The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854-1856

ANDREW C. RATH

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

THE CRIMEAN WAR IN IMPERIAL CONTEXT, 1854–1856
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-54451-3
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First published in 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN 978-1-349-57473-5 ISBN 978-1-137-54453-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137544537

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rath, Andrew C.
The Crimean War in imperial context, 1854–1856 / by Andrew C. Rath.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Crimean War, 1853–1856—Naval operations. 2. Crimean War, 1853–1856—Campaigns. I. Title.

DK215.R237 2015
947′.07381—dc23 2015006797

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: August 2015

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Sarah and Dad

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Acknowledgments

Special thanks are due to McGill University professor emeritus, Valentin Boss, and his wife, Militsa Krivokapich-Boss. In addition to recognizing Dr. Carman Miller at McGill, the author especially wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by Susanne Pastuschek, Johanna Leinonen, and the wonderful team at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Kristin Purdy and Brigitte Shull. Drs. Brian Farrell of the National University of Singapore and Andrew Lambert of King's College (London) were wonderfully supportive of the project, which was partially funded by project grants from Finland's Kone Foundation (Koneen Säätiö).

Assembling and interpreting a wide range of sources in English, French, Russian, German, Japanese, Finnish, and Swedish would not have been possible without the linguistic acumen of Sven Carlsson (Swedish); Mark Conrad, Maria Hristova, Darya Ivashniova, Vladimir Nikitin, and Dr. Svetlana Chervonnaya (Russian); Johanna Beil (German); Aleksi Huhta and Robert Lindberg (Finnish and Swedish); Daniel and Azusa Lachapelle Lemire (Japanese); Jamie Liu Chen (Chinese); and Alexandra Merrill, Celeste Lordet, and Sarah Limoges Rath (French). The author also appreciates John Bowen's and Dayne Weber's cartographic abilities and the assistance of David Retter of the National Library of New Zealand.

The staffs of the National Maritime Museum and the Service Historique de la Défense at Vincinnes were extremely helpful, especially Professor Thomas Vaisset. Hervé de Miniac and Baudoin de Pimodan generously opened their family archives. A great deal of credit is also due to Dr. Howard Fuller of the University of Wolverhampton, Dr. Ruslan Davydov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Jan Martin Lemnitzer of Oxford University, David Retter at the National Library of New Zealand, Dr. Barry Gough, and Professor Patrick Louvier and Alexandre Studeny of Université Paul Valéry Montpellier III.

The inevitable typographic errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

Introduction: More than a "Crimean" War

The Crimean War of 1854–1856 was a unique conflict that differed from other nineteenth-century wars in its participants, timing, and scope. Named after only one of its five theaters, the bloodshed that became known as the Crimean War is known for events including the Charge of the Light Brigade and figures such as nursing pioneer Florence Nightingale. The circumstances surrounding this struggle, however, are far more complex than is suggested by the siege of the Russian-held Black Sea port city of Sebastopol. When the British and French Empires joined their Ottoman counterpart in one of its many clashes with Russia, it was the only instance during the hundred years separating Napoleon's conflicts from World War I that saw more than two of Europe's five great powers square off against one another on the battlefield. Fighting between an Anglo-French-Ottoman[1] alliance and Russian forces was also unusual because each belligerent state was a very different type of empire, ranging from Czarist autocracy to limited British parliamentary democracy. A third distinguishing feature of the Crimean War—its geographic scope—is often overlooked or minimized. Admittedly, many conflicts have minor theaters far from their main fronts, and fighting in remote areas often has little or no impact outside of its immediate surroundings. As the ensuing chapters demonstrate, however, events in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific had a number of profoundly significant and enduring consequences whose causes only become evident through a multifaceted operational history of the Crimean War in each region.

At first glance, it seems difficult to believe that an original work could be written about the Crimean War. More than a million works mention the conflict by name, and thousands more devote their entire focus on it. Detailed historical accounts written from the 1850s to the present already cover the war as a whole as well as the diplomacy that surrounded it. Hundreds of additional books, articles, and dissertations, meanwhile, further analyze specialized topics such as

Denmark's decision to remain neutral in 1854.[2] For all the merits, though, none of these individual works taken alone can coherently explain what happened in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific between 1854 and 1856 or how and why events in each theater mattered.

Existing studies of the Crimean War are not all flawed; instead, the issue is that their contents and source bases are not ideally suited to understand the full scope of the conflict's naval campaigns. The former British ambassador in Helsinki was far from alone in initially pointing out "that Finland was well over a thousand miles north of the Crimea" after first learning of the war's sesquicentennial celebrations in the Baltic.[3] Orlando Figes' critically acclaimed *The Crimean War: A History*,[4] for example, mentions the Baltic on more than 28 different occasions without even devoting a full page to explain what happened there. Likewise, accomplished diplomatic historian Winfried Baumgart's *The Crimean War, 1853–1856*[5] devotes only a few paragraphs to events in the White Sea and Pacific. This certainly does not mean that either of these books or those that resemble them are somehow flawed, but rather that it would be a mistake to rely on general accounts for a detailed operational history of the Crimean War's naval campaigns outside of the Black Sea. Yet even this attempt would be less problematic than accepting the insular approaches of the few authors who have attempted to study these events by exclusively relying on easily available records, press accounts, and secondary sources written only in English.[6] Many more scholars instead drew upon a richer array of sources in their examination of topics relevant to the impact of these three campaigns. Nevertheless, their full meaning only becomes apparent once their contents are synthesized into a broader framework.

Any survey of existing historical writing related to the Crimean War ultimately reveals that the field is fragmented, especially after authors moved away from the common nineteenth-century approach of writing comprehensive histories.[7] Current works instead examine events from one of several specialized or regional perspectives. Andrew Lambert's groundbreaking work, for instance, situates British naval campaigns in the Baltic within the larger context of Britain's political and military command structures as well as the war plans that they produced.[8] These books and articles join the work of British authors such as Howard Fuller, whose work examines Britain's mid-nineteenth-century naval planning against not only Russia but also the United States and France.[9] The events of the Crimean War in East Asia, meanwhile, are even further interwoven into accounts that are primarily focused on Russian expansion at China's expense,[10]

Tokugawa Japan's evolving relationship with maritime powers in the 1850s,[11] and key individuals ranging from a Russian governor-general to a British rear admiral.[12] Compilation of primary documents from Chinese, Japanese, and Russian sources[13] cover only portions of a much larger story and yield something far different from the misleading impression given by other authors who did not assemble the historical evidence necessary to fully evaluate complex events.

Major problems with the few books that currently attempt to study the Crimean War's naval campaigns unfortunately extend far beyond relying on a narrow source base drawn from *The Times* and documents held at the UK National Archives. Instead, the fatal flaw of a work such as John Grainger's *The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856* is that it often draws demonstrably incorrect conclusions while making generalizations that are as unsupported as they are broad.[14] Consider the following passage from that book's introduction, which was supposed to discuss how this author would approach events involving Russian, Chinese, Japanese, French, and British participants:

> I do not know all of the languages involved . . . yet this is less vital than it appears, for the central players in these events were always British. It was a British expedition, with French participants added, which was the precipitating cause of the whole sequence, and the others who were involved were largely reacting to what the British did, either actively or unconsciously.[15]

It should also be noted that even this myopic preference for English-language sources misses a number of very significant ones from repositories in Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.[16] More extended criticism, while possible, ultimately serves little purpose. The briefest glance at this work as well as that of Peter Ducker's *Crimean War at Sea* reveals that the Crimean conflict's naval campaigns have simply never received careful attention from works that, in Ducker's case, did not cite a single original source in English much less in any other relevant language.[17]

It is one thing to establish originality, but another matter entirely to examine its significance. Many conflicts, after all, have seen minor skirmishes far from the main fronts that mattered little to both the outcomes of those wars and to events in the regions in which they occurred. It would be especially tempting at this point to outline a single conclusion—an overarching argument that would easily apply to events in each region. This would not be true to the historical record,

as is evident in later chapters. Britain's "great armament" directed against St. Petersburg and the possibility of Swedish-Norwegian participation in a Baltic conflict certainly played a prominent role in Russia's decision to seek peace, yet other events in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific are best dealt with progressively. Events surrounding Russia's annexation of the Amur River Valley in China had nothing to do with debates over blockading the White Sea or restoring the Åland Islands to Swedish-Norwegian rule. Instead, the immediate consequences of these campaigns are best dealt with systematically through an organized narrative such as this one.

There is an undeniable trade-off between the broad coverage necessary to fully examine the Crimean War's scope and the level of detail found in each chapter. Content surrounding French and British political and naval policymaking structures, for instance, neither resemble nor match the lengths of works such as Michèle Battesti's *La Marine de Napoléon III*[18] or Charles Iain Hamilton's *Making of the Modern Admiralty*.[19] Historians, including Werner Eugen Mosse andWinfried Baumgart, to name a few, devoted entire books to the circumstances surrounding Russia's decision to make peace in 1856. The present work's value instead lies in its synthesis of relevant background information and focus on details that directly relate to Russia, French, and British war-planning and naval campaigns. It might disappoint readers expecting further discussion of topics that have already been well-covered elsewhere, but there are fast-diminishing returns associated with, say, conducting original research on background historical statistics only to replicate the authoritative *International Historical Statistics*.[20] This also explains why, for instance, French, British, and Russian views of Sweden-Norway and Denmark are weighted far more heavily than either of these countries' internal perspectives, which are analyzed in great detail by *Danish Neutrality during the Crimean War (1853–1856)* and the works of Swedish historians including Karl Hallendorff.[21] Careful prioritization is thus essential to present a manageable account of the naval plans, operations, and consequences that make the Crimean War's naval campaigns so salient.

The ensuing pages focus on two priorities when examining wartime events in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific: major events in each region and the significant trends that accompanied them. Major events include notable military engagements as well as incidents such as the 1854 suicide of Britain's Pacific naval commander or the signing of several key agreements by countries including Japan and Sweden-Norway. Significant trends, on the other hand, comprise the evolving attitudes and diplomatic relationships that were so important for

all the belligerent and neutral powers involved. Each priority is, of course, melded together in a narrative that is organized both geographically and chronologically. Throughout each chapter, there is a special emphasis on considering an inclusively multilingual source base that represents as many different perspectives as possible. This approach yielded a number of rich details, but was somewhat limited by the relative scarcity of viewpoints from enlisted personnel compared to the correspondence of officers and well-placed noncombatants such as surgeons. Nevertheless, it is often possible to rely on the vivid imagery of contemporary figures' own words to better illustrate what could otherwise be subsumed within terse or euphemistic high-level correspondence and distant or censored press reports.

The Crimean War in Imperial Context begins by providing background information to better acquaint readers with the circumstances characterizing Russia, France, and Britain in the 1850s. Chapter 1 shows how both Britain and France planned to join the Ottoman Empire as allies against Russian aggression. It also establishes that Britain's and France's de facto chief naval strategist, British Admiralty First Lord Sir James Graham, never intended the assault on Sevastopol to be a siege at all; he instead called for a grand raid to precede a "more important spring campaign in the Baltic."[22] As British foreign secretary Lord Clarendon put it, the "object of the expedition . . . should be . . . to finish the Eastern question in the Euxine (Black Sea) before the Baltic opens & we can pay a visit to Cronstadt (the island fortress complex protecting St. Petersburg)."[23] Chapter 2 outlines how the Russian Empire's leaders intended to respond or, in one particular case, use the conflict to their geopolitical advantage against neutral China. Chapter 3 then turns to events in the Baltic during the full conflict's first year in 1854 by following each belligerent power's initial preparations for both military and commercial warfare. It then considers the positions of Sweden-Norway and Denmark, next discussing British raids along the Bothnian Coast of what was then Czarist-ruled Finland. The Anglo-French capture of the Russo-Finnish fortress of Bomarsund in the Aland Islands separating Finland from Sweden, on the other hand, is included in Chapter 4. This chapter then focuses on examining Allied, or British and French, debates concerning the advisability of attacking the Cronstadt (Kronstadt) and Sweaborg (Sveaborg, Suomenlinna) fortress complexes protecting St. Petersburg and Helsinki, respectively.

Attention then turns northward to the White Sea, where Chapters 5 and 6 chronicle Britain's and France's naval campaigns against that region of Russia in 1854 and 1855. The contents of Chapter 5 delineate

how British and French forces decided against attacking the regional capital of Archangel but instead burned the Town of Kola. This chapter also provides a detailed look at two British warships' ill-advised decision to bombard the fortified Solovetsky Monastery Complex in 1854 and the difficulties inherent in establishing a unified blockade policy in a remote region. Chapter 6, meanwhile, discusses the conflict's impact on Russian coastal populations along with these campaigns' impact on the development of French naval medicine's approach to preventing and treating scurvy. This chapter's primary emphasis, however, is on the Allies' success in convincing Sweden-Norway that an ostensible Russian threat to the remote region of Finmark (Finnmark) merited signing an anti-Russian treaty in November 1855.

The focus of Chapter 7 is the widest ranging. It explains how a maritime conflict with Britain and France played into the hands of Russian leaders such as Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov, who eagerly embraced conflict with these maritime powers as a pretext for finally undertaking large-scale voyages down the Amur River at neutral China's expense. After illustrating China's inability to effectively respond to Russia's forceful actions in 1854, Chapter 7 then analyzes British and French goals in South America. These priorities, in turn, help explain the confused and weakened amphibious assault on Russia's main Pacific port at Petropavlovsk; an attack primarily designed to defend British and French commercial interests in the Northern Pacific. The chapter then concludes by using a number of newly discovered sources to analyze the suicide of Rear Admiral David Price, a senior Allied naval commander for the Pacific and its corresponding impact on Anglo-French operations.

Chapter 8 picks up where its predecessor left off by providing a detailed account of how and why an assault force of more than 700 French and British marines and sailors disintegrated in the face of natural obstacles and fierce Russian resistance. As these defeated Allied warships limped away from the Russian coast in September 1854, another squadron approached Japan and inadvertently obtained significant concessions from an isolationist Tokugawa Shogunate after linguistic and cultural misunderstandings worked in Britain's favor. Wartime exigencies and the Ansei-Tokai Earthquake, meanwhile, meant that a simultaneous Russian mission to Japan would have to wait until 1855 for its goals to come to fruition. Consequently, Russian negotiations with Japan are discussed in Chapter 9, which confirms that Russian prospects in the Pacific were far brighter in 1855 and beyond. This was especially the case after reinforced Allied warships found Petropavlovsk evacuated, allowed Russia's remaining

naval assets to escape from Des Castries (De-Kastri) Bay, and failed to locate the Amur River and the Russian forces concentrated there. After outlining Russian negotiations with Japan, Chapter 9 concludes by discussing the mistaken Anglo-French annexation of the Kurile Island of Urup.

Finally, Chapter 10 examines France's and Britain's second campaign in the Baltic. These efforts culminated in the August 1855 bombardment of Sweaborg by British and French gunboats, mortar vessels, and improvised island batteries. It also uses Finnish records to provide a fresh look at Russo-Finnish actions surrounding a notorious incident dubbed the "Hango (Hanko) Massacre" by Britain's press. Chapter 10 concludes by employing seldom-cited Russian archival sources to understand why Czarist officials feared that the 1855 campaign was a mere precursor to a far more damaging effort in 1856 that would witness Sweden-Norway uniting with Britain and France to invade Finland or devastate Cronstadt and St. Petersburg.

The "Conclusion" establishes how the events and trends evident in each naval campaign culminated in Russia's decision to accept peace terms in 1856. It provides more detail relating to the Czarist government's decision to accept peace than do much longer works. This is essential to proving that a combination of factors including the naval threat to Cronstadt/St. Petersburg, inadequate war production, near bankruptcy, and looming Swedish-Norwegian (not to mention Austrian and Prussia) participation forced Russia to accept defeat in the Crimean War. These factors were far more influential than the 1855 fall of Russia's Black Sea fortress of Sevastopol, which Nicholas I labeled "of secondary importance in comparison" to threats against St. Petersburg and Moscow.[24] Thematically, then, it makes little sense to systematically reiterate the regionally focused conclusions reached in each preceding chapter. This works' methodology is not to somehow invent overarching interregional connections uniting naval campaigns that each occurred in distinct contexts. Instead, historical evidence demands a regional approach because the Crimean War's developments were the only common denominators in these very different parts of the world. The Conclusion does provide a limited overview of the Crimean War's general impact on international maritime law and the Åland Islands' demilitarization, but does not introduce fresh analysis of subsequent developments. Ultimately, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context's* conclusions are interspersed throughout, in keeping with the multifaceted nature of the conflict that unfolded among belligerent empires in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific between 1854 and 1856.

Maps



Map of Baltic Region in the 1850s

Map of the White Sea in the 1850s

Map of the Pacific world in the 1850s



Map of Petropavlovsk in 1854

Notes on Terminology

Although this study focuses on conflict among the British, French, and Russian Empires between 1854 and 1856, it is important to note that fighting between Russian and Ottoman Turkish forces actually began in 1853 and that the Italian Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont eventually joined the Allies. Furthermore, the correct name of this conflict is the subject of ongoing scholarly debate. Contemporary British accounts often referred to "the Russian War," while the French occasionally preferred "la Guerre d'Orient." These are unsatisfactory from a Russian and even Ottoman perspective, but so is "the Eastern War." Ultimately, historians of multiple nationalities came to accept the "Crimean War" designation. In keeping with Napoleon Bonaparte's observation that history is the version of past events upon which people have decided to agree, this study simply refers to "the Crimean War."

Nineteenth-Century Name	*Modern Name*
Åbo	Turku
Brahestad	Raahe
De(s) Castries Bay	De Kastri Bay
Eckness	Tammisaari
Gamla (Gamala) Carleby	Kokkola
Helsingfors	Helsinki
Nargen	Naissar
Nyland	Uusimma
Reval or Revel	Tallinn
Sweaborg	Suomenlinna
Uleåborg	Oulu
Viborg	Viipuri
Wingo Sound	Vinga

Alternate Spellings and Dates

The Crimean War unfolded in diverse regions with competing national traditions. Consequently, it involved languages that were unfamiliar to many Western Europeans and North Americans in the 1850s. Spelling in the nineteenth century was not uniform, and considerable variation existed among or even within[25] different sources. This is especially the case when native speakers of English and French attempted to transcribe or translate Russian names. The City of Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, for instance, also became Petropaulovsk, Petropavlovski, Petropavlowsk, and Petropaulovski. Likewise, the initial surname of Russia's governor-general in Eastern Siberia, Muravyov, was also spelled Muraviev, Muravyev, Murav'ev, etc. This work initially provides current spellings and place names in parentheses following the most common variation of the original nineteenth-century spelling or name. For the sake of uniformity, this work also uses the designation "Ambassador" when referring to a country's primary diplomatic representative to another power.

Russia marked dates on a Julian calendar until 1917, a practice sometimes referred to as "old style." This system differed from the "new style" Gregorian calendar with which Britain, France, and many other powers marked time. In order to avoid confusion, all dates refer to the current Gregorian calendar except in archival footnotes, where the Julian date precedes the Gregorian one. Additionally, the titles of works not written in English, French, or German are translated for the convenience of readers who might not be familiar with other source languages.

CHAPTER 1

Allied Prewar Planning: The "Nelson Touch" That Never Materialized

German statesman Otto von Bismarck once envisioned nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian conflict as a duel between an elephant (Russia) and a whale (Britain). Although the German chancellor's metaphor did not include France or smaller powers, it aptly described much of the Crimean War. When Britain and France joined the Ottoman Empire in this struggle against Russia in 1854, a unique example of a geographically expansive yet strategically limited conflict ensued among vast empires at different stages of economic and technological development. The British and Czarist Empires were already concerned with ruling on a transcontinental scale by the 1850s, though neither had yet reached its territorial apogee. Outside of Africa, in fact, an adversarial Anglo-Russian relationship prevailed everywhere in the world, albeit often at a distance. The vast distances that still separated Czarist and British territory instead ensured that Anglo-Russian conflict during the mid-nineteenth century manifested itself in conflict over so-called intermediate areas in the Baltic, Ottoman Empire, Caucasus, and Pacific. These areas became especially important during the Crimean War, when circumstances challenged Britain and France to attack the Czarist Empire outside Central Europe.

Neutral Prussia and the Habsburg Empire separated the warring states in Europe while entire oceans and vast expanses of Central Asia and China performed a similar function for the belligerent powers' colonies. The Russian Czars' principal harbor on the Kamchatka Peninsula at Petropavlovsk, for instance, was over 6,600 kilometers from Russia's Imperial Capital at St. Petersburg, not to mention 13,350 kilometers from the British Pacific Station's base at Callao, Peru.[1] Captain Ivan Izylmetiev of the Russian frigate *Aurora*, for one, simply referred to Petropavlovsk as "the end of the World."[2]

Unsurprisingly then, the Crimean War's naval campaigns outside the Baltic unfolded in areas that fit British first lord of the Admiralty Sir Charles Wood's description of the Northern Pacific as "a part of the world of which very little was known."[3]

Unlike the geography of some regions far from Europe, it was well known in the 1850s that the size of a country's population did not always determine its geopolitical power. An entire third, or estimated 420 million, of the Earth's 1.2 billion people in 1854 occupied the same Qing China that the British, French, and Russian Empires successfully coerced.[4] Japan's 27.2 million residents in 1852[5] also compared well to the number of inhabitants in the United States and Britain, yet both independently compelled Japan to change its policy of strict isolation within three years. The losing power in the Crimean War, Russia, boasted more than 70.6 million subjects in 1854, though only 1.68 million of them resided in Finland.[6] Nevertheless, these Finns wielded far more influence than their share of the population would suggest. Russia's total was more than the combined populations of France, at 36.23 million, and the British Isles, with 27.68 million, while the United States had yet to surpass 25 million inhabitants.[7] Sweden-Norway and Denmark, whose respective populations numbered only 5 million and less than 1.5 million,[8] were undeniably constrained by their limited pools of human resources. Ultimately, though, the most important indicator of military capability in the 1850s was technology.

Conflict among three of Europe's leading powers came at a moment in which the economies of its largest belligerents were markedly different. In the mid-1850s, Britain was a world leader in industrial production with France attempting to catch up and Russia lagging far behind. Consider the production of pig iron, or iron refined to an intermediate state—this material served as backbone of arms manufacturing and infrastructure including bridges, railways, and frames for large buildings. In 1854, Britain produced 3,119 metric tons of pig iron, to which France added 771 metric tons.[9] Combined output in Russia amounted to only 213 tons, and the Grand Duchy of Finland produced 8 tons compared to Sweden-Norway's 146.[10] Concerted Russian iron purchasing programs in Belgium, which produced 285 metric tons in 1854, and the German States, at 390 metric tons, could not overcome such a formidable disparity.[11] Even before the conflict began, then, Russia already found itself at a pronounced technological and therefore military disadvantage. The American minister to Russia from 1850 to 1853, for one, did not let his personal admiration of Nicholas I stop him from noting that Russia "could not boast

of a single invention in mechanics" and had "borrowed" everything except for its "miserable climate."[12]

The soldiers and weapons that people and industry yielded were controlled by entirely different systems of government, which was enormously significant. The Czarist Empire's autocracy starkly contrasted with Britain's limited parliamentary democracy. French Emperor Napoleon III's precarious political position, meanwhile, left him in constant search of popularity as he balanced competing French political ideologies and social groups without the backing of a strong party apparatus or clearly defined political ideology. As the French ruler commented: "what a government I have! The Empress is a legitimist, Napoleon Jérôme a republican, Morny an Orleanist. I myself am a socialist. There are no Bonapartists except for Persigny, but he is insane."[13] Understanding Napoleon III's acute sensitivity to the public opinion that had helped sweep him to power just a few years prior to the Crimean War makes it easier to account for a November 1854 memorandum in which he even included the price of individual shells when evaluating the effect of naval bombardment on coastal fortifications.

Although he personally loathed Britain's initial wartime prime minister, Lord Aberdeen, Napoleon III was determined to emulate Britain's industrial and financial growth, which he had seen first-hand as a political exile. Across the English Channel, however, lay an entirely different system of government that constrained both Lord Aberdeen and the man who succeeded him as prime minister in 1855, Lord Palmerston. A career diplomat and politician, Aberdeen attempted to manage a diverse parliamentary coalition and a divided cabinet. Unlike Napoleon III, though, Britain's initial wartime prime minister lacked both imperial authority and an acute sensitivity to public opinion. In response to Palmerston's acknowledgment of popular support for a war with Russia, for instance, Aberdeen responded by noting that, "in a case of this kind I dread popular support . . . when the Athenian Assembly vehemently applauded Alcibiades, he asked if he had said anything particularly foolish."[14] Despite some initial domestic policy successes, Aberdeen sealed his political fate by, in Queen Victoria's words, "consenting to a course of policy which he inwardly condemned against his better judgment" and conceding out of a "desire to maintain unanimity at the Cabinet."[15] Aberdeen's weak leadership thus ensured that his country not only went to war, but also that men such as Admiralty First Lord Sir James Graham exercised more power in 1854 that they otherwise would have.

Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, replaced Aberdeen in early 1855 after the latter resigned over accusations of wartime mismanagement. As an ardent Russophobe, Palmerston played a key role in incorporating naval policy into a broader strategy following Aberdeen's and Graham's departure from power. By the time he assumed prime ministership, however, Palmerston found himself the manager of a limited conflict rather than the architect of a broad one. The British statesman earnestly wished to contain Russian expansion by force on a number of fronts, but instead found himself forced to reaffirm the previous government's commitment to besieging the Black Sea port of Sevastopol.[16] The new prime minister strove to rearm the Royal Navy with an emphasis on steam power and gunboats while guiding foreign policy, but ultimately remained keenly aware of the limits that the Anglo-French alliance and public opinion imposed on his freedom of action. As he wrote to Queen Victoria:

> (Although) greater and more brilliant successes by land and sea might probably have been accomplished if the war had continued . . . any great and important additional security against future aggressions by Russia could only have been obtained by severing from Russia large portions of her frontier territory . . . and to have continued the war long enough for those purposes would have required greater endurance than was possessed by your Majesty's Allies, and might possibly have exhausted the good-will of your Majesty's own subjects.[17]

By the time Palmerston became prime minister in 1855, the Aberdeen ministry's forbearance had already indelibly shaped the Crimean War. Britain's initial wartime government would simply not tolerate the heavy casualties that would have presumably involved bombarding granite coastal fortifications with wooden-hulled warships or, as Horatio Nelson originally stated in 1794, "laying wood before walls."[18] Admiral Lord Dundonald may have wanted to use sulfur to destroy enemy gunners like wasps and hornets, but concerns over the project's "barbarous and uncivilized character"[19] joined those related to practicality to ensure that toxic fumes were not deployed against Cronstadt. Value-based objections did not always carry the day, though, especially when it came to British shore raids in the Gulf of Bothnia. Nevertheless, British and French commanders acted knowing that their conduct would be scrutinized as "affecting in some degree the reputation" of their respective governments, which had each voluntarily foresworn the possibility of permanently conquering Russian territory.[20]

In addition to Dundonald and Nelson, countless authors examined prior military events in the early- to mid-nineteenth century. The accounts that most excited a young Czar Nicholas I or influenced Sir James Graham's war planning recounted great campaigns and personal heroics rather than critically analyzing them. The Allies' initial lack of a coherent strategy in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific accordingly stemmed from the limited vision of decision makers who too often, with the exception of Palmerston, formulated plans without regard to goals with "operational, strategic, or political value."[21] In spite of the advantages enjoyed by Anglo-French naval forces when it came to "the best Napoleonic tradition" of maneuvering in order to fight at an advantage, the Crimean War was fought in what one modern theorist describes as "the worst Napoleonic tradition of not having a clear idea how victory would conclude a war satisfactorily."[22] It was only later that leaders including France's ambassador to London and subsequent foreign minister Alexandre Colonna Walewski gave more credence to his and Lord Clarendon's thoughts on the importance of trying:

> our best . . . to obtain genuine and resounding victories; and for this, it is urgent to bring together all of our modes of action instead of dividing them onto different points. "This is how," adds Lord Clarendon, "all great men have proceeded"—and he brought up that Emperor Napoleon's characterizing principle is the focus on a certain point and at a given moment using large forces that permit him to strike serious blows and end the war in a single campaign, often in a single battle.[23]

Contemporary strategic theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini (Heinrich Veniaminovich Jomini) did not analyze the dynamics of a conflict such as the Crimean War in any depth. The Swiss-born Jomini, for example, could only offer Russian leaders limited advice on how to best defend the Baltic rather than win the Crimean War.[24] Accounts of Russia's eventual triumph in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s instead pushed a then-impressionable Nicholas I to further embrace militarism. The Czar's memos on defensive strategy, for example, outlined how the Allies' "preponderance of force" would be counterbalanced by the "righteousness of (Russia's) sacred cause," which would "double (Russia's) material forces."[25] Works that would have applied more directly to the Crimean conflict, especially Sir Julian Stafford Corbett's *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911), were only written decades after peace in 1856 and did not consider the potential for a limited conflict to

become unlimited[26] through possible developments such as an 1856 attack on Cronstadt. Ultimately, only an examination of original sources is capable of providing a full account of the belligerent powers' planning.

These sources indicate that British and French planners were placed in a difficult position by their governments' reluctance to fully engage Russia in an unlimited land conflict in territories such as Finland. As one French representative reported from London:

> There is hesitation to include Finland in a plan, because we cannot hope that Russia, even with our foot on its throat, would ever consent to abandon it, and also because it would be regrettable to tell the world "We want to take Finland from Russia," and to not manage to tear it away from them. There is also concern of scaring off Austria and the rest of Germany by seemingly wanting, very intentionally, to weaken the Muscovite giant.[27]

This left Anglo-French commanders and political leaders to instead give every consideration to the best methods of approaching and then assaulting Russia's fortified harbors from sea.[28] Early reports, such as one made by Captain Edmund Lyons of the *Miranda* regarding Revel, drove home the reality that these schemes would be very difficult without supporting ground forces and additional intelligence. Despite great efforts by individual consuls and the (British) Admiralty Hydrographic Office, for example, detailed navigational information was often gained only through wartime experience and therefore could not be employed to plan in advance.[29] Allied experience in the Baltic also demonstrated that intelligence reports on Sweaborg and Cronstadt were subject to conflicting interpretations and often led to serious disagreements among policymakers and military commanders.[30]

Prior to the Crimean War's outbreak, preventing a Russian invasion or bombardment of British and French coastlines was far less contentious but still imperative. French warships only arrived in the Baltic in June of that year, which meant that this task fell to the British Royal Navy.[31] Mid-century Britain was no stranger to invasion scares, and even the most remote of possible Russian action was a concern. The remote possibility of Russian warships from the Pacific sailing undetected to attack British coastlines, for instance, was discussed in Parliament as late as the summer of 1855.[32] French decision makers shared these concerns, which became evident with Drouyn de Lhuy's request for British protection of France's northern coastline.[33] Allied

naval superiority forced all but the most optimistic of Russian commanders to conclude that such an attack, even if attempted with the utmost stealth, would be futile to the point of suicide.[34]

British and French leaders expected Russia, as the conflict's weaker naval power, to attack their trade through an approach known as a *guerre de course.* This entailed using naval units to destroy or capture enemy merchant ships in the hope of causing economic damage. Access to the Baltic and Black Seas was limited by their narrow access points, which were closed by Britain's Royal Navy at the conflict's beginning.[35] Russian warships in the Pacific, on the other hand, presented more of a threat to Allied commerce.[36] British and French merchant ships and whaling fleets in these waters were especially at risk of capture by Russian forces. Isolated colonies also scrambled to make defensive preparations and to request reinforcements from London,[37] while insurance rates spiked as British parliamentarians discussed "very high premiums" for insuring commerce.[38] Yet, the small number of Russian warships in the Pacific combined with their focus on defending the Amur River's mouth and opening Japan ultimately mitigated the threat they posed to British and French commerce. The Allies' main concern was that Russia would resort to another tactic from the "age of sail" by commissioning privateers by issuing letters of marque, or official licenses to capture enemy shipping.

Accepting Russian letters of marque would primarily appeal to businessmen from the United States thanks to what French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys described as "the nature of its population and a slew of local circumstances."[39] De Lhuys was correct. American shipping magnate William Henry Aspinwall's offer to sell his best Pacific steamers to Russian diplomats, though, fell apart due to lack of funds from conservatives in St. Petersburg and not the US government.[40] As Secretary of State William Marcy emphasized, he was also reluctant to renounce privateering because America's navy remained small compared to its merchant marine, whose tonnage was behind only Britain's in 1854.[41] Consequently, American politicians including Marcy, President Franklin Pierce, and Attorney General Caleb Cushing all emphasized to Allied diplomats that privateering would be—in Marcy's words—America's "most effective method of action" in any potential maritime conflict and that great care should be taken in banning the practice.[42] James Buchanan, Washington's representative in London and future president of the United States, advanced a different argument, adding in his correspondence to Secretary Marcy that "there was nothing really different in principle or morality betweens [*sic*] the acts of a regular cruiser & that of a Privateer,

in robbing a Merchant vessel upon the ocean."[43] The US government's reluctance to ban privateering thus left Allied diplomats such as French ambassador to Washington, Eugène de Sartiges, to instead craft a number of narrower arguments and work to close neutral ports in order to convince the US government that tolerating privateering was impracticable and not in its national interest. Even more convincingly, British diplomatic pressure on smaller neutral powers such as Chile, Hawai'i, and Portugal induced these countries to follow Sweden-Norway's lead and close their ports to potential privateers.[44] Coupled with Russian leaders' reluctance to press the issue, discussed in Chapter 2, Allied diplomatic efforts ensured that American privateering remained a source of anxiety and eventually prompted diplomatic agreement rather than a wartime reality.

French consuls and naval commanders were especially troubled by the possibility of Russian privateers operating from harbors at San Francisco, which was carefully monitored by France's Irish-born consul, Guillaume Patrice Dillon.[45] Yet they were also conscious of threats outside of the United States. Drouyn de Lhuys, for example, noted that "the independent states of South America" could potentially "elude" any North American prohibitions on privateering as they had done from 1823 to 1828.[46] Likewise, British commanders emphasized the potential for even the smallest Russian vessels to do "much mischief to British shipping and trade" on the high seas.[47] These fears justified threatening to intercept the Russian schooner *Rogneda* if it attempted to leave the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and use its eight "small" guns against British shipping.[48] Interestingly, these threats were recounted by Britain's commander at Rio[49] in a letter of March 28, 1854, in which he explicitly acknowledged menacing the *Rogneda* prior to having received a formal declaration of war.[50] Once war had been declared, Britain and France were free to coordinate a blockade—traditionally the method employed by stronger naval powers to attack commerce.

The Anglo-French blockades of Russia during the Crimean War were extremely complex. First, blockades were forced to conform to detailed requirements established by obscure and conflicting legal precedents. Second, Britain and France were eager to avoid antagonizing neutral United States and Prussia and to grant special exemptions for areas such as Finmark.[51] Even a year into the conflict, it was evident to both British and French leaders that their conflicting blockade policies had resulted in considerable confusion and, as Drouyn de Lhuys put it, "difficulties."[52] The British Admiralty further "had occasion to observe that . . . misconception exists among

officers of H M Ships respecting the precautions which are necessary to the legal establishment of blockades and the attention due to the rights of neutral vessels."[53] Subsequent chapters of this book address the Allied blockades in more detail, but it is important to note that British and French war planning was substantially impacted by difficulties in formulating and implementing a joint blockade policy. As a British Admiralty memorandum intended to outline blockade procedure noted: "the Instructions to French Naval Officers, and the principles of French Prize Law, are in some important particulars very different from this memorandum. This must be very carefully borne in mind, particularly in conjoint operations."[54] Happily for the Allies, French leaders including Drouyn de Lhuys and Walewski took their cues from Napoleon III and were at pains to coordinate their efforts.[55] Difficulties emerged in the White Sea, but ended with an exasperated de Lhuys underlining multiple words for emphasis while scolding Navy and Colonial Minister Théodore Ducos for acting without the joint consent of both governments.[56]

Formulating commercial policy also involved coordination among British cabinet members rather than exclusively between the British and French governments. Lord Aberdeen's cabinet was unsurprisingly divided over the best procedure for blockading Russian commerce, and no member of Aberdeen's ministry alone enjoyed the type of power that allowed Napoleon III to quickly resolve such disputes. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Clarendon, for instance, believed that a blockade would choke off Russian exports and pressure the Czarist government to sue for peace, while influential parliamentarian Lord John Russell held that only a military effort would succeed.[57] British policy became clearer, however, when Clarendon and First Lord of the Admiralty Sir James Graham began to take the lead in designing Britain's wartime commercial policy before war was even declared. Their approach involved forgoing tradition by prohibiting privateering and the letters of marque that so worried Napoleon III's government. Graham's confidential communication to Clarendon contained extensive condemnation of privateering on moral grounds, but also conveniently emphasized the advantages that would accrue to Britain if the practice were to be abolished during a conflict with Russia.[58] Prohibiting privateering proved so beneficial to British interests that, by April 1856, Clarendon was able to convince Lord Palmerston, Queen Victoria, and Britain's House of Lords that the proposal should be adopted by all European powers at the expense of the United States.[59]

Addressing privateering was only one aspect of the Allies' wartime commercial policy. Edward Cardwell, the pragmatic head of Britain's Board of Trade until 1855, observed that British directives were based "on the supposition that the trade of Russia could not be wholly checked" by even the most stringent of measures.[60] He supported this point by circumspectly using the example of Prussia manufacturing stearin[61] from Russian animal fat and then legally exporting the product to Britain despite the latter power's prohibition on the import of Russian animal products.[62] Cardwell acknowledged that any Russian trade able to "bear the cost of transport" would evade an Anglo-French blockade, but argued that even a partially effective naval effort was sufficient "to inflict commercial pressure on Russia."[63] Cardwell identified annihilating the Czarist merchant fleet, diminishing Russian trade, and driving up prices due to the cost of land transportation through Prussia as three major accomplishments[64] during the initial months of the conflict. Although some of these economic achievements were due to the efforts of Britain's Royal Navy, it was much more difficult to celebrate the initial military feats of those same fleets during the war. Sir James Graham initially oversaw these forces with the help of his trusted advisor on technology and warship construction and emissary to France, Surveyor of the Navy Sir Baldwin Wake Walker.[65] Graham had Walker's offices moved to a more central location so that the surveyor and his skilled technical team would be more accessible,[66] and was only just beginning to shape Britain's initial participation in the Crimean War.

As first lord of the Admiralty, Graham exercised a preponderant influence over Britain's maritime war planning thanks to divisions within Lord Aberdeen's coalition cabinet. His influence was further magnified by factors including the ill health of a dying first sea lord.[67] Graham, for example, successfully nominated Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier to command Britain's Baltic Fleet in 1854 despite "great differences of opinion"[68] as to the wisdom of his choice. The decision was admittedly made easier when a leading candidate declined the appointment on account of age and exhaustion, while even Lord Dundonald's admirers were concerned by his 79 years of age and affinity for attacking ports with toxic gas fumes.[69] Graham's prewar plans, on the other hand, were subjected to less scrutiny, especially thanks to his affinity for secrecy. The impact of his ideas was magnified by Napoleon III's unwillingness to issue specific instructions to Napier's French counterpart in 1854, Vice Admiral Alexandre Parseval-Deschênes. By the French commander's own admission, this lack of direction and his fleet's numerical inferiority forced France's

Baltic contingent to depend on Napier's British fleet for their combined course of action.[70]

Parseval-Deschênes' forced deference was especially natural considering that Britain, France, and Russia all lacked large centralized staffs and war-planning organizations in the mid-nineteenth century and earlier.[71] This led decision makers to improvise as best as they could, given the circumstances of individual conflict. Sir James Graham's efforts at the beginning of the Crimean War were no exception, and the first lord turned to three sources on Britain's last experiences in the Baltic during the Napoleonic wars. The first source was a biography, *The Life of Nelson,* written by the Romantic man-of-letters Robert Southey. Southey's work recounted Admiral Horatio Nelson's 1801 exploits in the Baltic from a narrative rather than an analytical perspective. This proved problematic when attempting to formulate operational plans. Nelson was reported to have anticipated "laurels" at Revel by attacking Russian ships after ice had thawed,[72] but Southey did not provide further details relating to how Nelson's plan would have been implemented. This is hardly surprising given the contemporary relationship between history and naval war planning. The concept of a "usable past," or historical lessons in the form of fundamental principles, was only developed later in the century at institutions such as the United States Naval War College.[73] Even the journals of Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Britain's commander during another Baltic expedition (1808–1812), were insufficient operational guides. This fleet's activities in 1808 and 1809, for instance, were the subject of a tense exchange between Graham's Admiralty and Sir Charles Napier over the benefits of steam power versus the enduring hazard of collisions and groundings in heavy fog.[74]

Saumarez was long dead by the time the Crimean War broke out in 1854, but his subordinate Admiral Sir Thomas Byam Martin lived until October of that year. This was long enough for the elderly Martin to provide Graham and the Admiralty with a memorandum on Russian positions in the Baltic and chair a committee tasked with evaluating Lord Dundonald's proposals for chemical warfare.[75] Martin originally wrote his memorandum in 1835, but updated it with a covering note before dispatching it to Graham in June of 1853.[76] He called for a steam-powered, line-of-battle fleet accompanied by flotilla craft capable of undertaking coastal bombardment operations against targets outside of Sweaborg and Cronstadt, which he considered too strong to be attacked.[77] More recent information was needed, however, and Graham turned to the venerable hydrographer of the navy, Sir Francis Beaufort, to obtain intelligence.

Beaufort conveyed Graham's wishes to Captain John Washington of the Admiralty Hydrographic Department, which normally produced maps and charts to assist with maritime navigation. Washington had been scheduled to visit Denmark, Sweden, and Russia on a mission to establish "an improved form of lifeboat," which provided an excellent pretext for an intelligence-gathering mission.[78] Consequently, Washington was instructed to avail himself "of every opportunity of obtaining information respecting the Baltic Fleet and present state and condition of the defences at Cronstadt, Reval, etc."[79] Washington's resulting report also included comments on the defences and fleets of Norway, Sweden, the Åland Islands, Åbo (Turku, Finland), and Helsingfors (Helsinki) in addition to Revel and Cronstadt. The most detail was devoted to Cronstadt, which Washington found "very imposing" after visiting it on four different occasions.[80] The British captain was given a substantial degree of access to both Sweaborg and Cronstadt. His report mentions being "allowed to land and walk round the ramparts" of Sweaborg and taking several tours of Cronstadt in the company of senior Russian officers.[81] Washington acknowledged that "being so civilly treated . . . has thrown a certain amount of dust in my eyes and may have blinded me to some defects," but did not consider that Russia had gone to great lengths to keep him from realizing that the Russian Baltic Fleet was in poor condition.[82] Washington's favourable assessment of Cronstadt strengthened the impression already formed by Admiral Thomas Byam Martin's memorandum and Graham's natural pessimism. The Admiralty's first lord did not plan on immediately assaulting Cronstadt. Revel, on the other hand, seemed a promising venue for initially inflicting a major setback on Russia, and Washington's report tellingly included historical data on precisely when Baltic ice dissipated in a note just below the section devoted to "Reval."[83]

Unbeknownst to Graham until April 3, 1854, Russia had withdrawn its warships from Revel and nearby Port Baltic (also Rogervick, now Paldiski) months before the Allied declaration of war.[84] This only became apparent after Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons and the *Miranda* forced their way through ice in order to reconnoitre both anchorages. Lyons' report reached an advanced squadron of the British Baltic Fleet just days prior to the conflict's formal beginning, and its news rendered Graham's initial plan for Baltic operations superfluous. Worse still for its prospects, the British fleet's arrival in the Baltic also allowed it to concretely ascertain that Sweden-Norway would not immediately join the struggle against Russia. That kingdom's monarch, Oscar I, linked Sweden-Norway's participation in

the war to more concessions and assurances than the Allies were willing to grant in the spring and summer of 1854.[85] Not even the capture of Bomarsund, Russia's stronghold in the Åland Islands, in August of the same year could persuade Oscar to reconsider his demands and provide Britain and France with troops and gunboats. The British Baltic Fleet could thus anticipate experiencing major difficulties assaulting or capturing major Russian positions in the Baltic, and could not expect the situation to improve with Swedish intervention. The question of how to win a major victory against Russia in the Baltic was thus left unanswered by Britain's prewar planning. French leaders were not able to immediately relieve the confusion that resulted, although they did join in attempting to attract Sweden to the Allied cause.[86]

France's prewar planning for the Baltic Theatre contrasted with Britain's due to a lack of central direction. At first glance, French naval archives feature plans of attack on Rogervick-Port Baltic (Paldiski), Riga, Revel, and St. Petersburg, accompanied by color-coordinated maps and plans of attack.[87] Further inspection, however, reveals that they are the unsolicited by-products of Lieutenant Georgette du Buisson's efforts to obtain a naval commission and not the work of Navy and Colonial Minister Théodore Ducos, who had not ordered the plans in advance of their unsolicited submission.[88] Du Buisson's sanguine assessment of prospective Allied assaults was relatively brief. Yet it did provide specific details highlighting navigational difficulties, including shallow rocks and difficult approaches to ports and confirming that the French also believed that a Russian fleet division was still anchored at Revel.[89] The lieutenant assumed that the French fleet would operate in conjunction with that of its ally in attacks on Russian ports,[90] while the reverse was not always the case in British prewar planning. This was fortunate because the French Navy's best ships had already been dispatched to the Mediterranean and Black Seas. French vessels only arrived in the Baltic in mid-June of 1854,[91] and were still woefully unprepared for deployment, much less combat.

Vice Admiral Parseval-Deschênes, France's Baltic commander in 1854, candidly reported that his ships were unready to see combat for multiple reasons. These included a lack of officers and winter clothing, not to mention overhasty armament.[92] Parseval-Deschênes blamed Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier and British public opinion for rashly forcing the dispatch of Allied fleets. A note in the margin by Ducos, however, emphasized that it would have hurt French patriotism to leave the French fleet to prepare at Brest.[93] Ducos, de Lhuys, and

Napoleon III were aware of British intentions in the Baltic thanks to forwarded documents from British politicians, especially Secretary of State for War Lord Newcastle.[94] These documents revealed the fundamental difficulties faced by British and French leaders throughout the remainder of their conflict with Russia, including what the Allies should do after preventing the Russian fleet from exiting the Baltic and blockading the Czar's Baltic ports. Coastal raids and the capture of Bomarsund's 2,255-men garrison[95] paled in comparison to the potential destruction or capture of Sweaborg and Cronstadt, and Allied planning for the remainder of the conflict focused on the feasibility and advisability of assaulting these fortresses.

Sweaborg and Cronstadt assumed even greater importance at the Crimean War's outbreak, when the impetus for attacking Revel was discovered to have left along with the Russian warships formerly moored there. Even after the British and French fleets obtained more detailed intelligence on both fortress complexes, opinions on how best to proceed differed greatly. Bomarsund's considerably less formidable defenses, coupled with the Allies' ability to isolate the Åland Islands, made the British and French decision to besiege the fortress much less complex. Yet even this relatively simple decision was not taken easily. Parseval-Deschênes convinced Napier to postpone the eventual assault and to instead reconnoiter Cronstadt. This argument was made because, as the French vice admiral recounted in English and underlined for emphasis, the Swedes were "not sure" about their participation in the conflict.[96] Consensus regarding the larger fortresses was more difficult to reach. The ensuing chapters' discussion of the Allies' 1854 Baltic campaign outlines a multitude of conflicting opinions involved in contemplating assaults on Sweaborg and Cronstadt. It took a change of year and of prime minister in Britain before the Anglo-French fleet would bombard Sweaborg and begin constructing a flotilla to threaten Cronstadt. Britain's new wartime leader Lord Palmerston, after all, thought that to only expel Russia from Wallachia and Moldavia during the Crimean War "would be only like turning a Burglar out of your house, to break in again at a more fitting opportunity."[97]

CHAPTER 2

The White Sea, Finmark, and Russian Strategy

Lord Palmerston's February 1855 elevation to the prime ministership also impacted strategy north of the Baltic, in the White Sea. Three hundred years after three British vessels had first entered these waters in a futile search for a northeast passage to India and China, the same number of warships arrived with a different mandate.[1] The later squadron had not been sent to "discover strange countries,"[2] but rather to blockade Russian ports including Archangel and Onega. The Russian Empire's trade and territory had changed dramatically since the mid-to-late sixteenth century. Although the White Sea's ports were no longer the Czars' only maritime outlet, the region's economic interaction with Britain had remained constant. British merchants and capital were as instrumental in exploiting forest and animal products in 1854 as they had been three centuries earlier. Russia's northern possessions also carried on a brisk trade with Finmark, a region of the Norwegian Kingdom that was personally united under Sweden's ruling dynasty. Anglo-French diplomatic efforts to win Swedish favor prompted Britain's foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon, to assure Sweden's King Oscar I months prior to the war's outbreak that such commerce would be exempted from any wartime blockade.[3]

Clarendon's assurance was reluctantly seconded by Napoleon III's government, which was more intent on maintaining cordial relations with Britain than controlling minor operational details in distant polar waters. Clarendon's counterpart after May 1855—Alexandre Colonna Walewski— was deemed "perfectly correct in deferring to the wishes of Lord Clarendon" when arranging the belated dispatch of two French warships to join the three British ones already on station.[4] France's White Sea commander, Captain Pierre-Èdouard Guilbert, complained that the Finmark easement provided cover for

otherwise-prohibited Russian trade,[5] but was nevertheless repeatedly instructed to always cooperate with British blockade policy.[6]

The British White Sea strategy to which France deferred in 1854 was straightforward. Sir James Graham instructed experienced naval officer and polar explorer Captain Erasmus Ommanney to blockade Archangel and Onega while cooperating with the French and allowing Russian trade with Finmark.[7] Graham also floated the possibility of attacking both major ports, especially Archangel, by characteristically directing his commander to "ascertain . . . the operations which it may be desirable to undertake" against them.[8] These potential operations, unlike those in the Pacific, benefitted enormously from detailed navigational information furnished by Sir Francis Beaufort and Captain John Washington of the Admiralty Hydrographic Office.[9] Documents compiled with the assistance of Britain's Royal Geographical Society, for example, revealed that the approach to Archangel was protected by a naturally occurring submerged ridge. This was confirmed through reconnaissance conducted by small ship's boats in early July 1854.[10]

Ommanney's intelligence-gathering efforts had already indicated that Archangel was garrisoned by 6,000 troops, new artillery batteries, 15 gunboats, several small steamers, and a guard vessel.[11] Given the strength of this garrison compared to a British squadron of three ships and 540 men,[12] an amphibious landing of the type undertaken at Petropavlovsk was out of question. The shallow bar also meant that only a warship's small boats could safely pass over it, and their limited armament was "far too insignificant to attempt anything against the Enemy's gunboats and batteries."[13] Even after the French ships' arrival, Ommanney and his squadron were relegated to spending the remainder of their campaign fighting frustrating engagements against less appealing targets such as the Solovetsky Monastery complex. Although the Allied presence in the White Sea during the summer and fall of 1854 ultimately fulfilled Graham's desire to use the minimum number of warships necessary to blockade Russian ports, it faced the same challenges as its matching efforts in the Baltic and Pacific during the conflict's first year. General operations against trade and minor successes, such as the destruction of Kola on the nearby Murman Coast, did not seem satisfactory given the technological advantages enjoyed by the British and French navies. By late 1855, however, the efforts of John Rice Crowe, Britain's consul-general in Norway, and Lord Palmerston dramatically altered the White Sea's strategic importance.

The Finmark region of northern Norway was a part of blockade planning and diplomatic efforts by Clarendon and Graham, but the

latter was already out of office by the time Finmark became an issue capable of impacting the war's entire course. Little had Graham anticipated that Palmerston, informed by Crowe, would succeed in converting their long-standing fear of Russian aggression in the region into a November 1855 defensive alliance with the kingdom of Sweden-Norway. Crowe was correct in supposing that he had "reason to believe the importance of the subject [Finmark] did not escape his Lordship's [Palmerston's] notice" as early as 1836.[14] The Allied governments' success in exploiting the Finmark situation, combined with "great armament" for an 1856 campaign in the Baltic, illustrates that events in these theaters could assume different and far more important roles than those initially envisioned by planners whose previous efforts to woo Sweden-Norway had proved unsuccessful.

Even the best-laid antebellum plans hatched in London and Paris afforded considerable discretion to naval commanders on distant stations. One-way delays in communication between London and the White Sea could reach two months, leaving Ommanney to campaign largely on the basis of his original orders. [15] Delays in communication were even more pronounced in the Pacific Theater, where British and French commanders received strikingly vague instructions. Rear Admiral David Price and the British Royal Navy's Pacific station, for example, relied on a general circular addressed to "the several naval commanders-in-chief on foreign stations," commanding them to cooperate with French forces in protecting "the interests of the subjects and commerce" of both states.[16] Price's French counterpart in the Western Pacific, Rear Admiral Febvrier-Despointes, meanwhile, also received "*assez vagues*" (quite vague) instructions ordering him to protect commerce while leaving the possibility of joint action with Anglo-French forces assigned to Chinese and East Indian waters to his discretion.[17] The commander of France's "Division of Réunion and Indochina," Rear Admiral Adolphe Laguerre, was eager to assist by engaging Russian forces, but was unable to quickly concentrate his widely scattered warships and simultaneously monitor unrest in China.[18] Rear Admiral James Stirling of Britain's East Indies and China Station, meanwhile, had taken a controversial interest in negotiating with Tokugawa Japan. It was thus left to the combined squadrons of Price and Despointes to develop plans for attacking Russia's Pacific forces during the conflict's first season.

Allied war planning for the Pacific was a collection of responses to widely dispersed imperatives. British forces were ordered to defend an expansive array of imperial and commercial interests, but were given few specific instructions concerning how this should be

accomplished. Aside from the aforementioned circular requiring him to protect the interest of British subjects and commerce, cooperate with French forces, and exercise caution when approaching Russian warships,[19] Price received task-oriented communications in early 1854 from Britain's Admiralty. The British rear admiral's journal indicates he was compelled to track specific Russian warships en route to the Pacific, deliver supplies to an arctic expedition, discourage an American annexation of Hawai'i (the Sandwich Islands), suppress possible Russian privateering off California, and monitor serious domestic unrest in Chile and Peru.[20] Despointes, meanwhile, was also required to attend to matters in Peru.[21] The French rear-admiral, even more so than Price, continually received alarming reports of Russian *corsairs*, or privateers, off San Francisco, Hawai'i, and even Chile.[22] Acting in consultation but with Price as the senior officer, the British and French rear admirals thus formulated a plan to wage war in the Pacific region. Their combined squadrons would rendezvous in Honolulu, Hawai'i, after detaching warships to cruise off South America and California. The rendezvous, in turn, would be followed by an assault on Petropavlovsk designed to destroy Russian ships sheltering there and secure Anglo-French whaling operations in the northern Pacific.[23]

The assault on Petropavlovsk was hampered by lack of reinforcements from Chinese waters, where Rear Admirals Laguerre's and Stirling's plans quickly diverged. Laguerre preferred to concentrate his scattered forces to defend French concessions in Shanghai, which Stirling had left defenseless against what Laguerre assumed were nearby Russian warships.[24] Stirling, on the other hand, confidentially reported to Sir James Graham that the Crimean War was an attractive opportunity to approach an isolationist Tokugawa Japan.[25] Instead of deferring to Britain's East Asian plenipotentiary and Hong Kong governor Sir John Bowring, Stirling ordered his squadron to enter into what became a complex series of negotiations with Japanese officials. The British rear admiral initially sought to convince the Japanese to prohibit Russian warships from accessing Japanese ports, but instead obtained a full-fledged diplomatic convention, "opening" Nagasaki and Hakodate to Royal Navy warships.[26] French warships were not mentioned in the convention, and French minister to China, Alphonse de Bourboulon, felt it would be degrading to accept passage on a British ship and thus appear "as the humble protégé of a great foreign Power."[27] At any rate, Bourboulon, Sir John Bowring, and Rear Admiral Laguerre were fully occupied with the Taiping Rebellion raging in China, not to mention other concerns such as suppressing

piracy, defending Hong Kong, and repairing the grounded French frigate *Jeanne d'Arc.*[28] Coordinated war planning involving Allied vessels in Chinese waters would thus have to wait.

Hong Kong was not the only British possession to undertake frantic preparations against Russian assault in early 1854. The Falkland Islands, Vancouver Island, and New South Wales and Victoria in what is now Australia, also strengthened their defenses and appealed to London for additional protection.[29] British possessions in the Indian subcontinent administered by the East India Company, meanwhile, hoped that they would not be the source of troops for deployment elsewhere. India's governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, urged that British Indian forces not be committed to the war against Russia and instead remain in reserve for "our [British India's] own fights."[30] Dalhousie found a ready ally in Sir Charles Wood, president of the Board of Control until March 1855. Wood seconded Dalhousie's March 1854 opinion that "there is no ground left for believing that Russia separated by enormous tracts and by many wild tribes from the sources of her military power, could by (any) possibility succeed against the British power in the East."[31]

Campaigns in distant regions such as the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia added to the Czarist Empire's difficult task of planning for war on a continental, if not global, scale. Russia's Imperial government was forced to take a very different approach than that of Britain and France because the latter powers' maritime superiority allowed them to choose, albeit not always wisely, when and how to engage Russian forces. In a striking reversal of conditions that saw the failure of Napoleon Bonaparte's 1812 invasion, Russia's vast territorial holdings constrained its war efforts and planning despite the large armies at its disposal. Czar Nicholas concluded in December 1853, for example, that "it is impossible to draft in advance a detailed plan for the forthcoming campaign" because "defensive operations" would depend "on the plans and undertakings of our advancing enemies."[32] The Russian Emperor privately added that, although he did "not know what else the Englishmen would invent against us in their rage," he expected the British would be "in the Baltic Sea" come spring.[33] Amid much uncertainty, His Imperial Russian Majesty concerned himself with preparations on the Baltic "to be on the safe side" given that "here we have the capital of the Empire…threatened."[34] In Nicholas' judgement, any immediate 1854 threat to St. Petersburg did not "yet" involve an amphibious "landing" but would instead entail "some new long-range and high-destructive shells" with which the Allies were going to "probably…destroy Cronstadt and then [St.] Petersburg itself."[35]

Russia in the 1850s was an autocracy; the influence of Nicholas I and his advisors held sway in virtually every conceivable aspect of life, even those unrelated to politics, economics, and the military. Unlike Napoleon III, the Russian Czar attempted to personally oversee all manner of administrative details of Russia's otherwise corrupt and ineffective bureaucracy. As the wife of his minister of Foreign Affairs observed poetically, however, "the strange thing about [Nicholas] is that he ploughs his vast realm, but not a single fruit-bearing seed does he sow."[36] In response to his minister of Education's objections to the censorship of an unobjectionable report on the empire's universities, for example, the Czar simply declared that he "absolutely *forbid* all similar articles in journals, regardless of whether they are *for* or *against* universities."[37] The negative effects of perpetuating a system where, in the words of one American diplomat, birds "were afraid to chirp lest the police should put them in lime"[38] were manifold. The most important drawback, however, was that the Russian Emperor's skewed views of warfare and diplomacy went unchallenged. This changed dramatically with the accession of Alexander II following Nicholas' death in March 1855. The new Czar displayed his emotions openly, to the point that officers sneeringly described him as an "old woman."[39] Although Russia's change in leadership did not yield immediate relief from the absurdities of a system in which every sale of land by a nobleman necessitated at least 1,351 separate hand-copied and signed documents,[40] Alexander II's more collaborative methods of moderating discussions shaped his decision to concede defeat in 1856 on the advice of his closest advisors who were acutely aware of the sobering reality that underlay the Empire's military strength on paper.

The Russian army's troop strength in 1854 dwarfed even the combined total of Britain's, France's, and the Ottoman Empire's.[41] Much like Allied naval forces in the Pacific, however, Russia's military was obligated to deploy much of its strength far from theaters of actual combat and plan accordingly. Half a million Russian troops were needed to maintain order in the Empire's countryside, and another 200,000 controlled Poland while watching Austria and Prussia and safeguarding the Russian state's "center."[42] Subtracting garrison forces tied down in the Caucasus, this left no more than 166,000 troops to defend St. Petersburg and the Baltic at the beginning of 1854 and up to 218,000 by the summer of that year.[43] Russia's navy, meanwhile, played a mixed role. Naval resources were instrumental in defending ports such as Petropavlovsk because, in Grand Duke

Konstantin's words, the Anglo-French fleets' "overwhelming force" required Russian warships to assume "purely defensive posture under the protection of our fortresses."[44]

Such a cautious approach did not sit well with all of the Czarist Empire's military leadership. The first inclination of Russia's most aggressive commanders was to position divisions of sailing battleships in the two largest entrances to the Baltic: the Great Belt and Sound (Öresund). A plan developed by Prince Evegny (Eugene) Golitsyn then called for concentrating all of Russia's steamships at the Swedish port of Gothenburg in order to tow whichever division was not directly engaged to the rear of an attacking Allied fleet.[45] Golitsyn notably assumed that Russian sailors' "courage and initiative" would compensate for "material disadvantages."[46] Prince Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov (Menschikov), who occupied several senior positions from 1854–1856,[47] objected to these recommendations for multiple reasons.

Menshikov argued that dividing the Russian fleet would weaken it and that historical precedent indicated that flanking warships did not arrive in time to aid the remainder of fleets.[48] Menshikov also opined that it was "unthinkable" for a sailing fleet to fight a propeller squadron "without great losses" and that a defeat far from Russia's ports would "end in the total destruction of the fleet."[49] The Russian commander also wrote that it was "impossible" to rely on Denmark and Sweden; the "mere appearance of an English squadron in Danish waters" would "force Denmark to submit to the demands of mighty England."[50] Accordingly, Menshikov concluded that Russia should more prudently concentrate on defending the Gulf of Finland and building coastal telegraph lines through an effort supervised by the Finnish senate's head of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Baron Kazimir Gustavovich von Kothen (Koten).[51]

In December 1853, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich directed Menshikov to review another memorandum, this one written by the Czar. Nicholas I began by outlining the goals of a "possible appearance of England and France's united fleets in the Baltic," which he believed might involve luring the Russian fleet into battle at sea and destroying it; attacking Revel, Sweaborg, and Cronstadt; or landing an amphibious assault force in the Russian Empire's Baltic provinces.[52] His Imperial Russian Majesty wanted to know whether and where the Allied fleet could be met or if it was more reasonable not to send the Russian fleet into battle "until the enemy suffers losses in attacks on our parts."[53] Realizing that "the advantage of steamships will deprive us from hoping to win with sail ships," Czar Nicholas

debated the merits of stationing different divisions at Cronstadt and Sweaborg and supposed that the Russian fleet should be placed between Cronstadt and Cape Lisily Nos to the north in anticipation of an unsuccessful Allied assault on Cronstadt.[54] In response to his Emperor's thoughts, Menshikov sent a special note indicating that Nicholas' suggested placement of the Russian fleet outside Cronstadt was "impossible due to the lack of depth" and that "the goal of the Baltic fleet must be to shelter its ports" or "defeat the enemy if he divides his forces or is weaker."[55]

The closing months of 1853 also saw Count Login Loginovich Geiden offer a perceptive assessment directly to Konstantin. Geiden believed that the Allies would send a large force to either destroy Russian naval forces or inflict damage on "both commerce and coastal areas."[56] The count was especially worried that the Allies would "take advantage of our disunity" and attack Russian squadrons "one-by-one," especially because neither Revel nor Baltic Port (Port Baltic or Paldiski), unlike Sweaborg, could be expected to protect a nearby Russian fleet.[57] Geiden was not the last Russian commander to draw this conclusion, and he admonished that "accepting battle" at anchor with an inadequately protected fleet was "always perilous for those in the defensive, as demonstrated by the examples of Chesma, Abukir, Copenhagen, Navarino, Sinope, etc."[58] The memorandum recommended that Russia either decisively act against "inexperienced" Allied crews immediately after they entered the Baltic or "hide the whole fleet" at Sweaborg rather than a smaller port if the Anglo-French fleet proved too formidable.[59]

Geiden's assessments were corroborated within two months, as Grand Duke Konstantin began 1854 by seeking the counsel of two trusted imperial confidants, Adjutant Generals Frederick Maurice von Heyden and Fyodor (Fedor) Petrovich Litke. Both men held important commands in the Baltic and agreed that the Russian fleet should be entirely concentrated at Sweaborg. Von Heyden argued that "at present neither Revel nor the Baltic Port [Port Baltic, now Paldiski] nor Hango offer a safe haven to our fleet" and emphasized that naval disasters including Copenhagen, Navarino, and Sinope demonstrated the "always ruinous" consequences of 'accepting battle at anchor when the fleet is not protected by the local topography.'"[60] Litke began by categorically stating that any enemy fleet deployed to the Baltic "will, of course, appear in such strength" to render resistance at sea "impossible."[61] The adjutant general acknowledged that "the purpose of the giant forces currently prepared" in British ports could not be to "solely" obstruct Russia's commerce.[62] The Russian

commander, however, gave Graham and the Aberdeen ministry too much strategic credit in assuming that:

> our enemies likely have in mind to strike a heavy blow against us, which could have a more direct impact upon Russian policy (than a blockade), [this blow] can be no less than the destruction of our fleet and elimination of our large naval installations.[63]

Litke was ultimately correct in concluding that the coming conflict would "be a defensive war for Russia," especially because steamships provided the Allies "with methods of transportation [that] no one dreamed of in previous wars."[64] The adjutant general finally suggested that, "however painful it is for our ego," Russian commanders should acknowledge "so many factors" indicating that Russian ships and crews were only two-thirds, if not less, as capable as their British counterparts.[65]

Litke's opinions enjoyed the broad support of other Russian commanders,[66] who held British officer's broad sea experiences in higher esteem than those of Russian officers. This experience, though, was not always triumphal. Britain's Gulf of Bothnia commander, James Hanway Plumridge, for one, was terrified of Russian gunboats thanks to his experience during the Napoleonic Wars as a junior officer on the frigate *Melpomene*. Aptly named for the Ancient Greek Muse of Tragedy, the *Melpomene* was rendered motionless by a lack of wind and shot to pieces by Danish gunboats.[67] As Sir James Graham later icily pointed out to Sir Charles Napier, however, steam propulsion had freed British warships from their dependence on the wind,[68] while the same was not true for many corresponding Russian vessels. Maneuvers led Nicholas I to furiously react to what he deemed "nonsense" prewar assurances that Russia's Baltic gunboat fleet was "excellent."[69] Similarly disheartening details soon emerged regarding Russia's Baltic fortifications, especially those far from St. Petersburg.

