

The American Civil War in British Culture

Representations and Responses, 1870 to the Present

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

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To Sivan

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Introduction

This book explores why twentieth-century Britons were fascinated with the American Civil War, how they understood it and how they presented it to themselves and to Americans. Based upon the findings of this investigation, the book argues that the American conflict has played an exceptionally central role in British culture, and it puts forward a comprehensive and nuanced explanation for this phenomenon. This study also exposes the scope of the encounter between the British and the Civil War and shows how in this encounter the British used the war in order to understand, comment on and even shape domestic as well as Anglo-American affairs.

British interest in the Civil War after the conflict ended has in recent years attracted scholars who have detected an underexplored historical phenomenon that could cast new light on questions in American, British and Anglo-American history. Historians such as Jay Sexton, Brian Holden Reid, Hugh Dubrulle, Kevin Kenny and Adam Smith, have made important headway in explaining the place and role of the war in British culture and in Anglo-American relations.[1] Thus we know that in the early decades of the twentieth century the British used the Civil War in order to understand and align themselves with the United States, as Smith has demonstrated; we know that the Americans used the image of Abraham Lincoln for purposes of public diplomacy in Britain in the late 1950s, as Sexton has shown; and we know that lessons the British drew from the war were connected with their view of the United States, as Dubrulle has shown. These studies provide ample evidence for the British interest in the conflict; they define many of the themes that are worth exploring in this field, and they greatly inspire this work.

The above studies also bring to the fore the work that is still needed in order to fully understand the place and use of this American war in

twentieth-century British culture and the significance of this phenomenon. Four lacunae can be found in the picture of the war's stature in Britain as generated by extant studies. First, current work focuses on the British interest in a single aspect of the war or in the place of the conflict in a single sphere of British life. We thus have studies about Britons' interest in Lincoln, about the war in British military thought and about the conflict's manifestations in British political discourse. However, no concerted research is yet available that unearths and explores the common thread that links these together.[2] Second, the field of popular culture, where there exists a plethora of evidence for British fascination with the Civil War, is currently underexplored. Films, artifacts and – even more so – Civil War societies such as American Civil War Round Table and re-enactment clubs have often escaped scholars' attention. The limited chronological perspective of current studies creates a third lacuna. Whereas existing scholarship focuses on the British interest in the war until the Second World War, the second half of the twentieth century has so far received little scrutiny.

A fourth lacuna was created by the limited place that scholars have hitherto given to the United States in their works. The dominant approach to the study of the British view of the Civil War has focused on Britons' ability to shape the war's meaning according to relevant contemporary British affairs. Historians have emphasized, for example, the impact of the Great War and of the Irish question on, respectively, British military and political thought about the Civil War.[3] This methodology has its virtues. Above all, it acknowledges the independent British interpretation of the conflict and shows how Britons shaped the war's meaning autonomously in a domestic context.

However, this approach undermines its own merits. It is too inward-looking in that it only rarely considers a foreign, especially American, influence on the British view of the Civil War and thus fails to recognize three key features of the British interest in and use of the conflict. First, when Britons fashioned their understanding of the Civil War they usually drew on American sources that reflected American views of the conflict. *The Birth of a Nation* (D. W. Griffith, 1915), for example, a cinematic manifestation of a Southern view of the conflict, was a cornerstone in British education about the Civil War.[4] While scholars have identified an active British interpretation of the war, they have failed to appreciate its extent by overlooking a major means by which Britons reacted to and acted upon American interpretations of the war. A second feature is that, as Smith and Dubrulle observed, Britons' understanding of the war was closely tied in with their views of the contemporary United States.[5]

The emphasis on the British context to explain how Britons understood the war has downplayed the place of the United States as a pivotal part of this domestic context. The third feature is the British export of their own representations of the Civil War to the United States and the presentation of their view of the conflict before the American public. Here, too, the extent to which Britons used the war at home but also abroad has gone largely unnoticed.

Taken together, the picture that emerges from current studies is of an inward-looking, fragmented and ephemeral British interest in the Civil War. This book challenges this view by using a new methodology. First, it takes a broad thematic and temporal scope and examines British fascination with the war in the major spheres of British life as continuous and stemming from common sources. It reviews the links that, throughout the twentieth century, connected the war's place in British politics, military thought, intellectual life and popular culture. Second, it examines critically the American sources on which Britons drew, taking into account the ever-changing American memory of the war embedded in these sources, and explores the ways in which the British interpreted them. Third, it scrutinizes Britons' array of views of the United States as part of the context that shaped their understanding of the Civil War. Finally, this book explores the British export of their interpretations of the conflict to the United States and the motivation behind it.

Such an analysis unearths a new picture that raises new questions. For one thing, it reveals that the Civil War has had an exceptionally central place in British culture. It reveals that for a hundred and fifty years Britons have been fascinated with an American historical conflict, a fascination that penetrated the major spheres of British life. Imprinted onto the political discourse, military thought, intellectual life and popular culture, the American Civil War left a deep, lasting mark on British society, such as no other foreign conflict has done. By comparison, the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) have not sustained their appeal in Britain outside limited, mostly military, circles.[6] Similarly, the British enchantment with the Italian *Risorgimento*, which in mid-century was consensual and widespread, ultimately waned.[7] British interest in other foreign conflicts, such as the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), was even more short-lived. Conversely, British fascination with the American Civil War remained high. At times, it even seemed to have intensified as the conflict moved further into history. To illustrate this point, the place of Giuseppe Garibaldi and Abraham Lincoln in British thought can be briefly compared. In the 1860s, the British 'cult of

Garibaldi', in the words of Maura O'Connor, celebrated the Italian icon as a democratic and nationalist leader, a self-made man and a freedom fighter.[8] Yet ultimately, Lincoln – a controversial figure in Britain at that time – was the one who overwhelmingly dominated British thought as a foreign hero of exactly this character. The image of Garibaldi has in the meantime sunk into oblivion.

Following Tom Buchanan's study, it seems that only the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) could potentially claim stature similar to that of the American war.[9] Yet much remains to be said in favor of the unique place reserved for the American conflict in British life. For one thing, even a hundred and fifty years after its end, the American war has sustained its appeal. While the reasons for the rise and decline of British fascination with the war need to be examined, the fact remains that, as late as the 1960s – and in some spheres even much later – the war was not forgotten across the Atlantic. Additionally, unlike the memory of the Spanish Civil War that, since the 1990s, has remained prominent mostly in leftist circles in Britain, the American conflict won a place in the minds of Britons across the political and social spectrum.[10] Finally, not even the Spanish Civil War seems to have generated as broad and diverse a commemorative culture as has the American war. The American Civil War Round Table and re-enactment societies, for example, began to appear in Britain as early as the 1950s, and they have been flourishing here since the 1960s.[11] One of the first groups to re-enact the Spanish war, the *La Columna*, appeared only in 2000, and its members have been playing mainly Britons and other foreigners who fought on the Continent, not the Spanish, as opposed to Britons re-enacting the American war who assume American identities.

The above methodology reveals also that the British image of and interest in the Civil War have been part of a wider transatlantic encounter in which a complex, dynamic and independent American historical affair was used by equally complex, dynamic and independent British users. The war, in a word, was epic. It is seen as the first modern war, with extensive involvement of civilians and politicians in the fighting, and featuring strong moral aspects that touched upon questions of freedom and slavery, democracy, nationality and independence, to name just a few of the aspects that accorded 'epic' traits to the conflict. In addition to its remarkable scope, the Civil War was a complex historical affair, the understanding of which has been constantly evolving. Many of the war's fundamental aspects have been a source for debate going on to this day. Such debate includes: the very causes that led to the conflict;[12] the war's military aspects and its place in the history of warfare are being

constantly reconsidered;[13] Lincoln's policies and military conduct have been a subject of discussion, as have the president's stance regarding race, slavery, black colonization and emancipation;[14] the role and experience of African Americans in the war has been equally debated, and Reconstruction has generated a contested historiography of its own.[15] The Civil War also generated multiple representations and interpretations that became part of its legacy. The Northern, Southern, African-American and conciliatory narratives of the Civil War are the main (in many ways conflicting) views of the war.[16] Furthermore, all Civil War narratives have constantly changed, as have the interactions between them and their dominance in the United States.[17] The great majority of historians agree that during the 1880s the conciliatory representation of the conflict began to dominate the American perception of the Civil War.[18] Having achieved its place at the core of American culture in the 1910s, this narrative was significantly challenged only around the period of the war's centennial (1961–1965), when the African-American legacy of the conflict began to raise its head.[19] The British, then, encountered a living historical affair that had given them much material to use and many ways to do so.

Indeed, the British turned to the war (that is, they interpreted this American conflict as they saw it) as well as to its multiple interpretations (that is, they re-interpreted the war's various narratives that had been constructed in the United States) according to their needs and within domestic and Anglo-American contexts. Additionally, the British had their own, independent, historical connection to the American conflict. Engulfed in its global resonance, the British in the 1860s had acknowledged the epic scope of the Civil War and showed much interest in the events in America. As Richard Blackett has argued, 'no other international event … had such a profound effect on the economic and political life in Britain as did the war in America'.[20] In the twentieth century the war's impact in Britain continued to appeal to many Britons for whom the war's historical impact on their country was often an abundant source of lessons and war narratives. The outlines of the most dominant narrative that emerged from the war's resonance across the Atlantic stressed that the British aristocracy had supported the Confederacy – based on sentiments of kinship, opposition to democratic reforms at home and on the hope of seeing the demise of the United States. The working class, according to this narrative, had endorsed the Union – based on workers' support for democratic reform at home and of abolition. As Duncan Andrew Campbell has shown, this narrative of Britain's involvement in the conflict penetrated the twentieth-century academic

debate on this subject.[21] The following chapters expand on Campbell's observation and show that, in other spheres too, the British have cherished narratives about their involvement in the conflict. The autonomy and richness of both the war and its British interpreters have produced a nuanced, multi-faceted and dynamic historical phenomenon.

The above arguments, to be substantiated throughout the book, raise the two correlating and interlinked questions that drive this study forwards. Regarding the argument about the war's centrality in British culture, the historian is compelled to ask why the British have been interested particularly in the Civil War and, furthermore, why has this foreign conflict played such a central role in British culture. The richness and complexity of the Civil War and Britons' autonomy in representing it raises the question of according to which principles and rules the British translated and used the war, both in Britain and in the Atlantic arena. These questions are interlinked in that an attempt to answer one necessarily touches upon, and illuminates, the others. Accordingly, the chapters that follow discuss these issues conjointly, separating them only when doing so contributes to further establishing the Civil War's central place in British culture and sheds further light upon the transatlantic encounter between this American war and the British people.

In exploring the place and use of the American Civil War in modern British culture, this book has two further goals. The first is to permit a better understanding the conflict's long-lasting global impact. Scholars have become increasingly interested in the global and lingering impact of the Civil War. Sven Beckert's work, for example, which examined the war's immense and enduring effect on the global cotton market, casts light on its lasting economic impact around the world.[22] Examples from the military sphere have existed for a long time, often in studies about the origins of the Great War and about total warfare.[23] Equally, the Civil War has had a cultural impact, one which seemed to have had a no less long-lasting global reach. Civil War re-enactment, for example, has spread as far as Australia, and it is known that *The Birth of a Nation* had an evident impact in France.[24] Scholars have also shown the international reach of Lincoln's legacy.[25] The scholarship on the lasting global cultural impact of the conflict is in its infancy and needs more attention. Above all, there is no one complete case study that examines the war's lingering cultural impact anywhere other than in the United States.

A second goal is to gain another angle to inspect the history of Anglo-American relations. Academic skepticism notwithstanding, historians have in recent years established the need for a cultural approach to

the study of Anglo-American – and international – relations.[26] Within this field, scholars have shown how historical consciousness functioned as cultural diplomatic tools that contemporaries used in order to understand and shape Anglo-American relations. David Reynolds for example, has argued that the notion of the 'Special Relationship' has been a constructed instrument that was used in order to advance both American, but mostly British interests in the years since the Second World War.[27] Similar work has been conducted regarding the notion of being Anglo-Saxon lineage. Edward Kohn, for example, has shown that Anglo-Saxon rhetoric was a 'device' that was 'utilized in responding to Anglo-American crises and their resolutions'.[28] The Civil War and its representations have not yet been scrutinized through this lens. Showing how the British used narratives of the war as a tool at home and in the transatlantic arena in order to understand and shape Anglo-American relations, this study presents the Civil War as a new prism through which to examine these relations. Potentially, unlike the notion of the 'Special Relationship', which emerged in the 1940s, and the sentiments of a common Anglo-Saxon identity, which reached and passed their zenith around the turn of the twentieth century, the Civil War and its representations would allow, *inter alia*, for another way to study the ever-changing Anglo-American cultural relations since that war and to the present day.

This brings to the fore the chronological and thematic scope of this book. This study examines a period of more than a hundred and fifty years. However, the wide canvass of this work is not a goal in itself, but an instrument. A broad perspective was needed in order to overcome the weaknesses of the existing fragmented scholarship and present a concerted analysis of the interlinked and continuous popular British interest in the Civil War. Additionally, in an attempt to explore the full spectrum of possible British views of the conflict and the full range of British utilization of these views in both a British and Anglo-American context, a broad chronological scope was needed that encompassed changes in both British and Anglo-American history.

In order not to sacrifice depth for breadth, the work is constructed of five case studies in political, military, intellectual and social British history in which the Civil War played a central part. Each chapter exposes a spectrum of British uses of the Civil War in a particular field, a spectrum that, in turn, reflects a range of views – both of domestic affairs and of the United States. Since Britons' views of local affairs and of America are varied, their interpretations of the Civil War, even in a single field, have been myriad and manifold. Together, the chapters expose the full range

of British uses of the war and, thus, the full scale of this cacophony. It is precisely this multiplicity of voices that each chapter, and the book as a whole, strives to emphasize in order to answer this study's main question regarding British use of the Civil War. However, each chapter, as does the book itself, also finds the harmony that exists and permeates this tension. Building on Michel De Certeau, the book holds that, after establishing that 'users make innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules, [we] must determine the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of this collective activity'.[29] The chapters' connectedness and the book's internal coherence lie in their exposing a varying multiplicity and the constant principles based upon which it flourishes.

At the same time that the book seeks to find the principles upon which British interest in and use of the Civil War was founded, its internal coherence also lies in showing a relatively linear change of focus in the British view of the war. Chronologically, the book demonstrates a British shift of focus, from looking to the war for political lessons and military lessons to lessons about civil rights, and even entertainment. These lessons, however, have not been exclusive. If the British focus changed from politics to warfare in the 1920s and 1930s, the American Civil War's political aspect merely moved to the background rather than disappeared.

Chapter 1 examines the use of the Civil War in British political discourse by focusing on the "Irish question" between the 1880s and the 1920s. This chapter demonstrates the growing awareness, among British politicians, of the enduring strength of the American political system and their acknowledgement that American power might influence what Britons saw as domestic British affairs. Chapter 2 looks at the Civil War's role in military thought, doing so mainly through the works of the three preeminent British military thinkers of the twentieth century: Frederick Maurice, Basil Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller. Alongside an emphasis on the impact of the Great War on their understanding of the Civil War, this chapter shows that military thinkers' views of the United States were also influential in determining how they interpreted that war's military and non-military lessons. Chapter 3 takes issue with the war in the eyes of British intellectuals as depicted in their biographical writings about Abraham Lincoln. To present a novel analysis of this subject, the chapter examines not only that which made Lincoln an appealing icon to the British, but also that which rendered him and his legacy problematic to British appropriation.

The following two chapters deal with popular culture. Chapter 4 focuses on the British reception of Civil War cinema, the foremost agent in transmitting representations of the conflict from the United States to the wider public in Britain, and examines the British reception of films considered milestones in the history of Civil War representations. The chapter begins during the Civil War semi-centennial with an analysis of the British reception of *The Birth of a Nation* (1915). It then looks into the British response to *Gone with the Wind* (1939), followed by an examination of the reaction to the cinematic representations of the war from an African-American point of view, through an analysis of Alistair Cooke's *America* (1972), *Roots* (1977), and *Glory* (1989). The chapter ends during the war's sesquicentennial with an analysis of *Lincoln* (2012). Chapter 5 focuses on British societies dedicated to the study and re-enactment of the conflict. In the first historical account of these popular clubs, the reasons for their initial appearance in the 1950s and their continuous popularity to this day are discussed.

The Conclusion draws on the findings of all previous chapters in order to present an inclusive picture of the British use of the Civil War and an explanation as to why twentieth-century Britons were fascinated with that particular conflict. In so doing, this book depicts for the first time a coherent, inclusive and nuanced picture of how the American Civil War was understood from across the Atlantic and through a historically distanced perspective.

1
The War and the Political Debate about Ireland

From the very outbreak of hostilities Britons were exposed to the contesting notions of political unity and political autonomy that were embedded in the rhetoric explaining the Civil War. British correspondents and envoys reported from America and, throughout the war, Northern and Southern agitators worked indefatigably in Britain to convey their respective – naturally conflicting – ideas about the issues.[1] Accordingly, as historians have already pointed out, Britons could and did draw parallels between the war in the United States and the questions that it raised about nationalism and British affairs.[2]

However, in the Irish context, for Britons of the mid-1860s the debate about national autonomy and unity was almost irrelevant outside Irish nationalist circles. True, since the Acts of Union in 1800, Anglo-Irish relations had been ever turbulent.[3] Compared with Scotland and Wales, Ireland seemed a less-natural addition to the Union, and both the Irish and British constantly debated the nature of their relations.[4] However, the turmoil of Ireland's position in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, especially in the Civil War era, should not be overstated. The 1850s, for example, was a relatively calm decade. Additionally, Fenians and members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) had remained unorganized and divided until at least late 1863.[5] As Richard Blackett has argued, many at that time recognized that 'no British government had ever conceded the legitimacy of calls for independence in either [India or Ireland]'.[6] For a time there was no reason to think that this would change. With danger to their political order far from sight, Britons saw few political lessons to draw from the war in America regarding Ireland's status within the British Union.

For Irish nationalists, the case was different. In Ireland, mass-movements promoting ideas of national autonomy had begun to appear as

early as the 1790s.[7] By 1861, notions of self-rule were not new and hardly irrelevant to Irish nationalists, who thus saw the conflict in America as a timely opportunity to advance their goals. As Joseph Hernon has noted, Irish nationalists were aware of the analogy between the secession of the South in the United States and their aspirations for national autonomy at home.[8] However, in the context of the Irish Question, Irish nationalists, both at home and in America, viewed the war chiefly in a pragmatic way that was based on two main assumptions. First, they thought that they could find an ally or allies in America. Supporters of the Union reasoned that a unified United States would be a natural and invaluable ally in their fight against Britain.[9] Much along the same lines of reasoning, Irish support of the Confederacy stemmed partially from the belief that two American nations – a Northern one and a Southern one – would pose greater opposition to Britain than one.[10] A second pragmatic calculation was that the war in America was an opportunity to gain military training to be utilized later against the British.[11]

British politicians were conscious of Irish nationalists' aspirations and supposed gains from the war, and they linked the conflict and its possible repercussions on Anglo-Irish and Anglo-American affairs much as the Irish did, especially in the years immediately following the American conflict. In 1866, John George, former solicitor-general for Ireland, expressed his anxiety in the House of Commons about the war's implications on the military abilities of Irish nationalists. Fenianism, he feared, 'had attained a greater power and strength in consequence of the hundreds and thousands of men who had been disbanded at the termination of the American Civil War'.[12] A week earlier, Prime Minister Earl Russell, expressed his own distress about the potential danger of the Fenians' military skills:

> With regard to Fenianism, I believe my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State said what was perfectly correct when he contended that it was another of those movements coming from foreign countries; that as the movement of 1798 had been connected with the French Republic, and as the movement of 1848 was connected with the revolutionary ideas which were rife at that time on the Continent, so this Fenian movement of our own day has been connected with the American Civil War.[13]

The Fenian stir brought together in the British mind lessons from the Civil War, British politics and the question of Ireland. As W. E. Gladstone put it at the time: 'It is only since the termination of the American war

and the appearance of Fenianism that the mind of this country has been again turned to Irish affairs'.[14]

However, Irish nationalists interpreted events erroneously. For one thing, military lessons from the Civil War, such as guerrilla warfare and the use of explosives, achieved limited success and endorsement when they crossed the Atlantic. The methods employed during the Dynamite War in the 1880s, for example, roused mainly bitter feelings, even among the Irish.[15] It was clear, too, that trained as they might have been – and an Irish-American military elite did emerge out of the war – the Irish did not have the discipline, organization or military power to stand against the British.[16] Additionally, Irish nationalists had misread the political map. Seeking an ally in America, they had failed to realize that, despite evident tensions, Anglo-American relations were in fact on the road of rapprochement. As Phillip Myers has argued, rather than undermining Anglo-American rapprochement, the Civil War, during which Britons and Americans resolved their conflicts diplomatically, in many senses contributed to this motion.[17] The failed raids in Canada between 1866 and 1871, by which Fenians sought to incite a transatlantic conflict, but instead met with Anglo-American cooperation and the concluding of the Treaty of Washington (1871), were good indications that by this stage a war between Britain and the United States was but a daydream.[18]

The Fenians in America, as the IRB at home, were illegitimate extra-parliamentary movements. They did not generate a genuine debate about the political status of Ireland in the British Union. Since British politicians did not see a concrete challenge from Ireland to the integrity of the Union, the Civil War continued to bear only limited relevance to Anglo-Irish politics. For the British, as Russell's words (cited above) made clear, Irish radicalism and the Civil War – and the idea of a fight over national unity and national freedom that both represented, were American and thus foreign. As such, Russell calmly predicted: 'That spirit, I trust, will not be one of long duration, and it certainly is not one which ought to be connected with the general condition of Ireland'.[19] He was largely correct. Britons felt no reason to worry about the Civil War's impact as either a source of potential conflict with the United States or of Irish military power. Additionally, they saw no reason as of yet to look to the United States for relevant lessons on this matter.

The 1870s saw a profound shift in the British attitude to the Civil War. Starting from this period, three parallel developments moved Britons to see the conflict's political aspects as relevant. The first was a change in the Irish question. In the early 1870s, as Irish revolutionary activism declined, an Irish parliamentary movement, under the leadership of

Isaac Butt, became the leading voice of Irish nationalism.[20] This movement first made Irish Home Rule a conceivable, if at this stage unlikely, political model for the United Kingdom.[21] Butt's idea of home rule ran along federal lines. 'I believe', he stressed in 1870, 'that Ireland would be happier and better under a Federal Union with England than she would be either as a member of the American Confederation, or as an independent nation under the protection of any European power'.[22] Nonetheless, whether within the empire or not, the Irish question began to undermine the nature of the British Union from within the British political system.

A second development was a change in the British perception of the United States. The Civil War cast doubts on the viability of the American political system.[23] Many in Britain saw the conflict as a test that would reveal whether American democracy – a novel political ideology and form of government – could endure.[24] Deterred by the scale of violence and skeptical that reunification could ever be achieved, some saw the war as evidence that the American experiment had already failed.[25] However, after the war and as the century wore on, the United States proved to be anything but an abortive endeavor. Increasingly industrialized and populated, rapidly growing financially and more willing to exert its power in the western hemisphere, the durability of the 'Gilded Age' United States was unquestionable.[26] Accordingly, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, British political thinkers frequently used the United States as a practical model through which to assess their own governmental system.[27] As Hugh Tulloch has observed, even conservatives, previously critical of the United States, had by the 1880s come to commend it.[28] As time passed, the success and resilience of the American model became more evident, less doubtful and thus more applicable.

The third development was the continuous consolidation of the representation of the war that depicted it as a glorious constitutive moment for the United States. This was especially true with the rise of the conciliatory narrative of the war in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This narrative emphasized that both Northerners and Southerners showed their Americanism and patriotism in the fighting.[29] Accordingly, rather than a symbol of national decline, the war was rooted in contemporary American memory, culture and national identity as a moment of rebirth into greatness. It came to symbolize patriotism, citizens' love for their nation and national unity. Notions of a noble fight for secession were perpetuated in the Southern legacy of the war, known as the 'Lost Cause'. Although (according to this narrative) secession was legitimate, it was also stressed – again, especially with

the rise of sentiments of reconciliation – that the South had not wanted to take that path and had been forced to do so only when its way of life had been endangered. The narrative of reconciliation accommodated these sentiments alongside the celebration of reunion. Subsequently, the view of the war as a patriotic and romantic event that had united America and forged its current political system became the dominant post-conflict narrative.[30]

The change in the nature of the Irish question, the growing prominence of the United States and the rise of the conflict's reconciling representation made the Civil War appealing to British politicians. Examining Ireland's political status in the Union, they now began to internalize the war and to draw lessons from the American experience that the war's narratives reflected. In June 1871, Spencer Cavendish, the Marquess of Hartington, challenged Irish nationalists to attempt breaking the Union, promising them that 'they will find that our determination is just as strong as was that of the people of that country to which we are told their eyes are always turned – the United States of America – that their Union should not be dissevered'.[31] Similarly, when Butt presented his political scheme in the House of Commons on 2 May 1872, Gladstone reminded him:

> You cannot have two supreme authorities in a country; and as in the great American Civil War it was the Federal Government and the Federal Legislature which found it necessary to take into its own hands the circumscription of the liberties of the States, and the solution of the controversy which had formerly been raised on that subject.[32]

The prime minister did not neglect to remind Butt that the war also gave the Fenian 'conspiracy' an 'additional scope', but the focus of the speech was clearly elsewhere. Increasingly, the military and diplomatic aspects of the war's possible impact on Anglo-Irish affairs gave way in British political discourse to its political aspects.

Rather than looking at the Civil War as a purely foreign affair, external to British politics, British politicians started to appropriate the conflict, apply it to the British Union and draw lessons from it. Gladstone, for example, presented a contemporary and legitimate British reading of the Irish question and, consequently, of the Civil War. For one thing, Butt did not call for secession as did the Confederate states, but rather for Irish autonomy fully subordinated to British rule. In fact, Butt – an imperialist who saw Ireland as an integral part of the British Empire – repeatedly stressed that he 'was anxious to maintain the Union'.[33] Gladstone also

denied the Irish claim based on a construction of the British Union as an American federation. He further omitted from his analogy the liberties that the American states enjoyed under their federal Union and which were denied to Ireland, such as having state legislatures. Appealing to America's heritage, Gladstone, Cavendish and others nonetheless filled it with British substance.

As the century progressed, and at a time when American growth became increasingly evident, so too the Irish question became more pressing. Succeeding Butt in 1882, Charles S. Parnell had established the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) and cemented the idea of Irish Home Rule in British political discourse. By 1885, the IPP had won the Irish vote in Ireland from Liberal hands, becoming the latter's indispensable, if inconvenient, political partner.[34] Consequently, British Liberals had to alter their use of the Civil War. Instead of accentuating the war's unifying force, Liberals began to emphasize the political liberty that the war and its aftermath had secured for the individual states. On 13 April 1886, Gladstone, whose Liberal Party was by now politically shackled to Parnell's IPP, and who now promoted his own Home Rule bill, told the House of Commons:

> My Right Hon. friend finally laid very much stress on the case of the United States of America. He pointed out that insidious advisers recommended the Northern States not to insist upon the maintenance of the Union, but that they did insist on the maintenance of the Union and carried their point. Why, true, sir; but, having carried their point, what did they do? Having the Southern States at their feet, being in a position in which they were entitled to treat them as conquered countries, they invested every one of them with that full autonomy, a measure of which we are now asking for Ireland.[35]

Robert Wallace, Liberal MP for Edinburgh East, expressed a similar position, to great cheers, in a Junior Liberal Association's convention in Glasgow in 1887. To Conservatives and Liberal Unionists who argued that federalism was but the first step towards full separation, Wallace answered that '[t]he experience of the American Republic proves that that is an utter fallacy'.[36]

Gladstone's later reading of the Civil War in a way that supported Home Rule was no less selective than his previous reading that opposed the same motion. He knew, for example, that his bill offered Ireland a very different status in the United Kingdom than that of the American states under the Federal Union. Although this time he did not omit

mentioning the liberties held by the American states, Gladstone's bill did not allow for Irish representation in Westminster in the same way that the American states were represented in Congress. However, if Gladstone's use of the Civil War pointed to a change in the Liberals' interpretation of the war, it did not show a change in their understanding of the meaning of the war as a constitutive moment in American history. The Liberal interpretation continued to perpetuate and depend upon the idea that the Civil War had made the United States a thriving nation and a successful political model.

The Civil War further provided Home Rule advocates with the evidence that self-rule could in fact guarantee quieter and closer Anglo-Irish relations. The rise of the narrative of reconciliation in the 1880s, which acknowledged Southern sentiments, made the Civil War an example for national brotherhood that was secured by a degree of political autonomy. This, it showed in turn, secured a stronger political order. In an 1886 essay in support of Irish Home Rule, E. L. Godkin, an Ulster-born American and founder of the influential journal *The Nation*, wrote that:

> The withdrawal of the Federal troops from the South by President Hayes, and the consequent complete restoration of the State governments to the discontented whites, have fully justified the expectations of those who maintained that, if you remove what you see to be the cause, the effect will surely disappear. It is true, at least in the Western world, that if you give communities a reasonable degree [of freedom to manage their own affairs], it is sure in the long run to do the work of creating and maintaining order.[37]

Concessions on national unity, Godkin claimed, drawing upon the war's reconciling message, brought order to the United States. On this basis, Godkin advocated Irish Home Rule. Evidently harnessing the legacy of reconciliation in support of Irish self-rule, Samuel Smith, a Gladstonian Liberal MP for Liverpool, called in 1884 for overcoming the bitterness in Anglo-Irish relations by taking an example from post-war American unity:

> No war excited deeper animosity than that war.... It was said both before and during the war that it would be impossible to bridge over the chasm. But it had been bridged over.... There had now been for several years past the most sincere desire for amicable relations, and, to a large extent, it had been attained.[38]

By the turn of the century, Smith would have had amended his position on Home Rule and called to oppose it. However, in the 1880s, reconciliation and limited devolution seemed to him to be the keys to stronger Anglo-Irish unity, as they proved to be in the United States.

With Home Rule becoming a conceivable notion and possible reality in Britain, opposition to Irish autonomy intensified. Conservatives and Liberal Unionists were not at all convinced that Home Rule was not, as Robert Wallace promised, in fact a step towards secession. In a speech in the House of Commons on 11 April 1893, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Conservative Civil Lord of the Admiralty, loyally presented the case against Home Rule and its advocates' employment of Civil War analogies:

> I know that an attempt has been made to compare the 45 States Governments of the United States to a separate Irish Parliament. The analogy is ridiculous, and absolutely false, and could only have occurred to the mind of some academical philosopher, who is totally unfitted for practical politics. There is a far closer analogy between our present local government system of County Councils and the State Legislatures of America, than between those Legislatures and a separate Irish Parliament. It was, indeed, to prevent a separate Congress for the whole Southern States that the North undertook the great Civil War of 1861. It is an interesting coincidence that the present Prime Minister of England [Gladstone] was then on the side of the Separatists of the United States, just, as he is now the chief apostle of separation in the United Kingdom. I believe that ... the people of the United Kingdom will decide in favour of Union, just as did 30 years ago the people of the United States. If the progress, the wealth, and the prosperity of the people of the United States appear now to be almost boundless, it is mainly because they came to this great national decision 30 years ago, that any sacrifice was worthy to be undertaken in order to maintain their Union.[39]

In 1886, Liberal Unionist Joseph Chamberlain had raised the same arguments against Gladstone's first Home Rule bill – including the emphasis on the latter's support of the Confederacy during the war.[40] Unlike Home Rule advocates, Unionists and Liberal Unionists called up the war to draw parallels between Irish autonomy and the South's secession. Home Rule, they argued, would bring the United Kingdom to the verge of destruction, as did the Southern secession to the United States.

Despite their use of the Civil War to buttress opposing Irish policies, both Unionists and Home Rule advocates evoked the war because it represented a powerful political model. Both factions saw it as the historical event that explained the contemporary 'almost boundless' prosperity of the United States. The United States and the Civil War were in turn flexible enough for British politicians – Unionists and Home Rule advocates alike – to use for opposing purposes. Moreover, the use of the Civil War and of the United States by both sides showed that the wartime popular view of the conflict as evidence of the weakness of the American system had become by this time a marginal one. To those who might have still criticized the federal system as the cause for the Civil War, James Bryce, an academic and Liberal MP for Aberdeen South, answered in his seminal 1888 study of the United States:

> [N]ot merely that the national government has survived this struggle and emerged from it stronger than before[,] ... but Federalism did not produce the struggle, but only gave to it the particular form of a series of legal controversies over the Federal pact followed by a war of States against the Union.[41]

While Bryce did not write much about the Irish question, his monumental *The American Commonwealth*, the accepted work on America in Britain at that time, provided a picture of the United States as a strong, unified nation.[42] Upon such an image, British Unionists and supporters of Home Rule drew their analogies between the Civil War and the Irish question. No longer was the strength of the American political system in any doubt, and no longer could it be argued that the Civil War had proved this system brittle. On the contrary, now the Civil War came to explain the rise of post-war American power.

The clash between Unionists and Home Rule supporters led to scrutiny of the British involvement in the Civil War. While, in the above examples, both factions appealed to historical events that took place in the United States, events in Britain during the war now proved to be relevant to the debate as well. When Chamberlain and Ashmead-Bartlett accused Gladstone of being a supporter of the Confederacy in the 1860s, they did not draw from American history or use American heritage. Rather, they looked back to Britain's history. 'I remember', said Chamberlain in 1886, 'that in the time of its greatest crisis ... my Right Hon. friend [Gladstone] counselled the disintegration of the United States'.[43] As with America's heritage, the British use of their own

heritage was selective. Gladstone supported the Confederacy during the war. However, he did not think that secession or the breaking of the Union were positive or desirable. As Howard Jones has argued, Gladstone believed, like many of his contemporary Britons, that the Union could not be restored and that, in light of this, Britain ought to stop the carnage in America.[44] In the debate with Chamberlain, Gladstone tried to make this point and argued that he 'did not counsel' the breaking of the Union. This was to no avail.

Britons' stances towards the war while it was raging became morally charged and politically powerful in the post-war domestic political discourse. In 1892, for example, the Duke of Argyll opened his argument against Home Rule thus:

> I took an early part in trying to set right the misguided current of feeling which at first set strongly in England against the American Union in the great Civil War. Both on the ground that slavery was the institution really fought for by the South, and also on the ground of the right of the American Union to fight for its single nationality, I felt that the 'North' was in the right, and that the cause of civilization was at stake in the success of the Union. My feeling and opinion on the Irish question of Home Rule is founded on the same convictions.[45]

The Duke of Argyll used the Civil War and his stances during the war as points of reference in order to reaffirm his contemporary character and political reasoning. Based on his stances regarding the Civil War in the 1860s, he hoped to give additional credence to his position regarding Ireland in the 1890s.

Whereas Unionists, Home Rule advocates and Irish nationalists all found in the Civil War an applicable analogy, this was not to last. Following a fundamental change in Irish nationalism in the late 1910s, the uses of the Civil War in Britain underwent an additional shift, this time solely within Irish circles. Parliament's enactment of the Third Irish Home Rule Bill in 1912 and the bill's subsequent suspension in 1914; the Easter Rising and the British reaction to it in 1916; and the conscription crisis in 1918 brought constitutional nationalism in Ireland to an end. In its place, the radical wing of Irish nationalism, the Sinn Féin, led by Arthur Griffith, took the reins.[46] When Irish aspirations were no longer for autonomy within the empire, but rather for complete independence, the Civil War became for them an inadequate source upon which to draw. During the conscription crisis in 1918,

for example, prominent IPP member Joseph Devlin told the House of Commons that

> [t]he Leader of the House [Andrew Bonar Law] in his speech, quoted from his favourite statesman, President Lincoln, as to what he was prepared to do if men were not prepared to conscript themselves into the American Army. I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman does not understand the difference between the two situations. President Lincoln was conscripting Americans in America in defence of American rights. You are conscripting Irishmen, and Ireland is not your country.[47]

Daniel Boyle and Jeremiah MacVeagh, other IPP members, used similar language and drew on the same chapter in American history during that debate. Flexible as it was, the Civil War had always been perceived in British politics as a war that had established a great, united nation and that both proved and furthered patriotism. As such, the conflict could not have provided Irish nationalists with the support they needed when they aspired to complete autonomy.

Ultimately, during the Anglo-Irish War (1919–1921) Irish nationalists rejected the analogy between the Civil War and the Irish question altogether. In July 1921, the *Irish Bulletin*, Sinn Féin's official publication, carried a two-part article in which it stated that

> [i]t has been the practice of British ministers to draw an analogy between the War of Independence in Ireland and the Civil War in America.… The analogy is false both in essentials and in detail. There can be no question of secession on the part of the Irish people, who have always denied the right of the British Government to rule Ireland or to include her in the territories of the Empire.[48]

Instead of the Civil War, the article suggested an alternative American precedent, which explicitly appeared in its title: 'The True Analogy, The American Revolution and the Irish War of Independence'. The new analogy gained ground quickly. Responding to Jan Smuts's plea for the Irish to accept Britain's offer to grant Ireland a dominion status, on 14 September 1921 Mary MacSwiney, a prominent Sinn Féin member, told the Dáil Éireann – the Irish Republic's revolutionary parliament:

> Take the strong analogy that lay between the position today and that of the American colonies in 1778. England then made all the promises and offers she was making to Ireland today. There were

> compromisers who at all costs wanted to remain with England. Even those who supported the Republic were divided, and Congress would have accepted a compromise were it not that George Washington and the army stood out. They in Ireland to-day knew they had a George Washington at their head not a Jan Smuts.[49]

For Irish nationalists in their struggle for independence, the American War of Independence became the comfortable source from which to draw analogies.

Against Irish radicalization, British politicians felt increasingly comfortable with the Civil War analogy and with the political ideas of national unity for which it stood. Lloyd George, for example, denounced Éamon de Valera, a Sinn Féin leader and president of Dáil Éireann, as being worse than Jefferson Davis because of de Valera's insistence on keeping Ulster as part of a future Irish state. Davis, Lloyd George argued, at least did not demand autonomy for those who did not want it.[50] 'Jefferson Davies's [*sic*] more moderate claim was fought for by the whole strength of the majority of the States of the American Union', he noted.[51] Home Rule advocates and Ulster Protestants, who now sought to grant Ireland a degree of autonomy while keeping Ulster fully in the Union, used the Civil War, as Unionists had done in an earlier period, to argue against the more radical demand of Irish nationalists for full independence.

The increasing British tendency to use Civil War analogies is understandable. The American conflict could not have supported complete disunion. This made the Irish opposite tendency to reject the Civil War as an apt analogy equally logical. However, the new Irish practice of appropriating the American War of Independence might raise some questions. After all, the Irish argued that they were not fighting, as did the Americans in the 1770s and 1780s, for future independence, but rather that they were struggling to regain a lost independence. Irish nationalists might have done better to have promoted their goals by drawing parallels with the Polish uprising of the mid-1860s or the Hungarian revolt of 1848, as Griffith had famously done before.[52] For Griffith, a central feature in the Hungarian analogy was that Ireland, like Hungary, had lost its previously held independence.

However, American analogies had an advantage that other analogies lacked: they were understood in America. By the late 1910s, as the Irish question reached a boiling point and American power peaked, this had become a central consideration. Unlike Hungary and Poland, the United States had become a world power. This made American analogies far

more relevant to the British and Irish than did Polish, Hungarian or other analogies. Even as British and Irish politicians naturally sought their people's support, as the dispute between them escalated, and American power became more real and evident, it was the United States and the American public that both sides courted.

Early on, both Unionists and Home Rule advocates acknowledged the potential influence of the United States on Anglo-Irish relations. During his ten-week tour of the United States in late 1879 and early 1880, Parnell explicitly declared in the House of Representatives that, 'the public opinion of the people of America will be of the utmost importance in enabling us to obtain a just and suitable settlement of the Irish Question'.[53] Also, from the start, both opponents and supporters of Irish Home Rule used Civil War analogies when they attempted to attract audiences across the Atlantic. In 1892, Gladstone, himself addressing an American readership, accused the Duke of Argyll of trying to manipulate American public opinion by drawing false parallels between the Civil War and the Irish question.[54]

However, even by the mid-1910s there were still those, on both sides, who did not ascribe much significance to an American involvement in Anglo-Irish relations. Referring to American opinion on the issue, Lord Robert Cecil, parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, stated in 1916: 'I do not myself take a very serious view of this aspect of the question at present'.[55] On the Irish side, too, it is worth noting that Parnell's was a brief single visit to the United States, which harvested minimal success in pressing the Irish question into the mainstream of American politics.[56] Parnell's successor, John Redmond, visited the United States three times (in 1899, 1904 and 1910) but his trips yielded no more than unofficial American sympathy. Additionally, at this stage Irish endeavors in the United States focused chiefly on rallying Irish-Americans rather than on appealing to Americans as such. At the same time, contemporary American interests were focused on internal affairs and on the western hemisphere, and intervention in Anglo-Irish affairs seemed unlikely.

