CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN

EUROPE REDEFINED

EDITED BY
PIOTR H. KOSICKI & SŁAWOMIR ŁUKASIEWICZ

Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain

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Editors' Preface

In a 2015 lecture at the Catholic University of Lublin, in Poland, Wolfram Kaiser—perhaps Europe's most incisive historian of Catholic politics—declared, "the history of Christian Democracy in twentieth-century Europe as a research field is currently in a profound crisis." Having neglected "research on the transfer of ideas and practices"—Kaiser argued—mainstream scholarship on this influential political family is producing work of increasingly marginal impact. On the other hand, Kaiser suggested that the very audience that he was addressing—a mix of scholars and practitioners from across Western and East-Central Europe—had the opportunity to define a promising new direction for the study of modern European politics. Poland, which played host to the conference, has, after all, consistently been the most Catholic of the former Iron Curtain countries. In Kaiser's words: "because Polish research on Christian Democracy has been somewhat disconnected from the friendly circles which have researched and propagated what I have called 'pure' Christian democracy, it may well be easier to develop and insert innovative ideas and approaches into changing networks and research themes."

We, the editors of this book, organized that conference. We heard in Wolfram Kaiser's sobering assessment—which, in revised form, appears as the introduction to this book—a call to gather scholars from across the entire continent in order to define a genuinely European research agenda.

The purpose of the May 2015 gathering in Lublin was to establish the state of the art of scholarship on Christian Democracy in twentieth-century Europe. Having heard over thirty presentations, we chose to invite eighteen authors to contribute to a multi-author volume proposing a transnational, East-to-West understanding of Christian Democracy's many roles in the creation of a united Europe. We tasked these authors with providing a fresh perspective based on their latest research.

Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain: Europe Redefined presents the results of that work. We have organized this book around three thematic axes: the horizon lines of Christian Democracy as a political force in twentieth-century Europe; the successes and failures of Christian Democracy throughout the Cold War in permeating and penetrating back and forth across the Iron Curtain; and the specific consequences of how Christian Democracy in East-Central Europe (and especially in Poland) has interacted with European Christian Democracy writ large. The volume we offer here to the reader is the fruit of our collective labors.

In the aftermath of World War II, the success of (Western) European integration assured the ascendancy of a new flavor of political economy—at once neoliberal and welfarist—predicated on the incorporation of a peaceful Federal Republic of Germany into a transnational system of security guarantees. As historians from Tony Judt to Alan Milward have argued, this was a moment of revolutionary rupture in the continent's history.

Sixty years later, this order is in danger of collapsing under pressure from a whole host of threats: from the looming prospect of "Brexit", to an unprecedented migration crisis, to the rise of a populist, xenophobic extreme right across the continent. In this context, it is essential for scholars to re-examine the roots of European integration in order to understand where things went wrong and, if possible, how to fix them.

Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain does precisely this, through the lens of one transnational political force. Though its origins lay in late-nineteenth-century Catholic social thought and activism, Christian Democracy came into its own in the aftermath of World War II as the lone political force of the right that, rather than collaborate with fascism, distinguished itself by unrepentant resistance to the Third Reich and its allies. With the Vatican's enthusiastic support, Christian Democrats then played a central role in laying the foundations of a united Europe in the 1940s and 1950s.

This, at least, is the story as traditionally told. Virtually absent from this account, however, is what political scientist Jacques Rupnik has called the "other Europe": the East-Central European nations trapped behind the Iron Curtain for four decades, until the *annus mirabilis* of 1989. East of the Rhine, too, Christian Democrats had once had an important voice—until the ascendancy of Communist regimes either halted, or coopted, their participation in national politics. Yet even then, both at home and in exile, the Christian Democratic dissidents of East-Central Europe played a crucial role in advancing a non-Communist politics of social justice throughout the Cold War. They also helped to launch transnational networks to lobby for this agenda across Europe— and beyond the continent's borders, as well.

East-Central European Christian Democrats benefited especially from American support, establishing themselves as Cold Warriors delicately balancing their own religious commitments with a subjective under-standing of "national interest" on the one hand, and American geopoli-tics on the other. Poles, in particular, played a central role in establishing transnational Christian Democratic networks both within Europe, and between Europe and Latin America.

And yet, since the Communist collapse in 1989, Christian Democracy in Poland has arguably fared worse than while the Soviet Bloc still existed. In fact, the whole of East-Central Europe has, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, witnessed an ongoing tug of war between an integral nationalism with roots predating World War II and a technocratic neo-liberalism inspired by the American model. One of the most important results of this contest has been the sidelining of social justice as a ral-lying cry, with the result that Social and Christian Democratic move-ments alike have largely failed as political forces in East-Central Europe. While the former remains tainted by its roots in the Communist *anciens régimes*, the latter lacks the kind of strong backing from the Catholic Church that Western European Christian Democracy, for example, received following World War II from Pope Pius XII.

There are many scholarly studies—especially in the French, German and Italian languages—of the Christian Democratic politics of postwar Western Europe, but there is not yet a single volume in any language that examines the links between transnational Christian Democracy and the nations of East-Central Europe. Moreover, existing histories of Christian Democracy have tended to focus either on ideology (e.g. the work of Philippe Chenaux) or party politics (e.g. the works of Michael

Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser). Most of the studies produced in French and Italian have emerged from within the Christian Democratic fold: these studies make no pretense of objectivity, instead taking as one of the principal tasks of their scholarship the dissemination of a glorious legend of Christian Democracy.

While building on the foundations laid by previous generations of scholars, we insist that understanding the trajectory of "Europe" in the second half of the twentieth century requires looking beyond the continent's western half. Our volume is distinctive in two respects: its spatial geography, which looks east as well as west; and its conceptual vocabulary, which goes beyond the tired confines of neofunctionalism, rational choice theory and ideological confessionalism. Instead, this book understands Christian Democracy—on both sides of the Iron Curtain—as a mix of nationalism, transnationalism and Cold War geopolitics. Given the dearth of scholarship highlighting the Central/Eastern European side of European transnationalism, this book represents a major step toward redefining the present agenda for research into transnational European politics and ideology. We sincerely hope that it will inspire educators and policymakers alike to seek new perspectives rooted in the most current interdisciplinary research.

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Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain is divided into three parts. The first consists of six chapters, which broadly explore different forms taken by Christian Democracy in post-World War II Europe, offering case studies at the crossroads of transnational politics and European integration that challenge well-worn scholarly narratives of the European community's "founding fathers." These chapters stand on their own as an argument for reimagining Christian Democracy's role in European transnationalism, but they also provide a foil for understanding the role of East-Central European Christian Democrats.

The book begins with a powerful introduction by Wolfram Kaiser, who explains the central goal of our collective efforts: breaking through the logjam of confessional and institutional agendas that have long frozen the lion's share of research into European Christian Democracy into a positivist stasis. Kaiser proposes a broad-minded exploration of how Christian Democracy has interacted with other political, cultural and religious forces in late-twentieth-century Europe—and how the continent's eastern half played a central role in crafting today's Europe that, as yet, remains almost entirely unexplored.

Leading Belgian historian Patrick Pasture's chapter explores how Christian Democrats conceived of "Europe" in the 1940s and 1950s, in the fledgling years of European integration. In particular, Pasture reconstructs both continuities and discontinuities across the traditional caesura in twentieth-century European history: World War II. Defining the shifting trendlines for how Catholics and Christian Democrats imagined Europe allows Patrick Pasture to lay the groundwork for a new spatial geography of European Christian Democracy. The outcome de-centers the confessional commitments of well-known Western European Christian Democrats like Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, instead creating a space for a pluralistic understanding of Europe, with varying confessional and ideological commitments. Pasture's argument offers a foundation for understanding how activists from across the Iron Curtain, too, could play a serious role in forging a European identity already in the first decades of the Cold War.

In the volume's third chapter, Tiziana Di Maio offers a much-needed reality check on the so-called "founding fathers" of European integration. She explores how the famous Christian Democratic statesmen Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi moved their nations beyond the stain of fascism, to the point of making them motors of a new supra-national order. By de-centering France in the story of European integration's origins, Di Maio paints a portrait of two postwar European peripheries—Germany and Italy—linked by a shared experience of defeat in World War II, actively encouraging their Western European colleagues to accept a project of European integration. Theirs is a lesson that speaks volumes in the face of twenty-first-century European challenges connected to "Brexit" and resurgent populism and xenophobia across the continent.

In the fourth chapter, eminent international historian Antonio Varsori offers a counter-history of European Christian Democracy from the continent's "southern" periphery, establishing a baseline for thinking longitudinally about the limits of Christian Democracy as both a concept and a political program. Tracing the slow death of Italian Christian Democracy from Fanfani through Berlusconi, ending with Italy's most recent former prime minister Matteo Renzi, Varsori presents a story of weakening ideology and European commitments. This Italian story becomes a crucial foil for the detailed stories of East-Central European Christian Democracy—and the rise and fall of its commitment to Europe—that occupy the rest of our volume.

In the fifth chapter, the Reverend Wiesław Bar pulls together the work of Pasture, Di Maio and Varsori, offering an East-Central European perspective on the first postwar generation of Western European Christian Democrats, among whom one finds the proverbial "founding fathers" of a united Europe. By systematically reconstructing the criteria used by the Catholic Church in determining whether or not to beatify Christian Democratic politicians like Alcide De Gasperi and Robert Schuman, Rev. Bar makes clear that Christian Democracy has been as much about faith as about policy, and that, as such, its legacy has been substantially shaped by the late Polish pope John Paul II. Moreover, Bar's conclusions illuminate the well-honed criteria that today's East-Central Europeans have at their disposal for assessing how Europe has fared relative to the intentions of its "founders."

Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł closes the first part of *Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain* by turning to a more traditional subject of scholarly inquiry into Christian Democracy: transnational party politics. Her chapter, however, takes the unusual approach of locating the disconnect between the traditional core of the European integration project (France, Germany, Italy) and Europe's East-Central periphery in how transnational political cooperation has evolved at the level of the European Parliament. This chapter shows that, while the European People's Party has weakened—rather than strengthened—transnational Christian Democratic ideology since the 1970s, East-Central European actors nonetheless still look to it as an anchor for a potential European revival.

Part II of *Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain* shifts the focus squarely to East-Central Europeans, covering activities both behind the Iron Curtain and among Cold War political émigrés, as well as transfers between the two. Eight chapters offer broad arguments about the role played by East-Central Europe's Christian Democrats—especially Poles—in both the rise and fall of the region's commitments to a "united Europe."

Jarosław Rabiński's chapter opens this part with a case study in how the establishment of Communist regimes in East-Central Europe at the close of World War II led to the elimination of political pluralism. Rabiński recounts the dismantling of a Christian Democratic network that had distinguished itself throughout the war both on Polish soil and in the London-based state apparatus in exile. Within three years after the war's end, a party that had been actively encouraged by postwar Poland's nascent Communist establishment to rebuild its field organization and stand for elections had been pushed either into exile, or into the Stalinist

interrogation rooms of the postwar secret police. At the turn of the 1940s and the 1950s, the center of gravity for East-Central European Christian Democrats shifted back into the political emigration.

In the book's eighth chapter, Paweł Ziętara continues this story. With Christian Democracy eliminated from open political activity by the late 1940s, the select group of Polish Christian Democrats who were able to settle west of the Iron Curtain took on the mantle of representing both their region and their political family to the world. As self-styled mediators of East-Central European political Christianity, the men and women of the Polish Christian Labor Party working in Brussels, London, Paris and Rome forged a "European" political culture that they then sought to feed back across the Iron Curtain. Ziętara reconstructs the trajectory that these exiles followed after de-Stalinization opened a window in 1956.

Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter answers a crucial question: what made it possible for East-Central Europe's Christian Democratic émigrés to remain so active in exile, to develop and maintain such extensive partnerships across Western Europe and to establish a successful network of acolytes behind the Iron Curtain after 1956? As Kosicki shows, it was American funding, logistical support and political knowledge funneled through the Free Europe Committee, Inc.—the forerunner and parent organization of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—that brought "Iron Curtain" Christians into European transnationalism. Nonetheless, the horizon line for these East-Central Europeans' activities was never European integration proper, but rather a delicate balance of American Cold War geopolitics and East-Central European sovereignty. By explaining what made the exiles' transnational activities possible, this chapter also reveals the limitations of their commitments to the European idea.

In the tenth chapter of *Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain*, Idesbald Goddeeris explores the trade unionism of Polish Christian Democrats who settled in Belgium after World War II. By zeroing in on the oft-neglected case of Poles in Belgium—working in and around Brussels, the epicenter of the postwar European integration project—Idesbald Goddeeris makes clear just how deeply a small network of committed activists could impact the culture of a unifying Western Europe. At the same time, as Goddeeris demonstrates, it is essential to look beyond the world of intellectuals and political elites, to understand how Christian Democracy penetrated into the daily lives of workers across Europe—and shaped their long-term responses to crises on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Leszek Jesień hones in one of the most influential figures to emerge from Goddeeris's story. From the mid-1950s until the end of the Cold War, Belgian-based Polish Christian Democrat Jan Kułakowski served as one of the principal architects of Christian trade unionism not only in Western Europe, but across multiple continents. In 1989, he returned to Poland and became the country's new ambassador to the European Communities; a decade later, he would negotiate the terms of Poland's accession to the European Union. As Leszek Jesień demonstrates, Kułakowski moved away from political Christian Democracy, turning from confessionalism to pluralism in a manner that has heralded the longer trajectory of political Catholicism in Europe.

Like Jesień, Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska tells the story of a political émigré who played a crucial role in shaping a cross-Iron Curtain Christian Democratic political culture. Polish-born engineer Jerzy Kulczycki, having settled in the United Kingdom after World War II, became in the 1960s one of the world's most prominent purveyors of East-Central European books. After launching a Polish-language Christian Democratic publishing house, Kulczycki undertook the project of promoting a European identity behind the Iron Curtain through the distribution of books. Yet while Kulczycki helped to build an awareness behind the Iron Curtain of what it meant to be part of a larger European community, less and less of this culture has survived among generations of Europeans raised since the end of the Cold War.

Sławomir Łukasiewicz rounds out the book's three biographical case studies with a portrait of the London-based émigré Stanisław Grocholski. A life-long activist in Catholic organizations, both in pre-World War II Poland and in post-World War II Western Europe, Grocholski never joined a Christian Democratic party, yet he advanced an agenda that shaped the social activism of Christian Democrats with whom he interacted in Western Europe and behind the Iron Curtain. By testing the boundaries of Christian Democracy as a political affiliation, Grocholski's case demonstrates how the transnational success of East-Central European Christian Democracy failed to translate either into long-term national success or strong European commitments.

Closing the book's section on European Christian Democracy East and West, Aleks Szczerbiak and Tim Bale offer a comprehensive and compelling answer to the question: why did Christian Democracy in East-Central Europe after 1989 *not* experience the kind of ascendancy that it enjoyed in Western Europe after 1945? Szczerbiak and Bale reflect

specifically on the failure of Christian Democracy to gain a foothold in democratic, almost homogenously Catholic Poland. None of the currently successful Polish parties that identify themselves, or have identified themselves, with the center-right profile themselves as Christian Democratic, nor can they be objectively labeled as such. While superficially Poland looks like fertile ground for Christian Democracy, the factors that were crucial to the formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in postwar Western Europe were largely absent during the emergence of democratic, multi-party politics in post-Communist Poland. Indeed, Szczerbiak and Bale argue, it is unlikely that such a conjuncture will ever occur anywhere in Europe again.

For its third and final section, *Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain* gives voice to prominent statesmen who helped to build a cross-Iron Curtain Christian Democratic political culture—only then to see that culture called into question following the end of the Cold War. Three of twentieth-century Europe's most influential Christian Democrats take us across the important divide of 1989, thinking about the challenges that have survived Christian Democracy's encounters with the Iron Curtain. These extraordinary practitioners combine informed analysis, first-hand recollections of key past moments and compelling predictions about the role that Christian Democracy might play in present and future European crises.

For four decades, from the time of his emigration from Poland until his return in 1990, Stanisław Gebhardt has been one of the world's most influential Christian Democratic political operatives. In the book's fifteenth chapter, he offers a brief history of the exile-driven Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, in which he played a leading role. Based out of Western Europe after World War II, East-Central Europeans like Gebhardt and his Polish Christian Labor Party worked to square American Cold War geopolitics, European identity and a deep commitment to the national sovereignty of their homelands. The way in which these exiles passed that blend of commitments on to subsequent generations—or rather, were partially blocked in doing so by their Western European colleagues—explains both the euphoric embrace of a united Europe in 1989 and a subsequent, dramatic turn back to the nation.

In the sixteenth chapter of *Christian Democracy Across the Iron Curtain*, former Slovak prime minister Ján Čarnogurský reconstructs the winding road of Christian Democracy in Slovak lands, first behind

the Iron Curtain and then since its fall. Like no one else in this book, he understands the promise and the pitfalls of Cold War-era Christian Democratic transnationalism for the countries of East-Central Europe. Reflecting on the circumstances for his own party's emergence out of the ashes of the Soviet Bloc, Čarnogurský makes clear that the Western European Christian Democratic vision of the "other Europe" left little place for a new generation of activists trained by East-Central European exiles.

In the testimony that brings our book to a close, distinguished economist—and former minister-president of Saxony—Georg Milbradt confronts the reality of Christian Democracy's displacement from European public life. In a day and age where the supranational European People's Party barely acknowledges its ideological roots, while Germany's ruling Christian Democratic Union has virtually abandoned the social market economy, Christian Democracy's history as a founding force of European integration might seem irrelevant to Europe's present problems. Yet, as Milbradt suggests, considered reflection on who Europeans are and what heritage they are willing to embrace is crucial to surmounting the crises facing Europe today, from "Brexit," to spiraling debt, to the continental turn toward populist authoritarianism. To avoid a reversion to chauvinist nationalism, some force greater than a nebulous "European" identity must speak to future generations of Europeans—in the West, Center and East. This may not be Christian Democracy, but, given its historical role, Christian Democracy is a logical starting point for new reflections on an integrated Europe's chances for survival.

* * *

In the years that we have devoted to bringing this project to fruition, we have incurred many debts of gratitude.

Before the book, there was a concept, and before the concept, there was a conference. The conference entitled "Christian Democracy and the European Union: Poland, Central Europe, Europe" was above all the brainchild of Sławomir Łukasiewicz, who, with the initial idea in place, brought on board Piotr H. Kosicki. The conference could never have come to fruition, however, without the support of its institutional sponsors: the Institute of National Remembrance, Lublin Branch—particularly, its director Jacek Welter; the Institute of European Studies of the Faculty of Law, Canon Law and Administration at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin—and Rev. Piotr Stanisz, dean of the

eklezjalnego," *Roczniki Nauk Prawnych* 26, no. 3 (2016): 79–98. For Aleks Szczerbiak and Tim Bale's chapter, we gratefully acknowledge Sage Publications for granting permission to re-publish parts of Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak, "Why Is There No Christian Democracy in Poland—and Why Should We Care?," *Party Politics* 14, no. 4 (July 2008): 479–500.

Last but not least are the individuals most directly involved in enabling us to prepare and publish this volume. We are deeply grateful to our editors at Palgrave Macmillan, Molly Beck and Oliver Dyer, for welcoming this book and shepherding it throughout the publication process, as well as Palgrave's wonderful production team. Finally, we thank the individuals most responsible for sustaining us in our work on this book, as in all else: our respective spouses, Melissa Azoulay and Anna Łukasiewicz.

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Contents

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAN	Central Archive of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych), Warsaw
AAS	*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Acts of the Holy See
ABVV	General Belgian Trade Union (Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond)
ACLI	Christian Association for Italian Workers Abroad (Associazione Cristiana per Lavoratori Italiani all'Estero)
ACS	Central State Archive (Archivio Centrale dello Stato), Rome
ACV	General Christian Trade Union (Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond)
ACW	General Christian Employees' Union (Algemeen Christelijk Werknemersverbond)
ADS	Archives of August Edmond De Schryver, KADOC, Leuven
AIPN	Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej), Warsaw
AJZ	Janusz Zabłocki Collection (Akta Janusza Zabłockiego)
AMRDG	Maria Romana De Gasperi Archives (Archivio Maria Romana De Gasperi)
AMSZ	Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych), Warsaw
AN	National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)
AP	Popular Alliance (Allianza Popular)
APIASA	Archives of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America
ARP	Anti-Revolutionary Party (Antirevolutionaire Partij)
ASG	Private Collection of Stanisław Gebhardt (Archiwum Stanisława Gebhardta)

ASMAE	Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archivio storico diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri), Rome
BGUO	Main Library of Opole University (Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Opolskiego)
BUKUL	University Library of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin (Biblioteka Uniwersytecka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II)
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CARHOP	Center of Animation and Research on People's and Workers' History (Centre d'Animation et de Recherche en Histoire Ouvrière et Populaire)
CBOS	Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej)
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl)
CDS	Center of Social Democrats (Centre des Démocrates Sociaux)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union)
CDUCE	Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe
CFTC	French Confederation of Christian Workers (Confédération Française de Travailleurs Chrétiens)
CHU	Christian Historical Union (Christelijk-Historische Unie)
ChZWPwB	Christian Union of Free Poles in Belgium (Chrześcijańskie Zjednoczenie Wolnych Polaków w Belgii)
CISC	International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Confédération internationale des Syndicats chrétiens)
CISL	Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori)
CKS	Central School Committee (Centralny Komitet Szkolny)
CSC	General Christian Trade Union (Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens)
ČSL	Czechoslovak People's Party (Československá Strana Lidová)
CSU	Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union)
DC	Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana)
DER	Division of Exile Relations
DL	Liberal Democracy (Démocratie Libérale)
DM	German Mark (Deutsche Mark)
DP	Displaced Person
DS	Democratic Party (Demokratická strana)
EC	European Communities
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ECPM	European Christian Political Movement

ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ED	European Democrats
EDC	European Defense Community
EDG	European Democrat Group
EDU	European Democrat Union
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPP	European People's Party
EUCD	European Union of Christian Democrats
EU	European Union
FEC	Free Europe Committee, Inc.
FEER	Free Europe Exile Relations
FG	Fine Gael
FGTB	General Belgian Trade Union (Fédération Générale du Travail Belge)
FI	Forza Italia
GDR	German Democratic Republic
H	Høyre Hovedorganisasjon
HIA	Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford
HZDS	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko)
IAC	International Advisory Council
ILC	International Literary Center
ISH	Institute of Social History
IUYCD	International Union of Young Christian Democrats (Union internationale des jeunes démocrates-chrétiens)
KADOC	Documentation and Research Center for Religion, Culture and Society, University of Leuven
KAI	Catholic Information Agency (Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna)
KDH	Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie)
KDS	Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana)
KDÚ	Christian Democratic Union (Křesťanskodemokratická únia)
KF	Danish Conservative People's Party (Det konservative folkeparti)
KIK	Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej)
KOK	National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus)
KRN	State Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa)
KSČ	Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československá)
KUL	Catholic University of Lublin (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski)

KVP	Catholic People's Party (Katholieke Volkspartij)
LCM	National Union of Christian Health Services (Landsbond der Christelijke Mutualiteiten)
LR	The Republicans (Les Républicains)
MBP	Ministry of Public Safety (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego)
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MOC	Christian Workers' Movement (Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien)
MP	Member of Parliament
MRP	Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire)
MSp	Moderate Coalition Party (Moderata Samlingpartiet)
ND	New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία)
NEI	New International Teams (Nouvelles Équipes Internationales)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NiD	Polish "Independence and Democracy" Freedom Movement (Polski Ruch Wolnościowy "Niepodległość i Demokracja")
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del)
NKWPB	Main Committee of Free Poles in Belgium (Naczelny Komitet Wolnych Polaków w Belgii)
NPR	National Workers' Party (Narodowa Partia Robotnicza)
ODCA	Christian Democratic Organization of America (Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América)
ODiSS	Center for Social Documentation and Studies (Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych)
ODS	Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana)
ONR	National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny)
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei)
PC	Center Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum)
PD	Democratic Party (Partito Democratico)
PiS	Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
PISM	Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum
PMK	Polish Catholic Mission, Brussels
PMS	Polish School Mother (Polska Macierz Szkolna)
PO	Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
PP	People's Party (Partido Popular)
PPI	Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano)
PPS	Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)

PRRE	Polish Council of the European Movement (Polska Rada Ruchu Europejskiego)
PSL	Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
RMK	Catholic Labor Youth (Robotnicza Młodzież Katolicka)
RPR	Assembly for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République)
SAB	State Archives of Belgium
SB	Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa)
SEA	Single European Act
SIPDIC	International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration (Secrétariat international des Partis démocratiques d'Inspiration chrétienne)
SK	Catholic Organizations (Stowarzyszenia Katolickie)
SMK	Association of Catholic Men (Stowarzyszenie Mężów Katolickich)
SN	National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe)
SP	Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy)
SPK	Association of Polish War Veterans (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Kombatantów)
TRJN	Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej)
UDF	Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française)
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UEF	Union of European Federalists
UFE	Union for Europe
UMP	Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire)
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
VPN	Public Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu)
WCL	World Confederation of Labor
WEOD	West European Operations Division
WUCD	World Union of Christian Democrats
ZChN	Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe)

Christian Democracy Reframed

Introduction: From Siege Mentality to Mainstreaming? Researching Twentieth-Century Christian Democracy

Wolfram Kaiser

The history of Christian Democracy in twentieth-century Europe as a research field is currently in a profound crisis. This crisis is reflected in the increasingly marginal role of such research, and funded research on Christian Democracy in particular, in the larger historiography of modern and contemporary Europe.

In this chapter, I will suggest what I think are some of the structural and academic causes of this crisis. As this research field has been so heavily dominated in the past by institutions and authors affiliated to Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church, as well as Christian Democratic political parties and associated institutions, it seems appropriate to point out that this text has been written from the perspective of an outsider. I am not a member of a Christian Democratic party or, for that matter, any political party. I have not had a formal affiliation with any of the institutions—such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the KADOC (Documentation and Research Center for Religion, Culture

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and Society) at the Catholic University of Leuven or the Istituto Luigi Sturzo—which have fostered research on Christian Democracy in the past and are continuing to do so. I also work in a country, the United Kingdom, with a marginal intellectual tradition of Catholic social thought and no Christian Democratic party tradition at all.

I believe, however, that the situation is not entirely hopeless for the patient. I will therefore try in the second part of this chapter to suggest some structural reforms and a set of research themes that might facilitate a renaissance of research on the history of Christian Democracy and perhaps, more generally, of European political ideology and party history. This is precisely the task undertaken by this volume of essays.

Decline and Marginality in Modern History

Historical research is closely bound to, and influenced by, contemporary social, economic and political trends. One of these has been the first structural reason for the crisis of Christian Democracy as a research field: namely, the relative decline in many Western European countries of the parties belonging to that political family.[1] The erosion of the Catholic milieu and the decline in life-long party allegiance among voters hit political parties such as the Dutch Catholic People's Party increasingly hard from the mid-1960s onwards. After the merger with two Protestant parties in the 1970s, the Netherlands' Christian Democratic Appeal only received a meager 8.5% of the vote in the national elections of 2012, although it rebounded somewhat in the 2017 elections, gaining 12.4%. In France, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP)—a key centrist party and supporter of European integration—collapsed under pressure from Gaullism in the mid-1960s. Ever since, Christian Democracy has formed only one part of the highly volatile centrist and center-right political formations in France that were loosely allied to the newly elected French president Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections. In Italy, the Democrazia Cristiana—highly fragmented internally into Catholic Action, liberal-conservatives and left Catholics—seemed the natural party of government until it disintegrated in the early 1990s. Successor parties have formed appendices to the right of the left or to the left of the right as new, similarly internally fragmented blocs in Italian politics have emerged.

The end of the Cold War facilitated the successful expansion of the European People's Party (EPP), formed in 1976, into the future

East-Central European member states of the European Union.[2] Despite the initial challenges of identifying appropriate partners in the volatile new party systems, this expansion has helped the EPP to consolidate its strong position in the European Parliament, where it has been the strongest parliamentary party since 1999.[3] As several chapters in this book highlight, some of the new European Union member states like Poland had traditions of Christian Democracy (of sorts) dating back to before World War II.[4] To some extent, these traditions persisted during the Cold War, when they provided one important focal point of criticism of, and opposition to, the Communist regime.[5] After the experience of forty-five years of Soviet occupation, strong anti-socialist attitudes initially prevailed, for the most part. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, distinctly Christian Democratic parties did not emerge. In Poland, the division into a pro-European centrist people's party, the Civic Platform, and the nationalist Catholic right-wing party of Law and Justice, which once more gained political power in the 2015 national elections, has actually made the unification of Christian-inspired political groups in one political formation impossible. The result is a political minefield for researchers, especially those based at Catholic institutions like the Catholic University of Lublin, where a workshop held in 2015 became the inspiration for this book.

The decline of Christian Democratic parties, and of the Christian Democratic core in broad-based people's parties, has naturally led to reduced academic interest in them and in their history. The economic and financial crisis in the European Union and the growth of populist Euroskeptic parties has aggravated the situation further. Research on Euroskepticism and Euroskeptic parties is mushrooming and often well-funded by European Union and national funding bodies.[6] They are keen to identify the sources of this phenomenon, which has potential to disrupt the European Union even further, to the point of undermining the membership of some of its countries, as in the case of the United Kingdom's decision to opt for "Brexit" in the 2016 referendum.

At the same time, funding for research into the history of Christian Democracy by institutions affiliated with Christian Democratic parties has declined. The Catholic Documentation Center at Nijmegen is a case in point. With the university hosting it having deleted the "Catholic" denomination from its title, it has come under pressure to reinvent itself with sharply reduced funding. This, in turn, seems to have led to a broadening of the center's previous focus on Catholicism, but with

much less attention paid to party history and European connections than before. Research on European Christian Democracy, as a result, appears to depend even more on the institutions that in 2013 formed the European organization CIVITAS-Forum on Archives and Research on Christian Democracy.[7] The most important of these is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, with its strong role, for historical reasons, as one of the major political foundations in Germany.

The second structural reason for the crisis is precisely that research on the history of Christian Democracy in the past was too closely affiliated with, and dependent on, institutions with close links to Christian Democratic parties. In postwar Western Europe, modern and contemporary history as a research field was much more highly party-politicized than it is now. Political parties and affiliated institutions began to organize research on their own history, normally entrusted to historians who were members of that party, or at least close to it politically. In some countries like Belgium, the *Verzuiling*, or pillarization of society along political and linguistic lines, extended to universities and academics working within them. In other countries, like West Germany, political preferences were closely associated with major historiographical schools. Thus, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, or social and "societal" history, became the domain of Social Democratic and left-liberal historians. Political and diplomatic history was largely done by historians affiliated with the Christian Democrats. Academic networks built on such pillars and schools dominated the recruitment of researchers and professors.

Much of the historical research on political Catholicism, Christian Democracy and Christian Democratic parties was, as a result, highly politicized. It was often characterized by much navel-gazing, deliberately marginalizing the critical outside-in perspectives of independent historians without some form of party affiliation—including British and American historians. In Germany, for example, Frank Bösch published a challenging book on the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), including the critical issue of its funding operations during the Adenauer era, but its reception was largely limited to more left-wing historians.[8] British contemporary historian Martin Conway, in turn, has felt marginalized in Belgium with his work on Belgian political Catholicism and the affiliation of its right wing with authoritarian and fascist groups and parties, as well as their continuities across World War II.[9]

Some work by Christian Democrats on Christian Democracy has even had autobiographical traits, as in Helmut Kohl's doctoral thesis on the

origins of the CDU (and other political parties) in Rhineland-Palatinate after 1945.[10] More recently, at the crossroads of Christian Democracy, international cooperation and European integration, Roberto Papini's work has been similarly characterized by a fusion of activist experience, attempts at historical reconstruction and the propagation of a singularly Christian Democratic vocation for Europe and the international order.[11]

As a result, the dividing line between professional historical research and the preservation of party heritage has often blurred. The European vocation of Christian Democracy is a case in point. The lack of cooperation—for the moment, at least—of the Munich-based Hanns Seidel Foundation, affiliated with the Christian Social Union (CSU), with CIVITAS reflects traditional fault-lines in German politics. These fault-lines go back to, among others, the debate in Wildbad Kreuth in 1976 about the possible pan-German expansion of the CSU as a more Catholic-conservative party and the associated conflicts over the creation of the EPP and the European Democrat Union during the second half of the 1970s.[12] To some extent, at least, these conflicts have been, and still are, also about what kind of "Europe" Christian Democrats want, and how to use research as one—weak, but not irrelevant—factor to promote a particular identity and vision for Christian Democracy.

Fewer and fewer historians see their role as contributing to the promotion of party heritage and parties' electoral success, however. As in the rest of society, fewer academics are now party members, and still fewer have strong party affiliations. Academic evaluation criteria have changed rapidly, especially in Northern Europe, where external funding and international networks and publications increasingly influence hiring, recognition and pay. At the same time, the growth of cultural history and of the so-called "new" political history, which is less focused on institutions and decision-making, has marginalized research on political parties, their ideological development and political action.[13] It has become increasingly clear that, with some notable exceptions, research on the history of Christian Democracy for far too long has been nationally introspective, often lacking even an implicitly comparative perspective. Now that the Christian Democratic academic milieu has eroded, just like that of other political groups and parties, it becomes obvious to what extent research on the history of Christian Democracy has taken place in an academic greenhouse.

Conducting research on Christian Democracy in this greenhouse has caused intellectual problems in the past, however. The similarly

"pillarized" research on socialism organized by affiliated institutions and foundations has, nonetheless, been more organically embedded in a larger field. This field has encompassed other social groups and actors, especially the history of the working class and of the trade unions. Moreover, this research has drawn upon social history and its concepts and methods, including the comparative approach.[14] The resulting orientation induced other forms of seclusion and introspection. But it has also helped the history of socialist ideas, political parties and movements to become more organically linked into other research and, importantly, to profit from theoretical and conceptual debates in modern and contemporary history.

Research on Christian Democracy, in contrast, has been more loosely linked to the history of ideas and political history. It has often reconstructed the ideas of Jacques Maritain and others as largely self-contained, borrowing an older approach from the field of intellectual history, without sufficiently placing their evolution in their social context of societal transformations, ideological and party competition or transnational exchanges.[15] At the same time, the highly state-centric older political history focused for a long time on state institutions and their decision-making, which apparently did not require the careful study of domestic political forces and political motivations. That approach, where foreign relations are explained through social change, economic interests and domestic political competition, was best left to Marxists—even after the end of the Cold War. Work on Christian Democracy thus has not really interacted sufficiently with new theoretical, conceptual and methodological developments in modern and contemporary history.

Moreover, the self-marginalization of much research on the history of Christian Democracy and the lack of relevant research networks with the Anglo-Saxon world, where no such party tradition exists, has also greatly complicated the internationalization of this research field. Thus, in the early 2000s, Michael Gehler, Helmut Wohnout and I were unable, despite several approaches to a number of French colleagues, to recruit a single French academic to attend a conference in Vienna on European Christian Democracy—this, despite the fact that they could have given their papers and contributed to the conference in French, while we merely hoped that they might conceivably understand the papers in English and perhaps, to some extent, in German. This was not a realistic expectation, however, and we ended up recruiting two colleagues for the resulting book only, which did not require communication in languages

other than French.[16] The situation has improved somewhat since then. However, the disconnect in this research field between continental Europe—especially the Mediterranean countries—and predominantly Protestant Northern Europe has made cooperation in English far more difficult than in other fields.

In the past, historians working in Britain or North America have made major contributions to our understanding of Christian Democracy in a more or less pan-European perspective. This includes, but is not limited to, Stathis Kalyvas's political science work with an empirical focus on the origins of Christian Democracy[17]; Martin Conway's research on political Catholicism and democracy[18]; and my own work on party networks and European integration in long-term historical perspective.[19] This research has contributed to the slow and, in some ways, paradoxical spread of English for research on Christian Democracy, alongside the partial use of Spanish in the Americas.[20]

Integrating research on the history of Christian Democracy conducted elsewhere and in other languages more organically into the field of modern and contemporary history, which itself is in the process of internationalization, now appears to depend on the use of English for communication and publication. The problem is, however, that English is the lingua franca of neither Catholicism nor Christian Democracy because of the disconnect between the continental European and the Anglo-American and Northern European religious and political cultures. As a result, English is often adopted in a half-hearted and less than competent manner. Publication is often with third-rate publishers, which bring anything out for a sufficient subsidy. Manuscripts are frequently unedited, or badly edited, with chapters written in convoluted and inaccessible English. Book chapters often recycle work published twenty years earlier in another European language. Moreover, these academic chapters are frequently preceded by congratulatory opening speeches by retired Christian Democratic politicians and functionaries whose sole interest, more often than not, is their parties' heritage, or even just their own personal legacies.[21]

Publication of older research in bad English is a more widespread disease in the historiography of Christian Democracy, however. Such books have no impact. They contribute nothing to the state of the art. And they actually make sure that the research field remains marginalized in modern and contemporary history in times of more and more comparative, transnational and global approaches to understanding the world in which we live.

Structural Reform and Integration in Modern and Contemporary History

What, then, is to be done? I have a number of suggestions for structural reforms and for conceptual and thematic innovation, which can perhaps help to overcome the crisis of this research field. I make these suggestions as an outsider, but with a strong interest in the survival and strengthening of supportive structures for research on the history of Christian Democracy broadly conceived.

It seems to me that the research field of Christian Democracy has for a long time reproduced the siege mentality that has characterized Catholicism, and political Catholicism in Europe, for much of the last 150 years. This mentality, and its sensitivities to the conflict lines within Christianity and its political forms of organization, have affected research on Christian Democracy. At the most general level, these conflicts concern the relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism, and their associated political groups. Thus, the particular focus on Christian Democracy, with its roots in Catholic social teaching and its loosely associated preference for the creation and deepening of a continental "core Europe" with somewhat "supranational" features, has made it difficult to look beyond Christian Democracy's cultural boundaries. And yet, there lie liberal-conservative traditions inspired in part by a cultural Protestantism, which have by and large reconciled with the political organization of Christian Democracy in the EPP.[22] However, Protestant-inspired political traditions also include evangelical Euroskepticism and have—at different times and in various ways—influenced Christian parties in Scandinavia, as well as Conservative and Labor Party attitudes in Britain toward European integration.[23] There is even the violent anti-Catholicism of the Ulster Unionists around Ian Paisley, directed against Irish nationalists and the European Union as an allegedly "Roman Catholic" project. In a broader perspective, we need to take these intellectual and political traditions, forms of political organization or activity, and relations with political Catholicism into account.

Below the confessional level, however, I also see traces of the siege mentality in attempts to retain a strong, if not monopolistic, research focus on apparently "pure" forms of Christian Democracy and on a form of Europeanism associated with Christian Democracy's so-called "founding fathers" of the European Union, including Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi.[24] Their storyline still appears to

be one of several motives for the frequent non-cooperation between the Adenauer Foundation and the Seidel Foundation, which goes way back to their conflicts over identifying ideal sister parties in transitional Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, or in East-Central Europe in the 1990s, as well as over the formation and orientation of the EPP.[25] For research on the history of Christian Democracy, however, such political fault-lines create very unhelpful divisions and aggravate the field's marginality. More cooperation among partners with substantial resources could instead strengthen the field, assisting in its greater mainstreaming into modern and contemporary history.

The Catholic siege mentality also informs attitudes toward research on the history of other political traditions, ideologies and parties. It would be desirable, however, to see more research in a comparative or transnational perspective on the relations of Christian Democracy with socialism, and socialist political parties in particular: from their competition for the allegiance of the working class, to their cooperation in so-called "grand coalitions." Such cooperation has, after all, characterized the work of the European Parliament since its inception, where it has recently been reinforced once more by the growing strength of Euroskeptic parties after a period of greater left–right polarization.[26] "Grand coalitions" have also dominated the political scenes of many Western European countries at different stages in their development, especially in countries like Austria but more recently even in Germany.

Individual researchers have sought to tackle critical corollary topics. One key example is Peter Van Kemseke's study of the globalization of socialism and Christian Democracy in the first twenty years after World War II.[27] At the institutional level, however, organized socialism appears to have been slightly more adventurous in facilitating comparative analysis—perhaps precisely because of its association with societal history, which has fostered comparison as a historical method. On separate occasions, for example, I have been invited to contribute a co-authored article on socialist and Christian Democratic policies toward party formation in 1970s Spain and Portugal to the *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* edited by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation,[28] and on Christian Democratic transnationalism in interwar Europe to a conference and publication on transnational parties coordinated out of the Institute for Social Movements, formerly the Institute for the History of the Working Class Movement, associated with the Ruhr University in Bochum.[29] Obviously, it is impossible to generalize from this limited German experience. But it

is imperative that institutions associated with or interested in Christian Democracy not just tolerate, but actually facilitate cooperation and comparative research on the history of political ideologies and parties. Such an approach can also assist in the desirable mainstreaming of research on Christian Democracy in the broadest sense into modern and contemporary history.

I have one final suggestion for structural reforms on which the organization CIVITAS has already been working: that is, to foster closer cooperation among archives that hold relevant sources relating to Christian Democracy and Christian Democratic parties, which would be highly valuable for researchers. Most archives now have user-friendly access rules. During my previous work on transnational cooperation among Christian Democratic parties in the twentieth century, I still witnessed in some archives the phenomenon of privileged access being given to in-house researchers or those with strong party affiliations, sometimes under the pretext that sources had not yet been organized and made accessible. Such unethical behavior cultivates research on Christian Democracy as a closed-shop affair. It severely undermines attempts to attract young researchers and to integrate research on the history of Christian Democracy more organically into the wider field.

In this context, it would also be important for organizations like CIVITAS to lobby pro-actively for the liberalization of archival access rules to facilitate research, including in particular the necessary, fundamental change required to liberalize the Vatican's highly secretive archival policies. Paradoxically, the Vatican has decided to allow access to sources on Pope Francis's role during the Argentinian junta period.[30] In contrast, it is still impossible for researchers to access and utilize sources from earlier periods after 1945 related to far less contentious issues. Thus, to give just one example, I have just co-edited a book on international organizations and environmental protection in the twentieth century, which includes an important chapter by an Italian colleague, Luigi Piccioni, on the ambivalent policy of the Holy See toward the United Nations' 1972 Stockholm conference.[31] For his chapter, however, he had to rely entirely on media reporting and accessible private papers, since the relevant Vatican archives remain closed.

Financial constraints can, of course, impede cooperation among archives. Still, such cooperation can go further than merely facilitating physical access to sources for visitors traveling to the archives in person. Putting more and more sources on the internet and linking them

electronically across archives should be a medium-term objective. In addition, research on the history of Christian Democracy lacks a systematic approach to conducting and collecting interviews with eyewitnesses. Some interview material is available through cooperation of historians with other institutions. Hanns Jürgen Küsters made a start with his project and book on the founding of the European Economic Community more than thirty years ago, with interview transcripts available on the homepage of the Historical Archives of the European Union at the European University Institute in Florence.[32] Michael Gehler has conducted multiple interviews (e.g. with Hans von der Groeben and Fritz Hellwig) that are relevant to the history of Christian Democracy, mostly published in the "European Political Identity" series of the ZEI (Center for European Integration Studies) at the University of Bonn.[33] The European institutions' own heritage policies, including the European Commission's official history projects, help to conduct and collect interviews that are also made accessible on the homepage of the Historical Archives of the European Union, some of which are also relevant to the history of Christian Democracy.[34] However, much more interview material is quite scattered and difficult for historians to retrieve and use.

The structural changes that I have suggested could make a major contribution to developing new intellectual agendas for research on the history of Christian Democracy. I would suggest that one way forward would be for some of this research to connect better with the new history of ideas. Catholic researchers sometimes seem to believe that confessional and political ideas emerge from divine inspiration and, notably, within the closed environment in which they circulate.[35] Arguably, Marxists understand better than Catholics that political ideas largely depend on changing social and economic circumstances, as well as competition with other ideas and political groups—whether authoritarian and fascist on the right in interwar Europe, or socialist and Communist on the left. Secularization processes, too, have demanded new answers from Catholics and Christian Democrats, ranging from foregoing the use of adjectives "Catholic" or "Christian" in the French MRP's party name to the debate about the meaning, if any, of the "capital C" in the CDU's party name.[36]

Another way forward could be to discuss Christian Democracy as a heterogeneous web, or part of such a web, of actors and institutions. In his work about the Catholic "black international," Emiel Lamberts has sought to map predominantly aristocratic Catholic connections

during the late-nineteenth-century culture wars.[37] Patrick Pasture has looked at Christian trade unions and their search for a "third way" from a European perspective.[38] Much less work has been done across different actors, from the Holy See to Christian Democratic parties and trade unions. While we have a fairly good idea of the role of Christian beliefs and Christian Democratic actors in the origins and evolution of the European Union,[39] we know next to nothing about their contributions to the work of other international organizations—for example in the case of the environment and development policies mentioned above. Since Pope Francis (with an eye on developing countries) has advocated three children as an ideal number,[40] we might be tempted to forget that Catholic policies on birth control once had (and may still have) a significant effect on national and international policies, as well as social developments on the ground, across the world.

Linked to the suggestion for more research cutting across the different micro-worlds of Christian Democracy is my plea for research on the transfer of ideas and practices, which has only been conducted in the most rudimentary way so far. Conceptually, such research on transfers has now been developed in early-modern and modern history for more than twenty-five years, but with little impact on research into Christian Democracy.[41] How have political ideas traveled, either from other political ideologies and groups into Christian Democracy loosely defined, or within the Christian Democratic family across borders of regions and countries? How have Christian Democratic practices been shaped by experiences elsewhere, and influenced them in turn?[42] Moreover, Christian Democrats have been active at more than the European Union and national levels of parliamentary politics and government. Christian Democratic networks may have also facilitated the formation of networks and exchange relations at the level of regional and local government, for example.

Tackling these and other research themes requires broad historical background knowledge and language skills. In many cases, it can probably only be done in research teams—something that is now beginning to be practiced more widely in modern and contemporary history. This approach has its pitfalls, especially when it comes to writing up the research results. However, it has much more potential—including for obtaining funding—than conferences populated by friends of Christian Democracy, resulting in incoherent edited volumes with chapters whose intellectual horizon ends either on the borders of Christian Democracy, or those of the author's country and national specialization.

Conclusions

Research on Christian Democracy in twentieth-century Europe has been in decline for some time. In the first part of this chapter, I have demonstrated that this trend has resulted from structural factors like the decline in the electoral strength of Christian Democracy and the highly desirable professionalization of history as a discipline, where party affiliation no longer suffices to secure academic positions in most European academic systems. I have also shown, however, that the decline is to some extent self-inflicted, the result of the pervasive influence of the Catholic siege mentality on the research field. This siege mentality has prevented more comparative research with other political ideologies and political parties, more exchange with "Anglo-Saxon" historiography and, more generally, better mainstreaming of this research in modern and contemporary history.

As the second part of this chapter has shown, in order to become more relevant, research on the history of Christian Democracy needs to be better embedded in modern and contemporary history and its theoretical and conceptual debates and developments. It certainly needs to continue the recent trend of greater professionalization and internationalization. This trend requires continued de-confessionalization and de-politicization of such research, as well as the use of thorough peer review to improve this research's quality. Publication in English may be necessary to reach a larger international audience, but it is not appropriate for all research, especially when it targets national or sub-national topics. Generally, however, the more fascinating and still underexplored topics in the history of Christian Democracy suggest the use of transnational or comparative approaches, which may in some cases require cooperation in larger research teams than historians have traditionally known.

The volume that follows seeks to connect to such broader trends. Historians in western and north-western Europe are sometimes tempted to think, like Neville Chamberlain when contemplating the future of Czechoslovakia in 1938, that the more we travel toward the east and south-east in Europe, the less we know—and, perhaps, the less we can learn. Actually, the reverse may be true: because Polish research on Christian Democracy has been somewhat disconnected from the friendly circles that have researched and propagated what I have called "pure" Christian Democracy, it may well be easier to develop and insert innovative ideas and approaches into changing networks and research themes.

Notes

1. See Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2004); Emiel Lamberts, ed, *Christian Democracy in the European Union 1945–1995* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997).

2. Wolfram Kaiser, "Political Parties in the European Polity: Eastern Enlargement in Historical Perspective," in *Europe Twenty Years after the End of the Cold War: The New Europe, New Europes?*, ed. Bruno Arcidiacono et al. (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), 33–45; Janosch Steuwer and Siebo M.H. Janssen, "Die christlich-konservative Volkspartei: Potenziale und Probleme der Zusammenarbeit christdemokratischer und konservativer Parteien in der EVP," in *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration: Entwicklungen und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*, ed. Jürgen Mittag (Essen: Klartext, 2006), 579–601; Steven Van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities: Christian Democracy in the European Union," in *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, ed. Steven Van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 269–295.

3. For a semi-official perspective, see Thomas Jansen and Steven Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Berlin: Springer, 2011).

4. See also Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018).

5. Jan Żaryn, "In Conflict with the Communist State: The Catholic Church and Catholic Political Organisations in Poland," in *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London: Routledge, 2004), 118–138.

6. For perceptive insights into the 2014 European Parliament elections, see "The Eurosceptic Union," *The Economist*, 31 May 2014. As a basis for more comparative research in recent years, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, eds, *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, vol. 2: *Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

7. For information on its origins and for its mission statement, see http://civitas-farcd.eu/about/mission (accessed 5 November 2015).

8. Frank Bösch, *Die Adenauer-CDU: Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945–1989* (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001).

9. Martin Conway, "Belgium," in *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–1965*, ed. Martin Conway and Tom Buchanan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 187–218; focusing on one Catholic-inspired collaborationist movement in Wallonia see also Martin Conway, *Collaboration*

in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940–1944 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993).

10. Helmut Kohl, *Die politische Entwicklung in der Pfalz und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945*, PhD diss., University of Heidelberg, 1958.

11. See Roberto Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, trans. Robert Royal (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Roberto Papini, *Il coraggio della democrazia: Sturzo e l'Internazionale popolare tra le due guerre* (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 1995).

12. For a discussion of the relevant literature and sources regarding the CSU, see Thomas Schlemmer, "Die aufsässige Schwester: Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der CSU 1945–1976," *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 6 (1999): 287–324. For the European dimension, see Wolfram Kaiser, "Europeanisation of Christian Democracy? Negotiating Organisation, Enlargement, Policy and Allegiance in the European People's Party," in *Societal Actors in European Integration: Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958–1992*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 15–37. For documents on the creation of the EPP and the European Democrat Union, see Michael Gehler et al., eds, *Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten und Konservativen: Dokumente 1965–1979* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016).

13. Although a much wider trend, see for the particular "Bielefeld" variety of "new political history," Willibald Steinmetz et al., eds, *Writing Political History Today* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013).

14. For a still-useful introduction, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, "Historischer Vergleich: Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme," in *Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsforschung*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1996), 9–45.

15. For such a conceptual approach, see Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45 (2006): 30–50.

16. For their contributions to subsequent English-language publications, see Bruno Béthouart, "Entry of the Catholics into the Republic: The Mouvement Républicain Populaire in France," in *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London: Routledge, 2004), 85–100; Jean-Claude Delbreil, "Christian Democracy and Centrism: The Popular Democratic Party in France," in *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–45*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (London: Routledge, 2004), 116–135.

17. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

18. See Conway and Buchanan, eds, *Political Catholicism*; in a broader context, Martin Conway, "The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age 1945–73," *Contemporary European History* 13, no. 1 (2004): 67–88.

19. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

20. As, for example, at the conference at the University of Notre Dame which created the basis (*inter alia*) for Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg, eds, *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).

21. For an unfortunate example see Jean-Dominique Durand, ed, *Christian Democrat Internationalism*, 3 vols. (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013).

22. For the Scandinavian EPP parties, see, e.g., Hans-Joachim Veen, ed, *Christlich-demokratische und konservative Parteien in Westeuropa*, vol. 4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994).

23. Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth, *Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015).

24. See especially Patrick Pasture's and Antonio Varsori's chapters in this volume. The "founding father" myth plays an important role for the EPP's heritage and has also become musealized—especially, but not only, in the museums devoted to Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi: Wolfram Kaiser, Stefan Krankenhagen and Kerstin Poehls, *Exhibiting Europe in Museums: Transnational Networks, Collections, Narratives and Representations* (New York: Berghahn, 2014), ch. 5.

25. Kaiser, "Europeanisation of Christian Democracy?"; Wolfram Kaiser and Christian Salm, "Transition und Europäisierung in Spanien und Portugal: Sozial- und christdemokratische Netzwerke im Übergang von der Diktatur zur parlamentarischen Demokratie," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* (2009): 259–282. For the case of Portugal, see Matthias Stenger, *Transnationale Parteienzusammenarbeit: Die Beziehungen der deutschen und portugiesischen Christlichen Demokraten von der Nelkenrevolution bis zum Vertrag von Maastricht (1974–1992)* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2010).

26. Amie Kreppel and Simon Hix, "From Grand Coalition to Left–Right Confrontation: Explaining the Shifting Structure of Party Competition in the European Parliament," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, nos. 1–2 (2003): 75–96.

27. Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy 1945–1965* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006).

28. Kaiser and Salm, "Transition und Europäisierung in Spanien und Portugal."

29. Wolfram Kaiser, "Von der Isolation im politischen Katholizismus in die (innere) Emigration: Transnationale Kooperation katholischer Volksparteien in Europa 1925–1933/38," in *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration: Entwicklungen und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*, ed. Jürgen Mittag (Essen: Klartext, 2006), 215–228.

30. "Pope Francis orders Vatican to open files on Argentina dictatorship," *The Guardian*, 29 April 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/pope-francis-argentina-orders-vatican-open-files-dictatorship (accessed 5 November 2015).

31. Luigi Piccioni, "Only One Earth: The Holy See and Ecology," in *International Organizations and Environmental Protection : Conservation and Globalization in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (New York: Berghahn, 2017).

32. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, *Fondements de la Communauté Économique Européenne* (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 1990 [German 1982]).

33. https://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/publications/european-political-identity (accessed 5 November 2015).

34. http://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/Index.aspx (accessed 5 November 2015).

35. Hence often exaggerated assumptions about the influence of such ideas on politics as, for example, in the case of Alan Paul Fimister's study of the (admittedly devout Catholic) *Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008). But see, as an example of an integrated analysis of social groups, transnational interaction and the formation of ideas, Piotr H. Kosicki, "The Soviet Bloc's Answer to European Integration: Catholic Anti-Germanism and the Polish Project of a 'Catholic-Socialist' International," *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 1 (2015): 1–36.

36. See, e.g., Béthouart, "Entry of the Catholics into the Republic"; Maria D. Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).

37. Emiel Lamberts, *The Black International 1870–1878* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002).

38. Patrick Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d'une troisième voie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999).

39. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*; Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels: Éditions Ciaco, 1990); Lucian N. Leustean, *The Ecumenical Movement and the Making of the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
40. "Pope says three children per family is about right. Catholics don't need to breed 'like rabbits'," *Washington Post*, 20 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/01/20/pope-says-3-children-per-family-is-about-right-catholics-dont-need-to-breed-like-rabbits/ (accessed 5 November 2015).
41. For a still-useful introduction, see Matthias Middell, "Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik—Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis," *Comparativ* 10, no. 1 (2000): 7–41.
42. In my research, I have frequently come across learning processes among Christian Democratic parties regarding modern forms of electoral campaigning—before some of these parties began to borrow more from American practices. However, no one seems to have taken this up as a research topic so far.

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Catholic and Christian Democratic Views on Europe Before and After World War II: Continuities and Discontinuities

Patrick Pasture

There is little doubt about the decisive impact of Christian Democracy on the formation of the European Communities and the European Union (EU)—suffice to recall the "founding fathers" like Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, and more recently Jacques Delors, as well as the present and previous heads of the European Council, Poland's Donald Tusk and Belgium's Herman Van Rompuy. Indeed, Christianity's impact upon Europe as a cultural and political space has been decisive. Some even view the EU, or at least its forerunners, as an essentially Catholic project. At the same time, European history in general, and European integration history in particular, is also perceived in almost exclusively secular terms—witness the proposal not to include a reference to Christianity in the preamble of the draft European constitution in 2003, while maintaining a reference to Humanism and Enlightenment.

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25

I will not explore this dichotomy, but rather investigate the Catholic and Christian Democratic impact on European integration before and after World War II. As the Protestant impact on European integration is less determining, or at least less visible, I will concentrate on Catholics and Christian Democrats. With the latter term, I refer to a distinct political movement, whose boundaries however remain vague, especially before World War II. Hence I include mainly Catholic politicians and thinkers speaking about European unity and its political organization.[1] The Catholic Church's hierarchy, incidentally, in this respect, is just one player among many, and not even the most important one. But in any case, such an assessment implies some reflection on democracy and human rights, which became key elements of European self-representation after World War II, but had important roots in prewar Christian thought. Investigating continuities and discontinuities reveals a far more complicated story than that of the gradual "enlightenment" of which we are accustomed to hear.

Just beyond the simple statement that Christian Democrats influenced the early European integration process, one immediately finds some key divergences. The dominant scholarly representation of Christian Democracy shares with the historiography of European integration the perception that World War II somehow constitutes a break—that everything actually "started" then. That representation is correct insofar as Europe underwent various major political changes in the war's course, although much of what is perceived as novel after 1945 was already imagined, if not always realized, in the 1930s or earlier, and many of the changes that we associate with the postwar period were only implemented in the late 1950s, if not later still.

The histories of Christian Democracy and European integration both offer plenty of examples of such continuities and discontinuities. The clearest break was the division of Europe, which—pardon my cynicism— "integrated" one part of the continent into the Eurasian Soviet empire, which extended far further to the west than any previous Russian empire had done before, while letting Europe's western part engage in a contentious path of regional integration and association with the United States. The western part was in some ways less unified than the eastern part, but it surely was more effective in leaving behind the causes of the war (in particular the French–German antagonism) and in achieving economic recovery. While Western Europe entered onto a path of economic growth, the eastern part of the continent soon fell behind. The division

also split Christian Democracy as a continental political movement: while blossoming in the west, where Christian Democrats quickly (albeit unexpectedly) became the dominant political force, this political family's members were virtually outlawed in the east, barely surviving with their lives. The division, although real enough, did not preclude parallels and interactions, among others through exiles acting as go-betweens, but one must assess their impact according to proper proportions.[2] Unlike in the remainder of this volume, the East-Central European Christian Democrats will hardly play any role in this chapter.

Traditional narratives of both European integration and Christian Democracy incidentally ignore what was actually, seen from a global perspective, the most important change: decolonization. The real importance of this mid-twentieth-century development is only coming to the fore now, in the twenty-first century, when the demise of the "old world" and the emergence particularly of East Asia as the economic and cultural center of the world are becoming apparent.[3]

The emphasis on a break across the caesura of the Second World War, however, obscures some important fundamental continuities with earlier times. That there were European predecessors of course has been recognized, in particular Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa Movement. Recent research, however, focuses on prewar anti-liberal views of Europe, as the Euroskeptic John Laughland already suggested in 1997. (Referring to Laughland in the context of European integration history may be blasphemous, but this does not change the fact that he had a point.)[4]

In fact, the traditional representation has cast European integration as a path to "enlightenment," with great visionaries imagining a Europe that overcame its demons, mostly associated with nationalism, ultimately resulting in an European Union that has brought peace while acting as a moral beacon of the world. Although this image is not totally devoid of truth (Laughland is not the best possible introduction to European integration history), I think that it is wrong for many reasons. First and foremost among these is that it ignores the variety of motives to plead for unity, instead producing a distorted view of contemporary Europe that ignores important parts of the continent's history—perhaps even at the risk of repeating it.

In this chapter, I would like to reassess these continuities and discontinuities with regard to Christian Democratic views on European unity, emphasizing the complex ways in which Catholics and Christian

Democrats contributed to European unity and showing that they were actually quite well integrated in broader political movements, from socialist radicals to fascists. This reassessment points toward new spatial and temporal understandings of a Christian Democratic Europe.

Pre-World War II Varieties

The first task is to recall modern (i.e. "post-French Revolution") Europe's continuous nostalgia for a lost Christendom, which has inspired cross-confessional Christian romantics as well as Catholic ultramontanes.[5] After the First World War, widespread pessimism over Europe's fate generated an intense reflection on the proper organization of the continent, resulting in various calls for a pan-European "palingenetic" rebirth that was often, though not always, imagined as profoundly Christian. This reflection often incorporated profound fears about a looming "awakening" of Islamic and East Asian empires.

In these pessimists' eyes, Europe needed to pull itself together against external threats, rejuvenate and constitute itself as a "Third Way" (or "third force"). Such ideas, for example, underpinned the explicitly Catholic *Abendland* movement concentrated around the famous monastery of Maria Laach in Germany; Catholic avant-garde intellectuals such as Giovanni Papini and Curzio Malaparte in Italy; and conservative noblemen such as Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Count Hermann Keyserling and Otto von Habsburg. Many of them dreamed of a contemporary restoration of Catholic Europe after the old Carolingian empire or the Habsburg Empire of Charles V. They opposed Communism, but also the "Anglo-Saxon" internationalism represented by the League of Nations.[6] Some argued already from the early 1920s not only for a "conservative revolution," but also for Europe's cleansing of "democratic corruption." Perhaps the most influential among them was prince Karl Anton Rohan, the founder of one of the main cultural circles in interwar Europe, the Europäische Kulturbund (European Cultural Association; Vienna 1922, Paris 1923), which published the illustrious *Europäische Revue / Revue européenne*.

Clearly, such ideas drew them to Italian fascism. Prince Rohan indeed explicitly described himself as a fascist, expressing sympathy for Mussolini in the 1920s. The fascist affinity is less clear for Malaparte and especially Papini, though both did ultimately embrace fascism in the 1930s.[7] However, the Europäische Kulturbund refrained from

overtly engaging in party politics, appealing instead to much wider circles, including liberals such as José Ortega y Gasset and Alfred Weber, socialists such as France's Marcel Déat, as well as proto-fascists such as the Italian esoteric philosopher Julius Evola and Mussolini's right-hand ideologue Giovanni Gentile. The network also interfaced with the influential Katholische Akademikerverband (Catholic Academic Association), created in Cologne in 1913, which included as a member also Cologne mayor—and future great post-World War II German chancellor—Konrad Adenauer.

Catholics could also be found in the vanguard of those who pleaded for a Franco-German reconciliation and understanding, which in turn would imply wider European collaboration. Many of Western Europe's Catholics, for example, followed closely the ideas regarding French–German rapprochement advanced by the weekly *L'Europe Nouvelle* and its inspiring founder Louise Weiss, who had a mixed Jewish-Protestant background. *L'Europe Nouvelle* published articles by leaders of different political colors and confessional backgrounds, including Catholics as varied as Weimar Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, French diplomat Wladimir d'Ormesson and the French extreme right writer Pierre Drieu La Rochelle.[8] Unsurprisingly, such ideas were particularly prevalent in the 1920s in the Rhineland among conservatives and business leaders, but also in left Catholic circles, with Joseph Joos as a central figure seeking reconciliation with France and defending, like Adenauer, a vision of a European federation.[9] The Catholic newspaper *Kölnische Volkszeitung* in 1924 adopted the French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot's plea for a united Europe, understood mainly in economic terms. In France, journals identified with conservative Catholic essayist Wladimir d'Ormesson, including *Revue de Paris* and *Le Temps*, supported similar views. In the international field, the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Confédération internationale des Syndicats chrétiens, CISC), constructed on a Franco-German base, supported European federalism quite explicitly.[10] The same was true of the Catholic pacifist Democratic International led by Marc Sangnier, founder of the republican movement Le Sillon. At its 1930 congress, Sangnier's Democratic International for Peace explicitly endorsed the concept of the United States of Europe.[11]

The idea of a Christian Europe was very prominent in the most famous interwar movement, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union. Yet this was no Christian association, nor did it strive for a restoration of Christendom. Emphasizing economic and political

collaboration, Pan-Europa was also less palingenetic than the *Abendland* movement and its various appendages. From its very origins, Pan-Europa was conceived as a neutral movement, though it did obtain support from Catholic circles as well. The Austrian Chancellor Msgr Ignaz Seipel was the Austrian branch's first president, and the Social Democrat Karl Renner its vice-president—a pairing that, given the polarization of inter-war Austrian politics, represented a remarkable and significant demon-stration of political collaboration. Catholics and Protestants strove also to bridge the Franco-German antagonism through economic partner-ships, such as the movement for a European Customs Union, as well as the Circles of Colpach and liberal industrialist Émile Mayrish's Comité Franco-Allemand d'Information et de Documentation (Franco-German Committee of Information and Documentation). (Mayrish was not a Catholic, as far as I know.) Among the Catholics who interfaced with these groupings, we find not only the principled Adenauer but also the conservative Catholic Franz von Papen, who would become chancel-lor in the Hindenburg cabinet of 1932 and vice-chancellor under Adolf Hitler in 1933–1934.

Some Christian politicians in the 1920s and 1930s started organiz-ing at the European level in the International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration (SIPDIC). That the name referred to neither "Christian Democratic" nor Catholic parties is significant: the SIPDIC was no real inter- or transnational movement, but rather a com-mon office of different national Christian parties or movements. Its main objectives lay in the circulation of ideas, not in adopting transnational European policies. National preoccupations largely eclipsed international considerations. Hence the SIPDIC hardly expressed itself on the ques-tion of European unity. However, the lack of international ambitions was only one reason why it did not explicitly argue for European unity, in contrast to other associations. Another reason was that Christian—I hesitate to label them Christian Democratic—parties were deeply divided, above all on the issue of international politics on the European continent.[12]

Although the dominant narrative of European integration history considers the ambitious plan for a European Union in the League of Nations that French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand launched on 5 September 1929 as largely still-born due to the increased protectionist wave after the 1929 Crash and the ensuing economic depression, the plan did raise hope among Catholics. It was even discreetly supported by

the Holy See, which favored the rapprochement of France and Germany and opposed nationalism. (This may be surprising, as in French domestic politics Briand was considered an outspoken anti-clericalist, even if he had moderated and revised his ideas on the matter since serving as the rapporteur of the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State.)[13] At its last congress in October 1932, under the leadership of Cologne mayor Konrad Adenauer, SIPDIC even passed a motion in favor of a European Common Market, as well as long-term planning for a political union.[14] This, however, was little more than SIPDIC's swan song.

And yet, "third way" aspirations survived and flourished. In the early 1930s, a different, more philosophical "Europeanism" emerged within personalist milieus. This development is mostly associated with a number of young, often (but not exclusively) Catholic French intellectuals publishing in journals such as *Esprit* and *Ordre Nouveau*, but actually they fit into a much broader personalist movement, partly within the Catholic Church but as much outside it. In Central Europe, this movement built upon the thinking of, among others, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Rudolf Eucken, Charles Renouvier and particularly, in the early twentieth century, Max Scheler, Nikolai Berdiaev and Heinrich Pesch.[15]

Emphasizing the concept of "community" as a bridge between the individual and society at large, rejecting nationalism as well as statism, the by and large Francophone personalists showed a particular interest in federalism, even in the federalist ideas of the nineteenth-century anarchist and mutualist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, as well as Protestantism and ecumenism (particularly the work of Jewish philosopher Martin Buber). The Protestant philosopher Denis de Rougemont, in particular, connected personalism, Protestantism and federalism as he knew it from his homeland, Switzerland.[16]

These men and women had a major impact on European thinking. Federalism was seen as a process that engendered both decentralization (up to the level of the region and the community) and a "bottom up" approach in which "lower" instances delegated competences to a higher level; this was, in fact, the very definition of subsidiarity. Furthermore, it included a European dimension, conceiving of Europe as a profoundly Christian project, in which confessional ideals would serve as the basis for establishing a lasting peace.[17] In one of the earliest texts of this emergent federalist thinking, René Dupuis and Alexandre Marc argued for a European federalism breaking with the existing order, charting a middle course between "nationalist imperialism" (or imperial nationalism)

and some sort of "abstract internationalism." This new "young Europe," described as vibrant, solid, sustainable and united, was to constitute a new "European community [which is] not cosmopolitan and international." This, in the personalists' view, had been the weakness of Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa, while their alternative was to be "supranational and decentralised."[18]

Many of those new personalists and proponents of a "new order," in particular the Austrian corporatists, Germans after the mold of Carl Schmitt and France's non-conformists, by rejecting the individual as sole constituent of the political order, however, logically also opposed parliamentary democracy. As an alternative, they imagined a "new" or "true" democracy respecting the spirituality and the connectivity of the person, over and against the "terrorism" of the masses.[19] However, pleading for "true democracy" and an "integral Christianity" risked amalgamation with fascism, to the extent that France's *Ordre Nouveau* ultimately materialized as a school for fascist ideas, rather than a seedbed for democracy. The French thinkers led by Alexandre Marc proposed a corporatist model in which different "communities," lacking in democratic representation, would determine politics, paradoxically according the state a central role, and thereby paving the way for authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

In fact, however, all over Europe Christians were strongly tempted by corporatism's authoritarian, totalitarian and anti-Semitic politics in the 1930s. In largely Catholic countries such as Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain, Catholics joined fascistic parties. Even Nazism attracted major Catholic support as a function of its "totalitarian"—not so different perhaps from, for example, Action Française's "integral"—ambition.[20] Lutherans, incidentally, either remained aloof from politics or supported extreme right parties as well, including National Socialism in Germany. Those transnational European movements that argued most explicitly in favor of a European "rebirth" and unification from a Christian perspective, if they had not already done so in the 1920s, also drifted toward fascism.

At the same time, a minority of Christian intellectuals and politicians reacted against the obviously abusive politics that emerged in Europe, including—though rarely emphasized—the persecution of Jews. They let their consciences speak.[21] A case in point is the British Catholic Christopher Dawson, often represented as a reactionary figure, who nonetheless emphasized the Christian underpinnings of Europe, its

pluralism and its interactions with other political concepts to oppose fascism and Nazism.[22]

It is in this context that Jacques Maritain published his famous *Humanisme intégral* (1936), imagining a "New Christendom" that would reconcile the fundamental neo-Thomist rejection of liberal modernity with a respect for republican values, and hence be both secular and confessional. The two pillars of such a "secular Christian society" were the common good, in particular "justice," and the defense of the spiritual value of the human person, which required fundamental liberties of the protection of private life, the family and culture. However, *Humanisme intégral* explicitly rejects liberal democracy. As John Hellman has compellingly argued, Maritain actually came to embrace democratic values during the war as a result of his understanding of the practical realities, certainly helped by the political theorist Yves Simon's astute comments.[23] In the United States, human rights were perhaps seen as universal already in the late 1930s, in part because democracy and religion in the USA were not seen as opposite, but as complementary. It was indeed the ethical awareness in the confrontation with the realities of the rejection of individualism and democracy, thus "practical reasoning," that made certain Catholics, though by no means all, oppose totalitarianism in the 1920s and 1930s.[24] The influential margins here belonged to the Thomists, who almost inevitably lured their adepts into fascist collaboration.

World War II strengthened the federalist and democratic views of those who resisted fascism and collaboration, even if the Nazis' rhetoric about a new European order during the war, particularly as promoted by Vichy France, discredited the idea of an integrated Europe altogether. The discrediting of a European project extended particularly to the Resistance: even Coudenhove-Kalergi, pleading his cause in American exile, was seen as a traitor.

In this context, Swiss, British and American federalisms appeared to offer alternative models for a future Europe. Through the Federalist Union, to which both Catholics and Anglicans contributed, British ideas about federalism had a wide impact in the Anglo-Saxon world, including the USA.[25] The Swiss thinker Denis de Rougemont only developed a more systematic vision of federalism while in exile in the USA, where, according to his biographer, he first became conscious of his Europeanness—a feeling that many exiles shared.[26] Similarly, Maritain and the Italian Christian Democrat Don Luigi Sturzo began to conceive

of a European union only after 1940, in American exile, where the feder-
alist movement bloomed, particularly in the circles in which they moved.
Exiled *Abendlanders* such as Otto von Habsburg experienced a simi-
lar awareness, cherishing the idea of an association modeled on the old
Habsburg "dual monarchy" ideal, even if adapted—though how remains
questionable to this day—to democracy.[27] Nevertheless, as Wolfram
Kaiser has pointed out, these various political thinkers' experiences in the
USA also drove them into a more Atlanticist position, as well as favoring
regional alliances without Germany after 1941.[28] Most favored a (sub-)
regional unity only—such as between France and Belgium, the Danube
or Balkan countries—concluding that a wider union was unrealistic.
At a minimum, they felt that the war had reinforced their abhorrence
of nationalism, and as a result they shared the curious assessment that
blamed nationalism for the war.

AMBIGUITIES OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BREAKTHROUGH AFTER WORLD WAR II

To the surprise of almost everyone—not least themselves—Christian
Democrats emerged as the dominant political force on the European
continent after World War II. The reasons why fall beyond the scope of
this chapter, but a few observations are necessary. Christian Democracy
remained largely a Catholic and, to a lesser extent, Reformed affair.
Meanwhile, Lutherans entered onto a different path of reflection and
engagement with the world that kept them largely aloof from party
politics, though interesting parallels with Catholics can be discerned as
well, beginning mainly in the 1960s. In the meantime, the new world
that Catholic activists conceived no longer appeared as a restored
Christendom, perhaps not even, as Étienne Fouilloux argued with regard
to France, a "new" kind of Christendom.

Instead, this new world was to be fundamentally pluralistic, even secu-
lar. Christians were to collaborate with non-Christians in order to bring
about a society commensurable with their ideals.[29] Perhaps their con-
tacts with the USA, which steadfastly supported European Christian
Democracy after the war, also played a role in this process. It also implied
a healthy dose of anti-clericalism—a deliberative, though cautious, dis-
tance with regard to the clerical authorities that, in the eyes of many
lay leaders, particularly in France and Belgium, had often fallen short of

bravery and moral leadership during the war. And yet this was not necessarily the view of the majority of the faithful, who continued to look to the churches for hope and stability, particularly in Germany. Hence the Christian Democratic leaders considered the churches, and in particular the Catholic Church, to be still useful; they did not grant them leadership though. The churches, too, incidentally, preferred to retreat from political interference, at least in theory. Certainly, in Catholic lands, the impact of the Church hierarchy on society steadily increased once again, as the hierarchy saw pervasive dangers to the basic interests of the Church, which contributed to the restoration of "pillarised Catholicism."[30]

Nevertheless, there was more continuity across the caesura of 1945 than may appear at first sight, and also more ambiguity. Namely, it took time before new principles became generally accepted. The Holy See, while nevertheless engaged in emphasizing the principle of "human dignity" as the core of its new vision and opposition to totalitarianism, actually stopped short of embracing democracy and pluralism until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. In his famous Christmas speech of 1944, for example, Pope Pius XII expressed only a very conditional support for the "democratic ideal of liberty and equality," still warning against "the whims of the masses."[31]

There were also still many leading Catholic thinkers who did not embrace democracy at all. This was, for example, the case of the postwar *Neue Abendland* in Germany, which somewhat remarkably emerged from the war as opponents of Nazism because of the Nazi persecution of Catholics and the exile of a few well-known leaders such as Otto von Habsburg.[32] Prince Rohan, too, returned to propagating extreme right ideas. However, these currents remained marginal, and the mainstream Christian Democrats as well as, it should be noted, most of the ecclesiastical hierarchy remained aloof from them. Rohan, for example, ended his days as a pariah.

But the ambiguities of postwar Catholic politics in Europe began with Christian Democracy itself. While it referred to democracy, its ideal remained "Christian," or, as the International Union of Young Christian Democrats (Union internationale des jeunes démocrates-chrétiens, IUYCD) advocated at their 1948 congress, "a truly democratic Europe of Christian inspiration."[33] While referring to "Christian" as well as "humanistic" values, postwar Christian Democrats aimed at offering an alternative to the materialistic world and its individualism, as well as to

the nation-state, understood to be obsolete, at least by most radicals: the new slogan was that now the "time is for federations." In the economic field, the essence of the Christian Democratic project remained corporatist, or at least communitarian—always rejecting capitalist liberalism as well as Communism, and arguing for some sort of "third way." Its European program in particular followed the logic of the personalist multi-layered organization that transcended the nation-state. Clearly, elements of *Ordre Nouveau* thinking found their way into Christian Democratic thinking, among others through the pages of the French journal *La Fédération*, which earned some notoriety exactly because both former Vichyites and Christian Democrats, including from the Resistance, found there a forum for exchanging ideas, in particular on the organization of the economy.[34]

Christian Democracy's postwar ambiguity comes to the fore particularly in a domain that may appear highly surprising: human rights. In his paradigm-changing monograph *The Last Utopia*, as well as its sequel *Christian Human Rights*, Samuel Moyn argued that Catholic thinking had a formative impact on the formulation of human rights after World War II—and that Christian Democrats, in particular, had a major hand in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950).[35] However, as Piotr H. Kosicki and Paul Hanebrink have argued in reference to Poland and Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s—whose cases were not isolated—for Christian Democrats it was the rights of the Catholics, not human beings, that needed defending—precluding, for example, a presumptive defense of the rights of Jews.[36]

That idea certainly continued after World War II, in particular with regard to education. Without endorsing Marco Duranti's inordinate claim that human rights were at least partly some kind of extreme right Catholic conspiracy to offer a refuge for collaborators,[37] it can hardly be denied that they were imagined as a means to offer protection from the totalitarianism of not only fascism, Nazism and Communism, but also from the republic, and from the secular state. Recent research has also suggested that, in contrast to popular writings on the subject, the Holocaust, and Jews and Judaism more generally, did not factor prominently in the drafting of either the UDHR or the ECHR, particularly not among Catholics. In other words, anti-Semitism had not disappeared overnight in 1945.[38] This restrictive interpretation of human rights incidentally had another consequence—that human rights were not

supposed to be universally applicable in Europe's colonies—although that was foreseen for some.[39] Furthermore, Catholics continued to argue for collective rights, an issue on which, however, they ultimately found themselves to be on the losing side.

The Christian human rights concept was deeply rooted in the personalistic concept of human dignity, which was certainly imagined in the 1930s to strengthen the rejection of totalitarianism, Communist as well as Nazi. Remarkably, the larger category of fascism seems hardly to have been criticized for not respecting human rights, and Catholic dignitaries known for fascistic sympathies such as Austrian bishop Alois Hudal felt perfectly comfortable adopting the language of human dignity. In Austria, in fact, Catholic conservatives once supportive of the Dollfuss regime actually drew on the new theory of totalitarianism to protect the Austrofascist state from Communism as well as Nazism. "Totalitarianism," in the view of its main Catholic architects Waldemar Gurian, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Jacques Maritain, was imagined as the culmination or apogee of a secular, republican modernity. In other words, it was the other side of the coin of liberal democracy, which stripped individuals of their connections, their character and their values. Hence it was liberalism itself that inevitably paved the way for totalitarianism, the all-encompassing power of the state. The alternative that Catholic personalists of the 1930s proposed was a society based on Christian principles and centered around the person (not the individual) as a social being, hence based upon "communities." It could be democratic, but in the interwar period few thought that it would necessarily be so.[40]

Former proponents of a "new order" were not always excluded from postwar Christian Democratic circles. Christian Democrats, in the struggle for votes in the new Europe, strove for reconciliation, especially with the enemy within. The French *La Fédération* offers a case in point as this journal offered a meeting place for former proponents of the *Ordre Nouveau*, including outright collaborators in the Vichy regime, with Christian figures from the Resistance. These former antagonists united in promoting a European federalist ideal that continued many of the themes that had emerged in prewar personalist circles.

The core of the Christian Democratic ideal continued to reject the predominance of the nation-state as an all-determining political structure, promoting a multi-layered (neo-)corporatist society that would respect different communities built around the individual (or the

person). More than before the war, this implied action at the international and European levels. In other words, World War II, as generally understood across the continent, had once again—a recurrent theme in Catholic thought since the French Revolution—shown the pernicious power of the absolutist nation-state.[41] Obviously, then, Catholics in general and Christian Democrats in particular opposed the sanctification of the republic that some, including contemporary historians as Antonin Cohin and Marco Duranti, associate with liberal democracy, implying, correctly, that Christian Democrats therefore rejected this system as well. Their alternative, I believe, should not, however, be so easily cast aside as implying a turn to some reactionary totalitarian machinery.

While recent scholarship thus emphasizes a "transwar" continuity, one should not overlook the discontinuities either. A major difference with the previous war was that in 1945 no similar need for a European palingenetic rebirth emerged. To be sure, there existed a sense of destruction and economic and moral bankruptcy, resulting in a widespread movement for moral regeneration. Perhaps the *reality* of doom was even greater after World War II.

But, unlike in 1918, three decades later there was an acute sense of a new start. That was perhaps most outspoken with regard to domestic politics, which would lead to the development of a more inclusive society (albeit in more homogenous nation-states) and the welfare state (on both sides of the emerging Iron Curtain, despite the differences in ideology and political economy). And yet on this point, too, continuities bear emphasis: most ideas were not new, and a more inclusive society materialized only from the 1960s onwards. The international political situation clearly showed the greatest discontinuities, with the geopolitical map of Europe being completely redrawn, the global power balance definitively altered, and decolonization begun in the Global South. In contrast to 1918, nobody actually believed that Europe would be able to regain its former position, even if the continent also witnessed what Martin Shipway has called a "late-colonial shift," which came to the fore in the Eurafrica project that would endow even the European Economic Community with a colonial dimension.[42] This idea of a new start, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, implied much continuity in the concrete proposals and plans.

However, in contrast with the general feeling after World War I, after the subsequent war the idea of a moral victory of Good over Evil prevailed, which perhaps stimulated the sense that indeed a new start had

been initiated. With regard to Christian Democracy, the Nazi persecu-
tion of Catholics somehow dissociated the Church from its general
collaboration with fascism, especially as some of those who had fascist
sympathies had distanced themselves from Nazism. Hence Redemption
had in some way already been achieved.

The rejection of nationalism to some extent offered a common
ground to Christian Democrats and other European federalists, though
one should not exaggerate the impact of either party. At the end of
World War II, it appeared that European political leaders had learned lit-
tle from the past and were firmly on their way to repeating the errors
of Versailles, even with a vengeance.[43] What changed was less a gradual
European *prise de conscience* than the emerging Cold War, which pro-
duced the conditions to pacify Western Europe. It is this geopolitical
context that allowed European federalists to reconnect with interwar
conceptions of a European federation as a way to overcome the divisions
that had once again ruined the continent and jeopardized its position in
the world. Their ideas found an attentive ear in the Vatican. For vari-
ous reasons, the latter's space for intervention remained limited, how-
ever, not least because the Holy See and much of the Church hierarchy
throughout Europe had largely failed the test of moral leadership during
the war. This, incidentally, was also the case with Protestant churches.

A Restart for a Christian Democratic Europe

In the postwar European project, several dynamics converged, and their
confrontation and interaction led to a new path for the continent—or,
at least, for its western half. The most obvious, and immediate, was the
Cold War. It was the Cold War that rendered obsolete the postwar Allied
plans with regard to the destruction and division of Germany—although,
ironically, the French obsession with dividing Germany would material-
ize, if not as imagined.

Less generally acknowledged, but just as important, was decoloni-
zation. Maintaining Europe's dominant status in the world had been a
major motivation to envisage forms of European collaboration already
from the nineteenth century, a practice that was not particular to
Catholics.[44] With decolonization imminent, European federalism could
be a way to compensate for the continent's loss of global influence, a fac-
tor that certainly played a major (though largely unacknowledged) role
in the European orientation of France, the Netherlands and, with much

delay, also Belgium, as well as, initially, the United Kingdom (UK)—at least in the eyes of Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office. It also aggravated the need to reinforce national economies, which, as Alan Milward has demonstrated, was one of the main motives behind European economic integration. Still, attempts to preserve their status as colonial powers could prevent European countries from fully engaging in European integration, as was eventually the case for the UK, but initially at least also for France and, for even longer, for Belgium. Moreover, it hindered the development of a strong alternative European identity through an emphasis on human rights as European values.

Apart from some former *Ordre Nouveau* activists such as Denis de Rougemont and especially Alexandre Marc, Christian Democrats did not appear at the forefront of European integration immediately, and its main proponents did not occupy major positions in political life. Moreover, an important part of the new generation of "left Catholics," who emerged in Western Europe as a significant (though, in hindsight, perhaps overrated) social and political phenomenon, initially objected to the Euro-Atlantic perspective implied in the Marshall Plan.[45] The plan had called upon Europeans to associate under the leadership of the USA and to integrate under the auspices of a transatlantic economic and political alliance. By the end of the 1940s, however, fears of Communist and Soviet expansion were complemented by the attractions of American dollars—in the form of diverse support schemes for Christian Democratic parties and movements. The United States supported the European Christian Democrats, particularly in Italy, as the new Cold War foreign policy establishment saw in the Christian Democrats a political power that could contain Communist infiltration. At the same time, Americans also feared that Catholic politics could be too weak among working classes, the reason why they supported unified social-democratic and Christian labor unions.[46]

Still, the Christian Democratic role in European cooperation initially remained restrained. Apart from Denis de Rougemont, Alexandre Marc and François de Menthon, Christian Democrats only belatedly associated themselves with the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948, which created the European Federal Movement. To be sure, de Menthon made a proposal for a European "constitution"—indeed, for a United States of Europe—in his remarks at The Hague. Likewise, it was Georges Bidault—member of the Resistance, founder of the highly successful Christian Democratic Popular Republican Movement

(Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP) and French foreign minister in the government of the Christian Democratic eminence Robert Schuman—who outlined France's new European policy, pursuing the creation of a European Assembly (later realized in the Council of Europe), as well as a customs and economic union.

The Council, however, was a far cry from what Aristide Briand had advocated in the interwar years. In the end, Christian Democrats remained divided with regard to the intensity of European collaboration. In June 1949, Bidault himself even opposed the creation of a Christian Democratic faction in the new European Assembly, while the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, an association of pro-European Christian Democratic politicians newly formed in 1947, was hardly supported by the newly constituted Christian Democratic parties.[47]

The tide shifted afterwards only slowly, for reasons well known. The search for an alternative European order initially included a European defense scheme as well as an economic union, a "third way" between Soviet Communism and American capitalism. Its only initial result was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the outcome of a French initiative put forward by Jean Monnet, a socialist civil servant (and horse-shed Catholic), and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, as the patience of the USA was running out with the quarreling Europeans and with France's use of Marshall funds in its overseas colonies.

The 1950 Schuman Plan combined at least two perspectives. At its core was the design for economic integration of Europe based upon industrial cooperation, including a regional and industrial free market and a customs union on the one hand, enriched by Monnet's new insights into the value of central economic planning, which made him an advocate of supranational authority. Already during the war, Monnet had imagined drafts to bring German industry under French control as part of the dismantling of the Third Reich, not unlike what France had previously envisioned after World War I. Beyond this not entirely reconciliatory objective of the Schuman Plan, however, was its horizon as the European answer to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, at least partly aimed at re-establishing a strong European economy not completely dependent on American intervention. But re-establishing a European economy actually proved to be less a pan-European project than a series of national ones, particularly for France, where it had also a colonial dimension. But the multifaceted features of the European integration project also illustrate the Christian Democratic

sense of compromise, flexibility and will to transcend the level of the nation-state.[48]

Nevertheless, institutions were created spanning most of Western Europe, with the ECSC as first in a series, and Christian Democrats did take the lead in this process. One simple reason for their leadership is that, in the early 1950s, Christian Democrats were in charge of the main departments in key European countries—with a consequence described aptly by Wolfram Kaiser as "hegemony by default." This means that Christian Democrats were holding the steering wheel and disposed of reliable partners across the borders, who often knew each other personally already from the 1920s, or who had perhaps met during the war in various networks and meetings, among others in Geneva.

Adenauer is a particularly interesting case, as he had already argued for Franco-German reconciliation in the 1920s, recognizing as few German politicians had the French need for security.[49] Wary of Prussian imperialism, he had suggested breaking the Rhineland off from Germany into an independent state, in the interest of appeasing French fears and inspiring a more conciliatory French policy toward the German people. The personal relationship between Adenauer and Schuman—who was born in Luxemburg with the German nationality of his father—was certainly important in this respect. Philippe Chenaux and Wolfram Kaiser have admirably, from different perspectives, retraced the intensive yet largely secret personal contacts between European Christian Democrats, mainly in and around Geneva.[50]

The story of these contacts also makes clear that one should not overestimate the European orientation of (Western) European Christian Democrats, even in the 1950s. Even the French architects of the ECSC had the interests of France in mind, although they admitted that a productive—in more senses than one—reconciliation with Germany came to seem inevitable. After the Marshall Plan expired, French Christian Democrats actually prioritized bilateral Franco-American relations in view of American support for Indochina.[51]

By Way of a Conclusion

I am not going to venture into the question, still very much alive, about the originality of Christian Democracy, nor into the question of whether there is something distinctively Christian Democratic in European politics.[52] Concrete proposals were strongly influenced by existing models

formulated before World War II by various Europeanist movements and circles. This was also true during the war, as in the case of outspoken socialist proposals such as the Ventotene Manifesto "For a Free and United Europe" (*Per un' Europa libera e unita*), drafted by the Italian Communist Altiero Spinelli and the anti-fascist Ernesto Rossi, which even inspired the Catholic prime minister of the new Italian republic Alcide De Gasperi. I also think that the question of continuity or discontinuity across the classic caesura of World War II is often misguided, as one should distinguish more in terms of issues.

But there are some developments that I do want to emphasize:

1. Notwithstanding a still-dominant secular presentation of European integration history and some contemporary presentations of European integration as a secular project, Christians in general and Catholics in particular occupied a central stage in the debate on European unity all throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their subsequent marginalization in the historiography has either been based upon a secularist bias or a misinterpretation of their various relationships with different worldviews and political currents, including socialists, liberals and fascists. In this context, however, one needs to acknowledge that boundaries between these movements and positions, particularly with fascism, were less clear than imagined in hindsight.

2. The recognition and desire to collaborate even within a unitary organization appeared to be novel after World War II, but, as I have indicated, was in fact not so much or far less so at the international level. Scholars of Christian Democracy have emphasized the importance of discussions with Resistance leaders, such as those on the initiative of the Italian Communist Altiero Spinelli at the house of the Dutch Reformed theologian Willem Visser 't Hooft in Geneva during the war. Meanwhile, other scholars, such as Philippe Chenaux, have downplayed the importance of these contacts, arguing that those experiences were shared only by a small minority, and were all but generally accepted.[53] Surely Chenaux is right with regard to these specific talks, but we saw Catholics and Christian Democrats already engaged in mixed associations and circles in the 1920s and 1930s as well. Here we find a surprising continuity. The discontinuity, meanwhile, lies in the rather (slow) development of a separate Christian Democratic international action.

3. Were Catholics and Christian Democrats "internationalists" par excellence, and particularly more in favor of European unity after World War II, as has often been argued?[54] To be perfectly honest, I have my doubts. Apart from a handful of individuals, Catholics were not particularly prominent in the federalist movement, while those who were did not achieve great influence—like the movement itself. Perhaps they were a bit more in favor of some sort of reconciliation, but I would not be too sure about that either. Obviously, what united Catholic politics at the time was a rejection of nationalism—which, after World War II, became a widely advertised key feature of Christian Democracy and Roman Catholicism alike. From this perspective, anti-nationalism perhaps motivated a turn to Europeanism, sometimes as a more realistic alternative to universalism.

   If Christian Democrats played a major role in the construction of (Western) European institutions in the 1950s, it is because they were in power and they, among others, had become convinced that some sort of unity was needed to save their countries in the context of the emerging Cold War. Of course, being in power in a republic implies a certain moderation and pragmatism, but the case of Georges Bidault illustrates that it may have been more than just the pragmatism of power. This brings me to what Kees van Kersbergen identified as the most distinctive feature of Christian Democracy: its ability to compromise, to transcend political cleavages. The creation of the ECSC certainly offers a case in point.

4. The term "Christian Democracy," especially in its presentation as a major political force after the war, suggests the acceptance of what today is viewed as the defining set of essentially European values: the acceptance of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, the separation of Church and State. This chapter has confirmed the contributions of Christian Democrats to these values, but also considerably complicates the narrative. Even Christian acceptance of democracy was a far more ambiguous process than the militants of the movement like to believe,[55] while recent research by Samuel Moyn, Marco Duranti, Antonin Cohen and others has shown that, in addition, the values of

human dignity, human rights and the acceptance of pluralism must seriously be qualified. The ambiguities that I also emphasize apparently had a lasting impact even on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, up to today vis-à-vis the freedom of religion, which, according to Nehal Butha, appears to uphold a very "Christian Democratic" view on secularism, a view that appears quite inadequate today to the task of dealing with contemporary issues of religious freedom, in particular for Muslims.[56] At the very least, this question invites us to reconsider the history not only of European Christian Democracy, but of European values in general as well.

Notes

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3. Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006).
4. See esp. Dieter Gosewinkel, ed, *Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeanisation* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015); John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea* (London: Little, Brown & Co., 1997).
5. Patrick Pasture, "Between a Christian Fatherland and Euro-Christendom," in *Christianity and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. John Wood (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 169–188.
6. Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland Zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 33–110, esp. 33–56; Dagmar Pöpping, *Abendland: Christliche Akademiker und die Utopie der Antimoderne 1900–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2002). On Rohan and the Europäische Kulturbund, see Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Eurotopias: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa and Rohan's Europäischer Kulturbund," in *The Space of Crisis: Shifting Spaces and Ideas of Europe, 1914–1945*, ed. Vittorio Dini and Matthew D'Auria (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 161–177; Christian Bailey, *Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: German Visions of Europe in Germany, 1926–1950* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2013), 3–42; Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg:*

Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 309–456; Matthias Schulz, "Der Europäische Kulturbund," *Europäische Geschichte Online* (EGO), http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schulzm-2010c-de; Dina Gusejnova, "Noble Continent? German-Speaking Nobles as Theorists of European Identity in the Interwar Period," in Dini and D'Auria (eds), *The Space of Crisis*, 111–133.