On April 12, 1854, Russian war minister Vasily Andreyevich Dolgorukov wrote to Menshikov that Baltic defenses outside of Sweaborg and Cronstadt were "a little like the Chinese [language]," which was not a flattering assessment.[70] "Between us," Dolgorukov continued, "in peacetime, we are too occupied with things which are not too helpful in case of war, and once war comes, we are surprised that we are not properly prepared."[71] Many coastal fortifications in Finland had been constructed during the pre-1809 period of Swedish rule. This meant that they were designed to operate in conjunction with fleets of gunboats or, in the case of Sweaborg, to resist the

landward attack of a large army. Imperial Russian authorities initially planned to reconstruct and augment these coastal batteries and fortresses, but later changed course and abandoned outlying positions in favour of concentrating their forces around major cities and fortress complexes, especially Sweaborg and Cronstadt. The results of this shift in policy were dramatically illustrated in late August 1854, when Swedish-built fortresses at Hango (or Hangö, now Hanko) were destroyed by their own defenders.[72] Russia's incomplete fortress complex at Bomarsund in the Åland Islands postdated Swedish occupation and presented a different strategic problem. According to its March orders from St. Petersburg, Bomarsund could remain in a tenable position only "based on the surmise" that the Allies would attack "without landing forces."[73]

Russia's intelligence related to Allied assault plans meant that the Czar worried about assaults on Russia's Baltic provinces even when the Anglo-French fleet cruised off Finland.[74] This was precisely what Allied decision makers including Drouyn de Lhuys intended when creating what he described as "uncertainty" that "could only plunge (Russian authorities) into an extreme perplexity."[75] Imperial Russian fortresses protecting Revel and Riga, in modern Estonia and Latvia, were dangerously outdated despite their respective garrison strengths of 20,000 and 10,000.[76] Russian commanders considered Riga "safe, but not in view of its fortifications or its garrison, but only because it is remote from the sea shore and does not give the enemy any bait/lure."[77] As for Revel, even 20,000 would not save the city from fiery destruction caused by naval bombardment, while its garrison was not expected to endure a siege for the 16 days it would take reinforcements from St. Petersburg to arrive in the absence of railroad connections.[78] Worse yet, Russia's fortress at Riga was situated inside the city and therefore could not defend its outskirts, while Revel was "surrounded by commanding heights" and could easily be cut off from its supplies of fresh water.[79] Although both Nicholas I and Alexander II approved the dismantling of fortifications within both cities at "the right moment," this could only be accomplished after the Crimean War for logistical reasons and the sake of appearances.[80] As a committee of Russian commanders decided, completely disarming Revel during wartime would be "much more difficult" than rescuing the garrison with a field army if the city came under attack.[81] According to Jomini, "Revel, even half empty, probably won't be the object of Allied operations," while a "defenceless Revel" would be "very tempting."[82]

The fortress complexes defending Helsinki and St. Petersburg were in far better condition, especially because natural features such

as shallow, rocky, and narrow approaches worked in their favor. Nevertheless, both Cronstadt and Sweaborg confronted important challenges. Cronstadt's guns, for example, could not protect the nearby munitions factory at Sestroretsk (Siestarjoki), which War Minister Dolgorukov worried might fall victim to a "large-scale landing" instead of a naval bombardment.[83] Russians authorities, in fact, deemed 21 out of 32 Finnish cities and towns open to attack by Allied squadrons while only planning to stubbornly defend four of them.[84] Ultimately, Nicholas I affirmed this strategy when he wrote, "I think so as well" in responding to an assessment that "the entire shore of the Gulf of Bothnia . . . may be considered totally defenceless since small garrisons in some towns may defend them only from looting by a few enemy boats."[85]

As demonstrated by the entire course of the Allies' 1854 campaign, small Finnish coastal towns would bear the brunt of British efforts in the Baltic. Admittedly, by war's end in March 1856, the Allies had captured Bomarsund, bombarded Sweaborg, and threatened Cronstadt and St. Petersburg. Yet the most intense destruction of property, a "disastrous failure,"[86] and a "massacre" all occurred in small towns far from major cities, fortresses, and senior commanders. The same dynamic, albeit on a much smaller scale, characterized the Crimean War in the White Sea. The Archangel (Arkhangelsk) Province's capital and namesake principal port, by all accounts, was well protected from naval bombardment by geography and an adequate garrison. Other northern towns and monastery complexes were not as militarily fortunate. Archangel's governor, Roman Platonovich Boyle, could do little to prepare for naval assaults beyond implementing a declaration of martial law and deploying reinforcements that were modest at best and nonexistent at worst. Kola, Russian Lapland's regional capital on the Barents Sea, for instance, obtained a hundred obsolete flintlock muskets and small amounts of gunpowder in place of the artillery batteries and 20 gunboats ordered to defend Archangel.[87] In a scene repeated all along the White Sea coast in early 1854, Kola's inhabitants received instructions in March to "think for themselves what ships may visit them and what could prevent them from repelling the unwelcome visitors."[88] Just as its city provost and inhabitants had feared, Kola did not escape British notice and was burned to the ground in August 1854.[89]

Russian authorities in the White Sea did enjoy one substantial advantage in the form of a considerable network of clergy and fortified monasteries with centuries-old ties to the region. The Russian Orthodox Bishop of Archangel, Varlaam Uspenski, received

intelligence reports from outlying ecclesiastical establishments detailing the movements of Allied warships. The most notable contribution to war planning and defense, however, came from Archimandrite Alexander, head of the Solovetsky (i/oi) Island Monastery. Alexander received news that martial law had been declared in April 1854, and immediately organized his monastery's defenses.[90] This reaction was not as incongruous as it initially sounds, given the institution's long history of defending Russian power in the area from earlier Czarist enemies. Solovetsky's earlier engagements with Swedes and Germanic orders of crusading knights were tangibly reflected by its monks' arsenal, which included sixteenth-century pole axes and spears covered with "layers of rust" in addition to more modern firearms and artillery.[91] In conjunction with the monastery's "massive" stone walls and a tiny battery of field artillery, these preparations and Alexander's leadership sufficed to withstand a July bombardment by *Miranda* and *Eurydice* under Erasmus Ommanney. The British captain later recalled that, during negotiations preceding the bombardment, "the Archimandrite acknowledged himself to be the sole director of military operations."[92] Even in his subsequent attempts to emphasize the monastery's military character, Ommanney could only point to the former British consul at Archangel's assurances that 80 soldiers and 8 cannons had arrived from Archangel prior to the bombardment.[93] Such figures instead made the Russian prelate's achievements appear even more impressive. Within a matter of months, they were matched by events much further east.

The Crimean War in East Asia occurred at a moment when the Russian Empire was squarely in the midst of establishing and then consolidating its control of key areas in the region. Czarist, Soviet, and older Western scholarship traditionally presents Russia's annexation of the Amur River Valley as the inevitable culmination of Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov's tireless individual efforts.[94] The reality of this process is considerably more complex. Muravyov (v'ev, etc.) was undoubtedly instrumental when it came to orchestrating Russian success in the region, but only because he was able to maneuver within Russia's Byzantine political system and exploit circumstances to maximum advantage. Muravyov owed the governor-generalship of Eastern Siberia to Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, after the then minister of the Interior convinced her to influence Nicholas I and thereby arrange Muravyov's 1847 appointment.[95] The Czar's choice elicited immediate reactions, not all of them related to Muravyov's relatively young age of 38. One of Muravyov's political rivals remarked, "well, we will have a war with China," and attributed its absence to the "apathy and

stagnation of the Chinese Empire."[96] Britain joined China in the new, avowedly Anglophobic governor-general's sights. He also directed his policies against the "threatening and selfish English,"[97] to whom he derisively referred as "the islanders."[98] In keeping with Alexander Herzen's aphorism that a governor's power 'increases in geometric progression in provinces like . . . Siberia,'[99] Muravyov sought to firmly establish Russian control in Eastern Siberia and the Pacific before the British Empire did. This could not come to fruition, though, without the unique set of circumstances presented by the Crimean War in East Asia.

Muravyov's Anglophobia and initiatives predated war with Britain and France, but they immediately took center stage in a political struggle that was already raging in St. Petersburg. Foreign Minister Count Karl Nesselrode, along with Finance Minister Fedor Vronchenko and the latter's predecessor Yegor Kankrin, joined other influential politicians in opposing any moves that could conceivably threaten the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.[100] China's first treaty with a European state, the Nerchinsk agreement denied Russia access to the Amur River and its northern basin. This was especially unfavourable to the Czarist Empire because, as Muravyov emphasized to Nicholas I, the Amur was "the only river flowing from Siberia into the Pacific Ocean."[101] Nesselrode and his like-minded colleagues, on the other hand, advanced several arguments against potentially disturbing the region's status quo. Finance Minister Kankrin was reluctant to "damage" Russo-Chinese relations and the cross-border trade that accompanied them.[102] Nesselrode, meanwhile, employed the metaphor of untying a net to describe the possibility of convicts and exiles escaping to the Pacific via the Amur.[103] Muravyov and his outnumbered supporters, including (pre-1852) Minister of the Interior Count Lev Alekseevich Perovsky and Menshikov, countered with their own economic and geopolitical arguments while playing on Nicholas' fear of Siberian separatism. Yet these efforts were only one component of a larger effort to reverse Nicholas I's December 1846 characterization of the Amur as an unnavigable and therefore "useless" river.[104] The main advantage enjoyed by the expansionist camp was a geographical factor mentioned earlier: distance. Muravyov and his subordinate, naval officer and explorer Grennady (i/ii) Ivanovich Nevelskoy, were free to act aggressively and interpret vague mandates such as the Czar's directive that "*a bon entendeur, peu de paroles*," or "to a good listener there are few words."[105]

Establishing and then maintaining control over distant Pacific territories during the early 1850s was a four-step process for Russia,

and the products of the first and fourth steps proved immensely helpful during the Crimean War. The first step was exploration. Nevelskoy's voyages accomplished this feat by revealing critical geographical details relating to the Amur's mouth, Sakhalin Island, and the Strait of Tartary. This information eluded Anglo-French forces in 1854 and beyond. The second step involved convincing Nicholas I that such efforts were worth supporting. During Muravyov's 1853 interview, the Russian Emperor pointed to a map of the Amur and remarked "very good, but to protect this territory, I would have to send military forces from here," shifting his gaze to Cronstadt.[106] That same interview, however, ended with Nicholas laughing and instructing his governor-general to "go on" with a planned expedition after Muravyov convinced him that it was possible to defend the Amur with local Siberian forces.[107] The Czar's personal approval or the third step, in turn, shielded Nevelskoy and Muravyov from their political opponents in St. Petersburg by legitimizing their initiatives, often after the fact. The fourth and last step entailed supplying and defending posts once they were established. Although its staple trade in furs had been declining for some time,[108] the Russian America Company was of great assistance in both tasks during the Crimean conflict. Provisioning reinforced garrisons at distant posts such as Petropavlovsk was hardly a triumphal success, as is evident in an excerpt from a letter by Kamchatka governor and rear admiral Vasily Zavoyko in which he refers to "facing death from hunger and other things."[109] Nevertheless, even a fragile supply line provided for a Russian force sufficient to repel an Allied amphibious assault in August and September of that year.

Preparations for the Crimean War in East Asia fit seamlessly with proposals that Muravyov had been articulating since his appointment in 1847. These included strengthening fortifications at Petropavlovsk, placing Kamchatka under the military governorship of a rear admiral,[110] and concentrating Russia's available forces near the Amur's mouth. Despite the objections of Nevelskoy, the latter objective also entailed withdrawing from more exposed posts on Sakhalin Island. Nevelskoy's misgivings aside, temporarily abandoning Sakhalin did gain the support of Russia's overall naval commander in the Pacific, Vice Admiral Efimy (ii) Putyatin, who had left Cronstadt with a small squadron in January 1853.[111]

St. Petersburg initially dispatched Putyatin to "establish political and trade relations" with Japan. [112] Accordingly, the Russian commander was already engaged in complex rounds of negotiations with the decentralized Tokugawa bureaucracy since August 1853. The

Russian mission did not immediately attain its objective, but led Japanese decision makers to consider that "the Russians are likely to be every bit as persistent as they have been polite."[113] Putyatin opposed Muravyov's designs on the Amur and Sakhalin Island, and the Crimean War provided a convenient pretext for the vice admiral to order the latter's evacuation in order to curry favor with the Japanese and conserve thinly spread Russian forces.[114] Putyatin could not interfere with Muravyov's efforts on the Siberian mainland, however, despite the governor-general's angry reflection that "Putiatin is really not a bad man, but it is a pity that he has meddled in the Amur affairs, which he may damage."[115] Russo-Japanese negotiations continued into 1855 as the bulk of Russia's half-dozen frigates, armed transports, and smaller warships left Japanese waters in order to ferry reinforcements to Petropavlovsk and assist in defending that port. Ships not performing these services took shelter at the port of Nikolaevsk, which Nevelskoy founded in 1850 to fulfill Muravyov's 1849 wish that "at the mouth of the Amur, instead of a [potential] British fortress, [there] stood a Russian fortress, just like the ones at the port of Petropavlovsk."[116] These shelters were especially important for Russia's scattered Pacific warships that, like their counterparts in the Baltic and White Seas, remained unsupported by privateers after Nicholas I and Grand Duke Konstantin decided against issuing letters of marquee, or commissioning warships from neutral nations such as the United States.

Officials who favored this approach, in fact, were only overruled by Grand Duke Konstantin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1855. Assistant Foreign Minister Lev Grigoryevich Sinyavin, for one, correctly argued in May 1854 that British and French authorities were frightened at the mere "thought" of Russian privateering.[117] Sinyavin continued by emphasizing that Britain and France were "merchant nations" with scattered commercial fleets and asserting that privateers could also cause damage by increasing insurance costs.[118] Collegiate Secretary Aleksandr Rotchev, the last administrator of Russia's Fort Ross outpost in northern California before its abandonment in the early 1840s, cited Americans' "uncompromising animosity to England" and desire for material gain when arguing that the United States could furnish enough privateers to force England "to think about putting an end to the War."[119] Rotchev's assessment was corroborated by reports from Russia's *Charge d'Affaires* in Washington, Eduard Andreevich Stoeckl, and were accompanied by specific American proposals for privateering in the Pacific. In a memo to Nicholas I from retired general staff officer and noted entomologist Victor Ivanovich

Mochoulsky (Motschoulsky), for example, Mochoulsky reported that his 1853 visit to the United States involved Americans asking him about obtaining letters of marque.[120] Granting these would, as the argument went, throw British "commerce into great disarray" before news of war's outbreak could even reach distant British colonies.[121] Americans, according to Mochoulsky, were especially eager to seize shipments of British gold from colonies such as Australia.[122]

Mochoulsky's advocacy of privateering was only one element of his broader plea for an active Russian overseas colonial policy, which did not appeal to Russia's rulers. The scientist pointed out that access to the Pacific would bestow a "totally different political significance" to Russian fleets "locked" in the Baltic and Black Seas.[123] Despite presenting a case that "a nation that wants to have a world-wide influence should be everywhere," Mochoulsky's previous advocacy on behalf of Fort Ross, purchasing a Sandwich (Hawaiian) Island, or establishing a Russian colony in India had been ignored because of both distance and fear of potential conflict with the United States, Britain, and even Mexico.[124] The Russian government's official rationale for employing privateers was instead much closer to Foreign Minister Nesselrode's January 1855 vision, which involved privateers damaging Allied commerce with an ancillary goal of distracting Anglo-French forces from a renewed attack on Russia's East Asian possessions.[125] A cautious diplomat, Russia's foreign minister anticipated no direct profit from even successful missions and emphasized that privateers should be explicitly forbidden from interacting with the Russian American Company thanks to its neutrality agreement with the British Hudson's Bay Company.[126]

Revealingly, Grand Duke Konstantin had deemed even Nesselrode's conservative proposals for privateering problematic.[127] These concerns had already been articulated in May 1854 by Assistant Foreign Minister Sinyavin, whose detailed consideration of privateering's feasibility highlighted drawbacks that resonated with Konstantin.[128] Sinyavin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' staff produced a detailed memo that considered relevant issues including costs, steam versus sail privateers, crews, and using San Francisco and Baltimore as bases before concluding that any effort would involve "significant difficulties" including a lack of intelligence information and safe harbors to accommodate prizes.[129] Although the ministry also assessed that privateering would damage Allied stock markets, double insurance rates, scatter Anglo-French fleets, and force both governments to increase taxes, it hinted at the prospect of complicating Russo-American relations. By 1855, the Grand Duke concluded that the

precautions suggested by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid friction with the United States "make any success of this undertaking (privateering) impossible."[130] Coupled with logistical difficulties such as privateers having to "sail across the whole hemisphere [while] risking encountering a strong enemy," Konstantin successfully requested "permission to abandon the proposal regarding the institution of privateering" in the Pacific.[131]

Russian authorities also had to abandon initial plans for privateering in the Baltic that would involve private vessels darting out from behind small, rocky islands known as skerries. Czar Nicholas initially preferred skerry privateering to raising coastal militias, but feedback from Russo-Finnish authorities convinced him otherwise.[132] St. Petersburg learned from local authorities that immediately launching privateers at the conflict's April 1854 onset would be problematic because many coastal residents were at sea hunting seals until early May.[133] More importantly, Major General Aleksander Jakob von Wendt (Vendt) emphasized that conversations with other officials revealed that privateering would provide "a pretext for vengeance" in coastal areas rendered indefensible by their low population densities.[134] Wendt also noted that Finland's more educated residents were especially opposed to the idea,[135] while the governor of Åbo added that the small size of peasant vessels meant that larger Allied warships would "pose a great danger" to prospective privateer crews.[136] The acting governor of Nyland (Uusimaa), Finland's most populous region, considered skerry privateering "useless and dangerous" and added that the "damage inflicted on the enemy would be insignificant in comparison with the losses suffered by the whole coastal area."[137] Ultimately, Nicholas I concurred with local advice to forgo skerry privateering, a decision that could be softened by face-saving suggestions such as the hope that coastal people's "natural appetite for revenge" would organically generate privateers after Allied attacks.[138]

The initial plans of all the belligerents in the Crimean War varied tremendously, from large-scale assaults on fortified cities to the improvised preparations of a monastery on a remote White Sea island. When it came to the war plans of Anglo-French naval forces in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific, a few succeeded brilliantly, more failed miserably, and most were frustratingly indecisive. None sufficed to dispel Alfred Thayer Mahan's contention that the British and by extension the French were accustomed "to meeting difficulties as they arise, instead of by foresight" and to learning "by hard experience rather than by reflection or premeditation."[139] Even if these assessments overstated the case, complex wartime imperatives required more than

plans hatched by select politicians or even extraordinary exertions by officers and their crews. Complex imperial naval campaigns required precisely the type of strategic thinking that was conspicuously absent from the instructions of Théodore Ducos and Sir James Graham to their naval commanders. Allied political leaders and their advisors, not to mention their Russian adversaries, were challenged to overcome a lack of strategic planning institutions and useful literature on naval strategy and historical operations. As an anonymous author wrote under the pseudonym T124:

> There were plenty of naval histories, but they were mainly narratives. They told of the glorious exploits of the Royal Navy and of how they happened. What they did not tell was why they happened, and whether the policy that brought them about was well or ill-conceived.[140]

British planning, in particular, improved as the Crimean War progressed. Ultimately, however these improvements came too late to halt Russian expansion in East Asia or allow Allied warships in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific to achieve decisive successes in 1854.

CHAPTER 3

The Crimean War's First Shots in the Baltic, 1854

Several months prior to the Crimean War's outbreak, British foreign secretary Lord Clarendon straightforwardly concluded that, "in the event of war between this Country and Russia, the Baltic must become a theatre of active operations."[1] In fact, the entire Crimean conflict was precisely timed to facilitate a British plan to cripple the Russian warships they thought were still anchored off Revel (Tallinn), Estonia.[2] Allied efforts against Russia's Black Sea stronghold at Sevastopol, on the other hand, was designed as a grand raid and not a protracted siege: in Clarendon's words, "one blow in the Baltic was worth two in the Black Sea."[3] Planning for that blow commenced long before the war's outbreak,[4] and fused with concerns that Russian warships would slip undetected into the North Sea and attack British and French coastlines.[5]

Decision engagements instead proved elusive, with the exception of the siege of Bomarsund in the Åland Islands. Allied plans for assaulting Russia's principal fortifications and cities, however imaginative or even eccentric, never came to fruition. Neither did Czar Nicholas I's fervent desire to destroy the British and French warships cruising within sight of his capital. Instead, an increasingly impatient British public and press who did not want to hear that, without Swedish-Norwegian cooperation, fighting in sparsely populated Finland along a 150–200 kilometer front would, to use the metaphor of French diplomat Charles Victor Lobstein, "be undertaking an expedition à la Charles XII."[6] Britain and France were instead left to watch the most powerful fleet ever assembled conduct a frustrating series of coastal raids and contentious blockade captures until December 1854, when ice and weather conditions ended a campaign season that had begun in April.

Dispatching fleets to the Baltic in early 1854 necessitated locating serviceable warships. The process encountered delays in both Britain

and France, albeit for different reasons. Napoleon III only approved the formation of a Baltic squadron under Vice Admiral Alexandre Parseval-Deschênes on February 25, 1854,[7] scarcely a month before Britain and France declared war on Russia. French authorities thus scrambled to provide suitable ships, trained crews, adequate winter clothing, sufficient number of officers, and replacement ammunition while fretting over other consequences of overly hasty armament.[8] The French Emperor's gift of the Virgin Mary's image to boost morale[9] could hardly compensate in a military sense for France's inability to dispatch more than one steam-propelled battleship, the 100-gun *Austerlitz,* to the Baltic, along with seven sail of the line, six sailing frigates, and five smaller steam-propelled vessels.[10] Britain experienced similar problems with the combat-readiness of its warships, but possessed a far larger pool of maritime resources than did France or Russia. The Baltic was not a permanent British naval station, and Admiralty head Sir James Graham was reluctant to take the expensive step of assembling a fleet for deployment there until war with Russia became inevitable.[11] Graham nevertheless managed to assemble over a dozen screw-propeller-driven battleships and coastal defense vessels along with a squadron of sailing battleships and supporting craft, but declined to add gunboats and mortar vessels.[12] Popular hyperbole aside, the high number of propeller-driven steam warships made this battle group the most powerful fleet yet assembled. The vulnerable wooden hulls that enclosed these warships' engines and guns, however, did not bode well for their capacity to withstand engagements against shore fortifications firing red-hot projectiles. Debates related to operations involving any type of warship, in fact, soon added to the mutual antipathy between Graham and Britain's newly appointed Baltic Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier.

Napier's appointment was controversial even though it came by default, which foreshadowed the poisonous acrimony that characterized the vice admiral's professional relationships throughout the 1854 campaign. Napier was the product of a command structure clogged with aged veterans of the Napoleonic Wars who had not even been constantly employed, much less seen combat, in decades. In the period spanning Napoleon Bonaparte's 1815 surrender and the 1854 outbreak of the Crimean War, a captain in the Royal Navy consistently faced more than an 80 percent chance of being unemployed during any given year.[13] This meant that seniority and "interest," or political patronage, too often determined which captains and commanders were selected to lead ships into battle, though this applied more to his captains than it did to Sir Charles. A very young Napier had enlisted

in 1799 and commanded the rocket bombardment during the Anglo-American War of 1812 that later furnished the American national anthem.[14] By 1854, Napier had successfully overseen an impressive variety of actions against French, Danish, American, Portuguese, and Egyptian forces while advocating in favor of steam propulsion and performing other tasks such as combating piracy. A lack of respect for authority and civility contributed to Napier's military successes during incidents such as the bombardment of Acre, Syria, but left an extensive trail of political and military enemies in Napier's wake. They soon haunted his efforts during the Crimean War.

Sir Charles' penchant for conducting bitter public feuds with politicians and fellow officers had to be overlooked given the lack of other suitable candidates to command a large fleet in 1854. Lord Dundonald, then 79 years old, fell out of consideration due to his perceived lack of restraint rather than his age. As Graham wrote to Queen Victoria, "there is reason to apprehend that he (Dundonald) might deeply commit the force under his command in some desperate enterprise, where the chances of success would not counteract the risk of failure and of the fatal consequences which might ensue."[15] Dundonald's forceful advocacy of chemical warfare attacks on Cronstadt did little to dispel this assessment. Graham instead hoped to offer the Baltic command to 72-year-old Sir William Parker, but the admiral's failing health frustrated this design.[16] With Sir George Seymour "absent in North America . . . the choice would seem to fall on Sir Charles Napier . . . though this appointment may be open to some objections."[17] Napier's appointment was announced on February 25, 1854, too late for him to have any input in selecting the captains he would command. Many of these men already bore an intense personal dislike of Napier from their service with him off Syria in the early 1840s, and were not reticent to share their opinions through correspondence that reached politically influential figures throughout Britain. Even Napier's French counterpart, 64-year-old Trafalgar veteran Alexandre Parseval-Deschênes,[18] remarked before meeting Napier that "the dominating character of this Admiral is well-known as well as his desire to be spoken of."[19] Given what was spoken about him in 1854 and after by the press, politicians, and fellow naval commanders, Napier lived to regret this desire.

Relations between the British vice admiral and his subordinate captains were so strained that observers rapidly began to record evidence of serious tension. Parseval-Deschênes wrote approximately a month-and-a-half after joining Napier's squadron that the British admiral "has the most indecisive and irresolute character that it is

possible to encounter and is only acting for his own benefit. This opinion…is so widely accepted in all of his [Napier's] squadron that I think it is my duty to speak of this."[20] Noted diarist and socialite Charles Greville also recognized that, toward the end of the Baltic campaign in 1854, Napier was "detested by his officers and they one and all complain that he has been so little adventurous, and maintain that more might have been done. The justness and correctness of this, time will show."[21] Greville's assessment proved oversimplified, and Napier's legacy remains controversial. Although Napier tenaciously defended his reputation in the press and Parliament by using both official and private correspondence from the Baltic Campaign of 1854,[22] his reputation as a commander suffered irreparable damage. This resulted less from Napier's command decisions and more from his notorious lack of discretion and penchant for expressing it in writing and public venues such as speeches. Contemporary politicians and more recent historians often quoted captains' criticisms of Napier verbatim rather than critically analyzing their merits.[23] On one particular occasion, for instance, they selectively omitted a "good deal" of the vice admiral's admonitions that "war was somewhat different nowadays than it used to be" and "that discipline was absolutely necessary," while instead criticizing motivational speeches that preceded these warnings as sabre-rattling.[24] This did little to improve strategic planning during the campaign or the subsequent quality of its related historiography.

The fleets that the British and French dispatched to the Baltic in 1854 suffered additional problems with personnel, namely a lack of trained crews. Although Napier's reluctance to immediately undertake large-scale combat meant that these issues were not immediately apparent to most outside observers, they were glaringly obvious to better-informed figures. Aside from a small core of technical specialists, mid-century British warships were not continuously manned when in-between deployments. This had not been a problem in earlier centuries, when unwilling recruits could be forcibly impressed or offered bounties to join the Royal Navy. By the 1850s, however, both options were politically and fiscally inexpedient. As one senior Russian commander secretly reported to Grand Duke Konstantin after visiting Britain in January 1854: "given the current state of (British) public opinion and commerce…compulsory recruitment is hardly possible."[25] Unsurprisingly, British reports on the fleet's proceedings contained ominous sub-headings such as "certain ships insufficiently manned and officered."[26]

Graham was hardly alone in making human resource decisions. His immediate subordinate, First Sea Lord Sir Maurice Berkeley, was also responsible for some of the problems with manning the Baltic fleet. As one retired naval commander indignantly commented after noting Berkeley's requirement that volunteers be taller than five feet eight inches, "Nero fiddled whilst Rome was burning, and by Sir Maurice Berkeley's own statement we learn that he was engaged in measuring the respective heights of our seamen, whilst thousands of his countrymen were dying from overwork."[27] French warships confronted a similar lack of officers and men,[28] but received reinforcements and did not have to pin their hopes on Graham's unrealistic suggestions that Napier obtain crews and pilots in Sweden-Norway or even Denmark. Drills at sea and the rapid attrition of older crewmembers drawn from a recently established reserve coast guard system eventually sufficed to create a British fleet capable of navigating with only minor collisions, but, in the words of one contemporary author, "this desultory system, or rather want of a system, became a cause of much embarrassment and expense."[29] At any rate, Russian Adjutant General Litke noted that "the rabble of men [British authorities] are now chucking from all parts of the United Kingdom" would still be "more able-bodied" and capable of servicing guns for longer than their Russian counterparts.[30]

The limitations on what even the most powerful warships could achieve without the support of troops and gunboats proved even more embarrassing for a British public accustomed to large-scale naval victories. The most recent British ambassador to St. Petersburg (Sir George Hamilton Seymour), for one, recognized that expectations in Britain ran too high. Seymour did everything he could to persuade his superiors "that the fleet cannot sail on ice and take Cronstadt," but to no avail.[31] The British cabinet's determination to limit military expenditures, even during wartime, combined with Sevastopol's unexpectedly durable resistance meant that a large army and gunboat flotilla could materialize in 1854 only through the intervention of Sweden-Norway. The Swedish government had anticipated a war in the Baltic since February 1853, but its diplomats had been busily negotiating the details of their and neighboring Denmark's neutrality during a potential conflict.[32] King Oscar I personally assumed control of foreign affairs in July of that year and immediately ordered secret overtures to Denmark concerning a joint declaration of neutrality,[33] although negotiations broke down in late 1853 and only came to fruition closer to the Crimean War's outbreak in 1854. This came

just in time for both countries, which found themselves in extremely vulnerable positions because of geography and circumstances.

The Allies had historically based reasons to hope that Sweden-Norway would join their respective war efforts in 1854, despite some recent cooperation in foreign policy between Nicholas, Oscar, and the latter sovereign's father, Charles XIV. [34] France and Britain could particularly empathize Sweden's centuries-long struggle with Russia for control of the Baltic, especially its 1809 loss of Finland and Russia's fortification of the Aland Islands in violation of earlier agreements. Norway, personally united with the Swedish monarchy, was still in the midst of a festering dispute with Russia over territory and the rights of indigenous people in the extreme northern region of Finmark (Finnmark). These factors alone, however, initially failed to overcome a serious challenge that undermined British and French negotiators for more than a year: Napoleon III's diplomats enthusiastically attempted to ally with Sweden-Norway, while Lord Aberdeen's government did not. Consequently, a vicious cycle developed in which Oscar I's doubts about joining a limited war and Britain's hesitation caused Swedish-Norwegian leaders to impose more conditions and stall, which in turn increased Britain's reluctance to enter into a binding offensive alliance. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, these tensions were only resolved in late 1855.

Drouyn de Lhuys described the benefits of a close alliance with Sweden as "self-evident," but its benefits were less apparent to Oscar I.[35] The Scandinavian monarch initially pressed for monetary subsidies to underwrite the cost of his military's efforts against Russia and an Anglo-French guarantee that Sweden would retain any conquests in Finland. Although Napoleon III's government was, in de Lhuy's words, "resolutely" in favour of accepting these terms, he and Walewski soon discovered with "profound regret that the opinion of the English Government is different."[36] Although Walewski initially could not understand why the British cabinet would hesitate to consider Swedish-Norwegian terms,[37] he soon realized that Britain's experiences during past wars made the British cabinet especially reluctant to enter into such an arrangement.[38] Even more problematic, though, was Aberdeen's and Clarendon's opinion that guaranteeing Finland was "impermissible" because—as they put it to Walewski—it would

> place the war we are waging with Russia on a completely different level, put conditions onto a peace resolution that would surely extend the war's duration, and mean not putting down our weapons until Russia is destroyed.[39]

As the Aberdeen ministry dithered and Oscar I increased his demands, the chances of expanding the Anglo-French alliance in 1854 dwindled.

French efforts repeatedly suffered from not heeding British admonitions that Sweden-Norway had "always cooperated depending on Austria's actions" and that "until this point any attempt on our part (to obtain a declaration of war on Russia) would therefore be premature and without results."[40] These warnings were repeated to Walewski by Britain's *Charge d'Affaires* in Stockholm, Wiliam Grey, who added that Oscar believed that "if the Cabinet of Vienna does not make a clear pronouncement before the end of summer, nothing decisive will be done in this campaign."[41] Consequently, the first secretary of France's London embassy Philippe-Charles Maurice Baudin secretly reported in August 1854 that "people think we have been too quick and certainly too alone in Stockholm."[42] As King Oscar directly informed French ambassador to Stockholm, Charles Victor Lobstein, he was "a constitutional sovereign" obligated to prove to his government and Parliament that the "Oriental question (had) become a European question."[43] "In short," continued Oscar, "I must be able to announce that Austria, as well as France and England, has recognized . . . the necessity of diminishing Russia in the North."[44] Dashing Allied hopes that, as Drouyn de Lhuys put it, "the momentum of (Swedish) public opinion will help energetically," Oscar I did not agree that entering into a full-scale war with Russia would fulfill the "national wish" that French officials and the British public initially attributed to Swedish-Norwegians.[45] By August 17, 1854, Britain and France agreed that they could "wait until the right moment to act" and that, in Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, there would be "nothing more to do than keep up good arrangements with the Court of Stockholm as long as Austria is not tied to us."[46] As the Allies had realized, that opportune moment would not arrive in 1854.

A lack of 60,000 Swedish troops and 80 gunboats may have limited the Allies' initial Baltic campaign, but Swedish-Norwegian neutrality was still far from disastrous for British and French forces. This was especially true after the Swedish-Norwegian government rejected Russian requests to completely close its ports to any belligerent warships.[47] Sweden-Norway's foreign minister responded by emphasizing that it was difficult to lock the doors of a house when one did not have the keys and adding that the British would never respect a defense "based on words."[48] A strict declaration of neutrality thus favored Britain and France over Russia, whose fleet could not hope to benefit from replenishment in Swedish ports without having to

offer battle to the Allies' steam-propelled warships.[49] Unbeknownst to the British public, however, Sweden-Norway's neutrality coupled with the impossibility of Graham's design for a crushing attack on Russian warships off Revel still fundamentally limited the possible achievements of an Allied Baltic campaign in 1854, which began as Sir Charles Napier's warships entered the Baltic in early April.

Napier's initial task was to reach the three possible entrances to the Baltic—the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and Oresund Strait (Øresund or Öresund)—all of which ran through waters claimed by the Kingdom of Denmark. Influential members of Danish King Frederick VII's court, including his heir and the prime minister, openly admired Nicholas I's empire.[50] The same was true for many of their colleagues in the ministries of War and Foreign Affairs.[51] Moreover, Danish attitudes toward Britain had been hardened by the Royal Navy's 1807 bombardment of Copenhagen during the Napoleonic Wars. Regardless of its historical antipathy toward Great Britain, though, Denmark was in an especially vulnerable position in 1854. Its armed forces were relatively weak and were needed to defend Denmark's German-speaking duchies of Schleswig and Holstein; as the French ambassador in Copenhagen noted hearing on "all sides," Danes often asked "who knows whether or not Russia has already sold us to Prussia!"[52] Besides, geography alone meant that Danes would find themselves "between a hammer and an anvil"[53] in a Baltic conflict.

Unlike the Swedish-Norwegian case, Denmark's potential participation in the Crimean War was not a key concern for the Allies, who only needed to pass through Danish waters while entering and exiting the Baltic. In another contrast to the situation further north in Sweden-Norway, Allied diplomats also had more realistic expectations that Denmark would remain neutral if at all possible. As French ambassador to Denmark Adolphe Dotézac opined:

> This policy is in [Denmark's] nature, careful calculator of its own interests, framing all of the large issues of Europe within the narrow proportions of its personal issues, only taking interest in its own affairs, at once fearful and optimistic and for whom neutrality always seems the most desirable position because it offers hope during the fight of winning from either side and of showing, without compromise, its devotion to the winner once the fight is over.[54]

Consequently, it was not a surprise to anyone when the Royal Danish government unanimously agreed that it was impossible to forcibly oppose an Allied fleet's passage and that the integrity of Denmark's

territory and ruling dynasty demanded strict neutrality.[55] Equally unsurprising was that Denmark extended little more than a polite welcome to Sir Charles Napier in 1854 during his visit.

British warships arrived off Copenhagen after first leaving for the Baltic on March 10, 1854.[56] Controversy immediately flared when Napier interpreted a dispatch from Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon as a directive to take his squadron through the Great Belt into the Baltic. This action conflicted with the Graham-led Admiralty's orders to await further instructions at Wingo Sound, but Napier justified himself to the Admiralty. The vice admiral simply enclosed Clarendon's dispatch along with an explanation that the Russians might have passed out through the Oresund Strait while British warships were sailing and steaming into the Baltic through the Great Belt.[57] Clarendon's orders were dated March 9, 1854, meaning that they predated Britain and France's formal declaration of war against Russia by several weeks. They reflected the British foreign secretary's fears that Russian warships would escape the Baltic and become "a serious inconvenience to the commerce of this country (Britain)" if Allied squadrons demonstrated "any overstrained forbearance by not stopping Russian warships by force."[58] Graham and the Admiralty lords quickly bestowed their retroactive approval on Napier's actions, but a precedent had already been set for strained relations between Britain's Admiralty and its Baltic commander.

The British fleet's hurried departure demanded an urgent Russian response, and Nicholas I immediately dispatched aides to inspect warships and defenses at Sweaborg and Cronstadt, while Russian forces continued to reinforce shore defenses with underwater mines. Russia's Committee on Underwater Mine Warfare was the first such permanent body to enjoy official recognition by a government, but bureaucratic incompetence and interservice rivalries delayed the initiatives of Swedish émigré Immanuel Nobel and his German-born counterpart Moritz Hermann Jacobi.[59] The Crimean War's impending outbreak necessitated a crash development and manufacturing program spearheaded by Immanuel Nobel, who made such progress that Nicholas I never learned that earlier designs and prototypes had been lost.[60] Nobel's mines relied on a chemical reaction triggered by contact with a sliding mechanism on the mine's interior.

Unlike Jacobi's electromagnetic models, Nobel's devices were dangerous but underpowered because they carried only small explosive charges.[61] In 1855, British Rear Admiral Michael Seymour lost an eye rather than his life after mounting an unintentionally successful demonstration of how a Russian mine could be induced to explode.[62] The

Allies were fortunate that Russian mine installers intent on completing their tasks alive often declined to remove built-in safety mechanism. At any rate, the number of operational mines protecting Sweaborg fell far short of the Russian Naval Ministry's vision of a "huge" and "very efficient" system.[63] Even when such a network became operational off Cronstadt, Adjutant General Litke pointed out that the difficulties and costs of protecting a large space with mines joined the threat that a "single stray cannon-ball" hitting a galvanic battery or conductor could "wipe out the whole defense."[64] British and French warships also avoided any unhappy experiences with German inventor Wilhelm Bauer's 52-foot iron submarine, which made over 130 successful dives in Czarist service between 1856 and 1858.[65] Mines and other submerged defenses, such as piles, were only some of the daunting obstacles protecting Russian coastal installations in the Baltic. Ultimately, though, underwater warfare featured more prominently in the subsequent American Civil War. As the American "Military Commission to the Theater of War in Europe" reported to then secretary of war Jefferson Davis, Russian underwater warfare "recommends itself to our attention."[66]

Static defenses such as mines were especially important because Russia's Baltic strategy was predicated on the prewar conclusions of senior commanders and Grand Duke Konstantin that the Allied fleet's "overwhelming force" robbed Russian warships of "any chance of success."[67] Drawing subsequent conclusions, however, proved difficult because Allied intentions were "not possible to foresee" prior to the conflict's outbreak.[68] Accordingly, Czar Nicholas resorted to identifying a "triple purpose" that the Allied Baltic Fleet "may" have had, including:

1. destroying our fleet and bombarding Cronstadt and Sweaborg
2. landing forces on the Finnish coast (to) agitate the local population, stirring up its former sympathy for Sweden
3. bombarding the coastal cities of the Baltic (Provinces), namely, Libau (Liepaja), Vindava (Windau, Windawa, now Ventspils), Riga, Pernov (Pärnu), and Reval and landing of forces along the coast (from Southern Lithuania to St. Petersburg).[69]

Given the divergent nature of each possibility and the "strategic disadvantages" of a long coastline, insufficient communications, and an absent railway network, Russian forces attempted to man concentrated positions and wait for the Allies to make a mistake.[70] This meant that Russia's Baltic fleet, for all its high command's discussion

of positioning, began the Crimean War moored at Cronstadt and Sweaborg. These were the "only two chief ports" in which, to quote one advisory memo, they "may always have a reliable hiding place, as well as an opportunity to repair damages and load supplies."[71] Russian naval commanders' eagerness to engage Allied ships damaged in ill-advised engagements with shore fortifications, though, was frustrated by British and French caution and troubling revelations concerning its battle-readiness.

The latter concerns came to light after His Imperial Russian Majesty ordered a meeting in Cronstadt Harbor on the 110-gun flagship *Imperator Pyotr I* (Emperor Peter I). Accompanied by heirs, ministers, and senior admirals, Nicholas I broached the possibility of simultaneously attacking the British fleet entering the Gulf of Finland with the two Russian fleet divisions at Cronstadt and the one at Sweaborg.[72] Russia's Baltic admirals responded that the plan was "positively impossible" due to the strength of the British squadron, the Russian fleet's lack of steam propulsion, and the "very weak" abilities of Russian crews.[73] Kronstadt commander Fyodor (Fedor) Petrovich Litke, in fact, confided in his diary that Grand Duke Konstatantin whispered a request that Litke "*combattez*" any "unfortunate" proposal to fight the Allies at sea.[74] Although Czar Nicholas had initially hoped to attack British and French warships near Revel while possibly relieving Bomarsund, Litke noted that the Russian ruler accepted his commanders' assessments that this was "impossible."[75]

Russia's Emperor may have accepted that a large scale naval battle need "not be thought of," but the chaos that surrounded Russia's Cronstadt Naval Division enraged him. Nicholas' adjutant general and personal aide recalled the Czar's reaction to disorganization on the *Imperatritsa Aleksandra*, which prevented his commands from being heard: "I never saw in this awful state of anger not only the Emperor, but a single person in the world . . . he could not speak for a while."[76] Russian preparations thus shifted back to reinforcing shore fortifications, deploying troops along the Baltic coastline, and removing navigational beacons to force hostile warships to engage in time-consuming survey work and coastal reconnaissance.[77] Militia could also be mustered in Finland and what is now Estonia and Latvia, but these forces required hurried training and often "did not understand anything in Russian."[78] In spite of these preparations, the Russian Empire's strategic uncertainty created what Russia's ruler described as a "state of anxiety [that] is quite troublesome and difficult."[79] In the lack of more definite information, every rumor such as the "the supposed landing of 11 thousand Polish descendants for stirring up"

modern Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland along with "various other [Allied] strategems" was a cause for serious concern.[80]

The timeliness and accuracy of intelligence obtained through reconnaissance and less direct sources were points of contention throughout all of the Crimean War's naval campaigns. These issues immediately became apparent when it came to Sir James Graham's proposal for attacking Revel. Sweden-Norway had been aware of the Russian fleet's withdrawal from Revel and Port Baltic since October 26, 1853,[81] but this news did not reach the British fleet and Admiralty until March 26 and April 3, 1854, respectively.[82] This did not escape Napier's post-campaign criticism of Graham and the Admiralty in Parliament, and Charles Napier MP took an opportunity during a March 1856 debate to lament the necessity of Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons' early reconnaissance mission of Revel and Port Baltic. The former vice admiral pointed out that the British fleet initially "did not know where the Russian fleet was . . . though we had a Minister at Copenhagen, a Minister at Sweden, one at St. Petersburg, and one at Hamburg, and Consuls all over the Baltic."[83] Russian authorities, on the other hand, faced an entirely different intelligence situation. Nicholas I "considered it uncomfortable" to summon paid volunteers from Finnish churches "because such measures may be considered similar to inviting people to serve as spies and may result in the loss of the significance of this war" in their eyes.[84] Instead, the Russian Emperor decided that officials should encourage Finns to informally supply intelligence through "an appeal in churches to honor the patriotism of the people without naming any means of actual expression of those feelings."[85]

No espionage was necessary for the reconnaissance mission of Captain Bartholomew James Sulivan, which revealed that Revel was "a very strong place, and [that] it would be folly to attack it with ships."[86] Graham's Revel plan was well in keeping with historical precedent from Nelson's Baltic campaign against Napoleon and with correspondence from the 1830s,[87] but was never appropriately updated. Napier personally blamed Captain John Washington and his 1853 intelligence-gathering mission for gossiping about and "playing Boswell" to Russia's Grand Duke Konstantin, which "was hardly what Capt. Washington was sent to Russia for."[88] Napier's own handling of intelligence, though, was hardly beyond reproach. A secret dispatch from Russia's minister in Denmark, Ernst Romanovich Ungern-Sternberg, in fact, accused the British vice admiral of "betraying his campaign plan" by explaining to a Russian informant that "first, we (the Allies) will endeavor to take Reval."[89] Ultimately, though, campaign plans

first had to be formulated before they could either be betrayed or executed.

Practical evaluation eliminated a number of other proposals for attacking Russia in the Baltic, especially those of Thomas Cochrane, the 10th Earl of Dundonald. This notoriously eccentric naval officer's checkered career commenced in 1793 and was marked by the same bitter personal and professional feuds as Sir Charles Napier's. Dundonald's adventures during the Napoleonic Wars allowed him to witness the toxic by-products of sulfur manufacturing in Sicily.[90] His "mind being awake to impressions of a professional nature," Dundonald began planning to introduce toxic fumes to British naval warfare.[91] Sir Thomas repeatedly emphasized that his intended targets were French naval bases including Cherbourg, but eagerly adapted his schemes for use against Cronstadt and other Russian strongholds.[92] Graham decided to refer Dundonald's plan to a committee of high-ranking officers qualified to evaluate its feasibility. After acquainting themselves with Dundonald's proposal to outfit iron colliers, or coal-carrying vessels as either smoke or sulfur producing vessels, members asked Dundonald and the eminent scientist Michael Faraday a series of pointed questions that literally and figuratively underlined their desire to see "*proof*."[93] Dundonald's reply was breathtakingly optimistic,[94] while Professor Faraday was skeptical about whether the proposals were "*practicable* on the scale proposed and required."[95] Faraday's observations were complemented by the openly hostile ones of Sir John Burgoyne, Britain's inspector general of Fortifications. Burgoyne concluded that, "as regards the application of the sulphurous vapour, independent of the barbarous and uncivilized character that would be given it, there are very great doubts of its efficacy which are itemized by Mr. Faraday."[96] The committee reported to Graham that Dundonald's plan should be rejected and that it considered Burgoyne's assessment as one "in which everything is said that *can be said on the subject*."[97] Europe was thus spared this early form of chemical warfare for another few decades on the grounds of impracticality rather than moral repugnance.[98]

Dundonald was not alone in proposing to attack Cronstadt by unconventional means. Suggestions poured into Admiralty offices, including an imaginative plan to dam the River Neva and thereby flood Northern Russia from St. Petersburg to the White Sea.[99] Inspired by Swedish schemes from 1809, the author emphasized that it would "reduce the war to the capture of Cronstadt and spare thousands of lives and millions of money."[100] This unsolicited proposal appealed to the economizing instincts of Graham and other cabinet

members, not to mention Napoleon III, by contextualizing the dam's inflation-adjusted costs as "about half the cost of the Crystal Palace,"[101] centerpiece of the 1851 Great Exhibition. Consequently, the British government formally evaluated proposals to dam waters surrounding Cronstadt and Sweaborg in June 1854.[102] Further consideration, though, revealed that even the most detailed plans for dam construction were so highly problematic that "it remains to be considered which country would be the greater sufferer if this project were carried out."[103] Critics noted that 1,500 out of the 2,000 vessels entering Cronstadt in 1853 were English, and realized that any remaining obstacles would present a considerable inconvenience to British commerce once the war ended.[104] It was also necessary to consider that damming operations at both Cronstadt and Sweaborg "would be carried out within range of the principal batteries, and this would risk great loss of life."[105] Both projects were thus abandoned as debate shifted toward how best to assault Russia's major coastal forces using more conventional methods, which nevertheless included even more outlandish suggestions including dredges shielded with supposedly shotproof buffalo-hide armor.

After entering the Baltic and attempting to establish a blockade, Sir Charles Napier paraphrased one of his eventual opponents by presenting Sir James Graham with three options. The first involved blockading the Gulf of Finland and other areas such as the Gulf of Bothnia, which Napier knew would not "please the people of England."[106] The second option was "to go to Cronstadt, offer battle to the Russian fleet, which they won't accept, or attempt the harbour; I look on the latter to be impossible."[107] Sir Charles elaborated on the difficulties facing a successful assault of Cronstadt, and emphasized that the channels approaching and passing the fortress were narrow, dangerously shallow, and covered by powerful batteries.[108] Napier's third option involved conquering the Åland Islands and besieging Bomarsund, and the vice admiral declared that he "lean(ed) to this" operation.[109] The possibility that excited the British public and politicians not including Graham, however, was an attack on Cronstadt. Even proponents of the idea, though, had to agree with the tragically understated conclusion that "a certain sacrifice, not only of men, but also of ships" would be "unavoidable" in any attack.[110]

Better-informed Allied figures dreaded the possibility of an attack on Cronstadt that used only large ships of the line and not gunboats and other specialized assault craft. Graham made a point of counseling Napier to ignore Parseval-Deschênes' "high-sounding instructions" of attacking Cronstadt "if it be within the power of man" by

reminding the British vice admiral that his duty did "not extend to the impossible."[111] Graham's judgment was unfair to Parseval-Deschênes, who strongly advocated bombarding Cronstadt only with mortars and long-range artillery.[112] Yet the first lord's assessment represented the unanimous conclusions of naval experts acquainted with the respective capabilities of the Allied Baltic Fleet and Cronstadt in 1854. Debates over attacking Cronstadt, Sweaborg, and even Revel continued to rage throughout the year, but always saw the most analytical and experienced parties conclude that engaging these positions using only large warships would be a grave error. Bellicosity aside, it was simply impossible to empirically refute the points raised by *Fraser's Magazine*'s systematic discussion of how and why a seaborne assault on Cronstadt by unsupported and unarmored battleships would fail miserably.[113]

Despite their prominence in Admiralty decision making and popular presses, assaults on major Russian harbor fortifications were not the most immediate demands on Allied warships in the Baltic. Napier initially anchored his fleet in Kioge Bay (modern Køge Bugt) near Copenhagen and the entrance to the Sound before proceeding to Hango (Hanko), at the Gulf of Finland's entrance across from Port Baltic (Paldiski).[114] His fleet's smaller vessels, meanwhile, separated from the main squadron and took up positions to enforce a confused blockade of the Estonian coast and the Gulfs of Riga and Bothnia. Britain's largest warships proceeded cautiously due to heavy fog mixed with the exhaust from coal-burning steam engines, which exacerbated an already trying navigational process involving untrained crews and unfamiliar waters. On May 20, a French fleet departed for the Baltic. That same day, which fell almost five months before Allied troops landed on the Crimean Peninsula, a British raid along the Finnish coast produced the first shots of the Crimean War in the Baltic. Captain Hastings Reginald Yelverton of the *Arrogant*, a relatively shallow-draught screw vessel mounting 46 guns, and Captain William Hutcheon Hall of the 6-gun paddle-steamer *Hecla*, fought their way through eight miles of narrow channel to capture a Russian merchant vessel at Ekness (or Ekenäs, now Tammisaari).[115] The British saw the operation as a great success and reported it as such, while Russian authorities and subsequent historians countered that it was a Russian "victory since the English boat eventually retreated."[116]

Disputes over the outcomes at Ekness or Hango (Hanko) two days later aside, the most important task facing Allied warships in the campaign's early stages was enforcing a complicated blockade. By virtue of their fleet's earlier arrival and larger size, British politicians and jurists

took the lead over their French counterparts in formulating blockade policy after differences over neutral goods were resolved through a joint declaration on March 31. As Parseval-Deschênes wrote on June 19, 1854, for example, he had not declared a blockade because Napier had arrived first and had already declared one.[117] Britain and France were also careful to formulate blockade policy "with a view to avoid disputes with the vessels of neutral powers," especially the United States and Prussia.[118] This entailed a tripartite policy that included not only a blockade of Russian coasts, but also export controls on items with military applications and generous grace periods for both neutral goods and ships already at sea. British ministers were initially divided on the subject of blockades and other forms of economic warfare. Sir James Graham and Lord Clarendon, however, took the lead in articulating that blockading and seizing Russian contraband were "claws" that compensated for concessions to neutral powers.[119] British and then French cruisers were thus left to enforce the problematically litigious Baltic naval blockade.

Records indicate that Allied commanders encountered difficulties in the blockade process long before Napier's furious post-campaign denunciation of the "quibbles" and "law harpies" at Britain's Admiralty courts.[120] This was not for lack of information on the Russian merchant marine. The French government, for instance, possessed a list of virtually every Russian merchant vessel along with details including their masters, rig, tonnage, drafts, homeports, and owners.[121] By July 18, 1854, though, Graham found it necessary to supplement this information with a memorandum to British naval officers in the Baltic, reminding them of the different steps necessary to render any capture legal. These included the "actual presence of an adequate naval force," with a "mere declaration" being "invalid."[122] In practical terms, this questioned the legitimacy of Allied commanders' approach of using merely a handful of frigates to blockade huge areas such as the Gulf of Finland instead of stationing squadrons of warships off each blockaded port; this question remained unsettled until the Declaration of Paris in 1856.

More complicated for early blockade efforts was the Anglo-French decision to allow a grace period to Russian vessels that had begun voyages before both Allied governments' declarations of war in late March.[123] The situation was further exacerbated by a lack of communication between Queen's Advocate Sir John Harding[124] and Sir James Graham at the Admiralty. Napier bitterly recognized that the days of captains winning substantial prize money from the sale of captured enemy vessels and cargos had passed. He reported that captains

were discouraged from engaging in the capture process by "various minute circumstances" and the prospects of having to pay the costs of unsuccessfully defending themselves in Admiralty courts.[125] The complexity of legal correspondence and proceedings related to such seizures lent credibility to Napier's assessment,[126] but the vice admiral failed to realize that his government and its French ally had significantly farther-reaching concerns than seizing Russian merchant vessels or directly addressing Prussia's complicity in smuggling contraband. The Allied Baltic Fleet of 1854 restricted its efforts against Russian commerce that year in deference to larger British economic and diplomatic interests, which only added to popular dissatisfaction with a lack of large-scale assaults on Russian positions.

Attacking Russia in the Baltic required a precise understanding of that sea's hydrography, or physical characteristics, as well as the specifications of Russian shore fortifications. The Allied fleets were thus especially fortunate to have the assistance of Captain Bartholomew James Sulivan. Graham initially passed over Sulivan's candidacy for a combat command, but Chief Hydrographer of the Navy Sir Francis Beaufort ensured that Sulivan received a special appointment as a surveyor in the paddle steamer *Lightning*. Sulivan had previously served on the *Beagle* during Charles Darwin's voyage, and continued his friendship and correspondence with the biologist while surveying the Falkland Islands.[127] These and other previous experiences were especially important because the Allied Baltic Fleet lacked the services of local pilots, or maritime guides, normally hired to assist foreign vessels in navigating narrow or other difficult waters. Graham hoped that Swedish-Norwegian or Danish pilots would assist the Baltic Fleet, but both groups were unavailable due to their respective governments' precarious diplomatic positions.

Worse yet from an Allied perspective, pilots dispatched from London were only familiar with major commercial shipping lanes rather than important routes for military operations.[128] Captain Sulivan succinctly deemed them "quite useless" because they "did nothing but learn the pilotage they were supposed to have learnt before."[129] Sir Charles Napier was initially skeptical of navigation not assisted by pilots, and greeted Sulivan by publicly remarking that the only use of survey vessels was as fire-ships,[130] or vessels that were deliberately burned in the hope that they would also ignite enemy ships. Napier eventually modified his views on the subject in response to Sulivan's efforts, but not before valuable time and opportunities had been wasted. Accumulating hydrographic information was a progressive process, and even a cursory comparison of the navigational

information available in 1854 and 1855 reveals that British commanders in the latter year benefitted from a significantly more extensive amount of information when attempting to execute operations.[131]

A lack of intelligence did not always prevent British officers from initiating hostilities, but their early efforts produced uneven results and were always conducted on a small scale. Several days after the successful May 20 raid on Ekness, Captain James Wilcox of the frigate *Dragon* convinced Napier to allow his ship to ascertain the range of its guns on one of the two small forts protecting Hango (Hanko). Situated at the Gulf of Finland, Hango Harbor was an important Russian gunboat base that Nicholas I ordered defended with "determination," though not at the Sweaborg garrison's expense.[132] Master of the Fleet George Biddlecombe, ostensibly the British fleet's chief navigational officer and Bartholomew Sulivan's main rival, endorsed Wilcox's request, but Fort Gustavsvärn's defenders returned fire more effectively than either Biddlecombe or Wilcox anticipated.[133] Napier then had to restrain captains, including Henry Keppel, from conducting an aimless bombardment in response to their regret that "there is little or no excitement especially for we big ships."[134] Russian Rear Admiral Bogdan Alexandrovich Glazenap (Gottlied Friedrich von Glasenapp), meanwhile, reported to Grand Duke Konstantin that the incident "once again confirmed the advantage of stone batteries" against ships' "wooden walls."[135]

Napier may have been happy to conclude that authorities back home shared his opinion that "Hango was not worth caring about," but the British vice admiral found his captains' impulsiveness disturbing.[136] Maintaining a blockade, though, demanded that these same captains be given considerable discretion when acting in squadrons detached from the main fleet to the Gulfs of Bothnia and Riga. Such latitude facilitated successes including the seizure of merchant vessels at Libau (Liepaja) on the coast of modern Latvia,[137] but also gave free reign to the destructive impulses of a British paddle-steamer squadron in northern Finland. Although confirmed as legal by a divided House of Commons in 1858,[138] the large-scale burning of property by forces under Rear Admiral Sir James Hanway Plumridge and captains including George Giffard outraged everyone from King Oscar I to Vice Admiral Parseval-Deschênes, who thought them beneath the standards of his fleet.[139]

Plumridge and four paddle-steamers received orders from Napier on May 5 to reconnoiter the Åland Islands and Åbo (Turku) before proceeding to blockade the Gulf of Bothnia. The squadron quickly found its reconnaissance mission to Åland "hazardous," and a lack

of hydrographic information combined with underwater obstacles ensured that even the compact 6-gun *Vulture* found herself "several times on the rocks."[140] Worse still, the British squadron pushed far past Åbo into the Gulf of Bothnia's still-icy waters without reporting on the city's defenses. The rear admiral then employed his ships' small boats to destroy vast amounts of Finnish timber, tar, and shipbuilding materials, thereby opening the most morally controversial operations of the Baltic campaign.

British forces initially met little opposition because Finnish spy Anders Gurr reported to Russian authorities that sources in Stockholm indicated the British squadron "did not intend any landing on the shores of the Bay of Bothnia."[141] Plumridge and his captains readily cited figures of destroyed vessels, tar barrels, timber, and naval stores as evidence "of the large amounts of mischief done to the enemy,"[142] while others presented British sailors as petty arsonists preying on vulnerable civilians. In the words of (Baltic) Fleet Interpreter General Henry Woodfall Crowe, son of Britain's Norwegian consul general John Rice Crowe, the expedition's "unnecessary cruelties have done more to create an ill feeling if not a deadly hatred towards anyone bearing the name of an Englishman, than all tracts or instigations of the clergy and (Russian) Government agents could have effected in any number of years."[143] Even the (London) *Times*' dispassionate assessment concluded that, "in short, the injury inflicted by such attacks on the Russian Empire and its Government is not commensurate with the losses to private interests and the risk of our own seamen."[144] Such risks were not immediately apparent during early operations at Brahestad (Raahe) and Uleåborg (Oulu), but were driven home by a disastrous raid on Gamla Carelby (Kokkola) a week later.

British paddle-frigates arrived off of Brahestad, a small Finnish coastal town high up the Gulf of Bothnia, at the end of May. On the May 30, 14 boats from *Leopard*, *Vulture*, and *Odin* carrying 304 men and 6 guns entered the harbor. Brahestad's magistrate initially observed that the "real purpose" of this landing was unknown, but then added that "suddenly in a few minutes the intentions of the enemy became clear in all their ruthless ferociousness."[145]

After incinerating all the Finnish merchant vessels they could find,[146] British forces commanded by the *Leopard*'s senior lieutenant, Benjamin Priest landed and "immediately" set fire to immense quantities of shipbuilding materials and commercial buildings.[147] Priest's official report explicitly mentioned his tangible efforts to spare "private" property or even flour caches he "had reason for supposing . . . to be private property," and even reported that his subordinates assisted

with “preventing unnecessary alarm to the inhabitants.”[148] This official record, however, omitted the British declaration that any residents who dared to extinguish the fire would be shot. This stood in stark contrast to the anger of Finns who were, in the words of well-informed Helsinki University librarian Sven Gabriel Elmgren, “grieving” and simultaneously “amazed at the barbarous actions towards defenseless towns.”[149] As Brahestad’s town magistrate added:

> we could scarcely believe our eyes and could not yet comprehend that an enemy eager to demonstrate its advantages to other nations of humanity could go to the length of such an attempt against a defenceless city and private property without any provocation.[150]

Ultimately, multiple accounts corroborate the senior lieutenant’s postscript claim that his boats destroyed 14 merchant vessels and about 25,000 barrels of pitch, tar, and oil along with a large quantity of timber and shipbuilding materials and several shipyards.[151] *Odin*’s naval surgeon and skilled amateur watercolorist Dr. Edward Hodges Cree, observed the “great destruction of property” while adding that “it was in order to assist in crippling the enemy.”[152] It is thus interesting to note that even a physician who clearly empathized with the “unfortunate” Finns and deemed the blaze “an awful and cruel sight” took the time to justify his shipmates’ actions in a private journal.[153] Captain George Giffard’s callous 1892 *Reminiscences of a Naval Officer*, on the other hand, explicitly validated Napier’s suspicions that his captains would vent their frustrations through “wanton destruction” of property and targets “not worth going after” if left to their own devices.[154] Although officers including George Biddlecombe were still attempting to defend the fleet’s actions in 1878 by asking, “what would have been the state of any English port or town if the Russians could have entered it?”[155] these rationalizations were telling. Nicholas I, meanwhile, simply wrote “thugs” on reports of British activities.[156]

A similarly destructive encounter occurred two days later at Uleåborg (Oulu), approximately 60 kilometers north of Brahestad. A slightly larger force of 8 boats and 328 sailors and marines discovered numerous scuttled merchant vessels along with storehouses that “were for the most part cleared out.”[157] This description, however, was completely at odds with the abnormally large amount of tar stored thanks to an 1853 surplus and a wartime drop in prices.[158] According to Cree, a nighttime raid “soon made such a blaze as illuminated the country for many miles round.”[159] “A more destructive

fire than at Brahestad,"[160] incinerated what local resident Carl Johan Nyström described as "all the ships and wood" and 50,000 to 60,000 barrels of tar.[161] Nevertheless, Lieutenant Priest spared Uleåborg's town center when he decided not to burn an empty Cossack barracks "as its destruction by fire would have involved the burning of a large number of private houses, if not the whole town."[162]

Captain George Giffard, on the other hand, did not share his subordinate's magnanimity. Giffard proudly recounted threatening to "lay the town in ashes" and "send a 10 inch shell into the church" to prove that his frigates could cover the approach of small boats, deeming the gesture a potential "mark of our regard."[163] According to Uleåborg's governor, though, British forces ended up firing only three shots during the entire operation, all aimed at coastal residents attempting to save forest products or rafts from incineration.[164] Dr. Cree was thus overly optimistic when recounting that a shipment of fresh provisions "showed that the Finlanders had no ill feeling against us";[165] as Elmgren noted that "the damage wrought by Plumridge brought alive a belligerent Finnish spirit."[166] The only casualties of both raids were ice damage to the *Valorous*' paddlewheels and the loss of one crewman, who had fallen into a drunken sleep inside a Uleåborg warehouse burned by his countrymen.[167] Similar landings at Torneå (Tornio) and the Kemi River's mouth, both at the extreme north of the Gulf near the Finno-Swedish border, also proceeded smoothly for the British. This changed dramatically less than a week later, on June 7, when small boats entered the difficult-to-approach harbor of Gamla Carleby (Kokkola) beyond the protective range of the larger frigates that launched them.