By the late 1910s, however, that situation had changed. For both the Irish and the British, American involvement in the Great War had turned the United States from a faraway model to a leading actor on the world stage. As Katherine Hughes, representative of the Irish Women's Council of America, told the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1918: 'America must intervene to aid Ireland in her struggle for self-determination because America now is the world's arbiter'.[57] As the United States' centrality in, and impact on, global affairs became more

profound and more evident, so the British and Irish views of its potential role in the Irish debate changed. While neither side had since the 1870s ascribed any special importance to potential American mediation, this was to change gradually as American involvement in the dispute became the primary concern of both. American acceptance of the Irish call for independence would have put considerable pressure on Britain to accept partition; an uninterested America, by contrast, would have signaled that as far as the United States was concerned, the Irish question was a domestic British affair. Both the British and Irish acknowledged that and wanted to have the United States on their side. To this end, they began to export to the United States their opposing positions on the Irish question portrayed using the values embedded in the narratives of the Civil War.

At the end of the Great War, Irish nationalists looked to America with renewed hope. It was, after all, Woodrow Wilson who, more than any other contemporary politician, declared this war as having been fought in the name of national freedom.[58] Consequently, the now-radical Irish leadership worked ceaselessly to rally the United States to its cause. In a letter to de Valera from Mary MacSwiney, just back from the United States (he was still there), she stressed her certainty 'that all energies should be concentrated on that country.... In my opinion it is absolutely essential that a lot of the *very best* and most suitable people should go there at once'.[59] As opposed to Parnell or Redmond before them, MacSwiney and de Valera – among the most prominent and most representative Irish leaders of the time – did not remain in Ireland during the decisive moments in the country's history. On the contrary, they rushed to the United States.

As their perception of America's place in the world changed, Irish leaders started to export to the United States Irish-selected narratives of US history and heritage. In March 1921, for example, in a speech in San Francisco, MacSwiney told her audience:

> [T]he books that I carry around with me are the Declaration of Independence of the United States, the Constitution of the United States, and the War Speeches of Woodrow Wilson. I want those of you who are of Irish blood to realize that it is not as Irish-Americans that you can best help Ireland today, but by being American citizens. I want those of you who are not of Irish blood ... to realize that if you are going to be true One-Hundred-Per-cent Americans, you must be true to the ideals and the traditions of this great country, and the better Americans you are, the more you love freedom, the closer you

> are to follow the precepts of Washington and Jefferson and Patrick Henry and Daniel Webster and Abraham Lincoln.[60]

Unlike her predecessors, MacSwiney did not go to the United States in search of the Irish. Rather, she was after 'true One-Hundred-Per-Cent Americans', and she thought that the best way to appeal to them was through their own history, heritage and values. Accordingly, to convey her message, MacSwiney reiterated what by this time had become a regular motif in her American speeches: 'In 1776, you declared your independence, and in 1916 we declared ours[;] ... I ask the people of America to give us our Yorktown this year by recognizing the government of the Irish republic by that date'.[61]

What made MacSwiney's presentation of American history so Irish were the events that she chose to emphasize, not the narratives she ascribed to them or the values that she tied to them. The Irish presentation of the American War of Independence correlated with the way contemporary Americans understood it. For them, too, it symbolized national freedom and the overthrowing of tyranny. The Irish ability to present their case in a language the Americans both understood and agreed upon was precisely their strength.

Within the intensifying contest for the American heart, the narratives of the Civil War were to become a central battlefield. The key statement given and endorsed unanimously in the Irish Race convention in New York in 1916 was a good example of one way in which the Irish used the war. '[W]e know to our cost', it read, 'of the savage blows struck at us by England during the Civil War in the efforts to divide the country....'[62] Through a narrative of the Civil War that they chose, the Irish endeavored to resurrect bitter Anglo-American sentiments. They used the war as a decisive turning point in American history, and argued that at that time Britain had sought to destroy the United States by supporting the Confederacy. The 20,000 or so soldiers of Irish descent, recent immigrants from Ireland to the American South, who fought for the Confederacy, were, of course, omitted from the Irish representations of the Civil War.[63] Irish nationalists in Ireland sought to use the war in much the same way and for similar ends. On 21 November 1921, Arthur Griffith sent de Valera, then in the United States, what he thought might be used as evidence for English support of the Confederacy during the Civil War:

> I enclose you copy of list of *English* subscribers to the Confederacy Loan during the Civil War. It was issued, I believe, by State Secretary

> Seward. There were perhaps some errors in it. Gladstone, Ashley, and others denied they ever subscribed. But others did not impugn it. If the files of the N. Y. Press of that period be looked up (Sept-Oct 1865) much information might be got. At the same period the 'Shenandoah' Confederate privateer was although *the war was month over* preying on Federal commerce and *receiving belligerent rights* from England.[64]

'Written up this fact could make good propaganda', Griffith summarized. The Irish and Irish-American message to the American public was clear: Britain had betrayed the United States when it intervened in the Civil War and recognized the Confederacy, and it was now time for the United States to respond in kind.

Britain, of course, did not endorse the Confederacy, just as Irish soldiers did not fight solely for the Union. This was a distortion that served the Irish. By this time, however, as Chapter 3 thoroughly discusses, the accepted narrative of the Civil War perpetuated the notion that the British elite did support the Confederacy. This narrative gained ground in Ireland, Britain and, to the latter's misfortune, in the United States, as well.[65] As they did with the War of Independence, the Irish again used an agreed-upon representation of American and Anglo-American history.

The Irish had other uses for the American Civil War in the United States. As Kevin Kenny has shown, Irish nationalists appealed to Lincoln's image as a source of moral support for their demands for national unity and national independence.[66] This was true also of the war more generally, especially when the Irish addressed American audiences. Facing the prospect of the political separation of Ulster from the rest of Ireland, a motion that was officially introduced in the Government of Ireland Act (1920), Irish nationalists turned to the Civil War in much the same way as did the British. 'A parallel with your war of secession is the parallel between Ulster and the rest of Ireland today', MacSwiney stressed in a hearing before the American Commission of Inquiry on Conditions in Ireland in December 1920. 'If you were justified in fighting that war rather than let part of your country secede', she added, 'then you must admit that we're justified in fighting for a century, if need be, rather than let a part of Ireland secede'.[67] As for national freedom, Lincoln's immortal phrase from the Gettysburg Address, that the Civil War was fought so that a 'government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth', had become one of de Valera's most recognizable adages and trademarks.

The British were not far behind. They, too, were convinced that if only they could convey their message in a language that was familiar to the Americans, they could muster the American public. As Carlyon Wilfroy Bellairs, Conservative MP for Maidstone, argued in the House of Commons in 1918:

> I think, too, it is practically the unanimous opinion of this House that night and day the door stands open to Home Rule for Ireland on the basis on which it is possessed by every State in the American Union, and when that fact becomes known throughout America then all American sympathy with regard to the position of hon. members below the Gangway disappears at once.[68]

As a constituting moment in the establishment of the American political system and as an American symbol, the Civil War seemed a useful precedent for the British in explaining themselves across the ocean. Presenting Britain's side in the Anglo-Irish dispute 'before the court of public opinion', Philip Whitwell Wilson, former MP and later a major promoter of Britain's cause in the United States, launched a typical British blow to counter Irish efforts. It was the United States in the Civil War, he argued, that had established the case against secession: '[T]he unity of the United Kingdom is as sacred a thing as the unity of the United States is sacred to American citizens. If we are wrong, then Lincoln was wrong'.[69] Wilson used the Civil War in the same way that British Unionists had, in the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, used it to support national unity. Using this interpretation of the Civil War, Wilson now asked Americans to look to the conflict for lessons about contemporary Anglo-Irish affairs. He then moved on to consider the question of Britain's sympathies in the Civil War, which in light of possible American mediation or acceptance of the Irish call for independence, had become acute by 1920. Wisely, he separated popular opinion from diplomacy. 'There were in Britain at that time many men who agreed with Gladstone that Jefferson Davis had created a nation', he conceded. 'Yet during the whole of that struggle, the diplomacy of Britain was admittedly irreproachable ... '.[70] Wilson turned to the issue of Britain's response of the Civil War and was forced to do battle against the prevailing, if misleading, wisdom that many among the British had supported the sundering of the Union. Britons had done all they could to present the Irish question as a domestic affair and to prevent the Americans from accepting the Irish stance for independence. Considering similar efforts were carried out by the North during

the Civil War, and considering that Britain did not intervene in the American conflict, the use by British agitators of the war as a useful precedent in the United States seems to be a natural one.

The Irish and British planted their analogies in fertile soil in the United States. Indeed, the Americans were impressed. 'Her knowledge of American history', stressed a report on one of MacSwiney's' hearings in the United States, 'was quite as thorough as her knowledge of Irish history'.[71] The success of the British and the Irish was evidenced in the late 1910s and early 1920s by Americans repeatedly turning to the Civil War and War of Independence in order to assess and fashion an opinion on Anglo-Irish affairs. Speaking in the Dáil Éireann on 9 May 1919, Frank P. Walsh, Chair of the American Commission on Irish Independence, stated:

> Today the people of America understand the aspirations of the people of Ireland; they are so beautifully lucid, so remarkably clear, that any person of ordinary understanding may not be confused. Ireland to-day has done with all talk as America understands it, of the Repeal of the Union, of Home Rule, of Dominion Home Rule, of the various shades of refinement of European, Irish, and English politics; and I may paraphrase – if I may, Mr. President – your interest in the words of our great President at Mount Vernon, when I say that you take your cue from us; you intend what we intended.[72]

'You intend what we intended': here was language that Americans understood and goals that they were willing to endorse. Similarly, in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson sent George Creel, head of the United States Committee on Public Information in the Great War, to Ireland to assess the situation there. That same year, Creel denounced Britain for presenting the Irish question as 'England's domestic problem':

> Men of Ireland gave heart and strength to Washington, they died by thousands that the Union might endure, and of the army raised to crush German absolutism fully 15 per cent, were of Irish birth or descent. It is with this record of love and sacrifice behind them that the Irish in the United States call upon America to lend hope to their unhappy motherland. It is a call that America must answer. A decision cannot be evaded.[73]

Creel, as did many Americans at the time, remembered only the Irish who had supported Washington and American independence and, later,

only those who had sacrificed themselves so that 'the Union might endure'.[74]

The British case also resonated across the ocean. George L. Fox, for example, a scholar and educator who, *inter alia*, taught at Yale University, echoed the British view in front of the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1918. 'Sinn Feinism in Ireland', he argued, 'is simply the doctrine that we knocked out in Appomattox Courthouse, and which Ireland accepted'.[75] On much the same note, in September 1921 an American reader of the *New York Times* wrote:

> As a friend of the Irish people [I] urge the acceptance of the terms now offered. I am one of the few survivors who had come to man's estate before the American Civil War in 1861. Certainly the Southern leaders were as de Valera and his associates.... [I]t was the sworn duty of Abraham Lincoln to enforce the law in the Southern States just as it is the sworn duty of Lloyd George to enforce the law in Ireland.[76]

Lloyd George himself could not have put it better. As Britons had intended, by 1921 many in the United States had come to read the situation in Britain through the prism of the Civil War narrative that deplored disunity.

The Irish and British successes in conveying their messages by using American heritage resulted not only from their ability to appeal to the United States as a responsible world power and present their case in terms of American values. Rather, it was also an outcome of Americans' exceptional readiness at that time to understand the world and their place in it in these terms, to view themselves as accountable, as responsible. In essence this tapped into their embrace of their newfound position as a world power. Pointing to the United States' new global responsibility, Creel argued in 1919 that, with regard to the Irish question, 'It is idle to adopt a tone of heavy reproof and talk of "America first."'[77] The same year, the California State Assembly and Senate jointly resolved:

> That at a critical time in the history of the human race, when the idealism of America dominates the world's thought, we respectfully represent to our spokesman, the President of the United States, that in speaking for the self-determination of all nations, small as well as great, he should not overlook the claims of the oldest nation of western Europe, to wit, Ireland.[78]

For many Americans it became the duty of the United States to go out to the world and spread American 'thought' and values. Since the turn of the twentieth century, 'Manifest Destiny' – first applied in the mid-nineteenth century, and mainly to North America– stood, in the eyes of many Americans, for a messianic mission of bringing democracy, freedom and protection to places outside the continent as well.[79] Motivated by this sense of divine mission, an increasing number of American officials sought to assist Ireland in what they were by now convinced was the latter's quest for exercising American values.

British officials were concerned over Irish success at rallying American public opinion, and over the possible effect of this on the Irish question. In a summary of the political situation in the United States in 1919, William Wiseman, head of the British intelligence service in Washington during the Great War, stated that a great danger was the 'effect on American public opinion of speeches of de Valera and his friends… '. He added: 'It may be that America will accept [the] idea of a separate Irish Republic as something which is an inevitable and generally accepted solution...'.[80] Moreover, the British were concerned over what seemed to be their own misguided use of the Civil War to promote Britain's views in the American South. In June 1920, Auckland Geddes, British ambassador to the United States, telegraphed home his impression that 'the best of the Southerners are not pleased at the comparison between Lincoln's declaration on the subject of maintaining the Union and the present Irish situation, recently made by the Prime Minister'.[81] Clearly, the British had done something wrong.

Representations of the Civil War were a more complicated diplomatic apparatus to use than first thought. This was not because of the perceived problematic British involvement in the war, discussed above. Rather, it was due to British use of the American heritage of the conflict. On 24 April 1920, shortly before Geddes sent his cautionary report, N. B. Forrest, commander in chief of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV), issued an official condemnation of Lloyd George's analogy linking the Civil War and the Anglo-Irish dispute:

> In comparing the Irish republic to the Southern Confederacy and De Valera to Jefferson Davis Lloyd George has offered, unconsciously, perhaps, a gratuitous insult to the Southern States in the American union and to the splendid sons of the Southern Confederacy who fought and distinguished themselves in the fields of France in the world war. It is remarkable that a statesman holding the high office of premier of Great Britain would be so ignorant of the political history

> of America. Ireland has not the status of an independent State as was the case with the American colonies. Ireland has not been a self-determined republic. De Valera, without discrediting his status is not the elected president of a confederation of states, called as was Jefferson Davis, to the high office. There is no parallel in which the status of the so-called republic of Ireland and that of its president correspond to the Southern Confederacy and its chief executive.[82]

As Forrest's statement made clear, his discontent was not raised by an opinion differing with the British on Anglo-Irish issues. On the contrary, as indicated by his questioning of de Valera's status as the Irish president, Forrest supported the case against Irish autonomy. However, this was exactly the source of tension. While, in 1920, Irish independence was – to Forrest as to Lloyd George – illegitimate, the South's secession in the 1860s was to Forrest legal and justified. This invalidated the analogy in Forrest's eyes.

The legacy of the Civil War had remained contested in post-war United States. The narrative of reconciliation, which came to dominate the American memory of the war in the early decades of the twentieth century, offered a delicate and fragile harmony between several competing views of the conflict. The narrative balanced between acknowledging that the Confederacy had fought for just causes, of which one was their autonomy and way of life, and celebrating the post-war North-South reunion. Forrest's words mirrored this balance when he made clear that in his attack on Lloyd George he sought to defend the dignity of the 'Southern States in the American union'. The sons of the Confederacy, he emphasized further, fought in France, as Americans. Organizations like the SCV and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) were particularly sensitive to the place of the Southern memory of the war in this equation of reconciliation. At times, Britons missed this complexity and undid this delicate balance. Because the SCV and UDC enjoyed much influence on Southern politics and society, the British failure to keep this balance translated into diplomatic repercussions.[83] Considering that the British aimed to align themselves with, and approach, Americans – and certainly not to insult or alienate them – their use of the Civil War in the South was a diplomatic failure.

Associating the Irish question with the War of Independence, the Irish were on relatively solid ground since the view on that chapter in American history was more consensual within the United States. Until the early decades of the twentieth century, for example, Washington was a more consensual icon than Lincoln.[84] That is not to say that the Irish

communication with the Americans, and especially with the South, had always been conducted serenely. De Valera, as a case in point, faced a fierce protest in Birmingham, Alabama, by British supporters in 1920.[85] However, while often differing on Anglo-Irish issues, Irish nationalists and the American public agreed on American history, heritage and values. Although they could disagree on whether the Civil War and the War of Independence were applicable analogies to describe the situation in Ireland, both the Americans and Irish agreed on what these American events represented. Thus de Valera was cordially received by the governors of New York, Indiana and New Hampshire, but also by the governor of Virginia.[86]

Ultimately, this Irish influence was to little effect. Public opinion never amounted to significant official action regarding the Irish question, and the United States did not accept Irish independence above British opinion. True, in Congress, in numerous state legislatures and among many in the public, it was the Irish voice and not the British that gathered supporters.[87] Thus, despite his reluctance to do so, Senate resolutions forced Wilson to give stage in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to both the Irish-American and Irish delegations.[88] Still, Sinn Fèin representatives did not achieve much in Paris and never persuaded Wilson to pressure the British seriously.[89] What finally determined the United States' response to the Irish question was Wilson's *realpolitik* approach to this matter.[90] Although he was sympathetic to the Irish call, the United States' interests, Wilson believed, lay with Britain.[91]

On 31 August 1921, the *Westminster Gazette* published a caricature featuring David Lloyd George and Éamon de Valera talking over the telephone. 'Don't forget Abraham Lincoln!' urged the British prime minister; 'Remember George Washington!' cried the president of Dáil Éireann.[92] It is now clear that had the caricature been more accurate it would have featured Uncle Sam, too, holding an additional earpiece. Shortly, however, this tripartite conversation was put on hold. For British and American politicians, the Irish acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921 resolved the Irish question. President Harding, although sympathetic to the Irish cause, largely kept his administration clear of the Irish turmoil.[93] The British evacuated their forces from all but the six counties in the northeastern part of the island and turned their backs on both Northern Ireland and the newly born Irish Free State.[94] And Irish republicans fell into civil war.

By then, several sources of British interest in the American Civil War, as well as several uses of the conflict, had become evident. For one thing, Britons referred to the war since it was multifaceted and could convey

diverse, and at times opposing, lessons. As such, Britons holding different political views on domestic affairs, such as the Irish question, could find the war relevant, providing both a justification for their different opinions and a common arena for discourse. Moreover, Britons turned to the war for the values that it came to embody from the late nineteenth century. For many in Britain in the 1860s the Civil War projected political weakness, national disintegration and hatred to be criticized and abhorred. However, during the five decades that followed Appomattox the meaning of the war changed. The post-war representations of the conflict gradually portrayed it as a manifestation of gallantry, patriotism, brotherhood and love of the Union. These values, embedded in the war's representations, would not have been as appealing but for the growing prominence of the United States. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Civil War came to explain the birth of a political model that proved highly successful. Finally, because the conflict became an American symbol, it also became a route through which to approach the Americans. When the United States became a pivotal actor on the world stage, Britons exported to America their views on Anglo-Irish affairs through the prism of the Civil War in the hope of cultivating American understanding and sympathy.

2
The Civil War in British Military Thought

From the outset the Civil War caught the British military's attention. For its scale and scope, because of politicians' involvement in military affairs and generals' intervention in politics, for the introduction of new technologies, and for its actual and potential impact on their country, British officers observed closely the American conflict. As Hugh Dubrulle has argued, during the war British military men looked almost solely to the Confederacy for positive lessons. Professionally, Britons thought that the Confederate States Army executed its military operations on a level near perfection. On political grounds, they supported the South's struggle for national independence, the preservation of its agrarian, genteel way of life, and its social and political hierarchies. British military thinkers attributed the Confederacy's superb military conduct to these values and goals. By contrast, they viewed the North as imposing an unwanted national unity and decadent lifestyle on the South. Northern institutions – especially capitalism and mass democracy that the British regarded as derivatives of mob rule – appalled Britain's military elite, who regarded those institutions as the source of the North's military weaknesses and failures.[1] These were seen also as the reason for the war's massive scale and horrific casualties.

Although the Civil War in America caught the attention of British officers while it was raging, shortly after its end the interest of British military thinkers waned. While Jay Luvaas's contention that Britons did not learn much from the American conflict before the Great War is now largely rejected, the fact remains undisputed that between the late 1860s and the mid-1880s, no major work appeared in Britain on the subject.[2] Instead, the American Civil War gave way to studies on the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), which seemed more relevant.[3] Furthermore, other than its apparent

irrelevance, the army that had been the center of attention and the subject of admiration for British officers throughout the conflict, ultimately lost. As late as 1864, Arthur Fremantle, a British military officer who had spent three months with the Confederate forces in America, could still predict that the Confederacy would win the fight. The South that 'display[s] a unanimity and a heroism which can never have been suppressed in the history of the world, is destined, sooner or later, to become a great and independent nation'.[4] And yet Southern heroism had been suppressed, a fact that must have cast at least some doubts on the validity of the lessons that its way of life and warfare presented.

In this light, the period between the 1880s and 1910s, when the Civil War became a key subject of inquiry in the British Army, and many military writers turned to it for lessons, could rightly be seen – in Luvaas's words – as a 'renaissance'.[5] Professionally, two concerns above all had made the historic American war again relevant to contemporary Britons: the increasing likelihood of a major war in Europe and the Second Boer War (1899–1902). In both cases, the Civil War was seen as a rich repository for military lessons unavailable in any other past conflict, British or foreign. And there was another reason. British military thinkers came to see the Civil War as a conflict that gave birth to modern America. As America's prominence became more apparent, so did the war become more appealing as a source for relevant lessons about the United States and also about Britain in relation to it.

Tensions in Europe brought the Civil War back into the limelight as British military thinkers believed that a future war on the Continent would possess similar traits. Highlighting the importance of studying the American conflict, G. F. R. Henderson, the driving force behind the revived interest in the Civil War across the British army, noted in 1894:

> Now I do not think I am predicting impossibilities when I say that armies somewhat similar in constitution may at some future date have to be handled by ourselves. England has before now been drawn willy-nilly into continental wars; she has before now had to engage in a life-and-death struggle with the Great Powers.… History repeats itself. There is no sign whatever, despite long years of peace, that the prospect of our being drawn into a great European conflict is more remote than heretofore.[6]

During the last decade of the century, Henderson could vividly see future British generals leading to battle mass armies composed of both professionals and civilian volunteers. While none of Britain's previous wars

would serve as a source of reference for such a war, the American Civil War was a relevant precedent. Henderson was not alone. By 1900, an increasing number of British military men and politicians were seeing a large-scale continental conflict against Germany as an alarming possibility.[7] Thus, alongside diplomatic efforts to relieve Britain's isolation in the international arena, extensive reforms had been implemented throughout the army, aiming to prepare it for future challenges.[8] In this light, as Brian Holden Reid has shown, British military thinkers saw in the Civil War a useful precedent because it was a massive war waged by a modern democracy in which many of the soldiers were untrained civilians, and it was a war in which discipline and generalship became especially important.[9]

In many senses, the Second Boer War was a materialization of Henderson's and others' prophesying regarding the future of warfare. With approximately 500,000 soldiers deployed in the field (of that number about 100,000 non-professional volunteers), 22,000 dead, broad civil and political involvement, guerrilla warfare and usage of new firearms on a far larger scale than ever before, the Boer War was a departure from Britain's previous colonial conflicts.[10] As such, it brought to the surface difficulties that had hitherto been either unfamiliar or marginal. The British major, George W. Redway, for example (who published two books about the Civil War, in 1906 and 1910), wrote angrily that

> [t]he working of the army system in America in the sixties is of practical importance to all English-speaking peoples to-day, and it is to be regretted that there exists no authoritative treatise on the subject: many of the errors in administration which characterised our conduct of the Boer War might have been avoided by timely study of the factors which protracted the War of Secession a generation ago.[11]

Redway, who during the war in South Africa took a central role in mobilizing soldiers and thus experienced the difficulties in managing mass forces firsthand, had no British precedent from which to draw lessons on this subject. The Americans, by contrast, seemed to him to have confronted these problems half a century earlier.

The change in British images of the future of warfare had led to a change in their understanding of what military lessons should be drawn from the Civil War. Since the 1930s, historians have been claiming that during this period, British military thinking on the Civil War remained almost as it had during the war. In 1933, B. H. Liddell Hart, who did much to advance the argument that before 1914 the British

learned nothing new from the Civil War, argued that after the American conflict, General Robert E. Lee succeeded in what he had hitherto failed to achieve, namely to conquer both the North and Britain.[12] After the 1950s, Luvaas, Liddell Hart's protégé, continued to propound the view that Britain turned almost solely to the Confederacy and for the same reasons as before. Dubrulle, challenging Luvaas's contention that the British had learned little from the war during this period, concluded nonetheless that Wolseley continued to study Southern generals, as did many in the British Army between the 1880s and 1914, and that 'the biases of previous authors – particularly an admiration for Confederate hierarchical society and the leadership it produced – crept into [G. F. R.] Henderson's ... work'.[13]

However, a close examination reveals that, by the turn of the century, the Union Army had become a legitimate object of examination for British officers and, furthermore, that they had come to admire Northern political institutions and ideological spirit no less, often even more so than those of the Old South. P. H. Dalbiac, an army officer and Conservative MP, wrote in his 1911 book about the campaigns in Chancellorsville and Gettysburg:

> From the first they [the soldiers of both the North and South] showed themselves capable of taking punishment with the penitence and endurance of trained soldiers; and the enormous percentage of losses suffered by both sides without demoralisation teaches us what can be expected from armies of citizen soldiers, when called upon to do their duty in defence of their homes and the belongings which are dear to them.[14]

As Dalbiac's words showed, a democratic people's army, as the North had traditionally represented and which appalled British observers in the 1860s, was by the 1910s not always perceived as all bad. Dalbiac did not even ascribe mass democracy and a people's army to the North, but rather to both armies. By the same token, the prominent military scholar, Spenser Wilkinson, lauded the civil–military relations in the North and, while praising Lincoln, expressed his dismay that Britain failed to follow the same path:[15]

> What a contrast between such a man and the present Prime Minister of England [Balfour], who, at the close of the great struggle in South Africa, thought, or professed to think, that the cause of the difficulties had been not in the political blindness of the government, but

> in the technical imperfection of a War Office which, after all, had without any breakdown of moment, provided and maintained a force five times as large as it had ever been authorised to contemplate.[16]

Similarly, in his 1906 essay praising Lee, military intellectual, Garnet Wolseley, commended also the North. Wolseley, an eminent British admirer of the South in the 1860s, had seen 'in the dogged determination of the North ... the spirit for which the men of Britain have always been remarkable'.[17] Whereas during the Civil War, British observers were appalled by civil–military relations in the North and by its seemingly brutal strategy, by the turn of the century these seemed to be not only relevant and important, but admirable.

Moreover, while historians accurately noted that contemporary British military thinkers focused almost solely on the lives and military conduct of Confederate generals, it should not be immediately inferred that British military men admired the South or Southern ideals. As shown, Wolseley used his essay about Lee also to propel allegedly Northern characteristics and spirit. Moreover, in many cases, Britons portrayed Southern generals as not at all Southern. For Henderson, for example, more than a Southerner, 'Stonewall' Jackson was in fact a Westerner, just like Lincoln. Comparing the two, he noted:

> Descendants of the pioneers, those hardy borderers, half soldiers and half farmers, who held and reclaimed, through long years of Indian warfare, the valleys and prairies of the West, they inherited the best attributes of a frank and valiant race. Simple yet wise, strong yet gentle, they were gifted with all the qualities which make leaders of men.[18]

In the same vein, in Henderson's discussion of secession, Lee and Lincoln represented similar nationalistic views. 'In time[,] under the influence of such men as Lincoln and Lee, the nation might have found a solution to the problem, and North and South might have combined to rid their common country of the curse of human servitude'.[19] Ultimately, for Henderson both Lee and Jackson were among the 'staunchest Unionist[s]' in the South, not different from Lincoln and the Northern Unionists.[20] Wolseley, too, a critic of Lincoln during the war, discovered in Lee much of the American character that Lincoln possessed.[21] 'To me', he wrote in 1887, 'two figures stand out in that history towering above all others[,] ... One, General Lee, the great soldier; the other, Mr Lincoln, the far-seeing statesman of iron will, of unflinching determination. Each

is a good representative of the genius that characterised his country'.[22] Concluding his account of Lee, Wolseley expressed his confidence that the Southern general 'will be regarded not only as the most prominent figure of the Confederacy, but as the great American of the nineteenth century[,] ... whose memory is equally worthy to be enshrined in the hearts of all his countrymen'.[23] More generally, many emphasized that the Confederacy, as did the Union, had fought for American values. 'In fact', wrote Redway in 1910, 'the South went to war for "State Rights" which were as sacred to America in the middle of the nineteenth century as Self-Government is to Canada today'.[24] By the turn of the century, Wolseley, Henderson, and numerous other British officers often portrayed their Southern heroes as American first and Confederate second.

That is, of course, not to argue that Southern characteristics were deplored or ignored altogether. As Dubrulle has argued, Henderson and Wolseley showed great admiration for Jackson's piety, loyalty and aristocratic manners, all of which were traditionally associated with Southern institutions and ideals.[25] The Confederate way of warfare, too, did not lose its appeal within British military circles. Lee's and Jackson's tendency to concentrate their forces for a decisive assault on the Northern enemy, for example, was in line with contemporary British doctrine and was thus viewed with great esteem. In his 1911 book on the campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, Eric W. Sheppard of the 10th Battalion, Manchester Regiment, wrote admiringly of Jackson:

> [W]herever danger threatened, there he collected all the forces he could lay hands on, and hurled them against the intruders to drive them out. For this he did not fear to weaken to an apparently dangerous degree the rest of his line, in order that he might concentrate all available forces on the one decisive point, and in this he showed the true general's instinct.[26]

However, between the 1880s and 1910s, the British praise of the Old South and its romantic way of life did not prevent them from drawing a plethora of lessons from the Union Army and did not overshadow their admiration of the North's struggle to preserve American unity, advance modernity and promote democracy.

Considering the contemporary dominant representation of the Civil War, the British views of the Southern generals should not be surprising. In the United States, the Civil War generals, even those of the Confederacy (in fact, particularly they), whom the British so deeply

admired, had gradually come to symbolize American unity and national sentiments rather than sectionalism. Although this has been recognized by historians studying the American side, it has been overlooked in readings of the British side. As John Neff has shown, Lee, more than any other Civil War hero (even more than Lincoln at that time, as discussed in the following chapter), became upon his death in 1870 the foremost emblem of sectional reconciliation in the United States.[27] By the turn of the century, Jackson and, even more so, Lee, had become as American as they were Southern. Indeed, a closer look at Liddell Hart's words quoted above makes clear that he, too, acknowledged Lee's power over Americans, Southern and Northern alike. In both the United States and Britain, some Southern generals were symbols of reconciliation and thus of the United States rather than solely of the South.

This representation of the Civil War had arrived in British military circles through the writing of American military intellectuals. The works of J. C. Ropes, which had remained a primary source for British military men through to the interwar period, offered one such good example. In an 1895 study of the war, Ropes stressed that his narrative ran 'opposite of the one which was held so generally throughout the South', in maintaining that secession was illegal and that it was the Confederacy that initiated the war when Beauregard's forces fired on Fort Sumter.[28] At the same time, however, Ropes's works furthered the sentiments of reconciliation that had begun to gain ground in the United States. In an 1881work on Union general John Pope, he wrote that, 'while the book, is, of course, written from the Federal standpoint, it has been my endeavor to keep in mind that it is now sixteen years after the war, and that the country is, at last, in every sense, at peace'.[29] Ropes presented a conciliatory account of the war that portrayed Southerners and Northerners in like colors, as gallant warriors who fought for just causes. 'The courage and endurance displayed by both sides', he wrote, 'were wonderful indeed'.[30] Above all, Ropes maintained that the generals in the war – both Union and Confederate – kept themselves away from political debates and only fought bravely for what they thought was right. No hatred, he noted, ever existed between the generals.[31] According to Ropes, ultimately all had celebrated the post-war reunification.

This point deserves further elaboration, as it remained central to the British reading of the war within, but also outside, military circles throughout the twentieth century. Of all the aspects of the Civil War, including Lincoln's image, the army and soldiers took the lead in promoting a conciliatory interpretation of the conflict. Soldiers were consensually perceived as a-political and could thus be depicted as

non-sectional. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, in films, novels, monuments and other cultural symbols it was perpetuated that the military was ideologically neutral, a mere tragic exponent of politicians and, above all, of extremists on both sides. In that way, problematic issues were easily marginalized in military narratives as non-military and thus irrelevant. Ropes, who found ample space in his work for discussion of the principle of states' rights in order to demonstrate Southern patriotism, found no place for slavery. In his four-volume narrative, he stressed that 'into this subject the scope of our narrative will not allow us to go'.[32] In a military narrative, this approach needed little justification. 'An inquiry into the causes of the war of secession', he argued, 'will not aid us in our examination of its military problems and incidents. It is not necessary in this work to attempt the history of the slavery question'.[33] War narratives, more than other means to fashion, project and export representations of the Civil War, were easily harnessed to present the conflict as a unifying event that promoted American patriotism.

To *fin de siècle* British military thinkers, the Civil War was not only a source for relevant military lessons, but also an American symbol. These were closely connected. Looking at their contemporary world, British military intellectuals could not have ignored the presence and power – including military power – of the United States. For example, the Spanish-American War of 1898 was for many Europeans a manifestation both of American military force and of increasing American intervention in world affairs.[34] British concessions in Panama in 1901 were more evidence of this sort. At the same time, the Civil War came to account for American patriotism, unity and growing power. Americans thus saw the Spanish-American War as a symbol of sectional unity, which in turn explained the nation's military power. Britons, too, came to share this view. As late as 1927, Frederick Maurice, a prominent British military intellectual whose works are thoroughly discussed below, noted that, 'the Union of North and South which was made indissoluble at Appomattox, was dramatically portrayed in the war with Spain, when a son of Colonel Marshall performed for a son of Grant the same functions which from 1862 to 1865 the father had performed for Lee'.[35]

As a symbol of unity, which in turn broadcast American power, the Civil War was highly appealing to British military intellectuals. With unity and power, British military thinkers could (or wished to) identify. In his aforementioned essay on Lee, Wolseley left little doubt as to why he saw the Civil War as a symbol of American power, and why he thought it should be clear to Englishmen that the North was right to take up arms:

> [O]f Englishmen who believe that 'union is strength' and who are themselves determined that no dismemberment of their own empire shall be allowed, few will find fault with the men of the North for their manly determination, come what might, to resist every effort of their brothers in the South to break up the Union.[36]

This point was clear to Leo Amery, too, especially in light of the Boer War. In his influential *The Times History of the War in South Africa* (1900), he noted that, similar to the South in the Civil War, the Boers in Africa were fighting an unjust war of secession to break an unbreakable political union.[37] The post-Civil War United States was for British military men the ultimate proof that unity was power – both political and military. Henderson openly criticized the Confederate cause and championed the North's right to resist secession while the South 'ignored or missed [the Constitution's] spirit'.[38] Although he blamed the abolitionists for inciting the war, Henderson nevertheless stressed that 'the South chose to bring down in ruin the splendid fabric which their forefathers had constructed'.[39]

Other than as an emblem of American – and indeed universal – unity and patriotism, the Civil War also appealed to contemporary British military intellectuals as the first modern war and as a symbol for the birth of the modern, and thus better, United States. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britons were highly conscious of the past, and the past was an integral part of their contemporary culture.[40] Furthermore, as Paul Readman has argued, between the 1890s and 1914, Britons had especially emphasized continuity in history.[41] According to what Herbert Butterfield has termed the 'Whig interpretation of history', as late as the 1930s Britons looked more to the future with hope for continuous improvement than to the past with nostalgia.[42] In the same way, many in Britain viewed modernity positively and the United States as an ever-improving nation, one which progressed from a pre-modern to a modern state. As Henderson noted in his seminal biography of 'Stonewall' Jackson:

> For more than fifty years after the election of the first President, while as yet the crust of European tradition overlaid the young shoots of democracy, the supremacy, social and political, of the great landowners of the South had been practically undisputed. But when the young Republic began to take its place amongst the nations, men found that the wealth and talents which led it forward belonged as much to the busy cities of New England as to the plantations of Virginia and the Carolinas.[43]

During this time, there is relatively little evidence in British military works of nostalgia for the old American republic. Even the praise for the Old South and its romantic – now lost – way of life did not overshadow admiration for the modern United States.

The British view and adoption of the conciliatory representation of the Civil War showed not only that this narrative was relevant to them, but also that it was more relevant than were other Civil War narratives. The Atlantic sphere accommodated several Civil War narratives fashioned in and exported from the United States. Alongside the representation that depicted the Civil War as the date of birth of a benign, united and modern United States, the Southern narrative – the 'Lost Cause' –encouraged notions of a romantic lost world that was crushed under the feet of the Union Army and with the rise of modern America. In a similar way to the conciliatory narrative of the war, the Southern narrative also crossed the Atlantic. For his work on Jackson, for example, Henderson used, *inter alia*, the *Journal of the Southern Historical Society* that often gave stage to Lost-Cause advocates to present their interpretation of the 'War between the States'. Thus, in an essay published by the SHS, M. F. Maury, a US Navy scientist who joined the Confederacy, wrote 'A Vindication of Virginia and the South':

> Assuming the attitude of defence, she [Virginia] said to the powers of the North, 'Let no hostile foot cross my borders'. Nevertheless they came with fire and sword; battle was joined, victory crowned her banners on many a well-fought field; but she and her sister States, cut off from the outside world by the navy which they had helped to establish for the common defence, battled together against fearful odds at home for four long years, but were at least overpowered by mere numbers, and then came disaster. Her sons who fell died in defence of their country, their homes, their rights, and all that makes native land dear to the hearts of men.[44]

The journal, Henderson thought, was a 'perfect mine of wealth to the historical student'.[45] Nonetheless, Henderson chose to present a different legacy in his works, one that alongside praising Southern gallantry emphasized and celebrated the post-war reunification. For him the North was in fact right to fight against secession, while the South 'ignored or missed [the Constitution's] spirit'.[46] The Southern representation of the Civil War was less relevant to British military thinkers who looked into the future with hope and to the modern United States as a model.

By the Great War, the Civil War had been rooted in British military thought as the conflict that gave birth to the modern United States and put it on its course to world dominance. Thus, on a professional level, turn-of-the-century military intellectuals found the war particularly appealing because they believed that the American conflict held the keys to understanding and mastering the future of warfare. At the same time, from a broader perspective, British officers saw the American conflict as a key to comprehending American power, which lay in American unity and in American modernity – both of which, they came to believe, were brought about by the Civil War and its aftermath. Underlying this reading was a positive view of both the future and of the United States.

Throughout the interwar period, the pre-World War views of the Civil War did not go unchallenged. Furthermore, the new strands of interpretation of the Civil War's legacy that came to the fore in interwar British military thought were, in many ways, conflicting. This was nowhere more apparent than in the works of Frederick Maurice, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller – the prominent military thinkers and the most prolific writers on the Civil War of the period. And yet, conflicting as their views were, Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller shared a broad common basis of interest in the Civil War. The interwar British understanding of the Civil War, then, was fragmented and contested, but at the same time definite, monolithic and coherent.

Maurice (1871–1951) was educated at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Staff College, Kimberley, where in 1913 he became an instructor under the command of William Robertson. During the Great War, after service in France, he was ordered back to London to become director of military operations at the War Office.[47] Maurice's promising military career was terminated in 1918 after a highly publicized clash with Prime Minister David Lloyd George over the government's strategy during the war. This controversy was to have significant influence on Maurice's later work as a military correspondent for the *Daily News* and the *Westminster Gazette*, as well as on his scholarly work, including on the American Civil War. Of the generals of the American conflict, Maurice found Robert E. Lee the most admirable object of study.

