

The Imperialism of French Decolonisation

Ryo Ikeda

French Policy and the Anglo-American
Response in Tunisia and Morocco



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
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**French Policy and the Anglo-American
Response in Tunisia and Morocco**

Ryo Ikeda

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List of Abbreviations

CARAN	Centre d'Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales
CDF	Central Decimal File
CSTT	Commandement Supérieur des Troupes de Tunisie
DDEL	Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire
EDC	European Defence Community
FO	Foreign Office (UK)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of United States
GA	UN General Assembly
LA	Latin America
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (France, Quai d'Orsay)
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (US)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council (US)
PDI	Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance
PTT	Poste Télégraphe et Télécommunication
SC	UN Security Council
SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
TNA	The National Archives (UK)
UDSR	Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance
UGSCM	Union Générale des Syndicats Confédérés du Maroc
UGTT	Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens
UN	United Nations
YUN	Yearbook of the United Nations

Introduction

Prior to the outbreak of World War II a limited number of sovereign and independent states existed in Asia and Africa; most of the territories in those regions were ruled by European colonial powers. By contrast, the contemporary world is dominated by independent countries as a result of decolonisation. Two features about the way decolonisation proceeded were predominant: the first was its rapidity, the second its relative smoothness in the sense that it did not result in major conflicts between the United States and Europe, albeit, of course, with important exceptions. As for the first, shortly after the end of the war, it was expected by the British government that only a few territories would be independent within a generation.¹ With regard to French overseas territories, political autonomy, let alone independence, was ruled out. Yet by the 1960s, almost all British and French former dependencies were independent, and by the 1970s, Portugal, a colonial power that had resisted the decolonisation trend until the last, agreed to dissolve its colonial empire. What was the starting point of this rapid process and how can this rapidity be explained?

Second, one can point out that the colonial powers agreed to international pressure on decolonisation with surprising calmness in the sense that many cases did not produce visible friction between them and the United States. Major exceptions were, above all, the Suez Crisis and the Indochinese and Algerian wars, but most colonial territories in sub-Saharan Africa became independent without accompanying military conflicts and therefore without international tension. In the Cold War era, European colonial powers in general were faced with a rising tide of anti-colonial nationalism, and the United States was its most vocal champion. This posed a dilemma for the colonial powers, as they were pressured into pursuing decolonisation by the United States while

belonging to the Western Alliance. Indeed, decolonisation was one of the major issues to cause discord among the Western powers until the 1960s, but this discord did not culminate in the breakdown of the Alliance. All the colonial powers chose to recognise the independence of their colonies and to remain within the Alliance. Decolonisation did proceed in close connection with intra-Alliance politics, and if decolonisation had caused violent conflicts between the metropole and its colonies more fervently, political relations between the United States and the colonial powers would have been strained accordingly, as was in fact the case with the Algerian War. But why, in most other cases, was this process smooth, to the extent that US-colonial power frictions did not come out in the open?

This book tries to address these questions by analysing French decolonisation policy towards Tunisia and Morocco although, of course, wide-ranging questions of this kind cannot be fully treated within a single book. Both countries were French protectorates in North Africa and obtained independence in March 1956. France dealt with them as sister countries because of their geographical proximity and ethnic and religious similarities; in fact, nationalist movements in each country developed hand in hand. French policy towards the two countries offers interesting insights, not least because Tunisia marked a clear watershed of French decolonisation policy and also because Morocco was the first case whereby a colonial power had recognised the independence of its dependent territory in the post-World War II era.² Furthermore, unlike Britain, France, in the wake of the war, had ruled out recognition of any political autonomy in its dependencies, let alone popular sovereignty or future independence. It turned, however, to decolonisation in part as a result of pressure from the United States whose concern was the Cold War, so the analysis of the French *volte-face* offers a valuable clue about interactions between decolonisation and the Cold War. In particular, this book will focus on France's two major decisions: the recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy in July 1954 and that of Moroccan independence in November 1955.

So far, existent research has contended that decolonisation was caused mainly by three elements. According to Springhall, they were: first, nationalist explanations which emphasise that indigenous upheavals set the pace for decolonisation; second, international explanations which illustrate that the United States and the USSR were hostile to old-style imperialism; third, metropolitan explanations which argue that empire became burdensome and served no strategic or economic purpose for the mother country.³ If, as Hyam points out, the third element means

'a collapse of morale' to rule on behalf of metropolitan opinion, this would be the weakest.⁴ However, economic considerations merit attention because the establishment of the welfare state after World War II in Europe had aroused expectations among African subjects. As Cooper analysed in his weighty tome, this would entail a heavy economic burden on the colonial authorities who would finally be led to devolving power to the colonised peoples.⁵

This research agrees that these forces, to varying extents, functioned in favour of decolonisation. Yet three reservations are required: the first was that these factors alone do not fully explain the motivations behind, and timing of, the French major decisions. This is because, as will be shown, it was not necessarily when pressure from the local, international, or metropolitan side increased that France made substantive concessions. The second reservation is that nationalist or international requests for the independence of dependent territories were not strong at least until around the mid-1950s, and that they were rather content that independence was a future goal. Therefore, argues this research, the French motivations behind Tunisian internal autonomy can be explained by the three above-mentioned elements while that behind Moroccan independence needed a new explanation. It will be argued that contrary to a commonly-held view it was rather Moroccan independence that strengthened international opinion in favour of that of other dependencies in the post-World War II era, not vice versa. Thirdly, aspirations for economic development were also powerful in Tunisia and Morocco, but the French making concessions in the protectorates were not primarily motivated to avert the burdens. Rather, Moroccan independence was recognised because otherwise it would have proclaimed unilateral independence without French consent. This unexpected turnaround was caused by the opening of a Russian economic offensive, as will be revealed below.

In the following, I will mention this book's uniqueness by explaining in detail the problems surrounding the French decision on Tunisian internal autonomy and Moroccan independence. Although France's two decisions have not attracted much scholarly attention, a number of points can be raised as to the causes and impact in the colonial, imperial, and international contexts of these two events.

With regard to the Tunisian issue, the first point is concerned with the country's newly gained status. France recognised its internal autonomy through the Carthage Declaration in July 1954, but Tunisia had hitherto enjoyed certain political autonomy under the protectorate regime ruled by the Bey, the local sovereign. There was little wonder that this change

had been dismissed as trivial, because both regimes lacked the right to foreign policy. However, this research will argue that this decision admitted the internal exercise of Tunisian popular sovereignty which France had denied. In fact, the principle that it had so far deployed in all its dependencies was assimilation or, as its modified version, association, the contents of whose concepts will be discussed in detail in background history. The book will analyse why the French turnaround occurred and will argue that the nationalists' attack against the Bey, not the French authorities, was crucial. The dichotomy of the nationalist movements against France does not offer an appropriate analytical framework.

The second point pertains to international pressure for decolonisation. The French colonial principle, either that of assimilation or association, was increasingly out-of-date in the period that the book deals with. Instead, anti-colonialism was on the rise in the post-war era, and its origins can be traced back to the principle of self-determination that US President Woodrow Wilson had implicitly referred to in his Fourteen Points. His words, coupled with Vladimir Lenin's preceding announcement, captured the attention of a broad public in colonial territories worldwide and became the icon of a just international society.⁶ After the war, the newly independent Third World countries advocated self-determination at the United Nations and outside of it, and this constituted strong international pressure against colonialism. The nationalists made efforts to 'internationalise' the questions and the French attempt to prevent internationalisation ironically needed cooperation from their allies, albeit in a less conspicuous manner than in the Algerian case which Matthew Connelly analysed in his work.⁷ Yet, as will be shown below, international pressure on the independence of dependent territories was not powerful in the diplomatic arena until mid-1950s.

The American pressure posed the above-mentioned dilemma to the colonial powers, and Britain's solution to the dilemma lay in 'the imperialism of decolonization', to use the expression coined by Louis and Robinson: the gradual recognition of decolonisation and eventual independence of its colonies, and the maintenance of influence in their former colonies with US political and financial support thereafter. Britain's aim in part lay in preventing Soviet influence from intruding into their former colonies.⁸ This British practice itself constituted powerful pressure against French colonial policy. This book will, therefore, investigate how this pressure functioned and turned France towards self-determination.

Third, as implied above, the recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy or popular sovereignty meant the reversal of French colonial principle,

which was assimilation or association. This conversion initially was not apparent to international opinion, but proved true when France launched similar policy changes in other territories, including Morocco, from the autumn of 1954 onwards. The French efforts would culminate in the passage of the *Loi-cadre* or the Enabling Law in 1956 by the French National Assembly. Previous research tended to argue Indochinese affairs in mid-1950s marked a watershed in French decolonisation. This work, however, will make clear that the internal autonomy in French overseas territories that the *Loi-cadre* stipulated was not logically consistent with the new status that Vietnam gained as a result of the Indochinese War, but was similar to what the Carthage Declaration outlined. In this sense, Tunisian internal autonomy constituted a very significant turning point in post-war French colonial policy.

The fourth point relates to the coherence of the Western Alliance. Based on declassified governmental documents, recent research tends to shed light on Franco-US tension over decolonisation,⁹ and can be divided into two groups. The first one stresses that the United States, mainly at the UN, exerted diplomatic pressure on France and supported the nationalist movements. In this regard, these works have a tendency to explain why French influence declined. However, in reality, French influence did not disappear as a result of decolonisation. France would not have accepted American pressure or persuasion if it had been forced to withdraw completely from North Africa. In fact, the second group of works on Franco-American relations over this issue emphasise that the character of American pressure was more nuanced and actually the Americans wanted 'orderly decolonization'.¹⁰ Preferring the French presence to remain in their colonial territories, this argument continues, the United States assisted France in transferring power to the local people without causing trouble.¹¹

In this connection, Britain's role must be referred to, although this is an issue which very few existing works have highlighted.¹² The fact that the Americans posed pressure against the French either in the UN or outside warned the British of the danger of the Franco-American schism widening. The schism was growing as US pressure was so harsh that it aimed to deprive Paris of its initiative in North Africa, feared London. As a consequence, the British attempted to convince Washington of moderation towards the French, and sometimes the latter did listen to London's persuasion. As will be revealed later, the British concern to protect France from international pressure lay less in their own colonies than in the Western Alliance; their aim was to prevent France from withdrawing from NATO.

In contrast to the Tunisian case, Moroccan independence was accompanied by a number of paradoxes. First of all, Morocco lagged far behind several other dependencies in terms of political development and, as a result, preparations for independence. Its society was feudalistic in inland areas, and modernisation began only gradually under the protectorate regime. Modern political institutions had been arranged only insufficiently, and the first step towards the establishment of the internal autonomy regime had barely started when independence was decided upon. In a word, Tunisia was considered much more prepared for independence in this sense, but the granting of independence occurred in reverse order. Indeed, it was this reversal that provides a key to understand the remarkable characteristic of post-war independence, which, in essence, was different from the decolonisation which had been in progress.

Secondly, on the eve of the French decision, Moroccan political forces were so divided that there was no single group to which political power could be devolved. There were two large ethnic groups: the Arabs who mainly resided in city areas, and the Berbers in mountainous areas. There was a powerful feudalist group which consisted of Berber dignitaries, sometimes called the traditionalists, who were hostile to nationalist movements. Moreover, the nationalists themselves were seriously divided over how to proceed with state-building after independence, and with which foreign power's assistance. Existing research tends to assume that there was a single and dominant nationalist group that raised voice for independence before the mother country retreated, but this assumption fails to hold true in the Moroccan situation.

The third paradox is connected to British decolonisation policy. The prevailing notion is that Britain was much more flexible in colonial areas, and was less reluctant to recognise independence. The author does not disagree with this view, but would like to stress that the British became rather slow to recognise independence after the granting of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947 in accordance with Sir Stafford Cripps's offer in March 1942 that India would after the war have full dominion status or the option to secede from the Empire commonwealth.¹³ Certainly, Britain had committed itself to decolonisation in Africa before the end of World War II. After the war, through constitutional reforms, the British began to set up regimes in which local people were allowed to have a say,¹⁴ but their pace of reaching independence was by no means swift. The book will argue that the French recognition of the independence of Tunisia and Morocco significantly contributed to facilitating Britain's granting of independence to African colonies in

the post-World War II era, not vice versa. Unquestionably, the North African protectorates' independence also promoted that of France's own other dependencies, all the more so because some of them were more ready for independence.

The fourth paradox lies in international opinion at the time of the French decision. Contrary to a normal assumption that the international community was calling for the independence of colonised territories, this demand was never dominant in the mid-1950s. Even Arab countries, who were most sympathetic to the North African nationalist cause, did not request it, at least not in diplomatic arenas. What they wanted France to recognise in Tunisia and Morocco was not independence, but self-determination. Needless to say, it was deemed that self-determination would eventually lead to independence in the foreseeable future, but independence was not regarded as an immediate goal. This was the reason why the United States and the United Kingdom supported France as a result of its colonial policy change in Tunisia. Why, then, did the French decide on Moroccan independence in the absence of strong demand for independence by Moroccan or international opinion?

The novelties surrounding Moroccan independence suggest that a new political force worked to achieve it, and that this event was not a mere extension of the ongoing decolonisation which was already aiming at self-determination since the Wilsonian Moment. This present work will argue that this political force was an international one, and that the Soviet Union's launch of an economic offensive in 1955 offered a new possibility to dependent peoples. This was because, beyond the political support that the superpowers had given to those peoples, the military and economic assistance was supposed to provide fundamentals that enabled them to advance state-building even without the mother countries' help. Moroccan independence was one of its first signs. This book concurs with the view that it was a culmination of various political forces, either at local, international, or metropolitan levels, and of many other international events caused by those forces, such as the Indochinese War. But the Soviet's opening a new Cold War front, regardless of whether the Russians had intended it or not, fundamentally transformed the logic of decolonisation which had already been under way and aggregated other political forces towards the shaping of a new international society composed of sovereign states.

As the two countries are dealt with, the book is not organised in an entirely chronological fashion. However, political developments in each country will be explained chronologically and the order of the chapters is so arranged as to clarify the interaction between the two

countries' affairs. Each chapter marks a period in which certain international settings defined the outline of political developments in the two nations. Chapter 1 will describe the history after the establishment of protectorate systems in Tunisia and Morocco. France introduced reforms to modernise the two countries, not necessarily with efforts towards democratisation. The French Union, an organisation that was the basis of post-war French colonial policy, will also be explained.

Chapter 2 will examine the period from 1950 to February 1951. The UN General Assembly [hereafter UNGA or GA] resolution to recognise Libyan independence greatly advanced the nationalist demand to autonomy in Tunisia, and then in Morocco. In April 1950, Habib Bourguiba, the President of the Neo-Destour (the most influential nationalist party), called for Tunisia's sovereignty and independence thereafter. France responded that it would lead Tunisia to internal autonomy, but its real intention lay in denying it. The French longer-term purpose was the incorporation of the country into the French Union. The dialogues reached a settlement in February in 1951 when both sides agreed on minor organisational reforms of the Tunisian government. On the other hand, the demand of the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef (Mohammed V), for Moroccan independence aroused fierce opposition from el-Glaoui, a conservative dignitary in Marrakech, who favoured the French presence and called for the Sultan's deposition. The French, making use of this rivalry, tried to make him yield, but the latter kept refusing to condemn the Istiqlal, the nationalist party, to the end.

Chapter 3 will analyse the UN discussion on Morocco and its effects. France's high-handed attitude towards the Sultan ignited international criticism and the Arab countries brought the matter to the UN. France refused international debates on North African issues, as it claimed its own exclusive jurisdiction over Tunisia and Morocco. The United States, torn between the French and the Arabs, decided to abstain on whether the UN should take up the Moroccan question. This was indeed the first case that the United States had opposed in UN debates on colonial affairs, and the US hesitance led to the UNGA's inaction over Morocco. As for Tunisia, negotiations restarted in Paris in October 1951. However, the negotiations collapsed in December 1951, when France flatly rejected internal autonomy. Bitterly disappointed, the nationalists decided to put the problem to the UN where the Tunisians hoped Arab countries and the United States would support the nationalist cause.

The UN debates on Tunisia and Morocco in 1952 will be the topic of Chapter 4. At the UN, the French position remained that the North African problems were under their exclusive jurisdiction. Caught

midway between the French and the nationalists, the United States could not give support to either side. Yet, persuaded by the former, the United States once again abstained on whether the UN Security Council [hereafter SC or UNSC] should take up the Tunisian problem, and finally the UNSC refused to discuss the problem. Nonetheless, at the UNGA, considering the number of Arab-Asian member states, the United States tried to convince the French to accept UN competence to discuss the problem because it would soften the Arab attitude and enable the Western powers to control the situation in the UN. However, Britain's unwavering opposition to the UN's jurisdiction enabled France to oppose UN debate. As a result of the Anglo-French common front, the United States moderated its attitude and defeated the Arab plan to invite the nationalists' representative to the UN. Chapter 4 goes on to explain that the UNGA passed a resolution which encouraged France and Tunisia to continue bilateral negotiations for self-government without, however, specifying the content of self-government or with whom France should talk. Subsequently, the UNGA adopted a similar yet watered-down resolution on the Moroccan question.

Chapter 5 will focus on the period in which the UN debates in 1952 brought about an impasse to North African affairs. In December 1952, the Sultan rejected the French plan concerning the municipal assemblies because he believed that the nationalist setback that resulted from the UN resolution was temporary. Fearing that his support for the nationalists threatened to undermine traditional society, el-Glaoui intensified an anti-Sultan movement. Making use of pressure against Mohammed V, the French tried to force him to accept their national assembly plan. In August 1953, he was obliged to accept the plan but el-Glaoui mobilised his own and his fellow pashas' tribesmen to force France to decide on his deposition. Being afraid of deposition by el-Glaoui, the French deposed Mohammed V and agreed with the dignitaries on a new Sultan. Under his reign, France tried to implement the reform plan, but the nationalists reacted angrily and terrorism spread, not least in major cities. Contrary to the Sultan, the Bey, the Tunisian sovereign, accepted the French municipal plans because, seeing the result of the UN debate, he regarded the nationalists as powerless. Calm returned to Tunisian affairs because of France's cautious attitude, though the elections under the French plans were never welcomed by the indigenous people. However, the Bey's acceptance in March 1954 of the French plan with regard to a national assembly caused strong opposition from the nationalists, especially Bourguiba, and terrorist activities followed.

Chapter 6 will highlight why France recognised Tunisia's sovereignty and internal autonomy in July 1954 through the so-called Carthage Declaration, and will also examine the process of Franco-Tunisian negotiations thereafter to define the contents of internal autonomy. This chapter will argue that having been aimed at establishing a national assembly for which French settlers would also have a right to vote, the French plan in March 1954 was an outright challenge to the Tunisian people's sovereignty since it denied their right to self-determination. Bourguiba's condemnation of the Bey culminated in an irretrievable collapse of the latter's prestige and the paralysis of the protectorate regime. Aware its interests were in peril, France finally understood the importance of cooperation with the nationalists, and the Neo-Destour in particular, in ruling Tunisia. Franco-Tunisian talks for internal autonomy commenced soon after and were concluded in April 1955. In parallel with its new Tunisian policy, France started the reorganisation of the French Union. Its new strategy towards its colonies was based on the recognition of internal autonomy as opposed to the policy of assimilation or association that had hitherto been pursued.

Chapter 7 will concentrate on the process in which Mohammed V's restoration was decided upon. Following the Carthage Declaration, the French considered recognition of Moroccan sovereignty essential. Unlike in Tunisia, however, there was no single dominant political group with whom to collaborate in Moroccan rule. The serious divisions of Moroccan opinion made Paris hesitant to act. It was the US action that broke the stalemate. The US warning of August 1955 that it would vote for UN debates on Morocco finally pushed France to start the reform process which would introduce internal autonomy. The Americans were irritated by French *immobilisme* while seeing the flare-up of anti-colonial international opinion exemplified by the Bandung Conference in April 1955. France removed the incumbent Sultan in September 1955, and started preparations to set up an internally autonomous regime. However, the Moroccan situation went beyond French expectations. The chapter will then examine the significance of the arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt which promoted the friction of Moroccan political groups and even contributed to causing anti-French riots. In order to prevent a further radicalisation of nationalism, in October 1955 el-Glaoui accepted Mohammed V's restoration, to which France agreed.

Chapter 8 will analyse the motivation behind Paris's decision on the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, and also the Franco-Tunisian and Franco-Moroccan negotiations. Paradoxically, the lack of political unity, together with the rise of neutralist-oriented nationalism, necessitated

the French decision on Moroccan independence. Then the decision on Tunisia followed suit, as the French regarded the Tunisian demand as irresistible, considering the country had always been far ahead of Morocco in terms of political development. France concluded the agreements on independence first with Morocco, then with Tunisia in March 1956, and successfully left its influence in both countries. Unstable political conditions in Morocco allowed France to have a stronger say especially on foreign affairs than in Tunisia.

The dialogues after the recognition of independence, and the negotiations thereafter on economic assistance from foreign powers, constitutes the focus of Chapter 9. From the French viewpoint, the March 1956 agreements were merely concerned with the principle of independence, so details had to be fixed on how the two countries would exert a right to foreign policy as sovereign states. Yet, both countries regarded their sovereign status as a *fait accompli*, so the negotiations were sometimes stymied. Their attitudes were boosted by the Anglo-Americans, who welcomed early independence, albeit to different degrees. After all, France and Morocco reached agreements on foreign policy later in the year while France failed to have equivalent agreements with Tunisia. Nonetheless, to Tunisian and Moroccan disappointment, the United States confined itself to playing a complementary role in providing economic assistance, which forced the two countries to lean on France.

Some explanations of terminology would be useful before commencing the main argument. 'Decolonisation' is defined as measures intended eventually to terminate formal political control over colonial territories and to replace it by some new relationship.¹⁵ In the present work, as in others, this term will particularly refer to measures to devolve substantive power to the local people aspiring to form a political community of its own. The distinction between the terms 'internal autonomy', or '*autonomie interne*' in French, and 'self-government' is important. The French used '*autonomie interne*' in two ways, and both of them were crucially different from the Anglo-Saxon term 'self-government'. First, until July 1954, the French repeatedly stated that they intended to lead Tunisia and Morocco to '*autonomie interne*' but actually had no intention of giving them any kind of autonomy. Second, the internal autonomy to which the French started to commit themselves in Tunisia after July 1954 had much substance, but it still had no logical connection with future independence. In contrast, 'self-government' in British colonies always had the likelihood of leading to independence. In relation to this, French plans before July 1954 will sometimes be referred to as 'reform plans' in accordance with French insistence, although they were

in fact not aimed at introducing autonomy to local people and therefore it is very difficult to call those plans 'reform'. However, for the sake of convenience, the French plans prior to July 1954 will be referred to as such from time to time because other Western governments, including the US government, also called them reform plans. Shortly after the end of World War II, France refashioned its colonial empire and renamed its colonies 'overseas territories' in place of 'colonies'. However, this book will refer to 'French colonies' and 'French colonial policy' for the sake of convenience.

1

Tunisia and Morocco under French Protectorates

Tunisia became a French protectorate when the Treaty of Bardo was concluded on 12 May 1881. This treaty allowed France to control certain geographical areas under the guise of re-establishing order and protecting the Bey from internal opposition, and also allowed French diplomatic agents to protect Tunisian interests in foreign countries. Then the Convention of Marsa of 8 June 1883 gave France a right to intervene in Tunisia's domestic affairs. Now Tunisia was placed under the control of the French Resident-General. Morocco became a protectorate as a result of the conclusion of the Treaty of Fez on 30 March 1912, whereas the coast area along the Strait of Gibraltar was ceded to Spain with the exception of the Tangier zone in November 1912. The Treaty of Fez gave France the right to occupy certain parts of Morocco with the same pretext as in Tunisia, that is, the protection of the sovereign from internal opposition, and to hold actual reins of power while preserving the mask of indirect rule consisted of the Sultan and the Sharifian government.¹ The Treaty also provided that only the French Resident-General was capable of representing Morocco in foreign countries. Thus subject to the Resident-General's absolute power, the two countries lost almost all autonomy not only in external but also internal affairs. The Resident-Generals had strong powers to formulate specific plans, the outline of which was decided by Paris, and to make decisions on the methods by which to negotiate with local representatives. Tunisia and Morocco would henceforth absorb a great number of settlers from European countries,² but for the most part Tunisia remained an Arabic country and Morocco Arabic and Berber.³

Thus France made the two countries protectorates, and therefore local rulers and corresponding state machinery were retained. This fact resulted in several important consequences. First, France started

to commit itself to modernising them. Under the protectorate regimes, both countries were to be equipped with certain modern political institutions like the Grand Council in Tunisia and the Government Council in Morocco. Yet the real French aim was not only at wooing the locals' grievances but also at institutionalising the rights and interests of French settlers. Second, unlike Algeria, both countries did not become France's departments and preserved indigenous state machinery. The sovereigns of the two countries retained the right to sign the decrees, called *dahirs* in Morocco, which were submitted by the Resident-Generals. This was an important right, because in the post-World War II era it would enable both sovereigns to resist French attempts to impose projects on their countries. Third, a sense that they formed a community separate from France was developed, and therefore nationalist sentiments grew relatively easily in comparison to sub-Saharan territories where peoples had more aspirations to assimilation until the mid-1950s. Fourth, as a certain indigenous hierarchy remained, the French had fewer difficulties in finding a group or an individual to whom they would be able to transfer power in the future decolonisation process than in the Algerian case. This partly explains why the two countries' decolonisation process was not to be as violent as Algeria's.

After 1881, France moved into key positions at all levels of government in Tunisia while carefully maintaining a semblance of Tunisian rule but forcing the Tunisian prime minister to have a French adviser. The process of French infiltration continued as the commander of the French occupation forces became minister of war in the Tunisian government. In the provinces, caids, who were the heads of each tribe, held a semi-independent status, but a system of French civil controllers was established in 1884 who introduced central government supervision over the caids.⁴ Overall, the French protectorate met no serious opposition from the Tunisians.⁵

Undoubtedly encouraged by US President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918 which implicitly referred to national self-determination, the Destour party, or *le Parti Libéral Constitutionnel*, was established in Tunisia in February 1920. The party demanded the termination of the protectorate but did not exclude negotiations with France.⁶ In April 1922, Nanceur Bey called for a constitutional guarantee for the Tunisian people, but was forced to withdraw this request by the Resident-General.⁷ This event prompted the French authorities to react in two ways: firstly, France began to promote the emigration of French people to Tunisia, though so far Italian immigrants held a majority. Secondly, in July 1922 it was decided to establish the Grand Council at the national level and

the Prefectural Council (*le Conseil des Caïdat*) at local levels.⁸ This represented French concessions in the sense that now the Tunisians were allowed to voice their opinion in making decrees, but both types of assemblies were consultative in character, so indigenous people remained unable to affect decision-making substantively.

In March 1934 the Destour party broke up into the Neo-Destour, led by Habib Bourguiba, and the Vieux-Destour. The former recruited its members mostly from moderate intellectuals, while the latter did so from the religious bourgeoisie. Based on grass-roots mass movements, the former was inclined to seek gradual transition to greater Tunisian autonomy while safeguarding legitimate French interests. On the other hand, the Vieux tended to be radical, putting more emphasis on pan-Arab solidarity. Especially after World War II the Neo-Destour was inclined to seek independence through negotiations, whereas the Vieux-Destour came to denounce the Neo-Destour for close collaboration with the French.⁹ In 1936 Bourguiba started to demand Tunisian greater autonomy from France. Referring to the idea of co-sovereignty, the Bardo Treaty guaranteed a distinct Tunisian sovereignty, according to him.¹⁰ Actually, it is the idea of co-sovereignty that represented a complex and variable legal status of Tunisian sovereignty. As Lewis vividly reveals, first invented as a concept to justify ascribing French nationality to Europeans born in Tunisia, this term was, after World War II, to be taken by French settlers to mean that they were themselves 'sovereign' over Tunisian territory and consequently should have a permanent role in governing the protectorate.¹¹

Unlike in Tunisia, Moroccan affairs were far from stable; the Sultan's agreement to establish the protectorate in Northern Morocco did not mean a French conquest of the whole territory. France wasted no time in penetrating into Southern Morocco, populated mostly by the Berbers, and started the suppression of the opposition through military operations called *pacification*. In this process the French authorities distributed the captured lands to warlords who collaborated with them. The French appointed them as pashas and caïds, with almost a free hand in each area, and armed these tribal overlords with modern weapons.¹² There were four phases of *pacification*: the first was 1912–1914, intended to subjugate an area called *bled Maghzen* which had traditionally been under the Sultan's control. The second was to vanquish the Middle Atlas from 1914 to 1920, and the third was to suppress an armed revolt of the Rif rebels which lasted from 1921 to 1926. Led by the Abd al-Krim family from the Spanish zone, the Rifians defeated the Spanish force and founded 'the Rifian Republic'. Alarmed by this, France intervened and

the Abd al-Karim finally surrendered to its troops under the command of General Philippe Pétain.¹³ The final stage lasted from 1930 to 1934 which conquered the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas, and the edge of the Sahara. Thus more than 20 years were required before order was restored under the authority of the Sultan, and therefore of France.¹⁴

The conquest of Southern Morocco did not destroy its feudal social structure which was based on tribes. Si T'hami el-Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech and the head of these Berber tribes, was at the top of this structure with enormously concentrated power.¹⁵ Importantly, French troops in Morocco were recruited among the Berber people. This was indeed a classic example of French 'divide and rule' policy,¹⁶ because the French greatly helped el-Glaoui to establish his own position with the purpose of making him a counter-force to the Sultan. As a part of this policy, the so-called Berber *dahir* was issued in May 1930, by which the Berber populations were administratively divided from the Arab ones, and were allowed to be governed by their own customary tribunals and courts of appeal instead of the Islamic sharia courts, though the Berbers were Muslims. In other words, this *dahir* was meant to drive a wedge between the Arabs and the Berbers, thereby facilitating French control. The Arab population's harsh protest movements made the Residency retreat, and troubles subsided as a result of the Sultan's letter of August 1930 to allow the Berbers to submit to the rule of sharia if they wished. This revolt was to be an embryo of nationalist movements in Morocco.¹⁷

After the outbreak of World War II and France's surrender, Vichy France and Gaullist France were subject to international pressure for the liberation of their colonies, as the Atlantic Charter in July 1941 stated the Anglo-American wish 'to see sovereignty and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them'.¹⁸ On 30 May 1942, the Soviet Union approved the principle of putting all the European colonies under international supervision. Faced with violent protests from the British, however, the United States suggested at the conferences of Cairo and Teheran that an international trusteeship be applied only to the French colonies, although this proposal did not bear fruit.¹⁹ These developments made the French suspicious that the Anglo-Americans might intend to eject France from its overseas territories. This suspicion was to be strengthened by the events of the summer of 1945 when French troops would be forced to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon by the British.²⁰

After Anglo-American forces landed in North Africa in November 1942, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a dinner party in January 1943 in honour of Mohammed V in Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca.²¹ There

was a rumour that Roosevelt promised him independence, but irrespective of whether the US promise was true or not, this event was bound to boost nationalist sentiment. The awakening of Arab nationalism culminated in the establishment of the Istiqlal, the largest nationalist party in Morocco, on 10 December 1943, with Allal el-Fassi as President and Ahmed Balafrej as Secretary-General. It issued a manifesto reclaiming Morocco's independence to the Sultan, the French, the British and the Americans on 11 January 1944, urging the Sultan to take the initiative in negotiations with 'interested nations...whose object would be the recognition...of that independence'.²² Angered by this act, the French authorities in Morocco arrested the Istiqlal leaders. Significantly, soon after its foundation, the party already aimed to attract international support to the nationalist cause.

The French Committee of National Liberation, which had been founded in Alger in June 1943, opened the Brazzaville Conference on 30 January 1944. With the chair of Charles de Gaulle as its sole established President, the Conference's goal was to 'determine on what practical bases a French community including the territories of Black Africa could be gradually established'.²³ Given Roosevelt's hostility to colonial regimes, it was considered urgent to modernise French method and concepts of colonial rule, though by making clear that there was no question of African independence.²⁴ Its result turned out to be very disappointing for the nationalists. The Brazzaville recommendations stated: 'the objectives of the work of civilisation accomplished by France in the colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French imperial bloc; the constitution of "self-governments" [sic] in the colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded'.²⁵ Indeed, this position was to constitute the original framework of French policy towards its overseas territories, not only in Black Africa but also in North Africa in the post-war era. This was in stark contrast to Britain's colonial goal: 'the ultimate, if distant, aim of British colonial policy was evolution towards self-government', as Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald announced in 1938.²⁶

The doctrines that underlay the recommendations were assimilation and association. The two ideas should be elucidated here. The former can be described as an idea that aims 'by giving the colonies institutions analogous to those of metropolitan France, little by little...realizes their intimate union through the application of common legislation'.²⁷ Offered as the antidote to assimilation, association is a more flexible and practical type of colonial rule, aiming to retain native institutions.²⁸ It was expected this would better serve as a means of gaining native

cooperation. The Brazzaville Conference recommendations contained these two different doctrines: on the one hand, the highly centralised political unity was asserted, as mentioned above; on the other, however, the need to respect traditional society was also emphasised. Thus the recommendations represented what Tony Chafer called 'an uneasy balancing act' between the two doctrines.²⁹

To French embarrassment, their position on colonial matters was to face severe pressure for the national emancipation of colonised peoples. A very important source of the pressure was the United Nations, founded in 1945. The UN Charter acknowledged the principle of self-determination, although the colonial powers claimed the colonies were under their jurisdiction and that the principle of non-intervention should override that of self-determination.³⁰ Even Britain adamantly rejected any UN rights of international supervision of colonies.³¹ Nonetheless, the UN played a prominent role in Indonesia. Soon after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the nationalists proclaimed independence, and the British force reoccupied Indonesia so as to maintain order. The Dutch army succeeded the British occupation, and started military operations against the nationalists in 1947. The problem was taken to the UN, and the United States proposed a UN Committee of Good Offices. The Dutch resisted the UN resolutions for a ceasefire in 1948, but were forced to accept a resumption of talks in Jakarta, brokered by the UN Commission for Indonesia in April 1949. The UN's involvement accelerated the transfer of sovereignty which was completed in December 1949.³²

After the liberation of Paris in August 1944, the French Committee of National Liberation implemented a series of reforms in Tunisia in February 1945 so as not to alienate its population. The composition of the Tunisian cabinet was modified, but even the most moderate Arabic journal did not accept that this was a reform sufficient to get the people into the higher ranks of their own government. The Tunisians reacted in two ways: first, on 22 February, the various political parties published 'the manifesto of the Tunisian front' which reclaimed internal autonomy under the regime of a constitutional monarchy;³³ second, the Neo-Destour decided to send its own leader, Habib Bourguiba, to Cairo where he clandestinely arrived by an American aeroplane in April.³⁴ He was to appeal to international and Arab opinion through the Arab League which had been founded in March 1945 and whose original goal was Arab unity.³⁵

In September 1945, the Grand Council was reorganised into the French and Tunisian sections, each of them consisting of 53 members.

The former was elected directly by French adults through universal suffrage, and the latter separately through a double college system.³⁶ Dissatisfied nationalists, including both the Neo- and the Vieux-Destour, clandestinely gathered in August 1946 in Tunis and advocated Tunisia's independence. Salah ben Youssef, who was the Neo-Destour's Secretary-General and leader during Bourguiba's absence, took the initiative in this gathering. Indeed, this was the first time in which a meeting of nationalists from all strands had proclaimed the country's independence.³⁷

In France, the Constituent Assembly produced a draft Constitution in April 1946. Its Article 41 stated that the union between the *métropole* and its overseas territories was to be 'freely chosen', while Article 44 granted all residents of the French Union the status of citizens and recognised their right to be represented in the National Assembly. In addition, local assemblies, elected by direct universal suffrage, would in future administer France's overseas territories. This draft was, however, rejected by the referendum for reasons unconnected with colonial matters the following month. Then it was denounced by right-wing politicians such as General de Gaulle before the second draft was produced. The second dropped the reference to a Union 'freely chosen', and restored the double electoral college system.

The Constitution of the French Fourth Republic, produced by the second Constituent Assembly, was accepted by the referendum in October 1946.³⁸ Under its Title VIII, where the Constitution provided the French Union, control over the overseas territories was far stricter than that in the draft. Reflecting the spirit of the Brazzaville Conference, France had no intention of granting internal autonomy to its overseas territories.³⁹ The Union consisted of Metropolitan France, overseas departments, overseas territories, on the one hand, and associated states and associated territories⁴⁰ on the other. As central organs, the Union had the High Council and the Assembly but both were consultative, not legislative. Article 65 provided that France would consult with the delegates of the associated states for the purpose of coordinating the means of defending the Union, but in reality the Council represented strong control exerted by Paris. The Assembly was designed to give a voice to overseas territories in drawing up legislation directly affecting their areas.⁴¹ All the constituent territories and associate states of the Union sent representatives to the Assembly, but the associate states, which were allowed certain political autonomy, sent delegations to the Council too. The Union was thus a highly centralised organisation, unlike the British Commonwealth. For this reason, France's goal was to be resisted severely by the nationalists and international opinion.

However, the two North African protectorates did not participate in the Council or the Assembly because the Bey and the Sultan refused to join the Union, so Tunisia and Morocco were not associate states. They were thus a very big deviation from post-war French policy towards their overseas territories and, hence, securing the two countries' membership became France's primary goal. Although mostly consisting of Black African territories, this organisation would greatly affect French policy towards North Africa. The principle that France adopted in ruling the two protectorates was association. As Betts pointed out, the idea of association and that of protectorate overlapped in the thoughts of French writers, but association was called forth on many occasions to be a policy to govern the protectorate.⁴² Therefore it is safe to conclude that in Tunisia and Morocco the policy of association was pursued until around World War I. Also in the post-World War II era, which the present work will deal with, it can be argued that French policy overall was based on this idea. However, what should be underscored is the fact that, after World War II, decolonisation was predominant and other ideas, assimilation or association, were never acceptable to the North African nationalists who sought sovereignty.

In February 1946, the liberal-minded Eirik Labonne was appointed as Resident-General in Rabat, and el-Fassi and Balafrej, who had been in prison since 1944, were released soon after that. Then Labonne announced his own reform plan which focused on economic development while making use of the country's natural resources. However, the Istiqlal publicly opposed these reforms in July 1946 in accordance with its own decision in 1944 not to consider any reform unless aimed at independence, and started trying to win the Sultan over to its side. In a letter to Mohammed V, charging that the Labonne plan 'consolidated the bases of a colonialist policy', Balafrej demanded the constitution of an authentic Moroccan government that could enter into negotiations, under the Sultan's leadership, for the conclusion of a new treaty with France. The Sultan, for his part, did not authorise the Labonne plan and left unsigned the six *dahirs* that would have put the reforms into effect.⁴³

Early 1947 witnessed an upsurge of North African nationalist movements. The Congress of Maghreb Arab (*le Congrès du Maghreb Arabe*) was held with North African nationalist participation from 15 to 22 February and obtained verbal support from Azzam Pasha, the Arab League's Secretary-General.⁴⁴ In Morocco, the Casablanca riot broke out on 7 April in which 83 people were killed. Three days later, Mohammed V visited Tangier⁴⁵ and made a speech calling for Morocco's unification

within the Arab World, indicating clear support for the Istiqlal and the Arab League. His visit was made possible by Labonne's agreement that had been given in November 1946, when Mohammed argued that he wanted to affirm his own authority throughout the empire before consenting to the Resident-General's reform plans. Yet his visit only confirmed strong nationalist sentiment towards independence and territorial unity. Having realised the failure of his liberal policies, Paris decided to dismiss Labonne and appointed General Alphonse Juin as the Resident-General in May 1947.⁴⁶ Juin quickly made it clear that independence for the Maghreb was not on any French agenda.⁴⁷ In fact, Juin had been given instructions authorising him to threaten the Sultan with deposition if he continued to resist French plans.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the rise of nationalist sentiment made Paris understand the necessity of introducing superficial reforms to dodge criticism. In June 1947, Juin set up a new organ, the Council of the Vizier and Directors (*Conseil des Vizir et Directeur*) within the Maghzen. This meant that through *directeurs* or French advisers inside the Maghzen, the Residency was able to exercise direct control over the viziers, whereas hitherto the Grand Vizier⁴⁹ had controlled to a certain extent the implementation of the *dahirs* submitted by the Residency for the Sultan's signature. Thus, in truth the Residency was aiming to deprive the Maghzen of its vestiges of power. In October 1947, Juin changed the procedure for recruiting members of the Moroccan Section of the Government Council⁵⁰ who were to be elected by restricted suffrage. As this reform meant granting the right of suffrage to the bourgeois merchants, a door to the Council was now opened to Istiqlal members who were to secure a political footing. Yet the Residency's real purpose was to pave the way for representatives of the French settlers in the municipal assemblies. Juin tried to force the Sultan to accept the municipal assembly projects which planned to secure French settler representation, with every French voter having 20–30 times as much voting power as the Moroccan voters, but this met with the latter's refusal.⁵¹ The elections to the Government Council took place in February 1948, and the Istiqlal obtained 15 out of 77 seats.⁵²

In Tunisia, Mustapha Kaâk was appointed as Prime Minister in July 1947. Yet he was only regarded as a French puppet, and a strike which took place in Sfax on 5 August had a political character. The decree of 9 August put Tunisia's general administration under the prime minister's authority, but the prime minister's primacy was only superficial: there was no significant transfer of substantive powers to Tunisians, although even this superficial reform was condemned by the French settlers.⁵³

The death of Moncef Bey, the ex-Bey, in September 1948, resolved the dynastic problem which had dominated Tunisian politics ever since General Juin had dethroned him in May 1943.⁵⁴ This event helped the nationalists establish better relations with his successor, Amin Bey. In June 1949, the Neo-Destour adopted the principle that Tunisia should become a constitutional monarchy with representation for the people in a future national assembly. This was clearly a strategy aimed at obtaining Amin Bey's support for the nationalist cause.⁵⁵

In 1948 and 1949, the North African situation was relatively calm, partly because of the outbreak of the Palestine War and the sharp divisions of opinion among the Arab League member states over this problem which had diminished the League's strength.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, North African nationalists had created the Arab Liberation Committee in Cairo on 6 January 1948. The Committee decided that it would be prepared to negotiate with France if it recognised the independence of the three territories (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) beforehand, but nevertheless permitted each nationalist party to deal with France.⁵⁷ This Committee would to some extent affect the tactics adopted by North African nationalists, as will be shown later. However, the overall indifference of the Arab countries to North African nationalist movements disappointed Bourguiba,⁵⁸ so he returned to Tunisia in September 1949 and the Neo-Destour started a vigorous campaign for independence.

At the end of 1949, incorporating Tunisia and Morocco into the French Union was still the French goal. Both countries were supposed to participate *de jure* in the Union as associate states; namely, they would voluntarily participate while preserving their indigenous institutions. However, the Union *de facto* signified nothing but a centralised organisation controlled by Metropolitan France, and this was the reason why the sovereigns of the two countries refused to join it. Thus, in reality the two countries, if they moved towards self-government, would deviate significantly from French policy based on the Union. The French were aware that the largest stumbling block for their goal of making Tunisia and Morocco associate states of the Union was the sovereigns' right to sign decrees. As will be described below, France started to persuade them to accept these proposals which were in fact designed to nullify this right despite the French insistence that they would lead the two countries to internal autonomy. In order to persuade the sovereigns, it was also considered imperative to sever their links with the nationalists.

In addition, it must be emphasised that the rise of anti-colonial nationalism was posing imminent threat to the traditional rulers. They were, in theory, totally incongruous with popular sovereignty, so were

presented with a conundrum of how to treat the nationalist movements. One solution was a direct confrontation and the other was the acceptance of popular sovereignty, that is, that of constitutional monarchy. Torn between the two alternatives, the strategies that the Bey and the Sultan would adopt differed considerably. Relying on France's power, the former chose to take a distant attitude towards the nationalists. However, the Sultan tended to be more sympathetic towards the nationalist cause, if not popular sovereignty, because French support for el-Glaoui, Mohammed V's rival, prevented him from siding with France.

2

The Commencement of Negotiations

At the end of 1949, the UN promised Libyan independence by 1952. Libya was composed of three territories: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. There had existed geographical and cultural differences among the territories which were to constitute Libya,¹ and this fact provoked lively reactions in French North Africa. Tunisia and Morocco had long held territorial unities, and it was natural that the prospect of Libyan independence raised the two populations' expectations for independence, or at least self-government. It was also natural, therefore, that the French became aware of necessity for reform to ensure the access of the residents to political institutions. In the era of self-determination, it was essential to arrange a political system to guarantee and broaden people's participation in order to maintain political cohesiveness of a community. The question was how.

France was faced with difficulties in the two protectorates. This was because it had to establish a political regime which appeared democratic while, in substance, denying the local people's sovereignty. In Tunisia, conflicts between settlers and the nationalists grew. The problem was how to guarantee French settlers' voice while the nationalists were calling for a right to constitute a political community solely composed of their own nationals. It was logically impossible to reconcile the two groups' demands, but the French government was resolved to maintain the political community comprising the two distinct peoples, both because it wanted to keep France's special status in Tunisia and because it wanted to secure the country's accession to the French Union as stipulated in the Constitution.

Morocco offered a much more complicated picture because of the existence of feudalist dignitaries. After the French authorities launched an initiative for reform as a reaction to the UN promise for Libya, the Sultan

posed a huge challenge by calling for independence. This provoked a fierce reaction from the pashas and the caids, led by el-Glaoui, who were hostile to the country's modernisation and political autonomy as the nationalists claimed. As a result, antagonism intensified between the nationalists and the Sultan on the one hand, and the settlers and the dignitaries on the other. It was for this reason that the French authorities felt compelled to speed up the political reform which had a semblance of 'democratisation' and which Resident-General Juin had already tried to implement. As in Tunisia, the privileged position of France and French settlers, and the country's future adherence to the Union, were taken for granted.

2.1 Bourguiba's demands for sovereignty: Tunisia, January 1950–June 1950

On 14 January 1950, the French Council of Ministers decided 'in the framework of the treaties of Bardo and Marsa, to guide Tunisia to autonomous management of its own affairs'.² This decision was greatly motivated by the UN resolution in November 1949 which promised Libyan independence in January 1952. In fact, the degree of political evolution in Libya was considered to be far behind that in Tunisia.³ Wary that possible nationalist fanaticism in Libya might make their control of Tunisian affairs difficult, the French were determined to accomplish their plan before 1952.⁴ In fact they had already started formulating reform projects at the end of 1949. However, this decision did not mean that France had engaged in comprehensive reforms which would ultimately lead Tunisia to internal autonomy, let alone total independence. On the contrary, as will be shown below, the French aim lay in avoiding substantive reforms and ultimately adhering Tunisia to the French Union. It was considered out of the question to alter the foundations of its protectorate regime, at least at this stage, by replacing or modifying the Treaty of Bardo and the Convention of Marsa.

In formulating these reform projects, the Quai d'Orsay emphasised the following three points: (1) the personality of Tunisia; (2) the essential role of French settlers; and (3) France's power over foreign affairs and defence, which should not belong to the Tunisians.⁵ The first point suggested that France had respected, and would respect the character of Tunisia, but not its sovereignty as had been demanded by the nationalists. French hypocrisy was conspicuous particularly in the second point, for the preservation of '*une administration franco-tunisienne*', a phrase used in a memorandum of the Quai, was incompatible with internal autonomy. This point illustrated that Tunisia's internal autonomy as envisaged by

the French did not have substance since it deemed the Tunisians alone incapable of administering the country. French settlers' participation in the administration must be kept because their existence had contributed to Tunisia's political and economic development. The third point, needless to say, meant that France was intent on not allowing the Tunisians to exert the rights in relation to foreign affairs and defence.

The French went on to argue that these three basic points entailed the following five elements: first, Tunisia would have to uphold the monarchy, although it was envisaged that the Bey's privileges would be modified as democratisation evolved. This was because the Treaty of Bardo and the Convention of Marsa were concluded with the Bey, whose consent the French considered essential to guarantee legally their presence. Second, with regard to governmental organisation, the Tunisian Council of Ministers would be presided over by the Prime Minister, not by the Resident-General as hitherto. Parity would be established between the number of Tunisian and French ministers within the government, although this did not exclude a possibility of forming a government composed only of Tunisian members in the future.⁶

Third, in return for the alleged enhancement of the Tunisian government's powers, both national and local assemblies would have to be reformed, as these would guarantee the prevention of any single political party from having a thorough hold on the state. That is, by making use of those assemblies the French aimed to hinder the Neo-Destour's monopoly of power in the Grand Council⁷ and in the government in general. Fourth, the Tunisian administration would have to be composed of both French and Tunisian people. Its legitimacy could not be doubted 'whatever the degree of autonomy or independence might be'. Finally, the Resident-General and the CSTT (*Commandement Supérieur des Troupes de Tunisie*) would cease to belong to the Tunisian government in their capacities as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence since their authority corresponded to the powers reserved to France. However, it was emphasised that the Resident-General would continue to exert French control on the Bey and the government. Hence, the real French purpose was, contrary to their own insistence, avoiding reforms for Tunisia's internal autonomy or popular sovereignty. Only the second point can be regarded as a development for greater autonomy, but in any case there was no change to the Resident-General's monopoly of power.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Neo-Destour had been engaged in energetic activities since September 1949. As well as appealing to France, the party's efforts also lay in attracting international attention to the nationalist cause. In February 1950, Mongi Slim, one of its leading

members, asked the Arab League to examine the Tunisian question with the aim of bringing it to the UN, although two months later the League decided not to discuss the problem.⁸ Bourguiba's effort was, on the other hand, rather aimed at gathering support for the nationalist case among Tunisian people. For this reason he travelled throughout the country making speeches and holding meetings with local people.⁹ Confident of popular support, he landed in France on 12 April with the purpose of publicising his demands. Tahar Ben Ammar, the president of the Tunisian section of the Grand Council, also visited Paris to back Bourguiba's action and, in Tunisia, several meetings were held proclaiming support for Bourguiba.¹⁰

These moves pressured the Bey to side with the nationalists. On 11 April, he sent a letter to Vincent Auriol, the President of the French Republic, to draw attention to the importance of reforms by indicating his fear that 'the expression of Tunisian people's freedom might degenerate into despair, which is likely to provoke what we wish to avoid'.¹¹ However, it seemed that as a successor of the deposed Moncef Bey, who had been popular because of his nationalist stance, the Bey's concern was more his own popularity than promoting the nationalist cause. Regarding his position, Resident-General Jean Mons, noted:

The Bey has been caught by the demon of popularity.... If his change of attitude has a more grave consequence than the agitation of the Destour... it is because he is inside the institutional mechanism of the Protectorate; more precisely, the Bey disposes of the only true power that the protectorate regime left to Tunisians, that is, the seal of decrees.¹²

In this sense, Mons rightly commented to the Americans: '[the] Bey is not supporting Bourguiba'.¹³ Nevertheless, he was afraid the Bey might seek further popularity by coming to the nationalists' side. In that case the Bey's retention of a right to veto decrees by refusing to sign could seriously threaten French plans. Hence both the French and the nationalists would, more than ever, compete in obtaining the Bey's collaboration, but this represented his dilemma in the era of rising nationalism.

On 14 April in Paris, Bourguiba submitted to *l'Agence France-Presse* (AFP) the seven demands whose main points were:

1. The resurrection of an executive agent to exercise sovereignty.
2. The constitution of a homogenous government, responsible for public order and presided over by the Tunisian prime minister.

3. The abolition of the secretary-general.¹⁴
4. The abolition of civil controllers who implement direct administration.
5. The abolition of French gendarmerie who embody the military occupation.
6. The institution of elected municipalities while representing French interests.
7. The creation of a national assembly elected through universal suffrage. This will fix future Franco-Tunisian relations while respecting legitimate interests of France and Tunisian sovereignty.¹⁵

Points 1–6 were, according to his declaration on 3 June, aimed at restoring sovereignty to the people. He reasoned that the Protectorate Treaty had recognised it, but that ‘Tunisian sovereignty is suffocated...by French control’. Only after French acceptance of points 1–6, would Tunisia, with a democratic regime, be able to negotiate with France with a view to concluding something like an alliance treaty.¹⁶ These points notably reflected his desire to achieve popular sovereignty in accordance with his own request in 1936. He also wrote to his comrade: ‘these 7 points must perpetuate our independence’.¹⁷

Importantly, Bourguiba was willing to cooperate with France as long as the latter worked for Tunisia’s internal autonomy and independence, and he never intended to eliminate France and French people from Tunisia. In this sense his basic position was pro-French. Nevertheless, he later insisted that Tunisia, as a sovereign country, would guarantee the interests of France and French people and that this guarantee be given in place of direct French control.¹⁸ The above demands were rather moderate and gradual if compared with the immediate independence that the Moroccan nationalists claimed in October 1950,¹⁹ but here lay Bourguiba’s strategy. He considered that his moderate programme ‘will serve to unmask France’s intention, to realise the people’s unanimity and the support by the sovereign, to win us a great part of French opinion without having recourse to international opinion (the Arabs, Muslims and the Anglo-Saxons).’²⁰ That is, his tactics were to obtain as much sympathy as possible from French opinion without having to appeal to international opinion. Yet it must be noted that recourse to diplomatic means was not his only strategy. As he wrote to another party leader in May 1950, he had already started preparing for ‘armed combat’ if the French made no concessions.²¹

As had been expected, Bourguiba’s demands triggered stark opposition from French settlers, represented by their pressure group,

le Rassemblement français, resisting all suggestions of modifications to their privileges. Their leaders, such as Senator Antoine Colonna,²² sent a memorandum to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman dated 25 May. It argued that the problem posed by Bourguiba was related to all territories of French North Africa, and rejected even minor concessions on the part of the French: 'French authority must be restored... It [Tunisia] must strictly remain a country of Franco-Tunisian co-sovereignty.'²³ It was this principle of co-sovereignty, sometimes also called the principle of parity, that the French settlers and consequently the French government had advocated, and would continue to advocate in Tunisia and Morocco. This referred to the principle that the French and Tunisians should have an equal say in Tunisia's administration but ultimate power was reserved for the former, a principle already embodied in the composition of the Grand Council where the French had the same number of representatives as the Tunisians. Clearly, this principle effected a tremendous discrimination against the latter, given the different population sizes. Naturally and crucially, this principle thoroughly contradicted Tunisia's popular sovereignty which logically meant that its political community must be constituted by indigenous people alone.²⁴ France regarded this principle as a very effective brake with which to prevent a future national assembly from passing a resolution to sever Franco-Tunisian links.²⁵

Meanwhile, Resident-General Mons was advocating a more liberal approach. He reported to Paris at the end of April 1950 that the situation was calm and that it was impossible to find any troubles stirred up by Bourguiba's visit to Paris, as against Colonna's claims. Concerning French settlers, Mons observed that whereas their political leaders 'retain a fighting attitude', the masses of settlers preferred to accept the idea of reforms. Finally, he stressed the impossibility of staying behind.²⁶

The Quai d'Orsay argued that three possible courses were open to France: (1) to adopt the line of the *Rassemblement français*, reversing liberal policy that had been practised for three years; (2) to do nothing major in the immediate future but to examine minimal reforms; (3) to adopt Mons's line, examining 'a novel construction of a Tunisian institutions which would break with co-sovereignty and release the personality of Tunisian state under France's protection'.²⁷ The Quai agreed with Mons that the Tunisian situation was calm, though it noted the Bey's support enhanced the Neo-Destour's influence among the bourgeoisie. It even pointed out that the party was willing to cooperate with France by ceasing to demand independence.

However, the Quai categorically rejected examining Mons's proposal to abandon co-sovereignty since the total reversal of their colonial policy towards the whole Empire was out of the question. Thus, as a compromise between pressures from the settlers and from the nationalists, it decided to take the second course. Paris dismissed Mons and announced on 1 June that Louis Périillier would succeed him as the Resident-General.²⁸

2.2 The announcement of the French plan: Tunisia, June 1950–February 1951

In June of 1950, the French government publicly pronounced its intentions to launch a plan that would lead Tunisia to internal autonomy. On 10 June, Schuman declared in Thionville: 'Mr Périillier's mission is going to lead Tunisia towards independence, which is the final objective for all the territories inside the French Union.'²⁹ His statement to a private session of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly mentioned that the reform would be based on the following points:

1. The Tunisian government will consist of nine Tunisian Ministers and three French Counsellors-General.
2. The Council of Ministers will be presided over by a Tunisian, instead of the Resident-General as hitherto.
3. The abolition of French advisers to the Tunisian Ministers.
4. Tunisians will in future be eligible for all posts in the administration.
5. Tunisian participation in local government as a preparation for greater political responsibility at a later date.³⁰

Bourguiba had announced his support for Schuman's declaration in Thionville in the name of the Neo-Destour on 10 June.³¹ Yet Bourguiba had reservations about the French Union. He wrote to Salah Ben Youssef that the possibility of Tunisia's adherence to the Union could arise only after independence. He did not abandon a hope that the French would finally accept the Tunisian demands, but added that, in order to tilt the balance in favour of Schuman's group, 'it was essential to show the people's firm and unanimous attitude, including that of the Bey'.³² That is, Bourguiba's expectation was that the Bey would eventually come to the nationalist camp.

On 13 June, the new Resident-General made a radio announcement explaining the broad outline of French intentions.³³ The French plan consisted of three areas: first, a governmental reorganisation; second,

the opening of more public service posts to Tunisians; and third, municipal reforms, although details had not yet been examined concerning the latter two points.³⁴ The first point was that the Council of Ministers would no longer be presided over by the Resident-General but henceforth by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister and the CSTT would no longer be members of the Council of Ministers. The French advisers to Tunisian Ministers would be removed. The Secretary-General's endorsement of all the acts of the government would be discontinued,³⁵ and Jean Vimont was appointed to the post. Regarding the third point, the French planned to begin assembly reforms at local levels, not the national level. Fearing that a national assembly based on the principle of co-sovereignty would provoke fierce opposition from the nationalists, they considered that starting at a municipal level would arouse less resentment.

In June and July 1950, Périllier had a series of conversations with the Bey and Prime Minister Si Mustapha Kaâk, but on 8 July the Bey and Kaâk complained that 'emphasis on the subordination of the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister is not sufficiently clear' in the French plan. They also demanded the immediate dismissal of French advisers to Tunisian Ministers. Périllier flatly rejected such subordination, and instead emphasised that the Secretary-General 'should preserve the powers to manage personnel affairs and expenditures'.³⁶ In the plan the Secretary-General's power was to be constrained and yet remain dominant and, at any rate, there would be ultimately little change to French control of Tunisia. In view of Kaâk's opposition, Périllier concluded that it was impossible to start negotiations with the Kaâk Government and decided that he should be replaced by a new prime minister. Périllier states in his memoirs that he had wished to form a government which would represent all shades of Tunisian opinion, and consequently would include Neo-Destour members,³⁷ though it is doubtful whether he really had this intention. After negotiating with the Neo-Destour, Périllier chose as a successor M'Hamed Chenik, a former prime minister in the era of Moncef Bey.

Meanwhile Schuman's declarations in June 1950 intensified tension between French settlers and the nationalists. The French section of the Grand Council resigned on 10 July to protest the introduction of the French plan. Tahar Ben Ammar reacted by putting forward a motion to the Residency to complain about Paris's unwillingness to accept internal autonomy, emphasising: 'no effort has been made to give satisfaction to one of the oldest demands by Tunisians'.³⁸ The Residency did not accept the motion, however.

Nevertheless, Schuman was adamant in moving forward. He declared on 20 July before the Council of Republic 'the necessity of breaking "*immobilisme*". Périllier, for his part, after obtaining from Paris approval for the formation of the Chenik Government, including several Neo-Destour members,³⁹ began consultations with the party. There was concern that Bourguiba might refuse to sanction his party's participation if the Secretary-General's power remained intact and if the Council of Ministers continued to contain French representatives.⁴⁰ Yet Salah Ben Youssef accepted his participation in the government, a decision to which Bourguiba agreed.⁴¹ At Bourguiba's initiative the Neo-Destour Enlarged National Council approved that decision on 4 August.⁴² This was significant, considering the opposition by the North African Liberation Committee and by other nationalist parties at home and abroad, including the Istiqlal in Morocco.

It was announced on 17 August that Chenik would form a new government with the membership of Salah Ben Youssef as the Minister of Justice and Mohammed Badra, another Neo-Destour member, as the Minister of Social Affairs.⁴³ A communiqué issued on the same day stated that the new government's mission was 'to negotiate in the name of His Highness the Bey the institutional modifications that must guide Tunisia into internal autonomy'.⁴⁴ This was a distinctive event in the history of French policy in Tunisia in the sense that France authorised the Neo-Destour, which had been banned a few years before, to participate in the government. The French judged it possible, with the Bey's authority behind them, to make the nationalist party accept their reform plan, which contained nothing substantive, so that French settlers could accept it. In contrast, however, the Neo-Destour's involvement was aimed at impressing French opinion about its sincerity for negotiation, thereby strengthening the pro-Schuman group and making France withdraw their plan for French attendance in the country's political institutions.

Périllier was optimistic that he could soon start negotiations. He even announced that: 'substantive reforms would be carried out before the end of the year'.⁴⁵ He issued a decree on 7 September relating to the abolition of the posts of the French advisers to Tunisian Ministers.⁴⁶ The Neo-Destour welcomed this decision, although it correctly regarded this as leaving intact the French veto power at a higher level. The Vieux-Destour's opinion was entirely dismissive and the views of the French settlers were adverse.⁴⁷

However, the prospect of commencing negotiations was rapidly disappearing. Prime Minister Chenik, having accepted office, was now

convinced that the French purpose was nothing but avoiding substantive reforms to realise internal autonomy. As early as 12 September he wrote a letter to Périllier requesting:⁴⁸

1. the suppression of endorsement of the Secretary-General
2. the devolution to the Prime Minister
 - a. of the attribution hitherto incumbent upon the Secretary-General;
 - b. of the elaboration and the execution of the economic plan;
 - c. of the control of personnel affairs and public expenditures of the civic administrations.

Simply put, Chenik demanded that all important powers be transferred from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister. These demands were natural, since the French had already announced their intention to recognise internal autonomy. However, the Resident-General's reply was simple: 'this note cannot be admitted as a base of discussion, which instead must be my declaration of 13 June'. On 30 September the Tunisians put forward a second note repeating the same conditions.⁴⁹ As John Jernegan, the American Consul General later put it, the Tunisian reluctance to accept the French plan echoed the former's deep-rooted distrust of the French, if taking into consideration the fact that the plan's first and second points were aimed at alleviating French control as a matter of formality.⁵⁰

These notes smashed Périllier's optimism. He announced on 7 October that it appeared to him 'a time to grant a pause to politics' and that instead Tunisia should address 'the problems of economic and social reconstruction'.⁵¹ However, he had not given up the June 1950 plan itself. Realising the difficulties with the governmental reorganisation, he decided to open negotiations on its second and third points: the recruitment of civic officials and the municipal reforms. From him, Chenik received a proposal for the establishment of two mixed commissions in order to examine the two issues.⁵² On 30 October, Périllier explained to Schuman the necessity of a pause in realising the envisaged reforms due to fierce opposition both from French settlers and Tunisian nationalists.⁵³

The Tunisian government rejected the proposed mixed commissions. In his letter to Périllier dated 4 November, Chenik strongly argued that direct conversations should commence between the French and Tunisian governments.⁵⁴ This was an outright challenge to a fundamental principle of French control of Tunisia, for its protectorate status meant that France's representative was the Resident-General in Tunis, and logically

the Tunisian government was not entitled to negotiate directly with the French government. Stimulated by the Moroccan Sultan's memoranda in October 1950, Chenik probably also calculated that direct Franco-Tunisian negotiations at a governmental level would greatly attract French and international attention, thereby pressuring France to make concessions. However, Périllier replied that such negotiation was out of the question.⁵⁵

Unlike Périllier, Paris did not wish to wait.⁵⁶ He was called back to Paris to discuss the programme with Schuman in detail at the beginning of December 1950. Then, on his return to Tunis, Périllier submitted a new plan to the Bey on 13 December.⁵⁷ Its first point stated that the number of French ministers would be reduced in the Council of Ministers, which would be presided over by the Prime Minister but by the Resident-General in the case of decisions on economic and financial affairs. This reservation indicated that French concessions would be restricted as compared to that of the summer of 1950. Instead, on the second point the French agreed to the nationalists' request to abolish the Secretary-General's endorsement: regarding the decrees of technical ministers, the endorsement would no longer be required.⁵⁸ The decrees of the Prime Minister and the other ministries would be submitted to the Resident-General's endorsement instead of that of the Secretary-General. The reduction of the Secretary-General's power was considered indispensable to giving the impression he no longer played an important role as represented by France in the Tunisian government. The third point stated that the number of Tunisian and French officials would be the same among higher posts in the administration.

Yet, in view of the fact that the ultimate French control on virtually all the administration of the government would remain untouched, the Tunisians were not satisfied at all. On his receipt of the French plan, the Bey's impression was that 'he would strongly wish to study the decrees carefully, which, in his first view, do not appear to contain as substantive reforms as he had strongly hoped for'.⁵⁹

In the months that followed, Chenik continued his opposition, but Bourguiba, who returned from Paris and himself talked with Périllier regarding this issue several times, agreed to the French plan as part of what he called 'a tactical step back'.⁶⁰ The Tunisian government followed his position. The Neo-Destour, though, publicly maintained its opposition when the party's National Council, held under Bourguiba's presidency on 31 January and 1 February, concluded that the negotiations 'have not yet reached the bases of an internal autonomy regime'.⁶¹ On 1 February, both sides achieved agreements which contained minor

modifications to the December 1950 French position, and over which Secretary-General Vimont had offered his resignation, opposing the envisaged restriction of his post's attributions.⁶² The Tunisian Council of Ministers approved it on 7 February, and then the Bey signed the decrees related to the February 1951 accords. However, aware of French unwillingness to make substantive concessions, Bourguiba had already left Tunisia on 2 February, this time in order to launch his efforts to appeal to international opinion instead of appealing to French opinion.⁶³

Thus, of the three main points listed in the June 1950 plan, the first and the second were accomplished. What remained was the third point, that is, the problem of municipal assemblies, but the Tunisians also made concessions on this issue. They agreed that it should be entrusted to a mixed Franco-Tunisian commission which would be held under the presidency of Dr Materi, the Minister of Interior.⁶⁴

2.3 The Sultan's memoranda: Morocco, December 1950–February 1951

As in Tunisia, Moroccan nationalist sentiment was greatly encouraged by the UNGA resolution of November 1949 which promised Libya's independence in 1952.⁶⁵ The French government's announcement of its intention to lead Tunisia to internal autonomy gave further impetus to the rise of nationalism. In September 1950 Mohammed V set up the Imperial Moroccan Cabinet at the Palace. This was designed to secure a vital liaison between the Maghzen and the sovereign so as to offset the partial absorption of the Maghzen into the Council of the Vizier and Directors.⁶⁶ The nationalists were soon heavily represented in the Imperial Cabinet, and the Sultan's refusal to sign the decrees that Juin had submitted to him for seal in December 1947 thus appeared in its true light as the concerted policy of the Sultan and the Istiqlal.⁶⁷ Despite French hopes, the positions of the Istiqlal and the sovereign were growing closer.

In October 1950, the French government invited the Sultan to Paris. Its aim had been to re-create the facade of harmonious cooperation which had gradually been deteriorating,⁶⁸ but this turned out to be a crucial moment in which the Sultan determinedly turned to the nationalist side calling for independence. To French surprise, he refused to sign a joint communiqué and instead, on 11 October, submitted a memorandum stating: 'the current Moroccan problem is not a matter of fragmented reform or superficial reorganisations'.⁶⁹ Specifically, he called for: (1) greater educational facilities for Moroccans; (2) fuller Moroccan

participation in the administration; and (3) permission for Moroccans to form their own trade unions.⁷⁰ This memorandum was drafted by the Sultan's entourage, but was actually agreed upon by the nationalists who had been suspicious as to whether he would really present it to the French.⁷¹ The nationalists had been pressuring the Sultan to take a firm stance. In fact, they had opposed his visit to France, for his acceptance of the invitation could have been taken as a sign of his conciliatory attitude.⁷²

The French reply of 31 October proved disappointing to the Sultan because it merely hinted at a possible lifting of censorship and recognition of a right to form trade unions, which would be discussed at a mixed commission to be established at Rabat, and side-stepped the problem of Moroccan sovereignty.⁷³ On 2 November he made a crucial demand that the abolition of the Treaty of Fez should be negotiated. This stunned the French, who had assumed 'the Sultan would be loath to abrogate the Treaty of Fez which guaranteed the throne to him and his heirs'.⁷⁴ The French had never dreamed that the Sultan, whose position they considered was warranted by France, would call for independence. Thus torn apart by the nationalists and France, unlike Amin Bey, Mohammed V chose to join the former contrary to French expectations otherwise.

There was no longer room for compromise between the position of the French government and the Residency on the one hand, and that of the Sultan and the nationalists on the other. As later developments showed, as in Tunisia, French policy was aimed at incorporating Morocco into the French Union while keeping intact the interests of France and French settlers. Independence was ruled out, since it was incompatible with the Union. The French government insisted that they aspired to lead the Moroccan people to internal autonomy through modernisation and democratisation but, clearly, their purpose was to avoid any significant transfer of power to the indigenous people. The political regime that they tried to introduce was to be built on the principle of co-sovereignty: while keeping French nationality, French settlers were to have the right to vote in assemblies at either national or local level. This was considered an effective brake with which to prevent a future national assembly from proclaiming independence. This French stance was totally irreconcilable with Morocco's independence as demanded by the Sultan and the nationalists.

In parallel with Mohammed V's initiative, the Istiqlal started anti-French broadcasting under the auspices of el-Fassi. This party's strategy lay, first, in showing that 'the position the sovereign took in Paris responded to the people's unanimous aspiration'. This was also the case with the

Tunisian nationalists, but what was remarkable with the Istiqlal was its large-scale efforts to internationalise the problem. The Istiqlal sent pamphlets to the UN and the Arab League arguing 'France's work in the Sharifian Empire⁷⁵ merely aimed at the monopolisation of the material and human resources of the Empire to the benefit of a privileged class of French residents.' The same pamphlets were distributed by two Istiqlal members during a session of the Moroccan Section of the Government Council in December 1950. General Juin reacted by purging them from the Council.⁷⁶

The Istiqlal's activities also alerted traditionalist pashas and caids, a phenomenon that did not occur in Tunisia. In particular, el-Glaoui felt threatened because of his belief in traditional values and his loyalty to France. As a Berber chieftain, he hated Arab nationalism inspired by the Istiqlal and other nationalist parties, and also disliked the Sultan, who had previously granted an audience to trade-union members, including communists, and who was favourable to the country's modernisation.⁷⁷ The antagonism between Mohammed V and el-Glaoui intensified and finally, on 21 December, the latter publicly condemned him for his connection with the Istiqlal.⁷⁸

On the other hand, Juin was considering renewing an attack on the Sultan, taking advantage of the latter's conflict with el-Glaoui. Perhaps he believed that the time was ripe to get the Sultan to accept his projects of October 1947⁷⁹ and to abandon the latter's close relations with the Istiqlal. A divergence of views was, however, growing between Paris and Juin, although this was rather related to the method to be employed than to the aim to be pursued. The Quai d'Orsay was afraid that his position was too favourably disposed towards the Pasha of Marrakech and therefore that 'whatever the manner in which he tried to exploit the situation, it will tend to collide with the Sovereign'. Its memorandum continued:

[T]he Pasha of Marrakech...rallies around him the support of many Moroccan notables....[T]he old opposition between the tribes and their traditional leaders on the one hand, the urban Arab bourgeois and the Sultan on the other hand, seems to take some reality. This state of affairs turns, to our advantage, Franco-Moroccan antagonism...to a rivalry between two Moroccan groups.... [But while] we wish to take a position of reformers in order to obstruct the sovereign, who is more eager to re-establish the absolute monarchy rather than to make his people evolve, we risk...posing, to the eyes of the world, as supporting our policy on the last vestiges of the local feudal system....⁸⁰

The Quai believed Juin's policy could be criticised by world opinion unless his proposal for political reforms was based on 'sufficiently democratic principles'. Finally, it was noted that 'because of Juin's temperament, we may be forced to choose a serious setback of our prestige... or a dynastic crisis', which later proved to be a fundamental dilemma in France's rule of Morocco. As long as the French relied on the dynasty, their rule found itself in hot water if the Sultan was defiant of the protectorate regime.

Both the French and the Moroccans needed American support. On 26 January 1951, the Resident-General met the Sultan. Juin, after mentioning that he was going to the United States with French Prime Minister René Pleven, urged Mohammed V, first, to condemn publicly the Istiqlal's methods, such as anti-French broadcasting, if not its ideology and, secondly, to sign the *dahirs* on Juin's October 1947 projects. By referring to the trip, Juin implied that the Americans would agree with his plan. The Sultan refused both of his demands on the grounds that 'his capacity as Sovereign remained above parties' and that he had not yet fully examined Juin's projects.⁸¹ His demands apart, what was remarkable was Juin's menacing attitude. Juin reported to Paris about this meeting: 'I told him that my mission... allowed me to consider either his abdication or his deposition' if France's reform plan was to fail.⁸² Thus, by explaining Paris had already given him permission, Juin explicitly threatened the sovereign with deposition. Then, in Washington, Juin met George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Juin insisted on the necessity of forcing the Sultan to denounce the Istiqlal's methods, and pointed to the threat from the possible expansion of communism which would profit from the troubles. However, McGhee displayed a cool attitude and asked him instead whether the French could not collaborate with the party.⁸³ As they were soon to find out more clearly, the Americans were seeking rapprochement between the French and the nationalists.

