THE AGE OF LINCOLN and CAVOUR

Comparative Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century American and Italian Nation-Building



Enrico Dal Lago

The Age of Lincoln and Cavour

Also by the Author

William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform

American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. "Peculiar Institution" in International Perspective

Agrarian Elites: American Slaveholders and Southern Italian Landowners, 1815–1861

The Age of Lincoln and Cavour

Comparative Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century American and Italian Nation-Building

Enrico Dal Lago

palgrave
macmillan

THE AGE OF LINCOLN AND CAVOUR

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-48542-7

First published in 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe, and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-50367-4 ISBN 978-1-137-49012-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137490124

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Amnet.

First edition: February 2015

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: Nation-Building in the Age of Lincoln and Cavour: Comparative Themes and Dimensions 1

I Nineteenth-Century American Abolitionism and Italian Democratic Nationalism

1 Radicalism and Nationalism: Northern "Liberators" and Southern Laborers in the United States and Italy, 1830–1860 21

2 Purging Nations with Blood: John Brown, Pisacane, Social Justice, and Guerrilla Warfare 37

II Lincoln, Cavour, and Progressive Nationalism

3 Economic Progress, Markets, and Railroads in Lincoln's and Cavour's Early Careers 61

4 Progressive Nationalism, Politics, and National Unifications: Lincoln and Cavour after 1850 93

III Secession, Civil War, and Nation-Building in the United States and Italy

5 The Specter of Confederate Secession in Early Post-Unification Italy 123

6 Inner Civil Wars in the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, 1861–1865 141

Conclusion 165

Notes 171

Index 225

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

My first thanks go to my home institution, the National University of Ireland, Galway, for granting me a sabbatical leave for two semesters in 2013–14 and 2014–15, which were crucial for researching and writing the present book. I wish to thank all my colleagues in History, and the past and present Heads of History, Caitriona Clear, Roisin Healy, and Alison Forrestal, for providing the ideal environment for working on my book; the Moore Institute and its current Director, Daniel Carey; the School of Humanities and the past and present Heads of School, Lionel Pilkington and Steven Ellis. I also wish to thank the staff at the James Hardiman Library at NUI Galway, especially the interlibrary loans staff, and the archivists at The National Archives at Kew, UK.

An older, shorter, and somewhat different version of Chapter One in the present book has been published as Enrico Dal Lago, "Radicalism and Nationalism: Northern 'Liberators' and Southern Laborers in the United States and Italy, 1830–1860" in Enrico Dal Lago and Rick Halpern, eds., *The American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History* (Palgrave, 2002; reproduced, with changes, with permission). Also, shorter and somewhat different versions of sections of Chapter Three and Chapter Four have been published in Enrico Dal Lago, "Lincoln, Cavour, and National Unification: American Republicanism and Italian Liberal Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 3:1 (2013). Finally, a brief summary of parts of Chapter Five has been published in the first half of Enrico Dal Lago, "The American Civil War and National Unification: Comparisons and Connections between the Confederate South and Southern Italy" in Peter Stearns, ed., *The American Civil War in Global Context* (Richmond: Virginia Sesquicentennial, 2015).

I wish to thank also those colleagues and friends who have helped in different ways, either by commenting on preliminary versions of chapters or by making important suggestions for improvement, or simply by listening to me talk about some aspects of this book. I wish to thank, in particular, Ed Baptist, Cristina Bon, Leslie Butler, Nicholas

Canny, Catherine Clinton, Don Doyle, Roisin Healy, Anthony Kaye, Peter Kolchin, Axel Körner, Bruce Levine, Caleb McDaniel, Rafael de Bivar Marquese, Lawrence Powell, Lucy Riall, Tim Roberts, Dale Tomich, and Andrew Zimmerman. At Palgrave, I wish to thank especially the anonymous reader of my manuscript, who provided positive and very helpful comments, and also Chris Chappell and Mike Aperauch for all their help. I wish to give particularly warm thanks to Madeleine, for her help throughout the writing of this book. Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Olinto and Rosa Dal Lago, and my brother Stefano for their continuous support.

Introduction

Nation-Building in the Age of Lincoln and Cavour: Comparative Themes and Dimensions

Current scholarship on the Civil War era in the United States and on the *Risorgimento* era, or era of national unification, in Italy has advocated a move toward wider approaches to the study of these two crucial phases of the nineteenth-century processes of nation-building in the two countries. In recent years, the publication of a growing body of historical literature has focused on the widening of perspectives and the identification of little-known or neglected links and connections between different regions of the world at the time of the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento*, following the current "transnational turn" in historiography.[1] In a 2012 introduction to a special issue of *The Journal of the Civil War Era* dedicated to "New Approaches to Internationalizing the History of the Civil War Era," Caleb McDaniel and Bethany Johnson recognized the important work done by recent transnational studies on the United States in the nineteenth century, but they also argued that "the nineteenth century in general and the American Civil War era in particular are ripe for reconsideration from global, comparative, and transnational perspectives."[2] Also in 2012, in a review article that interpretatively summarized the recent scholarship on *Risorgimento* Italy, Maurizio Isabella acknowledged the importance of the transnational dimension of several recent studies, but he also wrote that "more comparative work is needed to assess what, if anything, was special about Italy's state formation and its culture."[3] Thus, in both articles, the authors—all leading scholars in the fields of transnational history of either the

nineteenth-century United States or nineteenth-century Italy—have been keen advocates of widening the scope of studies in their fields through a more widespread adoption not just of the transnational approach, but also of the comparative approach.

Historical comparison is hardly a completely novel approach to the study of the American Civil War. The original idea of comparing the American Civil War to nineteenth-century European processes of nation-building, including Italian national unification, goes back to a 1968 essay by U.S. historian David Potter.[4] In that essay and in other writings, Potter argued that we should see the American Civil War in close relationship to the nationalist movements that agitated Europe from the first half of the nineteenth century. In this perspective, given the substantial failure of the latter before 1860, the war waged by Abraham Lincoln for the national reunification of the United States in 1861 represented, together with the national unification of Italy under a constitutional monarchy in the same year, the first real victory of liberal nationalism in the Euro-American world since the Latin American independence movements of the 1810s and 1820s. Thus, for Potter, the type of nationalism that triumphed in the United States with the victory of the Union in 1865 was comparable, in the universal and libertarian ideals that inspired Lincoln and the Republican Party, to the type of liberal nationalism that had characterized both Latin America's nationalist movements and Europe's 1848 nationalist movements and that, as epitomized by Italian Prime Minister Camillo Cavour, was the dominant ideology in a process of formation of the Italian nation-state partly contemporaneous to the American Civil War.[5]

Despite the general admiration for David Potter, no scholar followed on his groundbreaking path for comparative historical studies for at least two decades, very likely because, during that period, the discourse of American "exceptionalism"—that is, the idea that the United States had followed an absolutely unique process of historical development, which made America fundamentally incomparable to other countries—was widespread in American academia.[6] At the same time, it is also true that during the same years in which Potter made his comparative arguments, in the mid to late 1960s, two other scholars had begun to think about the American Civil War in a comparative perspective. The first scholar was American historical sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr., whose monumental *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) was one of the first large-scale comparative studies, with an unparalleled breadth of vision and scope, both in terms of chronology and space, within the boundaries of Modern History.

The other scholar was Italian historian Raimondo Luraghi, who, in his equally monumental work, *A History of the American Civil War* (also released in 1966), hinted at a number of possible and highly inspiring comparative issues in regard to individuals, themes, and episodes of nineteenth-century U.S. history and Italian *Risorgimento* history. At the heart of both studies was the conviction, particularly widespread among Marxist scholars of nineteenth-century America, that the American Civil War had witnessed the defeat of an agrarian and precapitalist South by an industrialized and capitalist North, and that therefore the war was a phenomenon essentially comparable to other, similar conflicts that had characterized the emergence of modern nation-states in nineteenth-century Europe.[7]

These studies, while groundbreaking, remained without a following until the 1980s and the rise of the new scholarship on nationalism and, at the same time, the rise in popularity of the comparative historical method, both of which led to the weakening of the myth of American exceptionalism and also of the idea, still very popular, that the American Civil War was a phenomenon essentially not comparable to any other. Studies on the different historical facets and varieties of nationalism by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians such as, especially, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm, have shown how modern nations, particularly the nations that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, arose as results of operations of social engineering and the "invention of traditions," in Hobsbawm's famous expression.[8] Even though these scholars did not always include the United States in their treatments, it is not difficult to see how their theories led American historians who were favorable to historical comparison to adopt them, especially since they could use those theories to demolish once and for all the misguided concept of the exceptionality of creation of the American nation as an artificial process. At the same time, starting from the 1980s, American historians working in the particularly prolific field of slavery studies progressively widened their comparative horizons—until then mostly limited to the U.S. South and to other New World slave societies—and began a tradition of scholarship focusing on comparison of the U.S. slave system with other labor systems, both free and unfree, in the entire Euro-American world.[9]

All this new historiographical ferment created the conditions for a major step forward in the historiography of the American Civil War, as the suggestions coming from the new studies on nationalism and on comparative slavery progressively influenced research conducted by different scholars, ultimately leading to the current pleas

for more comparative historical studies situating the Civil War in its Euro-American and global dimension. In her groundbreaking study on nationalism in the Civil War U.S. South, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism* (1988), Drew Faust made a number of references to Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, and the same can be said of two other crucial studies, Susan-Mary Grant's *North Over South* (2000) and Melinda Lawson's *Patriot Fires* (2002), on nationalism in the antebellum and Civil War U.S. North. Significantly, the latest scholarship on nationalism in the antebellum South and in the Confederacy, well represented by Stephanie McCurry's *Confederate Reckoning* (2010) and Paul Quigley's *Shifting Grounds* (2011), has incorporated the comparative dimension, since both works make reference to nation-building in contemporary Europe.[10] The same is true also of the few recent works that have looked at transatlantic connections between the United States and Europe specifically in relation to themes such as: the 1848 European upheavals, as in Timothy Roberts's *Distant Revolutions* (2009); the significance of the start of the American Civil War, as in André Fleche's *The Revolution of 1861* (2012); and the transnational contacts of American abolitionists, as in Caleb McDaniel's *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery* (2013).[11]

Despite this flourishing of scholarship, studies that have actually made explicit and sustained, or "rigorous," comparisons–in which, according to Peter Kolchin, the comparative analysis of two cases is the heart of the study, rather than just hinted at briefly—focusing on the nineteenth-century United States, and particularly on the American Civil War and contemporary events in Europe have been, and are still, only a few. Among them, worthy of mention are sociologist Liah Greenfeld's *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (1995), which attempted to insert the entire history of the United States within the contours of a new interpretation of the rise of nations in the Western world, similarly to the more recent work by Lloyd Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America* (2011)—the latter relating to the period after 1776 on both continents.[12] Particularly important in this respect were two essays published in the early 1990s by Steven Hahn and Carl Degler, respectively, on U.S. Southern planters and on the American Civil War in comparative perspective. In those two essays, Hahn and Degler essentially considered the Civil War as a phenomenon of national consolidation comparable to similar phenomena that occurred in the same period in other parts of Europe.[13] At the same time, though, while Hahn hinted at comparative points between the United States and Germany, most of Degler's essay dealt

with the specific comparison between Lincoln and Bismarck focusing on each man's iron will and determination to fight large-scale, costly, and technologically innovative wars for the sake of building the American and German nations. This particular comparative theme eventually gave origin to an important collection of essays focusing on the American Civil War and the German wars for national unification, entitled *On the Road to Total War* (1997).[14]

In addition to the aforementioned studies, the new scholarship on world history and on global history, which has grown exponentially in the last decade, has made a particularly important contribution to creating the necessary conditions for a comparative historical approach to the American Civil War in relation to the nineteenth-century nationalist movements in Europe.[15] These studies not only have led scholars to definitely disregard the idea that the United States had followed a historical path completely different from that of other nations, but also have shown the importance of placing American history, especially in regard to events such as the Civil War, once considered in isolation, within the context of the socioeconomic and political changes undergone throughout the world.[16] This historiographical development initially followed the pioneering work of Eric Hobsbawm in his trilogy of books on the world history of the long nineteenth century: *The Age of Revolutions* (1962), *The Age of Capital* (1975), and *The Age of Empires* (1983).[17] Most recently, the publication of seminal studies such as, especially, C. A. Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World* (2004) and Jurgen Osterhammel's *The Transformation of the World* (2014), has provided an indispensable framework for the undertaking of comparative historical research focused on the nineteenth century, placing particular emphasis on the importance of transnational links and exchanges of ideas, goods, and people between different regions and countries, and thus on the interconnections between different national histories.[18] If, on the one hand, this new perspective has made the work of the historian of the nineteenth century much more complex, it has, on the other hand, shown new and fascinating potentials for the study of this crucial period in world history.

In fact, in showing how "the American Civil War was . . . a global event in the same sense as the Taiping Rebellion or the 1848 revolutions, because direct connections of trade, government, and ideology spread its effects across the globe," C. A. Bayly has posed in the clearest possible way a fundamental methodological question to the scholars who intend to embark on a historical comparison between nation-building in the United States and Europe in the nineteenth century.[19] The question focuses on the correct approach to a

comparative historical study of this type, and it is, put simply, whether we should treat separately the case studies under investigation—i.e., the United States and other countries—or whether we should take into account, in making this comparison, the numerous contacts that those regions had with one another throughout the nineteenth century. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that the few scholars who have written sustained comparative monographs of the types already described by Marc Bloch in the 1920s, and then updated in a seminal methodological 1980 article by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, have generally agreed with Peter Kolchin on the fact that "rigorous" comparative history is only the approach that, through sustained comparison, gives equal importance to the different and distinct case studies with the specific objective of discovering the reasons for the similarities and differences between them.[20]

However, it is also important to notice that as a result of its specific methodology based on the comparison of two or more case studies, usually relating to different national historiographical traditions, comparative history is, effectively, a cross-national historical approach, as George Fredrickson has remarked, and thus it has more in common than usually accounted for with the historical methodologies that have characterized the "transnational turn" in the historiography of both the United States and Europe in the past twenty-five years, and specifically with *histoire croisée* and *transfergeschichte*.[21] While *histoire croisée*, or "entangled history," focuses on cultural and social relations between nations in the modern period, especially neighboring ones such as France and Germany, according to its main advocates Benedicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner, *transfergeschichte*, or "transfer history," investigates the "transfer" of ideas and cultural practices observed in intellectual, technological, and other type of exchanges, from country to country at different times.[22] After a long debate that has seen advocates of transnational history and advocates of comparative history criticize each other over the pitfalls of the two methods and their supposed incompatibility, several scholars would now agree that it is indeed possible, and in certain cases even highly advisable, to integrate the comparative historical approach with transnational historical approaches such as *histoire croisée* and *transfergeschichte* in specific types of research. [23] And, in truth, despite the differences between the two types of approaches, if one analyzes in depth their methodology and the particular ways in which historians use it, one can certainly agree with Heinz-Gerhard Haupt's and Jurgen Kocka's conclusion that "as is the case with *histoire croisée*, transfer history does not fundamentally contradict the principles of historical comparison."[24] In an

important article published in 2003, Kocka argued that, in response to the growing challenge represented by the "new" world history and global history—both, effectively, transnational historical approaches on a planetary scale—comparative historians must be able to combine transnational and comparative historical methodologies.[25] In particular, Kocka had noted that comparative historical studies, already transnational in themselves, can only be enriched in their analysis of similarities and differences by the treatment of specific historical junctures effectively caused by the exchange of ideas, the movement of people, and, in general, the relations between nations and regions.[26]

This is especially true in regard to the comparative study of nation-building in the United States and Europe at the time of the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento*, given the continuous exchange of people, ideas, and goods that occurred between the two parts of the Euro-American world on the opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and the continuous relations between the United States and other European nations throughout the long nineteenth century (1780–1914). Even though they have not yet studied these exchanges and relations in a systematic manner, American and European historians, including Italian-American and Italian scholars, have long recognized the importance of these investigations, leading to the publication of several studies that nowadays would be called "transnational," given their focus on the discovery of previously little-known links between, on the one hand, some of the most important Italian and European liberal, democratic, and revolutionary activists, politicians and groups, and, on the other hand, prominent figures and contemporaneous developments in the Early American Republic and the Civil War United States.[27] This scholarship, together with the latest comparative and transnational research, forms an indispensable and extremely useful foundation for a study of nation-building that focuses on the United States in the Civil War era and Italy during the *Risorgimento* era, and its insights are still invaluable in many respects.[28]

Following both the old and recent scholarship represented by these studies with a wider research focus, in linking the United States with Italy in the central decades of the nineteenth century, specifically in relation to the phenomenon of nation-building, it is important to notice that, effectively, the reunification of the American Republic after the Civil War was an event that caused the geopolitical restructuring of the entire North American continent in 1861–65. Similar, in this sense, was the geopolitical restructuring of the central part of the European continent that occurred as a result of the Italian and German national unifications in 1861–71. Interestingly, both old and

new studies looking for transnational links between the two continents have clarified that the most prominent politicians in Europe and America had a perception of these events that we could rightly call "transcontinental," since they were aware not only of developments on both sides of the Atlantic, but also of the repercussions that those events had in the specific region of the Euro-American world where they resided.[29] In this respect, equally important to the geopolitical dimension is the fact that the restructuring of the North American continent under Lincoln with the American Civil War led to the creation of a continental nation-state—the post–Civil War United States—based on republican principles that had a great deal in common with the ones that characterized the formation of one of the two new large nation-states in the European continent—the Italian constitutional monarchy under Cavour; therefore, this renders the comparison between nation-building in the United States and Italy in the "age of Lincoln and Cavour" particularly significant. Tellingly, this significance is corroborated by the fact that Italian, European, and American nineteenth-century politicians and activists on both sides of the Atlantic correctly recognized the completion of the process of formation of the American nation with the victory of Lincoln's anti-slavery Union in the Civil War as an episode of paramount importance in the advance of the principles of nineteenth-century European liberal nationalism as they were expressed particularly through the recent creation of the constitutional Italian Kingdom in the *Risorgimento*.[30]

It is also important to acknowledge that the process of nation-building that took place in the age of Lincoln and Cavour in the United States and Italy was characterized by the existence of competing national projects, or different ideas about the future shape of the American and Italian nations. While in the United States different attitudes toward the place of slavery in the American nation—ranging from radical Abolitionism to the ideology of Lincoln's Republican Party—and long-standing differences on the more or less centralized nature of the U.S. federal institutions ultimately led to the American Civil War, in Italy different ideas on the forms of the future Italian national government—ranging from democratic republicanism to the ideology of Cavour's Moderate Liberals—and long-standing differences in regional political traditions ultimately caused the post-unification crisis culminating in a long and costly civil war in southern Italy, the so-called Great Brigandage, contemporaneous to the American Civil War.[31] In this respect, the existence of competing national projects in the process of nation-building was by no means a unique feature of the history of the nineteenth-century United States and

Italy, but rather it was a familiar story in the contemporaneous processes of nation-building of several other countries, whether nation-building was ultimately successful or not, and also whether there were similar or different characteristics determining the origins of competing nationalisms. Among those countries, particularly worthy of a brief comparative investigation is Ireland.

Nineteenth-century Ireland is a particularly eloquent case in point with regard to competing nationalisms and projects of nation-building, as a result of its long-term historical and social fractures and divisions dating to the Tudors and subsequent waves of English conquest and establishment of an English Protestant elite ruling over a largely Catholic population and holding the political power and the majority of the land. As a result of these historical circumstances, the first notable expressions of Irish nationalism in modern times occurred as a result of, first, Protestant attempts at gaining parliamentary independence from Britain, with Henry Grattan's 1782 achievement of legislative autonomy, and then of Protestant Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen's 1798 revolutionary attempt to create an Irish Republic—both movements heavily influenced by contemporaneous developments in revolutionary America and France.[32] After the 1801 Act of Union, which abolished the Irish Parliament, two competing types of Irish nationalism, inheritors of the eighteenth-century movements and often related to the different concepts of "moral force" versus "physical force," confronted each other by ultimately contemplating different projects of nation-building. The former type was essentially constitutional and sought through peaceful agitation and pressure on the British Parliament to achieve ultimately Home Rule for Ireland, while the latter type was revolutionary, often secret in its tactics, and sought ultimately to achieve Irish independence from Britain through violent means.[33]

It is important to notice that these ideological traditions in the national projects overlapped and cut across social and religious differences. Thus, with Daniel O'Connell's 1843 movement for Repeal of the 1801 Act of Union, a distinctive Catholic type of Irish constitutional nationalism came to the fore for the first time, since, in D. George Boyce's words, "O'Connell could rest content in the knowledge that the Catholics were the majority, and were therefore the Irish nation."[34] Conversely, the Young Ireland movement of 1842–48 was both revolutionary and declaredly nonsectarian, since, even though stemming from O'Connell's Repeal movement, the Young Irelanders ultimately rejected it and instead, "espoused a form of inclusive nationalism which could transcend religious differences" and which

aimed at Irish political independence.[35] This was also the goal of the Fenians of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), founded in 1858, whose aim was the creation of an independent Irish republic and whose leaders claimed to be nonsectarian.[36] Interestingly, while O'Connell's Repeal movement had a great resonance among American abolitionists, who, following radical agitator William Lloyd Garrison, from the 1840s rejected the union with the slaveholders sanctioned by the U.S. Constitution, the Fenian project of creating an Irish republic separate from Britain had certainly something in common with the secessionist impulse in the Confederate South during the American Civil War, and also, to a certain extent, with the post-unification attempts to restore the Bourbon Kingdom in southern Italy at the expense of the unity of the Italian nation.[37] More generally, this brief overview of the different varieties of nationalism and national projects in nineteenth-century Ireland, and of the importance of the different religious and social constituencies related to them, is a revealing example of how nation-building in another part of the Euro-American world was a matter of contention between competing ideologies in comparable ways to the situation in the United States and Italy in the age of Lincoln and Cavour.[38]

Together with the existence of competing nationalisms, an important feature of nineteenth-century nation-building in the United States and Italy was the violence associated with the process of incorporation of the southern regions within the two nation-states. In fact, even though vastly different in terms of scale and degree, the American Civil War and the Great Brigandage were comparable examples of large military operations, which, through violent processes, led to the eventual defeat of resistance to the formation of the American and Italian nation-states in the Confederate South and southern Italy. Even though these processes were not wars of colonial conquest brought upon indigenous populations of faraway lands, both the American Civil War and the Great Brigandage shared some similarities with contemporary colonial wars in terms of interpretations of the ideological battles and characterization of the "enemies" and, at times, also the brutality of policies directed toward the latter—both features that characterized in much higher degree the processes of conquest and treatment of the indigenous populations of Africa and Asia by different European powers.[39] In this perspective, it is worth examining briefly the case of the French process of colonization of nineteenth-century Algeria as a particularly illuminating example of violent extension of a European nation-state through warfare, suppression of regional indigenous resistance, defeat, and final incorporation, in a non-Euro-American context.

In 1830, France invaded Algeria, which was then ruled by a nonindigenous Turkish Ottoman elite, based in the coastal cities and in ongoing conflict with the indigenous farmers living in the hills and mountains of the interior countryside—both groups of strict Muslim faith—with the excuse of defeating the Mediterranean piracy fomented by Algerian corsairs, but with a view to establishing a crucial colonial foothold in North Africa.[40] In only two years, the French defeated the Ottomans and conquered the two main coastal cities of Algiers and Oran by 1832. Yet it was at this point that Muslim indigenous leader Abd al-Kadir rose to the fore, prefiguring an Algerian national movement as he "rallied the people round a religious cause, appealed to their patriotic sentiments and led a resistance movement against the French between 1832 and 1847."[41] By calling the people to participate to a holy war against the French and, above all, by implementing guerrilla tactics—following a widespread pattern of regional resistance to outside invaders that we can observe also in the American Civil War and in the Great Brigandage—Abd al-Kadir succeeded in defeating the French in 1835 and was able to keep Algeria free until 1837.[42]

Yet, the subsequent French response was brutal, especially from 1841, when General Bugeaud began a scorched-earth policy with which he brought upon Abd al-Kadir and his large number of rebels the full might of the French army, hitting the civilians particularly hard and leading to thousands of dead in the process. Much outrage was expressed by some quarters within the public opinion.[43] In 1843, Abd al-Kadir was forced to flee to Morocco, where he continued to lead the guerrilla attacks against the French until he surrendered in 1847; the last embers of Algerian resistance were eventually crushed in 1857.[44] Thus, with a long and costly war of conquest, the French succeeded in defeating incipient Algerian nationalism and in incorporating Algeria within the French nation-state, initially considering it as an integrant part of France, even with a right to representation in the French Parliament for the European settlers. This changed when Napoleon III abrogated that right, although Algerians were permitted to participate in the French army and the colonial administration. Yet, in practical terms, Algeria continued to be ruled by a small elite of nonindigenous French people, and Napoleon III's vision—which focused on the creation of an autonomous "Arab Kingdom" that would fuse French and Algerians together—caused resentment among the indigenous Algerian people, who welcomed his fall after his defeat in the Franco-German War of 1870–71.[45]

The briefly outlined examples of Ireland and Algeria presented here show that it would be possible to construct several comparative

studies between the processes of nation-building that occurred in different regions of the world during the nineteenth century, particularly if one focused on either the existence of competing ideas of nationalism and individuals and groups associated to them, or on the violence associated with the process of incorporation of regions into the nation-state through large-scale warfare. In this respect, the specific comparison between the United States and Italy in the age of Lincoln and Cavour in this book appears as only one of a number of possible comparisons of this type, and yet one that, even though little practiced, would yield particularly significant insights, as recent historiographical developments have hinted at. Thus, partly as a response to the recent calls for more comparative studies on the United States in the Civil War era and on Italy in the *Risorgimento* era, given their importance in the development of modern American and European nationalism, this book argues the case for a comparative study of the age of Lincoln and Cavour with the intention of seeking to better understand the process of nation-building specifically in nineteenth-century America and Italy.

Remarkably, the process of nation-building in the United States and Italy occurred in parallel during broadly similar time frameworks, beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century and culminating in the 1860s with two conflicts, though on different scales: the American Civil War and Italian national unification and its immediate aftermath. Despite the enormous complexity and multiplicity of factors involved in the two processes of nation-building, there is no doubt that, in striking parallel terms, the two key historical figures who were particularly instrumental in defining and leaving their blueprints on the two nations that managed to survive the two parallel ordeals of civil war and national unification were Abraham Lincoln and Camillo Cavour. For this reason, it is appropriate to speak of an age of Lincoln and Cavour, taking inspiration both from Orville Vernon Burton's suggestions in his seminal synthetic work *The Age of Lincoln* (2009) on the United States and Lincoln in the Civil War era, and also from Rosario Romeo's intuitions in his monumental biographical study *Cavour e il suo tempo* [Cavour and his Times, 1969–84] on the Piedmontese statesman in the context of *Risorgimento* Italy.[46]

Significantly, older studies—particularly those by Howard Marraro and Giorgio Spini—had already established the existence of a plethora of actual connections between the U.S. Civil War and *Risorgimento* Italy by looking, through a transnational approach, at the many links between different activists and political groups in the two countries, thereby laying the foundation for future comparative historical

work on the age of Lincoln and Cavour.[47] Effectively, these studies showed how, during the period from 1848 to 1860, Italian activists who belonged to different political currents—as happened with activists and revolutionaries who belonged to other oppressed European nationalities—not only established themselves in the United States, but also participated in the American political debate. In turn, also as a result of this phenomenon of political migration, the American public opinion showed a great deal of interest in the Italian *Risorgimento* and in the different political programs for Italian national unification—as shown in studies such as Paola Gemme's *Domesticating Foreign Struggles* (2005) and Daniele Fiorentino's *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia* (2013)—which American politicians of different parties interpreted with reference to their own situation.[48] It is certainly true that, in general, the admiration for Mazzini's republican ideology and Garibaldi's military exploits was widespread in the United States. Yet, it is also true that American abolitionists were closer ideologically to the Italian Democrats while the U.S. Republican Party was closer to Italy's Moderate Liberals, including in terms of direct support.[49]

The fact that the U.S. Republican Party was closer to Italy's Moderate Liberals, in particular, invites us to reflect upon the parallels between the ideological positions of these two political movements, and especially of their two leaders—Lincoln and Cavour—during the Civil War and *Risorgimento* eras. In his 1965 pioneering essay, Glauco Licata attempted for the first time a comparative historical analysis, with some transnational elements, of the crucial roles of Lincoln and Cavour in the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento*.[50] A year later, in his history of the American Civil War, Raimondo Luraghi clarified further the grounds for a comparative study between the two men and their times, calling Lincoln "the Cavour of the . . . American *Risorgimento*" and arguing that, "as for Cavour the process of Italian national unification was to lead to . . . a liberal and parliamentary Italian nation, similarly for Lincoln the 'great republic' was to be essentially founded upon a further development of its democratic elements."[51] A few years later, in a seminal 1969 essay on Lincoln and the Italian *Risorgimento*, Enzo Tagliacozzo wrote that Lincoln, "from the start was a moderate, and for certain aspects a conservative, and this may qualify him as closer to Cavour than Mazzini, also as a result of his staunch faith in political and civil liberties and in the institutions of parliamentary representation."[52] Despite the importance of these suggestions, though, no historian has actually embarked on a comparative study of Lincoln and Cavour and their times. And yet, now, also as a result of the flourishing of new scholarship in relation to the

200th anniversaries of Lincoln's and Cavour's births—in 2009 and 2010—and the 150th anniversary of the start of the American Civil War and of Italian national unification in 2011, it is possible to understand at a deeper level and with much more detail the real significance of a comparative historical study of the two men, as already hinted at by Licata and Luraghi, within the contexts of their times. Therefore, it is also possible to analyze in comparative perspective and in more nuanced ways the similarities and differences between the processes of nation-building that the United States and Italy experienced during the age of Lincoln and Cavour.[53]

This comparison is particularly significant at a time when the historiographies of both the U.S. Civil War era and the Italian *Risorgimento* are in the midst of a renewal through a period of intense scholarly debate on the significance of the different themes and facets of the processes of nation-building in the two countries in the course of the nineteenth century. In particular, in the United States, also as a result of the influence of comparative and transnational historical methods and approaches, the "New History of the Civil War Era" has looked at themes and issues that reflect the current interests of many scholars for a correct historical understanding of the varieties of nineteenth-century American nationalism. Thus, on one hand, U.S. Civil War historians have investigated the particular type of Republican and antislavery nationalism that characterized the North in the "age of Lincoln" and the Union government.[54] On the other hand, they have focused on understanding the different layers and the conflicting ideas and projects that constituted or else opposed Confederate nationalism in the South.[55] In doing this, U.S. Civil War historians have complicated a great deal the familiar narrative of the reasons for the success of nationalism in the Union and failure of nationalism in the Confederacy, adding texture to it, especially with their sustained investigative focus on the attempts at creating competing national cultures through the implementation of images, symbols, and the use of rhetoric and politics, following important nuances derived from cultural studies.[56]

This is a particularly important point in a comparative perspective that looks at the developments of the most recent historiographies of the U.S. Civil War era and of *Risorgimento* Italy in parallel fashion. In fact, comparably to American historians, Italian historians have looked at the nineteenth-century process of nation-building with fresh eyes in recent years and have questioned previous assumptions, stimulating a debate on the character of nineteenth-century Italian nationalism that bears some resemblance to historiographical developments in

the United States. Thus, in similar fashion to the new history of the U.S. Civil War era, the new history of the *Risorgimento*, spearheaded by Alberto Banti's studies, has also emphasized the importance of symbols, images, and rhetoric—together with literature, music, and art—in the creation of a shared national culture.[57] Unlike what has happened in U.S. historiography, though, this approach has led to a historiographical emphasis on the study of the creation of this shared national culture as a promoter of strong feelings and emotions among large numbers of patriots at the expense of the importance of the study of politics. This neglect, in turn, has led to an ongoing debate and has caused much criticism by historians of the *Risorgimento* who have maintained their focus on political history, though with nuances coming from cultural studies—as several historians of the U.S. Civil War era have also done.[58] Equally important is the fact that, in both American and Italian historiographies, the reevaluation of the political process of nineteenth-century nation-building through an emphasis on cultural aspects has led historians to acknowledge and study with renewed interest the presence of conflicting nationalist ideas and conflicting projects for the future of the nation[59]—an aspect that would easily lend itself to comparative studies of the United States and Italy in the age of Lincoln and Cavour with other nineteenth-century nations in formation.

