De América Latina a Israel, Al Kibutz: 32 Años De Aliá Jalutziana De Los Miembros De La Familia Del Hashomer Hatzair a Su Federación Kibutziana Del Kibutz Artzi* (Israel: Israel Departamento Latinoamericano de la Organización Juvenil Sionista Mundial Hashomer Hatzair), p. 77.
26. RP, interviewed by author, May 2012.
27. 'Jazak: Fuerza para bregar por nuestro propio destino', *Jazak*, August 1963, 1–6.
28. 'Proyecto de Reglamento' by *Tejezakna* for AHAS, Chalom, 1963.
29. 'Baderej: Nuestra Manera de Hacer la Revolución', *Raices*, April 1970, 72–3.
30. A total of 11,736 young men and women were trained by the Institute from its beginning to the early twenty-first century; 2065 of those came from Argentina, the country that sent the largest number of young to be trained. Also, Sephardi leaders-in-training were mostly males, but a few young women traveled later on. See Bar-Gil, *Juventud*, p. 132.
31. 'Gran Acto Cultural y Artístico', *Program*, June 1940.
32. NM and RP, interviewed by author, May 2012. Printed 'song book' for the fortieth anniversary of *Baderej* in Israel, 2010.
33. The conflict between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and the role the Diaspora communities had in 'solving' it, was the object of much debate. Some (Argentine) Sephardi leaders believed that the mere existence of the State of Israel signified the end of the conflict. See, for example, S. C. Imach, 'Kibutz Galuiot al reves', *Jazak*, October 1963, 2–3.
34. GR recollections, written in Israel, 2003.
35. *2nda Veidá Rashit*, Tejezakna, April 1964, 1.
36. 'Actividades de Tejezakna', *Jazak*, June 1964.
37. Givat Haviva (hereafter GH), Folder (2) 18.2–1, letter to Akiva in Israel by Herbert Vasserman, 20 October 1969.
38. 'Despedida de un grupo de padres de jalutsim en a.h.a.s Chalom', *Crónica Sefaradí*, May 1968, 23; GH, Folder (2) 18.2–1, letter written to Israel, March 1968.
39. Sephardi youth migration to Israel was very even in terms of gender. Anecdotal information suggests that young women were very seldom allowed to migrate unmarried.
40. There are many memories of 'Festivals' in theaters before 1963, although no records survive that allow me to discuss them in detail. NM, interviewed by author, May 2012.

41. The interest in folklore was evident not only in Argentina, of course. In Latin America, its study and dissemination was closely linked to the project of *mestizaje* and, consequently, to a reimagining of national identity. See O. Chamosa (2010) *The Argentine Folklore Movement: Sugar Elites, Criollo Workers, and the Politics of Cultural Nationalism, 1900–1955* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press).
42. Chamosa, *The Argentine Folklore Movement*, p. 211.
43. RP recollections published online on http://elveoveo.blogspot.com/search/label/VEO%20VEO.…7, date accessed 20 October 2013.
44. 'Actividades del club social alianza', *Crónica Sefaradí*, May 1967, 21.
45. 'Actividades', *Crónica Sefaradí*, May 1967, 22.
46. 'A.H.A.S – Chalom: El Dias mas largo del S. XX', *Crónica Sefaradí*, August 1967, 23.
47. 'Actividades del Club Oriente', *Crónica Sefaradí*, May 1968, 23.
48. Chamosa, *The Argentine Folklore Movement*, p. 3.
49. That folklore came to be identified as the equivalent of Israeli folk dance and music is ironic, as Chamosa points out, because the historiography has tended to associate Argentine folklore with the most nationalist (and anti-Semitic) groups.
50. See Manzano, 'The Making of Youth in Argentina', chapter 6.
51. A smaller group from Vicente Lopez (in the Province of Buenos Aires) also joined them. SM, personal communication, May 2012.
52. 'Baderej: Nuestra Manera de Hacer la Revolución', *Raices*, April 1970, 72–3.
53. 'Baderej', *Raices*, April 1970.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. GH, Folder (2) 18.2–1, letter by Herbert Wasserman to Kibbutz Gazit, 30 August 1969.
57. See Manzano, 'The Making of Youth in Argentina', pp. 283–95; SM, personal communication, May 2012.
58. See, for example, D. B. Israel (1978) *De America Latina a Israel, Al Kibutz,* pp. 67–9.
59. Dror Gordonia and Ijud Habonim suggest, in their institutional histories, that they were the most successful at organizing youth in their countries of origin. See Bar-Gil, *Juventud*, p. 95; Israel, *De América Latina a Israel, Al Kibutz*, p. 38.
60. Roniger and Babis, 'Latin American Israelis', p. 299.
61. S. Klor (2012) 'The Aliyah from Argentina to the State of Israel in the Years 1948–1967', University of Haifa, abstract, np.
62. The overall number of immigrants from Latin America, from 1948 to 2004 is 92,071, with a total of 59,158 from Argentina. See Roniger and Babis, 'Latin American Israelis'.
63. See F. Goldberg and I. Rozen (eds) (1998) *Los Latinoamericanos En Israel: Antología De Una Aliá* (Buenos Aires: Contexto), p. 63.
64. For a list of kibbutzim with a large percentage of Latin Americans, see Goldberg and Rozen, *Los Latinoamericanos En Israel*, pp. 73–80.
65. SM, personal communication, December 2012.
66. See the picture of one such meeting in 1963 in Israel, *De América Latina a Israel, Al Kibutz*, p. 52.
67. Many immigrants to Israel were later sent to work among youth groups; in many cases, the youth leaders were sent to their countries or origin, but not always. RP, interviewed by author May 2012.

68. Goldberg and Rozen, *Los Latinoamericanos En Israel,* pp. 166–7.
69. Ibid.
70. *Bereshit*, Gazit, May 1967, 23–4.
71. Ibid., 23.
72. Ibid., 3.
73. JA, interviewed by author, May 2010.
74. MB, interviewed by author, May 2010.
75. *Bereshit*, August 1967, 21–2.
76. *Crónica Sefaradí*, July 1967, 9.
77. Ibid.

10

Swinging across the Iron Curtain and Moscow's Summer of Love: How Western Youth Culture Went East

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The American journalist Harrison Salisbury was very surprised to encounter Tarzan on Moscow's Gorky Street when visiting Russia in 1949. To be precise, he did not meet Tarzan himself nor did he bump into the American actor Johnny Weissmuller on Moscow's main street. Rather he encountered the Soviet version of Tarzan: a young lad who amused him and his friends with the piercing cry of 'Ekh-Dzhein' (Hey-Jane).[1] Tarzan was a phenomenon in Soviet postwar youth culture. He inspired a new hairstyle (long at the front and back, short at the sides) among trendy young Soviet men, provoked innumerable imitations of the above-described kind, and was well known even in remote areas of the country.[2] By the time Salisbury met Tarzan as part of Soviet youth culture, the fetching hero had made a remarkable journey. The film copies, which introduced Soviet audiences to the man from the jungle and American film sensation, had come from occupied Germany as so-called trophy items and were shown in Soviet cinemas in the dubbed German version with Russian subtitles. Tarzan, who only made his way onto the Soviet screens because the Soviet postwar cinematic industry was in desperate need of money, had thus already entertained fascist Germany before he found himself in communist Russia.[3] His on-screen persona was then filtered through the eyes of his enthusiastic Soviet audience, who applied their own views, desires, and preferences to it, turning him – the semi-primitive of the jungle – into a counter-icon for the strict, rule-bound Stalinist society in which they lived.

Tarzan had mass appeal among Soviet youth, but he proved particularly inspiring for what was arguably the Soviet Union's first subculture: the so-called *stiliagi*. Dubbed 'style-seekers' by the disdainful Soviet press, these youngsters did indeed aspire to bring 'style' to their lives, taking great care to dress in Western fashion (tight trousers, colorful ties, and thick-soled shoes became *stiliagi* markers), to comb their hair in an extravagant way (Tarzan's quiff provided early inspiration, while later Fellini's films made

the 'Italian' style popular), to bond over the sound of jazz gleaned from the Voice of America and trophy records brought home by returning veterans of the war, and to dance faster and more daringly than their peers. There is no doubt that in terms of looks and spirit the *stiliagi* were part of a wave of jazz-inspired youth cultures in Europe, which drew their cultural repertoire from the American swing scene, and which had already spawned the Swing kids and Swing Heinis in fascist Germany and Austria, the Zazous in wartime France, the zoot-suiters in the United States, and later the Teddy Boys in postwar Britain. They all were counterpoints to an environment that was militarized and culturally repressive. At the same time they all were products of the growing cultural influence of America in Europe and part of an increasingly global youth culture. And yet, they all were specific to their time and place. The *stiliagi* were unmistakably shaped by their Soviet habitat and experience. They were not perfect replicas of their Western peers. Vasilii Aksenov, later an acclaimed émigré writer, considered himself a real 'chuvak' (the *stiliagi* term for themselves) because he had acquired a reindeer sweater as sported by John Payne in the film *Sun Valley Serenade* – a classic among Soviet youth. While later contact with Moscow's golden youth soon disabused him of his version of 'stylishness', his life as a provincial *stiliaga* in Kazan was no less rebellious or subcultural than that of the boogie-woogie dancing KGB offspring whom he encountered in the Soviet capital.[4]

Aksenov's personal history as the son of the party activist Evgenia Ginsburg, repressed in 1937, and at the time of her son's forays into fashion, an inmate of the GULAG, highlights another specific aspect of Soviet nonconformist youth culture: its conscious or unconscious relationship with political dissent and regime criticism. While most *stiliagi* prided themselves in their apoliticalness, for some (including Aksenov) it was a significant part of their journey into opposition. Even for those who did not go down this road consciously, the mere enactment of the *stiliagi* lifestyle opened up questions about what their actions meant within the rigidly normative Soviet system. They certainly had a different valence to the very similar behavior of their Western counterparts. Two decades later another Western-inspired, and more consciously global, youth subculture – the hippie movement – would raise the same questions: how Western were Western-inspired youth cultures across the Iron Curtain? How successful were youth in transgressing their national boundaries? Or to what extent did they remain subject to the particularities of their location and circumstance?

This chapter is going to take a detailed look at two significant waves of Western-inspired youth culture in the Soviet Union and examine their significance with reference to the questions posed above. Both the *stiliagi* and the Soviet hippies took their semiotic clues from phenomena that originated in the West and spread around the globe, yet both could not help but respond to and be shaped by more homegrown factors such as the repressive

measures they faced, the economic realities of the postwar Soviet Union and the specific traditions and legacies of official youth cultural practices. There are some important differences between the two movements. While the *stiliagi* were largely unaware of their global cohort, the hippies reveled in their internationality and considered it one of their hallmarks. The hippie creed was based on a more precisely articulated ideology, while the *stiliagi* were bound only implicitly by a shared idealism for the anarchic nature of jazz, swing dancing, and the fashion that accompanied this scene. *Stiliagi* embraced and worshipped the fruits of Western consumption, while the Soviet hippies shared their Western peers' criticism of capitalist consumption. By virtue of their existence in different epochs, the source bases available to study these movements are quite different. The voices of the *stiliagi* have been preserved in a few memoirs and interviews conducted about a decade ago. Mostly, we have to rely on state documents to reconstruct their world. To the contrary, enough former Soviet hippies remain living that oral history has proven fruitful. This richer and larger source base will be evident in the second part of the article.[5] Yet despite these inconsistencies, because of their shared origins and antecedents in the West, both *stiliagi* and Soviet hippies offer a prism through which to explore how a transnational approach enriches the study of subcultures, and how global subcultures in odd places enhance our understanding of the process of cultural border-crossing.

Even a cursory glance across national and political borders seems to suggest that the concept of postwar global youth culture(s) does not do justice to the complexities of the phenomenon of youth cultural markers and practices which transgressed borders and turned into international movements.[6] On the one hand there is no doubt about the similarity between many youth subcultures in the twentieth century. The Foxtrot and Charleston craze of the 1920s; the swing and rock 'n' roll cultures of the 1940s and 1950s; the beatnik generation and its angry successors of the 1960s, the hippies, punks, and breakers of later decades all spread across several countries and continents. On the other hand to equate these expressions as simply identical in origin and character would be to misrepresent grossly both their more detailed cultural fabric and their function and position within their respective societies. Rather than perfect copies of a contemporary (usually American) trend, the Western-inspired cultural practices across the Iron Curtain appear to be 'bastards' with features that resemble both imported as well as homegrown style. And rather than concepts of 'globalization' or 'conflicting Cold War cultures', Michel Espagne's 'cultural transfers' or Jürgen Osterhammel's 'transculturally comparing history' seem to be more appropriate approaches to the phenomenon of 'Tarzan in Moscow'.[7] Indeed, the hybridity of Western-inspired Soviet youth cultures was the result not only of Western culture perceived through the prism of Soviet conditions but also the consequence of multiple transnational journeys. Just as Tarzan

traveled through Germany before reaching the Soviet Union, much of Soviet hippie culture was rooted in the musical message of the Beatles and much of Soviet hippie slang was derived from British English rather than American parlance. Youth cultural knowledge was subject to the forces of transnational transfer, not all of which were predictable or rendered communication perfect. The writer Vladimir Kaminer provided a brilliant summary of the coincidences and vagrancies that created Soviet Western-style youth culture and consumption in the 1970s and 1980s:

> Lovers of capitalist music did not have an easy time in the Soviet Union. This music came only sporadically and mostly through diplomatic luggage and the KGB to our country. ... The KGB sons and daughters showcased their music and copied the records for their friends, who in turn had other friends and thus came the music among the people. ... Did the KGB agent go to a music supermarket, the whole country listened to Roxy Music, Sparks and ZZ Top. Did the agent end up at a different corner, then all of Soviet youth got into King Crimson, and when he passed a Goth place, everybody was sighing with The Cure.[8]

Thus, rather than simply situating youth subcultures into a context of globalization, concentrating on their transnational journey and the metamorphosis inherent in this process will provide better insight into their origins, as well as the rise and role of international counter cultures both across the globe and within their respective societies. At the same time looking at the West-East transfer of subcultural markers and practices, and at the way these markers and practices were deformed and reformed in the process, will provide a window onto the possibilities and limitations of the transnational approach. Twentieth century subcultures have always featured two axes: one vertical which relates them to their respective main cultures and own histories, and one horizontal which – via the modern phenomena of media, increased travel, and internationally connected economies – links them to related subcultures across the globe.

The fact that in the case of the *stiliagi* and the Soviet hippies the horizontal axis was running against mainstream norms and was established in conditions that were expressly hostile to any contact with the West renders the transnational aspect even more visible and sharply defined. This was transnationalism in a quasi-laboratory of extreme circumstance, demonstrating the strength of the forces that propelled it. Yet the Iron Curtain also serves to highlight the impact of national histories. Indeed, the study of subculture and its theories might serve as a very useful model for creating a framework for this ambivalence. The subculture's multivalent relationship with its main culture has fostered a variety of concepts which aim to capture subculture's precarious location between the world in which its members have been socialized and their new environment made up of new,

outside influences.[9] There is no reason why these concepts should not be employed across borders, making visible the hybrid nature of any culture that has traveled geographically as well as metaphysically.

Swinging across the Iron Curtain

Even before American soldiers brought the lindy-hop and jitterbug across the Atlantic and made large swaths of European youth dance like black Harlem, jazz and swing had acted as mediators to create a new, global youth culture. Founded on the roaring success of the dances of the 1920s, which had swept bohemian Europe (and not only) off its feet, the fast tunes of the 1930s and 1940s, the peculiar style of the jazz musicians – aloof and sartorially elegant – and the new increased availability of radio and records created a youth culture that emulated American style, listened to big band jazz and danced with a speed and physicality that had not been seen before. The fact that Europe had turned largely conservative and/or dictatorial placed this new culture not only in opposition to an older, disapproving generation but also to the entire normative system of the ruling ideologies. With Nazi Germany swallowing up ever-greater parts of Europe, swing culture's free-spirited hedonism, its black American roots and its counterpoint to military style turned swing into an antifascist and anti-occupation statement.[10] The advance of the Red Army into central Europe at the end of the war and the subsequent involuntary encounter of millions of Soviet citizens with the 'West' brought swing and its fashion into the Soviet Union, whose own normative framework at that point was based on a conflation of communist collectivism and Soviet patriotism, none of which sat easily with the individualism and Americanism inherent in swing culture. Not that the Soviet Union was entirely unfamiliar with jazz and modern entertainment. Indeed, cultural policy in the 1930s had partially embraced the need to amuse people as well as educate them and some Soviet musicians such as Eddie Rosen and Leonid Utesov, who starred in the immensely popular 1934 film *Happy Guys* by Grigori Aleksandrov, rose to considerable prominence.[11] In some places the foxtrot was not only tolerated, but taught in classes, and during the war songs such as Gershwin's Moonlight Serenade were ubiquitous.[12] When the wartime alliance gave way to the Cold War, the mood changed. Jazz was forbidden, adulation of America became a 'thought crime' and the raising of a distinctly 'Soviet' youth formed part of the battle for global ideological and physical superiority. It was in this climate that the first *stiliagi* were born.

The first *stiliagi* were in all likelihood children of elite families who for professional reasons had better access to Western goods and knowledge. They imitated a style of dandy-like dressing they believed to come from America but which had de facto been in circulation in Europe for several years. Most of the items that transferred the necessary cultural knowledge

came indeed from German and East European households, which had been plundered by the Red Army. Alexei Kozlov recalls how he 'appropriated' the trophy records brought by some girls to school dances. He argued to himself that Benny Goodman and Glenn Miller meant nothing to the girls' fathers (who had brought them home from the war), 'but the world' for him.[13] The so-called trophy records, together with the radio station 'Voice of America', provided the soundtrack to this emerging subculture that was based on a common love for jazz, a belief in stylish and differentiating fashion and a general daredevil attitude, which found expression in faster and more sensual dancing (forbidden on Soviet dance floors). As a consequence swing and its freedoms became associated not with Black or American culture, as it was in the West, but with the West – indeed an imaginary utopian version of it – in general. Even pre-war Eastern Europe was part of this imagination of a world in which jazz provided the beat to a more colorful and exciting life. Swing for *stiliagi* meant thus similar, but not quite the same, things as it did to its Western fans. It was not only a statement of entertainment. It was the basis of a certain attitude of dissent, an attitude that consciously adored the forbidden fruit of the Cold War, Western popular culture. Just as in the West, jazz was rebellious. But its rebellion was less generational, class or race based, but directed against its most basic enemy: Soviet cultural and moral policy.

The *stiliagi* started hanging out on respective main streets (in Moscow it was Gorky Street, in Leningrad Nevsky Prospekt) making visibility and provocation part of their identity. A new slang was born, setting the emerging *stiliagi* communities linguistically apart from the gray masses – the *zhloby* – as they disdainfully called the drably dressed ordinary citizens. The phenomenon spread from the capital to the provinces and from the elite youngsters to ordinary youth. By the mid-1950s most midsized towns in the Soviet Union had a *stiliagi* community and when Khrushchev decided to break the silence that surrounded nonconformist behavior among youth the movement mushroomed with an ever-growing public introduced to the idea of living out youthful rebellion in fashion and music.[14]

The term *stiliaga* itself was coined by the Soviet journalist Beliaev in an article in the satirical journal *Krokodil* in 1949 but was never employed by the adherents to the subculture themselves, who used the Yiddish-derived *chuvak* to describe their boys and *chuvicha* their (much less numerous) girls. Indeed, Beliaev's article betrayed more about the perplexity with which the Soviet authorities confronted the new movement than about the *stiliagi* itself who in all likelihood never wore the peacock-like cloth Beliaev ascribed to them nor were they orientated toward a bourgeois past as alleged by the subheading of the article.[15] Indeed, they considered themselves to be cutting-edge, which at the time and in their minds, meant to be as Western as possible. Unaware of their direct parallels such as the German Swing Kids, the French Zazous or American zoot-suiters (all of whom were derivations

of the original Harlem swing dance scene themselves), the involuntary opening of the Soviet Union to the West during and after the war had given them a glimpse of a life that seemed more fun and more stylish than the rigid routines offered to them in their own environment.

The lust for the West and its 'cool' drove the *stiliagi's* identification with jazz music. They gleaned their desired tunes (which had to be authentically American) mainly from Western radio and especially Willis Conover's jazz hour on the Voice of America. They learned new dance steps (from the description of Komsomol and the Soviet press *stiliagi* danced both the Lindy Hop and collegiate Shag) from whatever source they could find – film, books, hearsay, visitors in the grand Moscow hotels – and labeled them the 'Hamburg' or the 'Canadian' – presumably in reference to the corners of the world from which they assumed they hailed. The same was true about their obsession with 'authentic' Western fashion. A police interview with the *stiliaga* Arkady Bairon is very instructive about the *stiliagi's* attention to detail in their quest to be both different from the East, yet very much like the West:

> The current fashion is a coat with arms in a style called Raglan. At the front there is a double cockade on which buttons are sown…The most fashionable jackets now have one button, are very long and broad in the shoulders narrowing lower down. The arms have extended cuffs…To wear broad ties is not in fashion now, therefore I ask my mother to alter every tie I buy in a shop to make it narrow.[16]

Everything had to be authentic rather than filtered through the Soviet lens. The music had to be real American jazz played by real American bands, not toned down by a Soviet orchestra. The dancing had to resemble that done on the other side of the Iron Curtain with new steps eagerly copied from trophy films and the occasional foreign visitor. The fashion had to be taken straight from the glimpses gleaned of life in a more colorful world. Bairon explains that he got acquainted with the ins and outs of a Raglan coat by following a visiting diplomat around town.[17] It was by no means only America that played the godfather role. Bairon elaborated on his own hairstyle to the Moscow police in 1954, proudly tracing its origins to the films of Fellini, which had just arrived in Moscow and were shown to a select audience of students of cinema.[18] According to a female *stiliaga* from Leningrad, even Picasso had to serve as a transmission vehicle. His painting of a girl with a pony tail exhibited in Leningrad in 1955 made this quintessential 1950s American hairdo the height of fashion among stylish Soviet girls.[19] The original (and thus in the view of the stiliagi most authentic) connotations of the swing scene arose from a political and social situation so far removed from the world of Soviet youngsters that its significance was entirely lost on the *stiliagi* crowd. Swing came out of Harlem dance halls, where it was

part of a growing sense of emancipation of the black community, but also served as one of the first cultural vehicles that crossed the racial divide. By the time it crossed the ocean with the American GIs, swing and its culture was de facto mainstream – but only when considered on its home territory. In fascist and postwar Europe it still had a whiff of subversiveness, not to say novelty and exoticism.[20] And it was in this incarnation as a symbol of irreverence and modernity that it traveled across the Iron Curtain.

