Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy

EDITED BY
Alex Dowdall
and John Horne

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"From first-hand oral accounts of the sieges of Sarajevo and Leningrad, from a great range of documentary evidence, and from literary works imagining the sack of Troy, this volume studies warfare at its very darkest: the devastation of cities and their civilian populations. The techniques of siege may have changed beyond recognition over the millennia, but the objective of capturing or destroying entire communities or states has remained a constant feature of warfare, and the human and material cost has always been extraordinarily high. The detailed case studies assembled here offer fascinating and disturbing insights into the politics, economics, ethics and psychology of siege warfare, starting less than 30 and ending more than 3000 years ago."

—Hans van Wees, *University College London, UK*

Alex Dowdall · John Horne
Editors

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Introduction

Alex Dowdall and John Horne

Siege is a form of war once more in the headlines with the conflict in the Middle East. The Syrian city of Aleppo was split in two for four years from 2012 to 2016, each half besieged by the forces of the other side—the regime of Bashar al-Asaad (backed by Iran and Russia) and the diverse coalition that emerged from the 'Arab Spring' and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. As this book goes to press that siege has ended amid a welter of accusations by each party that the other targeted innocent civilians. The world watched the harrowing spectacle of starving and traumatised people trying to escape the ruins of eastern Aleppo into the care of the United Nations without retribution (so far) against those who had targeted them. The desolation they left behind was not just human suffering, but also the destruction of one of the most important medieval Arabic cities, its monuments, mosques and churches in ruins. Other sieges have marred the war-torn landscape of Iraq as well as Syria (Homs, Mosul)—a reminder that for all the destructiveness of modern firepower,

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sieges (often of considerable duration) remain integral to warfare as they have been throughout the ages.

Not only are sieges and the fate of civilians caught up in them immemorial, but they have shaped the imagination as well as the experience of war. The founding epic of Western literature, Homer's *Iliad*, recounts several months near the end of a ten-year siege that concluded with the sack of Troy as the inhabitants, with few exceptions, were enslaved or put to the sword and the city pillaged and burned. Among those who escaped was Aeneas, bearing his aged father Anchises, who according to Virgil's *Aeneid* (looking back at the fall of Troy from the first century BCE) went on to found Rome, a city that also had its own litany of sieges. Sieges, in short, and the fate of the inhabitants who are caught up in them and suffer their consequences, have in the Western tradition at least occupied a central place in the art and literature as well as the annals of war.

The strictly military reasons for the perennity and importance of sieges seem fairly clear. Ever since warriors fortified strongholds that could threaten enemy forces in the field and ever since urban centres developed as the locus of economic and political power, both became logical targets of attack. Quite apart from the fact that taking major centres was often the goal of a campaign, making their defence a priority, the use of strongholds to control extensive tracts of territory or to provide refuge to forces under pressure gave sieges a broad strategic importance.[1] Because the defence of such strongholds was static, however, attacks on them produced a type of warfare that stood out, and continues to stand out, from the manoeuvre of armies in the field or from the harassment of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency against an extended population.[2] Concentration in space and the polarisation of attack and defence mark out the siege.

Further characteristics emerge under closer scrutiny. One is the distinction between direct and indirect attack on the part of those laying the siege. Direct assault is the quickest means of reducing a stronghold. But the strength of the latter's defence and the quantity of its supplies (or its capacity to be resupplied) help determine the balance of advantage between the two parties. The indirect means of starving the enemy out may prove a more effective form of attack in the longer term—or at any rate the prerequisite for a successful assault. To these two means of attack one should add the no less classic weapon of treachery and trickery in order to weaken morale, provoke internal division or lead the

defenders into fatal missteps. A wooden horse, after all, was the undoing of Troy. Yet, it is by no means certain that the ultimate advantage lies with the besieger rather than the besieged. The former requires more soldiers than the latter, since the point of defensive works is to economise manpower, and the larger forces deployed by the besieger cannot then be used elsewhere. In the end, besieging forces may be seen off by the strength of the defence or besieged in turn by relieving forces. As in other forms of warfare, there lies a third option between victory and defeat—negotiated surrender.

The special place of civilians in sieges compared to other kinds of warfare is self-evident with towns and cities, which by definition contain large non-military populations. But in the case of forts and castles, inhabitants of surrounding areas may well seek protection and thus become caught up in a siege. By its very nature, siege warfare exposes civilians to the risk of particular forms of violence—such as bombardment, hunger, disease, assault, rape, slavery, pillage, destruction of homes and buildings and the desecration of cultural and religious sites. Other types of combat may result in some or all of these. But sieges place civilians at the heart of battle more consistently and in greater numbers than other kinds of warfare—at least until the onset of bombing from the air or the emergence of modern genocides.

It is this prominence of non-combatants in siege warfare (or at any rate of those with no official status as warriors) that we propose to study in this volume. Recently, historians of different eras have devoted a good deal of attention to the effects of military violence on civilians, including urban populations.[3] Yet there has been little recognition of siege warfare as a discrete type of military engagement that makes civilians especially vulnerable, and therefore of the questions that stem from this. Collectively, the authors of the chapters presented here contend that the importance of sieges extends far beyond their tactical and strategic value for armies in the field. Sieges have been the sites where the relationships between civilians and war have been defined to their fullest extent. The book therefore raises questions about the roles of civilians during sieges—as victims, particularly during the bloody massacres in which sieges often end, and as active participants through their attempts to support or undermine military forces. It also asks about the codification of laws and customs of siege warfare; daily interactions between soldiers and civilians; the broader symbolic meanings of sieges for the wars of which they form a part; their place in historical memory; and the ways

in which civilian survivors have dealt with siege trauma. In addressing these issues, the book suggests that long before the 'total wars' of the twentieth century, sieges eroded the distinctions between the civilian and military worlds, and ensured that non-combatants were both victims and participants of conflicts.

In order to pose these questions and to begin to address the gap in our knowledge about civilians under siege, the book adopts a distinctive, regressive method. As with any historical inquiry, there is a danger in assuming evolutionary logic with the attendant risk of teleology (*post hoc ergo propter hoc*—subsequent, therefore consequent). The dangers are all the greater when the subject in question is one which, while precise (the fate of civilians), relates to a phenomenon that has occurred with varying dimensions in different historical contexts and with such fluctuating importance throughout history. By working in reverse order from the siege of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, for four years from 1992–1995, during which civilians with scant protection lived under artillery fire from the Bosnian Serb forces in the surrounding mountains, to the siege of Troy in the second millennium BCE, which was rooted in historical reality but assumed mythological status in the literature of classical Greece, any idea of causal relationships is disrupted. Instead, we gain a set of studies, each one of which poses fresh issues precisely because its place in the sequence is not consequential and all of which invite comparison with each other. The intention is to generate questions and identify arguments about civilian experience that pay due regard to the differences in form and importance taken by siege warfare across history.

Those differences call for brief comment. If sieges figured in classical Greece, they were the dominant form of warfare from the late Roman to the high medieval periods and again in the early modern period, as the offensive capacity of the gunpowder revolution met its answer in the new 'artillery fortresses' pioneered in early sixteenth-century Italy. These culminated in Vauban's forts on the expanded eastern frontier of Louis XIV's France in the late seventeenth century.[4] Larger field armies in the eighteenth century and the anticipation of the 'nation in arms' during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars swung the pendulum back to the war of movement. Yet the nineteenth century saw a continued duel between improved fortress design and more destructive firepower, giving rise to important sieges not only in Europe (Sebastopol in the Crimean War in 1854–1855, Paris in the Franco-Prussian War

in 1870, Edirne/Adrianople in the First Balkan War in 1912–1913, Przemyśl in Galicia in 1914–1915, at the start of the First World War) but also in America (Richmond, Vicksburg and Atlanta in the American Civil War).

The limits of space and our own knowledge have led us to focus on the 'Western way of war', but we are acutely aware that sieges also played a role in warfare outside Europe. Chap. 8 by Alan Murray on the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 and Chap. 5 by Fergus Robson on the French and British expeditions to Egypt and Palestine at the turn of the nineteenth century allow us to look at how Westerners treated civilians in sieges in two non-Western settings. But this theme becomes even more significant during the zenith of Western colonialism. From Delhi and Lucknow during the Indian 'mutiny' in 1857 to the siege of General Gordon in Khartoum in 1881–1882 (and the subsequent reduction of the Sudan by Kitchener) or Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, sieges marked the irruption of European colonialism into Asia and Africa and the violent reactions by indigenous peoples against it. In 1904–1905, the Japanese dramatically stepped on stage as the first Asian power to modernise its military with a protracted siege of the Russians at Port Arthur. How 'indigenous' and Western forces treated the civilians of the other side in these colonial sieges is an important dimension of the subject that others will hopefully take up.

The twentieth century complicates the picture for reasons of scale and definition. Paris with two million inhabitants in 1870 anticipated the potential size of civilian populations caught up by siege in an urbanising world. There were three million in Leningrad in 1941–1944, including some 300,000 refugees, and up to two million in Aleppo in 2012–2016. Both these sieges still conformed to the classic definition of a strong point or defended city surrounded and mostly cut off from resupply (Leningrad famously could be supported in winter by ice roads over Lake Ladoga and there was limited aid from the air in both cases). Both were subject to starvation as well as direct assault. But air power reduced the distinction between besieged cities under fire and the civilian population of an entire region or country which could be targeted by mass bombing, as happened widely in the Second World War and Vietnam.[5]

The same was true of naval blockade. This was an ancient component of siege warfare: it contributed to the fall of Calais to the English in 1346–1347 and, when deployed on a novel scale during the Napoleonic Wars, it helped isolate the continent from outside supply. Yet its

implications became altogether different when applied to industrial and urban societies that relied on a global division of production and trade. The indirect dimension of siege warfare—depriving the besieged of vital supplies—could now be attempted for a country or even a continent, as during the two world wars. Aerial bombardment (destroying cities from above) and continental naval blockade (starving civilians out) thus translated key features of siege warfare to civilians not under close siege and so to entire societies.

This was also the case with the siege as defensive combat. Traditionally, the cost of fortifications limited strong-points to individual fortresses or defended towns, although the accumulation of these, as in the southern Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (a highly urbanised area for the pre-industrial world), might well amount to a defensive system. However, the kind of people's war opened up by the French Revolution meant that field works (an ancient form of defensive warfare) could now be deployed thanks to mass armies and field artillery as an extended defensive system, amounting to a kind of siege warfare over substantial rural zones. These might even incorporate towns and prior strong-points as subordinate elements. This was partly what happened between Washington DC and Richmond during the American Civil War (the battle of Fredericksburg, the sieges of Petersburg and Richmond) though the lesson went largely unlearned in Europe.[6] It is what occurred to general surprise in Europe in 1914–1915, not just in the west, but also on the successive 'fronts' (the term in its current sense dates from that moment) that locked Europe into a mutual siege as each side sought both to defend itself and to attack the other and also to deprive the latter of vital supplies by naval blockade and unrestricted submarine warfare.[7] In these ways, therefore, siege warfare and its effects on the civilians caught up in it have influenced warfare more generally in the contemporary age.

Overall, this book is structured around four main themes. The first concerns the definitions and limits of sieges. Certain features are common to all sieges since the latter constitute a form of positional war rather than warfare of movement and tend to focus on fixed sites of actual or symbolic power. Yet as we have noted, there is always a relationship not only to the wider campaign but also to the broader territory in which they occur. Emilie Dosquet in Chap. 6, for instance, discusses how, during Louis XIV's wars in the late seventeenth century, sieges and positional warfare were elements of a wider strategy of 'aggressive defence'.

They were inextricably linked to partisan warfare, or 'small war'. In many cases, once besieged locations in the Palatinate had capitulated, the siege was inverted and spilled out into the surrounding countryside as towns became bases for French raiding parties—with devastating effects on unprotected civilian communities. Fergus Robson analyses similar developments in late-eighteenth-century Calabria and Puglia, where the French Revolutionary armies witnessed, and participated in, the melding of siege warfare and guerrilla warfare. Alex Dowdall in Chap. 4 shows how, during the First World War, opposed lines of trenches spread across vast tracts of Europe and, in the manner already indicated, combined with aerial bombing, long-range artillery fire, economic blockade and unrestricted submarine warfare to ensure that many Europeans experienced something of the conditions of siege warfare. Siege, in other words, is a kind of combat that even in earlier periods, and certainly more recently, extends more widely than at first might seem to be the case. We must be aware that what happens outside the defences of a particular stronghold may be as important as what happens inside.

The second theme consists of the distinctive types of violence that siege warfare inflicts on civilians—ranging from indirect, economic violence, and in particular attempts to starve besieged locations into submission, to bombardment and outright massacre. Were certain conditions more or less likely to result in violence? How sieges end is a vital factor, but also a variable, for the fate of civilians. Massacres of civilians have always been common when strong-points fall. But what conditions precipitate them? How important are factors such as race, religion and cultural difference in determining the outcomes of sieges? The frenzied onslaught that accompanied the fall of Jerusalem in 1099, discussed by Alan Murray, or the sieges undertaken by Napoleon's army in Egypt, a force isolated in a strange and distant land, described by Fergus Robson, suggest that inter-religious siege warfare outside Europe was particularly brutal, especially if the successful besiegers felt themselves vulnerable to the surrounding population. The ferocity with which British forces destroyed Delhi after the siege of 1857, following the 'mutiny' of the indigenous Sepoys and the complicity of the last Mughal emperor, bears out the same point.[8] Yet as Ivana Maček and Alexandra Wachter show in their studies of Sarajevo (Chap. 2) and Leningrad (Chap. 3), the racially motivated violence that has so often characterised twentieth-century warfare in Europe, in sieges as elsewhere, was no less brutal.

It is all the more striking, therefore, to find as Jane Finucane shows in Chap. 7, that the conflict which stood for the following two centuries as the mythic embodiment of brutality towards civilians in an era of religious conflict, the Thirty Years War, was in reality a good deal more nuanced regarding the treatment of civilians in sieges. This is not to deny the slaughter when the Count of Tilly besieged and took Protestant Magdeburg for the Catholic League in 1631. But as Finucane suggests, this may have been untypical of what actually happened to civilians when towns fell while thriving as the mythical embodiment of the worst that could befall them. In reality, at least in the earlier phases of the Thirty Years War, civilians seem often to have escaped such devastation or to have experienced it only to a limited degree, especially when prolonged resistance encouraged a negotiated outcome. Comparing these cases thus enables us to consider whether extreme violence against civilians is a characteristic feature of all or most sieges, or not, and if so, to what extent siege warfare really affects non-combatants more than other types of conflict.

The different cases under consideration also expose the array of motivations underlying the use of violence against civilians and the reactions of the latter. Sometimes, civilians were deliberately and consciously targeted, as attacking forces sought to crush the morale and resistance of the entire besieged population, combatant and non-combatant alike. At other times, attacking armies considered civilian casualties merely as collateral damage in their attempts to reduce defending garrisons. Yet the violence that civilians experienced during sieges helped to eradicate distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, and between the civilian and the military worlds. Did civilians on some occasions feel that siege conditions, and especially the threat of extreme violence, transformed them into combatants, as seems to have been the case in Jerusalem at the turn of the twelfth century or Leningrad in the twentieth? This requires us to consider whether civilians were not merely the victims but also the perpetrators of violence during sieges. Indeed, in certain scenarios civilians were to be found not only among the besieged but also the attackers, as with the Crusaders who advanced on Jerusalem in 1099. On that occasion, the nature of the expedition and the predicament of the defenders meant that all involved on both sides, whether warriors or not, were obliged to take part in the fighting. Moments such as this reveal the difficulties involved in maintaining a stable definition of the term 'civilian' in the context of siege warfare, the nature of which sometimes dictates that all concerned take up arms or otherwise help out.

Yet despite the recurrence of this tendency across the ages, contemporaries continually tried to draw a distinction between combatant and non-combatant, and to ensure that certain protections were granted to civilians during sieges. This brings us to our third theme—how the customs, norms and laws of siege warfare have been produced, defined and changed over time. Perceptions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour are, and always have been, a central dynamic of siege warfare. In ancient Greece, as described by Joshua Hall, religious notions of sacrilege regulated siege warfare and dictated that those seeking sanctuary in temples and other religious buildings receive protection. And as Philip de Souza argues, the extreme treatment that might be meted out to the population of a besieged city that held out did not necessarily justify its application—as the Athenians who rowed back on the destruction of Mytilene during the Peloponnesian War realised. In Europe during the Middle Ages, religious conventions derived from the philosophy of Augustine of Hippo focused on the concept of 'just war' and were concerned with the circumstances that rendered war appropriate or obligatory for Christians. The focus was on the moral justifications for war rather than its appropriate conduct. Indeed, Augustine's philosophy even implied that in a war undertaken righteously, any type of violence was acceptable. Nonetheless, the various 'Truces of God' promulgated in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, followed by the *Innovamus* set forth at the Third Lateran Council of 1179, aimed to categorise those persons immune from military assault—churchmen, merchants and peasants involved in farming.[9]

From the early modern period, legal theorists including Alberico Gentilli and Hugo Grotius were instrumental in further codifying the laws of war, based on moral consensus and conceptions of natural law. In his monumental *De jure Belli ac Pacis* (*The Rights of War and Peace*), Grotius sought both to identify the legitimate causes of just war and to regulate its conduct once begun in accordance with the laws of nature. This included exempting women, children, farmers and merchants from attack, as well as giving quarter, both during battles and sieges.[10] Many of the writings of the early modern period formed the basis of the modern laws of war, as laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1907, the UN Conventions after the Second World War, and elsewhere.[11] All of these efforts to regulate warfare were deeply concerned with sieges, given their large impact on civilian populations. This is not to say that the evolving laws of war ever aspired to offer absolute protection to civilians during sieges. On the contrary, during the Middle Ages and the

early modern period massacre and pillage were deemed perfectly acceptable, even expected, when garrisons rejected negotiated conclusions and forced attackers to take a town by storm, or when non-combatants participated in the town's defence (though as Jane Finucane shows, this does not necessarily mean that such devastation took place). The 1907 Hague Conventions outlawed such practices, but not the attacker's right to bombard defended towns. During the First World War, many cited the legality of bombing defended locations when attempting to justify aerial bombing raids far from the lines given the fact that in this 'continental siege' all towns were theoretically defended. Siege warfare was thus a highly regulated, even ritualised form of combat, yet also one in which civilian casualties were sometimes deemed acceptable.

Yet, as the chapters in this volume demonstrate, these rules, regulations and rituals were frequently broken, and civilians often suffered far more than even the laws and customs of war envisaged. In ancient Greece, sanctuary was not always respected, especially following contentious sieges when civilians participated in the defence of their town. As Alan Murray points out, the crusader massacre of the population of Jerusalem in 1099 may have been acceptable under the conventions of war at the time, given that the city did not surrender and was taken by storm. Yet there is no evidence that the crusaders ever offered surrender terms to the city. During French operations in the late-seventeenth-century Palatinate, as Emilie Dosquet shows, laws and customs of siege warfare were sometimes respected, with garrisons and besiegers negotiating mutually acceptable surrender terms. But during 'after-siege' operations, such rules more often broke down. Raiding parties seeking to exact contributions theoretically required official orders to carry out their activities; in practice they did not always receive such orders, and from the perspective of the civilian populations concerned, there was little difference anyway between officially sanctioned and unofficial violence. The rules of siege warfare were therefore often at the forefront of the minds of participants, although the content of these rules varied greatly over time, as did the extent to which they protected civilians and the rigour with which they were applied.

Finally, this book explores the memories and cultural representations of civilians under siege. The cases of Sarajevo and Leningrad reveal the traumatic memories which sieges have inflicted on civilian populations. In the former, as Ivana Maček argues in relation to the children of Sarajevan refugees growing up in contemporary Sweden, memories

of the siege have been passed down and, in the process, transformed from one generation to the next. In the case of one family, the parents did not hide their experiences of the siege from their daughters, but at least sought to shield them from the worst of their traumatic memories. This, combined with their daughters' responses to attitudes towards the Bosnian war and siege of Sarajevo prevalent in Swedish society, helped create 'family memories', wherein emotionally charged experiences during the siege are turned into moral lessons and the parents' nostalgia mixes with the children's fantasies. What is notable in Maček's case is that the children she has studied display few signs of 'secondary traumatisation', in contrast to the children of siege survivors in Sarajevo itself, where the phenomenon is common. This, perhaps, is due to the fact that the memories of the siege of Sarajevo which she studies were formed in the context of Sweden's open and pluralist democratic culture, rather than the politically tense climate of contemporary Bosnia.

In this respect, the remembering studied by Maček also stands in contrast to that of the siege of Leningrad. As Alexandra Wachter shows, survivors of this siege struggled to form their memories in the contentious political atmosphere of the Soviet Union after the Second World War and then of Russia after the fall of Communism. In the immediate aftermath of the siege, a heroic narrative of resistance and victory was propagated before the Soviet leadership in Moscow, wary of the popularity of local party leaders in Leningrad, actively repressed commemoration. Official commemoration, and the narrative of heroism, started up again during Khruschev's thaw, when youth organisations, in particular, were tasked with presenting the siege as an ideal topic for patriotic education. It was presented as a difficult time which Leningraders nevertheless mastered. Although there were some attempts to analyse the siege in a more objective light in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the patriotic narrative of resistance and heroism continues to this day and, as Wachter shows, actively shapes the memories of survivors. Those who experienced the siege feel compelled to take their recollections from an official canon of sorts and repress more troubling and traumatic memories which, nonetheless, emerge at unexpected moments.

Although the categories of trauma and memory are applied with more difficulty to the early modern, medieval and classical periods, we can still identify the central role that older sieges have played in the 'self-memories' of towns. Successful resistance or, conversely, destruction and massacre are lasting images and, in certain cases, the treatment of civilians

under historic sieges has generated mythic meanings for subsequent generations, as in the case of the Thirty Years War for nineteenth-century Germany. The effects of siege warfare on civilians have thus produced important cultural legacies, as illustrated by the bombarded towns of northern France during the First World War. Here, civilians looked to the histories of their own towns during early modern and medieval sieges for moral lessons—to seek reassurance and models of action. The sieges of classical antiquity with which this collection ends, and especially the siege of Troy, have also assumed mythic dimensions and provided posterity with vast, and potent, cultural repertoires. Indeed, it may be, as Philip de Souza suggests in the final chapter, that the extraordinary literary focus given by classical authors, and especially Euripides in his tragedies, to the fate of non-combatants, and especially to women and children, in the cataclysm that engulfed the Trojans, helped turn innocent besieged civilians into the quintessential victims of war for subsequent millennia— until they were replaced in the twentieth century by those of the even greater cataclysm of genocide.

Yet as we started out by observing, sieges have nonetheless remained a key feature of war in the contemporary period, and the civilians caught up in them (whether active participants or not) still embody the collateral suffering visited by war on those not centrally engaged in combat. In early 2016, the UN estimated that 400,000 people were living in 15 besieged locations during the Syrian Civil War without proper access to food or medical aid. Other estimates put the figure as high as 600,000. Abdullah al-Khatib survived one such siege in the Yarmouk refugee camp, which was surrounded by pro-Assad forces for three years. He summarised the brutal logic underlying these military tactics and the particularly acute effects they have on civilians: 'Through the sieges, they [the pro-government forces] are pressuring the civilians so they in turn pressure the rebels and blame them for the siege. This is despite the fact that the ratio of armed rebels to civilians in these areas is usually one to ten, so the primary victims are the civilians.' In January 2016, reports emerged of the particularly horrific conditions prevailing in the town of Madaya, several dozen miles outside Damascus in southern Syria. This town of 30,000 people had been blockaded since July 2015 by pro-government forces, in retaliation for similar blockades carried out by rebel troops on the towns of Fua and Kefraya, further north. Images of emaciated children caused international outcry and prompted the leader of the British Liberal Democratic Party, Tim Farron, to condemn 'this

medieval-style siege of thousands of people' being undertaken by the Assad regime.[12] The history of siege warfare from Sarajevo to Troy, or indeed from Aleppo to Troy, indicates, however, that there is nothing 'medieval' at all about such brutal tactics.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1832; repr. Princeton, 1976), book 6, Chaps. 10–13, 393–414.

2. Brian Hughes and Fergus Robson (eds), *Unconventional Warfare from Antiquity to the Present Day* (Basingstoke, 2017) looks at this parallel theme in a companion volume.

3. Erica Charters, Eve Rosenhaft and Hannah Smith (eds), *Civilians and War in Europe, 1618–1815* (Liverpool, 2012); Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (eds), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (Basingstoke, 2009); Marcus Funck and Roger Chickering (eds), *Endangered Cities: Military Power and Urban Societies in the Era of the World Wars* (Leiden, 2004); Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene (eds), *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War* (Farnham, 2011); Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (eds), *Civilians in the Path of War* (Lincoln, 2002).

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Transmission and Transformation: Memories of the Siege of Sarajevo

Ivana Maček

More than 20 years have passed since the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 for Bosnia and Hercegovina, which began the end of the four-year-long Siege of Sarajevo. Three-quarters of the pre-war population of Bosnia and Hercegovina, around three million, fled or were driven from their homes, and of these around one million left for 'third countries' outside the former Yugoslavia.[1] This brought a complicated and fragile peace for both citizens who stayed in the country and those who found refuge abroad. 'By 1994, half of Sarajevo's 600,000 pre-war residents had left the city. Another 150,000 "displaced persons" had arrived, mostly Muslims from villages and small towns in eastern Bosnia'.[2] While some refugees in third countries were obliged to return to Bosnia and Hercegovina after the war (Germany, for instance, had a policy of compulsory return), others, including refugees in Sweden, were left with a choice. Some people returned to their homes; others resettled in territories that were now under the military and administrative control of 'their' ethnonational group.[3] The vast majority of refugees in Sweden,

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however, chose to remain, as they felt that they had better opportunities there than if they were to return to Bosnia and Hercegovina.[4]

In 2013–2015, I followed the families of more than 20 people who left Sarajevo for Sweden because of the siege. I was interested to see what significance experiences of the siege now have in the lives of the parents who were there, as well as for their children, most of whom were born in Sweden. In this chapter, I have chosen to focus on one family in order to examine important phenomena connected with the intergenerational transmission and transformation of the parents' experiences to the next generation.[5]

Comparison with the results of a similar study done a few years ago in Sarajevo suggests that living in Sweden shapes the ways the siege is remembered and understood today.[6] Another important factor is how the siege is narrated.[7] As I myself did anthropological fieldwork in besieged Sarajevo, my interlocutors knew that I had experienced the siege, albeit from a different position than themselves. For the grown-ups, this fact connected us through common experience. For the children, I occupied a position similar to their parents. The fact that I come from the former Yugoslavia, have lived in Sweden since 1990 and have a son born in Sweden after the war also made our life experiences similar. I believe that these commonalities opened doors that would otherwise have remained closed and enabled me to offer an account of the transmission and transformation of parents' experiences of the siege of Sarajevo in Sweden.

The Porous Siege

The siege of Sarajevo lasted from spring 1992 to spring 1996. During the ensuing 20 years, the majority of pre-war residents who fled have not returned permanently. When I talked to Sarajevans in Croatia in the 1990s, as well as during the past few years in Sweden, many said that they left 'on the last airplane' or 'with the last bus convoy'. The flight of Sarajevans from the town in early April 1992 was substantial, helped by what was left of the former Yugoslav army, but people also left later, when the front lines surrounding the town had been established and the siege was tighter.[8] As one young woman I befriended during the siege told me in 1994, 'anyone who wanted to could leave'. In other words, the siege was porous: people could move in and out, albeit with difficulty. If you wanted to leave, you needed good contacts with all three armed groups involved: the HVO (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*, Croat Defence Council, Bosnian Croats' Army), the ARS (*Armija Republike Srpske*, Bosnian Serbs'

Army) and the ARBiH (*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the army of the Bosniak-dominated government).[9] Paying bribes to all three was often necessary. The porousness of the siege also meant that goods could pass into the town, creating a flourishing black market.[10] Especially after the opening of the tunnel under the airport runway, which was under the control of the Muslim-dominated government of Sarajevo, opportunities for relatively safe government-sponsored departures and returns were considerably increased.[11] Finally, one of the harshest aspects of siege life was the rupture of communications with the outer world. The telephone lines were cut, and there were few expensive satellite phones and fax machines; amateur radio broadcasters had only a few crackling connections; some messages passed through the Red Cross on their standard-form letters; some private parcels came through humanitarian organizations.[12]

In many families, the women left first, taking the children with them, while the men stayed. Men had a military obligation and needed extra papers to leave. Moreover, people reasoned that hostilities would not last longer than the summer, so someone should remain to protect the apartment from being occupied by refugees and to hold onto the family's position in local society. When it became clear that the hostilities were prolonged and unpredictable, and that participation in armed units meant not only defending the hometown but also being sent to frontlines elsewhere in Bosnia and Hercegovina, fighting a war that most saw as senseless and not in their own interests, the men also began to leave.[13] Most of the families that I have met in Sweden today left the besieged town in this way and settled in Stockholm, the Swedish capital.

In order to understand the ways in which the siege has been transmitted and transformed in the Swedish context 20 years after it ended, I take a close look at a middle-class urban family. Vesna and Nenad were both born in Sarajevo; they were already a couple before the war; when the war started, they had just begun their first jobs after completing their studies and were still living with their respective parents.[14] After leaving the town separately, they settled in Sweden where they married and had two daughters.

The Perilous Siege

The younger daughter, Daniela, aged 15, knew very little about the war because, as she told me, her parents did not talk much about it when she was a child and had only just started talking more now that she was older.

When she was younger she imagined the war as constant shooting, but now that she thought about it, she realized that there could not have been shooting all the time, and she could not really understand how life functioned in wartime. Regarding the siege of Sarajevo, she knew from her grandmother that they had neither food nor electricity and that her grandfather worked as a doctor in the hospital. About her parents' life in wartime she knew nothing, except that 'it was not good' and that 'it was not easy'. She was slightly embarrassed about not knowing more. When I asked her to try to imagine how it was for them, she said that they must have felt a lot of fear and discomfort. Her mother left, she thought, because she could live a better life in Sweden. When I asked why her father stayed longer, she said that he probably thought that he could live there but after some time he realised it was impossible.

Although Daniela's knowledge of the siege was very limited and mostly generic, it included both transmissions and transformations of some key themes in this family's experiences: the danger and low standard of living, and the sense that the situation was surreal and incomprehensible. She was not aware of the particulars of her parents' experiences during the siege, or of why and how they decided, attempted and finally managed to leave.

Her older sister, Ida, aged 18, knew more about these themes. She said she knew some 'details' about the siege, but what she actually knew was mostly *what* had happened to her parents, not *how* it happened and how they felt about it. By referring to her parents' experiences as 'details', she meant that she did not have a broader picture of the siege. When the parents, sometimes both and sometimes individually, told me about the events that Ida knew about, their stories were richer and often had a different focus. I call these narrated memories 'family stories' and analyse whether and how they have been transmitted and transformed.[15]

While Daniela struggled to understand what it meant to live with intermittent, but lethal, shooting, Ida must have heard a story about a neighbour who was killed during a heavy bombardment in front of the apartment block where her mother lived. 'Mum and Dad did tell me … How their neighbours were shot in front of them and how the grenades were falling constantly. I mean, in Sarajevo you can still see. All that is not yet repaired, there is still a lot of [damage] there, the holes.'

In the parents' version of this family story, it was a rather more absurd occasion. The young couple was in town and came back to where Vesna

lived with her parents. Her mother told them that the water had just come on and she had warmed the boiler, so Nenad should take a shower. This was embarrassing as he was not often there; it felt a bit too intimate. But hot water was a rare luxury, and he decided to accept the offer.[16] Vesna described what happened:

> Exactly when he started to take a shower, a shell blew up exactly where we had passed. A man who vulcanized tires was there, standing there where he usually worked, and was killed. Everything was shaking; I think that was when our windows in the kitchen shattered. And [Nenad] heard that it exploded [*laughter*]. I think that one shell hit the building, one in front of it, and one more. Three all at once. But there is hot water, and he is taking a shower. Should he stop, or not? Ah, I will not stop. And he continued to take a shower. And we lay down. I mean, shrapnel was whizzing in the kitchen … [*Seriously*] Shrapnel was actually the worst.

She told this story with a characteristic combination of laughter at the absurdity of the situation, seriousness in the face of the existential danger they lived with every day, and a sort of quiet wonder and sadness over not wanting to think about it, much less tell her daughters.

When we look at the transformation of this experience in the daughters' telling, we see that 'one neighbour' who was killed became 'neighbours', that talking to him half an hour earlier became 'shot in front of them', and an apartment block exposed to intermittent shelling became 'grenades were falling constantly'. This tendency to expand the scale of events is similar to Daniela's idea that 'there was shooting all the time'. In the children's imaginations, the violence and destruction become more all-encompassing and dramatic. The absurd and embarrassing part about their father standing in the shower soaped from head to toe while their mother's family was lying on the floor to avoid the shrapnel was not part of the children's narrative. Perhaps they had not been told that part of the story or did not understand it because they were too young; perhaps they did not realise that the joy of showering, even under such circumstances, had some dignity as a memory of the siege. The joy, absurdity and humour become incomprehensible and disappear from the children's stories.[17] Thus, the stories are transformed. Some parts of the experience are lost in the transmission. But others, such as the closeness of lethal danger and the fact that the family survived by sheer coincidence, are caught quite precisely by the children.

Significantly, Ida connected the parents' story to something that she had experienced herself during her visits to Sarajevo: the visible holes left in asphalt and buildings by exploding shells. For children born after the war and living abroad, these tangible and poignant remains of the war are often their only material connection to their parents' experiences. These traces are thus filled with the children's imagination and feelings of unease in the face of their parents' past.[18] Because this past is cognitively incomprehensible, the fear and existential anxiety that some children describe do not stem from memories of the war as a lived experience but from an imagined, 'secondary memory'.[19]

Another example of the transmission and transformation of family stories involves a narrow escape. Ida recounted her father's story of a time he was supposed to go over a bridge, but felt he should not. She stated that 'later that same day many, I do not know whether it exploded or [what, but] many people were killed on that bridge'. Nenad described the same episode:

> They killed that guy in front of me. When I was coming back from work. There was one little bridge, towards this house of mine, where the number two tram turns. And the sniper always shot here, on this bridge. And now I stood by that bridge. I never liked to run across a road when many people were running. Many people run, you know, it will hit someone, and with the luck I have, it will hit me. Instead, you know, I always wait somehow to be alone. And I said okay, I will wait. And I waited, and waited, and waited there. And as I waited to pass, only a 'swoosh' [sound of a shell] and 'boom' [sound of an explosion].

The daughter had correctly caught her father's intense emotional experience, the sense that he had once again escaped death only by chance mixed with the horror of witnessing the death of a man who just a minute before had been standing beside him. Yet some salient details in her version differed; for example, the solitary man who lost his life became 'many people'. Moreover, her father's customary strategy for crossing the local bridge, which happened to save him that day, was transformed in her account into his intuition of particular danger. In the daughter's version, her father had an almost magical, even godlike, foreknowledge that saved him, while in his version death was random.[20] This shift might reflect the general tendency of children to imagine their parents as omnipotent and invulnerable, which provides them with a sense of security while growing up. Perhaps these parents, who valued decisions based

on knowledge and unbiased inquiry, had tried to protect their children from—or had no way of telling them about—the randomness of fatalities during the siege.[21] Given the difficulty of communicating the intermittency of violence and their own vulnerability, many parents try to avoid 'burdening' their children by sharing their experiences of war.

The parents' accounts often included comments about their relationships with people with whom they shared, or from whom they received, food. They also conveyed their disappointment when people whom they thought would help did not do so and their delight when others assisted them unexpectedly. Nenad recounted numerous examples of people who helped him by sending food parcels from Belgrade, and one aunt who, inexplicably and distressingly, failed to do so. A man whom he knew from his student days and a man from Japan whom the couple had befriended before the war had managed to send parcels through the local church, as his aunt could well have done. People helped the family with the documents, permits and passports needed to leave and paid for their places in a convoy. During the siege, Sarajevans told me of receiving help unexpectedly, as well as their disappointment in people they had trusted. The main point was always the same: in war, people's true character is revealed.[22]

Stories of hardship were complemented by stories of triumphantly overcoming difficulties. One story that was particularly important to this couple, which they both told me, was when Nenad managed to call Vesna in Sweden by phone from Sarajevo. His boss and business partner had an ingenious idea of making small telephone central exchanges use the few and expensive satellite connections that existed in the town. He sold this idea to an important state institution and a large industrial firm, and while they were installing or repairing these connections he managed to make free calls to Sweden under the pretext of having 'to check whether the connection is working properly'. Nenad's story is more detailed and contains dramatic moments that could have jeopardised his attempt to put through a call, but both he and Vesna expressed pride in his and his partner's ingenuity, as well as amazement over the abnormal situation that made an otherwise simple thing such a feat.[23]

As these examples reveal, parents turn the most dramatic events into family stories. For children without any wartime experiences of their own, these stories form their knowledge of the siege. While some aspects become more dramatic and others are omitted, the emotional values of the stories are transmitted to the children. When children recount

what they know about their parents' experiences, however, they express mainly respect and shock, while their parents display humour, joy, anger and sorrow as well. Moreover, children interpret their parents' stories through their own experiences and context. Thus, seeing the traces left behind by exploding shells helps children imagine their parents' experiences of war, forming secondary experiences and memories.

Leaving the Besieged Town

Some of the family's most dramatic stories concerned their efforts to flee the besieged town. While Daniela did not know anything about her parents' experience of leaving, Ida talked about it in vague terms:

> It was a rather complicated situation. And in the end they managed to get everyone … out of Sarajevo … to leave Sarajevo, by some truck or whatever it was. They put themselves on some kind of a list somewhere. I do not know, I heard something that the UN was supposed to help somehow, but that it didn't and in the end it turned out, somehow, that it did not do anything good, though I do not know exactly what and how.

Ida mixed together different family stories, and the facts were not exact. But she grasped the process of getting their names put on a list and undertaking perilous journeys through the siege lines, as well as the sentiments conveyed by her parents' stories. She also knew that their attempt to get her mother out of the town with the help of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had failed. The daughter's story ended there, but both parents told me that while returning from the UNHCR offices they had a close brush with death.

'We could have got killed that time,' Vesna said. As it was a long way into town, they started hitch-hiking. But massive shelling hit a nearby market, and they saw cars speeding along what was called Sniper Alley with bloody bodies hanging out of them. When a car stopped they jumped in, but immediately realised that the driver and his companion were members of an extreme Croat nationalist militia. The men asked them about their nationality, but as their names sounded Christian they did not bother them. The couple were terrified, but the men let them off at a crossroads near their home.

In addition to this dramatic episode, Vesna's account of trying to leave Sarajevo included her family's failed attempt to get help through a

local war thug. Both she and Nenad told me how he eventually managed to put her on a list for 'the last' Red Cross convoy with sick people leaving the town after her father's colleague provided her with a fake diagnosis of a serious illness. Recounting her 20 hour journey meant reliving the horror, fear and sorrow she had felt, as well as the perilous but essential act of taking matters into her own hands, which took an emotional toll that Vesna found surprising. Nenad, too, told me about his dangerous escape attempts, which nobody else in the family mentioned, as well as his long journey through numerous checkpoints. Significantly, the children did not mention, and probably did not know about, their parents' most frightening experiences while trying to leave the siege.

The importance of the story of the failed attempt to leave the town with UN help has been transmitted to Ida, but its meaning and emotional quality had been transformed. While the parents expressed contempt for the UN and its officials, the elder daughter described its failure matter-of-factly. But she understood that this failure could have had fatal consequences for her parents: 'And I know that there was a massacre, in … What was the name of the place?' Thinking that she meant one of the massacres in Sarajevo that finally provoked world opinion to press for the ending of hostilities, I asked, 'On a market, or … ?' 'No,' she replied, 'in another town. Something "Srebrnica", something.' 'Ah! In Srebrenica,' I said. 'Yes,' she confirmed. 'That it was really there, that many people were killed … I really don't know any more … I mean, it has passed, what, twenty years, and it is still very … very … The subject is still not … It is still very much a taboo.' The association between the UN failing her parents in particular and the people of Bosnia more generally by permitting a genocide suggests the scale of her parents' negative emotions towards the UN. While the emotional scale is accurately transmitted, the content is transformed in accordance to Ida's own understanding of the UN's moral obligations. In her moral universe, the failure to help a young couple exit the siege does not seem massive enough to cause such indignation, but a failure to prevent a genocide is.

This shared family opinion of the UN's betrayal goes hand in hand with their outspoken view that you need to take responsibility for your own life and cannot depend on others. Had they relied on the UN or Bosnian politicians, they would live today as people in Sarajevo do: in a country that does not function, with almost 50% unemployment, a low standard of living and an undemocratic political system plagued by national animosity. This assessment is entirely compatible with cherishing

all those people, whether family, friends or colleagues, who helped the parents accomplish their plans. But nothing would have happened without their own efforts and capacities.

While the parents were still angry and cynical towards the UN, Ida was engaged in efforts to assist refugees, and her parents were proud of her activism. She was also very concerned about nationalistic and neo-Nazi movements in Europe today. Parental values have been transmitted, but their anger and cynicism have been transformed into altruism and solidarity. Natan Kellerman has reported that, in a similar way, the children of Holocaust survivors are not simply hampered by their parents' experiences; their secondary experiences could also be a source of strength.[24]

Another constructive consequence of the parents' experience is the daughters' strong commitment to do well in their own work, currently as students and soon as professionals. The motivation, in the children's eyes, is a good standard of living and all the choices and freedom that this brings. Their parents stand as living exemplars of the advantages of education. Their parents' guidance on how to solve problems and overcome obstacles in life serves as an example for them to follow. As their parents were successful professionals even before the war, this capacity would have been transmitted to the daughters in any case. However, the children accept their parents' success in overcoming their war experiences and fleeing to a country where they knew almost no one and had to start again from scratch as unquestionable evidence that they held the right values.

The 'Unnecessary' Siege

While talking about what she knew about the siege through her parents' experiences, Ida spoke more quietly than usual, sensitively and carefully, almost as if she were handling something fragile. Was it, perhaps, out of respect for the impossibility of imagining life during the war, despite the palpable evidence of shell explosions on the city's surfaces? Both during and after the siege, Sarajevans described the almost surreal quality of life in the town.[25] This sense of incomprehensibility has been passed on to a generation born far from Sarajevo. Ida concluded tiredly that the war had been 'unnecessary'.

When explaining to me why she did not know more about the war, Ida said that her parents did not talk a lot about it, because they did

not want to give the daughters an oversimplified picture of something so complicated. She thought that the war was still a sensitive subject for her parents, so she was reluctant to ask them much. 'But I am interested. I will find out,' she said confidently. 'I can look up things myself now.' A moment later, she admitted, 'But I do not know where to start.'

Vesna told me that she deliberately did not tell her daughters anything about the war when they were younger, and even now she lets them form their own understanding of the situations they encounter while visiting Bosnia. She realizes that, as her daughters grow older, they discuss certain topics that they previously had not, but mostly in general terms and informed by the situation in Sweden. The parents have told the children some 'anecdotes', she said, mostly during long drives from Sarajevo to the Croatian coast during summer holidays. Her daughters sometimes got angry at their parents for not telling them more: 'Why do we not know this? Why haven't you told us?' Vesna was curious, though, about what they might have conveyed to their children 'indirectly', 'without being conscious of doing it', as she put it.

Nenad said that he did not tell his daughters stories about his lucky escapes from death:

> I do not know whether there is a need and a reason [*pause*]. Perhaps there is. One needs to know what had happened in order to be able to go on. On the other hand, why should I burden them with some things? Let them live their own lives, and if at some point it will be necessary to sit down and talk, we will talk, like, how it was, how it will be.

Almost without taking a breath, however, he angrily described the war as motivated exclusively by greed for power and money:

> I definitely think that the whole war down there is crazy and so idiotically organised. Like, here they say that it is a war on a religious basis, that there are different peoples/national groups [*narodi*]. That is an empty story for fools [*šuplja priča*]. I mean, that is so simplified, all that. There are only two reasons. That is, rule and money. So someone has the power and in that way provides for themselves; they steal the money to provide for themselves.

His anger at this pervasive greed and at the false explanations of the war has been transformed into Ida's quiet and sorrowful assessment of the war as 'unnecessary'. Neither of his daughters clearly expressed his view that the war was about power and money.

Reorienting Priorities as a Consequence of the Siege

When I asked Ida whether she thought that the war had any influence on her family, she said that her parents did not care much about material things or petty conflicts with unimportant people; they valued family much more, as well as the close friends whom they treated like family. They also developed a more open and accepting understanding of other people's choices during the war, not excusing them, but rather understanding why they acted in ways that they themselves would not have. This enabled them to maintain relationships with some relatives.

Nenad explained, 'There are two good things about war. Everything else is bad … One good thing about the war is that you see who is who. People show their real faces. And the other thing that is good with war is that things come into perspective. What is important, what is less important.' He offered numerous examples of material things that were destroyed in the war but did not really matter. He also argued that it is useless being stressed at work and thinking only about what one might have done or might have had rather than appreciating what one has. It was easy to fall into this trap in Sweden, he felt, which led to constant dissatisfaction.

Nenad's and Ida's accounts of the positive consequences of wartime experiences concurred: the war brought a broader understanding of other people, a sense of the special value of friends and of social and emotional ties with relatives, and it set priorities straight—no materialism, no petty quarrels.

When I asked Nenad whether he was concerned about what his daughters might think or was anxious that they do not get any episode 'wrong', he told me about his mother's relatives who live in Serbia and whom they visit regularly. One of his mother's brothers, whom he liked a lot, turned out to have been an officer in the Serbian army during the war in Bosnia. Nenad had been troubled by this fact, but after a lot of thinking concluded that this part of the family could not help becoming indoctrinated by wartime Serbian media propaganda. He also remembered, that as a child he had seen, and thought absurd, a national Romantic painting hanging in his Serbian relative's home of an ancestor who had 'heroically' died after slaughtering twenty Turkish soldiers. But then he added that, although his dear uncle was indoctrinated, some of his female cousins organised demonstrations in Serbia against the war in Bosnia and one of them was nearly arrested. He concluded:

All people are not the same. [Some say that] on the one side of Drina all are *Četnici* [Chetniks, derogatory term for Serbian nationalists], on the other side of Drina all are *Balije* [derogatory term for Muslims]. It is not like that. Everyone is for oneself alone and everyone decides for oneself how to relate to oneself, and to the others, and to one's surroundings. Absolutely. There is no question about that. I have my opinions about that war; perhaps they are good, perhaps they are bad, but they are mine. And so, I can talk with everyone.

His answer points to the complexity of the war and of peoples' reasons for making particular choices. This knowledge has been transmitted to, and understood by, Ida.

His statement also displays his convictions regarding personal responsibility for one's attitudes and choices, which was clearly transmitted to his daughters. Another life strategy that the daughters learned from their parents, despite their anger over the war's destruction of their way of life, is rationality and trust in well-grounded knowledge. As their father said:

So much insanity in all of it … That is madness, complete madness. And for whom? For a few idiots who went and drew maps and divided [the whole country]. Milošević and Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović [the nationalistic leaders of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, respectively]. Altogether, all three of them. And Kučan [Slovene president during the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia] nicely said, this cannot work. And he was right. Had they listened to the Slovenes this shit would not have happened. If they had listened to that Ante Marković [the last Yugoslav federal prime minister]. The man was an engineer. He came [and said]: we have a problem. This is how the problem is solved. Let's work. But no. The herd [*stoka*] needed a cowboy [*čoban*] to tell them what to do. I don't know. Two per cent. Two per cent of the votes [went to the non-nationalist party of Ante Marković]. I cannot get over it.

Nationalism and Nostalgia Before and After the Siege

Although Daniela's school class had discussed how fear can make people seek security in group belonging, they had not specifically studied the Bosnian War. Nonetheless, she had some ideas about how nationalism shaped the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. She knew that after President Tito's death politicians could not agree on how to divide territories into new countries and that this was the cause of the war. Her

father's anger at the three main nationalist politicians seems to have convinced her that they were the culprits who caused the war.

By age 18, Ida had been exposed to more information in school. She had learned about 'Greater Serbia' and the beginning of the First World War. However, she recognised Swedish bias in the portrayal of these events, as the organisation that lay behind the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo was called 'terrorist'. She also objected to the former Yugoslavia's long-term president being called a 'dictator'. Her father's contempt for nationalism was expanded to contempt for simplistic historical and political interpretations.

Both daughters maintain that their parents encourage them to think logically and independently, and to formulate opinions only after collecting information and asking people about their experiences and attitudes. Ida thought that, although the former Yugoslavia was not perfect, with a one-party system and Communism, the country functioned and life there had been good. All this stands in stark contrast to Bosnia and Hercegovina today. This 'Yugonostalgic' view is shared by almost all pre-war Sarajevans, whether they were children, youths or grown-ups, and whether they left, stayed or returned.[26]

Although memories of the lives they had lost did not hamper members of this family, they did cause the parents anger and deep and unhealed sorrow. Vesna only displayed clear anger once, when I asked her how she related to the war:

> That was also very hard for me, that someone took my country, which I loved very much. They took my identity. Somebody decided that that identity does not exist anymore. Since I come from a mixed marriage, I was a Yugoslav. I really felt like a Yugoslav. I mean, there existed no other option for me. And I was very proud of my Yugoslavness and that somebody should that simply take it from me … that was a loss. That was a big loss for me. And it took me a long time to make some kind of new identity, and I still cannot really.

This huge loss of identity is something that all Sarajevans who left the town as grown-ups have reported on many occasions, sometimes with anger and sometimes in sorrow.

Like his wife, Nenad was deeply upset by national divisions in Bosnia today. He told me the names—Croatian, Serbian and Muslim—of his

closest friends and business partners at the outbreak of the war who were now living in Zagreb and in Canada. 'Well if that was a *ključ*, I really know nothing,' he concluded with frustrated laughter. The former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Hercegovina, had a quota system called *ključ* by which all national groups had a right to equal representation in governing and administrative bodies. Proponents of nationalism have suggested that the quota system was an artificial way of showing that all peoples were justly represented, while in fact some national groups were discriminated against and the national blending of the population was merely a Communist myth. Nenad's anger and agitation were a reaction to this nationalistic attitude, because his example showed that people actually did mix. 'It was a natural *ključ*,' he reiterated. 'People found each other and worked together. There were absolutely no problems. What problem did they have to make business together? There was no problem for us to socialise. There were many like this, and like that. All nice, good people. I mean.' He paused. 'Terrible. I simply cannot get over it.'

Then he spoke about the assumption, which he often encountered in Sweden, that the war was based on religion. After some ironic comments about the unimportance of religion in his life, he told me about Vesna's grandfather, who was an Orthodox priest in Banja Luka (one of Bosnia's larger cities, now in Republika Srpska) after the Second World War. 'Every morning he, his colleague *fratar* [Catholic Gray Friar], who lived next door, and their colleague *imam* [Muslim priest], every morning they drank coffee together. The three of them. After the Second World War.' He reiterated this description several times. 'I say, the hell, if, after the Second World War, when the Communists won, were in power, and all, the three of them could all sit and drink coffee, why should not people do the same now?' He continued: 'And then they say, here they tell me that this is a religious war. Come on.' He paused. 'It is such a joke that it is unbelievable. The time that it will take that country to recuperate is a catastrophe. It is … [*pause*] It is a historical mistake.'

The children do not share this sense of tremendous loss. In this family it has been transformed into an understanding of and respect for the parents' need to reconnect with family and people in Sarajevo. The children imagine that life in the former Yugoslavia was good, but their life experiences and opportunities in Sweden exceed anything they see in Bosnia and Hercegovina today.

Conclusion

Focusing on the family of one couple that lived through the siege has allowed me to analyse the transmission and transformation of their experiences to their children—their daughters born in Sweden. This family's experiences, choices and attitudes, although in some respects unique, have much in common with the majority of families in Sweden with experiences of the Sarajevan siege.

The emotional charge in the parents' stories conveys to the children that what is being said is of existential importance. However, the content of what is told changes, and the focus shifts in the children's understanding in accordance with their own lives and experiences. In Sweden, international solidarity, anti-racism and altruism are promoted as morally correct attitudes, even though today the social-democratic government is under pressure to stop the influx of refugees and nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments are gaining ground. Daniela's understanding of nationalism as the malign force behind the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia is thus congruent with the Swedish middle-class urban context. Ida's awareness of different perspectives and biases, and the need that both daughters feel to think for themselves, have been promoted both by their parents and by the Swedish school system. Nenad did not wish to communicate to his daughters his view that power and money were responsible for the conflict, because questions of what caused the war—and thus moral responsibility for it—are still highly politicised in Bosnia and Hercegovina today. At the same time, the daughters' understanding that the picture they are given in Sweden is false and simplistic, and that nationalism is stupid and prejudiced, was transmitted without transformation from their parents. The daughters' absorption of this view was facilitated by the predominance of tolerance and democracy over nationalism in contemporary Swedish political discourse.