Thus, the recognition of an age of Lincoln and Cavour as a ground for comparative analysis of the two historical figures as well as the multiple regional, national, and international contexts—American, Italian, and, primarily, Euro-American—in which they operated has been, effectively, the starting point for the writing of this study of the parallel processes of nation-building in the United States and Italy in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a study with which I have sought to offer a widened perspective on the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento* maintaining a firm focus on the comparative dimension, but at the same time looking for important, and sometimes neglected, transnational links. In suggesting themes for a comparative analysis of the age of Lincoln and Cavour, I have devoted the longer central section of the book to the actual comparative study of Lincoln and Cavour. In the first section I have focused on the American abolitionists, Lincoln's radical competitors in the project of creation of an antislavery American republic, in comparison with the Italian Democrats, Cavour's equally radical competitors in the project of creation of an Italian free and unified nation. I have devoted the last section of the book to the actual wars for national unification in the United States and Italy—(i.e., the American Civil War and Italy's

Great Brigandage, both fought in 1861–65), since we can interpret them as supreme tests for Lincoln's and Cavour's ideas on national unity, even though in the latter case the test was on Cavour's legacy, given the Italian statesman's untimely death in June 1861.

In short, the three comparative themes I have looked at specifically in the age of Lincoln and Cavour are: (1) American Abolitionism and Italian Democratic Nationalism; (2) Lincoln's and Cavour's own ideologies and accomplishments; and (3) nation-building and civil war in the 1860s United States and Italy with specific reference to the two southern regions. Even though different, these three themes represent three equally important aspects in an integrated analysis that focuses on comparative elements in the processes of nation-building in Civil War America and *Risorgimento* Italy while also keeping in mind the importance of transnational links and connections between the two countries at this time. In most of the chapters I have clearly privileged the comparative element in the analysis, looking specifically for the presence of similarities and differences between aspects of the three themes under consideration and viewing their significance in the contexts of the processes of American and Italian nation-building in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. My overall objective has been to understand whether the clear parallels that can be observed in the study of the two contexts, specifically in relation to American Abolitionists and Italian Democrats, Lincoln's and Cavour's ideas, and the Confederate South's and Southern Italy's inner civil wars, were more than simply coincidences, or were, instead, the results of the existence of comparable factors, and, in lesser measure, of ideological influences—even though operating in largely different milieus—in the two parallel processes of nation-building that characterized the mid-nineteenth-century United States and Italy as part of a wider world with a particularly historiographically important Euro-American dimension.[60]

In Chapters 2 and 5 I have explicitly adopted an integrated comparative-transnational historical approach, following the suggestions of historians such as, especially, Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, and Jurgen Kocka.[61] At the same time, despite the possibility of, and usefulness deriving from, integrating the two approaches, I remain convinced that, as Peter Kolchin has argued, "transnational and comparative history . . . are fundamentally different methodologically and serve different but overlapping goals," and consequently "transnational history and comparative history coexist in uneasy tension."[62] Comparative historians have correctly agreed that the "transnational turn" in historiography has taught us the importance of investigating

the movements of ideas across borders and the influence, direct or indirect, that these ideas have had across nations and states for the course of historical events in different countries. I believe that by keeping these important concepts in mind and looking for direct or indirect contacts, especially between national ideological milieus, it is possible to enhance and integrate the comparative historical analysis of the process of nation-building in Civil War America and *Risorgimento* Italy in the age of Lincoln and Cavour. I hope that the combined comparative-transnational perspective I have adopted in the two chapters mentioned has contributed to demonstrate this.[63]

The book is organized in the following manner. The three sections in which it is divided correspond to the three broad themes, among the many possible themes that could be investigated in the age of Lincoln and Cavour, on which I have focused my comparative analysis; each section includes two chapters.

Section I is on American Abolitionism and Italian democratic nationalism. Chapter 1 compares the relation of American Abolitionists with the south of the United States and of Italian democratic nationalists with the south of Italy and argues that activists in the two radical movements were instrumental in creating wrong perceptions of the two regions. Chapter 2 deals with a specific study of American abolitionist John Brown and Italian democrat and socialist Carlo Pisacane and focuses both on comparative points and transnational links between the two radicals' circles, as demonstrated especially by the common awareness of nineteenth-century ideologies of guerrilla warfare and revolution.

Section II is a specific comparison of Lincoln and Cavour and is the heart of the study. Chapter 3 looks at Lincoln's and Cavour's early lives and careers, arguing that both men believed essentially in economic development as a fundamental factor in national progress, as demonstrated especially by their comparable interest in railroad building. Chapter 4 looks at Lincoln's and Cavour's later years and focuses on their political ideologies and actions as agents of American and Italian national unification and as comparable examples of a worldview I have termed "progressive nationalism," which emerges clearly from their commitment to civil and constitutional liberties, tinged in both cases by certain elements of moderate conservatism.

Section III is about the American Civil War and the aftermath of Italian national unification, particularly with regard to southern Italy at the time of the 1861–65 civil war known as the Great Brigandage. Chapter 5 looks at the perception of Confederate secession and of the start of the American Civil War in early post-unification Italy, when

the threat of a secession of the southern Italian provinces was a real possibility, and at both American and Italian politicians' perceptions of the situation in the two countries, also as a result of transnational contacts. Chapter 6 compares the inner civil wars of 1861–65 and their different features and phases in the Confederate South and in southern Italy, where, effectively, comparable struggles over the definition of nationhood combined and overlapped with parallel social revolutions that saw the agrarian masses as protagonists. Finally, the Conclusion explains briefly how the in-depth comparative study of the three themes under scrutiny in the present book, together with the awareness of the importance of crucial transnational links and influences, can help us understand better the wider contexts of the age of Lincoln and Cavour and of the phenomenon of nation-building in the mid nineteenth-century United States and Italy.

Part I

Nineteenth-Century American Abolitionism and Italian Democratic Nationalism

Chapter 1

Radicalism and Nationalism: Northern "Liberators" and Southern Laborers in the United States and Italy, 1830–1860

> *The Liberals of Italy . . . are to a man, philanthropists, or "friends of humanity" by profession. Accordingly, we find that they are fanatical Negrophiles, abolitionists . . . They tell us boldly that they intend to act, that it is their duty, in virtue of the "solidarity of the people," to make all men free . . . Italian Liberals and American abolitionists form but one army, fighting under the same banner in the same cause.*[1]

This excerpt is taken from an article titled "Prospects of Italy—Italian Liberalism," published in the 1858 issue of one of the foremost literary reviews in late antebellum America: *Russell's Magazine*. From the appearance of its first issue, in 1857, *Russell's Magazine* quickly established itself as a periodical that—in the words of editor Paul Hamilton Hayne—represented "the opinions, doctrines, and arguments of the educated minds of the South."[2] At the same time, the magazine's contributors, who also included celebrated planter and poet William Grayson, were wholeheartedly committed to the support and defense of U.S. Southern institutions, especially slavery. Therefore, the author of the excerpt captured the opinion of a considerable part of the Southern slaveholding elite by making an interesting connection between American abolitionists and Italian Liberals—a generic term that described the political activists who worked toward the goals of "freeing" Italians from foreign rule and creating an Italian

nation. As it happens, those activists generically qualified as "Italian Liberals" in the United States and in other countries included a more conservative group, the Moderate Liberals, and a more radical group, the Democrats. Even though the two groups shared the same hatred for slavery and a general affinity for the freedom of people and nations, Italian Democrats were the closest to American abolitionists, since many of them were indeed committed to the immediate emancipation of U.S. Southern slaves, and thus these two groups formed, in that respect, "one army, fighting under the same banner, for the same cause," as the author of *Russell's Magazine* so eloquently argued.[3]

Studies undertaken initially by Joseph Rossi, Howard Marraro, Giorgio Spini, and more recently by Don Doyle, Roland Sarti, Paola Gemme, Timothy Roberts, and Caleb McDaniel, among others, have shown that there were many connections between American abolitionists and Italian Democrats.[4] In particular, it is well known that Giuseppe Mazzini was very popular in American antislavery circles, both because of his "conviction in favor of the holy cause of abolitionism," in his own words, and also because of his personal acquaintance with prominent American abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison and other important antislavery agitators.[5] In fact, over the course of his life, Mazzini met Garrison twice, in London, in 1846 and in 1867, and the two formed a friendship that led to occasional long-distance collaboration supported by shared ideas about the need to end both slavery and national oppression. However, in the wider context, Mazzini was only the most illustrious of a large number of Italian political refugees who helped to shape the positive attitude of the American public opinion in the Civil War era toward the Italian movement for national unification.[6] Matteo Sanfilippo has argued that Italian refugees who taught in the United States and Canada in the first half of the nineteenth century were particularly instrumental in forming a pro-Italian, and thus anti-Bourbon and anti-Austrian, opinion among upper-class North American students who were to become civil servants and diplomats.[7]

While mentioning some important transnational connections, this chapter mainly explores the possibility of comparing the American antislavery movement and the Italian movement for national unification between 1830 and 1860, maintaining a focus on American abolitionists and Italian Democrats, and with specific reference to the U.S. South and southern Italy. In this respect, we can take the similarities noted in the 1858 article in *Russell's Magazine* between American abolitionism and the "Liberal" drive to make Italy an independent nation—two related struggles united by the general commitment to the causes of freedom and humanity—as the starting point of our

comparison. In general, the most idealist advocates of American antislavery in the United States in the Civil War era and of the movement for Italian unification during the *Risorgimento* strove to achieve freedom in different national contexts and under different circumstances.[8] This was particularly true of American abolitionists and Italian Democrats. The fact that contemporaries perceived these struggles as "*one single cause*, not only in principle, *but in the means of success*" is remarkable and invites us to reflect upon the meaning of categories such as liberty and oppression in nineteenth-century Europe and America, and specifically on the many points of contact between the concepts of freedom from slavery and national self-determination.[9]

In general terms, antislavery and nationalist ideologies were linked by a strong belief in progress. David Brion Davis, Seymour Drescher, and Robin Blackburn have shown that at the end of the eighteenth century slavery had started to be considered retrogressive, and consequently emancipation became a symbol of progress.[10] Nineteenth-century abolitionism, therefore, was a progressive movement, and its advocates held the belief that slavery was an injustice against which each person of conscience had to fight. Conversely, nationalism had started to be linked to the idea of progress when the idea of modern nation spread in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the American and French revolutions. Nineteenth-century nationalists believed that the fight for the recognition of oppressed nationalities set humankind on an increasingly progressive path.[11] According to David Richards, nineteenth-century Americans actively supported the Italian national struggle at the heart of the *Risorgimento*, because "during the nineteenth century [they] took an understandable interest in the developing forms of liberal nationalism in Europe from the perspective of the legitimate aims of revolutionary constitutionalism that had justified their own revolution and the resulting constitutional developments."[12] However, as both David Brion Davis and Caleb McDaniel have pointed out, the efforts of American radicals, especially the abolitionists, to support the struggles of oppressed nationalities such as the Italian one in homage to the progressive principles of republicanism was seriously damaged by the presence of the retrogressive institution of slavery within the borders of their own American republic.[13] To be sure, the nineteenth-century idea of progress also had clear connections to the rise of Romanticism, whose language of "natural rights"—originally an idea spread by the Enlightenment—appealed to both abolitionist and nationalist rhetorics.[14] Individual freedom was a central concept in Romanticism, and it was its denial, either in the form of slavery or in the form of

oppression of patriotism, that was rejected with horror as highly retrogressive and immoral. The liberation of slaves from bondage and the liberation of patriots from oppression, therefore, clearly had some points in common that Romantic intellectuals were keen to stress.[15]

An excerpt from a famous letter that Mazzini wrote to Rev. Dr. Beard, Chairman of the Antislavery Committee in England, in 1854, brilliantly illustrates all these links, and specifically the relationship between the struggle against both slavery and national oppression and the Romantic notion of freedom:

> Blessed be your efforts, if they start from this high ground of a common faith; if you do not forget, whilst at work for the emancipation of the black race, the millions of white slaves, suffering, struggling, expiring in Italy, in Poland, in Hungary, throughout all Europe; if you always remember that free men only can achieve the work of freedom, and that Europe's appeal for the abolition of slavery in other lands will not weigh all-powerful before God and men, whilst Europe herself shall be desecrated by arbitrary, tyrannical powers, by czars, emperors, and popes.[16]

Progress and Romanticism were incompatible with slavery and oppression in any form, and for Romantic intellectuals such as Mazzini the fight against these two evils constituted the "national question" of those countries where either of them was present. There is no doubt that the United States and Italy in the nineteenth century provide the most dramatic examples of successful struggles against slavery and against national oppression. However, what makes them comparable cases is the fact that the way the two struggles were handled and the way the two "national questions" were resolved contributed to a permanent difference between the northern and the southern parts of the two countries.[17]

In the case of the United States, since slavery was a Southern institution, what was effectively perceived as a struggle of the forces of progress against evil was organized in the Northern states and involved a glorification "of northern society . . . by isolating slavery as an unacceptable form of labor exploitation," in the words of Eric Foner.[18] Northern reformers saw the presence of slavery in the South as evidence of institutionalized tyranny as well as a threat to the very foundations of republican life.[19] In the case of Italy, oppression of national feelings occurred throughout the peninsula, but progressive intellectuals and revolutionary ideologues were primarily based in the northern regions of Piedmont and Lombardy. These individuals viewed the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in southern Italy,

particularly after 1848, as the negation of the idea of progress because of its perceived systematic denial of political rights and its oppressive social system based on the exploitation of the peasantry.[20] In the U.S. South, African American slaves were exploited in a very straightforward way: they were stripped of their freedom, they were brutally beaten and overworked on the plantations and farms, and they were discriminated against on the ground of perceived racial difference. On the other hand, in Italy, southern Italian peasants were free, but they were mostly landless laborers or tenants on the large landed estates, called *latifondi*, on which they were tied to the landowners by particularly usurious contracts. Although their particular conditions differed greatly, both American slaves and southern Italian peasants provided progressive reformers with two powerful examples of exploitation of agrarian laborers—an exploitation that American abolitionists and Italian Democrats, in particular, considered as the most evident symptoms of the presence of unjust and tyrannical social systems in the United States and Italy.[21]

However, whereas American abolitionists placed the exploitation of African American slaves in the U.S. South at the center of the American national question, Italian Democrats viewed the exploitation of southern Italian peasants as part of Italy's national question only because of the oppressive nature of the Bourbon Kingdom in southern Italy. Still, in the minds of American abolitionists and Italian Democrats, slaves and peasants became comparable symbols of the repression perpetrated by retrogressive societies that stood in the way of national progress. Therefore, the achievement of national progress ought to pass through the emancipation of the slaves and the end of the slave system in the United States and through the destruction of the Bourbon state and the improvement in the conditions of the southern peasantry in Italy. Between 1830 and 1860, the U.S. South and southern Italy became the objects of powerful attacks by American abolitionists and Italian Democrats, through the influence of public opinion and through direct action. The aim, in both cases, was to overthrow a reactionary regime that denied individual freedom to a considerable part of the population in one way or another. In both cases, there were several plans made to achieve this aim through an armed revolt by the masses of agrarian laborers. The "liberation" that would have followed would have merged with the formation of new republican nations that would have guaranteed basic rights and some degree of social justice. Throughout this thirty-year period, in both the United States and Italy, there grew a conviction that a change in the oppressive regimes located in the two southern regions could

only come from external forces located in the North. Long before the Union Army arrived in the U.S. South and Giuseppe Garibaldi landed in Sicily, southern agrarian laborers in the United States and Italy were thought to expect "liberators" from the North to bring the change they longed for.

UTOPIAN SOLUTIONS

American abolitionists and Italian Democrats shared a deep moral commitment to the realization of their goals. Their best-known representatives, epitomized by William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini, had made the resolution of the American and Italian national questions—that is, the abolition of American slavery and the creation of an Italian nation—their life causes, and were convinced that these were first and foremost moral problems. This stood in stark contrast to more materialistic approaches, which were more concerned with the practicalities of the abolition of slavery in one case and of the creation of an Italian nation in the other. Consequently, both American abolitionism and Italian Democratic nationalism, especially the ideologies of the two movements represented by Garrisonians and Mazzinians, had a strong element of utopian reform, since both subordinated the practical solutions of problems of social injustice to the overarching aim of general regeneration of society. This, in turn, affected the relationship of Garrisonian abolitionists with slaves in the U.S. South and of Mazzinian Democrats with the southern Italian peasants, since, in both cases, utopian elements helped to create a view of southern laborers that did not match the reality of either their social conditions or their actual needs.[22]

In the United States, in 1831, Garrison had started a campaign for immediate abolition through his own antislavery paper, *The Liberator*. He based his moral crusade against slaveholding on the idea that slavery not only contaminated the entire Southern society, but also spread its deadly influence all the way to the North, making the whole country profoundly unequal, and therefore un-American. This moral judgment was, in large part, derived from the influence of prominent Evangelical preachers attached to the major religious reform movement of the Second Great Awakening, such as, especially, Charles G. Finney, according to whom men had to repent for their sins in order to obtain salvation; in this perspective, slavery was the greatest sin of all.[23] Democracy, for Garrison, was based on personal recognition of freedom and equality as the true laws of God. To him, the crusade against slavery was a nonviolent battle to win the souls of Americans,

to persuade them to take personal responsibility for their actions, and to recognize the sin of maintaining a republic that allowed the existence of unfree laborers. In Garrison's view, the great abolitionist aim of immediate emancipation of the slaves in the South was subordinated to the conversion of ministers, editors, and the entire American public opinion through "moral suasion." The 1833 founding of the *American Anti-Slavery Society*, whose "Declaration of Sentiments" spoke of "abolition of slavery by the power of repentance," marked the high tide of Garrisonian abolitionism and of its nonviolent approach to the solution of the slavery issue.[24]

Several influential American abolitionists thought the same way as Garrison, and rather than becoming involved in violent action to free the slaves, they tried to influence the American public opinion by any nonviolent means, particularly propaganda. Wholly committed to the strategy of "moral suasion," the *American Anti-Slavery Society* embarked upon an 1835 Great Postal Campaign, delivering hundreds of thousands of copies of publications that included descriptive eyewitness accounts of the effects of slavery accompanied by pamphlets denouncing the horrors of slavery in a particularly graphic manner and recurrent appeals to the conscience of Americans, particularly Northerners. They also circulated thousands of petitions to Congress to abolish slavery until the 1836 Gag Rule put a stop to all parliamentary debates on antislavery issues.[25] Abolitionist pamphlets and speeches explained that slavery was evil because it reduced laborers to things, deprived them of free will, and exposed them to acts of brutal violence. However, as Don Doyle has pointed out, the abolitionist campaign did not draw "so much on the audience's sympathy for the slave as it did on condemnation of slaveownership as a sin."[26] In this respect, the abolitionist crusade envisioned by Garrison and the Garrisonians was a highly utopian enterprise. To them, winning the battle for "moral suasion" would have automatically guaranteed both freedom and equality to African American slaves. The resolution of the American national question was left to the good conscience of Northerners. In fact, as Ronald Walters has shown, abolitionists sought to redeem the nation by spreading southward Northern ideas of morality; significantly, this type of "cultural imperialism" tended to present Northerners as the opposite of Southerners, in that they were "hard-working, educated, prosperous, freedom-loving" individuals.[27]

At the same time, in the abolitionist pamphlets, slaves were presented as helpless victims of Southern brutality who were patiently waiting for a rescue that the Northerners' influence on the American public opinion was to bring about. Thus, the actual goal of the

liberation of the slaves could and would only be achieved when Northern pressure on the U.S. federal government through "moral suasion" was enough to force Southerners to renounce slaveholding. Even though some did not rule out completely the possibility of spontaneous slave revolt, most Garrisonian abolitionists were staunch pacifists, as was Garrison himself, and this led them to embrace the doctrine of "non-resistance," or the absolute refusal of "any act of violence or coercion, even in self-defense," from the late 1830s onwards.[28] Yet, when applied to the African American slaves in the U.S. South, this doctrine effectively ruled out the possibility of revolts, and thus it helped construct an image of the slaves as not being capable of looking after themselves, and therefore in need of help from the North for their own liberation. Although engaging heart and soul toward the goal of establishment of racial equality in the United States—to which they contributed in a major way—in committing their lives to bring about the end of enslavement of African Americans, Garrisonian abolitionists could not help but think that they were destined to fight for the liberation of what they ultimately considered an unfortunate and unhappy race.[29]

The idea, inspired by abolitionists, that slaves were gentle and patient in the midst of oppression, unlike "vengeful and liberty-loving" Anglo-Saxons, was a powerful engine of racial prejudice. It is true that slave revolts in the antebellum U.S. South were surprisingly few; almost all of them—except for the 1811 Louisiana uprising and Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831—had been discovered and repressed before any action could take place. Why, people asked, did the slaves not revolt as any white man would do? Abolitionists invariably answered this question by invoking Christian virtues, asserting, with Amos Phelps, that "the Negro's heart, despite the maddening influence of oppression, is too kind, too full of tenderness and love . . . the white man seeks vengeance, but not he."[30] This attitude has been called by George Fredrickson "Romantic Racialism," and was best represented by William Ellery Channing, who wrote in 1835 that "we are holding in bondage one of the best races of the human family. The negro is among the mildest and gentlest of men."[31] Since slaves belonged to a "gentle race," they could not rise up against their oppressors. This logic not only justified early forms of Northern racial discrimination against Southern blacks, but also it was instrumental in constructing an enduring image of African American slaves as being dependent on the help of Northerners to be able to break free from oppression.

In 1831, the same year in which Garrison began publishing *The Liberator*, Mazzini was in exile in Marseille, where he founded the

association called Young Italy for the promotion of Italian national unification according to republican principles. Denis Mack Smith has emphasized the novelty of Mazzini's idea of the association as an "'apostolate,' a quasi-religious movement calling its members to a life of conspiracy and self-sacrifice."[32] In truth, there was in Mazzini as much a moral commitment and religious sense of mission as there was in Garrison, and it is no coincidence that the two were to become friends later in life.[33] According to Roland Sarti, Mazzini's commitment and creed were largely based on Henri de Saint-Simon's "view of a future society based on the principle of association, religious faith, and faith in progress."[34] To this messianic background, Mazzini added his particular views on democratic nationalism: his central idea was that the nation was a product of the work of the people and at the same time the fulfillment of God's plans for humankind. Repeatedly, Mazzini wrote phrases such as "where God wanted the existence of a nation there were the means to create it."[35] For Mazzini, every man had a mission and the most important mission was to bring the nation into existence.[36]

Unlike Garrison, though, Mazzini believed in the realization of his mission through revolutionary insurrection. The people, whom he called "the largest and poorest class," were to be guided by the intellectuals on the road to liberation from oppression. However, since Mazzini looked for collaboration, rather than conflict, between different social classes—similarly to Garrison in this—his idea of achievement of Italian national unification through revolution was, in practice, as utopian as nonresistant abolitionism. Similarly to Garrison, in fact, Mazzini believed that the people could be led to "the discovery of their collective mission and hence . . . the establishment of a new moral . . . order."[37] Therefore, Mazzini was opposed to any revolutionary plan involving class conflict as a potential generator of violence and civil war. In the minds of those Italian Democrats who were followers of Mazzini, the liberation of the masses from oppression would lead to the simultaneous achievement of national unity and social justice. In 1831, outlining the main ideas behind his program, Mazzini wrote that "*Young Italy* does not want national unity to be based on *despotism*, but rather on the agreement and free consent of everybody."[38] All Democrats agreed on the incompatibility of the institution of monarchy with these premises. Therefore, the resolution of the Italian national question ought to pass through the destruction of monarchies throughout the peninsula, and first and foremost the Bourbon Kingdom in the south, which was perceived by the Democrats as the most reactionary monarchical state.

For his part, Mazzini turned his attention to the Bourbon Kingdom at different times in his attempts to provoke the revolution that would free the Italian people from national oppression. Several other Democrats also considered southern Italy as a place that had the potential for insurrection. In their minds, the exploited southern peasantry would rise against Bourbon oppression and would be guided by the leaders of Mazzinian organizations coordinated from headquarters placed outside the Bourbon territory. Mazzinian Democrats effectively saw southern Italian peasants as if they represented a type of spontaneous and primitive insurrectionary force, which needed to be directed and guided by properly trained revolutionary leaders, often from northern Italy. The liberation of southern peasants from exploitation and Bourbon oppression, thus, could be achieved only after a preliminary work of introduction of Democratic ideas and of establishment of Democratic networks, which necessarily ought to begin outside the Bourbon Kingdom.[39] As a result, similar to African American slaves in the U.S. South, southern Italian peasants were constructed by Italian Democrats as helpless victims patiently waiting for the rescue brought by northerners, be they agitators or revolutionaries. To be sure, peasant revolts occurred at different times in the Bourbon Kingdom in the period leading up to 1860, but their cause, rather than being the fulfillment of an abstract idea of freedom or nationality, was usually the hunger for land. The Mazzinian Democrats' failure to address the concrete problem of land, therefore, meant that their carefully planned revolutionary insurrections could never succeed. Moreover, to follow Antonio Gramsci's thought, the fact that the Democrats never elaborated a program capable of fulfilling the peasantry's specific expectations of land redistribution in the end led to the Democrats' subordination to the much more successful Moderate Liberals in the process of construction of the Italian nation.[40]

Yet, in Mazzini's view, to address the land issue with the peasantry meant to spark class conflict; this would have inevitably led to a degeneration of social relations into violence and anarchy, whereas the fundamental tenets of Mazzini's political program focused on harmony and consent as ideal foundations of the future Italian democratic republic.[41] Perhaps most important of all was the fact that the construction of the image of the southern Italian peasantry as waiting for a spark coming from outside the south to start a general insurrection was, in the words of Paul Ginsborg, a true "Romantic myth." In fact, this proved to be a myth particularly with the tragic failure of the expedition of the Bandiera brothers, who were killed in Calabria in 1844 while attempting to spark a peasant revolution

against the Bourbons in the southern Italian countryside. The two Bandiera brothers sacrificed their lives in a highly symbolic act of martyrdom in which they knew they could count on little military support, yet they still had complete faith in the revolutionary potential of the Calabrian peasants. In fact, according to Ginsborg, "the peasants of Calabria were considered by the Bandiera as endemic rebels and ready to answer the patriots' call to arms."[42]

It is true that, unlike African American slaves, southern Italian peasants were not objects of the type of "Romantic Racialism" analyzed by George Fredrickson, mostly because they were nominally free, and they were obviously not discriminated against racially or exploited with the same degree of violence. Yet, in both cases, the obvious prejudice that subsumed the stereotype attached prevalently by northerners to the character of the southern agrarian masses was divested in romantic terms. Thus, the "Romantic myth" that Paul Ginsborg has referred to led the construction of a powerful and distorted image of southern Italian peasants, since Mazzinian Democrats thought of them as needing guidance before they could fully realize their own condition and make a decisive contribution to the improvement of their own lives. Similarly, "Romantic Racialism" led Garrisonian abolitionists to think of American slaves as essentially helpless and meek and waiting for emancipation to be handed down to them. Thus, in these two remarkably comparable cases, these views led dangerously to similarly constructed ideas of Southern masses as being dependent on Northern help: on one hand, African American slaves needed help to be freed from U.S. Southern slaveholders; on the other hand, southern Italian peasants needed help to rise against Bourbon oppression.