The *stiliagi* flocked to those places in the Soviet Union that most resembled the cosmopolitan spaces of their Western dreams. These were the very same spaces that had been singled out by the Soviet state as its flagship locations. Moscow's central Gorky Street, whose eastern side pavement was irreverently renamed 'Broadway' by the *stiliagi*, was the Soviet Union's showcase of success. It had been completely remodeled by Stalin in the early 1930s turning the old and windy mercantile street into a straight, six-laned thoroughfare with multistory buildings on either side. In the early postwar years the Soviet Union's only cocktail bar, the *kokteil khall*, opened here and became a magnet for the local *stiliagi* crowd, many, not all of whom came from families of the political elite.[21] A few years later the *stiliagi* and their cocktail bar had become the stuff of legend and an inspiration for future nonconformists. Henri Hamran, a Swedish exchange student, recalls in his account of his time in Moscow in 1960 that rumors abounded about the wild times in the now-closed cocktail hall, with teddy boys (*stiliagi*) driving up in red sports cars.[22] Interestingly, Hamran not only tried to translate the *stiliagi* back into a Western language (naming them Teddy Boys, which was a subculture that was younger than the *stiliagi*) but also demonstrates how swing culture's time in the Soviet Union had formed its own myths and legends informing future generations, who looked to their own past as well as to the West for inspiration. And of course, people like the Swede Hamran, who had knowledge of Teddy Boys and similar phenomena in the West, was a carrier of information to the eager ears of his fellow Moscow students, thus relaying cultural information both ways.

In reality most *stiliagi* operated not in quasi-Western surroundings such as the elite cocktail hall but in the ordinary, drab spaces of the Soviet postwar life. Yet they did their best to manipulate these spaces for their own needs. In later years it became common practice to beat the strict 'no *stiliaga*' door policy of many dance events (controlled and enforced by the so-called *druzhiniki* – Komsomol youth patrols) by changing in the toilets after having gained entry in 'normal' dress. *Stiliagi* persuaded bandleaders to play faster tunes to allow stiliagi-type dancing and at times, under the banner of Komsomol events, organized dances specifically designed to cater to the local *stiliaga* community.[23] Arkadii Bairon saw no contradiction between his activities as a Komsomol organizer and his devotion to *stiliagi* life and fashion, skillfully using one to facilitate the other. Private dance parties were the reserve of the privileged few who lived in non-shared

apartments and owned both a record player and an appropriate collection of records (aided by the practice of so-called records on the bone – records pressed onto x-ray plates).[24] Vasilii Aksenov describes his amazement at his first encounter of 'proper' *stiliagi* in Moscow, when he saw the daughter of a high-ranking KGB general bopping wildly to a fast swing track at a private party in her parents' apartment.[25]

We have no concrete evidence, but it can be assumed that children of elite households had access to a more direct transfer of Western culture, potentially even having experienced the West themselves. In the absence of concrete testimony we can only infer that the so-called *Shtatniki* (from the word *Shtaty* for the United States) – a subgroup of the *stiliagi* consisting of so-called golden youth – wanted to draw attention to their higher authenticity, meaning to their more immediate closeness to the West. However, we do know what factors gave authenticity. In terms of dancing, *stiliagi* perceived everything that was fast – and hence more danceable on a Lindy step – to be more authentic. This perception was a direct inversion of the Soviet authorities explicitly forbidding fast dance numbers, especially those that featured the saxophone – hence precisely the kind of music that was good for the fast Lindy step. The fact that American and Western European orchestras played by no means only fast numbers was irrelevant. Indeed, in the West the anarchic bebop was threatening the whole concept of big band swing and swing dancing as a whole, which soon came to be seen as redolent of a past era. It is also clear from Bairon's testimony that 'authenticity' rested on getting information – one of the classical deficit items in the Soviet Union. Information was more valuable the more restricted it seemed. Films by Fellini, only open to cinematography students, and glimpses of diplomatic chic fit the bill of 'classified' information. Hence, even though the Soviet Union had its own fashion journals and couture houses, which themselves were inspired by the West, youth spurned their offerings in favor of what was beyond the Iron Curtain and thus hard to grasp. *Stiliagi* culture was inspired by the West, yet shaped – partially inversely – by the moral and political system of the East.

While unabashedly directed toward the 'ideological enemy' and keen to be as close to what was perceived as Western authenticity as possible, the *stiliagi* were not as 'un-Soviet' as they imagined. Their obsession with proper and correct fashion mirrored the Soviet value of *kulturnost*, which in the 1930s had broken ties with the idea of 'revolutionary dress' and since then propagated a dress code that was decidedly conservative and bourgeois. While the dandy-like style of the *stiliagi* thus differed in detail from the Soviet norm, in essence the idea that dress determined one's identity and proper dress was desirable was not alien to the Soviet canon. Similarly, the idea of a collective elite, which underpins the self-identity of any subculture, was something that was deeply rooted in the self-perception of the Bolshevik regime, who based their own identity on

their revolutionary past and the myth of the communist underground struggle.

Much of their identity was also rooted in Soviet-specific circumstances. The *stiliaga* Aleksei Kozlov, later a feted jazz saxophonist, recalls that his first socialization was the local *dvor*, the typical Russian courtyard around which Soviet apartment buildings were built. The courtyard crowd identified with the mystical culture of Russia's criminal underground, whose jargon, songs, and separate code of norms were the stuff of legend among the Soviet postwar population.[26] This early fascination with a culture that inspired awe both because of its illegality and its secrecy and separateness from the mainstream left its markers on *stiliagi* self-identity. *Stiliagi* by and large did not see themselves as a political opposition – those who were so inclined kept that identity separate from their *stiliaga* life – but as kids 'scrambling towards freedom', carving out their own spaces and fostering an identity that defined 'Sovietness' in a broader sense than the official doctrine.[27]

As challengers to the hegemonic order *stiliagi* shared many characteristics with their Western counterparts yet adapted them to their local habitat. Like the American zoot-suiters *stiliagi* was in many ways a rejection of the militarized masculinity that prevailed in societies engaged in the war effort.[28] Dressing up was commonly seen as a female preoccupation and as such the dandy-like style of the *stiliagi* (the vast majority of whom were male) was reminiscent of Oscar Wilde and his crowd, even though it is unlikely that the homosexual overtones associated with this parallel were consciously noted by the *stiliagi*.[29] Like the French, German, and Austrian swing kids active during the time of the Nazi regime, Soviet *stiliagi* rebelled with their music and dancing against an ideology that was conservative, hostile to hedonism, and infused with rigid thought patterns. The *stiliagi*'s studied apoliticalness and concentration on exterior markers such as fashion and dancing was a decisive negation of their politicized surroundings.[30] While class did not play a big role in *stiliaga* identity, they shared with English Teddy Boys the appropriation and subversion of a dress code that signified more wealth and power than they de facto possessed. While the London Teddy Boys made a statement by wearing Saville Row suits in their rough East End neighborhoods, the *stiliagi* took Soviet proper dress norms to their extreme, creating an image of Western superiority while at the same time accentuating certain markers to a ridiculous extent. Ties, shoes, and socks were all central to Soviet proper dress (since they distinguished the new Soviet man from the Russian peasant dressed in a collarless shirt and cloth rather than leather shoes). The *stiliagi* manipulated their ties to suit the fashion, were proud of their several centimeters-thick soles and colorful socks. All of this negated the correct Soviet attire, which did not recognize changing fashion trends and emphasized equality rather than distinctiveness. Just as the *stiliagi* colonized the spaces central to official Sovietness, their style too picked out the attributes that had meaning in Soviet main culture and subverted them in

order to emphasize their separate, yet linked identity. Lévi-Strauss has coined the term 'bricolage' for this process, which neither adopts nor negates hegemonic cultural elements, but employs them in a manner and in a setting that gives them an entirely new meaning.[31] As demonstrated, *stiliagi* culture transferred not only Soviet elements into new semiotic meanings, but did the same to some of the hallmarks it adopted from the West. Exceedingly proper dress was not a sign of class conflict but of implicit political dissent. Jazz music was not the messenger of a more emancipated black America, but the antithesis to a dull, prescribed official youth culture.

While thus undeniably Western in appearance, preferences, and identity, the *stiliagi* emerge as a youth culture that was a hybrid between its Western inspiration and its Soviet habitat. That became even truer as time went on and the movement spread beyond the vaguely cosmopolitan spaces of Moscow and Leningrad into the Russian provinces. More and more meanings of Western style got lost in translation. As mentioned above, Vasilii Aksenov was very proud to acquire a reindeer sweater as sported by John Payne in the film *Sun Valley Serenade*. He considered this item of clothing the height of sophistication until confronted by apparel with a 'higher' level of authenticity in Moscow.[32] When the term *stiliagi* became a staple of the Soviet press in their efforts to combat what they perceived as the 'youth problem', they created an avalanche of imitators most of whom now aspired to a style that had not only crossed the ideological border of West to East but had also been filtered through the malicious eyes of the Soviet press. *Stiliagi* now really began to look like the peacocks the press had painted them as. At the same time rock 'n' roll replaced swing in the West as the music of choice for the young generation and introduced a new repertoire of fashion, which seeped into the Soviet Union. The summer uniform of the *stiliagi* in the mid-1950s was described by a female consort as a loose checkered shirt – something that was a far cry from the studied elegance of the early *stiliagi* and more reminiscent of what James Dean sported as an early rocker in *Rebel without a Cause*.[33] Interestingly, Elvis Presley's rock 'n' roll culture left little imprint in the East, where the twist was adopted but not much of the rock. It was left to another music revolution to bring about the next big wave of youth subculture in the Soviet Union. The rise of the Beatles gave birth first to the *Beatlomany*, who then emerged and merged into the rising hippie movement. 'The Soviet hippies stuck out because of their sheer volume', Russian rock critic Artemy Troitsky recalled. 'By the early 1970s there was an army of hippies all across the Soviet Union, and not only in the big towns such as Moscow and Leningrad, but even in small provincial nests'.[34]

Moscow's summer of love

The first hippies appeared in Moscow roughly in 1967, once again recruited largely, but not exclusively, from the children of the elite.[35] Simultaneously,

but independently, hippies also started to appear in several cities in the Baltic States, who, due to location and family ties, were more exposed to the West and its cultural and material transfers. Like the *stiliagi* the hippies rallied around music and fashion – yet this time the music came in loud, inspiring beats, the fashion was relaxed rather than formal and the regime produced boredom rather than terror in people's hearts. The time was ripe for the rise of the Soviet hippies.

How and when hippiedom crossed the Iron Curtain is easier to trace than swing's journey a few decades back. While, of course, each hippie had his or her own individual journey toward hippiedom, a vast number of people refer back to the same music, the same pictures, and the same articles and publications, which inspired them. The Soviet press was a crucial distributor of knowledge of this new phenomenon that puzzled the communist authorities, who liked the hippies' anticapitalist and anti-Vietnam stance, but not its declared individualism and generational rebellion. The fact that the very first Soviet coverage of the Western hippies, which appeared in the summer of 1967 in the youth journal *Roveznik*, was about British hippies hanging out in Hyde Park meant that British slang and British spaces loomed large in the perception of the Soviet hippies.[36] The words *flet* (flat/apartment), fiver and tenner remained in the vocabulary of Soviet hippie slang long after the movement's fascination with its Western peers had passed. The article itself became a cult item and was passed through the generations of Soviet hippies. (Interestingly, *Pravda* reported on New York hippies in the same year, but this article is rarely cited among the community. The *Pravda* article, even more than the one in *Roveznik* was very positive about the anticapitalism, antimaterialism, and anti-egoism of the hippie community. Yet, very few of the very first generation of Moscow hippies are still alive and the article's explicit interpretation of the hippies as a logical consequence of the Beatnik generation could very well have influenced those early hippies, such as Ofelia, and Sasha and Sveta Markov, who moved in the wider orbit of the literary circle SMOG.)[37] A later article by the New York-based journalist Genrikh Borovik added the San Francisco scene to the mental map of the Soviet hippies, while an article on Drop City in Colorado in *Sovetskaia Arkhitektura* planted the idea of communal life.[38]

Personal contact was, of course, the most effective form of transmission. In Moscow there was a girl nicknamed Masha Shtatnitsa (from the Russian term *Shtaty* for the States), or in real life, Maria Izvekova, who had just returned with her diplomat parents from New York. According to the testimony of her contemporaries she brought back a vast knowledge of wide flared jeans, beads, hairbands, and amulets, significantly shaping the style of the budding Moscow hippies.[39] Artemy Troitsky, who had lived with his journalist parents in Prague for several years until 1967, became a major purveyor of new music, part of which he had brought from Prague, where he mingled with the offspring of the European communist elite, and part of

which he obtained via contacts such as the stepfather of his friend and fellow hippie Sasha Lipnitsky, who happened to be Brezhnev's English translator.[40] The teenage Sergei Batovrin, who in 1971, returned from several years in New York, found himself welcomed in much older hippie circles keen to ingest what he had to tell them of his firsthand sightings of the New York hippie scene, including his sojourn to find the Woodstock festival gathering.[41] Several self-taught tailors provided the necessary fashion in a country that was chronically short of jeans and colorful textiles. The inspiration here came from the few photographs in the press, carefully shared snippets from journals from Poland or Czechoslovakia or the occasional glimpse that Soviet newsreels provided of Western hippie fashion. Interestingly, the Soviet hippies soon turned this deficit into a virtue, with the most devoted of them rejecting jeans and other ready-made items as too unimaginative.[42] Hand-made clothing was seen both as being in line with hippie ideology and as catering to a certain love of folk arts and Slavophilia.[43] Photographs of this time demonstrate that the hippie fashion that resulted was by no means inferior in terms of creativity to that sported in Berkeley, London, or New York. By the late 1960s Moscow's hippie community had grown considerably to several hundreds, possibly even a thousand hippies (depending on the definition of hippie). They made the Maiakovskaia square their regular meeting spot and also assembled regularly at the so-called *Psichodrom* – the first courtyard of the old building of Moscow's Lomonosov University, which adjoined the journalism faculty, home to many leading lights of the first hippie generation. This was no coincidence. The very term *Psichodrom* was coined by the young poets of the SMOG movement, who used it to describe this convenient meeting point for youth. Yet more importantly, the journalism faculty was the playground of privileged youth, who had better direct access to information from the West, thus underscoring the transmission role of the so-called Soviet 'golden youth'.[44] While much of the more radical points of the Western hippie movement did not make it across the Iron Curtain (neither drugs nor concepts of Eastern spirituality played a role yet in the Moscow scene and the testimony on the existence of 'free love' is very mixed), the desire to imitate Western peers certainly stretched into the ideological domain, even if this meant some mental acrobatics vis-à-vis attitudes toward the West and the United States in particular. The antimaterialism of the Western hippies was a difficult act to follow in a society that was beset with shortages of almost all consumer goods, yet their political creed of peace and antiwar engagement was adopted more easily.[45]

In 1969 a spontaneous barefoot march took place on Gorky Street. Since it occurred on the Day of the Tank driver, another one of the numerous Soviet holidays, an understanding arose that their march was in support of the recently crushed Prague Spring – a sentiment that remained in all likelihood hidden from the authorities, who otherwise would have reacted with much more severe measures than a few administrative cautions. However, it did

not take a lot of imagination for the Soviet regime to see how hippie concepts of love of freedom and peace could be turned against Soviet politics, not to mention the subversive effect of such visible differences on Soviet streets. United by a shared love for partially forbidden, but certainly frowned upon music and fashion that was decidedly 'un-Soviet', the Soviet hippie movement from the very beginning oriented itself not only toward the West but also against the Soviet order. In that respect they mirrored the experience of the *stiliagi* a decade or two before them. While in 1969, the state responded with only a threatening display of power by sending several police vans to the hippie meeting point on the Maiakovskaia Square, two years later the state decided to respond with more force to another hippie demonstration. The 1971 demonstration took the Soviet Day for the Defense of Children as its spiritual background to demonstrate the plight of Vietnamese children (and this was, of course, congruent with the hippies' understanding of themselves as flower children and innocent creatures in a hostile world). One of Moscow's recognized hippie leaders, a son of a KGB officer known by his nickname Sontse (Sunny), convinced the local hippies that it was time for the Moscow community to show its solidarity with the fight against the Vietnamese War. This was to include a procession of hippies marching from the university to the American embassy. It is unclear if the whole action was a provocation from the KGB or if indeed the rumor that the Moscow City Committee had given permission was true, yet during the event, the demonstrators were arrested at the university gates, taken to several police stations, fingerprinted, registered, and for the most part, subsequently released.[46] The Soviet state had made it abundantly clear that it was not going to tolerate any ideological hippie activities, whether anti-American or not.

The arrests after the 1971 demonstration sent a clear message that being a hippie in the Soviet Union was not without consequences. The events in Moscow were mirrored in other cities. There was a crackdown on the local hippie community in Sevastopol in 1970 after they attempted to stage an antiwar demonstration – in a city that was essentially a military garrison for the Soviet navy.[47] In 1972 the Lithuanian police came down heavily on the Kaunas hippies after the self-immolation of a sympathizer at their meeting place in the center of town.[48] The fact that being a hippie was no longer simply a matter of fancy but a serious choice that involved taking an oppositional stance to the rules of the regime changed the hippie communities across the country. In Moscow the hippie community moved away from the premises of the university. In the process its membership also changed. After 1971 very few serious adherents to the hippie lifestyle in Moscow were students anymore – or if they were, when they encountered the hippie community, they very soon ceased to be so. The post-1971 hippie was more committed to a dropout lifestyle and was usually engaged in jobs designed to keep him, and less frequently her, out of the clutches of the law against 'parasites', which could mean prison for people found without

employment. Moscow hippies assembled now at various places on Gorky Street. The authorities set up a Komsomol patrol headquarters in close proximity, which was charged with keeping an eye on the local hippie community. Arrests and interviews in Komsomol premises became a normal part of hippie life, as did forced stays in psychiatric hospitals and treatments with insulin shocks and tranquilizers. As a result the Soviet hippie community became a more hardened entity, and one that tried to separate itself increasingly from mainstream society, creating not only an alternative lifestyle but also an alternative sphere of existence.

The term *sistema* – the Russian word for system – was already in circulation among the first wave of hippies, who had coined the term to express their solidarity with each other as well as with hippie contacts in Riga and Tallinn. It was, however, from the mid-1970s onwards that this term assumed real importance in the life of the Soviet hippie community and became one of the hallmarks of its existence. *Sistema* became the byword for what it meant to be a Soviet hippie, beating not only the ennui of late socialism but also the dangers of being different in a world that considered deviation from the norm an attack on its ideological foundations. The idea of the *sistema* as a network of information and personal contacts was developed in the mid-1970s by a new generation of hippies. They continued to develop their own slang, soon even compiling dictionaries, expanding their network across the whole Soviet Union, traveling extensively, usually hitchhiking in the Baltic States and down south, and following a certain seasonal schedule. The Lithuanian hippie Liudvikas Jakimavičius wrote in his memoirs of the annual cycle of the Soviet hippie trail.

> The hippies would show up in Vilnius in autumn and stay awhile. Then they'd take off and hitchhike to Saint Petersburg or the Crimea or they'd take a month off and hang out in the psychiatric hospital. Then they'd show up again in the Bermuda Triangle. We'd meet, drink coffee, red Bulgarian wine, smoke Prima cigarettes, and they'd talk nonstop about their adventures, about everything that they'd been through while they were away.[49]

Soon more ritualization was introduced. The first of May was celebrated as the opening of the summer 'season' in Tallinn. The first of June was commemorated as Day of the Defense of Children and in memory of the demonstration in 1971. From 1976 onwards there were serious attempts to have a regular hippie summer camp somewhere in the Baltic States. From 1979 onwards Gauia near Riga became the home of an annual hippie retreat, which was to continue right to the end of the Soviet Union. Among some members of the hippie community it became also customary to think of certain stages of hippiedom, which could be achieved through travel into far-flung corners of the Soviet Union.[50] Certain hippies acquired a legendary

status providing both role models and heroes to the community. And while it was always vigorously denied that there were leaders in the hippie community, there were clearly some hippies who assumed leadership positions.

The 'ritualization' and 'professionalization' of the Soviet hippie community meant that the movement was better equipped to survive in an environment that was hostile to them, and at certain times, such as the Moscow Olympics, sought to eradicate them entirely. Yet it also meant that the Soviet hippie movement became more and more an entity that modeled itself on a Western movement but was in essence increasingly shaped by its own experiences, history, and habitat. In short the Soviet hippie movement became more and more Soviet in the course of the 1970s. Much of their repertoire of beliefs and practices was specific to their particular situation.

It is telling that they felt the need to formalize their loose bands of friend- and kinship by giving themselves a title – *sistema* – that implied more than just affiliation with the global hippie movement. While *sistema* was originally a purely Muscovite term, it was soon embraced all across the Soviet Union. One of the coiners of the term even made the expressive link that 'they [meaning the authorities] had their system and we created ours'.[51] Yet even before the *sistema* became a union-wide phenomenon stretching from Lvov to Vladivostok local groups had tapped into their experience of organized youth to make sense of the new hippie creed and fashion. Almost all hippies sought the publicity and visibility of town centers to showcase themselves to the world. Many created symbols and elaborate entry rituals to set themselves apart. In Sevastopol the first hippies devised an entrance ritual and oath and created their own symbol in addition to the international peace sign.[52] In some cases hippies felt the need to respond to their political setting. The adoption of a hippie calendar with holidays and clearly marked beginnings and ends of seasons is also reminiscent of the strict Soviet year that included a host of major and minor holidays, which were observed through the practice of defined official and unofficial rituals. The idea of a summer camp was not foreign to Soviet young people, most of whom had gone at least once through the experience of the obligatory pioneer camp – often indeed a place where they were first introduced to other youngsters listening to rock music and following a more daring fashion code. By the mid-1980s some members of the hippie community published manifestos, which suggested a coherent program of hippie politics (which de facto was not true since the movement was quite fragmented) and in the 1990s a University of Hippie Life was established in Moscow.[53] In general, despite their credo of freedom and no rules, the Soviet hippies became more formal and institutionalized over the years, drawing from their experience as Soviet citizens and responding to the need to maintain coherence in the face of persecution.