A week and a half after Plumridge's squadron first arrived off Gamla Carleby, Sir Charles Napier informed Vice Admiral Alexandre Ferdinand Parseval-Deschênes that it had suffered a "disastrous failure."[168] Acting on reports that "a small screw steamer" was moored in the vicinity, Plumridge dispatched the *Vulture* and *Odin* to "operate on" Gamla Carleby, a coastal town south of Brahestad and Uleåborg.[169] The British ships delayed active operations for a day due to inclement weather, which was a fatal mistake. Alerted by telegraph, Russian commanders rushed infantry companies and artillery to the assistance of local Finnish marksmen.[170] Unaware of this development, Captain Frederick Glasse of the *Vulture* anchored four miles out to sea and launched small boats[171] after his spyglass revealed "no Castle, Fort, or defences" protecting the town.[172] Two hundred and fifty-two British officers and men initially stayed offshore, while Lieutenant Charles Arthur Wise landed under a flag of truce to parlay

with a delegation including the town's vice mayor, Berndt Roos, most prominent merchant, Anders Donner, and two Finnish shipmasters acting as interpreters.[173] Wise deemed their refusal to allow British forces to land "impudent"[174] and threatened to burn the town, but Russian infantry, two field artillery guns, and approximately 100 local volunteers summarily ambushed the approaching British boats from behind the cover of seaside planks and warehouses.[175] With these local volunteers especially "sure shots through their annual seal hunting,"[176] even Finnish observers described the ensuing results as "awful" for the British.[177]

Lieutenant Wise's notation that he "deemed it expedient to withdraw,"[178] failed to adequately describe a defeat that saw the British lose the *Vulture*'s paddle box boat,[179] 21 prisoners, and more than 50 casualties.[180] Celebrated local marksman Matts Kanokken shot one boat's commander—Lieutenant Edward Murray Carrington—through the head, while British return fire sailed high and only succeeded in killing an artillery horse.[181] Forty-five minutes after the engagement commenced, British survivors rowed away without *Vulture*'s paddle box boat, which snagged on an old shipwreck and delivered more than 20 prisoners huddled in the water and blood that filled its bottom.[182] The *Odin* and *Vulture* were unable to cross a shallow bar at the mouth of Gamla Carelby's harbor, and Captain Glasse wisely judged further operations "impracticable" after Wise detected two whole regiments of infantry taking positions and building protective earthworks.[183] Plumridge was left to conclude from a distance "that this serious catastrophe has resulted from surprise, and a subsequent want of suitable management"[184] and reject as "inadvisable" Captain George Giffard's conclusion that the British should return and "punish" the town.[185] As limited details of the incident reached Helsinki, observers including Elmgren concluded that the most important consequence was that "Gamla Carleby was saved, at least for now."[186] Russian authorities, on the other hand, were gratified that the British had been "punished for their impudent atrocities" at Brahestad and Uleåborg, though interrogations revealed that British prisoners were "not aware" of why their squadron had even been detached so far north in the Bay of Bothnia.[187]

CHAPTER 4

Bomarsund, Sweden, and Sweaborg

The Russo-Finnish victory at Gamla Carleby undeniably resulted from Captain Glasse's tactical error, which was acknowledged by Plumridge, Napier, and even Parseval-Deschênes. Yet the French vice admiral raised several analytical points in his initial meeting with Napier on June 18, 1854. Parseval-Deschênes wondered why the British were occupying themselves with "*petites affaires* rather than using their forces to strike *grands coups*," or great blows, against targets such as Cronstadt.[1] The French commander attributed Napier's persistence in his opinion to the "well-known" English tradition of destroying commerce and mentioned that it would be advantageous to spare the Finnish people's interests so that they would make common cause with the Allied fleets.[2] Napier was also dissatisfied with Plumridge's actions because they distracted from "the principal part" of the Plumridge's mission, which involved providing "concrete information on the navigation and defences of Åland and Åbo."[3] This particular mandate, in fact, allowed Parseval-Deschênes to realize that Napier had more important concerns than coastal raids on small towns.

The French vice admiral found it easy to deduce from Napier's instructions and frequent British Admiralty letters that the British government was principally interested in capturing the Russian fortress of Bomarsund in the Åland Islands.[4] The meeting's focus accordingly shifted to resolving personal and professional differences, including which major Russian position to first reconnoiter in preparation for an attack. Debates over the morality of British actions in the Gulf of Bothnia were thus left to politicians, subsequent historians, and the press, much to the disadvantage of the Royal Navy's reputation at home and in Scandinavia.[5]

Reputations were also important factors in the joint decision making of Allied naval commanders. Parseval-Deschênes disliked Sir Charles Napier prior to even meeting him,[6] while Napier, blithely thought Parseval-Deschênes a "pleasant man" who elicited "no doubt

that we will act well together."[7] The French vice admiral hardly relished his dependence on Napier for strategy and ironically ended up criticizing Napier for indecisiveness rather than any reported aggressiveness or abrasive interpersonal style. Despite their personal differences, however, both men made overcoming "petty national rivalries" a priority.[8] Parseval-Deschênes accepted Napier's assessment of Sweaborg's strength sight-unseen, but convinced Sir Charles to reconnoiter Cronstadt rather than Bomarsund.[9] The two nations' warships accordingly departed together on June 21,[10] though the French line-of-battle ships were heavily outnumbered by their British counterparts and were not propelled by steam.[11] This set the tone for the rest of the campaign. Parseval-Deschênes lamented that his squadron's numerical inferiority, coupled with lack of instructions from Paris, left him completely dependent on an indecisive Napier for strategy, which was humiliatingly reported by both English and French newspapers.[12] Regardless of his feelings, though, the French vice admiral did play an important role in the debates over the vulnerability of Cronstadt and Sweaborg to attack by sea. Both issues remained major points of contention until the Baltic began to freeze and the Allied fleet withdrew.

Close reconnaissance revealed that Cronstadt's fortifications were every bit as daunting as Captain John Washington and others had reported. Royal Engineers' translations of Prussian maps, reports, and diagrams from the mid-1820s graphically depicted not only Cronstadt's fortresses and the ranges of their guns, but also placed these details in context by showing how they covered the two channels through which Allied warships would have to pass.[13] More recent depictions of the same details illustrated the interlocking fields of large-caliber shellfire that blanketed the deeper South Channel and the obstructions barring access to the North Channel.[14] The British and by extension the French also had the advantage of a detailed series of watercolors and observations relating to each individual Russian fortress. These were written and drawn by officers on the *Odin* in 1851, when their ship carried Ambassador Sir Hamilton Seymour to St. Petersburg.[15]

Sir James Graham did not require additional evidence in support of his already pessimistic view of attacking Cronstadt with the resources available in mid-1854, but the Admiralty forwarded copies to Napier anyway.[16] These "agree(d) so well with"[17] the onsite assessments of both the British and French vice admirals and Captain Bartholomew Sulivan, who noted Cronstadt's extensive fortifications and the Russian battleships moored in supportive positions behind them.[18]

Interpreter General Henry Crowe, meanwhile, privately noted that anyone who “attempted an attack by sea, without a land force to support him would indeed justly be called foolhardy and likely get a good licking in the bargain.”[19] The well-connected interpreter then added that any attack on this “hornet’s nest” “would be useless and a failure,” resulting in “damaged ships and (the) loss of innumerable lives.”[20]

The issue of attacking Cronstadt was twofold. The first consideration involved the strength of Russian positions and supporting fleet units. The second and equally important consideration necessitated evaluating the strength of these Russian defenses against the means available to attack them. Parseval-Deschênes informed his superiors in Paris that taking Cronstadt required a land operation and a fleet of steam-powered gunboats and mortar vessels capable of operating in shallow waters.[21] These vessels were not forthcoming in 1854, which did not escape the notice of Conservative politician and former governor-general of India Lord Ellenborough. A week prior to the Allied fleet’s departure for Cronstadt, his lordship, a close friend of Napier, delivered a scathing denunciation of the Aberdeen government’s expenditures on “trifling or ornamental articles.”[22] These included increases for the British Museum and facilities (Burlington House) to support Learned Societies such as the Royal Astronomical Society and Geological Society of London.[23]

Lord Ellenborough calculated that these sums would have purchased 98 shallow-draught steam gunboats that “might have taken Sweaborg and destroyed Cronstadt” if sent to the Baltic.[24] The balance of Ellenborough’s speech revealed his remarkably perceptive assessment of factors that eluded Sir James Graham and other members of Aberdeen’s cabinet while haunting Allied efforts in the Baltic and elsewhere. It cited “statesmens’ objects in the war” that “were not objects visible to the people,” and rhetorically wondered “if the contest should not be characterized by brilliant and decisive successes from time to time to animate the people, can we expect that their constancy will be maintained?”[25] Sure enough, British public impatience at the lack of success against Cronstadt and Sweaborg validated Ellenborough’s point within a few months.

Unlike the Allied fleet’s initial assessment of Cronstadt, early reconnaissance of Sweaborg was revisited in earnest only toward the end of the 1854 Baltic campaign. Controversy began soon after British warships entered the Baltic in April, but was confined to a small circle of high-ranking British officers. (British) Foreign office intelligence reports[26] and early reconnaissance raised the possibility

that the Russian Fleet's Sweaborg division had been frozen outside of Helsinki Harbor. Napier's discontented battleship captains lost no time in blaming their chief for not rushing to destroy these warships while they were outside the range of Russian shore batteries. The arguments of even Napier's most ardent detractors, however, were markedly ambivalent, as were the corresponding conclusions of some historians.[27] Lord Clarence Paget of the *Princess Royal* concluded that "it has never yet been positively ascertained . . . whether the Russian squadron were out or inside of Helsingfors."[28] His fellow captain Henry Codrington added in a letter to his sister that he did not "wish it mentioned" because he had "hear(d) on the other tack that they have never been outside Sveaborg at all."[29] Historian Andrew Lambert's thorough presentation of available evidence, though, goes a long way toward resolving any historiographical uncertainty by citing Rear Admiral Plumridge's note that there was no ice in the vicinity of where the Russian Division was supposedly trapped.[30] At any rate, the issue had not become a public dispute in 1854 because, in Captain Paget's words, "the Press were not made acquainted with the details."[31] This limited controversy merely foreshadowed the significantly more serious debate over assaulting Sweaborg that marred the closing months of 1854 for both the British and French fleets.

Completing Parseval-Deschênes' request to reconnoiter Cronstadt freed Napier to turn his fleet's attention to Bomarsund. The French fleet in particular was encouraged to leave Cronstadt after an outbreak of cholera,[32] an infectious disease related to contaminated food or drinking water. France's naval commanders also had to defer to their British counterparts both by numerical inferiority and lack of instructions from Napoleon III.[33] Parseval-Deschênes wanted to visit Revel next, but instead resigned himself to follow the British to the Åland Islands. This Swedish-speaking archipelago of hundreds of mostly uninhabited islands between Finland and Sweden had been conquered by Russia in 1808 and afterward fortified in direct violation of the 1809 Russo-Swedish Treaty of Fredrikshamn (Hamina). By late June of 1854, the British cabinet and Prince Consort Albert, Queen Victoria's husband, had decided over the objections of Sir James Graham that the Åland Islands should be reconquered by Allied forces, even if that meant requesting French troops.[34] Together with heavy artillery and fleet gunfire support, these troops would be capable of conducting a proper siege of Bomarsund.

Russia's stronghold in the Åland Islands, Bomarsund was designed to control the principal approach to Lumpar Bay. Construction began in 1830, but only a casemated main fort of granite-faced brick and

three outlying towers were complete by 1854.[35] The result was a far cry from the massive fortress complex initially envisioned by Russian planners and did little to allay the 1828 concerns of then governor-general Arsenii Zakrevski about the vulnerability of Russian forces in the archipelago.[36] Even Nicholas I realized that its garrison was "small in numbers and could be put in a difficult situation" if cut off from the Finnish mainland.[37] The Russian Emperor's assessment came to fruition in mid-August 1854. It had been foreshadowed on June 22 of that year when Captain William Hutcheon Hall led three vessels into Lumpar Bay and opened fire on the Bomarsund's main fort.

Although this was not the first time that an officer under Rear Admiral James Hanway Plumridge's command had acted rashly, such an impulsive bombardment wasted more in ammunition than it did in lives. Captain Hall won fame in command of British East India Company's steamship *Nemesis* in action during the first Anglo-Chinese (First Opium) War of 1839–1842.[38] A decade later, however, Hall was overqualified to command the *Hecla*, a modest paddle-steamer mounting a tiny fraction of the guns carried by a ship-of-the-line. Following his squadron's aforementioned voyages in the Gulf of Bothnia, Plumridge ventured off Cronstadt to meet with Napier and the main Allied fleet. This left Hall as the senior officer in command of *Odin*, *Valorous*, and *Hecla*. He accordingly took full advantage by exceeding his orders and opening fire on Russian positions as soon as his squadron came within range on the afternoon of June 22. The British ships' supply of explosive shells and solid shot bounced harmlessly off Bomarsund's granite-faced brick walls while setting fire to minor wooden outbuildings and a wooden roof designed to shield the masonry from snow. The squadron then withdrew a few hours later as Hall began composing pretentious dispatches including lines such as "if that success was taken advantage of immediately, the result would be the capitulation of the Island of Åland."[39] He added that "the forts must have suffered greatly . . . if we may judge from the awfully grand appearance of the flames when the squadron left."[40] Hall's commentary differed greatly from more circumspect observers. Bartholomew Sulivan, for one, accurately deduced that "one might as well have thrown peas at the fort" and pointed out that the Russians derisively painted black marks near each hit on the fortress because the damage was otherwise difficult to observe.[41]

With "a wonderful view of the battle" from his post in command of Fort Notvik (Nottich or Tower U), Finnish captain Emil Leopold Melart observed that the fortress suffered almost no damage apart

from a dented roof.[42] Napier took the incident as a frustrating waste of ammunition and further confirmation that captains such as Hall could not be trusted to act independently in squadrons detached from the main fleet. The vice admiral did, however, praise the bravery of Mate Charles Lucas in throwing a live Russian shell overboard. This action won Lucas the first Victoria Cross ever awarded,[43] and Sir James Graham exploited the whole incident for political gain. An embittered Napier subsequently observed that the incident was a "godsend to the Government at the moment: as, provided something is done, the public is not over particular in inquiring how or where, or whether by order or not, though this is of the first importance in the conduct of a fleet."[44]

Bomarsund's initial good fortune soon vanished as Napoleon III responded to the Aberdeen government's request to dispatch a French expeditionary force to the Baltic. The embarkation of 10,000 French troops under Major General, or *Général de Division*, Achille Baraguey (Baraguay) d'Hilliers, was originally scheduled for July 13, but encountered several delays. Logistical problems abounded when loading French soldiers onto British transports.[45] Furthermore, the embarkation process was complicated by a French request to switch the departure point from Cherbourg to Calais to lessen any potential strain on the still-expanding French railway network.[46] The change did little to allay the Francophobic inclinations of Sir James Graham or Sir Charles Napier,[47] but French troops and equipment along with a modest contingent of British combat engineers under Brigadier General Sir Harry David Jones nevertheless arrived in Lumpar Bay in early August. Here, they joined an Allied fleet that had awaited them since departing from its position in command of the Gulf of Finland. Detached naval squadrons, meanwhile, watched Sweaborg, blockaded the Åland Islands rather than the Gulf of Bothnia, and maintained a presence in the Gulf of Riga. A seamless rendezvous with the main Allied fleet, however, remained possible after Napier wisely altered Sir James Graham's instructions to transfer the French troops into small steamships two hundred miles south of the Åland Islands.[48] The French received the "whole of the material of their siege train" on August 5,[49] and landing operations commenced unopposed several days later.

Vice Admiral Napier, to put it charitably, was less than candid in reporting "that the greatest cordiality has existed between Major General Baraguay d'Hilliers, Vice Admiral Parseval and myself during this our first operation."[50] Both senior Allied naval commanders were annoyed with one another and at the dispatch of so many French

troops, albeit for completely different reasons. Parseval-Deschênes was upset that Napier had ignored his preference for visiting Revel after Cronstadt and at Napoleon III's preference for communicating through the British government and General Baraguay d'Hilliers.[51] Although the French vice admiral undeniably harbored an immense personal dislike for his British counterpart, Parseval-Deschênes' complaints stemmed from deeper issues than personal conflict alone. His complaints that the British press and even d'Hilliers often failed to acknowledge the French Navy's contributions to the Baltic campaign betrayed Parseval-Deschênes' underlying fear that Britain's numerical and technological superiority in warships threatened to marginalize France's contributions in the Baltic. Napier, for his part, was forced to accommodate his French counterpart's concerns and accept the assistance of a French expeditionary force that he believed to be "too many for Åland, and too few for anything else."[52] Even Major General d'Hilliers only wanted 1,000 troops, or one-tenth of the available total, to be landed for an attack on a fortress Parseval-Deschênes deemed imposing by sea but vulnerable by land.[53]

Bomarsund's isolation from potential reinforcements on the Finnish mainland made the fortress' August 16 surrender a foregone conclusion. Bomarsund's commandant, Major General Jakob Bodisco immediately dispatched visiting Captain Nikolay Vasilyevich Shensin to St. Petersburg to convey Bodisco's assessment on the "doubtfulness of a successful outcome against the combined attack of huge forces from the ground and sea routes."[54] The Czar, meanwhile, had already noted the garrison's "weakness" on orders indicating that its strength was designed "only" to repel a naval attack "without any landing forces."[55] Bomarsund's final orders, recently delivered by Shensin from St. Petersburg, assumed the garrison would face attack from the sea.[56] Despite Nicholas I's private assessment that the fort could only resist "for about ten days,"[57] obtaining the Russian garrison's surrender would require the Allied landing force to take multiple steps. The first demanded that Anglo-French warships and transports locate an alternate passage into Lumpar Bay than the one covered by the main fortress and two outlying towers, Forts Novik and Prästö (Presto or Tower Z).

Attacking these works plus a third tower, Bränklint (Fort Tzee or Tower C), involved landing men, artillery, and supplies in position to overcome two towers before turning on the main Russian fort. Finally arose questions of arranging the transportation and accommodation of prisoners, conducting gunnery trials, and demolishing the main fort after determining that the Swedish-Norwegian government was

not immediately entering the war. The Allies accomplished each of these in under two weeks, with varying degrees of difficulties, and casualties on all sides were light until a cholera outbreak. Conflict among commanders and competing ideas related to topics such as the effectiveness of warships against shore fortifications, however, continued to flare long after Bomarsund and its surroundings had been left in "ruins," useful only as a site for scavenging construction material.[58]

Threading the Åland Islands' narrow passages with a long ribbon of large ships was a difficult task; even a Finnish captain stationed in Bomarsund admitted that the Allied fleet's arrival in waters that the garrison considered inaccessible was "proof of the high accuracy of the enemy's surveying."[59] Unbeknownst to British and French forces, senior Finnish officer Colonel Sten Knut Johan Furuhjelm (Furuhelm) had approved a plan to attack Allied warships by setting peasant vessels on fire.[60] Local inhabitants had already scuttled their vessels "to save them from enemy violence," though, and Russian planners abandoned the effort as "futile."[61] Instead, orderly single-file lines of British and French warships could be accurately illustrated in publications including the *Illustrated London News* and *L'Illustration, Journal Universel*. Such images were often courtesy of professional artists, including Sir Oswald Brierly in addition to talented military artists, which included the surgeon and amateur watercolorist Dr. Edward Hodges Cree. Sketches, paintings, and other artwork were especially important to all of the Crimean War's naval campaigns because combat photography was still in its extreme infancy and was ill-suited to capture action and events in distant theaters.

A different perspective on operations in the Åland Islands came from young British noblemen following their country's fleet in several private yachts, especially Reverend Robert Edgar Hughes and Frederick Temple Blackwood, Lord Dufferin. Reverend Hughes, for one, praised Sulivan's surveying accomplishments before denigrating all the Russian figures he described.[62] Hughes jauntily recorded observations such as his brother's remark that Russian corpses were "the first Russians that I have seen clean and sober yet," while comparing these defeated opponents to unclean animals and vermin.[63] Anglo-French forces had to complete the necessary preparations for attacking Russian positions, though, before Hughes could make these observations.

A joint reconnaissance mission on August 1, 1854 saw Bomarsund "shot tremendously with spy-glasses" and "carried off every bit on paper" as Allied officers recorded specific details.[64] Four days later,

French siege artillery and sappers arrived, albeit belatedly. With these preparatory tasks complete, French and British forces landed at two locations outside the range of Russian cannons on the August 8.[65] With all outlying troops already withdrawn to Bomarsund's fortifications, Russian forces in Fort Notvik remained "unaware" of the Allies' proximity until alerted by a soldier's wife returning from the countryside a full day after French artillery had opened fire on the westernmost Russian tower of Brännklint.[66] The landing process and subsequent Allied maneuvers, in fact, were so removed from the threat of a Russian attack that bands preceded Allied forces and loudly played popular songs.[67] As Lord Dufferin remembered years later:

> It was a lovely sunshiny morning; the air was loaded with the wholesome smell of the pine woods which clothed the valleys; and, as we passed upward through the heathery, rock-strewn slopes, wildflowers, butterflies, the hum of bees, and the odour of the sweet-scented shrubs, encompassed us with a sense of peace and beauty which contrasted strangely with the violence of the drama in which we were about to engage.[68]

On the day of the landing, French forces initially bombarded the strategically located Russian tower of Brännklint, commanded by Captain Karl Alexander Joakim Teche (Tesche).[69] Although heavy French artillery did not succeed in immediately breaching the emplacement's granite-faced brick walls, it did keep Finnish-Russian snipers from assuming rooftop positions.[70] The latter accomplishment allowed a swarm of French *chasseurs*, or light infantry troops, to pour in a highly accurate rifle fire.[71] Tesche hazarded forays to and from Bomarsund's main fortification to confer with his superiors while "looking very depressed from fatigue and concerns," but concluded that French pressure was "overwhelming."[72] With the tower and its guns damaged beyond hope of repair, its commander drew his sword and led a mostly successful retreat to the main fortress before being bayoneted and imprisoned on August 14.[73] French troops captured 32 Russian soldiers, while 140 more defenders managed to withdraw to Bomarsund's fortress.[74] Brännklint Tower caught fire and exploded soon thereafter, as Allied attention turned to the western Notvik Tower, or Fort Nottich. A small section of Brännklint's wall remained intact, shielding Allied observers, including Sulivan, who had ventured too close to the burning tower while validating the observation that "there was not a spot big enough to lay your hand on that was not marked by their (French *chasseurs*') murdering bullets."[75]

Significantly larger projectiles soon presented Notvik Tower's garrison, in its commander's words, with two choices: "be blown up or . . . surrender."[76] Notvik lay to the north of both Brännklint and Bomarsund, and was designed to project its strength seaward. Instead, an improvised landward British artillery battery originally intended to support French efforts against Fort Brännklint blasted away the emplacement's protective outer wall.[77] This positioning meant that only 5 of Notvik's 17 guns could return fire even before sustaining damage.[78] Conditions inside the tower rapidly deteriorated over the next three days, as corpses piled up in hallways, water supplies went bad, and wounded men endured "awful" conditions with no doctors and inadequate medical supplies.[79] 32-pound British guns mounted on a nearby hill made a gaping hole in the tower's walls that observers described as large enough to admit a coach and team of horses or even an 8-ton yacht.[80] Fort Notvik and its entire garrison surrendered on August 15 after its ammunition magazine narrowly escaped destruction, and British fire was so intense that it was difficult for defenders to even extend a handkerchief acting as a white flag.[81] Russian forces were thus left to destroy their arms and request a British doctor, who was "surprised at the squalor that faced him" inside the ruined tower.[82] In keeping with a British captain's subsequent assurances to Melart that "it was governments that were at war, not individuals," officers from both sides enjoyed tea, cognac, and a musical performance inside the captured tower.[83] Russia's linen-shrouded dead, meanwhile, were left for observation by visitors such as Hughes, who wondered in an introspective moment what "these poor fellows know or care about the Turkish question?"[84]

The Allies' successful landing and assault on the Brännklint and Notvik Towers placed Major General Bodisco and the remainder of his garrison in the main fortress of Bomarsund and Prästö Tower in an untenable strategic position. In a unique reversal of the dynamics that normally characterized Allied naval campaigns during the Crimean War, geography favored Bomarsund's attackers once they successfully navigated the Åland Island's intricate passages. Britain's and France's complete naval superiority meant that the Russians could not receive reinforcements. The Allies, meanwhile, could methodically maneuver cannons and mortars into protected positions on high ground overlooking the doomed fortress. Bomarsund's last orders called for the garrison to destroy its fortifications before starting a guerrilla war or crossing back to Finland at Åbo.[85] Both sides acknowledged that Bomarsund was more resistant to naval bombardment than landward siege, and its garrison was left to hope for an opportunity to

distinguish itself in hand-to-hand combat.[86] During the surrender negotiations of August 16, however, Baraguey d'Hilliers explained to his Russian counterpart that the latter's men would have "waited in vain" because d'Hilliers was constructing batteries whose fire would have ensured that "not one stone of the fortress would be left standing on another."[87] A-soon-to-be captured Russian officer, Ivan Ivanovich Zhukov, also astutely pointed out that

> Assuming we had still made a sortie; how could it have reached an Allied battery? Which battery? We were not aware of the position of the batteries and we could not see their embrasures. The whole terrain was covered with rocky ravines...with the enemy easily adjusting.[88]

After witnessing what Zhukov described as a "continuous and useless loss of men and wishing to save the remaining ones,"[89] Major General Bodisco solicited the advice of trusted subordinates such as Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Tamelander. This trusted subordinate did not hesitate to assess with "absolute conviction that, after the surrender of two towers, [Bomarsund] could not withstand a heavy and long siege."[90] Shortly thereafter, Bodisco surrendered the fortress and sent orders that Prästö Tower should also surrender before it was destroyed.[91] The order was not immediately obeyed, but was finally acknowledged after several hours and a British naval bombardment. Back at the main fortress, on the other hand, Russian soldiers including Ivan Zagorodnikov "hardly had time" to assemble before "the French flag was flying at the the officer's annex and a double rank of French and English soldiers had surrounded us."[92] Bomarsund's surrender was so hasty, in fact, that French forces had to reclose its gates so that General Baraguay d'Hilliers could make what Dufferin described as "one of those clever *coups de théâtre* of which the French are such masters," by riding a white charger "amid the blare of clarions and the music of the bands" and amid "a blaze of staff uniforms."[93] Zagorodnikov thus was left to write in captivity and dream of preventing an Allied landing before driving British and French warships out of the Baltic.[94] Russian editors subsequently praised the accuracy and detail of Zagorodnikov's writing, but thought it "pretentious" that a nonofficer could be "not only literate, but a well-read man."[95]

Official reactions to Bodisco's decision varied. Nicholas I initially concluded from "private" and "enemy" sources that Bomarsund's defenders had "done their duty as far as possible,[96] though General Bodisco was eventually accused of cowardice for surrendering the main fort before it had been breached by Allied artillery. Prince Menshikov,

for example, responded to official assessment that Bomarsund had "fallen with honor" by opining that the garrison could have mounted a more vigorous defense.[97] Riga native and fortress mason Friedrich Rennenberg, released as a noncombatant shortly after the main fortress' fall, testified that Colonel Furuhjelm had been much more passionate than Bodisco about defending the fortress, resulting in a "heated" argument between them.[98] Even Rennenberg, however, was deemed "not aware of the circumstances which had preceded the surrender of the fortress and served as the reason for it" and could not produce any damning testimony against Bodisco.[99] Eventually, the Russian commander was exonerated by Alexander II and a commission of enquiry. As one influential Russian statesman remarked to Sulivan after the Treaty of Paris in 1856, Bodisco had shown great moral courage by risking his own reputation to save the lives of his defenceless soldiers while a weaker man would have held out until many had been killed for the sake of his own reputation.[100] The position of Russian forces in isolated emplacements, after all, had been so grim that they been "pickling" their dead in lime-filled casks, which created a "horrible spectacle" for British personnel who had mistaken the barrels for "salt provisions" before a lid came off and a "most obnoxious odor arose"[101] from this "very imperfect form of internment."[102]

The 2,255 prisoners taken by Anglo-French forces at Bomarsund[103] came at a small cost to the Allies, but an ensuing outbreak of cholera added considerably to the total number of French casualties and spread to the Islands' civilian population.[104] With French personnel butchering live animals inside their camps, relieving themselves on the spot rather than in latrines, and only partially burying bodies so that arms and legs remained visible above ground, the epidemic's source was not difficult to trace.[105] By that point, however, Russo-Finnish prisoners had already departed for internment in Britain and Frence. Although Senior Warrant Officer Wilhelm Vansen and Junior Medical Attendant August Kollin both escaped from confinement in the small town of Lewes and returned to Finland after twice being captured, their experience was atypical.[106] Their counterparts who remained in Lewes and the French city of Tours were left to interact with their captors, and note, to the surprise of Zhukov and others, that the British treated them with "absolute hospitality" while, by late 1855, the French "often asked themselves the question 'where is the end of this war?'"[107]

Matters could also have been much worse for the British Royal Navy after the *Penelope* ran aground 1,800 or 1,900 yards from Bomarsund

on August 10.[108] The warship had been assigned to draw Russian fire, but ran aground after Russian gunners, in Dufferin's words, "purposely lured us into our present position."[109] Matters were especially serious because the *Penelope* carried not only Dufferin, but also Sir James Graham's son Stanley, a young midshipman who received more than expected from Sir Charles Napier's query—"have you a mind to see a shot fired over you?"[110] A number of Allied warships and small boats immediately rushed to the helpless ship's assistance, and Napier ordered Rear Admiral Plumridge and Captain James Crawford Caffin to refloat the *Penelope* by whatever means necessary.[111] These included throwing heavy items including cannons overboard, after which the ship floated free and out of range. The only British warship destroyed by Russian forces during the Crimean War (the *Tiger*) had met a different fate after running aground in the Black Sea several months earlier, corroborating Caffin's observation that his ship's escape with only three casualties was "most providential."[112] Napier's account of the incident was highly defensive, but little came of an incident with few losses that came within a week of a widely reported Allied victory. More intense debate instead centered on two questions relating to the siege: how should the victorious Allies dispose of the fortress and the surrounding and to what extent had naval gunfire contributed to Bomarsund's fall.

The fortress complex's after-action fate depended on Oscar I and the government of Sweden-Norway. Drouyn de Lhuys and others in the Allied governments—including Clarendon and British ambassador to Stockholm, Arthur Magennis—hoped to "inspire" King Oscar with the prospect of reoccupying the Åland Islands for the first time in half a century and removing any threat to Stockholm from Bomarsund.[113] The King declined, just as he had indicated to Major General Baraguey d'Hilliers before the Allies had even taken Bomarsund. As d'Hilliers reported to Napoleon III, the Swedish-Norwegian Monarch felt that Swedish troops potentially occupying Åland "would be crushed by the Russians come the freeze" and would be impossible to resupply.[114] King Oscar also successfully resisted any pressure placed on his government by Swedish-Norwegian public opinion by reducing petitions from the Order of Peasants to an individual proposition that, to the regret of French ambassador to Stockholm Charles Victor Lobstein, "had no further development."[115] This dashed Napoleon III's hopes that the Allied troops in the Baltic would "attract Sweden to our alliance,"[116] and left Major General d'Hilliers to argue that taking further risks in 1854 would mean that the Allies would "pull chestnuts from the fire only to have Sweden

eat them" in the future.[117] The position of Sweden-Norway in August 1854 thus left the Allies free to demolish Bomarsund's walls, after gunnery expert and Rear Admiral Henry Ducie Chads conducted gunnery trials against them with the *Edinburgh* in early September.

Interpreting these trials' results was a controversial process that was rapidly engulfed by larger debates over the advisability of attacking major Russian fortifications. On September 4, 1854, the *Edinburgh* anchored 1,060 yards off Bomarsund and opened fire with both explosive shells and solid cannonballs on a section of the fortress that Allied demolition engineers had deliberately left standing for that purpose.[118] Chads then steered to within 500 yards and began firing a series of broadsides that caused Bomarsund's walls to crumble.[119] Although the trials conclusively demonstrated that heavy shot at close range could destroy shore fortifications, Chads and other circumspect figures immediatelye detected a number of serious issues for which the test did not account. As the French general of engineers Adolphe Niel noted, Brigadier General Harry Jones, Napier, and other senior naval officers such as the commander of Britain's Black Sea Fleet shared his opinion that "such a maneuver could not have taken place under the fire of the enemy: the ship and crew would have suffered too much."[120] Napier's correspondence with the Admiralty emphasized that Bomarsund's walls were mostly brick and only poorly faced with granite, consequently rendering their destruction "not astonishing."[121] The aristocratic captains who detested Napier, on the other hand, were more inclined to criticize the "stone wall and red hot shot disease" that they and other brash observers believed had prevented their fleet from engaging larger Russian fortifications with warships alone.[122] In the following three months, such observations played directly into the hands of Sir James Graham, who used them against Sir Charles Napier in assigning blame for the 1854 campaign's frustratingly indecisive conclusion.

Bomarsund's fall received widely favorable coverage in Western European newspapers,[123] but proved insufficient to independently satisfy the immense expectations that the British public in particular had for their fleet. Sir James Graham was acutely aware of this public discontent and accordingly altered his public and private correspondence with Napier and the Baltic Fleet. Letters from Graham and other Admiralty lords, especially Sir Maurice Berkeley, once commended Napier's caution and pleaded with the vice admiral not to "knock his head against stone walls,"[124] but changed dramatically in the July weeks preceding Bomarsund's fall. Graham began issuing contradictory instructions, alternately suggesting that Napier attack

Sweaborg, Revel, or Åbo (Turku) and then praising the admiral's "prudence and sound judgment" for declining.[125] The extent of these contradictions becomes apparent with any examination of Graham and Berkeley's correspondence with Napier, who could hardly contain his temper when drafting replies after September 1854.[126] The vice admiral's conduct in the immediate aftermath of Bomarsund's fall temporarily remained cooperative, and British steamers reconnoitered the approaches to Åbo and its garrison on August 18.

The coastal city of Åbo, located on Finland's southwest coast across from the Åland Islands, served as Finland's capital under Swedish rule and remained the Grand Duchy's largest city for decades after 1809. Two forested islands protected Åbo's harbor in addition to man-made defenses, which combined with its location to make the city an excellent station for Russian gunboats.[127] Five of these Russian vessels from Helsingfors, in fact, had managed to slip through the Allied blockade in late June and moor in its harbor.[128] Åbo's significance was not lost on either side, and Russian intelligence indicated that the city could expect Allied warships after they finished at Bomarsund.[129] War Minister Dolgorukov, though, noted that it was "doubtful" the Allies would "dare to make any decisive attack against Sweaborg and Helsingfors" while concluding that Russian commanders "should rather fear for Abo."[130] "Reliable assurances" aside, Russia's inspector of Marine Pilots for the Åland Islands deemed these reports "false rumors" designed to conceal either an Allied attack on Sweaborg or a complete withdrawal from the Baltic.[131] Nicholas I agreed, and deemed the city's defense "worthy of special attention."[132] It was only in mid-September that Russian commanders in Finland reported to St. Petersburg that the Allies' dismissal of translators hired in the Åland Islands meant that they were not going to "undertake any actions against the Finnish mainland" in 1854.[133] Napier, meanwhile, dispatched a reconnaissance mission to compensate for Plumridge's earlier neglect and assess whether a fleet reinforced with the French troops who took Bomarsund could successfully attack the city.[134]

Captain Francis Scott of the *Odin*, assisted by the surveying commander Henry Otter and the *Alban*, led four vessels through passages so difficult that even relatively small steamers ran aground "frequently" when producing a detailed report on the port's defenses.[135] These details, in turn, emphatically contraindicated an assault by either Allied naval or ground forces. Scott and Otter discovered that two of the three possible channels leading to Åbo Harbor were dangerously shallow and strongly defended by gunboats, booms, chains, underwater piles, and concealed artillery batteries in addition to natural

obstacles such as rocks.[136] British reconnaissance also reported that 15,000 Russian troops were expected or had already arrived to defend the city, and Captain Scott opined that passing through any channel "must be attended with an immense sacrifice of life" to Russian small-arms fire.[137] Although this estimate of Russian troop strength was five times too high, orders to "arm good riflemen from Åbo" to "follow the recent example at Gamla Carleby" validated his conclusion.[138] Senior Allied commanders including Bartholomew Sulivan, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and the Brigadier-General Jones all agreed that a landing without direct naval support under such conditions "would have failed."[139]

No such unanimity existed when the Allies again contemplated assaulting Sweaborg, and the ensuing controversy proved fatal to an already strained relationship between Napier and Sir James Graham. Even minute differences of opinion became weapons in the hands of a first lord of the Admiralty who had determined that Napier alone would bear the brunt of public frustration. Graham skillfully leveraged the opinions of multiple figures on how best to attack Sweaborg in the fall of 1854 in order to deflect mounting public criticism. Sir James' approach shocked then angered not only Napier, but also Parseval-Deschênes and Baraguay d'Hilliers. Interpersonal difficulties began in earnest when the British Admiralty, on September 4, received a dispatch from Napier that included two reports by Brigadier General Jones on the feasibility of attacking Sweaborg and Revel. The British engineer had accompanied Parseval-Deschênes, d'Hilliers, and Niel on a voyage to Revel and Sweaborg so that French commanders could personally inspect both bases before France exited the Baltic for the winter. The French vice admiral and major general each agreed with Napier that neither fortified harbor invited attack late in the campaign season,[140] but Jones' report mentioned that a long-range bombardment that included a landing and "large rockets" might succeed in setting Sweaborg's wooden buildings on fire.[141] Napier felt that Jones' observation, sans the latter's plan for landing 5,000 men, corresponded with his own plan for assaulting Sweaborg, written "some time ago."[142] Sir Charles therefore duly forwarded Jones' report with the expectation that it would corroborate his own assessment of Sweaborg as well as those of Parseval-Deschênes and d'Hilliers. Events quickly proved otherwise.

Jones wrote his report on Sweaborg while on board the *Lightning* as it returned from carrying the engineer and senior French officers to Revel and Sweaborg on August 24 and 27, respectively. The engineer freely admitted that Sweaborg's position was "naturally a very strong

one and not open to regular attack," while carefully qualifying his observations as "merely an outline of what is feasible, practicable, and of easy execution."[143] Graham was nevertheless grasping at straws in the hope of avoiding public criticism, and honed in on two details from Jones' plan: the possibility of landing 5,000 men on nearby Bak Holmen Island and the possibility of completing an attack in no more than a week. The first lord chose to ignore Jones' call for heavy batteries of mortars and large rockets along with the even more pressing detail that Napoleon III considered the season for Baltic operations over and had ordered Major General d'Hilliers to withdraw his cholera-ravaged expeditionary force on August 30.[144] Worse yet for the prospect of cordial Allied command relationships for the campaign's remaining months, Graham took a similar approach in interpreting the French engineering general Niel's remarks. Sir James again ignored Niel's opinion that Jones' push for landing on Bak Holmen was "useless in the one case, insufficient and dangerous in the other," that the operation was "rash," and that ships are "very easy to be set on fire."[145] Instead, the first lord isolated Niel's assessment that Sweaborg could be ruined in less than two hours by concentrated broadsides delivered at close range[146] while ignoring the French engineer's assertion that "it does not come within my province to advise it." Despite Napier's August 29 assessment that broaching the possibility of assaulting Åbo, much less Sweaborg, "would lead to discussion which would lead to nothing,"[147] Graham forced him to hold three different conferences with his senior commanders and their French counterparts in September; the results only validated Napier's position.[148] Irrespective of the large mass of supporting evidence and the opinions available to Napier at sea, the British vice admiral was losing ground at home thanks to a multifaceted smear campaign orchestrated by Graham.

Personal conflict among Graham, Napier, and the French commanders caught in the crossfire was hugely significant because it cut to the heart of an expansive range of issues at stake for the Allies during the Crimean War. The Aberdeen cabinet's weakness and divisions allowed Graham to assume an unusual degree of control over war-planning and operations. This was further magnified by Napoleon III's designs, which included dispatching troops to Bomarsund but not closely coordinating with Parseval-Deschênes and France's sailing battle fleet. Furthermore, debate over attacking Sweaborg highlighted the evils of a joint command divided not only by nationality but also by service: subsequent chapters demonstrate how these divisions between Allies and among officers also

hampered operations in the Pacific. Finally and most importantly was the sentiment that still dominates how the Crimean conflict is perceived: frustration. By September 1854, press, public, and aristocratic warship captains were "getting uproarious because nobody is killed and wounded" and "because Cronstadt etc. and Sevastopol have not been captured."[149] These sentiments combined to motivate Graham to use his position at the Admiralty to mercilessly press Napier for results that both men knew were impossible to obtain. Contrary to Napier's reputation, however, no rash actions ensued and the damages inflicted in September, October, and November 1854 ruined reputations rather than warships or fortifications.

All three mid-September Councils of War ordered by Graham ended up confirming the joint opinion of Vice Admirals Napier and Parseval-Deschênes that further operations that year in the Baltic were impracticable. Parseval-Deschênes, for instance, was furious with Niel for "spreading a total misunderstanding of naval combat."[150] Although the French vice admiral was equally displeased at Baraguay d'Hilliers' attitude,[151] the French major general emphatically supported both Allied vice admirals by withdrawing his troops before the second and third councils. Likewise, Parseval-Deschênes declined to attend the third council on the grounds that he had already twice given his opinion that Sweaborg should not be attacked because the Allies had flammable wooden battleships rather than specialized gunboats and mortar vessels.[152] Napier's account of the first council's proceedings was especially revealing. The vice admiral mentioned "a good deal of dissatisfaction in England that more was not done," but adamantly resolved to never "lend myself to any absurd projects, or be driven to attempt what is not practicable, by newspaper writers who, I am sorry to say, I have reason to believe are in correspondence with officers of the fleet, who ought to know better."[153] Even the unanimous opinion of Napier, Parseval-Deschênes, and three rear admirals, including Chads, mattered little to Graham, who was busy building a case that Napier's timidity rather than his own lack of planning was responsible for an absence of resounding successes against Russia in 1854.

Graham's stranglehold on information passing through the Admiralty afforded him considerable advantages in a battle for public opinion, subsequently overshadowed by the Aberdeen cabinet's February 1855 fall. The first lord enjoyed the luxury of disingenuously selecting minor details from correspondence and presenting them completely out of context with no opportunity for rebuttal. Furthermore, Graham did not hesitate to issue entirely contradictory orders, which alternately praised Napier for his caution and prudence

before questioning the vice admiral's courage. Graham also skillfully employed the correspondence of captains, including Clarence Paget and Henry Codrington, who deemed their commander an "old lady" and saw their year in the Baltic as "a bad professional dream."[154] Paget's letters found their way to Secretary of State for War Lord Newcastle. The war secretary, in turn, forwarded extracts to Graham that struggled to reconcile Newcastle's conflicting desire to demonstrate a commitment to action while simultaneously ensuring that there would be no "useless waste of life . . . even to please the British Public."[155] Graham next exploited a fabricated controversy over the exact date of the fleet's withdrawal from the Baltic to discredit Napier with other ministers, including Foreign Secretary Clarendon and Viscount Palmerston, still home secretary and soon prime minister.[156] These ministers' newly unfavorable opinion, coupled with public dissatisfaction, persuaded even erstwhile friends and allies of Napier such as *Times* editor John Thaddeus Delane to abandon their public support of the vice admiral's conduct. Napier's command was politically finished several months prior to receiving an order to haul down his flag on December 22.[157]

Napier was hardly blameless throughout the campaign. Fortunately for the men he commanded, however, the vice admiral's faults lay more with his interpersonal choices than his military ones. Napier's erstwhile supporter and First Sea Lord Berkeley, for instance, informed him on Christmas that "the Admiralty have not to my knowledge found fault with your acts: they do find fault with your writing."[158] Napier agreed, replying "you are quite right—it is the writing that has made the mischief and it will require more to unmake it."[159] Yet Napier was never able to unmake the damage stemming from the combination of his irascible nature with Graham's manipulation. In hindsight, Sir Charles made three serious errors in dealing with his counterparts in the Royal Navy in 1854. The first involved communicating with Sir James Graham rather than the entire Admiralty Board, which later gave Graham complete control and deniability. Napier's second mistake involved humiliating politically well-connected captains in public rather than patiently compensating for their lack of experience and judgment in private. The vice admiral's final error resulted from his generally poor ability to prioritize and therefore determine which issues and documents merited full disclosure to Sir James Graham. Napier could, but elected not to, take some satisfaction that his initial loss in the battle with Graham was assuaged after Aberdeen's cabinet lost a larger struggle to maintain public support and political power. Instead, the former commander spent the

remaining half-decade of his life locked in a bitter struggle to clear his name in the House of Commons and press.[160] Although partially successful, the process generated so much acrimony that issues of wider importance, especially strategic planning, were subsumed within a personal rather than a national debate.

Wartime conflicts of opinion were also subdued in Finland, though it is not "impossible to present documentary evidence" outlining Finnish opinion of the war.[161] Nevertheless, it is important to note that Finland's periodicals are actually less indicative of popular opinion than were details contained in secret Russian reports. Publications including Uleåborg's (Oulu's) *Olun Wiikko-Sanomia* carefully avoided in-depth reporting on sensitive topics involving government actions or the war.[162] Helsinki periodicals such as the *Helsingfors Tidningar*, *Suomentar*, and *Morgonbladet* were certainly allowed to criticize Plumridge's actions, but were also censored or required to translate content "word for word" from Russian publications.[163] Strict censorship, in the eyes of high-ranking St. Petersburg commanders, was especially necessary considering that coastal Finland was allegedly "populated not by the native Finns but by the Swedish settlers who have not yet lost sympathy for their fellow-countrymen in terms of descent, language, and faith, as well as Western philosophy."[164] Despite Finnish inhabitants' responsiveness to local officials and events such as Imperial visits, Russia remained concerned that the "spirit of the population" in Finland might be "openly hostile."[165] This concern led Berg's predecessor as governor-general of Finland, Platon Ivanovich Rokasovsky, to follow St. Petersburg's suggestion that he invite provincial governors to report "under strict secrecy . . . any facts worthy of attention regarding popular sentiments."[166] The effort was also undertaken because the rumors that did reach Russia's imperial capital were too vague for decision makers to have "any clear idea of which circumstances are at issue" or if grievances were economic or political.[167]

Reassuringly for Imperial Russia, provincial governors did not note significant popular dissatisfaction or any changes in the "general sentiments" of their provinces beyond "due comments and deliberations" on the contents of Swedish newspapers.[168] Although Vasa Governor Alexander von Rechenberg acknowledged the "indiscretion and stupid chatter of certain individuals who wish to demonstrate that they are following political developments," he confidently reported that these sentiments were unworthy of attention and "would not lead to anything."[169] Postal officials did seize a letter in which Karl Friestedt, a native Finn serving on board a French warship, made unflattering

references to his homeland as a "forced-labor camp," but this was an exception and was not accompanied by significant amounts of like-minded correspondence.[170]

The only substantive conclusion that Russian officials were able to draw from their surveillance was that Finns "sometimes deliberated about possible military operations" but were "predominantly" concerned with issues "regarding commercial affairs."[171] "Private conversations with pastors and local police officials," meanwhile, did reveal their fears that encouraging patriotism and a "militant spirit in the people" would not be conducive to "keeping peace and order among the local folks."[172] Official assessments questioning the loyalty of the "upper classes" throughout Russia's Baltic possessions also highlight the difficulties in determining a uniform popular reaction to the conflict, especially based on the correspondence of Finland's elite.[173] As Governor von Rechenberg emphasized, "newspapers are mostly read by people from higher estates" who were "able to discuss the news in a proper light."[174] Even after Britain's landings in the Gulf of Bothnia, a university student noted that an emotional wartime appeal to coastal peasants "did not get any response" and that it was "unclear" what the rural Finns "thought to themselves" during the "dead silence" that followed.[175] Nevertheless, Finns of all sociolinguistic backgrounds indisputably cared more about the Crimean War's potentially immediate impact on their homes than they did about "causes that have nothing to do with Finland."[176] It was common, in fact, for the Grand Duchy's inhabitants to wonder what Finland had "to do with the War's reasons" and how "Russia's power in the Orient or anywhere else is any of our business."[177] The same held true for residents of the Åland Islands, who would still be "unreliable . . . whether they were Russian, Swedish, English, or French subjects" because they, to quote reports reaching Russian authorities, were frugal by nature and took the side on "any occasion" from which it would be most likely to gain the "maximum profit."[178] Conflicting emotions including fear, relief, and enthusiasm waxed and waned between 1854 and 1856, but were closely related to circumstances such as potential danger to civilian property or a Russian imperial visit rather than clearly political or nationalistic ideologies.

The results of the 1854 Baltic campaign were as troubling to both sides. The Russian government learned that its expensively built and maintained fleet was utterly useless against screw-propelled Allied warships, though coastal fortifications did suffice to ward off attacks on Russia's largest harbors that year. Nicholas I was already privately admitting in October 1854 that "only God knows what will come in

Spring!" from a "strong expedition in the Baltic," particularly if the Allies succeeded in the Crimea.[179] The Anglo-French Fleet, meanwhile, had to accept that it was ill-equipped to mount assaults using battleships alone without incurring massive damage and casualties among their crews. Although this seemed a prescription for only small-scale actions and larger, frustrating stalemate, it is important to keep in mind that one side had the power to radically alter the balance of power evident in the Baltic campaigns of 1854 and 1855. Britain's industrial and financial resources allowed it to threaten Russia's straining Imperial government with the total destruction of its capital, fleet, and finances by 1856. This threat came independent of French assistance, but likely involved Swedish-Norwegian resources and even those of Denmark, Prussia, or Austria. The Baltic campaign of 1854 was not an insignificant precursor to the subsequent "great armament" and Treaty of Paris. The Allies instead built on their reconnaissance and frustration to ensure that their subsequent actions would not strike Finns as "unplanned and summary."[180] As Nicholas I, Grand Duke Konstantin, and Minister of War Menshikov all concluded by the end of 1854, "we definitely predict that next year the Anglo-French will be acting in the Baltic more decisively than this year."[181]

CHAPTER 5

Campaigns in the White Sea, 1854

Sixty years after the Crimean War's first naval campaigns, an unusual token of goodwill arrived in northern Russia. This icon of St. Michael the Archangel was Britain's to return after its seizure during the 1854 Anglo-French effort against Russia's northern coasts.[1] Contemporary participants and subsequent authors alike noted the considerable distance separating the White Sea and Murman Coast from the Crimean conflict's ostensible focal point around the Black Sea, albeit for markedly different reasons. A special issue of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, for example, featured Nicholas I's emphasis on the Allied decision to direct "their blows on such points as were more or less accessible to them" in the Baltic, White Sea, and the "far distant coasts of the Pacific Ocean."[2] The Czar astutely perceived that these campaigns demonstrated that Britain and France were not simply fighting to protect the Ottoman Empire, but this point was lost on some subsequent historians who incorrectly argued that such efforts were not "what Britain and France had gone to war *for*."[3] The primary Allied motive for dispatching warships to the White Sea was the same one that had initially attracted English merchant vessels during the sixteenth century—controlling trade.

The 1854 and 1855 Anglo-French campaigns in the White Sea are best seen as blockades designed to employ minimal resources so that larger fleet units could presumably be put to better use elsewhere. Even a decidedly small-scale conflict in the Czarist Empire's far north, though, had profoundly significant consequences that extended far beyond issues relating to blockading. This became especially apparent after Allied diplomats successfully leveraged a minor dispute involving Finmark[4] (Finnmark) and northern Finland in order to secure a decisive alliance with Sweden-Norway. Furthermore, the importance of White Sea sites including the Solovetsky Monastery in the eyes of the Eastern Orthodox Church meant that even half-hearted attacks

resonated throughout the Russian Empire and remained controversial for decades afterward in Britain.[5]

Neither the prospect of alliance with Sweden-Norway nor the ethical implications of bombarding a fortified monastery immediately concerned Captain Erasmus Ommanney as his modest squadron of one frigate and two sloops entered the White Sea on June 19, 1854.[6] Two French warships were unable to join them until mid-August.[7] Befitting his fellowship in Britain's Royal Geographical Society and his previous experience in searching for doomed Arctic explorer Sir John Franklin, Ommanney continually noted that environmental conditions varied greatly over short distances in the White Sea.[8] Lieutenant[9] Jean Albert Riondel, a key subordinate of Guilbert, added that opinions on conditions in the White Sea were "very contradictory" in that "some seafarers represented it as extremely dangerous" while others felt it "presented fewer dangers than the English Channel."[10] Ommanney's successor in 1855, Captain Thomas Baillie, also noted that men who enjoyed swimming off the Russian Port of Archangel were eager to don overcoats further north. "Sudden and violent transitions from heat to cold" were uncomfortable for Allied seamen,[11] but other environmental factors had even more serious consequences. Similar in Riondel's view to "those of Lower Brittany," the White Sea's coastlines were uniform but not especially high.[12] This meant that Allied warships and small boats could easily approach vulnerable coastal villages despite Russian efforts to arrange ambushes. Surrounding tundra and rugged forests also made obtaining fresh provisions especially challenging for ships that were, in Ommanney's words, "in a remote sea surrounded by an enemy's coast . . . shut off from all resources except those we carried with us."[13]

Russians had a markedly different view of the White Sea, which had once been their only maritime outlet. Although this situation changed at the expense of Sweden and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, the northern ports of Archangel and Onega remained important export centers for products including rye flour and timber well into the 1850s when, as a whole, the White Sea region accounted for 5 percent–10 percent of the Russian Empire's trade.[14] Details related to these trade patterns, however, were much better known in London than they were in Paris. France's consul in Christiania (Oslo), Antoine Odilon Amédée Fabre, confessed that his agent in Hammerfest was completely inadequate and recommended relying on British diplomats for better information.[15] In contrast to many of his diplomatic counterparts, however, Fabre articulated a case for French intervention in the White Sea months before France

and Britain formally joined the conflict. In a letter dated January 10, 1854, for instance, the French diplomat emphasized to Théodore Ducos that "a squadron which, along with steamboats (and especially more precise details), could obtain . . . a considerable chunk of Russian wealth in this area. Privateers would also obtain a great deal there," although there was "a great chance that privateers or small British ships would make these first captures" instead of French warships.[16] In the absence of any compelling counterarguments, Fabre's views significantly influenced Ducos and Drouyn de Lhuys, who noted:

> you bring to my attention that the merchant ships that every year leave in great numbers our French ports, in order to fish for herring and cod in the North Sea, would be exposed to Russian attacks . . . which could be organized in the White Sea and especially the port of Archangel.[17]

As Ducos forthrightly pointed out to Captain Guilbert, meanwhile:

> France and England have been drawn into the war with Russia by the Czarist Empire because it threatened their commerce. It is because of this that ships were sent to the Black Sea and the Baltic . . .
>
> As for the White Sea, the Russian ships in the port of Arkhangel could potentially threaten and destroy the boats affected (*sic*) to the fishing commerce of the British unless the Allies blockade them.[18]

Consequently, Ducos concluded that "the Allies should immediately blockade the Russian ports in the White Sea and send a maritime expedition with the goal of annihilating any military establishments in the ports as well as any warships that were found therein."[19]

A renewed Allied military presence in the region was hardly comforting to the Russian inhabitants of the Kola Peninsula and White Sea coasts, especially considering that an 1809 British raid during the Napoleonic Wars was still within living memory. An Oxford fellow who traveled to northern Norway in the mid-1850s, for instance, recorded an oral history account outlining how one Russian peasant came to lose a cow in 1809. The peasant had been unprepared for a British foraging party that suddenly landed in a bay, and had been unable to hide his cow. A British officer offered to purchase the animal, but the peasant was unwilling to sell it and falsely claimed it was the property of the Imperial Russian government. Whereupon the officer simply replied "in that case I shall take her without paying for her."[20] Forty-five years later, another British squadron would "levy contributions" of livestock "found" along the White Sea's shores; courteously at first, but by force if necessary.[21]

The overriding concern of British efforts[22] in the White Sea during both early- and mid-nineteenth-century campaigns was the port of Archangel (Arkhangelsk), situated at the mouth of the northern Dvina behind a series of islands in that river's delta. The City of Archangel was built of wood and inhabited by more than 25,000 people in addition to a substantial garrison commanded by Provincial Governor (and Vice Admiral) Roman Platonovich Boyle.[23] Similar to the governor generalship of Eastern Siberia under Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov, the Archangel province's remoteness further enhanced Boyle's authority and role in defence-planning. Guilbert and Riondel both independently labeled the governor as "almost a vice-king" of the province,"[24] and Boyle did not hesitate to concentrate available Russian forces near Archangel while informing towns such as Kola that he was "upset" to "constantly" receive "empty complaints" about their lack of military resources.[25] A long-established consular presence and information obtained from neutral and captured Russian merchant vessels meant that British and later French commanders knew Archangel was defended by 6,000 troops along with numerous shore batteries, gunboats, guardships, and a "very formidable" Fort Novodvin.[26]

Worse yet for the chances of a successful Allied naval attack, Archangel was similar to St. Petersburg in that it was only accessible to warships through four shallow channels, all of which were strongly defended. Obstacles including Russian troops, batteries, and gunboats were graphically marked in red by Ommanney on his map of "Arkhangel Bay and the Northern Dvina" and accompanied by discouraging notes including: "by the latest accounts there are 20,000 troops collected to defend Arkangel and the approach of the Dwina.[27] Although this was a dramatic initial overestimate, the actual figure soon became irrelevant given a lack of deep approaches to the city. Initial British and subsequent Allied reconnaissance efforts all led to the unanimous conclusion that Archangel could not be successfully attacked because it could not even be reached by Allied warships. Russia's other northern centers, however, were not as fortunate.

Russia's seat of government for the Murman Coast and Kola Peninsula was Kola, a small town that acted as the administrative center of Russian Lapland. The Town of Kola lay more than 50 kilometres (30 miles) away from the Barents Sea and 1,144 kilometers (711 miles) from Archangel, but was accessible by ascending a narrow and shallow Kola River.[28] It had been "previously visited" by British forces in May 1809, resulting in "noticeable losses" for some inhabitants and "complete bankruptcy for others."[29] Prominent

townspeople believed that "the ease with which the town was taken would be remembered by the enemy," and petitioned Governor Boyle to reinforce its meager complement of retired soldiers on the grounds that Kola would be targeted "if the enemy decides to send a part of its fleet to the northern shores of Russia."[30] Despite the early dates of their requests and petitions, however, the governor was unwilling to weaken Archangel's garrison and sent only 100 rifles and ammunition. He reasoned that Kola was safe because the British would have to approach Kola in small ship's boats, whose crews could "barely cope" with light rifle fire and would be vulnerable to even the most rudimentary "local" defenses, including villagers wielding long clubs.[31] Little did the Russians realize, though, that Captain Edmund Lyons and the screw-propelled sloop *Miranda* had another plan entirely for assaulting a town that British commanders "regarded as a place of considerable importance" for its proximity to Norway, governmental role for Russian Lapland, and ability to conceal merchant ships in nearby creeks.[32]

Another important Russian outpost in the White Sea began preparing for war in early 1854, which seemed out of place given its designation as a monastery. As the British government and Ommanney later went to great lengths to point out, however, the Solovetsky (Solovetskoi, Solovetskii, etc.) Monastery and its surrounding complex served triple purposes as monastery, fortress, and political prison.[33] Constructed on the White Sea's largest island group, the Solovetsky Islands, the monastery had played an important role in Russian history since its establishment in the fifteenth century. Its formidable stone ramparts were initially intended to repel enemies including Swedes and crusading orders of Germanic knights, and also allowed the monastery to function as a rallying point for the "Old Believer" Sect during the *raskol*, or seventeenth-century schism that tore apart the Russian Orthodox Church. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century, the Solovetsky Monastery had shipped its arms to Archangel and was no longer listed as an active fortress. The arms that remained were museum pieces, some dating back to the sixteenth century reign of Ivan IV "The Terrible."[34] The monastery's clergy, some of whom were political prisoners, initially felt they had been "left by the Emperor…to be made a sacrifice for his sins" when they heard that British ships were approaching.[35] Yet they were fortunate to have received substantially more reinforcements than were dispatched to Kola, including regular troops and a half-dozen cannon to supplement older artillery pieces still in the monastery's possession.[36] Coupled with the complex's "strong walls of fortification"[37]

and the limited supply of ammunition carried by British warships, these reinforcements proved sufficient to repel a British bombardment in mid-July 1854.

Ommanney and the two ships that accompanied him to the Solovetsky Islands were clearly surprised by the monastery's unexpected resistance. This reinforces two themes that reappeared throughout a number of British and French primary documents concerning their campaigns in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific during the 1850s. The first was that British experiences in these theaters, often involving combat, "tend(ed) to prove . . . contrary"[38] to Allied officers' generalizations regarding Russian subjects residing in these regions. Ommanney, for instance, found it "a matter of surprise" that inhabitants of "so remote a country . . . possess(ed) a degree of intelligence and civilization that could hardly have been anticipated."[39] The French consulate in Hamburg, meanwhile, concluded that there was a low risk of local resistance because Russian White Sea inhabitants were "not industrious and not wealthy enough to arm themselves."[40] The second theme to quickly emerge was that the Allies initially knew little about the specifics of Russian defences and instead learned through trial and error.

The White Sea had never been a regular station for British and French warships, which put the naval forces of both countries at a disadvantage during their initial operations. Théodore Ducos reminded his squadron commander multiple times that French warships had "scarcely" and "infrequently" visited the Russian Far North, making navigation especially "dangerous."[41] The risk presented by shallow and rocky waters was further heightened by a deviation in French compasses caused by the local attraction of the French flagship *Psyche*'s armament, which Guilbert believed was certainly "the cause of many shipwrecks in these waters!"[42] The French did receive British Admiralty charts based on earlier Russian surveys from 1833,[43] but these documents were not completely accurate. British officers in 1855, for instance, still found grounds to "respectfully suggest" that a rock "said to be very dangerous" be marked on Admiralty charts; they also commented on more minor details, including the incorrectness of a lighthouse sketch in the margins of those documents.[44] British ships ran aground numerous times without further incident, but there were several instances during which matters threatened to become significantly more serious, most notably when the wooden-hulled *Miranda* ran aground less than 300 yards from the burning Town of Kola.[45] Ommanney's 1870 conclusion that White Sea navigation was "*not without danger*" was thus fully warranted;[46] safe

navigation remained an Allied concern throughout the remainder of both the 1854 and 1855 campaigns.