Violent Solutions

Both American abolitionism and the Italian Democratic movement had extremist militant fringes that gained progressively more power and influence as Garrisonian abolitionists and Mazzinian Democrats began to show the fundamental shortcomings of their utopian approaches. Unlike the more utopian activists, in fact, these more militant American abolitionists and Italian Democrats were more pragmatic in their approaches to the problems of U.S. slave emancipation and creation of an Italian democratic republic. In the case of American abolitionists, the more militant among them were characterized by a more radically violent stance on the American national question, and therefore militant abolitionist leaders were both more pragmatic and more committed to the need of using insurrectionary means to

achieve the aim of liberating Southern slaves. Conversely, in the case of Italian Democrats, the more militant among them were both more pragmatic and more extreme in their views of class warfare as an indispensable element in the insurrection that would free especially the southern masses. In both cases, militant activists believed that revolution ought to be sparked by an initial armed revolt that would serve as an example and that would eventually lead to a general insurrection, and this belief not only did not challenge, but actually reinforced the fundamental premises of the constructed idea of northern "liberators" rescuing oppressed southern laborers.[43]

In the United States, militant abolitionists were the most active in advocating the need for a general armed revolt of African American slaves and a widespread insurrection against slaveholders in the South. The 1850s saw a crescendo of attempts at provoking both. On one hand, this was a result of the basic failure in achieving the objectives of the highly utopian enterprise of "moral suasion." On the other hand, the increasingly violent political atmosphere of the sectional conflicts over the expansion of slavery from the late 1840s onwards prompted a redefinition of abolitionist means and aims. Thus, Jane and William Pease have argued that the failure of the antislavery politics of the Free Soil Party, which proved too weak as an antislavery coalition, and the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act as part of the Compromise of 1850—by which catchers of fugitive slaves were helped by federal authorities on the entire national territory—forced the new generations of abolitionists to change strategy and move toward direct action against the Southern slave system.[44] In the words of James B. Stewart, "abolitionists who endorsed non-violence for practical reasons would obviously feel free to discard the tactic whenever desperate circumstances seemed to justify doing so. For some abolitionists, the pro-slavery triumphs of the early 1850s were such a compelling reason."[45]

Among the most active militant abolitionists was James Redpath, a leading propagandist of slave insurrection from the early 1850s up to the American Civil War. Being in contact with other radical abolitionists—notably William Lloyd Garrison and John Brown—Redpath undertook several trips in the southern states in order to see for himself the conditions of the slaves and test the possibilities of a slave insurrection. He stated clearly his views on the American national question when he proclaimed: "let the abolitionists of the North not be deceived. The South will never liberate her slaves unless compelled to do so."[46] Therefore, following his statement that "I do not hesitate to urge the friend of the slave to incite insurrection,"

Redpath was willing to initiate the enterprise himself and to resort specifically to guerrilla warfare in order to achieve his aim.[47] Effectively, in the United States, the idea of Northern "liberators" going to rescue oppressed Southern laborers had never before been as clear as in Redpath's prediction that "a general stampede of the slaves" could make Virginia and North Carolina free states "if the abolitionists would send down a trustworthy band of 'Liberators' provided with compasses, pistols, and a little money for the fugitives."[48]

When advocating slave insurrection, militant abolitionists such as James Redpath usually looked to Haiti, where the only successful slave revolt had occurred more than a half-century earlier, as a source of inspiration. In fact, Haiti stood as a permanent warning to slaveholders and as a permanent symbol of hope for the slaves.[49] However, when referring to practical means of sparking slave insurrection through guerrilla warfare, other militant abolitionists such as John Brown seem to have had in mind the example of Napoleonic Spain. There are speculations that John Brown might have known and applied the insurrectional theories of the Italian Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz, a Piedmontese officer who had fought and headed guerrilla operations in Spain in the 1820s. In fact, as noted in Chapter 2, John Brown's ideas on guerrilla warfare and slave insurrection might have shown an acquaintance with the theories and writings of contemporary European radicals, particularly Italian revolutionaries, not just Bianco, but also Mazzini.[50] In general, though, there is no doubt that Brown was the very symbol of slave insurrection in 1850s America. In the words of Herbert Aptheker, he was "the apotheosis of revolutionary commitment" of the last generation of abolitionists.[51] In Brown's view, the liberation of the slaves and the solution to the U.S. national question were to be achieved by sparking an insurrectionary war through guerrilla tactics directed at the heart of the Southern slave system. Still, similarly to Redpath, Brown firmly believed in the liberation of the slaves as a process whereby a few committed Northerners could rescue the masses of oppressed Southern African Americans. Brown's conviction that guerrilla acts, such as the final one he attempted at Harpers Ferry in 1859, were required to spark slave insurrection only reinforced the abolitionist construction of African American slaves as helpless victims who belonged to a submissive race. Indeed, all militant abolitionists committed to using violent means carried as far as possible the idea of Northern "liberators" of Southern slaves by asserting the necessity of resorting to immediate violent action, given that the slaves themselves were meant to be waiting for the opportunity to start it.[52]

Similarly to American militant abolitionists, in the 1850s Italian Democrats were also constantly making plans for revolutionary insurrection. Guerrilla warfare was especially suited for countries such as Italy, which was for the most part occupied by reactionary regimes. The methods of guerrilla warfare and their possible application to the Italian case were popularized by the writings of Bianco di Saint Jorioz. Like some American abolitionists, Italian Democrats looked at Napoleonic Spain as a successful example of insurrection through guerrilla warfare. They believed that, between 1801 and 1814, most of the Spanish population had participated in the struggle to achieve national independence from the Napoleonic army. As Bianco's work showed, the war had been organized through small bands of partisans (*guerrillas*, called *bande* in Italy) trained in the countryside and used for sudden attacks against the enemy.[53] The idea of guerrilla warfare involving peasant participation appealed particularly to those Democrats who believed in the possibility of a revolutionary movement starting from the southern Italian countryside. Whereas Mazzinian Democrats held a highly utopian view of the necessity of educating the southern Italian masses to revolution—and they became increasing skeptical about the possibility of doing so—other Democrats, such as Nicola Fabrizi, thought in practical terms about the organization of guerrilla groups among southern peasants.[54]

Starting from 1839, Fabrizi organized a clandestine revolutionary structure, called *Legione Italica* (Italian Legion), which was intended to be in charge of starting a general insurrection of southern Italian peasants by implementing guerrilla units. The *Legione Italica*, which was based in Malta, succeeded only in causing minor problems to the Bourbon regime, rather than in overthrowing it, but its example proved far-reaching in its consequences. Fabrizi contributed more than any other Democrat before 1848 to showing that the way to resolving Italy's national question should pass through the organization of peasants in the south and the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy. In his view, the idea of "liberators" of the southern masses coming from outside was subordinate to the practical organization of warfare, which he thought was the key element of a future general insurrection.[55] The years 1848–49 marked a watershed in the Italian Democratic movement. The revolutions that occurred in those two years throughout the peninsula, including Naples and Sicily in southern Italy, failed because of the irreconcilable differences between Democratic and Moderate Liberal ideas over the solution of Italy's national question. While the Democrats strove to achieve radical objectives through the formation of revolutionary republics,

the Moderate Liberals wanted only limited reforms carried out by constitutional monarchies. Above all, the Democrats failed to address the problem of land distribution in the countryside, and this failure drove the support of peasants away from them. Both in Naples and Sicily, it was clear that the 1848 revolutionary governments had collapsed when their leaders had retreated from radical programs involving the redistribution of land among southern peasants. As Bianco had noticed, the solution to Italy's national question through revolutionary insurrection was tied to the land problem in the countryside. This was particularly true of the Bourbon Kingdom, where peasant exploitation and hunger for land were more acute than anywhere else in Italy.[56]

Keeping in mind the above reasons as explanations for the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions, Carlo Pisacane elaborated a theory of insurrection that combined the participation of the people in the revolutionary war with a true socialist approach to the problem of land distribution. As noted in detail in Chapter 2, Pisacane made clear that, unlike Mazzini, he thought that the birth of a new Italian nation should address the problem of resolution of class conflict. Speaking in socialist terms, in the 1850s Pisacane located the potential for a social revolution among the lower classes who were exploited by capitalists in the cities and by landed proprietors in the countryside, the latter especially in southern Italy.[57] Thus, Pisacane's ideas effectively reinforced the image of southern Italian peasants as helpless victims of oppression waiting for "liberators" to arrive from outside the south. In his view, in fact, all oppressed classes had an innate goodness and sense of justice, but they were unable to start fighting against exploitation by themselves, since they needed an external source of help in order to begin a social revolution. Based on these premises, Pisacane eventually tried and failed to spark a general peasant insurrection in the southern Italian countryside at Sapri, in Campania, in 1857. In doing so, he ultimately proved that even Democrats with socialist ideas did not differ a great deal from utopian Democrats such as Mazzini in imagining the masses of southern Italian peasants as patiently waiting for outside "liberators" to reach them and deliver them.[58]

James Redpath and Nicola Fabrizi demonstrated through their writings and their actions the importance of organizing and planning insurrections of U.S. Southern slaves and southern Italian peasants in advance, through reconnaissance and strategy, if they were to have any hope of success. Their examples were particularly important for the two generations of American abolitionists and Italian Democrats who, disillusioned with the utopian premises of Garrisonian abolitionism

and Mazzinian democratic republicanism, looked for more pragmatic and radical solutions to the American and Italian national questions in the 1850s. The ethos of those two generations was ultimately epitomized by the comparable attempts by Carlo Pisacane and John Brown to spark insurrections among southern Italian peasants at Sapri in 1857 and among U.S. Southern slaves at Harpers Ferry in 1859, respectively. In practice, both Brown and Pisacane operated according to ill-conceived ideas on how to start a social revolution in the southern countryside. In this respect, Pisacane's views about the possibility of an insurrection in the Bourbon Kingdom were comparable to Brown's views about the possibility of a slave insurrection in the U.S. South. In this sense, also, Brown and Pisacane's actions represented the ultimate proofs that up to the start of the American Civil War (1861–65) and the achievement of Italian national unification (1860–61), American abolitionists and Italian Democrats continued to believe in their own constructed images of oppressed southern agrarian laborers waiting for outside "liberators" to rescue them.[59]

Over the course of the three decades between 1830 and 1860, American abolitionists and Italian Democrats sought to resolve two distinct, but related, national questions. In the United States, the abolitionists focused on the elimination of Southern slavery as incompatible with the ideals of the American republic. In Italy, the Democrats focused on the creation of a republican nation through the overthrow of reactionary regimes, especially the Bourbon Kingdom in the south. Through propaganda and direct action, American abolitionists and Italian Democrats waged a constant war against the oppressive regimes located in the two southern regions. In the process, they constructed comparable images of themselves as "liberators," while at the same time constructing equally comparable images of the southern agrarian masses as helpless victims longing for help to arrive from outside, particularly the north. This construction of an image of northern "liberators" versus southern laborers had two related long-term effects in both countries: it created a history of dependency of the two souths upon the respective norths for social change, and it contributed to northern discriminations against ex-slaves in the U.S. South and peasants in southern Italy. Although the actual mode and shape of the discrimination were very different in the two southern regions, mainly as a result of the absence of a racial factor in the Italian case, they were major factors in the creation of a comparable perception of permanent difference between the northern and southern parts of the country in both the United States and Italy.

Chapter 2

Purging Nations with Blood: John Brown, Pisacane, Social Justice, and Guerrilla Warfare

Victory, when it is in accord with progress, merits the applause of the people; but a heroic defeat merits their tender compassion. The one is magnificent, the other sublime. For our own part we prefer martyrdom to success. John Brown is greater than Washington and Pisacane is greater than Garibaldi.

—*Victor Hugo*[1]

These words from Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, first published in France in 1862 and then released in full in the English translation in the United States in 1863, make at once an unusual connection and a comparison between American radical abolitionist John Brown and Italian democrat and socialist Carlo Pisacane. At the time Hugo wrote his epic novel, memories of both John Brown's 1859 death in the failed attempt to provoke a slave insurrection in the U.S. South and of Pisacane's 1857 killing in the failed attempt to rouse the peasants of southern Italy to revolt were still fresh. Hugo reflected on the two events as examples of heroic martyrdom for the cause of liberty—much like the events of the Parisian failed revolution of 1832, whose protagonists were at the center of his work. Even though Hugo's own interpretation and comparison may be disputable, we can still take his words as a starting point for a study that focuses on these two activists in order to understand at a deeper level the similarities and the differences between Brown and Pisacane and the mindsets that prompted them to commit themselves to martyrdom and also the important

connections between their milieus in terms of shared influences of widespread nineteenth-century ideas, strategies, and tactics of insurrection and revolution through guerrilla warfare. Before doing this, however, it is useful to briefly recount the events of 1859 and 1857 that led to the deaths of Brown and Pisacane and that had a large echo in both America and Europe.[2]

On the night of October 16, 1859, John Brown—a staunch Calvinist with a reputation as a religious zealot and opponent of slavery willing to kill for his militant abolitionist ideals—descended with a band of twenty-one companions on Harpers Ferry, a small town in present-day West Virginia, then in the slave states of the U.S. South. His plan was to seize the arsenal there and distribute the weapons to the slaves in the hope of starting a general slave insurrection. After cutting the telegraph wires, Brown and his men managed to secure Harpers Ferry's arsenal, and the following morning, October 17, they took hostages from among the employees on their way to work. Then, Brown waited for the slaves in the neighboring fields and farms to join him, but the insurrection he had planned did not start. Instead, President James Buchanan sent the U.S. Marines, who, under the command of Robert E. Lee and J. E. B. Stuart, future Confederate heroes in the approaching U.S. Civil War, took control of the area and surrounded Harpers Ferry's arsenal. On October 18, Lee gave Brown an ultimatum, which the latter declined, and then attacked the outpost with his Marines, leaving ten dead on the ground, among them also two of Brown's own sons. The Marines wounded Brown and captured him together with seven of his companions.[3] As he lay in prison for six weeks, Brown argued his case in correspondence with many different people. In the trial that followed, utilizing a straightforward and powerful rhetoric, Brown effectively managed to bring the event to the attention of the media, both nationally and internationally.[4] By the time he was hung in Charles Town, on December 2, 1859, Brown had become an abolitionist hero and a martyr for the cause of liberty. He was revered not just in the antislavery circles in the North of the United States, but in Europe as well by intellectuals such as Victor Hugo, who, even before mentioning him as an example of martyrdom in *Les Miserables*, called him "the liberator, the champion of Christ" and argued that he was murdered by the American Republic as a whole.[5]

Only two years before John Brown's Harpers Ferry raid, in June 1857, another daring attempt at bringing about an insurrection of oppressed masses had occurred when Italian democrat and socialist Carlo Pisacane had landed at Sapri in the Bourbon Kingdom, in

the hope of rousing southern Italian peasants against the landowners and the reactionary Bourbon regime that the latter supposedly supported. Contemporaries such as Victor Hugo found much in common between the two bold and desperate actions, both equally heroic and ill-planned. In short, on June 25, 1857, Pisacane—a disillusioned southern Italian nobleman and an ex-officer of the Bourbon army, who had become a follower of Giuseppe Mazzini and had developed radical ideas on social reform—left from Genoa with twenty-four companions aboard the ship *Cagliari*. Two days later, on June 27, they landed in the island of Ponza, where they took the weapons from the arsenal and freed 323 prisoners from the Bourbon jail, hoping that they would follow them to fight the Bourbon regime, even though only a few had been imprisoned for political reasons. On June 28, they landed in Sapri, where Pisacane thought he would find large numbers of southern Italian peasants armed and ready to follow him in his march on the Bourbon Kingdom's capital, Naples. Instead, the local Bourbon authorities, who had warned the peasants that a band of criminals was approaching their towns and houses, moved swiftly and managed to defeat Pisacane and his companions at Padula on July 1. Only Pisacane and fewer than a third of the original contingent momentarily escaped, and they were finally surrounded at Sanza, where they were massacred by the very peasants they had come to liberate, while the survivors were captured by the Bourbon authorities.[6] Even though, unlike Brown, Pisacane did not live to face the trial, the death penalty inflicted on Pisacane's surviving companions in 1858 had a large international echo, since it was seen as the ultimate proof of Bourbon oppression, while in Italy the event highlighted the profound divisions in the democratic movement for Italian national unification.[7]

Contemporaries of Brown and Pisacane, such as Victor Hugo, saw similarities in the two men's noble sacrifices, but since the 1960s several historians have argued less about the existence of comparative points between the events of Harpers Ferry and Sapri and their significance than about the possibility that a transnational milieu of common ideas about the practice of revolutionary insurrection might have influenced Brown and Pisacane leading them to plan essentially similar actions in two different countries on two different continents. Raimondo Luraghi suggested possible comparisons between John Brown's 1859 raid at Harpers Ferry and expeditions made by Italian Democrats to start a revolution in southern Italy, including Pisacane's in 1857, stating that they were similar in that they were all desperately inadequate enterprises against a much stronger enemy.[8] At the

same time, both Luraghi and, more than ten years later, Italian scholar Giulio Schenone argued that some specific nineteenth-century ideas on guerrilla warfare were likely common elements shared by Brown's and the Italian Democrats' doctrines of revolutionary insurrection.[9] More recently, Timothy Roberts has argued in *Distant Revolutions* (2009) and in other works that Brown was aware of Mazzini's and other Italian Democrats' doctrines and tactics of revolutionary insurrection and was directly influenced by them.[10] Eugenio Biagini has acknowledged the same connection, while he has highlighted the comparative element in stating that "it is remarkable that . . . [two years] before Harpers Ferry, another revolutionary firebrand, the Mazzinian socialist Carlo Pisacane, attempted a similar expedition in the [Bourbon] Kingdom of the Two Sicilies."[11]

The few recent studies that have revived the idea of a connection between John Brown and the Italian revolutionary tradition in the *Risorgimento* are part of a growing scholarship that, following the suggestions of recent transnational approaches to American history, seeks to look at transnational links and connections between the United States and other countries in the Civil War era.[12] Particularly in the case of the post-1830 abolitionist movement, to which Brown belonged, scholars of the nineteenth-century United States have produced important recent works that have clearly demonstrated the links between several important American abolitionists and major European activists.[13] In parallel fashion, a growing group of scholars of nineteenth-century Italy has applied the transnational approach to the "new" history of the *Risorgimento*, searching for connections hitherto overlooked between Italy and other countries in the lead-up to Italian national unification.[14] The transnational approach has been particularly fruitful in the investigation of the transnational links between the Italian democratic movement, to which Pisacane belonged, and major currents and activists, in Europe, in America, and even beyond.[15] We can thus take inspiration from these recent studies to reconfigure the issues of historical parallelisms between John Brown and Carlo Pisacane and of contacts between the milieus within which they moved and operated with a view to joining together some of the important discoveries of the current transnational scholarship with some of the equally important claims made by scholars who have looked at Brown and Pisacane separately.

Despite the fact that many of Brown's contemporaries looked at his life and deeds in an international dimension, most scholars, with only a few notable exceptions,[16] have seen him exclusively in the context of the nineteenth-century United States and have sharply divided

over the interpretation of his actions, initially moving between the two extreme views of him as either a hero for the cause of liberty or as a religious fanatic.[17] More recently, historians have provided progressively a more balanced view of Brown by reaching a better understanding of the abolitionist context, of his relationship with both white and black abolitionists, of the religious and cultural milieu to which he related, and of his revolutionary ideas on the fight against slavery.[18] Yet, as Evan Rothera has noted, "placing Brown in an international context could help to move the historiography to the next frontier."[19] That frontier would, then, ideally include Europe and the still little understood transnational relationship between Brown and the Italian democratic movement. In fact, by making a reappraisal of both the evidence and the educated speculations in regard to that relationship—clearly building on the research carried on by the scholars cited earlier—we can reach a more complete understanding of specific aspects of Brown's complexity of thought, especially if we combine the transnational approach with the insights that we can gain from a comparative study of Brown's and Pisacane's views, particularly in regard to social change.

In comparable ways to the scholarship on Brown, interpretations of Pisacane's thought and actions have varied wildly according to different periods and scholars, ranging from initial assessments of him as a hero doomed to fail to the idea that he was a socialist influenced by radical Piedmontese circles, or a Jacobin and anarchist, or else an inheritor of the legacy of the eighteenth-century Neapolitan Enlightenment.[20] More recently, scholars have focused on the in-depth analysis of Pisacane's relationship with socialist circles, on his political ideas, and on the revolutionary features of his thought, while also looking at the wider local and national contexts of Pisacane's actions.[21] As in Brown's case, most scholars of Pisacane have maintained an almost exclusive focus on nineteenth-century Italian history and the *Risorgimento*. Only a few have looked at the international context even though, as Graziano Palamara has argued, "the contacts Pisacane made abroad . . . were in any event crucial for him to start maturing his ideas," while even fewer scholars have hinted at possible transnational and comparative studies of Pisacane in relation to radicals of other countries, including John Brown.[22] Following the calls for an internationalization of the historiography on both Brown and Pisacane, therefore, we can say that the time is ripe for an integrated comparative and transnational assessment of the two men's radical thoughts in regard to social change and of the contacts and reciprocal influences between the nineteenth-century American abolitionist

and Italian democratic nationalist milieus to which they belonged, particularly in regard to doctrines and practices of guerrilla warfare.

RADICAL COMMITMENT TO SOCIAL EQUALITY IN TWO DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

Born and raised in completely different historical settings and circumstances on opposite sides of the Euro-American world, and effectively belonging to two different generations as a result of the strong age difference between them, John Brown and Carlo Pisacane went, nevertheless, through life experiences that, even though completely divergent, influenced them in comparable ways and prompted them to develop a similar crave for social justice, especially as a response to the constant exploitation of the masses of agrarian workers—slaves and peasants—which they saw as a particularly abhorrent feature of their homelands. Born in Connecticut in 1800, the son of a pious farmer and convinced opponent of slavery, John Brown developed his radical views first and foremost as a result of his Calvinist upbringing, which taught him that sin stood in the way of a proper relationship between man and God, and of his deeply entrenched hatred of slavery as the biggest cause of social injustice and of immense suffering to black people, as witnessed also by him firsthand in his youth.[23] Yet, in Brown's adult life, after he married and built a family, it was his constant propensity to business failure, which led to bankruptcy following the financial crisis of 1837–42, which ultimately radicalized him, at a time when militant abolitionism, heavily influenced by the Second Great Awakening and infused with Protestant concepts of sin and retribution, was on the rise in the Northeast and Midwest of the United States.[24] In John Stauffer's and Zoe Trodd's words, "with the panic and the bankruptcy he [Brown] became a passionate outsider, totally rejecting the values of his material world . . . he sought to replace his world with God's dominion, believed that sin could be abolished immediately."[25] Thus, Brown became a radical abolitionist who, by the late 1840s, was committed to the immediate end of slavery by whatever means possible, including violence, and to the creation of a new social order, both interracial and egalitarian.

Compared to Brown, Carlo Pisacane could have not been more different in his upbringing and early life, since he was born in Naples in 1818, the son of a southern Italian noble who started a military career in the Bourbon army and seemed to be destined to follow the path of most Bourbon officers at the time. Yet, by the mid-1840s, Pisacane was secretly harboring libertarian ideas and in 1846 he publicly showed

his admiration for democratic republican leader Giuseppe Garibaldi. It was, though, Pisacane's pursuit of a "forbidden" love, reciprocated, from a married woman, Enrichetta Di Lorenzo, and his subsequent escape from Naples with her, defying established social conventions, which forced him to come to terms with the reactionary social system that characterized the Bourbon Kingdom and other states in the Italian peninsula.[26] As he met Italian exiles abroad, and other exiles from oppressed nationalities, in France and England, and then in Piedmont, Pisacane matured his conviction that a major revolution was needed in order to change the existing social order.[27] This conviction would lead, in time, to Pisacane's idea that, in Luciano Russi's words, "without the overthrow of the economic and social structures, civil liberties remain instruments of exploitation."[28] In this sense, the turning point for Pisacane was his participation in the revolutions of 1848–49, whose failure he attributed to the missed opportunity by the revolutionary leaders to involve the peasant masses in a movement for the creation of a new, socially egalitarian, Italian nation.

Thus, despite the different upbringing and youth experiences, by the late 1840s Brown and Pisacane found themselves at similar points in their lives. Having decided not to be part of the social order that characterized the countries of their birth, because they found it wanting in terms of both social justice and equality, they decided to give their lives to sparking the revolutionary change that they longed for. While Brown planned the creation of an interracial American society, Pisacane envisioned the foundation of a new socially egalitarian Italian nation.

According to Herbert Aptheker, John Brown marked a departure from earlier abolitionist attitudes in an important way, since "his hatred of slavery reflected a rejection of both racism and elitism. He repeatedly insisted that he was a partisan of the slave and of the poor."[29] Aptheker saw Brown as the most extreme example of a tradition of abolitionism that placed particular emphasis on the idea of elimination of private property in the form of slavery, and he quoted the words of William Phillips, a reporter of the *New York Tribune*, who, after a conversation he had with Brown in 1856, wrote that "he thought society ought to be recognized on a less selfish basis . . . and thought there was an infinite number of wrongs to right before society would be what it should be, but that in our country slavery was 'the sum of all villainies.'"[30] To be sure, Brown's insistence on social justice and elimination of poverty derived, first and foremost, from his Calvinist view of God's just punishment of man's sins and the consequent need for radical reform and social improvement, which would be guided

by "moral stewards," or men who were "uniquely qualified to direct that improvement," in the words of Caleb McDaniel.[31] Yet, there is no doubt that radical militant abolitionists such as Brown helped place the U.S. national question in a new perspective, since, in his view, the way to American national progress passed not only through the abolition of slavery, but also through the abolition of social inequality and class conflict.

Famously, Brown proved to be true to these beliefs in May 1849, when he moved with his family and started a farm in the black community of North Elba, or Timbucto (after the name of the legendary African city) which had been established three years earlier by prominent abolitionist and philanthropist Gerry Smith in Essex County, New York, where he had granted land to three thousand free African Americans.[32] Even though Brown spent relatively little time there, and he effectively acted mostly as an adviser by helping to fulfill the utopian vision of moral order that the abolitionists had in mind for free African Americans, there is no doubt that North Elba was still a bold experiment in a new type of social order based on interracial cooperation and harmony between whites and blacks.[33] During the short time that he was there, according to David Reynolds, "John Brown treated . . . black families in the area on terms of complete equality."[34] But there was more to it than that, because Smith had conceived North Elba as a way to help improve the material conditions of African Americans, since he thought that they were "the poorest of the poor, and the most deeply wronged class of our citizens."[35] Thus, there was a strong element of social justice in Smith's experiment, and this element appealed particularly to John Brown, who had written his father, before moving to North Elba, that he wished "to live with those poor despised Africans to try & encourage."[36] Moreover, John Brown's son, John Brown Jr.—who, significantly, later became a socialist—reported about his father's interest in the idea that "all should labor for the common good; 'having all things in common' as did the disciples of Jesus in his day."[37] In this cooperative vision of labor and society, even though inevitably imbued with Christianity, Reynolds has found a clear echo of the contemporary communities established by the followers of French utopian socialist Charles Fourier, most notably the one in Brook Farm, Massachusetts.[38] In fact, even though private property was firmly established at North Elba, in both Gerry Smith's and John Brown's views, economic equality there was at the heart of a utopian social experiment that witnessed, effectively, the interracial cooperation between everybody laboring for the good of the community.

The echo of utopian social experiments loomed large in Brown's life and, doubtless, the North Elba experience influenced his ideas about the future society he wanted America to become. In April 1858, nine years after he had moved to North Elba, as he was planning the attack on Harpers Ferry, Brown organized a meeting with forty-six of his supporters, twelve whites and thirty-four African Americans, including prominent activist Martin Delaney, at Chatham, Canada. According to Tony Horwitz, the meeting was nothing less than a "latter-day Constitutional Convention" in which the delegates would talk about "the secret creation of a new American government."[39] And in truth, the meeting regarded the organization of the type of American society that Brown envisioned arising from the ashes of the great slave insurrection that he was planning—an American society that was to be radically different as a result of the abolition of slavery and of its corollary, racism. This new society, according to Brown, would initially characterize a free state devoid of the laws of slavery in the U.S. South, which, similar to Haiti half a century earlier, would have to fight an ongoing war in order to survive, establishing, in the process, "a guerrilla community devoted to destabilizing slavery," in the words of Louis DeCaro.[40]

The fundamental document for the government and society of this future model and free guerrilla community was the *Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States*, written by Brown in January 1858 and approved by the delegates at Chatham on May 8 of the same year. Modeled closely after the U.S. Constitution, Brown's *Provisional Constitution* was a radical document that, on one hand, provided guidelines for the construction of a nation with similar legislative, judiciary, and executive powers—the latter of which was held by Brown himself as the elected commander-in-chief—to the ones of the American Republic, while, on the other hand, it contained the essence of Brown's radical vision of interracial cooperation and utopian social equality.[41] In fact, Article I, on the "Qualification for Membership" included all the individuals who were "Proscribed, oppressed, and enslaved Citizens, or of the Proscribed and oppressed races of the United States," without distinction, in line with the interracial cooperation project.[42] At the same time, Article XXVIII on "Property" showed Brown's continuing commitment to utopian socialist principles in the statement that "all property the product of the labor of those belonging to this organization and of their families shall be held as the property of the whole equally without distinction, and may be used for the common benefit or disposed of for the same object."[43] The same could be said also for Article XXXIX on "All Must

Labor," which stated that "all persons connected in any way with this organization, and who may be entitled to full protection under it, shall be held under obligation to labor in some way for the general good."[44] Thus, Brown's free guerrilla state, which was to provide the blueprint for the future reformed society in the post-slavery insurrection period, was essentially a version of the American Republic characterized by a full commitment to the type of racial equality that had characterized North Elba, but with even more radical features than the latter in regard to utopian socialist principles, such as the commonality of property and the obligation to labor for the common good.[45]

In several respects, Carlo Pisacane was a radical whose ideas are comparable to those of John Brown, especially in the way they both related to social issues. In his pamphlets, Pisacane repeatedly wrote that the solution to Italy's national question was a moral issue—a conviction that he shared with most Italian Democrats, especially the followers of Mazzini—and that it was tied to a much more general problem of social justice, which was particularly acute in southern Italy. In this sense, he was comparable to Brown, who was also convinced—as were the majority of his American abolitionist peers—that slavery and the social injustice it produced were first and foremost moral issues. In Pisacane's own words: "I am convinced that a moral revolution is already occurring in southern Italy: an energetic impulse can push the people to start a determinant [revolutionary] movement; therefore, my efforts are directed towards carrying out a conspiracy which will give that impulse."[46] Pisacane thought that his own efforts would help to stimulate the preconditions for a radical change in a moral sense, and, like Brown, he thought that the change would result in the creation of a more egalitarian society. Pisacane expounded in a clear and articulate manner his main concepts on these issues in an important manuscript, which his friends published posthumously as four separate essays in 1858.[47] The third essay, *La rivoluzione* (The Revolution), probably written by Pisacane in 1851, is particularly significant for our understanding of the author's thoughts on the issues of social justice and of the type of progress represented by the creation of the new nation that would have emerged from the social revolution he envisioned.[48]

According to Luciano Russi, for Pisacane "true progress . . . [was] the one that focuse[d] on the universal improvement of the [human] condition, in a society in which liberty and equality, [and] sense and sensibility are reconciled."[49] In this perspective, in his essay *La rivoluzione*, Pisacane identified the main obstacle to universal improvement and to the nation's social progress in the existence of private property, which acted, quite simply, as the cardinal foundation of an

entire unjust social system, since it kept the dispossessed, that is, the majority of the people, "forever condemned by society's laws to poverty and ignorance."[50] Envisioning a social experiment as utopian as Brown's and Smith's North Elba, but more radical in socialist terms, Pisacane described the economic basis of his postrevolutionary egalitarian society imagining that "the Italian soil will be divided according to the different types of crops that suit it. A portion of the land measured according to the number of people will be given to each town, and this land will be grown by those who will dedicate themselves to agriculture; they will form a society that will establish its own constitution."[51] Thus, according to Graziano Palamara, the type of freedom that characterized Pisacane's vision of the new egalitarian nation had radical socialist features, specifically because it derived from a system of "absolute equality" that "extended to every economic and social relationship, as a result of the abolition of private property and of the establishment of a collectivistic society."[52] Such a collectivistic society, Pisacane wrote in a section of *La rivoluzione* in which he cited, significantly, French radical socialist Proudhon, "should place at the disposal of each of its members, without distinction, all the means it owns, in order to facilitate the development of its members' physical and moral faculties."[53] Pisacane summarized his view by stating that "freedom without equality does not exist, and both are indispensable conditions in a [new] nation."[54]

In his last writing, *Il testamento politico* (Political Testament), which he composed on June 24, 1857, shortly before embarking on the expedition to Sapri, Pisacane summarized in a few pages and in a clear and effective way both the reasons for and the essence of his socialist beliefs.[55] Indeed, Luciano Russi has seen in Pisacane's last work a particularly well argued and articulated political statement and has identified three main themes: "1. The claim of the importance of the socialist ideal in the context of the national revolution; 2. The establishment of socialism as the inevitable future of Italy, and perhaps also of the entire Europe; 3. The definition of socialism through the words *liberty* and *association*."[56] Significantly, Pisacane wrote, in relation to the latter theme, that the combination of the two concepts expressed by the words "liberty" and "association" made his belief "a different type of socialism from the French-derived ones, all more or less founded on a monarchic and despotic idea,"[57] clearly referring to the conservative involution of French politics with the rise of Napoleon III's populism. Instead, in his ideal postrevolutionary society, Pisacane wanted the maximum amount of freedom, which would lead to a voluntary and spontaneous association of individuals who shared

economic resources and were therefore social equals in an egalitarian community.[58]

In an important section of the *Testamento politico*, Pisacane explicitly criticized the false progress that the current social order propagandized only in order to favor few rich individuals and impoverish the majority. In Pisacane's own words, "if these so-called improvements are considered progress, they will act in the sense of increasing the destitution of the poor and drive them, inexorably, to stage a terrible revolution, which, by changing the social order, will put to everybody's disposal what is now at the disposal of a few."[59] Thus, similar to John Brown's 1858 *Provisional Constitution*, which provided the guidelines for the organization of a free guerrilla state as the model for the future interracial and socially egalitarian order that would inevitably replace the existing ungodly American society based on the unjust exploitation of the slaves, Carlo Pisacane's *Testamento politico* was a document that talked about the inevitability of social change in the process of formation of the new Italian nation. This prediction was based on the fact that the existing social order was founded on the unjust exploitation of the masses, especially the agrarian masses, propagandized as progress, and on the belief that this exploitation was bound to lead to a major revolution aiming at creating the nucleus of a new egalitarian and socialist Italian state.[60] Significantly, as Pisacane had explained in previous writings, the cardinal element of the new egalitarian society was the abolition of the right to private property—an element that may remind us of the "property of the whole, equally without distinction" in Brown's *Provisional Constitution*, even though the latter element was not as central or as concrete in Brown's thought as the abolition of private property was in Pisacane's view, but was, rather, part of a more utopian socialist vision.