Liddell Hart (1895–1970), arguably the foremost military intellect of the century, wrote prolifically on the Civil War and has left a visible mark on the works of military and non-military writers to this day. With the outbreak of the Great War, despite health problems and his parents' discontent, Liddell Hart volunteered to be an infantry officer, full of hope and sense of duty. His war experience, however, was short and traumatic, and in 1916 his active service ended after he was injured in

the Battle of the Somme.[48] This experience set him on the path to a productive career as a critic and writer, which soon gained him international reputation.[49] Moderate at first, by the early 1920s Liddell Hart had become a harsh military critic and a zealous believer in the need to overhaul the army.[50] When questioned regarding his greatest influences, Liddell Hart answered: William T. Sherman.[51]

Fuller, (1878–1966), was an influential military man, revolutionary, activist, essayist and journalist.[52] After the First World War, Fuller was convinced that political and military omissions had led to unnecessary destruction; his criticism of the army grew rapidly. As an instructor in the Staff College in the mid-1920s he spoke, for example, for abandoning Henderson's *Jackson* as a principal textbook, which he claimed had generated narrow-thinking in soldiers.[53] Upon Fuller's retirement from the army in 1933, he began what he privately saw as the most interesting phase of his life, when his political stance became more prominent.[54] In 1934 he joined the British Union of Fascists, while the 1930s in general were also an incredibly fertile period in his writing career. One of Fuller's main themes in his works was the American Civil War. His protagonist was Ulysses S. Grant.

Initially, Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller all turned to the Civil War for military lessons regarding modern warfare. Common to all three was also their recourse to the conflict for military lessons in light of their understanding of the Great War and their experiences in it, and in light of the next war, which they thought would ultimately arrive. Their lessons, however, differed greatly.

Maurice was not among the British military intellectuals who took special interest in the Civil War prior to the Great War. Nonetheless, he is known to have found Henderson's book fascinating and influential, and his own military lessons presented an exemplary continuum between the two periods.[55] As with his predecessors, Maurice saw in the Civil War an affirmation of his strategic view that the most efficient way to overcome a foe was to concentrate massive powers on the principal front and attack the enemy's main force.[56] Praising Grant for his hammering assaults in the Eastern Theatre, Maurice thus reflected on the Somme:

> Certainly Grant had not lost confidence either in himself or in his men. But the heavy tale of casualties had shaken public opinion in the North and had alarmed many of the politicians in Washington; just as the casualties of the Somme had made the people of Great Britain realize, as they had not realized before, the terrible nature

> of modern war, and had convinced certain of the statesmen in Downing Street that that battle had been a ghastly and costly failure. Fortunately for the North, they had in Washington a man who had the courage to look beyond lists of casualties, and the imagination to picture the effect of Grant's methods of exhaustion on the South. Lincoln refused to withdraw his support from Grant, and so made victory possible in 1865.[57]

As Maurice's interpretation of events at Cold Harbor demonstrated, other than promoting a strategy of direct assault, he was concerned also with civil-military-political relations. Maurice continuously argued for politicians' obligation to protect military commanders and their professional decisions from public criticism; for generals' freedom from political intervention in professional affairs; and he was an advocate of conscription, which he thought the government should support. In the Civil War, Maurice found evidence to reinforce all his arguments.

Maurice's account of Cold Harbor, in which his dismay with British conduct in the Battle of the Somme was evident, also demonstrated that his stance was not an easy one to hold in Britain during the Great War. For one thing, in light of the increasing number of casualties on the Western Front, and facing growing public unrest, politicians were reluctant to endorse the demand for more manpower from generals Douglas Haig and William Robertson in order to concentrate British military strength in France.[58] Similarly, Maurice argued that with Lloyd George's constant intervention in military affairs, proper division of authority between the military and the government was never practiced in Britain during the war.[59] Conscription, too, was a difficult policy to sell. Traditionally, many Britons believed conscription stood in opposition to Britain's national character, especially for service abroad.[60] Lord Shaw voiced a common view when naming the Military Bill of 1916 'essentially un-British'.[61]

Maurice had experienced the difficulty of implementing these lessons first hand. In light of the German success on the Western Front in 1918, British politicians – led by Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law – accused British generals – primarily Haig and Robertson – of executing an irresponsible and costly strategy in France.[62] A close friend of both generals, and like them an adherent of the Western Front strategy, Maurice was not averse to voicing his opinions. On 6 May, he published a letter in which he accused both Lloyd George and Bonar Law of misleading the public and demoralizing the soldiers.[63] Maurice stated that his motivation for publishing this polemical letter was the belief that the prime

minister was sacrificing Britain's soldiers and war effort for personal interests. In order to please potential voters, claimed Maurice, Lloyd George sought to avoid decisive battles even at the price of prolonging the war. Maurice further argued that the public was concerned solely with the rising number of casualties and was ignorant of strategic and tactical considerations. While scholars still debate Haig's and Lloyd George's conduct during the war, in the late 1910s it was the latter who held the upper hand.[64] The public clash with the prime minister marked the end of Maurice's military career, leaving the disavowed general with a bitter sense of injustice.[65]

In this light and, as historians have already noted, Maurice's accounts of the Civil War might be viewed as an implicit criticism.[66] He repeatedly argued that, in the notorious clash with Lloyd George, he was never truly allowed to defend himself publicly.[67] Comparing events of the Civil War with those taking place in the Great War, Maurice's criticism was vividly lucid, as the analysis of his account of Cold Harbor demonstrated. However, it would be wrong to dismiss Maurice's Civil War writings as merely a semi-disguised criticism . After all, he had expressed his contempt publicly and explicitly well before he turned to the study of the Civil War in the mid-1920s.[68]

It would be helpful, instead, to note that Maurice genuinely believed that the military and political circumstances of the Civil War would be akin to those of the future. As such, the American conflict was immensely relevant to him, in that he did not hold that the Great War really 'ended all wars'.[69] Maurice understood that if the new international institutions and pacts functioned they might secure peace; he also believed that if they failed, another world war would be more than likely. Accordingly, he stressed that the Civil War was the best war to shed light on contemporary modern warfare and that Britons must draw valid lessons from it, not about the previous European war but for the next one.[70] While acknowledging that technical conditions in future wars would be different, Maurice held that the nature of military-political relations and the role of the public would remain similar to those in America in the 1860s.[71]

Maurice turned to the Civil War for military lessons also because he thought that as a foreign war it would be an apt source, which the Great War could not yet be. In many senses, he believed, Britons were not ready to draw, examine and learn from the Great War in a sufficiently detached way, as it was immersed in bitter conflicts that he knew all too well. Accordingly, in 1926, Maurice opened his account of the Civil War thus:

> We are too near to the events of the World War to make it possible to examine dispassionately the relations which existed between statesmen and soldiers in the countries concerned, nor have we yet ... the material needed to enable us even to begin a judicial examination of questions which bristle with controversy. But some sixty years ago there was fought out a bitter and protracted struggle between two democracies.... It has seemed to me therefore to be worth while to examine critically, in the light of our own recent experience, the method of conducting war adopted by the North and South in the years 1861–1865.[72]

Featuring the most up-to-date developments in modern warfare and reflecting a direct British experience, the World War would have been the best precedent from which to draw lessons in order to prepare for the next war. However, being soaked in controversy and emotion, Maurice sought a more distant, non-British conflict that would nevertheless allow him to make relevant arguments.

From the same American war, in light of the same World War and equally conscious that another war would ultimately arrive, Liddell Hart drew the opposite military lessons. Generally, Liddell Hart, like Maurice, found the Civil War appealing because he saw it as the first modern war. Accordingly, he turned to Sherman, since he thought that the Northern general had best demonstrated the lessons of modern warfare. 'The army which marched with Sherman from Atlanta to the Atlantic', he wrote, 'was probably the finest army ... the modern world has seen'.[73] Yet, from this common basis, Liddell Hart attacked the strategy that Maurice advocated.

From Sherman Liddell Hart took the need for mobility, flexibility, self-reliance and speed. He described with admiration how, prior to leaving Atlanta on his march toward the Atlantic, Sherman had reduced the burden carried by his men to a necessary minimum, keeping it mobile and flexible.[74] 'Economy of force', he argued in admiration, 'was his ruling law'.[75] Additional lessons included the role of economic and psychological warfare, which Liddell Hart saw as pivotal in defeating an enemy army, especially that of a modern democratic country. Accordingly, he argued that Sherman's march through the Carolinas was aimed primarily at spreading despair among the Southern population. In Liddell Hart's view, following the fall of Atlanta and Savannah, 'it only remained to carry that impression into South Carolina and the fate of the Confederacy would be sealed'.[76]

All of the above were the basic building blocks of Liddell Hart's most cherished trademark – the strategy of the indirect approach.[77] Simply

put, this theory stressed that a general must avoid concentrating his power and commencing attacks on the principal front against his enemy's main force. Instead, the general should search for alternative routes to the enemy's most vulnerable points.[78] Clearly, then, Liddell Hart and Maurice were diametrically opposite when it came to military strategy. In the modern era, Liddell Hart deduced from the American conflict, 'a frontal attack on an enemy in position became an almost hopeless venture'.[79]

Lessons about modern warfare became immensely relevant to Liddell Hart in the wake of the Great War. 'If those keys had not lain so long neglected in the dusty lumber-room of history, the problem of the world war might have been better understood', he wrote.[80] Instead of trying to find a different route, Liddell Hart lamented, the French and British generals aimlessly tried to hammer their way through the Western Front. To him, this was as fruitless as Halleck's conduct in Corinth in 1862 when he faced the entrenched forces of Beauregard.[81] As opposed to Maurice, Liddell Hart came to see the Western Front policy as futile and costly, and he supported Lloyd George's views that an alternative – such as at Gallipoli – should have been sought and pursued.[82] In general, he opposed the strategy of concentration of power and promoted, instead, the above-mentioned indirect approach.[83]

At loggerheads with him professionally, Liddell Hart nonetheless shared Maurice's view of the Civil War as more than a channel by which to express criticism and bitterness about the past. He, too, was pragmatic and genuinely concerned about the future, and he spent the interwar period advancing the implementation of his lessons from Sherman as measures to prepare for the next war. 'Any reasonable man must hope that war will have no future', he predicted in 1932, 'but experience does not lend encouragement to the hope'.[84] Ultimately, the British conduct in the Second World War left Liddell Hart with the same sense of an ignored prophet that he had during the 1920s and 1930s when he thought that the army was reluctant to adopt the lessons learned from Sherman. In 1961, he wrote bitterly that, the British command did not absorb these lessons, so

> [t]hereby, unfortunately, it was left to the Germans to take over the British lead.... Guderian enthusiastically embraced the idea of deep strategic penetration, and tried out in details the new techniques that had been evolved in Britain. Five years later he commanded the main spearhead which carried out the far-reaching thrust, through

> the Ardennes to the Channel, that proved decisive against the French Army in 1940. That 1940 campaign ... was a triumph for the new concept – and with it was completed the chain of causation from Sherman.[85]

In all likelihood, Liddell Hart saw himself as the connecting link in this chain of developments that had stretched from Sherman to Guderian. He only hoped that it would end with a British, rather than a German link.

As historians have shown, Liddell Hart's professional reading of the Civil War was far from unproblematic. This, it has been argued compellingly, reflected in Liddell Hart's often ill-targeted criticism of the wartime and post-war British Army. For example, although Liddell Hart continuously criticized the army for not initiating any significant reform after the Great War, the fact was that it underwent fundamental changes during the interwar period, some even in accord with Liddell Hart's own vision.[86] Thus the principal exercise of the British Army in 1931 was aimed at testing the possibility of reducing equipment and weight from armed forces, thereby making them lighter and more flexible. Some even called the drill 'the Sherman March'.[87] Similarly, contrary to Liddell Hart's assertions, pre-war military intellectuals drew lessons from the Civil War, and some of these lessons were akin to his. In particular, while he argued that before the Great War British thinkers ignored the Civil War's Western Theatre and Sherman's crucial role in defeating the Confederacy, some, like Wood and Edmonds, argued as early as 1905 that:

> The military genius of the great Confederate leaders, Lee and Jackson, the unrivalled fighting capacity of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the close proximity of the rival capitals, have caused a disproportionate attention to be concentrated upon the Eastern theatre of war. But it was in the West that the decisive blows were struck. The capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July, 1863, was the real turning-point of the war, and it was the operations of Sherman's Grand Army of the West which really led to the collapse of the Confederacy at Appomattox Court House.[88]

Scholars have correctly pointed at Liddell Hart's omissions and inaccuracies to argue that he was attempting to promote his own military philosophy, sometimes forcing facts into theory.[89] Adhering to his indirect approach, Liddell Hart downplayed Grant's central role in defeating the

Confederacy by hammering Lee's army in the Eastern Theater, attributing all the success to Sherman.

True as this may be, in Liddell Hart's criticism of the previous generation of British military intellectuals, and in his assault on pre-1914 military thinkers' reluctance to learn from the Civil War, something more profound was evident. At the heart of his thought lay the sense that the Great War was an historical watershed separating his generation from past generations. Professionally, he constantly argued that during the Great War Britain departed from many of its long-held traditions. 'For the first time in our history', he wrote, for example, 'we poured the nation into the army'.[90] Similarly, Liddell Hart stressed that, unlike past conflicts, during the First World War Britain had abandoned its traditional adherence to both limited liability in Europe (that is, its policy of not committing itself to European alliances) and to its reliance on naval warfare.[91] If Liddell Hart's emphasis on British military departure from tradition was not always accurate, it nonetheless loyally reflected a strong feeling of detachment from the past and a sense of there being a generational gap in his military thought. This sense left its mark across Liddell Hart's military thought and works, including on the Civil War.

Fuller and Liddell Hart agreed on many aspects of strategy, including vital aspects of the Great War and the Civil War. However, the two thinkers also markedly differed in their understanding of other aspects of both conflicts, and Fuller presented yet another reading of the professional value of the Civil War. As did many of his contemporaries, Maurice and Liddell Hart among them, Fuller drew from the Civil War professional lessons he considered relevant to modern warfare. Moreover, like Liddell Hart, he believed that lessons from the American conflict were all the more relevant during this time because they had not been previously learned. 'The old tactical school learned nothing', he wrote in 1933, 'the new died with the war; so it happened that the grim lessons of Malvern Hill, Shiloh, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness had to be relearned in every succeeding war right up to the World War of 1914–1918, when they appeared in their most tremendous form; yet soldiers still hesitate to accept them'.[92]

In accordance with his passion for technological military innovation, the Civil War served Fuller as a lesson primarily about the impact of new technology on the battlefield. He argued that technologies that were introduced during the Civil War had revolutionized the battlefield in a way that has remained significant since. Above all he emphasized

the introduction of the bullet and argued that 'in 1861–1865 the rifle bullet was the lord of the battlefield as was the machine gun bullet in 1914–1918'.[93] Fuller acknowledged that technological means change frequently. However, he maintained that their tactical impact was largely constant. Fuller's main professional lesson from the Civil War was thus that since that war 'the rifle had rendered the defense the stronger form of war'.[94]

This tactical lesson imposed new strategic thought. Fuller argued that when the defense had become the stronger form of warfare, frontal assaults were rendered futile, while indirect methods became all the more necessary. Of Grant's campaign against Lee's army in 1864 Fuller wrote:

> When examining Grant's tactics, it is generally overlooked that to him physical attack was but one of three forms of attack, the other two being moral and economic (or material) attacks; attacks which were waged against the will and resources of the Confederacy, and not merely against the strength of her armies. The attacks of Sheridan in the [Shenandoah] valley and of Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas were in nature moral and economic, whilst his own in Virginia was a physical onslaught so unrelenting and fierce that it shielded these attacks from physical interference.[95]

In 1931, two years after he wrote this about Grant, Fuller applied the same principles to the last and the next wars in his *Lectures on the Field Service Regulations II* (F.S.R.):

> Once a front can neither be turned nor broken, as happened in France from November 1914 to October 1917, the true battle is shifted to the industrial areas; here lie the reserve forces which will ultimately win the war. This is what happened during the last war, and is likely to happen during the next.[96]

Even on the tank – Fuller's obsession – he wrote that it was 'a psychological, more so than a material weapon'.[97] As his words above demonstrated, in many places throughout his work Fuller seemed to echo Liddell Hart's strategy of indirect approach. Liddell Hart himself, reviewing Fuller's *Lectures on the F.S.R. III* (1932), noted that the latter's contentions were 'similar to my 1928 argument on the strategy of indirect approach', and added that 'Fuller's adoption of it is a most valuable reinforcement'.[98]

Such an approach should have put Fuller in a problematic position, however. Largely owing to Liddell Hart's influence, Grant's generalship in 1930s Britain became notoriously associated with frontal, bloody and fruitless strategy as opposed to Sherman's economical conduct. Reviewing Fuller's *Grant and Lee* (1933) in the *English Review*, Liddell Hart was pleased with the author's criticism of Lee but disappointedly concluded: '[I]f only he could analyse Grant in the same way'.[99] Interestingly, in his *Lectures on the F.S.R. II*, Fuller seemed to have endorsed Liddell Hart's views:

> The Germans were of opinion that numerical superiority was the decisive factor.... The German plan nearly succeeded not because it was a sound plan, it was not, for the entire forces of the empire were put into the front line, and all flexibility was lost ... In spite of the then recent lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, its controlling idea was frontal attack of all armies on the battle of Cold Harbor pattern tried out by General Grant with disastrous results in 1864![100]

In what sense, then, were Fuller's arguments so fundamentally different from those of Liddell Hart's that their close friendship nearly ended in the late 1920s because of their views on Grant and Sherman? How may Fuller's inconsistency in his military thought be understood? And why did Fuller choose Grant as a protagonist if the American general embodied a strategy that he did not endorse?

The answer is that Fuller was not interested solely in Grant's tactics but also in his cause. According to Fuller, all the generals in the Civil War – including Grant – failed to grasp the significance of new technological developments and executed futile frontal attacks.[101] However, he argued, of all Civil War generals, Grant was singular in understanding and following Carl von Clausewitz's maxim that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means'.[102] 'Few generals', Fuller wrote in his study of the events at Cold Harbor, 'better understood the influence of politics on war than Grant'.[103] To Fuller, that was the essential difference. The British intellectual emphasized that Grant's conduct during the war – as opposed to Lee's – was always guided by higher policy and exempted Grant from being a 'callous butcher' by stressing that political constraints had left him with little choice:

> In reviewing Grant's generalship during the last year of the war, it is all important to keep his object clearly in mind, and especially so because those who criticize his strategy and tactics frequently

> overlook it. It was to establish unity of strategical direction and to end the war in the shortest possible time, because, as we have seen, the political condition of the North brooked no delay.[104]

With the 1864 election approaching and Lincoln's re-election far from secured, Fuller argued that Grant had no choice but to act directly and forcefully in order to provide the president with military achievements that would, in turn, be translated into political capital.

That, like other lessons from the Civil War, became highly relevant to Fuller in light of the Great War. Fuller regretted that during the war, the Allies' political leadership did not emulate Lincoln's coherent policy. Maintaining that a general must know what his superiors, that is, the government, aim at achieving by way of war, and act accordingly as the head of the armed forces, Fuller also stressed that the government was responsible for conceiving a definite policy and political end to a war. However, in Fuller's eyes, in 1914 'there was no Anglo-French political point of view, therefore the military point of view was subordinated to a vacuum, which at once filled to become the sole point of view: in other words, the means monopolized the end'.[105] The result, Fuller concluded succinctly, was that 'chaos was planted in Europe'.[106] Lincoln, on the other hand, had a policy – one that put reunification as the main goal – and he directed Grant to advance it. In every battle, Grant fought with Lincoln's plans and goals before his eyes, leading the effort to compel 'the South to re-enter the Union'.[107]

In addition to professional lessons, Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller commonly turned to the American Civil War because it also explained the contemporary United States, which they came to see as relevant as were the military lessons from the Civil War and from the Great War. Never before the Great War – when over a million American soldiers had passed through their country – did Britons have the Americans so close to home.[108] Never before the interwar period was American influence on Britain as powerful. While Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller again differed in their views of the United States, they all seemed to have felt compelled to comment on it. As an American symbol that explained the rise of the contemporary United States, the Civil War was a point of access through which this could be done.

Maurice viewed the United States much as his predecessors did, as a country that in the Civil War was reborn a stronger, modernized unified nation. It was that war, he argued, drawing from one of the war's consensual representations, which had created the modern United States. Although he wrote a biography of Lee that portrayed the

Southern general in a positive light, Maurice was not an admirer of the South. Certainly, his work showed that he held Southern chivalry in high esteem. 'The free life and independent means of the gentlemen in Virginia', he noted, '[and] the management of large estates ... produced men with a natural aptitude for government, men who in their day rendered great service'. Furthermore, Maurice saw the Civil War as a mark of the Old South's demise. On the heyday of antebellum Virginia, he wrote sentimentally that, 'during the boyhood and manhood of Robert E. Lee, they reached and passed the zenith of their power. New forces ... were at work'.[109]

However, to Maurice, if the war saw the demise of a romantic old world, it gave rise to an admirable modern world. '[H]istory has shown that [Lee] was wrong and Lincoln right', he wrote, 'that the future of this great country depended upon the development of the Union '.[110] The South, he ultimately determined, referring to secession, fought for a cause that history deemed wrong. Moreover, Maurice found it important to stress that in the war's aftermath, the South too, joined the mission of reunion. 'After the war', he noted, '[Lee] devoted himself to the task of reconciliation'.[111] In this, Lee followed Lincoln's aim to reunite the country and lead it to world prominence. Similar to the pre-1914 generation of British military thinkers, Maurice rejected one Civil War representation – that of the South – and appealed to another – that of reconciliation. Through the latter, he looked with admiration on the modern United States.

Maurice's view of the United States was shaped by pragmatic considerations. In the Great War he found the proof that the modern United States had to be understood and approached. Throughout his career Maurice consistently argued that in order to protect itself, Britain must abandon the isolationism that had characterized its late nineteenth-century foreign policy and acquire allies that shared its interests. At the end of the nineteenth century, he believed that it should have been Austria, Germany and Italy.[112] After the Great War, in which 'the situation had indeed become dark, and was relieved only by America's entry in the war', Maurice had turned his attention to the United States.[113] Involved in the post-war negotiations with the Americans about disarmament, he also saw the major bone of contention between Britain and the United States and the necessity to overcome it:

> I suggest that the first step towards coming to an arrangement with the United States is to make a serious effort to get the old vexed question of neutral rights at sea settled.... It is difficult for an Englishman

> who has not done what I had to do last year, to sit for a month discussing this question of the limitation of armaments round a table with American sailors, soldiers, and international jurists, to grasp how strongly Americans feel on this question.[114]

'Any arrangement', he added, 'by which American influence would be on our side ... must surely on balance be to our advantage even if we sacrifice some power of blockade'.[115] While clearly evident before 1914, American power became strikingly evident for Maurice during and after the Great War, as it became apparent to all Britons. This American power was to Maurice an important assurance of Britain's safety. However, as his words above showed, Britons did not always experience the proximity of American power positively. Some, to whom Maurice's words were directed, saw it as undermining the place of their own country. Liddell Hart, and even more so Fuller certainly suspected that this was the case.

Liddell Hart was highly critical of the contemporary United States. For one thing, as Azar Gar has shown, Liddell Hart feared that another war against Germany 'would result in the subservience of Britain to the United States and in the end of the Empire'.[116] Furthermore, from his account of Sherman, it is clear that Liddell Hart was critical of contemporary American society and culture. Sherman was more than one of Liddell Hart's military heroes. As he repeatedly noted, he saw in the Northern general also a cultural role model and he emphasized time and again that Sherman was not only a brilliant commander but also an embodiment of American identity and culture. 'The man is William Tecumseh Sherman', he wrote, 'who, by the general recognition of all who met him was the most original genius of the American Civil War; and who, in the same breath, is often described as "the typical American"'.[117] Sherman attracted, and was relevant to, Liddell Hart as an American as much as he did as a general. As Liddell Hart stressed, a pressing reason for him to write a biography of Sherman was 'to give the European reader a clue to the better understanding of the American character as it has evolved from its "prototype"'.[118] The biography, then, was also Liddell Hart's guidebook to the United States.

In Sherman's biography, and in various other publications, Liddell Hart pointed to what it was that had made Sherman 'the typical American'. He was rough and stubborn, nonconformist, unsentimental and realistic; he lacked any rituality; he talked fast and smoked excessively; he attached no importance to appearance and had unkempt hair and beard; he believed in hard work as a key to success; and he had a businessman's

point-of-view on every aspect of life.[119] On the face of it, Liddell Hart portrayed a typical Northern hero. 'Despite the tempestuousness of his speech and manner, Sherman was no ardent cavalier, to be swept away in a surge of martial enthusiasm and popular excitement to a gallant but useless sacrifice', Liddell Hart wrote, ridiculing the Southern fighting spirit that so many in Britain and the United States had come to admire by that time.[120] The Southern way of life, he maintained, was lazy, slave-based and lacking in self-discipline.[121]

However, there is no reason to assume that Liddell Hart sought in Sherman a channel to express his pro-Northern or anti-Southern sentiments. Although it never materialized, Liddell Hart's private papers disclose that in the early 1930s, not long after he published his biography of Sherman, he contemplated a project on Confederate general John C. Pemberton, whose life and conduct in the war he found fascinating.[122] Furthermore, Liddell Hart often characterized his Northern hero with what were traditionally seen as pre-modern, even Southern features. Sherman, he stressed for example, ran his business under strict and coherent moral rule, and the British biographer cited him saying: 'I know this is not modern banking but better be honest'.[123]

Rather than a modern Northern hero, Liddell Hart's Sherman was a symbol of the early republic that was lost in the Civil War. Thus, for example, he noted that Sherman fought to save the country that his familial ancestors had founded when they signed the Declaration of Independence.[124] Furthermore, in the preface to the biography Liddell Hart asserted that other than to explain the United States to the European reader, Sherman's story will also 'give the American reader the opportunity of testing, by the acid of Sherman, the purity of the present product and how far reality corresponds with the ideal set up by the most realistic of idealists'.[125] In other words, Liddell Hart maintained that contemporary Americans could look through Sherman into their past and see how far they had drifted from this ideal United States. Distancing Sherman from the United States of his time enabled Liddell Hart to look critically upon the post-Civil War United States.

How critical Liddell Hart was of the modern United States and what he thought were its major defects can be seen in the way he described Sherman's constant clashes with his environment in the North. According to Liddell Hart, Sherman failed miserably in two areas in particular that had reflected the latter's foreignness in his own country and time: in his relations with Northern politicians and in his relations with the public. Liddell Hart repeatedly emphasized how Sherman's superiors had unjustly deplored him because of his scorn for, and inability

to cope with, their ignorance and populism (including Lincoln's at the early stages of the war).[126] On the other hand, the Northern general's hatred of the mob, his inability and reluctance to cooperate with the press, and his failure to manipulate the masses meant that he was under constant attack from below as well. '"Sherman's Press complex" ousted his reason', Liddell Hart wrote, 'thus it is not surprising that he soon suffered a counter-blast'.[127] In Liddell Hart's view, the Civil War had raised up mediocre politicians in the United States and gave the public exaggerated political power through the practice of mass democracy. Looking through the prism of the Civil War's representation that portrayed it as the birth of the modern United States, in accordance with his predecessors, Liddell Hart nevertheless did not share their celebration of the new nation, shaped in the image of the victorious North.

Fuller's view of the United States was different from both that of Maurice and Liddell Hart. On the one hand, Fuller was immensely critical of the contemporary United States. Arguably, he was more critical of America than was Liddell Hart. Certainly he was clearer and more vocal about it. In his *Empire Unity and Defence* (1934), for example, Fuller criticized the United States for undermining Britain's naval power, for its isolationist policy and for its closed financial system.[128] On the other hand, he saw in America a great hope for Western civilization. Fuller first presented his views of the United States coherently in 'Atlantis: America and the Future', an essay he published upon returning from his first visit there in 1924.[129] This visit, he testified, was the source of his interest in the American Civil War.[130] Although almost unstudied, Atlantis is a key to understanding Fuller's views of the United States and his interest in its Civil War, and the connection between them.

Fuller opened 'Atlantis' with a multi-pronged assault on his contemporary United States, depicting the typical American as brutal, grotesque and despicable. In accordance with his fascist criticism of materialism, Fuller argued that Americans were big people with big wallets but with small brains, and that morals, values and beauty were meaningless to the American, who cared only for property, ownership and material goods.[131] All of America's notorious characteristics, Fuller further argued, were by-products of nationalism and industrialization of which the United States was not only a result, but also the generator. In 'Atlantis,' he wrote of the United States that, 'her birth as a nation does not date from 1776, but from 1769, the date when James Watt produced his first pumping engine'.[132] In a similar vein, he noted in 1932 that the birth of the spirit of nationalism dated 'even more truly from the signing of the

Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776, than from the storming of the Bastille on July 14, thirteen years later'.[133] Breaking away from the British Empire, the 13 colonies contributed to the motion of imperial fragmentation and nationalism that Fuller so vehemently despised. Interwar America had a vile place in Fuller's historical worldview as the embodiment of materialism, immorality, mob-rule and mediocrity or, in other words, as the generator and emblem of the present nationalistic era.

Yet despite his contempt for the United States, in 1924 Fuller saw in it also a source of great hope for western civilization. Scorning the United States throughout, Fuller nonetheless concluded 'Atlantis' by noting that 'what Rome did produce was a great heroic race. To-day I believe that the germs of such race lie embedded in the materialism of America'.[134] Fuller saw the possibility that out of American materialism, anarchy and lawlessness would one day dialectically emerge a great and united people that would constitute a new global empire. Empowered by the forces of youth and discontent, which he admired, Fuller thought in 1924 that in the near future the 'Atlantides will vanish and become true Americans'.[135] Fuller hoped to see the United States becoming a world power that would propel universal unity and an ever-increasing integration. He thought that this was what the true American spirit stood for; and he thought that by the 1920s, the United States had become strong enough to fulfill this destiny.

Based on this prediction Fuller fashioned his understanding of the Civil War. In that war he saw the 'true Americans' triumph, demonstrating the genuine spirit of the United States. Unlike Liddell Hart, Fuller was enchanted by the American republic of the future rather than by the republic of the past. As opposed to Liddell Hart, he despised the old, pre-Civil War United States, and he endorsed Northern generals without challenging the view that they were symbols of modernism, brutality and democracy. It was precisely for this reason that he admired them. Thus for Fuller, too, as for Liddell Hart, Sherman was the face of the United States. This was not, however, for representing its past, but rather because he was

> out-and-out typical of the new America at this time emerging from out of the chrysalis of the old. This, as we shall see, is true, because he broke away from all the conventions of nineteenth-century warfare, took the public into his confidence, at heart despised the people, and, above all, the popular press, and with steel waged war as ruthless as Calvin had done with word.[136]

By contrast, of Lee he wrote scornfully that 'he belonged to the eighteenth century – to the agricultural age of history'.[137] What Liddell Hart saw as the romantic era of the Declaration of Independence, the idealized era of Sherman's ancestors, Fuller saw as an age destined for the junkyard of history.

While rejecting romantic views of the American past of the kind that Liddell Hart had held, Fuller did not share Maurice's views of the present United States either. He deplored the nation that had emerged from the Civil War, and he anticipated its dialectic demise. This also distinguished Fuller from the pre-1914 generation of military thinkers, who focused their – usually admiring – observations on the present-day United States. In contrast with such views, in the Union ranks during the Civil War Fuller identified the true American spirit that was to build the new America out of the ruins of his contemporary one. This was especially true for Grant, who 'more nearly than any other man impersonated the American character of 1861–1865. He will stand, therefore, as the typical hero of the great Civil War'.[138]

Fuller's view of America and its Civil War was rooted in his ideological positions. Influenced by trends of fascist thought and a Hegelian interpretation of history, he saw civilization as dialectically progressing from one stage to the next.[139] According to this theory, each phase of development was better than the previous one and yet still largely defective and thus doomed to create the forces that would ultimately undermine and destroy it. War, Fuller argued, was a principal apparatus by which progress from one ill stage to the next has been historically made.[140] Observing his contemporary world, Fuller claimed that the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were the major turning points in history that had carried civilization from its pre-national to its current national stage. Accordingly, the ills of this stage were nationalism and its by-product, mass-democracy. Fuller despised both and often saw them as interchangeable.[141] Thus he eagerly anticipated what he thought would be the next phase of civilization's development – the international era – and he believed he foresaw the war that would bring it about.

Fuller argued that in order to pass from the national to the international phase, Europe would have to undergo an international war, or, as he once called the Great War, a 'European Civil War'.[142] However, as he frequently asserted, with the Treaty of Versailles demolishing any chance of German reconstruction, and with the war having created new nations instead of abolishing the existing ones, a greater European union was, if anything, more out of reach in 1919 than it had been in 1914.[143] Under the subtitle *The Apotheosis of Nationalism*, Fuller wrote

disappointedly in 1932 that, 'in the name of national liberty the war was declared, and in the name of the self-determination of nations it was concluded'.[144] Failing in its 'civil war', Fuller asserted, Europe was destined to undergo another such war. By contrast, looking across the Atlantic he saw a model and a source for vital lessons. The United States, he hoped, was since the Civil War and the victory of the Union military, on the right track.

Finally, Liddell Hart and Fuller (less so, Maurice) turned to the Civil War because it seemed to them to represent the impact of modern war of such a scale upon the continuation of national identity and historical tradition. From their perspective of the Great War as a watershed in British and European history, the Civil War seemed to them as a canvas upon which they could project their views of the old and new British and European identities. As they held different views about their post-Great War world, so were their interpretations of the Civil War different as well.

That Liddell Hart saw the Civil War as a watershed in America's history and identity made it immensely relevant to him. He felt the same about the Great War and Britain. Other than on military affairs, as discussed above, Liddell Hart saw post-war Britain as a nation that also deviated sharply from its political and ideological tradition during, after and above all because of the Great War. He thought, for example, that the war gave rise to un-British ideas of democracy and liberalism, which were based upon 'the masses', on equalitarianism and on statism. By contrast, he argued in 1939, British democracy 'is far from attaining equality for its individual members. At the same time, it embodies ideas which go much further, and mean much more[;] ... our nation's identity is based on individual freedom and volunteering'.[145] Like many in post-war Britain, Liddell Hart felt that he was living in a new world that was created by the war. In the minds of many, the World War generated an historical consciousness of a gap between an old, quiet and stable world and a chaotic, modern one.[146] As opposed to their Edwardian predecessors, numerous interwar military intellectuals – and British intellectuals more generally – no longer felt that they lived with their history and were part of it, but rather that they had been torn away from it. For Liddell Hart the Great War divided British history in two in the same way and along the same lines as the Civil War divided America's history between Sherman's United States and the modern United States.

In this light, not only is Liddell Hart's appeal to the Civil War more fully understood, but also his reference to and portrayal of Sherman. Bridging the gap between old and new Britain, Liddell Hart's choice

between the two was clear. In his work and public statements, he repeatedly called on Britons to turn to their own, pre-Great War special tradition of freedom, inspiration and creativity, because 'this has been the source of our national vitality'.[147] Liddell Hart did not want to look to the future, but to the lost past, that of old Britain and old America. Much like his portrayal of Sherman, he felt that he was a defender of the British tradition in a changing world. And in a way similar to his Sherman, he felt that he was losing the battle. So much so that in 1951, he privately confessed to Luvaas that, after 1940, he felt that he lived in a country that did not understand him.[148]

Liddell Hart's views of the Civil War were a reflection of his view of the contemporary world. Professionally, he was a reformer who had sometimes even held revolutionary stances. As such, Sherman and the Civil War were relevant to him as emblems of future warfare. By contrast, his political and social vision saw Liddell Hart as a traditionalist who perceived his nation to be lost as an outcome of the Great War. In this respect, the Civil War was relevant to him as a tragic, futile conflict that destroyed an old nation and its identity and constructed a new nation and new identity in their place. For Liddell Hart, in striking opposition to Fuller, progress could not be carried through radicalism and warfare. Mirroring this, he wrote about Sherman that

> [h]is hatred of anarchy was not inspired by an abstract motive, but by the essentially practical one that only in a state of order are prosperity and progress possible. Order was merely the means to the end – progress. For Sherman consistency was not a static conservatism, but a progress through order to a better order.[149]

Liddell Hart's Sherman stood on the border between the old world and the new, looking both forward and backward; as did Liddell Hart himself.

Fuller held a different view of his post-Great War world and, accordingly, a different understanding of why the Civil War was a valuable source for lessons. As seen, in complete opposition to Liddell Hart, he argued that the demise of the old American world was one of the Civil War's greatest achievements. Furthermore, to Fuller, the war proved 'as nothing else could have, that South and North were interdependent'. By creating a basis for a 'more perfect peace', the war ensured that 'within a generation of the reunion of the North and South ... not only were the entire ravages of the war made good, but a prosperity was experienced totally undreamt of by the wildest visionary in 1861'. By making

progress through war, Fuller concluded, the Americans 'proved their war to have been a legitimate one'.[150] And Fuller hoped that the Great War would play the same role in the development of Europe. 'What this war was to America', he stressed in 1929,

> the World War will one day be to Europe. Both were creative impulses shattering what was obsolete and releasing things new.... Such are the two great stepping-stones of our age, and unless we set our feet firmly on the one we may slip on the other as we step forward to the conquest of destiny – the unity of the world.[151]

The Civil War was relevant to Fuller as it symbolized the demise of an old world and the constitution of a new one on its ruins. That is also how he saw the First World War, or, more accurately, that was what he hoped it to be.

In 1938, Alfred Burne, a decorated officer and a prolific military writer, opened his book *Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864–65 Campaign* with a clear aim in mind:

> The title of this book was suggested by the fact that three notable books ... have recently been published in England on Lee, Grant, and Sherman. I refer to Robert E. Lee, The Soldier, by General Sir Frederick Maurice, Grant and Lee, by General J. F. C. Fuller, and Sherman, by Captain Liddell Hart. Each general in turn is held up to our admiration, yet obviously all three cannot be equally admired, and it is the aim of this book to try and strike balance between the rival protagonists.[152]

Burne's determination finally to decide, through the images of the Civil War's generals, which interpretation of the war was correct, was not uncalled for, since it seems that in too many aspects they could not be held together. Maurice's lessons about direct assaults on the enemy's main force stood in clear opposition to Liddell Hart's lessons about the indirect approach; Fuller's positive judgment of Grant contrasted with Liddell Hart's severe criticism of the Northern general; and Maurice must have disagreed with Liddell Hart and Fuller's negative view of Lee. Their critical receptions of each other's works indeed reflected the incompatibility of their readings of the Civil War.

However, whereas each military writer drew his own lessons from the Civil War and fashioned a different view of it, some similarities are apparent in the reasons and ways in which they appealed to the war. In

the first place, all military thinkers saw in the conflict a source of military lessons concerning both the Great War and future wars. Pre-1914 military men saw relevant lessons in the Civil War as well. Some were similar to the lessons that came to the fore during the interwar period. Pre-war thinkers, too, saw the Civil War as a case study for democracy at war, armies of untrained civilians and volunteers, battles of attrition and military-politics relations. However, these lessons still lay in the future for the pre-1914 British strategist. After the Great War, trench warfare, stalemates, mass casualties, untrained soldiers and the broad impact of modern warfare on society became much more familiar to British military scholars. The lessons of Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller from the Civil War reflected the same sense of disappointment in British conduct throughout the Great War. Clearly, the three disagreed about what went wrong during the war. Maurice thought that the government did not allocate enough resources to the Western Front; Liddell Hart and Fuller thought that the generals had forced the government to concentrate too much on that front. However, they all shared the view that after the Great War, British military doctrine had to be revised. Moreover, Maurice, Liddell Hart and Fuller were not captives to the perception that another war of this kind would not come in their time. Maurice raised this option as early as 1927 and possibility even earlier. In the writings of all three, the Civil War thus received additional urgency that was far less evident before 1914.

Interwar military thinkers also turned to the Civil War because they thought that it explained the contemporary United States, which was relevant to their world. During and after the Great War, the United States became part of world affairs and of British life as never before. Military cooperation during the war and British dependence on American military force, coupled with greater financial, social and cultural interaction, turned the United States into a part of the context within which Britons understood their world. Furthermore, as Fuller's work perhaps best reflected, the place of the United States on the world stage had become significantly more central. From a faraway model – to be observed and studied – the United States and American power became a tangible, quotidian reality. Evidently, the three military thinkers differed in their interpretations of America. Maurice observed it with pragmatic esteem; Liddell Hart was critical of it; and Fuller viewed the United States with resentment intermingled with hope. However, the works of all three reflected their common understanding of the new position of the United States, their need to comprehend it, and in Maurice's case also to align Britain's interests with it. Although the way in which Liddell Hart saw

America's relevance was less visible, in his aspiration to understand it his case was as clear as those of Maurice and Fuller. Through the character of Sherman, Liddell Hart reflected on the identity of America and wished to convey lessons about the United States to both his American and British readers.