7. Walter L. Adamson, "Giovanni Papini: Nietzsche, Secular Religion and Catholic Fascism," *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–20; Walter L. Adamson, "Modernism and Fascism: The Politics of Culture in Italy, 1903–1922," *American Historical Review*, 95, no. 2 (1990): 359–390; Brett Colasacco, "From Men into Gods: American Pragmatism, Italian Proto-Fascism and Secular Religion," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 15, no. 4 (2014): 541–564.

8. Christine Manigand, "Projets genevois et projets d'unité européenne à travers l'Europe Nouvelle de Louise Weiss," in *Histoire des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'idée européenne*, ed. Gérard Bossuat (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), 125–138.

9. See esp. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92–97.

10. Patrick Pasture, "Realità e concezioni europee nel movimento sindacale cristiano tra le due guerre," in *Il fattore religioso nell'integrazione europea*, ed. Alfredo Canavero and Jean-Dominique Durand (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 1999), 373–386; Patrick Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d'une troisième voie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999).

11. Gearóid Barry, *The Disarmament of Hatred: Marc Sangnier, French Catholicism and the Legacy of the First World War, 1914–45* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 128–152, 164–166; Kaiser, *Christian Democracy*, 62–63.

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13. Philippe Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe: Les catholiques et l'idée euro-péenne au XXe siècle* (Tours: CLD, 2007), 35.

14. Thomas Jansen and Steven Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Berlin: Springer, 2011), 9–10.

15. Jan Olof Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Johan De Tavernier, "The Historical Roots of Personalism," *Ethical Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2009): 361–392. On the Non-Conformists and their views on personal-ism, see Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, *Les non-conformistes des années 30: Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française* (Paris: Seuil, 2001); Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 21–61; James Chappel, *Spiritual Welfare: Catholic Political Economy in Twentieth-century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

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17. Undine Ruge, *Die Erfindung des "Europa der Regionen": Kritische Ideengeschichte eines konservativen Konzepts* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003), 90–94.

18. René Dupuis and Alex[ander] Marc, *Jeune Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1933), 150, 175; John Hellman, *The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc and Ordre Nouveau 1930–2000* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002); Bernhard Voyenne, "Genèse du fédéralisme marcien," *L'Europe en formation*, nos. 319–320 (2000–2001): 13–29.

19. Patrick Troude-Chastenet, "La critique de la démocratie dans les écrits personnalistes des années 1930: Esprit et Ordre nouveau," *Cités* 4, no. 16 (2003): 161–176; Stefanos Geroulanos, *An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 112.

20. See, e.g., Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 1–20.

21. For the compelling (though not overall unambiguous) case of Christian labour see Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*; John Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

22. On the attitude of Dawson toward fascism, see Bernhard Dietz, "Christliches Abendland gegen Pluralismus und Moderne: Die Europa-Konzeption von Christopher Dawson," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* no. 9 (2012): 491–497; Stephen G. Carter, "Historian of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of Christopher H. Dawson, 1889–1970" (PhD diss, Durham University, 2006), 142–145; Luisa Passerini, *Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 64–80; Tom Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105–116.

23. John Hellman, "The Anti-Democratic Impulse in Catholicism: Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon and Charles de Gaulle During World War II," *Journal of Church and State* 33, no. 3 (1991): 453–471.

24. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 21–61; Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

25. Philip M. Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

26. Bruno Ackermann, "'Le cheminement des esprits'," *Revue Suisse d'Histoire* no. 47 (1997): 171–191.

27. Conze, *Europa*, 107ff.

28. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 119–162, esp. at 150–151, 155.

29. Étienne Fouilloux, "Feu la 'nouvelle Chrétienté'?" in *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe 1945–2000*, ed. Leo Kenis, Jack Billiet and Patrick Pasture (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 39–54.

30. Patrick Pasture and Wilhelm Damberg, "Restoration and Erosion of Pillarised Catholicism in Western Europe," in *Transformation*, ed. Kenis, Billiet and Pasture, 55–76.

31. Étienne Fouilloux, "Intransigence catholique et monde moderne," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 96, no. 1–2 (2001): 71–87 (esp. 79) (English quotations from Pius XII's 1944 Christmas message from http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/); and a different view in Philippe Chenaux, *Pie XII: Diplomate et pasteur* (Paris: Cerf, 2013), 305–309; Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*, 87.

32. Conze, *Europa*, 111–206, on federalism 124–127, 140–142, 152, 197–206; Vanessa Conze, "Facing the Future Backwards: 'Abendland' as an Anti-liberal Idea of Europe in Germany between the First World War and the 1960s," in *Anti-liberal Europe*, ed. Gosewinkel, 78.

33. Quoted in Laurent Ducerf, "Les jeunes des Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, entre jeune Europe et nouvelle chrétienté," *Histoire@Politique* 10, no. 1 (2010): 33 (DOI:10.3917/hp.010.00103).

34. Antonin Cohen, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne* (Paris: PUF, 2012), esp. 292–316 ff; Voyenne, "Genèse"; Bernhard Voyenne, *Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste* (Nice: Presses d'Europe, 1976).

35. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Moyn, *Christian Human Rights*; James Chappel, "'All Churches Have Heretics': Catholicism, Human Rights and the Uses of History for Life," *The Immanent Frame* (2015): http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2015/06/05/all-churches-have-heretics-on-catholicism-human-rights-and-the-advantages-of-history-for-life.

36. Piotr H. Kosicki, "Masters in their own Home or Defenders of the Human Person? Wojciech Korfanty, Anti-Semitism and Polish Christian Democracy's Illiberal Rights-Talk," *Modern Intellectual History* 14, no. 1 (2017): 99–130; Paul Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism and Antisemitism, 1890–1944* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 170–192.

37. Marco Duranti, "The Holocaust, the legacy of 1789 and the birth of international human rights law: revisiting the foundation myth," *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 2 (2012): 159–186.

38. Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother*; Duranti, "Holocaust."

39. Louise Moor and A.W. Brian Simpson, "Ghosts of colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights," *British Yearbook of International Law* no. 76 (2005): 121–193.

40. Essential to totalitarianism is, however, the equation of Nazism and Bolshevism. Arguably the first to make this equation methodologically was Waldemar Gurian in 1932: James Chappel, "The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe," *Modern Intellectual History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 561–590.

41. See, e.g., Emiel Lamberts, *The Struggle with Leviathan: Social Responses to the Omnipotence of the State, 1815–1965*, trans. Maria Kelly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016).

42. Martin Shipway, *Decolonisation and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).

43. Patrick Pasture, *Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

44. Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*.

45. Martin Conway, "Left Catholicism in Europe in the 1940s: Elements of an Explanation," in *Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, ed. Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 237–247.

46. Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*, 209.
47. See Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł's chapter in this volume; Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 163–190; Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane*, 134–135.
48. Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*, 176–184, 185–195. On Christian Democracy's inclination toward compromise, see esp. Kees van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State* (London: Routledge, 1999).
49. See, e.g., Tiziana Di Maio's chapter in this volume.
50. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, 191–252; Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane*. See also Lucian N. Leustean, "The Ecumenical Movement and the Schuman Plan, 1950–54," *Journal of Church and State* 53, no. 3 (2011): 442–471.
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52. Patrick Pasture, "Rethinking the roots of Christian Democracy: A European view," RSCAS Working Papers (accepted).
53. Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe*, 90.
54. Pasture, "Christian Fatherland."
55. Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 132–143.
56. Nehal Butha, "Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (2014): 10–36.

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Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer: A New Approach

Tiziana Di Maio

The political community of "Europe" envisioned by the founders of what would later become the European Union (EU) was above all a community based on a specific set of values. Economic integration, which is often regarded as the driving force of the broader integration process, was not their main, unique purpose when they began their work at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s. Alongside industry, agriculture and commerce, they pursued a mutual, cultural understanding among European peoples. They believed that integration could take place only on a base of shared values. Often, they were called "visionary," their European project "a dream." Nevertheless, its fulfillment was built on solid ground, which allowed the dream to come true through a policy of realism and pragmatism. The so-called founding fathers of the European Communities paid continued heed to the context in which they were operating, and as a result they understood that a complete realization of their political visions could only be achieved in time. It is for these reasons that their pro-European politics remain current today, even amidst the very serious crisis of both economy and values embodied,

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among others, by the United Kingdom's 2016 vote for "Brexit." With the old dictum of "ever closer union" seeming invalidated by the rise of national populism and demands for a retreat from Brussels, it is essential for scholars and statesmen alike to keep in mind postwar Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi's call to "act promptly and insightfully." These are the words that Italy's celebrated European "founding father" used to call France and (West) Germany to a "European" negotiating table, to reconcile.[1]

The EU is currently undergoing a dramatic period and, as a result, even the significant achievements of its founding fathers seem to be questioned. It is with an eye toward "Brexit" and Europe's populist resurgence in the second decade of the twenty-first century that this chapter will offer a new narrative of the common vision of Europe and the shared political partnership undertaken by two great postwar statesmen: De Gasperi and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Theirs is also a story of two nations linked by defeat in the Second World War, whose leaders looked beyond the emerging Cold War division of Europe to argue that a united Western Europe was better than none.

Two Statesmen: Parallels, Analogies and Differences

Since the very end of World War II, Italian, German and international historiographies have sought to make sense of the unique careers of Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. Their biographies and politics, both domestic and foreign, have been extensively examined—both individually and in comparison with one another. The first interpretations of the two statesmen's policies were influenced by the quest for parallels between Italian and German history, which resonated clearly in the study of the two leaders.[2] In particular, the analysis of the reconstruction and the re-establishment of democracy after Fascism and Nazism showcased "common or similar solutions taken by the two countries and the two statesmen," as well as their "personal" driving role in the politics of their countries' respective national reconstructions.[3] Existing studies have also emphasized the similarities in De Gasperi's and Adenauer's biographies, as well as in their political and religious beliefs. As the story goes, by rule of analogy, the common features of the two men's biographies have been taken as narrative pillars for the history of the construction of the EU.[4] However, against the multiple parallels traced throughout

the historiography, more recent studies have highlighted both "the analogies and differences," "the convergence and asymmetry" of the two statesmen.[5]

It is well known that De Gasperi and Adenauer—just like postwar France's Foreign Minister Robert Schuman—were from boundary regions marked at the time by a recently irredentist and separatist past.[6,7,8] They were Catholic, spoke the same language (German) and underwent their political educations before World War I, which they regarded as a dramatic caesura in European history. It was bearing witness to the tragedy of the Great War that produced their deep desire for peace and the idea of a united Europe. Other similar patterns were the Italian and German dictatorships, their imprisonment and witness to the Nazi-Fascist Alliance, which led once again to war, as well as great defeat.

After World War II, both Italy and Germany were considered unreliable, albeit for different reasons.[9] De Gasperi and Adenauer became heads of government in a period when it was necessary to make fundamental choices. The war had destroyed not only material goods, but also the people's morale. Everything was to be rebuilt, starting with the democratic order, political process and diplomatic relationships, which the war had demolished, leaving postwar statesmen to wonder if the damage was not irreversible.

It was necessary to bring together the populations that had fought against one another, and in particular to reconcile with Germany, which would become an essential partner and a bulwark of American and European efforts against the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War. The reintegration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the liberal "West" implied a comprehensive reconciliation with the German nation. After World War II, the horror of the concentration camps and the crimes carried out by the SS and the Wehrmacht were revealed. In the face of this knowledge, world public opinion began to consider the whole German population "collectively responsible" for the Nazi offenses, requiring that an example be made of the German nation, thus to be exemplarily punished.[10] In September 1944, US Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau proposed to Franklin D. Roosevelt a plan judged symbolic of the initial project of a "Hard Peace" that his administration was weighing. Under the Morgenthau Plan, Germany—as the country responsible for the war—was to be politically dismembered and transformed into a mainly agricultural country through a systematic,

industrial dismantlement, so as to prevent it from causing harm again in the future.

In the end, the Nuremberg Trials ultimately sought to inculpate and punish responsible individuals, rather than a nation. The coming of the Cold War made allies of the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, culminating in the latter's acceptance into NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1955. And yet, a stigma of collective responsibility hung over Germany for having dealt Europe the tragic experience of war twice in less than thirty years.[11] And like Germany, Italy, too, had a past to forget and a future to rebuild from scratch. This was the context in which the German–Italian bilateral relationship was re-established after the end of World War II, together with a personal connection between Adenauer and De Gasperi. Against this backdrop, the European project began to take shape.

Overcoming the Past

De Gasperi's policy toward Germany was inspired by the prewar political line of the Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party, PPI), founded in 1919 by Luigi Sturzo.[12] From the end of the Great War onward, Sturzo—one of De Gasperi's political mentors—had underlined the "need for a compromise between the victors and the vanquished, as well as coexistence with Germany at the European level for long-term agreements."[13]

The importance of reconnecting with Germany was openly articulated in 1921, when a PPI delegation—guided by Sturzo and joined by De Gasperi—traveled to Germany in order to establish relations with the German Catholic political party, the Zentrum (Center). Such a visit represented the first concrete step toward the international collaboration of European parliamentary groups of Christian inspiration. Furthermore, the choice of location was not accidental: at the time, the Zentrum was one of the main Catholic parties in Europe and, therefore, a point of reference and model for its Italian counterpart.[14] Above all, the PPI initiative clearly revealed the Italian desire to overcome the wounds that World War I had caused and the ways the peace treaties had exacerbated them.[15]

On that occasion, Alcide De Gasperi met Konrad Adenauer for the first time. After returning to Italy, the former wrote in the pages of the newspaper *Nuovo Trentino* that, in Germany, there was a school of

thought that was gradually turning away from the traditional policy of "Teutonism" toward a new concept of "solidarity and European brotherhood."[16] Don Sturzo, for his part, wrote then in the columns of *People and Freedom*: "God made nations healable."[17]

After World War II, De Gasperi's Christian Democratic Party (DC) returned to Sturzo's line, adapting it to current needs and putting it into practice. The new Italian Catholic party was inspired not only by Sturzo but also by memory of the PPI's active participation in the first proto-Christian Democratic "international," the International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration (SIPDIC), created in 1925.[18,19] De Gasperi's revival of the combined prewar legacies of the PPI and SIPDIC convinced the German Christian Democrats that the Italian DC could be trusted as a partner. In fact, the party was among the very first in Europe to reject officially both the principle of a punitive peace—consistent with De Gasperi's request for a fair terms policy also for Italy—and the concept of collective German responsibility. DC—itself facing the complex scenario of a divided Italian nation having to overcome the shame of wartime collaboration with the Third Reich—was thus accepting Pope Pius XII's invitation to strive for a peace agreement consistent with the principles and values of the Gospels. De Gasperi's goal, in other words, was a "Christian peace," based on respect for human dignity.[20]

De Gasperi and Adenauer met for the second time thirty years after that first PPI visit. In June 1951, the chancellor was received in Rome: it was his first official visit to a foreign country. As observed by Adenauer's German biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz, the reason why he chose Italy was quite disheartening: "at the time, it was the only state where he was welcome with no restrictions."[21] During their head-to-head meeting, De Gasperi and Adenauer strategized about anti-Communism and European security, which was to be guaranteed by the economic and military support coming from the USA and Europe. The two leaders declared that the new Italo-German friendship would serve European unity, releasing a statement to this effect in order to reassure France that they were not establishing another Rome–Berlin axis.[22] De Gasperi and Adenauer affirmed a consensus of viewpoints on the major international challenges of the day, as well as the shared will to solve the domestic problems of various individual European states by forming a united Europe.[23]

Six years after the end of World War II, the Italo-German friendship was rekindled over the issue of consolidating the peace, as Adenauer

and De Gasperi admitted in an exchange of telegrams on the day following the German chancellor's Roman visit. De Gasperi enthusiastically observed to Adenauer that the best strategy for the defense of peace and democracy on the continent would be an organic union of the free peoples of Europe—meaning, those nations not trapped behind the Iron Curtain. The chancellor answered with words of determination and hope:

> We agree that the problems of our time can only be solved if we manage to defeat that extreme nationalism that in the last decades has caused everyone immense misfortune. The only way for this to happen is through a strong collaboration among the free peoples of Europe, in whose name we are ready to deploy all of our forces. We all want peace, peace within freedom![24]

In Rome, Konrad Adenauer was surprised to note a certain sublimation of anti-German feelings. Had the Italians forgotten about that brutal friendship, the massacres and reprisals committed during the Nazi occupation of Italy? Of course not. The relaxed atmosphere characterizing the chancellor's visit was made possible above all by an informational and educational campaign conducted by DC since 1945, which sought to facilitate among Italians a good disposition toward this "new" Germany. In an interview published in the newspaper *Il Popolo*, Lina Morino wrote, "Adenauer is certainly the most reliable guarantee for tomorrow's Christian and pro-European Germany."[25] During that interview, the chancellor declared that "Germany strongly agrees with Italy on the idea of realizing a European federation," and its main goal is "peace consolidation."

This interview can be considered emblematic, as it was published a few days before Adenauer's visit to Rome. It showed that Italian Christian Democrats believed it necessary to suppress the attempt by socialists and Communists to keep alive the memory of an increasingly obscure Italo-German past by explaining Adenauer's visit and the renewed relationship between the two countries as a means of fostering the birth and strengthening of a new Europe. The interview also demonstrated that Italian public opinion needed to be reassured about the solidity of these new relations. In 1951, the fear was that (West) Germany was "more prone to an acceleration in relations with France, rather than with Italy." The chancellor parried such concerns

by thanking the Italian government for "always declaring itself in favor of Germany's complete equality of rights within the community of free peoples," stating that "true harmony in Europe will not be possible without an understanding among Germany, France and Italy."[26]

In Rome in 1951, the chancellor reportedly enjoyed one of the best days of his life.[27] The kind welcome and treatment that Adenauer received was based on the line in the sand that he drew between Nazi Germany and the new Rhenish, federal, Catholic-led and democratic Germany. The new, post-"Teutonic" (west) Germany of the early 1950s was now finally pointing "toward a new concept of solidarity and European brotherhood." Such a Germany deserved to be trusted again.

The importance of this recasting was elemental. This is clear if we recall that, during the last years of World War II, the pan-European anti-Lutheran prejudice—shared by generations of Catholics, animating debates since the 1930s on Protestant heresy as a core foundation of National Socialism—had risked corroborating the theory of an existing German tendency toward authoritarianism and blind, unconditional obedience.[28] As British historian and theologian Donald Nicholl argued in *La Via*, "Catholics learned, for their part, to draw a very sharp line connecting Luther to Hitler, including Frederick the Great and Bismarck."[29]

This essentialist "Teutonic" tendency was to be centralizing, militarist and pro-German. After World War II, however, it faded, alongside outmoded narratives of past Prussian glory—as Guido Gonella, one of DC's founders, wrote in the party newspaper *Il Popolo* in 1944.[30] It is also worth recalling that, in 1947, Italy witnessed the publication of a host of books with forceful, even aggressive, titles, such as *Uomini e tedeschi* (Humankind and the Germans). According to this book's Russian author, these were the two categories into which humanity had been "reduced by the experience of the Nazi invasion of Ukraine."[31]

Italians' increasingly cordial attitude echoed among German politicians and contributed to the spread of a feeling of trust toward DC. First Bavarian Catholics, then the Christian Democrats represented by Adenauer, began to regard De Gasperi's party and Italy more generally as a trustworthy ally. "Italy gives Germany a hand,"[32] wrote Josef Müller, leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), in May 1948, a time when the re-establishment of official contacts with *the* enemy (Germany) was branded inappropriate by French and other European political authorities.[33] Thanks in part also to the pope's mediation, Bavarian Catholics were the first representatives to establish a good relationship with the

Italian Catholic party. Their priority was to heal the rift between the two countries after two dramatic years of Nazi occupation. In the wake of these efforts, beginning in 1948, Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) started to build an intense and fruitful relationship with DC.[34]

At the same time, the establishment of the Geneva Circle and the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales afforded Italian and German Christian Democrats the opportunity to get to know each other better and to strengthen their parties' relationship.[35] This, in turn, helped to foster the recovery of diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany, as well as their cooperation on behalf of European integration. From the German point of view, it was the electoral success of DC—the only Christian Democratic party to win an absolute majority in its first elections after the war—and De Gasperi's pro-European actions that had helped to foster greater trust in the Italian party.

German trust in DC, in turn, intensified their bilateral and international collaboration. Specifically, the contact between DC and the CDU, which shared the same religious and political beliefs, was crucial to create a more relaxed atmosphere for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany (as well as relations between the nations). In fact, it was only in 1951 that the Federal Republic of Germany took control of the country's foreign policy and, therefore, of its diplomatic relations.[36] Until then, personal contacts had played an essential role in the two countries' approach and in the intensification of their relations, which, thanks to the commitments of these years, reached their zenith in the period 1951–1953. On the other hand, Italy won its own diplomatic victories, too: the first embassy to open in Bonn was, in fact, Italian; Adenauer's first official visit abroad was to Rome, while De Gasperi was the first European head of government to make an official visit to the Federal Republic.

The historical archives paint a portrait of two leaders in perfect harmony, even if their bond was not (yet) as strong as the one linking the (West) German and French governments.[37] Their correspondence intensifies considerably in these years, revealing a fruitful alignment on the questions of the European Defense Community (EDC) and of the project for a European political community. It also demonstrates that the relationship between the two statesmen is mainly based on confidence in De Gasperi, whom the German press and diplomatic corps considered the major guarantor of DC stability, as well as that of the Italian government more generally.

At the same time, Germany, too, needed a stable counterpart. Italy, then, was "unquestionably the most significant connection to Germany in Europe," as the German pro-government newspaper *Neue Zeitung* reported in 1951.[38] "The fact that the prime minister is a friend of Germany and supports its well-founded requests because of a profound conviction of his must be taken into consideration as an important development to our credit"—so wrote German consul general to Italy Clemens von Brentano after meeting De Gasperi prior to his second state visit to the US, in a note to Auswärtiges Amt.[39]

After World War II—and, among others, on the advice of his diplomatic corps—De Gasperi soon realized that Germany would continue to play a prominent role in international relations, even if it would also need to tend toward passivity for a long time.[40] The Italian leader understood that Europe's future depended on Germany's participation in the European integration process. Beginning in 1948, therefore, De Gasperi argued for its inclusion in Europe; the Italian statesman even acted as mediator between France and the Federal Republic in order to soothe persistent tensions. Peace and stability on the continent were, in fact, mainly subject to the resolution of the old, ongoing Franco-German rivalry.

During the debate on rearmament and the prospects for a "European army," Italy claimed that European integration should imply a more "realistic" policy toward Germany.[41] In a meeting with French premier René Pleven and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in Santa Margherita Ligure in February 1951, De Gasperi delivered a speech intended to aid France in overcoming its hesitation about the Federal Republic's equal participation in an integrated army.[42] On the eve of the meeting, De Gasperi had received Germany's consul general on an unofficial visit, reassuring the diplomat that he believed Germany's contribution to be "absolutely necessary." The Italian prime minister also maintained that he would strive to find a solution to the problem that "would take into consideration German public opinion as well as the wavering French attitude." Brentano explicitly articulated the "well-known arguments" of his government, including *Gleichberechtigung* (equality of status) for its contingents and subsequent revision of the occupation statute.[43]

Back from the Santa Margherita conference, as well as visits to London and Paris, De Gasperi received von Brentano again and informed him he had told French and English representatives that a "European defense without Germany was nonsense." De Gasperi asked

him to reassure Adenauer, insisting that he "would defend with strong conviction the cause of Germany's admission to the family of free peoples as a member with equal rights, in need of an active German partnership with the other peoples of Europe."[44]

Hans-Peter Schwarz has argued that, in the new context of the Cold War, Alcide De Gasperi and his foreign minister, Carlo Sforza, considered the integration of the "new Germany" into Europe and the commitment to overcome the Franco-German rivalry as one of the "missions of a democratic Italy."[45] His remark is confirmed in the Federal Republic's first chancellor's memoirs: "I have never forgotten that, right after the birth of the Federal Republic, the Italian government led by Alcide De Gasperi sided resolutely with the reintegration of Germany into the community of the European nations."[46]

A COMMON VISION OF EUROPE

The political experience and biographical paths of De Gasperi and Adenauer became the basis of their political projects and, most notably, their visions for Europe. Adenauer's interest in a united Europe derived directly from his previous political experience and convictions, developed during the German Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Such beliefs included, for instance, the unconditional repudiation of National Socialism and totalitarianism, the defense of the Christian vision of mankind and a commitment to peace and freedom. The German chancellor's Rhineland origins were crucial to the development of his pro-Western leanings and his understanding that an urgent reconciliation with France constituted a precondition for peace and unification on the continent.

The idea of a politically united Europe became part of Adenauer's vision already in the wake of World War I. In 1919, addressing Cologne University students, he invoked the need to promote a lasting reconciliation among peoples, achieved through a stable community of nations, in order to save Europe.[47] This project had to be based on reconciliation with France: European unity and Franco-German friendship have been indissoluble since then.

Their two intertwined economies helped to seal and strengthen this relationship. In 1923—the year of the great crisis of the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, paired with separatist turmoil in the Rhine— Adenauer went so far as to suggest a community of economic interests

among the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr, Belgium and France.[48] Such a transnational economy could have been an exemplar for real and complete integration, as Adenauer reaffirmed years later in his *Memoirs* while meditating on the meaning of the Schuman Plan.[49]

Adenauer's Europe hinged, therefore, on an actual partnership among Europeans. In the early 1920s, he understood that World War I had made Europe politically weaker. The fracturing of European peoples and the continent-wide resurgence of nationalism were major concerns. Two decades later, after the catastrophe of World War II, he had the chance to contribute and make his vision a reality by pursuing a policy aimed at strengthening Europe through union and partnership.[50] As Adenauer understood it, the creation of a "United States of Europe" would give the Old Continent the opportunity to "benefit from the blessings of a permanent peace."[51]

Alcide De Gasperi, too, developed internationalist and pro-European sensibilities between the two world wars. Like Adenauer's Rhineland background, De Gasperi's Trentino origins help to explain his internationalist thinking.[52] It is also due to his particular experience of war that the Italian statesman matured in his awareness of the dawn of a new era in international relations. After World War II, while former anti-Fascist leaders and Italian diplomats were aiming at restoring Italy's predominance in Europe, and in particular, in the Mediterranean basin, De Gasperi foresaw that nation-states would no longer be able to act by their own individual power in the approaching bipolar, Cold War system.[53]

This intuition convinced De Gasperi that European states could overcome their postwar political and economic weaknesses only by uniting, with the result that they would be able to play a proactive diplomatic role in resolving the US–Russian antagonism. His concept of Europe, however, was not of a "third power," competing against the two superpowers. Its mission was, instead, to *mediate* between East and West, capitalism and materialism. De Gasperi saw Europeanism and Atlanticism as "two faces of the same policy," as he indicated in the pages of *Il Popolo* in 1949, in which he aimed at justifying and presenting the North Atlantic Treaty as a guarantee of European integration and security.[54]

Even the German chancellor recognized well in advance the weakness of nation-states in the face of the new bipolar system, as well as the essential American role in postwar Europe's reconstruction and security. It is, in fact, telling that the US ranked first in volume of Germany's

foreign correspondence. To Konrad Adenauer, a united Europe would have to reflect Germany's bond with the West and, therefore, a preference for the USA. At the same time, European integration was to bring an equalization of rights, which followed from the Allies' decisions as they appeared in the treaties signed in Washington, DC, on 8 April 1949. These established the birth of a German, Western state with limited sovereignty—in particular, the new state was to be deprived of foreign policy and defense competence—but also envisaged that the Federal Republic would be able to regain sovereignty fully once the Germans had demonstrated an adherence to norms of democratic action, anchored to the West and adjoined to the process of European integration. According to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "a major objective of the three allied governments is to encourage and facilitate the closest integration, on a mutually beneficial basis, of the German people under a democratic federal state within the framework of a European association."[55] To Adenauer, in the end, European integration was an attempt to prevent the realization of an anti-German coalition among the victors of World War II: "my nightmare is called Potsdam," he wrote in his memoirs, paraphrasing Bismarck's *Cauchemar de coalition* (Coalition Nightmare).[56]

Both Adenauer and De Gasperi were aiming to secure Italy and Germany to Europe and the West. A politically united Europe was, to them, the institutional realization of economic agreements and the solution to defense and security problems. Europe also represented the definitive end to previous authoritarian regimes, as well as a tool for fighting the threat of Communism.[57] Therefore, the German and Italian statesmen did have a shared path to follow and a common goal to reach. And yet, for Germany, Europe symbolized the way to the reacquisition of full sovereignty.[58] Meanwhile, for De Gasperi, Europe represented the achievement of Italy's highest level of autonomy, an "autonomy within integration."[59]

Their political visions and goals converged to the utmost in the years 1951–1953, when pro-European politics became tangible, and De Gasperi committed fully to this project. The Italian's suggestion to found a European political community followed the vision of Adenauer, who saw it as a means to have Germany's *Gleichberechtigung* acknowledged. Moreover, such a proposition leads to the definition of what could be called a "pragmatism based on ideals," which is a recurring feature in De Gasperi's politics. Its origins can be traced to the Italian statesman's

address to the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 10 December 1951, when he presented his project: "The need for security generated the North Atlantic Treaty as a defense against external threats. Nevertheless, in order to respond to them efficiently, Europe *first* needs an *internal* system of defense to prevent the resumption of its own tragic legacy of civil wars. It is the seed of disruption and decline, as well as mutual skepticism and moral decay that we must fight."[60]

Alcide De Gasperi believed strongly that the creation of an institutional mechanism for military security at the European level was necessary, and that it would also serve to initiate and accelerate the political unification process. The Italian prime minister knew that Adenauer would support him on this count, as he was putting faith in De Gasperi's project, which could lead to desirable outcomes from the Federal Republic's point of view.[61]

Germans wanted to confer official, solemn awards on their "Roman friend," as De Gasperi was called by many German newspapers in 1952.[62] Deserving of mention among such awards is the Charlemagne Prize, presented to De Gasperi in 1952 in recognition of his work in support of European unity. Aachen *burgomaster* Albert Maas explained the motivation for the prize, which efficiently summed up the role played by De Gasperi since World War II in the pursuit of European unity: "H.E. Alcide De Gasperi […] was awarded the international Charlemagne Prize […] in recognition of his ongoing contribution to the promotion of the unification of Europe. His tireless dedication—inspired by a sense of reality—to the political and economic collaboration of European peoples for the achievement of a supranational union has achieved significant and practical results!"[63]

In the official speech given during the ceremony, *burgomaster* Maas stressed the active political role played by De Gasperi. Maas reflected:

We are very honored today to be conferring this prize upon an active European politician. It is one matter to bring a great idea to people's consciousness through rousing power, and it is another matter to bring such an idea closer to its realisation through tenacious struggles against faint heartedness and egoism. And this, your Excellency, is your historical achievement! It is not necessary to recall your thoughtful, committed "waggling" during many European conferences […]. With a goal in mind, you have brought Italy onto the European path! Without Italy, we would not be so far along; Europe cannot come into being without Italy.[64]

During De Gasperi's visit to Germany, local newspapers often underlined the new spirit of the Italo-German relations. "The Italo-German friendship must serve the European community," the two leaders declared in a joint statement released before De Gasperi's departure from Germany.[65] In their long meeting, De Gasperi and Adenauer had extensively discussed the danger of a renaissance of neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi groups, thus agreeing on the constitution of an "anti-totalitarian front" between Italy and Germany, to be founded on the exchange of information between the two countries' police corps and secret services.[66] The Italo-German friendship found further impetus in the intensification of cultural exchanges. In particular, the two statesmen committed to facilitating the mobility of young students, as well as German workers willing to spend their holidays in Italy or Italians keen to travel to the Federal Republic. They also set out the basis for an agreement establishing the return of German cultural institutes once located in Italy.[67] Adenauer praised the new Italo-German friendship and expressed his wish for it to become even deeper and more solid with time.[68]

De Gasperi's image as a supporter of the German cause in international assemblies found further confirmation during the visit to the Federal Republic. The visit also nurtured new hopes in the pages of the German press. According to *Die Welt*, De Gasperi was intensifying the campaign which had already been contributing to overcoming the rift among European peoples. The Italian prime minister—continued *Die Welt*—was the friend capable of overcoming the obstacles still dividing the peoples of Europe—in particular, France and Germany—and of convincing their governments to convoke a European Constituent Assembly: "this is why our hopes rely on him."[69]

In the award acceptance speech, De Gasperi invited Germans to be optimistic: the nationalistic hatred and era of revanchism, which had caused the war in Europe, was now over. The Italian statesman insisted, "The future will not be built through force, nor the desire to conquer, but by the patient application of the democratic method, by the constructive spirit of agreement and by respect for freedom. More than once, this truth was announced to peoples, but too often it was also swallowed by impatience and impulsive and irrational forces."[70]

The Charlemagne Prize was awarded to De Gasperi at a moment when, as both head of government and foreign minister, he was one of the most committed supporters, as well as author of a decisive turn

toward a more concrete program of union among the six countries that had adhered to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), followed by an abortive attempt at a European Defense Community. Two years later, in January 1954, when De Gasperi's personal and political situation was deeply changed, Adenauer's government bestowed upon him its "Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany," so as to explicitly and openly reiterate West Germany's gratitude for his important work in support of the country.[71] This honor was granted to De Gasperi "in recognition of the special merit accrued to the Federal Republic of Germany."[72]

Conferring such an award was also a strong sign of support to De Gasperi at a moment when he seemed to be on the way out, both domestically and in the field of European integration. It was a symbol of support to the persona, the man, who, despite his political decline, was still enjoying Adenauer's loyalty. The chancellor, in fact, continued to believe he could count on De Gasperi. In March 1954, during a state visit to Rome, Adenauer went to meet him at his residence in Castelgandolfo and before leaving, the German stated, "We need two more years to live. Then, once Europe will be united, we could finally retire."[73] Adenauer had traveled to Rome to convince Prime Minister Mario Scelba, De Gasperi's successor, of the meaningful impact Italy's ratification of the EDC Treaty would have had on the French Parliament. Nevertheless, the minutes of the meeting held at Villa Madama on 26 March show clearly that the Italian government could no longer be considered as an "entry to our credit," as consul general Clemens von Brentano had observed three years earlier. Adenauer and Scelba did not understand one another. They both aimed at defending their countries from an eventual Soviet armed attack; as such, they both sought to contain the expansion of Communism. And yet, they never seemed aligned. Each one emphasized his own country's challenges, to the point of exaggeration.[74]

A few months later, Germans grieved De Gasperi's unexpected death. As records show, the news arrived almost simultaneously with the French refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty.[75] Those days were "filled with torment," for the failure of the EDC was a "tragedy," wrote the chancellor in his memoirs.[76] It really had been "the opportunity that happens once, and it is lost, if it is not seized," as De Gasperi had affirmed in December 1951 in Strasbourg, joined by six foreign ministers during a meeting on the EDC Treaty.[77]

Conclusions

The policies of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi were inspired by common values, but also by contingent circumstance: the necessity of taking momentous choices in order to avoid irreversible damage to the international system. After World War II, Italy's and Germany's pro-European leanings were the result of an ideological choice, consistent with the common political beliefs of the two Christian heads of government. Such choices were reinforced by the demands of so-called *Realpolitik*. The word refers to policies based on pragmatism and it is often used with a negative inflection, for example when indicating a Machiavellian approach to politics directed at maintaining power, with no consideration for religion or morality. But, as never before (or since), during the years of the foundation of the German and Italian postwar republics and the resumption of their relationship, the term *Realpolitik* not only had a positive meaning, but it in fact implied an ethics of responsibility that simultaneously encompassed pragmatism, principles, values and religious inspiration.

Since the second half of the 1950s, Italy's and Germany's policies in favor of the European integration process have been interpreted idealistically, through the prism of a legendary affinity and friendship between their leaders. Historiographically, such a story ended up obscuring the very concrete reasons behind the decisions De Gasperi and Adenauer had taken after their countries' defeat. The archives record a harmonious collaboration between the two, but they also show it to be modest, formal and official, thus not comparable to that between the German and the French governments, represented by Adenauer and Schuman. Talks between De Gasperi and Adenauer covered the EDC and the project of a European political community. (There is, in fact, no registered discussion between them on the ECSC.)

At the end of World War II, both Italy and Germany were defeated Axis Powers, considered untrustworthy due to the stain of fascism. De Gasperi and Adenauer understood that embracing the Allies' request for their countries' proactive participation in the European integration process was the only way for the two defeated states to regain stability and autonomy in the new international scenario, together with *Gleichberechtigung* for Germany. Therefore, West Germany's and Italy's foreign and pro-European policies were based upon *both* idealist *and* realist reasons.

Were Adenauer and De Gasperi visionaries? Was their pro-European ideal a dream or in fact a concrete and forward-looking project? Reflecting upon the prospects for European political union, De Gasperi stated in 1952:

> Do you know what is problematic about this project? The real challenge is economic and financial. A federation is based on a principle: each member's payments are proportional to its own resources. An absolute equation number cannot be the rule. Instead, each state contributes proportionally to its wealth. Obviously, the most experienced, worthy and prosperous countries will tend to defend such an historical privilege. Still, within the federation, since the possibilities broaden, there are certain levels of wealth and resources, as well a chance of benefiting from them.[78]

In 1956, when the European project was about to be relaunched after the failure of the EDC Treaty, Adenauer gave a speech in memory of De Gasperi and encouraged Europeans to keep walking the path opened by his Roman friend:

> When De Gasperi died, all Europeans were left with the duty to finish his work, in spite of all obstacles that appear while we realize our visions. Today, that mission is more relevant than ever. We need to find the way to give Europe a common path, without which the future of the European peoples will always be in danger. On this path's threshold – which, as I hope, will preserve the immeasurable, spiritual values of our old continent – will stand in all his historical greatness Alcide De Gasperi. To him, the friend, the statesman, the great European he was, goes our gratitude.[79]

Sixty years later, Europe is no longer divided by an Iron Curtain. Europe no longer faces the choice that Adenauer, De Gasperi and others did: to push ahead with European political union when half of Europe remained captive behind the Iron Curtain. In 2017, the European Union faces new and risky challenges: a middle class that is deeply disappointed and dissatisfied; high youth unemployment rates; a monetary union that seems to have favored only certain countries, thus creating a competitive gap that could potentially challenge the survival of the euro; and the inability to handle migration flows in a common, joint way that is respectful of the founding values of the EU. The net result is a growing feeling of insecurity and fear across Europe. Given such challenges, the citizens' perception of the European institutions has changed: they

are considered weak, far-removed from the real issues of the day. Such an explosive mix risks favoring nationalist thrusts, protectionist and sovereigntist closures and Euroskeptic movements—with a multi-speed Europe seeming almost the best among realistic outcomes.

And yet, in the face of Greek debt, "Brexit" and the growing distrust of East-Central Europe toward the idea and reality of European federation, it is essential to recall the principled *Realpolitik* of Adenauer and De Gasperi: two statesmen who moved their nations beyond the stain of fascism, to the point of making them motors of a new supranational order. The mission described by Adenauer in 1956 is more relevant than ever.

Notes

1. *Il Popolo*, 15 April 1950. Alcide De Gasperi's speech "L'idea europea nel solidarismo cristiano" given in Sorrento, closing the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales Congress.
2. In 1971, the city of Salerno, Italy, hosted the Ninth Italo-German meeting of historians devoted to the transitions from dictatorship to democracy in Italy and Germany: Gabriele De Rosa et al., *Dalla dittatura alla democrazia: La Germania e l'Italia nell'epoca dopo il 1943* (Braunschweig: Albert Limbach Verlag, 1973). Furthermore, in 1979 and in 2009 the Italo-German Historical Institute located in Trento organized two important conferences on the two statesmen and their countries' shift to democracy: *Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi: Due esperienze di rifondazione della democrazia*, ed. Umberto Corsini and Konrad Repgen (Bologna: Mulino, 1984); *L'Europa di De Gasperi e Adenauer: La sfida della ricostruzione*, ed. Maurizio Cau (Bologna: Mulino, 2012). In 2011, LUMSA University and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Delegation in Rome organized a cycle of seminars on the two statesmen, within the parameters of the initiative "Unità–Mito–Visione" (Unity–Myth–Vision), on the occasion of Italian Unity's 150th anniversary: Tiziana Di Maio, "Dalla dittatura alla democrazia: De Gasperi e Adenauer per una nuova Europa," *Res Publica* no. 5 (2013).
3. Corsini and Repgen, *Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi*, 10; Cau, *L'Europa di De Gasperi e Adenauer*, 19.
4. In this area, the interpretations and the testimonies that were published immediately after De Gasperi's death played a significant role. For about fifty years, the documents of Alcide De Gasperi's personal archive remained the property of the family and were not accessible to scholars. Only in the last fifteen years has the family of the Trentino

statesman granted permission for certain scholars to access the archive, which was recently given to the Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence). For a long time, scholars only had the documentation (De Gasperi's writings, speeches and papers) published by De Gasperi's eldest daughter, Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi. Of these, see in particular: Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *De Gasperi uomo solo* (Milan: Mondadori, 1964); Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *La nostra patria Europa* (Milan: Mondadori, 1969); Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *Alcide De Gasperi ricostruttore della patria* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1969); Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *De Gasperi scrive: Corrispondenza con capi di Stato, cardinali, uomini politici, giornalisti, diplomatici* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1974); Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *De Gasperi e l'Europa* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1979). In this context, it is worth mentioning also the volume published by De Gasperi's secretary, Paolo Canali: Adstans [Paolo Canali], *Alcide De Gasperi nella politica estera italiana (1944–1953): Note e riflessioni* (Milan: Mondadori, 1953); the biography published by Giulio Andreotti, *De Gasperi e il suo tempo* (Milan: Mondadori, 1956); and finally the volume of testimonies edited by Giovanni Di Capua in 1976: *Processo a De Gasperi, con 211 testimonianze raccolte e interpretate da G. Di Capua*, ed. Giovanni Di Capua (Rome: Ebe, 1976). Over the years, several analyses were dedicated to the "founding fathers" of the European Union, namely De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman. See, e.g., Werner Weidenfeld, *Impegno per l'Europa: Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Robert Schuman: Problemi, proposte, argomenti* (Rome: Fondazione Konrad Adenauer, 1981); *Sulle tracce dei padri dell'Europa, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Jean Monnet e Robert Schuman*, ed. Giuseppe Zorzi (Trento: Fondazione Trentina Alcide De Gasperi, 2013); Gerlando Lentini, *Alle radici cristiane dell'Unione europea: Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi* (Rome: Città Nuova, 2004); *I fondatori dell'Europa unita secondo il progetto di Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi*, ed. Giuseppe Audisio e Alberto Chiara (Cantalupa: Effatà, 1999); Thomas Jansen, "Alcide de Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer, Italien und Deutschland in Europa," *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Online-Publikation*, 2004, at http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.5188; *Vie parallele: Parallele Wege Italia e Germania 1944–2004 Italien und Deutschland 1944–2004*, ed. Renato Cristin (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005); Tiziana Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi e Konrad Adenauer: Tra superamento del passato e processo di integrazione europea* (Turin: Giappichelli, 2004); Tiziana Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer: Zwischen Überwindung der Vergangenheit und europäischem Integrationsprozess (1945–1954)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014).

5. Pietro Scoppola, "Alcide De Gasperi e Konrad Adenauer: Analogie e differenze," in *Italia e Germania 1945–2000: La costruzione dell'Europa*, ed. Gian E. Rusconi and Hans Woller (Bologna: Mulino, 2005), 179–189; Gian E. Rusconi, "Adenauer e De Gasperi: Convergenze e dissimmetrie," in *L'Europa di De Gasperi e Adenauer*, ed. Maurizio Cau, 437–459.

6. For an updated and complete biography of the Italian statesman, see, e.g., Piero Craveri, *De Gasperi* (Bologna: Mulino, 2006); Alfredo Canavero et al., *Alcide De Gasperi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009).

7. The most complete biography of the German chancellor remains: Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction*, trans. Louise Willmot (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 2 vols.

8. Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman homme d'Etat (1886–1963)* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986).

9. For a document-based analysis of the events that led to the Italian armistice in September 1943 and to the subsequent accusation of betrayal by Hitler's Germany: Elena A. Rossi, *Una nazione allo sbando: L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943* (Bologna: Mulino, 1993).

10. A series of lectures on the "questions of guilt" was published in 1946 with great effect – publicizing theories developed by Karl Jaspers at the University of Heidelberg during the winter semester of 1945–1946: "That we are alive, this is our fault," the German philosopher had affirmed. His analysis of the concept of guilt, examined in different domains (criminal, political, moral and metaphysical fault) had to serve, according to Jaspers, as a self-reflection, to find the dignified way of assuming guilt in all its forms; every German was, to varying degrees, co-responsible for the Nazi crimes. In Jaspers's writing, he also indicated the guilt of the victorious powers, but "not for lessening our burden, but for the sake of sincerity, to also resist the possible self-justification, which in politics would have disastrous consequences for everyone," he explained. Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage* (Schneider: Heidelberg, 1946).

11. See, e.g., Jan-Werner Müller, ed, *Memory and Power in Postwar Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

12. As regards the PPI's foreign policy, see Giorgio Gualerzi, *La politica estera dei popolari* (Rome: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1959). On the party's approach to the Franco-German problem, see Igino Giordani, *La politica estera del Partito Popolare* (Rome: F. Ferrari, 1924), 110.

13. These are the words of Luigi Sturzo in the preface to the Italian translation of the following: Alexander Edgar, *Adenauer e la nuova Germania* (Naples: Edizioni politica popolare, 1959), 5.

14. On the relationship between the PPI and the German Center Party between the two wars, see Stefano Trinchese, *Governare dal centro* (Rome: Studium, 1994).

15. Canavero et al., *Alcide De Gasperi, L'esperienza del Partito popolare*, I; Trinchese, *Governare dal centro*, 53–80. Giulio Andreotti analyzes De Gasperi's 1921 visit to Germany as well, underlining the meaning it continued to hold for De Gasperi and Adenauer after World War II: Andreotti, "Adenauer und De Gasperi," in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit*, vol. 1: *Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, ed. Dieter Blumenwitz et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), 390–394; Francesco Malgeri, "Alle origini del Partito Popolare Europeo," *Storia e politica* no. 18 (1979): 285–310.

16. Alcide De Gasperi, "La nostra inchiesta in Germania," *Il Nuovo Trentino* (7 and 14 October 1921).

17. Luigi Sturzo, *La mia battaglia da New York* (Cernusco sul Naviglio: Garzanti, 1949), 81–82.

18. For a complete history of DC from its clandestine founding until its dissolution, see the seven volumes published by the Edizioni Cinque Lune in the late 1980s and updated in 1999 with two new volumes published by Editrice Mediterranea: *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, ed. Francesco Malgeri (Rome: Cinque Lune, 1987–1989, 1999). On the DC political line under De Gasperi's leadership, see Francesco Malgeri, *La stagione del centrismo* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002).

19. Roberto Papini, *Il coraggio della democrazia: Sturzo e l'internazionale popolare tra le due guerre* (Rome: Studium, 1995).

20. With the radio message of 2 June 1945, Pius XII was among the first to officially reject the thesis of collective guilt and plead in favor of a just peace for Germany: Michael F. Feldkamp, *Pius XII und Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 157.

21. On Adenauer's visit to Rome, see Federico Niglia, *Fattore Bonn: La diplomazia italiana e la Germania di Adenauer (1945–1963)* (Florence: Le Lettere, 2010); *Alcide De Gasperi: Scritti e discorsi politici*, vol. III:4: *Alcide De Gasperi e la stabilizzazione della Repubblica (1948–1954)*, ed. Sara Lorenzini and Barbara Taverni (Bologna: Mulino, 2009).

22. Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer.*

23. On the talks between De Gasperi and Adenauer, see the official press release and the statements by the Italian prime minister in the personal papers of De Gasperi: Archivio Maria Romana De Gasperi (AMRDG), *Carte Bartolotta*, 1951, Vol. 7, 21621–21622.

24. Auswärtiges Amt, Press release no. 526/51, Konrad Adenauer to Alcide De Gasperi, Telegram (Bonn: 24 June 1951), Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin – previously Bonn – (PP.AA), Büro

Staatssekretäre, 1949–1963, B2/0063-4 (298), with the translated copy of the telegram sent by Alcide De Gasperi to Konrad Adenauer.

25. Lina Morino (1912–1981), Head of Foreign Relations of the DC party, was a member of the Geneva Circle and of the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales. Delegated several times to the Federal Republic, also on behalf of De Gasperi, she played an important role in the resumption of relations between DC and the Christian Social Union and Christian Democratic Union. On Lina Morino and the role she played in the resumption of relations between the Italian and German parties: Tiziana Di Maio, "Un'artefice sconosciuta dell'integrazione europea: Lina Morino," in *Cittadine d'Europa: Associazioni femminili e processo di integrazione europea*, ed. Beatrice Pisa (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2003), 185–202; Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer.* The latter also describes Morino's role as a link between Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer.

26. Lina Morino, "Un'intesa fra Italia, Francia e Germania indispensabile per una vera armonia in Europa," *Il Popolo*, 16 May 1951.

27. *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 16 June 1951. The controversy on the issue of the libraries of German institutes in Italy (in which Benedetto Croce also took part) did not affect the chancellor nor diminish his enthusiasm for his reception.

28. Renato Moro, *La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica (1929–1937)* (Bologna: Mulino, 1979), 413–476; Renato Moro, "La Germania di Hitler come 'eresia protestante'," in *Die Herausforderung der Diktaturen: Katholizismus in Deutschland und Italien 1918–1943/45*, ed. Wolfram Pyta, Carsten Kretschmann, Giuseppe Ignesti and Tiziana Di Maio (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2009), 93–108.

29. Donald Nicholl, "L'altra Prussia," *La Via*, 17 January 1953.

30. Guido Gonella, "La Prussia focolaio del pangermanesimo," *Il Popolo*, 11 August 1944.

31. Mario Ghidini, "Uomini e tedeschi," in *Uomini e tedeschi: Scritti e disegni di deportati*, ed. Armando Borrelli and Anacleto Benedetti (Monza: Tip. Tipografica Sociale, 1947), 94–106.

32. "Italien gibt Deutschland die Hand: Dr. Josef Müller berichtet der 'NZ' über seine Gespräche in Rom," *Die Neue Zeitung*, 7 August 1948.

33. Josef Müller (1898–1979) took part in World War I, and in 1939, after the outbreak of World War II, he joined the Resistance and was charged with having contacts with Pope Pius XII. During the war, he was repeatedly received by the pope. In 1943, he was arrested and deported to a concentration camp. After the liberation of Germany, he returned to Munich, where he was among the founders of the confessional Catholic Bavarian Party, the CSU, which, after World War II, was in a

confederation with the CDU. On Müller, see Friedrich Hermann Hettler, *Josef Müller ("Ochsensepp")* (Munich: Uni Dr., 1991); Winfried Becker, "Gründung und Wurzeln der Christlich-Sozialen Union," in *Geschichte einer Volkspartei: 50 Jahre CSU 1945 to 1995*, ed. Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung eV and Manfred Baumgärtel (Munich: ATWERB-Verlag, 1995), 69–107.
34. Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer*, 205–278.
35. On Christian Democratic parties' transnational cooperation after World War II, see Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels: Editions Ciaco, 1990); Wolfram Kaiser, "Begegnungen christdemokratischer Politiker in der Nachkriegszeit," in *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, ed. Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth (Stuttgart, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1994), 139–157; Wolfram Kaiser, "Deutschland exkulpieren und Europa aufbauen," in *Christdemokratie in Europa im XX. Jahrhundert*, ed. Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser, Helmut Wohnout (Vienna: Bohlau, 2001); Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); *Transnationale Parteienkooperation der Europäischen Christdemokraten: Dokumente 1945–1965*, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (Munich: K.G. Saur Verlag, 2004); Ştefan Delureanu, *Le Nouvelles Équipes Internationales: Per una rifondazione dell'Europa* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006); *Le Nouvelles Équipes Internationales: Un movimento cristiano per una nuova Europa*, ed. Jean-Dominique Durand (Soveria Monelli: Rubbettino, 2007); *Christian Democrat Internationalism: Its Action in Europe and Worldwide*, ed. Jean-Dominique Durand (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013–2014), 3 vols. On the Italian contribution to postwar cooperation, see Tiziana Di Maio, *Fare l'Europa o morire: Europa unita e "nuova Germania" nel dibattito dei cristiano-democratici europei* (Rome: Euroma, 2008).
36. On the BRD retaking control of foreign policy, see Arnulf Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Westdeutsche Innenpolitik im Zeichen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), II; Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, 1945–2000* (Stuttgart: Dt.Verl.-Anst, 2001); Klaus Hildebrand, *Integration und Souveränität: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1982* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Bismarck in Bonn? Die Außenpolitik Adenauers in historischer Perspektive* (Friedrichsruhe: Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung, 2002); Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*; Bernard Vogel, *Adenauer, das Petersberger Abkommen und die außenpolitische Orientierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2003).

37. The majority of the documentation allowing for the reconstruction of relations between the two statesmen is kept in the private archive of Alcide De Gasperi, now deposited in the Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence), the Archiv der Stiftung Bundeskanzler Adenauer Haus in Rhöndorf (which houses the personal papers of the German Chancellor) and the Archiv für Demokratische Christlich-Politik, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin (which houses the papers relating to the CDU). Additional documentation can be found in the archives of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Archivio storico diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome and Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin) and at the respective State Archives (Central State Archives, Rome and Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).

38. These are the words of the Italian correspondent, Louis Barcata, after the local elections of 1951, in which DC had obtained 35.9 percent of the vote, overcoming strong opposition from the neo-fascist and monarchist right in the south as well as the Social Communist opposition in the rest of the country. Louis Barcata, "De Gasperis Partei bleibt das Rückgrat der Demokratie in Italien," *Die Neue Zeitung*, 14 June 1951. The 1951 elections were defined by *Münchener Merkur* as a clear defeat of the "Communist propaganda paid for by Moscow" and "unequivocal evidence of the strengthening of De Gasperi's government and all the policy pursued so far,"*Münchener Merkur*, 30 May 1951. Actually, the election marked a sharp decline for the DC party.

39. Clemens von Brentano to Auswärtiges Amt, "Strictly confidential" note, 6 September 1951, Tgb. Nr. III b, 04650, PP. AA., Abt. 3/B11-00419-1.

40. It is interesting to note that, in 1947, when the disagreement among the four Allies that would lead to the division of Germany became increasingly obvious, De Gasperi required some Italian missions and embassies to send reports on the situation with Germany directly to him; see Egidio Reale to Alcide De Gasperi, 13 November 1947, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (ACS), De Gasperi Secretary, B. 21, f. 172. The most detailed reports came from Pietro Quaroni (first from Moscow and then from Paris), Nicolò Carandini and Tommaso Gallarati Scotti (London), Egidio Reale (Bern), Nicola Scamacca (Brussels), as well as Giovanni Vitale Gallina, General Secretary of the Legazione, the first Italian diplomat to be accredited in Germany at the time of the institution of the Italian Representation to Germany in 1947.

41. Archivio storico diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE) Rome, *Appunto riservato per il Direttore Generale Affari Politici, Roma, 8 giugno 1951*, Affari Politici, Germania, 1950, B. 13.

42. On the meaning of the meeting in Santa Margherita, see Daniela Preda, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo* (Bologna: Mulino, 2004), 553; Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane?*, 159.

43. Clemens von Brentano to Auswärtiges Amt, "Secret" Report, 7 February 1951, no. 26, PP.AA., B. 2, 1906. In his report, Brentano explicitly underlines the press silence, believing that the meeting "would be undesirable due to French susceptibility."

44. Clemens von Brentano to Auswärtiges Amt, "Very Urgent – Secret" Telegram, 23 March 1951, no. 46, PP.AA., B. 2, 1906.

45. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer*, vol. 1: *Der Aufstieg, 1876–1952* (Munich: Dt. Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1994), 869–870.

46. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 3: *1955–1959*, 2nd edn (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 259.

47. Konrad Adenauer, *Reden 1917–1963*: *Eine Auswahl*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag Anstalt, 1975), 38–41.

48. *Kölner Tageblatt*, 3 November 1923; Schwarz, *Adenauer*, I: 266; Werner Weidenfeld, "Seine Sorge hieß Europa: Konrad Adenauer," in *Persönlichkeiten der europäischen Integration: Vierzehn biographische Essays*, ed. Thomas Jansen and Dieter Mahncke (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1981), 314.

49. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 1: *1945–1953* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1965), 431.

50. Continuity is particularly discussed in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949*, 1st edn (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1966), 426–436; Werner Weidenfeld, *Konrad Adenauer und Europa: Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik der ersten Bonner Bundeskanzler* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1976), 32–46.

51. Konrad Adenauer, radio speech, Nordwestdeutsche Rundfunk (NWDR), 6 March 1946.

52. Umberto Corsini, "Le origini dottrinali e politiche del pensiero internazionalista e dell'impegno europeistico di Alcide De Gasperi," in *Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi*, 249–293.

53. Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992* (Rome: Laterza, 1998), 3–42; Elena Aga Rossi, "L'Italia nel contesto internazionale (1945–1948)," in *1945–1946: Le origini della repubblica*, vol. 1: *Contesto internazionale e aspetti della transizione*, ed. Giancarlo Monina (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007), 25–59.

54. "Truman, la realtà e l'Italia," *Il Popolo*, 23 January 1949; "Nell'unione europea per la pace," *Il Popolo*, 16 February 1949.

55. Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 8 April 1949, in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949*, vol. 3: *Council of Foreign Ministers, Germany and Austria* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), 175–176.

56. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2: *1953–1955* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966), 168, 214–216, 249.

57. Along with American support, anti-communism and fear of the Soviet threat to Western Europe represented real factors in the first stages of European integration. However, if anti-communism guided the actions of both "founding fathers," it must be kept in mind that they interpreted and pursued it differently. In the Federal Republic, Communism did not have a large following; it was, rather, an extra-state phenomenon, concerning eastern Germany, subject to the USSR; in Italy, on the other hand, Communism was deeply rooted in the reality of the country. Adenauer could outlaw the German Communist Party, while De Gasperi had to deal with the Italian Communist Party and try to contain it in Parliament: Scoppola, "Alcide De Gasperi e Konrad Adenauer"; Rusconi, "Adenauer e De Gasperi," 437–459.

58. Adenauer often engages with the subject in his *Memoirs*.

59. Ennio Di Nolfo, "La politica estera italiana tra interdipendenza e integrazione," in *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004), 17–28.

60. *Verbale della riunione dei sei Ministri degli Esteri alla Conferenza dell'Esercito europeo a Strasburgo*, 11 December 1951, AMRDG (currently Archivio Storicio dell'Unione Europea, Fondo Alcide De Gasperi), Affari Esteri, XI, a, *Esercito europeo (1949–1951)*.

61. Di Maio, *Alcide De Gasperi und Konrad Adenauer*.

62. During his visit to the Federal Republic, the press defined De Gasperi as: "the Roman friend" – see "Besuch eines Freundes," *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 22 September 1952; "Ein guter Freund kommt," *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 22 September 1952; "Der Freund aus Rom," *Der Neue Tag*, 22 September 1952; *Hamburger Tageblatt*, 22 September 1952; *Badisches Tageblatt*, 20 September 1952; "a sincere mediator" – see "Ein ehrlicher Makler," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 September 1952; *Neue Württemberghische Zeitung*, 20 September 1952; "Ehrlicher Makler und Freund Deutschlands," *Schwarzwälder Bote*, 20–21 September 1952; "a great Italian" – see "Große Traditionen – große Hoffnungen: Der Festakt im Aachener Rathaus – Karlspreis für einen großen Italiener," *Aachener Nachrichten*, 25 September 1952; a "pioneer" and "creator" of a united Europe – see "Schrittmacher Europas," *Kölner Stadt Anzeiger*, 20 September 1952; "Ein Baumeister Europas," *Mannheimer Morgen*, 22 September 1952.

63. Aachen Mayor, Dr. Alberto Maas's speech on the occasion of the bestowal of the Charlemagne international prize on 24 September 1952, *Programm für die feierliche Überreichung des internationalen Karlspreises der Stadt Aachen an S.E. den Herrn Ministerpäsidenten und Aussenminister der Republik Italien Alcide De Gasperi am Mittwoch, dem 24. September 1952 im Kaisersaal des Rathauses zu Aachen* (speech, Aachen town hall, 24 September 1952), Stadtarchiv Aachen.

64. Ibid.

65. "Deutsch-italienische Freundschaft soll Europa-Gemeinschaft dienen," *Die Neue Zeitung*, 25 September 1952.

66. "Keine neue Achse," *Aachener Nachrichten*, 22 September 1952.

67. "Estes Gespräche Adenauer – De Gasperi," *Aachener Nachricht*, 23 September 1952.

68. Konrad Adenauer's speech held at the Palais Schaumburg on 22 September 1952 on the occasion of De Gasperi receiving the Charlemagne Prize. Adenauer publicly rejoiced that Germans had received De Gasperi's visit with enthusiasm. "Erste Aussprache Adenauer – De Gasperi," *Die Welt*, 23 September 1952.

69. "Hoffnungen auf Deutschland," *Die Welt*, 23 September 1952.

70. Alcide De Gasperi's Charlemagne prize acceptance speech on 24 September 1952, *Programm für die feierliche Überreichung des internationalen Karlspreises der Statdt Aachen*, Stadtarchiv Aachen.

71. The award was created on 7 September 1951, "desiring to visibly express recognition and gratitude to deserving men and women among the German people and of foreign countries […] who served the rebuilding of the country in the fields of political, social, economic and intellectual activity": *Erlaß über die Stiftung des "Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," vom 7. September 1951*, in AMRDG with the bestowal parchment and the Grand Cross.

72. *Verleihungsurkunde, Bonn, den 6. Januar 1954*, AMRDG.

73. De Gasperi, *De Gasperi e l'Europa*, 21.

74. Minutes of the talks between Italian prime minister Scelba and German chancellor Adenauer: AMRDG, Affari Esteri/XIII, O, *Rapporti con i vari stati: Germania*, currently in the Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence).

75. "A pro-European man has died," announced *Die Welt,* claiming his passing to be a great loss not only to Italy ("Ein Europäer star," *Die Welt*, 20 August 1954). "Germany lost a friend," who had continued to work for European integration up until the end (Ro., "De Gasperi," *West-Deusche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 August 1954), a "Friend of Germany and Europe" ("Mit Italien trauert ganz Europa um De Gasperi," *Die Neue Zeitung*, 20 August 1954).

76. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, 2: 270–271, 298.
77. Minutes of the meeting of the six Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the European Army Conference held in Strasbourg on 11 December 1951: AMRDG, Affari Esteri/XI, a, *Esercito europeo (1949–1951)*.
78. *Il futuro dell'Europa*, radio conversation recorded in Rome on 5 January 1952, in De Gasperi, *De Gasperi e l'Europa*, 130–135.
79. Konrad Adenauer et al., "Riconoscenza per Alcide De Gasperi," in *Testimonianze su De Gasperi* (Turin: Aldo Spinardi Editore, 1956), 13–15.

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Not Only De Gasperi: Italian Christian Democrats' Commitment to Europe

Antonio Varsori

If we examine the most widespread general texts of the history of European integration, we would usually discover that Italy's role in the integration process is neglected or underrated in favor of a narrative which sees both France and Germany as the main "heroes," with Britain often portrayed as the "villain" in the integration story. In this picture, very few Italian politicians are remembered.[1] Obviously, there are a few exceptions: Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli; the former, an established partner of Robert Schuman's and Konrad Adenauer's in the European Pantheon of the "founding fathers"; the latter the standard-bearer of the federalist ideal, mainly a European statesman rather than an Italian politician.[2] But De Gasperi died in 1954, and that is more than sixty years ago; so, in spite of Italy's continuing involvement in the European Community/European Union, it seems that Italian politicians do not deserve more than a few cursory and vague remarks as actors in the European integration process.

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This is quite surprising when we examine Italian Christian Democracy. The Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy, DC) ruled the country without interruption for about fifty years. Until the collapse of the First Republic, with only two exceptions, the Spadolini and the Craxi cabinets during the 1980s, all of the Italian prime ministers had been leading members of DC; once again, with very few exceptions, a Christian Democrat almost always held the office of foreign minister. Last but not least, the loyal and unflinching commitment to the European ideal, together with loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and the United States, as well as interest in the Mediterranean areas, remained the pillars at the same time of the Christian Democrats' and of Italy's foreign policy.[3]

In this chapter, I will try to demonstrate that De Gasperi was not an isolated case when we deal with Italian Christian Democracy's attitude toward the issue of European integration. On the contrary, deep involvement in the integration process was a fundamental characteristic of most—we might say almost all—the Christian Democratic leaders. Last but not least, I will try to demonstrate that the Christian Democrats' European heritage influenced Italy's attitude toward the European Union well beyond the end of the so-called First Republic.

THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND EUROPE FROM DE GASPERI TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The first Italian Christian Democrat leader on whom we focus our attention is Amintore Fanfani. Fanfani belonged to the Christian Democratic ruling generation which took the place of De Gasperi during the mid-1950s. He was born in 1908, into a peasant family in the Arezzo province; a brilliant student and a fervent Catholic, he became a professor of political economy in the mid-1930s at the Catholic University of Milan. A supporter of corporatist concepts, he began to oppose the Fascist regime during the war, taking refuge in Switzerland. After the end of the conflict, he became a member of the left wing of DC, the so-called *professorini* ("young professors") alongside Giuseppe Dossetti and Giorgio La Pira.

A strong-willed, outspoken and ruthless politician, but also an intellectual, Fanfani began to emerge as a leading member of DC in the mid-1950s. He favored the so-called "turn to the left": dialogue between DC and Pietro Nenni's Socialist Party as a way to create a center-left government bound to a bold reformist program. He was

prime minister in various Italian cabinets during the late 1950s and the early 1960s; later, on various different occasions, he headed the Italian Foreign Ministry during the second half of the 1960s. His political star began to fade during the 1970s, but he still played a role in public life until his death in 1999.

Fanfani was always very interested in foreign policy, and he advocated a more relevant role for Italy in a period when Italy was emerging as one of the most industrialized countries owing to its economic miracle.[4] It is very often stated that Fanfani was mainly interested in Italy's Mediterranean role and in the early aspects of the détente between Moscow and Washington. Actually, Fanfani, whether as prime minister or foreign minister, was compelled to face de Gaulle and France's challenging European policy. On this front, he consistently remained very active and, in spite of differences of opinion, he won de Gaulle's respect.

On the occasion of the negotiations of the Fouchet Plan of 1961, Fanfani played an important role as a mediator. Although Italy disagreed with de Gaulle's hegemonic ambitions and his strictly intergovernmental approach to the European project, Fanfani thought that there was something positive in the French design and that a compromise solution would in the long run favor the future of a united Europe. His position was different from that held by the Benelux countries, which, on the contrary, were utterly suspicious of de Gaulle's motives. In this connection, it would be possible to point out the numerous bilateral meetings that Fanfani had with the French general. Some commentators argued that Fanfani admired de Gaulle, perhaps even aspiring to create a presidential republic in Italy, a sort of forbidden issue in the political discourse of the Italian First Republic. Fanfani's cautious attitude toward de Gaulle's France was confirmed later on when Fanfani had to deal with Britain's first application to the European Community.

The Italian government, which Fanfani led between late 1960 and mid-1963, was strongly in favor of Britain's involvement in the European Community. From an international standpoint, Italy hoped that Britain could become a counterweight to France's hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, as the Kennedy administration supported Britain's application, Italy aimed at demonstrating its loyalty to the USA. Such a position would ease Fanfani's task in his scheme to create the first center-left government with the full participation of the Nenni Socialists. In order to overcome the suspicions of the right-wing Christian Democrats, Fanfani had to demonstrate that Washington supported the center-left

political formula. In the end, Fanfani made strong efforts in order to favor Britain's candidacy. At the same time, he was aware of the growing obstacles that France was putting up to Britain's membership. His suggestions of moderation to the British authorities were often sensible and coherent, but the Macmillan cabinet was convinced that the French would never dare to veto London's application.

When de Gaulle, in his well-known press conference held in January 1963, did indeed announce his veto of Britain's candidacy, Fanfani thought that, if on the one hand Italy and the other European Economic Community (EEC) partners had to condemn de Gaulle, then on the other hand it would be impossible to resort to an open break with France. In the Christian Democratic leader's pragmatic assessment, the EEC could not survive without France, while Italy's economic miracle was closely tied to the creation of the EEC customs union.[5] Of course, Fanfani was not afraid to defend Italy's economic interests in the EEC context when he thought that vital Italian issues were at stake. In the summer of 1965, it was Fanfani's tough attitude on the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which detonated the so-called "empty chair" crisis. In spite of his appointment in October 1965 at New York as president of the United Nations General Assembly, a very demanding function, from across the Atlantic he continued to follow with great care and with a strong sense of personal involvement the development of the "empty chair" crisis. He was especially concerned with Italian agriculture's future, rather than with European commision powers, thereby confirming his pragmatic attitude toward the European project. Nevertheless, Fanfani was unable to deal with the final outcome of the "empty chair" crisis, as in November 1965 he was compelled to resign from office for domestic reasons.[6]

The "empty chair" episode would open the door to prominence to another DC leader, Emilio Colombo, whose Europeanist record is of some relevance here. Colombo was born in 1920 at Potenza in Lucania, one of the poorest southern Italian regions. A bachelor and a devout Catholic, he devoted his life to his political commitments in Christian Democracy. A member of the moderate wing of the DC, Colombo would on various occasions between the 1960s and the 1980s serve as prime minister, foreign minister and head of important economic ministries. His first European experience came in 1961 when, at that time a young minister for Trade and Industry, he was appointed head of the Italian delegation at the Brussels conference on the economic aspects

of Britain's application to the Common Market. His soft, almost curial, manners, his tendency to favor compromise solutions and his "good sense" attitude won the respect of the European partners. The British authorities, too, otherwise generally skeptical or critical of Italian politicians, appreciated Colombo's efforts and openly stated that whatever progress had been made in the negotiations had been the outcome of Emilio Colombo's art of mediation.[7] Later, in 1963, Colombo became Treasury minister in the center-left coalition government led by Aldo Moro.

In November 1965, when Fanfani was compelled to resign, Aldo Moro thought that Colombo, owing to his European record, could represent the Italian government in the negotiations which would solve the "empty chair" crisis. Colombo was convinced that a compromise with de Gaulle would be of vital importance. Moreover, he was regarded as a Francophile; last but not least, in his capacity as economic minister, he was fully aware of the importance of the EEC for the Italian economy. In late 1965, Colombo had a meeting with the French foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville, where he put forward the formula of "agreement on disagreement."

Italian Christian Democrats were regarded as masters in creating Byzantine political formulas which could reconcile what appeared impossible to reconcile; in Italy, Moro's "convergent parallels" are still often recorded as the best example of the Christian Democratic art of compromise. So Colombo was the original author of what would become the core of the Luxembourg compromise, which would lead to the resolution of the "empty chair" crisis.[8] In the early 1970s, as prime minister, Colombo openly supported Britain's candidacy to the EEC. In the early 1980s, in a period of serious Euro-sclerosis, an initiative by Colombo and the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher led to the so-called Colombo–Genscher declaration, which aimed at favoring the re-launching of European political cooperation.[9]

Aldo Moro is usually regarded—abroad as well as in Italy—as one of the most influential and best-known Italian Catholic statesmen, perhaps also as a consequence of his tragic death in 1978 at the hands of Red Brigades terrorists. Moro was born in 1916 at Maglie, a small town in the Puglia region. He was a leader of the Catholic university student movement and a very devout Catholic. He was a friend of Giovanni Battista Montini, who would become Pope Paul VI. Moro launched an academic career, and he became a professor of constitutional law,

first at Bari University, and later on at Rome's La Sapienza University. From 1963 until 1968, he was prime minister of the First Republic's first center-left coalition. In this period, he was perceived by foreign commentators as a politician mainly interested in domestic policies, paying scant attention to foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s he was appointed foreign minister; in this role, he appeared to be mainly concerned with Italy's Mediterranean role and far less with Rome's European choices.

Actually, the most recent historical research has demonstrated that Moro was involved in the re-launching of European integration which followed The Hague summit conference of December 1969.[10] In this context, Moro strongly supported Britain's candidacy to the EEC, and he tried to play the role of mediator between Paris and London. Moro was also very much concerned about the social transformation which characterized Western European societies as a consequence of the 1968 student upheaval. He concluded, therefore, that the European ideal could become a point of reference for the younger generations, and as a result he was probably the first European leader to advocate an EC policy toward European youth.[11] Moreover, he was convinced that the European Community had to strengthen its social policy, which would obviously favor Italy, especially the southern part of the country. In this same period, another Christian Democrat, Carlo Donat-Cattin, a left-wing Catholic from industrial Turin, very near to the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions, the Catholic trade union CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori), was appointed labor minister. It was mainly Donat-Cattin's initiative that led to an early form of European social dialogue through the convening of the Luxembourg tripartite conference and the creation of the permanent committee on employment, with the involvement of representatives from European trade unions.[12]

The last Christian Democrat leader on whom we focus our attention is Giulio Andreotti.[13] Andreotti was born in Rome in 1919 into a lower-middle-class family. A member, like Moro, of the Catholic university student movement, he was always very near to the Roman papal curia. A secretive and devious politician, he was always well known for his cynical "*boutades*" (outbursts) and love for political power, but for a long time he enjoyed the favor of public opinion for his pragmatic and realistic approach to political issues. His political career began very early, in the late 1940s and early 1950s as under-secretary to the Presidency of

the Council under Alcide De Gasperi, whom he always regarded as his mentor. During the 1960s, Andreotti was appointed defense minister, and he began to develop some useful international experience. In 1972, for the first time he became prime minister of a short-lived conservative government. During his term in office, the Treasury minister, the Liberal Giovanni Malagodi, decided that the Italian lira would leave the European "snake."

Such a decision marked the lowest point in the relationship between the EEC and Italy, and the country was labeled "Europe's Cinderella." Apparently, in those years Andreotti did not show a keen interest in the European project; he was mainly perceived as a clever tactician, chiefly interested in domestic policy and in keeping himself in power. Although Andreotti was a member of the moderate wing of DC, owing to his political skills and maneuvering, in 1976 he was regarded as the leader who could form a government that could enjoy the abstention of the Italian Communists, without arousing the fears of suspicious major Western allies toward a direct Communist involvement in governmental responsibilities. Two years later, following Aldo Moro's kidnapping, Andreotti became the prime minister of a national unity cabinet, which had to face the terrorist threat and a difficult economic situation. It was on this occasion that Andreotti showed that the Catholic commitment to the European ideal was a part of his policy, too. In 1978, owing to a Franco-German initiative, the members of the European Community opened a negotiation which would lead to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS).

The Andreotti government, which had just experienced the severe crisis related to Moro's murder, had to face another difficult choice, albeit of a different character: should Italy join the EMS? Such a decision would involve the implementation of a policy of "austerity" that would create serious difficulties in relations with the trade unions. Moreover, the Italian Communist Party, which had supported Andreotti's uncompromising policy on the occasion of Moro's kidnapping, was not in favor of Italy's immediate adhesion to the EMS. So on this issue the future of the Andreotti coalition government was at risk. And yet Andreotti concluded that Italy's loyalty to the European ideals was by far more important that the fate of his own cabinet. Andreotti wrote in those days that his decisions had been largely inspired by De Gasperi's example and by the role that the Italian Christian Democrats had always played in European integration. In December 1978, Italy joined the EMS,

which was later regarded by Italian historians as the first case of "external bound," an important aspect of Italy's Europeanist policy.[14] The concept implies that a European constraint could help a weak government to implement unpopular policies by exploiting an external—European—commitment which bars any other option.

After a short political eclipse during the early 1980s, in 1983 Andreotti was appointed foreign minister, and he remained in office until 1989, when he once again became prime minister, a role he fulfilled until 1992. Thus Andreotti's role was of fundamental relevance in the context of Italy's European policy in the period which was shaped by the Kohl–Mitterrand team, Jacques Delors's initiatives and the great European transformations which led to the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty. Andreotti and the Socialist Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, played a leading role at the Milan European Council in June 1985 when their intervention led to a majority vote whose consequence was the convening of the Luxembourg intergovernmental conference and the signing of the SEA. Actually, Andreotti was very critical of the SEA treaty, as in his opinion there had been scant progress on the front of political integration, especially as far as the role of the European Parliament was concerned. Andreotti's position was also of great relevance during the negotiations which led to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

In this context, Andreotti was one of the few politicians who fully understood the important, even revolutionary, consequences of the final achievement that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would imply for Italy's economic system. The treaty was a further and by far more constraining "external bound" on the Italian government's economic choices. Only if the Italian authorities could face off the traditional contradictions of the Italian economy—increasing governmental deficit, corruption, inefficiency of state-owned industries and banks—through a policy of austerity and privatizations would Italy become a full member of the eurozone.[15] Another Christian Democrat who understood the vital challenge that the Maastricht Treaty was posing to the Italian ruling elite was the Treasury Minister, Guido Carli. Although he was mainly a technocrat—formerly he was governor of the Bank of Italy and chair of the industrialists' association "Confindustria"—he had been elected to the Senate to represent DC. Alongside Carlo Azeglio Ciampi—at that time governor of the Bank of Italy—Carli was Italy's main negotiator of the EMU.[16]

In the end, the majority of the Christian Democratic political class was unable to understand the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for Italy's internal political balance. Such a failure was at the origins of the political "revolution" that, between 1992 and 1994, wiped out an entire political class and led to the collapse of the First Republic.

The Christian Democrats' European Legacy During the So-called Second Republic and Its Final Collapse

When foreign commentators think about Italian politics after the collapse of the First Republic, their attention usually focuses on Berlusconi and the poor relations between Italy and the EU, as well as the EU's negative opinion of Italy when Forza Italia was in power. But they seem to forget that Berlusconi was first in power for less than one year and that, between 1994 and 1996, the Italian governments were led by Europeanist technocrats, fully supported by the center-left. Indeed, between 1996 and 2001, as well as between 2006 and 2008, and yet again after 2011, Italy was ruled mainly by center-left coalitions, usually led by Catholics or by technocrats, whose main goal appeared to be loyalty to the European ideal. Moreover, we may argue that the European ideal, transformed into a sort of divinity whose opinions could not be challenged, was the only common foundation, the main ideological pillar, on which politicians who had been part of the First Republic political system—that is former Communists, former left-wing Christian Democrats, former lay parties—could build a political formula in a period in which most ideologies had disappeared.

In this context, the European legacy of Italian Christian Democracy played an important role in shaping Italy's policy toward the EU. The main representatives of such a trend were on the one hand Romano Prodi, and on the other Enrico Letta.[17] Romano Prodi was born in Scandiano, near Bologna, in 1939. He started a university career, and he became a professor of political economy at the University of Bologna, where he was a member also of the well-known reformist think tank and publishing house il Mulino. He joined the Christian Democrats, and in 1978 he was appointed minister for the first time. During the 1980s, he was the president of the powerful Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), which controlled most of the state-owned industrial and banking system.

So it is not surprising that, in the mid-1990s, when Prodi proposed himself as the leader of a center-left coalition—the so-called "Olive [Ulive] tree," the common baseline of this coalition was full adhesion to the European ideal. Furthermore, when the "Olive tree" won the general elections in 1996, the foremost goal of the Prodi government was the recovery of the Italian economy through a policy of austerity, which would enable Italy to be a member of the first group of European member states to adopt the new common European currency, the euro. Such a policy appeared to be successful, and it is not by chance that Prodi was later rewarded with the appointment as president of the European Commission. Although in 2001 Berlusconi came back to power, the EU was always suspicious, if not hostile, toward his center-right government, especially when in 2003 the Italian government joined the USA in the peace-keeping operations in Iraq, flouting the mainstream European opinion represented by Chirac and Schroeder, who opposed George W. Bush's Middle East policy. So, when, in 2006, the center-left won the general elections once again, Prodi came back to power as the true representative of the traditional Italian commitment to the EU, and European opinion favored this development.

But in 2008 Berlusconi once again won the parliamentary elections. His government, nevertheless, was doomed to failure as a consequence of private scandals and of the financial crisis that was in the process of disrupting the global economy. In 2011, a technocrat and a former European commissioner, Mario Monti, was called to confront the serious economic situation. When in 2013 the new elections gave rise to a difficult domestic balance among the political parties, after a failed attempt at forming a government by Aldo Bersani, a former Communist, once again the center-left chose a young heir to the Christian Democratic tradition to lead the Italian government: Enrico Letta.

Letta was born in Pisa in 1966, and he studied political science at Pisa University, where he earned a Ph.D. Moreover, he completed additional studies at Sciences Po in Paris, and as a young scholar he was almost immediately interested in the EU. His political career began in Christian Democracy, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s he was the president of the Young European Christian Democrats. His Europeanist record is outstanding and, like Mario Monti, he was very much appreciated in Brussels's "small world" as a full member of the Europeanist elite. But his government was short-lived: in 2014, he was compelled to

resign and to leave the leadership to another leading representative of the Democratic Party (PD), Matteo Renzi, a former Mayor of Florence.

At a first glance there seems to be a link, as far as the European commitment is concerned, between Renzi and other Christian Democrats. In fact, however, this is a false link: although Renzi is a Catholic, he belongs to a younger generation, and he has never been a member of Christian Democracy. Moreover, he has no Europeanist experience and no ties whatsoever with the tradition represented by the Christian Democrats of the First Republic, or even the Catholic members of the "Olive tree." Renzi's attitude toward Europe appears to be pragmatic, if not simplistic; he knows that the feelings of most Italians are no longer so favorable as they were only ten years ago toward the EU and European ideals, while on the contrary Euroskepticism is increasing also among the voters of the Democratic Party. And so, on several occasions Renzi tried to exploit Euroskeptical slogans as a way of demonstrating that his government is bound to pursue a more rigid and realistic policy toward Brussels, such as "Europe cannot be the Europe of the European bureaucrats," "Europe cannot be the Europe of the bankers," etc. When Federica Mogherini was appointed EU high representative for external affairs, Renzi argued that such a choice had been a personal and national diplomatic "victory." He rejects, at least in his official statements, the policy of austerity advocated by Germany, but he is far more cautious when he is in Brussels.[18]

Matteo Renzi represents a definite break with Christian Democracy, but also with the Italian Christian Democrats' European commitment. An era in Italy's European policy is definitely over.

Notes

1. Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 1–29. Obviously there a few exceptions such as the recent contribution by Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe: A History of European Unification* (Oldenbourg: W. de Gruyter, 2015).
2. See especially Wolfram Kaiser's, Tiziana Di Maio's and Wiesław Bar's chapters in this volume; Daniela Preda, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo* (Bologna: Mulino, 2004); Piero Craveri, *De Gasperi* (Bologna: Mulino, 2006).

3. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the role played by Christian parties toward European integration, but attention has usually focused on the German case. Nevertheless, see, e.g., Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jean-Dominique Durand, ed., *Christian Democrat Internationalism* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013–2014), 3 vols; Lucia Bonfreschi, Giovanni Orsina, Antonio Varsori, eds, *European Parties and the European Integration Process, 1945–1992* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015).

4. For an assessment of Fanfani's international role, see Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, eds, *Amintore Fanfani e la politica estera italiana* (Venice: Marsilio, 2010); Varsori, *La Cenerentola*, 159–224.

5. Antonio Varsori, "The Art of Mediation: Italy and Britain's attempt to join the EEC 1960–1963," in *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957–1963*, ed. Anne Deighton and Alan Milward (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). On Fanfani's Atlanticism, see Evelina Martelli, *L'altro atlantismo: Fanfani e la politica estera italiana (1958–1963)* (Milan: Guerini e Associati, 2008).

6. On Fanfani's position, see Varsori, *La Cenerentola*, 187–203.

7. Such an attitude was confirmed by the British records; see Varsori, "The Art of Mediation."

8. Varsori, *La Cenerentola*, 201. In general, on the "empty chair" crisis, see Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace, Pascaline Winand, eds, *Visions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006).

9. On the Colombo-Genscher Declaration, see Hans Stark, *Kohl, l'Allemagne et l'Europe: La politique d'intégration européenne de la République Fédérale 1982–1988* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), 32–42.

10. Francesco Perfetti et al., eds, *Aldo Moro nell'Italia contemporanea* (Florence: Le Lettere, 2011); Alfonso Alfonsi, ed., *Aldo Moro nella dimensione internazionale: Dalla memoria alla storia* (Milan: Angeli, 2013); Federico Imperato, *Aldo Moro, l'Italia e la diplomazia multilaterale: Momenti e problemi* (Nardò: Salento Books, 2013).

11. Simone Paoli, *Il sogno di Erasmo: La questione educativa nel processo di integrazione europea* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010), 87–89.

12. Maria Eleonora Guasconi, "Paving the Way for a European Social Dialogue," *Journal of European Integration History* no. 1 (2003): 87–110.

13. Massimo Franco, *Andreotti: La vita di un uomo politico, la storia di un'epoca* (Milan: Mondadori, 2010); Mario Barone and Ennio Di Nolfo, eds, *Giulio Andreotti: L'uomo, il cattolico, lo statista* (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2010).

14. Varsori, *La Cenerentola*, 314–330.

15. Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della guerra fredda: La politica estera dei governi Andreotti (1989–1992)* (Bologna: Mulino, 2013), esp. chap. 6. The volume is mainly based on the personal papers of Giulio Andreotti kept at the archives of the Luigi Sturzo Institute in Rome.

16. Guido Carli, *Cinquant'anni di storia italiana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1993); Piero Craveri, ed., *Guido Carli Senatore e Ministro del Tesoro 1983–1992* (Milan: Bollati-Boringhieri, 2009).

17. Romano Prodi, *La mia visione dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa* (Bologna: Mulino, 2008); Romano Prodi, *Missione incompiuta: Intervista su politica e democrazia* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2015). On Letta's European commitment, see Enrico Letta, *Euro sì: Morire per Maastricht* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1997); Enrico Letta, *L'allargamento dell'Unione Europea* (Bologna: Mulino, 2003); Enrico Letta, *L'Europa a venticinque* (Bologna: Mulino, 2005).

18. On Matteo Renzi's attitude towards the EU, see my interview in Marco Valerio Lo Prete, "I rischi della Guerra al vincolo esterno," *Il Foglio*, 6 February 2016.

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Sainthood vs. Nationhood: The Beatification Causes of Schuman and De Gasperi

Wiesław Bar

For all of the scholarly attention paid to Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer as politicians and statesmen, there has been precious little effort to explore with any rigor the legacies of their Catholicism. This is precisely the task undertaken by this chapter. The importance of this topic extends well beyond the biographies of these Christian Democratic statesmen and, in fact, beyond the national stories of their home countries. In the story of the beatification causes of Schuman and De Gasperi, we find a bridge between West and East, between "old" and "new" Europe—not least because the pope who approved consideration of the causes for their beatification was the Polish-born John Paul II. The quests for the beatification of Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi frame the legacy of their "Christian inspiration" as a story unconstrained by the Iron Curtain that limited the reach of the European project in their lifetimes.

This treatment of the topic covers both theoretical and practical issues, with an emphasis on the latter. After considering the theological and canonical aspects of beatification processes in general, the chapter

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will focus on the specific causes of Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi. Both beatifications have encountered a range of roadblocks, yet both remain active. Their respective stories carry significance not only for the Catholic Church and Europe as a political or spiritual community, but also for individual Europeans, as both citizens and—where applicable—religious faithful.

The Proposal for Beatification

Since the dawn of Christendom, the importance of any proposed canonization has had to be demonstrated, both with regard to the first martyrs, and to the martyrs who came along later.[1] The basis of the veneration of the latter was the heroism of their virtues—penance and mortification—as well as their miracles, which served as the guarantee and confirmation of their sainthood.[2] Similar principles applied when the Holy See introduced procedures for beatification in the sixteenth century.

The aim that beatification and canonization are intended to serve has been repeatedly recalled by the popes. In 1982, Pope John Paul II explained this purpose in detail when he spoke of the canonization of the martyr of Auschwitz, Maksymilian Maria Kolbe:

> The saints and the blessed exist in history in order to serve as permanent reference points against the background of the transience of man and the world. What is expressed in them is something durable and everlasting. It testifies to eternity. From this testimony, man draws again and again upon the awareness of his vocation and the certainty of his destiny. This is the direction in which the saints lead the Church and humanity.[3]

John Paul II returned to the foundations for beatification and canonization in many documents published throughout his pontificate. Given the status of Schuman and De Gasperi in the Church as laymen, not clergy, two of John Paul II's pronouncements on the subject are particularly relevant to their causes: *Christifideles laici*, on the vocation and mission of the lay faithful in the Church and in the world, published in December 1988, just over two decades after the Second Vatican Council; and his 2003 post-synodal exhortation dedicated to Europe.[4] In the latter, we read that the large number of witnesses to the Christian faith are a great sign of hope, "which we should admire and emulate. They affirm the life of the Church; they appear as a light for the Church and

for humanity, because they have allowed the light of Christ to shine in the darkness."[5]

As emphasized by the Rev. Professor Henryk Misztal, ecclesial value is another way of measuring social value, that is, the social impact of the canonization or beatification of a holy or blessed person on the people of today. In the law of canonization, ecclesial value is "the theological idea of the sociological importance of beatification and canonization."[6] By beatifying or canonizing, the Church offers God its thanks for faithful persons endowed with a particular grace—thanks that they remained faithful to Him during the time of their trials (martyrdom), as well as in their daily lives led according to their calling. At the same time, the Catholic Church offers saints and blessed persons to those alive on earth as examples of the holiness to which they have all been called. Last but not least, saints and the blessed may act as celestial advocates.[7] Hence the call to nominate persons "whose lives have the dimension of a particularly relevant example, and are a specific challenge for modern man."[8] Pope Benedict XVI, for example, appealed to conferences of bishops to select "figures who are contemporary, who still inspire" as candidates for elevation to the honor of the altars.[9]

Only the teaching of the popes mentioned above is reflected in current canon law. Although we do not find the phrase "ecclesial value" in the Codes of Canon Law, the same principle is articulated in other terms, for example in 1236 CCEO (Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium) and 1186 CIC (Codex Iuris Canonici): "The Church […] supports the true and authentic veneration of other Saints, upon whose example the faithful model themselves, and by whose intercessions they are supported."[10] Meanwhile, clear instructions exist relating to the verification of ecclesial value, both at the stage of preparing the cause and during the beatification process. For these, we look to a special law: the Apostolic constitution *Divinus perfectionis magister*, which John Paul II promulgated by the Constitution of 25 January 1983.[11] In the section which concerns us, he decided that the bishop responsible for the cause "1. will demand of the Postulator […] accurate information about the life of the servant of God, as well as reasons that seem to speak for the canonization to be conducted."

This rule of conduct was developed in the *Standards of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints which should be upheld during the investigation by Bishops in matters of canonization* of 7 February 1983.[12] The tasks of the postulator "must include above all a search, within the

life of the servant of God concerned, for the reputation of holiness, as well as the validity of the cause for the life of the Church; and to inform the Bishop of this" (no. 3b). The postulator must be personally convinced as to the existence of the ecclesial value in a given cause; he is to demonstrate this fact in the request to initiate the procedure (*supplex libellus*).[13] This element is very important with regard to the issues presented in this chapter, especially in relation to the cause of Alcide De Gasperi.

The ecclesial value of each cause is verified during the process of canonization within the diocese, and the material gathered during that time is subjected to judgment in the course of the substantive discussions in the Congregation for the Causes of Saints. In the event of a positive decision—one which proves the martyrdom or the heroic virtues of the servant of God—their value is affirmed by a decree of heroic virtue or martyrdom.

Robert Schuman (1886–1963)

In his 2011 essay entitled "Robert Schuman, pray for us!" Paweł Kostecki drew attention to the important fact that Schuman's "process is taking place without any special interest from the media, not only in Poland but also France, Brussels and the Vatican. And it has been going on for twenty-one years."[14] Personally, I think that this is as it should be, especially with regard to the latter places. A search online reveals that media have already set many presumptive deadlines, not only for the beatification, but also the canonization of Schuman and De Gasperi— this, at a time when the processes have not even completed the diocesan phase. This fact has convinced me of the importance of raising and discussing the topic.

The media should not concern themselves with the processes of beatification on their own, but rather with the individual servant of God under examination. This goes for both Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi. The actors in these causes (including the postulants) should focus their attention on these two men's virtues and values. In the context of this topic, I will first present the most important facts from the ongoing causes for beatification.

Crowds of the faithful gathered at the Cathedral in Metz, in the Franco-German borderlands of Lorraine, on 7 September 1963. They were attending the funeral of Robert Schuman. His reputation as a holy

man traveled sufficiently widely and quickly that, three years after the funeral at the cemetery in Scy-Chazelles, his mortal remains were moved to the historic, fourteenth-century church located opposite his family home.

The date of 15 August 1988 witnessed the establishment of the Institute of Saint Benedict, Patron Saint of Europe. Its founder, Prof. René Lejeune (died 2008), was a former close colleague of Robert Schuman. The group of lay faithful who created it—French, German and Italian—initiated the cause for Schuman's beatification, and the institute has been the driving force in this matter. The Institute of Saint Benedict, Patron Saint of Europe described its goal in these terms: "to promote, within the heart of the Church and the world, the light of the assumed sanctity of Robert Schuman (1886–1963), and to offer prayer in this matter."[15]

The canonical opening of the beatification process, by Bishop Pierre Raffin OP, took place in Scy-Chazelles on 9 June 1990. This process gained momentum after the appointment as diocesan postulator of Canon Joseph Jost, a priest of the diocese of Metz, on 12 June 2002. In parallel with the examination of over 200 witnesses, mostly politicians who were colleagues of this servant of God, a historical commission under the chairmanship of Prof. Jean Moes, and a theological commission headed by Dr. Guy Villaros, also began examining Schuman's cause. With respect to the latter, an error was committed, because the censors should have acted independently; those who had been called to work as a theological commission ended up censoring certain writings. Meanwhile, the historical commission gathered documents and analyzed Schuman's effect on contemporary history. Around 750 documents related to the life and activity of this servant of God have been collected; these files amount to over 50,000 pages in total.