The comparison between John Brown's and Carlo Pisacane's thoughts in relation to social change shows clearly that both activists were committed to acting on their radical visions of inevitable overthrow of the existing social order and replacement with a new one. The initial impulse for this radical view came to Brown from his strong Calvinist faith and his solid antislavery background combined with embracement of a militant and violent view of American abolitionism. This was the result of both the impact of personal circumstances on him and also of Brown's own conviction that slavery and racism were the major social problems in an American society profoundly unjust and therefore far from God. Conversely, Pisacane had a privileged upbringing, but he clearly came to realize that the social rules that ordered the behavior of his class and provided the norms for public

life in his milieu were little more than social traps and hypocritical façades that masked the existence of profound injustices based on a system of continuous exploitation of the masses, especially the peasants. Therefore, he embraced an increasingly socialist version of Italian democratic nationalism as a way to create the preconditions for a social revolution that would lead to the construction of a new egalitarian Italian nation.

Remarkably, in both cases the rebellion against the most widespread and evident injustices of the social system led not just to the embracement of militant and violent methods of overthrow of the social order, but also to the elaboration of comparable specific ideas that provided guidelines for the construction of a more egalitarian society. Thus, in both his North Elba experiment and in his *Provisional Constitution*, Brown set out the main framework for the type of interracial society, with strong utopian socialist elements, that he envisioned the American Republic could and would become after the revolutionary insurrection of the slaves forced the U.S. government and the slaveholders to abolish slavery. Comparably, in both his essay *La rivoluzione* and his *Testamento politico*, Pisacane expounded clearly his view of the new egalitarian Italian nation that would emerge from the ashes of a national revolutionary insurrection involving the masses in the countryside and ultimately leading to the creation of a novel social system characterized particularly by the abolition of private property, according to his socialist beliefs. Thus, in both cases the idea of a revolutionary insurrection involving the exploited masses as the foundational act for the creation of a new and more egalitarian nation and social order was paramount. And yet, as we shall see, even though Brown and Pisacane likely based their vision of social revolution and mass insurrection on the same sources—which were related to an ongoing nineteenth-century transnational and transatlantic dialogue over a Euro-American corpus of texts, mostly originated in Italy, on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare—they held fundamentally different opinions and came, ultimately, to different conclusions in regard to the application of that theory and practice to the specific conditions of their own countries.

Common Sources and Different Views on Guerrilla Warfare and Revolution

The identification of important similarities, amid considerable differences, in the visions of equality, with either more or less utopian socialist elements, that characterized the thought of John Brown and

Carlo Pisacane is an important element to keep in mind when looking at the issue of transnational contacts between the two activists' milieus in relation to doctrines and practices of guerrilla warfare and revolution. To be sure, the few Italian and American historians who have investigated this issue have focused on the military aspect of these contacts and on the influence that the same ideas and types of military strategy and tactics may have had on Brown's and Pisacane's actions.[61] Yet, the social aspect is equally important in understanding the wider context and the significance of these crucial transnational contacts, since nineteenth-century revolutionaries on both sides of the Euro-American world, from legendary popular leaders Bolívar and San Martín in South America to Toussaint L'Ouverture and the slaves who staged the Haitian revolution, conceived military action in the form of guerrilla warfare as a *social* type of conflict—that is, a conflict in which military leaders headed the masses against their oppressors with the declared aim of overthrowing the current social order and replacing it with one characterized by a higher degree of social justice. In this sense, the fact that both Brown and Pisacane committed themselves to creating the preconditions for a more equal society, which they envisioned in their thought and writings, by means of a general insurrection, in itself validates the idea that their transnational contacts made them part of a Euro-American milieu of revolutionaries who thought along comparable lines, also because they read from the same texts.[62]

In this respect, it is important to point out that the most widely known texts of guerrilla warfare in the mid-nineteenth-century Euro-American world were the works written by Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz, whom we encountered in Chapter 1. After participating in the failed 1821 revolution in Piedmont, Bianco di Saint Jorioz had spent time in guerrilla operations in Spain and in Greece and had then joined Mazzini's *Young Italy*, bringing a crucial influence on Mazzini with his two main works: *Della Guerra d'insurrezione per bande applicata all'Italia* (On the Insurrectionary War with Guerrilla Squads Applied to Italy, 1830); and *Manuale pratico del rivoluzionario italiano* (A Practical Handbook for the Italian Revolutionary, 1833).[63] In both pamphlets, Bianco made interesting observations on military tactics, particularly when he argued that it was possible for a small group of committed revolutionaries with the proper equipment, a carefully devised plan, and a good knowledge of the terrain, to start a general insurrection. The most important factor in guerrilla warfare, was, for Bianco. the participation of the people, specifically the peasants in the countryside. In fact, Bianco saw peasants as an

ideal reservoir of guerrilla forces, because they were accustomed to intolerable living conditions, which made them better able to withstand the cruelty of guerrilla warfare.[64] However, in Bianco's view, the peasants' participation in a war of liberation from national oppression could have been guaranteed only by the promise of an equal distribution of land. Thus, to Bianco, in principle, revolutionary insurrection through guerrilla warfare was tightly linked to the creation of a society with a higher degree of social justice—a reasoning that could easily apply also to the slaves' participation in revolutionary activity as conditional to the promise of freedom. In effect, Bianco's doctrines provided a template that revolutionaries could apply in different situations and areas within the Euro-American world, and the fact that Mazzini—the most prominent Italian Democrat and a well-known figure in American abolitionist circles until the end of the 1840s—adopted these doctrines makes it highly probable that both Pisacane and Brown might have been familiar with Bianco's writings. However, as we shall see, the two revolutionaries differed in their views of guerrilla warfare as the best tactic for the conduction of an insurrection with a strong element of social conflict.[65]

According to Timothy Roberts, "several aspects of [John] Brown's exploits suggest his application of Bianco's principles," very likely as part of a tradition of revolutionary writing related to, and partly inspired by, Mazzini.[66] Elaborating on earlier claims by Giulio Schenone, Roberts identifies these aspects in Brown's insistence on guerrilla actions involving initially a relatively small group of men with the aim of sparking a general insurrection, and in his strategic preference for hills or mountainous terrain, ideal for guerrilla warfare—both aspects that emerged clearly in the planning of the Harpers Ferry raid.[67] It is likely that Brown combined his knowledge of Bianco's writings and of war in Napoleonic Spain with the extensive readings he made on the Haitian revolution and on slave insurrections and maroon communities in the United States and the West Indies, thus studying the history of guerrilla warfare on a truly Euro-American scale. From his readings, according to David Reynolds, Brown arrived at the conclusion that "tiny groups could cripple huge armies through the effective use of terror tactics and natural defenses"—a vital insight for his planned action at Harpers Ferry.[68] In his study of John Brown's tactics, W.E.B. Du Bois has claimed that Brown chose Harpers Ferry because it was, effectively, the entrance to "the Great Black Way," an expression originally used by Harriet Tubman—who helped Brown in planning the raid—in order to describe the entry points to a number of mountainous areas and swamps, mostly along established routes

of the Underground Railroad, the secret network through which abolitionists smuggled slaves to the north and freedom, routes all carefully marked in Brown's diary. From those areas, it was theoretically possible to conduct guerrilla warfare of the type envisioned by Bianco in the very heart of the U.S. South's slave system.[69] In practice, "here—in the words of Du Bois—amid the mighty protection of overwhelming numbers, lay a path from slavery to freedom, and along that path were fastnesses and hiding places easily capable of becoming permanent fortified refuges for organized bands of determined armed men."[70]

Significantly, in August 1849, John Brown made a brief tour of Europe at a time when the 1848–49 revolutions had just been defeated in different parts of the continent. We know that Brown went to England, Belgium, and Germany; had he gone to Italy as well, he would have noticed the legacy of the failed revolutionary experiments of the Venetian Republic, and especially of Mazzini's Roman Republic, which had just fallen in July 1849 under French attack.[71] According to his friend Richard Realf, Brown studied Europe's fortifications and battlefields "with the intention of applying the knowledge thus acquired to the conduction of guerrilla warfare in the United States," at a time when Mazzini had just reissued his own pamphlet, heavily influenced by Bianco, on guerrilla tactics.[72] It is impossible to know more about Brown's experience in Europe, but, after his return to the United States, according to Timothy Roberts, "Brown probably became aware of Bianco's ideas through his association with Hugh Forbes, a British mercenary who had commanded various Italian troops in defense of the Republic of Venice in 1848, and later served in the army of Giuseppe Garibaldi."[73] Forbes had also written and published in 1854 an important handbook inspired by both Bianco and Mazzini, called *Manual of the Patriotic Volunteer*, on the principles of guerrilla warfare and revolutionary insurrection, and, understandably, the English "colonel"—as he styled himself—"struck Brown as the perfect drillmaster for the volunteer force he planned to train," in Tony Horwitz's words.[74]

In the end, Forbes betrayed Brown revealing the Harpers Ferry plan to members of the U.S. Congress. However, Brown's initial reliance on Forbes, based on the latter's experience as a guerrilla leader in the 1848–49 revolutions, together with Brown's own trip to Europe, and also his acquaintance with some other European revolutionaries, point to the conclusion that Brown knew and acknowledged the importance of the writings on guerrilla warfare by Bianco and Mazzini, also given the fact that he had recruited Forbes in New York, where

there was a strong presence of members of Mazzini's *Young Italy* in exile.[75] Thus, Brown's adoption of military tactics that resembled the ones in Bianco's treatises is not surprising. At the same time, it is important to point out that Brown must have followed Bianco's writings also because the idea of guerrilla as a revolutionary war waged by the exploited and dispossessed masses against their oppressors with the aim of creating a new and more egalitarian society clearly resonated with Brown's own idea of the reasons slaves would have engaged in guerrilla warfare against their masters with the specific aim of creating an interracial republic with utopian socialist element—and thus, a republic with features common to both the North Elba experiment and the 1858 *Provisional Constitution*. In this perspective, therefore, it is not too much of a stretch of the imagination to think that, in planning the raid at Harpers Ferry, Brown interpreted and adapted Bianco's ideas about the masses in the countryside as the ideal reservoir of revolutionary forces for guerrilla action to the situation in the U.S. South. Here, the slaves formed the natural reservoir of guerrilla forces to be led in the violent creation of a new and free society, or in "the establishment of a permanent black free state within the borders of the United States"—an aim that can be clearly classified as revolutionary, as Albert J. Von Frank has argued, and comparable to the ones that characterized Europe's contemporary nationalist movements.[76]

It is particularly important to note that the period in which John Brown is likely to have become acquainted with Bianco's and Mazzini's theories of guerrilla warfare, between 1849 and 1859, was a period of change in the Italian democratic movement, as a result of the failed 1848–49 revolutions, and also a period characterized by intense debate on the pros and cons of guerrilla warfare as an instrument of revolutionary insurrection, as Luciano Russi has shown in his studies.[77] Until 1848, Mazzini was the unchallenged leader of the Italian Democrats, and his adoption of Bianco's theory of guerrilla warfare had ensured that most members of the Italian democratic movement, including Carlo Pisacane, saw it as the privileged tactic for revolutionary action. However, after the Democrats failed to maintain the governments they had managed to establish through mass revolt in the failed experiments of the 1848–49 democratic republics—particularly the Roman Republic, which witnessed the participation of Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Pisacane himself—the theories on guerrilla tactics espoused by Mazzini and by Bianco came under close scrutiny and severe criticism by several democratic activists, including Pisacane.[78] Thus, even though the study of transnational links shows

that it was more than likely that Brown and Pisacane had been somewhat influenced by the same writings by Bianco and Mazzini on guerrilla warfare, by the time Brown had become aware of their existence through his contacts with the Italian democratic movement, particularly the Mazzinian circles, Pisacane had written a sharp criticism of those same writings. As a consequence, the influence that Bianco's writings had on Brown and Pisacane, though equally important, produced, effectively, an opposite impact on the two men, as a result of different historical circumstances.

In his 1851 essay *Guerra combattuta in Italia negli anni 1848–49* (The War Fought in Italy in the Years 1848–49),[79] Pisacane criticized Bianco's and Mazzini's idea of the centrality of guerrilla warfare in the entire course of a projected revolutionary insurrection and considered it, instead, only the very initial stage of a revolution, after which, in the words of Luciano Russi, "it is immediately necessary to work at the transformation of the masses into a [regular] army, since the most important task of the heads of the revolution is (and must be) the formation of people's battalions and the creation of an 'Armed Nation'"[80]—a concept that Pisacane had borrowed from revolutionary France and its army of "citizen-soldiers." By this time, Pisacane had come to the conclusion that the idea that the masses could only participate in the revolutionary insurrection as part of irregular guerrilla groups was an idea that diminished the value and significance of the revolutionary struggle; he thought, instead, that "a deeper cause must be sought in what directs a people's power."[81] To Pisacane, who wrote his crucial essay *La rivoluzione* on the topic in the same year (1851), that "deeper cause" was the creation of the new society that he envisioned and described at different times—a society characterized by the previously excluded masses' participation in Italian national life, and thus also in the Italian nation's regular army.[82] Since he was, effectively, an exiled southerner who hoped to bring change to southern Italy from outside the south—in line with the Italian democratic tradition discussed in Chapter 1—Pisacane became progressively convinced that the revolution that would bring about the new society should start in the Bourbon Kingdom, where the exploitation of the southern Italian masses by their landlords in the countryside had forced peasants to live in a state of poverty that was no longer bearable. Consequently, from 1855, when he approached Mazzini again, Pisacane worked at a plan that would bring the revolution to southern Italy, or the *Mezzogiorno*, and would involve the peasant masses in a major insurrectionary action against the Bourbon authorities—a plan that, ultimately, led to his failed 1857 expedition at Sapri.[83]

It must be noted that Pisacane's choice for the place was not accidental, since Sapri was in the area of Cilento, which, together with the regions of Calabria and Basilicata, formed a "revolutionary triangle," as Carmine Pinto has termed it, with a strong tradition of anti-Bourbon activity.[84] Thus, in transatlantic perspective, we can say that Pisacane's tactical choice of starting the peasants' revolution in the heart of southern Italy's "revolutionary triangle" reminds us of Brown's tactical choice to spark the slaves' insurrection from the points of entry to the U.S. South's "Great Black Way." Also, for both Brown and Pisacane, the element of social conflict was paramount in conceiving the revolution. Both men believed that the agrarian masses would spontaneously rise in revolutionary insurrection if they were promised what they longed for: freedom in the case of U.S. southern slaves and land in the case of southern Italian peasants. Thus, to Pisacane, who, according to Antonino De Francesco, effectively harbored the same "hope, always maintained by the Democrats, in the revolutionary potentials of the southern [Italian] people,"[85] the objectives of the revolution conducted in the *Mezzogiorno* were the ones he theorized in his 1851 essay; they should include, first and foremost, the abolition of the right to private property, according to Pisacane's socialist principles. Only after these objectives were made clear could the spontaneous organization of the people bring to life the revolution, initially through guerrilla groups and, almost immediately afterwards, through the creation of an "armed nation," which would rise against the tyrant government and outnumber the oppressor (i.e., the Bourbon regime), creating the premises for the establishment of a new and more socially egalitarian Italian nation.[86]

The transnational analysis of John Brown's links with the European, and especially Italian democratic, revolutionary milieus and with some specific historical figures within them, shows that it is very likely—as already postulated by several Italian and American scholars—that he was acquainted with the fundamental writings of Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz and Giuseppe Mazzini on guerrilla warfare. This is all the more significant in the context of a comparative study between Brown and Pisacane, since it appears that both read and absorbed the main ideas in Bianco's and Mazzini's theories of insurrection through guerrilla warfare. Yet, Brown and Pisacane did so at different stages in their lives and with ultimately opposite outcomes. Brown became acquainted with those ideas in the 1850s, showing his preference for guerrilla tactics and for the employment of the agrarian masses in squad formations in the preparation of his 1859 raid at Harpers Ferry. Pisacane had initially embraced Bianco's and Mazzini's ideas as early

as the 1830s, but he criticized them after the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions, favoring instead, in the lead-up to his 1857 expedition at Sapri, the idea of transforming the agrarian masses into a national army. But there is room to speculate that two particular elements in Bianco's writings must have had a comparable impact, in different ways, on Brown and Pisacane.

The first element was the focus on the agrarian masses in the countryside as a natural reservoir of revolutionary forces, because of their high level of exploitation—an idea that could be applied to both U.S. southern slaves and southern Italian peasants. The second element was the focus on making an explicit link between the revolutionary insurrection and the creation of a new social order that would resolve the agrarian masses' most pressing problems, effectively providing them with the very reason to be led in the insurrectionary action, whether this reason was the promise of freedom in the case of the slaves or the promise of land in the case of the peasants. Significantly, both Brown and Pisacane believed that the final victory of the oppressed over their oppressors would create a new nation, more egalitarian in its principles and practices. Yet, Brown's idea of a more egalitarian social order was based mostly on the concept of racial equality, with the insertion of some utopian socialist elements, which could be achieved within the existing framework of the American democratic republic. Conversely, in Pisacane's case, the creation of a new Italian nation would give birth to an egalitarian state that would act on his socialist vision of ultimate abolition of the right to private property and of establishment of a classless society.

Altogether, the crucial differences that have emerged from a comparison of John Brown's and Carlo Pisacane's radical thought on social change and on the idea of revolutionary insurrection show clearly the importance of the influence of the different upbringings and milieus that formed and shaped the life experiences of the two activists. In fact, on one hand, Brown's initial Calvinist and antislavery education and his later contact with militant American abolitionists were the two main factors responsible for his radical idea of purging the sins of slaveholders by shedding blood through a slave insurrection that would lead to the creation of a novel interracial society. On the other hand, Pisacane's initial elite education and subsequent disillusionment with the Bourbon regime, and his later contact with Mazzinians and revolutionary exiles were the main factors behind his thoughts on the need for violent replacement of the existing social order with a new propertyless egalitarian society through mass revolution. Amid these crucial differences, though, it is possible to find important similarities

between Brown and Pisacane, particularly in the emphasis of both on dedicating their lives to accelerating the end of an unjust social order and its replacement with an egalitarian one, and also in their comparable idea that the foundational act of either a renewed or a brand new nation was to purge it, or cleanse it, of past injustices by shedding blood in a major social upheaval. At the same time, the study of the transnational links between Brown's and Pisacane's milieus adds a further important element to this comparative analysis, since the fact that Brown and Pisacane effectively read from the same texts on guerrilla warfare, particularly Bianco's and Mazzini's writings, which circulated in the Euro-American world, shows that they were both part of a transnational and transatlantic circle of revolutionaries who debated the best means to achieve freedom through mass insurrection in different national contexts. The fact that Brown and Pisacane read the same texts but ultimately arrived at opposite conclusions testifies to the very existence of that debate and to the fact that different participants in the debate must have either adapted or rejected ideas on guerrilla and revolutionary warfare, as Brown and Pisacane did, when they related them to the specific places and historical circumstances they found themselves in, whether in Europe or the Americas.

Part II

Lincoln, Cavour, and Progressive Nationalism

Chapter 3

Economic Progress, Markets, and Railroads in Lincoln's and Cavour's Early Careers

In recent years, thanks to the work of transnational scholars such as Thomas Bender, Ian Tyrrell, and Carl Guarneri, the American Civil War has acquired a very definite place in the ever-growing literature on nineteenth-century nation-building in the Euro-American world.[1] Yet, as early as the 1960s, David Potter claimed that the main contributions of the American Civil War to nineteenth-century world history and the two features that made it a unique case study for historical comparison were that "it turned the tide which had been running against nationalism for forty years" and that "it forged a bond between nationalism and liberalism at a time when it appeared that the two might draw apart and move in opposite directions" after the defeat of the 1848 European revolutions.[2] Potter referred specifically to the ideology represented by Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party as a high tide of a type of liberal nationalism with a great deal in common with mid-nineteenth-century European liberal nationalist movements. Significantly, within the European context, the most celebrated of such movements was the one for Italian national Unification—the *Risorgimento*—which resulted in the victory of liberal principles with the creation of an Italian constitutional monarchy in 1861, masterminded by Camillo Cavour. Thus, we can say that, from this particular perspective, the *Risorgimento* would make an ideal case study for comparison with the American Civil War.[3]

In the present chapter and in Chapter 4, I will look at the antebellum and Civil War era United States and at *Risorgimento* Italy with a

specific focus on mid-nineteenth-century liberal principles contained in an ideology that I have termed "progressive nationalism"—an ideology related particularly to ideas of economic development, individual liberty, and political representation. I intend to do so by focusing specifically on Abraham Lincoln and Camillo Cavour. As we have already seen, very few scholars have hinted at the possibility of comparing Lincoln and Cavour or attempted to argue about the parallelisms and connections between their deeds and ideas; among those scholars, particularly important are Raimondo Luraghi, Glauco Licata, Enzo Tagliacozzo, and, more recently, Eugenio Biagini.[4] Partly following the intuitions of these scholars, I argue that a comparative study in this sense should start from the observation that, in the American Civil War era and in the Italian *Risorgimento* era, Lincoln and Cavour faced national crises of comparable magnitude, crises that they themselves helped to create and brought to completion, leaving the nations that emerged from these trials permanently marked with unmistakable blueprints. Such blueprints consisted, in both cases, of the two main elements of the ideology of progressive nationalism: (1) the belief in a strong connection between economic development and sociopolitical progress as the indispensable factor that ensured equal opportunities to the nation's citizens, and (2) the indissolubility of the tie between nationality and parliamentary representation as the most important guarantee of civil liberties enjoyed by both individuals and institutions.

Thus, as an important part of their ideology of progressive nationalism, Lincoln and Cavour shared a common belief in the importance of economic development and in its direct link to social and political progress. This is hardly surprising if we think that, even though born and raised in very different environments, both Lincoln and Cavour experienced firsthand and, indeed, embraced the massive economic changes that occurred all around them during their formative years. It is fair to say, that, unlike the historiography on Cavour—the focus of which has been often on the study of the Piedmontese statesman's economic thought and activities, epitomized by works such as *Pensiero e azione economica del Conte di Cavour* (1961) by Raimondo Luraghi, *Cavour e il suo tempo* (1969–84) by Rosario Romeo, and *Cavour* (1999) by Luciano Cafagna[5]—the historiography on Lincoln has not usually produced full-length biographical studies of the American president with a specific focus on economics, with the notable exceptions of Gabor Boritt's *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream* (1978), and Olivier Frayssé, *Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 1809–1860* (1994).[6] Scholars have tended to treat Lincoln's economic ideas mainly in chapters on his formation and the Whig

years. These biographical studies typically focus on politics and sectional conflicts, or, more recently, on Lincoln and slavery. Otherwise, scholars have produced full-length studies of Lincoln's early years that focused mostly on his family, his difficult life on the frontier, or his rise as a lawyer and then as a politician, with little on the crucial role of economics.[7]

Yet, a renewed focus on the economic context of Lincoln's early life in Illinois and on its influence on the formation of his economic ideas, following in Boritt's and Frayssé's footsteps, would shed a great deal of light on a crucial element in Lincoln's thought—that is, his continuous preoccupation with national economic development.[8] Through the study of this specific element of Lincoln' thought, we would also be able to see the comparability between Lincoln's ideas on national economic development and similar ideas stemming from comparable economic circumstances of growth induced by the nineteenth-century world market and the industrial revolution in other regions of the world, such as Cavour's native Piedmont. In both Lincoln's and Cavour's cases, in particular, it is possible to see a similarity in the ideas of economic development as an occasion to provide opportunities for self-advancement to the citizens of the nation. In this sense, therefore, I argue that we should study national economic development as a crucial element in Lincoln's and Cavour's ideology of progressive nationalism.

In the 1840s and 1850s, Lincoln's adoptive state of Illinois, together with a large area of the U.S. Midwest, went through a large degree of economic transformation. The demand for the wheat and corn produced on its prairie farms increased exponentially, largely as a result of the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad, which began in 1851. Scholars have talked at length about the consequent changes in Illinois as related to the effects of the market revolution, both in regard to the creation of an integrated transportation system and of incipient industrialization, and also in connection to the rising northeastern cities' demand for the Midwest's wheat and corn production, which led to the effective projection of Illinois into the expanding national and international markets. In particular, according to Don Fehrenbacher, in 1850s Illinois, "industrialization proceeded at a rapid pace, merchants and professionals multiplied, and by 1860 almost half of those gainfully employed were engaged in pursuits other than farming."[9] In practice, in Daniel Walker Howe's words, "the space-binding technology of the train magnified the opportunities for farmers . . . to ship their crops to distant destinations, encouraging market production rather than local consumption."[10] And within

this context, as Eric Foner has remarked, the Illinois Central Railroad "transformed Chicago's agricultural hinterland, a vast area including northern and central Illinois and parts of Iowa and Wisconsin, into one of the world's preeminent centers of commercial production"; significantly, Foner has also stated that "Lincoln's rise coincided with that of Illinois."[11]

On a different scale, Cavour's native Piedmont in the 1840s and 1850s, and in general the entire area of northwestern Italy, also underwent crucial economic transformations. Here, on one hand, agricultural production, especially of wheat and rice, was more advanced that in other parts of Italy, with large farms and fields and a complex irrigation network located in the fertile Po Valley. On the other hand, a system of domestic industry focused on textile manufacturing—which scholars have termed proto-industrialization—had started to appear. At this time, it was still, in the words of Lucy Riall, "a first stage of industrialization; a mid-point between cottage and factory," one in which peasant families were employed in early types of textile mills in order to produce manufactured products, specifically woven silk, in both Piedmont and Lombardy.[12] Economic historians Franco Bonelli and Luciano Cafagna have argued that this type of proto-industrialization coexisted harmoniously with the changes in techniques and output of agricultural production and also with the concurrent improvements in the transportation system, which led to the construction of important railroad lines especially in the 1850s—improvements in which Cavour played a major role. Proto-industrialization affected Piedmont much as the market revolution influenced Illinois—although on a different scale—by projecting the products of its incipient domestic industry, particularly woven silk, onto the world market. In both cases increasingly larger quantities were produced in order to face the continuously growing demand.[13]

Even though Lincoln's and Cavour's careers and employments could not have not been more different, they both had a direct experience of the effects of crucial and relatively quick economic transformations on two areas that were on the periphery of the world economy (i.e., Illinois and Piedmont)—related in one case to the market revolution, and in the other case to proto-industrialization. This first-hand experience convinced Lincoln and Cavour of the fact that economic progress was an indispensable factor in bringing the nation together and also in linking it to the rest of the world. In practice, both the market revolution in the United States and proto-industrialization in continental Europe, and specifically in northern Italy in our case, were phenomena that resulted from the global effects of British industrialization

on the more peripheral areas of the world economy, and therefore, in this sense, they can be usefully taken as comparable backgrounds for the momentous economic transformations that affected Lincoln's Illinois and Cavour's Piedmont. However, an important difference is the fact that, on a national scale, while the market revolution in the antebellum period effectively lay the foundations for the future massive, full-scale industrialization of the northern United States in the later nineteenth century, proto-industrialization in northern Italy only laid the foundations for a more limited type of industrial transformation in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.[14]

At the same time, though, on a more regional and local level, Lincoln's Illinois experienced the market revolution starting from a preeminent grazing and then farming basis. In this sense, it was akin to Cavour's Piedmont, which experienced proto-industrialization as a preeminently agricultural economy. Both Illinois and Piedmont, therefore, had a great deal in common with those peripheral areas that the recent scholarly literature has taken as prime examples for the analysis of phenomena of proto-industrialization in both Europe and the Americas—areas such as, for example, Catalonia in nineteenth-century Spain and Minas Gerais in nineteenth-century Brazil. Interestingly, in the two cases of Catalonia and Minas Gerais, scholars have found that the existence of a domestic industry, textile or otherwise, within a preeminently preindustrial economy was not a sufficient condition to lead to full-scale industrialization. Equally, if not more, important factors were market integration through a developed transportation system and a strong tie between domestic products, whether agriculturally or industrially based, and long-distance markets, as in the cases of both mid-nineteenth-century Illinois and Piedmont.[15]

Yet, from both Lincoln's and Cavour's perspectives—in different contexts, but in comparable ways—economic progress, as it related, in general, to advances in agriculture, incipient industrial production, and market integration, was more than simply part of a program of development in business-related activities. It was an important aspect of their ideology of "progressive nationalism" and of their nation-building project. As such, the concept of economic progress dominated speeches and writings related to the early steps of their two political careers. Significantly, both Lincoln's and Cavour's careers started within movements—the Whig party and the Moderate Liberals[16]—committed to wide range policies of improvements that focused on transportation, infrastructures, and market integration. As discussed later, in the Whigs' case the program of improvement found its ultimate expression in Henry Clay's "American System"—a

comprehensive plan of governmental support for entrepreneurial activities, whose ultimate aim was the market integration of the entire American nation. In the Moderate Liberals' case, instead, the program of improvement was inspired by the ethos of market integration and support for entrepreneurship that characterized progressive liberals particularly in England—the country that the Piedmontese liberal aristocracy considered their preferential model for national development.[17]

In both cases, however, there was also an important sociopolitical dimension to the program of economic improvement—a dimension that provided a direct link to the ideology of "progressive nationalism"—since, in different ways, both political movements also put forward policies that aimed at the expansion of political freedom and at a higher degree of participation of economically active groups of citizens in the political life of the nation. In this sense, looking at this dimension in comparative perspective and through the lens of "progressive nationalism," it is possible to see how, in both cases, governmental support for entrepreneurial activity and market integration were effectively the economic foundations of a comprehensive program aimed at achieving the political integration of the nation through the extension of the basic political and citizenship rights.