The fact, however, that the Soviet hippies lived a precarious life, in constant and imminent danger of repression, meant also that the movement

did not develop into newer forms of youth culture.[54] A special feature of the Soviet hippie movement was that it remained frozen in time with little new impetus to its ideology or its outer markers – partly because the environment in which its members lived also changed little until the onset of *perestroika*. Sure enough the creation of camps, new meeting spots, samizdat publications and manifestoes changed hippie life and rituals. New generations of hippies joined and took over the movement, making the 1980s hippies arguably even more numerous than their 1970s counterparts. These not only had a history to look back on but also more in the way of infrastructure to tap into. Yet they also had few alternatives, even though a punk scene developed from the early 1980s. Unlike in the West, where punks and hippies saw themselves on opposite ends of a youth cultural spectrum, the common enemy of the official regime made Soviet punks and hippies more bedfellows than rivals. It was only the reforms of *perestroika* and the explosion of newer youth subcultures onto the scene, which catapulted the Soviet hippies out of their state of stagnation – and created a plethora of newer and younger subcultures from breakdancing to skateboarding. Ultimately, it was the end of the Soviet system that also spelled the hippies' end. New borders closed off the old hippie trails and capitalism made cashless survival much more difficult. New and more drugs, adulterated home-distilled alcohol, and the deterioration of social services blew the *sistema* apart, literally killing a fair number of its members. Nothing could have demonstrated the interconnectedness of hippies and their Soviet habitat more potently than their post-Soviet disintegration.

Hence Soviet hippies, too, were hybrids. They wanted to be like their Western peers – and in many respects they succeeded – yet they were also children of their Soviet habitat. They measured the world using the same yardsticks as those propagated by mainstream culture, yet they also defined themselves against this world. Both actions sustained dependency on their Soviet background rather than a divorce from it. Much of their program betrayed the same idealism as communist doctrine (and here the Western hippie and Soviet influences neatly confer), but also much of their structure, ritual, and organization took its cues from their Soviet upbringing and experience.[55]

Yet Soviet hippies, too, were masters of bricolage. They did not just reflect late Soviet reality. They manipulated it. Indeed their whole creed of love, peace, and friendship took Soviet values and made them unrecognizable – something the Soviet regime could not tolerate and which led to the crack down of the early 1970s. Precisely because of their ideological proximity toward the official communist ideology, yet their obvious distance from Soviet norms, they were considered such a threat. Yet, the Soviet hippie way of living as much as possible outside the Soviet system and connected to the Western world, was not only symbolic of how the West was winning the cultural Cold War. It was part and parcel of the fabric that made up

late socialism. Skirting the system, while exploiting its weakness was not a strategy monopolized by hippies. They were just particularly good at it. The Soviet hippies' relationship to its global, Western peers was also one that was characterized by a mixture of imitation, manipulation, and bricolage. Many items that made up the hippie way of life in West and East carried slightly different overtones in the socialist context. As discussed, hippie fashion, while studiously imbibed from pictures gleaned from the press, came to symbolize less a rejection of bourgeois taste – even though, it was that too – than a statement of difference in a world that was seen as dull and gray. Communal life was less about the rejection of the nuclear family model and/or the creation of a utopia – too many people still lived in communal apartments to make communes look particularly radical – and more an escape from Soviet norms and repression.

Conclusion

The Soviet *stiliagi* and hippies are in many ways astonishing transnational phenomena. Against all odds they used tiny holes in the Iron Curtain to construct youth cultures that imitated the West and succeeded in results remarkably similar to those that were their inspiration. Western visitors often expressed surprise at the sight of such Westernness in an otherwise very Soviet landscape. The fact that Teddy Boys could be spotted in the mid-1950s prancing on Gorky Street and hippies in the mid-1970s sitting in the very heart of the capital of the Soviet empire is testimony not only of the power of globalized popular culture in the later decades of the twentieth century, but also of the power of youth as a transmitter of cultural knowledge.

It is no coincidence that young people drove the import of Western culture into the Soviet bloc in the postwar years.[56] Ever since the nineteenth century youth had started to think of itself in terms of a concept that transcended national boundaries and – to a lesser extent – class divisions. The rhetoric of youth that underpinned the understanding of both Soviet and Western society toward their young people stressed supposed anthropological constants such as enthusiasm, romanticism, energy, and adventurism as markers of youthfulness. These were the very values both societies inculcated in their young people thus paving the way for them to look along generational lines and across geopolitical borders rather than limiting their gaze to their own supposed national characteristics. Already before the war numerous youth organizations such as the Scouts, but also the less international German Bünde, considered themselves to be first and foremost 'youth' and as belonging to a national framework second. After the war the age of formal youth organization was replaced by the rise of informal youth movements, which were defined by external markers and shared interests rather than by ideology or formal associations. This made

identification across borders even easier and more likely, since in an age of increased globalized trading, better transnational media – especially radio and new forms of recording music – and American cultural dominance, young people soon found that they liked the same music and were appreciative of the same fashions no matter where they lived. Youth across the globe, or at least across its Western half – and that included the Soviet Union – soon found themselves in so-called communities of knowledge. Not race, class, or nationality defined their identity but a shared enjoyment and practice of knowledge – whether of jazz, swing, rock or fashion, slogans, or attitudes. Having located themselves within a 'community of knowledge' that transgressed their own easily accessible cultural territory, young people would employ their energy and free time to gather more knowledge and hence a stronger sense of shared identity.

The study of the *stiliagi* and hippie communities of the Soviet Union also offers an interesting glimpse into subcultural theory and its potential for transnational history. Most subcultural theories were developed by the Chicago and Birmingham schools with very specific phenomena in mind – the gangs of South Chicago and the Teddy Boys, Mods, and Rockers in Britain. Both schools therefore like to stress certain attributes, such as race and class respectively, which were of great importance in their investigations.[57] Neither of these factors played much of a role in the Soviet Union either in the 1950s or the 1970s. Yet if one looks beyond tight definitions and takes race and class simply as expressions of social hierarchy, then subcultural theory opens great comparative windows. Dick Hebdige defined youth subcultures and their rituals as 'imaginary responses to real life problems'.[58] Both the *stiliagi* and the hippies felt marginalized in the society they inhabited: the *stiliagi* because they were by and large not returnees from the front and hence not part of newly privileged groups of the postwar Soviet Union, the hippies because they were part of a generation of youth who had desires different from those that were permitted by the official authorities. Both of them created worlds – partly real, partly imaginary – that allowed them to believe that they enjoyed freedoms greater than in truth existed. They furnished this world with their own specific markers of distinction, drawn from what they believed was the Western world. In reality much of their picture of the West was imaginary too, informed as much by a desire for a general utopia anywhere in the world as by the meager information that made it into the Soviet Union.[59] And here again age played a role. Most Soviet citizens lived with some sort of imagined West that informed their worldview. Yet only young people, not settled with families and proper jobs, had the tenacity to live out what was in their imagination – to make it real, at least in the small patch of space over which they had control.

While young people emerge here as an important motor in creating globalized youth culture, they were not only imitators but creators, who

formed their own hybrid version of Western-inspired trends, which reflected both the way in which their information had been transmitted and the mental and physical environments in which it was received. The *stiliagi* and hippies of the Soviet Union are best understood by examining their journey of mutation from their Western idols not by simply focusing on their similarities and differences to those with whom they shared an interest in the West. It was the interplay between imported and homegrown forces that created youth movements, which took root beyond the Iron Curtain. Both aspects were necessary to make youth cultures more global yet also capable of surviving in their respective environments. This could at times mean that, despite continuing to profess kinship, national varieties of youth cultures deviated considerably from their original inspiration to the point of constituting separate subcultures in their own right. Arguably, the Soviet hippie *sistema* of the 1980s was more a product of the Soviet Union than the West. Yet at the same time, hippies could be considered true successors to the flower children of Haight-Ashbury – they championed hippie ideals in an environment that was hostile and continued to be so long after most of the California hippies had moved on to new things.

The fact that youth cultures were not simply imported into new environments as copies of phenomena elsewhere, however, also meant that young people were not aliens in the habitat they lived in. The fluidity of youth subcultural identity and its tapping into local custom meant that the edges of these movements were always fuzzy and their existence never isolated. The *stiliagi*'s love for jazz or stylish clothing was shared by a much larger contingent of youth than just the 'Broadway' in-crowd. The fact that the *stiliagi* used public places such as streets and official dance evenings to showcase their identity meant that their impact went far beyond their own circles. The same was true for Soviet hippies whose desire for having a good time meant that they were in constant contact with other segments of Soviet society, such as the budding rock music scene and nonconformist artists, but also other youth looking for a good time and even Komsomol functionaries, who, according to their own testimony, were not always immune to subcultural charms.

Looking at youth cultures across the Iron Curtain demonstrates not only the validity of a transnational rather than a comparative approach but highlights the agency of youth in connecting their worlds across the globe. It also suggests that subcultural theory and its preoccupation with exploring the relationship between hegemonic and subaltern cultures has something to offer transnational history. The relationship between source and transferred product is not simply one of imitation. Rather the relationship in its multivalency is akin to that of mainstream and subculture, which are linked in a constant dialogue of inspiration, alienation, and manipulation. What is fascinating about the Soviet case compared to more straightforward

examples of youth cultures crossing borders is the narrowness of the conduits through which information was passed. Neither the *stiliagi* nor the hippies had a reliable stream of information giving them a comprehensive picture of the phenomena they sought to emulate. Radio was their best bet for music but only a fraction of foreign broadcasting was about things that interested them. Personal contacts and Soviet propaganda had to be used to assemble the piecemeal picture they had of youth in the West. Yet, even if in detail they sometimes got it wrong – several hippies who emigrated to the West realized that their heightened expectations of the local scene were not matched by the reality – in essence they truly made Western youth culture a phenomenon that could not be stopped by the Iron Curtain. Maybe it was precisely the fact that they could not verify the utopia that was supposedly on the other side that made their efforts to be like the West so earnest and long-lived. At the very least, both *stiliagi* and hippies are proof that transnational youth cultures are not merely the product of extensive media and social networks but that they, in equal measure, rely on both the individual and collective imagination.

Notes

1. D. Caute (2003) *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 118.
2. J. Fürst (2010) *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Postwar Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 207; R. Stites (ed.) (1995) *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 126.
3. P. Kenez (1992) *Cinema and Soviet Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
4. V. Aksenov (1987) *In Search of Melancholy Baby* (New York: Random House), p. 13.
5. The material on the *stiliagi* was collected for my monograph on postwar Soviet youth *Stalin's Last Generation*. The interviews with the Soviet hippies are the result of two AHRC-sponsored projects 'Around 1968' at the University of Oxford (Principal investigator: Robert Gildea) (2007–10) and 'Dropping out of Socialism' (2011–14) at the University of Bristol (Principal investigators: Juliane Fürst, CoI Josie McLellan). In both cases official state documents proved astonishingly silent about the phenomenon of subculture, even though both appear at length in the Soviet press (but only after Stalin's death). Hence historians have acquired most of their knowledge from ego-sources, most of them produced many years after the fact. They have to be read with all of the usual caveats. Yet, a not insignificant part of the transnational process is experienced subjectively by its historical agents. It is in the personal adoption and manipulation of outside culture that borders are truly crossed. Ego-documents, whether written or oral in nature, are thus an imperfect, but immensely helpful source for exploring this process.
6. Richard Ivan Jobs' article in this volume 'Youth Mobility and the Making of Europe, 1945–1960' similarly argues that the internationalization of youth culture after WWII is better understood as the result of transnational forces than simply as a global phenomenon.

7. Much has been written recently on Cold War cultures, with most authors seeing conflict rather than mutual influence at the center of their investigations. See, for example, A. Vowinckel, M. Payk and T. Lindenberger (eds) (2012) *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western Europeans Societies* (New York: Berghahn Books); J. Gienow-Hecht (2010) 'Culture and the Cold War in Europe' in M. Leffler and O. A. Westad *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 398–419. See M. Espargne and J. Osterhammel (2001) *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaates: Studien zur Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisatonsvergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprech).
8. W. Kaminer (2009) *Es gab keinen Sex im Sozialismus: Legenden und Missverstaendnisse des vorigen Jahrhunderts* (München: Goldmann Manhattan) p. 41.
9. For just a sample of different approaches, see D. Hebdige (2003) *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (London: Routledge); S. Frith (1984) *The Sociology of Youth* (Ormskirk: Causeway Books); S. Hall and T. Jefferson (eds) (1976) *Resistance through Ritual: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain* (London: Hutchinson); M. Brake (1980) *The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subculture* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
10. M. Kater (1992) *Different Drummers: Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press); W. Breyvogel (ed.) (1991) *Piraten, Swings und Junge Garde: Jugendwiderstand im Nationalsozialismus* (Bonn: Dietz).
11. S. F. Starr (1994) *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1980* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 194–6.
12. J. Steinbeck (1999) *A Russian Journal* (New York: Penguin).
13. A. Kozlov (1998) *Kozel' na sakse i tak vsiu zhizhn'* (Moscow: Vagrius), pp. 70–1.
14. For a detailed description of *stiliagi* see Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, pp. 208–35. M. Edele (2002) 'Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953', *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 50, 37–61; R. Kirsanove (1998) 'Stiliagi: Zapadnaia Moda v SSSR 40–50-kh godov', *Rodina*, 8, pp. 72–5.
15. D. Beliaev (1949) 'Stiliaga: Iz serii Tipy ukhodiashchie v proshloe, *Krokodil*, 7, p. 76.
16. Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhi Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (hereafter RGASPI) M-f.1, op. 46, d. 175, l. 91.
17. RGASPI, M-f.1, op. 46, d. 175, l. 91.
18. Ibid.
19. Interview with female *stiliaga*, collected by Lev Lure for St. Petersburg television. I gratefully acknowledge here Lev Lure's kind permission to use the transcripts of his set of interviews.
20. U. Poiger (2000) *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
21. M. Rüthers (2006) 'The Moscow Gorky Street in Late Stalinism: Space, History and Lebenswelten' in J. Fürst, *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge), pp. 257–61.
22. H. Hamrin (1964) *Zwei Semester Moskau* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bucherei), pp. 72–3.
23. RGASPI M-f. 1, op. 46, d 175, ll. 89–91.
24. This typically Soviet outgrowth of the *stiliaga* culture produced its own off-shoot culture: the music *fartsovhshik*: somebody who traded copied music on the black market. The disseminators of music continued to drive subcultural practices for

the following decades, creating a particularly late socialist dimension to youth subcultures. See S. Zhuk (2010) *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1965* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); A. Troitsky, interviewed by author, New York, 3 March 2013.

25. Aksenov, *Melancholy*, p. 13.
26. Kozlov, *Kozel*, pp. 6–39.
27. V. Pustintsev, interviewed by author, St Petersburg, September 2004; 'Valentin Tikhonenko: Tarzan v svoem otchestve', *Pchela* 1, 1997, p. 22.
28. L. A. Alvarez (2001) *The Power of the Zoot: Race, Community, and Resistance in American Youth Culture, 1940–1945*, PhD diss., The University of Texas at Austin.
29. Tolerance or acceptance of homosexual life styles was not part of any Soviet subculture (except among the gay and lesbian community itself). Indeed, most of the *stiliagi* would have been horrified at the very idea. Yet they unquestionably sported a different masculinity to that dominant in Soviet postwar culture.
30. On West European swing kids see R. Pohl (1991) 'Schraege Voegel mausert Euch! Von Renitenz, Übermut und Verfolgung Hamburger Swings und Pariser Zazous' in W. Breyvogel (ed.) *Piraten, Swings und Junge Garde*; Kater, *Different Drummers*.
31. C. Lévi-Strauss (1962) *The Savage Mind* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).
32. Aksenov, *Melancholy*, p. 13.
33. Interview by Lev Lur'e for St Petersburg television.
34. A. Troitsky, interviewed by author, New York, 3 March 2013.
35. A. Zaborovskii, interviewed by author, Moscow, 14 July 2010.
36. Iu. Ustimenko, *Deti s tsvetami i bez tsvetami*, *Rovesnik*, 1967.
37. I. Zhukov, 'Pis'ma iz Ameriki: Khippie i drugie', *Pravda*, 6 April 1967, p. 4. SMOG (*Samoe Molodoe Obshchestvo Geniev* – the Youngest Society of Geniuses – or *Smelost', Mysl', Obraz, Glubina* – Courage, Thought, Image and Depth) was the loose assembly of young Moscow poets, who organized unsanctioned, public readings and were loosely affiliated with the emerging dissident movement.
38. G. Borovik, 'Khozhdenie v stranu Khippilandiu', *Vokrug Sveta* Nr. 9, 1968, pp. 25–32.
39. Zaborovskii, interviewed by author.
40. Troitsky, Lipnitsky, interviewed by author.
41. Batovrin, interviewed by author.
42. T. Teplisheva, interviewed by author, Moscow, 17 October 2011; Batovrin, interviewed by author, Ioko, Moscow, 24 October 2011.
43. On this theme see Tsen Baptist's account of the meaning of Soviet hippie fashion, unpublished manuscript, Archive Tatiana Teplisheva.
44. Sveta Barabash (Ofelia), whose mother worked for the KGB, Sasha Lipnitsky, whose stepfather was translator to Brezhnev, Sasha Borodulin, whose father was an internationally recognized photographer and Tatiana Strel'nikova, whose father worked for *Pravda* in New York, were all members of the journalism faculty.
45. This does not mean that antimaterialism did not feature in the rhetoric of the Soviet hippies but it could not be of quite the same importance in a place in which every scrap of paper was recycled. See on this theme, for example, Hilary Pilkington's analysis of the Punks in H. Pilkington (1994) *Russia's Youth and Its Culture* (London: Routledge).
46. V. Soldatov, interviewed among others by author, Moscow May 2009, Maksim Kapitnovskii, Moscow, 8 September 2011; S. Litvinenko (Boxer), interviewed by author, Moscow, July 2009.

47. D. Futerman, interviewed by author, Sevastopol, 30 May 2012; I. Ermash, interviewed by author, Odessa, 28 May 2012.
48. A. Vinokuras, interviewed by author, Vilnius, 29 July 2009; S. Egorov, interviewed by author, Vilnius, 28 July 2009; Modris Tenison, Riga, 4 August 2009.
49. L. Jakimavičius, http://www.versus.lt/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/ac2d5865fc87e2748574a4d0ed778ef1.pdf, date accessed October 2013.
50. S. Moskalev, interviewed by author, Moscow, 24 April 2009.
51. Soldatov, interviewed by author, 8 September 2011.
52. Futerman et al., interviewed by author, Sevastopol, 29 May 2012.
53. Archiv der Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Manifesto of Moscow hippies, Fond Misha Bombin.
54. Hippies were rarely arrested except for drug offenses. However forced hospitalization in psychiatric units was very common as was constant physical harassment, which could include beatings and shearings.
55. W. Risch (2005) 'Soviet "Flower Children". Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s L'viv', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (3), 565–84.
56. For another account of how young people drove transnational cultural transfer even in difficult circumstances see Andrew Ivaska's contribution in this volume 'Movement Youth in a Global Sixties Hub: The Everyday Lives of Transnational Activism in Postcolonial Dar es Salaam'.
57. For the Chicago school see, for example, A. Cohen (1955) *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe: Free Press); For the Birmingham school see (representatively), Hall and Jefferson, *Resistance through Ritual*; Brake, *The Sociology of Youth Culture*.
58. Hebdige, *Subculture*.
59. A. Yurchak (2006) *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 158–206.

11

Deng's Children: Chinese 'Youth' and the 1989 Movement

Fabio Lanza

In 2011, while writing on the category of 'youth' in twentieth-century China, I found a measure of inspiration in media representations of the Arab Spring.[1] Western media presented the ousting of Mubarak and similar dictators as the work of technologically inclined young kids (they tweet! they are on Facebook!) rather than as the result of a complicated mixture of Islamist organizations, economic inequality, and political dispossession. Understood in such terms these events appeared much less threatening to Western ears. After all, if these were democratic, secular and West-friendly young people – analysts and editorialists seemed to imply – then they could and should be supported without ambiguity. 'Americans need feel no ambiguity' was precisely what the *New York Times* editorial board had told its readers on 6 May 1989 apropos of the student demonstrations that had shaken Beijing since mid-April. These young students, 'China's future' – the editorial argued – were protesting for things that were as vaguely defined as they were immediately understandable to US readers: economic prosperity and democratic reforms.[2] Unlike their elders, these young people were 'like us'.

This chapter analyzes the meanings and uses of 'youth' during the 1989 Tiananmen movement from two different but interconnected perspectives: first, that of those who participated or intervened in the movement; second, that of observers, analysts, and supporters from outside the People's Republic of China (PRC). Youth political activism has a long and complex history in China, dating back to the May Fourth movement of 1919.[3] So, what did it mean then, in specific moments and for different actors, to invoke 'youth' in order to describe what was going on in and around Tiananmen Square in 1989? What historical and sociological implications did the term evoke? And, what kind of selective appropriation was necessary to claim only one portion of the layered history of young people's activism while refuting any unwanted connection? Finally, as Tiananmen 1989 was an event with a global audience, this chapter examines how Chinese protesters framed their own 'youth' for onlookers outside the PRC and asks what kind of understanding – and often misunderstanding – did the name 'youth' produce among foreign analysts?

It is important to clarify, first and foremost, that 'youth' was *selectively* deployed in 1989, and to describe the activists primarily as 'young' was not the most obvious choice. The Beijing demonstrations were more commonly labeled as part of a 'student movement', but these were young people nonetheless and 'youth' was evoked often, always with strategic or tactical intent. The effects were not limited to China, as 'youth' was performed *for* global spectators and deployed *by* observers from all over the world; the 'revolution' was indeed televised. The (recently launched) television channel, Cable News Network (CNN) sent 40 journalists to China to cover the USSR-China summit in May and 'students were very much aware of the coverage, and timed their protest to the summit talks'.[4] Marvin Kalb, then director of the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University, highlighted this 'boomerang effect', with reports of events in the Western media reverberating back to the protagonists via BBC or Voice of America and influencing their posture. The process of Western news media coverage thus altered the events of 1989, and Beijing students, Kalb argued, ended up fashioning their revolution so that it was coverable by the American – and, I would add, global – networks.[5] The selective deployment of 'youth' was part of this refashioning.

'Youth' did not work as a proper political category in 1989, in the sense that it did not name new organizations, new subjects, or new locations for politics.[6] That does not mean that the category of 'youth' was inert or ineffective during the movement, but rather that its main effect was a depoliticizing one. A short essay by Seymour Martin Lipset published in the 24 May 1989 issue of the *New York Times* exemplifies this effect. Looking at China and Korea, Lipset asked why students were so prominent in 'fostering rebellion and radical politics', but he found an answer only by switching from 'students' to 'youth', that is by evoking sociological and psychological explanations of adolescent angst, juvenile extremism, and a lack of social responsibility. 'Youth' then, in Lipset's description, became the category that the Nazi movement shared with 1968, and Tiananmen with Italian Fascism; in other words, here 'youth' named an antihistorical and depoliticizing operation.[7] Interestingly, even the indignant replies to Lipset's argument did not really break from this depoliticizing framework. In a letter to the editor published on 6 June of the same year, four history professors at Yale University rightfully criticized Lipset's juxtaposition of the Tiananmen martyrs with Nazi youth, but concluded by simply reversing his judgment: it is 'the maturity of age' that has been historically to blame for the failure to check the 'the excessive and vehement exercise of power'.[8] Here we have two radically divergent understandings of the value of youth (and old age), both of which however tend to erase the historical and political specificities of instances of youth activism.