A maladjusted compass was just one of the problems the French experienced in deploying Guilbert's frigate *Psyche* and Capitaine de Frégate[47] Nicholas Léon Gaigneron Marolles' brig *Beaumanoir* to the White Sea. Even more serious was the three-week delay that stemmed from the *Beaumanoir's* late arrival in Norway. Guilbert realized that "this is wasting precious time because the opening to Arkangel is not open for much of the year"[48] and that the Allied blockade's implementation would have to be delayed. The French commander's subsequent recommendations for an 1855 campaign reveal his belief that a May arrival in the White Sea was ideal, not the August 11 rendezvous that instead marred the 1854 campaign.[49] Given the Allied squadron's withdrawal from the White Sea in September of that year, the 1854 delay meant that France's initial campaign in the Russian north was extremely limited in duration. Timing was irrelevant to assaulting Archangel, though, as the port remained out of reach of Allied warships throughout each campaign. French tardiness in 1854 instead mattered because it delayed the implementation of a blockade, ordered on May 20, for months.[50]

In addition to waiting with what Lieutenant Riondel described as "ardent impatience" for the French squadron,[51] British warships involved in the 1854 campaign also carefully monitored the projected arrival of transports with fresh provisions and colliers, or coal-bearing ships. Logistical challenge compounded the aforementioned navigational difficulties during both White Sea campaigns, and the former had serious health consequences for French sailors in 1855. The Allies faced a problem due to the region's location and geography, which were not conducive to providing British and French warships with customary ration staples such as beef. Officers of both nations noted the difficulty of purchasing fresh provisions at the 1,000-inhabitant Hammerfest, the northernmost Norwegian town of any significance.[52]

Once Russians authorities learned from the captain of a Hanoverian merchant vessel that the British squadron cruising off Archangel wished to purchase beef, officials in the provincial capital limited neutral carrier's beef supplies to two pounds per crewman.[53] The French *Moniteur de la Flotte* printed a more explicit letter from Captain Guilbert in 1855, which held that Russian civilians were initially "willing to sell fresh provisions" to Allied ships prior to "the appearance of an order from the Government threatening with the punishment of death, or exile to Siberia, all those who held any intercourse with the vessels of

the allies."[54] Lieutenant Riondel added that coastal residents' previous willingness to sell the Allies provisions in 1854 changed after the "threat of death or exile quickly transformed good dispositions into clear acts of hostility."[55] Governor Boyle's September 1854 suggestion that the inhabitants of coastal villages "should not be so dumb and cowardly as to allow the enemy to use their property" did little to contradict the French captain's assessment.[56] Guilbert concluded that "measures of terror" effectively convinced Russian residents to display "a decided hostility" toward Allied forces, but neglected to mention the damage done to coastal towns by British forces as a possible motivating factor.[57] Allied sailors eventually adjusted to the taste of reindeer venison in place of beef,[58] but delays in communication remained a problem because of the distances involved and Russia's "rigid search" of all neutral vessels in order to "detect any communication" from Allied ships.[59]

The prospect of assaulting Archangel attracted British and then Anglo-French squadrons, which had explicit instructions to closely blockade its approaches. The first aim of the Allied blockade in the White Sea, as well as in the Baltic and Pacific, was essentially negative. Ensuring that the Czarist government could not use even the most isolated ports of its empire as launching points for warships and privateers to threaten Anglo-French commerce was a vital Allied war aim. Sir James Graham, for one, had come of age during an earlier era in which Britain's merchant marine suffered enormous losses to French and American privateers. Consequently, he was keenly aware that even isolated or sporadic incidents could throw the London insurance market into a panic.[60] An anxious British Parliament also pressured Graham to defend the economic interests of its constituents from even the remotest of Russian naval threats,[61] while the French government shared these apprehensions. Théodore Ducos even went to the trouble of specifying to Captain Guilbert the individual names of Danish and Hanoverian vessels carrying French goods in the White Sea, especially linen, before ordering his commander to ensure that they were protected.[62] Speedily implementing these directives, however, was entirely another affair.

An Allied blockade of the White Sea did not begin with the arrival of British ships in the White Sea on June 19, 1854. This was certainly attributable to the delayed arrival of French warships, but also to larger diplomatic considerations. Graham and Clarendon needed time to coordinate blockade policy with Napoleon III's ministers, tailor an exemption for Finmark, and iron out practical details such as how to address an existing Anglo-Russian system that allowed British

merchants to prepay for Russian goods.[63] A political problem quickly arose as a result of Graham's deceptive statements to merchants and shipowners that he had "no intention of establishing a Blockade" of Archangel[64] when, in fact, the first lord's private correspondence betrayed his long-held intentions to the contrary.[65] By June 2, 1854, former ambassador to St. Petersburg, Lord Clanricarde was openly questioning Graham's statements in the House of Lords and pushing, along with Lord Beaumont, for an aggressive blockade of Archangel in order to drive home the "inconveniences of the present war" to the Russian population and its government.[66] Lord Aberdeen vocally objected to Lord Beaumont's assertion that "any" British Admiralty had a "perfect right" to blockade "any" Russian port without prior notice.[67] Yet the sitting prime minister's extended counterarguments that the British Navy's vigor only stopped short of "any such horrible notions as firing upon all parts of a town" manifested a tone entirely out of synch with subsequent British actions at locations including Kola.[68]

The undisclosed determination of Graham and Clarendon to blockade Archangel and mounting parliamentary pressure had already obviated the need for Ommanney's dispatch "Suggesting a Blockade of the Ports in the White Sea" by the time it was written on June 14. Nevertheless, the document reveals several problems that confronted Allied forces in this endeavor.[69] The first and most important problem with the Anglo-French blockade in 1854 was that its delayed timing rendered attempts to implement it absurd. By mid-June, Ommanney counted over 400 neutral vessels as already entering Archangel, with almost another full month remaining until a blockade could be formally declared.[70] This meant that Russian exports for 1854 had already departed long before Anglo-French legal requirements allowed the delivery of a formal blockade notification to Archangel on August 13th. The few vessels legally captured by the Allied squadron were consistently under 100 tons and carrying cargos of fish or rye flour,[71] staples related to local trade rather than international commerce. When the schooners *Volga* and *Dwina* were captured by British and French warships, respectively, Russian sources emphasized the flimsiness of pretexts that included lack of an official coat of arms on the Swedish-Norwegian consular certificate and the fineness of their construction rather than the more substantial presence of contraband, weapons, or Russian government property.[72]

On May 17 and 19, 1854, Governor Roman Platonovich Boyle received two letters. The first was from his own government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the second arrived from the Royal Swedish-

Norwegian consulate in Archangel.[73] They informed His Excellency that the British and French governments would not interfere with trade between Russia's northern possessions and the Norwegian territory of Finmark even after the formal establishment of a blockade. In keeping with the aphorism that a good compromise leaves everyone unhappy, the provision attracted protests from military authorities representing each of the belligerent powers. Théodore Ducos complained that the Russian government and its agents were deliberately exploiting isolated incidents in which a few Russian ships carrying grain and bound for Finmark were stopped by Allied vessels, and instructed Guilbert to ensure that "local populations are confident in our ability to protect their commerce."[74] Ducos accused the Russian government of forcing its merchant vessels to stay in their harbors and pretend they were not allowed to trade with Finmark,[75] while the Russians countered that crews and vessels engaged in permitted trade had been illegitimately seized by both British and French warships. Ommanney also denounced Czarist authorities for "circulating false representations with a view to excite a prejudice against our intentions."[76] The British captain's letterbook, however, indicated that problems relating to the Finmark exemption could not be solely attributed to Russian duplicity. Even euphemistic phrases such as "mature consideration" could not disguise the confusion that British officers experienced when attempting to make lawful blockade captures.[77]

The British government's blockade policy, or initial lack thereof, was the principal target of critical newspaper articles. Unlike the debates surrounding Cronstadt and Sweaborg in the Baltic, no acrimonious exchanges over the wisdom of assaulting Archangel captured the attention of Britain's press or Parliament. Instead, Clanricarde got off a parting shot at the Aberdeen cabinet's White Sea blockade policy in a *Times* article from August 30. This piece, in turn, reprinted a July letter emphasizing that, without a blockade, the British squadron's presence in the White Sea was "next to useless."[78] Allied efforts improved considerably the following year, with controversy limiting itself to continued, and often anonymous, sniping over the Finmark exception and the specific date of the Allied squadron's withdrawal.[79] Regardless of whether its mandate was to blockade or simply injure Russian interests in the region, the British squadron's first destination in the White Sea was Archangel; the same was true for French warships arriving subsequently.

The correspondence and actions of Ommanney and subordinates, especially Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons, from the outset of the

1854 campaign revealed their eagerness to attack Archangel. The simple fact that British warships drew too much water to pass through the channels that allowed access to Archangel, however, defeated these ambitions in both 1854 and 1855. As one contemporary civilian critic pointed out, merchants had "known for centuries" that a shallow sandbar obstructed even the deepest channel, Berezov.[80] This made Graham's choice of the *Eurydice*, *Brisk*, and *Miranda*,[81] the shallowest of which drew 15 feet of water, an act of "singular fatuity," or utterly complacent and smug stupidity.[82] Although the first lord's defense was busy planning larger operations elsewhere, Graham unwittingly limited the potential military accomplishments of Ommanney's squadron by depriving them of the means necessary to successfully attack their largest possible objective. This unpleasant reality quickly became apparent to British commanders as reconnaissance missions commenced in early July following an improvement in the weather.

At a conference on board the frigate *Eurydice*, Ommanney and his two senior officers, Captain Lyons (*Miranda*) and Commander Frederick Seymour (*Brisk*), formulated a simple plan for attacking Archangel. After sounding the bar that obstructed the channels entering the Dvina River and leading to Archangel, the steam sloops and armed ships' boats would enter the Dvina and proceed to attack the port city and shipyard. Problems immediately arose during initial reconnaissance operations in July, when small ships' boats discovered that the Berezov Channel, even with favorable weather conditions and a high tide, was simply not deep enough to allow either the *Miranda* or *Brisk* to continue toward Archangel.[83] Horse-drawn Russian shore artillery and approaching gunboats soon forced these boats to withdraw and drove home the realization that they had moved beyond the protective range of the larger British warships kept at a distance in deeper waters.[84] Ommanney then ordered the *Miranda* to reconnoiter the lesser channels, but Lyons found the Murman Channel "perfectly impracticable for any thing but small vessels"[85] and withdrew. Later surveys soon revealed that the Nikolski and Poujience Channels were even shallower.[86] Pierre-Édouard Guilbert, for one, later noted that these channels were only nine feet deep and were also defended by Russian forces even though Allied passage seemed "implausible."[87] Allied commanders thus had to conclude that their "squadron is totally inadequate to attempt any operations" against Russian defenses surrounding Archangel,[88] especially because the small boats that could pass the bar were "far too insignificant to attempt

anything."[89] Firmly convinced that operations against "such an overwhelming force, defended by natural obstacles" would be "utterly futile,"[90] British warships steamed and sailed away from Archangel in search of other targets and were later followed by their French counterparts.

On the morning of July 18, 1854, Russian lookouts manning the Solovetsky Monastery's towers sighted two approaching enemy vessels.[91] These were the British sloops *Miranda* and *Brisk*, which were proceeding "with the intention of examining the Bay of Onega" to the southeast of the Solovetsky Islands.[92] The two steam vessels carried reinforced complements drawn from the *Eurydice* along with Ommanney and an interpreter. The larger sailing frigate, meanwhile, stayed at the White Sea's entrance to guard Cross Island and a collier.[93] Accounts then diverged dramatically, depending on the nationality of their authors. Russians believed the British were after the monastery's treasures, already removed to Archangel for safekeeping.[94] Ommanney, on the other hand, later wrote that he was simply "admiring the imposing aspect of the Monastery and its massive fortifications" from *Brisk* when he heard an exchange of cannon shots involving the *Miranda*.[95] The events that followed remained so controversial that, 36 years later, the British Admiralty demanded the right to inspect a draft historical account based on official records and to prevent publication of "all or any part of" the account should it be deemed objectionable.[96]

British and Russian sources immediately began to dispute two major points related to the monastery's bombardment. The first involved how to most accurately describe the "character" of a complex that, by Ommanney's own admission, was simultaneously "a fortress, monastery, and place of banishment for political offenders" as well as a destination for pilgrims.[97] The second concerned the more tangible issue of which side fired first. Archimandrite Alexander claimed in his report to the Russian Orthodox Synod, or Church Council, that two three-masted frigates with about 60 guns each opened fire on the monastery and Holy Gates without provocation, with the only Russian artillery battery out of British sight.[98] The Archimandrite's claims were deliberately exaggerated. Aleksandr knew from Petr Sokolov, a monk and retired soldier who delivered dispatches, that the *Miranda* and *Brisk* carried less than half that number of guns.[99] According to Vassily Antonov, a Russian civilian in British custody and a "history taken down from eye-witnesses still living" by a subsequent archimandrite, the British shots were blank warnings.[100] Furthermore, Captain Lyons' description of the Russian

infantry and artillery batteries' precise location in a report written on July 19 proves that both were obviously visible to *Miranda*'s crew.[101] It is also unlikely that the British squadron was after the monastery's treasury, as Ommanney claimed that a "vast amount of wealth" had already left St. Petersburg to support the Russian war effort and was unlikely to be found so far north.[102] Despite his noninvolvement with Lyons' initial decision to fire a warning shot and then return Russian fire, the senior British commander made an ill-advised decision soon after both ships temporarily withdrew beyond the range of Russian cannon shot.

At 6:00 a.m. on the following morning of July 19, a small boat flying a flag of truce arrived on shore with an ultimatum from Captain Ommanney. Archimandrite Alexander's response objected to Ommanney's reference to a "garrison commander" as a groundless assumption that the monastery had a commandant,[103] but the Russian prelate allegedly did "acknowledge himself to be the director of the military operations."[104] Ommanney argued that this admission was "at variance with . . . the character of the Monastery,"[105] and added an interesting adjective to his description of events 16 years later by deeming the archimandrite the "sole director of military operations."[106] The ultimatum's contents, meanwhile, were the subject of considerably less disagreement. Both Russian and British archives contain full translations of the document, and the texts of each are consistent.[107] Although Russian participants laughed at interpreter Frederick Hill's rendition of "squadron of ships" as a "squadron of horse (cavalry),"[108] the type of linguistic misunderstanding that marred Anglo-Japanese negotiations that same year was absent from this exchange. There was no mistaking British demands, which Ommanney labeled as "conditions."[109] They included the unconditional surrender of all Russian military forces on Solovetsk Island along with their weapons, including the garrison commandant's sword, on pain of a bombardment that "must necessarily follow their refusal."[110]

The British ultimatum explicitly justified its "conditions" as a response to the monastery's defenses first firing on the *Miranda* without provocation.[111] The document reached the Russian delegation via a small British boat and was thereafter relayed to the monastery on horseback. Within two hours, the British received a general response that denied the convent had initially opened fire and instead blamed the British squadron.[112] Russian authorities also claimed that the monastery's modest complement of soldiers was not a "garrison" and was only intended to protect local inhabitants, concluding that

there was "nothing to surrender."[113] Ommanney characterized the reply as "evasive" and hauled down the flag of truce at 8:00 a.m. At 8:30 a.m., the *Miranda* opened fire on a Russian field artillery battery, while the *Brisk* threw solid shot and shell against "the walls of the Monastery and the building enclosed therein at a distance of 16 or 17 hundred yards".[114]

Six-and-a-half hours and hundreds of artillery rounds later, Ommanney and his captains reached an embarrassing conclusion. Their two sloops together mounted less than a third of the cannon carried by larger battleships, which meant that the *Miranda* and *Brisk* carried neither the firepower nor the ammunition to batter down the monastery's heavy stone walls. As Ommanney defensively observed years later: "the nature of the coast and navigation" meant that "our closest position to the Monastery was 1600 or 1700 yards[:] a long range for damaging stone walls."[115] The *Miranda* repeatedly drove Russian gunners from their position beside the monastery, but both sides acknowledged the Russian gunners' bravery in returning to their batteries.[116] Ommanney later cited, "the admirable and advantageous" placement of Russian artillery as evidence that an "skilled artillerist" was present,[117] and immediately informed the Admiralty that such evidence "prove(d) that some military officer of experience was on the spot."[118] This assessment was completely accurate, as a combat engineer and artillery officer had accompanied the cannon sent from Archangel more than a month earlier.[119] Russian return fire killed 19-year-old King Marshall, "an ordinary seaman and man of colour" from Sierra Leone, and left another crewman on the *Miranda*, Stephen Hart, without an arm.[120]

More serious than their two casualties was the simple fact that British "shot fell harmless on the massive outwork which encloses the Monastery."[121] This forced the *Brisk* to aim at church domes and outworks, "the only portions of the building which were within range,"[122] and lent credibility to the assertions of Archimandrite Alexander and subsequent Russian accounts that charged the British with "tend(ing) to aim at the churches and their domes."[123] The "hurricane of brass and iron" hurled from British decks set some fires,[124] but even Ommanney disappointedly observed that these remained "occasional" thanks to the fire-fighting efforts of Russian monks.[125] Throughout the engagement, British officers had difficulty assessing the extent to which they had damaged Russian fortifications. A late afternoon landing on nearby Peri Island, though, allowed Ommanney to observe that the monastery and its surrounding defenses were

"unassailable by the small force at my command"[126] and that "the extent and strength of the walls" made it "quite impracticable for our small force to assail."[127] Concluding that there was nothing more to be done, Ommanney and his squadron left the anchorage soon after daylight on July 20.[128]

CHAPTER 6

Kola, Blockade, and Advances in Naval Medicine

The Solovetsky Monastery's resistance fit seamlessly with the Czarist government's wartime propaganda efforts. Russian writers mocked Britain and France for calling themselves Christian, "worrying about the abolition of slavery," and "writing laws that prohibit the cruel treatment of animals" while entering into an "unrighteous alliance with the enemies of Christ (the Muslim Ottoman Empire)."[1] News of the incident was "carried into every part of Russia,"[2] and contemporary Czarist publications emphasized that it was "impossible to make up" facts including absence of any deaths among the small seagulls covering the monastery's yards.[3] Archimandrite Alexander, though, freely embellished the details of his monastery's encounter in his official report and during a personal audience with Nicholas I.[4] The Russian prelate neglected to mention that the first shots fired by the English were warnings that came nowhere near the monastery's Holy Gates and instead claimed that the *Miranda* and *Brisk* were frigates mounting about 120 guns instead of their actual total of 31.[5] Alexander also added poetic details such as the timing of the last British round, which allegedly hit just after a bell had signaled the beginning of a service of the Kazan Mother of God.[6]

As British historian, columnist, and traveler William Hepworth Dixon recorded in an oral history account from a Russian peasant in 1870, Britain lost a larger ideological battle. Dixon's subject, for example, "scoffed" to his English visitor,

> Now, see what you have done. You wage war upon us; you send your fleets into the Black Sea and into the White Sea; in the first to fight against the Empire, in the second to fight against the Church. In one sea, you win; in the other sea, you lose. Sevastopol falls to your arms;

> while Solovetsk drives away your ships. The arm of the spirit is seen to be stronger than the arm of the flesh.[7]

Russian journalist and historian Mikhail Pogodin added in the widely read *Moskovskie Vedomosti* that he was unsure why "the British decided to attack the Monastery . . . they could neither do any military harm nor derive any benefit from it—why would they annoy the whole nation and arouse hatred against themselves without any benefits or prospects?"[8] Pogodin also countered objections that the British were not certain that they could destroy the monastery by pointing out that Ommanney must have been "absolutely sure" he could destroy Solovetsky.[9] Otherwise, British forces 'would not have started the attack, like they have not started attacks on Cronstadt and Sveaborg.'[10] The Russian writer further opined that his country's foes were "not that simple to take on an impossible task; they do not make even one step without the hope of success."[11] Although this was true for Britain's cautious senior commanders in the Baltic, it sadly overestimated Ommanney's discretion on this particular occasion.

Russian points of view, according to Dixon, were especially interesting to his British readers because of their scarcity. With good reason, few English-language accounts of the incident circulated alongside some brief newspaper articles and Ommanney's "dry dispatch."[12] More formally known as "Reporting the Bombardment of the Solovetsky Fortress and Monastery," the document arrived in London on August 24, 1854.[13] Even on the eve of the battle, Ommanney took painstaking care to justify his decisions and demonstrate that the Solovetsky Monastery was actually a Russian fortress that had opened fire without provocation on British ships.[14] Sir James Graham was neither convinced nor impressed and wrote a note to that effect directly on Ommanney's report, reading,

> Regret expenditure of his ammunition & do not consider it advisable to commence hostile operations on building of this character without more decided expression of hostility on the part of the enemy, & prospect of more decided success on ours.[15]

Captain Ommanney always remained especially sensitive about the incident, and vigorously defended his reputation and actions for decades until his death as a knighted Admiral in 1904. He particularly objected to Dixon's 1870 book *Free Russia*, intended by its author "as a report from the other side . . . singular and imprecise as an illustration of native modes of thought" regarding an episode

that was still a topic of conversation "in clubs and at dinner tables."[16] Ommanney and Dixon then exchanged a series of letters that politely complemented one another while Ommanney bitterly denigrated the Russian "race" as "slaves to superstition."[17] The British captain sarcastically claimed that "canonization is my due!!!" because the archimandrite "made good capital out of me for the benefit of his monastery."[18] Ommanney's ultimate conclusion that the "attack was not made hastily or without due consideration of the unpleasant duty which circumstances imposed on us, nor did we retire with shame as you have expressed it,"[19] was certainly less than candid. Sir Erasmus had no reservations in pointing out each of the inaccuracies of Archimandrite Alexander's statements to Nicholas I, although he seemingly protested too much that British forces did not leave Solovetsky with "shame."[20] Ommanney and his legacy were thus especially fortunate that the British Admiralty shared his sensitivity in relating to the attack and imposed conditions on accessing relevant records for decades,[21] tempering even a traveling Anglican clergyman's criticism as late as 1893.[22]

Later Soviet historians were likewise displeased with the religiosity of Czarist accounts relating to the Solovetsky Monastery's defense. Stalin Prize winner Yevgney Viktorovich Tarle, in particular, savagely criticized the "nonsense" of 1854 publications whose emphasis on "miraculous deliverance" undermined what Tarle saw as the "true" heroism of Archimandrite Alexander and his subordinates.[23] Tarle's and Ommanney's retrospective criticisms matched British observations during the 1855 campaign, where remarks by figures such as Master and Assistant Surveyor George Frederick McDougall repeatedly mentioned the efforts of Russia's Orthodox clergy to sustain popular "fanaticism."[24] From his vantage point on board the frigate *Maender*, McDougall singled out a Russian priest who was "particularly zealous in inciting the inhabitants to resist any landing that might be attempted [by the British]." The navigator also mentioned that the Solovetsky Monastery incident lent credibility to the Orthodox Church in northern Russia.[25] McDougall recounted the monastery's alleged contention that "the Holy Virgin" caused the "iron shower" of Ommanney's bombardment "to fall harmlessly to the ground," before adding that, "absurd as it may appear . . . the assertions of the Monks are devoutly believed by the ignorant mass of the Russian people."[26] The 1855 Allied squadron's interpreter seconded such commentary by explaining to the surveyor that the terms of abuse hurled by Russian "scoundrels" resisting landing parties included telling British sailors to "Go to H-ll!"[27] Lieutenant Riondel added that

the 1855 Anglo-French squadron had "excited the religious fanaticism of the populations"[28] and, according to Russian accounts, the Orthodox Faith was an important dimension of Russian resistance to Allied efforts in the White Sea.[29] This was especially important given that the destruction of coastal towns and a more effective Allied blockade in 1855 left the Russian populace in need of all possible sources of moral support.

When it came to the actions at both the Solovetsky Monastery and Kola, a revealing contrast emerges from within the records of France's White Sea squadron, which was not involved in either incident. Captain Pierre-Édouard Guilbert only noted that the British had "attempted an expedition with their steamships on a small island off Onega called Solovetsky but retreated after one of their men was killed," and made no mention whatsoever of a monastery or bombardment in mid-July.[30] Lieutenant Riondel added that British warships had undertaken an "expedition against the little fort on the Island of Solvetski (*sic*)" but had retreated after "such a forested country" made it "impossible" to land.[31] The late August destruction of Kola by Captain Lyons and the *Miranda*, meanwhile, garnered extensive discussion by French officers. Guilbert emphasized that it "went without saying that he was in no way informed of this devastating investigation,"[32] but neatly summarized by writing that the *Miranda* had just returned from Finmark where its crew had burned the Town of Kola, Russian Lapland's main point.[33] Kola's inhabitants and few defenders had anticipated a British attack for months, but preparations were incomplete and limited.[34] On August 22, 1854, the results of close-range British firepower against wooden targets became devastatingly apparent.

Kola's fiery destruction resulted from Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons' aggressive interpretation of his orders to reconnoiter the Kola River before the British squadron withdrew. Lyons was an especially bold officer killed while bombarding Sevastopol less than a year later, and shared Ommanney's frustration. On August 21, 1854, Lyons and the *Miranda*, preceded by the ship's boats used to sound and place navigational markers, pushed up the narrow River Kola to within two miles of its namesake town.[35] Ommanney had previously deemed the passage "inaccessible to anything but boats," but surprise worked to the British ship's advantage.[36] In Guilbert's analysis, the Russians "never thought that a ship the size of the *Miranda* would ever enter these waters,"[37] and Governor Boyle had already dispatched an aide to Kola on the grounds that its inhabitants "should expect an attack by rowboats."[38] Regardless, both Lyons and Russian authorities were

aware that the "precipitous, and, in parts, overhanging" cliffs flanking the Kola River potentially afforded defenders excellent cover.[39] The *Miranda*'s sudden arrival, according to Russian reports, "thwarted" efforts to summon sharpshooting Sami hunters from neighboring localities.[40] Though Russian forces could do little else in the absence of heavy artillery, Lyons observed upon arriving that

> The defenses were evidently prepared with a view to resist an attack by Boats, the possibility of the ship getting up apparently not having entered into their calculations, for if it had done so, they might easily have prevented it by sinking a vessel or even a boat filled with stones...Presuming an attack to have been made by Boats, the defenses were strong and skilfully (*sic*) arranged, and would probably have inflicted a heavy loss.[41]

Instead of suffering such losses, though, the *Miranda* and its crew proceeded unopposed to within 500 yards of the town by the evening of August 22.[42]

After surveying the town and its modest government buildings, churches, and storehouses,[43] the British assessed its defenses. These included a two-gun turf and stone battery along with an extensive wooden stockade with blockhouses and loopholes allowing defenders to fire from within houses.[44] In a scene repeated countless times over the next two years, a British ship's boat and Lieutenant Cecil Buckley approached the shore and, according to Ommanney, "submitted conditional terms for the surrender of the Garrison."[45] The document's original text, told a completely different story. It read as a "demand (for) the immediate and unconditional surrender of the Forts, Garrison, and Town of Kola" along with "every article of whatever description belonging to the Russian Government."[46] Townsman Gregory Nenchinov initially rowed out to meet the small boat carrying the British delegation, but linguistic difficulties limited communication to what little Nemchinov could understand from the British party's "broken" Russian.[47] None of Kola's inhabitants or enlisted defenders spoke a foreign language, so Lieutenant Andrey Martynovich Brunner changed into civilian clothes and met the British negotiators, who suggested that he meet with Lyons because that captain "spoke many languages."[48]

After Brunner boarded the *Miranda*, Lyons was "most polite" in translating the substance of the British document into French.[49] The British captain astutely described his Russian counterpart as "a person who represented himself to be a magistrate of the Town, but

whom I believe to have been an Officer,"[50] but nevertheless continued to negotiate. Brunner, in fact, was a visiting aide of Governor Boyle thrust into command by the illness of Captain Pushkarev of the First Archangelsk Garrison Battalion.[51] After protesting that the British had used the white flag as cover to secure the *Miranda* with a spring-loaded cable, Brunner informed Lyons that British terms "would not be accepted"[52] and refused British demands with what absent French officers later described as "an indignation filled with energy rather than wisdom."[53] Lyons then indicated that hostile operations would commence within an hour, though the British captain waited for an answer until daylight on the August 23 before hauling down the flag of truce and opening fire on the town and its defenses.

Red hot shot and explosive shells quickly and predictably combined with a "fresh breeze" to make Kola "burn furiously."[54] The *Illustrated London News* contained a poignant description that mentioned church bells "tolling their last knells" as they fell into the conflagration below them.[55] Kola's ill-armed garrison of 50 retired soldiers, assisted by civilian volunteers, had no hope of defending the densely concentrated and irregularly spaced wooden houses, which were reduced "to ashes" during a daylong bombardment.[56] Russian forces were similarly unable to prevent the British from landing three boats in order to confirm that the Russian's only battery had been rendered "a heap of ruins" and to burn outlying government buildings and storehouses that might have otherwise escaped unscathed.[57] The entire enterprise was not without some difficulty for the British. The same "violent" tides that had run at six or seven knots and previously driven the *Miranda* aground eight times caused the ship to become "critically situated" less than 300 yards from the burning town.[58] The warship's crew, though, succeeded in keeping the sails, rigging, and decks "well wetted" until it could be removed from danger, thus ensuring that "no bad consequences ensued."[59] With Kola's destruction complete, the British seized a church bell as a trophy and returned upriver after capturing several small Russian merchant vessels hidden in nearby creeks thanks to intelligence obtained from a fisherman.[60] With 92 of their 110 houses destroyed, Kola's homeless inhabitants did receive a grant for relief from St. Petersburg, but later reports indicated that the funds had been corruptly misappropriated and that an investigation was ongoing.[61]

In keeping with the fears that Kola's mayor expressed just days prior to the conflict's March outbreak, newspapers throughout the British Empire indeed relished "the idea of spreading the news of victory" that accompanied the town's destruction.[62] Periodicals in

Britain and its colonies portrayed *Miranda*'s exploits against Kola in "the most favorable terms,"[63] in contrast to more reserved reporting of the earlier bombardment of the Solovetsky Monastery.[64] *The Illustrated London News* received several sketches from the White Sea within three weeks of the incident and was therefore able to add a print of the town in flames.[65] After complaining that it had heard no more of "the proceedings of Captain Lyons and Captain (actually Commander) Seymour for the last three months than if they had sailed on a Polar expedition," the *Times* was likewise happy to report "that the northernmost shores of the Russian empire have not escaped the ravages of war"[66] and included none of Captain Guilbert's concerns that, despite his "very high opinion of Captain Lyons," he opposed in principle the "rigors of useless wars" that left "inoffensive populations . . . at the mercy of the Winter season in such a climate."[67]

This was neither the first nor the last occasion on which Britain's press declined to cover the less savory aspects of the Allies' 1854 and 1855 White Sea campaigns, especially British attacks on small coastal villages in retaliation to the resistance that their armed male inhabitants usually offered.[68] Although French crews, in Lieutenant Riondel's words, "burned . . . with the desire" to answer the "provocations" of Russian villagers taking up arms, Guilbert "resisted" on the grounds that "the assured destruction of villages was death without results."[69] "Burning and destroying many villages that were little or not at all defended" bothered France's White Sea commander, who informed Paris that "these things happened before my arrival and since I have not hidden the little sympathy that I have towards similar expeditions."[70] This did little to spare coastal villages such as Pushlakhta, though, which grievously suffered the consequences of Ommanney's resentment at being fired upon and ordered away "in an insulting manner."[71] The British captain's determination "to resent this reception" soon manifested into a small boat expedition and shrapnel shelling of the town, which allowed British marines to take possession and "burn the place to the ground; being built of wood the fire raged with fury for three hours."[72] Russian accounts do not hesitate to point out that the village had no garrison,[73] which is not convincingly countered by Ommanney's deliberately vague assertion that the inhabitants "were led by some armed people of a military aspect."[74]

Other villages escaped more lightly after choosing not to resist and lost only government property and civilian foodstuffs that proved tempting to British foraging parties that, by their commander's own admission, "took as we chose."[75] Similar to those in the Gulf of

Bothnia, British coastal raids in the White Sea thus stretched the boundaries of the morality to which the Royal Navy claimed adherence and harmed civilian populations far more than the Imperial Russian government. These operations also allowed British sailors to vent frustrations similar to those shared by their counterparts in the Baltic, most of which centered on the immunity of major targets, lack of major fleet actions, and frustrating inefficiency of a blockade that resulted in few lucrative captures.

The belated mid-August arrival of French ships allowed a formal blockade to commence the next day. Even had the blockade begun weeks earlier, however, its starting date would still have been irrelevant; it was simply too late in the year for any Russian merchant ship to remain in Archangel or Onega. *The Times* picked up Clanricarde's criticism that it was "obvious such a blockade will only be a farce as regards Russian trade for this year" along with an anonymous letter of complaint from Britain's White Sea squadron.[76] Yet it was hardly necessary for his lordship to "force" the Aberdeen Government to alter its commercial warfare policy for the coming year:[77] Graham and Clarendon were already making arrangements for blockading Archangel more efficiently in 1855.[78] Ommanney and Guilbert, meanwhile, jointly reconnoitered Archangel and concurred that "nothing can be done with our force towards an attack upon Arkangel."[79] They also decided that there was "no motive for hazarding the safety of either (French or British) Squadron" by remaining in the White Sea as weather conditions became progressively more hazardous.[80] After Guilbert refused to remain behind after the impending British departure,[81] Allied ships embarked Britain's vice consul at Archangel and left the White Sea on September 22. They arrived at their home ports in Britain and France in mid- and late-October, respectively.

The *Psyche*'s October, 1854 arrival in Brest completed a brief campaign, but it was precisely this "promptitude" that the ship's surgeon believed had undoubtedly "saved this frigate from the disaster that a longer journey at sea would inflict upon the crew."[82] Such a disaster took the form of scurvy, a dreaded disease resulting from vitamin C deficiency. French forces in all the war's theaters suffered painful symptoms in both 1854 and 1855, prompting French surgeons from both the White Sea and Pacific squadrons to independently publish their observations on the subject during the mid- to late-1850s.[83] A "great number" of his countrymen facing an "impending death" especially concerned surgeon René Ernest Gallerand, who participated in both of France's White Sea campaigns.[84] Dr. Gallerand considered the disease "the greatest enemy that I had to fight during the

two campaigns," but blamed the "atmospheric influences that are without a doubt the greatest cause of scurvy in these seas."[85]

Fortunately for the lives and gums of their fellow sailors, both Gallerand and Captain Guilbert began to examine why their British Allies seemed unaffected by the disease during the 1855 campaign. Their efforts were considerably aided by Dr. Murray of the *Maender*, who observed the French sailors' poor health and explained the British Admiralty's methods of preemptively combating the disease through prophylactic, or preventative, rations of lemon juice.[86] Gallerand had "known for a long time that lemons and oranges had antiscorbutic properties,"[87] but it is important to remember that the precise link between vitamin C deficiency and scurvy remained unknown until 1932. "The beneficial effect of lime juice + other anti-scorbutics in the shape of preserved vegetables," for example, was only the third of four reasons given by Master George McDougall of the *Maender* for "the absence of scorbutic taint of any importance" during his ship's 1855 voyage.[88] His other reasons, such as "the wholesome nature of the climate," were sadly mistaken, though the British were well-advised to consume the White Sea coast's blackberries and wild onions "on principle whenever an opportunity offered."[89] As one British commander noted, "good puddings" made with berries would "allow the scurvey no hope of attacking" his ship.[90]

The British Navy's prior experience with long voyages and polar exploration became a model for French treatment efforts. Dr. Gallerand thought that Captain John Ross' Arctic voyages in the 1830s were an especially "useful" example, though the French surgeon concluded that the lesson of "greatest interest" was Ross' careful choice of experienced crews.[91] During France's White Sea campaigns, however, Gallerand shifted his focus to the underlying reasons why British warships carried plentiful supplies of lemon juice and were able to provide several dozen two-litre bottles to save those French crewmen worst afflicted.[92] Convinced that "these unfortunate men would be dead today without the arrival of this unexpected relief,"[93] France's senior medical officers in the White Sea—including Gallerand and junior surgeons Alfred Louis Grenet and Edward Amand Michaux—independently called "attention to this potent preservative" and the necessity of its preventative administration.[94] As Gallerand emphasized, consumption of lemon juice was "organized in the British Navy to a grand scale" using lemons from Malta, with lunchtime lemonade consumption occurring as regularly on British ships as the distribution of wine on French vessels.[95] Emphasizing citrus was certainly more helpful than British Assistant Surgeon John

M. Tronson's thought "that fresh baked bread, such as that supplied to the French sailors each morning at sea not being easily digested, is consequently injurious to their health."[96] Happily for British crews in the Pacific and on his vessel, the steam sloop *Barracouta*, Tronson also noted that British sailors subsisted on salted provisions for no more than two weeks before receiving "a liberal allowance of lime juice."[97] Their French counterparts, on the other hand, had previously relied on ineffective routines including rubbing their teeth with a mixture of coal and cinchona (quinine) while using vinegar as mouthwash and scrubbing decks with sand rather than seawater to "lessen the humidity."[98] In the absence of British citrus products, these measures miserably failed to protect French sailors in remote regions such as the White Sea.

French authorities may not have been independently able to improve the health of its crews during the 1855 White Sea campaign, but the renewed Allied blockade was a different story. Guilbert and his second-in-command Bruno-Jean-Marie D'Harcourt again led a French squadron, this time including the warships *Cléopâtre*, *Cocyte*, and *Petrel* to establish a blockade of the White Sea. The senior French officer was proud to note their significantly early departure on May 12, 1855, allowing his frigate *Cléopâtre* and its accompanying paddle steamers, commanded by Lieutenants Camille Arpin (*Petrel*) and Antoine-Marie Georgette-Dubuisson (*Cocyte*), to "almost precede the British in these waters!"[99] Guilbert thought it especially important to keep moving because "he [Guilbert] did not consider it at all likely that the Russians would make any attempt to annoy us [Allied forces] with their gun boats, but he [Guilbert] had a dread of some fire ships being sent out."[100] His British counterparts, meanwhile, thought this was "very ridiculous" and noted that "no one ever heard of fire ships being sent against vessels in an open roadstead. They could scarcely by any possible chance do any injury."[101]

French warships were able to rendezvous with their British counterparts off Archangel on June 15, 1855, whereupon they discovered that the British had already declared a blockade four days earlier.[102] The British Admiralty had again dispatched the frigate *Maender* and two smaller screw-propelled sloops, the *Ariel* and *Phoenix*, but Captain Thomas Baillie now led British forces after Captain Ommanney's assignment to the Baltic.[103] Baille and his subordinates, Commanders John Montagu Hayes (*Phoenix*) and John Proctor Luce (*Ariel*), were charged with implementing a more effective blockade effort. In late October 1854, in fact, Sir James Graham was already determined to

strictly blockade the White Sea in 1855 "from the first moment when the state of the Sea will permit." A larger Allied squadron and earlier blockade declarations boded well for the 1855 blockade's efficacy and meant that Russian coastal populations "suffered severely" during the war's second year.[104] Even the smallest vessels were capable of ferrying arms to coastal populations and necessitated interception, which kept blockading warships busy.

In complete contrast to their frustrating experiences the previous summer, British and French naval forces "intercepted, captured, and destroyed a number of enemy ships" in 1855.[105] Guilbert could happily report that patrolling Allied steamships were "thus able to intercept all mercantile interactions from one port to the other";[106] Commander Luce, in fact, opined that Captain Guilbert did not seem "quite satisfied about the limits of our blockade."[107] British and French sources recounted learning from Russian ones, including Anton Pofkoff (or Pafkoff) of Kandalaksha, that the White Sea Districts and Kola were so ill-supplied that renewing a blockade in 1856 would probably result in these areas being "entirely deserted" by their inhabitants.[108] Guilbert further noted that blockading as a "mode of operation had angered and discouraged the coastal populations that can no longer receive their supplies from Arkangel unless by land."[109] Russian peasants in coastal districts also had additional burdens imposed by their own government. Poffkoff, for one, noted that "Russia Authorities" had ordered coastal inhabitants "to have *no intercourse* with the hostile forces" before concluding that "taxes and recruiting quite exhaust the country and God knows what will become of them (Russian civilians) if the war lasts."[110] The Russian merchant also added that peasants had difficulty defending themselves with officially issued muskets but were better shots with their own rifles, used for seal-hunting.[111] Rumors that America siding with Russia was "sure to be the case" only provided a small degree of comfort.[112]

Instead of lamenting the plight of Russian civilians, British observers celebrated it as a "great point" and "achievement" that made these peasants "feel the injurious effects of the war."[113] Neither the Allies nor neutral powers seriously questioned what destroying the White Sea's peasant-dominated fishing industries and making tea, salt, and spirits "unobtainable" in coastal districts had to do with winning the Crimean War and weakening the Imperial Russian government.[114] Figures including Graham instead emphasized "the moral effect" of a strengthened 1855 blockade as "a good indicator of the firm purpose of the Allies," although it is difficult to seriously consider his

argument that a severe approach in the White Sea would "dry up one of the large Sources of Capital which flows…into the Enemy's Country."[115] As even the normally considerate Commander John Proctor Luce privately opined:

> I think we should only be carrying on the war strictly and with proper vigour if we attacked every place that dared to resist our search for government stores and if we helped ourselves to all the supplies we needed, paying for them when freely offered and fighting for them if necessary where they should be refused. We ought also strictly to examine every part of the coast and destroy everything larger than a fishing boat that could float on the water. This system strictly followed out would cause everyone to suffer from the war, and where all suffer many will soon clamour for pace, and the country that suffers most will give in first.[116]

British raids on villages during the 1855 campaign, especially those adjoining the Gulf of Kandalaksha and Murman Coast, made Russian villages even less likely to cooperate with British efforts to purchase fresh supplies for their ships.[117] Royal Navy officers nevertheless refused to acknowledge any possible connection between "the questionable degree of respect with which Flags of truce were received" and the fact that these flags usually preceded heavily armed landing parties that incinerated wooden houses if their demands went unmet.[118] Russian and British sources credit Captain Baillie with exercising a considerably more moderating command influence than had Ommanney,[119] but this magnanimity had limits. As Commander Luce added,

> Capt Baillie's ideas are eminently peaceful. He does not see the use of attacking these places and considers that their capture would not be worth the risk of losing a single life. I don't agree with him. I consider that everything the Russians deem worth defending, we ought to deem worth attacking.[120]

The occasionally independent actions of Allied warships, on the other hand, meant that more junior British officers such as the *Phoenix*'s John Montagu Hayes were free to write "flaming" dispatches about what Commander Luce sarcastically deemed "the history of the famous battle of Gob," alluding to a biblical contest against the Philistines.[121] Besides, even Captain Baillie's "very great quantity of discretion and prudence" did not always stop him from participating in these attacks by "wantonly attacking and destroying a little village

where nothing in the world was to be gained" after British forces were fired at by nine armed Russians.[122]

For his part, meanwhile, Captain Guilbert pointed out that the Allies had "not yet created links with the local populations and thus cannot get information" on how best to attack fortified Russian positions.[123] This was especially important given the senior French commander's aversion to suffering casualties. Allied landing parties even resorted to asking Orthodox monks in nearby parishes "if it was the same Archimandrite at the [Solovetsky] Monastery as last year" and whether the monastery had received reinforcements.[124] Coupled with the "paucity" of means available to Allied White Sea forces to attack a substantially reinforced Archangel in 1855, this lack of intelligence meant that British and French warships "settled for the establishment of a severe blockade" before withdrawing in October of that year.[125] Little did French and British personnel realize, however, that British-led diplomatic efforts to transform the region's importance were already well underway.

In spite of the attention naturally attached to Cronstadt, Sweaborg, and the Åland Islands, the venue that finally allowed the Allies to entice Sweden-Norway into signing an anti-Russian agreement was Finmark, a coastal region in the extreme northeast of Norway. Key figures in the new Palmerston ministry, which replaced Aberdeen's in February 1855, allowed themselves to be convinced by ever more hyperbolic correspondence that Russia's alleged designs on a "never freezing port in Finmark" would result in "another Sebastopol at small distance from Scotland."[126] British consul general to Norway, John Rice Crowe, in fact, had stridently warned his superiors of a Russian threat to Finmark since the beginning of his diplomatic career in the 1830s.[127] By the end of that decade, Crowe had succeeded in attracting the earnest attention of the then foreign secretary Palmerston, already a committed Russophobe. The latter, in turn, involved the Admiralty and Board of Trade. These early developments meant that simmering tensions would more easily reach a boiling point a decade and a half later, when the Allies seized upon the little-known dispute as a pretext for entering into a defensive alliance with Sweden-Norway in November 1855.

Crowe and a Scottish compatriot, travel writer Samuel Laing, created elaborate historical accounts though which they traced Russia's supposed designs on Finmark back to the Middle Ages.[128] Along with more senior British and Norwegian politicians, both men were thoroughly convinced that insidious Russian motives consistently underlay otherwise local disputes, especially the right of indigenous,

nomadic Sámi (then known as Lapps) to graze their reindeer herds on either side of the border separating Sweden-Norway and Russian Finland. Historians, on the other hand, conceded as early as the 1920s that Crowe's missives were a "cry of wolf."[129] This was confirmed after Soviet authorities, eager to discredit their Czarist predecessors, allowed the Swedish historian Carl Fredrik Palmstierna access to Russia's secret diplomatic archives in the 1930s. Palmstierna's work, since confirmed by every recent historical account, revealed that there was never "any" evidence to support Anglo-French suspicions.[130] Lord Aberdeen similarly emphasized in December 1855 that the British government had never seen "any unfriendly correspondence" regarding Finmark,[131] but he was no longer prime minister. His political superiors were instead inclined to agree with Crowe, who emphasized the "secresy with which Russian transports her material over vast distances" and dredged up a stinging example from 1854 when he wrote that it "is notorious that, ten years ago, Petropaolofsk, in Kamtchatka, was neither fortified nor contained any of the appliances for defence: how did our ships find it prepared last year?" [132]

Those skeptical of Russian motives feared that the Czarist Empire coveted Finmark because the region contained Varangerfjord (Waarenger Fiord), a channel allowing ice-free sea access even in winter. Their alarmist views were fed by geographical ignorance. It was a "common view" in Sweden-Norway, for example, that Russian harbors on the Barents Sea were all covered by ice for as long as seven or eight months a year while Norway's coastal waters remained unfrozen.[133] As French ambassador to Sweden-Norway Charles Victor Lobstein added, "the more [Swedish officials] studied the map of the north of Norway, the more they discovered deep and spacious ports, which, remaining free of ice during the winter, would be for Russia of an incalculable worth."[134] This misconception was not disproven until 1867, by which time Sweden-Norway was firmly entrenched along Palmerston's "long line of circumvallation to confine the future extension of Russia."[135] The British prime minister had already succeeded in convincing key stakeholders that a diplomatic agreement was necessary before Varangerfjord could "speedily" become "the Sebastopol of the North" in both British and French correspondence.[136]

Palmerston, Clarendon, and Walewski felt that the Finmark controversy, heightened by a wartime atmosphere, was a perfect "opportunity" for France and Britain to diplomatically commit themselves to the defense of all Sweden-Norway and not just Finmark.[137] Walewski, for one, was more than convinced. Having succeeded Drouyn de Lhuys as France's foreign minister in May 1855, Walewski provided

French diplomats in Stockholm with an extensive historical account of how the Czarist government had "violently changed the state of things" in Finmark in violation of treaties dating back to 1751.[138] This letter concluded with the French foreign minister's observation that negotiating a "wide-ranging" treaty with Stockholm would have been "difficult" during peacetime but that "the state of war with Russia make such a transaction natural."[139] Walewski continued that there was "no doubt" that the cabinet of St. Petersburg would continue "its plans of expansion in Norway . . . as soon as peace is re-established."[140] Even better for the Allied cause, King Oscar I reached even broader conclusions—"doubtlessly," in Ambassador Lobstein's words, motivated "by stronger reasons than those pulled from the small quarrels about Finmark."[141]

The Swedish-Norwegian King noted that even an agreement "limited as it is to the specific case of Finmark would be no less an act of defiance against Russia," which he felt would be a "real policy change" for Sweden.[142] The Scandinavian Monarch added that Russia "would be shocked that I confronted it for so little," and was especially concerned that guaranteeing the integrity of Finmark alone would not "keep Russia from looking to take over Gotland Island, which dominates the Baltic, or the Port of Landskrona, which dominates the Sund."[143] King Oscar also admitted to Allied diplomats including Charles Victor Lobstein and Arthur Magennis that Finmark was "a subject little understood in Sweden."[144] Instead of ducking the issue of Finmark as he had with potentially occupying the Åland Islands, however, Sweden-Norway's King admitted that he "recognized as you do all of the dangers that threaten us from Russia" and requested a "general" alliance "in order that the result is equally important for the two united kingdoms."[145] The Allies were happy to oblige, and the resulting agreement sufficed to "justify" what King Oscar described as an "entire change of that policy which had been followed in this country since 1815—namely, instead of leaning on Russia for support to now to seek it from England and France."[146]

All signatories consequently had good reason to welcome the so-called November Treaty, signed on the twenty-first day of its namesake month in 1855. The agreement obligated Britain and France to defend the entirety of Sweden-Norway, which in return promised not to cede any part of its territory to Russia. Its ratification was completely unexpected in capitals such as Copenhagen and St. Petersburg, and French diplomats learned from their Austrian counterparts that "the impression (in the Russian capital) was most profound."[147] As noted strategic theorist and Russian advisor Antoine-Henri Jomini

assessed two decades after the war, the idea that Russia would "turn Hammerfest...into a second Sebastol" was "nonsense," which "may have seemed incredible had it not been confirmed by an official agreement."[148] Politicians in London and Paris, meanwhile, saw far outside Finmark when assessing the agreement's significance. Victor Fialin de Persigny, Walewski's successor as France's ambassador in London, for one, presented his predecessor with a rhetorical question: "what is truly being proposed by the treaty at hand? Not only to protect Swedish territory against Russian invasions, but rather to create an enemy of Russia."[149] This opportunity, Persigny, continued, came with the added benefit of avoiding a large campaign that would manifest "the rivalry of our generals and admirals and the lack of unity and direction which we have had such problems with in the current war."[150]

The November Treaty was also especially gratifying to Palmerston, who had already identified "a strong interest also in keeping the Russians out of Norway and Sweden and if we can do so by Inkshed instead of by Bloodshed, sure it is wise to take the opportunity."[151] The British prime minister bluntly added that his government acted not "out of pure love and regard for the Swedes & Norwegians; it is not to keep them in; but to keep the Russians out."[152] Lord Clarendon wholeheartedly agreed, and had already argued that "the importance to us of not having a large Russian naval establishment in an unfreezing Port of the North Sea is immense (tho' we need not put that prominently forward)."[153] The November Treaty was a powerful confirmation that, by late 1855, Britain and France viewed what the Palmerston's government described as new "the main and real object" of the Crimean War: an opportunity to curb "aggressive ambition of Russia" not only in the Black Sea, but much further afield.[154] As Walewski had written to Lobstein during negotiations, the "attention" of Napoleon III's government had been attracted to Russia's undoubtedly "ambitious plans (that) are as menacing for the safety and independence of Europe in the North as they are in the Middle."[155] This diplomatic agreement also guarded against the possibility that Sweden-Norway would "one day" give in to Russian pressure or "captivating proposals...by consenting, for example, to exchange the Åland Islands and Bomarsund for Finmark."[156]

November Treaty aside, it makes little sense to examine the White Sea campaigns of 1854 and 1855 in terms of victories, especially military ones. It is instead helpful to analyze the belligerent powers' accomplishments, positive and negative, in the northernmost theatereof the Crimean War. British and subsequent French actions during

both years indisputably prevented the potential escape of Russian privateers or commerce raiders from the confines of the White Sea and the correspondingly catastrophic effect of that possibility on London insurance markets.[157] Anglo-French warships also succeeded in overcoming logistical and navigational obstacles to tie down thousands of Russian troops around Archangel, though at the cost of terrorizing villagers all along the White Sea's coast. The Allied blockade in 1854 was largely an exercise in futility, but it did furnish important lessons for the following year, which saw Britain and France severely curtail both local and international maritime trade throughout the region. Events including Ommanney's futile bombardment of the Solovetsky Monastery meant that Allied efforts hardly resulted in an uninterrupted triumph, but even the normative capital gained by the Czarist regime from such incidents was outweighed by Russia's fundamental inability to break the Anglo-French naval stranglehold on her northernmost navigable waterways. Although the Czarist government could take some solace in its achievements toward the Pacific, the Allies' dominance of Russia's other seas, more effective blockades, and diplomatic understandings with Sweden-Norway and Austria increasingly indicated to even the most stalwart Russian decision maker that renewed campaigns in 1856 would "favour the Western Powers more than Russian beyond all reasonable comparison."[158]

CHAPTER 7

The Crimean War in the Pacific World, 1854

The Crimean War played multiple roles in a larger drama unfolding in the Pacific world during the 1850s. Anglo-Russian conflict, or the threat thereof, took center stage in Russia's nascent efforts to expand its territorial holdings in East Asia at the expense of Qing China. Likewise, linguistic and cultural misunderstandings among British and Japanese protagonists transformed an ostensibly European struggle into a catalyst of diplomatic relations between the two countries, much to the chagrin of British mercantile interests in China. Instead of interrupting a protracted series of negotiations over a broader range of issues than were at stake during Commodore Matthew Perry's famous mission, wartime events actually facilitated these exchanges. The joint Anglo-French naval campaigns against Russia's easternmost possessions in 1854 also foreshadowed subsequent developments, including the Hawaiian Islands' loss of independence; Russia's 1867 sale of Alaska to the United States; and the abandonment of time-honored practices from the waning "Age of Sail," especially privateering. Such a multifaceted sequence of events involved far more than British naval actions constituting "the mainspring of events" and principal determinant of the far-reaching consequences that ensued.[1]

The Crimean War in East Asia began in late August 1854, months before Russian forces first sighted a combined Anglo-French naval expedition off the Kamchatkan port of Petropavlovsk. Just as scattered British and French naval forces and colonies learned of the conflict's outbreak in May of that year, over 1,000 Russian troops gathered at a remote riverside mine in Eastern Siberia and set out for the distant Pacific Ocean on what one participant described as "ungraceful boats . . . and equally clumsy rafts."[2]Although smaller tributaries' rapids occasionally caused these rafts' logs to "move up and down like piano keys," the expedition encountered good weather

and few natural obstacles.[3] Nevertheless, this locally raised Russian force paused before embarking on its voyage to pray before an icon rescued from a settlement ceded to the Chinese by the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.[4] This agreement, motivated by the presence of thousands of Qing troops, once compelled Russia to renounce any claim to an area larger than France in return for an ambiguously defined border and limited trade concessions.[5] This outcome was hardly surprising given the tenuously slight Russian presence in the region, and the sole aspect of the document that displeased Czar Peter the Great was that his imperial seal followed rather than preceded the Kangxi Emperor's.[6] Reinforced by the subsequent Treaty of Kyakhta (or Kiakhta) in 1727, the integrity of China's northern borders was largely secured until the nineteenth century, when the Crimean War proved ideal for the designs of an ascendant faction of Russian expansionists.

Historians often portray Russia's vast territorial acquisitions of the 1850s as the culmination of tireless individual efforts by the governor general of Eastern Siberia Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov.[7] This obscures the complex dynamics that actually allowed Russian soldiers and settlers to push down the Amur River and annex the lands to its north. Muravyov's predecessor W. Yakovlevich Rupert, for instance, had already fervently argued that "the Amur is necessary for Russia's eastern region in the same way that the Baltic coast is necessary for its western region" and vigorously advocated on behalf of Russian annexation.[8] In contrast to earlier efforts' lack of traction, however, several critical factors unique to the late 1840s and 1850s allowed Muravyov and like-minded supporters to win Nicholas I's personal approval for their actions. The first such factor was the prewar victory of expansion-minded Russian officials over their more conservative colleagues. By April 1853, Czar Nicholas sanctioned his government's official involvement in the pursuit of aggressive East Asian policies even at the risk of damaging Russo-Chinese trade at Kyakhta and angering Britain.[9] Nevertheless, Muravyov was forbidden from venturing down the Amur despite his contention that circumstances required more vigorous action. As Nicholas responded, "let circumstances lead to this…we will wait."[10] The Crimean War was thus a godsend to Muravyov and other imperialist ideologues because it added resonance to their Anglophobic arguments that St. Petersburg might one day "read in the newspaper that the British have obtained navigation rights on the Amur" if Russia did not act decisively.[11] The Crimean conflict's timing also meant that China—weakened by the First Anglo-Chinese or Opium War of 1839–1842, the ongoing Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), and other conflicts such as the Nien

Rebellion (1851–1868)—was in no position to resist Russian military expeditions and the territorial demands that followed. As Ensign Aleksey Evegny Baranov bluntly noted, there was otherwise

> no particular reason to hope that the Chinese would willingly and without hindrance permit such an incursion into their territory…in general, they did not suffer the presence of foreigners among them, and now here was an entire flotilla.[12]

Russian expansionists' motives for viewing the Amur Region as a territory that "should be ours!"[13] are thoroughly examined in other scholarly works,[14] as is the perspective of China's administration.[15] All available evidence unmistakably leads to the conclusion that Muravyov's overriding concern in Siberia was to preempt British expansion at Chinese expense even in the absence of official approval from St. Petersburg.[16] Consequently, the outbreak of a conflict with Britain and France over a set of issues entirely unrelated to East Asia fit seamlessly with the governor general's fear that avaricious British "islanders" would "conquer Kamchatka or at least leave it a desert," "rule the shores of China and Japan," and "*tear Russia away from the Pacific*."[17]

Thanks to the presence of an Ecclesiastical Mission in China's Imperial capital and the correspondence of its archimandrite,[18] both St. Petersburg and Russia's Siberian administrators were keenly aware that the Taiping Rebellion and other internal turmoil were "enfeebling and exhausting the (Chinese) government to the extreme."[19] The question, according to Russian expansionists, was whether Russia or Britain would benefit from China's faltering control over its northeastern domains. As tensions continued to mount in Europe in January 1854, Nicholas I decided that "circumstances" had arrived.[20] Accordingly, the Czar authorized an Amur expedition in response to Muravyov's "main" argument that Petropavlovsk was in dire need of reinforcements.[21] Wartime exigencies thus provided Muravyov with long-awaited permission to descend the Amur and renegotiate the boundary separating Qing and Romanov domains. In practice, this meant that the Crimean War in East Asia began with Russian preparations to ride, or more accurately march and sail, roughshod over the Qing position that China "had no concern with the rivalry of the outside world."[22] The conditions that Nicholas I imposed in return for his permission, in fact, "only later became known" to members of Muravyov's expedition.[23]

A month after the embarkation of what one German observer described as Russia's *Amurjourney* or *Amurflotillen*, Chinese officials

in the southern provinces provided Beijing with a problematic description of the Crimean War's outbreak and underlying causes. This document, in fact, was the culmination of Viceroy Ye Mingchen's (Yeh Ming-chen's) effort to "gradually begin to shed light on the situation" by translating foreign newspapers.[24] Mingchen included accurate observations of rapid British efforts to fortify Hong Kong and keep watch for approaching Russian warships, but badly misinterpreted events in Europe.[25] While the young Xianfeng (Hsien-feng) Emperor Yizhu correctly concluded that "the Russians surely have some other treacherous plans besides intending to fight the English,"[26] he was preoccupied with what he understatedly referred to as "internal disruption and civil unrest."[27] On June 24, 1854, Yizhu learned that a Russian expedition had passed the strategic town of Aigun (modern Aihui) and had proceeded down the Amur.[28]

The timing of this Russian expedition and China's internal disorder combined to ensure that Muravyov's first expeditions met no resistance. By 1854, Qing authorities had severely depleted the manpower of China's relatively stable northeastern provinces near the Amur River and drastically reduced their garrisons to fight rebellions elsewhere.[29] The military governor of Jilin (Kirin), for instance, reported that more than 7,000 out of the 10,000 Chinese troops normally stationed in his province had been deployed far south against Taiping rebels, leaving fewer than 800 men at key garrisons.[30] This made no impression in Beijing, however, as the Xianfeng Emperor flatly stated that recalling even 2,000 soldiers to counter Russian forays was unthinkable given the Taiping threat.[31] Furthermore, modern Chinese scholarship argues that the northeastern provinces of Shenyang (Mukden), Jilin, and Heilongjiang (Heilungchiang) had been artificially depopulated by a Qing Court intent on maintaining ethnic Manchu privileges at the expense of potential Han Chinese settlers.[32] Notwithstanding additional factors, including the ideologically charged assertion that officials in the northeast were demonstrably less capable and motivated than their Russian adversaries,[33] China's government was left to observe and then rationalize Russian expansion.

Russia's first voyage down the Amur became impossible to overlook once officials including the Heilongjiang province's deputy commander, Husunpu, met with Muravyov. Husunpu initially questioned the Russian governor general's position that the Amur route was necessary because of Britain's Pacific naval strength, but had to conclude that, "in the Eastern Provinces the soldiers and arms are entirely insufficient, it was not convenient to start hostilities."[34] For

his part, Muravyov held that he was simply protecting Russian territory from the British while adding that Russia's appearance "at the Amur's mouth at that time" would benefit the Chinese government by "depriving the English of the possibility of attacking China from that direction."[35] Although Muravyov demanded precautions such as not hunting with firearms or stopping at settlements, his threat to burn Aigun to the ground if necessary indicated that the Russian governor general, in Ensign Baranov's words, "was set on getting through to the mouth of the Amur no matter what."[36] The few Chinese troops that remained in Aigun were no deterrent to Russian officers, who viewed them as "a kind of mob with practically antediluvian weapons" and dismissed "the well-known unmilitary quality of the Chinese."[37]

As confusion over the Crimean War's true course mounted in China's capital, Emperor Yizhu rationalized letting the Russians proceed on the grounds that it "seemed unworthy to put difficulties in their way."[38] At this point, Beijing had not heard the reports reaching Aigun that "the Russians were coming like the *shuga,* i.e. as many as the blocks of ice in the river when it breaks up in Spring."[39] China's government had to wait until mid-October 1854, however, to learn that Russians had been establishing fortified settlements near the Amur River's mouth months before Muravyov's expedition left.[40] As a correspondent of the *Augsburger Allgmeine Zeitung* recounted to his readers in Germany, an envoy from Beijing thereafter arrived to address the situation. In a tone the Chinese "used to use for rebellious barbarian," the official ordered the Russians to abandon Amur with "signs of compunction and contriteness for their shameless robbery."[41]

The Russian response was indirect yet telling: they showed the Chinese official Russian ships, cannon, and military personnel and then asked whether all this would suffice for the defense of Russia's newly "acquired country."[42] Muravyov also continued to work with officials including Grennady Nevelskoy to secretly undermine the system by which Chinese officials demanded tribute from indigenous Nivkh (Gilyak) people.[43] By July 21, 1854, Archimandrite Palladii could write to Muravyov that China's Grand Council would seemingly content itself with playing "an observer's role on the Amur" in light of the Qing Empire's weakness and Russia's historic ban on the export of opium to China.[44]

Despite its Emperor's persistent conclusions that "the Russian barbarians have some intentions which they do not speak of openly,"[45] China's Imperial government was unable to reach out to Britain and

France for assistance against Russia. Palladii was happy to report that he doubted China would accept British help, assuming it was forthcoming, because "Britain is the nation they hate most."[46] Russian figures adroitly played upon these sentiments by explaining to another Chinese delegation, pressing for an explanation of the first Amur voyage that the Russians were "forced" to occupy the Amur estuary because "the British were now determined to conquer China."[47] The Russian argument held that the British, realizing they could not conquer all of China from Canton, had "modified their plan of war and wanted to try to invade the country from the north through Russian territory."[48] Although this did not fool China's Imperial court, its delegation, in the words of one Russian midshipman, "seemed to have been satisfied by this explanation and believed that their government must certainly be grateful to the Russians for this measure and perhaps would even support it."[49]

The futility of any potential Chinese appeal to the Allies is especially evident in contemporary diplomatic correspondence. Although Lord Clarendon suggested that British diplomats convince the Chinese Emperor to cease trading with Russia, expel Palladii, and incite Mongols to rebel on Russian territory, Britain's most influential diplomats in East Asia were otherwise inclined. Sir John Bowring, recently appointed governor of Hong Kong and a former superintendent of Chinese trade, informed Clarendon that the Taiping Rebellion and the unfavorable state of Anglo-Chinese relations meant that such "measures were neither feasible nor desirable."[50] Sir John instead urged the French government to join Britain and "profit from the embarrassment of the Tartar dynasty,"[51] just as Britain had in 1853.[52] French diplomats, meanwhile, argued that the Allies would not obtain anti-Russian concessions from China unless negotiators from both naval powers could count on the support of a force "capable of inspiring more terror than the Russians could exert."[53] Further to the south in Hong Kong and Canton (modern Guangzhou), British and French warships were already intent on protecting their commercial interests from rebels, pirates, and overzealous Chinese officials alike. It thus comes as little surprise that by the time British and French forces undertook joint military action in China in late 1856, it was against Chinese rather than Russian adversaries.[54] Russia's expansion efforts grew more secure by the year and were permanently formalized by treaty within a decade, which made neutral China one of the Crimean War's most notable geopolitical casualties despite its nonbelligerent status.

China and island states including Japan and Hawai'i were not the only Pacific states to remain neutral between 1854 and 1856. After

overcoming a considerable degree of confusion and mistrust,[55] the Hudson's Bay Company persuaded the British government to accept a February 1854 offer from the Russian American Company designed to maintain "reciprocal neutrality...on the North West Coast of America."[56] This meant that each empire's only adjacent territories were excluded from a conflict before it even began, and closer inspection helps explain the motivation of both sides. Correspondence reveals that key Russian officials had given up any hope that Russian America (Alaska) could be held in the face of American expansion and British maritime supremacy. Far from attempting "to round out" a position in North America,[57] Muravyov was instead urging Nicholas I that they "*must not lose sight of the fact that sooner or later we will be compelled to give up all of our North American holdings.*"[58] British authorities including Vancouver Island governor James Douglas, meanwhile, appealed to the Colonial Department for protection but instead learned that London viewed defensive measures as both "unnecessary and unadvisable."[59] Far from being a "sign that neither side had seriously thought" that conflict would extend to North America,[60] the bilateral agreement was instead a recognition that Russia, Britain, and their respective chartered companies had little to gain and a great deal to lose in fighting over these sparsely populated lands.