On 29 May 2004, Bishop Pierre Raffin presided over the last session of the beatification process at the diocesan level in Scy-Chazelles. That date marked the official closing of the file for Robert Schuman's beatification. The original was deposited in the diocese's secret archive, and on 23 June 2004 two authenticated copies were sent to the Congregation for the Causes of Saints in Rome. The postulator for this phase of the process, with the consent of the aforementioned Congregation, was the ordained Norbertine Father Bernard Ardura; the previous postulator adopted the function of vice-postulator.[16]

On 27 February 2006, the Congregation issued a decree confirming the validity of the diocesan process. The bishops then moved on to compile the *Positio Super Virtutibus*, which is the subject of substantive discussion within the Congregation.[17] The completion of the postulation process was expected in 2013, which was celebrated as the Year of Schuman in conjunction with the fiftieth anniversary of his death. This was done (1) to inform about Robert Schuman and his spirituality, in order to promote and foster the reputation of his holiness; (2) to underscore that political commitments are a legitimate expression of the holiness to which each Christian is called, as the Second Vatican Council made clear; and (3) to educate the younger generation about the work of the Schuman Foundation, as well as the importance of personal involvement in public affairs.[18]

The claimant in this case, the Institute of Saint Benedict, Patron Saint of Europe, continues to pursue its objectives at the diocesan level, among others, by holding annual conferences. A jubilee was celebrated on 4–8 September 2013 under the slogan "Robert Schuman: Holiness and Politics."[19] In a message to the gathering, the secretary of state for the Holy See, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, wrote of Pope Francis's hopes that Europe will be able to assume more consciously its true identity and spiritual heritage, continuing the insights of Robert Schuman.

The institute's activities are very well thought out, focusing on hitherto less well-known stories of this servant of God's spirituality. The result, then, has been to spread more effectively the reputation of the French statesman's holiness. The 2013 conference considered the following issues, among others: "Robert Schuman's Policies in the Service of the Common Good," "Robert Schuman: Holiness and Politics," "Robert Schuman, A Politician–Christian" and "The Europe of Robert Schuman: A Community of Nations United by Christian Roots." These two latter discussions were led by Cardinal Philippe Barbarin, Archbishop of Lyon and Primate of France, and Cardinal Péter Erdő, Archbishop of Esztergom-Budapest and Primate of Hungary. The choice of panelists thus served a strategic purpose, representing the unity of the peoples of Europe and the construction of a united and fraternal society, precisely along the lines of what Robert Schuman worked throughout his life to achieve.[20]

ALCIDE DE GASPERI (1881–1954)

The personal virtues of Alcide De Gasperi were widely acclaimed immediately after his death on 19 August 1954 in Sella di Valsugana, where he had been on holiday. Cardinal Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Patriarch of Venice and future Pope John XXIII, declared immediately upon receiving the news, "If during any beatification process I shall be asked for my testimony, I assure you that it will be beneficial for the recognition of the virtues of this statesman, who was clearly inspired by a Biblical vision of life in the service of God, the Church and the fatherland." The archbishop of Milan, Alfredo Ildefonso Schuster, responded to the news of De Gasperi's death that "he had left this earth a humble and true Christian, who by his faith had given a perfect testimony, in his private and public life." The unusual reconciliation of these areas was due to the fact that De Gasperi entered politics as a service, bearing his own religious and civil virtues. Only this rare complementarity can give rise to a full life.[21] Pope John Paul II put it best in a letter to the Italian bishops, asking, "Is it not significant that among the greatest promoters of the continent's unity were De Gasperi, Adenauer, Schuman […] animated by a deep Christian faith? Was it not perhaps the evangelical values of liberty and solidarity which inspired their paths?"

Italy's Christian Democratic party offered its support to the start of the beatification process for its founder in 1987. In order to do this, a special committee was established in Trento, the diocese of De Gasperi's birth, chaired by the former episcopal vicar of the diocese, Guido Bartolameotti. In parallel, a second committee came into being in Rome, whose members included then-Interior Minister Oscar L. Scalfari and the Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, whom Christian Democracy's critics from the left deride as a "lay cardinal" (*il cardinale laico*).[22]

On 11 December 1989, Bishop Camillo Ruini, secretary of the Italian bishops' conference, announced the start of the process of beatifying Alcide De Gasperi. In the diocese of Trento, the cause began in April 1992 by decision of the archbishop, who had assumed responsibility for the committee five years earlier, under then-Archbishop Giovanni Maria Sartori.[23] The De Gasperi Society was founded to promote the religious aspects of the Italian prime minister's life. Initially, however, it was only the Christian Democrats who had looked favorably on starting the process. Others argued that, if the Church beatified him, it would be

nothing more than a gift for a political party that would be honored by the beatification.

The cause's supporters tried to head off such criticism. "We don't want a holy party-democrat," stated the vice-postulator Monsignor Armando Costa in defense of the cause. Costa insisted from the outset that the cause should not be linked to the halls of political power, but instead should be about the man himself, who was a saint as well as a democrat and a politician. As he put it, "We are only at the beginning of the process, which will undoubtedly take years, and no one can say today how it will finish. Yet we know with certainty that our work will be completely free of any political assessment; we will only be moving in strictly religious circles."

On 8 December 1992, Archbishop Sartori of Trento turned to the Bishops' Conference of the Trentino region for an opinion on how to conduct the case, and to the Holy See for a *nihil obstat*. On 29 April 1993, Cardinal Felici, prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, gave the green light to start the diocesan phase of the process.

On 18 September 1993, the Bishop of Bolzano and Bressanone, Wilhelm Egger, intervened. While recognizing the strong Christian and ideological motivations that influenced the start of the beatification process, Egger stated that the inhabitants of the Alto-Adige had not argued for it. The reason was their objections to the political decisions that De Gasperi had taken in relation to South Tyrol. These objections were so strong that, for at least part of the German-speaking faithful, the problem was not only political, but in fact rose to the gravity of a religious concern. Specifically, the objections referred to the De Gasperi–Gruber agreement, concluded in Paris on 5 September 1946, which regulated the question of South Tyrol—to the German speakers' disfavor, De Gasperi's detractors argued. A Capuchin from Bressanone, Father Josaphat Wieser, gathered signatures for a petition against the continuation of the process, and the first to sign it was the Auxiliary Bishop of Bolzano-Bressanone, Heinrich Forer.

Luigi Bressan, Archbishop of Trento since 1999, expressed regret that the question of South Tyrol had stalled the diocesan phase in the beatification proceedings. According to Bressan, De Gasperi had acted in the highest register of love to ensure that politics worked in the service of man and the common good, and in a very difficult era at that. In 2003, the postulator resigned, insisting that he had done so for personal reasons.[24] Pope Benedict XVI was unfairly accused of blocking the

process in 2006, when it was in fact the claimant's indecision that had delayed the appointment of a new postulator.[25] Since 2013, the relatives of Alcide De Gasperi have been hoping for the personal intervention of Pope Francis in the diocesan phase of the process.[26]

To the outside observer, it seems that, at the diocesan level, both supporters and opponents of the beatification are emerging from their deadlock. Proof of this can be found in the meeting in Calavino on 21 September 2014 organized by the local "Alcide De Gasperi" intellectual circles, in cooperation with the Trentino branch of the De Gasperi Foundation, and with the participation of various cultural circles. The focus was the place of culturally autonomous regions in this statesman's political thought and policy, and the result went a long way toward obviating earlier concerns from the region.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CHURCH AND FOR EUROPE: ROBERT SCHUMAN

Two crucial considerations frame the larger implications of the beatification process of two "founding fathers" of European integration, Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi. Cardinal José Saraiva Martins, the long-time prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, stipulated in an interview that reflections on the question of holiness in political activity are a matter for lay Christians, because only they see it as their own task within the Church. The clergy, monks and nuns have their own mission, within which they should—under normal conditions—refrain from any political, economic or syndicalist activities.[27]

It is also crucial to note that the initiatives to begin the beatification processes for Schuman and De Gasperi preceded by nearly two decades the polemics surrounding the question of whether or not to introduce Christianity as one of Europe's unifying elements into the European Union (EU) constitutional treaty ultimately defeated in 2005. The Catholic Church did not begin the process in response to the EU constitutional controversy, nor out of a desire to strengthen its own position in those debates. The very suggestion recalls British ideas from the period of the Thatcher government, claiming that the European project is a Catholic conspiracy directed by the Vatican.[28]

The importance of raising the servant of God Robert Schuman to the honor of the altars boils down to one word: peace. This is well expressed

in the text of a prayer approved by Church authorities on 5 December 1988, shortly after the founding of the Institute of Saint Benedict, several years before the start of Schuman's beatification process:

> Lord, you wanted your creations to reflect your love, and for the nations to build bonds of peace and solidarity with one another. / Your servant Robert Schuman was a faithful builder of peace. He performed his duties with apostolic zeal. He was the co-creator of the European Union; he wished for "Europe to declare the universal solidarity of nations." All of his actions indicated that politics can be a path to holiness. In the image of your Son, he was "quiet and humble of heart" (Mt 11:29). / Lord, let us in your Church venerate Robert Schuman, disciple and successor of Christ, as one of the blessed. Let him be a model for legislators and rulers, so that they should become the servants of their peoples, and work for peace and justice among them. / Grant us, through the intercession of your servant Robert Schuman, grace … God our Father, in the time of our earthly pilgrimage, make us instruments of your holy will. And by our inner struggles in faith, give us that eternal life to which we are called (1 Tim 6:12); and according to the example of Robert Schuman, help us to live in your love. Amen.[29]

The principal significance of Schuman's case, therefore, derives not from his prominence as a politician, but rather from the spirituality that he preserved and integrated into a career in transnational statecraft. In other words, Schuman should be an exemplar for secular statecraft, and his Christian Democratic and European commitments were part and parcel of his exemplary path. Bishop Isidor Markus Emanuel of Speyer had insisted already in the 1960s that the beatification of Schuman "would clearly reveal to the world that today too, holiness in politics is possible."

Schuman, for his part, regarded his work in politics as both a service and a vocation. His mother had taught him: "You have to go through life doing good for others."[30] His vision of Europe followed closely from the lessons of childhood: from forgiveness to reconciliation, in a spirit of mercy.[31] A lawyer and politician, a lay apostle, he combined prayer with action, politics with love, his personal holiness with the public good; for example, he attended morning mass whenever he could, even when he held the highest offices of his life, prime minister and foreign minister of France. Schuman was no opportunist, and he humbly endured the ill will he encountered because of his faith. He was polite but persistent. He possessed the ability to listen and to maintain discretion.

In his professional life, Robert Schuman displayed the same characteristics that guided him in his private life: simplicity, honesty, tolerance, the ability to accept the other side's arguments and respect for all. His associate Raymond Barre testified that, in Schuman, there was no split between private ethics and professional responsibility to the public good. He was a free man, unbeholden to political correctness, even as he found himself at the heart of a constitutionally secular state. Schuman was also consistent, as is clear from his statement of 19 March 1958: "All the countries of Europe are steeped in Christian civilization. This is the soul of Europe, and we should return to it."[32] Speaking of a united Europe beyond Cold War borders, Schuman insisted, "This union of nations must not and cannot be transformed into a business or a technical company. It must be given a soul. Europe will live, and will defend itself if it has its own consciousness (conscience) and responsibility, and that will happen when it returns to the Christian principles of solidarity and fraternity."[33] Most recently, Pope Francis repeated these sentiments on the occasion of accepting the International Charlemagne Prize in 2016.[34]

When drawing upon the past, Robert Schuman was not merely remembering; he was also looking for a solid foundation for the project of overcoming the effects of wars, and for institutional bonds (the community) starting from one sector—the economy. However, he also warned that limiting Europe to the economy alone could lead to the loss of the European spirit, the erasure of that sense of solidarity which "on the international level means a community of resources, of responsibilities, and above all of destiny." And this destiny was peace in Europe—God's peace.[35]

Francisco Javier Aznar Sala recalls Schuman's teaching on the importance of Christian education for the future of Europe, as well as his personal example (defending freedom of education with an eye toward controversy around the integration of religious education in Alsace-Lorraine).[36] The timeliness of the sources from which he drew, and the teachings he left behind, as well as the example of his involvement in politics and education, were highlighted by both John Paul II and Benedict XVI.[37]

Significance for the Church and for Europe: Alcide De Gasperi

Remembering the late Alcide De Gasperi, his Christian Democratic disciple Giulio Andreotti concluded, "He died as a saint […]. He was a good Christian, a great man."[38] De Gasperi himself had once written to his wife Francesca: "There are fighters (conquerors), people of government (statesmen) and people of faith. I would like to be somewhere between these last two."[39] And so it proved, as many have witnessed.

Contrary to various rumors, the impetus to move forward with the cause came on 20 June 2009 from Pope Benedict XVI in his address to the Council of the De Gasperi Foundation, to whose members he had granted an audience at the Vatican.[40] The pope mentioned the Italian statesman as the exemplar of a leader for all Italian politicians of Christian inspiration, but not only for them. De Gasperi's was the testimony of a statesman, who "in his political activities served the Church, Italy, Europe […] without serving the Church by political objectives, and without departing in his political choices from the dictates of conscience."

De Gasperi was able to combine deep spirituality with political activities. During historic moments of deep social change in Italy and Europe, in the face of significant difficulties, he was able to devote himself effectively to the service of the common good. With prudent, far-sighted vision, he led the reconstruction of Italy, which had just emerged from the period of fascism and World War II. He courageously blazed the trail for the country's future, defended its freedom and democracy, and showcased its image on the international stage. "The memory of his experience in the government and his Christian witness should affect and stimulate those people who today rule Italy and other nations, to be inspired by the Gospel," stated Benedict XVI in encouragement.[41]

Pope Francis, too, has invoked De Gasperi as a model for an active spirituality in secular life. For example, on 6 May 2016, before the highest representatives of the EU, the pontiff recalled De Gasperi's words of 21 April 1954 to the European Parliament: "All those who are equally impelled by concern for the common good of our European homelands, our homeland, Europe, should without fear begin constructive work that requires all our efforts of patient and enduring cooperation."[42] De Gasperi's admonition is just as true today, given the alternative of building only a community of administration, isolated from values, lacking

in a higher purpose for politics. Such a superstructure could become a tool of oppression, as happened, among many other cases, in the Roman Empire.[43]

Should it come to pass, De Gasperi's beatification would be the first such case for a leader of a modern government (not counting monarchs of the distant past). His watchword—"The politician looks towards the next elections, the statesman towards the next generation"—may serve as an inspiration for us today, for our approach to and involvement in politics in the spirit of Max Weber's celebrated considerations on the difference between politics by conviction and "politics as a vocation." This is a pan-European and, indeed, universally human reflection that transcends the limitations of the Iron Curtain that divided Europe in the final years of De Gasperi's life. His approach offers an example of how we may overcome the crisis between the sublime from the past and the leadership of today, to which Giorgio Napolitano was one of many to draw attention.[44]

The Istituto De Gasperi in Bologna has undertaken appropriate tasks for understanding and disseminating the thought and approach of its patron during its seminars. Those with which I am familiar, from 2012–2013, have already been inspirational in their choice of subject matter. It is a pity that no trace of their activities is (as yet) perceptible in Poland.[45]

The Redeemed Face of the "Founding Fathers"

In his speech delivered on 6 May 2016, Pope Francis expressed the view that "the projects of the founding fathers, the heralds of peace and the prophets of the future, have not lost any of their relevance: today more than ever, they inspire us to build bridges and demolish walls. They seem to express a clear call not to settle for cosmetic retouches or tortuous compromises to correct certain treaties, but courageously to set forward new, deeply rooted foundations." Drawing from this transfusion of European memory, allowing us to be inspired by the past, we must update the idea of Europe to make it capable of integration, dialogue and (re)birth.[46]

But this cannot be a Europe which has been torn from its roots. "O France, eldest daughter of the Church, what have you done with your baptism?" asked Pope John Paul II in 1985. Today the question remains the same, except that many a Catholic is now asking it of Europe. This has led to the creation of the association *Cooperazione Cristiana per l'Europa* (Christian Cooperation for Europe).[47] This is a

question of what kind of foundations to lay, and it has also been asked in Poland, for example by the emerging *Europa Christi* movement and the organization of congresses, including "United Europe: An Idea Coming from Religious Politicians, Candidates for Sainthood," held in Częstochowa and Warsaw, 11–14 March 2017. On Polish soil, then, in the "new" Europe beyond the political boundaries of De Gasperi's and Schuman's union, the postulator for Schuman's beatification recalled that the French statesman was a Christian devoted to serving the common good.[48]

Paweł Kostecki subtitled his provocative reflections on Schuman's beatification process with an even more provocative question: will the beatification of Robert Schuman be the beatification of the EU?[49] The answer, however, is no: there will not be a beatification of the EU, nor of any party international or of any political party in particular, but only in the Church and to the Church (*coram Ecclesia*). Of course, the message of the beatification is addressed to all people of good will, and in a special way to those who are united in the Christian Democratic political current.

It must clearly be stated that, for both Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi, this will be the beatification (perhaps, ultimately, canonization) of a person, and not of an institution, even though that person was involved in creating or directing that institution. The beatification will take place because of the proven virtues of that person, and not because of his individual decisions, including his political decisions, taken for better or for worse. This is how the beatification processes of Schuman and De Gasperi are helping to restore an example of spirituality in secular life to conversations long dominated by ideology and policy.

Translated by James Todd

Notes

1. See e.g. Pierre Delooz, "Pour une étude sociologique de la sainteté canonisée dans l'Église catholique," *Archives de sociologie des religions* no. 13 (1962): 17–43; Pierre Delooz, *Sociologie et canonisation* (Liège-The Hague: Faculté de Droit, 1969); Henryk Misztal, "Znaczenie społeczne beatyfikacji i kanonizacji," *Roczniki Nauk Prawnych* no. 9 (1999): 2, 84; Henryk Misztal, "Walor społeczny kanonizacji na przykładzie sprawy Anny Jenke (1921–1976)," *Roczniki Nauk Prawnych* no. 10 (2000): 2, 155–169; Edward Nowak, "L'evangelizzatore del terzo millennio è

sinonimo di santo: Beatificazzioni e canonizzazioni nella pastorale della nuova evangelizzazione," in *Las Causas de canonización hoy: Teología y Derecho*, ed. Ricardo Quintana Bescos (Barcelona: Scire, 2003), 169–202; Wiesław Bar, "Walor eklezjalny beatyfikacji i kanonizacji," in *Przygotowanie sprawy beatyfikacyjnej*, ed. Wiesław Bar and Lidia Fiejdasz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010), 57–98. This text is a revised and expanded version of an earlier Polish-language publication: Wiesław Bar, "Sprawy beatyfikacyjne Roberta Schumana i Alcidego De Gasperiego w aspekcie ich waloru eklezjalnego," *Roczniki Nauk Prawnych* 26, no. 3 (2016): 79–98.

2. Henryk Misztal, *Prawo kanonizacyjne: Instytucje prawa materialnego, zarys historii, procedura* (Sandomierz-Lublin: Sandomierz Diocesan Publishing, 2003), 2, 147–149.

3. John Paul II, General audience for the Polish people, 11 October 1982, reprinted in *L'Osservatore Romano* no. 9 (1982): 1. In the encyclical *Veritatis splendor*, he wrote: "The martyrs, and with them all the saints of the Church, thanks to the eloquent and inspiring example of their lives, transformed to their very foundations by the radiance of moral truth, cast a bright flame of light on every era of history, awakening the moral sense." See John Paul II, *Encykliki Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II* (Kraków: Znak, 1996), 613–614. He spoke about this many times, for example on the occasion of canonizations: "Martyrdom […] finds its culmination in […] the liturgy of beatification, in which we give glory to God in a special way: *Te martyrum candidatus laudat exercitus.* God, who through this solemn action of the Church—that is, by beatification—crowns their merit by this reward, yet reveals the grace He gave them, as it is said in the liturgy: *Eorum coronado, tua dona coronas.*" Missale Romanum, *Prefatio de Sanctis I.*

4. John Paul II, "Adhortatio Apostolica Post-synodalis 'Christifideles Laici'," *Acta Apostolicae Sedis (AAS)* no. 39 (1989): 466–468.

5. John Paul II, "Adhortatio Apostolica Post-synodalis 'Ecclesia in Europa'," *L'Osservatore Romano*, Polish edition no. 24 (2003): 8.

6. Misztal, "Znaczenie społeczne," 84; Misztal, "Walor społeczny kanonizacji," 157–158.

7. Nowak, "L'evangelizzatore del terzo millennio," 169–202. This frequently recalls the liturgy of the memories of the saints and the blessed, for example. The preface on the Shepherd's day, which says that "his example sustains us in a good life, his words teach us, and his intercession nurtures us in your [God's] care." *Mszał Rzymski dla diecezji polskich* (Poznań: Pallotinum, 1986), 90.

8. Zenon Grocholewski, in *Niedziela*, 18 April 1999.

9. "'We need God with a human face': Interview with Pope Benedict XVI, granted to the German media before his pilgrimage to Bavaria scheduled for the beginning of September," *Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna* (KAI) no. 34 (2006): 24.

10. "Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli II promulgatus," *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 75 (1983), pars II, can. 1186; *Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium, auctoritate Ioannis Pauli II promulgatus* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), can. 884; *AAS* 82 (1990): 1236.

11. John Paul II, "Constitutio Apostolica 'Divinus perfecionis Magister': Modus in procedenti Causarum canonisationis instructione et recognoscitur Sacrae Congregationis pro Causis Sanctorum nova datur ordinatio" (25 January 1983), *AAS* 75 (1983): 349–355.

12. "Normae servandae in inquisitionibus ab Episcopis faciendis" (7 February 1983), *AAS* 75 (1983): 396–403.

13. The provisions cited above must be further interpreted in light of the *Sanctorum Mater*, the instruction of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints from 2007 regarding the diocesan or eparchial investigation of matters of canonization. In the field of our interest, the most important are 15, 17, 41 and 45. See Congregation de Causis Sanctorum, "Sanctorum Mater: Istruzione per lo svolgimento delle Inchieste diocesane o eparchiali nelle Cause dei Santi" (17 May 2007), *AAS* 99 (2007): 465–510; for the English translation, see Congregation for the Causes of Saints, "Sanctorum Mater: Instruction for Conducting Diocesan or Eparchial Inquiries in the Causes of Saints" (17 May 2007), online at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/csaints/documents/rc_con_csaints_doc_20070517_sanctorum-mater_en.html (accessed 1 June 2017). See José Luis Gutiérrez, "La instrucción 'Sanctorum Mater' de la Congregación de las Causas de los Santos," *Jus Canonicum* 48, no. 96 (2008): 631; Wiesław Bar, "Przed *Sanctorum Mater*," in *O "Sanctorum Mater,"* ed. Wiesław Bar and Lidia Fiejdasz (Lublin: Stowarzyszenie Kanonistów Polskich, 2008), 21; Mirosław Sitarz, "Miejsce instrukcji w hierarchii aktów normatywnych," in *O "Sanctorum Mater,"* ed. Wiesław Bar and Lidia Fiejdasz (Lublin: Stowarzyszenie Kanonistów Polskich, 2008), 37–39.

14. Paweł Kostecki, "Robercie Schumanie, módl się za nami!," *Pressja* nos. 26–27 (2011): 101.

15. "Santo Schuman—Święty w garniturze," online at http://www.schuman.pl/pl/fundacja/historia-fundacji-schumana/robert-schuman/712-santo-schuman-wity-w-garniturze (accessed 11 May 2016).

16. Joseph Jost, "Robert Schuman: Il padre dell'Europa," in *I Padri dell'Europa alle radici dell'Unione Europea*, ed. Cosimo Semeraro (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2010), 13–42.

17. For the most important steps in the process of beatification, see the website of the Diocese of Metz: http://www.metz-catholique.fr/dossiers/robert-schuman/681-quelques-étapes-de-l'enquête-canonique-concernant-robert-schuman (accessed 1 May 2015). See also other materials devoted to Robert Schuman: http://www.metz-catholique.fr/dossiers/robert-schuman (accessed 1 May 2015).

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20. "50e anniversaire de la mort de Robert Schuman—4 septembre 2013," online at http://www.robert-schuman.com (accessed 10 May 2015).

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22. "La Democracia Cristiana promueve la beatificación de Alcide de Gasperi," *El Pais*, 27 February 1987. For the latter's view in this case, see Giulio Andreotti, *De Gasperi e il suo tempo* (Milan: Mondadori, 1956); Giulio Andreotti, *De Gasperi visto da vicino* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1987).

23. Orazio La Rocca, "Sant' Alcide della discordia," *La Repubblica*, 16 April 1992.

24. Emma Mariconi, "De Gasperi 'Beato'? C'è dice no," *Il Giornale d'Italia*, 23 October 2015.

25. "The beatification process of Alcide de Gasperi has been stopped," his daughter Maria Romana said in an interview with *Corriere della Sera*, which was reported in Poland by KAI on 21 August 2006, followed by other media which boldly stated that "the Pope is blocking the beatification" (*Życie Warszawy*, 14 September 2006).

26. "Beatificazione di De Gasperi, il Papa incontra la figlia dello statista trentino," *ADNkronos*, 14 January 2016. Pope Francis received De Gasperi's daughter Maria Romana at that time. Further media reports, drawing on the original source, reported that "the Pope will address the beatification of Alcide De Gasperi" (*Niedziela*, KAI).

27. Gianni Cardinale, "Los politicos tambien van al cielo," *30Giorni*, no. 9 (2004); René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman: Padre de Europa, 1886–1963* (Madrid: Palabra DL, 2000).

28. "The European Commission and religious values," *The Economist*, 28 October 2004; Paweł Sobczyk, *Kościół a wspólnoty polityczne* (Warsaw: Santiago, 2005).

29. Paweł Kostecki, "Robercie Schumanie, módl się za nami!," in *Schuman i jego Europa*, ed. Anna Radwan (Warsaw: Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana, 2015), 78–79. Underlining in the original.

30. Kostecki, "Robercie Schumanie," *Pressja*, 111.

31. Gislhain Knepper, "Robert Schuman, prophète de l'Europe: Du pardon à la réconciliation dans un esprit de miséricorde," online at http://metz.catholique.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2016/06/Intervention-Knepper.pdf (accessed 1 March 2017); Edoardo Zin, "Robert Schuman: Du pardon à la réconciliation, sous le signe de la miséricorde," online at http://metz.catholique.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2016/06/Intervention-prof-Zin.pdf (accessed 1 March 2017).

32. Edoardo Zin, "La fe ilumino su acción política," *30Giorni* no. 9 (2004).

33. Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe* (Paris: Nagel, 1963).

34. "Francis: What happened to you, Europe? Speech at the ceremony awarding Francis the Charlemagne Prize," *L'Osservatore Romano*, Polish issue #37 (2016): 32.

35. Kostecki, "Robercie Schumanie," 104–106.

36. Francisco Javier Aznar Sala, "Robert Schuman: Custodio de la educación cristiana en Europa como marco de futuro para la hispanidad," online at http://www.formacioncontinua.ucv.es/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Reflexion_R_Schuman.pdf (accessed 1 May 2015).

37. Benedict XVI, "San Pablo antes y después de Damasco. Catequesis" (27 August 2008), reprinted in *Discurso* (11 July 2009).

38. Andreotti, *De Gasperi visto da vicino*; Lorenzo Tedeschi, *Il giovane de Gasperi* (Milano: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Andrea Riccardi, *Pio XII e Alcide de Gasperi—una storia segreta* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2003); Maria Romana Catti de Gasperi, *Mio caro padre* (Genoa-Milan: Marietti, 2003); Maria Romana Catti de Gasperi, *De Gasperi: Ritratto di uno statista* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004).

39. His correspondence is published in Alcide de Gasperi, *Cara Francesca: Lettere* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2004).

40. Bruno Bartoloni, "De Gasperi Beato, impulso dal Papa: Benedetto XVI: sia esempio di moralità per i governanti," *Corriere della Sera*, 21 June 2009.

41. KAI, "Papież o jednym z ojców zjednoczonej Europy," *Wiadomości KAI*, 28 June 2009; Igino Giordani, *Alcide de Gasperi il ricostruttore* (Rome: Cinque Lune, 1955).
42. "Francis: What happened to you."
43. Franco Fratini, "Europa: La visión de los padres fundadores," *30Dias* no. 12 (2011); José Manuel Sais Álvarez, "Retos del proceso de integración europeo: Una valoración," *Revista EAN* no. 59 (2007): 27–40.
44. Fratini, "Europa."
45. See online at http://www.istitutodegasperi-emilia-romagna.it/htm/seminari2012.htm (accessed 30 April 2015).
46. "Francis: What happened to you."
47. See online at http://www.cooperazionecristianaperleuropa.eu (accessed 1 March 2017).
48. Ireneusz Skubiś, "Europo co zrobiłaś ze swoim chrztem," *Niedziela* no. 10 (2017): 12–13.
49. Kostecki, "Robercie Schumanie."

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A Truly "European" Christian Democracy? The European People's Party

Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł

Organizational cooperation between Christian Democratic parties in Europe developed in several stages after World War II.[1] Initially, the aim was to create a broad organization that would bring together Christian Democrats from across the continent. Together with the development of European integration, however, cooperation began to move increasingly to the forum of the European Communities (EC)—to the Christian Democratic political grouping in the European Parliament and, ultimately, to the European People's Party (EPP), the transnational federation of parties created in 1976.[2]

Initially, the EPP grouping consisted exclusively of strictly Christian Democratic parties based in EC member countries. By definition, this approach meant that the EPP reproduced Cold War divisions, excluding all non-EC parties (including exile parties from behind the Iron Curtain). In addition, the EPP excluded EC-based center-right groupings that declared values and principles similar to those of Christian Democracy, but had different roots. Most notable among these were the conservative parties.

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In the 1990s, however, this situation changed, with the Cold War ending and EC member states creating the European Union (EU). Following the EU's establishment, Christian Democratic parties from its member states started to implement the so-called "opening up" strategy toward center-right parties from outside the mainstream of Christian Democracy. In addition, they sought to establish cooperation with like-minded parties from outside the EU.

The "opening up" resulted in significant changes within the Christian Democratic camp. On the one hand, it was able to expand its cooperation, thanks to which the Christian Democratic political grouping has been the largest force in the European Parliament since 1999. On the other hand, this expansion has affected the ideological and political assumptions of Christian Democracy, which has been forced to consider the views of its new allies in its political program.[3]

The "opening up" strategy, which has now been in place for more than two decades, raises the question of just how well it has, in fact, succeeded. The objective of this chapter, then, is to assess the balance of gains and losses since the early 1990s, when Western Europe's Christian Democratic parties began to expand their cooperation, first with Western European center-right parties from outside the Christian Democratic camp, and then center-right groups from East-Central Europe.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first describes the events that led to the creation of the EPP in 1976. The focus is on restrictions on membership in the newly created EPP, which became reality despite the federation's ongoing discussions with both non-EC Christian Democratic and conservative parties. This fragmented the community of Christian Democratic parties in Europe, one symptom of which was the parallel operation of four organizations: the EPP, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD), the European Democrat Union (EDU) and the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (CDUCE)—a network of East-Central European Christian Democratic exiles analyzed elsewhere in this volume by Stanisław Gebhardt, Piotr H. Kosicki and Paweł Ziętara. The second part of this chapter attempts to answer the question of why the Christian Democrats pivoted in the 1990s toward cooperation with parties outside their camp—and even outside the EU. In the final, third section of the text, I analyze the results of this expansion, concluding that the EPP pragmatically traded its coherence as a Christian Democratic entity for greater influence in the international system.

The Institutionalization of Cooperation Between the Christian Democratic Parties

Although forerunners of contemporary Christian Democracy had pioneered transnational cooperation beginning in 1925 with the International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration, it was really only after the end of World War II that Christian Democracy became a transnational force. Christian Democrats' postwar cooperation began in 1947 with the formation of the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI, New International Teams), a political "international" organized according to national groups, rather than political parties. The inspiration came from France's Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP), which, due to its cooperation in the domestic arena with the Socialists, did not want to join the Christian Democratic organization as a party. Meanwhile, the British delegation consisted of Christian-oriented politicians from various parties, as well as non-party figures. The Dutch delegation distinguished itself by including representatives from three different Christian Democratic parties.[4]

The NEI's first headquarters was in Brussels. As the MRP's role in the organization grew, however, it moved to Paris. Throughout the 1950s, discussions were ongoing within the organization on how to ensure its further expansion. After the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, parties from member states collaborated closely within the framework of their common grouping in the EEC's Assembly, which was later transformed into the European Parliament. They also lent their cooperation to the NEI forum, thereby marginalizing parties from non-EC countries, especially Austria and Switzerland, which had initially played a big role in the transnational organization.[5]

The crisis in the NEI intensified at the beginning of the 1960s, in light of the difficulties affecting the French Christian Democrats after General Charles de Gaulle's seizure of power and France's subsequent rebirth in 1958 as the Fifth Republic. The resulting marginalization of the French Christian Democratic party, which had previously opposed closer transnational integration, opened a window for those parties which had favored closer cooperation within the NEI, including the adoption of a common agenda; these included parties from Austria and Italy. In 1964, the NEI's Secretariat was transferred from Paris to Rome. One year later, at the NEI's Seventeenth Congress in Taormina, in

Sicily, a decision was taken to reorganize the entire structure in order to enhance cooperation between Christian Democratic parties. Beginning in 1965, it was the parties that had to be members of the organization, not the national groups. The symbol of this new beginning was the adoption of a new name: the EUCD.[6]

The rechristened NEI redefined itself further by entering into closer ties with the Christian Democratic grouping in the European Parliament. European integration became the main topic of the EUCD Congress, although not all of its members belonged to the EC. Opportunities for cooperation within the looser organization of the EUCD quickly proved insufficient, and so efforts were made to create an assembly that would take up issues related to European integration. This was done at the beginning of the 1970s, first by creating a standing conference of EC Christian Democrats within the EUCD, and then converting it into a body of the EUCD named the Political Committee for Christian Democratic Parties of the EC Member States.[7] This committee set itself the objective of laying the foundations for a future European Christian Democratic party.[8]

In the mid-1970s, there was also a shift in the balance of power within the European Parliament. The Christian Democrats, who had been by far the strongest political grouping, gave way to the Socialists. This was, among others, a consequence of the EC's so-called Northern expansion in 1973 to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Parties of the left from the newly admitted countries strengthened the Socialist group in the European Parliament. Meanwhile, the Christian Democratic faction gained little, as there were no Christian Democratic parties in Denmark and the United Kingdom, only the Fine Gael (FG) party from Ireland.[9]

Christian Democratic leaders soon reached the conclusion that, in many European countries, the right side of the political spectrum was populated by conservatives or other center-right parties that did not identify with Christian Democracy. In other words, further EC enlargements might strengthen other European factions while bringing the Christian Democrats no new members. The enlargement trajectory was thus likely to ensure the lasting domination of the Socialists in the European Parliament. In the mid-1970s, then, the idea arose of establishing a broad alliance with aconfessional parties of the center-right. For their part, the conservatives, too, saw the advantages of a broad alliance of non-collectivist parties after they formed their own faction in the

European Parliament in 1973, even though they did not yet have any extra-parliamentary organization.[10]

Discussions on the creation of an extra-parliamentary, transnational federation of parties had gained momentum in advance of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, held in 1979. The 1970s had seen a multitude of different meetings and conferences aimed at working out a formula for this future organization. The Christian Democratic parties had to take decisions on two key issues: first, whether cooperation within the framework of the new organization should only be extended to parties from EC member states, or also to other groups cooperating within the EUCD framework, which could obtain associate member or observer status; and, second, whether the cooperation should be confined to Christian Democratic parties, or be open to other like-minded, non-collectivist center-right groups, even if they did not draw on Christian Democratic doctrines.

These issues divided the parties associated within the EUCD into two camps: advocates of restricting membership to Christian Democratic parties from EC member states, and supporters of building a broad alliance of center-right forces encompassing Christian Democratic and conservative parties both in member states and beyond. The first group included Christian Democratic parties from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as Italy, which attached great importance to the Christian Democratic identity and to a federal vision of Europe, fearing the "watering down" of this vision as a result of cooperation with center and center-right parties outside the Christian Democratic camp.

Meanwhile, the second group consisted of more pragmatically oriented parties focused on countering the Socialists, who were growing in strength on the European stage. The leaders of this group included parties from Germany, but also from Austria and Switzerland. These last two were not EC member states at that time, and their parties feared exclusion from mainstream cooperation if the new organization only included parties from the member states.

In 1976, when the EPP was created, the first option emerged victorious. The new organization's members could only be strictly Christian Democratic parties from EC member states.[11] Both conservative groups and non-EC Christian Democratic parties found themselves outside the ranks of the new EPP.

The decision to exclude Christian Democrats from beyond the EC set the EUCD on a course for continuity. And yet German and Austrian

Christian Democratic parties refused to abandon the alternative EPP vision: in 1978, their talks with conservative parties from Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries led to the creation of the EDU, a working association of Christian Democratic, conservative and other like-minded parties.[12] From the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, then, there were three organizations in Europe bringing together the Christian Democratic parties: the EPP, the EUCD and the EDU. Only Christian Democratic parties from EC member states could belong to the EPP; Christian Democratic parties from all over Western Europe could join the EUCD; and all center-right parties from this part of Europe could join the EDU. However, all of these continued to reinforce Cold War divisions by excluding the exiled parties of East-Central Europe. For this reason, though weakened by generational turnover and a precipitous decline in funding, the CDUCE nonetheless continued to serve as the voice of Christian Democratic parties forced out of their homelands by Communist regimes.[13]

The relations between these organizations were accompanied by great mistrust. The parties from Austria and Switzerland expressed bitterness because they had not been admitted into the EPP, even as observers. The term "waiting room club" arose within this context.[14] In turn, the parties from the Benelux states and Italy perceived the EDU as a rival to the EPP, and they resented German Christian Democrats' involvement in the EDU's creation. Charles Ferdinand Nothomb, chair of the Walloon Christian Democratic party, even referred to the situation of belonging to both the EPP and the EDU as "bigamy."[15]

Sharp criticism of the EDU proved incompatible with the prospect of joining this new organization. Dutch Christian Democrats refused to do so, posing the rhetorical question: "Where in the EDU's program is the Gospel?" Italians, meanwhile, objected, "We are not conservatives!"[16] In fact, the EDU's conservative detractors made a parallel point. Asked about prospects for alliance with the Christian Democrats, a British Conservative activist retorted, "Think if a Conservative candidate went on the hustings in this country, and said: 'I'm being supported by the EPP'. It would be as difficult for him in the rural bits of Sussex as it would be for an Italian Christian Democrat in Perugia to say, 'I'm linked with the Conservative Party'."[17]

This proliferation of rancor and internal fragmentation certainly did not boost the image of Europe's Christian Democratic parties. However, initial mistrust gradually gave way to cooperation over the course of the

next decade. By the turn of the 1990s, these relationships were so good that Christian Democrats were once again considering the creation of a single organization, as well as a common grouping with the conservatives in the European Parliament.

Cooperation Within the EPP

The broadening of European integration to include Greece, Spain and Portugal, and then Austria, Finland and Sweden, posed great challenges to the Christian Democratic organizations, confronting them with the need to adapt. Even more challenges came along with the enhanced cooperation that followed from the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, and still more from the creation of the EU in 1992. In particular—as Christian Democrats had feared in the 1970s—successive enlargements of European integration accelerated the growth of the Party of European Socialists and its political grouping in the European Parliament, as the new member states brought large Socialist parties. The Christian Democrats could not enjoy similar gains, as—with the important exception of Austria—the right side of the political spectrum was dominated in the new member states by parties with no links to Christian Democratic traditions: in other words, by conservative or conservative-liberal movements.

Aside from the Socialist ascent, the sea-change within the Christian Democratic camp is likewise attributable to processes of secularization, the crisis of the welfare state and the increasingly (neo)liberal policies of successive national governments.[18] In practice, the ideological gap had substantially narrowed between Christian Democratic parties and the conservative and other center-right groups. Moreover, in France, one of the pioneers of European integration and Christian Democracy alike, political Catholicism had lost its importance. Since winning France's 1946 parliamentary elections, the MRP had gradually lost support; with the advent of the Fifth Republic, it was completely marginalized by General de Gaulle's center-right camp. Three decades later, Italy's Christian Democratic movement, too, came apart at the seams. Democrazia Cristiana (DC) had been Italy's main governing party for decades, as well as a strong pillar of first the EUCD and then the EPP. Yet its successor at the helm of the Italian center-right, Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI), cannot be considered a Christian Democratic party.

After the end of the Cold War, the national parties constituting the EPP faced a choice. They could either insist on doctrinal purity and resist cooperation with center-right parties outside the Christian Democratic camp, which would translate to reduced importance in the European arena, or extend their cooperation to those parties outside the Christian Democratic camp which shared similar values. In contrast to the 1970s, the EPP opted for the second solution. The principal reason for this was a change in the balance of power within the EPP.[19] After the collapse of DC in Italy, which had been the backbone of the camp opposing collaboration with the conservatives, Germans became the largest force in the EPP, pooling the forces of the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) and the Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union, CSU). These parties, in turn, had from the start favored a broad alliance of all center-right forces capable of opposing the Socialist tide rising across Europe.[20]

The turning point came in 1992, at the EPP Congress in Athens. There, the "opening up" strategy, abandoned in the late 1970s, was reinstated and formally adopted. The Athens congress heralded a new era of cooperation, including not only conservative parties from EU countries, but also non-EU parties, which could become associate members or observers respectively. Conservative parties joined the association gradually, one by one, on an individual basis. This pace of expansion strengthened the EPP's negotiating position with each individual party, at the same time reducing the potential for criticism within the Europarty.[21]

At the same time, the EPP could expect further challenges linked to the collapse of Communism in East-Central Europe and the need to establish contacts with parties from that part of the continent. Realizing that the EU might well expand eastwards, EPP leaders began as early as the beginning of the 1990s to identify partners for cooperation in the former countries of the Soviet Bloc. Paradoxically, almost none of these came from among the Cold War exiles of the CDUCE, which dissolved in 1992. Rather, the long-term grooming of East-Central European candidates for EPP membership involved granting aid to create organizational structures and conduct campaigns.[22] At each stage, Christian Democratic political parties from Western Europe monitored closely the evolution of their East-Central European counterparts, and fledgling foundations likewise played a significant role in this work.

The first extension of Christian Democratic party cooperation had, in fact, taken place a full decade prior to the Athens congress.

The admission to the EPP in 1981 of Greece's New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) party had not caused major controversy; although ideologically it did not conform to the EPP's doctrine, the two sides managed to come to an arrangement.[23] Much more challenging was the inclusion within the EPP's ranks of the Spanish People's Party (Partido Popular, PP). This, initially in the form of the Popular Alliance (Allianza Popular, AP), marked the beginning within the European Parliament of cooperation with the European Democrat Group (EDG), created by British and Danish conservatives.

Meanwhile, the EPP established cooperation with smaller Christian Democratic parties from Spain that belonged to the EUCD. The AP, whose political program combined conservative elements with liberal and Christian Democratic ideas, also felt uncomfortable in the EDG dominated by the British Conservatives. Changes inside the AP, as well as closer cooperation with the Bavarian CSU, contributed to their decision to cooperate with the EPP. However, this was a gradual process, and the tactics developed at this time were used later to integrate other controversial members into the association.

This strategy of going "through the group to join the party" was predicated on the gradual inclusion of new parties into the EPP. The first step was the accession of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from a given party into the EPP group in the European Parliament on an individual basis, and then their agglomeration in this faction as a national delegation. Afterwards, the national party joined the extra-parliamentary EPP as an observer. Finally, the observers applied to become full members of that organization.[24] These MEPs expected to prove their value through cooperation within the group, thereby gaining acceptance in the eyes of the EPP's members, some of whom regarded the new arrivals with great suspicion. Only then would their home parties formally join the EPP.

On the one hand, this tactic made it easier for the EPP to maintain a coherent organization in the face of both the positive and the negative consequences of enlargement; on the other, it gave new member parties time to gather information and acculturate to the culture and structures of the EPP. The use of the European parliamentary group as a "waiting room" en route to full recognition and legitimacy grew out of a certain instinctual caution on the part of the EPP. As David Hanley rightly underscores, the group's founders would probably have been surprised if they knew what purposes it would serve just a few decades later.[25]

This way of extending cooperation, staggered over time in several stages, gave both the EPP's leadership and the leaders of the new member parties the tools to overcome internal opposition gradually.

MEPs from the Spanish People's Party joined the EPP after the European Parliament elections of 1989. The following autumn, the party obtained observer status, and a year later it became a full member of the organization. Its accession strengthened the EPP's conservative wing, shifting its internal balance and opening a path to the inclusion of yet more groups from outside the family of Christian Democratic parties.

Italy's FI, too, successfully deployed the same tactic. Having initially constituted its own European Parliament group under the name Forza Europa, Berlusconi's party then began working with French Gaullists and Irish conservatives within the Union for Europe group (UFE). Eventually, the Italian party decided to apply for EPP membership.[26] Over opposition from many Benelux, French and even Italian Christian Democrats—who objected to FI's government coalition with the extreme-right Alleanza Nazionale (AN)—FI succeeded in its bid by making use of the proven strategy of going "through the group to join the party." At first, only the twenty FI MEPs who had previously been members of DC were able to join the EPP group. But then FI threatened that, if the EPP did not accept its other members, it would form a centrist group in direct competition. Eventually, the EPP capitulated to this threat, in the face of some internal opposition. After FI's victory in the Italian European Parliament elections in 1999, the EPP admitted Berlusconi's party into the extra-parliamentary federation, in order to be able to count the Italian MEPs as members of their own ranks.[27]

The third major success story of going "through the group to join the party" concerns the admittance of the French Gaullists to the EPP. After the collapse of the MRP, the Center of Social Democrats (Centre des Démocrates Sociaux, CDS) was established in its place; in 1978, this party joined the coalition under the name of the Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF). After the European Parliament elections of 1994 and 1999, some deputies from this coalition joined the Christian Democratic group, while others joined the liberal group. In 1999, the EPP also admitted MEPs from Démocratie Libérale (DL) and the neo-Gaullist Assembly for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR), France's main right-wing party. The latter had to overcome both protests from the

UDF and widespread mistrust of Christian Democrats among its own ranks. Thanks to the ultimate accession of the neo-Gaullists, however, the EPP became the largest political grouping in the European Parliament for the first time since 1975. A corollary to the cooperation within the framework of the EPP group in the European Parliament was the granting to the RPR of membership in the EPP's extra-parliamentary structures. Eventually, the three French groups cooperating within the framework of the EPP—the RPR, the DL and some of the UDF—merged, and therein lay the origins of the Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), which in 2015 adopted the name The Republicans (Les Républicains, LR). Despite all of these vicissitudes, this party is still a member of the EPP.

And yet, the tactic of going "through the group to join the party" is hardly foolproof. In the case of the British Conservative and Unionist Party, it failed. After Margaret Thatcher, known for her Euroskepticism, resigned from the post of prime minister of the United Kingdom, British Conservative MEPs were admitted to the EPP faction in May 1992, together with the Danish Conservative People's Party (Det konservative folkeparti, KF). One might have expected that their inclusion into the extra-parliamentary EPP would follow, as had been the case of the Danish Conservatives, who were granted observer status in 1993. In that same year, other new observers included Swedish (the Moderate Coalition Party, Moderata Samlingpartiet, MSp), Finnish (the National Coalition Party, Kansallinen Kokoomus, KOK) and Norwegian conservatives (Høyre Hovedorganisasjon, H). Two years later, the Danes, Finns and Swedes were granted full membership in the EPP.[28] However, massive internal protest erupted within the EPP against the prospect of admitting the British Conservatives, who themselves expressed a clear reluctance to join the ranks of the Christian Democrats.[29]

As the EPP has expanded, the role of ideology has diminished, with ideological discrepancies proliferating between the political programs of the Christian Democrats and the conservatives partnering with them in the EPP group. One of the clearest signs of the EPP's ideological "watering down" was the addition in 1999 of a second element to the group's name: the European Democrats (ED). Members of the latter had negotiated the right to develop and promote views departing from the EPP line on issues of such foundational importance as constitutional and institutional questions regarding the future of Europe.

The newly hyphenated political group survived two European Parliament terms under the name of the European People's Party–European Democrats (EPP-ED). In 2009, a group of conservatives seceded, creating their own group in the European Parliament. With the EU's enlargement in 2004 to include the states of East-Central Europe, the British Conservatives found willing partners for cooperation. In the end, then, the Conservatives met the minimum membership requirement to create their own group in the European Parliament and the extra-parliamentary Europarty.[30] In light of the impending "Brexit," however, this group's future—which bears heavily on East-Central European participation in the European Parliament—lies in doubt.

And yet the EPP, too, successfully extended its cooperation to parties from East-Central Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a move to abolish the EUCD; after the decision to admit non-EU parties into the EPP as observers, membership in these two organizations now overlapped to a significant degree. It was decided, however, to maintain the EUCD for some time as an organization through which it would be possible to attract new partners and members from East-Central Europe.

Just as the EPP group in the European Parliament had previously served to engage conservative parties from countries belonging to the EU, now the EUCD—and, to a lesser extent, the EDU as well—performed a similar role for parties from non-EU countries.[31] Whereas in the case of Western European parties from outside the Christian Democratic camp, the road to the EPP had led "through a group to join the party," parties from the eastern half of the continent developed a new tactic: "through the EUCD, or the EDU, to join the EPP."[32]

This strategy proved to be very effective. The EPP managed to enlist the cooperation of the main center-right parties from all of the new EU member states admitted in 2004, with the exception of the Czech Republic. Although the EPP did include the TOP 09 (its name derives from a Czech acronym for "Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity") and the Christian Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People's Party (Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie–Československá Strana Lidová, KDU-ČSL), the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana, ODS) remained outside. For five years, the ODS's MEPs belonged to the European Democratic wing of the EPP-ED. However, after 2009, they chose to work in a new grouping, the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), in alliance with the British Conservatives, in whom they saw an ideological affinity.[33] Poland's Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), which won legislative elections and took

the reins of national government in 2015, are also members of this group.

Despite concerns about the so-called Eastern Enlargement of the EU in 2004 (which included the admission of eight post-Communist countries) and again in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), the EU's dramatic expansion did not result in any major changes to its political scene. Party systems in the countries of East-Central Europe have largely proven compatible with Western European systems. Based on research by Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček, it appears that the same was true of those Christian Democratic parties whose founding ideas did not differ significantly from their Western European counterparts, or from the EPP program. Hloušek and Kopeček observed similar invocations of "Christian values," including the position of the family, as well as European integration and the social market economy. Differences arose in relation to environmental matters, to which parties from East-Central Europe gave lower priority. One exception was the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH), which manifested a Euroskeptic attitude.

In addition, Hloušek and Kopeček point out that the Christian Democratic parties from East-Central Europe have, on the whole, enjoyed less electoral support than their Western European counterparts. Of course, evaluating this claim takes us onto the challenging terrain of defining the political boundaries of Christian Democracy. Hloušek and Kopeček classify as Christian Democratic groupings found in only three formerly Communist territories: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. The situation in Poland and Hungary was different, where—despite vibrant Christian Democratic activism in exile after World War II—no strong Christian Democratic parties emerged after 1989.[34] And yet, conservative and even liberal parties in Poland and Hungary have regularly invoked Christian ideas, texts and rhetoric.[35] For this reason, the EPP and its grouping within the European Parliament have grown to include center-right parties from East-Central Europe that do not identify as Christian Democratic.

Edoardo Bressanelli, in his analysis of all of the East-Central European parties that have joined the EPP, also came to the conclusion that they did not differ significantly from the group's main political line. Bressanelli studied differences among the EPP members from "old" and "new" Europe along two axes: left/right and pro-/anti-EU attitudes. His research shows that, along the first of these axes, parties from East-Central Europe have clustered to the right of center, projecting similar ideological profiles.[36] And yet, they are not so far to the right as to lie

beyond the spectrum of attitudes represented by EPP's members from "old" Europe. The EPP's Western European core has exhibited significantly more ideological diversity than its Eastern counterparts.

In the case of the axis of Euroskepticism/Europhilia, the situation appears to be different, for East-Central Europe's EPP parties maintain a slightly colder attitude toward European integration than their Western European partners. The difference, however, is considerably less than one might expect based on popular representations. On a scale of 0 to 20 (where 0 means opposition to integration and 20 means full support), the parties from Western Europe had an average result of 11.4, while those from East-Central Europe had 10.1. Four parties from the west and six from the east had results below the mid-point. However, some of these left the EPP grouping in 2009 in order to found a new conservative grouping; as a result, the EPP has returned to its more traditional Europhile positions.[37]

The Results of Extending Cooperation

Bringing center-right parties into the EPP from outside the Christian Democratic camp, and then parties from outside the EU as observers, led to the transformation of the EPP into an organization associating a broad spectrum of political parties. This shift has allowed the pre-existing separate Christian Democratic party organizations to integrate with their allies. After the EPP adopted the strategy of "opening up" to different groups, the memberships of the EPP, the EUCD and EDU—once distinct from one another—largely overlapped. However, Christian Democrats decided to preserve all three organizations for the purposes of networking and organizing cooperation with parties in East-Central Europe. Only in 1999, with EU enlargement to post-Communist countries on the horizon, was the decision taken to abolish the EUCD.

The case of the EDU, however, was more complicated. Back in 1998, on the twentieth anniversary of the organization's founding, its leadership drew attention to its important role in bringing together the Christian Democrats and the conservatives. And yet, if this was its *raison d'être*, then by the end of the twentieth century that reason had ceased to exist, a by-product of the EDU's success.

No decision was taken to disband the organization, but it has effectively been on hiatus since just before the EU's enlargement to the east.[38] Within the EDU framework, Christian Democrats cooperated

with the British and Czech conservatives, whose accession to the EPP proved impossible due to their policy differences, especially their opposition to the EPP's vision of a unified Europe taking the form of a federation of states. In April 2000, the EDU secretariat was transferred from Vienna to Brussels, where the organization was supposed to share a common office with the EPP.[39] Formally, the EDU has not been dissolved, although the resignation of the EDU's Secretary General Alexis Wintoniak from his post in 2002 marked the de facto end of the EDU as a stand-alone organization.[40] Sauli Niinistö, the last chair of the EDU, negotiated the organization's absorption by the EPP, becoming honorary president of the latter.

Thanks to its strategy of gradually but consistently expanding cooperation, the EPP has not only resisted marginalization in a dramatically transformed Europe, but in fact, in 1999, after almost a quarter-century of Socialist domination, it once again formed the largest group in the European Parliament. After the 2004 elections, and even after the withdrawal of cooperation by British and Czech conservatives in 2009, it remained the European Parliament's largest group. It preserved this numerical advantage with the elections of 2014.

After the creation in 2009 of the conservative group in the European Parliament, as well as the extra-parliamentary Europarty—the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists—the majority of the EU's center-right parties decided to remain in the EPP and its political grouping in the European Parliament. These include the Italian FI and the French UMP (now the Republicans), as well as conservatives from the Scandinavian states (the Danish KF, the Finnish KOK and the Swedish MSp). The strategic choice to remain in the EPP is a lasting effect of these parties' accommodation within Christian Democratic structures and—perhaps even more importantly—of their Europeanization.[41] Remaining in the largest grouping proved more appealing to them than joining a newly created, untested conservative faction of moderate size.

In addition to its dominant position in the European Parliament, the EPP and its member parties occupy a significant number of posts in other bodies of the EU. Christian Democracy, together with its allies, has once again—just as in the early days of the integration process—become its main political force, and exerts great influence on the decision-making process in the EU. As of this writing (January 2017), the group has 217 deputies from twenty-seven EU member states—the United Kingdom is the only exception—who amount to nearly 30% of all

MEPs. These numbers translate into the assignation of posts within the European Parliament's Presidium, as well as the chairs of many important committees. Fourteen of the twenty-eight members of the European Commission, including its head Jean-Claude Juncker, come from parties cooperating within the framework of the EPP. The EPP is also well represented in the Council,[42] and in the European Council, which since 2014 has been led by an EPP politician, Poland's Donald Tusk.

The EPP's so-called summits also play a strong role in assuring the EPP's continued influence. The summits take place prior to the meetings of the European Council and the ministerial meetings, which in turn precede the meetings of the Council of the European Union. The party summits have, in fact, been held since the 1980s, although their role increased considerably in the 1990s: whereas originally they were organized during the party's congresses, since the 1990s they have preceded meetings of the European Council, the body for designating and determining the priorities of European integration.[43]

The agendas of the leaders of parties cooperating within the EPP now correspond to the agenda of the European Council, which makes it possible to establish the opinions of other parties before EU summits, and allows for negotiation and compromise. These changes mean that the summits have begun to attract party leaders, who previously had often only sent their deputies. This phenomenon is much more visible among Christian Democrats than among the Socialists or Liberals. An invaluable role in this respect was played by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who regularly participated in the summits, leading them personally and thereby attracting other heads of governments to attend.[44]

Since 2007, the EPP has also organized ministerial meetings that precede the sessions of the EU Council. The first to be arranged were for ministers for foreign affairs; their goal was to create a forum for discussing Europe's most pressing foreign policy issues. Since 2008, similar meetings of economic and finance ministers have been held, and since 2010 other ministerial portfolios have followed suit. As of this writing (January 2017) the EPP organizes ministerial meetings in ten fields; their role is to improve the coordination and cooperation of the parties in the Council of the European Union.

Conclusions

Seen from the perspective of more than four decades, even in the face of an EU-wide crisis, the EPP has been a great success. The extension of the cooperation within the EPP framework that began at the turn of the 1990s is a strong accomplishment. Certainly, it resulted in a measure of marginalization or "watering down" of Christian Democratic ideology, but the EPP has regained influence and facilitated transnational cooperation across Europe East and West, in a way that its predecessors, the NEI or EUCD, did not in the face of the Iron Curtain.

Not only did the merger of the EUCD and the EDU with the EPP prove successful, but also the position of Europe's Christian Democratic party has been definitively strengthened, and its influence on the decision-making processes within the EU is the strongest Christian Democracy has enjoyed since the turn of the 1940s and 1950s. At the same time, cooperation with groups outside the Christian Democratic camp—the conservatives and the conservative-liberals, from both Western and East-Central Europe—has changed the ideological face of the EPP, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Many of the parties currently cooperating within the EPP do not have roots in strictly Christian Democratic principles. The EPP's acceptance of groups from outside the Christian Democratic camp has resulted in shifting the discourse from social-corporatist principles in a more market-friendly direction, and weakened the strongly pro-integrationist concepts of the Christian Democrats who originally favored the creation of a European federation. Yet these changes have occurred not so much due to the adoption of parties from the newer, post-Communist member states, but rather from extending cooperation to parties outside the Christian Democratic camp—the conservatives and conservative-liberals—regardless of whether they came from Western or East-Central Europe.

The dissatisfaction of some Christian Democratic parties with such developments became clear with the creation of opposition groupings within the EPP. These have included the Athens group, which objected to the admission of FI, or the Schuman group, which protested against the creation in 2000 by the Austrian People's Party of a coalition with the extreme right wing, demanding instead the restoration of the EPP's Christian Democratic identity.[45] These protests and the EPP's internal opposition, however, were not able to stop the conversion of the EPP

into a centrist party, where it has now arrived more closely than at any time in its entire history to the reality of a "catch-all" party.[46]

The construction of a broad alliance among the Christian Democrats and other center-right parties from both Western and East-Central Europe must be considered a success. At the same time, however, one must also understand the limitations associated with the creation of such a wide range of groups. As David Hanley says, one symptom of failure in incorporating these various political parties into the EPP may have been the creation in 2002 of an organization under the name of the European Christian Political Movement (ECPM). The ECPM has pushed for the cooperation of political parties on the basis of Christian Democratic values; in 2010, it received the status of a Europarty.[47]

Both the origins and the values proclaimed by the ECPM's member parties indicate that they should be candidates for membership in the EPP. The ECPM also includes Protestant groups alongside the small Catholic parties and organizations, and this Europarty underscores its attachment to values such as the protection of life, the traditionally understood family as the cornerstone of society and the important role of religion in society, as well as its opposition to euthanasia and cloning. In the course of work on the project for a Constitutional Treaty for Europe, the ECPM sought to include a reference to Christian values and their elemental contribution to European integration. The creation of the ECPM shows clearly that the EPP is paying a price for its expansion: a partial departure from its original Christian Democratic values.

By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that, if the EPP had continued along the path defined by principles adopted in the 1970s, drawing strictly upon Christian Democratic values and resisting cooperation with conservatives, its role would have been reduced. The EPP would have amounted to a lesser force not only in the history of European integration, but also in the secularized societies of Western Europe and in the globalizing contemporary world. By making pragmatic moves relating to their own structures and alliances, the EPP has partially departed from Christian Democratic values, while guaranteeing its influence on the development of an expanded EU.

Translated by James Todd

Notes

1. On earlier stages of cooperation between Christian Democratic parties in Europe, see Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12–65.

2. Christian Mertens, *Die österreichischen Christdemokraten im Dienste Europas* (Vienna: Medien und Recht Verlags, 1997), 51.

3. David Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State: Parties in the Era of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 97.

4. Thomas Jansen, *Die Entstehung einer europäischen Partei: Vorgeschichte, Gründung und Entwicklung der EVP* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1996), 66–67. The Dutch delegation consisted of representatives of the following parties: the Catholic People's Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP), the Christian Historical Union (Christelijk-Historische Unie, CHU) and the Anti-Revolutionary Party (Antirevolutionaire Partij, ARP). In the late 1970s, all three parties formed a common group, the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA); Jürgen Wahl, *Your Majority in Europe: What the European People's Party Is and Does* (Luxembourg: Robert Schuman Foundation, 2004).

5. Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnational Christian Democracy: From the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales to the European People's Party," in *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London: Routledge, 2004), 226.

6. The fact that the new organization drew explicitly upon Christian Democratic principles, seeking to ensure that its members would be parties, meant that representatives of the United Kingdom, where for historical reasons there was no Christian Democratic party, found themselves outside the organization, even though they were in the NEI. Alexander Demblin, "Die ÖVP in internationalen Organisationen-EDU, IDU," *Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik* (1984): 244.

7. Kaiser, "Transnational Christian Democracy," 226; Mertens, *Österreichischen Christdemokraten*, 62.

8. Jansen, *Entstehung einer europäischen Partei*, 91.

9. Steven van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities: Christian Democracy in the European Union," in *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, ed. Steven Van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 270.

10. Andreas Khol, "EDU's challenge to lead Europe," in *Twenty Years of the European Democrat Union, 1978–1998*, ed. Lars Tobisson, Andreas Khol and Alexis Wintoniak (Vienna: Europäische Demokratische Union, 1998), 20.

11. On 28 October 1976, the EPP's Political Bureau decided that no other parties should be granted associate membership, or even observer status. Thomas Jansen and Steven Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2011), 45.

12. The events leading up to the creation of the EDU, including difficult negotiations within the Christian Democratic camp, are detailed in Lars Tobisson, "The Birth of EDU—from a Nordic Perspective", in *Twenty years of the European Democrat Union, 1978–1998*, ed. Lars Tobisson, Andreas Khol and Alexis Wintoniak (Vienna: Europäische Demokratische Union, 1998), 5–18.

13. The CDUCE included political parties from Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary. The headquarters of the organization was initially located in New York City, then in Washington, and from 1964 in Rome. See e.g. Piotr H. Kosicki's and Paweł Ziętara's chapters in this volume.

14. "Club der draußen vor der Tür Stehenden," quoted in Jansen, *Entstehung einer europäischen Partei*, 107.

15. Jansen, *Entstehung einer europäischen Partei*, 109.

16. Khol, "EDU's challenge to lead Europe," 27.

17. Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, *Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration: The Process towards Direct Election* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 229.

18. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 92–93.

19. Karl M. Johansson, "European People's Party," in *European Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration*, ed. Karl M. Johansson and Peter Zervakis (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 51–80.

20. Thomas Jansen, *The European People's Party: Origins and Development* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 100–101.

21. Van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities," 276.

22. See Stanisław Gebhardt's chapter in this volume.

23. Jansen, *European People's Party*, 112; Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 94.

24. Van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities," 276.

25. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 95.

26. Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, "Rozwój historyczny grup politycznych w Parlamencie Europejskim oraz skład polityczny Parlamentu szóstej kadencji (2004–2009)," *Politea* 7, no. 1 (2007): 209.

27. Van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities," 279–280.

28. Jansen, *European People's Party*, 119. Full-fledged membership in the EPP is only offered to political parties from countries belonging to the EU, and thus cannot be granted to Norwegian parties, which work with this Europarty as associate members or observers.

29. Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, *Europejska Unia Demokratyczna, czyli o współpracy partii chrześcijańsko-demokratycznych i konserwatywnych* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2004), 175–176.

30. In accordance with the current rules of procedure of the European Parliament, creating a group requires at least twenty-five MEPs from at least a quarter of the EU member states. Rule 32, Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. Provisional Edition-January 2017, online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu (accessed 27 January 2017).

31. David Hanley, "Christian Democracy and the Paradox of Europeanisation," *Party Politics* 8, no. 4 (2002): 473.

32. The EDU's participation in the democratization process in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe is detailed in Esther Schollum, "Die Europäische Demokratische Union (EDU) und der Demokratiesierungsprozess in Ost-, Mittel und Südeuropa," *Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik* (1991): 491–523.

33. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 102–105.

34. See Aleks Szczerbiak and Tim Bale's chapter in this volume.

35. Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček, *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East-Central and Western Europe Compared* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 150–154, 220.

36. The only exceptions were the Slovak Hungarian Coalition Party (*Strana maďarskej koalície*, SMK) and the Latvian New Era party (*Jaunais laiks*, JL). The latter joined in 2001 as part of the Unity (*Vienotība*) grouping.

37. Edoardo Bressanelli, *Europarties after Enlargement: Organisation, Ideology and Competition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 103–110.

38. Andreas Khol, executive secretary of the EDU from 1979 to 1999, expressed it as follows: "Considering these double memberships and the costs of the organisations, it is high time to streamline the structures. The separate organisation of the Union of European Christian Democrats is outdated; the long-term target necessarily is to have the European People's Party as the only organisation; for a transition period, the EDU will, as stated above, have an important function, albeit limited in its duration." Khol, "EDU's Challenge to Lead Europe," 38.

39. Kosowska-Gąstoł, *Europejska Unia Demokratyczna*, 172–179.

40. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 99.

41. On the Europeanization of the party, see e.g. Robert Ladrech, "Europeanisation and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis," *Party Politics* 8, no. 4 (2002): 389–403.

42. The Council is a body made up of ministers from the member states, and was thus originally called the EU Council of Ministers, then the Council of the European Union, and then, after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, simply the Council. However, to distinguish it from the European Council of heads of state and heads of government, in the literature it is

often still described as the Council of the European Union. In this study, the terms are used interchangeably.

43. Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 186.

44. Jonas Tallberg and Karl M. Johansson, "Party Politics in the European Council," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 8 (2008): 1231.

45. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 98; Van Hecke, "A Decade of Seized Opportunities," 292.

46. The Athens group was founded by the leaders of several parties: the the Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) and the Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) from Belgium, the Christen-Democratisch Appèl from Holland, the Italian People's Party from Italy, Fine Gael from Ireland, the Christian Democrats from Luxembourg and the Basque and Catalan parties. These party leaders wanted to ensure that the values established in the basic EPP Athens Program of 1992 would be protected. This pertained especially to the EPP's Christian Democratic roots. However, according to Wilfried Martens, this group restricted its activities to four meetings. Pascal Fontaine, *Voyage to the Heart of Europe, 1953–2009: A History of the Christian Democratic Group and the Group of the European People's Party in the European Parliament* (Brussels: Éditions Racine, 2009), 336. As for the Schuman group, this was an informal group whose mission was to ensure that a federalist and Christian Democratic line would be followed. The Schuman group held a few meetings in Strasbourg, but then ceased to exist. Fontaine, *Voyage to the Heart of Europe*, 347. For the concept of a catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara, Myron Weiner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 190–191.

47. Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State*, 100.

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Christian Democracy Across
the Iron Curtain

The Elimination of Christian Democracy in Poland After World War II

Jarosław Rabiński

In the first years after the end of World War II, the authorities in Communist Poland sought to maximally reduce and then eliminate the possibility of legal political activity in the mainstream of Christian Democracy. In so doing, they struck at a social and political movement which had a tradition on Polish territory dating back at least to the nineteenth century. In this chapter, I explain why Communists invited Christian Democrats to return openly to Polish public life in 1945, only to turn around and suppress Christian Democracy on Polish soil over the course of the next three years, co-opting its movement and torturing and imprisoning its leadership. I examine this question by focusing on four major issues:

1. the reasons for the Communist authorities' initial consent for the legalization of Christian Democracy in Poland directly after the end of World War II;
2. the reasons for the withdrawal of this consent;

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3. the tools and methods used to eliminate Polish Christian Democracy from public life; and

4. the reasons for the Communist authorities' persistence in opposing the reactivation of Christian Democracy in the 1970s and 1980s.

POLITICAL TACTICS

In light of the Communists' forceful suppression of the Christian Democratic movement by the end of the 1940s, the Communists' original consent to its legal operation in the form of the Christian Labour Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP) may come as a surprise. In fact, the Moscow-installed Communists who took the reins of power at the war's end issued permits for the party's principal leaders, who enjoyed considerable authority, to return to the country. These men included SP chair Karol Popiel, Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński and General Izydor Modelski.[1] All had been part of the government of Poland in exile, from whom the new Polish authorities had made a decisive break when Joseph Stalin had created the so-called Lublin Committee in July 1944.[2] This apparent contradiction in the activities of the postwar Polish authorities can, however, be explained by a number of factors.

First of all, permission for the relegalization of the Christian Democratic party's operations in 1945 was pegged to the implementation of the provisions of the Yalta Agreement. Specifically, Poland's Communists needed to keep up appearances. In the Crimea, Joseph Stalin had pledged to Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt to hold very rapid "free and fair" general elections in Poland. Stalin's promise also included the right of participation for "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties." Furthermore, the postwar government of Poland would also include "democratic leaders" from the exile community that had spent the war in London.[3]

Government-in-exile Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk was one of those who pushed his way to the front. This is not surprising if we consider the sequence of military and political events in 1943–1944, including the decisions taken by the prime minister in this period and his international position. The Communists—a self-styled "people's government"—had to take into consideration the aspirations of the "people's party," that is, the political party led by Mikołajczyk: the Polish Peasants' Party (perhaps better translated literally as the "Polish People's Party," Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL). Mikołajczyk undoubtedly was the

politician of the greatest stature among all those émigré politicians who opted for negotiations with the new rulers of Poland. The mass constituency of the political option that he represented did not allow the Communists any easy way of forbidding him from participating in the political life of postwar Poland.[4]

The chair of the SP, Karol Popiel, was one of Mikołajczyk's strongest supporters as head of government in London. Popiel and Mikołajczyk belonged to a four-person group of "party leaders" making the sensitive decisions about what courses of action the Mikołajczyk government should take.[5] After their return to Poland in 1945, the SP head also supported the former prime minister in his fight for power in the country. We may ask the question: with whom among the émigré political leaders could the Communists have worked – in order not to arouse the suspicion of the "Anglo-Saxons"—if not with those people who, by defining themselves as realists, were trying to bring about a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union and its exponents in postwar Poland? From this perspective, Mikołajczyk clearly pushed his way to the fore, and behind him came Popiel, who supported his political concepts.

At the same time, Popiel and other leading SP activists were not unknown to Communist policymakers. Stalin knew Popiel's name, as it had appeared on the list of potential participants in the Moscow Conference of June 1945. Although in the end the Christian Democratic leader did not take part in the conference, which determined the shape of the government of postwar Poland, he was still remembered as a politician on Mikołajczyk's side. Meanwhile, Mikołajczyk became deputy prime minister in the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, TRJN).[6]

Popiel also had a good working relationship with Michał Rola-Żymierski—real name: Łyżwiński—who in 1945 stood at the head of the Polish People's Army.[7] These contacts made it possible for Popiel to install General Izydor Modelski high in the new Communist state's military structures. During World War II, Modelski himself had come into contact with Soviet ambassador Viktor Lebedev, leading to the establishment of direct, informal relations between Polish and Soviet policymakers. Lebedev demanded that Modelski be present during these discussions.[8] These, and other personal ties, increased the chances of the SP not only engaging in legal political activity, but even having a potential influence on important areas of public life in postwar Poland.

In seeking the rationale for the Communists' consent to SP's legal operation in Communist Poland, we must also go back to the Christian Democrats' thought and political practice during the years of first the Second Polish Republic, and then the Second World War. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the conviction dominated among the SP's politicians—especially those in exile, but in time those in Poland as well—of the need to have good-neighborly relations with the country's neighbor to the east. The most radical Christian Democrat in this regard was Michał Kwiatkowski, editor of the émigré journal *Narodowiec* (Nationalist) and a member of the Polish National Council, who published extensively and delivered countless speeches.[9] In exile, others, too, had articulated a belief in the need to normalize relations between Poland and the Soviet Union; the SP's leader on this issue was Stanisław Sopicki, who led the party's internal opposition to Popiel.[10]

But Sopicki's arguments in exile were nothing new. Before 1939, the SP had been one of the few political forces to accept the ideas of General Władysław Sikorski formulated on the need for Polish-Soviet normalization. This attitude, before and during World War II, must have been closely observed by the Soviet authorities. In fact, in 1943, on the fourth anniversary of the death of SP founder Wojciech Korfanty, Soviet radio broadcasts noted the anniversary and stressed the SP's desire for good relations with the Soviet Union, calling for others to support this course.[11] The timing of this broadcast was striking, coming as it did a mere few months after two defining events in Poland's twentieth-century history: the Nazi discovery of the Katyń Forest Massacre in April 1943, and Polish Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski's death under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash over Gibraltar in July 1943. Given the circumstances, the SP's leadership was hardly ready to embrace the Soviet Union, and the party distanced itself firmly from the Soviet interpretation of these events.

Communists perceived yet another point of confluence with the SP in the Polish Christian Democratic movement's openness to the pursuit of justice for workers. Karol Popiel's National Workers' Party (Narodowa Partia Robotnicza, NPR), one of the two interwar political parties that merged in 1937 to form the SP, had even employed Marxist concepts. The NPR had, for example, repeated the term "class struggle" without irony—yet this was not a parroting of Marx, but rather a critical re-appropriation of his vocabulary. The NPR wanted to be a "class" party, oriented toward a specific social grouping, namely, the industrial working

class. Among those thinkers who exercised a substantial influence on this party were, on the one hand, Catholic social thinker and future bishop Teodor Kubina, and on the other—Professor Ludwik Kulczycki, whose ideological roots were socialist.

The concept of "class warfare" appeared both in the programmatic documents of the NPR and in the public statements of its politicians. NPR activists—in contrast to politicians of interwar Poland's Christian Democracy party—believed in prioritizing the social question above all, while making the concession of describing it in terms supplied by their political rivals for the hearts and minds of the working classes: Marxist socialists. (This divergence with Christian Democracy was responsible for many problems that later appeared in the course of the two parties'— ultimately successful—efforts to merge in the mid-1930s into one party, the SP.) And yet the NPR's 1921 program included the lines: "Class warfare is one of the symptoms of social life, yet it is neither exhaustive of that life, nor is it the only way of addressing all sorts of social inequalities." Furthermore, NPR activists rejected the Communist ideal of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," instead advocating gradual reforms achieved by means of parliamentary democracy. The NPR replaced Marxist concepts with a solidaristic attitude, understanding the proletariat as an integral part of nation and society, sharing in the nationwide interests of its other social layers.[12]

Indeed, Popiel's interwar party understood workers' justice differently from the Communists. Such openness on the labor issue—in fact, simply a hallmark of the NPR's fidelity to Catholic social teaching—could, in the eyes of the new authorities two decades later, after World War II, have signified the "democratic" nature of the Christian Democrats. In addition, the SP's policies were aimed at the "workers," which could have given the Communists a convenient opportunity to co-opt a bureaucratic, intellectual electorate into the new political reality.[13]

The Communists' initiative to relegalize Christian Democracy was also probably rooted in the former's reluctance to work with the Catholic Church. Taking into account its moral and social authority, which had been strengthened by the clergy's attitude during the occupation, the Church was initially seen as too strong an opponent, with strong support among the religious in Polish society. The showdown with the Church was postponed to a later time, hence the presence of Communist notables at religious ceremonies, and the consent for Catholic symbolism in the public space of a Communist-ruled state.

From this point of view, the permission granted to the SP in 1945 made it possible to "manage" the Catholics politically, facilitating their civic activity under the auspices of a "party of the people who go to church."

Consent for the SP's postwar relegalization may also have been motivated by a desire to split the anti-Communist opposition. Having several independent parties active on Polish soil—as opposed to Mikołajczyk taking on the Communists alone—ought, the Communists reasoned, to lead to their mutual rivalry: for voters, for seats in parliament and for public prominence. Indeed, the parallel workings of both Mikołajczyk's PSL and Popiel's SP in a newly Communist Poland could in practice lead to disagreements between them on specific matters of policy.[14] Generally, however, the idea of sowing deeper divisions within the opposition did not bear fruit. In the first few months of Communist Poland, the PSL and the SP worked closely together, agreeing on a sort of division of labor without getting involved in mutually destructive disputes. The SP's leaders were realists: they acknowledged the greater political potential of the PSL, and they made no attempts to undermine this state of affairs—believing, as they did, that Christian Democracy had a considerably smaller political constituency. Moreover, this fact – the SP's relatively weak political base and limited electorate—may also have been the cause of the Communist authorities' willingness to relegalize the party in the first place.

Finally, it is possible that the decision-makers in postwar Poland wanted to take advantage of the Christian Democrats' experience of exercising political power in sensitive domains. During World War II, Karol Popiel first headed the government's Bureau of Administrative Work (Biuro Prac Administracyjnych, 1941–1943), and then served in the Mikołajczyk government as Minister for the Reconstruction of Public Administration (1943–1944). It would have been hard not to notice that his experience could be very useful in the reconstruction of postwar Poland. Under Popiel's leadership, the Bureau of Administrative Work and the Ministry for the Reconstruction of Public Administration both produced a plethora of expert opinions and regulations spanning a wide range of issues related to planning for the restoration of normal operations of the central and local administrations in a postwar environment.

Popiel's colleagues, too, returned to postwar Poland with serious administrative credentials. The priest Zygmunt Kaczyński had, during the war, led one of the principal ministries in Mikołajczyk's cabinet (1943–1944): the Ministry of Education. Meanwhile, throughout World

War II, General Izydor Modelski held high office in the Ministries of Military Affairs and Defense (1939–1945). If we add to this the experience of SP politicians like Jerzy Braun, who remained in Poland throughout the war, representing the SP in the leadership of the wartime underground, then we find in the SP leadership of 1945 a team that was experienced, amply qualified and battle-tested under difficult conditions. The Communists were right, if they believed that these men could have worked well on behalf of the reconstruction of the Polish state.

A Change of Strategy

Given the various arguments in favor of allowing the Christian Democrats to operate legally in postwar Poland, we should ask the question: what changed within the space of one year, in the period between July 1945, the month of Popiel's return to Poland, and July 1946, when SP leaders suspended the party's activity in the face of imminent co-optation by Communist agents? Furthermore, within the space of just four more years—by 1950—the Polish Republic would formally withdraw the SP's concession and forcibly merge its remnants with another group (the puppet concessioned Democratic Party, or Stronnictwo Demokratyczne). Why did the Communist government ultimately withdraw its approval for an (independent) Christian Democratic party? Some of the reasons are obvious and well described in the literature. However, I believe that key pieces of the explanation have thus far escaped scholars' attention.

First of all, there was a profound strengthening and retrenchment of Communist power in Poland within twelve to eighteen months of the war's end. A celebrated June 1946 referendum on three issues of major national policy was rigged to achieve a so-called "Three times Yes" result, in accordance with the will of the rulers; in January 1947, the results of parliamentary elections followed suit.[15] The success of this large-scale "correction" of the voting results affirmed the Communists in their conviction that they were now exercising hegemonic control over social and political life in Poland.

At the same time, policymakers obtained an insight into the public's real preferences, revealing the Polish people's actual rejection of the new authorities. The logical response to this dissonance could only be a decision to end the "pluralist experiment" and proceed with the radical elimination of Poland's political opposition. In this context, we should recall the Polish Communists' respect for Joseph Stalin's brutal

thesis that class struggle should intensify along with the progress of the revolution. In the context of postwar Poland, this meant that, after a period of tolerance for some non-Communist parties and movements, the time would come to fight them in the open. Between 1945 and 1948, the Communists gradually moved away from the tactic of avoiding clashes with the Catholic Church in Poland.[16] In this sense, we may consider the Communists' strike against the SP as the vanguard of their attack on the Church, although these activities were strictly channeled toward the political entity most directly associated with the Catholic hierarchy.

In a situation of growing Cold War tensions, the Polish Communist authorities' need to disguise their actual intentions from the "West" dropped away. The worsening international relations between the superpowers meant that the question of political pluralism in Poland ceased to be a potentially combustible factor. The complex global situation resulted in the West's de facto acceptance that the countries behind the new Iron Curtain would submit to totalitarian rule, firmly planted as they were in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. This strengthening of the Communist geopolitical position in the years following the war in turn gave the local "rulers" freedom to eliminate their political opposition.[17]

One important factor that conditioned the Communist authorities' approach to the question of the SP's legal activity was a standardization of public discourse, universal behind the Iron Curtain in the years 1945–1947, in a manner increasingly approaching totalitarianism.[18] The requirements of Communist propaganda led to anything inconsistent with Marxism being ousted from public debate in Poland. This, of course, meant there was no longer any space to promote a Christian Democratic political program, even a heavily truncated one, whose philosophical grounds and practical pay-offs would both have been unacceptable to the Communist establishment.

What previously could have been an asset now became a burden. The factor that had previously made the SP attractive to the Communists—a Christian Democratic program focused on the working class, and thus an alternative way of attracting Catholic workers to participation in political life—became an area of potential competition that, from the Communists' point of view, was now unnecessary. The Christian Democrats began to be perceived as a force that could eat away at the Communists' electorate. To counteract this, the Communists (the Polish Workers' Party, or Polska Partia Robotnicza) initially attempted to

relegate the SP to the ghetto of the Catholic intelligentsia.[19] By the end of the 1940s, however, even a completely servile Christian Democracy proved extraneous, if not indeed dangerous, to Communist aims; the result was the SP's gradual, but brutal, suppression.

Elimination

The Communists eliminated the Christian Democratic SP from the Polish political scene in three successive stages.[20] The first, playing out in the years 1945–1946, ended with the introduction into the SP of a group of "agents of influence" implementing the will of the Communists. The next phase, centered on the year 1946, entailed the party's co-optation and takeover by those closet Communists, while Popiel and his colleagues suspended their political activities and went either into exile or into prison. Finally, between 1946 and 1950, the SP went from co-optation to non-existence under its new, phantom leadership, as a prelude to the absorption of its members by a different political organization.

Throughout the first two stages, Polish Communists followed the example of the ancient Greek Trojan horse strategy. In July 1945, after Popiel arrived in Poland, the Executive Committee of the SP had decided to resume overt organization-building in the countryside for the first time since 1939. At the same time, however, a competing "Labor Party" announced its formation, led by activists of the dissident "Jolt" (Zryw) faction that had been close to Popiel in the early years of the occupation, but was ejected from the SP in 1942.[21] Its leader was the physician Feliks Widy-Wirski.[22] Taking advantage of Zryw's existence, the Communist authorities made it difficult for the real SP to operate, calling for both groups with the same name to merge.

Popiel's intervention with the state authorities yielded no results. On the contrary, the threat arose that—if the "unification" talks failed—the government would consider only the usurpers to be legitimate. In this situation, on 14 September 1945, a forced (and backdated) "agreement" was concluded between the independent Christian Democrats, who followed Popiel and enjoyed the support of the vast majority of party members, and the group of usurpers, who had minimal resources but enjoyed the support of the government. Under the terms of this agreement, Popiel remained the chair of the SP. The party's Executive Committee consisted of nine representatives of Popiel's group—Antoni Antczak, Stanisław Bukowski, Józef Gawrych, Kazimierz Kumaniecki,

Józef Kwasiborski, Jerzy Lewandowski, Zbigniew Madeyski, Piotr Nowakowski, Konstanty Turowski—and nine from the "Jolt" faction—Stefan Brzeziński, Jerzy Domiński, Zygmunt Felczak, Marian Lityński, Józef Maciejewski, Tadeusz Michejda, Eugeniusz Stręcioch, Damazy Tilgner and Feliks Widy-Wirski. A similar parity (seven persons from each side) was agreed in relation to the SP's representation on the State Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN).[23] The objective of the first phase of the operation had been achieved.

The artificial nature of this forced hybrid construct of the SP translated into a permanent conflict between the Communist-controlled Zryw and the majority, who favored Popiel's line. There were differences between the two factions in virtually every sphere: their ideological assumptions, their plans of action, their political programs. The fight between the factions consumed a great deal of time, at the expense of their everyday activities. The SP activists focused around Popiel made unsuccessful attempts to achieve independence. In the end, Popiel managed to get a clear message from Roman Zambrowski, a top-ranking Communist.[24] The politicians met on 13 July 1946 during a session of the Negotiating Commission for the Democratic Parties (Komisja Porozumiewawcza Stronnictw Demokratycznych). Zambrowski declared that Polish Communists would not tolerate the existence of an independent Christian Democratic grouping.

In this situation, the SP's Executive Committee, made up of Popiel's followers, decided to suspend the SP's activities and resign from their seats in the KRN. These decisions were implemented between July and September 1946. In the short term, these decisions by Popiel's supporters handed political victory to the opposite faction. "Jolt" did not respect the resolutions to suspend the SP's activities and continued to operate, completely taking over the party's management. In this way, the goal of the second phase of the operation was achieved; a group of politicians whose ideological roots had little or nothing to do with Christianity, and who accepted the postwar reality of Communist Poland, appropriated the name and traditions of the SP.[25]

Under new management, the SP lost any bearing on the country's material reality, becoming instead a convenient propaganda tool for reaching Catholic Poland. The third stage of the elimination of Christian Democracy from Polish political life concluded on 8 July 1950 when, in violation of the group's statutes, its Supreme Council disbanded the party and announced its accession to the Democratic Party, whose existence

was still permitted by the authorities. The leaders of the dissolved party joined the leadership of the Democratic Party, although they did not play a very serious role in it. The majority of the former SP's members, however, did not undertake any activity in the new party, seeing their Christian Democratic political activity as having come to an end.[26]

In addition to gradually moving against Poland's Christian Democratic party, Communists pursued a range of different actions in the immediate postwar to neutralize the Christian Democratic program. Karol Popiel's supporters, for example, were confronted with a mountain of administrative difficulties. State authorities refused the SP a permit to hold its first congress, which had been scheduled for 15 July 1945; in the end, it did take place, in near-secret conditions. The second congress, however, scheduled for 19–20 July 1946, was prevented altogether. In fact, it was the refusal to permit this congress that convinced the SP's pro-Popiel leadership to vote to suspend the party. Pressure was on the SP to ensure that its more eminent members, who had worked in the wartime resistance, such as Konrad Sieniewicz, Jerzy Braun and Stefan Kaczorowski, did not join the leadership of the "united"—read: Communist—SP. Finally, in September 1946, the presidium of the KRN refused to consent to a new formula for Polish Christian Democracy, styled as a "Christian" Labour Party (*Chrześcijańskie Stronnictwo Pracy*), with the strong support of the Polish episcopate.[27]

In addition to administrative harassment, SP activists were subjected to classically totalitarian methods. After the SP's elimination from the Polish political scene, officers of the Communist secret police took steps to remove former Christian Democratic activists from society by physical force. The defunct party's leaders were arrested and subjected to several months of investigations, during which they were tortured to extract the relevant evidence. The Christian Democrats were subjected to show trials, which were to serve as "proof" that, from the point of view of the Communist authorities, it was not in itself sufficient to physically isolate its political opponents. It was necessary to dragoon them into new roles, useful for the authorities, by recasting in a spiteful light what they had achieved in the past. It was no coincidence that the "reports" from the 1951 show trials of prominent Christian Democrat activists were published under the suggestive title of "Allies of the Gestapo" (*Sojusznicy Gestapo*).[28] The intention was to create an association in the public's mind between the wartime Nazi occupiers and the postwar participants in the Christian Democratic "conspiracy."

The effect of these actions was the physical elimination by Communist officials of their ideological opponents from public life. Many Christian Democratic leaders were sent to prison: these included Antoni Antczak, Jerzy Braun, Stanisław Bukowski, Jan Hoppe, Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński, Tadeusz Kudliński, Józef Kwasiborski, Władysław Siła-Nowicki, Kazimierz Studentowicz, Zofia and Konstanty Turowski and Cecylia Weker. Many had risked their lives during World War II fighting for Poland's liberation from German rule. The effects of the repression were lost years, ruined health (at least in the case of Jerzy Braun), family problems associated with long-term absences from home (as was the case with Zofia and Konstanty Turowski) and finally the highest price of all—death in Communist prisons (Antczak, Rev. Kaczyński).[29]

SP politicians who wanted to avoid repression, while at the same time being able to continue their political activities, chose exile. This path was taken by SP chair Karol Popiel and SP secretary-general Konrad Sieniewicz, as well as Stefan Kaczorowski, General Izydor Modelski and others. Popiel and his closest colleagues in turn recruited younger generations of followers in exile: Stanisław Gebhardt, Seweryn Eustachiewicz, Janusz Śleszyński, Jan Kułakowski and many others.[30] The price of their freedom was in no way negligible. Cut off from their homeland and family, impugned as "deserters," exposed to the machinations of Communist security services, they struggled with the elemental need to build up their positions almost from scratch in deeply challenging living conditions in new, far-away countries. And so the SP became, once again, a political force in exile.

FAILED ATTEMPTS AT REACTIVATION

The SP persisted in exile through the end of the Cold War. When former prisoner of Stalinism Władysław Gomułka returned to power at the helm of Poland's Communist party in 1956, Karol Popiel expressed hope that perhaps the SP might yet return to Polish soil as a concessioned political force.[31] And yet the Communist authorities upheld their decision that the Christian Democratic party should remain absent from the political system of Communist Poland not only during the "thaw," but also throughout the 1970s and 1980s—indeed, until the very end of the Cold War. If this attitude is perhaps unsurprising with respect to the 1950s and 1960s, the passing of Gomułka's time in power following the violent repressions of 1968 and 1970, and the advent of new

Communist party secretary Edward Gierek, associated with the liberalization of political life and a more lenient treatment of the Catholic Church, might well seem to have been a good time to revise this decision. A new generation of homegrown Christian Democrats took steps in this direction at the beginning of the 1970s, and then again in the early 1980s, following the introduction of martial law and the suppression of Solidarity in December 1981.[32] And yet, Communist Poland never permitted the re-establishment of Christian Democracy on Polish soil. Why was this the case?

Despite the partial liberalization of the system in the 1970s, social movements that drew upon Christianity continued to be treated as hostile forces. The Communists' fear of a reactivated Christian Democratic party was undoubtedly fueled by the overall religious make-up of Polish society, in which—despite the authorities' perennial efforts—the Catholic Church enjoyed predominant authority, and the percentage of believers (and thus potential supporters of Christian Democracy) remained at a very high level. Likewise, even if a new party were to emerge, it could draw on the historical memory—arguably, even an anti-Communist legend—connected with the fight for independence and the SP's subsequent suppression.

The most significant promoter of the idea of reactivating Christian Democracy on Polish soil in the late Communist period was Janusz Zabłocki, a long-time Catholic activist with roots first in *Dziś i Jutro*/PAX, subsequently a co-founder of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club movement (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej, KIK) and the monthly journal *Więź* (Bond) and finally the creator of the Center for Social Documentation and Studies (Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, ODiSS).[33] One of the key distinguishing features of Zabłocki's political project was his embrace of the idea of cooperation with former members of the SP. From the point of view of the Communist authorities, however, this meant that the attempts to reactivate Christian Democracy were being led by an individual who, institutionally speaking, was deeply embedded in state structures, as an MP in Communist Poland's parliament, and the leader of a group with its own press and economic resources. Added to that, Zabłocki had the support of the Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński.[34] Taken together, these factors made him seem both an effective and dangerous political player.

Zabłocki had one more important advantage. Over decades of social and political activism since the end of World War II, with extensive

support from former SP activists, he had established a wide-ranging network of contacts with leaders of Christian Democratic parties throughout Western Europe: especially in Italy, but also in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium.[35] Janusz Zabłocki's burgeoning transnational network meant that he had the ability to build relationships with decision-making politicians in Western Europe, over the heads of the Polish authorities. All of these factors led Communist leaders to stick by their strategic calculation to refuse Christian Democracy the right to operate in the Polish People's Republic.[36]

To the uneasy relationships between those who favored the reactivation of Polish Christian Democracy and the Communist policymakers, we must add one more factor: divisions within the anti-Communist opposition itself. The idea of reactivating the SP was viewed with reluctance by an influential part of Solidarity elites that held more left-wing beliefs. Personal conflicts, too, played a role.[37] This complex of social factors, at least in part, explains why the SP was not revived at the most favorable time, namely during the "carnival of Solidarity."[38]

Conclusions

The Polish Christian Democrats were not favored by history. The chain of circumstances that placed power in postwar Poland into the hands of the Communists prevented the SP from playing the major political role for which, it would seem, Catholic statesmen were destined in a near-homogenous Catholic country such as postwar Poland. Let us note that, in the late 1940s in Western and Southern Europe (both in individual states and the nascent European Community), and then again in the 1960s in Latin America, the trauma of World War II and the geopolitics of the Cold War, among other factors, brought Christian Democracy to power.[39] At the same time, however, Poland was totally dominated by the "one true" Marxist ideology—Stalin's version—the principles of which stood in complete opposition to the ideas of the Christian Democrats.