LINCOLN AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN ANTEBELLUM ILLINOIS

Born in 1809 to a poor farmer's family on the Kentucky frontier, Lincoln lived his life almost as if it was the embodiment of the possibilities to be found in a country such as the United States, where economic expansion and political democracy went hand in hand. In 1816, Lincoln's father moved the family to Indiana, and, eventually, in 1830, to Illinois. The Lincolns were among many families that had moved from the South to the Midwest, partly because of economic necessity caused by the hardships of farming life on the frontier, and partly simply because they hated slavery.[18] In 1828, and then again in 1831, Lincoln was hired by local storekeepers and merchants to transport goods on a flatboat along the Mississippi River all the way to New Orleans. It was a crucial formative experience to him. According to Allen Guelzo, at that time, the "Mississippi was the great commercial highway on which all American commerce west of the Appalachians flowed."[19] Robert Fulton's invention of the steamboat, in 1807, had made commercial navigation on the great rivers faster and cheaper, and by the 1820s, hundreds of steamboats were regularly cruising on

the Mississippi and its tributaries, bringing goods to the large urban market of New Orleans and back to the Midwest.[20] In his two trips to New Orleans, Lincoln saw the large steamboats, witnessing first-hand the relentless commercial transformation that the market revolution and the integrated transport system brought to the frontier. At the same time, though, as Eric Foner has noted, Lincoln's "trip exemplified how the market revolution of the early nineteenth century was simultaneously consolidating the economy and heightening the division between slave and free society." The increasing commercialization and integrated transportation system in the North stood in stark contrast to the massive expansion of the slave system and plantation economy in the South.[21] Even though he had been familiar with slavery, Lincoln witnessed for the first time the full extent of its horrifying consequences in his two trips to New Orleans, the largest slave market in the South—an experience that, in all likelihood, affected him and conditioned him deeply.[22]

After living on his own for six years in New Salem, in the Sangamon Valley of Illinois, working in a variety of different jobs—including storekeeper, surveyor, and postmaster—in 1837 Lincoln finally settled in Springfield, where in a short time he became a renowned lawyer. Throughout this early period of his life, Lincoln developed a thirst for knowledge and learning that led him to read every book he could put his hands on, often in contrast with his father Thomas's narrow idea of education as simply a means to a practical end. In Lincoln's early years in Kentucky and Indiana, without a functioning public school system, aside from knowledge of the Bible, the little schooling that the Lincoln family could afford focused mainly on the basic tools of a general type of education, and therefore on spelling, grammar, arithmetic, the history of the United States, and the works of great literary figures such as Shakespeare, whose plays remained particular favorites of Lincoln's until later on in life. By the time he reached New Salem, though, Lincoln had been complementing the few school readings with reading and learning of his own on different subjects, and this he did even more once he settled down in Illinois.[23] Behind Lincoln's thirst for knowledge, as Allen Guelzo has noted, was the fact that, for Lincoln, "reading meant a catalyst for 'improvement,' for self-transformation," and this idea of man's capability for self-improvement through education, and the related idea that the nation should do everything to allow its citizens to be able to embark on an path of self-improvement, if they chose to do so, was to remain with him for the rest of his life.[24] Indeed, Lincoln's choice, as early as 1832, to join the Whig Party and its wide-ranging program of development—which

sought to spread the benefits of the market revolution for the sake of the economic and social improvement of Illinois and of the rest of the United States—was entirely consistent with his idea of, and approach to, education as self-improvement. In fact, according to the Whigs, "government-promoted economic growth created the context in which 'self-made men' (a phrase coined by Calvin Colton, Henry Clay's campaign biographer) could achieve economic success and assimilate into the republic of property holders."[25]

But there was more than that, since Lincoln combined his ideas about the importance of individual and national improvement with specific views of the history of his country that came through his early readings. In fact, according to Richard Carwardine, "from Mason L. Weems' *Life of George Washington* (1800), and especially William Grimshaw's popular and whiggish *History of the United States* (1821), Lincoln acquired an understanding of the geopolitics that shaped the country's destined course to nationhood and its guardianship of Enlightenment principles."[26] This belief, acquired through these and other readings, led Lincoln to think of the United States as a special nation entrusted with the task of being a bastion against reactionary regimes such as the ones that mostly characterized Europe in the years of his youth. A final important element in Lincoln's early education, then, related to his career as a lawyer, which started as a result of his acquaintance with upcoming Springfield lawyer John Todd Stuart. They met as members of the local Illinois militia in the 1834 Black Hawk War.[27] Stuart invited Lincoln, who had no formal education in law, to borrow his law books. Thus, Lincoln studied the theory and practice of law and, in 1836, passed the exam to be admitted to the Springfield bar. Lincoln's readings in law focused on William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1769), and other texts on English Common Law, whose practice, by Lincoln's time, had been adapted to the postrevolutionary American context by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story and others by emphasizing the importance of property rights.[28] The latter, significantly, became the central issue of Lincoln's legal career in Illinois, and one that would influence deeply his economic and political views.[29]

In Illinois, a peripheral state in the world economic currents, and yet located on the crucial axis of communication between the rising industrial centers of the Northeast and the expanding agricultural West, Lincoln took an unconditional political stand in support of the economic development unleashed by the market revolution.[30] In joining the Whig Party in 1832, Lincoln sought to support the program of internal improvements—Henry Clay's "American System"—which

was central to the party's ultimate aim of creating a nation of property holders. Between 1834 and 1842, when he was elected in the Illinois Legislature four times in a row, Lincoln argued in favor of all types of program of internal improvement that would enhance the Illinois communication network. He proposed bills for the construction of toll bridges, roads connecting towns within the state, and highways connecting Illinois with neighboring states, and, in December 1835, he even proposed to hire "a company to construct a canal upon the valley of the Sangamon river"—a work he hoped that would match the colossal Erie Canal, finished only ten years earlier in New York State. Logically, as Allen Guelzo has noted, Lincoln could not fail to recognize that "the kind of commercial system Clay had been advocating for the past fifteen years was only a larger version of the state-funded transportation and commercial projects Lincoln had advocated in Illinois."[31]

Similar to Lincoln's, Clay's origins were also in Kentucky, at the periphery of the southern frontier. According to Charles Sellers, "Clay represented the intensely enterprising spirit generated as the commercial boom extended cash-crop agriculture into subsistence farming areas."[32] This was essentially what had happened in Kentucky, and Clay—who, like Lincoln, had started his career as a lawyer before becoming a politician—was determined to see that both Kentucky and America's periphery would take advantage of that boom by embarking on a comprehensive program of modernization, one in which slavery had no place.[33] In fact, even though he was a slaveholder, Clay was convinced that slavery kept the South from modernizing, but he feared the consequences of the presence of a large population of free blacks; accordingly, while he advocated gradual emancipation, he was also a staunch advocate of colonization—the scheme to send emancipated slaves back to Africa. Significantly, Lincoln embraced wholeheartedly Clay's views on both modernization and slavery.[34] According to Gabor Boritt, Lincoln's interest in Clay "was that of a political moderate, a supporter of social order, towards another, and that of one antislavery man towards another." But Lincoln also admired the fact that, similarly to him, Clay was also a self-made man, while his devotion to the older man "was inseparable from devotion to an economic vision."[35] More than anything, Lincoln shared—in Eric Foner's words—"Henry Clay's belief that the Whig economic program would benefit all Americans, as well as Clay's powerful devotion to national unity."[36] In other words, in Clay's economics and politics Lincoln found already the fundamental elements of progressive nationalism, since the idea of progress was an integral part of

Whig economic thought, as was the idea that all the nation's citizens should share in the basic rights and in the opportunities that economic progress would afford. Both these ideas resonated well with the thought that characterized European liberals such as Cavour, who envisioned national progress in comparable ways.[37]

There is no doubt that Clay's American System was a program that joined together economic progress and nationalism, particularly through the federal government's creation of a national bank, the implementation of protective tariffs on imported manufactured goods, and the integration of the national market through comprehensive infrastructural improvements, from which both agriculture and manufacturing would have benefited. In Clay's own words, "under the operation of the American System, the products of our agriculture command a higher price than they would without it, by the creation of a home market, and by the augmentation of wealth produced by the manufacturing industry, which enlarges our powers of consumption both of domestic and foreign articles."[38] Appropriately, Eric Foner has stated that "Clay's American System" was, effectively, "a comprehensive program of government-sponsored economic modernization."[39] Also, according to Daniel Walker Howe, in the American System, the leading values of Whig political culture, "such as order, harmony, purposefulness, and improvement found expression in the form of an economic program," one through which "the future of America would be shaped in accordance with those values."[40] The improvements envisioned in Clay's American System were to come mainly in the shape of a widespread and integrated transportation network by means of railroads, roads, and canals. Together, these would connect the four corners of the American nation, linking even the remotest frontier to the forces of the market revolution and bringing immense benefit also to Lincoln's adopted state of Illinois.[41]

Consequently, Lincoln defended and advocated Clay's program of internal improvements in several speeches throughout his political career as a Whig statesman, which culminated in his appointment to the U.S. Congress in 1847, while he increasingly believed in the power of railroads to create a truly integrated national economy.[42] As early as 1835, Lincoln was heavily involved in a financial scheme to support the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad; if approved by the Illinois Legislature, the construction of the railroad would have been the centerpiece of his program for the creation of an integrated communication system and would have made Illinois, ahead of its time, a crucial area in the rapidly developing continental transportation avenues of the United States. Unfortunately, despite passing the

important Internal Improvements Act in 1837, the Illinois Legislature was not as supportive as Lincoln had hoped, also because, even if it was clear that internal improvements met with the general favor in the public opinion, the Whigs were still the minority party in the state's House. By 1840, therefore, it was clear that Lincoln's scheme for the Illinois Central Railroad would not materialize. Still, Lincoln continued to advocate and promote different schemes for internal improvements for as long as he remained in the Illinois Legislature, and then he attempted to do the same at the national level, when he was elected in the House of Representatives and sat for the first time in Congress in 1847–49. As Lincoln entered Congress in 1847, as Allen Guelzo has pointed out, "his primary concerns clustered around the conventional Whig demands for market development, and Lincoln poured most of his energies into demands for renewed federal sponsorship for a national banking system, for internal improvements, and for tariffs."[43] Yet, he soon realized that most of the debates during his congressional term were taken by the ongoing Mexican War and the Whigs' attacks on President James K. Polk's aggressive and unconstitutional handling of foreign policy. Interestingly, while Lincoln joined with much fervor the Whigs' position of condemning Polk's foreign policy, in his speeches he did not mention the issue of expansion of slavery, which, through the 1844 U.S. annexation of the slaveholding republic of Texas, had been at the origin of the Mexican War.[44]

It is worth noticing that Mexico had abolished the slave trade in 1824 and slavery in 1829. Therefore, the creation of a Texan region filled with U.S. immigrants who practiced slaveholding in the northern part of Mexico's territory from the early 1820s was an act in open defiance to Mexican law. At the same time, it is also particularly important to point out that at that time, Mexico was under the presidency of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who effectively acted as a dictator, and who had abolished Mexico's 1824 federal constitution and had replaced it with the Constitution of 1836 (the so-called *Siete Leyes*). In practice, with the 1836 Constitution—in the words of Michael Meyer, William Sherman, and Susan Deeds—"in a feature designed to ensure centralist organization, the states of the old federal republic were transformed into military departments," whose governing officials were appointees chosen by the President himself.[45] Therefore, there were interesting differences in the political development of Mexico and the United States in the 1840s, as, unlike what had happened in the United States, in Mexico the drive toward centralization necessary to keep the country together in face of centrifugal movements for independence such as the one in the northern

province of Texas had led to the abolition of the federal system and the establishment of a military dictatorship. If anything, this could be an important cautionary tale for Whigs such as Henry Clay, and increasingly also Lincoln, who believed in the importance of strong and centralized federal governmental institutions as an important feature in the national program for internal improvements. On the other hand, Texas's 1836 independence and the Mexican War that started in 1846 had a direct link with the U.S. Southern slaveholders' attempts to expand the area of influence of American slavery, since the type of slavery that was practiced in Texas was associated with cotton agriculture in the antebellum American South, which was then progressing toward its highest levels of production.[46] With the 1848 end of the Mexican War, therefore, the slave system would prove as powerful as ever, and this might also have provided a cautionary tale for the Whigs, and especially for Lincoln, who, effectively, came into contact for the first time with the issue of slavery's expansion, an issue that would become central in his political career only a few years later.[47]

In that same 1847–49 congressional term, in a particularly important speech at the House of Representatives on June 20, 1848, Lincoln explained how he intended to put in practice the economic policies required by a program on internal improvements on a national scale. The speech has been analyzed in detail by Gabor Boritt in his 1978 study *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*—still unrivalled as an analysis of Lincoln's economic policies.[48] However, subsequent historiography has mostly focused on Lincoln's defense of internal improvement in relation to constitutional issues—particularly through his point that, in the words of Mark Neely, "practical demands for internal improvements should outweigh any minor constitutional doubt or controversy"—thereby mostly overlooking the speech's crucial significance in the context of Lincoln's economic thought.[49] In the speech, Lincoln told his fellow congressmen that, in order to achieve the objective of national economic progress, they should:

> let the nation take hold of the larger works, and the states the smaller ones . . . what is made unequal in one place may be equalized in another, extravagance avoided, and the whole country put on that career of prosperity, which shall correspond with its extent of territory, its natural resources, and the intelligence and enterprise of its people.[50]

For Lincoln, there was no question that a carefully planned and harmoniously executed program of internal improvements such as the

one he had devised, in conjunction with a policy of adoption of protective tariffs for American manufactures and of construction of a centralized national bank, would have ensured the nation's prosperity. More than this, it was clear to him that the nation's economic prosperity was the necessary requirement to guarantee equal opportunities to all the nation's citizens.

Four years later, in his July 6, 1852, speech "Eulogy on Henry Clay," who had died the previous week, Lincoln made the above points even clearer while summarizing both the philosophy of his "beau ideal of statesman," as he called Clay, and also his own. Lincoln said that Clay "loved his country . . . mostly because it was a free country; and he burned with a zeal for its advancement, prosperity and glory, because he saw in such, the advancement, prosperity and glory of human liberty, human right and human nature."[51] Essentially, this was Lincoln's clearest statement to date of his belief in the indissolubility of the link between economic advancement and guarantee of basic civic rights—the two pillars of progressive nationalism. Significantly, these were also the two main tenets at the heart of the moderate liberal thought of Cavour, whose ideas had a great deal in common with Lincoln's own in terms of linking together economic advancement and civic rights. At the same time, though, the different ways in which the two statesmen expressed these basic ideas was determined, necessarily, by the great difference in sociopolitical setting between the American republican system and the Piedmontese dynastic monarchy, which became a constitutional state with its own parliament and official parties and political affiliations only in 1848.

Cavour and Economic Progress in Nineteenth-Century Piedmont

To be sure, Cavour's upbringing could not have been more different from Lincoln's. Born in 1810 as the cadet son of a prestigious aristocratic family, Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, felt very strongly the power of inheritance. His family had a long tradition of landowning and armed service to the House of Savoy, customarily associated with the Piedmontese nobility in the northern Italian Kingdom of Sardinia. In 1820, when Cavour was only ten years old, his father sent him to the Royal Military Academy, where Cavour received a formal and conservative type of education, centered mostly on the knowledge of French, the language spoken in Piedmont at the time, of Italian, and, above all, of mathematics and sciences—subjects in which he excelled and which led to his appointment as an officer in the Engineer Corps

in the Sardinian Army in 1825.[52] Later in life, Cavour stated that he regretted not having been taught the importance of knowing the great literary works in the early phases of his education, and he tried to compensate for this in his adult life by reading some of the most important novels of his time. In fact, according to Rosario Romeo, in these early years, Cavour's "real inclinations and his deepest interests lay somewhere else [than mathematics]: in Political Science and Ethics, in History and Political Economy"—disciplines that he cultivated in his private reading time.[53] In truth, Cavour's knowledge of mathematics and science were crucial for his intellectual development, since he applied a scientific approach to all the different realms of his activities, from agriculture to economy and politics. Yet, he combined this scientific attitude with a yearning for personal fulfillment beyond the narrow horizons of his noble status in nineteenth-century Piedmont, and this yearning led him to approach the works of the great liberal French and English thinkers.

Between 1827 and 1830, in his main task as a commissioned officer in the Sardinian Army's Engineer Corps, Cavour was stationed in various locations to take care of roads, bridges, and fortifications in the solitary and mountainous areas of Piedmont. In those years, Cavour spent a great deal of time reading, according to Giuseppe Talamo, authors ranging "from Benjamin Constant to Guizot, from Bentham to Smith, from Condillac to Comte, from Robertson to Chateaubriand, from Machiavelli to Montesquieu."[54] Part of the reason for Cavour's acquaintance with these authors was his brief sojourn in Geneva, in 1827, where he came in contact with a much more culturally open and intellectually stimulating milieu than the one in Turin. From reading Benjamin Constant, in particular, Cavour learned that true Christianity was based on the freedom of conscience, rather than on the belief in the pope's infallibility, and that "humankind's spiritual progress and [true] religious sentiment" were, therefore, inextricably tied together. This was, effectively, a crucial concept in the development of Cavour's liberalism as a sociopolitical system based on the effort toward improvement and personal fulfillment in a society and a nation of responsible and responsibly represented individuals.[55] Also, from reading the works of Francois Guizot, a key figure in European liberalism and a protagonist of the 1830 revolution in Paris (an event that had a lasting impression on the young Cavour) and of the subsequent French governments until 1848, Cavour learned the importance of thinking about progress as a gradual and moderate, rather than abrupt, process, and yet one that required a rupture with the past—another crucial concept in his future liberal thought and

practice. Finally, in Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarian philosophy, Cavour found a rational philosophical justification for his desire to operate for the improvement of humankind through politics, and therefore a crucial motivation for his future political career. Effectively, by engaging with these different readings, Cavour showed an independence of thought that led him to sympathize with liberal politics and ultimately to resign from the Sardinian Army in 1831.[56]

Throughout the 1830s and the 1840s, Cavour took care of the family's large landholdings at Leri, and, as he did so, he set to dedicate himself to the business of agriculture with the passion of the modernizer, showing clear signs of what the conservative nobility called a "bourgeois attitude." In his own estate at Leri, Cavour proved to be a model resident and experimental landowner, and, from 1843, he established a fruitful collaboration with Giacinto Corio, his estate administrator and agent. In a flurry of activities that tell us a great deal about Cavour's personal passion for learning as much as he could about agricultural management and that reached its peak in 1845–50, Cavour showed with his own example the difference that resident landownership made in relation to the economics of landed estates. Following the agronomic treatises he read constantly, he sought to experiment with different types of scientific techniques of cultivation, and eventually he gave a major contribution to Piedmontese agriculture through the introduction of new fertilizers, such as guano, and also of new machinery on his own landed estate.[57] If we were to place Cavour's efforts at agrarian modernization within the wider context, though, we would notice that the drive toward scientific agriculture and the increasing importance of the doctrine and practice of agronomy are themes that we can easily find among all the landowning classes that lived in the Euro-American peripheral regions of the nineteenth-century world economy. In southern Europe, these regions included Italy, both north and south, and Spain.[58]

In nineteenth-century Spain, in particular, the regions with reformist landowners who were the equivalent of Piedmont's progressive agrarian elite included the areas of commercial agriculture on the coast, from Catalonia to Cadiz, which were grown with cash crops such as Valencian oranges and Catalonian wine grapes. In Spain, thus, entrepreneurial attitudes tended to be associated with this type of commercial agriculture, and agrarian reformers attempted to prompt the older landowning class, which lived off the rent of the large grain estates (*latifundia*), to engage in agricultural modernization through the conversion of some of the land to horticulture. This feature shows particularly well in studies of the cultural and scientific press of the

southern Spanish region of Murcia, *latifundia*-based, a region where, as in Piedmont, nineteenth-century agrarian reformers supported the necessity of modernization specifically through the implementation of chemical fertilizers and the renovation of traditional agricultural industries, such as silk. In areas such as Catalonia, this had led to a comparable move to Piedmontese proto-industrialization. At the same time, progressive landowners gathered in regional institutions, such as the Cantabrian Economic Society, and also debated on prestigious economic journals, such as—from the 1830s—the Catalan-based *Revista de Agricoltura Pratica* (Review of Practical Agriculture), in which they engaged in discussions over what constituted modern agriculture.[59] Even though Spanish commercial agriculture and proto-industrialization were not considered a model to follow by Piedmontese agricultural reformers such as Cavour in nineteenth-century northern Italy, the fact that in a neighboring southern European country the agrarian elites engaged in comparable experiments at modernization of their landed estates through the implementation of agronomy and scientific agricultural techniques is indicative of the general European agronomic milieu to which Cavour belonged. Moreover, the similarities in agronomic attitudes among the European elites also included the foundation of agricultural societies and the publication of agricultural journals, such as those in Spain mentioned earlier, as forums for discussion among the landowners—both practices that, as we shall see, characterized the activities of the reformist Piedmontese landowning elite to which Cavour belonged.[60]

At the same time, an important element that emerges clearly from the analysis of the modernizing efforts of the reformist landed elites in Europe is the attempt by progressive landowners to establish a paternalistic relationship with their tenants.[61] In Cavour's case, it is clear from the documents that he sought to do so with his own tenants, whom he rewarded for their interest in improvement, and, in a famous and often quoted 1844 essay called *Thoughts on Ireland: Its Present and Its Future*, Cavour argued that Irish Protestant landowners ought to do the same with their own, mostly Catholic, tenants in Ireland.[62] In fact, in the mid-nineteenth century Cavour's Piedmont was akin to both Ireland and Spain in its status of peripheral region to the great economic movements caused by the industrial revolution. Yet, comparable to Lincoln's Illinois—which, in the 1850s, was at the start of a process that would end with its transformation "from a grazing to a corn state in the 1860s," thanks to increasing farming activity and to the building of the Illinois Central Railroad[63]—Piedmont was also placed in an ideal position for close contact, in

terms of communications and transfer of entrepreneurial skills, with more economically advanced and industrialized regions, in this case northern European countries such as France, and, especially Britain.

In fact, Cavour's ideas about economy, which he saw rationally and scientifically as a result of his early education in mathematics, were particularly influenced by the reading of British classical political economists such as, especially, Adam Smith and David Ricardo. In practice, while these authors acquainted Cavour with the social problems related to industrialization, they also convinced him that England was the model modernizing society, supported by a thriving economy and by an unparalleled degree of political freedom and civic equality, by liberal standards, in the whole European continent. To his readings and studies, though—which led him, as early as 1834, to publish as his first work a summary in French of the British government's *Report* by the 1832 Royal Commission into the Operation of the Poor Laws, the document that would lead to the implementation of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act—Cavour also added a first-hand knowledge of England, matured through two trips he made to London and other English cities in 1835 and in 1843.[64]

In both trips, Cavour maintained as his main aim the observation and study of Britain's modern sociopolitical institutions and of its economic achievements in an effort to understand if and how it was possible for his native Piedmont to follow in England's footsteps. Certainly, in his first trip, in May 1835, Cavour confirmed his admiration for England, especially through his visits in London to the Royal Geographical Society and to the model prisons built according to Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" system, and then through his first-hand witnessing, in Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham, of the industrial revolution at its peak and of the proliferation of railroads connecting cities and towns. Yet, already in that first trip, Cavour also witnessed the strains that shook the British system through the controversies over the liberalization of the grain trade, the municipal reform, and, above all, the "Irish Question," as he witnessed debates at the House of Commons in which the great Irish statesman Daniel O'Connell participated. In contrast to his first trip, in his second trip to England in April–May 1843, Cavour seems to have focused his attention almost exclusively on the ongoing debate about the liberalization of the grain trade and on the massive development in railroad building.[65]

Also as a consequence of these influences, even in his landowning business, Cavour sought to provide a model of rational estate management according to up-to-date methods implemented in England

and in northern Europe. Therefore, from the start, he linked his own private activity as progressive landowner with the spread of especially English progressive economic theories and practices in his native Piedmont. Not only did he write numerous essays on agricultural innovations, such as chemical fertilization, but also, in 1842, he was one of the thirty-six foundational members of the Associazione Agraria Subalpina (Subalpine Agrarian Association, or AAS), a progressive agricultural association that, significantly, opened its doors to both noblemen and bourgeoisie and encouraged collaboration between the two classes.[66] According to its Constitution, this new agrarian association, which included all the Piedmontese landowners interested in agronomy, aimed to gather "all . . . the various elements of agricultural progress" by promoting improvement in farming methods and by disseminating information on scientific agriculture.[67] As a consequence, "in the space of a few years"—in Emanuele Faccenda's words—"the AAS became an institution capable of giving voice to the most creative instances of development of the country, and, at the same time, of working intensely with a view to the renewal of the Piedmontese economy through its support of a radical improvement in agrarian techniques." The AAS did this specifically through the conferring of prizes for agrarian inventions and performances, through the translation of important agronomic treatises, through the foundation of agrarian schools, and through the dissemination of, and debate on, agronomic practices in the articles published on its official organ: the *Gazzetta dell'Associazione Agraria* (Gazette of the Agrarian Association, 1842–48).[68]

Uniquely in 1840s Piedmont, the AAS encouraged the participation of both nobility and bourgeoisie in its activities and debates. In fact, even though the majority of the initial 1,725 members belonged to the court aristocracy—as they were those who effectively owned most of the land and the largest landed estates—there were also many professionals, especially lawyers, even though only some of them were landed proprietors. At the same time, according to Anthony Cardoza, "the association [also] had a broader social mission," since it encouraged collaboration between the upper and the lower classes toward the general aim of agricultural improvement.[69] In practice, the Association aimed, as Faccenda has pointed out, "to improve the lot of tenants . . . making them protagonists of a type of social progress that was contained within determined and precise moderate limits," thus making sure that, as a result of the improvement of their condition, the tenants would not embrace the option of a revolution and would, instead, have an interest in preserving the right to property.[70]

In 1843, Cavour wrote in the *Gazzetta* that "the best way to promote the advancement of the agrarian economy is to encourage the zeal of those [very] individuals . . . who know how best to cultivate the land."[71] In other words, Cavour told the Piedmontese landowners to give incentives to the peasants, who were much closer to the land, and therefore knew best how to improve it—as he had hypothesized that the Protestant landowners should do with their Catholic tenants in Ireland. In practice, Cavour embraced wholeheartedly what effectively amounted to "a rational program of modernization of the economic, productive, and socio-political system of the country," in the words of Antonio Chiavistelli, put forward by the AAS.[72] Even though Cavour was actually away for most of the first months of existence of the AAS, when he returned in the summer of 1843, he became immediately engaged in a number of activities related to it, from presiding on meetings to writing articles for the *Gazzetta*, conferring prizes, and participating in various committees.[73]

Yet, even if he wholly embraced the principles and objectives of the AAS, in that same period Cavour also distanced himself from the ideas that other members had on the best way to achieve those objectives—ideas that entailed a much larger degree of intervention by the government in support of various initiatives than he had in mind, leading to a control on individual freedom, which, to Cavour, raised in the tradition of French and English liberalism, was unthinkable. This profound dissent is at the heart of an important article published by Cavour on the *Gazzetta*, "Considerazioni sulla poca convenienza di stabilire poderi-modello in Piemonte" (Considerations on the little need to establish model farms in Piedmont, 1843), in which he argued against the establishment of model farms by the Piedmontese government. His opponents wished simply that the government transferred to Piedmont the agronomic practices and patterns that had been successful in other countries, specifically Prussia, one of the centers of European agronomic culture.[74] Arguing against the Prussian idea of model farms managed by the state, also because of all the costs that this entailed, and about the practical difficulties of creating and conducting effectively large-scale agronomic schools or experimental fields, Cavour invoked the English example: "there [in England], the intelligent and educated individuals who, from the mid-eighteenth century have dedicated themselves to agricultural progress . . . have simply prompted the study of the practitioners, enlightening them and directing them on the way to improvement, and giving them all the encouragement they could avail of."[75] In other words, following the English tradition of economic liberalism, Cavour argued that

the AAS ought to support with its activities the small, but gradual improvements made by the individual entrepreneurial and progressive landowners, which were better in terms of cost, quality, and practical returns, provided that those landowners were left free to make experiments and debate about them.