Some of the emotional qualities attached to the parents' attitudes have, however, been transformed by the daughters. The parents' anger and sorrow has become the daughters' interest and sense that they should know more, coupled with their respect and internationalist engagement. The parents' references to Sarajevo, Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia have been widened to encompass the global arena their daughters were raised in—not only because their only two cousins live in Australia and because Sarajevans today are to be found worldwide, but also because of Sweden's international orientation.

At the same time, other emotions and some specific facts have been partly lost or transformed. The violence, destruction and precariousness of life during the siege loom larger and are more dramatic in the daughters' stories than the parents'. Parts of stories that were absurd and humorous are missing from the daughters' stories, as is the parents' sense of utter helplessness and the irrationality of destruction.

If we compare these findings with Kalina Yordanova's research in post-war Sarajevo and Carol Kidron's studies of the children of Cambodians in Canada and of European Jews in Israel, we can see both some shared and some distinct phenomena.[27] One common phenomenon is the appearance of 'family stories', in which emotionally charged experiences are often turned into moral lessons and existential attitudes. The transformation of parents' direct experiences into generic, yet more dramatic, 'secondary memories' of children is another general phenomenon. Many differences between these cases are due to differing post-conflict situations and the contexts in which the children grow up. Refugees' children in Sweden enjoy more favourable circumstances than those in Canada, Israel, and Bosnia and Hercegovina. Not only is the social welfare system advantageous, even for newcomers, but some key political values were easily transferred from pre-war Bosnia and Hercegovina to contemporary Sweden. In Canada, Cambodian refugees occupy poorer socioeconomic positions, while in contemporary Bosnia and Hercegovina social solidarity and respect for differences are almost extinguished.

The nature of the conflict has an effect as well. In both Israel and Bosnia and Hercegovina, the constant presence of nationalist unrest and threats of violence create an unstable political and existential context. In Sarajevo, since the war, many organisations have engaged in helping people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), so one of the few ways of providing for one's subsistence has been to stress the disabling symptoms that the war had caused, thus encouraging parents to hold on to the traumatic side of their war experiences. In contrast, not only is Sweden a stable country, but even parents with PTSD have tried to minimise the symptoms, and their traumatic past has not been transmitted to their children as 'secondary traumatisation'. Yordanova's study in Sarajevo shows remarkably higher levels of both parents' PTSD and children's secondary traumatisation than in families with comparable experiences of adversity that I have studied in Sweden.

Another important difference is the nature of post-conflict contact with the country of origin. Here, the Swedish case is unique: families travel regularly and relatively frequently to the parents' places of origin. Parents' nostalgia and children's fantasies are corrected by confronting the Bosnian reality. Both parents and children appreciate the warmth and close relatedness to other people that still exists in Bosnia, but the drawbacks, such as poverty and nationalism, are much stronger, which keeps them firmly grounded in Sweden. Comparison with the stark disillusionment of Palestinian children described by Gatrell shows the importance of the nature of transnational post-war contacts.[28]

Ultimately, however, the nature of the conflict that the parents lived through—a prolonged siege over several years—generated a process of disillusionment, from the first phase of bewilderment and spite towards 'primitivism', through the normalisation of violence and discrimination, to an insight that the life they were used to had been forever lost. This context helped to shape both the transmission of memories to their children and the transformations that those memories would undergo.

NOTES

1. UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia, *Information Notes on Former Yugoslavia*, 8/94 (1984).
2. Ivana Maček, *Sarajevo under Siege: Anthropology in Wartime* (Philadelphia, 2009), 86.
3. For the explanation of the term 'ethnonational' and the relation between national, ethnic and religious belonging and identification in Sarajevo, see Maček, *Sarajevo*, 124. The Dayton Peace Agreement recognised three national groups as constitutive in Bosnia and Hercegovina: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
4. Around 40,000 refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina came to Sweden in the early 1990s. On the difficulties of returning to Bosnia and Hercegovina, see Stef Jansen, 'Troubled Locations: Return, the Life Course and Transformation of Home in Bosnia-Herzegovina', in *Struggles for Home: Violence, Hope and the Movement of People*, ed. Stef Jansen and Staffan Löfving (Oxford, 2008), 43–64. On returns from Sweden, see Melita Čukur, 'Dilemmas of Return—Two Anthropological Case Studies', in *Returning Home: An Evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ed. Melita Čukur, Kjell Magnusson, Joakim Molander and Hans Skotte (Stockholm, 2005), 47–100; Marita Eastmond, 'Beyond Exile: Refugee Strategies in

Transnational Contexts', in *Forced Migration and Global Processes: A View from Forced Migration Studies*, ed. F. Cre´peau, D. Nakache and M. Collyer (Lanham, Maryland, 2006), 217–236. On returns to Sarajevo, see Anders H. Stefansson, 'Refugee Returns to Sarajevo and their Challenge to Contemporary Narratives of Mobility', in *Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stayed Behind*, ed. Lynnelyn D. Long and Ellen Oxfeld (Philadelphia, 2004), 170–186. Note, though, that this decade-old research describes the choice to return or stay as an open-ended process of keeping open as many options as possible. My contemporary materials from Sweden show a different kind of dynamic: people have chosen Sweden as their permanent place of residence, while their short visits and longer stays in Bosnia and Hercegovina are predominantly of a social nature. Several excellent ethnographic accounts of life in post-siege Sarajevo give a more substantial picture of its current problems and the reasons why it compares mostly unfavourably to life in Sweden in the eyes of my interlocutors: Ioannis Armakolas, 'Sarajevo No More? Identity and the Sense of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in *Republika Srpska*', in *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society*, ed. Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings (Aldershot, 2007), 79–100; Anders H. Stefansson, 'Urban Exile: Locals, Newcomers and the Cultural Transformation of Sarajevo', in *New Bosnian Mosaic*, 59–78; Fran Markowitz, *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope* (Urbana, 2010); Elissa Helms, *Innocence and Victimhood: Gender, Nation, and Women's Activism in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Madison, 2013); Keziah Conrad, 'Dwelling in the Place of Devastation: Transcendence and the Everyday in Recovery from Trauma', *Anthropological Theory* 14 (2014): 74–91; and Stef Jansen, *Yearnings in the Meantime: 'Normal Lives' and the State in a Sarajevo Apartment Complex* (Oxford, 2015). See also writer Aleksandar Hemon's account: 'Izvještaj o posjeti Potomstva Sarajevu (A Report from Offspring's Visit to Sarajevo)', 9 May 2009, http://pescanik.net/izvjestaj-o-posjeti-potomstva-sarajevu/ (accessed 14 June 2009).

5. I focus here on some typical experiences of the siege of Sarajevo, but without attempting to cover it in all its complexity. My book, *Sarajevo*, presents a full ethnography.

6. Kalina Georgieva Yordanova, 'Intergenerational Transmission of Traumatic Experience in the Families of War Survivors from Bosnia and Herzegovina', PhD diss. (University College London, 2014).

7. On the importance of context and memory in 'stories' and personal narratives, see Marita Eastmond, 'Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (2007): 248–64.

8. Maček, *Sarajevo*, 89–91.

9. For a popular joke about this, see ibid., 168.
10. Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo* (Ithaca, 2008); Maček, *Sarajevo*, 66–8, 79, 81–2, 84, 98.
11. Maček, *Sarajevo*, 27.
12. My ethnography of the Sarajevan siege is filled with examples of the precarious, yet possible, communication channels with the outer world.
13. Maček, *Sarajevo*, 89–95.
14. Vesna and Nenad are pseudonyms. Like many other pre-war Sarajevans, my interlocutors were fierce opponents of nationalism, and they did not think that their ethnonational background in any way defined them. One of the possible ways of determining ethnonational background, however, was through names. In this sense the pseudonyms I have chosen reflect their real names, which had some importance during the siege.
15. For transmission and transformation of memories of the siege in Sarajevo, see Cornelia Sorabji, 'Managing Memories in Postwar Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.)* 2 (2006): 1–18.
16. On how precious water and a hot shower were, see Maček, *Sarajevo*, 64–6, 70–2.
17. For the life-sustaining importance of humour during the siege see ibid., 51–4. See also Srdjan Vucetic, 'Identity is a Joking Matter: Intergroup Humour in Bosnia', *Spaces of Identity: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 3 (2004): 1–28.
18. In contrast, for young people in present-day Sarajevo who yearn for a better future and life opportunities, these holes, filled with red colour after the war in order to commemorate the shelling of the city Together with commemorative plaques, are mostly a source of irritation; they symbolise being stuck in the past, in the war that they feel was not theirs and remains a major obstacle to a better future.
19. I propose the term 'secondary memory' because it captures well the phenomenon of transmitting memories of events to family members who did not experience them directly, in the same way as the term 'secondary traumatisation' captures the transmission of trauma within families. The term 'postmemory' carries the same sense; coined by literary scholar Marianne Hirsch in *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (Cambridge, 1997), it has been used extensively. I propose to reserve 'postmemory' for broader phenomena, including the social and cultural context in which the understanding and remembrance of the past is negotiated, rather than using it within the limited family context.
20. On the randomness of dangers and irrational strategies for trying to ignore them, see Maček, *Sarajevo*, 31–51.
21. Nenad told me several other stories about incidents when he miraculously avoided dangers that his family members did not mention.

22. For similar stories and observations during the siege, see Maček, *Sarajevo*, 62–89.
23. On inventiveness and pride during the siege, see ibid., 70–8.
24. Natan P.F. Kellermann, 'Psychopathology in Children of Holocaust Survivors: A Review of the Research Literature', *Israel Journal of Psychiatry & Related Sciences* 38 (1984): 36–46.
25. Maček, *Sarajevo*, 89.
26. For more about Yugonostalgia during the siege, see ibid., 171.
27. Carol A. Kidron, 'Silent Legacies of Trauma: A Comparative study of Cambodian Canadian and Israeli Holocaust Trauma Descendant Memory Work', in *Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on Intergenerational Transmission*, ed. Nicolas Argenti and Katharina Schramm (New York and Oxford, 2010), 193–228; Yordanova, 'Intergenerational Transmission'.
28. Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford, 2013), 118–47.

'This Did not Happen': Survivors of the Siege of Leningrad (1941–1944) and the 'Truth About the Blockade'

Alexandra Wachter

The German decision to besiege rather than conquer Leningrad, and the Soviet decision to hold the city at any cost, resulted in one of the greatest human catastrophes of the Second World War.[1] Estimates are that at least one out of three million civilians[2] fell victim to starvation between 8 September 1941 and 27 January 1944; only a minority of these civilian casualties were caused by illness, bombing or shelling. Living conditions during the blockade of Leningrad, especially in the first winter under siege, have been compared to living conditions in Nazi concentration camps. Not only the scale of death and deprivation, but also the sense of alienation, exposure and disintegration of social and psychological processes, justify such a comparison.

A major difference, however, lies in the fact that the experience in concentration camps (and battlefields) was spatially separated from the habitual living spaces of inmates (or soldiers), while the siege brought

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the life-changing experience into the streets of a 'normal' city, and into the private homes of its inhabitants. The violence, in short, became domestic. Liudmila P., a survivor of the siege who, at the age of 84, agreed to be interviewed for my research in 2009, described this change in her spatial perception:

> Then, before the war, Leningrad was just a city. People lived here, spent time at different places, somewhere they lived, somewhere they studied, somewhere they went to school, worked and bought food. But then the situation changed dramatically, and these familiar places turned into another kind of place. And it no longer felt like an ordinary city, it was a totally different setting.[3]

Even when the siege was lifted and the city was restored to its pre-war splendour, Leningrad remained the place where at least a million civilians had died, or almost died, and who continued to live with very unsettling memories:

> And the people, who experienced extremely painful things here … And then they restored the city, but I think that for those who lived through it, it could no longer be the city that it had been before. Because those various locations, they were now [connected] with totally different … [Alexandra Wachter: Memories?] Yes. You walk along and you think: 'Here this and this happened.' *Blokadniki* [siege survivors] have a very peculiar memory, because everything is being projected onto the past, you remember everything. And you keep quiet about it, because after all, life moves on, and you don't want to burden anybody with it.[4]

For surviving Leningraders, site and event remained bound to each other, which meant a horrifying if fascinating concentration of traumatic memory.

Much has been written about trauma in connection with the Holocaust, its effect on survivors and their descendants. And no less has been written about the siege of Leningrad; but on the whole, Holocaust and blockade narratives are fundamentally different. The story that is told in Soviet and post-Soviet literature, historiography and collections of survivors' memoirs is not one of disintegration and trauma; it is a coherent story of a critical moment in history that was heroically mastered and eventually turned into a happy ending.[5] The handful of published accounts that are able to convey the impact of the 'other' experience on human perception, behaviour and emotions are little

known to the majority of survivors and are met with little sympathy by their official representatives.[6] Although survivors' organisations support the notion that the blockade was akin to concentration camps,[7] and have included more critical facts into their narratives over recent decades, they still essentially adhere to the grand narrative, thereby denying the possibility of any long-term psychological effect of the experienced past. This becomes particularly apparent at times when changing political agendas might have allowed for alternative ways of narrating the past, namely during the thaw and in the decade between 1985 and 1995—the time of *perestroika* and the first post-Soviet years.

   This chapter draws on research that I conducted in St. Petersburg between 2005 and 2011, namely oral history interviews with child and adolescent survivors, participant observation at official and semi-official gatherings, and written accounts from the collection of the manuscript section of the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg. I give a short outline of the siege of Leningrad and its commemoration, and argue that while the persistence of 'old' patterns might partly be due to a long-standing and trusted habit, it also testifies to the conflicting needs of survivors—to break the officially imposed silence, to see their siege experience recognised by the state and society, to make sense of the past, and to protect themselves from threatening memories. My focus is hereby not on the politics of remembrance as pursued by survivors' organisations,[8] but rather on the 'predetermined breaking point', when clashes between the 'grand narrative' and personal memories create fear, tension and emotional confusion.

Civilians Under Siege in Leningrad, 1941–1944

In the summer of 1941, the German Army was approaching Leningrad. The lack of reliable information made it extremely difficult for Leningraders to decide whether they should leave the city or stay. The threat was both underestimated and played down. Many decided to stay, especially after an ill-fated evacuation of children to places that were soon after overrun by the advancing enemy. A large proportion of those trapped when the city was surrounded on 8 September 1941 were therefore old people, women who replaced conscripted men in the workforce, and about 400,000 children.[9]

   Soviet publications tend to level the siege experience by swiftly talking about 'the 900 days' and the 125 grams of bread per day, but in fact

living conditions varied significantly in different phases and for different people.[10] The supply situation deteriorated gradually in autumn 1941, until food rations were no longer suitable for survival in December. The city was also left without electricity, transport, sewerage and regular heating. People continued to work as long as they were physically able to, many out of necessity (workers were entitled to higher food rations than dependants or children), and people started to drop dead on their way to work, in bread queues, in factories and offices. As relatives often did not have the strength to take the deceased to a cemetery, corpses lay in flats, courtyards and streets, or were stacked at certain collection points. The occurrence of cannibalism was covered up in Soviet times, but most survivors have at least heard of such cases, or seen human corpses with pieces of flesh cut out.[11] Lidiia Ginzburg gives a concise description of the transformation of the emaciated in this phase of the siege:

> Siege man of autumn'41 was replaced by the man of winter'41–'42. Here is the man walking along the street during shelling … The possibility of being killed is present in this man's mind, but his immediate sensation is hunger, more precisely the fear of hunger, and his hungry urgency, blindly intent on its goal.[12]

During the 'frozen state of dystrophy' (that is, muscle shrinkage due to malnutrition), many people were unable to feel fear; doctors in Leningrad's psychiatric hospitals described a variety of changes in personality and behaviour and called it 'psychosis of emaciation' or 'dystrophic psychosis'.[13] Not everybody was able to live up to the proclaimed moral standards and, in extreme cases, such transformations resulted in criminal acts that could even be directed towards family members.

But the exceptionally low temperatures in winter 1941–1942 also promised salvation: an ice-road was set up across Lake Ladoga in mid-November 1941, and operated until late April 1942. This provided the city with a minimum of food and allowed for the gradual evacuation of civilians to the mainland. When the ice melted, lorries were replaced by ships. In the course of 1942 food supplies slightly improved, fewer civilians had to be fed, and starvation stopped being the main cause of death.

When existence was no longer reduced to what has been called 'bare life' or 'minimal life', emotions began to return.[14] Some people were the only ones left of their entire family, many children had been found barely alive among dead relatives, and some had witnessed the psychological

transformation of their trusted parents, often an experience more terrifying than the endured hardships and losses. With improving living conditions stress levels rose, and with them the occurrence of hypertension, which reached epidemic proportions in 1942.[15] The frequency of this diagnosis suggests that mental strain did not lessen, but merely changed its character.

When Soviet forces managed to open a corridor into the city in January 1943, a railway line ensured better supplies, and the civilians remaining in Leningrad tried to regain some sense of normality. The local party leadership exhorted them to hold on, and almost anything they volunteered or were ordered to do was interpreted as a contribution to the city's defence: working, studying well, performing music for soldiers or planting vegetables. Negative moods amongst the population were monitored by the NKVD, and severely punished.

Silence and Trauma

After the lifting of the siege, Leningraders were expected to rebuild the city with the same enthusiasm with which—according to the official version—they had defended it.[16] As during the siege, local propaganda drew on local pride in the city. An exhibition that opened in 1944 demonstrated their heroic deeds and was turned into the National Museum of the Defence of Leningrad a year later.[17] In May 1945, Leningrad was among the first four cities to be awarded the title Hero City (Fig. 3.1). But soon the leadership in Moscow—weary of the popularity of local party leaders—accused Leningraders of claiming far too special a role in the Great Fatherland War.[18] A visit paid by Georgii Malenkov to the Leningrad regional committee in February 1949 was the prelude to a wave of repression. In the course of the so-called Leningrad Affair, Party officials and the museum's directorate were put on trial and the museum itself was closed to the public.[19] From then on the topic of the blockade was subject to censorship.

This official silence echoed the silence of those who tried to forget. Even today, most survivors shy away from addressing their anguish openly. This reluctance was encouraged in Soviet society, which did not recognise the existence of long-term mental injuries, or classified them as a sign of weakness. Child survivors in particular were often faced with a wall of silence and left alone with their memories by society and adults, who were either traumatised or wanted to protect children. Siege

Fig. 3.1 Vosstaniia Square, St. Petersburg with obelisk (1985) and the title GOROD-GEROI LENINGRAD (Hero City Leningrad) on a roof-top, 2011

orphans in particular were deprived of empathetic assistance. Catriona Kelly quotes an orphanage worker who laid out the principles adopted towards children who had 'suffered terrible experiences during the war', among them the recommendation 'to ask the children no questions whatsoever, to protect them from recollections of what they had lived through'.[20] The nature of trauma worked hand in hand with Soviet propaganda, which alternately presented the siege as a success story or silenced it. This did not necessarily help the process of critically assessing the past and laying ghosts to rest.

Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad

In the era of Khrushchev's thaw, official remembrance gradually developed, and in the late 1950s and 1960s the first monuments to the blockade were put up.[21] Around the same time, predominantly younger

survivors started to gather with former classmates. Like most teenagers and even children, they had been summoned to carry out defence-related or other tasks considered useful by the *Komsomol* and *Mestnaia protivovozdushnaia oborona* (local anti-air defence) organs, and had been subject to massive patriotic education, especially from 1942. In 1943, over 15,000 of these young Leningraders had been awarded the military award 'Medal for the Defence of Leningrad' and were thus considered war heroes along with working adults and soldiers defending the city.

In 1962, bearers of this very medal initiated the erection of a monument to 'Pioneer Heroes' in the Tauris Gardens. The project was actively supported by the Komsomol organisation. Six years later, in 1968, the inauguration of the monument *Tsvetok zhizni* (Flower of Life), which is part of the Green Belt of Glory and dedicated to the children of the siege, marked the birth of the first official blockade survivors' organisation:

> I invited those who were wearing the Pioneers' tie and the badge of the Komsomol during the blockade to come here, where we erected a monument to the children of the city under siege, the Flower of Life. And on the next day, in the 528th room at Smolny, we gathered, and it was then that we decided to found the organisation Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad, to unite all those young heroes who, in the years of the blockade, helped their fathers, mothers to withstand, survive and win: those who, during and after the war, were awarded the highest award of our city, the Medal for the Defence of Leningrad.[22]

These words were spoken by Valerii Selivanov, a former history teacher and Komsomol functionary, by the Flower of Life monument in 2010. Interestingly, Selivanov himself was too young to have been a pioneer hero during the siege, and too young to help his mother and father 'withstand, survive and win'. He was not even two when the war broke out, and lost both his parents shortly thereafter. His interpretation of the historical events can only be based on second-hand information. What is, however, first hand, is the early childhood trauma of losing both parents and growing up in state institutions.

Siege orphans like Selivanov were inevitably subject to intensive Soviet propaganda.[23] Even the country's top-level leadership paid some attention to the patriotic education of siege orphans. The Chairman of the

Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, Andrei Zhdanov, let child evacuees from Leningrad know what the state expected from them:

> TO THE INMATES OF ORPHANAGE No. 17
>
> I wish you, my dear friends in orphanage No. 17, health, success in your studies and in life. I want you to grow dauntless, unreconciled towards enemies, capable of hating them wholeheartedly, with a strong love for our fatherland, and our native Leningrad, in which you walked your first steps in life, and together with which you lived through a difficult, but glorious and unforgettable year of the Great Patriotic War.
>
> Yours, A. Zhdanov.
>
> 7 July 42.[24]

The children's reply demonstrates that the patriotic education was not without effect:

> We live well. Our orphanage is warm, clean and cosy. We eat well. The name of our orphanage is 'Young Patriots'. We are keen to justify this name as much as we can. We learn how to use guns and shells. We paid 18,000 roubles into the Foundation for Victory over the German aggressors.[25]

Small children have to rely on the benevolence of their parents for physical and psychological survival, and in the case of siege orphans the state took this role in the form of ideologically trusted educators. The heroic interpretation guaranteed a certain protection from feelings of despair, a set framework which acted as a kind of life vest for those who had lost everything at an extremely vulnerable age.[26] When the ban on siege memorialisation was lifted during the thaw and the first memories were articulated, young survivors were the first to take the initiative. They wanted to speak and find out about the silenced past. But it turned out that the newly granted freedom also posed a threat to their emotional well-being. So when freedom of speech was gradually replaced by a cult of the war towards the later phase of Khrushchev's rule and under Brezhnev, and the siege was officially discovered as an ideal topic for patriotic education, many young survivors followed the call of youth organisations to participate in the education of future Communists, thereby repeating the propaganda they had been subject to as children.

Selivanov became one of the key figures behind the erection of monuments to child heroes, the foundation of survivors' organisations and initiatives for ideological youth education; a fervent defender of the heroism which, without doubt, he would have liked to display in order to save his parents' lives.

Leningraders, People of Principle

As part of their activities, the Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad turned to the Museum of the History of Leningrad and offered their collaboration. To them, the museum was a surrogate for the National Museum of the Defence of Leningrad, which had left a lasting impression on child survivors and, as we have seen, was closed in 1949 and abolished between 1951 and 1953:

> There was a huge gun, a 'Big Bertha', with a barrel; well I don't know … it was big like that! Us boys, we could climb in. Well, the museum, it was, it really impressed the imagination of a little boy, and it evoked a deep admiration, there were so many halls, and they were huge! And I remember, there was one hall with an aeroplane hanging from the top. And then there was an exhibition, I remember that, I didn't read it, where they piled up helmets, German helmets, and cannons. And then all this was destroyed, that's terrible.[27]

With the destruction of this somewhat idealised museum, the siege narrative that it had propagated was conserved in the minds of many survivors as 'the truth' that must be restored and defended against anybody who tried either to silence the siege or present it in a different light. Leningraders had consigned memories and siege-related objects to the museum during and shortly after the war; items not destroyed in 1953 were transferred to the Museum of the History of Leningrad.[28] While many survivors retreated into private, a number of younger survivors almost obsessively tried to restore this collection, as if they hoped that if only this lost museum could be restored, life would go back to normal.

These activities were somehow dissociated from survivors' personal stories. The same Liudmila P., who did not want to burden anyone with her emotional memories about the siege, became one of the first and most dedicated collectors of items, photographs and written memoirs:

> At first, I even started before that, because I have always been preoccupied by this thought, that something must be done. I went to the museum, … and I have an official document, called *spravka* No. 1. I was the first to come to the museum. I can show you right now, this museum, it says on the paper that I can be 'trusted to collect' items from the blockade, and to hand them over to the museum. And that's what I did. Forty-four of my own things, and I brought many more … And later this *obshchestvo* [organisation] was organised, and I joined it.[29]

The organisation that united like-minded persons, who felt that 'something must be done', offered a suitable platform for Liudmila P.'s activities.

A Sovet sodeistviia muzeia istorii Leningrada (Board of Assistance to the Museum of the History of Leningrad) was founded and survivors started to gather in a small room, which was allocated to them by the museum. Apart from collecting objects, committed Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad also took to collecting memoirs. A collection of these dating from the 1970s and 1980s is stored in the manuscript section of the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg. They might have been intended for publication, but were handed over by the Museum of the History of Leningrad in the late 1980s. What makes them interesting is that they cast light on the dilemma in which younger survivors appeared to be trapped. They were keen to revolt against the silencing of the siege, but in doing so were confronted with threatening details.

The earlier documents date from the 1970s. Most of them have fine-sounding titles and tell model stories, but some also show signs of dispute. Vladimir Daev wrote a text entitled 'Printsipial'nye Leningradtsy' ('Leningraders, People of Principle'), in which he claims that Leningraders met the highest standards of morale, no matter what. He describes an incident in the winter of 1941–1942. While dismantling wooden houses for firewood, he discovered the arm of a dead body in a pile of snow:

> Dropping the rod, I ran away, but then I felt ashamed for my faint-heartedness and turned back. With the help of a wire, I pulled the body of a dead man, who was dressed in a padded jacket, out of the snow. Now he is visible, now they will see him and take him away. This was the only dead body that I saw on the streets of besieged Leningrad, which they had not yet taken away.[30]

However, a note on the edge of the text states: '*Vy oshibaetes*'' ('You are mistaken'). The corrector also disagreed with Daev's further explanation:

It is natural for humans to bury the dead, even enemies. How could Leningraders, who embodied the best qualities of mankind, have cold-bloodedly walked past their deceased fellow citizens? This did not happen.[31]

Again, a comment says: '*Bylo*' ('It did happen'). Daev clearly was not pleased with these remarks, but probably wanted to avoid retyping the rather long account. He solved the problem by adding his own comment, possibly in the hope of discrediting the undesirable remarks:

The notes with a pencil were made by a very fine woman, but nevertheless by a woman (consultant). This will be clear to anybody who reads those notes, even without knowing her. In fact, this is not women's business.[32]

The majority of personal accounts in the collection show the clear influence of propaganda. In accordance with the official narrative, the siege is presented as a difficult time, which was nevertheless mastered by Leningraders due to the virtues they revealed. Some accounts that were written earlier got the right messages attached later. An author who reproduced selected parts of her siege diary, in a 'letter to an unnamed editor', explained that she feels emotionally agitated when re-reading her notes, but does not want to share her emotional experience. Instead, she wants to write about the 'heroic young people, my peers, 15–17-year-old boys and girls who, in the days of the blockade, did everything possible to beat the enemy as fast as possible'.[33] The diary excerpts are accordingly introduced with the appeal to the 'young people of today: to study and work in a way that is worthy of builders of Communism'.[34] Similar appeals can be found in other accounts, revealing a purpose behind this collection that went beyond the wish to preserve the past.

A large number of documents were composed in 1988. It therefore seems likely that the organisation launched an appeal around this time. Some of the collected texts are handwritten, which allows for the observation that a number of accounts bear the same handwriting. We can assume that somebody was trusted with meeting survivors and taking down their stories. Perhaps these survivors did not feel comfortable enough to compose their own piece of writing, and were grateful for assistance, which probably included guidance in the process of recollection and choice of suitable topics.

I Did It All Wrong, Didn't I?

For her own contribution, Liudmila P. chose the topic of siege lessons, a touching description in verse of frozen children who burn with the desire to learn, and a pale teacher, who is full of dedication and love for the children:

> You, little boys and girls of today
> Cannot imagine your peers –
> -little blockade geriatrics, ... who, unlike their successors,
> Came to frozen classrooms every day.
>
> The school...-barricaded windows ...
> A tiny oil lamp smoking on the desk...
> And cold hearts burning with the desire
> To fully grasp the teacher's lesson.
>
> And dear Praskov, our devoted physicist,
> Weakly holding the chalk in his gloved hand,
> In the frigid classroom, blackened by oil lamps
> Tells us about electric arcs…
>
> Our pale teacher, feeble, and dear...
> Caressing heads and scribbling on the blackboard...
> In all his Love, Hope, and Faith, gathered the strength,
> That helped even children withstand the war.
>
> Dear teachers of the siege
> /the task is twice as hard, as tough,
> The award you deserve has not yet been invented.
> May the reward be 'No to war!'[35]

The poem is signed 'Your blockade student-Pishchaleva-Iagdanova'. Asked about her schooling experience during the siege, Liudmila P. pointed out that she was sixteen at the outset of the war, and started to work in 1942 so as to be entitled to a worker's ration card. Being on guard duty in a fire brigade gave her time to study and dream of her future career as a geologist. The story of the pale teacher caressing the heads of presumably smaller schoolchildren is probably not invented outright, but more likely the result of combining memories of an actual teacher with the common theme of model pioneer children and devoted

teachers, which so well suited the Soviet educational programme of the time. By presenting herself as a former schoolgirl, an identity which only marginally corresponded with her actual role during the siege, Liudmila P. strengthened her legitimacy to appeal to contemporary schoolchildren's conscience, while her work in a fire brigade offered less opportunity to do so.

Around the same time, in 1985, and in her function as a 'Member of the Board of Assistance to the Museum of the History of Leningrad of the Pioneer Organisation of the District of Vasil'evskii Island', Liudmila P. also designed a siege-related excursion for children around her native district: 'Vasil'evskii Island at the time of the Great Patriotic War through the eyes of a siege schoolgirl from Vasil'evskii Island'. Again she combined her own (suitable) memories with topics drawn from the official canon, and again she spoke as a former siege schoolchild. Liudmila P. was not fit enough to repeat the walking tour in 2010, so we 'walked' it on a map of the area instead (Fig. 3.2). The tour started at the district's pioneer palace and opened with the topic 'About the continuity of generations', a Soviet notion that implies that a set of ideological ideas is being passed on from one generation to the next—as opposed to a dialogue.[36] Liudmila P. designed each of the twenty-five stops to match a certain theme ('About the beginning of the war', 'About volunteers, citizens in arms, beginning of the siege', 'About schoolchildren in the siege, guarding of rooftops, equipment in attics, bomb shelters, studying', etc.). 'Schoolchildren during the siege', in different variations, acted as a kind of red thread. Liudmila P. stressed that she was both surprised and very delighted at the reaction of her young audience, whom she described as hanging on to her words and asking numerous questions. To her, the children's vivid interest was rewarding in terms of her goal to conduct 'patriotic educational work'. She was also flattered by the attention towards her own person and her identity as a siege survivor, an attention much needed by those who had experienced the silencing of the siege as a secondary traumatisation. And it did not seem to matter that the story that got the attention was a brushed-up version of what Liudmila P. had experienced.

Both her poem and the excursion stand in blatant contrast to the horrifying details Liudmila P. shared during my interview with her. By February 1942, she had witnessed the death through starvation of her four grandparents, her father and her younger brother. She described how the deceased grandmother had been lying on the kitchen table for

Fig. 3.2 Map of Vasil'evskii district with notes by Liudmila P.

ten days, because she was bloated and therefore too big to be buried, and that the corpse of her brother fell out of the improvised coffin made out of a cupboard when the family lowered him into the same grave where they had buried her father the previous day. Her mother could no longer be trusted to pick up the family's daily bread from a bakery, because she was not able to control her urge to nibble on the bread on the way home. And one night, after bringing her dying father to a hospital, Liudmila P. got lost on her way home:

> I got lost, and I ended up in these … dead people were piled up in stacks. And it seemed to me that I walk … and opposite there is another stack … I was in the middle of corpses. I even started climbing up those stacks, I thought to myself, I have to somehow climb over. And there were arms, legs.[37]

After this experience she suffered a psychological breakdown accompanied with a high temperature and was unable to keep the promise she had given to see her father the next day. When she was able to return to the hospital on the third day, her father had died.

Liudmila P. has decades of experience of talking about life under siege to Soviet and post-Soviet children. What she and many other survivors transmitted, however, was not their own experience, but bits of suitable themes, bent to fit the desired narrative and brushed up with model stories of pioneer heroes. When I asked her for an interview, she eagerly agreed, not suspecting, perhaps, that she would enter unknown territory: as a foreign scholar I quite obviously did not have to be taught courage and love for the Russian fatherland, and this seemed to plunge her into confusion. She ended up describing details of her siege life that she would not have told in schools. After the interview she expressed a deep insecurity about whether she had 'done it the right way': 'I did it all wrong, didn't I? All these stories about funerals.'[38]

I had witnessed a similar confusion in Liudmila P. a week earlier. She was spontaneously invited to say a few words at a round table under the title 'Memory Workshops: Bond between Times, Bond between Generations'.[39] After several survivors had presented to a group of young St. Petersburgers and foreigners their obviously well-rehearsed 'performance', Liudmila P., haltingly, started to talk about the funeral of her father and brother, but was soon interrupted by the host of the event who announced that participants would have the opportunity to hear Liudmila P.'s memories from her school days the following week. Afterwards, while walking to the tram station, she said to herself: 'I was so surprised about myself, that I said such a thing. I have never been able to say it before. It really is, so … strange.'[40]

The question of how to transmit her experience is clearly a matter of deep concern to Liudmila P.: 'Since one needs to know some kind of, … we did not study how to do it, they did not teach us, how one should talk. [Pause] Maybe *you* can tell me?'[41] Like Selivanov, Liudmila P. was subject to massive Soviet propaganda at a young age and takes a certain comfort in talking about the siege in the familiar 'Soviet way'. She has always had a strong urge to save the siege from being forgotten and was among the first to collect actively items and memories. But unlike Selivanov, she has her own memories, which pop up when she leaves 'safe grounds' and cannot so easily be dismissed as falsifications of history.

THE SIEGE DECLASSIFIED

Not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 20 to 22 January 1992, a group of 'professional and other experts on the history of the stronghold on the Neva' gathered to discuss historical problems surrounding the Siege of Leningrad. The round-table discussion was organised by the survivors' organization, Inhabitants of Besieged Leningrad. Three years later, in 1995, the results of this meeting were published under the title *Blokada rassekrechennaia* (*The Siege Declassified*),[42] an allusion to the censorship to which research on the siege had been subjected in Soviet times. It was the first publication of a series under the same title, and the most promising. Viktor Demidov, who edited the shorthand report of almost 200 contributions and discussions for publication, stated in the book's foreword that, although thousands of books, articles and memoirs had been written on the Siege of Leningrad, 'we do not yet have a full and clear picture of these events, the tragedy and deed of which are colossal. Many things have never been studied, others were silenced, distorted'. Historians, he continued, take different views on topics like 'the aggressor's plans concerning Leningrad', 'the plans of our highest military and political spheres—about its defence, and the balance of forces on the North-Western region', the 'reasons for the siege', and whether it would have been 'possible to prevent the high numbers of casualties from hunger and illness in 1941–42'.[43] All of these were crucial and delicate questions, as they posed a threat to the grand narrative, and Soviet historians were not able to address them under the auspices of state propaganda and control mechanisms. When the ideological pressure eased in the second half of the 1980s and (temporarily) disappeared with the end of the Soviet Union, historians from Leningrad/St. Petersburg found themselves in a situation they had dreamed of for decades. The discussion of 1992 and the publication of its results in 1995 testify to the fact that in the first half of the 1990s many questions were openly discussed; that there was a general expectation that Siege history could be rewritten without the influence of ideology; and that survivors' organisations would be actively involved in this process. 'For the first time ever', Demidov concluded in his introduction to *The Siege Declassified*, 'the reader will not find here the enforced "consensus of opinion" of previous times, "know-it-all attitudes" or truths which are not being doubted. On the contrary, he will discover that we do not have ready answers for many questions. This, however, is natural for a freely developing discipline'.[44]

Fifteen years later, however, there was a marked return to the controlled 'memories' of the Soviet era. In 2009, the International Association of Siege Survivors' Organisations of the Hero City Leningrad presented the fourth publication of the series '*Blokada rassekrechennaia*': *Workers of Besieged Leningrad*, which followed *Children and the Siege* and *Medics and the Siege*.[45] While *The Siege Declassified* reflected an atmosphere of debate by reproducing conflicting views and discussions, *Workers of Besieged Leningrad* is a collection of survivors' narratives, many of them very short, some of them less than a page. They were written by members of the organisation who were asked to send in their memories on this particular topic, much like the unpublished accounts that were collected by the Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad in the 1970s and 1980s. There are no analytical texts by historians, just a short foreword by the organisation's president Valentina Leonenko, which closes with the words: 'Glory to the Hero-City! | Glory to the city of workers! | Glory to its heroic defenders! | Glory to its workers!'[46]

Not only is there now a clear use of Soviet propaganda slogans stressing the 'heroic', but there is no further mention of Demidov's 'freely developing research'; not long after 1992 the 'consensus of opinion' found its way back into the series '*Blokada rassekrechennaia*' and other publications by survivors' organisations. 'We preserve memory in the form in which it should be preserved,'[47] Leonenko told me. In this, the president of the organisation of Inhabitants of Besieged Leningrad, Irina Skripacheva, agrees. In an interview with *Peterburgskii dnevnik* she stated:

> Our main object is to eternalise the memory of the heroic deed of besieged Leningrad, and to pass it on to new generations, in order to prevent the history of the Great Patriotic and the Second World Wars from being rewritten, as people try to do now in some places.[48]

Soviet society rewarded heroism and shunned victimhood, so survivors' organisations had good reason to act accordingly in order to safeguard concrete benefits and attention for their members. These in turn not only benefitted financially and socially: as Lisa Kirschenbaum has pointed out, the officially promoted myth of heroism also seemed to have endowed their suffering with meaning.[49] While dispute in the accounts of the Manuscript Section of the Russian National Library

evolved around suppressed details of the siege, like the number of corpses on Leningrad's streets, few *blokadniki* would outright deny such details today.[50] Many former taboo topics have been integrated into survivors' narratives and published, when this became possible in the 1990s. However, by framing the collections with adequate forewords, editors make sure that these details do not question the original interpretation, but enhance the effectiveness of the story told.

CONCLUSION

When the ban on siege commemoration was lifted during the thaw, the Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad adopted the narrative of a grand struggle with a happy ending, as it was promoted during the siege and by the Museum of the Defence of Leningrad shortly after the war. For many it was the only interpretation with which they had been presented before silence fell on the topic, and even if it did not correspond with their own memories, the fact that it had been suppressed alone served as the most reliable proof of its 'truth'. Most child survivors were subject to massive patriotic propaganda as children—prior, during and immediately after the siege—while little or no offers to share their often traumatic memories were made by those around them. The claim that people supported each other negates memories of parents who were no longer able to share bread rations. It blends out the horrifying experience of the first phase of the siege, while resonating with the experience of those who were old enough to participate in the activities of youth organisations in the later phase of the siege. When the siege was finally discovered as an ideal topic for 'shaming' increasingly unenthusiastic young citizens into 'good behaviour', many child survivors were prepared to participate in the process. Voluntarily or involuntarily, they supported the politics of survivors' organisations and passed on biased presentations of the siege to subsequent generations.

A similar process was repeated during perestroika and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the promising start of 'The Siege Declassified', the series almost immediately returned to the practices of the 1970s and of Soviet historiography—through the choice of topic, the form of presentation and the (lack of) interpretation. The vivid discussion among historians and siege survivors was replaced by the publication of survivors' memories with a distinct purpose: to defend the 'truth about the blockade'. Truth is now no longer equal to (the suppression

of) historical facts, but adheres to their interpretation in the framework of a grand narrative with a happy ending. I argue that this adherence is not only determined by political and social concerns, like safeguarding social and financial benefits for survivors, but also by a psychological need to preserve a protective shield, which prevents the eruption of uncontrollable and feared emotions.

Around the seventieth anniversary of the lifting of the siege in January 2014, the independent Russian TV station Dozhd launched an online poll asking viewers whether they thought that Leningrad should have been given up in order to save civilian lives. The question was not new, but provoked an outcry among so called 'patriots', and was backed up by survivors' organisations. Iurii Kolosov, head of the organisation Young Participants in the Defence of Leningrad, and the military historian Iurii Frolov wrote an open letter to a speaker of the Duma, demanding that a law be issued which does not tolerate the 'discrediting of the Victory in the Great Fatherland War'.[51] Defenders and Inhabitants of Besieged Leningrad, they maintain, feel offended by the poll that was dragging in the mud the honour and dignity of those who are still alive, and those who gave their lives. Like that 'very fine woman' who corrected the author of 'Leningrad, people of principle', not all survivors would agree with that. But even today, few will publicly oppose a narrative which blurs the past and the unsettling emotions that it left in survivors, and which thus prevents either from being addressed and put to rest.

NOTES

1. The chances were high that the Army Group North could have taken Leningrad in September 1941, but the German command stopped the attack and employed hunger as a means of warfare. This way, they calculated they would not have to feed the inhabitants over the winter, and could enter the practically extinct city in spring, without risking high losses in street fights and by explosions, as happened in Kiev around the same time. And unlike Kiev, Leningrad was not abandoned. The Soviet command hazarded the consequences of the hunger blockade, and later German attempts to take the city failed. A note in *Völkischer Beobachter* on 10 November 1941, says 'we were offensive in Leningrad as long as it was necessary to encircle Leningrad. Now we are defensive, now they have to try to break out, but they are going to starve to death in Leningrad'. Quoted from Antje Leetz (ed.), *Blockade Leningrad 1941– 1944. Dokumente und Essays von Russen und Deutschen* (Reinbek bei

Hamburg, 1992). For a detailed analysis of the changing strategies of the German Heereskommando, see Jörg Ganzenmüller, *Das belagerte Leningrad: 1941–1944. Die Stadt in den Strategien der Angreifer und Verteidiger* (Paderborn, 2005).

2. The official number cited by the Soviet government at the Nuremberg trials was 649,000, but it is generally recognised that this figure is too low. Some estimates have been as high as two million or more (excluding the 1.6–2 million deaths in fighting). Most historians agree on a number of civilian casualties between 1 and 1.5 million. See Ganzenmüller, *Das belagerte Leningrad*, 238–9; Peter Jahn (ed.), *Blockade Leningrads. Blokada Leningrada. 1941–1944. Dossiers. Dos'e*, (Berlin, 2004). See also Tat'jana Voronina, 'Heroische Tote. Die Blockade, die Opferzahl und die Erinnerung', in *Die Leningrader Blockade. Der Krieg, die Stadt und der Tod*, special issue of *Osteuropa* 61(8–9) (2011): 155–168.

3. Interview with Liudmila P., 18 November 2009.

4. Ibid.

5. Tat'iana Voronina has pointed out that this narrative shows characteristics of socialist realism. See Tat'iana Voronina, '"Sotsialisticheskii istorizm": obrazy leningradskoi blokady v sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauke', *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 1(87) (2013), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2013/1/v15.html (last accessed 8 August 2017).

6. For example, see Lidiia Ginzburg's *Zapisi blokadnogo cheloveka*. English edition: Lidiya Ginzburg, *Blockade Diary*, trans. Alan Myers (London, 1995). See also Gennadii Gor's poems: Gennadij Gor, *Blockade. Gedichte* (Vienna, 2007).

7. P. L. Petrova, in the introduction to *Etapy zabvenniia*, maintains: 'The fact that the Germans encircled the city turned Leningrad, with its inhabitants and children, among others, into a "place of forcible detention created by the Fascists". And in terms of its disastrous consequences on the human organs, especially the children's, those inhuman circumstances and sufferings, this genocide, which Leningraders survived (or did not survive), in this BLOCK of HELL [when split in two, the Russian word blok/ada means "block of hell"] is akin to what people experienced in Fascist concentration camps.' See P. L. Petrova, *Etapy zabveniia. Zakliuchitel'naia glava k sborniku 'Bol' pamiati blokadnoi'* (Mytishchi, 2005), 8.

8. Tat'iana Voronina has offered an interpretation of the politics and control of memory as practised by siege survivors' organisations. In accordance with Pierre Bourdieu, she argues that survivors' organisations can be seen as players, striving to occupy a position that guarantees maximum access to financial and symbolic resources. See Tat'jana Voronina, 'Die Schlacht um Leningrad: Die Verbände der Blockade-Überlebenden und ihre Erinnerungspolitik von den 1960er Jahren bis heute', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 60 (2012), 58–77.

9. This number is quoted from Iurii Ivanovich Kolosov, '"Stoiali so vzroslymi riadom …" K 40-letiu Regional'noi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Iunye uchastniki oborony Leningrada"' (unpublished paper seen by author).

10. The siege lasted for 872, not 900 days.

11. According to Nikita Lomagin, who was granted access to relevant documents in the former NKVD archives in the 1990s, 1965 people had been arrested for cannibalism by June 1942. Nikita A. Lomagin, *V tiskakh goloda: blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh germanskikh spetssluzhb i NKVD* (St. Petersburg, 2001), 236. The first month without a single arrest for cannibalistic murder was March 1943; ibid., 267.

12. Ginzburg, *Blockade Diary*, 35.

13. See for example Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv nauchno-tekhnicheskoi dokumentatsii Sankt-Peterburga (hereafter: TsGANTD-SPb), f. 313, op. 2–1, d. 347, l.l., E. K. Iakovleva and N. V. Sparina, 'Izmeneniia lichnosti pri alimentarnoi distrofii'; TsGANTD-SPb, f. 313, op. 2–1, d.299, l.1, Tupitsina, 'Dinamika psikhozov za period blokady. Nabliudeniia nad dushevno-bol'nymi v bol'nitse im. BALINSKOGO osen' 41—zimy 43 g. stradavshie v toi ili inoi mere distrofii'; G. B. Abramovich, 'O rasstroistvakh soznaniia pri psikhozakh na pochve Istoshcheniia', in *Nervno-psikhicheskie zabolevaniia voennogo vremeni* (Leningrad, 1945), 14–19.

14. The term 'bare life' is borrowed from Giorgio Agamben; 'minimal life' has been used by Svetlana Magaeva. Svetlana V. Magaeva, 'Physiological and Psychosomatic Prerequisites for Survival and Recovery', in *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941–1944*, ed. Andrei R. Dzeniskevich and John Barber (Basingstoke, 2005), 123–159.

15. *Raboty leningradskikh vrachei za gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Vyp. 7. Gipertonicheskaia bolezn'* (Leningrad, 1945); *Raboty leningradskikh vrachei za gody Otechestvennoi voiny, Vyp. 8. Gipertonicheskaia bolezn'* (Leningrad, 1946).

16. On the restoration of Leningrad, see Stephen Maddox, 'The Memory of the Blockade and its Function in the Restoration of Leningrad, 1944–1949', in *Bitva za Leningrad. Diskussionnye problemy. Po materialam mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoprakticheskoi konferentsii 'Blokada Leningrada: spornoe i besspornoe' Sentiabr' 2007 goda*, ed. Nikita A. Lomagin (St. Petersburg, 2009), 277–307; Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995: Myths, Memories and Monuments* (Cambridge, 2006), 113–150.

17. See Andrea Zemskov-Züge, *Zwischen politischen Strukturen und Zeitzeugenschaft. Geschichtsbilder zur Belagerung Leningrads in der Sowjetunion 1943–1953* (Göttingen, 2012).

18. Holocaust remembrance was similarly suppressed in the Soviet Union. To give any attention to special cases would have meant to diminish the heroism of all Soviet citizens. See Zvi Gitelman, 'Die sowjetische Holocaust-Politik', in *Mahnmale des Holocaust. Motive, Rituale und Stätten des Gedenkens*, ed. James E. Young (Munich, 1994), 115–123 (118).

19. Following the critique from Moscow, staff members started to work on an adjusted version of the exhibition, in the hope that the museum could be reopened. These hopes, however, were not fulfilled. In 1951 the museum was closed for good and in 1953 the remaining part of its collection was transferred to the State Museum of the History of Leningrad.

20. Catriona Kelly, *Children's World: Growing up in Russia 1890–1991* (New Haven, 2007), 244.

21. Piskarovskoe Memorial Cemetery was the first official memorial site that was inaugurated, on 9 May 1960. Between 1965 and 1968 the so-called Zelenyi poias Slavy, the Green Belt of Glory, an ensemble of twenty-six monuments along the front line of September 1941, was erected.

22. Quoted from Valerii N. Selivanov's speech at the monument Flower of Life, 10 May 2010. Recording by the author.

23. A 1942 decree by the Council of People's Commissars regulated the daily work in siege orphanages. The orphan and siege survivor Stanislav Kotov notes, not without pride, that the 'best Komsomol teachers' were commissioned for this task, and that a lot of effort was made to educate children as 'cultured, truthful, courageous, resilient, work-loving and wholeheartedly committed to their Fatherland'. See Stanislav Kotov, *Detskie doma blokadnogo Leningrada* (St. Petersburg, 2005), 31–32.

24. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, Moscow, f. 77, op. 2, d. 90, 3, 'A.A. Zhdanov's correspondence with inmates of children's homes who were evacuated from Leningrad' [June 1947].

25. Ibid., 4A–5.

26. That patriotic convictions have a certain potential to offer consolation to children who have lost their parents or are temporarily separated from them has also been shown in observations on British children sent to the USA during the Second World War. Michael Henderson, who was himself evacuated together with his brother, has described the 'sense of patriotism which imbued even the youngest, and carried them through separations and setbacks'. See Michael Henderson, 'Evacuation of British Children to North America in World War II', *Children in War* 1(3) (2005): 13–18 (13); idem, 'The Role of Patriotism in Sustaining the Evacuees to North America in World War 2', *Children in War* 1(4) (2004): 81–86.

27. Interview with Nikita V., 10 November 2009.

28. From 1964, parts of the former collection were used for the exhibition 'Leningrad in the Years of the Great Patriotic War' in the Museum of the History of Leningrad.

29. Liudmila P., 18 November 2009.

30. Natsional'naia Rossiiskaia Biblioteka, fond rukopisi, St. Petersburg (hereafter NLR), f. 1273, d. 12, 112, Vladimir Grigor'evich Daev, 'Printsipial'nye Leningradtsy'. Vospominaniia' [1970s].

31. Ibid., 113.

32. Ibid., 2B.

33. NLR, f. 1273, d. 4, 11, Sof'ia Iakovlevna Meerson, 'Iz dnevnika blokadnoi shkol'nitsy (Otryvki), Leningrad 1941–1944' [1970s].

34. Ibid., 10.

35. NLR, f. 1273, d. 39, L. Iagdanova, 'Uchiteliu blokadnogo Leningrada' [1989].

36. The notion 'continuity of generations' has survived from the 1960s, when newspapers started to write about the importance of passing on the memory of the war to maintain a bond between generations (usually described as *sviaz' pokolenii*). See Viktoriia Kalendarova, 'Formiruia pamiat', in *Pamiat' o blokade: Svidetel'stva ochevidtsev i istorcheskoe soznanie obshchestva: Materialy i issledovaniia*, ed. Marina Loskutova (Moscow, 2005), 275–295.

37. Liudmila P., 18 November 2009.

38. Ibid.

39. Round table with survivors and adolescents of the project 'Karta Pamiati', organised by the Centre for Social Support Doverie in the Library on the Karpovka, 12 November 2009.

40. Liudmila P., 12 November 2009.

41. Liudmila P., 18 November 2009.

42. Viktor Demidov (ed.), *Blokada rassekrechennaia* (St. Petersburg, 1995).

43. Ibid., 5.

44. Ibid., 7.

45. V. I. Leonenko et al. (eds), *Truzheniki blokadnogo Leningrada. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel'stva ochevidtsev, dokumental'nye materialy* (St. Petersburg, 2009); T. M. Golubeva et al. (eds), *Deti i blokada. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel'stva ochevidtsev, dokumental'nye materialy* (St. Petersburg, 2000); T. M. Golubeva and N. B. Vetoshnikova (eds), *Mediki i blokada: vzgliad skvoz' gody. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel'stva ochevidtsev, dokumental'nye materialy* (St. Petersburg, 1997).

46. Leonenko, *Truzheniki*, 7.

47. Interview with Valentina I. Leonenko, 11 March 2010.

48. Tat'iana Kirillova, '"Detskoe litso" blokady' (Interview with Irina B. Skripacheva), Peterburgskii pravovoi portal, 14 May 2007, http://ppt. ru/news/38212 (last accessed 8 August 2017).