Without the Communist factor and its dependence on the Soviet Union, Polish Christian Democracy would likely have played a key role in Poland's reconstruction and governance after the end of World War II. The merits of this assumption are based on the following: the Christian Democrats' position in the structure of the underground authorities within Poland and the government in exile; the experience gained

in their work for the state; the SP's reputation as the party of Poland's legendary wartime leaders, General Władysław Sikorski and pianist-statesman Ignacy Jan Paderewski; the party's ability to form coalitions; the work conducted under the auspices of the SP—political, academic and theoretical—which resulted in a series of specific reform projects in various fields of social and political life; the increase (caused by World War II) in public sentiments both radical on the one hand and religious on the other (both of which factors should, under normal circumstances, have resulted in electoral gains for the SP); the rise in importance of the working class, for whom the Polish Christian Democrats had devised a socio-political program; and concomitant political trends in Western Europe. Even in its embattled, embittered condition, the postwar SP still managed to propose a new philosophy of governance of its own, based on the modern, holistic, original doctrine of unionism.[40]

Postwar solutions imposed from above did not allow Polish Christian Democracy to wage a fair electoral fight. The election results in post-war Poland were fixed in advance to favor the Communists. Beyond the obvious travesty of electoral process, this amounted to a tremendous waste of human potential and enthusiasm, as postwar statistics make clear. Even in the extremely unfavorable conditions immediately follow-ing the Second World War's conclusion in May 1945, the Labour Party had between 100,000 and 120,000 members. Five years later, at the end of the activities undertaken by the closet Communist grouping, it numbered barely 25,000 people. This was, among others, the result of a Communist game: recruiting the SP to return to Poland in 1945, only to force its leaders and rank-and-file alike into prison or exile by the end of the same decade, never to be restored to Polish public life.

Translated by James Todd

Notes

1. There is one biography of Karol Popiel: Ryszard Gajewski, *Karol Popiel 1887–1977* (Suwałki: Wyższa Szkoła Służby Społecznej im. Księdza Franciszka Blachnickiego, 2008). See also, e.g., Ryszard Gajewski, *Ks. Zygmunt Kaczyński—kapłan i polityk* (Lublin: System Graf, 2013).
2. For more on this topic, see Jarosław Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie w latach 1939–1945* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2012).

3. See the interesting analysis (today, a classic) of the course of the Yalta talks concerning Poland, and the content of the final declaration by the leaders of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on this issue, in Jan Karski, *Wielkie mocarstwa wobec Polski 1919–1945: Od Wersalu do Jałty* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 1998), 425–460.

4. Roman Buczek, *Stanisław Mikołajczyk* (Toronto: Century Publishing, 1996), I: 371 onwards; Andrzej Paczkowski, *Stanisław Mikołajczyk czyli klęska realisty (Zarys biografii politycznej)* (Warsaw: Omnipress, 1991).

5. Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 466–468.

6. Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 609–610.

7. Jarosław Pałka and Jerzy Poksiński, *Michał Żymierski 1890–1989* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2015).

8. Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 547–550; Sławomir Łukasiewicz, "Generała Modelskiego ucieczki i powroty," *Więź* no. 1 (2007): 100–101; Stanisław Kirkor, "Rozmowy polsko-sowieckie w 1944 r.," *Zeszyty Historyczne* no. 22 (1972): 53–54.

9. Kwiatkowski proposed among others a break with an Eastern policy driven by, as he put it, "contempt" for the Soviet state. On the Katyń question, he opposed the London government's hardline stance. Kwiatkowski's views on Polish–Soviet relations ultimately drove other leaders of the SP in exile to distance themselves from him. For an analysis of Michał Kwiatkowski's key statements from a crucial, and simultaneously horrifically difficult, moment in Polish–Soviet relations in the years 1943–1944, see Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 487–491, 496–497; Jarosław Rabiński, "Dwa memoriały Michała Kwiatkowskiego w sprawie polityki zagranicznej rządu RP na uchodźstwie w latach 1942–1943," *Roczniki Humanistyczne* no. 2 (2009): 217–239.

10. And yet this did not mean unconditional support for the policies of gradual accommodation adopted by the Polish government with respect to Soviet demands. Quite the opposite—Sopicki many times over criticized the "soft" stance of Mikołajczyk's cabinet on the issue of the eastern borderlands. This, too, set Sopicki in opposition to Karol Popiel, leading among others to Sopicki's decision to join the exile government of Tomasz Arciszewski, whose legitimacy Popiel contested, to say the least (though the underlying questions were far more complicated). See, e.g., Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 493–497, 500; on the SP's contradictory stances on the Arciszewski government, Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we*

władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie, 569–589. On Sopicki—who in the years 1934–1937 had served as secretary-general of Poland's Christian Democracy party—see, e.g., Stanisław Gajewski, "Sopicki Stanisław," in *Słownik biograficzny katolicyzmu społecznego w Polsce* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1995), III: 78–79; Tadeusz Wolsza, "Działalność polityczna i poglądy Stanisława Sopickiego (1941–1976)," *Polska 1944/45–1989: Studia i materiały* no. 4 (1999): 241–260; Tadeusz Wolsza, "Sopicki Stanisław Antoni," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Warszawa-Kraków: IH PAN, 2000), XL: 489–492.

11. Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 485–486.

12. Quoted in Gajewski, *Karol Popiel*, 91; Adam Laska, *Narodowa Partia Robotnicza 1920–1937: Studia z dziejów ruchów społecznych w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo "Fosze," 2004), 152–159; Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 62–64.

13. Paul Misner, *Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialisation to the First World War* (New York: Crossroads, 1991); Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 21–61, 93–113.

14. This was the case, for example, with respect to differences of style and strategy adopted on the one hand by PSL members (who were more radical) and SP members (who appeared more moderate) in the State Council—a difference highlighted by Communist speakers who thereby sought to provoke conflict between SP and PSL. See, e.g., *Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z posiedzeń Krajowej Rady Narodowej* X (1946): col. 190.

15. The "people's" referendum became a convenient pretext for Communists to postpone parliamentary elections. According to official statistics, Poles had overwhelmingly supported the Communist position, which called for a "three times Yes" vote in response to all three questions in the referendum. In reality, however, this support was limited to about 26% of those who voted. The results of the referendum supplied Communists with information about the scale of their influence in society, leading them to conclude that it would in fact be necessary to falsify the results of parliamentary elections.

16. It is possible to give many examples of its symptoms, beginning with the elimination of religious programming on Polish Radio, through the creation of the Office of Confessional Affairs (Urząd do Spraw Wyznań) and the co-optation by Communist authorities of the ecclesiastical charity *Caritas*, finally ending with the show trials of clergy in the 1950s (including Kielce bishop Czesław Kaczmarek) and the arrest of Poland's primate, Stefan Wyszyński.

17. Inessa Iazhborovskaia, "The Gomułka Alternative," in *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, ed. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 126–135.

18. According to classic definitions of "totalitarianism," one of the tools for totalitarian governance is the ruler's monopoly over means of mass communication. The point is to prevent the creation of any content in the public sphere that would in any way contradict the official governing discourse. In this way, elements of content repeated in various media outlets reinforce one another, rendering the message credible. The flow of information in Poland was overseen by the Ministry of Information and Propaganda, as well as the Central Office for the Control of the Press (Centralne Biuro Kontroli Prasy), transformed in 1945 into the Main Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Public Performances, which carried out preventative censorship. See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzeziński, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Hanna Świda-Ziemba, *Człowiek wewnętrznie zniewolony: Mechanizmy i konsekwencje minionej formacji: Analiza psychosocjologiczna* (Warsaw: Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1997).

19. On ghettoization, see, e.g., Martin Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945* (London: Routledge, 1997), 18; on the SP's relationship to the postwar Polish Catholic intelligentsia, see Piotr H. Kosicki, *Personalizm po polsku: Francuskie korzenie polskiej inteligencji katolickiej*, trans. Jerzy Giebułtowski (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2016), 133–220.

20. Konstanty Turowski, *Historia ruchu chrześcijańsko-demokratycznego w Polsce* (Warsaw: Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, 1989); Waldemar Bujak, *Historia Stronnictwa Pracy 1937, 1946, 1950* (Warsaw: Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, 1988); Jacek M. Majchrowski, *Geneza politycznych ugrupowań katolickich: Stronnictwo Pracy, grupa "Dziś i Jutro"* (Paris: Libella, 1984); Jacek M. Majchrowski, "Pierwsze pół wieku polskiej chadecji," *Znaki Nowych Czasów* no. 17 (2006): 116–129.

21. Andrzej Friszke, "Konflikt we władzach naczelnych Stronnictwa Pracy 'Romb' w 1942 roku," *Przegląd Historyczny* no. 1 (1987): 45–62.

22. Mirosław Piotrowski, *Służba idei czy serwilizm? Zygmunt Felczak i Feliks Widy-Wirski w najnowszych dziejach Polski* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994). Evaluating the brief postwar activities of Zygmunt Felczak (who died in 1946) is a controversial exercise among historians: Wojciech Frazik, *Emisariusz Wolnej Polski: Biografia polityczna Wacława Felczaka (1916–1993)* (Kraków: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2013), 197–198.

23. Turowski, *Historia ruchu chrześcijańsko-demokratycznego w Polsce*, 514, 535.

24. Turowski, *Historia ruchu chrześcijańsko-demokratycznego w Polsce*, 545.
25. See, e.g., Feliks Widy-Wirski, *Polska i Rewolucja* (Poznań: Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza "Zryw," 1945); Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 93–113.
26. Bujak, *Historia Stronnictwa Pracy*, 240.
27. Jarosław Rabiński, *Konstanty Turowski 1907–1983: Życie, działalność, myśl społeczno-polityczna* (Katowice: Unia, 2008), 169–171. Konrad Sieniewicz's memoirs contain a report of a similar initiative attempted a year earlier (in the autumn of 1945), which was sabotaged by the Communists: Konrad Sieniewicz, *Wspomnienia polityczne 1939–1945: Ku jakiej Polsce szliśmy* (Katowice: Unia, 2012), 145–147.
28. *Sojusznicy Gestapo: Proces Kwasiborskiego i innych* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1951).
29. Antoni Antczak—during World War II, one of the leaders of the underground SP (among others, SP executive committee chair from 1942 onward), as well as the underground state administration in occupied Poland (for example, as government delegate for Pomerania). He died in 1952 in suspicious circumstances in the prison at Wronki, near Poznań. The official version recorded in prison documents holds that the cause of death was leukemia. Meanwhile, Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński, postwar pastor of the All Saints' Parish in Warsaw, died in 1953, also in mysterious circumstances—officially ruled a heart attack—in the infamous Mokotów prison in Warsaw. See, e.g., Andrzej Paczkowski, "Aresztowanie ks. Zygmunta Kaczyńskiego," *Więź* no. 4 (1991): 109–114.
30. See, e.g., Stanisław Gebhardt's, Piotr H. Kosicki's and Paweł Ziętara's chapters in this volume.
31. See Paweł Ziętara's chapter in this volume; Janusz Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja w kraju i na emigracji 1947–1970* (Lublin: Ośrodek Studiów Polonijnych i Społecznych PZKS, 1999), 126–130.
32. Rabiński, *Stronnictwo Pracy we władzach naczelnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie*, 234–236.
33. Janusz Zabłocki created the Center for Social Documentation and Studies in 1967, launching it as an institution devoted to the analysis and popularization of Catholic social teaching across Polish society. The new journal *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* (The Christian in the World), established in 1969, played a crucial role in these efforts, making available in Polish translation key documents of Church social teaching, including the documents of the Second Vatican Council, papal encyclicals, exhortations and sermons. See, e.g., Stanisław Popławski, *Katolicko-społeczny ruch ODiSS: Powstanie, rozwój, program* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej, 1981).

34. Jan Żaryn, "Janusz Zabłocki—chrześcijański demokrata zaangażowany w PRL (cz. 2)," in Janusz Zabłocki, *Dzienniki* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2011), II: 12–22.

35. See, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 127–198.

36. For Janusz Zablocki's initiatives, see his *Dzienniki*, vols. I–III (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, Zablocki Zablocki 2008–2013); Małgorzata Strzelecka, *Między minimalizmem a maksymalizmem: Dylematy ideowe Stanisława Stommy i Janusza Zabłockiego* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2015); Rabiński, *Konstanty Turowski*, 222–237.

37. One key example is the conflict—both personal and political—that divided the former friends and colleagues Janusz Zabłocki and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, with the latter becoming later, in 1989, postwar Poland's first non-Communist prime minister. In the years of the "carnival of Solidarity," 1980–1981, Mazowiecki became one of Lech Wałęsa's closest advisors, as well as editor-in-chief of *Tygodnik Solidarność* (The Solidarity Weekly). See, e.g., the series of articles published by Janusz Zabłocki, "Mazowiecki mój przeciwnik," *Ład*, 1990–1991.

38. See, e.g., Padraic Kenney, *Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

39. See esp. Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter in this volume; Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006).

40. In its broadest sense, "unionism" in this context was a philosophical, political and social doctrine devised during World War II, mainly by Jerzy Braun, which assumed a fundamental reconstruction of the social and political order on the basis of Catholicism, on the basis of a multi-layered cooperation between peoples and nations. Jerzy Braun, *Unionizm* (Warsaw: Ogólnopolski Klub Miłośników Litwy, 1999); Maria Żychowska, "Jerzy Braun (1901–1975): Twórca kultury harcerskiej i 'Unionizmu'" (Tarnów-Warszawa: Fronda, 2003); Rafał Łętocha, "Unionizm: Zarys koncepcji ideowych katolickiej konspiracji lat okupacji," *Almanach Historyczny* no. 6 (2004): 313–335.

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Christian Democrats Across the Iron Curtain

Paweł Ziętara

The history of the contacts between Christian Democratic circles in Poland and in exile abroad, which lasted for more than forty years, is difficult to analyze within a short chapter. Out of necessity, this chapter should be treated as a starting point, depicting the scope and the complexity of the subject matter. At the outset, let me define the groups that will be the subject of this text. In the Polish context, the term "Christian Democrats in exile" has a relatively simple definition. It covers the group that survived the larger, historic Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP)—in one incarnation in London, in another in Communist Poland—rallying around the figure of Karol Popiel.[1] This group took on its final form in autumn 1947 under the name of the Board of the Labor Party in Exile (Zarząd SP na Wychodźstwie).

Unlike other self-styled Christian Democratic parties of the 1940s, this group favored the implementation of the provisions of the Yalta Conference concerning Poland and accepted the new territorial shape of the country. It also rejected the legal foundations of the London-based Polish government in exile, which was based on the latter's

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constitutional continuity with the prewar authorities, from which their mandate to represent Poles on both sides of the Iron Curtain had derived.[2] At the same time, Popiel's group was the only émigré faction of the SP which made efforts to seek and maintain contacts with Poland.

The Christian Democrats remaining in Poland were technically a circle of surviving underground activists belonging to two conjoined movements, the Unia (Union) and the SP, some of whom also remained active after the war. From the mid-1960s onward, the path of Christian Democracy in Poland was increasingly claimed by Janusz Zabłocki and the Center for Social Documentation and Studies (Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, ODiSS), which Zabłocki led, and then subsequently by the Polish Catholic Social Union (Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny, PZKS). Of course, when speaking of the contacts between the Christian Democratic parties within Poland and in exile, mention must be made of Poland's vibrant—but not Christian Democratic—movement of publicly engaged lay Catholics: the Znak (Sign) movement, which included the editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Universal Weekly), the monthly periodicals *Więź* (Bond) and *Znak* (Sign), the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej, KIK), as well as the movement's small circle of MPs in the parliament of Communist Poland in the years 1957–1976, who also openly invoked Christian inspiration.

However, Znak clearly distanced itself from the Polish Christian Democratic tradition, the wartime legacy of Unia and from the SP in particular. This movement developed its own ideological concepts, critiqued in the wake of its manifesto-like publications in the pages of its own journals advocating social "minimalism" and "neo-positivism."[3] It is symptomatic of this approach that, after 1989, in a newly free Poland, these same Catholic intellectuals undertook political activities within the liberal-democratic parties, namely Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) and Unia Wolności (Freedom Union).[4] For similar reasons, Christian Democracy cannot be expanded to include the PAX Association, which had no luck in trying to reconcile Marxism with the social teachings of the Catholic Church.[5]

Popiel's decision to return to Poland in July 1945, and to attempt to implement the provisions of the Yalta Conference together with Stanisław Mikołajczyk, met with the support of the SP's clandestine structures on the ground in Poland. However, the Communist authorities had no intention of tolerating the existence of a genuine,

autonomous political party with a Christian Democratic profile. The growing harassment and repression, as well as the campaign of sabotage carried out by a group originating in the National Uprising Party (Stronnictwo Zrywu Narodowego), meant that merely a year after Popiel's 1945 return to Poland, in accordance with a resolution of the leadership led by Popiel, the SP's activities on Polish soil were suspended. Popiel left Poland in October 1947.[6]

Despite the party's formal relegalization in the newly Communist country, the Christian Democrats in Poland did not neglect their contact with the SP groups still in exile during the initial postwar period. These contacts were principally maintained through emissaries who traveled between Warsaw and London with great dedication. They brought funds from the West to finance organizational activities in Poland and to support activists who found themselves in difficult material circumstances. On the way back, they transported into the free world activists who had been threatened with arrest by the Communist security ministry (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, MBP), and sometimes also the family members of those who remained in exile. And in both directions they brought the most precious material possible: information—about the state of affairs in Poland, in exile and around the world, together with political opinions and analyses. One of the most important emissaries was Wacław Felczak, who had been associated with the SP even before the war; his older brother Zygmunt was a member of the party leadership who, after his expulsion from the SP in the summer of 1943 for pro-Communist activities, became the head of the group Zryw (Uprising). The younger Felczak traveled to the West four times, and came back the other way three times. During his fourth attempt, in December 1948, he was arrested in Czechoslovakia by its security services.[7] Another important case was that of Ryszard Kamiński, former officer of the Home Army's "Krybar" battalion, formed by Unia followers, who succeeded in entering Poland on two occasions. The price for doing so was eight years in Communist jails and the irretrievable ruin of his health. He died soon after being released under an "amnesty."[8]

Before heading for Poland, the emissaries familiarized themselves with the positions of all of the SP's émigré leaders, including those who did not support the choices Popiel had made: Stanisław Sopicki, Bronisław Kuśnierz and General Józef Haller. However, a key role in organizing contacts and exchanging information among the Christian Democrats fell to the so-called national delegation, made up of three politicians who

had been active in the underground both during the war and after its end. These men had only left Poland near the end of 1945: Stanisław Kauzik, the head of the Department of Information and Press of the Polish Government Delegation for the Country; Stefan Kaczorowski; and Konrad Sieniewicz.

Sieniewicz, according to findings by the Polish Communist secret police, was involved in the creation of the SP's intelligence network, which gathered data about political and economic relationships in Poland. After his departure, Zofia Fedorowicz was supposed to take over this role. In June 1946, Sieniewicz went to Denmark to meet Cecylia Weker, his informational liaison (*łączniczka*) from the period of the occupation, who had managed to travel to the West with a group of students from the University of Warsaw. At this meeting, the two activists established a new method for the SP to exchange correspondence between Christian Democratic circles in Poland and those in exile, as well as a system of codes and codenames. In autumn 1947, Sieniewicz apparently encouraged members of the group in Poland to establish contacts with the Freedom and Independence Association (Zrzeszenie "Wolność i Niezawisłość"), the largest underground anti-Communist organization in Poland. However, this initiative met with a negative response among Christian Democrats on the ground in Poland. At the same time, both Sieniewicz and Kaczorowski, who deemed it essential to strengthen the structures of the party in exile, consistently pushed the leading SP activists remaining in Poland to emigrate. Both men made extensive efforts to organize escape routes to the West for their party colleagues.[9]

At the same time, semi-formal attempts were also made to find paths into Poland. In 1947, Seweryn Eustachiewicz, one of the leading activists of the underground Unia remaining in the West—he had been liberated by the Allies from a German concentration camp two years earlier—returned to Poland for several days. Officially, he was acting as an employee of the delegation of the American Polish War Relief at the Munich headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). During this visit, he made contacts with his wartime comrades, including Jerzy Braun, Kazimierz Studentowicz and Stanisław Wąsowicz.[10]

In the second half of 1948, arrests of the SP's leadership began. In a series of show trials, these men and women were sentenced to long periods of incarceration, up to life in prison. They were also routinely

given the additional penalty of having all of their property confiscated, something few historians underscore today. The main trial, conducted in the spring of 1951 by the Military District Court in Warsaw, focused on Józef Kwasiborski, Stanisław Bukowski, Antoni Antczak, Jan Hoppe and Cecylia Weker. The principal intent was to document the alleged cooperation between the SP and the Gestapo.

A year earlier, the editors of and contributors to *Tygodnik Warszawski* (Warsaw Weekly) had also been put on trial.[11] Braun, Studentowicz, Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński and Konstanty Turowski were also among those tried in separate cases. The charges brought against them included contacts with the SP in exile, which the Stalinist courts defined (under article 7 of the Council of Ministers' Decree of 13 June 1946 on Crimes Especially Dangerous in the Period of Rebuilding the State) as "collecting and disseminating reports and documents constituting state or military secrets, to the detriment of the Polish State," thus laying the foundation for harsh punishments. The use of funds sent from the West was consistently treated, in accordance with article 6 of the Decree, as "receiving material benefits, in connection with activities detrimental to the Polish state, from a person acting in the interest of a foreign government or a foreign organization."[12] The few SP activists who for various reasons remained at liberty were intimidated or monitored by the MBP. Christian Democratic structures inside Poland ceased to exist.

However, if we are to believe the documents collected by the security apparatus of Communist Poland, Christian Democratic émigrés were still trying to get into Poland during this period. Sieniewicz was supposed to have been particularly active in this respect, as he worked tirelessly to set up intelligence networks within Poland based on the old Unia and SP structures. Bolesław Biega was alleged to have been his partner in those activities, with funding provided by the American-sponsored National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. (later renamed the Free Europe Committee, Inc., FEC).[13]

A turning point in the history of Christian Democratic contacts across the Iron Curtain was Seweryn Eustachiewicz's spectacular, secret trip to Poland. Having spent several years in Argentina after his stint with UNRRA, he returned to France in 1953, quickly becoming one of the SP's most important exiled activists in Europe. In February and March 1956, "Sever" spent nine days in Poland. In all probability, he arrived without the knowledge of his party colleagues, yet with the knowledge, and even at the expense, of the Polish Communist security services,

under whose discreet supervision he remained during his whole stay. He was, however, free to move around the country. He spoke not only with the leaders of the PAX Association, from whom he had received a formal invitation, but also with Jerzy Turowicz, Stanisław Stomma, Stefan Kisielewski and Bishop Michał Klepacz, the acting head of the Polish Episcopate. None of the other exiles could have boasted of a similar experience at the time. It is hard to overestimate the value of the personal observations and impressions that Eustachiewicz gained during this visit, which he shared with his political friends back in the West. These, in turn, had a profound influence on the subsequent evolution of the Popiel group's attitude toward their homeland.[14]

This process coincided with tectonic shifts in the international system and growing signs of a "thaw" in Poland. The hitherto tightly closed borders of Communist Poland were gradually opening up. The PAX Association's activists, who had been able to travel internationally since the late 1940s, took advantage of this liberalization as well.[15] It was their mediation that had made Eustachiewicz's 1956 trip to Poland possible, having put him in contact with representatives of the embassy of the Polish People's Republic in France. According to the testimony of one of the top SP activists, Stanisław Gebhardt, in September 1956 Ryszard Reiff, Paris correspondent for PAX's periodical *Słowo Powszechne* (Universal Word), approached Eustachiewicz with proposals from his boss, Bolesław Piasecki, addressed to the entire movement of Christian Democratic exiles.

These proposals sounded revolutionary. Piasecki invited Popiel to come to Poland, and was apparently ready to hand over to the Christian Democrat the leadership of PAX, so that on the basis of the association's structures he could rebuild the SP on Polish soil, bringing in Christian Democrats from both inside and outside Poland. Then, as Poland's newly strongest political movement, the SP could presumably replace the Polish Communist party, taking the "leading role" in the Polish state while also guaranteeing the interests of the USSR on the Vistula River.

Bolesław Piasecki proposed guaranteeing that the newly merged party's political platform would reflect the "values of the SP." He himself only intended to retain control over PAX's industrial plants.[16] This last idea was extremely significant. The United Economic Complexes (Zjednoczone Zespoły Gospodarcze) formed the basis for financing the association's activities, as well as the personal fortune of its leader. Controlling them would allow Piasecki to take the helm of the new party at the appropriate time.

The archival documents that I have seen contain no confirmation that any such proposals were made. In part, this is understandable, given how confidential and highly "anti-socialist" these ideas were. In fact, they were a variation on a concept already devised by the exiled former prime minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, in which his Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) was to have been replaced by the Christian Democrats. At the same time, the authoritarian nature of the political system was to be maintained. From today's perspective, these suggestions appear completely devoid of the *Realpolitik* of which Piasecki boasted. But perhaps they reflected a genuine assessment on his part of the geopolitical consequences of Khrushchev's February 1956 "Secret Speech," the visible and ongoing collapse of the security apparatus in Poland and a Communist party tormented by factional struggles.

In conjunction with Piasecki's enormous personal ambitions, this assessment might have inclined the leader of PAX to try to repeat the tactic that he had successfully used against Soviet General Ivan Serov in 1944 in order to escape death at the hands of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs).[17] But one might just as well believe that these proposals were only one element, agreed in advance with the Polish security services, of the repatriation campaign that the Communists had already launched in Warsaw more than a year earlier, aimed at the disintegration of the Polish émigré community. Bringing Popiel back into the country, given his political biography, seemed like an achievable goal, and would also have undoubtedly been a considerable success for the Warsaw government.

The result of Seweryn Eustachiewicz's 1956 visit to Poland, as well as his indirect response to the proposals by PAX, was the unprecedented press conference convened by Karol Popiel in Paris on 8 October 1956, two weeks before the Communist party plenum that brought Władysław Gomułka back to power after a decade. The course of the press conference attested to the real and substantial changes that had affected the émigré Christian Democrats' perceptions of Poland and the conditions prevailing there. Of three possible scenarios for the future development of the situation in Poland, Popiel made clear that he saw potential for "a real liberalization." By this he meant the abandonment of the one-party system and legalization of at least one political formation that would be distinctly different from the Communist party. Unsurprisingly, Popiel named Christian Democracy as the natural candidate for this role, disparaging the "progressive Catholics" of PAX as being overly submissive to the Communist dictatorship. In this situation, Popiel declared on behalf

of the SP that he was willing to return to Poland and to examine the possibility of relaunching the Christian Democratic movement in Poland, as well as its participation in upcoming elections.[18] The cadres for this movement would, quite naturally, be recruited from the Christian Democratic circles operating on Polish soil.

Popiel's statement marked the opening of a political dialogue with the authorities in Warsaw. In effect, the SP situated itself in the invented role of a domestic political opposition. This attitude was radically different from that adopted by the other Polish émigré circles, which had at this time consistently rejected any possibility of legitimizing the ruling Polish Communists. The exception was the periodical *Kultura*, published in Paris by Jerzy Giedroyc, although his circle formally proceeded from quite a different position—that of opinion-makers, with no immediate political designs.

The issue of reactivating the SP within Poland would re-emerge in different forms right up to the end of the party's activities in exile. Out of a desire to be closer to Poland, Sieniewicz left the United States, moving permanently to France. Popiel did the same in the spring of 1957.

The political changes that occurred in Poland after October 1956 allowed Christian Democrats living on both sides of the Iron Curtain to establish bilateral contacts in multiple fields of play. Members of the SP in exile took advantage of the partial opening of Communist Poland's borders to undertake an extensive campaign, intended to make it easier for representatives of Catholic groups in Poland to visit countries in Western Europe. This was a major logistical operation, which also required significant fundraising. Due to the chronic lack of foreign currency in the Polish People's Republic, every citizen applying for permission to travel to the West had to present an appropriate invitation guaranteeing that their travel costs and stay abroad would be covered. The Christian Democrats took advantage of the network of contacts in Western European Christian circles that they had built up since 1945 to cleverly inspire a variety of political, social, cultural, scientific and religious organizations and institutions, as well as individual people, to send invitations to Poland. Material support for these activities came from the American-funded FEC.[19]

These actions took various forms. The easiest involved sending invitations to individuals in Poland, usually under the pretext of participation in conferences, congresses or seminars organized in one or more Western countries. However, these generally only allowed for relatively short stays

abroad. In the second half of the 1950s, one of the important meeting places was Alpbach in Austria, where the European Forum held its annual conferences, inviting guests from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Both Sieniewicz and Eustachiewicz personally participated regularly in these events. Attendees from Poland included Stanisław Wąsowicz and Franciszek Wentowski, who had been linked to Unia and the SP during the German occupation.

As early as the summer of 1957, SP activists put together the first group trip to France for members of the recently established Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (KIK).[20] After a few days in Paris, the participants spent two weeks on the Mediterranean island of Port-Cros near Toulon, where they took part in a meeting of young people, mostly in their teens and twenties, mainly from Western countries. They were accompanied by representatives of the Polish Christian Democratic youth organization in exile. The choice of the meeting's location was no coincidence. The meeting was backed by the Conférence Olivaint, a student association founded by the Jesuits, whose aim was to prepare its members to participate actively and constructively in public life.[21] The residence program combined leisure activities with educational ambitions; it envisioned participation in discussions and lectures delivered by representatives from the worlds of culture and politics. The guests from Poland had the opportunity to listen to an American diplomat from the embassy in Paris, as well as Robert Schuman, the former French prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, best known as one of the "founding fathers" of a united Europe.

In the following years, there were two more such trips. The second main destination for these group excursions was Italy. In the autumn of 1958, a group of as many as thirty-nine people went there for three weeks, visiting almost the whole of Italy from Udine to Naples. A year later, an even bigger group repeated the tour. In the long term, however, these kinds of voyages proved impractical given the costs incurred, and their organization was halted. The best way of assisting compatriots in Poland seemed to be individual scholarships, which allowed for longer stays in the West, some lasting even up to a few months.[22]

It is worth emphasizing how profoundly important these first journeys were, both for those doing the inviting and for their guests. The vast majority of participants from behind the Iron Curtain were visiting the West for the first time. Without the help from the Christian Democrats, their chances of taking such trips would have been minimal, or nil.

After six years of war and a decade spent under the Stalinists' watchful eyes, these excursions enabled travelers from Poland to reconstruct, or even to establish, contacts with Western culture, social and political thought. "It's hard even to say that I'm looking forward to this trip. What awaits me is beyond my imagination somehow, it doesn't fit in the scheme of my past experiences," thirty-one-year-old KIK co-founder Janusz Zabłocki wrote in his journal on the day of his first trip to France.[23]

Regardless of the form and the length of the stay abroad, the guests from Poland could count on good hospitality on the part of the exiles. Assistance provided by SP activists was very diverse in nature: from small favors, such as picking someone up from the train station or booking a hotel, to events as special as arranging an audience with the pope. In France, Eustachiewicz, Maciej Morawski and Sieniewicz were the main players; in Italy, Stanisław Gebhardt and Stanisław August Morawski did this work. They did this so well that, according to a 1960 assessment by Communist Poland's security apparatus, all of the KIK activists' trips to Western countries were initiated and co-organized by Sieniewicz and Eustachiewicz.[24]

At the same time, their compatriots' visits abroad allowed representatives of Popiel's group to gather extensive first-hand information about the real situation in the country, to a degree which had hitherto been impossible. Sporadic exchanges of letters, or careful study of printed publications coming from the Polish People's Republic, were nothing compared to holding direct conversations with people who knew the reality first-hand. These visits also made it possible to inspire the guests from Poland and to shape their attitudes in the way the émigré Christian Democrats desired. In the grand scheme, these excursions and scholarships could be used to form new social and political elites, rooted in Christianity, who would bear the burden of resistance against the Communist government, and who in the future might assume responsibility for the fate of the Polish state.[25]

One successful attempt to institutionalize the efforts to facilitate travel to the West for representatives of Polish Christian groups in the broadest sense was the establishment in Rome, at the initiative of Morawski and Gebhardt, of the Centro per gli Studi e le Relazioni Internazionali (Center for International Studies and Relations, also called Centro Esperienze Internazionali—or the Center for International Experiences) in the autumn of 1962. This was a center for international studies,

formally acting under the auspices of the Italian Christian Democratic party, which offered a very wide range of activities, including the learning and sharing of political, social, economic and cultural knowledge between the countries of Western Europe and the countries of East-Central Europe, Asia and Latin America. In reality, however, this institute was an extremely efficient tool to organize and finance the stays of Polish people in Italy.[26]

In this way, more than 100 scholars came from Poland in the period from 1963 to 1970, making up two-thirds of all of the center's guests from the countries of the Soviet Bloc. These also included older SP and Unia activists, whom Communist whims sometimes allowed to cross the Iron Curtain. The main proponent of inviting representatives of this group was Sieniewicz. It was also he who, independently of the center's actions, took advantage of his Italian contacts to arrange scholarships for young people from backgrounds associated with the Christian Democrats in Poland.[27] The Istituto Cristiano-Sociale de Cultura (Christian Social Institute of Culture), opened in June 1969, served similar purposes. Together with the international figures, the leading authorities for the institute included Popiel, Sieniewicz and Gebhardt from the SP in exile, as well as representatives of Catholic groups in Poland—notably, Janusz Zabłocki and Andrzej Micewski.[28]

Yet departures from Poland, especially in the initial period after October 1956, were carefully regulated and controlled, and sometimes even inspired, by the security authorities in Warsaw. Only those who had permission could leave Communist Poland, which opened the door for different kinds of pressure and operational tactics. The Office of Confessional Affairs (Urząd do Spraw Wyznań), an administrative body established in 1950 mainly to control the activities of Catholics in Poland in strict cooperation with the secret police, interfered with the lists of travelers submitted by KIK, removing people who had been recommended by Sieniewicz. Władysław Siła-Nowicki, associated with the SP since World War II, was denied a passport upon his invitation to Alpbach in 1958. According to the SB (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, or Security Service—the successor to the MBP), his invitation was merely a pretext for him to meet Sieniewicz and Eustachiewicz in order "to exchange views on political matters and the possible implementation of Christian Democrat activities in the country." This assessment disqualified Siła-Nowicki as a candidate to leave Poland. Instead, two less significant SP

activists, Józef Chmara and Franciszek Wentowski, were permitted to leave. The latter, a friend and collaborator of Sieniewicz's from before the war, was designated by the security organizations as a secret inform-ant, codename "Sokolnicki."[29]

There was, in fact, nothing special about Wentowski's involvement with the secret police. Many activists traveling to the West from Poland with the aid of the Christian Democrats in exile often held high posi-tions in the lay Catholic circles of Communist Poland; in so doing, it was impossible for them to avoid more or less significant contact with the regime's security apparatus. Stanisław Wąsowicz, who participated in the Alpbach Forum on a regular basis in the late 1950s, was a secret collaborator codenamed "Borowski" who worked to break up both émi-gré and domestic SP circles on behalf of the secret police. Nevertheless, and in spite of their many years of friendship, Sieniewicz quickly realized Wąsowicz's real agenda.[30]

Meanwhile, Wacław Auleytner, the long-time secretary (1956–1972) of Warsaw's KIK and an MP of the Communist parliament (1972–1984), traveled frequently to Paris and Rome as a guest of the Polish Christian Democrats. And yet, in a statement in 2013, he admitted to having maintained contacts with the secret services of the Communist government for thirty-five years, starting already in 1949. The Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN) have preserved numerous letters of denunciation delivered by Auleytner, signed with the aliases "Maciek" and "Anna," describing his contact with SP émigrés. His statements told the SB not only about his own personal encounters with the exiles, but also about the content of conversations they had held in good faith with other people from KIK.[31]

Unlike Auleytner, the long-time Catholic activist Andrzej Micewski did not have the courage to publish such a confessional document in his final years. And yet, while maintaining intensive contacts with the Christian Democrats from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, he provided the SB with information using the codenames "Michalski" and "the Historian" (*Historyk*). His cooperation with the security services, which was undoubtedly secret and deliberate, was also in some cases compensated financially by the Ministry of the Interior. For Micewski, this collaboration was an essential ingredient of his political activi-ties, offering him the possibility of regular contact with the authorities at quite a high level (deputy department director in the Ministry of the Interior), and of building up his own position, thereby facilitating his

frequent trips back and forth across the Iron Curtain. At the same time, Micewski filtered the information that he received from the exiles. He was far from fully open with his interlocutors from the SB; one might even be inclined to the impression that he sometimes tried to lead them in a direction desired by the émigré Christian Democrats.[32]

According to testimony given many years later by the Christian Democrats of the SP, they were quite aware of the authorities' strict supervision of their guests' travels out of Poland; of the inevitability of contacts between the people leaving and the SB; and of how those contacts routinely bred conversations, at the very least at the moment when each traveler had to hand back his passport at local police headquarters upon returning to Poland. Consequently, the SP could have only limited confidence in their guests from Poland. The Christian Democratic hosts practiced a kind of self-censorship, and the openness and sincerity of conversations with their compatriots necessarily had limits.[33] The long shadow of the secret police constantly hovered over Poles making contact on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

This also applied to other forms of communication. Correspondents on both sides of the Iron Curtain understood that functionaries of the Communist Polish state would be able to open the mail; in Poland, wiretapping was common practice with respect to the phone lines of people suspected of incorrect thinking. Despite this, Polish Christian Democrats did make calls from Paris or Rome to Poland. In March 1958, Eustachiewicz and Gebhardt called KIK president Jerzy Zawieyski to beseech him to convince Primate Wyszyński to receive a delegation of French Catholics who were heading to Warsaw by arrangement with the SP in exile. In October 1960, Zawieyski used the phone to set a date with Gebhardt for the two to meet in Paris.[34]

Letters containing important information evaded postal censors, as they were put in the hands of trusted individuals traveling in one direction or the other across the Iron Curtain. However, there was always the risk of being searched thoroughly at the border, which could reveal compromising packages and expose the courier to much unpleasantness. Nevertheless, there were ways around this risk. When a KIK activist refused to carry a letter from Warsaw to Seweryn Eustachiewicz, Polish-based SP activist Jerzy Braun read the letter aloud in his presence, asking him to convey the information contained in it to the addressee by word of mouth. Wanda Eustachiewicz, who was going to France in June 1962 at the invitation of her brother, was entrusted by SP members in Poland

with the task of forwarding comprehensive information from them to members of the party abroad. Since carrying documents was impossible, Jan Hoppe, the informal leader of the Christian Democrats in Poland, visited her several times, telling her the appropriate information, which she then had to learn by heart and faithfully reproduce for her brother following her arrival in Paris.[35]

At the same time, the official propaganda of the Polish People's Republic painted Popiel's group as American agents, lackeys taking the foreigners' thirty pieces of silver. Even after the "Polish October" of 1956, the Communist government in Warsaw frowned upon the group's intensifying contacts with individuals in Poland. Konrad Sieniewicz enjoyed particular notoriety in Communist Poland. When Sieniewicz openly admitted during one of Janusz Zabłocki's visits to Rome that these trips to the West were in fact funded by the Americans, the latter's reaction to this was characteristic. It was not only one of surprise, but also of psychological resistance to continuing his contacts with the SP (which at that point had already been ongoing for more than ten years), and of fear that the authorities of the People's Republic would use them to blackmail him into withdrawing from any further public activities.[36]

The Warsaw government's policy regarding outbound travel was not random. As a rule, representatives of the Znak movement had less difficulty in leaving, and its leaders, in particular, had regularly visited the West since 1957. It was a different matter, however, for the Christian Democratic "old guard" remaining in Poland, whom the ruling People's government still treated very suspiciously. Jan Hoppe only succeeded in obtaining a passport in the spring of 1962. His stays in Rome, paradoxically, confirmed the fears of the Communist authorities. Despite his serious health troubles, Hoppe did not intend to give up his political activities. Thanks to his undisputed personal authority, he was instrumental in reconnecting Popiel's group in 1965 with another émigré SP faction, based in London and led by Bronisław Kuśnierz, after a separation of nearly twenty years. He was also the co-author of the united party's political platform. As punishment, two years later he was again forbidden to leave Poland. Thanks to the efforts of Janusz Zabłocki, who was then serving People's Poland as an MP, this decision was revoked in February 1969. Two weeks later, Hoppe died before being able to collect his passport.[37]

Other Christian Democrats residing in Poland were treated similarly. Wartime SP-Unia leader Jerzy Braun was allowed to travel to Rome

in 1965; the government's agreement to this may have been linked to the fact that the security services then regarded him as an informant. However, he failed to fulfill the hopes that the secret police placed in him. Meanwhile, former SP executive committee member and MP Konstanty Turowski, after repeated refusals, obtained permission to travel only in the 1970s, after Edward Gierek's team replaced Władysław Gomułka at the reins of power in Communist Poland.[38]

The Interior Ministry's regulation of the contacts between the Christian Democratic circles separated by the Iron Curtain worked also in the other direction. Sieniewicz was consistently denied permission to travel to his homeland. In 1967, he had actually obtained a visa for Poland, courtesy of Janusz Zabłocki's intensive efforts; just before his scheduled departure, however, the visa was cancelled. Zabłocki attributed this Communist about-face to the power struggle at the top of the Communist hierarchy between the former Minister of the Interior, Władysław Wicha, and his successor Mieczysław Moczar.

And yet, other émigrés affiliated with SP were able to travel to Poland at the very moment when Sieniewicz was denied entry. Not only in 1967, but again and again in later years, the authorities gave permission to enter to Jan Kułakowski, an unofficial activist of the SP in exile who held high offices in the international structures of Western Europe's Christian trade unions. It is hard not to see this as a game played by the secret police with the aim of antagonizing, even fracturing, SP cadres. Sieniewicz was once again denied a visa in 1974. Eventually, three years later, he was allowed into Poland on a French passport, which was intended to restrain the secret police's temptation to prevent him from returning to the West.

In 1977, Sieniewicz in fact visited Poland three times. The first trip took place in January, when the SP secretary-general formally participated in a meeting of the international Conference on Dialogue and Cooperation (*Dialog i Współpraca*) organized by Zabłocki. He held several meetings with former leaders of SP in Poland: Józef Kwasiborski, Konstanty Turowski, Zbigniew Madeyski, Kazimierz Studentowicz and Władysław Siła-Nowicki. Sieniewicz also devoted significant attention to members of Zabłocki's ODiSS group. He traveled to Kraków, Lublin, Poznań and Łódź. In June of the same year, he returned to Poland to attend the funeral of Karol Popiel, and delivered a eulogy at the Powązki cemetery in Warsaw. Finally, Sieniewicz visited Poland yet again six months later, for the third time that year. These visits strengthened his

ties with Zabłocki and ODiSS, but at the same time they earned the criticism of other SP activists in exile, whose sympathies lay instead with Zabłocki's political opponents in the Znak movement, as well as the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników). After 1977, Sieniewicz was able to travel regularly to Poland.[39]

An extremely important consequence of the journeys to the West organized by the exiled Christian Democrats was Iron Curtain Catholics' forging of international contacts and partnerships. Thanks to the mediation of the SP in exile, Znak and later also ODiSS gained the opportunity to establish and expand cooperation with social-Catholic groupings in different fields of activity in Western Europe: civil society, trade unions (Jan Kułakowski played a prominent role here, as did fellow trade union leader Bolesław Lachowski), universities, the editorial offices of magazines and finally Christian Democratic politicians. This applied above all to the Italian Christian Democrats, but also to their counterparts in Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany and France.

Sieniewicz personally opened many doors for Janusz Zabłocki, whom in many respects he saw as a protégé. He accompanied his younger colleague in the autumn of 1969 on a visit to Bonn, and through his contacts was able to arrange meetings with important German politicians, including the head of the Social Democratic Party in the Bundestag, Herbert Wehrner. Sieniewicz thereby brought his experience to bear on discussions over the new West German government's policy toward Poland, sounding it out on prospects for the establishment of permanent Polish diocesan administrations for the Catholic Church in the Western Territories transferred from Germany to Poland after World War II.[40] For the consultations that Zabłocki carried out in Germany, he had sought and received the prior approval of both the Church hierarchy in Poland (Primate Stefan Wyszyński and Wrocław archbishop Bolesław Kominek) and the Warsaw authorities. Undoubtedly, these strengthened his political position within Poland toward Church and party alike.

The leaders of Znak were supported by Eustachiewicz, who tirelessly built up a network of contacts for them throughout Europe. After his death in 1963, this role then passed to Jan Kułakowski, who developed an exceptionally close relationship with Znak MP—and future prime minister of Poland—Tadeusz Mazowiecki.[41] One institutionalized form assumed by these contacts was the series of international Dialogue and Cooperation conferences, which attracted devotees of social Catholicism from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Starting in 1973, these were held

every two years, alternating between Poland and Western Europe: in Nieborów, Brussels, Katowice, Paris and Częstochowa. Sieniewicz made a huge contribution to the preparations for the first meeting. He and Zabłocki visited Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany; selected individuals from Western Christian Democratic groups with whom new initiatives could be presented; organized meetings and held talks. In Belgium, Zabłocki also enjoyed the help and logistical support of local SP affiliates Franciszek Gałązka and Bolesław Lachowski; the latter also took part in the conference in Nieborów. Meanwhile, Jan Kułakowski, who sympathized with Zabłocki's opponents in Znak, did not take part; he approached the idea with a certain suspicion, and merely submitted a letter. Sieniewicz sat on the project's Continuation Committee, which was appointed in 1975 and assured continuity in the intervening years between the conferences. His Polish colleagues on the committee included Zabłocki and two other ODiSS activists. Sieniewicz's assistance was extremely important in organizing the third meeting in 1978, after the Znak movement had irreversibly fractured. Throughout this time, the distinguished SP émigré provided political cover for Zabłocki's circle, helping them to maneuver around the uncertainty and hesitation of Western European Christian Democratic circles that had become confused as to the situation in the Polish Catholic groups. The last of the Dialogue and Cooperation meetings was held in 1981; further meetings were prevented by the imposition of martial law in Poland.[42]

Another effect of Sieniewicz's political lobbying on both sides of the Iron Curtain was the "informal meeting" of the Sub-Committee for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe of the European Union of Christian Democrats with "Polish friends of Christian social inspiration," which came to pass in Rome in October 1981. The Polish participants were handpicked by Sieniewicz: Zabłocki, Siła-Nowicki and Stanisław Janisz, a PSL activist in exile in the 1950s who shared certain Christian Democratic commitments, having co-founded the Peasant Solidarity (*Solidarność Chłopska*) movement. Their fellow panelists included Giuseppe Petrilli, the secretary-general of the Christian Democrat International; his deputy, Karl Joseph Hahn; and Vito Latanzio, the vice-president of the Christian Democratic group in the European Parliament. These unofficial talks were the first step toward the formal inclusion of the Polish Christian Democrats in the transnational structures of European Christian Democracy.[43]

A separate, yet still important field of interaction was the Vatican. After relocating from Paris to Rome in 1962, the SP activists (with the support of the Italian Christian Democratic party) effectively built up a network of contacts there. These they then shared with visitors from Poland. Alongside Popiel, Sieniewicz, Gebhardt and Stanisław August Morawski, an important role was also played by Witold Bronowski, a PSL activist in Italy and an expert on Vatican issues, former secretary of the Polish Embassy to the Holy See from 1942 to 1944, who had maintained good relationships with the Christian Democrats.

The Christian Democrats' assistance was particularly important during the period of the Second Vatican Council. The Catholic lay activists arriving from Poland to participate were initially held at arm's length in Vatican circles. The émigrés helped to break the ice, among other methods by facilitating meetings with influential figures in Vatican diplomacy such as Agostino Casaroli, the under-secretary and then secretary of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs; Monsignor Luigi Poggi; and Gabriel Montalvo, head of the Polish section in the Secretariat of State. Support for Catholic activists from Poland was also important in their attempts, on the one hand, to establish a permanent Polish administration of the Church in the Western Territories, on the other to facilitate the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Communist Poland.[44]

Visitors from Poland in turn reciprocated in a fashion by making introductions behind the Iron Curtain for the SP. In the spring of 1968, Zabłocki introduced Sieniewicz to Dominik Horodyński, the official Polish press correspondent in Rome, who looked to use the new contact to obtain more objective information about the activities of the SP in exile. Even more important, however, was the arrangement, at Sieniewicz's request, of a private meeting (without unwanted witnesses) with the ambassador of the Polish People's Republic in Italy, Kazimierz Sidor. This came about thanks to Zabłocki's mediation in the autumn of 1974. A year and a half later, in April 1976, the three men met again.[45] This kind of mutual "familiarization" by the Warsaw authorities and Sieniewicz through reports prepared by Sidor probably contributed to the ultimate approval of this exiled politician's visit to Poland.

Aside from growing international contacts, Christian Democrats in exile and in Poland were—in spite of the Iron Curtain—linked by the realities of material support. In the first years after World War II, direct financial support from abroad was most important. Emissaries coming

from the West brought money, which was allocated not only for organizational purposes, but also as individual aid for activists of the party who had no means of subsistence, and for the families of those who had been arrested.

The liquidation by the Communist secret police of the East–West channels of communication with Poland by 1948 meant that, beginning with the onset of Stalinism in the Soviet Bloc, aid in the form of packages sent from the West containing food, clothing or medicine played an increasingly important role. But it was not just the recipients who benefited from the goods in these packages. Anything which was unavailable on the Polish market could be monetized on the black market for a decent profit. Medicine suited this purpose best, especially antibiotics, which were in high demand (at high prices) due to the costs of shipping them into Poland, as well as their size. In the spring of 1957, Sieniewicz commissioned an SP activist in England to send to four addresses in Poland packages of drugs with a total value of close to $70, including 15,000 tablets of penicillin.

Help was also forthcoming in other ways. Jan Hoppe's stays in Italy, organized by Christian Democrats living in Rome, were less about politics, and more about giving him the opportunity for treatment and cure of the illnesses he had suffered since his tortuous imprisonment throughout the Stalinist years. Given the state of his health, the Warsaw authorities' withholding of his passport was not only an example of administrative persecution, but also a way to physically eliminate an awkward citizen. In 1982, with the help of Sieniewicz and Gebhardt, a seriously ill Konstanty Turowski was treated at the Gemelli clinic in Rome, where he underwent an operation.[46]

Catholic activists back in Poland tried within their limited means to reciprocate the help. In 1960, at the request of Seweryn Eustachiewicz, Zabłocki helped to find work for the former's sister Wanda, who had been forced to leave her job at the PAX-run enterprise Inco. In the end, she found employment as a secretary on the supervisory board of Libella, run by Zabłocki. As a parliamentary deputy, Zabłocki tried to assist with Popiel's plans to buy a flat in Warsaw and ultimately to return to Poland. During a stay in Rome in 1974, Zabłocki's daughter took care of the eighty-seven-year-old SP chairman for several weeks.[47]

Attempts were also made to organize material assistance on a larger scale. Zabłocki, for example, examined the possibility of helping the émigré SP party to expand the business of the Polish-based Libella company, which

financed most KIK operations. In October 1957, barely five days after the company's chartering, Zabłocki sent Stanisław Gebhardt a detailed prospectus, looking to sound out whether Christian Democrats in the West might countenance sending foreign currency to assist in the purchase of printing presses, which in Poland were seen as a very profitable investment. However, Zabłocki, who was then still only at the beginning of his many years of interaction with the SP in exile, was working from exaggerated notions of the émigrés' financial possibilities, shaped as they were by stereotypes of the rich West. Furthermore, his proposal does not seem to have taken into account the restrictive customs regulations and foreign exchange laws in force at that time in Communist Poland. Gebhardt's response, which took him almost six months to send, expressed a willingness to fund the contributions of one issue of the Catholic monthly *Więź*, accompanied by a non-binding promise to "consider the options" for more substantial assistance. The matter re-emerged two years later, during Zabłocki's stay in Paris in the autumn of 1960, when Sieniewicz put him in touch with a French company that, like Libella, was involved in the manufacture of plastic products.[48] No evidence survives, however, as to whether this proposed economic cooperation ever came to pass.

The numerous visits to the West in the early 1970s by Konstanty Turowski and Czesław Strzeszewski, both employees of the Catholic University of Lublin (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, KUL), resulted in the SP exiles' growing interest in the academy. According to information collected by the secret police of People's Poland, the Christian Democrats expressed a readiness to provide assistance in the form of financial transfers, scholarships, books and opportunities to establish contacts with scholars abroad. For his part, Sieniewicz apparently promised to get the help of UNICEF and UNESCO (the United Nations children's charity, and education and scientific organization respectively) in securing a sum of $40,000 to create new sociology departments within Lublin University's Faculty of Christian Philosophy. Turowski gave him a detailed report on this matter. The Rome-based Polish émigré Emeryk Hutten-Czapski promised to grant several scholarships to KUL students to enable them to continue their studies abroad. Stanisław August Morawski promised to secure a sum of 400,000 lire for scholarships, and together with the London-based SP publisher Jerzy Kulczycki he offered to send books to the university's library for free.[49]

This last proposal was linked to another important consequence of SP's cross-Iron Curtain contacts, namely efforts to expand freedom of speech in Poland. Stanisław August Morawski was a crucial player here. The Centro Esperienze Internazionali which he ran was involved not only with granting scholarships, but also with printing and distributing Western and émigré books and periodicals to Poland which for various reasons were unavailable there. Polish visitors to the center had unfettered access to a variety of publications illegal in Communist Poland, and if they were willing to risk transport, they were given plentiful copies for their return journey to Poland. Within the framework of this action, which continued uninterrupted until 1989, several thousand publications were taken to Poland.

London's Jerzy Kulczycki pursued a similar agenda, albeit on a much larger scale. In 1963, the Christian Democrats founded the Odnowa (Renewal) publishing press, of which he was the head; from 1972, he was also the owner of a bookstore named Orbis. Of particular importance was his cooperation with the Catholic University of Lublin, where he found a worthy partner in the person of the library's director, Andrzej Paluchowski. The distribution of books behind the Iron Curtain was supported financially by the FEC.[50]

The publishing house Odnowa soon took on the seminal role of a forum in which representatives of the exiles and of Polish Christian Democratic circles could meet. Kulczycki published the memoirs of Karol Popiel and Jan Hoppe; poems, meditations on ecumenism and the millennium of Polish Christendom by Jerzy Braun; a pamphlet by Sieniewicz describing his impressions of his first visit to Poland; and political texts by *Tygodnik Powszechny*'s Catholic—albeit not Christian Democratic—outstanding columnist Stefan Kisielewski, which would have had no chance with the censors in Communist Poland. In 1978, Odnowa even published a political pamphlet by Janusz Zabłocki entitled "The Identity and Strengths of the Nation" (*Tożsamość i siły narodu*). In this text, Zabłocki laid out a program for the political circle he had led out of the split in the Znak movement, as well as a polemic with the theses of the "secular left" represented in Poland by leading '68ers Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń. Authors living in Poland not only gained a platform wherein they could freely present their views, but also, thanks to the program of distributing books behind the Iron Curtain, they could with the émigrés' assistance reach readers in Poland itself.[51]

In the other direction, the group centered around Zabłocki's ODiSS made some timid attempts to bring the émigré Christian Democrats into the official press in Poland. The winter of 1970 saw the publication in the ODiSS journal *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* (The Christian in the World) of a text written by Popiel himself, slightly abridged by censors, entitled "The treaty which will probably never be" (*Traktat, którego zapewne nie będzie*). The article, which had been published four years earlier in a Polish-language periodical in the West, discussed the reasons for the stalemate on the issue of establishing a Polish administration for the Church in the Western Territories. According to Zabłocki, its publication was possible thanks to the intervention of Dominik Horodyński, who had managed to win over the powerful Communist party secretary Zenon Kliszko.

In the following years, two letters to the editor penned by Popiel appeared in print on the subject of various historical matters. After his death in June 1977, the censors' office allowed a portion of his memoirs concerning Polish wartime prime minister General Władysław Sikorski to be printed in Poland. In 1983, ODiSS reissued two books by the late SP chairman that had previously been published by Kulczycki in London: his *Political Memoirs* (*Wspomnienia polityczne*), covering the period from World War I to the fall of France in 1940; and *General Sikorski as I recall him* (*Generał Sikorski w mojej pamięci*). The latter volume went through two editions, in 1985 and 1986. These books enjoyed only small print runs by the standards of Communist Poland: five and ten thousand copies respectively, while editions of a hundred thousand or more were nothing extraordinary—though printed with interference by censors (the book on Sikorski even had a note on the title page: "Full text available from Odnowa Edition Ltd London 1978"). However, they rescued Popiel from oblivion.[52]

In 1974, Sieniewicz's writings appeared for the first time in the pages of *Chrześcijanin w Świecie*. A collection of texts concerning the World Conference on Population in Bucharest contained his speech as a delegate of international Christian Democracy. Four years later, he managed to publish an article on the election of the Polish pope, John Paul II. A special issue dedicated in 1984 to the fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, alongside several other articles recalling the roles of Unia and the Christian Democrats in the rebellion, featured the recollections of Sieniewicz, as well as his report from his time as a regional government

delegate in a district of Warsaw. Beginning in 1981, the names of activists connected with SP in exile began to appear in the columns of the weekly journal *Ład* (Order), also published by ODiSS.[53]

However, joint attempts to create a cross-Iron Curtain periodical rooted in social Catholicism and Christian Democracy ended in failure. The idea was to base this new journal in the West, but keep it open to authors from Poland: it was intended to become a platform for intellectual exchange involving groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This project was presented by Popiel's SP group for the first time in 1957. It could have been based on *Odnowa*, the SP exiles' party bulletin before the same name was used for its new publishing venture in the early 1960s. Beginning in February 1958, the *Odnowa* bulletin appeared monthly, thanks to a subsidy from the FEC. This periodical was intended for domestic Polish consumption, and it shunned anti-Communist slogans or any hint of confrontation with the authorities in Warsaw. According to a well-informed Communist secret police agent based in exile, a few dozen copies were sent to known addresses in Poland. The special thin paper and reduced format allowed the bulletin to be mailed in small envelopes which would not catch the censor's eye at the post office.[54]

The monthly's editor, Seweryn Eustachiewicz, tried to obtain the cooperation of authors based in Poland, although he did not achieve any spectacular successes in this regard. The Christian Democratic "old guard" was divided with regard to this initiative. Józef Kwasiborski responded to it very negatively, even seeking to deny Popiel's group the right to use the name *Odnowa*, carried first by a weekly published in Warsaw in 1936–1937 and again in 1946–1947 as the official organ of the SP. Likewise, most of the members of the editorial board of *Tygodnik Powszechny* did not follow through on promises made to Eustachiewicz that they would write for or work with *Odnowa*. The only one who kept his word was Dominik Morawski, who regularly sent articles to the monthly. And yet, *Odnowa* succeeded to a limited extent in creating a forum for discussion between Poles on different sides of the Iron Curtain. December 1961 saw the publication of a text by Tadeusz Myślik, one of the editors of *Tygodnik Powszechny* and a member of KIK, which responded to the polemic by Jan Bielatowicz and Stefan Mękarski against his earlier article in the Kraków-based weekly concerning possible areas of cooperation between Poland and the émigré community. *Odnowa* ceased publication in 1962 when the FEC withdrew funding.[55]

The idea of publishing a Christian Democratic political and social journal in the West re-emerged in the early 1970s. This time, the initiative came from Poland. While visiting Rome, Lublin scholars Czesław Strzeszewski and Konstanty Turowski indicated to Sieniewicz that there was a need to create a journal publishing "objective and factual articles" which could also serve as "some kind of decent ideological handbook." A certain percentage of materials were to come from Poland.[56] In the end, however, the project seems to have stalled for lack of financing.

For the Christian Democrats in exile, the single most important reason for maintaining contacts with Poland after October 1956 was the rebuilding of political ties across the Iron Curtain. The most natural partners for Popiel's group belonged to the surviving "old guard" of the prewar Christian Democratic party, as well as activists of the wartime Unia underground. Following Eustachiewicz's 1956 visit to Poland and preparation of a report that was adopted in November 1956 by the Council of the SP in exile, the SP advocated maintaining the most active possible (but discreet) contacts with SP activists remaining on Polish soil; from Eustachiewicz's report, the SP in exile also adopted plans for the exchange of press and information, and the provision, where possible, of assistance, advice and guidance.[57]

These, however, were no simple matters. Some of these activists had only recently been released from Communist prisons. Others were on parole, or on medical leave because of disease or injury developed during their incarceration. Any mistake on their part could have been deemed by the authorities to be an anti-state action, which risked return to prison. With a few exceptions, the Christian Democrats in Poland were initially suspicious, withdrawn into the realm of their own privacy and often simply physically unable to undertake further activities as a result of their prison experiences. It was no coincidence that during the Paris talks with Warsaw government diplomats in the autumn of 1957, Eustachiewicz raised the question of the full rehabilitation of those SP members sentenced to prison during the years of "errors and distortions," with the additional proviso that Communists enable SP activists to resume public activity.

This second demand, of course, was ignored. Christian Democrat activists in Poland were deliberately marginalized by the authorities, kept under surveillance and treated as potential threats. The political projects of Kazimierz Studentowicz, who in October 1956 suggested to one of the Communist party leaders, Zenon Kliszko, that the SP should

be relegalized, were not supported either by the Communists or by the future Catholic activists of the Znak movement.[58] In fact, the Warsaw authorities arbitrarily made their own choices for the official representative bodies of Catholic groups by granting permission to members of Znak to enter public life. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the Znak movement's main journal, had its legitimate editorial board restored, while *Tygodnik Warszawski*, which had been connected to SP prior to its shuttering in 1948, was not revived. This was a clear sign of the limitations on concessions that Catholic activists might expect in a post-Stalinist Poland.

Despite the limited prospects for a Christian Democratic revival in Gomułka's Poland, the Christian Democrats in exile received favorably the broadening scope for the presence of Catholics in the homeland's public life through the Znak movement: the recovery of *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Znak*, co-opted in 1953 by PAX; a small representation in the Polish parliament; the emergence of KIK, and later also the monthly *Więź*. Popiel, aware of the ethical dilemmas faced by members of the Znak parliamentary circle, assessed that they should guarantee that "they should find the boundaries in every difficult situation which true representatives of Catholics may not cross."[59]

The group around Popiel invested certain hopes in the political activities of Znak. The natural link between the two circles was Seweryn Eustachiewicz. Like the leaders of Znak's Kraków group, Stanisław Stomma and Jerzy Turowicz, before the war Eustachiewicz had distinguished himself as a young Catholic activist of the Odrodzenie (Renaissance) Catholic Academic Youth Association. They were linked not only by their long acquaintance, but also by their common ideals. Eustachiewicz maintained these ties even after he resigned from all of his posts in the SP in November 1961.[60] His unexpected death in 1963 weakened the Kraków group's contacts with the émigré Christian Democrats. Meanwhile, his successor as SP liaison with Znak, Jan Kułakowski, gradually drifted further away from his colleagues in SP under the influence of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and his political philosophy. Interestingly enough, in the interview-memoir published at the end of his life, Kułakowski's activities in the Christian Democratic party in exile were omitted altogether.[61]

From the end of the 1950s onward, Popiel and Sieniewicz, together with the leaders of the Znak movement, held exploratory talks in Western Europe expressing their willingness to strengthen cooperation in multiple domains between their respective circles. The SP leaders

hoped to return to Poland in order to engage in some form of public activity, even within the existing political structures of the Communist state. The Christian Democrats treated these projects very seriously, genuinely seeking a formula for coexistence, and even cooperation, with the authorities of Communist Poland on economic, social and cultural matters. Their only concerns pertained to the question of how long any such concessions might last. In 1960, Karol Popiel tried to arrange talks with the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka. During a session of the United Nations in New York, Popiel intended to lobby Gomułka with a project to restore the SP in Poland as part of the political "controlled margins" in a nominal—and carefully choreographed—coalition with the Communists. To Popiel's disappointment, however, the Warsaw authorities ignored his initiative.[62]

The reaction of the Znak movement was also negative, precluding substantive political cooperation. The failure of political cooperation was not, however, merely a reflection of discrepancies between the two groups' collective experiences and ideologies. Znak did not wish to expose itself to charges of disloyalty to the Warsaw government, which could have led to all sorts of harassment, as well as real attacks on their very modest capital. Znak's leaders thus believed it appropriate to consult with the authorities on what position they should take regarding cooperation with the SP. They did not intend to overstep the boundaries set by their overseers from the Communist party.

This attitude sometimes surfaced even in matters of total agreement among all parties concerned, such as the defense of Poland's postwar western border. Despite his initial acceptance, Stomma ultimately rejected Sieniewicz's proposal that KIK draw up a petition concerning the status of the Polish Catholic faithful in the Western Territories, which Sieniewicz was prepared to convey to the papal nuncio in Bonn, hoping that this would counter the propaganda of the West German government. Znak's leaders also argued against the return to Poland of the émigré Christian Democratic activists. It is therefore difficult to avoid the impression that the Catholic activists of de-Stalinized Communist Poland were treating their émigré elders in quite an instrumental manner—notably, as a resource for financing foreign travel and networking in Western Christian Democratic environments, as well as the Vatican. Correspondence between Stomma and Eustachiewicz in the early 1960s appears to attest to this attitude.[63] For obvious reasons, Znak was not

interested in any initiatives to rebuild the SP in Poland. Regardless of any actual ideological differences, this would have inevitably meant the appearance of political competition, which would have challenged Znak's presumptive monopoly on representing Catholics in Communist Poland.

In parallel, the survivors of the prewar Christian Democratic movement made attempts to get involved in the activities of KIK.[64] It is hard to assess unequivocally to what extent this decision was agreed upon with the SP in exile, or to what extent it was a consequence of the failure of the émigrés' talks with the leaders of Znak. In a report passed to friends in the West, Jerzy Braun explained the decision in reference to a recommendation from Cardinal Wyszyński, in the absence of any opposition from the Communist party. Braun had planned to undertake social and cultural activities, without precluding a return to political activity after a few years. According to a plan devised by his former SP colleague Kazimierz Studentowicz, the activities of the two SP groups, abroad and in Poland, as part of KIK, were intended to complement one another, although the émigrés were ultimately to take on a supporting role toward their colleagues back at home, who were to have constituted the new executive center. The émigrés were, in effect, to have been reduced to the role of an extra-parliamentary opposition, which provisionally would have remained outside Poland. The strategic objective was nothing less than the rebuilding of the SP inside Polish borders.

Despite maintaining a prudent distance from the leaders of Znak, at first the Christian Democrats achieved some success. Jerzy Braun joined the board of the Warsaw KIK with a good electoral result, coming ahead of both Stomma and Zabłocki in terms of overall members' votes. Studentowicz created the Section for Catholic Social Thought (Sekcja Katolickiej Myśli Społecznej) in the club. Gradually, however, fundamental philosophical differences surfaced, with the result that the Christian Democratic "old guard" were marginalized within KIK. After a bitter dispute with Zawieyski, Braun stepped down from the leadership of the group in 1963. Echoes of these events reached the communities in exile, and they certainly contributed to a growing sense of distrust toward the Znak movement. Braun's departure for Rome in May 1965, which turned out to be permanent, severely weakened the Christian Democratic group in KIK, which never regained its initial vitality.[65]

The rift between the Christian Democrats in exile and the mainstream of the Znak movement deepened in November 1963 when Stomma made overtures to the Vatican Secretariat of State without the

prior authorization of the Polish hierarchy. He went so far as to distribute among the participants of the Second Vatican Council a political document called the "Opinion" (*Opinia*), which openly advocated for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Polish People's Republic and the Vatican. The problem was that he did so without the knowledge of Primate Wyszyński, who was present in Rome at the time.[66] The SP's conference in January 1964, which had called Znak "the most authentic group" in Poland to be part of their network of political contacts, nevertheless urged caution in the wake of Stomma's actions, expressing their concern over Znak's disloyalty, which risked undermining the trust placed in the Christian Democratic party by the Polish episcopate. The émigrés' doubts and worries were tersely summarized in an extract from notes made in preparation for the conference: "Znak—a group which is limited by its conditions or ambitions, and yet it is the only existing group, not political, but intellectual."

Two years later, the SP undertook the firm defense of Polish bishops who had been violently attacked by Communist propaganda in the wake of addressing to German bishops in November 1965 a letter containing the famous phrase "We grant forgiveness as well as ask for it."[67] The Christian Democrats' show of support contrasted with the defensive reaction of Znak's parliamentary group. In a letter to Zawieyski, Popiel tried to show that he understood the highly awkward situation of the Catholic deputies in the Communist parliament, acknowledging the latter's declaration in December 1965 as "an expression of reasonable prudence and of a sense of real responsibility." The Christian Democrats in Poland, however, were uncompromising. Turowski regretted that Znak had not managed to put up even the slightest defense of the Polish bishops, believing their statement to have been harmful, something which would be "commonly understood as confirming the validity of the allegations presented by the Communists against the Polish episcopate." Hoppe made remarks in a similar vein.[68] In October 1967, the SP Council announced that it saw the need for a "renewal of the steering committee of the Polish Communist Party," a statement which could be considered as support for the party's "national" faction under General Mieczysław Moczar. Znak's mainstream, meanwhile, backed Gomułka to the end, perceiving him as the lesser of two evils.[69]

At the same time, ever clearer divisions were emerging within the Znak movement. Janusz Zabłocki was gradually evolving toward an ideological position closer to the Christian Democratic party. He had been impressed by Popiel's political authority. During his frequent

visits to Rome in the role of Vatican II correspondent for *Więź*, he built up good relationships with the Christian Democrats, over time becoming Sieniewicz's main partner in Poland. The year 1963 had witnessed a significant rapprochement in their views; two years later, Zabłocki pronounced an "oath of lasting cooperation" with the SP. The ultimate aim, albeit distant, was the reconstruction of the Christian Democratic party in Poland. In the shorter term, the goal was to establish and legalize the solid bonds between Zabłocki's group in Poland and SP's team in exile.

Just a few months earlier, Zabłocki had become an MP in Communist Poland's parliament, which gave him a wider scope for action, potentially opening up a credible channel of contact with the authorities. After he created ODiSS in the spring of 1967, he tried to convince the Christian Democrats in Poland to cooperate with that organization. In December 1973, he delivered a speech in parliament demanding equality for Catholics in the social, professional and civic life of the Polish People's Republic, insisting on their right to represent their own views publicly and to organize themselves into a movement guided by the principles of Catholic social teaching, all while remaining in communion with the episcopate. This was taken as a demand to allow for the construction of a new Catholic political party in Poland. As reported by the Paris correspondent of *Kultura*, however, Popiel adopted a cautious "wait and see" attitude toward Zabłocki. Amid reservations that émigré politicians lacked sufficient knowledge to critically evaluate the activities of "independent national leaders," he admitted that he did not see any elements of the current situation in Communist Poland conducive to relaunching the SP.[70]

One final roadblock to reviving Christian Democratic politics in post-Stalinist Poland stemmed from the fact that not all of the senior Christian Democratic party figures in Poland accepted the leadership to which Popiel aspired. According to secret police reports, Studentowicz's skepticism in this matter was also shared by Józef Kwasiborski. He thought that the Rome-based SP, which had been divorced from Poland for more than twenty years, was unaware of the conditions and opportunities for action in the country, and thus was not in a position to dictate tactics to local Christian Democrats. In Kwasiborski's view, Poles in Poland should decide for themselves, and Popiel's group should implement the country's directives, not vice versa.[71]

Clearly, there was a breakdown in communication between the two sides. According to entries in Zabłocki's *Diaries*, Sieniewicz and Popiel were surprised to hear in the winter of 1971 about a petition from five Christian Democratic activists in Poland—Wacław Bitner, Kwasiborski,

Christian inspiration in Communist Poland. He was also allegedly the author of the idea that the chairman of the reborn SP should be Wiesław Chrzanowski.

Zabłocki talked about his plans with his "Roman friends," but to his disappointment, they did not display the enthusiasm he had expected. More decisiveness was shown by the senior Christian Democrats within Poland. On 23 November 1981, Turowski, Kaczorowski, Zbigniew Madeyski and Siła-Nowicki presented a petition to the Polish episcopate for the reactivation of the party as suspended in 1946. The introduction of martial law three weeks later prevented any further action in this direction. Eventually, the SP was reactivated on Polish soil in February 1989. Among the twelve signatories of the founding statement, next to the Polish activists (Zabłocki, Siła-Nowicki and Studentowicz), were the signatures of émigrés (Sieniewicz, Zofia Fedorowicz-Grzelak and Zbigniew Ossowski).[74] However, for various reasons, the new party did not play a role adequate to the aspirations of its creators in the political life of independent Poland.

The most important strategic political plan of the Christian Democrats in exile—the reconstruction in Poland of a legally operating Christian political party, which would represent the interests of a substantial part of Polish society—never came to pass. The ideas of the prewar Christian Democratic party, and of the wartime Unia underground, found no successors. To a large extent, this was the result of the prolonged media monopoly held by the "minimalists" within the Znak movement. At the same time, however, the activities of SP's members in other fields did produce tangible benefits: enabling Poles behind the Iron Curtain to establish and maintain cultural, academic and to some extent even political contacts with the West; developing scholarship and book exchange programs; and offering organizational and logistical support. In assessing the consequences of these activities, it is worth remembering the potential that the Christian Democrats in exile safeguarded. According to estimates by Communist intelligence in the early 1960s, the SP party led by Popiel numbered around 100 members.[75] Over time, its numbers decreased in a natural way, with the advancing age of its members. And at best, the group of people actively involved in contacts with Poland only numbered about a dozen people. The enormous amount of work they did must inspire our respect.

Translated by James Todd

<h1 style="text-align:center">Notes</h1>

1. See Jarosław Rabiński's chapter in this volume.
2. For more on the creation of the SP's governing board in exile, see Janusz Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja w kraju i na emigracji 1947–1970* (Lublin: Ośrodek Studiów Polonijnych i Społecznych PZKS, 1999), 67–69; Andrzej Friszke, *Życie polityczne emigracji* (Warsaw: Biblioteka WIĘZI, 1999), 163.
3. See, e.g., Stanisław Stomma, "Maksymalne i minimalne tendencje katolików w Polsce," *Znak* no. 3 (1946); Stanisław Stomma, "Idea i siła," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24 December 1956; Stefan Kisielewski, "Czy neopozytywizm?," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24 December 1956. For a critical reinterpretation, see Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 114–151.
4. Mention should be made in this company of the following activists: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Stanisław Stomma, Jerzy Turowicz, Andrzej Wielowieyski and Krzysztof Kozłowski. Mazowiecki did indeed begin his public activity in the SP, which he joined at the age of nineteen in 1946. However, soon afterwards the party suspended its activities. This ended the Christian Democratic episode in the life of the future prime minister. Piotr H. Kosicki, "After 1989: The Life and Death of the Catholic Third Way," *TLS – Times Literary Supplement*, 13 December 2013; Andrzej Brzeziecki, *Tadeusz Mazowiecki: Biografia naszego premiera* (Kraków: Znak Horyzont, 2015), 34–35.
5. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 152–188, 218–302.
6. Andrzej Andrusiewicz, *Stronnictwo Pracy 1937–1950* (Warsaw: PWN, 1988), 200–232, 244–337.
7. For more, see the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, hereafter AIPN), 944/131, Files on the criminal case of Jan Wacław Felczak before the military district court in Warsaw, ref. 221/49; Wojciech Frazik, *Emisariusz Wolnej Polski: Biografia polityczna Wacława Felczaka (1916–1993)* (Kraków: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2013), 225–342.
8. AIPN, 944/372; extract from the interrogation of Ryszard Kamiński, codename "Antek," on 24 February 1949, 18; *Sojusznicy gestapo: Proces Kwasiborskiego i innych* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1951), 204–209; Karol Popiel, *Na mogiłach przyjaciół* (London: Odnowa, 1966), 142–143.
9. AIPN, 944/372, extract from interrogation…; *ibid.*, extracts from the minutes of interrogations of Cecylia Weker on 11 January 1949 and 25 June 1950, 20–21, 100–102; *ibid.*, testimony of Józef Kwasiborski on 26 May 1950, 103–109; AIPN, 507/195, Minutes of interrogations

of Jerzy Braun on 10 March 1950 and 15 March 1950, codex 45v–46 and 53v–54; AIPN, 0648/86, testimony of Jan Wacław Felczak on 24 October 1949, codex 238–243v; AIPN, 944/131, Minutes of interrogations of Jan Wacław Felczak on 21 and 22 February 1949, 12 August 1949, 27 May 1950, codex 52–54, 55–57, 168v–171v, 188–200; Wiesław Chrzanowski, *Pół wieku polityki czyli rzecz o obronie czynnej: Z Wiesławem Chrzanowskim rozmawiali Piotr Mierecki i Bogusław Kiernicki* (Warsaw: Ad Astra, 1997), 169, 171–172.

10. AIPN, 01224/63, Report concerning the development and operational/political exploitation of the situation created in conjunction with the proposals of Eustachiewicz (codename: "Sever"), Warsaw, 28 April 1955.

11. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 114–151.

12. Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja w kraju i na emigracji*, 52, 59–60; *Sojusznicy gestapo…*; Tomasz Sikorski and Marcin Kulesza, *Niezłomni w epoce fałszywych proroków: Środowisko "Tygodnika Warszawskiego" (1945–1948)* (Warsaw: von Borowiecky, 2013), 113–122; AIPN, 944/372, File of criminal case against K. Turowski before the military district court in Warsaw, ref. 1011/50; AIPN, 507/195, File of criminal case against J. Braun before the military district court in Warsaw, ref. 1050/48; *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 12 July 1946, no. 30, item 192.

13. AIPN, 0648/86, Director of the 7th Department of the MBP [Ministry of Public Security], Lt. Col. W. Sienkiewicz, to the Head of Department V of the MBP, Col. Brystygierowa. Report concerning the assembly of the SP in the country, 21 November 1953, vol. 1, codex 230; AIPN, 01178/580, Report concerning Bolesław Biega [*sic!*], 11 August 1954, 53–54. Biega arrived in the West relatively late. He was despatched on a business trip to Sweden in May 1948 as an employee of the company Polimex; in January of the following year, he refused to return to Poland. *Ibid.*, codex 7, 18, 29.

14. For more on Eustachiewicz's activities in exile and his journey to Poland, see Paweł Ziętara, "Seweryna Eustachiewicza przypadki," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 158 (2006): 35–71.

15. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 218–256.

16. Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja w kraju i na emigracji*, 40–42, 45; Stanisław Gebhardt, "Działalność na forum międzynarodowym," in *Świadectwa: Testimonianze*, vol. IV: *Pro publico bono: Polityczna, społeczna i kulturalna działalność Polaków w Rzymie w XX wieku* (Rome: Fundacja im. J.S. Umiastowskiej, 2006), 289.

17. Piasecki, a hardline anti-Communist arrested by the NKVD, not only avoided the death sentence, but in fact persuaded the Soviets that they should allow him to create a Catholic political group which would support the new Communist authorities in Poland. See, e.g., Kosicki,

Catholics on the Barricades, 93–113; Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki, *Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-century Poland – The Politics of Bolesław Piasecki* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), 79–81.

18. "The Press Conference of Mr. Karol Popiel, Chairman of the Polish Christian Democratic Movement, Paris, October 8, 1956," Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Stanisław Mikołajczyk Papers, box 113. After the press conference, Reiff allegedly passed on to Eustachiewicz the reaction of Piasecki, who said that Popiel had lost his chance to reconstruct the SP, and Poland had lost its opportunity to recover its "freedom" for 25 years. Gebhardt, "Działalność na forum międzynarodowym," 290.

19. See Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter in this volume.

20. Riding a wave of liberalization beginning in October 1956, Communist authorities in Poland permitted the establishment of five social and cultural associations assembling lay Catholics.

21. See, e.g., David Colon, "Les jeunes de la Conférence Olivaint et l'Europe, de 1919 à 1992," *Histoire@Politique: Politique, culture, société* no. 10 (2010).

22. AIPN, 01224/63, the Borowski report, 6 October 1957; AIPN 785/4, letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 1 April 1958; Janusz Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, vol. 1: *1956–1965* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2008), 95–99, 104, 170–171, 174, 176, 181; Archive of Modern Records, Janusz Zabłocki Collection (Archiwum Akt Nowych, Akta Janusza Zabłockiego; hereafter AAN AJZ), ref. 20; letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 17 September 1958; Gebhardt, "Działalność na forum międzynarodowym," 302–306; Stanisław August Morawski, "Centro Esperienze Internazionali i inne inicjatywy stypendialne w Rzymie," in *Świadectwa: Testimonianze*, 337–342. The Third Department of the Interior Ministry established that in 1958 Popiel's group aided more than eighty people to travel to the West. AIPN, 01136/653, Lt. T. Kasprzak, Operational note on Popiel's Christian Democratic group, 11 November 1958, 20–26.

23. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 92.

24. AIPN 785/11, T. Wawrzyniewicz, Report on the declaration of the accession of former activists from Popiel's SP to KIK, and the proposal for cooperation between Popiel's group of SP activists in exile with KIK, 7 September 1960.

25. See Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter in this volume.

26. See Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska's chapter in this volume.

27. Morawski, "Centro Esperienze Internazionali," 343–355; AIPN 785/13, Col. W. Kossakowski, information from source codenamed "Anna," 3 September 1969.

28. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, vol. 2: *1966–1975* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2011), 402; AAN AJZ, ref. 28, the statutes and founding document of the Istituto Cristiano Sociale di Cultura, Rome, 6 June 1969.

29. AIPN 785/4, Service report from meeting with informant "Nowak," 14 April 1960; Service report from operating officer in Section I, Department III of Interior Ministry regarding Siła-Nowicki, 24 April 1962, in Władysław Siła-Nowicki, *Wspomnienia* (Wrocław: Zarząd Główny Stowarzyszenia Społeczno-Kombatanckiego "Wolność i Niezawisłość," 2002), 2: 350; AIPN 01224/63, "Borowski," report on 7 October 1958; AIPN 01224/63, "Sokolnicki," report by secret agents on 8 October 1958. For Sieniewicz's acquaintance with Wentowski, see Konrad Sieniewicz, *Wspomnienia polityczne 1939–1945: Ku jakiej Polsce szliśmy* (Katowice: Unia, 2012), 143.

30. AIPN 01224/63, "Borowski" report, 6 October 1957; AIPN 01224/63, task list for agent codenamed "Borowski" in connection with the trip to Austria between 21 August and 9 September 1959, 15 August 1959; AIPN 01168/273, on Konrad Sieniewicz, codenamed "Insula," 20 April 1963.

31. Wacław Auleytner, "Oświadczenie," *Więź* no. 4 (2013): 252–253. For examples of his activities, see AIPN 785/5, Informant codenamed "Maciek," Report concerning Polish Christian Democratic groups in exile, 14 August 1958; AIPN 785/10, Informant "Maciek," Report, 4 March 1959; AIPN 01178/584, extract from reports by secret collaborator "Anna," taken from discussions and arrangements during a stay in France and Belgium in January 1962; IPN 785/13, Col. W. Kossakowski, information from source codenamed "Anna," 29 May 1969; AIPN 785/16, Information from source codenamed "Anna," 6 November 1970.

32. For more on Micewski's cooperation with the SB, see the series of articles by Andrzej Friszke in *Tygodnik Powszechny*: "Tajemnice Andrzeja Micewskiego," 21 August 2006; "Od ściany do ściany," 28 August 2006; "Kontrakt," 5 September 2006; "W osmozie z władzą," 12 September 2006; "W przeciągu," 22 September 2006; Paweł Ziętara, "Strategia konia trojańskiego: Aparat bezpieczeństwa PRL wobec emigracyjnego Stronnictwa Pracy," *Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989* 10, no. 1 (2012): 350–352. Jerzy Kulczycki, one of Micewski's friends in exile, defended him against accusations of collaboration, saying that the balance of the "information trading" he had done was positive. Kulczycki, "Andrzej Micewski, przyjaciel, którego nie znałem," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 158 (2006): 240–244.

33. Gebhardt, *Działalność…*, 294.

34. AIPN 785/9, "Chairman," no. 34; Transcripts of bugged phone call from 28 March 1958; AIPN 785/11, Major T. Wawrzyniewicz, Service note concerning the Popiel group's concept for interaction with the Znak group, 10 October 1960.
35. AIPN 785/5, Lt. H. Walczyński, Service report from meeting with informant "Nowak," 15 January 1959; AIPN 785/11, Wawrzyniewicz, Report, 24 May 1961; Archives of Stanisław Gebhardt (hereafter ASG), letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 12 November 1960; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 393.
36. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 259.
37. Karol Popiel, "Droga ideowego piłsudczyka," in Jerzy Braun, Karol Popiel, Konrad Sieniewicz, *Człowiek ze spiżu* (London: Odnowa, 1981), 48–56; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 33, 215, 248, 341, 348, 364–6; AAN AJZ, ref. 21, Statement by the Labor Party, Rome, 17 May 1965.
38. AIPN 01069/761, Report on operational contact codenamed "Opium," 25 February 1974; Jarosław Rabiński, *Konstanty Turowski: Życie, działalność, myśl społeczno-polityczna* (Katowice: Unia, 2008), 236–237.
39. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 202–203, 209, 890; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, vol. 3, part 1: *1976–1981*, 182–184, 186, 188, 191, 255–256, 313, 400, 409, 415, 515–516; Konrad Sieniewicz, *W Polsce po trzydziestu latach* (London: Odnowa, 1977); Paweł Ziętara, "Konrad Sieniewicz w dokumentach bezpieki," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 15, no. 1 (2010): 109–110; Ziętara, "Strategia konia trojańskiego," 357–358.
40. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 152–188; Michael Fleming, *Communism, Nationalism, and Ethnicity in Poland, 1944–50* (London: Routledge, 2010).
41. See Leszek Jesień's chapter in this volume; Patrick Pasture, "Jan Kułakowski: From Exile to International Trade Union Leader and Diplomat," in *Intégration ou représentation? Les exilés polonais en Belgique et la construction européenne*, ed. Michel Dumoulin and Idesbald Goddeeris (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2005), 99–120; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 409–410, 412, 420–427, 429; AAN AJZ ref. 20, letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 17 September 1958; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, "Jan Kułakowski (1930–2011)," in *Rok 1989 i lata następne: teksty wybrane i nowe* (Warsaw: Prószyński, 2012), 491–495.
42. Janusz Zabłocki, "Ku odrodzeniu chrześcijańskiej demokracji (1967–1981)," *Znaki Nowych Czasów* nos. 5–6 (2003): 72–73; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 729–735, 745, 749–750, 767; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 334, 349. For more on the split in Znak, see, e.g., Andrzej Friszke, *Oaza na Kopernika: Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej 1956–1989* (Warsaw: Biblioteka WIĘZI, 1997), 162–167, 172–180.
43. See Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł's chapter in this volume; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 684, 686–689.

44. Piotr H. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 127–198, at 164, 177–179; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 507; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 103–108, 257–258, 413; Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 191.

45. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 258, 898, 901; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 100–101.

46. AIPN 944/372, extract from interrogation of Józef Kwasiborski from 5 January 1949, 18; AIPN 944/372, Testimony of Józef Kwasiborski from 26 May 1950; AAN AJZ 20, letter from Drzewiecki to Sieniewicz, London, 15 May 1957; Rabiński, *Konstanty Turowski*, 257.

47. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 288, 319; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 415, 844, 898, 902; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 256–257.

48. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 121, 144, 276, 285.

49. Information from the Provincial Command of the Citizens' Militia [Komenda Wojewódzka Milicji Obywatelskiej] in Lublin, on operations conducted against the Catholic University of Lublin, and cooperation between Sections II (counter-intelligence) and IV (religious affairs), 4 April 1974, in *Metody pracy operacyjnej aparatu bezpieczeństwa wobec kościołów i związków wyznaniowych 1945–1989*, ed. Adam Dziurok (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2004), 499–508; Rabiński, *Konstanty Turowski*, 203.

50. See Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska's chapter in this volume; Morawski, "Centro Esperienze Internazionali," 354–355; Jerzy Kulczycki, *Atakować książką* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2016), 144–161, 180–191, 205–208, 213–222, 235–236.

51. Popiel, *Na mogiłach przyjaciół*; Karol Popiel, *Od Brześcia do "Polonii"* (London: Odnowa, 1967); Jan Hoppe, *Wspomnienia, przyczynki, refleksje* (London: Odnowa, 1972); Jerzy Braun, *Tysiąclecie chrześcijaństwa w Polsce* (London: Odnowa, 1966); Jerzy Braun, *Ekumenizm w uchwałach Soboru i w okresie posoborowym* (London: Odnowa, 1968); Jerzy Braun, *Rytmy włoskie* (London: Odnowa, 1974); Jerzy Braun, *Prometej Adam* (London: Odnowa, 1980); Sieniewicz, *W Polsce po trzydziestu latach*; Stefan Kisielewski, *Materii pomieszanie* (London: Odnowa, 1973); Stefan Kisielewski, *Czy istnieje walka o świat?* (London: Odnowa, 1976); Stefan Kisielewski, *Na czym polega socjalizm? (spostrzeżenia z Warszawy)* (London: Odnowa, 1979); Janusz Zabłocki, *Tożsamość i siły narodu* (London: Odnowa, 1978); Braun, Popiel, Sieniewicz, *Człowiek ze spiżu*.

52. Karol Popiel, "Traktat, którego zapewne nie będzie," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 1, no. 3 (1970): 32–35, reprinted from *Narodowiec*, 20 July 1966; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 449; Karol Popiel, "O Korfantym i Sikorskim, Z poczty redakcyjnej," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 1, no. 15 (1972): 116–119; Karol Popiel, "Jeszcze o Froncie Morges, Z poczty redakcyjnej," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 5, no. 25 (1973): 91–93; Karol Popiel, "Generał Sikorski w mojej pamięci," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 6, no. 54 (1973):

1–19; Karol Popiel, *Wspomnienia polityczne* (Warsaw: ODiSS, 1983); Karol Popiel, *Generał Sikorski w mojej pamięci* (Warsaw: ODiSS, 1983).

53. Konrad Sieniewicz, "Wystąpienie przedstawiciela Światowej Unii Chrześcijańsko-Demokratycznej," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 6, no. 32 (1974): 71–74; Konrad Sieniewicz, "Papież z dalekiego kraju," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 12, no. 72 (1978); Konrad Sieniewicz, "Odcinek cywilny powstańczego Powiśla: Wspomnienia Delegata Rejonu I," *Chrześcijanin w Świecie* 8–9, no. 131–132 (1984): 151–160.

54. AIPN, 01136/642, Information from source "Literat," Popiel's Labor Party group seeking contacts with the SP in the United Kingdom, 20 January 1960, 79–83; AIPN, 01224/63, "Urszula," security service report on the weekly [*sic!*] publication *Odnowa* and its editor Eustachiewicz, 3 November 1958.

55. AIPN 785/2, Report, informant codenamed "Stefan," 27 November 1957; ASG, letter from S. Eustachiewicz to Wiśniewski, 27 September 1960; Tadeusz Myślik, "Propozycje dla emigracji," *Tygodnik Powszechny* no. 41 (1961); Tadeusz Myślik, "Bronię moich 'Propozycji…'", *Odnowa* no. 12 (1961); AIPN 01136/642, Note on the Labor Party, Popiel's group, 30 July 1962, 98–103.

56. Information from the Provincial Command of the Citizens' Militia, 499. From 1981 to 1984, the periodical *Odnowa Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna* (Christian Social Renewal) appeared in London, published by a team under the leadership of Kulczycki. They were only able to print six issues.

57. AAN AJZ ref. 20. The situation in the country: S. Eustachiewicz's report to the SP in exile on 17–18 November [1956] in Paris/New York.

58. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw (hereafter AMSZ), Team 8, bundle 60, vol. 825, E. Wychowaniec, Service note, 9 October 1957, 34; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 29–30; Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 126–127; Tomasz Sikorski, "Próby konsolidacji środowiska byłych działaczy Stronnictwa Pracy przed wyborami 1957 roku," in *Wybory i referenda w PRL w latach 1946–1989*, ed. Sebastian Ligarski and Michał Siedziako (Szczecin: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2014). One of the first SP activists whom the authorities allowed to travel to the West, back in 1957, had been Stanisław Wąsowicz. As a lawyer, he led the process of rehabilitating Jan Hoppe, which added to his credibility. Sieniewicz assigned him the role of liaison between the Polish Christian Democratic parties in exile and those in Poland. He soon realized, however, that his friend was working with the authorities in Warsaw. AAN AJZ, ref. 22, letter from Hoppe to S. Wąsowicz, 15 July 1957; AIPN, 01224/63, "Borowski" report, 6 October 1957; AIPN, 01168/273, Note on Konrad Sieniewicz, codename "Insula," 20 April 1963.

59. Karol Popiel, "Po wyborach," *Odnowa* no. 1 (1957).

60. Konstanty Turowski, *"Odrodzenie": Historia Stowarzyszenia Katolickiej Młodzieży Akademickiej* (Warsaw: ODiSS, 1987), 280–282, 286–288, 292, 296–298, 380–382; ASG, letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 8 October 1962.

61. Kułakowski named Mazowiecki as one of the three people who had had the greatest influence on his life. They met in 1963 and dated their friendship to that time. The other important people he listed included Turowicz, Jacek Woźniakowski, Stomma and Stefan Wilkanowicz. They were linked by their common approach to the world of "open Catholicism, directed towards social affairs, battling against what is happening in Poland, but not in a nationalistic way, just in a universalist, personalist way." Jan Kułakowski, *Rozmowy na Bagateli: Polska, Europa, świat* (Warsaw: Rhetos, 2004), 152–154. Neither Popiel nor Sieniewicz is mentioned in the book.

62. AIPN 785/10, Informant "Maciek," report, 4 March 1959; AIPN 785/11, Maj. T. Wawrzyniewicz, Service note on the Popiel concept of cooperation with the Znak group, 10 October 1960; *Polska emigracja polityczna: Informator* (Warsaw: Adiutor, 2004), 67–88.