In contrast to the relative tranquility along the northwest coast of North America, the situation off South America was significantly more volatile. Throughout 1853, for example, French warships had to closely monitor conditions in Guayaquil, Ecuador.[61] Chile and Peru also struggled to maintain political stability even as their economies and shares of international trade and investment expanded rapidly.[62] Captain Charles Parker of the frigate *President*'s Royal Marines, in fact, was struck by new evidence of "very extended commerce" when visiting the ports of Valparaiso, Chile and Callao, Peru in early 1854 after an absence of 20 years.[63] Protecting trade in products ranging from guano to silver attracted warships from Britain, France, and the United States, which explains why so many Allied warships were based in South America at the Crimean War's outbreak.[64] Problematically for Rear Admirals David Price and Febvrier-Despointes, however, conducting wartime operations did not relieve them from their peacetime responsibilities of monitoring Chilean and Peruvian politics while protecting commerce as far north as San Francisco. Price's obligation to deploy *Dido* and *Cockatrice* to monitor Valparaiso and Callao in May 1854,[65] for example, meant that these warships and their crews were unavailable for use against Petropavlovsk. As

Febvrier-Despointes discerned after a frank exchange with Price on May 7, 1854, "The English Admiral regrets not having more steam-boats and that his forces are not large enough to act immediately and effectively."[66] Anglo-French naval forces in South American waters continued to have notable impact on politics in Peru, Chile, and Ecuador through the 1850s, but only at the expense of their campaigns against Russia in 1854.[67]

Across the Pacific, the less numerous British and French warships stationed in Chinese waters found themselves similarly overextended. Hong Kong, like other British colonies including Vancouver Island, Australia, and even the Falkland Islands,[68] clamored for protection from the same potential Russian commerce raiders so greatly feared by French consular agents.[69] Britain's commander for the combined East Indies and China Station, Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling, perceptively realized that Hong Kong was an unlikely target for outnumbered Russian warships. He instead envisioned a Russian threat further to the north against China and to the east against Japan.[70] Nevertheless, Allied warships were still required to suppress an epidemic of piracy so severe that one American merchant, according to the *Times,* locked all of its ethnically Chinese passengers in an iron cage as a security precaution.[71] Assets outside of Hong Kong also had to be protected, not only from Chinese pirates and Russian raiders, but also deteriorating domestic political conditions in a faltering Qing Empire. By 1854, the Taiping Rebellion had raged for years, and figures such as Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys were receiving reports from Shanghai that tensions could re-explode at any moment.[72] Although a small British squadron obtained unexpected concessions during its attempt to secure the neutrality of Japan's ports, British and French warships from Chinese and even more distant waters were unable to directly participate in Allied efforts against Russian possessions in the Pacific until 1855.

When it came to coordinating the efforts of these widely dispersed Allied squadrons around the Pacific, British officers noted that their country's South American and Chinese/East Indian squadrons were so distant that ships logs' recorded time using different days.[73] The demands that such distances placed on a limited number of warships consequently added to already daunting expectations that they protect the coasts and exports of entire continents while still attempting to destroy Russian naval power in the Pacific. The difficulty inherent in successfully accomplishing this mission was not lost on British diplomats in Chile, who expressed their concerns to Sir James Graham over the "smallness" of British naval forces in the Pacific. In response,

the first lord simply stated that existing British warships would suffice to destroy any Russian warships because of French cooperation.[74] The French legation in Chile also anticipated that Allied forces in the Pacific would adequately protect commerce, but was "still worried" that Russian agents would buy large amounts of coal and exploit any momentary absence of Allied warships off Valparaiso.[75] Further north, the French consulate in Lima, Peru, was even more alarmed that Russian warships and privateers could potentially hide off Cape Horn and capture French ships and exports destined for Peru and Chile.[76] All the available primary sources, in fact, definitively indicate that the overriding concern of senior Allied decision makers during the Crimean War in the Pacific and East Asia was protecting a broad range of economic interests. With the exception of Rear Admiral James Stirling's 1854 mission to Japan and the concessions that followed, Allied actions over the next two years had little to do with Muravyov's ambitions and were instead intended to protect British and French commerce from all possible threats.

British and French decision makers' emphasis on economic factors is easy to discern from three critically important sets of documents related to Crimean War's initial stages in the Pacific. The two elements of the otherwise vague instructions dispatched to Allied naval commanders were mandates to cooperate with one another and safeguard the "commerce" of both states.[77] Additionally, the task-oriented communications supplementing these overarching orders dealt with subjects such as protecting valuable cargos carried by the British-owned Pacific Steam Navigation Company rather than how to locate and destroy Russian forces.[78] These directives were hardly surprising given the second set of documents in question: correspondence involving British and French consular officials. Even before the conflict's formal outbreak, communications from diplomats posted from New York to Australia warned of Russian privateers operating out of bases in Alaska, Hawai'i, Manila, Japan, San Francisco, New York, and so on.[79] As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the concerns of diplomats such as Guillaume Patrice Dillon, France's consul in San Francisco, often found a receptive audience in Paris.[80] Dillon's sentiments were similar to those of John Rice Crowe in Norway because, irrespective of their accuracy, they had a significant impact on the Allies' wartime policies. Other sets of documents also reveal that Allied naval commanders were keenly aware of the danger posed by Russian privateers and received reports of their potential activities directly rather than through London or Paris.[81] As French officer Édouard Polydore Vanéechout noted in his subsequent study of the

1854 campaign written under the pen name Edmund du Hailley, North Pacific whaling operations returned more gold to the United States than did the mines of California. Vanéechout added that the Allies feared that Russian naval forces or privateers would emulate the actions of Captain David Porter and the United States ship *Essex* during the War of 1812 by wreaking havoc on British whaling operations in the Pacific.[82]

The wartime consequences of Britain and France's concern with protecting their economic assets in the Pacific were profound. This priority combined with logistical difficulties to ensure that only six of the two dozen or so warships nominally available to Allied squadrons in early 1854 arrived off Petropavlovsk in late August of that year. The rest were protecting ports or engaged in missions such as the one that fell to the British and French vessels *Amphitrite* and *Arthémise*. Their mission to monitor San Francisco was hardly "inexplicable"[83] to those who understood the importance that the Allied governments placed on safeguarding commerce.[84] Considering, by their own admission, how little French and British commanders knew about the whereabouts of Russian warships and the North Pacific's geography, even remote possibilities such as Russian warships threatening British merchant vessels in the Gulf of Bengal were a source of anxiety.[85] Even more significantly, the wide dispersal of Allied naval units and the commercial assets they were required to protect meant that cooperation among warships from the Americas with their counterparts based off China and the East Indies had to wait until 1855 despite the pleas of Rear Admiral Adolphe Laguerre, the commander of France's (naval) "Division of Réunion and Indochina."[86] Laguerre blamed a lack of information regarding Russian whereabouts for ruining any chance of Allied success in the Pacific,[87] but inaccurate intelligence effectively sabotaged British and French forces even when they did locate substantial Russian forces at Petropavlovsk in 1854 and De Castries (De Kastri, Des Castries, etc.) Bay in 1855. Before arriving at either destination, though, British and French warships from South America first had to rendezvous in the Marquesas Islands before heading to Honolulu, Hawai'i.

The combined Anglo-French South American squadrons had to visit Hawai'i to support the vulnerable kingdom's independence in the face of growing American pressure. Both British and French officers expressed their countries' "great interest" in the island kingdom's continued "*independence*" and noted that their unprecedented display of naval force "naturally created . . . a great sensation, especially among the natives."[88] Despite these efforts, though, Lieutenant

Vanéechout predicted that the Anglo-American "race" for influence in Hawai'i would eventually result in the addition of a new star to the United States' flag.[89] Vanéechout's assessment matched that of France's ambassador to the United States, Eugène de Sartiges, who noted that the Allied opposition to American expansion in Hawai'i and Cuba antagonized the "expansion inherent in the spirit, morals, and logic of the American people."[90] In conjunction with Russia's approach of "devaluing the fate of Cuba, Hawai'i, and even Alaska," French and British measures in Pacific demanded that Allied forces carefully avoid antagonizing the United States any more than absolutely necessary.[91]

In addition to participating brief 20-minute audience with His Majesty Kamehameha III during which Price more directly requested the Hawaiian King to maintain the islands' sovereignty than did Febvrier-Despointes,[92] the Allied forces accomplished several important tasks. British and French warships first ensured that the Russians were not using Hawai'i as a base to outfit privateers, a prospect that especially concerned the French government.[93] More importantly, the Hawaiian visit was also intended to gather military intelligence concerning the whereabouts of Russia's largest warships in the Pacific, the frigates *Diana* and *Aurora*.[94] As Lieutenant Achille Amet wrote home to France, though, it was "quite probable" that the Allies were too late to catch one or more Russian frigates at Honolulu; "birds" that had "flown off already."[95] Rear Admiral Price, meanwhile, learned from an agent of the Hudson's Bay Company that two Russian vessels had left the archipelago two weeks earlier bound for Petropavlovsk, Russia's principal military outpost on the Kamchatka Peninsula.[96]

According to a letter Febvrier-Despointes wrote off Petropavlovsk days prior to the Allies' failed attack on September 4, both rear admirals had a twofold objective in mind when planning to assault the Russian port.[97] Their first goal was to eliminate the Russian naval threat to British and French whaling vessels in the North Pacific. As the French commander succinctly explained, "our presence here has met our first goal, safeguarding the interests of our two *commerces*."[98] Febvrier-Despointes noted that Petropavlovsk was "extremely fortified by the nature of its terrain" as well as by Russian military arts.[99] The French rear admiral accordingly suggested attacking with "*vive force*" rather than conducting siege operations with the modest stocks of ammunition carried by Allied warships.[100] It is important to note, though, that Price and Febvrier-Despointes only arrived at this course of action after a "lengthy" meeting following their departure from Honolulu in late July.

For a few hours on the afternoon of July 30, Allied officers believed that their ships were headed to Sitka and San Francisco.[101] These plans soon changed, however. Baltic German nobleman and Russian Navy Lieutenant Nikolay Schilling, captured after the 1855 wreck of the Russian frigate *Diana*, later recounted.

> British officers told me that their Admiral had made this decision (to set off for Petropavlovsk) without previous orders, at his own risk, and only on persuasion of his subordinates, especially the commander of the frigate *Pique*, Sir Frederick Nicolson. The old man (Price) was himself undecided over this, because he feared to arouse by such action the indignation of his government.[102]

Price's chaplain, Reverend Thomas Holme, described the rear admiral as a "poor old man . . . always weak and vacillating in everything he did."[103] The log of Alexander Vernon Maccall, a clerk on the British frigate *Pique*, similarly noted that Price "evidently showed great weakness in allowing everybody to sway him as they willed,"[104] making him incapable of dominating his French colleagues. According to even a sympathetic French captain, "the good Admiral Price was a perfect and kind gentleman but hardly at the height of circumstances. He was old and hadn't sailed, I was told, for the last 22 years since he had been named 'Rear Admiral.'"[105] This would soon have profound consequences after the Allies discovered that Petropavlovsk was more strongly defended than they had anticipated.

Unbeknownst to approaching Anglo-French warships in 1854, Nikolay Muravyov had personally supervised a complete overhaul of Petropavlovsk's defenses during the preceding five years. The Russian governor general of Eastern Siberia ignored the objections of figures including explorer Grennady Nevelskoy (Nevelskoi, Nevel'skoi, etc.) that Kamchatka could be isolated and successfully attacked by an enemy fleet.[106] The base undeniably faced significant logistical challenges thanks to a lack of nearby arable land, but Muravyov's advocacy on behalf of Petropavlovsk's excellent natural harbor and formidable natural defenses nevertheless convinced Nicholas I to make it Russia's principal naval base in East Asia.[107] As early as the summer of 1849, Muravyov and Kamchatkan military governor Vasily Zavoyko (Zavoiko, etc.) began attempting to bolster the port's previously insignificant defenses.[108] In choosing the site for a landwards artillery battery, the governor general also considered the possibility of an enemy landing and accordingly made arrangements to "welcome it with grape-shot."[109] Reinforcements, fresh from their initial

voyage down the Amur River, the frigate *Aurora* and armed transport *Dvina*, and combat engineer Konstantin Iosipovich Mrovinsky (Mravinsky) also arrived to augment Petropavlovsk's defenses.[110] The *Pallada*'s fragile condition, the strength of Anglo-French warships in Chinese waters, and the "main difficulty" in feeding large crews at the Amur River's mouth made the decision to reinforce Petropavlovsk even easier.[111] Instead of facing only sailors and a handful of volunteers, the approaching Anglo-French ships instead confronted carefully placed artillery batteries and hundreds of troops, many of whom were "originally Siberian bear hunters" taught European military tactics by Captain Aleksandr Pavlovich Arbuzov throughout their voyage down the Amur.[112]

Contrary to the completely erroneous assertion that "no serious planning had been undertaken for a war in the North Pacific by anyone,"[113] Russian forces trained for months in the expectation of fighting in hilly and wooded terrain. Village girls even played the role of an "enemy" so that Russian troops could practice maneuvering under cover of trees, bushes, and rocks.[114] Additionally, the well-educated children of Russian officers noted that their fathers supervised the construction of batteries from 4:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., only breaking for lunch.[115] The effect of these preparations was not lost upon Allied observers. Upon their squadron's early September arrival, for example, one British officer bitterly noted that the Russians had "not idled *their* time away," in contrast to the leisurely pace of the Allied squadron's passage that had "thrown away hours when minutes were invaluable."[116] As the *Forte*'s captain Amand Christope Méridec De Miniac added, "we could not kid ourselves anymore, the Russians had taken advantage of our slowness."[117] Influential Lieutenant Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov, in fact, wrote to his son that Zavoyko was "not idling" and had "already ordered where the batteries should be built" before learning that the Crimean War had even started.[118] Maksutov recounted beginning constructing batteries on Zavoyko's orders "as soon as I came off the boat."[119] Although "the battery turned out ugly and clumsy and got a lot of jeers from Engineer Mrovinsky," Maksutov proudly noted that it later "showed all its merits in battle."[120]

On August 28, 1854, an unidentified black steamship appeared at the entrance of Avacha (or Avatcha) Bay, Kamchatka. Although it flew American colors instead of British and French ones and had hidden its distinctive white stripes, the *Virago* could be recognized after a more "careful look" by officers who disagreed with Zavoyko's assumption that the vessel was part of American commodore Matthew

C. Perry's expedition to Japan.[121] Russian forces had already sighted all six British and French ships earlier that morning,[122] and an observation post was "busily at work" relaying information to headquarters in Petropavlovsk.[123] Officers on the *Aurora*, including Captain Ivan Izylmetiev,[124] recognized the mysterious vessel as the British paddle-steamer *Virago* from a prewar visit to British warships' home port of Callao, Peru. Before leaving Callao after a warning from the American consulate in Lima that war was imminent, in fact, the *Aurora*'s commanders had repeatedly visited the *Virago*.[125] Izylmetiev's suspicions were confirmed when the steamship abruptly headed back out of the bay, and Russian forces worked through the night to reinforce the boom protecting the harbor's narrow entrance.[126] This contributed to an early lunch of Petropavlovsk's commanders that, in the words of one participant, was understandably "not too merry."[127] Allied officers, meanwhile, "noticed a certain trouble in Admiral Price" after assuring him that they recognized details including the *Aurora*'s distinctive sun marking from that same prewar encounter in Callao.[128] The British rear admiral had already received correspondence from home warning him to beware of the Russian frigate, and consequently "dreamed of the *Aurora* and of [its] Armstrong cannons" installed by British shipyards prior to the conflict.[129] Price was also apparently "alarmed" by Russian batteries opening fire, despite the shot falling "considerably short" of the Allied warships.[130] The results of what another British officer described as "anxiety & indecision preying upon a mind, never very strong" would soon become painfully apparent.[131]

In addition to sighting the *Aurora* and a smaller warship just inside the sheltered harbor's bar, the British and French officers on board the *Virago* also observed seven or eight merchant vessels sheltered in the rear of the harbor.[132] These included a merchant vessel from Hamburg (the *Magdalena*) chartered by the Russian American Company to deliver provisions and the American whaling brig *Noble*, whose crew joined American merchants in being "very indignant" at Allies' choice of the Stars and Stripes as a disguise.[133] The Allied reconnaissance mission lasted only a few hours, but confirmed Price's worst fear: Russian warships and multiple artillery batteries now augmented Petropavlovsk's natural defenses.[134] This was a most discouraging sight for a commander who, to quote a contemptuous description by the *Pique*'s Lieutenant Edmund Grove, "fancied" that the Russians "would all run away at the sight of the ships that he anchored 2 miles off the Town instead of going straight on & attacking."[135] After a series of desultory, probing bombardments and small-scale landings

during the next two days, the 64-year-old Welsh officer slipped into a small armory on board his flagship at one o'clock in the afternoon on August 30, 1854 and deliberately shot himself in the chest with a pistol.[136]

David Price was not the first senior British officer to die on station during the nineteenth century, but his death is singularly important for multiple reasons. The first involves the incident's immediate impact, which altered the Allied plan of attack in favor of Petropavlovsk's Russian defenders. As Lieutenant George Palmer of the *President* wrote to his parents, "this unfortunate affair was the cause of all our after misfortunes."[137] Senior Allied officers and physicians rushed to pay their respects to the unfortunate British commander, who clung to life for four hours.[138] Reverend Thomas Holme, the *President*'s chaplain, suspected that the bullet missed Price's heart and instead lodged in his lungs,[139] though an autopsy soon confirmed that the bullet had passed through the right ventricle and led to an agonizingly slow death.[140] Overall command passed to Rear Admiral Febvrier-Despointes, a commander similar to Price in both age and experience. The "poor old (French) man who in his youth was a page to (Empress) Josephine" could reportedly only take Price's hand and remark "*courage mon ami*" as Price "constantly spoke of his wife & sisters."[141] The senior British officer, meanwhile, became the younger and more aggressive Sir Frederick Nicolson of the frigate *Pique*. Nicolson was already chafing at the cautious approach of his superiors, audibly remarking just before Price's suicide that he would "anchor for no Admiral; I left England to engage the Russian frigate. Tow me alongside her!"[142] Before these changes in command and their consequences could even register, however, Anglo-French officers faced the pressing issue of how to record the circumstances surrounding Price's death and inform the 2,000 sailors and marines of their combined squadron.

Several modern historical accounts consider an entry in the logbook of the *President*—"12:15 PM: Rear Admiral Price was shot by a Pistol Ball by his own hand"—as evidence that Price's death may have been an accident.[143] These narratives also cite "French sources" from British diplomatic records in Honolulu in an effort to prove that Price had shot himself "while putting pistols in his belt," and that the rear admiral's death "will remain unexplained until new and conclusive evidence comes to light."[144] The immediate problem with this conclusion is that it is based on an incomplete reading of the relevant Admiralty file, which also includes the *President*'s Captain Richard Burridge's report.

> The impression was that the Rear Admiral had accidentally wounded himself, but the observations afterwards made by him tended to induce me, and those about him to fear that it must have taken place during a momentary alteration of mind, the result of intense mental anxiety.[145]

One modern article also mischaracterizes the diplomatic reports to Honolulu, which led American minister David Lawrence Gregg to conclude that the circumstances surrounding Price's death "lead many to the conclusion that it was an act of suicide."[146]

This conclusion is far better supported than some modern authors acknowledge, especially one who does not cite any sources at all in concluding that "the only close evidence" of Price's intentional death was a private letter from Reverend Holme.[147] The clergyman recounted how Price "had tried to shoot himself through the heart" because, to quote the rear admiral's deathbed admission, "he could not bear the thought" that "some fault of his" might lead to his men's "destruction."[148] Holme ultimately reached the subsequently ironic conclusion that "there is no chance of concealing the horrid deed from the world," especially after a dying Price publicly "confessed his crime" to Febvrier-Despointes.[149] Reverend Holme, though, was far from the only witness. Private correspondence of multiple British lieutenants serving on different ships noted, in Edmund Grove's words, that the rear admiral "confessed having done it himself & seemed to repent it."[150] George Palmer and several of his French counterparts, meanwhile, independently corroborated Reverend Holme's account of a deathbed confession and plea for divine forgiveness and even added additional details such as Price's conclusion that he would feel "the torments of Hell for what he had done."[151] Had the 2008 work's author not considered his decision to ignore French much less Russian sources "less vital than it appears,"[152] he also might have read numerous French sources, including Dr. Henry Guérault's published medical notes. Dr. Guérault, a surgeon attached to France's two frigates, recorded the same quotes as Palmer and Holme while describing how Price committed suicide "in a moment of weakness" because he feared the consequences of "*insuccès*" or failure, which was "always severely judged in Britain."[153] The official French notation meanwhile, simply stated that, "on the planned day of the attack, [Febvrier-Despointes] learned that Admiral Price had committed suicide."[154]

Considering only the correspondence of those best informed is also of paramount importance when interpreting Russian accounts of the incident. Petropavlovsk's second-in-command, for instance, reacted angrily to a translation of an English article mentioning that

"Admiral Price was more afraid of responsibility than a child is afraid of a ghost" by discussing how Price, as a young man, once climbed the highest tower of St. Paul's Cathedral in London, tied his handkerchief on it, and challenged his peers to take it down.[155] Some Soviet historians later held that Price perished "within seconds" and that his reported suicide was a British "fabrication" designed to conceal the rear admiral's death at the hands of a Russian cannonball fired from shore.[156] Only the British rear admiral's suicide, though, explains the 1857 observation of the *Aurora*'s lieutenant commander that "we figured that there was not a great understanding between the chiefs, all the while being very far from thinking that such a terrible tragedy had happened."[157] Dmitry Maksutov, who later became the last governor of Russian America (Alaska), more directly noted that "later we found out that…English Rear-Admiral Price shot himself…It remains unclear why."[158]

Ultimately, the exact circumstances of this tragedy's ensuing cover-up emerge from the correspondence of those most closely involved. These efforts were not entirely successful, though, as the *Times* even printed a letter from a midshipman on the *President* reporting that Price "shot himself with a pistol, I believe on account of great excitement about the result of the battle; but, as it seems to be kept very quiet on board, it is better not to talk too much about it."[159]

Nevertheless, efforts to obscure the unsavory incident began soon after the fatal shot, when British officers learned that "the Admiral has shot himself, for God's sake keep it from the men if you can."[160] These efforts were aided by two developments: the "unprecedented" nature of a rear admiral's suicide on station and the quick thinking of French officers. Captain Amand Christophe de Miniac, for one, recounted how:

> "We saw Captain Nicholson who, coming on deck, told me point-blank and without any caution that Admiral Price was dying, and that he had just shot himself in the cardiac region. Being extremely moved myself of this terrible news, and realizing how much this would demoralize the crews and thereafter the consequences that this would entail, I encouraged him to stay calm and to say that it was while charging his pistol that M. Price had hurt himself."[161]

De Miniac's conclusions were fully supported by those of the *Forte*'s illustrator, Jean-René-Maurice de Kerret. This non-enlisted nobleman had the presence of mind to urge Nicolson to remain calm and loudly proclaim that Price's death was accidental "to those that were surrounding me so that they could not disprove this and that

they would not repeat the ill-considered and imprudent comments of Captain Nicolson."[162] Thanks to these efforts, four Allied prisoners, only two of whom survived their wounds, informed their Russian captors that Price, in Captain Izylmetiev's words, "shot himself by accident while loading his gun."[163] A written statement submitted by the *Magdalena*'s captain to Hamburg's Shanghai consulate, in fact, emphasized that the only surviving English prisoner was so confused that he "stated that the English Admiral died the day after their arrival at this place, and the French Admiral killed himself accidentally."[164] Weeks later, French officers deliberately furnished American reporters in California with a fabricated account of Price's "accident" after returning to San Francisco.[165]

It matters a great deal that this particular rear admiral joined the ranks of the more than 200 casualties that Britain and France suffered at Petropavlovsk. Price's suicide meant that his successors would alter the Allies' original approach of methodically isolating and destroying individual Russian shore batteries protecting the harbor's entrance. Even Russian defenders, such as Lieutenant Konstantin Pavlovich Pilkin of the *Aurora*, felt that this "clear" plan would soon result in the piecemeal destruction of Petropavlovsk's protective batteries and warships.[166] Instead, a divided Allied command structure that succeeded Price ensured otherwise. In a striking reversal of the previously amicable relationship between the two Allied rear admirals, Febvrier-Despointes and Nicolson irritated not only one other, but also their respective subordinates.[167] The restrained language of Febvrier-Despointes' normally understated correspondence, for example, includes the French rear admiral's observation that "until Admiral Price's death, perfect concordance existed between the two divisions and I am convinced that this would also have been the case if the one who replaced him would have taken responsibility."[168] Lieutenant Grove, meanwhile, described a confused, bifurcated command structure as "all '*will you do this*'? '*shall I do that*'?" The frustrated British officer privately added that "the grand fault was that there was no commander in chief. Nothing done without consultation—the French Adm(iral) took offence at some things we did, & vice versa."[169]

The basic problem was that Price, and Febvrier-Despointes after him, remained adamant that their squadron of three frigates, two smaller vessels, and a paddle-steamer remain "efficient,"[170] or sufficiently undamaged, in the event of the potential arrival of Russia's two other frigates in the Pacific, the *Pallada* (Pallas) and the *Diana*.[171] Neither Febvrier-Despointes nor Nicolson had any idea

that Russian vice admiral Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin (Putiatin) had already abandoned the aging *Pallada* near the Amur River's mouth and assigned the *Diana* to obtain concessions from Japan.[172] Unlike Febvrier-Despointes, Nicolson deemed potential casualties as less important than the successful destruction of Russian batteries and ships.[173] These commanders' divergent opinions were only reconciled after much correspondence and negotiation, and the ensuing compromise of landing 700 men on ground not covered by their ships' guns produced precisely the type of "unfortunate result" that Febvrier-Despointes had hoped to avoid.[174]

Actual combat began in earnest on August 31, the day following Price's suicide, although a confused Allied command structure considerably limited the scope of fighting. Low morale was also a factor; according to the *President*'s surgeon James Nicholas Dick, "gloom (had) spread over all hands" following Price's suicide.[175] A lack of morning winds forced the 120-horsepower *Virago* to laboriously tow the larger frigates *Forte*, *Pique*, and *President* into position. These Allied warships then engaged the first and second Russian batteries at the edge of point Shakov (Shakoff, Schakov, etc.) and the neck of the Koshka, or Little, Spit that enclosed Petropavlovsk's inner harbor.[176] Governor Vasily Zavoyko, meanwhile, claimed that Russia's most distant and isolated position, a three-gun battery at Krasny Yar (Krasnyi Yar), "worried everyone" in his camp, yet could not be reinforced.[177] Accordingly, the Russian midshipman in charge of that modest position received instructions to spike its guns and retreat to Russia's second battery at the neck of Koshka, which he did after the *Virago* finished towing larger ships and launched small boats carrying an Allied landing party.

Some British sources exclusively credit the efforts of British Royal Marines under Captain Charles Parker,[178] but Rear Admiral Zavoyko, his wife Yulia, and numerous other Russian observers all disagreed. They instead independently observed the French *tricolore* and not a British standard flying above Krasny Yar.[179] Much to Russian officers' relief, the Allied landing force, swelled by reinforcements to some 300 men, abruptly reembarked on their ships instead of pressing home an attack on the 11-gun battery number two at Koshka. Some historians credit the approach of improvised Russian reinforcements that had gathered near the *Aurora*, especially since Lieutenant Palmer added that a messenger warned that the Russian "party advancing was too strong for us."[180] Additional sources, though, reveal otherwise. Nikolay O'Rourke, a multilingual Russian cadet of Irish ancestry serving on the *Aurora*, had trained a spyglass on the

battery and observed that Russian forces were "retreating in the face of the enemy's great superiority."[181] An entry in Royal Marine commander Charles Parker's journal reveals that his men were ostensibly recalled so that they could have lunch.[182] Parker was bewildered, as were observers on the *Virago*, who noted that "everything was going on prosperously."[183]

British forces were eager to reengage the *Aurora* from sea while a landing party could again place itself in a position to attack battery number two from its left flank and rear, but were "doomed to disappointment" after consulting with their French Allies.[184] Little did Parker know, however, that Captain Nicholson had actually requested the landing forces' recall to patch a dangerous hit below the *Virago*'s waterline.[185] A strained exchange of correspondence and meetings that symptomized "lamentable delay" in Allied operations between September 1 and September 3 then commenced. Throughout, British and French commanders neglected to consider the telling lesson that their landing party had fired blindly into thick brush without perceiving that Russian defenders had already retreated.[186] This was, in Dr. Dick's words, "a melancholy prelude to what was to follow."[187]

The essential points at issue among Febvrier-Despointes, Nicolson, and their respective subordinates were straightforward. The French rear admiral emphasized how Allied "reconnaissance has proved" that the narrow entrance to Petropavlovsk's harbor was protected by a frigate and a half-dozen "admirably placed" batteries.[188] This meant "that no more than two of our Frigates could attack at one time," that they "would inevitably be raked while getting into position," and that "great damage must necessarily attend" any attempt to storm and capture the place by sea.[189] Nicolson "concurred" with this assessment that such an attack would "not be prudent to attempt,"[190] and instead pressed for an amphibious assault. The senior British officer's preference for a landing was not inherently disastrous. The events of August 31 had demonstrated that Allied landing parties could successfully overwhelm Russian batteries such as the one at Krasny Yar, but only if covered by naval gunfire and not when hobbled by inhospitable surroundings. It was only then that Nicolson's vexation combined with Febvrier-Despointes' caution and inaccurate intelligence provided by deserters from American whaling ships to produce a land attack that became, in the words of Britain's next Pacific commander, "a badly managed business."[191]

CHAPTER 8

Petropavlovsk, Japan, and After

The seeds of an Allied defeat at Petropavlovsk took root on the afternoon of September 1, 1854, and this timing was especially sudden. Allied warships led by the frigate *Forte* had bombarded two Russian batteries at Shakov and Koshka into temporary silence and had taken a third, Krasny Yar, by landing sailors and marines. Even one of the largest Russian emplacements, the five guns entrenched on Point Shakov at the base of a rocky hill, simply could not match the broadsides of the *Forte* and its English peers, the *President* and *Pique*. These warships were able to hurl hundreds of rounds against the battery. Allied shots rained rocky fragments from a cliff behind the Russian battery down on its gun crews, wounding their commander and eventually rendering the cannon impossible to man.[1]

This preliminary bombardment, in conjunction with the landing at Krasny Yar earlier that day, had Zavoyko preparing for the worst. The Russian commander issued orders to abandon the Shakov battery and spike its guns while positioning ammunition and reinforcements at the Koshka battery to repel the Allied landing force approaching from Krasny Yar to the South.[2] The senior Russian commander was also preparing to burn the *Aurora* and *Dvina* and transfer their crews onto shore, but he understandably omitted this detail from his subsequent official report while minimizing the contributions of senior Russian naval officers.[3] Nevertheless, Lieutenant Commander Mikhail Petrovich Tyrol of the *Aurora* volunteered during a postwar visit to Cherbourg in 1857.

> We knew very well that we could not resist our opposing forces very long, and the governor during the afternoon even thought . . . to agree on an honorable treaty. But our brave commander [Izylmetiev] opposed it, saying that although he shared the opinion of the governor on the end result . . . we should at least wait until the enemy showed up.[4]

Commander Tyrol's account was seconded by Nikolay O'Rourke writing "the naked truth as I learned it," though O'Rourke worried that this would "offend" Zavoyko.[5] Petropavlovsk's approximately 1,000[6] defenders were thus especially fortunate that Rear Admiral Febvrier-Despointes' caution and the Allies' diminishing supply of projectiles led them to cease these August 31 bombardments "as if to take a break."[7] By the time British and French forces resumed active operations on September 4, they had settled on a plan that promised to produce results entirely more favorable to Russia.

Allied warships sustained minor damage and half-a-dozen casualties from Russian return fire on the last day of August, but the unity of British and French commanders was splintering far faster than their vessels' wooden hulls.[8] French and British participants alike were upset that, in de Kerret's words, the result of their efforts had been "nil" after orders prevented Allied ships from pressing home their bombardment by engaging the *Aurora* and setting the wooden town of Petropavlovsk ablaze.[9] As negotiations between Febvrier-Despointes and Nicolson stalled on the following morning of September 1, the British paddle-steamer *Virago* traveled across the Bay of Avacha to dispose of Price's body "without the least ceremony more than decency required."[10] The rear admiral continued to haunt his erstwhile squadron even after death, as the British burial party took "two prisoners . . . one of them a Yankee, the other a Prussian."[11] These men volunteered that Petropavlovsk's scurvy-ravaged garrison men were vulnerable to a landward assault from the town's rear.[12] Nicolson's deliberately vague description of "some information having been obtained during this interval," though, did not sway Sir James Graham, who later wrote a scolding reminder to his captain that Petropavlovsk's outcome was "of a nature which ought to impress upon the officers of H.M. Ships that the utmost discretion is necessary in undertaking expeditions on shore."[13] A "long examination" before Nicolson and Burridge ensued, and British commanders received assurances that the dense brush at the back of the hills protecting Petropavlovsk had been removed, was traversed by good paths, and would not impede a landing party of 700 to 800 men.[14] Consequently, Nicolson had Captain Parker, his senior marine officer, draw up a plan for a large-scale amphibious assault on Petropavlovsk and set about coercing Febvrier-Despointes into ordering the attack. In the words of Henry Winans Hiller, a young crew member of the American whaling vessel *Noble*, the events that followed were "too near to be pleasant and too exciting to be indulged in frequently."[15]

British and French correspondence alike paints a vivid picture of senior Allied captains as frustrated and even disgusted by Febvrier-Despointes' "unqualifiable inaction" as the squadron's senior officer.[16] Captain Nicolson could at least count on the support of Captain Richard Burridge of the *President*, Commander Edward Marshall of the *Virago*, and Captain Charles Parker of the Royal Marines. Febvrier-Despointes, on the other hand, had to deal with Captain Pierre-Paul de La Grandière's furious reaction to a rumor that he was a coward for not bringing the *Eurydice* to the *Forte*'s assistance when the latter ships was engaged with Russian shore batteries on August, 31.[17] At any rate, simple mathematics ensured that the hesitant French captains would be outvoted in a council of war if Febvrier-Despointes yielded to Nicolson, especially because Captain de La Grandière felt obligated to abstain from voting on the grounds that it would be improper to offer an opinion as the leader of any potential French amphibious assault.[18] The key was to convince Febvrier-Despointes that his preference for reconnaissance and a rendezvous with warships from Chinese waters[19] would "compromise" the "Flags of England and France."[20] A "strong correspondence" sufficed, and "caused the French Admiral to agree to a plan of attack by land."[21] Although Captain de Miniac and Commander de Rosencoat voted against a landing, the British majority led by Nicolson carried the meeting as Febvrier-Despointes "consented" with what Dr. Dick described as "a very bad grace."[22]

It is critically important to note that French commanders opposed such a landing only because they were, in their own words, "proponents of trying a naval attack once more."[23] French noncooperation was not the "primary cause of the (Allied) defeat,"[24] and figures including Price's successor as Britain's Pacific commander in chief certainly did not view it as such. Rear Admiral Henry William Bruce, in fact, reviewed documentary evidence in 1856 only to conclude that "not only was the attack wrong made but badly Executed."[25] This assessment noticeably declined to blame Allied failures on either the French or Captain Burridge, who commanded the British landing force. The Allied defeat at Petropavlovsk was instead due to a combination of tenacious Russian resistance, rough terrain, and Nicolson's determination to mount an amphibious assault even if it meant, in Sir James Graham's scathing assessment, "detaching Seamen and Marines from their ships in the neighborhood of fortified positions of the Enemy, with imperfect knowledge of the Nature of the Country and the force expected to be encountered."[26] As Lieutenant Grove privately opined, Petropavlovsk "might & would have been ours . . . if

we had gone to work at once with some *one* to lead us that knew something about it."[27]

In contrast to Allied officers' private correspondence, Captain Nicolson's forthright letters to his French colleagues soon shaped the course of events. Nicolson's communiques included the succinct observation that "the possible loss of our good name arising from leaving this place without further attempts upon it appears to me all important."[28] The now-senior British officer's earlier comment about compromising both nations' national flags had already made a stinging impression on French senior officers, who took Nicholson's statement to mean, that, "by opposing such a plan . . . they were taking the responsibility of a failure that could befoul the colors of both nations."[29] In response to Febvrier-Despointes' leading question, "do you foresee any unfortunate result arising from the debarkation for the purpose of taking Petropaulovski?" the British captain blithely answered that "casualties must necessarily take place, but so far as I can foresee I cheerfully prognosticate that success must attend our efforts to capture the batteries from the rear."[30] Nicolson's optimistic assessment also included his opinion that Petropavlovsk's destruction "would compensate for the heavy casualties that will probably ensue,"[31] but the plan he adopted in order to satisfy Febvrier-Despointes' caution ensured that this statement was only half correct. Instead of following Parker's suggestion that a 700-man force approach the rear of Petropavlovsk using Lake Kultush to shield their route,[32] Nicolson pushed through a proposal that left naval captains Pierre-Paul de La Grandière and Richard Burridge to plan a divided landing party that, under multiple commanders, would have to climb Nikolskaya (Nikolsky, etc.) Hill, cut paths through dense foliage, and maintain good order while facing fierce Russian opposition.[33] As de Miniac sarcastically remarked after the landing, "the result of this nice combination was not long in occurring."[34]

In the early morning darkness of September 4, 1854, Allied forces began preparations for a large-scale landing at the rear of Petropavlovsk accompanied by diversionary bombardment of Russian shore batteries. As 700 sailors and marines gathered on board the *Virago*, again towing the *Forte* and *President*, Russian defenders raised the alarm on shore, cleared the *Aurora*'s decks, and prepared for what both sides anticipated would be a "decisive battle."[35] Yulia Zavoyko, for one, remarked that "this time we were expecting the most decisive attack" because "the squadron could not stay a lot longer because of the time of year."[36] Contemporary historian Paul Carles' notes added that fog made it impossible for the Allies to discern signals from more

than two ship lengths ahead.[37] Carles, though, primarily lamented the Allies' lack of a storeship and ammunition supplies capable of supporting a "prolonged bombardment" because it led to an amphibious landing planned and executed with "blameworthy carelessness."[38]

Allied participants in that landing, though, initially observed that "everything appeared to be going well."[39] After embarking a 700-man landing force an hour earlier, the *Virago* began towing the *Forte* and *President* toward the five-gun Russian shore battery at 6:00 a.m. that morning. The *Forte* in particular came under heavy fire at 7:10 a.m. from multiple Russian batteries including the five-gun "saddle" battery south of Nikolskaya Hill, commanded by Dmitry Maksutov's brother—Lieutenant Aleksandr Maksutov—who later died of his wounds after losing a limb, but Allied return fire silenced these shore batteries.[40] From his post on the *President*, the ship's surgeon provided a graphic description of the scene on shore.

> The dead and dying bodies of the Russians lay in heaps among the broken and disabled guns and around the embrasures and the contrast was striking between the Saddle (battery) an hour before, when all the men were at their guns, everything in military order and discipline, and as we see it now—a grand but awful sight. Every thing knocked over and destroyed, broken gun carriages, dead bodies, blood, arms, legs . . . heaped in masses to-gether—and well might the beholder say "truly the dogs of war are let loose."[41]

It only took British and French warships an additional hour to silence Russian shore defenses and commence landing operations at 8:15 a.m. At that point, two dozen small boats ferried Allied sailors and marines to their landing site near a destroyed five-gun Russian emplacement. This position protected a valley separating two mountains and ended in a gradual slope at a beach, which seemed to offer an approach to Petropavlovsk's rear. Rear Admiral Zavoyko, meanwhile, dispatched Lieutenant Yevgraf (Jevgraf) Ankundinov and 35 *Aurora* crewmembers to defend Lake Kultush.[42] Before Allied troops encountered Russian opposition, however, they struggled to organize an assault force even on an open beach. This process, in Lieutenant Palmer's words, was "like trying to make a parcel of foxhounds stand up in two ranks,"[43] while Dr. Dick bitterly noted that Allied officers other than Captain Parker "in fact . . . know nothing about the movement of troops on shore."[44] Matters soon became far worse for the British and French.

Captain La Grandière, in command of the French landing contingent, "looked for the path that the guides had pointed out" but

instead "found a mountain cut perpendicularly, brushwood between the rocks and dense thickets on the slope."[45] Thinking that they could not advance in order over such a terrain, La Grandière dispatched the *Eurydice*'s Lieutenant Alfred Antoine-François Lefebvre to "beseech" Captain Richard Burridge of the *President* to call back the marines of both nations and alter their plan of attack.[46] Britain's Royal Marines, however, had already formed their ranks under heavy fire and had advanced. Captain Charles Parker was visibly "shining in his nice red uniform," but de Miniac observed that Parker's detachment proceeded "indiscriminately and without any caution."[47] The results of moving, in the words of one British midshipman, "without any order"[48] had predictable consequences, and Russian sources recount the subsequent discovery of a corpse bearing a shirt embroidered "Parker" along with a flyer for a San Francisco performance of the opera *Ernani*.[49] Yulia Zavoyko also noted that Parker's pockets yielded notes on the landing force's strength and a plan for Petropavlovsk's capture and destruction, confirmed by the torches and restraints for prisoners that Russian combatants also recovered from the beach.[50] Although evacuated from the crest of Nikolskaya Hill, Parker met what Ms. Zavoyko deemed a "cruel fate" after his body had to be left behind during the frantic Allied re-embarkation.[51]

British and French accounts consistently emphasized the difficulty of the terrain that the landing force encountered, which Burridge described as "steep and covered with thick jungle."[52] While the Allied marines pressed forward up the gorge under heavy fire, and sailors from both countries "climbed like cats"[53] up Nikolskaya Hill, a third group under Burridge's command never managed to advance off the beach. Confusion reigned supreme as the Allied forces advancing up the valley found itself paralyzed by "a lack of adequate preparations, an absolute ignorance of the locale (because the information provided by the Americans was found to be wrong and deficient), and the difficulties of all kinds that it presented."[54]

Worse yet, Allied forces struggled to differentiate friends from foes. Near-sighted Lieutenant George Robinson from the *Pique*, for instance, called out in French to a party of Russian soldiers, "don't shoot, I'm English," for his trouble receiving a bullet that failed to kill him only because it hit his cartridge box/pouch.[55] Robinson's French counterpart, Lieutenant Lefebvre of the *Eurydice*, was not as lucky.

Assuming command of French forces on Nikolskaya after the death of Lieutenant Charles Giquel des Touches of the *Obligado*, Lefebvre attempted to organize a hillside ambush amid what French sailor

Andre Alexandre Buffet described as a "constant whistle of bullets."[56] As Lefebvre's group of 12 lay flat and attempted to, in Buffet's words, "figure out what side of the mountain the Russians were on," the French officer ordered men not to fire at what he assumed were their British "brothers."[57] Sailor François Pierre Marot, meanwhile, "heard the same thing being repeated," which meant that Lefebvre was soon shot through the face at, what Buffet described as, "almost point blank" range after ordering his men to fix bayonets and rising to locate Russian forces before charging.[58] For a dwindling French assault force that, according to sailor Etienne Jules Gustave Arene, was already considering a retreat after Lieutenant des Touche's death, Lefebvre's agonizing fate ended any hope of an organized assault as his remaining counterparts fought hand-to-hand to escape the hillside.[59] Lieutenant Lefebvre's body did shield François Pierre Marot from Russian rifle fire as Marot carried him down from Nikolskaya, but it had to be left behind during the Allied retreat and declared killed in action by a French administrative council held several days later.[60]

French sailors were not alone in mistaking Russian combatants for Allied ones. As British sailor William Petty Ashcroft recounted years later, "all our men had a broad white armband but the French and Russians were all wearing big coats and looked very much alike,"[61] especially since Russian forces had "limited" themselves to wearing only uniform caps in an effort to preserve their military uniforms.[62] French sailors made the same mistake and began simply shooting in the direction from which they heard sounds, which La Grandière deemed a "misunderstanding" that "probably led our allies to believe that they had enemies in front as well as behind them."[63] This misunderstanding, in turn, prompted British marines to return fire against a mixed party of British and French sailors.[64] Although the advance continued "with amazing composure ... despite the hellish fire," Nikolay O'Rourke noted that the similarities between the British Royal Marines' red uniform coats and Russian soldiers' red shirts "put the French at a complete loss" and made them "afraid to shoot" at anyone in red.[65] This "resemblance," coupled with "inaccessible rocks ... our cruellest of enemies," led Captain La Grandière to describe "a general firefight from all sides," which was not to the Allies' advantage.[66]

The Anglo-French marines and sailors who reached their intended destinations down the valley and at the top of Nikolskaya Hill, respectively, were further decimated by accurate Russian small-arms fire that "picked them off like sparrows."[67] Marines who had allegedly

imagined "that all they had to do was march on the town that they saw in front of them" down the valley, instead encountered Russian emplacements including an artillery battery, trench, log houses, and other dugouts, with the cannon therein welcoming them "by a shower of grapeshot"[68] that felled "an officer, a drummer, and the whole first row."[69] With Parker dead and their losses becoming "most severe owing to the number of the enemy that had been strongly posted,"[70] the Allied marines began to retreat, catching Burridge's trailing party of sailors in their wake. Burridge's official report emphasized how "incessant force . . . compelled" these men to "retreat towards the beach . . . after many attempts to rally,"[71] while conspicuously omitting his observation to La Grandière upon returning aboard that "the cowards, they abandoned me. They fled."[72] When the sailors atop Nikolskaya Hill began to flee as well, this series of Allied retreats became a terrible rout.

Russian defenders commanded by a police chief initially abandoned Nikolskaya Hill in an attempt to join the fighting below. They were also positioned to defend the side closest to the town and, according to Lieutenant Dmitry Maksutov, "not the very top of the hill."[73] Naturally defensive of Rear Admiral Zavoyko, who also happened to be his uncle, Midshipman Nikolay Fesun emphasized that Russian defenders were "not thinking that the enemy, who had little idea about the terrain, would rush straight up the mountain."[74] The landing's location meant that the *Aurora*'s crew had initially been "unaware of what was taking place," but a messenger soon arrived from Zavoyko requesting reinforcements capable of repelling a "numerous" enemy landing force.[75] The sound of approaching gunfire also "suggested (to the *Aurora*'s officers) that the enemy was advancing and that there was no time to think twice."[76] Consequently, Midshipman Fesun led 33 men to positions on the hill's right side at 8:30 a.m., while Ensign Dmitry Zhilkin brought a gun crew to the left "soon" after.[77] After the *Aurora* "detected enemy rifleman on top" of Nikolskaya at 10:00 a.m., a third force of 32 crewmen under Lieutenant Konstantin Pilkin hurried directly up to the hill's crest and was reinforced an hour later by an additional 35 men.[78] Together, these Russian detachments fixed bayonets to "remove" Allied forces[79] prevented from descending into Petropavlovsk by Russian artillery fire that otherwise lacked the elevation to impact the battle for Nikolskaya's highest point.[80] They succeeded in their mission, especially as they were able to hide behind bushes during their ascent.[81]

Allied confusion made this effort easier, with Russian participants noting that the Anglo-French assault force "did not have any

combined command; having taken the mountain, they did not know where to go and what to do."[82] Even La Grandière's otherwise sanguine report to Febvrier-Despointes did little to dispel this notion: the landing forces' co-commander informed his superior that, after "many officers made me aware of a retreat that seemed general, I called for a retreat."[83] To make matters worse for the British and French who did reach Nikolskaya's summit, a dozen indigenous Kamchandal (Itelmen) hunters, accustomed to shooting beavers through they eyes so their fur would remain undamaged, hid behind boulders and took aim.[84] The results were predictably catastrophic as, to quote Rear Admiral Zavoyko's official report, "mutilated, lifeless bodies hit the shore far below."[85] Besides, as Lieutenant Palmer later commented, the worse part of a "horrid place like this" was not seeing anyone "to revenge oneself on."[86]

With no potential for relief after their marines' retreat down the gorge, the Allies who scaled Nikolskaya Hill, soon found their force of "about 30" reduced to a half dozen men led by a corporal, who was also soon wounded.[87] As they desperately threw themselves down to arrive at the hill's base "with their clothes in shreds . . . almost unconscious,"[88] these survivors dislodged loose earth and stones that rolled down on their comrades and "wounded a great many men" in a "most terrible affair."[89] Closer to the beach, meanwhile, French and a few British sailors bought valuable time by making a stand under cover of ruined Russian positions while the *Virago* attempted to lay down fire to cover an evacuation. Nevertheless, Captain Burridge reported that, because "the boats had to be brought within range of the enemy's muskets, many of our men fell during the embarkation."[90] Yulia Zavoyko added that this Russian fire ensured that "death waited for" even those Allied combatants who reached their ships' small boats.[91] Descriptions such as one British sailor's account of his mate being shot through the head while helping to pull him on board[92] were common, especially as the Allies' 209 casualties gave the *Virago*'s decks "the appearance of a slaughter house" as it re-embarked the assaults' survivors.[93] The subsequent correspondence of Febvrier-Despointes, Nicolson, Burridge, and La Grandière naturally praised the landing force's cooperation and bravery, omitting de Miniac's less complementary anecdotes of French small boats "invaded by the British" and "being compelled to send the threat of shooting them if they did not return to take our men,"[94] some of whom had waded neck-deep into the ocean to enhance their chances of being rescued.[95]

This desperate stand, naval cover fire, and the pursuing Russian forces' lack of ammunition and further orders combined to prevent

British and French forces from being cut off from the beach and entirely destroyed. Midshipman Fesun, for one, lauded the *Obligado*'s efforts while noting that the ship's "fire considerably diminished the Allied losses in retreat."[96] Cadet O'Rourke also praised the Allies for their "amazing composure" in rescuing casualties during an otherwise "panicky" retreat.[97] Nevertheless, the last reboarding occurred as "bullets were showering down on the boats like hail,"[98] killing the re-embarkation's commanding officer, Lieutenant Jean-Philippe Alexandre Bourasset.[99] There was no need to give the prearranged signal for failure that Russian forces later found in the detailed instructions of a French officer, which involved an Allied crewmember standing "at a prominent position and raising both hands to the sky!"[100] As Yulia Zavoyko observed from a safe distance,

> There was moaning everywhere. One of the longboats left with only eight rowers, people from another [boat] put their hands in the air, as if asking for mercy. A few people went after the boats, with water up to their necks; others swam towards [the boats]. Not many of them were rescued.[101]

Although all of the sources from the scene emphatically painted a similar picture, official reactions in Europe were a different story.

Two months after the Allied landing at Petropavlovsk, an article appeared in the official *Moniteur Universel* and as a reprint in publications including the *Journal de Toulouse*. Its text mentioned Théodore Ducos' reception of dispatches from Febvrier-Despointes indicating that "the re-boarding proceeded without any difficulty."[102] This could not have been further from the truth, though Captain La Grandière had already predicted that his commander's official report would "diverge considerably" from what had instead been a "heartbreaking spectacle."[103] La Grandière and the French rear admiral had feuded with each other days before the disastrous landing,[104] but the *Eurydice*'s commander hardly displayed a penchant for inflammatory rhetoric and instead preferred euphemistically sharing with his superior that "the results that you had proposed were not quite attained."[105] Febvrier-Despointes had already acknowledged to Nicolson that the handing had been an "unhappy" one[106] precisely because of the circumstances surrounding the Allied retreat and re-embarkation. The French rear admiral even had a "quite bitter" conversation with his captains about the landing's events by "arranging them as he pleased and wanting to impose in some sort what we should say and write."[107] In contrast to the dry understatements of

Febvrier-Despointes and Nicolson, however, the correspondence of those actually on shore vividly described the events in question. By August 1856, the conservative British *Fraser's Magazine* was recounting anecdotes that included how a young midshipman "stood still and burst into tears" after finding himself alone when the landing party he was leading fled without him.[108]

News of the Allied defeat at Petropavlovsk traveled slowly, but nevertheless spread around the world, beginning in Hawai'i. As the American minister to that Kingdom gleefully noted in early November, "there is no doubt that the allies have been disgracefully whipped," and "the Americans here do not put on long faces on account of British and French disasters."[109] Reports of a "great victory of the Russian Army over English and French barbarians" also reached Shimoda, Japan, by January 1855.[110] News traveled even faster to French authorities in China thanks to the Hamburgian vessel that witnessed the battle while at anchor, which brought a Sardinian passenger and his report to Shanghai in October 1854.[111] Just as Russian officials declined to mention that their men had stripped Allied corpses of clothing and gold cufflinks and had to be prevented from also removing underwear and socks from the dead,[112] French naval authorities strove to put the best face possible on their defeat. Revealingly, however, their revised orders for 1855 emphasized that destroying the city itself was "not a priority" and that another landing would unjustifiably "endanger" the squadron's men.[113]

Despite Sir James Graham's private sentiments expressed in his comments written on Nicolson's optimistic report, the Admiralty head publicly emulated the French approach by feeding only the most flattering documents to the *Times* and the *Illustrated London News*.[114] Graham's approach was only a temporary expedient, though, as private letters reached these publications a few weeks later. Often reprinted in newspaper columns, such unofficial accounts instead offered frank commentary from participants in this "disastrous affair."[115] These descriptions included acknowledgments such as "our loss was most serious" and related the details of confused friendly fire that caused men to "meet their deaths without Russian interference."[116] As icicles already began to form due to progressively colder weather,[117] the Anglo-French squadron weighed anchor on September 7 and left Kamchatka for the Americas, capturing two small Russian transport vessels, the *Sitka* and *Anadir*, in the process. As Lieutenant Palmer wrote the next day, "I hope I shall never go on shore again with Jack (British sailors) in the bush."[118]

The same day that a beaten Allied squadron left the shores of Kamchatka, another group of British warships 3,200 kilometers away approached the Japanese island of Kyushu. Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling, in command of the Royal Navy's East Indies and China Station, officially brought four warships led by the frigate *Winchester* to search for Russian warships and "prevent the enemy from making use of the ports and resources of Japan" for the Crimean War's duration.[119] Unofficially, Stirling's "*confidential*" correspondence revealed a deeper motive.[120] The rear admiral noted that as Russia "developed" its "schemes" in "acquiring command over Northern China," the "vast importance of a close connection with Japan becomes more obvious."[121] Similar to efforts in other theatere throughout 1854, Britain's Japan mission was hastily improvised and ill-equipped for the task. This is evident, for example, from the briefest examination its Japanese-language interpreter's abilities. Entirely unlike every naval mission from 1854 to 1856, however, ill-preparedness and miscommunication actually worked in Britain's favor as, in Stirling's words, "negotiation ultimately took a more extensive and important character than that which I had originally contemplated."[122]

Stirling's conception of his mission's nature was completely misinterpreted both by Japanese decision makers and some subsequent historians. In his correspondence with Japanese officials, for example, the rear admiral forthrightly emphasized that "the business" that brought his squadron to Japan did not place it in the same light as "all former visitors—English, French, Russian and American," who came as "mendicants" and "solicitors."[123] This point was completely lost on some British historians,[124] who allowed themselves to be misled by sources including the *Times*, which criticized Stirling's self-described determination to "pertinaciously" neglect "every opportunity for opening trade."[125] Furthermore, it is important to note that Lord Clarendon and the British Foreign Office had already issued explicit instructions in June 1854 that eliminating pirate and Russian threats to British shipping and commercial interests in China took absolute priority over obtaining economic concessions from Japan.[126] When Stirling's dispatches reached London in December, in fact, Clarendon deemed Stirling's actions "deserving of entire approbation."[127] Even before he knew that Stirling would negotiate with the Japanese, Clarendon did not object to the multitalented diplomatist and economist Sir John Bowring's cancellation of a commercial mission to Japan, as events in China demanded Bowring's continued presence in that country and a trade mission to Siam (Thailand) promised easier results.[128] Stirling's improvised mission thus lacked the diplomats, commercial

representatives, and the capable pool of Japanese-language interpreters already slated to accompany Bowring's diplomats to Japan.[129] In their place arrived a negotiating team of naval officers who, as Stirling wrote to Sir James Graham in a private letter, saw Japan as "far more important in a Political, than in a Commercial sense" and felt that it would be a mistake to "force a trade upon them in opposition to the long established Institutions of the country."[130]

The principal factor that marked the Stirling Mission, Perry's American Expedition, and Russian Vice Admiral Yevfimy Putyatin's efforts after 1852 was their success at altering Japanese policy, not their novelty. British and Russian warships had visited Japan on other missions in the early nineteenth century, sometimes with dramatic results. At the height of the Napoleonic Wars in 1808, for example, the British frigate *Phaeton* sailed into Nagasaki Harbor and took two Dutch hostages on the orders of Stirling's predecessor, then-captain Fleetwood Pellew. While Nagasaki official Matsudaira Yasuhira considered an armed rescue attempt, his countrymen instead pointed out that he "might as well try to batter down a stone wall with eggs."[131] Although the situation resolved itself when the *Phaeton* left two days later, it was matched by Russian activities further north and foretold growing pressure on Japan to engage with the Western world as the nineteenth century wore on.

By the time the sickly Tokugawa Iesada became Shogun in 1853, the officials and hereditary stakeholders in the *bakufu*, or shogunate, were profoundly divided. Of the 61 clans offering opinions on how to deal with Westerners, for example, 22 favored opening the country while 19 advocated using force to expel the unwanted intruders; the remaining 20 remained anxious to avoid war or were undecided.[132] As the Shogun's senior council or *Rōjū* opined when noting "differences in the various statements" of its vassals, differences of opinion among those advocating opening Japan (*Kaikoku*) and expelling foreigners (*Joi*) "generally boiled down to the words 'war' and 'peace.'"[133] By the time Crimean War-era British and Russian missions arrived off Japan in the early to mid-1850s, Japanese officials including Nagasaki commissioner[134] Mizuno Tadanori were already arguing that, "given present trends, it is extremely difficult to forcefully refuse either nation what they are seeking."[135] As he prepared to meet Stirling in early October 1854 and commence negotiations, Mizumo heeded a recommendation from the seat of government in Edo (Yedo, now Tokyo) that he must not be too uncompromising when refusing British requests because, given their "reputation for brutality . . . there is no telling what sort of unlawfulness and violence

might result."[136] Ultimately, then, Stirling's argument that an agreement was reached "without solicitation or menace" was valid only from a British perspective.[137]

After what one historian unkindly dubbed, "the usual oriental policy of delay,"[138] Anglo-Japanese negotiations formally commenced in early October 1854. Almost immediately, the "difficulty of negotiation where . . . habits of thought and language are so widely different" became apparent to both sides.[139] With trained diplomatic interpreters or seasoned missionaries unavailable, the British mission instead relied on the services of a shipwrecked Japanese sailor, Otokichi, literate only in the phonetic *kana* script and not the more complex *kanji* characters of official documents and diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, both delegations settled on the temporary expedient of having the superintendant of the Netherlands' artificial island (Deshima or Dejima) in Nagasaki Harbor translate English documents into Dutch ones, which could then be written in Japanese by senior interpreter Nishi Kichibei. Russian officers including Vice Admiral Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin and the writer Ivan Goncharov had already complained about Nishi's tendency to misunderstand nuance and deliberately alter content during their round of negotiations in 1853,[140] but even the most conscientious Japanese-language interpreters in the 1850s confronted a larger problem—specialized diplomatic terms such as "consul" had no specific counterpart in Japanese.[141] Worse yet, entire Western diplomatic concepts such as "benevolent neutrality" had "no analogous meaning" in Japanese, even when transliterated.[142] It is thus unsurprising that Stirling's original English-language request took an entirely unintended form when rendered in Japanese.

The British rear admiral's original request seemed straightforward when posed in English. As one passage read: "it is absolutely necessary that he (Stirling) shall be informed of the views and intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to the admission into the ports of the ships of war of the belligerent parties in the present contest."[143] The British query, however, was accompanied by an assurance that "in the execution of the duties imposed on him by a state of war," Stirling "anxiously desired . . . to avoid as far as possible the commission of any act which may justly give offence to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan or his subjects."[144] Japanese translation, meanwhile, transformed this seemingly banal reassurance into the threatening phrase, "any act of war against the Emperor of Japan or his nobles."[145] Other phrases, such as "the ships of war of the belligerent parties in the present contest" (meaning those of Britain and

Russia during the Crimean War), became "those concerned in the present affair."[146] In conjunction with Otokichi's original mistranslation of British demands in oral form, Japanese officials misunderstood Stirling's Mission as a "request that Great Britain and its Allies in the present conflict be permitted to visit the ports of your country . . . not only Nagasaki, but other ports and locations with Japan's territory."[147]

A key reason for Japanese isolationism was the omission of "not" from Stirling's request that warships "in time of war are not to effect repairs, obtain supplies of munitions, bring in prizes, or remain over 14 days."[148] In response to what they incorrectly perceived as a British demand to open all Japanese ports to warships and even merchant vessels, Tokugawa bureaucrats in Edo instructed their frontline negotiators in Nagasaki to offer a compromise and "open" two ports, Nagasaki and Hakodate, to British ships. Determined not to "meddle with war," Commissioner Mizuno ignored his understated realization that he saw "some little difference" between inaccurate written exchanges and more correct spoken translations of Stirling's forthright explanation of his squadron's purpose in coming to Japan.[149] On October 14, 1854, British and Japanese representatives signed an agreement, now known as the Anglo-Japanese Convention.

Britain's 1854 naval mission to Japan was also noteworthy for a passenger that it did not carry—French minister to China Alphonse de Bourboulon. Although Stirling had mentioned the possibility of including his French allies in the agreement's provisions on several occasions,[150] nothing came of these requests during the Crimean War after Japanese authorities summarily dismissed the idea.[151] De Bourboulon, granted full plenipotentiary powers in March 1854,[152] declined to accompany Sir John Bowring's proposed trade mission on the grounds that it would be humiliating for France to appear "as the humble protégé of a great foreign Power (Britain)."[153] De Bourboulon was already dependent on the support of Rear Admiral Adolphe Laguerre's "Division of Réunion and Indochina," which gave French diplomats in East Asia even fewer options. Laguerre's handful of available warships were widely scattered and ill-equipped to withstand the temporary loss of the frigate *Jeanne d'Arc*, which required lengthy repairs after running aground off Shanghai.[154] With tensions in that city threatening to once again explode "at any moment" and a powerful Russian squadron supposedly lurking off the Chinese coast, Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys instructed de Bourboulon to request that warships protect French interests in China.[155] This pressing imperative was joined by reports that the achievements of

American and Russian missions to Japan from 1853 onward had been less successful than previously reported.[156] The French naval officers who did visit Japan actually shocked Tokugawa officials by simply offering polite greetings, which prompted the magistrate of Hakodate to ask leading questions such as "isn't there anything you want to discuss?"[157] Organized French efforts to negotiate with Japan would thus have to wait until after the Treaty of Paris in 1856.[158]

Russia's approach toward building a relationship with Japan during the 1850s was the polar opposite of Stirling's improvised efforts and France's abortive ones. News that the United States was preparing an expedition to Japan motivated Nicholas I to order the dispatch of an official mission in August 1852, several years prior to British and French declarations of war on Russia. On August 14 of that year, Vice Admiral Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin received "Secret Instructions" from Russia's Navy Ministry informing him that he had "been chosen to represent our government's position in establishing political and trade relations between Russia and Japan" and that he would "receive detailed instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the ways and means with which to achieve this goal."[159] The Russian naval commander accordingly left Cronstadt on October 19, 1852, aboard the aging frigate *Pallada* followed by three smaller vessels, arriving off Nagasaki in late August 1853 after circumnavigating Europe, Africa, and much of Asia.