49. See Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy*.

50. At the presentation of the photobook *Neizvestnaia blokada* at the Anna Akhmatova Museum at the Fountain House on 26 May 2010, Vladimir Nikitin, the album's editor, recalled that a decree, which prohibited the presentation of war-time photographs with more than three corpses, was still in force in the 1970s.

51. See, 'Uchastniki voiny, istoriki: Neobkhodim zakon, ne dopuskaiush-chii diskreditatsii Pobedy'(Peterburg i Lenoblast'), Regnum, 4 February 2014, http://regnum.ru/news/1762430.html?forprint (last accessed 8 August 2017).

'Like Troy, Though About as Much Larger … as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is Larger than the *Iliad*': Civilians and Siege Warfare During the First World War

Alex Dowdall

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, few people expected that combat in any future conflict would degenerate into the form of static, positional warfare seen in most theatres between 1914 and 1918. A 'cult of the offensive' shaped both official and popular conceptions of what war would entail.[1] Future conflicts would be short, bloody and fast paced. This is not to say that military thinkers did not envisage any form of positional warfare. As David Stevenson has demonstrated, fortresses had an important role in pre-war military planning. The lead up to 1914 was 'one of the great ages of European fortress building', and modern fortress complexes from Verdun, to Liège, Namur and Przemyśl assumed an important place in Europe's military landscape.[2] Such fortifications could consume up to a quarter of army equipment budgets, and their prevalence means that the popularity of

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the doctrine of the offensive among military planners was either qualified or irrational. Ultimately, however, these fortresses played a marginal role in the fighting, with certain notable exceptions including Liège, which helped slow the German advance through Belgium in August 1914, or the four and a half month Russian siege of Przemyśl in Habsburg Galicia.[3] Thus, in the pre-war years, military thinkers across Europe primarily anticipated offensive operations, but simultaneously planned for moments of defensive siege warfare, anchored around modern fortification systems. The war they eventually encountered conformed to neither of these expectations. Initial phases of field operations gave way to defence in depth, largely thanks to the increasing power of high explosive artillery, and combat invariable degenerated into the stalemate of the trenches. This was true from the Western Front, to Italy, Salonika, Gallipoli and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe.

In most cases, trench warfare bypassed the pre-war fortification systems and transformed large swathes of Europe into combat zones. In the West, the trenches stretched from the Belgian North Sea coast, through northern and eastern France, to the Swiss border. After 1915, the barrier of opposing trench lines extended through the central and eastern Alps, where Italy and Austria–Hungary faced off against each other. From there, the trenches continued on through the Balkans and Salonika, where an Allied expeditionary force confronted Austro-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian troops. In Eastern Europe, conditions were more fluid although, for the most part, defensive operations still predominated. This circle was closed by the North Sea, where both sides engaged in blockades and economic warfare with the intent of preventing their enemy's importation of raw materials and food. In April 1915, Allied commanders sought to break this continental stalemate in the southeast with the Gallipoli landings, but this endeavour proved a costly failure and only resulted in further trench fighting. The deadlock was only partly broken with the exit of Russia from the war in late 1917, before the German spring offensive of March 1918 finally brought a return to the war of movement in the West.

For much of the First World War, therefore, combat across Europe was positional, siege warfare. Already in early 1915 the French Commander in Chief, General Joseph Joffre, described the fighting during the recent Battle of Ypres as 'assuming the character of siege warfare'.[4] Herbert Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, shared this interpretation. In November 1914 he spoke at the Lord Mayor's annual banquet at London's Guildhall, telling his audience that 'the

development of armaments has modified the application of the old principles of strategy and tactics and reduced the present warfare to something approximating to siege operations'.[5] The notion that trench warfare resembled siege operations was quickly popularised, so much so that by January 1915 the *Manchester Guardian* felt that such assessments were 'a commonplace of the war'. The newspaper pointed out that warfare was repeating itself, as 'the details of siege-craft' from mining to hand grenades, re-emerged in the trenches.[6] This development was even evident on the high seas where, according to one historian, 'submarines replaced battering rams, catapults, towers, Greek fire and sappers'.[7]

This was, in many ways, a quite recognisable form of combat. Many soldiers felt that their experiences sat within an established trajectory of siege warfare, stretching back to the early modern period and beyond. In his account of his wartime experiences, for instance, Ernst Jünger described how, while injured and hospitalised in 1918, he took pleasure in reading Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, in which one of the principal characters obsesses over the siege works he encountered while campaigning in late-seventeenth-century Flanders.[8] This was a conscious effort on Jünger's part to interpret his experiences of trench warfare as a traditional form of siege warfare. Yet, while on a micro-level the daily work of trench warfare seemed familiar, this was a radically expanded version of siege warfare. Unlike most sieges, where one side attacks and another defends around a fixed point, during the First World War both sides were simultaneously attacking and defending across an entire continent. Thanks to the systems of trenches and reciprocal economic warfare in the North Sea, Europe was effectively besieging itself.[9] In the words of one contemporary journalist: 'stupendous as are the processes of attack and resistance in this war of peoples, the problem is of a kind that has existed since Troy, though about as much larger in degree as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is larger than the *Iliad*'.[10] Even if the forms that siege warfare took between 1914 and 1918 were traditional, its scale was new and modern.

Whether modern or traditional, however, like all siege warfare the First World War had direct effects on civilians. The combat zones were rarely uninhabited and engulfed numerous population centres. The most sustained and extensive exposure of civilians to trench warfare occurred at the Western Front, which passed through some of Europe's most industrialised and populated regions. Between late 1914 and early 1918, large towns including Ypres, Arras, Reims, Armentières and Soissons were located just kilometres from the front-line trenches. They retained parts

of their civilian populations for much of the war, and suffered considerably as besieged towns in the combat zone. Elsewhere, towns such as Gorizia, at the Izonzo front, and Przemyśl, in Habsburg Galicia, suffered similar fates, as their residents were exposed to trench warfare for various lengths of time.[11] The civilian inhabitants of the combat zones were at the forefront of siege warfare during the First World War. As this was, however, a siege conducted on a continental scale, civilians far from the fighting lines also suffered its effects, either directly through long-range high explosive shells, aerial bombing, economic blockade, unrestricted submarine warfare and the introduction of 'State of Siege' legislation, or indirectly through the industrial, social and cultural mobilisations of their nations for war. In effect, local sieges near the front lines formed parts of a broader siege war undertaken by the national community.

This chapter explores the involvement of civilians in these two distinct levels of siege warfare between 1914 and 1918—the local and the continental. It considers the effects of siege warfare on civilians, as well as their responses to their experiences. In doing so, it questions how the conflict changed the relationship between civilians and siege warfare. Historians have interpreted the deliberate targeting of civilians, particularly through aerial bombing and blockade, as indicative of the process of totalisation that underpinned the First World War.[12] The progressive expansion of military violence to include civilians was, it is claimed, an indicator of modernity that distinguished the First World War from what went before, and a radicalising factor which presaged the greater levels of violence experienced by civilians during the Second World War.[13] Yet, as this volume demonstrates, civilians have repeatedly suffered from particular types of military violence, including starvation and bombardment, during sieges throughout history. Such tactics were by no means innovations of the First World War. Recognising that the latter was a form of siege allows us to revisit this debate and consider whether all the effects of this conflict on civilians were uniformly modern, or whether some instead drew on established features of siege warfare.

The Sieges Within the Siege: Civilians at the Western Front

The Western Front was one of the principal locations of siege operations during the First World War. Yet this was not an exclusively military zone, where two armies faced off across a no-man's land. Throughout the war

it was a space shared between civilians and soldiers. As a result, it was also a site where civilians faced sustained military violence. For most of August and September 1914, as the German invasion pressed through densely populated regions of France and Belgium, the fighting remained highly mobile. Hundreds of thousands of civilians made their way to Britain and the French interior, fleeing the fighting, German atrocities, and the fears and panics that the invasion engendered. Some towns were defended by the allied armies, such as Liège, Antwerp or the fortress complex of Maubeuge which was besieged and bombarded between 30 August and 7 September.[14] But in general, as the Allied armies retreated prior to the Battle of the Marne, they abandoned most large garrisoned towns without a fight to the advancing First and Second German Armies.[15] At this point, the fighting passed over many towns in northeastern France, and they were occupied by German troops for the first time. Most urban destruction in this phase of the fighting happened during atrocities carried out by German units after they had entered towns already abandoned by French and Belgian forces.[16]

Matters changed in mid-September 1914, when the allied armies began their counter-attack during the Battle of the Marne, forcing their opponents to retreat north-eastwards and recross the Marne and the Aisne rivers. The German armies established defensive positions between Verdun and Noyon, and a series of successive outflanking manoeuvres by each side extended a trench system from the Swiss border to the Belgian coast.[17] It was at this point that numerous large towns in northern France and Belgium were caught up in military operations as strategic points of defence and attack. The war of movement ground to a halt in their vicinity, and these towns were transformed into fortresses under siege within the evolving defensive systems of the Western Front.

Reims, in the Champagne region, is a prime example. After a brief German occupation, during which it suffered an initial round of shelling due to miscommunications between German units, it was retaken by the French Fifth Army on 13 September 1914. But that evening, the French advance halted just outside the town, and the opposing armies dug into positions skirting its north-eastern suburbs that would remain more or less unchanged until the summer of 1918. On 14 September, the German bombardment of the town began in earnest, and 40 civilians were killed or injured. The bombardment reached a height of intensity on 19 September, with one shell hitting the city centre every five seconds. Scaffolding on the cathedral caught fire and spread to the roof,

destroying it and much of the building's medieval statuary and stained glass.[18] Inhabitants of the town witnessed its gradual transformation into a fortress. In April 1916, one municipal employee, Paul Hess, paid a visit to the town's north-eastern suburbs, where he noted drastic changes caused by the construction of siege works:

> Shelters for machine guns have been constructed in several locations and some streets in the suburbs are covered in barbed wire, much like others already have been. Men from the recently arrived 2nd Engineers have been put to work at the top of the Avenue de Laon making openings in the buildings so that they are linked together, as well as making slots in the walls of enclosures for firing through.[19]

Reims was by no means unique, and along the length of the Western Front towns were fortified for the purposes of siege warfare. On the Allied side, in Soissons, the local Catholic bishop noted how by early October 1914 'the streets are cut across by trenches and barricades'.[20] Further north, in the Pas-de-Calais, the front lines stabilised on the outskirts of Arras. Madeleine Wartelle, a resident of the town, described how French soldiers dug trenches and 'raised barricades out of planks and stones, complete with loopholes. The boulevards and streets were soon covered with barbed wire entanglements'.[21] The German army also converted towns it occupied into fortresses. Among the most important was Lens, in the coal-mining region of the Pas-de-Calais. The town centre was located only three kilometres from the front lines, and reserve trenches passed through its suburbs. In his diary, Léon Tacquet, a local notary, recorded how 'the Germans are fortifying Lens more and more; they have turned the *gendarmerie* into a real fort, with space inside for cannons', and how 'the town is completely undermined by the trenches and underground works that the Germans have undertaken to link the basements of buildings together so that they can cross the entire town without emerging onto the street'.[22]

The civilians who witnessed the rapid transformation of their home towns into fortresses were under no illusions as to what these developments signified. They recognised this conflict for what it had become— not as a war of movement, but as a siege. In Noeux-les-Mines, a coal-mining town less than 5 kilometres from the front on the Allied side, the director of the local mining company clearly saw how events were unfolding. In late October 1914 he noted that there was 'no

change' in the local military situation. He felt that the war of movement had degenerated into positional warfare, and that the armies were now engaged in 'a sort of siege warfare'. Four days later he observed that 'the numerous trenches that surround us are almost finished', and that heaters were installed in them 'with a view to a lengthy stay'.[23] In nearby Arras, Jules Cronfalt, a municipal functionary, began a new section of his wartime diary when his town was first shelled on 6 October 1914. For him, this signalled '*the beginning of the siege of Arras*'.[24]

Despite the initial civilian exodus of 1914, significant numbers remained near the front and witnessed the onset of siege conditions. In mid-November 1914, Arras still had a population of 3,654, over 14% of its pre-war population,[25] while Reims, with a pre-war population of 115,000, was home to over 35,000 civilians in February 1915.[26] On the German side, roughly half the pre-war population of Lens, or 16,000, remained in October 1914.[27] These civilians were forced to adjust quickly to life under siege. On both sides of the lines, soldiers invaded the streets of their towns, the occupying militaries acquired far-reaching police powers, and issued rules and regulations that structured civilian lives in minute detail. The German Army did so in a manner that at times appeared openly confrontational, but for their part Allied commanders did not shy away from enforcing strict military control.[28] In both cases, curfews were enforced, particular areas were placed out of bounds, and restrictions were placed on civilian movement. All this narrowed civilians' horizons to the boundaries of their home towns. As in all sieges, scarcity of food also became an overriding concern. On the Allied side, military traffic had priority on roads and railways leading to the front, with the result that towns here experienced an exacerbated form of the overall national food crisis. Local councils soon realised that the unregulated free market could not adequately supply a civilian population in the warzone, and widespread municipal intervention, ranging from municipally controlled wholesale and retail to price limits and rationing, ensured adequate, if reduced, supplies throughout the war. In German-occupied France the seriousness of the food crisis was far greater, given its near-total isolation from the world market. This prompted a radical solution in the form of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, a neutral, humanitarian organisation under American patronage, which was tasked with controlling almost all aspects of supply and distribution, and successfully prevented outright starvation.[29]

Perhaps the dominant issue for civilians under siege at the Western Front was, however, artillery bombardment. Long-range shelling defined an area that extended for more than 20 kilometres on either side of the front-line trenches, although towns within 5 kilometres of the lines were particularly exposed, as they also came within range of quick-firing field guns. The intensity of fire fluctuated, normally reaching peaks during large offensives. This was the case in Reims, where over 18,500 German shells landed between 1 and 7 April in anticipation of the Allied Nivelle Offensive, or in Arras during the allied offensives of May 1915, September 1915 and April 1917.[30] But even between offensives civilians lived with the constant threat and reality of low-intensity bombardment. Between 20 December 1915 and 31 March 1917, for instance, Reims was shelled on 263 out of 467 days, with up to 100 shells landing in quick succession during most bombardments.[31] Towns on the German-occupied side of the lines were not spared by Allied artillery, despite the continued presence of a friendly, occupied civilian population. In September 1915, a British medical officer observed an attack on Lens from a vantage point on the Allied side of the lines. He described a fire which created a 'tremendous glow in the sky and [a] pall of smoke slowly drifting southwards from the unfortunate town which we shelled merrily all the time as it burned'.[32]

Such intense levels of bombardment had devastating effects on the urban landscape. On 23 September 1915, two days before a major French assault began, the Abbé Foulon, a local priest, described the effects of German fire on Arras:

> More and more it seems as though we are living in the middle of a battle. One no longer knows how to summarise one's impressions. The artillery fire is incessant, horrifying, terrifying. The sound of the cannons is so intense that one is left dumbfounded. We cannot even make out the sound of the whistling of the shells anymore. And yet the Germans keep firing more and more. They have even sent over gas shells, and when you leave your house your eyes sting. The Germans seem to want to wipe the town out. They have fired an avalanche of incendiary shells into Arras today.[33]

The fear that German shells would wipe the town out was no rhetorical embellishment. By the end of the war, the extent of destruction at the front was immense. In Reims, only 7% of the buildings were deemed

'habitable' in June 1919. Arras fared only somewhat better, with 83% of its buildings damaged to a greater or lesser extent.[34]

Siege conditions transformed how civilians engaged with their home towns, forcing them to seek shelter underground in basements and to avoid wide open spaces. But they also transformed their identities. Artillery bombardment was one of the most characteristic features of combat during the First World War, and some have estimated that it caused between 70 and 80% of soldiers' war wounds.[35] When civilians were exposed to this quintessentially military experience, they began to self-identify as soldiers. On the Allied side, at least, these attitudes were encouraged by local elites and the press. One article in a Reims newspaper claimed, for instance, that 'just like our soldiers on the line of fire, [the civilians who have remained in Reims] accept bombardment with the greatest composure'.[36] In Arras, a local newspaper asserted that the civilians who remained 'mount the civilian guard on our abandoned ramparts'.[37] But this was not mere propaganda, and postal control reports suggest that civilians living under siege subscribed to these publicly constructed militarised identities. In June 1917, for instance, postal censors reported that one civilian from Reims wrote to a friend in Paris, informing her that the residents of the besieged town 'must be soldiers, in our own manner, but we must be soldiers'.[38] Similarly, the following year a woman from Noeux-les-Mines wrote to a friend stating that 'we are bombarded every day, during the day it is shells, at night bombs, it is terrible. We are, I assure you, facing danger just like the poor soldiers'.[39] Continued exposure to high-explosive, shrapnel and gas shells eroded the line between civilians and the soldiers who occupied, fortified and defended their home towns.

The onset of siege conditions thus radically altered the spaces civilians inhabited, as well as their identities. Both the bombing of civilians and the scale of the war's destruction were terrifyingly modern and looked forward to developments during the Second World War. Yet, in order to comprehend what was happening around them, civilians at the Western Front often looked backwards and described the war in traditional terms, as a type of siege. Towns in this region, strategically located near France's north-eastern borders, had experienced numerous sieges throughout their histories. These classic sieges became regular and potent reference points after 1914. In July 1916, for instance, one newspaper in Arras reproduced a woodcut of a seventeenth-century siege (see Fig. 4.1) along with a caption which urged readers to re-read

La Ville aux Cent Clochers

Relisez l'histoire des sièges d'Arras, ceux de 1640 et 1654 surtout ; vous serez surpris d'y retrouver tant de noms familiers ; non pas seulement des noms de localités : Saint-Laurent, Tilloy, Beaurains, Agny, Mont-Saint-Eloi, Roclincourt, Sainte-Catherine, mais tout le vocabulaire d'aujourd'hui : tranchées, mines, sapes, grenades, boyaux, attaques et contr'attaques à l'arme blanche. Sur une scène que l'on dirait toute moderne planent les ombres illustres de Turenne et de Condé.

Fig. 4.1 Arras under siege in the seventeenth century. *Source Le Lion d'Arras*, 25 July 1916; Bibliothèque nationale de France

> the history of the sieges of Arras, particularly those of 1640 and 1654; you will be surprised to find many familiar names; not only the names of localities: Saint-Laurent, Tilloy, Beaurains, Agny, Mont-Saint-Eloi, Roclincourt, Sainte-Catherine, but also the whole of today's vocabulary: trenches, mines, saps, grenades, tunnels, attacks and counter-attacks, often with knives. On a scene that one could consider entirely modern, rest the illustrious shadows of Turenne and de Condé.

Rather than being a new and incomprehensible industrialised war of *matériel*, the newspaper insisted that the current conflict was just another siege in an effort to render it more understandable, even familiar.

Civilians living near the front were thus able to categorise the current war as merely the latest in a long line of sieges which their towns had endured and survived. In April 1916, for instance, an editorial in *Le Lion d'Arras* reminded inhabitants of the town that it had suffered five previous wartime disasters—destruction by the Vandals and the Huns in AD 406; the siege of AD 890 by the Normans; the siege of 1477 by Louis XI; the siege of 1640; and the siege of 1654. After each, it claimed, 'Arras re-emerged more valiant, more productive and more prosperous'. It asserted that this would happen again and that now, 'for the sixth time, the proverbial tenacity of the Artesian race and its unfailing attachment to its native soil will ensure that the ancient city, currently buried under ruins, will have a prompt and glorious regeneration'.[40] Such

statements aimed to nullify the prospect of total urban destruction which the First World War contained.

But presenting the current conflict within a longer chronology of local siege warfare had a second, and perhaps even more important, function. Describing the war in this way accounted for, and even legitimised, the suffering and direct involvement of civilians in the conflict. During this siege, as during others in the past, both the soldiers who defended the town and the civilians who inhabited it were affected, and attitudes of defiance and heroism were expected of both groups. The erosion of the divide between civilians and soldiers was inherently linked to siege conditions. According to *Le Lion d'Arras*, the history of the town's sieges proved that resistance was a 'natural characteristic' of the population in the face of attack or, in the words of one contributor, 'Arras was born for war, devastation and glory'. In January 1917, the newspaper was even more explicit when it gave an account of the siege of 1640 because, it stated, 'in the time in which we live, one likes to recall, from time to time, several snippets of a glorious past'. It highlighted the courage and heroism displayed in 1640 in an attempt to inspire courage and heroism in 1917 and claimed that 'it is our duty, we who "make" the present, to make it beautiful, noble, grand and worthy of this past. We will do this without arrogance, without haughtiness, but with pride, courage and good humour'.[41] In Reims, a municipal councillor also appealed to the imagery of siege warfare when, during a speech at the town's 14 July 1915 celebrations, he urged the population to remain in place under the shells, resisting the enemy like soldiers:

> The present stagnation of operations and the subterranean appearance of this siege war makes the *union sacrée* of the civilian population and the military across the country all the more urgent. What better proof of this pact could be found elsewhere than in a town which for more than ten months has mixed the blood of its inhabitants with that of its soldiers in the defence of the country and its independence?[42]

The siege, as a form of conflict which had traditionally blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, had clear resonances within the towns at the Western Front during the First World War. Indeed, references to historic sieges, during which civilians had always both participated and suffered, helped to legitimise their participation and suffering in the twentieth century's continental version of siege warfare.

The traditional language and imagery of siege warfare thus helped make sense of the modernity of the First World War, and rendered the extent of its impact on civilians less surprising.

A Siege of Nations

There were, of course, notable differences between the war at the Western Front and the historic sieges that France's borderlands had experienced. Most important was civilians' ability to leave. As other chapters in this volume demonstrate, sieges do not always involve an absolute blockade, and civilians have often been able to escape. But departures from towns at the Western Front were on a larger scale, and most civilians could leave at any time they wished. Over the course of the war these civilian populations gradually declined until, in 1918, the various armies operating on the Western Front forcibly evacuated most of those remaining. Arras, Reims, Lens and other towns therefore ended the war devoid of inhabitants.[43]

But even after they left their besieged home towns, civilians from the front quickly realised that they could not escape the broader, continental-scale siege war that engulfed Europe. In France, as elsewhere, civilian populations far from the front lines became targets of military force. Aerial bombing was one of the primary methods. In 1914, military air forces were limited, and their role was confined to ground support and reconnaissance. But by 1918 technological and tactical developments had transformed air power into a central component of modern warfare. The belligerents developed large, dedicated squadrons of purpose-built bombers tasked with attacking industrial capacity and civilian morale in cities deep behind enemy lines, including Paris, London, Venice and the industrial centres of the Ruhr.[44] By 1918, for instance, the French aerial division had more than 700 fighters and bombers stationed on the Western Front for the purpose of tactical air raids over German lines.[45] The scale of the death and destruction they caused was limited, especially relative to the Second World War. In Germany, for instance, Allied bombs killed 740 and injured almost 1,900 over the course of the war.[46] But the effects of bombing on the morale and imaginations of belligerent societies, especially in the affected areas, were important. Although soldiers complained that civilians in the rear barely recognised that there was a war on, those who experienced aerial bombing asserted otherwise. Like civilians in the besieged towns at the front, they maintained that bombing brought them closer to the soldiers' experiences of war.[47]

The effects of blockade and economic warfare were more far reaching and contributed considerably to civilian suffering far from the front lines. Like aerial bombing, economic warfare was reciprocal. The Allies began their blockade of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1914 in a restricted manner. The situation intensified in spring 1915, with the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on 2 February, followed by the retaliatory British Order in Council of 11 March announcing unrestricted blockade. Although Germany interrupted unrestricted submarine warfare in autumn 1915 following international outcry at the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the Allied blockade was tightened. Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, with a view to crippling the Allied war effort before the likely entry of the USA into the war. This proved a failure, and once the USA entered on the Allied side, the blockade only became more hermetic. At the onset of economic warfare, the expressed intention was not to starve enemy civilians. Rather, the aim was to cripple the enemy's military capacity. But civilian suffering was an inevitable corollary of these policies, and with the intensification of economic warfare, especially the onset of unrestricted blockade and submarine warfare, the starvation of the enemy's population became a primary objective on both sides. Both the Allies and the Central Powers applied the logic of traditional siege warfare and wagered that a significant reduction in the enemy's supplies would erode morale and foment sufficient discontent to cripple fighting capacity. According to this logic, civilian suffering was a necessity.[48] Germany's gamble with economic warfare was an abject failure, and unrestricted submarine warfare did not bring the promised collapse of Allied economies and societies.[49] The effects of the Allied blockade are more debateable. At the time, numerous Allied leaders believed that the blockade had been one of the most effective weapons in their arsenal and a major cause of German defeat. Historians have subsequently questioned such interpretations, pointing to domestic inefficiencies and endogenous factors contributing to the decline in food supplies in Germany and Austria–Hungary.[50] Nonetheless, whether or not the blockade won the war for the Allies, or whether or not it was the main cause of hunger, the fact that it contributed to civilian hardship is undeniable. The most reliable, and conservative, estimate of excess civilian mortality due to the blockade in Germany is 300,000.[51]

As they had done when they looked at the conditions in the trenches, commentators, especially in France and Britain, turned to the image of

the siege in their attempts to understand and rationalise these developments. The stability of the fighting fronts, aerial bombing of towns far from the lines, the allied naval blockade of the Central Powers and unrestricted submarine warfare convinced many that this war really was a 'siege of nations'. In December 1914, *The Times* described how 'the siege, not of cities but of countries, continues on a 250-mile front from the Yser to the Argonne',[52] while the *Manchester Guardian* argued that the Allies 'have to face the full logic of siege-war. Though the siege is not of cities alone but of Empires'.[53] Even technical experts found the image of the siege useful. In France, Louis de Launay, a geologist and professor at the École nationale supérieure des mines in Paris, argued in a treatise on the economics of the Allied blockade that it was effective because it rendered the Central Powers nothing more than a 'besieged fortress, and a besieged fortress has always capitulated without access to outside aid. Because the fortress is so large, it will hold out longer. But as the investment is getting progressively tighter, it will end in the usual way'.[54] Perhaps one of the most forceful and prominent interpretations of the war as a 'siege of nations' was given by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, when he spoke in Paris in November 1917 after the formation of the Allied Supreme War Council. Calling for unity among the Allies, he criticised how they had 'gone on talking of the eastern front and the western front, and the Italian front and the Salonika front, and the Egyptian front and the Mesopotamia front, forgetting that there is but one front with many flanks, that with these colossal armies the battlefield is the continent … There is one feature of this war which makes it unique amongst all the innumerable wars of the past. It is a siege of nations'.[55]

Such statements had important repercussions, for once the war was conceived of as a siege of nations, the targeting of civilians far from the fighting fronts, through starvation and aerial bombing, became acceptable, even necessary. Indeed, the image of the siege became a powerful rhetorical tool used to justify attacks on enemy civilians and legitimise their suffering. In a debate in the British House of Lords on the limits of the Allied blockade, for instance, the Leader of the House, Robert Crewe-Milnes, claimed that 'the efforts to starve Germany' should not be seen as 'gross inhumanity' as 'there was no difference as regards inhumanity between the siege of a city and the siege of a country. Germany besieged Paris [in 1870–1871]. She did not consider the sufferings of the people in that city'.[56] Sentiments such as these were widely held. In

March 1915, a certain Mary Ralph of Nottingham wrote to the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* and provided a particularly lucid articulation of the brutal logic underpinning this siege of nations. She complained of those people who were concerned that the Allied naval blockade of Germany meant waging war on women and children. She felt such scruples were baseless, as 'it has always been regarded as legitimate warfare to reduce a city by famine. That has hitherto been the object of every investing army throughout history'. The war against Germany was, she claimed, nothing more than a traditional siege, albeit on a much larger scale. As the 'right of siege has existed and has been exercised in the case of cities', she could not 'understand why differences of area and numbers should make it wrong to invest and starve out Germany if we have the power. As a city of a million souls was to former war so is a country of 60,000,000 souls to the titanic struggle we are engaged in today'. To those who were worried that German women and children were suffering, she posed the question of 'what city ever was reduced by famine in which women and children were not the worst sufferers?' Seen as how 'every siege was undertaken as a means of ending hostilities', she felt there was no question that Germany should be denied access to all food.[57]

Both Crewe-Milnes and Ralph were responding to suggestions that the targeting of Germany's civilian population, through blockade and aerial bombing, was inhumane and in contravention of international law. This was, indeed, a common theme in German propaganda.[58] Conceptualising the war as a siege provided the Allies with effective rebuttals to such arguments for, as other chapters in this volume demonstrate, the laws and customs of siege warfare have always legitimised civilian suffering, seeing it as inevitable and sometimes necessary. This was still the case in 1914, by which point the rules of siege warfare were well established. The United States Lieber Code of 1863, one of the most important pre-1914 documents governing the conduct of warfare, expressly permitted the starvation of 'the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy'. According to Isabel Hull, 'permitting the stoppage of food shipments to enemy civilians was a recurrent feature of European warfare and a staple of the international law of siege, blockade and contraband'.[59] Bombardments that affected civilians were also permitted in the context of sieges. Such practices were regulated by The Hague Conventions of 1907, which set down rules designed to protect civilians in sieges and

bombardments.[60] These rules were, however, limited in scope. Article 25 of Hague Convention IV, for instance, prohibited the bombardment of undefended towns 'by whatever means', thereby anticipating the nascent threat posed to civilian populations by aerial bombing.[61] Military commanders would not, however, give up their right to attack towns entirely, and sieges and bombardments of places that served military purposes, whether or not they had civilian populations, were still permitted.[62] In such cases, officers were to make efforts to spare 'buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected', but only 'as far as possible', and only if they were not being used at the time for military purposes.[63] Nowhere was it mentioned that commanders should make efforts to avoid harming civilian residents of defended towns.

According to international law in 1914 assaults on towns were permissible, as long as those towns were defended. After the outbreak of war, therefore, describing the conflict as a siege, and Germany in its entirety as a fortress, was one of a number of arguments available to Allied politicians and military thinkers when they sought to claim that their methods adhered to established legal principles.[64] The British government applied exactly this logic in February 1918 in response to a German request made via the neutral Spanish ambassador in London that efforts be made to limit the bombing of undefended towns. According to the British official history of the war in the air, the General Staff of the War Office reassured the Cabinet that Germany could not accuse Britain of contravening international law for its actions because by 1918 it was:

> impossible to define, with any chance of general acceptance, what constituted an undefended town, and, in any case, when the matter had been debated internationally in the past no one had foreseen a cordon of troops extending from the sea to Switzerland. This was a new feature which modified all existing theories. As warfare developed so the defence of a town had had to be undertaken at increasing distance from its centre … In other words, a town might be rendered immune from bombardment, under modern conditions, only by lines drawn, or by operations conducted, at an appreciable distance. It would, therefore, be difficult to rebut the argument that the entire areas protected by the existing Allied lines, or by the corresponding cordon of ships in the North Sea, were 'defended'. Once this was admitted it followed that the bombardment of these areas by any means whatever, whether by land, sea, or air, was legitimate, since no

legal duty has been imposed on attacking forces to restrict bombardment to actual fortifications, and the destruction of its public and private buildings has always been regarded as a legitimate means of inducing a town to surrender.[65]

The British government decided to ignore the German request and continued bombing enemy towns. By maintaining that the war was a siege, albeit of a nation rather than of a town, they could claim that their actions were, in fact, perfectly legal and acceptable. The siege, therefore, acted as a powerful metaphor which legitimised the targeting of civilians far from the fighting fronts.

Conclusion

To contemporaries, the First World War presented many of the characteristics of a siege. This was especially the case for the inhabitants of the combat zones, who used the language and imagery of siege warfare to interpret their experiences, but also for those further from the lines who increasingly suffered the direct and indirect effects of war. Yet this was a curious, Janus-faced siege, which seemed simultaneously traditional in its forms and modern in its scale. As this chapter has demonstrated, civilian populations were at the centre of this paradox. On the one hand, it could be claimed that the Allied blockade of Germany, German unrestricted submarine warfare, and aerial and artillery bombardment of civilians, both at the front and far from the lines, sat comfortably within an established trajectory of siege warfare, where certain forms of violence against civilians were perfectly acceptable. Starvation and bombardment were, in many respects, quite familiar. Yet at the same time, siege warfare during the First World War was a radically new and expanded form of this type of engagement. Never before had a belligerent attempted to starve and bomb a society of 60 million people. Rather, therefore, than simply seeing all forms of violence against civilians during the First World War as parts of a uniform process of radicalisation culminating in the ethnic, exterminatory blood-shed of the Second World War, we should adopt a more nuanced perspective and recognise that the conflict stood at a crossroads. The scale of the destruction wrought on Europe by this continental siege was certainly a radical new departure and affected all civilians, some far more than others. So too were some examples of extreme violence against non-combatants, such as the Armenian Genocide or

German occupation policies in Eastern Europe.[66] But the logic under-pinning other acts of violence, such as the bombardment of towns in combat zones, aerial bombing far from the front and economic blockade, also looked backwards and drew on a much longer history of siege warfare, during which civilians had always suffered.

Notes

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Siege Warfare in Comparative Early Modern Contexts: Norms, Nuances, Myth and Massacre During the Revolutionary Wars

Fergus Robson

> We will pay you a sum of five hundred thousand écus
> If you will stop your cannons firing
> Madames, with your money,
> I would not know what to do
> Oh my cannon will burn your houses
> And my soldiers will pillage them
> Courage my soldiers
> The town is for the sack
> And we will kill the modest and the wealthy
> And we will take their silver and gold.[1]

This rendition of a widespread folksong recounting the siege of Mantua explicitly outlines the consequences of a town being taken by assault. It is important to note that in an earlier verse the governor of the

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town had sent Bonaparte's envoy packing, using unprintable language. The fact that this song was recorded in the centre of France, far from the battlefields of Italy or Germany, points to knowledge of siege etiquette being fairly commonplace. Similar versions of this song, some of which refer to Mantua but others to Turin, Moscow, Mons and even Besançon, existed in different regions of France and were collected throughout the nineteenth century.[2] Its salience for this chapter is its illustration of how civilian populations far from war zones became acquainted with the 'laws of war' or 'rules of honour', at least in a simplified form. As such it seems realistic to surmise that civilians were aware that unsuccessful resistance to a besieging army was liable to result in widespread death, destruction and loss for the inhabitants of the town or city. Soldiers were very familiar with the formal system which had evolved to manage the tense and potentially ruinous situations all sides could find themselves exposed to during a siege.

These sets of practices existed as a rough compromise between the interests, strengths and weaknesses of the besieged and besieging armies, as well as the civilian population, who frequently played an important role in the outcome of sieges. To summarise briefly these norms, the besieging army would summon the military commander to surrender, before laying a formal siege. The townsfolk might or might not attempt to convince the commander to surrender, or if the citadel and city were separate, the civilian governor might negotiate separate terms with the besieging army. If a siege went ahead the attacking army was to focus on reducing the fortifications while preventing sorties or the entry of supplies. Once a practicable breach had been established in the fortifications a second summons would be issued to the commander which, if accepted, would avoid the losses for attackers, defenders and the population, which were usually associated with the taking of a town by storm. This might result in a capitulation agreement, the terms of which varied but which could allow the garrison to leave freely with arms, flags and baggage. It might also include agreed payments to compensate the besieging army for its losses and pay the troops. It might also involve the garrison being taken prisoner. All of these outcomes however, went a long way to mitigating the damage caused by continued bombardment or assault and street fighting.

However, if a negotiated capitulation was not reached and a town was taken by storm, the attacking army was understood to have acquired the right to pillage the city. It was in these circumstances that the worst

happened, as troops very often unleashed their pent-up violence and anger on the inhabitants, raping, murdering, looting, burning and drinking, sometimes for a number of days. It was this scenario that formal conduct had been established to avoid, for understandable reasons, as there were no real winners in it. Variants of this system had been more or less conventional in European warfare from at least the Middle Ages and as such were entrenched in not only military culture but also civilian understandings of warfare.[3]

This system of managing sieges, its nuances, the ways it operated in different cases, and the effectiveness or otherwise of its norms of behaviour are the main subject of this chapter. The comparative approach also allows the addressing of questions as to whether and how the context of a siege changed combatants' behaviour. Did operating within Europe and in a colonial setting engender different comportments? Were the norms of siege warfare really adhered to by besieging armies across the diverse types of siege under consideration? What was perhaps particular to this period was the coalescence of the centuries-old set of practices designed to permit the avoidance of slaughter with newer ways of thinking about, and making, war. The impact of the 'limited warfare' of the eighteenth century alongside Enlightenment disapproval of warfare and the discourse of humane war as preached by the Revolutionaries, meant that there was an impulse to spare lives, up to a point.[4] This is not to deny Philip Dwyer's assessment of the prevalence of massacre during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; indeed the examples which will be employed to explore these issues echo many of his arguments.[5] Dwyer's thoughtful essay, alongside the important observation in the introduction to this volume, that siege warfare is often total war due to the blurring of the lines between civilians and combatants, are both important starting points for the present analysis. As Dwyer rightly points out, the sieges of the Revolutionary Wars were not in general any more humane than those which went before.[6] Nor, however, were they more savage than those which followed; colonial warfare and nationalist revolts during the nineteenth century witnessed particularly brutal sacks of towns and deliberate targeting of civilians.[7]

The brutality prevalent in the religious wars of the early modern period and the ethnic-nationalist wars of the modern period render the case studies selected for this analysis particularly useful since they straddle both categories. The at least notionally secular armies of revolutionary France encountered Catholic Austrian and Italian enemies when

besieging Mantua and later Naples during the first Italian campaign. They also encountered Arab and Turkish Muslim armies when campaigning in Egypt and Syria, and when they besieged Jaffa and Cairo. This array of religious and racial differences made these sieges genuine sites of militarised cultural encounters and affords us valuable insights into the shifting collective and individual identities of soldiers and civilians in siege warfare. This series of intersecting analytic perspectives, when applied to the rich comparative potential of the sieges in question, permits us to study variations in the practice of siege warfare and to enrich our understanding of dynamics of violence in European and colonial contexts. Mantua and Jaffa were conventional sieges of fortified towns with a military garrison, although their respective denouements were drastically different for a variety of reasons. Naples and Cairo, by contrast, were both sieges of towns in the grip of popular revolt, wherein the populace were supported by armies opposed to the French. The conduct of these sieges and their different outcomes all pose interesting questions about the totality of siege war, the effectiveness of the limitations theoretically in place and the cultural judgements which may have informed behaviour during sieges or sacks.

Mantua

As noted above, the siege of Mantua resonated strongly in French popular culture. Almost immediately after news of the Austrian surrender reached Paris, songs were composed and published in celebration of the victory.[8] While such outpourings of lyrical fervour were not unusual under the Directory, the siege of Mantua seems to have been particularly fascinating for French troops, who frequently mentioned it in letters and memoirs. Civilians too were aware, from army dispatches and newspapers, that peace depended on its being taken, and that its garrison still threatened French conquests in northern Italy. The soldiers, recycling what their commanders had told them, repeated that Mantua was the key to northern Italy and absolutely had to succumb to consolidate the successful campaign in which Bonaparte had led victorious French armies to all but expel the Austrians from Italy. Mantua was the last stronghold behind French lines, but a series of Austrian armies which descended from Tyrol made it a genuine risk to the French armies. This risk was increased by success as divisions from defeated Austrian armies joined the

garrison, rendering the troops inside theoretically numerous, if likely to be in bad shape.

After an early attempt to storm the fortress in May 1796, which saw the French seize some outer fortifications, the formal siege commenced in June with the digging of trenches and mounting of siege guns. This period of bombardment was short since the first relieving army was sent from Austria in late July and forced the siege to be abandoned with the loss of the siege artillery. The siege recommenced after the Austrian General Wurmser had been defeated, although he had succeeded in supplying fresh troops and provisions to the garrison.[9] The siege was once more interrupted by another Austrian advance under Wurmser, which ended with him and his troops joining the garrison and constituting a force of 23,000 men in the French rear.[10] The lack of siege artillery meant that this became more a blockade than a siege. Two further Austrian relief attempts were beaten off, however, and soon the growing shortage of food within Mantua and the spread of disease were seriously weakening the besieged garrison.

Due to having been forced to abandon their siege weapons by an Austrian assault, the French, in the words of Marmont, then a captain, 'gave up any serious idea of besieging or taking the town by storm, instead we resolved to blockade it and take it by famine instead'.[11] The lakes and marshes that surrounded the fortifications and helped give the area its reputation as unhealthy and diseased meant that both besieged and besieging armies suffered badly from illness and infection. Jean-Claude Carrier described life in the trenches as 'an unimaginable torment' due to the disease and the ability of the besieged army to fire on the French camp.[12] Alexandre Ladrix, during the second blockade, claimed that not a night went by without the French being shelled from within the town, a set of conditions that might have been expected to infuriate the army and inflame a desire for retribution.[13] In a similar vein, Guillaume Lecoq described the long blockade, noting that the deaths caused by enemy sorties and disease had reduced his division from 3000 to just 700.[14] Jérôme Laugier, on the other hand, was posted at a less exposed flank of the fortress and he expressed a certain sympathy for the misery the besieged army was exposed to inside the city.[15] This was another common theme; despite the war and the Austrian sorties, French soldiers frequently empathised with the sufferings of the populace and the besieged army. This did not prevent them from attempting to spread

panic in the city by deploying a small fleet of gunboats on the surrounding lake to shell the city before dawn.[16]

These attacks on the city were probably the least significant of the sufferings endured by the inhabitants. As noted above, the strategy was to starve the town into submission and the entry of a defeated Austrian army under Wurmser midway through the siege massively exacerbated shortages within the town. Chandler estimated that, of a garrison of 30,000, a mere 16,000 were capable of marching out after the capitulation, while Gillespie puts the number of dead during the siege at 7000.[17] The *cannonier* Bricard claimed that upwards of 35,000 civilians and soldiers had died in the town during the ten months of siege.[18] He went on to describe how

> the French troops avoided their camps for fear of infection from the terrible odour, the cemeteries of the town were putrid with the stench of disease. The garrison and inhabitants had suffered terribly. I went to Saint-George and La Favorite … the ground was covered with abandoned items, the fields were gorged with the bodies of the recently buried dead and the trees were shredded with shot.[19]

Carrier also noted that warfare had seen the population of the surrounding countryside flee, leaving a sense of utter desolation and ruining the agriculture of the region.[20] This observation was echoed by Jean Landrieux who quoted the local poet of antiquity, Virgil, to evoke the ruin which had befallen the land in the loss of livestock and silk worms.[21] The level of destruction and displacement wrought by any form of extended warfare, but especially siege warfare, given that it necessitates continuous operations in a relatively limited area, was a theme to which soldiers frequently returned. Many of the young men who served in the armies of the Revolution were from modest or rural backgrounds and the ravaging of a once rich countryside appalled them. This was, however, a military necessity and a seemingly inevitable consequence of siege warfare.

Once Wurmser capitulated the resounding sentiment among the troops was of magnanimity, pity and even admiration for the garrison and the inhabitants who had held out for so long. Carrier wrote of how they held on until the bitter end and Marmont praised the gallantry and good spirit of both Wurmser and his troops.[22] This sense, not of regret but certainly of empathy with the victims of siege, was not unusual, but

it was far from the rule at the time. It resulted perhaps because siege by starvation was less commonplace and also because the campaign around Mantua was a relatively clean war which did not provoke the same feelings of hatred that led to massacres and reprisals in other parts of Italy and elsewhere.[23] Such magnanimity in conquest was relatively rare, despite the fact that the claims of Bonaparte that 'slaying the defeated garrison, the savage rights of victory, are never practised by the French army, which despises them', were often echoed by his officers.[24] The specific circumstance of this press release was the follow-up campaign after the capitulation of Mantua when the army could perhaps realistically claim to be a generous victor.[25] The continued campaigns in Italy however soon belied this benevolent self-image.

Naples

Having signed peace preliminaries at Leoben in April 1797, followed by the formal treaty of Campo Formio in October, the majority of French gains in northern Italy were secured. This gave greater freedom to manoeuvre and allowed French troops to begin extending their domination. In February and April 1798, respectively, the Helvetic and Roman Republics were established in the wake of French victories and popular uprisings. A frontier conflict and disputes around provisioning of English ships led France and the Kingdom of Naples to war in November 1798, which began with a Neapolitan invasion of the Roman Republic. While there had been popular resistance to the French in northern Italy, most famously the massacre of wounded soldiers in Verona, these acts were not repeated with the besieged army and populace in Mantua. In southern Italy the crumbling of the Neapolitan army saw a general insurrection ordered against the French.[26] This experience of being turned on at night and ambushed on mountain roads, so similar to the circumstances which provoked such barbarity in the Vendée, alienated the French definitively from much of the population. Memoirs of the period unequivocally equate the latter with brigands, a catch-all term that essentially permitted the targeting of civilians and implicitly justified atrocities.[27]

The relatively small army under General Championnet rapidly penetrated as far as Capua, where a ceasefire was arranged. The king had fled to Sicily, the Neapolitan army had largely collapsed and the city was in the grip of popular ferment between a small patriot party and the *lazzaroni* (an urban group not dissimilar to the *sans culottes*). An attack

on a French envoy signalled the rupture of the agreement and French forces moved on the capital. They were met outside the walls by the armed *lazzaroni* with artillery; a first assault saw the French penetrate beyond the walls, but they were repulsed.[28] Lahure described the fighting that followed and how the streets were clogged with dead bodies.[29] Jean Chatton also evoked the brutality which was part of taking a city by storm: 'At the siege of Naples we fought in every suburb, we broke down the doors of houses and killed all those we found under arms, we burnt the houses to catch the remainder'.[30] Bonnamy explained how Championnet wished to allow the *lazzaroni* the opportunity to surrender once the French artillery was in place, and sent an envoy, whose white flag was greeted with gunfire.[31] This approximation of the etiquette of siege warfare, even against a city in revolt, demonstrates not just the influence of traditional forms, but also the importance of the individual general in determining the way a siege was conducted with regard to minimising the loss of life.

Very early the next morning the bombardment commenced and French troops attacked from all sides, setting fire to houses as they penetrated the city. Those who participated described an intensely violent assault, Lahure claimed it was among the bloodiest he ever witnessed, while the quotation from Chatton above confirms this.[32] Nonetheless, despite not fighting against a conventional enemy, the soldiers also seem to have had a grudging respect for the tenacious resistance offered by the population, which may, alongside Championnet's clemency, have served to dampen their desire for retribution.[33] During the course of 26 January 1799, after a siege and storm that lasted just three days, Championnet's promise to respect the city's patron saint, coupled with the inevitability of defeat, saw the defenders of Naples lay down their arms. Despite Naples having been taken by storm after a French envoy had been rejected, the soldiers did not go on the rampage. This once again chimes with the self-image of magnanimity and gives the impression that the French were attempting to wage war according to the precepts of humanity. However, an alternative reading of this evidence would suggest that the soldiers had expended the sanguinary rage that so often resulted from storming a town; that Championnet's clemency was a matter of pragmatism as much as humanity, but most interestingly this suggests that there was a larger siege going on. This is where the context of the wider warfare in the region is important and where traditional understandings of sieges become possibly less useful. The insurrection

against the French had by no means been limited to Naples itself and French troops crossing mountainous regions of Puglia had found themselves almost constantly under attack. In response they had engaged in a very dirty war of reprisals and atrocities throughout the region. Laugier documented these:

> in Ripa we slit the throats of 300 insurgents… This severe example, rather than calming the area, saw the insurgency grow … the most obstinate took shelter in the large well-fortified town of Guardia Grela and when we offered terms they rejected them and our envoy barely escaped alive. The assault was ordered, all those fit to bear arms were slaughtered and the town was set ablaze. Very few escaped the sack.[34]

Chatton also graphically described hacking to pieces those found in the houses of Foggia, after it was stormed by the French, and Lahure recounted how General Watrin had 1200 put to death after seizing Trajetta and also razed the ramparts and torched the town.[35] What is of interest in this context, especially given Michael Broers's assertion that this was as much a civil war between towns and countryside in Calabria, are the parallels with both earlier and later wars dealt with in this book. For it resembled Louis XIV's desolation of the Palatinate, when the French used the towns as bases to ravage the countryside, while its scale evoked the large-scale siege warfare of the First World War when whole areas, not just towns, were essentially under siege.[36]

All of this reminds us that siege warfare is not only immobile nor solely concerned with towns and cities. The examples of Calabria and Puglia can be profitably compared to the widespread use of the 'State of Siege' in repression within France as well as abroad, whereby military necessity and the restoration of order took utter precedence and permitted the military governor of a town or region to take all steps necessary to pacify the area in question.[37] Siege warfare thus overlapped with guerrilla warfare, in that both blur the lines between combatant and civilian, and loosen conventional constraints on soldiers' behaviour.

The type of war fought by the French in their attempt to subdue the Puglian and Calabrian countryside seriously backfired. Despite having captured the capital city and destroyed the Neapolitan army, they found themselves hard pressed to establish any sort of order and the Parthenopean Republic they erected came crumbling down once they were forced to march north to meet the invasion launched by the Second

Coalition. Having waged war without restraint on the cities, towns and villages of southern Italy, their wounded were massacred as soon as the army moved out and they were harassed at every turn by large bands of insurgents as they marched north. Chatton evoked the carnage that they both wrought and suffered as the Army of Naples retreated through hostile territory:

> We had to leave our wounded behind in Capua, we hadn't gone more than a league before they were attacked and burned alive … We had marched for three days without seeing a soul in any town or village, we found them when we reached Isola, a small but strong town … After forcing a passage across the river we slaughtered them all, we seized the town and we killed everyone, men, women and children. We pillaged it and set fire to it.[38]

The contrasts which emerge between the siege of Mantua and the siege of Naples, and Puglia-Campania-Calabria more generally, illustrate a number of important factors for understanding siege warfare and its effects on soldiers and civilians. The deliberate starvation of the garrison and population of Mantua pales in comparison to the descriptions of streets choked with dead bodies after the storming of Naples. The numerous evocations of mass killing in the small towns of southern Italy show yet a further escalation of the brutality that can arise from the interaction between a specific understanding of the laws of war and the psychological, ideological and contingent circumstances of a conflict. The formal and relatively familiar behaviour of all actors in the siege of Mantua gave way to an improvised and adapted variant of the rules of siege war in Naples. However, when the population of the countryside and small towns began to bear arms against the French it seems to have become, with exceptions, a no-holds-barred fight to the death with quarter rarely offered or expected. This points to one important preliminary conclusion: when civilians involved themselves actively in a siege it appears to have invalidated the usual restraint they were meant to benefit from and the rights of war were asserted without the formal constraints of a series of summons. There is also a hint, in the rapid resort to dehumanising language, that the slaughter in southern Italy was seen as more justified since their adversaries were less civilised and hence less deserving of quarter.[39] These dramatic and deadly consequences of siege warfare operating outside its normal contexts was also evident during the Egyptian campaign, possibly more so.

Jaffa

Having secured peace with all the major European powers except for Britain, the Directory, with some encouragement from Bonaparte, ordered the preparation of an invasion of Egypt, ostensibly to strike at British trade and Empire in India. The French fleet, carrying many of the battle-hardened units and generals of the Army of Italy, reached Egypt in July 1798. After a relatively brief campaign, the army secured the majority of lower Egypt including Cairo. The Mameluke Army, which had controlled the country, was defeated except for a small force under Murad-Bey in upper Egypt and some who had fled to Syria. Nelson's British Mediterranean Fleet destroyed the French Navy at Aboukir Bay, which cut off communications with France and left Bonaparte and his army stranded. This sense of being under siege in a foreign country with a largely hostile populace and the might of the Ottoman Empire to contend with certainly had a negative effect on morale and possibly rendered the French more brutal in their dealings with rebellious locals. There are endless accounts of the slaughter of villagers and peasants, often for relatively minor acts of resistance.

The suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire had been infringed by the invasion, and a declaration of holy war played a part in inspiring numerous insurrections and revolts against the French, not least the revolt of Cairo in September 1798. The Porte had ordered the formation of two armies to eject the French, one in Syria and the other to be transported from Rhodes. Having no fleet Bonaparte decided to attack the threat at its accessible source and marched a large part of his army, some 14,000 men, across the desert. They seized El-Arish, where the lives of the defenders were spared after a siege, and Gaza surrendered without a fight. Jaffa was the first fortified city in their path and full formal siege preparations began on 3 March 1799. The envoy sent to summon the Pasha to surrender was beheaded and his head was, by some accounts, catapulted back into the French camp; according to others it was paraded around the city on a pike.[40] Either way, the combination of an extremely strenuous march through the ferocious desert heat with inadequate supplies, Arab cavalry raids, artillery fire from the town, a number of sorties by the defenders who beheaded their victims, and the killing of the envoy seems to have left the troops in a volatile psychological state.[41]

When the French took the town by assault, both the logic of siege warfare and the soldiers' mental state led them to ransack the town

and massacre the inhabitants along with the garrison. In the words of Alexandre Lacorre: 'the unfortunate inhabitants did not escape this disaster, their possessions were pillaged, their women were raped and 3000 of them perished… The soldiers, drunk with rage and their success could not distinguish between Christian, Maghrebin and Muslim, [and] this charming small town had everything that is terrible in war visited upon it'.[42] Antoine Bonnefons described it as 'a horrible carnage from which not even women and children were spared, the streets were blocked by dead bodies and the soldiers' faces were the image of death'.[43] Accounts vary but the pillage seems to have gone on for up to two days and was only stopped by the intervention of officers backed by dragoons.