Moreover, in the Civil War British military intellectuals saw lessons about the impact of a colossal modern war on society. Above all, they examined the impact of such a war on the continuation of national history and identity. The Civil War was represented as the conflict in which a new United States rose from the ashes of an old United States. Put differently, it was portrayed as a watershed in American history and national identity. Pre-1914 military thinkers did not miss this aspect of the war. However, like many of the war's professional lessons, for them, this experience still lay in the future. By contrast, as was clear in the case of Liddell Hart and Fuller, this made the Civil War an immensely relevant event after the experience of the Great War – an experience that led many Britons to re-evaluate the world in which they were living. At the center of the process of constructing an image of the World War lay a struggle to erect a meaningful past and coherent national identity.[153] Despite such efforts, to many, the post-war world seemed very different from the one they used to live in. In the wake of the First World War, Liddell Hart and Fuller, too, felt as if they were torn from their past by a massive conflict. Whereas they responded differently to this sense of detachment from the past – Fuller blessing it, Liddell Hart condemning it – both thought that between 1914 and 1918 Britain underwent the same experience as the United States between 1861 and 1865.

Interwar British military thinkers turned to the Civil War for these reasons because all of these subjects were unclear and debatable but, at the same time, more urgent following the First World War and in light of another, coming, conflict. There was no agreement among intellectuals as to the British military doctrine; there was no consensus about post-war British identity; and there was a variety of views as to the nature of American influence on Britain and whether this influence was positive or negative. It was clear, however, that answers to these issues were required. Interwar military thinkers could thus be defined as a group who addressed these issues with a similar sense of familiarity and urgency, while their ambivalence generated diverse, even contradictory, views on military lessons, on British society and on the United States.

It is clear, therefore, why the Civil War was central to British military thought. For one thing, the American conflict was multifaceted and could convey a wide range of relevant military lessons. Maurice could

use it to advocate direct assaults, while Liddell Hart could advance the opposite course of action. Both would be correct, depending on through the eyes of which side in the war one would look and at which stage of the war. The Civil War was relevant and useful to British thinkers regardless of which strategic view they held. Eric Sheppard's works, published before and after the Great War as well as after the Second World War, best demonstrated this point. As seen, in 1911 he used the American Civil War to teach a lesson about the efficiency of direct assaults and concentrated on Jackson's campaigns in the Eastern Theatre. By contrast, in his interwar studies, he used the same war for the opposite lesson. 'It was in the West that the war was lost and won', he argued in 1938, and advised his readers to devote their main attention to Sherman's operations and to the Western Theatre to learn about the value of the indirect approach.[154] Later in life, when he altered his strategic views yet again, he still found the Civil War relevant. In a revised edition to his interwar guidebook, he concluded his Civil War chapter in 1952 by arguing that in light of the two world wars, 'the only really effective weapon against a brave and determined people in arms is the slow but sure process of attrition, which in the end, costly and bitter as it must be, reduces its powers of resistance below what [is] necessary for the continuance of the struggle'.[155] Sheppard kept his views on the Western Theatre as an important front in the Civil War. However, he no longer argued against the concentration of power on the principal front. In all stages of his intellectual path, the Civil War provided useful and relevant strategic lessons.

The war was multifaceted also as a symbol of the United States and as a prism though which to observe the country. It allowed British military thinkers to express a variety of opinions on the United States. Maurice lauded the nation that emerged from the war and advocated promoting closer relations with the rising American power. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, was critical of his contemporary America. Through the eyes of Sherman he asked his readers – British and Americans alike – to observe how the United States had drifted from its romantic origins. Fuller, by contrast, used Grant – and Sherman – to express his delight at the death of Lee's agrarian America and at the rise of the modern United States, which he hoped to see die and be reborn as well. Through the Civil War, the United States could have been viewed romantically, critically or anywhere in between.

Finally, the Civil War also allowed for diverse lessons about the impact of war on society. Viewed through its Northern or reconciliatory representations, the Civil War seemed to have established a great Union

and a powerful modern nation. Pre-1914 military intellectuals largely followed this narrative. After the Great War, Fuller represented this line of thought most lucidly and hoped that the First World War would have a similar effect on Europe. By contrast, the Civil War also allowed for a romantic lost past, now devastated in the conflict. During the interwar period, Liddell Hart emphasized that this was what had happened to the United States in the Civil War and to Britain during and after the Great War. The different representations of the Civil War made it always relevant to British military thinkers when they wanted to reflect on the changes that they thought the Great War had visited upon Britain.

3
British Intellectuals and Abraham Lincoln

In 1974, scholar Hugh Brogan, son of the eminent British historian Denis Brogan, presented his views on Lincoln in a preface to a new edition of his father's 1935 biography of the president. Lincoln, the younger Brogan explained, had been a strong, nationalistic war president who had taken up arms against the secessionist and pro-slavery Confederacy, and who had gradually adopted a more radical stance on the issues of racism and Reconstruction.[1] To contemporary intellectuals, young Brogan's views required little elucidation. Reviewing the book, Philip Toynbee, a novelist and son of the prominent world historian Arnold Toynbee, stressed that older, opposite views – according to which Lincolnite compromises should have helped avoid the Civil War, and Reconstruction was an un-Lincolnist, vengeful endeavor to demolish the South – were 'conventional, but now deeply disputed'.[2]

Of course, that was not always the way in which Lincoln was viewed within British intellectual circles. In many ways, the younger generation of Brogans and Toynbees challenged previous generations' image of the American president. Indeed, in his preface, Hugh Brogan criticized his father for depicting Lincoln as a peace advocate and adherent of moderate Reconstruction. What is interesting, however, is not that Lincoln's representation has changed within British educated circles, but rather that even more than a century after his death, the 16th American president still occupied British intellectuals' minds.

During the Civil War, as Lawrence Goldman has recently shown, Britons largely misunderstood the American president's policies, a misunderstanding that often resulted in their contempt for him.[3] Thus, for example, many saw in Lincoln's suspension of *habeas corpus* an act of despotism. What is more, the Emancipation Proclamation, rather than as a moral impetus, was often seen as a mere cynical attempt to

manipulate public opinion in America and abroad.[4] With the United States on the verge of destruction, and the president so perceived, it is of little wonder that British intellectuals did not find Lincoln appealing. The views of those, especially within radical and nonconformist circles, who saw Lincoln in a positive light complicated the British image of the president but did not generate a profound challenge to the view commonly held in Britain.

The assassination of Lincoln simplified this picture dramatically. Almost overnight, and with only marginal dissenting voices, the martyred American president became a hero in Britain.[5] Lincoln's benign image became the consensus among Britons, and he now stood for reconciliation and forgiveness alongside firmness and morality; for compassion as well as for fierceness; for a people's democracy alongside strong, lofty leadership. Lincoln's sharp rise to prominence in the British mind opened the way for his legacy to enter British intellectual circles.

The debate about democratic reforms in the late 1860s presented an early opportunity for British intellectuals outside radical circles to adopt Lincoln's legacy. For British radicals the case for evoking to Lincoln was clear. As Richard Blackett has shown, in the late 1860s radicals had linked their struggle for extending suffrage in Britain to Lincoln's democratic legacy, and they harnessed his image and their support of the North during the war to elevate the reputation of the British worker as a politically and socially responsible self-made-man.[6] The British worker, the argument ran at the time, showed supreme moral characteristics when he (the proposed reform did not include women) supported Lincoln and the North and thus proved his capacity to responsibly take active part in British politics. Furthermore, among the leaders of the workers, Lincoln's memory was often evoked in support of their cause, and in many internal debates the image of the late Richard Cobden, for example, was associated with that of Lincoln.[7]

However, while the debates on reform marked the entrance of Lincoln into the historical consciousness of British radicals, the president's heritage still lacked the power to enter British intellectual circles more broadly. For many, if Lincoln was now admired he still represented a poor political system.[8] Thus some condemned Lincoln's assassination without diminishing their support of the Confederacy and their criticism of American political institutions.[9] During the debates in 1866 and 1867, even Liberals such as John Bright, a great admirer of Lincoln and the North, saw American democracy as a mediocre system that had historically been putting the reins of power in the hands of unworthy presidents.[10] Conservatives, too, praised Lincoln but not the American

political system.[11] Promoting reform, significant efforts had been made by both Conservatives and Liberals to avoid turning the British political system into anything that resembled that of the United States.[12] In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the United States was struggling to recover from the conflict and destruction, and many in Britain could not foresee a real reunion between North and South. They certainly could not predict the rise of the United States to global power. If, as Jay Sexton has argued, the power of Lincoln's legacy stemmed from the symbolic representation of a powerful United States, then in the late 1860s and 1870s this powerful United States was still beyond the sight of many Britons.[13]

Furthermore, while British intellectuals had in fact little reason to adopt Lincoln's legacy, the Americans were often reluctant to let them have use of it. In a speech in Congress in honor of Lincoln's birthday in 1866, eminent American historian George Bancroft made every effort to distinguish between Lincoln and the recently deceased British prime minister, Lord Palmerston. Before both houses of Congress, and in the presence of British delegates, Bancroft stressed, for example, that 'Palmerston, from his narrowness as an Englishman, did not endear his country to any one court or to any one nation, but rather caused general uneasiness and dislike; Lincoln left America more beloved than ever by all the peoples of Europe'.[14] The differences between the two leaders were discussed at length. In addition, Bancroft charged the British elite for what he saw as its support of the Confederacy during the war, and he used Lincoln to draw a sharp divide between the United States and Britain. Bancroft was clearly prejudiced, and he constructed biased images of Palmerston. The latter was in fact immensely popular in Britain, was a friend of Italian nationalism and was an ardent adversary of slavery. However, Bancroft spoke within an acceptable narrative. By the late 1860s, as noted in Chapter 1, a representation of the Civil War had begun to gain ground according to which the British social and ruling elite supported the Confederacy and endeavored to advance the collapse of the American Union.[15] At home, radicals such as Bright and Cobden helped cement this memory in an effort to both align British radicalism with American democracy and distinguish it from British conservatism.[16] Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the conflict and its then iconic president were often used to highlight the divide between the British elite and the American people.

The coming years saw a shift in the British perception of the United States, of the Civil War and, accordingly, also of Lincoln's place in British thought. In 1888, James Bryce could write: '[F]rom Jackson till

the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the Presidents ... were intellectual pigmies beside the real leaders of that generation – Clay, Calhoun, and Webster. A new series begins with Lincoln in 1861. He and General Grant his successor ... belong to the history of the world'.[17] During the last decades of the century, the United States became a significant power. This, in turn, made the Civil War more appealing than before since it was no longer a symbol of a decaying country, but of a rising one. Furthermore, as Bryce's words showed, the Civil War now became a key, an explanation to the rising of America because it marked the birth of the modern and powerful United States. Glossing over Andrew Johnson, considered by Britons outside radical circles a mediocre and weak president who could not rule his Congress, Bryce connected the Civil War with the rise of a potent American leadership.[18] Lincoln became the harbinger of American leaders who, no longer 'intellectual pigmies', stood as the heads of an increasingly powerful democratic nation.

In addition, starting from the latter part of the century, Lincoln gradually became a consensual figure and national emblem in the United States as never before. In his 1866 *The History of Abraham Lincoln and the Overthrow of Slavery*, Isaac Arnold presented the martyred president as a fervent abolitionist and called on Congress to realize radical Reconstruction, which he saw as part of Lincoln's legacy. Many pages were dedicated to African Americans who fought in the war for their freedom, and the narrative praised Lincoln and the Congress for having 'put the sword into the hand of the slave'.[19] Such a Lincoln was resented in the South, and Lincoln thus remained a sectional icon. Arnold's biography of Lincoln from 1884, however, was titled *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* and was far less combative and sectionalist. According to Elihu Washburne, who wrote the introduction for the new edition, what Arnold (who had just died) really intended to write was a story of Lincoln's life 'disconnected with the history of the overthrow of slavery'.[20] Far more acceptable in the South since the end of Reconstruction and the rise of the narrative of reconciliation, and overtaking George Washington as the archetypical American symbol, around the turn of the century Lincoln came to represent the United States officially and more frequently.[21] Lincoln was now more closely associated with the United States directly and independently, not only circumspectly through the Civil War.

Finally, it was during this period that Lincoln's image began crossing the Atlantic with greater frequency and to a far better reception. In 1881, Isaac Arnold, then president of the Chicago Historical Society, presented a paper on Lincoln in London, giving most attendees, members of the Royal Historical Society, a first glance into the life of the president.[22]

Avoiding many contentious aspects of the British attitude towards Lincoln during the war, Arnold emphasized the British 'sympathy ... most eloquently expressed by all' upon Lincoln's death:

> It came from Windsor Castle to the White House; from England's widowed Queen to the stricken and distracted widow at Washington. From Parliament to Congress, from the people of all this magnificent Empire, as it stretches round the world. From England to India, from Canada to Australia, came words of deep feeling, and they were received by the American people, in their sore bereavement, as the expression of a kindred race.[23]

At the same time as sentiment changed, helping it as well as being reinforced by it, around the turn of the century biographies and primary sources became available to the British reader on a hitherto unprecedented scale. For example, in his 1907 biography of Lincoln, Henry Binns acknowledged his debt to the seminal work on Lincoln by John George Nicolay and John Hay, which had only recently arrived in Britain. 'Lincoln's speeches', Binns celebrated, 'are thus at last accessible to the general public on this side of the Atlantic'.[24] An accessible and independent symbol of a powerful nation, Lincoln became increasingly relevant and attractive to British intellectuals.

Subsequently, British persons of letters started to show particular interest in the president in their accounts of his life, as shown in Henry Bryan Binns's work. Not much is known about Binns (1873–1923), a Quaker, poet and moderate Edwardian social reformer; however, in his work Lincoln was for the first time consciously detached from the story of the Civil War and assumed an independent status in British writing.[25] Indeed, the British intellectual did not want to write about the war. 'Even an outline of the complex action of the Civil War', Binns wrote, opening his narrative, 'would only, as I think, have confused the picture of the man which I have tried to draw'.[26] For Binns, Lincoln's life was of independent value, and he used only two books that were not American biographies of Lincoln, and these were concerned with American and Illinois history and not with the Civil War.

An Edwardian social reformer, Binns portrayed Lincoln to be as socially conscious as he, himself, was. The American president, he argued, 'belonged to the same great school of Mill and Mazzini, and like theirs his vigorous individualism was balanced by the feeling for solidarity'.[27] Binns explicitly focused on Lincoln the self-made-man and advanced an image of the president as the patron of the worker. 'The life of the

workers', he noted, 'always remained his own life'.[28] Furthermore, in Binns's biography, Lincoln's social consciousness was rooted in religious beliefs. Again, like Binns, Lincoln, too, came near 'what may best be described as the Quaker position in religious matters'.[29] Finally, Binns's Lincoln was a nationalist. 'By temperament', Binns asserted, 'he was a constitutionalist. And this applied to his religious life'.[30] Binns's Lincoln was the embodiment of a pious nationalistic leader with strong social consciousness, who in some key aspects resembled Binns himself.

To portray Lincoln in that way, Binns drew upon two intertwined portrayals, which nonetheless reflected two distinct representations of Lincoln. One was the representation of Lincoln as an American social reformer, which became central in the United States during the Progressive Era.[31] Progressive ideas had been freely distributed within the Atlantic sphere at the time, and Binns was aware of this American view of Lincoln.[32] Thus, in the same vein, using slavery in 1860s America to criticize labor conditions in the Gilded Age United States, Binns noted that, 'where Cotton once was King now the Corporation rules; and the black slavery of the plantation has given partial place to the industrial white slavery of men, women and little children, both North and South'.[33]

Binns's was a selective reading of the Progressive representation of Lincoln's life. For one thing, the Progressive Lincoln was not the only available Lincoln in the Atlantic sphere. Rather than any special sensitivity for social justice, J. T. Morse, for example, who wrote a biography of Lincoln that Binns especially recommended, noted that Lincoln's 'chief trait all his life long was honesty'.[34] Although representing his life within a rags-to-riches narrative, Morse, as opposed to Binns, did not in any way refer to Lincoln as a worker patron, and he did not view slavery and emancipation through the prism of labor relations. Binns's independent representation of Lincoln was evident also in his particular use of the rags-to-riches narrative. Lincoln's story of rising from poverty to prominence – which Binns used in order to present the roots of Lincoln's social consciousness – was commonly used also to justify social Darwinism and the capitalist ideology of the Gilded Age, which Binns so vehemently scorned.[35] Binns further glossed over Lincoln's nationalistic and protective economic stances, which often differed sharply from those held by British radicals like Cobden and Bright and from the open-market ideology of the Manchester School.[36] Finally, on Lincoln's religiosity, Binns, a Quaker, ascribed to Lincoln beliefs that the historical evidence does not necessarily support. As Stewart Winger has shown, while religion had played a vital role in

shaping Lincoln's views and political life, he was not a Quaker, and his religiosity was firmly rooted in contemporary American spiritual developments.[37]

Side-by-side with the common American Progressive representation of Lincoln, Binns built upon British liberal representation of Lincoln as an ally of local radicals, liberals and nonconformists, doing so in order to tie Lincoln to British intellectual tradition more generally. For Binns, too, as for his predecessors, Lincoln, Bright and Cobden had shared a common world-view.[38] As Adam Smith has shown, a main theme in Binns's work was Lincoln's British pedigree and his close connection to British life, history and institutions.[39] Smith has compellingly inferred that in this, Binns's work was part of a broader British attempt to align the United States, evidently a rising power, to Britain by way of drawing parallels and ideological analogies.

Lincoln's legacy, however, posed some difficulties for such an endeavor, of which Binns was well aware. Binns knew that for Lincoln to symbolize an Anglo-American connection, the prevailing legacy of British antagonism towards the martyred President in the 1860s had to be bypassed. Drawing upon the legacy of the alliance between British radicals and Lincoln, Binns found in the workers of Lancashire of the 1860s the evidence that, regardless of other differences, Britain and the United States were ideologically deeply linked. During Lincoln's presidency, he wrote,

> the relations between the two countries were severely strained by the incidence of a war which proved disastrous to one of the principal branches of English industry. But it was at this period, when thousands of the men of Lancashire were thrown out of employment, and with their wives and children to the number of half a million were cast upon charity by the blockading of the [Confederate] cotton ports, that our northern artizans proclaimed their faith in Lincoln, and their recognition of the fact that it was their battle he was fighting across the sea.[40]

Binns did not refute the accepted view that the British elite supported the Confederacy, but he did highlight the strong support that Lincoln and the Union received in Britain. This was central to his argument for a broader and deeper connection between Lincoln and the British people. 'Essentially', he summarized, 'in temper and sentiment, [Lincoln] is unmistakably a Briton'.[41] In this way, Binns tried to represent Lincoln as an ally of all Britons, not merely radicals.

Binns's biography was a work of constant selection, translation and adaptation, put forth in order to appropriate Lincoln and associate him with the author's own views and country. Its significance lay in that it was a work of transition. It was the first British account of Lincoln as an independent icon and the first attempt to break the exclusive link between Lincoln and British radicals, workers and nonconformists. It showed that Lincoln had become an available independent icon whose life and legacy were multifaceted, flexible and attractive enough to detach themselves from the margins, moving more firmly into the mainstream of public consciousness.

Yet, ultimately, Binns's work sank into oblivion and held there since the mid-1910s.[42] After its publication in 1916, it was the biography written by Lord Charnwood (1864–1945) that came to be regarded as the first British account of Lincoln's life.[43] However, the replacement of Binns's Lincoln by that of Charnwood (an Oxford-educated Liberal member of the House of Lords) as the first and archetypical British view of the American president revealed much about the power of the latter, arguably more than it told about the irrelevance or weakness of the former. In fact, the transition from Binns's radical-nonconformist Lincoln to Charnwood's more elitist, even conservative, Lincoln was both arduous and, ultimately, incomplete. It required, on the one hand, overcoming the Civil War's heritage perpetuating the resentment of the British elite against Lincoln and the North, while on the other hand suppressing the radical-nonconformist heritage of Lincoln, already established on both sides of the Atlantic.

Reviewing Charnwood's 1916 biography of Lincoln, S. K. Ratcliffe, a British journalist and scholar, noted in the same year: 'Certain periods, certain commanding individuals ... have a more direct significance than others for the immediate present.... The words and policy of Abraham Lincoln have been more closely studied among us during the past two years than ever before'.[44] The Great War made Lincoln relevant and attractive to British intellectuals, and many turned to the life of the American war president, which, as Ratcliffe's words illustrated, was by then widely available to the British reader. Naturally, it was no longer the labor patron that Britons sought, but rather Lincoln the nationalistic war president and the symbol of a fighting liberal democracy.[45] Charnwood was well aware of this aspect of Lincoln's heritage in the United States when he set out to write his account of the president. Like all Lincoln representations, it was always there. When drawing upon Hay, for example, Charnwood could not have missed the argument underpinning the narrative that Lincoln's life in the

frontier lands west of the Appalachian Mountains had 'qualif[ied] him for the duties and responsibilities of leadership and government'.[46] When the First World War drew in the United States in 1917 and 1918, this representation of Lincoln largely replaced that of the Progressive period and ultimately came to dominate the American as well as the British spheres.[47] Charnwood could have interpreted Lincoln's life differently, as Binns had done. After all, both drew from the same American sources. However, in light of the Great War, a strong democratic war leader was far more relevant to him than was a patron of labor.

Charnwood's work was also a call for American sympathy at a time when this had become a priority. Throughout the Great War, numerous British intellectuals served as official and unofficial diplomats, trying to harness the now-major power to Britain's aid by showing that Britain fought for principles that were common to both nations, such as liberty, freedom and above all democracy.[48] Basil Williams's introductory note to Charnwood's biography was an out-and-out attempt to draw parallels between Lincoln's struggle for 'the noblest cause', and Britain's pass through the 'fiery ... trial for a cause we feel to be as noble'.[49] Such parallels, it was hoped, might alter the views of anti-interventionists in the United States, such as Senator Robert M. La Follette, Randolph Bourne, Jane Addams, and many others who saw Britain's war as anything but noble and pressed for maintaining American isolationism. The argument was often raised in the United States that an ally of Tsarist Russia, imperial Britain did not fight the war for democracy and self-determination as these were understood in America.

While the reasons were clear for Lincoln's appeal to Britons as a nationalistic war president and the advantages of using his legacy for public diplomacy in the United States were obvious, it also raised major difficulties on both fronts. The accepted wisdom in Britain as well as in the United States was that the British ruling elite had historically been antagonistic towards Lincoln because it saw in him the embodiment of the American values that they scorned. One of the most-resented values for which Lincoln stood was that of unrestricted mass democracy. Lincoln, in other words, was still commonly remembered as a symbol of Anglo-American ideological differences rather than affinities. Additionally, whereas Lincoln the war leader was indeed appealing to Britons during the Great War, this representation was but one of many of the president, and until the late 1910s it was not even the dominant one in Britain. Binns's radical-nonconformist was the familiar Lincoln in both the United States and Britain.

Therefore, in 1916, Lincoln's representation as a war leader and an Anglo-American symbol still had to be established before it could be appropriated and put to use.

Before appropriating Lincoln as a symbol for historical Anglo-American affinities, Charnwood had to negotiate with the Americans regarding Britain's right over their president's legacy. Whereas feelings such as those expressed by Bancroft in 1866 were somewhat assuaged by this time, the Civil War was still seen as a nadir of Anglo-American relations in both Britain and the United States. While Binns's endeavor to bypass this heritage was relatively simple to execute (because in both countries British workers' support of Lincoln was also remembered), Charnwood, representing the British upper and ruling class, had to address this problem again, and from a different angle.

Charnwood was severe in his outlook on the British elite in the 1860s. '[I]t is impossible', he noted, 'not to be ashamed of some of the forms in which English feeling showed itself and was well known in the North'.[50] In a sub-chapter dedicated entirely to this subject, Charnwood mentioned how Britons had tended to support the Confederacy over the Union and thus undermined Lincoln's war efforts. Charnwood did not blame the Americans, in the face of such antagonism, for having resented the British ever since. At a time of need – 'the embers of this resentment', he wrote, 'became dangerous to England in the autumn of 1914' – Charnwood made great efforts to make amends for this historical misconduct.[51] This was done in two separate but complementary ways. The first, building upon Binns's approach, was by emphasizing the steadfast support given to the Union by the working class. Confronting the accepted representation of the conflict, Charnwood insisted that yet another important angle to the British response to the war needed to be remembered: 'There is, however, quite another aspect of this question besides that which impressed so many American memories. When the largest manufacturing industry of England was brought near famine by the blockade [of the South], the voice of the stricken working population was loudly and persistently uttered on the side of the North'.[52] Yet Charnwood had to go further and explain the attitudes of the British elite, whom he represented and with whom he now hoped to associate Lincoln. Thus, he maintained adamantly that the local sour feelings had stemmed solely from British misunderstanding of Lincoln, and of the war as one purely for emancipation. 'When such men as these said such things', he explained, 'they were ... merely blind to the fact that a very great and plain issue of right and wrong

was really involved in the war'.[53] According to Charnwood, had they understood, Britons, elite and workers alike, would not have hesitated to support Lincoln and the Union in what, it was by now clear, was their noble war for the values of racial freedom and emancipation that Britons and Americans have historically shared.

That was Charnwood's greatest adaptation of the Civil War outside its historical and geographical contexts. True, Britons did not understand many of the issues involved in the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation perhaps above all. Furthermore, it is entirely plausible that had the British elite grasped these issues, its attitudes toward Lincoln and the Union might have been more positive. In fact, current research shows that Britons did not wholeheartedly resent the North and did not endorse the Confederacy, even despite frequent transatlantic misunderstandings.[54] However, none of this is to claim, as Charnwood did, that Britons and Americans shared a common set of values in the 1860s, and that these values were at the bottom of the Civil War. American democracy, for example, which took the central place in Lincoln's thought, was seen by British intellectuals and politicians, from across the political spectrum, as a dubious social and political system during and even after the war. By discussing the British reaction to the conflict only in the context of the slavery question, Charnwood turned the Civil War – as he turned also the Great War – into a simple conflict between right and wrong. He thus swept under the rug of the Emancipation Proclamation all the vast differences between the countries that had existed in the 1860s.

Having established that, Charnwood was free to draw parallels, through the Civil War and through Lincoln's life, between British and American views regarding what really mattered to him at the time: democratic outlooks. In Charnwood's narrative, the kind of American democracy that Britons had resented during the Civil War was the old American democracy of the pre-modern republic, not the modern American democracy that Lincoln represented. On the failures of the American political system in its early, pre-Lincoln days he noted:

> Only, Englishmen, recollecting the feebleness and corruption which marked their aristocratic government through a great part of the eighteenth century, must not enlarge their phylacteries at the expense of American democracy. And it is yet more important to remember that the fittest machinery for popular government, the machinery through which the real judgment of the people will prevail, can only by degrees and after many failures be devised.[55]

According to Charnwood, Britons and Americans shared a common history of democratic evolution from a corrupt social and political system to a noble one. Unsurprisingly, Charnwood saw in Lincoln the rise of the new American democracy – one to which the biographer could have related and associated British attitudes. 'I venerate Abraham Lincoln', he stressed, 'exactly because he is the true, honest type of American democracy'.[56] Charnwood thus projected the British views of American democracy in the 1910s onto the British attitudes to American democracy in the 1860s; and his narrative replaced the differing American and British attitudes to democracy in the 1860s with their closer outlooks on democracy in the 1910s.

Charnwood's endeavor was a complete success, and his target audience in the United States endorsed his views wholeheartedly. Under the title 'An Englishman's Lincoln', one Boston periodical noted, for example:

> One of the best traits of the English is their readiness to admit and correct past errors[;] ... the British aristocracy, which was strongly in sympathy with the Confederacy almost to the end of the American Civil War, has publicly and frequently repented of its blindness to the true issues involved in the struggle. (Abraham Lincoln by Lord Charnwood is an excellent example of the present British attitude to the Civil War period.).[57]

Charnwood's became the example of contemporary British attitudes towards the Civil War, and the Americans accepted his apologies on behalf of his country and class. In a meeting of the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1917, historian John Morse presented a paper about Charnwood and his work that went as far as placing some of the responsibility for the British misunderstanding of Lincoln and of the war on Lincoln himself and on the Americans. Lincoln's conduct, the paper read, 'was so hard to explain that no American could explain it'.[58]

With this hurdle behind him, Charnwood became a British diplomat of the first order. Invited to speak at the dedication of a Lincoln memorial in Springfield, Illinois, in 1918, Charnwood was applauded as the most fitting intellectual-diplomat in Britain. Under the title 'British Literary Envoy', one newspaper noted: '[A]n ardent admirer of Lincoln and a student of his life and times, the British peer is peculiarly fitted to promote mutual understanding and sympathy between his country and the United States'.[59] Charnwood's work so dramatically altered the way in which Americans understood the British response to the Civil War

that a British peer, a symbol of British aristocracy, became 'peculiarly fitted' to promote Anglo-American affinities through the representation of the conflict. In the South, too, where by this time Lincoln's legacy of reconciliation and democracy was largely accepted, it was noted that the visit of the 'biographer of Lincoln', as Charnwood was by then widely known, would surely contribute to the 'era of good feeling between the people of Great Britain and America'.[60] Charnwood's biography turned Lincoln and the Civil War from historical sources of bitter feelings and divide into symbols of a budding Anglo-American relationship.

While Charnwood sought to leap across the above historical hurdle, Lincoln's heritage posed an additional difficulty. During the Great War, Britons wanted a Lincoln who could matter to them at this specific point in time, namely one who had led a great democratic nation through a vigorous trial and one who had represented a shared Anglo-American ideological heritage. Charnwood had provided them with just that. However, Charnwood had done more than propel a much-needed representation of Lincoln; he had suppressed an unwanted one. Charnwood's work, stressed historian Basil Williams in his introduction to the biography, was 'the first considered attempt by an Englishman to give a picture of Lincoln, the great hero of America's struggle for the noblest cause'.[61] Although there is no evidence that either Williams or Charnwood had read Binns's work, no one in Britain or in the United States rushed to correct this error.[62] Binns's biography was irrelevant and perhaps even dangerous. It presented Lincoln as a social reformer deeply linked with the British working class rather than as an Anglo-American war-leader, and it did not do enough in order to downplay the schism in Britain over the Civil War and the transatlantic divide between Britain and the United States in the 1860s. A single British-written biography was easy to suppress in order to advance a more relevant and desired representation of Lincoln. However, when the submerged representation was imposed on Britain from across the Atlantic, it took a certain effort to repress it again, as was evident in the controversy in the 1910s over the Lincoln statues.

Founded respectively in 1909 and 1911 to celebrate the centennial of the Treaty of Ghent (1815), the American and British Peace Committees decided on a symbolic exchange of statues between Britain and the United States. After much deliberation, it was agreed that the British were to send Washington a statue of Queen Victoria, whereas the Americans would send to London Augustus Saint-Gaudens's statue of Abraham Lincoln, a replica of the one standing in Lincoln Park in Chicago. Shortly afterwards, however, the Great War forced the cessation of the

committees' work, which was resumed only in 1917. By then, however, it seemed that the American decision had been altered when instead of Saint-Gaudens's statue, the Committee announced that the Americans intended to send Britain George Grey Barnard's statue of Lincoln. The decision sparked a controversy on both sides of the Atlantic.[63]

Saint-Gaudens's and Barnard's statues represented two different Lincolns. Whereas the former represented Lincoln as a strong national leader – the savior of the Union, to use common terminology – the latter was a representation of Lincoln, the self-made man of the people.[64] While both representations depicted an American Lincoln, and both were accepted in the United States as legitimate depictions of the president, for many British intellectuals only the first was applicable to their country, and only this representation was thus desired. As military man and scholar, Frederick C. De Sumichrast, for example, wrote in *The Times*:

> It is claimed that it [Barnard's statue] represents 'the man of the people', and not the statesman. It is the statesman who saved the Union; the statesman who gave freedom to the slaves; the statesman who laid his life down for the country; the statesman who lives in history. And it is the great Lincoln that should be commemorated in this country.[65]

De Sumichrast did not argue that Barnard's Lincoln was not American (although he did contend that even Americans despised the statue). Britain, however, during the First World War demanded a nationalist war leader, not a humble rail splitter. Furthermore, not only was one Lincoln desired over the other, but British opposition to Lincoln the self-made man went so far as to openly scorn him. Already famous for his war-leader Lincoln, Charnwood noted in the House of Lords that 'it was very undesirable to set up a big public statue of a great man which to the ordinary eye had the appearance of a violent caricature'.[66]

True, as Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton have argued, 'The absence of sustained and bare-knuckled foreign critique of Lincoln [throughout history] is remarkable'.[67] Yet the British rejection of Barnard's statue showed that while a Lincoln was perhaps always appealing to Britons, some Lincolns were not. When they seemed to have stood against a British perception of Lincoln and in opposition to British needs and values, certain Lincolns were even explicitly treated with derision by the British. While the American objection to Barnard's statue might have explained some of the British negative reaction to it, it must be

emphasized at the same time that the statue represented an acceptable American view of Lincoln, and that it was an official American gift, endorsed by two ex-presidents, William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, as no less a Lincoln than that of Saint-Gaudens.[68] The British, however, would not compromise their own view of Lincoln and their own national identity, and they would not accept what seemed an irrelevant – even insulting – Lincoln (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).

Although the president and the historical episode that his image represented posed grave difficulties to British intellectuals, Lincoln was, in many respects, irreplaceable. As an American icon, Lincoln held the potential of reaching the American public as no British or other foreign war leader could. Giuseppe Garibaldi, for example, praised in Britain as a nationalistic democratic war hero in the 1860s, naturally had less appeal in the United States than Lincoln had;[69] and by the 1910s, the relevance, immediacy and importance of the United States had far exceeded that of Italy. George Washington, the only possible alternative as an American war president, and indeed potentially attractive for his British roots,

Figure 3.1 George Grey Barnard's statue of Abraham Lincoln in Lincoln Square, Manchester

Figure 3.2 Augustus Saint-Gaudens's statue of Abraham Lincoln in Parliament Square, London

Source: Pictures by the author.

was remembered also for fighting against the British, not less than for national self-determination and democracy. Furthermore, during this time the United States exported and projected Lincoln – if unintentionally – as the foremost American symbol. In 1926, David Knowles, a British Benedictine monk and historian, argued in his book about the Civil War that

> [t]he cult of Lincoln, indeed, in America, has occasionally been unintelligent and to some degree extravagant, as must always be the case with popular heroes, and it has led many outside America, who could see little greatness in the traits of his character which were emphasized by his admirers, to believe that his reputation was largely exaggerated. Within recent years, however, his personality and actions have been more carefully and critically examined, and his fame has not been diminished by the scrutiny. Lincoln was, of a certainty, a great statesman.[70]

Especially during the war's semi-centennial, between 1911 and 1915, one could not have missed that the Civil War was, so to speak, the United States and vice versa. The Americans signaled that Lincoln and the war were a way to approach them. Therefore, when Britons looked for an American symbol of wartime leadership that would provide them with an additional communication route with the Americans, Lincoln was the natural, best and in many aspects the sole option at that time.

Nonetheless, only in the spring of 1918 and following a request by the donors Eleanor and Charles Taft that Barnard's statue was to go to a British city after all, did a joint Anglo-American committee put forward a solution to the statues controversy. The United States, the committee suggested, would send both statues to Britain. In this way, after the Great War the controversy ultimately came to an amicable conclusion when the Saint-Gaudens statue was sent to London while Barnard's Lincoln was placed in Manchester.[71] This solution placed each representation of Lincoln where Britons thought it belonged. The *Manchester Guardian* enthusiastically reported that Manchester, chosen over Liverpool and Norwich, was about to receive the Lincoln, whom its people have endorsed since the days of the Civil War.[72] It was declared that Manchester appreciated Barnard's Lincoln even more in light of the controversy.[73] Before and after the unveiling ceremony in 1919, both the American Ambassador, John D. Davis, and Judge Alton B. Parker celebrated the historic alliance between the people of Lancashire and Abraham Lincoln and praised the great sacrifice of the textile workers during the war while supporting his policies. Davis emphasized the hundred years of overcoming Anglo-American differences peacefully and based on a common 'sentiment, interest, and purpose'.[74] With historical memory of unbroken support on their side, it was easy to harness Lincoln in Manchester to celebrate Anglo-American relations in 1919.

In London the following year Britons finally celebrated the Lincoln that they thought they deserved. On 20 July 1920, former Secretary of State Elihu Root officially offered the Saint-Gaudens Lincoln to the people of Britain.[75] Newspapers reported moving speeches by both Root and David Lloyd George, who accepted the gift on behalf of the British people. Root, like his countrymen in Manchester the previous year, emphasized the deep wellspring of the Anglo-American partnership, a source that had overcome minor differences between the countries.[76] Lloyd George, heartily agreeing on this point, stressed the co-ownership that both nations had over Lincoln. 'I am not sure', the prime minister

stressed, 'that you in America realize the extent to which he is also our pride'.[77] In the zenith of Anglo-American affinities in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, it was finally established that for Britain it was Lincoln the national democratic war leader who was most suitable. The man of the people representation was confined to the Manchester area, where it was celebrated as a local legacy. By this time it was further established that Lincoln symbolized an Anglo-American heritage of fighting for freedom, and that during the Civil War, had Britons seen that these were Lincoln's goals, all antagonism towards him would have vanished. After all, it was now accepted that on all other matters – especially on the moral superiority of democracy – the British and Americans had always been in firm fundamental agreement.

The British representations of Lincoln reflected and shaped the intellectual atmosphere within which the historiography of the British reaction to the Civil War emerged. In 1925, American historian Ephraim Douglass Adams published his *Great Britain and the American Civil War*. Adams's seminal work has rightly been the starting point of any academic study and historiographic survey on the subject since.[78] Adams is known among academics for cementing the bi-polar class interpretation of the British reaction to the Civil War, according to which the British upper class supported the Confederacy while the working class and radicals endorsed the Union. However, much more important here was Adams's conciliatory tone toward the alleged supporters of the Confederacy from across the ocean. Examining the hostile British response to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Adams asserted:

> To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matter for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at once convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it be remembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted ... with doubt extending even to bitter opposition and that British governmental and public opinion had long dreaded a servile insurrection – even of late taking its cue from Seward's own prophecies – the cool reception given by the Government, the vehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem so surprising.[79]

According to Adams, there were no real bitter feelings or deep differences between the British elite and Lincoln's North, just mutual and superficial misunderstandings. Thus, in the mid-1920s Adams could have summed up thusly: 'For nearly half a century after the American Civil War the natural sentiments of friendship, based upon ties of blood

and a common heritage of literature and history and law, were distorted by bitter and exaggerated memories'.[80] Half a century of the Civil War's memory being a source of division between the British elite and the Union was over. Instead, the Civil War and Lincoln came to forge a unique historical link between the countries. And the academic debate was officially launched.

Between 1919 and the early 1920s Lincoln had been broadly endorsed in Britain as a war president as well as a symbol of Anglo-American affinities and common values such as democracy and national freedom. As Adam Smith has shown, during the Second World War these aspects of Lincoln's heritage were reiterated in both the United States and Britain.[81] It was in this spirit that, upon receiving two pictures of Lincoln from American officials in 1940, A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, noted: 'No gift from you could have been more happily chosen, expressing as it does your sympathy in the struggle for the preservation of human liberty, the cause to which Abraham Lincoln devoted his life'.[82] These symbolic exchanges continued throughout the Second World War and reaffirmed the abovementioned representation of Lincoln. However, while in the 1940s Lincoln regained his place in British thought as a democratic war president and emblem of Anglo-American values, this position had not been awarded without struggle during the late 1920s and 1930s.

For one thing, during the mid and late interwar period, the marginalized radical-liberal-nonconformist representation of Lincoln was still being commemorated in Britain and had even regained some of its prominence. One such example was Henry Withers's 1927 biography of Lincoln, written for the Religious Tract Society, a Protestant evangelical organization that published essays mainly for the British working and middle class.[83] Withers's biography thus emphasized Lincoln's religious zeal as the source of his belief in freedom. 'The basis of Lincoln's power and influence', he wrote, 'was undoubtedly a firm belief that the will of God prevails and that without Him all human reliance is vain'.[84] That same year Henry Binns's biography of Lincoln saw its second edition and the radical-liberal-nonconformist heritage of Lincoln raised its head.

Other than illustrating the still prevailing relevance of the above representation of Lincoln in Britain, the publication and reception of Withers's and Binns's works showed what by 1927 had become less important to stress through Lincoln's image. As opposed to the early interwar period, Lincoln and the Civil War served far less to celebrate Anglo-American relations. While broadly covering the subject of

Lincoln's religion as put forward by Binns, the *Manchester Guardian*, for example, omitted any reference to Lincoln's British pedigree or to his alleged Britishness, which were central to the narrative.[85] Anglo-American relations were now sailing on somewhat turbulent waters in light of American isolationism and friction over issues of sea power and war debts.[86] In addition, the image of the Great War as a noble Anglo-American war was also fractured. A poll from 1939 indicated that 40 percent of Americans thought that the United States was a victim of British propaganda when it entered the war.[87] The relative cooling in the relations between the countries and the lessening presence of American power in Britain meant that Lincoln's post-Great War representation as an Anglo-American war president had lost some ground, allowing other Lincolns to emerge in Britain.