This chapter identifies 'youth' not as a demographic or even generational indicator, but as a subjective position. In 1989, as in the case of postwar

France analyzed by Rick Jobs, 'youth as a social group, as a concept, did not exist among young people until they themselves became conscious of inhabiting such an idea', or at least until somebody called them to inhabit a particular version of that idea.[9] This discussion will examine different understandings of 'youth' that emerged, first, throughout the 1980s and then, specifically, in 1989. The list is not meant to be in any way exhaustive. The number of sources examined here is limited, in part because there has been, especially since the early 1990s, a veritable flood of publications in Chinese, English, and other languages on the protest movement and it is almost impossible to account for such an outpouring of analyses, primary sources, and memoirs.[10] With these caveats, this chapter intends to provide an example of how a seemingly self-evident category like 'youth' can be made to reveal crucial issues about our understanding of political activism. In this sense, while 1989 had very precise historical specificities, it can serve as a case study illuminating more general issues related to 'youth movements'.

Youth as a socio-economic signifier and the Beijing movement of 1989

The Beijing movement of 1989 started with the death of Hu Yaobang, former president and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary, on 15 April. Mourning for a man who was generally considered honest – in a famously corrupt Party – took the form of improvised speeches and the laying of wreaths on the Monuments of the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. By the time of the funeral, on 22 April, students of the various universities in Beijing had organized something close to an independent student union and presented demands to the government, asking for a dialogue with student representatives. On the day of the funeral, hundreds of thousands of protestors came to the Square. In the following days, students organized in the schools and marched on the streets; the reaction of the government came on 26 April, when an editorial of the *People's Daily* condemned the protests as '*dongluan*' (chaos, turmoil) a term closely associated with the Cultural Revolution. The students reacted with a major demonstration on 27 April and another one on 4 May, both of which received massive support from the residents of the capital. The protests spread to other cities and there were attempts at a dialogue between the Party and the students, which largely failed. On 13 May, about 1,000 students started a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, at precisely the same time as Mikhail Gorbachev was expected to make his historic visit to China. Journalists from all over the world who had come to Beijing to report on the first China-USSR summit since the late 1950s found themselves interviewing hunger strikers instead. Beijing workers joined the students and officially formed an autonomous union in the Square. On 20 May, the government declared Martial Law and

Zhao Ziyang, then secretary of the CCP and supposedly more favorable to the students, was stripped of all his positions and placed under house arrest. Troops arrived in Beijing but were stopped by crowds of city residents and retreated to the outskirts. The occupation of the Square continued until the night between 3 and 4 June, when the People's Liberation Army shot its way to Tiananmen and cleared the Square. The number of deaths is uncertain but the massacre seems to have taken place on the streets leading to Tiananmen, and not so much in the Square itself.

The background to these events was profoundly shaped by the first decade of economic reform, instituted by Deng Xiaoping, in the post-Mao era. It also marked a time of reflection on the outcomes of that decade of change.[11] By the late 1980s, people had started to worry and complain about the unwanted consequences of these reforms, which had begun to affect the daily lives of Chinese citizens negatively. While these problems were not explicitly or exclusively limited to the young, the preoccupation coalesced around 'youth', which often came to embody the contradictory expectations of this period.

By the mid-1980s, the reforms, which had previously been restricted to the countryside, hit the cities. There were experiments in the liberalization of prices and labor, raising well-founded fears that lifetime employment and the associated welfare programs would no longer be available for the younger generations. Students and intellectuals felt that their situation was particularly dire, with their economic status declining vis-à-vis other sectors of the populace who were benefiting from the reforms. In the late 1980s students 'pointed out that even the most senior professors (along with engineers, doctors, and other intellectuals and professionals) made but a fraction of a taxi driver's income'.[12] A 1989 survey found that people who went to college earned nine dollars per month less than those who had not. They also had a shorter life span and less leisure time.[13]

In 1987, for the first time, 'over 5,000 graduates of tertiary education were rejected by the employment units they were assigned to at graduation, as a result of the reform in the state employment system'.[14] This was the first sign that one of the guarantees that made the drudgery and economic disadvantage of state-assigned jobs tolerable was rapidly dissolving. Yet, for university students, the perspective of 'being picked and chosen in the marketplace' implied not only an economic risk but also a perceived decline from a position of relatively high social status. Feng Congde, one of the leaders of the 1989 protest, cited a saying that circulated in Beijing in the late 1980s: 'you are poor as a professor and as dumb as a PhD'.[15]

The decay of intellectuals' positions was only one of the cultural and social changes that drew the attention and the preoccupation of the party leaders, who identified youth as the privileged location of these worrisome phenomena. (State-controlled) media sounded the alarm of an impending moral bankruptcy, with the newspaper *China Youth* playing a major role

in the debate. Critics worried that youth seemed to be acting in a moral vacuum, calls for building a 'socialist spiritual civilization' were not heeded and money had become the only measure of power, status, and success.[16]

These concerns over 'youth' were also related to the expectations that were placed upon young people, as youth was as much the repository of promises as it was a site of concern. For example, in early 1989, the prominent intellectual Su Shaozhi called on Chinese youth to 'have the courage to bear the historical responsibility and be prepared to pay the cost' in the long process to create a market economy and political pluralism.[17] At the time, this sounded like a tall order for a cohort that had seen job perspectives, economic conditions, and social status deteriorating specifically because of the introduction of capitalist reforms. And opinion polls (historically not reliable in China) showed a decline in the self-image of young students. In 1987, a majority of college students either 'did not care what they were' or considered themselves just 'ordinary people'. Only a tiny minority (2.8 per cent) saw themselves as 'the natural successors of the Party and the state'. In 1988, 90 per cent of college graduates admitted that their main concern was to make money.[18]

The disaffection of 'youth' was even more of an issue for the CCP, as the *New York Times* highlighted in 1987. The Party needed not only the skills but also the enthusiasm of university students, the cadres of tomorrow; Deng could not risk alienating 'the best of China's youth'.[19] Yet, the response of the government throughout the 1980s mostly took the form of a series of campaigns aimed at purging bad habits, fighting unwanted influences, or reviving a pure socialist ethos. The main effect of these campaigns, as well as of the debates of the 1980s, was to make youth, if not a potential political actor, at least the locus of crucial contradictions: between neoliberal reforms and the promises of socialism, between the unwanted epiphenomena of consumer culture and the still lofty ideals of 'revolutionary successors'. And, as this chapter argues, between two completely different views of the '1980s generation'.

Youth as generation

Since the 1989 massacre, 'China watchers' have followed closely the political and social trends among the Chinese youth of the 1990s. Comparisons of this cohort, raised during the time of the largest and fastest economic expansion ever witnessed, with the elder one tend to favor the generation of the 1980s: unlike the hedonistic and money-obsessed children of the post-1989 era, the young people who came of age in the 1980s are described as worried about the destinies of the nation, concerned about Chinese politics, yet globally aware and open-minded.

This post-1989 view is, however, tinged by the Tiananmen events. In the 1980s 'youth' was in fact more commonly identified with disillusion,

self-indulgence, and social anomie. The public debate on the widespread apathy of the young dates back to the very early period of the Deng era, when young people had a much closer connection to the politics of Maoism. In 1977, a letter from a young worker who 'wanted his youth back' elicited a huge – and coordinated – response. Besides the responses that parroted the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) line (devotion to the party and the nation, etc.) there were also many voices that questioned '"whether young people need ideals", "what kind of ideals should they have", and "where to begin"?'[20] Just a few years later, another letter penned by a 23-year-old woman and published in *China Youth*, aroused a ten-month debate over a so-called triple crisis of 'trust, confidence and faith' (*sanxin weiji*) among the young.

Interestingly, the student protests of 1986–7 did not seem to change the perspective of those who saw a chronic lack of idealism among Chinese youth.[21] In 1987, the *New York Times* remarked upon the apathy and cynicism of the young generation, citing, among others, the students at the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, the fountainhead of the recent protests: 'We are indifferent to all affairs: state affairs, party affairs and world affairs. We turn a deaf ear to all sounds: the sound of wind, the sound of rain and the sound of reading'.[22]

When the 1989 movement started, there came the sudden revelation that nothing was really wrong with this generation, which appeared to be special not for its cynicism, but for its passion. New explanations had to be found. For some, it was their distance from the history of the previous generations that made these young people especially interesting and promising. This was argued through dubious psychology, as in the case of Robin Munro, who found justification in the 'youthful libido' of this cohort. No longer channeled into Mao worship, the sexual energy of the young found expression instead 'in both a new exaltation of selfhood and in political outrage at the conservative gerontocracy bent on imposing its values and its will on its children'.[23]

More commonly, it was the socio-economic circumstances of the post-Mao era that came to be identified as the main impetus behind activism – in the same way as they had been singled out as the original cause of their apathy. It was their experience of the reforms that set them apart from the previous generation, one that had seen dreams and promises repeatedly postponed: 'They did not feel they had to wait for the future to win the values for which successive generations had struggled. They *were* the future'.[24]

In other instances, it was the connection – rather than the difference – between generations that was emphasized, with the children of the 1980s asserting themselves to complete the tasks left unfinished by their parents. A yellow sign put up by the Beijing University's Department of Physics on 14 May 1989 summarized this feeling: 'oh father, bent back with age, if only I had the spine to take over your struggle'.[25] A student protestor at the

Music Institute waxed poetically on the same theme in his 'farewell' to his parents, a public letter published on 21 May 1989. He addressed his parents, both 'outstanding party members', recalling first the weathered face of the mother, old before her time: 'the reason why we, young sons and daughters made a vow in Tiananmen Square is also because of you, as well as thousands and millions of mothers, so that you can obtain the part that you deserve', he proclaimed. He then turned to his father, patient and diligent over the decades: 'the children will die but will not forget your teaching', he declared.[26]

Glossing over the rhetorical flourishes, it is interesting that this text repeatedly deploys the term 'generation' ('*zhe yi dai*', '*yi dai ren*'), pointing to a collective identity whose membership is defined by age but which is also in a specific chronological relationship with the collective history of the previous age group. 'Youth' in the 1980s identified this generational divide but 'youth' remained open to contradictory and divergent uses. It could stand for continuity and separation, apathy and political passion, socio-economic conditioning and idealistic independence. And that was complicated by the fact that, no matter how different the generation of the 1980s may have looked, they still belonged to the long and complex history of youth in modern China.

Youth as its own history

When the students gathered in Tiananmen Square in 1989, they met around the Monument to the People's Heroes, where one of the bas-reliefs celebrates the first instance of youth activism in modern Chinese history, the May Fourth movement of 1919. And the relationship with the long history of youth protests figured prominently in the spring. 'Youth' evoked this history but, once again, the claim to this past was always contested and contradictory.

May Fourth, having been subsumed within the state and Party mythology, was the least controversial, and it was therefore repeatedly deployed as a model by the students and by sympathetic observers.[27] Much less easily inscribed into a state narrative was the history of youth politics after 1919, especially after the establishment of the PRC. The years since 1949 witnessed a series of episodes whose echo reverberated in 1989: the Hundred Flowers of 1956–7, the April 1976 movement, the democracy wall of 1978–9, up until the student protests of 1986–7. Looking at the huge discursive production of 1989, it is surprising how little 1979 and 1986 figured in the speeches and statements of the protestors; Fang Lizhi was probably right when he commented that 20-year-old students actually did not even know who Wei Jingsheng was.[28] These references were not prominent in the Western press either, and, among the sources I have examined, only *The Guardian* repeatedly mentioned the much more recent protests (March 1989) by Tibetan youth.[29]

In 1989, however, the most crucial and most precarious reference was that of the Cultural Revolution. It was ominously conjured by the government to equate the 1989 students with the Red Guards while the protestors took all possible measures to deny these associations. 'Youth' was one of the locations of this struggle.

The Cultural Revolution that the different sides of the 1989 confrontation invoked was not the enormously complex historical and political events of the years 1966–76; rather it was the simplified, black-and-white version that had been produced during the first years of the Deng era. That 'Cultural Revolution' stood as the implicit and explicit negative side of the post-Mao reform, it identified everything that had to be radically reversed or denied in order for China to move forward.[30] It was this mythical entity that was the object of the discursive tug-of-war in April–May 1989. The state-run media had already used the comparison with the Red Guards quite successfully to denigrate the 1986 demonstrators.[31] In 1989, the government reaction was slower but when it came, it was once again framed in connection with the Cultural Revolution. Deng himself was reported to have told senior party officers that some people were behaving like many had done during the Cultural Revolution and that they were not going to be satisfied until 'all is chaos'.[32] On 26 April 1989, the editorial in the *People's Daily* labeled the protests as 'turmoil' (*dongluan*), maneuvered by a few agitators, and accused students of 'linking up'.[33]

The references were all too clear; the repeal of the 26 April editorial became one of the major requests put forward by the students and by their supporters, who asked repeatedly not to label promising young people as agitators (*dongluan fenzi*).[34] Protestors went to great lengths to make clear the distinction between themselves and the youth of 1966–7. They reacted vehemently when, during the encounter with the government representative Yuan Mu he treated them 'like hotheaded little children', reminding them they 'weren't even born when the Cultural Revolution broke out', and calling attention to the similarities of their methods to those of the Red Guards. 'We hope the government leaders recognize, for the sake of the whole country, that this great patriotic student movement is the continuation of the "May Fourth" Movement seventy years ago', the students replied. 'It cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the Red Guards in the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, during which people were ordered about and fooled around by one man'.[35] On 3 May, the 'Department of Theory and Information Dissemination Committee at Beijing University' published a detailed list of the differences between their 'Patriotic-Democratic Movement' and the 'Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution'. The text shows how the students had absorbed the CCP official language on the history of Maoism and were ready to use it to their own advantage. They argued forcefully that the youth of 1989 was in no way analogous to that of 1966, first and foremost in terms of intellectual character:

> The Cultural Revolution remained under the influence of the personality cult, with the main force of the rebellion, the masses and the Red Guards, ignorant and easily misled. This made its manipulation inevitable. The current Movement, on the other hand, came into being after China had experienced ten years of reform. The mass of young students and intellectuals have studied and learned from western liberal-democratic ideas, have made a special analysis of the Chinese situation, and have suggested a series of political and economic reforms. Formulating ideas on democracy and freedom, intellectuals, students, workers and ordinary citizens from the different economic strata, have clearly organized their thoughts in order to fight for democracy, freedom, prosperity and the future strength of China. They are certainly not used by anyone with 'ulterior motives'. They have brains, and their IQs are certainly no lower than those of the bureaucrats![36]

It is important to note that this very tactical need to deny any connection with the Red Guards – while claiming instead the sanitized legacy of 1919 – led the students of 1989 to put forward a vision of 'youth' that was limited and restricted to intellectuals. In the passage cited above, the movement is largely one of brains and scholarship, of people who had studied and organized their thoughts; and while homage is paid to citizens and workers, the only 'masses' are the 'mass of young students and intellectuals'.

The Cultural Revolution functioned as a multipurpose – yet univocally negative – reference, and the students also employed it as a weapon against the government. Mimicking Yuan Mu's comments, a text on 28 April admitted that the protestors were indeed small children during the Cultural Revolution and they did not know much. Party officers, however, not only remembered it but they were also rehearsing the language of the time. 'They speak of "a small minority", with "ulterior motives", in "a conspiracy long concocted". It sounds so frightening, and so silly, as they try to take China back to the days of the Cultural Revolution', the students chided. Youth, in this sense, meant innocence, while it was old age that, far from providing wisdom, would lead them along ill-fated paths. The text ended with a call to action: 'Let us, the students and masses, respond by accusing *them* of being the real "small minority, with ulterior motives", and tell them we will not allow *their* "long-concocted conspiracy" to succeed!'[37]

The demonstrators' strategy of rebuttal and reversal was possibly successful, at least in theoretical terms. But the very obsession of critics and protestors alike with the specific precedent of the Cultural Revolution signaled the contradictory imprint that indelibly marked categories such as 'youth' and 'student'. This imprint was (and is) so much more difficult to dispel or neutralize precisely because that complex period could not be discussed, debated, or historicized. The Cultural Revolution, as the reverse founding myth of Dengism, could only be denied. It is not surprising, then, that even

a sympathetic observer of the 1989 movement like Philip Cunningham admits he could not avoid making the almost visceral connection with the Cultural Revolution:

> Who were these 'students' anyway but young people nurtured by the state, a tender elite who had not yet worked a single day in their lives? And what were they in danger of becoming? The new Red Guards! In the Cultural Revolution, donning a red armband gave young people the right to terrorize their elders. Teachers, parents, and party officials were hounded, sometimes to their death, by the young and ignorant. Afraid to disagree, millions pretended to support Mao's disastrous policies during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Could such madness happen again? It was enough to give me a sense of pity for the embattled government.[38]

While the 1989 protesters discussed their position in relation to precedents within the long history of youth movements *in China*, they generally did not draw connections to other instances of activism *outside China*, either contemporary or historical. Only Mary Dejevsky of *The Times* wrote, in passing, that while students at People's University rejected summarily any comparison with the Cultural Revolution, the reference to the Paris Commune cropped up 'often enough to be a cliché'.[39]

This was not the case for journalists who were often not too familiar with China (most did not speak Chinese), and who ended up covering the Beijing Spring as a consequence of the China-USSR summit. The Solidarity movement in Poland was evoked in the western press especially after 4 June, the repression of 1989 echoing in bloodier tones the one of 1981.[40] References to Solidarity, as in the case of *La Repubblica*, were often deployed to balance the overall description of the movement as one of 'kids' ('*ragazzi*'). Sandro Viola, writing on 20 May, drew a direct comparison to the strikes in Gdansk and spoke of a 'Chinese Solidarity', – without the icons of the black Virgin Mary and the pictures of the pope – a mass movement involving every sector of society.[41]

Yet, the same Italian journalists used a different transnational comparison much more frequently, one clearly tied with youth activism and one whose legacies remain still controversial in the European memory: 1968. After the funeral of Hu Yaobang, Marco Panara declared that the Chinese Spring had blossomed and he wondered whether it was going to be a 'Prague Spring' or a 'Parisian May'.[42] A month later, Sandro Viola described favorably the 'student movement' as 'more vigil, more careful than what we saw around European universities in 1968'.[43] Viola compared the senile Deng to old De Gaulle, who was forced to leave the political scene by the rebelling youths, just after he had disparaged May 1968 as a '*vachardise*' (bullshit).[44]

US journalists evoked 1968 more sparingly, but significantly they did so in reference to a specific aspect of the 1989 movement, the fact that it was being televised for a global audience. The *New York Times* aptly called upon Todd Gitlin, a name closely associated with the 1960s, to comment on the effects of the televised images of the Beijing protest around the world.[45] Similarly, Frank Reuven outlined the 'astounding comparisons' between Beijing 1989 and Chicago 1968, when students protested the Vietnam War during the Democratic National Convention. Foremost in both cases was the awareness that 'the world was watching' and that activism involved also a performance geared toward the inquisitive eye of the cameras.[46] The sacrifice of 'youth' was a crucial part of this performance.

Youth as sacrificial victims

On 26 June 1989, three weeks after the Beijing massacre, US congressman Dave McCurdy (D-OK) wrote an op-ed in the *New York Times*, ostensibly in support of proposed legislation for a youth national service program. Surprisingly, he began by recalling the tragedy of 4 June: 'While students in Tiananmen Square willingly pay the supreme sacrifice to bring democracy to China, we are engaged in a strenuous debate about whether our own youth should continue to receive the opportunities of democracy without offering something in return'.[47] Besides having the dubious honor of being among the first to tastelessly make use of the Tiananmen events for political gain, McCurdy's piece is noteworthy because it shows one of the central connotations that 'youth' acquired during the 1989 protests. Students often presented themselves as sacrificial victims, ready to immolate themselves for the future of the country. It was in these instances that words such as 'youth' appeared more frequently, highlighting the height of the sacrifice of these 'young students'. Once again, the meaning and use of 'youth' here were tactical: youth was one of the most conspicuous symbolic elements in what Esherick and Wasserstrom call the 'political theater' of 1989, a set of 'performances whose efficacy lies largely in their power to move specific audiences'.[48] Yet, this tactic had very significant consequences for the framing of the movement's politics.

The 'sacrificial' aspect of the 1989 protests took central stage with the hunger strike of 12–19 May, but it appeared even earlier. For example, in a 'Letter to All Compatriots' announcing the demonstration of 23 April, Beijing University students pointed out that, 'taking the risk of being punished, dismissed, beaten, and even imprisoned', they were nonetheless marching for 'more than thirty li'. 'Sometimes in cold wind, sometimes under the burning sun, sometimes in storms, and always under the threat of the police, we march, mourn, sit-in, and boycott classes. We are tired, weak, hungry, and thirsty'.[49] Yet, they remained duty-bound and willing to make sacrifices, they concluded. The sense of looming tragedy was not lost upon

the protestors and their supporters, especially after the 26 April editorial. On 27 April, before that day's massive demonstration, some students wrote their wills; it was on that very day, as young teachers at Beijing Normal University wrote, that 'the question of life and death was instilled in our minds: to live for China and to die for China'.[50]

This trope became dominant when hundreds (later to become thousands) of hunger strikers occupied Tiananmen Square on 12 May. Their declaration was overflowing with references to age, death, and sacrifice. 'In the finest moment of our youth, we must leave behind everything beautiful about life', they wrote. 'Although our shoulders remain tender, although our death is hard to face, we must part with life. When history demands it, we have no choice but to die'. First, they addressed their common mother, China: 'We fight for life with this spirit of death. But we remain children! Mother China, please look hard at your children. Hunger ruthlessly destroys their youth. Are you not touched when death approaches them?' Then, they called on their parents, justifying their unfilial act (self-immolation) with the primacy of their love for the country:[51] 'Dear parents, although we suffer from hunger, don't be sad. Uncles and aunts, although we bid life farewell, don't be heartbroken ... Farewell moms and dads, please forgive your children who cannot be loyal to their country and act with filial piety at the same time'.[52]

The tone might sound almost morbid but the hunger strike did have a major mobilizing and galvanizing effect on the people of Beijing – and on everybody who was watching it happen on the television screen. Beijing residents from a wide variety of backgrounds flocked to the Square to express support to the strikers.[53] And when the strike progressed and students started to require medical attention, it was the 'motherland's children'[54] who were passing out one after the other, their demands unheeded. Mothers and fathers in the capital were mystified by the 'apparent inhumanity of a government that lets its children starve without talking to them'.[55] The students were sacrificing *for* the future of China, their heroism a model for other, younger children. A short *dazibao* allegedly reporting a real conversation between a four-year-old girl and her mom encapsulates this aspect vividly:

Daughter: Mom, mom, why aren't those young uncles and aunts eating?
Mom: Because they are trying to get a beautiful present.
D: What present?
M: Freedom.
D: Who is giving them this beautiful present?
M: Themselves.
D: Mom, mom, why are there so many people in the square?
M: It's a festivity.
D: What festivity?