The Russian government's choice of this landing site reflected the influence of the noted Dutch Japanologist, Philipp Franz von Siebold, connected to Nicholas I through Muravyov's patron Anna Pavlovna. As "Additional Instructions" from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Putyatin that Siebold had "offered . . . his ideas on the best approach to our negotiations with the Japanese government and the best way to succeed in our ambition to establish trade relations between Russian and Japan."[160] Determined to avoid, in Siebold's words, the "inexplicable misunderstandings" and a "lack of mutual comprehension" that had marred previously doomed Russian efforts to negotiate with Japan,[161] Russia assembled a well-prepared mission. Its officers included Dutch- and Chinese-language linguists,[162] in addition to figures such as Lieutenant Voin Rimsky-Korsakov (older brother of the famed composer Nikolay) and writer Ivan Goncharov, author of the influential travelogue *Frigate Pallada*.[163]

During the 15 months that separated his squadron's October 1853 arrival and the February, 1855 Treaty of Shimoda that formally established Russo-Japanese diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin made four separate visits to Japan. While British and French officials gloated

over Russia's initial departure without a treaty,[164] their Japanese counterparts had different views. As Intendant Egawa Hidetatsu noted in a letter,

> The Russians are likely to be every bit as persistent as they have been polite; if they are refused, it will put them in the same position as the Americans, and our sacred land will have enemies both before and behind. Since this is unacceptable, we should conclude a pact with Russian permitting trade…these are my humble thoughts based on the current world situation.[165]

Commissioner of Finance and key plenipotentiary Kawaji Toshiakira, meanwhile, confided in his diary that Russia had "clearly become a great country" since signing the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk and had experienced a "night and day" improvement in navigational capabilities.[166] Although Kawaji acknowledged that Japan had "staved off disaster" after "someone called Napoleon of France initiated a great war" and momentarily defeated the Russians, he assessed that "there are limits to (Japan's) land, but no limit to the barbarian's greed."[167] The Japanese negotiator concluded his assessment of the Crimean War by noting that "should the Russians lose, (the usurpation of Sakhalin Island) will happen later. Should they win, it will happen sooner."[168]

Despite Kawaji's assessment of their intentions, Putyatin's men enjoyed a much greater understanding of Japanese culture than did their British rivals, thanks to the guidance of experts such as Siebold. The Russians, for example, took steps that included having Archimandrite Avakum "not dress differently from the secular people" on account of Japanese authorities' dislike of Western missionaries.[169] Both parties had also located capable interpreters including Hori Tatsunosuke, a translator whose previous work with Americans enabled him to leak a Dutch-language copy of the Convention of Kanagawa in return for a Russian bribe.[170] Nevertheless, cultural misunderstandings abounded throughout multiple rounds of negotiation, prompting the writer Goncharov to allude to the fable of a fox and crane frustrating one another at dinner.[171] Ultimately, however, the extended duration of Putyatin's mission had little to do with issues such as Russian officers' inability to use chopsticks. It was instead related to the scope of Russian demands, which went far beyond those formalized in Stirling's agreement. The Russian delegation focused on provisions for the division of the Kurile Islands (Article II), the appointment of a Russian consul to Japan (Article

VI), and guaranteed extraterritoriality for subjects of both countries (Article VIII). Putyatin was willing to wait out Japanese objections that they required time to consider "numerous and complicated problems that cannot be decided in a day."[172] In the end, Britain and France's inability to locate Russian warships in the Pacific afforded him the option to successfully do just that.

Given that the feudal lord (daimyo) of Mino's first inclination to the Russians' arrival included a proposal to fill a small boat with gunpowder and ram Putyatin's flagship,[173] it would be an understatement to argue that negotiations began inauspiciously. Cooler heads soon prevailed, however, as Kawaji Toshiakira explained:

> What the daimyo of Mino proposes makes good sense. Attacking and burning the Russian barbarian ships would free us at once from a number of enemies . . . However, by doing this we would be creating for the court a new enemy, a big country, and this would not be appropriate. That is why I have decided that no one should die.[174]

Kawaji, along with the other lead Japanese negotiator with Russia, acting Inspector General Tsutsui Masanori, cosigned a petition to the Tokugawa senior council (*Rōjū*) indicating that "it would be a great disservice to the shogun . . . if we were to advise him to play the hero and engage in rash acts that he will later regret and will throw the country into turmoil."[175] These two perceptive diplomats reminded their superiors that "we would do well to consider the case of the Qing official Lin Zexu, who asserted his country's honor and for a time put on quite a brave show, but who swiftly brought his nation to ruin."[176]

As negotiations wore on, both Japanese negotiators thus felt obligated to reach acceptable compromises, such as leaving Sakhalin undivided for the time being (Article II). An agreement only became final on February 7, 1855, after Putyatin's lone remaining warship, the frigate *Diana*, had already sunk after incurring considerable damage from the tsunami that destroyed Shimoda in December 1854. Seemingly confirming the observation of another Japanese negotiator's observation that "the will of Heaven really cannot be understood,"[177] the tragedy brought both sides closer. From that point forward, for example, Kawaji's diary began referring to "Russian people" (*rojin)* instead of "Russian barbarians" (*rojū*).[178] The Russian mission accordingly assumed the character, in Kawaji's words, of "a famished tiger or wolf," who, upon "encountering a man, drooped its tail and asked for something to eat."[179] By the time British warships captured a

portion of the *Diana*'s crew attempting to reach Petropavlovsk on the chartered Bremen brig *Greta* in August 1855, it was too late. Russia had already concluded a treaty that appeared, in the words of one British observer on the frigate *Sibylle*, "to be the most useful yet made."[180] Russia's limited East Asian resources once again sufficed to win substantial concessions from a neutral power rather than Britain or France, while Kawaji deemed Putyatin a "truly great man" after learning from Americans that Russia had won a "great victory" at Petropavlovsk.[181] From a Japanese perspective, meanwhile, peace and Russian expressions of thanks were counterbalanced with the judgement that it seemed unlikely "that scoundrels who routinely encroach (on other people's land) will care one bit about such a trivial thing as this treaty."[182]

The Crimean War in the Pacific and East Asia was not the First World War or even a First Pacific War, however vast an area it involved. Britain, France, and Russia were only some of the protagonists involved in a much broader drama playing out in the Pacific world during the mid-1850s. The fighting that did occur in the Pacific, though, was also quite revealing. Just as they had in the Baltic, poor planning and outdated intelligence once again thwarted Britain's and France's naval superiority. American politician Thomas Hart Benton, in fact, even saw Petropavlovsk as an example of how courage and dedication were more important than substantial military forces when it came to defending a long and vulnerable coastline.[183] The disastrous Allied assault also highlighted the faults inherent to a divided command that acted under the vaguest of orders and allowed aggressive officers to push ahead with ill-advised attacks. Unlike in the White Sea, the result was not an embarrassing bombardment of a fortified monastery or the incineration of a small wooden town, but a stinging defeat that could not be fully disguised by even the most optimistic public relations efforts. Another Pacific campaign would follow in 1855, but events in 1854 had already firmly set the tone for the Crimean War's outcome in the Pacific.

CHAPTER 9

Frustration in the Pacific, Shifts along the Amur

Britain's and France's 1855 campaign in the Pacific highlighted the futility of their efforts to frustrate Russian designs in the Pacific. Despite massive reinforcements, new commanders, and specific orders to coordinate the efforts of squadrons based in Chinese and South American waters, Allied forces utterly failed to accomplish their goals for the campaign. Russian forces successfully evacuated Petropavlovsk and escaped patrolling British warships, leaving a deserted provincial town instead of an attractive target. Allied forces were also unable to intercept and destroy heavily laden Russian warships and transports even after briefly locating them at De Castries Bay (De Kastri Bay). Finally, and in spite of their massive naval superiority and the shipwreck of the Russian frigate *Diana*, British and French warships were powerless to prevent the successful conclusion of Russo-Japanese negotiations or locate and breach Russian defenses at the Amur River's entrance. The same "apparently aimless movements and ill success of our naval forces on the north-eastern shores of Asia"[1] that marred the previous year's campaign again characterized the Allied powers' experiences in 1855. The game of military hide-and-seek on a grand scale played throughout the Western Pacific during that year represented a significant victory for the Russian Empire, which otherwise gained little from the Crimean conflict.

In the aftermath of the disastrous conclusion of their countries' 1854 efforts in the Pacific, British and French authorities had to confront both embarrassing press coverage and the necessity of appointing new commanders and drafting more specific orders. After endearing himself to San Franciscans by emphasizing his father's participation in the American Revolution, an exhausted Febvrier-Despointes died at sea in early March 1855.[2] Both Allied countries' South American squadrons thus needed new commanders for their

upcoming campaign. Rear Admiral Henry William Bruce had already arrived from Britain to replace Price in February 1855, accompanied by the battleship *Monarch*. Febvrier-Despointes' successor Martin Fourichon, on the other hand, took longer to reach his squadron's home port of Callao. By the time Fourichon arrived and prepared the *Forte* for a long voyage, a British squadron and the French frigate *Alceste* had already sailed for Petropavlovsk, leaving the other French vessels 18 days in their wake.[3] In addition to larger warships, more of them powered by steam, the Allied squadrons also received a new set of more specific orders from Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood. Determined to avoid the "hard lessons" learned at Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol in 1854,[4] French authorities instructed their commanders to obey British orders to proceed to Petropavlovsk and capture or destroy Russian warships without mounting another amphibious assault.[5] In the event that Russian warships had already left Kamchatka, Bruce and Fourichon were to proceed toward New Archangel (Sitka), though an Anglo-Russian neutrality agreement was still in force. Allied warships from Chinese waters, meanwhile, received directions to rendezvous with their South American-based counterparts off Petropavlovsk and support a renewed effort to destroy Russian naval power in the Pacific.[6] In spite of their larger size and improved coordination, though, both forces would still ignominiously fail to accomplish their primary mission of capturing or destroying Russian warships during the months that followed.

On March 14, 1855, courier Jesaul Martynov arrived at Petropavlovsk from Irkutsk. He carried decorations for its defenders and secret instructions from Governor-General Nikolay Muravyov. These instructions commanded Rear Admiral Vasily Zavoyko to "move everything in Petropavlovsk" to Nikolayevsk, at the mouth of the Amur River.[7] The impetus for these orders came not from Muravyov, who hoped to protect Petropavlovsk "to the very last,"[8] but rather from Grand Duke Konstantin, who informed his governor-general that Russia's most desirable Siberian position was "*not Kamchatka*, *but the Amur*."[9] The Grand Duke correctly reasoned that there were "hardly any measures sufficient to repel" a "sizeable" assault on Petropavlovsk. [10] He added that, if the Allies decided not to attack the port in 1855, then any defensive preparations "would only be a waste."[11]

By the time he wrote Muravyov, Konstantin had already obtained Nicholas I's preliminary approval to concentrate all their efforts at the Amur, thus leaving Russia's remaining Pacific territories "without defense" to deprive the Allies of any possible victories in the region.[12]

Muravyov, meanwhile, was already intent on withdrawing Russian warships from Petropavlovsk and was busy planning another Amur voyage and overseeing lengthy supply chains.[13] Before the ice thawed, Russian officials secretly began to direct supplies "not to Kamchatka, but to the estuary of the Amur River."[14] These efforts coincided with an American conclusion—which Sir James Stirling privately shared—that the Petropavlovsk battle "itself is a matter relatively unimportant compared with another fact: Russia has annexed Manchuria, and has taken military possession of the Valley of Amoor."[15]

The shift of Russia's military focus away from Petropavlovsk in 1855 represented an abrupt departure from efforts that were well underway throughout the end of 1854. In the immediate aftermath of their early September victory, for instance, Russian commanders in Petropavlovsk correctly anticipated that the Allies would "return with much greater forces" the following year and began preparing accordingly.[16] The results of their efforts, which continued unabated throughout the holidays, had produced impressive results by the time Russian forces abandoned them. In place of the exposed batteries that had confronted Allied warships in 1854, Petropavlovsk's garrison constructed an elaborate system of breastworks, trenches, hidden storehouses, and even a small fort designed to repel another Anglo-French landing.[17] Had St. Petersburg not decided otherwise, Muravyov was also preparing to float another battalion of soldiers, battery of field artillery, and even four blockhouses down the Amur in order to reinforce the Kamchatkan port.[18] Instead, Petropavlovsk's new defenses were never tested.

When British warships entered Avacha (Avatcha) Bay in late May 1855, an eerie scene greeted them. The "violent howling" of more than 500 sled dogs, according to a later American visitor, was disconcerting to Allied personnel who feared that "a garrison should be very large to have so many watch-dogs."[19] Once Allied forces entered the town, however, empty streets and recently abandoned buildings drove home a lonely American resident's comment to Rear Admiral Bruce that the Allies were "rather late."[20] Six weeks earlier, a Russian frigate, corvette, and three transports[21] had sailed through passages cut out of the ice that still enclosed the port and slipped past an advance force of two British warships from Chinese waters,[22] ordered to watch Petropavlovsk until Bruce's squadron could arrive. To his credit, the British commander behaved graciously, giving a box of cookies and marmalade to his Russian counterpart's pregnant wife Yulia and her children, left behind in a nearby village because of their delicate health.[23]

The first indication of Petropavlovsk's evacuation reached Bruce courtesy of Commander Frederick Henry Stirling of the paddle-steamer *Barracouta*. The son of Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling, Henry made an early reconnaissance visit to Petropavlovsk only to find it deserted. Invited for a breakfast meeting with other captains on the morning that a full Allied fleet arrived off the port, the younger Stirling summoned his courage when Bruce asked where he had been the night before. The answer of "Petropavlovsk!" stunned the rear admiral, who reportedly dropped his knife and fork and asked if the commander was "crazy."[24] Captain Sir Frederick Nicolson then attempted to justify his conduct the previous year by proving that Stirling had mistaken another site for Petropavlovsk, a "second Sevastopol."[25] Forced laughter and incredulity aside however, Nicolson lost the argument once Stirling produced a map that clearly showed the Avacha Bay's unique features. Although this incident remained relatively private and did not inspire public criticism in Britain, such a combination of poor judgment and geographical ignorance soon had far more serious consequences further to the south.

Before departing, British and French forces spent days destroying Petropavlovsk's new defensive batteries, whose strength and "good repair" made an impression.[26] Allied personnel then burned the port's government buildings, noting that "a good many others caught fire, accidentally of course, and were burnt to the ground."[27] At any rate, the "town was pretty well sacked . . . before the burning took place."[28] The Russian withdrawal had been so hasty that Allied forces had found open pianos with music laying about" in the Governor's House amid a "total wreck," though "nothing else could be expected in war time."[29] In a more creditable undertaking than occurred when a British master at arms allegedly broke into and robbed Petropavlovsk's church,[30] Allied landing parties succeeded in recovering two prisoners of war from the previous year's assault by employing American intermediaries to contact Russia's tiny caretaking force in Petropavlovsk's hinterlands,[31] which was especially fortunate because Rear Admiral Fourichon had given up on contacting anyone in such a forbidding landscape.[32]

Once the remaining French warships arrived off Kamchatka, most of the Allied fleet left for New Archangel only to find that it too did not harbor any Russian warships.[33] This did not please Dr. Dick, who opined that "there is I believe no doubt but that (the Russians) are concentrated at the mouth of the Amoor River and that our ancient enemy the 'Aurora' has gone there; but instead of following them, we are now hurrying our way on a peaceful mission to Sitka."[34]

Rear Admiral Bruce then visited Vancouver Island, a "territory of immense distance from England, and contiguous to envious, grasping neighbours"[35] before joining Fourichon in monitoring San Francisco and, eventually, South America.[36] British and French warships based in Chinese waters thus assumed the burden of carrying on active operations against Russia, but were no more successful in locating and destroying Russia's presence in the region.

The fundamental problems with these operations, from an Anglo-French perspective, were twofold. First, Allied commanders lacked actionable intelligence, which resulted in Rear Admiral James Stirling's message of November 27, 1854, to Sir James Graham, which stated:

> The repulse we have sustained at Petropaulowski will doubtless excite the Russians in that quarter to great activity, but in what direction they will employ themselves in the winter now commencing, is beyond my means of information to point out.[37]

Second, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Strait of Tartary[38] were "a part of the world of which very little is known," according to Sir Charles Wood.[39] Even in 1855, British and French commanders had to heavily rely on surviving records of eighteenth-century explorers, especially the Count of Lapérouse. The issue with this source of intelligence was not its age, but rather its incompleteness. Although Lapérouse's journal was the "constant companion" of British officers in the northern Pacific, they still felt "selfish regrets at the loss of the fuller and completer details of his voyage"[40] after the count's two vessels were lost at sea. Early European explorers including Lapérouse, William Broughton, and Adam Johann von Krusenster (Ivan Fyodorovich Kruzenshtern) all assumed that Sakhalin was a peninsula rather than an island, and the difference was more than semantic. Given Sakhalin's position near the Amur River's junction with the Pacific, at stake was whether oceangoing ships could reach the river's mouth. British and French commanders in 1855 were unaware that Russian explorer and naval officer Grennady Nevelskoy (Nevelskoi) had definitively proved that the Amur's entrance was accessible from either the north or south six years earlier.[41] The consequences of Russia's superior geographic knowledge soon became readily apparent in mid-May, when a British detachment of three ships under Commodore Charles Elliot briefly located Russian vessels at De Castries Bay, less than 100 kilometers (60 miles) south of the Amur.

Crammed into the frigate *Aurora* and an accompanying corvette and transports, Russian evacuees were not immediately safe after

slipping out of Petropavlovsk in mid-April bound for the Amur. The next step was eluding roving Allied patrols when passing through the Kurile Islands. By chance, the Russian squadron made the correct decision to disobey Muravyov's orders and sail through the fourth rather than the sixth strait separating the archipelago, thereby avoiding a large Allied patrol searching for them in the latter passage.[42] After separate journeys lasting between three weeks and a month, Russian vessels regrouped south of the Amur at De Castries Bay, which Lapérouse had named after the Marquis de Castries, France's naval secretary during the 1780s. Zavoyko and his commanders initially dispatched messengers and a large boat to make contact with Rear Admiral Nevelskoy and ascertain whether the narrow passage of Cape Lazarev further to the north was free of ice. Russian forces then used May 19, 1855, to position the frigate *Aurora*, corvette *Olivutsa*, and the armed transport *Dvina* behind islands sheltering the bay's rear. In the event of an attack, these vessels could move so close to shore that *Dvina* crewmember Theodore Nikitich Alekseev observed them floating on only a foot of water at low tide.[43] The timing of these preparations was especially fortunate for the Russian squadron. As a thick morning fog cleared on May 20, lookouts sighted three approaching vessels that were "no doubt military" and "no doubt English."[44] These observations were accurate; the British frigate *Sybille*, screw sloop *Hornet*, and brig *Bittern*, had ascertained the Russian location thanks to indigenous Ainu people, with whom British officers communicated "by the aid of rough drawings on the sands and signs."[45] Amid what observers on both sides described as intense excitement subdued by discipline, both groups prepared for battle.[46]

The sudden appearance of British ships surprised some Petropavlovsk's former defenders, who "had not expected such activity" on the Allied side and did not think British warships would appear earlier than June.[47] Zavoyko was furious not only with the negligence of shore-based Russian lookouts, but also with Governor-General Muravyov and Grennady (i/ii) Ivanovich Nevelskoy. The Russian rear admiral criticized both his superiors' decision to evacuate Petropavlovsk because it placed his small squadron in a precarious position, remarking, "so let them (Muravyov and Nevelskoy) come now and decide what to do with vessels which have no advantage over the enemy even in a defensive position. What a rescue!"[48] In contrast to Zavoyko, however, other Russian officers such as the *Olivutsa*'s Petr Ovsyankin expected an attack "any day."[49] Nevertheless, Ovsyankin noted that the Descastries' natural surroundings were very different

from Petropavlovsk's and were not well-suited for the construction of batteries.[50] Russian sailors resigned themselves to burning both transports and blowing up the corvette *Olivutsa* before withdrawing ashore in the face of an anticipated British assault, but one never materialized. Zavoyko's counterpart, Commodore Charles Elliot, was content to cautiously reconnoiter and try the range of his squadron's guns before sending for reinforcements. Elliot initially ordered the *Bittern* to observe Russian warships, but the brig's crew mistook Russian transports for additional corvette-sized warships and promptly withdrew.[51]

After a short conference among British commanders, the *Hornet* then steamed into the bay to try the range of its longest guns at 2,000 yards. A brief exchange of fire with the corvette *Olivutsa* saw both sides' projectiles fall hundreds of yards short of their intended targets, and soon ceased.[52] *Hornet*, meanwhile, hit an unmarked rock in spite of its shallow draught, which drove home the realization that these waters were "perfectly unknown" to British forces.[53] An improvised map of the bay and Russian ships drawn by the *Hornet*'s commander (Charles Codrington Forsyth), for instance, included the notations "dangerous rock," "apparently not a clear passage," and "grounded ice."[54] As darkness fell, Elliot sent Commander Edward Vansittart and the *Bittern* on an urgent mission to seek reinforcements from Rear Admiral Stirling.[55] Rather than face Russian broadsides through a "narrow approach," Elliot took the *Sybille* and the *Hornet* to patrol the Gulf of Tartary on the assumption that it was "highly probably that the Russian Squadron (would) immediately attempt to escape to the Southward."[56] By the time the two British warships returned eight days later on May 28, they found the harbor "apparently deserted."[57] Although Stirling immediately dispatched reinforcements when Elliot's message reached him on May 30, it was far too late:[58] Allied forces never again sighted a Russian squadron in the Pacific. Months later in October 1855, British warships could only fire at elusive Russian ground forces concealed by the thick woods that flanked the bay, causing few casualties or damage.[59]

The circumstances attending this Russian escape, especially in conjunction with the "singularly unsatisfactory" remainder of the Allies' 1855 Pacific campaign,[60] attracted scathing criticism in Britain's press and Parliament. By January 1856, publications including British India's *Bombay Times* and *Journal of Commerce* were providing enumerated lists of "points on which Commodore Elliot has to be brought to a Court Martial."[61] The *Times* had already weighed in on the subject, directly commenting that "Elliot gave the Russians

the opportunity most coveted, and he must be held responsible to his country for their escape."[62] Worse yet for the British Admiralty's public image, the criticism was not confined to Elliot. Rear Admiral James Stirling, Sir Charles Wood, and even "the Government at home" came under attack from publications such as the conservative *Fraser's Magazine*. As late as 1861, this publication was icily pointing out that the Admiralty "had taken no pains" to supply Elliot with "excellent charts of both entrances into the Amoor which have been for some time in possession of the Dutch Admiralty," and had also neglected to provide "even La Perouse's chart of the Gulf of Tartary!"[63]

Sir Charles Wood also had to defend his subordinates' conduct on the floor of the House of Commons from criticism by politicians including Benjamin Disraeli's close friend Henry Baillie, whose verbal attacks gained momentum following the publication of *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*.[64] Baillie's speech, dripping with sarcasm, criticized Elliot for appearing "to have been surprised to find that the Russians had refused to wait for the convenience of himself and the gallant Admiral (Stirling)."[65] Sir Charles Wood rose in defense of Elliot and Stirling, though the first lord was unable to counter Baillie's assertion that British officers remained in an "unaccountable, blamable, and lamentable state of ignorance" regarding Russian forces in the region.[66] Much to official Britain's relief, Wood's defense sufficed to save Elliot from a court martial; the Crimean War ended soon after this heated parliamentary exchange.

The Russian escape from De Castries Bay was especially galling to British observers because of their naval forces' inability to locate worthy targets of attack thereafter. Although he had publicly defended Rear Admiral Stirling's conduct, Sir Charles Wood privately informed his commander that "my Lords cannot conceal the expression of the disappointment (they) had felt" at his conduct in the Gulf of Tartary, which caused them "surprise and regret." [67] Their lordships went on to angrily opine that it was "clearly and obviously necessary" that Stirling and Elliot should have vigorously searched for the Russian's escape route to the north, just as it was "equally clear that this was not done."[68] Stirling and Eliot rapidly abandoned this effort after one of their steamers ran aground "because of insufficient precautions,"[69] but Sir Charles Wood and his advisors did not "understand" how a large sailing frigate such as the *Aurora* could disappear through a passage that was somehow inaccessible to the shallow-draught, screw-propelled steamers.[70] By the time that British and French warships

discovered a passage leading to the Amur's Mouth from the north, it was "too late in the season" for any further investigation, much less decisive action.[71]

Amid British hesitation and confusion, Zavoyko and his squadron left De Castries Bay for Cape Lazarev, further north toward the Amur's Mouth. The Russian rear admiral knew that the situation was "becoming dangerous," especially because "the weather and terrain did not allow" his forces to construct shore batteries to defend De Castries Bay.[72] On May 24, however, Zavoyko and Russian commanders, including his senior captain, Ivan Izylmetiev, received word from a small boat they had dispatched that Cape Lazarev was clear of ice.[73] This had already become apparent earlier that day, when Nevelskoy appeared in person after an overland journey in order to explain that, based on three years of observations, the Amur's entrance would be clear of ice by early June.[74] By the middle of that month, all vessels from Petropavlovsk were safely positioned past the Amur River's bar,[75] joined by an unexpected craft known as the *Heda*. This newly built schooner, named after the Japanese town where it was launched in April, represented the combined efforts of Japanese carpenters and the shipwrecked crew of the *Diana*.

Scarcely a day after his frigate sank in January 1855, Vice Admiral Putyatin set to work building the *Heda* from a nautical journal's description of the Cronstadt commander's yacht, *Opyt*.[76] Far from opposing the Russian project, Japanese officials were eager to assist and learn the art of Western shipbuilding in the process. The 300 carpenters involved were so successful at later applying their skills to Japanese-built vessels that noted naval historian Mizuno Hironori dubbed them "the fathers of the shipbuilding industry in modern Japan."[77] Although well-crafted, the schooner could not hope to hold all of the *Diana*'s former crew, most of which left Japan on the American merchant vessel *Caroline Foote* and the Bremen brig *Greta*, originally intended to supply American whaling ships. Both the *Heda* and *Caroline Foote* narrowly eluded patrolling Allied vessels and reached Petropavlovsk in May, whereupon they found the port deserted and successfully continued on to the Russian mainland.[78] The Russian sailors hidden on board the *Greta* were not as lucky, and their capture in the Sea of Okhotsk by the British steam sloop *Barracouta* was the only large-scale Allied success in the Pacific during the Crimean War's second year.

On August 1, 1855,[79] morning fog cleared to reveal a British steam warship bearing down on the *Greta*, which hid almost 300 Russian sailors in its hold. British suspicious were immediately aroused by the

brig's evasive behavior, and Commander Frederick Stirling dispatched a lieutenant and an armed boat to board and search the German ship, which had hoisted an American flag as a disguise. Lieutenant Robert Gibson, in command of the boarding party, judged the German captain's cover story that the ship was supplying American whalers as "unsatisfactory," leading him to "suppose something was wrong."[80] Gibson's suspicions were shortly confirmed after he observed "a number of men laying about on the main deck under the open hatchways" and forced the German captain to muster the ship's crew, discovering the *Diana* fugitives in the process.[81] Baron (and Lieutenant) Nikolay von Schilling, one of Russia's two most senior officers in the group, felt that "this fairy tale was given little credence as a Chinese member of the [*Greta*'s] crew had, through fear, already given us away."[82] Although Schilling and the other Russian lieutenant, Alexander Pushkin, "made strong remonstrates against the capture of shipwrecked men,"[83] the younger Stirling initially felt that he had no alternative except to bring them to his father at Hakodate. Schilling instead convinced the British commander to sail for the abandoned Russian port of Ayan (Aian, Ajan) along the Sea of Okhotsk to meet Commodore Elliot and obtain his approval for the Russian prisoners' release.[84] The commodore, however, was already in a foul mood and had other plans entirely.

After several tense conversations with the English-speaking Schilling, Elliot finally offered to exchange the prisoners only by delivering them to a Russian warship.[85] Schilling also seized the opportunity to mock Britain's inability to locate any Russian warships while carefully offering details that would mislead the British as to how to reach the Amur River.[86] In response to the Russian officer's counterproposal that he and his compatriots land at De Castries Bay, however, the British commodore began to lose his composure. Elliot informed Schilling that this was impossible because De Castries was "not a Russian but a Chinese territory."[87] The Russian Baron immediately challenged this conclusion, which led to the revealing exchange that follows:

SCHILLING: De Castries belongs to the Russian occupiers, and even if it were Chinese, I believe the heavy responsibility that you say that your Admiral (Stirling) will take with our release would be lessened by landing us at a neutral location.

ELLIOT: No you cannot be landed at De Castries, because this could be taken as recognition by us of a Russian claim to this area.

SCHILLING: This right has been recognized on the part of England for a long time.

Schilling then brought up the Royal Navy's earlier bombardment of De Castries. Although Elliot concluded that the bombardment meant "nothing," Schilling responded that it had "proved the coast to be Russian because, on neutral territory, [Elliot and British forces] would certainly have not damaged the forest by gunfire."[88] The logic of his argument notwithstanding, Schilling and his compatriots remained prisoners throughout the Crimean War and were eventually returned to England. They left Portsmouth in time to note the impressive number of British warships assembled for the postwar review at Spithead.[89]

Elliot and a reinforced squadron were patrolling the Sea of Okhotsk as part of a flawed plan that Sir James Stirling hatched on July 2, only a few days after the Russian escape from De Castries Bay. Still focused on negotiating with Japanese officials, Stirling dispatched Elliot and a reinforced complement of warships into the Sea of Okhotsk. The British rear admiral envisioned three possible courses for Russian warships: sailing in the Sea of Okhotsk; doubling back to Petropavlovsk; or moving south toward the coasts of Japan and China.[90] Unbeknownst to Stirling, though, there were several immediate and ultimately fatal flaws with his plan. Allied warships had left the approaches to Petropavlovsk for North American waters weeks earlier, and geographic ignorance made Allied vessels unable to follow the *Heda* and other Russian vessels that did venture into the Sea of Okhotsk.[91] Even more frustrating for British forces in particular was how close they came to the Amur's Mouth by approaching from the north.

In late July, British and French warships sighted the Russian American Company's brig *Okhotsk*, named after the sea it so often traversed. The *Okhotsk* had successfully escaped from the deserted fur-trading post of Ayan and was attempting, like so many Russian vessels before it, to reach the safety of the Amur's sheltered waters. Within a few miles of its intended destination, however, the *Okhotsk* stalled during a stretch of windless weather and was sighted by British forces searching for a passage to the Amur. The Russian, or more accurately Finnish, German, and Swedish, crew abandoned their ship after setting it on fire and attempted to reach the river in their ship's rowboats.

The ensuing pursuit by British forces resulted in the unusual spectacle of a small boat chase that eventually yielded 14 prisoners, many of whom volunteered a considerable amount of intelligence.[92] Royal Engineers Captain Bernard Whittingham, a guest of Commodore Elliot throughout the campaign, saw these prisoners as

"valuable prizes, in our lamentable state of ignorance, geographical and political."[93] British officers believed that the information they obtained was accurate, but a plan of the alleged position of Russian warships outside the Amur's mouth drawn by Captain William Hoste of the *Spartan* was, in reality, completely incorrect.[94] The Russian squadron more than "seemed" to have already entered the Amur by late July; by July 28, Russian warships had already reached Nikolayevsk (Nikolaevsk, etc.), 80 kilometers (50 miles) upriver.[95] They were never pursued. By the time Allied ships came close to locating the Amur in late October, winter ice forced them to turn back and instead fire grapeshot at indigenous Niv (Nivh) fisherman.[96] Their retreat confirmed the continued transformation of "a country the world supposed to belong to China" as, in the words of an influential American businessman and consul,

> [The Russians] simply took [the Amur River Valley]. After taking it, they contrived to have it ceded to them by treaty. Such a mode of acquisition is by no means a novelty among powerful nations. If I mistake not, honest Uncle Sam has occasionally acquired territory in much the same way.[97]

Two months earlier, meanwhile, Allied forces had been much less discerning in also attempting to acquire territory in East Asia. In late August, an Allied force of two frigates arrived off the Kurile Island of Urup (Uruppu).[98] The island was especially significant because the February 1855 Treaty of Shimoda awarded Urup and all the islands to its north to Russia, whereas the Russo-Japanese boundary had previously been in dispute.[99] Even in July 1855, though, Rear Admiral James Stirling confessed to Japanese officials that he was at a loss to know whether he was to consider the island of Urup as Japanese or Russian.[100] Regardless, Urup and its modest harbor at Tavano indisputably functioned as a storage depot for the Russian American Company, further legitimizing Stirling's resolution "that if Russian it will be my duty to take it from them."[101] The British did learn from Japanese officials that "all the Kuriles north of and including Urup are Russian territory" on June 5,[102] but Stirling was unable to discern Japanese motivations for conceding the island to Russia.

The British rear admiral nevertheless refused to let ambiguity prevent him from pressing ahead. After a confusing exchange with Hakodate inspector Chikaraishi Katsunosuke, the British commander simply concluded, according to Japanese records, that:

> Urup, which used to be yours, for some reason has sadly become both Russia's territory and your loss. The reason why they took over these territories, as well as Turkey, and why they initiated this war, is probably because they were looking for good ports.[103]

Accordingly, Allied detachments from the frigates *Pique* and *La Sybille* landed to apprehend Urup's three Russian residents, only to discover that the latter had already departed in a small boat.[104]

Despite their disappointment at another Russian escape, Captains Frederick Nicolson and Simonet de Maisonneuve went ahead with a strange ceremony. Amidst much fanfare, including ceremonial flag-raising, cannon salutes, and cheers, these British and French officers jointly annexed the island, which Maisonneuve suggested christening "*L'Isle de L'Alliance*."[105] After installing Alcausti Artemi (Aleousti Artemi), a "native of the Island . . . chosen by his countrymen" as provisional governor and "having satisfied (themselves) that there was nothing more in the neighbourhood," the Allies sailed back to Japan.[106] The only remaining official record of their visit to Urup was an inscription left on the principal residence in Tavano, the text of which indicated that the *Pique* and *La Sibylle* had "*taken possession of this island*."[107] Urup's tenure as a joint Anglo-French colony lasted only a few months, as Article IV of the Treaty of Paris mandated the return of any Russian territory seized during the Crimean conflict. Instead of comprising "one of the few successes off the coast of Japan for France and England,"[108] the annexation was a source of annoyance for governments at home. The French government, for example, had to deal with the Russian American Company's protest that the island should have been covered by its neutrality agreement with the British government and Hudson's Bay Company, while the "official" British Admiralty reaction consisted of a series of disapproving exclamation points: "!!!"[109]

Sir James Stirling already faced more serious problems than a lack of enthusiasm for his initiative to annex Urup. The rear admiral was ultimately correct in his anticipation that the Japanese would eventually relax the rigid restrictions codified in their 1854 agreement with his squadron,[110] but this did little to satisfy his commercially inclined critics.[111] Sir Charles Wood at least succeeded in shielding his commander's conduct by opining in Parliament that he did "not think it desirable—at any rate" to allow the inspection of the commander's dispatches "relative to the proceedings of Her Majesty's fleet in the China Seas."[112] The British Foreign Office also came to Stirling's defense by objecting to the Board of Trade's "flippant" observation

that the Anglo-Japanese convention had "very little to do with trade."[113] Publications representing the British mercantile community, on the other hand, freely expressed their opinion that the rear admiral had achieved "nothing creditable to the arms of his country, and something rather discreditable to his own diplomacy."[114]

Even the admittedly limited achievements of Stirling's improvised diplomacy were a vast improvement over the other miserably humiliating incidents that characterized the Allies' Crimean War efforts in the Pacific. Although Stirling's November 1855 "Memoir on the Maritime Policy of England in the Eastern Seas" focused on the value of the Amur River Valley and northern China in addition to Japan,[115] the Crimean War proved that Russian forces under Governor-General Muravyov rather than British warships had the means to effectively act on their commanders' larger designs for Northeastern Asia. In the words of an account from the *California Chronicle* that Stirling privately labelled "true and faithful," "if the subjects of the Czar retain possession of the Amoor, the time will come when the English and the French will regret that they did not take it, at any expense, while they might have done so."[116]

Shortly after realizing that Allied warships would not push through to attack the Amur River, Royal Engineers captain Bernard Whittingham reached a startling conclusion thanks to the region's indigenous inhabitants. Gestures and drawings on sand allowed them to express how they were already dividing the Amur River between "Lorchas" (Russians) and "Manchus" (Chinese).[117] These crude visuals were simply a graphic representation of Anglo-French failures in the Pacific during the Crimean War. Russia willingly abandoned any attempt to defend Petropavlovsk and settlements associated with the Russian American Company's fur trading activities, but only in order to focus on the Amur and its immense surrounding territories. Britain's and France's inability to even locate the Amur River's mouth, coupled with the incidents at Petropavlovsk and De Castries Bay in 1854 and 1855, respectively, was thus far more significant than the scale of actual fighting in the region initially suggests. The first year of the Crimean conflict finally gave Russian expansionists their long-awaited, pressing justification for expansion at Chinese expense. Events in 1855 proved that Britain and France were unable to prevent the Russian Empire from consolidating its hold over a vast swath of Northeastern Asia. When Russian expansion in the East Asia was finally checked a half century later, it was by Japan rather than Britain, France, or the 1856 Treaty of Paris that ended what had become more than a "Crimean" War.

CHAPTER 10

Sweaborg and Another Baltic Campaign, 1855

As Allied warships withdrew from the Baltic in December 1854 ahead of rapidly forming winter ice, it became apparent that additional campaigns would be necessary once spring arrived in 1855. By the time the first British warships steamed into the Baltic in April 1855, however, the political structure of Britain had changed dramatically. France's ambassador in London prior to May 1855, Alexandre Colonna Walewski, had noted in January 1854 that "the chances of a change in the English Cabinet would be greater" if the Crimean War became "prolonged."[1] Nicholas I deemed this "great overhaul in Ministry" from Aberdeen to Palmerston "hardly for the better," but died in March 1855 before witnessing its consequences.[2] The new Czar, Alexander II, and British prime minister, Palmerston, were undeniably different leaders than their predecessors. Yet they initially made few changes to either of their respective countries' strategies. The Russian Empire once again prepared to defend its coastlines, while Britain continued to assemble a powerful fleet to campaign against them with French assistance. Sir James Graham would no longer directly lead these efforts after tendering his resignation to Palmerston on February 22, 1855, but nevertheless managed to indelibly shape the Allies' ensuing campaign in the Baltic.

Prior to his departure, the former first lord had assembled a powerful all-steam battle fleet, selected a weak commander in Rear Admiral Sir Richard Saunders Dundas, and limited that fleet's flotilla craft. In conjunction with Napoleon III's focus on taking Sevastopol, this meant that the Allied Baltic Fleet of 1855 had to limit itself to a low-risk bombardment of Sweaborg. Such a prospect did not fully satisfy the British public, but the weak cabinet that Palmerston inherited from Aberdeen saw little point in enduring the enormous casualties required to capture Russia's Baltic strongholds. These positions,

after all, would have to be abandoned or destroyed for want of sufficient troops with which to garrison them against Russian counterattacks.[3] If not even victory in the Crimean Peninsula promised to end the conflict, capturing Sweaborg or Revel at great cost would hardly be more significant for either side: only Cronstadt would do. As early as November 1854, Nicholas I had already deemed Sevastopol's military situation "horrible to think about" and without "any hope for a better outcome."[4] Early in the war, Russia's Emperor found it most "difficult" that Russia could not avoid a strong Baltic expedition "most probably aimed right at Cronstadt, which is openly being mentioned."[5] Only after assembling a formidable alliance, exhausting Russian resources, and deploying a fleet capable of threatening Cronstadt could Palmerston's Britain and Napoleon III's France finally destroy Russia's remaining resolve to continue fighting the Crimean War. These achievements would have to wait until 1856

In January 1855, pressure exerted by an angry British public, press, and parliamentary opposition toppled the Aberdeen government. The prime minister's resignation, in turn, also necessitated the departure of his political allies, including Sir James Graham. Before Graham left office, he took time out from his embarrassingly public feud with Sir Charles Napier to ensure Britain's next Baltic commander would be more docile. With Sir Thomas Cochrane making it a point not to volunteer for service in 1855 and Rear Admiral Henry Byam Martin "a man of distinct views and opinions," Graham was drawn to the amiable and politically well-connected Sir Richard Saunders Dundas.[6] This officer's personal reserve and professional caution stood in stark contrast to Napier's disposition and made Dundas an especially attractive candidate to manage a campaign that did not require a "Nelson Touch." Significantly, Dundas and his French counterpart, Rear Admiral Charles-Eugène Pénaud, were too young to have served throughout the Napoleonic Wars; they had instead gained modest experience in smaller conflicts such as the First Anglo-Chinese (Opium) War.[7] Even after Graham's departure, key figures including Palmerston and Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon expected little more than a strict blockade and a possible long-range bombardment of Sweaborg, which is precisely what ensued.[8]

The fleet that Dundas commanded in 1855 was greatly superior to the one available to Napier in 1854, thanks to the early results of a long-running naval construction program aimed largely at France (and vice versa). The number of Allied steam-propelled battleships in the Baltic was not a subject of debate, though, so much as their

accompaniment. Britain's Crimean War squadrons in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific were consistently handicapped by a lack of steam-propelled vessels of sufficiently shallow draft to assault Russian coastal fortifications. The word "gunboat" had already entered the English language in the 1790s, but early examples were often just small boats launched from larger warships and fitted with a cannon in front.[9] It was only during the Crimean War that purpose-built vessels mounting a handful of large-caliber guns appeared in the Baltic alongside older oar-powered craft employed by Russia and Sweden.

The former group was the result of British planners', especially Graham's, belated realization that even the most powerful line-of-battle ships would not suffice to destroy the largest Russian shore emplacements. Graham, however, received little credit from Paymaster Hugh Francis Pullen, secretary to Rear Admiral Michael Seymour. As Pullen confided in his private journal:

> [An attack on Cronstadt] might have [been] done were it not for the treachery of the late Ministry & First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, who in neglecting to send with us a flotilla of gun boats & small vessels which the experience of last year proved to be necessary to success in this quarter, has completely prevented our striking a blow at Russian power and insolence in the north.[10]

Other specialized assault craft joined Allied gunboats in the Baltic, including small, sail-powered mortar vessels that larger warships could tow into action. The fundamental problem with these new flotilla craft and their machinery and armament was that they took time to construct, especially in conjunction with the British Royal Dockyards' continued emphasis on producing larger warships and France's still-limited industrial capacity. As marine painter and *Illustrated London News* correspondent John Wilson Carmichael noted in his diary, this timing meant that, even in late June 1855, reinforcements from Britain only numbered "two mortar vessels instead of 50 at least."[11] These figures rose considerably by the time the Allies bombarded Sweaborg in mid-August of that year,[12] but even this flotilla of 21 mortar vessels and 22 gunboats indicated that British dockyards needed more time before a "great armament" of gunboats, mortar vessels, and newly developed floating batteries could match the new Czar Alexander II's 1855 fear that Allied fleets "in sight of Cronstadt" were simply "waiting for the arrival of the remaining gunboats and floating batteries."[13]

Floating batteries were a solution to the fatal vulnerability of large wooden-hulled warships to well-aimed projectiles. As Napoleon III wrote to Théodore Ducos after the Crimean War's outbreak:

> In war, the chances must be even. You cannot venture against a wall of little value, armed with only a few cannons, manned by a small number of gunners, a ship carrying 1,200 men, armed with 80 cannons, the construction of which lasted for years and cost the State many millions.[14]

A French committee had already attempted to create suitable armor protection beginning in 1843, testing materials including rubber, coal, and layered metal sheets.[15] The French and (to a lesser extent) British metallurgical industries in the mid-nineteenth century were still developing the capability to produce substantial amounts of high-quality steel or wrought iron necessary to clad wooden hulls. Regardless, Napoleon III took a personal interest in constructing a specialized iron warship capable of assaulting coastal fortifications without incurring massive damage[16] because they would allow his navy and its ally to take Cronstadt "by the throat" with minimal casualties and expense.[17] Accordingly, His Imperial Majesty harassed Ducos into prioritizing the construction of ten floating batteries by April 1855, the earliest possible date for a second Baltic campaign.[18] Although France could produce only half of the number originally intended, Napoleon III furnished Britain with the plans for these vessels in return for details on a 68-pound cannon and Queen Victoria's yacht.[19] The most notable operational use of floating batteries during the Crimean War came at the Ukrainian port of Kinburn in 1855, which meant that plans for the Baltic Theater made a profound impact on the development of warship technology far outside their intended region.

On the same day that Sir James Graham resigned—February 22, 1855—a memorandum from Captain Bartholomew James Sulivan arrived at Admiralty House in London.[20] This experienced navigational officer had already spent 1854 as chief surveyor in the Baltic after Graham passed him over for a battleship command, though the outgoing first lord decided to employ Sulivan to plan a Baltic Campaign for 1855. Just as Captain John Washington had done in late 1853, Sulivan set to work outlining the "different Methods that may be adopted in conducting the Operations in the Baltic" in 1855.[21] Unlike preceding strategic consultants like Washington, Lord Dundonald, and Admiral Sir Thomas Byam Martin, Sulivan

had the benefit of a year's worth of recent combat experience in the Baltic Region. Accordingly, his memorandum comprised "three distinct plans": a close blockade of Russian coasts; injuring or destroying Sweaborg and Cronstadt; and, finally, combining naval operations with a land attack by a "strong military force."[22] In addition to outlining how best to supply the fleet with coal, Sulivan also recommended tightening the blockade at the expense of Finnish civilians on the grounds that it was "very desirable to make all parties feel the evils of war as much as possible."[23] Ultimately, though, Sulivan devoted the bulk of the document to a detailed outline of his plan to ruin Sweaborg by a long-range bombardment and not a costly close-quarters affair involving the Allies' wooden battleships. The document also strongly and repeatedly hinted that its author wished to attack Cronstadt, but that possibility did not appeal to Graham, Wood, or Dundas and was consequently shelved until planning later commenced for a large-scale effort in 1856. As the first British warships approached the Baltic in April 1855, Dundas received orders to investigate Sweaborg only as a possible target for long-range bombardment. He was instead to impose a strict blockade, carry out minor coastal raids, and conduct routine reconnaissance and monitor operations off Cronstadt.[24] French authorities, meanwhile, furnished Pénaud and his modest squadron with almost identical orders,[25] and an advanced squadron of French vessels met their British counterparts on June 1.[26]

Graham's vision for the Baltic in 1855, based on Sulivan's memorandum, called for a "flying" squadron of steam-propelled frigates to quickly establish a blockade in advance of the main battle fleet. Residual winter ice and the flagship *Duke of Wellington*'s collision with a confused American merchant vessel, however, slowed the British fleet's progress. In response, Sir Charles Wood privately wrote to Dundas urging "for heaven's sake make matters of this importance go at a better pace or we shall come to grief."[27] Following Dundas' response and offer to resign, Wood softened his original tone and let the commander and his fleet make their way to the Baltic by April. They were joined the following month by a modest French squadron of a half-dozen steam battleships and large frigates. The French warships' presence stemmed from Napoleon III's promise to Britain's Prince Consort Albert that the French Navy would join the British in accomplishing "whatever might be done," though British "prestige" was more at risk during naval campaigns in the Baltic and other, more distant regions.[28]

By early 1855, Russian planners were worried about far more than prestige. As Allied warships began to leave the Baltic in 1854, a committee of Russia's most prominent commanders, including the future Czar Alexander II, reached a sobering conclusion. Its preface read as follows:

> The present war has shown in practice the colossal development and technical perfection of the naval forces of western Nations. At present, their fleet can realize such military undertakings which previously were considered impossible; hence, all the calculations that have served as a basis for strategic considerations regarding naval operations should now be changed.[29]

As part of a "totally different basis" of defense necessitated by the "example of (the Allied) landing in Crimean," Czar Nicholas thought it "inarguable" for his planners to expect around 70,000 or 80,000 Allied troops in addition to Swedish reinforcements.[30] Intelligence reports from an espionage operation in Sweden-Norway, after all, revealed that this kingdom was "boasting that they have never been so well prepared as now" for a military conflict.[31] Even with an estimated 311,000 troops in the region by the spring of 1855, confidential Russian memos indicated these forces were "barely sufficient for us to wait in comfort for forthcoming events in the Baltic Sea."[32] Russia authorities once again felt it "obligatory" to further reduce the number of points they defended, for "otherwise, we won't be able to defend any."[33] They concluded that Russia's limited losses in 1854 were due to insufficient Allied preparations and not the "strength of our defense" or advantages of our situation."[34]

Rather than deploying regular troops outside of major cities such as Helsingfors, Russian commanders felt that "a few companies of Russian forces scattered around 850 kilometers would be of no use, would not keep the local population from treason, and could only be surrounded and taken prisoner."[35] Locally raised Finnish forces and "a few" Cossacks would instead be deployed "more for the moral comfort of the local residents than for any actual resistance against the enemy."[36] The four points—Åbo, Helsingfors, Sweaborg, and Vyborg (Viipuri)—that Russia's military leaders did elect to defend nevertheless had "different importance."[37] Helsingfors and Sweaborg boasted "unquestionable" importance as opposed to Vyborg's place as a communication relay point and Åbo's designation as militarily unimportant but politically and economically significant.[38] Accordingly, Sweaborg and Helsingfors received "all possible means"

of reinforcement, while Åbo's defenses remained adequate only to repel a naval attack and not a siege.[39]

St. Petersburg's defenses, meanwhile presented a more serious problem, for even parity between Russian defenders and Allied attackers would result in Russia's "inevitable defeat."[40] Worse yet, in the committee's thoughts, "defeat at the shores of the Gulf of Finland- would be an even greater calamity for Russia than the loss of Sevastopol and Crimea."[41] Officers returning from the Crimean Peninsula accordingly spent the summer of 1855 in Cronstadt and then Sweaborg, Åbo, and Vyborg sharing "useful insights gained from experience in Sevastopol."[42] Nevertheless, directly fortifying St. Petersburg would come at great cost and have a "negative moral effect" on the capital's residents and "the whole of Russia."[43] It was also hardly possible to "match" the "shallow-draft (Allied) steamships" that Grand Duke Konstantin expected in subsequent campaigns.[44] Although Cronstadt was still thought "sufficient" to protect St. Petersburg from attack by sea, the committee was convinced that "all calculations" in its 1855 report supported a sobering conclusion.

> Even at maximum strain of Russia's enormous forces, there is no chance to duly defend the shores of both seas (Baltic and Black) against decisive actions of both naval powers and simultaneously keep two armies at our ground borders strong enough for the struggle with Western neighbors (Prussia and Austria). Russia might have survived in such a general war with Europe only by having forces up to one million strong in the field.[45]

The factors that ultimately forced Russia to accept defeat in 1856 were thus becoming apparent before the 1855 campaigns even began. The mere opening of Baltic hostilities in 1855, in fact, dashed Nicholas' 1854 hopes that "*prompt and decisive*" action with Austria would ensure that everything be "over" before '*next April*—when Baltic navigation will be resumed (by the Allies).[46]

The first British screw-propelled frigates to arrive in the Baltic had two immediate tasks to accomplish before the Allies could launch any major operations. These early-arriving warships found themselves charged with imposing a tight blockade and conducting early reconnaissance of Russian ports including Revel, Estonia, and nearby Port Baltic. Accordingly, Captain Rundle Burgess Watson, the commander of Britain's advanced squadron, issued a notification of blockade in mid-April for the Baltic coast in advance of French warships' arrival.[47] In contrast to earlier Allied blockades of the Baltic and White Sea in

1854, the declaration's timing conformed to legal advice provided by the Queen's advocate.[48] In this instance, there would be no disputing the effectiveness of British-led efforts to disrupt maritime commerce as more numerous and larger merchant vessels would be intercepted. Off the Finnish port of Nystad (Uusikaupunki) alone, for example, the screw-propelled sloop *Harrier* burned or scuttled dozens of trading vessels as large as 600 tons on July 23 and 24.[49] Earlier that month, the British frigate *Magicienne* and gunboat *Ruby* discovered a large granite quarry in the Gulf of Finland along with 29 Russian bulk carriers, which the British ships summarily "destroyed by fire."[50]

The real issue with the Allied blockade, then, was not its effectiveness but rather its impact on the coastal populations of Finland and Russia's other Baltic territories. As Sulivan learned during a supper ashore as the guest of an English-speaking Estonian noble family in late July,

> He (Baron Sternberg) said that the rich did not feel the blockade, as all necessaries, such as coffee, sugar, tea, etc. and particularly all luxuries, were only increased a small percentage in cost by the land carriage from (Prussian) Memel and Austria, but that salt could not be brought that way, the carriage being so large a proportion to the price, and therefore the poor on the coasts were the sufferers.[51]

In response to the Baron's plea that "poor fisherman" on Estonian islands be allowed to trade salt, Sulivan regretfully pointed out to Sternberg "the difficulties of making such an exception to the blockade."[52] Given France's reluctance, initially shared by Wood and Clarendon,[53] to grant even politically expedient exceptions to Finmark and the Åland Islands,[54] life would only get worse for those most directly impacted by the Allied blockade before the Crimean conflict's end.

Neglecting to establish a timely blockade was one thing. Yet, in Sulivan's words, the "chief point" that Sir James Graham lodged against Napier at the end of 1854 was that the vice admiral had "lost" a great deal of time in personally examining Sweaborg and submitting a plan of attack based on those observations.[55] Contemporary figures agreed with this assessment, with historian Charles Yonge noting in 1866 that Dundas was "eager" to avoid Napier's earlier mistakes.[56] In Dundas' own words, he was "determined to lose no time" in first inspecting Revel and then Sweaborg as a passenger on the *Merlin*, Sulivan's new paddle-steamer.[57] The British rear admiral also dispatched fleet units to reconnoiter Revel and the Gulf of Riga,

with the latter task falling to Captain Erasmus Ommanney. Newly redeployed after commanding Britain's 1854 campaign in the White Sea, Ommanney and the *Hawke* entered the Gulf of Riga in August 1855.

Shortly thereafter, Ommanney began examining Russian defenses after conferring with the British ships already maintaining a blockade off the coast of modern Latvia. In keeping with his aggressive actions a year earlier, Ommanney recommended destroying the coastal town of Pernau (Pärnu, now in southwestern Estonia). The suggestion came in spite of the larger British warships' inability to "approach within two miles of the place," which was "surrounded by a regular fortification mounting several guns" and could only be taken through a "sudden dash."[58] Dundas, on the other hand, "did not consider it expedient" to adopt Ommanney's ambitious proposal for a small boat attack up a shallow channel.[59] As the cautious rear admiral informed Wood and the Admiralty, he, unlike commanders such as Captain Sir Frederick Nicolson in the Pacific, was "not prepared to sanction the landing of force" in areas strongly defended by Russian troops.[60] After Ommanney found Riga "inaccessible" and protected by a fortress at Dwinaminde, Allied attention once again fixated on the largest fortified harbors of Sweaborg, Cronstadt, and Revel. More detailed reconnaissance, though, again confirmed that Sweaborg was the only realistic target for a fleet that was not accompanied by an expeditionary force of ground troops.

Before bombarding Sweaborg, Dundas and Pénaud felt obligated to again inspect Cronstadt's defenses. Allied warships ventured so close to shore that sketch artists on their decks could observe the "dark green jackets, white trousers, and caps" of Russian troops and ominously noted that timber houses were "nearly all built of wood" and "would burn like tinder if a fire should take place."[61] Even in early July, however, more perceptive officers such as Sir Astley Cooper Key, captain of the frigate *Amphion* and a close friend of Sulivan, were reporting their "fear" that "Cronstadt is given up for want of a sufficient gunboat flotilla."[62] These apprehensions proved correct on June 4, when the *Merlin* ferried senior officers to inspect Cronstadt's Northern Channel. The rear admirals' journey confirmed that the passage remained blocked to larger ships by submarine pylons of stone and wood that appeared "even more substantial" in the channel's deeper passages.[63] Pénaud complimented the speed of Russia's ongoing defensive preparations[64] and Dundas agreed, concluding that, "Under these circumstances and in the absence of a powerful and numerous flotilla . . . no effectual attempt could be made to remove

such obstructions; and no serious attack appears to me to be practicable with the means at my disposal."[65]

Sulivan's musings on how to destroy these barriers with a canoe and swimmers in wool-lined oilskin suits aside,[66] the "very grea**t . . . difficulty** and danger of attacking such a place" was even apparent to Scottish medical student William Gerard Don.[67] This youthful volunteer from the University of Edinburgh's School of Medicine added that it was "therefore clearly our function to imprison the Russian fleet and paralyse (*sic*) all commerce."[68] Allied reconnaissance in 1855 provided helpful updates for Sir Charles Wood's planned attack through the Northern Channel with a grand fleet of flotilla craft in 1856,[69] but exposed Allied warships to fields of Russian "infernal machines," or early submarine mines.

The devices that Czarist forces installed off Cronstadt in the 1850s were not unprecedented innovations in naval warfare[70] unlike the program surrounding them. Allied forces first encountered both inventions in 1854 when the British paddle-sloop *Driver* discovered one's moorings, but Sulivan reported that the fleet had "hitherto rather joked about them."[71] Rear Admiral Pénaud initially feared the British steamer *Merlin* had been destroyed and would soon sink,[72] but continued his reconnaissance mission after realizing that the damage was less severe than initially suspected. The first reaction of senior British commanders, on the other hand, was to "play" with specimens their sailors fished out of the water. Just as Rear Admiral Michael Seymour remarked "this is the way it would go off" and activated a device, it exploded and blinded one of his eyes while injuring a number of key figures on the *Exmouth*. Dundas, meanwhile, lost his sight for a few hours after a separate incident.[73] Accidents aside, the mines' compact design meant that even thick minefields posed little threat to Allied warships. In a letter describing the incident on the *Exmouth*, British cadet Frederick Edwards even remarked to his sister that he "hope[d] to bring [an infernal machine] home to show you."[74]

Czarist historians cited French correspondence in claiming that the mines "forced" British and French warships to abandon their reconnaissance,[75] but the reality was that these mines carried too small a charge to penetrate even wooden hulls. Pénaud, for one, overcame his initial apprehensions to mention that the infernal machines were too weak to cause serious damage and were laughed at by his sailors.[76] Naturally, Soviet historians blamed Swedish émigré businessman Alfred Nobel and not the Russian practice of deliberately neglecting to arm Nobel's mines in order to protect the crews tasked with installing the devices.[77] As Hugh Francis Pullen imagined,

"frightened" Russian installers had used "laudable discretion" in installing the devices "in the safest way to themselves & their enemies also."[78] The Russian mines' weakness actually disappointed one *Illustrated London News* sketch artist, who felt that minor damage was insufficiently "picturesque" and had to settle for an image of "broken tea-cups."[79] The lack of a more severe underwater threat also allowed Dundas, Pénaud, and Sulivan to obtain an excellent view of Russian efforts to strengthen Cronstadt's defenses. Their observations led Ferdinand Hamelin, France's navy minister after Théodore Ducos died in April 1855, to conclude days after taking office that "there is nowhere with a more complete ensemble of fortifications than that of Cronstadt."[80]

The Allied fleet's mere presence in the Baltic had a profound impact on the war's overall course because hundreds of thousands of Russian troops were required to oppose them. Russian calculations indicated that they might amass up to 225,000 troops in the Baltic by 1855: a "huge number," but one "determined by necessity."[81] Even with these forces, though, British artist John Wilson Carmichael could recount walking through the forest on Nargen Island (Naissaar Island) off the Estonian coast "calling at House after House for milk" without fear of being ambushed or captured.[82] Months earlier in May, Captain Bartholomew Sulivan added his description of a surreal cricket match between the officers of the *Cressy* and the *Royal George* within sight of Revel, leading him to wonder "can this be wartime?"[83] The Baltic Region's coastal population, meanwhile, often had little need to ponder this question thanks to the aggressive impulses felt by British officers in particular. As Sulivan continued,

> The fact is, there is a kind of unfeeling, senseless anxiety to fire at anything that gives a chance, for the sake of firing, and some, I fear, for the sake of notoriety, or the chance of bringing about the pretence of a fight, so that they may write a letter.[84]

Hugh Francis Pullen, meanwhile, attributed charred coastal foliage to "the strange mania [the] French & English have for burning & destroying wherever they set foot . . . bringing suffering & distress on the poor harmless inhabitants."[85] Small-scale raids continued throughout the remainder of the 1855 campaign season, but were less severe than the Royal Navy's efforts in the Gulf of Bothnia a year earlier.

A major reason for British moderation was the close watch that Rear Admiral Dundas kept over the operations of his subordinates, which contrasted to Napier's approach during the preceding Baltic

campaign. Consider, for example, a dispatch Dundas sent to the Admiralty in reaction to the sloop *Harrier*'s actions against the town of Raumo (Rauma) in which he politely but firmly criticized the actions of Commander Henry Story and "directed Captain Warden to inform him [Story] that it will be a subject of deep regret to Her Majesty's Government if it should appear that needless severity has been inflicted upon the defenceless portion of the town."[86]

When the coastal town of Lovisa (Loviisa) caught fire in July, Russian sources exonerated British forces of any involvement.[87] This corroborated Dundas' report to the Admiralty, in which the British rear admiral emphasized that Captain Nicholas Vansittart had informed him "that the authorities of the town have themselves admitted and explained the accidental origin of the fire."[88] Reverend Robert Edgar Hughes admitted looting a silver locket from a deserted island village of Kotka, but added that other "irregularities . . . were very slight and were immediately repressed by the officers."[89]

Civilians living near the coast were also fortunate that Dundas, advised by Sulivan, saw fit to overrule Ommanney's suggestion for a "sudden dash" at the town of Pernau (Pärnu).[90] Ommaney's small-scale brushes with Russian defenders along the modern Latvian coastline, in fact, had already done little except prompt Russian lieutenant Vladimir Nikolaevich Brylkin to regret that he did not speak enough Esotian or Lettish to understand the jokes that his gun crews made about inaccurate British fire.[91] Sulivan took Ommanney's suggestion as evidence of how "few of our men . . . can really be trusted in command, or are fit to decide on what should and should not be done" while mocking the former White Sea commander's "flaming" dispatch and reporting that Ommanney was "not celebrated for brains."[92] In spite of references to the importance of remembering "what occurred last year at Gamla Carleby,"[93] however, British raiding parties were always cautious when approaching seaside towns. This became especially apparent at Hango (Hanko) on June 6, 1855.

Early in the afternoon on that June day, a boat from the British steam corvette *Cossack* approached the Finnish coast to land a small group of captured Finnish merchant captains. The events that transpired next produced one of the most heated controversies of the entire conflict. Although many of the surrounding circumstances were disputed by British and Russian sources, a basic outline was soon widely transmitted. A cutter commanded by Lieutenant Louis Geneste and carrying more than a dozen Royal Navy personnel landed under a flag of truce without receiving any acknowledgment from shore and while carrying arms at the bottom of their boat, both practices that

went "against the normal conventions."[94] As Geneste later noted while in captivity, concealed soldiers "suddenly . . . rose and fired on us and the boat from all sides," trapping his men and inflicting heavy casualties.[95]

Hours later, another small craft arrived in search of the first one and discovered the results of what Dundas described as "a most severe loss, under circumstances of extreme cruelty."[96] Some British politicians initially thought that it would be "impossible to say what the real facts of the case are . . . until Lieutenant Geneste and the survivors are set at liberty, or allowed freely to communicate."[97] Opinions changed rapidly, however, due to the testimony of ordinary seaman John Brown, "a young man of colour."[98] Brown was "dangerously wounded" by the Russia's initial volley of musket fire, but survived by feigning death and then attracting the attention of the rescue party sent three hours later. Brown's initial statement was "they are all killed,"[99] and he added a more detailed account from the *Cossack*'s sickbay indicating that his assailants spoke English, were dressed as riflemen, and were led by someone who "from his dress and appearance, seemed to be an officer."[100]

In response to vehement British protests, Russian authorities quickly launched an investigation into what Western newspapers had already labeled "Hango Massacre." This did nothing to pacify Dundas or assuage a Western European public exposed to lurid illustrations of what embedded marine painter John Wilson Carmichael described as the "slaughter" of a group including "poor Blacky," the lone survivor to escape either death or captivity.[101] Governor-General Berg initially attempted to limit negative reactions by refusing to send Lieutenant Geneste's account of the affair back to the *Cossack*, instead secretly transmitting a copy to St. Petersburg.[102] Testimony from Ekness residents, though, betrayed the reasons why this effort failed; the small boat had escaped from shore by next morning, leading them to assume that an unharmed British serviceman had been hiding on shore.[103] Geneste's graphic account of waving a white flag in vain eventually reached publications such as the *Illustrated London News* two months later, after what that publication deemed "a most unaccountable delay."[104] Russo-Finnish accounts, meanwhile, diverged considerably from Geneste's and Brown's.