The gruesome aftermath saw the 2000 odd survivors from the garrison, who had laid down their arms, brought to the beach in chains and killed with bayonets to save ammunition.[44] This episode in particular is quite well known and has been widely condemned as an example of Bonaparte's particularly ruthless approach to war.[45] Gunther Rosenberg has qualified it as a deviation from the norms of French military comportment in the period.[46] An argument can be made that the killing of the garrison in cold blood was a consequence of military necessity, a term which has often been used to skirt around the conventions of war. Vigo-Roussillon added an interesting extra layer to this stating that 'the army obeyed, albeit with a sense of disgust and horror, nonetheless they knew that in Egypt war was to the death and had often seen their comrades massacred pitilessly … Living in the Orient we had begun to adopt the *moeurs* of the Orient'.[47] The Mameluke, Bedouin and Turkish forces were indeed notorious for giving no quarter and, while this does not for a second excuse the massacre at Jaffa, it indicates how easily the French abandoned the conventions of war they were used to. However, it also hints at the deeply damaging psychological effect on the French of the unusual situation of being themselves besieged within Egypt while also laying siege to enemy towns.

As Philip Dwyer has rightly pointed out, the massacre in Jaffa of civilians after the siege, but also of the surviving garrison, was not utterly out of place in European warfare, with similar butchery having been practised by English, Russian and French troops elsewhere.[48] What does mark it out is that many of the garrison had surrendered in the mosque and other prisoners had been captured elsewhere, making this an exceptional infringement of the customary codes of warfare, even siege warfare. Geoffrey Best has pointed out that in Spain, after years of ruthless

guerrilla war, the French still gave quarter to captured insurgents.[49] While this does not demonstrate conclusively that the non-European status of the enemy made it easier for the French to break with the norms of warfare, it does presage the less restrained tactics routinely employed by European powers in colonial contexts in the nineteenth century.

Cairo

Following the defeat, or rather the failure, of the siege of Saint Jean d'Acre, the French army retreated through Palestine, burning crops and villages as they went. The army was at this stage demoralised by its failure and afflicted by plague and the harassing raids of Bedouin horsemen. While many of the troops describe the 'triumphal' entry to Cairo in glowing terms of relief and even homecoming, their position in Egypt was markedly more tenuous. Large armies continued to be amassed against them but Bonaparte, in July 1799, led the French to a significant victory over a Turkish invasion force which landed near Aboukir. Barely more than a month later he had sailed for France in the night, accompanied by a number of his generals, some of his savants and his elite guides. Ottoman persistence, and the sheer vastness of their military resources, saw another landing, this time near Damietta, defeated by the French in October, but discontent was rising within the army and a number of men were put to death for mutiny in November.[50] This period of French dominance and relative stability, under General Kléber, was also characterised by serious doubts as to the long-term feasibility of remaining in Egypt in the face of repeated attritional invasions. These considerations led to the negotiation of the first capitulation agreement, signed by Kléber and the Grand Vizier on 23 January 1800. Under the terms of this agreement, the English and Turkish fleets were to transport the French army with full honours of war, and retaining their arms and flags, as a sign that they were undefeated, back to France, while the Turkish army was to reoccupy gradually the towns as the French evacuated them. The stipulations of this agreement draw yet more parallels between the French occupation and being under siege. The right to leave a place with arms and flags was often found during negotiated ends to sieges, in Mantua for instance, as was the guarantee of safe passage as opposed to being taken prisoner.

This agreement, however, broke down as a result of the British refusal to transport a hardened French army back to Europe at the very time

that the Second Coalition was inflicting serious losses on the French. The reportedly massive army under the Grand Vizier had by this stage advanced close to Cairo and the French had to fight against overwhelming numbers in the Battle of Heliopolis on 19 March 1800. Their characteristic discipline and tactics saw them prevail yet again, and the Ottoman army of some 40,000 men was scattered.[51] Some of them, however, had retreated towards Cairo, which was for the most part undefended, Kléber having required most of the army for the battle.

The combination of rumours about the French departure, a not unrealistic assessment that the sheer size of the Ottoman force would destroy the French, and the mounting tension of the weeks prior to the eventual collapse of the capitulation agreement, all contributed to the uprising by the populace of Cairo and other towns against the French. In Cairo the inhabitants had the support of the considerable number of Turkish and Mameluke troops and the city fortifications had been significantly improved by the French.[52] Kléber had already sent troops back to assist the small garrison and with the rest of the army he pursued the chaotically retreating force of the Grand Vizier. The main French army returned to Cairo on 27 March and surrounded the city the following day. The situation by then was that a small French force was besieged within the citadel by the Mamelukes and the populace, who were in turn besieged within Cairo by the French army, who were themselves somewhat under siege in Egypt. While we should not make too much of this, it can perhaps help explain the move towards increasingly destructive tactics, as well as the willingness of the French to evacuate the country eventually, despite the blood they had shed in conquering and holding it. This breakdown in the normal form of sieges did not prevent Kléber offering a capitulation to Cairo and to Boulaq, a nearby town which had also risen up against the French. Although neither offer was accepted, they nonetheless demonstrate the continued relevance of certain norms of siege warfare to the comportment of the French.

The Greek and Coptic populations of Cairo were attacked by the besieged insurgents, as were the homes of European merchants in the city. Nakoula-al-Turki recounted how the population committed 'an incalculable number of horrors and abominations on the Christians … their women were violated and the town was the very image of devastation'.[53] Laval claimed that any native women who had had any contact with the French were burned alive in the squares of the city.[54] These atrocities, or rumours of atrocities, may also help explain the

gratuitousness of the French bombardment. Malus described how the French set up a rolling bombardment of the Turkish positions and the barricades in the streets.[55] Millet recounted how they shelled indiscriminately and used inflammable bombs, and while he regretted that the earthen houses failed to catch fire, he sadistically observed that 'a large number of the inhabitants were crushed under the rubble of their houses where they hid to escape the bombs. They were mistaken, only the grand mosque was bomb-proof'.[56] The French had thus abandoned the usual siege tactic of targeting only military buildings and fortifications; instead they seem to have targeted civilians indiscriminately. Millet again, clearly relishing it in the retelling, wrote about how a team of sappers observed locals holding a celebration outside a palace:

> The Turks were making music, dancing and engaging in their ignorant celebrations … Seeing them in such good humour we maliciously decided to put an end to their nice concert, which appeared more like a sorcerers' sabbath than human festivities. We set the mine alight and it was as effective as we had hoped, burying all the followers of Mohammed in the ruins.[57]

The tone of this and a number of other narratives of repression in Egypt stand out as especially vindictive among the memoirs from the period. This may have been because this was the second time Cairo had to be retaken; because after a victory as complete as Heliopolis further fighting seemed ludicrous; or because of the attacks on civilians within the city. However, it is also likely that their vindictiveness was facilitated by the non-European and non-Christian identity of the enemy.

The siege of Cairo lasted from 20 March until 21 April 1800, house to house combat followed, coupled with incessant bombardment of first the fortifications and then rebel districts once French troops had penetrated the city. The sack of Boulaq helped to precipitate the surrender of Cairo. After an extraordinary bombardment, French troops, in Bricard's words, stormed the town, deliberately setting it alight. François described how 'we used our bayonets to fill their trenches with dead bodies … we spread the fire from the outskirts as we fought our way in and were on the point of killing the remaining defenders when they laid down their arms'.[58] Bricard explained that 'the town was given up to pillage and the horrors of war … the merchant quarter was nothing but cinders while the rest of the town had been demolished'.[59] Moiret wrote

of how 'I saw the majority of the inhabitants killed by bayonet … After this severe and sad punishment those who knew Boulaq beforehand would not have recognised it. Such are the results of the terrible right of war'.[60] To return briefly to François's account, he wrote that they gave quarter to the remainder of the defenders but went on to note that any non-Egyptian taken prisoner was killed on the spot.[61] His usually moderate tone was transformed when he recounted how he suspected one captive was English. 'Once I became convinced he was genuinely English I blew his brains out. In doing so I proved my hatred for this nation, the cause of all our ills.'[62] This is once again a departure from the usual form of siege warfare. The Egyptian survivors of the garrison were spared but any foreigners were not, demonstrating the malleability of the norms around sieges but also the level of resentment against the English for having destroyed their means of returning home and then scuppering the first capitulation agreement.

The fighting continued in Cairo for another week. The story told by many of the memoirists claimed that the insurgents sent envoys to Kléber who motioned to them to look out the window at what had befallen Boulaq, as a threat that their city would be razed if the resistance continued.[63] The French reaction to the siege was certainly partly motivated by the increasingly evident fragility of their hold on the country and such 'salutary examples' were practised in European contexts during the Napoleonic wars. There was also, however, as noted above, a particular tone to the narratives of these events which appeared to relish the destruction. This was unlike many other contexts, where French soldiers expressed their regret for the consequences of their attack on a town.[64] While we cannot definitively conclude that the soldiers took to slaughtering Muslims or Arab Egyptians more easily than they did any other people they fought, the ways in which they described the massacres they committed certainly indicate that this was the case.

CONCLUSION

The sieges analysed here and their hugely varied outcomes for civilians provide rich examples for understanding the conditions, ramifications and complexities of siege warfare during the Revolutionary era. Comparisons between the forms and results of these sieges allow a number of conclusions to be drawn and pose questions as to the nature of siege warfare. One theme which emerges strongly is the spatial variable.

During this period, siege warfare was applied to much larger areas than had traditionally been the case. This suggests that a siege was as much a mentality as a geographically determined and constrained type of positional warfare. The evidence from Calabria, Egypt and Syria supports this case. The sense which emerges from accounts of these campaigns is that in southern Italy the French were laying siege to an entire province, while in the Middle East they were themselves under siege in Egypt while simultaneously laying siege to cities within it; similarly, in the insurgent Vendée, the French described their actions as laying siege to the entire region.[65] Indeed, Brown's discussion of the Vendée applies further creative tension to traditional understandings of sieges, by showing how heightened civilian engagement and severe repression of insurgents occurred in large regions as well as urban spaces.[66] In light of this it seems reasonable to suggest that sieges could occur independently of cities and that we should instead focus on sites, dynamics and mentalities of siege warfare. This means that an island, a mountain range, a river valley or an entire region could be besieged in similar ways to the more traditional urban sites of siege.

This leads to a second conclusion, namely that it is time to reconsider the characteristic view of Napoleonic warfare as one quintessentially of movement. The numerous and often dreadful sieges of these wars, alongside the extended counter-insurgency and pacification operations from the Vendée, to Spain, Tyrol and Calabria, suggest that the kind of broadened siege warfare discussed above was the third face of Napoleonic warfare (after pitched battle and guerrilla war). This in turn obliges historians to consider the full impact of sieges on civilian populations. While Katherine Aaslestadt has examined the impact of sieges on civilians in Germany and Michael Broers has illustrated the extent of guerrilla, bandit and counter-insurgency conflict throughout the Empire, applying the expanded spatial context of siege warfare described here can add significantly to this work and will also refocus study of the wars towards the experiences of civilian populations.[67]

The importance of the expanded spatial conceptualisation of siege war becomes especially clear when applied to civilians. The ramifications of storming a town for civilians were widely understood. Yet, as the case of Puglia-Campania-Calabria indicates, there were similar implications when it came to storming an entire region. In fact it was during just such non-traditional sieges that soldiers' conduct most easily broke down into massacre, as, for example, in both Naples and Cairo, where the insurgent

populace was backed by regular troops. Here, the army was capable of extreme levels of destruction, although as was evident in Naples, it did not necessarily lead to the troops entering the frenzied bloodlust sometimes described. Even Cairo and Boulaq—although subject to far greater destruction and death than Naples—escaped the fate of Jaffa and got off more lightly than many villages of Puglia and Campania. In light of this it is not possible to delineate a clear set of variables which determined the outcome of taking a town after a siege. The psychological state of the soldiers themselves as well as their sympathy with the population, or lack thereof, played an important yet unquantifiable role in their behaviour at the denouement of a siege.

A related conclusion concerns the role played by civilians during sieges. The cardinal sin was for the civilian population to assist actively the besieged garrison by bearing arms. In such instances, the general impulse to spare civilian lives was quickly abandoned for particularly vicious massacres without a whisper of quarter. Soldiers' conduct when storming a town was nonetheless generally predicated on a number of factors: the responses to summons, the level of risk and hardship to which the besieging army had been exposed and whether civilians had actively assisted the garrison. While following the traditional etiquette of a siege allowed avoidance of mass killing and destruction, breaches of these norms could have disastrous consequences for the inhabitants and garrison. Furthermore, it seems that this was widely, if not precisely, understood by soldiers and civilians. Philip Dwyer has suggested that massacres were actually used purposefully at times to cow resistant populations. This seems likely given the casual decisions to level towns and slaughter civilians in Italy and in Egypt (as well as in Spain and Russia in the following decade).[68] This complicates the question by adding the priorities of exercising and maintaining power to the already convoluted equation that determined the fate of civilians in a siege. To this analysis can be added Howard Brown's insights into the tendency of threatened regimes to resort to 'domestic state violence' of dramatic proportions, which during our period was often characterised, fittingly, by the use of 'State of Siege' legislation both within and outside France.[69]

Finally, there is the issue of whether soldiers treated European and non-European populations differently in siege situations. While the case studies presented here cannot offer a definitive conclusion, they do suggest that civilians of a different race or religion were treated with less humanity. The sense of relish when (some) soldiers described massacres

of Middle Eastern Muslims whose cities and towns fell is largely absent from accounts of similar events in Europe. Even within Europe, however, there is evidence that the French saw and thus treated Germans as more human, or more civilised, than Italians, especially southern Italians. While there are certainly examples of massacres in the German lands, these were less prevalent than in Italy or Spain, despite Germany being the principal battlefield during the period. This is supported by the way in which the soldiers generally described the Germans, namely as generous and decent in their dealings with the French, as opposed to the Italians and Egyptians who came off badly when military memoirists penned their ethnographies of the populations they encountered. The inhabitants of Italy, especially the peasantry but also the urban poor, were further down the soldiers' imagined hierarchy of civilised peoples than their Belgian, Dutch or German counterparts. The Egyptians, peasantry and elites alike, were even further down this hierarchy. All this served to make slaughtering them easier, or at least more easily justifiable in hindsight. This would appear to chime with and presage the development of double standards in warfare during the nineteenth century, with codified warfare between European powers and no holds barred combat with colonial opponents.

The evolving, and far from uniform, set of norms and nuances which governed siege warfare was stretched almost to breaking point by the ideological and identity conflicts of the Revolutionary wars. The extended spatial dimension of sieges, while already evident in Louis XIV's devastation of the Palatinate, was scaled up further again, encompassing vast regions. Alongside the psychological pressure and ideological rancour of the wars, this change led to increased threats to the lives and property of civilians. This was only furthered by civilians committing to local, national or ideological resistance to the French, flouting the protection afforded by older understandings of the role of civilians in a siege. While the national dimension was emphasized in Europe, other markers of difference, in and outside Europe, also came to the fore in sieges of the period. Religion and race both appear to have played some role in determining the way sieges were conducted and civilians treated in the aftermath. In this destructive intensification we can see the brutality of the wars of religion, and the routine sacking of enemy towns merge with more 'modern' national and ideological enmities to make sieges more dangerous than ever for both soldiers and civilians.

Notes

1. Musée des Civilisations d'Europe et de la Méditerranée, Marseille, Collection Léon Pales 35AP-19, 'La Prise de Mantoue', collected by Jean Joly in Vandenesse, 1822.
2. Ibid., Léon Pales's notes include detailed references to songs collected throughout France.
3. Geoffrey Parker, 'Early Modern Europe' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (New Haven, 1994), 48–51; Alexander Gillespie, *A History of the Laws of War: Volume 2, The Customs and Laws of War with Regards to Civilians in Times of Conflict* (Oxford, 2011), 130–131, 136–142.
4. David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (London, 2007), 48–51.
5. Philip G. Dwyer, '"It Still Makes me Shudder": Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars', *War in History* 16 (2009): 383–384.
6. Ibid., 395, 404.
7. Gillespie, *Laws of War*, 143–144, 152–153, 243–245.
8. Pierre Constant, *Hymnes et chansons de la révolution; aperçu général et catalogue* (Paris, 1904), 781–782.
9. David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York, 1966), 95.
10. Ibid., 100.
11. Auguste-Frédéric-Louis-Wiesse de Marmont, *Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse, de 1792 à 1841* (Paris, 1857), 213.
12. Émile Gaillard and François Vermale (eds), *Jean-Claude Carrier: Mémoires d'un jeune militaire Savoyard de 1793 à 1800* (Chambéry, 1930), 91.
13. Jean Barada (ed.), 'Lettres d'Alexandre Ladrix, Volontaire de l'an II', *Carnet de la Sabretache* 29(303) (1926): 76–77.
14. Guillaume Lecoq, 'Journal d'un grenadier de la Garde', *La Revue de Paris*, 18(4) (1911): 838. July–August.
15. Léon G. Pélissier (ed.), *De la guerre et de l'anarchie: les cahiers du capitaine Laugier ou Mémoires historiques des campagnes et aventures d'un capitaine du 27e régiment d'infanterie légère, par Jérôme-Roland Laugier* (Aix-en-Provence, 1893), 123–124.
16. Ibid., 125–126.
17. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, 121; Gillespie, *Laws of War*, 66.
18. Loredan Larchey (ed.), *Journal du cannonier Bricard 1792–1802* (Paris, 1891), 262.
19. Ibid., 262.

20. Gaillard and Vermale, *Jean-Claude Carrier*, 91–92.

21. Léonce Grasiliser (ed.), *Mémoires de l'adjudant-général Jean Landrieux; chef d'état-major de la cavalerie de l'armée d'Italie, chargé du bureau secret 1795–1797, tome premier, Bergame-Brescia* (Paris, 1893), 194–195.

22. Gaillard and Vermale, *Jean-Claude Carrier*, 139; Marmont, *Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont*, 256–257.

23. Gillespie, *Laws of War*, 65–66.

24. Pélissier, *De la guerre et de l'anarchie*, 147–149.

25. *Courrier Patriotique des départements de l'Isère, des Alpes et du Mont Blanc*, 22 Germinal Year 5 (11 April 1797).

26. Nicolas Cadet, 'Les soulèvements populaires de 1799 et 1806 dans le royaume de Naples: insurrections nationales ou guerre sociale?', in *La Politique par les armes; conflits internationaux et politisation (XVe–XIXe siècle)*, ed. Laurent Bourquin, Philippe Hamon, Alain Hugon and Yann Lagadec (Rennes, 2013), 210–211.

27. Pierre Lahure (ed.), *Souvenirs de la vie militaire du lieutenant-général Baron L.-J. Lahure, 1787–1815* (Paris, 1895), 185; Ernest Gridel and Capitaine Richard (eds), *Cahiers de vieux soldats de la Révolution et de l'Empire* (Paris, 1903), 76–77; Étienne Guillaume, Gustave Maison and Yves Moerman (eds), *Les trente batailles du sergent Denis Moreau; journal de campagne (1794–1809)* (Brussels, 2011), 145–147; General Charles Auguste Bonnamy, *Coup d'œil rapide sur les opérations de la campagne de Naples jusqu'à l'entrée des français dans cette ville* (Paris, Year VIII/1800), 75–76; Alan Forrest, 'The Ubiquitous Brigand: The Politics and Language of Repression', in *Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates*, ed. Charles Esdaile (Basingstoke, 2005).

28. Lahure, *Souvenirs*, 204.

29. Ibid., 204–205.

30. Gridel and Richard, *Cahiers de vieux soldats*, 73.

31. Bonnamy, *Coup d'œil*, 95–97.

32. Lahure, *Souvenirs*, 206.

33. Bonnamy, *Coup d'œil*, 98–99.

34. Pélissier, *De la guerre et de l'anarchie*, 185–186.

35. Gridel and Richard, *Cahiers de vieux soldats*, 76–77; Lahure, *Souvenirs*, 210.

36. Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels and their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Oxford, 2010), 59. See also Chapters 4 and 6 in this volume.

37. Howard G. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon* (Charlottesville, 2006), 200–212.

38. Gridel and Richard, *Cahiers des deux vieux soldats*, 78–80.

39. This tendency requires qualification in that a similar discourse was employed against the Vendean rebels of western France, the Spanish and Portuguese during the Peninsular War and against those Egyptians who resisted the French. As such it might have been a useful device to help minimise the guilt experienced by the soldiers or it may have been symptomatic of an imagined hierarchy of civilised peoples who deserved respect commensurate to their rank.

40. Jérôme-Étienne-Marie Richardot, *Relation de la campagne de Syrie, spécialement des sièges de Jaffa et de Saint-Jean d'Acre* (Paris, 1839), 19; Henri Galli (ed.), *L'Armée française en Égypte, 1798–1801; Journal d'un officier de l'Armée d'Égypte* (Paris, 1883), 125.

41. Général Thoumas (ed.), *L'agenda de Malus: Souvenirs de l'Expédition de l'Égypte, 1798–1801* (Paris, 1892), 131–134; Commandant Grandin (ed.), *Le carnet de campagne du Commandant Giraud* (Paris, 1899), 41–42; Léon G. Pélissier (ed.), 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte (souvenirs d'Antoine Bonnefons, 7 novembre 1792–21 février 1801)', *Carnet de la Sabretache* series 2, 1(121) (1903), 227.

42. Charles-Alcée Campan (ed.), *Journal inédit d'un commis aux vivres pendant l'expédition d'Égypte, voyage à Malte et en Égypte, expédition de Syrie par Alexandre Lacorre* (Bordeaux, 1852), 90.

43. Pélissier, 'Un soldat d'Italie', III, 229.

44. Pierre Vigo-Roussillon (ed.), 'L'expédition d'Égypte; fragment des mémoires militaires du colonel Vigo-Roussillon (1793–1837)', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 August 1890, 604. Some accounts, however, claim that they were shot.

45. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, 236; Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (Basingstoke, 2007), 243.

46. Gunther Rosenberg, 'The Age of Napoleon' in *The Laws of War*, ed. Howard, Andreopoulos and Shulman, 90–94.

47. Vigo-Roussillon, 'L'expédition d'Égypte', 604.

48. Dwyer, 'It Still Makes me Shudder', 386.

49. Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts* (London, 1980), 117.

50. Jacques Jourquin (ed.), *Journal du capitaine François, dit le dromadaire d'Égypte* (Paris, 2003), 347.

51. Paul Strathern, *Napoleon in Egypt: 'The Greatest Glory'* (London, 2007), 413. Some of the soldiers report, however, that it was 160,000 strong. See Jourquin, *Journal du capitaine François*, 360.

52. Emmanuel Bousson de Mairet (ed.), *Souvenirs militaires du Baron Desvernois* (Paris, 1858), 59, claims that they were 30,000 strong, but this is unlikely.

53. Nakoula el Turk, *Histoire de l'expédition des français en Égypte*, trans. M. Desgranges (Paris, 1839), 198.
54. Gaston Wiet (ed.), 'Journal du lieutenant Laval: mémoire inédit sur l'expédition d'Égypte', *Le Revue du Caire* 29 (1941), 97.
55. Thoumas, *L'agenda de Malus*, 189–190.
56. Stanislas Millet (ed.), *Le Chasseur Pierre Millet, Souvenirs de la Campagne d'Égypte 1798–1801 avec introduction, notes et appendices* (Paris, 1903), 190–191.
57. Ibid., 192.
58. Jourquin, *Journal du capitaine François*, 374–375.
59. Larchey, *Journal du cannonier Bricard*, 411.
60. Pierre Belfond (ed.), *Mémoires sur l'Expédition d'Égypte: Joseph-Marie Moiret Capitaine dans la 75e demi-brigade de ligne* (Paris, 1984), 150.
61. Jourquin, *Journal du capitaine François*, 375.
62. Ibid.
63. Bousson de Mairet, *Souvenirs militaires du Baron Desvernois*, 62; Alphonse de Beauchamp (ed.), *Mémoires secrets et inédits, pour servir à l'histoire contemporaine: Jean Gabriel de Niello-Sargy sur l'expédition d'Égypte* (Paris, 1825), 367.
64. Émile-Charles-Frédéric Berthezène (ed.), *Souvenirs militaires de la république et de l'Empire par le Baron Berthezène. Tome II* (Paris, 1855), 125–126; Pélissier, *De la guerre et de l'anarchie*, 106–108.
65. Brown, *Ending the French Revolution*, 200–211, 264.
66. Ibid.
67. Karen Hagemann, '"Unimaginable Horror and Misery": The Battle of Leipzig in October 1813 in Civilian Experience and Perception', in *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820*, ed. Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke, 2009); Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War*.
68. Philip Dwyer, 'Violence and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Massacre, Conquest and the Imperial Enterprise', *The Journal of Genocide Research* 15 (2013): 120–121.
69. Howard G. Brown, 'Domestic State Violence: Repression from the Croquants to the Commune', *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999): 602, 612–613.

Between Positional Warfare and Small War: Soldiers and Civilians During the 'Desolation of the Palatinate' (1688–89)

Emilie Dosquet

Philipsburg was taken in nineteen days; Mannheim in three; Franckendal [*sic*] in two; and Spires [*sic*], Triers [*sic*], Worms, and Oppenheim surrendered as soon as the French presented themselves before their gates.

The king was determined to make a desert of the Palatinate, as soon as these towns were taken. His design in this was to cut off the means of subsistence from the enemy … An order was sent to the army from Louis, signed Louvois, to reduce the whole country to ashes.

The French Generals, who could not refuse obedience, gave notice, in the very midst of winter, to the citizens of all those flourishing and well-built towns, to the inhabitants of the villages and to the Lords of above fifty castles, to quit their dwellings, as everything was immediately to be destroyed by fire and sword. Men, women, old people and children all fled away with the utmost precipitation. Some wandered about in the fields, and the rest

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took shelter in the neighbouring countries; while the soldiers, who are generally quick to execute and exceed commands of rigour, and flow to obey those of clemency, burned and pillaged their country …

All Europe beheld this action with horror. The Officers who executed the command, were ashamed of being the instruments of such barbarities.[1]

This extract from Voltaire's *Age of Louis XIV* recounted, sixty years later, a complex series of French operations as a simplified and seemingly coherent event that he called the 'burning of the Palatinate'. This was perfectly representative of a broader narrative thread, and both drew on previous accounts and was often taken afterwards as a model. Among its typical and distinctive elements, the figures of horrified officers, brutal soldiers and wandering populations stylised both the main actors of these operations and their interactions. Consistent with common stereotypes of war representations, this stylisation was based both on the military operations themselves and on how they were processed, as soon as they occurred, by the news networks of the time. Based on a history of both practices and representations, the aim of this chapter, by focusing on the French operations and their implementation, is to highlight in particular how the military practices laid the foundations of the event known today as the 'Desolation of the Palatinate'. I will consider these French operations as a combination of positional warfare and '*guerre des partis*'—or the type of low-level, small group combat that was neither battle nor siege, and characterised 'small war' under the Sun King.[2] In particular, I discuss the violence of the interactions between soldiers and civilians during what may be termed 'after-siege' operations. Indeed, sieges were not an end in themselves: in the case considered here, they initiated a military occupation and were the first and necessary stage of a strategy based especially on small war. Directly and indirectly implicating the populations, these 'after-siege' operations, like siege warfare itself, generated various types of friction between civilians and soldiers both in towns and in the countryside. Just as siege warfare blurred the frontier and the relationship between soldiers and civilians, these French after-siege operations revealed a more complex reality behind the stereotyped triptych of horrified officers, brutal soldiers and helpless civilians.

At the end of September 1688, Louis XIV initiated the so-called Nine Years War by invading the Upper and Middle Rhine territories of the Holy Roman Empire. After a few weeks of campaign, both banks of the Rhine were militarily occupied. Anticipating an inevitable retreat,

the Sun King—advised by both his Secretary of State for War, Louvois, and his *maréchal général des logis* (chief of staff) Chamlay—decided to implement a systematic strategy of devastation (a so-called scorched-earth strategy) that combined several well-known tactics of the time.[3] For nearly a year, between autumn 1688 and 1689, these French military operations took place on a large scale along the Rhine—between Cologne and Freiburg—from the Electorates of Trier, Cologne and Mainz to the Margraviates of Baden and the Duchy of Württemberg, mostly in the Electoral Palatinate (and its dependencies), as well as in the bishoprics of Worms and Speyer (see Fig. 6.1).

This radical strategy resulted from the Sun King's 'aggressive defence' policy, which he had pursued since the Dutch War (1672–78).[4] In seeking defensive objectives by offensive means, Louis XIV sought to secure French domestic territory by sheltering its margins. The Upper and Middle Rhine region was the primary stage on which the antagonism between the Bourbon and Habsburg monarchies was acted out, and in the 1680s, the Sun King's policy therefore focused on the eastern frontier, which was a blurred territorial patchwork. Thus the strategy implemented along the Rhine served a double purpose. In the short term, it aimed to deny potential supplies and operating bases to Louis XIV's enemy while maintaining his own troops in the field. In the long term, driven by his 'fatal predilection for pre-emptive strikes',[5] Louis XIV intended to protect French territory and prevent any enemy intrusion through Alsace and the Saar by both establishing continuous and fortified borders, and securing them by means of an actual unfortified buffer zone.[6]

In line with French strategic practices, this 'extreme application of standard military practices' resulted from the importance attached by Louis XIV to positional warfare, which shaped seventeenth-century warfare more generally and notably French strategy.[7] Because of the central role that he gave to fortifications in his understanding of French territorial security, the Sun King had 'a taste for "positional warfare"', of which sieges were the best-known expression.[8] By combining positional warfare with small war, however, the systematic strategy of devastation implemented in the Rhineland may be characterised as an 'after-siege' strategy. Daily warfare by detachments of troops who undertook a variety of missions that were logistically and strategically vital, small war was constituent of war as a broader process, which defined the pattern of warfare under Louis XIV.[9] Just as small war played a major strategic role on

Fig. 6.1 Area of the French operations, 1688–89. The maps have been created in collaboration with Teva Meyer, PhD in Geography and Geopolitics (Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

the Netherlands front during the Dutch War, it was also decisive on the Rhine front—still too often neglected by historians—in the French operations known today as the Desolation of the Palatinate. Furthermore, if civilians were in the first instance directly impacted by war during sieges, the French operations show that after-siege operations generated various interactions between soldiers and civilians.

Observing Habsburg progress against the Ottoman Empire, considered to be a counterweight allowing the French king to structure progressively his eastern frontier while the Emperor was occupied in Eastern Europe, Louvois wrote to Vauban in August 1687 that it made the king 'judge opportune to take care to provide the last perfection to his frontier on the side of Germany'.[10] It was no coincidence that Louvois informed Vauban, who was the *commissaire général des fortifications* and the mastermind of the rationalisation of the French border defence system, of the Sun King's designs.[11] As fundamental pieces of the French defensive system, fortresses were a key logistical element in sustaining an army that had increased exponentially.[12] They commanded lines of supplies and communication; sheltered storehouses of ammunition, grain and fodder (so-called magazines); and covered resource areas. As both a 'lock' on French territory and a point of entry into enemy lands, they consequently played a key strategic role, both defensively and offensively. As a result of the logistical issues of European warfare of the time, the cost of maintaining armies in the field, and the Sun King's inclination for positional warfare, the control and exploitation of enemy territories through fortresses and posts had become a major part of French strategy.[13] In order to command the eastern border, the French invasion aimed therefore to take control of the major strongholds of the Rhine and its main tributaries, the Mosel (on the left bank) and the Neckar (on the right bank). Between the end of September and mid-November, French troops garrisoned about fifteen strongholds, fortress cities and walled towns (see Fig. 6.2).

Among them, the conquest of Philippsburg was the key of the invasion. As Louvois observed, this fortress was an 'entrance to Germany'.[14] Once it had been conquered, Boufflers, who commanded troops in the Palatinate, emphasised that it '[covered] the frontiers of the Rhine well' and allowed the king 'to shake all Germany and to penetrate into its best and most beautiful parts'.[15] The taking of Phillipsburg accordingly became one of the topics of the almanacs, which celebrated the Sun King as a 'King of War'.[16] In one of these, we see the Grand Dauphin, holding the baton of command and seconded by the *maréchal* de Duras, in front of the Philipsburg siege (see Fig. 6.3).

'Master of positional warfare',[17] Vauban had improved the already specialized art of siegecraft, which had become a proper science based on sophisticated and rational methods.[18] The star-shaped fortress was first invested and encircled by rings of entrenchments from which, as

Fig. 6.2 French Occupation of the Rhine Territories at the end of 1688 Campaign

depicted in the etching, zigzagging approach trenches were dug to reach the bastions, open a breach and allow soldiers to begin the assault.

At some point, the moment of possible surrender arrived. This was highly codified, with both the honour and integrity of the besieged at stake, because they had to capitulate neither too soon nor too late.[19] The standards usually prescribed that honourable surrender was to occur after the opening of a breach and the repelling of at least two or three assaults. At Frankenthal, therefore, the governor waited until the French gave him the honour of opening a breach.[20] Conversely, fierce resistance could have a high cost because, as customary practices authorised, in such cases an assault could come with plunder and exactions. This was a threat that made several of the Rhine fortress cities and walled towns surrender quickly, or even spontaneously open their gates. Warnings of plunder and burning were thus distributed in Mannheim, and both city and citadel surrendered within a few days.[21] Behind such codes and rites of surrender, there was also an economy of means: the surrender was an exchange within which the besiegers traded marks of honour and safeguarded guarantees for a conquest at a lower cost, thus saving effort, time, material, money and men.[22] One example of such a surrender came at Heidelberg: because it had to be taken with limited damages, the elector obtained a generous capitulation as well as passports to leave the town.[23]

After the key strongholds had been secured, the period of military occupation began. The garrisoned fortress cities and walled towns, as well as the quartered villages and countryside, became spaces of intense daily interaction between soldiers and civilians. Just as statutory quartering in peacetime was a source of conflict, the billeting of soldiers, and even more so of enemy soldiers, engendered a troublesome relationship.[24] Winter quarters were an object of continual negotiation between civilian and military authorities. Besides the financial burden in the form of quartering taxes, billeting was a major strain on the inhabitants who hosted a minimum of four to five soldiers.[25] Their hosts had to provide both the *ustensile* (namely fire, candles and bedding) and consumables (like bread, meat and wine). The encumbrance of quartering was all the more troublesome given that several social groups—magistrates and deputies as well as the bourgeois—were exempted from this everyday financial burden.

Billeting and quartering caused many daily disorders and exactions committed by simple soldiers and unit officers. They often bullied,

Fig. 6.3 *The Capture of Philisbourg by the army of the King, commanded by Monseigneur le Dauphin, the XXX October M.DC.LXXXVIII. Paris: Jean Moncornet, 1689. Source* Bibliothèque nationale de France (Paris): Collection Hennin (n° 5687), RESERVE QB-201 (171)-FT 5

manhandled and robbed their hosts. In Heidelberg, for example, seven to eight soldiers had been billeted by French unit officers at the houses of the electoral representatives to 'live at [their] discretion' (*vivre à discretion*—namely as they pleased) in order to extort extra payments.[26] Recognising a method used to persecute the Huguenots during the so-called *dragonnades*—with which English audiences were familiar[27]—the *London Courant*, an Orangist newspaper which supported the ongoing English 'Glorious Revolution', interpreted this news as the latest expression of the barbarous war of religion undertaken by the papist French King: 'Such a sort of Missionaries, as lately converted the Protestants in *France*, are quartered at Mr. *Fabritius*, the Professor of Divinity's house in *Heydelberg* [*sic*], of whom they demand not only Meat and Drink, but Women to satisfie [*sic*] their Lust upon.'[28]

Evading the control of the military authorities, soldiers also scoured the countryside, seeking loot, ransacking and pillaging populations, in short marauding (*aller à la maraude*). In mid-February 1689, one report recorded several exactions by five to six soldiers, in Heidelberg and its vicinity, who had burst into houses, demanded wine (alcohol being a stimulating factor for excesses) and then raped mothers and daughters (or had intended to do so).[29] Some of these marauding soldiers deserted the army for good, and this 'spirit of desertion' seems to have been a substantial problem during the winter of 1689.[30] Although precisely assessing the full extent of daily indiscipline remains difficult, these disruptive excesses against local populations persisted in the ranks of the French army, despite the deep concern of the Sun King, the improvements introduced by Louvois and the many regulations and ordinances regularly issued in wartime.[31]

In February 1689, the regular missive sent by the counsellor Riesman to the Palatine prince-elector recorded a week of French military brutality in Heidelberg and its vicinity: women and girls were raped, children and old people wandered naked into the streets and woods, and individuals were mutilated or murdered. Consistent with both the collective European imagination of military violence that was based on a stock of textual and iconographic references made up of ancient stereotypes and interpretative patterns, and the representation of French military practices and brutality that had developed during the Dutch War, the report was published anonymously as a representative account of French brutality in the Rhine territories. It became a European editorial success.[32]

War was then a major component of ordinary political information, and such accounts were used to write the printed news. Alongside occasional battles and sieges, small war was an important part of day-to-day warfare, both in the news and in the field, especially during the winter when the major operations came to an end. Moving to winter quarters marked the end of the campaign but not of operations. After the sieges, therefore, small war took over to achieve the military appropriation of the occupied territories. Known at the time as a 'war of parties' (*guerre de partis*), this small war was waged by so-called 'parties' composed of troops detached from several companies of either cavalry, infantry or both. Their size varied from around 20 to 3,000 soldiers, depending on the mission.[33]

Although there was no specialised unit specifically allocated to small war, it was also called a 'war of dragoons' because of their usual presence in the parties.[34] Recognisable from their hood (*chaperon*), dragoons belonged to the mounted infantry. Equipped to fight on horseback as well as on foot, they were very adaptable to the variety of missions implemented by parties. Logistically and strategically vital, these were both offensive and defensive.[35] Some parties led intelligence raids to identify the enemy's movements and reconnoitre the field. They laid the groundwork for sieges by blocking the stronghold to be besieged. They conducted offensive raids against enemy parties as well as military and civilian convoys to disrupt their communications and supply lines and take prisoners and booty. Conversely, they contained enemy raiding parties and covered their own side's strongholds, camps, posts and convoys. They also led vital forage raids to collect fodder for their horses: such raids were all the more crucial given that such raiding was vital to the collection of 'contributions', a system on which the financing of the army in part depended.

Because the French monarchy found it impossible to support the entire cost of the 'Giant' its army had become, the exploitation of enemy territories was a strategically relevant objective that aimed to make war feed war: the importance of the contribution system was, in the French case, the result of this financial weakness.[36] Inherited in particular from the German armies of the Thirty Years War, the contribution system had subsequently been improved by European military authorities. The 'tax of violence' or disorganised looting that had previously sustained European armies was replaced by an orderly administration of resource extraction in the form of contributions, namely taxes in cash and in kind

backed up with the threat of burning and hostage taking. In short, disordered pillage had been institutionalised and rationalised, and in the particularly acute French case provided for perhaps 25 per cent of the expenses of the army in the field.[37]

From autumn 1688, the objective was to 'push the contribution' for as long as enemy troops were far from the right bank of the Rhine.[38] The winter quarters were consequently set up with this purpose in mind, as in Heilbronn, a bridgehead into the East of the Empire on the Neckar and seen as 'the source of infinite money'.[39] Heilbronn was one of a string of fortress cities and walled towns, each controlling and covering key areas from which resources were tapped. These were the designated strong points of contribution collection, and consequently important quarters of cavalry and dragoons had been established in them.[40] Although it was usually not in the interests of the occupying army to exhaust the territories where it intended to stay, contributions provided the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: maximising them was a means of exhausting the enemy while financing French troops.[41]

Contribution being assessed by each *intendant* in charge of a defined region, parties were first sent from the key strongholds with warrants advising the local authorities to organise the payment within a given period of time (see Fig. 6.4).[42]

Once the time had elapsed, parties led so called 'fire-raids' or 'executions' to rush slow payments and to compel or punish recalcitrant communities: concretely, they torched houses, buildings or villages after having plundered and taken both booty and hostages. The contribution areas were criss-crossed by these brutal treasurers who used terror to enforce payments by the threat of violence. Far from the control of the military authorities, the business of contribution collection added to the indiscipline of the troops and was accompanied by uncontrolled brutalities against civilians. The line between authorised booty and unpermitted looting, authorised and unauthorised violence, was all the thinner given that the distinction between marauding soldiers and soldiers in parties was in practice only determined by the official order that the latter held.[43]

Called '*courses*' like the privateers' raids at sea, these raids also took the form of long expeditions, particularly in Swabia (between the Neckar and the Danube) and Franconia (on the East of the Neckar). The one-month raid led by Feuquières with 1,400 men is a good example. Starting from Heilbronn, this party scoured about 500 kilometres

Fig. 6.4 French appropriation and exploitation of the occupied Rhine territories

of territory, collecting numerous hostages and around **240,000 livres**.[44] The end of this *course* in Swabia was related in a German account of 1689.[45] The associated etching showed a map with several burning small towns. Below the Danube, the etcher portrayed a party leaving one of these after the execution (see Fig. 6.5).

Gloating over his success, Feuquières himself wrote to Louvois: 'There is hardly anything that resembles more the raids of the Tartars.'[46] Such '*courses*'—and French '*guerre de partis*' more generally—did

Fig. 6.5 *The newly awakened incendiary LaBroche* (n.p., 1689). *Source* Herzog August Bibliothek (Wolfenbüttel), Xb 5881

indeed share several common features with war in Central and Eastern Europe, and the printed news reported both these French raids and the Turkish–Tartar raids of the ongoing Polish–Ottoman War in similar terms. This contributed to the classical depiction of the French as Turks and barbarians.

In order to achieve the complete military appropriation and exploitation of enemy territories, a secondary fortified network, made up of posts and outposts (castles, forts and small towns) covering the interstices between the main strongholds, was optimised. Raiding parties were thus in charge of taking these posts and of preventively destroying those that did not have any immediate use, such as securing communication and supply lines and above all contribution collection, so that the enemy could not use them later. Just as contribution collection was not an end in itself and was subordinated to a larger strategic goal,[47] so these operations were a parallel to the defensive improvement of the fortifications that were kept. They contributed to the same strategic goal—'to form the frontier'.[48]

The French operations must be seen from three interlinked perspectives. In the short term, the objective was to deny the enemy quarters on the Neckar as the major German princes mobilised their troops from the end of October 1688. In the medium term of the upcoming campaign of 1689, the aim was 'to prevent the enemy from crossing the Rhine next year as high as Cologne'.[49] The long-term goal of the war was 'to seal the frontier' so that 'the Rhine would be the frontier of the realm'.[50] The invasion of September 1688 was designed as a demonstration of power to compel the Emperor 'with an absolute necessity to give into time and force'.[51] But this ideal scenario soon appeared improbable, and the defensive obsession of the Sun King led him to extend and radicalise a short-term strategy to reach the long-term purpose by progressively elaborating with his counsellors a large-scale policy of destruction.[52] The radical potential of this strategy lay in the ambiguity of the French terminology, which defined 'to raze or to dismantle a fortress or a city' as merely the demolition of its walls and fortifications.[53] In line with the razing operations of posts, the maximalist logic was to dismantle and entirely ruin both the walls and habitations of strategically located fortress cities and walled towns that were considered unacceptable threats for the security of the eastern frontier. Such a radical policy was elaborated on the basis of the case of Mannheim, a walled Palatine city whose fortress of Friedrichsburg commanded the confluence of the Rhine and the Neckar.[54]

This policy of destruction evolved over the time that it took for it to be implemented. With the long-term goal of the war in mind, it followed the logic of unavoidable retreat to the line of French fortresses on the left bank of the Rhine (see Fig. 6.2). Facing the progressive formation of a large anti-French alliance and thus the perspective of a multi-front war, the Sun King did not have the means to maintain on the right bank the numerous troops that would have been necessary to occupy it during a long conflict. The retreat began at the end of December 1688 from the advanced quarters on the Neckar, and a month later all strongholds in Württemberg and Baden were abandoned. Accompanying the withdrawal of troops from the remaining quarters on the right bank of the Rhine, Heidelberg was abandoned in the beginning of March and Mannheim in mid-April. Grain and fodder were collected from the local populations and placed in French fortresses, and since the wheat was now green, parties foraged as much as possible while spoiling what they could not carry away. To protect Alsace during the upcoming campaign,

the potential operating bases of Worms, Speyer, Oppenheim and Bingen along the left bank of the Rhine were abandoned in mid-June. The objective of the campaign being then to prevent the enemy quartering between the Upper Rhine and the Neckar during the next winter, Duras's army crossed the Rhine at the beginning of August to dismantle the former French quarters between Philippsburg and Freiburg.[55] More than twenty post-towns were ruined, as well as several dozen villages burned, and the countryside was foraged.[56] In order to protect the Saar by anticipating the loss of Mainz and Bonn, the key post-towns of the Mosel banks had to be 'burn[ed] to the last house', while the defence of Mont-Royal was organised and the sowing of grains was prohibited in the surrounding six leagues.[57] Mainz having surrendered, Duras's army crossed back over the Rhine at the beginning of September. Between the Nahe and the Rhine, Frankenthal and about ten small towns from Worms to Speyer were demolished. In mid-October, as Bonn surrendered, Kreuznach and Alzey were razed before the separation of the troops. The retreat stabilised on the fortified French line, and the major destruction operations ended with the campaign.

Small war played a major operational role in the implementation of this destruction strategy. During the winter quarters, the dismantling operations had been executed in the major strongholds to be demolished by the garrisons. Simultaneously, besides razing posts, parties undertook operations in the surrounding areas, ruining villages, boroughs and small towns, while foraging and spoiling crops. During the campaign, Duras's army itself acted as a kind of fortress, and its parties worked hand in hand with those of the remaining French garrisoned strongholds in implementing the destructive operations.[58] Raiding parties were thus major players in a strategy which belonged fundamentally to small war. Rather than working randomly and in a gratuitously brutal manner, their carefully coordinated operations contributed significantly to French strategic goals.

The major objective of these destructive operations was the dismantling of earth and stone fortifications. After the engineers' assessment, the *intendants* assigned the work contracts to Alsatian entrepreneurs by public auction. Embankments were levelled, parts of walls were sapped and miners dug galleries for explosives in order to make breaches and ruin main towers. Such dismantling operations required a large workforce composed of both soldiers and civilians. In Mannheim, for example, they employed five battalions and 600 peasants from the electorate

of Mainz, or around 4000 men.[59] During this dismantling work, stocks of food, fodder and ammunitions, artillery and furniture were conveyed to the French fortresses. For their part, the inhabitants were ordered to evacuate to Alsace with their belongings. The fortifications having been razed, the buildings and walls were blown up; the houses and the remaining fodder and grains set on fire; and the sidewalls and gables sapped, before the city was finally abandoned.

Nevertheless, such precise planning only concerned a handful of cities, whose fates were sealed from autumn 1688, namely Mannheim, Heidelberg, Speyer, Worms, Oppenheim and Frankenthal. In practice, the implementation of such policies even in some of these cities was much more disorganised, mainly due to a lack of time and men. Troops were already in short supply and were required to work on fortifications in addition to collecting contributions. Furthermore, the *intendants* struggled to compel the peasants to help. The hurried retreat from Württemberg and Baden meant that only some posts were razed and only a few breaches were made in the walls of the towns. From the spring, the lack of time became increasingly acute. Because he did not have 'an infinite amount of time', Duras decided first to set fire to houses and then to sap sidewalls.[60] Although both burning and dismantling were insufficient on their own, the troops often only had the time during the campaign for the former, leaving the dismantling of the remaining walls and houses to the parties, or even to the inhabitants who were then compelled to do the work themselves.[61]

This strategy was the apogee of the so-called 'cabinet strategy', where the King planned and ordered in Versailles, and only left the execution to officers on the field. But it also indicated its limits.[62] Besides the lack of time and men, it depended upon the willingness of the officers and commanders to carry out the king's orders. After having been admonished for the hasty retreat from Württemberg and Baden, for instance,[63] Montclart, who commanded the French troops on the Rhine during the winter, was once again reprimanded regarding Heidelberg's destruction. Tessé, his subordinate in charge of the destruction, had abandoned the town having set 432 houses alight, though only 30–35 actually burned to the ground, after the inhabitants successfully put out most of the fires following his departure.[64] The variables of time, men and command meant that, although the destruction was extensive, it was also, despite the strict orders from Versailles, very heterogeneous. In Heidelberg, for instance, only the castle and walls were really damaged, while Mannheim

was razed to the ground.[65] As often and strongly as Louvois repeated that 'there is nothing worse than half executing the orders that the King gives to burn places in order to prevent the enemy from coming to establish themselves in them', effecting the destruction ultimately depended on the officers in the field.[66] Although Chamlay was concretely in charge of the campaign operations,[67] Louvois had to deal with Duras who was in overall command and who was reluctant to order the destruction of entire cities. Expressing his 'pain at destroying main cities such as Worms and Speyer', he underlined 'the unfortunate effect that such desolation could make in the world for the reputation and glory' of the king.[68] In the following months, he delayed or suspended destruction operations more than once, and as a result was finally replaced by his brother, the *maréchal* de Lorge, in November 1689.

Duras was the only officer who openly expressed some strong reservations, with the noteworthy exception of Tessé who, while carefully describing the implementation of his orders, took the risk of briefly expressing his emotion at having to burn the electoral capital.[69] Although the sympathetic officer was a standard narrative figure of depictions of war, the recurring references in printed accounts and news to French officers pitying and helping populations probably reflected some reality. In any case, as the extract from Voltaire at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, this figure became a topos of narratives of the French operations. Nevertheless, it seems that the vast majority of officers endeavoured, despite their possible moral reservations, to execute their orders to the best of their abilities. This was certainly the reality that lay behind textual and iconographic representations of French officers in classical scenes of supplication in which populations begged them to spare their homes and cities.

In stark contrast was the cruel and merciless officer. Because of their major operational role, this figure was most often embodied by the '*partisans*', as the officers who led the parties were known in French. Due to their widespread use of arson during both contribution collection and destruction operations, French soldiers became synonymous with 'incendiaries' (*Mordbrenner* or *incendiaires*) in printed accounts and news across Europe. The German etching depicting Feuquières's *course*, for instance, referred to his '*Dragoner und Mordbrenner*' (see Fig. 6.5). The French officer who quickly came to personify this '*Frantzösischer Mordbrenner*' was the cavalry brigadier Mélac. Recognised as a capable and accomplished '*partisan*', he took part in all the major operations of

destruction. Acknowledging his effectiveness, Duras 'sent him to all of those cities [namely Worms, Speyer and Oppenheim] so that nothing was spared'.[70] His rigorous execution of orders from Versailles ensured recognition in the form of monetary reward and a military promotion from the king, but earned him a sinister reputation.[71] Half a century later, Saint-Simon, who had known him well, wrote about this 'good partisan' whose 'obsession with making himself terrible in the eyes of the enemies had made him unique; by his frequent enterprises, he had succeeded in inspiring fear with his very name'.[72] His dark reputation was not confined to the field, especially because of his involvement in occupations and destruction operations such as those in Heidelberg and its vicinity. Because Heidelberg was both the electoral capital of the Palatinate and one of the cradles of German humanism, housing the oldest German university, these operations received publicity in the printed news, giving Mélac a unique, Europe-wide visibility in print. In effect, he became the face of the brutal French 'incendiary'. Like the soldier etched over the title block of Feuquières's *course* (see Fig. 6.5), he was portrayed with a flaming torch against a background of burning houses, as in one famous German broadsheet of 1689 (see Fig. 6.6)

Already in mid-April 1689, the Amsterdam gazette emphasised that 'the Palatinate [would] retain a sad memory of the fires and cruelties that [Monsieur de Mélac] [had] carried out in it'.[73] A telling example of how vivid this memory still was at the beginning of the twentieth century may be found in a German press-clipping published at the time of the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine after the First World War (see Fig. 6.7). Dated 1919, it compared general Gérard, commander of the VIII\u1d49 Armée quartered in Landau, with Mélac, the previous governor of this Palatine fortress town in the late seventeenth century.