M: The lighting of a fire.
D: Where's the fire?
M: In each and everybody's soul.
D: Mom, mom, who is in the ambulance?
M: Heroes.
D: Why are the heroes lying down?
M: To let the kids see.
D: Me?
M: You.
D: To see what?
M: A flower with the colors of the rainbow.[56]

But the students' sacrifice was also viewed as a sacrifice *of* the future of China: not only these people who were starving were young, but they were the best and the brightest, the intellectual elite and the moral exemplars on which China's progress could be built. As a banner held by an old professor on 15 May aptly summarized: 'My son is on a hunger strike, what is Deng Xiaoping's son doing?'[57]

All these themes reverberated in the global response to the crisis, and the international press seemed transfixed by the display of the young bodies of the hunger strikers.[58] In the days immediately following the massacre, it was the sacrifice of 'youth' that took central stage. 'The young of China are being killed to save the face of the old. Face matters', deadpanned *The Times*.[59] The same magazine reported on an interview with student leader Chai Ling, who had managed to escape to Hong Kong. She recalled the sacrifice of even younger activists, middle school students: 'I saw a young boy just 15 years old. He was writing his last testimony. I do not remember what he wrote, but I remember thinking that he was too young to be thinking about death, and he said he had never expected that life would be so short'.[60] The massacre, Catharine Sampson argued, had created another 'wasted generation', and 'the brightest and best of the nation's young people have been crushed under tanks, shot or burnt to death'.[61]

For obvious reasons, it was in Hong Kong that the hunger strike provoked the largest and most heartfelt public response.[62] Ads and letters were posted by groups or single individuals moved by the actions of 'Chinese youth'.[63] They called the hunger strike a 'righteous sacrifice' by 'fearless young people', the 'sons and daughters of the Chinese nation'.[64] In these texts, students are more often referred to as 'children'. This implied that they represented the future, the future of the country and sometimes 'our future' – the possessive adjective encompassing the foreboding of Hong Kong's return to the mainland.[65] And '*ragazzi*' – 'kids', just a notch above 'children' – was the moniker that the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* surprisingly decided to employ in much of its coverage. The images were often lyrical, the journalist gruesomely celebrating the sacrifice of the very young, these 'enthusiastic

and rebellious kids'.[66] The Party flags bent in front of '4,000 20-year-old kids who are letting themselves die in the old name of liberty and democracy', waxed Ezio Mauro.[67] They were pure and determined, even if ill advised. 'Kids' ran toward the soldiers 'not to assault them but to convert them'; they were ready to face a military attack 'bare-handed, like a supreme rite'.[68] Clearly, at least for the Italian journalists, the trope of youthful heroism proved irresistible.

Yet, 'children', while they could be 'heroic',[69] were also very vulnerable and their fragile bodies needed to be preserved;[70] 'save the children' became a refrain that reverberated from the pages of the *People's Daily* to those of pro-democracy newspapers in Hong Kong.[71] It was reemployed by the students themselves, at the end of the hunger strike, when they thanked the doctors and nurses of the capital, whose only credo, they wrote, was 'to save the people, to save the children, to save the students'.[72] This trope of children needing protection was also echoed in the statements of the workers who joined the occupation of the square at the time of the hunger strike. Workers too called the students 'children',[73] they styled themselves as 'elder brothers' (*dage*)[74] and they vowed to protect and shelter the hunger strikers with their blood.[75] It is difficult not to see here at work not only the division between manual and intellectual labor but also a restriction of the space of the political to the students, with the others (no matter if young or not) in a supporting role.

Finally, portraying themselves as 'children', as a promising youth ready to die, allowed the students to stand in direct contrast with the party leadership, which was, in fact, quite elderly and enveloped in a cloud of corruption and privilege: 'a country where 80-year-olds pass on orders to 70-year-olds who pass them on to 60-year-olds, and it's rubbish all down the line',[76] as a Beijing citizen reportedly commented. A hunger striker labeled the Chinese system 'patriarchal' and called for the end of 'gerontocratic politics', where 1.1 billion people put the fate of the country 'in the hands of a senile 85-year old'.[77] *The Guardian* described the sending of troops into Beijing in May as 'the revenge of old men who have been humiliated by a nation of young people'.[78] *Repubblica*'s reporters called Deng Xiaoping 'the grandfather of this young China who is convulsing in the universities',[79] and repeatedly labeled him as 'the 84-year-old leader' or 'old Deng'.[80] The final realigning of the leadership along the hardliners coincided with the return onto the stage of the 'gerontocracy of the Long March', frail, senescent leaders, walking unsteadily, often supported by nurses.[81]

Against this spectacle of biological decay and persistence in power, stood 'youth': pure, vigorous, unsullied, and promising. However, the meaning of this opposition could also be easily reversed, turning the 'sons and daughters of China' into real 'children' in need not of protection, but of scolding and discipline. And that was never clearer than in the *China Daily*'s editorial of 23 June, which took some of the main talking points of the protestors

and turned them upside down. Yes, the article intoned, this generation of students had indeed wider access to Western ideas, but they had 'failed to digest them'. They were smart, but they did not understand the long history of China nor the constraints it faced. 'The students' pressing aspiration for democracy is the chief expression of premature political needs', the article concluded. 'Guided in a correct direction, their enthusiasm could become a driving force for the country's construction of democratic politics. Misled or pressed over-anxiously, their enthusiasm becomes a destabilizing factor. In the absence of restraint, it could go to extremes. Under such circumstances, nothing short of a fresh start can satisfy students' cravings'.[82] If young people had cravings (not aspirations), believed in fantasies (not ideals), if they lacked restraints, were immature and easily misled, then – this was the implied argument – they could not be reasoned with. Other, harsher means were necessary.

Even at a discursive level, then, waging politics in the name of 'youth' was a risky strategy. This was evident at times even in the very sympathetic reports of the foreign press. When journalists underlined how young the movement's leaders were, or when they dubbed Chai Ling 'the Joan of Arc of the hardliners' they were also inevitably recalling the subconscious association of youth with rashness, childlike stubbornness and irrationality.[83] The shift from pure, heroic, sacrificial youths to reckless, irrational, riotous children was an easy one.

Youth as politics?

In late April, a 'reporter' for one of the university journals created during the movement told the story of a female student from the psychology department at Beijing University who went home to see her parents; instead of being pleased, the couple scolded her, asking why she wasn't out marching and protesting with the other students.[84] The story was meant to convey the idea of a cross-generational support for the young demonstrators but it raised one obvious question: why were the parents staying at home?

A youth movement is by definition limited by the tacit understanding that only 'young people' can be, in those specific circumstances, activists.[85] This was the case in 1989, as the anecdote illustrates quite clearly: the parents did not need any excuse to abstain from direct action, it was simply not their place, their only duty was to encourage a timorous daughter. This is obviously a huge obstacle for any political undertaking, especially one that aims at achieving radical and systemic change, but in 1989, 'youth' carried another, more restrictive meaning. During the Beijing spring, the term 'youth' referred almost exclusively to students. Which is understandable, given that this was primarily a student movement. Primarily, but not exclusively, and this reduction reflected and exacerbated the internal contradictions of the 1989 protests.

Much has been written on the narrowness of the movement, its inability to involve others, the elite status that young intellectuals claimed, and the students' presumption to speak for the whole nation.[86] But even as the category of 'youth' – rather than 'students' – was deployed more insistently to define the movement (during and after the hunger strike) this did not produce any unifying effect, and nor did it even bring calls for an expanded collective of young people.

The hunger strike did mark the moment when workers appeared on the scene as an organized group, joining the students in the square. These were in the majority *young* workers, who spoke of themselves as *young* people.[87] Yet, even after the strike ended and after the workers formed an independent union in the Square, they were never included under the category of 'youth'. Nor did they feel included. Workers referred to themselves as 'elder brothers' to the students, despite the fact that they were often not much older; they repeatedly stated how they had been mobilized 'to protect the students' (which was not really the case);[88] they promised students the spiritual and material support of the working class.[89] And this was not just limited to the workers; rather all non-student organizations felt the need to highlight their role in supporting the students.[90] 'Youth' never marked a general movement; it always meant a student movement to which other groups could provide help and protection but in which they could never directly participate. This was also evident in the need to fix the meaning of 'youth' to those specific students. In late April, when violent 'disturbances' took place in Changsha and Xi'an, *The Guardian* insistently described them as the work of 'unemployed youths', not of students. There was clearly bad and good youth, and only the students deserved the positive associations the category produced.[91]

This conflation of youth and students is particularly misleading because it obscures how the Beijing Spring was in fact a much larger movement, and one that different sets of (mostly young) people joined, each bringing different demands and different expectations. One of the crucial distinctions was that with workers. On 21 April, when the Workers Autonomous Federation started signing up new members, they released their first slogans, which did not coincide with those of the students: they asked for price stabilization and wage increases for workers, and they called for public disclosure of the assets owned by the 'princelings' (the sons and daughters of CCP leaders).[92] They shared with the students the concern over corruption and official profiteering, but the workers' demands reflected a more pragmatic uneasiness with the collapse of the socialist welfare system and the growing inequalities. They seemed much less interested in vague ideas of 'democracy'. In a public 'Letter to the Students', an anonymous worker called on the students to move outside the confines of a movement of intellectuals and gain the broad support of other groups. He advised against emphasizing 'the treatment of intellectuals and the budget for higher education'

as well as demanding 'impractical democratic change; for this will alienate the workers and farmers'.[93]

Yet workers and citizens had problems making their voices heard, especially when they were speaking for themselves, and not simply in support of students. Craig Calhoun retells the episode when Han Dongfang, one of the *young* leaders of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation, was allowed to speak on the steps of the Monument to the People's Heroes and students began to shout 'Who's this guy?' 'We are the vanguard!' 'Get down, leave!'[94] A WAF organizer complained that the students, unlike the workers, did not realize that it was 'a movement of the whole people. All the time they conceived of it as a student movement'. While it had indeed started as a student movement, the worker went on, all sorts of citizens' organizations had since sprung up spontaneously, but the students ignored them.[95]

The young workers and citizens who shared the Square with the students presented a different face of Chinese 'youth', one that was more difficult to understand and accept outside China, in part because it called into question basic assumptions concerning the post-Mao reforms and the contradictions they had produced. If one listened to the workers and other citizens' groups, 1989 was not just about a uniformly pro-reform population fighting against the conservative wing of the CCP over more democracy and more reforms. Rather, it was also a debate over what 'reforms' meant; whether some measure of welfare was still needed; whether the conquests of previous decades in terms of equality and workers' security had to be disbanded; whether liberalization could come without massive social disruption; whether there could be democracy, not just as a vague ideal or an electoral system, but as a real means of having a say about the economic model, the allocation of resources, life in the factories and in the fields.[96] All these issues and more were put forward in 1989, and references to 'youth' both subsumed and obscured them. The case of 1989, thus, demonstrates that a category such as 'youth' – despite its seemingly univocal reference to an age group, a cohort, or a generation – cannot have any stable connotation, even over a short period of time. Rather than a clear signifier, 'youth' is always a site of contestation and giving it definition is one of the political stakes of activism.

Coda

On 4 June 2012 I joined tens of thousands of Hongkongers in Victoria Park for the candlelight vigil in commemoration of the twenty-third anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. It was a massive demonstration, one of the largest to date. Before the start of the official program, the organizers from the stage called on people born after 1989 to raise their candles. They had come in large numbers, and they were possibly the majority. I looked around and, indeed, I saw mostly very young faces. Their presence in Victoria Park

clearly had a political meaning; they were indeed acting politically, even if the contours of their politics were unclear to me, as was their relationship with 1989.[97] And yet, I found myself instinctively reverting to 'youth', in all its depoliticizing simplicity. Uncomfortably, I caught myself echoing and paraphrasing the words of Yuan Mu: 'Why are you here? You weren't even born during the Beijing spring!'

Notes

This essay benefited immensely from comments by Rick Jobs, David Pomfret, the participants to the Hong Kong workshop, as well as the anonymous readers. I am also thankful to Susan Crane for her insights. Translations from Chinese and Italian are mine, unless otherwise noted.

1. F. Lanza (2012) 'Springtime and Morning Suns: "Youth" as a Political Category in Twentieth-Century China', *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 5 (1), 31–51.
2. 'What China's Students Want', *The New York Times*, 6 May 1989, 26.
3. For a history of modern student movements in China see J. Wasserstrom (1991) *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
4. E. Blau, 'CNN Basks in Reaction to Its Beijing Coverage', *New York Times*, 25 May 1989, C26.
5. E. J. Dionne Jr, 'Upheaval in China; TV Steps into the Fray, and Alters It', *The New York Times*, 21 May 1989, section 1, 18.
6. Lanza, 'Springtime and Morning Suns'.
7. S. M. Lipset, 'Why Youth Revolt', *New York Times*, 24 May 1989, A31.
8. D. B. Davis, P. Gay, J. Merriman, D. Montgomery, and J-C. Agnew, 'Violence of Old Men vs. the Idealism of Youth', *New York Times*, 7 June 1989, A26.
9. R. I. Jobs (2007) *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 46.
10. As for Western publications, I have examined the coverage of *The New York Times* (US), *The Guardian* and *The Times* (UK), and *La Repubblica* (Italy). I was surprised at how much the overall tone, quality, and thrust of the reporting varied among these publications.
11. For an analysis of political and intellectual change in the first decade of the Deng era, see M. Goldman (1994) *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
12. C. Calhoun (1994) *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 9.
13. Lee Feigon (1990) *China Rising: The Meaning of Tiananmen* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee), p. 110.
14. Xu Luo (2002) *Searching for Life's Meaning: Changes and Tensions in the Worldviews of Chinese Youth in the 1980s* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press), p. 127.
15. *The Gate of Heavenly Peace* (1995), Dir. Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon.
16. K. Hartford (1992) 'Summer 1988–Spring 1989 The Ferment Before the "Turmoil"' in S. Odgen et al. (eds) *China's Search for Democracy: The Student and the Mass Movement of 1989* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), p. 21.

17. Su Shaozhi et al. 'What Will the Year 1989 Tell Us?' in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 29. Su Shaozhi served as the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He was dismissed in 1987.
18. Xu Luo, *Searching for Life's Meaning*, p. 128.
19. 'Deng Versus Deng in China', *The New York Times*, 16 January 1987, A30.
20. Xu Luo, *Searching for Life's Meaning*, p. 25.
21. On the 1986 protests see J. Kwong (1998) 'The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China: A Democratic Movement?' *Asian Survey*, 28 (9), pp. 970–85.
22. E. A. Gargan, 'Students in China Turn Cynical and Apathetic', *New York Times*, 5 July 1987.
23. R. Bernstein, 'To Be Young and in China: A Colloquy', *New York Times*, 7 October 1989. A similar equally depoliticizing explanation has been provided for May 1968. See R. Wolin (2010) *The Wind from the East. French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press). For a much more complex analysis of the relationship between sexual liberation and politics, see D. Herzog (2007) *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
24. Lee Feigon, *China Rising*, p. 142.
25. P. J. Cunningham (2009) *Tiananmen Moon: Inside the Chinese Student Uprising of 1989* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield), p. 88.
26. '"Farewell" a public letter to my relatives' by 'A patriotic student from the Chinese Music Institute' in The October Review Association (ed.) (1989) *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan: dazibao, xiaozibao, chuandan, minkan* (Selection of documents from the Chinese pro-democracy movement: big-character posters, small-character posters, leaflets, unofficial publications), *October Review* Special Issue (Hong Kong: The October Review Association), p. 140.
27. Li Qiao (1990) 'The Soul of China' in M. Oksenberg, L. R. Sullivan, and M. Lambert (eds) *Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict: The Basic Documents* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe), p. 48. The journal *Xin Wusi* (New May Fourth) had started publications on 5 April, before the beginning of the protests. See *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan* II.
28. 'Interview with Fang Lizhi' (31 May, by the *Liberation Monthly* in Hong Kong) in Yu and Harrison, *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, p. 164. Fang Lizhi (1936–2012) was an astrophysicist and one of the most famous dissenting intellectuals in China. He is most closely associated with the 1986 student protests after which he was expelled from the Party. After the 1989 crackdown, he took refuge in the US embassy in Beijing and was allowed to move to the US the following year. He worked at the University of Arizona, Tucson, where he died.
29. 'China has a crisis', *The Guardian*, 20 April 1989. The Tibet precedent was mentioned also on 21 April and 24 April.
30. Alessandro Russo speaks eloquently on the 'radical negation' of the Cultural Revolution. See his 'How to translate "Cultural Revolution"' (2006) *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 7 (4), 673–82.
31. Lee Feigon, *China Rising*, p. 66.
32. 'A Document Circulated among Senior Party and Government Officials Earlier This Month' (25 April 1989) in Oksenberg, *Beijing Spring*, p. 205.
33. Reproduced partly in Han Minzhu (ed.) (1990) *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 83–5.

34. Advertisement by Hong Kong Women, 24 May in The Chinese Democracy Information Center (ed.) (1990) *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89* (Hong Kong: Federation of Hong Kong Citizens Supporting the Democratic Movement), p. 114.
35. 'Is It a Dialogue or an Admonitory Talk? On the "Dialogue" of April 29' by the Graduate students of Beijing Normal University (30 April 1989) in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 150. Also in Oksenberg, *Beijing Spring*, pp. 219–29.
36. 'The Patriotic-Democratic Movement Compared with the Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution' (3 May), in Yu Mok Chiu and J. F. Harrison (eds) (1990) *Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement* (Montreal; New York: Black Rose Books), p. 92. Also in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 163. Original in *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan*, I, p. 66.
37. 'Who Causes the Turmoil?' (28 April) in Yu and Harrison, *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, pp. 87–8. See also S. Wu Dunn, 'Upheaval in China; Faint Echo of the Cultural Revolution', *New York Times*, 27 May 1989.
38. Cunningham, *Tiananmen Moon*, p. 153. In the following lines Cunningham calls some of the protestors 'young Nazis' ready to pounce on us in the name of the students'.
39. M. Dejevsky, 'Student Power grips Peking University Campus', *The Times*, 23 May 1989.
40. See, for example, 'Turmoil in China; A Dialogue of Dissidents of 2 Worlds', *New York Times*, 14 June 1989; J. Tagliabue, 'Solidarity Breezes In, and Is Given a Burden', *New York Times*, 11 June 1989; A. Lewis, 'Death of a Pretense', *The New York Times*, 11 June 1989.
41. S. Viola, 'Hanno fermato la Primavera' (They have stopped the Spring), *La Repubblica*, 20 May 1989.
42. M. Panara, 'Il grande funerale spacca la Cina' (The big funeral breaks China apart), *La Repubblica*, 23 April 1989.
43. S. Viola, 'Contro Li Peng un milione in piazza' (One million in the streets against Li Peng), *La Repubblica*, 24 May 1989. Viola also made reference to Prague 1968 and Budapest 1956 in a previous article ('Il Silenzio del Potere', 18 May).
44. S. Viola, 'Ma è finita l'era di Deng' (But the Deng era is over), *La Repubblica*, 27 May 1989.
45. E. Blau, 'CNN Basks in Reaction to Its Beijing Coverage'.
46. F. Reuven, 'On Tiananmen Square, Echoes of Chicago in '68', *New York Times*, 4 June 1989, section 2, 27.
47. D. McCurdy, 'A Quid Pro Quo for Youth', *New York Times*, 26 June 1989.
48. J. W. Esherick and J. N. Wasserstrom (1994) 'Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China' in J. Wasserstrom and E. J. Perry (eds) *Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China*, 2nd edn (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press), p. 36.
49. Beijing University Students, 'Letter to All Compatriots' (23 April 1989) in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 106. A *li* is equivalent to 500 meters.
50. Letter from Young Teachers of Beijing Normal University (28 April 1989) in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 139.
51. D. Zweig, 'The Hunger Strike: From Protest to Uprising', in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 188.
52. 'Hunger Strike Declaration of May 13', in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, pp. 213–14.
53. Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors*, p. 71.

54. Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin, Li Nanyou et al., 'May 17 Declaration', in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 225. Students used the terms 'sons and daughters of China' to self-identify as well. See, for example, 'Our Task Is Hard and the Road Is Long' (Late May 1989) in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 343.
55. Zweig, 'The Hunger Strike', p. 188.
56. 'Brief Questions', in *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan*, p. 68.
57. 'A Few Things We Have Heard and Seen on the 15th Dazibao' by several professors at Beijing University, in *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan*, II, p. 3.
58. 'Students Stop Troops: Chinese Leaders Lose Control over Popular Revolution', *The Guardian*, 20 May 1989.
59. 'China's Dark Nights', *The Times*, 6 June 1989.
60. C. Sampson, 'Student's Tape Highlights Horror', *The Times*, 12 June 1989.
61. C. Sampson, 'Well-Trodden Path of Repression; Echoes of the Cultural Revolution', *The Times*, 12 June 1989.
62. I was surprised at how the hunger strike still figured prominently in the Hong Kong commemoration of the 1989 movement in 2012. One of the most visible banners posted outside the main cafeteria at The Chinese University of Hong Kong reproduced a sign from the period: 'Mama, I am hungry but I cannot eat'. Students in Hong Kong also held a three-day hunger strike leading to the annual June Fourth commemoration. T. Chong and T. Cheung, 'Keeping the Flame Burning', *South China Morning Post*, 4 June 2012, A4.
63. See, for examples, advertisements published on 19 May (Hong Kong Young Industrialist Award) and 20 May (People who work overseas) in *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 10, 15.
64. *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 15.
65. Advertisement by Lu Weicheng (22 May 1989) in *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 33. Also p. 68.
66. M. Panara, 'Il Partito si piega agli studenti' (The Party yields to the students), *La Repubblica*, 5 May 1989.
67. E. Mauro, '"Deng, vattene" è il grido della Cina' ('Deng, go away' is China's cry), *La Repubblica*, 18 May 1989.
68. E. Mauro, 'L'esercito rifiuta l'ordine di Deng' (The army refuses to follow Deng's order), *La Repubblica*, 23 May 1989.
69. *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 33.
70. Advertisements by the employees of Yanye bank (23 May), *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 50.
71. Ad by Lu Weicheng (22 May 1989), *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 33; 'History Will Remember This Day', collective report of People's Daily reporters (17 May 1989) in Han Minzhu (ed.) *Cries for Democracy*, p. 229.
72. 'Thank You Letter' by the entire student body of Beijing Normal University (28 May 1989) in *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan* II, p. 66. 'Save the Children' is a reference to the most famous short story in twentieth-century Chinese literature, Lu Xun's 'A Madman's Diary' (1918).
73. Lu Ping (ed.) (1990) *A Moment of Truth: Workers' Participation in China's 1989 Democracy Movement and the Emergence of Independent Unions* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Trade Union Education Centre), p. 5.
74. Lu Jing Hua, 'A Tribute to the Beijing WAF Martyrs', in Lu, *A Moment of Truth*, p. 146.