63. AIPN, 785/11, Maj. T. Wawrzyniewicz, Report on the declaration of the accession of former activists from Popiel's SP to KIK, and the proposal for cooperation between Popiel's group of SP activists in exile with KIK, 7 September 1960. In one of his letters, Stomma wrote, "We count on you a great deal, and we value our cooperation very highly. You have helped us very much. Once again I warmly thank you and assure you of my sincerest esteem. I count on our further cooperation and your further assistance. For this reason also, we would vote against your return to Poland. Such are our selfish considerations. In Paris, you are invaluable and irreplaceable." ASG, letter from Stomma to S. Eustachiewicz, 12 November 1960.

64. The following individuals joined the Warsaw club: Jerzy and Juliusz Braun, Kazimierz Studentowicz, Władysław Siła-Nowicki and Zygmunt Kopankiewicz.

65. AIPN, 785/11, T. Wawrzyniewicz, Report…; AIPN, 785/11, T. Wawrzyniewicz, Report, 24 May 1961; Kazimierz Studentowicz, "Polska racja stanu," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 September 1960; AIPN 785/11, Information concerning the rapprochement between the group of Braun, Studentowicz and others and the Catholic Intelligentsia Club in Warsaw, 23 March 1961; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 311–312, 356, 359–360, 364, 382, 525; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 98–99; Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 145–158, 193; Friszke, *Oaza na Kopernika*, 61–63.

66. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," 166–169.

67. "Polish Bishops' Appeal to their German Colleagues," 18 November 1965, in *German–Polish Dialogue: Letters of the Polish and German*

Bishops and International Statements (New York: Edition Atlantic Forum, 1966), 7–19; Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," 189–195.

68. Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 163–165; ASG, manuscript notes by Gebhardt at SP meeting, 16 December 1963; ASG, SP meeting, 25 January 1964 (typescript); Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 684–690; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 35–36, 110–111.

69. AAN AJZ, ref. 21, Statement by the Foreign Council of the Labor Party, 14–15 October 1967, Rome.

70. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 1: 174, 505, 509, 559, 666–667, 677–678; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 200–201, 204, 219; Dominik Morawski, "Czy stronnictwo katolickie w Polsce?," *Kultura* no. 5 (1974): 71–76.

71. AIPN 0227/1039, Information from informant "Jacek," 18 November 1969.

72. Popiel was surprised by the participation of Bitner, who had hitherto seemed reluctant to act in concert with the SP members. Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 2: 579–580; ASG, Wacław Bitner to Popiel, Sieniewicz and Gebhardt, 18 November 1973.

73. AAN AJZ. Ref. 22, Statement by the SP's ruling council, Brussels, 19–20 March 1977; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 238; Ryszard Gajewski, *Karol Popiel 1877–1977* (Suwałki: Wyższa Szkoła Służby Społecznej im. Księdza Franciszka Blachnickiego, 2008), 419–421.

74. Dominik Morawski, "Oświadczenie," *Kultura* nos. 7–8 (1977): 260; Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 205–208, 213–222, 235–236; Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 3:1: 684, 686, 690–692, 705–708, 713, 715; Chrzanowski, *Pół wieku polityki*, 359.

75. *Polska emigracja polityczna*, 67–68.

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Christian Democracy's Global Cold War

Piotr H. Kosicki

In 1959, two rising stars of Latin American politics, Chile's Eduardo Frei Montalva and Venezuela's Rafael Caldera, met in New York with the head of the Free Europe Committee, Inc. (FEC), Archibald Alexander. The men discussed efforts to combat the rise of Communism in South America, as well as the changing face of the Cold War order following Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power in the Soviet Union, his attempts at a "thaw" with US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the Soviet Union's violent suppression of reformist efforts in Budapest in November 1956.[1]

This was no chance encounter. The FEC was no simple non-governmental organization: rather, it stood at the apex of what political scientist Scott Lucas has called a "State–private network."[2] As such, in its more than two decades of existence (1949–1971), the nominally private but publicly financed FEC took charge of multiple fronts in the American Cold War effort, following a blueprint laid out in 1948 by then-State Department Policy Planning Staff head George Kennan, who called for "organized political warfare" against the Soviet Union to include cultural, intellectual and political projects independent of state action. A geopolitics of containment was to be matched with "a vigorous

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and effective ideological program" of global reach, which "proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in US interests to national freedom movements publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World."[3] These were the origins of the FEC.

Kennan's words also made clear that a "State–private" enterprise like the FEC needed foreign-born intermediaries in order to have hope of success in staging American political warfare globally. The creation of the FEC therefore went hand in hand with the harnessing and funding of a large network of political exiles from behind the Iron Curtain.[4] It was members of just such a network who got FEC President Alexander in the same room with Caldera and Frei Montalva—both of whom would, a decade hence, be elected presidents of their respective countries.[5] The forging of these connections had a direct and tangible added value for the American effort in the Cold War.

The men who made the 1959 meeting possible were three political exiles from Poland, belonging to different generations, but linked by loyalty to the same political family as Caldera and Frei Montalva: Christian Democracy. These exiles were Stanisław Gebhardt, Konrad Sieniewicz and Janusz Śleszyński. All three had left Poland after World War II, hampered in the pursuit of their political ambitions by the Communist cooptation of the political party that they would then serve in exile for decades: the Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP). When the FEC's forerunner, the Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. (soon renamed the National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., then again as the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.) was incorporated in the state of New York in May 1949, its new leadership cast a wide net among East-Central European political exiles, both inside and outside American borders.[6] The public statement accompanying the committee's incorporation made clear why the new organization needed political exiles from behind the Iron Curtain—men and women of substantial experience, but with principles that prevented them from remaining in their homelands and accommodating the Communist ascendancy: "Only in the field of ideas and spiritual values can victory be lasting."[7]

Though radio came to dominate the FEC's activities in the 1960s and thereafter, in the first fifteen or so years of its existence more than half of the committee's resources went to other types of projects. Those US-funded projects are absolutely crucial to understanding the nature and impact of the role played in the global Cold War by Christian

Democrats generally, and the Polish exiles of the SP in particular. As the FEC's Exile Relations Division laid out in a series of memoranda on "purposes and objectives," "it is the primary mission of the Free Europe Committee to engage in political warfare to help the captive nations of Europe regain their freedom."[8]

This chapter focuses on Polish Christian Democrats because it was they who landed on the front lines of FEC efforts already in the months following the committee's creation, remaining there into the mid-1960s. The Christian Democrats of the SP believed work on the FEC's behalf to be in line both with their Christian Democratic ideological commitments, and with their practical interests as political activists seeking to preserve and even grow their movement in the near-impossible conditions of exile. Christian Democrats like Gebhardt, Sieniewicz and Śleszyński became not only proxies for the American Cold War effort, but also empowered, independent political agents making use of American funds to pursue their own distinctly transnational, self-styled Christian Democratic agenda.

In the historiographies of Christian Democracy and of American "political warfare" alike, this is uncharted territory. The role of political exiles has traditionally been explored either according to a binary, push-and-pull framework—in other words, choosing between attachment to their homelands or their "Western" bases of operations—or as a footnote to the strictly (Western) European story of the construction of a European community after World War II. It is, of course, essential to keep in mind this Western European context, which Wolfram Kaiser has framed succinctly: "The division of Europe was an inevitable and acceptable consequence, despite the exclusion of Catholic countries like Poland. It assisted the Christian Democrats in becoming the hegemonic political force in continental Western Europe, as the main bulwark against Soviet communism, and also made it easier to overcome the Franco-German antagonism."[9]

In fact, Kaiser clearly establishes that, from the standpoint of Europe's dominant Christian Democrats—those governing Western Europe, unconstrained by the trials of exile—their East-Central counterparts did not actually fit into European transnationalism beyond *pro forma* invitations to participate in various organizations and forums. In practice, the exiles had to struggle continuously over decades to forge a political space for their own action, defining and redefining again and again their own attachments and roles with respect to Poland, with respect to

Europe, and with respect to international and global affairs more generally. Ground-breaking studies by Idesbald Goddeeris and by Peter Van Kemseke have shown the complexity of the exiles' position: while East-Central Europeans did succeed in impacting the Western European Christian Democratic agenda, they were always handicapped in this field of play by their weaker political status and by the lack of an actual electoral constituency. Goddeeris has accurately summed up the best for which these exiles could hope in the transnational political structures of Western Europe: "They could represent their fatherland in anticipation of its 'liberation', lobby for their case and eventually even exert pressure and wheedle these assemblies into sympathetic resolutions or favourable measures."[10]

Where the principal action was, then, for Christian Democratic exiles from behind the Iron Curtain, was not the Western European political arena but instead a virtually limitless gray area of transnational political warfare to which the Americans invited them and funded them, supporting a vast array of their efforts. These efforts lasted from the early Cold War years of the Truman Administration in the late 1940s, through the aftershocks of de-Stalinization and the "thaw" in the mid-to-late 1950s, until Lyndon B. Johnson's elevation to the US presidency in 1963 began a rapid American retreat from "organized political warfare."[11]

This chapter relies on materials drawn from one particular archival collection—which is, at once, one of the richest and one of the least-explored troves of source material on the experience and political activism of Christian Democratic exiles. The collections of the FEC deposited at the Hoover Institution Archives on the campus of Stanford University hold a wealth of material that helps to explain the Cold War backdrop, framework and context for many of the activities of East-Central European Christian Democratic exiles. This chapter will focus in particular on Poles because it was the Poles whom Christian Democracy's American benefactors at the FEC saw as the natural leaders of the entire transnational milieu of Christian Democrats operating in exile.

While telling the story of how Polish Christian Democrats became global Cold Warriors, this chapter also makes a larger methodological point about how ideas and ideology in the 1950s and 1960s fueled the formation of political movements and transnational activist networks. One of the key evidentiary links established by the Free Europe archives between the realm of ideas and the realm of concrete political action is the flow of capital and material resources across the Cold War network that the FEC built over the course of the 1950s.

Polish Christian Democracy Between World War II and Cold War

The activists of the postwar Polish Christian Democratic party SP had to reinvent their party and its purpose following its postwar suppression on Polish soil.[12] When its leader Karol Popiel escaped Polish territory in 1947, some of the party's leading activists continued to agitate for a role in Polish public life, though most gradually went underground—or became prey for Poland's Stalinist secret police. By 1948, the SP's leadership was spread across the globe: some were being interrogated in Stalinist jails on Polish soil, while others (like Popiel) were re-establishing themselves in London or (like Konrad Sieniewicz) forging new ties in New York and the emerging world of postwar international organizations.

In 1945, the Polish Christian Labor Party formally split into different wings, between those who followed Popiel back onto Polish soil after the Yalta Accords and those who refused to abandon the principled stand of London-based exile politics. The wing of the SP that remained loyal in exile to the leadership elected in Poland in July 1945—i.e. to Popiel and Sieniewicz—produced Polish Christian Democracy's crucial transnational players. From the standpoint of the United States, these were the only two names that mattered from this milieu. Both would, in fact, ultimately even receive social security pensions from the US government at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s. They operated first out of London and New York, then out of Paris and finally out of Rome. Their transnational activism in exile can be divided into successive stages conditioned by the availability of logistical and institutional support connected to their choices as emerging Cold Warriors. Their story goes far beyond the margins of the history of US foreign relations, revealing a clash of different agendas and intellectual frameworks in a remarkably impactful, yet little-known arena of the global Cold War.

Although Karol Popiel remained the nominal leader of the SP in exile until his death in 1977, in practice the initiative passed already in the late 1940s to representatives of younger generations, based in different countries but regularly on the move. SP Secretary-General Konrad Sieniewicz, born in 1912, had been a leader of the SP's clandestine wartime resistance; he relocated to New York in the late 1940s, and early on it was he who served as the first point of contact between the FEC and the Polish Christian Democrats. With the support of the FEC, Sieniewicz co-founded on 26 July 1950 an international organization for Christian Democratic exiles from behind the Iron Curtain, the Christian

Democratic Union of Central Europe (CDUCE), which he used as a stepping stone to enter into formal relations with Western Europe's Christian Democrats, and to become Christian Democracy's official delegate to the United Nations. In this capacity, Sieniewicz sought to build first bilateral, then trilateral partnerships between Christian Democrats in exile from East-Central Europe and Christian Democrats in Latin America and in Western Europe.[13]

Sieniewicz also benefited from the arrival of committed younger recruits to the SP in exile, who considerably expanded his operational abilities not only on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, but in fact across the North–South hemispheric divide as well. Janusz Śleszyński, born in 1916, had seen both military and diplomatic service with the Polish government-in-exile during the war before finding himself in the United States, where extensive contacts during his studies with international students from Latin America gave him the impetus to sign on with Sieniewicz as the CDUCE's Latin American liaison. Finally, there was Stanisław Gebhardt, born in 1928, a former inmate of the Mauthausen concentration camp who completed his studies in Britain prior to becoming a master networker and political operative, both for the SP and the CDUCE, where Gebhardt helped to build a strong "youth affairs" section in partnership with Christian Democratic youth from Western Europe—and, ultimately, Latin America, too.[14]

The Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe

Konrad Sieniewicz's principal vehicle for expanding SP influence in the international arena was the CDUCE. This exile international was the joint labor of a motley crew of self-styled Christian Democrats who represented different prewar philosophies of Catholic (or joint Catholic-Protestant) politics that had survived World War II either in exile or in their respective homelands. The organization brought together representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The CDUCE chairmanship fell first to Hungarian priest József Közi-Horváth, later succeeded by Czech legal scholar Adolf Procházka.[15] And yet, although the Poles of the SP never claimed the CDUCE chairmanship, arguably they held the greatest degree of control over the organization through the person of Sieniewicz, who continuously served as CDUCE secretary-general from 1950 until the era of the organization's marginalization in the 1970s. Since Sieniewicz's remit included

liaison work with other international organizations—from representatives of Latin American Christian Democracy, all the way up to the United Nations itself—this meant that when the CDUCE spoke, it was usually through the voice of the SP.[16]

Yet the Poles' influential role should not mask the diverse array of substantive functions carried out by the CDUCE. It was both a forum for different, nationally oriented East-Central European interests and a lobby group on behalf of the region as a whole. As such, it anticipated the 1954 establishment of the Assembly of Captive European Nations—another FEC project—in gathering political exiles to trumpet to American and global audiences alike the need for "national liberation" of peoples held "captive" behind the Iron Curtain.[17]

The CDUCE manifested multiple agendas, often in parallel, reflecting the core dilemma faced by every political exile: whether to integrate with the new political environment, or to double-down on claims to continue representing the "captive" homeland—even as claims to the legitimacy of that representation weakened with the passage of time. As former Radio Free Europe broadcaster George Urban has noted, "exiled or self-exiled intellectuals were not cast out to be happy. Satisfaction and assimilation in their new environment would have been an insult to their pride and integrity and a sign of the betrayal of their stated purpose."[18] And yet, generally speaking, East-Central European Christian Democrats sought to square this circle, believing that they could, in fact, best represent their home countries by integrating. In their approach, however, integration did not mean adaptation to US domestic concerns, but instead an active partnership with a global American vision for transforming the international system.[19]

Undergirding its international activism from the beginning was the commitment to "political warfare" announced by its principal funding source, the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., which shone the CDUCE's spotlight squarely and steadily on anti-Communist advocacy throughout much of the 1950s. A draft CDUCE memorandum from this time did not mince words: "The [C]ommunist system is a well premeditated totalitarian system penetrating into all spheres of human life with its ready-made solutions of all problems confronting the individuals as well as whole communities. This total [C]ommunist offensive calls for a total ideological war and resistance." Underscoring the East-Central European Christian Democrats' common roots "in the fight against Nazism," the CDUCE leadership located the roots of its

anti-Communist *bona fides* in a combination of wartime anti-fascism and long-term ideological commitments to Catholic social teaching, which "ought to be the rule in relations among social, professional and political organizations, as much in the national as in the international arena."[20]

The ideology of the CDUCE thus reflected a delicate balancing act between a relatively vague, but oft-repeated, commitment to Catholic social doctrine and a mission of "organized political warfare" that George Kennan could have easily endorsed. This mixed approach reflected both the relative electoral marginality of prewar Christian Democratic parties in East-Central Europe—regionally based, without mass national appeal, often targeted for harsh political suppression by rulers like Poland's Józef Piłsudski or Hungary's Miklós Horthy— and the formative experience of their brutal suppression by nascent Communist establishments in the aftermath of World War II. This is one reason why Western European Christian Democratic leaders like France's Robert Schuman or Belgium's August Edmond De Schryver were often hard-pressed to identify with the most pressing concerns of their East-Central European counterparts. Rather than define Christian Democracy in reference to the Catholic philosophical canon of corporatism or personalism, Sieniewicz, Közi-Horváth and others defined it functionally, as a Christian—but aconfessional—platform for anti-Communism: "*Christian Democracy* is essentially an effort to weave Christian ethics and principles into government and to apply the principles of charity and justice to all phases of political, social, economic and international life. Based upon the fundamental tenets of Christianity, this movement is a powerful challenge to the materialistic and atheistic ideology of [C]ommunism." And so, the CDUCE creed declared, "*Christian Democracy* provides a rallying point for diverse anti-[C]ommunist forces. Derived from all that is best and most cherished in Western Civilization, it has been reinforced and enriched by modern political, economic and social thought."[21]

The CDUCE philosophy received its most extensive elaboration in a sixty-three-page pamphlet published in 1952 and mailed out to prospective partners from CDUCE headquarters, containing essays by the various national leaders in the CDUCE. As Közi-Horváth wrote in his introduction to the pamphlet, the CDUCE leaders saw their charge as, among others, "witnesses of Communism," seeking "to prove to the free world that the peoples behind the Iron Curtain are not merely satellites, but actually slaves."[22] Sieniewicz sent this pamphlet, among others,

to the Belgian Minister of State August Edmond De Schryver, chair of Western Europe's Christian Democratic international, the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI). Sieniewicz spent the 1950s trying (with only limited success) to build up the CDUCE's influence within the NEI, and the pamphlet seemed to attest to the disconnect between Western European Christian Democrats' priorities and those of the East-Central European exiles. Although De Schryver politely acknowledged receipt of Sieniewicz's mailing, he neither requested more copies for circulation (something Sieniewicz had urged him to do) nor reflected substantively on the CDUCE's claims.[23] The very experience of being Christian Democrats in exile seemed, with the passage of time, to push the activists of the CDUCE away from their European colleagues, toward the Americans at the FEC.

The FEC, too, needed the Christian Democrats of East-Central Europe both for their political pedigree, and for their religious *bona fides*. As the Christian Democrats' later handler John Foster Leich noted in a 1955 memorandum, from the moment of its creation in 1949, the (then) Committee for Free Europe "had been under heavy attack from conservative nationalistic Catholic circles and in consultation with the Department of State came to the conclusion that support of the [Christian Democrats] would be the most constructive and useful response to this need." While the FEC financed the launching of the CDUCE, the CDUCE helped the FEC to overcome criticisms of having ignored religion in the struggle against Soviet atheism. On this point, the Christian Democrats seemed to represent a "safe" option: "progressive but non-Marxist," "particularly interested in labor problems" and able in FEC leaders' eyes to fend off accusations from "the more reactionary and nationalistic centers in which enthusiastic churchmen participate."[24]

In other words, the FEC needed religion without zealotry, and the Christian Democrats seemed the perfect fit. It helped that Christian Democracy did not appear to have a recognizable counterpart among established political currents in the United States. As one leading FEC operative argued in a memorandum to FEC president Archibald Alexander, "leaders of this particular political movement have great difficulty in finding a non-governmental place to plug in here. Their philosophy is contained somewhere between ultra New Dealism and constitutional liberalism; there is no political party which represents this part of the spectrum."[25] And yet Christian Democracy, while not intuitive to an American electorate, seemed perfectly attuned to reach the

wider world: "The Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe is based on the political orientation of Catholic democracy, in both Eastern and Western Europe. This has considerable potentialities in the uncommitted areas of Europe and Latin America."[26]

COUNTER-PENETRATION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

Christian Democracy thus both challenged and suited well the political heuristics developed by the early generations of FEC operatives to map out a global vision for Cold War "organized political warfare." This included a whole vocabulary for Cold War activism involving East-Central European exiles, predicated on a "linkage of psychological strategy and covert action."[27] At first, the campaign was broadly styled as "exile relations," ranging from simply keeping tabs on exile communities in the broadly understood "West" to financing an assortment of cultural, intellectual and political projects—some internal to the exile communities, others casting much wider nets. The responsibilities of Free Europe's team dedicated to "Exile Relations" (FEER) evolved as the unit itself did: beginning with a division headquartered in New York (DER), reconceived in 1956 as a network of European field offices (London, Paris and Vienna), and finally expanding into an entire West European Operations Division run from the field, with only minimal supervision by New York. With the liquidation of this last incarnation in 1965, the chapter of exile-driven political warfare effectively came to a close for the FEC.[28]

As the FEC played both defense and offense, exile relations proved seminal on both fronts. In its first institutional incarnation, the DER "sought steadily to marshal for political warfare purposes" exiles active "throughout the free world."[29] As DER staff declared in 1955, their division's "primary objective" was to work "with and through exile groups and individuals to broaden them, strengthen them, and help them, as symbols and as action bodies, to manifest their determination, and that of the Free Europe Committee, that their captive peoples shall again be free."[30] The defensive strategy built on the doctrine of containment, and it involved disbursal of resources to promote (anti-Communist) education and civic culture within the "Free World." Simultaneously, the exile relations personnel designed a cultural counter-offensive predicated on "counter-penetration."[31] Not only were representatives of Soviet Bloc governments—agents of whatever Communist secret service—trying to penetrate the West, but in fact the West tried to use exiles as their own agents to "penetrate" the Bloc.

Seen from an American standpoint, then, the SP's transnational contacts were, among others, a means of generating exposure to the West, and establishing common ground with Western Europe and North America. Even the de-colonizing Global South—as well as already long-decolonized Latin America—actively entered the FEC leadership's thinking starting in the mid-1950s. Already in 1955, DER operatives explained Christian Democracy's appeal in virtue of political Catholicism's broad and "considerable potentialities."[32]

The geopolitical Cold War context framed shifts within American support, or even initiative, for the political activities of East-Central European émigrés. At the outset, the FEC's line was anti-Communism, plain and simple. FEC Vice-President Bernard Yarrow described exiles as "a weapon in our struggle to insure that the free world be not deceived by Soviet lures or intimidated by Soviet threats."[33] Over time, however, and particularly by the mid-1960s, the FEC's agenda shifted in parallel with US foreign policy's evolution toward détente. This shift is clearly visible, for example, in the language of internal memoranda from section and division chiefs to the FEC president, whose focus evolved from "counter-penetration" intended to cultivate long-term assets behind the Iron Curtain, toward a more flexible program encouraging "internal relaxation" behind the Iron Curtain and "the re-association of east and west Europe."[34] Hand in hand with the discursive shift went a decrease in funding over time, a decrease in operational capability and subsequently also a decrease in the overall level of support that Americans provided to the East-Central European exiles.

Broadly speaking, early on, two major questions were on the minds of both Americans and East-Central European exiles in their contacts with one another—initially in New York and DC, then by the mid-1950s in London and Paris, which became the focal points of FEER operations for the next decade. As Paweł Ziętara has shown, among the Polish émigrés, we are talking about a dozen or so operatives. The FEC archives show that, in fact, the same was also true on the American side, beginning in 1956 with the opening of field offices in London, Paris and Vienna. The most extensive collaboration with the SP came out of the Paris office, belonging first to FEER, then to the FEC's West European Operations Division (WEOD).[35] The key American players included James McCargar, John Foster Leich, Edward McHale and Eugene Metz, among others. They were a mix of former diplomats and former military men, often with extensive experience in intelligence in the US wartime Office of Strategic Services.[36] This chapter does not dwell on their

individual stories, except to emphasize that they were few in number, that they got to know the exiles very well personally and that they forged and cultivated long-term connections and partnerships over the course of more than a decade.

In 1961, WEOD's London Program Office reported back to FEC headquarters that the European operation "has been given a clear-cut mandate to press the attack on the Communist infiltration of Western institutions and to mount a strong counter-offensive of political action and surveillance. […] Behind the Iron Curtain, our weapon in this combat is the complexity of our East–West personal contacts program."[37] This program represented a sort of *carte blanche* to follow an agenda defined first and foremost by the Christian Democratic exiles of East-Central Europe. Karol Popiel's lieutenants—Konrad Sieniewicz, and especially the next generation, Stanisław Gebhardt and Janusz Śleszyński—were to a great extent responsible for devising a range of initiatives themselves, based on the contacts that they were cultivating in different Western European countries. As FEC Vice-President Bernard Yarrow observed in 1955, over the course of five to ten years in exile, the FEC's partners had "gained confidence and refined their techniques, studied the tactics and objectives of the Communist regimes and otherwise improved their 'professional' skills. They are a valuable, and potentially great, political warfare force."[38]

The main agenda point of the FEC's partnership with the SP was christened the "Paris special project." This was a multifaceted initiative, including funds for bringing Poles across the Iron Curtain, providing support to Poles (individually and through community-building institutions) already living in London and Paris, and also pursuing the single most important goal on which the exiles and Americans squarely agreed: training future generations. There were two tracks to these initiatives: those focused on exiles and those focused on "counter-penetration"—in other words, importing young Catholics from the Soviet Bloc and then sending them back across the Iron Curtain with subversive knowledge, norms and political practices.

The opening of a new window for cross-Iron Curtain contacts came at an important crossroads in the evolution of the FEC's operational capabilities. In 1955, the Cold War had notably "thawed," as US president Dwight D. Eisenhower held a summit in Geneva in July with Communist Party of the Soviet Union general secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who then hosted West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Moscow two months later.[39] The FEC nonetheless gambled

that this "thaw" was at best only temporary, at worst—a ruse. Bucking apparently shifting winds in global diplomacy, the FEC leadership none-theless issued memorandum after memorandum to its employees and partners insisting that "The objectives of the exiles from the captive nations, as well as of the Free Europe Committee, have been in no way changed, although tactics in their pursuit must be redefined and adapted to the new climate. On the assumption that the Soviet soft policy can be even more dangerous than the hard policy of the past, the efforts of all workers for liberation must be intensified rather than slackened."[40]

In other words, the fundamental mission had not changed. Indeed, it was the DER's task to prevent exiles' demoralization and, above all, redefection, by assuaging fears "that their cause has been weakened by the new sweetness and light and that their compatriots behind the Iron Curtain must have lost much of their spirit of resistance. Generally speak-ing, they are anxious and disheartened. It is DER's job to restore their morale and fighting spirit, as well as to give them guidance and inspi-ration for their future activities."[41] The best way to achieve this goal was to redeploy FEC resources to send exiles right back into the field, making possible the "useful exploitation of the many opportunities for constructive work which exist for them."[42]

The FEC's renewed commitment to exile-related activities also implied a willingness to take full advantage of any operational enhance-ments made possible by either the diplomatic "thaw" or de-Stalinization. Internal FEER memos from 1956 called for a post-thaw "recasting of FEER activities and organizations."[43] Effective counter-penetration behind the Iron Curtain crystallized as a real possibility, especially in Poland, where Stalinism's victim Władysław Gomułka returned to power as general secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party in October 1956. These prospects survived even the violent suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Soviet tanks in November 1956.[44] One of the most impactful ventures supported by the FEC resulted in the regular journeys back and forth across the Iron Curtain of young generations of Polish Catholic intellectuals, in whom the Christian Democrats of the SP instilled hope for assuring the continuity of Christian Democracy on Polish soil.[45] At the press conference that Karol Popiel gave in Paris in November 1956, it became clear that a new opening had appeared for starting conversations that had not been possible during the years of Stalinism. For this reason, as Idesbald Goddeeris has pointed out, start-ing in 1956, East-Central European exiles' "attitudes and expectations became much more stable."[46]

At last, the Iron Curtain could be pierced, and perhaps it could even be made fully permeable, in a more lasting sense. In their pursuit of their own program of organization-building across the Iron Curtain—a quintessential campaign of "counter-penetration"—the Christian Democrats made use of American funds channeled through the FEC. This overarching goal steered the Polish Christian Democrats' Cold War activism for a full decade, from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s. The apparent high standards of living and support for East-Central European well-being that visitors from behind the Iron Curtain encountered in the "West" made for a great story that Poles then took home with them and reported in the pages of the periodicals that they edited: *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Universal Weekly), *Więź* (Bond) and *Znak* (Sign).[47]

For the post-1956 travelers from Poland, the vast majority of whom were under the age of forty, this was a completely unique opportunity to gain exposure to the West, to make the acquaintance of the Catholic intellectual and political luminaries of Western Europe, and above all to serve as conduits between the Catholic worlds on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As such, Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK) members like Janusz Zabłocki or the future Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki became both witnesses and participants in the globalization of European Catholicism, but also in its progressive deconfessionalization, ecumenization and embrace of liberalism.[48] What began as a distinctly Christian Democratic project rapidly expanded into nothing less than a springboard for East-Central European participation in the revolutionary transformation that took place within the Catholic Church and Catholic culture and politics worldwide in the 1960s.[49]

The exiles of the SP made this possible by plugging the young intellectuals from Poland into transnational networks—some well-established, some nascent—that provided the cross-Iron Curtain travelers with a context for understanding a range of positions on the pressing questions of the day. In the spirit of the Catholic Church's own broadening horizons in the era of papal transition from Pius XII to John XXIII, the Christian Democratic exiles looked also to secular forums, where Catholic politicians had long been welcome at the table, but were hardly the only voices to be heard. FEER and WEOD budgets report over three-dozen such initiatives by name, but Stanisław Gebhardt, among others, has explained that this was but a fraction of the number of forums to which the SP dispatched its young charges from Poland, most of which were "off-book." The Americans themselves, then, were unaware of the specifics of many of the initiatives that they were funding.[50]

Since Western European organizations proved quick to claim credit for having invited the Poles—even when the exiles were handling the logistics and the Americans were footing the bill—it may be impossible to reconstruct a complete and exhaustive list. Likewise, the impact was iterative and self-perpetuating, to the extent that it becomes difficult to assign "credit" or "responsibility." In 1965, WEOD's Paris chief Eugene L. Metz summed up the story of Polish Catholic journalist and academic Jacek Woźniakowski, who had been able to travel to India the previous year for a global ecumenical congress, by saying, "Though we had nothing to do directly with his trip, it is only because of WEOD contributions to other East–West projects that Woźniakowski was able to participate in the Indian meeting."[51] Woźniakowski had, however, unknowingly been the beneficiary of FEC support when he traveled to Fribourg in 1964, thinking that the ultimate source of his sponsorship was the international Catholic NGO Pax Romana, while the funding in fact came from WEOD.[52]

That said, some of the initiatives left long paper trails. One of the first examples was the European Forum Alpbach.[53] Founded in Austria in 1945, the Alpbach Forum hosted annual workshops for civic-minded students and aspiring political activists in their twenties and thirties. Each summer, a hundred or so young men and women from across Western Europe gathered in the sunny Austrian Alps for a mix of political education, debate and community-building. The first Polish presence came in the summer of 1956. The Polish "thaw" had not yet happened, and it was in fact the Christian Democratic exiles themselves who showed up to the Tyrolian hills, for example: the young couple Franciszek and Teresa Gałązka, who had settled in Belgium; and Jerzy Łukaszewski, a Catholic University of Lublin lecturer whom a Ford Foundation grant had enabled to cross the Iron Curtain—permanently, as it turned out for the future rector of the Collège d'Europe in Bruges and Polish ambassador to France.[54]

Beginning the next year, the SP brought to the Österreichisches College in Alpbach not only fellow exiles, but a trailblazing group of visitors from behind the Iron Curtain. The FEC provided approximately $2000 every summer to finance the participation of ten or more East-Central Europeans in the forum, with Poles earmarked as the budgetary priority.[55] In addition to Austria, the SP organizers looked to the Lyon-based Semaines Sociales, founded in 1904 as a forum for Catholic social thought. The Semaines Sociales organizers received several thousand dollars each year to integrate East-Central European Christian Democrats into their program. Last but not least, the international

Catholic organization Pax Romana—founded in 1921 and based out of Fribourg, Switzerland—invited Poles selected by the SP (like Jacek Woźniakowski) to annual workshops across Europe, as well as in Accra and Manila.[56]

In the years of the Second Vatican Council, supported by the SP, WEOD worked directly with Pax Romana in an effort to create public "exchange programs" not only with Poland, but also Hungary, in the wake of its conclusion of a "partial agreement" with the Vatican in 1964.[57] WEOD's support made possible "the building up of a network of Catholic students in Eastern Europe who deal with one another and with Western based Catholic student groups." As WEOD's Eugene Metz assessed in 1965, thanks to FEC funding, "the work of Pax Romana has increased enormously in Eastern European Catholic student circles."[58] In the end, making the once-covert exchanges public enjoyed some initial success—five Poles and one Hungarian attended the 1965 meeting in Luxembourg under the program's auspices—but proved unsustainable once WEOD funding evaporated.[59] Although Poles remained influential in Pax Romana, and the Polish activist Ludwik Dembiński even served as its secretary-general from 1967 to 1971, the formal exchange program ended up abruptly in 1965.[60]

To systematize the counter-penetration project, Christian Democrats adopted a protocol for dealing with their prospective Western European "front" organizations. After making contact with groups like the Alpbach Forum or the Swiss-based Pax Romana, the SP leadership prepared—in consultation with the leadership of the Warsaw Catholic Intelligentsia Club, which communicated on behalf of the entire country's de-Stalinization-era Catholic intellectuals—lists of invitees. The Western European organization then prepared and mailed personalized letters of invitation to those individuals, guaranteeing coverage of fees and room and board. In practice, however, it was Stanisław Gebhardt, Konrad Sieniewicz and their colleagues who supplied these funds, earmarked from the FEC's "Paris Special Project"—either laundering them through Western European friends, or simply paying their Polish visitors in cash on arrival.[61]

Three categories of Polish Catholic intellectuals received these invitations. One group consisted of holdovers from interwar Christian Democracy—Popiel's former colleagues in the 1930s and 1940s—who were almost always denied permission to travel by Communist Poland's secret police, which controlled access to passports. The second group included senior members of the KIK movement—like *Tygodnik*

Powszechny editor Jerzy Turowicz or State Council member and MP Jerzy Zawieyski—who, either by rekindling prewar contacts or gaining seats in the parliament of Communist Poland (which gave them access to diplomatic passports), managed to insert themselves independently into transnational networks, without any reliance on the mediation of the SP.

But the priority target group for invitations to the West consisted of young activists profiled by the SP as having the greatest likelihood of blossoming into future Christian Democratic leaders. The SP chose especially those who had significant background in Catholic activism, like Mazowiecki and Zabłocki, both of whom had been Catholic activists since their teenage years. Beginning in 1957—a year in which thirty-one-year-old Zabłocki traveled to France while thirty-year-old Mazowiecki went to Austria—these men, and dozens of their generation and the generation preceding it, benefited regularly from the combined resources of the SP and FEC. In these elite circles, the Cold War meant above all the need for awareness-building in the Soviet Bloc as to the differences in everyday life to the west or the east of the Iron Curtain—in hopes of enacting evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change.[62]

These presumptive future Christian Democrats, however, almost uniformly disappointed their compatriots in exile. Most, like Mazowiecki, made no secret of the fact that they did not consider themselves to be Christian Democrats. Zabłocki turned gradually toward Christian Democracy in the mid-1960s, ultimately attempting at two separate points in the 1980s to launch a Christian Democratic political party in Communist Poland—only to see both efforts fail. And yet, he too was no Christian Democrat at the moment when the SP began investing in him: his background was that of a self-styled "Catholic socialist," a devotee of the French personalist philosophers Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, and he believed into the 1960s that Catholicism and Marxism could foment "revolution" together.[63]

In other words, the FEC funds came with no strings attached: the SP and its front organizations never required the arriving Poles to sign on a dotted line and pledge allegiance to Christian Democracy. There was a risk involved for the FEC and its agents on the ground—the exiles. In fact, many of those front organizations—like Pax Romana or the French Catholic journal *Esprit*—not only shared the non-partisan standing of Alpbach, but were in fact openly skeptical of Christian Democracy, often turning their guests from behind the Iron Curtain against the very political movement that had made it possible for them to gain exposure to the West in the first place.

And yet, even in the extreme cases when the Christian Democrats' guests turned against them, the long-term consequences were clear: the formation of a transnational network involving First, Second and even Third Worlds; a network of support that first allowed Poles from behind the Iron Curtain to play an active role in the global transformation of Roman Catholicism in the 1970s, and then call on the support of long-term partners in the West in the era of the Helsinki Accords; and the global advent of human rights-talk and the birth of the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland.[64] Already by 1965, Poland's Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs sought to host in Warsaw an international meeting of Catholic activists—for which Communist Poland's Office of Confessional Affairs initially even granted conditional approval—"to demonstrate to the country their international contacts with important Catholics and intellectual personnel from abroad."[65]

And yet, the geopolitical context complicates this story of Christian Democratic exiles' Cold War efforts to assure a future for Christian Democracy behind the Iron Curtain. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the story of Cold War geopolitics was no longer the de-Stalinization story of 1955–1956: in fact, de-Stalinization quickly faded into the background of the larger Cold War narrative, particularly in the face of the suppressed Hungarian Revolution, the Suez Crisis and the Sino-Soviet split. Rather, it was decolonization—as well as its corollary, the emerging discourse of international development in the Global South—that stepped into the void. In its late 1955 plan for revamping the DER, the FEC leadership laid out a genuinely global agenda for Exile Relations, with its base of operations now relocated to the global cultural crossroads of Paris: "the activities in Europe, Africa and the Near East can be better administered from the Paris office, while the New York office can pay greater attention to Latin America."[66]

Political Warfare in Latin America

It is crucial to understand the role played by Polish Christian Democratic exiles in facilitating contacts among Americans, Europeans and Catholic activists in the Global South. The FEC code for this work was "Offensive in the Free World"—modeled on containment, but focused on the organic work of elite formation, education and anti-Communist civil society-building. The CDUCE's Konrad Sieniewicz used his position as

European Christian Democratic delegate to the United Nations to pioneer the first intercontinental Christian Democratic cooperation already in 1952–1953—over the occasional indifference, or even objections, of Western Europe's Christian Democratic international, the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales.[67]

At Sieniewicz's behest, the CDUCE in 1953 began publishing a Spanish-language bulletin—*Información Democrática Cristiana*—alongside its existing regular output in English and in the national languages of East-Central Europe. His target audience were the various Christian Democratic parties of Latin America assembled—for all the singularities and differences in their respective national circumstances—beginning in 1949 in a transnational network called the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA, Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América), which had grown by 1958 to include representatives of sixteen different countries.[68] Sieniewicz's goal was twofold: to build intercontinental lines of Christian Democratic solidarity, and to make a substantive contribution to the anti-Communist side in the global Cold War. Justifying the East-Central European exiles' turn to Latin America, Sieniewicz wrote in 1955 to the NEI's French chair, "Our action will be a clear sign of the will and the power of our worldwide members to defend the peoples' right to live by the universal principles of natural law against atheism and Communist attacks."[69]

Western European Christian Democrats may have been of two minds, but CDUCE's FEC sponsors did not hide their delight in Sieniewicz's accomplishments. In 1955, Christian Democratic exiles were mentioned throughout the top FEC brass's correspondence as the most promising liaisons between "parties in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East."[70] When the FEC leadership defined the terms of FEER's recasting in the wake of the thaw, the exiles' contacts in Latin America were listed as a top priority asset for exploitation "to advance FEC objectives as far as the free and uncommitted world is concerned."[71] Given its position in the Western hemisphere, Latin America quickly became a priority—especially in the wake of the Cuban Revolution of 1959.[72]

From its inception, the CDUCE contended "that the cordial relations between the Union and Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe and Latin America provide unusual opportunities for intervention and joint action in the political warfare field."[73] In March 1956, FEC President Whitney Shephardson affirmed a place for the CDUCE at the

heart of the mission of FEER—namely, "to engage in projects which <u>may</u> contribute something to combatting communism in the uncommitted world, but (in the opinion of RFE [Radio Free Europe] and FEP [Free Europe Publications]) <u>will surely assist</u> in the performance of our main mission which is to help the captive nations to regain their freedom."[74]

For its part, the FEC leadership was convinced that it was Poles in particular, and specifically Polish exiles—since they hailed from a near-uniformly Catholic country that had experienced the evils of Communism first-hand—who were best poised to make contact with Latin American counterparts and attest, based on their own personal experience and the experience of colleagues who had rotted in prison throughout Stalinism, that Communists must be prevented at all costs from coming to power in Latin America as well. In response, aspiring Christian Democratic statesmen like Venezuela's Rafael Caldera unequivocally committed to finding "new solutions which will leave behind formulas proposed by Marxism."[75] In a 1961 memorandum that he personally presented to John F. Kennedy, the future two-time Venezuelan president laid out a vision for Latin American Christian Democracy, to be achieved in partnership with Americans and Europeans together:

> In the political sense the aims of Christian Democracy are to defend democracy as a basic value and to foster the dignity of man and his natural rights. In the social sense Christian Democracy proposes to reform the present structure in order to realize social justice. This calls for a wider distribution of income. From the economic point of view, the Christian Democrats insist on the urgency for economic development in our continent. At the same time they defend the responsibility of the state to initiate economic matters and to intervene in the crucial phases of economic life. However, they encourage increase of and respect for private initiative on the condition that it submits to the governing law, recognizes workers' rights and accepts social responsibilities.[76]

This is what long-time FEC handler John Foster Leich had described in 1955 as a "progressive but non-Marxist" approach.[77]

The lesson was simple: even though Latin American Christian Democrats' goals were not exactly in line with all of the priorities of US foreign policy, their commitment to anti-Communism was sufficient to earn them the full backing of the FEC and its proxies, the exiles of the SP. In a 1959 memo to the FEC's Edward McHale, the CDUCE leadership had argued that "the balance of power would be tipped by the

outcome of the current struggle in Latin America between the Christian Democratic movement favoring a free system, and the Communist movement, working for a totalitarian system." Since "all efforts should be made to expand the positive anti-Communist activities in Latin America"—the East-Central European exiles argued—the FEC had a responsibility to invest in their work, for "[o]ur Union, [which] in the decade of its activities in Latin America built a strong, intimate and comprehensive relationship with the growing and influential Chrisitan [sic!] Democratic movement, may be employed by FEC to help direct the development of political, social and economic ideas in that Continent."[78] By mid-way through the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the FEC's leadership could earnestly advocate for prioritizing as partners the Christian Democrats, as "one of the few progressive and democratic forces working hand in hand with the Alliance for Progress" in Latin America.[79]

Although Sieniewicz had blazed the trail in the early 1950s, by the 1960s the younger activists Janusz Śleszyński and Stanisław Gebhardt, a major figure in the International Union of Young Christian Democrats, had taken over. These two men ranked among the most sought-after political operatives in America's Cold War effort. As the FEC's George Truitt wrote to his superiors from Caracas in 1962, "I want to appeal to you to please, please let us make an offer to Gebhardt. There are tremendous things to be done in his area here."[80] In a direct appeal made the same month to FEC Executive Vice-President John H. Page, Truitt requested $9300 annually to support Gebhardt's installation in Lima as the FEC's permanent resident liaison with the Latin American Christian Democrats.[81] By 1965, division heads across the FEC's operations were recommending Gebhardt independently to Pax Romana and other international organizations looking to expand their operations with "Latin American projects."[82]

Even as the FEC was commending the Polish experts on Latin America to others, however, the FEC itself was backing away from its support of Christian Democratic globalism. In June, the FEC's overseas bureau chiefs were recalled to New York for a big meeting on the "reorganization of Free Europe's activities and budgets."[83] One of the results was sudden and calamitous cuts to support for the Polish exiles and their various projects. The figures are striking: at the height of this project's funding, fiscal year 1962, more than $132,000 in FEC money went to the Christian Democratic exiles' Cold War efforts; a mere three years later, this figure had dropped precipitously, to a meager $7200.[84]

Funding sources and priorities changed radically as a result of chang-ing priorities in the US foreign policy establishment. As the focus shifted from Berlin and Cuba to Indochina, the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis receded into the distance. Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963 and Nikita Khrushchev's ouster from power in 1964, Kennedy's successor Lyndon B. Johnson proved to be no great supporter of covert funding, pushing for détente in Europe and Latin America even as he dramatically increased the commitment of US forces and funds to the conflict in Vietnam.[85] Like the larger US–Latin American "Alliance for Progress," the FEC's Latin America-centered Offensive in the Free World remained active, but no longer a first-order priority.[86] In Europe, meanwhile—the traditional focus of FEC opera-tions—the leadership closed the WEOD altogether, effective 30 June 1965.[87] Clandestine political warfare on a global scale was giving way to a near-exclusive emphasis on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, as FEC ventures transitioned from CIA oversight to public funding. This was a major step toward the ultimate de-funding of the FEC in June 1971.[88]

As their old FEC handlers were progressively de-funded, the exiles of the SP turned increasingly to new projects. The London-based engineer Jerzy Kulczycki ran the Christian Democrats' new publish-ing house Odnowa; together with his wife Aleksandra, he established a bookstore in London that became his base of operations for an exten-sive project of book distribution behind the Iron Curtain, coordinated with the FEC's publishing operations specialist George Minden.[89] Meanwhile, Sieniewicz and Śleszyński sought other sources of support, while Stanisław Gebhardt went to work for the German-Italian Christian Democratic International Solidarity Fund.

This is, therefore, more than just a story of the internal workings of the FEC, or even its responses to changing priorities in the US for-eign policy establishment. The Cold War activities of Polish Christian Democratic exiles in the 1950s and 1960s hold one of the keys to explaining the transformation of Christian Democratic ideology in the mid-twentieth century—not simply in Western Europe, but on a global level. The example of Janusz Śleszyński, SP activist and CDUCE point-person for Latin America, is telling. To provide official cover for his work on the FEC's behalf in Chile and in Venezuela, Śleszyński named him-self president of the Center for Christian Democratic Action—effectively, a one-man show. He chose to print the following one-sentence motto

at the bottom of his organization's letterhead: "The progress of the Christian Democratic movement is the progress of the social revolution and the progress of integral democracy."[90]

The intended audience of this phrasing was Latin American, and Śleszyński's choice of vocabulary therefore reflected also Latin American priorities, realities and specific policy proposals. In seeking to reclaim the idea of "social revolution" from Marxism, Śleszyński was in fact drawing on the ideas of, among others, Rafael Caldera, whose works he helped to translate into English and distribute worldwide with the support of the FEC.[91] In 1961, Caldera had written that Christian Democrats

> believe that the world is ready for a profound transformation. We call it the revolution. Not a violent change, but a substantial and rapid change whose rhythm and direction will not be limited to the evolutionary process which we have had for some time. This revolution has to be one with world-wide influence that will confront Communism with a vigorous plan that is capable of winning the minds of the young and the hearts of the masses. It will be a Christian revolution whose final goal is the realization of justice as found in the Bible.[92]

Like Caldera, the Polish Christian Democrats recognized that Latin America was a continent with a widening rich–poor gap and ample contemporary experience of "social revolution" made violent—in Argentina, Cuba and elsewhere, personified and lionized in the almost mythological figure of Che Guevara.[93] To stand effectively against Marxists, Christian Democrats on this continent needed to reclaim "social revolution" by appropriating its vocabulary, de-fanging it and turning it into practical policy proposals. Śleszyński's vision for Latin America complemented the deconfessionalizing trends in Western European Christian Democracy, but above all it benefited from the uniquely East-Central European Christian Democratic experience of having offered Catholics behind the Iron Curtain a serious ideological alternative to Marxism—at least, until Moscow-backed regimes took that away.

The FEC's partnership with Christian Democrats was, therefore, more than the work of any one SP activist. As the vanguard of the CDUCE and the front-line for FEC initiatives, the Poles of the SP developed a sophisticated plan for promoting Christian Democracy worldwide by simultaneously targeting and acting in multiple regions across the globe. A 1959 CDUCE memo prepared for the FEC insisted that Latin

Americans should be supported, "for the cause of the CDUCE [goes hand in hand with] the cause of Christian Democratic *Latinoamericanos*, who are our staunchest supporters in the struggle for freedom and democracy in our own homelands."[94]

The bottom line, then, was a program of international—and, in fact, intercontinental—solidarity spearheaded by Christian Democratic exiles from behind the Iron Curtain. It began with an American Cold War agenda, but it very quickly expanded beyond that agenda. Stanisław Gebhardt, Konrad Sieniewicz, Janusz Śleszyński and their SP colleagues oversaw crucial and still too-little-understood transformations in the global agenda of Christian Democracy. All of this began with but a handful of incredibly industrious and productive Polish Christian Democratic exiles.

Notes

1. [Edward] McHale to [Archibald] Alexander, 30 September 1959, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL) Corporate Records, Box 161.1, 3, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA). The author gratefully acknowledges the Hoover Institution Library & Archives as an essential resource in the development of this text, with special thanks to director Eric Wakin and RFE/RL curator Anatol Shmelev. The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, staff or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution. The author thanks also the Christian Democratic protagonists who have generously offered their testimony and their time: Franciszek and Teresa Gałązka, Stanisław Gebhardt, Jerzy Kulczycki, Jan Kułakowski, Maciej Morawski, Stanisław August Morawski, and Anna Ossowska. Special thanks also to A. Ross Johnson and to Richard C. Rowson for their invaluable insight.

2. Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 2–3. For an FEC insider's perspective, see, e.g., Richard C. Rowson, "The American Commitment to Private International Political Communications: A View of Free Europe, Inc.," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 31 (1966): 458–472.

3. Quoted at Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 58; Katalin Kádár Lynn, "At War While at Peace: United States Cold War Policy and the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.," in *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee*, ed. Katalin Kádár Lynn (Saint Helena, CA: Helena History Press, 2013), 7–70, at 18; John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

4. This is a key conclusion of a ground-breaking new Polish-language monograph: Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*

w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej (1948–1954) (Warsaw-Gdańsk: IPN-KŚZpNP/Uniwersytet Gdański, 2016). English-language works by the same author hint at some of the deeper conclusions: see, e.g., Anna Mazurkiewicz, "'Join, or Die' – The Road to Cooperation among East European Exiled Political Leaders in the United States, 1949–1954," *Polish-American Studies* 69, no. 2 (2012): 5–43; Anna Mazurkiewicz, "'The Little U.N.' at 769 First Avenue, New York (1956–1963)," in *East-Central Europe in Exile*, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz, vol. II: *Transatlantic Identities* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2013), 227–246.

5. Brian F. Crisp, Daniel H. Levine and José E. Molina, "The Rise and Decline of COPEI in Venezuela," in *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 275–300, at 275–276.

6. For a concise chronology of the committee's various incarnations, see Richard H. Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010), 219–232.

7. Quoted in Lynn, "At War While at Peace," 25.

8. On the concept of "global Cold War," see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); "Purposes and Objectives of DER," 7 March 1955, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5.

9. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 218.

10. Idesbald Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations: Eastern European Participation in the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales," *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 11, no. 3 (2004): 383–400, at 383.

11. A. Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), 202–221.

12. See Jarosław Rabiński's chapter in this volume.

13. Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalisation of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006), 189–240, esp. 189–191.

14. See especially the 1954 profiles for Gebhardt and Śleszyński in: Stefan Kaczorowski to Konrad Sieniewicz, 8 July 1954, University Library of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin (hereafter BUKUL) Rkps 2004, 19–20.

15. Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations," 386; Ştefan Delureanu, "Les exilés de l'Europe centrale et orientale dans le mouvement européen d'inspiration chrétienne

1947–1965," in *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert—Christian Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe—La Démocratie chrétienne en Europe au XXe siècle*, ed. Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001), 720–736.

16. For an insider's perspective, see Stanisław Gebhardt's chapter in this volume; compare, e.g., Sławomir Łukasiewicz, *Third Europe: Polish Federalist Thought in the United States, 1940–1970s*, trans. Witold Zbirohowski-Kościa (Saint Helena, CA: Helena History Press, 2016), 88–93.

17. Anna Mazurkiewicz, "The Relationship between the Assembly of Captive European Nations and the Free Europe Committee in the Context of US Foreign Policy, 1950–1960," in *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee*, ed. Katalin Kádár Lynn (Saint Helena, CA: Helena History Press, 2013), 397–437.

18. George Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War within the Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 87; on the dilemmas of "integration" and "representation," see Michel Dumoulin and Idesbald Goddeeris, eds, *Intégration ou représentation? Les exilés polonais en Belgique et la construction européenne* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2005).

19. See, e.g., John Foster Leich, "Great Expectations: The National Councils in Exile, 1950–60," *The Polish Review* 35, nos. 3–4 (1990): 183–196, esp. at 185; Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityce z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej*, 170–178.

20. CDUCE, "Memorandum on the anti-Communist propaganda campaign," [n.d. – likely 1950], 1, Archives of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America (hereafter APIASA), New York, Karol Popiel Papers, Box 9.12; "Union Démocrate Chrétienne de l'Europe Centrale, 2020, 'P' Street N.W., Washington D.C." [n.d. – likely 1950], APIASA, Karol Popiel Papers, Box 9.12.

21. CDUCE, *With Christian Democracy toward Liberation and Justice for Men and Nations* (New York: CDUCE, n.d. [likely 1956]). Italics in the original.

22. Joseph [József] Közi-Horváth, "The Aims of the Christian Democratic Union," in *Christian Democracy in Central Europe: Achievements and Aspirations of the Christian Democratic Movement* (New York: Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, 1952), 5–8, at 6. Copy held in the August Edmond De Schryver Papers (ADS) 7.2.11/1, KADOC Research Center, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.

23. Konrad Sieniewicz to August Edmond De Schryver, 2 May 1952, ADS 7.2.11/1, KADOC; A.E. De Schryver to Konrad Sieniewicz, 27 May

1952, ADS 7.2.11/1, KADOC; Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations," 386–387.

24. John F. Leich to Frederick T. Merrill, 21 January 1955, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5; see also Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej*, 345–346.

25. McHale to Alexander, 30 September 1959, 3.

26. "Purposes and Objectives of DER," 2; Leich, "Great Expectations," 192–193.

27. Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 64.

28. For an overview of the financial dimension of these transitions, see Lynn, "At War While at Peace," 28.

29. [Bernard] Yarrow to [Whitney] Shephardson, 21 December 1955, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5, 6; Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 75–78; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 101–110.

30. "Purposes and Objectives of DER."

31. Free Europe Committee, Inc., *Budget Request, Fiscal Year 1962–1963, West European Operations Division*, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 358.3.

32. "Purposes and Objectives of DER," 2; Brian H. Smith, *The Catholic Church and Democracy in Chile and Peru* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).

33. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 2.

34. "Policy and Planning Statement on Exile, Émigré, and Ethnic Group Relations with the East European Regimes and People and with FEC Programs," 15 November 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 258.10, 2.

35. See Paweł Ziętara's chapter in this volume.

36. See, e.g., Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 101; Richard Aldrich, "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948–60," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 8, no. 1 (1997): 184–227.

37. West European Operations Division of Free Europe Committee, Inc., "Regular Budget, Fiscal Year 1961–1962, London, 27 October 1961," HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 358.3, i, 1.

38. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 3.

39. See, e.g., N.S. Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004–2007), III, 55–64.

40. "Statement of DER Post-Geneva Appraisal for Use in Exile Relations" [draft], 22 August 1955, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5, 3; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 241–244; Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting*

Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), 54, 70, 94, 112.

41. "Statement of DER Post-Geneva Appraisal for Use in Exile Relations" [draft], 22 August 1955, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5.

42. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 1.

43. "Recasting of FEER Activities and Organizations," 5 December 1956, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5.

44. Paweł Machcewicz, *Rebellious Satellite: Poland 1956*, trans. Maya Latynski (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 79–130; Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy*, 211–248.

45. Stanisław Gebhardt, "Sprawozdanie o sytuacji na emigracji przedstawione na Radzie SP na Wychodźstwie," 18–19 November 1956, APIASA, Karol Popiel Papers, Box 9.10.

46. Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations," 385.

47. Piotr H. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 127–198; Christina Manetti, "Sign of the Times: The Znak Circle and Catholic Intellectual Engagement in Communist Poland, 1945–1976," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1998, 263–375.

48. This is amply documented in Janusz Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, 4 vols (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2008–2013). For a more concise overview, see Piotr H. Kosicki, "After 1989: The Life and Death of the Catholic Third Way," *TLS – Times Literary Supplement*, 13 December 2013.

49. See, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki, "The Catholic 1968: Poland, *Aggiornamento*, and the Global Sixties" (forthcoming, 2018).

50. Interview with Richard C. Rowson, 23 September 2014.

51. E.L. Metz to M.F. Delgado, 25 January 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

52. See, e.g., George Strasser to E.L. Metz, 27 May 1964, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14; Jacek Woźniakowski to George Strasser, 21 December 1964, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

53. "Organizations and Publications supported by the Free Europe Committee," HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 189.5.

54. Interview with Franciszek (François) Gałązka, 21 February 2006; Ludovik Push to Edward McHale, 6 August 1956, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 142.8; CDUCE, "Report on the Participation of the

CDUCE Delegation in the European Forum in Alpbach, August 17–September 6, 1956," HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 142.8.

55. "Second Progress Report EW-A-4-61 (formerly EW-A-2-60), Alpbach Forum for East West Contacts Program, Date of Final Approval March 23 1960, $1925 (account #829.98 from 1960)," 14 March 1962, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.6.

56. Philippe Lécrivain, "Les Semaines sociales de France," in *Le Mouvement social catholique en France au XXe siècle*, ed. Denis Maugenest (Paris: Cerf, 1990), 151–165; Karsten Lehmann, *Religious NGOs in International Relations: The Construction of "the Religious" and "the Secular"* (London: Routledge, 2016), 120–162; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 218–256.

57. Árpád von Klimó, "Vatican II and Hungary," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 50–74, at 60–69.

58. Eugene L. Metz to George C. Minden, 3 December 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

59. George Strasser to Eugene Metz, 14 February 1963, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14; George Strasser to Eugene Metz, 24 January 1966, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

60. Ludwik Dembiński, "The General Secretary 'who came in from the cold,'" in *Mémoires engagées / Memorias comprometidas / Memories of committed persons*, ed. Michela Trisconi (Fribourg: Pax Romana ICMICA/MIIC, 1997), 89–98; Kosicki, "The Catholic 1968."

61. See the documentation gathered by the security apparatus of Communist Poland, e.g. in BU 0785/7, 1–289, Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej), Warsaw, Poland.

62. On the role of "evolutionary change" in other configurations of cross-Iron Curtain interactions, see, e.g., Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945–50* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), esp. 172–173.

63. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, esp. 218–302.

64. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 120–175.

65. George Strasser to Eugene Metz, 29 November 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14; "Ocena efektów politycznych kontaktów zagranicznych Katolików świeckich/PAX-ChSS-KIK [1967]," Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Records), Warsaw, UdSW/

WSiSO/89/204, 7; Piotr H. Kosicki, "*Caritas* across the Iron Curtain? Polish-German Reconciliation and the Bishops' Letter of 1965," *East European Politics and Societies* 23, no. 2 (2009): 213–243.

66. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 6.

67. Peter Van Kemseke calls this the "NEI's Eurocentrism." Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development*, 181; Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations," 396. Paradoxically, the Americans continued to push the CDUCE to integrate with the NEI even as the latter's reticence became clear: Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej*, 349–351.

68. Kirk A. Hawkins, "Sowing Ideas: Explaining the Origins of Christian Democratic Parties in Latin America," in *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 78–120, at 93, 106; Roberto Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, trans. Robert Royal (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 159–202.

69. Konrad Sieniewicz to Robert Bichet, 23 February 1955, quoted in Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development*, 180.

70. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 9.

71. "Recasting of FEER Activities and Organizations," 7.

72. Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development*, 278; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 269–271.

73. Yarrow to Shephardson, 21 December 1955, 9.

74. W.H. Shephardson to [Bernard] Yarrow, 27 March 1956, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 198.5, 2. Underlining in the original.

75. Rafael Caldera to John F. Kennedy, 16 December 1961, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 161.1, 3.

76. Caldera to Kennedy, 2; compare, e.g., Rafael Caldera, *Democracia cristiana y desarrollo* (Caracas: IFEDEC, 1964); Donald L. Herman, *Christian Democracy in Venezuela* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

77. Leich to Merrill, 21 January 1955.

78. CDUCE to Edward McHale, 7 October 1959, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 161.1, 2.

79. George Truitt to John H. Page, 18 October 1962, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 204.17.

80. George [Truitt] to John [H. Page], 22 October 1962, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 204.17.

81. Truitt to Page, 18 October 1962; Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations," 398–399.

82. Eugene L. Metz to P.T. Kuriakose, 27 January 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

83. Strasser to Metz, 2 June 1965.

84. FY 1960–FY 1965 Budgets, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 189.5; explained e.g. in John H. Page to Janusz Śleszyński, 26 April 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 258.9.

85. Lynn, "At War While at Peace," 57–60.

86. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, United States and the World*, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). I thank Antonio Varsori for his suggestion that I explore connections to the Alliance for Progress.

87. Eugene L. Metz to George Strasser, 17 February 1966, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 252.14.

88. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 78; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, 270–274; Lynn, "At War While at Peace," 59.

89. See Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska's chapter in this volume; Jerzy Kulczycki, *Atakować książką* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2016), 112–143; Alfred A. Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-funded Secret Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013); Paweł Sowiński, *Tajna dyplomacja: Książki emigracyjne w drodze do kraju 1956–1989* (Warsaw: Biblioteka WIĘZI, 2016).

90. See, e.g., Janusz Śleszyński to John Page, Jr., 7 April 1965, HIA RFE/RL Corporate Records, Box 258.9.

91. See, e.g., Rafael Caldera, *Latin America: Crucial Test for Christian Civilization* (New York: Center for Christian Democratic Action, 1963).

92. Caldera to Kennedy, 16 December 1961, 3.

93. See, e.g., Paulo Drinot, ed, *Che's Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1950s Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

94. CDUCE to McHale, 7 October 1959, 2.

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The Polish Section of the Belgian Christian Trade Union ACV/CSC

Idesbald Goddeeris

To date, studies of the history of Polish Christian Democrats in Belgium have focused on particular figures, such as Stefan Glaser and Jan Kułakowski.[1] This focus is not surprising. These individuals were waging a struggle against the Communist regime in power in their home country, or were involved in European integration and later Poland's entry into the European Union: all topics that over the past few decades have been in the spotlight of historical research. The focus on these intellectuals, however, has taken attention away from Christian Democratic activities that were at least as important and involved far more people, specifically those of the Polish Section of the Belgian General Christian Trade Union Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond/Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (ACV/CSC). These began in the first years after World War II, making the trade union section one of the most active Polish organizations in Europe in the period 1950 to 1980. This story of Polish émigré activity also accounts in large part for Belgium's explicit solidarity with the Solidarność (Solidarity) trade union movement born in Poland in August 1980. Moreover, these local trade unionist activities

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257

were also at the base of prominent individual careers, such that of Jan Kułakowski. He only became a real Europeanist in 1990, after spending many years as a global trade unionist with Christian roots.

These are all important reasons for a discussion of Polish Christian trade unionists in Belgium. This chapter will first focus on the late 1940s and early 1950s and examine the origins of their organization, the reasons for its creation and the nature of its importance. In the second section, the chapter will elaborate on the 1980s, demonstrating that the Polish section was one of the key actors behind solidarity campaigns with the Polish anti-Communist opposition. At the same time, however, it will also argue that the union neglected the issue of newly arrived Polish migrants and, perhaps to compensate, entirely directed its actions toward Poland itself.

THE FIRST YEARS OF POLISH CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONISM IN BELGIUM

In 1950, about 60,000 Poles lived in Belgium.[2] They formed quite a heterogeneous community, not only because a quarter were Jews living in isolation from their Catholic compatriots, but also because 30,000 Catholic Poles had already immigrated to Belgium before 1940 to work in the coalmines, whereas the others had arrived during or immediately after World War II. As a result, the postwar Polish diaspora in Belgium was divided by conflicts between generations, classes (peasants and miners versus intellectuals), regions, experiences and ideologies. The Polish Christian Democrats were one of the only groups that attempted to bridge these gaps. This was mainly due to the Christian trade union.

While Christian trade unions disappeared in neighboring countries (Germany 1933, France 1963, the Netherlands 1981) and only continued to exist—though mostly not as a separate organization, but instead as a part of a broader trade union movement—in some particular countries (such as Austria, Italy and Switzerland), the General Christian Trade Union ACV/CSC evolved into the biggest trade union in Belgium. It surpassed the socialist General Belgian Trade Union ABVV/FGTB by the end of the 1950s and belonged to a broader labor movement (the ACW/MOC, or General Christian Employees' Union) that included women and youth organizations and the health insurance organization LCM.

Immediately after World War II, both the socialist and the Christian trade unions began campaigning among migrants. The ACV/CSC,

however, was more successful. Its socialist counterpart had to tackle the division between Communists and revisionists, and migrants had particular reasons to opt for the Christian trade union. For example, the Italian Christian social and cultural association ACLI (Christian Association for Italian Workers Abroad), with which the ACV/CSC in January 1947 signed a cooperation agreement, successfully attracted Italian miners.[3] The Displaced Persons (DPs) from East-Central Europe also preferred Christian trade unionism, first and foremost because of their opposition to state socialism back in their own homeland. The first contacts, in mid-March, took place with Ukrainian DPs. A week later, Polish activists also contacted the ACV/CSC. With these Poles, the union signed an agreement in August 1947. At that time, it was also talking with Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Belarusians. At the end of the month, the ACV/CSC created a separate secretariat for migrants.[4]

The ACV/CSC's most important motives were to establish a foothold among migrants and to canvass for new members at the expense of the ABVV/FGTB. However, Belgian workers' interests remained primary. On the one hand, the ACV/CSC campaigned to limit migrant labor to the mining sector, so that migrants accordingly would not penetrate other labor sectors. On the other hand, they kept striving for control of new migration currents.[5] Importantly, the trade union's interest in the Poles did not arise earlier than the spring of 1947. This had something to do with the Italian cooperation agreement of January of that year, but was principally due to the arrival of East-Central European DPs in the Belgian mines. In January 1947, Belgium signed an agreement to recruit in German camps, and in April, the first DPs arrived.

The migrants themselves, in the case of the Poles, had different motives for collaboration with trade unions. They wanted to improve the living and working circumstances of miners and to build up an alternative to the Communist mobilization and repatriation campaigns. It is not entirely clear who made the first contacts with the ACV/CSC. Franciszek Gałązka, who in 1987 wrote an unpublished history of the Polish section of the ACV/CSC, states that Konrad Sieniewicz, one of the leading figures within the Polish Christian Democratic party SP (Stronnictwo Pracy, the Christian Labor Party), talked to ACV/CSC president August Cool during a visit to Belgium.[6] On the other hand, Edward Przesmycki, the consul in Belgium of the Polish exile government in London, initiated in March 1947 the creation of an umbrella organization, the Comité des Réfugiés Est-Européens (Committee of East European Refugees, Corest).

This organization included representatives of Poland, Ukraine and the three Baltic nations, and its declared goal was to defend the interests of displaced miners. In order to receive assistance in finding employment and accommodation, or in transferring family members, Corest also addressed itself on migrants' behalf to the Belgian trade unions, and possibly did so before Sieniewicz. Interestingly, Corest disappears from the sources afterwards. Undoubtedly, following the creation of migrant sections within the Belgian trade unions, it had lost its major reason for existence.[7]

The migrant mobilization within the ACV/CSC was channeled in sections defined by geographical or linguistic criteria. In November 1947, there were three of them—the Italian, Ukrainian and Polish-Baltic sections—and three more were being created: Russian, Hungarian and Yugoslav. Two Polish war refugees led the Polish-Baltic section. Franciszek Gałązka was in charge of the southern part of the country; Franciszek Krakowski of the north. Paid by the ACV/CSC, these men traveled across the country to recruit members and activists. They did this both via local meetings and via a proper trade union press. In June 1947, Jan Wroczyński in Châtelineau created a local paper, *Życie i Praca* (Life and Work), that however quickly disappeared after four issues. In November 1947, a new, now national, magazine was founded: *Przy Pracy* (At Work), a literal translation of the ACV/CSC magazine title *Au Travail*. The first issue was published in four languages (Polish, Russian, Ukrainian and German); later issues appeared only in Polish, with other migrant groups being addressed via other periodicals. *Przy Pracy* was a purely trade union magazine. In its first issue, it promised to write on seven subjects: the activities of the Christian trade union, social legislation, accommodation problems, answers to readers' letters with concrete questions, French and Dutch language courses, specific topics for Poles in Belgium and general trade unionist news.[8]

The Polish section of the ACV/CSC was soon aided by the Catholic Labor Youth (Robotnicza Młodzież Katolicka, RMK), a Polish youth organization created in 1947. Initially, the RMK had little to do with Christian trade unionism. The ACV/CSC archives do not hold any trace of contacts; likewise, *Myśli i Czyny* (Thoughts and Deeds), the RMK review, does not refer to Christian trade unions. The RMK should, therefore, rather be seen as an actor in the international Catholic youth movement. Its founder was Jacek Przygoda, the rector of the Polish Catholic Mission in Belgium, who wanted to spread Catholic faith

among the youth via the RMK.[9] Bernard Sheil, the Catholic Bishop of Chicago and Catholic Youth Organization (CYO) foreman, financed its paper.[10] Its first members were not unionists, nor even blue-collar workers (or their children), but instead students. Its seat was established at a student residence in Brussels. Its president was Sławomir Matza, who had been active in the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne in France. And its major source of inspiration was, much more than Christian trade unionism, Catholic philosophy and theology. The RMK very often referred to religious topics and called the realization of God's Kingdom on earth its most important objective.[11]

Still, the RMK wanted to reach the labor youth, too. Motivated by Przygoda, during their holidays its members went to mines in order to recruit new members and establish local branches. In this way, they came into contact with the DPs who, in 1947, had been recruited in German camps. Already in January 1948, Walenty Nowacki, a Polish priest in Liège, wrote that DPs in Liège accounted for the majority of the membership. As a result, there was a quick rapprochement between the RMK and the most important advocate of these DPs, the Christian trade union ACV/CSC. This alliance was confirmed by the election, in the summer of 1948, of a new presidium of the RMK, which was now led by the unionist Franciszek Gałązka. Already a few months earlier, in January, the unionist magazine *Przy Pracy* and the RMK periodical *Myśli i Czyny* began to collaborate. Whereas *Przy Pracy* appeared in 1947 as a stapled sheaf of stencils, from 1948 onwards it was properly printed and added as an appendix to *Myśli i Czyny*. The January 1948 issue not only contained a Polish translation of a text by ACV/CSC President August Cool, but also an editorial thanking the RMK for its material help and its cultural and promotional activities.[12]

All of these efforts obviously helped in the recruitment of new members. In November 1947, 615 Poles were affiliated to the Christian trade union. This is a lot in comparison with other Polish migrant organizations.[13] Moreover, this number kept rising in the following years. By the end of 1949, the Christian trade union counted 753 Poles and Balts, spread across fifty local branches. The Communist opponents even gave a slightly higher estimate of the following of the ACV/CSC. A representative of the Warsaw government asserted in April 1950 that 988 Poles were affiliated with the Christian trade union. This was just a bit more than the ABVV/FGTB, which counted 953 Poles among its members.[14] The socialist trade union, however, was far less concerned about

migrants. It did not have its own periodical or secretary for migrants, and it did not create national sections, but instead only subsections for East-Central European workers that were connected to the Belgian sections.[15]

Meanwhile, the ACV/CSC invested much more money in its migrant activities. During a strike, a migrant member of the ABVV/FGTB received an allowance of fifty Belgian francs (BEF) from the third day onwards, while a counterpart at the ACV/CSC was completely refunded from day one. The ACV/CSC also conducted more intensive propaganda. For example, a Polish worker who since 1945 had lived in Liège and was affiliated with the ABVV/FGTB, switched to the ACV/CSC in April 1949 because the latter was the only trade union present at a meeting for DPs. The ACV/CSC also received more support from different corners. Mining patronage allowed priests into the DPs' barracks; furthermore, according to the socialists, the Polish authorities in exile in Brussels favored the ACV/CSC, with which the government in exile in London clearly had more contact as well.[16]

The Association of Catholic Men (SMK), too, collaborated with the ACV/CSC. The SMK derived from the RMK. After Catholic Mission rector and RMK founder Jacek Przygoda's departure for the United States in early 1948, the RMK continued to exist under the presidency of the new Mission rector, but it must have died a slow and silent death. In April 1951, its aging members created a new association, now for adults. This SMK was led by Jakub Sobieski, a war refugee who already by 1945 had started, along with Przygoda, the Catholic paper *Głos Polski* (The Polish Voice), and in the following year established the Catholic Organizations (SK), an umbrella organization of prewar and postwar Catholic associations, to which trade unionists such as Franciszek Gałązka and Jan Kułakowski also belonged.

The SMK set up a wide range of activities, including sports tournaments, religious events, local celebrations, theater competitions, and lectures and seminars (often about Catholic themes, such as Polish saints and Christian values). Importantly, it was also one of the main driving forces behind the Polish education of migrants' children. While, in the first years after the war, education was one of the fields in which the gap between the prewar and wartime migrations was most apparent, the different anti-Communist groups of the Polish diaspora buried the hatchet in the early 1950s and created a new Catholic, independent network of Polish schools. In September 1952, they organized a conference with

representatives of the old and the new migrations, during which a CKS (Central School Committee; quickly renamed PMS—Polish School Mother) was created under the presidency of Count Tadeusz Plater-Zyberk. It consisted of the Polish Catholic Mission rector and other representatives of the prewar migration (e.g. Edward Pomorski), supporters of London (e.g. Plater-Zyberk) and their Christian Democratic opponents (e.g. Jan Kułakowski and the activists' wives Glaserowa and Gałązkowa-Chacińska).

This collaboration is exceptional. Polish migrants in France continued to have two networks of anti-Communist education: one that was funded by the government in exile in London, and one that was organized by the Union des Associations Catholiques Polonaises.[17] According to its own numbers, the PMS in Belgium had forty-six schools in 1955, which employed twenty-seven teachers and taught 1027 children.[18] In this way, the anti-Communist network was as large as the Polish consulate's.[19]

The Polish-Baltic section of the ACV/CSC was also restructured in the early 1950s. It was renamed the Polish section and received a new president: Bolesław Lachowski, a prewar migrant born into a Polish miner's family in Douai, France, in 1927. Lachowski arrived in Belgium when he was two years old. In the autumn of 1953, a new trade union magazine, *Polak na Obczyźnie* (The Pole Abroad) began to appear instead of *Głos Polski*, which had stopped being printed the year before. Although this new structure led to an increase in membership (in 1956 the Polish section numbered 1500 members), *Polak na Obczyźnie* halted operations in February 1958, replaced by a Belgian section in the French trade union journal *Nasza Praca* (whose editorial board Lachowski joined). However, in 1962, the local activist Tadek Oruba created a new local periodical, *Przyjaciel* (Friend). When *Nasza Praca* editor-in-chief Rudowski fell ill in the summer of 1965, leading to the end of *Nasza Praca*, *Przyjaciel* was transformed into *Praca* (Work), the new national review for Polish Christian trade unionists in Belgium.[20]

All of this led to a further rise in membership. While there was not an important influx of new Polish immigrants after 1950, the number of Polish ACV/CSC members continued to increase until the late 1960s.[21] In 1976, the Polish scholar R. Dzwonkowski even stated, based on unidentified oral sources, that the ACV/CSC and the ABVV/FGTB each had 3000 members.[22] Just as in previous decades, however, the ABVV/FGTB was far less active. Beginning in 1952, it published in a separate

Belgian section of the French socialist trade union periodical *Głos Pracy* (The Voice of Labor), and only in 1975 did it create its own Belgian monthly *Głos Pracy*, which was discontinued by 1979.[23] *Praca*, its Christian counterpart, met with the same fate in 1981.

Polish Christian Trade Unionists in Belgium React to Solidarność

The decline of the Polish unionist press around 1980 is remarkable because it happened at the apogee of the Polish crisis and the rise of Solidarność. Belgium was, after all, among the countries in which Solidarność was most widely and openly supported. Trade unions were closely involved in the campaign of solidarity with Solidarity. In particular, the ACV/CSC and other Christian social organizations were the most vocal advocates of the Polish trade unionists.

In the first months after August 1980, the Belgian trade union federations reacted with measured caution to the events in Poland, but gradually the ACV/CSC took a more explicit position. In December 1980, it hosted the first two Solidarność representatives in Belgium.[24] During a meeting on 27 January 1981, the ACV/CSC Polish section formulated a series of suggestions for the ACV/CSC leadership. These included not only the extension of material support, but also strategic planning, the creation of a special commission and the visit of an official delegation to Poland.[25] From 26 April to 2 May, an ACV/CSC delegation paid a visit to Poland.[26]

While the trade union organized logistical and moral support, the first material and humanitarian relief campaign was set up by other social organizations of the Christian pillar, such as the Boerenbond (Farmers' Union) and the Landelijke Gilde (Rural Guild). Together with the Red Cross and a number of Catholic organizations, they launched a campaign in May 1981 that succeeded in raising about 7 million BEF (roughly US$ 190,000), with which they were able to purchase 200 tons of food.[27]

The ACV/CSC did not lag far behind. In the summer of 1981, a number of local unions began a special campaign on Poland's behalf, for instance in Limburg (the mining region where a great number of Polish immigrants lived and worked).[28] Another such campaign was launched in Mechelen.[29] The national ACV/CSC federation concentrated on

political and moral support, such as exchanges of trade unionists and the purchase of printing presses.[30] Only when Lech Wałęsa called on all Western trade unions to send food aid to the Polish workers for the winter of 1981–1982 did the ACV/CSC decide to start a relief campaign.[31]

Though the campaign was taken by surprise by the proclamation of martial law on 13 December 1981, the ACV/CSC reacted immediately to this new development. Already by 15 December, it had decided to create a common front with the ABVV/FGTB, which had not taken any initiatives prior to December 1981, and to join forces in demonstrations. The two trade unions in the following days organized a nationwide five-minute strike, marches in Belgium's major cities and a series of petitions and protest telegrams to the Polish embassy.[32] In 1982, they continued undertaking a number of common initiatives, but with less regularity, for instance on the international solidarity days of 30 January, 31 August and 10 November.

Polish Christian trade unionists were also closely involved in solidarity campaigns, forming the backbone of a series of committees. The Solidarność Belgium Action Committee (Komitet Działania Solidarność Belgia), for instance, was the initiative of several active members of the Polish diaspora. A note by Polish officials in Brussels mentions Stanisław Kozanecki (NKWP—Main Committee of Free Poles in Belgium), Jan Kułakowski (World Confederation of Labor—WCL), Franciszek Gałązka and the further unknown J. Zawiewski (ChZWPwB—Christian Union of Free Poles in Belgium; Gałązka was also active in the Polish section of the Christian trade union ACV/CSC), Michał Kuczkiewicz (Forum) and Władysław Dehnel (PPS, the Polish Socialist Party, and SPK, the Association of Polish War Veterans).[33]

However, the ACV/CSC was the committee's major supporter. A first leaflet was signed by the Action Committee under the "provisional address of the Polish Section CSC, Rue de la Loi 121, Brussels."[34] The same was true for the Informational Office (Biuro Informacyjne), which was set up by Solidarność activists who found themselves abroad: Krystyna Ruchniewicz (one of the members of the Group of Delegates), Józef Przybylski (one of the signers of the Gdańsk Agreement) and Bolesław Mikołajczak (who had settled earlier in Belgium and was active within the Polish section of the ACV/CSC).[35] As with the Action Committee Solidarność Belgium, the Informational Office's seat was at the ACV/CSC's offices in Rue de la Loi 121. Moreover, the ACV/CSC, together with the international trade unions and the ABVV/FGTB, helped the Coordinating Office of Solidarność, which was founded in

July 1982 by Solidarność exiles (led by Jerzy Milewski), with its main office in Brussels. The ABVV/FGTB agreed to pay Milewski's first annual salary; the ACV/CSC paid the salary of another collaborator and provided the office with accommodations.[36]

Over the following years, this solidarity continued, although, just as before December 1981, it largely came from the Christian pillar. The Christian Women Workers (KAV), the ACW/MOC, the health insurance organization LCM and the trade union ACV/CSC contributed to a campaign that collected more than thirty million BEF (more than US$ 650,000).[37] This sum was enormous and can be compared to the funds that were raised in France, where twice the amount (eight million FRF or fifty-seven million BEF) had been collected among a population that was more than five times larger (more than fifty-three million versus just under ten million).

Moreover, Christian associations lay at the base of many more activities, from summer camps for Polish children to new fundraising campaigns. The ACV/CSC regularly offered financial and other aid to the banned Polish trade union. In September 1984, it started a more systematic collaboration and concluded a cooperation treaty with a local Solidarność branch in Lublin, inspired by the so-called *jumelages* in France. This development injected new energy into fundraising efforts. In the following months, several branches of the Christian workers' umbrella organization sold candles and keychains. In 1985, a National ACV/CSC Poland-Solidarność Commission was created in order to coordinate Belgian activities in support of the Polish union movement. In 1986, it initiated a campaign that later proved to be its main achievement: helping to organize summer camps for 2000 children from the Lublin province.[38] But the National ACV/CSC Poland-Solidarność Commission undertook many more initiatives. It organized several training days for Belgian unionists who were involved in support activities for Solidarność, supported the underground press in Lublin by delivering money on each trip to Poland, and coordinated food and drug transportation.

The support of the ACV/CSC for Solidarność was not surprising. The Christian trade union assigned a high level of priority to the Polish crisis as it was able to connect this to its own ideology. Solidarność was a trade union gaining mass support, working together with the Church and defending the interests of workers in a contested socialist society—there are not many better illustrations confirming the legitimacy

of the Christian Democratic trade union movement. Its solidarity with Solidarność also marked a degree of compensation for the greater involvement of the socialist trade union in the mobilization campaigns of the previous years, for example in efforts on behalf of Nicaragua and Chile.[39]

Another element that accounts for the great degree of solidarity is the role of Polish immigrants in Belgium in general, and of the Polish section at the ACV/CSC in particular. Led at the time by Tadek Oruba, the section was very active in the organization of support for Solidarność. Oruba regularly exerted pressure on the ACV/CSC, initiating many of its efforts. In January 1981, it was the Polish section that had formulated a series of suggestions for the ACV/CSC leadership, thereby kickstarting the collaboration.

In 1985, the National ACV/CSC Poland-Solidarność Commission was founded after a report by Oruba had pleaded for coordinated action. However, Oruba's greatest success was the coordination of convoys to Poland. In 1989, he made a list of all transports between 1982 and 1985 with which he had personally been involved. The figures for 1982 numbered nineteen; for 1983 there were eleven, six in 1984, and finally five in 1985.[40] The Polish section can thus be considered one of the motors driving ACV/CSC involvement, which partly explains the contrast with the ABVV/FGTB's lower profile. The socialist trade union had an East-Central European section led by a Pole, Władysław Dehnel, but showed less activity at the beginning of the 1980s. Its periodical, *Głos Pracy*, stopped appearing in 1979, and Dehnel himself died in 1986.[41]

Importantly, however, the Polish section, as well as the Christian trade union ACV/CSC in general, only focused on Poland and was far less interested in aiding newly arrived Polish migrants. The Polish crisis indeed led to a new migrant wave: as a consequence, between 6000 and 8000 Poles settled in Belgium.[42] Nevertheless, the Christian trade unionists did not pay much attention to these new immigrants. The ACV Polish section's journal *Praca* throughout the entirety of 1980 and 1981 dedicated only one article to this new group.[43] Still, in March 1983, the trade unionists in a report spoke in the conditional tense (*należałoby*) about collaboration with other migrant organizations to help these newly arrived Poles. Rather than take care of the newly arrived migrants, they concluded that: "It is proposed to attach to exit visas for individuals leaving for Belgium informational pamphlets concerning the current economic situation in Belgium, as well as difficulties encountered by potential candidates for immigration."[44]

In other words, the Polish section of the Christian trade union ACV/CSC wanted to keep Poles in Poland rather than to help them settle in Belgium. Only once in a while did its reports make mention of the new refugees. In October 1985, for instance, the Polish section considered setting up an information and social aid center for "the Poles and refugees from Brussels and the provinces."[45] However, this plan ultimately went unfulfilled. The Polish section entered into crisis mode and permanently talked about shifting responsibilities to the regional departments, about the need to revitalize or to rejuvenate itself, and of the necessity to re-launch the journal *Praca*.[46] It did not, discuss addressing or including the newly arrived Polish immigrants.

The ACV/CSC and its umbrella organization ACW/MOC also did not put the newly arrived migrants very high on the agenda. No references to Polish immigrants can be found in its archival boxes concerning Poland, or in its documents on migration issues. It seems that the massive campaign of solidarity with Poland may also have served as compensation for the neglect of newly arrived Polish migrants.

Conclusions

The Polish section of the Christian trade union ACV/CSC is one of the most important organizations of the postwar Polish diaspora, not only in Belgium but also more generally. It had a huge membership, continued to exist for several decades, published several periodicals and was a key agent in major activities, from the education of Polish children to solidarity with Solidarność. This was not only the result of the commitment of a number of activists, such as Franciszek Gałązka and Tadek Oruba, but also of a cocktail of interests that account for the continuing engagement of different partners. The ACV/CSC supported the Polish section because it wanted to tighten its grip on migrants—who, after all, were competing with its Belgian workers—while also competing with the socialist trade union. The Polish migrants themselves hoped to improve their living and working circumstances and wanted to spread the Christian Democratic ideology to which they adhered, all while fighting against Communism at home.

Their success was not absolute. For instance, the Polish section did not have an impact on the elites among Polish intellectuals or Belgian politicians. The most famous Polish Christian Democrat in Belgium, Stefan Glaser, scarcely appears in the sources on Christian trade

unionism. Another pivotal figure, Jan Kułakowski, initially does, but after the 1950s was much more active in international organizations than on the ground in Belgian mining regions. As a result, the flowering of Christian trade unionism did not result in an active and multidimensional Christian Democratic movement of Poles in Belgium.

Nor did Polish Christian Democrats influence Belgian policy toward Poland, in spite of the fact that the Belgian Foreign Ministry was in the hands of Christian Democrats, first Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb and from 17 December 1981 onwards Leo Tindemans. Belgium initially rejected the economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR that had been proposed by the United States, pleading for dialogue with Moscow and Warsaw, or at the very least an advanced Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe follow-up meeting to the Helsinki talks in Madrid.[47] It later imposed sanctions against Poland and the USSR, which went further than those of other European countries and were applied more strictly.

And yet, by the end of 1983, and especially after the general amnesty of July 1984, a breakthrough was visible. Several Polish ministers came to Belgium, and several Belgian colleagues returned the favor. It is true that relations were far from cordial, and in May 1985, Tindemans at the last minute canceled a visit to Poland because he had been refused a meeting with Polish opposition members and denied a visit to Popiełuszko's grave.[48] However, this had more to do with the pope's visit that very same month than with any impact of the Polish Christian trade unionists.

Notes

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2. Idesbald Goddeeris, *De Poolse migratie in België, 1945–1950: Politieke mobilisatie en sociale differentiatie* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2005); Idesbald Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska 1945–1950: Mobilizacja polityczna i podziały społeczne* (Warsaw: Semper, 2005).

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7. Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (hereafter PISM), London, A.11.E 717 (E. Przesmycki to London; Brussels, 14 October and 19 December 1947); PISM, A.11.E 718 (idem to idem; Brussels, 12 October 1947); *Wiadomości prasowe ZPUW* 3 (1 November 1947), 5.

8. PISM, A.11.E 717 ("Rapport de la réunion des prêtres belges et étrangers au siège de la CSC," 6 November 1947, 3, 14); Gałązka, *40 lat sekcji polskiej*, 9; *Przy Pracy* 1/1 (1947): 2.

9. Polish Catholic Mission, Brussels (hereafter PMK), Kubsz (K. Kubsz to A. Baraniak; Brussels, 4 January 1948) and *Myśli i Czyny* 1/1 (January 1948): 12.

10. PMK, Kubsz (K. Kubsz to his superior; Brussels, 5 April 1948); PISM, A.11.E 717 (M. Załęski to the Polish Foreign Ministry in London; Brussels, 18 June 1948). About Sheil's relation with Poland, see, e.g., *The Polish American Journal*, 14 July 1951, 15 January 1955, kept at PISM, A.11.E 1189.

11. Gałązka, *40 lat sekcji polskiej*, 10; *Myśli i Czyny* 1/1 (January 1948) and 1/10 (October 1948).

12. Gałązka, *40 lat sekcji polskiej*, 10–14; PMK, Kubsz (V. Nowacki to L. Glysters; s.l., January 1948); Centre d'Animation et de Recherche en Histoire Ouvrière et Populaire (CARHOP), Brussels, CSC Service Migrant 54 (section polonaise) and 59 ("L'action de la CSC en faveur des travailleurs migrants et réfugiés"); Coenen, *Les syndicats*, 142–143.

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18. State Archives of Belgium (SAB), Brussels, Litwiński 9 (T. Plater-Zyberk to L. Litwiński; Brussels, 1955) and 13 (Macierz Szkolna to L. Litwiński; Brussels, November 1956).

19. Idesbald Goddeeris, "Oświata polonijna w Belgii w pierwszych latach powojennych," *Dzieje Najnowsze* 37, no. 1 (2005): 79–92.

20. *Praca* 1/1 (July–August 1965); Gałązka, *40 lat sekcji polskiej*, 15–17, 20, 23–26.

21. Patrick Pasture and Jozef Mampuys, *In de ban van het getal: Ledenanalyse van het ACV 1900–1990* (Leuven: HIVA, 1990), 123.

22. Roman Dzwonkowski, "Polacy w Belgii w ostatnich pięćdziesięciu latach," *Studia Polonijne* no. 1 (1976): 7–25, at 18.

23. *Głos Pracy* no. 1 (1978): 1; Eva Schandevyl, "Het Brusselse vakbondswezen en de migranten/allochtonen: discours en syndicale structuren sinds de jaren 1970–1980," in *Politiek, taal, onderwijs en samenleving in beweging*, ed. Roel de Groof et al. (Brussels: VUB Press, 2005), 383–441.

24. Interviews with Franciszek Gałązka (28 November 2006) and Józef Przybylski (7 December 2006).

25. KADOC, Jef Houthuys papers, 223 (Note au Bureau journalier, 11 February 1981).

26. *De Volksmacht*, 37/19 (8 May 1981), 2; KADOC, Houthuys 223 (Kontakten met Solidarnosc Polen, 10 June 1981). The delegation consisted of Willy Peirens (National Secretary), Tadek Oruba (President of the Polish section), Jean-Marie Lepage (Secretary of the Federation of Charleroi), Willy Vijverman (President of the Federation of Food and Services) and Piet Van Tittelboom (Secretary of the Federation of Aalst).

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29. *Het Volk*, 22–23, 26 August 1981; 1, 7, 24 September 1981.
30. *De Volksmacht* 37, no. 37 (25 September 1981): 7; *Het Volk*, 16 December 1981.
31. *De Volksmacht* 37, no. 48 (11 December 1981): 6, 9.
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33. Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej (AIPN), BU 2602/22195, 57 (note from 13 December 1981).
34. AIPN BU 2602/22195, 65–66.
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37. *De Volksmacht* 38, no. 8 (19 February 1982): 11; *De Volksmacht* 38, no. 35 (10 September 1982): 9.
38. KADOC, DIB 32 (Notes and letters of 13 June 1985 and 9 April 1986).
39. Kim Christiaens and Idesbald Goddeeris, "Beyond Western European Idealism: A Comparative Perspective on the Transnational Scope of Belgian Solidarity Movements with Nicaragua, Poland and South Africa in the 1980s," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 632–655.
40. Interview with Tadek Oruba (28 November 2006).
41. Goddeeris, *De Poolse migratie*, 108; Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska*, 91–92; *Polak w Belgii* 41, no. 8 (August 1986).
42. More than 5000, according to AIPN BU 2602/22195, 38 (The situation of Poles making a living in Belgium before 4 December 1981); about 7000 according to AMSZ, DK 31/87, 35 Belgia (Let us act in solidarity both here and there: The Polish Section of the Christian Trade Unions CSC-ACV, Programme 1983–84; June 1983); and between 6000 and 8000, according to AIPN BU 003171/53/2 (codename "Pilica," J-16454), 131–132 (Cryptogram no. 4625, 11 May 1989). On the Solidarność migration in Belgium, see Idesbald Goddeeris, "Polska migracja w Belgii w

latach 1980," in *Za naszą i waszą Solidarność: Inicjatywy solidarnościowe z udziałem Polonii podejmowane na świecie (1980–1989)*, ed. Patryk Pleskot (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017).

43. *Praca* ceased to appear at the end of 1981. There was another journal, *Flash: Informatieblad van de Poolse afdeling ACV*, but I was only able to find three issues from 1985 (KADOC, Jan Germeys Papers, 5). The WCL, too, had a journal of the same name: *Flash*.

44. AMSZ, DK 31/87, 35 Belgia (report of meeting in Ter Nood, Overijse, 18–19 March 1983, 18 March, 9 pm).

45. KADOC, Robert D'hondt Papers, D50 ("Section Polonaise: Activités pour l'année sociale 1985–1986," in "Service des travailleurs migrants de la CSC: Plan de travail des sections nationales: Annexe à la note du STM du 08 October 1985").

46. The concern to include the youth was already widespread in the early 1980s. See, e.g., *Praca* no. 6 (1980), nos 4, 6 (1981).

47. Helene Sjursen, *The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis: International Relations in the Second Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 63.

48. AMSZ, "Raport polityczny Ambasady PRL w Brukseli za rok 1984, 8–16," in D IV 38/87, 1 Belgia 1984, Bg 242 and "Szyfrogram Nr. 1132/IV/5039, 19 October 1984," in Bg 21; "Szyfrogram Nr. 2010/II/2230, 3 May 1985," in D IV 12/88 w 1 Belgia 1985; "Ocena pracy Ambasady PRL w Brukseli za 1984 r.," in D IV 13/88 w 1 Belgia 1985, Bg 023.

