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INTERNATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM AND THE FORMATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

The Pasts of the Present

Edited by **Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo**
and **José Pedro Monteiro**



Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series

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José Pedro Monteiro
Editors

Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World

The Past of the Present

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SERIES EDITORS' PREFACE

The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series seeks to publish studies of modern history that are not nation-centric. Rather than separate nations, each existing with its distinct identity and pursuing its own destiny, we emphasize transnational interactions across the globe. Interconnectedness and shared destinies rather than separation and distinctiveness are the key. Nations, of course, do exist, but they are not the only source of an individual's identity. Each person is also defined by his/her gender, race, age, physical and mental conditions, and many other factors. At the same time, individuals are also global human beings. They are connected with one another—whether they are aware of the connection or not—mentally as well as physically.

Such awareness has given rise to a historiography that stresses transnational interactions and interconnections. This volume is a very good example. The essays included all focus on such connections and ask one of the most interesting questions in modern and current history: the relationship between imperialism and internationalism. Nations sometimes pursue imperialistic activities in seeking to establish control beyond their boundaries, and at other times they are willing to cooperate with one another in pursuit of shared objectives. In this sense, imperialism and internationalism are both inherent in a nation's history, but this phenomenon can best be understood when they are placed within the framework of global and transnational history.

Here is another example of the current historiography: to view national history in a global, transnational framework. If the trend

continues and historians deepen their understanding of the global dimension of a country's existence, they will not only add a much needed perspective to the study of the past, but they will also contribute to enriching the global "community of scholars" so that they will come to exemplify the significant transformation that is taking place in the world today.

Cambridge, USA
Oxford, UK

Akira Iriye
Rana Mitter

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Pasts to Be Unveiled: The Interconnections Between the International and the Imperial

Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro

Internationalism, Imperialism, and the Formation of the Contemporary World assembles texts that contribute to the rethinking of the history of the twentieth century by exploring the understudied theme of the

*Translated by Sara Veiga

This volume results from researches and debates promoted by the projects *Internationalism and Empire: The Policies of Difference in the Portuguese Colonial Empire in a Comparative Perspective* and *Change to Remain? Welfare Colonialism in European Colonial Empires in Africa (1920–1975)*, both funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (Refs: FCT-PTDC/EPH-HIS/5176/2012 and IF/01628/2012). It is a revised, expanded and modified version of a volume that was published in Portuguese, entitled *Os Passados do Presente* (Almedina, 2015). We are grateful for the critical comments made by the reviewers of this volume. They helped us improve many of the arguments advanced in this introduction. We also thank Jessica Pearson and Jason Parker for their critical remarks and David Tucker for his final revision.

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co-constitution of, and the intersections between, two processes that fundamentally shaped its historical dynamics: internationalism and imperialism.¹ Similarly, the assessment of the reverberations and the legacies of the multiple instances of articulation and cross-fertilisation between imperial and international dynamics in contemporaneity constitutes a fundamental purpose of this volume, as its title suggests.²

The texts that compose this volume address several geographies, time-lines, and historiographical questions. While certainly responding to discrete historiographical themes and problems, they nonetheless share characteristics that are particularly useful to the analytical and methodological rethinking of the twentieth century, and of some of its most salient historical processes. Although these texts engage with a variety of topics and are not guided by a single, unified analytical or theoretical framework, they collectively constitute a rich illustration of the set of principles that we believe should guide the study of imperialism and internationalism, and enable the historicisation of their interrelation. From pre- and post-independence developmentalism in India, addressed by Corinna Unger, and from population control programmes, explored by Alison Bashford, to the international and transnational networks which have challenged US *imperialism*, handled by Jason Parker, the works presented here reflect a growing concern about the diversification and the interconnection of themes, problems, and fields in the historiography of the twentieth century.³ They establish and explore renewed chronologies and geographical connections, pose novel historiographical questions, and mobilise fresh analytical frameworks. The study and the proper appraisal of some of these issues and problems, and of their diverse spatial and temporal contexts and manifestations, are often completely or partially omitted from the more generalist narratives about the last century. Sometimes, they are just uncritically and summarily undervalued. Historians need to recognise their historical salience at the time and to unveil their relevance in varied ways, both in the past and in the present.⁴

This collection does not propose the establishment of a canon by claiming some sort of intellectual precedence or by aiming at the establishment of putative epistemological, methodological, and analytical *centres* and *peripheries*. Nor does it claim to be part of a specific disciplinary or sub-disciplinary field, which would thus reinforce the insufficiently questioned *territorial* and *institutional* delimitation between academic “tribes,” more or less organised and disciplined. Instead, it is a result of

shared attempts to establish a dialogue between different disciplinary and sub-disciplinary endeavours, by intersecting and tentatively cross-fertilising languages, methods, issues, and geographies and bringing closer together scholars that originate from rather diverse academic environments. These texts do this in a variety of ways. They respond to some of the major changes in the field of contemporary historiography. For example, in diversified ways, they answer reflections which value the need for the *internationalisation*, *transnationalisation*, and *globalisation* of the historical objects, problems, and methods with a view to decentralising the historical analysis of specific nations or regions. They identify instead the flows and dialogues that have crossed and overcome political obstacles or allegiances, without failing to recognise hierarchies, inequalities, and conflictual dynamics.⁵ In that regard, the work by Jason Parker—exploring the ways the re-appropriations and the contextual and contingent modelling of concepts such as the *Third World* are identified in a formally post-imperial world—is illustrative of how the orientation of the research focus on *circulations* and *interactions*, rather than on artificially delimited and reified objects, helps to rethink the political, cultural, and geographical obstacles that shape traditional narratives. The same can be said of the texts of Sandrine Kott and Daniel Laqua, for instance. Both texts directly question the rigid antinomies between national, international, and global inspirations, strategies, and allegiances. The fluidity and the overlapping, often contradictory, commitments of those people who gave shape to the “international” are thus exemplarily illustrated by the prosopography of international assemblies, experts, officials, and bodies.⁶

The texts gathered here also respond to transformations in concerns that enliven the fields of international history and imperial and colonial history. These transformations resulted in the re-appreciation of moments, actors, issues, and processes that had previously been relatively neglected, from the non-governmental organisations to the diasporas, including spaces and instances of inter-imperial cooperation.⁷ This effort is clear in the contributions of Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and Tobias Rupperecht, who respectively engage with the dynamics of the increasingly internationalised (and institutionalised) *colonial entente* in the interwar years or with the understudied economic, social, and cultural connections that cut across Cold War geopolitical “borders” or turbulent frontiers. The same can be said of Daniel Laqua or Sandrine Kott’s pieces, for example, which recover in an innovative way the history of

organisations that, despite the more recent interest in their workings, should merit even more interest within traditional international history, as in the cases of the organisms for intellectual and cultural cooperation under the orbit of the League of Nations or of the International Labour Organization.⁸

Clearly these concerns must avoid ahistorical forms of analysis, which are still abundant both within and outside the social sciences and humanities, particularly in the media and other means of public dissemination and in the political-ideological debates taking place in the public sphere. The (mis)uses of history abound. There are clear risks of arguing favourably for the existence of legacies based on the suppression of specific historical moments, or for the existence of genealogies of ideas or practices rising from *presentist* problems, interpretations, and interests. These ignore the historical contexts of the contested and disputed production of ideas and practices and of the multiple possibilities and imaginations in confrontation at the time.⁹ These diverse historical misunderstandings tend to be frequently associated with each other, being related as well to another recurrent analytical fallacy: the historical appreciation of what appears to explain the present *linearly*. The seemingly *inconsequential* processes, “paths not taken, the dead ends of historical processes” or the many possible alternatives in a given historical moment are devalued or overlooked. These are exercises in “historical” analysis subordinated to the end point of a teleology that, moreover, ignores the processes of synthesis, adaptation, and incorporation of the multiple solutions and options in confrontation. In short, it is a “history” written and reconstructed from a cause defined by its *known* consequence, which isolates and reifies a *course*, a process often associated with interests which are also *present* and which aim to justify and promote through the massively consumable *lessons of history*.¹⁰

As can be seen, for example, in the writings of José Pedro Monteiro, Daniel Laqua, Allison Bashford, and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, there has been an effort to elaborate and qualify the *paths of history* by trying to understand the motivations and the decisions of the actors according to their understanding of the *present* and their imagination about the *future* in a given time. In that sense, the role of institutions such as the League of Nations, which is usually reduced to its alleged failure in terms of its international security aims, or the action of political units which tend to be portrayed as doomed to dissolution, as in the case of the Portuguese colonial empire in the post-World War II, is herein

retrieved and critically analysed. The *failure narrative* about the League of Nation's relevance, associated with the *rise and fall* analytical model, which still has numerous enthusiasts, has fortunately been confronted. Even the League's contribution to collective security has been reappraised. At the same time, the League's impact on the enhancement of international and transnational cooperation in political, social, cultural, and economic issues—such as those related to sexual or drug trafficking, slavery and forced labour, health problems, and disease control—continue to be duly recovered in detail.¹¹ The same happens with the historical role of the United Nations and its dynamics, as the article by Alanna O'Malley clearly reveals by focusing on a security-driven initiative.¹²

The understanding of the workings and impacts of both institutions (and respective “systems”), historicising the plurality of actors and the political, economic, sociocultural, and technical rationales and *geographies* that composed them, needs to move well beyond the mere declaration and assertion of *failures* and *successes*. The assessment of the institutional and political realities of these organisations is hardly reducible to *rise and fall* perspectives, to views that take them as mere reflections of great power politics (in which nation-states seem to interact alone and tend to be seen as unitary actors). These new approaches also reveal the ways in which internal, self-contained analyses of their bureaucracies fail to capture their heterogeneous engagement with multiple individual and collective actors, with variegated idioms, repertoires, and geographies of power. Moreover, those types of *internalist* analysis do not capture their role as spaces of intersection of that multiplicity of languages and dynamics. Novel approaches also enable the empirical scrutiny of the connections between the League of Nations and the United Nations or with other coeval institutions such as the European Economic Community, for instance.¹³ As Susan Pedersen and Sandrine Kott pertinently suggested, international institutions must be thought of as “force fields” instead of as monolithic actors. Only then can the multiplicity and heterogeneity of individuals that composed the staff (with their own national, political or institutional affiliations), the national delegations, and the community of experts of these organisations or the variegated actors that channelled their grievances and political projects through these institutional apparatuses be properly acknowledged (and their role understood).¹⁴ This volume clearly engages with this demand, as can be seen in Jessica Pearson's work on the World Health Organization or in Sandrine Kott's and José Pedro Monteiro's articles on the ILO.

The efforts of thematic and geographical diversification and cross-fertilisation, and of redefinition of chronological barriers, are a result, but also a cause, of a greater purpose that unifies the texts and authors herein collected: the aspiration, shared yet varied in purpose and scope, of exploring the potential of *new* historiographies, especially those that result from efforts to rethink the international, the imperial and colonial (and of their interrelation and historical co-constitution).¹⁵ Take for example the writings of David Ekbladh, Corinna Unger, Daniel Maul, and Alison Bashford, and the ways they question traditional chronological divisions by covering topics such as development agendas and policies or the “geopolitics of the population” in contexts associated with moments of abrupt geopolitical reordering such as the world wars. Despite identifying disruptions, they nonetheless signal important historical continuities that have marked the policies and politics that aimed to shape and regulate these problems, and they do so by testing long-term approaches. At the same time, they elucidate us about the plurality of actors, networks, and institutions that have promoted several modalities of imperial (geo)political imagination in the twentieth century.¹⁶ Although some of these texts do not focus essentially on “formal,” self-declared, and institutionalised modalities of empire and imperialism, all of them do engage with variegated, fluid, and diffuse modalities of governing difference that still resonate today. These modalities cannot be properly understood without recovering the intellectual exchanges and the institutional frameworks that were deeply conditioned by a pro-imperial, racialized world order. Nor can they be assessed if the parallel increasing internationalisation of a wide array of political, social, cultural, and economic themes is omitted. This aspect is all the more important as one of the risks of crystallising the distinction between, for instance, *formal* and *informal* empires or *direct* and *indirect* rule, is to uncritically replicate concepts and distinctions that were constructed and institutionalised by imperial actors and officials themselves.¹⁷

The historiographical and empirical universes within which the texts in this volume navigate include several scales of analysis and diverse political and social concerns. Therefore, this volume combines different approaches and geographies and various disciplinary tools in order to illuminate important aspects of the nature and role of players and processes involved in the connected historical trajectories of imperialism and internationalism. Several texts integrate, within the scope of the analysis, a large number of actors, from international bureaucrats to

political decision-makers, including the so-called *experts*, thus carrying out the decomposition and critical dissection of discrete organisations and institutions.

The efforts to articulate, to a greater or lesser extent, local, national, and international scales (or the colonial, metropolitan, and international ones, in the case of “formal” colonial empires) are one example of this option, although the emphasis on this volume is placed upon the *imperial*, the *international*, and the *transnational*. Here the *international* is neither seen as a single coherent unit nor as a simple sum of national parts (in their statist shape). Instead, it is explored as being composed of multiple universes, with different correspondent degrees of *internationalisation* (the variegated process of “becoming more international”), unveiling the ways in which the international and the programmes of internationalisation—internationalisms—were conditioned by and have conditioned both local and national political, social, economic, and cultural conditions. In this sense, the dynamics and programmes of internationalisation—for instance, the internationalisation of problems and agendas, of societies (the intensification of societal interdependence, of people, information, goods, and capital), and of decisions (the “increase in the degree of ‘internationality’ of decision-making” and also “the proliferation of international decision-making” over traditional internal policy domains) interacted, not without a significant ambivalence, with nation-states (and empire-states) and their governments and representatives—are illuminated.¹⁸ In part, these questions stem from a critical appraisal of the still-persistent manifestations of epistemological and methodological nationalisms that have dominated the writing of the *national*, *international*, and *imperial* histories for years.¹⁹ As strange as it may seem, given the manifest supranational and transnational natures of empires, imperial and colonial historiographies continue to be frequently addressed in an analytical framework whose key, sometimes sole, actor is the metropolitan imperial *nation*. The emphasis on *metro-centric* perspectives in enquiries over imperial formations still reigns.²⁰ The focus on single national or imperial analytical frameworks, highlighting essentially the respective endogenous groups and dynamics, is another facet of these resilient analytical and methodological stances.²¹ As can be seen in the texts in this volume, for instance those of Jessica Pearson, Alanna O’Malley, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, and José Pedro Monteiro, the articulation of several levels of analysis is not merely a methodological option. Rather, it is a requirement, perhaps even an imposition, by

the contents and the hints found in international, imperial, and colonial archives.

Connected to these resilient tendencies, an aspect that deserves to be mentioned is the way in which several diplomatic histories continue to be largely focused on official correspondence between diplomats and, often, in the superficial and anecdotal description of their adventures, decision-making processes or *group identity*.²² This occurs despite the existence of numerous examples of innovative assessments of the historical context and the constraints of the political and diplomatic field. A logical corollary of this trend, the transposition (and the uncritical reproduction) of mental schemes and idiosyncrasies of these actors has resulted in general terms in a biased, partial, and *presentist* interpretation of the international history of the twentieth century, with abundant celebrations of *great* events, of the *great* powers, and, of course, of *great* characters, predominantly white men.²³ Albeit frequently in a masked way, this perspective still prevails, and in many cases it is motivated not by intellectual and analytical reasons, but by agendas relating to contemporary contexts of production of historical knowledge. These are marked by a diminishing autonomy of the academy towards external organised interests (in relation to the financing, to commissions, and to the recruitment of researchers, for example) and with the ongoing *wars* of memory (for instance, those regarding imperial and colonial aspects), among other aspects.²⁴ A shared contribution of this volume is to expand the universe of individuals and institutions that played a significant role in the history of internationalism and imperialism, and their interconnections during the twentieth century. This volume also aims to question their place in enduring historical processes that are pivotal to the plural construction of the present. Without neglecting government officials, bureaucrats, diplomats, and national representatives, this volume incorporates the experiences and outlooks of anti-colonial activists, international philanthropists, labour and health experts, refugees, and cultural protagonists who increasingly acted beyond the strict framework of the national state and formal bilateral relations.

Another important issue, with significant analytical and methodological consequences, that merits note in this introduction refers to the effects of the awareness of the impact of globalisation(s) on the present. Here, globalisation(s) is seen as a heterogeneous and ambivalent cluster of globalising dynamics with different temporalities and geographical expressions, historically associated with imperial processes. It has

impacted recent historiography, particularly with regard to questioning the limits of traditional approaches to contemporary history, eminently *state-centred* and limited to a very small set of actors and processes, in which a narrow, and non-relational, view of the political, the social, the cultural, and the economic is promoted.²⁵ In this context, the contributions of global history and transnational history have been extremely relevant, though not always well understood. These concerns are reflected in this volume, in the sense that several texts, in different ways, diversify the methods used and the objects of study selected, and also decentre and denationalise the perspectives mobilised. Reiterating the diversity of perspectives, theoretical apparatus, and methodologies, what characterises these novel histories of the imperial and the international (and of imperialism and internationalism), in which different doses of influence by the global or transnational perspectives can be found, is an effort to re-appreciate the more recent past, identifying new problems and causal nexuses, as fragile as they might be or as they might appear to be at first glance.

Overcoming the boundaries of the nation-state requires the study and rethinking of the flows and interactions that have crossed them, but also of the mental universes and the political and ideological frameworks of those who have promoted the creation of programmes, groups, or communities whose world of connections and scope of action did not respond to strict or predominantly national criteria (even if sometimes they aimed to reinforce those boundaries).²⁶ It also implies the reflection on the usefulness of the dichotomy, so often established and promoted, between a strongly national legal and political stronghold as opposed to the more open nature of other dimensions of social life (e.g., the economy). This type of exercise also helps to critically rethink the notion of power and its primacy within international history and the study of international relations, making room for questions about the usefulness and the artificiality of the differences between political and “technical” issues, for instance. In this regard, and as an example, the works by Alison Bashford, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, José Pedro Monteiro, and Jessica Pearson recover the geopolitical and diplomatic importance of areas that would traditionally be reduced to “functional” problems, thus supposedly without any marked political relevance, such as colonial labour, population control, or health policies.²⁷

This is not about the celebration of the end of the nation-state, but about the rethinking of the ways in which contemporary individuals

have reflected on the areas and scope of the various internationalisms, and about the ways they have combined them, sometimes in a convoluted way, with their national or local affiliations. Nor, the other way around, is this an effort to flatten the deep inequalities, material or symbolic, that characterised and still mark the world order. These two ideas are not contradictory.²⁸ Population control, cultural cooperation, health, and social and labour policy regulation, for instance, were increasingly regarded as demanding globalised solutions. The consequences associated with them could not be tackled or contained within national boundaries. But the growing awareness of the “oneness” of the world and of humanity did not preclude the persistence of hierarchical mechanisms and structures of *difference* that reinforced substantial disparities between groups, regions, and races. The impact of these coexisting processes must be critically addressed in order to understand the terms within which these problems, now and then, were (and are) debated and regulated.

The diversification and expansion of the range of objects of inquiry and historical research (individuals, institutions, or informal groups) should not be taken, however, as a simple reversal of previous trends or perspectives (and the consequent neglect of diplomats, of “great” or “small” powers or of eminently “strategic” or diplomatic problems). The effort is therefore cumulative and related to the articulation, and combined enquiry, of languages, repertoires of action, and spheres of analysis and intervention. Furthermore, it is not ignored that internationalism has always coexisted with the consolidation and institutionalisation of principles and practices (particularly within public international law). These have strengthened the corollary of national sovereignty and thus internationally re-legitimised specific internal policies, as can be inferred from the works of Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and Daniel Laqua.²⁹ The same can be said of Sandrine Kott’s example on how a particular and nationally inscribed way of thinking about social policies left an undeniable imprint on the later formulation of an internationalised and universally aimed social programme.³⁰

But except for the enthusiasts of binomials and dichotomies (and respective *models* and *typologies*), there is no paradox in the simultaneous affirmation of internationalism(s) and of various nationalisms.³¹ Internationalism was also, but not only, the sum of several national programmes and experiences.³² It should be highlighted that there was never a single internationalism, but several internationalisms that

have intersected and competed with each other.³³ That is the case, for instance, of pan-African and pan-Arab internationalisms, which unfortunately could not be incorporated into this volume. This omission is also the reflex of the several methodological and epistemological constraints faced by those who want to further the study of these subjects of historical enquiry. At different times, there were diverse and contested perspectives of internationalism and of international ordering principles. Along with liberal internationalism, other internationalisms existed, and sometimes revealed a noteworthy endurance and influence. We can take as examples the social democrat or socialist and communist systems, which are approached by Sandrine Kott and by Tobias Rupprecht in this volume.³⁴ This variety, in itself heterogeneous, revealed cases such as non-communist dynamics that intersected with modalities of liberal internationalism, such as internationalist trade unionism.³⁵ Another example can be found in international and transnational right-wing movements, for instance, in the formation of what Kott terms as “brown” internationalism.³⁶ The multifaceted manifestations of religious internationalism also provide an understudied but revealing example of the diversity of international imaginings, vocabularies, and practices. The institutionalisation of principles of international and interdenominational religious cooperation—Catholic and Protestant—proved essential to the reinvigoration of the evangelisation project, having a noticeable impact within imperial and colonial projects both directly, via ecclesiastical and missionary structures, and indirectly, via the channels opened up by international organisations.³⁷ Some of these actors and institutions contributed, willingly or not, to the formation of diverse strands of imperial internationalism. This modality of internationalism is addressed in the contribution by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo.³⁸ Also illuminating are the internationalisms based on solidarities resulting from a shared contestation to a post-imperial hegemony, whose constitution was deeply troubled since it stemmed from different political, socio-cultural, and geographical experiences, as shown by Jason Parker in this volume.³⁹ All these diverse, competing but also intersecting, internationalisms—normally downplayed in contrast to modalities of liberal internationalism—need to gain a proper place in studies of the contemporary world.⁴⁰ But they cannot be properly understood, we believe, via the simple mobilisation of dichotomies—for instance, *liberal versus illiberal*, *East versus West* or *Global North versus Global South* internationalisms. The study of the intersections between imperialism and internationalism, embracing the

heterogeneity of actors, idioms, repertoires, and institutions that enacted them, reveals a more ambivalent and nuanced ideological and political landscape. Another important aspect relates to how the novel histories of international organisations also need to reflect the role and centrality of these competing and diversified internationalisms in their historical dynamics.⁴¹

The “internationalist moment,” plural and with distinct temporalities, genealogies and motivations, was also multi-scalar, therefore requiring a more *globalised* analytical effort.⁴² The spaces of internationalism were as diverse as its idioms and repertoires of action. The local was as potentially international as the international was local. Accordingly, internationalist vocabularies, imaginings, and practices had a polycentric nature, generating multiple projects of engagement with international and transnational organisations, and numerous related expectations. The decentring and denationalisation of analysis are crucial to enlarging and enhancing the understanding of internationalisms, including their connections with forms of imperialism and also of nationalism. New geographies of internationalism need to be mapped; novel modalities of articulation and intersection with imperialism (and anti-imperialism) need to be included in our research endeavours.⁴³

For most of the twentieth century, the perspectives on international *ordering* that prevailed postulated the strengthening of several functions of the state (social, political, and economic), and they identified it as the main propellant of an internationalist (and sometimes imperialist) order.⁴⁴ Thus the in-depth analysis of the international, transnational, or global circuits, flows, and institutions does not imply a denial of the importance of the different national states and of the several programmes and movements that placed self-determination as their core aim, which are crucial to the characterisation of the past and current globalising dynamics.⁴⁵ In fact, it implies a refined and thorough analysis of the *histories* of the twentieth century. It is certainly incompatible with attempts to present *old* international policy histories as new ones, governed by nationalist and instrumental, policy-oriented, *presentist* perspectives (and uses) of history.

Similarly, the recognition and questioning of moments of co-creation and intimate interconnection between imperialisms of different types and projects of internationalisation (and respective programmes of internationalism), of flows and diasporas that have crossed imperial borders, and of dialogues and inter-imperial cooperation (particularly aiming at

the affirmation and consolidation of an imperial internationalism) on no account imply the denial of many imperial nationalisms that have competed against each other since the late nineteenth century. The imaginings of nationalism and of internationalism were closely connected. The recognition and questioning of these articulations do not entail the refutation of the fundamental relationship between the imagination and the embodiment of the ideas of “nation” and those of “empire,” noticeable in the process of constitution of different empire-states over this period.⁴⁶ The emergence of international and transnational consciousness, of related initiatives towards the implementation of international standards and policies, and the establishment and spread of *statism* were connected, and sometimes interdependent.⁴⁷ The same happened with the latter and the globalising dynamics of *new imperialism*, its transformations in time, and its enduring consequences.

If there is a common purpose to diversifying objects of study and revisiting old or opening novel historiographic interrogations, there is also a purpose, and a necessity, to convening different kinds of knowledge and perspectives about the historical phenomena under evaluation. That need becomes more urgent as the intention is to approach globalised processes, which can hardly be understood if they do not mobilise conceptual, methodological, and analytical instruments stemming from other historiographies and disciplines, or fail to apply a multi-dimensional analysis. This dialogue enables the identification of common genealogies of apparently disjointed and scarcely connected historical processes. It also offers new perspectives on historical enquiry. Accordingly, the promotion of these new historiographies in dialogue is characterised by an effort to promote a cross-fertilisation between different historiographic traditions (for example, international history and imperial history), and disciplinary fields (seeking contributions in international politics, economics, or sociology and anthropology). Take as an example the case of the development and socio-economic modernisation programmes that have characterised the twentieth century, studied in this volume by David Ekbladh and Corinna Unger. On the one hand, they cannot be understood without a refined, and combined, study of historical processes such as the Cold War and late colonialism. Nor can they be grasped without considering the circuits and networks that were associated with them (and which have crossed or transcended the state borders), their impact in very different societies, and the contexts of production from which they have emerged.⁴⁸

This epistemological diversification has as one of its most obvious results the opportunity to rethink and critically reanalyse genealogies and geographical divisions, establishing new connections and associations. In this regard, the crisscrossing of the issues of internationalism and imperialism, in their pluralistic manifestations, is one of the clearest examples of the potential of combining diverse sub-disciplinary and disciplinary knowledge. All this, of course, is based on the possibilities offered by the use of multiple archives, from the ones in foreign countries to those belonging to international organisations, non-governmental organisations, or private foundations. The multi-archival nature of the research gathered in this collective volume is a reflection of that.

If the primary purpose of this book is to bring together a set of texts that embody new historiographic trends within a critical dialogue, its second and equally important purpose is to promote a reflection on how languages, institutional settings, and action repertoires of internationalism and imperialism have interacted with and conditioned each other during the twentieth century. This does not mean that all texts here assembled necessarily tackle these issues directly, or in the same way. Some do; others focus on new ways to engage with just one of the phenomena, therefore questioning as well how it can relate to others. Nonetheless, they all contribute, in different ways, to the purpose of rethinking imperialism and internationalism and their connected history, providing at the same time concrete examples of topics and problems that can be further explored to improve our understanding of both phenomena and their intersections. The resonance of an imperialist and hierarchical ordering of peoples and nations survived the formal international normative abrogation of colonialism, as the rekindling of the concept of *Third World* that Jason Parker explores clearly shows. Also, devices, techniques, and ideologies of governing so-called *backward* regions or human groups persisted and were exchanged or emulated by formally “national” and outspoken anti-imperialist states such as the Soviet Union and Brazil, as Tobias Rupprecht suggests. As Alanna O’Malley’s text aptly demonstrates, the formal devolution of power did not preclude a markedly imperial reasoning (and action) by former colonial powers in international and sometimes military initiatives and institutions.

The affirmation of a nation-state model as the main tenet of international public law is commonly presented as one of the distinctive features of the twentieth century, along with growing economic globalisation. The gradual de-legitimisation of the imperial solution throughout that

century has contributed to a substantial detachment concerning the role played by imperial and colonial formations in shaping the contemporary world, including in the history of the assertion of *statism*. Empires thus appear as a distant relic, a solution that has languished throughout the twentieth century, and which was retrospectively marginalised as a powerful defining and influencing element in discussions and decision-making processes that have shaped the “historic course” up to the present day.⁴⁹

This book seeks to recover the importance of imperial actors and dynamics in the formation of the contemporary world, particularly their impact and coexistence with the rise of variegated internationalisms. More than simply signalling that coexistence, the set of texts presented here aims to illustrate in many ways the historic co-constitution of contemporary imperialisms and internationalisms, unveiling their common genealogies, interdependencies, and intersections. In other words, it is intended not only to identify moments when the life of empires was affected by the actions of international and transnational forces, or vice versa, but also to show the way in which the histories of internationalism and imperialism coincide in many fields, and how they cannot be apprehended in an isolated manner. The fact that the imperial solution, in its *formal* manifestation, appears to have lost its attractiveness, both within international law and within the “international public opinion,” should not make us lose sight of the fact that formative moments of the international order(ing) of the twentieth century were carried out by empire-states. That was certainly the case of the histories of the League of Nations but also of the United Nations and their respective specialised agencies, as the writings by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Jessica Pearson, and José Pedro Monteiro show.⁵⁰ But the impact of an imperialist reasoning on the international realm was not confined to colonial empires. It was also present in debates in international gatherings about how to maintain peace through territorial expansion, colonisation, and population transfers or in the instrumentalisation of private humanitarian aid in order to expand or guarantee markets.

The imperial dimension of the states (which was not reduced to their geographic extension), the multiple dynamics involving these formations, and the existence of *interdependent* relationships between different spaces, networks, and population groups that formed them are now well-recognised aspects. This fact makes it impossible to look at the participation of imperial powers in the various international *fora* as likely to be reduced to the interests and strategies of metropolitan states that have

replaced them. That conclusion ignores, for example, the non-materialised ideas of new political formations that resulted from efforts of imperial reconfiguration, which were imagined but never implemented.⁵¹ The “fantasies of federalism” abounded and a “federal moment” gained traction.⁵² At the same time, modalities of imperialist internationalism—that is, forms of international and transnational cooperation that aimed at empowering imperial and colonial solutions—were promoted, some aiming at reformation and others at de-legitimisation of that same imperial solution and of the sovereignties associated with it.⁵³

Several texts presented here show how the different international and transnational actors and programmes impacted and intersected with the lives of empires, in the fields of health, labour, and development, or in the dynamics of imperial geopolitical arrangements. They also demonstrate the ways many instruments and practices developed to solve eminently imperial matters (from intergovernmental organisations to networks and solidarities that coalesced in anti-imperialist struggles) were accommodated by other international actors who tend to be thought of nowadays as international spaces, stripped of their imperial genealogies. In that regard, we can mention, for example, the impact that the relations established within the mandates and trusteeship systems had in the way that forms of supervision, control, and prescription by international organisations developed and were implemented. Or, on the other hand, how the current interventions of humanitarian nature cannot be understood if the arguments and purposes that underlay an international *civilising* mission are not recovered and readdressed.⁵⁴

In this volume we have three different sections, which are chronologically organised. However, this distribution answers to specific historical dynamics of change and continuity that shaped the convoluted and tenuous relationship between internationalism and imperialism, and critically engages with the conventional narratives assigned to each of these periods.

In Part I, *Internationalism(s) in an Imperial world: The Interwar Years*, our main aim is not to take a conclusive stand in the broader debate about whether this era signalled the imperial zenith or the beginning of the end of empires. Given the geographical and thematic diversity of the texts that comprise this section, it is possible to grasp how some features of internationalism evolved amidst both post-imperial Central and Eastern Europe and the still imperially subjugated colonies and mandates of Africa, Asia, and Oceania. However, some of these

mechanisms were duly re-appropriated and transformed after 1945. The constitution of humanitarian networks or of a *social* epistemic community, conditioned as they were by imperialist and colonialist mindsets, also reveals the longer genealogies of processes that reverberated in the post-1945 world. This section is composed of five articles that deal with diverse manifestations of internationalism during the interwar years. Despite the fact that not all of them deal exclusively with formal colonial empires, they all deal with processes that significantly shaped and were conditioned by the multiple manifestations of imperialism that characterised the interwar years. Perhaps most importantly, all of them challenge the established caesura of 1945 and therefore stress the important continuities that persisted after that.

Part II, *Imperialism(s) and International Institutions: The Aftermath of World War II*, also contributes to critical engagement with the established boundaries that usually constrain the proper analysis of the relationship between imperial and international dynamics, histories, and historiographies. As the three texts show, a careful reading of the postwar years is needed in order to critically examine the deterministic assertions that take these years as being characterised by the inexorable decline of empires. Only hindsight projections enable the dismissal of multiple imperial imaginations and outlooks of imperial possibilities that survived World War II. Part II consists of three texts that deal with a specific and relatively short-lived period immediately after World War II. This period was characterised by cumulative but also contradictory processes as regards the interactions and intersections between forms of internationalism and of imperialism. On the one hand, ground-breaking transformations entailed by the war profoundly reshaped the international accommodation of explicitly imperialist ethos and designs. Promises of increasing political autonomy in the non-western world, the extremely negative reputation earned by Nazi policies and politics (and the associated repudiation of aggressive expansionist drives), and finally, the massive reliance on colonial workers and soldiers by the Allied powers were factors, among others, that contributed to the growing international delegitimisation of formal imperialism and colonialism and to the spread and enhancement of anti-colonial and anti-imperial drives. On the other hand, the variegated disruptions caused by the war in European societies and economies made imperial authorities more zealous of their colonial domains, and the sudden eruption of a novel, *cold* war gave them a new leverage regarding colonial issues in the new world order.

Finally, Part III, *Imperial Resiliencies in the Post-Colonial World Order*, is revealing about the ways the assertion of the *triumph* of the nation-state and of the end of empires in a post-colonial world order must be necessarily qualified. As the texts in this section suggest, former politico-juridical imperial ties and the anxieties about the modalities of how to govern *different* populations continued to resonate in a world of juridical equal and sovereign states. Part III includes four different texts that, despite focusing on different topics and geographical areas, deal with some crucial tenets of the evolution of the articulations between imperialism and internationalism in the era of the global “normative revolution.” This revolution de-legitimised formal imperial and colonial rule, and proclaimed the nation-state as the privileged, and the only acceptable, form of political organisation. However, as the pieces in this section show, imperialist dynamics and legacies persisted as a crucial feature of international and transnational relations, particularly concerning social, cultural, and economic relations and exchanges, but also in the cruder political domain.

As a way to conclude, it is important to underline that the option to use “imperialism” instead of “empires” in the title was deliberate. One of the advantages of the integrated study of internationalism and imperialism phenomena is that it allows the argument that some of definitive disruptions announced by the *triumph* of the nation-state might be illusory, or transitory. By adopting the term “imperialism,” the intention is to include within the volume’s scope the governance processes of differentiated populations (ethnically, socio-culturally, or racially) based on a hierarchical relationship, regardless of the fact that these processes develop within or outside a relation of institutionalised subordination.⁵⁵ This choice turns out to be fruitful in the sense that it allows space for considering and questioning rigid dividing lines between the colonial and the post-colonial world, between historical processes such as the Cold War and decolonisation.⁵⁶ It is not a question of defending some kind of immutability: the intention is instead to recover the genealogies and the legacies of the intersections between imperialism and internationalism and their reverberations in the contemporary world. This type of exercise may be seen as particularly advantageous since it allows the identification and assessment of the impact of imperial formations and policies in the constitution of the multiple paths of globalisation that have shaped the world as we know it. In this sense, the convergence and the combined questioning of phenomena as apparently diverse as colonial policies, population control policies,

and imperial and post-imperial geo-policies, international health policies, and decolonisation certainly constitute a key contribution to understanding the most remote and perhaps neglected genealogies in today's world, or, in short, to better understanding the several pasts which *led* to the present.

NOTES

1. This collection of texts focuses on the twentieth century, although some of them establish clear connections to events and processes of the preceding century. Of course, the chronologies of internationalism are diverse and have longer genealogies. The same goes for the historical intersections between imperialism and internationalism. On longer trajectories of internationalisation and internationalism, see, for instance, Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Recently, a splendid volume was published on a twentieth-century history of internationalism: Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalisms. A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), which contains one text that directly explores the engagement of internationalisms and imperialism: Susan Pedersen, "Empires, States and the League of Nations", 113–138. See also Glenda Sluga, "Was the Twentieth Century the Great Age of Internationalism?" Hancock Lecture 2009, *Australian Academy of Humanities Proceedings 2009*, pp. 155–174.
2. Consider as (distinct) examples Ralph Wilde, *International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3. We decided to include Alison Bashford's text, already published, because it provides a revealing example of the benefits of studying the intersections between imperialism and internationalism: among other aspects, it illuminates the way contemporary politics and policies debates must also acknowledge their imperial genealogies, challenging a static and rigid caesura between the *age of empires* and the age of the nation-state.
4. Obviously, tracing the origins and evolution of international debates on these topics cannot be subordinated to a political agenda either of denunciation or prescription. But this kind of recovering exercise is a powerful corrective to triumphalist or simplistic approaches to processes that had at their core an asymmetrical relationship between different socio-cultural and ethnic groups.

5. See, for example, the synthesis and reflections by Patricia Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism", *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 421–439; Idem, "Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International Contexts", *European History Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2010), pp. 624–640; Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History (Theory and History)* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Kiran Klaus Patel, "An Emperor without Clothes? The Debate about Transnational History Twenty-Five Years On", *Histoire@Politique*, no. 26 (2015), www.histoire-politique.fr. Of course, the monumental *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* edited by Akira Iriye and Pierre Saunier is of mandatory consultation: Akira Iriye and Pierre Saunier, eds., *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History: From the Mid-19th Century to the Present Day* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For a multidimensional analysis during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see the excellent set of texts in Emily Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870–1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Akira Iriye, ed., *Global Interdependence. The World After 1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); and, also, the seminal work by Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
6. For a discussion on the articulation of the "twin" liberal ideologies of nationalism and internationalism see Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). For an exemplary study of the actual actors and their living experiences of a different sort of internationalism see Brigitte Studer, *The Transnational World of Cominternians* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
7. On the theoretical debates in the field of international history, see, among others, Akira Iriye, "Internationalizing International History", in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender, (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 47–62. Patrick Finney, ed., *Palgrave Advances in International History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), and Pierre Grosser, "État de Littérature. L'histoire des Relations Internationales Aujourd'hui", *Critique Internationale* 65, no. 4 (2014), pp. 173–200. On some examples of empirical studies that reflect new concerns, see, among others, Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), and Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On the imperial

- history, see, among others, Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert Aldrich and Kirsten McKenzie, eds., *The Routledge History of Western Empires* (London: Routledge, 2014); Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, *Empires and the Reach of Global* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
8. In addition to their writings in this volume, see also Daniel Laqua, "Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order", *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011), pp. 223–247; Sandrine Kott and Joelle Droux, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights. The ILO and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessel, "Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organization", *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 465–492, and Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940–1970* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). For analytical and methodological questions, see AAVV, "Une autre approche de la globalisation: socio-histoire des organisations internationales (1900–1940)", *Critique Internationale* 52, no. 3 (2011) and Glenda Sluga, "Editorial—the Transnational History of International Institutions", *Journal of Global History* 6, (2011), pp. 219–222 (see also the remaining texts that compose the dossier).
 9. For a traditional debate, which varies according to the scientific fields being addressed, see Adrian Wilson and T. G. Ashplant, "Whig History and Present-Centred History" and T. G. Ashplant and Adrian Wilson, "Present-Centred History and the Problem of Historical Knowledge", both in *The Historical Journal* 31, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1–16 and 253–274; Ernst Mayr, "When Is Historiography Whiggish?", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51, no. 2 (1990), pp. 301–309; Oscar Moro-Abadia, "Thinking about 'Presentism' from a Historian's Perspective: Herbert Butterfield and Hélène Metzger", *History of Science* 47, no. 1 (2009), pp. 55–77. Of course, the great classic is Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (London: G. Bell, 1931).
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13. Alongside this volume, for several texts confirming this assessment, see Simon Jackson and Alanna O'Malley, eds., *From the League of Nations to the United Nations: New Approaches to International Institutions* (London: Routledge, 2017). For the European connection, see Patricia Clavin and K. K. Patel, "The Role of International Organisations in Europeanization: The Case of the League of Nations and the European Economic Community", in *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 110–131.

14. Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 5; Kott, in this volume.
15. For two rich examples of historical analysis of the twentieth century, see Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era", *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000), pp. 807–831, and Michael Adas, ed., *Essays on Twentieth-Century History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010).
16. For other important works by these authors, see, among others, David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, 1914 to the Present* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Corinna Unger, "Toward Global Equilibrium: American Foundations and Indian Modernization, 1950s to 1970s", *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 1 (2011), pp. 121–142; Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
17. See, for instance, Emmanuelle Saada, "The History of Lessons: Law and Power in Modern Empires", in *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power*, eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin W. Moore (New York: The New Press, 2005), pp. 35–47 and Véronique Dimier, "Direct or Indirect Rule: Propaganda around a Scientific Controversy", in *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Vision of Empire in France*, eds. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002) pp. 168–183.
18. On some conceptual ponderations, see Kjell Goldmann, *Transforming the European Nation-State: Dynamics of Internationalization* (London: Sage, 2001), esp. pp. 8–21, cit. pp. 9, 15. See also Goldmann's approach to internationalism in *The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation* (London: Routledge, 1994), although his conception of internationalism is essentially equated with "the liberal tradition of international ethics" as assessed by Michael Joseph Smith, "Liberalism and international reform" in *Traditions of International Ethics*, eds. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapelm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 201–204.
19. For epistemological and methodological nationalisms, see Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences", *Global Networks* 4, no. 2 (2002), pp. 301–334; Daniel Chernilo, *A Social Theory of the Nation State: The Political Forms of Modernity beyond Methodological Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2007); Jani Marjanen, "Undermining Methodological Nationalism. Histoire Croisée of Concepts as Transnational History" in *Transnational Political Spaces. Agents–Structures–Encounters*, Mathias Albert et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009), pp. 239–263.

20. For some reflections on the notion of imperial formations, see Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan "Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrains" in *Imperial Formations*, eds. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), esp. pp. 8–15.
21. See Michael Doyle, *Empires* (New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1986).
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23. For the tensions between individual agency and historical processes, see, for instance, Zara Steiner, "On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More", *International Affairs* 73, no. 3 (1997), pp. 531–546. For a much necessary, and extremely rewarding, correction of the historiography, see also Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James, eds., *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics Since 1500* (London: Routledge, 2015).
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25. On the issue of globalisations and their intersections with imperial processes, see, among others, A.G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico, 2002); Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*; Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Thompson and Martin Thomas, "Empire and Globalisation: from 'High Imperialism' to Decolonisation", *International History Review* 36, no. 1 (2014), pp. 1–29; and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, "Imperial Globalisations" in *Explorations in History and Globalization*, eds. Cátia Antunes and Karwan Fatah-Black (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 212–230.

26. See, among others, the contributions of Matthew Connelly, "Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty", *Past & Present* 193, no. 1 (2006), pp. 197–233, and *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control the World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
27. For the labour question, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, *The Labours of Empires: An International History of Modern Colonial Labour* (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming). Alongside Alison Bashford's works, on population control, see also The Population Knowledge Network, ed., *Twentieth Century Population Thinking: A Critical Reader of Primary Sources* (New York: Routledge, 2015). On the issues of health policies, see also Sunil Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: South and Southeast Asia, 1930–1965* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006).
28. For example, the emergence of what is usually called epistemic communities. See, about this and among others, Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" in *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, ed. Peter M. Haas (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 1–36, especially pp. 2–5; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Circulations, connexions et espaces transnationaux", *Genèses* 57, no. 4 (2004), pp. 110–126; and the impressive collective work Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, eds., *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015). For a critical perspective, see Yves Dezalay, "Les courtiers de l'international. Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l'impérialisme et missionnaires de l'universel", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 1, no. 151–152 (2004), pp. 4–35. See also the text by Sandrine Kott in this volume.
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30. In this volume.
31. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*.
32. For an excellent collection of texts, see Daniel Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured*.
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34. Tobias Rupperecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Sandrine Kott, "Cold War Internationalisms" in *Internationalisms*, eds. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, pp. 340–362. See also Brigitte Studer, *The Transnational World of the Cominternians*; and Talbot Imlay, "Socialist Internationalism after 1914" in *Internationalisms*, eds. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, pp. 213–241. For the opposite movements, see Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
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38. See also Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 28–65; Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 21–172; Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War and the End of Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

39. See also Manu Goswami, "Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms", *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 5 (2012), pp. 1461–1485.
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42. For two different *internationalist moments* and geographies, see Anne Rasmussen, "Tournant, inflexions, ruptures: le moment internationalist", *Mil Neuf Cent. Revue d'Histoire Intellectuelle* Special issue *Y a-t-il des tournants historiques? 1905 et le nationalisme* 19, no. 1 (2001), pp. 27–41; and Ali Raza, Franziska Roy, and Benjamin Zachariah, eds., *The Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and World Views 1917–1939* (New Delhi: Sage, 2015).
43. For the local as international, see Meredith Terretta, "'We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World': Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa's Decolonization", *Human Rights Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2012), pp. 329–360.
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47. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, "Introduction", *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, eds. in idem, p. 3. For the convoluted

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48. For more, see, among others, David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark Haeefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Marc Frey, Sonke Kunkel, and Corinna Unger, eds., *International Organizations and Development (1945–1990)* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl, and Martina Kopf, eds., *Developing Africa. Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).
 49. Providing abundant information that questions these prevailing assumptions, the work of Frederick Cooper constitutes a fundamental reference. See, for instance, *Empires in World History*.
 50. In this regard, see, among others, Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, and Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
 51. For example, the project of Eurafrica. See, in this regard, Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
 52. See Samuel Moyn, “Fantasies of federalism”, *Dissent* (Winter 2015); Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), and also Michael Collins, “Decolonisation and the ‘Federal Moment’”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24, no. 1 (2013), pp. 21–40.
 53. See the text by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo in this volume; Erez Manela, “Dawn of a New Era: The “Wilsonian Moment” in Colonial Contexts and the Transformation of World Order, 1917–1920” in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave, 2007) pp. 121–149; and Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski, eds., *Imperial Co-Operation and Transfer, 1870–1930: Empires and Encounters* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
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and Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*. On humanitarianism in this context, see Amalia Ribi Forclaz, *Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), and Silvia Salvatici, *Nel nome degli altri. Storia dell'umanitarismo internazionale* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015), especially Chap. IV, “Caotici anni di pace”. On the connection between *civilising mission* and humanitarian intervention, see Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

55. Obviously, we are aware of risks of the overextension of the concept of imperialism in the sense that inequalities across states, regions and continents are a permanent feature that cannot be reduced to an overarching definition of imperialism. Yet, it is a controllable risk in face of the naturalisation of the history of the nation-state and the widespread omission in certain academic and public domains of imperial legacies and the affirmation of the fiction of a world of equal, sovereign states.
56. In this regard, see, respectively, and as an example, William Roger Louis, and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Decolonization”, and Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence”, *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000), pp. 739–769. The number of works on the intersection between cold war and decolonisation has risen significantly. See, for example, the collective volumes by Robert J. McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), and Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, *Decolonization and Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). See also Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

PART I

Internationalism(s) in an Imperial World:
the Interwar Years

Towards a Social History of International Organisations: The ILO and the Internationalisation of Western Social Expertise (1919–1949)

Sandrine Kott

Having for long been a field of study reserved for political scientists and international relations specialists, international organisations are now attracting growing interest among historians.¹ This increased interest can be explained by the movement to “globalise” the discipline both in terms of its themes and its practices. While no single, accepted definition of global history exists, the majority of authors agree that a “universal” definition of the global should be rejected² and instead global history should be seen as an invitation to explore the connections, circulations, and cross-fertilisations that have so often been neglected within the framework of national case studies.³ International organisations and associations are particularly fertile areas of study in this regard: they represent spaces in which one can reveal the existence of networks of relationships and systems of circulation (*régimes circulatoires*) and explore the

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connections between the local, the national, and the global and, indeed, the process of internationalisation itself.⁴

To this end, it is important, however, to move beyond the debate between realists and functionalists which has dominated the study of international organisations, the crux of the argument being whether international organisations can be considered as international actors in their own right.⁵ The emergence and development of international organisations in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe were, in fact, contemporaneous to the spread of the nation-state model and the nationalisation of European societies.⁶ The dissolution of empires on the European continent after the First World War and the accompanying proliferation of nation-states made it necessary, according to the realists, to create permanent institutions capable of regulating conflicts. International organisations, they argue, were structurally dependent on the states that both financed them and set the rules of their functioning and thus became powerless spectators to the balance of power between states. This fact, realists claim, is demonstrated by the “failure” of the League of Nations (LoN) in the face of the imperialist ambitions of certain states and, more recently, by the powerlessness of the UN.

This pessimistic observation is based on an understanding of the international organisation as a diplomatic forum dominated by state and national interests. However, if one examines the organisations “from the inside” then one discovers a social space populated by a diverse array of actors: diplomats, of course, but also functionaries and experts whose identity was defined not only by their national origin but also by their participation in a number of international and national networks. By examining their activities and their trajectories, one can demonstrate how these actors participated in the international circulation of knowledge and expertise.⁷ These circulations highlight the existence of international networks, of course, but they were only possible thanks to the existence of specific groups and milieus within different national and/or local societies. It is at the intersection of these different levels that international organisations become sites where “the international” is produced. As such, international organisations are, I would argue, not so much *actors* in global governance as they are *sites* of internationalisation.

Studying this “mechanism of internationalisation” requires a methodological shift. Besides the study of grand plenary conferences, moments which favoured national antagonisms, it is important to re-evaluate the

work of the secretariats, commissions, and technical agencies and to make use of documents or archives produced by the functionaries and experts who worked in them. Using archival documents in preference to the profusion of official documents published by international organisations has two main advantages: it tells us about the gradual and often conflict-ridden processes that lay behind internationalisation and it allows us to pinpoint the diverse actors involved in this process.

When viewed from the perspective of their secretariats and expert committees, international organisations are revealed as spaces structured by the relations between individuals and groups of actors. But these relationships only make sense if we carefully contextualise them within the shifting geographical, institutional, and historical spaces in which they took place. The personnel files of functionaries and experts conserved in the archives of the International Labour Office or of the League of Nations (other organisations do not always grant access to such files) are, in this respect, a valuable resource. They provide information on the social and cultural profiles of the functionaries and experts and on the networks to which they belonged. This allows us to understand how a professional group is made up and how this group, at the intersection between different national social scenes and spaces, could develop and disseminate an international normativity.

In this article, the heuristic advantages of this methodological approach will be demonstrated on the basis of research undertaken in the archives of the International Labour Organisation (henceforth ILO). I will proceed in four stages. Firstly, I will address the question of the truly international character of the ILO, studying it as a site where numerous non-governmental, liberal Western European networks coalesced.⁸ I will then approach the nature of international organisation through the national/international dialectic, demonstrating, by using the German example, that it was on the basis of national expertise that international normativity was developed. Following this German example, I will then study how the German Third Reich developed its own alternative, brown internationalism, developing a social imperialism, and how it conflicted with liberal internationalism. Finally, in contrast to Nazi imperialism, I will look at the mechanisms through which the liberal social normativity was exported to “peripheral” spaces and, in the process, re-appropriated. For each of these points I will highlight the decisive role of the International Labour Office (henceforth Office)—or permanent

secretariat—by examining the correspondence and reports produced by its functionaries and experts.⁹

FROM REFORMIST NETWORKS TO THE TRANSNATIONAL SPACE OF SOCIAL REFORM

Reconstructing the origins of international organisations allows us to go beyond an “idealist” standpoint and to understand the processes and social and political networks that allowed the former to emerge. In different fields, the decades before and after First World War, and around the pivotal date of 1900 and the Paris Universal Exhibition, were a crucial moment in the gradual institutionalisation of these networks.¹⁰ The field of social reform provides a good illustration of this process. In major industrial countries, reformist networks¹¹ were formed at the end of the nineteenth century by representatives holding public office, professors, employers, and trade unionists. They gave rise to diverse international associations,¹² among them the International Association for Labour Legislation (henceforth IALL), founded in 1900. The latter brought together social reformers and experts on social questions, who were organised into national associations that were powerful in Germany, the United States, and France but weaker in Great Britain. From 1901 onwards, this association had a library and a permanent secretariat, under the leadership of the Austrian economist Stefan Bauer, in the Swiss city of Basel.¹³ This centre became the seedbed for what would subsequently become the International Labour Organisation.¹⁴ Several individuals embodied the continuity between the old current of social reform, particularly the International Association for Labour Legislation, and the new international organisation. The director of the new organisation, Albert Thomas, a French social reformer, was himself a member of the French branch of the IALL. Sophy Sanger, an eminent member of the British branch, took charge of the legislative section of the ILO, becoming the only female head of section. She was assisted in the task by Eduard Schluep and Edouard Thommen, who had both been employed by the IALL in Basel.

The creation of the ILO took place, however, in the specific context of the peace settlement established after the First World War. The statutes of the new international organisation were defined by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, its objective expressed in the following

terms: “universal peace...can be established only if it is based on social justice”, which in turn had to be rooted in “sentiments of justice and humanity.”¹⁵ This threefold aim—peace, justice and humanity—led to the compromise passed in 1919 between the representatives of governments, the reformist labour movement, and liberal social reformers.¹⁶ This compromise pursued an objective of social (re)conciliation embodied in the tripartite structure of the organisation: as such it represented a clear counter-model to the Communist project.¹⁷ Universal in ambition, the ILO was in fact the outcome of a liberal, European-based internationalism and it owes its longevity to the groups and associations that shared the aims of this liberal internationalism.

The trade union movement, which found its place within the ILO thanks to the organisation’s tripartite character,¹⁸ became its most natural supporter. During the early years, the trade union international, of social-democratic allegiance, as well as the socialist movement, provided a significant proportion of the functionaries and conference delegates.¹⁹ But this network of the socialist reform movement was soon joined by social Catholicism. The Christian trade unionist Hermann Henseler was recruited in 1921.²⁰ After Albert Thomas’s visit to the Vatican in Rome, the first Jesuit father, Arnou, was appointed as advisor on religious affairs. To this day, a Jesuit has always performed this role for the director general, a reminder of the fact that the Catholic Church is the oldest and a very powerful international organisation.²¹

The functionaries of the Office strove tirelessly, moreover, to surround the organisation with a dense network of international and national associations liable to support its activities. Albert Thomas played a decisive role, for instance, in the creation of the International Association for Social Progress (henceforth IASP), which made it possible to amalgamate the diverse pre-war associations.²² Although autonomous, this association was clearly dominated by the staff of the Office. Albert Thomas and Arthur Fontaine, head of the Governing Body, were members; Louis Varlez, the association’s deputy secretary was also a functionary of the Office, while his secretary, Adeodat Boissard, was a long-time friend of Albert Thomas.²³ During the association’s founding congress in Prague in 1924, the British members Lady Hall and Joseph Cohen fiercely defended the independence of the new association, but Albert Thomas immediately asserted that its mission was to support the action of the ILO.²⁴ At the association’s annual general meeting in 1931, Thomas restated that he expected it to bring the ILO “assistance in propaganda,

and the support of public opinion that you can foster and encourage.”²⁵ Within the IASP there were politicians and high civil servants who played the role of informal intermediaries between the association and their respective national governments and publics, a role encouraged by the association’s organisation into national sections. In the 1920s, moreover, the creation of new sections of the IASP in the Balkans went hand in hand with the extension of the activities of the ILO into these countries.²⁶

The ILO had a particularly desperate need to develop its links to national public opinion and national parliamentary milieus in order to accelerate the ratification process of the international labour conventions. To meet this need, the IASP had inscribed in its statutes that such support was one of its priorities. A commission met regularly to take stock of the state of ratifications.²⁷

The support of associations outside the ILO played a crucial role in the field of social insurance, which was one of the primary fields of ILO intervention.²⁸ Working on insurance made it possible to associate a multitude of actors with the ILO’s activities. The functionaries of the ILO could draw on the vast network of Socialist and, later, Christian Mutuality. This network would provide members and support for the *Association des unions nationales de sociétés de secours mutuels et de caisses d’assurances maladie*,²⁹ currently the *International Social Security Association*, founded by Adrien Tixier and Oswald Stein, both functionaries of the social insurance section of the Office. The new association founded in 1927 aimed to support the normative decisions of the ILO and to counterbalance the influence of the Swiss-based associations of doctors and private insurance companies that were attempting to organise themselves at that time.³⁰ The post of secretary of this international association was first held by the ILO officials Adrien Tixier and Oswald Stein.³¹ After the Second World War, Aladar Métal, a member of the social insurance section of the Office from 1931 to 1949, held the position of secretary general of the International Association of Social Security while another functionary, Flores, became secretary general of the Inter-American Conference on Social Security founded in 1940 with the support of the Office.³² Albert Thomas underlined the importance of these international networks for the legitimacy of the ILO: “our international organisation, our Office, would be nothing but a hollow bureaucratic organisation if we were not surrounded by all the living forces of social life and did not feel around us all the intellectual forces,

trade union forces, insurance systems, in short all those in the world who aspire to a better social life.”³³ For the first director of the organisation, the very legitimacy of the organisation’s activity and its ability to act rested on the constitution of an international public opinion, which he expected to act as a counterweight to the power of governmental priorities.

The ILO, therefore, was very much a site where liberal international/European networks of social reform coalesced. It had in part its own origins in these networks, and it also facilitated and encouraged their organisation and growth. However, this specifically transnational aspect of the International Labour Organisation did not eliminate the role played by national objectives and national actors, just as it did not weaken the resonance of the national frame of reference in the construction of international normativity. The truly international dimension of this organisation was, in reality, based on its constant negotiation back and forth with national societies (and not only with national governments) and would therefore conflict with the imperialist views of some of its members.

INTERNATIONAL EXPERTISE OR DENATIONALISED NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

The actors—the functionaries and experts of international organisations—were trained and socialised in national spaces and many had previously held, or were closely linked to, national offices. In their new international functions, moreover, they mobilised national knowledge and references. The ILO also depended on national governments and administrations for its funding and above all for statistical information and documentation, the collection of which being one of the fundamental missions of the organisation.³⁴ Finally, the support of national public opinions was essential to ILO’s survival. The establishment of national branch offices was an expression of this dependence; these offices played the role of intermediaries and essential interfaces with national societies. Branch offices were opened in Paris, Washington, London, and Rome in 1919–1920, in Berlin in 1921, and in Tokyo in 1924.³⁵ Alongside these national branches, six national correspondents were added in 1930.³⁶ The decision to establish these offices illustrates the real importance of some national spaces for the ILO, mostly located in the Western hemisphere. This importance did not necessarily intersect with their diplomatic importance; it should be noted in particular that the United States,

which did not join the organisation until 1934, had a branch office from 1919 onwards, while Germany, apparently internationally marginalised, had the largest branch office at the end of the 1920s.

This national/international dialectic is essential for understanding how international social expertise was constructed. During the interwar period, and especially during the 1920s, normative activity (the development of conventions and recommendations) was at the heart of the ILO's activities.³⁷ These norms were intended to regulate industrial and agricultural working conditions in the framework of the capitalist economic system. The legitimacy of the "legislative work" of the ILO was gradually reinforced as the functionaries of the Office were able to demonstrate their social "expertise."³⁸ Conventions were developed and adopted at the end of a preparatory process, the rules of which were stabilised in the course of the 1920s, and which always proceeded, as it still does today, from a skilful negotiation back and forth between the information and recommendations of governments and national actors and the international functionaries. All convention work is prepared through a long process of information gathering for which different nation-states serve as veritable reservoirs of experience. The meticulous nature of this documentary work and above all the fact that it could provide an irrefutable source of evidence was essential both for the chances of success of the conventions and for the long-term survival of the institution as a whole. The widely recognised quality of this documentary work allowed the Office to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the different governments that financed it, and allowed it to draft conventions which it could hope would attract a greater number of signatories. These activities of information gathering, report writing, and expertise amassing quickly assumed a central place in the work of the Office's staff. In the ILO's early years, a lack of qualified personnel justified the recourse to individuals referred to by officials as "experts." In the early 1920s, the director asserted his right to appoint such experts himself based solely on their abilities: "For questions of a scientific nature," he stated in 1921, "it is desirable that the choice of experts be made based on considerations of individual competence."³⁹

Nevertheless, the appointment of experts soon became a subject of heated discussions within the Governing Body between the director, Albert Thomas, and the government representatives. In 1923, Giuseppe de Michelis,⁴⁰ commissioner general for the Italian government, asserted, moreover, that: "it is our opinion that the foreign government should have its say in the choice of all persons who are to sit on special or

technical committees. Ultimately, we believe that the head of the Office should ask either the government representative or the government concerned for a certain number of names fulfilling the desired conditions, from which the Office will choose the experts appointed to participate in meetings.”⁴¹ By 1925 the governments had managed to assert their control over the nomination of experts. On the correspondence committee for social insurance in the 1920s, the first appointments of this kind were Andreas Grieser for Germany, Walter Kinnear for Great Britain⁴² and Gaston Roussel for France: all three were heads of the insurance departments in their respective governments.

The functionaries of the Office conceded to this kind of haggling because the experts fulfilled an important institutional function and were important intermediaries between the Office and the national level.⁴³ Nevertheless, the national origin of experts was not only linked to “political haggling” between governments and international functionaries, but also bore witness to the capacity of a national space to produce and promote specific expertise. The state of social legislation in different countries, the different ways insurance had been institutionalised, and the varying degrees of state involvement in these institutions therefore all played an important role in the appointment of experts. This explains why Germans were so clearly overrepresented in the experts committee on social insurance.⁴⁴ What has sometimes been interpreted as a kind of hegemony of the German model of social insurance, managed by the employers’ and workers’ representatives at the Office, in fact had its origins in the capacity of this national system to produce competent “specialists” in the eyes of the ILO. German experts thus played an essential role in the insurance conventions of the 1920s and 1930s. Andreas Grieser, head of the social insurance department at the Ministry of Labour in Berlin, sat as an expert on the commission on social insurance in the Office from 1926 and was a member of the German delegation to the labour conferences in 1925 and 1927. He was also the reporting member of the insurance commission at the International Labour Conference of 1927. As such, he exercised considerable influence over the drafting of the convention on sickness insurance, the final version of which was very close, in spirit, to the German sickness insurance law of 1884. In this way, Andreas Grieser made a decisive contribution to the internationalisation of the German social insurance system.⁴⁵

But while experts were specialists from a particular national system, the triumph of one solution or another was also linked to the

international support which it received. As such, the internationalisation of the German social insurance model was not only the result of the effectiveness of German experts but was also linked to the support that this solution received from the social reform movement and the international labour movement, which had adopted it as a model in 1904.⁴⁶ The German social insurance model, managed by the employers and workers, in fact clearly strengthened the position of the trade unions; it represented, moreover, the foundation of a form of social democracy defended, and in some respects embodied, by the ILO. In this way, the ILO helped to universalise the German social insurance model that had already been “denationalised” by the international labour movement.

International expertise was therefore created as the result of a complex process. While the possession of know-how played a role, it was not enough, and international expertise cannot automatically be inferred from the existence of an ideal international “epistemic community.”⁴⁷ On the other hand, even if they were sent by their national governments, international functionaries and experts did not necessarily represent them.⁴⁸ They also belonged to specific social spaces within their national space and they participated in international networks. The functionaries of the Office, meanwhile, sought primarily to strengthen the position of the institution in general, as well as their own place within it. This objective led them to join up with national actors who were best placed to bring about the victory of the normative decisions carried by the ILO.⁴⁹

The selection of experts, clearly driven by a concern for institutional effectiveness, was thus adapted to national and local realities. In 1933, when the Nazis came to power, Andreas Grieser, who embodied German international openness, was relieved of his functions at the Ministry; soon afterwards he was struck off the list of experts. What happened next is also clearly revealing of the contradiction between the liberal international project of the ILO and the “imperial project” of the Third Reich.

THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL IMPERIALISM: THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MODEL

As early as January 1933, the Secretary of State of the German Ministry of Labour (RAM) tried to negotiate a new place for Germany in the ILO, but the national-socialist Labour Front (DAF) adopted from the start a policy of rupture. Its very existence was profoundly contradictory

with the liberal tripartite nature of the organisation and the role played within in the ILO by reformist trade unionism. During his short stay in Geneva as workers representative for the international labour conference in June 1933, Robert Ley made provocative statements about the ILO, which he described as a temple of Marxism, and caused offence to the Latin American delegates.⁵⁰ In return, the president of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Belgian trade unionist Walter Schevenels, questioned whether the German workers' delegation was truly representative, the DAF being, he claimed, the result of the systematic destruction of union freedom in Germany.⁵¹ In protest, the delegation left the conference⁵² and Germany demanded its withdrawal from the ILO in October 1933. The hard line of the DAF had, as such, won out over the softer approach of the RAM. Nevertheless, in press articles, former German functionaries at the ILO who were seconded by the Labour ministry defended the legitimacy of the German withdrawal by casting doubt on the effectiveness of international conventions and calling for the development of bilateral treaties.⁵³ Indeed, since 1933 Germany had signed bilateral treaties on social insurance with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Denmark which were meant to make it easier for Germany to hire desperately needed labour from these countries.

From 1939 onwards plans were made to create a German-based ILO to replace what was denounced as a Western European liberal organisation. The RAM proposed to organise a loose association between the states allied with Germany and in particular with Italy with the aim of multiplying bilateral agreements and more generally of sharing information on social policy.⁵⁴ In 1940, Oskar Karstedt, who was chairing the working group on international affairs in the German Labour Ministry, went as far as to state that among the handful of German functionaries who remained in Geneva, some had offered their services to the ministry in the belief that the moribund ILO would soon have a German successor.⁵⁵

None of that came to fruition, but the idea of re-launching a German-based international labour organisation was indeed seriously pursued by the DAF which, beginning in 1935, was developing a veritable international social programme based on the alleged exemplarity of the leisure policy (*Kraft durch Freude*) of the Third Reich.⁵⁶ In 1941 the representatives of the DAF took steps to occupy the ILO's building in Geneva; the Swiss authorities, cautiously, did not follow up this request.⁵⁷ At the end of the same year, Robert Ley intended to transform the central office of *Strength Through Joy*, which he had run since 1933, into a central

office for an international social organisation. From 1941 to 1944 this office published the *Neue internationale Rundschau der Arbeit*, which was meant to replace the old *Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit*, published by the ILO until 1939.⁵⁸ An article by Robert Ley introduced the first issue;⁵⁹ those that followed were written in a triumphal, repetitive, and obscure style.⁶⁰ The message, without much substance, amounted to a virulent attack against the Treaty of Versailles, seen as the origin of an international system founded on grand principles of justice but which in reality allowed the domination by the power of money. The new brown internationalism, on the other hand, would give a fair place to those peoples with the strongest life force, particularly the German people.⁶¹ The European social policy promoted by the DAF clearly sought to protect the German worker and to attract the foreign labour that the new Reich needed.

The international practices and objectives of the RAM were expressed in more sober language, but the European ambitions of the ministry were no less real.⁶² The war opened up new possibilities for German social expertise, and in 1939 Labour minister Seldte proudly stated that the ministry would take charge of the spread of the German model “without needing to make a detour through the International Labour Office.”⁶³ A special *Referat* was created to study the social policies abroad and to advertise the German social realisations. The ministry sought to organise visits for foreign experts to the institutions of German social policy.⁶⁴ From April 1940 to December 1944 this *Referat* published the very rich and extremely well-documented *Sozialpolitische Weltrundschau* in order to keep the Ministry staff informed about social developments worldwide. This strategy of information also rested on the networks and expertise acquired by the RAM officials in the Geneva Office. The advance of the German armies, meanwhile, opened up new spaces for the RAM. It allowed functionaries to introduce, directly or indirectly, the social policies relating to their expertise, facilitating the process of putting occupied populations to work for the Nazi war machine. For RAM officials, the greater German Reich was a new departure in the internationalisation of German social policy⁶⁵; symbolically, a former colonial officer and specialist in African social policy, Oskar Karstedt, was put in charge of this *Referat* for International Affairs. As two functionaries of the Office put it in February 1941, German international social policy, serving the sole aim of European domination, had become totalitarian and needed to be internationally resisted.⁶⁶ As one

of the only remaining liberal international actors, the ILO, which had moved to Montreal in March 1940, entered the war against the Nazi imperial project.

CIRCULATION OR EXPORTATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

During the war, ILO officials multiplied missions in Latin American countries seeking to thwart the propaganda efforts of the Nazi authorities towards a Latin American public opinion assumed to be hostile to the hegemonic power of the United States. The ILO expert Emil Schönbaum, who had been professor of mathematics and head of actuarial and statistical methods at the Czechoslovak General Institute of Pensions and managed to escape from Czechoslovakia in 1939, wrote the social security code for Ecuador and helped the Mexican and Chilean governments to establish a system of social insurance; he was also active in Paraguay and Venezuela and established a miners' pension scheme in Bolivia.⁶⁷ Emil Schönbaum could build on a long expertise since in the interwar years he had been sent as an ILO expert to Eastern European countries to set up social insurance schemes.