After Berg initially notified St. Petersburg of the incident by telegraph on the day it occurred, Ekness Commander Major General Yegor Ivanovich von Moller added more detail from Russia's senior officer on scene, Ensign Isidor Dmitrievich Sverchkov. A previous incident had prompted von Moller to dispatch Ensign Sverchkov and

100 volunteers from the King of Prussia Grenadier Rifle Regiment, supported by 40 Cossacks, to "prevent any minor enemy landings."[105] Alerted at 11:00 a.m. to the small boat's approach by Hango's telegraph facility and Cossack sentries, Russian troops quickly marched to take up concealed positions. Split into two parties, each led by Ensign Sverchkov and Petty Officer Petr Pavlov, Russian forces spotted an armed boat approaching the shore at noon.[106] According to Sverchkov's official report, the British landed and seemed to pay special attention to the telegraph post.[107] Noticing only six men remaining in the boat after their crewmates and passengers had landed, Pavlov's men opened fire while Sverchkov's men charged from their hiding place and surrounded the British landing party.[108] The Russian Ensign concluded the engagement with an order to fire on the boat because its remaining occupants "were throwing overboard some things and the gun, intending to lighten the boat... to sail off."[109]

Russian authorities immediately realized that this matter-of-fact report would not stem a growing controversy, and Berg soon selected Aide-de-Camp Mikhail Ivanovich Chertkov to oversee a special investigation that would parallel the information-gathering efforts of Nyland (Uusimaa) provincial authorities. Traveling to Hango on Berg's orders to question Sverchkov and his subordinates on multiple occasions, Chertkov reported that "both the officer and the lower ranks... unanimously confirmed" their earlier testimony that "they had not seen the flag of truce at all, neither at the screw-driven corvette *Cossack*" nor "in the hands of the landed English officer."[110] Russian soldiers also "unanimously confirmed," according to Chertkov, that the enemy boat had a small-caliber copper gun that 'the English sailors threw into the sea during the skirmish.'[111] Chertkov added that, "in objection to the testimony of the imprisoned English officer (Geneste) that they had no loaded guns," he had personally inspected captured weapons and was convinced that three remained loaded while another three had shown signs of "recent use" and were accompanied by hundreds of rifle rounds.[112]

Local eyewitness statements, meanwhile, were the key evidence in a separate investigation conducted by Nyland provincial authorities. Recorded testimonies from the Finnish captains who accompanied the British, especially Karl Johan Edward Nystram, were important. Nystram systematically explained how the British loaded a longboat with rifles and the Finns' belongings before setting out for shore after Lieutenant Geneste and Finnish merchant Captain Johan Lundstrem (Lundström) disregarded Nystram's admonition not to sail to Hango because any armed forces there "would fire at them."[113] In an account

that Russian authorities subsequently labelled as "proven accurate and justified,"[114] the English-speaking Nystram also recounted overhearing British sailors "talking between themselves that they wanted to get beef, eggs, etc. in the village."[115] Importantly, this Finnish captain also provided a precise description of the small (under one square meter) size of the white flag that Geneste belatedly ordered raised at the small boat's front in comparison to the much larger Union Jack flying at its rear.[116] Nystram did not accompany Geneste's advanced party on shore and instead opted to reclaim his belongings from the boat, a decision that likely saved his life by allowing him to hide under a bridge along with countrymen Karl Oberg, Erik Westerberg, 11-year-old Theodor Lundstrem, and British physician Robert Easton.[117]

Dr. Easton soon joined the surviving Finnish mariners—Erik Westerberg, Henrik Laurin, and Karl Oberg—in providing additional details to provincial authorities. Captains Laurin and Nystram were "questioned in detail" by Major General von Moller, while Westerberg and Oberg corroborated Nystram's account for Nyland's provincial authorities.[118] Oberg reinforced Nystram's assertion that the British were also foraging by noting that the small boat's cargo also included empty baskets and flasks carried by several officers' valets along with rifles and live ammunition.[119] Most damaging for Britain's case were Dr. Easton's admission to an English-speaking Finnish merchant mariner that Lieutenant Geneste had been the "main actor" in previous incidents in which small British boats with "white flags raised both at the stern and at the fore" burned Finnish merchant vessels.[120] Von Moller also added that Easton had admitted that the "purpose" of Royal Navy landings had been "to burn coastal villages and merchant vessels."[121] Other Russian officers wrote that Dr. Easton had told an Ekness merchant that Geneste had ignored repeated warnings from his friends that "he would get caught sooner or later" if not "careful" when leading coastal raids, especially since Geneste's enthusiasm for torching property was "known to all the [*Cossack*'s] crew."[122]

Ultimately, Lieutenant Geneste's character was only one of the features that comprised the final assessments that Governor-General Berg relayed to St. Petersburg after the investigations' completion. In the conclusions they dispatched to St. Petersburg, the Russian administrator concluded that Geneste could not be trusted because Chertkov's investigation had "established the falsehood" of his testimony.[123] Berg also cited Finnish testimony in arguing that Geneste found "joy and glory in arson" while ignoring "repeated warnings

and advice from his friends to take care."[124] Even then, discrediting Geneste was only tangential compared to Berg's tripartite procedural argument to War Minister Dolgorukov. First, Russia's senior official in Finland claimed that a truly neutral British delegation would not have chosen a place on shore where they would not expect to meet any military forces.[125] Second, Berg deemed "any pretext" for negotiations "null" to begin with because the captured Finns were not prisoners of war and were immediately free once ashore.[126] Finally, Berg pointed out that legitimate negotiators could not have landed without "permission" from a local commander.[127] Nevertheless, Berg acknowledged the need to "refute" British claims in detail rather than procedurally through "a most thorough investigation" of the incident.[128]

Accordingly, Berg based the bulk of his conclusions on Sverchkov's initial statements and the detailed results of separate investigations by Chertkov, von Moller, and civil authorities. Berg's summary conclusion cited von Moller's report that "local residents" specifically accused the *Cossack* of previously misusing white flags, while the white flag raised in Geneste's boat "some distance" after it had left the *Cossack* was "unnoticeable" by Russian defenders ashore on account of its "small size" and similarity to white sails.[129] The Finnish governor-general also cited the exact, "significant" quantities of ammunition carried by British forces and described two incendiary shells recovered alongside other weapons. Berg added that, at any rate, "purchasing or capturing food from the local population" had to be considered "foraging," which was impermissible under a white flag: neither were reconnaissance nor, to cite Geneste's "own words," approaching the telegraph post.[130]

During the parliamentary debates that followed the incident at Hango, even the most outraged British politicians found themselves "bound to say that there were circumstances connected with this flag of truce which ought not to have occurred."[131] A native Prussian observer also noted that:

> In England, inside and outside of the Houses of Parliament, angry clamor arose and the actions of one inferior Russian officer were used to condemn the whole Russian government and population. The events were treated as evidence for the diehard and abhorrent barbarian (behavior) of the Russians, while the Press forgot that the British Parlamentär-flag had been misused in many cases before and that the Press had reported on them with pleasure.[132]

This acknowledgment mattered little in the court of worldwide public opinion. Unlike events at Petropavlovsk and the Solovetsky Monastery in 1854, the incident at Hango was a public relations disaster for Russia, especially in Finland and the neutral United States.[133] Sven Gabriel Elmgren's diary, for instance, noted that "the contempt against this murderous action is widespread" and that Helsinki's leading citizens were "not happy" with Russian actions.[134] Irrespective of the actual circumstances surrounding the incident at Hango and an alleged British misuse of a white flag off the Crimean port of Kerch, European public opinion joined Sir Charles Wood and the British Admiralty in choosing to "utterly disbelieve" Russian assertions that British officers routinely "abused the privilege of a flag of truce."[135] British forces took greater care when approaching shore under flags of truce thereafter, but the lesson came at a price for both sides. Royal Marine Lieutenant Francis Lean, for example, soon recorded that many in the fleet "chalked the word Hango" on shell boxes thrown overboard to wash ashore at Sweaborg and remind Russian defenders that they were suffering "a terrible retribution for that cowardly outrage."[136]

Even before bombarding Sweaborg a month after the incident at Hango, Allied commanders realized that the island fortress complex could not be captured without the assistance of a substantial army. Nevertheless, British and French commanders hoped to inflict damage on Russian warships in the harbor and wooden support facilities left unprotected by the fortress complex's low ramparts.[137] Although Prime Minister Palmerston was skeptical that targets "of value to the Russians" could be threatened from such a long distance, he did correctly "suppose [that the Russians] have magazines and workshops and timber stores and a collection of their combustable [*sic*] things," whose incineration would be "well and good."[138] With Cronstadt's defenses too strong for the Allied fleet and cities such as Revel also well-defended by Russian troops, "the wish to do something" became, in Dundas' words, "the principal inducement" for attacking Sweaborg.[139] Captain Sulivan's plan for a long-range bombardment by gunboats, mortar vessels, and mortars landed on small islands promised to balance Dundas' and Sir Charles Wood's caution with the prospect of damaging something other than Russia's maritime trade and coastal villages.

Prospects for a limited attack did not appeal to Britain's battleship captains. They found the prospect of their warships acting as "parents" and ammunition supply depots to smaller vessels while their crews "joyfully" watched the bombardment from high up their

rigging and yards especially galling.[140] Sir Astley Cooper Key of the *Amphion* and others felt their exclusion from an effort that did "not look for much result" "very trying."[141] Another fleet observer mentioned that the "sanguine" anticipated a great confrontation, but concluded that "others were of a different opinion" and thought that a long-range bombardment "would be one of those d – – d demonstrations" that "might as well" expend the ammunition carried by the Allied fleet.[142] Upon final analysis, both sets of opinions had merit. Although the assault had no prospect of capturing the fortress itself or the City of Helsingfors in the background, it demonstrated that even a modest force of gunboats and mortar vessels could inflict huge damage while suffering minimal casualties in return. The destruction of Sweaborg's exposed wooden barracks, storehouses, and docked gunboats was not a crippling blow for Russian forces in the Baltic in 1855, but instead served as an ominous indication of what a larger Allied force was capable of doing to Cronstadt in 1856.

Sulivan's plan for bombarding Sweaborg was straightforward. While most of the Allied fleet's line-of-battle ships patrolled off Cronstadt,[143] the rest of the fleet proceeded to Sweaborg in early August. Once in position, the idea was for British and French gunboats and mortar vessels to circle several thousand meters from the Russian fortifications. To use Sulivan's analogy, hitting these small vessels at great range was as difficult as hitting a fast-moving sparrow with a pistol from a distance.[144] British gunboats, meanwhile, practiced their marksmanship by placing flags on floating casks and then attempting to sink them.[145] As Palmerston noted, "4,500 yards is a long way from which to aim at things the nature and particular Places of which we do not know."[146] The long distance that Sulivan envisioned did have its advantages, though, as Lieutenant Lean thankfully noted that:

> Had we been 1000 yards nearer there would have been a different bill at the end of the fight but the constant motion and indistinct colour of the gunboats with the long range baffled the precision of [Russian] fire while to us it made no difference.[147]

The prospect of minimal casualties greatly appealed to Dundas, who hastened to assure the Admiralty that it "formed no part of my plan to attempt a general attack" on Sweaborg and that "the operations contemplated . . . were limited to such destruction of the fortress and arsenal as could be accomplished by means of mortars."[148] Royal Marine Artillery Major John Maurice Wemyss noted the difficulties

inherent in his task of "organizing a new service with a long forgotten weapon,"[149] but the main problem that plagued the Allied bombardment was neither the age of the weapons nor Russian return fire. Instead, the inability of Britain's newer equipment to withstand the rigors of a prolonged bombardment was, in Pénaud's words, the "unofficial reason" for the attack's end.[150]

The Allies' adoption of Sulivan's plan seemingly indicated that the navigational officer would be the one directing combat operations. Rear Admiral Dundas instead gave that role to Fleet Captain Sir Frederick Thomas Pelham. Dundas' choice infuriated Sulivan, but was squarely in line with Dundas' observation that "everybody wants to be fighting and *my* business must be control."[151] Sulivan soon gained significantly more control over the bombardment by deliberately exceeding his orders, but still concluded "that if an attempt on Cronstadt had been made in the same manner . . . we should have been defeated."[152] Fortunately for the Allies, Sweaborg was less formidable. Russian rear admiral Fedor Fedorovich Matyushkin was correct in arguing that the island fortress complex's "historical fame" and supposed invincibility was garnered during a time when steam-powered vessels did not yet exist and that the fortress would be "unable" to successfully repel a bombardment "in its present shape."[153] A handwritten note in the report's margin, however, indicated that Matyushkin's conclusion that "very few of our projectiles will reach the enemy, but on our side a good deal will be burned and destroyed" was "not approved by His Highness."[154]

On August 5, 1855, Russian defenders sighted an ominous dark shape on the horizon; "growing and increasing, it soon turned into a whole forest of masts."[155] "In view of the continuous presence of enemy ships, their careful examination of the terrain, and placing (navigational) signs and beacons," this was not a surprise to the Sweaborg's garrison.[156] After a few days of preparatory manoevers, Allied vessels opened fire on the clear, sunny morning of August 9 while floating on a calm sea that did not disrupt their accuracy.[157] Lieutenant Lean thought it a "pity that this fair scene should . . . be marred by the fatal discharge of hostile artillery, scattering destructive fire and death in every direction," while "beautiful churches with their domes of gold" served as "silent spectators of the scene."[158] "A general hailstorm of explosive missiles"[159] rained down not only from 21 mortar vessels and 22 gunboats, but also from a battery of five mortars that the French landed on the small Abraham Island (Abraham Holm).[160] Concluding from the "very beginning of the battle" that the enemy fleet had "decided to use the long range of its

fire without risking damage in return to destroy and burn the wood buildings inside the fortress," Governor-General Berg gave orders not to return fire unless the Allies ventured within range.[161] As the Allied bombardment continued into night, gunboats and mortar vessels withdrew to replenish their stocks of ammunition while small ship's boats mounting Congreve rockets closed inside of 2,000 yards of the fortress complex.

These improvised craft, in the words of one participant, had "such capital fun blazing away at the Russians," who "never returned a single shot."[162] Yet even admirers of the "graceful curve" that these rockets took from their launchers "until they joined the flames" engulfing buildings on shore acknowledged that this effort "was not considered as successful as it might have been, the distance being too great and numbers of the rockets bursting in the air or taking a wrong direction."[163] As the bombardment continued throughout August 10 and into August 11, British and French projectiles, to quote one Russian report, brought "destruction, fire, and death."[164] As the Sweaborg's acting commander, Lieutenant-General Alexei Fedorovich Sorokin, wrote to Berg, "there is no single place inside the fortress which does not show the traces of this horrible bombardment."[165] Sorokin noted that the Allies "immediately intensified" their bombardment of "anywhere" that a fire started, making the fortress' wooden structures "fall prey to flame" despite the efforts of fortress personnel commanded by Major General Alexander Petrovich Alekseev.[166] Over the next several days, the British and French bombardment simply overwhelmed Russian attempts to extinguish the fires that continued throughout "the whole two days of the attack" and inflicted "awful" damage visible to Finnish civilians in Helsinki.[167]

In spite of the considerable damage inflicted on unprotected structures and vessels during the Allied bombardment, Russian forces averted disaster by successfully protecting their main powder magazines. Multiple series of explosions within the islands' confines, including "a most awful and terrific" noontime one that caused firing by both sides to momentarily cease as "a part of the island was blown into the air . . . as though a volcano had broken forth."[168] These blasts produced a view resembling what Interpreter General Crowe thought "an eruption of (Mount) Vesuvius would be like"[169] and, according to Hugh Francis Pullen, sent debris falling "into the water like a shower of hail stones."[170] Nevertheless, the largest explosions emanated from Swedish-built warehouses housing repaired projectiles rather than magazines serving the main batteries.[171] The wooden roof of a magazine on the Island of Gustavsvard (Gustavssvärd, etc.) did catch fire

after being left exposed to Allied bombardment, but Russian volunteers extinguished the blaze before an explosion could destroy a whole section of the fortifications.[172] As one German commentator added, "a magazine for weapons with a wooden roof remains a good proof for libertinism" because it was not conductive to remaining alive.[173]

Flames also threatened the gunpowder storage room on board the battleship *Rossiya*, moored in position to block the main harbor entrance, but the efforts of its crew averted disaster.[174] Captain Vasily Poplonsky and two officers, Lieutenant Vasily Kostin and Ensign Vladimir Sventorzhetsky (Sventorzhetskii), received special recognition for their firefighting efforts and command of the changing shifts responsible for producing 352 shots from the only gun in position to return the Allies' fire.[175] Nevertheless, seventeen-and-a-half hours of "hellish" bombardment shook the huge warship and made the surrounding water appear as if it was boiling.[176] By the time the *Rossiya* could be towed out of Allied range at night by the steam-powered *Bogatyr*, it was full of the "blood, severed limbs, and maimed corpses" from almost 100 casualties, or two-thirds of Russia's total losses.[177] Reports of the *Rossiya*'s ordeal reached Allied units that did not directly participate in the attack, with Lieutenant William Dawson of the *Colossus* reporting that a Russian three decker had been "roughly handled by the gunboats" and "set on fire" before withdrawing to shallower water.[178]

The Anglo-French bombardment of Sweaborg ceased on the morning of August 11, 1855, although fires continued to rage for days afterward.[179] Dundas privately reported to the Admiralty that a major reason for that cessation was the deteriorating condition of the more recently cast British mortars, whose defects were poorly covered with soft metal by a private contractor focused on profits instead of quality.[180] Dundas alluded to the issue in reporting that "no proportionate advantage was to be gained by continuing the fire during another day with fewer mortars,"[181] but declined to note that British mortars were failing even as engineers from the floating workshop *Volcano* attempted to patch them with molten metal. Pénaud and others, on the other hand, were more direct in asserting that the real reason for the bombardment's end was the precarious condition of Britain's remaining mortars and not Dundas' estimation that the attack had accomplished all its goals.[182] Lieutenant Dawson, for instance, simply noted hearing that "nearly all our mortars split in *two* pieces."[183]

After 45 hours of bombardment that hurled projectiles weighing thousands of tons,[184] Allied naval forces attempted to assess the

damage they had caused. In the British case, references to mortar failure had to vanish from dispatches before they could be released for publication.[185] British officials also declined to publish the details of Rear Admiral Pénaud's misadventure during the early morning darkness of August 11, when French gunboats ran aground dangerously close to Russian shore defenses during a misbegotten attempt to attack the Russian battleship *Hezekiel*.[186] Irrespective of several such close calls, Allied warships suffered more from stress and accidents than from Russian counterfire.[187] Governor-General Berg optimistically pointed to the Allied gunboats' use of black flags to request tows away from action and "lots of fragments floating here and there" as evidence of enemy casualties.[188] Lieutenant-General Sorokin, on the other hand, knew better and reported that Allied tactics ensured they "could not suffer any considerable losses."[189]

Sir Charles Wood was especially pleased with his commanders' success at "injuring your enemy most seriously at little cost to yourself,"[190] while the normally "undemonstrative" Dundas began crying and almost choked when expressing his gratitude to Captain Bartholomew Sulivan.[191] Captain Astley Cooper Key, Sulivan's good friend, enjoyed recounting how "the wonderful part" of Sweaborg's bombardment was its accomplishment "without the loss of a (British or French) life."[192] Key's assessment mirrored Dundas' in acknowledging that Britain's "mortars were nearly all split or unfit for service" before arguing that it would be "useless" and of "doubtful success" to destroy Sweaborg's batteries given the damage already inflicted on the complex's buildings.[193] After all, British officers reasoned, the defenses that were admittedly not "much injured" had been built to defend the "dockyard, stores, arsenal, and public buildings," now "in flames and ashes."[194] Governor-General Berg, meanwhile, reported to St. Petersburg that "except for burning a great number of buildings, which was impossible to avoid, the overall damage to the batteries inflicted by two days of heavy bombardment turned out to be miniscule."[195]

British and French forces accurately assessed the damage to Sweaborg's structures, but wildly overestimated the number of casualties they had inflicted on Russian forces. As the smoke began to clear, Pénaud and other French officers took the lead in gathering intelligence by dispatching Finnish spies on intelligence-gathering missions. Russian authorities were already restricting access to the islands while what Rear Admiral Matiushkin described as "lack of knowledge of the [Finnish] language" caused "many interesting details and information which city residents receive from coastal

residents and fisherman to get lost."[196] Unsurprisingly, Finnish informants' estimates of over 2,000 Russian fatalities were approximately ten times too high.[197] Local fisherman repeated these estimates three weeks later to Captain Richard Hewlett of the *Edinburgh*,[198] though Sulivan wrote "quite impossible" in parentheses after a similar casualty figure.[199]

Official Russian figures, meanwhile, put the number of killed and wounded at just over 100, with fatalities accounting for half of that total.[200] Governor-General Berg identified both natural and man-made shelters and Russian commanders' reliance on them to "explain these rather limited casualties,"[201] and his figures were independently corroborated by a number of neutral observers and physicians. German-born surgeon Johann Ferdinand Heyfelder, who treated the garrison's wounded, estimated Russian fatalities at 73; other physicians' numbers were closer to the official Russian total of 55 killed.[202] Even Finnish participants who instinctively considered Russian numbers an "almost certain underestimate" admitted that "the number of casualties is not high."[203] The real importance of the attack in the eyes of influential commentators such as Finnish journalist August Schauman, though, was its revelation that Allied forces could accomplish what Russian commanders including Berg had once considered "impossible" by destroying Russian shore installations while not having to attack at close range and suffer high casualties.[204]

As reports of heavy damages to port facilities and supplies reached St. Petersburg,[205] a new struggle played out in the pages of major European newspapers. Nesselrode complained to Governor-General Berg that "our enemy has been celebrating his victory and, as usual, filling all Europe with his lies."[206] Press accounts were undeniably exaggerated, as even observers who seldom missed an opportunity to celebrate Russian casualties in graphic detail dismissed newspaper accounts describing "limbs and fragments of human beings . . . careening through the skies" as nonsense.[207] Descriptions of the "glorious blaze" that destroyed "the whole of the arsenal and store including an immense quantity of tar & pitch & hemp" and left "nothing but a shell of batteries," on the other hand, were easier to believe.[208] Russian commanders emphasized that, according to Lieutenant General Magnus Alexander von Güldenstubbe (Gildenshtubbe), "judging by the fierce fire from the enemy ships and the giant calibers of their guns, we should have expected greater losses and more damage than [was] actually inflicted."[209]

Regardless of the ongoing battle for public opinion or the degree of importance assigned to the fortresses' actual batteries versus support

facilities, the Anglo-French bombardment of Sweaborg was critically important. It definitively proved that even a modest complement of flotilla craft left unsupported by armored floating batteries could inflict significant damage on a heavily fortified Russian arsenal at great range while suffering minimal casualties in return. As Elmgren noted, "the result…was a moral defeat of the Russians, even more than a material defeat."[210] Although Dundas vetoed his French counterpart's immediate urge to launch a similar bombardment against Revel with long-range rockets that had just arrived from France,[211] Sir Charles Wood and the British Admiralty were already planning an enormous attack on Cronstadt in 1856.[212] Palmerston fully approved, and mentioned to Wood that experiments "in making a light shot proof coating for ships" were already underway and had the potential to render Dundas' suggested gunboats and mortar vessels "very powerful instruments of war."[213]

The August bombardment of Sweaborg was the indisputable highlight of the Allies' 1855 Baltic campaign. After ruling out further large-scale activities for the year, British warships continued their longstanding approach of coastal raiding, which appealed neither to Pénaud nor circumspect British officers such as Sulivan.[214] Four days after the bombardment ceased, Sulivan already hoped that "all hostilities are over for the season, because there is nothing that could be done with a prospect of success that is worth the risk of loss and failure."[215] Before returning to Britain to assist in planning the upcoming assault on Cronstadt, Sulivan again visited with an Estonian noble family, Baron and Baronness Starkleberg. The Baronness was ethnically Russian, which led to the only tense moment of their breakfast when Sulivan began discussing current events.

> When I said I hoped the fall of Sevastopol might lead to peace soon, she quite fired up, struck her little fist on the table, and the fire seemed to flash out of her bright eyes, as she said "What! Peace now? *No, never* till we have driven you out of the Crimea again."[216]

Even prior to this conversation, Allied warships had begun leaving the Baltic for their home ports.[217] Russian commanders had already happily anticipated "*the month of September will force the enemy to retreat without a battle* (in 1855)," but were less sanguine about the spring of 1856.[218]

Governor-General Berg, for one, concluded that the next Allied campaign would not be "similar to the first two campaigns" because the modest results of 1854 and 1855 would prompt Britain and

France to "think about creating new means for dealing more sensitive blows."[219] The Russian commander viewed the Allies' successes in destroying commercial activity and tying down "considerable armed forces" in the Baltic as mere precursors to their alarming "*final aim—annihilation of the (Russian) Baltic fleet and the defenses of Cronstadt and St. Petersburg.*"[220] Russia's Baltic Committee, especially Count Fyodor Vassilievich Riedeger, did not agree with the Finnish governor-general's pessimistic assessment of Finland's prospects for 1856.[221] Even the prospect of a 10,000-man force "burning and devastating with impunity along all of the defenceless Finnish coasts" did not overly concern leaders in St. Petersburg, with Riedeger concluding that "The burned shipyards and boats will be built anew in five or six (years), but the popular hatred for the robbers (Allies) would not be extinguished for decades. With this we acquire Finland."[222]

Instead, Russia's Baltic Defense Committee did agree with Berg's straightforward conclusion that the "consequences" of suffering a defeat at Cronstadt "would be incalculable."[223] The last point of Berg's own "conclusion," in fact, revealed that his motives for defending Finland were attributable to his fear that "the weak defenses of Finland imperil St. Petersburg and Cronstadt."[224]

CONCLUSION

1856 and a "Peace that Sticks in the Throat"

On January 1, 1856, a "pale and upset" Czar Alexander II summoned his most influential advisors to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg for an early-morning meeting.[1] At issue was a single question: should the Russian Empire accept an Austrian-mediated peace proposal or continue fighting an expanding Allied coalition. The arguments offered in response to Austria's proposal were complex. Regardless of whether they emphasized military, economic, diplomatic, or territorial concerns, however, all those present unambiguously concluded that Russia's position was fast becoming untenable.[2] In emphasizing that their government should seek lenient peace terms while it still could, senior ministers and diplomats did not even mention the September 1855 fall of Sevastopol.[3] Instead, their focus on Russia's economic exhaustion and mounting diplomatic isolation, coupled with potential defection of Poland and Finland, proves that even contemporary Russian decision makers saw the struggle as more than a "Crimean" War.

Consider Alexander II's opening statement at the first meeting of this high-level advisory group. Admitting that he was reluctant to assume such a "great responsibility" alone, the Russian Emperor soberingly declared that rejecting an ultimatum would mean that the "entirety of Europe is against us."[4] Alexander addressed his advisors with bleak assessments that Austria and the German state of Bavaria would join the Allies, while the Prussian King would "not be able to fight against the wish of his people" and remain neutral in the conflict.[5] The Czar next cited information "regarding the conclusion of a secret agreement between Sweden and the Western Powers" in assuming that 80,000 Frenchmen would be landed in the Baltic that spring.[6] Before turning to Count Nesselrode to read documents including a copy of the agreement between Sweden-Norway and the

Allies, His Imperial Russian Majesty closed by noting that "as far as our means to continue the war are concerned, I will limit myself to the following: this year the state budget deficit is 285,000,000 rubles."[7]

As the eldest man present, Adjutant General Prince Mikhail Vorontsov was first to state his opinion, which began with "any further resistance is impossible."[8] Konstantin Nikolaevich then offered that a disclaimer that, although he was an "ardent partisan of the war," his thoughts had "changed entirely."[9] In concluding that peace was both "necessary and inevitable," the Grand Duke cited an insufficient supply of rifles and a "very tangible" shortage of gunpowder that Russia's gunpowder factories could not alleviate.[10] Economic factors and Russia's lack of "a single ally," however, were only parts of Konstantin's confrontational invitation to ask what would happen in 1857 even if Russian managed to survive campaigns in 1856.[11] His Highness was especially troubled by a letter from Governor-General Berg, confirmed by a respectful bow from Minister of War Dolgorukov, highlighting a dearth of modern artillery to defend Russia's extended Baltic coastline.[12] As proof of the dire consequences that would rapidly ensue, the Grand Duke offered the following summary:

> When the enemy fleets approached Sweaborg and started throwing bombs, they burned the town. We also opened fire but had to stop after five minutes, since our bombs were falling into the sea without reaching the enemy ships.[13]

A number of other attendees similarly favored ending the Crimean War; State Secretary Count Dmitry Bludov was the only speaker to advise against peace on the grounds that it might inflame Russia's population. Before the conference closed, though, minister of State Property Count Pavel Kiselev (Kiselyov) succinctly encapsulated the factors compelling Russia to yield in his assessment.

> Our situation is extremely difficult. There has not been any historical precedent of an alliance of two naval powers destroying the operations of our fleet. Four Allied powers with a population of 108 million and an income of three billion are against Russia, with its population of 65 million and income of barely one billion. In such a situation, without any outside help . . . it would be insensible to risk another campaign.[14]

As Russia's senior advisors filed out of the room, Count Bludov and diplomat Peter von Meyendorff had to be physically separated "with

great difficulty" after Bludov remarked that "I do not think we are going to conclude a good peace."[15]

Less than two weeks after their initial meeting, the same men again met with Alexander II to discuss the acceptability of the Allies' proposed terms. This time, the meeting began with Nesselrode reading a memorandum indicating that Russia would have to accept terms unconditionally or face war with not only Austria but also possibly all of Germany and the Scandinavian states.[16] The foreign minister also mentioned that Russia would suffer "infinite material losses in the total blockade of its shores and borders," before arguing that the Empire should "spike its enemies' guns" by accepting the Austrian proposal, possibly dividing the Allies "diverse" coalition and clearing the way for a rapprochement with France.[17] In presenting this argument, Nesselrode was hardly alone in concluding that Britain "has been and will be our real and unforgiving enemy."[18]

Kiselov and others then cited their concerns about the loyalties of outlying provinces including Finland and Poland, with Kiselov adding that Finland, despite its erstwhile loyalty, had to be considered a "doubtful possession" ready to rejoin Sweden.[19] Count Aleksey Orlov, chief of the Empire's secret police, added that Russia's people might welcome peace, though their opinions should be ignored by decision makers.[20] Peter von Meyendorff, Russia's former minister in Vienna, closed by reiterating that continuing to resist "would inevitably bankrupt us," especially considering shortages of productive capital and manpower for the fields.[21] The diplomat identified Austria in the 1840s and eighteenth-century Sweden as cautionary examples of the inevitably dire outcome of "governments stubbornly continuing an unequal fight."[22] According to Meyendorff, the precedent was clear: "exhausted" by Charles XII's ruinous wars and lacking in "men and money," Sweden had fallen from the ranks of great powers to a third-rate status from which it "never recovered."[23] Shortly thereafter, Czar Alexander II decided that Russia had to end the Crimean War by accepting defeat.

The day before the Czar and his advisors concluded their deliberations, an Allied committee met in Paris to discuss how to proceed in 1856. Prior to the committee's deliberations, Lord Palmerston had already determined that "we can make our Plan of Campaign as well without the Black Sea Leaders as with them. The outline is clear. We must send Fleets & Troops to the Baltic. Take Cronstadt & Helsingfors and Finland & threaten Petersburgh."[24] "In view of the possibility that (Sweden-Norway) will join the Alliance sooner or later," meanwhile, Russia's high command planned to defend

Finland against a large invasion force.[25] Governor-General Berg was especially concerned with "the rapprochement of Sweden with the Western powers," and began his strategic assessment by surmising that Russia's enemies in 1856 "will not be limited to the English and the French, but will as well include the Swedes."[26]

Berg did find some comfort in noting that Finland's topography and low population density contraindicated a "so-called *big war*" and could not support large armies, but nevertheless acknowledged that all of Finland's important targets were "more or less accessible for naval attacks from the sea."[27] The governor-general advocated fortifying inland lakes to block the advance of ground troops, but worried about southern Finland because it would be "closer" if "St. Petersburg becomes the final target for the Allied operations."[28] The Russian Empire was especially fortunate that its leadership decided to end the Crimean War, for few could dispute conclusions that, in Berg's words, "any change in our political relations with Sweden" would not be in Russia's favor.[29]

There is no shortage of accounts analyzing the negotiations in Paris and their consequences. It is extremely important to note, though, that contemporary observers saw Russia's capitulation as intimately related to the broad struggle described in this study rather than the Siege of Sevastopol. French leaders were all too aware that "if peace is not made, the war will be taken to the north on the Baltic coast" thanks to Palmerston's "most ardent vow."[30] By 1856, this was not a welcome turn of events for Napoleon III's government, which began to worry that it would become the "Don Quixote of the English" by impracticably assisting Palmerston in the Baltic, where "French interest stops and all becomes English interest."[31] French diplomats added that Palmerston's "plans for northern war" explained why the British were not especially concerned with Austrian mediation and were conscious, as France's ambassador to Naples Alexandre Anatole Brenier put it, that France was "somewhat close to counting our resources."[32] Rejecting the British position that Russia should be "profoundly humiliated" as "childish behaviour and not politics"[33] and eager to encourage Czar Alexander II's "completely new direction of ideas and plans," Napoleon III's government welcomed Russia's acceptance of peace.[34]

Both France and Russia were well-advised to hurriedly negotiate the Crimean War's end in early 1856. In the aftermath of a successful Allied bombardment of Sweaborg in August 1855, Sir Charles Wood "was building flotilla craft as fast as he could."[35] This entailed rapidly assembling large numbers of gunboats that even Russian

planners conceded would "no doubt" be "solely steam and screw-driven" thanks to the wartime experiences of both sides.[36] By the early months of 1856, Britain's private shipyards were launching flotilla craft by the dozen while the Royal Dockyards applied the finishing touches to these vessels but remained focused on constructing larger warships. Britain's industrial capacity allowed contractors and subcontractors to produce large numbers of steam engines, but obtaining timber for hundreds of wooden hulls was problematic. The temporary expedient of employing unseasoned green timber sufficed for the projected Baltic campaign of 1856, but meant that Crimean War-era gunboats had to be scrapped within a decade.[37] In order to meet a self-imposed deadline of March 1 1856, Surveyor of the Navy Baldwin Wake Walker halted construction of all vessels not intended for the Baltic.[38] Consequently, Britain alone could plan to send 300 gunboats and mortar vessels to assault Cronstadt in mid-1856, compared to the 32 British and 11 French flotilla craft available for the bombardment of Sweaborg seven months earlier.[39] As two visiting French naval engineers reported to their government, the British effort was "prodigious."[40]

While British dockyards scrambled to complete work on the Baltic assault force and Russian ministers advised their sovereign to immediately seek peace, an Allied Council of War met in Paris. With Napoleon III presiding, this assembly of senior Allied politicians and military commanders met to consider 19 war-related questions divided into three categories: attacking "Russia in the Crimean; in the Baltic; and in Bessarabia or on the Danube with Austria."[41] This committee's verdict meant very little to the British government, which had been preparing to attack Cronstadt for months beforehand.[42] In response to Napoleon III's preference for a long-range bombardment,[43] the Palmerston ministry revealingly noted that it was "not disposed to limit" an attack on Cronstadt "merely to burning," and "would regret any delay in commencing the effective attack."[44] Before these plans could be implemented, though, Russia accepted the Austrian-mediated peace proposal and was eagerly joined by Napoleon III. This left Britain and smaller powers including Sweden-Norway to reluctantly follow suit; as Queen Victoria noted in her journal on March 11, 1856, "I own that peace rather sticks in my throat, and so it does in that of the *whole* nation." As her prime minister particularly regretted, the conflict ended while the Russian Empire was truly vulnerable.

> Her [Russia's] Finances are greatly embarrassed, Her munitions of war much exhausted, & Parts of her Territory occupied by her Enemies

> while her Population has been most inconveniently drained to fill up the gaps in her army. Such is her present Condition, and what is her future Prospect? She expects that next year Cronstadt will be destroyed and Petersburg menaced & possible Finland Invaded.[45]

Negotiations began in late February. The Crimean War formally ended on March 30, 1856.

In a postwar conversation, Bartholomew Sulivan informed London-based attaché Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev that "the fear of [Britain] succeeding at Cronstadt had much to do with [Russia] consenting to make peace."[46] Instead of disputing the British commander's assertions, Ignatyev "allowed that it might have influenced their decision to accept the terms" before revealing that he had been instructed to ask Sulivan's advice on how to replace navigational markers because the British surveyor "knew more about the subject than the Russians themselves!"[47] "*Highly secret*" assessments transmitted to St. Petersburg, meanwhile, corroborated Ignatyev's admissions by concluding that "in their present condition, Sweaborg with Helsingfors will not survive a joint attack."[48] Russian authorities, in fact, anticipated that "in case of a new war with the naval powers," the Allies would enter the Baltic "only with a strong fleet and huge landing forces," with which it will "most probably turn to Finland and Cronstadt."[49] St. Petersburg had heard from sources as diverse as Belgium's King Leopold I that, in the words of French ambassador to Belgium Adolphe Barrot, it "should hurry in finalizing the peace while bargaining the most possible because the war they are maintaining . . . can only have fatal results in the future."[50] The specifics surrounding these results were unmistakable, especially after "a good source" for French representatives "affirmed . . . that Kronstadt and Petersburg had few chances to stand against the fire of (Allied) fleets operating in the Baltic in the next campaign."[51]

The 1856 Treaty of Paris was based on four points, supplemented by separate conventions concerning the Åland Islands and maritime law. In stark contrast to Vienna in 1815 and Versailles in 1919,[52] no sweeping territorial redistributions or regime changes were involved in the Crimean War's end. Instead, Russia ceded modest portions of Bessarabia to the Principality of Moldavia, agreed to demilitarize the Black Sea, and accepted a multinational guarantee ensuring the free commercial navigation of the Danube River. Other powers joined the Crimean War's belligerents in further guaranteeing the Ottoman Empire's integrity and requiring Sultan Abdülmecid I to join them to protect his realm's Christians. Napoleon III and Palmerston,

meanwhile, dropped their pet projects for tearing away Poland and the Southern Caucasus from the Russian Empire. This left their plenipotentiaries to focus on technicalities and participate in a "full range of social engagements—banquets, dinners, concerts, balls and receptions."[53] Taken at face value, this hardly seemed a fitting end to a conflict that had cost millions of money and hundreds of thousands of lives, especially after Russia abrogated most of the terms within two decades.

The most enduring terms agreed upon in 1856 were not found in the Treaty of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856, but rather in the April 16, 1856, Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Although this follow-on declaration caught delegates from minor powers by surprise, it was not a sudden development. As Britain's ambassador to France, Lord Cowley, had written to Clarendon two years earlier in 1854,

> The neutral question will, if we do not take care, end by being more serious than the Eastern Question itself. It contains the germs of much future discontent, and I cannot help thinking that the government should consider seriously whether to settle it once and for all. Unfortunately there appears to be no means of settling it but by abandoning those principles to which we have stood until now.[54]

The "principles" to which Cowley referred encompassed centuries-old British precedents for seizing contraband at sea and legally capturing merchant vessels as prizes of war. As noted in earlier chapters, wartime imperatives had already forced French and British authorities to reconcile significant contradictions in their legal approaches to maritime conflict. A significant consequence of the Crimean War, though, came when these arrangements were formalized by a number of European powers. Clarified and expanded through subsequent conventions, these principles remain foundational for modern international law.

The impetus for what became known as the Declaration of Paris came from Napoleon III's government, which was eager to solidify Britain's wartime concessions on neutral rights at sea. Alexandre Walewski was able to rhetorically connect this goal to an even larger purpose, emphasizing to assembled delegates that all great European congresses had made monumentally progressive contributions, with the Congress of Westphalia ostensibly yielding freedom of religion and the Congress of Vienna abolishing the slave trade.[55] It would be a fitting end to the Congress of Paris, Walewski continued, if an

agreement could lay the foundation of a legal code for maritime warfare.[56] While Palmerston may have similarly referred to the abolition of privateering potentially, "like the abolition of Slave Trade becom(ing) universal among all maritime states,"[57] there were far less lofty concerns at play for Allied leaders anticipating a potential conflict with the United States. Even if gains on privateering had to be linked to softening Britain's stance on neutrality at sea, Palmerston's cabinet, in Ambassador Cowley's words, "catch Brother Jonathan (Uncle Sam) in the trip which he had laid for us."[58] As Lord Clarendon revealingly elaborated:

> It is quite clear that we can never again re-establish our ancient doctrine respecting neutrals, and that we must in any future war adhere to the exception to our rule which we admitted at the beginning of the present war, under pain of having all mankind against us. I am, therefore, for making a merit of necessity.[59]

In spite of some criticism in the House of Lords, Britain successfully obtained a ban on privateering that did not extend to the only potential enemy against which Britain would wish to use privateers: the United States. As if discussed in great detail by Jan Martin Lemnitzer's *Power, Law, and the End of Privateering*, the practice began to play a significantly less prominent role in warfare at sea.

The other 1856 compromise to have a remarkably durable impact on international legal precedent was a convention among Russia, Britain, and France that required Russia to demilitarize the Åland Islands. Demilitarization represented the sole remnant of Swedish-Norwegian King Oscar I's once lofty goals for the Paris Conference, which initially included limiting Russian naval forces in the Baltic and White Sea, prohibiting Russian fortifications northwest of Sweaborg, and restoring the Åland Islands to Sweden.[60] Oscar and his head delegate, Baron Ludwig Manderström, soon learned that Sweden-Norway's belated acceptance of Allied diplomatic overtures largely negated their country's claims. Britain was interested in demilitarizing the Åland Islands for its own strategic purposes, but Napoleon III and Walewski were intent on mending relations with Russia and were consequently unwilling to force the issue. Britain instead turned to Austria and the expedient of concluding a separate convention addressing the Åland Islands' demilitarization that could be annexed to the main Treaty of Paris in Article 33.[61] This allowed French leaders to credit the Allies' "constant moderation" for inducing Russian agreement and "thereby procure for Sweden . . . a newfound security in the Baltic."[62] Russia

did not even consider repudiating the Article's terms until the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, and the pre-World War I efforts of Czarist foreign minister Alexander Isvolsky failed to alter the island group's post-1856 status. Exigent circumstances during the World War I saw a brief remilitarization, but a postwar legal decision by a nascent League of Nations ensured that the islands remained an officially demilitarized province of Finland with special autonomous status.

The Crimean War's influence on broader post-1856 events in European history is examined in detail by works such as diplomatic historian A. J. P. Taylor's *The Struggle for Mastery in Modern Europe: 1848–1918*,[63] not to mention the conclusion of Orlando Figes' more recent work on the conflict.[64] These and other accounts of the Crimean conflict's impact issue a simple challenge to the present work. It is as follows: given that a defeat of Russia in any form temporarily robbed that Empire of its ability to influence European events, why did the conflict's more distant theaters matter? More specifically, why should historiography examine events in the Baltic, White Sea, or Pacific when any defeat coupled with the strains of fighting industrialized powers alone would have led to similar diplomatic arrangements?

The immediate temptation is to emphasize the endurance of agreements that demilitarized the Åland Islands and abolished privateering. One could also examine developments in the history of technology and medicine, including the development of armored warships and French advances in naval health and hygiene. Ultimately, though, the preceding study of the Crimean War's more distant theaters reveals that the conflict had significant global consequences for its belligerent empires and neutral powers alike. The conflict's Pacific Theater alone, for instance, allowed the Russian Empire to expand in East Asia at China's expense while deliberately leaving its North American possessions to stagnate in the face of their inevitable sale or seizure. The Crimean War in East Asia also forced Japan to confront more than an American mission, while Britain and France demonstrated the considerable value they placed on protecting their economic interests in China and South America. Ultimately, it is necessary to look far beyond not only the Treaty of Paris but also the Black Sea and its environs and consider the conflict's other naval theaters in order to arrive at these conclusions.

A formidable body of historiography demonstrates beyond any possible doubt that the 1854–1856 conflict between the Russian Empire and a growing Allied coalition was historically important. The present study, though, connects historical events in the Baltic,

White Sea, and Pacific with developments that might otherwise be distanced from their relationship to the Crimean War. Consider, for example, the White Sea, to which the Allies dispatched the smallest naval forces. The specific details of Britain and France's northernmost naval blockade interested few key decision makers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. Yet the political, legal, and moral challenges inherent in effectively coordinating and implementing blockade policy were obviously a different story. Similarly, Finmark was a relatively small and obscure region of northern Norway that had to wait until the Crimean War for its transformation into a key diplomatic issue that attracted a previously neutral Sweden-Norway to the Allied cause.

The impact of wartime developments in the Baltic was even more apparent. Russian delegate Philipp von Brunnow, for instance, informed Lord Clarendon that he "was perfectly aware of the feeling which existed in England, and that John Bull would not be satisfied without burning Cronstadt" before asking how this could be "prevented."[65] By their own admission, when senior Russian decision makers such as Nesselrode and Kiselev urged Czar Alexander II to end the conflict before it tore apart his Empire, they looked far beyond the Crimean Peninsula or portions of Southern Bessarabia (Bujak, etc.). Instead of Sevastopol's fall, they saw their Baltic provinces, Finland, Poland, and even St. Petersburg itself threatened by a growing coalition of enemies. As Count Bludov argued by quoting the renowned eighteenth-century French foreign minister the Duke of Choiseul, "because we do not know how to make war; let us make peace."[66]

The peace that Russia made in Paris shattered its image as a first-rate power and wholly discredited institutions such as serfdom. Czar Alexander II at least elected to end the Crimean conflict before it could destroy Russia's capacity for recovery and expansion. Instead of coming at the expense of Sweden, Poland, and the Ottomans as it had in the past, Russia's late-nineteenth-century territorial gains were located in Asia. The "Great Game" between Russia and Britain for power and influence in Central Asia has already been addressed in detail by other historical works:[67] the present work instead highlights the Crimean War's impact on Russia's expansion in East Asia and the northern Pacific. Far from attempting to "round out" its position in Alaska,[68] the Russian government instead viewed these possessions as a strategic and economic liability and looked to jettison them as efficiently as possible.[69] Even before Russia's 1867 sale of Alaska to the United States, Russia's rulers had also shifted their focus from the

Kamchatka Peninsula to newly acquired territories along the Amur. As Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich wrote to Governor-General Muravyov at the end of 1854, "the Siberian stronghold where all the fleet can find shelter and which we can defend is Amur, not Kamchatka."[70] The Crimean War alone did not complete the rapid process of Russian expansion in East Asia, but was the catalyst for its effective beginning and integral to the Sino-Russian agreements of the late 1850s, which remained contested into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[71] It is thus fitting that one has to look over 7,000 kilometers (4,400 miles) from Sevastopol and the Crimean Peninsula in order to locate one of the conflict's most significant geopolitical consequences.

Notes

Introduction: More than a "Crimean" War

1. And later Sardinian.
2. See, for example, Emanuel Halicz, trans. Jane Cave, *Danish Neutrality during the Crimean War: Denmark between the Hammer and the Anvil* (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1977).
3. Matthew Kirk, "Crimea in Finland: Her Majesty's Ambassador to Finland, Matthew Kirk, Describes the Impact of the Crimean War on That Country and How It Is Being Commemorated." *History Today*, Vol. 54, No. 8 (August, 2004), 3–4.
4. Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
5. Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853–1856* (London, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6. See, for example, the reference sections of: *Duckers, Peter. The Crimean War at Sea: The Naval Campaigns against Russia, 1854–1856* (Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Maritime Press, 2011) and John D. Grainger, *The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2008).
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8. Andrew Lambert, *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy, 1853–56* (Manchester, UK and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990); Andrew Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856, Doctoral dissertation, King's College, London, 1983; Andrew Lambert, "Arms Races and Cooperation: The Anglo-French Crimean War Coalition, 1854–1856," in Bruce Elleman and Sarah Paine, eds. *Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
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37. MD France, 2120, F. 236–237 [May 10, 1854] (AMAE).
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40. CP Angleterre, 700, F. 25–27 [March 17, 1855] (AMAE).
41. PA Walewski, 37, F. 56–57 [May 26, 1854] (AMAE).
42. PA Thouvenel, 20, F. 327–332 [August 9, 1854] (AMAE).
43. CP Suède, 326, F. 102–106 [August 13, 1854] (AMAE).
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45. CP Suède, 326, F. 10–12 [March 25, 1854] (AMAE).
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68. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5593, Pg. 12 [January 28/February 9, 1854] (RGVIA).
69. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5420, Pg. 9 [September 10/22, 1853] (RGVIA).
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148. ADM 1/5624 HA156 [May 30, 1854] (NA).
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164. 86–1854, Pg. 9 [May 31/June 12, 1854] (KA-KKK).
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167. Contre Lambert,"Looking for Gunboats," 2, Cree reports that the incident occurred at Uleåborg and not Brahestad: CRJ/17 [June 2, 1854] (NMM). This is confirmed by Uleåborg's Governor in 86–1854, Pgs. 26–27 [May 27/June 8, 1854] (KA-KKK).

168. BB4 733 111 [June 18, 1854] (SHD).
169. ADM 1/5624 HA153 [June 10, 1854] (NA).
170. Vesa 76, Pgs. 1–2 [May 27/June 8, 1854] (KA) and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 258, Pg. 70 [May 29/June 10, 1854] (RGAVMF) and Otto Donner [Swedish language], "From the Time of the Crimean War," *Vasa Tidning*, No. 267 (1898), 2.
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172. Ibid.
173. Vesa 76, Pg. 2 [May 27/June 8, 1854] (KA).
174. Donner, "From the Time of the Crimean War," 2 and Nyström Perttula, *Diary*.
175. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 258, Pg. 70 [May 29/June 10, 1854] (RGAVMF).
176. Vesa 76, Pg. 24 [June 13/25, 1854] (KA).
177. Donner, "From the Time of the Crimean War," 2.
178. ADM 1/5624 HA153 [June 8, 1854] (NA).
179. A boat stored on top of the structure enclosing a larger vessel's side-mounted paddlewheels.
180. Nyström and Perttula, *Diary* and Donner, "From the Time of the Crimean War," 3.
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182. Donner, "From the Time of the Crimean War," 2.
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4 Bomarsund, Sweden, and Sweaborg

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7. ADM 1/5624 HA137 [June 16, 1854] (NA).
8. BB4 733 178 [July 21, 1854] (SHD).
9. BB4 733 117 [June 19, 1854] (SHD).

10. ADM 1/5624 HA124 [June 20, 1854] (NA).
11. BB4 149 [June 27, 1854] (SHD).
12. BB4 162 [July 5, 1854] (SHD).
13. MPHH 11/309 [Multiple dates] (NA).
14. FO 925/3507 [Undated] (NA).
15. ADM 1/5631 CAP W207 [January 18, 1854] (NA) and MFQ 1/110 [January 28, 1854] (NA).
16. ADM 1/5631 CAP W207 [January 18, 1854] (NA).
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49. ADM 1/5624 HA 295 [August 7, 1854] (NA).
50. ADM 1/5624 HA 293 [August 8, 1854] (NA).
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94. Zagorodnikov, "The Diary of a Russian Soldier Who was Taken Prisoner at Bomarsund in 1854," 196–197.
95. Ibid., 185.
96. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pgs. 146–149 [August 19/31, 1854] (GARF).
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98. Vesa 31, Pg. 113 [August 31/September 12, 1854] (KA).
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100. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 238.
101. Crowe and Crowe, *The Crimean War Journals of Henry Woodfall Crowe* [August 13, 1855],
102. Dufferin,"At the Siege of Bomarsund as Seen from the Deck of the 'Foam,'", 602.
103. ADM 1/5625 HA361 383 [August 21, 1854] (NA).
104. Fond 317, Opis 1, File 59, Pg. 2 [April 19/May 1, 1854] (RGAVMF).
105. Vesa 31, Pgs. 205–207 [September 14/26, 1854] (KA). See also: Fond 283, Opis 2, File 6018, Pg. 110 [September 14/26, 1854] (RGAVMF).
106. FA-27–762, Pg. 1 [December 6/18, 1855] (KA-KKK).
107. Zhukov, "The Stories of I(van) Zhukov, the Russian Officer Who was in French Captivity (1854–1855)," 469 and 502.
108. ADM 1/5625 HA312 [August 11, 1854] (NA); Fond 550, File 4, Number 855, Pgs. 3–4 [Undated] (ORRNB); and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 263, Pg. 141 [September 28/October 10, 1854] (RGAVMF).
109. Dufferin, "At the Siege of Bomarsund as Seen from the Deck of the 'Foam,'", 598.
110. Ibid.
111. ADM 1/5625 HA312 [August 11, 1854] (NA); Fond 550, File 4, Number 855, Pgs. 3–4 [Undated] (ORRNB); and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 263, Pg. 141 [September 28/October 10, 1854] (RGAVMF).
112. ADM 1/5625 HA312 [August 10] (NA).

113. CP Suède, 326, F. 130–131 [August 31, 1854] (AMAE).
114. G1, 262 [July 30, 1854] (SHD).
115. CP Suède, 326, F. 140–143 [September 3, 1854] (AMAE).
116. G1, 262 [July 6, 1854] (SHD).
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120. Niel, *Siege of Bomarsund, 1854: Journal of Operations of the Artillery and Engineers*, 33.
121. ADM 1/5625 HA377 437 [September 5, 1854] (NA).
122. Hughes, *Two Summer Cruises with the Baltic Fleet in 1854–55*, 91.
123. Including, for example, detailed illustrations in French and British publications such as *L'Illustration, Journal Universel* and *The Illustrated London News* in addition to articles in newspapers from Luxembourg to New Zealand.
124. Charles Stuart Parker, *Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby* (London, UK: John Murray, 1907), 230.
125. Ibid., 233.
126. Napier, for example, to apologize for the language he used in an October letter to Graham and the Admiralty: Ibid., 237.
127. Fond 315, Opis 1, File 701, Pgs. 25–26, 56, 73–76 [Multipe dates] (RGAVMF).
128. Vadim Romanov [Russian language], "An Addition to the Account of N.V. Shensin on His Trips to the Aland Islands in 1854." *Russkii Arkhiv*, Nos. 5 and 6 (1865), 626.
129. Fond 317, Opis 1, File 59, Pg. 56 [Undated] (RGAVMF).
130. Vesa 33, Pg. 27 [July 31/August 12, 1854] (KA).
131. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 263, Pg. 75 [August 20/September 1, 1854] (RGAVMF).
132. Vesa 33, Pg. 27 [July 31/August 12, 1854] (KA).
133. Vesa 31, Pg. 122 [September 2/14, 1854] (KA).
134. ADM 1/5625 HA361 [August 25, 1854] (NA).
135. *Ibid* and Fond 315, Opis 1, File 701, Pg. 56 [Undated] (RGAVMF).
136. ADM 1/5625 HA361 [August 25, 1854] (NA).
137. Ibid.
138. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 6 [Multiple dates] and Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5597 Pg. 38 [May 31/ June 12, 1854] (RGVIA).
139. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 238.
140. BB4 733 258 [September 1, 1854] (SHD).
141. ADM 1/5625 [August 27, 1854] (NA).
142. Ibid.
143. PRO 30/16/18 [August 27, 1854] (NA).
144. Additional manuscript 40025, Folio 303 [August 30, 1854] (BL) and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 263, Pg. 75 [July 20/August 1, 1854] (RGAVMF).

145. Napier and Earp, *The History of the Baltic Campaign of 1854*, 420.
146. Bonner-Smith and Dewar, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Vice-Admiral Sir C. Napier*, 120.
147. Parker, *Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby*, 233.
148. Ibid., 126.
149. Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856," 163.
150. BB4 710 257 [September 18, 1854] (SHD).
151. BB4 710 234 [September 3, 1854] (SHD).
152. BB4 733 258 [September 1, 1854] (SHD).
153. ADM 1/5625 HA725 [September 13, 1854] (NA).
154. Greenhill and Giffard, *The British Assault on Finland 1854–1855*, 270–271.
155. Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856," 164.
156. Ibid., 168.
157. Bonner-Smith and Dewar, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Vice-Admiral Sir C. Napier*, 187–188.
158. Additional manuscript 40025, Folios 285–287 [December 25 and 27, 1854] (BL).
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160. See, for example, "Great Britain. House of Commons Debate," March 13, 1856. *Hansard's* vol. 141, CC. 48–119 and Napier and Earp, *The History of the Baltic Campaign of 1854*; "Great Britain. House of Lords Debate," July 16, 1854. *Hansard's* vol. 134, CC. 232–254.
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165. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 1 [Multiple dates] (RGVIA).
166. FC27 370, Pg. 5 [Multiple dates] (KA-KKK).
167. Ibid., 6.
168. Ibid., 9 and 12.
169. FC27 370, Pg. 13 [January 18/30, 1854] (KA-KKK).

170. FA-26–710, Pgs. 1–2 [November 1/13, 1855] (KKK-KA).
171. FC27 370, Pg. 13 [January 18/30, 1854] (KA-KKK).
172. FC27 370, Pg. 19 [March 26/April 7, 1854] (KA-KKK).
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176. Elmgren and Maliniemi, *The Notes of S. G. Elmgren* [March 24, 1854].
177. Ibid., [September 29, 1854].
178. Vesa 31, Pg. 192 [September 15/30, 1854] (KA). See also, FC26–351 [October 12/October 24, 1854] (KA-KKK).
179. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pg. 180 [October 6/18, 1854] (GARF).
180. Ibid., [June 10, 1854].
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1. Brian Perrett and Anthony Lord, *The Czar's British Squadron* (London, UK: Kimber Publishing, 1981), 45.
2. "Manifesto of the Czar," *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, (December 28, 1854), Extraordinary Supplement.
3. Richard Humble, *Before the Dreadnaught: The Royal Navy from Nelson to Fisher* (London, UK: MacDonald and Jane's, 1976), 85.
4. Used here to denote the Norwegian portion of the larger Sápmi Cultural Region, which is divided among modern Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.
5. See, for example, Additional manuscript 41340, Folios 146, 148 and 150 [April and May, 1870] (BL) and ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [Multiple dates in April, 1890] (NA).
6. LBK/14 8 [June 23, 1854] (NMM). Russian authorities, meanwhile, initially estimated that the Allied forces included approximately 10 ships. Fond 846, Opis 1, File 5597, Pg. 42 [June 12/24, 1854] (RGVIA).
7. BB4 716 08 [August 14, 1854] (SHD).
8. ADM 1/5631 CAP O66 [August 7, 1854] (NA).
9. Ensign, prior to December, 1855.
10. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
11. Ibid., and Thomas Milner, *The Baltic: Its Gates, Shores, and Cities* (London, UK: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1854), 379.

12. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 915, Pg. 4 [July 12/24, 1854] (RGAVMF) and BB4 716 33 [Undated] (SHD).
13. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
14. Andrew Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," in Bruce Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 29.
15. Alexandre Studeny, "La Marine Française en Mer Blanche durant la Guerre de Crimée," Master's thesis, Université Paul Valéry Montpellier III, 2011, 40.
16. Ibid., 31–32.
17. Ibid., 32.
18. BB4 715 203 [May 20, 1854] (SHD).
19. Ibid.
20. Frederick Metcalfe, *The Oxonian in Norway; or, Notes of Excursions in that Country in 1854–1855* (London, UK: Hurst and Blackett, 1856), 174–175.
21. LBK/14 25 [August 7, 1854] (NMM) and Ruslan A. Davydov and Gennadii Pavlovich Popov [Russian language], *Defense of the Russian North during the Crimean War* (Ekaterinburg, Russia: UrO RAN, 2005), 107
22. And French ones, but only in 1854 and 1855 and not in 1809.
23. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 18 [July 21/August 2, 1854] (RGAVMF).
24. BB4 716 28 [Undated, 1854] (SHD) and CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
25. Georgii Zakharovich Kunzevich [Russian language], "About the Defense of Kola Town from the Enemy in 1854," *Publication of the Imperial Society of History and Ancient Russian Studies under the Moscow University* (1906), 4.
26. ADM 1/5631 CAP O51 [July 4, 1854] (NA) and LBK/14 8 [June 23, 1854] (NMM). See also: CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
27. MPI/101 [Originally printed: May 20, 1854, modified by Ommanney on June 16, 1854] (NA). Russian archival evidence instead indicates that, even in 1855, the Arkhangelsk Province contained fewer than 9,000 soldiers. See, for example, Davydov and Popov, *Defense of the Russian North during the Crimean War*, 114.
28. ADM 1/5631 CAP O20 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
29. Kunzevich, "About the Defense of Kola Town from the Enemy in 1854," 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 16 [July 21/August 2, 1854] (RGAVMF).

32. ADM 1/5631 CAP O20 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
33. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL). See also Alexander A. Boddy, *With Russian Pilgrims: Being an Account of a Sojourn in the White Sea Monastery and a Journey by the Old Trade Route from the Arctic Sea to Moscow* (London, UK: Wells, Gardner, Darton, 1893), 103.
34. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 4 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF).
35. William Hepworth Dixon, *Free Russia* (London, UK: Hurst and Blackett, 1870), 190.
36. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 16 [July 21/August 22, 1854] (RGAVMF).
37. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
38. OD 265 [Multiple dates] (AHO).
39. ADM 1/5631 CAP O66 [August 7, 1854] (NA).
40. BB4 682 282 [March 19, 1854] (SHD).
41. BB4 715 203 and 214 [Multiple dates] (SHD).
42. BB4 716 33 [Undated] (SHD).
43. Chart 2269–2276 [Undated] (AHO).
44. OD 265 [Received: December 11, 1855] (AHO).
45. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
46. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
47. Commander.
48. BB4 716 5 [July 3, 1854] (SHD).
49. ADM 1/5631 CAP O67 [August 14, 1854] (NA).
50. BB4 715 ___ [June 28, 1854] (SHD).
51. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
52. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
53. LBK/14 12 [July 8, 1854] (NMM).
54. "The White Sea" from *The Moniteur de la Flotte* (November 5, 1855). Reprinted in the *Times,* (November 6, 1855), 6.
55. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
56. Davydov and Popov, *Defense of the Russian North during the Crimean War*, 107.
57. Ibid.
58. BB4 716 24 [October 20, 1854] (SHD).
59. LBK/14 12 [July 8, 1854] (NMM).
60. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 40.
61. See, for example, Great Britain. House of Commons Debate, July 31, 1855. *Hansard's* vol. 139, CC 1589–604.
62. BB4 715 211 and 21- [Multiple dates] (SHD).
63. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 31 and 35.

64. Ibid., 31.
65. ADM 2/1698 50–51 and 62–23 [May 2 and 5, 1854] (NA).
66. "Great Britain. House of Lords Debate," June 2, 1854. *Hansard's* vol. 133, CC. 1225–1230.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
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70. Ibid.
71. ADM 1/5631 CAP O82 [September 14, 1854] (NA).
72. Ruslan A. Davydov [Russian language], "The Capture of Russian Schooners *Volga* and *Dvina* by the Anglo-French Navies in the White Sea in 1854," Ushakovsky Readings: The Collection of Scientific Articles (MGPU: Murmansk, Russia, 2006), 160–172 and *L'Invalide Russe* (July 15, 1854), 687.
73. Ibid., 160.
74. BB4 ___ [August 1, 1854] (SHD). See also BB2 332 [August 29, 1854] (SHD).
75. Ibid.
76. LBK/14 [August 30, 1854] (NMM).
77. Ibid.
78. "Our Naval Operations in the White Sea." *The Times*, August 30, 1854, 5.
79. "Letters to the Ed." *The Times*, November 7, 1855, 1.
80. Milner, *The Baltic: Its Gates, Shores, and Cities*, 385.
81. Altogether, these ships had a total complement of approximately 60 guns (26 on the *Eurydice*) and were manned by 540 officers and men. The corresponding armament of France's 1854 White Sea squadron was 40 guns for the *Psyche* and 18 for the *Beaumanoir*. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 31.
82. Ibid.
83. ADM 1/5631 Cap O54 [July 5, 1854] (NA).
84. ADM 1/5631 Cap O51 [July 4, 1854] (NA).
85. LBK/14 [July 5, 1854] (NA).
86. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 33.
87. BB4 716 28 [October 20, 1854] (NA).
88. ADM 1/5631 CAP O55 [July 8, 1854] (NA).
89. ADM 1/5631 CAP O51 [July 4, 1854] (NA).
90. ADM 1/5631 CAP O52 [July 15, 1854] (NA).
91. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 22 [July 6/18, 1854] (RGAVMF).
92. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
93. Ibid.
94. Vladimir Burov [Russian language], *Almanac Solovetsky Sea*, No. 3 (2004), letter 1, p. 1 [July 22, 1854].
95. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
96. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [April 25, 1890] (NA).
97. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).

98. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 24 [July 10/22nd, 1854] (RGAVMF) and Burov, *Almanac Solovetsky Sea*.
99. Boddy, *With Russian Pilgrims*, 114.
100. Ibid., 97 and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 41 [July 6/18, 1854] (RGAVMF).
101. Davydov and Popov, *Defense of the Russian North in the Crimean War*, 74.
102. Ibid.
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109. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA) and Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 23 [July 10/22, 1854] (RGAVMF).
110. Ibid.
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112. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 24 [July 10/22, 1854] (RGAVMF).
113. Ibid.
114. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
115. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
116. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
117. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
118. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
119. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 4 [July 12/24, 1854] (RGAVMF) and Boddy, *With Russian Pilgrims*, 110.
120. *The Courier*, December 13, 1854, 2.
121. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
122. Ibid.
123. Burov, *Almanac Solovetsky Sea*, 2.
124. Dixon, *Free Russia*, 201.
125. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
126. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).
127. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
128. Additional manuscript 41340, Folio 150 [May 5, 1870] (BL).

6 Kola, Blockade, and Advances in Naval Medicine

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2. William Hepworth Dixon, *Free Russia* (London, UK: Hurst and Blackett, 1870), 201. See also, for example, *L'Invalide Russe* (August 1, 1854), 757.