75. Beijing WAF and Students' Autonomous Federation, 'Joint Declaration of all Workers and Students in the Capital' in Lu Ping (ed.) *A Moment of Truth*, p. 193.
76. J. Becker, 'Chinese Army 'Rejects Deng': Beijing Protesters Say Two Senior Leaders Have Re-signed', *The Guardian*, 22 May 1989.
77. Ma Siufang, 'Statement of a Tiananmen Hunger Striker' (24 May) in Yu and Harrison, *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, p. 68. Ma was 25 and had returned to school in 1986 after an eight-year hiatus.
78. 'The Force Will Still Be With Them', *The Guardian*, 20 May 1989.
79. M. Panara, 'Gli studenti occupano Pechino' (Students occupy Beijing), *La Repubblica*, 22 April 1989.
80. 'Sui giovani l'anatema di Deng' (Deng's anathema on the youth), *La Repubblica*, 27 April 1989.
81. S. Viola, 'La Cina nel caos', *La Repubblica*, 3 June 1989.
82. 'Why Good Intentions May Lead to Turmoil and Riot', *China Daily*, 23 June 1989 reprinted in Oksenberg, *Beijing Spring*, pp. 389–90.
83. M. Panara, 'Gli studenti di Pechino: "Gorbaciov? È poco"' (Beijing students: 'Gorbachev? Too little'), *La Repubblica*, 4 May 1989; M. Panara, 'Zhao Ziyang, nemico del partito' (Zhao Ziyang, enemy of the Party), *La Repubblica*, 27 May 1989; Panara, 'La Primavera di Pechino' (Beijing Spring), *La Repubblica*, 25 April 1989. *The Guardian* also highlighted the young age of the students' leaders, concluding, 'there is no sign of a Chinese Walesa'. 'First Step of a Long, Long March', *The Guardian*, 8 May 1989.
84. 'Dad and Mom Support You!' (Reporter of a University Journal, Late April 1989) in Odgen, *China's Search for Democracy*, p. 108.
85. The essay by Jialin Christina Wu in this volume illustrates a different, yet similarly exclusionary use of 'youth', related not to class or age, but gender.
86. See E. J. Perry, 'Casting a Chinese 'Democracy' Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs' in Wasserstrom and Perry (eds) *Popular Protest*, pp. 74–92; Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors*, p. 57. See also the *Newspaper Advertisements on the Democratic Movements of China '89*, p. 192.
87. A worker from Guangzhou remarked: 'Then, when we heard of the news of the formation of workers' organizations in Beijing, we *young* workers felt an inclination, though not a strong one, to do the same…So we divided up to liaise with the *young* people in our work places'. Lu Ping, *A Moment of Truth*, p. 69, emphasis mine.
88. Lu Ping, *A Moment of Truth*, p. 30.
89. 'An Open Letter to the Students' (undated, signed by 'A Beijing Worker') in Yu and Harrison (eds), *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, p. 112.
90. Alliance of all the people in the capital, 'Another Letter to the Patriotic Compatriots' (22 May), *Zhongguo minyun yuanziliao jingxuan* II, p. 24.
91. J. Becker, 'Protests Spread in China: Rioters Attack Government Buildings and Injure over 100 Police', *The Guardian*, 24 April 1989; J. Gittings 'Provincial Student Activists Struggle to Echo Beijing', *The Guardian*, 1 May 1989. *The Guardian* was also providing a counterbalance to the official account in the Chinese press, which overemphasized the incidents and blamed them on the students.
92. Lu Ping, *A Moment of Truth*, p. 2.
93. 'Letter to the Students' (28 April 1989, signed by 'A Worker') in Yu and Harrison (eds) *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, p. 111.

94. Han Dongfang (born 1963) was just three years older than Chai Ling, and probably not older than many of the graduate students involved in the protests. Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors*, p. 113.
95. Lu Ping, *A Moment of Truth*, pp. 98–9.
96. The argument that 1989 was truly a moment of confrontation between different ideas of what 'reforms' meant and which direction they should take has been made convincingly by Wang Hui. See his *China's New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
97. Alison Landsberg provides a very interesting insight into the issue of our relationship with the past by introducing the idea of 'prosthetic memory'. This new form of public cultural memory, she argues, 'emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as a movie theatre or a museum'. The Hong Kong commemoration of 4 June could be constituted as such a site. Through these experiences, Landsberg writes, 'the person does not simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live. The resulting prosthetic memory has the ability to shape that person's subjectivity and politics'. A. Landsberg (2004) *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 2.

12

A Transnational Generation: Franco-Maghribi Youth Culture and Musical Politics in the Late Twentieth Century

Paul A. Silverstein

The cultural predicament of late-twentieth century France was perhaps best illustrated in Matthieu Kassovitz's controversial 1995 film *La Haine* (Hate, 1995), a neorealist fiction that follows a day in the life of a trio of multiracial youth from a housing project on the urban periphery (*la banlieue*) of Paris in the aftermath of an anti-police demonstration. In one particularly poignant scene, a resident deejay – the iconic Cut Killer playing himself – performs a live mash-up of the American rapper KRS-One's 'Sound of Da Police' (1993), local hip hop sensation Suprême NTM's 'Police' (1993), and Edith Piaf's 'Non, Je Ne Regrette Rien' (1960).[1] The juxtaposition of seemingly incompatible musical genres (chanson and gangsta rap) in Cut Killer's composition underlines the film's portrayal of a hybrid, urban, postcolonial France marked by both violent clashes and unexpected solidarities – everyday and strategic transnational encounters across the divides of race, class, space, religion, gender, and generation. Piaf, NTM, and Boogie Down Productions trace out a soundtrack of parallel struggles for economic equality and social justice occurring across several decades on opposite sides of the Atlantic, and indeed the Mediterranean – a connection reinforced by the film's opening credits montage which overlays Bob Marley and the Wailers' iconic 1973 anthem 'Burnin' and Lootin'' over archival footage from 1980s and 1990s street battles between multiracial youth and the French police.

While a number of authors have focused on the emergence of a multiracial, hypermasculine 'ghetto patrimony' in the *banlieues* and the broader moral panics that have ensued in its wake, this chapter underlines the broader postcolonial dynamic uniting France and North Africa in which youth over the course of the last decades of the twentieth century emerged as a problem for state anxiety and management.[2] Building on Paul Gilroy's outlining of a 'Black Atlantic' as a 'counterculture of modernity', it explores the parallel emergence of youth protest movements on both sides of the Mediterranean since the 1970s – movements that were transnational in

scope and intimately connected to the emerging musical genres of new Berber folksong, Algerian raï, Moroccan gnawa, rock (especially punk and metal), and hip hop.[3] Youthful musical production and consumption map out alternate generational solidarities that ambivalently vacillate between articulations of stalwart localism and transnational solidarity across the Mediterranean as well as across the Atlantic. At the turn of the twenty-first century, these social movements coexist in productive tension, between a new militant Third Worldism, increasingly under the banner of global Islamic unity; a reinvigorated Berber ethnic assertiveness that seeks to create an ethnic homeland across the southern Mediterranean; and a contemplative Sufi revival that transcends racial and ethnic categories. This chapter traces the historical emergence, trajectories, and scalar dilemmas of such forms of transnational youthful political and artistic engagement.

Scalar dilemmas and everyday transnationalisms

Exploring the emergence of 'youth' as a political category in the late twentieth-century Mediterranean requires a renewed attention to the scalar dimensions of engagement and analysis, to the coexistence of multiple, incommensurable (yet not incompatible) logics of practice and knowledge operating in different spheres of social interaction. Nearly all the phenomena that historians and social scientists observe are multi-scalar depending on the perspective of the actor and analytical lens of the observer. In the case of the western Mediterranean, a young man or woman's social aspirations as a resident of a given *banlieue* housing project, a Franco-Maghribi, a Muslim, and a member of a transnational hip hop community are not competing differences of degree, but coexisting differences of kind, with radically different modes of action and obligation entailed by each orientation. In general, not only do young men and women continually move between different roles and modes of self-presentation, but youth protest music movements also must periodically negotiate between these different scales of discourse and action as they imagine different generational boundaries, address different audiences and operate in different cultural and political contexts. It is very often in these complex scalar movements between incommensurable modes of discourse and action that tensions and conflicts within the movements arise, particularly as activists attempt to 'scale up' local struggles for recognition to the attention of global audiences (which entails, for musicians, their commercialization), or 'scale down' a transnational discourse on anti-imperialism or multiculturalism to specific local concerns over institutional racism, police harassment, housing, or employment.[4] Indeed, the youth movements discussed in this chapter are particularly torn between competing orientations toward localism and globalism, between the elaboration of spaces for autonomous self-creation and the connection of such localized struggles for autonomy across spatial divides.

To this point, as Cati Coe and her coauthors have recently argued, 'youth have been under-theorized as "key players" in globalization and transnational processes'.[5] Certainly, scholars have long recognized the youthfulness of twentieth-century international migrations: whether in terms of young men's mobility as soldiers, sailors, miners, railway workers, or seasonal agricultural laborers in the beginning of the century; or in terms of the large-scale displacements of World War II and its decolonizing aftermath; or in terms of the mobility of students and industrial/construction guest-workers, and the resettlement of families in the postcolonial metropoles in the postwar period. As Abdelmalek Sayad has detailed for the Algerian (Kabyle) case, from a first 'age' of young men recruited by industrial concerns and selected by sending families on the basis of their dependability, to a second 'age' of adventure seekers, to a third 'age' of children born and/or bred between two worlds, the evolution of twentieth-century migrations and displacements can be measured by the changing youth experience.[6] Yet, migration scholarship has primarily approached youth as vectors of assimilation, particularly for the putative 'second generation'.[7] More recently, a rich scholarship has emerged on transnational families and the everyday lives of women and children as either direct agents or supporting props of migration.[8]

In this essay, I am particularly concerned not only with everyday but also with what I am calling 'strategic' transnationalism by which youth on both sides of the Mediterranean have forged quotidian webs of generational sociality (both material and virtual) that become the basis for conscious articulations of themselves as equally Algerian *and* Berber, French *and* Muslim.[9] These webs of sociality may be spatially located in a given country or city or even housing complex, but necessarily draw from wide and varied cultural fields that go beyond national borders. Already in the 1950s, the Manchester School anthropologists Max Gluckman, Arnold Epstein, and J. Clyde Mitchell who were studying Northern Rhodesian mining towns insisted on the differentiation of social fields when studying identity formation. Rather than presuming that young migrant men from African villages would naturally carry their tribal ties with them to the newly built cities, they argued that urban tribal affiliations of migrant miners took on new meanings, as categorical markers of identification rather than social structures.[10] James Ferguson, revisiting the Manchester School and the Copperbelt towns 30 years later, further differentiated between two kinds of Zambian townsmen: ruralists and cosmopolitans. Ruralists had maintained close ties with their tribal homelands and their kin, engaging in regular communication, monetary remittances, and family visits; if necessary, they could easily reintegrate into their natal villages because they had never left, socially speaking. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, had not maintained equivalent ties and had become townsmen par excellence, having invested primarily in establishing urban households and internalized the trans-tribal youth culture and urban lingua franca as their own.[11]

The ruralist/cosmopolitan distinction might similarly prove to be a useful heuristic for thinking through the various scalar generational identities that youth on both sides of the postcolonial Mediterranean have constructed through musical production and consumption. As scholars, we must be attuned to everyday transnationalisms that both trace out primordial connectivity to an idealized, authenticated (national or local) homeland, or, alternatively, strategically embrace urban cross-fertilizations and cosmopolitan belonging – as well as all the messy, complex formations that incorporate both ruralist and cosmopolitan dimensions. What follows is a brief exploration of three transnational Franco-Maghribi youth musical movements that are differently positioned among these orientations: Algerian raï, new Kabyle folksong, *le rock métis*, and, to a lesser extent, contemporary Francophone rap.

Algerian generations

In 1962, representatives from France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) signed the Evian Accords, formally ending the seven-year Franco-Algerian war and bringing to a close 132 years of French colonial occupation of North Africa. The treaty constituted a key moment in what Todd Shepard has called 'the invention of decolonization': the legal constitution of two nations as primordially and politically separate and separable from a complex social reality of interaction, intermarriage, and mutual influence across ethnic, religious, and spatial divides.[12] The government of Charles De Gaulle projected the separation as part of a natural process of maturation of its filial republics – the apanage of its *mission civilisatrice* – and of its own national evolution from an imperial power to a leader of European unity. In like fashion, the Algerian government drew on *salafi* Islamic historiography and the Manichean colonial critique of FLN ideologue Frantz Fanon to posit a singular Algerian revolutionary subject across time, formed in the unity of Algeria's indigenous peoples and the violent crucible of their continual struggles against invading foreigners.[13] Armed with the now-famous rally-call, 'One hero, the people', the victorious FLN glossed over the multiplicity of internal struggles during the revolution that pitted Algerian Muslims of different political orientations against each other in what Benjamin Stora has called the 'war within the war'.[14] FLN ideologues foresaw the construction of a new Algerian man, purged of the cultural decadence and economic poverty imposed by colonialism – a 'decolonization of the mind' (*décolonisation des esprits*) based in a fusion of Arab nationalism and socialism, and encapsulated in the salafi slogan, 'Islam is my religion; Algeria is my nation; and Arabic is my language'.[15]

However, the state's capacity to translate this ideology of Arabo-Islamic cultural autonomy into a lived reality, into a structure of feeling that would unite Algerian citizens into a single national purpose, was decidedly tenuous.

The very administration it took over (and the educational institutions that underwrote it) remained Francophone in both language and culture and bore the indelible traces of colonial governance. Although many of those who had sided against the FLN had fled the country or had been killed in the retributive violence that ensued in the immediate wake of independence, the war had left behind durable bitter memories, with family structures torn asunder by traumas that could not be simply attributed to past colonial abuses. For the urban populace, their tastes, judgments, and modes of distinction had been indelibly marked by the European influences of the settler populations, as well as, in many cases, by their own migration as laborers in the metropole.[16] In contrast, the vast majority of the population, living in marginal rural conditions, were illiterate, unable to operate in classical Arabic, and committed to popular religious practices reviled by the purifying national norms of salafism. A further significant majority (25–30 per cent) spoke Berber as their first or only language and had enjoyed relative cultural and legal autonomy under the French. Already in 1963, the eastern Berber-speaking region of Kabylia witnessed a three-month popular insurrection against the consolidation of FLN rule.

Much of the Algerian state's anxiety about the future of the revolution and the unity of the nation-state were projected onto the youth population. As in the other newly independent neighboring states of Morocco and Tunisia, the burgeoning youth population represented both a hope of national socioeconomic development and a feared wayward turn away from the unifying anticolonial spirit of the previous generation.[17] Kamel Rarrbo has demonstrated how the single-party Algerian state, through an Arabized state education system, the national student union (UNJA), and the adoption of French models of adolescence, attempted to tailor Algerian youth into the new bearers of the revolutionary torch.[18] If the first two decades after independence under President Houari Boumedienne witnessed the growth of state industries (particularly the hydrocarbon sector), heavy investment in country-wide infrastructural modernization projects, and political leadership among developing nations in the non-aligned movement, by the mid-1970s much of this political and economic dynamism had stalled, and by the mid-1980s it had stagnated into double-digit inflation and unemployment.

In failing to provide either a viable socio-economic structure or a forum for the freedom of expression, the state's strategy produced instead an increasing mass of young disenfranchised urban populations with few professional prospects and few sentiments of personal integration into the national project – they became colloquially known as *hitistes*, or 'wall-hangers'. These conditions set off a series of moments of urban unrest that ultimately led to the breakdown of the FLN's monopoly of power and a bloody decade of violence against an Islamist insurrection during the 1990s.[19] In calling the army into the streets to repress the October 1988 youth demonstrations,

the Algerian state further contributed to the elaboration of a generational rupture which opposed Algeria's younger populations to those who, in tying their personal trajectories to the success of anticolonial Arab nationalism, had become 'apparatchiks' within the bureaucratic state structure.

Algerian youth expressed their cultural and political alienation in large part through the development of a set of new musical genres, aided by the growing availability of portable radios, cassette recorders, and electric instruments. Among these, initially in western Algeria but soon spreading to the rest of the country, was pop *raï*, a genre of dance music originally sung by older women at marriage parties or cabarets that focused on love, hope, and regret, sometimes transgressing gender norms. With increasing influences from Western rock, soul, reggae, and disco, by the 1980s the genre had evolved into a form of electric protest music sung by and for young disaffected men and women (known as *cheb*-s and *chaba*-s), into songs of outrage, longing, and despair in the face of social conservatism, cultural censorship, and blocked ambitions.[20] Initially an underground phenomenon subject to state censorship, raï artists later received state support as contributors to the national culture industry and exports to the world music scene, only to later receive death threats from the Islamist insurgency.[21] By the 1990s, top raï stars like Cheb Khaled, Cheb Mami, and Cheb Nasro had relocated to France, Britain, or North America, where they not only became mainstays of Maghribi immigrant-oriented radio stations like Beur-FM, but also collaborated with rock, jazz, and other world music artists to create professionally produced and globally commercialized products for the global market.

The trajectory of new Kabyle folksong strongly parallels the local emergence, politicization, hybridization, and transnationalization of raï. Although many Kabyles garnered top positions within the FLN and the state administration, the Berber-speaking region particularly experienced the destabilizing effects of state centralization, rural reorganization, and Arabization, all of which threatened the dynamic reproduction of Kabyle village economic vitality, social hierarchies, and expressive forms. Fearing that Berber culture could become a rallying point for regionalism, the Boumedienne regime portrayed Berber identity as simultaneously backwards (part of the ante-Islamic *jahiliyya*) and colonialist (in that it was supposedly privileged by the French); eliminated university courses in Berber linguistics (in place since the colonial period); outlawed the public and literary use of Berber; and established a disproportionate number of Islamic institutes in the region. In spite of these efforts, an increasingly vocal Berber ethnic politics arose in the region across the 1970s and 1980s, in part mediated by the efforts of overseas Kabyle workers and intellectuals in Paris to standardize spoken Berber (Tamazight), develop a written script (Tifinagh), and transcribe oral folklore and poetry. In March–April 1980, Kabylia was rocked by a set of violent demonstrations, work stoppages, and school strikes in support of the occupation of the University of Tizi-Ouzou campus by Berberist students

in protest of the cancellation of a lecture on Berber poetry by anthropologist and novelist Mouloud Mammeri. In the wake of what became known as the 'Berber Spring', young Kabyle men and women formed hundreds of associations across Kabylia to promote Berber language and culture, linked through an umbrella Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) and, later, a set of political parties. Across the next several decades, youth activists periodically enflamed the region with school boycotts and clashes with the state gendarmes in their efforts to secure official recognition for Tamazight and a measure of regional self-determination.[22]

Folklore, poetry, and song has played a principal role in the development of Berber ethno-national consciousness. Jane Goodman has traced the meta-cultural work of these various expressive genres, chief among which is the emergent musical form of 'new Kabyle folksong' (*neo-chanson kabyle*).[23] From the early 1970s, predominantly male singer-songwriters like Lounis Aït-Menguellet, Djamel Allam, Ferhat M'henni, Idir (Hamid Cheriet), and Lounès Matoub took Berber oral poetry and song previously performed by female choruses, adapted them to guitar and mandolin, and rewrote them as folk, rock, or châabi ballads with explicitly nostalgic or political lyrics. Their songs became the soundtrack to the Berber movement, and they became well-remunerated icons of a resurgent Kabylia.

Surely the most emblematic and path-breaking political Kabyle folksong is Idir and Ben Mohamed's composition, 'A Vava Inouva' (O Father, My Father), recorded by a 25-year-old Idir originally in 1973.[24] If initially played on French airwaves, cassettes of the song quickly circulated across Kabylia and the song became the de facto national anthem of the transnational Berber movement. Every Berber activist knows the lyrics by heart, most can strum its basic melody and it is surely the most common number performed in Berber concerts, rallies, festivals, and association meetings. The song, a dialogue between father and daughter derived from a traditional folksong, is set in a wintery mountain hamlet and, like much of Idir's repertoire, draws on a rich mythological imagery of Kabyle village life. It connects singers and listeners to a cultural world which, because of emigration and urbanization, many younger Kabyles have never experienced firsthand. Yet, for all of its ruralist nostalgia, the song is decidedly modern, a guitar ballad born from the American and English folk rock anthems to which Idir and Ben Mohamed grew up listening, inspired by the new negritude works of cultural authentication to which they were introduced at the 1969 Pan-African Festival in Algiers.[25]

As Idir's work has been politicized by his young audience, other artists have more directly and actively engaged in formal politics. Ferhat, another guitar balladeer, has explicitly called his repertoire *chants révolutionnaires*, served as a leader of one of the rival factions of the MCB, and, in the wake of the 2001 'Black Spring' violence, founded a Kabyle Autonomy Movement (MAK) calling for Kabyle fiscal and administrative independence. One of

his earlier musical and political rivals, Matoub, likewise infused his châabi mandolin melodies with lyrics denouncing state Arabization policies and Islamist puritanism, often on behalf of the Rally for Culture and Democracy political party. He famously played his first public concert in Paris during the 1980 Berber Spring, wearing an army uniform on stage to show his solidarity with a Kabylia 'at war'. During the October 1988 youth uprising, he was shot five times by a policeman and left for dead on the side of the road. In 1994, he was kidnapped by the GIA and released only when his MCB supporters threatened 'total war' on the Islamists. His final album, *Lettre Ouverte à*… (Open Letter To…), included a lengthy version of the Algerian national anthem reworded in utter denunciation of the FLN and the military. On the eve of the album's release, Matoub was assassinated at a false roadblock near Tizi-Ouzou by shooters of unknown affiliation. His death set off several weeks of violent uprisings across Kabylia. In his death, Matoub became a martyr to the transnational cause of Tamazight and an icon of revolt for an increasingly militant Kabyle youth. His burial site in his natal village of Taourirt Moussa has become a site of pilgrimage, his name a graffiti tag symbolizing rebelliousness across the Berber-speaking Maghrib, and his poster image a mandatory accompaniment to any demonstration for Berber rights across the world.