Indeed, at the end of the 1920s, the normative framework of the organisation was fixed and social legislation everywhere was threatened by the economic crisis.⁶⁸ The functionaries of the Office went to great efforts to disseminate the social expertise amassed during its first decade, to attempt to adjust national legislation in accordance with international norms, and to increase the number of ratifications. As such, they pursued a twofold aim of disseminating and universalising norms while at the same time working to strengthen the ILO. To this end, they invited representatives of national administrations to Geneva to train them in the diverse techniques of social intervention. Moreover, on the request of governments, they travelled to a wide range of countries on technical missions. Around 60 missions of technical assistance were carried out by the ILO before the establishment of the first major development programme by the United Nations in 1949.⁶⁹

The most experienced functionaries and the handful of experts they recruited became, in a way, the missionaries of the ILO; they exported the technical know-how that they produced in three favoured fields: social insurance, industrial hygiene, and labour legislation. In Europe

itself, the Balkans represented a first testing ground.⁷⁰ In 1929, after the return to power of the liberal Eleftherios Venizelos, Adrien Tixier, head of the social insurance section, travelled to Greece, and during the same year, the section produced a report of 100 pages on the first version of the social insurance law. He then made two study trips to Athens to help the head of the insurance office to complete the drafting of the bill. Emil Schönbaum was then sent by the Office as an expert advisor to the Greek government. He played an important role in the introduction of the 1932 accident and sickness insurance law, which drew heavily on the conventions of the ILO.⁷¹ This law, Adrien Tixier was pleased to note, was “one of the very rare examples of progress in social insurance legislation that we are able to report.”⁷²

This missionary zeal also extended beyond Europe, however, and the action of the ILO was quickly globalised. In 1931 Camille Pône travelled to China to develop the country’s labour laws, and Ferdinand Maurette returned there in 1934 on an educational mission. The director, Harold Butler, twice travelled to Egypt, in 1931 and 1938, to assist in the establishment of hygiene measures and a labour code. But it was above all the countries of Latin America which became the favoured sites of missions: Cuba in 1934, Brazil and Chile in 1936, and in 1938 the Czech actuary Anton Zelenka⁷³ was sent to Venezuela.⁷⁴ In the Venezuelan case, the envoys of the Office were able to collaborate with jurists open to international influences in favour of a context of gradual democratisation of the country’s institutions, and in 1940 Venezuela adopted a social insurance law that took up most of the recommendations of the Zelenka mission; this law even explicitly mentioned the collaboration of the Office and included a list of international conventions on which it was based.⁷⁵ During the Second World War, when the Office had moved to Montreal and financial contributions from European countries had been cut off, these technical aid activities had a commercial objective: the functionaries exchanged their expertise for government contributions. This was the clear impression given by Adrien Tixier when he conducted expert advisory missions to the Mexican and Peruvian labour ministries on the question of social security and the labour code.⁷⁶

Beyond the specific war context, the technical aid missions also pursued a wider political objective because, through the tripartite system of managing social questions, the functionaries of the Office exported a model of democratic society directed against Nazism as well as against Communism. It was on these grounds that Salvador Allende, Chilean

Health Minister in the Popular Front government of Aguirre Cerda, defended the tripartite model of social insurance at the meeting of the Governing Body in New York in October/November 1941.⁷⁷ The Chilean government, moreover, invited the states of the Americas to the Inter-American Social Security Conference in September 1942; in his inaugural address, the Mexican Minister of Labour García Téllez underlined the importance of social security for world democracy.⁷⁸ As such, the functionaries and experts of the ILO were incontestably participating in a process of exporting models of political and social organisation developed in Western Europe to the periphery. But this exportation was only possible insofar these policies met with local actors willing to support them. Thus, in Central Europe, the rapid political developments, and especially the establishment of dictatorial regimes opposed to the forms of self-administration of insurance promoted by the ILO, put an end to its activities in this region of the world in the 1930s.⁷⁹

It would be false, moreover, to believe that the countries that received technical aid were passive recipients. Since the end of the 1920s, the countries of South Eastern Europe and Latin America had been expressing reservations about a policy that contented itself with universalising the norms produced in the West and demanded action better suited to their needs. During the same period, under the influence of representatives of Asian countries, particularly India, the Office had also begun to reflect on the global political inequalities produced by the widening socio-economic gap between different countries. This realisation was closely linked to the preparation of the convention (29) on forced labour, which sought to regulate the use of "native labour."⁸⁰ By advocating the abolition of forced colonial labour, which, it established, should eventually be replaced by paid work, Convention 29 and the discussions which preceded it implicitly put forward a vision for the reasonable, acceptable exploitation of dependent territories, trying therefore to stabilise the colonial project of Western European.

From 1943 onwards, at a time when the ILO was gradually being marginalised in plans for European reconstruction, the Office returned to this consideration of the social and economic improvement of underdeveloped countries and "dependent territories."⁸¹ In an article published in the *International Labour Review* in February 1943, Wilfrid Benson, the functionary in charge of colonial questions, put forward a programme of reforms for the colonies which, cautiously, underlined the need to implement a policy of economic and social development

and encouraged the internationalisation of these questions. This opened the way for a series of conventions and recommendations discussed and adopted between 1944 and 1947 during the international conferences in Philadelphia (1944), Paris (1945), and Geneva (1947), which aimed to promote the development of “dependent territories.” Appropriated by local elites, these early development projects therefore provided an argument in favour of demands for independence and the right to choose one’s own path to modernity.⁸² As such, they converged with the demands made in the 1930s by actors in the Balkans, the Middle East, Latin America, and China.⁸³

Just as the production of social knowledge amounted to more than simply the “product” of the functionaries of the ILO, its circulation resulted from more than a simple process of exportation. In order to circulate, this knowledge needed to meet the interest of local social groups and to be appropriated locally by them. In return, this process brought about a shift in the priorities of the organisation.

CONCLUSION

Social historians have been rightly wary of the transnational turn which tends to provide a rather conflict-free image of the circulation of knowledge and expertise and to focus its attention on dominant nations and social groups.⁸⁴ I have attempted to demonstrate in this article how, and within what limits, social historians can use international organisations as a means of escaping this embellished vision of global or transnational history, while at the same time avoiding methodological nationalism.

The International Labour Organisation provides an excellent field of study. It allows us to demonstrate that international organisations were not superimposed over national goals, but that they instead institutionalised existing exchanges and circulations. It confirms, moreover, the importance of international circulations in the development of social policies from the late nineteenth century onwards, an issue that has been obscured by the more vocal claims of national governments, which not only took the sole credit for the policies implemented but also attempted to present themselves as the essential, if not the only, actors in international discussions.

In turn, studying the ILO also highlights the forms of interdependence that cross over between the national and international levels. In return they became spaces of powerful legitimisation for states, as well

as for certain national actors seeking to promote specific solutions that were sometimes opposed within their own countries. In this respect, the study of debates surrounding the choice of ILO experts allows us to “denationalise” social policies. The interwar period saw, through the International Labour Office, the triumph of a “German-style” model of insurance that was redistributive and self-managed. The development of this model benefited from the wealth of expertise from Germany, but its spread depended on the existence of “organised international forces” capable of denationalising this national solution and on the existence of an organisation liable to facilitate its internationalisation.

This internationalisation process conflicted with the imperial project pursued by the Nazis, who were claiming to offer an alternative internationalism grounded in the vitality of the German nation. During the war, the ILO tried to oppose the National Socialist social propaganda, particularly in those parts of the world under a colonial or semi-colonial (Eastern Europe, Latin America) situation. The Nazis argued that the ILO, by exporting the democratic liberal model of social policy, also served “imperial interest.” Nevertheless, the success of such international missions always depended on the national and international contexts within which they were undertaken. The functionaries of the ILO could not always impose the norms developed primarily in Western Europe. In the 1930s, the countries of the Balkans, like those of Latin America, insisted on the need to implement a form of technical aid that was better suited to their specific economic and social needs. Development policies promoted and implemented from the 1930s onwards in part acceded to these demands but also resulted from a desire to address international imbalances and a concern to strengthen the ILO itself. Eventually they would contribute to a shift in priorities and modes of action.

Thus, working on international organisations as social spaces allows us to highlight the fact that “the international” was constructed in a dynamic and complex relationship between a wide range of different individual and collective actors who evolved in interconnected spaces. The social approach makes us wary of a reified and idealised vision and encourages us to take into account the international connections and circulations made by individuals and networks in order to understand local and national realities without, for all that, giving way to the naive optimism of generous cosmopolitanism.

NOTES

1. It is impossible here to give an account of the wide range of studies of these diverse organisations. On the current state of research see Madeleine Herren, *Geschichte der internationalen Organisation* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), currently one of the few overviews of international organisations written by a historian. See also *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011), which includes three articles preceded by an introduction by Glenda Sluga, "The Transnational History of International Institutions", pp. 219–222; the special issue of *Critique Internationale* (2011), "Une autre approche de la globalisation: socio-histoire des organisations internationales (1900–1940)" and Lorenzo Mechi. "Tendenze recenti della storiografia sulle organizzazioni internazionali", *Contemporanea* (2013), pp. 645–657. To get an idea of the diversity of research in progress, see the website of the History of International Organisations Network, based in Geneva (<http://www.hion.ch/>).
2. On this concept see, for example, Bruce Mazlish, "Comparing Global History to World History", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 28, no. 3 (1998), pp. 385–395 and above all Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). The work of world historians, therefore, is "to portray the crossing of boundaries and the linking of systems in the human past" (p. 3).
3. For a presentation of this approach: Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Circulations, connexions et espaces transnationaux", *Genèses*, 57 (2004), pp. 110–126; more recently: Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). For a reflection on the limits of the circulatory approach see Antoine Vauchez, "Le prisme circulatoire. Retour sur un leitmotiv académique", *Critique internationale* 59, no. 2 (2013), pp. 9–16.
4. Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5. For a presentation of these different positions see the special issue of *International Organization*, Vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), particularly, for the realist position, Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics", pp. 971–991; and for the functionalist position, Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions", pp. 729–757 and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", pp. 887–917.
6. See the converging perspectives of Madeleine Herren, *Geschichte der internationalen Organisation* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,

- 2009); Bob Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2009); Marie-Claude Smouts, *Les organisations internationales* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995).
7. On the importance of bureaucracies see the institutionalist approach of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
 8. The term “transnational” can also be employed in the sense of “non-governmental.” For this use see *International Organization*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (1971), particularly the articles by Joseph Nye and Robert S. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction”, pp. 329–349; and James A. Field, “Transnationalism and the New Tribe”, pp. 353–372. See also the special issue of *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 14 (2005), particularly the introduction by Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism”, pp. 421–439; and her article with Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations”, pp. 465–492.
 9. The history of the ILO has given rise to a rich array of publications in recent years, particularly Jasmien Van Daele et al., eds., *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century* (Bern/New York: Peter Lang, 2010) and Isabelle Lespinet-Moret and Vincent Viet, eds., *L'organisation internationale du travail. Origine-Développement-Avenir* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011); Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). These works contain references to older works on the subject.
 10. On 1900, see Anne Rasmussen, “Tournant, inflexions, ruptures: le moment internationaliste”, *Mil Neuf Cent. Cahiers Georges Sorel. Revue d'histoire intellectuelle* 19 (2001), pp. 27–41.
 11. This expression refers back to the work edited by Christian Topalov, *Laboratoires du nouveau siècle. La nébuleuse réformatrice et ses réseaux en France, 1880–1914* (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 1999).
 12. Rainer Gregarek, “Le mirage de l'Europe sociale. Associations internationales de Politique sociale au tournant du xx siècle”, *Vingtième Siècle* 48 (1995), pp. 103–118.
 13. On Stefan Bauer (1865–1934), see Matthias von Bergen, *Nationalökonomie und Weltbürgertum. Ein Beitrag zur Biographie des internationalen Sozialpolitikers Stephan Bauer* (Bern: Lizentiatsarbeit, 1990).
 14. Jasmien Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas, and the Founding of the International Labour Organization”, *International*

- Review for Social History* 50 (2005), pp. 435–466; Madeleine Herren, *Internationale Sozialpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Die Anfänge europäischer Kooperation aus der Sicht Frankreichs* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1993); Sandrine Kott, “From Transnational Reformist Network to International Organization: the International Association for Labour Legislation and the International Labour Organization (1900–1930s)”, in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, eds. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), pp. 383–418.
15. See the preamble to the ILO constitution: http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Origins_and_history/Constitution/lang--en/index.htm
 16. Carol Rigelman, “War-Time Trade Union and Socialist Proposals” in *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, vol. 1: *History*, ed. T. J. Shotwell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 55–79 and Reiner Tosstorff, “The International Trade-Union Movement and the Founding of the International Labour Organization”, *International Review of Social History* 50, no. 3 (2005), pp. 399–433.
 17. James T. Shotwell, “The International Labor Organization as an Alternative to Violent Revolution”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 166 (1933), pp. 18–25.
 18. The ILO is a tripartite organisation. During the annual international labour conferences (the parliament of the organisation) every country sends a delegation composed of two government representatives: one representative of the employers and one representative of the workers (the trade unions). The Governing Body, the executive of the organisation, is also composed in a tripartite manner.
 19. Geert Van Goethem, *The Amsterdam International: The World of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945* (Aldershot and Burlington: VT, 2006).
 20. Archives of the International Labour Office (henceforth ILOA), p 738.
 21. Maurice Barbier, “Les relations entre l’Eglise catholique et l’Organisation internationale du travail”, *Politique étrangère* 37, no. 3 (1972), pp. 351–387; Charles S. J. Gallagher, “The Roman Catholic Church, the ILO and the Quest for Social Justice”; Liosa Azara, “The Holy See and the ILO. The Origins of a Special Relationship” in *Christian Democrat Internationalism. Its Action in Europe and Worldwide from Post World War II until the 1990s. Volume II. The Development (1945–1979)*, ed. Jean-Dominique Durand (Peter Lang, 2013) pp. 335–42 and pp. 42–57.
 22. Denis Guérin, *Albert Thomas au BIT 1920–1932. De l’internationalisme à l’Europe* (Geneva: Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève,

- 1996), pp. 57–58 and Martine Fine, “Un instrument pour la réforme: l’Association française pour le progrès social (1927–1929)”, *Le Mouvement social* 94 (1976), pp. 3–29. ILOA, AIP 237, A. Thomas’s speech in 1924 at the International Congress for Social Reform in Prague, *Congrès international de politique sociale. Compte rendu des séances et rapports* (Paris: 1924), pp. 75–76.
23. *L’Avenir du travail* (AdT) (1928), p. 136.
 24. ILOA RL 01/4/52, exchange of letters between Stefan Bauer and Albert Thomas 21, 23 February 1922.
 25. AdT (1932), p. 24.
 26. AdT (1929), p. 148.
 27. AdT (1923), p. 119.
 28. Between 1919 and 1935 social insurance featured in one way or another almost every year in the discussions of the International Labour Conference. For a general inventory see BIT, International Labour Organisation. *International Labour Organisation and Social Insurance*. Studies and Reports. NO. 12. Geneva, 1936. For a detailed list of the conventions, recommendations and texts see the excellent website: http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/lang-fr/index.htm
 29. It became the CIMAS (*confédération internationale des mutuelles et des assurances sociales*) in 1937 and subsequently the *International Association for Social Security* in 1947. On the constitution of the CIMAS from a French perspective, see Michel Dreyfus, “Mutualité et organisations politiques et sociales internationales (1889–1939)”, *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire* 48 (1995), pp. 92–102
 30. ILOA, SI 22/1/1 report by Stein to Maurette, 10 December 1926.
 31. ILOA, SI 22/1/1 report by Tixier to Thomas, 5 October 1927.
 32. ILOA SI 1000 0.
 33. Speech by Albert Thomas at the opening of the conference of the *Union internationale des caisses maladie* held in Vienna, 10–14 September 1925. ILOA SI/1000/11/2.
 34. According to the terms of article 396 of the peace treaty, this documentary work was explicitly part of the Office’s mission, continuing the work of the Labour Office in Basel which, since 1901, had played the role of a European library on social issues. Alongside the rapidly growing library, the social insurance section soon also had a small documentation centre at its disposal, in which the legislation of different states was collected and which allowed it to answer requests for information from different national administrations (having first translated this information into the two official languages).

35. Bureau international du travail, 1931. International Labour Organisation. *International Labour Organisation; the First Decade* (London: 1931), p. 415.
36. ILOA D 700/110/1 1929. Correspondence offices committee meeting of December 1929 Geneva. In 1930, there were correspondents in Vienna, Brussels, Madrid, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague.
37. On norm-setting at the ILO: Jean-Michel Bonvin, *L'Organisation internationale du travail: étude sur une agence productrice de normes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).
38. From the 1930s onwards, the International Labour Office increasingly tended to view itself as a kind of technical agency of "the social."
39. A. Thomas, *Minutes of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office (GB)*, 9, 1921, p. 13.
40. On the ambiguous position of the Fascists towards the ILO, see Stefano Gallo, "Dictatorship and International Organisations: The ILO as a "Testground" for Fascism" in *Universalizing Social Rights: A History of the International Labour Organization and Beyond*, eds. Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 153–172. On de Michelis and immigration at the Office, see Paul-André Rosental, "Géopolitique et État-providence. Le BIT et la politique mondiale des migrations dans l'entre deux guerres", *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 61, no. 1 (2006), pp. 99–134.
41. ILOA, D600/206, letter of 16 July 1923.
42. *International Labour Conference*, ILO, 1927, pp. LXX ff.
43. ILOA, SI 1/0. Letter from Tixier to Thomas, 1930.
44. Aurin, Manes, Freund, Zahn and Moldenhauer. Grieser replaced Aurin in 1925.
45. Sandrine Kott, "Dynamiques de l'internationalisation: l'Allemagne et l'Organisation internationale du travail (1919–1940)", *Critique internationale* 52, no. 3 (2011), pp. 69–84.
46. *Congrès socialiste international d'Amsterdam (14–20 août 1904)*, vol. 14. (Geneva: Minkoff Reprint, 1980), pp. 134–135. *Congrès socialiste international, Copenhague, 1910* (Geneva: Minkoff Reprint, 1981), p. 481.
47. For a definition of such epistemic communities, see Emmanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program", *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992), pp. 367–390. A critical analysis is to be found in Yves Viltard, "L'étrange carrière du concept foucauldien d'épistémè en science politique", *Raisons politiques* 23 (2006), pp. 193–202 and Sandrine Kott, "Une 'communauté épistémique' du social?", *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire* 71, no. 2 (2008), pp. 26–46.
48. The situation is, of course, different for the delegates to the Governing Body or to the International Labour Conference.

49. Editors' note: on this topic, see Daniel Laqua's article in this volume.
50. See the full file with the press cuttings compiled by the information department, ILOA DADG 10-4.
51. See all the documents in *Procès verbal de la Conférence Internationale du Travail* (henceforth CIT), 1933, pp. 486–490.
52. CIT 1933, 17, pp. 486–490.
53. ILOA XH 7/24/2.
54. Bundesarchiv R3901/20653, Note RAM, Berlin 28 Dez 1939. I wish to thank Amélie Nucq, who pointed out this document to me.
55. Reichsarbeitsblatt, V, (RAB) 1940, 21, p. 362. Around 20 functionaries of the ILO remained in Geneva under the leadership of the Frenchman Marius Viple.
56. Karl Heinz Roth, *Intelligenz und Sozialpolitik im "Dritten Reich": eine methodisch-historische Studie am Beispiel des Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts der deutschen Arbeitsfront* (München/New Providence: KGSaur, 1993) and Karsten Linne, "Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront und die internationale Freizeit- und Sozialpolitik 1935 bis 1945", *Sozialgeschichte* 1999 10, no. 1 (1995), pp. 65–81.
57. ILOA PWRI-24 and Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (AAA), Berlin, Gesandtschaft Bern, 2844, Brief Krauel, 12 September 1941.
58. On the international efforts of the DAF, as seen by the Office, see ILOA, PWRI-24.
59. Robert Ley, "Die Überwindung des Geistes von 1789", *Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit* 1 (1941), pp. 1–9.
60. This was also the point of view of Marius Viple in ILOA Z1/11.
61. Editors' note: On the theme of the multiplicity of internationalist imperialsms and particularly its articulation with social policies, see the text of Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo in this volume.
62. See especially Roth, "Die Sozialpolitik des "europäischen Großraumes" im Spannungsfeld von Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938–1945)", in *Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938–1945): Beiträge zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik* (Berlin-Heidelberg: Hühthig, 1994), pp. 509–512.
63. Franz Seldte, *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich, 1933–1938* (München: 1939), p. 267.
64. "Ausländer sehen das Soziale Deutschland", RAB, Teil V, Soziales Deutschland, 25 January 1940, pp. 46–47.
65. Friedrich Sitzte, "Sozialpolitik im neuen Europa", *Soziale Praxis* 49, no. 16 (1940).
66. P. Waelbroeck and I. Bessling (International Labour Office). "Some Aspects of German Social Policy under the National-Socialist Regime", *International Labour Review* XLIII, no. 2 (1941), pp. 127–152.

67. On the period of the Second World War, see Sandrine Kott, "Fighting the War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO during the Second World War", *Journal of Modern European History* 12, no. 3 (2014), pp. 359–376.
68. See the speeches of the Directors General (Thomas, then Butler) to the ILC throughout this period.
69. Véronique Plata, *Une voiesociale pour le développement. Le Bureau internationale du travail et les débuts de la coopération technique (1919–1949)*, thèse Genève, 2016. See also Anthony Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 209–220.
70. ILOA, CAT 1/30/1/3. See, on this idea, the speech by Albert Thomas to the Alliance Française in Sofia, 26 February 1930.
71. ILOA SI 2/26/3.
72. ILOA, SI 2/26/3, note by Tixier, 16 January 1933.
73. Anton Zelenka, trained in Prague by Emil Schoenbaum, became the head of the social insurance department in the 1950s.
74. Charles Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America: comparative essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1986).
75. Véronique Plata, "La difusión de las normas internacionales del trabajo en Venezuela, 1936–1939: una práctica de cooperación técnica internacional en la OIT" in *América Latina y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo: redes, cooperación técnica e institucionalidad social, 1919–1950*, coords. Fabián Herrera León and Patricio Herrera González (Morelia, Michoacán, México: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 2013), pp. 127–160. Morelia: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de la Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo; Centro de Estudios Históricos de la Universidad de Monterrey; Programa de Pós-graduação em História da Universidade Federal Fluminense.
76. ILOA Z 1/1/1/9 Correspondence between Phelan and Tixier 1940–1944.
77. M GB, 1941, 90.
78. "L'œuvre de la conférence interaméricaine de sécurité sociale de Santiago du Chili", *Revue Internationale du Travail* (1942), pp. 746–778.
79. See in this respect the very pertinent article of Karl Pribram, "The ILO: Present Functions and Future Tasks", *Foreign Affairs; American Quarterly Review* 21, no. 1/4 (1942/1943), p. 158.
80. On this issue see Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: the International Labour Organization, 1940–70* (New York; Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan; International Labour Office, 2012), translation of *Menschenrechte, Sozialpolitik und Dekolonisation: Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (IAO) 1940–1970* (Essen: Klartext, 2007), here, pp. 39–43; Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, *Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime, 1919–1989*

- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), particularly pp. 30–35; Susan Zimmermann, “‘Special circumstances in Geneva’: the ILO and the World of Non-Metropolitan Labour in the Interwar Period” in *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, eds. Jasmien Van Daele et al. (Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 221–250 and James P. Daughton, “ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar Years” in *Globalizing*, eds. Kott and Droux, pp. 85–97.
81. On all this see Maul, *Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization*, here pp. 89–121.
 82. On this see Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept” in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard Randall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 64–93.
 83. See the specific case of China in Margherita Zanasi, “Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (2007), pp. 143–169.
 84. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Une nouvelle sensibilité: la perspective ‘transnationale’”, *Cahiers Jaurès* 200, no. 2 (2011), pp. 173–180.

Internationalism and Nationalism in the League of Nations' Work for Intellectual Cooperation

Daniel Laqua

In September 1934, as part of its Fifteenth Session, the Assembly of the League of Nations surveyed the League's efforts in the realm of intellectual cooperation. The same subject had featured on the Assembly's agenda in previous years. On this occasion, the context for these debates was particularly challenging, owing to several factors: the ongoing impact of the Great Depression, Japan's and Germany's departure from the

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League in 1933, and the disappointments of the World Disarmament Conference. Speakers deplored the material challenges for cultural and educational work; they alluded to national tensions whilst affirming the need for “moral disarmament”. To the Romanian delegate, the author Elena Văcărescu, the overall picture seemed ambivalent. She stated that “an internationalism of the spirit” had developed “in parallel to the waves of nationalism that are rising in the world today”. In this respect, she noted “a certain disagreement ... between ideas and actions”.¹

These remarks draw attention to wider ambiguities that characterised the interwar years. On the one hand, the 1920s and 1930s were an era in which nationalism manifested itself at many levels and in often violent terms. On the other hand, the very same period also saw the emergence of strong internationalist currents. Akira Iriye, for instance, has stressed the vibrancy of internationalism after the First World War.² Along similar lines, Daniel Gorman has argued that whereas internationalism had previously “existed in the sizeable shadow of nationalism..., [t]his changed in the 1920s, when the shock of the First World War led to a broad array of overlapping initiatives in international cooperation”.³

Nationalism and internationalism were not antagonistic in all respects: indeed, they intersected and could even reinforce each other. Glenda Sluga has drawn attention to this interplay, viewing nationalism and internationalism as “twinned liberal ideologies” that were underpinned by the “the same unresolved questions about the nature of individuals and groups”.⁴ In some cases, states could cast internationalism as a matter of national interest: for some of them, as Madeleine Herren as pointed out, it could open “back doors to power”.⁵ The present chapter investigates the rapport between internationalism and nationalism. In this context, internationalism is defined as a belief in the value of international organisation, a narrative of growing global interdependence, and the participation in international congresses or organisations.⁶ If we view “nationalism” as a belief in the existence and importance of nationhood, the underlying feature of internationalism is a belief in the value of international community. The latter, however, did not necessarily question national categories as such.⁷

At first sight, this interrelation may seem surprising. Nationalism and internationalism often tend to be perceived as more or less antithetical—not least by nationalists who fear that exchanges and border-crossings might have a corrosive effect on national identity. Yet, when studying international congresses and internationalist literature, we can see how

pronouncements on international fraternity coexisted with the representation and celebration of nationhood. The League of Nations was one manifestation of this phenomenon. It was an international organisation that was premised on ideas of nationhood—as reflected in both its name and its association with Wilsonian notions.⁸

The League of Nations' work in the cultural realm offers a particularly rewarding perspective on this relationship, as culture was an important vehicle for both nationalism and internationalism. This chapter therefore concentrates on two League ventures, the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (*Commission internationale de Coopération intellectuelle*, CICI) and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (*Institut international de Coopération intellectuelle*, IICI)—bodies that were supposed to ensure a peaceful future by creating a “society of minds”.⁹ Their work pointed both backwards and forwards: *backwards*, because it built upon existing traditions of cultural and academic exchange; *to the future*, because its work was resumed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Educational Organization (UNESCO). The constitution of UNESCO evoked the ambitions of its forerunner when expressing the ambition to build “the defences of peace ... in the minds of men”.¹⁰ Jo-Anne Pemberton has stressed the “lines of continuity” between these organisations. As she puts it, the interwar bodies for intellectual cooperation “supplied the nascent UNESCO with an organisational model and an ethos: a body comprising state representatives and intellectuals seeking to reduce the political temperature of world affairs”.¹¹

There is a rich body of research on the IICI and CICI. For instance, we now have a relatively clear picture of the transnational exchanges involving intellectuals, government agents, and League of Nations staff.¹² Recent research by Corinne Pernet has illuminated the little-known fate of these bodies after the outbreak of the Second World War.¹³ However, further work is needed to disentangle the ways in which national and transnational ideas were negotiated or projected by these actors. In commenting on the historiography of the League, Susan Pedersen has described the CICI and IICI as “more symbolically significant than effective”.¹⁴ It is exactly this “symbolic” dimension which allows us to explore the role of national ideas and images within international settings.

In the following, I will address two interconnected questions: how did agents of intellectual cooperation confirm or reinforce national

categories, even when ostensibly doing something very different, namely promoting transnational exchange? And how did they reconcile the tensions that were intrinsic to their endeavours? The discussion breaks down into four major parts. The chapter initially tackles national considerations within the cultural diplomacy that helped establish League bodies for intellectual cooperation. It then focuses on the role of National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation. This is followed by an analysis of how national differences were enacted at international conferences. The final part considers the people who were involved in the IICI and CICI. As a whole, these case studies address a central challenge faced by scholars of transnational history: border-crossings can also highlight the power and influence of the nation.¹⁵ Pierre-Yves Saunier has drawn attention to this ambivalence: modern nation-states have sought “to control, rebut or eradicate flows, ties and formations across borders”, yet they have also spawned “projects to nurture and orient” transnational phenomena—“if only to increase or protect what was defined as ‘national’”.¹⁶

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES FOR INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION

The League of Nations Covenant had not envisaged an organisation for intellectual cooperation. The creation of dedicated structures in this area has therefore been described as “an afterthought”.¹⁷ In 1922, a Committee on Intellectual Cooperation was founded within the League framework, counting prominent figures such as Henri Bergson, Albert Einstein, Marie Curie, Gilbert Murray, and, in later years, Paul Valéry and Johan Huizinga among its members.¹⁸ Four years after the CICI’s creation, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation opened in Paris. Both of these bodies were animated by a mixture of scientific concerns and pacifist ideals: their agenda covered subjects from bibliography and education to the study of international relations. As Tomás Irish has noted, such activities were nourished by the idea that “mutual understanding and cooperation amongst intellectuals, as well as international cooperation in intellectual and educational endeavours, was an important part of the path to peace”.¹⁹

From the outset, the CICI and IICI were embedded in a web of transnational relations. Nongovernmental organisations had lobbied for

their creation and subsequently corresponded with them. Their existence reflected a more general aspect of the League of Nations: the view that preparations for a peaceful future would have to reach beyond League officials and government representatives.²⁰ Accordingly, the IICI sent delegates to international congresses; meanwhile, the CICI discussed proposals from nongovernmental organisations, dedicating agenda items to the “development and expansion of the international spirit” and the ways to “encourage international life”.²¹ Furthermore, the Parisian institute hosted the meetings of the League’s Liaison Committee of Major International Organisations.²² This body brought together the representatives of different associations, aiming to bundle various educational efforts for peace.

Despite such transnational ambitions, national considerations played a major role in the establishment of the League’s bodies for intellectual cooperation. French policies and responses offer a good example of this aspect. Initially, some French officials had been sceptical about extending the League’s work to the cultural realm. However, they ultimately supported such plans, championing their own country’s leadership in this field.²³ In an early memorandum, Julien Luchaire—the IICI’s future director—suggested that France could extend its international influence if “following an ancient tradition, [she] presents herself as the nation that is best equipped to understand the intellectual effort of all others, to serve as a meeting place for their different products, to harmonise them in accordance with their spirit and thus transform them into the common heritage of humanity”.²⁴ When the IICI was inaugurated in 1926, Edouard Daladier—as Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts—acknowledged “apprehensions” about potential French dominance. Would the Institute, with its headquarters in France and a French official as director, be sufficiently “international”? In a memorable image, Daladier denied this charge: “The International Institute is animated by the same spirit of cooperation for peace, for the development of peoples—equal and interdependent—which ensures the greatness of the League of Nations. And if the tree was planted on the banks of the Seine, it is nourished by the juices of all soils.”²⁵

The creation of an International Institute of Educational Cinema (*Institut international du Cinématographe éducatif*) further illustrates the interrelation between intellectual cooperation and the projection of national interests and ideas. Funded by the Italian state, this body operated under the League’s auspices from 1928 to 1937 and contributed

to its work for intellectual cooperation.²⁶ The body had been preceded by a national institute, the *Istituto L'Unione Cinematographica Educativa* (LUCE), reflecting Benito Mussolini's interest in film as a propaganda vehicle.²⁷ Both the National and the International Institute of Educational Cinema were headed by Luciano de Feo, a key figure in Fascist Italy's film policy and a driving force behind the creation of the Venice Film Festival.²⁸ The organisations were one manifestation of the Fascist state's concern with cultural diplomacy: beginning in 1929, Italy maintained a National Centre for the Coordination of Scientific Institutes Concerning International Questions.²⁹ In 1938 the activities of this centre were rearranged into the *Istituto Nazionale per le Relazioni Culturali con l'Estero*, a "national institute for foreign cultural relations", with De Feo's involvement.³⁰ Despite the Italian attack on Ethiopia, League of Nations sanctions, and Italy's departure from the League, Henri Bonnet—Luchaire's successor at the helm of the IICI—expressed his hope for collaboration with this body.³¹ The *Istituto Nazionale's* conception of intellectual cooperation differed from the ideas that animated the League's efforts. In 1943 a newspaper in German-occupied Belgium described the *Istituto Nazionale's* work as "purely national", using bilateral relations merely as a way of problem-solving.³² The article's author contrasted the Italian institute's work with the IICI's impregnation with a "useless spirit of internationalism". Such examples illustrate that intellectual cooperation needs to be seen in connection with governments' interest in using mechanisms of transnational cooperation.

NATIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE LANGUAGE OF INTERNATIONALISM

Despite the evident linkages to national policies, the League bodies for intellectual cooperation were more than a playing field for state actors: they involved intellectuals from different countries. Such relations were formalised through the National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation, which were construed as links between national intellectual ventures and the League. Two congresses of National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation (Geneva 1929 and Paris 1937) reinforced the notion that international intellectual cooperation was based on the cooperation of different national units. In practice, National Committees sought to ensure that national voices were heard at an international

level. When Luchaire promoted the creation of a National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in France, he stressed its potential to act as a go-between for the French state vis-à-vis international organisations.³³ There were areas in which the National Committees had official functions: the “Casares procedure” for textbook reform, for instance, gave them a key role in tackling complaints about aggressive representations of other nations in school textbooks. However, the complex nature of these arrangements meant that it was used only three times before being overhauled.³⁴

The role of national bodies within the context of intellectual cooperation is illustrated by the cultural policies of the new or reconfigured states in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the existence of national minorities and border disputes added special resonance to the issue of intellectual exchange. As Andrea Orzoff has pointed out, “[e]ach fragile new state between Germany and the Soviet Union waged a continual cultural relations and propaganda battle, resting above all on a discourse of Europe”.³⁵ In Czechoslovakia, the Ministry of Public Instruction and National Culture sponsored exchanges of schoolchildren and university professors.³⁶ The fostering of Franco-Czech links emerged as a particular target. Stressing its commitment to intellectual cooperation, Czechoslovakia hosted an IICI event, the International Congress of Popular Arts (Prague 1928), whose relation to national representations was illustrated by its concern with national costumes and folk traditions.³⁷ In his opening remarks, Czechoslovakia’s Minister for Education, Milan Hodža, pointed out that the congress coincided with the tenth anniversary of Czechoslovakian independence. As Hodža put it, the celebration of the latter occasion had encouraged his country “to put our values to the test” in a setting of “international competition”.³⁸

Romanian policies provide another example of intellectual cooperation’s potential significance: in the early 1920s, representatives of the Romanian state corresponded with George Oprescu—secretary of the CICI and a Romanian himself—as well as with other League representatives, proposing an international loan for intellectual purposes.³⁹ This idea was premised on the international loans which had facilitated the financial reconstruction of Austria and Hungary and which had helped Greece to cope with the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War.⁴⁰ League officials had helped to broker these loans in the face of economic crises that had threatened to destabilise the postwar order. Meanwhile, the Romanian proposal focused on the notion of an intellectual crisis which

the development of its national higher education system might help to avert.⁴¹ In making their case, Romanian representatives used the rhetoric of a new international order: “in the new States which have been formed in the centre and South East of Europe, where the war produced important changes and gave rise to highly complex problems, the whole conception of life has to be adapted to the new circumstances and sometimes even entirely recreated”.⁴² Although the CICI welcomed this idea, nothing came of this scheme.⁴³ Along with other experts, Arthur Salter of the League’s Economic and Financial Organisation estimated that such a loan would not be attractive for financial markets.⁴⁴ Despite its lack of success, the proposal illustrates how protagonists of intellectual cooperation targeted international bodies for national purposes.

Similar concerns were evident in neighbouring Hungary. Unlike Romania, the country had been the beneficiary of an international loan. Hungarian statesmen and intellectuals hoped that the League would complement its financial aid with support in the field of culture. In 1924, Albert Apponyi—a former government minister and veteran of the Interparliamentary Conferences—persuaded the League of Nations to launch an international appeal for the intellectual workers of Hungary. As president of the CICI, Henri Bergson called upon universities, academies, and learned societies to send publications to Hungary and to establish various forms of scholarly collaboration.⁴⁵ Apponyi’s rationale for the appeal was twofold: on the one hand, he evoked the spirit of internationalism. This was underlined by his praise for a previous League of Nations appeal in support of the intellectual workers of Austria: “It has awakened or reinforced the sentiments of cooperation and solidarity between peoples of all civilisations, and it has contributed to maintain a home for European civilisation in the face of the most serious dangers.”⁴⁶ On the other hand, Apponyi justified the need for League action by listing Hungarian contributions to culture and learning. The work of its “great men”, he argued, had been made possible by their European contacts and their international educational trajectories.

The question of publications exchanges—which featured in Apponyi’s proposal—bore a particular national significance, as the matter potentially concerned Hungarian minorities abroad. From its inception in 1923, the Hungarian National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation complained that “on their territory, most of the successor states [of the Habsburg Monarchy] do not permit the introduction and distribution of Hungarian publications that have appeared since 1918”.⁴⁷ It hoped that

the League bodies for intellectual cooperation would remove obstacles to the dissemination of Hungarian publications in the neighbouring countries. The issue also arose in the Assembly of the League of Nations: at the 1934 meeting on intellectual cooperation, the Hungarian delegate affirmed the value of National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation and stressed his country's efforts in this respect. At the same time he claimed that these activities had been "paralysed by the attitude of certain neighbouring states", in particular to the obstacles posed to the dissemination of Hungarian publications.⁴⁸ In return, the delegate from Czechoslovakia argued that Hungary had obstructed efforts to promote moral disarmament.⁴⁹

These examples indicate how intellectual cooperation could be a contested and nationally charged field, as postwar borders had created national minorities, irredentist ambitions, and mutual suspicion. The president of the Hungarian National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, Albert Berzeviczy, was conscious of pronouncements that might belittle Hungarian culture vis-à-vis its neighbours. In a newspaper article, he claimed that an IICI publication on higher education had marginalised Budapest University. He complained that Cluj University—to which he referred by its Hungarian name Kolozsvár—had been "glorified" as an "achievement of Romanian culture".⁵⁰ The relationship between intellectual cooperation and the promotion of "home-land nationalism" became even clearer in the report of the Hungarian National Committee for 1938–1939: "the Hungarian National Committee has continued its efforts to establish cultural relations between Hungary and the Hungarian minorities that live in the so-called successor states."⁵¹ By that point, Hungarian politics had taken a turn towards the right. Demonstrating that intellectual cooperation could also be a tool for aggressive nationalists, Hungary and Nazi Germany launched cooperation in the field of history textbooks in the 1930s.⁵²

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES AND THE PROJECTION OF NATIONHOOD

Apart from the interaction between the IICI, CICI and national institutions, there is another way in which one can study the interplay of national and transnational factors: namely through representations of "the nation" at international congresses. Such events allow

us to consider a phenomenon which Michael Billig has called “banal nationalism”. With this term, Billig has drawn attention to the everyday “flagging” of nationhood, which helped to consolidate the notion of an “international world of nations”.⁵³ The IICI organised a series of events in which such ideas became expressed. The International Studies Conferences, which addressed questions of international politics, were one example.⁵⁴ Furthermore, from 1932 to 1938, the so-called *entretiens* brought together prominent intellectuals.⁵⁵ These “conversations” were transnational phenomena in several respects: the 1933 *entretien* on *L’avenir de la culture*, for instance, took place in Madrid at the invitation of the Spanish government, yet it had been prepared by the French National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. The international constituency at the conference included distinguished figures such as J.B.S. Haldane, Paul Langevin, Salvador de Madariaga, and Paul Valéry.⁵⁶ One year later, the *entretien* on *L’art et la réalité – l’art et l’état*, held in Venice, attracted, *inter alia*, the architects Le Corbusier and Henry Van de Velde, the authors Jules Romains and Thomas Mann, the politician Jules Destrée, and the composer Belá Bartok.⁵⁷

It was not only the organisation of these events and the range of its participants that seemed to express a spirit of internationalism: the specific focus on arts and letters was significant too. As Jo-Ann Pemberton has pointed out, the CICI and IICI expressed a significant commitment in this field because internationalism in this area “was seen as much less developed” than in the natural sciences.⁵⁸ However, this also meant that nationhood played a major role at such events. The Venice meeting on *L’art et la réalité* illustrates how such congresses could help to stage visions of nationhood. In his opening speech, Alfredo Rocco—chair of Italy’s National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation as well as vice-chairman of the CICI—stressed the importance of intellectual cooperation whilst praising Mussolini and the “fascist people”.⁵⁹ Such rhetoric is hardly surprising, as Rocco was a key theorist of fascist corporatism. This, however, makes his longstanding presence in international bodies on intellectual cooperation all the more striking.

The praise of Italian culture was taken up by one of the first contributors to the *entretien*, Roberto Paribeni, an archaeologist and member of Italy’s Royal Academy.⁶⁰ Paribeni had been involved in official efforts to promote *Italianità* and *Romanità*, for instance by working with the Italian Archaeological Mission to Albania.⁶¹ The dilemma of how to engage with the representatives of dictatorships had also shaped the

Madrid *entretien* the previous year.⁶² At that forum, the Italian mathematician Francesco Severi described the state as “the concrete expression of the Nation” and rejected the notion that science was “devoid of national character”: even in a discipline such as mathematics, “there are always features that are distinct to the spirit of its race”.⁶³ Severi played an active role in fascist cultural policy, being the sole mathematician in Italy’s Royal Academy.⁶⁴ Many of his interventions in Madrid implied a defence of Mussolini’s policies.⁶⁵ This became most evident during the open debate: having noticed various allusions to “tyrants”, he asserted that it was “very clear that in the modern world and amongst the peoples of ancient civilisation, tyrants are not possible”.⁶⁶

However, in one respect, Paribeni and Severi were less exceptional than appears at first sight: the role of the nation was also acknowledged by intellectuals who, unlike their Italian peers, did not perform public functions in European dictatorships. The Madrid *entretien* was explicitly focused on the relationship between “individual”, “national”, and “international” culture. On this occasion, the liberal internationalist Salvador de Madariaga described national cultures as “indispensable” since they provided the “spice of international life”.⁶⁷ At the same event, the French author Jules Romains denounced aggressive nationalism but juxtaposed this with a phenomenon that he regarded as self-evident and natural, namely “man’s sense of conditioning by his milieu, his soil, [and] by the national cultures of where he was educated”.⁶⁸

Such language resonated with a key trope of nationalist discourse—the way in which the nation was being “psychologised”. Glenda Sluga has drawn attention to nationalists’ frequent reference to national “souls”, “spirits”, or “character”, and the perpetuation of this discourse by internationalists during and after the Great War.⁶⁹ At the Madrid event, this view was exemplified by statements that works of art or science carried within themselves a national “spirit” or “soul”.⁷⁰ One year later in Venice, the IICI’s director Henri Bonnet suggested that the intellectual wealth of nations revealed “their true character”.⁷¹

Salvador de Madariaga embodied the tension between national and transnational ideas: he headed the Disarmament section of the League of Nations from 1922, taught Spanish literature at the University of Oxford from 1928 to 1931, acted as Spain’s ambassador to the US and to France, and had a brief career in the Second Spanish Republic before moving into exile in Britain in 1936. At events such as the *entretiens* and in numerous publications, he promoted intellectual exchange,

the extension of international law, and the strengthening of international organisations. Nonetheless, his 1928 essay on *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards* also treated nationhood as a psychological category.⁷² As Glenda Sluga has noted, Madariaga's text pointed to one of the "paradoxes of this new league-focused internationality"—namely that participants in international encounters became acutely aware of national differences.⁷³

INTELLECTUALS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The pronouncements at international congresses relate to issues of rhetoric and agency. Who were the individuals that contributed to the work of the CICI and the IICI? How can we assess their practices? Peter Haas has proposed the concept of epistemic communities to consider actors with "a shared set of normative and principled beliefs".⁷⁴ The role of experts within international organisations has proven a fruitful research area for historians, raising questions about their promotion of national or transnational interests.⁷⁵ League work for intellectual cooperation is particularly interesting in this context, as its protagonists were involved in science and learning—phenomena which are often portrayed as universal or transnational ones. The CICI's "eminent members" were supposed to be "representative of the various branches of intellectual life which have brought about the civilisation of mankind".⁷⁶ Yet protagonists of cultural internationalism were acutely aware of the national dimensions of their work. As a founding member of the CICI, Julien Luchaire was supposed to represent a transnational intellectual community, but when he was selected as the IICI's director in 1925, his French nationality was pivotal. In its discussions on the future shape of the Institute, the CICI supported the notion that the president of its administrative council "should always be French, as the Institute's 'moral bailman' vis-à-vis the French government, the great intellectual institutions in France, and French public opinion". The subsequent people in line, however, were meant to come from another country, "in order to ensure the internationalism of the Institute".⁷⁷ Luchaire later acknowledged the potential tension in his simultaneous connection to both a national and an international constituency: "I learned how it was necessary to measure, for oneself, the blend between French features and those of an international civil servant... [P]ersonally, I did not see any difficulty; but... [others] told me that was impossible to escape suspicions from one side or the other".⁷⁸

Even beyond his formal role, the interplay of national and transnational motivations characterised Luchaire's work for intellectual cooperation. He supported the idea of a French "house for international learned institutions and associations" and a permanent international "congress palace" as well as a "welcome centre for foreign intellectuals" which would provide board and lodging for visiting intellectuals.⁷⁹ This notion of an intellectual headquarters clearly centred on France and its capital Paris, and stressed the benefits for French intellectuals.⁸⁰

However, visions of a cultural and political mission were not confined to French intellectuals: similar attitudes manifested themselves in the political and cultural thought of two British intellectuals who played leading roles in the League's cultural endeavours: Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern. Both based their views about global order on the concept of national sovereignty and notions of British leadership. Murray was an Oxford classicist and founding member of the CICI; in 1929, he even became chair of the Committee. Peter Wilson has noted Murray's "integrationist" and "anti-nationalist" stance in the field of intellectual cooperation, stating that he regarded nationalism as "the main impediment to international cooperation".⁸¹ Yet, as Wilson has acknowledged, Murray "displayed all the hallmarks of the Victorian imperial mindset".⁸² Glenda Sluga has further emphasised the intrinsic limitations of Murray's internationalism, describing him as a "British imperialist who disliked the antinational implications of world citizenship and had an unmistakable class-, race-, and gender-bound view of internationalism's reach".⁸³

Like Murray, Zimmern was a scholar of the classical world, yet he was particularly renowned as a pioneer in the discipline of international relations, having held the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth, Wales. A leading theorist of interwar internationalism, Zimmern became the Deputy Director of the IICI at Institute's foundation. Yet, as Jeanne Morefield has shown, Zimmern continued to see "the nation as a privileged site of moral unity".⁸⁴ According to Mark Mazower, he "crystallized in his writings and life the intimate connection between Victorian readings of the ancients, the moral ideology of British global leadership, and the new liberal internationalism".⁸⁵ Murray and Zimmern seemed to exemplify wider currents of British internationalism: British pro-League activists promoted "a brand of internationalism which allied itself with existing markers of national identity, from military prowess to imperial mission".⁸⁶

WORKING FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The bodies for intellectual cooperation comprised more than prominent intellectuals such as Luchaire, Murray, and Zimmermann. It is therefore important to study the individuals who staffed bodies such as the IICI. Christine Manigand's research on French League of Nations staff in Geneva, for instance, has highlighted the simultaneous existence of transnational and national allegiances.⁸⁷ As Jean-Jacques Renoliet has suggested, the IICI's staff base made it "a very French body", whereas the CICI served as "an increasingly international head".⁸⁸ Within the IICI, the representation of different nationalities was a sensitive question. For instance, when discussing the renewal of the Czechoslovak subsidy for the IICI in 1931, H. Jelinek, a Foreign Ministry official and member of the Czechoslovak Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, complained about "the fact that some countries, whose sympathies for the Institute have remained platonic until now, have had representatives among the leading staff of the house, whereas Czechoslovakia has not had a single employee for two years".⁸⁹ He suggested that if this situation changed, the government would be able to provide a subsidy of 25,000 francs.⁹⁰

German involvement at the IICI headquarters took on special relevance, as the Institute's establishment coincided with the *détente* period in the wake of Locarno. Werner Picht acted as head of its Section for University Relations, and Margarete Rothbarth headed the Institute's "German service", charged with fostering links to German academia. Significantly, both had been selected by the Prussian Ministry of Culture.⁹¹ According to Luchaire, Picht displayed a "singular mixture of passionate patriotism and liberalism".⁹² Indeed, Picht's efforts were characterised by the effort to combine pragmatism, cosmopolitan ideas, and the principle of national identity.⁹³ Prior to joining the IICI, he had been the director of the *Akademischer Austauschdienst* (Academic Exchange Service). In this role, he had pursued the aim of "international friendship and goodwill in the academic world between Germany on one side, and England, America and other countries willing to cooperate on the other, primarily through the interchange of University students".⁹⁴ He also established the Anglo-German Academic Board to set up exchanges between the two countries. To Picht, this focus on cultural and intellectual exchange appeared to be compatible with national interests. For instance, in a letter to the German embassy in Paris, he promoted the benefits that a German Committee on Intellectual Cooperation could

bring to the IICI, but also stressed that the Institute could maximise the impact of German scholarship.⁹⁵

National considerations featured particularly prominently in the work of another German contributor to the League's work, Hugo Krüss. As director of the *Staatsbibliothek* in Berlin, Krüss played an active role in the discussions on the IICI and ultimately replaced Albert Einstein on the CICI. Described by Luchaire as "strictly and passionately German", German officials regarded Krüss as a more "national" counter-weight to Einstein.⁹⁶ Prior to his own involvement in the League's work for intellectual cooperation, Krüss—then based at the Ministry of Culture in Berlin—had stressed that if Einstein was joined by another German, the choice of individual would be "of decisive significance".⁹⁷ Such comments reflected Einstein's somewhat atypical status in this period: the physicist had been a founding member of the CICI at time when Germany was still excluded from the League and various international scholarly organisations. Einstein was an exception not simply because of his scientific pacifism but because his wartime stance meant that—both in his home country and abroad—he was less associated than many of his peers. As Tomás Irish has noted, "while Einstein was presented as the German delegate [within the CICI], his views were not representative of those of many German academics in the war period".⁹⁸ Yet, even for Einstein, national matters were not irrelevant, as his temporary resignation from the CICI in 1923 illustrated.⁹⁹

Krüss, however, was certainly a different figure—someone who was more clearly associated with national concerns and institutions. He left the CICI in 1933, coinciding with Germany's departure from the League of Nations. Krüss subsequently served as a cultural official in the Third Reich—yet he did not completely remove himself from the sphere of intellectual cooperation. For instance, in 1937, he spoke at the World Congress on Documentation, a Paris-based event that took place with League support.¹⁰⁰ In 1940, he returned to Paris—but this time, under very different circumstances, as he came as the Reich Commissioner charged with overseeing libraries in occupied Western Europe.

Not all staff members of the IICI depended on national patronage, and quite a few of them had transnational career trajectories. The case of the Russian émigré Ivan Efremov (known in France as Jean Efremoff) provides a particularly instructive example.¹⁰¹ Up to 1917, he was a Duma representative for the Progressive Party, which had initially supported the Tsar's war policies. Efremov had been heavily involved in the

transnational networks of liberal internationalists: he presided over the Russian group of the Interparliamentary Union from 1908 to 1917, and was a member of the Interparliamentary Council from 1909 to 1917. A specialist in international law, Efremov was also an honorary member of the *Conciliation Internationale* and sat on the Executive Committee of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In exile, Efremov tried to use his networks to obtain a post at the IICI. He received references from Paul Emile Appell, Rector of the University of Paris, and from the CICI member Gonzague de Reynold, who described him as “my friend”, suggesting that Efremov might help with the question of the “repatriation of Russian intellectuals”.¹⁰² The candidate himself stressed the “potential utility of the presence of a Russian at the Institute”.¹⁰³ Despite an impressive résumé and “certainly a very likeable personality”,¹⁰⁴ his application for a full-time post was unsuccessful.¹⁰⁵ Instead, Efremov was named as a collaborating expert for the Institute’s Juridical Section. This provided him with an opportunity to establish a career within the IICI: he subsequently became an *Attaché* in 1927 and a Section Member in 1928.¹⁰⁶ Yet Efremov found himself unemployed again in November 1930 when, as a result of the IICI’s reorganisation, the Juridical Section was abolished. Despite drawing on his contacts to the French prime minister Edouard Herriot and to the senator and chocolate magnate Gaston Ménier, Efremov’s efforts to find an alternative job within the IICI were unsuccessful.¹⁰⁷ The same year that Efremov lost his position also saw the departure of Tatiana Dudkin-Shestov. Born in Rome as the daughter of the Russian philosopher Lev Shestov, she was, like both her father and Efremov, a Russian émigré in Paris. Having joined the Institute in 1925, she rose to become *Chef du Service d’Analyse*, charged with the IICI’s work on intellectual statistics until the relevant section fell victim to the Institute’s restructuring.¹⁰⁸

Such experiences highlight how transnational, rather than national, networks could lead to involvement in the IICI—but how the absence of backing from national governments proved problematic in times of uncertainty. The IICI’s staff records need to be explored further and promise additional material on this question. When seen in conjunction with other protagonists of intellectual cooperation, including CICI members and intellectuals more loosely associated with League activities, such examples reveal the difficulties in drawing general conclusions on

the balance between national persuasions, transnational experiences, and shared ideals.

CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM?

How did protagonists reconcile professions of internationalism with national ideas? In many respects, this internationalism was a counter-image of “banal nationalism”: whereas Michael Billig’s concept refers to the often subtle referencing of nationhood in everyday settings, proclamations of an international community occurred in somewhat exceptional settings—from committee rooms to congress halls. Furthermore, in many cases, these professions of internationalism were neither subtle nor particularly deep-rooted.

A certain scepticism regarding the extent and depth of internationalism therefore seems justified. Nonetheless, in some respects, the CICI and IICI also allowed their protagonists to go beyond the nation and adopt stances that we might describe as “cosmopolitan”. The concept of cosmopolitanism has recently experienced a revival, as globalisation challenges exclusionary conceptions of culture and community.¹⁰⁹ Alongside the national dimensions of intellectual cooperation, the League bodies could also facilitate the articulation of cosmopolitan ideas—for instance, by projecting the notion of a “republic of letters”. At the IICI’s Madrid *entretien*, for instance, the Spanish philosopher Manuel García Morente expressed the view that “nationalism is not something that can serve as the basis for the culture of the future”.¹¹⁰ At the same event, Salvador de Madariaga stressed global interdependence, commenting that nations “are no more independent than the hand is in relation to the arm or the elbow”.¹¹¹ Universalism was one possible response to this diagnosis: Madariaga believed that a “universal university culture” was in the making. He thought that the latter “could constitute an international tissue which would form the biological link between the different members of humanity, namely the nations”.¹¹² Similarly, the American CICI member James T. Shotwell described the League’s work for intellectual cooperation as comprising “efforts to preserve the best ideals of culture and to widen the horizon of thought in all its manifestations”.¹¹³

Universalism and cosmopolitanism are connected if one regards both phenomena as “point[ing] to a possibility of attaining universal humanity

and the transnational community across different religions, languages and culture".¹¹⁴ Yet, for some advocates of intellectual cooperation, attaining these "universal" ideals was through the nation. In doing so, they formed part of a wider intellectual tradition. In nineteenth-century Europe, Giuseppe Mazzini had promoted a "cosmopolitanism of nations" in which national revival and universal principles were intertwined.¹¹⁵ Mazzini's ideas reverberated beyond Italy, reaching as far as Latin America and South Asia, and his intellectual legacy lasted well into the twentieth century.¹¹⁶ As Mark Mazower has pointed out, the discourse surrounding the League of Nations bore Mazzinian echoes.¹¹⁷ Indeed, two years before becoming Deputy Director of the IICI, Alfred Zimmern stressed that Mazzini's relevance for the question of how national attachments and universal ideas might be combined. Praising Mazzini as both "a great internationalist" and "a great Italian nationalist", Zimmern claimed that for the Italian, "Humanity was...an orchestra, in which each nation has its own distinctive contribution to make to the harmony of the whole".¹¹⁸

Seen in this wider context, it is hardly surprising that many protagonists of interwar intellectual cooperation continued to affirm their local, regional, or national allegiances. They thus seemed to exemplify a form of "rooted cosmopolitanism".¹¹⁹ Sidney Tarrow's description of "rooted cosmopolitans" today seems to capture these earlier efforts: they "engage in regular transnational practices" and can be, for instance, "civil servants who spend a considerable amount of their time in transgovernmental committees".¹²⁰ Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that Peter Haas has described epistemic communities as being marked by "cosmopolitan beliefs of promoting collective betterment".¹²¹ The protagonists of intellectual cooperation in the interwar years certainly sat on "transgovernmental committees" and evoked ideals of "collective betterment". The way in which they defined such progress, however, relied on two collectivities: the nation and the international community.

NOTES

1. "La XVe Assemblée de la S.D.N. commente et approuve l'oeuvre de Coopération intellectuelle en 1934", in *Coopération intellectuelle*, no. 43/44 (1934), pp. 378.
2. Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), e.g. pp. 6 and 21.

3. Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 2.
4. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2013), p. 3.
5. Madeleine Herren, *Hintertüren zur Macht: Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte Außenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA 1856–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000).
6. Martin Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); F.S.L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe 1815–1914* (Leiden: Sythoff, 1963).
7. Daniel Laqua, *The Age of Internationalism and Belgium, 1880–1930: Peace, Progress and Prestige* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), pp. 17–44.
8. Editors' note: see Sandrine Kott's piece in this volume.
9. Institut international de Coopération intellectuelle, *Pour une société des esprits* (Paris: IICI, 1933), the record of a meeting that featured contributions by the likes of Gilbert Murray and Paul Valéry.
10. Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution, adopted on 16 November 1945. On the UNESCO History Project, launched in 2005, see <http://www.unesco.org/archives> [last accessed 15 April 2014].
11. Jo-Anne Pemberton, "The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO", *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 58, no. 1 (2012), pp. 35 and 42.
12. F.S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations: Its Conceptual Basis and Lessons for the Present* (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1953); Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of UNESCO* (Wrocław: Zakład Naradowy im Ossolinskich, 1962); Phnam-Thi-Tu, *La Coopération internationale sous la SDN* (Geneva: Droz, 1962); Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle (1919–1946)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999); Daniel Laqua, "Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations and the Problem of Order", *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011), pp. 223–247.
13. Corinne Pernet, "Twists, Turns and Dead Alleys: The League of Nations and Intellectual Cooperation in Times of War", *Journal of Modern European History* 12, no. 3 (2014), pp. 342–358.
14. Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations", *American Historical Review* 112 (2007), pp. 1109.
15. See also the observation that "transnational communities...can be conceived as strengthening rather than weakening the power of states and the influence of particular interest groups within them": Patricia Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism", *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 431.

16. Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 8.
17. Corinne Pernet, "Twists, Turns and Dead Alleys: The League of Nations and Intellectual Cooperation in Times of War", *Journal of Modern European History* 12, no. 3 (2014), p. 343.
18. On the association between these individuals and the League, see e.g. Michel Jarrety, *Paul Valéry* (Paris: Fayard, 2008); Siegfried Grundmann, *The Einstein Dossiers: Science and Politics—Einstein's Berlin Period*. (Berlin: Springer, 2005), pp. 175–217; Anne-Isabelle Richard, "Huizinga, the Netherlands and the Spirit of Europe, 1933–1945", in *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957*, eds. Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (New York: Berghahn, 2013).
19. Tomás Irish, *The University at War, 1914–25: Britain, France, and the United States* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 186–187.
20. Anna-Katharina Wöbse, "'To Cultivate the International Mind': Der Völkerbund und die Förderung der globalen Zivilgesellschaft", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 54, no. 10 (2006), pp. 852–863.
21. A.24.1925.XII: Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Sixth Plenary Session. Report of the Committee submitted to the Council and the Assembly, p. 3, League of Nations Archives, United Nations Library, Geneva.
22. Eckhardt Fuchs, "The Creation of New International Networks in Education: The League of Nations and Educational Organizations in the 1920s", *Paedagogica Historica* 43, no. 2 (2007), p. 207.
23. Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oublié*, p. 21; Werner Scholz, "Frankreichs Rolle bei der Schaffung der Völkerbundskommission für internationale Zusammenarbeit 1919–1922", *Francia* 21, no. 3 (1994), pp. 145–158.
24. Julien Luchaire, "Note sur le rôle du nouveau comité nationale française de Coopération intellectuelle", 15 January 1923, p. 2 in file *Correspondence avec la Commission nationale française de Coopération intellectuelle*, IICI Archives, UNESCO, Paris—also cited in Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée*, pp. 39–40.
25. *Travaux de l'Institut international de Coopération intellectuelle pendant l'année 1926* (Paris: IICI, 1926), p. 7.
26. Christel Tailibert, *L'Institut international du cinématographe éducatif: Regards sur le rôle du cinéma éducatif dans la politique internationale du fascisme italien* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000).
27. Federico Caprotti, "Information Management and Fascist Identity: Newsreels in Fascist Italy", *Media History* 11, issue 3 (2005), pp. 177–191. Regarding Italian cinema and the debate on "fascist modernity,"

- see Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
28. Gian Pierro Brunetta, *The History of Italian Cinema: A Guide to Italian Film From Its Origins to the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 68.
 29. Letter from Dr Werner Picht, IICI, to Giovanni Gentile, 4 July 1929 in doss. *Relations avec le Gouvernement de l'Italie*, IICI Archives.
 30. Dr Luciano de Feo (Istituto Nazionale) to Henri Bonnet, 1 March 1938 in file *Istituto Nazionale per le relazioni culturali con l'Estero* (A.XI.5), IICI Archives.
 31. Bonnet to de Feo, 24 March 1938, *ibid*.
 32. Pierre Gilson de Rouvieux, "Une belle création du régime fasciste: l'Institut national pour les relations culturelles avec l'étranger", *Le Soir*, 6 January 1943. On Fascist Italy's cultural policy abroad, see Stefano Santoro, "Cultural Penetration of Fascist Italy Abroad and in Eastern Europe", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8, issue 1, (2001), pp. 36–66.
 33. Julien Luchaire, "Note sur le rôle du nouveau comité nationale française de Coopération intellectuelle", 15 June 1923, pp. 2–3.
 34. Fuchs, "The Creation of New International Networks in Education", p. 206. See also Eckhardt Fuchs, "Der Völkerbund und die Institutionalisierung transnationaler Bildungsbeziehungen", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 54, no. 10 (2006), especially pp. 892–893. One of the three cases in which the Casares procedure was applied involved a German complaint about a Belgian textbook: Christophe Bechet, "La revision pacifiste des manuels scolaires: Les enjeux de la mémoire de la guerre 14–18 dans l'enseignement belge de l'entre-deux-guerres", *Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis—Cahiers d'Histoire du Temps Présent* no. 20 (2008), pp. 82–87.
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A League of Empires: Imperial Political Imagination and Interwar Internationalisms

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INTRODUCTION

The study of the historical development of idioms, projects, networks, and institutions indispensable for the formation of an imperialist internationalism, or of an internationalist imperialism, is fundamental to a

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proper understanding of the interwar period.¹ With discrete genealogies and as a result of numerous historical intersections, the formulation of political doctrines and repertoires of domination and the establishment of networks and institutions that promoted the articulation between internationalist and imperialist arguments and logics were decisive for the political, economic, and sociocultural configurations of contemporaneity.² The interwar period, particularly due to the constitution of the League of Nations “system,” was a crucial historical moment in the process of internationalisation (and *trans-nationalisation*) of imperial and colonial matters, marked by several processes of redefinition of political and moral economies associated with the respective political formations. This period was marked by a considerable number of substantive changes in political and economic imperial reasoning, as well as in the related idioms and repertoires of imperial legitimisation.³ Relatively recent concepts, norms and doctrines of governance, and imperial assertion formed the basis of the creation, institutionalisation, and international regulation of the renewed normative standards of *imperial civilisation*. This arose as a result of the action of multiple individuals, groups, and institutions in competition at various levels and emerged from discussions focused on ethical and political dimensions and formalised in political and legal regulations concerning imperial formations and their widely proclaimed “civilising” role. It was one of the most significant results of the political changes that characterised the international (dis)order resulting from the seismic effects of World War I.⁴ The interdependence of the so-called imperial and European “crisis,” in the first case more proclaimed than actually demonstrated, is one of the most important observatories of such dynamics.⁵

The problem of “international control,” in its diverse variations and possibilities (including “dual control”), was one of the central issues that occupied the participants in the discussions and negotiations in Versailles. Among other crucial topics, such as arms trafficking, the issue of the “welfare of the natives” was substantially debated.⁶ As noted by George Louis Beer, the issues of the “development” and the “protection of indigenous rights,” for example in regard to property and labour issues, were key matters in the broader discussion over the terms and limits of the international scrutiny and supervision projects. He was an active American representative in Paris and a member of the “forum of British imperial idealism,” the *Round Table*, as well as of the Permanent Mandates Commission, whose recommendations he highly influenced.

Notwithstanding the fact that he embraced the predominant racialized civilizational reasoning, Beer nonetheless aimed to promote significant reforms. To Beer, the preservation of individual freedom, particularly regarding the question of labour, was more important to the future of Africa and of the Africans than a non-discriminatory policy of land distribution. To guarantee this purpose, the international regulatory factor was paramount: the expected “world-wide scarcity of raw materials” would probably make the “labour problem (...) very urgent,” multiplying “attempts to stimulate production [of raw materials] by illegitimate means.” The “need for adequate protection of the native” was clear, and at the same time the question was “by no means purely local.” Furthermore, the “line of demarcation between slavery and labour” was “very tenuous” and the “contract system” that prevailed in many colonies required “careful supervision and control.” An “international convention regarding labour” which would regulate “intercolonial recruitment”—the case of the recruitment of workers in Portuguese East Africa to the mines of Katanga, to Rhodesia, and to the Transvaal was the example given—and the multiple forms of forced labour was seen as inevitable. The new imperial world had to find and, more importantly, to demonstrate new governmental solutions for the colonial populations. Again, the “question” was “by no means purely local.”⁷ That was also highlighted by the representative of the British Foreign Office, R.G. Spicer: an improved “native administration” was mandatory. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most urgent cases mentioned were the ones regarding the Belgian and Portuguese colonies.⁸ The impact of the *civilised savageries*—the scandal in the Belgian Congo and the one of the *cocoa slavery* in São Tomé—did not disappear from public and institutional memory.⁹ The “proofs” of (non-)civilization, namely the ones provided by photography and disseminated in the media and in public sessions energised by magic lantern shows, were hard to counterbalance and suppress, notwithstanding the numerous pledges to imperial reform by official and private authorities.¹⁰

The League of Nations and its institutional regime constituted, promoted, and continuously conditioned a new imperial geopolitical landscape. The League also fostered renewed idioms and repertoires of imperial legitimacy, a renewed imperial moral economy. If the Great War was an imperial moment, its aftermath and its impact can hardly be seen as representing “the beginning of the end of the imperial order within international affairs.” The context of the *Wilsonian moment* was also

characterised by countless processes of resurgence, reinforcement, or expansion—and normative justification (and re-legitimation)—of imperial configurations (and respective institutions), which have coexisted with global demonstrations of anti-colonial motivations and stances. In the geography of the European colonial empires, the political imagination of imperial reform has matched that of self-determination, to say the least. The lines in the sand in Africa and Asia remained fundamentally imperial, not *national*.¹¹

Characterised by numerous and disputed formulations, there were discussions on the new imperial and colonial idioms and repertoires which transformed the governing imagination of European colonial empires. These included discussions on the *sacred trust*,¹² on the symbolic and material demarcation of the *colour line*,¹³ on the “good colonial government,”¹⁴ or later on, on “welfare colonialism” or on colonial developmentalism,¹⁵ all of which were key elements to a history of the evolution of discussions on the normative standards of *imperial civilisation*. This transformation, which of course retained older mechanisms of imperial and colonial statecraft, involved other entities, both international and transnational.¹⁶

“Thinking like an empire” involved a renewed and differentiated use of many of these idioms and corresponding repertoires of rule and governance.¹⁷ In the same vein and for the same reasons, being *recognised* as an empire—a *legitimate* and *progressive* empire-state in a context marked by the undeniable internationalisation and *globalisation* of the critical questioning of imperial and colonial solutions, and by the multiplication of instruments for the international assessment and supervision of its existence and operation—involved the use of those idioms and repertoires. New and renewed imperial configurations were designed (or imagined)—let us think for example of the ones arising from the introduction of the mandates system¹⁸—and their *modi operandi* started being assessed in a comparative manner within international organisations, via the establishment of shared instruments of formulation and analysis of imperial and colonial policies.¹⁹ The scrutiny and the potential international and transnational supervision of these *new* imperial societies and their respective modalities of sovereignty and government became institutionalised in a gradual but assertive way, and they have become a key feature of the history of intersections between idioms and modalities of internationalism and imperialism.²⁰

The institutionalisation of international scrutiny and accountability, which gained momentum since the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885) and Brussels (1889–1890), became more intense.²¹ In the late nineteenth century, the “international society” of European states (mostly imperial ones) became an “international society of self-proclaimed ‘civilised’ states”, a process that went along with various imperial and colonial expansionisms, and was closely connected to juridical developments. The legalization, justification, and legitimation of imperial and colonial expansionism and control were a reality.²² The elements of legitimation were clear: civilisation was an imperative that should be spread on a (more or less) global scale, serving to justify and legitimise, for instance, the politico-economic schemes of the European states competing to incorporate African territories in their spheres of influence or under their imperial sovereignty.²³

Despite their obvious shortcomings and limitations (particularly the lack of a clear and effective regulatory and coercive set of mechanisms), numerous principles of “civilised” administration were gradually identified and institutionalised from an international point of view from the late nineteenth century. The political (and legal) idioms related to an *imperial ethics* multiplied, being promoted by several, and distinct, philanthropic and humanitarian motivations and movements (religious and secular). These interacted with and pressed international *fora* in order to strengthen the international and transnational supervision of colonial administration.²⁴ The definition of normative “standards of international morality” by which colonial empires could be assessed in a critical and *factual* manner was an important goal, though one met with strong opposition by both imperial and colonial rulers and administrators, and by those who considered that the regulation and the realisation of those standards should be approached with caution. Their existence and multifaceted instrumental uses turned the conditioning of the *modi operandi* of empire-states into a reality, even if they had clear limitations. But these “standards of international morality,” which were furthermore related to economic arguments and strategies, were also essential to legitimising the imperial and colonial expansionism and consolidation that marked these years.²⁵

This set of processes had a significant impact on the ways in which imperial and colonial issues were addressed in the aftermath of the Great War, both domestically and internationally. The governing imagination of empire-states has interacted, in a systematic but naturally diversified

way, with the “standards of international morality” and with its increasing institutionalisation and legalisation. The empire-states aimed at the instrumental use of these normative standards in order to justify and legitimise the new imperial momentum, trying in addition to counteract some immoderations that could result from internationalist and *transnationalist* motives, principles, and initiatives. The latter could limit the former’s sovereign prerogatives and question imperial legitimacy, and therefore needed to be constantly monitored. This intersection generated numerous disputed debates over the internationally acceptable idioms and repertoires of colonial administration, their nature and justification. It occurred both within and outside international *fora*, between a new imperial moment—related to new geopolitical arrangements and to renovated idioms and repertoires of administration of colonial territories and populations—and reorganised internationalist and *transnationalist* drives—related to different political, religious, economic, and scientific genealogies.