The Moroccan nationalists sought American support as well. The Istiqlal told the US Consulate in Rabat: first, that France should deny its intentions on the Sultan's abdication or deposition; secondly, that it was essential for the French to appoint a new Resident-General in place of Juin; and, thirdly, that there was no collusion between the communists and the Istiqlal.⁸⁴

The primary US concern lay in Morocco's political stability. First, support for the French position was considered vital not simply because France was one of the most important American allies, but also because its disappearance could cause political instability in the country. Secondly, however, the French authorities' suppression of Moroccan nationalism would

inevitably make the indigenous people hostile to France and the Western countries, including the United States, thereby causing further instability. Washington, feeling itself in a dilemma, was to pursue a 'middle-of-the-road policy'⁸⁵ towards Morocco. Besides, the Americans had been deeply involved in Moroccan affairs especially since December 1950 when Moroccan base treaties were signed between France and the United States, which authorised the latter to construct aerial and naval bases.

A rumour was spreading that Juin had previously received US approval when he met McGhee. Seriously embarrassed, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, sent warnings to the French: (1) Juin did not have unqualified US support; (2) the United States would dissociate itself from French action to depose the Sultan and might be forced to state so publicly; and (3) if French action of such a kind resulted in the matter being raised in the UN, the United States would not support France.⁸⁶ In fact, as the French Embassy in Washington correctly noted, the Americans were desperate to avoid a situation in which it would have to side with either party in the UN.⁸⁷ Their Cold War concerns made this attitude 'inevitable'.

The British, too, approached the French. On 2 February, Sir Oliver Harvey, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed that after reaching agreement with the Americans, he should inform Robert Schuman of their concern about possible disturbances caused by a deposition. As a colonial power itself, Britain knew unnecessarily oppressive attitudes would only ignite resentment in the local people and that this might drive them to the communist camp. Harvey was also instructed to make it clear to the French that the British government did not wish to intervene in this matter. On that day Harvey also met David Bruce, the US Ambassador in Paris, who mentioned that American reactions had been exactly the same as the British, but the latter found the State Department's line somewhat stiffer than that of the FO.⁸⁸

The Anglo-American moves made Paris aware of the necessity of avoiding the impression that France was seeking deposition. On 5 February, after informing Juin of the governmental approval of his requests, Schuman warned him:

Therefore avoid anything that might give credence to the idea that France sought to depose the Sultan....The intervention of the US Embassy was characteristic in this regard....⁸⁹

Having returned from Washington, Juin once more met Mohammed V in mid-February and demanded that the latter accept his points of 26

January.⁹⁰ In addition, the ulama⁹¹ in Morocco also began to oppose the Sultan and to request the election of a new ruler. The Sultan turned to Paris, asking Auriol for arbitration. His reply only recommended that the sovereign accept the reform plans that Juin had tabled.⁹² Moreover, information began arriving at Rabat on the same day that the French civil controllers in the Middle Atlas areas had instructed Berber tribes to despatch their troops to Rabat in order to demonstrate against the Sultan. Perhaps these two factors obliged the Sultan to succumb.⁹³ On 25 February, he at last agreed: (1) to let the Grand Vizier, Hadj Mohammed el-Mokri, condemn 'the methods of a certain party'; (2) to remove from the Imperial Moroccan Cabinet the Istiqlal members who were deemed responsible for the policy of 'obstruction'; and (3) to seal the *dahirs* to realise the reforms presented by Juin in October 1947, that is, the establishment of the municipal assemblies with French settlers' representation.⁹⁴

The February 1951 crisis ended. Mohammed V's memoranda brought about much more domestic troubles than Bourguiba's demands did in Tunisia. The outcome of the crisis was certainly a retreat for Mohammed V, but not a total surrender, as it was agreed that the Grand Vizier, not the Sultan himself, would condemn the Istiqlal without naming it. The French thus made minor concessions, as finding a new Sultan after deposition was not an easy task. Besides, this crisis was not purely indigenous since it was to a large extent caused by the initiative of the Residency including Juin, if not the French government. The threatening attitudes that the French authorities adopted to get this result proved radical enough to provoke furious reactions from the Arabs, and therefore to attract international attention.

3

The UN Debates in 1951

This chapter deals with the Moroccan question being discussed in the UN in 1951 as a consequence of the February 1951 crisis. Indeed, 1951 and 1952 were to be the years in which the United States and the United Kingdom had conducted the most visible diplomatic manoeuvres on the decolonisation process of Tunisia and Morocco, since the two countries' affairs were temporarily open to international discussions. In a sense this was a struggle as to what extent the United Nations could grasp the initiative in handling colonial affairs from the suzerain country. While France was determined to maintain the initiative and reject UN intervention, the Arab-Asian countries and, to a lesser extent, the United States tried to secure a say on colonial affairs through the international organisation. In other words, the question was whether or not the principle of self-determination could not override that of state sovereignty, that is, non-intervention, and, if so, in what sense.

Interestingly, the Moroccan, not Tunisian, case was the first in which the North African questions had been brought into the UN although its nationalist movements were weaker as compared to Tunisia. Paradoxically, in order to compensate for internal weakness, the Moroccans tended to appeal to foreign Arab countries for help. As mentioned in the Chapter 2, the Tunisians, who were more confident of their strength, chose to appeal to French opinion instead of leaning on international force.

The UN attitude towards the Moroccan question in 1951 proved non-committal. That is, the organisation decided to put off debates for a while, and this reflected Washington's position to avoid being forced to choose between the French and the Arabs. Yet this US attitude was taken by Paris as tacit approval of the French ideal of assimilation or association. Therefore, the UN decision to postpone the Moroccan debate in

December 1951 allowed Paris to continue its previous policy: flat rejection of the Tunisian demand for self-determination and sovereignty.

3.1 Arab moves and Franco-American talks: Morocco, February–September 1951

Juin's attitude towards the Sultan during the February 1951 crisis was harshly condemned by journalists in Arab countries, the United States, and Britain. Above all, as an anti-French campaign, the Arab media started broadcasting false news such as the French bombardment of Fez and the French incarceration of the Sultan. Azzam Pasha convened the Arab League Political Committee to examine the Moroccan problem and then the Egyptian parliament adopted a motion to denounce French policy.¹ Moreover, he asked the British and American Ambassadors in Cairo for their governments' opinion in the event that the Arab League brought the problem to the UNSC. The Egyptian move provoked different reactions from the Anglo-Saxons. The British Ambassador responded that 'it was a matter which only concerned the French and the Moroccan governments',² whereas his American counterpart did not reply. It was already clear that the former was more favourable than the latter towards France.

The Americans regarded their reaction to the Moroccan crisis as a touchstone of their good intentions towards the Arab-Asians.³ Therefore Washington declared at a press conference, on 5 March 1951, that it had already advised both parties on moderation. The French were quite dissatisfied with this attitude, which, to their mind, 'contributed to accrediting the rumour that the US government is favourable to the cause of the Istiqlal'.⁴ Moreover, it was reported to Paris that, with the help of the 'Rodes group',⁵ the Istiqlal had been allowed by the US authorities to begin anti-French broadcasting activities in the United States.⁶ Yet the State Department instructed the Ambassador in Cairo to dissuade the Egyptians from supporting the submission of the problem to the UNSC.⁷ No wonder that the Americans did not want to be put in a position of having to choose between the French and the Arabs. It was considered paramount to show, presumably to the Soviet Union, that there was no wedge between the Western powers and the Arabs, by indicating their willingness to arbitrate between France and the Moroccan nationalists.

The British held a different view; they argued that 'the only people who would profit from a public discussion would be the Russians, [who] would of course back the Arabs, to the detriment of peace in North Africa and the position of the Western Powers'.⁸ For this reason

the British Foreign Office had persuaded the State Department not to publicly condemn Juin's stern policy against the Sultan.⁹ Interestingly, the FO was motivated to show that there was no wedge between the Western powers, 'which could only benefit the Soviets'.¹⁰ Therefore, the British did not tell the Arabs that they could induce the French to come to a settlement in Morocco. As Roger Allen, the head of the FO African Department, put it, to avoid impressing the Arabs that 'they can drive a wedge between [the British] and the French over Morocco' was the OF's aim.¹¹ 'A wedge' refers to the difference over how France should handle the Moroccan domestic conflict between the Sultan and el-Glaoui, as examined in the Chapter 2.

On 13 March, the Arab League Political Committee recommended that the member states bring the Moroccan problem to the UNGA, which was considered preferable because of the American and British attitudes and the French veto in the SC.¹² The Arabs' decision was shocking to the British, who were now fearful of possible repercussions in their overseas territories caused by a UN debate. Nonetheless, their choice was not to persuade the French to adopt a more liberal policy which could have moderated the Arab countries' attitude. On the contrary, the FO concluded that 'whatever we may feel about French motives in Morocco, it seems best to leave the question alone',¹³ seeing that the joint Anglo-Saxon approach to the French in early February 1951 had resulted in this awkward incident. Presumably it was understood that London's advice to Paris against Juin's intimidation had offered Egypt a chance for exploitation at the UN.

This situation forced Paris to realise that they should immediately present a reform plan to Mohammed V, who had just consented to the sealing of the municipal project of October 1947. With a view to inducing him to accept their plan, the French now proposed to establish a new type of local assembly, called *djémaas*, which would be exclusively composed of the Moroccans. That is, in addition to municipal assemblies in town areas as had been proposed in 1947, another kind of consultative assemblies in rural areas was now planned. A *djémaa* was a traditional assembly in local communities and the French were intent on transforming this into a new consultative institution consisting of representatives appointed by each tribe and having a certain degree of budgetary autonomy. A municipal assembly was to be composed of French and Moroccan members.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Arabs' efforts to internationalise the problem were being continued. On 9 April, the Moroccan National Front, which had just been established in Tangier among major nationalist parties,¹⁵ issued

a manifesto demanding independence and rejecting association with the French Union. General Juin noticed that international forces such as Egyptian journalists and the Arab League were behind this move.¹⁶ On the same day, the Egyptian Ambassador in Paris, together with other Arab countries' ministers, submitted a note to the Quai d'Orsay to call for practical recognition of Morocco's independence and expressed that otherwise they would raise the issue in the UN.¹⁷

The prospect that the Moroccan problem would be debated in the UNGA that autumn was becoming certain. The French wanted the United States to oppose UN discussion, so believed that the Americans must be convinced that France was really intent on leading Morocco to internal autonomy. On 13 April, Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador in Washington, pointed out that the US reservations about French policy would be likely to be aggravated in the course of a few months due to the American press reports and comments on the February 1951 crisis. Therefore, he continued, the French should approach not only US diplomats and consuls but also press correspondents and agencies,¹⁸ a proposal on which the Quai agreed. Upon instructions, Bonnet explained France's position to McGhee: it was attempting to prepare the Moroccans for eventual 'self-government' through its democratisation which would be launched at local levels, and that the Istiqlal was nothing but a few members of the privileged classes. However, McGhee replied that US information indicated the Moroccans were supporting the Sultan, and that 'the progress being made in Morocco is negligible compared to that in India and Pakistan'.¹⁹ Thus the French did not achieve their goal.

The Arab countries' moves, coupled with unsupportive US attitudes, caused Paris to present their plans to the Sultan. In May 1951 the French plan for local assemblies was transmitted to him,²⁰ though its details cannot be found in French archives. This was not made public until Mohammed V expressed disapproval two months later.²¹ In any case this was the first occasion that, as a response to the Sultan's demand for independence, Paris had officially proposed French settlers should have the right to vote in local assemblies. On 6 July the Sultan announced his refusal to sign it because the plan provided that the French and Moroccan representatives in the municipal assemblies would no longer be appointed by the authorities, but elected henceforward.²² Like Bourguiba, the sovereign considered the plan incompatible with sovereignty²³ because granting this right to French settlers would prevent the formation of a Moroccan political community which must be composed of indigenous Moroccan people alone. Instead, he signed a decree concerning *djémaas*.²⁴

General Augustin Guillaume was appointed as the new Resident-General in Morocco on 28 August. In fact, the Quai d'Orsay had already considered Juin's dismissal at the end of 1950 because his attitude was too coercive and therefore unpopular. However, the French were keen to avoid the impression that they disapproved of Juin's policy since it could cause great distress to the spirit of the Moroccan people, many of whom 'put their confidence in us', according to the French observance. For the purpose of showing their firmness, they thought the successor should also be a military officer.²⁵

On the other hand, el-Fassi, the Istiqlal's leader, announced on 14 August 1951 that he was going to visit Middle Eastern countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States in order to undertake a great tour of 'propaganda' for the Moroccan cause. Then on 31 August the Arab League started to discuss his proposal of bringing the question to the UNGA session in 1951.²⁶

The French strongly felt the importance of approaching Washington once again with the aim of securing firmer support. In late August 1951, Bonnet had opined that there were advantages in discussing Moroccan affairs with Acheson, because the State Department still adhered to the idea of French collaboration with the Istiqlal, whom the Americans considered would otherwise turn to the communists. He indicated the American attitude was prejudicial to France, as State Department officials continued to meet Moroccan nationalist leaders to show US neutrality in Franco-Moroccan conflicts in order to safeguard the future of United States–Moroccan relations.²⁷ Bonnet, therefore, suggested that a paper should be prepared to indicate the extent of collusion between the Istiqlal and the communists. However, perhaps the French themselves were not sure of this connection, for papers circulated in the Quai merely suggested that only the communists were attempting to establish collaboration with the nationalists, whereas the latter distanced themselves from the former.²⁸ The French attempted to use communism to persuade the Americans of the necessity of oppressing the Istiqlal, but in any case the Americans did not believe in such a connection.²⁹

At that time the State Department drafted a paper for the forthcoming Franco-American discussions entitled 'To harmonize French and US views on Morocco'. The US objectives that it explained were:

1. To maintain stability in Morocco so that Morocco can make the maximum contribution to Western security and our air bases may be utilized and protected.

2. To assist the French in making necessary economic and social reforms and in guiding Moroccan political evolution toward self-government at a sufficiently rapid rate to forestall nationalist uprisings.
3. To cooperate with the French in the promotion of friendly relations with the Moroccan people.

This paper continued with the view that an evolutionary policy in Morocco must be accompanied by restraint and moderation on the part of not only the Moroccans but also the French. In order to follow this stand the Americans felt it necessary to be informed of the French plans in detail so that they could refute the charges by Arab countries that French policy was repressive.³⁰ Thus, for the Americans the only solution lay in Moroccan self-government in agreement with France. To achieve this, they were resolved not to side with either camp and in this sense they adopted a 'middle-of-the-road policy'. This paper was of much significance because US attitudes towards the Moroccan questions would continue to be based on the points listed in it.³¹

On 11 September, Schuman–Acheson conversations were held in Washington and Schuman explained that France wanted to establish in Morocco a modern, stable, and democratic country capable of assuming increasing responsibilities. Schuman continued that the success of these efforts depended on whether France's Western partners would understand French policies, and underlined that a UN debate could only be detrimental to the progress of Morocco.³² Once again the French presentation was somewhat hypocritical since they never intended to give significant powers to the Moroccan people. In addition, the Americans were not notified of details of the French plan although Schuman proposed a common examination of the attitude to be taken at the UN. So, as had previously been the case, the French argument did not persuade the Americans to oppose UN debates.

Yet, Acheson admitted that 'Morocco was not ready for independence'. Thus Washington considered Moroccan political development insufficient to be granted independence. Besides, concerning the forthcoming UN debates, when Schuman asked Acheson to discourage Arab action, the latter promised to dissuade the Arab League countries from raising the problem in the UN. He further agreed to examine the case together with the French if the problem was put to the UN.³³

Failing to obtain American support, the French turned to a new tactic. Taking advantage of the NATO Council meeting at Ottawa later in September 1951, Schuman asked Acheson to exchange letters in which the United States would mention that it supported the French position

in Morocco but had no interest in its internal political affairs. However, Acheson did not give a clear reply.³⁴

3.2 The UN debates: Morocco, October–December 1951

The Egyptian government brought the Moroccan problem before the UNGA on 6 October.³⁵ Importantly, this was the first occasion that the North African problem had been put to the UN. The French had already decided in July 1951 that their delegation must not accept its competence to intervene in Tunisian and Moroccan affairs which were exclusively French internal matters. It had also been decided that 'our Delegates would otherwise withdraw, at least refuse to participate in the debate' if the UN opened discussions on Franco-Moroccan relations.³⁶

The Egyptian move made Paris both take action in Morocco and approach the Anglo-Americans. First, on 7 October, four days after his arrival in Morocco, Resident-General Guillaume met the Sultan to raise the question of the election of the Moroccan Section of the Government Council.³⁷ Ten days later, a decree of the Vizier announced that elections for those Chambers would be held on 1 November, a measure aimed at depriving the nationalists of time for preparation.³⁸ This decree expanded the Moroccan electorate from 8,000 to 220,000, but more than half of the increase was designed to cover rural areas where the Istiqlal's influence was weak. As the French had anticipated, the National Front announced its refusal to participate in the elections.³⁹ The Moroccan population giving wide support to the Front, the percentage of abstentions was extremely high: 95.9 per cent in Casablanca at its highest, and 60 per cent on average. However, the Quai d'Orsay was pleased with this result: 'This percentage is very satisfactory if one takes into account the violent intimidation of nationalist campaign and the manoeuvre of the Istiqlal.'⁴⁰

Secondly, the French made contact with the Anglo-Americans to ensure their support in the UN. On 9 October, under Schuman's instructions, Bonnet told Acheson that Paris 'had decided to fight the placing of this item on the agenda on the grounds that this was an internal matter under the UN Charter', emphasising 'the very great importance which the French government attached to obtaining [US] full support'. Bonnet asserted that if the UN agreed to discuss the question, Egypt would inspire disorder in Morocco to back up the Arab case.⁴¹ However, Acheson insisted on the UN's competence to discuss this problem, although he admitted that it was not 'competent to deal with this question in the sense of passing any condemnatory resolution or setting up a

commission of investigation and so on'. Regarding Schuman's proposal of September 1951 for an exchange of notes, Acheson mentioned that the State Department had not reached a conclusion.

On 9 October, Francis Lacoste, the Alternate Permanent French Representative at the UN, informed Gladwyn Jebb, his British counterpart, that the French would contest the competence of the GA to discuss the Moroccan item, adding that 'he assumed that in so doing the French government would have the full support of His Majesty's government'. Jebb replied: 'such support would be forthcoming'.⁴² Moreover, Britain immediately tried to convince the Americans to adopt the same attitude. Harvey asked Acheson, who was then in Paris, whether 'he could not support the French by voting against the Egyptian motion'. The latter responded that he had already made concessions to France by deciding to abstain on the vote for the placement. Harvey noted why it was impossible for Acheson to vote against: 'not to oppose the discussion of matters of this sort by the UN' was a basic principle with the US government. Acheson complained 'even this was laying him open to strong attack by "the liberal wing of the US delegation", led by Mrs. Roosevelt'.⁴³ He added, though, that he was 'prepared to advise other Governments, if they should consult him, to vote against admission of the item onto the agenda'.

On 8 and 9 November, the GA General Committee considered the Egyptian demand to include the Moroccan problem on the agenda. On the first day, Maurice Schumann, the head of the French UN Delegation, objected to that demand, 'denying the competence of the Assembly'.⁴⁴ On 9 November, the Committee adopted a Canadian motion recommending that the consideration of the question of placing the item on the GA agenda should be postponed.⁴⁵ In fact, by the beginning of the month, the French had already agreed with the Anglo-Saxons that it would be best to work for an adjournment,⁴⁶ an agreement on which the Canadian motion was based. This result also seemed to be due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Egyptians.⁴⁷ The GA plenary session concurred with the General Committee's recommendation on 13 December by 28 votes to 23 with seven abstentions.⁴⁸

This result made the French optimistic about American intentions, presumably because the US vote was regarded as an indication of its hesitance to discuss a colonial matter at the UN. Schuman wrote to Guillaume: '[This] represents, on the part of the Department of State, an effort of comprehension that we must not underestimate'.⁴⁹ This optimism could have allowed the French to take a very stern stand against the Tunisians, as shown in their note of 15 December 1951.⁵⁰

However, this French speculation was only an illusion. A State Department paper dated 21 November yet again argued that the US government should pursue a 'middle-of-the-road policy' towards Morocco. Moreover, American opinion was very critical of the abstention. In addition, the French had found the Sultan's attitude defiant during the UN session. On 18 November, Mohammed V had made a speech at the 24th anniversary of his accession to the throne:

The memorandum [in the autumn of 1950] reflects my desire to see Franco-Moroccan relations defined in an agreement guaranteeing Morocco's full sovereignty...while safeguarding the interests of various elements in our empire. From then on, I never stop hoping for the opening of negotiations on this subject....⁵¹

Thus the Sultan was planning to call for independence anew. This was the basis for which a new round of negotiations must be opened. Yet, as will be argued in Chapter 4, he was so cautious that his next step would only be taken in the spring of 1952.

3.3 The note on co-sovereignty: Tunisia, February–December 1951

Despite the accords of February 1951 on the abolishment of the Secretary-General's endorsement and so on, the Quai d'Orsay was aware that the results accomplished were far from meeting the Tunisian aspirations, whereas French settlers would be highly unlikely to accept steps to transfer substantive powers. It was anticipated that new demands might occur on the part of the Neo-Destour in the more or less near future.⁵²

In fact, on 20 February, Bourguiba instructed his party leaders to take a next step. After pointing out French avoidance of devolving substantive powers to the Tunisians, he listed his demands: (1) the abolishment of the Secretary-General; (2) the formation of the Council of Ministers of exclusively Tunisian nationals; (3) the absorption of security services into the Tunisian government; (4) the establishment of the National Assembly; and (5) the abolishment of the territory of military occupation and the replacement of the French gendarmerie by the Tunisian gendarmerie.⁵³ To his own demands of April 1950, Bourguiba now added new demands concerning internal security and a national assembly. The nationalists would henceforward increase their demands, especially about the latter point.

The conflict between the Tunisians and the French escalated rapidly. On 10 March, the Neo-Destour and the UGTT launched a general strike as a protest against French oppression of Moroccan aspiration for autonomy in the February crisis.⁵⁴ Minister of Justice Salah Ben Youssef himself took part in the preparation of the order to strike, so the Resident-General protested to the Bey and the Prime Minister.⁵⁵ Besides, the Tunisian ministers boycotted the first session of the Grand Council held on 31 March. Périllier noted that they were following the order of Chenik, who himself was inspired by Salah Ben Youssef.⁵⁶

The Resident-General warned Chenik in April that the Tunisian ministers' absence at the Grand Council was illegal.⁵⁷ The latter objected that their absence could be justified by the hostility that the Council's French Section expressed against the Tunisian government. He also demanded 'progressive enlargement of ministerial posts until a totally homogenous government and, eventually, the participation of Mr Habib Bourguiba in the Cabinet'.⁵⁸ This finally made Périllier conclude a new government should replace Chenik's. He underlined to Schuman that the Neo-Destour's involvement in the government should be terminated in order to implement the February 1951 agreements.⁵⁹

Perhaps encouraged by condemnation of the Arab press of French oppressive policies in Morocco, the Bey was slowly making a move towards the nationalists. On 24 April he protested to France over the French Senate's vote on that day to give French people in Tunisia the right to elect two members to the National Assembly.⁶⁰ In the nationalists' view, naturally, this resolution lost those French people the right to vote in the Grand Council, whose term was expiring in December 1951. They immediately increased their calls for the establishment of a national assembly elected by universal suffrage. Nationalist newspapers started criticising the French government.⁶¹

These developments made Amin Bey incline more decisively to the nationalist side. On the occasion of the Throne Festival on 15 May, he declared that Tunisia should have a constitution and that he had decided to start preparations for the establishment of an elected representation comprising all classes of the people.⁶² That is, following the Neo-Destour, the sovereign himself called for the building up of a modern Tunisia with popular sovereignty, equipped with a constitution and a national assembly. The Quai d'Orsay observed he was influenced by Prince Chedly, 'whose collusion with the Neo-Destour is well known'.⁶³ The Resident-General protested to the Bey that it was no longer possible to have conversations with the incumbent Tunisian government.⁶⁴ The

Bey did not yield, and wrote to Auriol calling for intervention against Périllier's move.⁶⁵

In July 1951, the Moroccan Sultan's refusal of French participation in local assemblies was moderating Périllier's attitude: he became willing to negotiate with the Chenik government. He might as well begin to doubt the viability of the principle of co-sovereignty.⁶⁶ The following month he proposed to Schuman that the Tunisian ministers be invited to Paris to discuss the basis of a new action plan, a proposal to which Schuman immediately agreed, probably from the fear that the Tunisian problem might be brought before the UNGA, into which Arab countries were likely to put the Moroccan problem at that time.⁶⁷ As long as the Tunisian ministers stayed in Paris, the French calculated, a semblance of some negotiations progressing would be created. Accepting this invitation, Chenik suggested that it be a few months later.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, he continued to demand a nationally elected assembly and in August 1951 announced his opposition to the convening of the Grand Council.⁶⁹

Yet in the autumn of 1951,⁷⁰ as the proposed Tunisian ministers' visit to Paris was coming closer, the Quai d'Orsay worried about the hardening of Tunisian attitudes whose nationalist sentiment was given impetus by the dispute between Britain and Egypt in October 1951.⁷¹ Likewise, Tunisian attitudes could have been encouraged by the Egyptian placement of the Moroccan problem on the UNGA agenda on 6 October. On 17 October, one day before the Tunisian ministers' visit, the Quai's memorandum examined French responses to Chenik's expected demands, but it merely showed the French position remained unchanged: first, France monopolised the initiative in introducing reforms and, secondly, achieving municipal reform had priority.⁷²

Then the Department of Africa and the Levant of the Quai d'Orsay drafted a note that discussed the future regimes of both Protectorates after the establishment of the local assemblies outlined in the French plans.⁷³ It clearly reflected French adherence to the principle of co-sovereignty. It was argued that the principle of parity would be very difficult to obtain once abandoned and that if both countries obtained internal autonomy without this principle, 'it was out of the question that the Europeans...are the object of discriminatory measures and find themselves in danger of...being victims of a real racism', judging from the situation in other Arab countries.

The Tunisian ministers, with Prime Minister Chenik as the head, held a series of conversations with the French in Paris. The memorandum that Chenik tabled under the Bey's signature on 31 October simply defined

the 'internal autonomy' which the Tunisians wanted, purposely using an Anglo-Saxon term, 'self-government', not a French term, '*l'autonomie interne*'.⁷⁴

The internal autonomy means an internally sovereign Tunisia, enjoying the 'Self Government'⁷⁵ and evolving its institutions according to its own mission.... At the governmental level, the homogeneity of the Tunisian government proved necessary.... At the legislative level, the establishment of a representative assembly, drawing up laws and controlling the management of the Government's general policy, will be a significant step towards democracy.... Finally, at the administrative level, while safeguarding French civil servants... it is indispensable to provide Tunisian public posts with a status compatible with the new regime.

The Tunisians called for the removal of all French control over internal affairs, not just for the establishment of a national assembly. Their demands were more comprehensive than the French had expected. That is, the self-government as defined in Anglo-Saxon terms was what the Tunisians desired.

Tunisia's 'self-government' was what the French simply could not accept. This was especially because it could be accompanied by people's representation and thereby might imperil the Bey's status which legitimated French protectorate rule. Having examined this note, the Department of Africa and the Levant pointed out that these demands would trigger worries on the part of French settlers.⁷⁶ Of the three points listed by Chenik, the Department commented that a Tunisian assembly presented the gravest danger to French interests: 'As the experience of various Arab states shows, a purely Tunisian Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, would constitute a formidable hotbed of nationalist agitation.' The Department highlighted the importance of 'the idea of parity', which would 'constitute without any doubt a guarantee much more effective than the veto, that is always very difficult to use in face of an elected assembly'.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, Paris was seriously divided as to how to respond to the Tunisian demands. Schuman and Périllier disapproved of the dismissal of the Chenik government at this stage.⁷⁸ Périllier addressed a confidential report to Schuman on 17 November, arguing for the necessity of recognising the principle of Tunisia's full internal sovereignty and for implementing it progressively at the three levels of executive, representative, and public service. Schuman proposed an appeasing reply

when the Council of Ministers met on 22 November, but was criticised by Henri Queuille and George Bidault. Harsh opposition to Chenik's demands was also raised by Senator Colonna, who requested Périllier's dismissal, the constitution of a new government, and the maintenance of settlers' privileges. Périllier alerted Schuman on 13 December that it would be a political error to let the Tunisians leave Paris empty-handed. He also suggested the necessity to reconcile with the Neo-Destour, emphasising the danger of removing the party, 'the most active and organised element, which for 30 years had deeply penetrated throughout the social milieu'.⁷⁹

On 15 December the French government handed to the Tunisians a note signed by Schuman. Reflecting the harsh opposition by the Quai and French settlers, this note presented an outright refusal of the demands for internal autonomy:

1. The indispensability of maintaining the principle of French participation in functioning the political institutions of the Protectorate.
2. A Franco-Tunisian Mixed Commission would be summoned in January 1952 to study the modalities of a new representative system.
3. The realisation of the municipal reform must precede the appreciation of any other reform.⁸⁰

This note so clearly showed France's adherence to the principle of co-sovereignty that it was called '*la note sur la co-souveraineté*'. It evidently demonstrated a firm determination on the part of the French that they would not release complete control over internal Tunisian affairs. For Tunisian nationalists, this note definitely denied the people's right to self-determination by giving French nationals the right to vote. This note was so startling to the Tunisians, as Bourguiba later recalled: 'since 15 December 1951, it was a matter of the political life or death of the people, of the presence or disappearance of a State, of the political status of a nation'.⁸¹ This was the reason why the French could not hand it in before the closure of the GA debates on Morocco on 13 December. Then Paris appointed Jean de Hauteclocque as the successor to Périllier.

The consequence of this note turned out to be very profound. As Jernegan lamented, 'the note must be taken as a definite set-back for the moderate Tunisian nationalists'. This was because the Tunisian ministers obtained virtually nothing after the long negotiations in Paris and therefore suffered serious damage to their prestige.⁸² The moderates, such as Bourguiba, would henceforward have to resort to drastic

action. One day after the French note, Bourguiba announced in Paris: 'the Neo-Destour must face a showdown that endangers the existence and future of the nation', and publicly spoke of recourse to the UN.⁸³ Thus Bourguiba abandoned his previous attitude with which to obtain internal autonomy through collaboration with France.

4

The UN Debates in 1952

The year throughout which the UN discussed the North African questions was 1952 and it was different from the other years that the book treats, in the sense that Tunisian and Moroccan affairs received a great deal of visible influence from international relations and the intra-Western Alliance politics. The UN debates had two rounds, the first at the Security Council and the second at the General Assembly. In face of the Arabs' challenge, coupled by political support from the Soviet Camp, to France's jurisdiction on the two countries, the Western powers struggled to secure French influence while the United States showed inclinations to see the UN take up the questions.

At the SC, Washington's reluctance to discuss the matters was evident both because of the Council's privileged legal status and because the numerical dominance of the Western powers would inevitably bloc UN debate. However, this was not the case in the GA. The United States was tenacious regarding the dependent peoples' self-determination and the UN's right to take up colonial questions, if not to pass a resolution to condemn French colonial rule, while determined to guarantee France's special position in North Africa. Reflecting the enormous influence of the United States on other member states, the resolution that the GA passed in December basically echoed its position. Yet with an exception: the British attitude proved crucial if subtle in preventing the Arab-Asian proposal for the UN's direct meddling and thereby its grasping of the initiative in Tunisian and Moroccan affairs. The result was an ambiguous character to the resolution which advocated self-determination or something similar in the two countries though denying its own involvement. Britain's position stemmed from both its concerns over its own colonies and its eagerness to protect France from international pressure.

The effect of the resolution was clear: both peoples in the protectorates and the French understood that what international society claimed was, as ever, self-determination and popular sovereignty, or something similar. Nonetheless, the international community's hesitance to be directly involved in colonial matters was also clear. In a word, this resolution would work as a double-edged sword, as France was able to ignore international opinion though the UN set a clear goal for decolonisation. The British effort to protect France from international pressure proved to be of much significance.

4.1 Bourguiba's return: Tunisia, January–February 1952

It was Bourguiba's return to Tunisia on 2 January 1952 that brought about a radical change to Tunisian affairs. Since he left Tunisia just before the February 1951 agreements, he had been promoting the nationalist cause in a number of countries.¹ Immediately after his arrival, he led a strong campaign in favour of the recourse of the problem. In addition, the Bey was reportedly keen to seek popularity among the people by means of 'his collusion with the Neo-Destour.'² Inside the government, the moderates, such as Prime Minister Chenik, tried to prevent UN recourse, but Bourguiba's speech on 8 January in Monastir, the town of his birth on the mid-eastern coast, pressed the Tunisian ministers into a decision. He stated: 'the Tunisian people were disposed to shed blood and to grasp the UN.'³ Although the Bey and Chenik did not agree, Bourguiba finally succeeded in persuading almost all the ministers.⁴ He thus overtly challenged the very principle of French control of Tunisia.

On 14 January Salah Ben Youssef and Badra, Tunisian ministers who had already been in Paris, submitted a note to the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, stating that Tunisia was convinced the UNSC would be able to resolve the Franco–Tunisian dispute.⁵ This had all the ministers' signatures, but not the Bey's. The request fundamentally changed the character of the problem, for it was highly likely to be brought to the UN in 1952 with the help of Arab countries. Furthermore, the US government was considered not unwilling to take up this problem because its failure to vote for the Moroccan item's inscription of the previous year had been severely criticised by American opinion. The French could not tolerate the Tunisian move, since this was a clear violation of the protectorate treaty. The UN, they maintained, must not intervene in their domestic matters. Likewise, they feared that violent anti-French activities were likely to increase in order to attract international

attention and that the Bey and the nationalists would be encouraged to resist the French plan once the problem was placed on the international scene.⁶

It was already rumoured that the Tunisians desired UN recourse through the good offices of Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister. Pakistan was then a member state of the SC,⁷ and the Arab League was reportedly exercising strong pressure on him to bring up the matter.⁸ On 16 January, Maurice Schumann, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asked Jebb to advise the Pakistani government not to cede to the pressure imposed by the Arabs. Jebb promised to help France⁹ and, in fact, the FO instructed him to persuade Zafrullah not to raise the Tunisian question.¹⁰

The French countered the Tunisian move in a radical manner. On 18 January, the Quai d'Orsay instructed Jean de Hauteclocque, the new Resident-General who had just arrived in Tunis, to arrest and expel Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour leaders to provincial villages. This was done on the grounds that they had appealed to Tunisians to provoke trouble throughout the country, such as the general strike on 17 January at Bizerta, a city on the northern coast. In the absence of a regular French government, the decision on these instructions was taken by a Ministerial Committee that included René Pleven, Robert Schuman, Georges Bidault, Edgar Faure, and Maurice Schumann, among others.¹¹

The Arab countries, for their part, were seeking the Anglo-Americans' involvement, as they wished to avoid an outright confrontation with France. On 18 January, Zafrullah Khan told the British and American UN delegations 'he would be prepared to refrain from any action if he knew London or Washington offered to act as mediators'.¹² Subsequently, Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, also asked both countries for arbitration, but the British response was negative.¹³ Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, met Zafrullah, but only urged caution on the Pakistani part, instead of convincing Paris of moderation.¹⁴

In fact, this attitude derived from a suggestion from Sir Oliver Harvey, the British Ambassador in Paris. As in March 1951, he argued on 17 January, one day before Zafrullah's approach, that the British should never 'undertake to try to influence the French to pursue a more moderate course' for the following reason:

[D]iscussion in the UN might have embarrassing consequences, but the effect on Anglo-French relations of any attempt on our part to

intervene... would be infinitely worse. They would be unlikely to listen to any advice we might give them and would only resent it.¹⁵

Thus he insisted that Britain, as a major ally of France, should not tender any advice to the French, even at the risk of the Arabs' bringing the matter before the UN. He reasoned that their intervention would produce deep-seated French suspicions that the Anglo-Saxons secretly wanted France out of its overseas territories, including North Africa,¹⁶ and that the damage to Anglo-French relations would make the prospect of solution remote.

On the other hand, Roger Allen, the head of the FO African Department, argued that colonial concerns dictated the British to tender advice to the French:

Although the French have behaved unwisely in many respects, we are bound on general grounds to support them. Moreover, on the particular case at issue HMG have themselves a substantial interest in preventing the discussion of the internal affairs of non-self-governing territories in the United Nations.¹⁷

Thus the African Department's belief was that they, as a fellow colonial power, had to support the French position in North Africa, if not necessarily individual French policies, by keeping the problem off the UN agenda. They believed so particularly because they felt there would be serious repercussions in Britain's own overseas territories if international intervention over this problem was allowed. If so, it would have been better for Britain to act as a mediator by advising France to make concessions. Therefore, the views of Havey and Allen could be in conflict. The prevailing British view was, however, that they should refuse any advice at the risk of the problem being taken up unless the French wanted it, and that only after Arab-Asian countries decided to put the matter on the UN agenda, should the British try to disrupt their move. They were already determined to give full support to France at the cost of the Arabs making recourse to the UN.

The French were, for their part, attempting to force the Tunisians to accept their plan of December 1951. On 15 January, Maurice Schumann had instructed Hauteclouque to protest gravely to the Bey that France rejected the UN referral and demanded that the Bey dismiss the Chenik government.¹⁸ For the French it was no longer possible to resume negotiations unless the Tunisians withdrew their demands in the UN.¹⁹ On 24 January, Hauteclouque again had talks with the Bey and

Chenik, demanding that the Bey make a public appeal for the restoration of peace and order. The latter declined to do so, although he authorised Hauteclouque to issue such an appeal in the Bey's name. The Bey, however, refused to recall the two Tunisian ministers in Paris and to withdraw the UN appeal, even though he had not publicly agreed on it either.²⁰ Still, Hauteclouque tabled a note to the Bey which repeated the demand of the December 1951 note for the establishment of mixed commissions, with the aim of examining the municipal and representative problems.²¹

The cool British attitude made the Arabs realise that they could not count on Britain's arbitration and promoted their decision to turn to the UN. On 30 January, 14 Arab-Asian countries addressed the chairmen of both the UNSC and the UNGA with the purpose of drawing their attention to the grave Tunisian situation by referring to French actions which constituted a threat to international peace and security.²² The French also approached the GA chairman, insisting that the cause of the crisis should be entirely attributed to the Bey and the Tunisian ministers.²³ On 5 February, the Tunisians rejected the French note of 30 January, and instead requested that France would have to terminate marshal law, which violated the principle of Tunisian sovereignty.²⁴

As usual, the US reaction was the key to any parties, so the Tunisians had also approached the Americans. At the end of January 1952, one Tunisian minister presented the nationalist case to Jernegan by stressing the moderate nature of their requests for greater autonomy and that the UN appeal was in the mildest possible form.²⁵ Washington was increasingly concerned with the development of Tunisian affairs, all the more so because of the UN debates on Morocco in the previous year. Having been informed that Paris was contemplating changes to the Tunisian government in order to achieve a breakthrough, Jernegan proposed on 14 February that the State Department warn the French that they were 'indulging in wishful thinking'. His proposal was aimed at persuading them to recognise that the Neo-Destour was a dominant fact of life, and that the appeal to the UN was a natural and logical reaction of dissatisfied nationalists.²⁶ Agreeing with him, the State Department instructed the Embassy in Paris to present a proposal. It argued that the best hope of keeping the problem off the SC lay in the resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations, and warned that the United States was obliged to follow its traditional policy of not opposing discussions if the issue was posed in the SC.²⁷ Yet, as will be displayed below, the Americans had in fact not reached a decision as to their attitude when the problem was put to a vote for inscription on the SC agenda.

4.2 The UNSC debates, February–April 1952

In late February 1952, Paris received the information from New York that on 20 February the Pakistani government had decided to bring the matter to the UN.²⁸ On 5 March, the Quai d'Orsay reacted by sending the following instructions to Washington, New York, London, and other capitals: 'You can on this occasion assert to your interlocutors that all initiatives aimed at grasping the United Nations would be groundless in this case since we deny its competence, and we will formally oppose the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the Council.'²⁹ This was the basic French position with regard to the UN. They were adamant that they should prevent UN debate on the Tunisian problem, since it was regarded as being under France's jurisdiction, not the UN's. If this position proved impossible to sustain, the French intended to postpone the debate for as long as possible. In either case, support from Washington and London was considered essential.

In Paris urgent efforts were being made to formulate a new reform plan in order to counter the Arabs' move. Along with the Americans, the French considered that the immediate resumption of negotiations was the best way of avoiding a UN debate. François Mitterrand (UDSR), the Minister of State in charge of examining the Tunisian question, developed a liberal plan, inspired by the principle of dual citizenship; that is, French settlers who had lived in Tunisia for five years would gain its citizenship and thereby participate in its political institutions. His plan consisted of: first, a government composed only of Tunisian ministers; second, a Tunisian representative assembly; third, an economic and financial council with consultative power; and fourth the Franco-Tunisian agreements which would guarantee French interests. This was highly rated by the nationalists but severely opposed by French settlers.³⁰ As explained in previous chapters, the prospect of establishing a national assembly was of the gravest significance to the settlers.

On the other hand, the Quai d'Orsay prepared a note in mid-February 1952 sketching out possible solutions of the three principal pending issues: a legislative national assembly, governmental reorganisation, and the recruitment of public officials.³¹ As opposed to Mitterrand's plan, this note demonstrated the Quai's persistent determination to prevent the Tunisian people from gaining any real power. First, as for the envisaged legislative assembly, it argued that there were two possible solutions. The first was the establishment of a single assembly, but the Quai considered that the Tunisians would hardly accept the situation that 'in the future Assembly, half of the seats would be reserved to the French'.

The second solution was the establishment of two assemblies. The first assembly would be composed of the Tunisians, while in the second, an Economic Council, the French would play a key role. The latter's remit would cover budgetary and economic affairs.

Second, regarding the governmental reorganisation, this note pointed to the Tunisian wish for a government composed exclusively of Tunisian ministers, apart from Defence and Foreign Affairs, but the Quai rejected the formation of such a government as premature. The note also indicated that it was out of the question to allow the Tunisians the control of internal security, as otherwise French settlers' security could not be guaranteed. Lastly, regarding the recruitment of public officials, access would be open to more Tunisian people than the December 1951 plan. Contrary to these three questions, the Quai d'Orsay's attitude became less intransigent over the issue of the French Union; it was abandoning the idea of Tunisia's full participation in the future. Instead, the Quai was contemplating a more flexible membership. That is, a special bilateral agreement could be negotiated with the purpose of securing Tunisia's participation at the High Council where an associate state was supposed to send its representative.

Another Quai d'Orsay note of 28 February showed persistent but unfounded French optimism.

[The Tunisian Ministers] demand...that the means to achieve the goal [internal autonomy] without delay should be specified. It is inevitable that the discord should relate to the duration of the steps [towards internal autonomy]. Even so, a solution seems possible on this point.³²

Thus the Quai failed to understand, or deliberately ignored, the structure of internal autonomy that the Tunisians called for, viewing that the difference of position was just about the duration of each step to 'internal autonomy'. Perhaps this optimism was reflected in the firm French attitude towards the Chenik government. Similarly, on 5 March, Hauteclouque noted opening negotiations with a new Tunisian government was desirable, because

if... the policy of persuasion and of conciliation... should fail, we would inevitably have to resort to a solution of force; many Tunisians... not only wait for it, but also hope for it... [The] forced resignation [of Chenik] will not anyway appear to be a political regression, if we immediately submit our reform proposal to the new Government.³³

Hautecloucq assumed, without much foundation, that the people did not support the nationalists, and therefore would welcome France's high-handed approach and Chenik's dismissal as long as it allowed the French plan to proceed. Creating the appearance of setting it in motion was deemed an urgent matter in order to prevent the UNSC debates. This optimism was dominant among the French, and in any case the fall of the Faure government on 29 February shattered Mitterrand's more liberal plan.³⁴

On 6 March, Jebb visited René Massigli, the French Ambassador in London, to enquire about French tactics in the case of a UN debate. Jebb explained two options. The first was to oppose the inscription of the problem on the agenda. To prevent that, he continued, at least five oppositions or five abstentions were required. The FO preferred this option while, in Jebb's opinion, the Americans would not oppose the inscription itself. The second was to accept the inscription and to contest the SC's competence to discuss this problem. He personally recommended the second option because this would have a clearer political effect,³⁵ taking into consideration the envisaged US position. Thus Jebb believed it desirable that France should accept the inscription on the assumption that at any rate its veto could successfully block any anti-French resolutions.

However, Jebb's advice concerning tactics was not favourably received. Faced with the British negative stance, the French turned to the Americans to thwart UN debates. Francis Lacoste met with Ernest Gross, the US Deputy Representative at the UN, on 12 March and asked him about the possible US attitude when the problem was taken up. The latter's reply was quite evasive: he had already informed Ahmad Shah Bokhari, Pakistan's UN Permanent Representative, that the United States would not actively oppose the inscription of the Tunisian item.³⁶

Not feeling assured by Gross's utterance, Paris approached the State Department at a higher level. On 19 March, Franco-American talks were held in Washington in which Bonnet, Acheson, and other American officials participated.³⁷ They discussed two questions: the first was about the inscription and the second was the SC's competence in the event of the item being inscribed. Bonnet discovered that the Americans did not share the French view on either question, however. Acheson mentioned that the Americans would not vote against inscription and that the State Department in general viewed the SC as being competent to deal with the problem. Bonnet objected that the item should not be placed on the agenda and that France would vote against, but could not convince the Americans. Nevertheless, Acheson

added that if the news on Franco–Tunisian conversations was officially announced, the support would be much more effective. This meant Acheson wanted a swift commencement of such negotiations in order to prevent the problem being brought to the SC. Bonnet, therefore, was able to report to Paris that the Americans did not want the SC discussions, as this would by definition force the United States to choose between France and Tunisia, and, ultimately, France and the Arab world.

Acheson's remark prompted the French Inter-Ministerial Council to adopt a plan on 21 March, based on the Quai's proposal, that is, on the idea of co-sovereignty.³⁸ This plan explicitly noted: 'the Resident-General will retain all powers which he currently holds as custodian of the powers of the Republic.'³⁹ On the morning of 25 March, Hauteclocque warned Amin Bey that he would not present the reform programme for discussion unless the present Cabinet was dismissed from office. The Bey replied that it was impossible, but Hauteclocque demanded the dismissal by three o'clock that day.⁴⁰ The Bey and the Cabinet once again refused. As in January 1952, France's reaction was high-handed; the Resident-General arrested all the Tunisian ministers except Salah Ben Youssef and Badra at midnight and ordered their temporary exile from Tunis to Kebili (in Southern Tunisia).⁴¹ In fact, Hauteclocque had already received instructions from Paris that gave him free rein in order to resume dialogue. Two days later, much to the nationalists' surprise, the Bey succumbed to pressure and accepted the French plan.⁴² As a result of the nationalists being arrested, Amin Bey was beginning to backpedal. He never supported the nationalists, so soon became close to France once nationalist influences had disappeared.

Having been unable to make a decision on how to vote on the problem's inscription, the US State Department was quite wary of these French moves. The Americans doubted whether their plan would be acceptable to the Tunisians and expressed grave concern over the arrest of the ministers, even though some State Department officials considered the French plan helpful in breaking the present impasse.⁴³ With some foundation, Bonnet wrote to Paris with sanguine eyes: 'We can count on the support of the American authorities in trying to stop the filing of the complaint of the Arab and Asian countries.'⁴⁴ However, what Washington intended was to warn Paris once more of the possible consequences of its firm policy. Secretary Acheson instructed the Embassy in France to approach Foreign Minister Schuman. As it was arbitrary French actions in detaining Tunisian leaders that had inflamed the situation, only France's most prompt action would warrant the United States forestalling the immediate inscription of the matter, the Americans argued.⁴⁵

The appointment of Shaheddine Baccouche as the new Prime Minister was announced on 28 March, which provoked a nationalist demonstration in front of the Bey's palace.⁴⁶ It was also made public that a mixed commission would be convened on 24 April with the aim of examining the French plan.⁴⁷ This development was far from what the Americans had expected, but, nevertheless, affected their attitudes. Having obtained an excuse, they were now eager to discourage the Pakistanis. Acheson immediately instructed Gross in New York to persuade Pakistani Delegate Bokhari not to bring the matter to the UN. Now that Franco-Tunisian negotiations based on the French programme would soon be underway, Acheson judged SC considerations undesirable, since such negotiations were the best means towards the solution.⁴⁸ Bonnet noted that these instructions were entirely satisfactory. He added that one American official had stated that the US delegation would be instructed to abstain or, maybe, even to vote against.⁴⁹

However, the Pakistanis did not abandon the idea of taking up the problem. On the contrary, Bokhari also approached one American UN delegate, and portrayed the ongoing negotiations by mentioning 'it appears... that "[the] French will be sitting on both sides of table.'" He thus pointed out that the Tunisian interlocutors were not those who represented their people. Rather than vote against the inclusion of the item, Bokhari urged the United States to abstain. Having failed to reach a decision on whether to vote for or against, the US official confined himself to replying 'under present circumstances [the] US cannot support SC consideration'.⁵⁰

At this point the French noted London's retreat on its position; it was now more inclined to abstain if the inscription of the item was voted on. On 28 March, after receiving news of the appointment of a new Tunisian Prime Minister, the UK representative Jebb told French and US counterparts that 'under his present instructions if four other members were against inclusion [the] UK would abstain or vote against. If there were not four others against, Jebb said he might have to vote for inclusion; he thought probably, however, he would be instructed to abstain'.⁵¹ In fact, the FO instructed Jebb on the same day that he should abstain if the United States voted for but France voted against.⁵² This modification of the British position was probably due to Jebb's proposition on the previous day. After pointing out that France's drastic action increased difficulties for the British, he had argued:

If the French insist on contesting the adoption of the agenda even without American support, they are almost bound to lose... [W]e should

vote with the Americans and not incur the odium of supporting the French in a lost cause....⁵³

Presuming that the British vote, either for opposition or abstention, would not influence the result, Jebb suggested that the British follow the American lead. Thus he viewed it essential to avoid a wedge with the United States while ensuring there be no international debates on a colonial issue.

On 29 March, Bokhari told one US delegate at the UN that they would perhaps reach the decision on 2 April in view of the session of 3 or 4 April.⁵⁴ In fact, on 2 April, 13 Arab-Asian countries formally asked the SC chairman to convene the council.⁵⁵

Alarmed by these moves, the French increased their efforts to persuade the British not to abstain. Massigli met Sir William Strang, the UK Permanent Under-Secretary. The French Ambassador argued that his government was urging Gross to be instructed to vote against, and that the FO should also instruct Jebb to vote against. Strang replied: 'Jebb would probably abstain', and added that whether Jebb abstained or not would make no difference since in either event there would not be enough votes for inscription.⁵⁶ Maurice Schumann spoke to William Hayter, the British Ambassador in Paris, on 1 April. He suggested the British vote against, referring to France's complete solidarity with Britain when the Persian problem was under discussion at the SC.⁵⁷ Massigli then urged Foreign Minister Eden to modify the instructions to Jebb, emphasising that the British vote could affect other SC members.⁵⁸ It was at this moment that, probably under Eden's initiative, London changed its position. On 3 April, the FO instructed Jebb: 'In view of renewed French representation here, you should vote against inclusion of this item on the agenda, whatever the American line.'⁵⁹ Thus Britain was resolved to show its willingness to hinder UN debates even with a possibility of open confrontation with the United States.

Both the Arabs and the French assumed that many countries would follow the US vote concerning the issue of inscription.⁶⁰ Being under strong pressure from both sides, the State Department had not yet decided on its stance. Its indecision also reflected a deep division of opinion inside the government. On 2 April, its UN representative strongly proposed that 'we should vote for inscription' although he added that postponing the consideration of the Tunisian item would be preferable.⁶¹ Conversely, the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department had recommended that the United States vote against, or, if that position was deemed impossible, abstain. In addition, Eleanor Roosevelt, the

Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the UNGA, strongly pleaded with Acheson that the Americans should not keep the problem off the agenda.⁶² On 3 April, the Quai d'Orsay instructed the embassy in Washington to 'make a final and urgent approach to the State Department' so that it would give the US delegation the instructions to vote against.⁶³ Bonnet highlighted to a State Department official, first, that the French reform plan had started to make progress, but if it lacked support from outside, the prospect of success would be damaged by 'the local agitators'. Second, the activities of anti-colonialist countries served the Soviet Union's interest by creating a crack within the Atlantic pact.⁶⁴ It was on the night of 3 April, one day before the US delegation would speak at the SC session, that Acheson decided to abstain. He instructed the delegation to explain that at that moment facilitating negotiations between the two parties would be more useful than UN discussions.⁶⁵

After all this, the SC rejected the inscription of the Tunisian item on the agenda on 14 April. The delegations from Pakistan, the USSR, Brazil, and Chile voted for the inscription, while those of France and the United Kingdom voted against. The United States, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey abstained.⁶⁶ As expected, the Soviet Union concurred with the Arab-Asian camp with the aim of undermining France's footing in its dependencies. The Russian Cold War concerns can be clearly found here, and their stance would be consistent throughout the decolonisation process of Tunisia and Morocco.

Thus the French successfully prevented Tunisian debates at the UNSC. They were satisfied with this outcome, but Hoppenot commented on how precarious the success was: 'The latent sentiment that persists in the milieu of the UN... since last December goes from open disapproval to moderate criticism.' He then added that the fact that neither France's allies nor friends could find elements for appreciation of France's Tunisian policy deserved attention.⁶⁷ In fact, following the Moroccan debates in the UNGA the previous year, American public opinion was extremely critical of the US abstention. Bonnet noted, 'the State Department appears to be struck by the magnitude and unanimity of the press reaction',⁶⁸ stressing that it was not until some progress in Tunisia had been made that US opinion would cease to criticise France.⁶⁹ Bonnet's observation soon proved right.

4.3 Towards a UNGA Special Session, April–July 1952

Despite the failure at the SC, the Arab-Asian countries continued their efforts to put the problem to the UN. As early as 22 April, the

13 Arab-Asian countries decided to approach other governments with the aim of proposing a GA special session. The GA regulation required them to collect a majority of member states (at least 31 votes), so the Arab-Asians started to canvass the views of Latin American [hereafter LA] countries' delegations.⁷⁰ On 1 May, both groups held a meeting, and Hoppenot reported that their initiative would certainly receive a favourable reaction from the LA countries.⁷¹

The Arab-Asians' new initiative made the State Department consider once again alerting Paris. The Americans feared that, as was the case in the SC, they would be confronted with a choice between France and the Arab world if there was no progress in Franco-Tunisian negotiations. Acheson instructed James Dunn, the newly appointed US Ambassador in Paris, to convey a message to the Quai d'Orsay. It emphasised that the US abstention was only aimed to give France time to move ahead, and that unless France immediately had the opportunity to negotiate with Tunisia on a long-term settlement that would lead to internal autonomy, the United States would have to reconsider its position. The message noted that the mixed commission, which had been expected to meet on 24 April, had not yet been established but had been postponed until early May 1952. Coupled with overwhelmingly unfavourable public opinion on the abstention at the SC, the State Department judged it paramount to press France to go on.⁷² This message was conveyed to Maurice Schumann on 2 May, only to provoke his surprise. His reaction suggests how furiously French opinion would react:

[the] US position of non-abstaining, if known, would cause dangerous reaction...on French public opinion and more particularly on rep[resentatives] in [the] Parliament. It would raise in the latter's minds how far [the] solidarity of Atlantic nations could be maintained in solving particular problems.⁷³

His remark meant that the Tunisian problem, or colonial problems in general, could threaten the solidarity of the Western Alliance.

As the French were afraid, the Arab-Asian countries' move encouraged the Tunisian resistance to the French plan. Indeed, as late as mid-May 1952, the mixed commission had not been established because of the lack of Tunisians disposed to participate.⁷⁴ This being the case, on 13 May, Resident-General Hauteclocque suggested that Paris abandon the mixed commission and instead 'proceed to the unilateral granting of reforms'. He also pointed out that the Americans wished that the

French projects should be realised quickly enough to reassure US opinion.⁷⁵ Moreover, Amin Bey gave Hauteclouque approval to abandon the mixed commission. Following his acceptance of the Chenik government's dismissal, he was trying to dissociate himself from the nationalist cause. As one French official put it to the Americans, the Bey was now opposed to the idea of a constitutional monarch.⁷⁶ Hauteclouque reported:

[Amin Bey], under pressure from the Neo-Destour, had seemed to move in the direction of constitutional sovereignty as evidenced by his speech to the Throne Festival of 15 May 1951, but now under the influence of Mr Baccouche, he presumably is returning to the traditional notion of absolute sovereignty.⁷⁷

The French, having being alerted by the State Department, decided to have high-level talks with the Americans. Consequently, Ambassador Bonnet called on Acheson to propose a Schuman–Acheson meeting.⁷⁸ Bonnet emphasised how regrettable the effects of Franco–American disagreements would be in the UN, only to find Acheson's position unchanged. Acheson replied that before deciding on support, Washington would need details of the French programmes. Likewise, the Tunisians had also approached the State Department to forestall the French move. Bahi Ladgham, a Neo-Destour leader in charge of international affairs, had mentioned to US officials: 'in envisaging French participation in and control over [the] executive and legislative branches of [the] Tunisian government, they violate [the] French promise of last year to grant internal autonomy'.⁷⁹ That is, he accurately pointed out that French settlers' proposed participation in the government and the national assembly would contradict Tunisian self-determination and sovereignty.

On 28 May, the Schuman–Acheson talks took place in Paris. The former emphasised the importance of US support, arguing that the Tunisian nationalists believed the US government would vote for inscription in the UN, and therefore that some agreement should be found between the two countries so that the 'extremists' would not exploit the US position. Acheson, however, did not agree. After explaining America's traditional sympathy for oppressed peoples, he stressed that only by publicising French plans could Washington canalise these habits of thought satisfactorily. Nevertheless, when Schuman asked whether his counterpart would make a public statement regarding the necessity of the French presence in North Africa if France published the plan, the reply was that

'this was not impossible'.⁸⁰ This agreement was of much significance to the French, as for the first time the United States promised support when their reform plan was made public.

The conversations prompted Paris to resume negotiations. Agreeing to Hauteclouque's proposal of 13 May, Schuman sent instructions to him at the end of May: 'abandon the Mixed Commission'.⁸¹ On 5 June, Hauteclouque made public the French plan's outline,⁸² and then Schuman announced its details at the French National Assembly on 19 June. The method of negotiating apart, this plan was in essence the same as that of March 1952, but with a few minor changes. The one which deserves mention was concerned with national assemblies. This plan proposed detailed provisions for the two national assemblies. In the legislative council, which would be composed only of Tunisians, the members were to be initially appointed by the Bey's decree, as the Bey would exclusively conserve the legislative power for the time being. They would be progressively substituted by members elected at a local level. The plan explicitly noted that the Financial Council, which would deal with financial and budgetary affairs, would have an equal number of Tunisian and French members.⁸³

The French National Assembly, however, did not approve this plan. The right wing attacked the government and even demanded Schuman's resignation. One parliamentarian succinctly expressed his anxiety: 'What will you do if the homogenous legislative Assembly that you plan proclaims Tunisia's independence?' It was natural too that other countries would support the independence even though France did not recognise it. Conversely, left-wing politicians like Mitterrand criticised the plan as derisory. Unless the Tunisians held the power regarding the budget, the reform plan was unlikely to meet the nationalist aspiration. Being immensely divided, the National Assembly did not agree to the plan. Neither did this plan receive approval from French settlers nor Tunisian nationalists.⁸⁴

With little doubt, the French declaration of their plan did not successfully hinder the Arab-Asian countries' move. They had decided on 13 June to formally request Trygve Lie to consult 60 member states about a GA special session and then asked him to convene such a session.⁸⁵ Under UN regulations, it was by 20 July 1952 that those countries would have to collect 31 favourable votes.

To French satisfaction, London's position remained unchanged from that in the SC. Hoppenot noted that the British UN delegation had received instructions to support French efforts to persuade member states' representatives to respond negatively to the UN Secretary-General's

sounding.⁸⁶ Regarding the reason for the British position, Eden noted convincingly:

The interests which we have at stake are so great – no less than the political stability of the Colonial Empire – that I consider it to be essential that we should support the French to the fullest possible extent in keeping Tunisia off any UN agenda. ... We can hold the position in the Security Council and probably also in the Assembly, whatever the Americans do.⁸⁷

On 25 June, Massigli met Strang, who confirmed that he had already instructed the British Embassy in Washington to persuade the State Department to take a firm position against the envisaged special session. Massigli asked Strang 'to approach the governments directly over which London has the influence'.⁸⁸ The French were thus convinced of Britain's support on colonial issues.

It turned out that the Americans did not pose difficulties either, although this never meant that they were satisfied with the French programme. Aware of nationalist dissension, State Department officials advised Acheson to refrain from any public declaration of support, contrary to the French hopes that their plan would deserve it in accordance with the 28 May agreement.⁸⁹ Still, Washington was opposed to a special session, as it had every desire to avoid a choice between France and the Arabs, unless it proved impossible. On 24 June, one State Department official announced on television that the US government was hostile to the convocation of a special session.⁹⁰ It was for this reason that the Quai d'Orsay was able to note optimistically: 'the 31 votes required for such a meeting will not be collected'.⁹¹ On 27 June, the US delegation replied to Lie that its government did not concur with the Arab-Asian request.⁹²

On 2 July, Hauteclocque wrote to Paris that Prime Minister Baccouche had handed to the Bey the reform projects of the previous month.⁹³ Then the Tunisian Council of Ministers started examining them and late in July proposed a number of minor modifications. The Resident-General noted that there was close collaboration between the French and Tunisian ministers inside the government.⁹⁴ Presumably this report was hypothetical, but at least Tunisian affairs were stable to the extent that the dispute between the two countries could be papered over.

In the UN, seeing Franco-Tunisian negotiations in progress, the prospect of convening a GA special session was disappearing. It was reported from New York to Paris on 21 July that only ten countries had responded

favourably to the Arab-Asian countries' request.⁹⁵ Subsequently, the UN Secretary-General informed the member states that he would not call a special session.⁹⁶

4.4 The UNGA and British intervention, July–December 1952

On 30 July, the Arab-Asian countries⁹⁷ handed a letter to the UN Secretary-General requesting the inscription of the Tunisian problem on the GA agenda. Unlike the SC or a GA special session, it was supposed, the item would be inescapably taken up in the GA, given the number of Arab-Asian member states. The Western powers were to take different stances from previously. Neither Paris, London, nor Washington could immediately decide on its attitude, each exploring the other two governments' views. Britain remained loath to influence the French standpoint, even though they did not welcome French acceptance of UN debates since it could have repercussions in their overseas territories.⁹⁸ In fact, the British position was to let France keep the initiative in Tunisian and Moroccan affairs, while hoping to guide French policy in the direction they considered desirable. In contrast, reflecting the severe criticism of their abstention in the SC vote in April,⁹⁹ the Americans firmly believed that they were unable to oppose the inscription, and took a far more favourable stance to the Arabs than in the 1951 GA session. Rather, they wanted the French to accept the inscription since they did not want anti-French resolutions passed in the GA.

Aware of the American stance, Paris was indecisive. Several Quai d'Orsay officials had already started to have doubts about the French tactic of keeping the Tunisian question off the UN agenda. Lacoste in New York argued the acceptance was desirable because 'the mere fact of our accepting the inscription... would provoke a profound, and very favourable, impression at the GA' since the ongoing Franco-Tunisian dialogues were unlikely to achieve a result satisfactory to the latter.¹⁰⁰

In Tunisia, despite French expectations in early July, there had been no progress in Franco-Tunisian dialogues. On 22 July, the Bey sent a message to Auriol, which surprised the French. He stated that, contrary to press suggestions that he had implicitly accepted the French plan put forward at the beginning of July, he had not even received the draft from Baccouche.¹⁰¹ Irrespective of whether he had really received it or not, the Bey was seemingly engaged in dilatory tactics, aware of the prospect of the problem being discussed in the next GA session. Undoubtedly, his change of attitude manifested his fear that he might be overthrown if he was divided from the nationalists, as was the case with King Farouk of

Egypt.¹⁰² On 1 August, he summoned the Council of the Forty (*le Conseil des Quarante*), a meeting which 40 leading political figures attended including Tahar Ben Ammar and members of the Neo-Destour, the Vieux-Destour, and the UGTT, to discuss the June 1952 French programme. Hautecloucq commented that this meeting, held without the knowledge of the government and the Resident-General, represented an act characteristic of the Bey's orientation towards independence.¹⁰³

On 6 August, a State Department official talked with Bonnet and suggested that Paris accept the inscription because otherwise France's moral position would be worse. Although the State Department had not reached a conclusion in favour of the inscription, he added that the British UN delegation held the same view as the United States.¹⁰⁴ In fact the Americans had not exchanged views with the British on this matter, but the former made use of the latter in order to persuade the French, pretending the Anglo-Americans shared the same stance. Realising that the Americans would probably vote for the inscription, Bonnet wrote to Paris that the government should accept the UN debates, as the United States would grant diplomatic assistance to France and would try to turn American opinion in favour of the French cause.¹⁰⁵ This indicated how important Paris viewed US support in the UN, and how desperately Paris wanted to avert isolation at the UNGA.

Simultaneously, the State Department sounded out the British view on whether they would cooperate in persuading the French.¹⁰⁶ It turned out that the British reply was rather negative. Its main points were: (1) France should not object to the inscription if the only question was that of UN tactics; (2) the issue raised is one of the deepest concerns to France and the United Kingdom; and (3) it would be unfortunate if the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be putting pressure on France.¹⁰⁷ The British worry was that open debate before the US presidential election would inevitably make Washington supportive of the nationalist cause.¹⁰⁸ Thus they desired to keep the problem off the agenda at least until the beginning of November 1952, even though they did not approve individual French policies. It may appear that the British acquiesced to French colonial policy, but this was not the case. The question was how to let France abandon its stubborn colonial policy, though in London's view the worst tactic was the Anglo-American gang up on France about decolonisation. As will be made clear, they were patiently waiting for a good time at which France could be induced to turn to decolonisation.

From the French viewpoint, the ideal course of action was the Tunisian acceptance of their plan, as had hitherto been the case. Its probability

would increase, they speculated, if it became clear that the Americans supported that plan. The Quai d'Orsay, therefore, instructed the Embassy in Washington to approach the State Department with the purpose of obtaining approval from Acheson to issue a declaration to support the French position in North Africa, which they considered had been envisioned at the time of the Schuman–Acheson talks on 28 May. Likewise, the Embassy in Washington was instructed to ask the State Department to approach Baccouche.¹⁰⁹ The Americans, the French expected, would convince the Tunisians that the settlement of Franco–Tunisian disputes could only be achieved through bilateral negotiations.¹¹⁰ Hauteclocque initially disliked the idea of a US approach to the Tunisians as a dangerous precedent of a direct contact between the US Consul General and the nationalist circles must be avoided, but in the end he agreed with the Quai that Acheson's declaration of support would outweigh any disadvantages.¹¹¹

On 12 August, Jean Daridan, an official at the French Embassy in Washington, met David Bruce, the US Acting Secretary of State, to ask for a declaration of support for France. The latter refused, however, mentioning that a decision was impossible as Acheson was on leave.¹¹² On the same day, a French official in London asked James Bowker, the Director of the FO African Department, for British assistance to encourage Acheson to decide in favour of such a declaration.¹¹³ Then Maurice Schumann again instructed Daridan to approach the State Department and emphasise: 'Our reform plan has no chance of being accepted by the Bey and his advisers unless they are convinced of the futility of their efforts to attract the US to their cause.'¹¹⁴ Daridan met Bruce again, highlighting the importance of Acheson's declaration especially because the Bey's reply to the French plan was supposedly imminent, only to find Bruce's position unchanged.¹¹⁵ At this time, desperate to obtain US support, Schuman was becoming favourably disposed towards the inscription of the Tunisian problem; on 20 August, he declared in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly: 'France could perhaps accept the inscription...but in no case it should accept a debate...with its corollaries (resolutions and Investigation Commission)'.¹¹⁶

The French put the priority on avoiding direct UN interventions such as a passage of resolution and its sending of a commission to Tunisia. For this purpose, they were reluctantly beginning to judge it as necessary to follow the US lead to accept the UN's competition to take up a colonial issue. Paris did not ask London as to the latter's position on the inscription. The French might as well calculate that Britain would concur with the United States.

Some British officials, especially Jebb, had inclined to the US side even before the SC session, where the Tunisian question was highly likely to be rejected, unlike at the GA.

On 21 August, Jefferson Jones, the US Consul General in Tunis, had talks with Baccouche. The former's emphasis was that the UN Charter required the parties of interest to seek a solution by negotiation and that GA debates could delay desirable reforms.¹¹⁷ This was what the French expected the State Department to tell the Tunisians. However, the Americans wished to maintain a balance between France and Tunisia. To French embarrassment, Ernest Gross announced in a radio interview that, first, the problem would be taken up in the GA unless the Franco-Tunisian negotiations reached a conclusion and, second, that there would be no constructive solution without agreement by 'real representatives' of the Tunisian people.¹¹⁸ Obviously he was referring to the Neo-Destour when he stated 'real representatives'.

On 5 September, Franco-American discussions were held. The two countries' dialogue followed a similar pattern to those in previous years. Bonnet highlighted the significance of Acheson's proposed declaration, but Acheson again refused. The latter emphasised a publication of the French programme would enable them to support France, but the former insisted that US support was a prerequisite for such a publication. Bonnet succinctly described this as 'a vicious circle'.¹¹⁹ Aware of American intentions, he once again proposed that Paris announce its intention not to oppose the inscription.¹²⁰

Meanwhile, on 9 September, the State Department discussed with a French diplomat a deal in which the Americans would issue a statement to confirm their support for the French position in North Africa in return for French acquiescence regarding inscription. A State Department memorandum dated 16 September outlined the envisaged statement in which the United States would declare that it considered the GA should have as its goal the resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations but that the US vote for inscription was not a vote of censure of French policy in Tunisia.¹²¹ This would have been similar to the sort of statement that the French had longed for from the United States.

On the other hand, the British government was determined to follow the course that the French would adopt. After noting the Canadian approval of the inscription, the FO argued:

If a precedent is set in the case of Tunis[ia] for the discussion by the UN of such affairs, Cyprus and other British territories may well come next. The strategic consequences... would be most grave. Nevertheless

we recognise the importance of the Tunisian question for France and we are not seeking to influence her in any way....¹²²

The British were fully aware of the danger resulting from the inscription of the Tunisian question but felt it essential to support France to the detriment of their own overseas territories. In fact, Eden even told a Canadian diplomat that the United Kingdom could hardly object to the admission of the Tunisian item unless the French opposed it.¹²³ As discussed later, Britain was supporting France as an ally of the Western Alliance rather than as a fellow colonial power.

On 9 September, Amin Bey finally put forward a long-awaited reply to the French which turned out to be a severe blow to their hopes. He wrote that the reforms did not respond to the minimum objectives that he had defined especially on 15 May 1951, or bring the country to the internal autonomy promised by France.¹²⁴ As the Quai d'Orsay noted, obviously the Bey was largely influenced by the Council of the Forty.¹²⁵ Auriol sent back a message to the Bey to warn: 'it does not depend on France whether to pursue with the Bey conversations on the base of a plan of reforms, whose reasonable character Mr Acheson acknowledged'.¹²⁶ Thus the French attempted to ascribe the deadlock in negotiations to the Bey by pretending that their reforms had won American support.

Paris had not yet decided on its attitude in the event that the problem's inscription was put to a vote. The Bey's rejection of the French plan only added to their difficulties. According to Dunn, in mid-September Robert Schuman was intent on avoiding actively opposing the inscription.¹²⁷ Moreover, some diplomats of France's allies, such as Lester Pearson of Canada and Gladwyn Jebb, were trying to convince the French of the desirability of not opposing the inscription.¹²⁸ It was in these circumstances that Schuman made a statement at the Anglo-American Press Club on 24 September: 'in coming to a decision the French government would have to weigh very carefully the views of the other governments, in particular the UK, the US and the governments of South America.' It should be noted that this was a rare case whereby France expressed its intention to consult other governments on its colonial policy. As for Paris's possible final position, the British noted: 'it is particularly certain that the [French] decision in the end will be in favour of the inclusion'.¹²⁹

Schuman's announcement made the State Department formally decide to vote for the inscription. Under Acheson's instructions, Dunn informed Schuman of this decision. The reasons were: first, that the Tunisian situation was at a standstill, unlike the situation in the spring

of 1952. Second, France could be more influential in the actual consideration of the problem by the UNGA.¹³⁰

Besides, importantly, State Department officials favoured the idea of granting a hearing to representatives of the Bey and the Sultan, as the Arab-Asians desired. That is, the US stance was much more favourable to the Arabs than in December 1951, when Washington excluded the idea of oral hearing. As a direct UN intervention in North African affairs, this was what France had to prevent at all costs, since it had exclusive jurisdiction. What was at stake here was whether a colonial power was able to keep the initiative in its dependent territory or not, and to what extent the UN could snatch the initiative from it. Knowing the French were never intent on proceeding with decolonisation, the United States stuck to the idea that the UN should deal with colonial affairs so that the country would be guided to decolonisation. Hoppenot and Bonnet told the Americans on 30 September that Paris was unlikely to consent to this idea, but added that the government might accept the idea only if it realised that the alternative would be the GA's invitation to Salah Ben Youssef.¹³¹

Nonetheless, this never meant the United States was totally favourable to the Arab-Asians, who wanted an anti-French resolution to condemn France. The State Department simultaneously started promoting mediation between the French and the Arab-Asians; in American officials' view, João Carlos Muniz, the Brazilian UN representative and also the Chairman of the GA First Committee, should assume leadership in persuading the GA to adopt a moderate resolution.¹³² While pursuing a 'middle-of-the-road policy',¹³³ the Americans did not wish to see the GA close with the Arab-Asians' total victory either.