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The Social Virtues of Christian Democracy, European and Polish: The Case of Jan Kułakowski

Leszek Jesień

It is truly pleasant to write about Jan Kułakowski. He was a good man, caring about others, engaged in the creation of the common good, a profoundly religious person, with a deep and sharp sense of humor—an ideal protagonist. At the same time, in writing the history of contemporary Europe, there is an undercurrent that pulls us toward deconstructing the continent's foundations, its positive basics, toward striving to find a positive side of the negative personalities, those excluded from the civilizational mainstream. Is this because this kind of story draws the contemporary European reader closer, engages him more intensely?

Jan Kułakowski made for an atypical Christian Democrat, with strong elements of the political left, and a passionate commitment to the pursuit of social justice, combined with—in his last years—his political participation in the liberal faction of the European Parliament, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Indeed, this was the multifaceted life that defined Kułakowski's unique blend of Social and Christian

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Democratic beliefs. The most important features of these, in his case, were a confessional openness that translated into social and political pluralism, predicated on a quest for dialogue with others as "persons." To the extent that Jan Kułakowski was a conservative at all, his conservatism was intrinsically connected with a permanent concern for the other: whoever happened to be a weaker participant in society, in life; in his immediate environment; or in the larger political communities of Poland on the one hand and Europe on the other.[1]

The Personality of a Trade Unionist

Jan Kułakowski was attached to a set of values that he described as "Christian" in his lifetime, considering them a just and important foundation for individual ethical behavior. Many of these seem quite simple: that one has to be honest and reliable; that one has to help the other, especially the weak and those in need. One has to contribute to the creation of common good and to support it—to see the individual, and to perceive each individual in the context of his own understanding of the world. In Kułakowski's mind, the ethical individual must of course define the meaning of his own life on his own individual terms, and yet this would be an impossible task without rooting in a community, without reference to the multitude of partners that make a community. The encounter between communities, which for Jan Kułakowski was a multifaceted experience of life, was an encounter between pluralisms: between individual experiences and broader cultures, varieties of points of view. In brief—one Christian religion, but many contemporary and temporal truths.

Jan Kułakowski was one of those true labor union leaders who understand their task as helping the weakest of the labor world. Today, this seems a somewhat forgotten language. Perhaps the unions do not act this way any longer, or just unwittingly contribute to this kind of vocabulary's retreat into oblivion. Yet Jan Kułakowski was this kind of labor activist: already in his youngest years, as a fledgling activist in his twenties, recently arrived in exile, he helped to organize the social and political life of Polish youth who happened to find their livelihoods in Belgium following the end of World War II. By the 1970s, already a high-ranking labor union official spending most of his time away from his comfortable home in Brussels, where the World Confederation of Labor (WCL) that he led was headquartered, Kułakowski traveled regularly to the remote

corners of the world. There, he frequently faced authoritarian regimes in order to negotiate the liberation of imprisoned activists: workers. He entered the murky offices of the local police officers and the locally powerful, including those who allegedly tore off fingernails and toenails personally, in order to try to convince them—with words, not bribes—to free imprisoned labor activists.

Naturally, Kułakowski carried with him the authority of an international confederation of labor unions based in Western Europe—the deconfessionalized successor to one of Europe's strongest traditional Catholic trade unions. He recalled interlocutors who threatened him physically in the course of his travels, perhaps playing with a pistol on the desk, while looking him straight in the eye. Yet, above all, his drive was to help those who were weaker in a double sense: not only workers, dispossessed as a social class, but also workers bereft of any possible democratic influence on the prospects of their countries. His was a philosophy of action predicated on restoring elemental political agency to an international social community existing in defiance of situations of immediate physical oppression.[2] This was true in South America, in Africa and later on also in the case of the Polish *Solidarność* (Solidarity) labor union.[3]

This was how Jan Kułakowski fell in love with Africa, where he traveled regularly and helped to establish labor unions and nurture a syndicalist culture. As a Polish citizen, and thus an émigré from a country without any modern overseas colonial adventures (in the sense of the European great powers' overseas empires), he was more credible for his African partners than any of his colleagues from the labor offices headquartered in colonial powers such as Britain or France.[4] When he argued for establishment of local labor unions, he maintained that they should not close their establishments to one another locally. On the contrary—they should cooperate, also on the international level. Therein lies the crucial link between Kułakowski's trade unionist vocation and his life-long, self-styled politics as a Christian Democrat: that international cooperation constitutes a positive answer to the challenges of the contemporary world around us.[5]

Helping labor unions around the world became his natural habitus. Hence, when in the early 1980s the labor union NSZZ Solidarność was created in Communist Poland—growing into a 10-million-strong massive social movement of protest against the Communist attempt at monopolizing social power—Kułakowski naturally became one of its key international and European spokespersons. Consequently, when in

December 1981, Polish Communists introduced martial law and banned Solidarność as both a labor union and a social movement, the Brussels home of Jan Kułakowski and Zofia Kułakowska, his wife and companion, in fact became a local center for meetings of Solidarność activists continuing their work abroad, independently of the important activities of the Brussels Coordination Bureau of Solidarność.[6]

Jan Kułakowski's early interest in the labor unions began in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when Kułakowski—born in 1930—was still a teenager. His new émigré home in Western Europe played host to a proliferation of new concepts of organization for the postwar labor world, experimenting with different corporatist visions. In the corporatist spirit of interwar and wartime Catholic social thought, many representatives of the organized world of labor joined forces with the organized world of employers to negotiate with governments fair shares of the common good. The cusp of the 1940s and 1950s was thus an unprecedented moment of opportunity for labor circles in Western Europe, where management and labor alike could directly take part in governing their countries.[7]

This kind of recipe for engagement in public life came to Jan Kułakowski while observing the needs of his compatriots, the young workers, employed in factories in Belgium just after the war. He came to the conclusion that they desperately needed to self-organize, for a number of different reasons. First of all, they were workers, thus the weaker partners of the industrial world. Second, they were frequently immigrants, thus the newest and weakest citizens of their adopted countries, new also to themselves. Third, in the vast majority, they were Catholics—like Kułakowski himself. He sought any practical help in positioning their localized worlds within the emerging larger structures of the postwar European social order; this, in turn, led him not only to classically defined trade unionism, but also to local parishes and to party politics. In his twenties, Kułakowski became a youth organizer and significant player in the émigré world of Karol Popiel's Polish Christian Labor Party, helping to organize and shepherd cross-Iron Curtain visits by the men and women of the post-Stalinist Catholic intelligentsia of Communist Poland.[8] Jan Kułakowski, Christian Democrat, social organizer, Catholic, thus began his vocation by building from the ground up: in the world of politics, communities of politically informed and engaged travelers from behind the Iron Curtain; in the world of labor, chapters of Christian

unions concentrated in neighborhoods across Belgium where young Polish émigré workers lived and struggled to find their place in a new environment.[9]

Negotiations with the European Union

In fact, Jan Kułakowski's adventure with European integration had only just begun when he confronted its corporatist venue in its fledgling stages, in the early 1950s.[10] Himself a representative of the world of labor, Kułakowski took an active part in the very early discussions on the overall shape of the European integration process. Hence, it is without surprise that we learn of his participation in the early negotiations that ultimately led to creation of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). As early as 1957—the year of the European Economic Community's chartering in Rome—the EESC, comprising representatives of workers, employers and various other social interest groups, delivered opinions on the course of European integration for the sake of the European Communities' institutions, based on the Rome treaties. The EESC's continuing task today is consequently to deliver advice for the European Union's (EU's) institutions, and it constitutes a key part of what has gradually started to be called the European social model.[11]

The beginnings of the European integration process came in an era when quite deep divisions among various streams of the labor movement—divisions based on their respective ideologies or confessions—still persisted and dominated their mutual relations.[12] Hence, it proved to be an extremely interesting experiment when an informal group named Perraudin was set up in Brussels. It allowed the participation of all kinds of unionist talent, with the exception of those directly involved with totalitarian Communist regimes; the goal was a free and spontaneous discussion on the future development of the labor world. Representatives of various camps in the labor world met there, from the socialist camp as well as the Christian one. Delegates came from various countries—Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Italy—thus bringing with them different particularities and specificities, which proved to be extremely useful in those early years of European integration. The Perraudin group was set up by none other than Jan Kułakowski from the Christian labor union and Teo Rasschaert from the Belgian socialist side of labor.[13]

It was said of Jan Kułakowski that he was not overly concerned with the details.[14] Still, this would not explain well his long-time, multi-term career at the very top of the international Christian confederation of labor unions—quite the bureaucracy. Kułakowski regarded the details of his work from a particular angle, carefully choosing those that he considered truly worthy of his full and undivided attention. All the rest, including those necessary for the continued functioning of organizational detail, he delegated to his colleagues and co-workers.

He had a particular gift for singling out the crucial elements of complex realities and concentrating on them, while managing to perfection the details of the most important issues. This proved to be an indispensable approach in the years of Poland's accession negotiations with the EU, which he led for four years, from 1998 to 2001. Kułakowski was no novice in this domain, having returned to Poland full-time in the early 1990s at the request of his long-time friend—then prime minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki—to man Poland's diplomatic mission to the European Communities. By the end of the decade, Kułakowski was thus well-equipped and well-known among his diplomatic partners for his practical, issue-based approach predicated on problem solving. It proved exactly suited to the most difficult moments of the accession negotiations.[15] To give an example, in one of the cases of tough negotiations concerning telecommunications, Kułakowski mastered details of the portfolio from the level of technical nuts-and-bolts of the cellular telecommunications in the country, down to the fine-grained history of investments of the Swedish company Ericsson in Poland. The key to solving the problem lay in determining the long-term consequences of any decision between the governments of Poland and Sweden, and yet this bilateral issue was entangled as an integral part of the accession negotiations with the EU. The negotiating battle concluded with a win for both sides, based on an optimal balancing act between thoroughly mastered technical details and a general picture involving both economic and political aspects of the game.[16]

During Poland's EU accession negotiations, Kułakowski was highly valued as a partner for his tactful and careful drive for compromise. This indeed is an essential part of any successful negotiating portfolio which, by definition, might otherwise tend to concentrate on differences rather than commonalities, on self-interest rather than common good, on particularities rather than larger common patterns. Hence, he was regarded as the one able to strike the right balance between the technical

detail necessary for any legal solution on the one hand, and a general vision and an ability to see the overall future direction of the process of European integration and the EU's enlargement to the east.[17]

Christian Democratic Unions

The Christian Democratic commitments of Jan Kułakowski were a multifaceted phenomenon. Undoubtedly, he was gifted with a very deep religious faith. And his religious beliefs—stemming from the personalist approach, and in particular from readings of Jacques Maritain, very much appreciated by him—were steady and strong. Those allowed him to peacefully and convincingly see and talk to the other: an agnostic, an atheist, man of the left, a materialist or a man of other convictions. The very basis for Kułakowski's approach to these relations was unconditional respect for his partner in dialogue, regardless of his race, social origin or religious beliefs.

The link between Christian Democracy and the political left has become crucial for understanding relations between the labor unions of different origins: social democratic and Christian. Jan Kułakowski began his professional activity in the Christian labor unions. Indeed, he concluded his trade unionist career as the secretary-general of the WCL, the organization that actually forged both streams of labor activism at the global level into one. He was elected to this top function for three consecutive terms in the years 1977–1989.

According to Jan Kułakowski, this process of negotiating the space between the social democratic stream of trade unionism, and the one of Christian roots, was possible because of their ideological convergence toward one another. Following World War II, the unions of socialist provenance gradually dropped their Marxist conceptual roots, considered prior to 1939 as an indispensable element of their existence and activities. At the same time, the Christian labor unions—following the long historical arc from Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum novarum*, outlining the basic rights of workers to safe work and fair wages, all the way through the proceedings of the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s—progressively opened themselves up to cooperation with the other unions. Both sides began to see and appreciate their fundamental role and task, that is, to focus attention on the working conditions and pay of their core members, the workers. In the process, Christian unions deconfessionalized themselves, surrendering traditional

confessional labels in favor of a secular, pluralist approach. This shift proved deeply formative and evocative for Kułakowski's personal convictions and his public ethics.

An essential element that contributed as a catalyst to this common cooperation was the process of European integration. What started as the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952, and evolved later into the European Economic Community of 1957, gradually contributed to bearing concrete economic and political fruits. And thus, for Western Europe, the golden era of the postwar crystallized. The leaderships on both sides of the labor union divide recognized the importance of these developments that were taking place around them, and they strove to enhance the meaning and importance of their unions on both the European and global levels. They wanted to influence the shape and dynamics of the European integration process, focusing especially on the kinds of solutions that would have been beneficial for the world of work.[18]

Jan Kułakowski's early work with the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions—so named until it was deconfessionalized in the 1960s, and rechristened the WCL—was mainly about practical help for young, Catholic émigrés. Thus, initially, the basic activity was not really about defending their workers' rights, but indeed about helping them to find their way in a foreign environment. This meant, above all, practical education and the social integration of young men and women largely lost in a new social fabric.

The initial driving force behind Kułakowski's involvement in the local Christian labor unions was his social proximity to the workers and his religious beliefs. Over time, the classic representation and defense of interests took over as a primary driver—initially, of workers against their employers, but subsequently as a broader picture of the interests of the world of employment against the state. This latest push for union interests against the state was generally helped by a singular ideological affinity between the Christian labor union leadership and the transnational ascendancy of Christian Democratic politicians across Western Europe during the first decades following World War II.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the power of labor union activists—particularly in Belgium and West Germany—was incomparably great by today's standards of political life. Jan Kułakowski himself once recalled that, although union leaders agreed to be invited to the offices of prime

ministers, chancellors and kings, they successfully insisted on receiving mere ministers in their own offices, on the premises of labor unions.[19] He recalled, for example, that he did not appreciate it when the famous President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, was late for a meeting. Kułakowski threatened to leave the office and not to wait any longer, because—he had argued—he was representing the all-meaningful world of work, for which even the most eminent statesmen must show respect.[20]

Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the power of labor unions—Christian and social democratic alike—progressively and substantially weakened across most of the world, even though unions helped to bring down Communism behind the Iron Curtain. It seems that there is a key to Kułakowski's success in the world of unions, first Christian Democratic, and later united with the social democratic stream. This key seems to be equally valid for his successes in times of practicing diplomacy and international negotiations. The key was his commitment to understanding and dialoguing with his counterparts on terms familiar to them, respecting the other over and against what could often be radical differences. Jan Kułakowski recalled once that, when he had wanted to understand his deeply atheist union colleague Teo Rasschaert, he thought of this colleague momentarily in terms of his own strong Catholic faith.[21] This act of trying to identify with a partner in dialogue yielded results. Rasschaert was the representative of the Belgian socialist labor unions, but at the same time Kułakowski's partner in their common search for ways and means of uniting the labor movement.

This kind of unification was only possible thanks to a mutual acceptance of negotiation partners' respective beliefs and differences in ways of thinking. At each and every moment that those conditions were not fulfilled and attempts to take over one side by the other appeared, the common task of defending the interests of the workers could not suffice to maintain unity. That is why, perhaps, the labor movement remains so fragmented globally despite decades' worth of attempts at rapprochement and unification. An important element of relations between the two most important currents of labor was naturally their respective organizational power, resulting in part from sheer numbers of members. Here the Christian labor unions remained weaker, and thus more cautious, in the process of labor unification.[22]

A Christian Democracy that Remains Open

A defining key to Jan Kułakowski's openness in his political and labor union activities was his openness in terms of personally practiced religion. He referred to himself as a Catholic, but not a zealot. And he openly criticized those segments of Christianity that—in his opinion—did not strive to enter into dialogue with one another. He considered, as a consequence, that the essence of what German theologian Karl Rahner called "open Catholicism," and perhaps more broadly, the openness of any religious belief, remains a personal sense of being.[23] This Kułakowski considered to be a position of individual and personal openness, strong in itself, toward a conversation and dialogue on the essence of things with other human persons, even those holding different religious beliefs. In this respect, Kułakowski was philosophically much closer, for example, to his long-time "open Catholic" friend Tadeusz Mazowiecki than to the political ideologies of the Western European Christian Democrats with whom he rubbed shoulders professionally for decades.[24]

Jan Kułakowski's ethical reflections on the role of religion in dialogue stemmed from a recognition of difference between two axes. One is a faith commitment, the individual's conviction that God exists, while the other is a cultural commitment—the conviction of Christianity's importance for society, its heritage in culture and politics. He went so far as to claim that "not every Christian Democrat has to be a religious person, and not every religious person has to be a Christian Democrat."[25]

This sentence requires clarification. In its first part, Kułakowski seems to say that to be a Christian Democrat requires acknowledgment of the importance of Christianity in the public sphere, and an embrace of its presence there. In the second part, meanwhile, he demands acknowledgment and acceptance of the social and public activities of a religious person, whose acts and activities have to be derived from his religion. Indeed, Jan Kułakowski protested strongly against the equation of religion with civic or national identity, rooted for example in interwar Polish claims of an equation between "Catholic" and "Polish" identity (the *Polak-katolik*). Consequently, Kułakowski protested plans for a "Christian Europe," that is, a European integration process modeled on a confessional paradigm, even if—as also witnessed by his own biography—he embraced the process's origins in the work of Christian Democratic politicians like Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman or Alcide De Gasperi.[26]

At the same time, Kułakowski always insisted that other political families had taken part as well in designing the process and setting up its objectives, most prominently the liberal Jean Monnet and the social democrat Paul-Henri Spaak. With this claim, he strongly protested the idea of any one ideology monopolizing claims upon the origins, development and heritage of this broad political project, even if it were in singular conformity with the political ideology of, say, Christian Democracy.[27] The reason for such a public stance, according to Jan Kułakowski, was simple indeed. Any "Christian" element in public endeavors should come through the totality of the individual activity of a deeply religious person. In other words, any presumptively Christian Democratic aspect of public life should be visible in reference to the public commitments and activities of individual religious persons who practice their ethics in public life, in accordance with their own beliefs. This should be successful, as Kułakowski believed, thanks to the openness of any public activity to dilemmas and uncertainties natural for all people, which should be only natural for an intellectually and emotionally honest person. This kind of approach to public life, according to Kułakowski, has to embrace a deep respect for any participant in social life.

In the contemporary Polish and European contexts, there seems to appear a special meaning for Jan Kułakowski's conviction that an institution should "deconfessionalize" its own Christian particularity by removing the cross from its own displays. Naturally, he strongly protested against any administrative ban on displaying the cross. Yet, in the case of the Christian union that he himself managed, he introduced a rule of individual, not organizational, conscience. If anyone wanted to display the cross on the walls of his office, he could do so freely. Yet the Christian unions under his leadership did not follow a universal practice of displaying the cross. This policy stemmed from Kułakowski's conviction that the public sphere should be acceptable for everybody, also for those who happen to have other beliefs. In order to create this kind of inclusive public sphere, one has to accept that mutual acceptance of different beliefs is a precondition for all participation in public life. And it so happened that in the Christian labor unions under his leadership, alongside the practicing Christians, there were also atheists, Buddhists and agnostics.

Unsurprisingly, Jan Kułakowski considered it a great paradox of his life that, at times when in Poland citizens were fighting to be able to display the cross on the walls of their schools and offices in public, because

this indeed was forbidden by the Communists, he—himself a deeply believing Catholic—took care that Christian Democratic labor unions under his leadership to the west of the Iron Curtain maintained an open public sphere, one that would allow a broad pluralism of ideas.[28]

The basic assumption of Jan Kułakowski about Christian Democracy, but also about any other idea that coalesces into an ideological structure in political practice, was that any human creation by definition cannot be perfect. He protested very strongly against any projects of creating an imagined ideal society, "because man is not perfect."[29] With this, Jan Kułakowski, a socially engaged Christian Democrat, strove for a cautious approach to building any human institutions for this-worldly life, as those can only be imperfect by their very nature. This appeared to him as the only honest position for a person confronted with such an imperfect world. For a man of religion, it was to give his life as an example, so that his faith would emanate into his surroundings.

Notes

1. The main source of published information about the life and activities of Jan Kułakowski is an extended interview published in book form: Jan Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli: Polska, Europa, świat: Z Janem Kułakowskim rozmawia Leszek Jesień* (Warsaw: Rhetos, 2004); the French edition is: Jan Kułakowski, *Rencontre à Bagatela: Entretien avec Leszek Jesień* (Mons: Éditions Couleur, 2015).

2. Patrick Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d'une troisième voie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000).

3. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*, 3rd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

4. Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 510–516.

5. On the lessons of post-World War II Christian Democracy, see, e.g., *Schuman i jego Europa*, ed. Anna Radwan (Warsaw: Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana, 2015); Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

6. Idesbald Goddeeris, *Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych "Solidarności": Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ "Solidarność," 1982–1989, część 1*, online at

http://rok1989.pl/download/17/22876/Pis10MSZSolidarnosciczI.pdf, accessed 21 July 2015.

7. See, e.g., Leif Lewin, "The Rise and Decline of Corporatism: The Case of Sweden," *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (1994): 59–79.

8. See Paweł Ziętara's chapter in this volume.

9. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*.

10. See Idesbald Goddeeris's chapter in this volume.

11. European Commission, *Industrial Relations in Europe* (2000), online at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=1619&langId=en, accessed 5 January 2017.

12. Paul Misner, *Catholic Labour Movements in Europe: Social Thought and Action, 1914–1965* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015).

13. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 70–78; Patrick Pasture, "Jan Kułakowski: From Exile to International Trade Union Leader and Diplomat," in *Intégration ou représentation? Les exilés polonais en Belgique et la construction européenne*, ed. Michel Dumoulin and Idesbald Goddeeris (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2005), 99–120.

14. Maciej Popowski, *Alfabet brukselski* (Warsaw: Kurhaus, 2015).

15. Jan Kułakowski and Leszek Jesień, "Poland," in *The Accession Story: The EU from 15 to 25*, ed. George Vassiliou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

16. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 250–252.

17. Eneko Landaburu, "Preface," in Kułakowski, *Rencontre à Bagatela*.

18. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 43–84.

19. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 64–66.

20. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 116.

21. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 77.

22. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 84.

23. See, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 127–198, at 170–186.

24. See, e.g., Tadeusz Mazowiecki, "Mission et liberté des laïcs en pays socialiste," in *Mission et liberté des laïcs dans le monde*, by Georges Hourdin et al. (Paris: Cerf, 1964), 33–50.

25. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 160.

26. See Tiziana Di Maio's and Wiesław Bar's chapters in this volume.

27. See Wolfram Kaiser's and Patrick Pasture's chapters in this volume.

28. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 157–196.

29. Kułakowski, *Spotkania na Bagateli*, 172.

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Christian Democracy off the Bookshelf: The Case of Jerzy Kulczycki

Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska

A book is a real weapon—this was a favorite saying of Jerzy Kulczycki, the Polish-born London publisher and bookseller, when he talked about his work. A long-time player in the Communist-era Polish Christian Democratic party in exile, Kulczycki was convinced that the written word had the potential to take on political agency during the Cold War. Indeed, in his hands, the written words of others became an effective tool in forming opinions and shaping behaviors on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The life story of Jerzy Kulczycki reflects to a large extent the biographies of many other Polish émigrés who settled in the West after World War II. He was born in Lwów (today's L'viv) in 1931. His father—Zdzisław Kulczycki—was arrested and murdered by the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1940.[1] Together with his mother, Kulczycki was deported to Kazakhstan. Just like many other Poles displaced from the eastern parts of Poland or imprisoned in Soviet forced-labor camps, mother and son left the Soviet Union with the Polish Army following the Sikorski-Maiskii Agreement of July 1941.[2]

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After the war, Kulczycki settled in Great Britain. He graduated from a technical university and became an engineer, working in the Greater London Council, where he took charge of the traffic light system. He had the charisma of a social activist already as a university student; it was then that he became engaged in the political work of Polish émigrés in London. Jerzy Kulczycki joined the Stronnictwo Pracy (Christian Labor Party, SP)—a Christian Democratic party led by esteemed elder states-man Karol Popiel.[3] From 1963, Kulczycki and his wife Aleksandra ran the publishing house Odnowa (Renewal), which grew out of the SP. In 1972, he bought a bookstore named Orbis Books (London) Limited, which he and his wife subsequently grew into one of the most politically and intellectually influential institutions in the Polish diaspora. With these activities making progressively greater demands on his time over decades, Kulczycki ultimately abandoned his engineering career in the mid-1980s in favor of the social and political activism in which he persisted until his death in 2013.

THE MEANING OF THE SP

After World War II, the activists of the Polish Christian Labor Party who gathered around Karol Popiel stood out among other political parties for one reason above all: they accepted the post-Yalta order in Europe.[4] When Popiel chose to return to Poland in the summer of 1945 in an attempt to reconstitute the SP as an active, legal political party, the party fractured—both in exile and on Polish soil. Popiel was hardly alone among Polish émigré political leaders in facing the dilemmas created by the Allied leaders at Yalta—even more famous is the case of former Polish government-in-exile Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, leader of the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL).[5] Since independent political action on terms allowed by the new Communist regime in fact proved impossible, the SP leadership decided to suspend its activity in July 1946. Some of the members of the party leadership who felt threatened with repression decided to emigrate, returning to London, the center of Polish political life abroad. There, in 1945, the Foreign Committee of the Labor Party (Komitet Zagraniczny Stronnictwa Pracy) had started to operate (initially, in parallel with Popiel's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reactivate the SP on Polish soil). The leaders of the SP—similar to other Polish political parties in London—were convinced that Poland as an independent country could

legitimately be represented by the authorities in exile.[6] The SP's Foreign Committee recognized the party platform published before the war, in 1937. This same committee then criticized Popiel's return to Polish soil and the new program drafted there under his guidance, as well as the new governing bodies of the SP chosen in Poland in 1945. The SP had split.

After he ultimately returned into exile in 1947, Popiel gathered around him a devoted following of SP activists of different generations who did not accept the policy of the London party. Perhaps his most trusted co-worker was Konrad Sieniewicz, chosen as secretary-general in 1945 prior to the SP's cooptation in Communist Poland.[7] They created the "SP in Exile" (Stronnictwo Pracy na Wychodźstwie), predicated on the notion that the center of Polish life had to be located on Polish soil, and that the task of Polish public figures in exile was to devise means of shaping the future of public life in Poland. The political bodies functioning in exile were to maintain and strengthen contacts with the Polish homeland and to struggle against the ideological barriers erected by the Iron Curtain.

The SP started to cooperate with Western Europe's Christian Democratic parties in order to raise awareness and generate interest in the fate of Christian Democrats behind the emerging Iron Curtain. In 1947, SP members became active in the governing bodies of international Christian Democratic organizations such as Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (New International Teams), later playing a visible and significant role also in the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) and the World Union of Christian Democrats (WUCD).[8] SP contacts with other East-Central European parties belonging to the broadly understood Christian Democratic political family helped to lay the groundwork for the establishment in 1950 of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (CDUCE). Karol Popiel's SP became uniquely responsible for attracting and organizing younger generations of future Christian Democrats, brought together in the Union of Christian Social Youth Organizations, which operated in close coordination and with the support of SP circles in Great Britain, Belgium and France. As the official ranks of SP membership diminished with the passage of time, the representatives of the union played an increasingly active and prominent role within transnational and global political networks, including the International Union of Young Christian Democrats (IUYCD).[9]

The SP After De-Stalinization

The SP operated on the assumption that, in more favorable geopolitical conditions, Poland would regain its sovereignty, which in turn would allow the SP to return to Polish soil permanently and operate there legally once again. However, ideological pressures exerted by post-war Poland's Communist regime provoked a response from communities in Poland with ideological convictions overlapping with, but not identical to, Christian Democracy.[10] Under Stalinism, the infamous PAX Association under the leadership of ex-fascist Bolesław Piasecki achieved some success internationally by propagating its new ideology of "Catholic socialism."[11]

The year 1956, however, brought de-Stalinization, and with it, new opportunities for Polish Catholic activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In Communist Poland, with PAX weakened, personal relations between secular Catholic activists and the Church hierarchy were once again established and strengthened.[12] Meanwhile, in exile, the SP expanded the reach of a monthly bulletin entitled *Odnowa* (Renewal) that it had published since 1946—first in New York, then in Paris. Written for a Polish audience, *Odnowa* was smuggled into Poland throughout the sixteen years that it appeared in print.

As the SP expanded its portfolio and intensified its activities beginning in 1956, it doubled down in its reliance on one particular source of funding: the American-financed Free Europe Committee (FEC).[13] FEC sponsorship supported members of Popiel's Labor Party working within the structures of European and global Christian Democracy, as well as publication of *Odnowa*, provision of grants to invited (Catholic) visitors from Communist Poland and participation of Polish activists and young scholars in conferences.[14] The SP was so dependent on the FEC that progressive changes in the American organization's funding priorities starting in 1962 forced a reorganization of Polish exile operations. *Odnowa* was canceled, as it was seen to have become an ineffective undertaking.

The SP's focus shifted to Rome, to which Karol Popiel and Konrad Sieniewicz relocated their headquarters from Paris. Cooperation and reliance on Italian Christian Democracy—the strongest in Europe at the time—grew substantially. It was also a major boon to be in the vicinity of the Vatican. After 1956, the world capital of Roman Catholicism became an important destination for Polish clergy and Catholic activists from

the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs that had emerged in Poland following de-Stalinization, as well as Catholic journalists from the editorial offices of *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Universal Weekly), *Więź* (Bond) and *Znak* (Sign). The Second Vatican Council, inaugurated in 1962 by Pope John XXIII, provided an opportunity and a platform for these Polish activists—few if any of whom were Christian Democrats—to network with Catholic activists from around the world.[15] Their international travels were possible in many cases thanks to the funds from scholarships organized by the exiled SP activists.[16] One of the most active in this field was the Rome-based Stanisław August Morawski, who founded an organization together with Italian Christian Democrats called the Center for International Studies and Relations (Centro per gli Studi e le Relazioni Internazionali; abbreviated as the Centro Esperienze Internazionali, or the Center for International Experiences).[17] Morawski's goal was to exchange political, social and cultural knowledge among the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Latin America, Africa and Asia. Morawski organized and financed scholarships for thinkers, social entrepreneurs and activists—with a substantial number coming from Communist Poland.[18]

The Book Trade: A New Field of Play for Christian Democracy

And so Jerzy Kulczycki re-enters our story. It was at his initiative that the SP opened its own publishing house. When Jerzy Giedroyc[19]—the most important Polish émigré publisher, especially concerned with Polish political thought—refused to publish the memoirs of Karol Popiel in his Paris-based Instytut Literacki (Literary Institute), Kulczycki suggested to Popiel that the SP establish a new publishing house.[20] He already had some experience in this domain, as he had been responsible for publishing *Odnowa*. He was well-organized and had all necessary background to carry out a new financial venture.

London was not only the political center but also the heart of Polish émigré literature. The British capital already played host to important publishing houses of different profiles such Poets' and Painters' Press, the Polish Cultural Foundation, Veritas and Bolesław Świderski's publishing house.[21] Kulczycki appreciated their role in the life of "Polish

London." He was personally convinced that the written word could and should be a tool in the ideological dimension of the Cold War.

Here, too, the SP was drawing in part on the example and practice of the FEC. Kulczycki participated in different ways in the American Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain for a few years. Initially operated under FEC auspices, the CIA fully financed this program from the moment of its inception in 1956, as historian Alfred Reisch has documented. Later, other CIA front institutions were set up on its margins to operate in secret. These included the International Advisory Council (1970) and the International Literary Center (1975). Many books were distributed to selected individuals, libraries and research institutes.[22]

By 1958, direct SP contact with communities behind the Iron Curtain had already been well established. When they arrived in Western Europe, visitors from Poland—and later from other countries—were given books for free upon visiting certain bookstores, libraries or cultural centers. The program was run until 1989 (until 1991, in the case of the citizens of the Soviet Union). During that period, readers in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were given about ten million books and magazines. Poland, however, was the greatest beneficiary.

Kulczycki was a friend of the London publisher Andrzej Stypułkowski, who ran the Polonia Book Fund publishing house.[23] In 1959—at the FEC's behest—Stypułkowski organized book and magazine distribution to the participants of the World Festival of Youth and Students in Vienna. The event was attended by delegates from the entire Soviet Bloc. Kulczycki, together with a dozen other young Polish émigrés, actively aided Stypułkowski's efforts (with similar initiatives addressed to other participants in the Festival).[24] For example, he helped Stypułkowski to draft reports of the Polonia publishing house for American sponsors of the Book Distribution Program. Therefore, he already had a general idea about the horizons that the Book Distribution Program opened to Polish émigré publishers. The American organizers received privileged access to purchase from publishing houses portions of the print runs for certain books—depending upon the expected popularity of a given book, from a few dozen to several hundred copies. These copies were then sent behind the Iron Curtain or distributed in the West among the visitors from Communist countries. Obviously, the FEC could not be the only source of financing for a successful publishing house, but the Book

Distribution Program was a good starting point to undertake publishing activities and to establish contacts with potential readers.

The SP's publishing house was to issue Christian Democratic books intended mainly for readers back in Communist Poland. When the publishing house started operating, it also targeted the reader's market of Polish émigrés, so there was the added prospect of popularity and sales within the Polish diaspora in the West. Odnowa Limited was registered in 1961. Its shareholders were the principal leaders of Polish Christian Democracy in exile: Karol Popiel, Konrad Sieniewicz, Stanisław Gebhardt,[25] Seweryn Eustachiewicz,[26] Zbigniew Ossowski,[27] Janusz Śleszyński,[28] Józef Wiśniewski[29] and Kulczycki himself. They also became members of the press's editorial board. However, it was in fact Jerzy Kulczycki who was ultimately responsible for all publishing matters.

The Odnowa press debuted in 1964 with the Polish-language edition of Zbigniew Brzeziński's academic study *The Soviet Bloc*.[30] This, of course, was not a work devoted to the topic of Christian Democracy. Only a year later the Polish Christian Democrats began promoting their own political family, releasing the Polish translation of Italian Christian Democratic leader Amintore Fanfani's *History of Economic Doctrines from Antiquity through the Nineteenth Century*.[31] That book opened a series of publications devoted to Christian Democracy. Even though Fanfani's work focused on an important aspect of social life, Polish Catholic readers—regardless of whether they lived in exile or behind the Iron Curtain—did not show much interest in economic issues until the 1980s. In other words, the Fanfani edition fell short of expectations.[32]

Yet Odnowa's next Christian Democratic titles gained more popularity. One of the most important was the biography of Alcide De Gasperi, postwar prime minister, iconic Christin Democrat and a "founding father" of the process of European integration.[33] A few other publications of Odnowa were focused on the Catholic political philosophy close to Christian Democrats' hearts. Odnowa was, for example, the first to publish the Polish translations of German Catholic philosopher Josef Pieper's work on social justice and Henry Bars's intellectual biography of the great French Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain.[34] The publishing house also issued the writings of Robert Houben—a lawyer, academic lecturer and activist of the Flemish Christian People's Party (Christelijke Volkspartij) in Belgium. Houben—like many contemporaries—sought to interpret the political obligations of Catholics in light of a contemporary international system defined by

the Cold War and by deconfessionalization, all while wedding Christian ideals to democracy as the only system in which it would be possible to realize the humanistic ideal.[35]

However, more readers were interested in the publications by and/ or about important figures in Christian Democracy in Poland. These included three volumes by the SP's own Karol Popiel: in 1966, 1967 and (posthumously) 1978. These books were part autobiography, part homage to late or fallen friends, including wartime Polish prime minister General Władysław Sikorski, who perished under mysterious circumstances in a 1943 plane crash over Gibraltar.[36]

Odnowa's publications to some extent promoted the wartime achievements of Unia (Union), an underground organization established in Warsaw during the German occupation. In 1943, Unia and the SP merged, waging a clandestine struggle thereafter against the occupier as part of the Polish underground. Unia's co-founder was Jerzy Braun—published many times over as an author by Odnowa, including collections of his poetry as well as his philosophical tracts—while Konrad Sieniewicz served as a member of its governing bodies. Many of postwar Poland's top Catholic activists had worked together with the organization, including Jerzy Turowicz, the long-standing editor-in-chief of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and Karol Wojtyła, the future Pope John Paul II.[37] Unia became the ideological cornerstone of the short-lived attempt at reactivating Christian Democratic politics on Polish soil after World War II.

One of the wartime Unia leaders, Jan Hoppe, remained in Poland throughout the Stalinist period—as its prisoner, tortured and sentenced—only to become an important liaison with the SP in exile in the 1960s. Beginning in 1962, due to his health problems he visited Italy for a few years, which enabled him to become a cross-Iron Curtain living link for the SP. In 1981, twelve years after his death, Odnowa actually published Hoppe's memoirs under his own name, recounting his public activism before World War II as well as his role in the wartime underground.[38] The SP leaders also put out a tribute to Hoppe, co-written by Popiel, Sieniewicz and Braun. The authors produced a portrait of a great patriot who was guided by Christian ethics both in his private and his public life, who supported democracy and who respected the ideas of others.[39]

The Odnowa catalog remains an important source of documentation and testimony about the activities of East-Central European Christian

Democracy, both in the homeland and in exile—before 1939, during World War II, in the months preceding (in the Polish case) the party's 1945 reactivation and 1946–1947 cooptation by Communists and then throughout the Cold War period in exile. Odnowa books also cast into stark relief the dilemmas faced by an activist coming from Poland to the West, and the complex relationship that such activists cultivated of necessity with the Polish political emigration in the 1960s. Hoppe fiercely criticized the feeling of invincibility projected by some émigrés, who believed that "the worse the situation in Poland became, the better [for the interests of the political émigrés]." Seeing cynicism in this position, Hoppe refused to adopt a blanket line of joy in every failure of the Communist authorities, seeing that Communist failures in fact adversely impacted Polish society.[40]

The Unia testimony published by Odnowa extended also to the arts and culture. One important case was the memoir of Mieczysław Kotlarczyk, founder and director of the Rhapsodic Theater established in 1942 on the initiative of Unia.[41] This underground theater in Kraków, in the heart of the General Government, was intended to preserve and spread Polish culture. Indeed, it outlasted the German occupation: with the exception of the years 1953–1957, it operated until 1967, when it was permanently closed in view of the arguably anti-Communist content of its repertoire. Historians agree that this enterprise played a vital role in Polish history as a pioneering theater of the spoken word.

As its prominence grew, the Odnowa press assumed the additional role of information broker for the Catholic hierarchy in Poland. Jerzy Kulczycki declared himself a supporter of the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, whom he treated as a great authority figure. The émigré publisher had particular regard for the prelate's sermons, which he decided to collect and publish.[42] In 1976, Odnowa put into print a series of homilies given by the primate in 1973 and 1974 entitled *The Primacy of Man in the Social Order*.[43]

Wyszyński's sermons reframed Catholic social teaching for a singularly Polish context, exploring the relationship between the Church, the nation and the state. Those texts argued for Catholics' obligations to their homeland—in the case of Polish Catholics, the protection of Polish culture and respect for national history. The theology of the Polish nation elaborated by Primate Wyszyński found many followers, notably at the Catholic University of Lublin, where the theologian Reverend Czesław Bartnik inaugurated the 1981–1982 academic year with a lecture on the topic. This lecture appeared in print the next year, published

not in Lublin, but in London—by none other than Jerzy Kulczycki.[44] Most of the print run, however, was transferred to Communist Poland, and to Lublin in particular, to be distributed by the university bookstore.[45]

POLISH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

Amintore Fanfani's writings may not have found a ready audience in Communist Poland in the 1960s, but a decade later, the Odnowa press turned once again to core issues of the Christian Democratic program, with political economy at the forefront. In order to satisfy the readers in Poland looking to understand their country's recurrent economic problems, Kulczycki published a collection of articles by Jan Drewnowski.[46] An economist and a political columnist, Drewnowski emigrated from Poland in the 1970s, going on to a career as an academic lecturer at various Western universities. His analysis of the political and economic system of the Polish People's Republic was designed to translate the fine-grained detail of economics into a language accessible to Poles, to help them to understand the bankruptcy of Communist political economy. Drewnowski was convinced that political transformation and full independence were possible for Poland, on the condition that Polish political thought be revived and a release valve for social pressure created.[47]

Beyond the autobiographical writings of Popiel, Hoppe and other leaders from the SP old guard, Odnowa published only a few works concerning the contemporary agenda of Christian Democracy, and the SP in particular. At the tail end of the Cold War, Odnowa issued a pamphlet containing key manifestos of the existing Christian Democratic internationals: both European (EUCD) and global (WUCD).[48] At the time of their Polish-language publication in 1987, both documents were principally of historical value. The collection's editor was Konrad Sieniewicz, and he chose to include alongside EUCD and WUCD declarations also the SP program adopted during the only congress successfully held on Polish soil after World War II, in July 1945.

Inscribing the SP into the first Polish-language edition of key Christian Democratic international documents was no coincidence; rather, this was Sieniewicz's attempt at a blueprint for future political action in Poland. The pamphlet was published at a crucial turning point from the point of view of the political situation in the Polish People's Republic, with the late 1980s marked by growing economic crisis and

social lethargy. The Solidarity movement—underground since the intro-
duction of martial law in December 1981—had run aground, looking
for new forms of programmatic inspiration and activity.

In this context, drawing attention back to Christian Democracy was
Odnowa's way of trying to point Poland—then still Communist—
toward an important, internationally battle-tested program. In his open-
ing commentary to the 1987 pamphlet, Konrad Sieniewicz emphasized
the topicality of the published documents. He underlined that Catholic
social teaching's political applications were universal, while in Poland the
political utility of Christian Democracy would become apparent in light
of objective evaluation of the domestic reality and international situation
alike.[49] Sieniewicz highlighted the engagement of Christian Democrats—
including the exiles of the SP—in the European integration process.
This Polish Christian Democratic old guard was aware that, from the
point of view of Poles living behind the Iron Curtain, the Western
European model might well constitute an attractive political project. In
this context, Sieniewicz argued that Polish Christian Democracy had a
unique role to play in enforcing checks and balances on the dilution of
Catholicism's role in a united Europe. This is why Sieniewicz returned to
the SP's program from 1945: to revive an old concept of Jerzy Braun's,
that a federal union of East-Central European countries could serve as a
guarantor of future European unity.[50]

Christian Democracy and the Writing of Polish History

By the time that Kulczycki published Sieniewicz's collection, Odnowa
was a different institution relative to how it had begun in the 1960s. The
early 1970s brought fundamental changes in Kulczycki's activity, with a
serious focus on the writing of Polish history free of Communist cen-
sorship. In 1971, Odnowa published London-based historian Jan M.
Ciechanowski's controversial study of the Warsaw Uprising.[51] Polish émi-
grés living in London saw it as challenging the rationality of the Warsaw
Uprising, perhaps even the entire logic of the Polish Underground State
and the Home Army. Nonetheless, the book was appreciated by authori-
ties such as Józef Garliński and recognized as a well-documented work.
Odnowa thereby helped to reshape the emerging Polish narrative of
World War II and the German occupation of Poland.[52]

Before the book's official launch, Kulczycki had already taken steps to
generate wider interest. A few copies even went to Aleksander Skarżyński,

the head of Communist Poland's State Office of Confessional Affairs (Urząd do Spraw Wyznań).[53] Skarżyński himself had in fact published extensively on the Warsaw Uprising a few years before.[54] Kulczycki believed that, if an influential high official gave a positive review, official distribution—perhaps even re-publication—could be possible on Polish soil. However, the censors' proposed changes proved so extensive and serious that both author and publisher agreed that it was quite impossible to allow the publication of such an imperfect version. In the end, the book finally appeared in 1984, with a preface by Skarżyński, which was one of the conditions for the book being published at all.[55]

Ciechanowski's work opened a new chapter for Odnowa. From that moment on, the press's catalog included many publications by renowned historians. Among others, Jerzy Kulczycki published seven books by the aforementioned Józef Garliński—a historian, Home Army soldier and émigré politician connected to the Polish "Independence and Democracy" Freedom Movement (Polski Ruch Wolnościowy "Niepodległość i Demokracja," NiD).[56] These included memoirs like *Fighting Auschwitz*, which depicted the resistance movement in the German concentration camp at Auschwitz where the author himself had been imprisoned. Garliński's other Odnowa publications included a popular general history of Poland's role in World War II and a study of the de-cyphering by Poles of the German "Enigma" code.[57] Such publications were read beyond Poland and the Polish diaspora, making a serious contribution to the historiography of World War II—as attested by the issuing of English-language editions of Ciechanowski and Garliński.[58] Odnowa also printed Zbigniew Siemaszko's study—the first of its kind— of the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne), an underground military organization during World War II which was linked to National Democracy.[59] Finally, a series of memoirs by Jan Nowak—the long-standing head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe—turned out to be bestsellers.[60]

Catholic intellectuals from Poland, too, made it into the historical offerings of Odnowa. Due to the popularity of Stefan Kisielewski—one of the emblematic essayists of the journal *Tygodnik Powszechny*—Odnowa's publications of his writings from the 1970s proved a great success.[61] Kisielewski put his works in print with Odnowa in large part to reach out to readers abroad, reproducing for them many of his earlier writings from the columns of *Tygodnik Powszechny*. However, that three-volume testimony—a document of the social,

economic and political realities in Communist Poland—ultimately appealed to readers both in Poland and abroad.

Odnowa's Book Distribution

Odnowa's books were distributed through many channels. In the diaspora, the books sold according to the traditional route. For transfer across the Iron Curtain, however, Kulczycki relied initially on the FEC. In 1961, the novice émigré publisher established direct contact with Adam Rudzki, who was in charge of the Polish section of the American Book Distribution Program.[62] He proposed that Kulczycki's planned Polish edition of Zbigniew Brzeziński should be distributed under the program. This then became the model for most of Odnowa's subsequent publications. Kulczycki could count on the program's purchase of anything from a few dozen to a few hundred copies: Brzeziński's *Soviet Bloc* originally went to Poland in 300 copies, while Nowak's *Wojna w eterze* (War in the Ether) reached 1600 in total in the first edition.[63]

Important though the American program was, ultimately its numbers fell far short of overwhelming: more books were distributed through other channels. Already in the 1960s, the SP's governing bodies tried to find sponsors willing to support the distribution of books especially to Poland.[64] Thus Rome became an important center of Odnowa's book distribution plans.[65] Scholarship programs targeting visitors from behind the Iron Curtain were operated out of Rome by Stanisław August Morawski's Centro Esperienze Internazionali, as well as a new organization of a similar profile established in 1973, the Center for European Meetings and Studies (Centro Incontri e Studi Europei). Together with Morawski, this was an initiative by Wanda Gawrońska.[66] The J.S. Umiastowska Roman Foundation embraced many Catholic activists from Poland in the late 1970s and 1980s under the guidance of Stanisław August Morawski, its president.[67] For these Poles coming to Rome, visits to Morawski's offices with the intention of collecting books and magazines were a kind of Roman ritual.[68]

Odnowa's publications promoting Christian Democratic thought made an effort to meet the needs and satisfy the interest of Catholic activists in Poland. Nonetheless, their content did not always receive positive reviews. The publishing house was criticized for a dearth of titles bearing on new phenomena in the Church in the era of Vatican II, in relation to which even the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain

seemed rather old-fashioned. Some Polish readers living abroad also believed that Odnowa's books intentionally avoided too harsh a criticism of the Communist system, to avoid alienating Polish Catholic activists who were linked with the authorities.

Not all of Odnowa's books fit the profile of the American Book Distribution Program. Publications focused on the Catholic Church as an institution or on spiritual life more generally were not the focus of the program's organizers. The main argument was that the Church had its own distribution channels, while the needs and interests of readers behind the Iron Curtain were far wider. What is more, Catholic books represented a particular worldview.[69] Nevertheless, the offer of the Book Distribution Program for readers from Poland included many publications combining some religious, social and philosophical reflections, as well as analysis of the current situation in the Church.

Kulczycki personally deserves credit for this wide-ranging distribution, as it was his initiative to put Odnowa's titles, as well as those of the Parisian publishing house Éditions du Dialogue run by Polish Pallotine Fathers, on the list of the books recommended for distribution to readers in Communist Poland.[70] The contacts of the émigré Christian Democrats of the SP with Catholic communities in Poland served as solid arguments to have those books included. Important events in Rome such as the Second Vatican Council, synods of bishops or the beatification of Father Maximilian Kolbe in 1971 provided more opportunities for giving out the books. The Kolbe event witnessed the distribution of about 800 copies of various Odnowa titles.[71] The election of John Paul II as pope in 1978 obviously also created more auspicious circumstances for wider distribution of Polish-language titles. Throughout the Polish pope's pontificate, Rome was visited by Polish pilgrims who were happy to receive free books.[72]

When it comes to the relations between Odnowa and the institutions of the Communist state, the diversified thematic scope of the books frequently worked to the benefit of the publishing house. In 1969, Kulczycki was granted permission by the Office of Confessional Affairs to deliver 1000 copies of Paweł Skwarczyński's study of the Reformation for free to Polish libraries of secular and religious institutions alike.[73] In 1971, Kulczycki was also able to send 400 copies each of the books by Jerzy Braun concerning Vatican II and the 1966 Millennium of Polish Christendom.[74]

The idea of mailing the books officially seemed ineffective, but in fact had some benefits. A few institutions that received Skwarczyński's book turned their attention to the wider catalog of the London publishing house. Despite the negative stance of the Office of Confessional Affairs concerning a few of the publications, Kulczycki managed to send some—including, for example, Fanfani's work—to the local branches of the Polish Economic Society. Such action translated into new contacts in Poland as those who received free books started to ask Odnowa for more. Kulczycki could grant those requests as part—or, in some cases, even most—of the purchase and shipping costs were covered by the Book Distribution Program.

From a Press to a Bookstore

In 1972, Jerzy Kulczycki bought a bookstore named Orbis, which until that moment had specialized in books in Polish. He decided to broaden its offerings. This is how Orbis Books (London) Limited became a recognized bookstore across the whole field of Slavic studies. Kulczycki used different distribution channels, but Orbis operated under standard commercial terms. He established numerous contacts first in the West, mostly with institutions and individuals interested in a wide offering of books concerning East-Central Europe. He cooperated with leading Slavic and Slavonic publishers around the world, who in turn supplied Orbis with books. His fellow publishers in the field quickly came to appreciate Kulczycki's sense of the book market, often asking his opinion about potential publications on Polish issues.[75]

Polish émigrés were interested both in the books published in the West and in printed matter coming from Poland. Kulczycki thereby opened new doors for distribution on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He established official book exchanges with many institutions in Poland, ranging from academic and public libraries, to Church institutions, to important state publishing houses. He sent books among others to the Ossoliński National Institute (Wrocław), the National Library of Poland, the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the library of the Catholic University of Lublin. Courtesy of Kulczycki's efforts, Lublin in particular amassed one of the biggest collections of Western publications in Poland, especially for the humanities and social sciences.

In most of these institutions, Kulczycki established direct horizontal links with individual representatives. He created an efficient personalized exchange network which allowed him to send some publications without charge under the Book Distribution Program while also acquiring new partners in Poland. Those partners then reciprocated by sending books published in Poland to Orbis, which in turn sold quickly to customers of the bookstore not only in London, but throughout the Cold War West. Such a system worked well as it was based on personal relations and ongoing correspondence with the representatives of the institutions. Similarly, Kulczycki sent some books to individuals who wrote asking for given publications. Orbis was also known for giving away free copies of books to people who came in person to the bookstore in London.

Shortly after purchasing Orbis, Kulczycki widened the offering of books from across the whole region of East-Central Europe. One of the first non-Polish titles that he offered was the popular Czech-language quarterly *Svedectvi*.[76] Throughout the 1970s, the bookstore acquired more and more contacts in Communist countries, joining in the Book Distribution Program to the Soviet Union as well. Kulczycki sent out an Orbis catalog of carefully selected books to readers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.[77]

In subsequent years, the contacts that he had established were used for sending books. Tourists from those countries heading to the West could pick up some books in person from Orbis. Unfortunately, few detailed records of the bookstore's day-to-day operations survive. A few International Literary Center (ILC) notes from April 1985 show that Orbis periodically gave out many books to the visitors from behind the Iron Curtain. Those reports note 885 book copies in total, given to 273 Poles, 107 Romanians, three Czechoslovakians and two Hungarians. Among the books in question, we find publications concerning literature, history and the history of ideas, as well as social and political sciences and various dictionaries. The majority of the books were in English. Among the most popular were Czesław Miłosz's *Visions from San Francisco Bay*, published in English just after he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1980. Another widely read book was *The Ascent of Man: A Personal View by J. Bronowski*, based on the BBC television documentary series showing the development of human society. The list of popular publications also included *The Modern American Novel* by Malcolm Bradbury and *A Short History of the Catholic Church* by J. Derek Holmes and Bernard Bickers. Interestingly, not only Polish readers

reached for *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20* by Norman Davies—the flagship study of the time concerning the Polish–Bolshevik War. Orbis visitors also asked for *The Road to Serfdom* by Friedrich Hayek, a fierce critique of socialism as inevitably leading to a loss of national independence.

Of course, Orbis was not able to give out so many books every month throughout the whole of its existence. Sometimes just a few dozen copies went out for free, but what is important is the fact that the bookstore's diversified offering attracted readers from a wide cross-section of countries interested in Slavic literature and regional studies. Readers from Communist states were interested in everything—from specialized literature crucial to scholarly work, through textbooks and dictionaries, ending on memoirs and fiction. Throughout the late Cold War, popular titles published by émigré publishing houses were mainly historical, autobiographical or commentaries on the contemporary situation in Communist countries.[78] Many émigré books sent a clear political message. In so doing, however, authors put themselves out of reach of the Iron Curtain readership, whose censors could not and would not allow the content to pass. Dictionaries were often unavailable in regular sales, or were very expensive.

CONCLUSIONS

Jerzy Kulczycki's Orbis satisfied the readers' needs. What is more, upon the request of institutions and individuals who held important positions in Communist Poland (from journalists to bishops), Kulczycki—at the expense of the IAC and the ILC—bought subscriptions to selected social, political and specialized magazines.[79] In the end, Orbis became an important crossroads on the map of the Cold War readership in East-Central Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

In interviews with various historians, Kulczycki highlighted that in the course of his work in the book trade, he talked with people representing all sorts of political concepts, and his overarching goal was to make use of all available opportunities. Beginning in 1981, he traveled regularly to Poland and met people with whom he had previously only corresponded. He had no objections to political contacts with representatives of the Communist Party (or its proxies in academia and the media), to whom he openly declared his intentions to take advantage of them in facilitating

the wider distribution of his books. Kulczycki knew that customs officers inspected the parcels addressed to those individuals—or looked through their baggage when traveling—far less thoroughly given their political standing.[80] At the same time, Odnowa's contacts with the Church were more discreet. Yet here, too, the cooperation was mutual: Kulczycki provided books to Church institutions and individuals and used them as intermediaries in shipping and smuggling books to Poland.[81]

Kulczycki's decision to travel to Poland in 1981 was risky for the time. Eight years later, just prior to the fall of the Communist system, he exhibited Orbis books at the International Book Fair in Warsaw. His stall—the first in the history of the book fair set up by an émigré bookseller—exhibited books published by Odnowa and a few other publishing houses which agreed to send books to Poland, such as Aneks, Éditions du Dialogue, IDEE, Independent Polish Agency, the Literary Institute, the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, Libella, Polonia Book Fund, Puls and *Zeszyty Literackie*. Kulczycki's decision was highly controversial among émigré publishers. They pointed to the fact that censorship was still in place in Poland—even though the book fair's stalls were not censored—and underground publishing houses and many people bringing books to Poland from the West were continually repressed and harassed. Therefore, the Orbis stall was perceived by critics as a kind of legitimization of the authorities in the Polish People's Republic.[82] However, local communities were satisfied that books from exile had finally found their way to an official Communist-sponsored book fair.[83]

In 1989, Odnowa published its last book. With the consent of the authors, Kulczycki gave unpublished manuscripts to the first private Catholic publishing house Norbertinum, in Lublin, which was founded by the head of the publishing house of the Catholic University of Lublin, Norbert Wojciechowski.[84] Meanwhile, the American Book Distribution Program, too, gradually came to an end in 1989–1991. For a few months in 1990, Kulczycki had distributed books to the post-Soviet states. At the end of his decades-long cooperation with Free Europe's George Minden—a Romanian refugee who in 1959 had spearheaded the Book Distribution Program, first for the FEC, and later the IAC/ILC—Kulczycki formulated a proposal of further support to the ex-communist countries in their quest for democracy-building. He believed that it was necessary to reject censored and over-ideologized literature, instead supplementing existing collections with English-language publications.

Kulczycki tried to convince the American sponsors to finance such an effort.[85]

In fact, that idea could also have provided a lifeline for émigré publishing houses and bookstores like Orbis. Lifting censorship in Poland opened up completely new opportunities for domestic publishers, who included also the heads of some underground publishing houses. Meanwhile, émigré publishing houses and bookstores were too expensive for customers from post-Communist Poland. Consequently, many of them lost their readers, who had taken advantage of decades' worth of distribution of free books. Unfortunately, Kulczycki's idea never came to fruition. Orbis closed in 2011.

Initially, Kulczycki planned to focus as a publisher on the promotion of Christian Democracy, filling a gap in the political discourse of Poles on both sides of the Iron Curtain by highlighting the achievements of the political family closest to his own convictions. And indeed—thanks to Odnowa—Polish readers gained access to the authors and classic texts of Polish and European Christian Democracy. Yet the work of Odnowa, and then Kulczycki's subsequent activities as a bookseller, far surpassed his initial plan. The publishing house put into print books by many renowned Polish historians like Jan Ciechanowski, Józef Garliński, Zbigniew Siemaszko and Paweł Skwarczyński, as well as two Sovietological publications by Zbigniew Brzeziński and a series of memoirs by Jan Nowak. These works figure in the canon of some of the most influential historical and political-science literature ever to appear in the Polish language.

The popularity of books published by Odnowa among readers in Poland became clear in the 1970s and 1980s, as underground publishing houses in Poland began to reprint some of these works. The list included the books by Stefan Kisielewski, Wiesław Wasiutyński, Jan Erdman and Jan Hoppe, among others. Some were even reprinted in multiple editions. Some of the most lasting include not only the historical publications and the memoirs of Christian Democrats, but also classical works regarding the ideological foundations of Christian Democracy—De Gasperi, Fanfani and Maritain, among others.[86]

Currently, books by Odnowa may be found in the catalogs of many Polish academic and Church institutions as well as public libraries. One of the libraries with the biggest book collection is the one in the Polish Sejm in Warsaw. These books are also sold online via Allegro—a popular auction website for the resale of, among others, previously purchased

books. Clearly, publications featuring the logo of Odnowa continue to be available on the reader's market.

What many of Odnowa's books have in common is the imperative of responsible social engagement and the traditional corporatist conviction that a Christian fulfills himself within an organic set of communities— family, nation, motherland—for which he is responsible. The political system in which those postulated values may be realized is democracy. Hence the ideological foundations for the press continued to express the Polish Christian Democrats' core postwar contention that Polish Catholics could not find social or political fulfillment without helping to achieve the independence of Poland and a new, democratic system. A separate question deserving of thorough study and reflection is how lasting the Christian Democratic thought and the values Kulczycki tried to instill in his fellow citizens in Poland really have proven to be.

Jerzy Kulczycki's career should be seen in its entirety, spanning his political, publishing and bookselling activities. Thanks to this one key émigré activist, the book collections of many libraries and individuals were enriched with many Polish-language publications that could not have been printed behind the Iron Curtain, even though they found a welcoming readership there. Behind the Iron Curtain, Kulczycki adopted a realist's approach, taking account of the conditions in a Communist state. However, in his own way he was a romantic and a risk-taker. After all, this influential publisher had trained as an engineer; when he took up his publishing and bookselling activity, he was taking on a second career. He paved new paths—some legal, some illegal—and thereby broke through the barriers erected by the Iron Curtain.

Translated by Renata Kujawska-Matacz

Notes

1. Zdzisław Kulczycki was one of the victims of the Katyń Massacres—a series of mass executions of Polish nationals carried out by the Soviet NKVD. In the spring of 1940, about 22,000 Polish citizens—prisoners of war, as well as other members of Poland's prewar intellectual elite who had been imprisoned after the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939—were murdered: see, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki, "Forests, Families and Films: Polish Memory of Katyń, 1943–2015," *East European Politics and Societies* 29, no. 4 (2015): 730–760.

2. See, e.g., Katherine R. Jolluck, *Exile and Identity: Polish Women in the Soviet Union during World War II* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002); *War through Children's Eyes: The Soviet Occupation of Poland and the Deportations, 1939–1941*, ed. Irena Grudzińska-Gross and Jan Tomasz Gross (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1981).

3. Karol Popiel (1887–1977) was a lawyer and a politician. He was a soldier of the Polish Legions in World War I and an MP of the Second Polish Republic. He was a co-founder of Polish Christian Democracy and, from 1937, a leader of SP. In 1930, he was a political prisoner; from 1939, an expatriate. In the years 1941–1944, he was a minister in consecutive cabinets of the Polish government in London. In the years 1945–1947, he attempted to resume political activities in Poland. In the years 1947–1977, he acted as the leader of the Stronnictwo Pracy na Uchodźstwie (the Labor Party in Exile). See, e.g., Jarosław Rabiński's and Paweł Ziętara's chapters in this volume.

4. S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010).

5. See, e.g., Jarosław Rabiński's chapter in this volume; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 93–113.

6. Idesbald Goddeeris, "Exiles' Strategies for Lobbying in International Organisations: Eastern European Participation in the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales," *European Review of History—Revue européenne d'Histoire* 11, no. 3 (2004): 383–400.

7. Konrad Sieniewicz (1912–1996) was an attorney and a political activist. During World War II, he was a leader of the underground movement Unia (Union), as well as a soldier of the Home Army. From 1945, he was in exile, having been first chosen as secretary-general of the SP. He was a leading activist in international Christian Democratic organizations such as the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (from 1950); in 1961, he became a co-founder and the secretary-general of the World Union of Christian Democrats. In 1992, he returned to Poland permanently.

8. See Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł's, Piotr H. Kosicki's and Stanisław Gebhardt's chapters in this volume.

9. Janusz Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska Demokracja w kraju i na emigracji 1947–1970* (Lublin: Ośrodek Studiów Polonijnych i Społecznych PZKS, 1999), 66–67, 80–84; Paweł Ziętara, "Strategia konia trojańskiego: Aparat bezpieczeństwa PRL wobec emigracyjnego Stronnictwa Pracy," *Aparat represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989* no. 10 (2012): 325–365; Sławomir Łukasiewicz, "Młodzi polscy chadecy na emigracji," *Zeszyty Historyczne* no. 163 (2008): 51–99.

10. Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska Demokracja*, 66.

11. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 218–256.

12. Christina Manetti, "Sign of the Times: The Znak Circle and Catholic Intellectual Engagement in Communist Poland, 1945–1976," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1998, 140–158; Małgorzata Strzelecka, *Między minimalizmem a maksymalizmem*: *Dylematy ideowe Stanisława Stommy i Janusza Zabłockiego* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2015), 133–169.

13. See Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter in this volume.

14. Interview with Stanisław Gebhardt, October 2014.

15. Piotr H. Kosicki, "Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr H. Kosicki (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 127–198.

16. See Piotr H. Kosicki's chapter in this volume.

17. Stanisław A. Morawski, "Centro Esperienze Internazionali i inne inicjatywy stypendialne w Rzymie," in *Świadectwa: Testimonianze*, vol. IV: *Pro publico bono: Polityczna, społeczna i kulturalna działalność Polaków w Rzymie w XX wieku*, ed. Ewa Prządka (Rome: Fundacja Rzymska im. J.S. Umiastowskiej, 2006), 337–355.

18. Zabłocki, *Chrześcijańska Demokracja*, 187–188.

19. Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000) was a lawyer, a politician, an editor and a publisher. From 1930, he worked as a state clerk and the editor of the journals *Bunt Młodych* (Rebellion of the Young) and *Polityka* (Politics). In 1941, he became a soldier of the Polish Armed Forces in the West. In 1945, he became an employee of the Polish government in exile. In 1946, he founded the Literary Institute (in Rome, from 1947 in Maisons-Laffitte, near Paris). He was also the editor and publisher of a monthly entitled *Kultura*, a book series called "Biblioteka Kultury" and the magazine *Zeszyty Historyczne* (History Notebooks).

20. Jerzy Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, ed. Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska and Paweł Ziętara (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2016), 146.

21. On Veritas, see Sławomir Łukasiewicz's chapter in this volume.

22. Alfred A. Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2013), 107, 109, 281.

23. Andrzej Stypułkowski (1929–1981) was a publisher, an essayist and an émigré activist. During World War II, he was a member of the underground and a Warsaw Uprising participant. From 1945, he was in exile, from 1947 in Great Britain. In the years 1953–1958, he was an employee of the Free Europe Press. In 1959, he founded the publishing house Polonia Book Fund Ltd, and in 1964 Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., which published books in Russian. In the years 1963–1971, he published the quarterly *Polemiki* (Polemics).

24. Reisch, *Hot Books*, 240–262.

25. Stanisław Gebhardt (born in 1928), trained as an economist and has spent the bulk of his life as a political operative. During World War II, he was active in the Polish underground. In 1944–1945, he was a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps. From 1946, he was in exile. He was an activist of Christian Democratic youth organizations and a member of the governing bodies of SP. He became an activist of international Christian Democratic structures such as the CDUCE and the WUCD (which he served as secretary in the years 1970–1973). In the years 1963–1972, he was the managing director of the International Solidarity Foundation. Since 1990, he has lived in Poland.

26. Seweryn Eustachiewicz (1910–1963) was an attorney and a political activist. In 1937–1939, he was an employee of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During World War II, he was a member of the underground organization Unia. In 1943–1945, he was a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps. In 1946–1947, he served as a representative of the Polish government in exile in the American Polish War Relief effort at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in Munich. He was also a member of SP governing bodies and an activist of the CDUCE. In the years 1958–1961, he worked as the editor of *Odnowa*.

27. Zbigniew Ossowski was a philosopher and an SP activist.

28. Janusz Śleszyński (1917–1985) was a lawyer. During World War II, he was a soldier of the Polish Armed Forces in the West. He became an activist of the SP in exile and the CDUCE, as well as a democracy and human rights activist (acting on behalf of such organizations as the International Association for Liberty and Democracy). He coordinated operations to support Christian Democracy in Latin America. In 1975, he became the WUCD's representative in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. See, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki's and Stanisław Gebhardt's chapters in this volume.

29. Joseph Cherryson (Józef Wiśniewski; 1931–?) was a teacher and an activist of the Liberal Party in Southampton Itchen in Great Britain.

30. English edition: Zbigniew K. Brzeziński, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

31. Amintore Fanfani, *Historia doktryn ekonomicznych od czasów starożytnych do XIX wieku*, trans. Antoni Czułowski (London: Odnowa, 1965).

32. Stanisław Gebhardt's account; Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 154.

33. Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *De Gasperi, polityk i człowiek*, trans. Antoni Czułowski (London: Odnowa, 1968).

34. Josef Pieper, *O sprawiedliwości*, trans. Antoni Czułowski (London: Odnowa, 1967); Henry Bars, *Polityka według Jacques Maritain'a*, trans. Jolanta Łoś (London: Odnowa, 1969).

35. Robert Houben, *Uwagi o polityce* (London: Odnowa, 1967).
36. Karol Popiel, *Na mogiłach przyjaciół* (London: Odnowa, 1966); Karol Popiel, *Od Brześcia do "Polonii"* (London: Odnowa, 1967); Karol Popiel, *Generał Sikorski w mojej pamięci* (London: Odnowa, 1978).
37. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 62–92.
38. Jan Hoppe, *Wspomnienia, przyczynki, refleksje* (London: Odnowa, 1981).
39. Konrad Sieniewicz, "Jan—pragmatyk," in Jerzy Braun, Karol Popiel, Konrad Sieniewicz, *Człowiek ze spiżu* (London: Odnowa 1981), 72.
40. Karol Popiel, "Droga ideowa piłsudczyka," in Braun, Popiel, Sieniewicz, *Człowiek ze spiżu*, 34–35; Jerzy Braun, "Jan Hoppe—polityk w służbie idei," in Braun, Popiel, Sieniewicz, *Człowiek ze spiżu*, 220–221.
41. Mieczysław Kotlarczyk, *Reduta słowa: Kulisy dwu likwidacji Teatru Rapsodycznego w Krakowie (Karty z pamiętnika)* (London: Odnowa, 1980).
42. Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 170.
43. Stefan Wyszyński, *Prymat człowieka w ładzie społecznym* (London: Odnowa, 1976).
44. Brian Porter-Szűcs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 148; Czesław Bartnik, *Chrześcijańska nauka o narodzie według prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego* (London: Odnowa, 1982).
45. Biblioteka Uniwersytecka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego im. Jana Pawła II, Manuscript Division (hereafter BUKUL), AK 15/58/dz, Letter from Jerzy Kulczycki to Adam Rudzki, 20 November 1982.
46. Jan Drewnowski, *O myśl polityczną* (London: Odnowa, 1976).
47. Marek Kornat, "Problem realizmu w polskiej myśli politycznej na uchodźstwie po II wojnie światowej—pytania i tezy," *Politeja* no. 3 (2013): 113–146, at 132–133.
48. *Chrześcijańska demokracja: Myśli przewodnie*, introduction by Konrad Sieniewicz (London, Rome: Odnowa, 1987).
49. *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 17.
50. *Chrześcijańska demokracja*, 12.
51. Jan M. Ciechanowski, *Powstanie Warszawskie: Zarys podłoża politycznego i dyplomatycznego* (London: Odnowa, 1971).
52. Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 277, 279; Jerzy Iranek-Osmecki, "Powstanie Warszawskie," *Zeszyty Historyczne* no. 21 (1972): 203–216.
53. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Letter from Jerzy Kulczycki to Adam Rudzki, 16 November 1971.The Office of Confessional Affairs (Urząd do Spraw Wyznań) was established in 1950 as a central organ of state administration which formulated and implemented a multidimensional policy towards churches and various religious denominations. Its domain also included the social and cultural activities of some religious entities, so

Kulczycki turned to the office for help for that exact reason. In practice, the office was one of the key institutions which repressed the Catholic Church. It was closed down in November 1989.

54. Aleksander Skarżyński, *Polityczne przyczyny Powstania Warszawskiego* (Warsaw: PWN, 1964).

55. Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 280.

56. See Sławomir Łukasiewicz's chapter in this volume.

57. Józef Garliński, *Oświęcim walczący* (London: Odnowa, 1974); Józef Garliński, *Polska w drugiej wojnie światowej* (London: Odnowa, 1982); Józef Garliński, *Enigma: Tajemnica drugiej wojny światowej* (London: Odnowa, 1980).

58. Rafał Stobiecki, *Klio na wygnaniu: Z dziejów polskiej historiografii na uchodźstwie w Wielkiej Brytanii po 1945 r.* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2005), 277–278, 330.

59. Zbigniew Siemaszko, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne* (London: Odnowa, 1982).

60. Jan Nowak, *Kurier z Warszawy* (London: Odnowa, 1978); Jan Nowak, *Wojna w eterze: Wspomnienia 1948–1956*, vol. 1 (London: Odnowa, 1985); Jan Nowak, *Polska z oddali: Wojna w eterze— wspomnienia 1956–1976*, vol. 2 (London: Odnowa, 1988).

61. Stefan Kisielewski, *Materii pomieszanie* (London: Odnowa, 1973); Stefan Kisielewski, *Czy istnieje walka o świat?* (London: Odnowa, 1976); Stefan Kisielewski, *Na czym polega socjalizm? Spostrzeżenia z Warszawy* (London: Odnowa, 1979).

62. Adam Rudzki (1901–1987) was an economist and an emigration activist. In 1937, he became the managing director of the Port and Waterways Board in the Free City of Danzig. He saw combat in September 1939. From 1945, he lived in exile, from 1951 in the USA. In 1952, he became an employee of the FEC, then of the International Advisory Council (IAC) and International Literary Center (ILC). From 1959, he was in charge of the book program addressed to readers in Poland. He was also an activist of the Independence and Democracy Polish Freedom Movement.

63. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Letter from Adam Rudzki to the directors of Odnowa Ltd, 9 December 1961; BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Settlement with the Author (obligations of the Odnowa publishing house toward Jan Nowak), 23 June 1988.

64. Stanisław Gebhardt's account; BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Letter from Jerzy Kulczycki to Konrad Sieniewicz, 25 May 1972.

65. Apart from the centers in Rome, the readers could also get books from war veteran Witold Zahorski, or at the Pontifical Institute of Ecclesiastical Studies (Pontificio Istituto di Studi Ecclesiastici) run by Father Hieronim Fokciński, Ph.D.: Paweł Sowiński, "Z ziemi włoskiej do Polski," *Wolność i Solidarność: Studia z dziejów opozycji wobec komunizmu*

i dyktatury no. 7 (2013): 58–73; Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska, "Nieśliśmy do kraju wolne słowo…," Interview with Father Hieronim Fokciński SJ, *Pamięć.pl* nos 7–8 (2015): 26–29.

66. Krystyna Kalinowska and Jacek Moskwa, *Frassati Gawrońscy: Włosko-polski romans* (Warsaw: Świat Książki, 2015), 409–414.

67. Morawski, "Centro Esperienze Internazionali."

68. Janusz Zabłocki, *Dzienniki*, vol. 2: *1966–1975* (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2011), 250, 419, 704, 896.

69. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Adam Rudzki to Stanisław August Morawski, 21 March 1974; *ibidem*, Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 2 April 1974.

70. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Jerzy Kulczycki to the International Advisory Council, May 1971; Jerzy Kulczycki to George Minden, 27 September 1977.

71. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Invoice of 9 November 1971.

72. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Distribution of books to Polish visitors during the inauguration of Pope John Paul II (1978).

73. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Jerzy Kulczycki to Aleksander Skarżyński, 11 December 1969; Paweł Skwarczyński, *Szkice z dziejów Reformacji w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej* (London: Odnowa, 1967).

74. BUKUL, Ak, 15/58/dz, Jerzy Kulczycki to Aleksander Skarżyński, 26 March 1971; *ibidem*, Aleksander Merker to Jerzy Kulczycki, 15 November 1971; *ibidem*, Jerzy Kulczycki to Adam Rudzki, 20 November 1971; Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 227–228; Jerzy Braun, *Tysiąclecie chrześcijaństwa w Polsce* (London: Odnowa, 1966); Jerzy Braun, *Ekumenizm w uchwałach Soboru i w okresie posoborowym* (London: Odnowa, 1968).

75. Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 194–195.

76. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 29 November 1972.

77. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 14 October 1982; Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 27 October 1982.

78. Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska, "Wolne słowo z Zachodu: Projekt dystrybucji książek za żelazną kurtyną na przykładzie Polski (rekonesans badawczy)," in *Drugi obieg w PRL na tle samizdatu w państwach bloku sowieckiego po 1956 roku*, ed. Przemysław Gasztold-Seń, Natalia Jarska and Jan Olaszek (Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2016), 506–507.

79. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 4 May 1971; *ibidem*, Adam Rudzki to Jerzy Kulczycki, 15 June 1971.

80. Kulczycki, *Atakować książką*, 220–221.

81. Paweł Sowiński, *Tajna dyplomacja: Książki emigracyjne w drodze do kraju 1956–1989* (Warsaw: Więź/ISP PAN, 2016); BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Jerzy Kulczycki to the office of "Lancet," 24 November 1986.

82. See discussion in *Tydzień Polski* nos. 4, 5 (1989).

83. This is mentioned by Norbert Wojciechowski—the long-standing head of the publishing house of the Catholic University of Lublin, who in 1989 founded the first private Catholic publishing house in Poland, Norbertinum; Interview with Norbert Wojciechowski, 27 December 2016.
84. Norbertinum—inspired by Kulczycki—published such works like the memoirs by Jan Krok-Paszkowski, *Mój bieg przez XX wiek* (Lublin: Norbertinum, 1990).
85. BUKUL, Ak 15/58/dz, Book assistance to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Jerzy Kulczycki to George Minden, 9 September 1990.
86. "Bibuła: Wydawnictwa niezależne 1976–1989: Indeks druków zwartych," online at http://www.incipit.home.pl/bibula_/bz_index.html (accessed on 23 December 2016); and the Polish citation database POL-index with the data on articles published in Polish scientific journals as of 23 December 2016.

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Christian Democracy beyond Christian Democracy: The Case of Stanisław Grocholski

Sławomir Łukasiewicz

When we talk about the Christian Democratic movement, or more broadly about the political involvement of Christians, including Catholics, it is often useful to focus on individual profiles. This approach is particularly justified in the case of the Polish Christian Democrats either forced into political exile after the end of World War II, or condemned to persist in their wartime exile.

A range of Christian Democratic organizations managed to flourish in postwar exile. These even included youth groups, whose numbers more often than not exceeded those of the political parties themselves. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s and even 1960s, these groups continued to recruit new members from among younger generations seeking to find their place in exile.[1] In most of the Christian Democratic exiles' important policy initiatives, however, individuals played the key roles.

One example of this is the figure of Stanisław Grocholski, whose résumé was, at the same time, not typical of a Polish Christian Democrat.

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His intellectual and political biography, however, can help us to understand the difficult choices faced in the twentieth century by East-Central European migrants who, despite having been forced to leave their homeland behind, retained political ambitions. Grocholski's views clearly drew him toward Christian Democracy, and yet, like many active, self-identifying Christian Democratic youth of his generation, he never formally joined any of the political parties federated in the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (CDUCE)—even the party hailing from his homeland, renowned Polish statesman Karol Popiel's Labor Party, Stronnictwo Pracy (SP). Though at the same time he was involved in many Catholic initiatives, Grocholski had good contacts with European federalists and complied with the requirements of modern European Christian Democracy.

Stanisław Grocholski was born in 1912 in Poland's eastern borderlands, home to a diverse ethnic mixture including Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorusians and Russians.[2] He was the scion of a long aristocratic line and was born on the family estate, Pietniczany. In 1931, he graduated from the famous high school for boys at Bielany in Warsaw, run by the Marian fathers, a secondary education that undoubtedly left a strong imprint on his views and commitment to the Catholic faith. In exile, he would later serve as a member of the board of directors of Friends of the famous Marian College in Fawley Court, in Buckinghamshire. Relatively little information is available about this early period of Grocholski's life. The intelligence services of Communist Poland, which for many years conducted investigations in which Grocholski's name figured as a person of interest, classified his political sympathies as belonging to the extreme right, the so-called National Radical Camp (Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR). They failed to establish any direct link between Grocholski and this group, although we may note some of his acquaintances and friendships with people from those circles, such as Andrzej Iwanicki. In various autobiographical documents (including, for example, his résumé), Grocholski did declare his membership in the "Renaissance" (Odrodzenie) Association of Catholic Students, of which he was even president for several years.[3] Before World War II, Odrodzenie was *de facto* an important movement of Catholic youth, while at the same time belonging to the transnational Pax Romana network founded in 1921, and based in Fribourg, Switzerland. The scholarly consensus is that there was a strong pull

within Odrodzenie (especially in its Warsaw and Lublin branches) in the direction of political activism associated with Christian Democracy.[4]

In his professional life, Grocholski became involved with Polish diplomacy, and just before the war he started working at the consulate in Marseilles. The outbreak of war, for him as for a large part of his generation, meant a need to remain outside Poland. He found employment in the so-called Special Branch, later Section III of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, which was responsible for contacts with the occupied homeland. Grocholski was a translator, and so he accompanied the branch commanders in their discussions with the British in the Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive. He thus received first-hand information about what was happening in Poland and what could be expected on the part of the Allies. He himself underwent training for the commando squad, the "Silent Unseen" (*Cichociemni*), but was not sent into Poland due to his considerable height.[5] These episodes reveal the activist within Grocholski, who already then, as in later years, was involved in a remarkable number of social and political projects.

Grocholski the Politician

Living and working in wartime London, Grochowski sought opportunities for political activity. Together with a group of colleagues, he came to the conclusion that the policy of the Polish government required serious changes. However, he could not find a place for himself in the political parties of the time, the exile establishment's so-called historical parties, through which he could influence government policy.

Friends meeting informally thus began a kind of underground movement. After the 1945 Yalta Conference, their movement took the form of a political party called the Polish "Independence and Democracy" Freedom Movement (Polski Ruch Wolnościowy "Niepodległość i Demokracja" [NiD]). The party adopted a unique recruitment policy: candidates had to be first of all either officers or bureaucrats whose views fell within one of the Polish government's three main political currents: Piłsudskites, nationalists or Socialists. The conscious development of this kind of singular political platform, intended to unite extremely diverse political camps, seemed quite original at the time. And yet, for the Polish political scene in London, this crossing of the political aisle was hardly unfamiliar, as we can see from the example of the government of Tomasz

Arciszewski, formed in the autumn of 1944 based on both the National Party, Stronnictwo Narodowe (SN), and the Polish Socialist Party.[6]

As a representative of the NiD, Grocholski held many important functions in the political life of the émigré community, including membership in the Provisional Council of National Unity (1953–1959), a kind of parliament in exile, and in the Executive of National Unity, a kind of government in exile in which he assumed responsibility for information policy in 1954. He also enjoyed a career as a journalist; between 1959 and 1979, he worked for the London-based *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza* (The Polish Daily and the Soldier's Daily), the most important Polish émigré daily during the Cold War, as its international affairs editor. He also belonged to the International Federation of Free Journalists, where many of his fellow journalists and NiD members ended up. Last but not least, he also served as the editor of *Życie* (Life, 1969–1972), an émigré magazine for Catholics that primarily dealt with social and religious issues, where he avoided direct involvement in politics. As a journalist, Grocholski limited himself to reports, notes and investigations, but he also put forward ideas for a platform. In one such piece, published at the end of the 1960s, he set forth the argument that the actions of the Church, whether in Poland or in exile, should stand as far as possible from any form of politics.[7]

Grocholski thereby found himself in a political movement that strengthened its position after the war, all while locating itself primarily on the left side of the political spectrum. Within the group, Grocholski was seen as a representative of its Christian Democratic wing. There were others in the NiD who followed this path, such as Zbigniew Rapacki, who after the war became an advisor to the French parliament on matters regarding Eastern Europe, but also prepared papers on international policy for Poland's head bishop, Stefan Wyszyński. But Grocholski occupied a distinctive position within the party. Without a doubt, he attached much more weight to matters of faith than many of his colleagues. For example, for the rest of his life, he kept the image of the Virgin Mary that had hung in the NiD headquarters in London's Westbourne Grove.

Grocholski also maintained a good rapport with the Church hierarchy of the time. Thanks to this, his fellow party members relied on him to resolve matters that involved the Catholic Church. For example, he intervened when a local pastor did not allow a political rally to take place after mass. Another very telling example is the story of Manchester's NiD branch. In May 1956, when one of the party's activists tried to

distribute leaflets in front of the gates of the Church of Saint Joseph, the priest responded sharply and forbade him from conducting any political activity. He then raised the matter during his sermon, suggesting that the faithful should disregard political affairs in general. The members of the NiD sent a special delegation to the priest, securing the promise of a public apology.

When no apology was forthcoming, however, Grocholski sent a lengthy letter on behalf of the movement to Father Kazimierz Sołowiej, rector of Brompton Oratory in London.[8] This letter was confidential, and also largely expressed Grocholski's private views, although he was certainly acting on behalf of the movement's leadership. The result is one of Grocholski's most comprehensive surviving statements on the relationship between religion and politics. He argued that, instead of cutting themselves off from politics, priests should "discreetly encourage citizens to take an active attitude toward public issues." Furthermore, he contended, the Church should involve itself both in the promotion of the National Treasury (an important source of funding for political activity within the so-called camp of national unity) and the elections in exile. Grocholski described such steps by the Catholic Church as essential components of "an active civic approach." At the end, he outlined a vision for the NiD that, while aconfessional, would join Europe's Christian Democratic parties in claiming "Christian inspiration." Grocholski wrote, "I am against so-called religious parties, especially in societies where religion is generally permitted (all parties—apart from the Marxists or the Masons—should stand on the basis of ethical principles based on the precepts of religion; NiD's program clearly proclaims its compliance with these rules in private and public life)."[9]

Stanisław Grocholski argued that the NiD had more opportunities to fight Marxists and Freemasons for the souls of workers and farmers than did the traditional Catholic nationalist parties. He also asserted that, among the members of the NiD, "especially in the provinces, the number of decent Catholics who are sincerely striving to change Polish political life for the better is growing substantially."[10] All of this, in his opinion, was why these activists were finding themselves the object of attacks by the well-established parties falling under the "Catholic nationalist" label. Grocholski concluded his letter with this appeal: "And so, it is in the Catholic interest […] to help, or at least not to hinder, those movements which by reaching out to 'leftist' elements are considered by Marxists as the main enemy. We do not expect any privileges,

we don't want to encourage more conservatively minded priests to express sympathy for our movement, but at least a certain benevolent neutrality would be […] in the long-term interests of the defenders of religion."[11]

As a politician, Stanisław Grocholski worked incessantly and intensively. He had extensive international contacts in the UK, USA and France. For example, he was involved in the work of Paix et Liberté (Peace and Freedom), a strong anti-Communist organization led by the French politician Jean-Paul David and funded by the CIA as part of its program of psychological warfare. Grocholski, together with several other colleagues from the NiD, edited the journal of its eponymous Polish section Paix et Liberté, in conjunction with anti-Communist activities in France.[12]

Grocholski was not a major political thinker. Although he took part in discussions, in the preparation of key documents and in the creation of a political movement, he did not leave behind any important political texts. From what has been preserved of his legacy, his rich correspondence, a picture emerges of an activist and organizer, caught up above all in international affairs, and in the fate of Poland and Polish immigrants in the West. This activist, no doubt guided by the values he had learned from Catholicism, visited groups of Polish immigrants, gave talks, organized lectures and urged others to undertake similar activities. Without theorizing, he became a model for a certain kind of political activism—Polish and Catholic, but not nationalist in the prewar sense—that deeply influenced the émigré world.

THE CATHOLIC IN EXILE

It is clear that Grocholski's public activities were substantially shaped by his faith commitments to Roman Catholicism. Certainly, his education with the Marian fathers and his membership in Odrodzenie played an important role in those commitments. During the war, he was active in Polish Catholic organizations such as Saint Stanislaus's Circle (Koło św. Stanisława) and the Thomists' Circle (Koło Tomistyczne); both organizations represented Polish academic youth in the Pax Romana international.

Grocholski also maintained formal institutional contacts with British Catholics. For example, he was one of the founding members of the Anglo-Polish Catholic Association, serving as its vice-president in 1943. The association's patrons represented the hierarchy of the Church.

For Poles at that time, this was the purview of Bishop Józef Gawlina, and for the British—the Archbishop of Westminster, Bernard Griffin.[13] The association's main objectives, next to prayer (particularly in veneration of Mary), included "strengthening the spiritual and cultural bonds between the Catholics of the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Polish Catholics," as well as "creating a community of bonds between the Polish Catholics in exile and the numerous Catholic organizations and associations in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations." The association also sent medicine to Poland.[14] Immediately after the war, Grocholski became a member of another organization, the Catholic Council for Polish Welfare, which (as the name suggests) mobilized Catholics to send aid to Poland.

The hero of this chapter was also—and perhaps most importantly of all—a member and co-founder of the Veritas Polish Catholic University Association, established in 1946. To carry out the association's tasks of deepening religious life and organizing aid for students, the association branched out one year later to establish a non-profit foundation. Grocholski thereby became a trustee of the Veritas Foundation (1948–1989), and ultimately its chair (1979–1989), among other functions. The foundation mediated the provision of scholarships for Poles by various British institutions.

And so was born the Veritas Foundation's Catholic Publication Center, which Grocholski served as a trustee. One observer remarked in 1955 that the center had been "created at the initiative of Polish Catholic activists, clergy and laity. Forced to remain outside their country in the wake of the imposition of a Communist regime in Poland, they decided to work for the benefit of Catholic and Polish affairs through the production and dissemination of the printed word."[15] Veritas ensured, among other matters, that exiles were able to obtain copies of the Bible in Polish, as well as missals, prayer books, catechisms, Marian books, textbooks, books for children and young people, and scientific books and novels. These included the Polish Library (Biblioteka Polska) series, Documentation of Church Teachings (Dokumenty Nauki Kościoła) and the annual Polish Family Calendar (Kalendarz Rodziny Polskiej). In addition to books, Veritas also issued periodicals: *Życie* (Life), a weekly aimed at intellectuals; the popular scientific weekly *Gazeta Niedzielna* (Sunday Newspaper) and a monthly for young people, *Droga* (the Way).

For Grocholski, his work with Veritas was a continuation of the contacts he had made during the war. These included Father Stanisław

Bełch, author of the definitive Polish translation of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, as well as such important Catholic activists in exile as Wojciech Dłużewski, Paweł Skwarczyński, Mieczysław Habicht and Adam Kosiba.[16] Until the creation in Paris in the mid-1960s of the Pallottines' publishing house Éditions du Dialogue, Veritas remained the most important Polish Catholic publishing house outside Polish territory. It also competed successfully with Polish émigré publishing centers emerging in parallel, such as Jerzy Giedroyc's Literary Institute and Jerzy Kulczycki's Odnowa (Renewal).

In addition, Grocholski's work in Veritas gave him the opportunity to establish lasting partnerships with the religious figures and lay leaders who were most important for the émigré community. The foundation's main patron was Archbishop Józef Gawlina, to whom Pope Pius XII had entrusted the care of the community of Polish Catholics in exile. Independently of Gawlina, however, the Catholic Church exerted direct power over Veritas via Monsignor Władysław Staniszewski, the Vicar-Delegate for Poles in England and Wales; Father Kazimierz Sołowiej, the recipient of Grocholski's important letter, was Veritas's ecclesiastical liaison. The Church's supervisory authorities also included, in addition to the three figures mentioned above, the Protonotary Apostolic Bronisław Michalski, Chief Chaplain to Poles in the UK.[17]

From 1946 onward, Grocholski also belonged to the Newman Association, whose External Relations Committee he joined in 1949. His membership in this Catholic organization was rooted in his pre-war Polish activism in the Renaissance movement (Odrodzenie). Thanks to one particular member of the Newman Association, Dr. Francis Aylward[18]—whom the Thomist father Bełch had introduced to Polish affairs—the place which Odrodzenie had held in the pre-war Pax Romana was taken by the Veritas Polish Catholic University Association. In 1947 to 1949, Grocholski was a delegate to and a board member of Pax Romana. The Newman Association also intervened to secure funds from the British Education Committee for Poles to study in Ireland.

And yet we have scarcely exhausted the list of organizations to which Grocholski belonged. We must also add Catholic Action (Akcja Katolicka), and from 1979, the Catholic Union of Great Britain as well. When the Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope John Paul II, Grocholski co-founded and became vice-president of the Friends of the Holy Father.

Grocholski the European

Stanisław Grocholski had two clear core identities: an anti-Communist, independence-oriented politics toward Poland on the one hand, and his confessional life as a Catholic on the other. These did not interfere with each other, with his Polish commitments in fact even obliging Grocholski to participate in projects connected to European integration. As a member of the NiD, he co-founded the Polish Union of Federalists in October 1949, served in its leadership and later represented the organization in the Union of European Federalists (UEF). He also belonged to the France-Europe de l'Est group.

One of Grocholski's tasks was to get young people involved in federal initiatives. He was one of the NiD's representatives at the youth congress that took place at the end of July 1952 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, where he was elected to the board of the European organization.[19] From 5 to 7 June 1953, he took part in a youth conference organized in Paris, dedicated to Central and Eastern Europe. French politicians also participated, and the deliberations were opened by François Mitterrand, then minister for European affairs. Grocholski had the opportunity to present his report entitled "Exiles and Europe" (*Wygnańcy a Europa*) at the conference. He sought to convince his audience that emigrants from East-Central Europe had a uniquely important role to play in European affairs; at the same time, he also appealed for support for their aspirations to independence.[20] An important result of this conference was the establishment of the Council of the Free Youth of Central and Eastern Europe (Conseil de la Jeunesse Libre de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale).[21] His wide-ranging, transnational contacts with East-Central European émigrés opened the door in 1972 for him to assume the position of vice-president in the European Liaison Group, created in London three years earlier, which represented émigrés and dissidents from East-Central Europe and from Russia.

Since 1948, Grocholski had also belonged to the European Movement. He took part in its conference on social affairs, held in Rome in July 1950.[22] A mere two years later, he was delegated by the Political Council of the Central and Eastern European Conference in London, on whose Social Commission he served.[23] Many years later, Grocholski also took part in the presidium of the Polish Committee of the European Movement in London, convened in 1964.[24] The Polish federal movement, like European federalism in general, underwent a crisis in the

mid-1950s. For Grocholski, European integration was an important field of observation for many years, but we have no traces of the extent of his commitments there. It was only in the late 1980s that he returned to the idea of resuming the activities of the Union of Polish Federalists, seeing an opportunity to boost European thinking in Poland.[25]

From this period comes one of Grocholski's few systematic political statements, published in London's *Trybuna* journal by the NiD. His text contained an analysis of the European political crisis of the late 1980s, as well as his fears for the future of European integration, which in his opinion lacked a political dimension. He recommended that the countries of East-Central Europe avoid risky actions, insisting instead on dialogue and reform (by taking advantage of *glasnost* and *perestroika*), and cooperation with representatives in the West. He proposed to build a lobby of common interests, whose base in the case of Poland could be the émigré community and the Polish diaspora at large. Grocholski, like most Western analysts at that time, was far from predicting the imminent end of the Communist system and of Soviet domination in East-Central Europe. He believed that the global crisis would not favor any settlement that altered the Yalta terms of 1945, and for this reason he recommended taking actions with a longer-term perspective in mind.[26]

And then, almost from one day to the next, 1989 brought change, and not only in Poland. This time of revolution and "refolution" was certainly a landmark in the life of people such as Grocholski, who had spent many years outside the country, while hoping until the end that the Communist system would collapse.[27] Like many of his generation, Grocholski had long hoped that, for him, Poland's liberation from the Soviet yoke would spell an opportunity to resume normal political activity within his own country. After 1989, Grocholski, too, looked for such a chance on Polish soil. Above all, he saw a place for himself as a liaison between new political elites in Poland and the Western world.[28]

He and his colleagues from the NiD sought opportunities to make contact with any new homegrown Polish political movement that would meet two basic conditions: it would be a party that drew upon Christian values and traditions, while at the same time being a pro-European party, preferably one which favored European federalism. This chapter is not the place to go into greater depth regarding how much Polish politicians in the early 1990s knew about European federalism; due to the long years of isolation, this level of knowledge was paltry. And yet Grocholski

and a handful of so-called "Christian Democratic" colleagues from the NiD found the elements they sought in the political program of the Center Agreement, Porozumienie Centrum (PC). In the end, the NiD was unable to make good on this program, for a number of reasons: first, because of the strong resistance of a part of the group that did not identify with the PC's program, even going so far as to see in it a threat to Poland. Second, the PC lacked a serious policy agenda, apart from the proposal for individual members of the NiD to join them. This was a slap in the face for the émigrés. It was also a signal that the Polish party did not really need any additional legitimation in the form of a "blessing" from an émigré party.