This text explores some of these issues by clarifying, inevitably in a brief manner, the ways in which the European colonial empires and their representatives reacted to and faced these historical circumstances—sometimes by using cooperative strategies, sometimes through dynamics of political and diplomatic differentiation, taking the issue of “native labour” in the colonial context, especially in its many prevailing compulsory forms, as a privileged observatory. The issue of colonial “native labour” was one of the main objects of dialogue, cooperation, and dispute between European empire-states and international society and its institutions. It was about this issue that some of the key proposals, arguments, and *policies* of the imperial internationalism were yielded.

THE *LABOURS* OF THE IMPERIAL CIVILISATION

As a constant diplomatic, political, economic, and administrative problem, the issue of colonial “native labour” occupied a prominent position within the broader interaction between European empire-states and international organisations and transnational movements. This topic significantly influenced the relationships between these different actors. It also clearly conditioned the political actions and choices of those states. As a crucial repertoire of administration and colonial domination and also as a *potential* instrument of international legitimisation, to which the European colonial powers have always given due consideration, the issue

of “native labour” was a clear example of this interrelation, revealing its *causes* and consequences, its potentialities and constraints. This issue was also a key element in the formation, and in the subsequent historical dynamics, of the competing modalities of imperial internationalism in the interwar period.

While the internationalisation process of imperial issues was being reinforced, the contrast between the new normative standards of the *imperial civilisation* and the labour legislation and practices in the colonial worlds became one of the main pressure devices impending on imperial formations.²⁶ Just as with the problem of *modern slavery*, the issue of colonial “native labour” proved to be a vital matter in the discussions about the idioms and repertoires of imperial and colonial administration that could be legitimised at an international level.²⁷

Individuals like Jean Goudal, a leading expert of the native labour section of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and of its diplomatic division, argued that the “colonial systems of legislation” regarding labour showed signs of “great progress”—a fact partly explained by the widespread *legalisation* and regulation of forced labour, a process which resulted itself from international pressures and dynamics prevalent already in the nineteenth century. But this in no way implied that the colonial territories were to escape the trend of a growing internationalisation. Their social realities started being frequently assessed by comparison with the normative standards defined internationally. With obvious connections to discussions held in the nineteenth century, these regulatory standards, gradually institutionalised and inserted into specific legislation, were induced by the workings of the League’s Slavery Commission and Mandates Commission and also by the Committee of Experts on Native Labour of the ILO, set up in 1926 and the source of the *native labour code* that predominated in the organisation during the interwar years.²⁸

In 1926, following joint initiatives by John Harris (well-known secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines’ Protection Society), Harold Grimshaw (ILO representative in the Temporary Slavery Commission of the LoN) and Albert Thomas (Director-General of the ILO), the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution aimed at engaging the International Labour Office in the study of the most appropriate ways to prevent the transmutation of forced or compulsory labour modalities into *conditions analogous to slavery*.²⁹ The nebulous intersections and the tenuous boundaries between slavery and forced labour, as

noted by Beer, required different instruments of knowledge and a more elaborate *expertise*, able to understand the multiple forms of coerced recruitment of “native labour” for public purposes (including community service) and private ones, or to operationalise the programmes of compulsory crop cultivation. Thus, a normative and institutional distinction between slavery and forced labour was necessary.³⁰ The specific manifestations of contract labour were another example that required more careful attention and required an in-depth approach. The understanding of these interconnected realities—slavery and forced labour—and their ambivalent overlapping was key to the institutionalisation of the debates about the legitimacy of the imperial formations after the war, about their reformist potential and about their civilising ability.³¹

This led to the creation of a renewed imperial order of information, likely to accompany a new international context when it came to imperial and colonial realities. The internationalisation of imperial and colonial issues and the establishment of international entities focused on their assessment led to the gathering, production, and organisation of information on the *modi operandi* of colonial empires and of the mandate territories. These circumstances led to a more in-depth discussion—that is, based on more information but also on more elaborated data—about the policies designed at the metropole and their impact on local realities. They also transformed, or at least significantly conditioned, the formulation of the imperial and colonial legal frameworks and the design of specific policies, such as, for example, colonial “native labour” codes. Indeed, major changes in the regulation of colonial labour were partially the result of specific moments of international discussion and agreements.³²

The three institutional arenas mentioned above—centred on the slavery problem, on the mandated territories, and on the issue of forced labour in the colonial contexts³³—were some of the most relevant political, ideological, and diplomatic *spaces* in which the imperialist and internationalist motivations and arguments converged and interacted. They thus generated further discussions on the principles, the possibilities, and the limitations of the projects and the practices of imperial and colonial governance and administration. The intervention and intermediation of an international authority had “genuine and far-reaching implications” in the way the colonies and the mandated territories were assessed and even ruled. A “comparison” between the territories under mandate and trusteeship and those outside the system—that is, still with the status of

colonies or other juridical classifications—reveals precisely that. The discussions that took place concerning the mandates about their political, administrative, and ethical innovations and their use to benchmark the colonial and imperial governments after the war revealed new reformist idioms of governance, even if not necessarily conducing to new practices.³⁴

Committed, to different degrees and certainly with different purposes, to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in particular to Article 22, empire-states were obliged to provide various documentation about many dimensions of colonial or mandated administrations to the Permanent Mandates Commission. The compliance of the methods of administration with the principles and the *spirit* of the mandates system, with respect to legislation but also in relation to concrete policies and practices, needed to be *factually* demonstrated. The same applied regarding the compliance with the “sacred trust of civilisation,” the proclaimed obligation to promote the welfare and development of populations under mandate or colonial-like sovereignty.³⁵

Despite the limitations of regulatory and coercive mechanisms, as we noted above, the normative, ethical, and moral pressures were undeniable. These pressures had different origins and revealed themselves on multiple levels, namely the international (and transnational), the metropolitan, and the colonial.³⁶ Surely, the “Observations” and “Recommendations” prevailed over all kinds of sanctions in cases of non-compliance with the stipulated standards. But the definition of particular standards, legally specified and collectively binding, enabled individual and collective assessments and comparisons performed by countless individuals, groups, and institutions in an international and transnational public sphere in expansion and *complexification*. The public demonstration of deviations or the illumination of a recurrent non-compliance with the *esprit du temps* regarding colonial and imperial issues was thus facilitated and became potentially more effective as a political-diplomatic instrument and as a device that allowed for normative and ethical pressures.³⁷ The latter, associated with various processes of internationalisation, affected both the imperial and colonial rhetoric and governance, conditioning imperial interactions and intersections—that is, the processes of imitation, competition, and innovation among and between empire-states. It further legitimised and strengthened the motivations and initiatives of groups and movements, old and new, that aimed at reforming or constraining the *status quo* colonial and imperial solutions.

These circumstances created suitable conditions for the promotion of new forms of *specialised* and *comparable* colonial and imperial knowledge, among other aspects.³⁸

These aspects were recognised by many of the most active protagonists of the time. For example, in his *Grandeur et servitude coloniales* (1931), the French Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, pointed to a “fact” that was mistakenly “neglected”: the colonial issues no longer belonged strictly to “national politics,” and the role and impact of “international censure” in the imperial and colonial politics (and policies) were undeniable. Each empire-state was obliged to take these facts into account in the formulation, implementation, and assessment of its imperial and colonial policies, considering the impact of its reception and appropriation by the myriad of parties interested in these issues within an international and transnational public sphere, but also assessing the way the latter process could constrain domestic policy.³⁹ As Frederick Lugard has stated, the terms of Article 22 constituted “a model and an aspiration for the conduct” of the mandated powers and, less directly, of colonial empires. The mandates system was a laboratory where the potentially positive effects of international supervision, official and non-official, were tested, within but also in the orbit of and even outside the LoN.⁴⁰ For many, this fact was a significant inconvenience. The ideas of independent supervision and *in situ* missions were promptly rejected, characterised as a violation of national and imperial sovereignties.⁴¹ As Lugard summarised it, the fundamental principle of the Permanent Mandates Commission was to avoid plain criticism on administration or on respective policies and, of course, any attempt at local inspection and direct intervention.⁴²

This diagnosis was shared by other personalities with far more critical perspectives on the purposes and utility of the mandates system. For Edward Dene Morel and of *Morelism*, the mandates system was little more than a “thinly disguised device to camouflage” territorial conquest by the “African powers of the Entente,” “a policy of imperialist grab” which could hardly be “a genuine international instrument through which the equitable treatment of the African races” and could become “a recognised international concern.” In the wake of this, George Padmore considered that the system had only been an expedient for the promotion of an illusion: that the French and the British were *not* annexing the German and Ottoman colonies as war prizes, concealing their true purpose. The system had been “conceived in sin and born in iniquity” and

“the crudity of conquest was draped in the veil of morality,” as H.A.L. Fisher argued. The statements of the trusteeship and of the mandates did not correspond to concrete practices of transformation and social *progress*; they were mere instruments to conceal the imperialist exploitation of “backward peoples,” at the same time managing to deceive domestic constituencies about the real reasons for this political project. The Mandates Committee was little more than an advisory body that occasionally met in Geneva, with no actual authority to enforce agreements and make corrective decisions. Moreover, the realities of colonial taxation, land policy, and education were seen as being more deficient in mandated territories than in some of the formal colonial territories.⁴³

The case of “native labour” was enlightening in that respect. Despite the progressive rhetoric, international norms continued to legitimise forced labour based on the elasticity of the justification of labour recruitment given proclaimed necessities for “public works.” Recruitment systems, including those related to the carriers, were characterised by Padmore by means of G. St. J. Orde Browne, the author of the important comparative work *The African Labourer*—commissioned by the *International Institute of African Languages and Cultures* and prefaced by Lugard—as a “deplorable relic of slave days.”⁴⁴ But despite that, the normative, ethical, and moral dimensions of postwar imperialism and colonialism had become central elements in the imagination and in the institutionalisation of the *spirit of Geneva*. The collection of information and the debate on certain topics alone led to the publicising and dissemination of this *spirit*, conditioning political and diplomatic statements, stances, and practices at various levels. The possibilities generated by the increasing internationalisation (accompanied by a gradual institutionalisation) of imperial issues—and its corresponding informational impact—also affected the widespread criticism of the nature, the scope, and the intents of the LoN and its bodies, which became potentially more factual and more sustained from an empirical point of view.

For example, discussions on the *types* and paradigms of colonial administration that supposedly characterised the British and French imperial projects (and the alleged *deviations* represented by the Portuguese and Belgian cases) were closely related to the discussions associated with the establishment of acceptable and legitimate normative standards of international morality (and their legalisation).⁴⁵ These led to the almost simultaneous publication of *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922) by Frederick Lugard, and *La mise en valeur des*

colonies françaises (1923), by Albert Sarraut, both unequivocally committed to the new *internationalist* imperial imaginary and ideologies.

A “COLONIAL SCIENCE MADE OF COMPARISONS”

The affirmation of an imperial and colonial *scientific* knowledge and the mobilisation of comparison as a key analytical instrument were crucial for these processes.⁴⁶ As Henri Labouret synthesised, a “colonial science made of comparisons” was in vogue. The “reformist movement’s pragmatist” in France and a leading member of several inter-imperial associations—for example, the *Institut Colonial International* (ICI)⁴⁷ and the *International Institute of African Languages and Cultures*,⁴⁸ Labouret understood the political, and not only the scientific, importance of the comparative exercise, which could be mobilised by empire-states both internally and externally.⁴⁹ The “colonial science made of comparisons” enabled the inter-imperial cooperation and differentiation, within and outside the LoN and of the aforementioned institutional arenas, and it provided a new type of arguments justifying the various imperial and colonial projects (and the mandated powers). The diverse explanations and the varying political, moral, economic, cultural, and *civilisational* methods of colonialism and imperialism between the wars were portrayed as *new*, *modern*, and *scientific*, being attuned to the various internationalist ideals and projects of global transformation associated with the LoN in particular, and with its system in general.⁵⁰

On the one hand, the institutionalisation of a “colonial science made of comparisons” encouraged the debates centred on the identification of *the* colonial administration method which incorporated and perfected the basic principles of the LoN when it came to the imperial and colonial issues, namely those which ruled, at least by the letter of the law, the mandates system. The arguments given in favour of *direct* or *indirect* methods of colonial administration, related to the consequent *native policies*, recurrently pointed to their accordance with the progressive fundamentals of the trusteeship system. The dispute over which imperial and colonial administration model would be more consistent with the new imperial ethical order was an incontrovertible reality. The most important experts involved in these disputed debates—Lucy Mair, Henri Labouret, Frederick Lugard, Margery Perham, Robert Delavignette, Freire de Andrade—were all more or less related to the processes of debate and political decision-making in the LoN and its committees

which addressed imperial and colonial issues, including the Permanent Mandates Commission. These processes acted as a sounding board for broader debates about the standards of imperial civilisation.

Similarly, this comparative drive determined the terms of the internal discussions on the putative specificities and national exceptionalities regarding the imperial and colonial projects.⁵¹ The *nationalisation* of reformist arguments about imperial arrangements, that is, the efforts to promote the authorship and *exceptional* originality of a given empire-state in the formulation and advocacy of projects of reform and rationalisation of the colonial administration, became an important instrument both in strictly diplomatic terms as well as at the political and ideological levels within the international and transnational public sphere. It was a key factor in inter-imperial differentiation and it contributed greatly to the (re)legitimisation of imperial and colonial solutions.

The trusteeship doctrines offer a clear illustration. The efforts to claim national authorship over colonial imperial progressivism placed the French *experts* against the English ones in a heated dispute. The latter, from Lugard to Hailey, among others, claimed the authorship of the idioms and of the repertoires of trusteeship. These would have been the great British contribution to the improvement of colonial management. Edmund Burke's *sacred trust* was highlighted as an original foundational moment; the *open-door* policy was considered a distinctive element. As argued by Joseph Chamberlain originally in 1898 and repeated by many others since then, the British imperial and colonial policies aimed at transforming their representatives into "Trustees of Civilisation for the Commerce of the World."⁵² A few years later, John H. Hobson questioned the self-indulgent proclamation on the rights of trusteeship and called for its internationalisation, that is, its scrutiny and regulation by international bodies. In his words, "until some genuine international council exists, which shall accredit a civilized nation with the duty of educating a lower race, the claim of a 'trust' is nothing else than an impudent act of self-assertion."⁵³ The genealogies of the idioms and the repertoires of trusteeship are plural and require more elaborate frameworks, and their own internationalization and multiple intersections are undeniably relevant and underexplored processes. The *plans* of Jan Christiaan Smuts and Woodrow Wilson do not summarise, in any way, the rich intellectual, political, and ideological dynamics associated with the trusteeship doctrine. The same happens regarding the idioms

and repertoires of imperial reformism, propagated and institutionalised within the LoN.⁵⁴

These discussions aiming at the *nationalisation* of imperial and colonial reformism also included the United States of America (USA), going therefore beyond the processes of differentiation or cooperation that involved the traditional, “formal” colonial empires. In fact, from Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson’s Press Secretary in Paris, to Alpheus Henry Snow, who wrote one of the most important reports on the problem of the trusteeship of “aborigines” in international law (completed at the request of the State Department), there were many proponents of the idea that the concept of trusteeship was fundamentally an American political innovation. For Baker, the USA’s “traditional principles and policies” represented the cornerstones—the “deep roots”—of the trusteeship’s reformist thinking. For Snow, the USA’s entry in the “work of colonisation” had, “above all,” “stimulated the civilized States to a more and more complete acceptance and fulfilment of their international responsibilities” because of its tradition of “guardianship and tutorship of aboriginal tribes.”⁵⁵

AN EXEMPLARY DEBATE

On the other hand, the institutionalisation of a “colonial science made of comparisons” favoured the mobilisation and dissemination of renewed arguments, which were declared to be *scientific*, about the possibility of an imperial and colonial “good government.” These arguments proved particularly useful for empire-states with a constant need for acknowledgment of their international legitimacy. Related to the ideological and legal frameworks resulting from Berlin and Brussels, the emergence of debates about the imperial and colonial “good government” did not precipitate the precise definition of its nature and operation. As in Berlin and Brussels, the rhetoric of regeneration was not accompanied by the exact specification of the meanings and the evidences of trusteeship and of the associated required moral and material welfare of the colonial or mandated populations. Therefore, the possibility of stipulation and implementation of disciplinary measures was in fact reduced. But, anyway, the topic of imperial and colonial “good government” was used and given instrumental use by many groups, from state representatives to missionaries, humanitarians, philanthropists, and scholars from various fields and publicists in both national newspapers and other publications

of increasingly global circulation. It was also the object of institutionalisation within the LoN system, strengthening the process of (re)legitimation of imperialism and colonialism as forms of legitimate government and, therefore, countering the gradual *globalisation* of anti-colonial discourses, programmes, and movements. The fact that the emergence of the topic was closely associated with scientific logics, comparable and verifiable—since increasingly quantifiable—certainly contributed to this outcome.⁵⁶

These issues involved more than Anglo-French disputes and they were also debated outside the mandates commission. The intersections between new forms of geopolitical realignment, (re)legitimation, and re-imagination and innovation of imperial governments occurred within several institutional arenas and involved numerous and diversified actors.⁵⁷ For example, the Portuguese and Belgian representatives, whose countries, as mentioned above, faced recurring international censure because of their methods of colonial administration, were active protagonists in these processes. A rather revealing example lies in the two memos written in 1925 by Freire de Andrade—the Portuguese representative on the mandates and slavery commissions of LoN, and on the committee of experts on “native labour” of the ILO—on the terms and interpretations of Article 22, and on the governing imagination of the mandates systems. Freire de Andrade showed a clear understanding of the potential impact that the debates located at the mandates commission could have on other institutional arenas, particularly those that shaped and limited the imperial and colonial geopolitical interests, at the LoN and the ILO. The year 1925 was a critical year for the Portuguese representatives in Geneva. The dissemination of a report by E. A. Ross in which the persistence of slavery-like practices and forced labour in Angola and Mozambique was denounced had caused numerous obstacles, reinforcing old accusations and raising new suspicions and international condemnation.⁵⁸ In this context, Freire de Andrade realised that the discussions on the welfare, or “well-being,” and development of the people in mandated territories would affect the coeval assessments on the forms to legitimise the ongoing imperial and colonial projects. For example, the proclaimed defence of “native administration” was considered dangerous, since it could lead to the preservation of “inhuman, cruel, and injurious (...) usages and customs.” The role of mandatory powers (and of the colonial powers in general) should exceed mere “supervision.” To Freire de Andrade, the great ideal was that of the “slow, unforced

assimilation of weak or inferior communities in strong and more highly-developed communities.”

The question of labour within mandated territories was another case that raised concerns about how to control the potential *excesses* of internationalist dynamics. The framework of the labour issue within the normative universe of the mandates system could entail significant changes in the ways native labour was assessed, regulated, and supervised in colonial contexts. Contrary to arguments propagated by “missionaries and philanthropists” and supported by British sectors, namely by figures such as Lugard, Freire de Andrade sustained that a “balance” should be “maintained” between “the potentialities of native labour and the ever-increasing demand upon it.” Otherwise, “nothing but harm can result,” he argued. It was fundamental to avoid the “danger that hasty or imprudent action on a philanthropist impulse” entailed. Moreover, Freire de Andrade agreed with Lugard. The latter reduced the fundamental dissent to the confrontation between those who were guided by “philanthropic” motivations and the ones advocating “utilitarian” motives. Freire de Andrade knew exactly where he stood, pointing out that the issue of “native labour” in the colonial context lent itself to the agitation of public opinion that had “not yet forgotten the cruel abuses of slavery permitted by *earlier* civilisations.” The deliberate confusion between “forced or compulsory labour,” indefensible in his point of view, was a good illustration of these uses. The realities in Africa—which was always the case referred to in his ruminations—required more caution in the production of analyses: “while peaceful and industrious tribes are to be found, there are others which, holding that to till the soil dishonours a man, harshly impose that task on women.” But without “native” labour, the welfare and development of territories under mandate and of the colonial territories were deemed impossible. Development preceded welfare; economic development was a *sine qua non* condition of observance of *sacred trust*. At the same time, as was often the case, the attempts to universalise principles and rights—and thus to redefine the interpretation of imperial and colonial sovereignties—were countered with arguments that celebrated the existence of cultural differences that should be considered. Corroborating *scientific* and *comparable* arguments that should guide the discussions and shape the policy-making process at the LoN, Freire de Andrade argued that it was imperative to produce factual knowledge about the local labour realities before institutionalising

certain principles. Development “by degrees,” after careful research, was the way to go.⁵⁹

As expected, Lugard questioned Freire de Andrade’s arguments, stressing that “the indirect or moral pressure” for labour should be condemned outright, and the use of compulsory labour for private purposes should be prohibited without hesitation. The recurrence of contrasting opinions between the two *experts* during the sessions of the mandates commission was also traceable in the sessions of the slavery commission and would eventually recur again in the sessions of the ILO committee of experts on native labour. It also led to the production of *memoranda* that allowed the determination of the main bones of contention regarding the issues of welfare and development in the territories under mandate and in the colonial ones, making them clear to the other members of the commission.⁶⁰

But Freire de Andrade was not convinced by the general movement of questioning “obligatory” labour, more or less based on a rhetoric of social change: it should be advocated either for public and private purposes and it should not depend on the provision of “education” as Lugard suggested. The education of the “natives”—the “education of the coloured man”—required “scores of years, or even centuries.” Labour was critical to the *bien-être et développement* of native populations, and it could not be made to depend on such a time-consuming historical process. Furthermore, labour, forced or compulsory if necessary, was the fundamental civilising instrument. Indolence and vagrancy should be punished, as they were in “civilised countries.” For Freire de Andrade, the argument that postulated that “native” development should depend on the preservation of traditions and customs—including forms of political and social organisation—of the “native races” was not in accordance with the great principles of the *sacred trust*. Given the *stage* of their educational and organisational achievements, preservation of inequality and the separation between the colonisers and the colonised. The argument in favour of the “equality of Eastern and Western races” would ultimately lead to the reinforcement of hierarchical and unequal forms of relationship. Therefore, the definition of the terms of imperial and colonial “good government” should be the result of careful consideration.⁶¹

RETHINKING A KNOWLEDGEABLE GOVERNMENT

Active participation in these debates about the legitimate and acceptable methods of imperial and colonial government, to which informational requirements were associated, also generated another important process, although it has not been largely recognised or studied. The gradual establishment of normative standards of the imperial civilisation and the production, collection, and sharing of international information on imperial and colonial themes—for example on the organisation of “native labour” systems—have allowed various instrumental and strategic uses by the empire-states, both on a metropolitan scale as well as at colonial and international levels. Due to numerous reasons, rationales and purposes, internal and external, diplomatic and economic, scientific and technical, relating to imperial and colonial issues, the interaction and active participation of empire-states within international institutions constituted decisive drives for the formulation, establishment, and administration of new, more “progressive” policies.

At the metropole, the multiplication of moments of bureaucratic rationalisation and scrutiny, and of instances of assessment of the formulation and the impact of imperial and colonial policies, raised more informed discussions about colonial political, economic, and socio-cultural realities. This contributed to the gradual institutionalisation of *colonial sciences*, of related doctrines of *modern* colonialism and its experts.⁶² The number and the quality of studies, analyses, doctrines, *syllabi*, and dissertations on colonial issues significantly increased, creating new synergies between political-bureaucratic circles and academia, for example. With regard to “native labour” in colonial contexts, it raised numerous debates on the subject, significantly altering the terms of the debates: the old and the predominant idioms of a strongly racialized colonial pragmatism were now confronted with various arguments. In different ways and based on distinct fundamentals, these called for imperial reform, based on more detailed and *empirical* assessments of colonial realities, and less dependent on political, economic, and moral *a priori* assumptions. A new imperial moral economy emerged and required other types of imperial *expertise*.

In the colonies, colonial administrations were invited to modify the mechanisms and institutions of collection and production of information and *intelligence*, in order to respond to numerous requests coming from the metropolises and from Geneva. The metropolises, on the other

hand, sought to perfect their idioms and repertoires of colonial administration and also to meet the requirements of the mounting international demands for *accountability*. For this purpose, a series of interconnected *investigative modalities*, to use B. Cohn's terminology, had to be improved. The need for knowledge and classification of the colonies' human and natural resources, for quantitative specification and *cultural* categorisation of their populations, and for the identification, knowledge, and classification of population groups according to essentially political, securitarian, social, and economic rationales, increased.⁶³

The need for enhanced *legibility* of the colonial territories and their social and political realities, identifiable in colonial administrations and in the governments of empire-states, became more intense, involving multiple ideologies and institutions of colonial rule, sometimes in open competition between themselves.⁶⁴ The government's capacity for intervention at various levels in colonial contexts was developed and furthered. The need to respond to external pressures, including the ones triggered by moments of intense criticism, or to provide information in response to official international requirements, led to the multiplication of moments of self-scrutiny and imperial inspection—from episodic reports to systematic questionnaires—that promoted the expansion of the colonial bureaucracy, of its jurisdictional capacity, and of its investigative modalities. That is to say, engagement and cooperation with international organisations—from the system of the League of Nations to that of the United Nations—stimulated and provided the means for the refinement of the instruments available to the authorities of empire-states to reinforce their colonial territorialisation, even those which were more clearly coercive.⁶⁵

With regard to the colonial “native labour,” these dynamics involved the production of numerous surveys, questionnaires, reports, policy reviews, and legislation about the phenomenon, geographically dispersed as it was. In many cases, it was the first time that this kind of informational and communicational procedures and protocols was mobilised and subject to administrative centralising processes. Also for the first time, similar questionnaires were sent to all colonial empires and to their colonial territories, producing a mass of comparable information on the legal, political, and socio-economic realities related to the question of “native labour,” among others. Accordingly, political gambling changed considerably. As noted by Susan Zimmermann, “the responses of metropolitan powers (...) moved away from meaningless phrases such as ‘H.M.

Government regret that they are not yet in a position to file a complete reply to this question, as to which enquiries are still in progress,' towards clearly more substantial information." Despite all the deficiencies which can be associated with the processes of production and collection of imperial and colonial information, the recurrence of these procedures and their progressive institutionalisation (although with variable degrees and speeds) were aspects that contributed to the establishment of new orders of imperial and colonial information.⁶⁶

These new orders of information also supported the increasing internationalisation of imperial and colonial issues. These processes have been both the cause and consequence of the intensified institutionalisation of international scrutiny and supervision, which had been registered since the Conferences of Berlin and Brussels.⁶⁷ The LoN questionnaires about slavery, produced and circulated in 1926 and in 1936, and those of the ILO on forced labour, leading to the creation of the Convention of 1930 on the same issue, are clear examples of this dynamic.⁶⁸ The common formulation of concepts, norms, and idioms (for example, the distinction between slavery and forced labour, or about norms and idioms of "native welfare" and development, as we have seen), the definition of standardised instruments of definition, analysis, and comparison of policies and the widespread international dissemination of comparable information became a key element in the definition of imperial and colonial projects. The same happened with the circulation and the critical interaction of imperial epistemic communities within international institutions, the former being made up of experts in idioms and repertoires of internationalism and imperialism, who were also well aware of their possible, fruitful articulation.⁶⁹

THE EXPERTS IN (INTER)NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

Some of these communities proved to be very dynamic in relevant international *fora*: the *Institut Colonial International*, the *Bureau International pour la Défense des Indigènes*,⁷⁰ the *Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society*,⁷¹ the *International Missionary Council*,⁷² the *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*,⁷³ and the *Union Catholique d'Études Internationales*.⁷⁴ The activities of some of these experts were closely related to the bureaucratic and administrative structures of their respective empire-states and with some of their colonial interests, but these loyalties were not necessarily overwhelmingly

determinative of their initiatives and decisions. These networks and imperial epistemic communities explored, in different ways and with different results, the interconnections between internationalism and imperialism from the late nineteenth century onwards.⁷⁵

Given these circumstances, the conditions and possibilities of action (and of success) by the “vigilantes” of empires benefited from substantial improvements. The limits and contradictions of the rhetoric of the civilising mission could be identified in a clearer, *factual* way. The *proofs* of uncivilised behaviour, in contravention of the internationalised and institutionalised standards of imperial civilization, were easy to get, and to demonstrate. The criticisms about the functioning of the imperial projects, especially when aiming at reform, not dissolution, were reshaped. At the same time, these institutional and informational dynamics facilitated the involvement of actors associated with or emanating from the colonial and *peripheral* societies, contributing in varying degrees to the assertion of the legitimacy of their claims. International *fora* were also an institutional “force field” that attracted anti-imperial and anti-colonial ideologies, groups, and movements, legitimising and publicising their existence and their purposes, although with several limitations. Another important aspect connected to these circumstances, one that requires a deeper analysis, lies in how they also legitimised the ideas and projects of individuals and groups in the metropolises which aimed at reforming the empire-state and its policies in colonial or mandated territories. In many ways and with various meanings, the intervention of all these actors was enhanced by the existence of the regime of the LoN.⁷⁶

In 1929, for example, precisely in a context where the positions in relation to the Forced Labour Convention were being fought and negotiated, the ILO endeavoured to organise a meeting of “Asian workers” from Japan, India, and China. Two of the main issues to be discussed were the “equal” treatment of all workers and the need to *globalise* labour standards, then eminently rendered applicable only in Europe, thus creating conditions for the borrowing of international legitimacy to some demands for the reform of labour policies and the promotion of labour rights in some contexts under imperial control or influence.⁷⁷ The belief that Albert Thomas conveyed to W.E.B. Du Bois in 1921 had some truth to it, despite the limitations of the most progressive agendas of imperial internationalism: “For the ILO, the principle of equality of races is an absolute principle in relation to labour protection.”⁷⁸ Despite the obvious limits of its supervisory and corrective reach, the ILO

became the privileged centre of action of an “international colonial issue-network” which variably objected to the recruitment and widespread use of forced labour in colonial worlds, among other aspects.⁷⁹

The coexistence, cross-fertilisation, and competition among multiple communities and epistemic networks—that is, plural and competing imperial internationalisms and internationalist imperialisms—contributed decisively to the dissemination of imperially based idioms and imaginaries (including those challenging the persistence of colonial and imperial formations), for the circulation of models and repertoires of colonial administration. These dynamics were also related to processes of imperial intersection that promoted inter-imperial imitation and dialogic processes when it came to the modalities of legislation and administration. The case of “native labour” is, at that level, a revealing example.

The case of the role played by the ICI, established in 1894, is particularly interesting in this regard. Since its creation, this inter-imperial epistemic community proved to be highly active in the production, comparison and circulation of knowledge about imperial and colonial issues. The case of colonial “native labour” is one of the most illustrative and significant examples.⁸⁰ ICI played a central role in the legal, ideological, and political consolidation of the so-called *new imperialism*. In the interwar period it continued to play an important role, contributing not only to discussions about the proper idioms and repertoires of colonial administration—facilitating the inter-imperial and inter-colonial comparison, differentiation, and cooperation processes, especially in international *fora* such as LoN and ILO—but also to the definition of articulated imperial foreign policies. It especially targeted the conditioning of *excessive* internationalist rationales; that is, those that might induce extreme forms of international scrutiny and supervision of empires. The *colonial ententes* orchestrated at the ICI regular meetings, often scheduled to moments that immediately preceded the most important meetings centred on colonial issues which were held in Geneva, are quite illuminating about the arguments, strategies, and political decisions taken by the various European empire-states in that period.⁸¹

The political decisions that led to the consideration of colonial “native labour” as “a special form of labour,” to the establishment of a “colonial clause” in the Constitution of the ILO, and to the codification of a Native Labour Code, which was a deviation from ILO’s more or less universalist principles, and the attempts to change the name of *forced* labour to *compulsory* labour—or to clarify their differences, as intended

by Freire de Andrade—were, of course, related to the dynamism of this colonial *front*.⁸² The “special circumstances” determined by “special conditions” of the societies under consideration prevailed over more ambitious reformist agendas.⁸³

Conveyed numerous times before and after the debates in the *séances* of the Committee of Experts on Native Labour, since the first was held, in July 1927, the articulated position of the colonial *entente* contained unshakable principles: forced labour was acceptable for public purposes (with regulation, however), for military purposes (the famous *deuxième portion du contingent* applied in the French West and Central Africa),⁸⁴ or due to tax obligations (the *prestations* or *impostos braçais* in French and Portuguese colonies, respectively).⁸⁵ Forced labour should be taken as a transitory phenomenon. The duration of this transience should be determined only by empire-states themselves, in accordance with its assessment of the *civilisation levels* that, in its view, would separate European societies and populations from the colonial ones.⁸⁶ In June 1929, at the sixth session of the debates of the International Labour Conference, the Envoy Extraordinary and the Portuguese Minister Plenipotentiary in Bern and in the League of Nations, Vasco de Quevedo, declared that forced labour should be taken as a benevolent instrument, a fair retribution for the costs of civilisation. The restrictions proposed by some would lead to a clear result: “the civilised nations would find that, though fulfilling humanitarian ideas, they do not achieve humanitarian results.” Anyway, in the Portuguese colonies, “all that exists is correctional labour for temporary circumstances.”⁸⁷ On the other hand, Blaise Diagne, from Senegal and a member of the French delegation at the ILO Conference in 1930 and the first black African Deputy in the French National Assembly, advocated the *civilisational* argument: the elimination of forced labour was defended—“we are in favour of the suppression of forced labour as soon as possible”—but the related legislation “must depend on the level of culture of the races to whom it is intended.”⁸⁸

The ICI (as well as similar networks of groups of pressure focused on imperial and colonial affairs, such as the Colonial Institute of Marseille) was a key promoter of a particular genealogy of *imperial internationalism*: one that was centred on the domestication and limitation of the potential excesses of internationalist supervision. However, the ICI participated actively in the process of internationalisation of imperial and colonial issues, contributing to their institutionalisation. In a certain

sense, the role of the ICI shows how, more than obstructing or mitigating the internationalisation process, many supporters of the persistence and strengthening of imperial and colonial projects aimed essentially at monitoring, disciplining, and guiding its possibilities.⁸⁹

Most of the leading members of the ICI were also central figures in the Committee of Experts on Forced Labour of the ILO, in the Slavery Commission, and in the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations: Freire de Andrade, Harold Grimshaw, Martial Merlin, and Frederick Lugard, for instance. Here too, the inter-imperial, international, and inter-institutional technical cooperation was a particularly significant fact. The possession of specific skills and of field *experience* was crucial. In the Committee of Experts on Native Labour of the ILO, members should have a first-hand “experience” of colonial administration and policies. Lugard, Freire de Andrade, Van Rees, and Albrecht Gohr clearly fulfilled that requirement. Others, however, did not. The cases of Madame Marzorati, from the *Institut des Femmes Coloniales* (based in Brussels), and of Nobumi Ito, the chief representative of the Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations, were the most obvious ones.⁹⁰ The Committee aimed at identifying the variety of legal frameworks and specific policies governing the phenomenon of “native labour” within colonial contexts, and also to determine the way in which this historical and geographical variety could be disciplined by a common international idiom, capable of generating comparative studies and of sustaining a standardised regulation and supervision. The establishment of a more comprehensive regulatory system, commonly defined, analysed and applied, was one of the stated goals.⁹¹

CONCLUSION

Together, all these informational processes have produced two sets of specific and interrelated consequences (although in some cases they were unintended, or unexpected): first, they have facilitated the *rationalisation* of the colonial administration, including that which related to their coercive, both material and symbolic, repertoires; second, they have contributed to the reinforcement of political and diplomatic strategies which aimed at *reforming* and strengthening the imperial legitimacies within an evolving international order. On the one hand, the tentative *rationalisation* of colonial bureaucracies (and of the assessment of its policies) and the associated attempt to improve the imperial informational

order, at the metropolitan and colonial levels, facilitated the consolidation of colonial sovereignty.⁹² The *native policies* that administered the *politics of difference* (in social, cultural, economic, and political terms) in the colonies changed in their substance and scope, though still being marked by the persistence of pronounced forms of racialization and sociocultural discrimination. On the other hand, the participation in these international and inter-imperial institutional contexts—in the ICI and in the Committee of Experts on Forced Labour, for example—and in the elaboration of novel idioms and mechanisms of assessment and supervision of imperial formations facilitated the development of new forms of imperial legitimation at an international level. Even the Portuguese and Belgian colonial empires, often subject to accusations of continued use of modalities of forced labour—*analogous to slavery*—were able to mitigate their impact using the argument that they were active participants in *fora* in which new concepts of sovereignty, new forms of administration, and new idioms of rights claim-making were discussed, and in some cases and to varying degrees, were regulated and enforced. These empire-states were participants committed to redefining the standards of imperial civilisation.

The case of colonial “native labour” is an example of these aspects. For most of the representatives of the European colonial empires in Geneva, their active participation in discussions on the need to promote a broad legalisation and regulation of forced labour constituted an irrefutable proof of dedication to a reformist agenda that introduced internationalist principles into imperial outlooks. Naturally, the potentially negative impact of “dangerous internationalisms” on imperial and colonial issues, as Penha Garcia, a Portuguese colonial expert, called them in 1932, was feared by many, especially within French, Belgian, and Portuguese circles. This generated numerous reactions, and obstructions. Before the beginning of World War II, only Great Britain ratified the Forced Labour Convention of 1930. South Africa, Portugal and Belgium refused its ratification. The Netherlands and France conditioned its effectiveness, posing several restrictions on its application.⁹³

However, this did not mean that the empire-states opposed or avoided *tout court* processes of cooperation about the development of instruments of assessment and comparison of policies, recruitment practices, and administration of “native labour.” In diverse degrees and with different motivations, their participation in the ILO and LoN’s committees was vital: these *fora* were important experimental spaces in regard

to forms of colonial administration, and provided new opportunities for the strengthening of the legitimacy of imperial formations as *modern, progressive, civilising* polities. Even when the ratification of international instruments of collective imperial supervision was discarded or rejected, the idioms and repertoires of imperial internationalism were taken into careful consideration in the *national* and *imperial* processes of production and collection of information, thereby interfering in the related decision-making procedures. For example, a 1933 report asserted that the 1930 Convention had entailed the production of substantial “scientific research” on the subject in Belgium. As we have seen, the idioms and repertoires of imperial internationalism, often associated with reformist principles and to a *new* imperialist and colonialist momentum, were also *nationalised* in order to legitimise the imperial projects of the postwar period.⁹⁴

As a result, the evaluation of the importance and impact of this logic cannot be exclusively based on the assessment of the immediate political, legal, and diplomatic dimensions.⁹⁵ It also requires a comparative analysis, within and between each imperial formation.⁹⁶ The diversity of interactions with, appropriations of and reactions to the new international circumstances by empire-states requires the mobilisation of a comparative lens, attentive to heterogeneous relationships and genealogies.⁹⁷

The international scrutiny and the projected supervision of imperial and colonial *modi operandi* involved, potentially, the mitigation or conditioning of imperial sovereignty. They surely entailed its redefinition, the degree of which varied according to the characteristics of each empire-state, that is, according to its political, social, or economic features and institutional capacities. Also, they promoted the reconsideration of traditional repertoires of political, economic, and sociocultural administration of colonial territories, and the critical evaluation of the existing imperial and colonial ideologies, making room for new actors, arguments, and interests. Colonial paternalism and pragmatism surely persisted. The racialisation processes lasted in some, indeed most, cases up to the demise of empire. Both conditioned the elaboration and potential implementation of international projects and programmes of social policy. But the pressure to promote international scrutiny, exercised by the international *fora* and by the pressure groups that converged within, not without noticeable limitations nor passionate disputes, facilitated the transformation of traditional idioms and repertoires of imperial administration (in its diversity), thus contributing to the redefinition of its

legitimacy. The implementation of reforms was an important instrument in repairing imperial reputations at an international level. Both in the period of the 1920s and 1930s, marked by the predominance of an inter-imperial agenda, as in the period after the Second World War, marked by the widespread questioning of the legitimacy of imperial and colonial formations, the importance of internationalism (in its diversity of doctrines and political projects) is unquestionable.⁹⁸ The historical connections, interdependences, and co-constitution between internationalism and imperialism (and nationalism) require further investigations in order to better understand how and why it happened.⁹⁹

NOTES

1. As this volume demonstrates, the study of this historical co-constitution is crucial to understanding the twentieth century. Briefly, by imperial internationalism we mean the complex of idioms, projects, networks, and institutions that have promoted forms of internationalism focused on imperial affairs. By internationalist imperialism we refer to the set of idioms, projects, networks, and institutions of imperial nature, whether or not related to empire-states, which have dialogued with forms of internationalism in order to reinforce and (re)legitimise its imperialist purposes. For a somewhat different conception, see Daniel Gorman's work on the emergence of international society. Gorman tends to reduce imperial internationalism to the internationalisation of the British Empire, as Julia Irwin aptly notes. Mark Mazower also addresses the tentative instrumental use of international organisations by imperial polities, in order to enhance imperial projects. His perspective rests essentially on the assessment of Jan Smuts' role. See Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 21–172; Julia F. Irwin, "Interwar Internationalism and Imperialism; or, Taking Idealism Seriously", *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (2014), pp. 1164–1166; and Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 28–65.
2. See, for example, Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Daniel Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Emily Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World, 1870–1945", in *A World Connecting, 1870–1945*, ed. Emily Rosenberg

- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 815–996; Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society*; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
3. On the League of Nations and its mandate system, see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); N. Meouchy et al., eds., *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Antony Anghie. “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations”, *N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics* 34 (2001), pp. 513–633; Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), *maxime* pp. 260–273. See also the rich set of texts in United Nations Library/Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983).
 4. On the standards of the imperial civilisation, see Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of Civilization in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Brett Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). On the international (dis)order, see, for example, Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order 1916–1931* (London: Allen Lane, 2014); and David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2013), *maxime* pp. 85–126 (on imperial issues).
 5. See the recent contribution by Susan Pedersen, “Empires, States and the League of Nations”, in *Internationalisms. A Twentieth-Century History*, eds. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
 6. See Andrew Webster, “The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism” in *Internationalisms*, eds. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, pp. 139–169.
 7. George Louis Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference. With Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Colonial Settlement* (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 2 edition, 1968 [1923]), *maxime* pp. 179–188 (“The Development of African Civilization”), and 249–258 (“Protection of Native Rights: Labor and Land”), *cit.* pp. 183, 186–187, 252, 254. For Beer, see also Wm. Roger Louis. “The United States and the African Peace Settlement of 1919: The Pilgrimage of George Louis Beer”, *The Journal of African History* 4, no. 3 (1963), pp. 413–433, *cit.* at p. 415. See also AAVV, *The League of Nations Starts: An Outline by its Organisers*

- (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), which contains many articles on the problem of international control written by key players in the LoN (for example, W. Ormsby Gore), and Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written from his Unpublished and Personal Material* (New York: Doubleday, 1922).
8. LoN Archive, R13, Dossier 2372, Memorandum by G. S. Spicer, "Some of the Principal Points Concerning Africa to be Dealt with at the Peace Conference", 17 January 1919.
 9. Kevin Grant, *A "Civilized Savagery": Britain and the New Slavery in Africa, 1884–1926* (New York: Routledge, 2005), *maxime* pp. 39–78; Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism, 1870–1930* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
 10. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, "As provas da "civilização": fotografia, colonialismo e direitos humanos", in *O Império da visão. Fotografia no contexto colonial português*, ed. Filipa Vicente (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2014), pp. 387–398.
 11. On the First World War and the imperial question, see Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds., *Empires at War 1911–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Andrew Tait Jarboe and Richard Fogarty, eds., *Empires in World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). Regarding the quote, see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 225. See also Erez Manela, "Dawn of a New Era: The "Wilsonian Moment" in Colonial Contexts and the Transformation of World Order, 1917–1920", in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 121–149.
 12. Ralph Austen, "Varieties of Trusteeship. African Territories under British and French Mandate, 1919–1939" in *France and Britain in Africa. Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, eds. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 515–542; Penelope Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920–1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 45–60; Michael Callahan, *A Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and Africa, 1929–1946* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics*, pp. 249–290; Brett Bowden. "'Poisons Disguised with Honey': European Expansion and the Sacred Trust of Civilization", *The European Legacy* 18, no. 2 (2013), pp. 151–169. See also the comparative and historical study by Ramendra Nath Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), and Nele Matz. "Civilization and the Mandate System under the

- League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship”, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 9 (2005), pp. 47–95.
13. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: the Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1996), *maxime* pp. 82–126; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), *maxime* pp. 284–309; Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 13–37. See also Yuichiro Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in Twentieth-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (New York: New York University Press, 2013), pp. 19–53.
 14. Veronique Dimier, “On Good Colonial Government: Lessons from the League of Nations”, *Global Society* 18, no. 3 (2004), pp. 279–299; Vernon Marston Hewitt, “Empire, International Development & the Concept of Good Government” in *Empire, Development & Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, eds. Mark R. Duffield and Vernon Marston Hewitt (Woodbridge: Currey, 2009), pp. 30–44.
 15. Among others, Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl, and Martina Kopf, eds., *Developing Africa. Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).
 16. Many of the ideas and arguments of these doctrines have genealogies that go back at least to the late nineteenth century.
 17. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 154 and 200. The expression *thinking like an empire* and the line of thought behind it took inspiration from Jane Burbank, “Thinking like an Empire: Estate, Law, and Rights in the Early Twentieth Century” in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, eds. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 196–217.
 18. The mandates system did not require a new modality of imperialism. Instead, it institutionalised a new regime of international scrutiny and accountability. In addition to the previously cited works, see also Susan Pedersen. “The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, no. 4 (2006), pp. 560–582.
 19. Editors’ note: On the intersections between international organizations and colonialism, see the articles by José Pedro Monteiro and Jessica Pearson in this book.
 20. For an analysis that includes the League of Nations and the United Nations, see the collective effort in R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop, eds., *Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight*

- of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).
21. See Suzanne Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade* (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 169–314; Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The “Civilizing Mission” of Portuguese Colonialism*, pp. 11–23.
 22. Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*, pp. 5–6.
 23. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The “Civilizing Mission” of Portuguese Colonialism*, p. 14. On the connections between colonial dynamics, concepts of sovereignty, and international law of positivist influence, see Antony Anghie. “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law”, *Harvard International Law Journal* 40, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1–71.
 24. L.H. Gann, “The Berlin Conference and the Humanitarian Conscience” in *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition*, eds. S. Forster, W. J. Mommsen, and R. Robinson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 321–331; Suzanne Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade*, pp. 236–291.
 25. Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem* (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2003), cit. p. 23. See also Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro. “Internationalism and the Labours of the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1945–1974)”, *Portuguese Studies*. 29, no. 2 (2013), pp. 142–163.
 26. By internationalisation we understand, in the wake of Susan Pedersen, “the process by which certain political issues and functions are displaced from the national or imperial, and into the international, realm”. See also the introduction to this volume for more on the processes, dynamics, and programmes of internationalization. See Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, pp. 4–5. Regarding the internationalisation of imperial and colonial matters, see, among others, Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 32–114; Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 98–178; Pierre Singaravélou, “Les stratégies d’internationalisation du débat colonial et la construction transnationale d’une science de la colonisation à la fin du XIXe siècle”, *Monde(s), histoire, espaces, relations*, no. 1 (2012), pp. 135–157.
 27. For the (anti)slavery issue, see Amalia Ribi Forclaz, *Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
 28. For many of those involved in these issues, including Goudal, the existing “colonial systems of legislation” were considered more developed than

- those that were being discussed internationally in the 1920s. The changes that took place in some European colonial empires from the end of World War II, already responding to pressures to introduce principles of legislative reformism, certainly contributed to these perceptions. These legislative changes were themselves a consequence of international pressure, as the Portuguese and Belgian cases demonstrate. See Jean Goudal, "The Question of Forced Labour before the International Labour Conference", *International Labour Review* XIX, no. 5 (1929), pp. 621–638, cit. 631–632.
29. See Frederick Cooper, "Conditions Analogous to Slavery: Imperialism and Free Labor Ideology in Africa", in *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies*, eds. Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 107–149; Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism*.
 30. On the legal and institutional dimensions, see Nicholas Lawrence McGeehan, "Misunderstood and Neglected: The Marginalisation of Slavery in International Law", *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16, no. 3 (2012), pp. 436–460, *maxime* 432–448.
 31. Gertrude E. Newbury and Colin W. Newbury, "Labor Charters and Labor Markets: The International Labour Organization (ILO) and Africa in the Interwar Period", *Journal of African Studies* 3, no. 3 (1976), pp. 311–327. Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 134–151. For a specific case, see Jean Allain, "Slavery and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation", *Journal of the History of International Law* 8, no. 2 (2006), pp. 213–244.
 32. In different ways and certainly due to different contexts and conditions, the 1920s were characterised by significant changes in the colonial laws relating to "native labour."
 33. This text is essentially focused on some aspects related to the Mandates Commission and the Committee of Experts on Native Labour. The research project I am conducting centres on a detailed analysis of these three institutional arenas. Forthcoming publications will engage with them accordingly.
 34. The implications in the colonies and in the mandated territories were diverse. That comparative study is yet to be made. R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop, eds., *Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective*, cit. p. xi.
 35. See *Le système des mandats, origines, principes et applications* (Genève: League of Nations, 1945); Yves Collart, "La Société des Nations et le colonialisme. Le mandat international: une vieille idée pour demain?",

- in United Nations Library/Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium*, pp. 384–403.
36. As Neta Crawford states, “after World War I, principles and beliefs that were essential elements of a decolonization regime—self-determination, nationalism, human rights, and an international interest in the affairs of colonial administration—were codified in this major international treaty and used to structure international relations.” The treaty mentioned is the treaty of Versailles. Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics*, p. 263.
 37. See, for example, Veronique Dimier, *Le discours idéologique de la méthode coloniale chez les Français et les Britanniques: de l’entre-deux guerres à la décolonisation (1920–1960)* (Bordeaux: Centre d’étude d’Afrique noire/ Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux, 1998), pp. 1–39, cit. p. 20.
 38. Veronique Dimier, “L’internationalisation du débat colonial: rivalités autour de la Commission Permanente des Mandats”, *Outre-mers* 89, no. 336–337 (2002), pp. 333–360. About the notion of imperial inter-sections, see Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, *Empires in World History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 14–17.
 39. Albert Sarraut, *Grandeur et servitude coloniales* (Paris: Sagittaire, 1931), pp. 120–121.
 40. Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and sons, 1922), cit. p. 50; H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), pp. 47–48.
 41. *Le système des Mandats, origines, principes et applications*, pp. 42–46.
 42. Of course, these restrictions were not absolute nor did they avoid other forms of political pressure. Ralph Austen, “Varieties of Trusteeship”, p. 522.
 43. Edward Dene Morel, *The Black Man’s Burden* (Manchester: National Labour Press, 1920), p. 228; George Padmore, *Africa and World Peace* (London: Frank Cass, 1972 [1932]), pp. 176–206, cit. p. 177–178, 190, 193, 195. Italics mine. On *Morelism*, see Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire. British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008 [1968]), pp. 254–265, 274–290. On Padmore, see the recent work by Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). See also H.A.L. Fisher’s *A History of Europe* (1938).
 44. The reference was to the porter system of transport in Tanganyika. Padmore cites G. St. J. Orde Browne, in his *Report on Labour in Tanganyika Territory* (London: Colonial Report No. 19, 1926), p. 36. The same quotation is cited on ILO, *Forced Labour. Report and Draft*

- Questionnaire. International Labour Conference, 12th Session* (Geneva: ILO, 1929), p. 251. George Padmore, *Africa and World Peace*, 196–197. See also G. St. J. Orde Browne, *The African Labourer* (London: Frank Cass, 1967 [1933]).
45. At that time, Lugard was the British representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission. Sarraut was the French Minister of the Colonies. In *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, an entire chapter is devoted to the “Principles Governing Control in the Tropics,” exploring the legacies of the Berlin and Brussels conferences and the possibilities of the mandates system, and also analysing the differences between the British and French imperial and colonial policies. See Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, pp. 48–63.
 46. For four coeval works focused on the inter-imperial comparison which incorporate or dialogue with international normative parameters, see Louis Franck, ed., *Études de colonisation compare* (Bruxelles: Goemaere, 1924); Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York: Macmillan, 1928); W. Ormsby-Gore, *Comparative Methods of Colonial Administration in Native Dependencies* (London: Chatham House, 1930); and Lucy Mair, *Native Policies in Africa* (London: Routledge, 1936).
 47. For example, Benoit Daviron, “Mobilizing Labour in African Agriculture: The Role of the International Colonial Institute in the Elaboration of a Standard of Colonial Administration, 1895–1930”, *Journal of Global History* 5, issue 3 (2010), pp. 479–501; Pierre Singaravélou, “Les stratégies d’internationalisation du débat colonial et la construction transnationale d’une science de la colonisation à la fin du XIXe siècle”, pp. 149–157; Ulrika Lindner, “New Forms of Knowledge Exchange between Imperial Powers: The Development of the Institut Colonial International (ICI) since the End of the Nineteenth Century”, in *Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870–1930: Empires and Encounters*, eds. Volker Barth and Roland Czetowski (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 57–78; Florian Wagner, *Colonial Internationalism: How Cooperation among Experts Reshaped Colonialism (1830s–1950s)* (Florence: Ph.D. Thesis, European University Institute, 2016).
 48. See Penelope Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920–1940*, pp. 12–13, 30–31; Benoît de L’Estoile, “‘Internationalization and Scientific Nationalism’: The International Institute of African Languages and Cultures between the Wars” in *Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism and the Politics of Knowledge*, eds. Helen Tilley and Robert J. Gordon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 95–116.
 49. From 1926 to 1928, Henri Labouret was responsible for the analysis of international issues and the monitoring of the Togo and Cameroons mandates. See Henri Labouret, “A la recherche d’une politique

- coloniale', *Le Monde colonial illustré* LXXXII (1930), p. 133 (quoted in Dimier, *Le discours idéologique de la méthode coloniale chez les Français et les Britanniques*, p. 21). See also Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State. Negritude and Colonial Humanism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), pp. 56, 58 (cit.), 70–72, n139 on p. 319.
50. Dimier considers that this contributed essentially to enhancing the Anglo-French rivalry. But this view does not recognise the centrality of inter-imperial cooperation processes that have characterised the political dynamics inside and outside the LoN and the ILO. For example, the territory of French Camerouns was one of the main objects of debate. The emergence of *revisionist* German colonial claims certainly contributed to this fact, and it promoted the defence of an Anglo-French cooperation in France, particularly by such figures as Labouret. Veronique Dimier. "L'internationalisation du débat colonial: rivalités autour de la Commission Permanente des Mandats", *Outre-mers* 89, no. 336–337 (2002), pp. 333–360. On the impact of Germany's entry into the LoN, see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, Part III, "New Times, New Norms, 1927–1933", pp. 195–286.
 51. Veronique "Dimier, Direct or Indirect Rule: Propaganda around a Scientific Controversy" in *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France*, eds. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 168–183.
 52. Joseph Chamberlain as quoted by Frederick Lugard in *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, p. 60. Lord M. Hailey, *The Future of Colonial Peoples* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944). See Anthony Anghie. "Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective", *Villanova Law Review* 45, no. 887 (2000), esp. pp. 904–905.
 53. John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1902), p. 251.
 54. On Smuts' plan, see Jan Christiaan Smuts, *The League of Nations: a Practical Suggestion* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1918). See also Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, pp. 28–65.
 55. Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. I, pp. 226–227 and 262; Alpheus Henry Snow, *The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations* (New York: Putnam, 1921), cit. p. 30. See also Ramendra Nath Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems*, pp. 13 and ff. and Kenneth Joseph Cosgrove, *The American Anti-Colonial Tradition and International Accountability for Dependent Peoples: A Study of the American Role in the Establishment of the League of Nations Mandates System and the United Nations Trusteeship System* (London: Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1990).

56. Veronique Dimier, "L'internationalisation du débat colonial", pp. 335–336; idem, "On Good Colonial Government: Lessons from the League of Nations", *Global Society* 18, no. 3 (2004), pp. 279–299. On the *globalisation* of idioms and anti-colonial movements, see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*.
57. The focus on Anglo-French processes of imperial differentiation or on Anglo-American disputes over the origin of the trusteeship rationale obscures these realities and difficulties their proper understanding.
58. For the context, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism, 1870–1930*.
59. Freire de Andrade also insisted that these concerns were extended to the white communities in those territories. Italics are mine. Archive of LoN, R75, from 1919 to 1927, dossier 46530: Freire de Andrade's Memorandum, *Report on the Interpretation of that Part of Article 22 of the Covenant which Relates to the Well-Being and Development of the Peoples of Mandated Territories*, 9 October 1925, cit. pp. 9–10, 13–14, 15–16, 19. See also Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, pp. 130–134.
60. LoN Archive, R75, 1919–1927, dossier 46530: Memorandum by Frederick Lugard, 19 October 1925, cit. p. 1.
61. LoN Archive, R75, 1919 to 1927, dossier 46530: Memorandum by Freire de Andrade, 22 October 1925, cit. pp. 2–5. On more about this issue, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism*.
62. For example, see Emmanuelle Sibeud, *Une Science Impériale pour L'Afrique* (Paris: EHESS, 2002); Marc Poncelet, *L'invention des sciences coloniales belges* (Paris: Karthala, 2008); Pierre Singaravélou, *Professer l'Empire. Les 'sciences coloniales' en France sous la IIIe République* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011).
63. Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
64. On the notion of legibility, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
65. The expansion of the colonial bureaucracies was partly a product of similar processes that occurred in the metropolitan bureaucracies and in the diplomatic apparatus.
66. Susan Zimmermann, "'Special Circumstances' in Geneva: The ILO and the World of Non-Metropolitan Labour in the Interwar Years" in *ILO histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, eds. Jasmien Van Daele et al. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 221–250, cit. p. 230.

67. Susan Zimmermann, "The Long-Term Trajectory of Anti-Slavery in International Politics: From the Expansion of the European International System to Unequal International Development" in *Humanitarian Interventions and Changing Labor Relations: The Long-Term Consequences of the Abolition of the Slave Trade*, ed. Marcel van der Linden (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 435–497.
68. On the ILO, see for example, ILO, *Forced Labour. Report and Draft Questionnaire. International Labour Conference, 12th Session* (Geneva: ILO, 1929); idem, *Forced Labour. Supplementary Report. International Labour Conference, 12th Session* (Geneva: ILO, 1929); Luis Rodríguez-Pinero, *Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime 1919–1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 17–52; Lars Thomann, *Steps to Compliance with International Labour Standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Abolition of Forced Labour* (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), *maxime* pp. 185ff.
69. Sandrine Kott. "Une 'communaute épistémique' du social?", *Genèses* 71, no. 2 (2008), pp. 26–46.
70. Edouard Junod. "Le Bureau international pour la défense des indigènes", *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge et Bulletin international des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge* 4, no. 37 (1922), pp. 27–43; Emmanuelle Sibeud. "Entre geste impériale et cause internationale: défendre les indigènes à Genève dans les années 1920", *Monde(s), histoire, espaces, relations*, Dossier *Philantropies transnationales* 6, no. 2 (2014), pp. 23–43.
71. Amalia Ribí, "'The Breath of a New Life?': British Anti-Slavery Activism and the League of Nations" in *Internationalism Reconfigured*, ed. Daniel Laqua (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 93–113.
72. See Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and Hugo Gonçalves Dóres, "Internacionalismos en competición: Política, religión y el Imperio colonial portugués (1890–1930)" in *Entre embarras et instruments. Les Églises missionnaires catholiques et le renouveau impérial des États ibériques (1808–1930)*, eds. Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, María-Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, and Xavier Huetz de Lempis (Madrid: Casa Velázquez, forthcoming 2018).
73. See Carol Miller, "'Geneva—the Key to Equality': Inter-War Feminists and the League of Nations", *Women's History Review* 3, no. 2 (1994), pp. 219–245; Maria Grazia Suriano, *Donne, pace, non-violenza fra le due guerre mondiali. La Women's International League for Peace and Freedom e l'impegno per il disarmo e l'educazione* (Bologna: Ph.D. thesis, Università degli Studi di Bologna, 2007); Laura Beers, "Advocating for a Feminist Internationalism between the Wars", and Madeleine Herren, "Gender and International Relations Through the Lens of the League of Nations (1919–1945)" both in *Women, Diplomacy and International*

- Politics since 1500*, eds. Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 202–221 and pp. 182–201.
74. Philippe Trinchan, “Adaptation ou résistance des catholiques au nouvel ordre international: le cas de L’Union Catholique d’Études Internationales 1920–1939” in *Schweizer Katholizismus zwischen den Weltkriegen 1920–1940*, ed. Urs Altermatt (Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1994), pp. 103–116.
 75. See Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, *The “Civilising Mission” of Portuguese Colonialism*.
 76. For the concept of “force field” applied to the LoN, see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians*, p. 5. See also the understanding of international organisations as “social spaces” in the text of Sandrine Kott in this volume.
 77. J.P. Daughton, “ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar Years” in *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, eds. Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 85–97, esp. 94–95.
 78. Despite the intentions declared, there were different labour codes until very late. Albert Thomas to Du Bois (1921), ILO Archive, N206/1/01/3.
 79. Rodriguez-Pinero, *Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law*, pp. 25, 26.
 80. Institut Colonial International, *La Main-d’oeuvre aux Colonies: Documents Officiels*, 1 series, 3 Vols. (Bruxelles: Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, 1895–1897–1898); Bibliothèque coloniale internationale, *Le régime et l’organisation du travail des indigènes dans les colonies tropicales* (Bruxelles: Établissements généraux d’imprimerie, 1929).
 81. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, “Internationalism and the *Labours* of the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1945–1974)”.
 82. Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940–70* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 23 and ff.
 83. Susan Zimmermann, “‘Special Circumstances’ in Geneva”, pp. 221–250.
 84. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 38 and ff. For several examples on the *deuxième portion*, see Babacar Fall, *Le travail forcé en Afrique-Occidentale française, 1900–1946* (Paris: Karthala, 1993), pp. 157–227. See also Myron J. Echenberg, “Paying the Blood Tax: Military Conscription in French West Africa, 1914–1929”, *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 9, no. 2 (1975), pp. 171–192.
 85. On taxation, see Leigh Gardner, *Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),

- and Philip Havik, Alexander Keese, and Maciel Santos, *Administration and Taxation of Former Portuguese Africa (1900–1945)* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).
86. The drafts of the *séances* are in ILO's Archive, N/206/2/1. See also René Mercier, *Le travail obligatoire dans les colonies africaines* (Paris: Larose, 1933), p. 91; Daniel Maul "The International Labour Organization and the Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present", *Labor History* 48, no. 4 (2007), pp. 477–500, *maxime* pp. 482–483.
 87. *Proceedings of the International Labour Conference, 12 Session, Volume 1* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1929), pp. 44–45.
 88. It is often said that Diagne defended forced labour at the Conference, but his statement simply objected in a clear way to the legislation on freedom of association. Based only on British documentation, Suzanne Miers quotes Diagne stating that the "lazy" nature justified the use of compulsion. Babacar Fall declares Diagne's support for the "pro-colonial reformism" and the use of forced labour. *Proceedings of the International Labour Conference, 14 Session, Volume 1* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1930), p. 291; Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century*, p. 146; Babacar Fall, *Sénégal: le travail au XX^e siècle* (Amsterdam: Ph.D. Thesis, FMG: Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, 2010), p. 136, n. 371, and p. 137.
 89. See Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, "Internationalism and the *Labours* of the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1945–1974)".
 90. On Marzorati's case, related to various pressures which sought the participation of women in ILO's committees, and on the case of Nobumi Ito, whose presence was valued as representing the non-European populations, see Susan Zimmermann, "'Special Circumstances' in Geneva", pp. 236–237.
 91. Jean Goudal, "The Question of Forced Labour before the International Labour Conference", pp. 623, 638; Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 102–106; Susan Zimmerman, "'Special Circumstances' in Geneva", pp. 236–237; Michael Callahan, *Mandates and Empire*, p. 58.
 92. In the 1920 s, colonial sovereignty was still more formal than real.
 93. France legally abolished forced labour in 1946, the Portuguese in 1962. The Belgians ratified the 1930 Convention in 1944, the Portuguese in 1956. K. K. Norsky, *The Influence of the International Labour Organization on Principles of Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 56–62.
 94. ILO Archive, N/206/1/01/3, "Geneva Forced Labour Convention", no author, 13 December 1933.

95. We thus agree with J. P. Daughton, "ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar Years", p. 87.
96. This research, for now, was not aimed at relating all these political, ideological, and technical processes with the assessment of their local consequences in each imperial formation, in each colonial society, a necessary condition for any comparative exercise. Naturally, this relation is a very important aspect for the history of the intersections between imperialism and internationalism.
97. For a summary of the different arguments mobilised at the time, see Jean Goudal, *Esclavage et travail forcé* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1929).
98. On new approaches on the importance of internationalism between the wars in the history of the twentieth century, as well as some texts in this volume and the works cited at the beginning of this text, see Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations", *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007), pp. 1091–1117; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 116–153. See also Simon Jackson and Alanna O'Malley, eds., *From the League of Nations to the United Nations: New Approaches to International Institutions* (London: Routledge, 2017).
99. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*.