Doubtless, if progressive noblemen such as Cavour could collaborate with progressive individuals outside the noble circles in an association with common objectives related to agrarian reform, the way was open to future collaboration between progressive nobility and bourgeoisie in the political arena.[76] This collaboration was a key point of Cavour's long-term project of "progressive nationalism"—a project that necessarily began with a focus on economic development. Comparably to Lincoln, Cavour saw an entire world of possibilities materializing in front of him as a result of the spread of the industrial revolution, which was then affecting Piedmont both by prompting the Piedmontese landowners' drive toward agrarian modernization and by causing the growth of a domestic textile sector, as a result of an increasing world market demand, especially for woven silk. In particular, as mentioned earlier, the demand for woven silk had caused the employment of a number of peasant families in the textile mills of Piedmont and Lombardy, the first example of factories in the two regions and the cause of the phenomenon that scholars have called proto-industrialization. In practice, for Cavour, as for Lincoln, economic development, in all its forms, was not only the best way to integrate the regional economic system and link it effectively to the mechanisms of the world market, but also an indispensable part of the road to a national progress that would have guaranteed a better possibility for equal opportunities for a larger number of the nation's citizens.[77]

LINCOLN, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, LIBERTY, AND RAILROADS

It is not surprising that Lincoln joined his conviction of the necessity of a systematic program of national economic progress with a strong belief in the principles of liberty and equality set in the Declaration of Independence. In his view, slavery could have no part, as it was up to the individual, once equal opportunities were given to him, to prove his worth. As Lincoln progressed in his political career, the economic reasoning became the basis of a firm antislavery position. It was, in the end, a combination of both his natural abhorrence of the slave system and his belief in the superiority of free labor for the economy of the nation that provided him with the moral grounds on which to

commit himself to active antislavery politics.[78] Doubtless, Lincoln had been contemplating such a thought while a Whig statesman. In fact, despite not mentioning the issue of the expansion of slavery in his speeches against the Mexican War, during his 1847–49 congressional term Lincoln supported the Wilmot Proviso, which, if passed, would have prohibited slavery from extending to the territories acquired from Mexico, while in January 1849, he proposed a bill for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, followed by a period of "apprenticeship" and with compensation to the slaveholders, in the U.S. capital Washington and in the District of Columbia.[79] Yet, it was the crisis of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act and the increasingly real possibility of slavery's further expansion into the west—the same issue he had already confronted at the time of the Mexican War—that pushed Lincoln decisively toward the antislavery camp. Then, in 1856, as he joined the declaredly antislavery Republican Party, Lincoln came to the conclusion that there was an ideal link between the Whig and the Republican ideologies of economic progress as the indispensable basis for equal opportunities for the citizens of a free American nation.[80]

Three years later, in 1859, Lincoln gave a significant speech in his Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society. Though it is true that, unlike Cavour, Lincoln never retained an interest in agriculture after he left his family's farm in his youth, he was acutely aware of the importance of farming and farmers in the overall program for internal improvements of the nation. As a Whig statesman, when he sat in the Illinois Legislature—similarly, in this, to Cavour—Lincoln was an advocate of agricultural societies, and a supporter of agrarian improvement, a theme that resonated with his 1859 speech in Wisconsin. As Eric Foner has noted, in that speech, Lincoln "lauded the advantages of scientific, mechanized farming, urging agriculturalists to combine physical labor with 'cultivated thought.' These attitudes were characteristic of the Whig Party."[81] In praising the virtues of the free labor epitomized by farmers, Lincoln argued that it was practiced by the majority of Americans, and therefore, as Michael P. Johnson has noticed commenting on the speech, "in effect, Lincoln proclaimed free labor the truly American system."[82] But Lincoln went further than that, summarizing his overall philosophy with revealing words: "let us hope . . . that by the best cultivation of the physical world, beneath and around us, and the intellectual and moral world within us, we shall secure an individual, social, and political prosperity and happiness, whose course shall be onward and upward, and which, while the earth endures, shall not pass away."[83] Therefore, he made a clear connection between his free labor ideology, deeply steeped in

Whig economic theory, and the Republican vision of the immense positive changes that free labor could produce in terms of guaranteeing the economic, social, and political progress of the nation and of all its citizens, ultimately by effectively placing the United States at the vanguard of the civilized world.

By then, according to Peter Parish, "Lincoln and others [had] espoused a kind of ameliorative nationalism. The aim of improvement was directed at individuals, the nation, economic advancement, and social and moral development."[84] Still following Parish, by embracing the new type of "ameliorative nationalism," "the Republicans took over the belief in the positive use of powers of an active and energetic federal government in order to promote national development."[85] In fact, according to Richard Bensel, by 1860 the Republicans had defined a program for the U.S. national political economy, according to which they "threw the entire weight of the federal government behind the expansion of northern industry and homestead agriculture." The Republicans' program would achieve its first major result with Lincoln's victory in the 1860 presidential election, since "Lincoln's election heralded the ascension to power of a broad alliance of northern industrial capital, labor, and landowning farmers."[86] This broad alliance was possible because, as Peter Parish has noticed, in the Republicans' vision national progress simply manifested itself in different realms—economic (with its various sectors, in a view that owed much to the Whigs), social, and moral—and all of these realms were connected to one another and worked together harmoniously toward the single, overarching objective of creating a strong, free, American nation. Yet, even though, in essence, the features Parish has identified as elements of "ameliorative nationalism" can easily fit the ideology I have called progressive nationalism, we must remember that there is also an important difference between the two definitions. In fact, unlike ameliorative nationalism, which Parish intended as simply a way to define the nationalist characteristics of the U.S. Republican Party, progressive nationalism defines an ideology that was much wider in scope and that subsumed novel attempts at national consolidation based on progressive features in an age of nation-building that characterized both America and Europe.[87] In Lincoln's United States, those features—namely economic progress and guarantee of basic civil rights on a national scale—defined themselves best through the Republican Party's ameliorative nationalism, but in Europe they were at the heart of liberal nationalism in several countries and regions, including Cavour's Piedmont, where they were the main tenets of the Moderate Liberals' program.

To be sure, Lincoln did not just make his policy of advocating economic progress as a means to the nation's advancement the central feature of his political career; he also linked it to the development of his entire legal profession. Throughout Lincoln's life, as Daniel Walker Howe reminds us, "in these callings [the political and the legal] he kept in close contact with the business world"[88]—a fact that shows with particular clarity in his close association with the interests of railroad companies. In 1850–51, plans for the construction of a major railroad in Illinois were revived when the federal government provided Illinois with a grant of more than 2.5 million acres for the construction of railroads by a corporation over the next ten years. In February 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad was chartered for the construction of a main railroad line in Illinois within four years and of subsidiary branches in another six years. It did much better than that, and the Illinois railroad network was all but completed by September 1856—the same year Lincoln joined the Republican Party, as the nation was torn apart by sectional conflict, and reaffirmed his commitment to free labor as the pillar on which to build the national program of internal improvements. According to William Thomas, not only was the Illinois Central Railroad "the single biggest project in this region," but also, one of its main effects "in the 1850s . . . was to show Americans in both sections just how fast, and dense, and internationally significant, northern free labor development could be."[89]

Overall, between 1840 and 1860, the railroad mileage in Illinois grew, astonishingly, from twenty-six miles to over thirty thousand miles, effectively in less than two decades. At the very heart of the realization of this massive program for internal improvements and creation of an integrated state communication network—which, likely, Lincoln saw as a small-scale regional version of a similar effort on the national scale—was the Illinois Central Railroad. In 1853, while a successful lawyer in Springfield, Lincoln was approached by the Illinois Central Railroad, and, as Allen Guelzo has argued, "this was only the beginning of a long and highly profitable relationship between Lincoln and the *Illinois Central*, which became his most important corporate client."[90] In fact, between 1853 and 1860, he defended the company in more than fifty legal cases, eleven of which argued in the Supreme Court, and particularly famous among them was the case *Illinois Central Railroad v. County of McLean*, where Lincoln's victory saved the company half a million dollars or more. Lincoln had been long convinced of the paramount importance of railroads in both regional and national economic development—"a never failing source," as he himself said, "of communication between places of

business."[91] It was in this spirit that he defended the powerful Illinois Central Railroad from legal suits, and, in the process, he achieved the most important legal victories of his career.[92]

Aside from the specificity of the legal cases, it is important to note that Lincoln's absolute faith in the power of the railroads to not just connect localities, but to create a real, integrated, national economy as an indispensable basis for social and civic progress—according to the main tenets of progressive nationalism—did not exist in isolation. In particular, according to the most recent scholarship, many of those who voted for Lincoln and the Republican Party in 1860 identified market integration and commercial expansion in the new western territories within a free labor system with railroad development—so much so that William Thomas has remarked that "a whole generation of young men, active in politics, business, and community life, became what we might call 'Railroad Republicans.'"[93] At the same time, looking beyond the United States, in a more international dimension, the connection between railroad expansion and progress was also a very popular idea among nineteenth-century European progressive intellectuals and politicians, such as, in northern Italy, Piedmontese nobleman Camillo Cavour. Thus, if, in the mid-nineteenth-century United States, belief in the importance of railroads and, in general, in industrial technology and its potentials for the national economy identified the believer as a "Whig," in the European countries this same belief was invariably classified as related to a "bourgeois" attitude maintained by either the middle class or, in the case of Cavour, by progressive aristocratic members of the ennobled elite. In truth, several members of the progressive liberal aristocracy—especially those who followed the English model—were more than ready to explore the new economic possibilities and, thus, they helped to blur the lines of division between the nobility and the middle class in the name of progress. Cavour was one such progressive liberal aristocrat, one who looked to England as a model, and one with a firm belief in economic and political progress as two sides of the same coin of progressive nationalism.[94]

CAVOUR, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND LIBERAL REFORMS

There is no doubt that Cavour thought of England as the model country to follow on a path to modernization that integrated agriculture and industry and gave a prominent role to the nation's government; the latter's role would guarantee necessary antiprotectionist

legislation, in order to boost interstate trade as much as possible, and would also provide the necessary infrastructure through the construction of an efficient transport system based on railroads. Shortly after his second trip to England, Cavour supported these views in an 1845 essay, "De la question relative a la legislation anglaise sur le commerce des cereals" [On the Issue of the English Laws on the Trade in Cereals], which led to another related essay in 1847, "Dell'influenza che la nuova politica commerciale inglese deve esercitare sul mondo economico e sull'Italia in particolare" [On the Influence that England's New Commercial Policy must Exercise on the World Economy, and on Italy in particular]. The latter essay closely followed the British Parliament's abolition of the Corn Laws, thus supporting free trade, as Cavour had hoped.[95] Also, in 1846, Cavour published an important article called "Des chemins de fer en Italie" [On Railroads in Italy], in which he advocated concerted efforts by the legitimate Italian states toward the construction of an integrated northern Italian railroad network.[96] In practice, Cavour believed that to embrace both agrarian modernization and industrialization, and therefore to join the world of economic possibilities opened by the effects of the industrial revolution, meant, effectively, to provide the nation with that strong economy that was the other side of the coin of a healthy sociopolitical system—a course of action that, in his view, resembled the one that his model country of England had followed during the industrial revolution. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that, from the economic point of view, as it might be expected, Britain seems to have been also Lincoln's model, since, according to Gabor Boritt, as early as 1846, in thinking of American economic development, "Lincoln simply took it for granted that his country . . . would be able to produce manufactures as efficiently . . . as England."[97]

Yet, unlike Lincoln, in professing his admiration for England Cavour was a staunch supporter of free trade. The reason Cavour's economic beliefs—similarly to the creed of all the liberal upper classes in Europe—were strictly antiprotectionist related to both the particular European liberal economic tradition that he embraced and to the particular conditions of Italy, where encouragement of trade exchanges and opening to foreign markets were indispensable features of a program for the economic recovery of a number of poorly connected and underdeveloped regions. Clearly, this was a major difference between Cavour and Lincoln, since Lincoln supported wholeheartedly Whig protectionist policies, which—in Eric Foner's words—"centered on a tariff on imported manufactured goods to aid industry and protect American workers from the competition of

low-wage foreign labor."[98] Also later on, after he joined the Republican Party, Lincoln continued to be protectionist for similar reasons, even though as president, in 1861, he clarified that he envisioned a protectionist policy "just and equal to all sections of the country and classes of people."[99] On the other hand, starting from opposite premises, Cavour's economic liberalism was based on the idea that freedom of trade would have allowed competition and, therefore, improvement in both industry and agriculture.[100] In Cavour's thought, the goal of expansion of production through technological/managerial improvement and freedom of trade was the pillar that supported economic development; ultimately, it would have also led to sociopolitical progress. In fact, as Luciano Cafagna has noted, Cavour's economic liberalism was inextricably linked to his sociopolitical liberalism. In both cases, Cavour meant freedom as a "liberation of positive energies," and thus as the indispensable requirement to allow progress in the shape of lively entrepreneurial activity and political debate; in turn, progress would lead to the construction of a sound economy and also to the extension of constitutional rights of representation in an elected parliament.[101] Therefore, in Marco Meriggi's words, Cavour's vision was one in which "faith in political freedom was tied in an indissoluble way to faith in the virtues of bourgeois" political economy.[102]

By 1847, these ideas had become the heart of the ideological line of Cavour's own newspaper, significantly called *Il Risorgimento* (The Resurgence). In the very first issue, Cavour stated in an article that "a nation's political resurgence can never be disjointed from its economic resurgence."[103] Then, on March 4, 1848, Piedmontese King Charles Albert conceded the Liberal Constitution (*Statuto Albertino*), which transformed overnight Cavour's native Kingdom of Sardinia into a constitutional monarchy with a Parliament whose members were elected among the propertied classes—the only constitutional political system in the entire Italian peninsula to survive the post-1848 reactionary wave with the 1850s restoration of absolutist governments. In an article published in *Il Risorgimento* less than a week after the King's concession of the Liberal Constitution, Cavour praised the fact that, in it, "the freedom of the press, and individual liberty are solemnly guaranteed," and that, in sum, "all the great principles . . . that form the true basis of freedom are frankly and resolutely affirmed."[104] The Liberal Constitution, therefore, became a symbol of progress, and the Moderate Liberals, the party that Cavour headed in the 1850s, aimed at promoting political progress through the constitution, in conjunction with economic progress through scientific and technological innovation. In 1849, Cavour was elected Member

of Parliament, and in 1850 he became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.[105] By then he had devised a consistent project of economic development that, although based on liberal economic principles, resembled in its breadth of scope Henry Clay's "American System." Both Clay's and Cavour's plans, in fact, were comprehensive projects of development whose fundamental principle lay in the need for an integration between the different sectors of the economy enhanced within a framework of crucial legal and political support provided by the nation's government. Ultimately, Cavour, similarly to Clay, believed that such a comprehensive economic program would have benefited all the nation's citizens, and therefore, in both cases, the program became a pillar of progressive nationalism.[106]

Regarding Cavour, Rosario Romeo, in particular, has argued that, after 1850, the Piedmontese statesman envisioned a complex economic program in which the implementation of freedom of trade would have accompanied the simultaneous creation of a host of "structures and institutions." Chief among these were the "postal services, railroad transportation, shipping lines, banking institutions"—the latter being especially important, given Cavour's links with the world of international finance, and especially with the powerful Rothschild family.[107] All these infrastructures—Cavour thought—would work together harmoniously in an integrated whole for the nation. Effectively, the comprehensive plan of economic reform that Cavour had in mind was to form the blueprint for the economic and administrative unification of a future Italian nation. Thus, in practice, in the mid-1850s, after his 1852 appointment as Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Cavour created and executed a program for the economic development of Piedmont that anticipated his economic guidelines for the development of a future unified Italy. In an 1853 speech in the Piedmontese Parliament, in summarizing his early achievements and exhorting the Deputies to support him, Cavour stated that

> instead of limiting ourselves and rejecting any idea for improvement or for big enterprises, instead of attempting in every possible way to balance the budget, we have preferred to promote all the works of public utility, to develop all the elements of progress that are present in our state, to awaken, everywhere in the country, all the possible industrial and economic activities.[108]

In fact, stimulated by the long-range and integrated economic program launched by the Cavour administration, agriculture and trade flourished, while textile mills gave Piedmont an early start in the

process of Italian proto-industrialization.[109] As Guido Pescosolido has noticed, Cavour essentially conceived the role of Piedmont, and later of Italy, in the global economy as "complementary to the industrialized economies" of England and northwestern Europe, and as allowing room for "a great and sudden agricultural development, but also for the growth of food, textile, and . . . also mechanical and chemical industries." In practice, Cavour's program for achieving such a scale of economic development rested on the two pillars of economic protectionism and of modernization of infrastructures and of the transportation system.[110]

Significantly, within this wide-ranging program, railroads played a particularly important role, as Cavour, similarly to Lincoln, was convinced that they symbolized the very essence of economic progress, because of their potential to both integrate the national market and also to connect it to distant markets. At the same time, railroads were also a symbol of progress because their construction by the government was beneficial to the people and the nation as a whole. In this regard, in his famous 1846 essay on Italian railroads, Cavour had written that "governments have the destiny of their peoples in trust, and railroad building is therefore a powerful instrument of progress which testifies to the benevolent intentions of each government."[111] In other words, only a liberal constitutional government that truly represented the interests of the people could have an interest in building railroads. With this in mind, Cavour advocated both the institution of a liberal parliamentary system and the creation of a railroad network in Piedmont until when, after the king's concession of the Liberal Constitution and the installation of the Parliament in 1848, it was possible for him to actually promote, through different financial operations, a great deal of the development in Piedmontese railroad building in the early 1850s.[112]

Yet, Cavour went further than that by clearly linking economics and politics on a national, not just regional, scale, and advocating the construction of railroads as a means not only to accelerate integration of the Piedmontese market, but also, ultimately, to transform "the people of Italy in both economic and moral terms."[113] By the time he became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and then Minister of Finance, Cavour was able to give a fundamental impulse to the creation of an integrated Piedmontese railroad network, with which he provided the other Italian states with an example to imitate. He did so especially through his support of the June 14, 1852 Act, which chartered two major British companies with the construction of two crucial railroads, one from Turin to Susa and the other one from Turin to

Novara, which crisscrossed and linked together the Piedmontese territory from east to west. At the same time, still prompted by Cavour, the Piedmontese government strove to connect the Piedmontese railroad network with the French railroad network, so as to link together regional and international markets, a goal that was fully achieved only a few years after the start of Cavour's first term as Prime Minister (1852–55). Significantly, Cavour's ideas of construction of a strong national economy also had an important element in the strengthening of a national bank—a goal that Cavour attended to throughout his years as Prime Minister in the Piedmontese government and an important feature of his Moderate Liberal economic thought that he shared with Lincoln's support for Whig and Republican political economies, both of which emphasized, similarly, the crucial importance of the presence of a strong national bank in the United States.[114]

The main tenets of the ideology and mindset of progressive nationalism—specifically, the belief in economic advancement as the indispensable basis for the guarantee of civic rights to the nation's citizens—clearly informed the ideas and actions of both Lincoln and Cavour, first during their early careers mostly outside national politics, and then in their first important experiences as representatives in the U.S. Congress and in the Piedmontese Parliament. Though born at different ends of the social spectrum and raised with different opportunities for learning, both Lincoln and Cavour lived their early lives in peripheral regions—the U.S. Midwest and northwestern Italy—and acquired a great deal of knowledge mostly through reading, and later on, through significant trips—Lincoln to New Orleans and Cavour to England—which opened their eyes to the outside world, and to its rapid, ongoing, and immense economic transformations. As they came of age, Lincoln and Cavour followed different paths, entirely consistent with their upbringing—Lincoln's "bourgeois" legal profession vs. Cavour's "aristocratic" landownership. Yet, in their intellectual education and formation, they confronted similar problems from different angles and in different contexts. In the 1830s and 1840s, through his activity as a lawyer and as a member of the Illinois Legislature, Lincoln promoted the Whig program of internal improvements and economic advancement that was at the heart of Henry Clay's "American System." In the same period, as he acted as resident landowner on his estate and was also a member of the AAS, Cavour provided with his actions and writings a model for agrarian improvement, while he supported the AAS initiatives and measures as beneficial to the economy of Piedmont as a whole. In practice, both Lincoln and Cavour gave their unwavering support for two major efforts at

advancing modernization in their own regional contexts—the Whig program in Illinois and the AAS program in Piedmont.

Then, in the second half of the 1840s, Lincoln and Cavour each had their chance to begin a career in national politics—Lincoln as a representative in the U.S. Congress in 1847–49, and Cavour as a representative in Piedmont's newly established Parliament from 1848 onward. In both cases, with their entrance into national politics, the vision of economic advancement became inextricably tied to the advocacy of the guarantee of civic rights in what became, in time, an organic nationalist ideology. In the 1850s, while Lincoln joined the Whig program of economic modernization with the antislavery positions of the Republican Party, Cavour combined his idea of economic progress with his constant support for the liberal and constitutional monarchical system; in short, even though in different ways and in different contexts, both became acutely aware of the equal importance of the two main tenets of progressive nationalism. As they did so, both Lincoln and Cavour placed particular emphasis on plans for market integration through the establishment of a wide-ranging communication and transportation system, one to be achieved primarily through the building of railroads, which they both considered as the very symbol of progress, given the immense benefits they brought to the nation's economy and society.

More than any other factor, Lincoln's and Cavour's similarity in their attitude towards the railroads shows how the two statesmen were close in their ideas on the constituent elements of economic progress on a national scale. Yet, their different ideas on protectionism betrayed the influence on them of opposite types of economic cultures. On this point, though, we should notice that there may still have been something in common between Lincoln's and Cavour's views, if, according to Heather Cox Richardson, "traditional protectionism, as Americans understood it from their observation of England and France, required high tariffs on manufactured commodities, while it dictated the free import of raw materials, including agricultural products."[115] At the same time, it is clear that in both cases, economic and political ideas were tightly linked together in a broader vision of progressive nationalism, since, for both Lincoln and Cavour, economic development was an indispensable prerequisite to the making of a national progressive sociopolitical system. Clearly, progress assumed very different features in Lincoln's American Republic and in Cavour's monarchical Piedmont and it is impossible to compare the democratic exercise of full citizenship rights in the United States with the restricted suffrage that allowed the formation of elitist constitutional governments in

the Piedmontese Kingdom of Sardinia. Still, even though in different degrees and with different characteristics, the ideas of progress that characterized Lincoln's and Cavour's thoughts combined economic development with socio\political advancement within specific contexts of programs of national improvement. In this respect, given the fundamental differences in systems of government and in the concepts of citizenship between Lincoln's American Republic and Cavour's Piedmontese kingdom, the fact that the two statesmen held broadly similar views of economic development as an indispensable foundation for increasing political participation is a somewhat intriguing feature, and one that is worth investigating in comparative perspective as a crucial element of their progressive nationalist ideology.

Chapter 4

Progressive Nationalism, Politics, and National Unifications: Lincoln and Cavour after 1850

As noted in the Introduction, despite the great influence of modern scholarship on nationalism—with particular reference to the classic studies of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence Ranger[1]—only a few historians have attempted to define the causes and experiences of nationalist phenomena by including among their case studies the United States in the Civil War era and nation-building in Abraham Lincoln's time. Still in 2009, Mark Neely asked a crucial question: "Lincoln was America's most important nationalist, but what does his career mean when measured by these [Anderson's, Gellner's, and Hobsbawm's and Rangers'] new ideas?"[2] Among the few scholars who have sought an answer to this question and to other related questions on nineteenth-century American nationalism, particularly worthy of mention are Liah Greenfeld, James McPherson, Don Doyle, and Thomas Bender.[3] While Liah Greenfeld has looked at the construction of the American nation—within which the Civil War represented the crucial final stage—in comparative perspective with nation-building in other countries such as Britain, Germany, and Russia, James McPherson has investigated in depth the meaning of the distinction between "ethnic nationalism," which represented a belief in a common ethnic background, as was the case in many European nations, and "civic nationalism," which represented a belief in shared values, as was the case in Civil War America. Utilizing some of the methodological nuances derived from McPherson's reflections, then, Don Doyle has written a comparative study of the United States and

Italy, focusing specifically on the existence, both real and imagined, of a perceived "other" in the shape of the south, in opposition to which the American and Italian national identities were constructed through civil war and national unification. In Thomas Bender's case, instead, the long-term transnational perspective of his general historical study has included a particularly enlightening chapter on the United States during the Civil War. Bender has clearly placed the Civil War experience within the context of the liberal nationalist movements that shook the contemporary Euro-American world, effectively following in the footsteps of David Potter.[4]

Building on the premises laid out especially by Potter, by Raimondo Luraghi, and partly also by Bender, Italian historians such as Tiziano Bonazzi have also attempted to provide an analytical framework for the study of the American Civil War in comparative perspective with European movements of nation-building, specifically with a view toward possible comparisons between the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento*.[5] In particular, Bonazzi has placed the American Civil War squarely in the path of development of nineteenth-century liberalism and has argued in favor of a substantial similarity in liberal national principles in the struggles for national consolidation in the United States and Europe, especially Italy, in the mid-nineteenth century.[6] If we follow both Potter's and Bonazzi's claims, therefore, we can think of a common background of liberal thought that characterized the ideology I have termed "progressive nationalism" in Europe and America—effectively a transnational ideology with liberal elements at its core, which subsumed experiments in progressive nation-building on both sides of the Atlantic. In this connection, the long debate among American historians on the relationship between liberalism and republicanism has proven extremely helpful for our understanding of the existence of crucial liberal elements in nineteenth-century American political culture. Already in the 1950s, Louis Hartz supported the idea of continuity between the liberal values propounded by the revolutionary generation and subsequent American political thought.[7] Since then, the scholarly consensus has been that, sometime between the Revolution and the Civil War, republicanism morphed into liberalism, which then became the dominant political ideology—though important studies by scholars such as Gordon Wood, Joyce Appleby, Lance Banning, Sean Wilentz, Harry Watson, Eric Foner, and J. David Greenstone have proposed different dates for this transformative process, ranging from the Federalist era to the Jacksonian period, and to the age of Lincoln.[8] In synthesis, most scholars would now agree with David Ericson's argument, which claims the existence

of a clear connection between the two ideologies based on the definition of "republicanism as a species of liberalism which granted relatively more space to the public sphere."[9]

In the present chapter, I take the view that, insofar as nineteenth-century American republicanism was based on a strong belief in the principles of the Declaration of Independence, it did contain elements that were common to the liberal ideology of contemporary European nationalists. At the same time, we must also keep in mind that, although many nineteenth-century European politicians might have manifested admiration for the unparalleled degree of political freedom in the United States, they were actually more than happy to settle with the liberties guaranteed by a constitutional monarchy and were rather suspicious of republics. The actual degree of liberty that the support for liberal principles entailed, therefore, differed greatly from the American to the European contexts. This crucial difference shows particularly strongly in a comparative study of the thoughts and policies of the two key mid-nineteenth-century American and Italian statesmen: U.S. President Abraham Lincoln and Piedmontese Prime Minister Camillo Cavour.[10]

In pursuing such a comparison, I believe it helps to define, amid the differences outlined here, a basic similarity in the description of the types of national feeling that supported the Union's victory in the American Civil War and Italian unification in the *Risorgimento* as, essentially, variants of an ideology I have termed "progressive nationalism." With this expression, I intend to indicate that, in both the American and Italian cases, in the actual process of nation-building, a core of nineteenth-century ideas related to the notion of progress—ideas that, as we have seen, connected together economic development and basic individual and civil liberties—played a crucial role in the political ideologies of the two national movements. Even though such ideas were interpreted somewhat differently in the American and Italian milieus, Lincoln and Cavour sought and succeeded to sweep away in both cases what stood in the way of their realization—slavery in one case, and foreign oppression and political fragmentation in the other—with the ultimate objective of creating what they considered to be a truly progressive nation.[11]

In the 1850s, the United States and Italy were profoundly divided societies in ideological and political terms. In both cases, a "national question" dominated the thoughts and actions of the most prominent intellectuals and politicians. In the United States, the divisive issue was slavery—an issue that effectively dominated the political life of the country, as a result of the controversy over slavery's possible expansion

in the western territories acquired with the 1846–48 Mexican War.[12] Consequently, in the United States, the "national question" focused on bringing together, as a true nation, the free north and the slave south, which until then had been joined in a loose confederation of states. In Italy, the "national question" was of a more immediate nature, since it involved at once the achievement of both national unification and national independence. In fact, due to Italy's prevailing political division in different dynastic states and to ongoing foreign oppression, the "national question" focused on bringing the country together by freeing it at the same time, and, starting from the 1830s, different views about the best way to achieve this aim confronted one another.[13] Arguably, Lincoln's and Cavour's views about the resolutions of the two "national questions" were tightly linked to the ideology of "progressive nationalism" that characterized both men's thoughts. In fact, their ideas stemmed, first and foremost, from the conviction of the benefits of economic progress, as noted in the previous chapter. At the same time, at their core, both men's views had an unwavering belief in individual liberty and political representation—a particularly important element in their nationalist political programs. As a consequence, even though operating in very different milieus, Lincoln's and Cavour's visions of how to achieve progressive nationhood provided similar answers to different, but comparable, sets of problems.[14]