3. Ruslan A. Davydov and Gennadii Pavlovich Popov [Russian language], *Defense of the Russian North in the Crimean War: Chronicle of Events* (Ekaterinburg, Russia: UrO RAN, 2005), 74.
4. Vladimir Burov [Russian language], Almanac Solovetsky Sea," No. 3 (2004), Letter 1, Pgs. 1–3 [July 22, 1854].
5. Ibid., 1.
6. Ibid., 3.
7. Dixon, *Free Russia*, 187.
8. Davydov and Popov, *"Defense of the Russian North in the Crimean War*, 75.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 73–74.
11. Ibid.
12. Dixon, *Free Russia*, 187.
13. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA).
14. See, for example, Ibid. and LBK/14 15 [June 19, 1854] (NMM).
15. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [July 19, 1854] (NA), reprinted in Andrew Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," in Bruce Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 36.
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18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. ADM 1/5631 CAP O57 [April 25, 1890] (NA).
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23. Yevgeny Viktorovich Tarle [Russian language], *Crimean War*, vol. 2 (Moscow and Leningrad/St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk, 1950), chapter 8, section 1, p. 2.
24. OD 265 [Received: December 11, 1855] (AHO).
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27. Ibid. See also, MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [June 14, 1855] (RIA).
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29. See, for example, Father Petr Lyskov's efforts to "cheer up" vulnerable peasants in Davydov and Popov, *Defense of the Russian North during the Crimean War*, 163.
30. BB4 716 18 [September 3, 1854] (SHD).

31. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, “La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855” (SHD).
32. BB4 716 18 [September 3, 1854] (SHD) and BB4 716 21 [September 4, 1854] (SHD).
33. BB4 716 18 [September 3, 1854] (SHD).
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35. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
36. ADM 1/5631 CAP 020 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
37. BB4 716 22 [September 4, 1854] (SHD).
38. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 2 [July 12/24, 1854] (RGAVMF).
39. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
40. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 262, Pg. 52 [August 25/September 6, 1854] (RGAVMF) and Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 6 [August 5/17, 1854] (RGAVMF).
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43. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 6 [August 12/24, 1854] (RGAVMF). See also, “News from the White Sea,” *L’Invalide Russe*, September 10, 1854), 951.
44. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
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50. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
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53. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, “La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855” (SHD).
54. ADM 1/5631 CAP 020 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
55. *The Illustrated London News*, October 7, 1854, 336.
56. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 915, Pg. 9 [August 12/24, 1854] (RGAVMF) and ADM 1/5631 CAP 020 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
57. AGC/30/17 [August 24, 1854] (NMM).
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60. Ibid. and *The Illustrated London News*, October 7, 1854, 336.
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63. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 39.
64. *The Courier*, December 13, 1854, 5.
65. *The Illustrated London News*, October 7, 1854, 336.
66. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 38 and 39.
67. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
68. See, for example, Fond 410, Opis 2, File 355, Pg. 11 [July 4/16, 1855] (RGAVMF).
69. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
70. BB4 716 31 [October 20, 1854] (SHD).
71. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
72. Ibid.
73. *L'Invalide Russe*, August 2, 1854, 771.
74. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
75. Ibid.
76. *The Times*, August 30, 1854, 5.
77. *The Times*, August 30, 1854, 5.
78. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 39.
79. ADM 1/5631 CAP O78 [September 4, 1854] (NA).
80. Ibid.
81. BB4 716 46 [October 20, 1854] (SHD).
82. "Scourbut: Emploi du Suc de Citronne Comme Moyen Prevétatif et Curatif." *L'Abeille Médicale*, vol. 13, No. 8 (1856).
83. Claude de Laguérenne and Jean Pierre Kernéis, "Le Voyage Autour du Monde du Pharmacien René-Primevé Lesson." *Revue D'Histoire de la Pharmacie*, Vol. 76, No. 279 (1988), 420.
84. "Scourbut: Emploi du Suc de Citronne Comme Moyen Prevétatif et Curatif." *L'Abeille Médicale*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (1856).
85. CC2 958 23 [October 29, 1855] (SHD).
86. "Scourbut: Emploi du Suc de Citronne Comme Moyen Prevétatif et Curatif." *L'Abeille Médicale*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (1856).
87. Ibid.
88. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
89. Ibid.
90. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [August 29, 1855] (RIA).
91. CC2 958 23 [October 29, 1855] (SHD).
92. "Scourbut: Emploi du Suc de Citronne Comme Moyen Prevétatif et Curatif." *L'Abeille Médicale*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (1856).
93. Ibid.

94. BB4 716 29 [October 29, 1855] (SHD).
95. Scourbut: Emploi du Suc de Citronne Comme Moyen Prevétatif et Curatif." *L'Abeille Médicale*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (1856).
96. John M. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and Various Parts of the Coast of China in HMS Barracouta* (London, UK: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1859), 105.
97. Ibid.
98. CC7 2E Moderne 3–7: Jean Albert Riondel, "La Mer Blanche et les Deux Croisières Anglo-Française pendant les Années 1854 et 1855" (SHD).
99. BB4 716 35 [June 5, 1855] (SHD).
100. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [July 4, 1855] (RIA).
101. Ibid.
102. BB4 716 37 [June 23, 1855] (SHD).
103. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
104. Ibid.
105. BB4 716 40[July 23, 1855] (SHD).
106. Ibid.
107. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [June 14, 1855] (RIA).
108. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
109. BB4 716 40[July 23, 1855] (SHD).
110. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [September 9, 1855] (RIA).
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO).
114. Ibid.
115. Winfried Baumgart, ed., *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs* (AGKK): *Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*, Band 2 [11. Dezember 1853 bis 1. Dezember 1854] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), No. 435, Pg. 715.
116. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [July 18, 1855] (RIA).
117. Ruslan A. Davydov [Russian language], "'We Should Come Back to a Frigate Without Feeling Disappointed:' British Troop Landings at Kuzomeni on July 16th and the Activities of Rural Resistance," *Ushakovsky Readings: Scientific Materials from the Inter-Regional Conference in Memory of Professor I. F. Ushakov* (MGPU: Murmansk, Russia, 2005), 127–134.
118. OD 265 7 [Undated] (AHO) and Ibid.
119. See, for example, Davydov, "We Should Come Back to a Frigate without Feeling Disappointed," 133–134.
120. MS 280, *John Proctor Luce Journal* [July 21, 1855] (RIA).
121. Ibid. [Undated].
122. Ibid.
123. BB4 716 37 [June 23, 1855] (SHD).
124. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 355, Pg. 11 [July 4/16, 1855] (RGAVMF).

125. BB4 716 37 [June 23, 1855] (SHD).
126. Winfried Baumgart and Martin Senner, eds., *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs* (AGKK): *Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*, Band 3 [3. Dezember 1854 bis 9. September 1855] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), No. 550, Pg. 827.
127. See, for example, FO 881/494 [May 23, 1855] (NA).
128. Ibid.
129. Paul Knaplund, "Finmark in British Diplomacy, 1836–1855," *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 30, No. 3 (1925), 482.
130. Jens Petter Nielsen, "The Russia of the Tsar and North Norway. 'The Russian Danger' Revisited." *Acta Borealia*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002), 81.
131. Baumgart and Senner, eds., *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs* (AGKK): *Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs*, Band 4 [10. September 1855 bis 23. Juli 1856] (Munich, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), No. 302, Pgs. 540–541.
132. FO 881/494 [May 23, 1855] (NA).
133. Nielsen, "The Russia of the Tsar and North Norway," 82.
134. CP Suède, 327, F. 23 [August 26, 1855] (AMAE).
135. FO 519/174 301–304 [September 25, 1855] (NA).
136. FO 73/269 [October 18, 1855] (NA) and CP Suède, 327, F. 43 [December –, 1855] (AMAE).
137. Ibid., No. 508, Pg. 774.
138. CP Suède, 326, F. 262–268 [July 1, 1855] (AMAE).
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. CP Suède, 327, F. 43 [December –, 1855] (AMAE).
142. CP Suède, 326, F. 275–279 [July 16, 1855] (AMAE).
143. Ibid.
144. FO 73/270 54 [July 16, 1855] (NA).
145. CP Suède, 326, F. 275–279 [July 16, 1855] (AMAE).
146. FO 73/270 54 [July 16, 1855] (NA).
147. CP Autriche, 461, F. 281–282 [December 26, 1855] (AMAE). See also: CP Suède, 327, F. 43 [December –, 1855] (AMAE).
148. Ivan I. Kaivarainen [Russian language], "Russian-Swedish Relations in the Years of the Crimean War and Finland." *Issues of History of the European North* (1974), 144.
149. CP Angleterre, 702, F. 264–266 [November 13, 1855] (AMAE).
150. Ibid.
151. FO 519/174 301–304 [September 25, 1855] (NA).
152. Ibid.
153. FO 73/269 [June 28, 1855] (NA).
154. FO 73/270 54 [July 16, 1855] (NA).
155. CP Suède, 326, F. 275–279 [July 16, 1855] (AMAE).
156. CP Suède, 327, F. – [October 25, 1855] (AMAE).

157. Lambert, "The Royal Navy's White Sea Campaign of 1854," 41.
158. Baumgart and Senner, *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs* (AGKK), No. 200, Pg. 383.

7 The Crimean War in the Pacific World, 1854

1. John D. Grainger, *The First Pacific War: Britain and Russia, 1854–1856* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2008), IX.
2. Nicholas von Glehn and A. Danilov, eds. [Russian language], "N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's First Amur Expedition." *Istoricheskii Vestnik*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1889), 642.
3. Aleksey Evegny Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855." *Rysskaya Starina,* Vol. 71, No. 3 (1891), 334–345.
4. Ibid.
5. John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 31.
6. Ibid., 31–32.
7. See, for example, John Grainger's contention that it was "the ambition of one man which compelled the British to fight in the Pacific area" in *The First Pacific War*, XIV.
8. Mark Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?: A Political-Geographical Inquiry into the Vision of Russia on the Pacific 1840–1865," Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983, 113.
9. Ivan Barsukov [Russian language], *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov Amursky*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Sinodalnaya Tipografiya, 1891), 324–325.
10. Ibid. The slightly more poetic version of Emperor Nicholas' response is "let us wait until events lead us thither" and is found in sources such as: Zenone Vladimir (Volpicelli), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway* (London, UK: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1899), 199.
11. Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?" 113.
12. Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855," 339.
13. Vladimir (Volpicelli), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway*, 198.
14. See, for example, Ibid.; Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Sarah Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, NY and London, UK: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), Joseph Lewis Sullivan, "Count N. N. Muravyov-Amursky," Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1955; Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov Amursky*, vols. 1 and 2, etc.

15. See, for example, Rosemary K. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Oxford, UK; and New York: Oxford University Press for the University of Malaysia, 1968) and the Chinese-language compilation *Ch'ou Pan I-Wu Shih-Mo*, or *IWSM*.
16. Sullivan, "Count N. N. Muravyov-Amursky"; Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov Amursky*, vol. 1, 200, 205–206, 212, 259; and Paine, *Imperial Rivals*, 36–37.
17. Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?" 134.
18. Archimandrite and distinguished Sinologist Palladii, née Petr Ivanovich Kafarov.
19. Paine, *Imperial Rivals*, 41, Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov Amursky*, vol. 1, 294, 298–305, 452, 483, and 489.
20. Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?" 235.
21. Ibid., 236.
22. George H. C. Wong and Allan B. Cole, "Sino-Russian Border Relations, 1850–1860." *The Chung Chi Journal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1966), 113.
23. Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855," 238.
24. [Chinese language], *Ch'ou-Pan I-Wu Shih-Mo*; *IWSM*, vol. 8 "A Complete Record of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Qing Dynasty [Xianfeng Emperor]" (Beijing, China: Palace Museum, 1930), 23.
25. Ibid.
26. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 45.
27. [Chinese language]. *Ch'ou-Pan I-Wu Shih-Mo*; *IWSM* (Vol. 8). "A Complete Record of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Qing Dynasty [Xianfeng Emperor]." (Beijing, China: Palace Museum, 1930), 2.
28. Ibid.; and Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 45–46.
29. See, for example, Yanpo Kung [Chinese language], "Muravyov's Military Invasion of China and Qing-era Border Defences in the Northeast." *Dongbeishidi: The History and Geography of the Northeast*, No. 3 (2008), 71–74.
30. Tsunghai Chang [Chinese language], "Muravyov and the Sino-Russian 'Treaty of Aigun.'" *Heihe Academic Journal*, No. 2 (1988), 63–68.
31. Ibid.
32. See, for example, Jiang Kao [Chinese language], "The Loss of the Northeast China Frontiers and the Enclosure Policy of the Qing Dynasty." *History Teaching*, No. 5 (2004), 18–21.
33. See, for example, Chang, "Muravyov and the Sino-Russian 'Treaty of Aigun,'" 67–68.
34. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 46.

35. Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855," 341.
36. Ibid., 341–342.
37. Ibid., 342.
38. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 46.
39. Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855," 342.
40. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 46.
41. Marcus Rohn, "Die Expedition Alexander Th. Middendorffs (1843–1845) und die Folgen." Master's thesis, Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, Germany, 2004, 59.
42. Ibid.
43. Baranov, "Recollections of an Officer in N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's Expedition, 1854–1855," 350.
44. Quested, *The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860*, 48.
45. Ibid., 49.
46. Ibid.
47. Nikolay Schilling, trans. Erich Schilling and Peter Girard, [Russian language], *Memories of an Old Sailor* and [German language], *Seeoffizier des Zaren* (Originally published in 1892. Cologne, Germany: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971), 8.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Takehiko Okuhira [Japanese language], "The Crimean War and the Far East, Part 2 [Kurimiya sensō to kyokutō (ichi)]." *Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1936), 17.
51. John F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954), 121.
52. Ibid.; and FO 17/200 [Multiple dates in 1853] (NA).
53. Ibid., 138.
54. France, for instance, did not even bother to join a feeble British diplomatic protest in 1855 against Russia's occupation of Chinese coastline south of the Amur. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia*, 138.
55. Even French authorities in San Francisco were monitoring the strength of Sitka's garrison, albeit inaccurately. See BB4 682 759 (SHD).
56. CO 305/6 5422 [Received: June 13, 1854] (NA) and CO 305/6 292 [Received: June 13, 1855] (NA).
57. Winfried Baumgart, trans. Ann Pottinger Saab, *The Peace of Paris 1856* (Santa Barbara, CA and Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, 1981), 200.
58. Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?" 133.
59. CO 305/5 10301 [November 28, 1854] (NA)
60. Grainger, *The First Pacific War*, 70. Grainger's claim is contradicted, for instance, by the Russian decision to dispatch scarce reinforcements to Novo-Archangel (now Sitka) to defend against a "fully expected"

attack by an Anglo-French fleet even after the declaration of neutrality. See, for example, Glehn and Danilov, "N(ikolay) N(ikolayevich) Muravyov's First Amur Expedition," 642

61. BB4 702 201 and 203 [April 5, 1853] (SHD).
62. See, for example, Victor John Coatsworth Bulmer-Thomas and Roberto Conde, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 492.
63. Robert Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War." Master's thesis, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, UK, 2003, 8.
64. See, for example, BB4 702 283 [February 23, 1854] (SHD) for a discussion of guano deposits and Lieutenant de Vaisseau Erulin, "Les Opérations dans le Pacifique pendant la Guerre de Crimée 1854–1856," Unspecified thesis/dissertation, L'École Navale (à Brest), 1933–1934, 6–7, for details on Allied deployments.
65. ADM 50/260 [May 16, 1854] (NA).
66. BB4 702 439 [May 7, 1854] (SHD).
67. For details on French naval forces' relationship with eventual Peruvian president Ramón Castilla, for example, see BB4 702 396 [February 12, 1854] (SHD).
68. Ian R. Stone, "The Falkland Islands and the Crimean War." *The War Correspondent (The Journal of the Crimean War Research Society)*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (April, 2001), 42–26.
69. CO 129/50 76 [Multiple dates] (NA) and BB4 682 671 [June 14, 1854] (SHD).
70. ADM 50/278 [June 9, 1854] (NA).
71. Gerald S. Graham, *The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830 to 1860* (London, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 284.
72. BB4 706 53 [June 21, 1854] (SHD).
73. William Petty Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII)." *The Naval Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July, 1965), 275.
74. ADM 2/1698 [May 1, 1854] (NA).
75. BB4 682 671 [June 14, 1854] (SHD).
76. BB2 332 14 [June 5, 1854] (SHD).
77. ADM 2/1611 [February 24, 1854] (NA) and Erulin, "Les Opérations dans le Pacifique pendant la Guerre de Crimée 1854–1856," 11.
78. ADM 50/260 [July 22, 1854] (NA).
79. BB3 683 23 and 26 [March 2 and February 6, 1854] (SHD).
80. BB4 682 791 [October 24, 1854] (SHD).
81. See, for example, ADM 50/260 [Multiple dates] (NA).
82. Edmond Du Hailley *Édouard Polydore Vanéechout*, *Campagnes et Stations sur les Côtes de l'Amérique du Nord* (Paris, France: Libraire de la Société de Gens de Lettres, 1864), 223.

83. John J. Stephan, "The Crimean War in the Far East." *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1969), 263.
84. Febvrier-Despointes, for example, reminded Paris of this mission's purpose in "protecting commerce" on September 22, 1854: BB4 702 495 [September 22, 1854] (SHD).
85. See, for example, BB4 682 793 [August 31, 1854] (SHD)
86. BB4 684 194 [November 3, 1854] (SHD).
87. BB4 684 213 [November 29, 1854] (SHD).
88. ADM 1/5630 Y136 [July 25, 1854] (NA). The French government also believed that the squadrons' presence was "important" in helping to maintain Hawaiian independence. See: BB3 683 252 [November 27, 1854] (SHD).
89. Du Hailley *Édouard Polydore Vanéechout*, *Campagnes et Stations sur les Côtes de l'Amérique du Nord*, 224.
90. CP États-Unis, 111, F. 46–56 [June 26, 1854] (AMAE).
91. Ibid.
92. David Lawrence Gregg and Pauline King, eds., *The Diaries of David Lawrence Gregg: An American Diplomat in Hawaii 1853–1858* (Honolulu, Hawai'i: Hawaiian Historical Society, 1982), 172.
93. BB4 682 224 [March 17, 1854] and BB3 683 [February 6, 1854] (SHD).
94. Du Hailley, *Édouard Polydore Vanéechout, Campagnes et Stations sur les Côtes de l'Amérique du Nord*, 226 and Barry M. Gough, *The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America 1810–1914 : A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy* (Vancouver, Canada : University of British Columbia Press, 1971), 114.
95. Achille Amet and Jean Etévenaux, eds., *La France à la Conquête du Pacifique: Correspondance de l'élève-officier Achille Amet 1849–1854* (Paris, France: Editions Osmondes, 1996), 106.
96. Ibid.
97. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 1, 1854] (NA).
98. Ibid. See also BB4 702 462 [September 22, 1854] (SHD) and BB4 702 477 [September 2, 1854] (SHD).
99. BB4 702 477 [September 2, 1854] (SHD).
100. Ibid.
101. Jean-René-Maurice de Kerret and Tugdual de Kerros, eds., *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855* (Saint-Thonan, France: Cloitre Imprimeurs, 2004), 156.
102. Schilling,*Memories of an Old Sailor*, and *Seeoffizier des Zaren*, 71.
103. LES/4/6 [September 12, 1854] (NMM).
104. LOG/N/P/1 [August 30, 1854] (NMM).
105. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 26, 1854] (DFA). Note: The De Miniac Journal is organized in multiday blocks identified by starting dates rather than individual days.
106. Bassin, "A Russian Mississippi?" 239.
107. Barsukov, *Graf Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravyov Amursky*, vol. 1, 219–222.

108. Fond 909, Opis 3, File 14, Pg. 312 [July 18/August 30, 1854] (RGAVMF).
109. Vladimir (Volpicelli), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway*, 178.
110. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003, Pgs. 52–56 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF).
111. Petr Ovsyankin [Russian language], "From the Memoirs of a Naval Officer." *Morskoi Sbornik*, Vols. 223 and 224; Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (1888), 89.
112. Aleksandr Pavlovich Arbuzov [Russian language], "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854 (from the notes of an eyewitness and participant)." *Russkaya Starina*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1870), 299.
113. Grainger, *The First Pacific War*, 70.
114. Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 299.
115. Natalia Kiseleva [Russian language], *In the Forefront of Memory: About the Siege of Petropavlovsk of 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Correspondence, and Official Documents.* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Kamchatpress, 2010), 69.
116. MS-0805 213 [September 1, 1854] (ABC).
117. De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 26, 1854] (DFA).
118. MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Nikolay Moritsevich O'Rourke, trans. Aleksandr O'Rourke [Russian language], *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora* (St. Petersburg, Russia: Elmore, 2011), 133.
122. Vasily Stepanovich Zavoyko and Aleksandr A. Preobrazhensky [Russian language], "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," *Historic Archive of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of History*, Vol. 7 (1951), 103.
123. MS-0805 202 [August 28, 1854] (ABC) and Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003 [August 17th/29, 1854] (RGAVMF).
124. Later known as the "soul of the defense" for his role in helping repel the Allied assault. Boris P. Polevoi [Russian language], *National Heroes: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Letters, and Official Documents.* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Dalipzdan, 1979), 224.
125. Nikolay Fesun [Russian language], "From the Notes of an Officer Who Served Aboard the Frigate Aurora." *Morskoi Sbornik*, No. 10 (1860), 1.
126. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 192.

127. MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
128. De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 26, 1854] (DFA).
129. Ibid.
130. MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
131. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
132. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 166.
133. Polevoi, *National Heroes*, 146. See also Novikov, Valery. "A Heroic Epic (Defence of Petropavlovsk Kamchatski in 1854)." *Far Eastern Affairs*. Vol. 20, No. 1 (1994), 56.
134. See, for example, Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII),"275.
135. MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
136. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
137. Ibid. British navigational officer George Hastings Inskip added in his diary that "the proceedings of the day (were) knocked in the head and everybody (was) more or less out of sorts." MS-0805 207 [August 30, 1854] (ABC).
138. Henry Guérault, "Relation Chirurgicale d l'Attaque de Pétropaulowsky au Kamstchatka par l'Escadre Anglo-Française des Mers du Sud en 1854," in *Mémoires de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts D'Orléans* (Tome Cinquième) (Orléans, France: Imprimerie de Pacnerre, 1860), 124 and MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
139. LES/4/6 [September 12, 1854] (NMM).
140. Guérault, "Relation Chirurgicale d l'Attaque de Pétropaulowsky au Kamstchatka par l'Escadre Anglo-Française des Mers du Sud en 1854," 124.
141. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
142. Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII)," 276. Rear Admiral Febvrier-Despointes also added that Nicolson "incredibly neglected" agreements: BB4 702 461 [September 22, 1854] (SHD). In fairness to Nicolson, however, enlisted sailor William Petty Ashcroft noted that Commander Marshall on the *Virago* was also "grumbling to the First Lieutenant" on account of Price's initial caution. Ibid., 275.
143. Stephan, "The Crimean War in the Far East," 264–265 and Novikov, "A Heroic Epic (Defence of Petropavlovsk Kamchatski in 1854)," 57.
144. Ibid., 265.
145. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [August 30, 1854] (NA).
146. Gregg and King, *The Diaries of David Lawrence Gregg*, 200.
147. Grainger, *The First Pacific War*, 39.
148. LES/4/6 [September 12, 1854] (NMM).
149. Ibid.

150. MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
151. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
152. Grainger, *The First Pacific War*, XIII–XIV.
153. Guérault, "Relation Chirurgicale d l'Attaque de Pétropaulowsky au Kamstchatka par l'Escadre Anglo-Française des Mers du Sud en 1854," 124
154. BB4 702 495 [September 22, 1854] (SHD).
155. Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," fn. 12.
156. Ibid., 303–304.
157. De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA).
158. MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
159. "The Affair of Petropaulovski." *The Times*, December 26, 1854, 9.
160. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
161. De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August *26th,* 1854] (DFA) and Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852– 1855*, 169.
162. Ibid.
163. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*204. Interestingly, Cadet O'Rourke still definitively wrote that Price had "committed suicide." See O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 147.
164. 2057/F8/III/B/370, Enclosure 1 [November 12, 1854] (WSA).
165. BB4 857 [October 15, 1854] (SHD).
166. Konstantin Pavlovich Pilkin [Russian language], "The Details of the Battle at Petropavlovsk on August 24th (September 5th), 1854." *Morskoi Sbornik*, Vol. 343, No. 5 (1911), 18.
167. See, for example, the tense exchange on September 1 and 2 in ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 (NA).
168. BB4 702 461 [September 22, 1854] (SHD). Nicolson, to quote Lieutenant Schilling's conversations with British officers, reportedly "did not want to submit to any foreigner, and then began a duality of power." Schilling, *Memories of an Old Sailor*, and *Seeoffizier des Zaren*, 72.
169. MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
170. Specifically, the frigates *President*, *Pique*, *and Forte*; the smaller vessels *Eurydice* and *Obligado*; and the paddle-steamer *Virago.*
171. See, for example, BB4 702 469 [August 31, 1854] (SHD).
172. George Alexander Lensen, *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697–1875* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 330.
173. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 3, 1854] (NA).
174. Ibid.
175. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [August 31, 1854] (YCBA).

176. See, for example, ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 19, 1854] (NA) and Fond 315, Opis 1, File 1680, Pg. 66 [August 20/September 1, 1854] (RGAVMF).
177. Zavoyko and Preobrazhensky, "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," 104.
178. Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War," 36–37. *The Times* did mention that both French and British sailors had landed to support the *President*'s complement of British marines commanded by Parker: "The Affair at Petropaulovski." *The Times*, December 7, 2003 [1854], 8.
179. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003 [August 20th/September 1, 1854] (RGAVMF). Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 302; Zavoyko, "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," 107; Polevoi, *National Heroes*, 148; and Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 196–197.
180. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
181. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 139.
182. Parker,"The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War," 38.
183. MS-0805 208 [August 31, 1854] (ABC).
184. MS-0805 210 [August 31, 1854] (ABC).
185. De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA) and MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [August 31, 1854] (NLNZ).
186. BB4 702 486 [September 2, 1854] (SHD); ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 3, 1854] (NA); and O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 139.
187. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 1, 1854] (YCBA).
188. BB4 702 484 [September 2, 1854] (SHD).
189. Ibid. See also ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 2, 1854] (NA)
190. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 2, 1854] (NA). See also BB4 702 484 [September 2, 1854] (SHD).
191. Additional manuscript 49565, Folio – [April 1, 1856] (BL).

8 Petropavlovsk, Japan, and After

1. Aleksandr Pavlovich Arbuzov [Russian language], "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854 (from the notes of an eyewitness and participant)." *Russkaya Starina*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1870), 302 and Vasily Stepanovich Zavoyko and Aleksandr A. Preobrazhensky [Russian language], "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French

Squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854." *Historic Archive of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of History*, Vol. 7 (1951), 106.

2. Zavoyko and Preobrazhensky, "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French Squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," 106.
3. Ibid., and Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 302.
4. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA).
5. Nikolay Moritsevich O'Rourke, trans. Aleksandr O'Rourke, [Russian language], *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora* (St. Petersburg, Russia: Elmore Publishing, 2011), 143 and 145.
6. Russian estimates of the garrison's size range from of 921 to 1,018, but the most specific give the following total: 41 officers, 476 soldiers, 349 sailors, 18 civilian volunteers, and 36 indigenous Itelmen (Kamchandal) hunters.
7. Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 304.
8. See, for example, Febvrier-Despointes' comments that "since the first attack, everything has gone wrong" and that there was "no cooperation between France and England" in BB4 702 462 [September 22, 1854] (SHD).
9. Jean-René-Maurice de Kerret and Tugdual de Kerros, eds., *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855* (Saint-Thonan, France: Cloitre Imprimeurs, 2004), 171 and MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
10. MS-0805 212 [September 1, 1854] (ABC).
11. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 2, 1854] (YCBA).
12. Robert Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War." Master's thesis, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, UK, 2003, 42; Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA); and Kerret and, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 176.
13. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [December 6, 1854] (NA).
14. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 2, 1854] (YCBA).
15. MSS 273/17, Henry Winans Hiller, "A Leaf from My Experiences in Siberia—and How I Got There." [Undated] (UCSB).
16. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA).
17. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 177.
18. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA) and Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 177.

19. Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War," 43.
20. BB4 702 486 [September 3, 1854] (SHD) and ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 3, 1854] (NA). See also, BB4 702 482 [September 3, 1854] (SHD).
21. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
22. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 3, 1854] (YCBA).
23. Ibid.
24. Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War," 3.
25. Additional manuscript 49565, Folio – [April 1, 1856] (BL).
26. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [December 6, 1854] (NA).
27. MS-Papers-5937–10/04 [September 15, 1854] (NLNZ).
28. Ibid.
29. BB4 702 462 [September 22, 1854] (SHD). See also: Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [August 31, 1854] (DFA).
30. BB4 702 486 [September 3, 1854] (SHD) and ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 3, 1854] (NA).
31. Ibid.
32. Parker, "The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War," 45.
33. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
34. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 176.
35. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003 [August 24/September 5, 1854] (RGAVMF) and Zavoyko and Preobrazhensky, "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French Squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," 110.
36. Boris P. Polevoi [Russian language], *National Heroes: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Letters, and Official Documents* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Dalipzdan, 1979), 151.
37. Paul Carles, "Campagnes des Mers du Pacifique et du Japon 1854 et 1855." [Multiple dates, 1870] (NL).
38. Ibid.
39. MS-0805 215 [September 4, 1854] (ABC).
40. MS 116/Box 1/19 "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
41. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 4, 1854] (YCBA).
42. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003 [August 24th/September 5, 1854] (RGAVMF).
43. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).

44. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [September 4, 1854] (YCBA).
45. BB4 702 472 [September 3, 1854] (SHD) and Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 177.
46. Ibid., and Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
47. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [September 4, 1854] (DFA).
48. "The Affair of Petropaulovski." *The Times*, December 26, 1854, 9.
49. Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 30.
50. Polevoi, *National Heroes: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854*166.
51. Ibid., 155 and MS-0805 220 [September 4, 1854] (ABC).
52. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 5, 1854] (NA).
53. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [September 4, 1854] (DFA) and Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 179.
54. Ibid.
55. Edward H. Seymour, *My Naval Career and Travels* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1911), 71.
56. CC7 Alpha 1467: Antoine-François Lefebvre, [September 8, 1854] (SHD).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. William Petty Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII)." *The Naval Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July, 1965), 277.
62. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 150.
63. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
64. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 177.
65. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 153.
66. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
67. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
68. Ibid., 179 and Fond 315, Opis 1, File 1680, Pg. 67 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF).
69. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 150.
70. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 5, 1854] (NA).

71. Ibid.
72. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 179.
73. MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
74. Nikolay Fesun [Russian language], "From the Notes of an Officer Who Served Aboard the Frigate Aurora." *Morskoi Sbornik*, No. 10 (1860), 4.
75. Konstantin Pavlovich Pilkin [Russian language], "The Details of the Battle at Petropavlovsk on August 24 (September 5), 1854." *Morskoi Sbornik*, Vol. 343, No. 5 (1911), 20.
76. Ibid.
77. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 3003 [August 24/September 5, 1854] (RGAVMF).
78. Ibid.
79. Fond 315, Opis 1, File 1680, Pg. 67 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF).
80. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 151.
81. MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL).
82. Fesun, "From the Notes of an Officer Who Served Aboard the Frigate Aurora," 5.
83. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
84. Arbuzov, "The Defense of the Petropavlovsk Port against the Anglo-French Squadron in 1854," 312. See also, MS 116/Box 1/19, "Letter from Dmitry Petrovich Maksutov to His Son Aleksandr" [Undated] (ASL) and Thomas Wallace Knox, *Overland through Asia: Pictures of Siberian, Chinese, and Tartar Life* (Hartford, CO: American Publishing Company, 1871), 63.
85. Zavoyko and Preobrazhensky, "Report of the Kamchatkan Military Governor about the Attack of an Anglo-French Squadron on Petropavlovsk Port in 1854," 114. For additional details, see BB4 702 490 [September 4, 1854] (SHD).
86. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
87. Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII)," 277.
88. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 180.
89. "The Affair of Petropaulovski." *The Times*, December 26, 1854, 9.
90. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 5, 1854] (NA).
91. Polevoi, *National Heroes: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854*, 166.
92. Ashcroft, "The Reminiscences of William Petty Ashcroft (Part VII)," 277.
93. MS-0805 220 [September 4, 1854] (ABC).

94. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 180.
95. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 154.
96. Fesun, "From the Notes of an Officer Who Served Aboard the Frigate Aurora," 5.
97. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 154.
98. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
99. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 4, 1854] (GPFA).
100. Fesun, "From the Notes of an Officer Who Served Aboard the Frigate Aurora," 4.
101. Boris P. Polevoi [Russian language], *Defenders of the Fatherland: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Letters, and Official Document*, 2nd ed. (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Dalipzdan, 1989), 154.
102. *Journal de Toulouse*, No. 306 (November 28, 1854), 1.
103. Kerret and Kerros, *Journal de mes Voyages Autour du Monde, 1852–1855*, 179.
104. Pierre-Paul de La Grandière, *Correspondences* [September 3, 1854] (GPFA).
105. Ibid.
106. ADM 1/5631 CAP N52 [September 6, 1854] (NA).
107. Amand Christophe Méridec De Miniac, *Journal Personnel* [September 4, 1854] (DFA).
108. The boy survived, however, after a Russian officer reportedly instructed him (in English) to "put up your sword, my boy; this is no place of you. Run back to your boat as fast as you can." Francis Marx, *The Pacific and the Amoor: Naval, Military and Diplomatic Operations from Fraser's Magazine* (London, UK: Robert Hardwicke, 1861), 7–8.
109. David Lawrence Gregg and Pauline King, eds., *The Diaries of David Lawrence Gregg: An American Diplomat in Hawaii 1853–1858* (Honolulu, Hawai'i: Hawaiian Historical Society, 1982), 200.
110. Thierry Mormanne, "La Prise de Possession de l'île d'Urup par la Flotte Anglo- Française en 1855." *Cipango: Cahiers d'études Japonaises*, No. 11 (2004), 212.
111. BB4 710 39 [January 28, 1855] (SHD).
112. O'Rourke, *The Notes of a Participant in the Circumnavigation of the Frigate Aurora*, 155.
113. BB4 682 880 [November 28, 1854] (SHD).
114. See, for example, "The Affair of Petropaulovski." *The Times*, December 6, 1854, 8 and "Naval Attack on the Russian Fort of Petropaulovski." *The Illustrated London News*, November 25, 1854, 534.

115. “The Affair of Petropaulovski.” *The Times*, December 26, 1854, 9.
116. “The Attack on Petropaulovski.” *The Illustrated London News*, December 16, 1854, 534.
117. Febvrier-Despointes had already written in April 1854 that Kamchatka could only be attacked in “nicer seasons.” BB4 702 407 [April 25, 1854] (SHD).
118. MS-2458 2 [September 8, 1854] (ABC).
119. FO 881/541 [October 26, 1854] (NA).
120. 2057/F8/III/B/370 [November 27, 1854] (WSA).
121. Ibid.
122. ADM 1/5629 [October 26, 1854] (NA).
123. ADM 1/5657 27 [September 30, 1854] (NA).
124. See, for example, Paul E. Eckel, “The Crimean War and Japan.” *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (February, 1944), 111 and Parker, “The British Pacific Naval Station in 1854; Problems of Trade, International Affairs, and War,” 29.
125. ADM 1/4647 S10 [October 27, 1854] (NA).
126. FO 17/221 [June 9 and 24, 1854] (NA) and William G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858* (London, UK: Luzac, 1951. Re-issued in paperback by Routledge, 1995), 100.
127. Pamela Statham-Drew, *James Stirling: Admiral and Founding Governor of Western Australia* (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 482.
128. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858*, 102. See also “Great Britain. House of Commons Debate,” June 23, 1854. *Hansard’s* vol. 134, CC. 613–614.
129. Ibid., 99.
130. ADM 1/5657 S10 [October 27, 1854] (NA).
131. William McOmie, *The Opening of Japan, 1853–1855* (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2006), 20.
132. George A. Lensen, *The Russian Push toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations 1697–1875* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 318.
133. Ibid., 319.
134. The Japanese word “Bugyō” is often translated as “governor” or “magistrate” in addition to “commissioner.”
135. Mitani Hiroshi and Nihon R. Gakkai, eds., trans. David Noble, *Escape from Impasse: the Decision to Open Japan* (Tokyo, Japan: International House of Japan, 2006), 226.
136. Ibid., 227. According to the Chinese interpreter accompanying Commodore Perry, for example, the Japanese were quite startled to learn from the Americans that Fleetwood Pellew of the *Phaeton*, far from having his career ruined, had been promoted to rear admiral and had recently commanded Britain’s China and East Indies station, Ibid., 225–226.
137. ADM 1/5657 [October 27, 1854] (NA).

138. Grace Fox, "The Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854." *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December, 1941), 414.
139. ADM 1/5657 [October 27, 1854] (NA). For a similar Japanese conclusion, see Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 228. In one especially revealing episode, Stirling apologized to a crestfallen Daimyo of Tsushima that they were both old without realizing that his lordship was disappointed that he was not even older than Stirling: [Japanese language], *Dai Nihon Komonjo—Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Monjo*, vVol. 12, "Public Records/Old Documents of Japan Relating to Foreign Affairs/Relations during the Late Tokugawa Shogunate" (Tokyo: Shiryō Hensanjo, Multiple dates), 372–373.
140. Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 225.
141. Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: the Unequal Treaties and Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 25.
142. Ibid.
143. FO 881/541 Enclosure 2 [October 26, 1854] (NA).
144. Ibid.
145. William G. Beasley, "The Language Problem in the Anglo-Japanese Negotiations of 1854." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*. Vol. 13, No. 3 (1950), 750.
146. Ibid.
147. Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 224.
148. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858*, 123.
149. Beasley, "The Language Problem in the Anglo-Japanese Negotiations of 1854," 751.
150. See, for example, ADM 1/5657 [October 19, 20, and 27, 1854] (NA).
151. Takehiko Okuhira [Japanese language], "The Crimean War and the Far East, Part 1 [Kurimiya sensō to kyokutō (ichi)]," *Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi*, Vol. 35, No.1 (1936), 65.
152. Richard Sims, *French Policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854–1895* (Richmond, UK: Japan Library, 1998), 15.
153. See earlier pages of this work.
154. BB4 706 70 [November 16, 1854] (SHD).
155. BB4 706 53 [June 21, 1854] (SHD).
156. BB4 706 43, 45, and 47 [April 17, May 4, and April 7, 1854] (SHD)
157. [Japanese language], *Dai Nihon Komonjo—Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Monjo*, vol. 12, "Public Records/Old Documents of Japan Relating to Foreign Affairs/Relations during the Late Tokugawa Shogunate" (Tokyo: Shiryō Hensanjo, Multiple dates), 64–66.
158. See Meron Medzini, *French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) for a discussion of Baron Gros' later efforts.

159. Edgar Franz, *Philipp Franz von Siebold and Russian Policy and Action on Opening Japan to the West in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century* (Munich, Germany: Iudicium Verlag, 2005), 59.
160. Ibid., 129.
161. Ibid., 145.
162. Captain Konstantin Posyet and Iosif Antonovich Goshkevich, respectively.
163. For an English language version, see Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov, trans. Klaus Goetze, *Frigate Pallada* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
164. See, for example, BB4 706 47 [April 7, 1854] (SHD).
165. Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 159.
166. Toshiakira Kawaji, Sadafumi Fujii, and Sadao Kawata, eds., [Japanese language], *Nagasaki Nikki (diary), Shimoda Nikki* (Tokyo, Japan: Heibonsha, 1968) [January 17, 1855].
167. Ibid., 171.
168. Ibid., [January 17, 1855].
169. Franz, *Philipp Franz von Siebold and Russian Policy and Action on Opening Japan to the West in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century*, 132.
170. Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 243–244.
171. Goncharov and Goetze, *Frigate Pallada*, 267.
172. Lensen, *The Russian Push toward Japan*, 328.
173. Donald Keene, *Travelers of a Hundred Ages: the Japanese as Revealed through 1,000 Years of Diaries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 390.
174. Ibid.
175. Hiroshi and Gakkai, *Escape from Impasse*, 165.
176. Ibid., 165.
177. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan, 1853–1855*, 360.
178. Kawaji, Fujii, and Sadao Kawata, *Nagasaki Nikki (diary), Shimoda Nikki.*
179. Keene, *Travelers of a Hundred Ages*, 394.
180. Bernard Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia* (London, UK: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1856), 202.
181. Kawaji, Fujii, and Kawata, *Nagasaki Nikki (diary), Shimoda Nikki.*
182. Ibid., [February 5, 1855].
183. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 228.

9 Frustration in the Pacific, Shifts along the Amur

1. Bernard Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia* (London, UK: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1856), 2.

2. BB2 332 857 [October 15, 1854] (SHD) and BB4 702 532 [March 11, 1855] (SHD).
3. BB4 702 545 [May 25, 1855] (SHD).
4. BB4 684 430 [April 16, 1854] (SHD).
5. BB4 332 880 [November 28, 1854] (SHD). See also, Additional manuscript 49562, Folio 4 [March 9, 1855].
6. John M. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and Various Parts of the Coast of China in HMS Barracouta* (London, UK: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1859), 89 and ADM 1/5657 26 [December 8, 1855] (NA).
7. Boris P. Polevoi [Russian language], *Defenders of the Fatherland: The Heroic Defence of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Letters, and Official Document*, 2nd ed. (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Dalipzdan, 1989), 208.
8. Natalia Kiseleva [Russian language], *In the Forefront of Memory: About the Siege of Petropavlovsk of 1854: Collection of Memoirs, Articles, Correspondence, and Official Documents* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii: Kamchatpress, 2010), 32.
9. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 921, Pg. 1 [December 3/15, 1854] (RGAVMF).
10. Ibid., 1–2.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 1.
13. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 921, Pg. 3 [November 15/30, 1854] (RGAVMF).
14. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 922, Pg. 7 [January 27/February 8, 1855] (RGAVMF).
15. 2057/F8/III/B/370 [November 27, 1854] (WSA).
16. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 85.
17. Ibid., 86–87 and Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 103.
18. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 921, Pg. 4 [November 15/30, 1854] (RGAVMF).
19. Thomas Wallace Knox, *Overland through Asia: Pictures of Siberian, Chinese, and Tartar Life* (Hartford, CT: American Publishing, 1871), 63.
20. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 94.
21. The *Aurora*, *Olivutza* (*Oliwudez*, *Oliovutsa*, etc.), *Dvina*, *Irtysh*, *and Baikal*, respectively.
22. The screw corvette *Encounter* and the steam sloop *Barracouta*.
23. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 91.
24. Nikolay Schilling, trans. Erich Schilling and Peter Girard, [Russian language], *Memories of an Old Sailor* and [German language], *Seeoffizier des Zaren* (Originally published in 1892. Cologne Germany: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971), 74.
25. Ibid.

26. MS-2213, *Journal of the Proceedings on Board HMS Dido* [Multiple dates] (NLNZ).
27. Ibid.
28. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [May 30, 1855] (YCBA).
29. Ibid.
30. MS-2213, *Journal of the Proceedings on Board HMS Dido* [Multiple Dates] (NLNZ).
31. ADM 1/5656 Y83 [July 17, 1855] (NA).
32. BB4 702 551 [June 18, 1855] (SHD).
33. BB4 702 552 [June 18, 1855] (SHD).
34. DA88.1.053 1853, *Journal of James Nicholas Dick* [June –, 1855] (YCBA).
35. Additional manuscript 49549, Folio 22 [April 16, 1855] (BL) and Andrew Lambert, *Trincomalee: Last of Nelson's Frigates* (Barnsley, UK: Chatham, 2003), 98.
36. HD 1898 [May 24, 1856] (AHO).
37. 2057/F8/III/B/370 [November 27, 1854] (WSA).
38. Also known as the Tartar Strait, Tartar Gulf, Gulf of Tartary, and so on.
39. "Great Britain. House of Commons Debate," February 8, 1856. *Hansard's* vol. 140, CC. 453–461.
40. Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*, 71.
41. Sarah Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, NY and London, UK: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 38. Furthermore, and despite Philipp Franz von Siebold's awareness of his efforts, the discoveries of Japanese explorer Mamiya Rinz⊠ were also unfamiliar to British and French forces.
42. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 92.
43. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 223.
44. Ibid.
45. Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*, 81.
46. Ibid., 86.
47. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 223.
48. Ibid., 223.
49. Petr Ovsyankin [Russian language], "From the Memoirs of a Naval Officer." *Morskoi Sbornik*, Vols. 223 and 224, Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (1888), 94.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 224 and Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*, 87.
52. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 211.
53. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 134.
54. MR 1/2012 [May 20, 1855] (NA).

55. ADM 1/5657 S109 [May 23, 1855] (NA).
56. Ibid.
57. ADM 1/5657 S109 [June 7, 1855] (NA).
58. ADM 1/5657 S10 559 [July 2, 1855] (NA).
59. Aleksey Alekseevich Peschurov [Russian language], "The Schooner *Heda* in the Tartar Strait." *Morskoi Sbornik*, Vol. 22, No. 6 (1856), 5.
60. "Naval Operations in the Pacific." *The Observer*, October 28, 1855, 3.
61. "The Affair of Castries Bay." *Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce*, January 9, 1856, 22.
62. "Escape of the Russians from Castries Bay." *The Times*, October 29th, 1855, 10.
63. Francis Marx, *The Pacific and the Amoor: Naval, Military and Diplomatic Operations from Fraser's Magazine* (London, UK: Robert Hardwicke, 1861), 8.
64. Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*.
65. "Great Britain. House of Commons Debate," February 8th, 1856. *Hansard's* vol. 140, CC. 453–461.
66. Ibid.
67. ADM 1/5657 26 [December 8th, 1855] (NA).
68. Ibid.
69. Schilling, [Russian language] *Memories of an Old Sailor* and [German language], *Seeoffizier des Zaren*, 67.
70. Ibid.
71. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 166.
72. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 211–212.
73. Ibid., 212.
74. Ibid.
75. Fond 410, Opis 2, File 922, Pg. 84 [August 12/24, 1855] (RGAVMF).
76. William McOmie, *The Opening of Japan, 1853–1855* (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2006), 361.
77. Ibid.
78. Kiseleva, *In the Forefront of Memory*, 89.
79. Bernard Whittingham incorrectly gives this date as July 29, 1855.
80. ADM 1/5657 S76 [August 1, 1855] (NA).
81. Ibid.
82. Schilling, [Russian language], *Memories of an Old Sailor* and [German language], *Seeoffizier des Zaren*, 63.
83. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 140.
84. Schilling, [Russian language], *Memories of an Old Sailor* and [German language], *Seeoffizier des Zaren*), 64.
85. Ibid., 75.
86. Ibid., 76.

87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 88.
89. Ibid.
90. ADM 1/5657 S109 [July 2, 1855] (NA).
91. Ibid.
92. ADM 1/5657 S141 [August 4, 1855] (NA) and Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan*, 137–138.
93. Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*, 132.
94. ADM 1/5657 S141 [August 4, 1855] (NA).
95. Polevoi, *Defenders of the Fatherland*, 215–216. See also Fond 410, Opis 2, File 922, Pg. 84 [August 12, 1855] (RGAVMF).
96. Fond 909, Opis 3, File 14, Pg. 53 [November 5/17, 1855] (RGAVMF).
97. MSS 273/24, Henry Winans Hiller, "A Leaf from My Experiences in Siberia—and How I Got There." [Undated] (UCSB). Note: Henry Winans Miller witnessed the Battle of Petropavlovsk as a teenaged crewman on the whaling vessel *Noble,* but later because a successful businessman and US consul.
98. Alternate spellings include Uruppu, Ouroup, Ouroupe, and so on. ADM 1/5657 S141 [Multiple dates] (NA).
99. Russia and Japan still disagree over the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's 1945 occupation of Iturup and the three other southernmost Kurile Islands.
100. ADM 50/278 [July 17, 1855] (NA).
101. Ibid., and [Japanese language], *Dai Nihon Komonjo—Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Monjo*, vol. 12, "Public Records/Old Documents of Japan Relating to Foreign Affairs/Relations during the Late Tokugawa Shogunate" (Tokyo: Shiryō Hensanjo, Multiple Dates), 10–11.
102. Ibid., 14–15.
103. Ibid.: transcript of July 13, 1855 conversation between Katsunosuke and Stirling.
104. ADM 1/5657 S141 [Multiple dates] (NA). In order to avoid confusion between the French frigate "Sybille" and a similarly sized British warship with the same name, the prefix "La" denotes the French warship.
105. ADM 1/5657 S141 [September 2, 1855] (NA). See also Ian R. Stone, "The Annexation of Urup, 1855." *Polar Record*, Vol. 28, No. 164 (1992), 61 and Thierry Mormanne, "La Prise de Possession de l'île d'Urup par la Flotte Anglo-Française en 1855." *Cipango: Cahiers d'études Japonaises*, No. 11 (2004), 225.
106. Ibid.
107. BB4 735 42 [September 2, 1855] (SHD).
108. Mormanne, "La Prise de Possession de l'île d'Urup par la Flotte Anglo-Française en 1855,", 209.

109. BB4 733 [October 5, 185-] (SHD) and ADM 1/5657 S141 [October 1, 1855] (NA).
110. See, for example, ADM 1/5657 S109 [May 18, 1855] (NA).
111. See, for example, "Great Britain. House of Commons Debate," December 21, 1855, *Hansard's* vol. 138, CC. 834.
112. "Great Britain. House of Commons Debate," February 14, 1856, *Hansard's* vol. 140, CC. 718.
113. Ibid.
114. William G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858* (London, UK: Luzac, 1951. Reissued in paperback by Routledge, 1995), 145.
115. Pamela Statham-Drew, *James Stirling: Admiral and Founding Governor of Western Australia* (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 500–501.
116. 2057/F8/III/B/370, Enclosure 2 [October 5, 1854] (WSA).
117. Whittingham, *Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia*, 110.

10 Sweaborg and another Baltic Campaign, 1855

1. CP Angleterre, 693, F. 48–53 [January 13, 1854] (AMAE).
2. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pg. 221 [January 19/31, 1855] (GARF).
3. See, for example, FO 519/4 347 [March 15, 1855] (NA).
4. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pgs. 189–190 [November 1/13, 1854] (GARF).
5. Ibid., 101.
6. Andrew Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856." Doctoral dissertation, King's College, London, 1983, 207.
7. Etienne Taillemite, *Dictionnaire des Marins Francais* (Paris, France: Editions Maritimes et d'Outre-Mer, 1982), 263 and John Knox Laughton and Andrew Lambert, "Sir Richard Saunders Dundas," in *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8255, 1.
8. See, for example, FO 519/4 347 [April 16 and 17, 1855] (NA) and James Phinney Baxter, *The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 81.
9. G.A. Osborn, "The Crimean Gunboats, Part I." *Mariner's Mirror*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1965), 103.
10. Pullen and Thomas C. Pullen, ed., *The Private Journal of Hugh Francis Pullen* (Ottawa, Canada: Private Printing, 1987), 26.
11. XJOD/7 [June 27, 1855] (NMM).
12. David, Bonner-Smith, ed., *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas Respecting Naval Operations in*

the Baltic, 1855, vol. 84 (Colchester, UK: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1944), 167.
13. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pg. 260 [May 30/June 11, 1855] (GARF).
14. BB4 710 151 [June 27, 1854] (SHD).
15. Michèle Battesti, "La Marine de Napoléon III: Une Politique Navale (Tome 1)," Doctoral dissertation, Savoie, France Université de Savoie, 1997, 95.
16. Ibid.,95–96.
17. BB4 710 51 [June 27, 1854] (SHD).
18. Battesti, "La Marine de Napoléon III: Une Politique Navale (Tome 1)," 96.
19. 4DD1 6 [August 24, 1854] (SHD).
20. Bonner-Smith, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas Respecting Naval Operations in the Baltic, 1855*, 382–398.
21. Ibid., 382.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 384.
24. Additional manuscript 49533, Folios 9–13 [April 7, 1855] (BL).
25. César Lecat Bazancourt, *L'expédition de Crimée* (Paris: Librairie D'Amyot, 1858), 330–331.
26. BB 4 727 43 [June 4, 1855] (SHD).
27. Additional manuscript 49558, Folio 42 [April 7, 1855] (BL) and Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856," 217.
28. Bonner-Smith, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas respecting naval operations in the Baltic, 1855*, 5.
29. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 1 [Multiple dates] (RGVIA).
30. Ibid., 10.
31. FC27 367 42, Pgs. 6–7 [April 16/28, 1855] (KA-KKK).
32. Ibid., 49.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 13.
36. Ibid.
37. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 24–25 [Multiple dates] (RGVIA).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 16.
41. Ibid.
42. Fond 283, Opis 2, File 6398, Pg. 1 [July 20/August 1, 1855] (RGAVMF).
43. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 24–25 [Multiple Dates] (RGVIA).

44. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 283, Pg. 18 [October 1/October 13, 1854] (RGAVMF).
45. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5494, Pg. 17 [Multiple Dates] (RGVIA).
46. Fond 728, Opis 1, File 2214, Pg. 152 [August 25/September 6, 1854] (GARF).
47. ADM 1/5647 HA25 28 [April 19, 1855] (NA).
48. ADM 1/5647 109 [May 22, 1855] (NA).
49. ADM 1/5648 293 [July 9, 1855] (NA).
50. ADM 1/5647 224 [July 1, 1855] (NA).
51. Bartholomew James Sulivan and Henry Norton Sulivan, ed., *Life and Letters of the Late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890* (London, UK: John Murray, 1896), 312.
52. Ibid.
53. Additional manuscript 49563, Folio 73 [July 24, 1855] (BL).
54. See, for example, BB2 332 102 [November 11, 1854] (SHD).
55. TRN/65 4 [September 17, 1855] (NMM).
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57. ADM 1/5647 85 [May 28, 1855] (NA).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. XJOD/7 [June 30, 1855] (NMM).
62. Philip Howard Colomb, *Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honorable Sir Astley Cooper Key* (London, UK: Methuen, 1898), 258.
63. ADM 1/5647 142 [June 4, 1855] (NA).
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68. Ibid.
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75. Modest Ivanovic Bogdanovic [Russian language], *Eastern War 1853–1856* (St. Petersburg: Sushchinskii, 1876), chapter 38, p. 2.
76. Battesti, "La Marine de Napoléon III: Une Politique Navale (Tome 1)," 130 and BB4 727 75 [June 25, 1855] (SHD).
77. Yevgeny Viktorovich Tarle [Russian language], *Crimean War*, vol. 2 (Moscow and Leningrad/St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk, 1950), chapter 16, sec. 1, p. 3.
78. Pullen and Pullen, *The Private Journal of Hugh Francis Pullen*, 24.
79. Reproduced in Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, *The British Assault on Finland 1854–1855: A Forgotten Naval War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 310. See also, Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 296.
80. Bazancourt, *L'expédition de Crimée*, 333.
81. Fond 846, Opis 16, File 5594, Pg. 16 [Multiple dates] (RGVIA).
82. XJOD/7 [August 13, 1855] (NMM).
83. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 284.
84. Ibid., 353–354.
85. Pullen and Pullen, *The Private Journal of Hugh Francis Pullen*, 30.
86. ADM 1/5648 346 [August 2, 1855] (NA).
87. HIS/39, English translation, trans. Louis Mackay, in [NMM] of Mikhail Borodkin, *The War on the Finnish Coast* (Stockholm, Sweden: Söderström and Company, 1905), 139.
88. Bonner-Smith, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas Respecting Naval Operations in the Baltic, 1855*, 112. See also, Captain Bartholomew Sulivan's note that the town's mayor, or burgomaster, had explained "that the fire was caused by a woman throwing out hot ashes or some such accident." Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 311.
89. Robert Edgar Hughes, *Two Summer Cruises with the Baltic Fleet in 1854–55, Being the Log of the "Pet" yacht* (London, UK: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1856), 222 and 224.
90. ADM 1/ 5648 405 [August 21, 1854] (NA).
91. Vladimir Nikolaevich Brylkin [Russian language], "Milgraben and the Gunboats at the Western Dvina in 1855." *Morskoi Sbornik,* No. 7 (1856), 71.
92. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 354.
93. ADM 1/5648 293 [July 9, 1855] (NA).
94. Wilhelm Rüstow, *Der Krieg gegen Russland im Jahre 1854* (Zurich: F. Schulthess, 1855), 469.
95. Vesa 93, Pgs. 23–24 [June 8/20, 1855] (KA).
96. FO 881/478 [June 9, 1855] (NA).

97. "Great Britain. House of Lords Debate," July 10, 1856. *Hansard's* vol. 139, CC. 645–652.
98. "Operations in the Baltic, Alleged Massacre." *The Nation*, June 28, 1855, 4.
99. Ibid.
100. FO 881/478 [June 6, 1855] (NA).
101. XJOD/7 [June 7, 1855] (NMM).
102. Vesa 93, Pg. 58 [June 22/July 4, 1855] (KA).
103. Vesa 93, Pg. 39 [June 12/24, 1855] (KA).
104. "The Massacre at Hango Head." *The Illustrated London News*, August 11, 1855, 163.
105. Vesa 93, Pg. 2 [May 25/June 6, 1855] (KA).
106. Vesa 93, Pgs. 6–7 [May 25/June 6, 1855] (KA).
107. Ibid., 7.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Vesa 93, Pg. 30 [May 30/June 11, 1855] (KA).
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Vesa 93, Pgs. 33–34 [June 11/23, 1855] (KA).
114. Ibid., 54 [Undated].
115. Vesa 93, Pg. 34 [June 11/23, 1855] (KA).
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., 35.
118. Vesa 93, Pgs. 38–39 [June 12/24, 1855] (KA).
119. Ibid., 38.
120. Vesa 93, Pg. 45 [Undated] (KA).
121. Ibid., 93.
122. Vesa 93, Pg. 55 [June 6/18, 1855] (KA).
123. Vesa 93, Pg. 58 [June 22/July 4, 1855] (KA).
124. Ibid.
125. Vesa 93, Pg. 40 [June 2/14, 1855] (KA).
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., 41.
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130. Ibid., 42.
131. "Great Britain. House of Lords Debate," July 10, 1856. *Hansard's* vol. 139, CC. 645–652.
132. Rüstow, *Der Krieg gegen Russland im Jahre 1854*, 469.
133. See, for example, "The Massacre at Hango." *The New York Daily Times*, July 6, 1855. Unpaginated.
134. Sven Gabriel Elmgren and Aarno Maliniemi, ed. [Swedish language], *The Notes of S. G. Elmgren*, vol. 2 (Helsinki, Finland: Suomen Historian Lähteitä, 1939) [June 11, 1855 and July 3, 1855].

135. Bonner-Smith, *Correspondence between the Admiralty and Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas Respecting Naval Operations in the Baltic, 1855*, 111.
136. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary,* Pg. 7 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
137. BB4 727 109 [July 17, 1855] (SHD).
138. II/A4/63 [July 10, 1855] (BI).
139. Additional manuscript 49533, Folios 115–120 [July 24, 1855] (BL).
140. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary,* Pgs. 2 and 8 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
141. Colomb, *Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honorable Sir Astley Cooper Key*, 259.
142. Hughes, *Two Summer Cruises with the Baltic Fleet in 1854–55*, 246.
143. BB4 727 135 [August 7, 1855] (SHD).
144. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 275.
145. MSS 88 [August 10, 1855] (RNM).
146. II/A4/63 [July 10, 1855] (BI).
147. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pg. 5 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
148. ADM 1/5648 367 [August 13, 1855] (NA).
149. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 342.
150. BB4 727 146 [August 14, 1855] (SHD).
151. Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856," 237.
152. Sulivan and Sulivan, *Life and Letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James Sulivan, K.C.B., 1810–1890*, 326.
153. Fond 224, Opis 1, File 261, Pg. 106 [September 30/October 12, 1854] (RGAVMF).
154. Ibid.
155. Fond 167, Opis 1, File 25, Pg. 44 [July 24/August 5, 1855] (RGAVMF).
156. Vesa S-Military Engineering-14903, Pg. 20 [July 24/August 5, 1855] (KA).
157. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pg. 3 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
158. Ibid., 3 and 4.
159. Ibid., 2.
160. Battesti, "La Marine de Napoléon III: Une Politique Navale (Tome 1)," 132.
161. Vesa 94, Pgs. 26–27 [August 4/16, 1855] (KA).
162. KMB 905/1 [August 12, 1855] (WYAS).
163. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pgs. 10 and 11 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
164. Fond 167, Opis 1, File 25, Pg. 44 [July 27/August 8, 1855] (RGAVMF).
165. Vesa 94, Pg. 5 [July 28/August 9, 1855] (KA).
166. Ibid., 6.

167. Elmgren and Maliniemi, *The Notes of S. G. Elmgren* [August 11, 1855].
168. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pg. 7 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
169. Henry Woodfall Crowe and Bernard Crowe, eds., *The Crimean War Journals of Henry Woodfall Crowe* (Victoria, Australia: Softsand, 2012) [August 15, 1855].
170. Pullen and Pullen, *The Private Journal of Hugh Francis Pullen*, 37.
171. Vesa 94, Pg. 28 [August 4/16, 1855] (KA) and Fond 167, Opis 1, File 25, Pg. 44 [July 27/August 8, 1855] (RGAVMF).
172. Vesa S-Military Engineering-14864, Pg. 1 [August 3/15, 1855] (KA).
173. Rüstow, *Der Krieg gegen Russland im Jahre 1854*, 480.
174. Fond 167, Opis 1, File 25, Pgs. 44–46 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF). See also, Vladimir Alexandrovich Svetorzhetsky, "*Rossiya* during the Bombardment of Sweaborg." *Naval Digest*, No. 11 (1855), 15–24 and Vesa 94, Pgs. 1–3 [July 30/August 11, 1855] (KA).
175. Vesa 94, Pg. 5 [August 2/14, 1855] (KA).
176. Fond 167, Opis 1, File 25, Pgs. 44–46 [Multiple dates] (RGAVMF).
177. Ibid.
178. MSS 88 [August 10, 1855] (RNM).
179. Andrew Lambert, "Under the Heel of Britannia, the Bombardment of Sweaborg August 8–10 1855," in Peter Hore, ed., *Seapower Ashore: 200 Years of Royal Navy Operations on Land* (London, UK: Chatham, 2001), 118.
180. "Correspondence with Reference to the Contract of Mssrs. Grissell for Mortars" [Multiple dates in March, 1856]. *British House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, 391.
181. ADM 1/ 5648 367 [August 13, 1855] (NA).
182. BB4 727 146 [August 14, 1855] (SHD). See also, 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pg. 9 [August 9, 1855] (RMM).
183. MSS 88 [August 10, 1855] (RNM).
184. BB4 727 146 [August 14, 1855] (SHD).
185. Lambert, "Great Britain, the Baltic, and The Russian War: 1854–1856," 248.
186. Additional manuscript 49533, Folios 137–140 [August 21, 1855] (BL).
187. XJOD/7 [August 11, 1855] (NMM).
188. Vesa 94, Pg. 27 [August 4/16, 1855] (KA).
189. Vesa 94, Pg. 7 [August 1/13, 1855] (KA).
190. Additional manuscript 49536, Folio 2 [August 21, 1855] (BL).
191. Colomb, *Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honorable Sir Astley Cooper Key*261.
192. Ibid., 260.
193. Ibid.
194. 1964/33, *Francis Lean Diary*, Pg. 15 [August 10, 1855] (RMM).
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Conclusion 1856 and a "Peace that Sticks in the Throat"

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Archive	Abbreviation
Alaska State Library Historical Collections; Juneau, Alaska	ASL
Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères; La Courneuve, France	AMAE
Archives of British Columbia; Victoria, Canada	ABC
Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences; St. Petersburg [Branch], Russia	PFA RAN
Borthwick Institute for Archives at the University of York; York, United Kingdom	BI
British Library Department of Manuscripts; London, United Kingdom	BL
De La Grandière/Pimodan Family Archives; Briec, France	GPFA
De Miniac Family Archives; Val Saint André, France	DFA
Karl Herman Renlund Museum; Kokkola [Gamla Karleby], Finland	KHR
National Archives of Finland; Helsinki, Finland	KA
National Archives of Scotland; Edinburgh, United Kingdom	NAS
National Archives of the United Kingdom; Kew, United Kingdom	NA
National Library of New Zealand; Wellington, New Zealand [Alexander Turnbull Collection]	NLNZ
National Library of Russia Manuscript Division; St. Petersburg, Russia	ORRNB
National Maritime Museum; Greenwich, United Kingdom	NMM
Newberry Library; Chicago, United States	NL
Royal Anthropological Institute; London, United Kingdom	RAI
Royal Geographical Society; London, United Kingdom	RGS

Royal Marines Museum; Portsmouth, United Kingdom	RMM
Royal Naval Museum; Portsmouth, United Kingdom	RNM
Russian State Military-Historical Archives; Moscow, Russia	RGVIA
Russian State Naval Archives; St. Petersburg, Russia	RGAVMF
Service Historique de la Défense; Vincinnes, France	SHD
State Archive of the Russian Federation; Moscow, Russia	GARF
United Kingdom Hydrographic Office; Taunton, United Kingdom	AHO
University of California Santa Barbara Library; Santa Barbara, United States	UCSB
West Yorkshire Archive Service; Halifax, United Kingdom	WYAS
Wiltshire and Swindon Archives; Chippenham, United Kingdom	WSA
Yale Center for British Art; New Haven, United States	YCBA

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