However, the British decision was quite opposite to that of the United States. Realising French intentions to listen to other governments, the British government ultimately determined its own attitude, expecting that it would influence the French. On 2 October, the FO sent instructions to the Embassy in Paris. It was emphasised that the question of principle involved was so important that even when the French government consented to a UN debate, '[Her Majesty's Government] must instruct their Delegation to make it unmistakably clear... that they do not accept that the United Nations Assembly has any standing to discuss and, far less, to pass resolutions on matters of this kind.'¹³⁴ Britain was thus adamant on the UN competence over colonial issues, even at the risk of an open wedge with the United States and France. The following day, Paris received an aide-memoire from London to the same effect.¹³⁵ Thus the British explicitly challenged the US position. Aware that Paris

was prepared to listen to other governments' advice, they at last revealed their own attitude. Rejecting the UN discussions, irrespective of France's decision, was the simplest way to safeguard their interests in colonial areas.

The British decision introduced a fundamentally new element. Actually, it was due to this British intervention that the French ultimately changed their course which had been to a large extent inclined to the acceptance of inscription. It was argued in Paris that neither the Parliament nor the people would understand that the French delegation would accept the inscription while the British opposed. In addition,

[The British move] would provide us with an excuse to explain the refusal to the Americans. On the field of principle, the British position is certainly very strong: to accept the inscription undoubtedly weakens our moral and legal position and may create...an unwelcome precedent.¹³⁶

The Quai sought reconfirmation of the British intentions. Massigli asked Eden whether there could be close Anglo–French coordination of action if both powers adopted the same attitude. The latter replied firmly, 'that is exactly our understanding'.¹³⁷

As a consequence, the French Council of Ministers decided to oppose the inscription of the problem on 7 October. The Quai explained to the Americans the reason for this change of course: '[the] US [was] not openly and actively supporting France on [the] competence question but that support was of more indefinite nature.'¹³⁸ Namely, the French chose the United Kingdom rather than the United States as a partner with whom to handle the North African problems in the UN. This was a critical moment when the French decided to defend its colonial policy as a whole at the expense of possible short-term benefits in North Africa brought about by US support. This sudden French about-face seriously perplexed the Americans. Acheson instructed the embassies in Paris and in London to explore detailed French tactics and the nature of the British support.¹³⁹

On 11 October, Maurice Schumann instructed the UN delegation to vote against the inscription both in the GA First Committee and its plenary session. The delegation was also instructed to make every effort to get the examination of the North African items placed low on the agenda once the inscription was decided on.¹⁴⁰ This meant that the French delegation would have to stay at the GA session during debates on North Africa. However, the Quai soon modified its position,

instructing the delegation to abstain from both the First Committee and the plenary session if the inscription was decided on.¹⁴¹ It was indicated that these new tactics would deprive the French delegation of a chance whereby it could try to prevent the GA from passing a resolution hostile to France. Nevertheless, it was perhaps judged that the new tactics were more consistent with the principle that the UN was not competent to deal with internal affairs, the principle to which France attached much importance, and that the advantage derived from this consistency would outweigh the disadvantage deriving from non-attendance.

On 22 October, the First Committee discussed the Arab-Asian motion which proposed placing the Tunisian and Moroccan questions second and third on the GA agenda respectively, following the Korean War question. The Committee voted for this motion, with 51 votes in favour, five against, and four abstentions. To French and British astonishment, Gross voted for this motion. Hoppenot had observed that France could count on US support in putting the questions at the end of the agenda.¹⁴² From Tunis, Resident-General Hauteclocque reported that the nationalists hailed his vote as France's defeat. In fact, the number of violent activities of nationalists had increased particularly a few days before the opening of the GA session.¹⁴³ No wonder the French press harshly attacked the US vote.¹⁴⁴

Hoppenot protested against the US vote when he met Secretary Acheson immediately after the First Committee session. Acheson insisted that the US negative vote would not have brought any change to the result and that Gross voted on his own judgement.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Gross actually decided to do so because 'developing Asia-African sentiment for early consideration of Tunisia' after the GA session's opening had put the US delegation in a position to choose Korea or Tunisia as the first item to be discussed.¹⁴⁶ The rise of this sentiment was unquestionably caused by the Sultan's revelation of Franco-Moroccan dialogues on 8 October 1952.¹⁴⁷

The French reactions were alarming to the Americans¹⁴⁸ for whom securing French attendance at the UN session was the minimum goal. The State Department started examining a letter from Acheson to Schuman in order to allay French worries, although it had rejected the idea of making a public statement in support of France. On 27 October, Dunn was instructed to emphasise orally that 'no other countries could give effective assistance to the French if they did not make a strong presentation at the United Nations regarding their achievements and programs for North Africa'.¹⁴⁹ Then the Americans revived an idea of a Brazilian draft resolution when Jessup met Hoppenot on the following

day. Jessup warned the latter that the Arabs could win a majority for an anti-French proposal 'if we sat back and did nothing' and mentioned that there was a good probability of obtaining sufficient support from the LA delegations to get a moderate resolution passed 'if the French could decide on an affirmative and constructive position now' over their attendance at the UN session.¹⁵⁰

However, regarding the issue of inviting representatives of the Bey, Jessup was not opposed to this and even expected 'the likelihood of a French defeat'. That is, the Americans remained resolved to give the UN a say over Tunisian affairs. Hoppenot took note of the US proposal on a presentation at the GA session, and underlined that the French could under no circumstances acknowledge that France was responsible to the UN in this matter.¹⁵¹

The Bey's declaration of his support of UN recourse on 28 October¹⁵² pressed Paris into accepting Schuman's attendance. Since January 1952, Amin Bey had failed to indicate his own attitude on this issue. Now that it was clear his representative would present a strongly nationalist case if invited to the GA, US support was considered essential.¹⁵³ This was because supposedly Amin Bey would be sending the Neo-Destour members such as Salah Ben Youssef, not moderate Tunisian representatives, to the UNGA as a speaker. As soon as Schuman received a letter from Acheson on 31 October suggesting his own presentation at the GA, he drafted a letter dated the same day.¹⁵⁴ His letter, transmitted to Washington on 3 November, stated that he was to make a speech in the GA on 10 November.¹⁵⁵

Schuman's acceptance contributed to moderating American attitudes concerning the invitation of North African representatives.¹⁵⁶ When Massigli had met Bruce in Washington on 31 October, the latter was willing to support granting an oral hearing to North African representatives and a UN enquiry into the situation in Tunisia and Morocco. Alerted by this remark, Massigli, under the Quai d'Orsay's instructions, asked Eden to persuade the State Department to oppose both issues. Eden, who had not been informed of these US positions, also expressed astonishment.¹⁵⁷ However, when Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, met Acheson on 6 November, it turned out that the latter intended to vote against on the issue of North African representatives.¹⁵⁸ The FO noted that this was an improvement on the original US position.¹⁵⁹ Schuman's acceptance of GA attendance alone did not, nonetheless, explain all the reasons for the US concessions since the Americans had favoured an oral hearing even when France was inclined to accept UN debate. Presumably, in view of strong French reactions after Gross's

vote on 22 October and, more generally, the Anglo–French common front, Acheson had already decided to withdraw the insistence over this issue on condition Schuman attended. The United States thus decided to confine UN involvement to just discussing the Tunisian problem without direct meddling such as the invitation of local representatives.

In addition to an oral hearing, the Americans had already started trying to dissuade the Arab-Asian countries from passing an anti-French resolution. When Acheson had talks with Schuman, who had just arrived in New York, he revealed that he had already contacted Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani UN representative who Acheson said expressed ‘his desire to be helpful’ to the Americans. Schuman replied that there could be no resolution ‘officially’ acceptable to France, but promised that the French delegation would provide maximum assistance to the US delegation in order to get a moderate resolution passed.¹⁶⁰ Then Schuman made a speech in the UN in which he redefined French policy towards the North African protectorates but mentioned that the French delegation would not attend the GA First Committee. This triggered difficulties with the Brazilians who did not wish to present their resolution unless the French attended the Committee, as Muniz complained to Schuman on 15 November.¹⁶¹ The Americans were unwavering. On 21 November, Jessup met Muniz and strongly suggested that he introduce a moderate resolution.¹⁶²

Debates on the Tunisian problem were opened in the First Committee on 4 December. The Arab-Asians had already introduced their draft resolution. This recommended, first, that negotiations be resumed between the French government and the Tunisian people’s true representatives for the purpose of implementing the right of self-determination and, second, that the Assembly establish a commission of good offices to arrange and assist in the negotiations, and ask the commission to report on progress. On 9 December, the LA countries presented their draft resolution which expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisians while safeguarding the legitimate interests of the French.¹⁶³ Subsequently the Arab-Asians proposed inviting the Bey’s and the Sultan’s representatives, but this proposition was turned down. Undoubtedly this result reflected the US change of stance. In the end, on 12 December, the Committee rejected the Arab-Asian draft resolution by 27 votes to 24 with seven abstentions, and instead approved the LA draft resolution by 45 votes to three with ten abstentions.¹⁶⁴ The Soviet Union voted for the Asia-Arab resolution in order to express support to the nationalist cause.

The GA plenary session, held on 17 December, decided to follow the First Committee's recommendation and passed the LA draft resolution by 44 votes to three with eight abstentions.¹⁶⁵ In fact, one day before the vote in the Committee, Jamali of Iraq had suggested to Muniz that the Arabs would vote for the LA resolution if theirs was defeated because 'no resolution would be by far the worst solution'.¹⁶⁶ The GA debates closed with the passage of the moderate resolution with an overwhelming majority.

The 1952 UNGA resolution was a double-edged sword for the French. On the one hand, this was a sinister precedent whereby the UN took up a colonial matter. Moreover, by recommending Tunisian self-government, the UN, with American support, announced that the principle of assimilation or association would never be acceptable to international opinion. Bourguiba in particular attached a high value to the US voting, when he noted: 'the US made a small step forward... It voted for the UN's competence.' He correctly regarded the American vote as 'a deferment'.¹⁶⁷ On the other, however, the fact that the invitation of Tunisians was rejected showed the UN's unwillingness to be involved in Tunisian affairs directly. Consequently, the French were to ignore the effect of the GA resolution. Besides, most nationalist leaders had already been expelled in January and March 1952. As explained in the Chapter 5, France, with this background, was to renew attempts to force the Bey and the nationalists to surrender.

Put simply, the UNGA resolution was based on the US position that was moderated by the UK initiative. The energetic activities of the United States successfully secured its main goal: the resolution did not call for Tunisia's independence or condemn French colonialism, even though the Americans made concessions on the UN direct involvement. Likewise, the UN denied French colonial policy and supported Tunisian self-government. The nationalists therefore expected international opinion would not desert them. Still, the British role was important in blocking the UN from grasping the initiative, such as the invitation of Tunisian representatives. France was thus able to secure its own lead in treating Tunisian affairs without direct intervention from outside. As shown later, this would to a large extent contribute to French influence remaining there.

4.5 UN Debates and the Casablanca Massacre: Morocco, February–December 1952

Despite the Tunisian recourse to the UN, Moroccan political leaders did not react in any significant way at the beginning of 1952. As the French

observed, the Sultan was watching the Tunisian situation closely to ascertain whether France would decide to revise its protectorate status. As late as 2 February, Prince Moulay Hassan remarked in a press interview on the Sultan's idea that can be summarised as follows:

1. Morocco will ineluctably accede to full sovereignty and independence.
2. Once independence acquired, the French could be treated as privileged.
3. The current Sultan will never consent to Morocco's entry to the French Union.
4. The Franco-US Agreements on air bases are contrary to the Treaty of Fez.¹⁶⁸

The Quai d'Orsay commented that the sovereign was under strong pressure from the Istiqlal: 'The Sultan is trying hard to stagger between the Protectorate that guarantees his reign and the nationalists.' This view was more or less grounded on the French over-confidence that his domestic position still relied on their recognition of him as a sovereign, but they were aware that he had to maintain a careful balance between the nationalists and the traditionalists. It was noted: 'the Sultan is not quite sure of the cohesion of the Sharifian Empire or the capacities of his future ministers...if he immediately wants to dispense with military support and technical aid of a modern foreign power, that is France.'¹⁶⁹ The French strongly believed that he viewed their presence essential. Ironically, this belief would later prove true on the eve of independence.

At last Mohammed V publicised his requests to France on 14 March. This was presumably encouraged by the Pakistani submission of the Tunisian problem to the UN two days earlier. His memorandum was composed of three demands: (1) the removal of martial law and the right to form trade unions; (2) the constitution by the Sultan of a government; and (3) negotiations on the revision of Franco-Moroccan relations.¹⁷⁰ The Sultan then sent his entourage to the Americans in order to explain his intentions. An American official in Tangier was notified that, first, the Sultan's goal did not lie in introducing a change in the form of Sharifian government but in modifying the composition of the present Sharifian government in order to make it capable of negotiating with France. Second, the Sultan steadfastly refused to join the French Union which would make direct access to the UN impossible to Morocco. Yet it was emphasised that he would accept Morocco's becoming part of a French Commonwealth in the same manner that India and Australia were part of the British Commonwealth.¹⁷¹ That is, what is crucial is

whether Morocco enjoyed sovereignty, and therefore its entry to the Union was obligatory or not. On 30 March, he drove around in Rabat by car to demonstrate his nationalist attitude to Moroccans, and by May 1952 regained the popular support that he had lost when he surrendered to Juin in February 1951, noted a French official.¹⁷² Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that popular representation was not referred to in the memorandum. It can be concluded that Mohammed V was less enthusiastically committed to popular sovereignty than Bourguiba though aware of the importance of popularity among the people.

Paris was unwilling to respond to the Sultan's memorandum at this stage, presumably because it was so preoccupied with the Tunisian question in the UN.¹⁷³ In April and May 1952, the French were keen to secure American support in view of obtaining their abstention on the inclusion of the Tunisian item on the SC agenda and the Arab countries attempting to hold a GA special session. Nonetheless, Bonnet suggested that the government approach Washington and emphasise the importance of their role in affecting other governments' voting in the UN.¹⁷⁴ On 13 May, Bonnet proposed Schuman–Acheson talks when he met McBride. The former underlined that 'to give the Moroccans the impression that [the Americans] felt the Treaty of Fez was a threat to the public order of Morocco would be...an incitement to disturbances'.¹⁷⁵ Then Bonnet passed on to Acheson Schuman's message that the Americans 'could decide on [the] nature and scope of discussions establishing common policy...in UN'.¹⁷⁶ Although the SC debate had been successfully blocked the previous month, the French were now afraid of the possibility of the GA taking up Tunisia and Morocco. Acheson's reply was, however, that the next Franco–American conversations would not be fully effective unless the French were able to expose their African policy on the whole.¹⁷⁷ As discussed above, the Schuman–Acheson conversations took place on 28 May, when the latter promised that the United States would support the French presence if the latter announced their reform plans in the North African protectorates.¹⁷⁸

On 7 August, the Iraqi government requested the UN Secretary-General to include the Moroccan problem on the GA agenda.¹⁷⁹ The Iraqi demand forced the Quai d'Orsay to discuss how to respond to the 14 March memorandum. Guillaume observed that Mohammed V considered the opening of negotiations alone would be sufficient to immediately bring about the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez and to establish a new regime similar to that prior to 1912.¹⁸⁰ A Quai d'Orsay note explained the principal points of the French plan, but it repeated the thesis that France and French settlers had contributed to the pacification and modernisation of

Morocco. As with the Tunisian case, France was determined not to alter its position: the establishment of municipal assemblies through the principle of co-sovereignty, and no transfer of significant political powers to indigenous people. As for concrete methods of implementing the plan, the Quai authorised the Resident-General to discuss them with the Sultan.¹⁸¹

Guillaume handed the reply to Mohammed V on 17 September,¹⁸² but without making its content public at this stage.¹⁸³ This was probably because the French were afraid of possible criticism by Arabs. Immediately after, the Sultan summoned a meeting composed of leading Moroccan figures of various shades of opinion in order to examine the French note. On 3 October, as had already been anticipated,¹⁸⁴ the Sultan rejected it on the grounds that the French reply did not meet any of his demands of 14 March.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, he did submit the French response to the press on 8 October. This move surprised the French who observed that his aim of publication lay in impressing world opinion that it was only the UN that could work out an acceptable solution to the Franco-Moroccan dispute. Supporting the Arab-Asian countries' initiative in the GA was also his intention.¹⁸⁶ In reality, at the end of September 1952, Mohammed V had been rather reluctant to disseminate the original French plan because it would surely have antagonised them.¹⁸⁷ Arguably, in view of France's decision on 7 October to oppose the inclusion of the North African items on the UNGA agenda, however, he chose to proceed with the revelation. As argued earlier in this chapter, the Sultan's disclosure would make the United States concur with the Arab-Asian motion which proposed placing the North African questions immediately after the Korean on the agenda.¹⁸⁸

Soon after the opening of the UN debates on Tunisia, a riot led by the Istiqlal broke out in Casablanca on 7 and 8 December, protesting against the assassination of Ferhat Ached, the leader of the UGTT, on 5 December. At least eight Frenchmen were murdered and an unknown number of Moroccan rioters shot by police and troops.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, on 8 December the UGSCM (*l'Union général des syndicats confédérés du Maroc*), the only Moroccan labour union, called for a 24-hour strike, to which the Residency responded by arresting 400 members of the Istiqlal, the UGSCM, and the Communist Party, and outlawed those groups. French records contend that 'the Casablanca Massacre' outraged French opinion,¹⁹⁰ but as a British source suggested, the French were not unanimous: the members of the French left, such as François Mauriac, condemned the excesses committed by the police.¹⁹¹

These violent events in turn strained Franco-American relations. Naturally, American public opinion regarded the French response to the

riot as typical oppressive policy. The American Consulate at Rabat was instructed to tell Guillaume: 'further violence no matter what origin will alienate US public opinion'.¹⁹² Guillaume explained to the Americans the background and causes of the recent events: 'French attempt to change a backward country of [the] Middle Ages into a Twentieth Century nation in [a] matter [of] forty years was responsible for their present difficulties'. Then he insisted, to no avail, that he had absolute proof of connections between the Istiqlal and the Communist Party and that the mass of Moroccans was not in sympathy with the Istiqlal.¹⁹³

On the other hand, debates on Moroccan affairs started in the GA First Committee.¹⁹⁴ As in Tunisia, the Arab-Asian countries favoured Moroccan self-determination, but the LA countries preferred a watered-down resolution. In the final analysis, the latter won as a result of US support. On 13 December, the day after its adoption of the LA draft resolution regarding Tunisia, the Arab-Asian countries submitted a draft resolution requesting the French government and the Sultan to enter into negotiations to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco. Eleven LA countries sponsored a moderate draft resolution, on 16 December, to call for the two countries to work towards the development of 'free political institutions'.¹⁹⁵ The 'free political institution' suggests an equivocal version of self-government or internal autonomy that the Arabs wanted as the goal of the negotiations. The following day the Committee rejected the Arab-Asian resolution and adopted the LA resolution with a Pakistani amendment which required 'both parties should pursue the negotiations, with a view to allowing self-government for the Moroccans'. The GA plenary session, on 19 December, approved the LA resolution by a vote of 45 to 3 with 11 abstentions but rejected the Pakistani amendment which, according to the US delegation, 'distorts the spirit of the LA proposition'.¹⁹⁶

As with the Tunisian one, this resolution was a double-edged sword for France. The resolution enshrined the UN competence by a massive majority.¹⁹⁷ Yet the result was not considered a total defeat for the French because their plan advocating French participation in Moroccan political institutions was not overtly rejected by the UN as a basis for further bilateral negotiations. Moreover, the UNGA also turned down interfering in Moroccan affairs directly. So the French would again begin to pressure the Sultan to accept their plan. As demonstrated below, faced with similar GA resolutions, the sovereigns of both protectorates were to show quite contrasting reactions. Their diverging reactions demonstrated the dilemma in which they were placed as a result of growing social mobilisation the ascent of nationalism in the post-war era.

5

The Impasse

The aftermath of the UN discussions in December 1952 generated contrasting responses from the two sovereigns. The Bey in Tunisia, finding the nationalist cause unsuccessful in obtaining full support from international society, resolved to break with the nationalists. The Sultan kept resisting the French projects and remained sympathetic towards the nationalists because the UN took up the North African issues and paid some consideration to the movements.

It appeared to the French that they were faced with much more trouble in Morocco than in Tunisia where the Bey's authority was unshakable. His siding with the French, together with the arrest and exile of the Neo-Destour leaders, seemed to assure the cohesiveness of the political community. As long as the UN did not want to intervene directly, Paris remained unchanged in its ultimate goal though its concerns about international opinion made the French authorities adopt softer methods in dealing with the nationalists. The Bey's approval of France's March 1954 plan for the national assembly with French settlers' participation marked a definite break with the nationalists. This also appeared to be a clear-cut and long-awaited victory for France, but was to lead to an unexpected outcome.

On the other hand, the division of the Moroccan political community was clear: the nationalist activities angered el-Glaoui, who built animosity against Mohammed V. For the purpose of heightening the cohesiveness of Moroccan political community, the French had no choice but to continue their traditional policy: the set-up of political institutions in which the French settlers and the Moroccans were allowed to have a voice. The issue was how to convince Mohammed V of the reform to realise such institutions. Once again, the antagonism between the Sultan and el-Glaoui proved to be a serious bottleneck for the French

goal. In addition, the UN discussions throughout 1952 also moderated the French tactics in Morocco. Considering the threat of deposition against the former no longer available because of international attention, Paris made use of el-Glaoui's pressure in persuading the sovereign of the 'democratisation' reform. This would prove to be a fatal choice; the confrontation between the two camps would compel the French authorities to take the initiative in removing Mohammed V from the throne. The removal would further anger Moroccan opinion and receive fierce criticism from the international community. This also indicated that the French traditional method of colonial rule, that is, divide and rule, had finally failed. In the era of nationalist-inspired social mobilisation, what was more important was how to aggregate popular opinion, thereby increasing the community's cohesion. France was obliged to realise that divide and rule was clearly outdated.

5.1 The anti-Sultan petition: Morocco, December 1952–August 1953¹

Immediately after the UNGA had adopted the resolution, Guillaume met the Sultan on 22 December 1952. He requested the sovereign to resume collaboration 'without second thought, which could have been given birth by the vain hope of intervention of the UN, the Arab League or another foreign power'.² However, Guillaume's persuasion did not work with the Sultan, who was convinced that the nationalists' setback was only temporary and that they would soon restore their former prestige.³ Therefore, Mohammed V declined the French plan, an attitude quite contrary to that of the Bey. The latter accepted the plan to set up municipal assemblies with French settlers' participation, as mentioned later in this chapter.

Paris was seemingly more self-confident than previously. The Istiqlal had been banned with the nationalist leaders being ousted as a consequence of the Casablanca Massacre. The removal of the nationalist leaders in the North African protectorates and the Bey's approval of the municipal plan, as it appeared to the French, gave them a green light to proceed to the realisation of their goal: the introduction of political regimes based on the principle of co-sovereignty and, ultimately, the incorporation of both Protectorates into the French Union. The Sultan's refusal to sign posed a principal obstacle to this goal, but the French were optimistic that pressing him to accept the plan would be easy.

At the beginning of 1953, the French made public their intentions regarding Tunisia and Morocco. In his declaration before becoming

Prime Minister, René Mayer stated on 6 January that France's mission was 'to guide the populations of Tunisia and Morocco towards the administration of their own affairs'.⁴ He was nominated as Prime Minister by 389 votes to 205 and formed a government including Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister. Evidently, France had no intention of granting internal autonomy or self-government to either Protectorate. In fact, nevertheless, some political figures demanded the two countries be given substantive political power. Guy Mollet, the leader of the SFIO, called for Mayer to fix the date of the lifting of the Protectorate and the successive stages of the passage of Tunisia to a sovereign and independent state. Likewise, Mitterrand advocated achieving internal autonomy in North Africa immediately. In any case, 'there would be no change of French policy in either territory and the French meant to go on with the reforms as heretofore', as Maurice Schumann put it to the British.⁵ By failing to refer to internal autonomy, the French were not able to secure US support for their presence in North Africa, as had been envisaged by the Schumann–Acheson talks in May 1952. Washington had no reaction to Mayer's declaration, although this would, to some extent, contribute to making American attitudes sympathetic to the French, as will be argued below.

In the meantime, Morocco was witnessing conflict between the Sultan and the traditionalists intensifying since the Casablanca Massacre of December 1952. As conservative Muslim leaders, the latter were furious with the Istiqlal's violent methods and hated Mohammed V whose sympathetic attitude, they considered, encouraged the Istiqlal, thereby undermining traditional Muslim society and the French position. This was a very serious situation because el-Glaoui preserved a semi-independent status in Southern Morocco. As mentioned before, it was the French authorities that had restored him as the Pasha of Marrakech in 1912 and had armed him with modern weapons since then.⁶ Being hesitant to destroy the feudal hierarchy beneath him, the French did not positively show objections to his movement. On the other hand, since France had an obligation to defend the Sultan under the Treaty of Fez, its failure to protect the Sultan was potentially a grave act which would be condemned by international opinion.

On 2 January 1953, in an interview with a Madrid newspaper, el-Glaoui violently accused Mohammed V of boosting a seditious movement. Even though Mohammed V knew France's commitment to the principle of co-sovereignty, he positively responded to Mayer's declaration,⁷ perhaps largely because of el-Glaoui's growing pressure. He sent a message to Auriol on 12 January which, referring to Mayer's declaration, confirmed

his intention to negotiate a solution.⁸ This note omitted reference to his earlier expressed position that the goal of negotiations should be the revision of the protectorate treaty but the Quai d'Orsay, too, had no reason to believe his position had changed.⁹

The Eisenhower Administration showed a more cooperative attitude towards France. Bidault discussed the North African problems with John Foster Dulles, the new US Secretary of State, in Paris on 2 February. He found Dulles's attitude more encouraging than that of his predecessor when the latter told him that 'the Republican Administration does neither intend to call into question the US's fundamental principles based on the Atlantic Pact nor wish the disintegration of the French Union'.¹⁰

Unlike 1952, Washington was not willing to see the North African problems discussed in the UN's 1953 session. On 19 February, the Arab-Asian countries met to examine the desirability of these items being taken up in the UNGA. On the very next day, an American weekly magazine, which supposedly had close relations with the government, announced that Dulles would assure the French that the US government would exert its influence in order not to create trouble for France.¹¹ The State Department judged it too early for them to show to the world positive results in the negotiations with the North Africans and, therefore, concluded that UN debates would be inappropriate. In fact, on 10 March the State Department instructed its UN delegation to oppose consideration of the North African problems in the autumn of 1953, 'on grounds that far too little time has elapsed since [the] adoption of GA resolutions'.¹² Besides, the US policy may have been motivated by not pressuring the French excessively in order to obtain their adherence to the EDC (European Defence Community).¹³

Heartened by talks with Dulles, Bidault replied to Mohammed V that it was by direct conversations between the Sultan and French representatives, that is, the Resident-General, that the problems had to be examined. For the French, it was imperative to make the Sultan realise that the problems concerning Franco-Moroccan relations must be regulated 'out of all external intervention' or without the 'agitation' of the Communists and of the Istiqlal.¹⁴ In view of the UN resolution just a month ago, Paris was quite nervous about the Sultan's listening to international opinion which partially paid respect to the nationalist cause. On 18 February, Bidault instructed Guillaume to emphasise to the sovereign: 'the democratisation that we are resolved to undertake must be done without bringing damage to the Sultan's prerogatives, which we guarantee'.¹⁵ This hypocritical argument did not convince the Sultan to agree to the French plan, however.

In Morocco, not only el-Glaoui but also several French Residency officials had started anti-Sultan campaigns. One French official published an article in *Paris-Match* on 7 February headed 'The Sultan must change or we must change the Sultan.'¹⁶ In mid-February 1953, Mohammed V reportedly complained to his entourage: 'A bitter propaganda [campaign] is being waged against the Sultan by the French officials... with the Glaoui serving as the willing leader.'¹⁷ Some Residency officials were in fact deeply involved in this anti-Sultan movement, believing that Mohammed V was the gravest obstacle to the French plans. Those officials' activities were made without explicit instructions from Paris. Yet, as will be made clear below, the French government, Foreign Minister Bidault in particular, was soon to take advantage of pressure on the Sultan by forcing him to agree to their programme, even though Bidault himself instructed Guillaume not to exert such pressure on Mohammed V, and Paris immovably opposed the idea of his deposition.

This tactic was in fact similar to what the French had adopted from December 1950 to February 1951, when they were demanding that the Sultan condemn the Istiqlal. However, there was one difference: after experiencing the 1952 UN debates, the Resident-General ceased to threaten the Sultan with deposition, fearing criticism from the international community. Here, an evident effect of the UN discussions can be found. Instead, the method that the French was to take was to make sole use of internal pressure from el-Glaoui. Deliberately or not, Paris and the Residency would leave the Moroccan situation almost unchecked until the Sultan asked France for help. It would turn out, however, that this tactic would produce a very unexpected and unfortunate result from the French viewpoint.

The draft of a *dahir* concerning the municipal institutions was once again tabled to Mohammed V on 2 March, although it seemed that no press reported this event. The *dahir* aimed at creating seven municipal assemblies composed of French and Moroccan members, each having an equal number of seats, but this project was never acceptable to the nationalists, even though most Istiqlal leaders had already been exiled. On 16 March, the Arab-Asian countries' delegations wrote to the UN Secretary-General denouncing 'France's violent and oppressive policy in Morocco'.¹⁸ Nevertheless, unlike in July 1951, the sovereign's position concerning this issue looked ambivalent. As Guillaume reported to Paris, 'Subjected to various and often contradictory influences, anxious not to break bridges with either France or the Istiqlal, Sidi Mohammed V hesitates.'¹⁹ Chiefly because of pressure from the conservative dignitaries,

the Sultan was unwillingly more inclined to succumb to the French plan than before.

At this moment, el-Glaoui made a decisive step towards the Sultan's deposition. On 20 March, a petition was signed demanding his removal, following a meeting of some 20 caids with el-Glaoui in Marrakech. This movement had originally been started in Fez by Sharif Abedelhaï el-Kitani, Grand Master of Kittanies, a pro-French Muslim brotherhood,²⁰ and 'espoused by [the] Pasha of Marrakech as a useful instrument against the Sultan'.²¹ The petition stated:

1. the Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef had broken the commitments and covenants by which he was bound in regard to the Muslim religion and under which he bore obligations to the Moroccan people;
2. by attaching himself to illegal extremist parties and applying their principles in Morocco, he was leading the country to its doom;
3. in so doing, he had placed himself in opposition to all men of goodwill in the country and had embarked on a path contrary to the tenets of religion.

Therefore the signatories asked the Resident-General and the French government to remove the Sultan. This petition at once began to circulate among the Moroccan chiefs.²²

Soon after, at the end of March, Mohammed V was showing a flexible attitude over the issue of municipal assemblies, presumably because he needed Paris's intervention more than ever in order to counter el-Glaoui's offensive. Emphasising that this problem was related to Moroccan sovereignty, he informed the Residency of the conditions upon which he would sign the *dahir* and accept French settlers' participation in those assemblies. Those conditions were: first, the right of French settlers to vote should be limited to the area of the municipalities, which would enable the Palace to regard that right as merely a technical means of recruiting committees and as having no political character and, secondly, the administrative supervision of the municipalities should be restored by the Residency to the Grand Vizier. Bidault noted with satisfaction that the Sultan did not object to the 'democratic' nature of the reform.²³ Pressured by el-Glaoui and French Residency officials, Mohammed V began considering accepting the French settlers' participation, albeit with some reservations.

Some French officials in Morocco contributed significantly to the enlargement of el-Glaoui's movement. It was only on 31 March that Jacques de Blesson, *Délégué à la Résidence Générale*,²⁴ notified Paris of

the petition without, however, transmitting its text. According to him, this was merely 'one of the signs by which the conservative opposition appear from time to time'.²⁵ He thus deliberately dismissed the significance of the petition. Bidault cabled Guillaume instructing that the government never condones recourse to such extreme measures as deposition.²⁶ Needless to say, France had an obligation under the Treaty of Fez to defend the Sultan. Paris already suspected that some anti-Mohammed V activities were developing but did not take positive measures to contain such movements.

Ironically, Mohammed V's conciliatory attitude towards France seriously concerned the traditionalist dignitaries, because now it was clear that Paris did not approve his deposition if he accepted the municipal project. From their viewpoint, he had to be dethroned unless he condemned the Istiqlal. From 4 to 6 April, a congress of the North African Religious Brotherhood was held at Fez, presided over by el-Kittani, in the presence of el-Glaoui and some 20 caids and a thousand Moroccan delegates representing religious brotherhoods. After speeches hostile to the Sultan, this assembly adopted resolutions in favour of expanding the movement of the brotherhoods.²⁷ Naturally, this gathering provoked sharp reactions from the Palace and other religious leaders. The Sultan told Guillaume that it would be impossible to make progress on the Franco-Moroccan dialogue until the atmosphere had improved, on the grounds that the rapidly developing revolt of the caids would have been impossible without the Residency officials' support.²⁸ In other words, Mohammed V requested that the ongoing Franco-Moroccan dialogues be suspended as long as the Residency officials supported el-Glaoui's movement. Then he also proposed to the French government that Franco-Moroccan conversations on municipal reform be continued in Paris, not in Rabat, because of the local troubles. This was in fact the first time that Paris had been told of the Sultan's complaint about el-Glaoui's campaigns.²⁹ However, the French refused the Sultan's request. Obviously, Paris wished to maintain pressure on him. Simultaneously, pro-Sultan groups and individuals, including Si Ould Embarek Bekkai, the Pasha of Sefrou, were also voicing their opposition to el-Glaoui. The ulama of Fez submitted a letter to the Sultan in which they supported him while protesting about el-Glaoui's activities.³⁰ This was a significant counter-attack on the Pasha of Marrakech, since no Sultan could rightfully be either deposed or elected without the ulama's consent.³¹

Meanwhile, outraged by the anti-Sultan movement, the Arab-Asian countries were preparing to bring the Moroccan problem to the UNSC in 1953. On 8 April, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the US representative at

the UN, reported to Washington that the Arab-Asians had decided to bring the Tunisian and Moroccan cases before the SC, hoping that the United States would vote for inscription.³² Yet Dulles instructed Lodge the following day to tell the Arab-Asian group the US view: 'we do not feel that sufficient time has elapsed since [the] adoption of GA resolutions [in 1952]'.³³ That day the Quai d'Orsay instructed the French UN delegation to oppose the inscription of the two items.³⁴ In May 1953, despite Dulles's position, the Arab-Asians still believed that the United States would vote for the inscription³⁵ but it proved that the Anglo-Americans agreed that they should vote against it.³⁶ In fact, the three Western countries' delegations in New York shared the view that '[the] best course is to keep Arab-Asians in the dark re[garding] our position thus prolonging their state [of] uncertainty and indecision re[garding] [the] submission of item',³⁷ so that those countries would finally withdraw their request in view of the ambivalent US attitude.

While the petition against the Sultan was circulating throughout the country, de Blesson failed to inform Paris of the gravity of the situation. Guillaume officially presented the petition to the Quai d'Orsay on 27 May, when the French government had already been suffering a ministerial crisis since the fall of the Mayer Government on 21 May.³⁸ On 30 May, the Quai issued a communiqué that mentioned 'this move can only reinforce the government's will to give an expression to the democratic tendencies that are emerging in Moroccan opinion'.³⁹ The French were not prepared to prevent el-Glaoui's movement from gaining strength although they did not positively want to assist it. Mohammed V told Guillaume that 'the petition... could only be considered as treason' and asked him to remove the caids who had signed it. However, the Resident-General coldly replied that 'had [the Sultan] agreed to sign the *dahir* implementing the municipal reforms, the petition would never have been circulated', to which the sovereign was reported as replying that he would never sign the municipal reform.⁴⁰ In fact, it was widely rumoured among the Moroccan people that France might depose the Sultan and that the Arab-Asian bloc would rally to his support straightaway. Knowing that Guillaume was unenthusiastic about stopping el-Glaoui's movement, Mohammed V requested Paris on 1 June to immediately bring to a close 'this organized dissidence'.⁴¹

Guillaume still toyed with the idea of forcing the sovereign to accept the French plans by making use of the troubles. On 3 June, he wrote to Paris that it was his own duty to let public opinion be expressed freely against the Sultan.⁴² The division of Moroccan opinion was becoming even more conspicuous. On the same day, the pashas of Fez, Sefrou,

Meknès, and Salé made declarations of loyalty to Mohammed V.⁴³ Similarly, about 300 messages protesting against the anti-Sultanate movement of pashas and caids were sent to Auriol. El-Glaoui, who was then in London, countered by announcing his plan clearly: 'The Sultan is deposed and no longer the emir of believers. In order to achieve his dethronement, what we need now is the consent of France alone.'⁴⁴ Thus, while the Sultan openly pressed Paris to give support, el-Glaoui was trying to force France to agree to the deposition.

In June 1953, the State Department changed its tactics towards the Arab-Asians. Presumably the Americans judged it better to thwart their move explicitly to bring the Moroccan problem to the UNSC, seeing them more eager to do so because of Guillaume's failure to halt el-Glaoui's movement. The State Department concluded on 10 June that, if asked, the United States should inform the Arab-Asians that it would vote against the inscription of the North African problems. This was aimed at drawing Arab-Asian leaders' attention to Dulles's address on 1 June 1953, whereby he had declared: 'the western Powers can gain rather than lose from an orderly development of self-government' of colonial territories.⁴⁵ On 15 June, one official at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington had conversations with an American diplomat over the issue of inscription, only to find that 'the US would not wish to see [the proposed resolutions] introduced'.⁴⁶ Thus, despite the troubles that el-Glaoui was creating, the Americans were adamant in opposing SC consideration of the Moroccan problem. Again, they were anxious to avoid UN debates whenever they could.

On 29 June, Mohammed V handed a letter to Guillaume. This was addressed to President Auriol, requesting the French government to intervene in order to restore order in accordance with the Treaty of Fez, and it also demonstrated the Sultan's intention to negotiate after the restoration of order. The sovereign insisted that el-Glaoui's agitation, the open rebellion of bureaucrats against Paris, and the action of a religious association constituted 'subversive plots undertaken in violation of the Treaty of 1912, and its article 3 in particular'.⁴⁷ The internal division was such that the Sultan had no other alternative but to indicate his willingness to negotiate on the French plan in order to secure French intervention to restore order.

Soon after this, however, during el-Glaoui's absence from Morocco, his sons started circulating a new petition demanding that the Sultan specifically condemn the Istiqlal. Fearing that Mohammed V's willingness to negotiate would allow him to stay on the throne, the chieftains were anxious to remind Paris that their main concern was his siding with the

Istiqlal. As in February 1951, the sovereign again refused to condemn the nationalist party.⁴⁸ Still, Guillaume's announcement on 22 July merely supported the anti-Sultanate caids' attempts: the Istiqlal's method had provoked a 'self-defence movement' which 'resulted in the petition'.⁴⁹

In the interim, little information about developments in Morocco was conveyed to Paris. In fact, as some Quai d'Orsay officials put it to the Americans later, certain Residency officials did not keep the government fully informed because they knew that Paris was opposed to the Sultan's deposition. As a result, el-Glaoui's movement made such headway that it was from a practical point of view too late for Paris to take the necessary action to stop the movement. Those Residency officials believed that they were acting in the best interests of France and Morocco.⁵⁰ Bidault was shocked by the news of el-Glaoui's tour through out Morocco from 4 to 7 August, whose purpose was 'to maintain the zeal of his followers'.⁵¹ On 4 August, he instructed Rabat to report the movement's goal and intentions, emphasising: 'it is important to prevent irresponsible elements from having the impression that they could create... the fait-accomplis we could not recognise'.⁵² The following day, de Besson optimistically noted that he did not expect France would be confronted by a fait accompli.⁵³

However, this was not the case. As de Besson's telegram on 8 August indicated, it proved that he himself had dismissed the gravity of the situation. Actually, greatly encouraged by the dignitaries' reactions, el-Glaoui had told him the day before that there had never been such favourable conditions to achieve deposition. Bidault instructed de Besson to dissuade el-Glaoui by stating:

The responsibilities assumed by France since 1912 did not allow the Government of the Republic to lose interest in Moroccan internal politics.... We could not disregard our duty concerning the maintenance of order.... Only the French Government was in a position to judge the external consequences that such and such particular acts on the Moroccan territory would bring about.⁵⁴

El-Glaoui disagreed, but promised that he would not take any decisive action until around 12–13 August.

Despite this undertaking, however, el-Glaoui and el-Kittani overtly pressed Paris to remove the Sultan. *Le Petit Matin* of 8–9 August reported that the former, when asked if Mohammed V was to be allowed to stay on the throne, responded 'that depends on France, and France only!' The latter declared: 'we want to leave ourselves with a freedom to

choose another sultan.⁵⁵ They were immensely irritated by the French government's disapproval of the deposition. Furthermore, as de Blesson reported to Paris over the telephone on 8 August, 'el-Glaoui... was no longer in control of his forces', although Paris dismissed this report as lightly.⁵⁶ Conversely, the Sultan, in his letter to Auriol, stressed that it was impossible to openly demonstrate such opposition without the French authorities' consent since Morocco was still under martial law. He urged Paris to take action by warning that the movements were trying to lead France 'to violate the international commitments... the treaty of 1912 in particular', that is, the protection of the Sultan's status.⁵⁷

On 12 August, the French Council of Ministers decided to send 'strong instructions' to Rabat to prevent el-Glaoui from proclaiming a new Sultan.⁵⁸ Likewise, on the same day Dulles instructed Douglas Dillon, the US Ambassador in France, to tell the French that '[the] US Government shares French concern over grave repercussions which would result in Morocco, Arab-Asian World and United Nations' in the case of a new Sultan being proclaimed.⁵⁹ Dulles was so alarmed that he sent another telegram to Paris that day: 'you should make it unmistakably clear to Bidault that we cannot help being gravely concerned over probable consequences of what seems... to be exceedingly ill-advised and ill-timed line of action'. The Americans were acutely anxious that Bidault seemed to indulge in wishful thinking that 'all depends on [the] Sultan'.⁶⁰ It was worried that Paris was too optimistic that the Sultan's acceptance would calm el-Glaoui and his fellows.⁶¹

It appeared that France's brinkmanship ultimately bore fruit. Bidault instructed Guillaume, who had just returned to Paris from sick leave, on 13 August: 'You must be able to make the Sultan accept the programme by this morning'.⁶² If so, the French promised to stop el-Glaoui's activities and protect him. Guillaume was also instructed to table a new compromise plan to the Sultan.⁶³ French sources did not disclose the content of this plan, but it was obvious that the French demanded that he condemn the Istiqlal in tune with el-Glaoui. Guillaume right away met Mohammed V, who conceded by 6:30 p.m. on that day. He agreed to all the points of the municipal reform plan, the devolution of the legislative power to the Grand Vizier, and the rejection of all UN intervention.⁶⁴ Faced with the fact that only France could protect his position from el-Glaoui, Mohammed V accepted the French demands instead of running the risk of leaving the country seriously divided, although his acceptance of French settlers' participation in the municipal assemblies was certainly a betrayal of the nationalist cause. Yet, importantly, he refused to condemn the Istiqlal to the end. All in all, Mohammed V's

concessions were significant. With relief, Bidault noted that he was satisfied with this result.⁶⁵

5.2 The deposition of Mohammed V

Contrary to French hope, however, el-Glaoui did not stop and went so far to name a new Sultan. On 13 August, el-Glaoui and el-Kittani gathered 9 pashas out of 23 and 309 caids out of 325, in order to issue a proclamation naming a new Sultan. Guillaume had talks with el-Glaoui on 15 August and succeeded in persuading the latter not to appoint a new Sultan. However, on the same day, el-Glaoui and el-Kittani elected as an Imam Sidi Moulay Mohammed Ben Arafa, an uncle of Mohammed V.⁶⁶ Having failed to obtain French approval, they confined themselves to nominating an Imam, but this was meant to pressure Paris to accept Arafa as a new Sultan. El-Glaoui explained that 'an Imam, supreme religious Moroccan leader...will hold the spiritual authority, hitherto exercised by the Sultan along with the temporal authority'.⁶⁷ Naturally, the existence of an Imam was not compatible with that of a Sultan, since the latter was both a sovereign and religious chief. Mohammed V immediately announced his refusal to accept the Imam and once again requested French intervention to restore order. This extraordinary situation led to a bloody incident in Oujda, a city in the Northwestern region, in which 23 people were killed.⁶⁸

On 17 August, John Dorman, the US consul at Rabat, urged the State Department to intervene, first because US air force and naval bases could be targets of terrorism in the case of passive US acceptance of the coup and, second, because the United States was the only country to maintain a special treaty concerning the bases.⁶⁹ Furthermore, another official at Tangier argued:

[The] United States was also [the] symbol that some hope lay in eventual recognition of legitimate aspirations [through] cooperation with anti-Commie [sic] West. There is reason [to] fear now that nationalists may be finally driven to arms of Commies.⁷⁰

For these reasons the State Department warned the French that Moroccan affairs might affect the relations between the West and the Arabs.⁷¹ Similarly, Harvey conveyed to de Margerie British concern about the deposition that could certainly cause Arab resentment.⁷² The matter was so pressing that even the British, who had refrained from advising, expressed their concerns. However, the Anglo-Americans did

not publicly prompt the French to avoid the deposition for fear of their reaction.

El-Glaoui's naming of the Imam seriously alarmed Paris, since the French brinkmanship had turned out to be wrong. At this stage, it can be assumed, three options were open to France: first, the prevention of el-Glaoui's attack against the Sultan probably by using French military force; second, the acceptance of deposition by el-Glaoui; third, the deposition by France. A Quai d'Orsay note of 17 August pointed out that France had two obligations resulting from the Treaty of Fez: first, to guarantee the Sultan's status and, second, to take all police action in order to maintain order.⁷³ The first point denoted a double responsibility, that is, the guarantee of the sovereign and that of the dynasty. The second point dictated that the French government should not leave the situation as it was, since the conflict between the Sultan and el-Glaoui would be highly likely to lead to a civil war or a forceful replacement of the Sultan by the latter.

Then this note merely argued for the third option, mentioning that deposition was justified but only if the sovereign was endangering the dynasty itself. Why was the third option considered the best? The Quai had already ruled out the first option, presumably because the move would tremendously diminish el-Glaoui's power without which French rule was unthinkable. Or it might trigger a large-scale armed conflict with Berber forces led by el-Glaoui. The French also feared the possibility of Berber revolt, as most of the French Union forces in Morocco were recruited from Berber people. The second option was out of the question, because this would be a fatal blow to the French authority in Morocco. Letting el-Glaoui take the initiative in solving the question would result in a total loss of face from the French viewpoint. Thus France was left only with the third option, which was the least evil of the three. Yet it was all too clear that, as the Quai was aware, very grave consequences for Franco-Moroccan relations, whatever course the government took, would be brought about.⁷⁴

The situation was reaching a critical point, especially because a religious festival called Aïd el-Kébir, to be held on 21 August, was thought to represent the deadline for the French decision as the Sultan was to attend this festival as the religious leader. On 17 August, el-Glaoui ultimately began to mobilise Berber troops in Marrakech. Demonstrations against France, calling for UN intervention, spread throughout the entire Arab world.⁷⁵ Then, el-Glaoui's ultimatum of 18 August to France and the Sultan was to determine the French course of action regarding the Sultan most decisively. He announced that the Moroccan people

were awaiting the French decision whether to remove Mohammed V or not and that unless the government acted immediately and firmly there would no longer be any place for France in Morocco.⁷⁶ In fact, el-Glaoui could no longer stop the movements of his fellow pashas and caids and their tribesmen.⁷⁷ If el-Glaoui had stopped he would have lost face in the eyes of Berber tribesmen. The Berber troops' attack against the Sultan was imminent.

The French Council of Ministers on 19 August failed to reach a decision on whether to support Mohammed V because of his acceptance of the French demands or to satisfy el-Glaoui by deposing the Sultan. In the early morning of 20 August, Guillaume asked the Pasha of Marrakech to withdraw his troops on condition that the Sultan denounced the Istiqlal, but el-Glaoui refused because his troops were already moving towards Rabat and he knew that such a denunciation was not likely. Finally, the French Cabinet reached a decision, later the same day, that France could not meet forces backing el-Glaoui with French troops, who were recruited from the Berber people, and that the only course open was to obtain Mohammed V's abdication or depose him. Immediately after on that day, Guillaume asked the Sultan to abdicate but, when the latter refused, Guillaume removed him and his two sons by plane to Corsica.⁷⁸ Ben Arafa was named the new Sultan by the Maghzen. France thus chose the deposition because it represented the least evil. The French managed to avoid a civil war while maintaining their own initiative in coping with the situation, but they knew that not only the Arab-Asians but also international opinion were bound to judge them harshly.

Undoubtedly the deposition was what Paris had wanted to avoid at all costs. French Residency officials were largely to blame for the denouement in the immediate term in the sense that they contributed to el-Glaoui's movement gaining strength in defiance of governmental instructions, so much that Paris could not halt it without using military force. However, the French government itself had to take some responsibility for the deposition because it pressured Mohammed V to agree to its plan by making use of the anti-Sultan movement was also certain. Paris was never willing to side with Mohammed V unless he dissociated himself from the Istiqlal. Moreover, as the Anglo-Americans correctly pointed out, this was a consequence of the long-term culmination of French support for el-Glaoui and the Berbers as against the Sultan,⁷⁹ although it was highly doubtful that el-Glaoui's movement had unanimous support from the Berber people.⁸⁰

In this sense, August 1953 witnessed the collapse of a traditional principle of French colonial rule: 'divide and rule'. In fact, France's control in

Morocco had been based on a precarious balance between Mohammed V and el-Glaoui. Against the background of the rise of nationalism in colonial areas in the post-World War II era, choosing the latter was inevitable for the French who had no intention to take a first step towards decolonisation. Quite the contrary, Paris was trying to force Mohammed V into submission by el-Glaoui's pressure, as a threat of deposition was no longer available because of the 1952 UNGA resolution. When it proved el-Glaoui's tribesmen could not be halted, the French chose to effect the initiative in order to secure their own presence in the country. Paris's paying attention to the 1952 UNGA resolution brought about this ironic outcome that received harsh international criticism.

Despite its opposition to the deposition, the State Department made no public statement concerning the French action. This was because '[the] Department feels any statement which would not offend French would be too weak to accomplish useful purpose with Arabs'.⁸¹ Nevertheless, an unequivocal warning from Dulles was transmitted to the French. On 24 August, he told the US Embassy in Paris

to impress upon Laniel our gravest concern that time is running out and that if France does not institute quickly a Reform [sic.] program with real substance with view to granting internal autonomy not only to Moroccans but to Tunisians and show real determination to move along this path notwithstanding the obstruction of local French officials [and] colons alike, we do not see how we can long pursue our present course.⁸²

On the same day Dulles instructed Lodge to vote against the inscription of the Moroccan case on the SC agenda.⁸³ Thus, the Americans gave a reprieve to the French also hoping to encourage the latter's favourable attitude towards the EDC question. Failing to obtain two-thirds of the member states (seven votes), the SC rejected the inscription on 3 September by a vote of five to five, with one abstention.⁸⁴ As in the previous year, the Soviet Union stayed in line with the Arab-Asians by voting for.⁸⁵ Dillon in Paris reported to Washington on 16 September that the US opposition had made a good impression on French opinion.⁸⁶ In spite of the UNGA resolution of December 1952, the Americans were patient enough to wait for the French government to move towards Morocco's internal autonomy.

Ironically, the deposition was caused partly because of the French self-restraint in not threatening the Sultan with deposition. Moreover, this incident was to enhance Mohammed V's prestige as a political martyr

and strengthen the Istiqlal immensely, as the French were well aware. They were made to realise the strength of nationalism but, even so, they tried to ignore it. The French optimistically considered that under Arafa's reign their plans would be able to receive acquiescence if not support from the people.

5.3 Terrorism and impasse: Morocco, August 1953–May 1954

The deposition of Mohammed V permitted the French government to promulgate a series of *dahirs*, two of which were concerned with the structure of the Sharifian government and restricted the Sultan's power. As in Tunisia, the French now began refashioning a Moroccan government and setting up municipal commissions. The first *dahir* provided for the establishment of the Restricted Council (*le Conseil restreint*), and the second *dahir* was intended to grant increased power to the Council of the Vizier and Directors. The executive and legislative powers, which hitherto the Sultan had theoretically exercised, were to be entrusted to the Restricted Council and the Council of the Vizier and Directors, respectively. Both councils would comprise the same number of Moroccan and French ministers.⁸⁷ In addition, the 1953 plan was expected to give Morocco elected assemblies at the national and municipal levels. At the national level, the reorganisation of the Government Council, made up of a Moroccan and a French section with an equal number of representatives, was the French aim. Eighteen towns selected as municipalities were to be administrated by elected municipal commissions, again consisting of an equal number of French and Moroccans.⁸⁸ These municipal councils would remain consultative in character.⁸⁹ Therefore, the French project remained with the principle of co-sovereignty and was not intended to devolve any significant powers to the people. Rather, through the removal of the Sultan's legislative power the French were keen to pave the way for Morocco's adherence to the French Union with settlers' participation in the future national assembly.

The deposition caused resentment among the indigenous people. The Istiqlal's exiled leaders and the Arab countries, especially Egypt, generated anti-French and anti-Arafa broadcasts⁹⁰ which led to a popular legend portraying Mohammed V as a national resistance hero. The expulsion of nationalist leaders in December 1952 had left rank-and-file nationalists no alternative but to resort to violence in order to influence appeals to the French authorities. The first terrorist acts were launched immediately after the deposition and Arafa himself narrowly escaped assassination in

September 1953. From the following month onwards, terrorist activities increased, especially in urban areas such as Casablanca. Terrorist activities, which mostly targeted the pro-French Moroccan population, made Moroccan notables less cooperative towards the French plan. At every level of the structure, including the municipal assemblies, the Moroccans held themselves aloof from the executive or administrative organs.⁹¹ Consequently there would be no progress towards the realisation of the French plan except the reorganisation of the Sharifian government.

Angered by the deposition, the Arab countries pledged their efforts to bring the problem to the UNGA in the autumn, despite their failure in the UNSC of August 1953. The US position turned out to be much more favourable to the French, for the reasons analysed above in this chapter. The Egyptians submitted a draft resolution to the GA First Committee on 7 October which requested to the UN that 'all necessary steps should be taken to ensure within five years the complete realization by the people of Morocco of their rights to full sovereignty and independence'. This draft also called for a strong initiative of the UN to realise the country's far-reaching goal, but these radical demands were never accepted by the GA. As in the previous year the LA countries tried to let the GA pass a moderate resolution. On 19 October, the Bolivian representative submitted a draft resolution which expressed the UN's 'hope that the free political institutions of the people of Morocco would be developed'. In accordance with the French UN delegation's request, Secretary Dulles instructed Lodge in New York to vote against this.⁹² The First Committee, including the United States, voted against the Bolivian draft resolution, and on 3 November the GA plenary meeting also rejected it and decided to postpone further consideration of the problem.⁹³

This process evidently indicated that the UN discussions were affected far more by the US attitude rather than the actual events which occurred in Morocco, because its situation was so unstable that it should have attracted much more international attention. The United States viewed it premature to allow the UN to take up the question again, considering sufficient time had not passed since December 1952. The French were on the whole satisfied with the Americans. Yet this seemed to have been based on the vain optimism that the Anglo-Americans were showing more understanding to their colonial policy.⁹⁴ Despite the Anglo-Americans' hope to the contrary, the French had no intention to turn to decolonisation.

Mohammed V's dethronement had created a new enemy for France. This originated in the fact that the northern part of Morocco on the Mediterranean coast had been under Spanish control since the

Franco–Spanish agreements of 1904 and 1912. In Spanish Morocco, the Sultan's deputy, the Khalifa, was the native ruler. As the Khalifa was officially appointed by the Sultan, the Spanish government insisted that the deposition also affected Spanish Morocco and, shortly after, started to condemn France for not having consulted it in advance. The anti-French campaign by the Spaniards culminated in a meeting of pashas and caids at Tetuán, one of the major cities in the Spanish zone, in January 1954. The Spanish High Commissioner accepted their petition that repudiated the deposition and declared that the dignitaries would not recognise the new Sultan's authority. In January 1954 the French government had asked the US State Department to help improve Franco–Spanish relations, but had failed to achieve their wholehearted cooperation.⁹⁵ Spanish activities further damaged Arafa's legitimacy in the eyes of the Moroccan people, thereby magnifying political instability in French Morocco. As a precaution, Paris transferred Mohammed V from Corsica to Antsirabé in Madagascar on 29 January.⁹⁶

In French Morocco the elections for the members of municipal commissions, which were due in March 1954, could not take place amid the climate of terrorism.⁹⁷ In April terrorist activities surged in Casablanca and a boycott of French products, cigarettes in particular, started.⁹⁸ At this time an enquiry started in Paris for a solution to the crisis, but without changing France's basic stance on colonial issues. The necessity of removing Arafa was being realised, but the problem was who would rule afterwards. An unofficial study group worked out a plan of setting up a Regency Council after Arafa's departure which would consist of representatives of supporters of Mohammed V, Arafa, and the traditionalists as a means of breaking the deadlock.⁹⁹ Mohammed's restoration was unthinkable but there would be no Sultan who could enjoy popularity among the people.

The French government felt the necessity of breaking the stalemate and the appointment of Francis Lacoste as the new Resident-General was announced on 20 May.¹⁰⁰ He was instructed to implement the following policy: reorganisation of the police; distinguishing of moderate nationalists from terrorists when applying repressive measures; and resumption of contact with nationalist opposition groups of diverse tendencies.¹⁰¹ Needless to say, however, these measures hardly contributed to solving the problem. Lacoste was to arrive in Rabat the following month, but terrorist activities continued undiminished, particularly in Casablanca, Marrakech, and Oujda.¹⁰² The approach of the first anniversary of the deposition was another reason for the heightening of tension. Furthermore, this was also because the turmoil

in Tunisia, explained in Chapter 6, was spreading and flaring up anti-French sentiments in Morocco.

5.4 The municipal reform: Tunisia, December 1952–January 1954

As in Morocco, immediately after the December 1952 UNGA resolution, the French renewed attempts to force Amin Bey to surrender. As early as 15 December, three days after the GA First Committee's rejection of the Arab-Asian draft resolution, the Resident-General urged him to approve the French plan. This was to produce a result in contrast to the case with Mohammed V. In reply, the Bey undertook to seal the two decrees on the municipal reform and the Prefectural Council 'even that evening'.¹⁰³ These two decrees constituted the third element which the French had intended to introduce to Tunisian political institutions since the summer of 1950. However, in spite of his promise, once Hauteclocque had left the Palace, he suddenly refused.¹⁰⁴ The French again had talks with Amin Bey on 20 December, and the latter did seal the decrees this time.¹⁰⁵ Thus the French finally succeeded in forcing the sovereign to accept the reform plan. At the end of 1952, it appeared that a better prospect of realising the French purpose was opened: the introduction of a political regime based on the principle of co-sovereignty and, ultimately, Tunisia's adherence to the French Union.

The Bey's acceptance provoked various reactions. Leaders of French settlers, like Colonna, welcomed it. In contrast, radical opinion among indigenous people protested against his betrayal and felt disappointed with the Neo-Destour who 'could not realise any of its purposes' despite their efforts to bring the problem before the UN. The Neo-Destour and the Communists published communiqués protesting against the 'coup de force' by the French authorities, but some Neo-Destour members argued that a truce was needed in order to let France abandon its firm attitude.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, violent activities protesting against the French plan started. An armed organisation called the Fellaghas was created in Southern Tunisia shortly after Hauteclocque's imposition of the plan.¹⁰⁷

It is worth noting Amin Bey's motivation behind his approval of the French plan which the ancient Prime Minister Chenik explained to a French official in February 1953:

The Bey had no desire whatsoever to divest himself of his privileges. Amin had never been involved in any way in the drafting of the speech of the Throne Festival of 15 May 1951, the work of Ben Youssef

and of Badra. The formula of a constitutional monarchy of English type was kept away as much as possible. ...¹⁰⁸

As for the reason why the Bey had come close to the Neo-Destour, especially in May 1951, Chenik maintained it was because he had not had any other way to win popularity despite his fear of the nationalist party. It can be assumed, therefore, that Amin Bey was more opportunistic than nationalist-oriented: what motivated him to accept the French plan in December 1952 was his desire to preserve his privileges as a sovereign and he was not unwilling to side with France once the nationalist cause did not win international support. In fact, the nationalists' demand for the establishment of a legislative national assembly theoretically meant the loss of the Bey's legislative power, even if it was nominal.

The Bey's acceptance allowed France to proceed to the next step. Mayer's declaration on 6 January 1953 reflected their determination to accomplish the June 1952 plan.¹⁰⁹ The Quai d'Orsay argued later that month that France should, first, prepare for the prefectural and municipal elections envisaged in the decrees of December 1952 and, second, follow up the plan.¹¹⁰

The local elections were held in the spring of 1953. In the prefectural elections in April, the French were overall content that 59 per cent of registered voters participated in them, despite the boycott from the Neo-Destour and the Tunisian Socialist Party. The municipal elections took place on 3 and 10 May. Just before them, on the night of 2 May, fearful of nationalist disruptive activities, the French authorities had arrested a number of trade union leaders, Neo-Destour members and Communists.¹¹¹ However, the results of these elections were much less satisfactory than those of the prefectural elections, as 51 per cent of Tunisian voters took part and in Tunis the turnout was only 8.83 per cent.¹¹² According to Prime Minister Mayer's report in front of the French National Assembly on 12 May, of the 69 municipalities as a whole, 40 elected all their council members, but two municipalities did not have complete Tunisian membership, three municipalities had only French members, and ten purely Tunisian municipalities did not elect any members. Some Tunisian council members were reportedly elected against their will. Furthermore, the caids, who were the presidents of the municipal councils, delayed delegating their powers to elected vice presidents who were to fulfil the role of mayors. In total, 'the municipal elections did never relax the atmosphere in the Regency. Quite the reverse, they were the occasion of a resumption of terrorism.'¹¹³

Some leading French figures were aware of the need for a 'soft policy' in Tunisia. In May 1953, President Auriol stated at the French Council of Ministers: 'If we want to bring back the country to us, some profound social reforms are required.'¹¹⁴ There were other political figures who even called for substantive political reform. In early July 1953, a committee studying the overseas problems, presided over by General Georges Catroux,¹¹⁵ made recommendations to the government: 'Tunisia should see the principle of its sovereignty solemnly affirmed by France. It could gradually take the management of its internal affairs under the direction of a homogenous Tunisian government, assisted by elected legislative organ while the French being represented in a council created beside the Resident General.'¹¹⁶ This programme was revolutionary in the sense that it proposed the recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy with popular representatives in the legislative council if not in the immediate future.

Meanwhile, the Tunisian situation remained unsettled, partly because of the troubled situation in Morocco. An armed incident occurred on 14 August between the police and the Fellaghas, killing eight people.¹¹⁷ On the same day an American diplomat in Tunis noted that there was no sign that a financial council, which was expected to review the budget in place of the defunct Grand Council, would be established despite the approaching 30 September deadline, when the second half of the 1953–1954 budget had to be promulgated. One week later, the American diplomat also pointed to 'the continued deterioration in the security situation in Tunisia during the past week', referring to the fact that French Residency officials were taking the situation more seriously than before.¹¹⁸

Still, the French were slow to move, presumably because they were preoccupied with affairs in Morocco where opposition to the Sultan had increasingly mounted since the beginning of 1953. It was only after Moroccan affairs had settled down as a result of the Sultan's deposition that Paris took its next major step in Tunisia. On 2 September, Pierre Voizard was appointed as the new Resident-General. This was welcomed by the Tunisian nationalists to some extent. Hedi Nourira, the then Neo-Destour's Secretary-General, declared that he was prepared to help Voizard 'to create détente'.¹¹⁹ Later in the month Amin Bey appealed to the people, expressing his desire for a calmer political atmosphere to facilitate the solution of problems, an appeal that, according to French sources, had been made voluntarily for the first time. The French hoped that this appeal would reduce terrorist activities, considering the prestige that the sovereign enjoyed among the Tunisians.¹²⁰

On 26 September, Voizard arrived in Tunis, with the government's instructions to begin reducing tension without, however, touching on substantive points of internal autonomy. Actually, the amelioration of this tense atmosphere was the key theme that Paris and the Bey had in mind. Voizard announced: (1) the abolition of press censorship; (2) the transfer of police powers, which had been in French hands since the introduction of martial law, to civil authorities; and (3) the amnesty of all political leaders who had been arrested in January 1952.¹²¹ The government had also instructed him to complete the June 1952 plan and that in the process of implementing the reform, he would have to negotiate with the Bey about future agreements between the two countries, which Paris judged necessary to guarantee permanent Franco-Tunisian links, thereby securing the interests of France and French settlers.¹²² To put into effect the above policies, extensive freedom of action was given to Voizard so that he could explore the conditions under which Franco-Tunisian dialogues would be resumed.¹²³

On 17 August, the Arab-Asian countries had requested the UN Secretary-General to take up the North African problems.¹²⁴ The GA decided to inscribe the problems on the agenda on 17 September.¹²⁵ The French and British governments' positions remained opposed to inscription, as the former confirmed: 'on the Moroccan and Tunisian items the French delegation will adopt exactly the same tactics as last year'.¹²⁶ On 26 October, the GA First Committee adopted the Arab-Asian draft resolution, by 29 votes to 22, recommending that all necessary steps be taken to ensure Tunisia's full sovereignty and independence.¹²⁷ Yet such a strong draft resolution did offer little hope, judging from the outcome of the Moroccan item.¹²⁸ The Arab-Asian countries accepted the amendments introduced by the Icelandic delegation which confined itself to recommending that both parties pursue negotiations to ensure Tunisian self-determination.¹²⁹ On 11 November, however, this motion did not obtain the required two-thirds majority in the GA plenary session,¹³⁰ which instead approved the Iraqi motion to propose postponing debate on the Tunisian problem. The French noted that the Arab-Asian countries did not want to suffer another defeat following the Moroccan case¹³¹ because, to those countries, Morocco offered a more promising prospect than Tunisia.

Despite the success in the UN, Voizard was quite cautious: before taking the next step, he started to sound out the nationalists and, in particular, the Bey about the possible programme. The French had already abandoned the June 1952 plan as unrealistic, given French

settlers' opposition. In October 1953 he reportedly continued to widen contacts with the Tunisians.¹³² Regarding his tactics, Quai d'Orsay officials explained to the Americans in December 1953:

[By] these consultations and his conversations with the Bey... he expects to be able to arrive at his own conclusions of the nature of reform which might be feasible. The Bey has indicated to the Resident-General that he favors such an approach.... [In contrast] M. Périllier's approach... was too spectacular and encouraged ever-increasing demands on the part of Neo-Destour.¹³³

The French were still trying to persuade the Americans that Périllier's policy had failed because he did not spend enough time persuading the Tunisians, not because the French aim was unacceptable to them. Needless to say, this excuse did not convince the Americans.

On 1 January 1954, the Resident-General announced the release of 41 Neo-Destour leaders, including Mongi Slim, the director of the Neo-Destour Political Bureau.¹³⁴ Yet, one major exception to amnesty was left: Habib Bourguiba, who was on Galite Island, about 20 miles off Tunisia's Mediterranean coast, and who consequently was unable to contact the nationalists or receive proper medical care despite his ill health. The nationalists campaigned vehemently for his release. On 18 January, Mohammed Masmoudi, the Neo-Destour's representative in France, publicised a communiqué deploring the fact that Bourguiba had not yet been liberated.¹³⁵ However, the French Residency refused because his transfer to France or Tunisia could allow him to begin an anti-reform campaign, thereby disturbing the current favourable atmosphere for the resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations, French officials explained to the Americans. The French added, Amin Bey 'would prefer not to have Bourguiba, whom he referred to as an "*exalte*" (hot-headed person), on the scene at this particular time'.¹³⁶ Namely, the Bey had already decided to break with the nationalists.

5.5 The Voizard plan: Tunisia, February–April 1954

On 27 February, the French restricted Cabinet meeting unanimously approved the plan that Voizard had presented.¹³⁷ This was the so-called Voizard plan. A Quai d'Orsay note of that day argued that this plan contained four principal points: institutional reforms, the formation of a new Tunisian government, Bourguiba's transfer, and a customs and cereal market union between France and Tunisia.¹³⁸

The main points of the institutional reform can be summed up as follows. As for the executive power and the municipal representatives, France made some concessions: first, the numerical predominance of Tunisian ministers over French ones in the Cabinet; second, the French Secretary-General's endorsement would be suppressed. However, with regard to the legislative power, the principle of co-sovereignty was skilfully preserved. The Tunisian national assembly would be composed of 45 Tunisians and 42 French parliamentarians, but the Economic Chamber would join the assembly when it discussed financial and budgetary issues. This Chamber would be composed of 11 French and 8 Tunisians,¹³⁹ so, in total, an equal number of French and Tunisian members were planned to participate in such discussions. Moreover, the Resident-General was to retain veto power in any case. After all, the devolution of power to the Tunisians remained superficial.

The second point of the Voizard plan centred on a new government with which the French government was to negotiate about the implementation of the plan. Voizard's choice of Prime Minister was Mohammed Salah Mzali, a former minister of the Chenik government. He had already obtained the Bey's approval on this matter on 5 February.¹⁴⁰ Thirdly, the Quai suggested Bourguiba's transfer from Galite Island to another place where he could enjoy better facilities. His transfer aimed to ease Tunisian discontent, thereby facilitating the new government's task.¹⁴¹ Lastly, this note argued that France and Tunisia should form the customs and cereal market union which would deprive the latter of the right to set up its own customs.¹⁴²

On 4 March, Amin Bey sealed the reform projects and announced the formation of the Mzali Government.¹⁴³ From the French viewpoint, this was a remarkable victory in the sense that, for the first time, the Bey's acceptance paved the way for French settlers' participation in a national assembly. In fact, as the Americans had correctly pointed out in February 1954, the French were, despite Neo-Destour's evident resistance, 'counting on the Bey's support and personal prestige to counteract this opposition and to win popular acceptance...of the reform program'.¹⁴⁴ As such, a very significant step towards the realisation of Tunisian membership in the French Union was taken.

However, the Voizard plan turned out to be very unpopular, and protestations followed from both the Tunisian and French settlers' sides. According to a report sent to Washington, 'the recent governmental reforms...have succeeded in pleasing no one'. The Neo-Destour and various nationalists bitterly denounced the 'pseudo-reforms' that would 'lead to a type of co-sovereignty rather than Tunisian sovereignty'.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the party had not yet taken its final position at the end of March, as it did not exclude 'an attitude "of constructive opposition" within the new institutions'.¹⁴⁶ Some Neo-Destour leaders were inclined to accept the French plan because they did not want to break their relationship with the Bey. The French speculated that Bourguiba's position concerning the plan would crucially affect the party's orientation.¹⁴⁷ On the part of French settlers, the *Rassemblement français* issued a motion on 10 March deploring the fact that they were presented with a *fait accompli*.¹⁴⁸ Tunisian students of the *Grande Mosquée* launched a demonstration under the Vieux-Destour's influence.¹⁴⁹ What is more, anti-French armed activities rapidly grew in number. The Fellaghas, whom the French considered were receiving support from extremist elements from Egypt and Libya, attacked a rail car in Southern Tunisia later in the month.¹⁵⁰ Having started in December 1952, the Fellagha movement was increasingly to gain force from March 1954 onwards. A British diplomat at Tunis noted that its members were going through military training at camps in Libya, run on funds obtained from Egypt.¹⁵¹

While accepting the Voizard plan, the Bey was desperate to regain popularity among the people, particularly because some nationalists insisted that 'the Bey had betrayed the nationalist cause'. He had proposed Bourguiba's transfer to Metropolitan France and, on 30 March, he sent a letter to that effect to René Coty, the President of the French Republic since January 1954. Knowing Amin Bey's intentions, the Quai d'Orsay advised: 'the sovereign should be able to prove that his appeal was understood and to withdraw a moral benefit which we do not have to bargain with him, if we are to count on his collaboration.'¹⁵² Thus, the strengthening of the Bey's position was considered fundamental in order to accomplish the French plan.

Despite objection to the Voizard plan, the Neo-Destour did not exclude its participation in the envisioned elections due to be held in June 1954. On 2 April, its National Council adopted two motions. The first motion stated that 'the reforms of 4 March 1954... infringe... Tunisian sovereignty, one and indivisible... and consecrate the participation of French people of Tunisia in the institutions'. Yet the second one declared that the party 'cannot consider participating in the forthcoming elections unless the conditions for a sincere and free ballot were assured' and that Bourguiba's release was necessary in order to fulfil those conditions.¹⁵³ The party left room for approving the Voizard plan, so the matter was not that of principle. In fact, it had formed the National Front as an electoral alliance with other nationalist forces. This was taken as a possible indication that it decided to take part in the forthcoming election as the

Neo-Destour was technically illegal.¹⁵⁴ In a word, Bourguiba's attitude remained the key to the success of reforms.

Opposition to the March 1954 plan was also expressed by Tahar Ben Ammar, a former President of the Tunisian section of the Grand Council, who put forward a motion to the French later in April 1954. In fact, as a result of a series of meetings with other nationalists that month, he already had the support of 15 signatories, nine of whom had participated in the Council of the Forty summoned by the Bey on 1 August 1952.¹⁵⁵ Criticising its undemocratic character, Ben Ammar's conclusion was that the Voizard plan, which retained the principle of co-sovereignty, did not meet Tunisian aspirations.¹⁵⁶ Thus, hostility to the French reforms was not confined to the Neo-Destour but shared by various nationalists.

In totality, the period that this chapter has dealt with saw no significant progress towards a settlement of Franco-Tunisian and of Franco-Moroccan relations, let alone the recognition of sovereignty. Neither did the international community indicate significant reactions to North African affairs following the 1952 UNGA resolutions. France kept continuing its effort to implement its reform so that its traditional goal would be achieved, while some, if not all, nationalists persisted in their resistance. The ambivalence of the resolutions allowed both the French and the nationalists to interpret them to suit their own purposes. The showdown of their confrontations, which would occur in Tunisia in the summer of 1954, will be explained in the Chapter 6.