More important still was the new prominent position of the Great War in British memory, which altered dramatically the British interpretation of the Civil War and of the legacy of Lincoln, as was evident in the quintessential British biography of the period. In 1935, Denis Brogan (1900–1974), an eminent Scottish historian whose works resonated loudly on both sides of the Atlantic, published his account of Lincoln's life.[88] Whereas Brogan's work reflected the author's admiration for Lincoln, it was a severely critical account of the Civil War. Rather than a moral war and heroic epoch in America's history, Brogan saw the Civil War, in light of his view of the Great War, as a horrible tragedy. The carnage in America in the 1860s was as appalling to him as that in France in the 1910s; the sights of the Somme as horrible as those of Fredericksburg: 'Burnside sent forward wave after wave of troops, whose astonishing gallantry ... won the admiration of their foes, who had the simple task of shooting them down. Like 1st July 1916, 13th December 1862, showed what new troops can be trained to endure'.[89] Similarly, while in other places McClellan was often depicted as a timid and hesitant general, Brogan found 'it easier to sympathise with him now than it was before 1914'.[90] On the background of the dreadful Civil War, Brogan presented Lincoln as an admirable peace advocate who fought only because there seemed to have been no other choice, against his will and hopes. On 4 March 1861, Brogan noted, 'there was still hope of peace and, perhaps, of union'.[91] He then quoted from Lincoln's first inaugural address to show the president's last appeal for peace.

Brogan's account of Lincoln was a typical contemporary anti-war manifesto. Pacifist movements, such as the Women's Co-operative Guild, represented the Great War no longer as a patriotic and heroic war,

but as a cruel and futile experience. Moreover, the prevailing memory of the First World War perpetuated the notion that the horrors of that war could have been avoided had there only been strong peace-seeking statesmen in Europe in 1914.[92] By the mid-1930s, the zenith of pacifist and anti-militant initiatives, Britain did not celebrate the Great War or any other war, including the American Civil War.[93] As the Civil War was caught in the current of lost-generation literature in Britain, Lincoln became, for Brogan, the foremost example of a national leader who hoped for peace when the world around him sought war.

To portray Lincoln as such, Brogan drew selectively from the existing Civil War representations crossing the Atlantic. Brogan especially recommended his reader to consult James Truslow Adams's *America's Tragedy* (1934), a Lost Cause narrative of the Civil War, which brought into full color the horrors of the conflict and the devastation of the South.[94] More generally, as Kenneth Stampp noted, the interwar period was a time when Southern historians such as Ulrich Phillips, Charles Ramsdell and Frank Owsley published some of the key works stressing that the Civil War was a repressible conflict, one that could had been avoided were it not for the work of radicals and warmongers.[95] Brogan could have chosen otherwise. A competing narrative that highlighted the inevitability of the war – associated at this time primarily with Charles and Mary Beard – was even more accepted and Brogan was surely familiar with it.[96] Furthermore, Brogan drew selectively and autonomously even from within the Lost Cause narrative he had adopted, as was evident in his portrayal of Lincoln as an appeaser. By contrast, ever since the war Lost Cause narratives have often represented Lincoln as an aggressor who led the violent North in a brutal war on the peace-loving South.[97] In Brogan's study, any criticism of Lincoln was omitted. After all, he wanted to portray a moderate appeaser who had hoped to avoid war.

The Second World War and its memory would eradicate this representation of Lincoln in Britain. In 1974, for example, Hugh Brogan wrote in the introduction to his father's biography that 'no survivor of the appeasement period could doubt that it is better at times to fight than to submit'.[98] In 1962, Brogan senior himself noted reflectively that '[in] the years after the massacre of the Western Front McClellan's caution seemed more sagacious than timid. I shared this view when I wrote. I do not hold it now'.[99] The prism of the 'guilty men', cementing in British memory the notion that Chamberlain and the appeasers of the 1930s should have aggressively confronted Hitler in time while preparing Britain for war, brought back ideas of nationalism and strong war leadership.[100]

These facets were to remain as main aspects of Lincoln's representations within British intellectual circles.

What should be surprising, however, was not that British intellectuals had again changed their understanding of Lincoln, but rather that he interested them at all. As opposed to the Great War, the Second World War provided Britons with an enduring and heroic war legacy of their own.[101] For one thing, the Second World War entered collective memory as the first truly ideological and morally justified war.[102] Additionally, Winston Churchill emerged from the conflict as a determined and admired national war leader and largely filled the void created by the memory of the poor leadership of the Great War and of the submissiveness of the British leadership in the late 1930s.[103] Furthermore, the Second World War could have replaced the Civil War as a symbol of Anglo-American alliance much more easily and with far less contention. That is, in that war, and unlike during the Civil War, Britain and the United States fought shoulder to shoulder for democracy and freedom from tyranny. Additionally, as David Reynolds has shown, from the Second World War, the 'special relationship' emerged as a culturally and politically constructed diplomatic tool that was utilized to stress the deep historical connections between the peoples.[104] The profound and widespread mourning of Roosevelt in Britain in 1945 and the reciprocal canonization of Churchill in the United States after his death in 1965 were evidence that Anglo-American relations could be celebrated much more easily through the heritage of their relations than through the heritage of the relations between Lincoln and Palmerston.[105]

Yet Britain's leading scholars and intellectuals kept returning to Lincoln and to the American Civil War. Jack Pole wrote three essays on Lincoln between 1959 and 1966; Churchill's account of the Civil War saw light in 1961; in 1962 Brogan's study of Lincoln was published in a second edition and with a new introduction by the author; and Lord Longford published a biography of the president in 1974, the same year that Brogan's biography saw its third edition. In what way, then, were Churchill and the Second World War unable to supplant Lincoln and the Civil War? In what way was the previous – turbulent – special relationship more interesting or useful than the new one?

For one thing, Lincoln, and the Civil War more broadly, seemed to British scholars to symbolize and explain the rise to prominence of the United States. This, in turn, made understanding them crucial for understanding the nature of a world power that had become immensely relevant to Britain. In his inaugural lecture at University College London (UCL) in 1955, the British historian specializing in the United States,

H. C. Allen, assessed the place, role and power of the United States in the world since the Second World War and noted:

> Whether as individuals we welcome this situation, or whether we deplore it, it is certainly vital that we recognize its existence. It is no more than rudimentary common-sense to do our utmost to understand – if only to help us influence – this powerful nation, upon whose action the destiny of the whole of mankind, and of ourselves above all people, depends, as it has depended perhaps upon no nation in recorded history. We must study the history of the United States: we dare do no other.[106]

As Michael Heale has argued, after the Second World War and in light of growing American power, British academics turned to study American history because they came to realize America's profound influence on British and world affairs.[107] Allen's lecture left no doubt that he was among them. Within the study of American history, Allen thought, the Civil War was particularly important since it was a key that was to unlock the origins of his present-day United States. In 1965 he explicitly argued that this was especially the 'war that made America great' because it modernized, industrialized and unified the United States.[108] His 1969 account of the British reaction to the Civil War was, *inter alia*, part of his endeavor to understand Britain's connection to the founding moment of the modern United States.[109]

The presence of Lincoln in British thought at the time was also a result of the American export of his image for purposes of public diplomacy. The mode of thought prevalent in the United States Information Agency (USIA), the foremost exponent of American public diplomacy at the time, was clear: cultural exchanges advance diplomatic relations and American foreign policy.[110] American officials believed that exporting a positive image of the United States through its history and culture would strengthen the American grip in the world at a time when it competed with the Soviet Union for spheres of influence. In Britain, American history and culture were, in a sense, injected into intellectual circles by the American agencies more than into any other sector of society. Thus, for example, the Americans encouraged the establishment of programs of American history in British universities. In a memorandum from March 1959, embodying this trend, Donald Elgar of the International Educational Exchange Service (IES) recommended initiating a 'lectureship at King's College London in American studies', following the model at Leeds.[111] Additionally, due to financial strains, the American agencies

focused specifically on the British educated elite. On 6 March 1959, Carl Bode, American cultural attaché in London, wrote to Argus J. Tresidder, cultural affairs planning officer of the USIA, advising that in light of budget problems 'we are probably better advised to concentrate on high culture rather than the broader, more general kind'.[112]

Of special import in this context is the fact that the Americans were at this time particularly concerned about racial tensions at home and about the way in which these undermined the positive image of the United States abroad. A USIA report from the mid-1960s revealed that issues of domestic race relations were the most influential factor in shaping the Western Europe's educated elite's image of the United States.[113] With this background, Lincoln was recruited to tackle the danger posed by racial tensions at home to the reputation of America abroad. As Jay Sexton has shown, the USIA utilized Lincoln to project a positive image of the United States as a free, liberal and egalitarian society during the Cold War and especially during the sesquicentennial celebrations of Lincoln's birth in 1959.[114] To make the image of Lincoln easier to adopt, the USIA often adjusted his representation according to the local culture to which it was exported. The British Lincoln was thus to be associated with the characteristics of local heroes such as William Pitt the Younger, Robert Peel and William Gladstone.[115] Through such representations of Lincoln the American agencies sought to project the everlasting American commitment to Lincoln's legacy of unity, freedom and equality.

However, as Jack Pole's accounts of Lincoln showed, rather than reflecting positively on the contemporary United States, by the late 1950s Britons turned to the legacy of the 16th president to highlight the lasting problematic reality of post-war America. This was especially true on issues of race relations across the ocean. Pole (1922–2010), then a lecturer in American history at UCL and reader in American history at Cambridge, wrote three essays on Lincoln between 1959 and 1964. Compared with his British predecessors, Pole's greatest innovation in his account of Lincoln was most visible in his analysis of the president's plans for Reconstruction. During the last phases of the war, Pole stressed, Lincoln aligned his policies more closely with the radicals in the Republican Party. From there Pole inferred that, had Lincoln not been assassinated, 'It is ... by no means fanciful to believe that something closely resembling radical Reconstruction would have been enacted under presidential leadership'.[116] For Pole, Lincoln was, by the end of the war, a genuine freedom fighter, not only a great nationalist. Had he lived, a radical Reconstruction that would have guaranteed greater

racial equality in America would have been conducted under executive authority. By contrast, all previous British biographers of Lincoln – from Binns to Charnwood to Brogan – admired Lincoln for his tone of appeasement towards the South and for his moderate plans for Reconstruction. Under this view, radical Reconstruction was to break away from Lincoln's legacy. As Binns bluntly wrote: 'After Lincoln's death his policy was wrecked by the temper both of his successor and of the Northern and Southern parties'.[117]

Pole's innovation was even greater in that he analyzed Lincoln's views on slavery and freedom in racial and political terms and thus kept it in its historical context. For Binns, racial freedom was translated into freedom of labor. To him slavery was but a previous manifestation of distorted labor relations, not a result of racist predisposition: '[B]lack slavery of the plantation has given partial place to the industrial white slavery'.[118] During the interwar period, the British used the idea of freedom in the context of Lincoln's life in order to reiterate the need for national freedom and national unity. John Drinkwater, for example, a British playwright famous for his 1918 play on Lincoln's life, thought that freedom derived its very existence from the reality, unity and power of the nation. Both Britain and the United States, he wrote in an essay about Lincoln in 1920, had roots in the 'mystical idea of coexistence' of individual freedom and national unity.[119] Conversely, for Pole, freedom in the context of Lincoln's life denoted racial and political freedom. In his eyes, Reconstruction should have been fiercer and it should have advanced real racial equality rather than be the prologue for the reign of 'Jim Crow'.

Pole's analysis reflected a broader shift in the historiography of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Influenced by civil-rights activists and contemporary developments in American society as well as contributing to their growth, historians came to see Reconstruction as a failure – not, however, because it was a too-radical endeavor taken against the South. Rather, Reconstruction was now seen as a failure because it was not radical enough and stopped short of bringing true change to the social and political status of the freed slaves and even further perpetuated past prejudice and racism.[120] These developments in American academia and society echoed loudly in Britain when confronted with issues of a similar nature.[121] When in the 1950s and 1960s concerns about race relations and civil rights came to the fore in Britain in light of growing immigration from the Commonwealth, Britons turned to the United States for lessons. The Race Relations Act of 1965 and especially those of 1968 and 1976 were largely an outcome of British perspectives of

events in America during that time.[122] Pole, himself, was in contact with human-rights activists in the United States in the 1950s, shortly before he became involved in drafting a scheme for a British anti-discrimination law.

It is hard to determine the degree to which social and political developments in the civil-rights era in the United States influenced Pole's works on Lincoln. He was a serious student of American history well before he published these works, and his interest in the conflict was clearly also motivated by pure intellectualism. Nevertheless, the fact that contemporary British scholars seemed to have found Lincoln's life and the Civil War interesting for their lessons about racism and race relations, especially in the United States, is beyond doubt. When Hugh Brogan listed the sources that influenced him while studying Lincoln and the war, the most important of these was 'the vast, confused, incomplete movement of the Black Revolution in the United States'.[123] 'My own view', Brogan stressed, 'is more or less neo-Abolitionist'.[124] Mary Ellison, too, who in 1972 had written an influential study on the British response to the Civil War, turned to the study of the war as a graduate student following her earlier, undergraduate, interest.[125] She had become interested in the negative impact of racism and wanted to focus on race in the United States. In this, Ellison was encouraged by her doctoral supervisor in UCL, H. C. Allen, who seemed to have held a similar outlook about the Gordian Knot connecting the Civil War and the history of race relations in the United States.[126]

Considering the motivation behind the USIA's export of Lincoln, the British studies of the president and of the war suggested that the American public diplomacy endeavor in the late 1950s and 1960s backfired. Pole, as did other British scholars, reviewed the Civil War through Lincoln's life autonomously and reached the conclusion that Reconstruction had ultimately betrayed the president's legacy of racial equality in America. Admiring Lincoln, Pole was critical of the post-Civil War United States. The British public, and certainly academics, were aware of events and developments in the United States, and they saw well beyond what the American government agencies wished them to see. A USIA report, which examined coverage of the riots in Alabama in 1963 in the *Manchester Guardian* and *Sunday Telegraph*, concluded that 'West European press treatment of the Birmingham situation continues to show remarkable sophistication and unusual understanding of the conflicting drives behind the racial struggle and the immense intricacy of the problem'.[127] While the USIA asked the British to focus on Lincoln, British scholars could, and did, put his life story in the broader context

of the Civil War and of American history and thereby depicted a picture of the United States different from the one projected from across the ocean.

Although British intellectuals also turned to the Civil War in order to understand the United States, they no longer used the war for cultural public diplomacy. As noted, the notion of the special relationship – of which Allen, for example, was an utmost advocate – largely replaced the Civil War in British eyes as an apt means to advance Anglo-American affinities, shared values and historical links.[128] Sustaining its importance as a key to understanding the origins of the United States, the Civil War was no longer an historical event that could, from the perspective of British intellectuals, define or influence contemporary Anglo-American relations.

As an academic subject that had no impact on contemporary Anglo-American affairs, the Civil War's complex nature could now be approached in a way that undermined the work of Charnwood and his contemporaries. In the late 1950s, British labor historian Royden Harrison challenged the prevailing wisdom that British workers had supported the Union during the Civil War.[129] In 1972, Mary Ellison, too, challenged the thesis that the workers of Lancashire had steadfastly supported the Union.[130] While Charnwood had sought to downplay the Anglo-American tensions of the 1860s by showing that the British largely supported – or ought to have supported – the Union and the United States, Harrison and Ellison showed that even among the workers – Charnwood's fig leaf – there existed strong support for the Confederacy. However, unlike Charnwood, contemporary scholars did not seek to make the war a symbol of Anglo-American affinities or endeavor to use it in order to advance British goals in the United States. They were thus free to revise previous assumptions in this field.

No longer a tool in the service of British public diplomacy, the Civil War was still central to understanding the birth and rise of the modern United States and the British relationship to it. In addition, the war and President Lincoln could well be used to reflect upon issues of civil rights and race relations – in Britain, but especially in the United States. In these, Churchill and the Second World War could not, and indeed did not, take the place of Abraham Lincoln and the American Civil War in British thought.

By the mid-1920s Lincoln had become an admired figure across the Atlantic, but British intellectuals resorted to him for diverse and at times opposing reasons. For some he was a democratic radical, for others he was a moderate reformer, for others still he was a constitutionalist

conservative. For some he was a peace advocate and for others a determined war leader; some regarded him as a nationalist, others as a civil-rights fighter. That some of these representations could not always be accommodated together became clear when British accounts of Lincoln seemed to undermine each other. In his depiction of Lincoln as a peace advocate, Denis Brogan challenged Charnwood's war president; Charnwood's war president replaced Binns's labor patron; and Pole's abolitionist Lincoln was in tension with Brogan's moderate sectional appeaser.

However, while British intellectuals did not agree on Lincoln's image and heritage, they all thought that relevant lessons about contemporary British concerns – pertaining to democratic changes, social reforms, wartime leadership and civil rights – could be drawn from the historical legacy of the American president. British intellectuals mastered Lincoln's history to a degree that enabled them to draw lessons and fashion his image according to their own understandings and needs. Charnwood's narrative of Lincoln, for example, was clearly a British representation of Lincoln, created for British purposes. His representation of Lincoln in a way that the American public found admirable (even more so than contemporary American representations) demonstrated Charnwood's ability to control and manipulate Lincoln's image. At times, the British ability to fashion a useful image of Lincoln was manifested in their rejection of one or more of the president's common contemporary representations. That was the case when Britons refused to accept George Grey Barnard's statue or in their critical view of the American representation of Lincoln as a symbol of racial equality and liberal progress in the United States.

Indeed, one of the main concerns for twentieth-century British intellectuals was the United States, itself: its place and role in the world and its impact on British life. Accordingly, intellectuals turned to Lincoln in order to comment on, understand, explain and even influence the United States or Anglo-American relations. Lord Charnwood used Lincoln and the Civil War to advance warmer Anglo-American connections; Henry Binns criticized the Gilded Age United States through Lincoln's life; H. C. Allen studied the war in order to better understand the American rise to world power; and Jack Pole and Mary Ellison looked into the war and Lincoln's life for the roots of post-Civil War race relations in the United States.

The British appropriation and rejection of certain representations of Lincoln shed light on what made the 16th American president unique in British thought. For one thing, Lincoln was a multifaceted romantic

hero and a political genius whose life generated an array of legacies. He was the war leader Charnwood saw as much as he was the freedom fighter Pole saw. He was an advocate of democracy as radicals saw him, and a constitutionalist as conservatives saw him. Moreover, throughout his presidency, Lincoln was confronted with numerous challenges that twentieth-century British intellectuals came to see as similar to the challenges they themselves faced. Lincoln, too, had to decide on issues of institutional democratic reforms, changes in labor relations, the call to arms and ethnic rights.

At the same time, Lincoln was also an American symbol. In the aftermath of the Great War, as Adam Smith has noted, George Bernard Shaw saw 'a cult of Lincoln in England'.[131] That local 'cult of Lincoln' was closely related to what David Knowles saw at about the same time as the 'the cult of Lincoln ... in America'.[132] The rise of Lincoln to prominence in American culture made him a prism through which to observe and communicate with the United States. He was the American president who had stood at the head of the nation when it had been reborn, and by the early twentieth century, he had become the personification of the modern United States. That Lincoln became an agreed-upon American symbol the British could manipulate and use was central to the appeal Lincoln held.

Thus, since 1920 a statue of Lincoln has been standing in Parliament Square in London, a sole foreigner among statues of British historical icons. Even among intellectuals, few today know the story of the statue and few could tell in detail the story of Lincoln's life, or even just of his presidency. However, if asked, any educated person would surely mention that the man was an American president who freed the slaves in the United States and led his country through its greatest trial in the Civil War. Many other aspects of his life and policies remain debatable at best, while others remain obscure to most. This only adds to the romantic aura and malleable legacy of Lincoln. That Lincoln was a romantic American hero, and that he led the United States through its rebirth into modernity and freedom, would always give his image a unique and irreplaceable position in British thought.

4
The American Civil War in British Cinemas

The British public had little contact with the legacy of the Civil War between the war's end and the first decades of the twentieth century. After the guns fell silent in America, Britain ceased to serve as a battleground for American propaganda, and the plethora of information that had flooded the British public sphere during the war turned into a drizzle of popular representations of the conflict. The British public largely lost sight of the war. In 1915 that changed. Half a century after Appomattox, D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* cemented the Civil War in British popular culture, where it stayed for the decades to come.

Resonating loudly in Britain, much of the film's power and long lasting impact across the Atlantic stemmed from the place and circumstances of its own birth. Thomas Dixon Jr, was a fervent Lost Cause soldier in the battle over the Civil War's memory in the United States around the turn of the century. In 1905, Dixon – a North Carolinian intellectual – wrote *The Clansman*, the novel upon which *The Birth of a Nation* was primarily to be based, to counter Harriet Beecher Stowe's narrative in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.[1] The latter, Dixon believed, had challenged the Southern narrative that argued that slavery was a benign institution from which both slaves and slave owners had benefited. In its stead, Dixon insisted that through the agency of popular culture, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had rooted in the United States a distorted representation of a decadent South. In response, Dixon's work glorified the South and its cause in the Civil War, especially through a romanticized portrayal of the Ku Klux Klan as the savior of the Southern way of life during Reconstruction. In 1914, Griffith – son of a Confederate soldier and likewise a Southern exponent – bought the rights to Dixon's work and launched the production of *The Birth of a Nation*.

The Birth of a Nation was a grandiose film on every level and a milestone in cinematic history.[2] The final version that was released in the United States was 12,000 feet long and over three hours in duration. Its production, too, was massive, and involved numerous actors, musicians, filmmakers and supporting personnel together with a vast amount of military equipment, specially designed costumes and specifically designated sets.[3] The film featured enormous battle scenes on a scale never seen before, alongside stretching its coverage to include not only the battles, higher policies and ramifications but also the impact of the war on the home front. Ultimately, *The Birth of a Nation* covered a historical period of almost twenty years.[4]

In content, Griffith's film followed Dixon's narrative and even more so the latter's sentiments and was a combative defense of the South's identity and integrity. It was, according to John Hope Franklin, out-and-out Southern propaganda.[5] *The Birth of a Nation* advanced the idea that disloyal African Americans and radical Northerners were to blame for the war that had destroyed the South – an idyllic, moral and peaceful society of slaves and slave owners – and resulted in the deaths of over 600,000 Americans. Presenting the tragic war at length, much of the film's weight was in its account of the war's aftermath. Reconstruction was presented as a conspiracy of radical Republicans and freed slaves to financially, politically, socially and morally rob the devastated South. Facing the further devastation and exploitation of their region, according to the film, white Southerners formed the Ku Klux Klan to redeem the South.

And yet *The Birth of a Nation* was not about Southern supremacy. Although it was an outright defense of the South, and despite its attack on the North's aggression, the film conveyed that the South sought peace and intersectional white brotherhood. '*Liberty and union*', read the film's final slide, 'one and inseparable, *now and forever*!'[6] The film was not about the South being morally or otherwise better than the North, but rather about the South being as good as the North. According to the narrative, in the horrendous war the South showed that it was no less patriotic than the North and no less brave and moral. And no less than the North, the South wanted peace and American unity. In this, *The Birth of a Nation* was part of the South's application to re-enter the Union and become, again, part of the American heritage of liberty, unity and democracy from which it had been expelled after the Civil War by, *inter alia*, the war narrative of the North.[7] The latter emphasized that the South sought to break up the Union and brought war upon the United States for the notorious cause of maintaining the institution of slavery.

The Birth of a Nation argued that the South asked none of these, but rather that it was forced to fight for its right to preserve its way of life in the Union.

In order to communicate this message, the South in Griffith's film fought for its identity and integrity in national terms and within a national discourse. In particular, it emphasized that the South wanted liberty and unity, as shown above. These, in turn, were historically seen in the United States as neither Northern nor Southern, but as American ideals. By showing that the South had wanted liberty, unity and peace –all-American values agreeable to both North and South – *The Birth of a Nation* represented it as the embodiment of the American identity. Applying to re-enter the national heritage, the South marked African Americans as truly un-American in its stead. 'The bringing of the African to America', read the film's second slide, 'planted the first seed of disunion'. Coming from a place that was not America, African Americans brought to the United States the un-American seed of war and disunion.

The film's reception in the United States showed that the South's application was successful. Racist and biased, the significance of the film lay in its loyal reflection of the context within which it was created. As David Blight has shown, by the war's semi-centennial (1911–1915), the cultural quarrel over the conflict's memory had come to an alleged end with sectional reconciliation emerging as the war's dominant representation and legacy.[8] *The Birth of a Nation* reflected and propelled this spirit.[9] Accordingly, and protests against it notwithstanding, the film gained wide national endorsement.[10] Testifying to its intersectional appeal was the fact that it was extremely well received in the white North – arguably even more so than in the South.[11] Moreover, as shown in the previous chapter, during the Civil War's semi-centennial the historical conflict became an official American symbol, a motion to which *The Birth of a Nation* greatly contributed when it promoted a consensual representation of the war and became one of its most recognized manifestations.[12] Thus in 1915 *The Birth of a Nation* became the official representation of the Civil War in popular culture exactly as the war was being unanimously accepted as the date of birth of the modern, unified United States. It is under these conditions that the film reached Britain.

Arriving in Britain on 27 September 1915, *The Birth of a Nation* instantly entered the acceptable mainstream. If the film generated any objection at all, it was marginal.[13] Judging by the reviews, the British found the film and the war attractive – in the first place as an entertaining event

that in its scale had no precedent. 'Eighteen Thousand Actors In A Mighty Film Spectacle', noted one review;[14] the film features 'extraordinary war scenes, which are presented on a scale never before attempted', asserted another;[15] 'the most expensive photo-play ever yet produced [with] no fewer than 18,000 performers and 3,000 horses being used in the production', wrote a third.[16] The British were thrilled by *The Birth of a Nation* because Griffith's film set new standards for popular entertainment and 'carries forward the moving pictures art not inches but yards, or even miles'. Subsequently, through the most spectacular film of the era, the Civil War was presented and viewed accordingly, as an incomparable spectacle.

On another, related, level, Britons were excited to have an overview of the famous American war about which they in fact knew very little. The film, noted the *Bioscope*, 'does more ... than present us with a series of mighty historical events. It links those events together and indicates their place as part of one great purpose'.[17] Since the days of the war, the Americans had presented the British public with fragmented information about and partial images of what was often seen as disconnected wartime events. In 1915, Griffith's film gathered all these events and projected a single account on a single canvas. As such, the film was seen as a valid authoritative lesson in American history. None other than the American president and former president of Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson, himself, was known for having approved of the narrative, and several slides in the film featured excerpts from his *History of the American People* (1901). Thus the *Athenaeum* stressed that the film helped in 'correcting what may be a widely held false idea of the causes which led to the American Civil War'; the *Picturegoer* stated: 'It gives a lucid and vivid explanation and description of the Civil War'; and the *Review of Reviewers* saw it 'as an absorbing lesson in history ... [with] a profound educational value'. 'Few Englishmen', this film critic added, 'have more than a nodding acquaintance with the great war of North and South; fewer still know anything of the ghastly time of "Reconstruction"'.[18]

As the above reviews suggested, the British found the film and the Civil War attractive also because they now saw the conflict as a holistic event with 'one great purpose' that had an 'educational value' for them. As argued earlier, *The Birth of a Nation* conveyed notions of unity, gallantry, selflessness, sacrifice for a higher cause, white supremacy and nationalism, which in the context of the historical and dramatic plot were associated with the American South. During the Great War the British found these values familiar and relevant, and they translated

them according to their domestic experiences.[19] As one critic bluntly wrote:

> Just as the unbridled passions of the blacks threatened to engulf the New World in its terrible flood of lust and horror, so the whole civilization, and especially Europe, is now faced with an even greater horror through the mechanisation of the Modern Huns. Let all learn from this production the lessons of fortitude, courage, and tenacity.[20]

Here black–white relations in the United States – Dixon's and Griffith's original concern – were translated to denote white–white British–German relations. Color was translated to nationality and ethnicity. To appropriate the values that were embedded in the Civil War, as these were presented to them in *The Birth of a Nation*, the British detached these values from their historical and national contexts and ascribed to them universal and a-historical validity. A critic for the *Bioscope* opened his article on the film with this assertion:

> In the first place, it may be as well to point out that this picture is not a work of merely local interest.... Its value as a wonderfully accurate reconstruction of a definite historical episode is so far transcended by its power and fascination as a mighty epic dealing with abstract human forces that its appeal will not be confined to Americans.[21]

Of the universal values that were embedded in the war with which this reviewer could have related were 'sacrifices and sufferings'. Seeing themselves as undergoing similar national labor pains, and required bravery, patriotism and unity similar to that presented in Griffith's film, the British public turned the Civil War into a familiar experience and saw in *The Birth of a Nation* its visual account.

While the British found that *The Birth of a Nation* presented them with experiences that they could turn relevant and familiar, a final source of the film's appeal was that it was a foreign film, which told a story of a foreign war and of foreign people. More specifically, the film and the war were appealing because they were from and about the United States. 'We are introduced', noted one laudatory review, 'to every conceivable sphere of life and to every possible class and type of American men and women'.[22] Another critic noted that the film was 'a work of great fascination, for it depicts ... the development of the United States from the days of slavery and the great war of the North v. South'.[23] In 1915 few Britons were yet to have experienced the United States directly and for many it

remained far and mysterious. As archetypical American products, both the Civil War and the Hollywood film itself generated interest and even exotic wonder. The *Times*, for example, noted that the screening of an American film in a British theatre 'is an event of considerable theatrical interest and significance'.[24] The Ku Klux Klan, this reviewer then added in puzzlement, was a 'strange, romantic, somehow intensely American affair ... whose members [were] disguised in strange medieval garments'.[25] The British audience went to see *The Birth of a Nation* because it presented a plausible image true to its name: the birth and rise of their contemporary, related yet distant, powerful United States.

The British were not blind to the presentation of the awful war and of the racial tensions in the United States. However, using the drama and romance and the redemptive climax of the film they constructed a positive image of the war as a magnificent moment in American history. Even the advertisements, said one critic, 'give no idea of the great human interest aroused in this extraordinary story of romance, love, and patriotism interwoven with the pictorial record of the history of the United States'.[26] 'The audience', reported another reviewer, 'was fascinated and spell-bound as the drama, with all its awful realities of civil war and racial antagonism, with the lighter touches of love and pathos humour and merriment was unfolded'. It was, he concluded, 'the most terrible, yet glorious, epoch of American history'.[27]

The British could have interpreted the film, the Civil War and the representation of the United States differently. In France, for example, the screening of *The Birth of a Nation* in 1916 generated fierce protest and antagonism.[28] The French were disturbed by the film's pacifist message, its racist tone and the realistic violence that was presented in it. By contrast, in the unprecedented position of the British requiring aid during the Great War, and based on the notion of a common Anglo-Saxon race, America rose sharply in prominence on the British horizon.[29] This was the basis for Britons' keenness to appropriate American culture and identity, and for the positive British experience of *The Birth of a Nation* as a symbol of this culture and identity. As one reviewer stressed, drawing Britain and the United States together under the same title: 'The production has a lesson for all of us of the Anglo-Saxon race at this time'.[30] Thus the British exploited the film and the Civil War as a platform to propel ideas and sentiments about the United States and of Anglo-American relations, which they considered important at the time.

In 1915 the Civil War achieved a place in British popular culture as a spectacular and thus highly attractive and entertaining event. It was

also a war with which the British public was not fully familiar, but which presented values with which it could relate; and it was an American symbol through which Britons could align themselves with the American experience and draw parallels between the United States and their own country. Twenty-five years later, by the early stages of the Second World War, the Civil War had become useful for the British for all this, but also for distinguishing themselves from their American cousins and drawing a sharp divide between the two peoples.

As the Second World War approached, and indeed arrived, the British used the Civil War as evidence of common values shared with the Americans, as they had done during the Great War. As was evident in their reception of films about Lincoln – 'the greatest American of all time' in the words of one critic – what Britons found most appealing were the films' celebration of the American belief in freedom and the presentation of a fight for democracy.[31] Thus, for example, on 31 August 1939, the *Monthly Film Bulletin* saw in *Young Mr Lincoln* (John Ford, 1939) 'the glorification of democracy and its ideals'.[32] Another critic noted that in *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* (in Britain *Spirit of the People*, John Cromwell, 1940) 'Lincoln's advocacy of the rights of man, his love of freedom, and his tolerance strike a note which would appeal any time. Today they evoke a passionate sympathy and response from all believers in democracy'.[33] The film, added another review, was important 'both as entertainment and as education, while its propaganda value in the present state of world crisis is incalculable'.[34] Furthermore, British critics emphasized the films' American origins and stressed that Britain and the United States shared the values that the films conveyed. 'For although it deals with another country's history', noted one reviewer about *Spirit of the People*, 'its theme is universal and its effect far-reaching'.[35] Similarly, *Today's Cinema* wrote that although *Lincoln in the White House* (William C. McGann, 1939) was an American film, 'The Gettysburg Speech brings to conclusion a subject that completely transcends mere American appeal'.[36] On the verge of a global conflict against fascism, and as American support was becoming crucial, the British willingly stressed their allegiances to values – and democracy above all – that in the context of the Civil War and of Lincoln's life were associated with the United States.

In many senses, there was little requirement for British translation in American films about Lincoln and the Civil War because through these films the Americans projected and exported these very ideas so pressing to the British psyche at the time. The representation of the Civil War as a war that Americans fought in the name of democracy and freedom was

becoming a main theme in the United States during this time, and films about the conflict conveyed this message without the British having to search for it. *Lincoln in the White House*, for example, opens with the final words of Lincoln's first inaugural speech, expressing the president's hope to avoid war; it then moves on to show Lincoln kneeling before the Declaration of Independence as he hears about the bombardment of Fort Sumter; shortly afterwards Lincoln is shown issuing the Emancipation Proclamation; and this short 20-minute educational film ends with Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, a hymn of praise for democracy. The film was all about the coming of the war against fascism and about the need, when all other solutions have failed, to fight for freedom and democracy.

Furthermore, films about Lincoln often conveyed that the United States shared the British view on global affairs and was ready to take its place next to Britain. The anti-isolationist tone of *Spirit of the People*, for example, must have been an encouraging sign for the British, heralding the end of the United States' non-intervention policy of the 1930s. Robert E. Sherwood's 1938 play, upon which this film was based, was an outright anti-isolationist work that marked its author's change of heart, from an interwar pacifist to an ardent advocate of America's intervention in global affairs.[37] 'I feel', Sherwood noted in his diary on 21 September 1938, 'that I must start to battle for one thing: the end of our isolation'.[38] Accordingly, in the film, Lincoln is explicit about his views regarding the government's moral responsibility to actively defend and spread freedom and democracy. For example, responding to Stephen Douglas's support of popular sovereignty, the cinematic Lincoln professed: 'That is the conclusion towards which the advocates of slavery are driving us: "Let each state mind its own business", says Judge Douglas. "Why stir up trouble?" This is the complacent policy of indifference to evil, and that policy I cannot but hate'.

Although the British did not need to look hard in these films for support of their views, they did need to actively reconstruct the meaning of the Civil War and choose from the films' American messages those values and messages that they found most relevant. For example, both *Spirit of the People* and *Young Mr Lincoln* were as much about the Depression Era United States as they were about democracy's battle against fascism.[39] 'Thank God we live under a system by which men have the right to strike', stated Lincoln, assailing slavery in his cinematic debate with Stephen Douglas in *Spirit of the People*. Putting these words in Lincoln's mouth, Sherwood had created Lincoln as a Rooseveltian New Dealer, in accord with the playwright's own contemporary stances. However, for

the British public in 1939 and early 1940 this Lincoln was less relevant and only seldom did reviewers address this theme in the film or this aspect of his personality and policy.

While using the Civil War as a platform for promoting a common Anglo-American ideology, the British during this period turned to the war also in order to distinguish Britain from the United States and construct their national identity as a contrast to that of the United States. Nowhere was this more evident than in the British reception of *Gone with the Wind*, the foremost Civil War film of the time.[40] Historians have correctly noted that David O. Selznick's cinematic adaptation of Margaret Mitchell's 1936 novel was the 'box-office phenomenon of the war years' in Britain.[41] However, less discussed is the fact that, from its initial arrival in 1940 the film was a source of much discomfort and criticism for the British public, which the latter often tied with the film's and its subject's American pedigree.

In many ways, *GWTW* was an iconic American film. For one thing, it was grandiose and among the most expansive, most advanced technologically and most commercialized productions of the time and was thus easily associated with the American film industry. What is more, *GWTW* was American in its subject matter and in the way it represented the conflict. True, as was the case for Dixon early in the century, a major driving force behind Mitchell's motivation to write *GWTW* was to resurrect the honor of the South.[42] Like *The Birth of a Nation*, Mitchell's novel presented the mid-nineteenth century South as a peaceful, harmonious and idyllic society, which was destroyed by the war and Reconstruction. However, unlike *The Birth of a Nation*, *GWTW* was not at all warlike: it featured few battle scenes; it decidedly turned the focus from the battlefield to the home front; it brought to the fore the image of the Southern lady on the plantation; and its emphasis was on the folly of the Civil War and the needless suffering and destruction the war had brought. In this, *GWTW* reflected the American, and not particularly Southern, spirit of isolationism and pacifism that was at its height when Mitchell wrote the novel in 1936. The film also followed the dominant Civil War narrative of the 1930s and showed – as did *The Littlest Rebel* (David Butler, 1935), *So Red the Rose* (King Vidor, 1935) and *Hearts in Bondage* (Lew Ayres, 1936) – that the Civil War, or any war, was not worth the victims who died or the destruction generated. Furthermore, again unlike Griffith's 1915 film, the film version of *GWTW* was not about white supremacy or even about racial tensions. On the contrary, racial aspects were deliberately downplayed in the film in order to deliver a more peaceful and all-American message

of racial harmony. Propelling consensual American values and omitting discussion of race tensions (mainly by cutting out the story of the K.K.K), the film was widely endorsed across sections in the United States.[43] Even the African-American press often praised it, especially after Hattie McDaniel won an Oscar for her performance in the role of Mammy.[44]

Although *GWTW* was highly anticipated in Britain, immediately upon its arrival it became the center of a financial controversy. On the weekend just after the film's première, the British Cinematograph Exhibitors Association (CEA) launched the first blow in what would become an ongoing battle between the CEA and the film studio, Metro Goldwyn Mayer (MGM), over the terms of the film's distribution in Britain. On their part, and as was practiced in the United States, MGM demanded a higher-than-usual minimum price for tickets, as well as 70 percent of the revenues. The CEA, however, insisted that no special price should be charged for tickets and that no more than 50 percent of the film's profits would be paid to MGM.[45] Soon, what the *Kinematograph Weekly* called the 'Gone with the Wind dispute' reached the public and even Parliament, where it was often dressed in nationalistic colors.[46] *The Scotsman*, for example, proudly reported that '[British exhibitors] refuse to exploit their audience in the interests of an American film distributor'.[47] Much in the same note Neil Maclean, Labour MP for Glasgow Govan, anxiously asked in the House of Commons: 'Is it not the case that when this war [WWII] finishes cinemas in this country will be in the hands of the American producer, who has taken possession of the film production in this country since the last war?'[48] During the dispute, *Gone with the Wind* was presented as an American attempt to financially exploit the British public. Thus, urging people to boycott the film due to the high prices of the tickets, an angry reader of the *Daily Mirror* wrote: 'Hollywood's a bit optimistic in expecting Britain to pour out what is saved ... on four hours of the American Civil War, particularly when this country's got quite a war of its own'.[49] Cinemas in Lancashire, indeed, boycotted the film.[50]

In addition to the financial dispute, the film's pacifistic tone grated on many British ears. CEA president, Harry Mears, for example, said 'the horrors of war are so emphasized that the psychological effect upon the public may not be good in times when we are fighting for our existence'.[51] Mears was at the time deeply involved in the dispute with MGM, which likely influenced his view. However, he was not widely off the mark with regard to public feelings. 'I didn't really enjoy it', noted one Mass-Observation diarist of her viewing experience, 'I had

been warned that it was very sad but it wasn't so much its sadness as the horrible realism of it ... that made it un-enjoyable to me'.[52] Another reaction, antagonistic to the film's pacifist and isolationistic tone, was criticism of the Americans for dealing with a romantic war of the past while Britain was fighting in a real one. '[It] is certainly not the time to rake up the past', stressed one reviewer of *GWTW*.[53] British distributors were indeed concerned that the local public 'would not be interested in the American Civil War while the nearer battle raged'.[54] Unlike Britain, local critics sometimes emphasized, many in the United States were indifferent to injustice outside their borders and were occupied with their own romantic historical war.