By the mid-1850s, the two men were on their way to being acknowledged as the leading political statesmen of the United States and Italy. As they advanced in their political careers, they refined their political ideas preparing the background for the decisive political and military processes through which the two countries would have completed their ultimate transition to nationhood along the guidelines that they had set. Such guidelines were based on the adoption of two firm, but clearly "moderate" stands in regard to the two national questions: Lincoln's moderate antislavery unionism and Cavour's moderate liberal nationalism. Also, crucial to the achievement of their comparable aims of creating an economically progressive and politically free nation were Lincoln's and Cavour's involvements with two powerful moderate political organizations: the U.S. Republican Party and the Italian National Society. In both cases, both older and more recent scholarly studies have clarified how, for the national program to be successful, the moderate political organization needed to have a broad basis of consensus that included radical elements. In this sense, a comparison between Lincoln's instrumental role in maintaining a unified objective in the winning of the Civil War within the Republican Party, especially given the rise to prominence of the radical Republicans, and Cavour's

instrumental role in maintaining a unified objective in the creation of an Italian nation with both Moderate Liberals and Democrats within the National Society is particularly enlightening. Ultimately, both the Republican Party and the National Society succeeded in attracting nationwide support from coalitions of prevalently, but not exclusively, moderate political forces and in the end, their activities, under Lincoln's and Cavour's guidance, triggered the succession of events that led to the actual processes of nation-building through national unification in the United States and Italy.[15]

Lincoln's Progressive Nationalism to the 1860 Election

In that profoundly divided society that was the United States in the mid-nineteenth century,[16] Lincoln took a clear and unmistakable stand on the slavery issue first in reaction to the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, and then by joining the relatively newly formed Republican Party in 1856.[17] His move was, in many ways, a logical conclusion to the political path he had embarked upon since joining the Whig Party a quarter century earlier. Always convinced that slavery was wrong for both economic and moral reasons, as a northern Whig Lincoln had felt profoundly uncomfortable in belonging to a party that gathered so many large slaveholders from the South.[18] Yet, it was only when slavery proved such a powerful political issue that it threatened to break the unity of the nation in more than simply economic and social terms that Lincoln decided to join the Republican Party. In other words, Lincoln acted decisively on his deep-seated antislavery convictions only when slavery proved to be the real "national question" in America. Looking at Lincoln's changing stance on slavery in comparative perspective and through the lens of progressive nationalism helps to clarify how much antislavery and nation-building were actually linked in Lincoln's mind. This is not surprising, given that, as Peter Parish has noted, "the decades of Lincoln's public life, from the 1840s to the 1860s, were critical years in the construction of American nationhood," and those were the decades during which he elaborated his antislavery positions.[19] From the 1840s, nation-building in America was linked to territorial expansion, and therefore to the national question centering on the possible expansion of slavery, and, ultimately, on the very existence of slavery in the American Republic. Yet, as Eric Foner has recently remarked, it was the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, with Democrat Stephen Douglas's support for the doctrine of popular sovereignty, that brought the point home for Lincoln by making

slavery's expansion a pressing national issue, since "Douglas's willingness to see slavery spread, Lincoln declared, violated the core principles of American nationality."[20]

Two years later, Lincoln joined the Republican Party, which, in essence, was a broad political alliance of antislavery forces committed to halting the slaveholders' hegemony on federal governmental institutions and, thus, to preserving national unity avoiding the transformation of the United States into a purely slaveholding republic. Significantly, the issue related to the possibility that this much-dreaded transformation would actually materialize into what was commonly referred to as the "nationalization of slavery." Interestingly, despite his initial recognition that slavery had been recognized and protected by the U.S. Constitution as a "national institution," by 1858 Lincoln had manufactured a version of American history, which, according to Eric Foner, "in effect erased proslavery Americans from the nation's founding," since, in Lincoln's view, the Founding Fathers had attempted to place slavery on its course to extinction, and the Republicans followed in their footsteps.[21] In doing this, Lincoln constructed an immaculate antislavery pedigree for the antislavery nationalist politics pursued by the Republican Party—the one political force that effectively represented the tradition of resistance to the process of "nationalization of slavery" in the United States.[22]

Scholars have investigated at length the convergence, within the Republican Party, of the ideologies of republicanism, antislavery, and free labor. However, only a few historians—especially Peter Parish and James Oakes—have thought about this convergence as the core of a nationalist ideology.[23] In this sense, a transnational and transatlantic comparison with contemporaneous nationalist ideologies in Europe, such as the one that characterized Cavour's Moderate Liberals in Piedmont, shows how much in common the Republican Party's program had in terms of advocating a type of national progress based on economic advancement in conjunction with respect of basic civil liberties—the two pillars of progressive nationalism—which, in the 1850s United States, led inevitably to the Republicans' opposition to slavery and support of free labor.[24] In fact, as Don Fehrenbacher has argued, strictly speaking from the point of view of the federal government's attitude toward slavery, the Republican Party's program was nothing short of revolutionary, because of its advocacy of a dramatic reversal of a situation that had lasted for almost seventy years. This would be enough to describe such a program as one that sought to create the blueprints for a new conception of American nationhood.[25] The details of such conception, encapsulated in the famous motto

"Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men" are well-known, thanks to Eric Foner's studies, which have shown the convergence of ideas of economic and moral superiority of the free-labor system in the opposition to slavery.[26] It is not difficult to see how Lincoln would have completely subscribed to this view, given his conviction of the need to provide equal opportunities to everybody, and, above all, his absolute belief in the principles of freedom and equality of the Declaration of Independence as a foundation for the American nation. Therefore, Lincoln's deepest republican principles found their highest expression in the ideology of the Republican Party.[27] And yet, the Republican Party's ideology was very much part of a progressive nationalist view according to which, while republican principles were to be applied to the whole society, white and black, free labor was to become the normative labor system throughout the nation, as a consequence of the confinement of slavery and its eventual extinction.[28]

In his last speech as a Whig candidate for the senate, at Peoria, Illinois, in 1854, Lincoln exhorted Americans to halt the expansion of slavery by opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Act, showing that he was aware that his republican principles were akin to the liberal principles that pushed the rest of the world, and especially Europe, in the direction of progress. In a particularly revealing part of his speech, he said that "already the liberal party throughout the world expresses the apprehension 'that the one retrograde institution in America is undermining the principles of progress and fatally violating the noblest political system the world ever saw.'"[29] As Richard Carwardine has remarked, for the better part of a quarter of a century, from the 1840s to the Civil War, Lincoln thought that "the world's progressive forces looked to the United States as an unequalled example of liberty; that it was the nation's mission to act as the improver of mankind."[30] Therefore, to Lincoln, European liberal nationalism was akin to the type of republicanism that he embraced and that placed America at the forefront of a common, global struggle for national freedom against retrograde forces such as absolutism and slavery. A transnational and transatlantic perspective, by underscoring connections and comparisons between American republicanism and European liberal nationalism, shows clearly how the two ideologies participated in this global dimension as fundamental components of what was, essentially, a common project aiming at either fashioning or refashioning countries according to the basic tenets of progressive nationalist thought. It is impossible to understand Lincoln's progressive nationalism and his embracement of the nationalist principles of the Republican Party from 1856 onwards without referring to this

fundamental international dimension, according to which the United States were, for all intents and purposes, the nation entrusted to lead the world on the path to both progress and freedom.[31]

In 1858, as the Republican Party rose in influence in the United States, Lincoln ran again for the senate, this time after being chosen by the Illinois Republican convention as the opponent of Democrat Stephen Douglas.[32] In the subsequent Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln reiterated his views on liberty and republicanism, arguing that slavery was a threat not just to both, but also to the economic progress of the country.[33] Thus, Lincoln argued that slavery had to be halted in its expansion and asked his fellow Americans: "What is that we hold most dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever threatened our liberty and prosperity save and except this institution of slavery?"[34] Interestingly, as David Ericson has pointed out, in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln went so far as to compare slavery to royal absolutism, talking about "the struggle between 'the common rights of humanity' and 'the divine rights of kings.'"[35] This analogy would have easily connected, in the minds of educated listeners, Lincoln's antislavery position with the liberal nationalist movements that fought against Europe's absolute monarchies, and also with the liberal reforms of enlightened noblemen such as Cavour, who aimed at curbing the absolute power of the Piedmontese monarchy through constitutional means, while at the same time creating the basis for the foundation of a liberal Italian nation.[36] In practice, in the words of Richard Carwardine, "Lincoln viewed the European nationalist and revolutionary movements of the mid-nineteenth century . . . as part of 'the general cause of Republican liberty.'"[37] Therefore, Lincoln embarked on that path, which, by the time of the Civil War, would lead him to fuse together "the cause of Union with the cause of freedom, which is the equivalent to saying that he fused the cause of nationalism with the cause of liberalism," as David Potter had already claimed in 1968.[38]

As he emphasized the liberal elements of his republican principles, Lincoln engaged in the creation of a truly nationalist ideology, fashioned out of a combination of his own convictions and the main ideological tenets of the Republican Party. It was an ideology of progressive nationalism, one in which political and economic freedom and equality—the central elements of progress—were essential. And yet, to Lincoln, even the achievement of economic freedom and equality could not justify a radical stance on the "national question," and thus support for outright abolition of slavery, also so as to not alienate the majority's support. Here, Lincoln truly showed the moderate nature of his nationalist ideology—a moderate approach that

had several elements in common with that of contemporary European liberal nationalists, since in both cases it was a matter of not advancing political programs with radical changes at their core in order to maintain, as much as possible, the unity of the nation, or at least guarantee the broadest political support. Thus, even though in principle he embraced the idea of freedom for African Americans slaves, in his pragmatic approach Lincoln made the Republican Party's "moderate" program of opposition to the expansion of slavery, rather than its immediate abolition, the centerpiece of his national policy.[39]

To transform his pragmatic approach, based on such principles and policies, into a truly nationalist ideology, Lincoln emphasized his absolute commitment to the preservation of the Union, thereby applying progressive nationalism to a particular, contingent, historical juncture. Maintaining as his central objective the refashioning of the United States as a new Union according to the principles at the heart of progressive nationalism, Lincoln negotiated a difficult political path between extreme positions in such a way that his moderate approach was able to adapt successfully to changing circumstances to the point of supporting, during the Civil War, an ultimately revolutionary act such as slave emancipation. As Dorothy Ross has recently argued, "Lincoln's fervent support of both universal liberty and a particular historical nationality, his attachment to a fixed past and a progressive future, gave him free-soil views that straddled the political spectrum from abolitionist fervor against slavery to conservative Unionism."[40] In other words, Lincoln's faith in the crucial importance of the historical specificity of the nation that incarnated the universal principles he believed in was at the basis of his unwavering support for the preservation of the Union at all costs. And, as Gary Gallagher has noted, Lincoln's belief in the exceptionality of the Union as a nation that provided Americans with "a democratic beacon shining in a world dominated by aristocrats and monarchs" was shared by most northerners.[41] Lincoln's progressive nationalism, therefore, aimed at preserving the exceptionality of the American nation by maintaining intact the idea of the Union at a time in which the Union was drifting toward internal separation.

Thus, in the "House Divided Speech," delivered at Springfield, Illinois, during the 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas that preceded the Illinois Senate election, Lincoln famously asserted (borrowing the "house divided" image from the Gospel):

> "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half *slave* and half *free*. I do not expect

> the Union to be *dissolved*—I do not expect the house to *fall*—but I *do* expect it will cease to be divided. It will become *all* one thing, or *all* the other.[42]

Here—three years before the effective break-up of the Union in two different political institutions—were Lincoln's bold acknowledgment that the United States were divided in two halves beyond reconciliation, an affirmation of faith in the national principle, and a prediction that national unification was to succeed if conducted along "moderate" lines—that is, without forcing the issue one way or the other. In other words, Lincoln pointed the way to the resolution of America's "national question" by envisioning what can only be described as a future unification of the free and the slave parts of the country. In fact, as Eric Foner has noted, in the same speech, Lincoln warned about the "'tendency' toward the nationalization of slavery," and therefore he clarified his hope and belief in a national unification that would defeat this tendency by upholding antislavery principles.[43] Yet, in such a process of unification, faithful to his "moderate" politics, Lincoln did not plan to interfere decisively, if not to reaffirm his own personal and unconditional belief in the liberal principles of the Declaration of Independence that lay at the heart of America's national identity.[44] In reviewing Lincoln's achievements, J. David Greenstone has claimed in *The Lincoln Persuasion* that Lincoln successfully created a new type of liberalism, fusing two previous brands of liberalism—the one represented by humanist liberals, focused on individual preferences, and the one represented by reform liberals, focused on individual development.[45] Effectively, as a result, Lincoln's new version of liberalism not only became a fundamental part of his ideology of progressive nationalism, but also laid the foundation for the future political development of the post-Civil War United States.

In 1860, the Republican Party managed to gather the support of the majority of moderate antislavery advocates in the North and, after winning the presidential elections in November, Lincoln was inaugurated president in March 1861.[46] Soon after, the majority of the southern states created the Confederacy, seceding from the Union; Lincoln's response was, in the words of Robert Cook, "to equate Secession with treason and to regard the Union as an unbreakable whole."[47] The consequent Civil War that ensued, between Lincoln's Union and the Confederacy, lasting four long years until April 1865 and characterized by unexpected brutality and a great number of casualties, would, then, force Lincoln to partly transform his policy by yielding to abolitionist and radical pressures on the issue of emancipation; he

would still maintain his commitment, though, to an overall program of national unification of the American Republic according to moderate and liberal guidelines. Significantly, in the same year in which Lincoln gained the presidency of the United States for the Republican Party, liberal principles akin to the ones at the heart of Lincoln's republican beliefs were about to score an important victory in Europe with the creation of a liberal—though monarchical—Italian nation. Arguably, this outcome was, in large part, the crowning achievement of the great leadership qualities and political skills of moderate Piedmontese statesman Camillo Cavour.[48]

Cavour's "Progressive Nationalism" to 1859

Throughout the 1850s, Cavour was the driving force behind Piedmont's economic and political modernization. Faithful to his liberal principles, since his appointment as prime minister in 1852, he had sought the continuous support of a parliamentary majority, which he had reached through the alliance—the *connubio*—between deputies of the center-left and center-right. In practice, Cavour achieved this by making a personal agreement, as leader of the parliamentary Right, on the objectives of governmental policies with Urbano Rattazzi, the leader of the parliamentary Left. It is significant to read how, eighteen years later, Rattazzi recalled his and Cavour's objectives in the making of what he called "the new party" that arose from the *connubio*, or "the fusion of the two Center groups" in Piedmont's parliament:

> In home affairs, we would resist all reactionary tendencies that might threaten us after the recent *coup d'etat* in France [Napoleon III's 1851 creation of the second French Empire]. At the same time, in so far as circumstances permitted, we would promote a continuous and progressive development of the freedoms allowed by our constitution, alike in politics, economic and administration. As regards international affairs, we would prepare the way for Piedmont to liberate Italy from foreign rule.[49]

In practice, Cavour devised with Rattazzi a plan for guaranteeing the necessary parliamentary support for a program of economic and civic development that would make Piedmont the leading progressive government in Italy and would eventually lead to the creation, under Piedmontese leadership, of a progressive Italian nation, free from foreign domination. While placing the parliament at the center of Piedmontese political life, Cavour used its support to fend off

pressures from the King, the Catholic Church, and the conservative circles on one side, and the democratic and revolutionary agitators on the other side.[50] In doing this, Cavour managed to set the guidelines for the transformation of the relatively backward Piedmontese state into a model constitutional government acting according to liberal principles akin to the ones that set the tone for political life in more advanced countries such as England and, to a certain extent, the United States.[51]

In effect, though, in setting independent Piedmont as a model of constitutional government for the other nonindependent Italian states, Cavour succeeded primarily in the objective of linking the adoption of liberal institutions with the idea of Italy's liberation from foreign oppression—an idea that was central to his own particular understanding of progressive nationalism. In other words, Piedmont's independent status had spared Cavour's native state from both outright foreign occupation and military interference, mostly from Habsburg Austria, and had allowed the free development of a Piedmontese constitutional monarchy based on liberal principles; as a result of this, Cavour thought that the Piedmontese Kingdom of Sardinia could guide the movement for the liberation of other Italian states and at the same time provide a model of liberal political organization for the Italian nation as a whole.[52] It is important to notice that Cavour was particularly vocal in his belief of an indispensable and sequential link between national independence and progress; already in 1846, he had written that "without independence, Italy cannot hope for any durable political improvement or be confident of any real progress."[53] Compared to Cavour, other prominent members of the Piedmontese Parliament, such as Massimo D'Azeglio, prime minister from 1849 to 1852, were milder in their convictions. Often quoted on nation-building, D'Azeglio notably remarked that "the most dangerous enemies of Italy are not the Germans, they are the Italians . . . because . . . they remain the old Italians of before"; therefore, unlike Cavour, he did not believe that independence would automatically lead the country on the path to national progress, especially if this did not produce a real change of mind among the nations' citizens.[54]

In 1852, faithful to his words, as prime minister, Cavour engaged in a wide-ranging program to bring Piedmont precisely to that "durable political improvement" and to that "real progress," which, according to him, could only be reached through a combination of economic liberalism and parliamentary politics—effectively the two pillars of progressive nationalism. In Cavour's own words, "the virtues of citizenship, beneficial laws that protect all rights equally, and

the good political systems . . . are also the principal causes of economic growth."[55] Thus, Cavour was adamant that only constitutional reforms and economic progress joined together would allow a government to guarantee the citizens of a country the indispensable civil liberties—those liberties that, implicitly, could only characterize the social and political life of countries, such as the future Italian nation, that were independent.[56] In analyzing the bourgeois mindset that characterized the cultural and social milieu of Cavour's Piedmont, and which affected deeply Cavour's own views, Luciano Cafagna has pointed out the crucial importance of the two concepts of "cult of freedom" and "cult of progress." Both were fundamental in creating the premises for free and progressive action that could lead to either the expression of novel ideas through publishing activity, or through different types of economic initiatives, or else through the active participation in progressive politics. As Cafagna has noted, through his activities and career, Cavour showed how freedom and progress were inextricably linked together by engaging in all the three types of progressive action mentioned earlier.[57]

Similar to the way Lincoln invented a new type of liberalism that provided the American republic with the blueprint for its future political life, Cavour effectively set in motion the beginning of a long-term process, as these same liberal principles that were at the heart of his ideology of progressive nationalism were to become the ideological core of the future liberal ruling class of a unified Italy—a ruling class prevalently formed of large landowners, competent administrators, and skilled politicians, like Cavour, and of a similar northern Italian background.[58] In the words of Raffaele Romanelli, the post-1860 Italian Liberal was someone who "never yield[ed] to authoritarian temptations and always defend[ed] staunchly the constitutional system and the parliamentary prerogatives, and above all believe[ed] deeply in an idea of freedom which manifests itself in [free] economic enterprise . . . individualism . . . [and in] the civil coexistence of ideas and interests."[59] In fact, these points can be fruitfully compared to the U.S. Republicans' belief that, in Eric Foner's words, "the interests of labor and capital were identical" and to the Republicans' "faith in the harmony of interests and their commitment to economic progress and social mobility"—effectively, both of these were conservative tenets not dissimilar in content and practice from the ones held by Italian Liberals.[60]

In short, we can very well say that Cavour's initial efforts at reform in 1850s' Piedmont according to moderate liberal guidelines were an early attempt to implement the same ideas that were to characterize

the policy of post-1860 Italian Liberals by utilizing Piedmont as a laboratory for the type of economic, social, and political changes that were to be made in a future unified Italian nation.[61] Thus, supported by a majority in the Piedmontese parliament, Cavour proceeded to implement crucial changes aimed at centralizing the administration and rationalizing the bureaucracy of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and also, at the same time, at dismantling all the vestiges of absolutism by weakening the power of the Catholic Church in social and legal terms. To this end, while he was still minister of finance in D'Azeglio's government, Cavour provided a decisive support for the 1850 Siccardi Laws, put forward by Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs Giuseppe Siccardi, which abolished the ecclesiastical tribunal, the Church's legal impunity, the right of asylum in churches, and the inalienability of Church property. Given that the Catholic Church was a major supporter of conservatism, the passage of the Siccardi Laws was a major victory for the type of reformist politics that Cavour spearheaded. In arguing in favor of the law and in explaining its significance in expressing clearly the government's political principles, Cavour said "I believe that its effect is to prove to all the friends of progress that this [clarity of political intentions] can be obtained through our constitutional institutions."[62] Then, in 1854, after he became prime minister, Cavour proposed, with Rattazzi, a law that abolished all the religious orders with no clear social function such as education and caring for the sick, and expropriated the Church's monasteries in favor of the state. The 1855 Rattazzi Law eventually was passed by the Piedmontese Parliament, but not without a fierce opposition from the conservative Right, which almost led to the fall of Cavour's government during the so-called Calabiana Crisis, named for the senator who headed the conservatives in parliament.[63]

The reforms discussed here show clearly that, in Cavour's idea of progressive nationalism, the equation of freedom with economic and civil progress left no place for the illiberal authority of absolute kings and popes. And in Piedmont, earlier than in every other Italian state, the success of the struggle against the power of the Church—through the abolition of clerical privileges and the adoption of civil marriage and of state-controlled education—was to clear the way for the extension of liberal ideas not just to the social and political life, but to the very conduction of governmental affairs. In other words, by breaking the *Ancien Regime*'s strong alliance between church and monarchy—the latter still thought to exist by divine right—Cavour increased enormously the degree of liberty in Piedmont and, therefore, the chances of survival and success of its constitutional system based on

parliamentary representation.[64] Thanks to these reforms, unparalleled in the Italian states suffocated by Habsburg-led reaction and absolutist repression in the aftermath of the failed 1848 revolutions, Piedmont was able to attract the attention of increasing numbers of Italian nationalists who began to look at Cavour as the natural leader of a "moderate" program of unification along liberal lines.[65] This is particularly important in the context of the process of Italian national unification, especially when we think that a large number of the exiles who arrived in Piedmont after 1848 came from the southern Italian regions, and specifically Naples and Sicily, in the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. There, the revolutionary biennium 1848–49 had seen the failure of a major attempt to transform the absolutist Bourbon system into a constitutional monarchy, and the repression and persecution of liberal and democratic Italian nationalists that had followed had led to the displacement of many political refugees. Among them, particularly important in influencing public opinion were the southern Italian Moderate Liberals, and also several Democrats, who now looked at Cavour's Piedmont as the leading political and military force in the creation of a liberal Italian nation.[66]

By 1857, these groups of Italian nationalists had founded the Società Nazionale Italiana (Italian National Society), a political organization and patriotic movement committed precisely to such program.[67] As Stuart Woolf has written, "the National Society was self-consciously liberal . . . it looked to the educated middle classes—the industrialists, the traders, the landowners—rejecting both aristocratic claims to social privilege and the threat implicit in an appeal to the masses."[68] Therefore, the National Society was the actual political expression of the Piedmontese moderate liberal program, as Roberto Romani has described it in his recent analysis of 1850s Piedmontese political culture. According to Romani, "in the 1850s, the Piedmontese Moderate Liberals created a peculiar political culture, suited to the twofold task of strengthening representative institutions at home and justifying Piedmont's Italian mission"—that is, the creation of an Italian nation, primarily through the agency of the National Society, based on Piedmontese political institutions.[69] Even though Romani has emphasized the conservative character of the Moderate Liberals' program—showing, effectively, how their idea of progress and respect for natural laws went hand in hand with a suspicion of outright democracy—the truth is that Piedmontese monarchical constitutionalism and moderate liberalism were elements of a political system that was progressive by the standards of 1850s Italy. In fact, this was a political system that had in common with European liberal ideologies and also

with American republicanism the fundamental tenets of "progressive nationalism": guarantee of equal economic opportunities and respect for the basic civil liberties of the citizens of the nation.[70]

Thus, as representative of the Piedmontese moderate liberal ideological outlook, the National Society had a great deal in common with Cavour's progressive nationalist and moderate liberal ideas for Italian national unification. Cavour had expressed clearly these ideas in an 1855 speech to the Piedmontese parliament, in which he had argued that it was necessary "to prove to Europe that Italy has sufficient civic sense to govern herself freely and according to the law, and that she is in a condition to adopt the very best form of government."[71] This was a clear programmatic statement on the achievement of national independence, by way of unification, that showed a commitment both to the principle of self-determination and to the formation of that "very best form of government"—which, to Cavour, was a constitutional monarchy modeled after the Piedmontese one and based on parliamentary representation. It is no wonder that Giuseppe La Farina, the future leader of the National Society, had come in close contact with Cavour already since September 1856 to elaborate common plans of action. The alliance between the two was to play a crucial role in the achievement of Italian national unification along moderate liberal lines and under the guidance of constitutional monarchical Piedmont.[72]

As Lucy Riall has remarked, "the campaigns of the National Society, and especially those of its newspaper *Il Piccolo Corriere d'Italia* [which promoted Piedmontese leadership in national unification] . . . played a vital role in making nationalism respectable among the educated middle classes of Italy."[73] At the same time, Cavour's involvement with the National Society gave the association the effective status of main conduit for the ideas and strategies for a program of Italian national unification that was both progressive and moderate in its objectives. As a result, by 1859 the National Society had become the main vehicle of expression for the Moderate Liberals in northern and central Italy, while it was Cavour's main instrument of informal politics, especially through its campaign of recruitment of volunteers for the impending nationalist war to chase Habsburg Austria out of northern Italy.[74] Therefore, comparably to Lincoln's rising leadership in the Republican Party—which owed a great deal to Lincoln's ability to appeal, with his progressive and moderate antislavery approach to the American "national question," to diverse and somewhat opposite constituencies within the party—Cavour's rise in status among Italian nationalists through his collaboration with the National Society owed much to his leadership of Piedmont's Moderate Liberals,

whose progressive and moderate approach to Italy's "national question" appealed also to a diverse constituency of supporters of Italian national unification.[75]

Progressive Nationalism and the American and Italian "National Questions"

To be sure, the foundational elements of progressive nationalism in Lincoln's republican beliefs and in Cavour's liberal principles might now seem quite at odds, specifically because of the profoundly different milieus in which they expressed themselves. Born and raised in a relatively young American nation—one in which republican values set the tone for bold experiments in party politics and lively debates in Congress and within the public opinion—Lincoln had a view of liberty and its corollaries that relied heavily on the principles of freedom and equality set out in the Declaration of Independence. Though moderate by abolitionist standards, Lincoln's actual ideas on American society would have seemed far too radical to most European progressives. Instead, Cavour's upbringing in monarchical Piedmont at the peak of post-Napoleonic reaction and, at the same time, his contacts with freer countries in Europe gave him a view of liberty that was firmly based on the limitation of absolutist powers—that is, the King and the Church—and on the necessity of parliamentary representation. Already viewed as moderate by radical Democrats, his ideas on the future shape of the Italian nation would have been considered at the very least outmoded by American politicians.

Yet, an important element of comparison is the fact that Lincoln's and Cavour's different interpretations of the meaning of liberty were both at the heart of programs of national regeneration devised according to comparable ideologies of progressive nationalism, and through processes that involved the composition of sociopolitical fractures—fractures due, in the U.S. case, to the existence of slavery and its support or rejection and, in the Italian case, to administrative, political, and ideological fragmentation. Effectively, in both cases, the processes that Lincoln and Cavour masterminded resulted in the "unification" of divided sociopolitical elements with a victory of progressive ideas, a victory that led to both the extension of basic political and citizenship liberties and rights in the newly unified nations and also the integration of markets on a national scale. Nineteenth-century commentators were acutely aware of the parallelisms between the achievements of Lincoln and Cavour and of the fact that, even though operating in different countries, continents, and circumstances, they shared a clear

similarity in their basic beliefs. For example, in 1893, in England, a Tory MP said that "these great men [Lincoln and Cavour] will be famous for all time for the glorious work of unity and consolidation which they had achieved for their own nation and their own race."[76] And in 1898, an anonymous American journalist captured the essence of the similarity in beliefs, aims, and objectives between Lincoln and Cavour in an article entitled "Bismarck and His Work," published in the California newspaper *The San Francisco Call* in order to commemorate and comment on the death of the great Prussian statesman Baron Otto Von Bismarck.[77]

After summarizing briefly the life and deeds of Bismarck, the anonymous author of the article compared and contrasted the Prussian chancellor with Lincoln, Cavour, and Gladstone, finding that, unlike Bismarck:

> Lincoln, Cavour, and Gladstone were essentially men of our time. In no other age could any of them have achieved the work he performed in the way by which he actually accomplished it. They were constitutional statesmen. They guided rather than ruled the people. Their power was exerted more as an influence upon the popular mind than through courts and armies. They were educators of the masses, as it were, and took no step that did not have the sanction of the better, if not greater, part of the citizens of the countries whose affairs they administered. It was not so with Bismarck.[78]

Essentially, the reason the author of the article had for joining the names of Bismarck, Lincoln, Cavour, and Gladstone was that these were the names of the four dominant statesmen of the mid-nineteenth century in their respective countries. However, Bismarck's illiberal methods stood in stark contrast to the liberal beliefs of the other three. The author of the article does not explicitly refer to the role played by Lincoln and Cavour in the unification of the United States and Italy, respectively, at the time of the Civil War and the *Risorgimento*, but he still identifies correctly the essence of their liberal aims and achievements by stating unequivocally that, unlike Bismarck, "they were constitutional statesmen" and "educators of the masses," and that, effectively they both believed in the importance of the parliamentary system and in the citizens' representation in an elected government. This belief was, indeed, one of the two fundamental pillars, together with the focus on economic improvement, of both Lincoln's and Cavour's progressive nationalism, and the main idea that guided their efforts at achieving national unification in the United States and Italy along liberal lines.[79]

At the same time, it is equally important to notice that, in both Lincoln's and Cavour's cases, the processes of national unification along liberal lines they masterminded rested firmly on the commitment to "moderate" views of the resolutions of the American and Italian "national questions," whether the latter focused on slavery or on foreign oppression. Still, there are both similarities and differences in the roles that Lincoln and Cavour played in the actual politico-military processes that led to national unification in the United States and Italy. In light of the existence of comparable elements in the economic and political backgrounds, the problems that Lincoln faced in 1861 and that Cavour faced in 1859, when they embarked on their respective politico-military resolutions of America's and Italy's "national questions," and the actions that the two statesmen took, may seem broadly comparable. In both cases, the resolution of the "national question" involved decisive steps toward the consolidation of a divided country into a national unity through war and military conquest. Also in both cases, such action was the culmination of a long process of nation-building, a stage that contemplated the creation of a new national identity modeled after the principles of progressive nationalism and the liberal institutions of the polity—the Union in one case and Piedmont in the other—that had promoted national unification along progressive nationalist ideas. In this respect, following the intuitions of David Potter and of the recent historiography on transnational nineteenth-century U.S. history, we can clearly place the American Civil War in its Euro-American context, in connection and in comparison with contemporary experiments of consolidation of nations, such as Italy, in an age of diffused nation-building in both America and Europe.[80] At the same time, we also need to recognize that, within the range of nineteenth-century experiments in nation-building, Lincoln's United States and Cavour's Italy were particularly successful cases of the triumph of progressive nationalist principles and ideas, even though in two very different contexts.