6

Tunisia's Internal Autonomy

The Bey's approval of the French plan on the national assembly triggered terrorist attacks against French settlers and Tunisian collaborators. Domestic turmoil would finally result in the French recognition of Tunisian sovereignty. However, the terrorist threat was not the only cause for the French policy change. What turned out to be crucial was Bourguiba's attack against the Bey, who had betrayed the nationalist cause. Amin's departure from the nationalists proved to be fatal in the post-World War II era, when popular sovereignty was increasingly gaining legitimacy. In other words, Bourguiba's audacity in breaking with the Bey, whose popularity was waning but who had still been regarded as a legitimate sovereign by the majority of the people, was decisive. The collapse of the traditional authority of the sovereign led the French to change their power base in the country. Needless to say, the nationalists were now chosen as their collaborators, and this new method would eventually be applied to other French dependencies. The recognition of popular sovereignty was regarded as an effective strategy through which the French would build up cooperation with such collaborators. France's effort would result in the reorganisation of the French Union.

In this process neither the Americans nor the British exerted any visible pressure on France towards decolonisation. However, this never meant international pressure did not work. Quite the contrary, this chapter will make clear that this process was defined by the 1952 UNGA resolution in two aspects. First, what Paris agreed to was the self-government of the local people as recommended by the GA. The international community had utterly rejected the French policy of assimilation or association as anachronistic but had regarded the country not yet ready for independence, and this was the line the French adopted in the summer of 1954. Second, as the UN refrained from direct intervention, as

evidenced by the 1952 resolution, France was allowed to hold the initiative throughout the process of transferring power. This would largely contribute to French influence remaining in a significant manner. One can add that the French turnaround was a prerequisite of US support for their position in North Africa and the overseas territories in general, and therefore would contribute to consolidating the coherence of the Western Alliance.

6.1 The Carthage Declaration, May–August 1954

Following the announcement of the March 1954 plan, Tunisia experienced further troubles in May. As an American diplomat reported to Washington, 'the fellagahs [sic] are undermining French authority in Central and South Tunisia, intimidating the local population, and endeavoring to convince the villagers that the French are powerless to protect them'.¹ Thus their activities were effective in bringing damage to the legitimacy of French rule. Later in the month, referring to the expansion of the Fellaghas' activities into Northern Tunisia, the Quai d'Orsay commented that the deterioration of the general situation 'is no more the effect of the fall of the Dien Bien Phu than the hope calculated by the Neo-Destour, of a change of the government and of an eventual re-examination of the 4 March reforms.'² Their activities were, continued the Quai, so fierce that police operations alone were limited in their ability to halt the attacks. However, what deserves mention is that the Fellagha was not only challenging French rule. It was also undermining the Bey's authority, since he was a sovereign, however nominal, in the people's mind.

It was in these circumstances that Paris decided on Bourguiba's transfer to Groix Island, near Brittany peninsula, expecting that this measure would contribute to a climate favourable to the elections.³ This was because, first, the French became less optimistic about the elections due to be held by the Voizard plan. It was noted: 'The participation of the Neo-Destour in the elections...appears less and less certain and remains subject to the settlement of Bourguiba's case.'⁴ The French in fact wondered if the Neo-Destour had not given its members instructions to oppose the forthcoming elections.⁵ Second, they were anxious to restore the Bey's popularity which they believed would bring about stability. On 21 May, Resident-General Voizard announced Bourguiba's transfer to Groix Island, where he was permitted to receive visits and to make public his views on the evolution of the Tunisian problem.⁶ However, the situation was to evolve in quite the opposite way to what the French and the Bey had hoped.

Immediately after his transfer, Bourguiba wasted no time in phoning one of his entourage and ordered that his instructions of March 1954 be published without delay. In fact, on 10 March, he had given a letter about the Voizard plan to his son, who had exceptionally been allowed to visit his father by the Resident-General. Expressing his disagreement with the plan, he had ordered the party leaders to take action 'to make the people understand his decision to break definitely with the Bey'. For him, 'the legitimacy is not the Bey's privilege, but rather that of the people, "source of all power"'.⁷ This was unambiguously the first outright challenge to the Bey's legitimacy. His conclusion was remarkable, considering other Neo-Destour members' somewhat conciliatory attitudes, exemplified by the 2 April declaration.⁸ However, the Neo-Destour did not follow its president's instructions. The party's communiqué, published on 22 May, was antagonistic to the Voizard plan in spite of the improvement in Bourguiba's living conditions – although this certainly attacked French policy – but was not aimed at encouraging the people to challenge the Bey's authority.⁹ However unpopular he might be, the Bey held all traditional authority, so even the nationalist leaders hesitated to defy him.

Bourguiba's instructions were published in the Arabic newspaper *Al-Sabah* on 27 May. This had, to use his own expression, 'a bomb effect'. A significant fact was that this appeal was directly aimed at the Tunisian people, unlike the Neo-Destour's communiqué of 22 May which was merely directed at the French authorities. The press reported a further increase in violent activity, conducted not only by the Fellaghas but also by French settlers. On 29 May, Voizard, who had just returned from Paris, was confronted by 200 hostile settlers demanding measures to protect their rights. The Bey condemned the violent activities before French and Tunisian representatives, breaking with the custom of not giving any audiences during Ramadan.¹⁰ Here the French faced a dilemma: Bourguiba's contact with the nationalists was exacerbating the situation but prohibiting such contact would enhance his prestige as a political martyr, thereby further undermining the French plan's prospects. Therefore, the Quai d'Orsay did not decide on the prohibition, even though Amin Bey now demanded that Bourguiba's broadcasting activities be restricted again because of the danger that the latter's remarks brought to his authority.¹¹

Thus the Fellagha insurgency and Bourguiba's activities went hand in hand. However, this did not mean that Bourguiba was encouraging the Fellaghas' activities. Interviewed by *Paris-Match* on 28 May, he stated: "serious politicians" cannot push their compatriots to violent acts... it is despair that armed terrorists' hands, and those truly responsible for

terrorism are not Tunisians'.¹² In any event, importantly, both Bourguiba and the Fellagha immensely undermined the Bey's authority and French rule.

On 9 June, Voizard noted: 'The morale of the Mzali Government is poor.... [T]he Ministers received threatening letters.'¹³ In the light of the pro-French Tunisian government being jeopardised, a marked change appeared in the Quai d'Orsay's mindset. Maurice Schumann argued two days later: 'it would be useful in the circumstances, if we are to avoid the isolation of the Ministry Mzali and not be led to an impasse in the implementation of reforms, to resume contacts with the most representative elements of French and Tunisian populations, including certain figures of the Neo-Destour'.¹⁴ This was the first time that the French had contemplated the need for overt talks with the Neo-Destour since January 1952, though at this stage they had no intention of discussing the modification to Tunisia's protectorate status as outlined in the Treaty of Bardo.

Troubles were compounded for the French when the Laniel Government fell on 12 June. On the following day, the election for the Tunisian Economic Chamber was held, but most of the elected Tunisian members had expressed disapproval to the Voizard plan.¹⁵ Day after day, terrorist incidents were reported in which many French and Tunisian people were killed or wounded. Local people were discouraged from going to shops or cinemas managed by French people and clerks received letters threatening them not to work at those shops.¹⁶

On 16 June, four Tunisian ministers offered their resignation to Prime Minister Mzali. Voizard noted: 'This is the first time a Tunisian Minister has relinquished power without being expressly ordered by the Bey.'¹⁷ Furthermore, Mzali himself offered his resignation on the same day. 'The Bey seems definitely to have lost whatever popularity or respect in which he was held by a great number of Tunisians,' as the Americans correctly put it.¹⁸ However, the Bey requested Mzali to stay in place provisionally, as the appointment of a successor appeared extremely difficult, all the more so because of the ministerial crisis in Paris.¹⁹

Mzali's resignation triggered a clear change in the French way of thinking. A note dated 17 June pointed to a quick deterioration of the political situation in Tunisia. This was partly due to the activities of the Fellaghas, who had established semi-independent political regimes in several areas. This note continued:

the resigning Government has never enjoyed great popularity in Tunisian opinion. [The] attitude of the Neo-Destour seemed dictated

by its disappointment of being kept out of the negotiations, and we were able to hope that influenced by the Sovereign's firm position, it would finally rally to an attitude of constructive opposition. ...

[W]e would probably be heading for much more serious difficulties if we expect to seek, before the situation is recovered in terms of public order, an agreement with the Neo-Destour with a view to constituting a new Government. ...²⁰

The memorandum recommended that the government reinforce French forces in Tunisia to restore order and security and to assure the country's administration. This suggests that the Quai d'Orsay was aware that agreement with the Neo-Destour was fundamental in forming a new government. For the first time in history, agreement with the nationalist party was conceived as indispensable to Tunisia's future.

Why did the Quai argue for the resumption of negotiations with the Neo-Destour? Why was this moment judged as critical? The reason lies at its realisation that it was no longer possible to manage Tunisian administration without such an agreement. So far the French had set up puppet governments counting on the Bey, who had retained popularity among the people, and had been trying to introduce pseudo-internal autonomy under the disguise of those governments. Now that the Bey's authority had collapsed due to the activities of Bourguiba and the Fellagha, a new way of legitimising their control had to be found, otherwise the privileges of France and French settlers would be at peril. In fact, as will be argued below in detail, it was indirect control through collaboration with the nationalist party that they would adopt. Logically these French concessions did not mean that they had decided to abandon their interests in Tunisia but that they would change their way of control.

This change of course was highly rated in London as well. On the very same day, an FO minute argued 'it seems already obvious that the French policy of "integration in the French Union" will not work' and that 'things would be much easier if the French went instead for "self-government within the French Union."' ²¹ Actually, the new French policy would be in line with what the British described in this minute and had pursued in their own dependent territories, apart from the fact that the latter did not rule out independence as the final goal.

At the same time, in Paris, Pierre Mendès-France was appointed as the new Prime Minister on 18 June, which was to bring about a dramatic shift in the French attitude to the Tunisian problem. In his speech before being elected, he displayed his intentions to 'resume with Tunisia and Morocco the dialogues unfortunately interrupted'. Mendès-France

obtained 419 votes in favour and 47 against for his nomination in the National Assembly. This meant that the parliamentarians approved his new policy with an overwhelming majority. Nationalist circles in Tunisia received this news with enthusiasm²² because his liberal stance on overseas territories was well known.²³ The following day he set up the Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, with Christian Fouchet as the Minister. Now North African affairs, which had been under the control of Maurice Schumann since 1951, were handed over to Fouchet.²⁴

Immediately after, while negotiations for a peace settlement in Indochina were going on in Geneva, Mendès-France and his advisers discussed the development of their 'Tunisia strategy'. Its main points were: (1) a restoration of some of the moral authority of the Bey, providing limited assurance of the continuity of Tunisian legitimacy, and (2) involving the Neo-Destour in negotiations.²⁵ Then, Mendès-France aimed to renew Franco-Tunisian relations which would go further than a resumption of dialogues with the Neo-Destour. A Quai d'Orsay memorandum dated 26 June argued that, beyond what had been mentioned in that of 17 June, the opening of new negotiations on the status of Franco-Tunisian relations would be a prerequisite for the Neo-Destour's agreement on a new government.²⁶

Paris desperately needed Bourguiba's agreement on this 'strategy', but it was politically risky to contact him officially. Therefore Mendès-France asked Alain Savary²⁷ to tell Bourguiba on 4 July that important decisions were about to be made, but that they could not possibly bear fruit without the Neo-Destour's accord and support. Bourguiba gave Savary an encouraging reply.²⁸ On 10 July, in an interview in *Le Monde*, he confirmed that the French head of police would remain in post during the first stage of *tunisification* of political institutions in his programme.²⁹ Having been informed of Mendès-France's intentions, Bourguiba was undoubtedly trying to exhort French opinion to accept their Prime Minister's new thinking.

Yet the Tunisian situation continued to worsen in the meantime. On 5 July, Amin Bey finally accepted the Mzali Government's resignation and appointed Georges Dupoizat, the Secretary-General of the Tunisian government, as an interim Prime Minister.³⁰ A French national being appointed to this post was criticised by the Bey's entourage as well as the nationalists. The collapse of the protectorate regime was thus apparent to all Tunisians. In mid-July, a group of moderate French settlers even wrote to Mendès-France that 'the "arguments of good sense" should substitute for force'.³¹

The note of 16 July drafted by the Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs argued for a more comprehensive plan to be introduced in place of the Voizard plan.³² First of all, this note pointed out that 'reform policy' based on the Convention of Marsa had failed, and that 'in the institutional domain, reform policy came to nothing' as all the political institutions that France had established, such as the Grand Council and even the Tunisian government itself, had ultimately failed to function. It went on to argue:

One institution remains, which already existed at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate; the Bey dynasty. But ignored by his people when his relations with the Resident-General improve, the Bey... is no longer but a symbol... without political authority.

This note further suggested that the main reason for this failure was the principle of co-sovereignty.

The final collapse of 'reform policy', which had become evident since the Mzali Government's resignation, brought about a fundamentally new way of thinking in the French government. So far France had aimed to establish a political regime in which French settlers' special position would be institutionalised through their participation in the national and local assemblies, thereby depriving the Tunisian people of a right to self-determination and, ultimately, achieving Tunisia's participation in the French Union. Enlarging political participation of both French and Tunisian nationals would have been the only possible solution in the age of social mobilisation if Tunisian people's right to vote was to be allowed. The French now realised, however, that it was no longer possible to maintain their goal by making use of the Bey's pseudo-traditional authority, although the maintenance of the Bey was still considered highly helpful in preventing the radicalisation of indigenous opinion on whether to uphold close relations with France.

The lesson that Paris drew from the experiences after the March 1954 plan was that France's control of Tunisia must be based on the consent of the indigenous people who desired to restore sovereignty and constitute a political community composed of Tunisian nationals alone. In fact, this was what Bourguiba meant when he noted 'the legitimacy is not the Bey's privilege, but rather that of the people, "source of all power"' in March 1954. Hence the French decided to grant internal autonomy to the Tunisians so that the latter could establish a new regime based on their own sovereignty, in accordance with Bourguiba's Seven Points of April 1950. Simply put, the French now accepted the nationalist

demands. Collaboration with them was judged as indispensable to continue French rule. It was fortunate that the pro-French and predominant faction of the Neo-Destour, led by Bourguiba, approved French influence as long as they recognised Tunisian sovereignty. Indeed, the problem for France had been that of how to secure viable collaborators who accepted French control or influence. It was this concern that finally obliged France to make a decisive turn to decolonisation.

Existing research tends to assume that nationalist pressures or terrorist activities forced Paris to accept internal autonomy or argues that Mendès-France's coming to office changed French policy. Some research also points out that the fall of Dien Bien Phu made French leaders and opinion understand the strength of Third World nationalism. This book agrees that nationalist pressure worked significantly, but argues that an important point was that Bourguiba's attack was primarily against the Bey's authority, not against French authority per se. His acceptance of the French plan in March 1954 to set up a national assembly angered the nationalists, Bourguiba in particular, because this act was plainly a betrayal of the nationalist cause. It soon turned out that Bourguiba's operations had an outstanding impact. Once Amin Bey had lost his popularity and authority, Tunisia witnessed an extraordinary situation in which no Tunisians were willing to succeed Mzali as Prime Minister following his resignation. Since the French publicly committed themselves to the idea of internal autonomy, it was politically impossible for a French national to be appointed to this post.

The Fellagha's activities also greatly contributed to the collapse of the Bey's authority, but this militant group could not be a collaborator to whom France transferred power or an actor to win the people's political support. The psychological shock caused by the fall of Dien Bien Phu could have played a role in the French decision, but merely added momentum to the above process in the sense that the government had less difficulty in selling the new plan to French opinion. There is no doubt that Mendès-France played a key role in this dramatic change of course, as previous research has argued. However, importantly, French archives suggest that the Quai d'Orsay had already begun examining the desirability of negotiating with the Neo-Destour on 17 June 1954. This was one day after Mzali's resignation and one day before Mendès-France was elected as Prime Minister by the National Assembly. There had been no room for negotiation with the nationalist party as long as the French refused to abandon the principle of co-sovereignty, so the French inclination to talk with the nationalist party represented a drastic turnaround. Mendès-France's decision to recognise Tunisian

internal autonomy was certainly a bold one but a logical extension of this change of policy.

Needless to say, this policy change did not mean that the French accepted the disappearance of their position. Now that the Bey's authority fatally collapsed, a new way of securing the indigenous people's consent to the privileges of France and French settlers had to be found out. The note of 16 July concluded that the only possible solution was a network of agreements between the two countries. According to the Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, such agreements would permit France to renounce the Convention of Marsa and to replace the Treaty of Bardo. Furthermore, 'the commitments will derive values and authorities from the satisfaction of amour-propre of the Tunisians, whose sovereignty would thus be recognised and confirmed'.³³ The Ministry reasoned that making use of Tunisian national pride was much more effective in achieving their aim. In other words, 'the abandonment of reform initiative would constitute the essential concession of France in return for the guarantees that France will obtain for itself and the French in Tunisia'.³⁴

Specifically, the note of 16 July suggested that the government should open negotiations with the purpose of concluding several particular agreements replacing the Convention of Marsa, and conclude a general treaty which would offer the framework within which those agreements would be concluded. First, with regard to the general treaty, since France decided to give Tunisia internal autonomy but not independence, it must define new Franco-Tunisian relations without giving equal status to Tunisia. Second, the new policy was not meant to abandon Tunisia's future adherence to the French Union, as this note argued that the envisaged general treaty 'should open the way to Tunisia's participation in the French Union',³⁵ that is, its foreign relations and defence would continue to be French responsibility. Finally, the envisaged particular agreements were aimed at defining what kind of special status France and French settlers would enjoy even though Tunisia would enjoy internal autonomy.³⁶

Obviously the new strategy drawn up by the French government was based on the careful examination of Tunisia's internal affairs. Nevertheless, it must be underscored that international considerations worked significantly in framing the new policy. Paris counted on US support in not only bringing this into practice, but also blocking possible UN discussions. In fact, on the international scene, the Arab-Asian countries had decided in mid-July to bring the Tunisian problem to the UNGA.³⁷ Fouchet sketched out the French programme about Tunisia's

internal autonomy when he discussed the matter with US Ambassador Dillon on 27 July, referring to the 'tunisianisation' of public service, including police.³⁸ In reply, Dulles commented: '[the] Department is heartened by [the] outlines of [the] French plans'. That is, Washington understood that the aim of new policy was to devolve substantive power to the Tunisians, which in turn enabled Paris to be optimistic about US support inside and outside the UN.

The Council of Ministers on 30 July approved Mendès-France's new policy.³⁹ Then, on 31 July, Mendès-France, accompanied by Fouchet and General Juin,⁴⁰ flew to Tunisia, where he made the well-known Carthage declaration to the Bey. He announced:

The internal autonomy of Tunisia is recognised and proclaimed without ulterior motive by the French government... [W]e are prepared to transfer to people and Tunisian institutions the internal exercise of the sovereignty.⁴¹

He continued that the interests and rights of French people must be respected and that France and Tunisia would enter into negotiations to secure both countries' new relations.⁴² While the Tunisians highly esteemed Mendès-France's proposal, the *Rassemblement français* criticised his plan, emphasising 'it could not accept that the French would become "privileged and protected foreigners" in Tunisia'.⁴³ This was the very idea that France's new strategy denied.

Preparations for the opening of negotiations started immediately. On 2 August, the Bey entrusted Ben Ammar with the task of forming a new government, whose purpose was negotiating on internal autonomy with France.⁴⁴ Then the Neo-Destour Political Bureau approved the party's participation in the Ben Ammar Government, following Bourguiba's advice which had been given to Mongi Slim, whereas Salah Ben Youssef refused to side with Bourguiba's line.⁴⁵ The constitution of the Ben Ammar Government, with the participation of four Neo-Destour members, was announced on 7 August.⁴⁶ On the other hand, however, the Vieux-Destour disclosed its reservation, indicating that the objective of the negotiations should be total independence. This party also announced its opposition to the country's secularisation that Bourguiba advocated.⁴⁷ Subsequently the French and Tunisian governments jointly declared that negotiations would be opened at the beginning of September 1954.⁴⁸

In the interim, Paris had decided to reinforce French troops in Tunisia, an essential precondition of entering into negotiations with the

nationalists. On 19 July, Mendès-France had given General Pierre Boyer de Latour, the CSTT since February 1954,⁴⁹ the instructions to re-establish order by augmenting French troops. Then the latter was appointed as the Resident-General, and arrived in Tunis in mid-August.⁵⁰ The French National Assembly approved, by a vote of 451 to 122, the government's Tunisian policy as outlined in the Carthage declaration.⁵¹

Although approving France's new strategy, nevertheless the State Department concluded that the Americans 'should not make any commitments at this time' but that 'the most the US can do is to note with interest that negotiations are being resumed in an atmosphere of cordiality', since the details of the programme had not yet been publicised.⁵² As shown below, Washington's concern was whether or not the French turnaround would soon spread to other territories, above all Morocco. If this was the case, it meant Paris had set out a decolonisation policy. Otherwise its new policy in Tunisia did not deserve their open support, the Americans speculated.

6.2 Franco-Tunisian negotiations and the Fellagha problem: September–December 1954

Franco-Tunisian negotiations started in Tunis on 4 September. In the first session Fouchet showed the following eight Agreements to the Tunisians, stressing that all of them must be accepted and put into force as a whole. They were: the General Agreement (previously called a general treaty), the Agreement Related to the Rights and Interests of French People in Tunisia and Tunisian People in France, the Agreement Related to Administrative and Technical Cooperation, the Military Agreement, the Diplomatic Agreement, the Judicial Agreement, the Cultural Agreement, and the Economic Agreement.⁵³ Salah Ben Youssef reacted by declaring in Cairo that the Tunisian negotiators must confine themselves to Mendès-France's Carthage declaration, but that if the negotiations failed, the people should fight for complete independence. The French were aware that full independence was the desire of the Neo-Destour's rank-and-file members and that the nationalist party would possibly call for it as the next step.⁵⁴

In mid-September Latour argued for the importance of avoiding Tunisian nationalism going to excess. The task of constructing a Tunisian constitution should not be left to the Neo-Destour since, if this occurred, they would abandon the monarchy and establish a dictatorship, thereby enabling the abrogation of the expected Agreements for internal autonomy, continued Latour. Moreover, '[t]he birth of a

Tunisian republic would inevitably exalt Algerian separatism'.⁵⁵ Keeping the responsibility for public order under the French director was essential, he suggested, because otherwise troubles would endanger French settlers and the envisaged Agreements.

In relation to these circumstances, Bourguiba was not allowed to return to Tunisia nor to take part in the negotiations. This was because his intervention might flare up nationalist sentiment, leading to the formulation of a constitution and even full independence. In fact, in an interview Bourguiba replied 'necessarily' when he was asked whether Tunisia would have a constitution. Aware that France did not like to see the monarchy abandoned, he mentioned he personally preferred a constitutional monarchy as its newly established regime.⁵⁶ At any rate, French settlers never accepted his return. Their position could be summed up in Puaux's following statement in a newspaper *la Tunisie-France* on 15 September: 'on the road Mr Mendès France is committed to, I can only see a series of abandonment in face of increasing demands'.⁵⁷

In the course of Franco-Tunisian discussions, it turned out that the Fellaghas posed the gravest problem. The issue was that for France this organisation imposed a threat to order, while from the Tunisian point of view this represented a nationalist force. So the former sought to drive out the Fellaghas whereas the latter tried to reorganise them into a future army if circumstances permitted.

The French assumption was that the Fellaghas were now acting in collaboration with Salah Ben Youssef in Cairo and that the arms were being provided by Egypt and Libya. They also, it was suspected, received orders from exiled nationalist elements which were believed to be acting in full accord with the Arab League.⁵⁸ On 11 September, when Latour met Ben Ammar and other ministers, the Tunisians demanded that French troops' activities against the Fellaghas be terminated.⁵⁹ This remark echoed a Tunisian desire that a national army should be created in place of the existing police under French control. In fact, the Treaty of Bardo did not prohibit the constitution of a Tunisian army. The Resident-General refused, stating that it would give rise to serious danger. He instead asked whether the Tunisian government was prepared to call for the surrender of the Fellaghas, but the reply was evasive. Then the Tunisians demanded that the Fellaghas be given a truce of one month. Latour once again refused, and mentioned that this would only give the Fellaghas a rest, thereby allowing them to strengthen their military power.⁶⁰ Of course, the French were aware of the Tunisian hidden aim concerning their national army.⁶¹ On 16 September, Latour appealed to the Fellaghas to capitulate.⁶²

The three Tunisian Ministers of State in charge of the negotiations held talks with Mendès-France on 24 September. The latter asked the Tunisian government to invite the Fellaghas to return their arms and go back to their original tribes.⁶³ The former refused, however, so the meeting ended without results.⁶⁴ Accordingly, each side went its own way. On 2 October, Mendès-France wrote to Fouchet that a total amnesty was necessary⁶⁵ and, in a press conference on the following day, Latour announced that France had reached a decision to give amnesty to the Fellaghas.⁶⁶ Fouchet instructed Latour 'to make the Tunisians understand that their future as well as that of Tunisia was "to the West and not to the Arab League"'.⁶⁷ The French were thus afraid that the creation of the de facto Tunisian army out of the Fellaghas would allow pro-Arab League elements inside the Tunisian government. The question was always seen as an international one over whether France could retain the country in its own influence or allow it to float towards Egyptian influence.

Nonetheless, the Tunisian government merely announced on 4 October that it condemned individual terrorist activities.⁶⁸ In consequence, there was no solution to the Fellagha problem. As for the reasons for the Tunisian attitude, Latour noted:

1. The Tunisian government certainly wants the success of the negotiations. It knows that a large part of public opinion would not forgive a failure of the talks.
2. The Neo-Destour considered and still considers the Fellagha movement as a means of pressure.
3. But Prime Minister Mendès-France's very firm attitude made the Neo-Destour fearful of a stiffening of our stance which could risk affecting the negotiations.
4. [The Neo-Destour] is sincerely fearful of the movement, which continued to amplify and could lead to a revolutionary situation.
5. These different considerations press, some by sincerity, the others by tactics, to wish that the Fellaghas should suspend their activities.⁶⁹

The Tunisian government was in a difficult position. It had to reach accord successfully on the agreements for internal autonomy. On the other hand, considering radical Neo-Destour members' opinion, it had to press Paris on some issues like the formation of a national army, but without the regime being overthrown. For these reasons confining itself to announcing its disapproval of individual terrorist activities, but not of the Fellaghas themselves was the Tunisian government's stance.

Reflecting disagreements on the Fellagha problem, the ongoing negotiations on internal autonomy had not made much progress. At the beginning of October 1954, agreement had almost been achieved only on the Agreement on Administrative and Technical Cooperation. With regard to the Agreement on the Interests and Rights of French People in Tunisia and Tunisian People in France, the Tunisians opposed having French as the second official language, although they approved in principle the settlers' participation in municipal assemblies. As for the Judicial Agreement, the French insisted on the maintenance of existing French jurisdiction in Tunisia, but the Tunisians demanded the immediate transfer of all affairs concerning their own nationals to the competence of Tunisian courts. Finally, concerning the Military Agreement, the Tunisian delegation called for the creation of a national army, and demanded that the stationing of French troops must be limited to the strategic bases determined in advance. In relation to this, the Tunisians asserted the maintenance of the Treaty of Bardo, because it did not forbid the creation of such an army.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, Tunisia witnessed the rise of radical opinion. The slow progress in the negotiations diminished the government's prestige in local opinion. This was all the more so because of the intensification of the Fellaghas' activities which were now extending to Algeria. Moreover, they were taking on the appearance of a liberation army.⁷¹ Reporting to Paris that the Neo-Destour was dominated by its extremist fraction, Latour lamented: 'All measure of détente is exceeded by a sense of exaltation orchestrated before any effect is produced'.⁷² The party's radical section had pressed Bourguiba to convene its National Council, and the latter agreed that it be held in Tunis on 14 November. Conversely, the Neo-Destour's moderate members expected that his intervention would pacify the radicals.⁷³ In the light of this situation, Mendès-France, too, decided to count on Bourguiba. They secretly met at the end of October and discussed the Fellagha question. Knowing the difficulties that Mendès-France was facing at the National Assembly, Bourguiba promised to take responsibility for putting an end to the group's dissidence and appealing for their return home if France guaranteed their liberties.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion on 1 November 1954 further radicalised Tunisian opinion. On the other hand, Nouira, the Minister of Commerce from the Neo-Destour, repeatedly tried to alleviate the French fear by stating that the situation in Algeria was not caused by the Neo-Destour or the Arab League.⁷⁵ More embarrassingly, Latour also found Salah Ben Youssef's attitude becoming aggressive to the extent that 'he would not hesitate to provoke... showdown

designed to derail the talks'.⁷⁶ In fact, the divisions between Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef, who refused to agree with the French on internal autonomy, became increasingly apparent at this time. Likewise, the Algerian rebellion had a grave effect on the French Parliament. The opposition to Mendès-France, such as the Independents, the Peasants, the Radical Socialists, and the Gaullists, more than ever criticised the government's conciliatory attitude towards the Fellaghas, insisting that his North African policy had given birth to the Algerian fiasco.⁷⁷ Thus the Algerian problem hardened both parties' attitudes, thereby making Franco-Tunisian agreements more difficult to achieve. At the beginning of November, Paris informed the Tunisians: 'whether the Franco-Tunisian Agreements are definitely adopted would be subject to the end of the Fellagha activities'.⁷⁸

The Neo-Destour National Council adopted a rather uncompromising motion on 14 November. It authorised the government to work out a solution to the Fellagha problem with the French, while guaranteeing their safety and personal freedom.⁷⁹ The first part of the motion asserted that a solution to the latter was a precondition to the former. The second part stated that pursuing the politics of repression did not fit with the politics of negotiation and that Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef should be allowed to return immediately.⁸⁰ French newspapers fiercely condemned the Neo-Destour, insisting that it justified violence conducted by the Fellaghas, and French parliamentarians urged the government to take a harder line with the Tunisians.⁸¹

It was at this moment that Bourguiba presented a solution to the Fellagha issue and the Franco-Tunisian negotiations with three conditions. In an interview with the *New York Times* on 17 November, he said that the first condition was that the Fellaghas would have to be protected from retaliation. The second was that they should never be considered as bandits or outlaws, because they were patriots who shared the same ideal with Bourguiba himself. The third and particularly important one was to give to the Tunisian government the responsibility to maintain order in the region where the Fellaghas operated. According to him, the Neo-Destour would lose face with Tunisian opinion if it accepted the French proposition that they should maintain responsibility over the police for ten years after the conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian Agreements. He added that for the Tunisians internal autonomy was only a step in the battle for independence, but that they wanted to stay in France's orbit as an independent country.⁸²

Bourguiba's declaration enabled both parties to move ahead quickly on the Fellagha. Franco-Tunisian talks were held in which Faure, the

acting Prime Minister, Fouchet, Ben Ammar, and Djelloui participated, and on 18 November agreement was reached in principle.⁸³ Mendès-France, then in Washington, showed strong determination to go ahead, as he wrote to Fouchet: 'The question is whether or not we reach a solution in Tunisia which will then have its repercussions in Algeria or in Morocco.'⁸⁴ That is, Mendès-France viewed this problem not as confined to Tunisia but as something that would affect the course of future developments in Algeria as well as Morocco. A satisfactory solution to the Fellaghas would create an atmosphere in which the problems in the other two territories would also be resolved.

A joint communiqué was issued on 20 November, in which, in order to promote the reintegration of the Fellaghas into society, both governments appealed to them to surrender, guaranteeing that those who returned their arms to the French authorities would not be punished.⁸⁵ The Americans noted that Tunisia conceded, fearing that the negotiations for internal autonomy would be broken off because of French reaction to the Neo-Destour's hard-line motion if it did not agree to the Fellagha accord.⁸⁶ However, this was not the case. The Tunisians conceded because the French showed a flexible attitude on defence and police issues. In fact, Latour was notified that Mendès-France had decided to draft the General Agreement which would deal with these issues in a way more acceptable to the Tunisians.⁸⁷

The Fellagha agreement was immediately put into practice. Latour met Ben Ammar on 26 November, when they agreed that the Tunisian government should appoint 21 delegates to visit simultaneously each of the areas where the Fellaghas were present. Ben Ammar revealed that he had already sent secret emissaries to contact them, and requested that France suspend military operations against the Fellaghas. Latour agreed that it would do so instantly.⁸⁸ This agreement had a remarkable effect: after receiving the emissaries, the Fellaghas at once accepted the offer of surrender on 30 November.⁸⁹ Latour proudly announced the success of the operation early in December, stating that 1,998 Fellaghas had surrendered 1,553 weapons and that the Fellagha problem was 90 per cent solved.⁹⁰ Against the background of this success, the Mendès-France Government managed to obtain a vote of confidence by 294 votes to 265 in the National Assembly debate on 11 December.

In addition, this success had a favourable effect on the international scene. In fact, the Arab-Asians had brought the Tunisian problem to the GA on 28 July. When its First Committee opened discussions on the issue, these countries welcomed the spirit of cooperation since the Carthage Declaration. Accordingly, they submitted a joint draft

resolution whereby the GA would express the hope that the negotiations would bring about a satisfactory solution. The Committee adopted a slightly revised resolution which recommended the adjournment of the discussions, by 54 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.⁹¹ On 17 December, the UNGA plenary session adopted its First Committee's recommendation. The UK representative abstained on the grounds that the UN was not competent to discuss a colonial matter, but simultaneously expressed confidence on the negotiations.⁹² This clearly indicated that the UN almost unanimously supported the Franco–Tunisian dialogues that were unlikely to result in Tunisian independence. Indeed, the international community viewed the independence of colonial territories as premature, and attached a high value to the fact that France had begun decolonisation by devolving substantive power to the local people.

6.3 The Franco–Tunisian agreements: January–June 1955

The solution to the Fellagha problem prompted the resumption of negotiations for internal autonomy. In January 1955, negotiations on the General Agreement, which would look at diplomacy and defence, were opened. Early in November 1954, the Tunisian delegation had already shown their reluctance to agree to the maintenance of France's right to control diplomacy and defence. Latour noted: 'Slim entrenched himself behind [the Bey's] authority as a convenient shield to refuse the agreement of Foreign Affairs.' Astonished by Slim's attitude, Amin Bey told Latour that the question of defence and foreign affairs must be dealt with by himself and the Resident-General, based on the Treaty of Bardo, upon which the latter agreed.⁹³

When both parties started discussions on these matters in Paris on 4 January 1955, the French found their counterpart's attitude hardened as compared to the previous year. The Tunisian delegations insisted that the General Agreement should not mention a Tunisian army and diplomacy because the Treaty of Bardo did not prohibit Tunisia from exerting these rights, while the French argued that the General Agreement should confirm the maintenance of French responsibility for these issues.⁹⁴ That is to say, '[i]n total, the French negotiators want to stick to strict internal autonomy whereas for the Tunisians, this autonomy must tend towards independence'.⁹⁵ Conflict also arose around the issue of the Southern Territory, which had been administered by the French military authorities since the end of the nineteenth century. The French delegation demanded that the Tunisians accept France's special power in this area because of its strategic importance in light of the defence of Africa.⁹⁶

Faced with this impasse, both parties looked to the Bey to arbitrate, but to little avail.⁹⁷

Furthermore, Bourguiba declared on 11 January: 'For us, internal autonomy is a step towards total independence,'⁹⁸ and this put the Tunisian delegation in a difficult position in view of public opinion. After returning to Tunis, Djelloui, one of the three Tunisian delegates, had talks with Latour, highlighting this declaration's effect on the Tunisian negotiators: 'to break off the negotiations would certainly constitute a disaster, but to accept the French delegation's proposal would be an even greater disaster'.⁹⁹ However, the political organisations and the trade unions which Ben Ammar had consulted were unanimous in their desire not to break off the negotiations, as he said to Latour on 18 January. In addition, he continued, he had obtained clear authorisation from the Neo-Destour and the UGTT permitting him to resume conversations personally in Paris. Even so, it was clear to the Resident-General that Ben Ammar, following Bourguiba's declaration, considered that internal autonomy was only a step towards independence. Latour wrote to Paris: 'if... France demanded diplomatic and military clauses be inserted, Tunisia would request dispositions to permit to start discussions on its access to external sovereignty afterwards.'¹⁰⁰

The second round of the negotiations commenced in Paris on 23 January. In this round, over the issue of the police, both sides agreed on the presence of the Residency's authority for two years but they did not agree on how long the transition thereafter would last, the French favouring eight years and the Tunisians two. Negotiations progressed on the Southern Territory issue and the Tunisians agreed to the maintenance of French troops and French authority for security in this territory.¹⁰¹

On 5 February, the Mendès-France Government suddenly fell as a result of debates in the National Assembly over North Africa that had started three days before. It was reported to Paris that in Tunisia a feeling of deception and disillusionment had spread among the Muslim population, while French settlers generally did not hide their satisfaction.¹⁰² A ministerial crisis followed which inevitably interrupted the Franco-Tunisian talks. Faure, who announced his desire to rapidly recommence negotiations before being elected, became the new Prime Minister on 23 February and appointed Pierre July as the new Minister for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs.¹⁰³ Both countries agreed early in March that negotiations should be restarted on 15 March.¹⁰⁴

In the meantime the Tunisians were voicing their demand for Bourguiba's return to Tunisia more loudly. The Neo-Destour Political Bureau concluded on 11 March that the return of Bourguiba, who was

'only capable of preventing the party's extremists from committing excesses',¹⁰⁵ must be realised instantly. This meant that the nationalist party itself could hardly contain the growing demands from rank-and-file members, largely instigated by Salah Ben Youssef. Two weeks later, Masmoudi, a Tunisian delegate for the negotiations, officially called for Bourguiba's return on behalf of the government.¹⁰⁶

When talks were resumed on schedule, several important issues remained unsettled: first, the question of a Franco-Tunisian 'permanent link' was left unsolved, as the French wished to substitute it for the Treaty of Bardo, whereas the Tunisians did not want the General Agreement to refer to it. Second, the problem of the security of the Southern Territory was being discussed on the basis of Tunisian control of the civil police and French control of the frontier military police but final agreement had not yet been reached. Third, the issue of French representation on the municipal councils was disputed. The Tunisians argued it should be proportional to the number of residents in the community while the French requested parity.¹⁰⁷ At this point the negotiations were on the brink of failure. On 29 March, July declared the French delegation had to take into account the views expressed in the National Assembly, as the Tunisian delegation had to do with Tunisian opinion.

However, French concessions on Bourguiba's homecoming paved the way to achieve settlement. The two countries decided to reach a conclusion before 20 April. Negotiations were reopened on 5 April, and with the attendance of Faure and Ben Ammar after the first week, the remaining problems were beginning to be smoothed away. Both sides compromised on the issue of the Southern Territory, whereby they agreed: 'this region will be under common administrative law, except for the appointment of civil and military authorities and include a border area where police will exclusively fall under the military authorities.'¹⁰⁸ Subsequently, Faure announced on 13 April that Bourguiba would be allowed to travel throughout France. As for his return, Faure stated that at that moment it was impossible to authorise this, but that 'the thing was in the realm of possibility'.¹⁰⁹

On 21 April, Faure invited Bourguiba to the *Hôtel de Matignon*. This was the first time that the French Prime Minister had officially met the latter.¹¹⁰ Bourguiba's participation and Faure's acceptance of it largely contributed to the successful conclusion of the negotiations.¹¹¹ Faure's recognition of the Tunisian people's special position in France enabled Bourguiba to propose that the Tunisian delegation compromise in the negotiations. The French government agreed that French seats in municipal councils would not be over three out of seven. Both sides agreed

that Arabic would be the only official language, but that French would also be used in public life.¹¹² However, the most important compromise was made when the French permitted Bourguiba's return to Tunisia, while the Tunisians accepted Faure's insistence that 'the notion of close and permanent links between the two countries' should be introduced in the preamble of the General Agreement.¹¹³ This meant Tunisia was not allowed to have responsibility for external affairs and defence. Both parties wanted to avoid the breakdown of the negotiations from which the Neo-Destour radical section, and ultimately Egypt, who wanted Tunisia to take Salah Ben Youssef's line, would profit. This could have entailed in the vanishing of France's presence in Tunisia.

The French and Tunisian delegations signed a protocol of agreement on 22 April. Then, on 3 June 1955, Faure and Ben Ammar officially signed the Franco-Tunisian Agreements¹¹⁴ which meant the termination of the Convention of Marsa. Tunisian opinion was not entirely satisfied with the results, however. The Economic and Financial Agreement stipulated Tunisian adherence to the monetary and customs union with France¹¹⁵ which deprived Tunisia of a right to impose tariffs freely. In the text on the Franco-Tunisian Agreements there was no reference to the possibility of Tunisia's future independence. In fact, Latour noted that the Tunisians received the signature of the Agreements with less enthusiasm than had been expected. The Vieux-Destour and Salah Ben Youssef were very disappointed at the Agreements. Many French settlers, facing the *fait accompli* and feeling abandoned by Paris, reacted violently and resentfully.¹¹⁶ Thus, although Tunisia obtained internal autonomy, the situation would not be stable, with opposition forces continuing to attack the government and Bourguiba.

Nevertheless, the latter's return was approved by France. Backed by Bourguiba's prestige, the Tunisian government was to consolidate the new regime without demanding further steps for independence at least for the time being. The French, on the other hand, knew that Bourguiba's return would unavoidably increase nationalist demands in the long term, but were satisfied that Tunisian demands would focus on internal autonomy for the moment. Indeed, most nationalists failed to go on to request independence. As the UN resolution at the end of 1954 indicated, the international community still viewed the independence of dependencies as premature and unnecessary. It was rather natural from the contemporary viewpoint that the movements for independence did not gain much force in Tunisia. France already regarded Egypt as an enemy because it tried to draw Tunisia into the Arab camp by encouraging Salah Ben Youssef's group aiming at independence, although at

this stage Egypt could not afford to provide material assistance which would enable Tunisian independence against French will.

Thus the confrontation between the French and the nationalists over sovereignty, referred to at the end of the Chapter 5, ended in the latter's triumph. France had to turn to decolonisation through the recognition of internal autonomy at the sacrifice of its goal of association. What was particularly impressed upon Paris was the strength of nationalism and the significance of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, this was not a one-sided victory for the Tunisians. The UN stance of non-intervention, apart from setting the goal of bilateral negotiations, allowed the French to preserve the initiative before and throughout the negotiation process, so French influence in Tunisia was guaranteed as a result. With this expectation, France was to set on a similar course in Morocco.

7

The Restoration of Mohammed V

The removal of Mohammed V and the consequent enthronement of Arafa only confirmed the instability of the protectorate regime. Not surprisingly, Arafa's rule proved very unstable and, following the turn-about in Tunisia, Paris finally understood that popular sovereignty should be recognised in Morocco, too. Yet again, the question was how to achieve it, as the existence of the traditionalists, on whom the French had relied for rule, proved to be the largest stumbling block. The immediate removal of them would easily put order in peril because the nationalists' force was still feeble and divided. The French would have to pay the price for their long-held policy of divide and rule in the era of nationalism which required homogeneity in a political community. The conclusion that Paris reached in August 1955 was to set up an amalgam regime consisting of the traditionalist dignitaries, the moderate nationalists who were loyal to the deposed Sultan, and the radical nationalists who were represented by the Istiqlal, while gradually developing nationalist forces. By this, it was expected that the new regime would ensure popular sovereignty in the foreseeable future.

However, the Russian launching of an economic offensive produced an unexpected result. The further radicalisation of nationalism towards Arab neutralism undermined the unstable basis of the internal autonomy regime which had barely been founded. Alarmed by the prospect of possible disintegration of the political community, el-Glaoui at last yielded to nationalist pressure and accepted Mohammed V's return. Nevertheless, the fact that his restoration was desperately required indicated that the future acceptance of popular sovereignty was not sufficient to save the community in face of a new threat derived from the Cold War. Unquestionably, all parties, including Paris and el-Glaoui, were aware of this threat.

7.1 The Lacoste plan: August 1954–July 1955

As argued in Chapter 5, Moroccan affairs saw no progress after the arrival of Lacoste, the newly appointed Resident-General, in June 1954. However, after Mendès-France's coming to office, it became clear that France was venturing into decolonisation policy in Tunisia. Moroccan nationalists started to raise a voice to call for a similar policy. On 9 July, Ahmed Balafrej, the Istiqlal's exiled Secretary-General, declared in Madrid that Franco–Moroccan dialogue could start only with 'the only true and legitimate spokesperson of Morocco, the one on whom the Moroccan people have put all confidence, the Sultan Mohammed V'.¹

On 1 August a demonstration took place in Fez demanding his return with the cry 'Long Live Allal el Fassi'. By calling the name of the Istiqlal's leader, the demonstration indicated robust support for the nationalist cause. In the first week of the month, several terrorist attacks occurred in Casablanca and in Port-Lyautey, killing 46 people in total.² France ruled out Mohammed's restoration lest el-Glaoui be alienated, however. As for the divisions in Moroccan opinion, Lacoste noted that while in Tunisia a national sentiment existed, in Morocco there were two worlds: urban areas and rural areas, the former counting on Egyptian and Iraqi support and the latter being ruled by traditional, feudal elites.³ On 4 August, the PDI (*Parti démocratique de l'indépendance*) publicly requested the '[r]eturn of the legitimate king on the Moroccan throne, and the resumption of dialogue'. Balafrej warned the French: 'The imprisoned leaders... would not be able to exercise a moderating influence for a long time'⁴ vis-à-vis the rank-and-file unless they applied a sincere solution.

In fact, Si Ould Embarek Bekkaï, the former pasha of Sefrou,⁵ had already displayed his own position. On 21 May, one day after the appointment of Lacoste as the Resident-General, Bekkaï publicised his own proposal which was made up of three points: (1) Moroccan sovereignty must be recognised; (2) a Supreme Council would temporarily hold the sovereignty so that the people would be consulted on the choice of their sovereign; (3) the means to develop Moroccan sovereignty to full independence would be sought by the Council and the French government.⁶ Thus Bekkaï called for Morocco's sovereignty and future independence without referring to the ex-Sultan's immediate restoration or popular sovereignty.

In fact, one of the focal points of Moroccan demands was the restoration of Mohammed V, as Lacoste noted in late August 1954. The nationalist parties, such as Istiqlal and the PDI, called for his restoration. However, this option was flatly rejected by the conservative

dignitaries, headed by el-Glaoui, and most French settlers. Considering their vigorous opposition, the restoration seemed politically unrealistic. Hence, the position of Bekkaï. As Lacoste also pointed out, 'a number of wise nationalists' acknowledged that France could not consent to his return to the throne.⁷ It was possible to categorise nationalists in accordance with the extent to which they wished for his restoration. Bekkaï was categorised as a moderate nationalist by the French authority, and the Istiqlal and the PDI as radical nationalists.

Based on this analysis, Lacoste proposed to Paris that France should urge Sultan Arafa to resign and search for an alternative, either a Regency Council or a new Sultan, if it was impossible to obtain nationalist cooperation under Arafa's reign. He continued that many nationalists would compromise on the acceptance of Mohammed V's transfer to France without a restoration, as this would improve his living conditions and make his acceptance of the settlement process appear 'voluntary'.⁸ As well, the question of whether Arafa should be removed or not was to be called the dynastic problem, and this would be a serious obstacle for the French to overcome, as will be seen.

Meanwhile, Paris was preoccupied with other issues, such as the EDC and Indochinese and Tunisian affairs, but had already considered the Tunisian-type solution in Morocco. Nevertheless, the French had no intention of taking a significant step until the Tunisian problem was settled. Tunisia was always viewed easier to deal with than Morocco, where the division of internal opinion gave France much more difficulty in finding a single political force to which substantive power should be devolved. On 27 August, Mendès-France stated before the National Assembly: 'We must, with the Sultan Ben Arafa, call progressively, but as rapidly as possible, the Moroccan people to manage their own affairs in the framework of Moroccan sovereignty', although he admitted that there was no time to be spent on dealing with this problem.⁹ He also promised that the government was ready to take steps to improve the ex-Sultan's personal situation but that, at the same time, his restoration must be excluded. The National Assembly approved his policy by 419 votes to 112.¹⁰

As a consequence of Mendès-France's statement, the Moroccan political forces publicised their own positions. El-Fassi publicised the Istiqlal's requests in September 1954; they were the restoration of Mohammed V, Morocco's complete independence, and the unification of the French and Spanish zones.¹¹ Conversely, el-Glaoui and his fellow dignitaries who had been committed to Mohammed V's deposition remained hostile to his transfer to France, let alone his restoration. The position of the moderate nationalists was in between that of the two groups. Bekkaï

declared on 6 September that the problem would not be successful 'if the question of the first interlocutor... is not resolved'.¹² He then suggested that Mohammed V be transferred to France and that ultimately his restoration must be allowed. Now Bekkai's view was that France should, after recognising Mohammed V as the *interlocuteur*, grant internal autonomy to Morocco and that he should be restored after a certain period.

The three major shades of Moroccan opinion can be summarised as follows: with regard to Mohammed V's restoration, the traditionalists rejected his restoration and even his transfer to France. The radical nationalists called for his restoration, while the moderate nationalists accepted his return to France although they preferred the restoration at a later date. Interestingly, their positions regarding Mohammed V's status corresponded to Morocco's future political status vis-à-vis France. This was because the reverse of France's decision on the deposition would inevitably bring about the reassessment of the French policy that had hitherto been based on support from the traditionalists. El-Glaoui and his supporters categorically rejected any reduction of French influence in the country. In contrast, the radical nationalists called for immediate and full independence, and the moderate nationalists accepted the recognition of sovereignty without immediate independence.

Paris remained reluctant to start addressing the problem. Christian Fouchet, the Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, sent instructions to Lacoste on 8 September. These instructions suggested that the French were changing their ideas but were buying time until the conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations which had just been opened. Briefly, Fouchet pointed to the necessity of establishing a government composed of Moroccan and French ministers. As well, he agreed with Lacoste that the dynastic problem must be given priority and that Arafa must be dethroned, although these policies must not be put into practice instantly. Instead, the points that Fouchet stressed the nationalists should be informed of were: 'the dynastic question must stay in the background for the moment... while the French government cannot consider the return of Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef'. Lastly, the instructions were aimed at preventing UN discussion of the Moroccan problem.¹³ Lacoste published these proposals on 20 September, one day before the opening of the GA session.¹⁴ In fact, the countries¹⁵ of the Arab-Asian bloc had asked on 28 July 1954 that the item be placed on the agenda of the GA session.¹⁶

Washington did not highly appreciate the French programme. Some State Department officials simply pointed out that this programme 'contained nothing new'. Frustrated with the lack of progress towards

internal autonomy, they recommended that Dulles approach Mendès-France:

We hope some further and perhaps dramatic steps can be taken in Morocco urgently, otherwise the US... could not work to avoid debate in the 9th General Assembly nor a resolution again urging progress through bilateral negotiations.¹⁷

Herbert Hoover, the acting Secretary of State, suggested Dulles should talk with Mendès-France in Paris, if possible.¹⁸ Yet no record of the Dulles–Mendès-France conversations has been found, perhaps because the former regarded this approach as ill-timed in view of the continuing discussions on German rearmament as a result of the French National Assembly rejection of the EDC treaty in August 1954.

In September 1954, Georges Izard had visited Mohammed V in Antsirabé and revealed the Regency Council plan.¹⁹ The latter consented on condition that the Istiqlal approved.²⁰ The reason he did not reject this plan was that 'Regency' implied the existence of a Sultan, that is, Mohammed V himself, even after the departure of Arafa. On the other hand, however, Paris was contemplating the establishment of a new Sultan. As such, another mission headed by Dubois-Roquebert²¹ was sent to Antsirabé on 18 October with the aim of obtaining Mohammed V's renunciation of the throne in return for his transfer to France in case he agreed to the designation of a new Sultan. The ex-Sultan immediately rejected this and instead requested his own restoration, asserting that there was no justification for abdication. He also insisted that he could not play any political role in Madagascar and that his consultation with representatives of Moroccan public opinion was essential before making up his mind.²²

French difficulties burgeoned with the outbreak of an insurrection in Algeria on 1 November 1954. Two radio stations in Hungary and Egypt harshly attacked oppressive French policy towards North Africa, and this further helped encourage Moroccan nationalists' violent activities.²³ Likewise, the Spanish multiplied their efforts to instigate anti-French feeling. Driven into a corner, the French sought US support. In Washington Mendès-France had conversations with Dulles on 17 November, invoking the question of Spanish and Egyptian broadcasting activities. In response, Dulles considered the question sympathetically,²⁴ although regarding Mendès-France's request for a public statement of US support against outside intervention, his reply was that the Americans could not give France a blank cheque.²⁵

Yet overall the Americans were supportive because they had already been notified in October 1954 that the French had been greatly inclined to Arafa's dethronement,²⁶ as implied by the aforementioned Dubois-Roquebert mission. First, Henry Byroade, the Assistant Secretary of State, drew the attention of the Egyptian Ambassador to US concern over the Voice of the Arabs, an Egyptian radio service that was conducting anti-French broadcasts. Second, Dulles told the Syrian Ambassador in Washington: 'the Arab states should refrain from everything that could harm the possibilities of settlement which currently exist in North Africa'. Dulles, too, instructed the American ambassadors in Cairo and Madrid to request that each government restrict anti-French broadcasting activities.²⁷

The French also asked the Americans for support in the UN. The GA First Committee started debating the North African problems in December 1954. Irritated with the lack of progress towards reform unlike in Tunisia, the Arab-Asians put forward a joint draft resolution which reaffirmed the 1952 GA resolution. Ambassador Bonnet asked Dulles on 9 December to exert influence on the Arab delegations to postpone the GA examination of the problems.²⁸ Thus Dulles instructed Lodge to vote against it, because the '[s]ituation in Paris [was] so delicate and balance in favour of sustaining Mendes-France on London-Paris accords [over German rearmament] so precarious'.²⁹ On 13 December, in the First Committee, Lodge voted against the Arab-Asian resolution.³⁰ Nevertheless, the Americans moderately urged France to introduce reform in Morocco. Before voting Lodge affirmed: 'the US still adhered to President Eisenhower's declaration in support of the principles of self-government'.³¹ The GA plenary meeting at any rate adopted, on 17 December, a resolution providing for the postponement of the Moroccan question until the next session.³²

Following the failure of the Dubois-Roquebert mission, Paris finally agreed with Izard on Arafa's dethronement, possibly in view of the US attitude at the UN. In December 1954, he was officially sent to Antsirabé with a plan for the Regency Council. On 26 December, the ex-Sultan confirmed his own agreement to a settlement, after having obtained agreements from the nationalists, including the Istiqlal. What Mohammed V accepted was the establishment of a Throne Council³³ rather than a new Sultan, and a provisional government as a basis for unofficial negotiations with Paris. Then he specified that the provisional government's role would be: to negotiate an agreement affirming the integrity of Moroccan sovereignty; to organise Franco-Moroccan relations on a basis of 'close links';³⁴ and to put into effect the reforms that would transform Morocco into a

modern country under a constitutional monarchy. Lastly, the ex-Sultan demanded that the people freely choose their own sovereign once calm was restored.³⁵ Thus, by rejecting a formula for a new Sultan, Mohammed V left the door open to his own future restoration. The important subject of how to obtain Arafa's abdication was not discussed at this time.

However, Resident-General Lacoste disagreed. He instead suggested France should never permit the Regency Council or Mohammed's restoration. In January 1955, Lacoste made a long report in which he articulated a serious dilemma regarding Arafa's position: on the one hand, as long as he reigned, France could count on support from French settlers and the traditionalists; on the other hand, it was clear that terrorist activities would never cease under his reign since, for the nationalists and the mass of people in the towns, Arafa's presence 'on the throne... suffices to justify the terrorist action'.³⁶ Nevertheless, he argued for Arafa's dethronement and then for the establishment of a new Sultan. The Council should be ruled out, because first, such a council had no precedent in Moroccan history.³⁷ And, second, this solution was a clear violation of the Treaty of Fez which guaranteed the Sultan's status. Consequently, he recommended the 'third person'.³⁸ He lastly stressed the importance of obtaining the ex-Sultan's promise of non-restoration.³⁹

The National Assembly debates on North African affairs proved fatal to the Mendès-France Government as mentioned above. Mendès-France was criticised for his policies towards North Africa and Algeria in particular. He was forced to resign on 5 February and Edgar Faure became the new Prime Minister on 23 February.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the Moroccan situation again worsened. In mid-March 1955, Lacoste reported to Pierre July, the new Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, on the increase in terrorist attacks in Casablanca.⁴¹ The terrorists began deliberately attacking European people rather than the Moroccan population on whom the terrorists' attention had been concentrated since the deposition.⁴² Yet Faure was so preoccupied with the ongoing Franco-Tunisian negotiations that Lacoste was not given any instructions during his stay in Paris from 2 to 10 March.⁴³

The increase in terrorist activities made Lacoste more reluctant to take action. A new plan he submitted to July on 14 May asked Paris to reverse its position on the dynastic problem.⁴⁴ He argued that the following elements necessitated a fresh examination: the Franco-Tunisian negotiations for internal autonomy, the extension of troubles in Morocco, the aggravation of the Algerian situation, and the psychological effect of the Bandung Conference.⁴⁵ According to him, the dynastic problem was only a pretext for those who were committed to violent acts. The

nationalists', notably the Istiqlal's, real objective was to drive France out of North Africa as a whole. Hence the importance of the caids, since the majority of them still had extraordinary power in the rural areas, and their support was indispensable for the French position. The Pasha of Marrakech 'embodies...the loyalty to France'.⁴⁶ Since Arafa's departure would be regarded as France's betrayal, regardless of whether the Regency Council or a third person would come after, Lacoste now concluded Arafa should stay on the throne and that a Moroccan government should be established under his reign.

In spite of Lacoste's recommendation, France was embarking on policy change in Morocco. After the signing of the Franco-Tunisian Agreements in late April 1955, Paris decided to initiate reforms, though bypassing the dynastic problem at the moment. A novel point was the importance that the French government, Prime Minister Faure in particular, attached to the nationalists, as later developments showed. At the end of May, Faure agreed with July on Lacoste's dismissal.⁴⁷ Shortly after the signature of the Franco-Tunisian Agreements on 3 June, Faure set up an interdepartmental Committee for Coordination of North African Affairs.⁴⁸ The Moroccan situation was so pressing that Lacoste warned: 'The security of our compatriots and even that of [the] French establishment in Morocco can be at stake'.⁴⁹ Economic activities in Casablanca and Rabat were being paralysed because of shop closures, partly orchestrated by foreign broadcasts, particularly Radio Damascus.⁵⁰ Terrorist attacks against the French population occurred and French shops in major cities closed because of strikes at the end of June.⁵¹

On 20 June, the French Council of Ministers decided on the replacement of Lacoste with Gilbert Grandval.⁵² Faure announced the governmental programme before the National Assembly the following day. Its main points were: (1) the permanence of the French presence in Morocco; (2) the abolition of the system of direct administration; (3) the creation of modern governmental institutions; and (4) the organisation of genuine close links between the two countries.⁵³ This announcement showed that Faure was giving consideration to the internal autonomy which was similar to what Tunisia had obtained through the Agreements. After their experiences in Tunisia in 1954, the French began to search for a way of coming to terms with the Moroccan nationalists, though governmental archives declassified so far do not reveal its details.

At the same time, US and UK officials were increasingly concerned about Moroccan affairs, largely because they were accused by French newspapers of failing to apply the principle of the North Atlantic alliance in support of French North African policy.⁵⁴ French opinion's hostility was directed

more against the Americans than the British, for the latter made a public statement welcoming the Franco-Tunisian Agreements soon after their signature whereas the former did not.⁵⁵ This was, as discussed before, because France's extending the Tunisian-type solution to other territories was the prerequisite for public US support. On 16 June, Ambassador Dillon urged Dulles to pay attention to Morocco, emphasising that French leaders 'have become suspicious and resentful of U.S. policy in that area' because of its 'unwillingness to allow the transfer of helicopters from Indochina to North Africa'.⁵⁶ Then, the Americans were told that while London felt the French should realise 'the days of old-time colonialism are over', it would still continue its policy of supporting the French position.⁵⁷

The British were keenly aware that Anglo-Saxon advice would merely irritate French opinion thereby increasing the probability of French failure. Jebb had written to Eden in March 1955:

During the last years we have...succeeded...in placing the French firmly together with Western Germany in the general defensive system of the West.... We shall still, however, have to continue to work very hard to prevent her from slipping out of this system as a result either of internal, or of external pressure, or of both.... [T]he attitude of the 'Anglo-Saxons' towards France generally may have a certain influence on the issue of the struggle.... [W]hat is evident above all is that if the French really lose their grip on Africa North of the Sahara, the left wing and neutralist forces in France itself will be immeasurably increased.⁵⁸

Jebb continued that the defence of Western Europe in the face of a neutralist or quasi-hostile France was impossible in the long run. British concern was the avoidance of French withdrawal from NATO which was highly likely if France was driven out of North Africa. Since Anglo-Saxon intervention would increase this probability, the British were extremely hesitant to advise the French. Even the ratification of the Paris Accords on German rearmament by the French National Assembly in December 1954 did not lessen Britain's anxiety.

It was clear to the British that French colonialism was anachronistic. They strongly hoped that France would follow their course and turn to decolonisation. The problem for them was that they were not allowed to advise France even though its colonialism was doomed to failure in the near future. The only way left to the British was to wait for the French to come to realise the failure and set about decolonisation on their own initiative. The FO was certain that French opinion would not

put the blame on the Anglo-Saxons as long as France failed to solve the North African problems – that is, France being thrown out of North Africa – without their explicit intervention. Otherwise, and this was the worst-case scenario, France might choose to drop out of the Western defence system, driven by its left- or neutralist-oriented public resentful at the Anglo-American interference. London was firmly determined not to advise Paris, all the more so because Washington appeared eager to warn Paris.

State Department officials had little faith in French competence in handling colonial affairs, as the British noted.⁵⁹ This was presumably because Faure's announcement of 20 June did not refer to the dynastic problem. As a country that advocated national emancipation, the Americans could not afford to be so tolerant as the British, therefore they could not wait for French policy change. On 20 June, Dillon had strongly conveyed American concerns to Faure. The latter, as expected, did not react favourably and instead produced a list of complaints about the failure of British and American policy to support France in North Africa.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, immediately after this, Faure expressed his confidence in support from France's allies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, at a press conference on 24 June.⁶¹ Faure then told American officials on 2 July that 'he would welcome at any time an expression of Washington's views' especially on the dynastic problem.⁶² It is unclear why Faure suddenly changed his mind and showed an affirmative attitude to the Anglo-Americans on this matter, but one possible reason is that he considered American support could be useful in encouraging liberal tendencies among French opinion, if its timing was carefully calculated. The Americans appreciated this move as evidence that the French had, to the end, recognised US good offices and were now seriously addressing the Moroccan question. They gave no immediate reaction, however, fearing that it could still be interpreted as interference.⁶³

7.2 The Grandval plan and the Aix-les-Bains meeting: July–August 1955

The new Resident-General Grandval arrived at Rabat on 7 July. Just before his departure, he had received lengthy instructions from the Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs. The instructions explicitly mentioned that the exercise of the government and of the administration must be transferred to the Moroccans themselves so as to transform their passive consent to France's permanent presence into an active

one. Consequently, it was out of the question to eliminate Moroccan sovereignty, and all methods of co-sovereignty must be ruled out.⁶⁴ These instructions partially exceeded what Faure had mentioned in the previous month, as it referred to Morocco's sovereignty, though the recognition of it remained a future goal. The principle of co-sovereignty must be renounced when the protectorate system was replaced by 'a new method of association'⁶⁵ between the two countries. The French realised, as in Tunisia, that cooperation with the nationalists was indispensable to sustain French rule. A Moroccan government to implement administrative decentralisation should be established, though in the plan this would include French ministers.

Additionally, the French had already concluded that the formation of such a government was impossible under Arafa's reign, as Arafa 'could not manage to impose his authority or prestige'. Instead, to French regret, 'the legend of Mohammed V was created'.⁶⁶ Thus the instructions frankly admitted that the establishment of Arafa had been a complete failure and, worse, had enhanced Mohammed V's prestige. His influence must be excluded at the time of the formation of a government, so its formation should be completed before his transfer to France.

Still, the French government became indecisive concerning Arafa's dethronement, so instructed Grandval to inform Paris if addressing the dynastic problem was necessary. Upon his arrival, therefore, he wasted no time in sounding out the representatives of all shades of Moroccan opinion, especially the traditionalists. On 13 July, he had long talks with el-Glaoui whose position was: 'all ideas of restoring Mohammed ben Youssef or his sons must be... absolutely proscribed' since Arafa was the legitimate Sultan.⁶⁷ However, at the end of the month, it emerged that the caids appeared to be resigned to Arafa's departure, provided they received assurances that Mohammed V and his descendants would be kept from the throne.⁶⁸ When he talked with caids in Meknès, he found 51 of the 52 caids adopted the position: 'We know nothing but God and France'.⁶⁹ The chieftains' orientation was perhaps decisive in changing el-Glaoui's stance. He now felt that he had to make concessions, but imposed an important condition: Arafa's dethronement could be accepted only if he was immediately replaced by another Sultan chosen among six candidates that el-Glaoui himself listed.⁷⁰ For him, the absence of a Sultan was unthinkable, since it would lead directly to Mohammed V's return, and Arafa's successor must be under his wing.

Meanwhile, the British and the Americans were exchanging views. As mentioned above, the former were worried that the United States had a low opinion of French ability to handle colonial situations. They were

intent on moderating US attitudes vis-à-vis France, so perhaps under the instructions of Eden, who had originally been advised by Jebb, Makins began 'urging the Americans to be sympathetic towards the French'.⁷¹ It was probably these British efforts, together with Dillon's advice to the same effect on 16 June, that made Dulles pay more attention to Moroccan affairs. On 13 July, he ordered Julius Holmes, the US Consul General at Tangier, to undertake a survey in North African areas.⁷²

By now the Moroccan problem seemed most likely to be brought to the UN again. On 26 July, considering the spread of disturbances in those territories, the Arab-Asian UN delegations⁷³ decided to demand the inscription of the Algerian and Moroccan problems on the GA agenda. The French position remained as in previous years; the UN was not competent, and the questions should be debated as late as possible if they were taken up.⁷⁴ As there had been no significant progress towards a settlement of the Moroccan crisis since the adoption of the GA resolution in 1952, the UN's taking up this issue in the autumn of 1955 appeared highly likely.

Grandval sent an action plan to Paris on 2 August, whereby he plainly suggested that Arafa abdicate.⁷⁵ In sharp contrast to el-Glaoui, he recommended that the Regency Council be created, not 'the third person', because he believed that there was no ruler who could stay on the throne without following Arafa's fate. This plan was defined by its strict time schedule:

The large credit of which I dispose in all the Moroccan milieux would be withdrawn if no decision on this point was taken before 20 August. The popular despair would then fuel fanaticism. ... In an open conflict with the majority of the country, the authority of France and its Resident-General would disappear. ...⁷⁶

The second anniversary of the deposition was on 20 August 1955. Grandval warned that if France did not take action before that date, Morocco would descend into anarchy. He also stressed that the ex-Sultan's deep involvement was central to this plan, and that Mohammed V should make 'a public statement by which he would call his subjects to take the provisional authority as legitimate'. Nonetheless, he ruled out the possibility of Mohammed V's restoration, which was never acceptable to el-Glaoui and French right-wing politicians. The tight schedule of the Grandval plan derived from the fear that if Arafa stayed in place longer or if the establishment of the Throne Council was delayed, a political 'vacuum' would result in the ex-Sultan's restoration.⁷⁷

The Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs analysed the Grandval plan with grave interest. A memorandum of 3 August began by stating: 'The importance of steps proposed by Mr Grandval... shows... the gravity of the Moroccan situation, where the risks of insurrection now tend to replace the pressure of terrorism.'⁷⁸ On the whole, this memorandum accepted the Grandval plan. The summary of the Ministry's comments was as follows:

1. A Council composed of the Grand Vizier and two representatives of Moroccan opinion would be more stable and solid than a 'khalifa'.⁷⁹
2. France's obligation to protect the Allaoui dynasty.
3. Fatmi ben Slimane⁸⁰ was the best choice as the head of a future provisional government.
4. A provisional government could not be entitled to negotiate about future Franco-Moroccan relations, but only to devise the institutional reforms in accordance with France.
5. Mohammed V's public support for the solution must be his appeal not as the sovereign but as a technician.
6. The Spanish should be informed of the French decisions.
7. Mohammed V should be transferred to France after the Throne Council and the Moroccan government had established their authority.

Central to the memorandum was the establishment of a Throne Council, and the ex-Sultan's involvement in the settlement process, albeit as a 'technician' in order to minimise the enhancement of his prestige.

In parallel to the Afro-Asian moves in the UN, the Americans grew more sensitive to their approach. From 1 to 3 August, a meeting was held in Paris on North African problems in which John Jernegan and US officers from North African posts participated. The meeting concluded:

there has been recent evolution in French thinking and events in North Africa shocked Metropolitan France from its complacency. ... Influence of colons in France is probably diminishing. ... [The] program which Grandval outlined and general approach of Faure and Mendes-France... do appear worthy of our support...⁸¹

The Americans appreciated the Grandval plan, as this included Arafa's dethronement. Actually, they had already noted in July 1955 that 'there is unquestionably [a] new spirit developing in France', as indicated in the 'Socialists' call for basic revision [of the] constitution [of the] French Union in order [to] permit free association [of] all three North African

areas with France'.⁸² Yet this meeting also emphasised that their support for the French position in the UNGA would depend on whether France could take action before its opening, and that the French should be warned of this. In other words, unless there was significant progress towards reform in Morocco, Washington should notify Paris that it would vote for UN debate. To conclude, the meeting recommended that Dulles issue a public statement to show American satisfaction on the Franco-Tunisian Agreements, thereby giving support to Grandval's efforts.⁸³

Meanwhile, US Ambassador Dillon and Holmes, who presided over the above meeting, had conversations with Faure on 2 August.⁸⁴ The latter repeatedly asked them whether they considered Arafat's dethronement indispensable or not. Holmes mentioned: 'The solution envisaged by the Resident-General...is on the right lines. But it must have the approval of Ben Youssef.'⁸⁵ That is, the Americans agreed with the Quai d'Orsay and Grandval as a whole. Dillon then expressed 'the personal view that the United States might find it very difficult to give France the kind of support on the Moroccan problem we have given [in] the past two Assemblies, if the situation there has not substantially improved'. Thus the US implicitly notified the French of their possible attitude at the UNGA. The Americans, nonetheless, had the impression that Faure had already been resolved to tackle the dynastic problem.

In addition to the approach to Faure, on 1 August, Dulles had proposed to the British an Anglo-American joint intervention. The US 'doubted the ability of the French to handle the situation effectively....[The French] action in removing to North Africa [the] American equipment which they had obtained through MDAP for their NATO forces created a serious problem',⁸⁶ as Dulles explained to Ambassador Makins. However, the FO turned down this proposal, reasoning that there was, in French opinion, 'a growing realisation that [a] new relationship between the metropolitan country and the overseas territories will have to be worked out'. The FO instructed Makins to tell Dulles that if either the UK or the US government intervened, it might have a reverse effect on the French.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, the British were not proactively opposed to Washington's initiative unless the former themselves did not join, as averting an appearance of the Anglo-American tandem approach was the priority.

US officials were frustrated by the lack of progress in Morocco which had made the State Department's position extremely difficult in terms of US opinion. Two and half years had already passed since the UNGA resolution in December 1952. As well, as Maurice Couve de Murville,

French Ambassador in Washington, put it, the Americans were particularly sensitive to the rise of Third World nationalism, exemplified by the Bandung Conference in April 1955. He pointed out that the détente in the Cold War urged the Americans to turn their attention to such phenomena, and then warned that the United States would vote for a UN resolution unless the French started solving the problem.⁸⁸ Actually, Holmes had written to Dulles that it was important 'to determine our attitude toward France and toward the Afro-Asian Group, bearing the Bandung Conference in mind'.⁸⁹ In consequence, Dulles was resolved to tender advice to the French, together with the British if possible.

In contrast, the way of dealing with France that the British contemplated was far more indirect. Instead of putting pressure on the French government, London's aim lay in encouraging French opinion to be liberal and thereby prompting the government to turn to decolonisation. One British official argued that French politicians, press, and people were beginning to have new thoughts on France's relations with North African dependencies:

This 'immobilisme' on the part of successive French Governments has reflected a basic unconcern on the part of the French man in the street. ... Now, however, that decisions have been taken in [Indo-China and the EDC], the men in the street and the political parties have had time to turn their attention to the problems of North Africa. ...

One which seems feasible is to encourage publicity for the new turn of thought in France in the ... weighty British papers. ...⁹⁰

Echoing this suggestion, an editorial entitled 'Unjust Suspicions' appeared in *The Times* on 5 August which argued that Britain should assist French efforts in North Africa. London considered this way effective to convince French people of Britain's heartfelt support of the new policy. The British approach was soon to be agreed upon by Dulles, who had focussed on pressuring the French governments.

Along with the necessity to take action, the Moroccan situation appeared gloomy. On 5 August, Arafa announced in *Le Monde* that under no circumstances would he consider withdrawing. This 'obviously cut any possibilities of rapid adoption of the Grandval plan', to use Faure's expression.⁹¹ With some ministers blaming Grandval for his surrender to terrorism, the Council of Ministers on the following day could not reach a decision to approve his plan or not. Moreover, Arafa's dethronement was vigorously opposed by the principal members of the Laniel Government who had decided on Mohammed V's deposition, including

Bidault.⁹² This group was undoubtedly backed by French settler groups like the *Présence française*.

On the other hand, Dulles finally agreed to London's tactics. On 10 August he issued a statement indicating American satisfaction with the Franco-Tunisian Agreements, which the French Senate had ratified five days earlier, in order to 'help Grandval on Morocco'.⁹³ This statement meant that Dulles not only followed the recommendation of the 1-3 August meeting mentioned above, but also agreed to the British proposal to encourage liberal tendencies in French opinion instead of making a joint approach.⁹⁴ In fact, unlike Britain, Dulles had not issued such a statement at the time of the signing of the Franco-Tunisian Agreements in April 1955, despite Dillon's repeated requests.⁹⁵ In this sense, Britain's persuasion was crucial in modifying the US attitude towards France.