Such criticism of American cultural products – and specifically of the cinematic representations of the Civil War as an archetypical American icon and landmark in the history and identity of the modern United States – was not new. During the 1920s and 1930s, as Anglo-Saxon sentiments waned and relations between the countries cooled, many Britons felt increasingly threatened by American culture and its growing influence in the United Kingdom.[55] The Cinematograph Film Act of 1927, which set quotas to limit the number of foreign films arriving in Britain, mirrored a growing public antagonism, especially towards American cinema.[56] Accordingly, during this period, the British distanced themselves from the American experience as exported through cinematic representations of the Civil War. The *Kinematograph Weekly*, for example, wrote on *Operator 13* (in Britain *Spy 13*, Richard Boleslawski, 1934) that, 'it is a little too American in sentiments and detail for the entertainment to approach the upper class'.[57] Much in the same spirit, the reviewer of the *Picturegoer* was bored by *So Red the Rose* because 'the American Civil War period does not mean as much to us, obviously, as it does to American audiences, and in consequence one is not deeply moved as one might have been by the action'.[58] The film's 'essentially American atmosphere may lessen its general appeal' anticipated another review.[59] Rarely was a contemporary review of a Civil War film complete without stressing the war's American pedigree and its irrelevance to the British audience as a result.

However, rather than allowing the irrelevance of American films about an American war to condemn them to anonymity, such reviews showed how, through Civil War cinema, the British constructed their identity in opposition to the American one, using the very foreign nature of these films and historical events. Viewed in this way, that the films and the Civil War were archetypically American was not only relevant but of the utmost import. While less significant Civil War films had generated

such reviews already in the interwar period, the British endeavors to detach themselves from the United States and construct their national identity in contrast with it through the representation of the Civil War reached a peak with *GWTW*.

The dominant aspect of *GWTW*, and by far the most abundant source from which Britons drew in order to emphasize the divide between their country and the United States, was Scarlett O'Hara's character and the film's representations of gender roles. Some even saw the film as primarily a 'ruthless study of mercenary and calculating womanhood ... played against the American Civil War'.[60] The image of British actress Vivien Leigh, cast over hundreds of American actresses who had auditioned for the role of O'Hara, was crucial to this national endeavor.[61] No coverage of the film was complete without stressing Leigh's Britishness. Some regretted that Britain had lost a homegrown star to Hollywood;[62] others saw it as a welcome symbol of Anglo-American cooperation in the film industry.[63] Everybody, however, celebrated Leigh's Britishness.

Soon Leigh became the archetypical British woman, and critics began to set her British femininity against that of Scarlett. *Today's Cinema*, for example, described Scarlett's womanhood with an evident disdain and stressed that she was 'a revelation of a feminine dishonour and determination'.[64] Much in the same spirit, *Picture Show* described her as 'a tempestuous creature with a devilish temper and merciless code which recognises no accepted code of honour'; while for the *Monthly Film Bulletin* O'Hara was a 'shameless flirt'.[65] Against Scarlett's femininity, Leigh's British womanhood glowed. *The Picturegoer*, for example, published Leigh's own account of her experience on the set of *GWTW* in which Leigh positioned herself in clear contrast to Scarlett. She noted for example that, '[Scarlett] needed a good, healthy old-fashioned spanking on a number of occasions and I should have been delighted to give it to her'.[66] Glossing over Leigh's mercurial temper as well as the more controversial aspects of her life, such as her affair with Laurence Olivier, *The Picture Show* emphasized that for the good-natured actress, home and family always came first. 'She continued with her studies', a biographical essay in the magazine read,

> but then something more important came along to occupy her time. She became the mother of a little girl whom she named Suzanne. Once the affairs of her home were in order, and little Suzanne's care had been arranged for, Vivien felt the urge once more to try her talent in the field of professional acting.... Vivien is very clever with interior decorating, and mauve is her favourite colour for home

> furnishing[;] ... she is keen on horseback riding, and before she went to Hollywood she hunted frequently with the South Devon and Dartmoor hunt.... She does not like gay night life.[67]

Leigh was portrayed in the press as moderate, innocent, motherly and British, that is, a true woman and all that Scarlett was not.

By the early 1940s, in Britain the Civil War had become instrumental not only in drawing the two nations together, but in marking the divide between them. On 3 August, 1940, reviewing the impact on Britain of *GWTW* and other Civil War films, film critic Edward Wood captured this spirit and wrote in his column:

> Many of the films that the British public does not yearn for at any time, and has absolutely no use for just now, depict some phase of the American Civil War, which started in 1861 and finished in 1865. I have lost count of the number of films I have seen with this war as a background, foreground, beginning, middle piece or ending, but I know there were too many for my liking since the present war began. Most of us have scant knowledge of the part England played in the Napoleonic wars – apart from the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo – and many of us are hazy about the last war, but every regular cinema-goer must have seen enough pictures about the American Civil War to write a book about it, as the saying goes.... Some of these films have been first-class pictures, on the whole, but so far as the British public is concerned the war part has not been wanted, and at this particular period of our history American producers have shown a lamentable lack of knowledge of what the British public wants in sending over such films. A more touchy people might have boycotted these films, but we are notoriously long-suffering in such matters. It cannot be said that film depicting the American Civil War have any educational value for us.[68]

Wood somewhat exaggerated. Such vehement expressions about Civil War films have been hard to find in the news media archives. However, he was not entirely out of tune with other critics, many of whom were critical of the Americans for dealing with a historical romantic conflict when the British and Europe were immersed in a real war for the survival of democracy against fascism.

And yet Britons flocked the cinemas to watch *Gone with the Wind*. A poll conducted by Dave Fred, manager of the Carthay Circle Theatre, on the film's attendance patterns showed that of 965 adults surveyed,

405 came to see the film for the first time, 347 a second time, 190 a third time, and the remaining 23 saw it more than three times.[69] 'The whole', noted one viewer in his personal diary, 'was a very moving experience'.[70] Evidently, the British view of *Gone with the Wind* was not homogeneous, certainly not as critics had sometimes wished to present that view. Furthermore, of the aspects of the films over which public opinion was divided were the film's pacifistic sentiments and its representation of gender roles. Some, for example, saw *Gone with the Wind*'s anti-war messages as a legitimate, even timely lesson. One reviewer thus argued:

> A point arises here whether the realism of the war scenes with their attendant tragedies will strike a little too closely at the heart of a nation at war.... Such scenes could not, in any case, be legitimately cut, for they are the basis of the whole argument and vivid lesson in humanity's inhumanity.[71]

Likewise, as Helen Taylor has shown, personal accounts disclose that many among the British public found the American characters in *GWTW* extremely familiar. One woman, for example, later on recalled that 'as a girl I held up Scarlett as a kind of model for myself, especially in regards to her "never give up" sentiments'.[72] Endeavoring in their reviews of *GWTW* to propel a distinct British identity in opposition to that of the United States, expressions in the press often obscured the fact that the public was far more ambivalent in its views of *GWTW*, of the war and of Scarlett.

This ambivalence mirrored the way in which Britons saw themselves in the early stages of the Second World War, especially in relation to the United States. The social and cultural changes that the war brought challenged British perceptions of their identity and led them to re-consider some of it. The movement from prewar appeasement to war, and the transformation of women's place in society, were just two such instances.[73] At the same time, the increased presence of the United States – both physically and ideologically – opened the way for closer relations between the peoples, but also for confusion. A Mass-Observation survey from 1943 illustrated this when it showed that the United States' entry to the Second World War generated much confusion and even discontent among many in the British public.[74] Exported continuously as an iconic representation of the United States, the Civil War was an apt and available platform for the British to reconsider and reiterate their national identity in relation to that of the United States.

Furthermore, even when the Civil War was utilized in Britain to criticize the United States, it continued to fascinate British critics as a romantic, colorful and thrilling affair in American history. *Today's Cinema*, for example, argued about *Santa Fé Trail* (Michael Curtiz, 1940) that, 'as with most films dealing with American history, this one is most impressive for Britishers on its spacious treatment'.[75] *Spy 13* was described by the critic for the *Kinematograph Weekly* as a 'picturesque ... drama, set in the colourful period of the American Civil War, which cunningly camouflages the slightness of popular story with charming romance, bright comedy, tuneful music, and stirring spectacles'.[76] In *Gone with the Wind*, the Civil War's romance, colorfulness, drama and thrill reached their peak. One laudatory review noted that 'there are outstanding scenes thrillingly presented, notably the capture of Atlanta by the Yankees and its destruction by fire'.[77] The film's greatest asset, wrote another,

> is that, despite its length, it does not seem to be longer than the average, for it has no moment when the story ceases to grip or the theme to interest. A flaming background of the American Civil War lends this take of romantic conflict a strange earnestness, and its spectacle is always part and integral part of the development.[78]

Even Edwards Wood – whose vehement criticism of the United States, of Hollywood and of the Civil War is cited above – chose *GWTW* as one of the best films of 1940.[79]

During the later interwar period, the British saw the Civil War as an American emblem through which they both aligned themselves with and differentiate themselves from the United States. In addition, the war fascinated the British public as it was represented as an epic and romantic conflict. In films, this representation gained extra force. Starting from this period, films began to present the Civil War on the big screen in full color and rich sound, giving the British filmgoer a spectacular experience of a spectacular war. In this, too, *GWTW* was the foremost example. As one journal put on its front page: '"Gone with the Wind" opens a new era in screen history and one which cannot fail to make itself felt as a public force'.[80]

Despite its suppression in American popular culture before the 1960s, the African-American view of the Civil War did not escape the attention of the British public, who often saw beyond the dominant American representation of the conflict. Thus, despite its relatively moderate narrative and despite its wide endorsement in the United States even

among African Americans, one Mass-Observation diarist expressed his suspicion about *Gone with the Wind*:

> I note that the negro and radical press in the U.S.A. have found both [the novel and film] far from satisfactory. They dislike its defence of slavery and feudalism, race problem, anti-Lincoln sentiments, etc.… Fem[ale]-sec[retary] (30-ish) trots out a familiar line of talk about some American friends (Virginia) who were "so kind to their old 'mammies', who in turn were faithful to them". Seems everything in the slave tradition can be excused these days.[81]

Similarly, the Coloured People's Association in Britain and British minority groups that were sensitive to the resistance to the film in the United States protested against the screening of *GWTW* in Britain in 1940.[82] The *Daily Worker*, the official communist voice in Britain, severely criticized the film as well.[83] Peter Noble's assault on *The Birth of a Nation* in the 1940s was another example that Britons could see beyond American representations of the Civil War. The British journalist, writer and film historian accused the American director of bigotry and crowned him 'a pioneer of prejudice!' for his *The Birth of a Nation*.[84]

However, until the 1960s all of the above and their like were the exception. Although its circulation in 1939 was impressive in comparison to previous years, the *Daily Worker* did not represent a consensual British perspective.[85] Similarly, as has been seen, the American objection to *The Birth of a Nation* in the 1910s had no parallel response in Britain until the 1940s.[86] Likewise, the reception of *GWTW*'s representation of race relations was overwhelmingly positive. While the British have fashioned their own views and interpretations of the war, the African-American narrative was not central to their understanding of the Civil War in the sphere of popular culture.

During the late 1950s that began to change, first in the United States and then in Britain. Against the background of the Cold War, and especially during the Civil War's centennial between 1961 and 1965, the American establishment sought to fashion the historical conflict of the 1860s as a symbol of American unity and patriotism.[87] To nourish and distribute this heritage, Civil War representations blurred the differences between North and South and between blacks and whites, accentuating instead their common American identity. Civil War cinema, which had flourished since the 1950s and during the centennial, often promoted this message.[88] For example, in *Major Dundee* (Sam Peckinpah, 1965) Union and Confederate, as well as African-American soldiers

united despite their mutual antagonism towards each other, in order to fight murderous Indians. The film showed that, faced with an outsider 'non-American' enemy, all 'true' Americans – Union, Confederate and African Americans – found their differences negligible. 'The Major's present war is not with the South', one character said, 'but with the Apache'.[89] In this way, African Americans were incorporated into the national story of the Civil War after being repeatedly pushed out of it since the late nineteenth century (as seen in *The Birth of a Nation*). Their place as outsiders was now taken by Native Americans, Mexicans or other 'foreigners', who played the role of non-Americans.

However, as Robert Cook has shown, from inception, the centennial celebrations were immersed in controversies and struggles between Southern Lost-Cause agitators and civil-rights activists. Advancing the African-American point-of-view of the Civil War, civil-rights activists accentuated the appalling image of a slavery-ridden South, of the war as an unfinished enterprise and of Reconstruction as an abortive project that had legitimized racism in the United States. Clearly, this representation could not have been realized alongside the Lost Cause representation in a grand narrative of American reconciliation and unity. Consequently, as early as 1961, the celebrations had become a symbol of sectional and racial fragmentation, and the contested nature of the conflict's legacy surfaced.[90]

The protest in the United States resonated loudly in Britain. While representations of the Civil War continued to cross the Atlantic through popular cultural products, more than ever they now reflected a greater diversity of views corresponding with developments in the United States. One Mass-Observation respondent, for example, recalled that it was not until

> the 60's that I learnt about the existence of slavery in the USA, and that the Civil War hadn't changed things very much. When I grew up in the 60s I knew all about the struggle for civil rights in the USA. That was mainly through the singing of Pete Seeger.[91]

Events in the United States motivated the British public to revise its understanding of the war. Therefore, when *GWTW* was released again in London in 1961, the *Observer* noted that, 'the Jim Crow amusements now seem more than ever repellent'.[92] The *Guardian*, stressing that *GWTW* was a mere nostalgic mirage of a corrupt society, contended that 'not the least important political aspect of the centennial has been the obvious, if camouflaged, attempt to dissociate it entirely from the

South's present guilty secret'.[93] Such reactions were new in the mainstream media in Britain.

Nonetheless, at the height of the Cold War, the British found the conciliatory and patriotic representation of the Civil War more appealing than the one that presented the United States as a disintegrated – and disintegrating – society. After all, the British film industry produced similar cinematic narratives at that time and reflected similar nationalistic and anti-communist sentiments.[94] Thus, while a narrative that excluded African Americans had become unsustainable, the British public seemed to have been receptive to the inclusive representation of the Civil War that incorporated contesting views into a story of continuous American progress towards freedom and unity. For its wide resonance and authoritative stature on both sides of the Atlantic, Alistair Cooke's famous television series, *America: A Personal History of the United States* (BBC, 1972), was a valid example and an illustrative case in point.

Cooke became enamored with the United States during the early 1930s, when he left for Yale on an academic scholarship. In 1937, after continuously having crossed the Atlantic back and forth, he left Britain for good. Also from early on, Cooke came to believe that the British and Americans needed to know more about each other and he devoted much of his career in the media to that purpose.[95]

By the time he made *America*, Cooke had come to believe (chiefly due to the Cold War) that understanding the United States was a necessity more than a luxury. Summarizing *America*'s 13 episodes, he stated: 'I have tried in this program to say something about American civilization today, because what is fiercely in dispute between the communist and the non-communist nations is the quality and staying power of American civilization'.[96] Thus *America* was, among other things, a look at the United States as the representative of the non-communist world and an endeavor to evaluate its ability to resist communism by offering an alternative liberal ideology. Cooke's series celebrated the American spirit of innovation, pragmatism, liberalism, diversity and wealth as the world's best hope against communism and as its antithesis. His episode on the American Revolution, for example, opened by contrasting Lenin's idea of equality (which supposedly advances a notion of 'equality' as the oppression of individual rights and identity) with the American liberal vision of equality (as expressed in the Declaration of Independence). With admiration, he declaimed: 'all men are created equal', and stressed that the Declaration was a 'world changing' document.[97] Thus began Cooke's story of the continuous growth of a liberal alternative to communism.

However, *America* was not an uncritical glorification of the American way of life. Whereas the series showed Britons the wonders of the United States, it also criticized Americans for having abandoned the path set forth by the nation's founders. In his criticism, Cooke reflected the low point which the contemporary United States had reached in British eyes by the early 1970s. As his biographer has noted, 'Cooke hated the 1960s' and saw the United States as a giant who had lost his way.[98] Cooke resented what he saw as Americans' unrestrained materialism and consumerism, as well as the United States' over urbanization and mistreatment of its natural resources. He also opposed the war in Vietnam and was disappointed by the Watergate scandal. One of the gravest sources for Cooke's concern was the social upheaval of the 1960s in general, which he thought tore American society apart, and in the African-American and civil-rights movements specifically, he saw the greatest danger to American stability and social order, especially in the South.[99] By the early 1970s, the world's best hope against communism, the United States seemed to Cooke to be standing at a crossroads and not necessarily facing in what he thought was the right direction. Summarizing his series, he thus posed the pessimistic open-ended question of 'whether America is in its ascendant or its decline'.[100]

Reflecting the image of an ideologically and socially unified United States in the background of Cooke's thought, his episode about the Civil War presented the viewer with a typical conciliatory narrative. The program acknowledged slavery as a major theme in the story of the war and it debunked the myth of the idyllic South. Cooke dedicated approximately 22 minutes (roughly half the episode's total running time) to discussing the horrible conditions under which slaves had lived in the South. Cooke's emphasis on slavery did not, however, come at the expense of presenting Reconstruction as a terrible, vengeful and extremist project set out to devastate the South. The South, he said bitterly, 'was not only conquered, it was now to be punished.... [S]everal Southern states were put under military control ... and the state governments were run by negroes who could hardly read or write'.[101]

Ultimately, Cooke delivered an inter-racial reconciliation lesson and noted that, 'the negro has a long way to go, but he has come further in the last 30 years than in the previous 300'.[102] Cooke's examination of the Civil War of the 1860s from the vantage point of the 1960s allowed him to gloss over the war's immediate aftermath and the long-lasting repression of African Americans in the United States. Instead, he could end his account of the war – after giving the South its respectful place in post-war American history – a century after the conflict's termination

and present it as the starting point of a long, yet deterministic, liberal project that was now reaching its admirable end. Had Cooke adopted the African-American view of the war he would have been forced to present the post-war United States as a racist country that was re-united at the price of racial divide and racial suppression that has lasted ever since. That was not the liberal tradition and progress Cooke sought to portray, nor was it the explanation he was after for the social turmoil in the contemporary United States.

The late 1970s and 1980s saw deep change come over the representation of the Civil War, when the African-American narrative finally reached the mainstream of popular culture as an independent aspect of the war, an aspect that was to challenge the other representations of the conflict. Generally, the African-American view of American history made important headway into the heart of British and American popular culture with Alex Haley's 1976 novel, *Roots*. *Roots* was a written and then televised (an ABC mini-series in 1977) manifestation of the identity politics that took hold in the United States in the 1970s. Haley wanted to celebrate his African-American heritage and give it a distinct voice in the story of the United States.[103] Presented manifestly from an African-American vantage point, through the supposed story of Haley's own ancestors, the book traced the place of Africans in the United States, from their arrival as slaves in the eighteenth century to the 1960s.[104] While Haley presented his book as a painstaking genealogical research, shortly after its publication *Roots* was revealed as a work of fabrication, at least to a degree. This, however, did not prevent it from becoming a tremendous success. Following the success of the pseudo-research, ABC bought the rights to Haley's work and in 1977 the production of *Roots* was on its way.[105]

Roots exposed the public – in both the United States and Britain – to an unromantic view of the Civil War era, especially in the South, and in an unprecedented way.[106] The series vividly showed how in post–Civil War United States, reconciliation between whites in the South came at the expense of the freed slaves. 'We's got to go to the law, don't you see?', cried freedman Tom Harvey, after another white supremacist assault on his family and property. 'Ain't supposed to be no white men's law. Only supposed to be one law, *the* law'. Soon, however, the African-American family discovered that the sheriff cannot, and indeed will not, enforce the law against white racists, fearing it would lead to violence. There was nothing in Haley's account of the Civil War era to show a romantic image of the South or of the United States of the kind that *GWTW* had perpetuated. Even the touching scenes of soldiers'

sacrifice were omitted. Instead, *Roots*' post-war United States was a cruel and violent place, and if reconciliation and reunion eventually came to America, the series stressed that it was at the price of political and social racial repression.

Glory (Edward Zwick, 1989) attacked the romantic representation of the Civil War from another angle. Also focusing on African Americans, it told the story of the Union's all-black 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, from the decision to create it in 1862, to its abortive assault on Fort Wagner in South Carolina on 18 July 1863. For the broader public, *Glory* presented for the first time the story of African Americans' bravery and eagerness to fight for their freedom, and of their gradual understanding that they needed to unite among themselves as well as to join the Union Army in order to achieve that goal. Furthermore, as James McPherson has argued, the film focused on a historical point in time when African Americans' keenness to fight freed Lincoln to take the measures needed to turn the Civil War from a war solely for reunion, to one aimed at ending slavery.[107] The film was based on Peter Burchard's novel, *One Gallant Rush* (1965), and on the letters of Robert Gould Shaw, the white colonel who was placed in command of the regiment. Accordingly, the film maintained a high level of historical accuracy and authenticity. *Glory* authoritatively undermined the representation of slavery in the South as a benign institution that benefited both slaves and slave owners: it showed that African Americans sought freedom and were willing to die for it. At the same time, it also challenged the Northern narrative of the war by showing the prejudice and racism that was rife throughout the Union Army.

The public in Britain reacted favorably to these representations of the Civil War and especially to the new African-American viewpoint. As an American program that focused on American history, *Roots* enjoyed an unprecedented success in Britain, and the last two episodes, dealing with the Civil War era, achieved staggering ratings.[108] As a favorable BBC Audience Research Report indicated, the majority of the audience was 'closely involved with this well-paced story'.[109] On *Glory*, the conservative *Daily Mail* joined the liberal press in praising the film and stressed that, 'if your cinema expectations of Civil War drama have been set by *Gone with the Wind* and cavalry-adventure escapism, prepare for a new world'.[110] The film's purpose, added one film magazine to the laudatory reaction to *Glory*'s novel approach to the Civil War, 'is to redeem a key moment in black history'.[111]

While the African-American narrative of the war undermined the conflict's Southern and reconciliatory romantic representations, it presented a new and no less appealing narrative of the Civil War. For one

thing, the African-American story of the war was a heroic chronicle of bravery and sacrifice for a higher cause. For showing African Americans fighting for their freedom – especially despite the hardship of training and the horrors of war, and despite the widespread racism and prejudice within the Union Army – British critics saw in *Glory* an 'epic reconstruction [that] lives up to its title by finding nobility in combat'.[112] Equally, Robert Gould Shaw – whose view of the idea of an African-American regiment develops throughout the film from ambivalence to outright support – was seen by British reviewers as an 'idealistic young Boston aristocrat' who believed in freedom and equality and, ultimately, in leading his all-black regiment in battle, gave his life for that cause.[113] As the North's war for reunification and the South's willingness to sacrifice its people for its way of life, the African Americans' devotion to the idea of freedom and their readiness to die for it were of equally moving and heroic stature.

Furthermore, British critics lauded *Glory* because they saw in the African-American narrative of the Civil War also a story of a thrilling war. The film, wrote a critic, was 'a stirring account of [a] black regiment [fighting] in the American Civil War, from its first recruiting drive to its heroic assault on an impregnable fort'.[114] 'Aside from its motives', noted another, 'the film's chief virtue is its spectacular choreography. The final battle ... is a striking combination of dynamism and clarity.... The battle's intensity sucks in the spectator and quickens the blood'.[115] 'The charge on a Rebel fort', wrote a reviewer on the screening of the film on television in 1996, 'is so moving there won't be a dry eye in the house'.[116] In *Glory*, the African-American representation of the Civil War contributed another angle to the action and to the representation of the conflict as an epic and thrilling war story.

Moreover, the African-American narrative of the Civil War, as presented in *Glory* and *Roots* (prior to its revelation as a fabrication) attracted audiences because it told a fairly true and historically accurate story. No coverage of *Glory* omitted mentioning that it was based on actual events and on authentic historical records. Even the more critical reviews found it hard to challenge its authenticity. As the *Guardian* noted:

> Few cinemagoers expect total historical accuracy.... In the case of *Glory*, a portrayal of the outrageously ignored saga of the all-black (but white officer-led) 54th Massachusetts Regiment in the American Civil War, complaints centre more gently on the sheer lack of space in the film to portray all the terrible ironies experienced by ex-slaves in Lincoln's army.[117]

Unlike other Civil War films before it, *Glory* even presented a high level of authenticity in all that regarded the costumes and firearms. The heroism, patriotism, belief in freedom and equality and the gruesome battles that *Glory* presented were thus more appealing than the romanticized and, by then it was clear, widely fabricated image of the Civil War as seen through the prism of the Lost Cause and films as *GWTW*.

Finally, as with the other Civil War narratives, the British found in the story of the African-American troops a prism through which to comment on the contemporary United States. For example, seen through African-American eyes as a war for the highest causes, the Civil War in *Glory* was favorably compared with the war in Vietnam, which had been deeply criticized in Britain.[118] The reviewer for the *Times* put *Glory* together with other films that were 'titillating the national consciousness with guilt for Vietnam'.[119] Another critic went so far as to argue that *Glory* 'vaults clean over the shame of Vietnam, to reaffirm the almost prehistoric notion of the value of gallantry in a just cause'.[120] The *Guardian*, too, as did the *Times*, connected *Glory* and *Born on the Fourth of July* (Oliver Stone, 1989) as two films about 'real-life heroes ... who went to wars a century apart charged with idealism and patriotic fervour'.[121] The idealism of Shaw was thus utilized in order to comment on the moral questions that the war in Vietnam had raised regarding the moral image of the United States.

The African-American story of the war was thus appealing because it was heroic; it was moral; it involved sacrifice for a higher cause; and it allowed the British a stage from which to observe the past and present United States. In addition, the representation of the Civil War from an African-American vantage point was fascinating because it told an until-then untold story. Moreover, the African-American story in *Glory* and even in *Roots* was historically true and therefore more impressive and thrilling. In this way, the African-American story of the Civil War ultimately added another appealing aspect to the American conflict of the 1860s.

Looking back from the vantage point of the Civil War sesquicentennial, it is evident that the impact of African-American narratives on the cinematic representation of the conflict has been profound. While Southern narratives – as presented in *Gods and Generals* (Ronald F. Maxwell, 2003), for example – have not completely lost their appeal for Hollywood, they have been under constant attack in recent years. Thus in the adaptation of the autobiographical slave narrative *12 Years a Slave* (Steve McQueen, 2013), the cruelty of Southern slavery is exposed in a Kafkaesque world in which a free African American could be illegally

enslaved and do little about it; in *Django Unchained* (Quentin Tarantino, 2012), the gruesome side of slavery in the Deep South is portrayed with typical Tarantino-style visual violence; and in *Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter* (Timur Bekmambetov, 2012), the drinking of African-American blood as a metaphor for slavery and the depiction of slave owners as vampires is, though childish, one of the most direct and daring visual assaults on Southern slavery and on the people who fought to maintain it ever seen on the silver screen.[122]

Moreover, abolition and African Americans' role in its achievement are discussed in one of the sesquicentennial's more frequently debated cinematic events – Stephen Spielberg's *Lincoln* (2012). True, *Lincoln* is not told from an African-American point of view, and African Americans barely appear on the screen: After a short conversation between Lincoln and two black Union soldiers at the beginning of the film, African Americans largely clear the stage in Spielberg's account of how abolition, through the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, became the law of the land. Unsurprisingly, then, historians attacked *Lincoln* for marginalizing African Americans' agency in attaining their freedom.[123]

However, the opening scene, in which Lincoln discusses the war with the soldiers, explains, step by step, much of what follows. Initially, it establishes that African Americans fought in the conflict. 'Some of us', Private Harold Green told the president, 'was in the Second Kansas Colored. We fought the Rebs at Jenkins' Ferry last April, just after they'd killed every Negro soldier they captured at Poison Springs.… The ones of us that didn't die that day, we joined up with the 116th U.S. Colored, sir'. "'I'm Corporal Ira Clark, sir', says the second soldier, introducing himself, 'Fifth Massachusetts [Colored Volunteer] Cavalry'. In *Lincoln*, black combat soldiers are not a peculiar, sporadic phenomenon. It is acknowledged not only that they fought, but that they were an integral part of the Union Army. As the scene develops, two unnamed white soldiers join the conversation. And thus, in one of the film's sole presentation of the war's soldiers, the overwhelmingly white Union Army is portrayed as half black and half white.

Furthermore, what is effectively the prologue of the story bridges the gap, so rarely discussed, between the battlefield, on which African Americans fought for their freedom, and Washington, where a white president fought for the same goal. As the conversation comes to an end, Lincoln learns that Clark could recite the Gettysburg Address and the president's promise to fight to give the nation a 'new birth of freedom'. In this way, *Lincoln*'s first five minutes convey in a clear and direct way by which the message that African Americans fighting for the Union

gave Lincoln not only the political opportunity but also the moral basis to fight – for months in Washington and for about two and a half hours on the screen – for the Thirteenth Amendment and a new birth of freedom.[124] Thus, a hundred a fifty years after the Civil War, as one historian has argued, referring to *Lincoln*, *12 Years a Slave*, and *Django Unchained*, 'stories of black slavery and black freedom seem to have definitively arrived in Hollywood'.[125]

Sesquicentennial Civil War cinema roused the British public to revisit America's war. Spielberg's *Lincoln* exemplified how a central source of interest for Britons was the relevance of the Civil War to contemporary American politics and to Barack Obama's presidency above all. '*Lincoln* is a perfect movie for the age of Obama', as one reviewer noted.[126] British critics often drew parallels between the two presidents, noting the legal background of both and similarities in their ways of executing policies. More generally, Britons found in *Lincoln* a reflection of the contemporary American political system. The film, argued the *Independent*, is 'the most realistic cinematic depiction ever of how the US political system, with its separation of powers, works'.[127] Furthermore, British reviews of Spielberg's biopic were often used as platforms to comment on American politics. Coinciding with the fiscal-cliff crisis, which threatened to paralyze the American political system, *Lincoln* was used in Britain to convey lessons about the need to compromise as well as about leadership 'at a time when American politics grows ever more fractious'.[128] 'Obviously, there is a lesson for President Obama as he seeks a way down from the cliff-edge' noted one reviewer. 'Its message for today is … also — very topically, in the light of Barack Obama's tribulations — about the need for compromise', contended another. 'An ability to "get things done" was another of Lincoln's virtues that seems to shine particularly brightly in 2013, when the US Congress has just completed the least productive legislative term in its history', said a third.[129] Whether by emphasizing compromise or firm leadership, Britons used *Lincoln* to express their expectations that Americans would find a way to solve their current political debacle.

Lincoln could serve the British public as a measuring tool with which to analyze contemporary American politics because, *inter alia*, they saw it as 'a piece of full-blown Americana'.[130] For one thing, it was about the founding moment of the modern United States. 'It's a film about … the creation of the world's greatest democracy', noted one typical review.[131] Moreover, *Lincoln* was a Hollywood film created by the contemporary director perhaps most associated with Hollywood, and was about the archetypal American. One of Britain's leading film blogs thus argued

that '*Lincoln* is monumental film making of a monumental period of American history centred on a monumental man. It will be remembered as one of the most important films from one of America's most important film makers'.[132] Many saw it as 'an unabashed hymn' to the United States.[133] *Lincoln* told the ultimate American story against which other American stories and events could be judged.

In their reactions to a film glorifying American history and national identity, Britons used *Lincoln* also to reflect on their own history, identity and contemporary politics. In conversations with British interviewers, costume designer Joanna Johnston and leading actor Daniel Day-Lewis noted that on the set of *Lincoln* their foreign, British identity became felt. 'I'm British so I thought that might work against me', noted Johnson[134]; as a Briton, Day-Lewis admitted, 'the idea of desecrating the memory of the most-beloved president this country has ever known was just kind of a fearful thing to me'.[135] *Lincoln* often allowed Britons to use the United States and its iconic war and president to express their views on British national identity in a multicultural age when this identity is constantly debated.[136] 'Spielberg excels in identifying things Americans have done well. But', bemoaned the reviewer for the right-wing *Daily Mail*:

> [W]here is our home-grown film-maker who can do the same with British triumphs? ... Why don't any film-makers on this side of the Atlantic make movies about this country's history that might warm British hearts the way Spielberg does American ones? [W]here are the heroics? Where is Nelson at Trafalgar or Wellington at Waterloo?[137]

Sounding much the same note, the center-left *Independent* noted that 'Spielberg's "*Lincoln*" encourages national pride, so such a film could never be made here'. Stressing the difference between the British and the American national psyches, the review deduced that *Lincoln* is a neat little reminder of the profound psychological differences that still separate the British and American outlooks on life, especially in the field of the creative arts. No home-grown talent could make a film like *Lincoln*, not because there is no comparable event in recent British history, but because ... making the native citizenry feel good about their historical selves is not a trick that most British artists ever feel like bringing off.[138]

The title of the review made a blunt distinction: 'Unlike us, the US believes in itself'. By drawing these contrasts between American and British cultures, Britons participated in the debate over what Britishness

means: they defined and redefined it and reiterated their sense of belonging to it.

Ultimately, however, the main source of *Lincoln*'s appeal, or lack thereof, among the British public was its ability to entertain. 'Spielberg is always a professional, and the film is never less than well-crafted', summarized one reviewer, 'but I don't see it doing well on this side of the Atlantic. There's none of the flair, fun or originality that mark Spielberg's finest work'.[139] Indeed, many found the film too long, too slow, too American, or, in a word, boring. However, while Spielberg's film did not feature the usual elements of a Hollywood war film, Britons were often carried away by the thrilling, romantic and heroic story of a martyred president who fought for a moral cause and gave his country a new birth of freedom. Referring also to Daniel Day-Lewis's laudatory performance as Lincoln, the *Guardian* wrote:

> Day-Lewis encompasses the great statesman who shaped history, the intimate man of the people and the mysterious, charismatic figure who so fascinated Picasso that he collected thousands of pictures of him and once held up a photograph of Lincoln, proclaiming: 'There is the real American elegance!'[140]

After a long discussion of the numerous historical errors in the film, the *Times Literary Supplement* nonetheless summarized that '*Lincoln* is ... the most intelligent, least deluded film about American politics since Robert Rossen's *All the King's Men* (1949)'. *Lincoln*, the review continued, is far more appealing than Rossen's film because it is about how 'the greatest measure of the nineteenth century was passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America'.[141] Evidently, Lincoln, the Civil War and the abolition of slavery in the United States entertained the British public even without the battles and the generals.

Films about the Civil War attracted the attention of British critics and audiences because they presented an array of values that Britons were able to separate from the American context and appropriate to themselves, thus making them relevant to contemporary domestic affairs. Furthermore, British reviews of Civil War films showed that Britons saw in the conflict an opportunity to examine American society and the character of the modern United States. Reviews of films about the war have often been platforms used by critics in order to reflect on the history of the modern United States and on its development since its rebirth. As in the British political discourse, military thought and academic writing, the diverse British appeal to Civil War films demonstrated the

multifaceted nature of the war and its unique place as a constitutive event in American history and as the moment of birth of the modern United States.

However, the British attended the cinema to watch films about the American Civil War primarily because the films and the war entertained them. Even when Britons criticized the ideological message of the films, and even when criticism of American cinema in Britain soared and reviews dismissed American films as a low form of culture, British critics were in agreement that the films were thrilling, colorful, artistically impressive or, in a word, fun to watch.

Indeed the Civil War featured all the elements that make good entertainment. It was an enormous, tragic, heroic and epic war; it was a war of soldiers and citizens, of men and women; it was a founding and transformative moment in the history of the world's greatest power; and it raised heroes, from professional military men to citizen-soldiers to women and children. The Civil War, in other words, was a good story. It was this element that allowed other elements full scope of use by holding the fascination, hearts and minds of generations of Britons. Moreover, the cinema was an apt medium for representation of the American conflict in the sphere of popular culture. The silver screen allowed for presentation of the war in all its gigantic proportions and epic dimensions. Unlike statues, academic studies or even the television, the cinema presented the war in motion and as close to its true measures as was possible fifty, or almost a hundred and fifty, years after its end. Ultimately, the cinema also enabled the portrayal of the Civil War in vivid colors and rich soundtrack. It allowed for the presentation of the blue and the gray and the white and the black, and it allowed for the presentation of the red of blood.

Furthermore, the story of the Civil War is entertaining and interesting because it is true. The sacrifice that African Americans made for freedom, the South's fierce resistance and the North's war to save the Union, were all, to a greater or lesser degree, historically true. If stories from the war, such as the one told in *Glory*, seemed sometimes unbelievable, their historical veracity added to the thrilling experience of watching Civil War films. Civil War cinema has featured a unique combination of history, fiction, entertainment, contemporary relevance and the ability to reflect on the past and present United States. As the American war became an integral part of popular culture in Britain, some have even taken it upon themselves to relive it.

5
Civil War Roundtable and Re-enactment Societies

Dawn. First light gently falls on the humid canvas tents. An expectant sense of things to come practically hums in the air; the Union and Confederate soldiers nonetheless prepare quietly and with ease. Weapons are cleaned and gear checked, canteens are filled afresh and shoes are brushed. The sound of a bugle and a roll call. Drills. More drills. After several hours of additional arduous maneuvers, the soldiers finally meet on the battlefield. A shot rings out in the Cheshire sky and the Battle of Gettysburg commences, yet again, over 150 years and about 3,400 miles away from Pennsylvania, 1863. The all-British members of the American Civil War Society – Britain's biggest American Civil War re-enactment club today – perform in earnest. The Union wins. The fallen stand again. Hands are shaken. Dusk.

Public societies in Britain – such as the American Civil War Society (ACWS) – studying and re-enacting the American Civil War are not new. The first society, the Confederate Caucus, was founded in 1951. Many have followed since.[1] Yet the numerous devotees – including some of those re-enacting the American Civil War – who re-enact and study the Battle of Hastings or the English Civil War or the Boer War or the Great War or the Second World War or the Falklands War testify that Britons have a sufficient arsenal of national wars on which to draw.[2] So why join an American Civil War society?[3]

Popular activity dedicated to the American Civil War has been organized around two main formulations, and its inception dates to the 1940s and 1950s in the United States. Constituting the first established format, Civil War Round Tables are academically oriented organizations, comprised mostly but not solely of amateur historians and enthusiasts. Since the opening of the first club in Chicago in 1940, Round Table activities have included conferences, dinners and

study-tours.[4] The other format, Civil War re-enactment societies, deals with performing 'living history' activities and mock battles. During re-enactment events participants dress in period costumes, re-create military camps, present authentic period lifestyle and some even pay heed to period food. Too often associated with post–Civil War encampments held by the Grand Army of the Republic – a fraternal organization of Union veterans – Civil War Round Tables and re-enactment societies had in fact developed separately as popular organizations.[5] The first American re-enactment club, the North-South Skirmish Association (N-SSA), owes its origins in 1950 to a group of Westerns fans who first met at a shooting club.[6] By the early 1950s, the first historical societies similar to the Round Tables, and later also re-enactment clubs, began to appear across the Atlantic.

In 1951, F. R. D. Marshall, a Civil War enthusiast, founded the Confederate Caucus in Sutton, Surrey, and marked what was to be the beginning of decades of diverse popular activity revolving around the Civil War in Britain. Not much is known about Marshall or about this early 'discussion group', which seems to have left little evidence of its existence.[7] According to its founder, the society was 'a group of serious students of the Confederate and Civil War history, its main object being to hold regular meetings to discuss the subject and all new book publications, films, plays etc., on television and cinema screens, that dealt with some facet or aspect of it'.[8] Despite its still somewhat obscure origins, it is clear from its emphasis on studying the war that the Confederate Caucus followed the practice of Civil War Round Tables in the United States. As will become clearer in what follows, during the 1950s and 1960s Marshall cultivated a wide and branching network of personal connections with Americans who were involved in Civil War activities in the United States. In all likelihood, based on this network, Marshall imported the increasingly popular Round Table activity from the United States to Britain, as he later did with other sorts of activities. What is also clear is that as early as 1951 Marshall was exposed to American representations of the Civil War through books, films, plays and television programs that were available to him in his country.