The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917–1945

Daniel Roger Maul

In 1918 the American Friends Service Committee, the body responsible for coordinating the humanitarian relief efforts of the American Quakers, urged all female Friends currently sewing clothing to be sent to the needy in France to take particular care over their work. The clothes, the women were told, were a “silent army of representatives” whose standard would play a part in determining the USA’s image abroad. The women were instructed to look at each item of clothing and to ask themselves “Is it worthy of America?”¹ This episode exemplifies, in miniature, the degree to which, by that point in time, personal efforts to help the needy had become entwined with questions of national prestige. It thus embodies the global historic dimension of American international relief² between the wars which this essay investigates. Specifically, this paper focuses on the major relief campaigns run in many parts of the world between 1917 and 1941 by American NGOs such as the AFSC and the American Red Cross. These activities are examined from the perspective

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of three almost parallel, overlapping processes: firstly, the growth in the amount and significance of private foreign relief issuing from the USA in the period in question³ secondly, the emergence of what in the research has been termed “global civil society,”⁴ and thirdly, the process of internationalisation, or the evolution of global governance.⁵ While studies into fields such as the protection of refugees and minorities, intellectual collaboration and the development of intellectual property law have revealed dense networks of cooperation and coordination between the League of Nations and its bodies on the one hand, and elements of “global civil society” on the other,⁶ the field of international humanitarianism has yet to be investigated in this regard. And although work into the long-neglected internationalism of the period between the wars is currently enjoying an unexpected boom,⁷ hardly any of the studies published so far have touched on whether similar forms of cooperation and coordination existed between the League and humanitarian groups whose relief work extended beyond their own national borders. In America’s case, the situation is compounded by the fact that the activities of private aid organisations have, until now, largely been overshadowed by the foundation philanthropy of the Rockefellers, Carnegies, and the likes, which took off at the same time.⁸

In the field of humanitarian aid, the two world wars are only of limited suitability as epoch boundaries, as much of what was happening began well before 1914 and continued well beyond 1945. While acknowledging the watershed constituted by the First World War, periodization in this field ideally needs, as suggested by Akira Iriye and Sebastian Conrad/Dominik Sachsenmaier, for example, to take account of the continuities which persisted beyond this cut-off point.⁹ What the “interwar period” does describe, however, is an important episode in the history of international relief, a phase in which national, international, and transnational dimensions increasingly began to merge. It is an integral chapter of a yet to be written global history of international humanitarianism, and thus of the civil societal roots of solidarity in the international system in the twentieth century. The established theory that the interwar period was characterised by de-globalisation tendencies simply does not hold in the field of private American humanitarian aid. Tracing the history of international humanitarianism opens up an alternative perspective on the way in which American civil society responded to the position as world power which the USA had assumed at the end of the nineteenth century. Starting from the observation that American

NGOs played a pioneering role in the emergence of an “international humanitarian order,” their activities can be used as an indicator, as it were, of changes in the moral foundation on which the world order was based. Continuing the debate on the “global USA,”¹⁰ the focus now moves to the influence of the international links and transnational relationships forged by American relief organisations. In the light of the work still to be done in this field, this essay will end not with a conclusion in the traditional sense, but with a research agenda.¹¹

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELIEF

In many respects, World War I, and in particular the United States’ entry into the war in 1917, marked a turning point in what was by then an already long tradition of American relief activities abroad. It can rightfully be claimed that the USA’s rise to the rank of superpower, and the increase in its economic might and prosperity, manifested themselves in many parts of the world not just on a diplomatic level, but also and not least in the humanitarian activities of private groups.

Local campaigns (usually limited to the big cities of the East Coast) to help the needy abroad had been held as early as the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s and the Great Famine in Ireland in the mid-1840s.¹² The first major expansion phase of American international relief began after the Civil War and was inextricably connected with the emergence of national media. Emily Rosenberg notes that the American public has not been “without a foreign crisis to relieve” since the 1890s,¹³ when relief began to be organised on an increasingly global scale for the victims of famine (e.g., in Russia in 1891/92 and India in 1895), natural disasters and persecution.¹⁴ There were a number of groups behind these activities, with a significant impulse provided by missionaries and evangelical moral reformers, who, as time went by, became more and more forceful in publicising their activities and objectives.¹⁵ Parallel to this, the American Red Cross (ARC), which had been founded in 1881, became a pioneer within the international Red Cross movement by expanding its activities beyond helping soldiers wounded in war and entering the field of both national and international emergency relief.¹⁶ In the 1890s the ARC was active in Russia, the Ottoman Empire (following the Armenian massacres), and in Cuba in the run-up to the Spanish-American war in 1898.

Alongside this quantitative and qualitative increase in foreign aid, which until this point had been provided exclusively by voluntary agencies using private means, official political interest in international relief also began to grow. This led, starting from the Spanish-American war of 1898 and the USA's manifest ascension to the rank of world and colonial power, to a continuous tightening of the bond between American foreign policy and private aid organisations. During Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, there was a marked increase in attempts to combine humanitarian operations with US diplomatic and foreign trade interests. This was particularly blatant during the Mexican civil war when, in 1911, a National Mexican Relief Committee was set up under the auspices of the American Red Cross, on which sat not only delegates from the State Department, but also representatives of US economic interests in Mexico. Unsurprisingly, questions were raised.¹⁷ But even during the Cuban War of Independence, President McKinley had regarded his (moral) support for the aid provided first and foremost by the Red Cross to the "*reconcentrados*" interned in Spanish prison camps as a means of appeasing the pro-interventionist mood in the country.¹⁸ Following the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, however, the Red Cross was quickly incorporated into the American armed forces. After 1898 it became the rule that in a crisis, the President would appeal to the public to donate to the Red Cross—especially after the organisational reform of 1905, which gave the American President an honorary position at the head of the national Red Cross Society and regularly included members of the State Department on the organisation's key committees. Parallel to this, the American government also took on a more active role in supporting private aid initiatives—e.g., allowing relief supplies to be transported by the Navy, or having Congress increase the budget for aid in the event of natural disasters (such as the Messina earthquake and tsunami of 1908). Though none of this constituted a full nationalisation of humanitarian aid (aid campaigns and relief operations continued to be privately organised and, predominantly, privately financed), it shows that the potential of humanitarian relief as an instrument of foreign policy (for political or economic ends or to boost the image of the United States abroad) had not only been recognised but was being exploited to a much greater extent than ever before.

The outbreak of World War I led initially to an explosion of American aid efforts in Europe. Of particular significance was the Belgian Relief campaign headed by the future President Herbert Hoover, which played

a critical role in feeding Belgium's civilian population under extremely difficult circumstances.¹⁹ Hoover's Committee on Belgian Relief (CBR) was not uncontroversial on home soil, the bulk of its work taking place as it did while the US still held a position of neutrality. While some people feared that the USA was becoming indirectly involved in a European war, others criticised the fact that America feeding the Belgian people took the pressure off the occupying power and thus ultimately helped the German war effort.²⁰ This double-sided criticism marked a point in the debate for and against humanitarian aid beneath the threshold of open governmental intervention that would be returned to in many later conflicts and influence the actions of all the parties involved, both governmental and non-governmental.

When the USA entered the First World War in 1917, however, these discussions became—for the time being—obsolete. On President Wilson's orders, all the aid organisations active abroad were now required to act under the auspices and coordination of the ARC, which in turn functioned as a quasi-governmental institution. As in other warring nations, entry into a conflict which was universally understood as "total war" led to a government-funded upswing in humanitarian activities. This was probably even more the case in the USA than it was elsewhere, the hope being that the construction of a strong national identity would help to integrate the home front into the national war effort.²¹ Humanitarian relief for European civilians, wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and others was intended to create an emotional link to the soldiers in the field, the Allies and, generally, the goals of American foreign policy. The American Red Cross was particularly good at casting the willingness to provide generous aid to foreign countries as part of the American identity, and therefore as proof of patriotism.²² The majority of the groups active in the field of humanitarian aid, such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), founded in 1914, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and the numerous ethnically defined aid committees (e.g., Italian American Relief) subordinated themselves to the ARC's leadership and its new form of "patriotic humanitarianism." The same even applied to the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organisation (in which other "peace churches" such as the Mennonites and Brethren were involved)²³ whose origins lay partly in the radical pacifism of the Society of Friends. The AFSC wanted to offer young Quakers the chance to demonstrate their patriotism in a way that didn't conflict with their religious

convictions by providing them, under the auspices of the Red Cross, with an alternative to military service (driving ambulances on the front, reconstruction in war-torn areas). From this initially limited mission would develop, in years to come, one of the most influential providers of American foreign relief whose operations in humanitarian crises between the wars extended from food aid to Germany and Austria to activities in Russia, Spain, and China.²⁴

The end of hostilities saw the end of this formal subordination of private international relief to the American war effort, but not its intertwinement with the interests of American foreign policy. Neither did American humanitarian relief efforts themselves end with the war. On the contrary, with regard to the USA's transnational relief, 1919 saw the beginning of what Herbert Hoover termed the "second American intervention."²⁵ Hoover's parastatal *American Relief Administration* (ARA) was charged with ensuring that postwar Europe was fed. Equipped with generous quantities of food and other supplies which far exceeded the resources of all the other Allies combined, the role of the ARA, under whose auspices most private aid organisations acted, was, as defined by Hoover, primarily humanitarian. However, there was no denial of the long-term political and foreign trade objectives connected with its activities—namely fighting Bolshevism and opening up new markets for American crop surpluses and for other industries vying for the chance to help with European reconstruction. Weak parliamentary governments (in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia) were targeted with support, while in other cases, Hungary under Bela Kun being the most prominent, relief was withheld in an attempt to destabilise governments that were held to be leaning towards Bolshevism.²⁶ The practices of the ARA were not uncontroversial among the American public. Congress had early on passed a bill banning the ARA from feeding "enemy children or adults" on the backs of the American taxpayer (Hoover, who believed strongly in the need to stabilise Germany for humanitarian, political, and economic reasons, got around this ban by officially delegating this work to the Quakers, which meant it would have to be privately funded).²⁷ At the same time, the ARA's openly anti-Bolshevik bias was sharply criticised from within Liberal and Socialist circles.

Similar criticism accompanied the ARA's last and biggest relief operation, which was carried out in Russia in the summer of 1921. At the climax of a famine which threatened to kill millions, Hoover entered into an agreement with the Soviet government which granted the ARA and

the organisations acting in its name (including the ARC, the Quakers, the JDC, and the YMCA) more or less total freedom in their activities to feed the starving. After this, the ARA had to deal not only with the mistrust of the Soviets and the liberal press at home, which had forgotten neither the ARA's anti-Bolshevik policy nor the fact that in the civil war which preceded the famine, the ARC, for example, had limited its aid deliveries to the "white" side—it also had to compete with a European relief initiative supported by the International Red Cross and the League of Nations and led by the League's Norwegian Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen. The ARA, however, had much greater resources at its disposal than the Nansen mission, in turn giving it more influence on the Soviet government, both of which only served to emphasise the "American" character of ARA aid. At the same time, the ARA's activities in Russia were criticised heavily by the American Right for potentially strengthening and maintaining the Bolshevik regime. Hoover (who by this point was Secretary of Commerce and thus himself a member of the government) responded that the operation offered a unique chance to circumvent the Soviet authorities and reach the Russian people directly, and thereby to create a favourable climate for future political and economic contacts.²⁸

The awareness that international humanitarian aid could serve as a tool in national image bolstering and the achievement of foreign policy goals continued even after 1920, when most international relief fell back into private hands. The American Red Cross remained an important player throughout and continued to shape the USA's humanitarian face abroad.²⁹ But other earlier aid traditions, too, resurfaced: Near East Relief, for example, was a charity which took up where the predominantly evangelical relief provided for the Armenian Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s had left off.³⁰ This was complemented by the numerous Jewish relief activities engaged in by organisations such as the JDC in Eastern Europe and Palestine.³¹

Only in some exceptional cases were transport and other resources provided by the government. A good example was the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 in Tokyo/Yokohama, which attracted global attention for the sheer scale of the destruction it caused, and inspired relief campaigns in various countries. The disaster illustrated the tension typical of the 1920s post-Wilsonian era between the basic mood of anti-internationalism on the one hand, and the US government's desire on the other to use the relief activities of private groups both as an image-building

tool and to further particular American economic interests—including those of the American construction industry, which hoped to scoop lucrative contracts in reconstruction, and of Mid-West farmers, who recognised in humanitarian aid an opportunity to create a favourable climate for opening up new markets on which to get rid of their crop surpluses. The anti-Japanese feeling (and general xenophobia) which united a significant proportion of the American public and was apparent in published opinion thus contrasted the position taken by many in the US administration who saw the extensive private relief work that sprang up after the catastrophe as a welcome opportunity to improve both economic and diplomatic relationships with Japan.³² This example shows that humanitarian aid, even private aid, was, by this point in time, already part of the diplomatic repertoire.

As the interwar period progressed, open collaboration between aid agencies and government bodies became more and more difficult thanks to the neutrality legislation that began to be passed in the 1930s in response to the increasingly isolationist mood in America. The global economic crisis, which further limited the scope of international aid activities, only compounded the situation. Against this background, attempts to obtain government funding by Jewish groups such as the JDC, which despite the fall in people's willingness and ability to donate were still managing to raise huge sums of private money to help the Jews being persecuted in Europe, failed consistently right up until the Second World War. Neither was it possible to achieve an increase in the quotas which limited to a minimum the number of refugees from the growing territories under Nazi control which the USA was prepared to take—despite intensive lobbying by humanitarian groups. In comparison to the number of refugees taken in simultaneously by France, Britain and various other European countries, the number of those permitted to enter the USA was, initially at least, vanishingly low.³³

Similar mechanisms governed the USA's reaction to the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Though the sympathies of both the President and the majority of the American public clearly lay with the beleaguered Spanish Republic, the political mood in the country was predominantly anti-involvement in European conflicts. This, coupled with the need to pander to Catholic voters, put an official American relief commitment out of the question.³⁴ As the American Red Cross was also unwilling to become involved, partly because it was

busy running a campaign for the victims of the Japanese invasion of China, it was once again the Quakers who, for the entire duration of the conflict, provided relief on both sides of the frontline.³⁵ That they succeeded at all was only due to the AFSC's ostentatious neutrality, which set it apart in a highly polarised discussion in which supporters of the Republic and supporters of Franco were all doing their best to mobilise civil society.³⁶

The neutrality laws, which had basically prohibited any kind of aid to countries at war, were amended during the Spanish conflict in a way that would have far-reaching consequences for the future. In order to be able to better supervise private relief activities, the government instituted a registration and licensing procedure—a novelty in peacetime—which all aid agencies wishing to assist in Spain had to undergo.³⁷ As the first step towards the permanent integration of private humanitarian relief into official governmental structures, this formed not just a prelude to the period after America's entry into the war in 1941, but also anticipated the period after 1945, which would be marked by a strengthening of this trend.

INTERDEPENDENCIES AND INTERNATIONALISATION

The rise of American international relief obviously did not take place in isolation. Religious and secular aid agencies whose activities extended beyond national borders sprang up in other regions of the Western world too—including the British Empire, France, and Scandinavia. American relief agencies were connected to all these groups by a dense web of cooperation and competition—as can be seen again in the example of the Quakers and the American Red Cross. The American Quakers were part of a transnational religious network and had strong links to Friends in other countries, particularly England, while the ARC was part of the international Red Cross movement. These international links are often what highlights the specifically American features of US aid agencies. The ARC, for example, played a leading role in extending the activities of the Red Cross from just tending the victims of war to organising peacetime relief operations—a development which shortly after the First World War went down in the statutes of the International Red Cross as the “American Amendment.”³⁸ The move reflected the dilemma of the ARC's founding generation, which had to “sell” to the American public the benefits of an organisation which many on that side of the Atlantic

associated with European militarism and power politics.³⁹ The aid provided by the American Red Cross in the event of natural disasters, for instance, was in one respect a way of demonstrating the value of the organisation in times of peace. World War I saw the ARC's conclusive transformation into a powerful parastatal organisation managed by Wall Street Bankers, and in 1919, the ARC was the driving force behind the establishment of the International League of Red Cross Societies. This development was a manifestation both of the American wish to expand the scope of the Red Cross movement in general, and of the ARC's particular desire for the national societies to be granted more independence from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which was manned exclusively by Swiss citizens. Indeed, from a certain perspective, this could be interpreted as a quest for American supremacy. Although not all of its ambitious goals proved to be attainable and the ARC increasingly returned its focus to national issues during the post-Wilsonian era, it remained an important driver of change within the international Red Cross family.⁴⁰

As in the case of the ARC, the activities of the AFSC did not originate on a solely national level either. The American Quakers collaborated closely in their charitable work with Friends in Britain, who boasted an even longer tradition of foreign relief. Later, in particular after the major humanitarian campaigns which saw the establishment of new Quaker communities in Germany, France, and Austria, the circle of Quaker collaboration extended even beyond the Anglo-American context, even if British and American Friends continued to dominate it. Transatlantic organisational structures for the coordination of charitable work had existed even before the First World War, and these were now strengthened, for example by the establishment of the *Friends World Committee for Consultation*, whose headquarters were in London.⁴¹ The AFSC and its British equivalent, the Friends Service Council (FSC), collaborated during World War I, and on subsequent missions ranging from famine relief in Russia from 1921–1923 to relief for victims of the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless, the American Quakers' international relations were not free of tension either—tension which, as in the case of the ARC, stemmed in part from their very “Americanness.” In reports by American Friends on relief operations carried out in cooperation with British Quakers, points of conflict are put down by both sides to differing national styles.⁴² Although the AFSC always avoided excessively close ties with institutions of state, it did on occasion, willingly or not

(e.g., when it was acting as part of ARA or reporting to the ARC), serve as a representative of specifically American interests. Both during the campaign to feed Germany and Austria (former enemy states) following the First World War, and during the Spanish Civil War, the American government used the Quaker reputation for neutrality to provide strategic but politically explosive aid.⁴³ To some extent, the leaders of the AFSC actually perceived themselves as ambassadors of the USA (a role they were ascribed by both the government and by the beneficiaries of the aid they provided). Supplies handed out by the Quakers were often labelled with messages such as “A Greeting of Friendship from America, distributed by the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers),” just to make it clear where the goods in question came from. Equally, the stations set up to feed hungry children in Germany and Austria were hung with the American flag. Very little empirical research is available into this aspect of the work of American relief organisations, but even less has been done into other fields in which American voluntary agencies interacted with, influenced, and were influenced by humanitarian groups outside the USA. What research there is indicates that American humanitarian aid soon developed a specifically “American” profile characterised by the principles of scientific philanthropy (tried and tested at home), by an emphasis on helping others to help themselves, and by “calculated restraint.”⁴⁴ As Julia Irwin has recently shown, the expansion of the ARC during the First World War and the years following it can be interpreted as a projection into the wider world of the values of the progressive age.⁴⁵ However, this presupposes an exceptionalism with regard to American humanitarianism which it would be mistaken to take as absolute. A closer look reveals that American groups were indeed shaped and inspired by their collaboration with aid agencies abroad. A particularly influential organisation in this respect was the British children’s charity Save the Children, set up by Eglantyne Jebb and her sister Dorothy Buxton (a British Quaker). Save the Children pioneered campaigns that consciously featured children in a bid to attract donations.⁴⁶

Between the wars, private international relief efforts were complemented by two serious initiatives—both driven by Americans—aimed at creating intergovernmental structures for the organisation of humanitarian aid. The first was the establishment in 1919 of the International League of Red Cross Societies, whose main advocates were the ARC and its chairman (from 1917) Henry P. Davison. Davison’s idea was to make the League a kind of international coordination body for relief activities

which would function on the same level as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The plan failed for many reasons, including resistance from the ICRC, which was worried about losing its position within the Red Cross family, and the fact that very few governments were prepared to hand over a task of this magnitude to a voluntary organisation—especially not one which would clearly be dominated by the ARC, whose resources far exceeded those of any other country. Ultimately, following Davison's untimely death in 1921, upon which the management of the ARC was taken over by John Barton Payne and became infused with the anti-internationalist spirit of the post-Wilson era, even domestic support for the plans dwindled and disappeared (Herbert Hoover and the ARA had been sceptical about the idea from the beginning).⁴⁷ John Hutchinson, a leading expert on the history of the International Red Cross, published a largely ignored double article in the *International History Review* 2000/2001 which examined both this initiative and the second attempt to internationalise humanitarian relief during the period between the wars—a scheme known as the Ciraolo Project. Named after its initiator, the president of the Italian Red Cross, Giovanni Ciraolo, the project was an endeavour to establish under the auspices of the League of Nations an international organisation which would deliver assistance in the event of man-made or natural disasters worldwide. The financing of this organisation was to be based on the principle of mutual insurance.⁴⁸ This undertaking, too, would eventually fail, though it did bring about the establishment of an International Relief Union (IRU), which began operating in 1931. By this point, however, the original plan, which had been extremely ambitious (requiring governments to acknowledge, for instance, a “right to humanitarian aid”), had been diluted beyond recognition. Until its tacit dissolution during World War II, the IRU remained a paper tiger with no real influence. Tellingly, the project had been roundly rejected by the USA from the start. The official reason given for the ARC's and the American government's categorical refusal to be involved in any way whatsoever was that humanitarian relief belonged in private hands, not the hands of the state. Concerns were also raised that the principle of mutual insurance would, in practice, purely because of the uneven distribution of the probability of natural disasters across the globe, divide the world into net givers and net recipients of humanitarian relief—not to mention the fact that even if they paid into the IRU, countries like the USA would, for reasons of national prestige, be unable ever to accept its

help should a disaster occur on home soil. An equally important, though unofficial, argument was that relief provided by an international organisation would no longer be recognisable as aid from America. These discussions show very clearly the extent to which humanitarian aid had, by this point, despite all claims to the contrary, become a means of boosting the USA's national image abroad and, consequently, even an instrument of American foreign policy itself. The debates which the Ciraolo Project sparked from the beginning show that the same conclusion can be applied to Britain, France, Sweden, and, indeed, the vast majority of the governments involved in the undertaking.⁴⁹

Although the IRU must ultimately be described as a failure, the League of Nations itself was an important player, providing various critical impulses in the field of humanitarian aid. Initiatives to help Russian and Armenian refugees ended in the establishment of a High Commission for Refugees (later also known as the "Nansen Office" after its founding head), and subsequent initiatives tackled the refugee crises which arose as a result of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany and, later, the Spanish Civil War. The League of Nations looked to humanitarian NGOs—including those from the USA—in an advisory capacity in all these cases, and precisely because the USA wasn't a member, this collaboration was seen in American internationalist circles as an important bridge to the international community, the significance of which far outweighed the actual crisis in question.

The foundation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) during World War II had less to do with the doomed IRU and the League of Nations' refugee work than it did with the American experiences of World War I and its aftermath. The leading role played by the US in the establishment of UNRRA in 1943 is well documented. Both structurally and in terms of personnel, the organisation was the direct successor of a US government agency led by the former governor of New York, Herbert Lehman—the first director-general of UNRRA.⁵⁰ As recent research shows, the "internationalisation" of humanitarian aid (from Washington's point of view) at this point in time occurred for largely pragmatic reasons. The Roosevelt administration wanted to (a) spread the cost of international relief and (b) nip criticism of its political instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid in the bud, but without relinquishing its influence on the distribution of money and supplies. This was, not least, a consequence of the period from 1917–1923 during which the USA had singlehandedly funded a large proportion of

humanitarian relief in Europe while simultaneously having to fend off vehement calls from the other Allies for the joint administration of the aid, and coming in for fierce criticism abroad and from some circles at home for the perception that ARA catered solely to American interests. After America joined the war in 1941, “controlled internationalisation” was a way for the US government to prevent both of these conflicts from repeating themselves.⁵¹

CONCLUSION

The establishment of UNRRA marked an attempt to institutionalise an international regime of emergency relief headed by the USA. This setup did not last long—by 1949, the organisation had already become a victim of the looming Cold War. Nevertheless, World War II can still be regarded, from a long-term perspective, as a watershed in American international relief. Although responsibility for international emergency and disaster relief largely fell back into private hands, the phase after 1945 was marked both domestically and within the new UN system by stronger ties between governmental and private relief agencies. This is not to say that the work of private aid agencies had become obsolete during the UNRRA phase—indeed, the period had seen some important new players (the most prominent American one probably being CARE⁵²) come onto the scene. However, many governments, including that of the USA, now began to create permanent structures to institutionalise foreign relief as a relevant aspect of peacetime foreign policy, setting up official bodies to coordinate and, to a certain extent, fund private relief operations. These bodies would effectively commission licensed NGOs to carry out aid operations in the name of the state.⁵³ It is this last point in particular (along with aspects such as the diversification and, from the 1950s, the geographical shift in the focus of relief work to countries in the Global South, plus the stepwise transition to longer-term forms of aid) which make World War II and the years immediately afterwards appear as a turning point in the history of international relief. Otherwise it could be said that CARE in particular, as a consortium of numerous smaller relief organisations which, in the main, had been active between the wars too, simply reflected the wartime experience of many private groups that the most mutually advantageous way of conducting relief work was in cooperation with US government agencies. Having said this

it must not be forgotten—and this essay hopefully makes this clear—that the foundations of many postwar developments were laid in the interwar period, from the state's practice of licensing aid agencies (which had happened in World War I and under the neutrality legislation of the late 1930s), to the growing recognition by the government of humanitarian aid as a means of boosting the national image and of pursuing economic and foreign policy goals, to the first initiatives aimed at organising and institutionalising emergency and disaster relief on an international level. In many respects, the field of humanitarian relief thus seems to run counter to the conventional periodisation of American interwar history, as the phase between the wars can scarcely be neatly labelled as one of isolation and withdrawal. Here as on an international level, where despite the failure of major plans for the organisation of an international relief regime (Red Cross League, IRU) a high degree of transnational exchange and networking took place, further research is required before any conclusive statements can be made. Much remains to be investigated—the significance of the wide-ranging relief campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, as a seismograph of changing attitudes and world views within American civil society and as a medium through which the Americans perceived the world outside the USA, has hardly been acknowledged to date. Furthermore, deeper research into the history of humanitarian relief in the period between the wars would contribute to the debate on the “global USA” by permitting an analysis of the increase in the importance in global politics of American civil society organisations, and of their contribution to the emergence of global governance since the end of the nineteenth century, taking into account the complex web of relationships which connected them with other players on the national and international levels.

In this sense, and in the spirit of global history as “historiography with an awareness of global interrelationships,”⁵⁴ examining the international relief provided by American NGOs opens a window through which the period from 1919–1939 appears not just as “the phase between the wars.” Humanitarian aid is revealed as a mirror of and driving force behind global interactions and relationships which remained in place even throughout a period of increasing “de-globalisation.” It also presents itself as a field in which the tensions of the globalisation process—the clash between a universal humanitarian ethos and national particularism—become visible as they relate to American civil society.

NOTES

1. "Our Representatives in France", in AFSC-Bulletin No. 12a (1922): Library of the Religious Society of Friends in Britain, London.
2. The best overview is currently: Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity. A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Bertrand Taithe, "Horror, Abjection and Compassion: From Dunant to Compassion Fatigue," *New Formations* 62 (2007), pp. 123–36; a summary and synthesis of more recent research can be found in Eleanor Davey, "A History of the Humanitarian System. Western Origins and Foundations", in *HPG Working Papers* edited by HPG: HPG, June 2013.
3. The standard work on American foreign relief continues to be Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie, eds., *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
4. James W. Walker and Andrew S. Thompson, eds., *Critical Mass. The Emergence of Global Civil Society* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008).
5. From the wealth of literature on global governance in which the significance of non-governmental players is taken into account see Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
6. See in particular Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations." *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007).
7. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Daniel Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011).
8. Siehe Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1972); Landrum R. Bolling and Craig Smith, eds., *Private Foreign Aid. U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982); Helke Rausch, "US-Amerikanische 'Scientific Philanthropy' in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien zwischen den Weltkriegen", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 33, issue 1 (2007), pp. 73–98.

9. Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880–1930* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
10. Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations. America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006); Ian Tyrell, *Transnational Nation. United States History in Global Perspective since 1789* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
11. Editors' note: With respect to the reevaluation of the interwar years, especially within the USA and related to its international dynamics, see also David Ekbladh's chapter in this volume.
12. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 3–65.
13. Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Cultural and Economic Expansion 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 34.
14. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 9–137.
15. Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
16. For a general overview on the ARC, see Foster Rhea Dulles, *The American Red Cross: A History* (Washington, D.C.: Harper & Row, 1950); Patrick F. Gilbo, *The American Red Cross: The First Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
17. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 33f.
18. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 199ff.
19. George H. Nash, *The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914–1917* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983).
20. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 231–239.
21. Tammy Proctor, *Civilians in a World at War, 1914–1918* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), pp. 153–203.
22. Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
23. J. William Frost, “‘Our Deeds Carry Our Message’: The Early History of the American Friends Service Committee”, *Quaker History* 81, no. 1 (1992), pp. 1–51.
24. See John Ormerod Greenwood, *Quaker Encounters: Vol. 1: Friends and Relief* (York: William Sessions Ltd., 1975) (though the focus here is on the relief activities of British Quakers); Pa. John Forbes, *The Quaker Star under Seven Flags, 1917–1927* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962).

- For more on the individual campaigns: David McFadden and Claire Gorfinkel, *Constructive Spirit: Quakers in Revolutionary Russia* (Pasadena: Intentional Productions, 2004); for more on the Spanish Civil War: Farah Mendlesohn, *Quaker Relief Work in the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002); for more on aid to German refugees under the Nazi regime: Hans A. Schmitt, *Quakers and Nazis: Inner Light in Outer Darkness* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).
25. Quoted in Curti, *American Philanthropy*, p. 269.
 26. See *ibid*; for more on the case of Hungary see George W. Hopkins, "The Politics of Food: United States and Soviet Hungary, March–August, 1919", *Mid-America* Vol. 55 (1973), 245–270.
 27. Franz Adlgasser, *American Individualism Abroad: Herbert Hoover, die American Relief Administration und Österreich, 1919–1923* (Vienna: Ph.D. Thesis, Universität Salzburg, 1993).
 28. On the ARA's operations in the Soviet Union see Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Daniel Maul, "Appell an das Gewissen Europas—Fridtjof Nansen und die Russische Hungerhilfe 1921–1923", Themenportal Europäische Geschichte.
 29. Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, pp. 141–185; Dimitra Gianulli, "American Philanthropy in Action: The American Red Cross in Greece, 1918–1923", *East European Politics & Societies* 10, issue 1 (1995), pp. 108–132.
 30. Merrill D. Peterson, *Starving Armenians: Americans and the Armenian Genocide and After 1915–1930* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2004); Flora A. Keshgegian, "Starving Armenians: The Politics and Ideology of Humanitarian Aid in the First Decades of the Twentieth Century" in *Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Empathy*, eds. Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 140–155.
 31. Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper; a History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1929–1939* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974).
 32. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 118f.
 33. Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 52–85.
 34. Dominic Tierney, *FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
 35. Gabriel Pretus, *Humanitarian Relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013); Farah Mendlesohn,

- Quaker Relief Work in the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).
36. Daniel Maul, "The Politics of Neutrality: The American Friends Service Committee and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939", *European Review of History*, 23, no. 1–2 (2016), pp. 82–100.
 37. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 391ff.
 38. David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 13–51.
 39. Curti, *American Philanthropy*, pp. 99–138.
 40. See Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, pp. 141–185.
 41. Ormerod Greenwood, *Quaker Relief*, pp. 231f.
 42. See, for example, John Forbes, *The Quaker Star under Seven Flags*.
 43. To get around Congress's hostility to the feeding of "enemy children and adults" in Germany and Austria after WWI, Hoover transferred ARA's relief resources to the Quakers. The AFSC was commissioned to distribute official aid in the Spanish Civil War, too, as the Quakers were the only organisation whose neutrality was recognised by every side.
 44. See, for instance, David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2010), pp. 14–40; Friedman and McGarvie, eds., *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*.
 45. Irwin, *Making the World Safe*.
 46. Linda Mahood, *Feminism and Voluntary Action: Eglantyne Jebb and Save the Children Fund, 1876–1928* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); more specifically on the SCF's Russian campaign see Linda Mahood and Vic Satzewich, "The Save the Children Fund and the Russian Famine of 1921–23: Claims and Counter-Claims about Feeding 'Bolshevik' Children", *Journal of Historical Sociology* 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 55–83.
 47. Irwin, *Making the World Safe*. For a discussion of literature Johannes Paulmann, "Conjunctures in the History of Humanitarian Aid during the Twentieth Century", *Humanity* 4, no. 2 (2013), pp. 215–238. For the immediate post-war years Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism 1918–1924* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 48. John F. Hutchinson, "Disasters and the International Order: Earthquakes, Humanitarians, and the Ciraolo Project", *International History Review* 22, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1–36.
John F. Hutchinson, "Disasters and the International Order: The International Relief Union", *International History Review* 23, no. 2 (2001), pp. 253–298.
 49. Hutchinson, "The International Relief Union".

50. Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA", *Past and Present*, No. 1, Supplement 6 (2011), pp. 258–289.
51. See Ben Shephard, "Becoming Planning Minded: The Theory and Practice of Relief 1940–1945", *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 3 (2008), pp. 405–419.
52. Heike Wieters, *The NGO CARE and food aid from America, 1945–80. "Showered with Kindness"?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017). CARE (originally short for: *Cooperation for American Remittances to Europe*, now *Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere*) was founded in 1945 by a consortium of 22 American charities to centrally coordinate private relief activities in war-torn Europe.
53. Rachel McCleary, *Global Compassion. Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
54. Andreas Eckert and Sebastian Conrad, eds., *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag, 2007), p. 27.

Depression Development: The Interwar Origins of a Global US Modernization Agenda

David Ekbladh

Modernization has become an integral means to understand the international history of the Cold War world.¹ Not only does it help explain the extent and depth of the ideological struggle between the poles of liberal capitalism and state communism; it also provides a means to more fully explore the global and invasive impacts of the strategies pursued by each side. Beyond this, it offers a means to examine the role and agency of the “Third World” nations who were the targets of this process in their reactions, negotiations, resistance, and desires for development that provides a new perspective on the global struggle.²

But as much as this focus on the Cold War illuminates, it obscures. Much of the scholarship on the topic does not stray beyond the bipolar conflict. But the concept of development (of which modernization is a subset) and its resonance on the world scene obviously has a longer history. As a term, modernization can be traced to the eighteenth century, and vital parts of its intellectual pedigree can be found in the nineteenth

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century. Auguste Comte articulated a concept of development by which the rush of industrialization could be guided to produce positive progress.³ The “civilizing mission” that justified the European, American, and Japanese colonial projects that straddled the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was supremely developmental. Imperial projects could be justified on the basis of technological superiority and the promise of improvement for those peoples made subjects.⁴ Broad reform movements, particularly the somewhat amorphous world of international progressivism, link these external civilizing urges to programs, often coded as purely domestic, about “reconstructing” societies to face the pressing demands of modern life.⁵

Accordingly there is no single starting point for the powerful transnational force of development. However, there are moments when the crystallization of particular approaches for influential programs of development emerged. For the modernization that would be so instrumental to the global strategy of the United States during the middle decades of this moment would not come during the Cold War but before, during the crisis brought by the worldwide Depression and the chronic international upheaval of the 1930s.⁶

The Depression closed a decade of liberal ascendance internationally. After World War I, a menagerie of new parliamentary states appeared in East and Central Europe, Japan enjoyed a liberal interlude, and the international economy was shaped by a capitalism dominated by laissez-faire principles. So the speed with which the global capitalist economy unraveled and inability of liberal governments to contain the aftershocks raised sudden and acute questions. Edmund Wilson felt the ideological nadir in 1931, “What we have lost...not merely our way in the economic labyrinth but our conviction of the value of what we are doing.”⁷ Reinhold Niebuhr, at the emergency’s trough, noted the inability of a “senile” system to contend with the difficulties besetting a modern, integrated, and mechanized world, demonstrating that, “Western society is obviously in the process of disintegration.” In 1933, Harold Laski saw a globe despoiled, breeding “a temper of feverish haste” where “the spirit that denies has triumphed over the spirit which affirms.” Noting that this was reminiscent of other revolutionary moments in history, he appreciated the temptations of other systems. He felt “the only answer capitalism can make to the challenge... is... proof that material benefits it can secure are definitively greater than those of an alternative system.”⁸

Liberals believed the technological wonders of an interconnected world economy—air travel, mass communication, and industrial production—ushered in by science and engineering and their promise for general prosperity were being squandered by outmoded politics. For one of the most devout, Raymond Fosdick, traditional liberalism seemed devoid of the means to contain the hazards of industrial society that was, by its nature, globally interdependent. This failure left “the world...very sick.”⁹ Free market capitalism, extolled only years before as the surest means to progress, was questioned by voices, “on all sides of the political frontier.” Nationally focused economic policies quickly came to be seen as wrongheaded and inefficient, a damning perception among more technologically minded progressives.¹⁰ For others, liberal capitalism’s exploitative and wasteful characteristics were simply aggravated by the crisis. Governance of modernity seemed beyond the capacity of liberalism. This view did more than challenge specific policies or particular governments. It struck at the basic, systemic ideas behind liberal democracy and capitalism as the means to organize societies.¹¹ In a true test of its ability, universal liberalism appeared to have universally failed.

The search for conviction was a continual part of the crisis for liberals. The imperatives of industrial society brought rolling changes to liberalism, but the Depression demanded reformers stand at the forge and recast the intellectual bases of their worldview.¹² Even liberal titan John Dewey, who preferred to keep his distance from both the New Deal and communism, was impelled to reconstruct an ideology dismissed as a “mealy-mouthed...milk and water doctrine.” Massaging the heart of his faith, Dewey asserted that liberalism could be a radical doctrine for human development rather than a tattered cloak for laissez-faire capitalism. Through a more socialized economic life (a recurring theme for Dewey), liberalism could provide the means for all individuals to develop their full potential. No academic enterprise, his intervention was an explicit attempt to craft a “fighting faith” to display that liberalism remained relevant to global debates on the shape of modernity. Ignoring liberalism—which many appeared ready to do—could “narrow the issue for the future to a struggle between Fascism and Communism” and bring “catastrophe.”¹³

Dewey’s comment acknowledged an unforgiving reality: domestic debates were inextricably bound to the international fate of liberal ideas. Those liberal ideas, in turn, were in a fierce competition with other ideological systems that had not only arrayed themselves against liberalism

but offered what at the time seemed both compelling visions and actual mechanisms to develop productive modern societies. Internationalists who had invested heavily in the construction of a liberal order in the 1920s were dumbstruck by the potent stew of chauvinistic nationalism, economic exclusion, and bleak racism stirred by the Depression. This compelled internationalists of all stripes to reformulate their own views and programs to fit within an altered world. A spectrum of liberals in the United States and abroad was waking to the new realities in international life of the rise of authoritarian regimes. As expansionist policies of Japan, Italy, and Germany strained the international system, the statism, police powers, and cults of personality credited to these regimes came to be seen as diametrically opposed to the core values of the United States. The ideologies were no longer a critique or a diplomatic nuisance but as an existential threat to liberalism.¹⁴

Symptomatic of this shift were efforts begun in 1936 by the Council of Foreign Relations, an epicenter of liberal internationalism, to study the origins and operation of what were initially termed “dictator states.” This taxonomy included fascist Germany and Italy, as well as the USSR.¹⁵ It was assumed that this new and rapidly spreading form of political and social organization was an established fact in the global body politic. Opinion makers saw fascist and communist states linked by a common set of political, economic, and social structures leading to disturbingly similar behavior domestically, despite some different international interests.¹⁶

A new term for these states gained currency: “totalitarian.” Initially used by Italian fascists in the 1920s to describe their political and social worldview, the term found quick, if vague, application to describe the ideologies challenging liberalism in the 1930s. By the end of the decade the major foundations, unsettled by the totalitarians, were shepherding public opinion toward global engagement.¹⁷ Rockefeller, as part of this effort, began research programs to grasp, “the fundamental challenge which they represent.”¹⁸ Motivating these actions was an assumption that all societies carried the latent bacillus for totalitarianism easily jarred to virulence by forces of modernity. This was not alien (indeed, it was foundational) to similar outlooks during the Cold War.¹⁹ Economic and social development over the preceding century had produced democratic, liberal, and individualist revolutions at some points and authoritarian regimes. These trends needed to be mapped by the social sciences so that they could be understood and confronted. Such a view meshed

with a belief that development, impregnated with liberal concepts, could inoculate societies, assuring the disease need never arise.²⁰

The fear of total state power abroad ran parallel to fears of the concentration of government power at home. Both assumed a corrosive impact on American life. On the international front in the later 1930s, political scientist Harold Lasswell effectively articulated an idea that illiberal fragmentation brought conditions where martial elites gained control of the levers of power, skewing societies. The argument was eventually extended to a fear that such devolution abroad might force the United States itself to adopt the domestic regimentation of its opponents to combat their influence.²¹ During World War I, Woodrow Wilson and others had expressed similar fears that degenerative effects of German militarism and Bolshevism globally could alter American society domestically. Their answer had been an attempt to refashion international affairs to ensure US national security.²² Elements of this formulation were in the calculations of the 1930s. However, the totalitarians were considered unique to human history and, because they appeared when modern societies were in crisis, were likely to remain a persistent concern in international politics. If these ideas were allowed to advance unchecked abroad, an unnatural “garrison state” would result at home. This formulation worked into the marrow of American geopolitical thinking in the late 1930s and endured through the Cold War.²³

Facing totalitarianism was more than an intellectual exercise. Historians have traced the critical shift in how liberals internationally recognized the threat from the newly defined “totalitarian” states in the late 1930s.²⁴ A commitment to international development was part of a new US globalism and was used to contain dangerous forces loose in the world. In the mid-1930s liberals internationally saw nationalistic economic policies as corroding the structure of international life. For increasing numbers of American elites, the peril was not abstract. The breakdown of international trade, exchange, and agreements negatively affected the United States itself. Internationalists from Henry Wallace to the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations argued that a fractured world economy offered little hope for prosperity through revived and integrated international trade. It was a formulation that eventually won over significant sectors of opinion. By 1936 Roosevelt was repeating such formulations, asserting, “a dark modern world faces wars between conflicting economic and political fanaticisms,” which was logical, as “without...liberal international trade, war is a natural sequence.”²⁵

Totalitarian states, organized around an unholy trinity of unalloyed statism, venomous nationalism, and stern autarky, came to play the villains in this formulation. Before the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, internationalists were articulating a need to take concerted action to promote and protect an integrated international economy dominated by liberal principles. It was Eugene Staley, a Tufts University economist with ties to the Council on Foreign Relations, who best projected American fears and the strategic need for international development in the critical years between 1937 and 1941.

Staley's liberal internationalism was at his core. His 1923 undergraduate essay on Allied war debts, written at Hastings College in Nebraska, won a prize from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His admiration for Beatrice and Sidney Webb and the influence of John Dewey suffused his doctoral work at the University of Chicago, where Staley sought to find a way to employ his discipline as a means to solve social problems.²⁶ These views were enhanced by an international education. Like so many internationalists and academics (including an influential cadre of economists), Staley was influenced by close contact with the international institutions in Geneva that had grown up around the League of Nations. In 1935, before taking a teaching position at the Fletcher School of Tufts University, he studied at the Graduate Institute of International Studies from which he toured Europe—including the Soviet Union—and saw firsthand a world in transition.²⁷

In Geneva, an engaged person like Staley could see how the transnational concept of development could be broken down by both techniques and the ideologies that might govern how they were applied. During the 1930s, the League sent several missions to offer advice on various topics ranging from agricultural reform to intellectual cooperation. The advisors on these missions revealed the changes coming to the concept of development. The League appreciated this, even advertising this technical assistance in an exhibit at their Pavilion at the 1939 New York World's Fair as "A New Method."²⁸ The programs were carried out with a respect to the sovereignty of non-Western states that pointed to a characteristic that would shape postwar development programs. Nevertheless, the experts sent by the League reflect how ideologies imprint on development strategies. They were certain that the "undeveloped, ill-educated, and poverty ridden masses in less fortunate countries," had outlooks that were "resigned and apathetic" that left them "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of

the modern world.” Modern technology and intellectual trends were seen as the forces that were reshaping the globe and were the means to shake less developed peoples from their “backwards” state. Revealingly, perspectives some technocrats held were themselves shaped by ideologies that were transforming international affairs in the period. English technicians saw their work in a liberal colonial framework. Other reforms offered by European advisers were inspired by Social Democratic ideas. An Italian working for the League tried to export a vision of Fascist modernity. He used Mussolini’s ambitious Agro Pontino as a template for the programs he suggested for the Chinese. The League’s varied operations in China preview the role that international institutions would play on the issue following World War II. But they also reveal that ideological differences and conflict that would mark the application of development over the coming decades were already in operation.²⁹

This cosmopolitan exposure sited Staley’s in a larger world of development that went far beyond the United States. That figures and forces there were connecting types of international development to global strategy demonstrates that they were part of a larger global dialogue on the issue that had many nodes. Emphasis on rural “reconstruction” in the interwar period that embraced an expansive view that the village was a critical site for the transformation to modern life was hardly limited to proponents of Fascist Italy’s Agro Pontino.³⁰ This view enlisted adherents on every continent ranging from imperial officials to anti-colonial nationalists.³¹ The commitments of reformers and modernizers did presume that far-reaching changes could be connected to grander schemes. In this era, massive technological and infrastructure programs meant to bolster national and regional development became *de rigueur* to demonstrate state legitimacy and power. The Soviet Union, in particular, claimed to show that the power to foster industrial modernity rapidly was possible under communist regimes. With the construction of massive multipurpose water control projects like the Dnieprostroi or the conjuring of the steel city of Magnitogorsk from the earth behind the Urals, it offered powerful proofs for its case. These demonstrated that statist and autarkic policies could work, even thrive, in diverse environments. Crucially too, it suggested that they were transferrable to other parts of the world that might be considered “backward.” It was all particularly dangerous in a time when liberal capitalist states seemed staggered by the world economic crisis that other types of systems, particularly those labeled as totalitarian, could more effectively deliver the benefits of modern life.

The intensity and volume of this transnational dialogue on development was intensified by the fact its power could be harnessed by variety of ideological movements for their own ends. The campaign to construct Magnitogorsk never shrunk from the politics that surrounded and drove its construction. It was a state socialist project meant to convert its inhabitants into good communist citizens.³² This sets the period apart and explains the urgency of thinkers in the US and why their concept of development took on a global cast that was to be extended to far reaches of the world. Their ideas and policies were always part of a larger transnational competition on the question of development; a competition that had a direct relevance to the security of the United States itself.

As the 1930s degenerated into continuous crisis, Staley engaged a cross-section of international issues, proffering analysis that echoed later debates over globalization. He adhered to a belief held by so many of his contemporaries, who saw technology dramatically altering all aspects of life as it shrank distances and bound the world tightly together.³³ He repeated internationalist mantras that such integration demanded the free flow of raw materials, capital, people, and knowledge. Those who impaired the normal flows of raw materials, capital, and the other lifeblood of the international economy were standing in the way of progress and social welfare for all. Like debris blocking a rushing river, localist and nationalist economic policies disrupted the natural flow of the global economy. In the end, economic nationalists were fighting the forces of history. But they were more than inconvenient; they were potentially mortal for liberal societies. If such vices entrenched themselves in international life, the fragmentation already wrought by the Depression would become permanent.³⁴

Other dangers loomed. Staley joined other prominent internationalists involved in the peace movement in calls for greater international cooperation. But events were accelerating, rushing the world into what Staley feared would be an "era of totalitarian war." A trend toward the establishment of "power economy," where the ultimate goal was the expansion of military might, was eroding commitment to the "welfare economy" focused on raising living standards for the population as a whole. International politics and trade were being skewed by aggressive policies, incited by economic crisis but increasingly becoming naked quests for national power. While nationalistic policies of the United States and others were a problem, the search for autarky by totalitarian states was cause for alarm. In the arenas of international trade and economic

development, the threat to the United States of such “national localism” was acute. Aggressive foreign policies and barriers thrown up by nationalistic economic programs emerging from polities corrupted by totalitarian ideologies had global impacts. This opinion was integral to a new geopolitical view based on the maintenance of a global system hospitable to American values as imperative to long-term security. As it had for so many other liberals, the shadow of the “garrison state” had darkened Staley’s gaze. Failure to bend the world to liberal principles would eventually force the United States the down the road to regimented social and political life in order to survive in an ideologically inhospitable world.³⁵

With the stakes so high, history needed a push. With nations increasingly caught up in nationalistic “war fever,” misdirecting resources to military spending instead of global trade and the general welfare assumed to flow from it, international cooperation had to be renewed. However, this commitment required the cultivation of agreements and institutions as well as new capacities to guide growth. Capital and raw materials were spread unevenly across the globe, and the requirement that they move freely and easily could not be guaranteed in the darkening world of the 1930s. This movement was vital if a peaceful, healthy international economy was to be maintained. Cooperation of this sort had the added benefit of constructing a foundation for collective security against totalitarian aggression.³⁶

Staley’s proposal to solve this problem was a comprehensive program of liberal international development in a form recognizable today. It presupposed systematic intervention in poorer areas of the globe to guide economic and social change. Through various means, technical knowledge would be injected into poorer areas of the globe to smooth the way for freer movement of raw materials and commerce, assuring the stability of an open, liberal world order. Planning, made safe for free society, would make such expansion possible. Staley believed any effort required cooperation across a set of institutions.³⁷ Internationally, it was the task of governments as well as voluntary and international groups, including the League of Nations, to increase the capacities of the peoples of poorer, often colonial, nations. Discussing his ideas, Staley chose not to dwell on the contradictions emerging from colonial development. Like many countries predisposed to development, China drew his attention. It could be offered as a compelling case study, assailed as it was by colonial powers but nominally independent and a major international flash-point. It became his example of how international development might be conducted. It was already being offered technical aid by the League

(by the end of the 1930s it was coordinating its work in public health with US government efforts) and leading American nongovernmental groups such as the Rockefeller Foundation.³⁸ If China received technical assistance on liberal terms that fit its perceived needs, it could eventually become a productive member of a liberal international economy.³⁹

Education in the technical arts would eventually unite a rank of modern, technologically minded persons with the capital that would foster growth. Staley shared a view common internationally, that development was one interconnected process linking the economic and the social. "Bringing roads and schools and technical institutes and machinery to China and India and Borneo" would create a "self-reliant generation...equipped with modern tools for meeting their own needs and for exchanging with other peoples." There was a further reason to act. If liberal forces did not lead such development, these areas of the globe would fall under the sway of "nationalistic imperialisms." Following these false prophets to the future would bring revolution and war that would not only harm peoples in the underdeveloped nations but, perhaps more importantly, continue dislocation within the international economy. According to Staley, the United States had to be the engine of history and drive the process. The "economic millennium," Staley scolded, "will not be brought about by hoping for it." American leadership was an acknowledgment of its considerable economic and technical resources. It also reflected a bleak understanding that if the United States did not assume the role, someone else—whose goals were deemed less savory—would do it. By default, global leadership and specifically command of world development lay in the hands of the United States.⁴⁰

Again, Staley's ideas were not divorced from other development ideas and agendas operating at the same time globally. The instrumental nature of educational and social change to the process were not at all dissimilar to those that had gained currency in the French and British empires following World War I. In order to increase economic productivity and safeguard their respective imperial systems from unrest, colonial authorities attempted to reconfigure their African subjects into their vision of "industrial man."⁴¹ Reshaping individuals to fit modern life demanded changes in their outlooks and daily life. However, it was hardly a vision restricted to the fevered imaginations of American liberals. Creating variations of the "new man" was a preoccupation for contemporary colonial, communist, and fascist regimes as well. As new methods were embraced, the conceptualization and content of

“reconstruction” changed. Executors of programs were increasingly comfortable with planning in the mix. All assumed that modern industrial technologies would be part of the modernization equation. The extent of development shifted as projects were increasingly conceived as large-scale, embracing wide regions and large populations.

As international affairs became more contentious after the outbreak of war in Europe, non-interventionists spoke of securing the United States by fortifying the Western Hemisphere. Interventionist liberals undermined these arguments by defining the sphere necessary for the defense of the United States as global rather than regional. One of the most effective voices was Staley's. He energetically joined the acrimonious debates through newspapers, radio, and a host of public lectures in the years before the US entry to the war. He drubbed a leading anti-interventionist, Charles Lindberg, as a confused dupe of Hitler's divide-and-conquer strategy.⁴² In an influential article in *Foreign Affairs*, Staley unraveled the limited, defensive formulations advocated by the likes of Charles Beard and Jerome Frank.⁴³ Dissenters could not see the “world was round.” Secure continents were now “myths,” as new technologies, particularly aircraft, made hemispheric defense obsolete. Blindness to totalitarian (which by the beginning of the 1940s effectively meant German) success voided assurances that the economic, political, and social system of the United States could survive in one corner of the globe. Physical realities of geography could not be altered but “human meanings” given to those elements, could “change.” Technologies rendering distance moot and forcing interdependence among nations at the same time sired the distortions of totalitarianism, creating a situation that demanded the United States take the reins of global leadership to secure itself. It was one element of a foreign policy accord bridging left and right, solidifying support for intervention, even among those who had no great affection for Roosevelt or the New Deal. In fact, this general strategic formulation with its imperative of US global leadership found its way into Henry Luce's famous essay, “The American Century,” in 1941.⁴⁴ Staley's views matured in the international discussion in which the subfield of development economics was rising. They were a remarkably cohesive expression of ideas that would predominate post-war. Indeed, Staley has been credited for loading “international development” with its current meaning.⁴⁵

Staley was hardly alone in his ambitions. The concern about development in what might be called the “periphery” increasingly found its

way into high-level and official thinking about the basic shape of postwar world even before the United States was in the conflict. A basic strategy for global development began to emerge as new concepts were sorted out on the ground. The sort of global vision of development in which Staley had trafficked became common currency in policy discussion. A mantra emerged in the call to modernize the periphery as a means to support a revived world economy built to liberal specifications. Many internationalists, spanning an embattled Atlantic, turned to the TVA as a mechanism to carry forward the development of “backward” areas that was one of the “economic essentials of durable peace.” The TVA idea was readied for programs in Africa, Asia, and South America. At a 1940 conference convened by the influential World Peace Foundation, leading figures in international relations promised war-torn China a “TVA for the Yangtze Valley” as part of a general program to revitalize a post-war liberal order.⁴⁶ This thinking went well beyond academics. The formulation went beyond simply the image of the TVA. Supporters saw state-led mechanisms as the means to cultivate profound change across much of the world. In 1941 former member of Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust” (he had made the initial proposal for that aid to domestic development the Federal Housing Authority) and leading international economist Winfield Riefler proposed a grand vision of an “International Development Authority” that would use surpluses to foster investment with the goal of enlarging and extending the capacities of “underdeveloped” countries on the periphery.⁴⁷ The proposal caught the attention of key figures in the administration including Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and Vice President Henry Wallace. Wallace, a fan of the TVA and of raised standards of living as the bread and butter of the “century of the common man,” was partial to such ideas. Of course, none of these plans were implemented in the forms their backers proposed. Nevertheless, these cases show that issues were widely and regularly discussed. International development to promote modern societies and modern people had become a staple means to attach and transform the countries to play a constructive role in a liberal world order that was to be led by the United States.

Active thought was being put into the structures and institutions that might guide various parts of the globe into a more modern position in the world economy well before Truman took office; indeed before the World Bank and other organizations central to the postwar settlement and later vested with a development mission were fully conceptualized.

This historically specific variant of international development, which took cues and justification from the experience of the United States, had a clear strategic rationale within a new American globalism. It was to assure and extend the sphere of liberal life against ideological challengers whose social and economic organization was corrosive to liberalism. Even with its international and private components, the role of the United States to push the whole program forward was seen as indispensable. These formulations easily flowed into global reconstruction activity during and after World War II.

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PART II

Imperialism(s) and International
Institutions: the Aftermath of World War II

Population, Geopolitics and International Organizations in the Mid Twentieth Century

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In May 2006 the United Nations Population Fund described itself as “an international development agency that promotes the right of every woman, man and child to enjoy a life of health and equal opportunity. UNFPA supports countries in using population data for policies and programmes to reduce poverty and to ensure that every pregnancy is wanted, every birth is safe, every young person is free of HIV/AIDS, and every girl and woman is treated with dignity and respect.” Its summary slogan currently runs: “UNFPA—because everyone counts.”¹ In many ways, this mission statement captures commonsense expectations of what “population” should mean for an international agency of the UN: the idea and ideal of women’s individualized choice over pregnancy and reproduction and the related aspiration of personal health. Scholars of feminism will immediately recognize the terms of population

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as presented here: they represent the eventual success of a particular line of twentieth-century feminist thought on population, reproduction, and the individual.²

Historians, too, have focused on the politics of sex, gender, and reproduction in assessing population as an international and intergovernmental issue, and occasionally as a world issue.³ This is a legacy not only of the substantive history itself, but also of the joint influence of feminist and Foucauldian scholarship on the history of sexuality and governance. However, to expect the history of the issue of population to be solely or even primarily about reproduction and individual health is to miss entirely other lines of thought within which population, and in particular world population, came to be a problem for international organizations of the twentieth century. These developed more from a political economy tradition than a feminist or human rights tradition (although these are obviously linked in certain ways) in which the population problem concerned land, productivity, and food. Indeed, a trace of neo-Malthusian economics and social theory lingers in the UNFPA's "reduction of poverty" aim, ambiguously situated between individual and family poverty on the one hand and aggregate economies of nations on the other.

In recent articles I have elaborated the spatial and geographic framework within which the economics of population was understood by experts in the interwar period. For many, the problem was primarily one of density and of unequal population distribution not only within but between nations and regions. A solution, then, was the international redistribution of people. And so the problematization of population often raised questions about and plans for migration, colonial expansion of territory, and the properties of land and soil: in other words, geopolitics. Population was thus the business of experts in geography, international relations, agriculture, and horticulture as well as experts in demography and biology and policy makers or lobbyists on pronatalism or birth control.⁴

In this article I show how the population problem was squarely a geopolitical one specifically for sections of the late League of Nations and the early United Nations (UN). I discuss two institutional occasions on which population came onto the agenda of the international organizations. It did so as a spatial and security problem: that is, on quite different terms to the current UNFPA's self-description. The first case is a series of meetings held by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (IIIC), resulting in the document *Peaceful Change* (1937).

The second case occurred in the early years of UNESCO, when Julian Huxley (1887–1975) and others attempted to raise population as a major world issue, drawing in part on the *Peaceful Change* ideas. There is certainly a history here of the connectedness of biopolitics with geopolitics: sex, gender, and reproduction are always implicated in any comprehension of population, and this was not lost on Huxley, to name but one population philosopher. Yet to understand the long twentieth-century history of the population problem as inevitably leading to the UNFPA version—a conflated feminist/health/development idea—is to sidestep entirely analysis of what the problem looked like to many earlier agencies and actors. While the geopolitical view of the population issue was common across many sections and agencies of both the League and the early UN (for example, the Economics Section of the League, and later the Food and Agriculture Organization), I have selected here the Paris-based IIIC and its postwar development as UNESCO to show the continuity of ideas over World War II, in a historiography typically committed to radical breaks from 1945. The interwar experts and the first generation of postwar experts were not infrequently the same people, and for them the population problem was geopolitical, not biopolitical, in the first instance.⁵

POPULATION, THE LEAGUE, AND THE UN: A TWENTIETH-CENTURY MAP

The history of how the League and the UN took up the complicated social, economic, biological, and intensely political question of population is best set out, to date, in the work of Symonds and Carder. This book is a careful empirical account from the earliest League avoidance of the birth control issue to the eventual establishment of UNFPA in 1969.⁶ The institutional story they trace is a complex one, for various assemblies, sections, and specialized agencies over several generations were constantly ducking and weaving the fertility limitation aspects while squarely addressing the security and migration aspects of the population problem.

The League of Nations neither endorsed birth control nor offered information on it. First, this was because contraceptive practice itself, as well as information on it, held a controversial legal and ethical status in almost all nations in the 1920s and 1930s. Second, many pronatalist

programs were framed and implemented in nationalist terms, which the League secretariat felt it could not undermine. And third, there were major socialist and communist objections to the neo-Malthusian economic theory driving many arguments for birth control; the latter saw population increase as the main cause of poverty and correspondingly sought population reduction as a key economic intervention. The Health Section of the League came closest to recommending policy on birth control information in a 1931 "Report on Maternal Welfare," headed by Dame Janet Campbell, but this was stepped on quickly by member states in the assembly, not to mention Catholic convert Sir Eric Drummond, director-general of the League.⁷ There was, however, marked private interest in birth control on the part of significant League individuals, understood both as a feminist issue (along the lines of Margaret Sanger) and as an economic issue (along the lines of J.M. Keynes).⁸ Yet to limit understanding of population to the reproductive question of birth control is to miss other modes in which it was, in fact, directly addressed by the League and subsequently by the UN.

Under the Economics Section and its various incarnations, the International Labour Organization and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, which I focus on below, population was discussed as a question of density, overpopulation, and underpopulation, and of the differential densities between nations. "Density ratios" were critical because of the firm connection so often drawn between population, war, and peace. For many contemporaries in the international arena, then, the population issue was first and foremost a security issue: population issues caused war; solving population issues avoided war. At the 1937 assembly, the Polish delegate spoke on the need to return to pre-1914 "freedom of movement" as a way to equalize this differential density. This prompted a successful proposal that a League committee "study demographic problems in their international aspects."⁹ But, wary of German, Italian, and Japanese territorial expansion in the 1930s, the assembly stated that "solutions other than territorial solutions were to be preferred."¹⁰ The resulting committee was established in January 1939 within Alexander Loveday's Economic Section, and was chaired by the Liverpool social scientist Alexander Carr-Saunders. The terms were directed, interestingly, both at overpopulation and depopulation and were squarely geographic and geopolitical in nature, including the long-standing question of underutilized land. In devising the plan of study,

Loveday and his staff tellingly conceptualized “people” as one side of the equation and “area” as the other. They suggested:

On the population side the following are of significance: total population; total agricultural population; total number of men gainfully occupied in agriculture.

On the area side the following is significant: total area (= land + inland water areas); total land (i.e., land exploited + land not exploited); land used for agriculture and forestry; land used for agriculture (i.e., arable land + permanent meadow and pasture + land for growing trees and shrubs).¹¹

The world distribution of arable land was constantly at issue: where land was underutilized, where land could be cultivated more intensively, and which nations needed arable land and what right they had to claim land outside their existing borders.¹² For Loveday’s section, this people-area-use triad was how proper density ratios could be calculated.

This League committee, created on the cusp of war, was the institutional origin of later UN population offices and projects. Critically, it transferred its business during the war to the Princeton Office of Population Research, under US demographer Frank Notestein. An important series of demographic studies was produced.¹³ And it was essentially this group—and its close intellectual and institutional networks with the juggernaut of US demography¹⁴—that formed the UN’s new Population Division, as part of the Department of Social Affairs, in 1946. In wartime and the immediate postwar years, then, the League programs dovetailed with existing US programs and research at Princeton, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Milbank Memorial Fund, and morphed into the UN Population Division. Under Notestein, the division initially focused on the compiling and processing of population data rather than on implementation or advocacy of population reduction,¹⁵ and consequently experienced difficulty distinguishing itself from the Statistical Commission (under the Economic Affairs Department). Where the division did comment on population policy, it was in terms of space and distribution. Frank Notestein, for example, continued the longstanding tradition of European and British theorizing on “Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure,” as one 1944 paper was titled.¹⁶

Nonetheless, the vast amount of demographic information collected by the Population Division and the circulation of data on increasing rates of world population growth formed an increasingly important base from which national arguments for policy and action on population reduction, as well as technical assistance, were to gain authority and urgency. Over time, and as the Cold War progressed, the Population Division itself began to spin the world population issue in the direction of US foreign policies. Several generations of thinking on war, population pressure, and pacifism in relation to World Wars I and II began to take a new shape in the Cold War with US foreign policy links between population reduction, economic development, and anticommunism.¹⁷

Over the late 1940s and 1950s, the specialized agencies of the UN also addressed population in fits and starts. Drawing directly from the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation's *Peaceful Change* reports, Huxley's vision as first director-general of UNESCO included raising awareness of exponential world population increase. The new Food and Agriculture Organization also became involved, initially sharing Huxley's vision under its director-general, John Boyd-Orr (1880–1971). Moreover, between about 1948 and 1952, member states and observers at the World Health Assembly, as well as personnel within the World Health Organization, attempted to have family planning incorporated as part of WHO business.¹⁸ In a strange alliance, the Vatican and Roman Catholic-dominated countries on the one hand and communist delegates on the other heatedly objected to this aspect of population, and it was resolved at the 1952 World Health Assembly that the WHO should not have any mandate to implement or recommend birth control or family planning measures.

It was not until 1968 that the World Health Assembly endorsed family planning as a basic component of primary health care.¹⁹ In that same year, UNESCO adopted a resolution put forward by the Swedish delegation that the agency "should promote a better understanding of the serious responsibilities which population growth imposes on individuals, nations and the whole international community."²⁰ And yet, when the UN secretary-general established the Trust Fund for Population Activities in 1967, the old idea of the training of demographers again received more emphasis than family planning. Under pressure from the US government as well as John D. Rockefeller III, however, including financial pressure of funds tied to family planning, most of the agencies (WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, ILO, FAO, and UNESCO, as well as

the World Bank and from 1969 the UNFPA) were to take on distinctive roles in world population planning, policy, and technical assistance on contraception.

The population question cut across the UN along other axes as well: there were, for example, critical regional interests in population policy. Pressed by India, Indonesia, and Ceylon and supported by the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) took the step of endorsing practice and policy recommendation, not just theory and data on population, as the UN's business. This led to the Asian Population Conference of 1963 in New Delhi unanimously recommending that regional governments seek practical assistance and action programs from the agencies, thereby contributing to economic development.²¹ By 1965 the UN Technical Assistance Board approved a request from the Indian government to review its family planning program. The Commission on the Status of Women weighed in, arguing for information to be given to married couples and for the study of connections between family planning and the improving status of women.²² The reconfiguration of the problem of population, spurred by UN-endorsed World Population Conferences in 1954 and 1965, was clearly evident by the early 1970s. For example the three symposia leading up to the 1974 World Population Conference were the Symposium on Population and Human Rights, the Symposium on Population and Development, and the Symposium on Population and Environment. A shift away from the security, migration, and land nexus was clearly discernible. Organizers by this point articulated the population issue thus: "it will be important to define and clarify the specific human rights which any population policy should take into account in connexion with the major demographic variables (fertility, mortality, migration) and given the conflicts which arise between individual and family rights and those of the community and mankind at large."²³ In the early 1970s, leading up to the 1974 World Population Conference (and Year), International Women's Year (1975), and the UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), the idea of population came to be strongly shaped by feminist agendas and ambitions, and by new fields for thinking about human rights in terms of gender and development. New commissions such as the Commission on the Status of Women became critical,²⁴ and a project on the status of women and family planning aimed to "strengthen the population program by broadening the scope of its knowledge on the human rights aspect of population, so as to enable

these aspects to be taken fully into account in the development of population policy and family planning programs.”²⁵

While it is often recognized that by the 1970s a human rights and feminist-oriented understanding of population-as-reproductive-politics had become dominant, just what version of the population problem was displaced is far less clear. The following sections offer two cases from earlier generations where population was directly addressed by international bodies: the spatial rather than (or prior to) the sexual significance of population becomes evident.

POPULATION AND PEACEFUL CHANGE

Starting its work in 1926, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) took up demography as an aspect of international relations in the mid-1930s. Population was specifically discussed under the rubric of “peaceful change.” The broad idea had emerged at a London meeting of the IIIC in 1935, and population was immediately central to the agenda: “the peaceful solution of economic, social, and territorial problems with special reference to questions of population, migration, and colonisation.”²⁶ At a subsequent Madrid conference in 1936, “demographic questions” was substituted for “population and migration questions ... since it was felt that these were but two aspects of the same problem.” The program of study culminated in a Paris meeting of 150 experts in “international relations.”²⁷ It was largely Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundation funds that enabled the 1937 Peaceful Change meetings of the IIIC,²⁸ and were, indeed, the basis for the League’s appointment of the Demographic Committee.²⁹

The proceedings of the Paris meeting were synthesized by General Rapporteur Professor Maurice Bourquin, expert on international law and collective security at the University of Geneva, and published as *Peaceful Change: Procedures, Population, Raw Materials, Colonies*. The title alone indicates the geopolitical basis of the issue.³⁰ The nature and scope of this IIIC program of study is especially significant because it led to two postwar institutional locations for the population issue in the UN. First it lay behind the secretary-general’s nomination of a Demographic Committee, chaired by Carr-Saunders, whose memoranda and participation in the Peaceful Change meetings were critical. As noted above, this 1939 committee transferred its wartime operations to the Princeton group, which shaped the new UN Population Division after the war.

Second, there is a direct intellectual and institutional line of thought about population that spanned the war, from this IIIC program on population and peaceful change to UNESCO's "International Tensions" project, which also took up the problem of demography and conflict.

Although the Peaceful Change meetings heard a range of expert and national opinions, there was general consensus that differential population densities and war were directly linked: "the authors are in agreement that lack of demographic balance can be a seriously disturbing factor in international relations and on which, if not adjusted, may sooner or later threaten the peace of the world."³¹ Participants such as the French demographer Adolphe Landry (1874–1956) thought that national differences in rates of population growth played a larger part in international tension than they had in the past.³² For this milieu, then (although clearly not for many of their contemporaries in the birth control movement), population was political not because of gendered power relations, but because of territorial questions. Simply, most of the participants subscribed to the idea that overpopulation created a pressure for more land. And so, in Madrid in 1936 and Paris in 1937 the key question was overpopulation: how might the fact of overpopulation be determined? What are the "symptoms" of it? What are the domestic remedies that might precede international remedies? Is expansion related to the fear of overpopulation, rather than the thing itself? If one country has a lower standard of living than another, is it necessarily overpopulated? One solution to overpopulation was migration; another was an increase in national territory. This is why, for international relations experts in the 1930s, population, migration, and colonialism were an almost given analytic triad.