Mélac personified the 'incendiary' in long-term memory. However, in the printed news of the week, this figure was more commonly embodied by the simple soldier of the ranks. Although Mélac's case highlighted the crucial role of officers, in print the brutality of the soldiery was contrasted with the 'humanity of the officers', as Voltaire's narrative shows.[74] This opposition reflected the contemporary stereotypes of the contrast between officers motivated by honour and morality, and soldiers driven by immorality and a desire for personal gain. Nevertheless, while discipline was a primary concern of the king and his minister, these operations, by their very nature, tended towards indiscipline. Perfectly aware that pillage engendered disorder, Montclart, in Mannheim, at first tried

Fig. 6.6 *True account and brief presentation of the abominable incendiaries of the French Brigadier Melac* (Nuremburg, c. 1689), German broadsheet with wood engraving (detail). Alamy.

to compel the inhabitants to demolish their houses themselves in order to avoid plunder. After their flat refusal, the inhabitants sought to sabotage the destruction by getting the 300 soldiers who were carrying out the work drunk. Montclart managed to end this drunkenness only by stopping the work and emptying the cellars.[75] But as the destruction

Fig. 6.7 *Two French generals*, German press-clipping (detail), 1919. *Source* Kurpfälzisches Museum (Heidelberg), Inv. Nr. S 5334

operations became less and less organised, discipline deteriorated and uncontrolled excesses multiplied. The thin line between permitted and forbidden violence was blurred for most average soldiers.[76] In June in the Middle Rhine cities, the soldiers '[believed] that the country was given over to pillage'.[77] Accused by Chamlay of authorising plunder in the towns to be destroyed in August, Duras replied that 'it is difficult to prevent soldiers from starting fires when they enter *en masse* to raze a town'.[78] Cavalrymen, dragoons and grenadiers, who were the major component of parties, were notably concerned by this increased licentiousness, which, despite the hanging of soldiers and the sanctions placed on officers, became a recurrent problem over the next months and years.[79]

Although classical narratives often depicted civilians as defenceless and passive victims, they in fact responded in many different ways to military pressures, and French operations sparked acts of resistance.[80] In autumn 1688, contrary to the orders of authorities in Württemberg, the inhabitants of the town, especially its women, protested and ultimately prevented the French occupation of Göppingen and Schorndorf.[81] In August 1689, the *intendant d'armée* recorded that around 200 marauding cavalrymen and dragoons were killed by peasants.[82] Nonetheless, the most prominent expression of resistance was the *Schnapphähnen*. Although first defined as brigands and highwaymen, they were more than a simple phenomenon of war criminality. Attacking troops and soldiers, these gangs of uprooted peasants and townsmen responded to French '*guerre de partis*' with a small war of their own, harassing French parties and convoys and using irregular tactics to disrupt French operations and communication.[83] Because they transgressed the frontier between soldiers and civilians, the French responded rigorously with punitive raids and systematic hangings. However, the transgression was in practice not as clear as the French authorities claimed: on the one hand, former soldiers or deserters were often among the *Schnapphähnen*; on the other hand, being assimilated to irregular soldiers by enemy military authorities, the *Schnapphähnen* often joined regular enemy troops in operations.[84] Further blurring the line between soldiers and civilians, the *Schnapphähnen* drew on traditions of rural self-defence and citizen defence, and also gave evidence of proto-patriotic sentiments.[85] They were, in effect, an early form of partisan.

Because of the large population movements caused by the French operations, the number of *Schnapphähnen* increased as the months went

by, especially in mountainous regions and river islands.[86] Besides those populations that had fled at the beginning of the invasion, departures were first motivated by both the financial weight and the executions associated with contribution collection.[87] Peasants uprooted by work requisitions or ruined by taxes, the loss of their homes or both joined the *Schnapphähnen* in the mountainous forests along the banks of the Rhine. This phenomenon reawakened memories of the Thirty Years War, when dehumanised individuals and groups, whose communities had disintegrated as a result of predatory warfare, lived in woods and caves like beasts. These migrations were then further fuelled by the massive waves of refugees caused by the large-scale dismantling and burning operations of fortress cities, walled towns and villages.[88] Around 900 families, or approximately 6,500 persons, had to evacuate Mannheim, for instance.[89] Although these urban populations were ordered to settle in Alsace, the majority fled into the Empire, rebuilding communities around their magistrates in cities like Frankfurt. Etchings of burning cities, such as the one shown in Fig. 6.8, often depicted these fleeing inhabitants in the foreground, crossing the Rhine in wide barges. Because many came back to the demolished cities to live in cellars or shacks, French parties were regularly sent to destroy their makeshift homes. Mannheim, for instance, was burned at least five times before 1693.[90]

The population movements were frequently reported in European printed accounts and news, such as in June 1688 when the *Relations Véritables*, the most important French-language weekly periodical published in the Spanish Netherlands, recounted that the Rhine territories were 'full of the remnants of people, whose houses the flames had consumed'.[91] Emphasising the forced nature of these migrations, these uprooted populations were compared to cattle or slaves—another implicit parallel with Turkish–Tartar practices—in particular the hostages who were taken away to Strasbourg to secure contributions.[92] Since the Bible was at the time a ubiquitous frame of reference for war narratives, these migrations reminded the early modern reader of the Babylonian deportation and captivity, and this resonant image was often used to denounce French operations.[93]

Overshadowing other possible figures of civilians, as Voltaire's narration illustrates, the desolate and wandering populations became, along with sympathetic officers and brutal soldiers, a topos of the event—that is to say one of the elementary sequences and figures that structured the narrative thread of the French operations. The printed news granted

Fig. 6.8 Speyer on fire, German etching published in a German periodical entitled *Europäischer Mercurius* ([Nuremberg?], May 1689). *Source* Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (München), Res/4 Eur. 185 m, fol. Xx

the figure of the refugee a privileged place in the memorialisation of the events. In a German print of 1689 staging the trial of Louis XIV, inhabitants declared that 'it only remains for us to be for eternity witnesses of French brutality, and to scream for revenge everywhere in Europe, wherever we are scattered'.[94]

Conclusion

Behind the event known as the Desolation of the Palatinate, therefore, lay a complex set of operations mixing positional warfare and small war, and designed to secure the eastern border of the kingdom along the Rhine. This meant an evolving strategy of devastation which had major consequences for civilians, who became the objects and sometimes (by their resistance) the self-constituted subjects of the war. Although during the Dutch War, small war had already been used on a large scale in the Netherlands, it had served a conservative strategy.[95] In 1688–89 on the Rhine front it was more developed and achieved one of the clearest expressions of its major strategic role in Louis XIV's wars. Such large-scale small war first emerged as part of sieges that took control of strong

points, from which the raiding parties then operated in order to control the surrounding region. After the siege, the balance of military operations was reversed. Fortress cities and walled towns now became the secure strong points from which the operations were conducted more systematically on the surrounding countryside. While civilians were a key component of the fighting during sieges, they subsequently faced 'after-siege' operations that were not necessarily military engagements, but which nonetheless encapsulated the everyday experience of war in the field for both them and the soldiers. Occupied cities and towns became spaces of intense daily interactions between soldiers and urban populations, while small war generated new frictions between soldiers and the inhabitants of the countryside. Both a result of positional warfare and a corollary of siege warfare, this small war of the Sun King connected winter quarters and campaigning; urban spaces and the countryside; garrisons and armies; short and long-term goals; and finally soldiers and civilians. Through the printed news (written accounts, periodicals, broadsheets, etc.), stylised figures of soldiers and civilians, as well as their interactions, have had a part in the transformation of the French operations into the event that became known as 'the Desolation of the Palatinate'. As Voltaire's account testifies, this event, characterised by the supposedly well-organised violence of the monarchical state and the apparently random and gratuitous brutalities committed by soldiers against civilians, came to epitomise the horror of war.

Notes

1. Voltaire, *The Age of Louis XIV*, 3 vols (London, 1779–81), vol. 1, 205–206.
2. Small war (known in French as '*petite guerre*') refers to a range of activities that varied from time to time and from place to place. During the reign of Louis XIV, it was called '*guerre de partis*', as it was carried out by detachments of troops, or parties, from regular units under the command of an officer known as a '*partisan*'. Consequently, historians working on early modern warfare describe it as 'partisan warfare'. This '*guerre des partis*', which was a form of regular warfare conducted by regular troops, shared tactics with irregular warfare. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with irregular warfare, especially in its modern forms as developed from the 1750s, which is undertaken by irregular soldiers or armed civilians, and is also called 'partisan warfare'. See Johannes Kunisch, *Der Kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus* (Wiesbaden,

1973); John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle* (Cambridge, 2006), 538–546; Bernard Peschot, 'La guerre buissonnière: parti et partisans dans la petite guerre (XVIᵉ–XVIIIᵉ siècles)', Thèse d'habilitation (Université de Montpellier 3, 1999); George Satterfield, *Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673–1678* (Leiden, 2003); Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (ed.), *Stratégies irrégulières* (Paris, 2010); Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat, *La petite guerre au XVIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris, 2010); Beatrice Heuser (ed.), *The Origins of Small Wars: From Special Operations to Ideological Insurgencies*, special issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25 (2014).

3. Kurt von Raumer, *Die Zerstörung der Pfalz von 1689 im Zusammenhang der französischen Rheinpolitik* (2nd edn, Bad Neustadt, 1982); Michèle Fogel, 'La désolation du Palatinat ou les aléas de la violence réglée (septembre 1688–juin 1689)', in *Guerre et répression. La Vendée et le monde*, ed. Jean-Clément Martin (Nantes, 1993), 111–117; Hermann Weber, 'La stratégie de la terre brûlée. Le cas du Palatinat en 1689', in *La Vendée dans l'histoire*, ed. Alain Gérard and Thierry Heckmann (Paris, 1994), 193–208; John A. Lynn, 'A Brutal Necessity? The Devastation of the Palatinate, 1688–89', in *Civilians in the Path of War*, ed. Mark Grimsley and Clifford Rogers (Lincoln, 2002), 79–110; Jean-Philippe Cénat, 'Le ravage du Palatinat. Politique de destruction, stratégie de cabinet et propagande au début de la guerre de la Ligue d'Augsbourg', *Revue historique* 631 (2005): 97–132.

4. André Corvisier, 'Louis XIV et la guerre. De la politique de grandeur à la défense nationale', in *L'État classique, 1652–1715*, ed. Henri Méchoulan and Joël Cornette (Paris, 1996), 261–280; John A. Lynn, 'A Quest for Glory: The Formation of Strategy under Louis XIV, 1661–1715', in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*, ed. Williamson Murray et al. (Cambridge, 1994), 178–204.

5. Paul Sonnino, 'The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars', in *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Jeremy Black (Edinburgh, 1987), 112–131 (here 122).

6. Raumer, *Zerstörung*, 98; Lynn, 'Brutal Necessity?', 88–94.

7. Lynn, 'Brutal Necessity?', 100–2; Cénat, 'Ravage du Palatinat', 101–104.

8. Lynn, 'Quest for Glory', 192–96; idem, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 547–593.

9. John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714*, (Oxford 2013), 361–376; Satterfield, *Princes*, 5 and 319.

10. André Corvisier, *Louvois* (Paris, 1983), 450.

11. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 553–567; Michèle Virol, *Vauban, de la gloire du roi au service de l'État* (Seyssel, 2003).

12. John A. Lynn, 'Food, Funds, and Fortresses: Resource Mobilization and Positional Warfare in the Wars of Louis XIV', in *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder/Oxford, 1993), 137–159.

13. Lynn, 'Quest for Glory', 187–92.

14. Service historique de la défense (SHD), GR A[1] 824, Louvois to La Grange, 13 September 1688.

15. SHD, GR A[1] 824, Boufflers to Louvois, 2 November 1688.

16. Joël Cornette, *Le roi de guerre. Essai sur la souveraineté dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris, 1993).

17. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 559.

18. Christopher Duffy, *The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great 1660–1789* (2nd edn, London/Boston, 2015), 1–97; idem, *Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare 1660–1860*, (2nd edn, London/Mechanicsburg, 1996); Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 567–580; Virol, *Vauban*, 23–123; Jamel Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the Spanish Succession* (Leiden/Boston, 2007).

19. Randall Lesaffer, 'Siege Warfare in the Early Modern Age: A Study on the Customary Laws of War', in *The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James B. Murphy (Cambridge, 2009), 176–202; John Childs, 'Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1650–1783', in *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender*, ed. Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan (Oxford, 2012), 153–168; John A. Lynn, 'The Other Side of Victory: Honorable Surrender during the Wars of Louis XIV', in *The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618–1850*, ed. Frederick C. Schneid (Leiden/Boston, 2012), 51–67; Paul Vo-Ha, 'Rendre les armes: le sort des vaincus, XVIe–XVIIe siècles', doctoral thesis (Université Lumière Lyon 2, 2015).

20. SHD, GR A[1] 828, Vertillat to Louvois, 15 November 1688.

21. SHD, GR A[1] 827, Saint-Pouange to Louvois, 4 November 1688.

22. Vo-Ha, *Rendre les armes*, 201–413.

23. SHD, GR A[1] 824, Louvois to Duras, 27 September 1688; A[1] 826, Saint-Pouange to Louvois, 22 and 24 October 1689.

24. See Ralf Pröve, 'Der Soldat in der "guten Bürgerstube". Das früh-neuzeitliche Einquartierungssystem und die sozioökonomischen Folgen', in *Krieg und Frieden, Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Bernhard R. Kroener and Ralf Pröve (Paderborn, 1996), 191–217; Christian Desplat (ed.), *Les villageois face à la guerre, XIVe–XVIIIe siècle* (Toulouse, 2002); Markus Meumann and Jörg Rogge (eds), *Die besetzte Res Publica. Zum Verhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und*

militarischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten von Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 2006).

25. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 158–169; Jean-Pierre Rorive, *Les misères de la guerre sous le Roi-Soleil* (Liège, 2000), 99–183.

26. Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 77/3700, Draft letter from Palatine Chancellery to Louvois, December 1688(?).

27. Roy L. McCullough, *Coercion, Conversion and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Leiden, 2006), 125–179; Anne Dunan-Page, 'La dragonnade du Poitou et l'exil des huguenots dans la littérature de controverse anglaise', *Moreana* 171–172 (2007): 86–121.

28. *London Courant*, 6 (29 December 1688).

29. Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 77/3701, Reports of 19 February 1689.

30. SHD, GR A[1] 874, Montclart to Louvois, 27 February 1689. See Bernard R. Krœner, '"Le maraudeur". À propos des groupes marginaux de la société militaire au début de l'époque moderne', in *Nouveaux regards sur la guerre de Trente Ans* (Paris, 1998), 167–179.

31. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, 397–414; David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2001), 526–533.

32. Emilie Dosquet, 'Die Verwüstung der Pfalz als (Medien-)Ereignis: von der rheinländischen Kriegshandlung zum europäischen Skandal', in *Krieg und Kriegserfahrung im Westen des Reiches 1568–1714*, ed. Rutz Andreas (Göttingen, 2016), 333–369, here 347–351.

33. The minimum number varied according to the evolution of royal regulations.

34. Thierry Sarmant, 'Une seconde cavalerie: les dragons de Louis XIV et de Louvois', in *Le cheval et la guerre du XVe au XXe siècle*, ed. Daniel Roche (Paris, 2002), 233–241.

35. Satterfield, *Princes*.

36. Fritz Redlich, 'Contributions in the Thirty Year's War', *Economic History Review* 12 (1959–60): 247–254; Ronald Th. Ferguson, 'Blood and Fire: Contribution Policy of the French Armies in Germany (1668–1715)', D.Phil. thesis (University of Minnesota, 1970); John A. Lynn, 'How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siècle', *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 286–310; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 225–276.

37. Lynn, 'How War Fed War', 303–306. Guy Rowlands has argued that this estimation must be reduced by half. See Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661 to 1701* (Cambridge, 2002), 125–126 and 365–366.

38. SHD, GR A[1] 2538, Louvois to Chamlay, 28 September 1688; A[1] 831, Chamlay to Louvois, 4 October 1688. See also Ferguson, *Blood and Fire*, 56–121.

39. SHD, GR A¹ 826, Chamlay to Louvois, 18 October 1688.
40. SHD, GR A¹ 824, Louvois to Saint-Pouange, 28 October 1688; A¹ 2538, Louvois to Chamlay, 5 November 1688.
41. SHD, GR A¹ 824, Louvois to Chamlay, 27 September 1688.
42. On contribution collection, see Satterfield, *Princes*, ch. 2.
43. David Parrott has underlined this ambiguity between legitimate and illegitimate force. See Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 523.
44. SHD, GR A¹ 828, Feuquières to Louvois, 17 November 1688; A¹ 832, Feuquières to Louvois, 11 December 1688.
45. [Daniel Speer], *Der Neu-aufgewachte Mord-Brenner LaBroche* (1689).
46. SHD, GR A¹ 832, Feuquières to Louvois, 4 December 1688.
47. Lynn, 'Brutal Necessity?', 94–98.
48. SHD, GR A¹ 828, Boufflers to Louvois, 22 November 1688.
49. SHD, GR A¹ 2538, Louvois to Chamlay, 12 October 1688.
50. SHD, GR A¹ 828, La Goupillière to Louvois, 23 November 1688.
51. SHD, GR A¹ 826, Chamlay to Louvois, 27 October 1688.
52. Concerning the instigators of this policy, see Lynn, 'Brutal Necessity?', 98–102; Cénat, 'Ravage du Palatinat', 110–113.
53. Antoine Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel*, 1690.
54. SHD, GR A¹ 824, Louvois to Duras, 4 October 1688; A¹ 826, Chamlay to Louvois, 27 October 1688; A¹ 871, Louvois to La Grange, 17 November 1688.
55. SHD, GR A¹ 2538, Louvois to Chamlay, 1 June 1689; A¹ 873, Louvois to Chamlay, 31 July 1689.
56. SHD, GR A¹ 879, Chamlay to Louvois, 1 September 1689 and Montclart to Louvois, 21 September 1689.
57. SHD, GR A¹ 873, Louvois to Montal, 26 July 1689 and Louvois to Boufflers, 8 August 1689.
58. Georges Satterfield first suggested that field armies worked as fortresses on the Rhine front. See Satterfield, *Princes*, 324.
59. SHD, GR A¹ 874, Montclart to Louvois, 2 February 1689.
60. SHD, GR A¹ 876, Duras to Louvois, 21 May 1689.
61. SHD, GR A¹ 878, Duras to Louvois, 11 August 1689; A¹ 879, Chamlay to Louvois, 1 September 1689.
62. Guy Rowlands, 'Louis XIV et la "stratégie de cabinet". Mythe et réalité', *Revue historique des armées* 222 (2001): 25–34; Cénat, 'Le ravage du Palatinat'.
63. SHD, GR A¹ 871, Louvois to Montclart, 18 January 1689.
64. SHD, GR A¹ 875, Tessé to Louvois, 4 March 1689, and La Grange to Louvois, 17 March 1689.
65. Roland Vetter, '*Kein Stein soll auf dem andern bleiben*'. *Mannheims Untergang während des Pfälzischen Erbfolgekrieges im Spiegel französischer*

Kriegsberichte (Heidelberg, 2002), 105–120; idem, '"Ein anderes Mal werden wir es besser machen". Aus der Korrespondenz des französischen Kriegsministeriums über die Zerstörung Heidelbergs im Jahre 1689', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 150 (2002): 571–580.

66. SHD, GR A^1 872, Louvois to Huxelles, 18 March 1689.
67. Cénat, 'Ravage du Palatinat', 118.
68. SHD, GR A^1 876, Duras to Louvois, 21 May 1689.
69. SHD, GR A^1 875, Tessé to Louvois, 4 March 1689.
70. SHD, GR A^1 877, Duras to Louvois, 18 June 1689.
71. SHD, GR A^1 872, Louvois to Duras, 26 June 1689; A^1 970, Mélac to Louvois, 14 March 1690.
72. Louis de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, ed. Yves Coirault, 8 vols (1982–88), vol. 2, 245.
73. *Nouveau Journal Universel* (14 April 1689).
74. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 520–522; *Relations Véritables* (12 March 1689).
75. SHD, GR A^1 875, La Grange to Louvois, 4 and 6 March 1689.
76. Lynn, 'Brutal Necessity?', 85–86.
77. SHD, GR A^1 876, La Fonds to Louvois, 10 June 1689.
78. SHD, GR A^1 878, Chamlay to Louvois and Duras to Louvois, 19 August 1689.
79. SHD, GR A^1 935, Louvois to Duras, 6 October 1689; A^1 936, Louvois to Chamlay, 15 June 1690; A^1 1089, The King to Lorge, 13 August 1691; A^1 1212, The King to Lorge, 16 June 1693.
80. René Pillorget, 'Populations civiles et troupes dans le Saint-Empire au cours de la guerre de Trente ans', in *Guerre et pouvoir en Europe au XVIIe siècle*, ed. Viviane Barrie-Curien (Paris, 1991), 151–174.
81. Uwe Jens Wandel and Karl-Heinz Ruess, *Frauenprotest 1688. Die Schorndorfer und Göppinger Weiber* (Schorndorf, 1988).
82. SHD, GR A^1 878, La Fonds to Louvois, 7 August 1689.
83. Coutau-Bégarie, *Stratégies irrégulières*; Beatrice Heuser, *Rebellen – Partisanen – Guerilleros. Asymmetrische Kriege von der Antike bis heute* (Paderborn, 2013); idem, *The Origins of Small Wars*.
84. SHD, GR A^1 874, Tessé to Louvois, 1 February 1689.
85. Michael Kaiser, 'Die Söldner und die Bevölkerung. Überlegungen zu Konstituierung und Überwindung eines lebensweltlichen Antagonismus', *Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Stefan Kroll and Kersten Krüger (Münster, 2000), 79–120; Gerhard Fritz, 'Kriegsführung – Kriegskriminalität – Kriegsflüchtlinge. Überlegungen zur Zeit zwischen dem Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und dem Pfälzischen und Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg in Südwestdeutschland', in *Krieg und Kriegserfahrung*, 160–168.

86. SHD, GR A¹ 874, Tessé to Louvois, 9 January 1689, and Huxelles to Louvois, 28 February 1689; A¹ 883, Chamlay to Louvois, 22 July 1689. For a contemporary account, see Rolf Reutter, 'Der Pfälzer Erbfolgekrieg 1688–1697. Tagebuch des erbachischen Oberamtmanns Adolf Friedrich von Pfreundt', *Geschichtsblätter Kreis Bergstraße* 21 (1988): 88–101. For a case study, see Klaus P. Decker, 'Die Schnapphähne am Donnersberg im Jahre 1690. Ein Versuch militarischen Widerstandes gegen die Verbrennungspolitik Ludwigs XIV', *Mitteilungen des historischen Vereins der Pfalz* 79 (1981): 303–324.

87. For a survey of war migrations, see Matthias Asche (ed.), *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin/Münster, 2008).

88. Global figures are missing, but for an idea of the large-scale impact of these war migrations, see Heinz Musall and Arnold Scheuerbrandt, 'Die Kriege im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Siedlungs-, und Bevölkerungs- und Wirtschaftsstruktur der Oberrheinlande', in *Hans Graul Festschrift*, ed. Horst Eichler and Heinz Musall (Heidelberg, 1974), 357–378; Fritz, 'Kriegsführung', 177–180.

89. Roland Vetter, '1685–1689, Zwischen Krise und Krieg', in *Geschichte der Stadt Mannheim*, ed. Nieß Ulrich and Caroli Michael, 3 vols (Mannheim, 1914–2007), vol. 1, 254.

90. SHD, GR A¹ 876, Montclart to Louvois, 8 May 1689; A¹ 876, Tallard to Louvois, 7 April 1690; A¹ 1091, Louvois to Huxelles, 11 May 1691; A¹ 1156, Huxelles to Barbezieux, 11 February 1692; A¹ 1213, Mélac to Barbezieux, 9 February 1693.

91. *Relations Véritables* (11 June 1689).

92. Klaus P. Decker, 'Rheingauer Geiseln im "Pfälzischen Krieg". Zur franzö-sischen Kontributionskriegführung im 17. Jahrhundert', in *Deutschland und Frankreich in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Eberhard Schmitt (Munich, 1987), 407–437.

93. See for example *Des jetzt-regirenden Französischen Königs allergrausam-ste Tyranney und kaum erhörte Mord-Brennerey Erste Fortsetzung* (Nuremberg(?), 1689).

94. *Concursus Creditorum* (1689), 38.

95. Satterfield, *Princes*, 131.

Before the Storm: Civilians Under Siege During the Thirty Years War (1618–1630)

Jane Finucane

Between the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618 and Swedish intervention in 1630, Germany's biennial news compendium, the *Relationis Historicae* or *Historical Relation* (hereafter *RH*), reported 280 instances when cities, towns and fortifications were challenged to admit approaching forces or suffer the consequences.[1] These accounts offered contemporaries, and so the historian, cumulative if uneven evidence for the nature of siege warfare in this period.

They allow us to interrogate two key perspectives on early modern siege warfare. This was at once the most dangerous and the least volatile of contests: a form of 'total war' in which the lives of every man, woman and child in the besieged stronghold were potentially forfeited,[2] and yet a time-hallowed ritual permitting challenge, surrender and careful gradation of punitive action, allowing for defeat without dishonour. Thus, the 'Laws of War' called for a formal challenge giving the besieged party the opportunity to surrender, and it was expected and accepted that some defence should be mounted against preliminary assaults;[3] but,

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as Afflerbach and Strachan have summarised the legal position, if the stronghold

> defended itself too long, imposed too many sacrifices on the besieger, and had to be stormed, the conqueror was morally and legally justified in killing everybody found within the fortress. In some such cases women and children were spared, but there was no 'non-combatant' rule or law in the modern sense.[4]

Such treatment of a population might seem to typify the civilian experience of siege in the Thirty Years War. By the 1630s, and long after the end of the war, horror at a war of 'all-destructive fury', its 'seas of blood … [and] fury of fire', assured observers that Germany's innocent people had been visited by catastrophe, their lamentations surely representing a breaching of contemporary norms.[5] Events like the siege, storm and sack of Magdeburg in 1631 have become emblematic of the pain and destruction caused by the conflict. It is true that sieges were numerous, outnumbering pitched battles ten to one.[6] The frequency of these events, Parker reminds us, may distort our understanding of contemporary norms: the occasional disastrous outcome was not necessarily representative. Yet the logic of siege warfare, as he describes it, likewise tipped the balance toward catastrophe for the civilians behind the walls. 'Carnage', he claims 'was … common when a town was taken by storm, for sieges have always been treated as total war. Soldiers who sought a civilian shelter and civilians who militarised their homes by accepting a garrison in effect presented an undifferentiated target to the besiegers: military and civilian property were hard to distinguish during the battery, the assault, or the sack that normally followed a successful storm'.[7] It is argued in this chapter that Parker's claims, along with more recent work on the topic, underplay the distinction between soldiers and civilians on the one hand, and between besieged and defenceless populations on the other. I will use the reports in the *RH* to consider evidence for civilians' expectations of siege warfare, to explain what reassurances reports on contemporary practice offered civilians defending their settlements and to interrogate the concept of 'civilian' as presented in these sources.

Civilians suffered dreadfully from the Thirty Years War, with probably more than 3 million war-related deaths arising directly or indirectly from military action.[8] The conflict owes its special place in modern historiography to the suffering imposed on the general population, in the German

territories in particular. Early nineteenth-century accounts, reflecting confessional tensions, cast civilians as innocent victims of religious tyranny; a unified Germany subsequently characterised the war as the crucible in which a national character had been forged through pain and sacrifice.[9] A materialist turn after 1945 kept the scale of population and material losses under scrutiny, while the Thirty Years War became a safe locus for reflection on German civilians' suffering in wartime precisely because it was divorced from the horrors of recent political memory.[10] These trends have informed two connected problems in current historical thought: the recovery of contemporaries' *Kriegserfahrung*—their broader experience and understanding of war—and the investigation of the treatment of civilians as a marker for the evolution of modern warfare.[11]

Both questions require some definition of 'civilians', a term which is itself relatively recent. 'Civilian' certainly has its root in common with 'civilisation', 'citizen' and other developments from the Latin '*civis*' (city), but none of these words in their various forms and cognates were used in English and other European languages to evoke a binary opposition between soldiers and those outside military ranks until the late eighteenth century. Even then, the term only distinguished civil and military office, paralleling older usages stretching back to Roman law, derived from the same etymon and distinguishing the civic polity, its law and its concerns variously from churches, nations and the state of nature. The lexical gap seems significant. A stable terminology only emerged once this distinction became useful, and not directly from the practice of war: it emerged in societies with extensive military bureaucracies and standing armies, and with reference first of all to their bureaucratic organisation. Before this, the complex edifice of law, tradition, ethical advice, custom and military regulation that might inform us about the norms and practices of early modern warfare had nothing to say about civilians as such. Early modern sources may refer to the unarmed and to the innocent. They cite 'citizenry' and its cognates, and these are among the terms that evoke some element of our modern concept of civilian status insofar as they distinguish members of a community under threat from attackers. But these terms by no means imply, as 'civilian' does now, any measure of protection from the rigours of a just war.[12]

The period between 1550 and 1700 therefore had no blanket designation for those outside military ranks.[13] However, soldiers did constitute a clearly defined category in the early modern society of

orders—those engaged in the profession of arms—thus ensuring that the concept of the civilian, designating everyone else, remains useful for historians. As such it has been indispensable for our understanding of the Thirty Years War.[14] Drawing on eyewitness accounts and personal reports, historians have distinguished soldiers' *Erfahrung*, or shared experience of the war, from civilians'.[15] As far as the soldiers are concerned, they had a defined purpose, logic and routine in war and their anxieties arose mainly in relation to surviving camp life rather than combat.[16] They were little affected by the cause for which they fought, so that tensions between cause and conduct of war were negligible.[17] Civilians, for their part, felt the depredations of war in terms of disease, famine and hardship, which affected swathes of territory that never saw conflict. Yet personal accounts show that what they feared most was actual or reported encounters with military violence.[18] This bred terror of an enemy who was not easily defined,[19] and shock at instances where the conduct of war seemed to undermine its alleged purpose in upholding the religious and political order.[20]

Explorations of civilian *Erfahrung* confirm that contemporaries believed violence in the Thirty Years War to be unprecedented.[21] In accounting for the overall tendency towards greater restraint as the seventeenth century wore on, historians have emphasised the conditions of military service and notably the recruitment, provisioning and management of armies. As commanders, and the states that they represented, became more efficient in controlling and providing for soldiers, civilians supposedly faced diminishing risks.[22] This argument has certain limits for the Thirty Years War. Claims regarding the character and conduct of the common soldier were deeply political. The early seventeenth-century soldier, expensively equipped but not necessarily formed through immersion in a military culture, was much more insistently characterised than his predecessors as predatory and uncontrollable, a danger to all he encountered regardless of status and loyalties.[23] State propagandists relied on these stereotypes, thus making the explicit and ostentatious discipline and management of their forces a measure of their own side's righteousness precisely when campaigns were at their most controversial.[24] In reality, although the common soldier's reliance on booty and susceptibility to 'fury' certainly informed contemporary accounts, historians have questioned these explanations. Pay and provisioning were in fact prioritised so that opportunities for plunder rarely determined strategy.[25] Parker, in his

analysis of interactions between soldiers and civilians, concedes that the former could be controlled.[26] For him, the fate of the civilians hinged first on the observance of military codes and then on choices made by commanders either to exercise 'restraint' or to license 'excess' once strongholds were stormed. It was rare for sieges to end in massacre; wholesale slaughter was so unusual that it excited comment and criticism. Wilson nuances this point, for the Thirty Years War, by distinguishing periods when norms of restraint were observed from those when armies deliberately, and legally, returned excess with excess in a pattern of reprisal, as was the case with Swedish and Imperial operations in 1631.[27]

However, discussion of these patterns from the perspective of military codes, management and strategies returns us to a fundamental problem. If the typical civilian experience of siege warfare did not end in disaster, explanations derived from military codes and operations do not explain why. Afflerbach and Strachan, for example, conclude that in siege warfare, as opposed to the battlefield, the chain of command was maintained during combat, making the act of surrender relatively straightforward.[28] This understates the significance of the fact that a stronghold was occupied—and to some extent defended—by both soldiers and civilians, with citizens organised for self-defence and a wider population seeking safety behind the walls. It is well known that the threat of annihilation, if a stronghold was stormed, was counterbalanced with elaborate provisions for surrender.[29] Yet the decision and act of surrender were not military concerns alone. The elaborate codes which guaranteed soldiers their honourable retreat, and spared civilians who surrendered promptly from annihilation and plunder, had less to say about the longer term burdens of military occupation, conditions imposed in letters of protection (*salva guardia*) and financial levies, let alone punitive garrisoning—all motives for civilian resistance.[30] Sources that do speak to the experience of civilians have shown the difficulty they had in imposing their own logic on the goals and consequences of wars. Yet they were not entirely without influence and also took decisions that shaped the course of conflict. In an era of 'news revolution',[31] populations were informed by reports of military campaigns and civilian responses, reports from which, it will be argued below, civilians under sieges emerged as active parties, with their own distinct interests and a significant degree of agency. Civilians were by no means prominent in accounts of the war, but there was far more material to shape their expectations of combat in news sources than in military codes and regulations.

News as a Source for Civilian Experiences of Siege

The Thirty Years War was the first major conflict that readers could follow in the press, with newspapers now appearing for the first time in weekly series in many cities of the empire. A related source which has survived more evenly and thus allows for systematic study was the news compendium distributed twice yearly at book fairs, whose origin can be traced to the Frankfurt autumn fair of 1583.[32] These *Messrelationen* are a transitional genre: their compilation of news sources produced a work similar in form to the chronicle of contemporary history, but the sources themselves reproduced or tracked closely material used in the emergent weekly newspaper.[33] The editorial voice was usually discreet, with reports received from the imperial post network rarely deviating from narrative interspersed with reported speech and transcriptions of official edicts and agreements. The *RH* was close enough to its source material to fluctuate in the language applied to the warring parties, and announced no fixed editorial policy, but initial persistent references to Bohemian and Palatinate 'rebels' would be superseded, in the late 1620s, by discernible if discreet objections to imperial policy.[34] The fragmented accounts of siege warfare in the *RH* can be used to examine the representations of civilians at war presented to the German reading public as the war progressed, accounts first gathered by publishers from the peripheries of the Habsburg Empire, but, as the 1620s wore on, reporting on events ever closer at hand to its publishing centres.

The vast majority of the 280 sieges reported on by the *RH* between 1618 and 1630 occurred in the first six years of the war, during the Bohemian Revolt of 1618 to 1620, then in the 'Palatinate phase' of 1620 to 1625. This reflects the evolution of the conflict: the first phase was an intense counter-attack by the Hapsburgs and their allies on Bohemian and Palatinate rebels. Frederick of the Palatinate was routed by 1623, after which the theatre of war shifted from the Southern Hapsburg and Imperial territories to the Northern German lands. From the mid-1620s until 1630, the geographical range of the conflict narrowed, but Imperial armies grew: the aim was to maintain enough troops to extract resources, in the form of the contribution system perfected by Wallenstein, from friend and foe alike. Under these conditions, there was little call for smash-and-grab raids and perhaps less likelihood than before that a smaller commune could offer meaningful resistance.

The *RH* describes 206 conflicts initiated by commanders of the Austrian Hapsburgs and their formal allies in the Catholic League, 72 by their opponents. From late 1618 to early 1620, both sides were described as relatively evenly engaged across the Hapsburg lands and the south-eastern peripheries of the empire. But 1620 is portrayed by the *RH* as a victory parade for Imperial forces reclaiming these territories well before their triumph at the Battle of the White Mountain in November of that year. It documents 84 strongholds stormed, besieged or surrendered in 1620, almost a third of the total up to 1630. All but one of the 79 manoeuvres attributed to Imperial forces in this year succeeded, with the Spanish Ambrogio Spinola chalking up 40 conquests of fortified places. The frenetic activity of this first phase of the war was scarcely dampened in the 'Palatinate' phase, until the flight of Frederick of the Palatinate and the scattering of his generals in 1622 and 1623. Four years when the use or threat of siege warfare was reported as routine culminated in 1622, when the armies of Frederick of the Palatinate and his generals Ernst von Mansfeld and Christian von Braunschweig were pressed from one refuge to another by the forces of the Catholic League. From peaks of 34 (1619), 84 (1620), 45 (1621) and 52 (1622), reports of such confrontations fell back into single digits until the 1630s, with the exception of a relatively modest 19 for 1627.

From this cumulative evidence the reader would learn that few towns or fortifications could hope to withstand a siege. How much aggressors and defenders gained and lost in these encounters varied enormously, but the overwhelming majority of sieges—90 per cent—ended in success for the aggressors: outright failure awaited besieging forces in only 28 of the 280 confrontations reported. It is reasonable to focus, therefore, not on the measures which a community might take to withstand a siege, but on the range of outcomes which it might reasonably anticipate when enemies achieved an entrance.

Civilians are absent from most of the *RH*'s accounts of sieges, particularly in these early years. Most are brief, with some amounting merely to lists.[35] Set phrases are deployed to explain that a list of places has been taken by various means: 'some through force, some through surrender',[36] or 'captured, some plundered, some burnt'.[37] Litanies of apparently casual conquests were illustrated with engravings.[38] Of the 280 reports examined here, 96 are contained in such lists or supply only the barest detail of who entered or failed to enter what stronghold. While they give a powerful overall impression of sieges they say little about

civilians' scope for action. If these brief accounts are excluded, 41 per cent of the encounters discussed in more detail for 1620–1630 do refer to civilians, and this rises to 52 per cent of those dealing with sieges of towns or cities. By the late 1620s, some reference to civilians during sieges had become the norm in the *RH*, given the more active role they played. The sheer number of sieges reported in the earlier phase may help account for the absence of detail on civilians but the location and nature of the later conflicts were also relevant, as will be discussed below. Combined with the format of a regular news publication, the result was a more explicit focus on civilians even before the Swedish intervention in the war began a pattern of tit-for-tat atrocities after 1630.[39]

Given the risks, and the odds against a beleaguered population withstanding a siege, one might expect a clear preference for surrender. There is indeed some reference to formal capitulation in a substantial minority of cases (78 of the 184 more detailed reports). The *RH* related the terms of soldiers' capitulation and retreat in 28 of these reports, recounting the formulas permitting soldiers to leave *mit Sack und Pack* (bag and baggage), wearing some armour, bearing weapons, torches, banners and ammunition as terms dictated.[40] Where they focused on soldiers' negotiated withdrawals, these early accounts suggested controlled campaigns, fought with relish,[41] but with limited repercussions. Soldiers wishing for the oft-cited honour in surrender[42] might regret the ritual abasement of marching with torches extinguished and banners furled,[43] or the condition that their commander must travel on foot,[44] but accounts of their discourse and behaviour at the point of surrender are the clearest indications offered by the RH that codes of conduct in war were systematically observed. They provide a clear narrative arc with a tidy resolution, proving that in siege warfare, the act of surrender was often relatively straightforward.[45] The *RH* thus casts doubt on Höbelt's suggestion that the decision to surrender presented an almost intractable dilemma for the garrison under siege due to the value of the stronghold defended and the relatively small worth placed on the soldiers defending it, for this stage of the war at least.[46] Instead, it takes for granted and is extremely attentive to the value which soldiers placed upon their survival, and emphasises honour rather than loss of assets in surrender.

Constructing the Enemy: Innocence and Barbarism

The *RH* makes it clear that rhetoric which threatened excess (and thus endangered civilians) helped soldiers yielding a stronghold to save face. Assaulting Ladenburg in 1622, Mansfeld asked General Eynetten:

> Would he now surrender the town? If he did not, no-one, not even the child in its mother's womb, would be spared. General Eynetten put it to Mansfeld in return that he for his part, God be praised, had no child in the womb. Nonetheless, he was not disinclined to negotiate an equitable and honourable peace.[47]

Taken literally, Mansfeld's rhetoric was scarcely applicable to Eynetten and his troops; taken as shorthand for the breaching of norms through the implied annihilation of the whole population of the stronghold, it was a recognisable strategy. The compilation as a whole suggests that Mansfeld's threats were excessive, but not extraordinary. Bethlen Gabor had promised at Košice in 1619, that 'the child in his mother's womb would not be spared', while the Duke of Braunschweig promised the town of Höchst in Westphalia that his armies would 'not spare the child in his mother's womb' if they breached the walls. No related atrocities were reported: the *RH* reported that Höchst's citizens defied Braunschweig and fought on, and that although their town was eventually stormed and plundered, they themselves escaped.[48] Gabor not only convinced Košice's defenders that their only hope lay in surrender, but shattered the morale of nearby towns.[49] By reporting these threats, the *RH* supplied an explanation for surrender rather than a prediction of excess, thus reinforcing the norms that made such action exceptional. According to the *RH*, threats of wholesale slaughter in general had no bearing on a population's eventual fate. It rarely gave such threats space in its reporting, but where it did the outcome was always surrender, escape or resistance followed by a negotiated settlement.[50]

This rhetoric of threat thus indicates a readiness to negotiate the end of a siege as much as the violence that might ensue in the case of refusal. Such threats drew, appropriately to the local scenario or not, on the image of at least an innocent and harmless element in the population. This may suggest the working out, if only on paper, of a category of protected civilian. Nonetheless, the cases in which the *RH* suggested that those actually killed or mistreated in war were innocent by nature served

quite a different function, and were not normally associated with incidents of siege warfare. The innocent, the '*unschuldig*', who might reasonably be protected in time of war, appeared not in accounts of siege, but in reproductions of official statements deploring the effects of war and the enemy's methods: from the emperor himself who was pained at the suffering of 'the poor innocents';[51] from the Bohemian Estates who pitied the innocent children tyrannised by Imperial forces in reply;[52] in the protestations of town councils and authorities who feared for 'so many innocent people, widows and orphans' under their protection (for example at Zittau in 1620).[53]

These protestations drew on a long tradition: even private accounts of comparatively limited traumas employed a common rhetoric of suffering and atrocity.[54] The 'rhetoric of atrocity' certainly had its functions: in confessional propaganda, it supplied a shared vocabulary for the articulation of acceptable appeals to authority, and most obviously in the news compilations it justified both rebellion and retreat.[55] Attacks on innocents were consistently presented as tyrannical disruptions of the fatherland, inherently unchristian, a betrayal of the emperor's charge, and a justification of either his intervention or his subjects' rebellion. In short, the alleged unacceptable conduct of war by the enemy became the cause of a just war.

Even when not quoting directly from these exchanges, and not explicitly discussing the innocent, the *RH* took up this emphasis on the disruption of the empire by disloyal or foreign elements in its descriptions of the sufferings of the most vulnerable. 'Walloons, and worse still Cossacks' were accused of 'pillage, torture, murder and dishonour of the country folk and inhabitants, young and old, women and maidens' in Lower Austria.[56] Although fighting in support of the emperor, 'the Spanish reduced the market town of Schlebusch to ashes and killed and burned many men, women, and children'.[57] Those similarly accused were rebels against imperial authority: after taking Paderborn, Christian von Braunschweig was described as proceeding through Nassau and onward 'with robbery, plunder, and the dishonouring of women and virgins'.[58] Mansfeld's depravity was 'impossible to describe': in East Friesland, 'as well as robbing and plundering his soldiers dishonoured women and virgins, sometimes in front of their husbands and parents'.[59] The consistent message was that the torment of the weak and the abuse of women signalled dishonourable conduct of war. To reiterate the point, all these accounts, whether drawn from the diplomatic exchanges

cited by the *RH* or from its own summations of events, refer to the general conduct of troops across regions or the country as a whole and not to particular strongholds under siege. On the contrary, the question of a besieged population's collective guilt or innocence is never broached directly in the compilation.

Treatment of Civilians at the End of Sieges

Nonetheless, some clear trends can be seen in the reported treatment of civilians in strongholds that surrendered or were taken by storm. The compilation reports in some detail on 135 successful sieges of cities, towns and abbeys for the years in question.[60] Retribution against civilians after the place was taken is reported or implied in 45 cases; but against soldiers in only 21. The balance is redressed slightly if burning, plundering, looting and surrender of equipment are excluded: imprisonment, execution and massacre were reported for soldiers in 18 such cases; for civilians in 13. There is virtually no equivalence of treatment between soldiers and civilians after a siege, as the *RH* presents it: there were only four cases where both suffered punitive violence; only five where some measure of retribution is recorded for both categories. There is no doubt that the *RH* passes over in silence many of the consequences of siege and resistance: these figures should not be taken as an accurate account of events and losses. Their significance lies in the message they communicated to readers on the dilemmas faced by civilians: they could expect no protection from the elaborate and elaborately reported codes for military surrender; and while they might take comfort from the fact that resistance by no means assured a bloodbath, it was reasonably likely that they would face retribution.

Where a siege ended in surrender, the *RH* distinguishes even more clearly between the fate of soldiers and of civilians. Adverse consequences were reported in about one third of surrenders (10 out of 53 for civilians, 8 out of 53 for soldiers, with no cases in common). This is a lower proportion than for the strongholds that were stormed: for 42 of 83, or just over half, of these cases the *RH* reports some form of retribution. More reassuringly for some readers, the *RH* reports no cases where civilians suffered violence after surrender; soldiers were executed in 7 such cases. If these figures are taken at face value, surrender may seem to make no odds for soldiers, since they faced retribution in about 15 per cent of cases whether a town was yielded or breached. Many of their

number would, of course, have been killed in action as the town was stormed. It is significant however that the correlation between soldiers' and civilians' treatment is weaker again in cases of surrender: in fact, in most of the cases where surrender did not guarantee safety, the *RH* pointed to some clash of interests between soldiers and civilians, and it was this that posed the greatest risk to soldiers in cases of surrender.

For soldiers, the risk came where they shared no common interest or loyalty with the local population. It was possible for civilians to signal their surrender while soldiers fought on, as at Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1621.[61] Maximilian of Bavaria reclaimed Peckelsheim, Bornreihe and Warburg in quick succession in 1622, as the inhabitants surrendered without reference to their garrisons, helping Maximilian's forces to sub-due rebels unprepared for action. Soldiers who survived were imprisoned and ransomed at up to 3000 thaler.[62] When Maximilian approached Kronberg a little later, its people confirmed their loyalty to the empire and forced soldiers out to slaughter.[63]

For civilians, outcomes were more mixed. Late surrender might incur a fine on the commune.[64] Without a garrison or any organised defence, towns were manifestly incapable of resisting, and could not bargain for easy terms on surrender: this was the case for Edenburg, which was plundered after surrendering to Mansfeld in 1619, and for Lauterburg, which Mansfeld's troops found almost deserted in 1621.[65] Where a gar-rison was present, soldiers might still negotiate their own terms for an honourable and advantageous surrender, leaving civilians to pay the price of resistance. Einbogen's defending forces struck a deal with Maximilian of Bavaria in 1621, leaving with honour and two months' wages, while the townspeople were left to pay a steep fine against plunder, and their leaders were imprisoned.[66] Thein (twice in 1620) and Thabor (in 1621) were treated likewise.[67]

Even where surrender was negotiated without obvious disadvan-tage to civilians, their interests and those of the soldiers diverged, even clashed, with the official resolution of hostilities. This is apparent in one of the fuller accounts offered by the *RH* in the early years of the conflict: the siege of Bautzen by the Elector of Saxony in 1620. The compendium framed the elector's actions as the siege approached its climax as a modu-lated attempt to induce surrender: the besieged population received and refused 'many admonitions' to surrender; the Electoral Prince therefore 'made a beginning' by battering down a large section of the walls, set-ting fires, damaging crops, cattle and goods, and taking possession of the

outer town. This ensured that 'as the besieged had thus been frightened with fire and sword, they offered to come to terms with the Electoral Prince'.[68]

The terms of the agreement reproduced in the *RH* demonstrate that the act of surrender sundered any common cause between the townsfolk and their defenders, and made the distinction between them abundantly clear. By request, the Saxons sent officers to negotiate—two in rotation, implying the expectation that conventions would be followed. Provisions for the military were detailed, with elements of reciprocity. Commanders and their servants would remain as hostages with the elector until prominent prisoners belonging to him were returned. The troops could withdraw in fixed order, return to retrieve invalids on a fixed date and should not act against the elector in the next three months. Prisoners would be exchanged or ransomed according to rank. The town's arsenal would be left intact for the occupying forces.[69]

This precise and measured settlement framed surrender as an exchange and defence of military resources. It indicates that Bautzen's civilians might now suffer depredations from their erstwhile defenders—their defence was the fact that the besieging army had an interest in preventing this in order to take the prize intact:

> As far as the population was concerned ... the commanders [of the troops now leaving the town] having declared that they would withdraw without doing any harm or disadvantage to the population, as soon as these commanders left the town the Buergermeister and town council would come out to the Elector of Saxony or his delegate at the gates and humbly submit the keys to them.[70]

There is no indication in the *RH* of what happened to the civilians at the hands of occupying forces.[71] This was in a sense not newsworthy: the Electoral Prince's commission aimed to restore the town to obedience, and violence, at state and personal level, was a legitimate tool to achieve this aim.[72] Yet the account does make the town's vulnerability clear, and suggests good cause for citizens to delay surrender.

The *RH* suggests that surrender was less effective not where it came late, but where it reflected a lack of cooperation amongst the besieged, particularly where soldiers' interests clashed with civilians'. It indicates that codes were sometimes applied which promised easier terms in return for prompt surrender. For Oberneheim in 1622, Essen in 1623,

Stralsund in 1627 and Rostock in 1628, it describes some moderate retribution after strongholds had offered limited defiance.[73] But as a proportion of the sieges described, these cases are negligible. Only about half of the *RH*'s accounts were systematic enough to establish clear relationships between actions and outcomes, allowing readers to gain a relatively clear picture of the population's reactions and of some of the consequences of the confrontations. Even where sufficient detail was supplied, accounts were likely to reflect the exigencies of campaigns that required commanders not only to enter and subdue strongholds but also to consider their future management.

In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that strongholds with the capacity to resist most strongly were often reported to have won favourable terms for surrender. In 1627, Nordheim's citizens, 'since they were refused terms in defiance of the custom of war, resolved to fight to the death like honourable soldiers, and to die like heroes'. When imperial forces stormed the town, the citizen defenders repelled the attack, forced a ceasefire and negotiated surrender terms.[74] The citizens of Lippe in 1623 defended themselves at length, were rebuked by the Spanish for defying the custom of war, and nonetheless negotiated advantageous surrender terms.[75] Otzberg (1621) and Warendorf (1623) resisted for weeks, before surrendering without any reported disadvantage.[76] The *RH* was not always clear on the extent of strongholds' defiance, but a satisfactory accord after belated surrender was not presented as rare or unexpected. Whether by supplying or by omitting detail, the compilation suggests that this was the case for Jülich (1621), Soest and Franckenthal (1622), Stolzenau and Möllen bei Lübeck (1624), Göttingen (1626), Nienburg and Wolfenbüttel (1627) and Glückstadt (1628).[77] The pattern of accounts did not suggest that early surrender was advantageous but rather that it reflected weakness. With resistance, external events might turn events in favour of the besieged, or they might win important concessions such as guarantees of safety, protection of goods and freedom of movement and religion. None of this is surprising. But what is clear is that civilians scrutinising the *RH* had no reason to detach themselves from the business of war, nor to expect this business to run to the letter of military codes.

The *RH* made it clear that, even where citizens and soldiers made common cause to the extent of collaborating against the attacker, they could articulate and protect their interests and freedom of action. The town council of Neuhaus seems to have been hedging its bets when it

protested its humble obedience to the emperor, but appended to a long list of grievances and equivocations the simple excuse that it could not surrender its keys, since they were in military keeping.[78] At Rosenheim in 1622, soldiers ceased fire when Mansfeld approached with heavy weaponry, sued for pardon and opened negotiations, but:

> Some of the citizens fired on solders who approached the town, killing several, so that they entered in Fury and killed all those on the streets, so that 150 citizens and many women and children died … the town was ruined and at the same time supplied great booty.[79]

Even where a town had accepted a garrison willingly and where citizens collaborated enthusiastically in resisting a siege, the distinction between soldiers and citizens was preserved—something, by the *RH*'s account, that opponents were prepared to acknowledge. At the siege of Lippe in 1623:

> The besieged fired out irregular ammunition and crossbar shot. And when the Spanish had it conveyed through a herald that this was not in accordance with the custom of war, and that if they did not stop this, they would resort to other measures, the garrison explained that the citizens were to blame, so that the Spanish had it announced to the citizens that if this crossbar shot was fired again, they would search from house to house [literally: look through a house window] when the town was taken.[80]

The *RH* presents these cases without comment, and reinforces their implications with the fragmented information it delivers on surrender and defeat more generally: the weight of the evidence is very much against any contemporary assumption that civilians were bit-players in a stronghold under siege, that their fate was determined by military codes, or that they were not acting, legitimately, in their own distinct interest. This framing of their behaviour, however, does not amount to a pragmatic assumption of collective guilt of the kind that could make wholesale slaughter an expected or approved outcome.