Dulles's statement and the Sultan's refusal greatly changed Faure's strategy. Washington's support convinced him to make use of the nationalists in order to break the stalemate. In the Committee for Coordination held from 11 to 12 August and in the Council of Ministers on 12 August, he presented a plan and obtained agreement in both meetings. The Faure plan instructed the Resident-General to

suggest to Moulay Arafa that he immediately constitute a largely representative Moroccan government whose members would be chosen from a list agreed upon by a 'Committee of Five' where the Prime Minister, Mr Schuman, Pinay, July, and General Koenig would sit. If the Sultan can constitute this government, his members would be invited to visit France from 18 August, where the governmental delegation would receive them. In case of failure, it will rest with me to designate, from this list, a certain number of Moroccans who would be received by the same delegation on the same date. It is after this exchange of views that the government will determine the measures to resolve the Moroccan crisis. The crisis should, in any case, 'get out of the critical phase' on 12 September at the latest.⁹⁶

Apparently the Faure plan side-stepped the dynastic problem for a while, and indicated the French sensitivity to the schedule of the UNGA session, due to discuss the Moroccan problem at the end of September.⁹⁷ Although the FO observed there was no special reason for the date of '12 September', completing the process before the GA debate was essential. Yet, at this point Paris did not announce the details of the plan, especially about the establishment of the Regency Council, perhaps considering strong opposition from conservative opinion in France and Morocco.

Importantly, this plan put more emphasis on the nationalists' role than the Grandval plan. Its intention was, first, to impress Moroccan opinion with Arafa's inability to deal with the crisis and, secondly, to illustrate that France relied on the nationalists in establishing a new regime. Indeed, the French reform plans in Morocco had never indicated their willingness to collaborate with the nationalists as explicitly as this. Faure announced that the government had agreed upon a plan, but without revealing its tenor.⁹⁸ According to Grandval, who considered that the Faure plan would pave a way to the ex-Sultan's restoration, he angrily told Faure on 13 August: 'Your policy... is going to bring Ben Youssef back to the throne!'⁹⁹ For him, the Faure plan was gravely flawed as it failed to seek the ex-Sultan's voluntary abdication. His impression was that Faure envisaged the restoration. If this was true, Faure could have judged that the force of events might bring him back to the throne in the future.¹⁰⁰

On 15 August, Grandval tabled Faure's letter, demanding that he constitute a government in accordance with his request.¹⁰¹ However, it was clear by 17 August that the Istiqlal and the PDI, without whose agreements no solution was feasible, were hostile to any talks with the traditionalists under Arafa's initiative. Understandably, they did not trust French sincerity to negotiate with them, and rejected the idea of having talks with the traditionalist elements responsible for Mohammed V's deposition.¹⁰² Therefore, the Resident-General suggested that July send a delegation to Antsirabé with the purpose of obtaining at least passive cooperation from the ex-Sultan 'extremely urgently'.¹⁰³ Grandval received a letter dated 17 August from the Sultan stating that he had given up the attempt to constitute a government.¹⁰⁴ This impasse forced Paris to modify its position concerning Mohammed V's involvement: following Grandval's suggestion, it finally decided to rely on his authority in order to sell the governmental plan to Moroccan opinion. The Committee of the Five decided on 19 August to send a mission to Antsirabé, and to open a Franco-Moroccan meeting at Aix-les-Bains.¹⁰⁵ Perhaps Paris's inclination to the ex-Sultan moderated the nationalists' attitude.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, the Moroccan situation became even more strained as the anniversary of the deposition approached. Terrorist attacks multiplied from the night of 17 August in Casablanca. As predicted, troubles spread throughout Morocco by 20 August. Particularly serious was the massacre in Oued-Zem where 49 Europeans were killed. Disorder continued in Marrakech, Mazagan, and Safi the next day.¹⁰⁷

It was in this explosive atmosphere that Franco-Moroccan discussions began at Aix-les-Bains on 22 August. On the French side, the

representatives were the members of the Committee of the Five. Principal Moroccan attendants were el-Mokri as the representatives of the Maghzen, el-Glaoui and other chieftains, the delegates of both the Istiqlal and the PDI, and moderate nationalists like Bekkaï and Ben Slimane.¹⁰⁸ In accordance with the negotiations at Aix-les-Bains, the Committee reached the following conclusion on 26 August: (1) The retreat of Ben Arafa; (2) The return of Mohammed Ben Youssef to France; (3) The constitution of a Throne Council, the central figure of which would be Si Bekkaï; (4) The formation of a representative government in charge of negotiating with France. The French Cabinet approved this decision three days later.¹⁰⁹ Now Arafa's dethronement was judged as essential, but this conclusion was a logical consequence of the Faure plan to involve the nationalists in the consultation. Or, more precisely, the real purpose of the gathering was to convince the French and the Moroccans that this solution was essential.

The Aix-les-Bains meeting and the French decision thereafter brought about favourable reactions in the international scene. Early in August 1955, the Arab-Asian countries' attitude towards the Moroccan problem had been so firm that they had demanded Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, to intervene against France.¹¹⁰ Yet, after the talks were opened, attitudes abroad moderated. On 23 August, Hammarskjöld discussed Moroccan affairs with the delegates of six Arab-Asian countries,¹¹¹ and focussed their attention on the importance of the forthcoming conversations at Aix-les-Bains. He estimated his own remarks were effective: 'the Arabs and the Asians started to tone down their requests sharply'.¹¹² This group did announce on 30 August their decision to bring the matter to the UNSC. However, giving public opinion the impression that their decision was unwavering was the Arabs' wish, as one of their delegates told journalists. In fact, they had already been notified that the United States would vote against the inscription of the question on the SC agenda.¹¹³ In the final analysis, the Arab-Asian countries did not formally request the UNSC to discuss the question.¹¹⁴

Moreover, on 30 August, Dulles announced that the United States agreed on French policy towards Morocco, and hoped a Moroccan government could be established before the UNGA session.¹¹⁵ This was the first time that the Americans had openly revealed their support for France over Morocco. In addition to support for the Tunisian policy, which had been revealed earlier in the month when Dulles expressed congratulations on the Franco-Tunisian Agreements, now Washington's overt support was extended to Morocco. He finally agreed with Dillon

and the British that French turnaround to decolonisation was genuine and worth encouraging through public support.

7.3 The departure of Arafa: August–October 1955

On 30 August, General Latour, former Resident-General in Tunis, was appointed as the new Resident-General in Rabat.¹¹⁶ In the instructions given to him, the French government emphasised that the settlement of the dynastic problem 'constituted, unfortunately, a prerequisite for the formation of the Moroccan government'.¹¹⁷ Thus Paris definitely decided to dethrone Arafa. After his abdication, Latour should ask el-Mokri to constitute the Throne Council, which would include el-Mokri himself,¹¹⁸ Bekkaï, and another yet to be decided. The Council's first task would be to appoint Ben Slimane as the Prime Minister in accordance with the Grandval plan, and then make sure to include members of the PDI and the Istiqlal as ministers.¹¹⁹ This government would establish modern and democratic institutions, while guaranteeing the French people's interests. Then, and this was a novel part of the programme, the government was to negotiate new relations with France, a point that the French memorandum of 3 August 1955 had denied. The French Council of Ministers, nevertheless, had not yet decided at this stage whether adjustments must be brought to the Treaty of Fez. In addition, Latour, as a military officer, was instructed to assume responsibility both for the maintenance of order and for the application of the new policy.¹²⁰

At the same time, Paris was preparing for a mission to Antsirabé. It instructed General Catroux on 1 September to convince the ex-Sultan that as a result of the Aix-les-Bains meeting, France was determined to put an end to the direct administration to promote the constitution of a government representing various shades of opinion.¹²¹ The instructions also requested him to obtain Mohammed V's recognition of the expected settlement process and his promise not to engage in political activities, and to tell him that he would be authorised to enter France as soon as a new regime was set up, on 15 October 1955 for instance. In addition, the instructions clarified that the Throne Council would consist of the Grand Vizier, a nationalist and a traditionalist.

On his arrival at Rabat, Latour held talks with Arafa on 5 September, and found him inclined to abdicate voluntarily, because the growing opposition made it more difficult to fulfil his role.¹²² Then, he went so far as to talk to the Resident-General on what he wanted as compensation for his abdication.¹²³ The affirmation of the Aix-les-Bains agreement came also from the Istiqlal, who nevertheless put the following

conditions at a conference on 6 and 7 September: (1) Ben Arafa's departure; (2) the ex-Sultan's voluntary agreement on the Throne Council; (3) France's declaration to support Moroccan sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to guide the country to the status of an independent sovereign country in the framework of close links between the two countries.¹²⁴

The French obtained a satisfactory result at Antsirabé. The Mohammed V–Catroux conversations almost closed by 8 September, when Catroux presented to the former a draft of a declaration by Faure. Its main points were:

1. France would affirm Moroccan sovereignty and guide the country to a modern state, connected to France.
2. France would give agreement to the historic mission of the Alaouite throne.
3. A Moroccan government must elaborate modern and democratic institutions. It will also negotiate with the French counterpart in order to guarantee the interests of France and the French settlers, and the permanent close links between the two countries.

As for the third point, the draft continued that the permanent links would comprise, first, 'the association of the states by federal-type common institutions which would constitute an executive council' and, secondly, 'the community of the peoples, through the constitution of a common citizenship overlapping the French nationality and the Moroccan nationality'.¹²⁵

However, to French embarrassment, Mohammed V's attitude hardened as a consequence of the démarche by Bekkaï's delegation. It was noted on 9 September: 'he takes the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez as the first condition of negotiations... to define new relations between the two countries.'¹²⁶ 'Certainly, he accepted the first and second points of the French draft of 8 September. Yet he did not accept the third point on the basis that: 'there he found the spirit of the French Union into which the Moroccans had many times refused to be integrated.'¹²⁷ Obviously, he referred to such expressions as 'federal-type of common institutions' when he talked about the spirit of the Union. Besides, he did not renounce his right to future restoration.

Thus, one crucial point remained unsolved: to the end Mohammed V did not agree on the nature of future Franco–Moroccan relations, despite his previous acceptance of permanent links. Catroux's communiqué issued on the same day was evasive: 'Ben Youssef agreed to support the

policy that aims to create a free sovereign state, tied with France by close links.¹²⁸ More precisely, his refusal centred on the French Union, and this aroused serious apprehensions on the French part. Catroux noted with alarm:

Is it not necessary to foresee that the contagion of the example will step by step spread to other overseas territories? [T]his federal status must represent the final scheme of the French Union, but... I wonder if Morocco's choice does not involve risks...¹²⁹

It is not clear to what extent this apprehension was shared within the French government, but some leading politicians had already been aware of the dysfunction of the Union,¹³⁰ which was supposed to include Morocco as a member. If it failed to accept participation, the secession of other overseas territories could follow. Mohammed V's claim spectacularly revealed that realistically the Union was unlikely to survive. Therefore, the French now faced an urgent problem as to how to restructure the Union so that it could be more acceptable to peoples in the dependencies. Having such an importance, the Antsirabé agreement was not publicised at that moment though approved by the Cabinet on 12 September.¹³¹

This sense of crisis was shared by the British. The record of a meeting of British diplomats in early September 1955 was secretly transmitted to Paris. They argued:

[O]ur diplomacy endeavours...to get the French government to contemplate an association of permanent federal type...to replace the existing structures, to provide a framework of close links of France and of its previous colonies. ... It seems to us that reaching there is the useful solution in order to avoid the departure of the French Empire into scraps...¹³²

Thus the British contemplated that transforming the Union into a federal¹³³ organisation in which a wide range local autonomy was permitted was the only solution. Otherwise, they feared, the destruction of the French Empire would bring about international pressure on the British Empire itself, although to the end London would maintain its position that no advice on decolonisation should be tendered to Paris.

In fact, Paris had already started preparations for the Union's reorganisation. In October 1954, at a meeting with Alan Lennox-Boyd, the British Colonial Secretary, Robert Buron, the French Minister of Overseas

Territories, revealed the two principles of French colonial policy. The first one was integration, France's traditional goal, and the second was decentralisation. By the latter, he meant the extension of local responsibility for local affairs.¹³⁴ What he explained was a brave attempt to synthesise the apparently contradictory goals of self-government and the centralised, unitary structure of the French Union.¹³⁵ This was indeed an indication that the French new thinking, which had first appeared in Tunisia, was being introduced into sub-Saharan Africa.

By the autumn of 1955, Paul-Henri Teitgen, Buron's successor in the Faure Government, began examining the *Loi-Cadre* as a device to achieve administrative decentralisation in Africa and a federal structure *within* the French Union.¹³⁶ He sent a secret report on the Union's restructure to Faure, Coty, and other ministers at the beginning of October. The new organisation would be comprised of: (1) the election of all the territorial Assembly with universal suffrage; (2) in each territory, the Council of Government containing ministries elected by the territorial Assembly; (3) a sharing of the competences and powers (such as external relations and currency) between the governor and the Council of Government.¹³⁷ Undoubtedly, the restructuring of the Union, largely if not entirely, derived from the French effort to situate Tunisian internal autonomy in the context of the Union, as discussed in Chapter 6. France's new idea was now transforming the Union as a whole because internal autonomy and sovereignty were the ideas that the Union had denied. As suggested by the fact that Paris had decided to extend the new strategy to Morocco, it was already clear to the French that collaboration with the nationalists would work much better in controlling dependencies. Nonetheless, it should be stressed simultaneously that preserving the Union's external appearance even at the cost of abandoning its original spirit was perceived as paramount.

Turning to Moroccan affairs, having obtained Mohammed V's general agreement on Arafa's departure and the procedure thereafter was of great importance to the French, even if the ex-Sultan's attitude created a new problem. The next steps were an approach to the Spanish and a decision on the members of the Throne Council.

As will be argued below, the Spanish government aimed to internationalise the problem, thereby securing their say on it. On 9 and 10 September, Pinay had conversations with José de Casa Rojas, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, to inform Madrid of the accords with Mohammed V.¹³⁸ Yet the French were suspicious of Spanish intentions. According to the French plan, after his abdication, Arafa would be transferred to Tangier, which was controlled by the Tangier Control Committee.¹³⁹ Latour insisted

that it was indispensable to agree with the Spaniards in advance on his transfer, although Pinay rejected this idea on the grounds that they would intervene in any case, taking advantage of the French request.¹⁴⁰ Pinay told the Spanish Ambassador on 13 September about the possible installation of Arafa in Tangier,¹⁴¹ but his prediction proved right. The Spanish handed over a letter to the president of the Tangier Control Committee requesting that the authorities of the French zone should take no decision before the Committee's decision.¹⁴² The British and Italian ministers at Tangier immediately promised their aid to France.¹⁴³ The State Department instructed its representative to 'oppose any action...impending Faure programme for solving [the] Moroccan crisis'. The Committee meeting on 21 September decided 'action on Spain's request was beyond [the] possibilities of [the] committee'.¹⁴⁴ The Western allies thus stopped Spanish attempts to block the French plan.

Concerning the Throne Council, July had suggested on 10 September that a traditionalist would be appointed as the third member, as '[t]his has to balance the personality of Si Bekkaï and as a consequence be sought in the traditionalist milieu'.¹⁴⁵ A radical nationalist could not be appointed because French settlers would never consent and many parliamentarians still doubted the ex-Sultan's promise not to return to the throne.¹⁴⁶ The French and Moroccans had a meeting as to the third member on 17 September, but did not reach agreement.¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, the growing authority of Mohammed V, due to the Antsirabé meeting, had made Arafa change his mind. On 16 September, during a talk with the Resident-General in the presence of el-Mokri and el-Glaoui, he declared that his abdication would be harmful to the interests of France and Morocco. This was partly due to a nationalist press article which mentioned that Mohammed V would tolerate Arafa only for three months.¹⁴⁸ Arafa's orientation was also greatly affected by some ministers of the Faure Government, presumably including General Koenig, who had pushed for a more intransigent attitude.¹⁴⁹

The polarisation of Moroccan opinion became far more conspicuous, due to protest movements organised by the *Présence française*. Rabat's report on 20 September pessimistically mentioned that French settlers' resistance was crystallised against the Throne Council, which they were convinced would imply Mohammed V's return. Only the delegation of a third person could restore calmness and pre-empt bloodshed. Seriously alarmed by the pressing situation, this report even proposed to proceed to the establishment of the Council before the abdication.¹⁵⁰ The Resident-General again met with Arafa on 22 September only to find that he confirmed 'his intention not to leave the throne'. Latour

observed that his intransigent attitude was encouraged by the 'pressures [which] come from Paris and often from official circles, for example the mission of Mr Montel'.¹⁵¹

The greater the prospect of civil war, the more internationalised the Moroccan problem was becoming. The Istiqlal turned to the Spanish to break the deadlock. On 22 September, Balafrej declared to the press that the negotiations being blocked owing to certain French circles in Morocco and the Metropolis, the problem should be placed on the international scene, and suggested Spain was the most qualified to convene an international conference.¹⁵² An American diplomat notified the French on the same day that the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs wanted to convene a tripartite Franco-Spanish-Moroccan conference.¹⁵³

In addition to a possibility of a tripartite conference, the bureau of the UNGA decided to include the Moroccan problem on the agenda.¹⁵⁴ July noted: 'This debate will be formidable for our prestige in the United Nations. But it particularly risks triggering off in Morocco a new wave of unrest and violence, by taking advantage of hostile propaganda.'¹⁵⁵ Coupled with internal troubles, the effect of UN debates in 1955 was considered to have more serious effect in comparison with previous years. As was the case in earlier years, the French had already decided to vote against placing North Africa on the UNGA agenda. Faure reportedly gave some thought to reversing the previous position of refusing discussions by proclaiming French achievements in Tunisia and, to a far lesser extent, in Morocco, but dropped the idea because of the Algerian problem.¹⁵⁶

The growing outside pressure made Paris determined to break the stalemate: it decided on the Sultan's dethronement at any cost. On 23 September, July instructed Latour to tell Arafa that Paris considered recognising the Throne Council even if he persisted in his refusal.¹⁵⁷ On 27 September, Latour was once again instructed to warn him in the same way as before, not least because Pinay's speech in the UNGA on Morocco was forthcoming.¹⁵⁸ The latter cabled Faure from New York on 29 September stressing the urgency of implementing the Moroccan programme from the viewpoint of the UN timetable.¹⁵⁹ In the final analysis, the Sultan surrendered. Arafa was persuaded to abdicate and departed for Tangier on 30 September.¹⁶⁰ This was not in time for Pinay's declaration in the GA, though. He could not announce any political progress at the UN and merely stated on 29 September that 'France intended to make of Morocco a modern, democratic and sovereign state, united with France by the ties of freely accepted interdependence.'¹⁶¹ As such, the question was included in the UNGA agenda on 30 September.¹⁶²

7.4 The establishment of the Throne Council: October 1955

In the Aix-les-Bains agreement, Arafa's departure was the first significant step. The French needed more time than expected to accomplish this, but his dethronement before the debates on Morocco in the National Assembly on 6 October offered a better prospect of the Faure Government maintaining a majority.¹⁶³ Besides, as displayed by Dulles's announcement on 30 August, the French had good reasons to believe his departure deserved support from the United States and the international community.

On 1 October, Paris made a declaration on the next step of its programme. France's goals were similar in substance to the Aix-les-Bains and Antsirabé agreements. Yet the declaration stated that new Franco-Moroccan relations should be defined within the protectorate treaty, negating Mohammed V's desire to modify the protectorate system itself.¹⁶⁴ That is, the French aim was to introduce a semi-internal autonomy regime in Morocco, somewhat similar to that in Tunisia, without reaching independence.

However, two serious events occurred unexpectedly, and poured cold water on the French programme. The first one was the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, signed on 22 September 1955. This was a clear symptom that the Soviet Union had started supporting Egypt's military build-up. Egypt was embarking on a neutralist course under the initiative of Prime Minister Gamel Abdel Nasser, who was energetically advocating the solidarity of the Arabs. What was a problem for France was that Moroccan opinion was so attracted by him that the nationalists raised their demands accordingly. The French were thus forced to confront new circumstances created by the arms deal.

The second event was more serious, at least in the immediate term. On the night of 1 October, Moroccan commando groups attacked two frontier posts in the Rif, a border area with the Spanish zone. The following night an observatory at Bou Zineb, an enclave in that zone, was also attacked. Another group of Moroccan guerrillas assaulted an outpost of Imouzzer des Marmoucha in the Middle Atlas.¹⁶⁵ On 3 October, *Al Oummah*, a Tetuán daily newspaper, published a proclamation by the Arab Maghreb Liberation Army¹⁶⁶ announcing a national insurrection against France, an encirclement of the military posts in the Rif and the Middle Atlas, and the continuation of the fight until Morocco and Algeria achieved full independence.¹⁶⁷ The situation was so critical that on 3 October, Latour reported: 'what matters is no more to implement a Throne Council rapidly but to save Morocco at the moment'.¹⁶⁸ The

ex-Sultan in Madagascar warned the French, on the same day, that if the situation was not stabilised within the week, there would be a risk of uprisings throughout North Africa.¹⁶⁹ The absence of an indigenous sovereign was gradually dragging Morocco into civil war.

The sudden Russian involvement in Egypt had made the State Department anxious to pressure, once again, Paris to come to terms with the nationalists. On 29 September, Holmes suggested a change of US policy towards the North African problems, arguing: 'in the face of the riptide of nationalism in Africa and Asia... US [should] not premise its approach to North Africa ... on French considerations to the same degree as in the past, but instead place more emphasis on preserving the area for the West, regardless of temporary inconveniences which may arise in our relations with the French'.¹⁷⁰ On 3 October, Dulles and several State Department officials held a meeting in which Holmes referred to the arms sale to Egypt, to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Libya, and to the possibility that the Russians could decide to take their seat on the Tangier Control Committee, as recent evidence of Soviet interest in North Africa.¹⁷¹ The talks concluded that they should again consult the British on a joint approach to the French.

Holmes tried to induce the British to take a similar stand when he met Harold Macmillan, the British Foreign Minister, on 6 October. He referred to Dulles's willingness to 'bring home the seriousness of the situation to the French [at the time of the next meeting between Ministers on October 24 1955]'.¹⁷² However, the British did not agree. Macmillan told Winthrop Aldrich, the US Ambassador in London: 'there was no course open to us except to play the situation by ear'.¹⁷³ In fact, Britain's principal position remained unaltered: 'We should ... continue to refrain from any lecturing since this would defeat its object' and 'continue by all the indirect means in our power to encourage the evolution of the more liberal trends in French thinking on North Africa, on which signs have been becoming apparent during recent months'.¹⁷⁴ Consequently, London successfully moderated the Americans on this issue. Unlike in early August 1955, Paris had taken a clear step towards Moroccan decolonisation, so Washington accepted the persuasion.

To French surprise, the Istiqlal's position was hardening at this moment. It did not accept the governmental declaration of 1 October, claiming that it had agreed at Aix-les-Bains to participate in a government 'in exchange of French promise of "independence within an interdependence liberally negotiated"'.¹⁷⁵ Thus the party was withdrawing the agreements in late August whereby it had accepted Moroccan internal autonomy for the time being, and now instead officially advocated

'independence'. What is more, el-Fassi in Cairo announced on 4 October 'the formation of a "liberation army of Maghreb" and the creation of a "unified command" to lead the "struggle for liberation in Algeria and Morocco"'.¹⁷⁶ To a large degree encouraged by the rise of Arab nationalism advocated by Egypt, el-Fassi thus gave verbal support to the rebels. July announced that the French government would not negotiate with the Istiqlal unless the party condemned him.¹⁷⁷ Then, on 6 October, the Istiqlal openly revealed its disenchantment with the application of the Aix-les-Bains agreement.¹⁷⁸ In fact, the failure to establish the Throne Council, the rebellion in the Rif and el-Fassi's declaration of commencement of armed struggle 'provoked a strong emotion in France and created in the Parliament... an atmosphere of crisis'.¹⁷⁹

Yet, Faure was confident that cooperation with the Istiqlal was essential and possible by exploiting a rift growing rapidly inside the party. In the National Assembly debate on Morocco during 6 and 9 October, he made an impassioned speech:

[it is] essential to obtain... the collaboration of the Istiqlal. ... This man (Allal el Fassi) is not all the Istiqlal. Tomorrow the party could perhaps be so. That depends on us. Let's prevent that other men disappointed with Paris from turning completely to Cairo.¹⁸⁰

In fact, one Istiqlal leader announced to the press: 'Fassi spoke in his name and not in the party's name' although this did not indicate that the party clearly condemned him.¹⁸¹ As will be seen, the Istiqlal was pressuring France by failing to oust him, while keeping distance from him. Subsequently, the French National Assembly adopted the Aix-les-Bains agreement on 9 October. This, of course, provided a critical boost to the Faure Government, aiming to introduce a regime of internal autonomy in Morocco.

On the Throne Council issue, the French proceeded even without the Istiqlal's final consent. The formation of the Council was announced on 15 October. It consisted of el-Mokri; Bekkaï, representing the Youssefists (those who were loyal to Mohammed V); Caid Si Tahar ou Assou; and Si Hadj Mohammed Sbihi, the pasha of Salé and a nationalist sympathiser. Although Assou represented the traditionalists, the French tried to highlight their concessions to the Istiqlal by co-opting Sbihi as the fourth member.¹⁸²

Concurrently, Franco-Spanish relations were becoming strained, although the Spaniards had already dropped the idea of holding an international conference. The Quai d'Orsay recognised that the Aix-les-Bains

agreement could be harmful to Spanish interests. The possibility of Morocco's democratisation could risk the absorption of their zone into the French Zone, since Mohammed V held legitimacy among the people in Spanish Morocco.¹⁸³ Moreover, the Rif incident made the French even more suspicious of Spanish intentions. It was reported that a significant amount of arms was being smuggled from Spanish to French Morocco. The French were certain that Spain was even in favour of a subversive action against them.¹⁸⁴ *Le Monde* also reported the transfer of arms via two routes to the French zone and one route to Algeria.¹⁸⁵ On 15 October, the Spanish Foreign Minister protested against French newspaper articles which argued that the difficulties in the Rif were due to the Spaniards' complicity with the rebels. He even warned the French embassy in Madrid that his government could make recourse to the UN if an anti-Spanish campaign was pursued.¹⁸⁶ However, this controversy temporarily ended when Pinay handed to the Spaniards a note of appreciation about their efforts to reinforce patrols around the border.¹⁸⁷

The Throne Council now set about its task of appointing a Prime Minister. On 18 October, July instructed Latour to give support to Ben Slimane,¹⁸⁸ whom the Council asked to shape a government. Yet, whereas the PDI approved it, the Istiqlal announced on 21 October its refusal of the Council as constituted and rejected participation in the government under its aegis. On the same day, Bekkai tried to appease the Istiqlal in vain by publishing a document in which Mohammed V had approved it. Nevertheless, the French observed that the Istiqlal 'does not close the door to the participation', because the party had added that the government must receive 'the nomination of a high authority whose legitimacy is not contested'. Even so, Paris was determined not to ask the ex-Sultan to advise the Istiqlal on moderation. This was because 'the government policy is aimed ... at fading out his prestige while giving rise to a new political life in Morocco, independent from the person and guided by the set of all tendencies, including elements of the Istiqlal willing to cooperate with France.'¹⁸⁹ The experience in Tunisia had taught the French that relying on the nationalists was much more lasting and stable than the personal prestige of Mohammed V or the dynasty. Developing the nationalist force was France's long-term strategy, and this was why Mohammed's restoration must be prohibited at least for a while.

However, a sudden and unexpected development which would fundamentally transform the Moroccan situation occurred: on 25 October, el-Glaoui issued an announcement to approve 'the prompt restoration of

His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef and his return to the throne'. He added:

My aspiration coincides with the aspirations of the whole Moroccan nation: it is the independence of my country in the framework of close links between it and France.¹⁹⁰

It is noteworthy that el-Glaoui referred to the two ideas simultaneously: the restoration and independence. In fact, it was already recognised that these two ideas were complementary from around the beginning of October 1955 onwards; the approval of restoration had to go hand in hand with that of independence.

Rabat reported to Paris: 'the French in Morocco realise that the Moroccan unanimity being formed will no longer allow the French government to oppose Ben Youssef's return. ... As for the Moroccans, the towns are full of joy.'¹⁹¹ El-Glaoui's volte-face was reportedly a result of covert negotiations with the Istiqlal which had started around the end of July 1955.¹⁹² He realised that his diehard opposition to the ex-Sultan was losing support even among the dignitaries and was merely contributing to leaving the country seriously divided. Thus el-Glaoui succumbed to the nationalist pressure, although not fully. The acceptance of the ex-Sultan's restoration was aimed at preserving a traditional element in Moroccan political society which was contrary to the nationalist view. In any case, the French government was now to accept Mohammed V's restoration.

Here, an important question must be addressed: Why were independence and the restoration considered complementary? When Paris decided to venture into reform in Morocco as a result of the US warning in August 1955, its goal was the introduction of a regime of semi-internal autonomy, not the granting of independence. Why, then, did the French suddenly change their mind in October and judge its recognition obligatory, even though its content remained unclear?

In fact, this decision was necessitated by the conclusion of the arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet Union, the so-called Czech arms deal,¹⁹³ in September 1955. As a result of this deal, an extremely radical nationalist force emerged and rapidly gained political force, which called for neutralist independence following Egypt. Hitherto there had of course been political forces, including the Istiqlal, who had requested that France recognise independence. Nonetheless, it is pro-French independence that they were calling for, that is, independence while preserving strong ties with France. This was because the prospect for support from sources other than France after independence was uncertain. Therefore,

France had a choice not to listen to them, and, indeed, did not do so in any case. This attitude was possible, as the French were confident that the nationalists would not be able to find other sources from which they would get armaments. Those countries that had potential to provide such armaments were European countries and the United States, but support by those powers was politically impossible as long as France did not recognise independence, for such support against France's will would have inevitably created a serious crack inside the Western alliance.

It was this situation that the arms deal drastically changed. So far the Soviet Union had not been actively engaged in providing material support to Third World countries. The deal demonstrated a clear Russian intention to help large-scale Egyptian military expansion.¹⁹⁴ This suddenly brought about a novel element to North African affairs: now Egypt also had a potential with which to give Morocco outmoded weapons at the exchange of new armaments obtained from the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁵ In other words, now Morocco was given an opportunity to proceed with independence *against* French will, that is, state-building without French assistance. This was the very reason why, from around the beginning of October 1955, neutralist independence did become a practical option for the nationalists, and the nationalist force seeking this course increasingly gained force. This was revealed by the fact that the Istiqlal abruptly started voicing objections to the Aix-les-Bains agreements and calling for independence in its stead. Pro-Egyptian nationalist movements and the armed rebels supported by them constituted very grave threats to undermine feudalist hierarchy, so the situation provoked a sense of crisis among the conservatives. One British diplomat, who made a tour of Morocco from 8 to 18 October, noted:

The Moroccans could not possibly run Morocco... Complete independence for Morocco would mean administrative and economic chaos.... All reasonable Moroccans know this and realise that they cannot do without foreign help.... [W]e have been inclined to underestimate [the formidable nationalist challenge] and to think that it should not be very difficult for the French to obtain in Morocco a settlement similar to that in Tunisia.¹⁹⁶

This report illustrated that things were going far beyond French expectations and that the lesson they drew from Tunisian experience was no longer very useful.

However, here arises another question. Why did France not change its course even after the arms deal? In fact, its policy, aimed at the

establishment of the Throne Council and the introduction of a semi-internal autonomy regime thereafter, remained unaltered until el-Glaoui's announcement. This was because Moroccan political forces were so divided that, after independence, there would be no coherent political group(s) to assume power and rule the country. Stable management of the country by Moroccans was utterly unthinkable as things stood then, so no responsible political forces were willing to declare independence. As a result, all that the French authorities could do was to take a stay-the-course approach while trying to suppress the armed revolts.

The approval of Mohammed V's restoration by the Pasha of Marrakech fundamentally changed these conditions. Realising the traditionalist notables' strength was on the decline because of the rise of nationalism and feeling abandoned by France, el-Glaoui decided to accept the return of the ex-Sultan, who himself was at the top of the traditional Muslim hierarchy, aiming to limit any further reduction of traditionalist force. The chieftains were thus obliged to count on the Sultan, who had been their enemy, as a last hope.

Now the Moroccans had independence as a realistic choice. They had two options at this point: independence with the French presence or independence without it. Had the French not allowed independence, Mohammed would have had to choose the second course. Otherwise the discontents of dissident and revolutionary groups like the Moroccan Liberation Army and the Istiqlal's pro-Egyptian group would have exploded. However, it was all too certain that independence without the French presence would arouse violent opposition from el-Glaoui and, of course, the French settlers. Indeed, given the fact that Morocco could not proceed with state-building without assistance from outside, some nationalists might have preferred to cooperate with Egypt. This would have led to the disintegration of the feudalist social structure or to a civil war. In either case, Mohammed's prestige would have been seriously damaged and the unity of Moroccan territory would have collapsed. As will be argued in more detail in the Chapter 8, Mohammed V realised that independence with French cooperation was the least risky course and that France alone was in a position to provide the country with material assistance.

Hence independence must be recognised if the restoration of Mohammed V was to be admitted. At least some semblance of independence was required to meet nationalists', especially neutralist-oriented nationalists', aspirations. Fully aware of this logic, el-Glaoui called France to acknowledge independence and his return to the throne simultaneously.

8

Towards the Recognition of Independence

This chapter will analyse how France came to agree with both Morocco and Tunisia that talks should be opened for independence, and explain how the two negotiations were concluded in March 1956. Paradoxically, the rather hasty French recognition of Moroccan independence derived from the lack of its internal cohesiveness provoked by the radicalisation of nationalism. Nonetheless, Paris's vague recognition of it without mentioning the termination of the protectorate status did not meet the nationalists' satisfaction, particularly the Istiqlal's. Consequently, in order to co-opt el-Fassi and the Istiqlal to the political regime, Paris resolved to concede the right to control foreign policy and defence as a means of reinforcing Mohammed V's authority. Evidently, in order to secure the cohesiveness of Morocco's political community, the French undertook a fresh course: the recognition of state sovereignty which was not necessarily accompanied by popular sovereignty, which had been pursued following the Tunisian case. Paris could not tolerate a lengthy process of establishing a regime based on the latter.

The radicalisation of nationalist opinion caused by the arms deal occurred in Tunisia as well, but there was much less danger to the basis of the Tunisian political regime because of the entrenched prestige of Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour, a moderate yet dominant force in Tunisia after the ousting of Salah Ben Youssef. Unlike in Morocco, where Mohammed V was selected as the collaborator in place of the Istiqlal because of el-Glaoui's sudden volte-face, in Tunisia the French did not need to switch collaborators as a consequence. For the same reason, they did not feel obliged to grant independence until their decision was taken with respect to Morocco. Therefore Franco-Tunisian dialogues did not go as easily as in the Moroccan case. Interestingly, it was the American announcement to support the

French position in North Africa that enabled the two parties to reach a settlement.¹

8.1 The Sultan's return and the formation of the Moroccan government: October–December 1955

The about-face of the Pasha of Marrakech fundamentally changed Morocco's political situation, as his approval of Mohammed V's immediate restoration denoted the removal of all the obstacles to prevent it. Accordingly, the Istiqlal raised its demands. It announced on 27 October, first, that the Aix-les-Bains agreement was obsolete and therefore the Throne Council had lost its *raison d'être*; second, that now that the Moroccan people unanimously supported Mohammed V, France had lost its right to intervene in Morocco's internal and foreign affairs in conformity with the Treaty of Fez; and last, the provisional government should not be constituted until his homecoming.² The Istiqlal put the second point, because the Moroccan people's unanimous support for Mohammed V deprived France of an excuse to intervene with the purpose of guaranteeing the Sultan's status against internal opposition. Simply put, the party was now demanding the termination of the protectorate status. The party's other goal was Morocco's unity which was unachievable without the termination of the Treaty since its Article I clearly referred to the territorial division by the French and Spanish authorities.

Fully aware that the situation had altered completely, the French now had to deal with Mohammed V's return. Couve de Murville in Washington succinctly pointed out, 'the Aix-les-Bains plan is completely outdated'.³ It was deemed essential that his guarantee of a permanent French presence had to be obtained before his return. The Quai d'Orsay drafted a note that examined his possible attitudes: (1) he would remain disposed to settle Morocco's future with France, not against France; (2) it would be convenient to open negotiations to replace the Treaty of Fez with a new agreement; (3) those negotiations had to be conducted by a government which the Sultan would freely choose; and (4) the Residency must abandon direct administration.

The note also outlined the French position, the summary of which was

1. to prevent the internationalisation of the Moroccan problem, which is openly wished by Spain and secretly desired by the US.

2. to be flexible on the intangibility of the Treaty of Fez. But it is necessary to leave aside the clauses concerning:
 - a. Tangier and the Spanish zone
 - b. France's commitments towards the Sultan
 - c. the initiative of reforms, which was reserved to France
 - d. defence and foreign affairs.
3. to make Mohammed V recognise the necessity of constituting a government, comprising different shades of Moroccan opinion.
4. to abandon direct administration and to relinquish control progressively.⁴

Quite remarkably, that France finally recognised the necessity of revising the Treaty of Fez, that is, Morocco's protectorate status. The revision was considered inevitable, although, as points (2)c and (2)d indicated, they were determined to preserve the initiative in creating new political institutions and, equally, not to touch their responsibility for defence and foreign affairs. Point (1) was an important concern, given the Moroccan aspiration for the unity of territory.

The reason why France decided on the Treaty's revision has already been discussed at the end of the Chapter 7. Now that the ex-Sultan's restoration was inevitable, the French felt obliged to refer to the revision of the Treaty. Concessions must be made to Mohammed V, now France's *interlocuteur valable*, who had not abandoned the hope of its revision. The problem was that independence was not precisely defined and had already been a somewhat unclear concept for French policy members. The French were prepared to accept Morocco's full independence only when the Istiqlal demanded the revision of the Treaty of Fez, and they accepted its full independence and the abrogation of the Treaty as the last hope of retaining influence.

What Morocco then underwent was a revolutionary situation caused by the rapid dissolution of feudal order. As the US Consul General noted, while many French settlers felt extremely insecure as a result of the upsurge in nationalist demands, Mohammed V 'might successfully bring about [a] period of calm if he openly espouses program at least partially resembling that of [the] Istiqlal and the resistance'.⁵ Similarly, a British diplomat in Rabat described how drastically the developments after the end of September had altered his role in the eyes of French settlers:

The march of events proved much too strong for them, however, and nothing has been more surprising, after all the fuss and bother of the removal of Moulay Ben Arafa and the installation of the Council of

the Throne, than the tacit assumption of the local French population and its press of the inevitable return, sooner or later, of Mohammed V. Even the die-hards, as exemplified by *Présence Française* now accept him without murmur.⁶

For French settlers, the ex-Sultan, whose return had been a menace to their presence until around Arafa's departure, was now appreciated as a guarantor. To put it simply, his restoration with a plan resembling total independence could alone calm the country, where there was a possibility of the outbreak of civil war or revolution. Thus the recognition of Morocco's independence under his control was deemed indispensable in containing the Istiqlal's radical demands and appeasing the settlers.

On 31 October, Arafa publicised his abdication, giving a legal legitimisation to the returning ruler, and Paris also announced Mohammed V's restoration.⁷ He arrived in Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the next day, where numerous consultations with the nationalist leaders and leading French politicians commenced.

On 4 November, the Quai d'Orsay argued that the French must find out:

if Morocco develops towards democratic structures and unites with France through permanent links while the legitimate interests of the French in Morocco being guaranteed, or to the contrary if it turns to the East and, with independence acquired whether it likes or not, espouses the specific ideologies and institutions of the Arab League countries.⁸

Thus in the broader context of international relations, the question was whether Morocco would remain a pro-French country or adopt the Arab-neutralist line by following the Egyptian lead. It was perceived that for the Moroccans the choice between Egypt and France had long existed, but with the prospect of independence imminent, French worries immensely burgeoned. This was indeed a stark choice not between the West and East but between the West and Arab neutralism, yet the question was viewed in the Cold War context. This was because neutralism was only possible against this background and greatly encouraged by the Soviet's economic offensive. For the Russians, neutralism was sufficiently beneficial in the sense that a Third World country was torn off from the Western camp.

In order not to make the Moroccans turn to the Arab League, the Quai maintained that the French programme must be based on two

points: first, the modernisation and democratisation of Morocco, and secondly, the country's permanent links with France. It was also underscored that the constitution, which should be granted by the Sultan rather than formulated by the people, would nevertheless have to establish the basic principles of modern states, such as freedom of assembly, association, and expression and the separation of powers. In addition, now that Moroccan sovereignty was taken for granted, the representation of French settlers in the future national assembly was considered unrealistic.

From 5 to 6 November, Prime Minister Faure and Mohammed V conducted talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud near Paris. A joint communiqué issued on 6 November confirmed that the latter would shape a government which would negotiate with France with a view to leading Morocco 'to the status of an independent state united to France through permanent close links, freely consented and defined'.⁹ Significantly, this declaration failed to mention whether the protectorate treaty should be terminated or not, as opposed to the Istiqlal's request. Nevertheless, the reference to '*statut d'état indépendant*' reflected French concessions as this implied that a new Moroccan status could go beyond the protectorate one, whereas the 31 October 1955 note had expected to preserve their prerogative in defence and foreign relations. In other words, the Sultan succeeded in getting the French to agree to the word '*indépendant*' in return for his acceptance of the French presence in Morocco. Needless to say, however, the details 'of independence and close links' had yet to be defined, so both sides hoped that there remained room for manoeuvre. This was the reason why Paris deliberately adopted an ambiguous expression, '*statut d'état indépendant*', instead of simply recognising independence.

Why did Mohammed V prefer to collaborate with the French? This is a very important question, as otherwise the French presence would have disappeared. He, as a resolute nationalist, might as well have rejected it. A French official, who had conversations with him on 7 November, noted that Mohammed was fully aware of the serious divisions in Moroccan opinion that existed among the Liberation Army, the nationalists, the traditionalists, and French settlers:

While the Istiqlal, pressed by its impatient exiles' demands, hardens its positions, and the pashas, caids... and other 'traditionalists'... indicate their disarray in front of the collapse of feudalism undermined by a powerful mass movement, His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef... is unquestionably searching, in the French circles as well

as Moroccan, for men likely to help to reconcile the contradictory trends. France, which has fed until today the hotbeds of dissent by opposing the Moroccans with each other, can, in his mind, become the ideal ally to avoid an actual civil war.¹⁰

This official recommended that the government respond to his appeals and added: 'it seems that the worst mistake would be to apply to the national level the old principle of indigenous affairs *divide ut imperes* (divide and rule)'. Mohammed V himself needed the French presence in order to prevent a civil war. If he had turned to other powers, such as the United States and Egypt, they would have certainly alienated the traditionalist dignitaries who were fearful that the feudal system might disappear. In that case, serious internal conflict would have occurred between the nationalists and the dignitaries. Put in a word, Mohammed chose France as the most innocuous political partner with whom to construct the nation. Hitherto, French rule in Morocco had been based on internal conflicts between the Sultan and the Berber dignitaries. Now, however, having understood this traditional method no longer worked, the French were about to venture into a new strategy: unite and independence. This proved much more effective in retaining influence in the era of national emancipation and social mobilisation.

Nonetheless, the declaration at La Celle-Saint-Cloud was not acceptable to all factions of the nationalist elements in Morocco. Even in the Istiqlal, el-Fassi proclaimed on 8 November that the communiqué was unacceptable to the people.¹¹ His aim was to convince the Sultan to accept the abrogation of the protectorate treaty.

On 11 November, André-Louis Dubois, who had replaced Latour as the Resident-General, arrived at Rabat.¹² Mohammed V subsequently arrived in Morocco and returned to the throne, and on 18 November made an important declaration. After reporting that both countries would enter into negotiations whose aim was to end the protectorate regime, the Sultan emphasised that the independence would not exclude solid union and close cooperation between the two nations. According to him, 'the relations with France are not incompatible with the maintenance of links...with the other Arab peoples'.¹³ Thus, the pursuance of a pro-French line without severing links with the Arabs was his aim. He also referred to the future Moroccan government's objectives: the management of public affairs and the creation of democratic institutions under constitutional monarchy following free elections. On the same day, President Coty and Eisenhower sent him letters welcoming his return.¹⁴

As expected, the Sultan's return had provoked opposition from Madrid. The Spaniards were not indifferent to the development in the French Zone, because his return was bound to increase the prospect of Morocco's independence and unity, or, from the Spanish view, the absorption of their zone into that of the French. Actually, a French diplomat later pointed out that there had not been anything constructive about Spanish policies towards Morocco during recent years.¹⁵ Mohammed V and the nationalists, on their part, tried not to miss the chance for Moroccan unity. This was because, they realised, unity would be less achievable once either zone gained separate independence. Maintaining contact with the Spaniards would offer a better prospect of unity in the course of the forthcoming independence process.

As early as 27 October, two days after el-Glaoui's turnaround, Guy Le Roy de La Tournelle, the French Ambassador in Madrid had reported to Paris that Spain opposed Morocco's independence on the grounds that its social structure was so fragile that the communists would find suitable hotbeds of discontent.¹⁶ Then Washington tried to persuade the Spaniards not to obstruct French efforts to resolve the problem when Dulles visited Madrid to meet Francisco Franco, Spain's Head of State on 1 November.¹⁷ The State Department argued the Spanish could be helpful in the independence process, as being on good terms with moderate Moroccan nationalists would avoid 'throwing [the nationalist] movement into Pan Arab extremist hands', which would ultimately favour the Soviets.¹⁸ However, Dulles's *démarche* did not seem to affect Spanish attitudes significantly. José de Casa Rojas, the Spanish Ambassador to France, expressed their desire to participate in the discussion when he met Mohammed V in Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 11 November. After reminding the latter that Madrid had refused to recognise Arafa as a legitimate Sultan, he tried to obtain Mohammed V's agreement that no decision concerning Morocco's new status would be taken without consulting Spain. In reply, Sidi Mohammed expressed his hopes that a formula would be found which would take into account Spain's legitimate interests. Afterwards, he asked a French official to pay attention to Spanish amour propre, although he stressed his pro-French position had not changed at all.¹⁹

In Morocco, contrary to French expectations, the Sultan's return did not end bloody incidents.²⁰ This clearly showed that his restoration, together with the vague French promise of independence, was not sufficient to satisfy the Moroccans; rather, there were opposition forces that were still challenging his authority. A number of dignitaries were lynched in major cities including Rabat on 19 November and tax strikes

occurred in the Fez region in the name of independence.²¹ The Sultan appealed for calm without, however, condemning terrorist activities or the Rif dissidence.²² On 21 November, the Istiqlal's executive committee, which met in Madrid, announced its approval of the Sultan's grand lines of 18 November, but made it plain that its participation in the provisional government was impossible unless the forthcoming negotiations were aimed at accomplishing independence through the abolition of the Treaty of Fez.²³ Thus the most influential nationalist party pushed the French and the Sultan to clarify that the purpose of negotiations would be the termination of the protectorate status itself.

This situation was perhaps decisive for the French on the country's total independence, although no governmental documents have been declassified to detail the reason for the decision. From this time on, Paris became less hesitant to recognise a right to foreign affairs and defence to the Moroccans. In fact, on 17 November, Pinay had sent a message to the embassy in Madrid: 'this does not mean certain key provisions of the Treaty of Fez would disappear, notably with regard to the complete maintenance of the responsibilities entrusted to France as far as Defence and Foreign Affairs were concerned.'²⁴ This clearly indicated that Paris never thought of granting rights to defence and foreign policy at the time of 17 November. However, France would finally make concessions in order to secure the Istiqlal's participation in the government, as seen below.

On 22 November, the Sultan gave up an idea of shaping a government with Ben Slimane, who had offered resignation because of the Istiqlal's opposition, as the head.²⁵ The sovereign started sounding out principal political organisations on a new Prime Minister,²⁶ and designated Bekkaï to the post on 26 November. His nomination implied that the new government would be set up, under Paris's consent, with the purpose of something more than the Aix-les-Bains agreement in accordance with the party's increased demands.

These developments in turn moderated the Istiqlal's attitude towards the new government, although in Paris the Faure Government fell on 29 November because of the Algerian problem.²⁷ The party announced its acceptance of participation in the Bekkaï Government in principle, 'but on condition that ministerial posts would be entrusted to its representatives in relation to its importance'.²⁸ Thus compromise was finally achieved on Morocco's independence, including responsibility for foreign relations and defence, between the French and the Moroccans on the one hand, and between all major elements in Morocco on the other. On 30 November, Dubois reported to Paris that Bekkaï had agreed

to form a government which consisted exclusively of Moroccan ministers, attributing nine ministers to the Istiqlal, six to the PDI, and five to others. In reply, Pinay instructed Dubois to notify the Moroccans that he would consent if the French directors were associated with the decisions of the Council of the Ministers in technical areas.²⁹

Moreover, the same day, Dubois obtained from Bekkaï a written assurance that the Treaty of Fez would remain the legal basis of Franco-Moroccan relations until the conclusion of the forthcoming negotiations. This meant that the competence of the Resident-General would remain intact and, in consequence, that those of Moroccan ministers would be clarified by joint agreement between the Resident-General and the Moroccan government.³⁰ That is, the talks would be conducted with France as representatives of a sovereign state and Morocco as a protectorate. Moreover, this assurance gave the French a legal basis on which they were able to negotiate with the Americans on the US military bases in Morocco.

In the party congress held from 1 to 4 December, the Istiqlal unanimously adopted a motion which demanded that future negotiations be conducted on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty of the two countries. In particular, the motion's insistence was that close links between the two countries should be defined only after the independence. Hence a crucial difference existed between the position of Bekkaï and the Istiqlal: the former admitted the legal validity of the protectorate treaty until the conclusion of the Franco-Moroccan agreement, whereas the latter argued that both countries should negotiate on an equal legal status. The party also reaffirmed that independence must provide a right to conduct diplomacy and to organise a national army. In addition, the nationalist party requested that local administration be based on the principle of the separation of powers and that the pashas and caids henceforward should only exercise administrative power. Yet, despite the Istiqlal's firm position, Dubois observed that its members were divided and that it was only under el-Fassi's leadership that the radical elements were gaining force.³¹ In fact, Balafrej told Holmes that his position was quite different from el-Fassi's.³² Finally, the motion underlined that an independent Morocco would assure French settlers of their rights and interests.

The prospect of Moroccan independence had made the American bases emerge as an important issue in Franco-American relations. On 9 November, the Quai had pointed to the necessity of reaching agreement on the number and status of American troops, which had not been clearly defined in the Franco-American accord in 1950. Without such an

agreement, an independent Morocco and the United States could achieve an arrangement without France.³³ As long as the protectorate treaty was valid following Bekkaï's assurance in November 1955, French-US base negotiations were legal. The Quai suggested on 6 December that the ceiling on American servicemen authorised in Morocco be raised in accordance with US assertions on the grounds that a certain level of provision was essential to NATO nuclear strategy. In return, the French hoped to obtain US support in the talks with the Moroccans, particularly relating to foreign relations (that is, in the UN and relations with Spain).³⁴

Perhaps the French considered ensuring US access to Moroccan bases as an effective way to attract US attention to North African affairs. One week later, the Quai underlined that Faure should explain to Dulles that Morocco, like the rest of North Africa, should remain in the Western community and that France must be the only Western country to deal with it.³⁵ In Franco-American talks held in Paris on 17 December, Dulles asked Pinay to accept the increase in the number of American servicemen in the bases. The latter revealed the apprehension that its rapid increase would give the Moroccans the impression that the United States replaced France concerning external security. Yet he promised to examine the American demands.³⁶ Franco-American talks on this subject would be resumed after Morocco's independence, perhaps because there was no time for agreement beforehand.³⁷

On 7 December, Bekkaï constituted a government with the Istiqlal's participation. On 17 December, 13 governors (called *oumal*) of provinces were appointed to supervise the management of local affairs by pashas and caids.³⁸ Thus at local level, the new Moroccan administration was being set up. Two days later, when he met Dubois, Bekkaï demanded that the legislative power and the management of public affairs, including internal security and foreign relations, be transferred to his government. Dubois commented that the Moroccan position did not significantly differ from the French,³⁹ but this was not necessarily the case. It was certain that France had already agreed on Morocco's right to external affairs and defence in principle but not so with regard to internal security. In fact, earlier in December 1955, the Quai d'Orsay believed that the Sultan's concern about the Rif situation might provide an excuse for the French to curtail negotiations on the basis that the Moroccan people were incapable of maintaining order, and that the Sultan realised that collaboration with France might have a favourable result in view of the Fellaghas' case in Tunisia in the previous year.⁴⁰ It was natural to assume that the French expected the Moroccans to allow them to retain most of the responsibility for this matter.

Rabat then approached the Spanish. General Franco had announced at the end of November that France committed grave errors in introducing democratic methods in French Morocco,⁴¹ but it was anticipated that the Spanish attitude would soften as a result of a series of assurances by both the French and Moroccans.⁴² Balafrej stayed in Madrid from 11 to 14 December to talk with Artajo. The former stated that the nationalists 'expected the Spanish Government to grant concessions equal to those which were obtained from the French and commensurate with the new status of an independent and unified Moroccan state'.⁴³ The Spanish reactions turned out to be contradictory. On 15 December, General Franco reiterated condemnation of the introduction of democracy in French Morocco, but General Garcia-Valiño, the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuán, simultaneously publicised his support for Spanish Morocco's autonomy. These somewhat contradictory reactions perplexed the French,⁴⁴ but overall they speculated that this could be a sign of moderation.⁴⁵

The Moroccans wanted to open talks on the Treaty revision immediately. The sovereign's particular concern about rebel activities in the Rif area prompted him to obtain independence with the aim of establishing his authority.⁴⁶ On 21 December, he told Dubois of his hope to begin negotiations shortly. The French shared this hope. Dubois replied that the negotiations should be opened at the earliest date after the general election in France, which had been fixed for 2 January 1956, and that preparatory work could start in Rabat in the first half of the month. Subsequently, the Moroccans were informed that the dialogues could commence in mid-February.⁴⁷

Yet, before opening the talks, Rabat had to make a critical commitment to securing the French settlers' interests. On 29 December, the Moroccan government gave the French a letter from Balafrej to confirm its willingness to guarantee French citizens' freedom, rights, safety, property, and so on. For Paris, this guarantee was the prerequisite for the commencement of negotiations on the Agreements on financial aid for the year of 1956.⁴⁸ This indirectly helped France secure its own influence through French citizens in return for the financial aid indispensable to the running of the country that was about to be independent.

8.2 The Franco–Moroccan protocol: December 1955–March 1956

The rapid progress towards Moroccan independence pressed the Spaniards to venture for political reform. Dubois and Valiño held talks in Palafito in Spanish Morocco on 10 January 1956, when the former

expressed his hope of maintaining a liaison between officials and of establishing a liaison between the military of the two countries concerning the Rif rebellion. Valiño promised to cooperate with France. As for their shift of attitude, the British speculated: 'the Spanish were at first benevolently neutral towards the Riff [sic] rebels but have lately come to realise that they represent a potential threat to Spanish authority as well as an actual danger to the French'.⁴⁹ Valiño pointed to the difficulties in preventing some elements in the Spanish zone from giving support to the rebellion in the Rif, and added that Allal el-Fassi was at the centre of the movement. Valiño maintained that the Spanish authorities were also intent on introducing a phased reform similar to that in the French Zone.⁵⁰ On 13 January, Madrid declared that it foresaw the '*autogouvernement*' of the Spanish zone in agreement with the Khalifa.⁵¹

Spain's intention to follow the French reforms without mentioning unity aroused apprehensions on the part of Mohammed V and Bekkâï. When Dubois reported the result of the talks, they were afraid that the existence of two governments could result in a de facto territorial division. Moreover, there was a possibility that the government in the Spanish Zone would fall under el-Fassi's influence, which would enhance his prestige in all of Morocco, ultimately obstructing future Franco-Moroccan negotiations.⁵² Knowing of the Moroccan worries, Pinay instructed Dubois to tell the Spanish about the problem caused by their policies.⁵³ Thus the French and Moroccans were in agreement in avoiding the consolidation of Morocco's de facto territorial division. On 17 January, the French asked Madrid not to provide its zone with a governmental organisation incompatible with Moroccan unity.⁵⁴

In mid-January 1956, in conjunction with the turmoil growing in Algeria, disorder was persistently threatening the security situation in Morocco. First, the Rif rebellion continued. Dubois noted that the agitation of el-Fassi adversely affected Moroccan soldiers' morale. El-Fassi's activities were a heavy blow to Mohammed V's prestige, allowing soldiers to embrace an idea that the former was a true champion of national liberation. As a counter move, the sovereign once again urged Paris to open negotiations.⁵⁵ Second, terrorist activities frequently occurred near Oujda and the border with Algeria. The Sultan's communiqué calling for calm did not have a great effect. For the purpose of maintaining order more effectively, on 18 January Pinay approved Dubois's proposal 'aimed at returning to the pashas and caids the exercise of police powers'.⁵⁶ This was a concession in the sense that the French agreed to devolve responsibility for the maintenance of order to the Moroccans, but was simultaneously a refusal of the Istiqlal's demand to weaken

the dignitaries' power. As Dubois put it to Holmes, the result of this measure was satisfactory in large cities but less so in the countryside where terrorism lasted. Holmes wrote to Washington that in Dubois's mind '[the m]atter apparently ... seemed to be whether Sultan or El Fassi would prevail'.⁵⁷ Obviously this was a halfway measure to save the country from the threat of civil war, and would leave the traditionalists' power intact in local areas while to a certain degree sacrificing the goal of building a modern state. This was a remarkable consequence of permitting Mohammed V's restoration before the nationalist forces fully matured.

Dubois noted that except for the principal cities, the country remained subject to a climate of uncertainty favourable to agitation. According to him, leading Moroccan figures, including the Sultan, considered that independence must be a *fait accompli* by the time negotiations commenced. Obviously this thought resonated with the Istiqlal's position adopted at the beginning of December 1955, as opposed to that of the Bekkaï Government. Dubois warned Pinay that now the sovereign also wanted to abrogate the Treaty of Fez expressly 'to gather speed ... amid the Istiqlal's ambitions'.⁵⁸ Undoubtedly the Moroccan government and the Sultan were under strong Istiqlal pressure.⁵⁹ Mohammed V went so far as to declare to the press that he did not intend to appeal to the Rif rebels to lay down arms 'until the French have proved their good faith'.⁶⁰ This remark was aimed at negotiating a call for surrender with the transfer of responsibility for internal security to the Moroccans, as in Tunisia in November 1954.

On 30 January, French officials in Morocco and in Algeria met to exchange views on the general situation. It was pointed out that in the two territories

the same offensive is ... committed which aims to defeat France's intention to maintain close links with Maghreb. ... [T]his offensive can find its end only when the western boundary of the 'third bloc', which certain leaders of the Muslim world have dreamt of for a long time, reaches the rim of the Atlantic. Encouraged by Moscow in various manners, this ambition seems to have found ... certain complicity from the Spanish side.⁶¹

The term 'certain leaders of the Muslim world' was especially meant to be Nasser. The French were aware that he was trying to undermine their presence in North Africa by encouraging the nationalists in both territories to follow his own neutralist stance, with the aim of severing close

ties with France. Moreover, the French were convinced, not without foundation, that some North African activists were being trained in Egypt.⁶²

Regarding Morocco, the meeting argued for the importance of giving success to the Palace and the government. Impressing on Moroccan opinion that the Sultan and the government had succeeded must be prioritised, thereby helping them to appease the opposition inside Morocco and to take a middle way independent from Egypt. Undoubtedly, this would also contribute to the failure of the Egyptian plan to weaken the French presence in North Africa.

As a result of the French general election on 2 January, Guy Mollet, the SFIO leader who had revealed his willingness to grant Morocco independence, formed a new government on 31 January. Christian Pineau was appointed as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Alain Savary as the Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs. Now the French government was confident that a parliamentary majority existed for a far-reaching settlement, as Savary put it to Dillon.⁶³ Subsequently, on 11 February, Franco-Moroccan agreement was concluded over the transfer of power for internal autonomy so that the latter would become the 'government of management and negotiation' (*gouvernement de gestion et de négociation*) envisaged in the declaration at La Celle-Saint-Cloud in November 1955.⁶⁴

On 15 February, Franco-Moroccan negotiations commenced. A memorandum dated 18 February⁶⁵ categorised the issues into four principal points: (1) the legal situation; (2) independence; (3) close links; (4) others. Concerning (1), this memorandum reaffirmed that, in spite of the Istiqlal's insistence to the contrary, the two countries did not have equal status as the Treaty of Fez remained valid. Regarding (2), the French intention was clear:

Moroccan independence should be designed as a complete internal and external autonomy....[A]ll the apparent attributes it (military, diplomacy) must be given in order to avoid...the nationalists, supporters of the West, who are currently in power, from being quickly overwhelmed by the fanatics of pan-Arab ideal....

'Close links' comprised economic links, technical assistance, solidarity as regards defence and diplomacy, and the community of the two peoples.⁶⁶ As to defence, the maintenance of the French army in Morocco was indispensable, but its presence must be based on new justifications. Interestingly, it was asserted that US support, which the French considered necessary in negotiations, would not

be forthcoming if the close links appeared as a new form of protectorate.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the French viewed that Moroccan independence could contribute to the improvement of their relations with Arab countries in general.

However, in the course of the negotiations, as had been anticipated, the Moroccan negotiators were insistent that independence had to be proclaimed first and that, on that presumption, they would negotiate on close links as representatives of a sovereign state. This was unacceptable to the French, because '[t]he Parliament will not accept the independence of Morocco without close links', as Pineau mentioned.⁶⁸ Yet once again the French made concessions. In fact, former Resident-General Latour had recommended to Savary on 19 February that 'to forestall charges of bad faith', at the outset of the negotiations Paris should publicly announce their determination to abrogate the protectorate treaty and to grant Morocco independence, once special ties had been defined.⁶⁹

The first stage... terminated on 2 March, when a joint declaration was issued that France confirmed its recognition of Moroccan independence, including the foreign service and armed forces, and that both parties declared the purpose of negotiations recently opened was to strike new deals which would define the two countries' close links.⁷⁰ In addition, it was agreed that 'there would be no change in the status of the French Army in Morocco during the transitional period'.⁷¹ In other words, the French agreed that they could devolve to the Moroccans certain powers relating to this issue only after an agreement over internal security was concluded. Furthermore, both parties agreed to make no changes to the existing regime in monetary and financial fields until new forms of cooperation were defined.⁷² That is, Morocco would remain in the franc zone and the Act of Algeciras would not be abrogated, which meant a Franco-Moroccan customs union was not formed unlike in the Tunisian case.

Logically, this declaration did not mark the end of the protectorate status, although, in general, books and articles on the Moroccan decolonisation process finish their analyses at this date. Important issues such as defence, diplomacy, and a national army had yet to be settled in the course of the following negotiations, as what the Moroccans obtained in March 1956 did not have much substance. Massigli summarised the French intentions to the Americans: 'in general what France had done was to follow the line which had been used successfully in the past by the British, namely, giving the Moroccans everything on paper and hoping to retain substantial influence in fact'.⁷³

Even so, the psychological impact of this declaration on Moroccan opinion was dramatic. Several days after, the Quai referred to the reason for the concessions:

Since November, we are in a revolutionary situation in Morocco dominated by the wiping out of traditional frames and the sharp crystallization of national aspirations. ... [E]specially in its interior, local officials, French or Sharifians, have more and more difficulties in maintaining their authority. The morale of the Moroccan troops is deeply affected. ...

To support the Sultan without reservation was the only way to curtail this undertaking of subversion, concluded the Quai.⁷⁴ Indeed, the 2 March declaration enabled him to receive enthusiastic backing from his people, as Roger Lalouette, Dubois's deputy, noted.⁷⁵

The Anglo-Americans broadly appreciated the Franco–Moroccan declaration. On 6 March, British Ambassador Jebb published a message whereby he ‘welcomes the solutions “admirable and worthy of a great modern nation” brought by France to the Tunisian and Moroccan problems’.⁷⁶ The British remained supportive of the French position in North Africa in order to counter Nasser's influence, as Prime Minister Eden reaffirmed to Mollet at a summit meeting held on 11 March.⁷⁷ On 7 March, the Americans publicised two messages. One was addressed to Mollet, congratulating him on Moroccan independence and expressing US support for close Franco–Moroccan collaboration, implying that the United States was not interested in replacing France.⁷⁸ The other was conveyed to the Sultan celebrating the recognition of independence.⁷⁹ Thus some differences of attitudes remained between the British and the Americans, the former giving unconditional support to the French position and the latter putting more emphasis on friendly Franco–Moroccan relations. A more fundamental difference was the timing of recognition; the United States recognised Morocco's independence soon after the 2 March communiqué while Britain did not.

8.3 Rivalries between Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef: Tunisia, June–November 1955

As explained in Chapter 6, Tunisia obtained internal autonomy as the result of the conclusion of the Franco–Tunisian Agreements in June 1955. Paris allowed Bourguiba to return to Tunisia on 1 June after more than three years' exile, and the people enthusiastically received him as

'the father of the Nation (*le père de la Nation*)'.⁸⁰ Many French settlers also welcomed his return by sending letters to him, although some of them still saw him as 'an implacable enemy of the French presence'.⁸¹ Overall, Bourguiba's conciliatory attitude contributed to the development of Tunisia's moderate atmosphere, which the majority of French settlers highly appreciated, as Roger Seydoux put it.⁸²

This did not, however, solve the socio-economic problems which the Tunisians now had to tackle. The unemployment rate was high and there were many demonstrations demanding an increase in wages. The Tunisian government was so short of funds that it asked Paris on 25 July to provide three billion francs.⁸³ Discontent spread among trade unions and the UGTT decided to resort to a general strike to obtain a salary increase, though this plan was abandoned later.⁸⁴ Later in the month the government decided on a 30 per cent rise in salaries but this decision failed to satisfy the trade unions.⁸⁵ France agreed to make a loan of 3.4 billion francs for aid to agriculture and a gift of 2.6 billion francs to help the unemployed, which was announced on 3 September 1955.⁸⁶

At the same time, conflict between Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef, which had already been evident in the process of negotiations on the Agreements, came to the fore, especially because Paris also authorised the latter's homecoming and he succeeded in rallying support from the unemployed. He decided not to come back to the country, however, and continued to oppose the Agreements outside Tunisia. His public announcement against them was issued in Cairo on 12 July, which gathered support by some Neo-Destour members in the party session of Tunis. The Neo-Destour gave him an ultimatum requesting his return within ten days.⁸⁷ Realising that the conflict inside the party would certainly endanger his own position and the prospect of the success of the Agreements, Bourguiba in turn endeavoured to consolidate Tunisia's unity.⁸⁸

Security conditions in Tunisia did not stabilise in the summer of 1955, especially on its border with Algeria. In July, the violent incidents that Algerian armed groups caused were frequently reported, especially in El Kef, a city in northwestern Tunisia.⁸⁹ In fact it had already been revealed in the preceding month that substantial amounts of arms were being supplied from Libya to French North Africa.⁹⁰ The worsening Algerian situation caused further instability. It was reported in the following month, Algerian military activists often infiltrated Western Tunisia with the aim of establishing contact with the ex-Fellagha members. The French observed that these were the direct repercussions of two major incidents in Algeria which had killed dozens of settlers that month.⁹¹

Meanwhile, political institutions were being transformed to conform to the June 1955 Agreements. After their implementation on 31 August, the Ben Ammar Government resigned on 13 September in order to shape a government composed only of Tunisian ministers. Four days later, the Ministries of Finance, Public Works, Public Instruction, and Post Office, which had hitherto been run by French ministers, were taken over by Tunisians. On that day Seydoux was appointed as the French High Commissioner, a newly created post to replace the Resident-General. Salah Ben Youssef returned to Tunisia and was warmly received by the population in Tunis.⁹² Marshal law, which had technically been in existence since September 1939, was ended on 21 September by a decree signed by the Bey.⁹³

Yet the Tunisian security situation grew more unstable in the autumn of 1955. This was especially owing to Egypt's enhanced prestige as a result of its arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Its neutralist orientation was boosting anti-French movements in Tunisia as well as in Morocco, as analysed in Chapter 7. French settlers were reportedly intimidated by the presence of Algerian rebels, who passed through Tunisian territory 'either to seek refuge or to rest, or to try to recruit and find weapons and ammunition'.⁹⁴ Settlers' fears were confirmed when two French people were killed near the western border by Algerian Fellaghas during the night of 3–4 October. The French observed that those Fellaghas were trying to create unrest in the part of Tunisian territory that lay between Libya and Constantine in Algeria.⁹⁵ Seydoux, therefore, requested the CSTT to undertake a systematic clean-up operation and proposed that Paris reinforce the troops stationed along the border with Algeria.⁹⁶ He further explained: 'during their infiltration, the Algerian rebels benefit from the Tunisian population a wide complicity, if not an active participation'.⁹⁷ He then asked Bourguiba to publicise a statement of sympathy in order to ease French people's fears. The Neo-Destour's president agreed, adding that he had already requested Ben Ammar to issue a statement condemning the Algerian Fellaghas in the name of the government.⁹⁸

This violent incident was without delay followed by Salah Ben Youssef's declaration on 7 October⁹⁹ whereby he decisively opposed the Franco-Tunisian Agreements; he stated at the *Grande Mosquée* in Tunis that the Agreements allowed France to legalise what 'colonialism' had usurped since 1881 and make Tunisia join the French Union. He also exhorted Tunisian people to pursue a battle for total independence and, moreover, assured Algerian 'patriots' of his solidarity with them. According to *Le Monde*, this was the first occasion that he had held a gathering since

his return to Tunisia, and was 'the first signs of the struggle within the Neo-Destour'.¹⁰⁰ This announcement stunned Seydoux, who straight-away protested to Ben Ammar that this was intolerable since he was the Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour, whose members participated in the government.¹⁰¹ The dispute between Bourguiba's pro-French faction and Salah Ben Youssef's pro-Egyptian faction was increasingly conspicuous, as in Morocco. From this time onwards, the two factions were to arrange their own gatherings in order to present their cases to the people.

Bourguiba was quick to react. The Neo-Destour Political Bureau decided on 8 October to exclude Salah Ben Youssef, who was replaced by Ladgham as the Secretary-General.¹⁰² This measure aroused resentment in Muslim areas of major cities, where some shops closed as a protest.¹⁰³ This meant that Salah Ben Youssef enjoyed great popularity in urban areas. Seydoux pointed out that the possibility could not be excluded that the Neo-Destour's ex-Secretary-General had stirred up these troubles. Seydoux believed that he had returned from Cairo under orders from the Arab League to cause as much disruption as possible.¹⁰⁴ In a session chaired by el-Fassi, the North African Liberation Committee in Cairo decided on 15 October to exclude Bourguiba and the members of his party's Political Bureau, and instead to regard Salah Ben Youssef as its legitimate leader. Moreover, the ex-Secretary-General sent a telegram to Nasser in which he tried to show strong solidarity with Egypt, expressing his gratitude for the latter's support of the 'sacred Tunisian cause' and admiring Nasser's neutralist orientation.¹⁰⁵

Both terrorist activities and the domestic conflict made the French less optimistic about Tunisian political institutions being successfully created or modified in accordance with the Franco-Tunisian Agreements. Ben Ammar announced on 14 October that the constitution would be promulgated, but did not specify whether it would be issued by the Bey or by an elected assembly.¹⁰⁶ The Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs argued that Bourguiba enjoyed support from the majority of the party's members, while Salah Ben Youssef retained its radical members' support. It was also noted that the latter's statements could appeal to the ex-Fellagha members and that he also benefitted from a good reputation among Arab-Asian countries and the North African Liberation Committee. The Vieux-Destour's opposition to the Agreements remained strong. Finally, the Ministry concluded that the forthcoming Neo-Destour National Congress, due to be held in mid-November 1955, would certainly clarify the situation.¹⁰⁷ Seydoux was more pessimistic: he estimated that while the result would probably favour Bourguiba,

external forces like Egypt would certainly try to give advantages to his rival. He even wrote to the Quai d'Orsay¹⁰⁸ that if the Congress did not take a clear position, it would become an international event susceptible to the influence of the colonel of Cairo.¹⁰⁹

At this point, a completely new element was introduced into Tunisian affairs by the events in Morocco. The ex-Sultan's restoration had been made virtually inevitable by recent events since late October 1955 and, consequently, the prospect of Morocco's independence was suddenly emerging. Alarmed by this development, Seydoux sent a warning to Paris on 3 November:

[Tunisian opinion] is accustomed to thinking that Tunisia, more advanced and more in touch with the outside world than Morocco, should outpace it in the political emancipation.... Any concession [in Morocco] that would exceed what has been agreed in the Franco–Tunisian Agreements would be immediately exploited by the opponents of these Agreements [of June 1955]....

Therefore he stressed that, in defining future Moroccan policy, nothing must be promised that could diminish, in the mind of Tunisians, the results obtained thanks to the Agreements.¹¹⁰ However, from this time onwards, Paris was increasingly inclined to give independence to Morocco, as explained above, which would put France in a position where they could hardly refuse independence if requested by the Tunisians.