Nevertheless, Grocholski tried to bring about cooperation between the two organizations. He even prepared a special "project to terminate the operations of the NiD abroad and engage in activities in Poland," in which he assumed that the group would join the PC before the parliamentary elections of 1991.[29] Grocholski held talks with PC politicians, including Przemysław Hniedziewicz, Andrzej Anusz and Andrzej Kostarczyk. Ultimately, he concluded that the PC was quite close to the NiD in its political program, and that the party would develop "correctly," meaning "more to the 'left' than to the 'right' (whatever that currently means in Poland)." This is how he reported these conversations to Maciej Przedrzymirski:

> PC as a party wants to retain a broad centrist reach (its deviation "rightwards" is emphasized from time to time with regard to its voters, because "society looks unfavorably upon any leftist accents, as well as on the very adjective itself"). The Liberal Democratic Congress will remain outside the PC, but some (important) members will join the PC (e.g. Adam Glapiński, the minister). PC is inclined toward "Christian Democratic" ideas, but does not intend to become a "confessional" party, nor to support any "confessional" tendencies in the trade union movement. PC is in favor of the unification of Europe on a federal basis.[30] It favors the preservation of existing borders by establishing close cooperation with all its neighbors (Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine), and is in favor of all of them joining a united Europe. PC is also very interested in our achievements and contacts in European affairs (as well as the non-governmental initiatives) and the affairs of the Polish community abroad, as we understand it (the congresses of the *Polonia* diaspora). PC supports Pr[esident] Wałęsa, but not uncritically.[31]

Grocholski decided, probably to some degree as a result of his discussions with PC members, that as a party this organization founded by the twin brothers Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński was almost too similar to the NiD. Indeed, during the transition period of 1989–1991, it was difficult to choose unambiguously among the various groups originating from the umbrella of Solidarity that combined social demands with a vision of escaping from the Soviet-controlled zone. Declarations of support for European integration may have been made, but the ultimate political profile of the PC was far from either a party promoting social concerns in the spirit of Christian Democracy, or that of a federalist grouping. It seems that this is what Grocholski wanted the PC to be, and instead of offering his colleagues a sober assessment of its platform, he in fact merely reported his own wishful thinking. It is also possible that Grocholski, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, was trying to find the right arguments to convince his colleagues in London to join in the political life of Poland. The whole plan, however, ended in failure, and another couple of years of carefully observing the political scene in Poland deprived even Grocholski of his illusions.

Nevertheless, he did not cease in his attempts to enter into partnerships with various political organizations in Poland. Much more promising were his meetings with the *Polska w Europie* (Poland in Europe) colloquium (from 1991, a foundation) and with the Center for International Studies attached to the Senate of Poland.[32] These meetings resulted in the creation of the Polish Council of the European Movement (Polska Rada Ruchu Europejskiego, PRRE)—effectively, on 21 November 1992, although formally the District Court in Warsaw only registered the organization on 24 January 1994.[33] Its first chair was long-time Poland-based Catholic activist Andrzej Wielowieyski, and its first secretary-general was Zygmunt Skórzyński, co-founder of Poland's Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs in 1956.

The participants in the PRRE founding meeting received greetings from various Western leaders, including from the president of the international European Movement Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the movement's secretary J.H.C. Molenaar, the president of the UEF and chair of the European Parliament Egon Klepsch, the secretary-general of the UEF Gerard Wissels, as well as from several people described as "the Belgian friends": the former prime minister and President of the European People's Party Wilfried Martens, the minister Pierre Harmel, the former prime minister and minister for foreign affairs Mark Eyskens and

the Member of the European Parliament Fernand Herman.[34] Although the contacts with these "Belgian friends" might well have been the work of other prominent Poles abroad like Jerzy Łukaszewski, then Poland's ambassador to France and the long-time rector of the Collège d'Europe in Bruges, and Jan Kułakowski, the Polish ambassador to the European Communities and long-standing chair of the World Confederation of Labor, the participants in the PRRE's founding meeting only learned of these greetings thanks to Grocholski's letter.[35]

In this letter, Grocholski also wrote: "I ask the Council to consider, in its discussions and resolutions, the matter that is a constant subject of controversy, inhibiting the development of both the European Movement and the European Community: the opposition between federalism and the nation." He then explained:

> Organic, or natural, federalism guarantees the protection and development of Man, or the person, as well as for organic/natural human communities: the family, the parish and county, the region and the nation – which retains its state organization, ceding only enough sovereignty, and voluntarily at that, to the most minimal federal superstructure necessary for managing the common affairs of all of the nations of the federation. The federal authorities – the parliament, the court, the government – function in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. only in those cases that cannot be resolved at a lower level. Federalism enacts the slogan "unity in diversity," and that diversity is in the people and the nations.[36]

This was a kind of creed for Grocholski, in which he both argued for deeper European integration and reassured Poles—knowing these arguments as he did from many years of discussions in exile—that neither the nation nor the parish would be affected by this integration in its federal form. Grocholski also announced a practical proposal, aimed at urging Western nationals of Polish origin to join the European Movement, and to work through this organization for the unification of the whole of Europe. European unification was to cover not only the Cold War-era Western European member states of the European Communities, but also Poland and those of its neighbors that could meet the criteria for membership.

Grocholski also promised to affiliate the PRRE to the European Movement International, and he then kept that promise. The Poles' formal entry into the movement began in early 1993, with the Federal Council of the European Movement confirming it in December of that

year.[37] That month, in a speech delivered on behalf of the PRRE to the movement's Federal Council, Grocholski urged his Western European colleagues to undertake more intensive lobbying for their poorer and less secure brethren in East-Central Europe. In Grocholski's eyes, such a commitment should be predicated on practical help in paving its way into European structures, for example by creating a timetable for integration, affiliating with pro-European organizations from the region and bringing their own societies around to the vision of expanding "Europe" eastward.[38]

In the meantime, a Polish delegation consisting of Andrzej Wielowieyski, Zygmunt Skórzyński, Grocholski and Marek Poliwski took part in a conference of the European Movement organized in Munich in October 1993. As Karol Grabowski recalled, "in his talks with the PRRE's delegate Grocholski, [Valéry Giscard] d'Estaing [then President of the European Movement] expressed his delight at the presence of the Poles in the Movement, no longer as expatriates. The Community is counting on help to build the Union from those countries that should join the Community."[39] Indeed, this was an auspicious moment for building alliances, as the European Communities were already in the process of being refashioned into the European Union, pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty of February 1992.[40]

In subsequent years, Stanisław Grocholski continued to serve as the PRRE's delegate to European Movement meetings. He was also a delegate to NGOs in the European Union, and he worked to mediate between politicians and activists in Poland and politicians in Western Europe who were important from Poland's point of view. In his statements throughout the 1990s, he recalled that the situation in the countries of East-Central Europe was not stable, and called for the inclusion of this part of Europe as soon as possible into the zone of stability and security which the European Communities, and then the European Union, could offer.

Epilogue

It was this commitment to political and social affairs, as well as his strong commitment to Roman Catholicism, which made Grocholski a Christian Democrat in waiting, as well as a strong proponent of European integration. In Poland, however, no Christian Democratic party arose that would appreciate this European component.[41] Only a handful of

ephemeral Christian Democratic organizations appeared; meanwhile, post-Communist Poland's conservative parties, with their strong Catholic component, appeared to regard Europe with suspicion. The search for groups representing socially engaged Catholicism, which for Grocholski implied also a commitment to uniting the whole of Europe, did not bring any results. This is why the attempt to merge the NiD, the émigré group in which Grocholski passed as a Christian Democrat, with the PC ended in failure.

The political divisions that arose in Poland after 1989 ran counter to Grocholski's expectations. He remained associated with the PRRE, where long-time Catholic activists such as Andrzej Wielowieyski and Zygmunt Skórzyński were movement leaders; however, these men were no Christian Democrats.[42] Instead, they formed the political base for statesmen such as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the prime minister who led Poland out of Communism: his roots lay in Solidarity, yet he also formed a good relationship with the Christian Democratic parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, thanks to—for example—the Polish-German rapprochement he built up with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.[43] The difficulty for Christian Democratic groups in Poland turned out to be the lack of these kinds of horizontal linkages across national borders, memories of their ambivalence during the Communist period and the broader issues of divisions wracking the right side of the political scene in Poland. The initial support provided by émigré Christian Democrats such as Konrad Sieniewicz and Stanisław Gebhardt did not help.[44] It was probably all of this, which Grocholski knew very well, together with the specific nature of the environment that created the PRRE, that led him eventually, in 1997, to become a member of none other than Unia Wolności (the Freedom Union), a "catch-all" umbrella party with almost no reference to Christian Democracy. Its founder Tadeusz Mazowiecki had, in fact, memorably claimed, "I am a Christian and a democrat, but not a Christian Democrat."

Here ends the political journey of Stanisław Grocholski, a Catholic and a graduate of a Marian high school, willing even to work occasionally with representatives of the extreme right. His was a rich CV: in wartime, a graduate of the "Silent Unseen"; after World War II, an émigré politician and activist involved in European affairs; and a long-time trustee of the Veritas Catholic Foundation. His biography conveys well the complexity of the choices facing a Polish politician in the twentieth century who could not find his place either in the Christian Democratic

party in exile, nor, after 1989, in a Christian Democracy based on Polish soil. Stanisław Grocholski died in 2002 at his Belgian estate, Chateau du Valduc.

However, Grocholski's story is not only a history of difficult choices. It is also the story of the lost potential of Christian Democracy in East-Central Europe. The energy, creativity and commitment to Catholicism so characteristic of Grocholski could have worked in favor of the Christian Democratic pro-European grouping that he so desperately sought after 1989, and whose creation he had in fact expected. However, he was to be disappointed. And without a doubt there are many more such individual histories to be found in this part of Europe.

Translated by James Todd

NOTES

1. Sławomir Łukasiewicz, "Młodzi polscy chadecy na emigracji (zjednoczenie i sprawy międzynarodowe)," *Zeszyty Historyczne* no. 163 (2008): 51–99.

2. For broader context, see Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

3. On Grocholski's Catholicism, we find many answers in the extremely rich archival legacy he left (over 2000 folders). Of especial importance is no. 11, in which we find Grocholski's résumé, as well as an answer to the questions posed by Jan Ciechanowski as part of a survey prepared in 1985 for the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. These documents are the sources of much of the information contained in this text. I have reconstructed many of these threads in my book *Partia w warunkach emigracji: Dylematy Polskiego Ruchu Wolnościowego "Niepodległość i Demokracja"* (Lublin-Warsaw: IPN-KŚZpNP, 2014).

4. Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 21–61; Andrzej Luter, "Stowarzyszenie Katolickiej Młodzieży Akademickiej 'Odrodzenie' w Wilnie jako prekursor ekumenizmu i dialogu katolicko-żydowskiego w Polsce," *Forum Teologiczne* 7 (2006): 125–138, at 126–127.

5. Łukasiewicz, *Partia w warunkach emigracji*, 56.

6. On Polish governments in exile, see, e.g., Dariusz Gorecki, *Polskie naczelne władze państwowe na uchodźstwie w latach 1939–1990* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2002).

7. Stanisław Grocholski, "Kościół i polityka," *Trybuna* 58, no. 2 (1969): 13–16.

8. Father Kazimierz Sołowiej (1912–1979), during the war, pastor to soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces (Polskie Siły Zbrojne) in France, Algeria and Scotland. From 1948, parish priest in Edinburgh; in 1950–1955, secretary of the Polish Catholic Mission at Devonia Road. From 1961 until his death, parish priest of the Church of St Andrzej Bobola in London. See Zbigniew Siemaszko, "Dzieje parafii św. Andrzeja Boboli w Londynie," in *Kościół św. Andrzeja Boboli w Londynie: Przewodnik—historia—informacje* (London: Parafia św. Andrzeja Boboli, 1990), 88.

9. Main Library of Opole University (Biblioteka Główna Uniwersytetu Opolskiego), series VIII, Zarząd Okręgu Wielka Brytania 3, vols 1–2, Letter from Grocholski to Fr K. Sołowiej, London, 9 August 1956.

10. *Ibid*.

11. *Ibid*.

12. Łukasiewicz, *Partia w warunkach emigracji*, 538–542.

13. "Po zgonie ks. kardynała Griffina," *Biuletyn Działu Informacji Egzekutywy Zjednoczenia Narodowego* 56, no. 24 (1956): 64.

14. See the Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN), Stanisław Grocholski Papers, 692, the report of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Anglo-Polish Catholic Association, 2 July 1955.

15. Adam Kosiba, "O pracy wydawniczej Katolickiego Ośrodka Wydawniczego 'Veritas'," in *Złota Księga przyjaciół Katolickiego Ośrodka Wydawniczego "Veritas"* (London: Veritas, 1955), 5.

16. Thomas Aquinas, *Suma Teologiczna*, trans. Stanisław Bełch (London: Veritas, 1975–1986).

17. Grocholski was a trustee of Veritas in 1955, together with Adam Kosiba and Wojciech Dłużewski. The head of the institute was Józef Kisielewski: Kosiba, "O pracy wydawniczej," 9.

18. Bernard Cook, "Pax Romana and the Reconstruction of a United Europe along Christian Lines," in *Une Europe malgré tout, 1945–1990: Contacts et réseaux culturels, intellectuels et scientifiques entre Européens dans la guerre froide*, ed. Antoine Fleury and Lubor Jílek (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009).

19. "Z działalności członków PRW NiD," *Trybuna* no. 39 (1952): 6.

20. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1357, "Les exilés et l'Europe (rapport de M.S. Grocholski à la Conférence Européenne des Jeunes sur les Problèmes de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale-Paris, 5–7/6/1953)."

21. An extensive account of this conference can be found in *Wiadomości Związku Polskich Federalistów* no. 6 (1953).

22. *Social Conference of the European Movement, Press Bulletin* no. 5 (1950).

23. European Movement, *Central and Eastern European Conference organised by the Commission of the Central and Eastern European Movement: Full Report with introduction by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery* (London: European Movement, 1952), 126; "Konferencja Ruchu Europejskiego w sprawach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej," *Biuletyn Polityczny* nos 23–24 (1952).

24. On the basis of a list of members of the Polish Committee of the European Movement, see Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 626.

25. Many of these lines of inquiry, which are worthy of further exploration, can be found in his archives in the AAN.

26. Stanisław Grocholski, "Świat u schyłku XX stulecia," *Trybuna* 113, no. 57/113 (1988): 8–14.

27. On the concept of "refolution" as combining reform and revolution, see Timothy Garton Ash, *We the People: The Revolution of '89 as Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (Cambridge: Penguin Books, 1990).

28. Together with Grocholski's numerous contacts with the organizations to which he belonged, an important role was also played by the contacts made by his wife, Elisabeth Janssen (*primo voto* Plater-Zyberk, the daughter of the Belgian Treasury Minister Albert Édouard Janssen), creator of the Welcome to Belgium organization. Under the auspices of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, that organization helped the wives of diplomats residing in Belgium to get to know the country. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1031, a copy of a confidential letter by Grocholski of 23 December 1989.

29. *Ibid*., "Project to terminate the operations of NiD abroad and engage in activities in Poland," 28 February 1991.

30. The party manifesto, however, did not contain similar wording.

31. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1029, Note from Grocholski to the President of the NiD Central Executive Committee, Maciej Przedrzymirski, transcript, 28 February 1991; see also Biblioteka Polska w Londynie (the Polish Library in London), PRW 'NiD', col. 1495/13.

32. From 1995, the center operated as an NGO attached to the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation.

33. The PRRE council included Rev. Adam Boniecki (Kraków), Aleksander Gieysztor (Warsaw), Grocholski (Brussels), Jerzy Kłoczowski (Lublin), Jan Kułakowski (Brussels), Jerzy Łukaszewski (Brussels), Artur Międzyrzecki (Warsaw), Maciej Morawski (Paris), Józef Oleksy (Warsaw), Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (Warsaw), Zygmunt Skórzyński (Warsaw), Andrzej Wielowieyski (Warsaw) and Jacek Woźniakowski (Kraków). AAN, Stanisław Grocholski Papers. 1069, the Polish Council of the European Movement, communiqué for press and radio.

34. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1069, *ibid.*
35. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1069, Grocholski to Skórzyński, 18 November 1992.
36. *Ibid.*
37. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1071, Ernest Wistrich to Zygmunt Skórzyński, 29 January 1993. *Ibid.*, 1069, *PRRE i Ruch Europejski.* Grocholski had intended to announce officially the organization's establishment "at the international headquarters of the European Movement in Brussels." *Ibid.* [press release], the Polish Council of the European Movement.
38. AAN, Grocholski Papers, 1070, S. Grocholski, *Déclaration de la part du Conseil Anglais du Mouvement Européen à Varsovie présentée au Conseil Fédéral du M.E.I. à Bruxelles,* 17–18 December 1993.
39. Karol Grabowski, "Ruch Europejski – konferencja w Monachium," *Dziennik Polski,* 25 November 1993, 3.
40. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 379–471.
41. See Aleks Szczerbiak and Tim Bale's chapter in this volume.
42. In Skórzyński's case, disenchantment with Christian Democracy came early, in the first years of the Communist period, when first-hand experience with Communist cooptation of Polish Christian Democracy soured Skórzyński with regard to the long-term prospects of this political formation. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades,* 111–113.
43. See, e.g., Marcin Zaborowski, *Germany, Poland and Europe: Conflict, Co-operation and Europeanisation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 79–102.
44. On the divisions within the Christian Democratic movement in post-1989 Poland, see Dominika Sozańska, *Chrześcijańska Demokracja w Polsce: Przyczyny słabości i szanse rozwoju* (Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne—Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2011).

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Explaining the Absence of Christian Democracy in Contemporary Poland

Aleks Szczerbiak and Tim Bale

In the field of party politics, there is an implicit expectation that the party systems of East-Central Europe will over time come to resemble those of the western half of the continent. One of the obvious differences between these party systems and their Western European counterparts is that there are no cases of a Christian Democratic party that could claim anything like the success enjoyed by parties such as the German Christian Democratic Union–Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union–Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU–CSU), the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA), Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) or, before its implosion in the early 1990s, the Italian Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) party.[1] While in most countries in this relatively secular region of Europe this absence might come as no surprise, there is one in which, given the nature of its society and political

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divisions, one might have expected Christian Democracy, at least at first glance, to have gained a foothold and even to flourish.

That country is Poland—a nation of practicing Roman Catholics who make up around 95% of a population of 38 million, a large proportion of whom are still employed in the agricultural sector that, along with religious observers, traditionally supplied continental Europe's Christian Democratic parties with a core vote. This core vote cut across class lines and laid the foundations for a center-right that stood out against the redistributive politics of the left, the equally secular politics of liberalism and the capitalist politics of conservatism. When we look at Poland, however, there seems to be no such thing as a successful Christian Democratic party.[2] Despite the fact that almost all Poles were Roman Catholics and that religion has played an important part in contemporary Polish politics, none of the attempts to anchor self-identified Christian Democratic parties in post-1989 Poland have succeeded. Likewise, none of the successful parties operating in Poland meet the objective criteria for what constitutes a "classic" Christian Democratic party. In this chapter, we seek to examine and explain why this is the case: why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland?

The chapter begins by examining the historical traditions of Christian Democracy in Poland before discussing the fortunes of self-identified Christian Democratic parties in post-1989 Poland. It moves on to define more precisely the Christian Democratic party family and develop a set of five criteria against which we can identify and categorize political parties in post-1989 Poland—or elsewhere in Europe, and beyond—as having a "classic" Christian Democratic profile. It then applies those criteria to determine whether the main parties that have dominated Polish politics since 2005, and which either identify with or have at one time identified with the center-right, can be categorized as Christian Democratic. We also evaluate cases of moderately successful, overtly Christian-inspired parties against these criteria. Having established the lack of any successful Christian Democratic parties in post-1989 Poland, we then identify five factors accounting for the success of Christian Democracy in postwar Western Europe and examine the fate of these same factors in the post-1989 Polish context.

Polish Christian Democracy in Historical Perspective

Although, as we shall see, the Catholic Church has played an extremely important role in Polish history, Christian Democracy does not have deep historical roots in that country. Political entrepreneurs hoping to form a successful Christian Democratic party in post-1989 Poland did not really have any successful historical antecedents, or even much of a political tradition at all, upon which they could draw. Polish Christian Democratic groupings emerged at the end of the nineteenth century—a time when Poland remained partitioned between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia—in Upper Silesia and Greater Poland, regions under German administration, following the pattern of the influential Center (Zentrum) party. However, although all of the main Polish parties to emerge at this time (except for those on radical left) made frequent references to Christian values in their programs, Christian Democracy as a distinct political movement did not enjoy widespread support.

Nor were Christian Democratic parties especially influential during the period of the interwar Second Republic following the restoration of an independent Polish state in 1918. Although it enjoyed some support in the Christian trade union movement, during the interwar years, Polish Christian Democracy functioned primarily as a small and fragmented parliament-based movement. It was not until October 1937 that its various disparate elements consolidated with the formation of the Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP).[3] In 1945, there was an attempt to revive the Labor Party by its wartime leader Karol Popiel, and it operated openly for a short period. However, following increased persecution from the Communist authorities, the party executive suspended its activities in July 1946 and pro-regime loyalists gradually took over what remained of the party. The last vestiges of independent Christian Democratic political activity in Communist Poland ended in 1950, when a rump collaborationist faction of the Labor Party's remnants merged with the Communist satellite Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne).[4]

After the Labor Party was wound up, the remnants of Christian Democratic political thought continued largely as one current of thinking within the Catholic secular associations that the Communist

authorities allowed to function in a stringently controlled form on the margins of political life. The most prominent of these was the PAX Association (Stowarzyszenie PAX), established originally as a "collaborationist" organization comprising laity and priests alike who believed in the possibility of a rapprochement between Christianity and Marxism, and openly supported the Communist regime (which they hoped to "Christianize"). However, these licensed groupings also included the relatively more independent and potentially subversive (but, therefore, even more marginal and tightly constrained) milieu clustered around the *Universal Weekly* (*Tygodnik Powszechny*) newspaper and the self-styled Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej, KIK).[5] The latter network was established during the political "thaw" that followed the restoration of Władysław Gomułka as First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party in October 1956.

A motley crew of Catholic activists supported Gomułka's limited reform program, hoping that it would presage a more far-reaching relaxation of the political system. These included cultural activists belonging to the Znak (Sign) movement associated with the *Tygodnik Powszechny* weekly, together with some members of the PAX Association and lecturers from the Catholic University of Lublin (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, KUL—the only independent higher-education institution in the Communist Bloc). Although, unlike the PAX Association, the Znak movement maintained its independence from the Communist Party, they regarded the regime as an inescapable geopolitical reality and avoided engaging in overtly political activity. Rather, they attempted to carve out a niche for themselves within the Communist system by concentrating on cultural and educational activities aimed at promoting Christian culture and deepening religious faith. As a consequence, the authorities initially allowed this milieu to develop a network of around 500 Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs; however, as Gomułka's liberalizing reforms were quickly halted and reversed, this was soon reduced to only five (numbering at most a few hundred members each), one in each of Poland's major cities.[6]

During the Communist period, there were three main attempts to revive an independent Polish Christian Democrat movement.[7] The first of these was at the beginning of 1961, when a group of former Labor Party activists joined the Warsaw Catholic Intelligentsia Club and tried to use it as a platform for rebuilding Christian Democracy. However, the majority of the club's members supported the position taken by Znak,

rejecting the notion that the Church's social teaching and moral and ethical norms could be appropriated by a single party or, more broadly, that a political movement in a pluralistic society could be based on religious criteria.

A second attempt to turn Znak into a proto-Christian Democratic movement came at the start of the 1970s. This was the work of a group of activists associated with the Center for Social Documentation and Studies (Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, ODiSS) led by Warsaw Catholic Intelligentsia Club member Janusz Zabłocki. Four out of the five MPs in Znak's parliamentary circle supported Zabłocki, as did a number of priests and academics from KUL. ODiSS also succeeded in developing extensive contacts with the Christian Democratic international movement through the exiled leadership of the Labor Party in Western Europe.[8]

In the end, however, Zabłocki and his followers failed to win over a majority within the Warsaw Club, who feared that his initiative would draw the Znak movement too closely into official state structures and, ultimately, reduce it to simply another Communist satellite organization. These arguments appeared to be vindicated when Zabłocki and his supporters in the Znak parliamentary circle voted in favor of the controversial February 1976 amendments to the Polish Constitution that strengthened commitments to maintaining the "leading role" of the Communist Party in the Polish state, as well as "brotherly ties" with the Soviet Union. In fact, many of those associated with the *Tygodnik Powszechny*/Znak milieu who rejected Zabłocki's initiative came to work increasingly with the emerging "secular" democratic opposition.[9] Individuals associated with the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs also played a key role in the emergence of the Solidarity trade union movement in August 1980. On the other hand, Zabłocki and his followers broke away to form their own club in July 1976, which they dubbed the Polish Catholic Intelligentsia Club (Polski Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej). Shedding the Znak label altogether in 1981, Zabłocki and colleagues established the Polish Catholic Social Union (Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny), which kept its distance from the democratic opposition and continued to cooperate with Communist authorities.

Finally, there were also small groups of activists involved in the democratic opposition at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s that were both unambiguously Christian Democratic (unlike the *Tygodnik Powszechny*/Znak milieu) and anti-Communist (unlike the

Polish Catholic Social Union). However, these individuals and groupings played only a very marginal role in the Solidarity movement and in subsequent attempts to revive the Christian Democratic movement following the collapse of Communism and the emergence of pluralist, multi-party politics in 1989.[10]

No Successful Self-identified Christian Democratic Party in Contemporary Poland

So how have Christian Democratic parties fared in post-1989 Poland? Reviewing the fortunes of these parties is no simple task. For a start, it is not always easy to know which parties to classify as Christian Democratic. Even those parties with an explicit commitment to Christian Democratic principles have not always acted in keeping with their professed ideology, with some parties clearly (ab)using the label as a smokescreen to hide the lack of any distinctive program or policies.[11] However, for the purposes of this chapter, we are taking those parties that claimed to have a Christian Democratic identity at face value.

The early 1990s saw numerous unsuccessful attempts at establishing such "self-declared" Christian Democratic parties. For example, in 1991 Dehnel-Szyc and Stachura estimated that there were around forty Christian Democratic parties operating in Poland.[12] Most of them were either completely new parties that emerged from within the Solidarity movement, or attempts to revive historical parties that claimed continuity with the pre-Communist and pre-World War II Polish Christian Democratic movement. However, most of these were merely so-called "couch parties," of an ephemeral character, with no political base. Only six of them secured any parliamentary representation following the first fully free elections held in October 1991, even under the highly generous proportional electoral system.[13] So for the purposes of this analysis we confine ourselves to examining the fortunes of only the most (relatively) significant of these parties.

The first notable attempt to revive Polish Christian Democracy was the relaunching of the Christian Labor Party (SP) in February 1989, at a time when the pluralization of political life in Poland was just beginning. In fact, the SP's return to Polish political life predated the 4 June 1989 semi-free elections, in which opposition parties were allowed to compete with the Communists for the first time. The party claimed to be the successor to the historical Labor Party—suspended in 1946

on the initiative of its chairman, Karol Popiel—and was launched in part as an attempt to offer an alternative to the bipolar divide between Communists and Solidarity. The party's hopes rested on the prestige of its leader Władysław Siła-Nowicki—a renowned war hero, human rights lawyer and opposition activist, who had been a key negotiator between the regime and Solidarity in the mid-to-late 1980s and was then a vice-president of the Christian Democrat International.

However, the party failed to capitalize on this apparent potential and its impact on the Polish political scene remained negligible, with its membership peaking at around only 2000 members. The party split over the decision to support Siła-Nowicki rather than legendary Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa in the 1990 presidential elections. Subsequently, it participated in the October 1991 parliamentary elections as part of the "Christian Democracy" electoral bloc, together with four other small Christian Democratic groupings, winning 2.36% of the votes and five seats. It was a marginal grouping within the new parliament, and it went on to participate in the September 1993 parliamentary elections as part of a bloc formed by the Center Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum, PC). Having failed to obtain parliamentary representation, the party merged in February 1994 with Christian Democracy, another small grouping, to form the slightly renamed Christian Democracy–Labor Party (Chrześcijańska Demokracja–Stronnictwo Pracy). Thereafter, it participated in a number of initiatives intended to unite the center-right, eventually joining Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność"). The party secured one parliamentary deputy on its ticket in the September 1997 parliamentary elections, but then proceeded to fade into obscurity.

A number of other Christian Democratic parties emerged from within the Solidarity movement. The first notable one was the Center Agreement, launched in May 1990 initially as a broad (and somewhat ideologically incoherent) coalition of parties, political groupings and individuals supporting Wałęsa's presidential bid. (In fact, it originally included the Christian Labor Party.) However, at its first congress in May 1991, the PC transformed itself into a more structurally coherent and traditional member-based, unitary party, declaring its ambition to become a modern Christian Democratic party incorporating both liberal and agrarianist elements, modeled on the CDU–CSU.[14] A skeptic might well argue that this ambition derived more from admiration of the German party's electoral and organizational success than from any

ideological affinity. The party grew rapidly to 60,000 members, but it failed to gain the new president's hoped-for endorsement, at which point it pivoted from Wałęsa's most vocal supporter to one of his most dogged critics.

In the 1991 parliamentary elections, the Center Agreement emerged as the sixth-largest grouping, with 8.71% of the votes and forty-four seats. Soon afterwards, it suffered a series of damaging splits and all but abandoned the Christian Democratic agenda, preferring to focus on purging former Communists and secret service collaborators. The party then became part of the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition in 1996 (see below) and a dozen of the party's members were elected as deputies on its ticket in the September 1997 parliamentary election, before splitting in 1999 with the majority faction joining other small Christian Democratic and conservative parties to form the Agreement of Polish Christian Democrats (Porozumienie Polskich Chrześcijańskich Demokratów: PPChD - see below). A second faction remained loyal to PC founder Jarosław Kaczyński, continuing PC as an independent party—one that eventually formed the core of the new right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party launched in 2001.

Another "post-Solidarity" Christian Democratic grouping was the Party of Christian Democrats, formed in December 1990 on the initiative of a Christian Democratic circle based in Poznań, under the auspices of the Solidarity-backed Citizens' Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny). The party was intended to be a more authentically Christian Democratic grouping than the PC but remained much smaller and less electorally successful, never numbering more than 6000 members. The party won only 1.12% of the votes and secured the election of four deputies in 1991, although its leader Paweł Łączkowski went on to become deputy prime minister in Hanna Suchocka's 1992–1993 "post-Solidarity" government. It participated in the 1993 elections as part of the "Fatherland" Catholic Electoral Committee (Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy "Ojczyzna"), together with the clerical-nationalist Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN) and two other small parties: the Peasant Christian Party (by some accounts a Christian Democratic party, but probably more accurately categorized as agrarian liberal-conservative) and the Conservative Party (Partia Konserwatywna). However, the "Fatherland" bloc secured only 6.37% of the votes and thereby failed to cross the 8% threshold required for electoral coalitions to obtain parliamentary representation (higher than the 5% threshold for single parties).

The prospects for Polish Christian Democracy appeared to improve when twenty-two political groupings under the broad umbrella of the Solidarity trade union formed Solidarity Electoral Action in June 1996.[15] This was an ideologically eclectic and heterogeneous political conglomerate encompassing socially conservative trade unionists, (both economically interventionist and more liberal) Catholic nationalists and relatively secular liberal-conservatives. At the same time, this grouping also contained a strong self-declared Christian Democratic element. By the time of the September 1997 elections, Solidarity Electoral Action had expanded to encompass more than thirty such organizations, including the PC, the SP and the Party of Christian Democrats.[16] It went on to win the election with 33.83% of the vote and 201 seats and form a government led by former Solidarity economic advisor Jerzy Buzek, in a coalition with the post-Solidarity liberal Freedom Union (Unia Wolności).

Two months after those elections, a new union-sponsored political party, the Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement (Ruch Społeczny Akcji Wyborczej "Solidarność"), came into existence—nominally under Buzek's leadership, but in fact primarily inspired by Solidarity Electoral Action leader Marian Krzaklewski. The latter hoped—in vain, as it turned out—that all of the other existing parties would dissolve themselves into this new movement. The objective was to achieve a formal separation between political and union activity so that the Solidarity trade union would never find itself in the bind of having to protest against a government that it had, in large part, shaped. When it was formed, the Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement counted among its members Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, one deputy prime minister, several other government ministers, the speakers of both houses of parliament, over 100 deputies, 37 Senators and 3500 councilors. Although the party therefore reflected a relatively broad spectrum of political views, it was set up as a self-declared Christian Democratic party. Its programmatic documents, too, contained numerous references to Christian values.[17]

However, it is difficult to regard the Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement as a Christian Democratic party in any strict sense of the term. Indeed, from the outset, critics accused it of lacking any clearly defined ideology, Christian Democratic or otherwise, and being simply a clientelistic "party of power," intended to advance the political ambitions of Solidarity union leaders and individuals closely linked to the government.[18] Moreover, although the party was formed initially from the bottom up at the local level, achieving 40,000 members at its peak,

it was dominated by state and former union officials. As such, it never fulfilled its objective of becoming a mass, grassroots party.

It was not surprising, then, that Solidarity Electoral Action's spectacular 2001 election defeat, when it failed to secure any parliamentary representation, precipitated a major crisis within the Social Movement. A short-lived attempt to keep the party alive translated at an April 2002 conference into the removal of Solidarity Electoral Action from party's name; a new ideological statement moved the party toward a more "centrist" ideological profile, distancing it from its previous invocation of Polish Catholic traditions. However, reduced to 14,000 members by May 2002, after failing to win any seats in that year's local elections in coalition with the remnants of the Conservative People's Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe), the Social Movement dissolved itself into the new Center (Centrum) party in January 2004.

The right's electoral disaster of 2001 also scarred the Agreement of Polish Christian Democrats, a party formed in September 1999 on the basis of an agreement between the Party of Christian Democrats[19] and the majority faction within the PC, whose deputies had worked together under the auspices of the twenty-three-member-strong Christian Democratic Group within the Solidarity Electoral Action parliamentary faction. The objective had been to form a fourth, explicitly "Christian Democratic" pillar within Solidarity Electoral Action, alongside the syndicalist (Solidarity and the Social Movement), liberal-conservative (Conservative People's Party) and clerical-nationalist (Christian National Union) elements. At one time, the Agreement's leadership had considered merging and forming a unitary party with the Social Movement. However, the 2001 election defeat precipitated a major crisis in the party. Having left Solidarity Electoral Action in October 2001, three months later the Alliance of Polish Christian Democrats merged with the majority faction of the Conservative People's Party to form the Conservative Peasants' Party–New Poland Movement that, for its part, closed down when its supporters formed the new Center party in 2004.

There were also a number of other very marginal Christian Democratic parties not covered in this survey due to their peripheral nature. These include the Polish Christian Democratic Forum (basically, a political extension of the PAX Association). There were also agrarian parties emanating from the Solidarity movement that claimed to be directly inspired by Catholic social teaching or used the adjective "Christian" in their name. These included the Peasant Agreement

(Porozumienie Ludowe) that was formed originally in 1991 as an electoral coalition comprising the Solidarity farmers' union and two post-Solidarity agrarian parties: the Polish Peasants' Party–Mikołajczyk (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Mikołajczykowskie]) and the Polish Peasant Party–Solidarity (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe "Solidarność"). The Peasant Agreement became a unitary party when the Polish Peasants' Party–Solidarity broke away from the coalition to form the more liberal-conservative Peasant Christian Party. However, these are more accurately classified as agrarian or agrarian-conservative, rather than Christian Democratic, parties.[20]

Finally, Lech Wałęsa set up his own Christian Democracy of the Third Republic of Poland (Chrześcijańska Demokracja III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) party in the run-up to the 1997 elections, although it did not actually participate in the poll. Wałęsa hoped that this new party would capitalize on what he predicted would be the rapid demise of Solidarity Electoral Action and emerge as a future alternative on the center-right.[21] However, although some of its members were well-known figures associated with the former president, Wałęsa's party remained marginal: neither he nor Christian Democracy derived any benefit from Solidarity Electoral Action's eventual implosion. Indeed, it made no real attempts to develop a clear ideological profile, Christian Democratic or otherwise. The party, which Wałęsa deliberately kept small, was essentially just a vehicle for him to pursue his personal ambitions. In fact, the party ended up playing no role in his 2000 presidential bid (in which he won only 1.01% of the vote). Although it was involved in various subsequent initiatives to form new political groupings on the Polish center-right, none of these were successful. The party failed to stand in the 2001 elections and proceeded to fade into obscurity.

No Major Parties Meet the Criteria for a (Classic) Christian Democratic Party

In other words, none of these attempts to set up self-declared Christian Democratic parties in post-1989 Poland have been successful. As Tymoszuk aptly puts it, "the Christian Democratic movement in Poland after 1989 […] was divided, organisationally weak, and its programs were incoherent."[22] Moreover, none of the successful mainstream Polish parties currently in existence that identify, or have at any time identified, with the right or center-right have sought to profile themselves

self-consciously as Christian Democratic. Tellingly, this is true even of the parties that have become members of transnational Christian Democratic party networks. But is it possible to categorize any of these parties as at least "objectively" Christian Democratic, in the sense of fitting the "ideal type" of a Christian Democratic party?

In order to answer this question, we need to define more precisely the Christian Democratic party family and the criteria against which we can identify and categorize political parties as having a "classically" Christian Democratic profile. One of the simplest and most widely adopted approaches in the academic literature involves drawing on the international linkages that parties themselves establish in transnational party federations. As Mair and Mudde point out, in European Union (EU) countries in particular, direct elections to the European Parliament have stimulated increasing cooperation between like-minded parties in different member states, thereby helping to promote the institutionalization of official party groups in the European Parliament itself.[23] As a consequence, the various Christian Democratic parties in EU member states were transformed into a single transnational party federation, the European People's Party (EPP), as well as an associated European Parliament grouping.[24]

Although this approach enjoys the advantage of being relatively straightforward, easy to apply and in keeping with the parties' own subjective choices and actions, it also raises both general methodological and specific empirical problems.[25] In the case of the EPP (and, even more so, its European Parliament emanation), the most notable is perhaps the fact that, for reasons of political expediency, this transnational party federation has adopted an extremely expansive admissions policy.[26] As a consequence, it has included other moderate conservative parties that can less easily be identified as "objectively" Christian Democratic, such as the Spanish Popular Party or Forza Italia. Hanley has, for example, estimated that, of some sixty-four parties from thirty-two countries in the EPP's European Parliament grouping (including observers and associates), barely a third would qualify as Christian Democratic (even if we choose to be generous with the label).[27] They are increasingly outweighed by a combination of liberals, national-conservative parties and anti-core parties from the periphery. In other words, while *non-membership* in Christian Democratic transnational party federations may be useful as a criterion for *excluding* parties from the Christian Democratic category, *membership* in these organizations does not *automatically* qualify a party as Christian Democratic.

When it comes to ideology, there are essentially two views of "classic" postwar Christian Democracy. The first argues that Christian Democracy "can best be described as a left-wing branch of […] conservatism," albeit with some differences of emphasis.[28] Christian Democrats share conservatives' "respect for tradition, awareness of human imperfection, an emphasis on the natural social relationships in society and on the social need for religion, a clear preference for a form of affirmation of authority, the acceptance of a natural inequality among people […] and the defense of private ownership." At the same time, they also see it as their role to "guarantee the rights of organised religion and anchor specific Christian values in society," in order to offer "a more progressive social program (social capitalism), focusing to a large extent on the role of the intermediate social groups in society." They are also "less influenced by nationalism"—something which, perhaps significantly, distinguishes Christian Democratic parties not only from conservatism but from the inherently Catholic parties that came to dominate the politics of another country where Christian Democracy is routinely said to be absent: Ireland.[29]

The other view of classic Christian Democracy, championed by political scientists like van Kersbergen and Hanley, insists that it has a distinct ideological pedigree and comprises five distinctive, core elements.[30] First, in terms of their broad political philosophy, Christian Democrats have historically displayed a strong commitment to an organic, corporatist view of society, based on the idea that different social segments and interests can be reconciled. The notion of community, therefore, lies at the heart of Christian Democratic ideology and finds expression in the linked ideas of "personalism" and "solidarism."[31] "Personalism" views the individual as socially embedded and only able to reach fulfillment within the "natural" structures of society: family, community and the place of work. "Solidarism" involves the integration and reconciliation of different social groups.

In other words, Christian Democrats believe that society is composed of socially embedded persons rather than atomized individuals, as liberals would argue, and that individual rights and choices only gain meaning when framed within the context of a wider community.[32] But Christian Democracy also rejects the socialist notion that the collectivity can be more important than the individual, insisting that the former only exists to assist and complete the latter. Moreover, while Christian Democrats believe that all social groups have a specific role to play, they

also contend that all such groups are fundamentally equal. As a result, Christian Democrats reject the conservative emphasis on authority and elitism, in which one group's hierarchical social and political dominance is firmly entrenched, with social inequality held to be natural and desirable. For the Christian Democrat, then, the central goal of politics is to promote harmonious interaction and eliminate tensions between different social classes and individuals through negotiation and social accommodation.

Second, Christian Democrats are traditionally strong supporters of the family as the key means of achieving this societal equilibrium. Christian Democrats believe the family to be the cornerstone of the community—the primary vehicle for the transmission of social values and an ideal tool for social regulation—and therefore direct a significant amount of effort into supporting familial structures. A family-oriented approach to social policy is accompanied by a concomitant emphasis on conservative social and cultural values, which means that there is also a deeply traditionalist and moralistic thread running through Christian Democratic rhetoric. This tendency finds expression in a limited tolerance for all alternative social models, which sometimes leads Christian Democrats to openly malign single parenthood and homosexual relationships as a corrosive threat to the stability of the traditional family and, consequently, to the community as a whole.

Third, in terms of social and economic policy Christian Democrats have normally supported some kind of "state capitalism." They share with conservatives and liberals an essential (albeit qualified) belief in the beneficial power of a market-based economy, together with a conviction that private property constitutes an inviolable right and should be protected from an overly interventionist state. This notwithstanding, the latter is seen as having a duty to provide for all of its citizens, to protect the weak in society and to prevent the entrenchment of social exclusion. The German social market economy is, therefore, the archetypal Christian Democratic policy regime in which individuals, social groups such as business and the unions and the state all have rights and are constrained by mutual long-term obligations. Christian Democratic parties, therefore, have historically tolerated or even favored relatively high levels of public expenditure, particularly for the provision of social welfare, not as a means of economic redistribution but because the alleviation of poverty and the exercise of compassion are believed to mitigate the development of conflict between rich and poor. State intervention in and regulation of

the economy and the labor market would also prevent the development of an antagonistic relationship between capital and labor—hence the enthusiasm for (neo-)corporatist structures allowing worker input into management decisions and consultation among government, industry, the trade unions and other interest groups.[33]

Fourth, Christian Democratic foreign policy is underpinned by a strong emphasis on transnational, as well as domestic, partnerships.[34] As Hanley puts it, "more than any other political family, the Christian Democratic parties have striven explicitly for some kind of supranational identity; one would be tempted to say that perhaps the one thing they really share with liberals is a tangible discomfort in the face of raw nationalism."[35] Although Christian Democrats know that the nation, alongside the family and voluntary associations, is one of the communities in which humankind fulfills itself, "equally they know the fine line that often separates genuine identification with one's nation from unwarrantable pride and chauvinism."[36] This awareness derives in part from Christian Democrats' close association with the universalistic claims of the Roman Catholic Church, but it also relates to a worldview rooted in mutual understanding and reciprocity between individuals and groups (or, as Hanley neatly puts it, "making strangers into friends").[37] Christian Democratic parties' long-standing attachment to European integration as a means of overcoming nationalism flows logically from this worldview.

Fifth, Christian Democratic party programs are explicitly rooted in and underpinned by religiosity. Although the political philosophy of Christian Democracy is predicated on the application of general Christian principles and values to the governance of the state, rather than the formal "re-Christianization of society," Christian Democratic parties remain aware that their religious origins and the values that they embody are clearly inspired by, and originate from, Christian ethics. Christian Democrats are in politics above all to express a Christian vision of humankind and its destiny. And yet, although they may continue to enjoy close relations with—sometimes the explicit support of—the Catholic Church and its ancillary lay organizations, Christian Democratic parties are also self-consciously lay groupings and are not controlled by the Church hierarchy. Whenever possible, they keep the hierarchy at arm's length.

How do the two main parties that have dominated Polish politics since 2005—and which either identify with or have at one time identified

with the center-right—line up with these five criteria? Law and Justice was formed in April 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński to capitalize on the enormous popularity of his twin brother Lech, the Solidarity Electoral Action-nominated (but politically independent) justice minister. It was founded primarily as an anti-corruption, law-and-order party, encapsulated in its 2005 election slogan of building a "Fourth Republic"—a conservative project based on a radical critique of post-1989 Poland as corrupt and requiring far-reaching moral and political renewal. To begin with, at least, PiS mainly comprised individuals who had once been members of the Center Agreement party, although they were joined subsequently by defectors from two other Solidarity Electoral Action affiliates: the clerical-nationalist Christian National Union, and the more economically liberal and relatively secular Conservative Peasants' Party. Law and Justice won the parliamentary elections of 2005, and its candidate Lech Kaczyński was elected Poland's president that same year. Jarosław Kaczyński served as prime minister from 2006 until the party lost a snap parliamentary election in 2007. Lech Kaczyński's term of office ended abruptly in April 2010, when he died in a plane crash in Smolensk in western Russia. From 2007, Law and Justice was the main opposition party; in 2015, it became the first political grouping in post-1989 Poland to win an outright parliamentary majority. In that same year, its candidate Andrzej Duda was elected President of Poland.

At first glance, Law and Justice does, indeed, appear to bear a close resemblance to an archetypal Christian Democratic party. Its economic program was infused with social market rhetoric, and the party saw the state as fulfilling a significant regulatory and interventionist role to ensure economic security for its citizens. Its 2005 electoral successes were due, in no small part, to its commitment to the concept of a "social" or "solidaristic" Poland, arguing that it was the state's responsibility to build more solidarity between those who had succeeded in the new capitalist Poland and those who felt that they had lost out from economic transformation.[38] From the outset, PiS was a culturally conservative party strongly committed to traditional social values, particularly the importance of social policy to support the family. It also argued that the state should recognize and respect Christian values, which it considered to provide an axiological underpinning for civic activity in the public sphere.

However, Law and Justice never had any organic links with either the Catholic hierarchy or, at least to begin with, Catholic lay organizations.

Initially, its program was only loosely and implicitly informed by religious values. Law and Justice was extremely cautious about adopting too high a "religious" profile and very restrained in using such rhetoric for fear of putting off "secular" voters who might otherwise have been attracted by its social, economic and anti-corruption program.[39]

However, particularly toward the end of the 2005 election campaign, both the party and its presidential candidate made a much clearer pitch for the religious electorate.[40] Both became more closely associated with the influential clerical-nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja and its network of associated organizations and media outlets.[41] These included the "Radio Maryja Family" (Rodzina Radia Maryja), an organization formed from among the radio station's listeners, and various affiliated media enterprises: the "Trwam" ("I persist") TV station and *Our Daily* (*Nasz Dziennik*) newspaper. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that Radio Maryja was not linked to official Church structures.[42]

Although Law and Justice supported Polish accession to the EU, the party also had a strong anti-federalist, arguably "Eurosceptic," strand to its thinking, in many ways akin to the British Conservative Party.[43] Having initially aligned itself with the EPP, PiS subsequently decided to join, first, the anti-federalist "Union for a Europe of Nations" grouping in the European Parliament and later the "European Conservatives and Reformists" grouping. Law and Justice's ideology and program, therefore, reflected a mix of socially conservative, economically collectivist and national-patriotic influences. However, at its roots, the party's clearest defining characteristic, and the ideological core of its program, was always a commitment to the radical reform of the Polish state and the creation of a new moral, political and social order. This made it difficult to categorize in terms of Western party families, but one thing is clear: PiS was certainly not an archetypal Christian Democratic party.

Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) was also formed at the beginning of 2001, with the goal of capitalizing on the relative success of the independent liberal-conservative candidate Andrzej Olechowski in the 2000 presidential elections. In 2005, PO narrowly lost the parliamentary elections to Law and Justice, while its leader Donald Tusk was defeated by Lech Kaczyński in the presidential poll. Two years later, however, Civic Platform won a parliamentary contest, with Tusk becoming prime minister; in 2011, he became the first incumbent in post-1989 Poland to secure re-election. Tusk remained in office until November 2014, when he was replaced as party leader and prime minister by Ewa Kopacz.

The PO candidate Bronisław Komorowski was also elected president in 2010, defeating Jarosław Kaczyński in the wake of the Law and Justice leader's brother's untimely demise at Smolensk. And yet both PO and Komorowski lost their respective bids for re-election in 2015.

The substantial increase in the Civic Platform's share of the vote over the first decade of the 2000s stemmed, in large part, from its ability to construct a broader appeal that went well beyond its original "core" liberal electorate. Initially, the party attempted to re-position itself as more socially conservative, with a stronger national-patriotic discourse, which also involved developing a more religiously attuned profile. The key example was the Civic Platform's December 2001 "Ideological Declaration," a statement of self-definition citing the Ten Commandments as the basis of Western civilization and outlining the party's role as to "prudently support the family and traditional moral norms, which [have] served development and permanence," defend human life, ban euthanasia and limit genetic research.[44] This document shifted the party toward a more identifiably Christian Democratic ideological and programmatic profile. Moreover, although PO developed a more national-patriotic discourse, the party at large remained broadly supportive of the European integration project. From the outset, it was a candidate member of the European People's Party, and the party's Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) became full members of the EPP's European Parliament group after the June 2004 elections. The party also enjoyed consistently close bilateral ties with Germany's Christian Democratic Union.

However, the Civic Platform's economic program emphasized the importance of competitiveness, sound public finances and low taxation rather than a social market approach based on welfarism, state intervention and corporatism. Until it came to office, the party had attempted to profile itself as a modernizing form of pro-market, right-wing liberalism, focusing on economic issues and emphasizing the importance of competitiveness, sound public finances and low taxation. Its signature policies included commitments to introduce a "flat tax," to reduce costs and regulations for employers and strengthen their position vis-à-vis trade unions, to create more flexible labor markets, to reform public finances to reduce the state budget deficit, to protect the independence of the National Bank of Poland in setting monetary policy, to pursue a more restrictive and targeted welfare policy, to introduce education vouchers and university tuition fees, and to pursue partial privatization of the

health service. Above all, and notwithstanding its subsequent embrace of social conservatism, the Civic Platform was in the first years of the twenty-first century an economically liberal low-tax and free-market party. Moreover, despite its attempts to develop a more conservative ideological profile and invoke religious ethics as a source of values in the axiological sphere, this economic program was originally at the core of PO's philosophy and party identity. As a result, the PO's core identity was that of a right-wing liberal or liberal-conservative, rather than a Christian Democratic, political party.

In the mid-2000s, the party also tried to position itself as a moderately socially conservative party, which involved developing a more religiously attuned ideological program that shifted the party in the direction of Christian Democracy. At the same time, the PO also incorporated a stronger national-patriotic discourse, even including elements of Euroscepticism. However, as part of a deliberate strategy of diluting its profile in pursuit of electoral success, particularly after the 2007 contest, Civic Platform appeared to function more as a self-consciously eclectic "centrist" party—or a non-ideological "party of power," as its critics dubbed it. This pivot involved both downplaying the PO's economic liberalism and refashioning the party as a "modernizing" and pro-European "moderate" grouping, in opposition to the alleged forces of provincial conservative nationalism. The PO also diluted its social conservatism, aligning itself more closely with the socially liberal cultural establishment.

Earlier Moderately Successful Christian-Inspired Parties also Fail to Meet These Criteria

Not only the PO, but also more long-standing, moderately successful and apparently Christian-inspired parties likewise failed to meet our five criteria for categorization as Christian Democratic. One party that has sometimes been categorized as Christian Democratic, enjoying medium levels of electoral and political success in the 1990s, was the Christian National Union.[45] ZChN was formed in October 1989 by twenty Catholic lay organizations linked to the Solidarity democratic opposition movement. Although it was relatively small, with only 3000 members, the Union quickly emerged as one of the most significant parties on the Polish right. In the October 1991 parliamentary elections, it spearheaded the Catholic Electoral Action coalition (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka),

which emerged as the third largest grouping, securing 8.79% of the vote and forty-nine deputies, and went on to become a leading member of both the "post-Solidarity" Suchocka and Olszewski governments in power during the parliament of 1991–1993. The party participated in the September 1993 elections at the head of the "Fatherland" electoral committee together with three smaller right-wing parties, but this grouping failed to cross the threshold required to secure parliamentary representation. The party went on to play a leading role in the formation of the Solidarity Electoral Action: twenty-five Christian National Union deputies were elected as part of this coalition in 1997.

During the 1997–2001 parliament, ZChN members held key positions in the Buzek government, and the Union emerged as one of the four main elements within the Solidarity Electoral Action parliamentary club, acting as the organizational focus for the grouping's clerical-nationalist wing. However, in March 2001, a number of the party's leading members split off to form the new Right-wing Alliance (Przymierze Prawicy) party, which ran in the September 2001 elections in coalition with (and then went on to merge with) PiS. The rump Christian National Union remained affiliated to Solidarity Electoral Action until the 2001 elections, but left the disintegrating coalition following its heavy electoral defeat, moving to the margins of the Polish political scene.

As its name suggests, the Christian National Union was certainly a Christian-inspired party. It stressed its close links with the Catholic hierarchy; argued that public policy should be rooted in Christian values and notions of "social solidarity" and supported the family as the most effective guarantor of individual freedom, social stability and cohesion. However, the party had a much more expansive approach to promoting Christian moral values than an archetypal Christian Democratic party: for example, it sought institutional guarantees to underpin the Church's influence over public life in order to assure the Polish state an explicitly Catholic character. Indeed, the party was committed to a deep and thoroughgoing reconstruction of Poland's entire social, economic and political order on the basis of Catholic values—a process that, its leaders argued, was necessary for the nation's moral and political renewal. During the early 1990s, the Christian National Union was often accused of being a fundamentalist party attempting to turn Poland into a theocracy (*państwo wyznaniowe*).[46] Unlike Western European Christian Democratic parties, which did not restrict themselves to specific

denominations, ZChN required its members to be practicing Catholics. And yet, the Christian National Union always contained relatively moderate and pragmatic, as well as more fundamentalist and traditionalist, factions. Its participation in government throughout the 1990s prompted many of its leaders to tone down their earlier radical rhetoric.

The Christian National Union's ideology was also characterized by the importance that it attached to ensuring that the state reflected Polish national and cultural traditions. This was in stark contrast to Christian Democratic parties' traditionally "universalist" approach, exemplified by their long-standing attachment to European integration as a means of overcoming nationalism. Although the Christian National Union never opposed Polish accession to the EU in principle, it always adopted an extremely cautious approach toward European integration, advocating a "Europe of nations" and emphasizing the need to preserve national identities and limit encroachments upon state sovereignty.[47] For example, ZChN never sought membership in Christian Democratic international organizations such as the EPP, preferring to develop links with the more Eurosceptic, conservative-nationalist "Union for Europe" in the European Parliament, the precursor to the "Union for a Europe of Nations."

It was this much more expansive approach toward promoting, and ensuring that the state reflected Catholic values in public life, together with the party's strong emphasis on national-patriotic rather than "universalist" principles, that makes it difficult to classify the Christian National Union as Christian Democratic.[48] Indeed, its synthesis of Catholic and national values meant that, in many ways, the party appeared more anchored in the political traditions of the pre-World War II National Democracy movement (Narodowa Demokracja) than postwar Western European Christian Democracy. For example, in his typology of Polish parties, Sielski distinguishes between a "Christian Democratic orientation"—characterized by an attachment to Christian social teaching, solidarism and the family (and in which he locates the Center Agreement, Christian Democracy–Labor Party and the Party of Christian Democrats)—and a "Christian-national" current which attempted to ensure that Catholic religious norms and Polish national-cultural values played a predominant role in public life (in which he includes the Christian National Union).[49] In fact, the Christian National Union was always an ideologically heterogenous party that did, indeed, include a Christian Democratic strand, but also drew on other Polish

national-patriotic and conservative traditions, including those associated with the Christian-inspired wings of the Polish agrarian and labor movements. As Sabbat-Swidlicka aptly put it in 1993, the Christian National Union

> holds to the West European, Christian-democratic tradition linking the universal values of Christianity with the liberal, democratic social order but adds to it a specifically Polish element: appreciation of the historical and national role the Catholic Church has always played in Poland. Its leaders make no secret of their belief that, in a country with a predominantly Catholic population, religion should be "an organising element of public life". They claim that in the civilization to which Poland belongs there are no ethical norms other than Christian ones.[50]

Another Christian-inspired party that was fairly successful was the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin). The League was formed in the run-up to the 2001 parliamentary elections. Although it formally participated in the elections as a political party, the League was originally a coalition of various clerical-nationalist parties and right-wing groupings.[51] With support from Radio Maryja, it was able to harness the radical "religious right" electorate that had previously been subsumed within broader right-wing parties and coalitions such as Solidarity Electoral Action. As a result, the League of Polish Families emerged as the sixth-largest grouping to secure parliamentary representation, winning 7.87% of the vote and thirty-eight seats. It then survived the defection of some of its smaller affiliates and leaders to reorganize itself as a more coherent, unitary, member-based party. In the 2005 elections, the League succeeded in retaining most of the support that it had achieved in 2001 (7.97% and thirty-four seats), and, although initially the party went into opposition, in May 2006 it joined the PiS-led government as a junior coalition partner. The League's young and extremely ambitious leader, Roman Giertych, became a deputy premier. In the 2007 elections, however, the party failed to reach the threshold for parliamentary representation and was subsequently relegated to the margins of Polish politics.

As its name implies, the League was certainly a very strong supporter of conservative social values and of strengthening the legal and economic position of the family. Axiologically, the party invoked Christian values directly and explicitly to justify its strong opposition to homosexual marriage and adoption, as well as euthanasia, cloning and any attempt to

liberalize Poland's abortion laws. All of these issues occupied a prominent place in the party's program and rhetoric. The party portrayed itself as representing an alternative to both collectivist and liberal approaches to political economy, claiming to support a social market program, with a strong emphasis on policies to promote welfare and social protections.

At the same time, there were at least three important respects in which the League of Polish Families did not fit the ideal type of a Christian Democratic party. First, the party interpreted its support for "Christian values" in a distinctive way, closely identified with a particular ultra-traditionalist, integralist, pre-Second Vatican Council strand of Polish Catholicism. This was an approach shared by many Polish lay Catholics and clergymen, particularly those clustered around Radio Maryja and the network of organizations and media attached to the broadcaster. However, Radio Maryja was not linked to official Church structures and, moreover, since 2002 the radio station had begun to distance itself from the League anyway.[52] It became clear already during the 2005 elections—and even more so thereafter—that Radio Maryja was actually closer to the Law and Justice party.

Second, the League's economic program included proposals for high levels of state regulation and protection, particularly for small- and medium-sized (i.e. Polish) firms against large (i.e. foreign) enterprises; maintaining a dominant role for the state in "strategic sectors"; a highly critical approach toward privatization and strong support for trade unions. In other words, it was probably *too* economically interventionist, even compared to an archetypal Christian Democratic party.

Third, to an even greater extent than the Christian National Union, the League of Polish Families fused religious fundamentalism with radical nationalist rhetoric, making it an implacable and principled opponent of the European integration project. The party spearheaded the campaign for a "No" vote in the June 2003 Polish EU accession referendum; its MEPs joined the anti-EU "Independence and Democracy" grouping in the European Parliament following the 2004 European Parliament elections. All of this highlighted the fact that, although the League drew on a range of different conservative traditions, given its emphasis on defending national sovereignty against encroachment from international organizations, it was really a clerical-nationalist rather than a Christian Democratic grouping. As such, the League drew more on the traditions of Roman Dmowski's prewar National Democracy movement—particularly the wing representing the ideology espoused by

Jędrzej Giertych and his son Maciej (Roman's grandfather and father, respectively).

These two parties highlight the fact that national-patriotic themes appeared to be a much more important element in the Polish expressions of what might be termed "political Catholicism" than among its Christian Democratic counterparts elsewhere. The explicitly confessional Christian National Union and League of Polish Families usually combined their religiosity with a nationalist discourse, producing a synthesis of Catholic and national values that reflected the political traditions of the prewar National Democratic movement. One specific implication of this tendency appeared to be that Polish political Catholicism was much less committed to federalism and more Eurosceptic than its Western European counterpart, which was strongly influenced by Christian Democratic ideas of transnational reconciliation. Unlike the Polish confessional version, Western European Christian Democracy included a long-standing attachment to European integration as a means of overcoming nationalism.

In summary, then, parties in post-1989 Poland that have called themselves Christian Democratic have thus far failed, while none of the country's more successful parties—including both those who identified with the center-right and the more explicitly Christian-inspired parties—could be called (or called themselves) Christian Democratic. In the remainder of this chapter, we attempt to explain why this might be the case by analyzing the conditions that led to the emergence of successful Christian Democratic parties in post-1945 Western Europe. We then go on to compare this framework with the conditions that prevailed in post-1989 Poland to see which of these conditions were present and which were absent.

REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A GENERALIZATION

One of the most important books on comparative politics to have appeared in the last twenty years is Stathis Kalyvas's *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Kalyvas's main argument is that the formation of confessional political parties in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe occurred even though they were neither envisaged nor desired by their initial sponsors, that is, conservative political elites and the Roman Catholic Church.[53]

The only flaw in what is otherwise an exemplary combination of social-scientific and historical methodologies is Kalyvas's claim that there was a "remarkable continuity" between the parties that he examines and the Christian Democratic parties that came to dominate the politics of a number of Western European countries for several decades following the end of the Second World War. This idea is rejected by most experts on the postwar period, historians as well as political scientists—a consensus that arguably calls into question (albeit implicitly) Lipset and Rokkan's assertion that the political formations of the postwar period reflected the cleavages of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The historian Martin Conway insists that "'Christian Democrats' (of the pre-war era) were precursors of the post-1945 Christian democrats in name only."[54] The political scientist Carolyn Warner likewise maintains, "the post-war Christian democratic parties were *not* lifted from storage as a continuation of the pre-war Catholic or Christian democratic parties. Maintaining that they were […] seriously distorts the process of post-war party formation."[55] In short, in order to understand why Christian Democratic parties came about and how, at least in some countries, they became so successful, we have to look at "a particular conjuncture"—the first few years after a regime change that saw totalitarian dictatorships or their puppet governments replaced by democratically elected administrations.[56]

Doing this does not mean, however, that we are obliged to give up the search for generalization and an explanatory framework that can be exploited in another time and another place, not least in a period that saw a similarly momentous regime change. In fact, a comprehensive survey of the literature on the postwar development of continental Christian Democracy reveals a number of factors associated with success. It also reveals that the absence or weakness of one or more of those factors in a particular country could make it less likely that a Christian Democratic party would do as well there as its counterparts in countries where those factors were in play. We discuss here each of the factors in turn, in descending order of importance, indicating the extent to which they were important in the immediate postwar in a number of continental European countries that did or did not see the formation of a substantial Christian Democratic party.

By a "substantial" Christian Democratic party, we mean those that, in the wake of the first elections following World War II, and until at

least the 1970s, regularly took between a third and two-fifths of the national vote, were crucial components of most governments and had no significant conservative competitor. Examples of countries that hosted such parties are Italy (DC), Belgium (Christian People's Party–Social Christian Party, Christelijke Volkspartij–Parti Social Chrétien), the Netherlands (the present-day CDA and its forerunners such as the Catholic People's Party, Katholieke Volkspartij) and Germany (the CDU–CSU). The country that might have provided fertile soil for such a party, but in the end did not, was France: there, despite a potentially promising start, the Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire, MRP) soon lost out, first electorally and then governmentally, to competitors on the center-right.[57]

Factors favoring Christian Democracy in the years immediately following World War II included, in descending order of importance, the following.

1. *A substantial (and preferably practicing) Roman Catholic population*. "There was," as Conway puts it, "no secret to the postwar electoral success of Christian Democracy: it relied primarily on the successful yoking of political choice to religious commitment."[58] The higher the level of the latter, the easier it was to achieve the former. Italy and Belgium were almost entirely Catholic and, while attendance at mass varied between regions, on average it exceeded 40% in those countries in the late twentieth century.[59] In France, only around a quarter of the population was Roman Catholic. Other countries where the Catholic population was in the minority, such as (West) Germany (nearly half) and the Netherlands (about a third), surmounted this hurdle, however, by incorporating or cooperating with political Protestantism.

   Success, of course, also depended on a solid majority of the Catholic population actually voting for the Christian Democrats. This was almost certainly achieved in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, where something approaching nine out of ten practicing Catholics did so. Such voting was reasonably solid in Germany, where about half of all practicing Catholics voted for the CDU–CSU. In France, these voting patterns have been considerably less stable.[60] All parties, we should note, were almost certainly given a temporary boost by something of a post-World War II boom

in a historical Catholic religiosity that presumably offered some consolation for the miseries of war and occupation.

2. *A real and pervasive fear of a victory (or takeover) by a militant secularist, anti-clerical, egalitarian and potentially totalitarian left.* This was a widespread—and, given events like the coup d'état in Prague in February 1948—a reasonable anxiety all over continental Europe. Anti-Communism had become commonplace in the course of the interwar and war years, while in the postwar period many Communist parties received a boost from their association with resistance to German occupation, and/or through material assistance from a recently triumphant Soviet Union.[61] The apparent (if evanescent) unity of those parties encouraged many to believe that only a similarly united effort could beat them back.[62]

3. *Bedrock support from (a) newly enfranchised female voters, (b) agricultural sectors and (c) the propertied middle classes.* Although the reasons why can only be surmised (the usual suspects are the parties' "pro-family" rhetoric and women's relative religiosity), women, many of whom were voting for the first time in the aftermath of the war, seem to have provided significant support for the Christian Democrats of Western Europe.[63] Unlike levels of Catholic piety, however, there seems to have been little variation between countries on this score. The same can be said for the other sources of core support—the so-called "rural–middle class alliance" or "farmer–bourgeois alliance." Some of these had supported the authoritarian right in the interwar era, but in the postwar period these electorates helped to push Christian Democracy away from a thoroughgoing social corporatism toward a more free-market economic policy, albeit one that preserved agriculture as a special case and looked to a supranational Europe to help matters.[64]

4. *Potential competitors on the right either (a) delegitimized by their participation or tacit acquiescence in totalitarian regimes or (b) unwilling or unable to organize themselves rapidly.* Like fear of Communism, this demobilization applied across much of continental Europe in the wake of World War II. In essence, the responsibility for the crimes of the dictatorial regimes and/or their puppet governments, and indeed for the war itself, lay fairly obviously—if not always directly or completely—with the conservative right. Indeed, so heinous were they that there could be little

consideration, at least immediately, for the "successor parties" that more peaceful transitions to democracy have produced. One enormous advantage enjoyed by Christian Democratic politicians was that they could present themselves as moderates untainted by association with the previous regimes. Many of them had, in fact, been persecuted or even imprisoned by those regimes, joining in the patriotic resistance against them.

At first glance, the matter of delegitimization is not one of those factors that might allow us to discriminate between one country and another. There is, however, one obvious qualification—and it applies to France. There, there clearly was a leader, Charles de Gaulle, around whose charismatic presence a center-right alternative to Christian Democracy could have been constructed from the outset had he not been reluctant to get more directly involved. Polls in 1946 suggested that over two-thirds of those who supported the Popular Republican Movement, which at that point was seen as closest to the general, would have voted for a party led by de Gaulle himself. Little surprise, then, that once the Gathering of the French People (Rassemblement du peuple français) was founded in 1947, so many of them defected, at great cost to the Popular Republican Movement, whose leaders declined to "break right" with the Rassemblement, preferring instead to carry on a center-left coalition in defiance of what they saw as a damaging trend toward bipolarization.[65]

In fact, this apparent French exceptionalism points to a more general consideration, namely, that the continued success of Christian Democratic parties across Europe in time varied according to their capacity to persuade more unambiguously right-wing electors and politicians to stay with them, a capacity that varied according to institutional logic. Hence Italian Christian Democracy started out well, but once it became evident that the Italian electoral system would afford small authoritarian parties a foothold, it lost some support—although this was compensated (as it was in Belgium until the national cleavage could no longer be contained) by centrist governmentalism. The CDU–CSU, on the other hand, could bank on Germany's high threshold to make voting for a more radical right-wing option seem like a waste of time.[66]

5. *A Church hierarchy with great prestige and a centralized organization that, during crucial early elections, threw its weight*

and resources behind its chosen Christian Democratic party. This is clearly a factor that allows us to discriminate between countries, partly because it emphasizes the role of agency, but also because there were considerable institutional differences between what was ostensibly the same Church in different countries. No doubt, this explains why it is the main focus of Warner's valuable recent work—a study that reveals that the decision of the Church in some countries to support a particular party contributed to "locking in" that party as the main center-right contender, notwithstanding the fact that the choice was sometimes *faute de mieux* to start with and occasioned more than the odd regret afterwards.[67]

In Italy, the Lateran Accords of 1929 had left the Church in the highly centralized control of a Vatican with immense autonomy and financial power. Once this agreement had been re-cemented into the postwar constitution by Christian Democracy, which also engineered an exit from the government of the left, the Church ceased flirting with more authoritarian forces on the right. Especially in 1948, its mobilization on DC's behalf was uncompromising.[68]

In Belgium, Cardinal Van Roey, widely regarded as a wartime patriot and a man whose hatred of the secular left matched even that of Pope Pius XII, similarly swung the Church behind the Christian People's Party–Social Christian Party. This meant an effective strangling of Belgian Christian Democracy's potential rival, the Belgian Democratic Union (Union Democratique Belge), at birth.[69]

In Germany, political euthanasia, rather than infanticide, was the order of the day. The Catholic hierarchy had been left with considerably reduced institutional capacity by a Nazi regime from which it had (albeit not immediately) asserted its independence. Yet it nonetheless proved instrumental in killing off the prewar (Catholic) Zentrum—the better to provide a sure start to the new-kid-on-the-block, the cross-confessional CDU. This was a party whose untainted brand seemed (correctly, it turned out) to offer a better chance of embedding the Church's taxation and property rights, as well as its welfare operations, in the postwar state order.[70]

The Netherlands provided something of a contrast here in that there was less of a sharp break with the prewar tradition of political Catholicism. At the same time, the material and moral support of bishops who, like their compatriots in other countries, were seen to

have stood apart from (and frequently up to) the Nazis, was almost as strong.[71]

The obvious exception was France. There the Catholic Church hierarchy was, first, tainted by association with Vichy; second, hamstrung by a powerful secular tradition that made it difficult to argue against a separation of Church and state without provoking a massive backlash; and, third, not the relatively centralized, unitary actor that its counterparts in other countries could claim to be. Consequently, in spite of the fact that the early signs for the Popular Republican Movement boded well, the Church hierarchy would not, and to some extent could not, go to bat for the party—a low-profile approach that became even lower once it became clear that the party would not only not give the Church what it wanted on crucial questions (like religious schooling), but that, unlike most of its counterparts in other European countries (at least in the early years), it was also prepared to govern in coalition with the left.[72]

6. *Support and campaigning on behalf of a Christian Democratic party by groups and associations in civil society.* If ever there was a golden age of the mass party in Europe, it was the immediate postwar. Just as some Communist and Social Democratic parties spawned entire subcultures—to spread the party line and keep the faithful loyal—some Christian Democratic parties enjoyed "a distinct political advantage in having a network of extra-party ties: unions, lay associations, social and charitable activities and parish organisations"—even if these did not always strictly stay on message.[73] But here again, there was variation and contrast between countries.

One of the reasons why the Vatican's support for Italian Christian Democracy was so effective in the immediate postwar period was that, during the Mussolini years, the nationwide lay organization Catholic Action had remained both intact and subordinated to the Church. It had branches in each of the country's 24,000 parishes, and these were mobilized to create so-called Civic Committees that did direct electoral campaigning.[74] An important element of Catholic Action was the Christian Association for Italian Workers (Associazione Cristiana per Lavoratori Italiani), which agitated successfully for a separate Catholic trade union federation in 1947, and which remained essentially loyal to Christian Democracy until the 1960s.[75] By that time, however, DC had in some ways weaned itself off its reliance on Church-influenced organizations

and money by replacing those advantages with the clientelism and patronage afforded it by its long-time control of the state.[76] Nevertheless, the role of intermediary institutions for the delivery of welfare in Italy (as elsewhere in continental Western Europe), meant a continued role for what would now be called "faith-based" organizations. The "pillarized" societies of the Netherlands and Belgium likewise gave local Catholic/Christian Democratic parties strong connections to civil society groups that, in turn, worked to keep the parties strong, helping them to maintain support across class lines.[77]

The phenomenon of cross-class support, however, did not hold so true in (West) Germany. Although they gradually reclaimed a long-standing role in the delivery of social and health services during the postwar decades, Catholic associations had been rendered virtually defunct by the Nazi regime. Moreover, the CDU–CSU never developed a truly organic link with the trade union movement.[78] In France, Catholic Action survived the war, but it kept the bishops very much at arm's length; fearing a backlash if it did get too involved in politics, its leaders decided to invest its energies (and limited resources) into reawakening the Christian spirituality of average citizens, rather than helping a particular political party.[79] As for more secular interest groups, the anti-Communist, conservative farmers' federation quickly wrote off the Popular Republican Movement after it pushed for rationalization of the agricultural sector. Meanwhile, the Christian trade union, the 900,000-strong French Confederation of Christian Workers (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens), was skeptical about its capacity to act as an advocate of workers' interests and keen to retain its own autonomy.[80]

7. *A Christian Democratic party that delivers the basics to the Church but manages to achieve relative autonomy from the Church hierarchy and its more contentious policy demands.* Christian Democratic parties had to offer the Church something in return for its support, while at the same time minimizing the extent to which carrying out a confessional agenda would cost the party the support of non-confessional and/or moderate voters. This was not an easy task in the immediate postwar: many bishops and cardinals were seized after 1945 with an "integralist urge" to use the state to secure Catholic hegemony and the defeat of modern values that they saw as sinful. At the same time, some of the Church's more

contentious demands, especially on schooling, had considerable (and therefore tempting) potential to mobilize core supporters.[81]

This delicate balancing act was made somewhat easier by an almost universal (if fuzzy) commitment among Christian Democratic parties to a "social Catholicism." On the one hand, this ideology went down well with a Church that was ambivalent about unbridled capitalism.[82] On the other, it signaled to the wider electorate that they were progressive (but still anti-Communist) parties less hung up on religion than many of their detractors contended.

However, the balancing act worked better in some countries than others. In Italy, for instance, Christian Democracy managed to deflect Vatican pressure for an alliance with monarchists and neo-Fascists by re-securing the Lateran Pacts and persuading the papacy that the DC coalition with moderate secular parties was the best way to defeat the ultimate enemy: Communism. DC's gambit proved to be a successful holding operation, buying the party enough time to get its patronage politics up and running. In Belgium, the Christian People's Party–Social Christian Party replaced the adjective "Catholic" in its name with the more ecumenical (and conciliatory) "Christian." The Belgians worked hard to present theirs as a party open to all those who supported its progressive, centrist social and economic policies—a strategy that it then undermined somewhat in the 1940s and 1950s by taking the Church's side during successive national crises—first over the monarchy, and then over the deconfessionalization of education.[83] The German CDU–CSU, meanwhile, resisted pressure to include the 1933 concordat and the confessional school system in the new Federal Republic's basic law. Konrad Adenauer saw the concordat as tainted by association with the Nazi regime; cast together with the confessional school system (which the Church could pursue anyway in individual Länder), it could have alienated the mass following that a true "people's party" on the right should seek.[84]

This approach of keeping the Church at arm's length was taken even further, indeed probably too far, by the French Popular Republican Movement. Like Italian Christian Democracy, the MRP saw its role as more of a broker or arbiter between parties trapped by economic interests and bipolar traditions.[85] Unlike their Italian counterparts, however, the French could not, or would not, offset the downsides of that role (the constant compromises, the blurred

identity) with patronage politics or a continued association with Catholicism. Indeed, representatives of Christian Democracy in postwar France, if anything, made a point of not doing what the Church wanted; no surprise, then, that the MRP paid the price of fading into oblivion.[86]

Christian Democracy in Post-1989 Poland—The Missing Links

While, superficially, Poland looks like fertile ground for Christian Democracy, the factors that were crucial to the initial formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in postwar, newly democratic continental Western Europe were largely absent during the emergence of democratic, multi-party politics in post-1989 Poland. So what then were the missing links that meant that such a party did not emerge? In the case of post-1989 Poland, only the first of our seven conditions—a substantial, practicing Roman Catholic population—appears to have been present unambiguously following the transition out of Communism. Our second condition—fear of a takeover by a militant, secularist, anticlerical, egalitarian and potentially totalitarian left—existed, but only in attenuated form. Meanwhile, none of the other five factors that we have identified as being crucial to the success of postwar Western European Christian Democratic parties were present—or, if so, then only in a very limited or qualified form.

Surveys taken in the early 1990s found that 97% of the Polish population declared themselves to be Catholics while, according to the Polish General Social Survey of 1992, 49% of respondents attended mass at least once a week. Together, these statistics showed Poland to be one of the strongest Catholic communities in Europe.[87] Historically, the Church was felt to have played a crucial role in upholding and defending Polish national identity. During periods when Poland did not have independent statehood or when national sovereignty was constrained, membership in the Catholic Church represented, as Monticone puts it, a form of "resistance to foreign domination and oppression by non-Catholic powers."[88]

During the Communist period, the Church was also an important focus for opposition to the regime.[89] Moreover, beginning in the mid-1970s, when "only" 75% of Poles declared themselves to be Catholic, Poland experienced a religious revival, particularly following the election

of John Paul II to the papacy in 1978. So there were also clear analogies with the boom in traditional Catholic religiosity that parts of Western Europe experienced immediately following the Second World War. At the end of 1980s, the Church "performed the role of de facto official opposition and of the mediator between the [C]ommunist government and Solidarity," and played a key role in the Round Table negotiations that led to the collapse of Communism and transition to democracy.[90] All of this meant that, when the democratic breakthrough came in 1989, the Catholic Church was the most trusted and respected public institution in Poland.[91]

That said, the early 1990s also saw the emergence of a secular, anti-clerical (but also clearly non-totalitarian) left. This was partly in reaction to the way in which the Church—as Korbonski puts it, "dizzy with success" at the overthrow of Communist rule—moved quickly to expand its influence in the public sphere, exploiting its prestigious position and the political opportunities that opened up when parties sympathetic to its agenda gained substantial parliamentary representation following the October 1991 elections.[92] First, religious education was reintroduced in state schools. Second, the parliament passed a highly restrictive law controlling the practice of abortion. Third, a new law regulating radio and television stipulated that broadcasters had to respect Christian values. Fourth, in 1993 the outgoing government signed a concordat between Poland and the Vatican, an agreement which—critics felt—gave the Church excessive influence and privilege. What made matters worse is that the government representing Poland as party to the concordat took this step after it had lost a vote of no-confidence in parliament, while MPs were still debating a new constitution that was, among others, set to define the nature of the Church–state relationship. Fifth, the Church was also heavily criticized for appearing to intervene too overtly on behalf of Christian and pro-Church parties and candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections.

Evidence of an anti-clerical backlash could be seen in a number of different metrics. First, the Church saw substantial—and rapid—erosion in its public approval ratings: from over 80% at the end of 1980s, to only 46% in November 1992.[93] A March 1991 CBOS survey also found that the Church had lost its position as Poland's most trusted institution (to the armed forces).[94] Although its ratings rose again steadily in the mid-to-late 1990s, the Church was never able to recover its earlier levels of support and reclaim its position as a relatively unquestioned moral and

political authority.[95] Second, this decline in the Church's prestige was combined with a feeling that it had an excessive influence on public life; Polish Social Survey data from 1992–1997 consistently found that more than half of Poles felt that this was the case, with this figure peaking at 65% in 1993.[96] Third, the Communist successor party Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) exploited growing public anxiety about perceived excessive clerical influence as one of the springboards for its return to power following the September 1993 parliamentary elections.[97] Moreover, in spite of Church's fairly open support for him, the incumbent Wałęsa lost the 1995 presidential election narrowly to Democratic Left Alliance leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski which, as well as demonstrating the limits of the Church's political mobilizing capacity, also meant that anti-clerical politicians controlled parliament, the government and the presidency.

The clerical–secular divide that emerged as a major source of political divisions in Poland in the early 1990s did not manifest itself in terms of a split between Catholics and non-Catholics. Rather, it was based on divisions between those who felt that the Church should play a prominent role in Polish public life and those who feared that this could lead to clericalism and religious fundamentalism. For example, an October 1994 Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, CBOS) survey divided Poland into more or less equal clerical-traditional (42%; 17% radically clerical) and secular (46%; 17% radically secular) camps based on respondents' views on issues such as religious education, abortion and the ratification of the concordat. These figures corresponded closely to levels of Church attendance, with regular church-goers believing that the Church should play an active role in politics and more skeptical, less devout Catholics, as well as non-believers, advocating for the separation of Church and state.[98]

This clerical–secular divide developed into an important and sustainable determinant of party identification and voting behavior. A flood of sociological research on Polish voting behavior found that levels of religiosity (measured by regularity of Church attendance) and attitudes toward the Church's public role were the most significant factors in determining patterns of ideological left-right self-placement, as well as party and candidate preferences, in every post-1989 Polish election.[99] Indeed, the clerical–secular divide combined (and overlapped) with the closely linked factor of attitudes toward the Communist past to form a "historical-cultural" axis that dominated party competition

in post-Communist Poland throughout the 1990s. The "left" was identified primarily with a more positive attitude toward the Communist past, liberal social values and relative secularism, while the "right" was associated with anti-Communism, conservative social values and a strong adherence to the Catholic faith.[100]

For sure, the Democratic Left Alliance was a thoroughly reformed and socially democratized party; this was not the representative of an orthodox Communist, and potentially totalitarian, left such as, say, the Italian Church faced in the immediate postwar. By the time of the October 1991 parliamentary elections, there was certainly no realistic prospect of a return to the *ancien régime*. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s, there did appear to be both a strong potential social base for a Christian Democratic party in Poland and, given the resurgence of an anti-clerical left, a clear incentive for the Church hierarchy to actively promote a party that could protect its interests.

Why, then, did this party never materialize? First, the social constituencies that had provided the bedrock of electoral support for Western European Christian Democracy (newly enfranchised female voters, the rural-agricultural sectors and the bourgeoisie)—our third condition—were either missing in post-1989 Poland, or Polish Christian Democrats faced serious electoral competition for their votes. Female voters in post-Communist Poland were not necessarily any more likely to vote for Christian Democratic or Christian parties, or indeed other center-right parties, than they were to support liberal or social-democratic ones. Some, like their newly enfranchised counterparts in postwar Western Europe, may have been attracted by Christian Democratic "pro-family" rhetoric. However, others seem to have been equally hostile to its patriarchal overtones, the concomitant "traditional" role that it ascribed to women and its implicit disapproval of single parenthood. Some Polish female voters may also have been discouraged from voting for Christian Democratic parties by the Church's stance on issues such as abortion and birth control.

Although estimates vary on the precise figures, a third of Poles lived in rural areas in the early 1990s, with one-fifth of the Polish workforce employed in agriculture, the overwhelming majority as peasant smallholders. Uniquely among Soviet Bloc countries, peasant smallholdings had survived in Communist Poland as an independent sphere of the economy, creating—unusually for a post-Communist state—a substantial segment of the electorate with reasonably well-defined and crystallized

social and economic interests and a collective identity. This substantial rural-agricultural electorate could have provided Polish Christian Democracy with a potential social base of support, as it did crucially for postwar Western Europe's Christian Democratic parties. However, Polish Christian Democrats faced significant competition for this electorate from the outset, from other center-right parties, from the ex-Communist/social-democratic left and, perhaps most significantly, from agrarian parties.

Indeed, initially it was the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), formed in May 1990 as the successor to the former Communist "satellite" United Peasants' Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe), that emerged as the most significant party among this segment of the electorate.[101] The rise of the agrarian party reflected this political family's much longer history and more substantial purchase in the Polish countryside than the Christian Democratic movement.[102] In fact, there were many aspects of the PSL's ideological and programmatic profile that overlapped with archetypal Christian Democracy. These included: an attachment to the Catholic Church's social teachings and support for the application of Christian ethics in public life; a commitment to order, tradition and evolutionary social change; a belief in fostering harmonious social relations between capital and labor based on "personalism"; and a critique of both collectivist socialism and "liberal" models of capitalism. Indeed, the Peasants' Party leadership periodically considered transforming the PSL into an overtly Christian Democratic party in order to broaden its appeal, even seeking membership in the EPP. After all, the EPP included many agrarian parties that had transmuted into Christian Democratic formations, such as the Austrian People's Party and the Bavarian Christian Social Union.[103] By mobilizing the protest vote of the (rural) periphery against the (urban) center, the PSL could conceivably have also taken a page out of the playbook of Scandinavia's small (Protestant) Christian Democratic parties.

However, the PSL remained, at root, an interest-based "class" party wedded to a peasantist ideology, known as "neo-agrarianism" in its modernized form, rather than a values-based (proto-)Christian Democratic movement. Neo-agrarianism shared many of the characteristics of Christian Democracy; in the case of transmuted agrarian parties, Christian Democratic parties generally retained a commitment to protecting the agricultural sector. However, agrarian and Christian Democratic parties differed on the importance that they attached to,

among others, the centrality of peasant culture to the maintenance of national identity, and the role of religion as the well-spring of political ideology and motivation for political action.[104] Moreover, although the Polish Peasants' Party went into electoral decline in the mid-to-late 1990s, this did not spell the end of agrarian politics in Poland, as many of PSL's voters initially turned to another agrarian party, the radical Self-defense (Samoobrona) grouping—and later its former coalition partner, PiS—instead of Christian Democracy.

As for Poland's middle-class voters, their identity and their interests were by no means as clear as they had been in postwar Western Europe, particularly during the early years of the post-Communist transformation. In spite of Communism's attempts to produce socially undifferentiated societies that deprived individuals of institutionally or socially structured identities from which to derive political interests, post-1989 Poland was clearly not socially homogenous.[105] However, the new social identities that were emerging as a result of the transition to the free market were in considerable flux; this instability, in turn, marked the birth of multi-party politics in Poland.[106]

In more established democracies, an easily identifiable property-owning "middle class" with a strong subjective sense of its own self-interests might have provided a natural social base for center-right parties, including Christian Democratic formations. In Poland in the early 1990s, however, an amorphous set of social and economic alignments meant that such a class was still only in the process of formation. Indeed, insofar as middle-class voters represented an objectively identifiable social and economic constituency, evidence showed that they were as likely to vote for liberal parties—more unambiguously committed to promoting low-tax, free-market programs that were attractive to these kinds of voters—as they were for Christian Democrats committed to greater state intervention.[107]

Second, running counter to our fourth condition, there were many other, equally credible political alternatives to Christian Democracy available on the center-right in post-1989 Poland. This represented one of key differences relative to the situation faced by Christian Democrats in postwar Germany or Italy, whose potential competitors on the right were either delegitimized by their participation or tacit acquiescence in totalitarian regimes, or unwilling (or unable) to organize themselves rapidly. Poland had the largest anti-Communist democratic opposition in the Soviet Bloc. Indeed, it was the only country in which a mass opposition

emerged along the lines of the Solidarity movement. This unique constellation of events meant that Poland was also the most ideologically diverse of Soviet Bloc countries. Christian Democracy was thus only one of many ideological currents that existed, including conservatism, (clerical and more secular) nationalism and (social and conservative) liberalism together with a (much weaker) social-democratic strand. A plethora of new parties, therefore, emerged in 1989 from Solidarity and the democratic opposition movement.

Moreover, the record of Christian Democratic activists during the Communist period was a somewhat ambiguous one. For sure, many of the leaders of post-1989 self-declared Polish Christian Democratic parties such as the Center Agreement, Polish Christian Democracy and the Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement had impeccable records of activism in *Solidarność*. Like their postwar Western European counterparts, these Catholic politicians could present themselves as untainted by association with the previous, non-democratic regime. But so could many of the other party-forming elites on the center-right, and they too were, to a greater or lesser extent, prepared to help advance the Catholic Church's political agenda. Moreover, in addition to individuals with "heroic" biographies such as Siła-Nowicki, many of those involved in early attempts to reactivate Christian Democracy in post-Communist Poland, such as the SP, had been tied to Janusz Zabłocki's "accommodationist" Polish Catholic Social Union and the cooptation of Znak's parliamentary circle. In other words, these individuals lacked the prestige of association with the Solidarity movement and, if anything, seemed somewhat tainted by Communist-era political affiliations.[108]

At the same time, most of the Catholic intellectuals in the *Tygodnik Powszechny/*Znak milieu had worked closely with the democratic opposition—most prominently, the Soviet Bloc's first non-Communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who took office in the summer of 1989. During the Communist era, Mazowiecki and his colleagues had opposed moves to revive the Christian Democratic movement; after 1989, too, they were not interested in re-establishing Christian Democratic parties.[109] Indeed, most opposed attempts by any party to appropriate Catholic social teaching (and, indeed, all efforts to develop parties on the basis of religious criteria) as anachronisms in a pluralistic society. Insofar as they were involved in party politics, individuals from the Znak movement tended to become members of less overtly Church-inspired parties. Mazowiecki, for example, became in 1990 the founder and first leader of

the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna), which comprised socially liberal and more "secular" conservative elements, as well those who drew their inspiration more directly from Christian values and Catholic social teaching.[110]

Third, while, like its counterparts in postwar Western Europe, the Polish Catholic Church certainly enjoyed high levels of prestige and a disciplined organizational structure, its hierarchy was unwilling to throw its moral weight and resources unambiguously behind any one pro-clerical party, Christian Democratic or otherwise. Thus, our fifth condition went unmet. The Church had emerged from the Communist period as the most popular and trusted public institution in Poland. Moreover, given that it was the only significant civil society actor able to operate under a Communist regime that had claimed a monopoly on all aspects of social organization and subordinated all intermediary bodies, the Catholic Church was also one of the few institutions to enter the post-1989 period with a developed, nationwide organizational infrastructure. In 1993, for example, there were 25,187 Catholic priests organized in 9266 parishes, providing any putative Polish Christian Democratic party with a strong potential social-associative base.[111] Indeed, one of the reasons for the anti-clerical backlash in the early 1990s was the fact that the Church was felt to have intervened too overtly in electoral politics, with some leading clergymen openly identifying themselves with various post-Solidarity, pro-Church parties.

However, it is important to note that the Episcopate never *officially* endorsed a specific party nor candidate in parliamentary and presidential elections. Most cases of clerical intervention in the electoral process involved individual clergymen rather than the Church hierarchy per se. Interventions also generally involved supporting a number of, rather than a single, Christian or pro-Church party or candidate. As Sabbat-Swidlicka put it in 1993, "If the clergy as a group can be said to identify with the broad reform movement begun by Solidarity, there are certainly no grounds to identify either the hierarchy or the lower clergy as such with specific right-wing parties."[112]

The closest that the Church came to an official endorsement was in the October 1991 parliamentary elections, when the hierarchy at least gave the impression that it was openly supporting a number of Church parties, specifically the Christian National Union-dominated Catholic Electoral Action coalition.[113] In his account of the 1991 elections, Korbonski, for example, claims, "The Church's involvement

was formidable: the Episcopate used its powerful institutional network and its media essentially to tell the voters how to vote. During Sunday masses, priests would give out detailed instructions to their parishioners, and the churches were freely used to display campaign literature favored by the bishops."[114] For sure, a clergyman, Father Bijak, played a key role in brokering the Catholic Electoral Action bloc.[115] Likewise, at least one senior cleric, Archbishop Józef Michalik, openly praised the coalition for defending Christian values.[116] Christian National Union spokesman Ryszard Czarnecki also claimed that Catholic Electoral Action enjoyed the support of the Polish primate, Cardinal Józef Glemp, a claim that the cardinal neither confirmed nor denied.[117] As Sabbat-Swidlicka put it:

> Many candidates of the Christian-National Union assumed that because they were supporting the Church's positions on moral issues they could automatically count on the support of the hierarchy, and they did not hesitate to use this fact as a campaign platform. Indeed, it [was] difficult for it [the Episcopate] to disavow completely a party that includes the Church's objectives in its political program and election campaign […]. For its part, the Christian-National Union […] said that while it accepted the fact that the Church did not indicate its political preferences for any specific party, the Christian-National Union had always felt [it had] "the Church's moral support".[118]

Finally, on election day itself, an "instruction" appeared in many parishes that specified five parties and political groupings that the faithful should support in the election: Catholic Electoral Action, the Center Agreement, Christian Democracy, the Party of Christian Democrats and the Peasant Agreement coalition.[119]

At the same time, there are conflicting accounts over the role that the Church played in the 1991 elections, particularly the extent of its overt support for Catholic Electoral Action. As noted above, the Episcopate's formal position in 1991, as it has been for every election since 1989, was not to identify with or support any particular parties or candidates. Officially, it limited its involvement to a general and unspecified call upon the faithful to vote for honest, trustworthy and competent candidates who were in favor of promoting Christian ethics and values, and against egotistical, immoral and corrupt ones who advocated separation of the Church and state.[120] Even the Episcopate's "unofficial" intervention through the election-day "instruction," which the bishops—of

course—denied having issued, involved a range of parties, rather than a single one.