In practical terms too, the *RH* undermines Parker's argument that civilians and soldiers in a besieged community hosting a garrison presented an undifferentiated target.[81] Whatever the reality of events, the accounts from Rosenheim and Lippe, as well as the description of Tilly's storming of Korbach in 1623, suggested that even where a town was

stormed, there were conventions for signalling submission and claim-ing protection. At Korbach, 'anyone who was to be found out on the streets mounting a defence was cut down, so that the citizens with-drew into their houses, and most suffered plunder and disarming', but, it is implied, not worse.[82] The Spanish at Lippe indicated that the same distinction would normally hold, and that only the use of illegal ammunition might undo it; Mansfeld's troops, even in their fury, only slaughtered those who were still fighting. When Minden was stormed in 1626, Tilly's troops were described as leaving only 20 of 2,500 men defending the walls alive, but the women whom they slaughtered like-wise had, it was claimed, come out to try to save their menfolk.[83] Men, women and children were killed at Lippe, but again were defending their town when they fell.[84] However much these accounts may have been framed by post hoc rationalisations and minimisations of atrocity, the message of the *RH*'s accounts was consistent: citizens who surren-dered were safe from violence, while those whose fellow citizens fought on were nonetheless safe from immediate personal violence so long as they signalled surrender. In this way, the compilation presents a category of the civilian under siege who is protected from the worst effects of war. But behaviour, rather than age, gender or status, was the key factor here. Rather than measure the nuances of corporate resistance and surrender, the *RH* suggests that there were norms of behaviour for individuals in sieges.

The *RH* reported only two cases where the slaughter became general and touched even civilians who did not meet the invading troops in the open. These were Heidelberg and Germersheim, both stormed by impe-rial forces in 1622. When Heidelberg fell, Cossacks burned the outer town; then 'the soldiers were now in the Fury and impossible to hold back … up to the third day there continued woeful cries for help, plun-der, massacre, [various forms of tortures] and dishonouring and abduc-tion of women and virgins'.[85] Croatians in imperial service who took Germersheim in 1622, 'massacred every citizen, soldier, woman and child they could lay hands on', until Archduke Leopold became aware of their behaviour and stopped the 'bloodbath' by forbidding further slaughter on pain of death.[86] In both cases, commanders allegedly lost control, and foreign troops with a reputation for violence were promi-nent amongst the perpetrators. In neither case were the victims described as innocent, although women and children were amongst their number. This is consistent with the *RH*'s presentation of women (and at Lippe,

children) fighting at the town walls, confronting the enemy in open spaces and contributing to the community's corporate act of defiance. Their tormentors were nonetheless twice removed from imperial authority, both foreign and out of control. Their behaviour is not condemned as illegal, but is certainly not of the kind that would be attributed to honourable combatants.

Later in the war, the *RH* would take a clear stance on the mistreatment of women when, showing signs of disquiet at imperial policy, it referred to Gustavus Adolphus's exploits further afield in a paragraph headed 'Sweden's Laudable Behaviour':

> It has already been reported how Commander Baudiss delivered many captives from Massow to the Swede, amongst them many women and virgins, and he treated them well and nobly and did not suffer any injury to their honour. However, he set the ransom as high as possible, but with the excuse, that he was making war and must have money.[87]

The *RH* had already, by 1622, cited dishonouring of girls and women as one of the consistent markers of tyrannical forces and 'atrocious' behaviour. It is telling, however, that these laments were not tied to events at particular strongholds and their capture by enemies, but to troops rampaging through lands and provinces. The *RH*, with its implicit definition of civilians under siege as active, interested and largely independent parties at war, consistently detaches them from broader accounts of innocents at the mercy of soldiers' depredations. It makes it clear that citizens and inhabitants of strongholds have goods and privileges to defend, and suggests through weight of evidence rather than analysis that prompt and orderly surrender offers them no real advantage. It presents the primary risks of defying a besieging army as material—pillage and plunder—rather than violence against the person. Taken together, its accounts of siege offer a sharp distinction between soldiers and civilians: not a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, but a representation of the different parties whose interests are formed by the conditions of siege.

Citizens and soldiers under siege were represented as two distinct groups, each prepared to act independently. By their nature, they would face different consequences after storm or surrender, and the reports in the *RH* made this clear. Soldiers, if they survived, would leave the town whether free or captive, their units intact or disbanded, equipped for war

or stripped of weapons and armour and supplied with (or deprived of) wages and the necessities for survival. For citizens, by contrast, physical harm and immediate loss of personal goods loomed large amongst the hazards of war, but the prospect of occupation meant that these and other losses were bound up in the overall threat to their town or city. Their concerns included the preservation of existing social structures and political authorities as well as the maintenance of freedom of trade, movement and religion.

Conclusion

On the eve of Gustavus Adolphus's invasion and of the phase of the Thirty Years War which would bring a wave of reciprocal 'excess' and atrocities to the strongholds of the empire's northern territories, civilians drawing on the *RH* had little reason as yet to fear disaster: on the contrary, they would assume that the robust defence of their strongholds was legitimate and rational. The progress of the war, fought now by armies larger than those campaigning in the southern territories during most of the sieges reported, would unleash enough exemplary horror to undermine this confidence, and the conflict would be remembered for its mass atrocities. Yet such episodes are not representative of the war as a whole nor of the expectations civilians might have formed around siege warfare. For the *RH* hints at facts that would only be recovered much later by historians: that towns, however threatened, were seen as places of relative safety,[88] and that the typical attack in this first period of the war was a smash-and-grab raid, accompanied by unregulated and unreported violence.[89] In fact the *RH* identified the innocents who really deserved protection as those living beyond the walls of towns or forts. They were most vulnerable to the marauding or occupying enemy, for they had no protective forces nor any bargaining power against the enemy. In these circumstances, while civilians under siege evoke the distinction between the civic and the military, defending the polity rather than serving in arms, it is amongst civilians outside the walls that the *RH* locates innocents deserving of protection. As a militarising state increased the number of its administrative elites, the distinction between civilian and military would become meaningful in the modern sense. In the interim, civilians under sieges, having assets to protect, and having some hope in resistance, defence and negotiation, formed a category distinct both from soldiers and from those persecuted innocents.

Appendix: Abbreviations

RH 1618b *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio Jacobi Franci historische Beschreibung aller denckwuerdigen Historien/ so sich hin und wider in Europa/ in hoch und nider Teutschland/ auch in Franckreich/ Schott unnd Engeland/ Hispanien/ Hungarn/ Polen / Siebenbuergen / Wallachey / Molddaw / Tuerckey / u. hierzwischen nechstverscheiner Franckfurter Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz dieses 1618 Jahrs verlauffen und zugetragen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1618).

RH 1619a *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmeß biß auff Fastenmeß dieses 1619. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1619).

RH 1619b *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz dieses 1619 Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1619).

RH 1620a *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmeß biß auff Fastenmeß dieses 1620. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1620).

RH 1620b *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz dieses 1620 Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1620).

RH 1621a *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmeß biß auff Fastenmeß dieses 1621. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1621).

RH 1621b *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses 1621. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1621).

RH 1622a *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmeß biß auff Fastenmeß dieses 1622. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1622).

RH 1622b *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses 1622. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1622).

RH 1623a *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmessz biß auff Fastenmessz dieses 1623. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1623).

RH 1623b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmesß biß auff Herbstmesß dieses 1623. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1623).

RH 1624a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmesß biß auff Fastenmesß dieses 1624. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1624).

RH 1624b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmesß biß auff Herbstmesß dieses 1624. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1624).

RH 1625a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmesß biß auff Fastenmessz dieses 1625. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1625).

RH 1625b   *Historicae Relationis Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmeß/ biß auff gegenwertige Herbstmeß dieses 1625. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1625).

RH 1626a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmesß/ biß auff Fastenmesß dieses 1626. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1626).

RH 1626b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses 1626. Jahrs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1626).

RH 1627a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Michaelismeß/ biß auff jetzige New Jahrsmeß dieses 1627. Jahrs* (Leipzig, 1627).

RH 1627b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1627).

RH 1628a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmesß 1627. biß auff Fastenmesß/ dieses 1628.* (Frankfurt am Main, 1628).

RH 1628b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmesß/ biß auf Herbstmesß dieses 1628. Jahrs …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1628).

RH 1629a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Herbstmesß 1628. biß auff Fastenmesß dieses 1629. Jahrs …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1629).

RH 1629b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz dieses 1629. Jahrs …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1629).

RH 1630a   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … Fastenmeß biß auff Herbstmeß dieses 1630. Jahrs …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1630).

RH 1630b   *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio … vor und hierzwischen nechstverschienener Franckfurter Herbstmeß 1629 …* (Frankfurt am Main, 1630).

NOTES

Please see the appendix, above, for the abbreviations of the various editions of the *Relationis Historicae* (*RH*) used in these notes.

1. This quantitative analysis excludes accounts of a far smaller number of reports from the Polish–Ottoman War (1620–1), the Swedish–Polish Wars (1621–9) and the Spanish campaigns in the Dutch Republic, the Spanish Netherlands and the contested territories of Jülich-Cleves.
2. See Geoffrey Parker, 'The Etiquette of Atrocity: The Laws of War in Early Modern Europe', in *Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe*, Geoffrey Parker (London, 2003), 143–158, 150–151.
3. Simon Pepper refers to conventions for the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in, 'Siege Law, Siege Ritual, and the Symbolism of City Walls in Renaissance Europe', in *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge, 2000), 573–604.
4. Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, 'A "True Chamaeleon"? Some Concluding Remarks on the History of Surrender', in *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender*, ed. Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan (Oxford, 2012), 435–446, 439.
5. J. Philolaus, 'A serious aviso to the good people of this nation, concerning that sort of men, called Levellers' (London, 1649), 3. Cited in Barbara Donegan, 'Atrocity, War Crime and Treason in the English Civil War', in *War Studies Reader: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day and Beyond*, ed. Gary Sheffield (London, 2010), 158–200.
6. John Childs, 'Surrender and the Laws of War in Western Europe, c. 1650–1783', in *How Fighting Ends*, ed. Afflerbach and Strachan, 153–168, 158.
7. Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity', 150–151.
8. Peter Wilson cites a recent estimate of five million war-related deaths for the Holy Roman Empire alone: 20 per cent of the pre-war population, which he compares with proportions of 5.5 and 6 per cent for the First and Second World Wars respectively. Allowing that total deaths across all armies involved in the Thirty Years War numbered less than two million,

it is clear that the scale of civilian casualties was remarkable: Peter H. Wilson, 'Was the Thirty Years' War a "Total War"?', in *Civilians and War in Europe 1618–1815*, ed. Erica Charters, Eve Rosenhaft and Hannah Smith (Liverpool, 2012), 21–34, 26.

9. See Kevin Cramer, *The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century* (Lincoln, 2007), esp. 141–177, 217–231.

10. For these developments see David Lederer, 'The Myth of the All-Destructive War: Afterthoughts on German Suffering, 1618–1648', *German History* 29(3) (2011), 381–387.

11. Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity', 147–148.

12. Charters, Rosenhaft and Smith adopt a narrower interpretation of 'civil' in *Civilians and War in Europe*, 11; Forrest, Hagemann and Rendall argue for a relevant usage of *Civilgesellschaft* in the eighteenth century, but the counterpoint here must be the state of nature: Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (eds), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (London, 2009), 5.

13. Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity', 147–148.

14. Wilson, 'Was the Thirty Years' War a "Total War"?', 26.

15. On these concepts see Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling, *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Munster, 2006), 178; Benigna von Krusenstjern, 'Das Schiff, der Steuermann und die Kriegsfluten. Staatserfahrungen im Dreißigjährigen Krieg', in Paul Münch (ed.), *"Erfahrung" als Kategorie der Frühneuzeitgeschichte* (Munich, 2001), 425; Wilson 'Was the Thirty Years' War a "Total War"?', 23–4.

16. Geoff Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618–48* (London, 2004), 34–38.

17. Lothar Höbelt, 'Surrender in the Thirty Years' War', in *How Fighting Ends*, ed. Afflerbach and Strachan, 141–151, 141.

18. Sigrund Haude, 'The Experience of War', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War*, ed. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (Farnham, 2014), 259.

19. Wilson, 'Was the Thirty Years' War a "Total War"?', 26.

20. Haude, 'The Experience of War', 266.

21. Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War*, 164–178, esp. 175–176.

22. See e.g. Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity'.

23. Exemplified in Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Fuß* (2nd edn, Frankfurt/Main, 1620 [1st edn 1615]). See Roland G. Asch, '"Wo der Soldat Hinkömbt, da ist alles sein": Military Violence and Atrocities

in the Thirty Years War Re-Examined', *German History*, 18(3) (2000), 291–309.

24. Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus, at La Rochelle and Stralsund respectively, epitomise this tendency. See e.g. Christian Jouhaud, 'The Context of the Siege of La Rochelle', in *Europa Triumphans: Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe*, ed. J. R. Mulryne, Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly and Margaret Shewring, 2 vols (Aldershot, 2004), vol. 2, 120–127, 124.

25. Peter Wilson, 'Strategy and the Conduct of War', in *Ashgate Research Companion*, ed. Asbach and Schröder, 269–281.

26. Generals may have claimed to have lost control of their troops on occasion, but this could cover for their own strategic (and legal) implementation of terror. See Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity', 156–159.

27. Wilson, 'Strategy and the Conduct of War', 278.

28. Afflerbach and Strachan, 'A "True Chamaeleon"?', 348.

29. Childs, 'Surrender and the Laws of War', 154.

30. See John Thiebault, 'The Material Conditions of War', in *Ashgate Research Companion*, ed. Asbach and Schröder, 245–256, esp. 250.

31. See Wolfgang Behringer, 'Communications Revolutions: A Historiographical Concept', *German History* 24 (2006): 333–374.

32. Johannes Weber, 'Strassburg, 1605: The Origins of the Newspaper in Europe', *German History* 24 (2006), 387–412, 389. See also Behringer's study of the development of the press and its dependence on the imperial and supraterritorial postal systems: Wolfgang Behringer, *Im Zeichen des Merkur. Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen, 2003), esp. Section 1, 66, 688.

33. Krisztina Péter, 'The News-Writer and the Chronicler', in *Early Modern Print Culture in Central Europe: Proceedings of the Young Scholars Section of the Wrocław Seminars September 2013*, ed. Anna-Maria Rimm, Stefan Kiedroń and Patrycja Poniatowska (Wroclaw, 2014), 63–78.

34. The compilation never wavered in its respect for the Emperor and his agents, but showed support for the Lutheran cause: Gustavus Adolphus was held up as a model commander in 1628 (*RH* 1628a, 42); Pastor Georg Zeaemann, imprisoned on imperial orders, was eulogised in prose and (very unusually for the publication) verse in 1629 (*RH* 1629a, 70).

35. This tendency reflects the preponderance of small-scale clashes, as observed by Thiebault, 'The Material Conditions of War', 254.

36. *RH* 1621a, 42.

37. Ibid., 112.

38. Facing *RH* 1621a, 42.

39. Wilson, 'Strategy and the Conduct of War', 278.

40. E.g. at Písek (1619): *RH* 1620a, 79; at Grätzen (1619): *RH* 1619a, 117; at Thein (1620): *RH* 1620a, 155; at Lübau (1620): *RH* 1621a, 57; at Falckenau (1621), *RH* 1621b, 35; at Bratislava (Pressburg) (1621), *RH* 1621b, 37.

41. E.g. Spinola and Pithan at Jülich (1622): *RH* 1622a, 83–4; Cham in the Palatinate (1621), *RH* 1622a, 7.

42. Articulated both as a condition for surrender by those besieged and as an incentive offered by their opponents: at Ladenberg (1622): *RH* 1622b, 9; at Meisenfeld (1622), *RH* 1622b, 19; at Franckenthal (1622): *RH* 1623a, 28, *RH* 1623b, 25–28; at Kłodzko (Glatz) (1622): *RH* 1623a, 43; at Lippe (1623): *RH* 1623b, 96, *RH* 1624a, 13–15, 32–40; at Göttingen (1626) *RH* 1626b, 74; at Wolfenbüttel (1627), *RH* 1628a, 78.

43. At Bratislava (Pressburg) (1621), *RH* 1621b, 37.

44. At Grätzen (1619): *RH* 1619a, 117.

45. Afflerbach and Strachan, 'A "True Chamaeleon"?', 348.

46. Höbelt, 'Surrender in the Thirty Years War', 141–151, 141.

47. *RH* 1622b, 9.

48. *RH* 1622b, 34–35.

49. *RH* 1620a, 14.

50. *RH* 1619a, 18; *RH* 1620a, 3–4; *RH* 1620a, 14; *RH* 1622b, 34–35; *RH* 1623b, 96; *RH* 1624a, 13–15, 32–40; *RH* 1628b, 3–4, 36.

51. *RH* 1619a, 14–16, 15.

52. *RH* 1619a, 20–22, 21.

53. *RH* 1621a, 30.

54. Kaspar von Greyerz, 'Ego-Documents: The Last Word?', *German History* 28(3) (2010): 273–282; Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War*, 1–5 and 189–198.

55. Parker, 'Etiquette of Atrocity'; John Thiebault, 'The Rhetoric of Death and Destruction in the Thirty Years War', *Journal of Social History* 27 (1993): 271–290.

56. *RH* 1621b, 45–46.

57. *RH* 1623b, 61–62.

58. *RH* 1622a, 89.

59. *RH* 1623a, 86–87.

60. The figure excludes castles and isolated fortifications.

61. *RH* 1621b, 37.

62. *RH* 1622a, 109.

63. *RH* 1622b, 38.

64. As at Essen (1623): *RH* 1624a; Cleves (1624) *RH* 1624b, *RH* 1624b; Stralsund (1627): *RH* 1628.

65. *RH* 1620a, 78; *RH* 1622a, 37.

66. *RH* 1621b, 31.
67. Thein: *RH* 1620a, 155; 1620b, 56; Thabor: 1621b, 102; 1622a, 37–38.
68. *RH* 1621a, 26.
69. Ibid. 26–27.
70. Ibid. 27.
71. Frank Müller, *Kursachsen und der Böhmischen Aufstand 1618–1622* (Münster, 1997), 319–322 deals with Saxony's part in this siege.
72. Susan Dwyer Amussen, 'Punishment, Discipline, and Power: The Social Meanings of Violence in Early Modern England', *Journal of British Studies* 34 (1995): 1–34.
73. *RH* 1622b, 72; *RH* 1624a, 52; *RH* 1628a, 92; *RH* 1628b, 38.
74. *RH* 1627b, 83–84.
75. *RH* 1623b, 96; 1624a 13–15; 32–40.
76. *RH* 1622a, 77; *RH* 1623b, 83.
77. Jülich: *RH* 1621b; Soest: *RH* 1622a, 83; Frankenthal: *RH* 1623a, 28, *RH* 1623b, 25–8; Stolzenau: *RH* 1625a, 67; Möllen bei Lübeck: *RH* 1625a, 71; Göttingen: *RH* 1626b, 74; Nienburg: *RH* 1628a, 76; Wolfenbüttel: *RH* 1628a, 78; Glückstadt (1628): *RH* 1628b, 70–71, 75–76, *RH* 1629a, 5–8, 34–36.
78. Letter from Neuhaus Burgermeister and Rat to Tampier: *RH*2, 11–12.
79. *RH* 1622b, 91.
80. *RH* 1624a, 14–15.
81. See Parker, 'The Etiquette of Atrocity', 150–151.
82. *RH* 1624a, 69.
83. *RH* 1626a, 66–67.
84. *RH* 1624a, 34.
85. *RH* 1623a, 7.
86. *RH* 1622b, 87.
87. *RH* 1628a, 42–43.
88. Thiebault, 'The Material Conditions of War', 253.
89. Childs, 'Surrender and the Laws of War', 158.

A Race Against Time—A Fight to the Death: Combatants and Civilians in the Siege and Capture of Jerusalem, 1099

Alan V. Murray

Introduction

On 15 July 1099, after a siege lasting five weeks, an army of Western European crusaders stormed into the Muslim-held city of Jerusalem. The Holy City—the most sacred location for medieval Christians—was the goal of the expedition which had been proclaimed three and a half years before by Pope Urban at the church council of Clermont in November 1095, and its conquest had momentous consequences. On the day of the capture and those that followed, the victorious crusaders proceeded to massacre most of the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants of the city. A month later they marched down to the coast, and outside the city of Ascalon defeated an army which had originally been sent from the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt with the aim of relieving Jerusalem before the crusaders could take it. This second victory can be regarded as ending what has come to be known as the First Crusade (1098–1099). With their vows fulfilled, the majority of the crusaders now departed for the West,

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but those who remained in Palestine under their newly elected ruler, Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lotharingia, gradually expanded the territory under their control, which eventually became the kingdom of Jerusalem, forming one of four Christian-ruled principalities in the Levant.[1]

When the crusaders entered Syria in 1097, Jerusalem was held by the Artūqids, a Turkish dynasty in the service of the Great Seljuk sultan, whose own main power base lay in Persia and Iraq.[2] During the crusader siege of the Turkish-held city of Antioch on the Orontes (modern day Antakya, Turkey) in the winter of 1097–1098, a legation arrived from al-Afdal, the vizier (chief minister) of the Fatimid caliphate. As executive leader of the Shi'ite power which controlled Egypt as well as the cities of Palestine as far north as Acre (modern day Akko, Israel), al-Afdal wanted to open negotiations in the hope that he could enlist the crusaders as allies in the Fatimids' long-lasting struggle against the Seljuk sultans and their satellite sub-kingdoms, which were now the leading Sunni power in the Near and Middle East. However, the Fatimids failed to understand the driving force behind the crusade, which was a new, ideologically driven form of war; they thus did not recognise that its objective was the liberation of the Holy Land. The crusaders spun out the negotiations but ultimately rejected the Fatimid overtures, and when they eventually advanced south with surprising speed in the spring of 1099, the Fatimids and their allies in Palestine were taken completely by surprise. However, they managed to use the intervening time to seize control of Jerusalem, whose small garrison of some 300 Turkish soldiers rapidly surrendered and withdrew in 1098.[3]

These circumstances, as well as defensive measures taken by the new Fatimid governor immediately before the siege, meant that at the point that the crusaders approached Jerusalem, the city was largely inhabited by civilians. What is remarkable, however, is that the crusade army itself included a large number of participants who had had little or no military experience before leaving their homes in the West. This chapter will examine the comparative experience of defenders and besiegers during the crusader siege. I will attempt to demonstrate how the demarcation lines between combatants and non-combatants became blurred in the course of the siege, and then go on to look at the consequences of these developments after the capture of the city.

Besiegers and Besieged

The core of the armies of the First Crusade consisted of the retinues of the dukes, counts, bishops and great lords. Each of these prominent figures had a number of household knights in their service, each of whom would have been supported by at least one groom, while each retinue included various service personnel: aulic (legal) officers, chaplains, falconers, armourers and other specialists, and probably a number of foot soldiers, as well as—in what was a labour-intensive age—numerous domestic servants. In addition, most of the great men were accompanied by varying numbers of vassals, allies and kinsmen, each of whom had smaller retinues of their own.[4] These contingents formed the military forces which Pope Urban II had intended to bring about the liberation of the Holy Land. Yet participation could not be restricted to armsbearers alone. This was not only a matter of practicalities, but was inherent in the nature of the armed pilgrimage that the Pope had proclaimed. He had offered a remission of sins to all who went to the Holy Sepulchre, the traditional site of Christ's burial, death and resurrection. The precise nature of this indulgence has been much debated by historians, but the important factor for the composition of the crusade was that many people throughout Western Europe were aware of a once in a lifetime offer of great spiritual benefits. This offer was taken up not only by the traditional military classes (the nobility and knights), but also by numerous individuals who had no or little military experience: men of all ages, women and children. The requirements of traversing hostile territory and the organisation of the crusaders for battle and sieges meant that the originally amorphous groups of civilians were obliged to attach themselves to the military contingents and—at least in theory—to accept their commands and discipline.[5]

Half a dozen separate armies left the West at the end of the summer of 1096. After crossing the Bosphorus into Asia in 1097, they met and absorbed the remnants of the popular expeditions under Peter the Hermit, which had been defeated by the Turks of Asia Minor the year before. According to the most plausible estimates, the total number which set off to cross the Anatolian plateau amounted to some 50,000–60,000. Yet the cumulative effects of casualties in battle, of desertion and of death as a result of privation and illness, as well as the detachment of forces which remained in northern Syria, meant that the number of crusaders had probably been reduced to considerably fewer than 20,000 by the time that they entered Palestine at the beginning of the summer of

1099. Of this figure, only a minority—possibly as few as 2000—could be considered as belonging to the traditional military classes, that is the knights and nobility.[6]

During the three and a half years of campaigning, various developments occurred which blurred the originally clear distinctions between armsbearers and civilians among the crusaders. The privations of the march meant that many of the former lost horses, followers and servants, and were often reduced in status. One telling example is that of Hartmann, Count of Dillingen and Kyburg, who before the crusade had been one of the richest men in southern Germany. By the time of the siege of Antioch (1097–1098), he had lost almost all of his equipment and following, and was dependent on Godfrey of Bouillon for rations. Hartmann was not unique: many men who had left the West as lords or knights were reduced to fighting as foot soldiers in the service of those who had access to finance or material resources.[7] Yet the status of many civilians was also gradually transformed. The losses of the campaign meant that no able-bodied men could avoid military duties: going on foraging parties, hauling building materials, constructing fortifications, doing sentry duty and guarding prisoners, and when necessary fighting with whatever equipment they had available. Yet, even though most able-bodied men had been transformed into warriors in the cause of the Lord, the army still contained a long tail of non-combatants. These included women, who ranged from the wives of lords, such as Hadwida, wife of Dudo of Cons-la-Grandville, and Godevere, wife of Baldwin of Boulogne (later Count of Edessa), to numerous paupers and even quite exotic specimens such as a runaway nun from a convent in Trier.[8] In between these social extremes were a large number of wives and servants of less prominent crusaders, many of whom had lost their husbands, as well as children and men who were too old or infirm to wield weapons.[9] Thus the force which approached Jerusalem on 7 June 1099 consisted largely of people who had been civilians up to the point when they had left their homes in the course of the year 1096, although most of them had undoubtedly become used to being subjected to at least a rudimentary form of discipline in maintaining formations and obeying orders from those who had been designated as their superiors.

The crusaders arrived outside Jerusalem on 7 June and made a first attack against the city on 13 June, which was repulsed with considerable casualties, mainly because they had an insufficient number of siege ladders. Their leaders decided to blockade the city and construct siege

machinery which they realised would be needed in order to mount a successful assault against the formidable walls. The urban landscape which lay before them corresponded in extent to the area of the present-day Old City.[10] Its population before 1099 has been estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000.[11] The city had been under Muslim control since its conquest from the Byzantines in the year 638. While the language of the city largely changed from Greek to Arabic in the course of the next five centuries, it is likely that Christians remained the predominant element among the populace. Thus in the late eleventh century the geographer al-Muqaddasi, himself a native of Jerusalem, lamented that Muslims were outnumbered by Christians and Jews.[12] The majority of the Christians belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, but there were also numbers of the so-called Eastern or non-Chalcedonian churches, notably Syrian Orthodox and Armenians.[13] The later eleventh century saw a greater clustering of religious groups around certain neighbourhoods. Many Christians lived in the north-west section around the church of the Holy Sepulchre, which also contained numerous monasteries, but since they formed the majority, they were also found throughout the city. The Jews seem to have congregated in the north-eastern section, since this area, or at least part of it, was still sometimes referred to as the Juiverie after the crusader conquest.[14]

The Fatimids were surprised by the speed of the crusader advance and had little time to prepare for the inevitable attack. Al-Afdal had ordered an army to be mustered at Ascalon (modern day Tell Ashqelon, Israel), the main Fatimid base on the coast of Palestine, but its mobililisation was still incomplete by the time that the crusaders reached Jerusalem. The city governor, Iftikhār al-Dawlah, had a garrison which was fairly small. We hear mostly about a force of some 400 cavalry which acted as a mobile reserve within the city, but the infantry forces may not have been much more than this; the Turkish force which they had replaced had amounted to only 300 men. Iftikhār al-Dawlah evidently doubted the loyalty of the Christian inhabitants, and ordered them to be expelled, fearing that they might collaborate with the crusaders.[15] This information is given in only a minority of sources in cursory terms, and one might also question how complete the expulsion was. There was a later tradition that Gerard, a Westerner who was master of the Hospital of St. John, remained in concealment in the city during the siege, and one wonders whether the Fatimid authorities, who had only seized control of the city from the Seljuks the previous year, were in a position

to identify and round up all of the Christians. One would also like to know much more about where the Christians went. Did they relocate to other towns at a safe distance, or did they take refuge in the surrounding villages and countryside to await developments? Certainly the chronicler Albert of Aachen talks of Christians who had been expelled by the Saracens on suspicion of treachery, who had retreated to Bethlehem, five miles to the south. Such people were in a position to give information to the crusaders about the layout and defences of the city and conditions within it.[16]

The expulsion of the Christians must have made a considerable difference to the relative size of the two forces which confronted each other, depending on how high we set our estimate of the total population of the city. If we accept the lower estimates (*c*.20,000), then the expulsion of the Christian majority would have reduced the numbers of the besieged to below that of the crusaders. Yet if we go for the higher estimates (*c*.30,000), it is possible that the besiegers were actually outnumbered by the population within the city. And with a relieving army about to start moving from the coast, there was a good chance that they, too, would come under siege.

The Course of the Siege

The city of Jerusalem occupied a very strong defensive position. Its eastern side and most of the southern side were protected by ravines formed by the valley of the Kedron stream, while the western wall, which also rose up above sloping ground, was defended by an especially strong fortification known as the Tower of David, while another bastion, the so-called Quadrangular Tower, was situated at the junction of the western and northern walls. Since it would be impossible to employ siege machines against the eastern, western and most of the southern sides, the crusaders took up positions where there was more level ground: most of them faced the western half of the northern wall between the Quadrangular Tower and the Damascus Gate, while Raymond of Saint-Gilles and his southern French troops faced a section of the southern wall opposite Mount Zion.

In terms of supply, the besiegers paradoxically found themselves in a much worse position than the city populace. The Fatimids had driven flocks into the city, and the expulsion of the Christian population greatly reduced the number of mouths to be fed. The defenders had no

shortage of water. Since Roman times Jerusalem had enjoyed a number of pools fed by springs, while many houses were equipped with cisterns which were filled by rainfall; the Temple Mount contained several huge rock cisterns, some of which contained many thousands of cubic litres. Outside the city, by contrast, water was very scarce. The defenders had blocked or polluted most of the pools immediately outside the walls, and only one, the Pool of Siloam, was safe to use, but its irregular flow of water could not provide enough for the entire crusader army. Even as it arrived before Jerusalem, a large number of squires were sent to Emmaus, two miles away, where there were known to be springs and cisterns.[17] As the siege progressed, foragers had to bring back water from sources up to six miles distant, but in doing so they were in danger of being ambushed by Muslim villagers or scouting parties from Ascalon. In general a kind of free market prevailed. Those who were prepared to travel could often obtain water (as well as food) and sell any surplus to those who had sufficient funds, but those who purchased water often had to drink directly from the skins in which it had been collected and thus had no way of telling how pure it was; even a draught that cost twopence might be putrid or mixed with mud. Some of those who took water direct from muddy sources died from swallowing leeches in the liquid, which became fixed in the throat, stomach and nasal passages.[18]

While those who were able to do so were expected to fight, many of the non-combatants among the crusaders spent much of the siege foraging. The biggest involvement of non-combatants, however, was in providing labour. Many of the rural Muslim Arabs of the vicinity were rounded up and put to work hauling timber, but they still had to be guarded. Their numbers were also insufficient for all of the necessary tasks. This meant that almost all those in the crusader camp who were not involved in regular military duties had to provide unskilled labour, especially on the time-consuming construction of siege machinery: mangonels, siege towers and a covered battering ram. Timber and other materials were relatively scarce in the environs of Jerusalem and often had to be sourced from considerable distances away. Thus young men, old men, boys, girls and women were sent to Bethlehem to collect and bring back a large quantity of withies to make protective panels which were to be mounted on the siege engines; they were to use mules and donkeys to transport their loads, but if these proved insufficient they were to carry them on their backs.[19]

With so few soldiers available to him, the Fatimid governor pressed the remaining population of Jerusalem into service. Some of the chroniclers make a clear distinction between the Fatimid garrison and the permanent inhabitants. Fulcher of Chartres, for example, states that when the crusaders broke into the city, 'Arabs and Ethiopians' fled into the Tower of David, the strongest fortification along the walls. This description would seem to reflect the Bedouin and Sudanese components of Fatimid armies, which he appears to distinguish from the permanent Muslim inhabitants, whom he describes as Saracens (*Saraceni*).[20] Albert of Aachen stresses how the civilian populace took an active role in defending the city alongside the garrison, explaining that as the crusaders assembled outside the city, they saw how 'the city gates were closed by the soldiers of the king of Egypt, the Tower of David was protected by an armed guard, and all the townspeople were spread out on the ramparts to bar the way and resist the Catholic army'.[21] Elsewhere Albert distinguishes between the two groups, referring on the one hand to 'the soldiers of the king of Babylon' (*milites regis Babylonie*), as many of the Western sources describe the caliph of Egypt, and on the other hand to 'the citizens' (*cives*), that is, the remaining civilian inhabitants of the city. However, he often couples the two categories in descriptions of military operations, which make it clear that the inhabitants—at least the Muslims among them—made a major contribution to the defence of the city. Thus we are told that when the French Lord Gaston of Béziers came plundering outside the city as the crusaders first approached, he was attacked by a sortie made by the 'townspeople and Saracen soldiers' (*a ciuibus et Sarracenis militibus*).[22] This involvement of the civilian Muslim population in the defence of the city is scarcely surprising. It is unlikely that the Fatimid garrison was numerous enough to man all of the walls which came under attack, especially since it had to service a large number of mangonels, which threw stones against the siege towers of the besiegers. There were fourteen of these machines on the southern wall alone.

We can elaborate on the crusaders' perception of the defenders in a couple of episodes mentioned in the chroniclers which are usually only discussed by modern historians as colourful vignettes. They record several instances where the defenders gratuitously insulted the Christian faith in full view of the besiegers. These involved desecrating crosses by spitting or urinating on them, or subjecting them to mock executions by hanging.[23] One such episode mentioned by the Provençal priest Peter

Tudebode is significant in that it is one of only a handful of instances in all of the First Crusade chronicles where an utterance made by persons of Eastern origin is represented by an approximate rendering of Greek or Arabic, rather than in its Latin equivalent. Tudebode describes indignities wrought on crosses by Saracens on the walls, who are recorded as shouting out the words *Frangi agip salip*, which he explains as meaning 'Franks, this is a good cross' (*Franci, est bona crux*).[24] It is difficult to establish what the underlying Arabic speech forms may have been, but the key point is that some crusaders either had someone who was able to interpret the insult for them, or possibly some of them had learned enough Arabic to understand it themselves. The fact that Tudebode bothered to record it in something like its original form also suggests that it rings true; so in an atmosphere of growing religious fervour and desperation such insults would only magnify a desire for revenge on the part of the besiegers.

In a different case, Raymond of Aguilers reports how two Saracen women tried to perform magic by uttering incantations which were intended to disable a crusader mangonel. He gleefully relates that God ensured that a projectile from the same machine killed them both, as well as three small girls who were standing nearby. This is a quite unusual episode. If these women and children were visible to the crusaders like Raymond, they must have been present on the city walls, but it is unlikely that they were attempting to use magic. Raymond describes the women as singing (*carminantes*). In many Arab societies in the Near East there are traditions of women accompanying their menfolk to war (if not actually into battle), and also encouraging them with cries, shouts and especially with ululations (*zaghārit*) which could be used variously to express joy, grief or salutation.[25] The presence of women and children as encouragement and a visible reminder of what was at stake is a sign of how desperate the situation had become. Yet it is also an indication that the defenders in this example were not Fatimid soldiers, but Muslim civilians who had either volunteered or been pressed into service.[26]

The location of Jerusalem and the fact that large numbers were needed for foraging and construction meant that the crusaders were unable to blockade the entire city, and messengers were able to pass in and out to communicate with the Fatimid army which was mustering at Ascalon on the coast approximately forty miles away. If this army arrived before the crusaders could capture the city, they would be caught between two opposing forces. Thus for them, the siege was a race against

time. Increasingly, foraging for food and water and hauling timber for siege engines occupied an ever-greater proportion of their manpower, but the poor nutrition available meant that they were becoming weaker by the day. The crusader leadership attempted to compensate with morale-building activities, including inspirational sermons, fasts (which one imagines were no great hardship, given the desperate supply situation) and processions around the walls, all of which increased fervour and fanaticism. There is no evidence that the crusaders offered surrender terms to the defenders, nor did the governor try to secure any, evidently trusting that he could hold out until relieved. The expulsion of the Christian population probably also hardened the divide. If the Orthodox patriarch or other representatives of the Christian community had still been present in the city, it is conceivable that they might have approached the governor and pleaded with him to negotiate.

The city's defenders had every reason to resist as long as possible. It was well known that as they had advanced through Syria, the crusaders had carried out massacres after capturing the towns of Ma'arrat al-Numan and Albara.[27] Both soldiers and civilians in Jerusalem must have feared a similar fate. These fears can only have been reinforced by the crusaders' treatment of Muslims whom they had captured in the course of raids in the surrounding countryside, since in several cases executions were carried out in full view of the city walls. One of these, a man of high status, was led out to a position opposite the western wall in view of the Tower of David, and beheaded on the spot. The crusaders also intercepted some of the messengers who were trying to reach the Fatimid forces on the coast. Under interrogation one of them revealed a great deal about the communication with the Fatimid leaders; he was then placed in the arm of a mangonel so that he could be hurled—still alive—to his certain death against the walls.[28] This was clearly related to another tactic used previously during the siege of Nicaea (modern day Iznik, Turkey) in Asia Minor, when the crusaders 'used to throw the cut-off heads of the Turks inside the city walls to frighten the chiefs of the fortress and the guards of the walls'.[29] These and other tactics of intimidation adopted by the crusaders must have had the effect of encouraging even more desperate resistance on the part of the defenders.

Capture and Aftermath

Despite the time and effort they invested in sourcing timber and building machines, the crusaders were only able to construct a small number of them: two siege towers, one battering ram and an unspecified number of mangonels. With time against them, they carefully considered their deployment. One siege tower, commanded by Godfrey of Bouillon, was first directed against the north-western corner of the walls, while the other was deployed by Raymond of Saint-Gilles against the walls opposite Mount Zion in the same area where the southern French had been operating for several weeks. However, during the night of 9/10 July, Godfrey's tower and the battering ram were moved from their original location to a point further east along the northern wall which was thought to be weaker and less well defended. The projectiles shot from the crusaders' mangonels were primarily used to keep defenders away from the ramparts; the main damage was done by the battering ram, which demolished the outer wall and was beginning to damage the more substantial inner wall when the Fatimid troops succeeded in setting fire to it, so that it capsized and could no longer be used. This action left the ram blocking access to the wall for the siege towers, and so the crusaders themselves carried out the risky operation of burning the ram down completely in order to clear the approach. Once the tower had been moved into position, assaults were resumed. On 15 July the troops of Godfrey of Bouillon were able to cross from the tower onto the ramparts, seize the section of wall and spread out to open the city gates on either side. This breach on the northern side was soon followed by a successful assault of the south-western walls.[30]

Resistance collapsed as most of the Fatimid troops retreated into the Tower of David, leaving most of the civilian population to its fate. There is a broad agreement among Western, Arabic, Armenian and Hebrew sources that the crusaders then began a bloodbath in which they carried out a slaughter of the city's Muslim and Jewish inhabitants.[31] Raymond of Aguilers, himself an eyewitness, relates:

> Some of the pagans were mercifully beheaded, others pierced by arrows plunged from towers, and yet others, tortured for a long time, were burned to death in searing flames. Piles of heads, hands, and feet lay in the houses and streets, and indeed there was a running to and fro of men and knights over the corpses.[32]

Robert the Monk, who wrote the most popular and successful (in terms of manuscript transmission) account of the crusade, describes the slaughter as the crusaders reached the Temple of Solomon, as they called the Al-Aqsā mosque:

> Our men – worried that the sun would set – found a new rush of courage, broke into the temple and put its occupants to a wretched death. So much human blood was spilt there that the bodies of the slain were revolving on the floor on a current of blood; arms and hands which had been cut off floated on the blood and found their way to other bodies so that nobody could work out which body the arm had come from which was attached to another headless body. Even the soldiers who were carrying out the massacre could hardly bear the vapours rising from the warm blood.[33]

It is striking that these and other similarly lurid descriptions are given by Christian chroniclers, which suggests that they were not being used critically. Rather, we have to recognise that many of the descriptions are derived from or echo biblical imagery. Thus Raymond of Aguilers states that on the Temple Mount the crusaders 'rode in blood [up] to the knees and bridles of their horses'.[34] It is doubtful whether this description should be understood literally, since it can be identified as a reference to Revelation 14:20, which describes the vision of the winepress of the wrath of God, from which blood will flow up to the bridles of horses.[35] Revelation, as well as the Old Testament books of Isaiah and Zechariah, were employed by the Christian chroniclers to create the impression that the liberation of Jerusalem and the slaughter of the Gentiles which followed it had been divinely ordained. Yet as Kedar has argued, the adoption of biblical imagery does not in itself invalidate the descriptions given by Raymond and other chroniclers; slaughter remains slaughter, even if it is described in apocalyptic terms.

Some specialists in medieval warfare have argued that the massacre of both combatants and civilian population alike was the normal fate of any city taken by storm according to the conventions of warfare at the time, pointing to similar events where the defenders had refused to surrender.[36] This may well be true, but there is no evidence that the crusaders ever offered any surrender terms. The slaughter on the day of the capture, 15 July, can be explained as the effects of frenzy and bloodthirsty desire for revenge on the part of enraged crusaders. Over the course of five weeks, the crusaders had seen how the originally

civilian populations had fought them on the walls, bombarded them with arrows and projectiles, and offered insults and injury to Christian symbols. They were aware that the Christians of Jerusalem had been expelled; they must have known that any male native they encountered was a Muslim or Jew, and thus a potential opponent.

Yet most Western sources agree that this hot-blooded slaughter eventually petered out. This is understandable. The crusaders, already weakened by the privations of the siege, must have been exhausted by the fighting. Their immediate needs would have been food, water and rest; those who were not exhausted hoped to secure plunder and prisoners who could be ransomed. Robert the Monk, continuing the passage quoted above, states that 'once they had finished this indescribable slaughter their spirits became a little gentler; they kept some of the young people, male and female, alive to serve them. They ran through streets and squares, plundering whatever they found; and each kept what he plundered'.[37] Some of the Jewish and Muslim populations were sold for ransom, while others were able to escape to Egypt or Syria, suggesting that in the immediate aftermath of the capture the city was not completely secure.[38] At this point many of the inhabitants had been taken captive, but others were hiding in houses or cellars. Large numbers had taken refuge on the Temple Mount, and one of the crusader leaders, the Norman Tancred, had given his banner to a large group as a token that he had accepted their surrender. Most of the Fatimid troops were still holding out in the Tower of David under the command of the governor.

Yet as Kedar has demonstrated in great detail, the sources agree that the massacres continued for at least another day after this, while Albert of Aachen states that the slaughter went on until 17 July.[39] How can this extended massacre be explained? The crusaders had no secure communications either with the West or with the pockets of Frankish-held territory far to the north. The only ships that had joined the crusaders in Palestine had been dismantled and transported overland by their Genoese crews to provide wood for building siege engines at Jerusalem. With Fatimid forces concentrating at Ascalon, the only conceivable strategy for the crusaders was to make Jerusalem secure as quickly as possible, and use it as a base to confront the Fatimid army in the coastal plain; in the event of a defeat they could retreat back into the fortified city and attempt to hold out there in the hope that some relief would arrive from the West in the form of later waves of the crusade.

Securing Jerusalem in these circumstances was anything but straightforward. The crusaders had to man the city walls and keep the Fatimid troops isolated in the Tower of David, while also attempting to locate food supplies for the coming weeks; while doing all these things, they also needed to keep the surviving inhabitants inside the city under control. Their biggest single fear must have been that these large numbers might rise up against them as soon as the Fatimid relieving army approached the city; certainly they had seen enough proof that the civilians were not passive bystanders, but had played a significant part in the defence of the city.

Presumably only the wealthier inhabitants with connections elsewhere could have been ransomed, which left the problem of what should be done with the rest. It would have been possible to expel the Muslims and Jews from Jerusalem, but they would still present a major problem. Allowing them to leave would have simply increased the number of people competing for scarce resources of food and water in the environs of the city.[40] More dangerously, they could have provided a labour force that could be employed by the approaching Fatimids in mounting a siege of the city, in precisely the same manner that the crusaders had used Muslim captives. The chances of a successful assault would have been greatly improved by large numbers that could be used to construct and move siege engines, fill in ditches and haul supplies of food and water.

The thinking of the crusade leadership can be discerned in a passage given by Albert of Aachen, who reports a speech which he claims was made during a council of the crusade leaders:

> Jerusalem, city of God on high, has been recovered, as you all know, with great difficulty and not without harm to our men, and today she has been restored to her own sons and delivered from the hands of the king of Egypt and the yoke of the Turks. But now we must be careful lest we lose it through avarice or sloth or the pity we have for our enemies, sparing prisoners and gentiles still left in the city. For if we were to be attacked in great strength by the king of Egypt we should be suddenly overcome from inside and outside the city, and in this way carried away into eternal exile. And so the most important and trustworthy advice seems to us that all the Saracens and gentiles who are held prisoner for ransoming with money, or already redeemed, should be put to the sword without delay, so that we shall not meet with any problem from their trickery or machinations.[41]

The Fatimid garrison was still capable of offering resistance from the Tower of David; the crusader leaders therefore decided to grant it free passage to Ascalon, thus removing one military obstacle.[42] Yet greater dangers were still posed by internal enemies (the large number of captives within the city) and external enemies (the approaching Fatimid army). This speech—even if it is a literary construction written well after the event—encapsulates the thinking of the crusader leadership, offering plausible if grisly reasons why the remaining Muslims and Jews should be executed in cold blood. The massacres of 16 and 17 July can be most plausibly understood as a calculated action carried out with the aim of removing the internal threat. The fact that so many crusaders postponed their plundering and agreed to forgo potential ransoms in order to carry out executions is an indication of a steely determination. For the slaughter which followed the leaders' decision was both organised and merciless. The crusaders advanced onto the Temple platform and slaughtered those who had taken refuge there.[43] Those who were already being held as captives were split up into groups and executed. Some were kept alive long enough to be put to work in cleaning up and carrying the bodies of the slain outside the city, where they, too, were put to death.[44] When Fulcher of Chartres visited the city a year later, he was struck by the great number of rotting corpses that lay outside the walls.[45]

Conclusions

The attempt of the crusaders to capture Jerusalem before it could be relieved by the Fatimid army from Ascalon meant that for defenders and besiegers alike, the siege of the city was a fight to the death. Many of those who had left Western Europe as civilians had in the course of two years of campaigning effectively become soldiers—not professionals, but fighters motivated by faith and fervour. The privations they had suffered and sights they had seen probably made them just as willing as the knightly class of armsbearers to slaughter their enemies not only in rage, but also in cold blood. Similarly, most of the Muslims and Jews within the city had lived their lives as civilians until the fateful summer of 1099; yet the knowledge of their likely fate, as had been suffered by their fellow believers in northern Syria, spurred them on to assist the Fatimid forces, which had the effect that soldiers and townspeople alike were identified by the crusaders as enemies. In these desperate circumstances, those who

had once been civilians on both sides had little choice but to fight, and in a great number of cases, to die.

The experience of the siege of Jerusalem had a significant effect on the strategic thinking of those crusaders who chose to remain in Palestine rather than return to their homes in the summer of 1099. With only Jerusalem, Jaffa and Galilee under Christian control, it was evident that the Muslim-held cities of the coast would need to be captured in order to secure communications with the West and to reduce the opportunities for Fatimid counter-attacks. Godfrey of Bouillon, elected as defender of the Holy Sepulchre in July 1099, was at first content to take tribute payments from the Muslim authorities which he used to pay his soldiers, but shortly before his death in the summer of 1100 he had launched an attack on Haifa, which culminated in a massacre of its inhabitants.[46] His successors Baldwin I (1100–18) and Baldwin II (1118–31), who took the title King of Jerusalem, between them besieged almost every city on the coast until the capture of Tyre in 1124 left only Ascalon in the possession of the Fatimids. These actions, in which the small royal forces were greatly augmented by pilgrims and fleets from the West, aimed not only at gaining control of ports, but also at removing Muslims and Jews and replacing them with Franks or indigenous Christians. At Arsuf (1101), Beirut (1110) and Tyre (1124) the Muslim authorities surrendered on terms, with Muslims and Jews being allowed to leave with their moveable goods, but the sieges of Caesarea (1101) and Acre (1104) ended with assaults and massacres of the non-Christian populations.[47] The Franks did little to disturb the Muslim peasants of Palestine, who were needed to work the land, but they regarded the non-Christian urban populations as a security risk. The facts on the ground created in the course of the expansion of the kingdom of Jerusalem clearly derived from the experience of the crusaders at Jerusalem in July 1099.

Notes

1. On the wider context of the conquest of Palestine and the foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, see John France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge, 1994), 355–356; Joshua Prawer, 'The Jerusalem the Crusaders Captured: Contribution to the Medieval Topography of the City', in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), 1–16; Susan B. Edgington and Luis

García-Guijarro (eds), *Jerusalem the Golden: The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade* (Turnhout, 2014); Alan V. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History, 1099–1125* (Oxford, 2000). By the summer of 1099 two detachments from the crusade armies remained in northern Syria, where they were establishing the county of Edessa and the principality of Antioch; subsequently another contingent under Raymond of Saint-Gilles, Count of Toulouse, formed the nucleus of what became the county of Tripoli on the territory of modern Lebanon. For the sacrality of Jerusalem and the Holy Land, see Alan V. Murray, 'Sacred Space and Strategic Geography in Twelfth-Century Palestine', in *Sacred Space in the State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia*, ed. Jarosław Wenta (Toruń, 2013), 13–37.

2. For the Great Seljuk sultanate and its sub-kingdoms, see A. C. S. Peacock, *The Great Seljuk Empire* (Edinburgh, 2015).

3. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, 'Diplomatic Relations between Muslim and Frankish Rulers, 1097–1153 AD', in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Leiden, 1993), 190–215.

4. For a study of the composition of one of the main contingents, see Alan V. Murray, 'The Army of Godfrey of Bouillon, 1096–1099: Structure and Dynamics of a Contingent on the First Crusade', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 70 (1992): 301–329.

5. Conor Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (Leiden, 2008), 95–157.

6. France, *Victory in the East*, 122–142. France calculates a figure of 10,000 for the force which faced the Fatimids at Ascalon in August 1099, which would allow for several thousand casualties during the siege of Jerusalem.

7. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana: History of the Journey to Jerusalem*, ed. and trans. Susan B. Edgington (Oxford, 2007), 332–334; Alan V. Murray, 'Money and Logistics in the Armies of the First Crusade: Coinage, Bullion, Service and Supply, 1096–1099', in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John Pryor (Aldershot, 2006), 229–249.

8. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 191–92, 203, 209.

9. Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade*, esp. 271–282; Alan V. Murray, 'Sex, Death and the Problem of Single Women in the Armies of the First Crusade', in *Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval Mediterranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor*, ed. Ruthy Gertwagen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (Farnham, 2012), 255–270.

10. Dan Bahat and Chaim T. Rubinstein, *The Illustrated Atlas of Jerusalem* (New York, 1990), 68–89. The walls had been reconstructed during the eleventh century, leaving several important religious sites outside the fortified ones; these included the churches of St. Mary on Mount Zion and St. Peter in Gallicantu and the Pool of Siloam.

11. Joshua Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (London, 1972), 82.

12. Al-Muqaddasi, *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions: A Translation of Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Ma'rifat al-Aqalim*, trans. Basil Anthony Collins (Reading, 1994), 151–152.

13. Alan V. Murray, 'The Demographics of Urban Space in Crusade-Period Jerusalem, 1099–1187', in *Urban Space in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, ed. Albrecht Classen (Berlin, 2009), 205–224.

14. Alan V. Murray, 'Constructing Jerusalem as a Christian Capital: Topography and Population of the Holy City under Frankish Rule in the Twelfth Century', in Alan V. Murray, *The Franks in Outremer: Studies in the Latin Principalities of Palestine and Syria, 1099–1187* (Farnham, 2015), Essay XIII: 1–18.

15. A.S. Tritton and Hamilton A.R. Gibb (eds and trans), 'The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 92 (1933): 69–102, 273–306 (here 73); Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 398–379; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique (Willelmi Tyrensis archiepiscopi chronicon)*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, 2 vols (Turnhout, 1986), 374–375.

16. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 398–401; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, 375.

17. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 398–399.

18. Ibid., 413; *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum: The Deeds of the Franks and the Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem*, ed. Rosalind Hill (London, 1962), 88–89.

19. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 409.

20. *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913), 300: '*tam Arabes quam Aethiopes, in arcem Daviticam fugientes*'. On the composition of Fatimid armies, see Yaacov Lev, 'Infantry in Muslim Armies during the Crusades', in *Logistics of Warfare*, ed. Pryor, 185–208.

21. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 402–403: '*porte urbis a militibus regis Babylonie clause sunt, turris Dauid satellito armato munita, uniuersi ciues in menibus ad prohibendum et resistendum populo catholico diffusi sunt*'.

22. Ibid., 400. Similar formulations are given at 418: '*Sarraceni milites et qui urbis erant ciues*'; 422: '*ciues autem et milites regis Babylonie*'; 426: '*uniuersi ciues ac milites regis Babylonie*'; 428: '*ciues autem ac defensores urbis*'.

23. See, for example, Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 415.

24. Peter Tudebode, 'Petri Tudebodi seu Tudebovis sacerdotis Sivracensis historia de Hierosolymitano itinere', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, 3: 1–117 (here 105): '*Videntibus*

omnibus Christianis, cum quodam ligno verberavant, et postea, ut majorem Christianis inferrent dolorem, ad murum eam frangebant, dicentes alta voce: Frangi, agip salip! Quod apud nos sonat "Franci, est bona crux"'. Tudebode's rendering of the Arabic is problematic. The word *Frangi* evidently represents the Arabic *Faranjī*, 'Frank' (or the plural form *al-Ifranj*), while *salip* is clearly *al-ṣalīb*, 'cross'. The word *agip* might represent Arabic *ʿajīb*, 'wondrous (thing)'. In this case the utterance may have been an ironic insult on the lines of 'Frank(s), this is a wondrous cross', or possibly a question, 'is this not a wondrous cross?'. It is also possible that the second word may be a mistake for Arabic *ʿabīd*, the plural of *ʿabd*, 'slave, servant'; in this case, 'Frank(s), servants of the cross' would be equally conceivable as an insult directed by Muslims against Christians, whom they often suspected of idolatry. I am grateful to Dr. Niall Christie of Corpus Christi College, Vancouver, for suggestions concerning the underlying meaning of the Arabic phrase.

25. Boaz Shoshan, *Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo* (Cambridge, 1993), 75; Samia Abdennour, *Egyptian Customs and Festivals* (Cairo, 2007), 38.
26. Raymond of Aguilers, 'Raimundi de Aguilers canonici Podiensis historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, 3: 231–309 (here 299): '*Verum hoc praeterire non libuit, quod quum duae mulieres petrariam unam de nostris fascinare vellent, lapis de eodem tormento viriliter excussus mulieres carminantes cum tribus puellis parvulis allisit, atque animalibus excussis incantations avertit*'.
27. *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, 74–75; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 368–369, 376–377.
28. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 423.
29. Ibid., 108–109: '*capita Turcorum amputat intra urbis menia iactabant, ad terrendos magistros arcis et custodes murorum*'.
30. France, *Victory in the East*, 346–356.
31. A detailed analysis of all sources is given by Benjamin Z. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades', *Crusades* 3 (2004): 15–75, who also provides a wider sample of quotations.
32. Raymond of Aguilers, 'Raimundi de Aguilers', 300: '*Alii namque, quod levius erat, obtruncabantur capitibus; alii autem sagittati de turribus saltare cogebantur; alii vero diutissime torti et ignibus adusti flammeriebantur. Videbantur per vicos et plateas civitatis aggeres capitum et manuum atque pedum. Per cadavera vero publice, hominum et equitum discursus erat*'.
33. *Robert the Monk's History of the First Crusade: Historia Hierosolimitana*, trans. Carol Sweetenham (Aldershot, 2005), 200.

34. Raymond of Aguilers, 'Raimundi de Aguilers', 300: '*Sed tantum sufficiat, quod in templo et in porticu Salomonis equitabatur in sanguine usque ad genua, et usque ad frenos equorum. Justo nimirum judicio, ut locus idem eorum sanguinem exciperet, quorum blasphemias in Deum tam longo tempore pertulerat*'. A similar image is given in the *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, 91.

35. *Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem*, eds. Robert Weber, Bonifatius Fischer, H. I. Frede, J. Gribomont, H. F. D. Sparks and W. Thiele (3rd edn, Stuttgart, 1969), 1896: '*et calcatus est lacus extra civitatem et exivit sanguis de lacu usque ad frenos equorum per stadia mille sescenta*'.

36. France, *Victory in the East*, 355–356; Kaspar Elm, 'Die Eroberung Jerusalems im Jahre 1099. Ihre Darstellung, Beurteilung und Deutung in den Quellen zur Geschichte des Ersten Kreuzzugs', in *Jerusalem im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter. Konflikte und Konfliktbewältigung—Vorstellungen und Vergegenwärtigungen*, ed. Dieter Bauer, Klaus Herbers and Nikolas Jaspert (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), 31–54.

37. *Robert the Monk's History of the First Crusade*, 201.

38. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099'.

39. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 439–445. On the importance and accuracy of Albert's testimony, see especially: Peter Knoch, *Studien zu Albert von Aachen: Der erste Kreuzzug in der deutschen Chronistik* (Stuttgart, 1966); Susan B. Edgington, 'The First Crusade: Reviewing the Evidence', in *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, ed. Jonathan Phillips (Manchester, 1997), 57–77.

40. On the problems of supply, especially the scarcity of water, see France, *Victory in the East*, 334–335.

41. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 440–441: '*Ierusalem, ciuitas Dei excelsi, ut uniuersi nostis, magna difficultate, et non sine dampno nostrorum recuperata, propriis filiis hodie restituta est, et liberata de manu regis Babylonie et iugo Turcorum. Sed nunc cauendum est ne auaricia aut pigricia uel misericordia habita erga inimicos hanc amittamus, captiuis et adhuc residuis in urbe gentilibus parcentes. Nam si forte a rege Babylonie in fortitudine graui occupati fuerimus, subito ab intus et extra expugnabimur, et sic in perpetuum exilium transportabimur. Vnde primum et fidele consilium nobis uidetur quatenus universi Sarraceni et gentiles qui captiui tenentur pecunia redimendi aut redempti sine dilatione in gladio corruant, ne fraude aut ingeniis illorum nobis aliqua aduersa occurrant.*'

42. *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, 92; *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, 308–309. As Kedar argues, it is likely that some of the civilians who had taken refuge in the Tower of David were able to leave with the garrison.

43. *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, 92.

44. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 442–443; *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, 92; Guibert of Nogent, 'Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, 4: 113–263 (here 228).
45. *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, 332–333.
46. On tribute, see Alan V. Murray, 'The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden, 2008), 275–286.
47. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 520–521, 562–563, 566–567, 674–675; *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, 534–536, 733–736.

As They Were Ripped from the Altars: Civilians, Sacrilege and Classical Greek Siege Warfare

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The most common view of archaic and classical Greek warfare is one of hoplites, pitched battles and strictly defined cultural norms.[1] Within this picture, sieges, siege warfare and city sacks are often marginalised.[2] For

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Barry Strauss, it was after the period of the Persian Wars that Greek siege warfare came into its own.[3] In Kern's specialised study of siege warfare in the ancient world, he quite boldly states that 'traditional Greek warfare did not aim at the conquest of cities and territory', and thus siege warfare was neither important nor practised until the Peloponnesian War.[4] It was only with the introduction and development of systems of fortifications in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE that Greek warfare changed to prioritise the attack on cities, as agricultural lands could no longer be easily ravaged.[5] Similar thinking was developed by Garlan in the 1970s.[6] V. D. Hanson has described this situation as reflecting 'a breakdown in the ability of soldiers to conduct war, or, rather, a failure of one side to offer resistance in the field and thereby to keep the killing far distant from civilians and their homes'.[7]

These conclusions are well founded in a view of Greek warfare that was highly ritualised and governed by rules, one of which supposedly prohibited the targeting of civilians, which by extension we may read as settlements.[8] In general, however, this *agonal* (rule-bound) view of Greek warfare has been questioned in recent literature.[9] Peter Krentz has successfully argued against many of Ober's observed 'rules', including the notion that civilians were not to be targeted, arguing instead that they were typically put out of the way of combat; thus not targeting civilians was a matter of practicality rather than a rule.[10] Hans van Wees has gone on to criticise, rightly, the 'civilised' version of Greek warfare as presented under the cover of agonal war.[11]

Part of the problem in discussing early Greek siege warfare is in the terminology and concepts of what constitutes a 'siege' and differentiates it from other forms of warfare which directly impact on settlements. A siege proper is usually defined by one particular characteristic: it takes place over an extended period of time.[12] This is not the only 'type' of warfare that affected civilians and settlements, however. It is problematic to separate the warfare of prolonged occupation of territory around a settlement from the more rapid capture or assault of a town. Both of these scenarios put civilians and their property, as well as the property of the community, into harm's way.

In contrast to Ober's observed rule that Greeks would not specifically target civilians in warfare, there is ample evidence, beginning with the 'Homeric world', that civilians and settlements were often targeted in war.[13] Odysseus, the great hero of the Homeric poems, was known as a sacker of cities for his deeds at Troy, but is also known to have sacked

Ismarus, a city of the Cicones.[14] A number of other figures from the Homeric poems were renowned for sacking cities: Enyo, Ares, Oileus, Otrynteus and Achilles.[15] Along with the deities of Enyo and Ares, Greek tradition also ascribed the epithet of 'city-sacker' to the goddess Pallas/Athena.[16] Conversely, Athena is usually described as being the protector of a city rather than a 'sacker' of cities.[17] Although typically seen as the god of the dirty side of warfare, even Ares is once given the epithet of protector of cities.[18]

This brief survey of Homeric evidence for siege warfare is evidence that early Greeks were not averse to the practice. There is not room in this analysis to enumerate the examples from more historical periods, but throughout the discussion it will become apparent that siege warfare was common. The present chapter examines the impact of sieges on civilian groups in Greek history. I explore the specific hardships endured when war is brought to a settlement, during the siege and in the aftermath of a city's sacking. The analysis then moves on to look at the one supposed way for persons to save themselves after their city had been sacked. This practice of seeking divine protection at divine sites (altars/temples/sanctuaries) is well known throughout Greek history and was used not only by persons in times of war, but also by those in trouble during peacetime.[19] The usefulness and effects of taking asylum after the successful sacking of a city will be discussed and the universal protection supposedly given will be questioned.

'Civilians' Under Siege

As we have seen, Greek civilians were not exempted from the destructive pattern of warfare which subsumed those of military age in such a complete manner, despite what some modern authors may have us think. This section looks at the conditions which civilians in besieged and captured cities would be forced to endure. It is perhaps unfair to proceed without pointing out that, while Greeks certainly committed atrocities against other Greeks, as well as barbarians, this was not a unique phenomenon in the Hellenic world. As this volume shows, and a thorough reading of the historical tradition certainly reveals, civilians in besieged and captured cities in various times and places faced extreme violence (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.73).

Once a Greek army besieged a city, little could be done by the defenders to break the siege, or so it seems from the evidence. But that did not

stop the defenders from trying. During the mythological siege of Troy, most of the action revolves around the attempts of the Trojans to drive off the Greeks, resulting in a number of skirmishes and battles in front of the walls of the city or the walls of the Greek camp. While the men of military age would have been used to this kind of fighting (as it would not have been much different than a pitched battle, except on a smaller scale), the inhabitants of the city would not have been used to seeing or hearing the destruction wrought on their loved ones.[20]

Before the city was sacked, the most visible and audible horrors would have been in the form of skirmishes outside of the walls. Examples of skirmishes during sieges are easy to find. When the Spartans besieged Plataea in 429 BCE, the aggressors built a wooden palisade around the town, which Thucydides tells us was meant to prevent the residents from launching sorties outside the walls (2.75). In 425 BCE, the Messinians drove the Naxians inside their walls and began to ravage their territory; anticipating their allies coming soon, the besieged sallied out from their town and defeated the Messinians (Thuc. 4.25). The inhabitants of Himera found some limited success in mounting a sortie against a besieging army of Carthaginians, slaying perhaps as many as 6000 of them (Diod. Sic. 13.60), but the Punic army, reinforced by reserves camped in the hills, pushed them back and, to a man, killed a group of 3000 (Diod. Sic. 13.60.6–7). The crux of the Athenians' Sicilian Expedition (415–413 BCE) was a lengthy siege of Syracuse, during which most of the fighting was carried on outside of the city walls in a series of pitched battles (Thuc. 6.63–70, 100–102, 7.3–6, 23). Ultimately, the Athenians failed to capture the city and their attempt to conquer Sicily was thus thwarted.

Skirmishing in front of towns seems, therefore, to have been a common phenomenon in Greek siege warfare, and one that directly impacted on the civilians still trapped within the city walls. Loved ones, whether husbands, sons or fathers, were killed within eye and earshot of them and the psychological impact must have been quite significant. It is likely that they observed most of the action. The image of the town under siege on the shield of Achilles showed women, children and old men stationed on the walls as their men of fighting age marched out against the besiegers (Hom. *Il.* 18.514–516). The epic attributed to Hesiod (*c.*750–650 BCE), *The Shield of Heracles*, portrays a skirmishing force outside a besieged city with wives watching and lamenting from the town's towers, while old men pray to the gods as they watch their sons in

combat (238–248). Diodorus reports that parents, children and relatives ascended the walls of Himera when their men sallied forth (13.60.4). Although the initial success would have imbued a level of jubilation into the civilian observers, the obliteration of the 3000 likely had an extremely negative psychological impact. The responses to the death of Hector outside the walls of Troy are our best reflection of the emotional response from family seeing their kin die outside a besieged city (Hom. *Il.* 22.1–515).[21] The lyric poet, Alcaeus of Mytilene (sixth century BCE), provides us with the haunting image of 'children's screams filling the Dardanian plain' in the aftermath of Troy (fr. 298). These sights would likely have had a demoralising effect on the population, affecting the continued will to fight as well as the civilian population's willingness to continue enduring hardships rather than fleeing or surrendering the city.

During these acute moments of conflict during sieges, civilians typically played no role. Women did not (usually) partake in combat in Greece, while old men and young boys were not considered physically able. Only a few sources provide evidence of active participation of civilians in the defence of the city's fortifications. After Cleomenes destroyed the Argive army, a group of women following Telesilla, a priestess, took up arms and defended their city (Plut. *Demul. vir.* 4.245c; Polyaenus *Strat.* 8.33; cf. Hdt. 6.77).[22] Women and children helped to reinforce and rebuild the walls of Gela during the Carthaginian siege at the end of the fifth century BCE (Diod. Sic. 13.108.8). During a war between Sinope and Datamas in the middle of the fourth century BCE, we hear of women arming themselves with what they could and walking the walls, in order to be mistaken for men and deceive the enemy into thinking there were more defenders than actually present (Aen. Tact. 40.4–5). Besides these limited cases, civilians took little active role in the defence of a city's walls.

If the besiegers eventually broke through a town's defences and began to sack it, however, civilians could not readily avoid combat. Although old, young or female, if forced to fight, they would not have had a hard time getting hold of arms. Aeneas Tacticus warns that a town's *agora* was the perfect place for dissident civilians to find weapons, which also means that during the defence of a town it would have been a perfect place for the inhabitants to arm themselves to some degree (Aen. Tact.30). Although not attested to in a historical siege, a planned uprising at Sparta sometime around 399 BCE used tools gathered in the *agora* as weapons, providing evidence of another source of killing implements

(Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.7). How effective these arms would be against the invading army is perhaps less important than the fact that the civilians *could* defend themselves to some degree.[23]

The best remembered, and perhaps most spectacular, means by which civilians tried to help defend their town was by climbing on top of buildings and throwing rocks and roof tiles down upon the enemy. The first historical instance of this of which we know was during the Theban attack on Plataea. At one point during the fighting within the town, the women and slaves pelted the Thebans with roof tiles from above (Thuc. 2.4; Aen. Tact. 2.6; Diod. Sic. 12.41.6). Women and children did the same during the sacking of Selinus in Sicily by the Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 13.56.7). Agesilaus sent children and the elderly to the rooftops during a surprise attack on Sparta by the Thebans (Diod. Sic. 15.83.3). Polyaenus preserves a memory of women attacking with roof tiles during an Aetolian sack of Acarnania (*Strat.* 8.69). Although outside the chronological scope of this study, the great Epirate king, Pyrrhus, was killed while assaulting Argos by a woman hurling a roof tile down upon him (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34; Paus. 1.13.8; Polyaen. *Strat.* 8.68). While throwing roof tiles and stones may not have had much of an impact on the outcome of the assault, it provided trapped civilians one final ray of hope in defending their settlement. In addition, although the tiles thrown at Selinus did not prevent the city from being sacked, Diodorus does claim that they hindered Carthaginian progress. Equally, Thucydides and Diodorus both claim an important role for the tile throwers in Plataea, with the latter going further, claiming that it was the tile throwers who turned the tide during the battle.[24]

Although temporarily safe from enemy soldiers outside the walls, civilians were menaced by pestilence, famine and treachery within a besieged settlement. Throughout Mediterranean history, the region's warm and wet climate has helped to spread certain diseases. Whatever the source of infection, populations which were confined within walls readily succumbed.[25] During the Peloponnesian War, when the Spartans had driven the Athenians inside their walls, a great plague developed (Thuc. 2.47–55; Diod. Sic. 12.45.2). Thucydides, a witness to the events within the city, preserves a graphic and unsettling record of what life was like in a besieged city suffering from a plague.[26] Many dead bodies lay around, unburied; the birds and animals that eat human flesh did not come near them, or if they did they died (Thuc. 2.50).[27]

Athens is the best documented case of a city 'under siege' experiencing a plague. Three instances of plague, however, developed in the camps of besieging armies on Sicily late in the fifth and early fourth centuries BCE. This was the case in the Punic camp during the 406 BCE siege of Akragas in Sicily (Diod. Sic 13.86.2). Although we do not hear of the plague spreading to the city, it seems likely that it would have had to at least some degree, as it was transmissible enough to spread throughout Carthage and Libya on the army's return (Diod. Sic. 13.114.2). Two further plagues during Sicilian sieges are recorded taking place outside of Syracuse, one during the Athenian siege in 413 BCE (Diod. Sic. 13.12), the other during the Punic siege of 396 BCE (Diod. Sic. 14.70). Again, we do not hear of the transmission of pestilence into Syracuse, but it is not unthinkable. Knowledge of the plague by Diodorus' source(s) may have been based on an outbreak in the Greek population.[28]

Civilians within city walls were also forced to deal with the possibility of betrayal and intrigue. Judging by the passing statements in Thucydides and Xenophon, treachery was a common means by which to take a town. The Corinthians took Anactorium in this way, only to lose it back to the Athenians and their allies in the same manner (Thuc. 1.55, 4.49). The Mitylenians attempted to take Methymna by treachery, although they failed (Thuc. 3.18). A group of exiles took Antandrus in the same way (Thuc. 4.52). The Athenian force besieging Byzantium in the late fifth century BCE was forced to rely on treachery to take the city when their assaults failed (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.14–15). Throughout these narratives, we do not usually get details of the treachery involved, perhaps because it was not known or treachery was so common that it did not need to be described in detail. The most detailed evidence we have shows how Chalcis was once captured because of a traitor secretly burning through the bar lock of one of the gates (Aen. Tact. 4.1–4).[29]

The paranoia about traitorous actions was so widespread in the Greek world, that the fourth century BCE military theorist, Aeneas Tacticus, covered it extensively in his extant work *How to Survive Under Siege*.[30] Aeneas prescribes many measures which must be taken in order to prevent plots from within the besieged city from being carried out. Amongst these are a number of seemingly extreme suggestions. Private parties are to be banned (10.4). Letters in and out of the city should be read to make sure that they are not being sent by traitors (10.6). Those who own more than one set of arms must provide a list of everything

that they possess and people entering the city must display their arms openly (10.7, 9). Frighteningly, he believed that inns should be locked from the outside by magistrates (10.10). Much of the behaviour encouraged by Aeneas would have added to the anxiety of a city already under siege. Only men loyal to the current political regime were to be made guardsmen (1.6), and these guardsmen were to be stationed in all the public spaces (1.9). These public spaces, the vital organs of a Greek city, were also to be broken up with ditches to prevent their use in a revolt (2.1). If these precautions were put into place, as they may have been, then the civilian population would have been driven to extraordinary heights of pressure and anxiety.[31]

Once all lines of practical defence had been exhausted and the city had been taken, the fate of those within was set, with some variance. Men of military age were often killed. This was certainly the case in punitive sieges, such as the Peloponnesian siege of Plataea (Thuc. 3.68) or the Athenian destruction of Melos (Thuc. 5.116). Hans van Wees has counted nine instances of all adult males being executed after sieges.[32] The Carthaginians were guilty of this practice, as well, in their wars against the Sicilian Greeks, torturing and killing all those captured after the sack of Himera (Diod. Sic. 13.62). Diodorus repeated a story, rather disturbing to the modern mind, about mercenaries in the service of Carthage wearing severed hands and carrying heads as trophies in the aftermath of assaults (Diod. Sic. 13.57.3). Although the purpose of killing the military-aged male populations of captured towns is not explicitly outlined for us, we may be able to provide our own, brief, account based on a reasonable supposition. Military-aged males serve as a threat to a conquering army. They can lead dissent within the conquered community as well as join or lead armies of reprisal from allies of the defeated state. For these reasons, they were often executed.[33]

Being sold into slavery was the most likely fate of women and children who had not been evacuated before the sack began.[34] Often we hear of these two groups individually mentioned as being enslaved after a siege.[35] Occasionally, we hear that the entire population, presumably including free born men, was enslaved.[36] This type of enslavement occasionally led to entire identity groups being brought under the yoke.[37] There seems to have been little compunction against doing this to other Greeks, let alone to barbarians. From the Homeric assemblage we may see evidence of this in the old woman who was a slave in the household of Odysseus, but had originally come from Sicily (Hom.

Od. 24.211–212, 386–389). The behaviour which is so praised in the Homeric poems, by which the heroes were remembered quite readily as 'city-sackers' and who bragged about the number of settlements that they had captured, must have been extremely common among elite warmongers. We hear of slaves being a prize of the victors throughout the Homeric poems.[38]

Although evidence concerning Greek civilians under siege is not as prevalent nor as detailed as we may like, a picture does nonetheless emerge. This is of despair and paranoia within besieged cities in the Greek world. Women lamented, men died and old men prayed as their cities succumbed to besieging armies. Once a city's defences were broken, there was little that could be done for the population that remained, with most facing either death or enslavement.[39]

'Gods' Under Siege

Despite the bleak fate of most civilians in captured towns, there was one last hope for salvation, or so we are led to believe. When a city's defences had been breached, the population that was left within could flee to the temples and supplicate, seeking *asylia*.[40] Ancient authors, such as Diodorus Siculus, claim that seeking asylum was typical Greek practice, such as his record of a complaint against the Carthaginians that 'to such a degree did the barbarians surpass all other men in cruelty, that whereas the rest of mankind spared those who seek refuge in the sanctuaries from the desire not to commit sacrilege against the deity, the Carthaginians would only refrain in order to plunder the temples' (13.57).[41] This accusation is substantiated in a later episode during the same Punic expedition in Sicily, when, after the successful siege and sack of Himera, the Carthaginians dragged suppliants out of the temples and slaughtered them (Diod. Sic. 13.62).[42] The same happened when the Carthaginians occupied Akragas in the aftermath of the retreat of the population and garrison (Diod. Sic. 13.90). The Greeks strongly castigated the Carthaginians for such acts. But how likely were the Greeks themselves to respect the right of *asylia*? And what impact did this have on civilians under siege?

Supposed Greek reverence for the sacred and its impact on warfare has been long recognised.[43] Almost one hundred years ago, in the shadow of the First World War, Helen Law readily contrasted the 'wanton destruction of sacred edifices practiced by the Germans in France' to the Greeks,

in whose practice of warfare there was 'no counterpart'.[44] Modern scholarly discussion has readily agreed with this point. Josiah Ober lists as the third most formal 'rule' of war in ancient Greece that 'the inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of the gods, especially heralds and suppliants, should be respected'.[45] This is one of Ober's only rules which Peter Krentz does not vehemently attack, claiming that 'some customs—the ones in which the gods took an interest—certainly go back to Homer'.[46] This is a practice of warfare which has made it into the general consciousness on 'laws of war' in the ancient world.[47] Hans van Wees has stated forcefully that this religious observance 'remained in undiminished force throughout the classical period'.[48] Some scholars have even posited that certain Greek states, namely Sparta, were so scrupulously religious that they would allow harm to come to themselves or to their allies to fulfil a real or perceived religious obligation.[49]

There are, however, a number of breaches of the supposed protection granted to religious sites throughout Greek history.[50] The most well-known and frequently discussed of these was the Athenian occupation of Delium, principally the Temple of Apollo, during the Peloponnesian War in 424 BCE. The leader of the army, Hippocrates, had his men fortify the precinct of the temple, creating a ditch and rampart (Thuc. 4.90). While this action was condemned by the Boeotians (Thuc. 4.92), the people against whom the Athenians were fortifying Delium, it has recently been pointed out that the strategy was popularly supported in Athens.[51] Earlier in the fifth century BCE, during the 'Ionian Revolt' against the Persian Empire, when the Greek army took Sardis, a Lydian/Persian city, it was put to the torch, including the temple of Cybebe (Hdt. 5.102). It was the burning of this temple that was used as justification for the Persian destruction of many temples in the path of their invasion of the Greek mainland. Although the Persian sacrilege is eventually used as an explanation for the defeat of Xerxes (Hdt. 8.143), Herodotus does seem to accept some Hellenic blame for the burning of the temple of Cybebe.[52] The version of the story recorded by Diodorus is stronger in its condemnation of the Greek act, saying that 'the Persians learned from the Greeks the burning of temples, repaying those who had been the first to offend justice with the same wanton act' (10.25.1).[53]

Although the outright destruction of temples is an excellent example of 'wanton violence', there was an attraction to attacking these sacred buildings: wealth. During the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 415 BCE, the defenders felt obliged to send a garrison to the Olympieium, a

large temple on the right bank of the River Anapos, outside of the city because they 'were afraid that the Athenians might make off with some of the treasure there' (Thuc. 6.70–71).[54] Economic motives were behind Dionysius I's sacking of an Etruscan temple in the town of Pyrgi, from which he supposedly gained one thousand talents (Diod. Sic. 15.14). This level of wealth was commonly found at sanctuaries across the Greek world. Thucydides records that the Athenian Acropolis held 6500 talents worth of gold and silver (2.13), and the inhabitants of Segesta, an Elymian city in Sicily, claimed to have the ability to finance the Athenian war against Syracuse using the gold and silver in their treasury and their temples (Thuc. 6.6–8).[55] This concentration of wealth made them attractive, if controversial, targets in wartime.[56]

This evidence is, of course, all circumstantial to the original inquiry: whether or not suppliants in temples during sieges and sacks were accorded better treatment than those civilians, or others, found throughout the city. More telling is the evidence for how suppliants were treated during periods of *stasis* in Greek city-states. When Cylon attempted to seize sole power in Athens around 630 BCE, his men were forced to supplicate at the altars on the Acropolis but were subsequently lured out and slaughtered, with some of them being slain at the altars themselves.[57] During a period of civil strife on Corcyra, not only were suppliants in the temple of Hera lured out to stand trial, only to be sentenced to death, but we also hear that 'men were dragged from the temples or butchered on the very altars' (Thuc. 4.81).[58] Xenophon relates how, during political upheaval in Corinth, religious conventions were disregarded and the massacre spread also to holy places (*Hell.* 4.4.3). In a similar situation in Tegea, factionalists following a man named Stasippus, fled to a temple of Artemis for sanctuary, only to have their pursuers climb onto the roof, dismantle it and begin throwing the tiles down upon the suppliants (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.7–9). Further examples throughout Greek history must make us question the inviolability of suppliants during trying times.[59]

Few examples of suppliants being killed in temples or other sacred spaces during war exist. The earliest, from a mythological context, relate to the Trojan War. Before the city of Troy was taken, Achilles kills Troilus, the young son of King Priam. In some versions of the story he is killed at an altar of Apollo, perhaps as a direct affront to the god.[60] After the Achaeans breached the city, Priam himself was killed while supplicating at an altar of Zeus, at least in some versions of the myth.

That preserved by Virgil, in the first century BCE, vividly narrates that Neoptolemus 'dragged the king [Priam], slipping in pools of his own son's blood, to the altar' (Virg. *Aen.* 2.550–551).[61] Although Virgil is a Roman author, artistic depictions of Priam's death at an altar date at least to the sixth century BCE; some of these images seem to show the horrible act of Neoptolemus bludgeoning the king to death with his own dead grandson, Astyanax.[62] The third, and most famous, sacrilege committed against a suppliant within the setting of the Trojan War was Locrian Ajax's assault on Cassandra, daughter of Priam. He 'came, crazed fatally, into that shrine of Pallas, who of all the blessed gods is most implacable to sacrilegious men. Seizing the maiden in his arms beside the sacred image, where she stood, the Locrian dragged her forth, not fearing Zeus' daughter, queen of war' (Alc. frg. 298).[63]

Two of these examples are eventually followed by the consequences of committing this kind of sacrilege.[64] Achilles is killed by Paris, but through the aide of Apollo, presumably as a reprisal for the slaying of Troilus.[65] More specifically noted than in the death of Achilles, Locrian Ajax's sacrilege against Athena caused considerable problems for him and his companions. On his voyage home, Athena wrecked the ship upon which he was sailing (Hom. *Od.* 4.499). Virgil paints the scene more dramatically, saying that by the actions of Ajax an entire Greek navy, along with its sailors, was lost at sea, the man himself being struck by lightning and impaled on a rock (*Aen.* 1.40–44). Athena's fury fell upon more of the Greeks than just Ajax because they had not punished him for his crime (Eur. *Tro.* 70–71). Two important points about these acts of sacrilege must be noted. The first is that, although Greeks supposedly avoided this type of action, these three heroes still committed the deeds, presumably knowing that it was sacrilegious. The second is that, in much of the tradition, Neoptolemus is not punished for his sacrilege, Achilles is not securely punished, and only Ajax endures full divine censure. The wrath of the gods does not seem to fall evenly in the mythological tradition.

Complementing these mythological accounts, there are rare, but important, historical examples of Greeks violating suppliants in times of war. A spurious case is found in the Greek foundation of Siris, a town in Southern Italy. Strabo relates a tale that when the Greek 'colonists' stormed the Trojan town, originally on the site, they dragged suppliants out of the temple of Athena, causing the cult statue to close its eyes (6.1.14). Unfortunately we do not know any more about this

event, as Siris appears only rarely in ancient texts, and the settlement was destroyed sometime in the sixth century BCE.[66]

Better known is the killing of a group of Argive soldiers who had taken refuge in a grove sacred to Argus in the aftermath of a battle with the Spartans in 494 BCE. Cleomenes, the Spartan king, tricked a number of the Argives into coming out and then killed them; unable to draw out the rest, the king ordered the grove to be set alight, thus destroying the sacred space as well as killing the remaining soldiers within (Hdt. 6.78–80; Paus. 2.20.8, 3.4.1). Cleomenes committed other acts of sacrilege during his time as king, such as removing a priest from a temple of Hera (Hdt. 6.81) and cutting down sacred trees at Eleusis (Hdt. 6.75). According to various Greeks, the insanity which eventually killed the king was due to his sacrilegious actions (Hdt. 6.75, 84).[67] The Spartans themselves, however, believed that his insanity was caused by drinking unmixed wine (Hdt. 6.84). While it is obvious that the various Greek peoples held the sacrilegious behaviour of Cleomenes against him, the Spartans did not. He was brought to trial by his own people only because some suspected that he had taken a bribe in return for not attacking Argos (Hdt. 6.82). Unless we are willing to accept that gods did in fact punish Cleomenes with insanity for his sacrilege, it would seem that his deeds went completely unpunished.

Three intriguing pieces of evidence involving the Spartan King Agesilaus II (*c.* 444–360 BCE) may help to elucidate a clearer understanding of how readily suppliants were protected in times of war. In the aftermath of the Battle of Coronea in 394 BCE, 80 Thebans from the defeated army took refuge in a nearby temple of Athena. Agesilaus, the commander of the Spartan army, was asked by his soldiers what they should do with these suppliants; he ordered that no harm should come to them, Xenophon telling us that he demanded this *even though he had been injured in the battle* (*Hell.* 4.3.20, emphasis added). In a panegyric of Agesilaus, Xenophon praises the king because he refused to do violence to suppliants of the gods, *even if they were his enemies*, as it would be unreasonable to call those who rob temples sacrilegious yet call those who drag out suppliants 'pious' (*Ages.* 11.1–2). In a completely different passage, Plutarch records a saying of Agesilaus that it was a pleasure to kill a traitor, even at an altar (Plut. *Mor.* 208e). The first two passages indicate that in the early fourth century BCE, the prohibition on harming enemy suppliants was left up to the commander. The third passage,

which reveals a different side of Agesilaus than the first, shows that certain types of persons seeking protection as suppliants should not be granted it.

The evidence mustered above is not strong enough to dismiss the idea that suppliants were often protected during the sacking of cities. Nonetheless, we have seen that throughout Greek history and mythology there are instances of suppliants' status not being respected. It is unfortunate that we do not readily hear the details of what happens once a Greek army breached the walls of a city, but this is likely reflective of Greek historical practice.[68] W. Kendrick Pritchett has pointed out that before Diodorus Siculus, Greek historians were reluctant to give details of the sacking of cities.[69] Diodorus provides an example of suppliants being respected but for the attacker's advantage. When Dionysius I of Syracuse sacked the Phoenician town of Motye in the early fourth century BCE, he found it hard to stop his troops from slaughtering the inhabitants whom he wanted to sell as slaves. He stationed criers around the city, telling the inhabitants to take refuge in the temples 'which were revered by the Greeks' (Diod. Sic. 14.53). This is likely the general approach to suppliants during the sacking of a city, at least from the fourth century BCE: Greek armies would respect the sanctity of suppliants if they so desired, motivated either by fear of divine retribution or through more practical concerns, such as Dionysius' concern of selling the population into slavery. Taking refuge in a temple may have afforded some level of protection if a Greek army stormed a city, but there seems little reason to presume absolute safety.

Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that Greek warfare was not simply a matter of pitched battles, as was once proclaimed by modern authors. Cities were valid and accepted targets in the warfare which pervaded the Archaic and Classical periods. In the earliest period we hear of heroes who were known as sackers of towns; whether or not this involved sieges, rather than simple raiding, we cannot say. The events of the Trojan War are evidence supporting sieges proper. In the historical periods there was no absence of siege warfare in the Greek world. Barbarians and Hellenes alike attacked settlements without compunction. Although we do not have as much vivid detail as we might wish for these periods, this chapter has explored those terrifying and horrible experiences that are preserved

in our sources. Horrors of all kinds abounded. Families saw their children killed, men saw their wives enslaved and entire communities were destroyed. Few, if any, were spared when a city was taken.

Suppliants and religious sites, typically regarded as sacrosanct in Greek warfare, may not have been as far out of bounds as once thought. Actual examples of sacrilege in wartime show that punishment often came down to the application of secular law, which did not necessarily guarantee that the sacrilegious party would actually be punished. This was shown to be especially true of Cleomenes of Sparta and the Athenian fortification of Delium. In this chapter I have also questioned the practical protection provided to suppliants in wartime by highlighting a number of examples which show that the sacredness of these persons was likely fluid rather than static. Although explicit examples of suppliants being abused in Greek siege warfare are not easy to find, the general treatment of them in other forms of war indicates that supplicating at an altar when a city had been taken might not have afforded any better treatment. In general, we can conclude that Greek siege warfare was as hellish and pragmatic as that of the 'barbarian' cultures with which it coexisted.

Notes

1. For an up-to-date synthesis of the debate on 'hoplite warfare' in Greece, see Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 'The Hoplite Debate', in *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, ed. Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano (Princeton, 2013), 1–56. The analysis of W. G. Runciman, from the point of view of an historical sociologist, is also a valuable starting point: 'Greek Hoplites, Warrior Culture, and Indirect Bias', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4(4) (1998): 731–751.

2. See, for instance, the comments by Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, *Part II*, (Berkeley, 1975), 173.

3. Barry Strauss, 'Naval Battles and Sieges', in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, ed. Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees and Michael Whitby (Cambridge, 2007), 237–247. The view that the experience of the Persian Wars spurred on the development of Greek siege warfare was also recently expounded by Louis Rawlings, *The Ancient Greeks at War* (Manchester, 2007), 133–137.

4. Paul Bentley Kern, *Ancient Siege Warfare* (Bloomington, 1999), 91. The Peloponnesian War has often been seen as a period of extreme change in

Greek warfare. See, for instance, Paul Cartledge, 'Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97 (1977): 11–27; Anthony M. Snodgrass, *Arms & Armor of the Greeks* (Baltimore, 1999), 107.

5. See in general the comments of Victor Davis Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*, (rev. edn, Berkeley, 1998), 79–102, and idem, *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (2nd edn, Berkeley, 1999).

6. Yvon Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris, 1974).

7. Victor Davis Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York, 2005), 180. This is not to say, however, that the results of Hanson's traditional 'hoplite battle' would not directly impact on cities and their 'civilian' populations, as he himself has shown in the case of Thespiai. See Victor Davis Hanson, 'Hoplite Obliteration: The Case of the Town of Thespiai', in *Ancient Warfare: Archaeological Perspectives*, ed. John Carman and Anthony Harding (Stroud, 1999), 203–217.

8. Josiah Ober, 'The Rules of War in Classical Greece', in *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory*, ed. Josiah Ober (Princeton, 1996), 53–71. See also Victor Davis Hanson, 'Hoplite Battle as Ancient Greek Warfare: When, Where, and Why?', in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. Hans van Wees (Swansea, 2000), 201–232.

9. The term 'agonal warfare' is commonly found in discussions of ancient Greece. It is derived from the Greek word '*agon*' meaning 'competition'. Thus, 'agonal warfare' is bound by rules and conventions. Battles, and wars themselves, are thereby seen as '*agones*' or competitions, rather than the life or death struggles of many modern wars. A brief overview, including a longer discussion of these rules and conventions, can be found in Louis Rawlings, 'War and Warfare in Ancient Greece,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence A. Tritle (Oxford, 2013), 3–28. John C. Dayton, *The Athletes of War: An Evaluation of the Agonistic Elements in Greek Warfare* (Ontario, 2005) has argued against the idea of 'agonal warfare' for all periods of Greek history. A recent PhD thesis has argued strongly that the Greeks waged war in a very practical, rather than agonal, fashion: Roel Konijnendijk, 'Ideals and Pragmatism in Greek Military Thought 490–338 BC', PhD thesis (University College London, 2015).

10. Peter Krentz, 'Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite Agôn', *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 71 (2002): 23–39. This point is further developed below.

11. Hans van Wees, 'Defeat and Destruction: The Ethics of Ancient Greek Warfare', in *Boser Krieg: exzessive Gewalt in der Antiken Kriegsfuhrung und Strategienzuderen Vermeidung*, ed. Margit Linder and Sabine Tausend (Graz, 2011), 69–110.

12. This seems to have been the working definition used in a number of recent treatments: Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), 138–145; and Louis Rawlings, *The Ancient Greeks at War* (Manchester, 2007), 128–142.

13. The issue of whether or not we can or should talk about a 'Homeric world' or even use the Homeric poems as historical sources is a debated topic. As a general introduction, see Anthony M. Snodgrass, 'An Historical Homeric Society?', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 94 (1974): 114–125; Moses I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (2nd edn, New York, 1979); Ian Morris, 'The Use and Abuse of Homer', *Classical Antiquity* 5 (1986): 81–183; and Kurt Raaflaub, 'A Historian's Headache: How to Read "Homeric Society"?', in *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence*, ed. Nick Fisher and Hans van Wees (Swansea, 1998), 169–193.

14. On Odysseus' 'city-sacker' (πτολίπορθος) epithet, see Hom. *Il.* 2.278, 10.363 and Adele J. Haft, '"The City-Sacker Odysseus" in Iliad 2 and 10', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 120 (1990): 37–56. For Odysseus' sacking of Ismarus see Hom. *Od.* 9.40, 165.

15. All references are to the *Iliad*: Enyo 5.333, Ares 20.152, Oileus 2.728, Otrynteus 20.384 and Achilles 15.77, 21.550, 24.108. Ares is also given this epithet by Hesiod (*Theog.* 936).

16. Athena is given this epithet (περσέπολις) by Aristophanes (*Nub.* 967) in a hymn which is attributed to the early fifth century BCE Athenian poet, Lamprocles, by the scholiasts. In the eleventh Homeric Hymn, dedicated to Athena, she and Ares are both described as caring for the 'deeds of war' of which the first mentioned is the sacking or ravaging (πέρθω) of cities (*Hymn. Hom.* 11.3).

17. The eleventh and twenty-eighth Homeric Hymns (11.1, 28.3) both describe her as protectress of cities (ἐρυσίπτολις). Athena is most commonly associated with the protecting deity of Athens, for instance in Aristophanes (*Eq.* 581).

18. *Hymn. Hom.* 8.3 (πολισσόος). On Ares as representing 'everything hateful' in war, see Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1985), 169–170. For a slightly different view, in which Ares and Athena are both seen as highly dynamic war deities, see Susan Deacy, 'Athena and Ares: War, Violence and Warlike Deities', in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, 285–298.

19. On the use of *asylia* in the Hellenistic world, for which we have considerably more evidence, especially for the practice as applied outside

of warfare, see Kent J. Rigsby, *Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley, 1997).

20. The sounds of a Greek battle are not discussed at length, but must have contributed to the terror instilled in the populace. For a vivid description of the sounds of battle see John Lazenby, 'The Killing Zone', in *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (London, 1991), 87–109 (here 94–95).

21. This is not to imply that the emotional toll of losing a family member, especially a child, in a war further abroad was any easier on the Greek psyche, as evidenced by Lysistrata's description of how women suffer in war, having to send their sons out as soldiers (Ar. *Lys.* 589–593). On the attitude of Greek women towards warfare see David Schaps, 'The Women of Greece in Wartime', in *Classical Philology* 77(3) (1982): 193–213, 193–196; and Pasi Loman, 'No Woman No War: Women's Participation in Ancient Greek Warfare', in *Greece & Rome* 51(1) (2004): 34–54, esp. 34–38 and 53–54. For a comparative historical approach to this topic and further discussion of the Greek evidence, see Lawrence A. Tritle, *From Melos to My Lai: War and Survival* (London, 2000), 79–100.

22. This story is problematic and is not generally accepted as a historical reality because of the lack of reference to it in Herodotus. This is the authoritative position of F. Graf, 'Women, War, and Warlike Divinities', in *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 55 (1984): 245–254 (here 247–248). Lionel Scott, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6* (Leiden 2005), 575–579 has presented a number of possibilities for the development of the story about a woman-led defence of Argos and it seems plausible that even in the absence of a historical Telesilla the participation of women was possibly the foundation for the wider story.

23. Whether the fighting was done by soldiers (men of military age) or by civilians, there is evidence that once a city's walls were breached the invading army did not always have an easy time defeating the inhabitants, and combat could be as slow as house to house; see John W. I. Lee, 'Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World', in *Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (Princeton, 2010), 138–162.

24. Some authors, such as Schaps, 'Women of Greece', 195–196, doubt that throwers of roof tiles had much military impact. The most thorough study of roof tiles as weapons in the ancient world, however, has pointed out that they were an effective weapon in crippling or killing enemies, even if they were not sufficient to turn the tide of a battle: William D. Barry, 'Roof Tiles and Urban Violence in the Ancient World', in *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 37(1) (1996): 55–74.

25. June W. Allison, 'Pericles' Policy and the Plague', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 32(1) (1983): 14–23 has pointed out that Thucydides, on some level, connected the plague in Athens to the concentration of persons therein.

26. Athens was not truly besieged, rather the strategy being employed was to bring all of the people from the countryside within the walls and let the Spartans devastate the land, not marching out the army to meet them. For discussion of this strategy, see A. J. Holladay, 'Athenian Strategy in the Archidamian War', in *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 27(3) (1978): 399–427; Josiah Ober, 'Thucydides, Pericles, and the Strategy of Defense', in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, ed. John W. Eadie and Josiah Ober (Lanham, New York and London, 1985): 171–88; and Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture*, 231–233.

27. Paraphrase of the translation of Rex Warner.

28. R. J. Littman, 'The Plague at Syracuse: 396 BC', in *Mnemosyne* 37(1–2) (1984): 110–116 has argued that this plague was the same which affected Athens from 430 and was part of an epidemic that lasted for a number of decades. If this postulation is correct, it seems either likely or necessary for the plague to have spread to the civilian population.

29. See Aeneas Tacticus 11 for a number of specific discussions.

30. The Greek title attributed to the work is *Περὶτοῦ πῶςχρὴ πολιορκουμένουςἀντέχειν*. A complete English translation and commentary is available by David Whitehead, *Aineias Tacticus: How to Survive Under Siege* (Oxford, 1990).

31. Aeneas provides enough evidence throughout to convince me that much of his advice is based on actual practices. Although not all of these suggestions would likely have been put into place at once in a single city, any combination of them would have contributed to an atmosphere of tension in the besieged settlement.

32. Van Wees, 'Defeat and Destruction', n. 60.

33. For the ancient world in general, see Hans van Wees, 'Genocide in the Ancient World', in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford, 2010), 239–258.

34. Pierre Ducrey, *Le traitement de prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1968), 111 saw this as the one advantage of being a civilian during times of war in Greece. The preferred tactic may have been to evacuate the civilians when possible, as happened at Plataea (Thuc. 2.6) and Himera (Diod. Sic. 13.61).

35. E.g. Thuc. 3.36, 68, 4.48, 5.3, 32, 116.

36. E.g. Thuc. 1.98, 113, 2.68, 6.62.

37. Hans van Wees, 'Conquerors and Serfs: Wars of Conquest and Forced Labour in Archaic Greece', in *Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and*

Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures, ed. Nino Luraghi and Susan E. Alcock (Washington DC, 2003), 33–80.

38. Daphne Nash Briggs, 'Servants at a Rich Man's Feast: Early Etruscan Household Slaves and Their Procurement', *Etruscan Studies* 9 (2002–03): 153–176.

39. The importance of eliminating an enemy's population is reflected in the resilience of the Greek *polis*, see Emily Mackil, 'Wandering Cities: Alternatives to Catastrophe in the Greek Polis', *American Journal of Archaeology* 108(4) (2004): 493–516.

40. Crimes against suppliants, in general, were considered especially grave (e.g. Plat. *Leg.* 5.730a). On the sacred protection afforded to suppliants, see Robert Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), 180–6. On supplication in the ancient world in general, see F. S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (Oxford, 2006).

41. Diodorus Siculus, as he is known to us, was the first century BCE author of a universal history of the ancient world, known commonly as *Bibliotheca Historica*. The context for the cited passage is a late fifth century BCE siege of the Sicilian Greek city of Selinus. Although it is possible that Diodorus' accusation against the Carthaginians was a result of the intervening centuries, which saw, amongst other things, three great wars between Carthage and Rome, it is likely a reflection of an accusation that he found in his sources. The historiography of Diodorus' history is complex; for the general reader the introduction to Peter Green's commentary should be sufficient: *Diodorus Siculus Books 11–12.37.1. Greek History, 480–431 BC—the Alternative Version* (Austin, 2006).

42. Despite Diodorus' accusation that the Carthaginians were alone amongst men in their sacrilege against suppliants, the Persians committed a similar atrocity when they took the Athenian Acropolis (Hdt. 8.53).

43. In an interesting discussion, Daniel Barbu has justly made the observation that 'in the context of war, religious institutions are rarely preserved because of their "religious" character': 'The Jewish Sacking of Alien Temples: "Limits of Toleration" in a Comparative Perspective', *History of Religions* 50(1) (2010): 21–42 (here 21).

44. Helen H. Law, 'Atrocities in Greek Warfare', *The Classical Journal* 15(3) (1919): 132–147.

45. Ober, 'Rules of War', 56.

46. Krentz, 'Fighting by the Rules', 24 and 24 n. 9.

47. Adriaan Lanni, 'The Laws of War in Ancient Greece,' *Law and History Review* 26(3) (2008): 469–89 (here 477–478).

48. Van Wees, 'Defeat and Destruction'. Van Wees briskly stated in an earlier work that Greek 'armies were meant to steer clear of temple precincts and estates'. See van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*, 119.

49. M. D. Goodman and A. J. Holladay, 'Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare', *The Classical Quarterly* 36(1) (1986): 152–160.

50. Greeks were not the only religious society to violate their own compulsions against harming sacred sites. Jack Wells, 'Impiety in the Middle Republic: The Roman Response to Temple Plundering in Southern Italy', *The Classical Journal* 105(3) (2010): 229–243 has shown that the general Roman consensus favoured protecting temples during times of war.

51. Sonya Nevin, 'Military Ethics in the Writing of History: Thucydides and Diodorus on Delium', in *Beyond the Battlefields: New Perspectives on Warfare and Society in the Graeco-Roman World*, ed. Edward Bragg, Lisa Irene Hau and Elizabeth MacCaulay-Lewis (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2008), 99–120.

52. Hans van Wees, 'Herodotus and the Past', in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker, Irene J. F. de Jong and Hans van Wees (Leiden, 2002), 321–349 (here 346). On this event, see also Jon D. Mikalson, 'Religion in Herodotus', in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*, 187–188. Interestingly, though, Herodotus provides a parallel to an early episode in his Histories, in which a Lydian ruler, Alyattes, accidentally set fire to the temple of Athena at Assesus (Hdt. 1.19). He fell ill after this and his emissaries were not permitted into Delphi until he rebuilt the burnt temple.

53. The translation is that of C. H. Oldfather, *Diodorus Siculus. Library of History Volume IV. Books 9–12.40* (London, 1946).

54. The translation is that of Rex Warner, *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972).

55. On the borrowing of wealth from temples to finance wars, see van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*, 236–237 and 315–316 n. 23.

56. While there seems to have been some legitimacy to armies plundering temples, according to Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.62), temple robbers were to be sentenced to death. This was a serious enough crime to be equated under the law with treachery (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.22). How much this was a secular threat, enforced through laws and courts, and how much this was a divine threat, is questionable, as tyrants, seemingly above secular laws, were said to rob temples frequently (Xen. *Hier.* 4.10–11).

57. The three principal versions of this story are recorded by Herodotus (5.71), Thucydides (1.126) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 12.1). Herodotus' version does not record any of the conspirators being put to death at the altars, only that those supplicating at the statue of Athena were lured out under false pretenses, originally having been told that they would not be put to the sword and then subsequently were killed. The implication of this story, compared with the other two, is that it was still considered taboo, or 'sinful', to draw suppliants out to their deaths under false pretenses.

Pausanias juxtaposed this episode with an earlier incident when Athenians had peacefully let go Peloponnesian suppliants; interestingly, before the first event it seems that the Athenians had to be reminded of the divine protection afforded to suppliants (7.25.1–3).

58. For the translation, see Warner, *Thucydides*.

59. For further instances, see Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification*, 184 n. 223. The malleability of this universal protection is reflected in a debate held in Syracuse on whether or not to respect the sacred protection accorded to Ducetius, previously an enemy in war, who had become a suppliant in their city (Diod. Sic. 11.92).

60. Timothy Gantz, *Early Greek Myth: A Guide to Literary and Artistic Sources* (Baltimore, 1993), 597–602. An early fifth century BCE Athenian cup, found at Vulci, illustrates the scene of Achilles dragging Troilus to an altar and killing him (Perugia, Museo Civico 89).

61. The translation is that of Frederick Ahl, *Virgil: Aeneid* (Oxford 2007).

62. A number of sixth century BCE vases show this image, such as an Athenian pyxis, discovered in Tanagra, currently in the Berlin Antikensammlung (F3988) or a sixth century BCE Athenian amphora found in Vulci (Louvre F222). Discussion of the images of this scene can be found in Michael J. Anderson, *The Fall of Troy in Early Greek Poetry and Art* (Oxford, 1997). See also, *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, II.2.684–685.

63. The translation is that of M. L. West, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford, 1993).

64. Only one text claims that Neoptolemus does not reach home because Apollo was angered at his slaying of Priam; indeed, the god proclaims that he will also not reach old age (Pind. *Pae.* 6.112–120).

65. A discussion of all the sources on the death of Achilles is usefully found in Gantz, *Early Greek Myth*, 625–628.

66. Hornblower and Spawforth, *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1413.

67. Paul Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC* (2nd edn, London, 2002), 149 points out that Herodotus' sources for Cleomenes betray a rather negative bias, which may explain why he relates so many explanations for the insanity of the king.