This discussion built on ideas already widely circulating at the level of world conferences and international organizations.³³ While most of the participants had moved on from some of the 1920s debates—for example, the possibility of mathematically determining optimum population density³⁴—at core this framework for problematizing population was far from new in the mid-1930s. But of course population and territorial claims held particular significance in the mid-1930s because of Japanese, Italian, and German expansionist action and rhetoric.

The idea that population pressure caused war was a version of the classic position of German *Geopolitiker*. As the Polish participant, international lawyer Stanislaw Edward Nahlik (1911–1991) put it at the Paris meeting: "the pressure of population for which it has not been possible to find a normal outlet will be released by violence. Nothing can prevent

it.”³⁵ The point here, however, is not that German geopolitics was somehow unusually influential beyond the Nazi regime, but that the conceptual link between pressure, territory, war, and peace was the standard conceptual and political framework for the question of population in this period. Even though this IIIC group was dedicated to the idea of *peaceful change* and not war, their comprehension of the population question was still fundamentally geopolitical: it was about space.

Geopolitics meant a “struggle for space and power” between nations, as Strausz-Hupé put it in 1942.³⁶ And although by 1937 the term itself had become firmly linked with the Nazi regime, in fact there was a demonstrable continuum between German *lebensraum* ideas and the argument of many demographic and economic theorists that overly dense nations needed more territory, one way or another.³⁷ This is as discernible in League-endorsed venues, such as the IIIC meeting, as it was in international scholarly meetings and societies—the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, for example. Scholars often associate geopolitics with authoritarian states, and with “war-making, and genocide,”³⁸ but historically there was also a reversal of the idea, and a usage aimed at peace making, humanitarianism, and even anticolonialism, which was nonetheless still about people, territory, and space.³⁹ Indeed, the critical difference between *Geopolitiker* and many of the IIIC demographers was not the theory that overpopulation required territorial expansion, but *the means by which* that expansion should be achieved—through war on the one hand, or peaceful international management of migration or even peaceful cession of territory on the other.⁴⁰ It is significant, for example, that demographer Imre Ferenczi, charged with drawing up a basic document for discussion on optimum population, called for a League of Nations Committee for Demographic Conciliation.⁴¹ It is *this* version of population and the politics of land and space that defined the League’s interventions and flowed into UNESCO’s demographic enquiries under its International Tensions project.

Colonial powers’ access to greater territory and economically productive resources was also typically part of discussion on world population. As Adolphe Landry put it in 1937, “the colonial areas of the earth which are at all suited for settlement...are already in the possession of one country or another...and the remaining immigrant-receiving regions are independent countries. It may be assumed that neither the one nor the other can be brought under the flag of a new Power without a struggle. The remaining colonial areas, which might conceivably be bartered

among the nations, are unsuitable for settlement, and this is notoriously true...of the former German colonies.”⁴² Landry’s analysis indicates how squarely the problem was still understood to be about *European* overpopulation in the 1930s. For this reason, the geographic, climatic, and environmental possibilities of future settlement of Europeans outside Europe were key research questions for this group of experts. For example, US geographer Isaiah Bowman’s influential book *The Limits of Land Settlement* was one of the US official memoranda to the IIC program of meetings.⁴³ It spoke to the questions first established at the Madrid meeting: “What are the areas which seem to offer possibilities of habitat for the different peoples (climate, social conditions etc.)?”⁴⁴ The League and its agencies defined the discussion of population through issues of space. It was a geopolitical point of view which shaped the problem of population for postwar UNESCO as well, in direct intellectual and institutional inheritance from the IIC meetings in the mid- to late 1930s.

POPULATION AND EARLY UNESCO

At the 1946 First General Conference of UNESCO, a group for the “Study of Tensions Crucial to Peace” considered problems “relating to population.”⁴⁵ At the third session in Beirut in 1948, it was resolved to promote enquiries into “population problems affecting international understanding, including the cultural assimilation of immigrants.”⁴⁶

And by 1951, the Social Tensions project, within UNESCO’s Social Sciences Programme, had settled on four platforms: the “studies of tensions arising out of population questions” fell alongside studies of national character, studies of technology, and studies of tensions arising from racial contacts and the problems of ethnic groups.⁴⁷ Like its earlier incarnation as the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, UNESCO assumed the study of cultural, scientific, and educational aspects of “the pressure of populations,” precisely because of its mandate to “contribute to peace.”

The larger questions of security, war, and space continued to govern the issue of population at UNESCO. At every point, however, these spatial issues held an implied politics of gender and sexuality, in that population questions are never *not* about reproductive bodies: they cannot be. This ever-present but usually implicit reproductive politics became explicit in the earliest years of UNESCO: a decrease of global population through sponsored educational programs of fertility control was

mooted by the first director-general, Julian Huxley, who had been seriously engaged with the wider politics of the birth control movement for some time.

With his background as a biologist, and as an internationalist, Huxley's vision for UNESCO conflated the biopolitical and the geopolitical. This is evident in his notoriously preemptive manifesto on the philosophy of UNESCO, under the organizing conceptual framework of evolution: "From the evolutionary point of view, the destiny of man may be summed up very simply: it is to realise the maximum progress in the minimum time." He continued, "UNESCO policy would have to include, besides the application of medical science, studies on agricultural productivity (soil erosion, mechanization, etc.) and on social welfare, and also the provision of birth-control facilities. In general, UNESCO must constantly be testing its policies against the touchstone of evolutionary progress."⁴⁸ He was quite clear on birth control and the need for active intervention into population size and by implication "quality": "The recognition of the idea of an optimum population-size (of course relative to technological and social conditions) is an indispensable first step towards the planned control of populations which is necessary if man's blind reproductive urges are not to wreck his ideals and his plans for material and spiritual betterment."⁴⁹

In introducing population planning into UNESCO's purpose, and in putting forward the idea of a UN-sponsored World Population Conference, Huxley is consistently represented in scholarship as being "ahead of his time."⁵⁰ While his statements were extraordinary in the specific context of United Nations history (given the League's active avoidance of birth control), they were not visionary for his wider intellectual milieu. Far from being "twenty years ahead" in this matter, he was simply repeating (and quite belatedly) several generations of thinking and writing on world population: for example, these ideas had been extensively developed at the 1927 World Population Conference in Geneva, which Margaret Sanger had convened and which Huxley had attended.⁵¹

But the point here is not just that Huxley brought a birth control agenda to UNESCO (when, ironically, the UN Population Commission and the Population Division were actively avoiding it, seeing their brief as the collection of demographic data), it is that birth control itself was so strongly linked to geopolitical issues: to war and peace, to food and agriculture, to relative densities, and, for Huxley in particular, to an

ecological decline. For Huxley, birth control was not primarily a means to greater health for women and children, nor a means to greater autonomy for women as humans.⁵² Rather it was a means toward a more peaceful and productive international community, in which humans thought of themselves ecologically, that is, in relation to other living organisms, and as “trustees,” as he would put it, of life on earth. Huxley was one of a line of thinkers who drew attention to soil depletion, deforestation, and salination as globally important problems, a set of ideas rarely more than one intellectual step away from “the population problem.” This is clearly evident at least from the 1920s, although it is often understood to be a phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s.⁵³

The connections between geopolitics and biopolitics were, if anything, even more strongly drawn by the UNESCO demographer Sripati Chandrasekhar. A US-trained expert on Indian population, he was plucked from the US Office of Strategic Services in 1948 for UNESCO and moved to Paris as a demographic researcher within the Social Tensions Project. Simultaneously encouraged by and shaping the extraordinary Indian interest in population activity under Nehru and then Gandhi, Chandrasekhar was drawn back to the Indian national framework and in 1964 was elected to parliament as member of the Indian National Congress Party. As Gandhi-appointed minister of health and family planning he launched a campaign for birth control for women, for the delay of women’s marriage, and for their more central place in the workforce, as well as advocating compulsory sterilization for men.⁵⁴ Yet Chandrasekhar’s governing concept of population is more accurately understood as spatial rather than sexual: or better, he understood the population problem as a sexual matter insofar as changing sex conduct (and therefore fertility rates) might diminish international social and political tension.

In the immediate postwar years, Chandrasekhar was able to develop and influence comprehension of population in ways consistent with Huxley’s own ideas. When writing on India in the late 1940s, Chandrasekhar was entirely forthcoming: “the most important solution is that of Birth Control. It is too late in the day for India to discuss the pros and cons.... It will not be a hard task.”⁵⁵ The longstanding endorsement by the Indian National Congress, by Nehru, and by the All-India Women’s Conferences made such statements about India specifically uncontroversial. Indeed for Chandrasekhar there was ultimately a much more rewarding alliance with the Indian governments and US

foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, than with intergovernmental world organizations.⁵⁶ When speaking as a UNESCO representative however, Chandrasekhar had to be more circumspect, despite, but also perhaps because of Huxley's controversial manifesto pronouncements on birth control. For example, Chandrasekhar represented UNESCO at the 1948 International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family, which the Swedish National Association for Sexual Knowledge and the British Family Planning Association organized. He conspicuously failed to mention birth control or family planning (which was coming to be the preferred term) and was strongly criticized for this omission by a British delegate. Wright wanted Chandrasekhar to "take back to UNESCO a recommendation from the Congress that family planning and all that it implied must be considered and must be put on the agenda."⁵⁷

If family planning was omitted technically, if not by implication, the connection between overpopulation and war was central to Chandrasekhar's presentation to the Family Planning Conference in London. In this we can see the ongoing dominance of the geopolitical comprehension of population issues, as discussed and shaped before the war by the IIIC. At the same time, a shift toward both a "world" framing and a postcolonial framing of the issue is evident. Chandrasekhar told the congress that throughout the world's history "population...has been a very potent factor in causing all international struggles and wars...population has been a direct instrument in promoting international discord and war. It is accordingly necessary for UNESCO to see exactly how population adjustment can help to avoid war."⁵⁸ He drew specific attention to the recent deliberate policies of Germany, as he put it, to *create* population pressure so as to expand territory, as well as to the "unavoidable" pressure that Japan (rather more innocently as he frames it) found itself under. Like so many population experts before him, Chandrasekhar directly linked population pressure and war, "optimum density" and peace: "population growth—deliberate or unconscious—has been the reason behind the demand for *lebensraum* and declaration of wars, accession to raw materials and unrestricted freedom to migrate from one country to another.... If this differential growth of peoples leading to great differences in standards of living becomes a permanent feature, the one world of our dream where wars become an ugly memory of the past can never be realized."⁵⁹ A signature argument for Chandrasekhar, but one already firmly established, as we have seen, was that the growing

restriction of movement in the twentieth century (especially race-based immigration acts) compounded overpopulation problems and created international tension. For Chandrasekhar, immigration restriction was deeply unethical in a world of famine on the one hand, and underutilized land on the other. He told the 1948 Population Congress in London, for example, that people justifiably ask: "Why should not Australia open her doors when China and South-East Asia are overflowing with human beings?"⁶⁰ His arguments were consistently based on a critique of sovereign nations that shirked world responsibilities to redistribute populations, especially where "empty lands" were available and in the light of growing regional famine. Concern about unused land was Chandrasekhar's thesis again in his 1954 book *Hungry People and Empty Lands: An Essay on Population Problems and International Tensions*, planned and written when he was in charge of demographic research at UNESCO and published when he was a Nuffield Foundation Fellow at London School of Economics.⁶¹ The "international tensions" of the title draws directly from terminology UNESCO used with regard to population matters, itself inherited from the IIIC.

In his UNESCO posting, Chandrasekhar corresponded with major international players, raising questions about the possibility of mass migration schemes. In 1949, for example, he sought the opinion of William Vogt, Conservation Section, Organization of American States (and sometime director of the US Planned Parenthood Federation), on a plan to move millions of Indians for the "colonization of currently unused South Pacific areas." Vogt was not keen, not least because of the likelihood that people would not "be governed by the ecological imperative, and control their birth rate as well as adapt their land-use practices...the result of such colonization would be destruction of these areas."⁶²

Famine and food crisis were Chandrasekhar's major concerns, and in this he was not alone. With the world food crisis, the population issue gained a certain platform across a number of UN agencies, and it is necessary to weave the history and politics of food into world histories of international organizations, as well as international histories of birth control. The food question was also geopolitical, raised in terms of arable land across the world, with respect to uncultivated spaces, the nature of soils, the possibilities of fertilizers, and the increasing of crop production, as well as the cultural and economic politics of diets. Lord Horder, adviser to the British Ministry of Food, president of the British

Family Planning Association, and chairman of the Standing Advisory Committee on Nutrition at the FAO,⁶³ said to the delegates at the 1948 Congress on Family Planning in Relation to World Resources that the three elements that made up the “tripod of international citizenship” were “world food resources, the essential standards of living, and population trends.” He stated that the two ways of acting on these world problems and effecting “security” were first migration and second family planning.⁶⁴ Entirely in concert with this notion of international citizenship and international security, one of Huxley’s more successful initiatives was sponsorship of background papers under the series title “Food and People.” The US soil scientist Charles E. Kellogg wrote one title, *Need We Go Hungry?* (1950), and reminded readers of an earlier title in the series, *Are We Too Many?*, writing: “Population trends and food production are no longer the exclusively specialist domains of the demographer and the farmer, but have been made the object of international planning.”⁶⁵ The new director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Norris E. Dodds, also put this version of the population question firmly on the UN table. Addressing the General Assembly he said: “Tomorrow morning there will be 55,000 more persons for breakfast than there were in the world this morning.... But we are not producing 55,000 more cups of milk a day for the new children...nor 55,000 more bowls of rice.”⁶⁶ And as his predecessor Sir John Boyd Orr put it, echoing several generations of catastrophic writing on the globe and population: “If we cannot solve that problem in this century, then we are heading for the greatest catastrophe in history.”⁶⁷

Nobel Prize winner (1949) Boyd Orr was a major supporter of birth control in Britain and was concerned with nutrition of individuals and world population growth. Yet he also thought that modern science had a solution to Malthusian overpopulation at its disposal, outlined in pamphlets such as *Food: The Foundation of World Unity* (1948). The link between population, resources, and soil was direct and constant, both raising earlier work and presaging a slightly later political ecology and environmentalism. He said in 1948, for example: “wherever civilization has gone, forests have been cut down, land erosion has taken place, land which should not have been ploughed has been ploughed up, and dust bowls have been created.” All of these players were fundamentally in agreement that “freedom from want of food” was both a world population issue and a world political issue.⁶⁸ They also shared a postwar optimism on large-scale management of the issue, including a faith in science

and technology: "Agricultural science and engineering science can do it...if we apply science to food production with the same intensity that we apply science to destruction in war."⁶⁹ For some, like Boyd Orr, this faith was directed toward maximizing crop production sustainably. For others, like Chandrasekhar, it was social science, increasingly including social science on sexual conduct, which offered the greatest hope.⁷⁰

CONCLUSION

The late 1940s Food and People project was premised on the fact that "world population is growing at a rate of over 200,000,000 a year."⁷¹ This kind of statement, which had circulated amongst demographers for many generations, haltingly came to validate UN-endorsed plans for population control. In the context of these international organizations, this formulation of the problem represented a shift from that of the League and the IIIC in two ways: first, population had become squarely and explicitly a "world" issue, rather than a national and international issue; and, second, birth control was being named, if only occasionally, as a possibility for world planning.

As it turned out, in the short term, birth control reverted to a kind of underground discussion within UNESCO, WHO, and the UN General Assembly, to be claimed afresh in the mid-1960s. Yet there is a larger analytic point in tracing this institutional and intellectual chronology and in foregrounding the rather forgotten years on either side of World War II: birth control arrived on the agenda of UNESCO as an essentially geopolitical issue, as one development of an ongoing framing of population in terms of space, territory, movement, and "international tension." Put another way, it is only through understanding the prior geopolitical terms of the population debate that we can properly grasp what birth control meant to this group of international actors in the late 1940s and 1950s. It is more historically accurate to assess the population debate in the middle of the century as an extension of a prior geopolitical comprehension of the problem than as a foreshadowing of feminist and human rights-based understanding of the 1970s.

NOTES

1. "Our Mission," UNFPA homepage, <http://www.unfpa.org/about/index.htm> (accessed 24 May 2006).

2. For this history, see Lara V. Marks, *Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); and Nilanjana Chatterjee and Nancy E. Riley, "Planning an Indian Modernity: The Gendered Politics of Fertility", *Signs* 26, no. 3 (2001), pp. 811–845.
3. For example, Matthew Connelly, "Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003), pp. 122–147; and Susanne Klausen, *Race, Maternity, and the Politics of Birth Control in South Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
4. These ideas are developed in Alison Bashford, "Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (2007), pp. 170–201; and Alison Bashford, "World Population and Australian Land: Demography and Sovereignty in the Twentieth Century", *Australian Historical Studies* 38, issue 130 (2007), pp. 211–227.
5. Editors' note: Regarding the question of rethinking chronologies and rigid caesuras, see Corinna Unger's contribution in this book.
6. Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973).
7. Infant Welfare. Preparation of a declaration by a Reporting Committee, 1932, Health Section, League of Nations Archives, Geneva, box R6003.
8. See correspondence between Crowdy, Drummond, and Sir Bernard Mallett, Dossier Concerning World Population Conference 1927, League of Nations Archive, Geneva, box R1602.
9. See Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, p. 17.
10. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 19.
11. Draft Plan for Regional Demographic Studies, Demographic and Migration Problems, 1933–1946, Economics Section, League of Nations Archive, Geneva, Box R4440.
12. Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, p. 16.
13. For example, published by the Economic, Financial, and Transit Department of the League of Nations, 1944, were Frank Notestein, Irene B. Taeuber, Dudley Kirk, Ansley Cole, and Louise K. Kiser of the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections, 1940–1970*.
14. See Dennis Hodgson, "The Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America," *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 1 (1991), pp. 1–34.
15. Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, pp. 69–71.
16. See Proceedings of the Round Table in Population Problems, *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944).

17. See John Sharpless, "World Population Growth, Family Planning, and American Foreign Policy", *Journal of Policy History* 7, no. 1 (1995), pp. 72–102.
18. WHO Director Canadian psychiatrist Dr. Brock Chisholm wrote to Paul Henshaw, chief of the Program Development Branch, Division of International Health, Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, Washington: "After exploring every possibility I could think of finding ways to take active measures from this headquarters about population problems, it seems that there is no probability of our being able to do anything about it in the near future. While I agree with you perfectly that this Organization should take a position of leadership in this whole matter, the fact is that a majority of national delegations to the World Health Assembly seem not to share our point of view. There has been already very widespread criticism of our sending Dr. Abraham Stone to advise the Government of India, but I think that such criticism will have no serious affects as his advice to the Government was confined entirely to the use of the 'rhythm method' which, we are assured by the Vatican, is acceptable even to the Roman Catholic Church." World Health Organization Archives, Geneva, GH 12 Birth Control, 21 January 1952.
19. WHO Official Records, 21st World Health Assembly; Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, p. 157.
20. UNESCO Doc. 15.C/DR.52, quoted in Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, p. 163.
21. Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, pp. 137–138.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. xii–xiii, 141.
23. Aide-Memoire: Symposium on Population and Human Rights, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1974, (Tentative) Population Division/Human Rights Division, 25 July 1972. UN Archives New York, S-1028-003-07 86/46 Q300/R21/SU20.
24. For example, Commission on the Status of Women, "The Role of Women in the Family: Status of Women and Family Planning", Progress Report, 28 December 1971, S- 0128-0003-07 Q300/R21/SU20 86/46, UN Archives, New York.
25. Project Request for United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 30 July 1973. S-128-0003-07 86/46 Q300/R21/SU20, UN Archives, New York.
26. International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, *International Studies Conference, Xth Session, Introductory Report* (Paris: League of Nations, 1937), p. 1.
27. International Studies Conference, *Procedures, Population, Raw Materials, Colonies* (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, 1938), p. 11.

28. It is important to recognize that the history of world population debate and policy in this period is at least as much about a coalition of national governments and US-based foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, Scripps, Milbank Memorial Fund, Carnegie) as it is about intergovernmental organizations and the agencies. Work by Matthew Connelly clarifies these connections: "Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty", *Past and Present* 193, no. 1 (2006), pp. 197–233; "To Inherit the Earth: Imagining World Population, from the Yellow Peril to the Population Bomb", *Journal of Global History* 1, issue 3 (2006), pp. 299–319.
29. Maurice Bourquin, *Introductory Report*, p. 19. See also Tracy B. Kittredge, Rockefeller Foundation to M. Bonnet, 4 December 1935, suggesting Carr-Saunders in particular for the IIIC program, as well as the need to integrate the Institute of Pacific Relations. Conférence permanente des hautes études internationale, UNESCO Archives, Paris, Box K.1.15.
30. International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*.
31. Leonard J. Cromie, "Introductory Report on the Study of Demographic Questions" in International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*, p. 120.
32. International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*, p. 120. See also Adolphe Landry, *La notion de surpeuplement* (IIIC: French Memorandum, no. 1), 1937.
33. See Bashford, "Nation, Empire, Globe."
34. Edmund Ramsden, "Carving Up Population Science: Eugenics, Demography and the Controversy over the 'Biological Law' of Population Growth", *Social Studies of Science* 32, no. 5/6 (2002), pp. 857–899.
35. Stanislaw Edward Nahlik, *L'accroissement naturel de la population et ses facteurs*, cited in International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*, p. 121.
36. Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942)
37. Statements of the principle (or even the natural law) of density and expansion of space abound. For example, "Migration has been advocated as one of the means of producing a better distribution of the world's inhabitants and so relieving pressure...large-scale movements...are needed to relieve areas of gross over-population and to develop the unexploited regions of the world." T. H. Davey, "Migration as a Factor in the Adjustment of National Populations" in *Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family* (London: HK Lewis, 1948), p. 66. Or from a slightly later period: "While, of late it has been maintained that national population pressures

- should not be advanced as the basis for determining Lebensraum, colonies or trade outlets, it is, nevertheless, recognized that inequalities and the distribution of population, of land resources and economic opportunity may be reduced if there is to be an end of current international tensions." Sripati Chandrasekhar, *Hungry People and Empty Lands: An Essay on Population Problems and International Tensions* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 69. See also Bashford, "Nation, Empire, Globe." For European geopolitics, see Holger H. Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, issue 2-3 (1999), pp. 218-241. Geoffrey Parker, "French Geopolitical Thought in the Interwar Years and the Emergence of the European Idea", *Political Geography Quarterly* 6, issue 2 (1987), pp. 145-150. Neil Smith, "Isaiah Bowman: Political Geography and Geopolitics", *Political Geography Quarterly* 3 (1984), pp. 69-76; and James Sidaway, "Geopolitics: Twentieth Century Spectre", *Geography* 86, no. 1 (2001), pp. 225-234. For Japanese use of the idea, see Li Narangoa, "Japanese Geopolitics and the Mongol Lands, 1915-45", *East Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (2004), pp. 45-67.
38. A. Charlesworth, "Towards a Geography of the Shoah", *Journal of Historical Geography* 18 (1992), pp. 464-469, cited in Sidaway, "Geopolitics", p. 230.
 39. The work of Warren Thompson and Sripati Chandrasekhar belong to this tradition, for example. See Bashford, "World Population and Australian Land."
 40. See Warren Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929).
 41. International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*, p. 138.
 42. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 163.
 43. Isaiah Bowman, ed., *Limits of Land Settlement: A Preliminary Report on Present-Day Possibilities* (Baltimore: American Coordinating Committee for International Studies, 1937).
 44. International Studies Conference, *Peaceful Change*, p. 118. A major UNESCO program, the Arid Regions Project, derived intellectually from this earlier cluster of issues about land and people. My thanks to Perrin Selcer for discussion on the Arid Regions Project.
 45. Report of the Program Commission as Adopted by the General Conference, General Conference First Session, 1946, pp. 222, 235. UNESCO/C/30.
 46. Resolution 4.315, Records of the General Conference of UNESCO, Third Session, 1948, Volume II Resolutions, p. 24.
 47. UNESCO, "Studies of Social Tensions, 1947-1952," UNESCO/SS/2, 19 January 1951.

48. Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), p. 12. For analysis of Huxley's ideas on evolution, see William B. Provine, "Progress in Evolution and Meaning in Life" in *Julian Huxley: Biologist and Statesman of Science*, eds. C. Kenneth Waters and Albert Van Helden (Houston: Rice University Press, 1992), pp. 154–180.
49. Huxley, *UNESCO*, p. 45.
50. For example, Symonds and Carder, *United Nations*, p. xii.
51. Margaret Sanger, ed., *Proceedings of the World Population Conference* (London: Edward Arnold, 1927).
52. Feminist and sex reform birth control lobbyists, who did argue on these grounds, certainly sought (and gained) the support and goodwill of the likes of Huxley. See correspondence between the conference organizers and Huxley in "International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family", UNESCO Archives 312.620.91 A06 (41-1) '49'.
53. "Many countries are coming to recognize not only that future agricultural needs are calling for systemic examination, but also their future supplies of timber are also calling for similar attention....This, and carelessness in the past, have made reafforestation [*sic*] an urgent necessity." George Knibbs, *Shadow of the World's Future* (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), p. 45; "This silting up of the natural watercourses is in part a consequence of the reckless manner in which the deforestation of the hills and mountains has been carried on." Warren Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), p. 215. See also Fairfield Osborn, *The Limits of the Earths* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1953).
54. Chandrasekhar Biographical Sketch, Sripati Chandrasekhar Papers, Ward M. Canaday Center for Special Collections, University of Toledo.
55. Sripati Chandrasekhar, "Population Problems of India and Pakistan", *UNESCO Courier* 2 (1949), p. 9.
56. See correspondence between Chandrasekhar and Douglas Ensminger, Ford representative in India between 1955 and 1969, Chandrasekhar Papers, Ward M. Canaday Center, University of Toledo Library, box 16, folder 39.
57. Dr. H.B. Wright, comment, *Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family*, p. 162. Dr. Joseph Needham, Head of UNESCO'S Natural Sciences Section told Huxley that Chandrasekhar's speech was "extremely carefully worded from UNESCO'S point of view." Needham to Huxley, 31 August 1948. UNESCO Archives, 312.620.91 A06 (41-1) '49'.

58. Chandrasekhar, "UNESCO and Population Problems", *Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family*, p. 156.
59. Chandrasekhar, "Indian Demographer looks at World Population Problems", *UNESCO Courier* 2 (1949), p. 10.
60. Chandrasekhar, "UNESCO and Population Problems", p. 157.
61. Chandrasekhar, *Hungry People and Empty Lands*, p. 9.
62. William Vogt to Sripati Chandrasekhar, 10 March 1949, Chandrasekhar Papers, box 1, folder 7.
63. Horder had also presided over the 1933 London Conference on Birth Control in Asia.
64. Lord Horder, Presidential Address, *Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family*, p. 4.
65. Charles E. Kellogg, *Need We Go Hungry?* (London: Bureau of Current Affairs, 1950), p. 46. The series was translated into French, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, and German. Other titles included Aldous Huxley and Sir John Russell, *Food and People*; G. Nannetti, *Alphabet of the Soil*; Margaret Mead, *The Family's Food*; S. Krolikowski, *The World's Larder*; and Kingsley Davis and Julius Isaac, *People on the Move*.
66. Norris E. Dodds, Address to the UN General Assembly, 1948, cited in *UNESCO Courier* 2 (1949), p. 10.
67. Sir John Boyd Orr, "World Resources" in *1948 Proceedings*, p. 9. For similar earlier statements, see for example, Knibbs, *Shadow of the World's Future*.
68. See for example, John Boyd Orr, *The White Man's Dilemma: Food and the Future* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953); John Boyd Orr, *Food and the People: Freedom from Want of Food* (London: London International Assembly Reports, 1944); and John Boyd Orr, *Food: The Foundation of World Unity* (London: National Peace Council, 1948).
69. Sir John Boyd Orr, "World Resources", p. 12.
70. See Chandrasekhar, Report on the Conference to the Head of Social Science, UNESCO, 31 August 1948, International Congress on Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family, UNESCO Archives 312.620.91 A06 (41-1) '49'.
71. "The Social Implications of Science", 30 July 1949, Food and People Pamphlets, UNESCO/NS/SIS/4.

Re-mapping the Borders of Imperial Health: The World Health Organization and the International Politics of Regionalization in French North Africa, 1945–1956

Jessica Pearson

As European states and their overseas empires emerged from the physical and ideological rubble of the Second World War, two phenomena quickly became intimately connected: a rapidly accelerating process of decolonization and an explosion of new postwar international organizations that aimed to improve the lives of people living in those areas of the world most in need of access to health and social services. Yet the intersection (and sometimes confrontation) between

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dying colonial empires and these new organizations has been surprisingly underexplored.

Many doctors, politicians, and international bureaucrats had high hopes that the World Health Organization (WHO)—founded in 1946 as a subsidiary organization of the United Nations (UN)—would solve the crisis of health across the globe. Although a multitude of international health organizations certainly existed prior to the Second World War, this new organization was to represent a new scale of commitment to the problem of global health. According to Arkady Sobolev, speaking on behalf of the United Nations at the 1946 International Health Conference, “for the first time in world history, the human community, gathered under the standards of the United Nations, had resolved to grapple with the great problem of fighting on a universal scale against illness, suffering and death.”¹ But while this organization’s professed apolitical aim was to help the world’s citizens achieve “the highest attainable standard of health,” the WHO quickly found itself entangled in the imperial and international politics of a decolonizing world.²

In order to achieve its objective of promoting health and well-being on a global scale, the founders of the WHO espoused a principle of “regionalization” (or “decentralization”) wherein member states would form subsidiary organizations based on pre-determined geographic regions. Health concerns, so the logic went, differed from region to region, and could be best addressed by a body that was more locally grounded. But other factors besides local climatic and epidemiological conditions inevitably played an important role as well in determining the ways in which these doctors and diplomats would divide up the globe. French delegations at the WHO prioritized demonstrating the existence of an unbreakable link between the metropole and France’s colonies overseas. Anti-colonial delegations like Egypt, India, and Pakistan, for their part, attempted to demonstrate the way this connection had been artificially constructed through decades—and in some cases, centuries—of colonial domination. These delegates tried to show that colonial territories were more closely connected to their neighbors, not by links of violence and exploitation, but by bonds of language and culture, and by shared health conditions. These political imperatives reveal important aspects of the postwar quest of both colonial empires and anti-colonialists to re-map and re-imagine the imperial world. And nowhere was this more true than on the African continent.³

As the role of international organizations was undergoing a dramatic change, another important shift was occurring across the globe: that of constitutional imperial reform in some places, and in others, the first stages of political decolonization. In 1946, with the inauguration of the French Fourth Republic, the French empire was constitutionally reformulated as the French Union, a new iteration of the colonial model based on a higher degree of equality between metropolitan France and its dependencies, wherein colonial subjects became citizens and colonies became overseas territories, departments, or associated states. But as French politicians and lawmakers struggled to reimagine the structure of their empire, they also faced the difficult task of explaining to the world what these new categories and frameworks meant. What did it mean, for example, to live in an overseas territory instead of a colony? What rights was a citizen of the French Union entitled to? And would overseas territories and their populations have the right to negotiate a looser relationship with the metropole at a future date?⁴

The broader meaning of this new iteration of empire not only mattered internally, but also had an important bearing on the role France would play in new organizations like the WHO, where the French claimed to have jurisdiction on five continents and in all six WHO regions. The WHO, for its part, was tasked with creating structures, policies, and programs that could accommodate the shifting territorial definitions of a changing (and decolonizing) world, and nowhere was this question as important as in the processes of decentralization and regionalization.⁵

This chapter focuses on debates about the place of France's North African territories—Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria—in the regional structure of the WHO. Over the course of the early 1950s, French doctors and diplomats battled to have these territories included in the Europe region—the most “evolved” of the regions, they argued, which the French thought would be capable of bringing “precious aid” to these territories.⁶ In 1951, French delegates to the WHO made the official request that these territories be attached to Europe. In 1953, they were provisionally assigned to the Europe region. And finally, in 1956 after their independence, Morocco and Tunisia became full members of the WHO, part of the European and Eastern Mediterranean regions, respectively.⁷ Algeria remained a part of the Europe region until the mid-1980s, when it joined the Africa region.

This seemingly simple progression of events, however, masks a complicated process of defending France's claim to unity with its overseas empire in the immediate postwar period. This process resulted in years of debate, countless hours of meetings, and thousands of pages of reports, letters, and telegrams, as the French government strove to ensure a certain political, sanitary, and geographic fate for its departments and protectorates in North Africa.

The WHO thus served as an important and unexpected forum in which both French diplomatic and medical personnel had to defend the idea of empire in a decolonizing world. Because of French concerns about this particularly sensitive area of their colonial empire, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria were the last territories of the French empire to be included in a WHO region and their position was the most contested.⁸ Moreover, on the African continent, Morocco and Tunisia were the *only* French territories to be represented not simply as "France" in their region (in this case, Europe), but as associate members, with certain (albeit circumscribed) rights of their own.

Yet most important to the specific position of these territories within the WHO was the broader international and colonial backdrop against which this story was unfolding. These colonial maneuverings at the World Health Organization were happening at a time when French rule in Morocco and Tunisia was on the verge of total breakdown, both as a result of pressure from nationalist groups—Neo Destour in Tunisia and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party in Morocco—as well as from the broader international community. In 1950, Mohammed V, the Sultan of Morocco, issued three demands based on the ideas of Istiqlal: more internal autonomy for the Moroccan government, better access to education for Moroccan Muslims, and the right to form trade unions. Just two years later, in 1952, anti-colonial delegations at the United Nations General Assembly succeeded in bringing the question of Moroccan and Tunisian independence before the UN.⁹ Although the two protectorates would not gain their independence until 1956 and Algeria would not be free from French rule until 1962, these debates in the early 1950s served as a kind of testing ground for the role that international organizations like the UN—and its subsidiary agencies like the WHO—would ultimately play in the process of French decolonization.¹⁰

Thus, the uncertain status of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria—along with the imperial jockeying that accompanied the process of assigning them to a geographic region of the World Health Organization—throws

into relief an important tension between colonial powers and new international organizations. These organizations, in essence, were providing an important opportunity to reorder the world along geographic lines that would allow territories in the developing world to break free of older relationships and to imagine new ones with neighboring territories that shared similar social, climatic, and most importantly, sanitary conditions.

The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the WHO, while in theory focused exclusively on questions of health, was in fact a domain in which the French had to defend not only the sanitary organization of its overseas colonies, but the political structure of its empire as well. This was particularly the case *vis-à-vis* their participation in the WHO regional organizations, where French imperialism met some of its staunchest opponents. Second, since the phenomenon of regionalization was not unique to the WHO (and this was something that the French themselves acknowledged), I wish to propose the process of regionalizing international organizations as a useful avenue for studying the intersection of the histories of decolonization and postwar internationalization.¹¹ Indeed, re-mapping the decolonizing world was not just about a transition from empires to new nation states. It was also about casting new regional loyalties and finding a place for these new states in burgeoning international organizations, which would in turn offer guidance to them as they set out to provide for their citizens.

DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CREATION OF THE WHO REGIONS

Debates about the potential role of regional organizations began taking place from the earliest preliminary meetings of the WHO. Indeed, the proceedings from the 1946 International Health Conference noted that of all the issues at hand in forming the new World Health Organization, regional arrangements were the most controversial.¹² While most participants at the conference agreed that some form of decentralization was desirable, it was not clear from the outset precisely what either the structure or the broader role of the regional organizations would be.

Some delegates argued that they should serve as local offices tasked with collecting epidemiological data, thus carrying on the torch of earlier regional organizations like the Alexandria Sanitary Bureau. Other delegates dreamed bigger, hoping that the Regional Offices would come to play an important role in formulating public health programs and

services on a regional level. In the end the biggest thinkers won out, and the regional offices quickly became important loci for coordinating on-the-ground health policies and programs, taking their role far beyond the earlier task of simply collecting information about the spread of epidemic diseases.

According to Article 44 of the WHO constitution—which was finalized by the 1946 International Health Conference—the World Health Assembly could “define the geographical areas in which it is desirable to establish a regional organization” and could establish a “regional organization to meet the special needs of such area.” The role of the regional organizations, according to the constitution, would be to “formulate policies,” “supervise the activities of the Regional Office,” organize “technical conferences,” and “co-operate with the respective regional committees of the United Nations.” The regional organizations would also be in charge of facilitating the allotment of funding by the WHO for projects to be undertaken on a regional basis.¹³ But what did these functions look like when put into practice? How important were the regional subsidiary bodies of the WHO? And how did member states—here, France—strategically approach this decentralized structure?

While some WHO programs were organized on a more local, country-specific level, many of its programs fell under the aegis of the regional offices. In the earliest years after the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Region, the WHO embarked on an anti-malaria campaign in conjunction with UNICEF, which provided the necessary supplies. This campaign was supplemented with another program to immunize children in the region against tuberculosis using the BCG vaccine. A regional campaign was also led in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq against bejel (non-venereal endemic syphilis), a problem of particular importance to this geographic area. The program involved training enough medical personnel to treat 30,000 patients and to work with governments in the region to develop services specifically directed at treating the disease.

In the Southeast Asia region, early programs focused on the study of cholera, malaria control, and the development of regional and national training centers for medical personnel. The European office focused on the health problems of refugees and displaced persons, as well as working to ensure the provision of medical supplies to regions still recovering from the effects of the war. For regions that had not yet established an office, WHO assistance came primarily in the form of fellowships

for doctors to study medical systems abroad.¹⁴ By 1953, the WHO's regional activities would extend to sub-Saharan Africa, where WHO advisors would coordinate anti-malarial house-spraying programs as well as public information campaigns to inform Africans about the work of the WHO.¹⁵

Although this level of regional coordination could perhaps not have been foreseen in 1946, delegates who were gathered at the meeting—especially those concerned about the fate of their countries' colonial empires—took the prospect of regionalization very seriously and were wary about the implications it could possibly have in their overseas territories. French doctors and diplomats, for their part, had three goals vis-à-vis the regional structure of the WHO and the French overseas empire. First, they hoped to ensure French representation in all six regional offices, based on the geographic placement of their overseas dependencies in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.¹⁶ Second, they aimed to delay the expansion of the WHO into sub-Saharan Africa for as long as possible, fearing that the interference of an international organization in French sub-Saharan Africa could threaten colonial rule.¹⁷ And last, but certainly not least, French delegates at the WHO wanted to ensure the inclusion of French North Africa in the European Region of the WHO.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND THE PROBLEM OF EMPIRE AT THE WHO

Although the regions of the WHO were predetermined by the World Health Assembly, the creation of regional offices (and the assignment of countries and territories to those offices) unfolded quite haphazardly in practice. While the French delegations at the earlier meetings had stated a preference for France's North African territories to join the Europe region, the possibility of their inclusion in the Eastern Mediterranean Office (established prior to the creation of the Europe Office) came up in early 1949.¹⁸ Fearing the possible association of French North Africa with the "nationalism of the Middle East" and the possible consequences of contact with the Arab League, the French delegation left these territories out of the initial discussions of regionalization. The policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to exclude North Africa from "the geographic zone of any organization under Arab influence."

These territories were thus “purposefully excluded” from the Eastern Mediterranean Office of the WHO, whose headquarters were installed in Cairo. Indeed, over the course of the First World Health Assembly, no mention was made of Morocco or Tunisia.¹⁹

Leaving Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria under the heading of “undesigned,” however, was only a stopgap measure in the quest to defend French colonialism at the WHO. Representatives from the French Foreign Ministry feared that the ramifications of not assigning them to a region would outweigh the possible benefits of excluding them from the regional organizations entirely. As one memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained, this would inadvertently “supply anti-colonial propagandists with the occasion to claim that the French were somehow depriving its North African possession of the advantages they could draw from belonging to a regional branch [of the WHO].”²⁰

So when Brock Chisholm, Director of the WHO, wrote to the French Foreign Ministry in 1950 to inquire about the regional status of French North Africa, the Ministry immediately replied that it wished these territories to be attached to the European region, which was now in the process of being formed.²¹ Culturally and medically, they argued, North Africa was a “natural complement” to Europe, and would fit easily into the framework of that region. As the French Foreign Ministry rightly feared, Chisholm’s letter—while in no way directly questioning the status of France’s overseas territories, or the right of the French government to speak on their behalf—sparked a debate that would last six years, until the formal independence of Tunisia and Morocco. Indeed, following Chisholm’s letter, the first internal correspondence within the Ministry was a request from the Secretariat to the Direction of Africa-Levant to study the best way for the French government to defend its thesis that French North Africa should take its rightful place within the Europe region.²²

After the official French proposal in May of 1951 at the Fourth World Health Assembly met with “violent opposition” from Pakistan and the Arab delegations, particularly Egypt, the need to defend the French case took on an even greater importance for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior, for the case of Algeria.²³ At this meeting, the Egyptian delegation had accused the French of not consulting the populations of Morocco and Tunisia before making its proposal, which the Egyptians claimed constituted a serious abuse of France’s position in the two protectorates.²⁴

In November of 1951, a meeting took place at the French Ministry of Public Health to discuss the issue. Present at the meeting were various members of the Foreign Ministry, Professor Jacques Parisot (French representative to the WHO Executive Board), and several French doctors who had been involved in many of the various WHO meetings: Dr. D. Boidé, Dr. Maurice Gaud, and Dr. Lucien Bernard. The goal of the meeting was to formulate a cohesive strategy to ensure the acceptance of the France's proposal at the next meeting of the Executive Board in January 1952, and by the Fifth World Health Assembly in May.²⁵

A report from the meeting indicated that the discussion had "shed light on the true meaning of these votes." It continued: "A negative vote in the Executive Board would surely lead to a negative vote in the Assembly, which would not only be injurious to France in general, but would be specifically troublesome in its practical consequences, resulting in a rupture between sanitary services in North Africa and those in the Metropole." Professor Parisot, moreover, highlighted the "dangers to which we are exposed, faced with a majority that is both politically hostile to the colonial powers, and sensitive to pressure from the Arab delegations." What was at stake, he claimed, was not just the question of regional belonging, but the unity of the French empire itself.²⁶

Moreover, with respect to the threat posed by international organizations, the problem was bigger than just the WHO. In a note from the French delegation at the Fourth World Health Assembly, French legal advisor Roland Maspétiol noted that the Egyptian assault on the French proposal was "not an isolated incident." Rather, "this attack forms part of a larger plan that seems to have as its goal to fuel further attacks that this country plans to lead at the General Assembly of the UN next November."²⁷ Evoking racist tropes and the potential threat of a unified anti-colonial faction of all non-white delegations at the upcoming UN General Assembly, the French delegation accused the Egyptians of trying to establish themselves as the leader of "all more or less colored peoples."²⁸ French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman noted in a letter to Professor Parisot that these questions were of particular importance in this moment, "a time when the solidarity between France and her overseas territories is so frequently put to the test."²⁹

As French doctors and diplomats faced mounting opposition at the WHO to the idea of attaching French North Africa to the European region, they blamed this hostile attitude on a generalized ignorance

about the legal and administrative status of France's various overseas territories. The challenge of forging a degree of comprehension among France's colleagues at the WHO was not a geographic problem, they argued, but rather a political one. Maspétiol noted that the status of France's North African territories and protectorates was "difficult to explain to a foreign audience, one that has, for the most part, little or no legal training... The reticence of certain delegations results solely from the difficulty they face in understanding the current status of [Morocco and Tunisia]." ³⁰

As for Algeria, French representatives claimed that their colleagues at the WHO showed a similar lack of understanding with regard to that territory's status. A letter from the Ministry of Public Health to the Ministry of the Interior reminded its recipient that at a recent meeting of the WHO Executive Board one delegate "had not hesitated to speak of French domination in its 'Colony' of Algeria." ³¹ Within the structure of the French Union, he noted, Algeria was in fact comprised of three departments (similar to the departments of metropolitan France) and was the French territory most closely integrated—at least administratively—with the metropole. ³²

But the threat to France's empire did not stop at a simple misunderstanding about the legal status of France's overseas territories. The delegate from Pakistan went as far as to suggest the possibility of forcing the French government to submit the treaties that had created the protectorates for examination by the WHO Assembly—a proposition that "we luckily succeeded in convincing them to withdraw," quipped one French delegate. ³³ Although the French delegation had successfully prevented Pakistan's proposal from becoming a formal resolution, the delegation noted that many of the other Arab delegations had been made aware of the proposal. The French delegates feared that it could reintroduced at any moment, thus creating the possibility that the broader international community would become the ultimate arbiter of the legal status of the world's dependent territories.

The problem with the status of Morocco and Tunisia, however, did not stop at having to justify, or even simply to explain, the status of these two protectorates to the broader international community. Even internally within the constitutional system of the French Union, the position of Morocco and Tunisia had been especially hard to pin down. In 1951 Maspétiol wrote in a memo to the Foreign Ministry: "We cannot even begin to explain the difficulties that we have encountered trying to fit

Morocco and Tunisia into the structure of the 1946 constitution.”³⁴ Indeed, Frederick Cooper’s recent study of citizenship in the French empire after 1945 testifies to the complex processes involved in fitting these protectorates—more loosely associated with the French Union than other African territories, like Senegal or Algeria—into the framework of Greater France.³⁵ In his memo, Maspétiol wrote: “It is thanks to these difficulties that we have had so many issues fitting these two countries into the normal framework of international institutions.”³⁶

But if the constitutional relationship between Morocco, Tunisia, and metropolitan France was far from clear, there was no question in minds of French doctors and diplomatic personnel about their medical and cultural relationship, or about the potential danger in letting these territories be grouped with the countries of the Middle East.

THE FRENCH CASE FOR A EUROPEAN NORTH AFRICA

To respond to these fears and to further explore the situation at hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for Morocco and Tunisia) and the Ministry Interior (for Algeria) initiated two studies focusing on the multitude of possible defenses of the connection between France and its North African possessions: geography, distance, climate, epidemiology, the structure of health services, the culture of the medical fields, language, economy, patterns of immigration and travel, and most importantly, the long legacy of the special colonial relationship between metropolitan France and North Africa.

Delegates making the case for the inclusion of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria in the Europe region emphasized the proximity of North Africa to the European continent, as well as the frequent migration of people and exchange of goods back and forth across both sides of the Mediterranean. Jacques Daire, one of the (French) Tunisian representatives at the Fifth World Health Assembly (1952) explained that Tunisia was situated at “the periphery of the Western Mediterranean.” It was much closer to the capitals of Europe than to either the Middle East or to sub-Saharan Africa, the latter being separated from North Africa by “thousands of kilometers of desert.” Moreover, he stated, “99% of maritime passenger traffic was conducted with European ports.” Dr. Georges Sicault, the representative for Morocco, echoed these points, noting that the distance between Morocco and Europe was a “mere twelve kilometers of sea.”³⁷ A member of the French delegation, legal advisor René de

Lacharrière, explained that “anyone who knew North Africa knew that almost all movement of population of goods and people moved in the direction of Europe and France,” not the Middle East. In 1951 alone, he stated, over 90,000 North Africans had migrated to France to work.³⁸

Other arguments focused on the links between medicine in North Africa and the medical establishment in metropolitan France. One telegram from a French administrator in Tunis to the French delegation at the 1951 World Health Assembly cited the European medical training of almost all Tunisian doctors, in addition to the fact that nearly all medical journals distributed in Tunisia were French-language, and that Tunisian medical publications were always written in French. “Egyptian medical language,” the administrator wrote, “was poorly understood” in Tunisia, and “the translation to French was extremely troublesome.”³⁹ Another report from 1951 pointed out that in the case of Algeria, the structure of medical services was modeled on that of metropolitan France. Medical professors at the University in Algiers, the memo noted, participated in a wide variety of European medical conferences and scientific exchanges took place primarily with French institutions.⁴⁰

If an undeniable link existed between the medical cultures of North Africa and those of Europe, these regions were also linked—the French argued—by sanitary and epidemiological conditions. “The incidence of typhoid fever,” they noted for example, “was analogous in Algeria, France, and Belgium.” The Tunisian delegate at the Fifth World Health Assembly noted that the “anti-tuberculosis campaign in place in Tunisia is the same as the one in action in Central Europe.”⁴¹ And, he argued, the spread of malaria, relatively common in Algeria, mirrored that of Italy, Sicily, Corsica, and Spain. Moreover, any diseases that were present in Algeria, French representatives at the WHO argued, were more likely to be spread to France than any other country, including those of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Region.⁴² Daire went as far as to say that Tunisia constituted a “sanitary rampart between Europe and the East, on one hand, and Europe and Africa, on the other.”⁴³

While these arguments did use connections in health and medicine to make a claim about the link between North Africa and Europe, the real crux of the French defense—and the aspect of the relationship they feared the most in danger—was the political and administrative connection between France and its North African possessions. One memo pointed out, for example, that Algeria, which had been under French control since 1830, “is a group of French overseas departments,”

administered by the Ministry of the Interior (not the Ministry of Overseas France), and that it is “represented in the assemblies created by the constitution: Parliament and the Assembly of the French Union.” Algeria, they explained, was an integral part of the French Republic, and could thus not be separated from Metropolitan France and the Europe Region. While the political and administrative links between France and Morocco and Tunisia were shakier, the author of the study recommended emphasizing the link between France and Algeria, and then establishing the cultural and medical unity of the three North African territories, thereby linking the latter two to France by proxy.⁴⁴ The Moroccan delegate to the Fifth World Health Assembly stated that “if the problem is with the name alone, the regional office could be called simply ‘The Eurafrika Office.’”⁴⁵

Part and parcel to the French plan was a coordinated effort to get Moroccan and Tunisian authorities and medical personnel to back France’s proposal. In the 1951 meeting at the Ministry of Public Health, Professor Parisot had noted that only an expressed desire by both the Moroccan and Tunisian authorities would allow France “to make its way out of the current impasse.” Parisot explained that without the endorsement of the Moroccans and Tunisians, there would be no way to prevent the Executive Board from falling prey to “Pakistani and Liberian demagoguery.” But the authorities of these two protectorates would only give their consent in exchange for one thing: a French proposal for their associate membership in the WHO.⁴⁶ The French Foreign Ministry thus started conversations with the Bey of Tunis and the Sultan of Morocco over the course of 1951 to start the process of applying for Associate Membership for France’s two North African protectorates, with the intention of presenting them as candidates at the 1952 meeting of the World Health Assembly.⁴⁷

This search for Moroccan and Tunisian endorsement, however, was not without its political risks, as Jacques de Blesson of the French Residence General in Rabat explained in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. De Blesson noted that by asking for official support from the Sultan of Morocco, the French would be creating a dangerous precedent, “offering him, for the first time, the occasion to officially state a position in an affair concerning the role of Morocco in an international organization,” an affair that, de Blesson argued, clearly fell in the jurisdiction of French, not Moroccan decision-making. This, he continued, would be “contrary to the very spirit of the Protectorate regime.”

Although Associate Members had no voting power at the Assembly level, French officials worried about the possibility of being required to allow the participation of indigenous doctors in the Moroccan and Tunisian delegations.⁴⁸

Seeing no other way out of the predicament, however, and satisfied by the limitations on the participation of Associate members, the French delegation proposed associate membership for Morocco and Tunisia in 1952.⁴⁹ Still, this move did little to secure the position of France's claim to a European North Africa. The French Government's request to have its North African possessions incorporated into the Europe region would continue to face violent opposition in the World Health Assembly, the WHO Executive Board, and the WHO Committee on Administrative, Financial, and Legal Matters.

CHALLENGING THE COLONIAL PARADIGM AT THE WHO

After the French proposal—introduced to the Fourth World Health Assembly in 1951—was met with hostility by Egypt and several other delegations, it was referred to the upcoming meeting of the Executive Board (January 1952) for further study.⁵⁰ Although the French delegation managed to pass a resolution in the Executive Board recommending that the Assembly adopt the French proposal, the opposing delegations, led by Egypt, succeeded in using a subsequent meeting of the Committee on Administrative, Financial, and Legal matters to stall the decision for an undetermined period of time, calling for a more in-depth study of the criteria for assigning different countries and territories to the various geographic regions of the WHO.⁵¹

According to the Egyptian delegation, not only did the WHO have a moral and technical obligation to honor the cultural, linguistic, and sanitary connections between North Africa and the Middle East, but the WHO also had a responsibility to run its own organization with the utmost efficiency. The Egyptian delegation, led by Dr. Mohammed Nazif Bey, argued that “the WHO could only improve its efficacy by concentrating its resources in geographically homologous regions. Tunisia and Morocco would certainly benefit from being attached to the Eastern Mediterranean Region where they would receive *appropriate* professional and medical assistance.” He continued: “I don’t see any point in sending European doctors there when experts speaking the same language are already available in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. We’re not talking

about the transport of passengers and merchandise here. We're talking about combatting illness and promoting human well-being."⁵²

The Egyptian arguments were supported by the Spanish delegation, headed by José Sebastián de Ericé y O'Shea, the Liberia delegation, headed by Dr. Joseph Togba, and the Pakistani delegation under the leadership of Col. M. Jafar. De Ericé argued that there should be "absolutely no question of attaching any territories in Africa to the European region." He explained that the link between the various diseases of North Africa and Europe—trachoma, malaria, and smallpox—only demonstrated that these maladies should be combated at their point of origin: Africa. Moreover, de Ericé claimed, the fact that passenger and cargo transport facilitated the spread of disease between North Africa and Europe was irrelevant, since the same could be said of the entire world.⁵³ Dr. Togba echoed these views, highlighting what he argued were the shaky foundations of the France's arguments. "Liberia is much closer to Brazil than it is to Brazzaville," he claimed, but Liberia had never used that justification to propose its attachment to the Regional Office of the Americas. Also, Europeans, he pointed out, did not make the pilgrimage to Mecca.⁵⁴

Some French officials and delegates tried to minimize the seriousness of these arguments. A note from the French embassy in Pakistan wrote off the opposition of the Egyptian and Pakistani delegations as a display of "excessive religious zeal in the service of pan-Islamic and national arguments."⁵⁵ Relying on racist tropes about black Africans, French delegates blamed Togba's outburst on his origins in the Krou tribe, which they claimed was "renowned for the aggressive and combative character of its members." One French diplomat in Liberia wrote to the Foreign Ministry that he had often encountered Dr. Togba's outbursts in meetings where he was unable to overcome "the temperament of his race" in order to reasonably fulfill his functions as an international bureaucrat.⁵⁶ But despite French efforts to brush off opposition to their proposal, most delegates understood the very real threat that these attacks posed to France's conception of imperial autonomy. French officials understood that it was not just their proposal for the regional placement of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco that was being challenged, but that anti-colonial delegations were in fact accusing them of "acting out an imperialist spirit."⁵⁷

In order to defend themselves against this charge, the French tried to use the support of the Moroccan and Tunisian delegates—now

represented as Associate Members of the WHO—to bolster their cause. At the Fifth World Health Assembly in May of 1952, after the admission of Morocco and Tunisia as associate members, their representatives Dr. M. Ghachem (Tunisia) and Dr. A. Faraj (Morocco) stated unequivocally (though not without a certain amount of coaxing by their French colleagues) that it was on behalf of the people of these two protectorates and with the approval of Tunisian and Moroccan authorities that the French delegation had requested their inclusion in the Europe region.

Dr. Ghachem, the Tunisian minister of health, stated that “being of an essentially European medical culture, Tunisia benefits from very easy and very rapid relations with Europe, and thus wishes to be part of the Europe region.”⁵⁸ But despite the frequent statements by the representatives of Morocco and Tunisia that the request to join the Europe region was being made on behalf of these territories, other delegations doubted the validity of this claim, given their dependent status. Dr. Togba, for example, stated that while he recognized that “this was not a political discussion,” he wanted to point out that “Morocco and Tunisia are not independent territories capable of speaking freely on their own behalf.”⁵⁹

Indeed, despite having succeeded in garnering the official support of the Moroccan and Tunisian delegations, the French feared the potential ramifications of any interaction between the representatives of these countries and the Arab delegations. One French delegate reported that while in attendance at the conference, he made every effort possible to take Dr. Ghachem on day trips outside of Geneva, hoping to avoid any contact between Ghachem and the members of the Egyptian and Pakistani delegations. He wrote in a memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The topic of conversation was always assignment to regions, and his co-religionaries accused him of betraying the Arab cause in refusing to come around to their point of view. The argumentation of his interlocutors, partly aimed to persuade, partly to threaten, did not fail to leave an impression on him.” The French perceived Dr. Faraj as less impressionable, especially after he publically threatened to withdraw from the WHO if the French proposal was not passed.⁶⁰

As the Egyptians continued to push for the postponement of the decision about assigning North Africa to a region, the French delegation declared itself “categorically opposed” to the adjournment of the debate, stating that it had already gone on for over eighteen months.⁶¹ Despite their protests, however, the Egyptian delegation—supported by

the Pakistani, Spanish, and Liberian delegations—was ultimately successful in convincing a majority of the committee that the question of assignment to regions merited further study. Their proposal to adjourn the question pending further study was passed by 23 votes to 18, with 11 abstentions. Initially, territories and countries pending assignment to a region would be administered under the heading of “undesigned,” by the central headquarters in Geneva. The French delegation, however, later managed to put through an amendment to have territories that had already made a request to be provisionally attached to the requested region.⁶²

DEFINING CRITERIA, DEFENDING EMPIRE

In response to these debates, a special committee was established to study the question of criteria for assignment to regions. Each delegation had its own idea of how this process should work.⁶³ The primary concern of the French delegation was less the actual criteria that the WHO would select to determine regional belonging, and more the fact that other delegations even thought the task of determining such criteria was within the purview of the WHO at all. French delegates were adamant about the right of colonial governments to determine the status of any dependencies.⁶⁴ The *only* valid criterion for assigning a territory to a WHO region, they argued, was the expressed desire of the ruling power. Anything else, according to the French Representative to the European Office of the United Nations, Bernard Toussaint, would constitute “a dangerous interference in the internal affairs of a Member State as well as an attack on the sovereignty guaranteed to it by existing treaties.”⁶⁵

The French delegation to the United Nations was fighting a similar battle in the UN Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories, where anti-colonial delegations asserted the right of the UN to set forth a set of criteria aimed at determining whether or not a territory had achieved self-government, a task that French delegates argued was reserved exclusively for the metropolitan government.⁶⁶ The study of regional criteria at the WHO was thus part of a broader process by which opponents of empire used international organizations to position the global community as the ultimate arbiter of the political and geographic status of dependent territories throughout the world.

Some delegations—including Great Britain, Denmark, and to a certain extent, the United States—supported the French position, arguing that the desires of the administering authority should be the ultimate deciding factor when considering placement within a region.⁶⁷ Other delegations vehemently opposed it, stating that *only* the wishes of the population concerned should be taken into account, along with the obvious geographic and sanitary factors. The Iraqi delegation went as far as to state that the wishes of the administering authority should be ignored entirely (a proposal that the French delegate, Dr. Aujaleu, declared to be unconstitutional).⁶⁸ Saleh Mahmoud, an advisor for the Egyptian delegation, pointed out that the wishes of a sovereign authority should not be the primary factor taken into account, since “history has shown that the States that exercise that sovereignty have not always brought happiness and well-being to the territories that they administer.” A member of the Indian delegation echoed this view, stating that the first factor considered should be geography, while the last should be the request of the sovereign government.⁶⁹

As French delegates to the WHO and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs struggled to defend France’s proposition to include Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria in the European region, they were acutely aware that there was much more at stake in these debates about criteria than regional programs for tuberculosis screening or malaria eradication. What was at stake was the integrity of the French Union, and the right of colonial powers to continue to define the internal relationship of the metropolitan government to its overseas territories, without needing the examination or approval of the broader international community.

While the French were fighting these battles—perhaps less surprisingly—at the United Nations, the fact that these debates spread to subsidiary UN agencies attests to the reach of this challenge to empire in the broader international community. This anti-colonial assault, the French argued, extended from organizations that were expressly political, down to those tasked with “apolitical” missions like improving health and well-being for the global community. In a 1952 meeting of the WHO Committee on Administrative, Financial, and Legal Matters, French legal advisor René de Lacharrière stated unequivocally: “The Algerian departments are an integral part of France, and have been for a century. To assign them to a region that is different from the one to which metropolitan France is assigned, would be to *cut France in two*. This would create for us an administrative impasse as much as a sanitary one.”⁷⁰

The question of defining criteria was ultimately sent back to the assembly for further study in conjunction with the United Nations and other specialized UN agencies, and in 1953, the Sixth World Health Assembly voted to provisionally attach Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria to the Europe Region.⁷¹ But although the French proposal to include its North African territories in the Europe region was ultimately accepted, the years of vitriolic debates speak to the highly political nature of the process of regionalization and the very real threat that even seemingly apolitical organizations like the WHO posed to the fate of colonial empires. The drawing of regional boundaries by the WHO was not just about determining geographic zones for malaria eradication campaigns or supplementary infant feeding schemes. This process spoke to the larger dynamics of a eleventh-hour attempt to preserve empire in a decolonizing world.

CONCLUSION

In 1956, just a few years after these territories were accepted into the Europe region, Morocco and Tunisia acceded to independence and became full-fledged members of the WHO. Their inclusion as full members was followed by another important change: an immediate request on the part of Tunisia to join the Eastern Mediterranean Region, and an expressed desire by the Moroccan delegation to join at a date in the not-too-distant future. In addressing the Assembly the Tunisian delegates, Dr. Jaibi and Dr. Slim, cited “technical and geographic reasons,” while still (under pressure from the French delegation) paying homage to the “extremely efficacious assistance” that the French had afforded them over the years, in addition to the “excellent services that had been rendered to them by the European Office.”⁷²

The Moroccan delegate, Dr. Faraj, echoed the sentiments of his Tunisian colleagues, stating that despite its short-term commitment to the Europe Office, it ultimately foresaw a revision to its current regional assignment, citing “technical reasons” as well.⁷³ Faraj pointed out that while the European Office would continue to be preoccupied with the kinds of health concerns present in the most developed regions of the world—cardiovascular disease, aging populations, and cancer—Morocco had “dying children to save, epidemic diseases to combat, social laws to establish, and personnel to train.” These concerns, Faraj argued, would place Morocco more squarely among the sanitary problems of the

Eastern Mediterranean Region. Yet despite the frequent reference to technical reasons, this immediate shift in the post-independence moment serves as a further testament to the broader geopolitical implications of regional membership in international organizations. Indeed, Dr. Faraj concluded his speech in the Assembly not with a statement about health in his country, but by thanking all those delegations whose countries had supported the cause of Moroccan independence.⁷⁴

This chapter has taken French North Africa as a case study to explore the ways in which the regional boundaries of international health after 1945 were shaped as much by political imperatives as by medical ones. But in addition to demonstrating the ways in which international organizations like the WHO served as important forums for debating the politics of empire, my goal here has also been to suggest a possible way of approaching the closely interconnected histories of decolonization and the emergence of new international organizations in the postwar world—two phenomena that cannot be studied in isolation.

While some studies have approached these questions from a broad political perspective, we need to understand how the dual processes of decolonization and internationalization shaped not only high politics, but also the most intimate aspects of life. Ultimately health is a question of individual bodies that make up a population. The kinds of health services available to a given population at a given time, especially after 1945, were shaped both by local and national governments as well as by broader international agendas. Indeed, organizations like the WHO, UNICEF, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) came to play an important role in driving the kinds of globalized and globalizing health programs that shaped the sanitary landscape of the second half of the twentieth century. And they did this in large part via regional organizations.

In order to appreciate the possibilities and constraints in which these organizations operated, we must strive understand the relationship between their international and regional iterations and the ever-changing geographies of a decolonizing world. If international organizations mattered in the bigger picture of the history of decolonization—both as forums for debating the fate of empire *and* in their role of providing important services to decolonizing countries—so too did their regional expressions. It was through regional subsidiary organizations—like the WHO regional offices—that the kinds of goods and services provided

were negotiated and it was through these groupings that decolonizing countries were able to re-imagine their regional identities as they broke long-standing ties with their European colonizers.

Decisions about regionalizing health were ultimately not entirely dominated by health concerns, but were also shaped by political questions as colonial governments too were struggling to re-imagine the geographic boundaries of their empires in the context of a rapidly decolonizing world. If these debates showed that decisions about health were in part shaped by decisions about politics, they also demonstrate that anti-colonial delegations in the global community were not just mobilizing around issues of political and constitutional restructuring, but also around issues more closely connected to the daily lives of peoples living in colonial territories: health, language, culture, and science.

NOTES

1. Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 2, Proceedings and Final Acts of the International Health Conference Held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946 (New York: United Nations, World Health Organization Interim Commission, 1948), 96. On the history of international health organizations prior to 1945, see Paul Weindling, ed., *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation, 1921–1946* (New York: Peter Lang, 2009); and John Farley, *To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913–1951)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). On the history of the WHO, see Amy Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Have Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006); and Javed Siddiqi, *World Health and World Politics: The World Health Organization and the U.N. System* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
2. “Constitution of the World Health Organization,” 1946. Also see Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 2, Proceedings and Final Acts of the International Health Conference Held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946 (New York: United Nations, World Health Organization Interim Commission, 1948), p. 18: “the fight against disease should outweigh any political considerations.” WHO Director Brock Chisholm also stated in the same meeting that “It was important that

- health should be regarded as a world-wide question quite independent of political attitudes in any country in the world.” See *ibid.*, p. 69.
3. Editors’ note: See also the chapters by José Pedro Monteiro and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo.
 4. Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
 5. Note de la délégation française auprès de l’Office Européen des Nations Unies à Genève, a/s La Politique Régionaliste de l’OMS, Etat de la Question à la Veille de la 2 Assemblée Mondiale, Mai 1949, p. 8, Nations Unies—Organisation Internationales (Hereafter NUOI) 323, Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve (Hereafter ADLC).
 6. Télégramme, 25 Apr 1958, NUOI 323, ADLC.
 7. World Health Organization resolutions WHA9.42 and WHA9.43, respectively. Also see E. de Curton, Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l’Office européen des Nations Unies, à Son Excellence Monsieur Christian Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Secrétariat des Conférences, Genève le 25 May 1956, NUOI 323, ADLC.
 8. Extrait du Rapport du Chef de la Délégation Française à l’Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé (Genève-Juillet 1948), NUOI 323, ADLC. On the Arab League’s position on Moroccan and Tunisia independence, see Memorandum of Conversation by Henry Villard of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, October 14, 1954, in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952–1954, Volume XI, Part 1, Africa and South Asia* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 655–657 (document 352).
 9. L.J. Butler, Bob Moore, and Martin Thomas, *Crisis of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States, 1918–1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008), pp. 220–221. For more on Neo Destour and Tunisian nationalism, see Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); C.R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (New York: NYU Press, 2001). On the question of Moroccan and Tunisian independence at the United Nations, see “The Moroccan Problem: Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” in *FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XI, Part 1*, pp. 648–651 (Document 348). On the debates about the decolonization of Morocco and Tunisia in the UN, see United Nations, First Committee, Seventh Session, Dec 1952, and United Nations, General Assembly, Eighth Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Four-Hundred and Fifty-Fifth Meeting, 3 Nov. 1953.
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 21. Ibid.

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25. Note sur le rattachement de l'Algérie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie au Bureau européen de l'OMS, 22 Nov 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC.
26. Ibid., p. 1.
27. Note confidentielle de M. Maspétiol, Conseiller d'Etat, membre de la délégation française à la 4 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, 24 Mai 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC.
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30. Note confidentielle de M. Maspétiol, Conseiller d'Etat, membre de la délégation française à la 4 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, 24 Mai 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC. On the histories of Morocco and Tunisia, see Lewis, *Divided Rule*, and Kenneth Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
31. Le Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la Population à Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur, Sous-Direction de l'Algérie, a/s Rattachement de l'Algérie au Bureau Européen de l'OMS, 18 Oct 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC.
32. See Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
33. OMS, Question d'Afrique du Nord, Note confidentielle de M. Maspétiol, Conseiller d'Etat, membre de la délégation française à la 4 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, 24 Mai 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC.
34. Ibid.

35. Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*.
36. Note confidentielle de M. Maspétiol, 24 May 1951.
37. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques: Maroc, Tunisie, Départements Français d'Algérie, Groenland, Somalie (Point 7.11 de l'ordre du jour), 1952, p. 1, NUOI 323, ADLC. Also see: Letter from Le Général d'Armée Guillaume, Commissaire Résident Général de la République Française au Maroc à M. Robert Schuman, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 28 Oct 1952, NUOI 323, ADLC. An earlier report on the division of geographic regions the South Africa delegation echoed a similar perspective about the difference between North and sub-Saharan Africa, pointing out that while the Sahara was not "a line of absolute demarcation," North Africa was "populated, anthropologically speaking, by a race presenting the same physical, linguistic, and social characteristics," and was linked by "common medical and sanitary problems." This used this argument, however, to make the case for French North Africa to join the Eastern Mediterranean Region. See World Health Organization, Interim Commission, Enquête relative à la détermination des régions géographiques. For the debates in the 1952 meeting of the World Health Assembly, see *Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 42, Fifth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 5 to 22 May 1952* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1952), pp. 117–119, 134–145, 273–279, 306–307.
38. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 6.
39. Télégramme, Tunis to the French delegation in Geneva for OMS meeting, le 5 mai 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC.
40. Note a/s du rattachement de l'Algérie au Bureau Spécial pour l'Europe créé au sein de l'OMS, Dec 1951, pp. 10, 14, NUOI 323, ADLC. On the history of the medical connections between France and North Africa, see Jonathan G. Katz, *Murder in Marrakesh: Emile Mauchamp and the French Colonial Adventure* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006) and Ellen J. Amster, *Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877–1956* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013).
41. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 1.
42. Note a/s du rattachement de l'Algérie au Bureau Spécial pour l'Europe, Dec 1951.
43. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 1.
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 46. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Résident Général de France à Rabat, no. 1513, Rattachement du Maroc et de la Tunisie au bureau européen de l'OMS, 26 Sept 1951, pp. 1–2, NUOI 323, ADLC.
 47. Note sur le rattachement de l'Algérie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie au Bureau européen de l'OMS, 22 Nov 1951, p. 2, NUOI 323, ADLC. Also see: Le Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la Population à Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur, 18 Oct 1951, and Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Résident Général de France à Rabat, 26 Sept 1951, pp. 1–2. Also see: *Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 42*, p. 251.
 48. Télégramme, Rabat, le 30 Oct 1951 to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, NUOI 323, ADLC.
 49. On the limitations on associate members, see Note relative aux travaux de la 5 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé (5–22 mai 1952), pp. 2–3, NUOI 323, ADLC. On the question of associate membership and the French Empire, also see Extrait des instructions données au Délégation française pour la 2eme Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, Juillet 1949; Note de la délégation française auprès de l'Office Européen des Nations Unies, Mai 1949. Also see WHO resolutions WHA5.15. Algeria did not qualify, as it was constitutionally a more integral part of the French state.
 50. See WHO resolution WHA4.67.
 51. Le Ministre de la Santé Publique et de la Population à Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur, Sous-Direction de l'Algérie, a/s Rattachement de l'Algérie au Bureau Européen de l'OMS, 18 Oct 1951, NUOI 323, ADLC. Also see WHO, EB/R.48, EB/9R76 and Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 2. Also see *Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 42*, pp. 273–279.
 52. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952. On the Egyptian position also see M. Maurice Couve de Murville (Ambassadeur de France en Egypte) à son Excellence Monsieur Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a/s OMS et Afrique du Nord, 23 Mars 1953, NUOI 323, ADLC.
 53. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 6.
 54. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

55. Ambassade de France au Pakistan, no. 738/SC, M. M. Laforge, Chargé d'Affaires à son Excellence, M. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a/s L'OMS et l'Afrique du Nord, 31 juillet 1952, NUOI 323, ADLC.
56. Légation de France au Libéria, Monrovia 6 Mar 1952, No. 38/SC, Jean J. Viala Conseiller des Affaires Etrangères de 1 classe à son Excellence Robert Schuman, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Paris, a/s Rattachement de l'Algérie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie au bureau européen de l'OMS, NUOI 323, ADLC.
57. Note relative aux travaux de la 5 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé (5–22 mai 1952), 2. This idea was echoed in 1953 during the meetings of the working group on criteria. See Bernard Toussaint, Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l'Office européen des Nations Unies à Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 29 May 1953, p. 21, NUOI 323, ADLC.
58. Note relative aux travaux de la 5 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé (5–22 mai 1952), 3. Statement was made in the plenary session of 12 May. Also see *ibid.*, Copie des extraits de la note du Docteur Ben Salem à laquelle se réfère la lettre du docteur Ghachem en date du 3 Novembre 1952, au sujet des critères de rattachement aux régions géographiques de l'OMS, p. 2, NUOI 323, ADLC.
59. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, pp. 5–6.
60. Letter to Broustra, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 27 mai 1952, pp. 1–3, NUOI 323, ADLC.
61. Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques, 1952, p. 6.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 9. Also see Office des Nations Unies à Genève, Centre d'Information, Communiqué de Presse WHA/17, 14 mai 1952, Cinquième Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, Commission des Questions administratives, financières et juridiques—le rattachement de l'Afrique du Nord à une Région de l'OMS est ajourné, and Note relative aux travaux de la 5 Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé (5–22 mai 1952), p. 5, NUOI 323, ADLC.
63. Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 46, Executive Board, Eleventh Session, held in Geneva from 12 January to 4 February 1953 (Geneva: WHO, 1953).
64. Note a/s du rattachement de l'Algérie au Bureau Spécial pour l'Europe créé au sein de l'OMS, Dec 1951, p. 2, NUOI 323, ADLC. Also see Toussaint to Bidault, 29 May 1953.
65. Bernard Toussaint to Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 4 mars 1953, p. 4, NUOI 323, ADLC. Dr. Ghachem, writing on behalf of the Tunisian delegation (and no doubt influenced by the views of the

French representatives) echoed this position, stating that in any case, the ruling government in question would have already “necessarily and with great attention to detail, undertaken a careful study of all the questions that could shape the choice, in other words, sanitary, economic, geographic, social, financial, and administrative factors... As a result, the best and simplest rule...would be to concede to the wishes of the governing member in question.” See Dr. Ghachem, Ministre de la Santé Publique (Tunisie) à M. l’Ambassadeur de France, Résident Général à Tunis, 3 Nov 1952, NUOI 323, ADLC.

66. See Pearson-Patel, *From the Civilizing Mission to International Development*.
67. Letter from the British Ministry of Health, 16 Oct 1952; British Memo, 26 August 1952, p. 2; Letter from the Danish delegation to the executive council, 27 Jan 1953; États Unis d’Amérique, Lettre du 16 janvier 1953, NUOI 323, ADLC. On the general history of US involvement in French North African affairs during this period, see Martin Thomas, “Defending a Lost Cause? France and the United States Vision of Imperial Rule in French North Africa, 1945–1956”, *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 2 (2002), pp. 215–247.
68. Toussaint to Bidault, 29 May 1953, p. 9.
69. Ibid., p. 10.
70. *Compte-rendu provisoire: Rattachement aux Régions Géographiques*, 1952, p. 6 (emphasis mine). Interestingly enough, the same claim was never made on behalf of France’s sub-Saharan African colonies, where health services were arguably just as connected to those the metropole as health services in North Africa were. This was likely due to the fact that although the French believed that in the Africa region they were among “friends”—that is, other colonial powers—there was little likelihood of attaching North Africa to the rest of the African continent, especially given the vast cultural, political, and sanitary differences between France’s territories north and south of the Sahara. The only other viable option was inclusion within the Eastern Mediterranean Region, which French colonial policy would never have allowed. On the French participation in the Africa region, see *Compte-Rendu sur la 2 Session du Comité Régional pour l’Afrique de l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé* (Monrovia, 31 Juillet—7 Août 1952), p. 9, 1 H 50 (163), Archives Nationales du Sénégal.
71. Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, Presse, Communiqué WHA/24, 19 mai 1953, Sixième Assemblée Mondiale de la Santé, Commission des Questions Administratives, Financières et Juridiques, Rattachement aux régions, NUOI 323, ADLC. See WHO resolutions WHA5.43 and WHA6.46. On the health programs inaugurated in Morocco and Tunisia

that year, see *Official Records of the World Health Organization no. 5*, pp. 84–96.

72. Curton to Pineau, pp. 1–2, and WHO, Ninth World Health Assembly, Twelfth Plenary Meeting, 23 May 1956, verbatim record, Resolutions 7 and 8, pp. 5–7, NUOI 323, ADLC.
73. Curton to Pineau, pp. 1–2.
74. WHO, Ninth World Health Assembly, Twelfth Plenary Meeting, 23 May 1956, verbatim record, Resolutions 7 and 8, pp. 8–9, NUOI 323, ADLC.

“One of Those Too-Rare Examples”: The International Labour Organization, the Colonial Question and Forced Labour (1961–1963)

José Pedro Monteiro

In 1961, the Portuguese government was the protagonist of two international incidents—more precisely, two complaints—that significantly affected its imperial and colonial policies and its political and diplomatic strategies. Largely ignored by historiography as well as by the “testimonies” of some of the protagonists in both processes, the two

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complaints regarding forced labour filed at the International Labour Organization (ILO) were critical for Portuguese imperial designs. Moreover, these processes, in which the Portuguese played two different roles—first as defendant, then as accuser—constituted prominent moments of the decades-long history of articulation between international and imperial processes. They were also unprecedented in the history of the ILO itself, since never before had a state filed a formal complaint against another member-state for not abiding by the provisions of a convention.¹

Exploring the two complaints in an integrated way allows two important operations. On the one hand, the unveiling of the conventional procedural dynamics of the ILO and of the mechanisms and processes of internationalisation of imperial issues and debates. On the other, a reflection on how the discussions and the regulation of social policies at an international level were accommodated in broader debates about the imperial and colonial question, and about the political and social limits of imperial and post-colonial sovereignties.²

The close association between, on the one hand, the processes of gradual internationalisation of the imperial and colonial issues and debates, and, on the other, the definition, assessment and regulation of “native labour” policies in the various European colonial empires is undeniable. That long genealogy can be identified in the internationalised and internationalising efforts to define and establish the standards of a “civilising mission” that promoted the eradication of slavery as a necessary condition for the collective and external recognition of a legitimate imperial government.³

That connection persisted well beyond World War I, but it was then integrated and framed within a novel institutional framework. The persistence of coercive modalities of labour exaction in colonial territories led the newly created international organisations to institutionalise the debates on the topic.⁴ The creation of the first international convention on forced labour in 1930, by the ILO, was thus deeply marked by the acknowledgement of labour realities and abuses in colonial societies—as had been the 1926 Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, sponsored by the League of Nations. Its articles made clear that this was mainly a convention based on, and eminently applicable to, colonial practices and policies. In fact, during these years, the question of “native labour” within the ILO not only deserved its specific framework, differentiated from the metropolitan one, but was also merged with the question of

freedom at work: all the conventions established by the ILO during the 1930s and related to colonial situations, which constituted what became known as the organisation's *Native Labour Code*, were mostly if not exclusively centred on the problem of freedom at work (specifically, on the recruitment methods and processes, on the regulation of “native” workers’ contracts, and on the abolition of penal sanctions in the case of breach of contract by the worker).⁵

In the aftermath of World War II, the global approaches to the theme of “native labour” witnessed important changes carried out both by imperial governments and colonial officials, such as the British and the French, and by the ILO itself. In many colonial empires, substantial efforts were undertaken so as to eliminate the persistence of coercive modalities of labour and to introduce labour regimes based on wage labour, promoting, albeit in a contradictory way, the “stabilisation” of workers near their workplaces and encouraging their families to join them, while new development policies, formally subordinated to the “native welfare,” were devised. These processes stimulated, but were also stimulated by, the changes that took place within the ILO orbit. ILO officials developed efforts to bring colonial labour standards closer to those in force in metropolitan territories: recognition and encouragement of participation of “native” workers in representative organisations, establishment of mechanisms for handling labour disputes, introduction of wage-fixing machinery, and the creation of independent and autonomous labour inspectorates in “non-metropolitan territories.”⁶

In addition to the abovementioned international and colonial dynamics, a coeval historical process contributed to the diversification of historical and political contexts associated with the problem of forced labour and its international normative transformation. The assertion of bipolar dynamics within the international landscape resulting from the increasing rivalries between the US and the USSR in the late 1940s had a direct impact on the conditioning of the international debates and also on the production and redefinition of international normative standards that aimed to promote “free” labour and curb its coercive modalities. The accusations regarding the existence of widespread forced labour practices in the socialist world, namely those motivated by political re-education purposes, were early on one of the instruments deployed by Western governments and non-governmental actors driven by Cold War rationales in their diplomatic and denunciation strategies that aimed to court international public opinion. This option would ultimately result in an

overall process of investigation and review of the international standards and norms related to slavery and forced labour, which lasted for at least one decade. The problem of forced labour, previously almost exclusive to debates about colonial contexts, was thus integrated into the dynamics of the Cold War. As a result, in 1957 the ILO created a new convention on forced labour that succinctly typified and condemned the different modalities of compulsory labour, either for political or economic purposes.⁷

If it is undeniable that the 1950s were marked by a reorientation in the way the problem of forced labour was addressed, its reduction to the historical and political context of the Cold War and of competition between alternative projects of modernity and the devaluation of its interconnection with colonial and imperial phenomena are problematic. As can be traced in relation to other topics, the Cold War lens sometimes obscures more than it reveals,⁸ not only because it tends to neglect the diversity of imperial and colonial realities,⁹ of the political imaginations of its rulers and administrators, but also because it casts in hindsight the “end” of the imperial solution as granted.

This series of factors has contributed to the fact that the history of the complaint filed by the Ghanaian government against the Portuguese at the ILO, and the subsequent one presented by the latter against Liberia, both related to the problem of forced labour, has earned relatively little attention, being mainly highlighted by its political-diplomatic dimension and ideological resonance, with an almost exclusive emphasis given to its “legal” verdict and to the appropriations and instrumental uses that were given to it.¹⁰ As will be seen, the process of the two complaints was far more than a *mere* diplomatic dispute, and it involved more actors than merely the three states in contention.¹¹

Perhaps more surprisingly, the lack of interest in the two complaints has also been noticeable within Portuguese historiography, including what regards the *memoirs* of the actors involved. The reasons for the invisibility and the lack of proper acknowledgment of these two processes are more or less clear. The year 1961 is commonly presented as a caesura in Portuguese colonial history, the year that presented the most pressing challenges to Portuguese colonialism: what later was to be acknowledged as the beginning of the colonial wars—first in Angola, then in Guinea and Mozambique, in 1963 and 1964, respectively. This assertion usually entails the downplaying of previous events and processes of contestation.

It also favours the crystallisation of a rigid chronological divide, with the outbreak of colonial wars as its central axis.¹²

The depiction of these two events as marginal in the broader political-diplomatic process of struggle against Portuguese colonialism was, of course, promoted by the actors involved, both at the time and later on, in their testimonies and memoirs. The simplification and straightforward assessment of both processes was a clear intent of the Portuguese imperial advocates. Both verdicts were made known in a booklet published in English in 1963 by the *Agência-Geral do Ultramar* (General Overseas Agency), the author of which was Júlio Evangelista, a journalist at *A Voz* (a newspaper close to the regime). Immediately afterwards, it was stated that the case represented "a gigantic and insidious plot" that had culminated, "undoubtedly," in a "victory for Portugal." Franco Nogueira, future Minister of Foreign Affairs, also asserted that the Portuguese government "was totally exonerated" of the allegations against it, that the complaint against Portugal was formally terminated, therefore implying that there would be no further consequences, and that it had been guaranteed that the ILO would "never again" make "an accusation against Portugal's overseas provinces." In his memoirs, Adriano Moreira, one of the most influential imperial late colonial ideologues and the Portuguese Overseas Minister during almost the entire duration of these events, also refers to the processes of both complaints only laterally, and only as an *ex post facto* legitimising element of the Portuguese government's new policies, designed by Moreira himself. Even such a critical author as Eduardo Mondlane (at the time of writing, leader of the Mozambican FRELIMO), when assessing the complaint, limited himself to questioning the impartiality of the commission and its alleged incongruences, similarly limiting its analysis to the commission's verdict and downplaying the evidence gathered in the sense that it did not preclude what he considered a positive outcome for the Portuguese imperial government.¹³

As will be seen throughout this text, the processes related to both complaints were particularly rich, not just as bilateral diplomatic disputes, but also in the sense that they constitute a privileged observatory for questioning and understanding the international dynamics of the debates regarding imperial and colonial solutions. Considering the effort that all participants dedicated to these two processes and their consequences, one can see the artificiality of the distinction between strictly political issues, on the one hand, and social, economic, and cultural ones,

on the other.¹⁴ For both the Portuguese and the Liberian governments, this was not just about legitimising their labour policies via an international organisation. It was also about asserting that the arguments for their particular mode of political sovereignty, which also impacted and depended on their social policies, were legitimate.

On the other hand, both complaints can be used as observatories that allow one to realise the stringent limitations of a mere diplomatic, bilateral approach.¹⁵ First, the complaints opened communication channels that boosted the participation of a myriad of non-governmental or transnational individual or collective actors that were not dependent on or subordinate to the governments involved. Second, the detailed study of both processes reveals the specific nature, intents, and vistas of the several individuals that worked on behalf of the ILO, revealing a considerable degree of autonomy by the organisation and the relative weight of institutionally driven purposes.

LABOUR POLICIES AND ANTI-COLONIALISM AT THE ILO

On 25 February 1961, the governmental representative of Ghana sent a letter to the ILO Director-General, the American David Morse, accusing the Portuguese government of not discharging the obligations that resulted from the ratification of the Convention regarding the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), in 1959. It was not the first complaint made at the organisation, but it was the first that was submitted by one state targeting another one. The specific historical and political context was also critical. Unlike other European colonial empires, the rulers and political and scientific elites of the Portuguese empire showed no intention of promoting self-government or further autonomy in the colonies, let alone granting immediate independence to their “overseas provinces.”¹⁶ While most African colonies were attaining independence or at least being granted a timetable for progressive autonomy and the eventual devolution of power, Portuguese authorities were resistant to significant paths of reform, even in the social sphere: in February 1961, the *Indigenato* regime (“native statute”) was still in force, as well as the associated *Código do Trabalho Indígena* (Native Labour Code) of 1928. Forced labour in certain circumstances still had juridical backing. The most far-reaching political reform that had been registered since the end of World War II could be summed up to the constitutional revision of 1951, which had semantically transformed the colonies into overseas provinces.

The *Indigenato* reform of 1954 did not significantly impact upon the daily lives of the native populations of Portugal's major colonies of Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique, since it mainly established that the smaller native populations of Timor and S. Tomé should not be regarded as *indígenas* ("natives") anymore. It is important, however, to point out that the apparent stability of the *politics of difference* in the empire cannot be reduced to an *essential* political immobility or stagnation. In fact, the persistence of mechanisms of legal, political, and economic differentiation during the postwar years coexisted with the development of diverse rationalisation efforts by the state-empire apparatus that affected its political, bureaucratic, and economic dimensions.¹⁷

Moreover, the filing of the complaint coincided with the multiplication of serious challenges to Portuguese imperial rule: from January to April 1961, the Portuguese government faced a riot in Baixa do Cassange, assaults on several police and military compounds in Luanda, and also vigorous insurrections in northern Angola. All these events were met with appalling violence in the colony of Angola. Meanwhile, the metropole was experiencing intense political turmoil, as the hijacking of the vessel *Santa Maria* by Portuguese oppositionists drew the attention of international public opinion to Portuguese internal politics and an aborted coup attempt intended to substantially revert Salazar's imperial and colonial stance.¹⁸

As a result of these events, Portugal's already precarious position in the United Nations, marked in the previous years by the refusal to deliver statistical and legal information on the colonies under Article 73 of the Charter, further deteriorated. The discussion on the situation of Angola was included in the March agenda of the UN Security Council, at the discretion of Liberia, coinciding with the beginning of uprisings in northern Angola organised by the *União das Populações de Angola* (Union of Peoples of Angola—UPA). The Portuguese authorities vehemently stated that these were sovereign and internal matters and therefore the UN did not hold authority to discuss them. Consequently, the Portuguese government refused to cooperate with the organisation.¹⁹

The Ghanaian authorities might have anticipated that the Portuguese reaction to the complaint in the ILO would be identical. After all, the Portuguese government and the imperial administration had long had a wary relationship with the organisation, presenting it as an organisation whose programme "goes far beyond the issue of labour relations and

which tends to exercise a trusteeship and a meddling in colonial problems that goes well beyond the kind of intervention that it has developed in European countries.” This negative assessment was also the result of a process that had begun decades before of permanent scrutiny and critical appreciation of Portuguese colonial labour policies by the ILO. This was one of the reasons why the first convention by the Portuguese government that actually impacted upon native labour policies had only been ratified in 1956, that is, Convention No. 29 on forced labour, created in 1930. Nevertheless, the ratification of this convention marked a growing integration of the Portuguese empire within the ILO’s normative framework concerning social policy in “non-metropolitan territories.”²⁰

One cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the Ghanaian authorities just wanted to strengthen the case against Portugal at the UN. For instance, the request by the representative of Ghana to bring the discussion of the complaint to the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations in case the Portuguese government refused to participate in the inquiry process supports this possibility. At least, the Portuguese authorities interpreted this reference precisely this way.²¹ That decision, however, cannot be detached from a broader appraisal of Ghana’s foreign policy—pursued after the granting of independence in 1957 and closely identified with Ghana’s President, Kwame Nkrumah—which was significantly shaped by the ideals of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism.²²

The Portuguese authorities were appalled by Ghana’s initiative, or at least pretended to be. As Ribeiro da Cunha, from the Department of Political Affairs of the Overseas Ministry and one of the leading actors in this process, assured, “the world” had gone “mad” and Ghana’s initiative represented a break with traditional diplomatic procedures at the ILO. However, and despite these rhetorical statements, the Portuguese government took a different stance from the one it took at the UN. Provided that the “non-politicisation” of the process was guaranteed, a commitment to fully cooperate with the ILO would be possible. If the discussions remained within a “technical” domain that would not question imperial legitimacy, the Portuguese authorities would not raise obstacles to cooperation. This decision was part of the Portuguese ideological and diplomatic strategy, which intended to formally detach the debate about the legal and political status of a territory from its actual imperial records regarding social and economic domains. But the decision was also born out of real pressures and demands being felt in the

colonies, in the metropole and, of course, internationally. The decision to participate in the process triggered at the ILO, with the proviso of the abovementioned assurances by the ILO officials, seemed to be the safest way to ensure that the Portuguese empire would not be totally ostracised in international *fora*—given its record at the UN—even if its authorities had to give up on some of the prerogatives of sovereignty that were usually proclaimed to be non-negotiable.²³

However, this decision carried risks and could lead to unforeseen and undesirable consequences. The first aim of the Portuguese demand for non-politicisation had to do with the need to prevent the merits of the complaint from being debated directly by the ILO Governing Body, a collegial and tripartite body where hostile states such as the Soviet Union had a seat. The formal possibility of the outright rejection of the complaint by the ILO was presented by the deputy director-general, Wilfred Jenks, as being simply impossible taking “the current world situation” into account. The remaining solution would imply appointing an impartial and quasi-judicial commission of inquiry composed of experts who would assess the merits and fundaments of the complaint. The commission reflected the geographical and political diversity of the organisation as a Swiss chair, Paul Ruegger, was appointed, assisted by a Uruguayan, Enrique Armand-Ugon, and the Senegalese Isaac Forster.²⁴

The workings of the commission of inquiry were impressive. The extent of the subjects covered and the richness of detail of the investigations were remarkable. The commission certainly constituted a key moment in the history of colonial inspection and supervision by international institutions. The ILO members and experts were thus able to obtain information about social conditions and policies in the empire, on each of the overseas provinces or even on specific sites or companies in each territory. But this research work was also the result of a cumulative process related to the gradual internationalisation of the debates on colonial policies (particularly on “native labour”), marked by the creation and expansion of the international supervision and regulatory mechanisms that then reached an unprecedented degree due to the specific political and historical conjunctures.²⁵ All the records, minutes, and drafts related to the participation of Portuguese delegates or experts in debates over colonial aspects at the ILO and in other institutions were made available to the commission members. The same went for the annual reports sent by the Portuguese government to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

(CEACR)—the committee responsible for examining the compliance with the conventions ratified by each member-state—and with the comments, critical remarks, and suggestions made by those experts. Relevant publications were also provided, from publications of the International Labour Office to books written by critics of the empire, a list that included authors such as the anthropologist Marvin Harris, the journalist and historian Basil Davidson, and the leader of the liberation movement of Guinea and Cape Verde, Amílcar Cabral.²⁶ Some of these *oeuvres* contained detailed information about the Portuguese labour practices and legislation in the colonies, pointing out, for example, the specific measures taken by colonial governments to recruit and employ forced labour or the role played by the administrative authorities in recruitment, or stressing the most critical provisions (such as the “moral duty to work”) enshrined in the Native Labour Code.²⁷

In addition, the constitution of the commission allowed a myriad of actors to get involved in the process. For instance, the United Arab Republic, which associated itself with the complaint in the quality of member-state, provided several reading suggestions to the commission and was actively engaged in gathering information on the situation in the colonies. Non-governmental organisations such as the Anti-Slavery Society, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Commission of Jurists, and the International League for Human Rights were invited to provide relevant information and to participate in the process. Other organisations which had not been invited, such as the American Committee on Africa or the Baptist Missionary Society, could still participate by providing information indirectly, sending it to the formally invited organisations. The latter channelled that information to the commission of inquiry, respectively the International Commission of Jurists and the International League for Human Rights.²⁸

The British government was also invited to provide information related to the territories still under its sovereignty that bordered Angola and Mozambique. It is important to note that many migrant workers from these Portuguese “overseas provinces” were working in these British colonies or trust territories. However, the people in charge at the Colonial Office were hesitant regarding the way to go, and what position to assume. On the one hand, the British rulers wanted to cooperate with the ILO. On the other hand, they wanted to avoid embarrassing the Portuguese government by providing compromising information. As importantly, they also feared the impact that this kind of process, which

set a precedent, could have on their own territories, especially those which were still not applying the 1957 Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour. It is nonetheless revealing that, at a time when a substantial part of the British empire was already independent and the rest, with the exception of Southern Rhodesia, was advancing towards self-government, the members of the Colonial Office feared the impact of such a process on the global debates about colonialism and, more specifically, that this process of inquiry could be emulated against the British empire "by some unfriendly country for anti-colonial purposes."²⁹ The possibility of organising local surveys was discussed but quickly discarded. The debate about allowing local governments to provide information to the commission, namely Julius Nyerere's in Tanganyika, whose independence was scheduled for December, the month when the commission visited the territories of Mozambique and Angola, generated a huge controversy between officials in the Colonial Office and in the Foreign Office about the best option. The situation was sorted out as the commission members refused to visit the country at Nyerere's invitation.³⁰

The workings of the commission, however, included other modalities of investigation and inquiry. In September 1961, the commission members questioned several witnesses. Some of them were chosen by the commission itself and included Portuguese government officials (from directors of the Native Affairs Departments in Angola and Mozambique to the directors of Public Works Departments, among others), managers or representatives of major colonial enterprises (such as Cassequel, Incomati, Diamang, etc.), the director of the agency responsible for organising the recruitment to the South African mines, and union representatives (although they did not represent the subjects of the complaint, in the sense that the *Indigenato* did not allow for the unionisation of people of native status).³¹ Ghana and the different non-governmental organisations were also allowed to present their witnesses. The Anti-Slavery Society called two Angolan refugees. As for the witnesses presented by the government of Ghana, the procedure was marked by an incident whose proper history has not yet been disclosed. Initially, the government of Ghana presented a list that only included anti-colonial militants, such as Amílcar Cabral and Miguel Trovoada, among others, and although the commission members showed discomfort towards that, they eventually accepted the list. Apparently, these activists decided not to attend the inquiries and Ghanaian authorities had to submit a new list of witnesses with the inquiry process already going on. The overwhelming

majority were Anglo-Saxon missionaries who had spent some time in the Portuguese colonies (with the exception of Basil Davidson).³² The fact that some of these names were also profusely quoted in the work by John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, is illustrative of the dimension, articulation, and activities of the networks which at the time challenged the Portuguese empire claims about the welfare of indigenous populations. However, further research on this particular aspect is much needed.³³

Perhaps more importantly, the process triggered by the complaint included an *in situ* inspection in the “overseas provinces” of Angola and Mozambique.³⁴ This visit was undoubtedly a milestone in the relationship between the Portuguese empire-state and international organisations. It was also a relevant event in the broader history of the intersections between internationalism and imperialism. The possibility of an international inspection of the colonies had been one of the most relevant elements that conditioned the ratification of “colonial” conventions by the Portuguese government. For example, the inquiries carried out by the UN’s subcommittee on Angola took place in Congo Leopoldville due to the refusal of the Portuguese authorities to agree to the investigation taking place in Angola.³⁵ In fact, the acceptance of the ILO’s inspection visits was far from being taken for granted. The first reaction of Ribeiro da Cunha, in February, when he was approached by Wilfred Jenks, was cautious: the Portuguese government would agree to cooperate with the ILO, but they could guarantee nothing regarding the visit.³⁶ But in April, both Salazar, the President of the Council of Ministers, and the Minister of Overseas, Adriano Moreira, ensured Jenks that the visits would be authorised.³⁷ Despite the numerous limitations, visits allowed the members of the commission to interview several workers in Angola and Mozambique, and to directly observe the colonial realities and dynamics.

As mentioned above, the inquiry procedures had several limitations. For example, information related to events that had taken place before 23 November, 1960, the date of entry into force of Convention No. 105 in the empire, could not be regarded as evidence, but only as contextual elements.³⁸ The nature of the commission’s investigation, eminently juridical as the Governing Body stated, meant that the scrutiny and analysis of the legislation, including local decrees, constituted the core of its focus. To produce actual evidences of law violations or breaches was particularly difficult, especially when dealing with an authoritarian political regime like Portugal. The means available for the accusation

to produce evidence were especially scarce, and heavily constrained. Notwithstanding, reflections regarding the limitations of the research process caused by the dictatorial nature of the state are almost absent in the commission's report. On the other hand, the commission's decision that the representatives of neither party could participate in the visits to Angola and Mozambique objectively was detrimental to one of the parties to the extent that the commission needed Portuguese guides and translators. As expected, these were colonial administrators or inspectors, or carefully appointed by them.³⁹

But these limitations did not prevent the members of the inquiry commission from finding several violations of the convention both within the existing legislation or in the colonial decrees. Contradictions were also identified in the statements of some colonial officers. Nor did they prevent, despite Portuguese official efforts, a few African workers in Angola and Mozambique from clearly stating that theirs was not a free contractual relationship.⁴⁰ If this initiative increased the information available on the Portuguese colonial realities, which could be mobilised for critics of empire, it also favoured movements of imperial self-scrutiny by the Portuguese authorities and rulers, illustrated, for example, by an information request issued by the Angolan government to all district governors so as to assess the compliance of labour practices with the terms of Convention 105. The signalling of irregularities in several districts could be used to try to apply last-minute measures. It would also increase and update the available information regarding actual practices on the spot.⁴¹

THE PORTUGUESE STRIKE BACK: FORCED LABOUR AND POSTCOLONIAL WORLDS

In the aforementioned correspondence that Ribeiro da Cunha maintained after the filing of the complaint, he ensured that the Portuguese government would not remain passive.⁴² When Silva Cunha, a colonial and law *expert* and future Minister of Overseas, was sent to the archives and library of the ILO to prepare the Portuguese defence, he had an additional task to perform. He was asked to examine the possibility of the Portuguese government lodging a complaint against Liberia or Ghana, the two states that had contributed the most to the discussion of Portuguese colonialism within international *fora*, and to find information that could be used for that purpose. The aim was clear: to fight back, mobilising the same instruments.⁴³

Although Silva Cunha did find some traces of the existence of modalities of coerced labour in Ghana, Liberia presented more favourable conditions for the filing of a complaint.⁴⁴ The latter had already been the subject of an investigation in the 1930s related to the topic of slavery led by the League of Nations and which involved American companies.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Liberia had been systematically violating its obligation to deliver annual reports on Convention No. 29, ratified also in the early 1930s. Besides that, the information collected by Portuguese officials indicated that many practices that could be labelled as forced labour were still effective, and had legal backing.

In August 1961 the Portuguese government lodged the complaint against the government of Liberia based on the non-compliance with Convention No. 29 of 1930, unlike Ghana, which had based itself on the latest convention, of 1957. The government of Liberia, in turn, requested the ILO to immediately dismiss the complaint due to, among other reasons, the fact that the complaint was politically motivated and constituted a mere retaliation for the Liberian initiative within the UN, with the aim of diverting attention from the complaint filed by Ghana. All these arguments appear to have some validity. But this initiative, it seems clear, was also guided by an ideological and diplomatic logic that was part of the Portuguese strategy to strengthen its imperial legitimacy abroad. To that end, the administration mustered the ILO's official documents but did the same regarding, for instance, information from the US government Labor Department regarding several enterprises developed by foreign companies in Liberia (among them, Firestone), clippings of foreign press, and some literature, such as the collective volume *Le Travail en Afrique Noire* organised by *Présence Africaine*, and involving authors such as Cheika Anta Diop and Georges Balandier, the latter specifically addressing Liberia and the labour practices of Firestone in the country. The mobilisation of sources as diverse as those provided contrasts with the widespread image of the Portuguese authorities as being unaware of or, at least, immune to international developments, either in the political or academic fields. Yet, the instrumental use of a volume written by individuals who shared a bitter assessment of European colonialism is still surprising.⁴⁶ Founded on these sources, the Portuguese government alleged that the Liberian government did not meet the obligations associated with the convention. According to the Portuguese government, there were particular groups of the population that might be coercively mobilised to work. That had to do with the

fact that in Liberia there was a dual system that divided the population according to their degree of “development”: the population residing mainly in urban and coastal areas (to a considerable extent composed of the descendants of freed slaves from the US), who enjoyed a broader set of rights; and the majority of the population, who lived in the so-called “hinterland” and who were governed by a special jurisdiction, which was composed of legislation with the revealing titles of Tribal Jurisdiction, the Laws and Administrative Regulations Governing the Hinterland, and the Aborigines Law.⁴⁷

It is hard not to see a resonance with the so-called “Belgian thesis” in this process triggered by the Portuguese; that is, the idea that the existence of different socio-cultural groups within a state was not exclusive of the colonial empires, as the same happened in countries with “indigenous” populations, such as Latin American countries, the USA, and Canada, with the difference that these were geographically contiguous. If the Portuguese government could obtain a favourable verdict in both complaints—if it was to be proved that Liberia did not meet its obligations under the convention, unlike Portugal, the Portuguese government could give an instrumental use to ILO’s decisions in its diplomatic strategy, reinforcing its argument that the socio-economic development of indigenous (and “backward”) peoples was not dependent on the juridical-constitutional status of a given territory. Moreover, it would allow the Portuguese authorities to charge the independent African states involved in diplomatic initiatives against the empire for committing some of the “crimes” that they accused the colonial powers of. The fact that Liberia had been independent since the nineteenth century served as a guarantee that its record in terms of forced labour could not be blamed on a colonial power.⁴⁸

Despite being launched in August, this process would only start after the commission of inquiry of Ghana’s complaint concluded its workings, in 1962. In contrast to the position presented by the representatives of Ghana in the accusation, the Portuguese rulers took an apparently less committed stance. Although the commission of inquiry had indicated witnesses (mostly Liberian officials and state rulers), the Portuguese authorities renounced the opportunity to call new witnesses. NGOs also played a substantially more limited role, and the inquiry commission itself concluded that an on-site inspection was not necessary. According to Jenks, and officially, the organisation of the visit would be very complicated due to the communication and transport conditions, especially

those related to roads and housing. According to Ribeiro da Cunha, the Portuguese government did not grant its agreement on this decision, nor had it been asked for. Its initial position, communicated by Motta Veiga, law professor and future deputy-minister of the Council of Ministers, was that the procedures should be the same as those that guided the complaint by Ghana. But in the end the government chose not to object to it, as it was anticipated that the exemption of the visit meant that the commission would advance a negative verdict for the government of Liberia in case it had “a modicum of independence”, it was stated. If that was not the case, the absence of a visit would be a “great argument to attack the report with,” when it was submitted to the Governing Body.⁴⁹

THE ILO AS AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR: THE DYNAMICS OF SUPERVISION AND REFORM

After the outcome of the two complaints was disclosed, the Portuguese authorities claimed that, without further ado, they had a diplomatic victory. The internal communication produced at the time reveals that this was not just an assessment born out of diplomatic considerations—a large part of the authorities genuinely believed this was true. However, a closer examination of the two events reveals that the results associated with the complaints were much more ambivalent. There is no doubt that the verdict on Liberia was substantially more assertive: it was determined that the Liberian government had failed to fulfil its obligations under the ratification of the convention (namely the one regarding the delivery of annual reports), and that its legislation allowed misdemeanours of the provisions of Convention No. 29, which was particularly relevant as evidence in an eminently juridical process. However, the Liberian government made the decision during the investigation process to repeal some of the most critical legislation related to the abuses and forced labour, in conformity with the commission’s suggestions. It promised to abolish the special administration in the *hinterland*, a promise made by its General-Attorney but that did not materialise at that time, and also to ratify new ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. These decisions were recognised by the commission as demonstrating the government’s will to reform and improve its social and labour legislation and policies. Also, the decision to revise the agreements established between the Liberian government

and foreign companies such as Firestone and their concessions for the supply of manpower were welcomed by the commission members, even if they set a short deadline for the formal renewal of the terms of franchise. Some inconsistencies or clear violations of the provisions of the convention persisted, and the commission of inquiry set a timetable for the future abolition or overcoming of these critical points, instructing the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to monitor its implementation. Some recommendations that were not directly related to the convention were also produced, namely those associated with the eventual ratification of other conventions, such as the convention on aboriginal and tribal populations and the convention on labour inspection.⁵⁰

The ILO's negative verdict concerning Liberia may have been motivated by various reasons. The legislation, which the Liberian authorities claimed as being obsolete, contained numerous inconsistencies and allowed forced labour practices. The government's decision not to deliver reports constituted a violation of the convention in itself. And, crucially, the period under review was extensive—around thirty years, contrasting with the Portuguese case, in which the period under review was of about a year—although the original intention of the commission was to limit the analysis to the period after the filing of the complaint, something that the Portuguese authorities did not accept. The realisation by the commission that some witnesses appeared to want to deliberately mislead them also did not favour the Liberian government's position.⁵¹ Moreover, the defence of Liberia's case, from a legal point of view, was particularly complicated: the legislation that was found was part of a Code of Laws which was being compiled by the Government of Liberia with the assistance of American experts. The government's defence strategy was to claim that that code was merely informative and that the legislation in question had been automatically revoked upon the ratification of the convention, an explanation that was rejected by the members of the commission of inquiry. But the most revealing aspect coming out of an integrated approach to both these cases, beyond a purely legal interpretation, is the number of similarities to be found between the two processes.

As mentioned before, both the private and public declarations by Portuguese authorities show that the majority of them seem to have genuinely believed in a clear-cut, politically significant victory. The assessment conducted by Costa Morais, an officer of the Department of

Political Affairs of the Ministry of Overseas, is symptomatic of this creed. Noting that the report was “honest and impartial,” in contrast to those produced by the “commissions—particularly political—of the United Nations,” Costa Morais did not fail to draw attention to some aspects that could enable the government of Liberia to save face. One had to do with the decision not to visit the territory. But Costa Morais assured that the decision made perfect sense, since the legislation authorising forced labour had already been revoked, and the impact of the new legislation could not yet be properly scrutinised.⁵² But that was a situation similar to that in force in the Portuguese “overseas provinces” during the visit of the commission of inquiry, when several laws had recently been revoked (with the exception of the Native Labour Code). In this particular aspect, the Portuguese government, always zealous of its imperial sovereignty, had been under a much deeper and pervasive scrutiny than the Liberian government.

The other two aspects were related to statements of the report which stated that the rapporteurs believed the recent economic development that Liberia had experienced had not been based on forced labour, and which expressed optimism regarding the future of labour policies of Liberia. For Costa Morais, the explanation was that it was a way to commit the government of Liberia to the final report, and at the same time and implicitly to condemn Liberian labour policies prior to that recent past. Costa Morais failed to observe, or did not want to see, the very remarkable resemblance to the narrative adopted in the complaint against Portugal; that is, the will of the ILO’s experts and officials to value above all the opportunity created by the complaints to lead both governments to adopt the organisation’s promoted standards and policies. But that did not seem to be obvious to the colonial administrators at the time. As Costa Morais signalled, “the recommendations were not limited to focusing on the complaint, but they went even further.”⁵³ He was referring to the recommendation of the commission of inquiry that new conventions should be ratified. Deliberately or not, he ignored that the same type of recommendations was included in the report of Ghana’s complaint against Portugal, the Portuguese government even ratifying the 1947 Convention on labour inspection during the duration of the mandate of the commission of inquiry and being constantly urged to ratify more conventions afterwards.

As was mentioned before, in the report of the complaint filed against the Portuguese empire, the commission decided to adopt a reformist

narrative that emphasised the ILO's role as an element conducive to changes, not failing to underline its reformist nature. The production of this narrative would not have been possible if the Portuguese authorities had not decided to deepen their integration within the ILO's normative framework since the late 1950s and, more importantly, if the multiple reforms which coincided in time with the complaint process had not happened. As early as May 1961, the Portuguese government legally created autonomous labour inspections in the colonies and outlawed compulsory cotton cultivation programmes and explicitly prohibited the engagement of the administrative authorities in the recruitment of “native” workers. In September, the *Indigenato* regime was finally abolished and, given the legal vacuum thus created, the future repeal of the Native Labour Code became unavoidable.⁵⁴ Of course, these changes were not only a consequence of the complaint process nor were they exclusively caused by international factors. The growing contestation in the colonies and the dissemination and affirmation of a “reformist” momentum in the metropole surely contributed to this outcome as well.⁵⁵ But there is little doubt that the complaint process was part of the set of events that made the reformist path possible, and politically useful. Most importantly, the complaint ensured that the result of the reforms would duly be in conformity with the ILO's standards and policies about colonial labour. That was what happened, in a more explicit way, in the case of the draft of the new Rural Labour Code, promulgated in April 1962. The draft had to be approved by Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in order to meet not only the international standards that the Portuguese government was committed to but also the recommendations produced by the commission of inquiry.⁵⁶

The adoption of this reformist narrative implied, on the other hand, the devaluation of some cases of abuses that were identified, presenting them as the exception, not the rule, contrary to what was suggested by Ghana's representatives. However, that did not prevent the commission from negatively assessing some events, such as an incident in Mozambique, where a European foreman did beat an African worker during public works on roads. Moreover, the remaining workers of this group, when asked by the commission members, claimed they were working against their will. The request for clarification by the commission had one important consequence: the company became an object of investigation by the Portuguese authorities.⁵⁷ Other companies' sites

where the commission was faced with coerced workers, such as Cassequel or Diamang, were subject to regular scrutiny, later reported to the Committee of Experts during the 1960s.⁵⁸ More importantly, the verdict of the commission ensured that, in the future, the Portuguese labour policies would be under close scrutiny by the Committee of Experts. This scrutiny would persist until the demise of the colonial empire. As the recommendations and suggestions of the commission went largely beyond the strict domain of freedom at work (including topics such as the level of education of indigenous peoples, which in turn compromised their ability to express their grievances to the authorities, the Portuguese development policies, or the (in)existence of representative trade unions), the areas of Portuguese colonial social policy under international scrutiny expanded. This situation became particularly critical to the Portuguese government from 1962 until 1974, as the initiatives aimed at contesting Portuguese colonialism within the ILO multiplied. Despite the triumphalist declarations by the Portuguese authorities, the process of the complaint by Ghana's government had costs to the Portuguese authorities, and the Portuguese cooperation involved risks.⁵⁹

However, the recognition of the costs and the risks is not contradictory to the idea that the Portuguese authorities were also able to obtain benefits from both processes. That was indeed the assessment reached by several actors closely connected to the Portuguese imperial government. That is the only explanation for the Portuguese strategy of dissemination of the events, which involved the publishing of books in English, such as Evangelista's, but also the use of brochures written in English announcing the outcome of the complaint against Liberia and informing that there were many other countries where similar practices could be found, countries which had "indulged in repeated calumny of the civilizing presence of the Portuguese in Africa." The episode served as a "lesson to those countries responsible for the conduct of the policy of the western powers."⁶⁰ The same kind of strategy had been followed by the newspaper *A Voz*, for which Evangelista wrote. There he created a section entitled "Those who vote against us," to denounce the conditions of life in hostile countries. Perhaps excited about Jenks' statement that "the new African states must be convinced that the rules of the game are the same for everyone" and that this result meant that "black and white people in Africa must be governed by the same laws," the Portuguese authorities began to study new initiatives. According to Ribeiro da Cunha, this was an idea that had already been presented by the President of the Council

of Ministers himself. In June 1962 this strategy got formal institutional backing. Motivated by the “true success” of the complaint, in the sense that it would have motivated profound legislative changes in Liberia—which was recognised by the ILO itself, according to the Portuguese authorities—the Portuguese government created a commission with representatives of the Foreign Affairs, Corporation and Social Welfare, and Overseas ministries that was held responsible for gathering data that would enable the filing of complaints against countries “which systematically proved to be hostile towards Portugal.” However, and according to Ribeiro da Cunha, the ILO had “certain ideas about this procedure that should be considered before we launch ourselves into these complaints.” Despite Portuguese plans, events like the complaint against Liberia were not repeated.⁶¹

But the development of new diplomatic initiatives in order to strike back internationally was not the only way in which the Portuguese government mobilised the processes of both complaints to promote its international stand as a legitimate, progressive imperial power. The labour reforms, approved by the ILO, could thus be presented as evidence that the empire legislation and policies were in accordance with international norms and standards, evidence of an empire that intended to streamline its administration and improve the living conditions of indigenous peoples. The interaction with the ILO could actually be used as a means to develop new and modern forms of self-scrutiny and formulation of imperial policies. The engagement with the ILO could also be presented as a positive example, in contrast to the UN: the Portuguese cooperation with the former denied the putative isolationism of the empire. As a government official stated, “if the most responsible specialised agency of the United Nations affirms that forced labour practices are forbidden by the Portuguese Government,” this “will be internationally very useful to us and it will undo the campaign that in that important sector is being directed against us.”⁶²

This kind of argument was particularly important at a time when Portuguese colonialism was being seriously challenged internationally, not only in international *fora* but also in public debates in countries that were long-standing allies of the Portuguese empire, such as the USA and the UK. Moreover, it is known that the US government strove for the Portuguese government to implement substantial political and social reforms. For instance, US consular officials in Mozambique and Angola, being critically aware of the labour realities in these colonies, sometimes

presented labour reforms to their counterparts at the State Department as proof that the Portuguese government had the ability to reform itself, therefore mobilising the social question in order to justify or promote US support to the Portuguese imperial stance. The fact that these reforms had the approval of the ILO and, an aspect of clear importance, that they were influenced by that organisation, were a sign that the Portuguese authorities were complying with international standards. For actors like William Gibson, the American consul in Angola, who believed that the USA should continue to “support the continued Portuguese presence in Angola” in the hope that the Portuguese government would apply the new reforms and create others so as to improve the living conditions of indigenous peoples, the growing Portuguese integration within the ILO frameworks and the reforms associated to it were welcomed.⁶³ According to him, “the new labour code [Rural Labour Code]” was “probably the most important legislative step taken to date by the Portuguese government to carry out the socio-economic implications of last year’s abolition of the Indigenato statute.”⁶⁴ As another consular officer ensured, the new code provided “adequate legal reply [to] recommendations [of the] ILO committee which recently investigated [the] labour situation in Angola.”⁶⁵ For the officers of the British Colonial Office, who also accompanied the complaint filed by Ghana closely, this process was also welcome. They thus foresaw that this was “one of those too rare examples of some practical good coming out of the ILO.”⁶⁶

CONCLUSION

The history of the two complaints is just an example of the many instances when internationalism and imperialism intersected throughout the twentieth century. Despite their relative absence in conventional narratives, these two events mobilised a broad group of actors, who at the time realised the importance and the possibilities of an international dispute of this kind. The detailed study of these complaints, of the multiple motivations in confrontation, and of the unforeseen consequences improves our understanding of the ways in which the history of the intersection between the international and the imperial did assume varied manifestations and produced diversified outcomes.

Therefore, I would like to underscore three particular aspects that marked both events and are discernible through their combined investigation.

First, the implicit or immediate downplay of a so-called “technical issue” at a time when political sovereignty seemed to be *the* question in the debates on colonial legitimacy is, as this text shows, misleading. Describing these processes as mere diplomatic quarrels between a colonial empire and new, “decolonised” states is reductionist. Despite the guarantees given by the ILO to the Portuguese state regarding the preservation of logics of sovereignty, the processes addressed demonstrate how a *simple* act of diplomatic nature can create a space, ad-hoc in its nature, through which various organisations and actors were able to act in a more significant and perhaps effective way. That included officers of the British Colonial Office, who continued to fear the outbursts of international inspection of different colonial situations, anti-colonial activists, and philanthropists of diverse origins and with different outlooks and purposes. The study of the profuse and intricate networks established, of the circuits of information dissemination, and of the more covert interference of certain actors is a future investigative trail that may enhance our understanding of the multiplicity of actors, intentions, and projects in conflict in these and similar processes.

Second, it is essential to think about the role of the ILO as an organisation with its own aims and dynamics, and with a considerable degree of autonomy. As this text shows, the international political context strongly conditioned the performance of the ILO’s experts and leaders. Some of the inspection and supervision mechanisms used by the organisation in these two complaints were the result of a cumulative process of development and improvement of investigative mechanisms associated with the internationalisation of the imperial debates. Given this, one cannot ignore that the extent of the scope of analysis and the toughening of the negotiating position of the organisation were greatly influenced by the historical and political contexts that conditioned the debates about the colonial question. The same happened with regard to the organisation’s ability to condition and model processes of reform, to ensure an even tighter scrutiny in the future, which was never reversed by the Portuguese authorities, as well as to enhance the growing normative integration of the states involved with these complaints.

But, and thirdly, Portuguese authorities also had the ability to give an instrumental use to both processes, reflected in the authorities’ narrative of a “diplomatic victory” that amalgamated the two complaints but, most importantly, in the way it invoked the ILO to lend legitimacy to their reformist efforts. Moreover, the two complaints demonstrate

how diverse international organisations were seen and were related to the colonial powers in different ways. The divergent relationships established between the Portuguese government and the UN and the ILO clearly show that the *international* interacted, in many, divergent, and convoluted ways, with the imperial.

NOTES

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7. Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 300–372; Sandrine Kott “The Forced Labour Issue between Human and Social Rights, 1947–1957”, *Humanity* 3, no. 3 (2012), pp. 321–335.
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9. See the African Labour Survey, rich in data on both independent countries and on the rest of the colonies. See International Labour Office, *African Labour Survey* (Geneva: ILO, 1962).
10. See Daniel Maul, *Human Rights*, pp. 264–267.
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PART III

Imperial Resiliencies in the Post-colonial
World Order

The Decolonization of Development: Rural Development in India Before and After 1947

Corinna R. Unger

INTRODUCTION

The process of decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century has concerned historians for a long time. Initially many historians in Europe studied decolonization from the point of view of the European colonial governments, specifically focusing on their decision-making process with regard to granting sovereignty to the former colonies. In later years, and also increasingly outside of Europe, historians began to analyze the activities of anti-colonial leaders and the role of nationalism in challenging colonial rule, thereby complementing the Eurocentric image of decolonization with the perspective from the colonies and their political leaders. Today many historians agree on the importance of integrating the two levels of analysis while also paying attention to local actors, politics, and culture as well as to the role international developments like the Cold War played in the decolonization process.¹ By understanding

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decolonization as a complex process involving many different players, localities, and levels of interaction, it no longer appears to have been completed by the former colonizers on the day a former colony achieved formal independence. Rather, decolonization is increasingly viewed as a multilayered process that lasted several years or even decades and continued well beyond the date of independence. Srirupa Roy has argued with regard to India that the time between August 1947, when India achieved formal independence, and January 1950, when the country adopted its constitution, should be understood as “a process of translating—in its literal sense of ‘carrying over’—colonial structures and technologies into a nation-statist order.”² Other scholars have taken the idea of the transitory character of decolonization even further. For example, Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah Ansari have suggested that instead of focusing on the caesura of 1947, historians should consider the period between the 1930s and the 1960s “as a formative period in South Asian history in terms of citizenship, the politics of development, and the secular state.”³ Taking up their suggestion to embrace a diachronic view of the decolonization period, this chapter focuses on continuities and changes of rural development concepts and policies in the context of India’s decolonization process.⁴

When India became officially independent in August 1947, many Indian politicians and intellectuals hoped that they could finally realize what they had been discussing for many decades: the question of what the country’s future should look like; how its political, social, and cultural life should be designed; which position it should take in Asia and in the world; and what its development goals should be.⁵ All of those issues were related to the question of how to deal with India’s colonial and non-colonial past. In 1946, India’s future Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,⁶ had emphasized the importance of the past for India’s future: “The present and the future inevitably grow out of the past and bear its stamp, and to forget this is to build without foundations and to cut off the roots of national growth.”⁷ At the same time, Nehru was convinced that the old ways had to make room for new ideas and practices: “National progress can [...] neither lie in a repetition of the past nor in its denial. New patterns must inevitably be adopted but they must be integrated with the old.”⁸ Nehru’s statements suggest that he believed that independent India would have to find a balance between “old” and “new,” between “past” and “future.” While independence offered the opportunity to eliminate those colonial structures that were considered

harmful to Indian needs and interests, others might actually be useful or valuable to India's future, and yet others again would have to remain in place for largely pragmatic reasons. Considering how hastily the British left India, it appeared impossible to overhaul the country's political and economic structures without risking the unity and stability of a state that had already been shaken by a violent division.⁹ This urgency worked in the interest of those unwilling to go any further than necessary in changing established structures.¹⁰ As Partha Chatterjee has argued, "the new state chose to retain in a virtually unaltered form the basic structure of the civil service, the police administration, the judicial system, including the codes of civil and criminal law, and the armed forces as they existed in the colonial period."¹¹ This conservative tendency was supported by the fact that many members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) who had been trained by the British remained in office when the ICS was transformed into the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). Thereby they contributed to "perpetuating a national administrative system that in numbers and outlook was more suitable to carry out the narrow colonial functions of law and order than the broad responsibilities for economic development of an independent government."¹² Something similar could be said for many other fields of Indian public life in the post-1947 years.

Against the background of the strong structural and institutional continuities, the new Indian state faced the challenge of having to provide a visible political, economic, and, not the least, symbolic alternative to the colonial state in order to secure the trust and support of the Indian population. Indian politicians had to convince the public that their development plans were in the interest of the nation and not in the interest of the colonial power or its successor. Hence, the Indian state after 1947, in making itself the caretaker of the Indian population, "was enlarged, its ambitions inflated, and it was transformed from a distant, alien object into one that aspired to infiltrate the everyday lives of Indians, proclaiming itself responsible for everything they could desire: jobs, ration cards, educational places, security, cultural recognition."¹³ All of these tasks were part of what became "the chief 'reason of state' in independent India": development.¹⁴ Development in terms of economic growth, social equality, and the improvement of living standards would allow India to overcome domestic problems that were considered the result of colonialism, particularly poverty and "underdevelopment", and to establish the country as a respected nation internationally.¹⁵ Development thus functioned as a lens through which many

of the colonial inheritances were filtered and adjusted, thereby becoming closely entangled with both the state-building project and the nation-building project of independent India.

At the same time, the room for maneuver the Indian government had on the federal and state levels was severely limited by economic constraints, conflicts of interest between regions and political parties, international constellations (particularly the Cold War), and, perhaps most importantly, the Indian population's willingness or lack thereof to cooperate with and support the political campaigns of New Delhi's officials. With regard to development programs, the limited resources of the new Indian state led to the question whether older approaches practiced by the British administration, by regional Indian governments, and by private actors should be entirely discarded, or whether some continuity in terms of development thinking and practice was politically acceptable. Of course the "transition from the colonial to the postcolonial" was "far too complex to be encapsulated in the dichotomy change/no change."¹⁶ Many of independent India's needs and concerns were rooted in colonial structures and could not be conceptualized as purely postcolonial problems. Generally a clear divide between "colonial," "British," and "pre-colonial" or "post-colonial," "Indian" patterns, norms, and interests is difficult (and problematic) to establish. While for anti-colonial nationalists the "search for a usable past" was a logical and necessary step to challenge colonial rule, historians should not be tempted to reproduce the distinction between two allegedly separate time periods (before and after the end of formal colonial rule) and the characteristics associated with them by their contemporaries. Thus, this chapter focuses on the ways in which development concepts were transformed in the context of decolonization by studying continuities and transformations in India's rural development policies across the caesura of 1947.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of independent India's attempts to solve its food problems, which were closely linked to the need to reform agricultural production and rural socioeconomic structures in many parts of the subcontinent. Agricultural cooperatives, which had been introduced by the British in the late nineteenth century as a tool of colonial rule, were granted a prominent position in this effort. This leads to the question which ideals and goals were assigned to cooperatives as instruments of rural development in colonial and postcolonial India, and in which ways the postcolonial state continued, adapted, or discarded colonial development approaches. In trying to answer this

question, the chapter aims to offer insight into India's transition into a postcolonial, and possibly, sovereign nation.

HUNGER, FOOD, AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING THE INDIAN NATION

Food was a central field of political decision-making in newly independent India, and one of extraordinary symbolic importance at a time when the memory of the 1943–1944 Bengal famine was still fresh.¹⁷ Yet the Bengal famine had only been the dramatic climax of a long history of food shortages in India. The British colonial administration had considered the “backwardness” of Indian peasants and agriculture the major reason for low yields and shortages. Consequently, several generations of colonial officials had tried to promote agricultural development by introducing European scientific approaches to India.¹⁸ The belief that Indian agriculture was inefficient lay at the heart of this thinking, which remained in place until the end of British rule. As the British Agricultural Commissioner with the Government of India argued in 1944, “At present India's rural economy, with its almost entire dependence on manual labour, is at an extremely low stage of development. The case for modernisation is unanswerable.”¹⁹ Hence, Indian agriculture would have to be mechanized and intensified to feed the (growing) Indian population.

Most Indian observers agreed that India's agriculture was not productive enough, yet many of them, particularly those critical of British rule, challenged the assumption that this was an “Indian” deficiency. Some of them argued that British colonial policies had created the structural problems that resulted in shortages and famines.²⁰ By disqualifying British colonial claims of improvement and contrasting them with their own visions of development, Indian nationalists tried to secure popular support and political legitimacy for their cause of ending British rule.²¹ While most of them agreed that British rule had been harmful to India's economic situation, they differed about the measures an independent Indian government should take to improve the country's living and economic standards. On the left side of the political spectrum the Communist Party as well as the Socialist Party called for a radical redistribution of land to put an end to the exploitation of small peasants and to give the landless access to the resources they needed.²² More moderately, the followers of a Gandhian line of thinking believed that

the food problem should be solved on a communal basis, which would also provide a chance to promote solidarity among Indians across caste and religious differences. Meanwhile, Nehru and other Congress leaders argued that the state needed to take a more active role in planning and regulating the economy.²³ What the different positions had in common was their emphasis on the all-Indian character of the food issue, which signaled the importance of the population's well-being for the establishment of a stable, coherent nation state despite the large size of India and its immense diversity in terms of culture, language, religion, and social and economic structures. Thus, food security and, implicitly, food-related policies could serve to strengthen or weaken the ties between the population and the government.

The first efforts of the Nehru government to improve India's food situation were rather half-hearted ones, and, as the case of the Grow More Food Programme suggests, presented a linear continuation of British food policies.²⁴ The program had been established by the British Government of India in reaction to the Bengal famine and aimed at increasing agricultural production. As part of the campaign, seeds and fertilizers were to be distributed to peasants, irrigation was to be extended, and new land was to be made available and used more intensively. When the British left in 1947, India's interim government decided to continue the Grow More Food Programme, aiming to raise food grain output by 4.8 million tons and to achieve self-sufficiency by 1951. The measures to reach this goal were the same as those foreseen by the British: the increased use of fertilizers and improved seeds, extended irrigation, land extension, and research on pests and diseases that troubled Indian agriculture.²⁵ From an administrative and governmental perspective the continuation of the Grow More Food Programme after 1947 seems perfectly reasonable. If newly independent India was to survive as an independent nation, the lack of food and the problems resulting from it—hunger, disease, poverty, and possibly civil unrest—had to be solved or prevented. At the same time the fact that the new government continued what had begun as a colonial campaign seems indicative of the pragmatic attitude that characterized many decisions taken in New Delhi in the immediate post-1947 period. Although India was now officially independent, at least structurally the late colonial state continued to exist and function in the field of agricultural policy as it had before 1947. Specifically, the campaign's emphasis on technical improvements mirrored the unwillingness or inability both of the British colonial

administration and of the new Indian government to engage more thoroughly with the socioeconomic situation of the peasants and rural life more generally.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results of the Grow More Food campaign, which was phased out in 1952, were considered disappointing. An evaluation committee came to the conclusion that in order to increase food production it was not sufficient to provide better seeds and to increase irrigation but that rural living conditions had to be improved, and that the rural population had to be given an active role in these efforts.²⁶ Implicitly, the committee members identified a conceptual weakness of the Grow More Food campaign that was characteristic of many colonial and non-colonial development programs at the time: for the new technologies to bear fruit, the peasants had to embrace them and cooperate actively with state representatives like extension officers. However, in colonial as well as postcolonial settings, the peasants were regularly accused of being stubborn, rejecting expertise, and undermining development efforts by continuing their old ways. In many instances class-based differences between peasants and government officials and deeply rooted distrust of the administration on part of the rural population made cooperation very difficult. In the eyes of many peasants it did not make a large difference whether the extension officers and administrators were British or Indian; what mattered to them was that they spoke a different language, showed little interest in the agricultural knowledge of the peasants, and, perhaps most importantly, represented the state, which was not known for its empathy toward peasants, be it the precolonial, the colonial, or the postcolonial state.²⁷ Decolonization, despite its inclusionary rhetoric, was an elite project in many regards, and elite perceptions of peasants were often very similar to those of the former colonizers.²⁸

Class interests also played a decisive role in preventing a land reform from being realized in India. There was broad agreement in India and abroad that the low productivity of Indian agriculture was closely tied to the unequal access to land and the economic dependence of small peasants and day laborers on large land owners, and that this structure had to be changed in the interest of economic growth and less inequality. Several steps to restructure land ownership were taken in the late 1940s and early 1950s: The *zamindar* system, which the British had used as part of their system of indirect rule and which favored the existence of a landowner class at the cost of small peasants, was abolished, and land

ceilings were instituted to limit the amount of land one person could legally own. However, in practice many former *zamindars* kept large holdings while dividing them up on paper, and the land ceilings had very little effect on the actual patterns on land ownership. Also, the ruling Congress Party had to compromise to receive the necessary votes to stay in power, seeing that the Indian Constitution had made land reform a responsibility of the states.²⁹ Landed interests thus proved much stronger than the willingness to compromise in the interest of the nation's peasants and productivity. Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador to India, summarized the situation in 1953 as follows: "Although Nehru talks constantly about the need for [land] reform, there are strong influences which prevent him from actually pressing forward [...]. Land reform programs are for the most part paper accomplishments, and where they exist they are largely unenforced."³⁰

Consequently, the Nehru government and the Planning Commission tried to find alternatives to land reform. They identified agricultural cooperatives as an instrument that they argued came closest to the needs and interests of India's peasants and the country's agriculture and economy at large.³¹ In a debate in the Indian parliament in 1959, members of the Congress Party argued that "co-operative farming was the only method by which the peasants with small holdings could produce more by using modern methods of agriculture."³² Nehru went even further in stating that "co-operative farming was 'the most profitable and the most scientific' means of tackling the country's food problem."³³ Apart from the economic advantages, Nehru also expected cooperatives to have a political effect on Indian rural life.³⁴ Cooperatives would return agency to small and poor peasants, who had long been trapped in poverty and dependence created by the colonial rule, which, in the eyes of its critics, had strengthened caste and class differences. Given the opportunity to break out of these structures, the small peasants would have an incentive to increase their productivity, yet they would do so as part of the cooperative representing the village. Thus, cooperative agriculture was both in the interest of individual peasants and in the interest of the Indian nation at large.

Based on the ways in which the Nehru government and the Planning Commission portrayed the benefits and value of agricultural cooperatives, it might appear as if they had been invented specifically for independent India. Yet the cooperative model had originally been

introduced by the British in the late nineteenth century to prevent peasants from challenging those socioeconomic patterns on which both the colonial economy and the colonial system of rule depended. Against this background, how can we understand the fact that cooperatives were given a key role in independent India's agricultural development strategy in the 1950s? To answer this question, let us first turn to the colonial period.

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT: RAIFFEISEN COOPERATIVES IN INDIA

Agricultural cooperatives came to British India largely as a response to peasant uprisings in the 1870s and 1880s.³⁵ At the time, peasants in the area around Mumbai (then Bombay) rebelled against what they perceived as growing financial pressure produced by British taxation, which resulted in a debt crisis that drove many peasants into financial ruin. What added to the crisis was that credits offered by money-lenders were forbiddingly expensive, which made it even more difficult for the peasants to survive. The British colonial government identified the "traditional" money-lenders in the villages as the key source of the problem. Thus, in their eyes it was the "backward" social structure of Indian villages that was at the root of the problem. Since the British, in line with the dogma of liberalism, did not want to take on "the responsibility of providing credit," they had to find alternative ways of improving the economic situation of the peasants.³⁶ Hence, the government of Madras sent one of its colonial officers, Frederick Nicholson, to Europe to study agrarian credit systems there.³⁷ In Germany Nicholson discovered the so-called Raiffeisen cooperatives and called for their replication in British India. What made those cooperatives attractive in the eyes of a British colonial administrator?

The Raiffeisen cooperative model was developed by the protestant mayor Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen. During the famine of 1846–1847 he had formed a benevolent assistance society similar to England's Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, the first consumer cooperative based on the principles of self-help, self-responsibility, and self-administration.³⁸ Raiffeisen's efforts in Germany became similarly popular, as the rapidly growing number of consumer cooperatives showed in the following years. Yet the general problem of peasants falling into debt remained unsolved. In 1864, Raiffeisen came up with

the model of small, non-profit credit societies. By pooling money and granting credits on the condition of unlimited liability, the peasants could circumvent private lenders and produce savings that could later be re-invested. They could thus help each other to improve their living standard without falling into an endless debt cycle. Raiffeisen's "peasant-friendly" approach³⁹ was closely linked to his belief that at a time when communal property was increasingly being replaced by individual property rights and the influence of the state was growing rapidly, the village, as the supposedly original unit of economic and social life, had to be strengthened. In other words, Raiffeisen wanted to shelter peasants "from the uncertainties of the market" and to endorse solidarity among them as a counterforce to the fragmentation of society many conservative observers feared was taking place in the context of industrialization and urbanization.⁴⁰ Consequently, the cooperative model emphasized the principle of transparency and endowed a strong sense of reciprocal responsibility on its members.⁴¹ From the point of view of social reformers at the time, self-help at the grassroots level promised to provide a sense of commonality that would counteract alienation, overcome poverty, and revitalize "traditional" ways of (rural) living. Cooperatives became a prominent subject of transnational social reformism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with transfers taking place between England, Germany, Denmark, India, Russia, and the United States, among other countries.⁴²

In the eyes of Frederick Nicholson, the Raiffeisen cooperative model provided a perfect fit for the situation observed in Madras and elsewhere. Broadly, one can detect three reasons for this view. First, since cooperatives emphasized self-help, the role of the state would remain limited, which was important to British liberals as well as to proponents of the concept of indirect rule. Second, the cooperative would help to raise the level of economic production and consumption which, in turn, would reduce the risk of peasant rebellions and contribute to the stability of colonial rule. Third, the cooperative would provide a structure within which peasants could be introduced to new agricultural technologies and, at the same time, be made familiar with a work ethos that was considered to be the norm in Europe. In that sense, cooperatives would not only serve as tools to develop the rural economy but also as instruments to educate and "civilize" the rural population.⁴³ The Madras government followed Nicholson's recommendation and began to establish

Raiffeisen-like credit societies in the 1890s.⁴⁴ These experiments attracted the attention of the Imperial Government, which, in 1904, passed the Cooperative Credit Societies Act.⁴⁵ This act required provincial governments to “establish co-operatives as an alternative source of rural credit.”⁴⁶ Several revisions and additions of the original act were put in place over the next decades; in 1912, a cooperative central bank was installed. By 1930 over 100,000 Raiffeisen-like credit societies with four million members existed in British India (although very unevenly distributed across the subcontinent).⁴⁷

It should be noted that not all of the agricultural cooperatives that emerged in India in the first third of the twentieth century were installed by the colonial government in top-down fashion. In some instances peasants initiated cooperatives themselves. For example, as world market prices were falling in the aftermath of the First World War, peasants in Western India set up cotton cooperatives that “provided credit and good-quality cotton seed to members on the condition that they pool their crops for sale.” The cooperatives did receive financial and organizational support from the Bombay government, which, due to the economic crisis, “now followed a policy of encouraging peasant co-operatives.”⁴⁸ The cotton cooperatives set up around Bombay and Ahmedabad in the 1920s and 1930s were considered an economic success. Yet, as David Hardiman emphasizes, this was “a very exceptional development, being the result of a particular conjuncture”:

The peasants of this region grew a crop which provided the raw material for the leading sector of capitalist industry in India, and there were strong pressures from the Bombay and Baroda governments for a more “modern” system of marketing. The state moved from an earlier insistence on *laissez-faire* to support for the peasants in their struggle, and co-operative institutions were sponsored to allow for an alternative system of marketing and primary industrial processing. The dominant peasants of this region had also developed a more capitalistic ethos, and were well-educated and well-informed enough to know how to organize and run co-operatives in an effective manner.⁴⁹

In other regions, where these particular circumstances did not exist, agricultural credit cooperatives were established from above, mirroring the interests of the government much more than those of the peasants.