8.4 The Neo-Destour National Congress: Tunisia, November–December 1955

The Neo-Destour Party held its National Congress in Sfax, a mid-eastern coastal city, from 15 to 19 November. To French relief, this Congress turned out to be a success for Bourguiba and adopted a number of motions, four of which were of particular importance. The first motion stated that the Franco–Tunisian Agreements constituted a step on the way to independence. The party thus demanded that Tunisia's independence be achieved in the foreseeable future, while rejecting Salah Ben Youssef's position. The second urged the government to 'quickly implement all the Agreements without any tolerance or concession'. Immediate elections for all the municipalities must be implemented and a constituent assembly should create a constitution to define the country's political structure, based around a constitutional monarch,

with the people as the source of sovereignty. The third motion called for the creation of an auxiliary force which was to constitute the nucleus of a national army.¹¹¹ Finally, the fourth advocated 'solemn commitment to continue the struggle until the complete liberation and full independence' of Algeria. The Congress reasoned that there would never be peace in Tunisia as long as the plight of the Algerian people was unresolved.¹¹²

Importantly, some Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt and Iraq, sent their delegations to this Congress. With the growing prospect of Tunisia's independence, they were struggling to expand their influence. The rivalry for Middle Eastern hegemony¹¹³ engulfed Tunisian territory as well. In fact, Egypt and Iraq's activities were not limited to the official level. The French authorities had already found that the Iraqi Royal Military College was training North African activists. This news seriously embarrassed the British, who had a defence treaty with Iraq.¹¹⁴

The French saw the adoption of Bourguiba's line by the Neo-Destour as only a partial success. Salah Ben Youssef still enjoyed support from a significant part of the population. The economic reform plan that the Congress adopted had alienated large landowners, who rallied around him.¹¹⁵ He also won support from those who felt threatened by 'Tunisian labourism' and people of the *Grande Mosquée*. Seydoux was uncertain whether this Congress would have a lasting effect on stability. Moreover, referring to the 'wait-and-see' attitude of the Tunisian government, he was also suspicious whether it could put into practice the Neo-Destour's programme. As he perceived, several ministers, including the Prime Minister, were pro-Youssef, because they believed that Bourguiba could not last long and they were strongly affected by Prince Chedly's pro-Youssef position.¹¹⁶ Not only Prince Chedly, but also the royal family as a whole, sympathised with Salah Ben Youssef because he was committed to maintaining Tunisia as a religious country, whereas Bourguiba, who was rumoured to be aiming to establish a republican regime,¹¹⁷ advocated Tunisia's secularisation.

The Neo-Destour's requests to the government required the French to rectify the security problem in accordance with the 1955 Agreements, while the latter could not deal with the constitutional problem because it solely concerned the Tunisians. At a meeting with French officials held in Paris on 25 November, Seydoux¹¹⁸ picked up two demands from the Tunisians: first, they wanted to augment the number of police staff at their government's disposal by creating auxiliary forces and, second, create Tunisian forces designed to fight the Fellaghas. Seydoux

recommended to reject both demands, but insisted that the increase in police numbers in certain areas should be allowed. Regarding the second demand, he argued that France should secretly start examining the creation of an embryo of the Tunisian army as soon as possible.¹¹⁹

The atmosphere in Tunisia remained tense. Both Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef held assemblies in various parts of the country and continued their disputes.¹²⁰ The first three days of December 1955 witnessed several attacks against individuals in which two were killed and seven injured. Both sides condemned the other as responsible. Seydoux noted the desire of 'Bourguibists...to use the situation they have created more or less directly in order to precipitate the formation of the auxiliary force'.¹²¹ To deal with the insecurity, Seydoux announced on 8 December that the two sides agreed on an increase of forces at the Tunisian authorities' discretion.¹²² Then, on 24 December, both governments reached an accord on the issue of the Southern territory, unresolved in the 1955 Agreements, agreeing that the transfer of the special police force¹²³ in that region to the Tunisian authorities would commence the following week.

The distance between the Bey and the Neo-Destour was widening. Apart from these security problems, the party's motions had raised constitutional issues. Since the motions had proposed a constitutional monarchy, the Bey and Ben Ammar were not keen on constitutional reforms.¹²⁴ The Bey's position was clear: 'he could not recognise any postscript to the Agreements signed by him'.¹²⁵ Besides, he did not want an increase in the Tunisian government's police force, but rather emphasised that responsibility for the maintenance of order belonged exclusively to the French High Commissioner according to the June 1955 Agreements.¹²⁶ Aware that the advance of Bourguiba's position denoted the decline of his own, the Bey was hostile to the government's greater authority than had been provided in the Agreements. This was quite contrary to the Moroccan case, where the Sultan himself took the initiative in calling for sovereignty and independence.

When Seydoux met Bourguiba on 25 December, the former found him irritated by the attitude of the Bey and the Tunisian government. Bourguiba resented the fact that the Bey and the Palace did not conceal their sympathy for Salah Ben Youssef, who was more committed to preserving the monarchy, and that the Bey disliked Bourguiba's republicanism. Bourguiba told Seydoux that he did not oppose the constitutional monarchy itself, but added that he wanted the Bey to fulfil the same role as the British King. Likewise, he criticised the government, whose Prime Minister was incompetent and which was suffering from

'*immobilisme*', although he did not wish for a reorganisation that would accompany Ben Ammar's removal. Lastly, he did not specifically refer to diplomacy and the army, but replied in the affirmative when asked whether his policy was to lead Tunisia to independence with French agreement. Bourguiba wanted to avoid making the ex-Secretary-General a martyr, so he opined that isolating him progressively among those groups hostile to the Neo-Destour, instead of oppressing him through violent means, was the best method.¹²⁷

On 28 December, the Tunisian government announced its decision to organise the elections for a constituent assembly which would be convened on 8 April 1956, a decision that had been strongly pressed for by newspapers which supported Bourguiba and the UGTT.¹²⁸ Although the Bey had at first refused to sign the decree to authorise them, Bourguiba prevailed on him to do so.¹²⁹ The decree provided that the assembly would be elected by universal suffrage, and the date for the elections was set on 25 March 1956. This decision had much significance. First, as Seydoux commented, this was the first moment that the Bey, who had nominally been the absolute sovereign, had accepted that sovereignty lay not with him but with the people. In this sense, the decree totally differed from his own speech of 15 May 1951,¹³⁰ which had not embodied his real intention to retain the absolute monarchy. In other words, Bourguiba's programme on popular sovereignty since the 1930s had finally crystallised. Second, this decree was a serious menace to both the Vieux-Destour and Salah Ben Youssef. For the former, 'Our Constitution is the Koran', and for the latter, this decree was nothing but the institutionalisation of what Bourguiba had gained as the result of the Agreements.¹³¹ Finally, setting the date for convening the constituent assembly would necessarily tighten the schedules of Tunisia's domestic politics and Franco-Tunisian negotiations, as will be shown below.

8.5 The Franco-Tunisian Protocol: January-March 1956

In January 1956, to a certain degree due to the decree of December 1955, troubles were continuing throughout Tunisia. Supporters of Salah Ben Youssef were campaigning violently against the 1955 Agreements. Making use of high unemployment, he succeeded in rallying around him other anti-French forces such as the Vieux-Destour, ex-Fellagha members, traditionalists, and bourgeois who were worried about the socialist tendencies of the Neo-Destour and the UGTT. This coalition group was formed in liaison with the Algerian rebels.¹³² *Le Monde* reported on 20 January the development of 'neo-fellagism', exemplified

by infiltrations by Algerian 'outlaws'.¹³³ Then the newspaper reported that rebel groups were extending into Tunisian territory.¹³⁴

In Paris, preparations were started for dialogues with Tunisia. In fact, the French anticipated that their counterparts would soon demand independence. On 20 January, the Quai d'Orsay argued that the government should immediately make important decisions, as Salah Ben Youssef was increasing his influence due to violent incidents in Algeria, the promise of Morocco's independence, Tunisia's economic and social difficulties, and support from certain Arab countries. The Tunisian government should further reinforce police power, as this was not incompatible with France's special position concerning defence. It was agreed that the benefits that would be made to Morocco especially in terms of diplomacy and the military must be extended to Tunisia in order to safeguard the prestige and the position of the Tunisian government in face of attack from the 'Youssefist' opposition.¹³⁵

Thus, Tunisia must be given independence, but the problem was to what extent the Agreements and the Treaty of Bardo should be amended. The Quai viewed that independence could be achieved without terminating the Agreements, because they were flexible enough to allow important amendments to the realm of Tunisia's right to defence. Concerning the Treaty, the Quai preferred not to abrogate it. This position was considered possible because, importantly, the Treaty did not have provisions that deprived Tunisia of a right to foreign policy and defence. Nevertheless, it was also indicated: '[The Treaty of Bardo] would be difficult to maintain if the Treaty of Fez was itself profoundly modified and the revision of the Treaty of Bardo will necessarily drive a revision of the General Agreement.'¹³⁶ That is, the French feared that the revision of the Treaty of Fez might endanger the political links between the two countries stipulated in the General Agreement.

The Neo-Destour National Council from 21 to 23 January unanimously decided to ask the Political Bureau to work for the constitution of a national army, and the termination of the troubles in Algeria so that its people could settle conflicts with France through negotiation.¹³⁷ Against the background of this decision, when he met Seydoux on 26 January, Bourguiba called for French agreement on the organisation of Tunisia's national army, responsibility for diplomacy, and the reinforcement of police power. He justified his demands by his own difficult position due to developments in Morocco and emphasised that it was unthinkable that Tunisia would have a less favourable regime than Morocco. He therefore insisted that he be given guarantees regarding these problems within a few weeks, adding that he wanted French support in his

electoral campaign for the constituent assembly. He referred to his plan to visit Paris at the beginning of February for the purpose of having talks with leading political figures.¹³⁸

On 27 January, perhaps initiated by Slim, the Tunisian government launched a large-scale police operation against Salah Ben Youssef and his supporters, arresting about 100 people and confiscating a number of weapons. This operation forced him to flee the country. He arrived in Libya via Tangier on the following day.¹³⁹ Consequently, Bourguiba greatly reinforced his position. Furthermore, the Tunisian police simultaneously started encircling the palace of the Bey and the domiciles of members of the royal families. In fact, the Tunisian government suspected that the Bey had given refuge to Salah Ben Youssef.¹⁴⁰

In the French National Assembly, before being elected as Prime Minister, Mollet on 31 January declared that the June 1955 Agreements did not constitute an obstacle to 'independence in the context of organised close links (*l'indépendance dans le cadre d'une interdépendance organisée*)', thereby revealing his intention to negotiate independence with the Tunisians.¹⁴¹ Naturally, the meanings of independence and 'close links' were yet to be defined, as in the Moroccan case.

Bourguiba met a number of French leaders, such as Mollet, Massigli, Savary, and Seydoux, during his stay in Paris between 2 and 6 February. He officially requested that certain provisions of the Agreements be amended so that Tunisia could enjoy 'independence with close links (*l'indépendance dans l'interdépendance*)' soon and exercise its responsibilities in the domains of defence and foreign policy.¹⁴² The French, in principle, accepted Tunisia's rights in these areas, but rejected the transfer of police power at that moment because there remained internal tension and a menace posed by the Algerian Fellaghas.¹⁴³

Faced with these demands, Paris had to take into account the following points: first, it was axiomatic that France would have to be highly influential in Tunisia's foreign policy and defence. The French concern was not the formation of the Tunisian army itself but the assurance of their troops' right to the surveillance of Tunisia's borders, especially with Algeria. Second, Bourguiba's position should be strengthened so that he could win the elections due on 25 March. He must, therefore, be given a reward by successfully concluding the approaching Franco-Tunisian dialogue by the time of the elections. In consequence, Seydoux proposed that the negotiations be taken in two stages; the government should first declare Tunisia's independence to reinforce Bourguiba's position and then negotiate after the constituent assembly was convened in April 1956.¹⁴⁴ Thirdly, the enhancement of Bourguiba's position should not weaken the

Bey's position, which France had committed itself to guarantee through the Treaty of Bardo. Consequently, Bourguiba should be told that France could give him full support only if he assented to the constitutional monarchy.¹⁴⁵ Fourthly, the French were not unwilling to modify certain provisions of the 1955 Agreements if necessary. It would be dangerous, they speculated, if extensive reinterpretation of the Agreements was allowed, because it would mean unilateral concessions on the French part. They insisted, nonetheless, that future negotiations must be conducted within the framework of the Agreements, as this would give support to Bourguiba as against Salah Ben Youssef. Fifthly, they had not yet decided whether to abrogate the Treaty of Bardo. As argued above, it was assumed that France would be pressured to revoke it if the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez was agreed upon with Morocco. Yet some French officials strongly argued for its maintenance, putting more emphasis on legal continuity between Tunisia's current and future status.¹⁴⁶

In the meantime, the Palace was kept under siege. Perhaps this encirclement was meant by the Tunisian government to pressure the Bey to authorise the opening of Franco-Tunisian negotiations, which might pave the way to the republicanism that Bourguiba covertly wanted. On 6 February, the Bey vehemently articulated his anger and irritation to Seydoux. The French neutralism favourable to Bourguiba was evident when he answered that France could intervene only where public order was threatened since Tunisia enjoyed internal autonomy. Seydoux confirmed that the Bey 'considers the departure of Salah ben Youssef... as a threat to his dynasty'. Knowing the Tunisian government's intention, Seydoux advised that since the Bey himself had ratified the 1955 Agreements, no discussions about their amendment were possible unless it was explicitly demanded by him and the government that he would appoint. Thus Seydoux urged him to accept the revision of the Agreements. In exchange, he proposed that France promise to guarantee the maintenance of the dynasty and his status.¹⁴⁷

As a result of talks with Bourguiba, on 7 February, Savary declared France's willingness to modify Franco-Tunisian relations: 'if His Highness the Bey expressed desire, they agreed to discuss with representatives of the Tunisian Government he would designate, the issues raised by Mr Bourguiba' in the spirit of Mollet's speech on 31 January. The communiqué that Amin Bey issued on 10 February stated that he would appoint a government to start negotiations on independence. Paris did not forget to ease French settlers' anxiety; Seydoux announced that France would never accept that the settlers' interests and rights, guaranteed by the 1955 Agreements, would be put into question.¹⁴⁸

Despite the waning of Salah Ben Youssef's influence, troubles in Tunisia and in all of North Africa did not come to an end. On the contrary, the 'rebirth of urban terrorism' near Tunis was reported in February 1956.¹⁴⁹ Tahar Lassoued, a 'Youssefist fellagha' distributed pamphlets in Tunis, proclaiming the formation of the Tunisian National Liberation Army. The infiltration of the Algerian Fellaghas continued particularly in Tunisia's mid-western Gafsa area, often killing French people. The re-formation of the Tunisian Fellaghas was reportedly underway.¹⁵⁰ It was considered that the North African Liberation Committee was instigating these troubles under the patronage of neutralist pan-Arabist Egypt. The Quai d'Orsay emphasised the importance of satisfying the prestige of pro-Western nationalists to counter a threat in North Africa. Therefore, the independence promised to Morocco could not be refused to Tunisia; otherwise Bourguiba would be very quickly replaced by Salah Ben Youssef.

Thus the granting of independence to Tunisia was again accentuated although the two protectorates' independence should not be perceived as a sign of allowing 'separatism' in Algeria. What deserves mention is that independence was incompatible with the French Union, and that France abandoned these countries' membership of it in the way provided in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic:

The accession of these two countries to the French Union as provided by Title VIII of the Constitution is excluded.... France must be the hub between the French ensemble (the structure of the Republic can possibly be fitted) and Morocco and Tunisia, states 'associated' with the Republic in accordance with treaties negotiated between them and France.¹⁵¹

Now that the two countries' independence was unavoidable, the French at last dropped the idea of both countries' participation in the Union. They had to accept a big deviation from their decolonisation policy which had been based on the Union in exchange for the retention of influence.

When the negotiations started on 29 February, both parties had already agreed on 'independence with close links (*l'indépendance dans l'interdépendance*)' of Tunisia. In the first session, Ben Ammar requested the termination of the Treaty of Bardo and the modification of the 1955 Agreements in order to render the provisions compatible with Tunisia's exercise of full sovereignty. Pineau's response was that the French government had not decided on the Treaty's abrogation.¹⁵² In the third session, held on 5 March, the Tunisians rejected the French draft of an expected communiqué, insisting that it would 'impose restrictions on

the total abrogation of the Treaty of Bardo, as required by the Tunisian delegation'.¹⁵³ The gap between both parties' positions did not decrease. Despite their recognition of Morocco's independence on 2 March, the French refused to agree on the Treaty's abrogation.¹⁵⁴ On 17 March, the negotiations almost collapsed, as the French were trying to persuade the Tunisians to agree to a newly disguised form of French control in matters of diplomacy. They were in fact arguing for an arrangement whereby both countries would exercise a right to foreign policy, and therefore allow France an equal say on it.¹⁵⁵ As Massigli put it to the Americans, the French believed that in comparison with the Moroccan case, Tunisia's 'independence' must be a watered-down version because it 'was much more subject to Egyptian influence due to its proximity to the Middle East'.¹⁵⁶ Naturally, the talks reached a deadlock at the following sessions.

According to Bourguiba, it was he who broke the stalemate. He had talks with Pineau and on 18 March reached agreement concerning the text of the protocol. Pineau and Savary basically accepted the Tunisian position and persuaded Mollet, who was taking the most hard-line attitude, to agree to it.¹⁵⁷ Consequently, France decided to announce the termination of Tunisia's protectorate status. Nevertheless, there was another decisive element in enabling France to make concessions, namely, US support for French policy. Pineau told Ambassador Dillon on 19 March that the knowledge that the latter 'was to make a speech tomorrow generally supporting the French position in North Africa had been one of major considerations which led the French Government to reach agreement with Tunisia'.¹⁵⁸ On the following day, Dillon delivered a speech in which he assured France 'in its struggle to find liberal solutions to ensure the continuity of its presence in North Africa, of the full support of the United States'. This clearly indicated the American hope lay in the 'coexistence' of French and Muslim populations, which meant Tunisians' enjoying independence in France's sphere of influence.¹⁵⁹ Following Dulles's speech on 30 August 1955 which had referred to Morocco alone,¹⁶⁰ this was the first case in which the US government had openly committed itself to supporting general French policy in Tunisia. In fact, Dillon's discourse was evaluated favourably by almost all the press in Paris.¹⁶¹ This US support was very effective in convincing French opinion that Washington did not want France out of North Africa, and that Tunisian independence would not terminate French influence.

On 20 March, just five days before the elections in Tunisia, the two countries issued a protocol agreeing that: first, France recognised Tunisia's independence; secondly, the Treaty of Bardo could no longer

govern Franco–Tunisian relations; thirdly, certain dispositions of the 1955 Agreements incompatible with Tunisia’s new status would be modified or abrogated; and fourthly, Tunisia would be able to exercise its responsibilities regarding foreign affairs, security and defence, and to organise a national army. Both parties also agreed to enter into negotiations on 16 April with the purpose of defining the modalities of cooperation, particularly in the field of defence and foreign policy.¹⁶² On 22 March, the United States conveyed its congratulations to Tunisia on the recognition of its independence.¹⁶³

9

The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

The acquisition of the right to foreign policy was a pre-eminent victory for the nationalists of Tunisia and Morocco. This right had a substantive meaning other than that of prestige. As indicated by the Istiqlal's persistence on this right even after the Franco–Moroccan communiqué at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, the leaders of both countries optimistically believed that it would greatly help obtain economic aid from foreign countries. They even assumed that they could play off France against other foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, and attain a better deal. This was one of the reasons why they chose to remain pro-French without venturing into the pro-Egyptian neutralist stance. That is to say, they viewed independence, or the right to foreign policy, as essential also in meeting popular aspirations for economic welfare beyond popular sovereignty.

However, it would prove that the leaders' goal was only insufficiently met. The Americans revealed their hesitance to offer economic aid to the Tunisians and Moroccans. Indeed, fearful of alienating the French, they confined themselves to playing a 'complementary' role in providing economic aid to the two countries, rather than expanding their influence.

9.1 Morocco's independence

The Franco–Moroccan declaration of 2 March 1956 was an outstanding success for Mohammed V and the Moroccan government. As shown by the following development, this would have a conspicuous effect in establishing his authority among the people, and therefore would contribute much to calming the situation.

Upon his return to Rabat, Mohammed V made a triumphant speech on 7 March:

France has recognised Morocco's independence and the right to enjoy all the attributes of sovereignty. France is also committed to ensuring its territorial integrity....[W]e will exercise our legal duty, without restriction, build a national army and secure our diplomatic representation.¹

Then he made an appeal to calm and order although, once again, he did not explicitly condemn the Rif dissidence.²

The French promise of Morocco's independence obliged Madrid to open negotiations with the Moroccans. Rojas submitted a note to the French, mentioning that Spain was ready to recognise independence.³ In mid-March 1956, the Spanish government invited the Sultan to pay an official visit to Madrid. The latter wished to use the occasion to realise Morocco's unity, but he knew that his acceptance would create a problem in Franco–Moroccan relations. Knowing his intentions, Savary notified Dubois, now the High Commissioner in Rabat, that he was not opposed to Mohammed V's official visit, reminding him of the benefit that France would get by faithfully applying the 2 March accords. Savary, however, added that this visit must not appear to be undertaken without any consultation with the French.⁴ On 17 March, the Moroccan Council of Ministers announced the Sultan's affirmative reply to the Spanish invitation. Dubois let Paris know the sovereign preferred to be accompanied by French advisors.⁵

The 2 March communiqué's effect was remarkable; it significantly moderated radical nationalists' attitudes. On 13 March, el-Fassi affirmed his conviction that the Sultan's appeal would be understood in the Rif,⁶ that is, el-Fassi was becoming loyal to the regime under Mohammed V's authority. Thus the 2 March declaration was producing results which had been expected in Paris and Rabat. Then Balafrej stated to the *AFP*: 'I feel that in about a week fighting the Rif could stop.' *Le Monde* also reported that the Moroccan political milieu in Tangier had established contact in recent days with Liberation Army leaders.⁷ According to Dubois, this would be a direct consequence of the act of faith that the 2 March declaration represented.⁸ Besides, el-Fassi was discreet concerning aid provided by the Arab world for Morocco's liberation.⁹ Favourable indications had reached Dubois on the progress of appeasement in the troubled regions.¹⁰ However, it was unfortunate from the French viewpoint that el-Fassi's moderation

would be offset by the deteriorating Algerian situation, as will be shown below.

The second stage of the Franco–Moroccan negotiations began on 24 March. The Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs argued that its objective was to define the modalities of granting independence in the field of (1) military and defence questions, (2) administrative and technical cooperation, (3) diplomacy, (4) cultural questions, and (5) judicial questions.¹¹ It was decided that each point should be entrusted to the corresponding special committees that both parties appointed.¹² Concerning (1), the French argued over how to hold strong influence in Moroccan defence in general and the constitution of the Moroccan army more specifically. Close links were viewed indispensable as Morocco was incapable of its own defence. They therefore maintained that France should help the country organise its army, whose soldiers would be conscripted Moroccans and whose officers would be recruited from French and Moroccan nationals.

Regarding diplomacy, the French were willing to support the candidacy in international organisations like the UN but would not allow Morocco to join a pact hostile to France. Evidently, what France was afraid of was Morocco's adherence to the Arab League and its close relations with Egypt. Then the Franco–Moroccan commission in charge of the problem of the Moroccan army started examining the issue. The Moroccans wanted to constitute the Royal Army as a symbol when the Sultan departed for Spain, to which the French agreed.¹³

Owing to el-Fassi's change of attitude, the Rif situation was becoming calmer. This was not, however, expected to bring about a full-fledged truce with the French troops. In fact, the Rif rebels had ambushed French troops on 25 March, killing several soldiers.¹⁴ On 29 March, the Liberation Army declared a provisional ceasefire and then 30 leaders visited Rabat to pledge their loyalty to the Sultan.¹⁵ As el-Fassi declared, nevertheless, the Liberation Army consisted of two groups, Moroccan and Algerian, and it was only the first group who responded to the Sultan's appeal.¹⁶ On 3 April, based on this development, the Moroccan government asked France not to undertake military operations against the rebels.¹⁷

In the interim, Madrid was endeavouring to reach agreement with Rabat before the conclusion of Franco–Moroccan dialogue. By 30 March, no agreement had been reached; the Moroccans had rejected a Spanish proposal aiming to ensure their equal rights to those of the French. Instead, the Moroccans had submitted to the Spanish High Commissioner a counter-proposal to establish the independence and

unity of Morocco.¹⁸ The Sultan had a series of meetings with General Franco after his arrival in Madrid, and finally a joint Spanish–Moroccan declaration was issued on 7 April to recognise Moroccan independence and unity. Yet again, the Moroccan people welcomed this declaration.¹⁹ To French satisfaction, its content remained principally the same as the Moroccan position at the end of March 1956 and it was less restrictive than the Franco–Moroccan declaration in the sense that the notion of ‘*libre coopération* (free cooperation)’ was used instead of that of ‘*interdépendance*’ (close links).²⁰ As Dubois praised the Sultan for his firmness which had served not only the interests of Morocco but also France,²¹ the French were delighted at this outcome.

Thus, Madrid finally recognised that their status was less advantageous. The Moroccans, nevertheless, accepted a Spanish offer for assistance in some fields; General Franco offered aid for the organisation of the Moroccan army during the period of transition. Realising how desperate the Moroccans were to constitute a national army, Dubois urged Paris to assist them.²² Yet, the close relationship between Rabat and Madrid did not disappear. The Spanish–Moroccan diplomatic agreement in February 1957 would provide that the representation of Moroccan interests in South and Central America was allocated to Spain, and this would enormously upset the French.²³

The situation on the Algerian–Moroccan border remained troubled in the spring of 1956, since the Algerian group of the Liberation Army did not respond to the Sultan’s appeal.²⁴ The intensification of the Algerian insurgence in March 1956²⁵ had made the Moroccan situation deteriorate through the penetration of Algerian militants into its territory. In parallel with this, increased pressure came to France over the pace of the transfer of responsibility for public order. Moroccan ministers, including Bekkaï, had talks with the French on 4 April to study the modalities of the transfer of power concerning internal security. Hence Dubois urged Paris: ‘we could not further delay the assumption of office by a Moroccan Director of Security’.²⁶ The Spanish decision on 9 April to devolve police power to the Moroccans in their zone added to their demands.²⁷

Savary’s telegram to Dubois on 12 April clarified the conditions under which France could accept the transfer of responsibility for public order. First, the French authorities must reserve the possibility of using the army and the gendarmerie in order to protect the persons and the property of French and foreign nationals. Second, unless irregular armies were disarmed, the French forces had to deal with them and, in any case, would take the initiative to assure security along the Algerian border. Third, public security should remain under French authority as long as

the situation required, and also the domain of the DST (*Direction de la surveillance du territoire*).²⁸ This message suggested Paris's firm intention to retain significant responsibilities over this issue even after the conclusion of Franco–Moroccan negotiations. After his return from Spain, the Sultan on 16 April made an official statement that the Moroccan army, comprised of around 10,000 servicemen, would be established by 12 May, the date of Aïd Seghir Festival. Taking this opportunity, he desperately wished to show his own prestige to the people thereby strengthening his authority. In fact, in addition to the Rif rebels and the troubles in the Middle Atlas area, Moroccan insecurity was such that the PDI was openly speaking of the menace of an Istiqlal putsch.²⁹ On 25 April, the Franco–Moroccan talks decided on the creation of a Moroccan army of nearly 15,000 personnel.³⁰

In contrast to the Moroccan army, Franco–Moroccan disagreement remained focussed on the transfer of internal security responsibilities. On 16 April, Savary repeated his previous position in his instructions to Dubois but Rabat openly requested the transfer of all necessary means for the maintenance of order to the Minister of Interior. On 20 April, when Roger Lalouette, talked with Bekkaï, the latter confirmed, first, that the French would preserve the right to intervene to protect French nationals and their property and, second that French troops would retain freedom of circulation for security reasons along the Algerian–Moroccan border. Nevertheless, he demanded that French troops should not wear French uniforms when operating along the border area.³¹ Thus the Moroccans accepted French responsibility for these two issues, but on condition that it did not stimulate nationalist sentiment. They also asked the French for the transfer of power for DST, but Savary notified Dubois that France's responsibility for this area should be kept intact in the short term. He was adamant on this point, since 'the problem of DST does not only interest Morocco. A concession in this area would have immediate consequences in Tunisia.'³²

At the same time as the decision on the army, the Sultan decided to take over foreign affairs. His aim was to 'combine presentation of the Moroccan Army and control of foreign affairs to impress public with [the] fact that essential attributes of independence are being steadily acquired'.³³ On 23 April, Rabat resolved to create the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to appoint Balafrej as its minister. Dubois warned the Moroccans: 'The exchange of diplomatic missions between Morocco and foreign states can not intervene without Paris's explicit consent'.³⁴ This development puzzled the Anglo-Saxons, who did not want to waste time before exchanging diplomatic missions.³⁵ For this reason, the British

and US Ambassadors in Paris informally approached the French, but the latter asked them not to appoint their diplomatic representatives until negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco on the modalities of conducting diplomatic relations completed.³⁶

On 28 April, Bekkaï reaffirmed that establishing diplomatic relations with other countries was compatible with France's special position. As he put it to a French official, Mohammed V's intention was to exchange diplomatic missions with France first and, only after that, Spain, Egypt, and the United States. The French bitterly noted that Moroccan impatience was encouraged by the haste of Washington and London.³⁷ Emphasising that Moroccan policy aroused apprehension among French parliamentarians, Savary wrote to Dubois that the government wanted to discuss the problem over foreign relations with Balafrej in Paris.³⁸ In fact, the French were concerned to make Franco–Moroccan diplomatic agreements acceptable to the parliament which was due to open at the end of May 1956.

On the night of 2–3 May, about 20 people loyal to el-Glaoui were massacred by a crowd near Marrakech. In view of strong anti-French sentiment among the population, Bekkaï demanded the suspension of the punishment of criminals by French troops, to which the French agreed.³⁹ Subsequently, a serious clash occurred between armed bands and a French unit 50 kilometres north of Fez.⁴⁰ Amid this explosive atmosphere, Bekkaï and Balafrej visited Paris, where Franco–Moroccan talks started. The French submitted a proposal to the Moroccans for certain diplomatic agreements, and indicated that, if the National Assembly approved the government's policy, the accord would come into force in June 1956, shortly after its debate. On 8 May, a communiqué was published announcing that the two countries had decided to pursue negotiations for agreements which would define close links.⁴¹ Then Savary was sent to Rabat to complete the negotiations.

The prospect of Franco–Moroccan diplomatic agreement caused an unexpected reaction from London. On 10 May, the British decided to recognise the independence of Tunisia and Morocco 'to forestall Nasser' and to establish diplomatic relations once negotiations between France and them were concluded,⁴² an announcement that came earlier than French expectation but which still fit with France's legal interpretation. Indeed, Nasser's growing influence posed threat to their interests in the Middle East. As was the case in Tunisia analysed later, this decision helped accelerate the settlement of the Franco–Moroccan negotiations. Unlike the Americans, the British had not recognised independence at the time of the 2 March communiqué. Britain, nonetheless, prioritised

the winning of the Moroccan people's good faith, even at the expense of their unswerving policy to support France.

The Royal Moroccan Army was officially presented to the Sultan on 15 May. Although the Liberation Army did not participate in the march of the Royal Army, its leaders had promised not to disturb the ceremony.⁴³ Yet in mid-May 1956, the Liberation Army remained influential in internal politics. Still, the Sultan neither approved nor disapproved of the Liberation Army.⁴⁴

To French surprise, on 15 May, Rabat disseminated a communiqué to give an unofficial agreement to the nomination of the Spanish Ambassador before the French National Assembly approved the government's policy. Savary immediately protested to Bekkaï that this decision could have an adverse effect on the Parliament and French opinion.⁴⁵ In fact, the Algerian fiasco obliged Rabat to take an apparently independent stand from France. Savary reported to Pineau that, regarding the wording of the diplomatic agreement, the Moroccans suddenly began to assert: 'the word "solidarity" [between both countries], which appeared in the preamble, seemed particularly shocking to several ministers, while France was engaged in operations in Algeria'. Yet, the French realised that anti-French sentiment among Moroccan opinion had moderated owing to the presentation of the Royal Army, and therefore the Sultan would choose to reach a diplomatic agreement.⁴⁶

A faction of the Liberation Army announced on 18 May that they would never accept the movement of French troops inside Morocco.⁴⁷ The situation was such that 'neither the Moroccan government nor the Sultan exercised any direct control over this army', as Savary put it to Dillon.⁴⁸ Then, an incident occurred in which French soldiers, while patrolling along the Algerian–Moroccan border, were taken prisoner by an armed Moroccan band.⁴⁹ The French told an American official: 'the Sultan had no day-to-day control of Eastern Morocco' which was controlled by the Army.⁵⁰ Bekkaï demanded to Dubois that French patrols be suspended,⁵¹ but this met with French rejection.⁵²

Although both powers disagreed on the issue of patrolling along the border, they signed the diplomatic agreement on 28 May, the substance of which remained the same as that of the French note of 8 May. Subsequently, the debate in the National Assembly on general North African policy opened on 31 May and a motion of confidence in the Mollet Government was adopted by 271 votes to 59, with 200 abstentions, enabling the Franco–Moroccan diplomatic agreement to come into force.⁵³ This finally authorised Morocco to exchange diplomatic missions with other countries.

Needless to say, the completion of the parliamentary debate did not conclude the transition period. In July 1956, France brought the question of Moroccan membership before the UNSC. On the SC's recommendation, the GA decided on 12 November to admit Morocco. The country's unity was achieved in the interim. On 9 August, the Spanish Zone came under the control of the Moroccan government. On 29 October, the diplomatic conference at Fedala put an end to the international administration of Tangier.⁵⁴

In the wake of independence, the rising unemployment rate, budget deficit, and the continuing activities of the Liberation Army anguished Morocco. French help, political, economic, and cultural was badly needed in order to press forward with nation-building. Yet the Moroccans were delaying the opening of discussions on such help, and only in mid-July 1956 did they show the intention to talk with the French. As a French official put it, their change of mind was largely because they became conscious of the difficulties in obtaining economic aid from the United States and other Western powers. The Moroccan leaders seemed shocked by the American cancellation of Aswan High Dam financing on 19 July, which had been offered to Egypt in December 1955. After mentioning 'US attitude had been very helpful', a French official in charge of talks with the Moroccans told Ambassador Dillon:

Moroccans had initially expected that immediately upon [the] achievement of independence they would be deluged with concrete offers of economic assistance from US, Soviet and possibly from other European countries....Moroccans are naturally disappointed as their original financial ideas had been totally unrealistic.⁵⁵

The Moroccans had no choice but to remain in the franc zone and to negotiate agreements on close links with the French, who of course preferred this course in order to secure political and economic influence.⁵⁶

However, there were a number of stumbling blocks before concluding the Economic and Financial Agreement which had been envisaged as a part of close links. Disagreements over the French troops' presence in Morocco, caused by the Algerian War, did not allow both parties to reach an agreement in the next year. Consequently major-scale financial aid, which France had kept granting to Morocco at 15–20 billion francs at an annual rate, ceased in 1957, though it would revive in July 1962.⁵⁷

As for other issues, the Agreement on administrative and technical cooperation was signed at Rabat on 6 February 1957. The Cultural Agreement was initialled at Rabat on 30 May⁵⁸ which maintained the

dual education system.⁵⁹ In any case the Moroccans were in no way hostile to the teaching of French even at the primary level.⁶⁰ Then Agreements on legal matters and mutual legal assistance were initialled on 11 June. As for the currency, Morocco remained in the franc zone after independence, but gradually gained autonomy until it was de facto no longer a participant in the zone at the end of 1950s.⁶¹

Thus Morocco entered the international stage while its unity was accomplished and its close links with France were maintained.⁶² The instability of the Moroccan situation and the feebleness of its regime did not cease because of the Algerian War. Having been the reasons for French hasty recognition of independence, these elements yet again prompted both sides to conclude agreements, and permitted French influence to be retained in Morocco.

9.2 Tunisia's independence

As in Morocco, the March 1956 protocol brought a favourable result for the Neo-Destour. This was particularly noticeable in the elections for the constituent assembly held on 25 March. The National Front, formed around the Neo-Destour and the UGTT, occupied all 98 seats. The 'Youssefists' and the Communist Party failed to win a single seat. The voting turnout was over 84 per cent overall but only 50 per cent in Tunis where Salah Ben Youssef retained popular support. The turnout was also low in the Southern territory.⁶³ Bourguiba was starting to institutionalise what he had gained as a result of the Franco-Tunisian protocol, which had already granted independence from the Tunisian viewpoint. As early as 23 March, he had announced: 'We cannot be truly happy...until the day our sister Algeria has regained its sovereignty.'⁶⁴ This was a clear indication of his intention to exert a right to foreign policy. On 31 March, Bourguiba announced his intention to shape a new government immediately after the first session of the Constituent Assembly, which would include a Minister of Defence and a Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was contrary to Ben Ammar's assurance given to the French on 20 March that Tunis would not nominate those ministers in the immediate future.⁶⁵

Franco-Tunisian talks over the transfer of responsibility for public order, which were held from 4 to 7 April, ran smoothly. Both sides in principle agreed on the new arrangements to eliminate the waiting period before a Tunisian takeover of normal internal security and also to define and limit French responsibility, especially in border areas.⁶⁶

In parallel with the heightening of Bourguiba's prestige because of the March protocol and the developments thereafter, the Prime Minister's

prestige was on the decline. Ben Ammar was being criticised due to his failure to condemn Salah Ben Youssef,⁶⁷ whose supporters were engaged in terrorist activities as a protest against the protocol.⁶⁸ On 8 April, the Political Committee of the Arab League authorised its member states to recognise Tunisia's independence immediately, perhaps because the League felt obliged to acknowledge the *fait accompli*. The developments following the protocol finally determined the Arab countries' support for Bourguiba. Paris welcomed this decision.⁶⁹ The Constituent Assembly was convened on 9 April, where Ben Ammar offered his resignation. Based on the Bey's approval, the Bourguiba Government was installed on 14 April, with 12 Neo-Destour members out of 17 ministers and with full support from the UGTT.⁷⁰ Bourguiba named himself both Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs, although the French had tried in vain to persuade him not to do so.⁷¹

Franco-Tunisian negotiations on the form and content of independence had seen no progress. Tunis repeatedly asked Paris to adjourn the opening of new negotiations scheduled on 16 April.⁷² This stemmed from disagreements over the interpretation of the March protocol. According to French insistence, the protocol's second point concerning the Treaty of Bardo suggested that the treaty had never been abrogated and that 'until [the] French Assembly ratifies [the] independence protocol it is not legal'.⁷³ In fact, the French wanted to get the new accord ratified by the National Assembly scheduled to start debates on North Africa at the end of May 1956.

Bourguiba had to tackle the persistent, if weakening, influence of Salah Ben Youssef, combined with the deteriorating situation in Algeria, so that he could consolidate his internal position. He met with Seydoux on 12 April, and insisted that the March protocol had immediately granted Tunisia independence, and that 'the proclamation of independence struck a heavy blow to Salah Ben Youssef'.⁷⁴ In fact, on 15 April, Salah Ben Youssef, in Cairo, accused the Tunisian government of collaboration with 'the French imperialists'. As a response, Bourguiba declared that Tunisia must organise its national defence, send its diplomatic representatives to foreign countries, and be admitted to the UN.⁷⁵ On 23 April, in an interview with *Le Figaro*, Bourguiba issued another statement which angered the French: 'my government would help "Algerian brothers", I would not oppose Tunisian volunteers fighting in Algeria, and I would not provide assistance to French troops fighting against arms trafficking'.⁷⁶ He defended his statement by telling Seydoux that he had to take into consideration anti-Bourguiba campaigns conducted

in Tunisia and the Middle East, and emphasised that it was essential to dissociate Youssefism from the Algerian resistance.⁷⁷

On 24 April, he summoned the consul generals in Tunis and declared that he wished to transform the consular corps into the diplomatic corps. Paris immediately protested, emphasising the 1955 Agreements would remain valid until the conclusion of further agreements.⁷⁸ From the French standpoint, the Franco-Tunisian protocol of March 1956 stipulated that the General Agreement of 1955 could be modified if necessary but did not specify how. Logically, Tunisia was not allowed to exchange ambassadors with other countries before agreeing with France. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Americans started examining the establishment of diplomatic relations in an effort to 'press for [a] prompt solution' of the problem, but the French asked them not to appoint diplomatic representatives until their negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco were complete.⁷⁹

However, Bourguiba could not wait while Franco-Moroccan negotiations progressed, so he confirmed on 1 May that Tunisia would enter into negotiations only after France recognised Tunisia's full independence: 'Only a truly sovereign and independent Tunisia will resume negotiations with France'.⁸⁰ Morris Hughes, the US Consul General in Tunis, noted that Bourguiba looked anxiously to the United States 'to offer him some practical encouragement, specifically through a readiness to open normal diplomatic contact with this government, so that he can show his people...that his pro-Western convictions are recognized...by the West'.⁸¹ He, who chose to take the pro-Western line without severing relations with the former protector, needed a compelling justification in the eyes of the people. These developments forced Mollet to decide to have a summit meeting with Bourguiba.⁸²

On 8 May, the British notified Bourguiba of their intentions to recognise independence, which he rejected because of the qualification 'as soon as Franco-Tunisian agreement on external affairs has been reached'. Then Britain publicly announced its intention to do so.⁸³ On 8 May, the Americans orally informed the Tunisians that their message to the Bey of 22 March 1956 had constituted their recognition of independence and that they wished to exchange diplomats.⁸⁴ Moreover, Washington also told the Quai d'Orsay that they wished to establish their embassy in Tunis promptly.⁸⁵ Thus the Anglo-Americans urged Paris to grant independence though the difference of the degree to which the two powers sympathised with the French stance remained significant. Bourguiba then urged the Americans to submit a note stating their intentions to establish a diplomatic mission.⁸⁶

Invited by Mollet, who was aware of the moves of Britain and the United States, Bourguiba stayed in Paris from 9 to 12 May.⁸⁷ The French offered to him a draft of a Franco–Tunisian diplomatic accord. Bourguiba refused to sign it, but both parties agreed that negotiations should take place in Tunis.⁸⁸ This draft was aimed at granting Tunisia as favourable a diplomatic status as Morocco; this was a French concession, as in late March 1956 they had wished Tunisian independence to be ‘watered down’. According to what he said to Dillon, however, Bourguiba flatly rejected the draft, because ‘the French tried to insist on his signing [a] draft Agreement... which... unified Franco–Tunisian foreign policy’. Nevertheless, Bourguiba made minor concessions, too. He told the French that he would ‘postpone the establishment of any foreign mission... after French parliamentary debate’ which would presumably abrogate the Treaty of Bardo on May 31 or June 1.⁸⁹

Paris was desperate to prevent the Anglo-Saxons from opening diplomatic relations with Tunisia before they did themselves. On 12 May, Latour, the ex–Resident-General in Tunis and Rabat, presented the French case to the Americans. The Parliament, he anticipated, would probably refuse to consider the abrogation due to Bourguiba’s refusal to discuss the content of independence. Therefore, Latour warned the Americans that ‘if other countries established missions [in] Tunis after June 1 in [the] absence of [a] new Agreement... such action would clearly be in contravention [of the] March 22 [sic] common agreement’. The United States, as mentioned, had already begun discussing with the Tunisians the establishment of its embassy, but Bourguiba informed the Americans of his promise about the postponement of the deadline.⁹⁰ On its part, the British FO was divided on whether to set up diplomatic relations if the French parliamentary debate closed without ratifying a Franco–Tunisian accord. Some officials argued for opening diplomatic relations, lest Tunisia should ‘turn towards Egypt and neutralism or worse’, but the FO ultimately adopted Jebb’s suggestion: ‘the creation of an impression with the French... that their allies had let them down would be even worse’.⁹¹ Therefore, the British delayed establishing diplomatic relations until after a Franco–Tunisian agreement.

Bourguiba did not want negotiations with France to break down. On 16 May, he proposed a deal to Seydoux: first, Tunisia would not exchange ambassadors with other countries before the parliamentary debate. Second, France and Tunisia should resume a dialogue for a diplomatic accord after the debate.⁹² Nevertheless, third, the representatives of both countries should be upgraded to ambassadors before the debate.⁹³ By contrast, the French were keen to conclude a diplomatic accord before

the debate's opening. On 23 May, Savary instructed Seydoux to convince Bourguiba to agree to commence negotiations as soon as possible. Bourguiba should be told, added Savary, that Paris was prepared to accept the Tunisian desire to be distinguished from the Moroccans in the form of the accord.⁹⁴ This was once again a significant concession; Paris decided to grant a more favourable diplomatic status to Tunisia than Morocco. Bourguiba's attitude moderated as a result. The following day, omitting the third point of 16 May, he decided not to exchange ambassadors with France before the parliamentary debates opened. Instead, he insisted to Seydoux that it be done on 2 June, with the exchange of ambassadors with other countries immediately after.⁹⁵ He added, next to diplomatic missions, 'he would conclude [a] diplomatic Agreement with France even more restrictive than that already concluded with Morocco'.⁹⁶

However, on 28 May, the day the Franco-Moroccan agreement was signed, Bourguiba gave a critical speech: he would appoint diplomatic representatives abroad before any resumption of negotiations with France.⁹⁷ This forced Paris to move quickly. In fact, Bourguiba's speech urged the Americans to establish their diplomatic mission in order to forestall other countries like the USSR or Egypt. The State Department warned the French that Bourguiba might receive ambassadors from foreign countries immediately after the closure of the parliamentary debate. It would be embarrassing, Washington maintained, if unfriendly countries opened embassies before the United States.⁹⁸

On 5 June, the French National Assembly closed without any decision on Tunisia. That day, agreeing with the Americans, Seydoux warned Paris: 'undoubtedly, countries like the United States and Britain will hardly admit just having consuls in Tunis while other states such as Russia and Egypt will be represented by ambassadors'. Even Tunisia's exchange of ambassadors with friendly countries before France would weaken its position. He therefore suggested that both countries should exchange ambassadors and that, thereafter, Tunisia should be allowed to open diplomatic relations with other countries.⁹⁹ In fact, Hughes declared on 5 June that the US government had decided to raise the Consulate General to Embassy status and appoint a *chargé d'affaires* or an ambassador.¹⁰⁰ Importantly, the American decision was not accompanied by asking for *agrément* for an ambassador.¹⁰¹ This measure was meant to impress Tunisian opinion that Tunisia and the United States had already established diplomatic relations, whereas *de jure* they still did not start such relations, a position which satisfied the French.

Even at this point, Paris's position remained unchanged. On 6 June, the French Cabinet reached a decision: the Treaty of Bardo and the 1955

General Agreement were still valid until the conclusion of a new accord and that France was prepared to conclude an accord with Tunisia to replace them.¹⁰² Bourguiba was furious with this: he warned Seydoux, 'imagine one day I would be blown away by the currents that I find it difficult to control', and insisted on avoiding any weakening of his own authority which was 'threatened by the agents of Cairo'.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, this French decision also indicated that the French were now keener to reach agreement than previously, because of the American move.

On 9 June, Seydoux and Ladgham agreed that negotiations be concluded in two stages: first, an agreement on Tunisia's right to an independent external policy, accompanied by the exchange of ambassadors between France and Tunisia; and second, negotiations for the treaty of friendship and alliance. However, what was essential for Bourguiba was that Tunisia's right to diplomacy must not be obtained as a result of its agreeing to a diplomatic accord with France.¹⁰⁴

On 12 June, the French Cabinet's limited session, chaired by Mollet, agreed in principle on the draft of the agreement prepared by Seydoux.¹⁰⁵ On 15 June, France and Tunisia signed 'the accord on the questions of diplomatic representation'. In spite of the similarities with the Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement, they differed significantly. First, the Franco-Tunisian accord stipulated

in countries where Tunisia will not decide to send a permanent diplomatic mission, the French Republic is prepared, if the Tunisian government requests it, to ensure the representation and protection of Tunisian nationals and interests. In this case, the French diplomatic and consular agents act in accordance with the requirements of the Tunisian government.¹⁰⁶

The Franco-Moroccan equivalence did not refer to Moroccan requirements. Secondly, the two governments, 'until the conclusion of the treaty that sets the terms of their cooperation in foreign affairs, acting in the spirit of friendship and solidarity that characterises their relations, will inform each other on all issues of common interest that will arise in this area'. As the French admitted, unlike the accord with Morocco, this did not fix the modalities of action between the two countries on the diplomatic level. The joint communiqué stated on 26 June that both parties would resume negotiations anticipated in the March protocol with a view to concluding a treaty of friendship and alliance.¹⁰⁷

The accord on the questions of diplomatic representation authorised Tunisia to exchange diplomatic representatives with other countries,

although 'Youssefists' still continued anti-French activities, especially in Southern Tunisia. Reflecting the stronger position that Bourguiba was enjoying compared to Mohammed V, Tunisia was given a more favourable status by France than Morocco was. On 16 June, the British government, which had repeatedly put off facing French objections, expressed its desire to open diplomatic relations with Tunisia, who at once accepted it. The UNSC, on the motion of the French delegation, approved Tunisia's application for UN membership on 26 July 1956.¹⁰⁸ As in Morocco, the GA decided on 12 November to admit Tunisia to membership. In July 1957, unlike Morocco, the monarchy was abolished and a republic was declared with Bourguiba as president. As for the monetary union and the customs union with France concluded in 1955, Tunisia remained a member even after independence. These constituted significant means whereby France exerted informal influence over a sovereign Tunisia. Although the country publicly announced its departure from the customs union in September 1959, and gradually withdrew from the monetary union in the late 1950s, its commercial and monetary relations with the French remained important in the early 1960s.¹⁰⁹

Tunisia's entry into the international community notwithstanding, its relations with France came with many troubles. Both parties' dialogues on a treaty of friendship and alliance were interrupted in July 1956 shortly after their opening. This was both because of the French Senate's unfavourable attitude to French economic aid to Tunisia and because of Foreign Minister Christian Pienau's public accusation of Bourguiba's reaffirmation of his solidarity with Algerian rebels and criticism of the French troops' presence at the Bizerte naval base.¹¹⁰ Therefore he approached Washington to provide economic aid in July, but the French were confident that he would be driven back to open talks with them because of economic and budgetary pinch because he would not obtain sufficient results from other sources than France.¹¹¹ Arguably, as in the Moroccan case, this confidence derived from the US cancellation of the Aswan High Dam financing offered to Egypt on 19 July.¹¹² As expected, Tunisia resumed negotiations with France on financial credit to its budget for 1956 in mid-August.¹¹³

Franco-Tunisian talks on economic aid were soon resumed as well, and when US Ambassador Dillon met Savary in September 1956, the latter confirmed that France had agreed to give Tunisia approximately 16 billion francs in aid. He also stressed that the United States should not undertake economic aid until after the completion of Franco-Tunisian negotiations.¹¹⁴ In late October 1956, the US Embassy in Paris

announced that all US aid to Tunisia would be made in full accordance with the French government, which severely discouraged Bourguiba. He decried that 'Tunisia must always be a tributary of France' and that '[the] US [is] unwilling [to] deal direct[ly] with Tunisia'.¹¹⁵ Amid the deterioration of the Algerian situation, the existence of French troops in Tunisia offended the nationalist sentiment to such an extent that in February 1957 Bourguiba finally started to insist on total evacuation of the troops except in the Bizerte zone.¹¹⁶ Consequently, Paris finally decided to suspend economic aid to Tunisia in April 1957.¹¹⁷ Up to the date of independence France had granted about 10 billion francs at an annual rate, but such large-scale aid thus ceased in 1957. As in Morocco, the United States began to provide financial and technical aid to Tunisia, and in the 1960s their financial aid was equivalent to that previously given by France.¹¹⁸

Thus France was much less successful in maintaining close links with Tunisia in comparison to Morocco. To the end, France and Tunisia failed to conclude the treaty of friendship and alliance which was equivalent to the Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement that provided both countries inform each other in advance of important issues. The Suez Crisis and troubles in Algeria would seriously sour Franco-Tunisian relations after 1956. Nonetheless, Tunisia remained strongly committed to a pro-French line. This was partly because Bourguiba's personal belief in Western values and also partly because of US support, be it political or economic, to Tunisia. As the French were aware, and the Americans agreed, 'Bourguiba is France's last great hope in Tunisia'. The US government, therefore, could not afford to betray his efforts to show the people that his pro-Western line was appreciated by the West.¹¹⁹ When Bourguiba asked Washington for economic help in December 1956, he told the French that he had no desire to have the United States replace France and that the 'US would only supplement French assistance'.¹²⁰

In this sense, despite the lack of visible diplomatic accords with France, Tunisia's pro-French line was enabled by American support. Paris and Washington mutually agreed on their division of roles, and Tunisia was aware of this. If the United States had declined assistance or had attempted to replace France, much damage would have been brought to Franco-Tunisian relations, either because the latter would have not been given sufficient aid or because France would not tolerate such a US move. The rearrangement of Franco-Tunisian relations, which had begun since the French decision on decolonisation, went in parallel with the stabilisation of Franco-American relations, and this held true in the Moroccan case, too.

Conclusion

This work has analysed the decolonisation process of Tunisia and Morocco, especially focussing on the two major events: Tunisian internal autonomy in July 1954 and Moroccan independence in November 1955. The existing research assumes that France agreed to these countries' independence because it could not resist nationalist pressures and international opinion calling for self-government or independence. There was no doubt that nationalist and international pressures played a very significant role in French decision-making. However, the book argues that these two factors alone do not explain the motivations and timing of the French decisions on important concessions relating to the two turning-points. Indeed, for the French the most important concern was whether to secure viable collaborators in Tunisia and Morocco and it was only when this concern came to the fore because of nationalist and/or international pressure that the French government made the aforementioned concessions. Finding viable collaborators was a difficult task because they had to satisfy multifarious and sometimes conflicting needs: on the one hand, they had to be able to secure French influence and convince the people of its importance, and on the other hand, they had to be able to achieve the political unity of their country while demonstrating orientation to independence from France.

However, closer examination of the French decisions on the two matters shows that Tunisian internal autonomy and Moroccan independence were clearly different concepts. Certainly each concept can be categorised as representing one stage of decolonisation and existing scholarly works have tended to assume that independence was a logical extension of internal autonomy. In other words, France as well as other colonial powers admitted independence to their dependent territories as their political community became mature enough to enjoy the right

to foreign policy and the army after setting up autonomous political regimes. Yet this research's analysis of French decolonisation policy towards Tunisia and Morocco shows this was not the case. Obviously, there were a number of paradoxes concerning Moroccan independence; on the eve of this decision, Tunisia was much more ready for independence in terms of political institutions and unification. Moreover, Tunisian internal autonomy had been encouraged by the international community, including the United States and the United Kingdom, France's important allies, while Moroccan independence was beyond their expectations.

So far, academic works on decolonisation have tended to assume that decolonisation is a long-term trend which originated in World War I, when the principle of self-determination was explicitly or implicitly proclaimed by Lenin and Wilson. The rapid gaining of independence by dependencies after World War II has been regarded as a part of this consistent trend. The questions of such writings have centred on whether the colonial power had intended to transfer political power to the local peoples, and if so when the sovereignty of the people, and then independence as its extension was recognised, and so on. These were certainly very important questions, and in fact popular sovereignty had been what the Anglo-Americans and other powers, including the USSR and the Arab countries, were requesting France to recognise in the North African protectorates and sub-Saharan overseas territories at least until 1954. Popular sovereignty usually meant, at least until that time, the assurance of local people's participation in political institutions with equal representation, and the formation of a distinct political community by the local people. This was what Britain had been gradually implementing in its colonial territories through constitutional reforms, and what France allowed the Tunisian nationalists to take the initiative on effecting by way of the Carthage Declaration. However, Moroccan independence was very different from the course that France began to take in Tunisia, and the French motivations behind the decision were quite different from a satisfaction of the desire for popular sovereignty. Thus the uniqueness surrounding Moroccan independence must be highlighted. In the following, I will in detail analyse the significance of the two events, and then will examine novel aspects of international relations that entailed the independence.

Yet before going into details, what should be mentioned here is the special status of the protectorates, and that this made it difficult to conduct analysis from an angle of dichotomy: France versus the nationalists. The rise of nationalism generated by Wilson's Fourteen Points greatly undermined the protectorate regimes with its shaking of the

traditional authority represented by the Bey and the Sultan. A serious challenge to French rule in Tunisia and Morocco, which relied upon the sovereigns' authorities, was posed; nationalism as a modernising force made a serious cleavage in society. The degree to which nationalist movements had melted the traditional authority affected how the local ruler treated nationalism and also how France would tackle the problem, and ultimately which side France would choose as collaborators after independence. The dichotomy between France and the nationalists, or that between the oppressor and the oppressed, is not very useful in analysing what determined the timing for France's decision on decolonisation, and therefore French motivations on decolonisation.

Hitherto, scholars have failed to shed sufficient light on the French recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy through the Carthage Declaration. There are two reasons for the insufficient attention: first, internal autonomy, or self-government in Anglo-Saxon terms, was regarded merely as a step towards independence. The country had enjoyed certain political autonomy under the protectorate regime, so the acquisition of 'internal autonomy' has been considered to have little sense. Second, the French made this decision on the basis of internal concerns. In other words, Tunisian affairs had not attracted international attention since the end of 1952, and therefore it appeared that no international pressure had been exerted on Tunisian affairs. For these reasons, previous research assumed Tunisian internal autonomy had little, if any, impact on other colonial territories. However, France's decision was of much significance in four aspects, namely, Tunisian decolonisation, international pressure, French imperial strategy, and the Western Alliance.

First, in the Tunisian context, the granting of internal autonomy was distinctive in recognising popular sovereignty for the first time. Since the introduction of the protectorate regime France had relied upon the Bey's sovereignty in legitimising its rule. As Lewis made clear, the French efforts in the 1930s to consolidate the Bey's sovereignty and thereby the protectorate regime had generated Bourguiba's call for popular sovereignty. In the post-war era, amid the dispute between the nationalists' call for popular sovereignty and French settlers' call for co-sovereignty, the Bey's position was torn apart. Throughout the UN debate in 1952 Amin Bey kept wobbling between France and the nationalists, but after the GA resolution, he determinedly took side with France because he judged that international society did not fully support the nationalist cause. His acceptance of the Voizard Plan to allow French participation in the national assembly was a clear betrayal for the nationalists, Bourguiba

in particular. What was novel about his strategy after the Bey's acceptance was attack against the Bey's authority. Thus far, under the disguise of co-sovereignty, the French had been trying to give French nationals a political right to vote for the national assembly but this was an outright rejection of the Tunisian people's sovereignty as such a right violated the latter's right to form their own separate political entity. Making use of the beylical sovereignty, the French authorities had attempted to justify French participation, but such justification was evidently in contradiction to the people's sovereignty.

Bourguiba's attack led to the collapse of the Bey's authority and popularity among the people, and this necessitated France to rely on the nationalists. Hence the French recognition of the Tunisian people's sovereignty and of the Neo-Destour as viable collaborators through the Carthage Declaration in July 1954. As explained in Chapter 6, the French new strategy was aimed at legitimising their rule through the nationalists' consent. Although France still retained a right to foreign policy, Tunisian sovereignty was never meaningless. Now the Tunisians were allowed to decide on their own regime and domestic measures, including such wide-ranging issues as its political institutions, secularisation, labour wage, and so on. In fact, the Tunisians held general elections through universal suffrage in March 1956. This was exactly the sovereignty that Bourguiba had started calling for in August 1936, apart from the point that the country was not allowed a right to foreign policy.

Certainly this was a major flaw of sovereignty, and this was what the French were to hold firm on for a year and half to come with a view to preserving the French Union. They themselves were aware of the contradiction between the principle of sovereignty and their rejection of Tunisia's external right, so they had to walk a tightrope. Since they had admitted the people's sovereignty, confining its exercise to internal affairs only depended on the Tunisians' consent. This was because, in order to counter challenges from radical opinion, Bourguiba temporarily accepted French non-admittance of Tunisia's independent status through the 1955 Franco-Tunisian Agreements. In fact, when the Tunisians demanded full independence following the Moroccan case at the end of 1955, the French found that they had already lost an excuse to keep this attitude.

Secondly, the recognition of people's sovereignty was actually what the Americans had kept calling on the French for in the latter's dependent areas. Since the articulation of US President Wilson's idea that all peoples should be allowed a right to self-determination – though Vladimir Lenin

had preceded him in advocating this principle – the United States had been adamant on this point, as a principle of national self-determination can be understood as a synonym for that of popular sovereignty.¹ Needless to say, though this principle itself was not applied to victor countries' colonies, its psychological impact was enormous, and anyway as a result of the Atlantic Charter, the United States started to exert pressure for self-determination in dependencies. Coupled with the US diplomatic pressure, moreover, the British turning to gradual transfer of power in Africa, itself a response to US pressure, posed a serious challenge to French colonial policy. In Tunisia, the French goal of establishing the national assembly with French and Tunisian participation did not meet this principle as far as the Tunisian people rejected the French formula. Moreover, international society challenged France's stance. As analysed in Chapter 4, following the political lead of the United States, and to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom, the UN member states basically agreed on Tunisia's self-determination.

Yet what should be emphasised here is that the Anglo-Americans and international society as a whole, including the Arab countries, did not demand Tunisian independence. Indeed, the independence of dependent territories was generally regarded as premature, and almost no public voice for independence was heard in the UN. As such, it was natural that internal autonomy gave the United States sufficient excuse to support French policy towards Tunisia, if not France's other colonial territories, after the Carthage Declaration. As shown by the UN decision in December 1954 not to discuss the Tunisian question despite the fact that France's goal was not independence, international society as a whole did not urge the colonial powers to grant independence at this time. Of course, the attitude of the UN reflected the calculation that the French approval of internal autonomy was by itself a great change and that eventually they would be compelled to recognise independence.

With regard to the UN, its reluctance to intervene in Tunisian affairs had already been evident in 1951. This was primarily because of the aforementioned position of Washington and London, but also because of its nature as a collective entity of sovereign states. Egypt's bringing of the North African question to the UN opened an international dispute: to what extent the international organisation should meddle into the protectorates whose jurisdiction France adamantly claimed. Naturally, UN intervention was a warning to all the colonial powers, but also posed potential threat to all its member states as a double-edged sword. Consequently, the maximum the UN could do was to advocate the principle of self-determination or self-government in the Tunisian case

in December 1952, as this was what the local people had demanded. Committing themselves to independence even at the GA, let alone at the SC, might have been viewed as impractical for the member states, including the Arab states at that time, since the independence of dependent territories was directly related to the sovereign state system. Caught in a dilemma, the Arab-Asian countries proposed an invitation of the North African representatives to the GA session. This would have certainly constituted the UN's grasping of the initiative, which had actually taken place in the Indonesian case, but was not adopted largely because of opposition from the Anglo-Americans.

Thirdly, at the imperial level, the French policy change soon spread to their other dependent territories. As in Tunisia, France had denied the sovereignty of the Moroccan people, but after the autumn of 1954 Paris was to indicate its intention to introduce gradual reform for internal autonomy. In other overseas territories, the French had justified their assimilationist policy by extending political rights to the local peoples. Its speed was slow and discrimination persisted as most of the Africans were categorised as second-class citizens, but as long as their opposition to assimilation was low, and African political leaders did seek a bigger say in Paris, assimilation was not considered totally incompatible with self-determination. However, the experience in Tunisia, together with that in Indochina in the first half of 1954, provided the French with a lesson that this self-justification would be hard to sustain in the near future. As a proactive move, France decided to alter their colonial doctrine. Henceforward, each territory was to be allowed political autonomy which would lead to the formation of separate political entities. As argued in Chapter 7, the French effort culminated in the *Loi-Cadre* that established internal autonomy in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though the status of these territories, in theory, had no connections with future independence, France's recognition of Tunisian internal autonomy thus marked a clear watershed in its post-war colonial policy. Apart from the logical connection with independence, the French decided to follow the British course on decolonisation.

Fourthly, Britain played a very important role in bridging the cracks between France and the United States. The British were so determined to leave the initiative in North African affairs with Paris that they were even prepared to consent to France's acceptance of UNGA discussions on Tunisia in the autumn of 1952, despite possible repercussions on British colonies. Importantly, by concurring with the French initiative, London's aim lay at preventing international pressure from being too harsh to the French. Otherwise, it was feared, the Franco-US schism

might widen so much that ultimately Paris could decide to withdraw from the NATO because of predicted Franco–US conflicts over Algeria. Then Foreign Minister Schuman’s announcement that Paris would listen to other governments on the UN’s taking up the problem allowed the British to refuse Tunisian debates. Britain’s adamant attitude ended in US concessions over the issue of oral hearing proposed by the Arab-Asian countries. In this sense, the United Kingdom succeeded in blocking the UN from grasping the initiative in North Africa, and this resulted in alleviating dissatisfaction that French opinion held against the United States and the UN over colonial issues.

In a word, the French *volte-face* meant that they decided to move with the flow of the time, the origins of which could be traced back to the Fourteen Points. Its impact on international relations was limited as a result, and merely accelerated the existent trend of decolonisation.

In a striking contrast, Morocco provides us a quite different story, as it indicates that France was faced with an unprecedented situation and hence its decision was to produce a new tide of international relations. As made clear in Chapter 7, the French goal was to establish a semi-internal autonomy regime when the departure of Arafa, the first step to the reform, was realised in September 1955. It was the arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt that fundamentally shook the situation, and ultimately brought about Moroccan independence. The fundamental problem was the existence of traditionalist dignitaries, headed by el-Glaoui, who were hostile to any kind of modernisation while the Istiqlal raised the demands. Particularly serious was the emergence of the Istiqlal’s pro-Egyptian faction, who was likely to follow Nasser’s Arab neutralism. If the situation had arisen whereby this group took the lead in Moroccan domestic affairs, it might have abolished the monarchy and advocated agrarian reform like Nasser, who had pursued it right after the removal of King Farouk.² This would have undermined the social structure in the Berber areas, based on the feudal system. In order not to radicalise el-Fassi, the Pasha of Marrakech made concessions by accepting Mohammed V’s restoration, to which Paris agreed. If France had not promised independence simultaneously, the Sultan might have chosen neutralist independence, or revolution or civil war might have occurred, which meant a total disappearance of French influence.

In other words, at the announcement of the arms deal, Paris judged that full sovereignty must be recognised so as to preserve political unification and territorial integrity, and that sovereignty must be transferred to Mohammed V, albeit in a vague manner. It was too late to arrange an internal autonomy regime as in Tunisia, and anyway it was

impossible owing to the feudal forces hostile to popular sovereignty. Existing research tends to assume that the rise of Moroccan nationalism, already with a cohesive power calling for independence, forced France to retreat and devolve power to its collaborators. However, on the eve of its decision on independence, there had been various shades of opinion and, therefore, no dominant nationalist force in Morocco. Above all, the existence of the feudalists who abhorred modernisation-oriented nationalist movements significantly contributed to the French recognition of independence. For France, this serious division of opinion had entailed the lack of a viable collaborator in Morocco. This was the reason why Moroccan independence was recognised. Otherwise Mohammed V, who had just returned and suffered a lack of political authority, could not have established his authority as a viable collaborator.

Nonetheless, France's effort proved insufficient and the Istiqlal stayed opposed to Morocco's new status, referred to in the communiqué issued on 6 November 1955. The French government attempted to deny Moroccans the right to diplomacy, but gave up in face of the Istiqlal's resistance. This was because 'the status of an independent state' could hardly go without this right, in spite of the Quai d'Orsay's argument that France should retain it even after Mohammed V's return. Why then was the party resolutely insistent to the right to foreign policy? As discussed in Chapter 9, the government and the party leaders were optimistic that once independence had been obtained, economic assistance and investment would pour in from a number of countries including the two super-powers. These would have enabled and promoted Moroccan economic development but, in reality, other powers were hesitant to offer such assistance. The actual consequence notwithstanding, Moroccan leaders held sanguine views that independence with the right to foreign relations would achieve economic growth and bring wealth to the people even while staying in the French orbit.

Moroccan independence had international impacts; it gave powerful momentum to the independence of other dependent territories, especially those of Britain. Interestingly, by the end of World War II, the British had already made public their stance to commit themselves to self-government in African colonies but grew rather reluctant to proceed with the independence of colonial territories after that of India and Pakistan in 1947 and Ceylon and Burma in 1948. However, it was only in March 1957, one year after the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, that Ghana became independent. In fact, after the establishment of an all-African Cabinet responsible for internal rule in April 1954, the British government had been hesitant to go forward until September 1956, when it announced

that Ghana would obtain independence on condition Nkrumah won the next election.³ Therefore, the British decision could have been greatly prompted by the French one on the two North African countries' independence. This was so all the more because, on the eve of independence, Morocco lagged far behind Gold Coast in terms of political development towards a unified independent country. In this sense, along with Soviet economic offensive after the mid-1950s,⁴ the independence of Morocco significantly contributed to the dissolution of the British Empire, and paved a way for an Africa of independent countries.

With regard to the French Empire, too, the French decisions that the book has focussed on greatly encouraged its breakup: by establishing the foundations of political regime of each territory through Tunisian internal autonomy and by exerting pressure towards independence beyond internal autonomy through, ironically, Moroccan independence, which was achieved outside the framework of the French Union. The Union as refashioned by the *Loi-Cadre* was replaced by the French Community with the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958. However, the Community did not last and France was to recognise the spate of independence of sub-Saharan overseas territories. Those territories would obtain independence in 1960, the Year of Africa. As Chafer made clear in the case of French West Africa, once the *Loi-Cadre* was in place, the trade unions, students and the youth movements, whose goal was an African federation, greatly pressed France and West African political parties and their leaders to further decolonisation beyond internal autonomy. Against those 'from-below' movements, the interests of the French and those African leaders converged in territorial independence, which successfully contained the radicalised demand.⁵ Thus the decolonisation of Tunisia and Morocco, and especially the independence of the latter, prompted other dependencies of the European colonial powers to attain independence at an unexpected speed and without causing much trouble inside the Western Alliance.

This never means that the French decisions made the territorial 'nation-state' solution inevitable. As pointed out above, some Africans preferred a federation connected with France to separate nation-states in the late 1950s. Nonetheless, the advantages in allowing the local people to form a separate political community were clear to French eyes, as the Moroccan case showed. Cultivating a sense of community among the population was regarded as a very useful shield with which to avoid political penetration or interference by foreign powers, such as Egypt and the Soviet Union. In this connection, it can also be argued that the French government was starting to prepare for what Todd Shepard

called 'Invention of Decolonization',⁶ since the turnaround in Tunisia and Morocco inevitably constituted a decolonisation drive on Algeria as well. At least, the decisions on the protectorates could have contributed to bracing French opinion for Algerian decolonisation, although, needless to say, the assertion that in the mid-1950s the whole government had already accepted Algerian independence is never sustainable.

Tunisia and Morocco thus gained independence while remaining in the French orbit. This does not mean that newly emerging countries gained nothing by obtaining independence. At least they were given options to ask for great powers other than the mother country and, in fact, as is well known, Guinea did choose to receive economic assistance from the Russians and broke with the French when it proclaimed independence in October 1958. But this was a rather rare case, and most former dependencies opted for their former suzerain power. This was of course in part because they did not want to introduce drastic changes into the domestic political, economic, and social structure through the severing of relationships with their previous master. However, their choice also derived from the fact that they hoped for American support, be it political or economic, as well as the West's liberal values, as suggested by Bourguiba's personal belief observed by a US diplomat.⁷ Thus France, together with US help of various kinds, was successful in keeping its dependencies in the Western bloc without allowing them to play off between the Western and the Eastern blocs on a large scale. This was what can be called the 'Imperialism of French Decolonisation' or, to use the expression of Richard Drayton, the 'masked condominium'⁸ in accordance with Britain's post-war practices.

Here, an interesting division of roles over Tunisian and Moroccan decolonisation can be pointed to. US pressure was the main force to promote France's policy change, but without British help, this process would not have been as smooth as it was. Knowing interference would only resent French opinion, Britain patiently awaited France's 'voluntary' turnaround to decolonisation and therefore tried to stop the Americans from meddling. It was this British patience that helped preserve the solidarity of the Alliance. As a colonial power itself, Britain could afford to be more patient to await France's volte-face than the United States was to France. The Anglo-Americans shared the concerns that the Russians must be prevented from benefiting from conflict between France and its colonies, but they adopted different ways of persuading the French.

In fact, in neighbouring Algeria, the British would show a somewhat different stance towards French policy, and this partly explains the reason for French *colons'* violent reactions in May 1958 against the government in face of decolonisation pressure. It was in February 1958

that the French military had bombed the Tunisian border village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in order to destroy Algerian rebels' training camps and arms storage. This incident provoked enormous international criticism of France and, in March, led the Anglo-Americans to propose a good-office mission for the purpose of precluding Tunisia's UN recourse, although in February Secretary Dulles had feared that 'to take [Algeria] out of [French] hands would have such a bitter reaction in France that it would destroy NATO'.⁹ Importantly, just before their offering the mission to the French, the Americans had considered British consent as a precondition in deciding to do so.¹⁰ In contrast to the protectorate cases examined in this work, the United Kingdom concurred with the US proposal. In this sense, Britain's decision to interfere in Tunisian affairs in 1958 greatly contributed to provoking vehement anti-Anglo-Saxon sentiment and a violent reaction from the settlers and conservative French opinion over the Algerian crisis. As is well known, this was an event that would lead to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's coming back to power.

The independence of Morocco and Tunisia clearly indicated that the colonised peoples were demanding something more than mere self-determination or popular sovereignty as advocated during and after World War I: economic growth and social welfare.¹¹ It may seem somewhat strange to our contemporary eyes, but international opinion by around 1954 overall considered self-government or internal autonomy with popular participation in political institutions as sufficient in realising the aspirations of colonised peoples, as long as future independence was foreseen. Yet this strange balance was suddenly broken down by the Soviet's economic offensive and France's subsequent recognition of Moroccan independence, meaning the coming of a new stage of the Cold War.¹² As mentioned in the Introduction, political and economic burdens to continue colonial rule had already been felt in the capitals of the European colonial powers by the mid-1950s. As things turned out, France decided to renounce its duties as a form of granting Morocco independence – though this was not its primary motivation – when the danger of neutralist independence, the possibility of which was opened by the Soviet initiative, suddenly emerged. The territorial nation-state solution was to spread to African territories. This solution was never inevitable, but the French contributed to making this solution more plausible by the two major decisions: directly by the Moroccan one, and indirectly by the Tunisian which resulted in the *Loi-cadre*. And the burdens were to be shared chiefly by the Americans with British efforts to reconcile their allies of the Western Alliance.