As seemed to be the case for Marshall's interest in the conflict, the Civil War first penetrated the consciousness of future British founders and members of Civil War societies primarily through American popular culture. This was carried by cultural agents – such as the television, the cinema, books and people – who could cross the Atlantic when most Britons and Americans could not. Before the age of transatlantic mass

tourism in the 1970s and 1980s, the British middle and working classes, comprising the bulk of the membership of Civil War societies in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, were largely dependent upon American export of Civil War narratives, images and information.[9] Recalling the scope of Civil War re-enactment in Britain in the 1960s, a founder of one Civil War re-enactment society noted that, '[F]ifty years ago, there was nothing. Maybe in America but going there was a dream'.[10] Similarly, the journal of one British Civil War society enthusiastically published low-quality pictures taken by a member during his visit to Virginia's Fort Darling in 1962, illustrating the rarity of such direct experience, geographically possible, of course, only for Americans.[11]

However, as the story of the Confederate Research Club (CRC) illustrates, through the agency of American popular culture, the British public had a range of Civil War representations available in their country. In February 1953, three Civil War enthusiasts formed the CRC in Portsmouth, Hampshire. Similar to the newly born Confederate Caucus, the CRC, too, followed the format of Civil War Round Table activity in the United States. By 1956, Patrick C. Courtney, one of the club's founders, could say that the CRC ran its activity 'along the lines of the Civil War Round Tables' which, as noted, flourished in the United States but not yet in Britain.[12] Following in the tradition of the Round Tables, according to its constitution the CRC aspired to 'promote and advance research and study of the Confederate history, especially Confederate activities in the United Kingdom and Europe'.[13] During club dinners, members of the CRC heard papers on topics such as 'The "Alabama" and the Law', by archivist and librarian Rupert Charles Jarvis, and 'Confederate Humour and Morale', by Thomas Green, another founder. The club's official journal, *The New Index*, reported on current affairs and published members' independent studies on themes related to the Civil War. On 1 January 1961, the CRC changed its title and officially became the American Civil War Round Table of London, England, and shortly thereafter the American Civil War Round Table UK (ACWRT UK), which still exists today. 'It was a dining club, meet periodically, have dinners together', recalled a veteran member about this period of transition.[14] Broadening its scope of interest beyond the history of the Confederacy, the ACWRT UK continued the scholarly tradition of the CRC, and saw itself as an organization 'dedicated to the study of all aspects of the civil war [*sic*]'.[15]

The founders and future members of the CRC had been exposed to the Civil War well before the club was established in 1953. In an August 1955 letter to historian Mary Elizabeth Massey, then in Winthrop College,

South Carolina, Courtney wrote that it was the re-issuing in Britain of the film *Gone with the Wind* in 1953 that had flared the enthusiasm of the founders and motivated them to establish the club.[16] However, by the time he wrote the letter the club had already listed more than 70 members, and Courtney himself reported that by the time the CRC was established, 'scattered Confederates' already existed in Britain.[17] Clearly, then, by 1953 future CRC members were familiar with the Civil War. This is hardly surprising considering that, as this book shows, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Civil War had been projected in Britain as part of the ever-growing American cultural export. More specifically, as the previous chapter showed, Civil War cinema was a pivotal American cultural agent that exported Civil War representations to the broader British public. Many British Civil War enthusiasts today recall how intrigued by the war they became after watching *The Red Badge of Courage* (John Huston, 1951) or John Wayne films.[18] Similarly, *GWTW* was a success in Britain already during the Second World War and along with other contemporary Civil War films exposed the British public to the conflict.[19] The founders of the CRC, like many in Britain, were lured and motivated by the lasting influence of the film. Narratives and representations of the Civil War likewise arrived in Britain with Americans who consumed them as an integral part of their own popular culture.[20] Illustrating this point, other early sources of influence on the development of the CRC (later the ACWRT UK) were Second World War American servicemen, also functioning as culture carriers.[21] As one ACWRT UK veteran member recalled:

> I was born at the start of the Second World War. Towards the end of the war, where I lived in Liverpool there were American bases. I had a friend who had four older sisters, and each one of the sisters had an American boyfriend.... [T]he war was just finished [and] there were no sweets, no chocolate, no magazines, [and they brought] American magazines, comics, ... and in these comics [were] stories about the American Civil War. I started to read these comics and books and got very interested from about 9 years of age.[22]

Achieving its central place in American culture during the twentieth century, the Civil War became part of the United States' official and unofficial, intentional and unintentional cultural export that had reached the broader public abroad.

The late 1950s saw the emergence of another kind of Civil War society in Britain, different from the ones that were shaped along the lines

of the Round Tables. This organization came about as an outcome of personal connections, which was another method for bridging over the Atlantic. By the close of the decade, F. R. D. Marshall, the father of the Confederate Caucus, had initiated a fruitful relation with Donald A. Ramsey from the Confederate High Command (CHC) in the United States. This personal connection shortly gave birth to the British branch of the society.[23] Similar to its American counterpart, the British branch of the CHC was a military-oriented organization whose members carried military titles and dressed in Confederate-like uniforms. A Civil War enthusiast remembered his first encounter with the CHC in Britain:

> [W]hen I get there ... I knocked on the door and this woman answered and she's all in this bloody crinoline ... Gone With the Wind sort of thing[,] ... and she introduced me to the guy I spoke to on the phone, and he's a full-blown major in the Confederate Army. He got a uniform but it was ... a bit Hollywood-style. I got in there and there's a room full of them. They're all officers, with their ladies, and I thought to myself 'oh dear, this is strange' ... anyway, this group, I thought 'I'm having none of this, I don't want to get dressed-up as a bloody officer'.... I thought it would be like a historical society.[24]

An advertisement in a magazine motivated this Civil War fan in the early 1960s to look for a social club dealing with the war he had, by then, already known and loved. However, since re-enactment was just emerging in the United States, and since it was unfamiliar in Britain, the activity of the CHC seemed strange to this Briton, currently an active re-enactor who often dresses as a Confederate soldier. True, the British branch of the CHC was something of a hybrid. It did not perform re-enactments as in the United States, nor did it promote academic research about the war, as did the Round Tables. Consequently, although it existed until the mid-1990s, early members found it unsatisfactory as a re-enactment society or as a scholarly setting. These individuals, in turn, became the founders of another research society and of the first Civil War re-enactment group in Britain.

The story of the Confederate Historical Society (CHS) began as another initiative of Marshall's, when the founder of the CHC in Britain grew critical of his own creation. Marshall's opposition to the CHC's militaristic and non-academic character led him to head a dissenting group of members to establish the CHS in February 1962.[25] The society – 'for those interested in the American Civil War and in particular the rise and fall of the Confederate States of America' – met bimonthly at 75 York Street

in London, and from July 1962 issued an official journal.[26] Until its final dissolution in the mid-1990s, the CHS focused on historical research about the war and published numerous studies by its members.[27]

As Civil War societies began to flourish in Britain, these societies, too, became Anglo-American cultural agents and platforms for Civil War transatlantic exchanges. For example, the CRC early on listed several American members alongside its UK membership. In July 1955, the editor of *The New Index* even noted that, of the society's new recruits, 'out of eleven there are ten Americans and one Englishman'. 'It is apparent', he urged, 'that greater effort is needed in the recruiting drives here in England'.[28] As the club grew so did its bi-national membership, until gradually it became a center for both British and American Civil War enthusiasts outside the United States. The Anglo-American composition of the CHS was no different. Initially comprising 43 all-British members, by 1968 the society registered 288 members of which 131 were British, 136 were Americans and 21 were from other parts of the world. More important than numbers, which in fact never soared as the heads of the CHS had hoped, was the fact that the London-based society became an international authority on the Civil War and a platform from which to transmit representations of the Civil War across the ocean. In 1962, for example, William Payne, a Texan member of the CHS, sent his British associates over a hundred Civil War stamps from the centennial special collection that was issued at the time in the United States.[29] In this way the society served as an Anglo-American hub and a conduit through which to transmit Civil War commodities from the United States to Britain. Ideas, opinions and images were transmitted, in both directions, even more frequently than artifacts with every issue of the club's journal.

Like the CHS, the Southern Skirmish Association (SoSkAn[30]), Britain's first Civil War re-enactment club, was a recalcitrant child of the Confederate High Command. Founded by four members of the CHC who were dissatisfied with the scope of the club's re-enacting activity, the SoSkAn issued its first membership card on 1 June 1968. As a founder of the club, then in his early twenties, recalled, after four years in the ranks of the CHC, 'I wanted more. I wanted this [points out to the SoSkAn's fully deployed re-enactment camp around us]'.[31] Soon, the SoSkAn became a beacon for others who sought to re-enact the Civil War and found the CHC unsatisfactory. With 19 participants taking part in the club's first event, the SoSkAn had reached 750 registered members at its peak and today lists about 400 re-enactors (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).[32]

Figure 5.1 Members of the Southern Skirmish Association in the club's first event, 1967

Figure 5.2 Members of the Southern Skirmish Association in a club event, June 1968

Source: Pictures courtesy of an anonymous British re-enactor.

The emergence and growth of the SoSkAn, and indeed of popular Civil War activity in Britain more generally, owed a debt directly and indirectly to the leading Civil War transatlantic agent of the time – the celebration of the war's one-hundredth anniversary. Re-enactment activities, for example, penetrated public consciousness in the United States and subsequently in Britain on a comparatively large scale, gaining a permanent foothold during and immediately after the Civil War centennial.[33] The Americans began to prepare for the events of 1961–1965 as early as 1957, when an Act of Congress created the Civil War Centennial Commission (CWCC). While scholars have examined the work of the commission and the influence of the celebration more generally in the United States, less is known about their impact in Britain and on British Civil War societies.[34]

For one thing, the celebrations tied the British societies more closely to events in the United States and led to a revision of those societies' fields of interest. In the late 1950s, for example, the Confederate Research Club 'was invited to become a British corresponding member of the Civil War Centennial Commission' and Patrick Courtney was appointed a member of the Advisory Council of the CWCC.[35] Consequently, a club member explained, '[W]hen it was the 100th anniversary, in 1961, the group got some sort of a revival in terms of interests and they changed their name.… We changed our name, to the American Civil War Round Table UK…to join ourselves to a wider group'.[36] The CRC had connections with similar American societies already during the early 1950s. However, the official link with the centennial celebration in the United States, established through the CWCC, bound the British society more firmly to American currents and led to a profound change in the orientation of the society: From a society explicitly associated with the Confederacy, the CRC became a club dedicated to the study of the Civil War as a whole. The depth and full significance of this change, which was a result of contemporary developments in the United States, is discussed at length below. Although the initiative was not always its own, the CWCC continued to endow British societies with the authority to represent the commission and the centennial in Britain. In that way, Marshall and his Confederate High Command became official centennial exponents, too, following Marshall's repeated requests.[37] Gradually, more and more bridges between the United States and Britain were established through the events and organizations surrounding and implicit in the centennial celebrations.

The Civil War exhibition, held in the American Embassy in London in 1962, demonstrated another aspect of the centennial's impact on British

Civil War societies. Taking part in the exhibition was a group of people dressed in Civil War uniforms, all of whom were British. A founder of the SoSkAn recalled his enthusiasm upon first spotting them in the following way:

> [T]hen my wife said to me come inside and have a look at what's on television. This was in 1962. I went in, and on television there was an exhibition at the American Embassy of the American Civil War.... A group of English Civil War enthusiasts was staged in the exhibition. So now, I'm hungry. The next day ... I didn't go to work, I went down to the West End and I went in ... and I met these guys standing there in their uniforms ... and it was a group called the Confederate High Command.... I joined them and I stayed with them from '63 'till late '67.[38]

The centennial publicized the existence in Britain of Civil War societies and brought them and, indeed, the Civil War itself, to the public's attention. This, in turn, gave Civil War enthusiasts – who previously had had no frame within which to express and develop their interest in the conflict – a local structure with which to associate and within which to act. Reporting on the growing enthusiasm about the war across the ocean at that time, Marshall thanked Karl S. Betts, executive director of the CWCC, for the material he had sent, which helped 'very considerably in our plans to observe the Civil War in this country amongst the many enthusiasts we are recruiting over here'.[39]

In addition to official initiatives, unofficial centennial by-products flooded the British public sphere during the celebrations and brought the war to an ever-widening British public. 'When the centenary celebrations came up, in the 1960s', recalled a veteran member of the SoSkAn, 'I collected anything I could get my hand on'.[40] Indeed there was a lot to grab. Although not official centennial merchandise, among the most popular and oft-mentioned sources of acquaintance with the war among British fans were the 82 Civil War News bubblegum cards, issued in Britain by A&BC in 1962.[41] The above member of the SoSkAn recalled:

> During the 60s, a company called ABC Ltd. [*sic*], they brought out a set of cards ... and one side of the card they had a reproduction of ... some action that took place in the Civil War. On the back there was like a newspaper article of that event.... All the kids collected these bubblegum cards ... and I collected two sets of these cards.[42]

Popular 'cultural goods' (or just plain merchandise) released officially but also unofficially during the centennial, such as games, academic studies, novels, television specials, films and stamps, generated enthusiasm and brought the Civil War closer to the British public than ever before. For many it was the first step towards either joining an existing British Civil War society or establishing one.

Clearly, then, even if no British arsenal of Civil War popular representations and activities was available, by the time British societies began to take shape in the early 1950s, their members had a large repository of American representations and forms of activities from which they could draw. With the coming of the centennial, this repository grew significantly and reached its peak. However, as fascination with the war grew, the American export of the Civil War legacy ultimately became insufficient for British enthusiasts. Early on, from every corner of the growing Civil War community in Britain came a call for more information, more primary and secondary sources and more popular goods. 'The major sources are usually American', lamented M. A. Rich of the CHS in March 1963, 'and little can be gleaned from short trade advertisement in American magazines'.[43] In subsequent volumes, Rich practically begged members with any connection to the United States to send the CHS editorial staff illustrations, pictures and maps, as they did not exist in Britain.[44]

However, Britons were not discouraged. Cut off from easy access to American sources, Britons focused on expanding their knowledge of the British aspect of the conflict. 'In particular', wrote Rich in 1963, 'the editor would like to receive material dealing with the links between this country and America during the period of the Civil War'.[45] British sources, as opposed to the American ones, were easily available. Ceaselessly, the CHS urged its members to use British primary sources (such as historical records of *The Times*), to broaden the scope of inquiry beyond the borders of the United States and to look for the war's historical impact on Britain. And when they looked, they found.

Thus Britain became, for those enthusiasts, a memorial and site of commemoration for the Civil War. In the late 1950s, for example, the Confederate Research Club established the Bulloch Memorial Fund – 'for the purpose of restoring and permanently maintaining in a suitable condition the grave of Commander James D. Bulloch' – to which the American Civil War Round Tables of Chicago and North Carolina also contributed funds.[46] Bulloch, a Georgian Confederate naval officer, was a secret agent, fundraiser and agitator who contributed immensely to Confederate efforts in the United Kingdom during the Civil War,

especially with regard to shipbuilding. After the war he settled with his family in Liverpool, where he died in 1901.[47] Alongside memorial sites for Americans in Britain, Civil War enthusiasts began to elevate and commemorate the British ties to the conflict. Some sought local graves of Britons with direct connection to the Civil War. Friends, recalled a founder of the SoSkAn, 'went down to Portsmouth and they found [Arthur] Fremantle's overgrown grave in an old cemetery and they've been in touch with the authorities ... and they've come along, cleaned up the grave and bought a lovely head-stone'.[48] Similarly, a report on a British sailor who served in the crew of the Confederate cruiser, CSS *Alabama*, led one CHS member to ask his fellows in 1963 whether there were 'any other memorials in this country to Civil War dead?'[49] and a letter to the *Daily Telegraph* requesting information about Britons who fought in the war received over a hundred replies.[50] Enthusiasts also conducted memorials for both British and American fallen soldiers, and SoSkAn members, in full gear, participated in services in several cemeteries across Britain.[51] Others organized Civil War tours to British 'battlefields', such as the Wirral area, where the CSS *Alabama* was built.[52]

On a more official level, exhibitions were organized across Britain, often based on the aforementioned unofficial networks, which brought to the fore the British link to the American war. Between 13 June and 30 August 1961, for example, the city of Liverpool initiated and hosted a special exhibition entitled 'Merseyside and the American Civil War'. Among the contributors that the British initiators harnessed to promote and take part in the project were the CWCC, American and British museums, private businesses, private individuals and public institutions.[53] The exhibition 'will feature Merseyside's contribution to the conflict', wrote E. W. Paget-Tomlinson, Liverpool Museums' Keeper of Shipping, to Edmund E. Gass, Assistant Executive Director of the Civil War Centennial Commission, in Washington.[54] To that end, read a supplementary leaflet, the display 'follows the course of the war in outline, but places particular emphasis on the construction of Confederate ships in Birkenhead and Liverpool and on the activities of the Liverpool built and owned blockade runners, to draw attention to the part played by our community in the conflict'.[55] A special place was dedicated to the story of the cruisers (or commerce raiders) CSS *Alabama* and CSS *Shenandoah* – built at Birkenhead in England and on the Clyde in Scotland, respectively – as well as to the Trent Affair. The exhibition was a success, and about 77,000 people visited it in less than three months.[56] Civil War exhibitions of this sort were staged elsewhere in

Britain as well, including the 1961 display at the Imperial War Museum in London.[57] Consequently, out of all this intense popular activity, for Civil War enthusiasts, the war became 'a very British affair', and Britain became an active, productive source for Civil War information, artifacts and representations.[58]

Moreover, through popular activities of this kind British enthusiasts often endeavored to export to the United States their interest in and connection to the Civil War. In so doing, they sought to use war representations to pull the United States toward Britain and promote Anglo-American affinities. Marshall, for example, explicitly stated that the Military Historical Society, which organized the above-mentioned exhibition at the Imperial War Museum, aspired to contact the various state centennial commissions and exchange Civil War material, in order 'to further promote Anglo-U.S. good relations'.[59] On another occasion, Marshall noted that the cooperation with the CWCC 'show[s] how very much the two peoples of our respective nations, are willing to co-operate at all levels, and how strong is the common bond of language and military tradition between us'.[60] Although the impact of the British export of their views and representations of the war to America is hard to determine, it is evident that the Americans acknowledged that Britons could enrich their understanding of their own war. 'We are much interested', wrote Betts to Courtney, in 1958,

> in anything you may turn up in England. Broadly speaking we would like to know about the activities of the Confederate commissioners over there and more details on the life of Judah Benjamin. We are publishing a monthly newsletter and it occurs to me that you may be in a position to supply us with some completely new historical material which would prove of great interest to our readers.[61]

And, indeed, reports and pictures from the exhibition in Liverpool had arrived in the United States as well and were distributed to the American public by the CWCC.

Ultimately, the growing British basis of Civil War activities and of British Civil War resources was to become fertile ground for additional local popular groups. Thus, in 1975, six Civil War enthusiasts formed the American Civil War Society (ACWS), a second major British re-enactment society. By then, these Civil War buffs had not only American export of war representations and activities to draw on, but also a diverse British arsenal. 'Because they [the SoSkAn] were always down south, I never joined them because I live up way in the north', recalled an

ACWS founder.[62] Additional groups drew on this expanding British base, and Civil War activities have since spread to all parts of the United Kingdom. The Confederate and Union Reenactment Society (CURS), for example, was established in 1997 by a member of the SoSkAn to bring together mainly members from Wales;[63] and, although less frequently, events have been taking place in Scotland and Northern Ireland, too (Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6).

The coming age of mass tourism meant a further line of communication between Civil War buffs on either side of the Atlantic. Thus in 1982, a first delegation of 76 ACWS re-enactors marched in full gear in North Carolina;[64] and in August 1989, Leighton Hall in Lancashire hosted an international event in which 151 American re-enactors took part alongside over 300 British, 30 Germans, 16 French, two Belgians and two Irish participants.[65] These mutual exchanges continue to this day and mark the coming of age of the transatlantic network that gave birth to Civil War activities in Britain in the 1950s.

However, the transatlantic networks that British and American Civil War enthusiasts have developed and nourished since the 1950s have been transmitting much more than historical tidbits about the war or forms of

Figures 5.3 An American Civil War Society re-enactment of the Battle of Gettysburg in Cheshire, England, April 2011

Figure 5.4 An American Civil War Society camp

Figure 5.5 A typical canvas tent used by British re-enactors

Figure 5.6 A Southern Skirmish Association camp
Source: Pictures by the author.

popular activities. Rather, they also have enabled values, conventions of commemoration, identities and heritage to cross the Atlantic.

David Lowenthal has argued that heritage and history differ from one another in their aspirations. Whereas both are concerned with the portrayal of the past, history strives to depict it as closely as possible, while heritage consciously distorts it in order to celebrate the present.[66] Therefore, heritage-creation necessarily entails de- and re-construction of the past as well as its glorification, as opposed to historical exercise that is determined to avoid precisely that. In the United States, Civil War symbols, such as the Confederate flag or the battlefield in Gettysburg, have been undergoing constant de- and re-construction, and the heritage embedded in them has been in constant flux.[67] Claimed to idealize and distort the past, the activity of popular Civil War societies in the United States, and especially of re-enactment groups, tends also to fall within the category of heritage-creation.[68] Thus, Civil War popular activity in the United States, similar to other Civil War commodities, has served as a means to fashion, re-fashion and glorify the war and to distribute American national heritage.

Along with, and through the transmission of, popular goods, activities and historical knowledge, transatlantic agents also carried with them to Britain this changing American heritage of the Civil War. As discussed in the previous chapter, against the background of the Cold War and during the centennial, when Civil War popular movements in Britain also began to take shape, Americans sought to represent the Civil War as a symbol of American patriotism.[69] Accordingly, popular commodity, public societies and official celebrations aimed to present an inclusive narrative of the war, one that highlighted reconciliation and unity and was free of contention. As shown in the preceding chapter, films such as *Major Dundee* (1965) promoted messages of unity and reconciliation by blurring the difference between North and South and between white and black Americans, and by highlighting instead their common American identity.

Another feature that promoted the conciliatory and uncontested heritage of the Civil War was an emphasis on its military aspect. In this sense, the popular sphere resembled the military sphere, discussed here in Chapter 2.[70] Warfare and soldiers, unlike politics and politicians, seemed neutral. The army, and since the late nineteenth century primarily the common citizen-soldier, was depicted in American culture as a-political and as a victim of circumstances rather than an active agent that affected them.[71] The Civil War News bubblegum cards, for example, brought into the limelight notions of wartime heroism, altruistic sacrifice, the folly and horrors of war, cross-sectional gallantry and the naivety of the common citizen-soldier. 'The brave soldiers met head-on', reported card number 81 on the Battle of Nashville in 1864, 'in one of the bloodiest battles of the war'.[72] Alongside the glorification of the common soldier, the cards also fostered a cult of military leaders. 'The South has a new hero today in General Stonewall Jackson', read card number 11; 'the fiery leader led the Southern troops to a sweeping victory at Cross Keys, earlier today'. Lastly, the cards conveyed that in the Civil War, the humanity of the soldiers had transcended sectionalism. Card number 52, entitled 'Friendly Enemies', featured a Confederate soldier nursing a Union foe and read: 'Since medical aid could not be administered to all, often two wounded soldiers would try to help and bandage one another.... Once wounded, the soldiers no longer thought of war, and only tried to help themselves survive'. As important as the notions and themes that the cards featured and perpetuated, were those that they omitted. Lending focus to military affairs, politics was outside the scope of the narrative, as was the subject of slavery.

The five official Centennial Stamps were not, in substance, different from the playing cards but, in addition, they advanced the importance of forgiveness as a lesson from the war. The first four stamps – entitled 'Fort Sumter', 'Shiloh', 'The Wilderness' and 'Gettysburg' – featured only fighting scenes of common soldiers. The last stamp – 'Appomattox' – showed a mourning soldier, with nothing to disclose his sectional affiliation, facing a monument under the caption 'with malice toward none'.[73] The soldiers on the stamps were all from the ranks, and the war was reduced to a series of battles. In the end, the stamps conveyed, all that remained was to forgive. For that to be possible, all but the soldiers and their heroic sacrifice needed not to be remembered, but rather to be swept away and forgotten.

However, that Americans had exported their heritage of the Civil War did not necessarily entail that the British assumed it as such, or indeed that they assumed it at all. Why, in fact, should Britons adopt a foreign history and heritage? Why should they celebrate another country's past or present? As one British film critic wrote, *Major Dundee* was 'a rallying point for all the Americans, both Union and Confederate, against the Old World'.[74] What was Britain's place in this all-American story? Was not the Civil War, as Stephen Hunt has argued, external to British re-enactors' cultural and historical context?[75]

Indeed, for many Civil War buffs in Britain, the war was in various ways foreign. This, however, was not a source of alienation. Rather, the American origins of the war and of its heritage were often a primary reason for British enthusiasts to adopt them. For one thing, the American pedigree of the war enabled Britons to immerse themselves in an historical event that, familiar as it might eventually become after studying and reliving it, allowed nonetheless for a safe degree of detachment. 'Because it isn't our war', noted one re-enactor when asked why he joined the ACWS, 'I'd feel quite uncomfortable [re-enacting a British war], especially in a World War Two environment; because my parents lived through that'.[76] 'I am not interested in portraying my English Civil War', noted another re-enactor, 'it's a bit closer to home'.[77] A foreign war enabled these people to distance themselves from historical affairs which, being part of their history and identity, might have given rise to overly strong emotions, touch upon open wounds or confront them with dilemmas as to which side to choose.

Furthermore, whereas other foreign wars could have fulfilled Civil War students' desire to distance themselves from the history that they were re-living, only this war was a war that could have explained the rise of the modern United States. This, in turn, had made it very

relevant to contemporary British life in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 'Because', argued a Round Table member when asked about his motivation for joining the club, 'in Europe we recognize the impact that America has had on European history, certainly since 1914'. 'Without the American Civil War', he added, 'you cannot conceive of America in its present form, [and] America has such a massive influence on us because we now live in the shadow of America'.[78] Two of his colleagues nodded in agreement. The Civil War was etched into memory and history as the event that gave birth to the modern United States. That United States was the one that fought the world wars; stood against communism; led and influenced the global economy; and spread its culture throughout the media. As such, no other war – not even a different American war – could have explained for the British the sources and character of the shadow under which they have been living for nearly a hundred years.

At the same time, Britons turned to the Civil War also because they found endless historical bonds tying them to the American conflict. Put differently, evidence shows that British enthusiasts often *did not* consider the war outside their historical context. Asked why he thought people in Britain have been dedicating themselves to another country's history, one ACWRT UK member replied: 'Don't ask the members why they are interested in an American historical event, which it was not solely. There were as many events and happenings in the UK and all over Europe directly associated with the ACW as there were in the US'.[79] Becoming aware of the historical involvement of Britain in the war, and of the war's impact on their country, British enthusiasts developed an historical consciousness that incorporated the Civil War into their national history. One veteran re-enactor, for example, lamented that 'it's a shame that English heritage [downplays] the American Civil War[;] ... I don't think they realize the links[,] ... so many links to justify English heritage'.[80]

In addition, British fans became fascinated with the Civil War because it was an inexhaustible source of romantic stories. Recounting the story of a battle that he could not specifically remember, one member of the ACWS recalled a tale about a soldier who

> was carrying no less than 11 different wounds, none of them fatal, but he was bleeding profusely, leaning against the flag. [Then his commander told him]: 'Sergeant, you're relieved to go to the rear'. He said, 'Why? What have I done wrong?' ... 'You're bleeding'. 'With respect, sir, I haven't got time to bleed, I'm going back out there'.[81]

The re-enactor said the soldier died shortly in battle. The place, date and context of the battle, which the re-enactor forgot, were in fact not at all important. What was important for the British buff was the story of a citizen-soldier who fought gallantly and sacrificed his life for a cause. For that matter, it was not even important if it was the Confederacy's or the Union's cause, since all causes seemed morally justified, especially through the narrative of reconciliation. Seen through the prism of reconciliation, as a SoSkAn member reflected on it: the war 'just grabs the human soul and [shows] just what we're made of[; it] brings out the cream and the spirit of human compassion, the spirit of our humanity'.[82] These values went beyond sectionalism and even beyond the borders of the United States. In addition to ordinary heroes, the war supplied British re-enactors with timeless leaders. 'It was the last war that created heroes on both sides', argued a veteran member of the ACWS.[83] Humanity, sacrifice for a supreme cause, heroism and leadership – on both sides – were fused together in the stories about the horrors of war.

Finally, Britons appropriated the American war because, rather than being external to their cultural context, they came to see it and the values that it represented deep *within* this context. Notions that were associated with the Civil War – such as gallantry, unity, humanity and patriotism – were alluring to British enthusiasts. In the context of the war, these were naturally attributed to the North, to the South or, through the prism of reconciliation, to the United States as a whole. Subsequently, American patriotism, American gallantry, American unity and American humanity were at the center of the British understandings of the war. 'And then in the end of it', remarked one British re-enactor, summarizing the story of the war in a nutshell, 'you got the Confederates helping the Union and you got the Union helping the Confederates. Because when all [was] said and done, they were all Americans'.[84] However, maintaining their appeal also as American ideals, upon arrival in Britain these ideals often took on new meanings and references through translation and localization. Asked about the side he chose to play, one Union re-enactor – appealing to his personal heritage – declared that, 'they are just slave-owning scummy Rebs. I don't believe in slavery, I'm a Church of England Christian, and I don't believe, as a lawyer, in people acting unlawfully and secession is unlawful'.[85] Appealing also to their own national identity, British enthusiasts have linked their country's heritage, as they saw it, with values that were associated with the Civil War. An ACWRT UK member noted that the study of the war is still relevant, as it can inform the nature of

Britain's relationship to the EU.[86] Similarly, rebellion, as both a national and personal British characteristic, has also been a central motivation in joining Civil War clubs. 'In these days, everybody wanted to be a reb', noted an ACWS founder, '[it's] the British spirit'.[87] A final repetitive theme among British enthusiasts has been the notion of the underdog. As one Confederate re-enactor bluntly put it, '[I]t is very British to like the underdog'.[88]

These views reveal the act of translation from 'American' to 'British'. Through representations of the Civil War, Americans intended to export, project and celebrate their own national identity. To them, naturally, it had nothing to do with the Church of England, with the EU or with the British spirit. As discussed in Chapter 3, when they wished to use the representation of Lincoln for purposes of public diplomacy, American information agencies did endeavor to invest his image with British characteristics.[89] However, the Civil War was rarely used to such ends and was thus not charged with 'British features' intentionally and in advance.

The 'Official Program of the Civil War Centennial Commission' from July 1958, for example, revealed no international aspirations, in Britain or elsewhere.[90] The USIA, too, seemed to have not been involved in the planning, and the events remained chiefly in the hands of the CWCC and the National Park Service (NPS). It was probably only in 1961 that Gass of the CWCC recommended to the USIA that it take upon itself to promote the centennial for the Emancipation commemoration abroad.[91] Thus the work of making the American war more British was left to the British to carry out. In popular culture, as in other spheres, the British developed their own independent understanding of the conflict and drew their own lessons from it.

Furthermore, in addition to the geographical transplant, inherent in the British reception of Civil War images was an act of de- and re-construction of the war external to its historical context. For example, far from representing the rebellious spirit of 1960s and 1970s Britain, Southern secession in the 1860s was, as James McPherson has argued, an archetypal counterrevolutionary act.[92] It was a fight for conservatism, reaction and oppression, as even contemporary Southern leaders acknowledged.[93] Similarly, in the 1860s, the Church of England was not at all in favor of the Union. 'The Union found few supporters among ministers of the Church of England', Richard Blackett observed.[94] Finally, no doubt knowledgeable about the military history of the war, most re-enactors and Round Table members likely knew that strategically, the Confederacy was not the underdog for most of the war. As

many believed at the time, despite its superiority in resources, the Union faced a nearly impossible mission in conquering the Confederacy.[95]

The British translation and de-construction of the notions associated with the Civil War that were exported from the United States showed the conflict was conveniently flexible, adaptable to British alteration. In turn, the ability of Britons to fashion their own images of the war made it appealing and easy for them to consume. However, in the United Kingdom as in the United States, the representation of the Civil War eventually proved less consensual than what might have first seemed the case. The transatlantic network that allowed for the emergence of a Civil War community in Britain allowed also for the transmission of competing narratives of the conflict. As in the United States, in Britain, too, the different American representations of the war continually competed with each other. In addition, Britons autonomously constructed a British Civil War heritage, which revealed itself to be incompatible with some of the American representations of the war. The dispute over the replication of CSS *Alabama* in the Merseyside area in the late 1980s and early 1990s saw all of these representations surface, and collide.

The CSS *Alabama* was a Confederate cruiser built in Birkenhead on the river Mersey in 1862. Until USS *Kearsarge* sank it off the French coast in 1864, the *Alabama* had caused extensive damage to Union shipping. After the Civil War, the warship became the center of an Anglo-American dispute over Britain's responsibility for the losses caused by the vessel. In 1871, the Treaty of Washington resolved the dispute. Although according to the treaty Britain was required to pay $15.5 million to the United States, as Philip Myers and others have shown, the *Alabama* claims allowed for a discourse that opened the way for closer relations and cooperation between the countries.[96]

This, however, was not the historical dispute that surfaced in Britain more than a hundred years later. In 1987, the Birkenhead Ironworks and CSS *Alabama* Trust registered as a charity aimed

> [t]o advance the education of the public by promoting for their benefit the acquisition, excavation, permanent preservation and restoration and display of (i) number 4 dock or a place of historic interest on the site of the former Birkenhead ironworks; (ii) hull number 290 (also known as CSS *Alabama*) and any items connected thereto; (iii) any other vessel or vessels of historic interest particularly those which have been associated with number 4 dock or other docks on Merseyside, provided that the aforementioned shall be open as far as is reasonably possible to access to the public.[97]

The initiative was part of a greater project to revitalize the Birkenhead docklands and turn the area into a tourist attraction.

Expectations of the Alabama project were high. 'Construction', declared the *Birkenhead News* in October 1989, 'will start in January, next year, creating jobs, training and commercial opportunities'.[98] Upon initiating the fundraising campaign, appeal president Ludovic Kennedy noted that the *Alabama* full-size model 'will be a flagship for Merseyside's resurgence and enterprise, a spur to business and employment opportunity. She will provide an unrivalled training platform for young people, and a tourist attraction of both national and international interest'.[99] Hoping to reach the American public as well, the Wirral Borough Council, too, enthusiastically backed the project that was expected to generate 'tremendous amounts of interest from across the Atlantic'.[100] Soon, however, the seemingly harmless educational and commercial initiative turned out to be sitting on local and national powder kegs. When dispute around the project gained momentum, it turned out that what was at issue were Lancashire's, Britain's and the United States' Civil War heritages.

The *Alabama* project hit a sensitive nerve in Lancashire's Civil War heritage. Since at least the 1920s, Lancashire's position during the conflict has been a matter of scholarly debate.[101] However, the view that Lancashire's working class had supported the Union – as the side that fought to abolish slavery and promote democracy – was burned into the region's local heritage and collective consciousness. Therefore, the intention to replicate a Confederate ship met with opposition from private people and anti-racist organizations, which claimed that the vessel was a symbol of bigotry that ran counter to the county's heritage. Nigel Todd, for example, a Newcastle Labour councilor, historian and anti-racism activist, wrote in the *Guardian*:

> The implications of engaging in heritage lies are graphically illustrated in the mad scheme to raise £2.5 million to build a replica of the Alabama – a Confederate pirate ship active during the American Civil War – as a tourist attraction on the Wirral. This idea is being promoted by Wirral Council's leisure department using the excuse that the Alabama was built on Merseyside and 'the people of Liverpool were sympathetic' to the slave-owning Confederacy. Someone should take the Wirral Council aside and gently remind them that, despite the enormous suffering in the Lancashire textile towns ... large numbers of cotton workers made it plain they wanted nothing to do with perpetuating slavery in the United States. Wirral Council has a

> clear duty to explain its purpose in raking up the Alabama. Why is the Council so intent on delivering a gross insult to the heritage of Lancashire's working-class communities?[102]

Todd's vitriol and vehemence – as did the protest against the project more generally – testified to just how ingrained in the county's heritage its part in the Civil War had become. For Labour representatives like Todd, the Lancashire working class's position evidently became also a contemporary point of honor. A Confederate symbol like the *Alabama* was, though even more than a century away, an 'insult'. Indeed, it was more than an insult. It was a threat. The re-appearance of the *Alabama* on the Wirral might have raised uncomfortable questions: Who built her? Were they British workers? Why did these workers take part in constructing a 'pirate', 'racist', 'slave-owning' ship? The morality of the region's working class was under threat.

The accepted wisdom about Lancashire's support of the Union was part, indeed the most contested part, of a national working-class heritage of the Civil War. In accordance with this heritage, members of Civil War societies proudly propagated the traditional, but now contested interpretation of Britons' reaction to the conflict, which stressed that the working class supported the Union, while the aristocracy supported the Confederacy.[103] As a member of the ACWS noted: 'The upper middle classes probably supported the South for a bunch of reasons. But the working class pretty much solidly ... was pro-Northern'.[104] When faced with the question of Britain's supply of weapons, clothes and other goods to the Confederacy, Civil War buffs often toted the neutrality of business. 'Ships were built here in Liverpool', conceded one re-enactor, 'but whether they were used for blockade runners or for war-ships, it was business for Britain'.[105] British political and economic attitudes during the war remain subjects of scholarly debate. As noted in previous chapters, current studies show that contrary to the accepted wisdom, the British upper and governing class did not overwhelmingly support the Confederacy.[106] However, the above heritage, perpetuated chiefly by working and middle class Civil War enthusiasts, elevated – and has been elevating since the 1860s – the moral character of their class in Britain and deplored the upper class and the government. This British heritage of the war, it now became clear, was incompatible with what was seen as the American heritage of the decadent Confederacy.

Moreover, the dispute over the *Alabama* project revealed that the incompatible American representations of the war had arrived in Britain, as well. That is, it showed that, as in the United States, contesting

representations of the war's meaning and impact in the United States in the 1860s split the British Civil War community, too. As assaults on the project grew, Donald J. Jordan, 'brigadier general' of the British branch of the Confederate High Command, could not refrain from comment or action. Jordan wrote to the Merseyside Community Race Relations Council, among others, demanding that they refrain from publicly labeling *Alabama* a 'slave ship'. For Richard Warren of the Confederate Historical Society, all that Jordan did was to re-inflame an issue better left dormant. Concerned that racial bias attached to the project would run the initiative aground, Warren launched an assault on Jordan:

> It seems that just as ruffled feathers were becoming a little unruffled, Don Jordan of the Confederate High Command took it upon himself to ruffle them well and truly once more by firing off letters to Merseyside Community Race Relation Council etc., accusing them of every abolitionist crime under the sun. The result? Naturally, all the activists beginning to come round to the realisation that the Alabama trust is, after all, perhaps not a front of the Ku Klux Klan have had their worst and most cherished fears realised. Nice one, Don! ... the consequences could be disastrous.... In the old days, the High Command was a bit of harmless fun. Under Ken Sharpe's command, it degenerated into a farce[;] ... under Don it has espoused born-again Confederatism with an enthusiasm that seemingly grows in direct ratio to the growing unreality of the ideology.[107]

Like Nigel Todd, Warren feared the 'disastrous' repercussion that *Alabama*'s contested heritage might entail. Unlike Todd, however, what troubled Warren was not the heritage of the war's impact on Britain and of the British response to the conflict. Rather, Warren was fighting over the heritage of the war's meaning and impact in the United States. Jordan, Warren declared, undermined the conflict's legacy of American reconciliation. According to Warren, in so doing, 'born-again Confederatism' might ignite the battle over the Civil War's legacy – a battle which, since the centennial, had cast a troublesome light on the war and on those involved in its representation, as shown in the previous chapter.

Warren's challenge did not go unmet. As he later noted, no other matter has 'provoked more responses'.[108] Indeed, Jordan's ire was to be expected. Furiously asserting his right to oppose labeling *Alabama* a 'slave ship', he attacked the Confederate Historical Society, noting that even 'the NAACP and dollar greedy developers are gentlemen compared with one of our own home grown cads'.[109] What angered members of

the Confederate High Command was the challenge to the legacy of the South that was posed by anti-racism activists and workers' representatives and backed by the CHS in its efforts to suppress the dispute. Accordingly, in addition to comparing him to a 'dollar greedy' Northerner and a civil rights activist, members of the CHC also challenged Warren's Southern identity. To show his disrespect, in a subsequent letter Jordan decried Warren as a 'self styled Confederate (?)'[110] In another letter, this time from a CHC member in Nova Scotia, Canada, the writer deplored Warren as being merely a '*SO-CALLED Confederate*'.[111] Re-affirming their own Southern identities, Jordan and other CHC members challenged Warren's and the CHS' Confederate affiliation because, they argued, the CHS suppressed the Confederacy's heritage in order to promote the inclusive, unitary heritage of the Civil War. As Jordan's reply illustrated, he had in fact shared Warren's anxiety. He, too, feared for the American legacy of the war, but it was a different American legacy.