If Matoub has become a transnational icon for assertive localism, particularly in France where Berber activism remains a central preoccupation for thousands of young men and women of Kabyle heritage, Idir has come to represent multicultural cosmopolitanism. While participating in a 1999 concert in memory of Matoub, Idir broadly steered clear of the internecine battles that have racked Kabyle politics. Instead, over the past decade he worked in France across varied cultural backgrounds and musical genres, collaborating with rock métis stars like Zebda and Manu Chao, rappers like Akhenaton, Breton folksingers Alan Stivell and Dan Ar Braz, and even chanson icons like Maxime Le Forestier, among others – all in the cause of celebrating the diversity of late twentieth-century France and the de facto multiculturalism of its younger generations. In this sense, Idir's oeuvre encompasses the spectrum of everyday transnational affiliations.

A case in point is his 1979 composition, 'Zwit Rwit' (Turn, Turn), a festive, nostalgic homage to a Kabyle village marriage celebration (*timeghra*). In 1987, it was adapted by raï superstar Cheb Khaled into the political 'El Harba Wine' (Flee, But Where), an Algerian Arabic-language song that interrogated, 'Where has youth gone?/Where are the brave ones?' and became the anthem of the October 1988 youth demonstrations in Algiers.[26] Khaled later rerecorded the song in the 1999 as a duet with Hindi film music star Amar.[27] Meanwhile, Idir himself has most recently remade the song with mixed French and Kabyle lyrics as the title track of his *La France des Couleurs* (France of [Many] Colors) album released in support of France's 2006 multiracial World Cup soccer team, and featuring a variety of French rap, R&B,

raï, and chanson stars, including a concluding cameo by Kabyle-French soccer star Zinedine Zidane.

French métissage

La France des Couleurs points to the panoply of overlapping transnational musical styles and a remarkably plural listening public in fin-de-siècle France. This multicultural public has emerged over the decades since the Franco-Algerian war, as generations born and bred in France have come of political age and have taken center stage in a number of intertwined projects of cultural and artistic production. North Africans have been laboring and living in France in large numbers since World War I. Most of the historiography has emphasized that this initial migration consisted primarily of young men in their 20s and 30s, initially primarily of Berber background, recruited from Algerian and Moroccan rural peripheries to man metropolitan mining, manufacturing, and agricultural industries or to serve on the front lines, whose stays in France were mostly provisional until the uncertainties of the Franco-Algerian war and the economic crises of the 1970s saw migrant strategies shift toward settlement and family reunification.[28] In her recent groundbreaking work, Amelia Lyons has traced such family migration back to the late 1940s, in part encouraged by the French state who – in the name of equality, morality, and integration – established special social services to care for its Algerian citizenry in the metropole.[29] By the time of the war of decolonization, women and children had become ‘the fastest growing and most politically significant segment of the Algerian population in France’.[30] In the process, durable North African communities of multiple generations formed in France, initially in the shantytowns (*bidonvilles*) on the outskirts of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, and afterwards in a variety of public housing projects (*cités HLM*) built largely in the industrial suburbs (*les banlieues*).

The economic crisis and subsequent deindustrialization of the *banlieues* fundamentally altered the conditions of life and future prospects for North Africans in France. Avenues for the presumed succession of the younger generation of men in their fathers’ places of employment were largely closed as factories and mining concerns stopped expanding or shuttered their operations.[31] At the same time, young Franco-Maghribi men and women grew up substantially more literate in French cultural norms than their parents, in large part due to their access (and often success) in public education and the rich cultural diversity of the housing projects. They experienced the same generation gap as their comrades growing up in a consumerist, postcolonial France with a popular culture largely oriented across the Atlantic, doubled in their case by the biculturalism of their households.[32]

In France, this generalized predicament of postcolonial France was approached as a youth problem to be managed through state policy, extending

the same concerns over 'integration' that had been directed at Algerian Muslims in the dying days of colonialism. French state officials and public intellectuals worried about the ability and willingness of the 'second generation' to productively add to French society, vacillating between welcoming a 'plural France' and fearing the cultural disunification of the Hexagon. Prior to 1981, the French state largely devolved much of the management of the social and cultural life of the Maghribi community to the overseas arms of North African governments, in the Algerian case the Amicale des Algériens en Europe and its parallel youth organization, the UNJA, official organs of the ruling FLN party.[33] The Amicale and the UNJA functioned as the primary mediator between Algerians in France and at home: centralizing documentary procedures for maintaining Algerian citizenship status while abroad (as pertaining to property rights, local voting privileges, military service, and so on); arranging transfers of immigrant corpses back for burial in Algeria; directing Arabic language and Islamic religious instruction for children of immigrants; and providing funds and facilities for ritual celebrations and cultural events. This monopoly was enabled by the series of postwar agreements between Algeria and France and abetted by France's ban on immigrant voluntary associations that remained in effect until the socialists took power under François Mitterrand in 1981.

At the same time, the French state had developed interventionist policies to contain potential unrest emerging from immigrant peripheries. During the Franco-Algerian war when the FLN used France as a center for recruitment, fundraising, and occasional military action, the bidonvilles were under heavy French police surveillance and occasional raids, and its residents were subject to nightly curfews.[34] As early as 1956, the French state established a National Corporation for the Construction of Housing for Algerian Workers (SONACOTRA) with the explicit purpose of relocating shantytown residents, first to temporary housing (*cités de transit*) and later to rent-subsidized housing estates (*grands ensembles*) financed through a set of Social Action Funds (FAS) which also provided welfare benefits through the North African Family Social Service.[35] Built with a minimum of 500 units in a combination of high-rise towers and low-rise blocks, the *grands ensembles* built on the outskirts of Paris, Lyon, and other French cities balanced imperatives of social mobility and security, circulation and containment.[36] They were constructed as utopian modernist experiments in hygienic social life, centralizing housing, commerce, education, and recreation in the immediate proximity to the factories in which residents were assumed to work. In the process, they broke up the ethnic communities that had formed in the bidonvilles, mixing residents of different backgrounds and incorporating them into formal structures of state control and increasingly bureaucratized police surveillance.

As Chris Warne has detailed, by the early 1960s, the *banlieue* housing projects had become the subject of moral panics over the rise of 'juvenile delinquency', over an emerging youth population not assimilating to French classical culture.[37] Such fears were primarily connected to the rise of gangs

of young, mostly white male fans of Anglo-American rock and roll who were known for the black leather jackets (*blousons noirs*) they sported, their self-projection as James Dean-like 'rebels without a cause', their brawling at rock shows, and their racist attacks on immigrants. While initially banning rock concerts and festivals, the state-funded recording industry domesticated rock and roll into a de-fanged *yéyé* music associated with figures like Johnny Hallyday performing on French television variety shows. After the May 1968 events in which student revolutionaries drew inspiration from African-American avant-garde jazz,[38] rock festivals again became subject to state scrutiny as sites of Leftist (*gauchiste*) unrest. Among other public acts aimed at disrupting bourgeois lifestyles, Maoist youth groups like the Force for Pop Liberation and Intervention (FLIP) 'sought to marry rock music and left-wing agitation' by swarming the gates of concerts and disrupting them with revolutionary messages.[39] Left-wing groups subsequently developed political festivals incorporating concerts by *gauchiste* chanson artists like Leo Ferré and Jean Ferrat alongside rock and jazz groups, most notably in the Communist Party's Fête de l'Humanité held annually in the Parc de la Courneuve outside of Paris. By the 1980s, these festivals received municipal and state funding and had become an explicit tool for integrating multicultural *banlieue* youth into Frenchness.

The Socialist Party came to power in 1981 under François Mitterrand with a broader agenda of promoting youth culture as a mode of remaking a 'plural France'.[40] Not only championing a 'right to culture' for working-class *banlieue* residents, but also a right to cultural diversity: 'pluralism supplanted participation as the vehicle for realizing the ideal cultural democracy'.[41] Speaking in Lorient just prior to his 1981 presidential election, Mitterrand defended the 'right to difference' as a universal human right.[42] This implied a redefinition of French national unity through its multicultural and multilinguistic diversity. In his preface to a programmatic report entitled *La France au pluriel* (A Plural France), Mitterrand commented that, '[W]e profoundly believe that if France must be united, she must also be rich in her differences. Her unity has enabled our country; respecting her diversity will prevent her undoing. One and diverse, that is France'.[43] While Mitterrand did not follow through on his campaign promise to enfranchise noncitizen immigrants, he did legalize immigrant associations.

In the wake of these changes, hundreds of Franco-Maghribi ('Beur') cultural associations formed throughout France in the early 1980s, focusing on a variety of social and cultural issues, from grassroots urban development, to antiracist politics, to ethno-religious activism.[44] These associations further became sites for cultural production, establishing newspapers, publishing houses, and radio stations, alongside a burgeoning complement of Beur novelists, musicians, and actors. These individuals and groups – in coordination with the mass political demonstrations of the 1983 Marche des Beurs, the 1984 Convergence, and the 1985 March for Civic Rights – constituted what would become known throughout France as 'the Beur Movement'.[45]

The Beur Movement reflected a growing assertiveness of a younger generation who came of political age in a *banlieue* context of increasing economic exclusion and racist violence. After the mid-1970s, the extreme right Front National had made a significant impact on the French political scene running on an explicitly anti-immigration platform. Racist attacks had increasingly targeted Franco-Maghribi youth, accompanied by numerous incidents of police brutality and a series of deportations of young Franco-Maghribis picked up by police on minor charges. In response, local youth organized into groups for self-protection or retribution, sometimes taking their anger out against the police or municipal structures in anti-police 'riots' that would periodically mark the next two decades. It was in this context of violence that Beur cultural activism emerged, as a protest movement attempting to harness the growing anger and despair of the *banlieue* youth into political change.[46] And, for this reason, the Mitterrand government adopted the Beur activists as privileged cultural mediators, awarding them civil service positions and funding their associations.

In general, the Beur Movement, in its various actions and productions throughout the 1980s, emphasized the 'second generation' of young Franco-Maghribis as a particular, localized, multicultural political subject distinct from their North African forebears or French neighbors. In publications like *La Beur Génération*,[47] Beur activists and writers celebrated the arrival of a new 'hybrid' (*métis*) population in France, endowed with their own politicians, academics, and artists. Claiming to occupy, in the words of Beur novelist Leila Sebbar, a subject position 'between Algeria and France',[48] Beurs thus presented themselves as the ultimate *bricoleurs*, combining multiple codes into their own and language and styles specific to their daily lives in the French *cités*. Cobbling their identity together from referents beyond the Mediterranean, some, like Nacer Kettane, president of the community station Radio Beur, saw themselves as the rejects of a globalizing world – 'mutants torn from the McDonald's couscous-steak-fries society'.[49] Others imagined the Beurs as the vanguard of a particular postcolonial space that linked North Africa and France via the media of American Beat authors and soap operas: 'From Santa Barbara to Tamanrasset by way of Dunkerque, Carthage and Marrakech, they will soon be speaking not of Greenwich Village, but of Beur Village, where the Ahmed Ben Kerouacs, Aïcha MacCullers and Abderrahman Burroughs will be sweeping away the fluff (*balaieront la pâte de guimauve*)'.[50] In highlighting this multicultural identity, Beur youth activists attempted to chart a 'third route' (*troisième voie*) of cultural autonomy between the French state's schemas of integration and the ongoing attempts by the Amicale and the UNJA to re-suture immigrant political life to the other side of the Mediterranean.[51]

Beur cultural producers, in underlining this diversity, occupied an ambivalent space between localism and cosmopolitanism. Novels written by Beur

authors, broadly inspired by the African-American fiction of James Baldwin and Richard Wright, sited their narratives in the mundane details of the authors' native housing projects, while employing dialogical techniques of code-switching and heteroglossia to portray Beur cultural in-betweenness as a universal predicament.[52] Likewise, Beur musical groups internalized the local hybrid acoustic environment they grew up with in the *banlieue*, where the 'funky hymns' of American R&B and soul – what contemporary Sufi spoken-word artist Abd Al Malik calls the public 'soundtrack' (*fond sonore*) of the *cités* – coexisted with their parents' preferred Algerian châabi, Moroccan gnawa, and Kabyle laments of 'exile' (*lghorba*) sung by immigrant musicians like Slimane Azem and the rising star Idir.[53] When they began to pick up their own instruments in the late-1970s, they brought these different harmonies and rhythms together into what journalist Paul Moreira, writing at the time, termed *rock métis* ('hybrid rock').[54]

Ethnomusicologist Barbara Lebrun has traced the emergence of rock métis to the breakup of *rock alternatif*, a post-punk, indie movement of younger rock musicians challenging the mainstream sound of yéyé privileged by major production labels and the national airwaves.[55] Like the earlier Left-leaning *chanson à texte* of Jacques Brel, George Brassens, and Leo Ferré[56] (later to be revived in the 1990s by groups like Pigalle and Têtes Raides playing *chanson neo-réaliste*) these new artists (including Carte de Séjour, Mounsi, Raïna Raï, Rockin' Babouches, and later Zebda) sought an authentic critique of consumerist bourgeois society that also spoke to the particular challenges of racism and marginalization they faced. Excluded from nightclubs and most performance venues by class and race discrimination, Beur artists and their audiences adopted a do-it-yourself aesthetic, playing on the street, in municipal youth clubs, or in the cellars and garages of their housing estates which they transformed into creative spaces for musical creation and listening pleasure. Increasingly, their audiences and reputations broadened with their public performances in cultural festivals and antiracist demonstrations, their increasing air-time on 'free radio' stations like Radio Beur (Paris) and Radio Gazelle (Marseille). By the late-1980s they had become commercialized, and were upheld by the state as exemplars of a troubled youth made good.

From the beginning, rock métis artists had been politically engaged. The Nanterre-based Mounsi – who merged Kabyle vocals with R&B, reggae, and punk musical influences – was one of the founders of the Rock Against Police (RAP) movement which organized rock concerts and political debates across the *banlieues*. Carte de Séjour – a Lyon-based group fronted by Rachid Taha that combined châabi and gnawa rhythmic and melodic features with punk vocalizations in Arabic – headlined a massive concert dedicated to of one of RAP's founding members Djamel who had been stabbed to death in his native Argenteuil.[57] Carte de Séjour joined forces with one of the founding Beur activist groups, Zaâma d'Banlieue, to provide musical accompaniment to the

major Beur demonstrations across the early-1980s, thus becoming certainly the most visible Beur musical group. They were featured with Zaâma, Rockin' Babouches and several other Beur artists in the state-sponsored 'Children of Immigration' public exhibit at the Georges Pompidou center.[58] In 1986, they recorded an Arabic-inflected remake of 'Douce France' (Sweet France), the 1943 nationalist chanson production by Charles Trenet, which they wrote as a direct response to proposed revisions to the Nationality Code that would have eliminated the automatic naturalization of French-born children of immigrants. The song brought them national fame as it was played on mainstream airwaves and even in the French Parliament; they were taken up by the media as veritable spokesmen for the Beur generation.

Rachid Taha was never particularly taken with this public, political role; chanson was simply yet another global musical genre to play with and make his own, part of his artistic resistance to the exoticized representation of Franco-Maghribis.[59] In spite of his collaborations with Zaâma, he always kept his distance from political parties and mainstream antiracist organizations like SOS-Racisme.[60] 'We're not Zorro', he lamented, 'We can't get people out of shit simply with our music'.[61] In this regard, Lebrun contrasts Carte de Séjour with the outspoken Toulouse-based group, Zebda whose 2002 album, *Utopie d'Occase* (Second-Hand Utopia) actually features an African child dressed as Zorro on its cover.[62] Coming from a variety of ethno-racial backgrounds, including three Franco-Kabyle front-men, the group combines rock, reggae, and especially chanson with North African rhythms and politically engaged lyrics sung in heavily accented Toulousian French mixed with occasional Arabic and Berber terms. In one 1995 composition, 'Le Bruit et l'Odeur' (The Noise and the Smell), Zebda included an audio clip from the 1991 speech by then presidential candidate Jacques Chirac in which he complained of the 'noise and smell' and high birth rates of immigrants in public housing. Drawing on the proceeds of its disco hit 'Tombez la Chemise' (Take Off Your Shirt) which won best song at the 2000 French Grammy (Victoire de la Musique) awards, the group financed a grassroots development association, Tactikollectif, and a political party, Motivé-e-s, to run in the Toulouse municipal elections. Campaigning on a far-left, antiglobalization platform that emphasized local investment, racial equality, and civic participation in the *cités*, Motivé-e-s garnered a surprise 12.4 per cent of the vote in the first round of the elections before allying with other leftist parties in hopes of unseating Toulouse's rightist mayor. Inspired by their success, other 'alternative lists' were organized in Grenoble, Lille, Marseille, Rennes, and Strasbourg, cities with significant housing projects and populations hailing from North Africa.

Transnational ghetto patrimony

Rock métis, like the Beur Movement as a whole, and indeed youth protest movements in general, thus ran a difficult gauntlet between cultural

autonomy and state cooptation, between aesthetic freedom and political engagement, between local authenticity and cosmopolitan vision. While Rachid Taha (as a solo artist) and Zebda continued to produce music, most Beur musical groups of the early 1980s suffered the same fate as the Beur Movement as a whole: a loss of local support from the younger generation of *banlieue* youth who accused them of selling out for personal gain without producing any tangible, material changes for local populations – of becoming, in other words, a *beurgeoisie*.[63] Rock métis certainly provided an appropriate soundtrack to the de facto multicultural life in the *cités*, with the strategic musical transnationalism both reflecting and serving as a space for reflection on the everyday cultural transnationalism that the younger generation of Franco-Maghribis in the 1980s were learning to negotiate. By the 1990s, however, it no longer quite captured the increasingly precarious position that many Franco-Maghribis and their families found themselves in, and new musical genres, including different expressions of hip hop emerging from across the Atlantic, were better able to sonically capture the sense of blocked youth aspirations.

Indeed, by the 1990s, the deindustrialization of the *banlieues* had produced dramatic effects for the younger generation of multiracial inhabitants. Youth unemployment reached figures above 30 per cent, and as high as 85 per cent for certain housing projects.[64] Young residents often found themselves blocked by a public education system that tracked many of immigrant background into increasingly irrelevant vocational degrees, while their very residence in the *banlieues* saw them stigmatized by potential employers. Though often proximate to urban centers, the context of physical and economic dilapidation was accompanied by a generalized sense of isolation and distress (*galère*) among many younger residents.[65] This led on occasion to anti-police revolts, eventually culminating in the November 2005 unrest.[66] Such violence augmented moral panics around youth delinquency and a growing 'temptation of jihad' among *banlieue* youth.[67] It prompted simultaneous government investment in youth after-school programs and summer camps, as well as more expansive local policing and monitoring efforts. These policing measures included the criminalization of many everyday youth practices (such as hanging out in the entryways or basements of public housing buildings), as well as the quotidian harassment of young cité residents in 'random' identity checks and searches.[68]

The challenge for young *banlieue* residents at the century's end was to construct meaningful, flourishing lives under such conditions of police harassment, state disinvestment, and economic privation. In part this involved the development of a healthy informal economy and network of cultural associations for the provision of employment, after-school tutoring, and legal advice, as well as goods and services not otherwise locally available or affordable. Moreover, young *banlieue* residents worked to appropriate and domesticate the housing projects and transform them into spaces for

human freedom and self-expression. They converted the negative spaces of modernist architecture – cellars, garages, concrete courtyards, and so on – into places of both work and leisure, marking them with graffiti and tags, creatively destroying them with 'bombs' of spray paint. They embellished the discordant *cité* soundscape of traffic, car alarms, construction, and vocal arguments with recorded or improvised musical forms of different genres played from portable stereos for small groups of listeners or, on occasion, like in the scene from *La Haine*, blasted from apartment windows for all to hear.

Hip hop in particular proved to be a salient musical form for particularly young men – as both producers and listeners – to comment on life in the *cités* and re-spatialize the *banlieue* as a site for collective action and individual fulfillment.[69] To a certain extent, the French state contributed to the development of the French hip-hop industry through quotas on radio air-play promoting Francophone musical production, as part of a process by which government ministries have tried to appropriate rap as an authentically French musical form, as a direct descendent of chanson.[70] Likewise, record labels explicitly engaged in the commodification of images of violence and sentiments of 'hate' for their own profit, scouring the *cités* for new, risqué youth acts.[71] Nonetheless, beginning in the 1990s hip-hop artists and their young listeners came to constitute a counterpublic for commentary and critique on postcolonial France.[72] Drawing on a 'ghettocentric' imaginary of local *cité* belonging, via images largely appropriated from African-American popular culture, these 1990s artists ambivalently projected micro-local identity and a transnational solidarity across 'ghetto' spaces that stretched from the French urban periphery to Algiers, Casablanca, Kingston, Rio de Janeiro, and the south Bronx.[73] From this ghettocentric subject position that strategically invoked transnational solidarity beyond the specificity of ethnic origins, Franco-Maghribi rappers joined other rappers of diverse backgrounds in a vehement denunciation of conditions of social and economic exclusion in the *banlieue* housing projects while simultaneously invoking an 'underground connection' to a far-flung hip-hop generation similarly suffering under the conditions of late capitalism – increasingly through the vocabulary and ethic of Islam.[74]

Such musical invocations of Islamic humanism have taken on a number of forms, from generalized moral exhortations deriving from artists' internalization of North African Sunni Maliki beliefs and practices, to explicitly Sufi teachings invoked by Butshishiyya-Qadiriyya converts like Abd Al Malik or Kéry James, to the hybridized hardcore rhetoric of Médine who equates Malcolm X and Afghan Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud as exemplary martyrs. In every case, such musical forms, while clearly sited in *banlieue* France, project ghetto belonging as an entry point into a global future led by the younger generation. French hip-hop artists from the 1990s supplemented the explicit fraternity they invoked with African-American

activism and ghetto life with a revalorization of (North and sub-Saharan) Africa through a language of maternity, as their 'motherland' (or *terre-mère*). French rappers like K-Mel of the Marseille-based IAM linked such Afrocentric imagery to the language, symbolics, and stylistics of Rastafarianism, allegorizing France as 'Babylon' and singing of the enduring effects of African colonial racism and violence, and performing duets with raï singers like Cheb Mami.[75] Franco-Maghribi rappers have similarly worked productively with Kabyle folksingers like Idir, and various rock métis artists like Rachid Taha have incorporated hip hop sounds into their compositions like 'Arab Rap'. Such collaborations draw on the youthful energies and critiques embedded in rap, reggae, raï, and punk music to elaborate a generational consciousness that conjoins local spatial belonging with transnational ghetto patrimony – outlining what one might, invoking Gilroy, call a 'Black Mediterranean', wherein 'blackness' comes to index a cultural condition rather than a racialized somatic quality.[76]

Conclusion

The three Franco-Maghribi youth music movements discussed in this chapter indicate a complex field of strategic transnationalism in which different ideological orientations toward the everyday localism and cosmopolitanism that coexist on both sides of the Mediterranean remain in productive tension. On the one hand, the artists of new kabyle folksong, rock métis, and French hip hop invoke specific imagined localities – be it a nostalgic Kabyle village or a gritty *banlieue* housing project – and, with their audiences, draw from such spaces cultural authenticity, moral authority, and political engagement. On the other hand, they connect these localized forms of belonging to transnational struggles for civic rights and cultural expression, to worldwide efforts to ensure human dignity against the structural inequalities reproduced by global capitalism. Whatever their particular ethnic background or musical style, they engage in collaborations with a diverse array of artists and political actors and seek to connect with audiences who may share neither language nor particular references. At the same time, these are ultimately musicians committed to artistic innovation and freedom; their ability to gain a livelihood and connect to far-flung audiences depend upon the commoditization of their musical talent and its commercialization by the transnational music industry. And such circuits similarly bring the artists into close relationship with state actors who seek to utilize musical publics to manage national civic relations.[77]

What makes these strategic dilemmas significant for understanding the history of youth in the twentieth century is precisely the ways that they parallel quotidian negotiations of sameness and difference, of proximity and distance, that young Franco-Maghribis on both sides of the Mediterranean were forced to confront. These young men and women have

lived a condition of everyday transnationalism whereby they are simultaneously host and guest in France, living in the only home they have ever known while being considered by both parents and the state as perpetually (x-generation) 'immigrants' exiled from their true homeland.[78] Confronting this liminal betwixt-and-betweenness, this both-and and neither-nor existence, involved decades of personal and collective reflection, often in artistic form. The musical genres discussed here provided precisely the public soundtrack for such struggles and aspirations, broadcasting intimate creative energies to a wider audience and providing a rubric through which individual listeners could reflect on their own lived experiences as part of a broader structure of collective engagement. The result was arguably a counterculture of postcoloniality that developed across the western Mediterranean and beyond.