68. There is one specifically mentioned instance of suppliants being spared, which is in the aftermath of the Athenian capture of Byzantium (*c.* 407–406 BCE). Diodorus mentions that around 500 Spartans who had fled to the temples were spared (13.67). This note is missing, however, from the contemporary account provided by Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.3.14–22).

69. Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War: Part V* (Berkeley, 1991), 152. Interestingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus commented that Thucydides often wrote vividly of the capture of cities, though my reading of Thucydides still leaves me wanting considerably more detail (*Thuc.* 15).

Civilians Under Siege in the Ancient Greek World

Philip de Souza

The cities and smaller urban centres of the ancient Mediterranean did more than merely fulfil the basic human need for shelter. They were the social, economic and religious focal points of communities that identified themselves with their city, so that to lose one's city was to forfeit one's place in the world.[1] The ubiquity of what are conventionally termed 'small wars' in Antiquity meant that cities were frequently the targets of raids, assaults, blockades and, occasionally, prolonged sieges. Walls and warriors often failed to deter or defeat attackers, and if the inhabitants could not then negotiate a peaceful end to hostilities, they would be exposed to pillaging and destruction of their homes, rape, and enslavement of their persons, and sometimes the wholesale slaughter of some or all of the population.[2] For ancient urban communities, therefore, a direct attack on their homes represented one of the most fearful aspects of warfare, and a negative outcome too often meant a dreadful fate.[3] The contemporary, non-combatant's perspective on sieges in ancient Greek warfare is elusive. This chapter analyses passages from the Homeric epics, the Classical historians Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, and a

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selection of the plays by the great Athenian tragedian Euripides in search of the voice of the victims of ancient Greek siege warfare.

In a recent study of the negative aspects of warfare in the ancient Greek world, Pascal Payen has emphasised the extent to which these literary texts highlight the intense human pain and suffering that wars cause.[4] Payen argues that, in spite of the prominence of warfare in Classical history writing, and the wealth of literary and artistic works that portray combat as a milieu in which manly virtues are on display, war is always a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.[5] The earliest Greek narratives of warfare, the Homeric epics, which are part of a larger corpus of works that recount the myths of the Trojan War, manifestly celebrate the glories of combat, but at the same time they present what Payen refers to as 'the other side of the coin', namely the inescapable fact that no warrior can excel without perpetrating extreme violence and causing great suffering.[6] In Payen's view, the overwhelming importance of warfare as a means of defending one's city explains why, in Greek history writing and other forms of literature, the memorialisation of military victory is closely associated with the human losses and material damage that have been suffered, and by implication with the greater losses that have been averted. The reverse side of the coin is revealed when contemplating defeat, or, rather, the human loss and suffering that it entails.[7]

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE TROJAN WAR

The story of the siege and sack of Troy is probably the most famous war in the history of the ancient Mediterranean. Modern scholars are quite reluctant to consider it an historical 'event', but ancient Greek writers had no doubt that it was an actual series of events, initially recounted by poets in an oral tradition and later written down and embellished in a variety of epic poems. They disagreed on when it occurred, but the more precise attempts to date the end of the Trojan War range from 1334 to 1183 BCE, and are thus all in what is now called the Late Aegean Bronze Age.[8] The later dates coincide with what is termed the Bronze Age Collapse and the migrations of the so-called 'Sea Peoples' that are associated with maritime raids and the destruction of numerous cities on the coasts of Libya, Egypt, Anatolia and the Levant.[9]

For most of the preceding five centuries the dominant political entity in Anatolia was the kingdom of Hatti, whose people are usually referred to as the Hittites. From the capital at Hattusa, 150 kilometres east of

Ankara, the Hittites ruled a kingdom that, at its height, included all of central Anatolia and incorporated subordinate allies whose territories stretched from the Aegean to Northern Syria.[10] The coastal city of Wilusa was one of many in north-western Anatolia that acknowledged the authority of the Hittite kings, but was not directly ruled by them. It is usually identified with the extensive archaeological remains in the mound of Hissarlik, site of the Classical city of Ilion, or Troy. At some point in the first half of the fourteenth century BCE, during the reign of the Hittite King Hattusili II, there was a confrontation between him and the king of Ahhiyawa, apparently because of an Ahhiyawan attack on Wilusa. The Ahhiyawan kingdom was probably centred on the city of Mycenae in Southern Greece, which, according to the epic tradition of the Trojan War, was ruled by the foremost of the Greek kings, Agamemnon, who led the Greek army that laid siege to and eventually sacked Troy. At this time, the Ahhiyawan king's influence extended across the Aegean to parts of the western coast of Anatolia, and some of the nearby islands.[11] There were further problems in this region for the Hittite kings in the thirteenth century BCE. Muwatalli II (1295–1272 BCE) had to send an expeditionary force to restore order in Wilusa following the defeat of his vassal Manapa-Tarhunda, ruler of the Seha River Land, by Piyamaradu, who was probably either a renegade Hittite nobleman or a prince of one of the other vassal states of Western Anatolia.[12]

The documents that refer to these events are diplomatic letters, but they offer few details that can be related to the mythical ten-year siege of Troy. We can, however, get some sense of the historical realities that may lie behind the Trojan story from annalistic accounts of the reign of one of the Hittite kings of the late fourteenth century BCE, Mursili II (1321–1295 BCE), which describe numerous military expeditions against cities and their consequences for non-combatants. In his first year, Mursili campaigned against the Kaska, whose cities lay north-east of the Hittite capital Hattusas and who had taken advantage of the perceived weakness of the Hittites following the recent deaths in quick succession of his predecessors, Mursili's father, Suppiluliuma I (1350–1322 BCE) and his older brother Arnuwanda II (1322–1321 BCE), both of whom probably died from a plague brought back to Hatti by Egyptian and Northern Syrian captives taken by Suppiluliuma's army.[13] Neighbouring vassal kingdoms and cities tried to throw off the Hittite yoke, refusing to send troops for the king's military expeditions and raiding the land of Hatti itself. The new king responded in kind, as this short

extract from the summary version of the annals of Mursili II's first regnal year shows[14]:

> [Then I, My Majesty], returned and because the Kaska of Ishupitta [fought me] and were not giving me troops, I, my majesty [went] to Ishupitta … I attacked … –humessa. And I took up from it deportees, cattle and sheep. And I brought them away to Hattusa. I [burned] down the city.

In his third year Mursili II replied to the aggressive actions of Uhhaziti, king of Arzawa, a large Hittite vassal kingdom located in western Anatolia, south of Wilusa, whose capital Apasa was on the site of the later Greek city of Ephesos. Uhhaziti was apparently trying to extend his authority over the western parts of what was considered the land of Hatti. It seems that he had transported many of its people into his territory, though whether he did this through persuasion or force is unclear. Mursili mounted a major campaign that captured Apasa and Uhhaziti fled overseas. He had help from the king of Ahhiyawa, but of more immediate concern to the Hittite king was an Ahhiyawan alliance with the vassal city of Milawata, probably ancient Miletos, in whose territory lay the city of Puranda and the fortified refuge of Mt Arinnanda, probably Mt Mycale, a steep, rocky peninsula north of Miletos.[15] Mursili II was particularly keen to get hold of those Hittite subjects who, in his view, had fled from his authority and found asylum with Uhhaziti and his allies[16]:

> The entire land of Arzawa fled. There were civilian captives who went to Puranda and Arinnanda and occupied Mt Arinnanda, civilian captives who went to Puranda and occupied Mt Puranda, and civilian captives who went across the sea with Uhhaziti. I, My Majesty, went after the civilian captives in Mt Arinnanda and I battled (the land of) Mt Arinnanda. The sun-goddess of Arinna, my lady, the mighty storm-god, my lord Mezzulla, and all the gods ran before me. And I conquered Mt Arinnanda. There were 15,500 captives that I, My Majesty, brought for the royal estate. There was no counting the captives that the lords, troops and horse-troops of Hattusa brought for themselves. Subsequently I sent the captives forth to Hattusa and they led them away.

A more detailed version of Mursili's annals describes how he finally dislodged the refugees, some of whom were clearly fighting men, although

the majority were probably their non-combatant dependents, from Mt Arinnanda[17]:

> This mountain is very steep and extends out into the sea. It is also very high, difficult of access, rocky, and it is impossible for horses to advance up it. The civilian captives held it *en masse* and the infantry were above *en masse*. Since it was impossible for horses to advance up the mountain, I, My Sun, went before the army on foot and went up Mt Arinnanda on foot. I beleaguered the civilian captives with hunger and thirst. And under the pressure of hunger and thirst they came down and fell at my feet (saying): 'Our Lord, do not destroy us. Our Lord, take us into subjection and lead us up to Hattusa.'

In the fourth year, Mursili II finished the campaign by capturing Puranda, a small city north of Apasa, which was held against him by one of Uhhaziti's sons, Tapalazunawali. The Hittite army cut off the city's water supply and Tapalazunawali fled, apparently abandoning his entire entourage, including his wife and children, to the mercies of the Hittite king. The annals for the subsequent years of Mursili II's reign are replete with similar accounts of punitive expeditions to (re)establish Hittite authority, resulting in the devastation of many cities and the capture and transportation of thousands of captives.[18]

It should be noted that the scale of the events envisaged by the epic poems on the Trojan War is far too grand to be taken at face value, as might be expected from an epic narrative that was developed over centuries. Similarly, we cannot necessarily trust the numbers of captured and slain enemies that are given in the royal annals of the Hittite kings. The humbler realities of war and raiding at the end of the Bronze Age can be seen from records of contemporary attacks on coastal settlements along the Levant. For example, a letter of the last king of the Syrian city of Ugarit (Ras Shamra), Ammurapi II (*c.*1215–1180 BCE), addressed to his ally the king of Alasiya (Cyprus), who has asked for assistance from Ugarit, bewails the fate of his own people at the hands of a very small fleet of seaborne raiders, probably some of the 'Sea Peoples', when his own forces are elsewhere[19]:

> My father, behold the enemy's ships came (here); my (cities?) were burned, and they did evil things in my country. Does not my father know that all my troops and chariots(?) are in the land of Hatti, and all my ships

are in the land of Lukka? … Thus the country is abandoned to itself. May my father know it: the seven ships of the enemy that came here inflicted much damage on us.

The last Hittite King Suppiluliuma II (1207–? BCE) was unable to mount the kinds of regular military campaigns that are recorded in the annals of the Hittite rulers a century earlier. The Hittite kingdom collapsed at the very beginning of the twelfth century BCE, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but would seem to include environmental problems, such as earthquakes, droughts and consequent grain shortages in central Anatolia, raids on the fertile coastal regions by the Sea Peoples, and increasingly effective challenges to waning Hittite military power by restless vassal states and neighbours like the Kaska, all of which contributed to a swift demise for the Hittite kingdom and the abandonment of its capital Hattusas.[20]

The Homeric Epics

The annalistic narratives and correspondence quoted above give us our best evidence for the kind of historical events that could have provided a factual basis for the mythical siege of Troy. What is clearly absent from them, however, is what might be termed the civilian perspective, which is hardly surprising, given that they are official documents, conforming to well-established traditions of style and content. They stand in stark contrast to the best known, and the earliest, epic poem about the Trojan War, the Homeric *Iliad*, which was probably composed at various places in the Eastern Aegean around 700 BCE, at least five centuries after the putative date for the 'historical' Trojan War. The *Iliad* is a poem that focusses on the deeds and feelings of individuals, both combatants and non-combatants. The principal character is the Greek hero Achilles, whose angry reaction to a dispute over captured women has far-reaching consequences, including the death of his close friend Patroclus, which Achilles avenges by slaying the Trojan hero Hector. The poem's narrative ends well before the traditional conclusion to the story, the sack of Troy by the victorious Greeks, but ancient audiences would have been familiar with the fate that hung over the Trojans. While it must always be borne in mind that the *Iliad* and its slightly later companion piece the *Odyssey* are poetic, rather than historical, narratives, we can take the ideas, values and emotions expressed in these poems as broadly reflective of the

social and cultural world of the Greeks around the time of their composition, and thus we can use them as indirect evidence for contemporary attitudes and views.[21]

The bulk of the *Iliad* and much of the *Odyssey* are focussed on the male protagonists, aristocratic warriors who strive to establish, maintain or improve their socio-economic status according to the dictates of a set of shared social norms and values that is usually referred to as 'the heroic code'.[22] This code is exemplified by a short passage from the *Odyssey* in which the eponymous hero, who has returned to his homeland after 20 years, is uncertain of his welcome. He presents himself in the guise of a Cretan aristocrat and describes how he achieved a position of leadership[23]:

> Farm work I never cared for, nor life at home, nor fathering fair children. I revelled in long ships with oars; I loved polished lances, arrows in the skirmish, the shapes of doom that others shake to see. Carnage suited me; the god put those things in me somehow. Each to his own pleasure! Before we young Achaians sailed for Troy I led men on nine voyages in ships to raid strange coasts, and had great luck, taking rich spoils on the spot, and even more in the division. So my house grew prosperous, my standing therefore high among the Cretans.

At the time the Homeric poems were being composed, warfare in the Greek world seems to have been largely a matter of armed groups of varying sizes carrying out raids, primarily aimed at securing plunder, including goods, livestock and slaves, but also at proving their martial prowess by defeating opposing warriors.[24] Throughout the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* this 'raid mentality', as one modern scholar has labelled it, underlies the path to wealth and status for the courageous, successful and profitable war leader.[25] That is not to say that the glories of war and the heroic code are the only concerns of these poems. As many scholars have noted, there is a strong undercurrent of reflection on war and its miseries.[26] It is, therefore, possible to discover in the Homeric epics an acute awareness of the experiences of non-combatants under siege, and even verses which empathise with the plight of the civilian victims.

Such empathy is probably most obvious when Hector's wife Andromache tries to dissuade him from leaving the city and returning to battle. She reminds him that she has no other family, because her former home, the city of Thebe, has already been sacked by a Greek raiding

party led by Achilles, who killed her father Eëtion and her seven brothers and captured her mother.[27] The sacking of Troy itself is alluded to indirectly when Achilles' old tutor, Phoenix, urging him to rejoin the fighting, tells the story of the Aitolian hero Meleagros, who refused to participate in the defence of his own city against the Kouretes even as they were storming its walls[28]:

> Then his fine-girdled wife entreated Meleagros with tears, and described to him all the miseries that come on people when their city is captured – the men are slaughtered, fire razes the city, and other men carry away the children and the deep-girdled women. His heart was stirred as he listened to these horrors, and he went out, and clothed his body in its gleaming armour.

Later in the poem, when Achilles is given a new shield prior to his fateful duel with Hector, he sees that its maker, the god Hephaistos, has adorned it with images of war and peace.[29] One image features two contrasting cities. In the first city Hephaistos has depicted a wedding procession and a legal dispute[30]:

> The other city had two encamped armies surrounding it, their weapons glittering. There was debate among them, with support for either view, whether to storm the city and sack it, or to agree with the inhabitants a division of their property, taking half of all the possessions contained in the lovely town. But the defenders were not ready to yield, and had secretly armed for an attack. Their dear wives and young children and the men overtaken by old age stood on the walls to defend them, while the others set out. They were led by Ares and Pallas Athena, both shown in gold, and dressed in golden clothing, huge and beautiful in their armour, and standing out, as gods will, clear above the rest: and the people with them were of smaller size.

These few lines evoke, with economical elegance, a perilous world in which the inhabitants of a city must fight stoutly and defeat their attackers, lest they be robbed of half their possessions, at best, or, at worst, lose all of them along with their homes.[31] The emotional and moral impact of this vignette is heightened for the poem's audience by their knowledge that the shield on which it is portrayed is about to be used by Achilles in his duel to death with Hector, a contest that will ultimately lead to the fall of Troy. In the words of one modern scholar[32]:

Homer gives victory and prowess their due recognition, but he never loses sight of the human cost, of the waste of what might have flourished and brought joy. Human beings protect their dependants and win glory, and thus war is important: human beings also suffer and endure, and war is a great cause of this.

The Historical Context of Ancient Greek Siege Warfare

The Homeric poems were composed at a time when the Greeks were just beginning to develop their distinctive form of city-state, the *polis*. One of the key characteristics of the larger *poleis* which emerged around 600 BCE was their centralised governments, which enabled them to field relatively large military forces and conduct warfare with long-term, strategic objectives, such as the domination of extensive territories, the imposition of alliances, the exaction of tribute and the elimination of rival cities.[33] The total destruction of a *polis* was rare, but not unheard of, during this period. The historical accounts that are available to us offer a very incomplete record, but the list includes the following. The cities of Asine and Nauplia in the south-eastern Peloponnese were destroyed and their people expelled by the neighbouring city of Argos, probably sometime around 700 BCE.[34] Arisbe on Lesbos was destroyed and the inhabitants enslaved by nearby Methymna, which became the dominant city on the island.[35] The central Greek city of Krisa was destroyed by the combined states of the Delphic Amphictyony in 590 BCE, and its territory was turned into pastureland, possibly because it was needed to feed the animals that provided sacrifices at the growing pan-Hellenic sanctuary of Delphi.[36] In western Sicily, Kamarina was destroyed by its powerful neighbour Syracuse in 553 BCE.[37] In southern Italy, Siris was destroyed around 550 BCE by the combined forces of the nearby cities of Sybaris, Kroton and Metapontum.[38] Sybaris was itself destroyed by Kroton around 510 BCE and the site was deliberately flooded to prevent resettlement.[39] The consolidation of a city's power could be achieved by other means, such as the integration of numerous small neighbouring communities into one large *polis*. This process is best exemplified by the growth of Athens, which became the centre of an especially large *polis* embracing the entire Attic peninsula.[40] In contrast, the pre-eminence of the *polis* of Sparta was based on a combination of the absorption and subjugation of some of its neighbours, who were allowed varying degrees of autonomy, and a network of unequal alliances with

others, both in the Peloponnese and beyond, reinforced from time to time by displays of military force.[41] It is likely that there were other instances in the Archaic period in which ambitious Greek *poleis* chose to destroy, or at least depopulate local rivals, but in general terms the political landscape of the Greek world was a fairly stable one by the latter part of the sixth century BCE, with large and small *poleis* coexisting in a state of watchful peace. Even the rise of the greatest of the ancient Near Eastern Empires, Achaemenid Persia, did not initially threaten their security, although many of the Greek *poleis* of Asia Minor, and a few of the islands off the coast, were forced to submit to the authority of the Persian king and pay him tribute.[42]

By the middle of the fifth century BCE, however, the situation in the Greek world had changed dramatically. An abortive revolt against the Persian King Dareios I by the Greeks of Asia Minor lasted from 499 to 494 BCE. It was briefly supported by the Athenians, who were the target of a Persian punitive force that crossed the Aegean in 490 BCE, but was defeated on the plain of Marathon. Ten years later, Dareios' son, King Xerxes, mounted a full-scale invasion aimed at subjugating all the Greeks. After taking a leading role alongside the Spartans in the successful resistance to the invasion, which ended in 479 BCE, the Athenians allied with, and then gradually subordinated, many of the island and coastal Greek *poleis* that had been part of the Persian king's western empire.[43] The Athenians swiftly rose to a position of military dominance across the entire Aegean region and built up a maritime empire, with resources of tribute and manpower on a scale not seen before in the Greek world.[44] The growth of Athenian power and the fear that it caused amongst other mainland Greek *poleis*, principally Thebes, Corinth and Sparta, resulted in a major conflict between the Athenians and their subject allies, and the Spartans and their allies, known to modern historians as the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE).[45]

The Peloponnesian War involved most of Greek world, from Asia Minor to Sicily. Its course down to 411 BCE was described by a contemporary Athenian, the exiled general Thucydides, in his unfinished history, which was continued to the defeat of Athens in 404 BCE and beyond by another Athenian soldier and exile, Xenophon, in his *Hellenika*.[46] During the war's first phase (431–421 BCE), the Spartans and their allies regularly invaded Attica during the summer, forcing the Athenians to abandon much of their agricultural land and seek shelter behind their city's extensive fortifications, known as the Long Walls. Their enemies

also mounted attacks on Athenian subject allies and imperial possessions in the northern Aegean, which were countered by Athenian naval raids against the coast of Lakonia, as well as attacks on some of the Spartans' main allies, such as Boiotia. Several cities were captured by both sides, and there was widespread devastation during this period.[47] A peace treaty between the Athenians and Spartans was negotiated by the Athenian general Nikias in 421 BCE, but neither side fully suspended military operations and the war was resumed in 415 BCE.

Two incidents from the early years of the Peloponnesian War, described in detail by Thucydides, reveal the extent to which both combatants and non-combatants were entirely at the mercy of the victors, and demonstrate the arbitrary manner in which decisions over their fates might be taken.[48] In 428 BCE, during the early stages of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were faced with a revolt of most of the cities on the island of Lesbos, led by the largest one, Mytilene.[49] The resources of Lesbos were essential to the Athenian war effort so the Athenians despatched a small army and a fleet to blockade Mytilene, which was dependent on reinforcements and food supplies from overseas. The Mytileneans appealed to Sparta for help but the relief force was too slow in coming. The Athenians sent a second fleet of 100 ships early in 427 BCE, in spite of the losses caused by a plague in Athens. The oligarchic regime at Mytilene distributed weapons to the mass of the population to stiffen their defences, but this plan backfired and the newly empowered citizens demanded a general distribution of grain to feed the starving population. When this did not materialise they surrendered the city to the Athenian commander Paches, who sent the leaders of the revolt back to Athens.[50] The Athenian citizen assembly was persuaded by the populist politician Kleon to make an example of the people of Mytilene in order to discourage further revolts amongst the subject allies. The assembly voted to execute all adult male citizens and sell the women and children into slavery. A warship was sent to Paches with the details of this brutal decision, but the following day widespread doubts about the justice of their decision prompted some citizens to call a second meeting of the Assembly that voted to rescind the decree and punish only the leaders of the revolt. A second ship raced to overtake the first, encouraged by the promise of great rewards from the Mytileneans if they could get to Lesbos in time. It reached Mytilene as Paches was reading his initial orders, so the citizens and their families were saved, although Mytilene was deprived of her fleet and lost much of her territory.[51]

At about the same time a small garrison which had been under siege by the Thebans and Spartans for the best part of a year in the Boiotian city of Plataia, finally succumbed to starvation and surrendered to the Spartans. Their neighbours, the Thebans, whose attack on Plataia in 431 BCE had opened hostilities in the Peloponnesian War, insisted on harsh treatment of the captives. The men, some 200 Plataians and 25 Athenians, were asked by the Spartans: 'Have you done anything of benefit to the Lakedaimonians (i.e. the Spartans) and their allies in the current war?' Unsurprisingly few of them could answer yes to this question, so the Spartans felt justified in executing them. The 110 women who had stayed behind when the city was evacuated a couple of years earlier were sold, although some of them may already have been slaves. The territory of Plataia was leased to Theban farmers.[52]

Sieges and Civilians in the Tragedies of Euripides

The Mytilene and Plataia episodes are narrated for us in a vivid and dramatic style by Thucydides, who may well have been an eyewitness to some of the events, and could have gathered testimony from many others for the rest. Yet our attempts to understand them are somewhat hampered by the lack of direct testimony from civilian participants. Nevertheless, we can gain important insights from some of the great works of Greek literature, which frequently focus on the emotive issues that preoccupied both soldiers and civilians in times of siege. That focus is, as Payen convincingly demonstrates, principally a consequence of the nature of ancient Greek warfare, the key features of which indicate that the citizens of the Greek *poleis* shared an essentially defensive ideology.[53] In particular, the centrality of citizen militias and the primacy accorded by those militias to their contingents of heavily armed infantrymen (hoplites), whose bronze armour and distinctive weaponry, the large round shield (*aspis*) and long thrusting spear (*dory*) were developed for defensive tactics, suggest to Payen that defending the *polis* and, above all, its citizen inhabitants, was the main purpose of ancient Greek warfare.[54] This concept is articulated in the Homeric passages quoted above, and Payen sees it reflected in Aristotle's emphasis on the defensive attributes of the ideal city in his *Politics*.[55]

Above all, it is the surviving examples of Athenian tragic plays that offer us some of the best evidence for how Greeks of the Classical period articulated the experiences of those on the wrong side of war. They also

reveal how problematic this exercise was for the tragedians and their audiences, brought up as they were on the Homeric epics and other narratives that focussed on the great achievements and extreme emotions of the mythical warrior-heroes, and paid only occasional attention to the non-combatants around them.[56] The audiences for these plays would have numbered in the thousands, and would have been composed largely of Athenian male citizens, along with some non-Athenians. It is likely that some women, and, less probably, some slaves, were also present. In broad terms, the predominant moral and political outlook of the audience would have been that of the male Athenian citizens. The specific context for the performance of all the Athenian tragedies that have survived was the festival known as the City Dionysia, a major religious and cultural event in honour of the god Dionysos, at which publicly funded theatre productions were staged. Typically a poet would write three tragic plays, all related to each other in some fashion, plus a comic, satyr play, for production at a particular festival. By the middle of the fifth century BCE the tragic plays had developed into a genre that, with some exceptions, explored aspects of human life, particularly human suffering, through dramatic presentations of episodes from popular mythology.[57]

The extant plays of the great Athenian tragedian Euripides exhibit a strong tendency to invoke his audience's sympathy for the non-combatant victims of wars, especially women, and to articulate some aspects of their suffering and miseries.[58] Euripides was celebrated in his own day for his preference for making the mythical characters seem much more human and far less heroic than his fellow tragedians.[59] Aristotle called him 'the most tragic of the poets', meaning that his plays had the strongest emotional impact, particularly because of his capacity to make the audience feel strong emotions and to elicit their pity for the central characters.[60] This was undoubtedly a key aspect of his appeal to his contemporaries, who found it easy to identify personally with the people and the situations portrayed in his plays. Euripides wrote three plays between about 426 and 415 BCE, that is in the middle of the Peloponnesian War, all of which are set in the aftermath of the Greek sack of Troy. They each have plots that deal explicitly with the experiences of some of the non-combatants who have survived the siege and its violent climax.

Euripides' tragedy *Trojan Women* is the latest of the three in terms of its composition, but it is set slightly earlier than the other two in terms of the chronology of the cycle of Trojan War myths. The play focusses on the fate of the wives and children of the defeated Trojans. The

eponymous chorus is led by Hecabe, wife of King Priam, her daughter Cassandra, Andromache, widow of the leading Trojan hero Hector, and Helen, wife of the Greek hero Menelaus, whose abduction by Hector's brother Paris started the conflict. Euripides deliberately eschews the traditional exploration of the ideals and values of the heroic warriors, offering his audience instead the chance to reflect on enslavement, forced marriage and the murder of their children from the women's point of view.[61]

The play opens with the god Poseidon describing the ruin of Troy, a once fair and prosperous city, and acceding to the demand of the goddess Athena that he join in punishing the Greeks for an impious act. During the sack of the city, the Greek hero Ajax had dragged Cassandra away from an altar sacred to Athena by force, which was an unpardonable insult to the goddess in Greek eyes. Athena, her father Zeus and his brother Poseidon will all make the Greeks rue this sacrilege. Poseidon concludes by condemning as a fool anyone who desecrates temples or tombs when sacking a city.[62] In keeping with most Greek tragedies there is very little 'action', but much reflection on events that have already happened, or happen 'off-stage' and are reported to the chorus. Early on in the play the women are informed by Talthybios, a herald, which of the surviving Greek heroes has claimed them as his prize, and Hecabe is told that her daughter Polyxena has been killed by the Greeks as an offering to their deceased hero Achilles.[63]

One way in which Euripides draws attention to the harsh realities that women had to endure as a consequence of warfare is by having Andromache and the other Trojan women discuss the lives that they will be forced to live now that their menfolk have failed to defend them. Andromache has been selected by Neoptolemos, son of the deceased Greek hero Achilles, who killed her husband, to be his 'wife'. She articulates the personal dilemma facing her thus[64]:

> I will be enslaved in the household of my own people's killer, and if I put Hector's love out of my mind and open my heart to this new husband I shall be seen to dishonour the dead. But the alternative is to hate and be hated by my own master.

Euripides uses the fate of Hector and Andromache's son, Astyanax, to great dramatic effect. The Greeks are persuaded by Odysseus that it is

unwise to allow the son of their greatest enemy to live. Talthybios conveys this news to Andromache in abrupt, but realistic, terms[65]:

> Know the worst: the Greeks are going to kill your son … Do not cling to him, or tell yourself you have some strength you lack. No-one can help you. See, your city is destroyed, your husband dead, you are a prisoner. Shall we match our strength against a lone woman. We can.

Andromache is led away to her new life while her son Astyanax is thrown to his death from the walls of Troy. His body is brought before the women by Talthybios, on his dead father's shield, so that they, led by his grandmother Hecabe, can dress it for burial.[66] The reactions of the women to the news of Astyanax's death, and their laments as they receive his body, leave no doubt that Euripides expected his audience to see the killing of the child as a terrible act. Hecabe calls it an unprecedented act of murder, shameful to all the Greeks.[67] Yet it is not treated as something that is deserving of divine retribution, in contrast to Ajax's impious treatment of Cassandra. The play ends with the women witnessing the final destruction of their city as they are led away to the ships that will take them to their new masters' homes.

Euripides' *Hecabe* was probably written sometime between 425 and 423 BCE.[68] It is a grim story of maternal grief and revenge that has been described as 'a study of the repercussions of international war on individual families'.[69] Its protagonist is the former Queen of Troy, Hecabe, whose city has been devastated, and her husband and most of her children killed or enslaved. She seems to embody all the misfortunes that war can inflict. Early in the play, as she and the other women of Troy begin their new lives as slaves, her daughter Polyxena is taken from her side by the victorious Greeks and sacrificed to appease the spirit of Achilles. At the end of a heart-rending exchange with her condemned daughter, Hecabe declares, 'I am already dead. Overcome by evil losses before dying'.[70] She then learns that her son Polydorus, whom she thought was safe as a guest of the Trojans' ally King Polymestor of Thrace, has been murdered by his host. Hecabe exacts a double revenge by luring Polymestor and his two sons into the captive Trojan women's tent, where he is blinded and his sons are killed. At the end of the play Polymestor predicts the death of Hecabe, who will drown herself on the voyage to Greece. The final lines, spoken by the Chorus of Trojan captives, underline the bleak, uncompromising theme of the evils of war:

'Head for the harbours and tents, friends. We must try to bear the hardships of slavery. Necessity is cruel.'[71]

Euripides' *Andromache* is usually dated on stylistic grounds to 425 BCE.[72] It was probably the earliest of his three surviving plays set in the aftermath of the Trojan War and explores the later fate of the title character, now a slave in the household of Neoptolemos and fearful that her master's Spartan wife, Hermione, will kill both Andromache and Molossos, the son she has borne to Neoptolemos, out of jealousy. The drama hinges around the harsh treatment that Andromache has had to endure from the vindictive Hermione and her father Menelaus, King of Sparta, and their desire to ensure that the only possible heir to Neoptolemos will be a future son of Hermione. In the early parts of the play Andromache, who has sought sanctuary at an altar dedicated to the goddess Thetis, mother of Achilles, expounds at length on her miserable life as the slave and concubine of Neoptolemos, son of her former husband's killer.[73] These passages, and the contrastingly arrogant and bullying characterisations of the Spartans Menelaus and Hermione, seem intended to invoke the audience's sympathy for Andromache and her infant son. Hermione has accused her of using witchcraft to make Hermione barren in order to supplant her, and she is tricked into leaving the altar by a false promise from Menelaus that doing so will stop him from killing her son. As he gloats over his deception, he expresses the brutal but undeniable truth of her existence as a slave at the mercy of the victors of the Trojan War[74]:

Seize her men, and grasp her tightly with your arms! For the words which she will hear will not be welcome to her. I have you in my grip. I held out your son's death so that you would leave the holy altar of the goddess, and used it to induce you to come into my hands for slaughter. That is how things stand for you. About the child here my daughter will decide, whether her choice is to kill him or not to kill him. Get into the house, and learn that slaves should never insult the free.

In the end, both Andromache and Molossos are saved through the intervention of Achilles' father, Peleus. News arrives that Neoptolemos has been killed by Orestes, son of Agamemnon, who was betrothed to Hermione long ago and now arrives to claim her as his bride. Peleus' divine bride, Thetis, arranges for Andromache and her son to settle in the distant land of Molossia, where she will marry Helenos, brother of

her dead husband Hector. *Andromache* was produced not long after the capture of Plataia by the Spartans and the suppression of the revolt of Mytilene by the Athenians. It could be construed as encouraging the viewers to reflect on the fate of captive women in general through consideration of one mythical example, whose resolute bearing in the face of adversity has heroic qualities.

What is most remarkable about these three plays is that, while Euripides pulls no punches in his presentation of the anguish and suffering that war causes for civilians, he does not simply portray the victims of war as pitiable, sympathetic, but essentially powerless figures. Instead he attributes many of the traditional qualities of heroic warriors to them, portraying them as passionate, brave, dignified and worthy of respect. As one leading scholar of Euripidean tragedy puts it: 'he is redefining the old epic notions of glorious war and transferring them to a setting where it is the victims who are seen as the real heroes'.[75]

The Historical Context of Euripides' Tragedies

The emotional and moral impact of Euripides' dramatic retelling of episodes from the Trojan War myth cycle was perhaps most keenly felt when *Trojan Women* was first produced in the spring of 415 BCE.[76] Shortly before this the Athenians had conquered the small island *polis* of Melos, in the Southern Aegean. Melos was nominally neutral in the ongoing struggle between Athens and Sparta, but, as befitted a community founded by Spartans, had probably been assisting the Spartan war effort financially, and had withstood an earlier Athenian attempt to bring it under their control.[77] Despite being faced with overwhelming force, the Melians refused to surrender, hoping for Spartan assistance. The initial attempt to negotiate the Melian's surrender provides the context for one of the most celebrated passages of Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, the so-called 'Melian dialogue'.[78]

In this rhetorical excursus Thucydides makes the Athenians argue that submitting to them is prudent, because otherwise the Melians face annihilation. The Melians try to argue that prudence should not matter because the Athenians' demand for submission is unjust, but this argument is swiftly abandoned and instead the debate becomes, for the Athenians, about the relative merits of tolerating Melian independence at the risk of appearing weak or making an example of them to demonstrate Athenian strength and inspire continued fear in their imperial

subjects. The Melians focus on the reasons why they should hope for (divinely inspired) Spartan aid. The dialogue is further evidence that, in the Greek world, wars of conquest and enslavement were not considered ethically wrong and that it was accepted that aggressive imperialists like the Athenians would be as brutal as they liked, so long as there was no prospect of other powers holding them to account.[79]

Although Spartan help failed to materialise, the Melians resisted stoutly under tight siege conditions, until internal quarrels and imminent treachery forced them to surrender. The Athenians reacted by decreeing the execution of all surviving males and the enslavement of the women and children.[80] A portion of the newly enslaved Melians must have ended up in Athens and it is quite likely that there were former Melians in the households of some of those who saw the first performance of *Trojan Women*.[81] While it is impossible to be certain that Euripides intended his play to echo those events (he may well have begun to write it before Melos surrendered), there are obvious resonances between the Athenians' treatment of the Melians and that decreed by the Greeks for the Trojans. It is particularly significant that, just as the Athenians passed the decree condemning the Melians in their citizen assembly, the killing of Astyanax is reported as the decision of the Greek forces meeting in an assembly, not as a spur-of-the-moment action, which is how it seems to have been regularly portrayed in literature and art.[82]

The year after their attack on Melos in 415 BCE the Athenians mounted a huge naval expedition against the Greek cities of Sicily, who appealed to Sparta and Corinth for aid. The Athenian forces in Sicily were completely defeated in 413 BCE, seriously weakening Athenian power and encouraging revolts among their subject allies.[83] Thucydides says that it was a long time before the Athenians could bring themselves to accept the reports that reached them from Sicily, that their magnificent forces had been totally destroyed. He sums up their mood thus: 'On every side there was nothing for them but pain, and they were plunged into fear and the utmost consternation at what had happened.'[84] He reports that in their weakened state they expected to be attacked directly by the Spartans and their allies, but this did not happen. However, even as they were engaged in a major campaign in Sicily, the Athenians had unwisely decided to support a revolt in Karia against the Persian King, Dareios II, who ordered his local governors to assist the Spartans and their allies.[85] In return for their recognition of the Persian king's claim to rule the cities and islands of the Ionian Greeks, the Persian king provided

the Spartans with major financial and military support. This enabled them to attack Athenian territories in the Aegean and the Hellespont with fleets of warships. After several years of indecisive confrontations, in 405 BCE the Athenians lost almost all of their last remaining fleet at Aigospotamoi in the Hellespont, and were blockaded into submission the following year.[86]

In a vivid passage that echoes Thucydides on the aftermath of the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenian historian Xenophon tells us that in 405 BCE, on hearing the news of the defeat at Aigospotamoi, the Athenians realised that they had lost any hope of resisting the victorious Spartans and their allies, whose fleet and army would soon arrive to invest their city. They contemplated their own fate with heavy hearts. They fully expected to be treated just as harshly by the victorious Spartans and their allies as they had treated the populations of many other Greek *poleis*[87]:

> As the news of the disaster was told, one man passed it on to another, and a sound of wailing arose and extended first from Piraeus, then along the Long Walls until it reached the city. That night no-one slept. They mourned for the lost, but still more for their own fate. They thought that they themselves would be dealt with as they had dealt with others – with the Melians, colonists of Sparta, after they had besieged and conquered Melos, with the people of Histiaia, of Skione, of Torone, of Aigina and many other states. Next day they held an Assembly at which it was decided to block up all the harbours except one, to repair and man the walls, and to take all other measures to put the city into a state of readiness for a siege.

Xenophon was almost certainly in Athens at the time, so this is very powerful evidence for the thoughts of his compatriots at this fateful moment. In the light of what has been discussed above, it is surely no surprise that uppermost in their minds was the island of Melos, where, in 416 BCE, all the surviving men were killed, the women and children enslaved, and the land was settled by Athenians. He also mentions Histiaia on the nearby island of Euboia, whose inhabitants were expelled from their city and its lands in 446 BCE; Skione, where in 421 BCE the men were slain, the women and children enslaved and the lands given to the Plataians; Torone, whose entire population was enslaved in 422 BCE; and finally Aigina, a much larger *polis* than all the others, whose citizens were expelled from their island by the Athenians in 431 BCE

and scattered across Greece.[88] The Athenians now had no need for the aid of dramatic retellings of the Trojan War myths, as their own impending doom enabled them to appreciate just how terrifying the prospect of a siege was for the inhabitants of an ancient Greek city. As it turned out, their conquerors were relatively merciful. In the spring of 404 BCE both Spartan kings led armies up to the walls of Athens and the Spartan admiral Lysandros moored his fleet outside the harbour at Piraeus. The Athenians waited behind their walls during a tense period of negotiations at Sparta. Their embassy returned with the news that the Spartans had resisted pressure from their allies, led by Thebes and Corinth, to destroy the city and enslave the citizens. In return the Athenians were required to dismantle their fortifications, surrender all but 12 of their remaining ships and become allies of the Spartans. Lysandros and his fleet sailed into the harbour and immediately set to work demolishing sections of the walls to the accompaniment of flutes. Xenophon, who witnessed this celebration of Spartan victory, wrote: 'They believed this day to be the beginning of freedom for the Greeks.'[89] There can be no doubt that, after witnessing, often as an active participant, a further half century of bloody conflicts and sieges amongst the Greeks, he fully appreciated the irony of that statement.

Conclusions

This chapter has explored both historical and cultural representations of civilians under siege in the ancient world, focussing on examples from ancient Greek epic poetry, tragedy and historiography. Defending one's city, and especially its non-combatant inhabitants, against assaults and sieges was a defining feature of ancient warfare, and evidence of the human cost of such conflicts can be found in Near Eastern documents from as far back as the mid-second millennium BCE, the traditional, historical context of the Trojan War. The trauma of being a civilian under siege is a theme in the Homeric *Iliad*, written in the late eighth century BCE and set in the tenth and final year of the siege of Troy. Although there were many occasions in subsequent centuries on which cities were sacked and populations enslaved or slaughtered, narrative accounts of sieges in the Greek world only emerged in the late fifth century BCE, when Herodotus and Thucydides invented the literary genre of prose history-writing. Thucydides' account of the events of the Peloponnesian War from 431–411 BCE was written by a man who experienced some

of them personally and was able to obtain eyewitness testimony of many others. The same is true of his fourth-century continuator Xenophon, but their brief reports of the fates of cities and the forms of violence inflicted on their civilian populations generally lack the empathy with victims and the emotional intensity that characterise the Homeric passages. However, the civilian experience of sieges and their consequences was one of the key features of another new literary genre, tragic drama, which was invented in Athens in the early fifth century BCE. Some of the finest surviving tragedies were written by Euripides and produced during the Peloponnesian War. They use a traditional, mythical setting in the aftermath of the siege and destruction of Troy, but adopt the perspectives of the women and children whose menfolk have failed to defend them, and who have been captured and enslaved. In these dramatic works the playwright invites his audiences to sympathise and even identify with the female leading characters, who articulate contemporary, civilian views of the human sufferings that were a regular consequence of siege warfare in Antiquity. Since, as this book has shown, the same sufferings in different forms and varying degrees characterised siege warfare during later historical eras, these literary voices from classical Greece speak directly to the present across the intervening two and a half millennia.

Notes

1. On refugees in the ancient Greek world see Robert Garland, *Wandering Greeks: The Ancient Greek Diaspora from the Age of Homer to the Death of Alexander the Great* (Princeton, 2014); on the importance of religious sites and their treatment see Sonya Nevin, *Military Leaders and Sacred Space in Classical Greek Warfare* (London, 2016).
2. In 100 recorded instances of cities being captured in the Greek world, from the sixth to the second century BCE, in 41 cases the inhabitants were spared, in 34 cases the inhabitants were enslaved, and in the remaining 25 cases the inhabitants were massacred: Pierre Ducrey, *Le traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique des origins a la conquête romaine*, (2nd edn, Athens, 1999), xv. Ducrey also reckons that, for the same period, 20% of soldiers captured after battles were massacred and 24% were enslaved, although the fates of the remaining 56% cannot be readily determined on the basis of the available historical accounts.
3. For a survey ranging from the late third millennium BCE to the end of the first century CE see Paul Bentley Kern, *Ancient Siege Warfare* (Bloomington, 1999).

4. Pascal Payen, *Les revers de la guerre en grèce ancienne* (Paris, 2012).

5. Ibid., 247–62.

6. Ibid., 7–45. On Homeric martial values see Hans van Wees, *Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History* (Amsterdam, 1992).

7. Payen, *Les revers*, 263–332. This interest in the reverse side of the coin links the great Classical Greek historians Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon with their Hellenistic and Roman successors, including Polybius and Josephus.

8. Trevor Bryce, 'The Trojan War', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Bronze Age Aegean*, ed. Eric H. Kline (Oxford, 2010), 475–482. Herodotus, *Histories*, Book 2, Chap. 145 states that it occurred 800 years before his own time, which would be around 1250 BCE. Duris of Samos, fragment 41, dated it 1000 years before Alexander the Great visited the city in 334 BCE; Felix Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923–), no. 76, F 41. The geographer Eratosthenes claimed it ended 407 years before the first recorded Olympic Games in 776 BCE, which would be 1183 BCE; Jacoby, *Fragmente*, no. 241, F1.

9. For a summary see Trevor Bryce, *The Kingdom of the Hittites* (Oxford, 2005), 333–340; for more detail see Robert Drews, *The End of the Bronze Age* (Princeton, 1993).

10. Bryce, *Kingdom of the Hittites*.

11. Ibid., 57–60, 290–293, 359–370.

12. Ibid., 224–227.

13. Ibid., 180–197.

14. Translation by Kathleen R. Mineck in *The Ancient Near East: Historical Sources in Translation*, ed. Mark W. Chavalas (Oxford, 2006), 255.

15. Bryce, *Kingdom of the Hittites*, 193–195.

16. Chavalas, *Ancient Near East*, 255.

17. Bryce, *Kingdom of the Hittites*, 194–205; for Mursili II's response to the plague see ibid., 205–207.

18. Chavalas, *Ancient Near East*, 256–259; Bryce, *Kingdom of the Hittites*, 195–205.

19. Jean Nougaryol, E. Laroche, C. Virolleaud and C. Schaeffer, *Ugaritica V. Mission de Ras Shamra Tome XVI* (Paris, 1968), 87–90, no. 24; M. C. Astour, 'New Evidence on the Last Days of Ugarit', *American Journal of Archaeology* 69 (1965), 253–258.

20. Bryce, *Kingdom of the Hittites*, 327–351.

21. On Homer as historical evidence see Jonathan M. Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World ca. 1200–479 BC* (Oxford, 2007), 22–27, 288; Robin Osborne, *Greece in the Making 1200–479 BC* (2nd edn, London 2009), 131–152.

22. See Christoph Ulf, 'The World of Homer and Hesiod', in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees (Oxford, 2009), 83–92 for a brief statement of these values, with further bibliography.

23. Homer, *Odyssey* 14.222–34 (adapted from Fitzgerald's translation).

24. See, for example, Homer, *Iliad*, Book 11, lines 669–761; *Odyssey*, Book 9, lines 39–52. For modern scholarship see Philip de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1999), 17–24; Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), 22–33, 66–70, 202–206.

25. Vincent Gabrielsen, 'Economic Activity, Maritime Trade and Piracy in the Hellenistic Aegean', *Revue des Études Anciennes* 103 (2001), 219–240.

26. See for example, Jasper Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), 81–143.

27. Homer, *Iliad*, Book 6, lines 404–434.

28. Homer, *Iliad*, Book 9, lines 590–596. Translated by Martin Hammond, *The Iliad: A New Prose Translation* (Harmondsworth, 1987), 178.

29. Homer, *Iliad*, Book 18, lines 478–607. For contrasting modern interpretations see Oliver Taplin, 'The Shield of Achilles within the Iliad', *Greece & Rome* 27 (1980), 1–21; Stephen Scully, 'Reading the Shield of Achilles: Terror, Anger, Delight', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 101 (2003), 29–47.

30. Homer, *Iliad*, Book 18, lines 509–519. Translation Hammond, *The Iliad*, 321.

31. Similar sentiments are expressed by the seventh century BCE poet Trytaios, whose verses were written as exhortations to Spartan warriors to display bravery when fighting for their fatherland: Tyrtaios, fragments 10, 11 and 12; see Payen, *Les revers*, 181–182.

32. Taplin, 'Shield of Achilles', 17.

33. For an excellent account of this period see Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, 153–275.

34. Theopompus, *History*, in Jacoby, *Fragmente*, no. 115, F383; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, 4.24.4; 27.8; 35.2; 36.4–5. The inhabitants of Asine were resettled by Spartans on the Messenian coast; see Hall, *Archaic Greek World*, 150–154.

35. Herodotus, *Histories*, 1.151; the date of this event is very uncertain.

36. Tim Howe, 'Pastoralism, the Delphic Amphiktyony, and the First Sacred War: The Creation of Apollo's Sacred Pastures', *Historia* 52 (2003), 129–146.

37. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Book 6, Chap. 5.3; Philistus in Jacoby, *Die Fragmente*, 3 B 556 F5.

38. Justin, *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, Book 20, Chap. 2.4.

39. Herodotus, *Histories*, 5.44; 6.21; Strabo, *Geography*, Book 6, Chap. 1.13.

40. See Michael Stahl and Uwe Walter, 'Athens', in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees (Oxford, 2009), 138–161.

41. See Massimo Nafissi, 'Sparta', in Raaflaub and van Wees, *Archaic Greece*, 117–37.

42. On the Achaemenid Empire see Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire* (Winona Lake, 2002); Amélie Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East c.3000–330 BC*, 2 vols (London, 1995), 647–701.

43. For a brief account see Philip de Souza, *The Greek and Persian Wars 499–386 BC* (Oxford, 2003), 7–74.

44. See Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972); Philip de Souza, 'The Athenian Maritime Empire of the Fifth Century BC', in *The Sea in History. Volume I: The Ancient World. La mer dans l'histoire. Tome I: L'Antiquité*, ed. Philip de Souza and Pascal Arnaud (Woodbridge, 2017), 412–425.

45. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 1. 22–3 and 89–118. For a concise account see Philip de Souza, *The Peloponnesian War 431–404 BC* (Oxford, 2002).

46. Detailed modern narrative and analysis in: Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969), *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, 1974), *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, 1981) and *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca, 1987); John F. Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study* (London, 2004).

47. For a survey of the fate of cities in this period see Kern, *Ancient Siege Warfare*, 140–154.

48. For more on the precarious status of civilians and the very limited 'rules of war', see Chap. 9 in this volume.

49. Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 49–55.

50. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 3.3–6; 3.18; 3.25; 3.27–8; Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 132–175.

51. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 3.37–50. For analysis of the debate as presented by Thucydides see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume I: Books I–III* (Oxford, 1991), 420–440.

52. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 3.52–9; 3.68. Thucydides notes that the great sanctuary of Hera at Plataia, which was the location of a major religious festival, and had historical associations with the defeat of Xerxes' army in 479 BCE, was preserved and a large hostel erected beside it; see Nevin, *Sacred Space*, 99–101.

53. Payen, *Les revers*, 184–231.

54. On hoplite warfare see van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 151–197.

55. Payen, *Les revers*, 237–46; Aristotle, *Politics*, VII.11, 1330a34–1331a18.

56. 'The examples of tragedy … demonstrate not only the acute awareness the Greeks had of the anguish of the victims of war and the need to recount their sufferings, but also the difficulty of developing a credible narrative, one which could be received by their contemporaries and in the future.' Payen, *Les revers*, 162.

57. For a brief account of the historical and cultural context of Greek tragedy see David M. Carter, *The Politics of Greek Tragedy* (Exeter, 2007), 1–20.

58. Bernard M. Knox, 'Euripides', in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature Volume. I, Part 2: Greek Drama*, ed. Pat Easterling and Bernard Knox (Cambridge, 1989), 64–86.

59. Aristophanes, *Frogs*, lines 1053–62.

60. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453a, 1–30.

61. One of the choral passages from the play begins 'Sing to me, O Muse, a new hymn of Ilion, in a tearful funeral mode' (Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 512–14). Euripides is here adapting the opening lines of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, which invite the Muse (of poetry) to sing, through the performer of the epic poem, about the anger of Achilles and the homecoming of Odysseus respectively.

62. Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 1–97.

63. Ibid., 240–290.

64. Ibid., 659–664.

65. Ibid., 719, 728–733.

66. Ibid., 1118–250.

67. Ibid., 1160; 1190–1191.

68. See John Gould, 'Euripides', in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (3rd edn, Oxford, 1996), 571–574.

69. Edith Hall, 'Introduction', in *Euripides: Hecuba, The Trojan Women, Andromache*, ed. James Morwood and Edith Hall, (Oxford, 2000), xx.

70. Euripides, *Hecabe*, line 431.

71. Ibid., 1293–1295.

72. Michael Lloyd, *Euripides: Andromache. Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Warminster, 1994), 11–12.

73. Euripides, *Andromache*, lines 1–55, 91–102.

74. Ibid., lines 425–434; translation Lloyd, *Andromache*, 51.

75. Shirley Barlow, 'General Introduction', in Lloyd, *Andromache*, xxv.

76. Unusually, we know the titles of the other two tragic plays that Euripides wrote to be performed immediately before it, *Alexandros* and *Palamedes*. It is clear from their titles that they concerned the exposure and rescue of Alexandros, or Paris, whose abduction of Helen provided the pretext for the Greeks to attack Troy, and the false accusation and consequent

execution for treachery of Palamedes by the other Greeks at Troy, but neither text has been preserved.

77. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 2.9; 3.91; 3.94.
78. Ibid., 5.85–113.
79. For detailed analysis and further bibliography see Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume III: Books 5.25–8.109* (Oxford 2008), 216–251.
80. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 5.114–6; Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades*, 16; Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 129–130.
81. It was later claimed that Alcibiades, a prominent Athenian, chose a Melian woman to be his concubine and had a son by her; Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 16; Pseudo-Andocides, *Against Alcibiades*, 22.
82. This is how the lost epic poems that dealt with the conclusion of the Trojan War seem to have presented the death of Astyanax: e.g. fragment 20 of the so-called *Little Iliad*; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, 10.25.9. In the *Sack of Ilion*, as reported by the second-century CE *Chrestomatheia* of Proclus, he is killed by Odysseus.
83. Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 131–169; Kagan, *Peace of Nicias and Sicilian Expedition*, 159–372.
84. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 8.1.
85. Andocides, *On the Peace with Sparta*, 29; Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*, 28–31; Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 172–173.
86. Kagan, *Fall of the Athenian Empire*.
87. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book 2, Chap. 2.3–5; translation Rex Warner, *Xenophon: A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth, 1966), 104.
88. Histiaia: Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 1.114; Skione: Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 5.32; Torone: Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 5.3; Aigina: Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 2.27.
89. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.2.23.

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