Notably, when Indian nationalist activity was growing stronger in the 1920s and 1930s, colonial administrators integrated cooperative structures into programs for “rural uplift” to deescalate the situation and strengthen the British hold over India’s countryside.⁵⁰ In the eyes of a British civil servant writing in 1941, the cooperative model’s great advantage was its “entirely unpolitical” character, which could “perform[s] the great political service of binding all classes together irrespective of caste, community or creed”—a notable advantage with regard to a society as complex and pluralistic as India’s.⁵¹ Similarly, the Prussian state, famous for its efforts under Bismarck to maintain political stability with the help of welfare measures, considered Raiffeisen cooperatives “socially useful but politically neutral” and started subsidizing them in the late 1880s, hoping to keep social unrest in rural areas at a minimum.⁵² It therefore seems safe to state that conservative politicians, administrators, and governments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries considered cooperatives useful because they promised to alleviate potential rural conflicts rooted in peasant dissatisfaction with socioeconomic conditions.

For very similar reasons, Western European observers—some of them conservative, some of them liberal, but most of them anti-communist—after 1945 encouraged the establishment of cooperatives in “Third World” countries. The legacy of the Russian Revolution of 1917, which had begun as a hunger revolt, figured prominently in their minds. Many also referred to their own countries’ industrialization experiences, which they interpreted as forerunners of the socioeconomic transformation processes former colonies like India were experiencing. To absorb the most radical effects of those developments, to neutralize the attraction of Soviet-type collectivization, and to prevent villagers from migrating to the cities, rural living standards had to be increased, they believed. Hence, national governments as well as Western-oriented international organizations, particularly the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Ford Foundation, promoted the cooperative model in the postwar period.⁵³ India, which was considered to be decisive for the outcome of the Cold War in Asia, received massive funding from various organizations to promote this kind of rural development. In sum, then, agricultural cooperatives were something that many politicians and experts considered useful with regard to promoting their own interests via India both before and after 1947. Yet what did the independent Indian

government hope to achieve by granting cooperatives a central place in its developmental strategy?

COOPERATIVES: A CURE-ALL FOR INDIA'S PROBLEMS?

Broadly speaking, there were three interconnected reasons why the Nehru government embraced the cooperative model so strongly. The first reason was predominantly economic in nature; the second reason was connected to India's international position and its foreign policy in the context of the Cold War; and the third reason was a political and ideational one, closely tied to India's nation-building project.

The economic advantages for supporting cooperative agriculture seemed obvious. Cooperatives would allow poor farmers to pool their resources and avoid taking out expensive credits. Together with state support, the cooperatives would enable them to use more efficient technologies, which in turn would increase yields and result in surpluses. Hence, the peasants would "contribute to the building up of a modern industrial sector by providing cheap labour and also cheap food."⁵⁴ Furthermore, cooperatives would help to "change the economy of the country from an individualistic to a socially regulated and cooperative basis," as the Planning Commission stated in India's First Five-Year Plan.⁵⁵ This brings us to the second, foreign policy-related reason for advocating cooperatives. While the Soviet Union and the United States were trying to win over the new nations by either encouraging or pushing them to follow a path of socioeconomic development and modernization modeled on their respective example, India, in trying to preserve its newly won independence, opted for non-alignment.⁵⁶ Indian leaders, most prominently Nehru, made a point of not following either a socialist or a capitalist model but instead choosing a genuinely Indian development path, one which allowed the country to bypass both the free-market and the collectivist model. Cooperatives played a key role in such "third way" approaches to development. Egypt, for example, in 1952 began to implement a land reform program that included the "creation of a system of mandatory, state-run cooperatives, through which peasants received agricultural credit, purchased tools, and made payments on the land they obtained from the government."⁵⁷ Similarly, the People's Republic of China under Mao established large cooperatives to speed up the industrialization process. Indian development planners closely watched these developments and referred to them regularly.⁵⁸

Yet Nehru's goal was to achieve similar growth rates without the use of authoritarian measures. He argued that "The co-operative form of organisation has the merit of combining individual initiative with the advantages of the large-scale enterprise and is the most effective tool for economic decentralisation. Co-operative enterprise grows thus to be the sheet-anchor on which democracy can grow and endure."⁵⁹ These goals fit squarely into the government's effort to build "democratic socialism" in India and promised to help realize the needs and interests of India's population.

The idea of defining a genuinely Indian development path, one that was independent from the strategic interests of the superpowers, brings us to the third reason why cooperatives were valued so highly in postcolonial India: the nation-building project. The success of this project rested to a large degree on the effort to create an Indian identity that was strong enough to overcome the many differences among Indian regions, ethnicities, languages, and political positions. In this context the struggle against British colonial rule served as a reference point, and the anti-colonial legacy became an integral part of India's postcolonial self-understanding. In the arguments brought forward by Nehru and others in favor of cooperatives, references to the independence movement played a prominent role, seeing that cooperatives had been discussed in the 1920s and 1930s by anti-colonial intellectuals and activists, who had integrated the cooperative idea into their efforts to weaken or challenge colonial rule.⁶⁰ In doing so, many had referred to the long history of self-help and cooperation in India's villages.⁶¹ Cooperatives seemed remarkably close to the *panchayats*, elected councils on the village level which could be traced back far into the subcontinent's history. The "revival" of *panchayati raj* after the end of British rule signaled the effort to "revive and strengthen community values and interests, and restore the corporate character of village life." Especially those following a Gandhian line of thought believed that "reconstructing the whole village as the primary unit of economic and political action" would allow India to shake off colonialism's "distortions" and return to its "true self."⁶² In that sense, the cooperative model introduced under British rule came to be seen as a potential tool of anti-colonialism. If peasants were encouraged to organize themselves, they could regain some of the confidence and agency they had lost under colonial rule, many nationalists believed. At the same time, Indians could prove that they were

capable of taking care of their own needs, and that no colonial patronage was needed.⁶³

Along those lines, the idea of empowering peasants with the help of cooperative structures after 1947 promised to help integrate the rural population more squarely into the Indian nation-in-the-making. Through their active participation in cooperatives the peasants would understand both the value of modern technology and of democracy, and through their work they would contribute to turning India into a modern and democratic nation.⁶⁴ Whereas Friedrich Raiffeisen had tried to use cooperatives to conserve older socioeconomic and cultural patterns, Nehru saw the advantages of the cooperative model in their social and economic development potential for independent India. The Community Development Programme, which was initiated on a federal level in 1952, was the most visible expression of this particular development strategy.⁶⁵

The Community Development Programme's goal was to improve the rural infrastructure and to increase agricultural output. The country's food problem not only continued to exist but grew worse at the beginning of the 1950s. In 1951, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture had acknowledged that "India is not self-sufficient in the production of foodgrains."⁶⁶ External aid could and should only be a temporary relief, not only due to Indian national pride but also because the government claimed responsibility "to promote the welfare of the people and to secure a progressive improvement of their standard of living."⁶⁷ Since New Delhi did not see itself in a position to invest large amounts of money into agricultural and rural development, the villagers were expected to do the necessary work.⁶⁸ Community Development thus promised to be relatively cheap and politically integrative at the same time. To make the program acceptable, Nehru and others invoked the Gandhian legacy and called on villagers' communal and national responsibility.⁶⁹ Through a complex system of blocks, units, and districts, and with the help of district and village level workers, each Indian village was to be included in the program, and cooperatives were to be established everywhere. From a purely economic point of view, it might have been sensible to select areas which promised fast increases in production and to award them a higher share of technical and financial support. From a nation-building point of view, however, it seemed more important to include all of India.⁷⁰

Numerically, the Community Development Programme, which was given ministerial status in the second half of the 1950s, achieved an impressive record.⁷¹ Yet compared to the high political hopes projected onto the program, the results were disappointing in many regards. Many peasants apparently felt reminded of colonial times when administration officials appeared in their villages because they feared that their land would be taken away or taxes would be increased. On the other hand, many Community Development officers were frustrated with what they perceived as apathy on part of the peasants—as one of them put it in 1955: “when will these people understand their own self-interest?”⁷² Self-help was an attractive concept in theory but difficult to realize in practice.

This was also the case with the cooperatives. They were supposed to be grassroots instruments by peasants for peasants, but in reality they were installed from above and served the interests of large landowners much more than those of peasants and day-laborers.⁷³ While the number of credit cooperatives grew continuously, their capital remained disappointingly low, requiring them to borrow from central banks and the government, thus undermining the push for decentralization. The output of the relatively few production cooperatives that came into existence was lower than average Indian output, and there were numerous instances of fraud and abuse.⁷⁴ Many of the problems with rural credit cooperatives had come to the fore in earlier years. In the 1920s, many of the wealthier peasants had refused to join cooperatives because they felt uncomfortable with laying out their financial situation in public. Others did not see the necessity of joining cooperatives because they were able to obtain cheaper credit from other sources. “The richer and better educated peasants who possessed the skills needed to run societies thus tended to remain aloof, while the majority of the members were relatively poor and illiterate, and lacked such ability.”⁷⁵ Moneylenders in the villages capitalized on this situation by having themselves appointed chairmen of the cooperatives and using their established ties to strengthen their influence. Kinship and family ties played an important role in securing access to credit.⁷⁶ Also, since the cooperatives were installed from above, many peasants regarded them as government institutions and did not consider them instruments of grassroots emancipation they could use in their own interest.⁷⁷ This perception survived the political caesura of 1947. In the view of many peasants, the precise nature of the government in place was less important than access to

credit and markets. Existing inequalities remained in place on the village level, thereby weakening the participatory and emancipatory potential of cooperatives. "A system of patronage and dependence built on landown-ership and tenancy declined, but development programs and populism created new mechanisms of patronage," as Akhil Gupta has argued.⁷⁸

Although cooperatives did not solve India's problems and did not provide a feasible alternative to land reform, the concept was not easily abandoned either. When Indian planners observed in the mid-1950s that Chinese economic growth rates were much higher than those in India, two delegations went to China in 1956 to study cooperative farms. Upon its return, the Planning Commission's delegation "recommended that 10,000 cooperative farms should be organized in India during the Second Plan." The second delegation, sent by the food ministry, formulated a very similar recommendation.⁷⁹ In November 1958, under growing financial and economic pressure, the National Development Council approved Nehru's suggestion to establish "a new and expanded program of cooperative development to organize multipurpose cooperative societies on the basis of the village community as the primary unit."⁸⁰ A few months later, a working committee on agricultural production enforced the central role of cooperatives: "The future agrarian pattern should be that of cooperative joint farming, in which the land will be pooled for joint cultivation, the farmers continuing to retain their property rights, and getting a share from the net produce in proportion to their land."⁸¹ This program went far beyond the establishment of credit and production cooperatives. It was, in fact, a program toward the redistribution of property rights of land. As a consequence, landowners began to lobby against the program, and the anti-socialist critique of Nehru and the Planning Commission grew louder.⁸² When India's economic and food situation became increasingly fragile in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a growing number of Indians criticized the all-Indian participatory character of development for being counterproductive and called for a more "effective" approach.⁸³ The answer seemed to lie in the turn to expert knowledge and technology. Indian planners and politicians, with much pressure from the United States government and support from the Rockefeller Foundation, opted for an exclusive intensification strategy, opening the way for what became the Green Revolution.⁸⁴ Although cooperatives remained in place and were reinvigorated by Indira Gandhi's government later on, they were no longer granted the key role

in India's development process they had enjoyed (at least on paper) in the 1950s and early 1960s.

CONCLUSION

What do the prominence of the cooperative model in India in the early years after independence and its eventual marginalization tell us about India's transition from colonialism to postcolonialism? The fact that representatives of newly independent India—a predominantly rural, economically fragile, non-aligned nation with a strong dedication to planning, egalitarianism, and democracy—considered cooperatives attractive development tools appears perfectly reasonable.⁸⁵ What seems more surprising from a historical perspective is that Indian postcolonial enthusiasm for cooperatives was apparently not inhibited by the fact that the British had used them as instruments of colonial rule. On the other hand, it should have become clear that the cooperatives the postcolonial government wanted to see installed were not the same as those established under colonial rule because the political imagination that informed the cooperative policy was different from the colonial one.⁸⁶ Nehru's and the Planning Commission's effort to make cooperatives the centerpiece of India's rural development was based on the assumption that cooperatives were apolitical structures. Their alleged neutrality made it possible to discard those elements which, due to their colonial legacy, were considered counterproductive or problematic, and to strengthen those which promised to further independent India's interest. The adaptation of cooperatives as part of postcolonial India's development strategy was a highly selective process in which many colonial elements were ignored while the anti-colonial legacy was granted a prominent role. In the context of India's decolonization-cum-nation-building process, this interpretative flexibility was of immense value.

What does all of this say about the relation between structural and conceptual continuities and discontinuities in colonial and postcolonial India with regard to development? As the example of the Grow More Food campaign has shown, direct continuities between (late) colonial and postcolonial development strategies helped India to manage the rather sudden end of colonial rule. The case also suggests that the label "postcolonial" might be misleading in that it suggests the existence of a new actor when, at least on a practical level, the late colonial state seems to have remained alive and active for some time beyond

formal independence.⁸⁷ The inquiry into the role and history of cooperatives has demonstrated how the Indian state, in drawing on a range of “Indian” and “non-Indian” experiences and ideas, created its own original development strategy, thereby effectively claiming to be a truly sovereign state. This was a lengthy process complicated by structural constraints and conflicting interests, and in economic terms its success was limited. Yet quantitative criteria alone were not decisive in the post-colonial setting. In other words, one should not underestimate how vital it was for the postcolonial state to prove its capability to formulate its own “developmental ideology.”⁸⁸ It was this capability that gave the new state much of its political legitimacy and sovereignty.⁸⁹ In this context it was not decisive whether or not the instruments used had a colonial legacy. What mattered was that in its specific configuration the new state’s development strategy appeared significantly different from colonial and other competing international models of development, and that the government appeared as the executive agency in charge of realizing this strategy. Although the cooperative approach was not continued beyond Nehru’s time, it seems safe to say that on a rhetorical and symbolic level it contributed to the making of the sovereign postcolonial state in the early years of independence.

NOTES

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2. Srirupa Roy, *Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 26.
3. Taylor C. Sherman, William Could, and Sarah Ansari, “Introduction,” in *From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947–1970*, eds. idem, (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1–9, 6.
4. Editors’ note: See also Alison Bashford’s text regarding the subject of re-equating traditional historiographical boundaries and the dynamics of historical continuities and ruptures.

5. See Benjamin Zachariah, *Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c. 1930–1950* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6. On Nehru's personal and political experience with decolonization, see Judith M. Brown, "Nehru—The Dilemmas of Colonial Inheritance", in *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Marc Frey and Jost Dülffer, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 177–194.
7. Jawaharlal Nehru, excerpt of *The Discovery of India*, reprinted in *Decolonization: Perspectives Now and Then*, ed. Prasenjit Duara (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 33–41, 33.
8. Ibid., p. 35. On the importance of history in shaping Nehru's understanding of India, see Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997), pp. 168–172.
9. On the partitioning of the subcontinent, see Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
10. Cf. Partha Chatterjee, "The Colonial State," in *The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 14–34, 15.
11. Idem, "The National State", in *The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus*, pp. 200–219, 204. Also see Judith M. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 204–205.
12. Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy: The Gradual Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 81; Brown, *Nehru*, pp. 206–207. For a detailed analysis of the ICS and IAS, see David C. Potter, *India's Political Administrators 1919–1983* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
13. Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, p. 41. See also Sherman, Gould, and Ansari, "From Subjects to Citizens", p. 3.
14. Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 107.
15. Cf. Chatterjee, "The National State", p. 205.
16. Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah Ansari. "From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947–1970", *Modern Asian Studies* 45, issue 1 (2001), pp. 1–6, 3.
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 78. Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments*, p. 126.
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80. Ibid., p. 161.
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83. Eckert makes a similar observation with regard to Tanzania, which, however, had been turned into a one-party system. Cf. Eckert, “Useful Instruments of Participation?”, pp. 112–117.
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The Anvil of Internationalism: The United Nations and Anglo-American Relations During the Debate Over Katanga, 1960–1963

Alanna O'Malley

When United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld received a request from Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu on 12 July 1960 for UN intervention into the Congo, he immediately realised that the organisation needed to take action. One of his biographers, Emery Kelen, recalls his reaction: “I must do this. God knows where it will lead this organisation and where it will lead me.”¹ The following evening Hammarskjöld called an emergency meeting of the Security Council to debate the request from the Congolese government for humanitarian intervention to defend the sovereignty of the country from Belgian incursion. It was not the first time the Security Council had been assembled on short notice, nor the first time they deliberated into the night, but it was the first time that any Secretary-General had invoked his powers under

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Article 99 to advise the council to intervene to defend the sovereignty of a newly independent state.² The Congo set precedents in UN actions from the beginning. It was to be the largest, most complex, and most expensive peacekeeping operation that had ever been launched, drawing the organisation into a constitutional and financial crisis before the withdrawal of troops in 1964. Over four short years, the Congolese Prime Minister would be murdered, Hammarskjöld himself would be killed the Congo in suspicious circumstances, and the UN's reputation would be permanently tarnished. Not until the 1990s was another peacekeeping operation of the scale of the Congo launched by the organisation again. The Congo mission also proved to be a challenge for the African policies of the European powers. Combining the tensions of Cold War politics with the trials and tribulations of decolonisation and the end of empire, the Congo was a unique context in which the traditional approaches of Britain and the United States (US) to African questions were overturned as African states and the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly played an increasing role in shaping UN policy towards the Congo, and later, Africa.³

The imperial internationalism of Belgium, Britain, France, and Portugal had been under fire since 1947, when the independence of India led to the gradual proliferation of nationalist views among countries of the Global South. In the following years anti-colonial sentiment combined with the assertion of the right of every nation to self-determination had challenged all aspects of the imperial project. By 1960 the end of empire was well underway, but the eruption of violence and disorder in the Congo just seven days after its independence from Belgium seemed to jeopardise the whole decolonisation process. The Congo and other African states including Ghana, the United Arab Republic (UAR), and Tunisia immediately interpreted the crisis as a threat to their hard-fought independence. As events progressed, they perceived the hand of neo-colonialism firmly at work in the Congo and used the UN role there as a way to denounce and disrupt the activities of Belgium, Britain, and the US on a regular basis during debates in New York. For British and American policymakers, the Congo represented the worst-case scenario for decolonisation. British Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod pointed out in 1961 that such was the anarchy of the Congo upon the departure of Belgium that it was a clear demonstration of what could go wrong when granting independence and decolonising too quickly.⁴ Officials in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's Conservative government

believed that the preservation of British economic interests in neighbouring countries in Africa was paramount and the decolonisation of remaining British colonies, especially those bordering Congo, including Uganda, Tanganyika, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, should be slow and steady in order to prevent the breakdown of law and order that took place in the Congo. The US, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and later President John F. Kennedy, although hesitant to be drawn into a proxy battle and branded as neo-colonialist, viewed the Congo as a conflict which threatened to turn Cold War tensions into a hot war in the centre of Africa. The combined fears of both the African states and the European powers involved in the crisis centred around the issue of the secession of Katanga, the Congo's most lucrative province, which itself declared independence on 11 July 1960.

Katanga not only came to represent the blatant manifestation of neo-colonialism in Africa, but also reshaped how post-colonial states used the UN to advance their agenda for decolonisation. The largest point of contention between the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN and the Western powers, as the crisis progressed, was the issue of the use of force by UN troops in Katanga and the question of how to end the secession. The debates in the General Assembly and Security Council on the policies and management of the UN intervention offered not only a platform for members of the Afro-Asian bloc to put forward their views, but increasingly, as the mission was reliant on troop contributions from their countries, a format to challenge the imperial internationalism of Britain and the US. For their part, although the traditional, liberal internationalist approaches of London and Washington towards Africa were broadly compatible, the Congo revealed the tensions which existed between their opposing views on how the issue of Katanga should be dealt with by the UN. At the root of their disagreements were diverse impressions of the importance of Africa and very different conceptions of the UN. Seeking to capitalise on the lack of unity in the Western position at the UN on the Congo question in the first three years of the crisis, the Afro-Asian bloc successfully used the issue of Katanga to demonstrate the power of an activist UN on decolonisation questions, and in the epistemic community which existed within and without the organisation, gradually rendered unacceptable the imperial internationalism inherent in Anglo-American policies towards Africa.

AN UNPRECEDENTED CRISIS

The Congo erupted into a civil and constitutional crisis just one week after the country secured independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. The breakdown of law and order began when the Congolese army, the Force Publique, mutinied against their Belgian officers, leading to violence and chaos on the streets of the capital Léopoldville. In response, the Belgians sent paratroopers back into their former colony to protect the remaining European community and their economic interests, an act that was interpreted by the Congolese as a signal that Belgium would try to regain control of the Congo. The newly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed to the UN to intervene in order to defend the sovereignty of the Congo from what was perceived as an aggressive act of Belgian imperialism which violated Congolese sovereignty. In response, the UN approved the intervention of the largest peacekeeping force that had been mandated to date in order to restore peace and order. In doing so, the crisis became immediately internationalised.⁵ As part of this internationalisation however, Cold War politics, which up to that point had been largely lurking in the background of the decolonisation process in Africa, became a more overt feature of the drama for the US, the USSR, and the European former colonial powers, and also other African countries.

The Congo crisis was immediately interpreted by other African states as a test case for decolonisation. From the beginning, states including Ghana, UAR, and Tunisia viewed their collective fate as hanging in the balance when fighting broke out between UN troops and Congolese Government forces. As the crisis progressed, leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Monghi Slim of Tunisia became increasingly irate and vociferous at the UN about what they viewed as the advance of neo-colonialism in the country. These allegations of neo-colonialism helped to create a basis of support and a consensus between African and Asian countries at the UN on how, together, they could shape the political, social, and economic development of Africa. They directed their criticisms primarily at Belgium and Britain, as Brussels and London responded to the deteriorating situation with efforts to preserve their interests by attempting to subvert Lumumba's government. Reacting to their activities, Nkrumah declared in the UN General Assembly in 1961 that all foreign, non-African intervention into Congo should be forestalled in order to allow for the restoration of full Congolese territorial

sovereignty. "It is quite clear," he argued, "that a desperate attempt is being made to create confusion in the Congo, extend the Cold War to Africa and involve Africa in the suicidal quarrels of foreign powers."⁶

There was more than a grain of truth to Nkrumah's declarations that Congo had in fact merely been granted a form of "clientele-sovereignty," or fake independence, namely, the practice of granting limited independence to the former colony with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state and controlling it effectively by means other than through politics.⁷ While the hyperbole of Nkrumah's allegations was designed to whip up anti-colonial sentiment when he delivered his remarks to the 15th session of the General Assembly, it is worth examining the details of his statements further. In response to the crisis in the Congo, Brussels and London had adopted policies designed to protect their extensive economic and political interests in the region. For Belgium, this amounted to the political and financial support that Brussels granted to the secessionist regime of Katanga, 16 times larger than Belgium itself, under Moïse Tshombe. The secession exacerbated the predicament of the Congo given that the entire economy relied on Katangan resources such as copper, cobalt, and diamonds. As a whole in 1959 the Congo produced 69% of the world's industrial diamonds, 49% of its cobalt, and 9% of its copper. The province was an extremely valuable source of raw materials, the exploitation of which contributed significantly to the global economy. These strategic materials were largely controlled by the Belgian financial group the Société Générale du Belgique (SGB) and extracted by the subsidiary Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) and its partner benefactor the Tanganyika Concessions group. UMHK was heavily intertwined in economic and political aspects of mining in the Congo, managing the output of somewhere in the region of 8431 metric tons of cobalt and 280,403 metric tons of copper annually.⁸ The company also had controlling interests in a range of enterprises from railways, cement works, flour mills, and insurance companies to cattle ranches, hospitals, and schools.⁹ The power and wealth of the company is illustrated by their remarkable profit margins. For example, from 1950–1959, UMHK recorded a total net profit of 31 billion Belgian francs.¹⁰ The outbreak of violence and political confusion that pervaded the Congo threatened continued production and the stability of the company and, logically, the flow of revenue from the region to British and Belgian shareholders and financial groups. Therefore, in response to the crisis, the Congo policies of London and Brussels had

at their core the objective of maintaining pre-independence networks of economic and political influence in Katanga and across the Congo.

The preservation of economic interests and thwarting of Lumumba's efforts to reintegrate Katanga by force if necessary dominated discussions about the Congo in the British Foreign Office from 1960 onwards. As Martin Thomas has recently argued, independence in Ghana had revealed to British officials that it was the adaption of British preferences rather than a real engagement with "constructive nationalism" that would allow them to execute plans for decolonisation which retained elements of the colonial systems.¹¹ Up to that point, British decolonisation had unfolded across Africa in a largely peaceful manner with the emergence of Libya in 1951, Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957, and Somalia in 1960. The looming independence of Nigeria, Tanganyika, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda did not immediately present overtly negative auspices for British relations with former colonies in Africa. This transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth system had at its core the protection of British economic and financial interests and networks in the region. It was envisioned in London that under the watchful eye of the British government, these nations would develop along social and economic lines in the vein of the British system, becoming strong members of the Commonwealth and in the process, securing the importance and prestige of Britain's world role.¹²

The instability of the Congo, however, threatened colonial regimes in neighbouring African countries and cast possible to the colonial shadow over the path towards peaceful decolonisation. Although Macmillan had acknowledged the rising tide of African nationalism in his "Winds of Change" speech in Cape Town in January 1960, as the Congo crisis progressed, it exemplified the worst excesses of violent pursuit of nationalistic ideals to the British government. British Congo policy was primarily focused on resisting the use of force by the UN against Katanga and perpetuating the secession through indirect support.¹³ The primary thrust of British strategies was to ensure that there was as little change as possible to the colonial political economy. In 1959, British colonies in Africa provided only 3% of imports and absorbed less than that in British exports.¹⁴ However, Britain's financial position was dependent on the value of sterling assets held by British colonies, which in 1958 had been valued at £1.45 billion. Crucially, 60% of British overseas capital was invested in Commonwealth countries.¹⁵ As efforts were made to diversify colonial economies, what officials in the Colonial Office feared most was how independence and

nationalism would impact upon the security of private firms, the stability of access to raw materials, and smooth operation of their companies. The injection of Cold War tensions into the Congo had fuelled insecurity among investors as firms like UMHK were the target of anti-colonial demonstrations. As the perception of Cold War instability fused with the volatile politics of nationalism, there was an increasing fear of what Thomas terms "flight capital" among investors and industries in newly independent states. In response, Britain sought to shore up their investments in Katanga and along the lucrative copper belt which straddled the province.

Politically, the Katanga secession also posed difficulties for British interests in the region. In the neighbouring Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, led by Roy Welensky, there was widespread support for the secession among the white settler population. Welensky quickly developed close relations with Tshombe, providing support and aid, both material and political, through the Federation. This benign attitude was also reflected by British consular staff in the provincial capital Elisabethville, who enjoyed cordial relations with Tshombe's regime.¹⁶ Welensky's activities were supported by a significant number of Conservative Party members who had investments in the region and who opposed rapid decolonisation in Africa. Members, including the Foreign Secretary Lord Alec Douglas Home, took a dim view of UN adventurism and consistently opposed the use of force by the UN against Katanga.¹⁷ This put Britain in the awkward position of directly diverging from the United States in regard to their Congo policy.

From the British perspective, the Cold War experience in confronting violent forces of African nationalism in the Congo had revealed the importance of preserving colonial networks of influence with African politicians and in managing carefully those relations to preserve British interests. In contrast, the US opted to fully embrace more moderate elements of Congo's nationalist forces in order to keep the country unified and prevent any infiltration of Communist influence. Where the US believed the UN should be empowered to move against Katanga in order to restore territorial integrity to the Congo, Britain staunchly refused to sanction the use of force by UN troops against the Katangan gendarmerie and Tshombe's mercenary army. British Congo policy exemplified the key characteristics of imperial internationalism; an effort to preserve as far as possible the status quo and prevent either the "dangerous" forces of African nationalism or the interventionist tendencies of the UN under

Hammar skjöld from threatening the preservation of economic and political interests in the region. In these respects it was similar to the liberal internationalism of the United States, but the acceleration of the Cold War dimensions of the crisis soon exposed the key differences in British and American views of the UN operation.

AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM IN THE CONGO

The US had long professed itself to be an anti-colonial nation, and policymakers in Washington had warned the European imperial powers as early as 1945 that colonialism was unsustainable.¹⁸ The process of decolonisation and the end of empire did not cause a significant problem for US foreign policy until the late 1950s and then it was generally restricted to Algeria and Vietnam. However the Congo crisis brought together the challenges of the Cold War with decolonisation in a way which exposed the shortcomings of American anti-colonial declarations. To officials in Washington D.C., the crisis represented a power vacuum in the heart of Africa that initiated a rise in Cold War rivalry and hostility. The country was strategically important in the global struggle against communism, and US policy throughout the crisis was to ensure that the Congo was governed by a Western-friendly regime to prevent the infiltration of any Soviet influence. In addition, Katanga was a source of important materials, not least of which was uranium, which had been used for American nuclear weapons production. Even by 1965 the United States Interdepartmental Stockpile Committee (SSACB)¹⁹ continued to regard the country as of primary importance in the sourcing of borty and diamonds. In attempting to shore up US economic interests, the State Department opted for a strategy of stabilising, both politically and economically, the Central Government, and thereby encouraging American investors into the Congo and Africa as a whole. In 1962 alone, the US government contributed more than \$85 million in bilateral aid to the Central Government and as William Minter describes it, "unknown millions more for CIA payments to Congolese politicians."²⁰

The US vision of modernisation of the Congolese economy was a reflection of its broader strategies of Third World development. It was driven by two fundamental tenets: the belief in the value of liberal economics and the perceived omnipresence of the Cold War, which both served to drive a rigorous modernisation campaign across Africa. The "new liberals" of the State Department included economists such as

Walt Rostow and liberal internationalists Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson.²¹ As Robert Rakove has argued, "Rostow sought to articulate a particularly American vision of development that could be pursued in the developing world."²² At the centre of this vision was the importance of rapid development and industrialisation in the economies of the Third World and extensive bilateral aid programmes which would shape the national interests of developing countries more favourably towards the West. What was important about Rostow's views was not just their influence in guiding the policies of the State Department but also that he considered democracy not as an "absolute condition" for development.²³ Bowles and Stevenson similarly believed in the importance of engaging African nations in an open and cooperative manner which would distinguish the American approach to Africa as anti-colonial and free of neo-colonial overtones. They advocated for the development of African economies through expansive aid programmes and the opening of markets in order to encourage the American private sector to invest more across the continent.²⁴ Although Bowles and certainly Stevenson had a more limited influence on State Department policies than Rostow, they formed an important part of the liberal lodestars who rose to prominence in the Kennedy administration and had a lasting effect on how the US approached Africa.²⁵

In parallel to economic investment, the US sought to re-orientate policy towards the UN, especially following the violent debates of the 15th session of the General Assembly in September 1960. President Eisenhower had followed a policy of abstaining on colonial resolutions at the UN in order to preserve relations with European colonial powers Britain and France, but the intervention into the Congo had the effect of drawing the US more directly into a decolonisation conflict. The US, although wary of the UN becoming too activist under Hammarskjöld's leadership, had supported his request to mandate a peacekeeping force and throughout the crisis and remained the largest financial supporter of the operation. At the same time, however, the failure of the United States to publicly criticise Belgium for their refusal to comply with UN resolutions between July and December 1960, which called for their withdrawal from the Congo, had the effect of tarring the Americans as neo-colonialists.²⁶ In particular, they came under sustained attack from the Soviet Union, with Premier Nikita Khrushchev travelling personally to the General Assembly in September to deliver a scathing attack on the UN and Western policy in the Congo.²⁷ Therefore, although both the

US and Britain had, on the surface, different Congo policies and had different approaches to colonial issues, especially at the UN, they both acted as agents of imperialist internationalism. In the British case, this was evident in their emphasis on maintaining and strengthening networks of colonial influence in Congo and Africa, while at the same time resisting efforts to further empower the UN force to end the secession and to Africanise the response to the crisis. The imperialist overtones of US policy are less evident but nonetheless a defining feature of the response towards the Congo question. In breaking with Britain and the former European colonial powers by abandoning a policy of abstaining on colonial resolutions at the UN from 1961 onwards, the US overtly tried to consolidate its profile as anti-colonialist. However, in responding to the Cold War dimensions of the crisis, rather than the colonial predicaments, the US policy emphasised the importance of creating a stable, democratic regime in Congo which led the State Department to employ increasingly coercive tactics in order to guarantee this outcome among the politicians of Leopoldville. This led to a perception of their approach to the Congo, among the Congolese themselves, and other African nations, as imperialist and domineering.

Throughout the winter of 1960 as the debates at the General Assembly continued to fire political imaginations of the Afro-Asian bloc, the United States too undertook an effort to reassert leadership over the direction of the UN operation. Relations between Hammarskjöld and Lumumba, which had deteriorated significantly even before the opening of the General Assembly, centred around a disagreement over whether or not the UN force would bring the secession of Katanga to an end.²⁸ Lumumba considered it an imperative to restore the territorial integrity of the Congo, but Hammarskjöld refused to allow UN troops to militarily engage the Katangan gendarmerie, pointing out that the main aim of the UN mission was the restoration of law and order. A military coup led by General Joseph Desiré Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) in September 1960, ousted Lumumba and placed him under the protection of the UN until one fateful night in November when he escaped and attempted to travel to join his supporters in the northern Congolese city of Stanleyville. Lumumba's decision to flee Léopoldville was one of the most decisive moments for the crisis. Up to that point the United States had been labouring under the assumption that no resolution to the Congolese constitutional quandary, or to the crisis as a whole, could be found as long as he remained in power. Delegates at the UN had led

a vigorous campaign of vote-gathering in the General Assembly in order to secure the recognition of his opponent President Joseph Kasavubu as Congo's legitimate leader by the Credentials Committee. Such was the force of this American effort that one Indian delegate remarked that he had "never before seen such a display of arm-twisting."²⁹ Despite the victory, India, Ghana, and Guinea openly objected to the seating of Kasavubu's delegation as the official representatives of the Congo, reflecting their continued support for Lumumba as the only legitimate leader of the Congo. The debates about Lumumba's role as Congo's leader took on a new and drastic influence in 1961 when his murder by Katangan officials led to another new precedent for UN action—the use of force by peacekeepers.

THE FEBRUARY RESOLUTION

The recognition of Kasavubu's UN representatives did not have the desired effect of restoring order in the Congo. Mobutu's coup had effectively removed the government but left the army in a state of disarray. Forces loyal to Lumumba attacked UN troops around the capital and raided the homes of UN officials, beating those they encountered in the process.³⁰ The widespread violence and chaos was inflamed further when the Congolese security forces, aided by Belgian intelligence agencies, arrested Lumumba before he reached the relative safety of Stanleyville. They soon handed him over to his enemies in Katanga, where he was brutally murdered by Tshombe and his supporters in January 1961.³¹ The killing of the Congo's first democratically elected and popular Prime Minister was widely condemned, sparking protests and demonstrations from Dublin to Moscow and fanning the flames of tension at the UN, where members of the Afro-Asian bloc reacted by denouncing the neo-colonial attitude of the Western powers who were widely believed to have been involved and threatening to withdraw their troops from the UN mission. Nkrumah railed against the West in an emotive speech that left no doubt as to where the responsibility for the murder lay: "The danger in the Congo is not so much the possibility of a civil war between Africans, but rather, a colonialist war in which the colonial and imperialist power hide behind African puppet regimes The colonialists and imperialists have killed them [Lumumba and two of his associates, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito who were murdered alongside him]

but what they cannot do, is to kill the ideals which we still preach, and for which they sacrificed their lives.”³²

Lumumba's death had the effect of incensing tensions at the UN on all sides. The Soviet position was one of outright condemnation of Hammarskjöld and the UN action in the Congo, with *Pravda* even going as far as to denounce the Secretary-General as a “butcher” and a “Judas” following the death of Lumumba.³³ The Soviets had come to the 15th session of the General Assembly in September prepared to both punish Hammarskjöld but also to unmask the imperialism of the US approach to the Congo.³⁴ While their controversial “troika” initiative, which proposed replacing the Secretary-General with three Undersecretaries, each representing one of the main political blocs, did not prove successful, their role in the debate about the Congo was extremely important in showing how the Cold War dimensions spilled over into the wider debates about colonialism. Indeed, the success of General Assembly Resolution 1514 in December 1960 which called for the granting of independence to colonial peoples was due in no small part to the role of Soviet delegates whipping up the debate. Delegates were specifically instructed to utilise the debates on the question of trust territories “to stir up ‘constructivism criticism’ of colonial policy and practice by such countries as the United States, England, France and Belgium.”³⁵ While ultimately this was a Cold War strategy designed to court the newly independent African and Asian nations, and in particular the non-aligned leaders such as Nkrumah and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, by interacting with these delegations, the Soviet Union actually, and perhaps unwittingly, solidified their contribution and role in the intellectual discussion of decolonisation and independence which was responsible for the success of 1514. After the assassination of Lumumba, the Soviet position hardened further and their refusal to contribute towards UN financing actually pushed them into a position of passivity on the Security Council as they continued to veto resolutions on the Congo.

Upon receiving the news of Lumumba's murder, the newly elected American President John F. Kennedy covered his face with his hands in despair. Not only did the assassination cast the UN in a poor light for failing to protect Lumumba, it led to a public condemnation of Western policy in the Congo and furthered the impression of neo-colonialism in Africa. Kennedy had already established an interdepartmental working committee on the Congo to revise the US policy at the United Nations

in order to generate support for a new mandate to increase the authority of the UN mission and to block all outside assistance to the Congo except through the UN.³⁶ In addition, the committee noted that in the event of the failure of the UN effort "we must consider the feasibility of other policies, including military action."³⁷ The USA therefore realised that the question of using more force in the Congo was central to the success of any new initiative, as was the support of the Afro-Asian bloc. When it was announced on 13 February that Lumumba had been assassinated,³⁸ the political pressure on all sides forced the hand of the Americans in response to the widespread outrage at the loss of the Congo's most charismatic leader. The controversy and speculation about who was responsible immediately spread like wildfire through the Secretariat and the UN ground offices. This provided the United States with the chance to use the moment of crisis to engineer the presentation and promotion of their plan to the Security Council as a way of providing a solution to the escalating conflict. The assassination had served to further divide opinion among the African states between the more moderate Monrovia group (including Chad, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire) and the hardline Casablanca group, (comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco).³⁹ With events spinning out of control, the Afro-Asian bloc now moved quickly to take some action overtaking the American initiative with a proposal from Ceylon and the UAR on 17 February which called for the withdrawal of all foreign military and personnel from the Congo and granting UN troops "the right to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war."⁴⁰ The response in the State Department was "bitter disagreement."⁴¹

There was internal division in the State Department between the Stevenson group (including Chester Bowles and the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George "Soapy" Mennen Williams), who advocated that the US should support the Afro-Asian resolution with certain amendments, and the Timberlake group (including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Undersecretary George Ball), who opposed the resolution. The result was a compromise on the original American position, and Stevenson was instructed to present two amendments to the resolution: a statement of support for Hammarskjöld and recognition of the Kasavubu government. However, despite a hard weekend of lobbying, Stevenson failed to persuade the Afro-Asians to adopt

the amendments⁴² and so the United States was left in the uncomfortable position of having to accede to a resolution which they had spear-headed the initiative for, but which was drastically different from what had been intended.

In its final form, the Afro-Asian resolution was presented to the Security Council by Liberia, and passed on 21 February by 9 votes to 0 with both France and the USSR abstaining.⁴³ In an ambivalent decree the resolution authorised forces to: "[take] all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and *the use of force, if necessary*, in the last resort."⁴⁴ This military order was in response to escalating problems in Katanga where UN troops continued to clash with Tshombe's mercenaries. As former Special Representative of the Secretary-General Conor Cruise O'Brien has described, "its immediate application ... would be nothing short of revolutionary."⁴⁵

The American attempt to court the Afro-Asians reflected a shift towards the position of Hammarskjöld and the Africans on the Congo question. However, this public support of Hammarskjöld's position exposed the Secretariat to accusations of Western collusion and ultimately had the effect of exacerbating tensions with the Secretary-General. In addition to unwittingly entrenching the Cold War dimensions of the crisis by forcing the USSR to veto the resolution, the empowerment of UN troops had the effect of destroying the consensus among the Western bloc on how Congo policy should proceed.⁴⁶ This attempt to assert American influence on the Congo question at the UN had essentially exposed the contradictory nature of the American anti-colonial position. While the US was concerned with not being branded as a neo-colonialist power, its failure to condemn Belgian actions and association with the British had the effect of drawing precisely neo-colonialist criticism from the Afro-Asians. Such was the dynamism of the Afro-Asian bloc on the issue of empowering the UN to use force in the Congo that their draft resolution was the version passed by the Security Council which mandated peacekeepers to use force in self-defence. More broadly, however, it revealed the extent to which the members of the bloc recognised the imperialist objectives inherent in American and British Congo policies. For the British, it was the protection of their strategic interests, and for the Americans, Cold War tactics that were evident in their approach towards the question of using force to prevent outside

interference in the Congo. While the passing of the resolution indicated that the interpretations of the Afro-Asian bloc members would prove decisive in formulating further UN Congo policy, its implementation paved the way for a direct challenge to the imperialist internationalism of Britain and the US in the Congo.

IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION

In the immediate aftermath of the February resolution, Hammarskjöld embarked on a renewed effort with Kasavubu to urge him to restore the Central Government and to ensure that Congolese troops did not continue to clash with UN forces. The empowerment of the peacekeepers to use force in self-defence led to a series of skirmishes around Elisabethville as the troops enforced their mandate of expelling Tshombe's mercenary army. It was a task that produced only limited results, as expelled mercenaries soon found their way back into Katanga under aliases or through a different route. O'Brien outlined the process as "token compliance," "the UN would be obliged, if it insisted on having its resolutions really applied, to use force."⁴⁷ At the same time as plans began to circulate about how the UN could "really apply" its mandate in Katanga, the Congolese politicians, including many of Lumumba's strongest supporters, met in Lovanium, now the University of Kinshasa, in an attempt to reconstitute the authority of the state. On 12 December 1960, Gizenga had set up a provisional nationalist government in Stanleyville, in the Orientale Province, claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the Congolese state. With the drying up of Soviet aid to his regime by June 1961, and the growing threat of military action against him by Mobutu's army, he agreed to take part in talks with the Léopoldville politicians in order to restore the authority of the Central Government.⁴⁸ The Americans supported his inclusion in a unifying government which appointed the moderate Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister and Gizenga as his deputy on 2 August.

With the reconstitution of the Central Government now complete, the UN turned its attention towards ending the secession of Katanga with a series of military strikes, supported with the legal and moral authority of Léopoldville. The first, codenamed Operation Rumpunch, took the Katangese mercenary army and provincial government by surprise. A dawn raid on the offices and homes of the regime's military commanders and Belgian and other foreign advisors resulted in the

peaceful exclusion of 273 personnel, much to the surprise of Tshombe. The follow-up, Operation Morthor, however, was drastically different. From the beginning there was marked confusion as to the direct objectives of the mission and how they were to be carried out. For eight days, beginning 13 September 1961, UN forces battled the Katangan army, resulting in the killing of hundreds of civilians and the loss of some seven UN troops. In their attempt to repeat the success of Rumpunch, UN forces encountered armed resistance from the Katangese who were prepared and mounted an armed resistance, resulting in exchanges of gunfire around Elisabethville. Another company of UN troops in Jadotville were sealed into their barracks where a six-day siege ensued.⁴⁹ This chaotic situation on the ground was also reflected in the wider political reactions, as the United States and Britain recoiled in horror from the escalating military engagement of the UN against Tshombe's mercenary forces, who led the army in battles against the peacekeepers.

Operation Morthor set alarm bells ringing in Brussels, London, and Washington. Within one day of the launching of the operation, the British Ambassador in Léopoldville, Derek Riches, presented Hammarskjöld with a demarche from Home which warned that the British government would withdraw all support from ONUC unless "1. Hammarskjöld could provide an acceptable explanation for what had happened in Katanga; or 2. Hammarskjöld could provide an assurance that the fighting would be swiftly ended."⁵⁰ To Britain, the decision to furnish O'Brien with arrest warrants for Tshombe and his associates was a clear indication of the intention to end the regime in Katanga. Internally there was bitter disagreement over what MacLeod termed "how we got ourselves into this position unless we had motive which did not appear on the surface."⁵¹ The problem also spread to British allies who increasingly believed that Britain was in collusion with Tshombe, an impression that was enhanced when Tshombe was discovered taking refuge at the home of the British Consul in Elisabethville, Denzil Dunnett, during the fighting.⁵² On learning of his location, the UN quickly telegraphed Dunnett, asking him to "do everything possible to arrange a meeting between [Tshombe] and O'Brien in order to bring about a ceasefire," with no success.⁵³ The result was the further worsening of relations between the Foreign Office and Hammarskjöld, who noted that the British were being particularly unhelpful.⁵⁴

The State Department was also left reeling from events in Katanga. Kennedy was reportedly "extremely upset" that Hammarskjöld had

used increased political and financial support from the US against Katanga without consulting Washington.⁵⁵ The State Department was also concerned about the effect on the European population with American Ambassador in Léopoldville Edward Gullion, noting that the UN was now “helpless to prevent participation by Europeans in what has become a ‘war of liberation’ against the UN.”⁵⁶ He also reported coming under pressure from the Belgian and the British Consulates to denounce the “atrocities of the UN monstrosity.”⁵⁷ Despite this however, the State Department line on Morthor was clear: although the UN had committed an inexcusable blunder, the US supported the UN in the Congo.⁵⁸ Part of the reason why the US did not condemn the action in Katanga may also have had to do with Hammarskjöld’s insistence that he had *not known*⁵⁹ that the operation was to take place when it did, and at that point was already on his way to Léopoldville to negotiate with the Central Government on the next steps. For his part Adoula also expressed resentment at what he termed the “UK action against the UN.” In a meeting with Gullion, he was regretful of the turn of events in Katanga, stating that neither he nor the UN had ever wanted a war in Katanga but that Tshombe had “prepared the combustible to which the least spark set fire.” Moreover however, Adoula believed that the British were now anti-UN and, for what he termed “impure reasons.”⁶⁰

Operation Morthor served to reveal that such was the extent of British opposition to the use of force to end the secession that the Foreign Office was willing to break with the US and the UN on this question. Up until 16 September, frantic telegrams flew between London, Washington, and Léopoldville as British and American officials both urged Hammarskjöld to formulate a peaceful resolution to the fighting.⁶¹ At the same time, in contrast to the assurances from the Foreign Office that it would cooperate with the UN, Dunnett continued to obstruct the UN actions, even after the arrival of Lord Lansdowne, the British special emissary who had been hastily dispatched to Elisabethville. The disagreement between the Foreign Office and the State Department over how UN resolutions should be implemented against Katanga was now out in the open. Although the wider objectives of their Congo policies and their economic and political interests in the region were largely intertwined, the means by which to achieve them were different. At the centre of this problem were their opposing views of what the UN should do with regard to the Katanga question and how the organisation should manage the intervention. It highlighted the fact

that the imperial internationalism of Britain and the US in the Congo was broadly similar up to the point where it had to be reconciled with their opposing visions of the UN. Crucially, the confrontations about the use of force over Katanga seemed to conform to the neo-colonialist image of their policies, as considered by the Afro-Asians, who reacted quite differently to the escalation of events in Katanga.

The first round of military action Operation Rumpunch had led to a renewed sense of confidence in the UN among African states.⁶² Over the summer of 1961 they had been lobbying Hammarskjöld to take more forceful action against Katanga, while also putting their wider strategy for the reintegration of Katanga into effect. Operation Morthor embodied their preferred plan of UN action: using force to decisively end the secession and restore territorial integrity to the Congo. British reactions, in particular, drew criticism from the Indians, with the American Embassy in New Delhi reporting to the State Department that there was bitter feeling in India about the role of Britain in the Congo.⁶³ Kennedy's earlier attempts through 1961 to court the opinion of the Afro-Asians by supporting the February resolution and later making a statement on the anti-colonial position of the US by voting for a resolution condemning Portugal for its continued colonial policies in Angola were now viewed as rather hollow.⁶⁴ This was further emphasised when it came to light that on 16 September Hammarskjöld had received a demarche from Kennedy, Rusk, and Home which requested him "to remain in the Congo until the fighting ended in order to demonstrate his 'seriousness.'"⁶⁵ This led to the sense among African and Asian leaders that the West still viewed the Congo question through a neo-colonial lens, but they also realised that the end of the secession could be in sight, even though some members, including Ghana, had yet to officially recognise the legitimacy of the Adoula-Gizenga government. The Anglo-American instructions to the Secretary-General proved decisive for both the secession and Afro-Asian opinion. On his way to negotiate a ceasefire between Tshombe and the UN, Hammarskjöld's plane crashed in mysterious circumstances just outside Ndola in Northern Rhodesia on 17 September. His death was, as Lise Namikas describes, "earth-shattering."⁶⁶

Without the strong leadership of Hammarskjöld in the Congo, the UN operation was thrown into a vacuum, into which the Afro-Asians swiftly moved. On 3 November, as the Burmese diplomat U Thant was elected as Acting Secretary-General, three of the largest contributors to

ONUC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan, called an immediate meeting of the Security Council on the Katanga question, in order to renew the UN strike against Katanga.⁶⁷ In the Congo, the tenuous alliance between Adoula and Gizenga had broken down and although the Central Government remained in place, Mobutu had led the Congolese national army on a campaign against Katanga. The Afro-Asian states broadly supported this endeavour and now turned to the Security Council to mandate the UN to finish the job. Despite several attempts by Stevenson and Ball to amend the draft presented by Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR on 12 November, which authorised the use of force to end the secession, the resolution was adopted on 24 November by 9 votes to 0 with Britain and France abstaining and the United States voting with "great reluctance."⁶⁸ It was a clear and significant victory for the Afro-Asians, representing their important influence over UN Congo policy.⁶⁹ The resolution was speedily implemented with another round of military action in December, after which Tshombe announced the end of the secession. Although this would not prove conclusive for the dissolution of Katanga as an independent state until a final strike in December 1962, this was the last Security Council resolution relating to Katanga. The Afro-Asian influence in creating and shaping UN military actions reflected a victory for anti-colonial internationalism and a corresponding defeat for the imperial internationalism of Britain and the US in the Congo.

CONCLUSION

The ending of the secession of Katanga by UN military actions in 1961 and finally in 1962 was revealing of the ways in which the organisation could be utilised to decisively intervene in conflicts regarding questions of sovereignty. It highlighted the pivotal role played by the organisation in resolving the Congo crisis as a whole, but also showed the importance of the UN as a theatre and as an actor in providing the format for the solution to the conflict. Afro-Asian activism at the UN had demonstrated the limits of the organisation's utility to the Western powers, but it had also provided African states in particular with the platform and the toolbox with which to challenge the imperialist internationalism of Britain and the US. The Afro-Asian bloc was far from a monolithic actor at the UN on the Congo question, but what was coherent among its members was both their determination that the UN mission, to which they contributed most of the peacekeepers, should use force to end the secession

of Katanga, and that the instruments of the UN such as the Security Council and to a lesser extent, the General Assembly, should be utilised to direct the mission towards their objectives. That they were successful in doing so reflected the potential of the organisation as a space in which internationalist ambitions and strategies could be amplified, adapted, and crystallised, while in the process, their anti-colonial, neutralist internationalism provided the format and the political support for UN actions, defeating the objectives of the imperial internationalism of Britain and the US.

For the question of sovereignty in the context of Africa, the Congo crisis was an important moment in which African states, in particular, realised the limitations of arguments about the preservation of sovereignty in an international conflict. In the short term, the Congo had an important influence on the survival of white minority regimes and white settler politics in Africa. The ending of the secession and the dismantling of the Katanga regime represented the idea that white regimes in neighbouring countries, including Rhodesia and Angola, were increasingly threatened by African nationalism. Indeed, the Rhodesian white minority leader Ian Smith was so influenced by the situation in the Congo that he accelerated the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, which came about in 1965. In Angola, the assault on Portuguese colonialism at the UN due to the internationalisation of colonial affairs on the Fourth Committee and the public debates in the General Assembly signalled the beginning of a bitter public struggle for Angolan independence. In the long term, the UN intervention also had a profound influence on the ways in which peacekeeping missions were designed and mandated and indeed, such was the detrimental impact of ONUC on the UN, both politically and financially, that this was the last peacekeeping mission undertaken on this scale until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. The Congo experience, therefore, served to condition the response of the UN towards issues of humanitarian intervention for decades to come and even to this day.⁷⁰ While the mission was initially mandated to safeguard Congolese sovereignty, more recent humanitarian interventions take place in the name of human rights and human security, thereby challenging the primacy of absolute sovereignty.

The differing variants of imperial internationalism that existed between Britain and the United States were exposed most clearly in their different visions of the UN and its role in resolving the Congo crisis. The crisis served to highlight the different manifestations of their

internationalist outlook in Africa and how it was affected by an activist UN, spurred on by the Afro-Asian bloc. The ending of the secession represented a victory for the Afro-Asian bloc because it legitimised their views of the crisis and implemented their ideas for how the UN should restore the territorial integrity of the Congo. While it was a defeat of the status quo in Africa, and particularly Anglo-American policies here, this defeat of imperial internationalist ambitions was short-lived. The gradual assertion of American power in the Congo and across Africa was soon manifested in new forms of neo-colonialism on the continent. The US, from 1962 onwards, played a more active role in shaping UN Congo policy as the lessons learned by the State Department in the Congo (and through parallel developments in the Vietnam war) enshrined a longer process of interaction with the Global South that soon replaced and reinvigorated old liberal internationalist methods of subjugation and control. Ironically, although the US remained critically concerned throughout the Congo crisis about being tarred by association with the European colonial powers and branded as “neo-colonialist,” their own policies towards the Congo and henceforth in Africa had the effect of fortifying the image of their internationalism as imperial. For Britain, although the ending of the secession reflected a defeat for their traditional liberal internationalism in Africa, it was also the beginning of a shift towards more subversive and clandestine tactics. The public defeat of their objectives for Katanga represented how the UN could be used to challenge imperial internationalism, which led officials in the Foreign Office to take a dim view of the organisation and its role in managing decolonisation. The UN emerged from the crisis with little financial or political capital, but it had proven to be a dynamic forum for the interaction between the Afro-Asian bloc and the Western powers; an anvil on which the variegated shafts of internationalism could be clearly viewed, altered, and catalysed.⁷¹

NOTES

1. Kelen Emery, *Hammar skjold* (New York: Putnam, 1966), p. 166. As reproduced in Rodger Lipsey, *Hammar skjold: A Life* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), p. 401.
2. Article 99 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that: “The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter

- which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” <http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm>.
3. Editors’ note: For other examples of engagement with the articulated histories of Cold War and Third World see the chapters by Jason Parker and Tobias Rupprecht in this volume.
 4. D. George Boyce, *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775–1997* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan; 1999), p. 226.
 5. For further on the Congo crisis see Madeleine Kalb, *Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982); John Kent, *America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo* (London: Routledge, 2010); Ernest Lefever, “The UN as a Foreign Policy Instrument: The Congo Crisis” in *Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments; Essays in Honour of Arnold Wolfers*, eds. Rodger Hilsman et al., (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 141–157; Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (London: Penguin Press, 1961); Richard D. Mahoney, *J.F.K.: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Lise Namikas, *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo 1960–1965* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo* (London: Cornell University Press, 1964); Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, The Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (London: Hurst, 2011); Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo, Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
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11. Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight, Britain, France and Their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 261–262.
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13. Alan James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis 1960–1963* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).
14. William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited, Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1986), p. 165.
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16. See generally, O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*.
17. Alan James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis 1960–1963* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).
18. Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism, The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). See also Louis and Robinson. "The Imperialism of Decolonisation", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22, issue 3 (1994), pp. 462–511.

19. Inter-departmental Memo, 15 October, 1965, Subject Files, Congo, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy/Administrations, 1958–1971, folder 5, Subject File Congo (1), box 448, Averell Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (AHP).
20. Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, p. 150.
21. For an overview of how these figures among others shaped the State Department's approach to modernisation and Africa under the Kennedy administration, see Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-Aligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 41–55. For more on US modernisation theories during the 1960s see also Larry Grubbs, *Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); Philip E. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans, John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
22. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-Aligned World*, p. 42.
23. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-Aligned World*, p. 44.
24. For further see Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).
25. For example, the African Bureau in the State Department was created only in 1958 but remained an important repertoire of Rostow's planning through the 1960s.
26. In July 1960 Security Council Resolutions 143, 145, and 146 all urged Belgium to abide by the decisions of the Security Council and remove its troops from the Congo. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/146. (1960).
27. For more on Soviet Policy at the UN towards the Congo see Alessandro Iandolo, "Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the 1960 UN General Assembly", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 41, issue 1, 1 (2017), pp. 128–154.
28. Lipsey, *Hammaraskjold: A Life*, pp. 438–476.
29. As quoted in Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence*, p. 264.
30. "Kasavubu Delegation Wins Seat in General Assembly, Vote Comes as Congo Troops Beat, Arrest U.N. Officials", *The Stanford Daily* 138, Issue 44, 23 November 1960. <http://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford19601123-01.2.12&c=—en-20-1-txt-txIN—#>.
31. Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo, Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2015).
32. Speech by Kwame Nkrumah, Accra, 14 February 1961, <http://www.nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=406&c=46>.
33. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 234.

34. Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Divided Together, The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945–1965* (Stanford C.A: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 260–261.
35. Ibid, p. 259.
36. As detailed in Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, 1 February. *FRUS XX*, 45–46. The principle elements were also outlined in a telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in India, dated 2 February. *FRUS XX*, 48.
37. Secret memorandum for the record, Working Committee on the Congo, 7 February 1961, box 8, Bureau of African Affairs, Central Africa. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Congo1960-61_1.pdf.
38. It was announced on Katanga Radio on Monday, 13 February that Lumumba had escaped UN protective custody and been murdered along with his associates by hostile villagers. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 225.
39. Catherine Hoskyns, “The African States and the United Nations, 1958–1964”, *International Affairs* 40, no. 3 (1964), pp. 466–480, 471.
40. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, p. 142.
41. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, p. 142.
42. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, pp. 235–236.
43. Statement by Hammarskjöld in the Security Council After Adoption of [what is entitled] Afro-Asian Resolution, New York, 21 February 1961, Security Council Official Records, 16th year, 942nd meeting as published in Cordier, Foote and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*, 359. From this it is clear that this is what the February 21st resolution is commonly referred to. The resolution was passed with just two abstentions from France and the USSR.
44. Paragraph A1 of Resolution 161 adopted by the Security Council on 21 February 1960, Appendix 1, Resolutions on the Congo adopted by the Security Council and General Assembly. Conor Cruise-O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back, A UN Case Study*. (London: Hutchinson, 1962), p. 336. Emphasis added.
45. O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, p. 40.
46. Carole Collins. “The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis”, *Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 243–269, 256.
47. O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, p. 203.
48. Sergei Mazov. “Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960–61) as Reflected in Russian Archives”, *Cold War History*, vol. 7, issue 3 (2007), pp. 425–437, 429.
49. For a good detailing of the military actions, see Kennedy, who challenges O’Brien’s narrative of events. Michael Kennedy and Art Magennis, *Ireland, the United Nations and the Congo* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014).

50. As quoted in Arthur L. Gavshon, *The Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjöld* (New York: Walker Publishing, 1962), p. 130. For further reading see generally Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?*
51. Iain MacLeod, as quoted in a telegram from Walker to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 18 September 1961, PREM 11/3175, NAL.
52. Telegram from Walker, the British Ambassador in Delhi, to the Commonwealth Relations Office. 18 September 1961, PREM 11/3175, NAL.
53. Telegram from Riches, British Ambassador in Leopoldville, via UN channels to Denzel Dunnnett, British Consul, Elisabethville, 14 September 1961, Cooperation and Liaison-Britain, Registry Files Political and Security Matters, Mission Files United Nations Operation in the Congo, [UK] S-0735-0004-01, UNA.
54. Telegram from the Rusk, Department of State to the American Embassy in Leopoldville, 15 September 1961, 770G.0019-1561, Department of State, Central Files, *FRUS XX*, p. 216.
55. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 296. Also Mahoney, *J.F.K.: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 100.
56. Telegram from Gullion in Elisabethville to the Department of State, 14 September 1961, 332.70G/9-1461, Department of State, Central Files, *FRUS XX*, p. 212.
57. Telegram from Gullion in Elisabethville to the Department of State, 14 September 1961, 332.70G/9-1461, Department of State, Central Files, Confidential, *FRUS XX*, p. 213.
58. Conversation between Gullion and Hammarskjöld in Leopoldville, as communicated to the Department of State, 15 September 1961, 770G.00/9-1561, Department of State, Central Files, *FRUS XX*, p. 215.
59. Telegram from Gullion, American Embassy in Leopoldville, to the Department of State, 17 September 1961, 770G.00/9-1761, Department of State; Central Files, *FRUS XX*, p. 226.
60. Telegram from Gullion, American Embassy Leopoldville to Department of State, 18 September 1961, 770G.00/9-1861, Department of State, Central Files, *FRUS XX*, p. 231.
61. There is no doubt that the Secretary-General came under intense pressure to resolve the situation from both the USA and the UK. Kalb claims that "Anglo-American effort[s] reached a climax on 16 September when Gullion presented Hammarskjöld with a joint demarche from Kennedy, Rusk, and Home, urging him to remain in the Congo until the fighting was ended in order to demonstrate his 'seriousness.'" However, the sources for this claim are Macmillan's diaries, which do not present a balanced impression. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, pp. 296–297. In addition,

Williams differs quite a lot in her analysis of events, which claims that Hammarskjöld came to the Congo specifically to negotiate a ceasefire, rather than being forced into it by the British to demonstrate his commitment after Operation Morthor.

62. O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, p. 220.
63. Telegram from American Embassy in New Delhi to the Secretary of State, 21 September 1961, 310/9-961, State Department Central Files, Congo. NARA.
64. The United States, for the first time ever, voted against its European allies, in voting in favour of a resolution condemning Portuguese actions in Angola, thereby establishing a precedent in the American attitude towards colonial questions at the UN. Security Council Resolution 163, 9 June 1961: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/163. (1961)
65. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 297.
66. Namikas, *Battleground Congo*, p. 153.
67. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 302.
68. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, p. 311.
69. Hoskyns, "The African States and the United Nations," pp. 466–480.
70. For more on the genealogies of humanitarian intervention and the role of the Congo crisis therein, see: Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–1964 (International Crisis and the Role of Law)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Norrie MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, *Shaping the Humanitarian World* (London: Routledge, 2009); W.R. Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience. Caring for Others in the Age of Terror* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
71. For more see Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation, America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis, 1960–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018).

“An Assembly of Peoples in Struggle”: How the Cold War Made Latin America Part of the “Third World”

Jason Parker

In February 1965, Che Guevara addressed the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity in Algiers. He declared that “it is not by accident” that his Cuban delegation found itself “in the circle of the peoples of Asia and Africa. A common aspiration unites us ... the defeat of imperialism [pursued by] an assembly of peoples in struggle.” The struggle against empire, he went on, “is not separate from the struggle against backwardness and poverty.”¹ His assertion was uncontroversial. By the time he spoke, the “Third World” was a globally recognized concept and geopolitical entity, and Che’s home-base of Latin America was understood—over the objections of some of its military regimes—to be a part of it. As a matter of geography, the Third World included Asia (minus Japan), Africa (minus South Africa), the Middle East (minus Israel), Latin America, and the Caribbean. As a conceptual matter, it served as a kind of intellectual umbrella whose full dimensions were still uncertain as Guevara spoke. It imperfectly and incompletely covered

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several overlapping groupings under its broadly understood solidarity: the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the Afro-Asian (or sometimes Afro-Arab-Asian) “Bandung Bloc,” Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, the Less- or Under-Developed Nations, the Newly Independent Nations—that is, all those nation-states and nationalist movements gathered into what are today more politely called the global South, and what Frantz Fanon called at the time the “wretched of the Earth.”

Yet it is worth remembering that Che’s words notwithstanding, Latin America was the latest and last arrival under the umbrella. When French demographer Alfred Sauvy first coined the term “Third World” in 1952, it did not include Latin America, certainly not explicitly and arguably not implicitly either. It sketched, instead, the dim outlines of a southward vision only beginning to perceive that the decolonizing areas of the world did not fit cleanly into the Manichean Cold War that the superpower conflict had imposed on the globe. Sauvy’s term had special resonance to his French audience, since it recalled the 1789 French Revolution.² This helped to drive home his intimation that the decolonizing areas—just as France’s “lower orders” had done two centuries before—were seeking to bring down the *ancien regime*. In fighting for self-rule, they were also conscious of their poverty and underdevelopment, and of the way that their determination to overcome these would be informed but not dictated by the East-West split. The need to address these gaps was a natural follow-on conclusion for peoples fighting first for political sovereignty via decolonization. For Latin America, the latter fight had already been won more than a century earlier—and the intervening decades had witnessed the development of the continental-cultural identity of “Latin America,” which would seem to distance the region from other parts of the Global South.³ This, along with the inclination of Latin American elites to identify racially with Europe rather than with their indigenous populations, and those same elites’ generally pro-West orientation in the Cold War, left Latin America well outside the rough commonality of experience and intention—“to become something”—that Sauvy perceived in the decolonizing world.

That process—decolonization—remade the atlas as it etched new political borders in the lands of the retreating empires, and redrew mental maps as it split the earth into three “worlds.” Its concurrence with a Cold War increasingly waged, whether by covert or military intervention or by public diplomacy campaigns for “hearts and minds” within the decolonizing areas, helped to create the concept, and later to expand

the entity, of the third such world. But the cresting waves of decolonization after 1945 did not produce its full, eventual membership. The discourses of decolonization in the British West Indies and around the Black Atlantic reminded Latin Americans of the ways that a century of recurring contact with the United States brought with it the sinews of informal empire—which could be as strong as those of formal imperial rule. When married to a shared interest in aligning with neither Cold War bloc, a determination to pursue economic development on friendly rather than “victim” terms, and a strong but amorphous impulse to the race-conscious activism then fighting to end white supremacy, the result expanded the meaning and membership of “Third World” to the new independent nations of the Caribbean and to the old independent nations below the Rio Grande. Even those decidedly non-radical and anti-Castro elements of Latin American society might have nodded in agreement with Che. They may have felt grudging admiration of the agency he showed in speaking up to join brethren of the global South, and in redefining the terms of world debate to spotlight economic development and modernization—on which they were also in surprising agreement with such anti-Castro figures as Kennedy’s modernization guru Walt Rostow. Although their policy prescriptions could be diametric opposites, the fact that the emerging diagnosis was shared by such diverse parties sufficed to cultivate an economics-first usage of “Third World” and, over the course of the 1960s, to make it a respectable intellectual position.

This essay explores the evolution and expansion of the term “Third World” from its original incarnation, denoting the decolonizing European empires and the have-not areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, to its fullest iteration at the inclusion of Latin America. The Cold War battle for “hearts and minds” the world over—a contest not just between East and West but between North and South, as rising newly independent powers joined their voices to those of the superpowers seeking their allegiance—sparked and shaped this evolution. It created the intellectual and geopolitical space for what would come to be called the Third World, but that space was repossessed and redefined by “native” actors themselves, very much including those in Latin America, above all Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Their rhetoric drew upon long-running South-South anti-imperialist critiques, and it echoed that of their decolonizing Caribbean neighbors as well as of distant sympathizers in Algeria, Indochina, Egypt, and Ghana. It could be heard at indispensable

international venues like the UN as that body's ranks swelled with newly independent states, and heard in those states' media outreach abroad as they joined the worldwide battle for "hearts and minds." This rhetoric met a cold reception from most publics in the western hemisphere as the 1960s began. However, by decade's end these dialogues had made clear a widely shared global-South conclusion that political and economic "colonialism" were inseparable. A confluence of currents then brought this conclusion not only into the Latin American mainstream, but into contact and then agreement with the new nations of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, whose leaders found enough common ground in the evolving definitions of the "Third World" to conjoin all their regions within it—an imagined community which, in the end, itself sought to transcend the Cold War.