Appendix 1: The Key Texts

The Treaty of Bardo

Le gouvernement de la République française et celui de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis, voulant empêcher à jamais le renouvellement des désordres qui se sont produits récemment sur les frontières des deux États et sur le littoral de la Tunisie, et désireux de resserrer leurs anciennes relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage, ont résolu de conclure une Convention à cette fin, dans l'intérêt des deux Hautes Parties contractantes.

En conséquence, le Président de la République française a nommé pour son Plénipotentiaire M. le général Bréart, qui est tombé d'accord avec Son Altesse le Bey sur les stipulations suivantes:

- ART. 1^{er}. Les traités de paix, d'amitié et de commerce, et toutes autres conventions existant actuellement entre la République française et son Altesse le Bey de Tunis, sont expressément confirmés et renouvelés.
- ART. 2. En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement de la République française l'accomplissement des mesures qu'il doit prendre pour atteindre le but que se proposent les Hautes Parties contractantes, Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis consent à ce que l'autorité militaire française fasse occuper les points qu'elle jugera nécessaire pour assurer le rétablissement de l'ordre et la sécurité de la frontière et du littoral. Cette occupation cessera lorsque les autorités militaires française et tunisiennes auront reconnue, d'un commun accord, que l'administration locale est en état de garantir le maintien de l'ordre.
- ART. 3. Le Gouvernement de la République française prend l'engagement de prêter un constant appui à son Altesse le Bey de Tunis contre tout danger qui menacerait la personne ou la dynastie de Son Altesse ou qui compromettrait la tranquillité de ses États.
- ART. 4. Le Gouvernement de la République française se porte garant de l'exécution des traités actuellement existants entre le Gouvernement de la Régence et les diverses Puissances européennes.

- ART. 5. Le Gouvernement de la République française sera représenté auprès de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis par un ministre résident qui veillera à l'exécution du présent Acte et qui sera l'intermédiaire des rapports du Gouvernement français avec les autorités tunisiennes pour toutes les affaires communes aux deux Pays.
- ART. 6. Les Agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France en pays étrangers seront chargés de la protection des intérêts tunisiens et des nationaux de la Régence.

En retour, Son Altesse le Bey s'engage à ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caractère international sans en avoir donné connaissance au Gouvernement de la République française et sans s'être entendu préalablement avec lui.

- ART. 7. Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis se réservent de fixer, d'un commun accord, les bases d'une organisation financière de la Régence, qui soit de nature à assurer le service de la dette publique et à garantir les droits des créanciers de la Tunisie.
- ART. 8. Une contribution de guerre sera imposée aux tribus insoumises de la frontière et du littoral.

Une convention ultérieure en déterminera le chiffre et le mode de recouvrement, dont le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey se porte responsable.

- ART. 9. Afin de protéger contre la contrebande des armes et des munitions de guerre les possessions algériennes de la République française, le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis s'engage à prohiber toute introduction d'armes ou de munitions de guerre par l'île de Derjba, le port de Gabès ou les autres ports du Sud de la Tunisie.
- ART. 10. Le présent traité sera soumis à la ratification du Gouvernement de la République française et l'instrument de ratification sera soumis à Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis dans le plus bref délai possible.

Casr Saïd, le 12 mai 1881.
Mohammedes Sadoq Bey. G^{al} BRÉART.
(Cachet du Bey)

Source: Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol.158, 1881, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1977)

The Convention of Marsa

S.A. le Bey de Tunis, prenant en considération la nécessité d'améliorer la situation intérieure de la Tunisie, dans les conditions prévues par le traité du 12 mai 1881 et le Gouvernement de la République ayant à cœur de répondre à ce désir et de consolider ainsi les relations d'amitié heureusement existantes entre les deux pays, sont convenus de conclure une convention spéciale à cet effet : en conséquence, le Président de la République française a nommé pour son Plénipotentiaire, M. Pierre Paul Cambon, son Ministre Résident à Tunis, officier de la Légion d'Honneur,, décoré de l'Haïd et grand-croix du Nichan Iftikar, etc. etc., lequel, après avoir communiqué ses pleins-pouvoir, trouvés en bonne et due forme, a arrêté, avec S. A. le Bey de Tunis, les dispositions suivantes:

- ART. 1^{er}. Afin de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'accomplissement de son Protectorat, S. A. le Bey de Tunis s'engage à procéder aux réformes administratives, judiciaires et financières que le Gouvernement français jugera utiles.
- ART. 2. Le Gouvernement français garantira, à l'époque et sous les conditions que lui paraîtront les meilleures, un emprunt à émettre par S. A. le Bey, pour la convention ou le remboursement de la dette consolidée s'élevant à la somme de 125 millions de francs et de la dette flottante jusqu'à concurrence d'un maximum de 17.550.000.

S. A. le Bey s'interdit de contracter, à l'avenir, aucun emprunt pour le compte de la Régence sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement français.

- ART 3. Sur les revenus de la Régence, S. A. le Bey prélèvera : 1° les sommes nécessaires pour assurer le service de l'emprunt garanti par la France ; 2° la somme de deux millions de piastres (1.200. mille fr.), montant de sa liste civile, le surplus des revenus devant être affecté aux dépenses d'administration de la Régence et au remboursement des charges du Protectorat.
- ART. 4. Le présent arrangement confirme et complète, en tant que de besoin, le traité du 12 mai 1881. il ne modifiera pas les dispositions précédemment intervenues pour le règlement des contributions de guerre.

ART. 5. La présent convention sera soumise à la ratification du Gouvernement de la République français et l'instrument de ladite ratification sera remis à S. A. le Bey de Tunis dans le plus bref délai possible.

En foi de quoi, les Soussignés ont dressé le présent acte et l'ont revêtu de leurs cachet.

Fait à la Marsa, le 8 juin 1883.
Mohammedes Sadog Bey. (L. S.) Cambon.
(Cachat du Bey)

Source: Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol.162, 1883, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978)

The Treaty of Fez

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté chérifienne, soucieux d'établir au Maroc un régime régulier, fondé sur l'ordre intérieur et la sécurité générale, qui permette l'introduction des réformes et assure le développement économique du pays, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

ART. I. Le Gouvernement de la République française et Sa Majesté le Sultan sont d'accord pour instituer au Maroc un nouveau régime comportant les réformes administratives, judiciaires, scolaires, économiques, financières, et militaires que le Gouvernement français jugera utile d'introduire sur le territoire marocain.

Ce régime sauvegardera la situation religieuse, le respect et le prestige traditionnel du Sultan, l'exercice de la religion musulmane et des institutions religieuses, notamment de celles des Habous. Il comportera l'organisation d'un Makhzen chérifien réformé.

Le Gouvernement de la République se concertera avec le Gouvernement espagnol au sujet des intérêts que ce Gouvernement tient de sa position géographique et de ses possessions territoriales sur la côte marocaine.

De même, la ville de Tanger gardera le caractère spécial qui lui a été reconnu et qui déterminera son organisation municipale.

ART. II. Sa Majesté le Sultan admet dès maintenant que le Gouvernement français procède, après avoir prévenu le Makhzen, aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'il jugerait nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la

- sécurité des transactions commerciales et à ce qu'il exerce tout action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.
- ART. III. Le Gouvernement de la République prend l'engagement de prêter un constant appui à Sa Majesté chérifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait sa personne ou son trône ou qui compromettrait la tranquillité de ses États. Le même appui sera prêté à l'héritier du trône et à ses successeurs.
- ART. IV. les mesures que nécessitera le nouveau régime de protectorat seront édictées, sur la proposition du Gouvernement français, par Sa Majesté chérifienne ou par les autorités auxquelles elle en aura délégué le pouvoir. Il en sera de même des règlements nouveaux et des modifications aux règlements existants.
- ART. V. Le Gouvernement français sera représenté auprès de Sa Majesté chérifienne par un Commissaire Résident général, dépositaire de tous les pouvoirs de la République au Maroc, qui veillera à l'exécution du présent accord.

Le Commissaire Résident général sera le seul intermédiaire du Sultan auprès des représentants étrangers et dans les rapports que ces représentants entretiennent avec le Gouvernement marocain. Il sera, notamment, chargé de toutes les questions intéressant les étrangers dans l'Empire chérifien.

Il aura le pouvoir d'approuver et de promulguer, au nom du Gouvernement français, tous les décrets rendus par Sa Majesté chérifienne.

- ART. VI. Les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France seront chargés de la représentation et de la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger.

Sa Majesté le Sultan s'engage à ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caractère international sans l'assentiment préalable du Gouvernement de la République française.

- ART. VIII. Sa Majesté chérifienne s'interdit de contracter à l'avenir, directement ou indirectement, aucun emprunt public ou privé et d'accorder, sous une forme quelconque, aucune concession sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement français.

ART. IX. La présente Convention sera soumise à la ratification du Gouvernement de la République française et l'instrument de ladite ratification sera remis à Sa Majesté le Sultan dans le plus bref délai possible.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont dressé le présent acte et l'ont revêtu de leurs cachets.

Fait à Fez, le 30 mars, 1912.

(L.S.) REGNAULT.

(L.S.) MOULAYABD-EL-HAFID.

Source: Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol.216, 1912, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1980)

The Constitution of the Fourth Republic

Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés.

Il réaffirme solennellement les droits et les libertés de l'homme et du citoyen consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République.

Il proclame, en outre, comme particulièrement nécessaires à notre temps, les principes politiques, économiques et sociaux ci-après:

La loi garantit à la femme, dans tous les domaines des droits égaux à ceux de l'homme.

Tout homme persécuté en raison de son action en faveur de la liberté a droit d'asile sur les territoires de la République.

Chacun a le devoir de travailler et le droit d'obtenir un emploi. Nul ne peut être lésé, dans son travail ou son emploi, en raison de ses origines, de ses opinions ou de ses croyances.

Tout homme peut défendre ses droits et ses intérêts par l'action syndicale et adhérer au syndicat de son choix. Le droit de grève s'exerce dans le cadre des lois qui le réglementent.

Tout travailleur participe, par l'intermédiaire de ses délégués, à la détermination collective des conditions de travail ainsi qu'à la gestion des entreprises.

Tout bien, toute entreprise, dont l'exploitation a ou acquiert les caractères d'un service public national ou d'un monopole de fait doit devenir la propriété de la collectivité.

La nation assure à l'individu et à la famille les conditions nécessaires à leur développement.

Elle garantit à tous, notamment à l'enfant, à la mère et aux vieux travailleurs, la protection de la santé, la sécurité matérielle, le repos et les loisirs. Tout être humain qui, en raison de son âge, de son état physique ou mental, de la situation économique, se trouve dans l'incapacité de travailler a le droit d'obtenir de la collectivité des moyens convenables d'existence.

La nation proclame la solidarité et l'égalité de tous les Français devant les charges qui résultent des calamités nationales.

La nation garantit l'égal accès de l'enfant et de l'adulte à l'instruction, à la formation professionnelle et à la culture. L'organisation de l'enseignement public gratuit et laïque à tous les degrés est un devoir de l'État.

La République française, fidèle à ses traditions, se conforme aux règles du droit public international. Elle n'entreprendra aucune guerre dans des vues de conquête et n'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la liberté d'aucun peuple.

Sous réserve de réciprocité, la France consent aux limitations de souveraineté nécessaires à l'organisation et à la défense de la paix.

La France forme avec les peuples d'outre-mer une Union fondée sur l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans distinction de race ni de religion.

L'Union française est composée de nations et de peuples qui mettent en commun ou coordonnent leurs ressources et leurs efforts pour développer leurs civilisations respectives, accroître leur bien-être et assurer leur sécurité.

Fidèle à sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a pris la charge à la liberté de s'administrer eux-mêmes et de gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires ; écartant tout système de colonisation fondé sur l'arbitraire, elle garantit à tous l'égal accès aux fonctions publiques et l'exercice individuel ou collectif des droits et libertés proclamés ou confirmés ci-dessus.

Source: <http://www.insecula.com/article/F0010328.html>, accessed on 24 October 2014

Titre VIII: de l'Union Française

Section I: Principes

Article 60

L'Union française est formée, d'une part, de la République française qui comprend la France métropolitaine, les départements et territoires d'outre-mer, d'autre part, des territoires et États associés.

Article 61

La situation des États associés dans l'Union française résulte pour chacun d'eux de l'acte qui définit ses rapports avec la France.

Article 62

Les membres de l'Union française mettent en commun la totalité de leurs moyens pour garantir la défense de l'ensemble de l'Union. Le gouvernement de la République assume la coordination de ces moyens et la direction de la politique propre à préparer et à assurer cette défense.

Section II: Organisation

Article 63

Les organes centraux de l'Union française sont la présidence, le haut Conseil et l'Assemblée.

Article 64

Le président de la République française est président de l'Union française, dont il représente les intérêts permanents.

Article 65

Le haut Conseil de l'Union française est composé, sous la présidence du président de l'Union, d'une délégation du gouvernement français et de la représentation que chacun des États associés a la faculté de désigner auprès du président de l'Union.

Il a pour fonction d'assister le gouvernement dans la conduite générale de l'Union.

Article 66

L'Assemblée de l'Union française est composée, par moitié, de membres représentant la France métropolitaine et, par moitié, de membres représentant les départements et territoires d'outre-mer et les États associés. Une loi organique déterminera dans quelles conditions pourront être représentées les diverses parties de la population.

Article 67

Les membres de l'Assemblée de l'Union sont élus par les Assemblées territoriales en ce qui concerne les départements et les territoires d'outre-mer, ils sont élus, en ce qui concerne la France métropolitaine, à raison des deux tiers par les membres de l'Assemblée nationale représentant la métropole et d'un tiers par les membres du Conseil de la République représentant la métropole.

Article 68

Les États associés peuvent désigner les délégués à l'Assemblée de l'Union dans les limites et les conditions fixées par une loi et un acte intérieur de chaque État.

Article 69

Le président de l'Union française convoque l'Assemblée de l'Union française et en clôt les sessions. Il doit la convoquer à la demande de la moitié de ses membres.

L'Assemblée de l'Union française ne peut siéger pendant les interruptions de session du Parlement.

Article 70

Les règles des articles 8, 10, 21, 22 et 23 sont applicables à l'Assemblée de l'Union française dans les mêmes conditions qu'au Conseil de la République.

Article 71

L'Assemblée de l'Union française connaît des projets ou propositions qui lui sont soumis pour avis par l'Assemblée nationale ou le gouvernement de la République française ou les gouvernements des États associés. L'Assemblée a qualité pour se prononcer sur les propositions de résolution qui lui sont présentées par l'un de ses membres et, si elle les prend en considération, pour charger son bureau de les transmettre à l'Assemblée nationale. Elle peut faire des propositions au gouvernement français et au haut Conseil de l'Union française. Pour être recevables, les propositions de résolution visées à l'alinéa précédent doivent avoir trait à la législation relative aux territoires d'outre-mer.

Article 72

Dans les territoires d'outre-mer, le pouvoir législatif appartient au Parlement en ce qui concerne la législation criminelle, le régime des libertés publiques et l'organisation politique et administrative.

En toutes autres matières, la loi française n'est applicable dans les territoires d'outre-mer que par disposition expresse ou si elle a été étendue par décret aux territoires d'outre-mer après avis de l'Assemblée de l'Union. En outre, par dérogation à l'article 13, des dispositions particulières à chaque territoire pourront être édictées par le président de la République en Conseil des ministres sur avis préalable de l'Assemblée de l'Union.

Section III: Des départements et des territoires d'outre-mer

Article 73

Le régime législatif des départements d'outre-mer est le même que celui des départements métropolitains, sauf exceptions déterminées par la loi.

Article 74

Les territoires d'outre-mer sont dotés d'un statut particulier tenant compte de leurs intérêts propres dans l'ensemble des intérêts de la République. Ce statut et l'organisation intérieure de chaque territoire d'outre-mer ou de chaque groupe de territoires sont fixés par la loi, après avis de l'Assemblée de l'Union française et consultation des Assemblées territoriales.

Article 75

Les statuts respectifs des membres de la République et de l'Union française sont susceptibles d'évolution. Les modifications de statut et les passages d'une catégorie à l'autre, dans le cadre fixé par l'article 60, ne peuvent résulter que d'une loi votée par le Parlement, après consultation des Assemblées territoriales et de l'Assemblée de l'Union.

Article 76

Le représentant du gouvernement dans chaque territoire ou groupe de territoires est le dépositaire des pouvoirs de la République. Il est chef de l'administration du territoire. Il est responsable de ses actes devant le gouvernement.

Article 77

Dans chaque territoire est instituée une Assemblée élue. Le régime électoral, la composition et la compétence de cette Assemblée sont déterminés par la loi.

Article 78

Dans les groupes de territoires, la gestion des intérêts communs est confiée à une Assemblée composée de membres élus par les Assemblées territoriales. Sa composition et ses pouvoirs sont fixés par la loi.

Article 79

Les territoires d'outre-mer élisent des représentants à l'Assemblée nationale et au Conseil de la République dans les conditions prévues par la loi.

Article 80

Tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outre-mer ont la qualité de citoyen, au même titre que les nationaux français de la métropole ou des territoires d'outre-mer. Des lois particulières établiront les conditions dans lesquelles ils exercent leurs droits de citoyen.

Article 81

Tous les nationaux français et les ressortissants de l'Union française ont la qualité de citoyen de l'Union française qui leur assure la jouissance des droits et libertés garantis par le préambule de la présente Constitution.

Article 82

Les citoyens qui n'ont pas le statut civil français conservent leur statut personnel tant qu'ils n'y ont pas renoncé. Ce statut ne peut en aucun cas constituer un motif pour refuser ou limiter les droits et libertés attachés à la qualité de citoyen français.

Source: http://www.insecula.com/article/F0010328_page9.html, accessed on 24 October 2014

Appendix 2: List of Key Persons

Acheson, Dean	US Secretary of State, January 1949–January 1953
Aldrich, Winthrop	US Ambassador to the UK, February 1953–February 1957
Amin Bey (Sidi Mohammed al Amin)	Bey of Tunisia, May 1943–July 1957
Artajo, Alberto	Spanish Foreign Minister, 1945–1957
Auriol, Vincent	President of the French Republic, January 1947–January 1954
Azzam Pasha, Abdel al-Rahman	Secretary-General of the Arab League, 1945–1952
Baccouche, Salaheddine	Tunisian Prime Minister, April 1952–March 1954
Balafrej, Ahmed	Secretary-General of the Istiqlal, Moroccan Foreign Minister, May 1956–
Basdevant, Jean	Chief of Protectorates Department, Ministry of French Foreign Affairs, August 1952–
Bekkai, Si Ould Embarek	pasha of Sefrou, –August 1953, Moroccan Prime Minister, November 1955–
Ben Ammar, Tahar	Tunisian Section of the Grand Council, Tunisian Prime Minister, August 1954–April 1956
Ben Moulay Arafa, Sidi Mohammed	Moroccan Sultan, August 1953–September 1955
Ben Youssef, Salah	Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour, –November 1955
Ben Youssef, Sidi Mohammed (Mohammed V)	Sultan of Morocco, November 1927–August 1953, November 1955– February 1961
Bidault, Georges	French Prime Minister, October 1949–June 1950, Foreign Minister, January 1947–July 1948, January 1953–June 1954
Bonnet, Henri	French Ambassador to US, January 1945–January 1955
Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice	French Minister of Interior, February 1955–January 1956
Bourguiba, Habib	President of the Neo-Destour, Tunisian Prime Minister, April 1956–July 1957
Boyer de Latour du Moulin, General Pierre	French Resident-General in Tunisia, September 1954–September 1955 French Resident-General in Morocco, August 1955–November 1955

Byroade, Henry	US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, April 1952–
Bruce, David	US Ambassador to France, –March 1952; US Under Secretary of State, January 1953–February 1953
de Casa Rojas y Moreno, José	Spanish Ambassador to France
Bey, Prince Chedly	Tunisian Prince, the son of the Bey
Chenik, Mohammed	Tunisian Prime Minister, July 1950–April 1952
Churchill, Winston	UK Prime Minister, December 1950–April 1955
Colonna, Antoine	French Senator from Tunisia, President of <i>le Rassablement Français</i>
Coty, René	President of the French Republic, January 1954–January 1958
Couve de Murville, Maurice	French Ambassador to the US, January 1955–July 1956
Dillon, Douglas	US Ambassador to France, March 1953–January 1957
Dorman, John	US Consul at Rabat November 1953
Dubois, André-Louis	French Resident-General in Morocco, November 1955–
Dulles, John Foster	US Secretary of State, January 1953–April 1959
Dunn, James C.	US Ambassador to France, March 1952–March 1953
Eden, Anthony	UK Foreign Minister, –April 1955, UK Prime Minister, April 1955–January 1957
Eisenhower, Dwight D.	US President, January 1953–January 1961
el-Fassi, Alall	President of the Istiqlal
El-Glaoui, Si Thami	Pasha of Marrakech, –January 1956
Faure, Edgar	French Prime Minister, February 1955–December 1955
Franco, Francisco	Spain's Head of State, 1939–1975
Franks, Oliver	UK Ambassador to the US, –October 1952
Fouchet, Christian	French Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, June 1954–February 1955
Grandval, Gilbert	French Resident-General in Morocco, June 1955–August 1955
Gross, Earnest A.	US Deputy Representative at the UN, –January 1953
Guillaume, Augustin	French Resident-General in Morocco, August 1951–April 1954
Hammarskjöld, Dag	UN Secretary-General, April 1953–September 1961
Harvey, Oliver	UK Ambassador to France, 1948–April 1954
Hauteclocque, Jean	French Resident-General in Tunisia, January 1952–September 1953

Holmes, Julius	US Consul General in Tangier, May 1955–July 1956
Hoover, Herbert	Under Secretary of State, October 1954–February 1957
Hoppenot, Henri	French Representative in the UN, 1952, 1953, 1954
Hughes, Morris N.	US Consul General at Tunis, June 1953–
Jebb, Gladwyn	UK Representative in the UN, June 1950–April 1954, UK Ambassador to France, April 1954–
Jernegan, John	US Consul General in Tunis, –May 1952, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, June 1952–
Juin, General Alphonse	French Resident-General in Morocco, May 1947–August 1951
July, Pierre	French Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, February 1955–January 1956
Kaâk, Mustapha	Tunisian Prime Minister, July 1947–July 1950
Kirkpatrick, Ivone	UK Permanent Under Secretary, November 1953–February 1957
Lacoste, Robert	Governor-General of Algiers, February 1956–
Lacoste, Francis	French Resident-General in Morocco, May 1954–June 1955
Laniel, Joseph	French Prime Minister, June 1953–June 1954
La Tournelle, Guy Le Roy de	French Ambassador in Madrid, September 1954 –
Lie, Trygve	UN Secretary-General, February 1946–November 1952
Lloyd, Selwyn	UK Foreign Secretary, December 1955–
Lodge Jr., Henry Cabot	US Representative to the UN, January 1953–
Macmillan, Harold	UK Foreign Secretary, April 1955–December 1955, UK Chancellor for the Exchequer, December 1955–January 1957
de Margerie, Ronald Jacquin	Deputy Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, –June 1955
Massigli, René	French Ambassador to the UK, –February 1955
Materi, Mohammed	Neo-Destour, Tunisian Minister for Interior, July 1950–April 1952
Mayer, René	French Prime Minister, January 1953–May 1953
McBride, Robert	US Consul at Rabat, –September 1951
McGhee, George	US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, –December 1951
Mendès-France, Pierre	French Prime Minister, July 1954–February 1955
el-Mokri, Si T'hami Hadj Mohammed	Moroccan Grand Vizier, –October 1955
Mollet, Guy	French Prime Minister, January 1956–

Mons, Jean	French Resident-General in Morocco, January 1947–June 1950
Morrison, Herbert	British Foreign Minister, March 1951–November 1951
Moulay Hassan	Prince of Tunisia
Muniz, João Carlos	Brazilian Representative in the UN, 1952
Murphy, Robert	Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, December 1953–
Mzali, Mohammed Salah	Tunisian Prime Minister, March 1954–June 1954
Nasser, Abdel Gamal	Egyptian Prime Minister, Egyptian President, June 1956–
Périllier, Louis	French Resident-General in Tunis, June 1950–January 1952
Pinay, Antoine	French Foreign Minister, February 1955–January 1956
Pineau, Christian	French Foreign Minister, January 1956–May 1957
Roosevelt, Eleanor	US Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the UNGA, 1952
Savary, Alain	French Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, January 1956–November 1956
Schuman, Robert	French Foreign Minister, July 1948–December 1952
Schumann, Maurice	French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, August 1951–June 1954
Seydoux, Roger	French High-Commissioner to Tunisia, June 1955–
Slim, Mongi	Director of the Neo-Destour Political Bureau, Tunisian Minister of State, August 1954–September 1955, Tunisian Minister of Interior, September 1955–
Strang, William	UK Permanent Under Secretary, February 1949–November 1953
Garcia-Valiño y Marcen, Rafael	Spanish High-Commissioner at Tetuan, September 1954–
Voizard, Pierre	French Resident-General in Tunisia, September 1953–September 1954
Zafrullah Khan, Chaudhri Sir Muhammad	Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 1947–1954

Notes

Introduction

1. In 1954, a Cabinet paper argued that the territories likely to be eligible for independence in the next ten to twenty years would be the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Central African Federation, a Malayan federation, and a West Indian federation. David Goldsworthy, ed., *The Conservative Governments and the End of Empire, 1951–1957* (London, HMSO, 1994), xlviii.
2. The exception was Sudan, which obtained independence in January 1956. However, Britain and Egypt had reached the Agreement of 1899 to establish the Sudan as a condominium. Thereafter, technically it was administered by Egypt under British consent. Wm. Roger Louis, 'The Coming of Independence in the Sudan', *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), Chapter 19.
3. John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), Introduction. He also contends that the metropolitan explanations need careful treatment. This book in general agrees with his reservation although it will point out that moderation on the part of French opinion after 1954 helped the government to adopt decolonisation policies to a certain extent.
4. Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Preface.
5. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
6. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Introduction.
7. Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
8. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1994).
9. Ingrid Geay, 'Les débats sur les recours de la Tunisie à l'ONU de 1952 à 1954', *Revue d'Histoire diplomatique*, vol. 110, no. 3 (1996); Annie Lacroix-Riz, *Les Protectorats d'Afrique du Nord entre la France et Washington, Maroc et Tunisie 1942–1956* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988); Samya El Machat, *Les Etats-Unis et la Tunisie: de l'ambiguïté à l'entente, 1945–1959* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997); Martin Thomas, 'Defending a Lost Cause? France and the United States Vision of Imperial Rule in French North Africa, 1945–1956', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2002); Martin Thomas, 'France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2001); Samya El Mechat, *Tunisie, Les Chemins vers l'Indépendance (1945–1956)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992).

10. For example, Caroline Pruden, *Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), ch. 8; Irwin Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
11. A number of recent works emphasise that US pressure on its allies was moderate. William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); idem, 'American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire', *International Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 3 (1984); Cary Fraser, 'Understanding American Policy Towards the Decolonization of European Empires, 1945–1964', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992); David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds, *The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000); Ebere Nwaubani, 'Promise versus Performance', in *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950–1960* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2001); John Kent, 'United States Reactions to Empire, Colonialism, and Cold War in Black Africa, 1949–57', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2005).
12. Although Martin Thomas's *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo–French Relations, 1945–62* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), focusses mainly on Algerian independence, this has been the only work that sheds light on Anglo–French relations over North African affairs.
13. Judith Brown, 'India', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 436. Then in 1948, Burma and Ceylon became independent.
14. Muriel E. Chamberlain, *The Longman Companion to European Decolonisation in the Twentieth Century* (Longman Companion to History: London, 1998), ch. 2.
15. John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London: Longman, 1996), xvii.

1 Tunisia and Morocco under French Protectorates

1. Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 88–92.
2. Despite French rule, however, the Italian population much outnumbered the French in Tunisia until around the turn of the century. Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44.
3. However, it must be emphasised that under the so-called Berber Policy, the French authorities in Morocco tried to separate the two ethnic groups rather artificially in order to ensure the permanence of French rule. This was under the assumption that the Berbers were easily drawn into the orbit of French law and culture. Robin Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule; French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912–1956* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), chapter IV.
4. Dwight L. Ling, *Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 50–55.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

6. Roger Stéphane, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba* (Paris: Plon, 1958), p. 72. 'Destour' means constitution.
7. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, Mon Oeuvre, 1952–1956* (Paris: Plon, 1987), p. 327.
8. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [hereafter MAE], Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 385, Note relative aux Conseils de Caïdat, undated. The Grand Council held an ordinary session each year to examine the budget, and one or several sessions to express its opinion on the legislative decrees in the financial, economic, and social fields which the Tunisian government submitted. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Note sur les réformes en Tunisie depuis la Guerre, 1 February 1952; *Ibid.*, Note pour le Ministre, 8 May 1950.
9. Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), pp. 159–160. Charles-André Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en Marche: nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté français* (Paris: René Julliard, 1972), pp. 74–76. Ling, *Tunisia*, pp. 139–144.
10. Lewis, *Divided Rule*, p. 171. According to her, he contended that the people had to be emancipated before there could an independent Tunisia. That is to say, he was calling for the recognition of people's sovereignty before independence and, as will be shown below, he would keep this stance after World War II.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171.
12. Gavin Maxwell, *Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua, 1896–1956* (London: Century Publishing Co. Ltd, 1983), p. 136, 155. The pashas were almost independent tribal chiefs while the caids were local governors whose task was to act as a link between the people and the central Maghzen. Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, chapter VI.
13. Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 104–111.
14. The lack of Moroccan experience of being administered by the Ottoman Empire partly explains why it had taken much longer to establish order than in Tunisia. The National Archives [hereafter TNA], FO371/125759, JM1015/13, Freese-Pennefather to Lloyd, no. 14, 29 January 1957.
15. Two or three villages formed a sub-faction, and several sub-factions a canton. Then two or three cantons composed a tribe. Maxwell, *Lords*, pp. 139–143.
16. *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*], 1952–1954, XI, pp. 131–142. Memorandum for the NSC Senior Staff, 12 September 1952.
17. Miller, *Modern Morocco*, pp. 125–129.
18. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>, accessed on 27 September 2013.
19. Charles-Robert Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial?* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978), p. 276.
20. Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 32–33.
21. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), translated by Marianna Oliver et al., p. 15.
22. Miller, *Modern Morocco*, p. 145; Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 19–20. The Russians also received this manifesto through their ambassador at Algiers. 'Istiqlal' means independence.
23. Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Unity*, 1942–1944 (Paris: Plon, 1956), quoted in Charles-Robert Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial?*, p. 276.
24. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, pp. 68–71.

25. La Conférence Africaine Française, Algiers 1944, quoted in Edward Mortimer, *France and the Africans 1944–1960: A Political History* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1969), p. 51.
26. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, pp. 43–44.
27. Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 8–9.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 106–107.
29. Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), pp. 56–61. However, as Segalla emphasises in his book, there was much overlap and ambiguity among the theories and policies associated with 'assimilationism' and 'associationism'. Spencer D. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912–1956* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), p. 9.
30. Goronwy J. Jones, *The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States: Interpretations and Applications of the Non-intervention Principle* (Cardiff, 1979), p. 68.
31. Ronald Hyam, ed., *British Documents on the End of Empire, The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951* (London: HMSO, 1992), 'Introduction', xxiv.
32. Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and L.J. Butler, *The Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918–1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008), chapters 12, 13.
33. In May 1945, the UGTT (*Union Générale du Travail Tunisien*) was created and attracted almost all Tunisian workers. Under its leader, Ferhat Hached, the UGTT was to succeed in getting the Neo-Destour to take into consideration social problems. Louis Périllier, *La Conquête de L'Indépendance Tunisienne* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1979), pp. 55–56.
34. El Mechat, Samya, *Tunisie: Les chemins vers l'indépendance (1945–1956)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), pp. 15–54.
35. Tawfig Y. Hasou, *The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League* (London: KPI Limited, 1985), 'Introduction'.
36. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord*, p. 160.
37. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, p. 80.
38. Chafer, *The End of Empire*, pp. 61–67.
39. A territorial assembly was not allowed and it was only in January 1952 that its establishment was recognised by Paris. Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, p. 173.
40. Associated states included Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and associated territories referred to Togoland and the Cameroons.
41. The National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], RG59, Lot 58 D48, Records of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Subject Files of the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs, 1945–1956, Box 2 [25 French Union].
42. Betts, *Assimilation and Association*, p. 131.
43. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 42–58; Miller, *Modern Morocco*, p. 147.
44. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, pp. 37–38.
45. In 1945, Britain and France, with the support of the United States and the USSR, ousted Spain from Tangier and forced it to accept even less than her

- pre-war role. A new committee of control was formed to represent the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the USSR. However, the USSR did not exercise its right to participate. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, p. 138, ‘The Current Situation in North Africa’, 12 September 1952.
46. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 47–63.
 47. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, p. 151.
 48. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 65.
 49. The Maghzen was equivalent to the traditional Moroccan government which was composed of the Grand Vizier, Vizier of Justice, and Vizier of Habous. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 268. The Grand Vizier was the head of the Maghzen. Habous meant religious charities. Maxwell, *Lords*, p. 154.
 50. This was a consultative organisation to the Residency, set up in 1919.
 51. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 68–76.
 52. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.
 53. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord*, p. 162.
 54. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–165. Moncef Bey, who maintained a neutralist stance during the German occupation of Tunisia in World War II, appointed the first truly Tunisian government since the establishment of the protectorate. He gathered popularity among Tunisians for his nationalist stance, but was forced to abdicate by the French authorities who regained Tunisian rule as a result of the Allied North African Campaign. Perkins, *Modern Tunisia*, pp. 106–107. The Bey's removal naturally angered the Tunisian people and stimulated nationalist sentiment.
 55. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, pp. 88–89.
 56. *FRUS*, 1950, V, p. 1744, Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State, September 1950; El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, chapters 2 and 3.
 57. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

2 The Commencement of Negotiations

1. Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Libya: The Creation of a Client State’, *Ends of British Imperialism*, Chapter 18.
2. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Note, 14 January 1950.
3. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Tunis to Paris, no. 2850, 16 October 1951.
4. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Letter to President, 3 March 1950. The British shared this worry. TNA, FO371/80619, J1018/2, Tunis to FO, 22 December 1949. For this UN resolution, see Saul Kelly, *Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
5. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre, 10 January 1950.
6. It was planned that the Ministers of Tunisian Justice, Agriculture, Labour, Public Health, and Commerce and Crafts would be allocated to Tunisians while the Ministers of Finances, Public Work, Public Instructions and the Under-Secretaries of PTT (Poste Télégraphe et Télécommunication) and Reconstruction would remain French.

7. See Introduction.
8. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, p. 92. On 3 April 1950, Slim also wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights, protesting that the French authorities were preventing Bourguiba from visiting Southern Tunisia. *FRUS*, 1950, V, p. 1776, n. 2.
9. Habib Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, Mon Œuvre, 1944–1951* (Paris: Plon, 1987), p. 261.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
12. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, Mons to Schuman, no. 579, 25 April 1950.
13. *FRUS*, 1950, V, p. 1775, Tunis to Acheson, no. 61, 21 April 1950.
14. This post was nominally to support the Prime Minister but allocated to the French, in fact having dominant power over the budget and personnel in the Tunisian government. The Secretary-General was appointed by the Bey at the Resident-General's recommendation. At the beginning of 1950, the Secretary-General had the power of veto over all the decrees of the ministries.
15. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 301–2. The Treaty of Bardo provided for a temporary occupation of Tunisia by the French military authorities. This provision had not yet been lifted at this stage.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 353–354.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
19. See below in this chapter.
20. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, p. 310.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
22. He was a member of the Senate in Paris, representing Tunisia.
23. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, Mémoire au Sujet de la Tunisie par la Délégation de la Colonie Française, 25 May 1950.
24. Referring to Alexandria where Greek, Italian, and French minorities attended the municipal council, Bourguiba accepted a moderate number of minority peoples' memberships in municipal councils. This was what he meant by the sixth point of his demands in April 1950. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, p. 310. What he rejected was the participation of a substantial number of foreign people in municipal councils, let alone in a national assembly.
25. This was also the case in French policy towards Morocco, as argued below.
26. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, Mons to Schuman, no. 579, 25 April 1950.
27. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Notes Schématiques sur la Situation Politique en Tunisie, undated.
28. *Ibid.*; NARA, RG59, Central Decimal Files [hereafter CDF], 772.00/1–951, the US Consulate General in Tunis (Jernegan) to the State Department, no. 237, 9 January 1951.
29. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 354–355. Schuman referred to independence, but soon retreated. Two days later, he announced in Paris: 'France has a mission to lead the populations [of the overseas territories] towards an independent management of their own affairs inside the French Union. This is what I pointed out in Thionville.' *Le Monde*, 13 June 1950.
30. TNA, FO371/80619, J1018/18, Harvey to FO, 16 June 1950. It is not clear why Schuman mentioned that the number of Tunisian Ministers would be greater

than French Ministers, while the Quai d'Orsay planned that the parity was to be established. Schuman's stance was slightly more liberal than that of other leading figures to get Tunisian support and to avoid any meaningful internal autonomy.

31. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 355–356.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 316–318.
33. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, untitled, undated.
34. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, vol. 101. Note pour le Ministre, 17 October 1951.
35. *FRUS*, 1950, X, pp. 1780–1781, The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to Acheson, no. 7, 10 July 1950; *ibid.*, pp. 1806–1807, The Ambassador in Paris (Bruce) to Acheson, 7 December 1950.
36. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Périllier to Schuman, no. 953, 11 July 1950.
37. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 78.
38. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 380, Réunion Extraordinaire du 20 Juillet 1950, Motion. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord*, p. 175.
39. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, Note pour Schuman, 24 July 1950.
40. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Circular no. 197, Paris to Tunis, 4 September 1950.
41. Périllier reported to Paris that Bourguiba had seemingly not been consulted beforehand. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 336, Périllier to Schuman, no. 1055, undated. However, Bourguiba implied in his memoirs that he had long been in favour of the idea of the Neo-Destour's participation.
42. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 363–364. Bourguiba returned to Tunisia on 2 August 1950.
43. Shortly after the formation of the Chenik Government, Bourguiba started a new stay in France. He had a series of conversations with the representatives of Arab countries in order to gather political support. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, pp. 105–106.
44. Victor Silvera, 'Les réformes tunisiennes de février 1951', p. 2, *Revue juridique et politique de l'Union Française*, vol. 5, 1951.
45. *L'Année Politique*, 1950, p. 174.
46. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Tunis to Paris, no. 429/432, 7 September 1950.
47. In accordance with the Beylical decree of 1947, these advisers had hitherto exercised a considerable measure of control within the Ministries to which they were attached, but now they were to be transferred to the Secretary-General. TNA, FO371/80621, JF1018/55, Tunis to FO, 1581/551/58, 20 September 1950.
48. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Note, Chenik to Périllier, 12 September 1950.
49. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Périllier to Schuman, no. 1356, 25 October 1950; *Ibid.*, Périllier to Schuman, 12 November 1950.
50. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/1–951, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 266, 9 January 1951.
51. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, p. 380.
52. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Périllier to Schuman, no. 1356, 25 October 1950. The mixed commissions were to be composed of the same number

- of French delegates as Tunisian delegates who were to be appointed by the French authorities. This clearly reflected the French intention of making no substantive concessions. In fact, this was a measure which the French had often adopted and would adopt both in Tunisia and in Morocco.
53. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Périllier to Schuman, no. 1361, 30 October 1950.
 54. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Prime Minister Chenik to Resident-General, 4 November 1950.
 55. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Tunis to Paris, no. 537/538, 10 November 1950. Schuman later confirmed this point; Schuman to Tunis, no. 592, 16 November 1952.
 56. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 92. He points out that the Socialists criticised the French plan as insufficient. André Julien argues that an incident in Enfidaville, a city in the northern part of Tunisia, forced the Quai d'Orsay to implement the plan hurriedly. On 20 November, the police opened fire against agricultural workers who threw stones at them protesting against bad economic conditions. Seven people were killed and around 50 injured. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord*, p. 177.
 57. *L'Année Politique*, 1950, p. 264.
 58. 'Technical ministers' refer to those of Labour, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, and Public Health.
 59. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Tunis to Paris, no. 596/598, 14 December 1950.
 60. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 274–275.
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
 62. Raymond Pons was appointed as the new Secretary-General on 23 March. *L'Année Politique*, 1951, p. 81.
 63. He was to visit Cairo, Karachi, New Delhi, Jakarta, and other cities. Nevertheless, Bourguiba announced in Karachi that the agreements 'constitute a significant if very feeble step of the French desire to bring Tunisia towards its autonomy.' Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, p. 414.
 64. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 381, Périllier to Schuman, no. 1356, 25 October 1950. Note that this mixed commission was different from those proposed in October 1950.
 65. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 67, Juin to Schuman, 33/C, 21 January 1950.
 66. Maghzen is a traditional Moroccan government. As for this Council, see Chapter 1.
 67. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 82.
 68. *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 1760–1762, The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to Acheson, no. 169, 6 November 1950.
 69. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 84, note, La Crise Marocaine, undated.
 70. *FRUS*, 1950, V, p. 1752, The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to Acheson, no. 2124, 19 October 1950.
 71. *Ibid.*, 1950, V, pp. 1752–1753, McBride to Acheson, no. 147, 23 October 1950.
 72. *Ibid.*, 1950, V, pp. 1760–1762.
 73. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 78; *FRUS* 1950, V, p. 1761; MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, vol. 96, Note 'La Crise Marocaine de Février 1951', undated.
 74. *FRUS* 1950, V, pp. 1762–1764, Bruce to Acheson, no. 1244, 17 November 1950.

75. 'The Sharifian Empire' (*l'Empire chéfirien*) is an ancient name of Morocco.
76. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 67, Circular no. 18, 15 March 1951.
77. Conversely, the Sultan was furious as the French authorities and el-Glaoui deliberately failed to inform him of the visit of American officials to Morocco, while they held a welcome party. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/1–451, Rabat to the State Department, Despatch no. 243, 4 January 1951.
78. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 82.
79. See Chapter 1.
80. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol. 96, Note pour le Ministre, undated.
81. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 76, Rabat to Paris, Résumé de l'audience du 26 janvier 1951.
82. Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Fonds Juin, Télégramme résident général à Diplomatie Paris, du 26 janvier 1951, cited in Bernard Pujo, *Juin, Maréchal de France* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), p. 271. However, Juin did not state in his memoirs that he had contemplated deposition. Alphonse Juin, *Mémoires 2* (Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1960), pp. 197–204.
83. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 76, Washington to Paris, no. 946/958, 1 February 1951. McGhee was the head of the US officials' mission to North Africa in the autumn of 1950.
84. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 76, Paris to Rabat, no. 71/78, 1 February 1951.
85. See below for the details of this term. The United States took the same attitude to Tunisian affairs.
86. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1371–1373, Acheson to the Legation at Tangier, no. 260, 2 February 1951.
87. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 76, Washington to Paris, no. 988/996, 2 February 1951.
88. TNA, FO371/90243, JF1022/5, FO to Paris, no. 96, 2 February 1951; JF1022/7, Harvey to FO, no. 38, 2 February 1951; JF1022/12, Franks to FO, no. 352, 3 February 1951. Harvey talked with Schuman over this issue on 3 February.
89. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 2, Entretien avec M. Général Juin, undated. See also Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 111.
90. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 77, Rabat to Paris, no. 147/149, 17 February 1951.
91. This was the orthodox religious council in Islamic society.
92. *Le Monde*, 27 February 1951; *l'Année politique*, 1951, p. 48.
93. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1377–1380, McBride to the State Department, no. 325, 28 February 1951.
94. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 68, Paris to Rabat, Circular no. 18, 15 March 1951; *Le Monde*, 28 February 1951.

3 The UN Debates in 1951

1. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 79, telegram circular, Paris to Rabat, 9 March 1951.
2. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 78, Couve de Murville to Paris, no. 184, 4 March 1951.
3. TNA, FO371/90244, JF1022/46, Washington to FO, no. 682, 7 March 1951.

4. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 78, Bonnet to Paris, no. 1871/1872, 5 March 1951.
5. This was a group of American businessmen in Morocco that rallied around Senator Rodes, engaging in activity in the US Congress to lift the restriction on exports from the United States to Morocco. France had promulgated a decree for this control in December 1948, to which the United States agreed as a temporary measure. *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 1754–1759, Acheson Memorandum to the President, 27 October 1950.
6. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 78, New York to Paris, no. 1129, 7 March 1951.
7. TNA, FO371/90244, JF1022/52, Washington to FO, no. 706, 9 March 1951.
8. TNA, FO371/90244, JF1022/46, FO to Washington, no. 929, 9 March 1951. ‘A public discussion’ was meant to be US arbitration between France and the Moroccan nationalists.
9. TNA, FO371/90243, JF1022/32, Washington to FO, no. 594, 26 February 1951; FO to Washington, no. 798, 28 February 1951.
10. Schuman agreed with the British on this point. TNA, FO371/90244, JF1022/46, Harvey to FO, no. 80, 12 March 1951.
11. TNA, FO371/90245, JF1022/71, Furlonge Minute, 11 March 1951, Allen Minute, 12 March 1951.
12. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 79, Couve de Murville to Paris, no. 250, 14 March 1951.
13. TNA, FO371/90246, JF1022/113, Harvey to FO, no. 204, 11 April 1951. Harvey argued that giving advice to the French was counterproductive because of their deep-rooted suspicions about the Anglo-Saxon intentions in North Africa.
14. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 79, Etude sur la situation au Maroc en mars 1951.
15. Those who participated in this pact were the Istiqlal, the Democracy Independence Party (PDI), the Reformist Party, and the Party of Moroccan Unity.
16. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 68, Juin to Paris, no. 325/329, 10 April 1951.
17. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 83, Note, Direction Général des Affaires Politiques, 29 June 1951; TNA, FO371/90246, JF1022/120, FO Minute by Stewart, 8 May 1951.
18. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 82, Washington to Paris, no. 2920, 13 April 1951.
19. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1381–1384, Memcon, by the Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs, 23 April 1951. According to this record, Bonnet used the Anglo-Saxon term ‘self-government’, not internal autonomy.
20. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 85, Projet de Réponse au Mémorandum du Sultan du Maroc, 21 August 1952.
21. On 9 May the State Department instructed the Consul in Rabat to ask the French for the details of the plan. *FRUS*, 1951, V, p. 1384, n. 7.
22. *Le Monde*, 8–9 July 1951. In the meantime, general elections were held in France on 17 June. Pleven was elected as Prime Minister on 8 August and Robert Schuman remained as Foreign Minister.
23. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Situation Politique (mars 1953).
24. *L'Année Politique*, 1951, p. 189.

25. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 83, Comité Central de la France d’Outre-mer, 18 July 1951.
26. *L’Année Politique*, 1951, p. 208. El-Fassi was in Cairo at the end of August 1951.
27. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 159, Washington to Paris, no. 6023/6028, 23 August 1951.
28. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 67, Note, Nationalistes et communistes au Maroc, 4 July 1951.
29. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 131–142. Memorandum for the NSC Senior Staff, 12 September 1952.
30. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1384–1386, Paper prepared in the State Department, 29 August 1951.
31. A ‘middle-of-the-road policy’ was also taken in the Tunisian case although the United States did not have military bases in Tunisia.
32. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 164, Conversations bilatérales Tenues entre Ministres des Affaires Étrangères de France et des États-Unis, 11 September 1951.
33. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1387–1389, US Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Minister of the US and France, 11 September 1951.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 1390, n. 4.
35. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol. 97, Untitled, 6 October 1951.
36. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 646, Note pour le Ministre, 31 July 1951.
37. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 83, Rabat to Paris, no. 810/814, 8 October 1951. This was an issue upon which the Sultan had agreed in February 1951.
38. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 95.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 96; MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 68, Note, undated.
40. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 84, Paris to Rabat, Circular no. 209, 3 November 1951.
41. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1389–1395, Memcon by Acheson, 9 October 1951.
42. TNA, FO371/90240, JF10113/10, Jebb to London, no. 329, 9 October 1951.
43. TNA, FO371/90241, JF10113/35, Harvey to FO, no. 645, 6 November 1951. The French were also aware of Washington’s stance on colonial matters at the UN. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 647, Washington to Paris, No. 7100/7119, 11 October 1951.
44. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol. 97, Note, 9 November 1951.
45. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol. 97, Note, no. 110, 10 November 1951. The countries that supported were Canada, Dominican Republic, the United States, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Those who opposed were Iraq, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.
46. TNA, FO371/95737, UP2021/3, Record of a meeting of the UK Delegation to the UNGA, 7 November 1951.
47. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10–2551, Bruce to Washington, no. 2440, 25 October 1951. According to Bruce, the Egyptians were offering instead moderation of their attitude on the Moroccan matter with the aim of receiving French support in the dispute with the British over the Suez Canal treaty of 1936. Cairo was attempting to create a split between the two colonial powers, as the British had feared.
48. *Yearbook of the United Nations* [hereafter *YUN*], 1951, pp. 357–359. The Russians and the Arab-Asian countries voted against.

49. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 159, Rome to Rabat, no. 1037/1039, 24 November 1951.
50. See this chapter, Section 3.
51. *L'Année Politique*, 1951, p. 299.
52. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 382, Note de la Direction d'Afrique Levant, 10 February 1951.
53. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 415–418.
54. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 419–420.
55. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Visit to the Bey, 11 March 1951.
56. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 382, Périllier to Schuman, undated.
57. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 382, Périllier to Schuman, undated.
58. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 382, Chenik to Périllier, 22 April 1951.
59. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 382, Périllier to Schuman, undated.
60. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 428–429.
61. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, vol. 101, Note pour le Ministre, 17 October 1951.
62. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Note pour le Ministre, undated; Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord*, p. 183.
63. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Circular no. 138, Paris to Tunis, 3 June 1951.
64. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Tunis to Paris, no. 226/228, 19 May 1951.
65. France's official reply was handed over to the Bey on 3 June. It simply demanded that he behave in accordance with the spirit of the accords in February 1951. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 104.
66. However, some pro-French Tunisians expected the nationalists to accept co-sovereignty after the Moroccan incident of February 1951 was forgotten. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Note pour le Ministre, July 1951.
67. See above in this chapter.
68. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 108.
69. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 337, Note de M Périllier pour le Président Schuman, undated.
70. After visiting Arab-Asian countries, Bourguiba visited the United Kingdom in August 1951, where he met Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison, and the United States in the following month, where State Department officials received him. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, pp. 484, 491.
71. MAE, 1944–1955, vol. 337, Tunis to Paris, no. 2850, 16 October 1951. Early in October 1951, Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha introduced legislation to abrogate the 1936 treaty which authorised Britain to station troops in the Canal Zone.
72. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 383, Note pour le Ministre, 17 October 1951.
73. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 383, Note pour le Ministre, October 1951.
74. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 383, Chenik to Périllier, 31 October 1951.
75. This English expression is used in the original text.
76. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 383, Note pour le Ministre, 15 November 1951.
77. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 383, Note pour le Ministre, 26 November 1951. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 treaty was regarded as a sinister precedent.

78. MAE, 1944–1955, vol. 337, Tunis to Paris, no. 2850, 16 October 1951.
79. Périllier, *La Conquête*, pp. 97–133.
80. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, *l'Evolution politique de la Tunisie depuis Juin 1950 et la Crise de Janvier-Avril 1952*, April 1952.
81. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 352.
82. He rightly deplored the fact that ‘the Tunisians were led to expect something, only to get worse than nothing’. *FRUS*, 1951, V, pp. 1425–1426, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 213, 19 December 1951.
83. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1944–1951*, p. 564; *l'Année Politique*, 1951, p. 338.

4 The UN Debates in 1952

1. Prior to his departure for Tunis, Bourguiba was reported as stating: ‘There is no precedent for a foreigner participating in the political institutions of a country in which he has not been integrated by accepting its nationality.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/1–252, no. 3950, Bruce to Acheson, 2 January 1952.
2. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Tunis to Paris, no. 12/19, 5 January 1952.
3. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Tunis to Paris, no. 23/26, 8 January 1952.
4. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Tunis to Paris, no. 44/52, 11 January 1952; Tunis to Paris, no. 53, 12 January 1952.
5. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 181.
6. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 361, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 354/356, 28 March 1952.
7. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Karachi to Paris, no. 35/37, 16 January 1952.
8. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Paris to Karachi, no. 30/32, 16 January 1952.
9. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Paris to Tunis, 16 January 1952.
10. TNA, FO371/97090, J1041/16, FO Minute, by Strang, 17 January 1952.
11. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, p. 673, footnote 3; TNA, FO371/97090, JF1041/3, Tunis to FO, no. 3, 18 January 1952. On that day, Faure was elected as Prime Minister.
12. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, London to Paris, no. 260/263, 19 January 1952.
13. El Mechat, *Les Chemins*, pp. 166–167. No documents containing the American reaction to this matter have been found.
14. TNA, FO371/97091, JF1041/24 FO, the African Department to Paris, 6 February 1952.
15. TNA, FO371/97090, JF1041/7, Harvey to FO, no. 38, 19 January 1952.
16. In April 1951, Harvey had already pointed to this point. See Chapter 3, Section 1.
17. TNA, FO371/97091, JF1041/25, FO Minute, 23 January 1952.
18. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Paris to Tunis, no. 35/39, 15 January 1952.
19. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Tunis to Paris, no. 482, 5 March 1952.

20. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 673–4, Bruce to the State Department, no. 4449, 25 January 1952.
21. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, l'Évolution politique de la Tunisie depuis Juin 1950 et la Crise de Janvier–Avril 1952, April 1952; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 674–675, Editorial Note.
22. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 359, Note pour le Ministre, undated. The participants were Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen.
23. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 358, Note, 30 January 1952.
24. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 674–675, Editorial Note.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 672–673, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 83, 21 January 1952.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 676–678, Jernegan to the State Department, 14 February 1952.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 679, The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the State Department, no. 5031, 15 February 1952; *Ibid.*, pp. 680–681, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, no. 4982, 22 February 1952.
28. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 359, Note, 20 February 1952.
29. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 360, Paris to Washington, no. 3753, 5 March 1952.
30. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 193. This plan's outline was also found in *Le Monde* of 22 March 1952.
31. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Note par la Direction d'Afrique Levant, 18 February 1952.
32. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Note, 28 February 1952.
33. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Tunis to Paris, no. 482, 5 March 1952.
34. Antoine Pinay was elected as French Prime Minister on 6 March.
35. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 360, London to Paris, no. 1088/1096, 6 March 1952.
36. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 360, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 131/144, 13 March 1952.
37. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 690–692, Memcon, Washington, 19 March 1952; MAE, Tunisie, 1944–1955, vol. 361, Washington to Paris, no. 1782/92, 19 March 1952.
38. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Paris to Tunis, 21 March 1952. Mitterrand also put forward his plan to leading political figures on 21 March. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 199.
39. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Paris to Tunis, 21 March 1952.
40. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 693–695, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 124, 25 March 1952.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 696–697, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 127, 26 March 1952.
42. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 200. It was reported that Hauteclocque threatened the Bey with deposition. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, p. 714, Jernegan to the State Department, no. 142, 3 April 1952.
43. For example, *ibid.*, pp. 695–696, Bonsal to the State Department, no. 5851, 25 March 1952.
44. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 361, Bonnet to Paris, no. 1964/1969, 27 March 1952.

45. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 700–701, Acheson to the Embassy in France, no. 5753, 27 March 1952.
46. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Paris to Tunis, no. 692, 29 March 1952; *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 203.
47. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 384, Paris to Tunis, no. 694, 29 March 1952.
48. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 703–704, Acheson to the US Mission at the UN, no. 362, 28 March 1952.
49. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 361, Bonnet to Paris, no. 2027/2030, 28 March 1952.
50. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 704–705, Austin to the State Department, no. 656, 29 March 1952.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 702–703, Austin to the State Department, no. 652, 28 March 1952.
52. TNA, FO371/97094, JF1041/67, FO to New York, no. 139, 28 March 1952.
53. TNA, FO371/97094, JF1041/67, Jebb to FO, no. 147, 27 March 1952.
54. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 363, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 384/385, 1 April 1952.
55. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 363, New York to Paris, no. 399, 1 April 1952; New York to Paris, no. 448/453, 3 April 1952. The participants were Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippine, Syria, and Yemen.
56. TNA, FO371/97094, JF1041/91, Conversation French Ambassador with Strang, 31 March 1952.
57. TNA, FO371/97094, JF1041/84, Hayter to FO, no. 200, 2 April 1952.
58. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 363, London to Paris, no. 1566/1569, 3 April 1952.
59. TNA, FO371/97094, JF1041/84, Hayter to FO, no. 200, 2 April 1952. As will be noted below, the British were motivated to avoid a precedent in which the UN dealt with a problem of non-self-governing territories. TNA, FO371/97092, JF1041/46, FO to New York, no. 74, 1 March 1952; JF1041/47, FO to New York, no. 78, 3 March 1952.
60. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 360, New York to Paris, no. 164, 14 March 1952.
61. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 709–710, Austin to the State Department, no. 663, 2 April 1952.
62. She reminded him that: ‘our action in the GA on Morocco [in 1951] had done us a great deal of harm.’ *Ibid.*, pp. 717–718, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by Evans, Office of the Secretary of State, Washington, 3 April 1952.
63. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 363, Paris to Washington, no. 5653/5655, 3 April 1952.
64. *Ibid.*, Bonnet to Paris, no. 2148/2158, 3 April 1952.
65. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 720–721, Acheson to the US Mission at the UN, no. 371, 4 April 1952. Acheson was reported to have said at the end of the meeting for the final decision that it was one of the most difficult decisions he had ever had to make. TNA, FO371/97095, JF1041/105, Washington to FO, no. 10268/62/52, 4 April 1952.
66. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 364, New York to Paris, no. 611/612, 14 April 1952.
67. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 364, New York to Paris, no. 647/654, 17 April 1952.

68. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 364, Bonnet to Paris, no. 2521/2523, 18 April 1952.
69. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 364, Bonnet to Schuman, no. 1922, 18 April 1952.
70. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 364, New York to Paris, no. 678/680, 23 April 1952; Paris to Latin American countries, Circular no. 59, 25 April 1952.
71. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 365, New York to Paris, no. 839, 2 May 1952; Secrétariat des Conférences, Note, undated.
72. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 735–737, Acheson to the Embassy in France, no. 6353, 29 April 1952.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 742–743, Dunn to the State Department, no. 6739, 2 May 1952.
74. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 212.
75. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 385, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 901/906, 11 May 1952.
76. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 746–747, Memcon, by McBride, 5 May 1952.
77. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 385, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 998/1004, 22 May 1952.
78. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 751–754, Memcon, by the Acting Deputy of Director, 15 May 1952.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 750–751, The US Representative at the UN to the State Department, no. 810, 13 May 1952.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 766–771, US Delegation Minutes of a Meeting, 3 June 1952.
81. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 385, Réunion chez M Robert Schuman, 31 May 1952.
82. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 225. One week later, Acheson declared at the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate that he would recognise '*les droits acquis*' (the acquired rights) of France in North Africa, but this was far from what the French had expected as US support at the meeting of 28 May 1952. *Le Monde*, 13 June 1952.
83. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 385, Déclaration du Gouvernement Français relative au Plan de Réformes en Tunisie, Paris, 19 June 1952. Needless to say, the Bey's legislative power was only nominal.
84. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, pp. 225–230.
85. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 1283/1285, 13 June 1952; Hoppenot to Paris, no. 1372/1375, 18 June 1952; Hoppenot to Paris, no. 1442/1449, 20 June 1952. The participants were Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, and Yemen.
86. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 1474, 24 June 1952.
87. TNA, FO371/97099, JF1041/176, Eden minute, 28 June 1952.
88. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, no. 2904/2908, 25 June 1952.
89. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 778–779, Memorandum by Popper to Hickerson, 20 June 1952.
90. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, Washington to Paris, no. 4498/4502, 25 June 1952.
91. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, Secrétariat des Conférences, Note pour la Direction d'Afrique-Levant, no. 824SC, 25 June 1952.
92. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 366, New York to Paris, no. 1513/1514, 27 June 1952.

93. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Hautesclocque to Paris, no. 1197/1198, 2 July 1952.
94. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Hautesclocque to Paris, no. 1232/1233, 19 July 1952; Note pour le Ministre, 22 July 1952.
95. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 367, Lacoste to Paris, no. 1693/1694, 21 July 1952.
96. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 784–785, Editorial Note.
97. The same countries as those who had requested a special GA [please reverse the order] session.
98. TNA, FO371/97102, JF1041/241, Draft brief for the Secretary of State for the visit of Mr. Pearson, 9 September 1952. The French were aware of the British position. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, London to Paris, no. 3608, 14 August 1952.
99. As the GA session came closer, public and press criticism in this regard was quite often referred to inside the State Department. For instance, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 786–788, Acheson to the Embassy in France, no. 548, 30 July 1952.
100. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 367, New York to Paris, no. 1752, 25 July 1952.
101. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Message du Bey de Tunis au Président de la République, 22 July 1952.
102. TNA, FO371/97102, JF1041/238, Rumbold to Allen, 10112/255/52, 6 September 1952. Egypt had experienced a political havoc since January 1952 and the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk in a coup d'état on 23 July.
103. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Tunis to Paris, no. 1390/1395, 1 August 1952.
104. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Washington to Paris, no. 5583/5592, 6 August 1952.
105. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Washington to Paris, no. 5638/5645, 7 August 1952.
106. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Massigli to Paris, no. 3427/3428, 6 August 1952; London to Paris, no. 3523/3524, 9 August 1952.
107. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 793–794, The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the State Department, no. 668, 6 August 1952.
108. Eden later told Massigli: 'I still took the view that the main debate ought not to take place until after the presidential election. ... [I]t seemed completely crazy to have international discussions of this kind in the last fortnight of the campaign.' TNA, FO371/97102, JF1041/233, Eden to Harvey, no. 876, 2 September 1952.
109. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Paris to Tunis, no. 1972/1975, 9 August 1952. Interestingly, it was Eden who first proposed to Massigli the idea of letting the Americans talk to the Tunisians. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Massigli to Paris, no. 3427/3428, 6 August 1952.
110. In fact, the State Department had conveyed this view to a Neo-Destour member on 6 August. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Washington to Paris, no. 5602/5607, 7 August 1952.
111. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Hautesclocque to Paris, no. 1444/1447, 11 August 1952.
112. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 795–796, The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis, 13 August 1952.

113. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, London to Paris, no. 3555/3556, 12 August 1952. On 20 August, the British Embassy in Washington approached the State Department on the French request. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Washington to Paris, no. 5858, 20 August 1952.
114. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Schumann to Washington, no. 13194/13196, 14 August 1952.
115. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 798–799, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, no. 1041, 22 August 1952.
116. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 247. In early August 1952, a French official had explained to the British the division of opinion inside the government. According to him, Pierre Pflimlin, the Minister of Overseas France, opposed debates on this problem, while Schuman was more subtle. Prime Minister Pinay was closer to Pflimlin. TNA, FO371/97101, JF1041/224, Hope Minute, 8 August 1952.
117. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Tunis to Paris, no. 493/495, 21 August 1952.
118. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 801–803, Memcon, by Acheson, 5 September 1952, n. 1; MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, New York to Paris, no. 2016/2020, 4 September 1952.
119. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 801–803, Memcon, by Acheson, 5 September 1952.
120. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Washington to Paris, no. 6322/6334, 11 September 1952.
121. Both sides insisted that the other should first make an announcement to that effect in order to dispel public suspicions of the other country's intentions. NARA, RG59, Lot58, D48, Entry 1293, Box 5 [40.1 UN Tunisia 1952–1953], Memcon, 10 September 1952; Secret Security Information, 16 September 1952.
122. TNA, FO371/97102, JF1041/241, Draft brief for the Secretary of State for the visit of Mr. Pearson, 9 September 1952.
123. TNA, FO371/97104, JF1041/268, Tunisia – Policy Guidance, undated. This document contains no date for Eden's remark, but implies sometime in September 1952.
124. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, The Bey to Auriol, 9 September 1952.
125. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Paris to Tunis, Circular no. 119, 14 September 1952.
126. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 386, Note, 15 September 1952.
127. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 811–812, Dunn to the State Department, no. 1711, 18 September 1952.
128. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 368, Réunion du 18 Septembre 1952; Washington to Paris, no. 6597/6606, 26 September 1952.
129. TNA, FO371/97102, JF1041/246, Paris to London, no. 397, 25 September 1952.
130. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 813–814, Acheson to the Embassy in Paris, no. 1780, 26 September 1952; pp. 814–815, Editorial Note.
131. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320.00/9–3052, US–French Talks on the UN, 30 September 1952.
132. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/9–2952, Memcon, 29 September 1952.
133. See Chapter 3, Section 1.

134. TNA, FO371/97103, JF1041/245, Tunisia and Morocco, Annex, 27 September 1952.
135. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, aide-mémoire, 3 October 1952. This aide-memoire recalled the Lyttleton–Pflimlin colonial talks held on 31 March 1952, where ‘both governments would strenuously resist any further attempts by the UN to intervene in the political affairs of non-self-governing territories.’ See also John Kent, *The Internationalization of Colonialism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 295.
136. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 2245/2250, 4 October 1952.
137. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Massigli to Paris, no. 4231/4232, 7 October 1952.
138. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10–752, Paris to Acheson, no. 2130, 7 October 1952.
139. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10–1052, Acheson to Paris, no. 2082, 10 October 1952.
140. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Paris to New York, no. 6853/6861, 8 October. The Iraqi government demanded the Moroccan problem’s inscription on the GA agenda on 7 August 1952. See this chapter, Section 5.
141. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Paris to New York, no. 2876/2880, 14 October 1952.
142. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, New York to Paris, no. 2483/2486, 22 October 1952.
143. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Tunis to Paris, no. 1777, 22 October 1952; vol. 372, Note, 12 May 1953.
144. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 824–826, Memorandum by Knight to Perkins, 23 October 1952. The British were also critical of this vote. TNA, FO371/97105, JF1041/288, FO Minute by Mason, 24 October 1952.
145. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, New York to Paris, no. 2508/2512, 23 October 1952.
146. NARA, RG59, CDF, New York to Acheson, DELGA no. 4, 320/10–2452, 24 October 1952.
147. See this Chapter, Section 5.
148. They had been notified of the new French tactics of non-attendance on 15 October. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10–1552, New York to Acheson, DELGA no. 4, 15 October 1952.
149. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 835–836, Dunn to the State Department, no. 2604, 28 October 1952, n. 2.
150. NARA, RG59, Lot53 D65, Entry 1496, Box 4 [Tunisia – Memos of Conversation], Memcon, 28 October 1952.
151. *Ibid.*
152. *L’Année Politique*, 1952, p. 266.
153. See the explanation concerning n. 131 of this chapter.
154. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, Acheson to the French Foreign Minister, pp. 837–839, 31 October 1952; MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 369, Schuman to Acheson, 31 October 1952.
155. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 837–839, n. 1.
156. No governmental records can be found with regard to the UN commission of good offices which the Arab-Asians were proposing. However, as

- mentioned below, the United States would vote against their draft resolution on this issue.
157. TNA, FO371/97105, JF1041/295, Eden to Harvey, Conversations between Acheson and the French Ambassador, no. 887, 5 November 1952. This document did not mention the date of the Massigli–Bruce talks but *Le Monde* reported that this talk had taken place on 31 October. *Le Monde*, 2/3 November 1952.
 158. TNA, FO371/97105, JF1041/297, Franks to FO, no. 2069, 6 November 1952. Meanwhile, the US presidential election was held on 5 November. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected as the new president.
 159. TNA, FO371/97105, JF1041/299, Brief for Secretary of State, 7 November 1952. However, the FO was dissatisfied: ‘the Americans are unshaken in their belief that the Assembly should discuss the Tunis[ian] item.’
 160. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 839–845, Draft Memcon, by Acheson, New York, 8 November 1952.
 161. NARA, RG59, Lot53 D65, Entry 1496 Box 4, US Delegation to the Seventh Session of the GA [Tunisia – Memos of Conversation], Memcon between Muniz and Jessup, 18 November 1952.
 162. NARA, RG59, Lot53 D65, Entry 1496 Box 4, US Delegation to the Seventh Session of the GA [Tunisia – Memos of Conversation], Memcon between Muniz and Jessup, 21 November 1952.
 163. *YUN*, 1952, p. 272; *UNGA Official Records*, vol. 7, 1952–1953, First Committee, p. 193, pp. 206, 231. The LA countries that presented the resolution included Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
 164. *YUN*, 1952, p. 277. Britain voted against the Arab-Asian draft resolution and abstained on the LA resolutions.
 165. *UNGA Official Records*, vol. 7, 1952–1953, Plenary Meetings, p. 382.
 166. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320.11/12–1152, Memcon, 11 December 1952.
 167. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, pp. 176–178. He concluded this note with optimism: ‘The victory of good sense and justice may be long in coming, but it will come...and we will deserve it!’
 168. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 84, Note, Direction Générale des affaires politiques, 9 February 1952.
 169. *Ibid.*
 170. Julien, *L’Afrique du Nord*, p. 334. *Le Monde* also reported this but its details were not published. *Le Monde*, 22 March 1952.
 171. NARA, RG59, CDF 651.71/3–2752, The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the State Department, Despatch no. 512, 27 March 1952. ‘The present Sharifian government’ meant the Maghzen.
 172. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 85, de Blesson to Schuman, no. 1115, 29 May 1952.
 173. As for a reason for this delay, Harvey later noted that Schuman was notorious for his distaste for tackling the Moroccan problem during his long term of office. TNA, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey to FO, no. 289, 21 August 1953.
 174. MAE, AM 1952–1963, Etats-Unis, vol. 359, Bonnet to Schuman, no. 2031, 25 April 1952.
 175. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 600–602, Memcon by McBride, 13 May 1952. McBride was then an official in the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, the State Department.

176. NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.022/5-1752, Acheson to Paris, no. 6820, 17 May 1952.
177. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Washington to Paris, no. 3214/3229, 15 May 1952.
178. Before the talks, French officials had even suggested that Schuman warn Acheson that it largely depended on the United States whether France would choose between the UN and North Africa. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 160, Aide-mémoire pour le Ministre, 21 May 1952.
179. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Note pour la Direction d'Afrique Levant, no. 1003/SC, 18 August 1952.
180. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Rabat to Paris, no. 564/565, 1 August 1952.
181. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Projet de Réponse au Mémorandum du Sultan du Maroc, 21 August 1952.
182. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Rabat to Paris, no. 666/669, 17 September 1952.
183. *L'Année Politique*, 1952, p. 254.
184. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-1052, Dorman to Acheson, no. 22, 10 September 1952.
185. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef to Guillaume, 3 October 1952.
186. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Guillaume to Schuman, no. 2283AL, 25 October 1952.
187. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-2552, Dorman to Acheson, no. 29, 25 September 1952.
188. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Guillaume to Schuman, no. 2283AL, 25 October 1952.
189. The riot and strike were obviously aimed at attracting international attention. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, XI, pp. 142-144, Memorandum by Bonbright and Jernegan, 17 December 1952. The British Consul in Casablanca noted that: 'the true total of Arabs killed was over 1500'. TNA, FO371/102974, JM1015/4, Casablanca to Allen, 39P/52, 18 December 1952.
190. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 85, Rabat to Paris, no. 988/993, 23 December 1952.
191. TNA, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey to FO, no. 289, 21 August 1953.
192. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, XI, p. 604, The Acting Secretary of State to Rabat, no. 52, 12 December 1952.
193. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, XI, pp. 604-606, Vincent to the State Department, no. 240, 14 December 1952.
194. UNGA debates on Morocco developed in a similar way to those on Tunisia. For the details of the three Western countries' attitudes, see above in this chapter.
195. *YUN*, 1952, p. 284.
196. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, XI, pp. 606-608, Editorial Note; *L'Année Politique*, 1952, pp. 288-289. Perhaps the Americans reasoned that the term '*se gouverner*', which clearly referred to 'self-government' as opposed to 'internal autonomy', would antagonise the French.
197. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 649, *Note pour le Ministre*, no. 275SC, undated.

5 The Impasse

1. Unfortunately, few governmental archives have been declassified concerning the deposition of Mohammed V in August 1953.
2. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 85, Rabat to Paris, no. 988/993, 23 December 1952.
3. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/12–2452, Dorman to Acheson, no. 73, 24 December 1952.
4. The original text is ‘de guider les populations de la Tunisie et du Maroc vers l’administration de leurs propres affaires’. *L’Année Politique*, 1953, p. 187.
5. TNA, FO371/102937, JF1015/4, Mayall to Allen, no. 10115/10/53, 19 January 1953.
6. Maxwell, *Lords*, pp. 133, 155. El-Glaoui had been dismissed from the Pasha of Marrakech by the Sultan Moulay Hafid in 1911. See also Chapter 1.
7. *L’Année Politique*, 1953, p. 197.
8. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Paris to Rabat, no. 15AL, 14 February 1953.
9. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2–453, Dunn to Dulles, no. 4352, 4 February 1953.
10. MAE, Secrétariat Général 1945–1966, vol. 29, Paris to Rabat, Circular no. 20, 3 February 1953.
11. *L’Année Politique*, 1953, p. 203.
12. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 609–610, The Acting Secretary of State to the US Mission at the UN, Gadel A-1, 10 March 1953.
13. In September 1955, one American official noted: ‘in the past the U.S. approach to NA problems has been conditioned mainly by French considerations involving our desire not to disturb any given French parliamentary equilibrium in order to avoid endangering the attainment of important U.S. objectives, such as gaining French adherence to EDC.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.00/9–2955, Holmes to Dulles, 29 September 1955.
14. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Paris to Rabat, no. 15AL, 14 February 1953. This French response was publicised on 13 February 1953.
15. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 2, Bidault to Guillaume, no. 303AL, 18 February 1953. An American diplomat reported to Washington that the French even told Mohammed V ‘the United States would give France carte blanche in North Africa’. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2–1853, Dorman to Washington, no. 289, 18 February 1953.
16. Centre d’Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales [hereafter CARAN], Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d’août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
17. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2–1853, Dorman to Washington, no. 289, 18 February 1953.
18. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Situation Politique au Maroc (Mars 1953).
19. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Guillaume to Bidault, 16 March 1953. Guillaume added that the Moroccan nationalists were encouraged by the recent works of Charles-André Julien, a professor at the University of Sorbonne.
20. There were seven religious brotherhoods or *zaouia* in Morocco, who diverged from the orthodox path of pure Islam, and had always been distrusted by the Sultans as undermining the central spiritual authority of the throne. Maxwell, *Lords*, p. 218.

21. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/7-2253, American consulate, Bordeaux to the State Department, Dispatch no. 10, 22 July 1953. This information was brought by Saadek el-Glaoui, one of the sons of the Pasha of Marrakech, who was, however, critical of his father's attitude against the Sultan.
22. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 147-148.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
24. He was sent to Morocco by deputy while Guillaume was on leave.
25. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117, [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
26. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 139-140.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
29. French officials had failed to report it to Paris. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117, [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
30. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 224.
31. Maxwell, *Lords*, p. 219. Note that the ulama in Fez were prestigious because Fez was a religious city.
32. NARA, RG59, Lot58 D742 and 59 D237, Tunisia General Correspondence 1953 (Mangano File), Memorandum, Hickerson to the Secretary, 9 April 1953.
33. NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/4-953, Dulles to New York, no. 383, 9 April 1953.
34. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 651, Note pour le Secrétariat des Conférences, 9 April 1953.
35. TNA, FO371/102941, JF1041/29, New York to FO, no. 388, 19 May 1953.
36. TNA, FO371/102942, JF1041/29, FO to New York, no. 471, 26 May 1953; MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, Washington to Paris, no. 2730/2735, 14 April 1953.
37. NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/6-1053, Dulles to New York, no. 482, 10 June 1953.
38. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
39. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 234.
40. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/6-553, Dorman to the State Department, no. 430, 5 June 1953. The pashas and caids were officials nominated by the Sultan who chose them from a list of three candidates proposed by the Resident-General. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 234. Therefore Mohammed V's request to dismiss these feudal leaders was legal.
41. *Ibid.*, 1953, pp. 545-546.
42. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
43. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 86, Situation Politique au Maroc, June 1953.
44. *Ibid.* El-Glaoui added that the new Sultan would be chosen from the members of the Alaoui family by the caids.
45. NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/6-1053, Dulles to New York, no. 482, 10 June 1953; *The Times*, 3 June 1953. Dulles had just returned from his trip to 12 Near Eastern and South Asian countries. The FO agreed on the change of US tactics while the UN delegations of Britain and France remained opposed to revealing their intention because the two delegations estimated that the Arab-Asians were not likely to bring the problem to the UN. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 651, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 1245/1246, 12 June 1953; TNA, FO371/102942,

- JF1041/36, Jebb to FO, no. 443, 15 June 1953; FO to Washington, no. 2046, 15 June 1953.
46. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 611–613, Memcon, by Metcalf, 15 June 1953.
 47. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Situation Politique au Maroc (juin 1953); Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 144.
 48. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 260. El-Glaoui was in London and then in Paris.
 49. *Le Monde*, 23 July 1953.
 50. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 622–624, Dillon to the State Department, no. 695, 21 August 1953; pp. 614–615, Dillon to the State Department, no. 541, 12 August 1953. 'Certain Residency officials' include Philippe Boniface, Director of Interior and Contrôller Civil of Casablanca.
 51. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note, 22 August 1953.
 52. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre Pinay, no. 28, Paris to Rabat, no. 716/717, 4 August 1953. Bidault's message was addressed to de Blesson because Guillaume was on sick leave.
 53. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Rabat to Paris, no. 632/639, 5 August 1953.
 54. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Rabat to Paris, no. 653, 8 August 1953.
 55. *Le Monde*, 12 August 1953.
 56. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Rabat to Paris, no. 653, 8 August 1953.
 57. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 264, p. 547.
 58. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 614–615, Dillon to the State Department, no. 541, 12 August 1953.
 59. *Ibid.*, pp. 615–616, Dulles to the Embassy in France, no. 471, 12 August 1953.
 60. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/8–1253, Dulles to Paris, no. 508, 12 August 1953.
 61. De Margerie later told a British official of Paris's optimism to this effect. TNA, FO371/102975, JM1015/64, Harvey to FO, no. 291, 18 August 1953. This was the very content of the wishful thinking that the Americans had been afraid of. Roland Jacquin de Margerie was Deputy Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 62. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Bidault to Guillaume, no. 738/743, 13 August 1953.
 63. *Ibid.*
 64. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 156; *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 265.
 65. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Guillaume to Bidault, no. 753/755, 14 August 1953.
 66. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Rabat to Paris, no. 720/729, 16 August 1953.
 67. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 266.
 68. *Ibid.*, p. 266. The Sultan's message of 16 August stated that he was 'the only sovereign of Morocco and the only spiritual leader'.
 69. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 616–618, Dorman to the State Department, no. 32, 17 August 1953.
 70. *Ibid.*, pp. 618–619, The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Satterthwaite) to the State Department, no. 72, 17 August 1953.

71. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 86, Washington to Paris, no. 6318/6326, 18 August 1953.
72. TNA, FO371/102975, JM1015/64, Paris to FO, no. 291, 18 August 1953.
73. CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117 [Maroc, la crise d'août 1953], Note pour le M. Président Bidault, 17 August 1953.
74. This view was conveyed to the Americans. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 619–620, Dillon to the State Department, no. 624, 18 August 1953.
75. Maxwell, *Lords*, p. 225.
76. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 167.
77. Note that de Blesson had already notified Paris of this point on 8 August.
78. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 621–622, Dillon to the State Department, no. 672, 20 August 1953. Dillon noted: 'We do not believe that French government itself was guilty of any duplicity in this matter. ... [S]everal Ministers, notably Faure and Mitterrand were strongly opposed to taking action [to] depose Sultan but ... in final analysis all were unwilling to take decision [to] use force to impose a solution'. *Ibid.*, pp. 622–624, Dillon to the State Department, no. 695, 21 August 1953.
79. TNA, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey to FO, no. 289, 21 August 1953.
80. One ex-caïd, who had resigned in February 1953, informed the Americans in September 1953: 'the Berbers were wholeheartedly in favor of the former Sultan.' NARA, RG59, Lot72 D232, Entry 5169, Box 1 [UN General Assembly (Sept.-Dec. 1953) Morocco and Tunisia], Memorandum from Satterthwaite to Lodge, undated.
81. *FRUS* 1952–1954, XI, pp. 629–630, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, no. 80, 25 August 1953.
82. NARA, RG59, Lot58 D48, Box 5, Entry 1293, Memorandum to Byroade, 26 August 1954.
83. *FRUS* 1952–1954, XI, pp. 627–628, Dulles to the Embassy in France, no. 627, 24 August 1953.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 629–630, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, no. 80, 25 August 1953.
85. *YUN*, 1953, p. 203.
86. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/9–1653, Dillon to Dulles, no. 1094, 16 September 1953. Dillon continued that the Americans should 'keep the closest possible liaison with the French delegation' at the UNGA session, as he considered the US vote 'a basis [sic] and very important factor in Bidault's decision to push the EDC actively'. The American discreet attitude derived from their concern over the EDC.
87. As for details of the two councils, see MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 89, Rabat to Paris, 12 October 1955, no. 110/8; vol. 87, 'Les Relations de la France avec la Tunisie et le Maroc', no. 159AL, 18 October 1954.
88. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, pp. 283–284.
89. TNA, FO371/102977, M1015/108, Rabat to FO, Despatch no. 88, 30 September 1953. Dillon reported the details of the plan to Washington. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 632–634, Dillon to the State Department, no. 1088, 16 September 1953.
90. The Egyptian government had started 'The Voice of the Arabs' to advocate anti-imperialism on 4 July 1953. MAE, Levant 1944–1965, Egypte, vol. 484, Note, 12 April 1954.

91. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 190.
92. NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10-2053, Dulles to Paris, no. 1505, 20 October 1953.
93. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, XI, pp. 635-636, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 15 October 1953. This draft resolution received 32 votes to 22 with five abstentions, so did not obtain the two-thirds majority. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 299.
94. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 655, Hoppenot to MAE, 13 November 1953. The British noted that the French considered the situation in both Tunisia and Morocco to be more satisfactory than a year previously. TNA, FO371/102937, JF1015/33, FO Minute by Price, 8 December 1953.
95. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 161, Note Pour le Président du Conseil, 12 November 1954.
96. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 180.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 214.
99. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 229-234.
100. US newspapers reportedly welcomed this decision because he was a civil, not a military, officer, unlike his predecessors. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 3, Washington to Paris, no. 3230/3232, 22 May 1954.
101. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 3, Note, 8 June 1954.
102. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 227.
103. MAE Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 387, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 2118/2122, 15 December 1952. As for the Prefectural Council, see Chapter 1.
104. MAE Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 387, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 2142/2126, 15 December 1952.
105. MAE Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 387, Tunis to Paris, no. 2155/2158, 20 December 1952.
106. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 388, Hauteclocque to Schuman, no. 2033, 24 December 1952; Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 2193/2199, 27 December 1952; Letter to Bidault, 5 February 1953; *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 195.
107. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 392, Paris to Tunis, Evolution de la Situation en Tunisie depuis l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies de 1953, 24 September 1954.
108. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 388, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 175, 11 February 1953. Hauteclocque shared this observation with Chenik. Vol. 388, Hauteclocque to Paris, no. 462/464, 16 April 1953.
109. See Chapter 4, Section 3.
110. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre Pinay, no. 29, Note, 27 January 1953.
111. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 232.
112. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 388, MAE to the chiefs of diplomatic posts, no. 480AL, 15 May 1953; *FRUS* 1952-1955, XI, Dillon to the State Department, no. 5783, 4 May 1953.
113. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 233.
114. Périllier, *La Conquête*, pp. 176-177.
115. He was an ex-Governor-General of Algeria and was recognised as a liberal leader on colonial issues.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 178. Périllier himself participated in this committee. Catroux was to publish the so-called 'Catroux Plan' on 4 October, aimed at reaffirming

- the principle of Tunisian sovereignty. This was not adopted by the French government, however. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/10–953, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no. 53, 9 October 1953.
117. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 271.
 118. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/8–1453, LeBreton to the State Department, Despatch no. 26, 14 August 1953; 772.00/8–2153, LeBreton to the State Department, Despatch no. 28, 21 August 1953. A financial council was what had been envisaged in the June 1952 plan.
 119. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 285.
 120. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 388, Note 'situation en Tunisie', undated.
 121. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Bidault to the Bey, 10 May 1954.
 122. The French government deemed these agreements necessary because it feared that the Tunisian assembly designed in the June 1952 reforms might abrogate the protectorate treaty. However, no documents are available to show that Voizard had talks with the Tunisians on this subject. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 388, *Compte-rendu de la réunion tenue chez le Secrétaire d'Etat*, 14 September 1953.
 123. The French Council of Ministers made this decision on 24 September 1953. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 286.
 124. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 373, MAE to the Resident-General, no. 1203/AL, 2 September 1953. Those which submitted this memorandum were Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Thailand and Yemen.
 125. *L'Année Politique*, 1953, p. 287.
 126. TNA, FO371/102942, JF1041/48, FO to New York, no. 842, 19 September 1953.
 127. YUN 1953, p. 209. The US delegation voted against this.
 128. See above in this chapter.
 129. YUN 1953, p. 212.
 130. *Ibid.*, p. 212. The LA countries, the UK and the US voted against.
 131. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 373, Hoppenot to Paris, no. 3100/3101, 4 November 1953.
 132. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/10–1453, American Consulate General (Morris Hughes) to the State Department, Despatch no. 57, 14 October 1953.
 133. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/12–253, Paris to the State Department, Despatch no. 1467, 2 December 1953.
 134. Habib Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 136. The release was what had been suggested by René Coty, who became the new President of the French Republic on 16 January 1954. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 187.
 135. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
 136. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/1–1254, Paris to the State Department, 12 January 1953.
 137. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/3–154, Paris to Dulles, no. 3132, 1 March 1954.
 138. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Note pour le Président par la Direction d'Afrique-Levant, 27 February 1954.
 139. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 194.
 140. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 197.
 141. This note agreed with Voizard, who proposed that Bourguiba be transferred to Corsica.

142. The Franco-Tunisian customs union would be concluded when the Agreements on the latter's internal autonomy were signed in June 1955, and would remain valid after its independence was recognised in March 1956.
143. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Tunis to Paris, no. 172/176, 4 March 1954.
144. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/2–1954, Paris to the State Department, no. 2150, 19 February 1954.
145. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/3–1754, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no. 182, 17 March 1954.
146. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie*, 1952–1956, p. 209.
147. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Note, La Situation en Tunisie, 23 March 1954.
148. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, pp. 195–196.
149. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Note, La Situation en Tunisie, 23 March 1954.
150. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 200; MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Note, Evolution de la Situation en Tunisie depuis l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, 24 September 1954.
151. TNA, FO371/108587, JF1015/22, Williams to Bromley, 665/601/21, 28 April 1954.
152. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Voizard to Paris, no. 383/390, 31 March 1954.
153. *Le Monde*, 4–5 April 1954.
154. TNA, FO371/108587, JF1015/23, Williams to Bromley, 29 April 1954.
155. See Chapter 4, Section 4.
156. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Etude Critique des Décrets du 4 Mars 1954.

6 Tunisia's Internal Autonomy

1. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/5–1254, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no. 29, 12 May 1954.
2. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Note pour le Président, no. 97, 20 May 1954. The fall of Dien-Bien-Phu was on 7 May 1954.
3. MAE, Tunisie 1954–1955, vol. 389, Note, 10 May 1954.
4. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 217. A similar expression is found in *Le Monde*, 5 May 1954.
5. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Note pour le Président, no. 97, 20 May 1954. The Neo-Destour had, though, announced their indecision on the participation in elections in April 1954. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie*, 1952–1956, p. 204.
6. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 203.
7. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie*, 1952–1956, pp. 226–227.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 226–236. Neo-Destour leaders had been informed of Bourguiba's ideas, *Ibid.*, p. 228.
9. *Le Monde*, 23–24 May 1954.
10. *Ibid.*, 29 May–2 June 1954; *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 219. Bourguiba's analysis of the Voizard plan was published in *l'Express* on 29 May. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie*, 1952–1956, pp. 235–236, 348–354.

11. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Note pour le Secrétaire d'Etat, 1 June 1954.
12. This statement was published in *Paris-Match* on 4 June. *Le Monde*, 5 June 1954.
13. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Tunis to Paris, no. 724/726, 9 June 1954.
14. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Paris to Tunis, no. 340/342, 11 June 1954.
15. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 226.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
17. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Voizard to Paris, no. 767/768, 16 June 1954.
18. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/6–1654, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no. 268, 16 June 1954.
19. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 226.
20. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 375, Note pour le Ministre, 17 June 1954.
21. TNA, FO371/108588, JF1015/50, 'French North Africa', 17 June 1954.
22. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 209; TNA, FO371/108588, JF1015/46, Tunis to FO, no. 901/601/48, 19 June 1954.
23. He had previously advocated that the government resume negotiations with North African nationalists. *Le Monde*, 18 June 1954.
24. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 232.
25. Lacouture noted that Mendès-France had talks with his advisers around 23 and 24 June. Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France* (Paris: Seuil, 1981), pp. 246–247.
26. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Note pour le Ministre, 26 June 1954.
27. As a parliamentarian of the SFIO, he was well known for his pro-Bourguiba stance. In January 1954, he had declared 'there will never be a solution [to the Tunisian question] against or without Bourguiba.' Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 196.
28. Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, pp. 246–247. No official record can be found concerning the Savary–Bourguiba talks. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
29. *Le Monde*, 10 July 1954.
30. *Ibid.*, 7 July to 10 July 1954.
31. *Ibid.*, 17 July 1954.
32. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Note pour le Ministre, 16 July 1954.
33. *Ibid.*
34. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 389, Note pour le Ministre, 28 July 1954.
35. In fact, by October 1954, the Quai d'Orsay would start exploring a way of reactivating the High Council of the French Union, an organisation that was then a dead letter. Indeed, as a result of the recognition of Tunisia's internal autonomy, the French now had to make the High Council more attractive to the Tunisians so that they would accept participation in it. CARAN, 115AJ/39 Territoires d'Outre-mer/Union Française 1, 1/1/1 (cote provisoire), Note pour M le Président, 5 October 1954.
36. Yet the French were to pay the price of securing its participation in the Union which had to be restructured thereby. See below.
37. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 374, Tunis to Marotuni, no. 54, 17 July 1954.
38. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/7–2754, Paris to Dulles, no. 376, 27 July 1954; 772.00/7–3054, Dulles to Paris, no. 3067, 30 July 1954.

39. Mendès-France's position was supported by Faure and Mitterrand but opposed by General Kœnig, who feared that a future Tunisian assembly might demand independence without strong links with France. Périllier, *La Conquête*, pp. 214–215.
40. Juin accompanied Mendès-France in order to show French settlers that Paris was not intent on abandoning them.
41. The original text is 'L'autonome interne de l'Etat tunisien est reconnue et proclamé sans arrière-pensée par le gouvernement français.... [N]ous sommes prêts à transférer à des personnes et à des institutions tunisiennes l'exercice interne de la souveraineté.' MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 390, la Déclaration de Carthage.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 255.
44. *Documents Diplomatiques Français* [hereafter *DDF*], 1954, Doc. 184, p. 186, n. 1.
45. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 227.
46. Of four Neo-Destour members, Slim and Mohammed Masmoudi were Ministers of State in charge of negotiation. The other Minister of State for negotiation, Aziz Djelloui, was not from the party. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 548.
47. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 84, Boisseson to Fouchet, no. 269, 20 August 1954.
48. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Boisseson to Marotuni, no. 254/256, 16 August 1954; vol. 375, Note, La Situation en Tunisie depuis le 1^{er} août 1954, 23 August 1954.
49. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 187.
50. Périllier, *La Conquête*, pp. 210–211.
51. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Note, 'Franco-Tunisian negotiations under way following approval by the National Assembly of French policy in Tunisia', 7 September 1954.
52. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/8–2654, Office Memorandum, 26 August 1954.
53. In the course of negotiations, the Military and the Diplomatic Agreements would be absorbed into the General Agreement'.
54. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Fouchet, no. 359/362, 10 September 1954.
55. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Fouchet, no. 237, 13 September 1954.
56. Périllier, *La Conquête*, p. 226. Bourguiba added: 'Remember "Destour" precisely means "Constitution"'.
 57. *Ibid.*, p. 243. Gabriel Puaux was a leader of French settlers.
58. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 179, Latour to Fouchet, no. 238, 14 September 1954.
59. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Marotuni, no. 381/384, 11 September 1954.
60. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Fouchet, no. 405/407, 14 September 1954.
61. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 179, Latour to Fouchet, no. 238, 14 September 1954.
62. *Ibid.*, doc. 173, p. 356, n. 2.
63. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Note, 2 October 1954.
64. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 227, Fouchet to Latour, no. 214/219, 27 September 1954.
65. *Ibid.*, doc. 238, Mendès-France to MAE, no. 3993/3994, 2 October 1954. On the same day, Fouchet instructed Latour to make plans to that effect.

66. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Fouchet, no. 524/529, 3 October 1954.
67. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 238, n. 3.
68. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 267.
69. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 243, Latour to Fouchet, no. 539/550, 4 October 1954.
70. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Note, 2 October 1954. Discussions had not started on the Cultural Agreement and the Economic and Financial Agreement.
71. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, pp. 266–267.
72. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 376, Latour to Paris, no. 637/640, 17 October 1954.
73. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 304, Seydoux to Fouchet, no. 739/747, 29 October 1954.
74. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 264.
75. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 313, Seydoux to Fouchet, no. 766/777, 4 November 1954.
76. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Paris, no. 819/827, 9 November 1954.
77. TNA, FO371/113789, JF1015/2, Intelligence Brief, no. 1714, 18 November 1954.
78. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 278.
79. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 266.
80. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 346, Latour to Fouchet, no. 867/869, 15 November 1954.
81. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 267.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 266; MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Bonnet to Paris, no. 6447, 16 November 1954.
83. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 376, Faure to Mendès-France, 17 November 1954.
84. CARAN, 115AJ/43 Tunisie II/5 (cote provisoire), Négociations Questions diverses, C) Débats sur la Tunisie du 10/12/54, Mendès-France to Faure, Fouchet, Pélabon, no. 6526/6529, 19 November 1954.
85. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Note, 18 November 1954.
86. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 897–898, The Chargé in France to the State Department, no. 2182, 22 November 1954.
87. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 386, p. 795, n. 1.
88. *Ibid.*, doc. 385, Latour to Fouchet, no. 962/968, 26 November 1954.
89. *Ibid.*, doc. 432, Latour to Fouchet, no. 1055/1060, 10 December 1954.
90. TNA, FO371/108589, JF1015/123, Tunis to FO, no. 29, 8 December 1954.
91. *YUN* 1954, pp. 82–83. Three abstentions came from Australia, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
93. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 392, Latour to Paris, no. 802/805, 6 November 1954.
94. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 7, Instructions du Ministère des Affaires Marocaines et Tunisiennes au Ministre Délégué de France à Tunis, 5 January 1955.
95. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 176.
96. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 394, Note, sur les Territoires Militaire du Sud Tunisien; vol. 393, Paris to Tunis, no. 340/346, 11 April 1955.
97. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 393, Paris to Tunis, no. 5, 5 January 1955.
98. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 377, Situation Politique en Tunisie (janvier 1955).

99. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 394, Latour to Paris, no. 160/171, 14 January 1955.
100. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 393, Latour to Paris, no. 229/240, 18 January 1955.
101. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 176–177. However, they refused to allow the Resident-General to nominate the caids, a right which should, in their view, belong to their government.
102. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 377, Latour to Marotuni, no. 406/407, 8 February 1955.
103. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 377, Situation Politique en Tunisie (février 1955).
104. *DDF*, 1955, I, Seydoux to July, no. 637/645, 11 March 1955.
105. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 393, Seydoux to Paris, no. 699/704, 13 March 1955.
106. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, pp. 311–312.
107. TNA, FO371/113790, JF1016/24, Williams to Bromley, no. 410/601/24, 25 March 1955; *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 220.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 220–221.
109. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 312.
110. Faure had seemingly reached the conclusion in early April that Bourguiba's participation should be allowed. Edgar Faure, *Mémoires II*, pp. 179–184, 191–196.
111. The British appreciated Faure's courage and realism in inviting Bourguiba to the negotiations. TNA, FO371/113790, JF1016/32, Jebb to FO, no. 158, 22 April 1955. As for the text of the Agreements, see *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 643.
112. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 288. He also accepted that French be the second official language; *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 223.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
114. Shortly before this, the French National Assembly had passed a resolution on 24 May declaring that Title VIII of the Constitution was *révisable*. Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, p. 221.
115. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 393, Paris to Tunis, no. 340/346, 11 April 1955.
116. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 393, Latour to Paris, no. 1211/1222, 29 April 1955.

7 The Restoration of Mohammed V

1. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 239.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
3. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 23, Lacoste to Mendès-France, no. 192, 30 July 1954.
4. CARAN, 115AJ/37 Cartonniers DPMF, Maroc 2, 2/V/3 (cote provisoire), 'opinion' Entretien – Sous-chemise <Balafrej>, Note sur nos conversations avec Hadj Ahmed Balafrej – Genève, 8 August 1954.
5. Together with Si Fatmi Ben Slimane, the former pasha of Fez, he pledged loyalty to Mohammed V in August 1953, and therefore was obliged to resign after the deposition.

6. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 217.
7. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 86, Situation politique au Maroc en Août 1954. Lacoste to Fouchet, no. 529, 22 August 1955.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 252.
10. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 144, p. 289, n. 3. Mohammed V had requested his return with his sons to France in a letter to Mendès-France dated 25 June 1954; doc. 2, Note du Ministère des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 22 July 1954.
11. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 88, Situation politique au Maroc et en Tunisie (septembre 1954), 27 October 1954.
12. *Ibid.*; *DDF*, 1954, doc. 287, p. 595.
13. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 3, Fouchet to Lacoste, 8 September 1954
14. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 655, Mendès to Fouchet, no. 182/SC, 21 September 1954.
15. They were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. *YUN*, 1954, pp. 84–85.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
17. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, pp. 657–658, Memorandum by Byroade and Merchant to Dulles, 15 October 1954.
18. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10–2154, State Department to American legation, Tangier, no. 74, 21 October 1954. Hoover to Tangier, no. 74, 21 October 1954.
19. This was the plan that had been examined in Paris since early 1954. See Chapter 5, Section 3, Izard was a lawyer and a close friend of Mohammed V.
20. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 229–234.
21. Henri Dubois-Roquebert was a personal physician of the ex-Sultan. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
22. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 287, p. 596, n. 1; Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 229–235.
23. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 335, Lacoste to Fouchet, no. 1146/1158, 11 November 1954.
24. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 161, Mendès-France to Marotuni, no. 6582, 20 November 1954. See also MAE, Levant 1945–1965, Egypte, vol. 484, Washington to Paris, no. 6515/6521, 18 November 1954.
25. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter DDEL], White House Office NSC Staff; Papers, 1948–61, OCB Central Files Series, Box. No. 61, OCB091.4 Africa, (File #1) (2), [3.1954–11.1956], 'Detailed Development of Major Actions Relating to US policy on French North Africa.', 14 April 1955.
26. NARA, RG59, Lot58 D45, Entry 1293, Box 2 [French Policy], Memcon, 19 October 1954. In addition, it can be assumed that the forthcoming debates on German rearmament in the French National Assembly, scheduled at the end of December 1954, made Dulles feel the necessity of removing French difficulties.
27. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 161, Bonnet to Paris, no. 6740/47, 29 November 1954. Bonnet reported that not only Radio Cairo but the Egyptian press changed their tone. It was also reported from Madrid that the US Ambassador supposed Franco had just decided to modify his French policy and that the High Commissioner would renounce his anti-French campaign. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 161, La Tournelle to Paris, no. 709/710, 2 December 1954.

28. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 426, Bonnet to Mendès-France, no. 7011/7013, 9 December 1954.
29. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, p. 662, Dulles to Lodge, no. 316, 11 December 1954.
30. *DDF*, 1954, doc. 443, Hoppenot to Mendès-France, no. 3532/353, 13 December 1954; *UNGA Official Records*, vol. 9, 1954, First Committee, p. 518.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 534. On 29 June 1954, in relation to Indochinese affairs but without nominating any countries, US President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister Churchill had issued a declaration to affirm the principle of the unification of diverse nations through free elections. *Ibid.*, doc. 443, p. 906, n. 1.
32. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, XI, p. 662, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, 11 December 1954, n. 3.
33. This was in substance 'Regency Council'. The Quai preferred the term 'Throne Council' because 'Regency' implied the existence of a Sultan, and thereby Mohammed V's return.
34. Hereafter I will use the term 'close links' as a translation of '*interdépendance*'.
35. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 255; Georges Izard, 'Le "Secret" d'Antsirabé', in *Etudes Méditerranées*, no. 4 (printemps, 1958).
36. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 26, Lacoste to Fouchet, no. 110 (1 to 5, 7), 12 January 1955. Particularly in Casablanca, December 1954 saw a series of attacks, killing three people. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 289.
37. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 26, p. 75.
38. *Ibid.* doc. 26, p. 77.
39. *Ibid.* doc. 26, p. 79.
40. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 91, Situation politique au Maroc (février 1955).
41. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 131, Lacoste to July, no. 545/560, 15 March 1955.
42. TNA, FO371/113831, JM1016/13, Casablanca to Hayman, 24P/55, 14 March 1955.
43. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 213.
44. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 280, Lacoste to July, no. 1517/1–2, 14 May 1955.
45. The Algerian situation so deteriorated that the French National Assembly passed an act declaring a state of emergency on 31 March. The Bandung Conference was held from 18 to 24 April, indicating the heightening of Third World anti-colonialism.
46. At that time there was already a rumour that Paris was considering Arafat's deposition. On 9 May, el-Glaoui declared to the press: 'the question of the sultanate was religious, which excluded any external interference'. *Ibid.*, no. 280, p. 640, n. 1.
47. Edgar Faure, *Mémoires II* (Paris: Plon, 1984), p. 265.
48. The other principal members of this Committee were Marshal Juin, General Marie-Pierre Kœnig (Minister of War), Maurice Bourguès-Maunoury (Minister of Interior), Pierre Pflimlin (Minister of Finance).
49. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 325, Lacoste to Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, no. 1802/1807, 7 June 1955.
50. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 89, Lacoste to July, no. 1909/1917, 12 June 1955.
51. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 246.
52. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 343, p. 779, n. 1. It seems that a few days before 20 June, Izard had revealed to Faure the outline of the plan drawn up at Antsirabé.

- Izard, 'Le "Secret" d'Antsirabé', *Etudes Méditerranées*, no. 4 (printemps, 1958), p. 74.
53. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, pp. 245–246.
 54. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/6, Paris to the Western Department, FO, no. 10723/37/55, 24 June 1955.
 55. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/1, Minute by Ramsden, 24 June 1955; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers 1951–1959 Box no. 3, Dillon to Dulles, 16 June 1955.
 56. DDEL, Dulles, John Foster Secretary of State: Papers 1951–1959, Subject Series Box no. 6 North African Survey – 1955 Julius Holmes [re U.S. policy toward North African countries], Dillon to Dulles, 16 June 1955. On 25 May, Paris had asked Washington to consent regarding the transfer of the helicopters provided for French use in Indochina to Algeria, but the American reply was not favourable. *DDF*, 1955, I, doc. 300, Pinay to Couve de Murville, no. 7878/7881, 26 May 1955; doc. 351, MAE to Washington, no. 9205/9210, 20 June 1955.
 57. NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/6–2355, London to State Department, despatch no. 3764, 23 June 1955.
 58. TNA, FO371/113803, JF1051/3, Jebb to Eden, 23 March 1955.
 59. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/5, Makins to Kirkpatrick, no. 10643/1/55/55, 30 June 1955.
 60. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/6, Paris to Western Department, no. 10723/37/55, 24 June 1955; *DDF*, 1955, II, vol. 354, MAE to Guiringaud, no. 89/104, 22 June 1955.
 61. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/1, Jebb to FO, no. 241, 25 June 1955.
 62. NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/7–255, Paris to Dulles, no. 24, 2 July 1955.
 63. NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/7–555, Tangier to Dulles, no. 2, 5 July 1955.
 64. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 27, July to Faure, 12 July 1955.
 65. It is unclear what this phrase meant, but undoubtedly the French never accepted the idea that Moroccan sovereignty could be achieved outside the French Union.
 66. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 27.
 67. *Ibid.*, 1955, II, doc. 28, Grandval to July, no. 2326/2333, 13 July 1955.
 68. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 265. His argument is based on Grandval's memoirs.
 69. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 63, Grandval to July, no. 2542/2545, 28 July 1955.
 70. *Ibid.*, doc. 75, Grandval to July, no. 2594/2600, 2 August 1955.
 71. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/7, Jebb to FO, 18 July 1955.
 72. DDEL, Papers 1951–1959, Subject Series Box no. 6 North African Survey – 1955 Julius Holmes [re US policy toward North African countries], Dulles to Dillon, 13 July 1955.
 73. They were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. *YUN*, 1955, pp. 63–65.
 74. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 98, Pinay to diplomatic representatives, circular no. 62, 9 August 1955.
 75. *Ibid.*, doc. 76, Grandval to July, no. 2601/2645, 2 August 1955. In his plan, a new Sultan would be established after two years' absence.
 76. *Ibid.*, doc. 76.

77. He pointed to this danger in his letter of 27 August to Coty. TNA, FO371/113834, JM1016/122, Reilly to FO, no. 359, 2 September 1955.
78. DDF, 1955, II, doc. 80, Note de la Direction générale au Ministère des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 3 August 1955.s
79. 'Khalifa' here meant a deputy of the Sultan, not the ruler in Spanish Morocco.
80. He had been Grandval's suggestion for the Prime Minister. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, p. 265.
81. FRUS, 1955–1957, XVIII, doc. 28, Paris to the State Department, no. 526, 4 August 1955.
82. NARA, RG59, CDF 771.00/7–2155, Dillon to Dulles, no. 282, 21 July 1955.
83. FRUS, 1955–1957, XVIII, doc. 28, Paris to the State Department, no. 526, 4 August 1955.
84. Ibid., doc. 182, Paris to the State Department, no. 489, 2 August 1955.
85. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/11, Paris to FO, no. 290, 4 August 1955.
86. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/10, Makins to FO, no. 1790, 1 August 1955. MDAP stands for Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
87. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/10(b), FO to Washington, no. 3158, 3 August 1955.
88. DDF, 1955, II, doc. 99, Couve de Murville to Pinay, no. 4217/4228, 9 August 1955.
89. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71A/7–2655, Tangier to Dulles, no. 36, 26 July 1955.
90. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/10(b), Ramsden Minute, 2 August 1955. Using newspapers had originally been Jebb's idea.
91. Faure, *Mémoires II*, pp. 391–392.
92. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/7–2855, Paris to Dulles, no. 419, 28 July 1955.
93. FRUS, 1955–1957, XVIII, doc. 28, Paris to the State Department, no. 526, 4 August 1955.
94. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/14, Makins to London, no. 464, 18 August 1955. However, Dulles added to the British: 'I do not believe we should close our minds to the possibility that some positive action may become necessary'.
95. DDEL, Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State: Papers 1951–1959, Subject Series Box no. 6 North African Survey – 1955 Julius Holmes [re U.S. policy toward North African countries], Dillon to Dulles, 16 June 1955.
96. Gilbert Grandval, *Ma Mission au Maroc* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956), p. 193; CARAN, Edgar Faure, 505APII, 345, Maroc [Août 1955, Comité de Coordination], untitled, undated.
97. TNA FO371/113833, Paris to FO, no. 309, 15 August 1955.
98. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 276–277.
99. Grandval, *Ma Mission*, p. 201.
100. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 292–296. However, it is difficult to interpret that Faure expected his restoration would be realised in a few months, as it actually was. The abolition of the Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs on 20 October 1955 seemed to indicate that, in French judgement, the establishment of the Throne Council settled the matter for the time being. See below in this chapter.
101. DDF, 1955, II, doc. 107, p. 241, n. 1.

102. *Ibid.*, doc. 113, Grandval to July, no. 2855/2861, 17 August 1955; doc. 117, Grandval to July, no. 2884/2887, 18 August 1955.
103. *Ibid.*, doc. 116, p. 259, n. 1, Grandval to July, no. 2873/2878, 17 August 1955.
104. *Ibid.*, doc. 118, Grandval to July, no. 2894/2899, 18 August 1955.
105. *Ibid.*, doc. 129, p. 296, n. 2. Sending invitations on the meeting to Moroccan leaders was first announced on this day. TNA, FO371/113833, JM1016/92, Reilly to FO, no. 327, 20 August 1955.
106. There is no document available regarding French soundings of the nationalist parties about the forthcoming Aix-les-Bains meeting.
107. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 131, p. 302, n. 2.
108. *Ibid.*, doc. 144, Note, Conversations franco-marocaines d'Aix-les-Bains, 27 August 1955.
109. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 263. Perhaps deliberately, no French sources mentioned the second point which was considered to trigger the fiercest opposition from French right-wing politicians. TNA, FO371/113834, JM1016/109, Paris to FO, no. 337, 29 August 1955.
110. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 125, Lucet to Pinay, no. 1530/1538, 19 August 1955.
111. They were: Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, India, and Burma.
112. *Ibid.*, doc. 135, Lucet to Pinay, no. 1580/1586, 24 August 1955.
113. *Ibid.*, doc. 149, Alphand to Pinay, no. 1672/1677, 30 August 1955.
114. *YUN*, 1955, p. 64
115. *Le Monde*, 31 August 1955.
116. On 23 August Grandval had already asked the government to accept his resignation. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 3, Grandval to July, no. 33/42, 23 August 1955.
117. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 150, Instructions du Gouvernement au Général Boyer de Latour Résident général de France au Maroc, 30 August 1955.
118. Securing el-Mokri's participation was considered fundamental in showing the continuity of the Sharifian State.
119. At the Aix-les Bains meeting, though, it had been agreed that the Istiqlal would not participate in the government until after Mohammed V's transfer to France, but nevertheless give support to the government. *Ibid.*, doc. 144, Note de M. Duhamel, Conversations franco-marocaines d'Aix-les-Bains, p. 366.
120. *Ibid.*, doc. 165, circular no. 68, Pinay to French diplomatic representatives, 3 September 1955.
121. *Ibid.*, doc. 157, Instructions to Catroux and Yrissou, 1 September 1955.
122. *Ibid.*, doc. 171, Latour to July, no. 3174/3177, 6 September 1955.
123. *Ibid.*, doc. 198, Latour to July, no. 3209/3210, 10 September 1955.
124. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 269.
125. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 185, Teitgen to Soucadaux, no. 162/166, 8 September 1955.
126. *Ibid.*, doc. 188, Soucadaux to Teitgen, 9 September 1955.
127. *Ibid.*, doc. 190, Soucadaux to Teitgen, no. 347/352, 9 September 1955.
128. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 269–270.
129. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 190. In Catroux's comment, 'this federal status' meant the Moroccan status as had been defined in the third paragraph of the draft dated 8 September.
130. *L'Année Politique*, 1954, p. 297.

131. This agreement was publicised at the beginning of November 1955, when Moroccan independence seemed imminent. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 270; *Le Monde*, 8 November 1955.
132. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pinay, vol. 13, Position Anglaise sur la Question Arabe, undated.
133. Note that British officials used 'federal' in a different meaning from what Catroux meant. By this word, the former meant an organisation with each territory being led to sovereignty while the latter meant assimilationist policy consistent with the original spirit of the French Union.
134. Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aff. Pol. 2223/8, Entretiens Ministériels Franco-Britanniques, 25 October 1954.
135. Kent, *The Internationalization*, p. 299.
136. *Ibid.*, pp. 306–307; Joseph Roger de Benoist, *L'Afrique Occidentale Française de 1944 à 1960* (Dakar, 1982), pp. 162–163.
137. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, *Faites entrer le témoin suivant: 1940–1958, De la Résistance à la V^e République* (Ouest-France, 1988), p. 464.
138. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 204, Pinay to de La Tournelle, no. 705/708, 12 September 1955.
139. Spain sent its representative to this Committee. See also Chapter 1.
140. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 205, Pinay to Latour, no. 1231/1233, 12 September 1955.
141. *Ibid.*, doc. 213, MAE to Tournelle, no. 722/726, 14 September 1955.
142. *Ibid.*, doc. 225, p. 525, n. 3.
143. *Ibid.*, doc. 225, Tanger to July, no. 164/167, 18 September 1955.
144. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9–2055, Hoover to Tangier, no. 154, 20 September 1955; 771.00/9–2155, Tangier to Dulles, no. 141, 21 September 1955.
145. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 196, July to Latour, no. 1200/1203, 10 September 1955.
146. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 271.
147. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 223, Réunion du samedi 17 septembre chez M. July, Procès-verbal.
148. *Ibid.*, doc. 221, Latour to July, no. 3171/3173, 16 September 1955.
149. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/18, Conversation between the Secretary of State and Holmes on October 6. Holmes noted: 'M. Faure's Aix proposals... were at once torpedoed by members of his own Cabinet who had telephoned to their friends in Morocco.'
150. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 227, Panafieu to July, no. 3290/3291, 20 September 1955.
151. *Ibid.*, doc. 235, Latour to July, no. 3297/3302, 22 September 1955. Pierre Montel was the Chairman of the Committee of National Defence in the National Assembly.
152. *Ibid.*, doc. 240, n. 3.
153. *Ibid.*, doc. 234, Pinay to Tournelle, no. 763/765, 22 September 1955.
154. The Bureau consisted of the GA President and vice presidents and presidents of the seven committees. Its recommendations had to be confirmed by GA plenary meetings. *Le Monde*, 23 September 1955.
155. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 233, July to Latour, no. 1318/1320, 22 September 1955.
156. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9–1255, Dillon to Dulles, no. 1123, 12 September 1955.
157. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 237, July to Latour, no. 1331/1334, 23 September 1955.

158. *Ibid.*, doc. 250, July to Latour, no. 1361/1364, 27 September 1955.
159. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9–2955, Dillon to Dulles, no. 1445, 29 September 1955.
160. Before departure, Arafa announced that he turned over to his cousin Moulay Abdallah Ben Moulay Abu Hafid the job relating to the Crown. That is, he officially refused to recognise the Throne Council's legitimacy by delegating his power to his cousin. This allowed the *Présence française* to do so. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 273–275, 283–284.
161. *UNGA Official Record*, vol. 10, Plenary Meetings, p. 154.
162. However, seeing Moroccan independence probable, the GA plenary meeting decided in December 1955 to postpone further consideration of the item by 51 votes to none, with five abstentions. *YUN* 1955, p. 63–65.
163. TNA, FO371/113835, JM1016/151, Jebb to FO, no. 382, 29 September 1955.
164. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 259, July to Latour, no. 1418, 1 October 1955.
165. *Ibid.* doc. 275, p. 617, n. 2.
166. This was organised in the Rif by Moroccan nationalists and was operating in liaison with Algerian nationalists. Roger Le Tourneau, *Évolution Politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane 1920–1961* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962), p. 245.
167. Pierre Boyer de Latour, *Vérités sur l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1956), p. 173.
168. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 275, p. 617, n. 2.
169. *Ibid.*, doc. 271, p. 610, n. 1.
170. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, XVIII, doc. 29, Memorandum, Holmes to Dulles, 29 September 1955.
171. *Ibid.*, doc. 184, Memorandum of a Conversation, State Department, 3 October 1955.
172. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/18, Conversation between the Secretary of State and Holmes, 6 October 1955.
173. TNA, PREM11/951, Conversation between the Secretary of State and the American Ambassador, 14 October 1955.
174. TNA, FO371/113806, JF1072/20, FO Minute by Phillip, 5 October 1955.
175. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9–2955, Allen to Tangier, no. 201, 20 October 1955. Note that the Istiqlal slightly increased its demand in early September from 'the status of independent sovereign country (*au statut indépendant et souveraine*)' to 'independence'. See this chapter, Section 3.
176. He, too, was voicing opposition to the Aix-les-Bains agreements. *Le Monde*, 6 October 1955.
177. *Ibid.*, 7 October 1955.
178. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 287.
179. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
180. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 332, p. 739, n. 1.
181. *Le Monde*, 9/10 October 1955.
182. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 328–329.
183. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 273, Madrid to Pinay, no. 1882/SGL, 4 October 1955.
184. *Ibid.*, doc. 304, Melilla to Pinay, no. 179/AL, 15 October 1955.
185. *Le Monde*, 22 October 1955.
186. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 309, p. 687, n. 1.
187. *Ibid.*, doc. 309, Pinay to diplomatic representatives, 18 October 1955.

188. *Ibid.*, doc. 332, Note of Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, 25 October 1955.
189. *Ibid.*, doc. 332.
190. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 288–289.
191. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 334, Rabat to Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, no. 3644/3655, 26 October 1955; *ibid.*, doc. 334, p. 744, n. 1.
192. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10–755, Rabat to Dulles, no. 184, 27 October 1955.
193. Both governments announced that this was a commercial deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in order to disguise the Soviets' direct involvement.
194. In the British Cabinet meeting, Macmillan warned that 'in the Middle East the Russians had clearly embarked on a deliberate policy of opening up another front in the cold war.' TNA, CM 36(55), 20 October 1955.
195. In fact, Egypt signed a military pact with Syria on 20 October. The pact aimed to provide for a unified army and military installations, and to include Saudi Arabia. TNA, FO371/115525, V 1073/1151, Damascus to FO, no. 414, 22 October 1955; FO371/115526, V 1073/1184, Damascus to FO, no. 121, 26 October 1955.
196. TNA, FO371/113836, JM1016/189, Jebb to Macmillan, no. 407, 26 October 1955.

8 Towards the Recognition of Independence

1. Ryo Ikeda, 'The Paradox of Independence: The Maintenance of Influence and the French Decision to Transfer Power in Morocco', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35/4 (2007).
2. *Le Monde*, 28 October 1955; NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/11355, Rabat to Dulles, no. 191, 3 November 1955.
3. MAE, Afrique Levant 1944–1959, Maroc 1953–1959, vol. 4, 'Sultan Ben Youssef', Washington to Paris, no. 6084/87, 27 October 1955.
4. *DDF*, 1955, II, no. 342, Note du MAE, 31 October 1955.
5. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/11–355, Rabat to Dulles, no. 191, 3 November 1955.
6. TNA, FO371/113836 JM1016/208, Rabat to Macmillan, no. 81, 7 November 1955.
7. *Le Monde*, 1 November 1955.
8. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 346, Note du MAE, 4 November 1955.
9. The original text is 'au statut d'état indépendant uni à la France par les liens permanents d'une interdépendance librement consentie et définie'. *Ibid.*, doc. 369, p. 817, n. 4.
10. *Ibid.*, doc. 353, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 9 November 1955.
11. *Le Monde*, 9 November 1955.
12. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 366, p. 812, n. 2.
13. MAE, Maroc 1950–1955, vol. 92, Situation politique au Maroc (novembre 1955).
14. *Ibid.*

15. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 3 Annexe, La Tournelle to Dubois, no. 342, 31 December 1955. Spanish attitudes could be grounded on another motivation. They admitted to the Americans that he had 'frequently criticised the Monarchy for having thrown away the Spanish empire'. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/1-1356, Madrid to the State Department, no. 730, 13 January 1956.
16. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 335, La Tournelle to Pinay, no. 503/504, 27 October 1955.
17. MAE, Afrique Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, doc. 21, La Tournelle to Pinay, no. 2134/EU, 17 November 1955.
18. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10-2955, Hoover to Geneva, no. 34, 29 October 1955.
19. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 359, Note du Département, 11 November 1955.
20. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 301.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
22. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
23. *Le Monde*, 23 November 1955.
24. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 369, Pinay to La Tournelle, no. 958/963, 17 November 1955.
25. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 302.
26. *Le Monde*, 24 November 1955.
27. Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 252. The French National Assembly was dissolved on 2 December 1955.
28. French governmental sources do not indicate the date of the party's acceptance, but it was probably on 28 November 1955. *Le Monde*, 29 November 1955; MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
29. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 404, Pinay to Dubois, no. 2094/2100, 2 December 1955.
30. *Ibid.*, doc. 399, p. 886 n. 1.
31. *Ibid.*, doc. 408, Dubois to Pinay, no. 4167/4177, 6 December 1955.
32. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 162, De Blesson to Pinay, 12 December 1955.
33. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pinay, vol. 28, Note pour le Secrétaire d'État, no. 1508, 9 November 1955.
34. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 162, Conversations avec M Dulles au sujet de l'Afrique du Nord, 6 December 1955.
35. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 162, Note pour le Président, 13 December 1955.
36. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 162, Conversations Franco-Américaines, 17 December 1955.
37. For details, see Olivier Pottier, 'Les bases américaines au Maroc au temps de la guerre froide (1950-1963): un face à face Franco-Américain', *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, 2003, n° 1.
38. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 308.
39. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 436, Dubois to Pinay, no. 1132/CC, 21 December 1955.
40. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/12-955, Dillon to Dulles, no. 2775, 9 December 1955. See also Chapter 6, Section 3.
41. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
42. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 406, La Tournelle to Pinay, no. 639/646, 4 December 1955.

43. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/12–1555, Madrid to the State Department, no. 597, 15 December 1955.
44. *Le Monde*, 17 December 1955.
45. MAE, Afrique Levant, Maroc 1953–1959, vol. 21, Madrid to Paris, no. 2305/EU, 21 December 1955.
46. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/12–955, Dillon to Dulles, no. 2775, 9 December 1955.
47. *DDF*, 1955, II, doc. 438, Dubois to Pinay, no. 4365/4368, 22 December 1955.
48. MAE, Maroc 1956–1968, vol. 199, note, a.s. Signature de la convention d'aide financière au Maroc, 4 January 1956.
49. TNA, FO371/119348, JF1015/10, FO Minute by Watson, 10 January 1956.
50. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 14, Dubois to Pinay, no. 80/98, 11 January 1956.
51. *Ibid.*, doc. 16, p. 32, n. 1.
52. *Ibid.*, doc. 16, Dubois to Pinay, no. 106/118, 12 January 1956.
53. *Ibid.*, doc. 16, p. 32, n. 1.
54. *Ibid.*, doc. 26, Pinay to Dubois, no. 128/130, 17 January 1956.
55. *Ibid.*, doc. 25, Dubois to Pinay, no. 135/144, 16 January 1956.
56. *Ibid.*, doc. 33, Dubois to Pinay, no. 167/175, 18 January 1956.
57. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/1–2756, Holmes to Dulles, no. 275, 27 January 1956.
58. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 49, Dubois Pinay, no. 266/274, 28 January 1956.
59. *Ibid.*, doc. 45, Dubois to Pinay, no. 247/256, 26 January 1956.
60. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/1–2356, Rabat to Dulles, no. 269, 23 January 1956.
61. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 58, Dubois to Pinay, 30 January 1956.
62. TNA, FO371/119367, JF1022/2, Paris to African Department, FO, no. 10723/28/56, 18 February 1956. The French had sent a message to the Anglo-Saxons arguing that the increase of Egypt's prestige in the Middle East was dangerous to French interests in North Africa. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 22, Annexe Aide-mémoire, Paris, 13 January 1956.
63. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2–1056, Dillon to Dulles, no. 3594, 10 February 1956.
64. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 95, Dubois to Savary, no. 418/424, 12 February 1956.
65. *Ibid.*, doc. 110, Note de la Direction général des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 18 February 1956.
66. As for economic links, there was a division inside the French government regarding a Franco-Moroccan customs union. The supporters argued that it was the only compensation for French political concessions, while the opponents objected that it would call into question the Act of Algeciras which would necessarily internationalise the problem. The Act provided that Morocco should have a right to collect a tax of 2.5 per cent and that it was prohibited from granting preferential treatment in the form of a customs union or the franchise to French products. The signatories included Britain, France, and Spain, so its abrogation required Madrid's consent.
67. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pineau, vol. 28, Note, Réflexions préliminaires sur le problème marocain, February 1956.
68. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 120, Procès-verbal Séance d'ouverture des négociations franco-marocaines, 22 February 1956.

69. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/2–2156, Dillon to Dulles, no. 3776, 21 February 1956.
70. Bernard, *The Franco–Moroccan Conflict*, p. 349.
71. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 202.
72. MAE, Maroc 1956–1968, vol. 198, non-titled, 20 October 1956.
73. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/3–356, Dillon to Dulles, no. 4004, 3 March 1956.
74. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 159, Note de la Direction général des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 10 March 1956.
75. *Ibid.*, doc. 139, Lalouette to Savary, no. 582/589, 4 March 1956.
76. *Le Monde*, 8 March 1956. Note that the equivalent Franco–Tunisian agreement had not been achieved at this point. Referring to Tunisia as well suggested the British attitude was generous to France. See this chapter, Section 5.
77. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 161, Compte rendu des conversations franco-britanniques aux Chequers. 11 March 1956.
78. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/3–756, Dillon to Dulles, no. 4061, 3 March 1956.
79. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, doc. 187, Editorial Note. Some US officials in Paris were afraid that this difference of position would put the United States in an unfavourable place compared with the British in view of French public opinion which was reportedly increasingly anti-American because of the US failure to support France over the transfer of French troops from NATO commitment in Germany to Algeria. NARA RG59 CDF, 751S.00/3–756, Paris to Dulles, no. 4060, 7 March 1956. As for the state of French opinion, see DDEL, Papers as President of the US, 1952–1961 (Ann Whitman File), International Series Box 12, France 1956–1960 (6), Murphy to Hoover, 3 March 1956.
80. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 247.
81. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Latour to Paris, no. 1703/1705, 6 June 1955.
82. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 1915/1920, 29 June 1955. Seydoux was then a French special minister in Tunisia.
83. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Latour to Paris, no. 2268/2273, 27 July 1955.
84. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Situation Politique en Tunisie, August 1955.
85. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 265. The government decided on a further 10 per cent salary increase in September 1955. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
86. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/84, Pell to Bromley, 1265/601/91, 9 September 1955.
87. He ignored this request, though. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Physionomie de la période du 20 juin au 20 juillet 1955, 23 August 1955.
88. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Situation Politique en Tunisie, August 1955.
89. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Latour to Paris, no. 2171/2173, 20 July 1955.
90. TNA, FO371/113894, JT10317/112, FO Minute, Kirkpatrick, 18 June 1955.
91. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Situation Politique en Tunisie, August 1955.
92. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 279–280.
93. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/88, Pell to Bromley, 1318/601/95, 24 September 1955.
94. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3089/3095, 30 September 1955.

95. Constantine was a department of Algeria, bordering on Tunisia.
96. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3128/3132, 4 October 1955.
97. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3301/3306, 14 October 1955.
98. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3146/3149, 6 October 1955.
99. Note that el-Fassi had announced the formation of the Maghreb Liberation Army only three days before.
100. *Le Monde*, 9/10 October 1955. The Vieux-Destour was influential among students at the *Grande Mosquée*.
101. DDF, 1955 II, doc. 281, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3171/3173, 7 October 1955.
102. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 293.
103. DDF, 1955 II, doc. 295, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3270/3279, 13 October 1955.
104. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/93, Williams to Bromley, 1446/601/102, 17 October 1955.
105. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, pp. 293–294. He wrote that the Tunisian people shared Egyptian aspirations for real independence especially in their purchase of arms necessary to ensure the security of the Arab world. *Le Monde*, 23 October 1955. Moreover, he had been reported as requesting Colonel Nasser for arms at no charge early in September. The French were given this information by the Libyan Prime Minister who had been asked by Salah Ben Youssef to facilitate the transit of such arms. MAE, Levant 1944–1965, Egypte, vol. 485, Paris to Cairo, no. 1892/96, 21 September 1955.
106. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3281/3294, 14 October 1955.
107. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 378, La Situation en Tunisie, 18 October 1955.
108. The Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs was abolished on 20 October.
109. DDF, 1955 II, doc. 336, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3529/3549, 27 October 1955.
110. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Seydoux to Paris, no. 3658/3662, 3 November 1955.
111. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Novembre 1955).
112. DDF, 1955 II, doc. 383, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4054/4076, 23 November 1955.
113. Regarding this rivalry, see Elie Podeh, *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact*, (New York: Leiden, 1995).
114. TNA, FO371/113801, JF1022/26G, Beith to Bromley, 1073/264/55, 3 November 1955.
115. *Le Monde*, 22 November 1955.
116. DDF, 1955 II, doc. 383, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4054/4076, 23 November 1955. Seydoux complained to the British that Bourguiba was a sick and tired man, and doubted if he now had enough energy to put through unpopular decisions. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/100, Williams to Bromley, no. 1634/601/111, 22 November 1955.
117. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/2–2956, Dillon to Dulles, no. 3940, 29 February 1956.

118. He stayed in Paris from 23 November to 2 December.
119. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Réunion chez M Massigli le 25 novembre 1955.
120. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/102, Williams to Bromley, 1697/601/115, 2 December 1955.
121. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Gillet to Paris, no. 4159/4168, 3 December 1955.
122. TNA, FO371/113792, JF1016/103, Williams to Bromley, 1731/601/118, 9 December 1955.
123. This was called '*les forces du makhzen*', referring to 'an auxiliary force of the special police in the former military areas of Southern Territory'. *Le Monde*, 25 December 1955.
124. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4037/4040, 23 November 1955.
125. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4518/4523, 27 December 1955.
126. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Gillet to Paris, no. 4159/4168, 3 December 1955.
127. *DDF*, 1955 II, doc. 443, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4498/4513, 27 December 1955.
128. MAE, Tunisie 1944–1955, vol. 379, Seydoux to Paris, no. 4541/4542, 28 December 1955.
129. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, pp. 467–469.
130. See Chapter 3 Section 3.
131. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 75, Seydoux to Paris, no. 29/43, 4 January 1956.
132. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Note pour le Ministre, 14 February 1956.
133. *Le Monde*, 20 January 1956.
134. *Ibid.*, 29 January 1956.
135. Note that this 'Youssefist' refers to those who supported Salah Ben Youssef, not Mohammed V.
136. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Note pour le Secrétaire Général, 20 January 1956.
137. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Janvier 1956).
138. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 44, Seydoux to MAE, no. 406/414, 26 January 1956.
139. *Ibid.*, doc. 78, p. 163, n. 2; *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 185.
140. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 78, Seydoux to Savary, no. 597/610, 6 February 1956.
141. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Note pour le Ministre, 14 February 1956.
142. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Février 1956); *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 78, p. 162, n. 1.
143. *Ibid.*, doc. 68, Seydoux to Basdevant, 2 February 1956.
144. *Ibid.*, doc. 68. As in the Moroccan case, the French considered that they should first announce their intention to recognise independence and then negotiate on the form and content of the independence which Tunisia would obtain. The concept 'independence' contained several elements, such as diplomatic relations with other countries, a right to defence, and

- a right to control internal security, but this note argued that France should recognise independence without defining the details.
145. *Ibid.*, doc. 78, Seydoux to Savary, no. 597/610, 6 February 1956.
 146. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Note, 2 February 1956.
 147. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 78, Seydoux to Savary, no. 597/610, 6 February 1956.
 148. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Note pour le Ministre, 14 February 1956; Situation Politique en Tunisie (Février 1956). ‘French settlers’ interests and rights’ referred to the protection of individual properties, a right to be subject to the jurisdiction of French courts, a right to continue to work as public officials in the Tunisian administration, and so on. *DDF*, 1955 I, vol. 232, Pinay to French diplomatic representatives, 28 April 1955.
 149. *Le Monde*, 9 February 1956, 15 February 1956.
 150. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Février 1956); *L’Année Politique*, 1956, p. 190.
 151. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pineau, vol. 28, J.S. Direction Générale, February 1956.
 152. *L’Année Politique*, 1956, p. 191.
 153. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 167, Comptes rendus des négociations franco-tunisiennes.
 154. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/3–1356, Dillon to Dulles, no. 4190, 13 March 1956.
 155. *L’Année Politique*, 1956, p. 195.
 156. NARA, RG59, CDF 651.72/3–356, Dillon to Dulles, no. 4006, 3 March 1956. However, US officials in Tunis commented that Massigli’s point was counter-productive in assuring Western influence. NARA, RG59, CDF 651.72/3–656, Hughes to Dulles, no. 102, 6 March 1956.
 157. Bourguiba, *Ma Vie, 1952–1956*, p. 503.
 158. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/3–1956, Dillon to Dulles, no. 4312, 19 March 1956.
 159. *Le Monde*, 21 March 1956. Originally, this speech had been intended to ease growing suspicion of the United States among French opinion. On 3 March 1956, Robert Murphy, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, had reported to Washington that anti-American sentiment was growing in French opinion ‘which seeks to place the onus for the French predicament in Algeria and Morocco on the US’. DDEL, Papers as President of the US, 1952–1961 (Ann Whitman File), International Series Box 12, France 1956–1960 (6) March 3, 1956 Memorandum for the President; The White House.
 160. See Chapter 7, Section 2.
 161. *Le Monde*, 22 March 1956.
 162. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (mars 1956); *L’Année Politique*, 1956, p. 196.
 163. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.02/5–1456, Dulles to Tunis, no. 123, 14 May 1956.

9 The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

1. *Le Monde*, 9 March 1956.
2. *L’Année Politique*, 1956, p. 194.
3. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 156, Pineau to La Tournelle, no. 225/227, 9 March 1956.
4. *Ibid.*, doc. 177, Savary to Dubois, no. 605/606, 16 March 1956.

5. *Ibid.*, doc. 191, Dubois to Savary, no. 790/800, 20 March 1956.
6. *Le Monde*, 14 March 1956.
7. *Ibid.*, 17 March 1956.
8. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 175, Dubois to Savary, no. 714/717, 15 March 1956.
9. *Ibid.*, doc. 187, Dubois to Savary, no. 762/771, 19 March 1956. His attitudes, though, would not henceforward be in perfect conformity with the French line. For instance, he declared 'Morocco did not recognise the accords on the American bases' on 14 March. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/3-1656, Holmes to Dulles, no. 423, 16 March 1956. He also started a campaign calling for the possession of Western Sahara. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 194.
10. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 175, p. 429, n. 1.
11. *Ibid.*, doc. 202, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 26 March 1956.
12. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 195.
13. *Le Monde*, 29 March 1956; *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 250, p. 609, n. 1.
14. *DDF*, 1956, I, *Ibid.*, doc. 207, Dubois to Savary, no. 927/931, 28 March 1956.
15. *Le Monde*, 30 March 1956, 1/2 April 1956.
16. MAE, Afrique-Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, vol. 25, Couve de Murville to Paris, no. 2137, 3 April 1956.
17. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 215, Dubois to Savary, no. 1013/1015, 3 April 1956.
18. *Ibid.*, doc. 212, Dubois to Savary, no. 965/970, 30 March 1956.
19. *Ibid.*, doc. 236, Dubois to Savary, no. 1101/1109, 12 April 1956.
20. *Ibid.*, doc. 224, Dubois to Savary, no. 1053/1059, 7 April 1956.
21. *Ibid.*, doc. 245, Dubois to Savary, despatch, no. 643, 14 April 1956.
22. *Ibid.* doc. 245.
23. TNA, FO371/125767, JM10317/8, Duke to FO, 26 February 1957.
24. MAE, Afrique-Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, vol. 25, Couve de Murville to Paris, no. 2137, 3 April 1956.
25. The Algerian situation worsened so much that on 12 March the French National Assembly had voted Special Powers to the Mollet Government. Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis*, p. 105.
26. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 239, p. 580, n. 1.
27. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 199.
28. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 239, Savary to Dubois, no. 928/935, 12 April 1956. The gendarmerie was the military police force in the countryside. The DST in this case was in charge of border patrol, especially along the Algerian-Moroccan border.
29. *Ibid.*, doc. 250, Lalouette to Savary, no. 1202/1205, 17 April 1956. There is no evidence in French sources that support the PDI's insistence. However, the French were seriously concerned about the Istiqlal's campaign for the re-drawing of the Algerian-Moroccan border which started at the beginning of 1956. The French refused, as it could have constituted a dangerous precedent. *Ibid.*, doc. 228, Dubois to Savary, no. 1064/1065, 9 April 1956; doc. 259, Lacoste to Savary, no. 541/S/Sud/2, 19 April 1956.
30. *Ibid.*, doc. 268, Savary to Dubois, no. 1073/1076, 25 April 1956.
31. *Ibid.*, doc. 262, Lalouette to Savary, no. 1272/1278, 20 April 1956, and p. 630, n. 1.
32. *Ibid.*, doc. 274, Savary to Dubois, no. 1086/1091, 26 April 1956. The issue of the DST was also pending in the ongoing Franco-Tunisian negotiations. *Ibid.*, doc. 493. Comptes rendus des négociations franco-tunisienne.

33. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/4–2156, Rabat to Dulles, no. 384, 21 April 1956.
34. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 276, Savary to Dubois, no. 1408/1412, 27 April 1956.
35. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/4–256, Dulles to Tangier, no. 506, 2 April 1956.
36. TNA, FO371/119368, JF1023/22, Tunis to FO, 24 April 1956; FO371/119368, JF1023/22(A), Minute [Diplomatic Relations with Tunisia and Morocco], 27 April 1956.
37. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 283, p. 682, n. 1.
38. *Ibid.*, doc. 283, Savary to Dubois, no. 1157/1160, 30 April 1956.
39. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 202.
40. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651/71.5–856, Rabat to Dulles, no. 419, 8 May 1956.
41. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 311, Savary to French diplomatic representatives, 12 May 1956. The main points of this accord mentioned that both countries would: (1) inform each other; (2) consult each other in cases of threats and establish a procedure for regular consultations, especially at the level of Foreign Ministers; (3) not agree to policy incompatible with their mutual interests; (4) not conclude international agreements contrary to the rights they mutually recognise; (5) maintain a constant connection between their delegations in international organisations; and (6) in foreign countries such as Morocco would have no diplomatic mission, French representatives will ensure the protection of Moroccan nationals at the request of the Moroccan government.
42. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 204. See also Chapter 9, Section 2. In fact, the FO had already instructed Jebb to notify Paris that London was considering a public statement to recognise the two countries' independence. MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pinay, 3, Jebb to MAE, no. 286, 3 May 1956.
43. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 315, Dubois to Savary, no. 1627/1633, 15 May 1956. Twenty thousand French-trained servicemen were placed at the disposal of the Moroccan government. The initial design of the army relied on 10,000 veterans of the Spanish army and 5,000 former members of the Liberation Army. Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 212.
44. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 203.
45. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 321, Savary to MAE, no. 1667/1672, 16 May 1956.
46. *Ibid.*, doc. 325, Savary to MAE, no. 1732/1738, 18 May 1956.
47. *Ibid.*, doc. 327, n. 1.
48. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/5–1156, Paris to Secretary of State, no. 5296, 11 May 1956.
49. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 338, n. 1.
50. NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/5–2356, Paris to Dulles, no. 5574, 23 May 1956.
51. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 338, Dubois to Savary, no. 1834/1840, 24 May 1956. The French patrols had been resumed one day before.
52. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 204.
53. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 369–370.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
55. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/7–2656, Paris to Dulles, no. 444, 26 July 1956.
56. TNA, FO371/119469, JM1016/15, Pyman to Lloyd, no. 73, 21 August 1956.
57. Meantime, the United States granted financial aid to Morocco. Jean-Pierre Gern, 'Morocco and Tunisia on the Threshold of Monetary Autonomy', *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 90 (1963), pp. 135–136.
58. Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict*, pp. 369–370.

59. While bilingualism is maintained at the schools managed by the French Cultural Mission under the control of the French Ministry of Education, Arabic alone is taught at Moroccan public schools. Even now, those bilingually educated are regarded as elites and therefore have better access to jobs and higher positions. Ali Alaou, 'Language and Ideology in the Maghreb: Francophonie and Other Languages', *The French Review*, vol. 80, no. 2 (2006).
60. TNA, FO371/125760, JM1015/54, Duke to FO, 14 May 1957.
61. Gern, 'Monetary Autonomy', p. 134.
62. Needless to say, the French presence was not wholeheartedly welcomed by the Moroccans. Sometimes the French asked their allies not to provide assistance except so as to complement French assistance, as Balafrej complained to a British diplomat. TNA, FO371/125765, JM1022/26, Rabat to Lloyd, no. 138, 12 December 1957.
63. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (mars 1956). The other groups which joined the National Front were l'Union Tunisienne des Artisans et Commerçants, and l'Union nationale des Agriculteurs et tunisiens, and independent candidates including Ben Ammar.
64. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 196.
65. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Gillet to Paris, no. 1512/1516, 7 April 1956.
66. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Avril 1956); *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 226, Comptes rendus des négociations franco-tunisiennes relatives to l'ordre public; NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/4–1056, Hughes to Dulles, 10 April 1956.
67. MAE Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Seydoux to Paris, no. 1400/1413, 28 March 1956.
68. *Le Monde*, 29 March 1956.
69. Egypt recognised Tunisia's independence on 18 April. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Avril 1956).
70. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (Avril 1956).
71. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Seydoux to Paris, no. 1569/1574, 11 April 1956.
72. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 280, Pineau to London, no. 4134/4139, 28 April 1956.
73. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/4–1956, Hughes to Dulles, no. 132, 19 April 1956.
74. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Seydoux to Paris, no. 1590/1594, 12 April 1956.
75. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 200.
76. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Savary to Seydoux, no. 692/698, 25 April 1956.
77. MAE, Tunisie 1956–1969, vol. 108, Seydoux to Paris, no. 1911/1920, 28 April 1956.
78. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 280, Pineau to London et al., no. 4134/4139, 28 April 1956.
79. TNA, FO371/119368, JF1023/22, Tunis to FO, no. 40, 24 April 1956; JF1023/22(A), FO Minute, 27 April 1956. *FRUS* 1955–1957, XVIII, Doc. 243, Dulles to Paris, no. 4167, 8 May 1956.

80. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 205.
81. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/5-456, Hughes to Washington, 4 May 1956.
82. *Le Monde*, 8 May 1956.
83. *Ibid.*, 11 May 1956. See this chapter, Section 1.
84. *FRUS*, 1955-1957, XVIII, Doc. 243, Dulles to Paris, no. 4167, 8 May 1956
85. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.02/5-1056, Dillon to Dulles, no. 5286, 10 May 1956.
86. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/5-1156, Dillon to Dulles, no. 5324, 11 May 1956.
87. Note that the Moroccan delegation stayed in Paris from 6 to 8 May.
88. MAE, Tunisia 1956-1969, vol. 108, Situation en Tunisie, 30 May 1956; *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 319, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2158/2167, 16 May 1956.
89. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/5-1156, Dillon to Dulles, no. 5324, 11 May 1956.
90. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/5-1256, Dillon to Dulles, no. 5336, 12 May 1956.
91. TNA, FO371/119373, JF1052/17, FO to Washington, no. 2250, 17 May 1956; FO371/119369, JF1023/31, Jebb to FO, no. 136, 16 May 1956.
92. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 319, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2158/2167, 16 May 1956.
93. *Ibid.*, doc. 320, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2168/2172, 16 May 1956.
94. *Ibid.*, doc. 335, Savary to Seydoux, no. 1070/1081, 23 May 1956. Bourguiba had proposed on 16 May 1956 that France and Tunisia should conclude an alliance treaty.
95. *Ibid.*, doc. 340, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2302/2312, 24 May 1956.
96. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/5-2556, Paris to Dulles, no. 5587, 25 May 1956.
97. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 205.
98. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 365, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2455/2463, 5 June 1956.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *FRUS*, 1955-1957, XVIII, doc. 243, p. 652]n. 5.
101. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 365, p. 889, n. 1. Naturally, the French protested at the US move. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/6-856, Joyce to Dulles, no. 5864, 8 June 1956.
102. *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 373, Savary to Tunis, no. 1207/1217, 7 June 1956.
103. *Ibid.*, doc. 372, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2483/2500, 7 June 1956.
104. *Ibid.*, doc. 378, Seydoux to Savary, no. 2563/2578, 9 June 1956; Doc. 384, Note de la Direction des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, Négociations avec les Tunisiens sur les questions diplomatiques, 11 June 1956.
105. *Ibid.*, doc. 389, Savary to Seydoux, no. 1333/1340, 12 June 1956.
106. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 208.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 208; *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 407, Pineau to London et al., no. 5877/5881, 15 June 1956.
108. TNA, FO371/119552, JN1031/1, Malcolm to FO, no. 75, 5 August 1956; *DDF*, 1956, I, doc. 419, p. 1030, n. 1.
109. Gern, 'Monetary Autonomy', p. 141; Samya El Mechat, *Les Relations franco-tunisiennes : Histoire d'une souveraineté arrachée, 1955-1964* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), p. 116.
110. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/7-1656, Paris to Secretary of State, no. 255, 16 July 1956.
111. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/7-2156, Tunis to Department of State, no. 20, 21 July 1956.
112. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/7-2656, Paris to Dulles, no. 444, 26 July 1956.

113. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/8–1856, Tunis to Department of State, no. 40, 18 August 1956.
114. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/9–2756, Paris to Secretary of State, no. 1464, 27 September 1956.
115. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/10–2656, Tunis to Secretary of State, no. 186, 26 October 1956.
116. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/2–1957, Paris to Secretary of State, no. 4216, 19 February 1957.
117. TNA, FO371/125831, JN1015/31, Tunis to FO, no. 39, 7 April 1957. The Americans described this decision as ‘a most short sighted’ act. TNA, FO371, JN10317/11, JN10317/11, Malcolm to FO, no. 39, 9 April 1957.
118. Gern, ‘Monetary Autonomy’, p. 135. The French government budget aid to Tunisia would soon be recovered, but remained around 46–70 million francs in the 1960s. Gérard Bossuat, ‘French Development Aid and Co-operation under de Gaulle’, *Contemporary European History*, vol. 12, no. 4 (November 2003).
119. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/5–456, Hughes to the Department of State, no. 247, 4 May 1956.
120. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/12–1156, Tunis to Washington, no. 284, 11 December 1956.

Conclusion

1. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, Introduction. James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 42–43.
2. Peter Mansfred, ‘Nasser and Nasserism’, *International Journal*, vol. 28, no. 4, *The Arab States and Israel* (autumn, 1973).
3. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919–1957* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 185, 196.
4. As for the Soviet leaders’ announcement for economic aid to the Third World, see, for example, Branko M. Pešelj, ‘Communist Economic Offensive Soviet Foreign Aid. Means and Effects’, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 29, no. 4 (autumn 1964).
5. Chafer, *The End of Empire*, Ch. 7. See also Frederick Cooper, ‘Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa’, *Past & Present* (2011), Supplement 6.
6. He argues that by portraying decolonisation as an essential step in the inexorable ‘tide of history’, France tried to escape its own responsibility for the revolutionary change to bring about the separation of Algeria. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
7. This was cited in Chapter 9. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/5–456, Hughes to the Department of State, no. 247, 4 May 1956.
8. Richard Drayton, ‘Masked Condominia: Pan-European Collaboration in the History of Imperialism, c. 1500 to the Present’, in Richard Drayton, ed., *The Masks of Imperial Power* (London: Palgrave Pivot, forthcoming).
9. Memcom, February 9, 1958, DDEL, JFDP, Telephone Calls Series, box 8. Cited in Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, p. 161.
10. Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War*, Chapter 4. For ‘an anti-American’ aspect of the events between the May 1958 uprising and the

return of de Gaulle to power, see Matthew Connelly, 'The French–American Conflict over North Africa and the Fall of the Fourth Republic', *Revue française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer*, vol. 2, 1997; Geoffrey Barei, 'The Sakiet Sidi Youssef Incident of 1958 in Tunisia and the Anglo-American "Good Offices" Mission', *The Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2 (February 2012).

11. Simpson pointed out that historians have largely dismissed the economic dimensions of self-determination. Brad Simpson, 'Bernath Lecture: The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 36, no. 4 (September 2012).
12. LaFeber argues that by the mid-1950s, each superpower believed that the future vitality of its ideological system depended upon 'winning' the Third World. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006* (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2006), pp. 177–179.

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