Notes

1. Cut Killer was born Anouar Hajoui to Moroccan parents. NTM's two rappers – Kool Shen (Bruno Lopes) of Portuguese descent and Joey Starr (Didier Morville) of Martinican origin – were convicted of disturbing the public order for a 1995 performance of 'Police'. For discussions of the 'NTM Affair', see D. L. Looseley (2003) *Popular Music in Contemporary France: Authenticity, Politics, Debate* (Oxford: Berg), pp. 56–7; A. Prévos (1998) 'Hip Hop, Rap, and Repression in France and the U.S.', *Popular Music and Society*, 22 (2), 67–84; P. A. Silverstein (2002) '"Why Are We Waiting to Start the Fire?": French Gangsta Rap and the Critique of State Capitalism' in A-P. Durand (ed.) *Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the Francophone World* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press), pp. 45–67; C. Tshimanga (2009) 'Let the Music Play: The African Diaspora, Popular Culture, and National Identity in Contemporary France' in C. Tshimanga et al. (eds) *Frenchness and the African Diaspora: Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). For a full analysis of *La Haine*, see G. Vincendeau (2005) *La Haine* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press).
2. See S. Bouamama (2009) *Les Classes et quartiers populaires: Paupérisation, ethnicisation, et discrimination* (Paris: Editions du Cygne); F. Dubet and D. Lapeyronnie (1993) *Les Quartiers d'exil* (Paris: Seuil); P. Duret (1996) *Anthropologie de la fraternité dans les cités* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France); V. Le Goaziou and L. Mucchielli (eds) (2006) *Quand les banlieues brûlent…Retour sur les émeutes de novembre 2005* (Paris: La Découverte); D. Lepoutre (1997) *Coeur de banlieue: codes, rites et langage* (Paris: O. Jacob); P. A. Silverstein (2008) 'Thin Lines on the Pavement: The Racialization and Spatialization of Violence in Postcolonial (Sub) Urban France' in M. Rieker and K. A. Ali (eds) *Gendering Urban Space in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 169–206; L. Wacquant (2008) *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality* (Cambridge: Polity); C. Wihtol de Wenden and Z. Daoud (eds) *Panoramiques: Banlieues…Intégration ou explosion?* (Paris: Seuil); C. Warne (2006) 'Music, Youth and Moral Panic in France, 1960 to the Present', *Historia Actual Online*, 11, 51–64.
3. P. Gilroy (1994) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 1–5.

4. For a more elaborated discussion of these scalar dilemmas, in the context of the Berber cultural movement, see P. A. Silverstein (2013) 'The Pitfalls of Transnational Consciousness: Amazigh Activism as a Scalar Dilemma', *Journal of North African Studies*, 18 (5), 768–78.
5. C. Coe et al. (eds) (2011) *Everyday Ruptures: Children, Youth and Migration in Global Perspective* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press), p. 5. The literature on transnationalism and migration is vast. This chapter is in particular dialogue with formulations by A. Appadurai (1996) *Modernity at Large* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); L. Basch et al. (1993) *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (New York: Routledge); N. G. Schiller and G. Fouron (2001) *Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home* (Durham: Duke University Press); P. Levitt (2001) *The Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press); M. P. Smith and L. E. Guarnizo (1998) *Transnationalism from Below* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction).
6. A. Sayad (1977) 'Les trois 'âges' de l'émigration algéreienne en France', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 15, 59–79.
7. See M. Gordon (1964) *Assimilation in American Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); A. Portes and R. G. Rumbaut (2001) *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
8. Cole et al., *Everyday Ruptures*; N. Foner (2009) *Across Generations: Immigrant Families in America* (New York: New York University Press); H. Goulbourne et al. (2010) *Transnational Families: Ethnicities, Identities and Social Capital* (New York: Routledge).
9. For a parallel study, see J. M. Hess (2011) '"For Tibet": Youth, Hip-Hop and Transforming the Tibetan Global Imaginary', in Cole et al., *Everyday Ruptures*, pp. 39–62.
10. A. L. Epstein (1958) *Politics in an African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press); M. Gluckman (1961) 'Anthropological Problems Arising from the African Industrial Revolution' in A. Southall (ed.) *Social Change in Modern Africa* (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 67–82; J. C. Mitchell (1956) *The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
11. J. Ferguson (1992) 'The Country and the City on the Copperbelt', *Cultural Anthropology*, 7 (1), 80–92.
12. T. Shepard (2006) *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
13. J. McDougall (2006) *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
14. B. Stora (1991) *La Gangrène et l'oubli. La Mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte).
15. M. Bennabi (1948) *Les Conditions de la renaissance. Problèmes d'une civilisation* (Algiers: Mosquée des Etudiants de l'Université d'Alger); M. S. Benyahia (1970) 'Les mutations psycholoqiques dans la révolution algérienne', *Révolution Africaine*, 316, 26.
16. Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist working in wartime Algeria, emphasized this hybridized cultural complexity of what Georges Balandier famously called 'the colonial situation' in order to argue against the Manichean revolutionary writings of Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. P. Bourdieu (1962) *The Algerians* (Boston: Beacon Press); G. Balandier (1951) 'La situation coloniale: approche

théorique', *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 11, 44–79. See J. Le Sueur (2005) *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).

17. Upon independence, the FLN established a Ministry of Youth and Sports in large part to promote the 'mobility of youth and their education in citizenship'. Ministère des Sports (2013), http://www.mjs.dz/fr/ministere/missions-et-attributions.html, date accessed 22 July 2013.
18. K. Rarrbo (1995) *L'Algérie et sa jeunesse. Marginalisations sociales et désarroi culturel* (Paris: Harmattan).
19. On the political economic history of late twentieth-century Algeria, see R. Malley (1996) *The Call from Algeria. Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press); L. Martinez (2000) *The Algerian Civil War: 1990–1998* (New York: Columbia University Press); W. B. Quandt (1998) *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington: Brookings Institute Press); J. Ruedy (1992) *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); H. Roberts (2003) *The Battlefield: Algeria, 1988–2002* (London: Verso); B. Stora (2001) *Algeria, 1830–2000: A Short History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
20. Originally from outside of Oran, in Algiers raï competed with the local popular music of *châabi*, a sung genre on the *oud* (mandolin) combining classical elements from the Andalusian repertoire with Berber rhythms and jazz influences. For histories of raï and its internationalization, see B. Daoudi and H. Miliani (1996) *L'Aventure du raï* (Paris: Seuil); D. McMurray and T. Swedenburg (1991) 'Raï Tide Rising', *Middle East Report*, 169, 39–42; M. Virolle (1995) *La Chanson raï. De l'Algérie profonde à la scène internationale* (Paris: Karthala). For a more complex and nuanced reading of raï as a gendered and politicized social phenomenon, see M. Schade-Poulsen (1999) *Men and Popular Music in Algeria: The Social Significance of Raï* (Austin: University of Texas Press).
21. In 1994, Cheb Hasni was assassinated by forces of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
22. On the history of the Berber politics in Kabylia, see M. Ait-Kaki (2004) *De la Question berbère au dilemme kabyle à l'aube de XXIe siècle* (Paris: Harmattan); S. Chaker (1998) *Berbères aujourd'hui* (Paris: Harmattan); J. Goodman (2005) *Berber Culture on the World Stage* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); B. Maddy-Weitzman (2011) *The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States* (Austin: University of Texas Press); Roberts, *Battlefield*; P. A. Silverstein (2003) 'Martyrs and Patriots: Ethnic, National, and Transnational Dimensions of Kabyle Politics', *Journal of North African Studies* 8 (1), 87–111.
23. Goodman, *Berber Culture*. On the history and corpus of Kabyle song, see also M. Mahfoufi (2002) *Chants kabyles de la guerre d'indépendance* (Paris: Séguier); T. Yacine (1989) *Aït Menguellet chante…* (Paris: La Découverte/Awal).
24. Goodman, *Berber Culture*, pp. 48–68.
25. Ibid., pp. 53–4.
26. J. Gross et al. (1997) 'Rai, Rap, and Ramadan Nights: Franco-Maghribi Cultural Identities' in J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds) *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 265.
27. The song was subsequently remixed in various Afro and dub styles for dance-halls. Khaled's other compositions, notably his 1992 'Didi', have likewise been remade in multiple genres and languages, from Russian to Turkish to Hindi and Urdu.

28. For histories of North African immigration in France, see K. Dirèche-Slimani (1997) *Histoire de l'émigration kabyle en France au XXe* siècle (Paris: Harmattan); M. Khellil (1979) *L'Exil kabyle* (Paris: Harmattan); C. Liauzu (1996) *Histoire des migrations en méditerrané occidentale* (Brussels: Complexe); A. Sayad and A. Gillette (1984) *L'Immigration algérienne en France* (Paris: Maspero); A. Sayad (1999) *The Suffering of the Immigrant* (Cambridge: Polity); P. A. Silverstein (2004) *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); A. Zehraoui (1994) *L'Immigration: De l'homme seul à la famille* (Paris: CIEMI/Harmattan).
29. After World War II, Algerian Muslims were granted formal citizenship, though with limited travel/work rights in the metropole and a separate mechanism of political representation. See Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*.
30. A. Lyons (2013) *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 4.
31. L. Talha (1989) *Le Salariat immigré dans la crise* (Paris: Editions du CNRS).
32. See K. Ross (1996) *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press).
33. On the politics of the *amicales*, see R. Aissaoui (2009) *Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). On the role of such overseas organizations in managing immigrant religious life, see N. Davidson (2012) *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); J. Laurence (2012) *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
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35. Lyons, *Civilizing Mission*, p. 2.
36. Wihtol de Wenden and Daoud, *Banlieues*.
37. Warne, 'Music, Youth, and Moral Panic'.
38. E. Drott (2011) *Music and the Elusive Revolution: Cultural Politics and Political Culture in France, 1968–1981* (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 111–54.
39. Drott, *Music and the Elusive Revolution*, p. 181.
40. Looseley, *Popular Music*, pp. 131–49.
41. Drott, *Music and the Elusive Revolution*, p. 267.
42. H. Giordan (1982) *Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence. Rapport présenté à Jack Lang, ministre de la Culture* (Paris: La Documentation Française), p. 7.
43. P. Socialiste (1981) *La France au pluriel* (Paris: Editions Entente), p. 10.
44. The term 'Beur' is a street slang syllabic inversion (*verlan*) of 'Arabe', used by young men and women of North African heritage, later appropriated by activists and journalists.
45. For histories of the Beur Movement, see S. Bouamama et al. (1994) *Contribution à la mémoire des banlieues* (Paris: Editions du Volga); A. Boubeker and M. H. Abdallah (1993) *Douce France. La Saga du mouvement Beur* (Paris: Im'media); R. Derderian (2004) *North Africans in Contemporary France: Becoming Visible* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); A. Hajjat (2013) *La Marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme* (Paris: Amsterdam); A. G. Hargreaves (1995) *Immigration, "Race", and Ethnicity in Contemporary France* (New York: Routledge); Silverstein, *Algeria in France*.

46. Silverstein, 'Thin Lines on the Pavement'.
47. F. Aïchoune (ed.) (1985) *La Beur Génération* (Paris: Sans Frontière/Arcantère).
48. Cited in K. Basfao and J-R. Henry (1991) 'Le Maghreb et l'Europe. Que faire de la Méditerranée?' *Vingtième Siècle*, 32, 51.
49. N. Kettane (1986) *Droit de réponse à la démocratie française* (Paris: La Découverte), p. 19.
50. M. Ammi (1985) 'Paroles de Beurs' in F. Aïchoune (ed.) *La Beur Génération* (Paris: Sans Frontière/Arcantère), p. 90. The formulation inverts Charles De Gaulle's famous defense of an imperial France 'from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset'.
51. Bouamama et al., *Contribution*, p. 99.
52. See A. G. Hargreaves (1997) *Immigration and Identity in Beur Fiction*: *Voices from the North African Community in France*, 2nd edn (New York: Berg).
53. A. Al Malik (2004) *Qu'Allah bénisse la France!* (Paris: Albin Michel), p. 15.
54. P. Moreira (1987) *Rock métis en France* (Paris: Souffles).
55. B. Lebrun (2009) *Protest Music in France* (Farnham: Ashgate).
56. Looseley, *Popular Music*, pp. 63–86; C. Tinker (2005) *Georges Brassens and Jacques Brel: Personal and Social Narratives in Post-war Chanson* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press).
57. Moreira, *Rock métis*, p. 61.
58. CCI/Centre Georges Pompidou (1984) *Enfants d'immigrés maghrébins* (Paris: Centre de Création Industrielle).
59. In an interview with Moreira, Taha implies that The Clash's exoticizing punk classic, 'Rock the Casbah', was inspired musically by Carte de Séjour's *Rhorhomanie* album they had sent The Clash three months previously. In 2004, Taha reappropriated and re-Arabized the song as 'Rock el Casbah', which he later sang on several occasions as a live duet with Clash singer Mick Jones. Moreira, *Rock métis*, p. 32.
60. Lebrun, *Protest Music*, p. 82.
61. Cited in Moreira, *Rock métis*, p. 39.
62. Lebrun, *Protest Music*, pp. 77–102. Zebda's name is a trans-idiomatic pun, with *zebda* being the Arabic word for butter, in French *beurre*, a homonym for Beur. See also D. Marx-Scouras (2005) *La France de Zebda: 1981–2004* (Paris: Autrement).
63. C. Wihtol de Wenden and R. Leveau (2001) *La Beurgeoisie: Les Trois âges de la vie associative issue de l'immigration* (Paris: Editions du CNRS).
64. Wihtol de Wenden and Daoud, *Banlieues*, p. 75.
65. Bouamama, *Les Classes*; Dubet and Lapeyronnie, *Les Quartiers d'exil*; Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts*.
66. Le Gouaziou and Mucchielli, *Quand les banlieues brûlent*; Silverstein, 'Thin Lines'.
67. D. Pujadas and A. Salam (1995) *La Tentation du Djihad* (Paris: J.C. Lattès); E. Brenner (2002) *Les Territoires perdus de la République* (Paris: Mille et Une Nuits).
68. D. Fassin (2011) *La Force de l'ordre: une anthropologie de la police des quartiers* (Paris: Seuil); F. Jobard (2006) 'Police, justice et discriminations raciales' in D. Fassin and E. Fassin (eds) *De la Question sociale à la question raciale. Représenter la société française* (Paris: La Découverte), pp. 211–29; M. Mohammed and L. Mucchielli (2006) 'La police dans les "quartiers sensibles": Un profond malaise' in Le Gouaziou and Mucchielli (eds) *Quand les banlieues brûlent*, pp. 98–119.
69. For discussions of the history and politics of hip hop/rap in France, see O. Cachin (1996) *L'offensive rap* (Paris: Gallimard); S. Cannon (1997) 'Paname City Rapping: B-Boys in the *banlieues* and beyond' in A. G. Hargreaves and M. McKinney (eds)

Post-colonial Cultures in France (London: Routledge); A-P. Durand (ed.) (2002) *Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the Francophone World* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press); J. Gross et al., 'Rai, Rap, and Ramadan Nights'; A. Prévos (1998) 'Hip Hop, Rap, and Repression in France and the U.S.', *Popular Music and Society*, 22 (2), 67–84. This section draws from my longer discussion of 'ghetto patrimony' in P. A. Silverstein (2012) 'Le patrimoine du ghetto. Rap et racialisation de la violence dans les banlieues françaises' in J. Cohen et al., *L'Atlantique multiracial. Discours, politiques, dénis* (Paris: Karthala), pp. 95–118.

70. Looseley, *Popular Music*, pp. 158–9, 206.
71. Silverstein, 'Why Are We Waiting'.
72. For 'counterpublics' as a parallel public sphere of debate and agency, mediated through voice and sound, see M. Warner (2002) *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York: Zone Books); in application to Islamic contexts, C. Hirschkind (2006) *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics* (New York: Columbia University Press).
73. The term 'ghettocentricity' comes from R. D. G. Kelley (1996) 'Kickin' Reality, Kickin' Ballistics: Gangsta Rap and Postindustrial Los Angeles' in W. E. Perkins (ed.) *Droppin' Science: Critical Essays on Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). In using this rubric, I am echoing French rap artists' own deployment of a language of 'ghettos', as explicitly appropriated from the African-American hip-hop lexicon. This is not to imply that the French cités and American inner cities are sociological equivalents. See Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts*.
74. H. Aidi (2014) *Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture* (New York: Random House).
75. Gross et al., 'Rai, Rap and Ramadan Nights'.
76. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*.
77. See the discussion of 'hip-hop diplomacy' in Aidi, *Rebel Music*, pp. 221–57.
78. Sayad, *Suffering*, pp. 278–93.

Afterword

Akira Iriye

The essays in this book demonstrate that youth is an excellent theme in terms of which to explore transnational history, in particular the relationship between national and transnational phenomena.

Aging, of course, is a process that is found in all societies. Regardless of where one is born, one reaches adulthood, becomes middle-aged, then joins people of old age, and eventually passes away. Few phenomena are as ubiquitous as the process of aging. And yet, as the contributors to this volume reveal, age is also a locally shaped process. Each country, each society, and even each family would seem to have its own idea of how to cope with people of different age categories. Aging is thus a good framework to utilize from which we may learn how transnational, national, and personal phenomena interact.

The young men and women described in the preceding chapters come from various parts of the world: Asia, the Middle East, Europe, North and South America, and Africa. They all seem to share the idea that youth is a category that transcends national boundaries. To be young is to be transnational. Young men and women are eager to study, work, and travel abroad and, if they stay home, they are anxious to meet with foreign visitors. Youth in this sense is virtually interchangeable with travel. For many of them, especially in the West, travel has generally implied going abroad, thus making it a transnational activity.

At the same time, traveling is also a process of national discovery – or national regeneration as is the case with the 'transnational Jews' who contributed to the establishment of the state of Israel (Chapter 9). Within one's own country, one meets people from various segments of society and comes to a fresh understanding of the nation. The discovery can also be supranational, such as gaining the awareness of a 'real' Latin America through traveling (Chapter 7) or the opportunities offered by youth hostels in post-1945 France, Germany, and elsewhere for developing a sense of European identity (Chapter 6).

For the bulk of people in the world, travel opportunities may be limited, but they may still have a transnational experience vicariously, through

books, plays, and other forms of cultural entertainment. A striking example of this is the way in which Soviet youth took to Tarzan movies and through them developed an idea of cultural developments elsewhere (Chapter 10). The chapter notes that even in a totalitarian society there are ways for young people to gain a sense of what goes on among their counterparts elsewhere. Through Tarzan movies, the youth on both sides of the 'iron curtain' gained a sense of shared cultural identity. Rural Japanese youth in the 1930s, to cite another example, embraced 'fascist agrarianism', but this came after a decade in which they had sought to develop 'rural modernity' in line with what they believed to be a global trend (Chapter 1). What we have here, then, is a complex interplay between the national and the transnational.

As several contributors note, young men and women are often eager to get to know (and sometimes to reform) their own societies through domestic traveling and in the process to establish contact with similarly motivated people. Others seek to contribute to international understanding through transnational activities. The story of young British and Soviet scientists meeting together in the 1930s is a good example (Chapter 3), and the activities by Mexican Boy Scouts in the 1960s another (Chapter 2). These people identified themselves in terms of their youth, a transnational category, but they retained their respective national identities.

Perhaps the key here is the fluidity of identities. It is not surprising that some contributors stress hybridity as a main theme. After all, people of all age categories are hybrid in the sense of being both national and transnational, and youth may lend itself to such hybridization because of their traveling. This is a phenomenon that may be said to have become notable during 'the global sixties', a decade that is the focus of attention in some chapters. In those years (from the late 1950s to the early 1970s) young people turned their attention to reforming their societies, but 'national political mobilization' went hand in hand with a transnational vision (Chapter 8). Precisely for this reason, as Chapter 11 indicates, some states – for example, China, France, and Yugoslavia – developed a negative perception of youth. The picture becomes even more complicated when we bring into consideration colonial youth, those men and women who do not have nations that they can legitimately call their own (Chapter 5). For many of them, a transnational experience is tantamount to an imperial experience, involving the issue of colonial liberation as an essential part of their 'hybrid' existence.

The world has never been the same, and one may suggest that those who came after the 1960s generation have, if anything, been even more drawn to transnational agendas – democratization, human rights, environmentalism, and so on. It may be expected that, even as forces of nationalism remain as a strong influence among young people everywhere, and even while such traditionally universal themes like idealism and alienation may continue to

characterize young people, the networks being established by global circulations of people, goods, and ideas would ensure that, in the words of one of the contributors to this book, 'everyday and strategic transnational encounters across the divides of race, class, space, religion, gender, and generation' will continue, thus making for a world of ever greater degrees of hybridity – and transnationality.

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