A brief glance at the literature, and a word on the definition of terms, help this thesis to come into view. While in one sense this argument challenges both Odd Arne Westad's magisterial *The Global Cold War* and Vijay Prashad's *The Darker Nations*, in another sense it reinforces some of their key findings and seeks to bridge the two.⁴ Westad's argument that the phenomenon of American and Soviet intervention, both equally done in the name of universalist ideologies, was the principal force that created the geopolitical entity of the Third World. It did so by, among other things, quashing self-rule and thereby creating the shared identity of fellow sufferers. But such interventions were on the whole more exception than rule. Even if, in practice, it only takes a few such interventions to serve as cautionary tales in which, say, West Indian actors see what happens to nearby Guatemala and adjust their actions accordingly, it nonetheless bears keeping in mind that most places did not experience the Cold War as a bloody military intervention in the way that the worst-case scenarios like Vietnam or Afghanistan did, nor as a ruthless but small-bore coup as did Guatemala. Most places, instead, experienced it as a media war. Perhaps more importantly, many of them then joined that fray themselves, validating the role of public diplomacy in the period and helping to redefine the terms of world discourse—above all the term and (per Benedict Anderson) the imagined community of the "Third World" itself. Westad's book pays needed attention to the role of violence in such formulations, but it deserves to be pressed further into line with the excellent recent scholarship on Inter-American relations that highlights the agency of Latin Americans themselves.⁵

As for definitions, as noted the term “Third World” itself was in flux from early on. Its French heritage helped it to become a somewhat more recognized trope in that language in the 1950s, especially after Jean-Paul Sartre contributed a foreword to Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth* in 1961, giving the term its widest audience up to that point.⁶ English was another matter. As the political scientist Leslie Wolf-Philips noted, as late as 1972 the term was not included in William Safire’s *The New Language of Politics*.⁷ Certain aspects of the term as it eventually came to be used could be found in its precursors in the 1950s, each one quite telling as to the fundamental attributes of the concept.

For example, one of earliest precursors was the neutralism advanced by India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito in the late 1940s, after the former won its independence and the latter broke away from the Stalinist camp. These, especially Nehru’s promotion of the persuasion, were an attempt, as Indonesian Foreign Minister Mohammad Hatta put it in the context of Korean War in 1950, to find a “third way” forward in the world crisis. This language, and the centrality of the Cold War in it, was adopted by leaders such as the Gold Coast’s Kwame Nkrumah, who sought a “non-nuclear third force” on behalf of his and other “emerging nations.” These, principally though not exclusively the nations like India and Indonesia being born from the decolonizing empires, were the prospective subscribers to, and exponents of, this language. They found themselves between, in Westad’s formulation, the empires of liberty and of justice, and sought to triangulate accordingly, following India’s lead in securing self-rule and controlling their own destinies.

They also found themselves, especially after the 1955 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, on the same side of the “global color line” so well observed by W.E.B. DuBois decades earlier. The practical applications of such transracial Afro-Asian(-Arab) solidarity proved somewhat limited. But it was nonetheless powerful enough in the moment, as captured in Sukarno’s oft-quoted remarks to the conference: “We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise.”⁸ In the aftermath of the conference, it remained powerful enough to denote the “Afro-Asian nations” or the “Bandung Bloc” at the UN. The cultural impact belied

the practical applications, as writers like Richard Wright published paeans to the “Bandung spirit.”⁹ The final precursor dimension of note was poverty. Westad’s empires of liberty and justice both promised the way forward economically, holding out hope for “underdeveloped”—another locution just coming into wide use in these years—colonial economies heretofore exploited for the gain of the metropolises. As one 1967 analysis had it, “what ‘Third World’ originally was, then, is clear; it was the *nonaligned world*. It was also a world of *poor countries* [emphasis added].”¹⁰

In all of these crosscurrents except the last, there would appear at first glance to be little room for Latin America. Some parts of the region, such as the idiosyncratic Argentina of Juan Peron, had enthusiastically embraced the idea of an alternate way in the Cold War. But most did not. Between the warm imagined memories of wartime cooperation, high commodity profits, and the Good Neighbor Policy, most Latin American regimes—if not always their peoples—would have had little hesitation in choosing the First World side rather than the existing Second or emerging Third. Moreover, all of Latin America and most (though not all) of the Western Hemisphere had “decolonized” more than a century before. As for the global color line, it cut through many Latin American societies internally more than it cleaved them from the global North, with which Latin elites overwhelmingly identified even though their contemporaries in Europe and *El Norte* did not always reply in kind. The ranks of the “Bandung nations” did not include Latin America, which did not send a single country to the conclave. The “Bandung Spirit,” in other words, was Asian, African, and Arab—not Latin.

Only on the final aspect—poverty, underdevelopment, and “imperial” domination—was there any resonance. But here it was palpable. Despite the special place that Latin America had long held in the US view of the world, the rhetoric of “Pan-Americanism” had for decades sat uneasily alongside recurring deployments of the US Marine Corps. In 1933, FDR appealed to a hemispheric “special relationship” in announcing an end to the age of *yanqui* interventions and the launch of the Good Neighbor era. To reinforce the new amity, Latin America became the subject of the first concerted US efforts at public diplomacy beginning in the late 1930s.¹¹ Cultural outreach and the insistent rhetoric of friendship paid dividends for Washington, helping to solidify hemispheric unity during and after World War II—even as Washington’s non-military meddling in internal Latin American affairs dulled some of the Good Neighbor’s

shine.¹² But the 1947 signing of the Rio Pact and the founding of the Organization of American States (OAS) the next year suggested that the shine was not totally gone, as with one or two exceptions the Western Hemisphere proceeded into the Cold War on a passably collaborative basis. How genuine or solid this unity actually was is a matter of debate. At a minimum, however, the US renunciation of bad-old-*yanqui* interventionist ways, and the putative hemispheric partnership in world and cold wars, seemed in the eyes of mid-century American diplomats and Latin elites to tilt the historic Latin American ambivalence regarding the United States in favor of the Americas as being all part of the same “world.”

This is not to say that popular currents in Latin America were flowing exclusively in that direction. The anti-American outburst that greeted Vice President Richard Nixon’s disastrous 1958 visit to Venezuela suggested as much, and a follow-up survey of Latin American opinion three years later found it “startling to face the long list of Latin American grievances against us,” including “the theory than Pan-Americanism means ‘Pan’ for the North and only Americanism for the South.”¹³ Nor is it to say that the region was immune from the structural and ideological dynamics that Sauvy detected in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Indeed, one of the less-noticed aspects of both Washington’s anticommunist crusade and Europe’s imperial devolution is the extent to which they could intertwine in the western hemisphere. The story of the 1954 US intervention in Guatemala—a body-blow, if not a death-blow, to the Good Neighbor—is of course well known. What is often forgotten is that it was not the first anticommunist intervention in the Cold War Americas. That fate belonged to British Guiana, where in 1953 London suspended the colonial constitution and landed troops to prevent Cheddi Jagan’s communist-inflected People’s Progressive Party from holding power.¹⁴ The anticommunist compact in the western hemisphere was not an American but an Anglo-American one, abetted by Latin American elites.¹⁵ Its similar execution—in the formal British Empire in British Guiana, and in the informal American Empire in Guatemala—was a strong hint that Sauvy’s amorphous region might have to make room for Latin America. At a minimum, certain commonalities were starting to show: poverty, thrall to distant centers of capital, a chronic risk of victimization at the hands of global-North powers and superpowers, and an abridged or absent sovereignty, among other things.

Erstwhile hemispheric unity, then, weighed against a yet-longer regional history of anti-Americanism grounded in the informal empire of US business and trade, and part of a larger Latin American ambivalence vis-à-vis the United States and its brand of capitalism.¹⁶ On this front, intra-hemispheric ties were weakest, and Latin America's commonality with the impoverished, decolonizing Afro-Asian-Arab world strongest, as the hemisphere's homegrown critiques of "imperialism" echoed those driving decolonization in the Old World. The focus on poverty as a consequence of economic domination by outsiders undergirded this commonality, and corroded the fragile bonds of hemispheric solidarity. The emphasis on poverty and underdevelopment not only widened the gap between rich US North and poor Latin South; it went yet further by casting, implicitly or explicitly, the former's capitalism as the villain responsible for the latter's fate.

Ambivalence about the United States was weakest on the Latin American Left, whose critiques of imperial capitalism had long and consistently made this case regarding the origins of the region's economic woes. Tellingly, however, not all the critiques on this point—lamenting Latin underdevelopment, and blaming the rich North for the same—came from radical quarters. Years before, in 1950, the Argentine Raul Prebisch, the director of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC, or CEPAL), and the John Maynard Keynes of the Southern Hemisphere, drew upon a study of global commodity prices to popularize the term "underdeveloped countries." Prebisch's work, and that of his Brazilian kindred spirit Celso Furtado, advanced the structuralist-economics schema of a center-periphery dyad, recognizable to any student of empire, formal or informal, then as now.¹⁷ But it was the triumph of radical-Left revolution in Cuba that began to recast the conversation. It served, in Brands' words, as the "catalyst ... exacerbating internal radicalization, anti-Americanism, and *tercermundismo* ['Third-Worldism']."¹⁸ The rise of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara as figures of first regional and then global importance helped to ground the Prebisch-Furtado critique—and to embed an anti-capitalist and anti-American one—firmly in the Latin American mainstream. Over the course of the 1960s, this tilted the region away from the hemispheric unity Washington hoped for, and toward its impoverished "kin" across the postcolonial global South.

In the wake of their victory over the Fulgencio Batista regime, both Castro and Che made extensive use of the spotlight to draw rhetorical

connections between their struggle and others outside the hemisphere. What proponents and detractors alike would come to call *tercer-mundismo* blossomed as a result. In an October 1959 speech in Havana, Che warned would-be interveners that Cuba's struggle was the universal one, invoking the “uncontainable forces of the Revolutionary Movement which has also shaken the colonial pillars in Asia and Africa where there are 1,600,000,000 people who support us with all their strength.”¹⁹ Castro echoed the point. In March 1960, in a Havana speech disseminated far and wide, he described Cuba's plight as the product of “colonization.”²⁰ At the United Nations later that year, he further affirmed the shared lot of “we the underdeveloped countries”:

The problems of Latin America are similar to those of the rest of the world: to those of Africa and Asia. The problems the Cuban people have had to face with the imperialistic government of the United States are the same which Saudi Arabia would face if it nationalized its oil, and this also applies to Iran or Iraq; the same problems that Egypt had when it quite justifiably nationalized the Suez Canal; the very same problems that Indonesia had when it wanted to become independent; the same surprise attacks as against Egypt and the Congo.²¹

This common ground was found not only in the shared experience of being on the receiving end of imperialism. It lay as well, Castro continued, in understanding the varied and equally necessary dimensions of that term: “[Cuba is] on the side of those peoples that wish to be free, not only politically—for it is very easy to acquire a flag [and] a color on the map—but also economically free, for there is one truth which we should all recognize as being of primary importance, namely, that there can be no political independence unless there is economic independence.”

To a degree underappreciated in retrospect, this harmonized not only with the stance taken by other global South champions like Nkrumah, Nasser, and Ben Bella but also with the view from Washington.²² The newly installed Kennedy administration differed strongly as regarded the culprits and the cure, but as a matter of first principle the new team largely agreed that economics commanded equivalency with, if not primacy over, politics. Kennedy's pick to head the United States Information Agency (USIA), famed journalist Edward R. Murrow, instructed his personnel to reach out to “developing countries” and

“modernizing countries” in exactly those words—rather than by any potentially pejorative references to their poverty, or to political affinities (such as “Free World” or “nonaligned nations”).²³ This language would respect global South sensibilities even as it expressed the overarching Rostow-guided theme of US policy toward the region—what historian Michael Latham calls “modernization as ideology.”²⁴ Its premise held that the widespread poverty of the non-European world constituted, in effect, an “earlier” stage of civilization—and one whose shared qualities were stronger, more definitive, and more important than most of the political and cultural differences within it.

This analysis and the policy later resulting from it were, in part, a response to Castro. The revolution in Cuba had shown that even though Latin America was not (excepting the European-ruled areas of the Caribbean Basin), strictly speaking, part of the decolonizing world, the region shared enough of that world’s condition that it too could potentially find itself part of the geopolitical Cold War stakes.²⁵ Two weeks before his inauguration, a Task Force had warned JFK that “substantial Latin American apprehension exists that the incoming Administration, while justifiably upgrading Asia and Africa, may continue to leave Latin America a step-child. We think [your] Administration promptly on inauguration should emphasize its vivid interest in Latin America.”²⁶ Kennedy and his team took the advice to heart. Their answer was to craft a policy meant to demonstrate the priority Washington placed on its neighboring region, as well as to show that the US understood Latin America’s problems as akin to those in the rest of the global South. This fused the psychological connection between Latin America’s story and the Afro-Asian narrative by defining their shared conditions of poverty and underdevelopment—and US solutions for them—in such a way as to neutralize Castro.

The policy result was the Kennedy administration’s signature initiative in hemispheric cooperation: the Alliance for Progress. Announced to great fanfare in March 1961, the Alliance would pool US and Latin American resources in a shared effort to spur economic development and lift Latin America out of poverty, “modernizing” its society and infrastructure along the way.²⁷ In the end, the Alliance disappointed these hopes. It rode on Kennedy’s own celebrity and commitment and hardly survived his assassination in more than name.²⁸ As Thomas Field has recently shown, the Alliance’s “modernization” agenda fell into bad odor in many sectors of Latin American society during the 1960s as it

gravitated—guided by Washington as well as by local actors—into the orbits of national militaries.²⁹ But the Alliance's own ill-starred career should not eclipse the light that it sheds on the fundamental convergence of analysis between Washington and Havana: the paramountcy of economics to "independence," the centrality of modernization to achieving both, and the way that these premises conceptually fused Latin America to its decolonizing global South neighbors.

The convergence of economics, independence, and modernization surfaced vividly at the 1961 Punta del Este meeting convened to design the machinery of the Alliance for Progress. Though seemingly at first glance an outlier on the political spectrum represented by the staid diplomats of the American republics, the Che-Castro diagnosis—though not its prescribed remedy—commanded a surprising level of agreement among the assembled. The sides differed, of course, on the role of capitalism in creating the status quo. For the Castro team, capitalism was synonymous with "imperialism" and was thus the cause of Latin woes; for the US side, it was, rather, the cure. But both, and socialist-leaning Latin American regimes between them, could all agree: poverty was the region's shared curse; it was at least in part the historical consequence of foreign capital; and it could only be addressed by cooperative, state-guided efforts at modernization and development. Che won no converts to radical Castroism at the Uruguay meeting. Both he and the US representative, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, as well as many of the Latin American foreign and economic officials present, would have disagreed sharply, and correctly, that there was little if any common ground in the formulae for societal modernity they respectively promoted. But the Punta del Este meeting itself, and the Alliance for Progress constructed there, affirmed that for Washington—and its counterpart capitals around Latin America—poverty was the paramount challenge, and the common crisis of the hemisphere, from Mexico southward.

Moreover, most if not all parties at the conference and afterward would have agreed in principle that the depth and pervasiveness of that poverty connected Latin America to other places in similar straits. As the European empires retreated from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean, most of the newly sovereign nation-states left in their wake faced long economic odds. Imperialism had left them impoverished, and newborn nationalism raised their hopes for a better destiny—and sooner rather than later. The Cuban revolution had demonstrated the potential explosiveness of the combination, as well as its reach into

the New World. As seen from Washington, the worrisome and dangerous part of the world map was expanding. It was marked not only or even predominantly by the recent transition of decolonization, nor by its erstwhile racial solidarities of Afro-Asian-Arab identity, nor by its non-alignment in the Cold War, but above all by its poverty and the societal volatility it fostered. In the words of a sweeping study conducted in the late Eisenhower years by the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad: "We are facing a revolt of the have-nots, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."³⁰

The Kennedy administration and its Latin American counterparts designed the Alliance for Progress to pre-empt this revolt by showcasing modernization-driven development done right—that is, Western-oriented and gradual. The Alliance's larger implication, perhaps appreciated more outside Latin America than inside it, was that the region had more in common—above all, "post-imperial" poverty—with decolonizing areas than first appeared. This suggested US affirmation of an essential commonality, one which had a stake in the East-West split but was more fundamentally circumscribed by North-South lines. As Chester Bowles had argued to the Kennedy national security team one month before taking the (tellingly titled) position of "Special Representative and Adviser on Africa, Asian, and Latin American Affairs:"

One of our difficulties [with Latin America] has been that we have continued to think in European terms. We considered that world stability depended on European stability. When we finally realized that Europe was no longer the place where all policy decisions were made, we adapted ourselves to the new look in Asia and Africa, but we continued to take Latin America for granted. We can no longer do that, for a real revolution has come to this area.³¹

The conclusion that the "real revolution" was at its core the same in Asia and Africa as it was in Latin America and the Caribbean drove the Alliance for Progress, as well as its marketing via American public diplomacy elsewhere in the global South—where it was increasingly well-received, and shared. Just after JFK's May 1961 allusion—in what is often better-remembered as the "moon shot" speech—to "the whole southern half of the globe," the USIA reported that Castro had called for but "abandon[ed] plans for a 'Conference of Underdeveloped

Nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America' for lack of response." His failure was short-lived; precisely such a meeting would take place in mid-decade.³² The temporary failure of this effort is itself of interest, but it holds less significance than the jelling though still tacit agreement between him, Che, Nkrumah et al., and JFK on the terms of global debate.

The consensus deepened—and broadened—over time. In 1963 Kennedy official Arthur Schlesinger emphasized this again to a Venezuelan audience: "If we succeed here [via the Alliance For Progress], we set an inspiring example for two-thirds of our world.... The basic choice confronting Latin America is therefore between the democratic revolution and the communist revolution.... The people of Asia have become vividly aware in recent months that they confront the same choice."³³ A survey the next year of public opinion in "LDCs"—less-developed countries—included for the first time ever Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela alongside Asian and African nations. Just as Washington's view of the world was enlarging the "southern half of the globe" to include Latin America, evidence began emerging which suggested they were right to do so—and which served notice that underdevelopment might, in the end, not be the only glue to bind the global South. In 1964, US analysts found that "as a result of preoccupation with domestic problems, an existing nationalism and a trend for non-alignment on East-West issues...a nascent neutralism appears to be developing."³⁴

Despite the growing discovery of these commonalities of persuasion, the relevant actors on the ground did not always themselves make the connection. This is understandable given that their battles were ultimately different in detail even if there were certain overarching unities. In this sense the story is perhaps not too different from the Civil Rights Movement-decolonization nexus, which as Tim Borstelmann, Jim Meriwether, Carol Anderson, and others show was both more and less than meets the eye.³⁵ Still, it is instructive that even those Third World actors shaping the rhetoric of the time did not always press an expansive concept of that entity when they had the chance. In one notable instance, for example, the triumphant Castro visited the island of Trinidad at a moment when its premier, Eric Williams, was leading a pitched battle against Washington to remove the US naval base at Chaguaramas. Hoping for an ally, Williams welcomed Castro with enthusiasm, but was nonplussed to discover that the Cuban was completely ignorant of this

anti-imperial battle underway at the other end of the Antilles.³⁶ That said, however, if the Cubans were less versed in the particular interweavings of their struggle with that of the decolonizing areas, they did speak increasingly frequently in broad terms of their synchronicity:

For many, it was something like an appendage of the United States. Many in this country, too, thought Cuba was [a] US colony. On the map, it was not. On the map we were in a different color from that of the United States. In reality, Cuba was a colony.³⁷

In microcosm during the first sixteen months of Castro's reign as he moved gradually but unmistakably toward the socialist camp, and in macrocosm across the length of the 1960s as his and other Latin American radicals' rhetoric echoed at the UN and elsewhere, these were declarations of an essentially shared struggle—a contention with which other voices around the Black Atlantic and the wide decolonizing world generally agreed. The Cuban declarations were soon followed by actions to support it, as in the deployment of Cuban forces to assist radical African revolutionaries, and such words and deeds became a central feature of the regime.³⁸

But it was not this alone that fused Latin America to the Third World, not least because, perhaps ironically, Castro's regime over time hewed at least as closely to the Second. It was also the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 after the defeat of alternate rallying points for global South solidarity, and the Latin American center's "Prebischian" embrace of the political economy of poverty and development as the central issue dividing North and South. This made Third World status respectable, so to speak, as a political course freely and independently acknowledged as a consequence of the economic inheritances of empire. Castro in 1960 had spoken of his battle to free his country from "imperialism" different in letter but like in spirit to the decolonizing European empires; by 1969, Peruvian Foreign Minister Edgardo Mercado could speak of his country along the same lines as being affirmatively part of the Third World.³⁹ It counts as perhaps only a small irony that Cuba and Chile at those particular moments were by most economic indices among the best-off countries of Latin America. Having handed power to the left end of their political spectra, they found themselves in agreement about the dilemma they fundamentally shared not just with each other but with other parts of the global South. Moreover, it is good to recall that notwithstanding the derogatory associations that attach to the term "Third World" in many present-day

minds, at the time it was a noble, future-oriented aspiration and identity. Historian Andrew Rotter observes that “key leaders of Third World nations, particularly Indonesian President Sukarno [and] Nehru, appropriated the idea of the Third World and claimed it as a source of power.... [At the 1955 Bandung Conference] both men offered definitions of the Third World that denied the inferior status the label implied.”⁴⁰ Broad global-South agreement regarding the addition of Latin America to this evolving entity helped to cement this sense of historic destiny.

Westad is certainly correct that superpower interventions helped to shape the collective consciousness of the Third World. The Bay of Pigs fiasco accelerated Castro’s progress into Soviet arms and signaled, along with LBJ’s intervention in the Dominican Republic four years later, that the Good Neighbor was no longer. But a fuller explanation of that collective consciousness should illuminate why Foreign Minister Mercado affirmed Third-World status four years before a superpower intervention in his own country. Centrist opinion largely agreed, even more so as the years passed, such that Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez could write in 1973 that “the Third World is not only a reality, it is also an ideology” spanning most of the Latin spectrum.⁴¹ The embrace of that status required more than cautionary tales of the USMC landing or the CIA meddling. It required a drawn-out process of collective conversation, from Bandung to the Bay of Pigs to Belgrade to the Che speech in Algiers that gives this essay its title, whose centerpiece for Latin America and decolonizing areas alike increasingly was *tercermundismo*. The conversation sought to make sense of the postwar moment—above all the race-revolution, the Cold War, the relatively abrupt end of the European empires that had dominated the world economy for centuries, and the heights of world power newly reached by the US and Soviet Union. It debated, in the voices of those historically unheard, the actual balance of forces in global relations, and the possible shapes of things to come—allowing, in a sense, Castro, Che, Prebisch, Furtado et al., to amend Sauvy’s vision and to expand its accompanying map.

NOTES

1. “At the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria,” Che Guevara, 2nd Economic Seminar of Afro-Asian Solidarity (Algiers Conference), 24 February 1965, in Ernesto Che Guevara (ed. David Deutschmann), *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution*, Rev. Ed. (Victoria: Ocean Press, 2003), p. 340.

2. Alfred Sauvy, "Trois monde, Une planète," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (118), 14 August 1952, p. 14.
3. That collective identity, Michel Gobat writes, was constructed in significant part due to the US provocations of the region in the mid-nineteenth century: "the rise of 'Latin America' was perhaps the most enduring outcome of one of the first anti-US moments in world history." Michel Gobat, "The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Race", *American Historical Review* 118, issue 5 (December 2013), pp. 1345–1375, 1347. See also Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
4. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008).
5. See for example Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In From the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008). For an overview of the development and evolution of this literature, see Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations", *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 5 (November 2003), pp. 621–636.
6. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1961). The book included a preface, penned by Jean-Paul Sartre, which highlighted the term "Third World."
7. Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?": Origin, Definition, and Usage", *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (October 1987), pp. 1311–1327, 1312.
8. Sukarno, "Speech at the Opening of the Bandung Conference," 18 April 1955, in *Africa-Asia Speaks from Bandung* (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955sukarno-bandong.html> (accessed 6 May 2014).
9. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report from the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1956). On the meanings and legacies of the conference, see Christopher Lee, *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); John Munro, *The Anticolonial Front: Cold War Imperialism and the Struggle Against Global White Supremacy, 1945–1960* (Santa Barbara: Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 2009); and Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference,

- and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955”, *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 5 (November 2005), pp. 841–868.
10. Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, 2 ed., (University of Chicago Press, 1967), cited in Wolf-Phillips, “Why ‘Third World?’”, p. 1313.
11. See Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
12. Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign Against the Germans of Latin America in World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13. Booklet, “Inter-American Relations: What Latin Americans Think,” attached to Barlow to ARA, 9 June 1961, 611.20/6-961, Box 1210, State Department CDF 1960-63, RG 59, US National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA).
14. Stephen Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 47–58. On Guatemala, see Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); and Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
15. Aaron Coy Moulton, “Building Their Own ‘Cold’ War in Their Own Backyard: The Transnational, International War in the Greater Caribbean Basin, 1944–1954”, Paper presented at University of California-Santa Barbara Center for Cold War Studies Conference, 11 April 2014.
16. For Latin America, see Alan McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); more broadly, see Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
17. Prebisch’s foundational text was *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (UN Department of Economic Affairs Press, 1950), while Furtado’s best-known work was *Formação Econômica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundo da Cultura, 1959). See also Edgar Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raul Prebisch, 1901–1986* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), Chaps. 12–13.
18. Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War*, 10.
19. “Summary of Speeches Made at October 26, 1959, Mass Demonstration [Havana, Cuba],” US Embassy-Havana to State Department, 12 November 1959, at <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1959/19591026-2.html>, accessed 4 March 2014.

20. "The Revolution Will Not Stop," Havana, 7 March 1960, in Castro Speech Database (<http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600307.html>, accessed 8 May 2014).
21. "Castro at U.N. Asks 'Colonial' Revolt," 27 September 1960, in Castro Speech Database (<http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600927.html>, accessed 6 May 2014).
22. As Peter Nehemkis (one of JFK's unofficial advisors on Latin America) put it just six months later, "in a revolutionary world, economic colonialism is as dead as political colonialism." Speech, "Alianza Para Progreso," Peter Nehemkis to 24 Chicago World Trade Conference, 6 March 1961, "AFP Jan.–Dec. 1961," box 290A, NSF—Papers of President Kennedy (hereafter NSF), John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL).
23. Murrow to Rostow, 19 July 1961, "USIA Gen. Jul.–Aug. 1961," box 290, NSF (also found in *FRUS* at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d127>). Murrow elaborated: "When your shop has time, I would like to have an updated 'Guidance on Preferred Terminology' prepared which would propose possible words to be used as substitutes for such terms as 'East-West', 'Cold War', 'pro-West', 'pro-American country' and many others which are misleading, inaccurate, and not in our best interests. All new suggestions should be checked out for worldwide translatability." The response came a week later: Memorandum, 'Useful Terminology,' Bundy to NSC Staff, 26 July 1961, 'FG 296—USIA Jan.–Jul. 1961,' box 184, White House Central Files—Subject File - Papers of Pres. Kennedy (hereafter WHCF), JFKL.
24. Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). See also Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Sheyda Jahanbani, 'A Different Kind of People': *The Poor at Home and Abroad, 1935–1975* (Providence: Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 2009).
25. As Bowles put it, "Castro deserves credit for waking us up on the subject of Latin America." Interview of Chester Bowles, JFKL. See also Speech (Caracas, Venezuela), "The Alliance For Progress: Prospects, Perils, and Potentialities," Arthur Schlesinger, 11 May 1963, "AFP Apr.–May 1963," box WH-2, White House Files, Arthur Schlesinger Papers, JFKL.
26. Report from Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems to President-Elect Kennedy, 4 January 1961, Document #2, *FRUS 1961–1963*, Vol. XII, accessed 10 August 2012 at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d2>.

27. See Jeffrey Taffett, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
28. Nor should the power of that celebrity around the hemisphere be underestimated. As Lincoln Gordon reflected on his own time in Brazil not long after the assassination, "Philip Quigg in *Foreign Affairs* 'suggests that one reason JFK was so liked and respected a figure in Latin America was that he was the kind of man they all really wanted to be President of their own countries.... In Brazil there is no doubt about this.... And the effects are still extraordinary.... [At a movie-theater in Brazil in 1964] There was a short documentary news film of highlights of the previous year, 1963. Goulart appeared several times and there was no reaction to this. JFK appeared on screen once and there was spontaneous applause from the whole audience. I am told this happens all the time.'" Lincoln Gordon Oral History, 30 May 1964, 70, Oral History Collection, JFKL. On the important role Gordon played, see Andrew Kirkendall, "Kennedy Men and the Fate of the Alliance for Progress in LBJ-Era Brazil and Chile", *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18, issue 4 (December 2007), pp. 745–772.
29. Thomas Field, "Ideology as Strategy: Military-Led Modernization and the Origins of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia", *Diplomatic History* 36, issue 1 (January 2012), pp. 147–183. This phenomenon was not confined to Latin America but could also be found contemporaneously in, for example, Indonesia. Bradley Simpson, *Economists With Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
30. The report went on to lament the likely intractability of the situation: "We have to deal with the Lumumbas, the Castros, and the Sukarnos [as they are]. They are largely immune to persuasion." Report of President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), "Conclusions and Recommendations," December 1960, "PCIAA 1960," box 468, NSF, JFKL.
31. Summary Minutes of Meeting, Interdepartmental Committee of Undersecretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, 29 November 1961, Document #35, *FRUS 1961–63*, Vol. XII, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d35>, accessed 12 August 2012.
32. Report R-29-61, "Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America 1960," 7 June 1961, box 5, USIA Office of Research—"R" Reports 1960–63, RG 306, NARA; Eric Gettig, "The Limits of Solidarity: The United States and the Havana Tricontinental Conference of 1966," paper presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations annual

- meeting, June 2011. In addition to Havana 1966 and Algiers 1965, avatars of the Third World project sought to organize a sequel to the 1955 Bandung Conference. Gettig shows that Washington did what it could to undercut these efforts, in order to influence Third World internationalism towards economic development and away from radical-revolutionary Afro-Asianism. Eric Gettig, "‘Trouble Ahead in Afro Asia’: The United States, the Second Bandung Conference, and the Struggle for the Third World, 1964–65", *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 1 (January 2015), pp. 126–156.
33. Speech (Caracas, Venezuela), Arthur Schlesinger, 11 May 1963.
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Globalisation and Internationalism Beyond the North Atlantic: Soviet-Brazilian Encounters and Interactions During the Cold War

Tobias Rupprecht

Cold War geopolitics seemed like a black and white affair to most Westerners in the 1950s. Not so much, however, to the Brazilian economist and high-ranking diplomat Wilson Sidney Lobato, who in a 1958 memorandum for the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations decided to add some colour: “As red as the Russians may be,” he wrote in his plea for closer and more pragmatic relations with the Soviet Union, “they will never change the black colour of raw oil they sell to us or the green colour of coffee beans they buy from us. Commerce is commerce and not the Sermon on the Mount.”¹ His suggestions fell on sympathetic ears in the Brazilian government. Developmentalist Brazil built up stable political, economic, and cultural relations with Moscow which later survived the military putsch of 1964 and two decades of anti-communist military rule, laying the groundwork for today’s collaboration of the two states

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within the BRICS group of emerging economies. During the Cold War, projections of what I call “Soviet internationalism after Stalin” had found an interested audience all over Asia, Africa, and Latin America.² Against this backdrop, many Brazilian politicians and intellectuals, from around 1960 onwards, no longer perceived the Soviet Union as the cradle of communist world revolution. The USSR, to them, served as a non-Western role model for fast development and industrialisation, and it helped them to pursue an independent foreign policy and thus expand Brazil’s influence in the world.

The Soviet Union, for its part, saw Brazil as a reliable partner in foreign trade and politics—and as a source of popular low- and middle-brow culture. Impulses for international economic and political integration and cultural exchange in the second half of the twentieth century, I thus argue in this chapter, were not limited to the spread of Western European and North American ideas of internationalism and globalisation. There is a bias in much of the scholarship on globalisation that associates too readily Western liberal capitalism with global integration and state socialism with self-isolation. What global historians like to call “entanglements” was not limited to Western states during the Cold War. Outside the North Atlantic world, states and societies, from the 1950s onwards, also increasingly interacted economically, politically, and culturally, often irrespective of their governments’ political orientations. Encounters between what were at the time known as the Second and Third Worlds were long underrepresented in Western historiography. Uncovering these contacts helps rethink an ostensibly clear bipolarity of the Cold War, and it also reveals some of the roots of contemporary geopolitical partnerships—or the “past of the present,” as the editors have chosen to call this volume. Brazil, in Cold War geopolitics somewhere between West and South, is a particularly insightful case study for these contacts as its changing governments from populist socialists to authoritarian anti-communists hardly affected the increasing interconnectedness with the Soviet Union that I present in this chapter.³

CONVERGENCE FROM THE EAST: PROMOTING SOVIET MODERNITY IN DEVELOPMENTALIST BRAZIL

A first attempt to establish diplomatic relations between Moscow and Rio in the wake of their Second World War alliance had failed when the Brazilian president Eurico Gaspar Dutra, upon US recommendation, sent

Soviet ambassador Yakov Surits back to Moscow in 1946 and declared illegal the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) the year after. The emerging Cold War had brought back the fear of a communist insurrection as the Brazilians had experienced it in 1935: under the auspices of the Comintern, Brazilian communists with their party leader Luis Carlos Prestes had reacted violently to an attempt to outlaw them and had brought about a serious constitutional crisis. In the late 1940s communists were still a noteworthy political force in the country with a stronghold in the harbour city of Santos—called Prestesgrad by some contemporaries. Still banned during the 1950s under President Gétúlio Vargas and his successor Juscelino Kubitschek, and shaken by Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalinism, the PCB soon splintered into dissident groups such as the Maoist *Partido Comunista do Brasil* (PCdoB) and Cuban-inspired *guerrilleros*. Both tried to revive a revolutionary spirit but in fact only contributed to the dwindling importance of the communist movement in Brazil.⁴

The few remaining Soviet embassies in Latin America were aware of their own reputation, and of the lack of political influence of the Communist Parties. They regularly sent home suggestions on how to improve the image of the USSR accordingly, always recommending downplaying the communist character of the Soviet state, and flaunting its technological and scientific achievements instead.⁵ This approach fit well with the new Soviet foreign policy concepts of the time. After years of self-isolation under Stalin, the new Soviet leadership opened the country to the world in order to spread, if much more cautiously than the early Bolsheviks, their model of society across the globe. But the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953 actually renounced violent revolutions in non-communist countries and propagated a peaceful path to socialism instead. The recent development of the Soviet Union from an agrarian backwater to industrial superpower within a few decades was now presented proudly as a model to states in the emerging Third World. What I call "Soviet internationalism after Stalin" was a conglomeration of these paternalistic activities in the Global South, which led to a reintegration of Soviet society, on economic, political, scientific, intellectual, and cultural levels, into the emerging global community.⁶

In order to sell their model of state-led modernisation to the Third World, the Soviet Union started an enormous image campaign, and many of its efforts in Latin America were focused on Brazil. This began with a number of government, rather than Communist Party,

delegations from Moscow. They were received by high-ranking Brazilian politicians, including President Kubitschek and both his future successors, Governor Jânio Quadros and the head of the workers' party João Goulart.⁷ They signed a cultural treaty between their countries, arranged for the exchange of technical experts, and eventually cleared the way for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1961.⁸ The new image of the Soviet Union was fostered through a wide range of Soviet media in Spanish and Portuguese, which were distributed through diplomatic and Communist Party channels, mainly via Mexico City and Buenos Aires, later through Havana, and through the locally organised *Instituto Cultural Brasil-U.R.S.S* in Rio de Janeiro. Based on such US journals as *Life* or *Look*, these new Soviet high gloss journals printed hardly a word on politics or even the word communism. Much space was given to the Soviet inner periphery: Central Asia and the Caucasus, having undergone an allegedly successful development programme directed by Moscow, were presented as role models for the modernisation of the Global South. Photos of shining modern machinery, reports on cultural and student exchange, fashion, sports, cars, technology, the cosmos, and smiling Caucasian girls with flowers adorned Soviet magazines like *Tempos Novos*, *Ciências Sociais* and *Mulher Soviética*.⁹ Soviet radio, broadcast with assistance of Portuguese communists in Moscow from 1953, also tried to appeal to broadly defined "progressive circles" rather than party communists, and devoted much of its programme to the scientific, economic, and cultural achievements of the Soviet Union.¹⁰ "Peace," "progress," and "development" ousted "revolution" and "communism" as catchphrases in Soviet international media.

The *Instituto Cultural Brasil-U.R.S.S.* also organised the screening of globally successful Soviet films of the Thaw period as well as the reception of many more Soviet artists who toured the world. In 1958, the Bolshoi Theatre performed in Rio de Janeiro and repeated its trip many times throughout the late 1950s and the 1960s. Scientists, chess players, classical musicians, and sportsmen represented the Soviet Union abroad.¹¹ Communism disappeared from self-representation to the extent that Brazilian left-wing intellectuals were actually irritated about the purely apolitical nature of Soviet activities in their country; they pleaded for more ideological work in a conversation with one of the visiting Soviet delegations, pointing at the more pro-active stance of communist China.¹² But the Soviets stuck to campaigns that flaunted the Soviet experience as an alternative modernity. The arguably most successful

element of this new Soviet self-representation was the space programme. The flight of the Sputnik in 1957 had impressed Brazilians, many of whom expressed their admiration in telegrams and letters to Moscow.¹³ The flight of *Vostok 1* in 1961 subsequently became *the* “success story of Soviet modernity.” In a somewhat double-edged comparison, Yuri Gagarin was labelled the “Columbus of the Cosmos”¹⁴—and sent to conquer the Americas. In July 1961, shortly after his successful space flight, he arrived in Brazil. After a great street parade with President Quadros, Gagarin was decorated with the state’s highest order of merit, the *Ordem Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul*. These happenings were very popular with the broad public and were repeated with the next generation of cosmonauts, when Andrian Nikolayev und Pavel Popovich came to Brazil in March 1963.¹⁵

The space programme also became a central feature in a series of exhibitions that the Soviets held in the Americas. The largest and most notable one took place at the São Cristóvão fairground in Rio de Janeiro in May 1962. On the opening day, Nikolai Patolichev, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, met Carlos Lacerda, the militantly anti-communist governor of the state of Guanabara, who conceded: “Your technological achievements can serve any type of regime!”¹⁶ Trade volume was raised from US\$100 to \$140 million. These still rather humble figures stood in a remarkable contrast to the scope of the exhibition. According to Soviet sources the largest exhibition ever held in Latin America, it displayed more than 10,000 exhibits that reflected many phenomena of a highly optimistic Soviet Union some months before the Cuban Crisis. Khrushchev wrote a greeting article for the conservative newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*, in which he explained magnanimously that the Soviet Union had also once started from the level of Brazil, which after its national independence now still had to achieve its economic autonomy. The Soviets were glad to offer a role model for further development. They themselves had free health care, free education, and would, by 1980, be able to offer free apartments and free transport, and the economy would have increased sixfold. The Soviet Union, as Khrushchev presented it to the Brazilians, was the future, the power behind peace, freedom, and development, and the exhibition was intended to give a taste of this.¹⁷ To see this state of affairs, selected visitors could fly in from downtown Rio in a Soviet helicopter squadron to see big elaborate models and documentary films of the hydroelectric power plant in Bratsk, of Soviet aircraft and of the nuclear-powered icebreaker *Lenin*.

An entire section was dedicated to the space programme, with models of the spaceships *Vostok 1*, *Vostok 2*, and the *Sputnik* on display, and huge posters of the handsome cosmonauts smiling at the visitors. Detailed models and interactive panels explained the electrification and energy supply in the USSR.¹⁸

President Goulart, Prime Minister Tancredo Neves and even the military high command were shown around and, filmed by a group of Soviet personnel, marvelled at Soviet robots and other high technology.¹⁹ While several exiled Cubans were arrested in front of the exhibition for rallying against the Soviet Union, Goulart congratulated the organisers on their great success. Like their president, the 500,000 visiting Brazilians were transfixed by the shining ball bearings, modern machinery, fancy watches, upmarket private cars, and tractors in the exhibition. To be sure, behind the colourful façade of cutting-edge technology and high-brow culture still stood a belief in the prospects of socialism. Yet in the run-up to the exhibition, long conversations had been held with Eastern-Europe-experts in the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, who demanded no communist rhetoric be used in the exhibition as this might create an “explosive situation.” The Soviets, in order to reach a broad audience and maintain friendly contacts with what they at the time called a “bourgeois nationalist government,” readily attuned their rhetoric.²⁰

In its official self-representation towards both politicians and the public in Brazil, the Soviet Union was no longer the cradle of world revolution, but a technologically advanced and cultivated European state with a highly educated and happily consuming population. No longer did the Soviets pursue old Marxist questions on the alienation of the human being, on man-nature relations or on the structural deformation of North-South economic relations, as some had done back in the 1920s. They now joined the global euphoria for development and modernisation. The alternative model of modern society that the Soviet presented through their media and their exhibition basically embraced most aspects of Western modernity, but spiced it up with the more just and provident aspects of an ostensibly harmonic Soviet path without a pauperisation of the masses or the exploitation of others. It also included a certain leaning towards authoritarian or populist rule—and rather prude morals and aesthetics: Quadros’ much ridiculed attempt to outlaw bikinis at the Copacabana, in some sense, reflected the same social conservatism as Khrushchev’s attacks against contemporary art displayed in the Moscow *Manezh* exhibition hall during an infamous incident in 1962.

CONVERGENCE FROM THE SOUTH: DEVELOPMENTALIST BRAZIL'S INTERESTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Moscow's new rhetoric notwithstanding, Brazilian elites were wary of Soviet inroads to Brazil. During the time of the Soviet exhibition, the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* featured a series of articles on deficiencies of the Soviet industry. Rio's archbishop, Cardinal Jaime Câmara warned publicly of a "Trojan Horse" of communist infiltration—especially among "indigenous elements," who, due to their poverty and ignorance, were susceptible to the bad intentions of the Soviets and might bring about an "indigenous bolshevism." Câmara called for greater spiritual peace and less technology, and he demanded that Brazilians take action against the "Cubanisation" of Brazil.²¹ Shortly afterwards, some Brazilians did take action and substantiated the warnings made by the Ministry of External Relations: the Soviet exhibition had to temporarily shut its doors, after an anti-communist group of army officers planted a bomb that would have destroyed the entire fair but was found before it went off. The Soviet media could not but see this conspiracy as a prime example of the evildoings of the frequently invoked reactionary circles.²² Clearly, Communism still aroused fear and suspicion amongst most Brazilians in the 1960s. Hundreds of letters reached the organisers of the Soviet exhibition, and, while most commented positively, many enquired about the lack of freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. But certain features of the Soviet state, those that the Soviet increasingly flaunted in their self-representation, commanded interest and respect.

The reformers during the decade of developmentalism in Brazil had a strong interest in certain aspects of the Soviet path to industrial modernity and thus readily collaborated with the USSR in many of its activities. President Quadros encapsulated this apparent contradiction: "Derrotamos o comunismo!"—"We have defeated communism!," he declared when he took office in 1961. He declined the support of the PCB and in his first interview as president again made it clear that he was going to fight any possible communist threat. But having underlined his staunch anti-communism, Quadros outlined a different kind of interest he had developed in the Soviet Union: "I agree with the socialists in the assessment of some demands of modern life: increasing state intervention into the economy...and the necessity of social planning and a welfare state."²³ In an article in *Foreign Affairs* he repeated to an international

audience: "The Western world must show and prove that it is not only communist planning that promotes the prosperity of national economies. Democratic planning must also do so, with the assistance of those economically able."²⁴

During the negotiations with Moscow on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations—pushed for by the Brazilian economy and strongly opposed by the military and many in the Foreign Ministry²⁵—Quadros emphasised even more the parallels he saw between Brazil and the USSR: both had "specific problems of a huge country, (with) vast territories where misery reigns and people fight for progress." It was thus "important for Brazil to develop exchanges with the Soviet Union. We have something to offer and much to learn."²⁶ To Khrushchev personally, Quadros said during a visit to Moscow: "The Russian people are in a position to understand us. Their modern history is characterised by a struggle, under different historical and social conditions, to reach today's wellbeing of the country. [...] The scientific and technical knowledge of the Soviet Union can, in this phase of enormous movement of progress, contribute to the development of my country, in a time when Brazil has decided to burst its chains of poverty, disease, and ignorance."²⁷ Other leading Brazilian statesmen spoke in a similar vein: Goulart turned to the Soviets for information on their literacy campaigns and wrote emphatic letters on peace and the progress of humankind to Khrushchev.²⁸ The conservative first new ambassador to the USSR, while appalled by the restrictions on diplomats in Moscow and the melancholy in the streets, could not conceal his "respect for the great technological achievements of the Soviet people."²⁹ And Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas charmed a Soviet business delegation: "For a long time, Brazil has been admiring the achievements of the Soviet Union in the fields of industry, science and technology, which have brought the USSR into the global lead."³⁰

In fact, not only did the Soviet Union project its ideas of internationalism and its paternalistic stance on Brazil, but Brazil actively contributed to the increasing entanglement of the two distant states. Contacts, first established through CEPAL, the United Nation's commission for Latin America, went back to the early days of the Kubitschek government. First attempts to send Brazilian delegations to Moscow failed in 1954 due to resistance from anti-communist conservatives in the government.³¹ But two years later, Ivette Vargas, President Getúlio Vargas' niece and the most influential female politician in Brazil at the time, headed a group of parliamentarians who went to Moscow and

were deeply impressed: "No doubt there is much we can learn from the experience and the development of the Soviet Union."³² The year after, another group of 50 members of parliament including the future Brazilian Prime Minister Tancredo Neves followed. They admired power plants, industrial sites, and a colourful international youth festival in Moscow. The more conservative Brazilian Ministry of External Relations still felt the need to declare these visits strictly private in order to avoid trouble with the United States.³³ Quadros spent two weeks in the Soviet Union in 1959, before he was elected president and before diplomatic relations were installed. Khrushchev received him in the Kremlin. The same accolade was awarded to Goulart, who was greeted by the entire Presidium of the Central Committee and was given the standard tour programme for friends of the Soviet Union when he came as vice president in December 1960 and again in August 1961.³⁴

In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was indeed a constant coming and going of Brazilian delegations to all parts of the Soviet Union. Federal and provincial parliamentarians and senators saw metro construction sites, hydrological power plants, the modernised cities of Central Asia and the Caucasus, schools, universities, and hospitals; met civil servants, intellectuals, and engineers; and marvelled at museums and ballet performances.³⁵ Mário Pedrosa, a former communist and now president of the National Cultural Council, helped build up cultural relations during a visit to Moscow.³⁶ The federal ministries also sent observers to their Soviet counterparts for longer periods. An expert from the Brazilian health ministry spent 14 months in Leningrad studying the local health care system.³⁷ Brazilian doctors went to Moscow to get to know the Soviet health system. Similarly, agrarian experts asked to be invited.³⁸ When Quadros flew to Moscow for the second time in spring 1960, members of the economic council of the Brazilian government came along and, among other things, had the Soviet system of education explained to them. The council's interest, however, was less in the Soviet feats and more in economic prospects: the year after, the head of the Brazilian coffee institute signed a trade contract in Moscow, whereupon Kubitschek showed good will and set over 50 imprisoned high-ranking PCB members free.³⁹ At the same time, Soviet polytechnic institutes and universities increasingly received Brazilian professors, students, and interns regularly. What a young man from Goiania wrote to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, asking for an invitation to study medicine in Moscow, represents hundreds of similar letters by ordinary Brazilians at the time:

"I by no means adhere to communist ideas; like most of my fellow students, however, I admire the remarkable development we see happening in the Soviet Union."⁴⁰

Brazilian intellectuals, of course, took part in the debate on the USSR. Until the early 1950s, Brazilian travellers to the USSR had usually been communists: travelogues by the novelists and at the time committed party activists Jorge Amado and Graciliano Ramos, by the Marxist historian [aut]Prado Júnior, Caio da Silva, and by the communist journalists Victorio Martorelli and Enaida Moraes uncritically celebrated every aspect of Soviet life with a heavy ideological bias.⁴¹ From the mid-1950s, however, politically neutral intellectuals also wrote accounts that, while not embracing all aspects, showed a fascination for the Soviet project. José Mendes, a young journalist for *O Globo* and *Correio da Manhã*, went to the USSR for several weeks in 1955. His *O povo nas ruas* ("The people in the streets") was a collection of smart and nuanced essays on the lives of Soviet citizens.⁴² While he did criticise censorship of the media, privileges for party members, and sometimes noticed fear of foreigners and a rather paltry living standard, people to him seemed, despite all shortcomings, confident in the system in which they lived, as well as patriotic and proud of their achievements. Mendes was deeply impressed by a highly developed agriculture and industry, by the quick reconstruction of cities after the war—and by progressive gender relations. He had his readers consider that, back in 1920, illiteracy among Soviet citizens was at the same level as in contemporary Brazil, and had now been completely eliminated. Especially full of respect were his reports from the Caucasus, where he examined the electrification, education, and health systems in Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴³

Even more enthusiastic was a series of publications by another Brazilian traveller: Nestor de Holanda, a newspaper and television journalist, who visited eight Soviet republics in June 1959. His travelogue *O Mundo Vermelho* ("The Red World") was a multi-edition bestseller in early 1960s Brazil.⁴⁴ His Soviet guide and translator, the future ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev, initially reported sceptically to his superiors: "Holanda has extraordinarily vague ideas about the Soviet Union...and asked many provocative questions that I refused to answer."⁴⁵ But these concerns were unfounded: his Brazilian fosterling gave an entirely positive account of the Soviet modernisation project, the gender roles, ostensible religious freedom, and the "colourful everyday and cultural life." Two aspects certainly contributed to Holanda's

benignity: firstly, he was received with full honours and privileges (in Georgia he “felt like the most important man of the entire Caucasus”)⁴⁶, was steered towards selective aspects of Soviet life by his round-the-clock guardians and translators—and he made more roubles than he could spend with several publications in Soviet newspapers and journals. The second aspect needed no official staging: Holanda was charmed by the knowledge of and interest in his home country. Everyone in the Soviet Union seemed to know and love Brazilian football, Jorge Amado, and samba music. He was constantly asked about the construction of Brasília, and he was overwhelmed when he found the collected works of Castro Alves, a nineteenth-century Brazilian poet, in the public library in the Uzbek capital Tashkent.⁴⁷

Holanda was so impressed by these well-educated Soviet citizens that he wrote another book aimed at eliminating any prejudices his fellow Brazilians may have had about the country. Published in two editions, *Diálogo Brasil-URSS* listed 100 typical questions and criticisms by anti-communist and politically indifferent Brazilians and had Soviet citizens, allegedly without the interference of any officials, answer them.⁴⁸ Hoodwinked by this Soviet self-representation, Holanda was convinced that he had found a role model for the development of his native Brazil: in a third book, he imagined what Brazil would look like as a socialist country (*Como seria o Brasil socialista?*).⁴⁹ He still denied being a communist and in his introduction underlined that socialism in Brazil would be different from the Soviet Union. But, in fact, he fantasised about the advantages of Soviet-style organisation of all sectors of Brazilian society. Most of Holanda’s contemporaries did not share his unconditional enthusiasm about the USSR. A New York Times survey (albeit after the Cuban missile crisis which chipped away at the Soviets’ image) in 1963 showed that only 12% of the Brazilian population thought of the Soviet Union as a “good country,” while more than half of them simply had no opinion.⁵⁰ But it is fair to say that in crucial sectors of Brazilian society around 1960, a great amount of interest in certain aspects of the Soviet Union did exist. Lopsided as they were, Holanda’s books sold record amounts of copies. The political elite of reformers, the administrative and technical intelligentsia in their fight against the perceived backwardness of their own country, venerated the scientific and technological progress of the Soviet Union and Soviet feats in erasing illiteracy and making education and high culture accessible to ordinary people.

AUTHORITARIAN ENTANGLEMENTS: SOVIET INTERNATIONALISM AND THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY REGIME IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

In the early 1960s, economic difficulties, increasing inflation, land reforms, and the imminent nationalisation of parts of the industry by Goulart's government unsettled many middle class Brazilians. Some conservative and military elites were still sceptical about the expanding interactions with the Soviet Union. Many of them thus supported the president's overthrow in a military putsch in March 1964, when the Armed Forces installed General Humberto Castelo Branco as the new president. To the domestic and international public, the new men in charge presented themselves as staunch anti-communists. Censorship now prevented positive reporting about the Soviet Union, and officially Brazil sided wholeheartedly with the United States in the Cold War. The USA had supported anti-Goulart movements for years, fearing a "second Cuba" or, considering the size of Brazil, even a "second China." During the coup d'état, the US embassy helped with the communication among the conspirators, and the Navy had its aircraft carriers and battleships patrol the Brazilian coastline to give military assistance if needed. Washington immediately recognised the new government that had allegedly staved off the hand of international communism, and hailed the putsch, which overthrew a democratically elected administration and disbanded political parties, as one of the democratic forces.⁵¹ The new regime had Soviet-friendly intellectuals arrested. Purges in the administration, the military, in politics, trade unions, think tanks, and universities removed whoever they considered to be leftists. The generals even declared a ban on Russian and communist authors like Maxim Gorki or Bert Brecht and initially even had Russian music removed from the radio programmes.⁵²

The Soviets themselves reacted remarkably calmly to their ousting in Brazil; only a short newspaper report stereotypically condemned the putsch.⁵³ The Cuban Crisis had dampened the cheerful optimism in Soviet possibilities in Latin America. Even more so after the dismissal of Khrushchev in October, the Soviets were not willing to support another ideologically unreliable, wayward, and tremendously expensive partner like Fidel Castro's Cuba. They were thus not unhappy that relations with Brazil had been put on a more pragmatic level—for cut they never were. Diplomatic relations were maintained, and as early as September 1964 the Soviets congratulated the military dictators on the Brazilian national

day and wished success in their further development!⁵⁴ Later that month, staff from the Soviet embassy in Brazil secretly met the vice-Foreign Minister Dario Castro Alves in Brasília. The Soviet diplomats recorded the friendly atmosphere in which they were asked to keep a low profile and for a while avoid contacts to certain Brazilian institutions.⁵⁵

In fact, many Brazilians maintained their political and economic interests in the USSR. Before the putsch, the influential media mogul Assis Chateaubriand had led campaigns against Goulart and his “flirtations with international bolshevism.” From 1964, he developed an intimate friendship with Soviet ambassador Andrej Fomin, whom he had decorated with his *Ordem do Jagunço*. Setting up the Soviet flag in his São Paulo residence *Casa Amarela*, Chateaubriand now propagated the maintenance of diplomatic relations with the USSR. In July, he was given medical treatment for several weeks in Moscow, a journey which was covered as a cultural delegation trip for his foundation, in order not to overly provoke the generals.⁵⁶ In a similar feint in early November, the Soviet diplomats Anatoli Shadrin und Nikolai Yatskov received medals from the Castelo Branco government. The Brazilian press announced they had acted against orders to interfere in Brazilian inner politics. A completely made-up story, as Brazilian Foreign Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha openly admitted in a meeting later that month with the Soviet embassy: “The ambassador should take that episode as a reflection of future policies towards socialist countries.” While public discourse changed to constant denouncements of communism and Soviet interference, economic and political relations with the USSR in fact remained at the same level. Leitão da Cunha handed over a list of persons and organisations with which the Soviets were allowed to have contacts—and they readily accepted.⁵⁷ Castelo Branco sent friendly notes to Moscow about the latest success of the space programme.⁵⁸ And football was to support the ongoing friendship of the two nations: already in 1965, a friendly game was organised in Rio’s Maracanã stadium, where the Soviet team reached a respectable 2:2 draw against the incumbent world champion.

Albeit now firmly lodged into different ideological camps of the Cold War, Brazil and the Soviet Union shared many characteristics and interests that explain the somewhat surprising harmonic relations of the new Brazilian leaders and elites with Moscow: in Brazil as in the Soviet Union between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, bustling populist reformers had eventually failed economically and spiritually. In both countries, the reformers were overthrown in 1964 by conservatives with the backing

of the military. The Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev and the Brazilian military president Castelo Branco now headed what were democracies on paper, but in fact one-party states that outlawed and persecuted political opponents. Decision-making was centralised, the opposition was curtailed, and parliaments or congresses had little political influence. Especially from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, Brazilian trade unions, academia, the judiciary, and the media were under political control just as they were in the Soviet Union. And just like their populist predecessors, the Soviet and Brazilian authoritarian rulers craved economic development.

Seeing a vital connection between development and security, both countries' leaders accelerated their industrialisation with government-led campaigns. The number of state enterprises such as communication and electricity companies actually rose during the dictatorship in Brazil. *Petrobras'* extended nationalisations threatened even Soviet endeavours in a bitumen factory in São Paulo, as Ambassador Fomin complained to Brazilian authorities.⁵⁹ In both countries, the military now had a tight grip on all sectors of society, including politics, and cemented their positions from their propaganda departments in the ministries of the interior. Secret services worked with extra-legal methods against real and ostensible foes of the regime, and they developed refined mechanisms of control and repression. Representative democracy was despised and a cult of the military prevailed. In Brasília, the socialist utopian city, the new men in power now found much space for their military parades, which looked just like their counterparts in Moscow.

Other reasons contributed to the surprisingly relaxed nature of Brazilian-Soviet relations: after a short period of convergence with the USA, the military government, just like the left-wing populists before them, sought to expand Brazil's influence in the world by pursuing an independent foreign policy. The Soviet Union now served two purposes in Brazilian geopolitical manoeuvring: it had become a trading partner, and it offered political leverage in relations with Washington. From 1965, the liberal economist Roberto Campos presided over the newly established Ministry of Economic Planning and Coordination. His first foreign trip as representative of the anti-communist military regime took him, of all places, to the Soviet Union. To the dismay of the Latin American left, he was received with all honours and was shown around the country for a week.⁶⁰ Campos had no sympathies at all for communist ideology, but pragmatically saw the advantages of collaboration in

certain fields—and the Soviets liked his realist approach. His meeting with the deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Akhimov was to signal political independence from the United States, and a meeting with Brazilian industrialists and Trade Minister Patolichev paved the way for a trade protocol, which was signed during the latter's visit to Brazil in 1966.⁶¹ As early as 1966, the USSR transacted two-thirds of its trade in Latin America with Brazil and the second military dictatorship on the continent, Argentina.⁶²

In terms of technological cooperation, military-ruled Brazil was—after Cuba—the most important Soviet partner in Latin America. As agreed on with Goulart's administration and confirmed during Campos' visit, Soviet technicians helped to build a combined heat and power station in the state of São Paulo; they participated in Brazil's ambitious electrification programme; and Soviet geologists continued their expeditions in rural Brazil.⁶³ After some failed attempts in the early 1960s, the Soviets profitably shared their expertise in hydrotechnology for several dam and power plant projects at Ilha Solteira and in Pernambuco, where they collaborated with Brazilian engineers who had studied in the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ Building on these contacts, a Soviet-Brazilian consortium later participated in a hydroelectric construction programme on the river Cuanza in Angola; collaborative projects in Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Peru followed in the 1970s and 1980s.⁶⁵ Even the Brazilian ministries were not obliged to cut their connections to Moscow. In 1965, the Ministry of Health proposed to resume collaboration and asked for subject literature from its Soviet counterpart.⁶⁶ The year after, a delegation of the Soviet ministry was received in Brasília and helped conceptualise a vaccination plan.⁶⁷ The Council of Engineering and Architecture at the Brazilian Ministry of Labour remained in contact with the Institute for Railway Building in Dnepropetrovsk, and the national school of engineering sent students to Moscow and Leningrad for specialised training.⁶⁸

In the aftermath of the putsch the new government had been very insistent about repressing any communist influence in the arts. Despite this, the *Instituto Cultural Brasil-U.R.S.S.* was allowed to continue its work, and court cases against its members were soon stayed—not least because it took over some of the communication on technical collaboration.⁶⁹ After a short break in 1964, the Soviets were also able to continue a pared-down version of their cultural diplomacy programme. In December, they participated in the 400th-anniversary celebrations of Rio de Janeiro; they were free to organise their art exhibitions, ballet

tours, cinema festivals, and book fairs.⁷⁰ Soviet academics went to the 50th anniversary of the Brazilian Academy of Science in 1966; and the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko was invited as juror in a music festival in the state of Rio in 1967.⁷¹ Brazilian students in the Soviet Union (about 100 in Moscow's Lumumba University, two-thirds of whom were apolitical according to Soviet estimates) continued their studies and at least students of economics and engineering returned without harassment.⁷² A Brazilian economist who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1970s recalled that, upon his return, he had "...no problem at all! To the contrary!"⁷³

The journalist Genival Rabelo, originally a supporter of the left-wing populist governments but now collaborating with the military government, could travel to the Soviet Union in 1966 and publish his very favourable account of Soviet life in *No outro lado do mundo* ("In the other half of the world"). Just like the travellers in the 1950s, he described enthusiastically the improvements that Soviet power had brought to former backwoods and unexplored areas. "As late as the thirties," he wrote, "Siberia was a neglected land, a predominantly agrarian area, like Brazil. Now it is being electrified, its heavy industry is growing rapidly. It is producing steel. Many labour processes are being mechanised. It will not be long before Siberia really becomes one of the richest places in the world. Even today it provides 90% of the Soviet Union's hydropower resources and 80% of its timber wealth." Like Nestor de Holanda a decade before, Rabelo saw the responsibility for the Cold War as lying with the West and was very positive about the technological and educational achievements, the "feeling of internationalism and fraternal concern for the working people of the world," the progressive gender relations, and the lavish health care system in the USSR. "Twenty more years of development in peace, and the Soviet Union will be the most progressive and happiest country on earth," he concluded his book. Although Rabelo collaborated with a staunch anti-communist regime, he repeatedly favoured the Soviet model of development over the American one.⁷⁴

While the persecution of leftists in Brazil increased notably after 1968, this did not affect relations with the Soviet state. Also during harsher phases of the dictatorship, Brazil actively used the geopolitical constellation and different sources of inspiration, Eastern and Western ones alike, in its own interest. Economic relations with the USSR remained stable. The Brazilian Minister for Development and Industry, Paulo Egydio, went to Moscow in 1967. During the most repressive phase of the anti-communist military regime, another Soviet trade fair was held in São

Paulo in 1972; the Brazilians organised one themselves in Moscow in 1974.⁷⁵ When the Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel started a process of political openness later that decade, he also reinforced Brazil's aspirations for economic and geopolitical autonomy—and thus further expanded contacts with the communist world, establishing diplomatic relations with China and with the Soviet-supported regimes in Lusophone Africa.

In Moscow, too, the changing Brazilian policies towards its leftist opposition did not affect official relations with the military regime. The leading Latin America expert of the KGB later recalled: "at that time, revolutions worried the Kremlin more than the reactionaries. ...for when a revolution succeeded, requests for help, credits and money followed hard. A stable conservative government, however...offered normal relations, without problems, without concerns."⁷⁶ The Soviets monitored closely the Brazilian economic miracle of the early 1970s, and representatives of the military government were always welcome in the USSR. A large delegation of parliamentarians and governors was invited in 1980, including high-ranking former members of the *Aliança Renovadora Nacional*, the ruling party created by the military regime, to discuss Brazilian economic reform, problems of foreign debt, and political decentralisation.

CULTURAL ENTANGLEMENTS: BRAZILIAN POPULAR ENTERTAINMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

Brazilian authoritarian rule did not affect the increasing cultural presence of Brazil in the Soviet Union either. One of the most popular foreign authors throughout the Soviet Union was Jorge Amado, whose novel *Os Subterrâneos da Liberdade* ("Catacombs of Freedom") was known to nearly everyone in the entire country.⁷⁷ The Brazilian playwright Guilherme Figueira seems to have enjoyed some success on Soviet stages.⁷⁸ "The interest in Brazilian music here is enormous," wrote the Brazilian embassy in Moscow back to Brasília in 1964, and noted the particular popularity of the Conjunto Farroupilha, led by the singer Jorge Goulart, who had been to the USSR two years earlier.⁷⁹ The pianist Arnaldo Estrella played concerts all over the Soviet Union in 1965, briefly after the putsch. The folklore musician Victor Simon was all the rage with a broad Soviet audience throughout the 1960s, likewise unabated by political developments in Brazil. With 20 men and women of a dancing company, he played 50 shows all over the Soviet Union in summer 1966 and combined his music with historic reenactments

of Latin American history. In their shows, indigenous people fought against the conquistadores, African slaves against their exploiters, and coffee planters against evil landlords. Honouring the repeated enthusiasm and hospitality of his Soviet audience, Simon added an extra surprise to the final scene of one of his shows: Brazilian dancers in costumes of the Soviet cosmonauts sang Rio de Janeiro's samba-anthem *A Cidade Maravilhosa* and celebrated a *Carnival on the Moon*.⁸⁰ The Soviet embassy staff in Brasília, eager to expand contacts between Brazil and the Soviet Union, reported to the Minister of Culture, Ekaterina Furceva, that they had difficulties finding more Brazilian groups of that kind that could play in the Soviet Union. Most professional artists had been influenced too strongly by western music, Ambassador Sergei Mikhailov complained personally—and recommended paying artists to sketch programmes specially tailored to fit the more conservative Soviet taste.⁸¹

Brazilian visitors to the USSR were often surprised how popular music from their home country was in the Soviet Union: The Brazilian communist journalist Eneida de Moraes recalled that the band in her Moscow hotel played Brazilian music.⁸² And the journalist Nestor de Holanda was overwhelmed to hear rumba and samba in a restaurant in the Black Sea resort town Sochi.⁸³ The Soviet bard Viktor Berkovskij to this day is most famous in Russia for his 1968 romantic hit *Na dalekoj Amazonke* ("at the far away Amazon"). Together with Moris Sinelnikov he had set to music a poem by Rudyard Kipling. Its lyrics repeat the narrator's longing to see Brazil once in his lifetime, while he watches ships leaving the harbour: "and I wonder, will I see Brazil, Brazil, Brazil, will I see Brazil before I get old?" Unaffected by political developments in Brazil, this exoticisation of Brazil lasted through the years of the dictatorship until the end of military rule in 1985. At that time, Brazilian *Lambada* had become just as popular a dance in the late Soviet Union as it had in the West. And Brazilian TV soap operas such as *A escrava Isaura* ("The Slave Isaura") consoled many Russians through the hardships of the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁸⁴

DEMOCRATISATION AND EXPANSION OF CONTACTS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

During the democratisation process from the mid 1980s, Brazil offered ample insights and warnings for Soviet reformers. The Kremlin thus closely monitored the Brazilian experience with stabilising state budgets

without exacerbating social tensions, and with attracting foreign capital while avoiding massive foreign debts.⁸⁵ In February 1990, the Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello met his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow and presented his *Plano Brasil Novo*, a fiscal and trade liberalisation and privatisation programme with radical inflation stabilisation measures.⁸⁶ Later that year, yet another Brazilian delegation of parliamentarians went to the Soviet Union, including the author of a history of the Brazilian constitution, which he presented to an interested audience in Moscow.⁸⁷ Confronted with increasing resistance from the old communist elite, some radical liberal Soviet reformers during the transition period were actually less interested in Brazil's recent democratisation, and more in its authoritarian past. Among several other repressive but economically successful modernising regimes in the Global South, Brazil's dictatorship was now seen by some as an example of "successful national economies that would not have come into being without authoritarian leadership."⁸⁸

As back in the 1960s, however, pragmatic relations between the two countries prevailed over such ideological outliers. In the course of the 1990s, Russia developed into the biggest single buyer of Brazilian meat. After mutual state visits of Presidents Vladimir Putin and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, both signed the bilateral "Brazil-Russia Strategic Alliance" in Moscow in 2005. At this occasion, an agreement was made that allowed the Brazilian Space Agency to send the first Brazilian astronaut, Marcos Pontes, into space aboard Soyuz TMA-8. In 2008, during a state visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to Brazil, the two countries even signed agreements on visa-free travel, which were implemented in 2010, and on cooperation in the aerospace, nuclear, and defence industries. The second summit of the BRIC states was held in Brazil, following the first one in Russia in 2009. The traditionally pragmatic relations continue to this day: the Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has refrained from criticising Russian foreign policy, and Brazil did not join Western sanctions against Russia after its relapse into imperialist reflexes and the invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The Eurasian Economic Union, Putin's grand geopolitical project, is currently discussing a free-trade agreement with Brazil and several other states from the Global South.⁸⁹

The roots of these mutually beneficial contemporary contacts between Russia and Brazil lie in "Soviet internationalism after Stalin." From the 1950s, the USSR managed to have itself no longer perceived as the cradle of communist world revolution but as a non-Western role model

for fast development and industrialisation, as it adopted to international diplomatic conventions, integrated into world trade, and followed global cultural flows. The role model character of Soviet industrial modernity lost its relevance in the course of the 1980s, and at that time it was Brazil that inspired some reformers in the Soviet Union. During, as well as after the Cold War, a guiding principle of Brazilian political decision makers, irrespective of their ideological leanings, was to reach national autonomy, also in foreign policy, though economic independence. In Soviet times as today, Moscow proved a useful partner for Brazil to expand its influence in the world by pursuing an independent foreign policy.

The late Soviet Union, meanwhile, saw Brazil as a reliable partner in foreign trade and politics—and as a source of popular culture, trends that only intensified after the transition period of the late 1980s. Internationalism and globalisation in the twentieth century, as I have argued in this chapter, were not limited to the spread of Western European and North American concepts of economic and political integration. Also outside the North Atlantic framework, states and societies, from the 1950s, increasingly interacted economically, politically, and culturally, often irrespective of their governments' political orientation. The Cold War era was not an entirely black and white affair, and many encounters between the Second and Third Worlds at that time contributed to the groundwork of today's interconnected world.

NOTES

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