By the time of the next parliamentary elections in 1993, the Church hierarchy made a more conscious effort to avoid the impression that it was endorsing any particular party.[121] Once again, the Episcopate limited itself formally to urging the faithful to vote and to issuing general guidelines.[122] The new official tone was exemplified by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, who took over as the Episcopate's secretary-general in 1993 and, in that capacity, became one of the architects of the Church's more pragmatic and restrained approach to electoral politics. Pieronek stated clearly that "the Church is not a political party and should never identify with any party […] today the most important mission for the Church is to spread the Gospel, not dabble in politics."[123] Nonetheless, although there were fewer reported incidents of the ordinary clergy's involvement in this election campaign, many pro-Church party leaders were still allowed to campaign in parishes and other Catholic lay organizations. The most significant intervention by a leading clergyman was a meeting at the home of Gdańsk archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski with a number of pro-Church parties that later formed the loosely structured "Fatherland" electoral coalition spearheaded, once again, by the Christian National Union.[124]

Indeed, spurred on by the policies of the new Democratic Left Alliance-dominated government, both the Church hierarchy and individual clergymen once again played a high-profile role in the 1995 presidential elections. These ended in an extremely closely fought and highly polarized second-round run-off between incumbent Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, his ex-Communist challenger from the secular left. The Episcopate issued two statements during the campaign warning the faithful not to choose anyone "who, during the time of the totalitarian regime, wielded power at the highest party-government level." Although these statements did not name Kwaśniewski, they were clearly directed against him.[125] Particularly during the second round, bishops and priests openly voiced their support for Wałęsa, while Cardinal Glemp declared that the choice between the two candidates represented one between Christian values and neo-paganism, and instructed the clergy to hold special masses to pray for the election of Wałęsa and mobilize the Catholic vote.[126] Earlier in the campaign, it was a clergyman, Father Maj, who acted as a political broker, attempting (unsuccessfully) to persuade the right-wing parties to agree on a single presidential candidate.[127]

However, the Church learned from its mistakes in the early 1990s. Elements within the Episcopate, with Bishop Pieronek as the most visible example, began to re-evaluate their approach to electoral politics, looking for alternative ways to achieve their political objectives. Direct involvement in electoral politics and the impression of having endorsed particular parties or candidates had, the new episcopal voices argued, both undermined the Church's authority and ultimately proved counter-productive, generating anti-clerical backlash that contributed to the defeat of pro-Church candidates in 1993 and 1995.

The fruits of this new approach became evident in the September 1997 parliamentary elections. Radio Maryja—which had always operated fairly autonomously from the Church hierarchy—and some individual, local clergymen continued to play an overt role in mobilizing the core "religious right" electorate, particularly for the pro-Church Solidarity Electoral Action coalition. However, the Church hierarchy maintained a more disciplined neutrality throughout the 1997 campaign, thereby preventing the secular left from mobilizing the anti-clerical vote effectively.[128] The Church has adopted the same approach in every subsequent Polish parliamentary and presidential election.[129] As Father Adam Schulz, spokesman for the Episcopate, put it (perhaps a little over-optimistically) in 1998, "the times when priests told their faithful how to vote are over."[130]

Fourth, in Solidarity—a large, anti-Communist and strongly pro-Catholic trade union rooted in conservative social values—any putative Polish Christian Democratic party certainly had the kind of strong potential civil society ally that aided its counterparts in postwar Western Europe. Although it never recovered the membership levels of its 1980–1981 heyday (nearly 10 million), the newly re-legalized Solidarity entered the post-Communist period with around 2 million members, while its credible claim to have a direct organizational linkage to the original movement meant that it retained an even larger social constituency for whom the Solidarity label remained an important "mobilizing myth." As such, Solidarity was, potentially, both an important organizational partner for center-right parties in post-1989 Poland and, specifically, a hypothetical source of institutional support for a putative Polish Christian Democratic party.

Our sixth condition was therefore partially fulfilled. However, unlike in postwar Western Europe, where Catholic trade unions (at least initially) threw their weight solidly behind Christian Democratic

parties, Solidarity was unwilling to support or campaign on behalf of any of the "post-Solidarity" center-right parties, including the Christian Democratic ones. The union put up an independent slate of candidates in the 1991 and 1993 parliamentary elections. It did finally decide to join the post-Solidarity parties in sponsoring the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action in 1996, and then the Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement that emerged in 1997 to take over the union's political functions.

This was probably the closest that post-1989 Poland came to the emergence of an electorally successful self-declared Christian Democratic party. However, the Social Movement developed as a largely non-ideological "party of power" at arm's length from the union. Together with the other parties that comprised the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition, it disintegrated following the 2001 elections. For its part, the union decided eventually to withdraw from electoral and party politics in the run-up to the 2001 elections, chastened by its bad experiences with Solidarity Electoral Action. In the 2005 elections, for example, although the leadership of the union wanted to support the Law and Justice party, it was forced to hold back from doing so explicitly for fear of antagonizing rank-and-file who retained bad memories of the union's foray into party politics. Instead, the union had to express this support by proxy, supporting the party's presidential candidate Lech Kaczyński enthusiastically instead.[131]

In some sense, the seventh and final explanatory factor identified above, that Western Europe's Christian Democratic parties delivered the basics to the Church while managing to achieve relative autonomy from the ecclesiastical hierarchy and its more contentious policy demands, was simply irrelevant in the Polish case. For one thing, no self-declared Christian Democratic party ever achieved enough electoral support to find itself in a position where it could "deliver" for the Church in this way. For another, the Church was, broadly speaking, able to achieve virtually all of its political objectives without having to "pick a winner." This was partly because, to a greater or lesser extent, virtually every center-right party in post-1989 Poland stressed its commitment to Christian values and promoted policies sympathetic to the Catholic Church's social teachings and political agenda anyway.[132] As the survey of the main center-right parties currently operating in Poland shows, even a grouping such as the Civic Platform, which emerged from a relatively secular liberal milieu, stressed its commitment to Christian values.

As Bishop Pieronek put it, "if there are more parties inspired by Church teaching, that might be even better (than a single Christian Democratic party), because there will be more than one party able to explain the Church's teaching in practice."[133]

However, the Church also, as Korbonski put it, "succeeded in deterring the anti-Church opposition" from attempting to roll back its gains.[134] For sure, the anti-clerical left returned periodically to the question of abortion. It even opened up new fronts on issues such as Church finances—especially the so-called Church Fund, which collected revenue from lands seized from the Church by the Communists after the war and from which it continued to be a beneficiary—and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) rights.[135] Given the importance of these moral and cultural issues in determining left-right ideological self-placement in post-Communist Polish politics, this was particularly the case when the secular left felt a need to invigorate its "core" electorate.[136] However, there have been no attempts to reverse the Church's political gains on issues such as religious education in schools, respecting Christian values in the broadcasting media and the concordat. Even on the abortion law, which the secular left has attempted to liberalize on a number of occasions, the Church was able to construct a hegemonic discourse accepted by some sections of the left, such as Kwaśniewski when he was president. The bottom line of this discourse was that the existing law represented a "compromise" solution that should not be challenged—in spite of the fact that it was the second most restrictive in Europe (after Ireland).[137] As one commentator put it, "every government, regardless of its political color, considers its first obligation to maintain proper relations with the bishops," while "subordination to the Church is almost a condition of conducting politics in this country" such that the Church "defines the sphere of democratic debate."[138]

An interesting illustration came in the 2003–2004 negotiations on the EU constitutional treaty, when even the secular Democratic Left Alliance-led government presided over by non-believer Leszek Miller made inclusion of references to Europe's Christian heritage in the treaty's preamble one of Poland's core negotiating demands.[139] Indeed, the Polish delegation at the June 2004 EU summit, when the treaty was finally agreed, again led by another secular-left prime minister, Marek Belka, was the last to concede on this issue, drawing praise from Pope John Paul II for its stance.[140] The Democratic Left Alliance-led government's support for this demand was partly a reflection of the fact that

it needed, and was grateful for, the Church's support in the June 2003 EU accession referendum.[141] But it also illustrated the way in which the Church had succeeded in shifting the terms of the political debate in its favor during the 1990s. Its more subtle and restrained approach to electoral politics also appeared to be more successful than its rather blunt interventions in the early 1990s. These successes included helping the pro-Church Solidarity Electoral Action to secure victory in 1997 and (arguably) preventing the Democratic Left Alliance from winning an outright parliamentary majority in 2001.

Conclusions

No self-declared Christian Democratic party has been successful in post-1989 Poland, while none of the currently "successful" Polish parties that identified with, or had at one time identified with, the center-right had self-consciously sought to profile themselves as Christian Democratic. Nor did any of them fit the ideal type of an archetypal Christian Democratic party that we set out in our five-point model. In other words, those parties that claimed to be Christian Democratic failed, while those that succeeded could not be described (nor did they describe themselves) as Christian Democratic.

In order to understand why this was the case we have laid out, in descending order of importance, the factors that were crucial in the formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in postwar Western Europe:

- first, a substantial (and preferably practicing) Roman Catholic population;
- second, a real and pervasive fear of a victory (or takeover) by a militant secularist, anti-clerical, egalitarian and potentially totalitarian left;
- third, bedrock support from newly enfranchised female voters, rural-agricultural sectors and the propertied middle classes;
- fourth, potential competitors on the right that were either delegitimized by their participation or tacit acquiescence in totalitarian regimes, or unwilling or unable to organize themselves rapidly;
- fifth, a Church hierarchy with high levels of prestige and a centralized organization that, in crucial early elections, threw its weight and resources behind its chosen Christian Democratic party;

- sixth, support and campaigning on behalf of a Christian Democratic party by sympathetic groups and associations in civil society;
- seventh, a Christian Democratic party that delivered the basics to the Church, but managed to achieve relative autonomy from the hierarchy's more contentious policy demands.

A close examination of the period after the fall of the Communist regime in Poland found that only the first of the seven conditions that we have identified as crucial to the formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in postwar Western Europe—a substantial, practicing Roman Catholic population—appeared to have been present unambiguously during the emergence of democratic, multi-party politics in post-Communist Poland. Our second condition—fear of a takeover by a militant secularist, anti-clerical, egalitarian and potentially totalitarian left—also existed, but only in attenuated form. None of the other five factors that we identified as being crucial to the success of postwar Western European Christian Democratic parties were present in Poland—or, if so, then only in a very limited or qualified form.

If a successful Christian Democratic party could not emerge in the superficially favorable circumstances of post-Communist Poland, what does this tell us about the long-term prospects for this party family? Put simply, the rapid rise and relative success of Christian Democracy after World War II was contingent on a combination of social and economic conditions and institutional choices that no longer exists and, furthermore, is very unlikely ever to reappear. The non-emergence of a successful Christian Democratic party in post-1989 Poland—a nation of practicing Catholics, with a large proportion employed in agriculture, where the religious–secular divide became one of the most important means of ideological self-placement—makes it difficult to envisage a successful Christian Democratic party of the "classic" postwar type emerging anywhere again in contemporary Europe.

In order to survive and even prosper in Western Europe, Christian Democratic parties have therefore had to move beyond the archetype. In terms of party ideology and identity, as Hanley and van Keersbergen have demonstrated, this has meant pivoting away from the social market economy model of capitalism and downplaying traditional Christian Democratic themes of solidarity, neo-corporatism and the role of the state in securing justice through redistribution. "Modern" Christian Democratic parties have increasingly taken on elements of economic

liberalism and moved toward a more market-oriented discourse. Meanwhile, the social profile of Christian Democratic parties has also changed as they have moved away from religiously rooted programs and evolved into more secular conservative parties.[142] In parallel, the EPP grouping has expanded organizationally well beyond its Christian Democratic core. As our survey of center-right parties in contemporary Poland shows, the EPP has recruited non-Christian Democratic Polish parties such as the liberal Freedom Union (until it left to join the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in 2002), the agrarian Polish Peasants' Party and the initially liberal-conservative, later centrist Civic Platform. In other words, although both individual Christian Democratic parties and transnational party family groupings have survived and even prospered in a more secular, market-driven age, they have done so by adopting a more ideologically flexible and organizationally expansive approach.[143]

Notes

1. See, e.g., Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Why There Is (Almost) No Christian Democracy in Post-communist Europe?" *Party Politics* 19, no. 2 (2013): 319–342.

2. Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Czas dla chadecji," *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 October 1997; Marcin Dominik Zdort, "Apetyt na chadecję," *Rzeczpospolita*, 9 June 1999; Janusz A. Majcherek, "Taka prawica, jaki Giertych," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 February 2005.

3. Ryszard Bender, "Kościół katolicki w Polsce odrodzonej," in *Życie polityczne w Polsce: 1918–1939*, ed. Janusz Żarnowski (Wrocław: Zakład Naradowy im Ossolińskich, 1985), 307–342, at 335–336.

4. For a slightly different view, focused on Polish Christian Democracy's experience in the 1930s and 1940s, see Jarosław Rabiński's chapter in this volume.

5. Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), esp. 218–314; Jan Żaryn, "In Conflict with the Communist State: The Catholic Church and Catholic Political Organisations in Poland," in *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, vol. 2, ed. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London: Routledge. 2004), 118–138.

6. See, e.g., Christina Manetti, "Sign of the Times: The Znak Circle and Catholic Intellectual Engagement in Communist Poland, 1945–1976," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1998, 140–158.

7. For a good overview, see Stefan Stępień, "Christian-Democratic Movement in Poland (1945–1989)," in *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, ed. Katarzyna Krzywicka and Edward Olszewski (Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 2000), 215–235.

8. See Paweł Ziętara's and Małgorzata Choma-Jusińska's chapters in this volume.

9. These included the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników), the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywateli) and the nascent independent trade union movement. These organizations emerged in the mid-1970s to defend human rights following the persecution of workers involved in the 1976 anti-regime demonstrations at Radom, Ursus and Płock.

10. See, e.g., Piotr H. Kosicki, "After 1989: The Life and Death of the Catholic Third Way," *TLS—Times Literary Supplement*, 13 December 2013: 13–15.

11. Czaczkowska, "Czas dla chadecji."

12. Małgorzata Dehnel-Szyc and Jadwiga Stachura, *Gry polityczne: Orientacje na dziś* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 1991), 146.

13. According to Gołoś, the six were the Centre Agreement (Porozumiene Centrum), the Polish Christian Democratic Forum (Polskie Forum Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczne), the Party of Christian Democrats (Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów), the Peasant Christian Party (Stronnictwo Ludowo-Chrześcijańskie), the Christian-Democratic Labor Party (Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczne Stronnictwo Pracy) and the Christian Party of Labor (Chrześcijańska Partia Pracy—not to be confused with the Christian Labor Party, SP). See Michał Gołoś, "Christian Democratic Parties in Poland," in *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, ed. Katarzyna Krzywicka and Edward Olszewski (Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 2000), 237–248, at 239. However, as we argue later, it is more accurate to characterize the Peasant Christian Party as a liberal-conservative agrarian party.

14. Gołoś, "Christian Democratic Parties in Poland," 243–244.

15. Adrian Karatnycky, "Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (1998): 13–18.

16. For an excellent analysis of Solidarity Electoral Action, see Michał Wenzel, "Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza 'Solidarność': An Attempt at Reviving the Legend," *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 31, no. 2 (1998): 139–156.

17. In fact, these statements tended to overlap with those of Solidarity Electoral Action as a whole, although they contained a somewhat stronger emphasis on the importance of spreading the influence

of Christian principles in public life: *Partie i koalicje polityczne III Rzeczpospolitej*, ed. Krystyna Paszkiewicz (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004), 140.

18. Gołoś, "Christian Democratic Parties in Poland," 245–246.
19. Although it had only managed to get eight deputies elected to parliament on the Solidarity Electoral Action ticket in 2001, it was able to secure strong representation within the Buzek government, including the economy minister and two other junior ministerial portfolios.
20. The Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), the most important agrarian party operating in Poland during the 1990s, is examined in more detail below.
21. Czaczkowska, "Czas dla chadecji."
22. Zenon Tymoszuk, "The Political Thought of the Christian Democratic Party and the Program Conceptions of Peasant Movements in Poland during the Period of System Transformation (1989–1998)," in *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, ed. Katarzyna Krzywicka and Edward Olszewski (Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 2000), 263–284, at 268.
23. Peter Mair and Cas Mudde, "The Party Family and its Study," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 211–229.
24. Luciano Bardi, "Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups and the Building of Europarties," in *How Parties Organise: Adaptation and Change in Party Organisations in Western Democracies*, ed. Richard Katz and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1994), 357–372; Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).
25. Mair and Mudde, "The Party Family and its Study."
26. See Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł's chapter in this volume.
27. David Hanley, "The European People's Party: Institutionalisation and Adaptation," Paper presented to the ESRC seminar series on the Contemporary Right in Europe, University of Sussex, 21 January 2005.
28. Emiel Lamberts, "Conclusion—Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945–1995)," in *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945–1995*, ed. Emiel Lamberts (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 473–481, at 474.
29. Martin Conway, "The Age of Christian Democracy: The Frontiers of Success and Failure," in *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 43–67, at 60.
30. Kees van Kersbergen, "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy," in *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. David

Hanley (London and New York: Pinter, 1994), 31–47; David Hanley, "Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon," in *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. David Hanley (London and New York: Pinter, 1994), 1–11.

31. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 125.
32. See, e.g., Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 21–61, 93–113.
33. R.E.M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), xxi.
34. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, xviii–xix.
35. Hanley, "Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon," 8.
36. Hanley, "Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon," 8.
37. Hanley, "Christian Democracy as a Political Phenomenon," 8.
38. Aleks Szczerbiak, "'Social Poland' Defeats 'Liberal Poland': The September–October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," Sussex European Institute Working Paper 86 (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, May 2006); Piotr H. Kosicki, "Anniversary or Apathy? Memory and Revolution in Poland since 1989," *The Nation*, 5 January 2015.
39. Piotr Zaremba, "Prawicowe odrodzenie czy przegrupowanie," *Rzeczpospolita*, 7 June 2001; Marcin Dominik Zdort, "Koniec karnawału," *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 July 2001; Mariusz Janicki, "Taka sprytna partia," *Polityka*, 25 June 2005. Jarosław Kaczyński's earlier wariness relative to what he saw as excessively clerical politics is exemplified by his refusal in the early 1990s to contemplate electoral cooperation between the Center Agreement and the Christian National Union on the grounds that, as he put it, the "shortest road to the de-Christianisation of Poland runs through the Christian National Union." Antoni Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej, 1989–1995: Zarys historii politycznej Polski* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo GEO, 1997), 168.
40. For example, both Lech Kaczyński and the Law and Justice party sent a special letter to individual parish priests calling for their support. Katarzyna Wiśniewska, "Lech Kaczyński wysłał proboszczom list," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 1 October 2005.
41. During the election, Radio Maryja mobilized its listeners to vote for Kaczyński as president and for both Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families in the parliamentary elections. However, subsequently the Catholic broadcaster's relations with the League cooled as the radio became one of the most vocal supporters of the PiS-led government. For a good analysis of how Radio Maryja supported the PiS and Kaczyński campaigns, see Jacek Hołub, "Jak bracia Kaczyńscy podziękują Radiu Maryja," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24 October 2005.

42. Indeed, liberal bishops shunned the clerical-nationalist discourse used by Radio Maryja, while even more conservative prelates were concerned by the way that the broadcaster grew beyond the direct control of the Church hierarchy.

43. Aleks Szczerbiak, "Opposing Europe or Problematising Europe? Euroscepticism and Eurorealism in the Polish Party System," in *Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Contemporary Europe*, vol. I: *Case Studies and Country Surveys*, ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

44. Platforma Obywatelska, *Deklaracja Ideowa Platformy Obywatelskiej: Przyjęta przez Klub Poselski Platforma Obywatelska w dniu 21 grudnia 2001r*, online at http://www.platforma.org/_files_/dokumenty/inne/deklaracja_ideowa_21_12_01.doc. Accessed 23 August 2006.

45. See, e.g., Wojciech Sokół, "Partie polityczne i system partyjny w Polsce w latach 1991–2004," in *Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne: Zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej*, ed. Wojciech Sokół and Marek Żmigrodzki (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2005), 190–274, at 232–233.

46. See, e.g., Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections: The Church, the Right and the Left," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 40 (1993): 24–30, at 28.

47. In fact, the party always contained a minority who were outright opponents of Polish accession to the EU, although most (but not all) of these broke away from the party in 1999 to form the Polish Agreement (Porozumienie Polskie). Aleks Szczerbiak, "Prospects for the Emergence of a Polish Eurosceptic Lobby," Paper prepared for the UACES Research Conference, University of Sheffield, 8–10 September 1999, 8–9.

48. See, e.g., Zdort, "Apetyt na chadecję."

49. Jerzy Sielski, "Typologia ugropowań politycznych w Polsce," in *Polska w procesie przeobrażeń ustrojowych*, ed. Sylwester Wróbel (Katowice: Wydawnictwo "Śląsk," 1998), 112–122, at 117.

50. Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Church and State in Poland," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 14 (1993): 45–53, at 51.

51. The point was to circumvent the higher electoral threshold for electoral coalitions (8%), compared to that for single parties (5%).

52. This was partly due to pressure from the Church hierarchy to disengage from politics and partly because its director, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, grew increasingly to dislike and distrust Roman Giertych.

53. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

54. Martin Conway, "Introduction," in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, ed. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1–33, at 11.
55. Carolyn M. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 24.
56. Conway, "The Age of Christian Democracy," 59.
57. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 110.
58. Conway, "The Age of Christian Democracy," 48.
59. Martin Conway, "Belgium," in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, ed. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 187–218, at 188; Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 142.
60. Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820–1953* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 358; Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 165, n. 2.
61. Conway, "The Age of Christian Democracy," 52–54; John Pollard, "Italy," in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, ed. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69–96, at 87.
62. Raymond Grew, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy: The Uncertain Origins of Christian Democracy in France and Italy," in *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 11–42, at 34.
63. James F. McMillan, "France," in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, ed. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 34–68, at 61; Peter Van Kemseke, "The Social Basis of Christian Democracy in France," in *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945–1995*, ed. Emiel Lamberts (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 174–188, at 175–176; Robert Leonardi and Douglas Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 166; Conway, "Belgium," 210.
64. Conway, "The Age of Christian Democracy," 54–56.
65. Van Kemseke, "The Social Basis of Christian Democracy in France," 176, 182–183; McMillan, "France," 61–62.
66. Lamberts, "Conclusion," 475.
67. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*.
68. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 110, 139; Pollard, "Italy," 87.
69. Emmanuel Gerard, "Christian Democracy in Belgium," in *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945–1995*, ed. Emiel Lamberts (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 65–78, at 69–70; Conway, "Belgium," 207–208; Ellen Lovell Evans, *The Cross and the Ballot: Catholic Political Parties in Germany, Switzerland, Austria,*

Belgium and the Netherlands, 1785–1985 (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999), 246.

70. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 189, 192, 197–199; Karl-Egon Lönne, "Germany," in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, ed. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 156–186, at 185.

71. Paul Luykx, "The Netherlands," in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds.) *Political Catholicism in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 219–247, at 229; Evans, *The Cross and the Ballot*, 239.

72. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 89, 110–114, 127, 179–184; Van Kemseke, "The Social Basis of Christian Democracy in France," 178–179.

73. Grew, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy," 23, 34.

74. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 147–148.

75. Pollard, "Italy," 92–93.

76. Pollard, "Italy," 89, 95.

77. Paul Lucardie, "From Family Father to DJ: Christian Democratic Parties and Civil Society in Western Europe," in *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945–1995*, ed. Emiel Lamberts (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 210–221, at 211; Luykx, "The Netherlands," 226; Gerard, "Christian Democracy in Belgium," 71.

78. Lucardie, "From Family Father to DJ," 214–215; Evans, *The Cross and the Ballot*, 269–270.

79. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 155–158.

80. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 159; Van Kemseke, "The Social Basis of Christian Democracy in France," 179.

81. Grew, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy," 13–14, 35.

82. See, e.g., Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, esp. 21–61.

83. Conway, "Belgium," 209–210.

84. Evans, *The Cross and the Ballot*, 270; Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976* (London: Croom Helm, 1977).

85. Grew, "Suspended Bridges to Democracy," 36.

86. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group*, 114, 179, 184.

87. Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland: A Case of Bounded Secularisation," in *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*, ed. David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 176–197, at 179.

88. Ronald C. Monticone, *The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945–1985: Forty Years of Church–State Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 3.

89. See, e.g., Bogdan Szajkowski, *Next to God … Poland* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983).
90. Mirella W. Eberts, "The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50, no. 5 (1998): 817–842, at 820.
91. CBOS, *Opinie o Miejscu i Roli Kościoła w PRL* (Warsaw: CBOS, 1988).
92. Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland Ten Years After: The Church," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 123–146, at 144; for good analyses of how Church–state relations evolved in the early post-Communist period, particularly how the Church overplayed its hand in politics and fueled an anti-clerical backlash, see Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Church and State in Poland."
93. CBOS, *Religijność Polaków: 1984–1994* (Warsaw: CBOS, 1994).
94. Grzegorz Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," in *Polska scena polityczna a wybory*, ed. Stanisław Gebethner (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Inicjatyw Społecznych "Polska w Europie," 1993), 203–221, at 212.
95. CBOS, *Religijność Polakow*; Beata Roguska and Bogna Wciórka, "Religijność i stosunek do Kościoła," in *Nowa Rzeczywistość: Oceny i opinie 1989–1999*, ed. Krzysztof Zagórski and Michał Strzeszewski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 2000), 183–194, at 188–190.
96. Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 181; Roguska and Wciórka, "Religijność i stosunek do Kościoła," 190–194.
97. Radosław Markowski and Gabor Toka, "Left Turn in Poland and Hungary Five Years after the Collapse of Communism," *Sisyphus* 1, no. IX (1993): 75–99.
98. CBOS, *Obecność i instytucjonalizacja wartości religijnych w życiu społecznym* (Warsaw: CBOS, 1994).
99. See, e.g., Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Portfel czy różaniec? Wzory zachowań wyborczych Polaków w latach 1995–2001," in *System partyjny i zachowanie wyborcze: Dekada polskich doświadczeń*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), 75–100; Mirosława Grabowska, "Religijność i Kościół a polityka w III Rzeczpospolitej," in *System partyjny i zachowanie wyborcze: Dekada polskich doświadczeń*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), 100–146; Tadeusz Szawiel, "Podział na lewicę i prawicę w Polsce po 1989 roku – jego sens i trwałość," in *System partyjny i zachowanie wyborcze: Dekada polskich doświadczeń*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), 178–216.
100. Mirosława Grabowska, *Podział postkomunistyczny: Społeczne podstawy polityki w Polsce po 1989 roku* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004).

101. For example, in the September 1993 parliamentary elections, the Peasants' Party won 29.4% of rural votes and 51.8% support among those working in agriculture: Tomasz Żukowski, "Wybory '93: Kto na kogo głosował," *Przegląd Społeczny* 20 (1994): 3–32.

102. Bender, "Kościół katolicki w Polsce odrodzonej," 336–337.

103. See, e.g., Krystyna Naszkowska, "Wszyscy chłopi Pana Boga: Czy PSL stanie się polską chadecją," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22–23 October 1993; Krystyna Naszkowska, "Jak z chłopa zrobić chadeka," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 March 2004; "PSL w stronę chadecji? – rozmowa z Jarosławem Kalinowskim," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 September 2004.

104. Wiesław Piątkowski, "O konsolidację ideową Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," *Ludowiec* nos 2–3 (November–December 1994).

105. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 4 (1993): 521–548; Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-party Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

106. Peter Kopecky, "Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?" *Party Politics* 1, no. 4 (1995): 515–534; Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 175–198.

107. Indeed, evidence also suggests that the professional middle classes and the business community often supported more traditional conservative parties, and even the social-democratic left. See, e.g., Aleks Szczerbiak, "Interests and Values: Polish Political Parties and their Electorate," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 8 (1999): 1401–1432; Aleks Szczerbiak, "Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties' Electoral Strategies and Profiles," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 5 (2003): 729–746.

108. For a different view of Zabłocki's political projects, see Jarosław Rabiński's and Paweł Ziętara's chapters in this volume.

109. Kosicki, "After 1989," 14–15.

110. In fact, the Democratic Union's successor, the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności)—formed in 1994 following a merger with the Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny)—was, for a time, the main Polish party linked to the Christian Democratic European People's Party. This prompted some analysts to refer to them in discussions of Polish Christian Democracy in post-1989 Poland. See, e.g., Zdort, "Apetyt na chadecję." In fact, although some of the parties' leaders, such as Mazowiecki (who remained its leader until 1995), took a pro-Church stance or drew some political inspiration from Christian values, neither the Democratic Union nor the Freedom

Union ever sought to profile themselves as Christian Democratic. Indeed, the Freedom Union profiled itself unambiguously, and should be more properly categorized, as a liberal party, particularly after Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of Poland's post-1989 economic reforms, replaced Mazowiecki as party leader in 1995. In 2002, it broke with the European People's Party and chose to link up with liberal international organizations, of which it remained a member until 2005 when it dissolved into the Democrats (Demokraci) grouping.

111. Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 176.
112. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections," 29.
113. For a good analysis of the Church's involvement in that campaign, see Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 205–209.
114. Korbonski, "Poland Ten Years After," 139. Two surveys carried out in the run-up to the 1991 election showed, respectively, that 33.6% of respondents said that priests had attempted to influence their vote, and 29% that they had received advice in their parish church on which party list to support: Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 209; Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej*, 181–182; "Wyborcza tajemnica Kościoła," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 November 1991.
115. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 211; Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej*, 180.
116. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 207. On another occasion, Archbishop Michalik argued that a "Catholic has an obligation to vote for a Catholic, a Christian for a Christian, a Muslim for a Muslim, a Jew for a Jew, a mason for a mason, a Communist for a Communist. Let everyone vote for those, whose conscience dictates that they vote"; see also Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej*, 180.
117. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 211.
118. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Church and State in Poland," 52.
119. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 208; Jarosław Gowin, *Kościół po komunizmie* (Kraków: Znak, 1995), 48–52; Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej*, 181; "Wyborcza tajemnica Kościoła."
120. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 206–208.
121. Rydlewski, "Czynnik wyznaniowy a współczesna scena polityczna," 219–221.
122. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections," 140.
123. Cited in Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, "Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Poland," Paper prepared for the PSA Specialist Group

Conference on Communist and Post-Communist Politics, South Bank University, London, 8 February 1997, 14–15.

124. "Happy end z arcybiskupem," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 July 1993. The coalition also included the Party of Christian Democrats, the Peasant Christian Party and the Conservative Party; it failed to cross the 8% threshold for electoral coalitions. In fact, there were conflicting reports as to whether Gocłowski *initiated* the meeting or simply *agreed to host* it at the request of the interested parties. Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Polish Elections," 25.

125. Eberts, "The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland," 828–829.

126. Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 183.

127. Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 187.

128. "Kosciół nie jest związany z żadną partią," *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 August 1997; Ewa K. Czaczkowska, "Oceny zamiast wskazań," *Rzeczpospolita*, 5 September 1997.

129. Although, again, in all cases both Radio Maryja continued to play a very active and controversial role in Polish electoral politics, and individual clergymen campaigned openly for specific candidates and parties. Radio Maryja had also played a key role in the emergence of the League of Polish Families as an electoral force in 2001—and again during the 2005 elections, mobilizing support for the Law and Justice party and its presidential candidate Lech Kaczyński.

130. Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 191.

131. Krzysztof Katka, "Jak rozmawiać, to tylko z Lechem," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 26 January 2006.

132. Gołoś, "Christian Democratic Parties in Poland," 239–240.

133. Cited in Chan, "The Religious Base of Politics in Post-Communist Poland," 189.

134. Korbonski, "Poland Ten Years After," 144.

135. See, e.g., Eliza Olczyk, "Kosciół na cenzurowanym," *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 September 2004.

136. In January 2003, for example, a group of Democratic Left Alliance female deputies drew up a proposal to liberalize the abortion law following pressure from Polish women's groups. Similarly, in March 2004, the Democratic Left Alliance announced its intention to pass a new bill that would not only ease restrictions on abortion, but also introduce universal sex education, secure access to birth control and legalize in vitro fertilization: Sabrina P. Ramet, "Thy Will Be Done: The Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989," in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117–147, at 136–137.

137. "Co dalej z ustawą aborcyjną," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 January 2004.
138. Roman Graczyk, "Wybór tronu z ołtarzem," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 4 November 2005.
139. Andrzej Stankiewicz, "W obronie zasad z Nicei," *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 September 2003.
140. Jacek Moskwa, "Jan Paweł II dziękuje Polsce," *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 June 2004.
141. See, e.g., Mariusz Janicki, "Czerwone i czarne," *Polityka*, 16 February 2002; Wojciech Załuska, "Porządki w SLD," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 26 January 2003.
142. See—among other contributions to the same edited volume—Emmanuel Gerard and Steven Van Hecke, "European Christian Democracy in the 1990s: Towards a Comparative Approach," in *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, ed. Steven Van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 297–318, at 308–312.
143. Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, some argue, have been prematurely written off. After all, religion is not quite the spent political force that many assume: see, e.g., Broughton and Ten Napel, *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2nd edn. Moreover, at least some Christian Democratic parties—or at least those that have experienced some success, rather than continued decline—have tried to "move with the times": see, e.g., *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, ed. Steven Van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004); *Political Parties and Electoral Change*, ed. Peter Mair, Wolfgang Müller and Fritz Plasser (London: Sage, 2004). But we should be careful not to be too optimistic, as outside Germany, things do not look good: Tim Bale and Andre Krouwel, "Down but Not Out: A Comparison of Germany's CDU/CSU with Christian Democratic Parties in Austria, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands," *German Politics* 22, nos. 1–2 (2013): 16–45.

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Christian Democracy Across the Cold War Caesura

The Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe

Stanisław Gebhardt

This chapter is a short recollection of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (CDUCE), its activities and its role in reshaping Europe and the world after World War II. I was a Polish exile activist within the CDUCE almost from its beginning, delegated by the Polish Christian Democrats of the Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy, SP). As such, this chapter represents a mixture of my first-hand knowledge of the CDUCE's organization, combined with personal opinions and analysis on the subject.

The CDUCE was created in the United States in July 1950 as the result of conversations among prominent representatives of six Christian Democratic parties hailing from East-Central Europe—following the sad tradition of links established during World War II in London, where many of them found shelter from German-occupied continental Europe. These parties, or rather some of their leaders in exile who assembled in the United States, came from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia and Poland. Originally, it was a very haphazard combination of people: long-time participants in the public life of

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411

their countries, which were now trapped behind the Iron Curtain, these politicians had just found themselves in the US. Following the outbreak of the so-called Cold War, they were looking for a center in the free world from which they could continue to fight for freedom and justice. The United States was not only an obvious choice, but also and above all the leader in the struggle against what many of these leaders had experienced as the coming of Soviet imperialism and enslavement of their homelands.

Europe, recovering after the unprecedented devastation of World War II and faced with the new dangers of the Cold War (real or imaginary), saw a need to strengthen European defense forces. This meant a careful examination of the position of conquered Germany. She was divided by four victorious powers and, practically speaking, had been neutralized. With the coming of the Cold War, however, the sanctions imposed by the three Western occupying powers—the US, Great Britain and France—had been lifted because of the necessity to create a democratic Germany as a part of the Western defense system against Soviet Communism. Possible Soviet aggression that had originally been taken into consideration subsequently seemed forgotten.

Against such a background, the leaders, or the representatives in exile, of those six East-Central European countries, after some initial contacts and friendly conversations, decided to create a union. Its aim was not only to facilitate mutual understanding of the various situations of the six countries, but also to create a stronger force in the fight for their liberation. Direct military action was obviously deemed impossible at that point, but, in the opinion of these leaders, it was necessary to prepare the Western European countries and the whole Western civilized world to face the dangers of Communism. The peoples of the free world needed to understand these dangers coming from the east. Therefore it was jointly decided that the forces of the exiled groups holding Christian Democratic convictions would be more effective working together than each of them on their own.

As a result, the CDUCE was established in New York, on 26 July 1950. Soon thereafter, the General Secretariat of the CDUCE was transferred to Washington, DC, for a very short time, only to return to New York. In parallel, representatives of the CDUCE were appointed on the ground in Paris, Rome, Brussels and West Germany. The Christian Democratic political parties assembled in the CDUCE were also admitted as full representatives of the region by the Christian Democratic

international organization created in Western Europe in 1947 under the name Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI). It is worth noting, however, that Czechoslovak and Polish Christian Democratic parties became founding members of this organization even before those parties fully ceased operations in their home countries. Despite its name, the NEI was a European organization of Christian Democratic parties. The name was chosen under pressure from the French, whose member party was called the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (Popular Republican Movement, MRP), on the logic that using the label "Christian" for a political movement was at odds with the secular republican character of the French movements and the French constitution. Cooperation between the CDUCE and the NEI developed very fruitfully, until the very end of the existence of the CDUCE.

In the beginning, the CDUCE prepared a memorandum, followed by two additional papers, explaining the struggle of the East-Central European countries and the extent of their subjugation to the direct control and pressure of the Soviet Union, encompassing all political activity and the destruction of every independent institution. This memorandum also clearly presented Soviet abuses in every domain of human rights. It was translated by the United Nations (UN) secretariat into various languages and adopted as a UN paper, for distribution to all national organizations. As a result, the CDUCE's analysis was thereafter widely discussed. This gesture of submitting the memorandum to the UN in January 1952 and shining a light on the real situation in the countries behind the Iron Curtain—proving that Soviet Russia was an aggressor—created a friendly atmosphere receptive to subsequent interventions in the secretariat of the UN.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the activities involved in working together with Western Europe's Christian Democratic parties proved very successful in the sense of presenting to the general public—via local means—the real situation of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The idea was to reach not only the political elites but, above all, the general public. The representatives of the CDUCE in Paris, Brussels, Bonn and Rome were directly responsible for maintaining contact with local Christian Democratic forces, but also for stimulating cooperation among the nationals of the member countries of the CDUCE in order to promote ongoing discussion and study of possible future cooperation among these countries. This cooperation was to be anchored in common

basic principles of Christian Democracy and, obviously, also an under-standing of various nations' particular interests.

As a result of the cooperation between the CDUCE and NEI, the CDUCE's general secretary Konrad Sieniewicz—based as he was in New York—was appointed the NEI's permanent delegate to the UN. It should be mentioned that NEI was recognized by the General Secretariat of the UN as a non-governmental organization with consultative status (B category) to the General Assembly, and to specialized bodies of the UN such as the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC), within which the Social Commission of the UN dealt among others with problems of human rights. At meetings of this commission, and at the yearly general assemblies of ECOSOC, a Polish Christian Democratic representative—either Sieniewicz himself, or someone appointed by NEI together with him—exposed abuses against human rights in various countries affiliated with the NEI.

In 1952, the CDUCE submitted a proposal during the General Assembly—nominally on NEI's behalf, but in fact on its own inspira-tion—to appoint a High Commissioner for Human Rights, similar to the high commissioners for refugees and exiles and other similar particular institutions that the UN was in the process of creating. This idea, pre-sented in 1952, was finally accepted and realized only at the end of the 1970s, during a General Assembly in Geneva, when the Soviet represent-ative could no longer block its admission. Needless to say, at this point everybody had forgotten that the original idea and the groundwork at the yearly general assemblies for the admission of this project had come from the CDUCE and, above all, its representative Konrad Sieniewicz.

With Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953, the Cold War seemed to be moving toward its end. Although the Soviet Union's subversive activities did not stop at all, their intensity changed. Yet the transition out of Stalinism created possibilities in the Soviet Union for the imple-mentation of some ideas of the Western world; under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union seemed to be looking for ways and means of improving its relations with the Western European countries. The creation in the 1950s of European institutions that grew out of the Coal and Steel Community, like Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) and the European Economic Community, obviously implied closer cooperation and therefore an economic strengthening of Western Europe. However, this was not the most important element that helped CDUCE to enlarge its activities to recall and explain the struggle

of the East-Central European countries, and to increase CDUCE pressure on Western governments to lobby the USSR for greater freedom of the Soviet Bloc countries.

The year 1955 was one of hope for many people from the East, although it took the next year to bring to the fore the first collective outcries for freedom and justice in Poland, then in Hungary, in full awareness of the failed uprising of 1953 in East Germany. This was a time of the discrediting of the so-called thaw, of the new wave of freedom and whatever else Khrushchev had promised. All of these promises in practice meant only less direct political control and nothing else. By the time of Communist Poland's eruption in strikes and violence in June 1956 (Poznań), and then Communist Hungary in revolution in October 1956, West Germany had already been admitted to the European institutions and to NATO, not yet directly, but via a specially created Western European defense and military organization. Membership in the Western European organization in essence meant membership in the NATO pact. That also meant the economic, political and military strengthening of Western Europe.

And yet, Western Europe's apparent strengthening in the mid-1950s did not seem to translate into growing political will in diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union. As the CDUCE, for example, understood it, such political will would translate into pressure on the USSR, for their region's freedoms and liberties, for justice in the countries that were denied it in the wake of the dashed hopes of the 1945 Yalta Accords. The CDUCE was therefore very active in 1955 and 1956 in contacts with the governments of Western European countries, attempting also to use friendly publicity sources to inform Western European societies of the danger of Soviet expansion. The idea was not to allow a moment's relaxation of attention on the fact that the military implantation of Soviet domination in East-Central Europe still continued, and that the moment of de-Stalinization was the right moment to exercise pressure on the Soviet government—a moment when the situation in the Soviet Union was presenting certain weaknesses and opportunities. The CDUCE believed in testing the limits of this pressure, but the organization's agenda was not well understood, and only partially accepted. The Christian Democratic exiles, for example, sought to give a chance to independent elements that remained behind the Iron Curtain, albeit on a very limited scale, to reclaim their public voice and to try to resume public work for the benefit of local societies. Yet there was a lot of hesitation on the part of Western Europe and the United States, which recoiled in

horror after the American foreign policy disaster of the failure and fallout of the insurrection in Hungary.

The year 1956 was disappointing because events in Poland—followed by the unique course of events in Hungary, very special ones, despite the disheartening ending—showed that the West was not at all prepared to intervene, even diplomatically, in favor of independence and human rights in the countries of East-Central Europe. One should underline the considerable efforts that the CDUCE made in favor of the insurrection in Hungary. CDUCE members assisted among others in coordinating with various human rights organizations and social assistance groups of all kinds—including religious charities like Caritas—in aiding the wave of refugees and trying, effectively out of their own pockets, to provide economic assistance to the insurrectionary forces in Hungary. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a very sad event, with a considerable negative impact on various Western European anti-Communist organizations.

Just a few months before, Polish and Czechoslovak politicians had worked with both the CDUCE and the NEI to launch a diplomatic initiative for achieving the neutrality of (a united) Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, following the example of Austria or Finland. The underlying goal was to liberate the four East-Central European countries (including eastern Germany) from the yoke of the Soviet Union and to break the Cold War stalemate of two military camps facing off against one another through NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This idea was very coolly received by the majority of CDUCE members—especially the Lithuanians and the Yugoslavs—who considered that only a total defeat of the Soviet Union would permit the liberation of our countries. On the other hand, the other members of the CDUCE were of the opinion, even if not unanimously, that it would in any event constitute a step forward toward freedom and democracy in East-Central Europe.

Further encouragement for this idea came in the so-called Van Zeeland Plan, made by the former Belgian prime minister in 1956. He also proposed a similar pact with the Soviet Union, making possible the disarmament and neutralization of these countries as a permanent buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc. In Van Zeeland's rendering, however, the details of the division remained yet to be defined: who, which country, how much and what degree of liberty, or rather which part geographically could be folded into this neutral bloc. It was one of

the political ideas of a neutral bloc in East-Central Europe between two warring giants that seemed to offer a ray of hope, a political step forward, which was—in the opinion of some of the CDUCE members—absolutely essential.

After the disaster of Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest in November 1956, CDUCE politicians saw a rather sorry picture. Their main hope—the foreign policy of the United States—was in a complete stalemate. With the victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower in the US presidential elections, and the declaration of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the policy of the US aimed only at the protection of US interests, not at military or political intervention in other countries, the CDUCE understood its protector as having made a declaration of non-intervention in the problems of East-Central Europe. This was considered to be the price for some possibility of an American agreement with the Soviet Union, which Khrushchev had dangled some time before the disaster in Hungary.

And yet, refugees coming west from Communist Hungary in 1956 and 1957 provoked a new wave of encouragement: in Poland and other countries, after all, there were signs of efforts toward independence and freedom, certainly without absolute success, but reflecting the active agency of various groups and persons engaged actively behind the Iron Curtain. In other words, even after the failure of the 1956 insurrection, Soviet Bloc citizens did not give up the fight against the Soviet yoke. Instead the insurrection brought an additional impulse for new efforts based out of the Western world, the free world, in which the fight of the East-Central Europeans could continue to aspire to bring freedom and democracy to their homelands. These efforts in the Western world produced some limited immediate results, where for example the CDUCE representatives in Belgium, France, Italy and West Germany were very actively engaged—together with the General Secretariat of the CDUCE, now relocated to Paris, in the pursuit of individual and official interventions. Western European politicians started relief assistance on Hungary's behalf, involving work on both sides of the Iron Curtain, including with the arriving multitude of refugees. This type of engagement produced new pressure on the Soviet Union.

At the end of 1957, the Polish Communist Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki had presented the UN with a kind of plan for neutralizing part of East-Central Europe. Of course, this was a totally different proposal to the Van Zeeland Plan, as Rapacki was above all seeking a non-nuclear

pact for Europe. The plan was to involve both Germanies, as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it mentioned nothing about freedom. In the end, it appeared only to have been a useless "trial balloon," though CDUCE members took it seriously at the time, all while insisting on the marrying of the neutrality question to discussions of civic freedoms, democracy and justice in those countries. In subsequent years, the Rapacki Plan remained a topic of much discussion among CDUCE members. In Arezzo, in 1957, then subsequently in Taormina, during another congress of the NEI, representatives of the CDUCE took part in special sessions devoted to the situation in East-Central Europe, setting out proposals to supplement existing discussions with an insistence on freedom and democracy. In Arezzo, Karol Popiel delivered a long exposé on the political, economic and military situations of Poland and of East-Central Europe more generally. Popiel also offered suggestions as to how to try politically to loosen the grip of the Soviet Union. Then, in Taormina, representatives of the CDUCE were asked to present reports on the situations in their countries, starting with fifty-seven ideas: what to do in favor of these communities.

Throughout the trials and tribulations of the 1950s, the CDUCE and its members cooperated closely and worked together, in fact daily, with their Christian Democratic colleagues in Western Europe. As a result, they, so to speak, exercised considerable private influence on the activities of the Western European Christian Democratic parties. The CDUCE had been an observer member in many European organizations, like the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe or the Assembly of Captive European Nations. This observer status made it possible to participate and to make the region's voices heard, explaining East-Central European problems to the larger European communities. In subsequent decades, however—especially beginning in the 1970s—the contacts and the physical possibilities of aging exile leaders considerably diminished.

Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, the CDUCE had directly enabled contacts between a host of Western European organizations and cross-Iron Curtain, but non-Communist, travelers visiting Western Europe courtesy of planning and funding obtained by the CDUCE, supported by the American-funded Free Europe Committee, Inc., until the latter was disbanded in 1971. Yet the promising legacy of this strange situation was cut short in the early 1980s by growing interest in the Soviet Bloc on the part of Western Europe's Christian Democratic politicians,

whose curiosity led them to explore new possibilities themselves. In the Western Europeans' opinion, it was they who had the power to facilitate the development of Christian Democracy in East-Central Europe, and to identify possible future leaders of Christian Democracy—not the "old guard" of the CDUCE.

This proved to be a disastrous shift in tone, not only for the CDUCE itself as an organization, but above all for the future prospects of the Christian Democratic movement in East-Central Europe. In effect, most of the new people identified by Western Europeans parachuting into the crumbling Soviet Bloc had no notion of what the Christian Democratic political force was. Moreover, they had no concept of democratic political life in general. By the end of the 1980s, the Communist economic system's negotiated changes, approved by various Catholic or Protestant constituencies in East-Central Europe, helped the new aspiring generation in their contacts with Western individuals and organizations, especially if they brought hope of some kind of improvement in their personal economic situations. This was obviously at odds with the study and development of Christian Democratic ideals that had long pre-dated the big wave of Soviet Communist repressions, and dated back as far as the late-nineteenth-century teachings of the Catholic Church.

There had been small circles of specialists working under neutral titles, but devoting systematic study and time to the preparation of social and economic proposals rooted in Christian Democratic ideas. These grew not only out of the actual experience of their translation into policy in various Western European countries, but also the original programmatic documents of Christian Democracy (e.g. the Christian Democratic Manifesto of 1974). Meanwhile, new groups cultivated by the West beginning in the 1980s could not have enjoyed the same degree of networking and policy-making capacity, given their limited access for decades to international networks and the censoring of the national media. Western European Christian Democrats, who often met these future politicians simply out of curiosity rather than out of any political sense, thereby dealt a body-blow to any prospect of creating historically rooted and widely supported Christian Democratic forces. Such forces had been growing behind the Iron Curtain, but needed certain simple stimulants, not—I repeat—imposing prepared and prefabricated "prescriptions" from Western European countries. With the Communist system collapsing in 1989, a particular disaster came about for many Christian Democrats, as the new guiding forces in East-Central

European politics—not all, but many—included aspiring statesmen look-
ing to make an accommodation with outgoing Communists. The result-
ing entrenchment of *nomenklatura* access to economic and financial
domains seriously inhibited the growth of the newly liberated post-Com-
munist states. In certain cases, individual Christian Democrats played a
major and successful role in the democratic transformations of 1989—
Hungary's József Antall and Slovakia's Ján Čarnogurský are crucial cases
in point. On the whole, however, much of the tremendous potential cul-
tivated over decades by the CDUCE in its various projects for the most
part went to waste as a result of thoughtless decisions by former Western
European partners.

Before describing the final phase of activity of the CDUCE, I return
for a moment to the UN. Headquartered as it was in New York, the
CDUCE was in near daily contact with the UN. The liaison who proved
particularly useful and engaged in contacts with the various delegations
or institutions at UN headquarters was a member of the CDUCE sec-
retariat: Janusz Śleszyński, who practically every day visited the big UN
building. Śleszyński knew everyone from the secretary-general down,
and had many friends among the various national delegations. His
French-born wife Cécile was one of the chief officials in the secretariat.
Unfortunately, she was later promoted to head the UN secretariat in
Geneva, which necessitated their relocation to Geneva from New York.

Janusz Śleszyński developed the idea that Latin American delegates
could strengthen the CDUCE's clout at the UN in pressing the Soviet
Union and its satellites to change their policies. He lobbied Latin
American contacts throughout the 1950s and 1960s to influence their
governments to condemn and counteract Soviet anti-democratic activi-
ties. The results were truly extraordinary. In the course of this work of
promoting CDUCE memoranda among diplomatic delegations and in
the UN, Śleszyński found that there were Christian Democratic groups
in Latin American countries which could be very helpful in pushing for
the liberation of East-Central Europe. At the same time, these prospec-
tive Christian Democrats also asked for help in their construction of
Christian Democratic movements in their own countries.

It is safe to say that Janusz Śleszyński's activities, although sometimes
stronger on enthusiasm than on preparation, have proven very successful
in the long term. In fact, his networking and propaganda efforts became
one of the first serious impulses toward the building of mass Christian
Democratic parties in Latin America. One of Śleszyński's principal

ideas—deeply shaped by his contacts with the Free Europe Committee, Inc.—was the priority of combating Communism in Latin America. This, in turn, became a rallying cry for Christian Democrats. Yet the best way to fend off Communism in Latin America was to offer concrete proposals for social and economic solutions. Therefore, Christian Democrats presented realistic programs, without the bloody sacrifices that Communism appeared to necessitate, based on the East-Central European example. In such a way, Christian Democracy could not be accused of merely parroting Yankee-inspired mechanical ideas of pure anti-Communism.

Unfortunately, some of the European countries trying to speed the development of fledgling Christian Democracy in Latin America not only made proposals, but in fact insisted on Latin American adherence to the European model. In the end, this was inadequate to the realities of life in various Latin American countries, and has proven a total failure. Furthermore, dividing young Latin American forces often led to the rise of radical extremist camps that rallied around the slogans that Christian Democracy was Yankee-controlled, merely opening a door for Western European capitalists to maintain US interests. This, for example, is part of the story of how Hugo Chávez came to power in Venezuela following the rule of Christian Democracy's Rafael Caldera.

Now, for all the pessimism voiced in this chapter, I must say that the work of the CDUCE was of immense importance. The CDUCE consistently bore witness to Western European countries and the free world in general the determination of Christian Democratic leaders in exile, to represent the aspirations of the people of their homelands to strive for freedom, democracy and justice rooted in the Christian principles. The CDUCE's indisputable success lay in assuring that these ideas received attention in a world preoccupied with a bipolar struggle against a totalitarian force.

CDUCE leaders Konrad Sieniewicz and Bohumír Bunža were involved in the creation of the World Union of Christian Democrats in 1961, representing it before the UN and its agencies. They also established in Rome the Christian Democratic Institute of Studies and Documentation and produced a variety of regular publications: a monthly journal named *Christian Democratic Review*, in English and Spanish; the bulletin *Panorama*, in five languages; and a range of political tracts and manifestos, including the "Political Manifesto of the Christian Democrats," in eight languages. There were, of course, countless other

international political activities under the auspices of the CDUCE whose authors have been forgotten.

From its inception, the CDUCE focused particular attention on training future generations of Christian Democratic cadres. The CDUCE's own youth section became a key player within the World Union of Young Christian Democrats. Along the way, young leaders of the CDUCE—including the author of this chapter—were instrumental in the creation of cooperating global networks of Young Christian Democrats. The Youth Section of CDUCE became a younger sister to the established Youth Section of the NEI, giving rise together in 1953 in Tours to a semi-independent youth organization: the International Union of Young Christian Democrats (IUYCD), a European-based organization.

East-Central European nationals belonging to the CDUCE leadership played an important part in setting up, growing and articulating policy proposals on behalf of Christian Democratic internationalism. Just as the CDUCE's Janusz Śleszyński made possible the systematic networking between Latin American and European Christian Democrats, the same activist also helped the IUYCD to interface with Latin American Young Christian Democrats, ultimately organizing the organization's first mission to Latin America. The resultant intercontinental cooperation led to the first World Congress, with the IUYCD thereby growing beyond the European continent to become a worldwide organization, run in significant part by CDUCE Youth Section leaders. The IUYCD was present in an observer capacity (with the responsibility of coordinating national delegates) at World Assemblies of Youth and meetings of the International Students' Union, UNESCO, etc. It also launched projects in Africa and Asia run directly from the general secretariat, established in Rome following the 1962 IUYCD Congress in Caracas.

To sum up, many various and sundry activities of the CDUCE should be remembered in one particular light: that its leaders wanted to create the basis for present and future cooperation among Christian Democratic parties. The horizon lines were not, however, confined to East-Central Europe, or even to Europe, but rather extended to all countries worldwide where Christian Democratic movements did or could exist. This was undoubtedly an idealistic approach to expanding Christian Democratic thought in the world, but it also had a clear pragmatic dimension, seeking among others to attain, as through the European Communities, a stronger force to oppose the Soviet Bloc.

Thus the CDUCE was present before many European institutions, consistently suggesting and trying to press for freedom for an entire half of the European continent.

The last congress of the CDUCE took place in Budapest in September 1990. In itself, this was a very successful conference. Present were not only delegates of the six member states of the CDUCE but also invited representatives of all European countries. The sad part of this was that, without understanding the particular situation in each individual country, elements from Western Europe—representing various national delegations as well as the European Union of Christian Democrats—were applying pressure to enact their own visions for Christian Democracy on former Communist countries, thereby circumventing the CDUCE. For instance, in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, the creation (or rather, the re-establishment) of Christian Democracy proved to be a complicated process as a result of various local independent persons and institutions that survived Communist rule and remained politically influential into the 1990s.

Even some representatives of the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe, often acting in an official capacity, assumed that they could and should judge who was or was not a Christian Democrat. Western Europeans thereby killed the prospects for rebuilding Christian Democratic forces based on historical continuities with movements that had survived the many Cold War decades in exile. The bitter irony is that this outcome came to pass in spite of objectively favorable conditions for Christian Democrats in the formerly Communist countries. The best example of misguided moves taken at the behest of Western Europeans was the decision to abandon Christian Democratic ideology in favor of pragmatic enlargement of the European People's Party in the European Parliament. In the end, then, this was no longer about Christian Democracy, but rather about admitting as members the representatives of often ill-defined, pragmatic political formations.

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Christian Democracy in Slovakia

Ján Čarnogurský

Any text concerning Christian Democracy in Slovakia must necessarily begin with the people who founded it, who comprised it and who still comprise it. In Slovakia, Christian politics was based on the main Christian churches, mostly the Catholic and then the Protestant churches as well. In 2001, according to the census in Slovakia, 73% of the population were Catholics and 7% Lutherans; before the advent of Communism, that proportion was even higher.

In 1948, in the first democratic elections held in Czechoslovakia after World War II, Slovakia was won by the Democratic Party (Demokratická strana, DS), which at that time represented both Catholics and Lutherans. The DS won 61.43% of the vote, the Communist Party of Slovakia 30.48%. However, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československá, KSČ) won in Czechoslovakia as a whole; they nominated the prime minister and held the most important ministries in the government. In February 1948, the Communist Party established its dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, which ended only in November 1989.

Senior officials of the DS were sentenced to long prison terms after February 1948, while others emigrated abroad, and they no longer took any part in political life in the Slovak lands. Socially committed

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Christians, who decades later would create Christian Democracy in Slovakia, had to start organizing from the absolute beginning. The foundation was laid by a Croatian Catholic priest, Tomislav Poglajen Kolaković. In 1943, he was forced to flee to Slovakia from the Pavelić regime in Croatia, where the Gestapo were hunting him for his activities organizing Croatian Catholics. In Slovakia, he founded underground circles, especially among the intellectuals, preparing them to struggle against Communism. He knew that Slovakia would fall into the Soviet sphere of influence as the Red Army swept westward across Europe. After the war, he published a book in the United States under the title *Father George: God's Underground*. In 1946, Kolaković was deported from Czechoslovakia; fortunately, he also had Belgian citizenship. In the early 1950s, members of Kolaković's circles were arrested by the Communist secret police and sentenced to a total of around 600 years in prison. Altogether, they served around 400 years in jail.

At the start of the 1960s, they were released from jail and started to practice what Father Kolaković had taught them. As a result, they began to establish religious circles for young people. By the early 1970s, such groups covered the whole of Slovakia. Superficially, these groups were apolitical. Their meetings involved prayer, but also discussions of social issues. Yet the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia considered all social organizations departing from official ideology to be anti-state activity. When the police exposed the leaders of these circles, the court sent them to prison.

The leading organizers had been Silvester Krčméry, who spent fifteen years in prison, and Vladimír Jukl, who served fourteen years. Around the mid-1970s, both of these figures managed to create a network of such circles, concentrated around a central leadership that included a large number of people. The activists in these circles were pious Christians willing to make sacrifices for the sake of a new model of religiously inspired social organization. Their activities consisted of regular meetings in private apartments, in small groups of up to ten people; in the summer, some groups went on holidays together, to abandoned cottages in the Slovak countryside, while in the winter their children went on skiing trips with spiritual leaders.

These circles ultimately also created business and information networks. In the 1970s, the first individual underground publications started to appear, which were circulated within individual regions of Slovakia, even around the whole country. From the end of the 1970s

into the 1980s, these groups visited religious pilgrimage sites in Slovakia in large numbers. There were dozens of such sites in Slovakia, and each received thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of visitors. Traditionally, the largest pilgrimage site in Slovakia is Levoča, where early every July, even under Communism, up to 200,000 people visit. In 1985, even the Communist government agreed to arrange the Festival of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Velehrad, where these saints had worked in the ninth century. About 200,000 people came and demonstrated in opposition to the Communist minister of culture. During the 1970s, the concept of a secret church grew in popularity as an anti-Communist rallying point. This included people and activities who were part of the secret religious circles in particular.

At the beginning of the 1980s, underground periodicals with a religious and social focus began to appear. The year 1982 saw the first appearance of the journal *Náboženstvo a súčasnosť* (Religion and Today), and a little later *Rodinné spoločenstvo* (The Family Community), and others. In 1988, the explicitly political and pro-opposition magazine *Bratislavské listy* (Bratislava Letters) first appeared. The magazines spread as quickly as was possible using typewriters and, later on, cyclostyle machines, but in 1983 a group of Dutch Christians from the Open Doors organization transported to Slovakia a disassembled offset printing machine, which their engineers reassembled when it was already in the country. Secret underground spaces were created for the machine in a Franciscan monastery in Bratislava, and the machine operated there until the collapse of Communism. The offset machine was able to print up to 500 copies of a written text in those conditions. The circles were important for the dissemination of the underground press, because they could distribute it in their own areas.

The religious circles' reach progressively expanded. In 1987, signatures from across Czechoslovakia were collected for a petition which has entered the historical record under the name of the Demands of Moravian Catholics (*Požiadavky moravských katolíkov*). Its author was a Moravian farmer, Augustín Navrátil, but it was supported by the Cardinal of Prague, František Tomášek. The petition gathered more than 500,000 signatures, most of which came from Slovakia. It was probably the biggest opposition petition circulated in the Soviet Bloc. The mass collection of signatures was possible thanks to the fact that there were religious circles in almost all of Slovakia, and their activists collected

signatures in their own areas, even when the police tried to disrupt the collection efforts.

In March 1988, the secret church was able to arrange the so-called Candle Demonstration (*Sviečková manifestácia*) in Bratislava. Prior to that, Slovakia had been rocked by the unexplained murder of several Catholic priests. The President of the World Congress of Slovaks, the former professional hockey player Marián Šťastný, organized a demonstration against the priests' murders (which state police were suspected of carrying out) in front of the Czechoslovak embassies in several Western states, as well as somewhere in Slovakia. The leadership of the secret church in Slovakia supported the idea, and the demonstration in Bratislava on 25 March 1988 proved to be the largest public mass demonstration against the Communist regime since the beginning of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia following the suppression of the Prague Spring two decades earlier.

The Candle Demonstration included demands on behalf of the churches, but also a demand for the government to respect civil rights. The Candle Demonstration broke through the public's preconception that "it would never happen." In October 1988, mass demonstrations erupted in Prague on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak state. And in November 1989, mass demonstrations erupted in towns and cities all over Czechoslovakia as part of the Velvet Revolution, which ended Communist rule in the country. In November 1989, it appeared that no one was willing to defend the Communist regime. On 10 December 1989, a new federal government of Czechoslovakia was formed, in which the Communists were a minority. The author of this text was also a member of that government. Even the Communists who were members of the government soon left the party (the majority of them, in fact). Communism in Czechoslovakia had finally been defeated.

In November 1989, the call came for the formation of Christian Democratic clubs, to serve as foundation stones for a future Christian Democratic party. Such clubs began to emerge across the country. A proactive role in their establishment was played by those committed Christians who had participated in the creation of the secret church under Communism, on both the Catholic and the Lutheran sides. The founding assembly was held on 17 February 1990 in Nitra, where the organization adopted the name of the Christian Democratic Movement

(Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH). The author of this text was elected as its chair.

After forty years of rule by the Communist Party, the very word "party" was seen by some Slovak statesmen as having been compromised. This was, in particular, the feeling among members of the KDH, who had consistently opposed the Communist Party prior to 1989. The word "movement" (*hnutie*) is actually closest to the term "party" (*strana*) in Slovak, so it was obvious to ordinary voters that the KDH "movement" referred to a political party. And yet, a movement is also something broader than a party. From its inception, the KDH included activists from beyond the realm of politics, who—apart from voting in elections—stayed away from politics, in favor of social activism in various Christian associations. The KDH created a civic space for these people, too, and so the word "movement" is also more appropriate in this respect.

The KDH was consistently formed as a ground-up initiative. First, Christian Democratic clubs were created across the country, and they sent their delegates to the founding assembly in Nitra; then, on the basis of a decision by that assembly, the movement (i.e. the party) was founded and registered under the relevant laws. The movement was also part of the government, in the person of its chairman. This ended the persecution of the social and political activities of Christians, which had lasted from 25 February 1948 to 17 November 1989.

The assistance that came from Western Christians during the struggle with Communism was diverse. I have already mentioned the printing machine that the Open Doors organization from the Netherlands successfully transferred to Slovakia. In the 1980s, diplomats from Western countries managed to attend trials of dissidents in Czechoslovakia, attempting to observe whether the Helsinki Conference's agreements were being honored, particularly its provisions on adherence to civil and human rights. Western journalists helped to publicize reports on the persecution of dissidents and, where appropriate, of Christians in Czechoslovakia and in the Eastern Bloc, across the Western media.

After November 1989, the KDH's activists faced a new challenge. During the Communist era, they had lived according to their principles on their own terms, preferring to meet with fewer people. To ensure that the secret police would not persecute them, they learned not to talk openly about their intentions. Within a matter of a few years or months, however, after the collapse of Communism, they had to acquire almost

the opposite set of values under democratic conditions. Namely, they had to reach out to the widest possible circle of people, to promote their ideas and highlight their successes.

Moreover, there was yet another challenge. Activists from the Communist-era secret church, many of whom had become activists in the Democratic Movement after 1989, made both choices because of their fundamental belief in Christianity. However, several aspects of this faith were less attractive to the general public. Mostly this related to the stability of the family and the negative view of abortion. Mass media preserved the attitudes of many journalists from the Communist period, while younger journalists had a more liberal view of the world. Members of the KDH were asked in almost every interview if they wanted to fully prohibit abortion or divorce, and so on. The members denied that they would ban either, but suggested, for example, there could be a restriction on abortion, and possibly a new assessment of the conditions for getting a divorce, which the public perceived as an obstruction to getting divorces. Only much later did we realize the need for a kind of dialectical attitude toward such issues.

After the creation of the KDH, mentors from affiliated parties in the West started to visit, and they taught us Western methods for conducting electoral campaigns. Yet this was hardly a simple matter. Methods that were common in the West, which the public there had come to understand and embrace over the decades since World War II, were new in the former Soviet Bloc countries, and some of the public perceived them as an infringement on their conscience. For example, in some cities, we used the method of posting flyers in private mailboxes. The response was rather negative, since it was perceived as a violation of privacy.

But overall, the Western European mentors' assistance was very positive, as we were taught methods that we ourselves might not have encountered. Most of these mentors came from the British Conservative Party. Mostly they were young people, recent university graduates. For them, it was a kind of service to work in a former Communist country, a challenge and an interesting experience. They also acquired experiences which they then no doubt used even after returning home. To mention some of their names: Tim Evans, Sean Gabb, Tom Grey, Nina Jurewich. Traveling around the country, organizing meetings, printing promotional materials—all of this was a new experience for us.

To draw up the basic documents and the structure of the manifesto for the elections, we most often used materials from the German

CDU-CSU parties. Given the geographical proximity and shared ideological traditions within Christian Democracy, these were the easiest for the KDH to use. The first democratic elections after Communism took place on 6 June 1990. In Slovakia, victory went to the Public Against Violence party (Verejnosť proti násiliu, VPN) with 29.35%. In second place was the KDH, with 19.21%. The other seats in parliament went to the original restored political parties and to the post-Communist Party. In Czechoslovakia, the electoral constituencies composed two federal republics, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Political parties were able to put up candidates in the context of these republics, as independent candidates.

The KDH also sought to contribute to the unification of Christian forces in Czech lands, where the Czechoslovak People's Party (Československá strana lidová, ČSL) existed. This party had been formed in the 1920s, and it had been in government for almost the entire interwar period in Czechoslovakia. Its leader had then gone on to head the émigré government in London, and during the Communist period he had been a member of the so-called National Front. After November 1989, the Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana, KDS) was formed in the Czech Republic, its chair the well-known dissident Václav Benda. Relations between the KDS and the ČSL were strained, and the two would not have merged of their own accord. However, when the KDH joined the alliance, they agreed upon the merger. In this way, the Christian Democratic Union (Křesťanskodemokratická únia, KDÚ) was formed, which brought together the KDH, KDS and ČSL. This association stood independently in elections in Czech lands, as in Slovakia the electorate would have felt somewhat alienated. Later, the KDS worked independently and eventually ceased to exist, whereas the original ČSL, under the acronym KDÚ-ČSL, is still in operation to this day.

On the basis of the election results, Vladimír Mečiar became prime minister in Slovakia, as the VPN's nominee; the leader of the parliament was František Mikloško, a long-time Catholic dissident and a former member of the secret church. The KDH was allotted the post of first deputy prime minister as well as some ministerial posts. VPN was a new party without any tradition, with an obscure ideology and an unclear political program. The internal imbalance in the VPN soon came to light.

Within the party's leadership, serious discord arose between Prime Minister Mečiar and his supporters on the one hand, and the party's

President Fedor Gál and his supporters on the other. In April 1991, Mečiar and his supporters left VPN. The KDH became the strongest party in the Slovak parliament, and the author of this text became prime minister of the Slovak government. The KDH also participated in the federal government of Czechoslovakia. Vladimír Mečiar founded his own new party, called the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS). Significant disagreements arose between him and his party on one side, and President Václav Havel and the federal government in Prague on the other.

The government led by the KDH, which lasted from April 1991 to June 1992, brought peace to the country as well as full respect for democratic principles. During that whole period, the question of the future constitutional arrangements between Slovakia and the Czech lands was discussed. On the Slovak side, all the political parties wanted greater powers for Slovakia and, in the future, a separate position for Slovakia in the context of today's European Union. A number of discussions were held between Czech and Slovak political representatives, but without a clear result. The politically ambiguous attitudes of post-Communist Czechoslovakia emerged in the elections of 1992. In Slovakia, these were won by Vladimír Mečiar's HZDS; the KDH dropped to 8.89% of the vote. The government was formed by the HZDS party together with the newly created, post-Communist, Democratic Left Party (Strana demokratickej ľavice).

The growing incompatibility of the newly created parties deepened rifts within Mečiar's own movement. A number of leading officials in the party did not want to follow the risky course on which Mečiar had set out. They gradually left the party and later founded their own new group. Shortly after the elections in 1992, the delegations from the winning parties—HZDS in Slovakia and the Civil Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana) of President Václav Klaus in the Czech lands—started talks.

The two leaders failed, however, to agree on the principles for the continued operation of Czechoslovakia as a joint state of Czechs and Slovaks, and so they agreed upon the division of the republic, which took place on 1 January 1993. In accordance with the agreement of both parties, the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia decided to divide the country by federal law according to the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. Just as the collapse of Communism in November 1989 took place without a single victim, receiving the name of the "Velvet Revolution," so the

division of Czechoslovakia took place without bloodshed, on the basis of agreement and constitutional law, and thus became known in journalistic circles as the "Velvet Divorce." During the hearing in the Federal Assembly, the KDH demanded that the division of the republic be put to a referendum, but its proposal did not gain a majority of votes, and so its deputies voted against the division of Czechoslovakia.

Early elections in September 1994 were won again by HZDS, and Vladimír Mečiar became prime minister. Even before the elections, a profound disagreement had emerged between Mečiar and the president of the Slovak Republic Michal Kováč; this conflict came to a climax after the elections. Kováč had been HZDS's nominee, but he was also supported in parliament by KDH deputies, because his behavior was more democratic than that of Mečiar.

After the elections, the clash between Mečiar and Kováč took on a criminal character. In August 1995, the Slovak Intelligence Service, which was subordinate to Mečiar, kidnapped Kováč's son and secretly transported him onto Austrian territory. A criminal investigation was being conducted into Michal Kováč Jr for fraud; he had been placed on Interpol's wanted list, and Mečiar had wanted in this way to ensure that the younger Kováč would stand before a German court in Munich. Kováč Jr voluntarily appeared before the court, but was later released. The kidnapping of the president's son created a political scandal, which still haunts Slovak domestic politics to this day. From the beginning, the KDH had stood up in defense of President Kováč. Mečiar's authoritarian government clamped down on the opposition even after Slovakia applied to join the EU. Slovakia received two warning notes from the EU to change its domestic policies. Both were sufficiently clear that, if Slovakia did not change its domestic policy, it could not become a member of the EU.

The KDH used its influence as the parliamentary opposition to maintain regular contacts with leading officials in Western countries. In particular, thanks to the Conservative Party of Great Britain and the Republican Party in the United States, we were able to gain academic posts in the UK and the US. Two deputy leaders of the KDH took advantage of this to study abroad, as did some other officials. Vladimír Mečiar's third government lasted an entire parliamentary term until 1998. Those four years of opposition were a test for the opposition parties, and for their inner strength and cohesion. During this period, the KDH became the leader of the opposition to Mečiar's government.

In the last months before the election, when Mečiar saw that his chances of holding on to power after the elections would be minimal, he changed the electoral law. The opposition parties were forced to combine forces, creating an artificial party. Nevertheless, the leader of the party was the KDH's candidate, Mikuláš Dzurinda. The party won the elections in September 1998, and formed a new government, of which Dzurinda became prime minister. This government fundamentally changed the internal and foreign policy of Slovakia, and the country's acceptance into the EU ceased to be a problem.

In 2004, Slovakia was admitted as a member of the EU. Subsequently, political attitudes in Slovakia started to stabilize. Governments took turns in office, as in any other democratic country. Sometimes the KDH was part of government, and at other times it was not. The basic division of political parties in Slovakia is such that there are conservative and liberal parties, to which the KDH also belongs. On the left, current Prime Minister Robert Fico has managed to unite those parties into one: Direction–Social Democracy (Smer–sociálna demokracia). There is also a party with an emphasis on nationalist policies, the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana). In the context of a trend that has also been reflected in other European countries, another party entered parliament in 2016, the People's Party/Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana/Naše Slovensko) of Marian Kotleba, which has an extreme rightist program. The KDH did not manage to enter parliament this time, but individual elements of its Christian Democratic policy have also spread to several other parties.

Slovakia is an economically stable country. Within the framework of the EU, it has achieved growth rates in the top rank of the member countries. Global car companies have a strong presence in the country's production sector. Over the past years, a number of Slovak journalists have pointed out that, although the KDH has never won parliamentary elections outright, the direction of the country has basically followed the political path that it set out.

After the collapse of Communism, Christian Democratic parties were founded in all of the countries of East-Central Europe. Whether or not they were aware of it at the time, they were all influenced by similar social conditions. There is a quip that "the Christian Democratic Party only keeps going in the countries of the former Holy Roman Empire." This is just a quip, but it contains more than a note of truth: among formerly Communist countries, Christian Democratic parties have only kept going in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. There are

parties with inclinations to Christianity in other countries, for example Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in Poland, but this is not a Christian Democratic party.

After Communism in the Czech Republic, the ČSL remained part of the Communist-led National Front bloc. Radical Christians therefore considered it to have been compromised, and they formed a new Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana). The new party, however, was unable to maintain its independent existence, and after a time it disappeared. The flag of Christian Democracy is still held aloft in the Czech Republic by the ČSL—although, as I have noted above, only as part of the abbreviation KDÚ-CDÚ.

In Hungary, the Christian Democratic People's Party was revived in the years 1990–1995 under the leadership of László Surján, who later became a member of the European Parliament. In 1994, it entered parliament as an individual party, but since 1998 it has not had any deputies. After 2006, the party teamed up with Viktor Orbán, and now its candidates receive a place on the Fidesz ballot, so that they can enter parliament.

Slovakia's was a special situation. Before the war, the closest parties to today's concept of a Christian Democratic party were the Catholic Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) and the Lutheran Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana [historická]). The Catholic Hlinka party, with the priest Jozef Tiso at its head, was badly compromised by its cooperation with Nazi Germany, and was banned after the war. The Slovak National Party was lost in the political turmoil at the end of the 1930s, and did not recover after the war. Its place was taken by the Democratic Party, but it too was compromised by joining the Communist National Front and did not last long as a separate organization. Paradoxically, in Slovakia, the political space for a new Christian Democratic party opened up in this way, and the KDH filled that void. A more significant problem for the KDH was the social environment in East-Central Europe after the collapse of Communism.

The creation or restoration of Christian Democratic parties in the former territories of the Soviet Bloc was favorably influenced by the example of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Voters in the former Communist states took note, and remembered that the Christian Democratic parties in the West had significantly contributed to rebuilding their countries from the ruins of war, whether in government or in

opposition. For this reason, there was the expectation that Christian Democratic parties would come into existence in their countries as well.

On the other hand, Communism collapsed in East-Central Europe only after wielding four decades of its political and ideological influence on the population. The Christian Democratic political program, clearly influenced by its sister parties in the West, appeared so radical as to be nearly incomprehensible. As an example, I would like to say that the KDH initially proposed a program for insulating the tower-block apartment complexes which had been constructed in bulk under Communism, and selling the apartments to their inhabitants. This idea met with a strong response: first, the state insulated the blocks, and then it sold off the apartments in the blocks. Another example appears almost comical. In April 1990, Pope John Paul II visited Czechoslovakia. His services under the open sky in Prague, Velehrad and Bratislava were attended by hundreds of thousands of worshippers, and some of the new entrepreneurs wanted to make money from the papal visit, so they set up many stalls selling food. However, they overestimated the demand, and much of the food was ruined. After the pope's visit, they demonstrated in front of the government offices in Bratislava, and demanded that they be compensated for their unsold goods.

Another challenge for Christian Democracy was liberalism's entanglement in the last stages of Communism. Quite a few former Communists successfully recast themselves as new liberals, and they were of the opinion that, if there was to be any freedom, then "let there be freedom in everything." I have already mentioned that liberal Communist legislation on abortion became a hot topic immediately in the wake of the Velvet Revolution. Yet, in the first decade after the collapse of Communism, the abortion laws were not changed in any country. This almost unlimited freedom began to apply to business as well, which led to the creation of pyramid companies, which threw thousands of their clients into poverty. Only gradually did states begin to adopt Western limitations and mandatory warranties. The awakening of nationalism led to multi-ethnic states and to armed conflicts, and so to the break-up of such states.

Czechoslovakia is a special case. It also fell apart, but did so in accordance with its constitution, and relations between Czechs and Slovaks did not breed hostility. The KDH in Slovakia had a significant effect on the constitutional process of the division of the state.

The experience of Christian Democratic parties in East-Central Europe has become part of the experience of Christian Democracy in Europe as a whole. It has contributed to the unification of the continent as it stands before the new challenges which await us.

Translated by James Todd

Suggestions for Further Reading

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The Prospects of Christian Democracy in Contemporary Europe: Experiences from Germany

Georg Milbradt

I would like to begin with a personal remark. I am not a political scientist who professionally analyses political developments, but an academic economist who had the privilege to be a politician and a member of government for some time. Therefore, my subsequent statement is rather a reflection of my own personal experiences and impressions than the result of academic research.

For our discussion, the case of the German Christian Democrats is interesting because we can look at West German, as well as at East German developments. Shortly after the end of World War II, the first party activities of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) started in Berlin and in East Germany. At that time, the Soviet occupation authorities tried to consolidate what remained of the fragmented party system of the Weimar Republic (outside the Nazi Party) and admitted four political parties: the CDU, the Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. In 1946, the Soviets forced the Communist and the

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Social Democratic parties to merge into the Socialist Unity Party, which ruled the country up to unification in form of a Communist dictatorship.

For the Soviets and the German Communists, the admission of the CDU was a well-calculated political move, because they contrived that in order to establish Communism they needed the initial support of Christian and Liberal parties, which represented the middle class. Shortly afterwards, the CDU was founded in the Western Zones, especially in Rhineland and Westphalia, the old stronghold of the Catholic Center Party (Zentrumspartei) from before 1933. In the east, mainly Protestants founded the new party, whereas in the west most of the founders were Catholics. However, both Protestants and Catholics wanted to form a politically stronger, united party, thereby overcoming the historic division of the politically active Christians into different denominational parties. The western CDU represented not only the merger of the old traditional Catholic and Protestant parties, but it also integrated elements of the traditional conservative spectrum and later supporters of a market economy. Initially, the position of the new party was left of center.

The first manifesto of the CDU in the British Zone (Ahlener Programm) called for the nationalization of big industry and for a state-controlled economy. However, these socialistic ideas were quickly abandoned after the Western Zones were economically united and the Deutsche Mark (DM) was introduced as the new currency by the Western occupying powers.[1] The German mastermind of postwar political economy was the Director of the Office for the Administration of the Economy (Direktor der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft) for the United Economic Zones, Ludwig Erhard, a professor of economics and ardent supporter of so-called Ordoliberalism.

Ordoliberalism has evolved as a special form of classical liberalism and is especially popular among German-speaking economists. According to Ordoliberalism, a market economy with strong competition is indispensable for successful economic development, but in contrast to classical liberalism, also a strong state is required to alleviate the social problems and tensions arising from an unconstrained market economy.[2] The state should guarantee the smooth functioning of the markets, because markets without state supervision and regulation would degenerate to monopolies and oligopolies and therefore would eventually suppress competition. A social security system should protect the poorer classes

against elementary risks such as age, illness, occupational accidents and unemployment.

Ordoliberalism has many similarities with Catholic social teaching and Protestant social ethics. Under the leadership of Ludwig Erhard as the first minister of economics of the new Federal Republic, the political program of Ordoliberalism, the "Social Market Economy," proved to be very successful in West Germany, facilitated the fast reconstruction of the war-torn country and became one important trademark of the CDU.[3] Together with its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU won the first federal elections and became the leading party in West Germany for the first two decades of the Republic's existence.

The electoral successes of the CDU were due to multiple reasons. First, most of the West German electorate was strongly opposed to all forms of totalitarianism—the Nazi dictatorship as well as Soviet Communism. Second, the vast majority of the population longed for economic and social progress driven by a booming economy and for re-admission to the family of democratic and free peoples, especially in Western Europe. The CDU seemed to be the guarantor of peace, freedom and prosperity for all. The success of the CDU was associated with a prosperous economy and a comprehensive welfare state, as well as European integration and transatlantic partnership. In many Western European countries, Christian Democratic parties existed, too, but were not as successful as the CDU, ultimately even disappearing, as in France (or, decades later, Italy).

In East Germany, the Communists were soon oppressing the CDU, prosecuting activists and the leadership who were thrown into jail or forced to emigrate to the West. The remainder of the party was brought under the total control of the Communists and became a political satellite party (*Blockpartei*).[4] However, on the local level the CDU succeeded in preserving a small degree of autonomy, becoming an alternative for politically active Christians who refused to join the Communist Party. With the political revolution of autumn 1989, the party regained its independence, won the first democratic German Democratic Republic (GDR) elections, became the leading force of reunification, and merged with the western CDU, together with two other new parties. West German chancellor Helmut Kohl heavily influenced this development, helping the CDU to become a leading political power in the East as well.

Before the first free elections in the East, most experts had predicted a left majority because of an unfavorable political environment for Christian Democracy (in contrast, for example, to Poland). Less than a quarter of the population belonged to Christian churches, of whom the overwhelming majority were Protestants. During the forty-five years of Communist rule, the GDR had become one of the most secularized countries in Europe. The surprising victory of the CDU depended on the wish of the East German electorate to unite with the West as soon as possible. They saw immediate reunification as a means to import a stable democratic system, the rule of law, a successful market economy and access to the European Union. For most of the time since the unification in 1990, a CDU-led government has been in charge of the country. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is of East German origin, has become an influential leader in Europe.

So why has the CDU remained so successful in Germany, even as most of its European sister parties fell into political obscurity? The CDU has been uniquely capable of adapting its policy and program successfully to the political and social environment, which together with moral values has changed dramatically since the 1940s, across for example the "students' revolution" of 1968, the de-churching and secularization of Western Europe, the influx of non-Christian immigrants in the wake of European decolonization, as well as globalization and, finally, the economic and financial crises of the early twenty-first century. As in nature, adaptation to change is essential for survival. However, the party was not only able to adapt to changes, but in fact could influence and steer these processes. The Germany of today is very different from the Germany of the late 1940s. Today, less than sixty percent of the population are members of Christian churches.[5] Even beyond the question of religion, however, twenty-first-century Germany has a very diverse and pluralistic society.

A political party can only be successful if it satisfactorily addresses the questions and demands of the electorate. Our answer cannot be that we are Christians and therefore know what is right for the country. We are not a party of Christians or a party for Christians only, or a party of the churches. We never have been. A traditional Christian value system is no longer self-evident for the whole society. We do not want to deny our roots and convictions. However, to be successful in elections and to be able to influence society, we must be guided by values that are of Christian origin, but are also shared by a civil society in its majority, that

is, freedom, solidarity, justice, the rule of law, mutual respect for other lifestyles and convictions. Therefore, today's CDU cannot be the CDU of the founding years. However, most of our DNA is still the same and influenced by Christian thought, for instance the inviolability of human dignity, natural law, the subsidiarity principle and the universal validity of human rights—all now binding political principles.

In Germany, the strategy of the CDU has been successful and—I hope—will remain so in the future. If we had focused our policy on the Christian electorate only, we would have become a small minority with few chances to influence society; ultimately, we would have disappeared as a dominant political force. Therefore, we have to be open to people of other faiths or non-believers and atheists in order both to remain influential and to preserve Christian values. Let me explain this by the example of Saxony, a state in eastern Germany: with 3% Catholics and around 20% Protestants. The Saxon CDU was always able to gain around 40% or more in state elections and three times even absolute majorities.[6] Most of our voters in Saxony are not church members. However, the minister-president was always a Christian, as were most of the members of parliament. We are still able to influence politics and society by Christian values, but we do not impose them on others.

In reality, it can be very difficult to apply Christian Democratic principles to solve present problems. I would like to describe my position with the help of two examples, the future of Europe after the euro crisis and the diminishing share of Christian population, especially in Germany.

For more than five years, the euro crisis has shaken eurozone countries and no immediate solution is in sight. Many hope that the countless political rescue measures will solve the crisis somehow in the future. However, we do not have not endless time. The crisis could destroy European integration, the social cohesion of the continent and our common European future. For instance, we cannot tolerate the extreme degree of youth unemployment in Greece and Spain for much longer. We cannot accept that many young people are growing up without a real chance for their life, a lost generation without hope. I am personally convinced that the founding fathers of the euro, among them leading Christian Democrats, made many mistakes during the euro negotiations. They created a common currency without a proper and stable foundation. From economic history, we could have learned that a currency union among sovereign states cannot survive indefinitely, especially if its members are very heterogenous. Now we have a common European

currency, but no common European state. Either we are able and willing to build this state, or the currency union will fail in the long run.

Many European leaders are hoping that we will get some kind of European state by means of individual *ad hoc* steps toward centralization, and yet nobody knows what kind of state that might be because we have no plan. Many politicians say that we need more Europe, but nobody says what kind of Europe. But that is the most interesting question. In the seal of the American presidency, a motto is written: *e pluribus unum*. The American idea is to form a new people and to leave the old nationalities behind. The Americans were successful in forging a new nation out of others. However, neither one European nation nor one European people exists, only European nations and European peoples. In the near future, that will not change. Therefore, the motto of the European Union is well chosen: *in varietate concordia*. Europe needs another form of union that is not a copy of the USA, because we Europeans are very diverse, and we do like it. We all want to maintain our own languages, our own cultures, and our own ways of living. We must allow a high degree of diversity, which in turn necessitates a high degree of autonomy. If you allow autonomy, the logical consequences are responsibility and—in economic terms—liability.

In the European currency union and in the global financial markets, we have allowed a high degree of autonomy, but without responsibility. According to Christian Democratic principles, responsibility—in economic terms, liability—is indispensable for autonomy; otherwise, the result would be chaos. Indeed, the consequences of this economic policy were casino capitalism and blackmailing.[7] Everybody can cheat his or her neighbor. That cannot go on forever. Therefore, we have to look at the alternatives. If we want a maximum of solidarity, then we need a very centralized European state. However, I think that the majority of Europeans would not accept this solution. Europe cannot send, for instance, a commissioner to Athens to rule the country, if the local politicians do not obey the common rules. That would only be possible in a European state.

Therefore, we have to take a step back and allow more responsibility, like in Switzerland or the United States. In both countries, subnational entities can go bankrupt. In the USA, many states have gone bankrupt in the past, as have counties and big cities. In Switzerland, the same is possible. In most federations, you have "no bailout" as a general rule, and the system functions. If you introduce a bailout clause, instead of a

no-bailout clause, you have to devise a completely different system with a high degree of centralization. We face an either-or, not an as-well-as situation. However, politicians like as-well-as more than either-or. They are looking for a compromise between mutually exclusive solutions. This compromise cannot function indefinitely.

As a Christian Democrat, I would add that we need also solidarity. However, we believe in freedom, too. As a person, I can choose, but have to be responsible for my choices afterwards. That is the teaching of the Catholic Church. The alternative view is that we are not able to choose, so somebody else has to do it for us. That is more or less the collectivistic, or even totalitarian answer. I do not like this view and prefer freedom and autonomy instead. I accept responsibility for my own choices, as well as for the choices of my region or my nation. We have to conduct this debate in Europe. What do we really want? Which Europe do we want? Depending on the answers to these questions, we will find the appropriate solution to the larger problem of our European future.

In many European countries, and especially in Germany, we are living in a very pluralistic society. We are no longer a real Christian country or a Christian people. In Germany, we have had different denominations for nearly five centuries with confessional wars leading to catastrophic results. Therefore, we have learned to respect the other's faith. As a Catholic, I have to accept that the teaching of the Protestant churches concerning divorce or abortion is different from ours. If we want to cooperate with other groups, we have to respect their different views. A politician has to find out what common policy is possible. The same applies to the non-Christian parts of society. In Germany, we have around five million Muslims. Many of them have citizenship and the right to vote. Therefore, the CDU cannot ignore the Muslim electorate and must try to attract their votes as well. This is possible because we share more common values with moderate Muslims than many people believe.

In a pluralistic society, the state has to be neutral. The state is not an instrument to convert people to our faith. I am a politician, not a preacher or a priest. I am not responsible for re-Christianization. That is a task of the churches. As a church member, I can help on a personal level, but not as a politician.

The decline or disappearance of Christian Democracy in many European countries demonstrates that there is no alternative. The same problem exists on the European level as well. The continent's remaining

Christian Democratic parties no longer form their own international association. They have merged with other center-right parties into the European People's Party (EPP). On the European level, the EPP is quite successful as well and influences European institutions and European politics. Thereby we are able to uphold Christian thought and successfully preserve fundamental Christian values like freedom, subsidiarity and autonomy, human rights, solidarity and justice. As Christians no longer have the political and moral monopoly on European public life, only together with others who share these values can we preserve our European heritage, which to a great extent is a Christian heritage.

NOTES

1. Rudolf Uerz, "Das Ahlener Programm: Die Zonenausschusstagung der CDU der britischen Zone vom 1. bis 3. Februar 1947 und ihre Vorbereitungen," *Die Politische Meinung: Monatsschrift zu Fragen der Zeit* no. 446 (2007): 47–52.
2. The name Ordoliberalism is derived from the Latin word *ordo*, English order, German *Ordnung*. ORDO was also the title of the Yearbook of Economic and Social Order, founded by the German economists Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, both leading scholars of Ordoliberalism. The idea of a regulatory policy based on Ordoliberalism is still very popular in Germany under the name *Ordnungspolitik*. See, e.g., Joachim Starbatty, "Ordoliberalismus," in *Geschichte der Nationalökonomie*, ed. Otmar Issing (Munich: Franz Vahlen, 1984), 239–254; Lüder Gerken, ed., *Walter Eucken und sein Werk: Rückblick auf den Vordenker der sozialen Marktwirtschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).
3. The Social Market Economy is the political program derived from Ordoliberal theory. According to Alfred Müller-Armack, the very influential director of the policy department in Erhard's Federal Ministry of Economics, the Social Market Economy is a socio-economic model, which combines free initiative on the basis of a competition-driven economy with social progress precisely secured by economic performance: Alfred Müller-Armack, "Soziale Marktwirtschaft," in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, ed. Erwin von Beckerath (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1956), 10: 390.
4. According to the Communist Popular Front concept, the non-Communist parties were forced to join an electoral alliance or bloc, the National Bloc of Democratic Germany (Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschlands) under the leadership of the Communist Party (SED), together with Communist-controlled mass organizations in East

Germany. In local and national elections, the bloc presented unity lists (*Einheitslisten*) with a majority of Communist candidates. As no other party list or independent candidates were permitted, the Communists and the mass organization secured a majority of candidates on the bloc's list, and the Communists could thereby avoid any form of political competition and secure their political power.

5. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevölkerung auf Grundlage des Zensus 2011: Bevölkerung nach Altersgruppen, Familienstand und Religionszugehörigkeit*, online at https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Tabellen/AltersgruppenFamilienstandZensus.html, retrieved 28 March 2017.

6. Sächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung. *Wahlergebnisse Sächsischer Landtag (Zweitstimmenanteile und Sitze)*, online at http://www.infoseiten.slpb.de/politik/sachsen/politische-ordnung/landtagswahlen/wahlergebnisse-seit-1990, retrieved 28 March 2017.

7. In Germany, Hans-Werner Sinn has criticized the economic policies in the USA and Europe and the euro crisis since 2009 in several books written from an Ordoliberal perspective: Sinn, *Casino Capitalism: How the Financial Crisis Came About and What Needs to be Done Now* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sinn, *The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets and Beliefs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

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Index

449