The *Alabama* dispute established that the long arm of the South reached far and deep into Britain. As an ACWS founder recalled, even during the late 1970s, '[E]verybody wanted to be a Confederate'.[112] Similarly, as their titles made clear, all early societies started as Confederacy-oriented organizations, and they focused on all aspects of Southern way of life and warfare. In addition, the Southern grip was fierce. A current British re-enactor portraying Robert E. Lee wrote:

> General Lee is still greatly respected in America[;] ... when you go to America, you go to some of the Southern States, there are still – those who are involved in re-enacting and some who are not – still talk about affection to the man. What I'm after is not to mean any disrespect to General Lee's memory[;] ... people take many photographs and those photographs can appear on the web and if they appeared on some American site this will be greatly disrespectful.[113]

Testifying to his fears that an improper portrayal of Lee might incite a transatlantic dispute (as he recalled had happened before) this re-enactor acknowledged that disrespect to a Southern hero and symbol might be explosive.

In Britain, however, reconciliation proved strong enough to face the Southern assault. While the dispute between the dominant British Civil War societies mirrored the ongoing battle over the war's heritage in the United States, so did the efforts to assuage that dispute. Soon after the eruption of the quarrel, cries for unionism and re-sterilization of the war's representations came from every corner. Paul Jenkins of the ACWRT

UK, for example, attacked the CHC for poisoning Civil War activity in Britain with ideology and disunion and implored all sides: 'Instead of uniting in the interest of all to achieve our aims and ambitions, some are pursuing their own ways which could lead to everything being lost. Perhaps all Civil War Societies in the UK should take note before it's too late'.[114] In an effort to neutralize the symbolism of *Alabama*, advocates of the project tried to promote what were perceived to be neutral aspects of the vessel's history and at the same time to downplay its problematic features. Emphasis was therefore given to technical and military themes, while all political and social facets were pushed out of the narrative. Jim Bacon of the Alabama project thus noted:

> My despair – and it is a real despair – is caused, in part, by the futility of viewing yesterday through today's eyes, and the irrelevance which diverts us from bringing the Project to proper conclusion. All we should be concerned with is the amassing of technical information for the replica, the background of the crew, the life and times of Liverpool in 1862, and the vessel's revolutionary strategic maritime use. NOTHING ELSE MATTERS.... In terms of the Project I have no interest whatsoever in the causes and issues of the American Civil War. These matters are outside the raison d'être of the Project and I sincerely hope they will form no part of the Project or the accompanying exhibition.[115]

The *Alabama* project thus developed into a British fight over the American legacy of the war. The fight, although in Britain and by Britons, was conducted in American terms and within a discourse in which the war's legacy was debated at the time in the United States. The British Civil War community – allegedly Southern-oriented – reacted forcefully against what it saw as neo-Confederate expressions and assaults. Rather than being 'Southerners', then, Civil War buffs were in fact largely united behind a seemingly neutral narrative of the Civil War.

While Northern, Southern and conciliatory views received much voice in the debate, there was no representation of an African-American view on the Alabama project. Those who opposed the initiative did so from the point of view of the British working class, not from that of African Americans. Indeed, as opposed to the Northern, Southern and conciliatory narratives, the competing narrative of the war from the vantage point of African Americans has not been absorbed within British Civil War societies, from the 1950s to this day.

True, it was not until the late 1970s, largely due to ABC's screening of *Roots*, that this narrative penetrated popular culture in both the United States and Britain.[116] Even in academic circles, the African-American perspective of the war and Reconstruction gained ground only in the 1960s.[117] Nonetheless, pointing to the absence of an African-American contesting narrative within the discourse of British Civil War societies is not to be halted by the pitfall of anachronism, since British enthusiasts were well-aware of this narrative through their connections in the United States.

British enthusiasts were highly sensitive to events in the United States that were related to their subject of interest. Profound changes in the character of the Confederate Research Club leave little doubt that this controversy and its effects did not pass unnoticed by the British Civil War community. As members testified, the CRC's taking it upon itself to promote the centennial in Britain became inevitably exposed to its American Round Table counterparts. Subsequently, the club changed its name in 1961 to the ACWRT UK to comply with American custom, as noted above. However, the change was far more profound than a mere alteration of titles. 'We did not want to be seen as being Confederate', noted a leading member of the ACWRT UK.[118] Confederate titles, it seems, were no longer unproblematic in Britain. Subsequently, the club's newsletter, too, carrying the charged title *The New Index* after the Confederate propaganda newspaper that was distributed in Britain during the Civil War, was renamed in November 1963 and ever since called *Crossfire*.[119] A further testimony of the profound change in the club's orientation and its rejection, at least on the surface level, of its now-problematic Confederate identity in order to adopt a more moderate and inclusive character, was the abandonment of the club by several members who were devoted to Civil War era Southern ideals.[120] Indirectly – and through the centennial celebration – the work of the civil rights movements and the African-American view of the Civil War in the United States arrived in Britain.

That the African-American narrative was not absorbed within Civil War activity in Britain was because there was no one among the all-white societies' members to absorb it. There is no evidence that this was an outcome of bigotry or even of Confederate sentiments. The reason appears to be that in British societies there was nobody with a special interest in promoting this view. In a recent conference in Charleston, SC, an African-American re-enactor related that he has been re-enacting the Civil War chiefly for the purpose of commemorating and

propagating the African-American story of the conflict.[121] In British societies, this interest group has been absent. Again, there is nothing here to suggest that British societies intentionally or unintentionally have been excluding people of African descent from their ranks. It is argued that had such people taken part in these activities, the African-American point of view, in all likelihood would have been absorbed within the discourse of these societies from the start since that view did exist and was available in the transatlantic space.

The absence of people of African descent from Civil War activity in Britain unearths a fundamental difference between the forces that stood behind the shaping of Civil War representations in the United States and in Britain. Since the war and into the twenty-first century, African Americans in the United States have been using the Civil War in their fight, first for freedom and then for social equality. Their fight has been conducted, *inter alia*, through the history, legacy and representations of the conflict. As Martin Luther King Jr famously opened his *I Have a Dream* speech in 1963 from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial:

> Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of captivity. But 100 years later, we must face the tragic fact that the Negro is still not free.

In Britain, this was not the case. As Richard Blackett has argued, African-American interpretations of the Civil War arrived in Britain with African Americans before and during the Civil War and those interpretations had a profound impact on the British public.[122] This narrative, however, seemed to have been forgotten after the Civil War, at least partly because there was no significant black community in Britain with a pressing interest in sustaining and promoting it.

At the same time, the British constantly viewed the racial aspect of the Civil War through contemporary British glasses. Thus the story of slavery, suppression and freedom in the Civil War was not necessarily connected in Britain to issues of race and race relations. As shown in previous chapters, intellectuals – for example, such as John Drinkwater – used it to argue for national freedom; and in British military discourse, this aspect seemed irrelevant and was omitted altogether. Here, race issues in the context of the Civil War were harnessed in Britain in the

fashioning of class identity. As seen, the British legacy and representations of the war perpetuated the divide between the British working class, who supported abolition, and the British elite, who allegedly did not. Through this representation, attitudes to race in the context of the Civil War divided the British into classes, not races.

Racial affairs in Britain, by contrast, had less influence on the British representations of the Civil War. The 1960s did not see the growing black community in Britain making use of the Civil War in their struggle for assimilation and civil rights. One plausible reason for this is that the racial composition of British society was different from that of the United States in that it was not as bi-racial.[123] Britain was not so divided into black and white as was the United States and as were representations of the Civil War. It seems that when Britons confronted racial tensions at home, the Civil War played little part in the debate. When he referred to the issue of race problems in Britain, Todd, for example, did not appeal to the Civil War but rather to the British slave trade. 'And where is the Council's sense of moral responsibility?', he challenged:

> Merseyside has one of the oldest black communities in Britain, testifying to the fact that the area was built on the proceeds of the British slave trade. So, what is the meaning of Wirral's enthusiasm for extolling the memory of a collection of squalid slave states and, as a 'publicity' aid, waving racist Confederate flags?[124]

Similarly, the recent Civil War exhibition in the Merseyside Maritime Museum seemed to have raised little, if any, public unrest. 'We have not received any complaints from visitors concerning the exhibition', noted the display's curator.[125] By contrast, the exhibition on the history of slavery in the same museum – an exhibit that opened in 1994 and dealt with Britain's part in the Atlantic slave trade – did raise concerns and cause some public discontent (although it was eventually praised and widely accepted).[126] The more recent public and scholarly debate about the way to best commemorate the 2007 bicentenary of the 1807 abolition of the British slave trade also shows that, on racial issues, the British tend to look back on their own history.[127]

As the dispute over the replica of the *Alabama* showed, the British working class's representation of the Civil War was able to resist neo-Confederatism in Britain from raising its head. Put differently, in Britain, the working-class narrative of the Civil War played the role of the African American representation of the war in the United States in opposing manifestations of neo-Confederate sentiments in the public

sphere. The *Alabama* project demonstrated that neo-Confederate representations of the conflict could not be accommodated alongside the British narrative of the conflict and, thus, they could have only limited place in Britain. From another angle, neo-Confederatism was also restricted in Britain by the prominence of the narrative of reconciliation that allowed only for expressions of moderate Southern sentiments.

Furthermore, the working-class representation of the Civil War held the power also to determine what manifestations of Confederate ideology or Confederate symbols were illegitimate. In many ways, there was something in Jordan's insistence that the *Alabama* should not be targeted in Britain. After all, it was no more a symbol of the Confederacy than the gray uniform that so many Civil War buffs had worn across Britain before, during and after the affair. Furthermore, not thirty years earlier, the same vessel was a welcomed icon in the same place from which now it was banned. As noted above, in the exhibition held in Liverpool in 1961 to celebrate Merseyside's contribution to the Civil War, replicas of Confederate vessels were the main sources of both British pride and visitor attractions. A model of *Alabama*, said the Museum's Keeper of Shipping, formed 'the centrepiece of the exhibition'.[128] No public unrest was recorded. However, while the historical artifact and the location remained constant, the heritage invested in both has been in constant flux – as Lowenthal contended is always the case with heritage. Evidently, the question of what were to be extreme Confederate emblems was open for debate and change. The war narrative of the British working class – undoubtedly influenced by the rising of the African-American narrative of the war in the United States – proved to be influential in determining this question in Britain when it contributed to the representation of the *Alabama* as a symbol of Southern racism and bigotry, which it had not symbolized before.

However, if there was no place for an extremist South in Britain, there was certainly a place for a moderate and romantic South with values that could be attributed to Britain. 'My politics is with the North', declared a SoSkAn member of the 16th Tennessee, 'but there's always ... the association with the loser'.[129] As long as it stood for national freedom, for a romantic and youthful rebel spirit and for the gallant underdog, the Confederacy had its British followers. Put negatively, as long as did not stand for slavery or for the destruction of the Union, the Confederacy sustained its appeal to Britons.

Since extreme Civil War ideologies have had little place in Britain, British fans – even those who often emphasized their deep Northern

or Southern sentiments – have found it easy to cross sectional lines. 'I started out on the Confederate side', noted one re-enactor, 'then I joined this regiment here [1st United States Sharpshooters]'.[130] 'Had my friends been in the Confederacy, I would have inevitably ended up there', noted another Unionist.[131] Zealous Confederates, too, have often been happy to switch sides. An 18th Virginia re-enactor – considered a 'hard-core' rebel – noted, for example, that, 'I don't have any great alliance to the Confederacy, I'm not some neo-Confederate nut or anything like it'.[132] For many British enthusiasts, the Civil War was not and still is not a matter of North and South, but rather of Americans and Britons. As long as these identities are not challenged, the Civil War will have a place in Britain.

In 1991 the Birkenhead Ironworks and CSS *Alabama* Trust was disbanded and the project abandoned due to lack of funding.[133] For many it was surely a relief. For others it was no doubt a disappointment. Yet the CSS *Alabama* has found a place in Britain. Once or twice a year a crew of British re-enactors gathers in Portsmouth on board the HMS *Warrior* – a British 1860 sail-powered ironclad – to re-live the life on board the *Alabama*.[134] Away from where it might be challenged, and on board a British vessel, the crew, originally assembled to perform on the river Mersey on board a replica of the original British-built Confederate ship, continues to shape and re-shape the heritage of the American Civil War.

British enthusiasts turned to the Civil War because they found the values that were embedded in it applicable and relevant; because the war seemed romantic; and because they came to see it as a key to understanding and approaching the contemporary United States. In addition, British enthusiasts turned to the Civil War because, almost paradoxically, it was a foreign affair though, crucially, not overly so. Some held that the impact the war had had in Britain in the 1860s meant that the Civil War was a part of Britain's national history. At the same time, and often in the same clubs, there were also those who, by contrast, had recourse to the war because it allowed them to distance themselves from their own, possibly charged, history. Britons could negotiate various links to the war because of the historical flexibility of those links. On the one hand, the war was an American affair. It was fought in America, by Americans for American reasons, and its impact was the greatest and most immediate on the American people and American history. On the other hand, the war's impact in Britain and on British lives was profound. As such, the Civil War enabled the British to turn to it both as an American affair and as an event in British history.

Above all, however, the last two chapters make it clear that common British people found the Civil War appealing primarily because it had characteristics that deemed it a good story. Indeed, so much so that the heroic, epic, romantic, multifaceted, colorful and American story of the war was not only fun to watch but also to study, commemorate, re-create and re-live.

Conclusion

The American Civil War achieved unique prominence in twentieth-century British culture. No other foreign conflict was etched onto British historical consciousness for so long and in such diverse ways as was the American conflict. Britons' interest in the Civil War – evident in British political discourse, in British military thought, among British intellectuals and in British popular culture – has continued from the days of the war itself to the present. Furthermore, the political, military, intellectual and popular fascination with the war was not confined to a single political camp, to a social class or to a geographical area. Tories have turned to it, as have Liberals and Labour; military thinkers and academics have found it interesting, as have people from other walks of life; residents of Cheshire have studied it, as have those who lived in and around London; and Scottish intellectuals and military men have been fascinated with it, as have re-enactors in Wales.

Although it manifested in a variety of ways, British fascination with the Civil War has its origins in several common sources. For one thing, Britons were attracted to the war because it was epic. During the war, the British understanding of the conflict exceeded its military aspect, recognizing its exceptional magnitude. Many saw the Civil War as a gigantic struggle in which Americans fought for universal values such as democracy, liberty, independence and unity and for the survival of their country.[1] These values went beyond the battlefield and beyond the American borders – as, subsequently, did the meaning and great scope of the war.

In the decades that followed the Civil War, its epic proportion reached new heights in British eyes when the conflict acquired an additional, romantic dimension and further symbolic value. As D. A. Campbell has shown, between 1861 and 1865 many in the United Kingdom deplored

both the North and the South for what they saw as their immoral and inhumane conduct.[2] From the late nineteenth century, however, a consensus began to form in Britain, according to which either the North or the South, or both, had fought gallantly for just causes. The view critical of both sides practically vanished. Unison of opinion emerged also regarding American reunification as the wholly positive result of the war. 'Although I am an ardent supporter of the South', noted one British Confederate re-enactor, 'strangely enough, I believe the outcome was right. It's very weird'.[3]

This, however, was not at all weird. Considering that the British learnt about the Civil War chiefly through the agency of its different representations, their romantic views were unsurprising and their sources were clear. The Lost Cause, for example, conveyed exactly the notion and sentiments that the above re-enactor found difficult to grasp. According to this narrative, the South was right to fight for its independence while, at the same time, it wanted American unity and was part of it. The other narratives of the war presented their protagonists in equally romantic terms: Northerners fought for national unity and abolition; African Americans fought for freedom and equality in the United States. Ultimately, all narratives portrayed a moving picture of the Civil War as a moral and romantic and, thus, epic struggle for American values of unity, independence and freedom.

Another source of British interest in the Civil War was that it was a multifaceted conflict in a continuous state of flux, long after it had finished in practice, gaining in meanings and interpretations. As such, the war generated, and has continued to generate, a wide array of lessons that Britons could find relevant. In the 1880s, for example, when the Irish Question became acute and began to challenge the integrity of the British union, Britons found the war's lessons about national unity and secession applicable and appealing. In a similar way, during the interwar period, when the memory of the Great War was still fresh and the coming of another major conflict seemed increasingly realistic, the military lessons from the Civil War took center stage. During the Second World War, the American conflict became important as a war for democracy; and in the civil rights era, the questions of slavery and race in the Civil War came to the fore.

Within each of its various aspects – such as the military or political – the Civil War presented multiple lessons that rendered it potentially relevant to an even wider array of positions and issues. Grant's and Lee's hammering and frontal strategy in the Eastern Theatre conveyed valid military lessons, as did Sherman's conduct in the Western Theatre and

in the rear of the Confederate Army. That allowed Frederick Maurice, J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart to turn to the American Civil War and still draw different, often conflicting, lessons. In much the same way, moderation and appeasement were parts of Lincoln's legacy, as were firmness and aggressiveness. It only depended on which of Lincoln's views on the various issues one wished to focus and at what period in the president's life. Lincoln was concomitantly the moderate appeaser Denis Brogan sought in the 1930s and the irreconcilable fighter that Hugh Brogan sought in the 1970s.

In addition, for many Britons, interest in the Civil War stemmed from a view of it as an American affair that explained the modern United States and its place in the world. In that the Civil War was unlike other American wars. Conversely, the War of Independence was seen as the conflict that gave birth to the pre-modern United States, which in many ways perished in the Civil War; the Spanish-American War demonstrated rather than accounted for the power of the United States, and so did the First and Second World Wars. The Civil War was imprinted into American and British consciousness as the date of birth of the modern United States and the beginning of the American rise to global power. As such, it allowed Britons to understand, reflect and comment on the United States. Liddell Hart, as one example, found Sherman's life interesting also because through it he thought he could comment on both the pre-Civil War and contemporary United States. For the British military thinker, the war was interesting as the point in history where the present-day vulgar and materialistic United States had risen from the ruins of a pre-war, genteel America. Similarly, critics praised *The Birth of a Nation* also because through the story of the Civil War they could observe the entire American society and its rebirth into its modern configuration; and round table members often took interest in the war because among other things it explained the character of the contemporary United States and its rise to power in the twentieth century.

Finally, Britons often took interest in the Civil War because of Britain's historical relation to the conflict, or because of the lack of such relation. The Civil War featured a unique link between Britain and an American war. On the one hand, it was a distinctively American conflict. On the other hand, the war's impact in Britain was profound. This put the Civil War in a special place in the history of Anglo-American relations. As opposed to wars in which Britain fought alongside the United States, such as the world wars; as opposed to the War of Independence and the War of 1812 in which it fought against the United States; and as opposed to American wars in which it was not at all involved and that

had a minimal or no direct impact in Britain (such as the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War), the Civil War could be seen as either a British or an American affair, or something in between.

The American conflict thus allowed Britons both to approach and to distance themselves from their subject of interest. Many amateur historians and Civil War buffs mentioned Britain's involvement in the war to be a primary reason for their fascination with the conflict. Some even took special care to preserve sites in Britain – from graveyards to dockyards – that feature a connection to the Civil War. For others, by contrast, the main appeal of the war was that it was specifically not British. Military thinker Frederick Maurice considered the Civil War a good source for lessons after the Great War just because, unlike the recent conflict in Europe, it was not British and thus was distant enough not to rouse bitter emotions. Similarly, some re-enactors turned to the Civil War because it allowed them to immerse themselves in an event that, as not British, was distant enough not to stir too-strong feelings. In many ways, the Second World War, for example, was emotionally too close, as was the English Civil War.

These sources of British interest in the Civil War – namely: its epic scope and romantic aura; its multifaceted nature; and its being an American, British and Anglo-American event all at once – stemmed chiefly from the conflict's status as a major, ever-evolving historical event. However, the independent character of the conflict is only part of the explanation for the British fascination with it. While the Civil War presented the British with a rich, in many ways unique, material with which to work, it was the British autonomous work with this material that ultimately rendered the conflict's place in British culture distinct. Put differently, to understand the Civil War's central place in British culture, one must understand how the British used the possibilities presented to them by the war.

Britons found in the Civil War's many aspects raw material that they could use in diverse ways. For one thing, while, as argued above, in certain periods certain aspects of the war seemed more relevant than others, the British understanding of the conflict was seldom one-dimensional. Britons' ability to connect the war's facets and assemble a complex interpretation of the historical events in America allowed them to exploit to the fullest the lessons of the war. British military thinkers, for example, often connected the Civil War's military lessons, its political lessons, and the lessons about the conflict's social and cultural impacts on American society. Thus, part of Fuller's recourse to the war stemmed from the fact that through it he could demonstrate the close relations

between warfare and the socio-political transformation of the United States. From there, he was able to use the war to draw even broader conclusions about the role of war in history. Similarly, British re-enactors, who paid significant attention to the military aspect of the war, often chose to join either a Union or a Confederate unit according to their views – not about strategy, but about the legality of secession, the immorality of slavery or about political independence.

The Civil War has maintained its relevance for the British also because they were able to choose the narrative of the war that best reflected their worldview. For example, Confederate re-enactors often pushed the narrative of the Lost Cause and, accordingly, represented the Civil War as being gallantly fought by the Confederacy for the preservation of its genteel way of life. This narrative served these re-enactors, *inter alia*, to buttress their stance on modern British politics. Conversely, *fin de siècle* military thinkers often drew on the reconciliatory representation of the war, even when they studied the lives of Confederate generals such as Lee and Jackson. This allowed them to advance their views on modern warfare. An examination of the sources Britons used makes it clear they were aware of the many ways in which the Civil War could have been interpreted, and that they chose the narrative they needed.

The British adapted the war to their world also by altering the substance of the narratives they sought to appropriate. That is to say that Britons could appropriate the ideals and notions embedded in the representations of the war without appropriating the context in which they emerged. This they did in two main ways. First, Britons often took the war out of its national, American context. In this way, politicians who opposed Irish Home Rule could choose the representations of the war that emphasized the need for national unity and thereby equate the Irish struggle for independence with Southern secession, despite the differences between the American and British political systems. Second, the British took the war out of its historical, mid-nineteenth-century context. Numerous British re-enactors joined a Confederate regiment because for them it symbolized the rebellious spirit of the 1960s, despite the fact that the Southern rebellion in the 1860s was a conservative and counterrevolutionary act.

As autonomously and diversely as they used the war's many aspects and meanings, Britons used the unique British connection to the war. This enabled them, *inter alia*, to express their nuanced, flexible and complex views of the United States and define their equally nuanced, flexible and complex relation to it. On the one hand, Britons often tried to tie their country to the United States through the historical bridges

that the Civil War could provide them. The people of Manchester in 1919 readily received George Grey Barnard's statue of Lincoln and celebrated their historical relations with the president also because they wished to demonstrate their support of closer Anglo-American relations. The British went to great lengths in certain cases in order to diffuse the charged history of Britain's response to the war and present a more amicable link. Many, like Philip Whitwell Wilson and Lord Charnwood, succeeded in such endeavors to an evident degree. This practice was understandable in light of the widespread desire to draw Anglo-American relations closer and stress common history and shared values with a now-global power.

However, the British did not always want to draw the United States closer, nor did they always think its influence to be positive. In these cases, they could emphasize that the Civil War was not related to Britain or to British history, and that it was a particularly American affair. The sphere of popular culture provided ample evidence for this utilization of the image of the United States and of its conflict. 'This Civil War of theirs', was how one angry Briton described the war in his cry for his fellow citizens to boycott *Gone with the Wind* because of MGM's insistence to charge high prices for tickets.[4] More generally, critics seldom sealed a review of a Civil War film without emphasizing that, as a film about an American war, the local audience might find it irrelevant and even boring. Considering that the British view of the United States was not always positive (certainly not all the time and not in every aspect), their use of the Civil War to also highlight the differences between the United Kingdom and the United States was understandable, as was their use of the war in order to draw the countries closer together.

Finally, the British were able to manipulate the Civil War's representations and export their views of the American conflict to the United States in order to advance their interests with the Americans by presenting British affairs and British opinions dressed in what, in the context of the Civil War, were American values. For example, Lloyd George's analogy between Southern secession and the Irish calls for independence presented the prime minister's view on the Irish Question through the American idea of national unity embedded in the legacy of the Civil War. That, in turn, made the British view on Ireland more understandable across the ocean. Similarly, as the reception of Lord Charnwood's biography of Lincoln has shown, it was easier for Americans to stand by Britain in the Great War and its immediate aftermath when seeing the British fighting for the same ideals for which Lincoln had fought, as Charnwood claimed and skillfully articulated.

The cases in which the British exported their Civil War representations to the United States demonstrated their profound understanding of the American symbolism that was attributed to the war as well as the war's pivotal place in American culture. In America, the power of Lloyd George's analogy between the Irish Question and Southern secession depended upon its representation of values with which Americans concurred. Lord Charnwood's success in the United States in conveying, through Lincoln's biography, that Britain had been fighting a morally justified war in 1916 was rooted in the British peer's adherence to a narrative that was consensual at that time across the Atlantic.

Yet there were also cases in which this British use of the Civil War proved problematic. For one thing, as noted above, in order to use the war to cultivate American sympathies, the British had to confront the popular narrative perpetuating the ruling elite's support of the Confederacy. But what is more, the British use of the Civil War was challenging because of its unresolved status in the American mind and culture. Thus, owing to the war's contested memory in America, Lloyd George's analogy between Irish independence and the South's secession generated antagonism in the South. For the same reason, Southerners reacted negatively to Frederick Maurice's assertion, in his otherwise laudatory biography of Lee, that history has proved the Confederacy's fight for sectional independence wrong. As one Texan commented angrily on Maurice's work, 'History has proved – and can prove – no such thing'.[5] The Texan then moved on to reiterate that Southerners were not secessionists. This almost paradoxical stance made sense within the narrative of the Lost Cause, which was familiar to Southerners and to Americans more generally. However for foreigners, playing on the chords of American memory proved more challenging.

The Civil War, then, presented the British with a romantic representation of an epic, multifaceted and flexible historical conflict that was almost equally British and not British, through which they could reflect on contemporary domestic affairs while understanding and communicating with the modern United States – a global power that had an increasing bearing on British life – and position themselves in relation to it. No other conflict was quite the same, which could explain the unique place of the American Civil War in modern British culture.

The continuous British fascination with the Civil War begins to unearth the wide scope of the war's lingering impact outside the borders of the United States. In Britain, the Civil War continued to influence and cast light on several pressing issues in contemporary British life, as was evident in the constant British use of the war in order to advance

their views on local affairs and to understand their own world. The Civil War also had an impact on the British image of the United States and on Anglo-American relations, an impact derived from the war's role both as a canvas upon which Britons projected and debated their ideas about the United States and as an instrument of cultural diplomacy that Britons used in order to shape the relations between the countries.

Thus, the Civil War as a symbol of the modern United States was an apt and available device for the British in order to preserve Britain's cultural independence and power in an unbalanced relationship with superior American power. Analogous to a judo expert who uses the opponent's strength to her own advantage, the British manipulated the American values and symbols that were embedded in the representations of the war in order to shape their own images of the United States and to advance their interests with the Americans. At the same time, the Civil War served the British in order to understand and cope with domestic social, political and cultural changes and with Britain's shifting place in the world. That the British turned to a foreign American symbol such as the Civil War was an indication of the cultural consequences of Britain's shifting position in the world, especially in relation to the United States and its rise to power. The Civil War, then, was to the British an apparatus with which to adjust to a new reality in the long era of transition from the age of empire to the American century.

Notes

Introduction

1. See, for example: Adam I. P. Smith, 'The "Cult" of Abraham Lincoln and the Strange Survival of Liberal England in the Era of the World Wars', *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 2010), pp. 1–24; Hugh Dubrulle, 'A Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British Inheritance', *Civil War History*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2003), pp. 153–80; Kevin Kenny, '"Freedom and Unity": Lincoln in Irish Political Discourse', in: Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton (eds), *The Global Lincoln* (New York, 2011), pp. 157–71.
2. Only two, unpublished, Ph.D. dissertations dealt with the memory of the Civil War, as a whole, from a transatlantic vantage-point: Dubrulle, '"A War of Wonders": The Battle in Britain over Americanization and the American Civil War' (Ph.D. diss., UC Santa Barbara, 1999); and Samuel J. Graber, 'Twice-divided Nation: The Civil War and National Memory in the Transatlantic World' (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 2008). However, Graber's work reaches only as far as the 1890s and focuses on the American memory of the war. Dubrulle's study, despite reaching as far as the early twentieth century, focuses mainly on the war years. See, esp. chapter 9.
3. Brian Holden Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart* (Lincoln, NE, 1998), pp. 135–48; Kenny, 'Freedom and Unity'.
4. David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), pp. 394–5.
5. Smith, '"The Stuff Our Dreams Are Made Of": Lincoln in the British Imagination', in: Carwardine and Sexton (eds), *The Global Lincoln*, p. 124; Dubrulle's entire Ph.D. dissertation, cited above, adheres to this approach. For an example of its application in his work see: Dubrulle, '"We are Threatened with … Anarchy and Ruin": Fear of Americanization and the Emergence of an Anglo-Saxon Confederacy in England during the American Civil War', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2001), pp. 583–613.
6. Dora Neill Raymond, *British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War* (New York, 1921), see, for example, the British response to the French declaration of war, pp. 69–84; Peter H. Peel, *British Public Opinion and the Wars of German Unification, 1864–1871* (College Park, MD, 1981), pp. 162–200 and 284–88; P. M. Kennedy, 'Idealists and Realists: British Views of Germany, 1864–1939', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 25 (December 1975), pp. 140–2; Richard Millman, *British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 199–218.
7. Maura O'Connor, *The Romance of Italy and the English Imagination* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 149–85; Kees Windland, 'Garibaldi in Britain: Reflection of a Liberal Hero' (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2002), pp. 1–14.
8. O'Connor, *The Romance of Italy*, p. 152. On the British image of Garibaldi, see: Ibid, pp. 155–78.

9. Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 30–1.
10. R. J. M. Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, (Baton Rouge, 2001), p. 201.
11. The book thoroughly discusses re-enactment in Chapter 5. Generally, the term refers to the popular activity of dressing in a similar way as in 1860s United States, re-creating period scenery and playing mock Civil War battles.
12. Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War* (New York, 1980), pp. 194–245; for more recent studies, see: Gary J. Kornblish, 'Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 1, No. 90 (June 2003), pp. 76–105; Frank Towers, 'Partisans, New History, and Modernization: The Historiography of the Civil War's Causes, 1861–2011', *The Journal of the Civil War Era*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 237–64; and Michael E. Woods, 'What Twenty-First-Century Historians Have Said about the Causes of Disunion: A Civil War Sesquicentennial Review of the Recent Literature', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (September 2012), pp. 415–39.
13. Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, 'Total War and the American Civil War Reconsidered: The End of an Outdated "Master Narrative"', *The Journal of the Civil War Era*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 394–408.
14. Stampp, *The Imperiled Union*, pp. 164–84; Phillip W. Magness and Sebastian N. Page, *Colonization after Emancipation: Lincoln and the Movement for Black Resettlement* (Columbia, 2011), pp. 5–10.
15. Carole Emberton, '"Only Murder Makes Men": Reconsidering the Black Military Experience', *The Journal of the Civil War Era*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 369–93; Eric Foner, 'Reconstruction Revisited', *Reviews in American History*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1982) pp. 82–100.
16. For a succinct account of these see: Gary W. Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War* (Chapel Hill, 2008), pp. 2–4.
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18. Obviously, there are dissenting voices, such as John Neff, whose study highlights the abyss and continuous resentment between North and South over the legacy of the war into the twentieth century. See: Neff, *Honoring the Civil War Dead*, pp. 4–13.
19. Cook, *Troubled Commemoration*, p. 5.
20. Blackett, *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War*, p. 7. The literature on this subject is vast and it is customary to start surveying the historiography on the subject with Ephraim Douglass Adams's seminal work from

1925. See: Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (London, 1925). See also: D. P. Crook, *The North, the South and the Powers, 1861–1865* (New York, 1974); Philip S. Foner, *British Labor and the American Civil War* (New York, 1981); Howard Jones, *Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War* (Chapel Hill, 1992); Duncan Andrew Campbell, *English Public Opinion and the American Civil War* (Woodbridge, 2003); Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (Chapel Hill, 2010). For economic perspectives, see: Jay Sexton, *Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837–1873* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 82–189; for a military analysis: Brian Holden Reid, 'Power, Sovereignty, and the Great Republic: Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations in the Era of the Civil War', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 45–76; for diplomatic and political examinations, see: Phillip E. Myers, *Caution and Cooperation: The American Civil War in British-American Relations* (Kent, 2008); and Campbell, *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (London, 2007), pp. 142–68. For a more focused study on the war's impact on British intellectuals and on democratic thought in Britain in the 1860s, see: Brent E. Kinser, *The American Civil War in the Shaping of British Democracy* (Farnham, 2011). For the war's impact on specific places and areas in Britain see: Lorraine Peters, 'The Impact of the American Civil War on the Local Communities of Southern Scotland', *Civil War History*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 133–52; Robert Huw Griffiths, 'The Welsh and the American Civil War c. 1840–1865' (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Wales, Cardiff, 2004); Francis M. Carroll, 'Belfast and the American Civil War', *Irish Studies Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), pp. 245–60; Nigel Hall, 'The Liverpool Cotton Market and the American Civil War', *Northern History*, Vol. 34 (1998), pp. 149–69.

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22. R. J. M. Beckert, 'Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 5 (December 2004), pp. 1405–38. See also, Douglas R. Egerton, 'Rethinking Atlantic Historiography in a Postcolonial Era: The Civil War in a Global Perspective', *Journal of the Civil War Era*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 81–5. See also: W. Caleb McDaniel and Bethany L. Johnson, 'New Approaches to Internationalizing the History of the Civil War Era: An Introduction', *The Journal of the Civil War Era*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 145–50.
23. See, for example: Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* (Bloomington, IN, 1988), pp. 11–17; Mark E. Neely Jr, 'Was the Civil War a Total War?', *Civil War History*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 5–28.
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26. See, for example: Nicholas Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American "Neutrality" in World War II* (New York, 1995); Jessica Bennet

and Mark Hampton, 'World War I and the Imagined Community: Civilization vs. Barbarism in British Propaganda and American Newspapers', in Joel Wiener and Mark Hampton (eds), *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850–2000* (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 155–75; Inderjeet Parmar, 'Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations', *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 53–75; For criticism on the "cultural turn" in the field of international relations, see: David Reynolds, 'International History, the Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch', *Cultural and Social History*, 3 (2006), pp. 87–90. Reynolds's main difficulty with the cultural approach is with questions of agency and causation. For a response to critics, and with special emphasis on the problem of causation, see: Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865–1890* (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 5–9. See also: Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte, 'Introduction: The Diplomats' World', in: Mösslang and Riotte (eds), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 17–19.

27. Reynolds, 'Roosevelt, Churchill and the wartime Anglo-American Alliance', 1935–1945: Towards a New Synthesis', in: William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), *The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 85–6. See also: Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', pp. 94–9. There the Special Relationship is a British "stratagem". See also Alex Danchev, *On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 1–122; Danchev, 'The Cold War "Special Relationship" Revisited', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2006), pp. 579–95; David Watt, 'Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship', in: William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), *The "Special Relationship"*, (Oxford) pp. 5–6; Steve Marsh and John Baylis, 'The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus of International Relations', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2006), pp. 173–211; William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, 'Reassessing the Special Relationship', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2009) pp. 263–84; John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer, 'Introduction: The Politics of Special Relationship', in: Dumbrell and Schäfer (eds), *America's "Special Relationships": Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance* (London, 2009), p. 4.
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1 The War and the Political Debate about Ireland

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3. Brian Jenkins, *Irish Nationalism and the British State, From Repeal to Revolutionary Nationalism* (Montreal, 2006), pp. 40–2; S. J. Connolly, *Divided Kingdom: Ireland, 1630–1800* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 484–93.
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7. Roy Foster, *Modern Ireland, 1600–1972* (London, 1989), pp. 289–317 and 390–5; Nancy J. Curtin, *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 13–37.
8. Hernon, *Celts, Catholics & Copperheads*, p. 2.
9. Mitchell Snay, *Fenians, Freedmen, and Southern Whites: Race and Nationality in the Era of Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge, 2007), pp. 65–76.
10. Hernon, *Celts, Catholics & Copperheads*, p. 53.
11. Susannah Ural Bruce, *The Harp and the Eagle: Irish-American Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861–1865* (New York, 2006), p. 54.
12. HC Deb 22 March 1866, Vol. 182 cc740–74.
13. HL Deb 16 March 1866, Vol. 182 cc358–418.
14. W. E. Gladstone in the House of Commons on 30 March 1868, in: Isaac Butt, *Ireland's Appeal for Amnesty: A Letter to the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, M.P.* Bristol Selected Pamphlets (1870), p. 22.
15. Hernon, *Celts, Catholics & Copperheads*, pp. 114–19; K. R. M. Short, *The Dynamite War, Irish-American Bombers in Victorian Britain* (Bristol, 1979), pp. 1–7; Niall Whelehan, '"Cheap as Soap and Common as Sugar": The Fenians, Dynamite and Scientific Warfare', in: Fearghal McGarry and James McConnel, (eds), *The Black Hand of Republicanism, Fenianism in Modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2009), p. 107.
16. David Sim, 'Filibusters, Fenians, and a Contested Neutrality: The Irish Question and U.S. Diplomacy, 1848–1871', *American Nineteenth Century History*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2011), p. 275. For the lack of organization and discipline see: Shin-Ichi Takagami, 'The Fenian Rising in Dublin, March 1867', *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 115 (May 1995), pp. 340–62; Comerford, *The Fenians in Context*, pp. 116–27; McGee, *The IRB*, pp. 33–4.
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18. For an account of the raids see: Hereward Senior, *The Fenians and Canada* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 81–135; for the raids' diplomatic repercussions see: Myers, *Caution and Cooperation*, pp. 245–7; Duncan Andrew Campbell, *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (London, 2007), pp. 176–87.
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21. Foster, *Modern Ireland,* pp. 397–9.
22. Isaac Butt, *Home Government for Ireland: Irish Federalism!: Its Meaning, Its Objects, and Its Hopes* (Dublin, 1870), p. 76.
23. Campbell, *Unlikely Allies*, pp. 164–5.
24. Brent E. Kinser, *The American Civil War in the Shaping of British Democracy* (Farnham, 2011), p. 2.
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33. HC Deb 2 May 1872, Vol. 211 cc140–69.
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38. HC Deb 20 February 1884, Vol. 284 cc1465–526.
39. HC Deb 11 April 1893, Vol. 11 cc29–116.
40. Joseph Chamberlain, *Home Rule and the Irish Question: A Collection of Speeches Delivered Between 1881 and 1887* (London, 1887), pp. 60–1.
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42. On Bryce's impact on British views of the United States see: Tulloch, 'Changing British Attitudes towards the United States in the 1880s', pp. 825–40.
43. Chamberlain, *Home Rule and the Irish Question*, p. 61.
44. Howard Jones, *Union in Peril: The Crisis over Britain's Intervention in the Civil War* (London, 1992), pp. 183–5. Bryce, however, supported Irish Home Rule.
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4 The American Civil War in British Cinemas

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5 Civil War Roundtable and Reenactment Societies

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Conclusion

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Daily Beast
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Dallas Texas Hours
Devon and Exeter Gazette
Guardian
Independent (UK)
Independent (US)
Irish Bulletin
Irish Times
Journal of the Confederate Historical Society
Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States
Kinematograph Weekly
London Daily Express
Manchester Guardian
Military, Navy and Air-Force Gazette
Monthly Film Bulletin
Movie
New Index, Journal of the Confederate Research Club
New York Times
Nottingham Evening Post
Observer
Picture Show
Picturegoer and Film Weekly
Pictures and the Picturegoer
Review of Reviewers
Sight and Sound
Sunday Telegraph
The Scotsman
The Times
The Watchman and Southron
Times Higher Education
Times Literary Supplement
Today's Cinema News and Property Gazette
Western Daily Press
Westminster Gazette

Films and Television Programs

Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter
America: A Personal History of the United States
Djungo Unchained

Glory
Gone With the Wind
Hearts in Bondage
Lincoln
Lincoln in the White House
Major Dundee
Roots
So Red the Rose
Spirit of the People
The Birth of a Nation
The Littlest Rebel
12 Years a Slave
Young Mr. Lincoln

Internet Resources

American Civil War Round Table UK website:
http://www.americancivilwar.org.uk/index.php
Common-Place:
http://common-place.org/vol-14/no-02/mitchell/#.UvELb3ddVEI
The Charity Commission For England and Wales:
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/RemovedCharityMain.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=519564&SubsidiaryNumber=0
The Confederate and Union Reenactment Club:
http://curs1.homestead.com/SOCIETY.html
'The Crew' website:
http://www.keme.co.uk/~nbarnes/civilwar/alabama.html
Dáil Éireann Archives Online:
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