Lincoln, the American Civil War, and the Nation's "New Birth of Freedom"

After Lincoln began his presidential term, on March 4, 1861, he began to act on his project for America's national unification along liberal principles and, as he did this, he reinterpreted its moderate features in a new light. Effectively, as Allen Guelzo has recently argued, the ensuing Civil War became for Lincoln "a test of the practical worth of liberalism—of whether ordinary people of any race were entitled

by nature to govern themselves and create their own government, and whether that government could be content with allowing those people to pursue their own self-interest and self-improvement," both of which were hindered by slavery.[81] After the Secession of the Confederacy, from the beginning of the war, in July 1861, all the way to its end in April 1865, Lincoln asked his countrymen's allegiance to a nation—the Union—that obeyed the liberal principles of progressive nationalism, since, as Melinda Lawson has noted, it was to be "strong and beneficent, bestowing economic well-being and guaranteeing liberty to its people."[82] Lincoln clarified his views of the meaning of the Civil War and of the support for the nation he was ready to fight for, and which effectively combined freedom and civic progress, in the July 4, 1861, Special Message to Congress:

> [The Civil War] is essentially a People's contest. On the side of the Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form, and substance of government, whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men—to lift artificial weights from all shoulders—to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all—to afford all an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.[83]

Thus, according to Nicholas and Peter Onuf, "the Union Lincoln would fight to preserve was . . . the *nation*—the single, united, free people—Jefferson and his fellow Revolutionaries supposedly had conceived and whose fundamental principles must never be compromised." For this reason, "the Civil War indeed proved to be a critical, defining moment in American national history."[84]

In Lincoln's definition of progressive nationalism—as in Cavour's idea of progressive nation-building—the national government's strong central authority was to be guarantor of the state's legitimacy and of the protection of the basic civil liberties. Yet, as Peter Parish has noted, as the Civil War progressed, Lincoln's nationalism became also increasingly "inclusive," as his changing attitude toward abolitionist and radical ideas on the role of African Americans in the national war for the Union demonstrates. Right from the very beginning of the Civil War, abolitionists and Radical Republicans had agitated for decisive Union measures to abolish slavery, while African American slaves had started fleeing to Union camps, especially in the areas bordering the Union lines. In turn, pressure from the Radical Republicans and the massive scale of the phenomenon of African American refugees led Congress to pass a First Confiscation Act in August 1861, which called for the seizure of all rebel property, including the

slaves. Then, in July 1862, a Second Confiscation Act stated that all the slaves of Confederate masters were to be considered free. Finally, in September 1862, after the Union's victory at Antietam, Lincoln drafted the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, whose final version became the official Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. The final version of the Emancipation Proclamation is the best example of Lincoln's changing attitude toward a more "inclusive" concept of nation along abolitionist and radical lines. The Proclamation not only freed slaves in the areas controlled by the Confederacy, but also went as far as stating that African Americans would be "received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service"—a first decisive step toward the black soldiers' engagement in full combat in a war that would see the enlistment of almost 200,000 of them.[85]

As Melinda Lawson has remarked, "with the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln's ideas about the role of race in American national identity began to change." As the first African American troops engaged in combat and proved their bravery and willingness to fight and die for the cause of the Union—the national cause—Lincoln became even more convinced of his move toward inclusiveness, suggesting, effectively that the black soldiers' "fidelity to the cause had earned them a place in the nation."[86] In fact, by providing a legal framework for black enlistment, Lincoln made the first crucial step toward recognition of African American citizenship rights, as several historians have remarked.[87] Thus, by 1863, after releasing the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln came gradually to believe that, given their willingness to fight for the ideals of the Declaration of Independence, African Americans were ready to be given citizenship rights in the new American nation in formation—a belief that would lead, eventually, to his late, but crucial support for the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which, on January 31, 1865, officially abolished slavery in the United States.[88] At the same time, though, in other respects Lincoln's approach to emancipation, while clear in regard to the necessity of transition to free wage labor, was also seriously limited by the fact that he never completely abandoned his initial plans for "colonization"—the idea of sending freed African Americans back to Africa—and also by his ambiguous attitude toward the issue of African American suffrage. As Steven Hahn has noted, Lincoln's view on the latter issue was of only "enfranchising 'the very intelligent' people of color, 'especially those who had fought gallantly in our ranks'," and even so he never made his idea public.[89]

At the same time, the necessities of war also forced Lincoln to adopt illiberal measures, such as especially the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*—which entitled imprisoned individuals to a speedy trial—in the South's border slave states loyal to the Union. In practice, as Mark Neely has explained, "Lincoln went to what many regarded as dangerous lengths in suspending traditional civil liberties mostly to make desertion and encouraging desertion more difficult." Yet, even though accused of tyranny by the Democrats in Congress, Lincoln was always convinced that he acted out of necessity, and even then within the framework of the Constitution. In a letter he wrote New York Democrat Erastus Corning in 1863, Lincoln clarified that the Confederacy's Secession was "a case of Rebellion . . . in fact, a clear, fragrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution," therefore—that is, that the writ of *habeas corpus* could be suspended only in case of rebellion or invasion—"specially applies to our present case."[90] Thus, as Neely has demonstrated, to Lincoln these were necessary measures he took to win the Civil War, so that the new American nation he envisioned could survive the ordeal and enjoy the full benefits of civil liberties afterwards.[91]

And, to be sure, even though much criticized for the illiberal measures he took, Lincoln continued to reaffirm the validity of the combination of nationalist and liberal principles that, to him, defined the essence of the Union's effort in unifying America in the Civil War. In particular, in the 1863 Gettysburg Address, Lincoln reminded his fellow Americans of how the Revolution had founded "a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," and he proclaimed solemnly how "this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom."[92] Significantly, according to Eric Foner, in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln "spoke of the nation five times and did not mention the Union at all. In this, the speech reflected the explosive growth of national consciousness that arose from the Civil War."[93] In fact, as Susan-Mary Grant has noted, "it was the nation that concerned [Lincoln], and he reminded his audience not only that the Founding Fathers had brought forth 'a new nation, conceived in Liberty . . .', but that men had given their lives to consecrate that nation and that proposition."[94] Therefore, in the Gettysburg Address, in envisioning the new progressive American nation that was to emerge consecrated by the sacrifice of the soldiers in the Civil War, Lincoln reaffirmed the validity of the liberal principles of the Declaration of Independence as its foundation and also—comparably to what Cavour did in Italy—he reiterated his interpretation of the struggle for national unification along liberal lines.[95]

Cavour, Italian National Unification, and Liberal Principles

By 1859, Cavour had consolidated his control of the National Society and had established an uneasy, yet fruitful, alliance with the democratic forces over the prospect of Italy's national unification. By then, Cavour had also made a crucial alliance with the French emperor Napoleon III in view of the imminent war between Piedmont and Austria, which Cavour masterminded as a major opportunity for Piedmont to create a Kingdom of Northern Italy, likely as a nucleus of a future Italian nation-state.[96] The National Society was crucial both in presenting the war in this sense, as a national crusade of liberation of northern Italy from foreign oppression, against the myopic view of a simple dynastic Piedmontese aggrandizement, and also in recruiting volunteers. Effectively, the war only lasted two months, but the few battles had very large casualties, and the tangible result was the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy, which was annexed to Piedmont, though not from the Veneto, which remained under Austrian control.[97] To clarify his view of the war and prevent possible misunderstandings, shortly after the war's conclusion, Cavour explained his objectives in a letter to D'Azeglio in which he wrote:

> the politics of the Cabinet in charge have always had a decisively national character; they did not have as a project the territorial aggrandizement of Piedmont, but, rather, the emancipation of Italy and the installment of established liberal institutions in the whole peninsula.[98]

As a first step in Cavour's plans, therefore, the 1859 Franco-Piedmontese War against Austria allowed the incorporation of Lombardy, whose importance was crucial because of its particularly advanced industrial economy, into the Piedmontese constitutional monarchy, and also, effectively, the spread of moderate liberal ideology and institutions in three-quarters of northern Italy.[99]

In April 1859, while the Franco-Piedmontese war was on, revolts occurred in Tuscany, where the people forced the Austrian grand duke to flee from Florence, and in Emilia-Romagna, where the papal government, heavily supported by Austrian troops, was forced to abandon the regional capital of Bologna. In both cases, Cavour had secretly helped the revolts with the decisive contribution of the National Society. As the old rulers left Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, Democrats either close to or affiliates of the National Society quickly established provisional liberal governments, and in March 1860

they were instrumental in organizing plebiscites that led to the two regions' annexation to Piedmont.[100] In May 1860, unexpectedly, even though sponsored by the National Society, the Democrats' leading figure, Giuseppe Garibaldi, took his one thousand Red Shirts (*I Mille*) to the conquest of Sicily from the Bourbon Kingdom, which he achieved in only two months, helped by the Sicilian revolt against Bourbon rule. Even though Garibaldi claimed to act in the name of the Piedmontese King Victor Emmanuel II, Cavour was suspicious of him and feared that the Democrats might hijack the project of Italian unification creating a republic, rather than the liberal constitutional monarchy he had in mind.[101] By September 1860, Garibaldi had entered Naples, after managing to conquer southern Italy and forcing Bourbon King Francis II to take refuge in the fortress of Gaeta. Cavour reacted quickly, sending Piedmontese troops to conquer the central Italian territories of Umbria and Marche, still under papal control, preventing the possibility of a democratic revolution taking over the entire peninsula, and effectively accelerating the process of Italian national unification under the Piedmontese constitutional monarchy and liberal Piedmontese institutions. Significantly, on August 29, Cavour had written his trusted secretary Costantino Nigra that "the crucial time has come. With God's help, Italy will be unified in three months."[102] On October 21, plebiscites held in the continental South and in Sicily resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of the annexation of the former Bourbon kingdom to Piedmont.[103]

On March 17, 1861, Victor Emmanuel II was proclaimed king of Italy. The entire Italian peninsula, with the sole exceptions of Venice and Rome, was now effectively unified under the Piedmontese constitutional monarchy, and Cavour's plan of extending Piedmontese liberal institutions to the other Italian regions could now proceed apace. Not surprisingly, the Italian kingdom's birth in 1861 ended Cavour's alliance with the Democrats, even though they had been the main supporters of the National Society, since the one common goal they had with Cavour's Moderate Liberals—national unification—had been achieved. At the same time, it is fair to say that, despite Cavour's progressive understanding and acting on the need to extend liberal institutions to the entire Italian peninsula, the principle of inclusiveness that was so strong in Lincoln's nationalism proved to be much weaker in Cavour's attitude toward the collectivity of the Italian people, especially in regard to his tormented relationship with southern Italy. In practice, Cavour could not help but think that the Italian south was inherently backward in comparison to the north. This idea came to him from the "conviction—in Giuseppe Galasso's words—that the

Mezzogiorno [southern Italy] was a region extremely rich in natural resources, which the centuries-old bad governments had mortified and reduced to the conditions in which it was in 1860."[104] The solution, for Cavour, was to bring to the backward south Piedmontese liberal institutions and administrative and economic modernization.[105]

To be sure, it would appear that, similarly to Lincoln, Cavour refused, for the most part, to compromise over his idea of progressive nationalism based on moderate liberal principles. Yet, also similarly to Lincoln, during the most difficult moments of the process of national unification, he was prepared to take equally illiberal measures in order to achieve the ultimate goal of creation of a nation-state along liberal lines. This is particularly clear in the way Cavour handled the plebiscites in southern Italy, which led to the regions' annexation to Piedmont. Even though he had claimed, in line with his liberal thought, that, like the plebiscites in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, the plebiscites in the *Mezzogiorno* should be free and manifest clearly the will of the people, by October 1860, weary of a possible negative response of the southern Italian people to the prospect of annexation, Cavour was prepared to use military force to guarantee a positive outcome, since national unification to him was not negotiable.[106] As he wrote King Victor Emmanuel II in December 1860, "the aim is clear, and not open to discussion: to impose unification on the weakest and most corrupt part of Italy [the south]. There is also little doubt about the means: ethical means, and if this is not enough, physical force."[107] Thus, in the name of the great overall plan of creating a progressive Italian nation-state with liberal institutions spread throughout the peninsula, Cavour was prepared to sacrifice at least some of his liberal principles—the same way Lincoln was prepared to sacrifice some of his own libertarian principles in order to keep the Union together and under a Republican government.

At unification's end, though, Cavour also reasserted his commitment to the liberal principles, and he showed this particularly through his staunch support of decentralization in the debates over the new Italian administrative system. Writing in January 1861, Cavour clarified that "the central power" was to be strong, "while yet allowing the regions and provinces to have a genuine *self-government*."[108] In his view, the Italian "Parliament will gather within itself the representatives of all the regions of Italy . . . it will be an instrument of harmony and union, not of *centralizing* tyranny."[109] With these words, Cavour expressed the substance of his idea of a progressive Italian nation, one in which the function of a strong central government was to be that of guarantor of the basic liberties, also at the administrative level. Even

though he was forced to abandon his plans for complete administrative autonomy of the southern regions as a result of widespread rural unrest in the *Mezzogiorno*'s countryside and the beginning of the long and costly civil war known as Great Brigandage, Cavour continued to support the idea of governmental autonomy—which, effectively, he had always advocated—for both cities and provinces throughout Italy.[110] In this sense, therefore, we can say that, both in Lincoln's Union and Cavour's Italy the liberal principles were to guide and inform the shape of the new unified nation and the relationship between the national government and the nation's citizens.[111]

Neither Abraham Lincoln nor Camillo Cavour lived to guide their newly unified nations in the first difficult years of their existence. Lincoln was murdered and died on April 15, 1865, while Cavour had already died of fever on June 6, 1861. Arguably, the liberal principles at the heart of Lincoln's and Cavour's concepts of "progressive nationalism" left very different legacies. Lincoln's "inclusive" vision of a United States in which both whites and blacks would have eventually enjoyed equal civil rights had a dramatic confirmation in the legal measures taken by the Radical Republican dominated Congress during the period of Congressional Reconstruction (1866–70). Conversely, Cavour's "exclusive" vision of the Italian nation—one that owed much to his inability to understand the particular conditions of the *Mezzogiorno*—acted, despite his actual words of caution, as an ideological background to the liberal Italian government's repression of the large-scale civil war and rebellion of southern peasants in the Great Brigandage (1861–65). Still, it is significant that both Lincoln and Cavour had advocated both firmness and leniency toward those who had been vanquished in the process of national unification—advice that, in both cases, fell on the deaf ears of their seemingly unprepared successors, with incalculable consequences for the subsequent histories of the two countries.[112]

Looking in a wider perspective, we can say that the comparison of Lincoln and Cavour as ideologues of a "progressive nationalism" that joined together economic progress and national extension of basic political and civil rights shows elements of an ethos shared by many progressive politicians in Europe and the Americas. In this respect, this particular comparison could widen its scope and analyze in a similar way the thought of other members of Lincoln's government and of the Republican Party, such as William H. Seward, and, on the other side, other Moderate Liberals who took part in Cavour's governments, such as Massimo D'Azeglio. Interestingly, both Seward and D'Azeglio were foremost diplomats in their own countries, and

therefore this particular comparison would shed a great deal of light on the international dimension of the progressive nationalist ideology best represented by Lincoln and Cavour.[113]

An equally important comparison would be one focusing on the relationship between Lincoln and the Radical Republicans and the relationship between Cavour and the Democrats—as both are studies in how moderate leadership dealt with more radical elements in the process of nation-building. In both cases, scholarship abounds on these two particular relationships in isolation, but the comparative perspective would help to understand how in Lincoln's case the Radical Republicans were increasingly instrumental in radicalizing Lincoln's view of slavery and in transforming the Civil War into a process of nation-building with emancipation at its core. In Cavour's case, the Democrats ended up co-opted by Cavour's Moderate Liberals in a plan that prioritized nation-building over the debate on the actual form of government the new nation would have. As a consequence, in reverse pattern, in the United States, Radical Republicans continued to exercise a large degree of influence in Congress even after the Civil War, especially at the time of Congressional Reconstruction, being at the forefront of the struggle to ensure the freed people equal civil rights. In Italy, instead, the Democrats remained a rather overlooked minority after national unification, and many of them opted to remain well outside the parliamentary life of the new nation as a way to maintain their radical beliefs.[114]

Looking for comparative perspectives beyond the United States and Italy, it is interesting to note that some scholars have taken Lincoln as a representative of a particular era in which liberal principles triumphed on a global scale. Therefore, the essays in the recent edited collection *The Global Lincoln* have shown how Lincoln has been considered an international icon representing the values of freedom and, effectively, progress, not just in the United States and Europe, but also in Asia and Latin America. The Latin American case is particularly enlightening, not just because liberalism was the dominant ideology among the nineteenth-century ruling elites in most of South America, but also because, as Nicola Miller has shown, Argentinian liberal statesman Domingo Sarmiento published a biography of Lincoln, shortly after the latter's death. Later on, as president (1868–74), Sarmiento effectively supported the implementation of a version of Lincoln's progressive nationalism in Argentina as a means to construct a strong, progressive, and centralized nation, capable of resisting centrifugal movements. Sarmiento famously expounded his own idea of progress and liberalism in relation to nation-building in his

novel *Facundo* (1845), in which he criticized the authoritarian politics of dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas. In this connection, it is worth noticing that, unlike the case of Lincoln, Cavour's place in the global context of nineteenth-century liberal nation-building has not yet been properly addressed by historians.[115]

Other scholars have, instead, focused on Lincoln's momentous achievement of slave emancipation in comparative perspective and have looked at the other contemporary, and equally momentous, achievement of serf emancipation in Russia. In this case, comparison has either looked at the dynamics, objectives, and ultimate results of the two legal provisions—a field of study pioneered by Peter Kolchin in several essays—or else, scholars have analyzed Lincoln in comparison with Czar Alexander II in studies more concerned with the parallels in style of leadership than in the ideologies that inspired the two statesmen, ideologies too different and far apart to be fruitfully compared. In this respect, the latter type of comparative study resembles the well-established comparison between Lincoln and Bismarck, which was popular in the nineteenth century, and the related comparison between the American Civil War and the wars for German unification—a comparison mostly attempted by military historians. Also in this case, in fact, the emphasis is on the style of leadership, and, in this particular case, on the commitment of both Lincoln and Bismarck to nation-building at whatever cost, including the one of implementing an earlier form of "total war" fought with a relatively advanced and deadly technology, and targeting, at least to a certain extent, civilians as well as armies in the field.[116]

However, while all these possible comparisons have the virtue of shedding light on previously little known aspects or themes related to Lincoln's influence and legacy as a liberal icon, or to the significance of the Emancipation Proclamation in an era of emancipations from unfree labor, or to Lincoln's style of leadership in an era of nation-building and advancements in technological warfare, none of these comparative investigations focus on the crucial Euro-American dimension of the main principles to which Lincoln subscribed as he envisioned the type of American nation he sought to fashion from the ashes of the Civil War. Those principles were at the basis of an ideology of progressive nationalism that Lincoln shared with contemporary and progressive European liberal statesmen and nation-builders, and first and foremost with Piedmontese Camillo Cavour, the mastermind behind the creation of a liberal Italian nation.[117]

Part III

Secession, Civil War, and Nation-Building in the United States and Italy

Chapter 5

The Specter of Confederate Secession in Early Post-Unification Italy

In the early days of June 1861, Count Camillo Cavour, the first prime minister of unified Italy, and former prime minister of the Piedmontese Kingdom of Sardinia, was on his deathbed with high fever. For the previous ten years, Cavour had been the driving political and diplomatic force behind the movement that had led to Italian national unification and that had resulted in the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in March 1861.[1] In those last days of his life, Cavour gave advice to his successors about maintaining the authority of the Italian government over the whole peninsula and not treating the population of southern Italy too harshly. The latter was the territory that Giuseppe Garibaldi had conquered in 1860, leading to the annexation of the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to the north-based Kingdom of Sardinia in the process of Italian national unification.[2] Cavour feared the possibility of an Italian civil war starting from the southern part of the country (or the *Mezzogiorno*) and in all likelihood reflected on the sequence of events that was unfolding in the United States. Significantly, he commented on the news of an imminent American Civil War in a somewhat pessimistic tone, noting that, "while the thrust to unification takes hold of Europe, America is about to divide itself."[3] Effectively, with this particular observation, Cavour compared and contrasted the seemingly opposite processes of national unification in Italy—which he optimistically saw as leading the way to other national unifications, such as the one that would take place in Germany only a

few years later—and national division in the United States, implicitly posing the question of whether the breakup of the Union could serve as a cautionary tale for Italy and for the future unified countries of Europe.

To be sure, by June 1861, Cavour had reason to believe that a civil war was about to start in the United States. The previous February, seven southern states had seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America, or the Confederacy. Considering this an act of treason, newly inaugurated President Abraham Lincoln had reinforced the federal garrison at Fort Sumter, in Charleston, leading to the first effective battle between the Union and the Confederacy, with a resounding victory by the latter on April 14, 1861. Soon after, four more southern states had broken away from the Union, completing the process of secession. In April, after the Battle of Fort Sumter, Lincoln had called for 75,000 volunteers, and in May he called for 42,000 more; Confederate President Jefferson Davis did the same, calling for 100,000 volunteers in March.[4] In June 1861, therefore, it was clear to external observers in Europe, including Cavour in Italy, that the Confederacy's secession from the Union was about to plunge the United States into a costly Civil War. Understandably, the reception of the news of secession and the imminent Civil War from America had different meanings for different European nations.[5] In particular, as Tiziano Bonazzi has noted, "in nations that had been just unified, such as Italy, or in nations still looking for ways to be unified, such as Germany, the aversion toward the [U.S.] southern states' secessionist movement was often a result of fear of anti-unification processes at home."[6] This was, thus, the case of post-Unification Italy in the summer of 1861, when the American Civil War began, leading Cavour and the political leaders who succeeded him to fear that a sequence of events resembling the ones that were occurring in the United States might also occur in a still fragile unified Italy.

Cavour died on June 6, 1861, but his words on leniency toward southern Italy and his observation on the coming of the Civil War in America had a clear echo in the events following his death. Cavour's successors applied the harshest possible policies to the southern Italian population, leading effectively to the five-year long civil war called the Great Brigandage, fought in 1861–65—contemporaneously with the American Civil War—between the Italian army, mostly made up of northerners and southerners who supported the Italian state, and guerrilla units made up of southern Italian peasants and decommissioned Bourbon soldiers.[7] Providing an interesting and unexplored counterpoint to the course of the American Civil War, which in the

first two years saw the Confederacy managing to maintain the independence acquired with secession, in 1861–62, the Italian government witnessed the greatest moment of risk for a possible secession of the southern Italian provinces, first as a result of the dynastic war waged by the deposed Bourbon dynasty against Italian rule in the *Mezzogiorno*, and then as a consequence of the actions of popular hero and democratic leader Giuseppe Garibaldi in his attempt to win over the southern Italian population to join him in the conquest of Rome. The Italian government eventually succeeded in averting the possibility of a secession of southern Italy, and therefore in preventing the Italian nation from following a similar fate to that of the United States in those same years, but at the cost of increasing the scale of its military effort and of imposing the state of siege and martial law in most of the south, with a consequent large number of casualties—a state of affairs that continued for the next three years, until 1865.[8]

1861: The Bourbon War against the Kingdom of Italy in an American Context

Effectively, by July 1861, both the United States and Italy were engaged in civil wars in which recognized legitimate governments—the Union and the Kingdom of Italy—stood against those who were classified as rebels—the Confederates and the brigands supported by the Bourbons. Similarly to the American Civil War, the southern Italian civil war began with a siege, when the fortress of Gaeta, near Naples, had fallen into the hands of the Piedmontese soldiers after 102 days of almost uninterrupted shelling, on February 14, 1861. In the siege, during which General Enrico Cialdini utilized more than 160,000 bombs, as Gigi Di Fiore has recently written, "the fortress of Gaeta became, in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the symbol of the not yet annihilated Kingdom of the Two Sicilies."[9] At the same time, the dignity and honor of the Bourbon soldiers provided a marked contrast to the brutality of the Piedmontese army, whose constant assault even prevented the nurses from taking care of the wounded. That event simultaneously defeated the last legitimate opposition to Italian unification, leading Bourbon King Francis II and his wife Maria Sofia to flee and take refuge in Rome under the protection of Pope Pius IX, and also paved the way for the start of a subsequent informal large-scale guerrilla warfare.[10] The latter was waged by Francis II through his support for the Great Brigandage and the coordination of the brigands' actions against the Italian government and army, with the help of former Bourbon soldiers and foreign military officers in the

hope of causing through a civil war the secession of the southern provinces from Italy and the restoration of the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Thus, whereas in the United States the Civil War was a direct consequence of the secession of the Confederacy from the Union, in Italy the southern Italian civil war—the Great Brigandage—was initially fought by pro-Bourbon supporters with the hope that it would lead to a secession of the *Mezzogiorno* from the Italian Kingdom.

When looking at the events in southern Italy keeping in mind the influence that events in the American Civil War might have had on Italian attitudes, it is important to briefly look at the parallels and connections between the United States and the newly formed Italian nation—a part of the history of this period that has been thoroughly studied by both American and Italian scholars. In general, despite the neutral attitude of American consuls and diplomatic *charges*—first and foremost, among them, John Daniel, who represented the United States government in the Kingdom of Sardinia's capital Turin from 1853 to 1860—for the entire duration of the process of Italian unification there was a clear sympathy both in the American public opinion and in the American government for the Italian cause, and this attitude at times led to interesting and unexpected parallels and comparisons between the American and Italian situations. Thus, in an article published on September 19, 1860 about Francis II's escape from Naples to the fortress of Gaeta, the U.S. Radical Republican newspaper *Chicago Press and Tribune* commented on "the escape to Gaeta of that young proslavery King of Naples, and the approach to Naples of the republican army with the antislavery Garibaldi at its command."[11] Interestingly, the terms "proslavery" and "antislavery" are not meant literally, but rather as if they were the equivalent of "reactionary" and "progressive" in both the American and the Italian contexts. This type of analogy and comparison emerged particularly clearly in the articles and editorials of the *New York Daily Tribune*, which was directed by Radical Republican Horace Greely and which sided wholeheartedly with the cause of Italian national unification, "using common terms—in Daniele Fiorentino's words—to the language of antislavery advocates: irrepressible conflict, emancipation," and others.[12] On March 1, 1861, reporting on the fall of the fortress of Gaeta, the *New York Times* claimed that it was "the last battle fought in Europe [with] the uncompromising despotism which yielded nothing in the cause of popular liberty," by which the author meant that the cause of Italian freedom had won against what was, effectively, perceived as Bourbon tyranny.[13] For its part, Lincoln's Union government did not pass up

any chance to acknowledge from the start the legitimacy of the Italian Kingdom, and with a letter dated April 13, 1861—the day before the fall of Fort Sumter and less than a month after the official creation of the Italian nation—Lincoln's Secretary of State William H. Seward explained to Italian Ambassador Giuseppe Bertinatti, who had been appointed by Cavour, that the United States recognized King Victor Emmanuel II as the legitimate King of Italy and his authority as "entirely in accordance with the wishes of the Italian people," even though Seward also insisted that the authority be exercised with "moderation and wisdom."[14]

The friendly relations between Lincoln's Union and Cavour's Italy were a logical consequence of the important foundations that Cavour himself had laid out in the preunification period, specifically when he had declared himself, as early as 1852, a convinced opponent of the U.S. South's extremists in the Democratic Party and of the latter's clear "support for slavery," and thus close to the antislavery Whigs who would later form the bulk of the Republican Party.[15] At the same time, Giuseppe Bertinatti, the diplomatic representative for the Kingdom of Sardinia in Washington, DC, was confirmed by Cavour as ambassador for the Kingdom of Italy in the United States in March 1861. From 1855 to 1861, Bertinatti was in constant contact with Cavour, and in 1861 he did not hesitate to write the prime minister that he considered Confederate secession an act of treason aimed at destroying the unity of the American nation, thus embracing Lincoln's stance on this. For his part, Cavour maintained a neutral position on the matter, but he also advised Bertinatti to convey the Italian government's sympathy to Lincoln's Union, thus informally supporting the latter and acknowledging it as the only legitimate government in the United States.[16] Thus, Cavour effectively made sure that, right at the very beginning of Italy's creation, Lincoln knew that the Italian ruling class was on the Union's side and against secession, even though privately he was somewhat pessimistic about the Union's survival through the impending American Civil War. Cavour's successors, then, followed in his footsteps, since, as Raimondo Luraghi has pointed out, "the ruling class that had guided the Risorgimento certainly did not feel, at the same time that the new [Italian] kingdom faced its first labored unification crisis, it could be in a position to support any secessionist attempt, wherever it came from."[17] This was especially the case of Bettino Ricasoli, Cavour's direct successor, not only because—similarly to Cavour—he was a staunch antislavery advocate, and therefore closer to Lincoln and the Union government, but also because, after Cavour's death, he was the first prime minister who had to face

the escalation of the crisis of the Great Brigandage in southern Italy, effectively a civil war with secession as a possible outcome.

Thus, in the words of Axel Körner, "when Baron Ricasoli, Cavour's successor as Italian prime minister, expressed his strong support for the constitutional authorities of the North [i.e., Lincoln's Union government], he did this also in the awareness of secessionist hopes among Papal and Southern legitimists of the Italian peninsula."[18] In other words, especially in 1861, the first year of the Great Brigandage, the activities of the supporters of the restoration of the Bourbon Kingdom—which they considered the "legitimate" one instead of the Italian government, and thus they called themselves "legitimists"—helped also by the Papal anti-Italian sentiment, created a situation that Ricasoli and the Italian ruling class, aware of the events in America, must have seen as possibly conducive to secession. In short, the parallels between the American and Italian situations were so self-evident that, for Ricasoli, taking a stand in favor of the American Union in the United States was the equivalent of taking a stand in favor of maintaining the unity of the Italian Kingdom in Italy. This is the reason for the description of Ricasoli's words that George Perkins Marsh, newly appointed diplomatic representative for the United States in Italy, made in a letter he sent Seward on June 17, 1861, shortly after Cavour's death and Ricasoli's installment as prime minister. In the letter, Perkins said that "[t]he tone of his [Ricasoli's] remarks leaves no room for doubt that his personal sympathies, as well as those of his Government, are entirely on the side of the President and constituted authorities of the Union in this great struggle," that is, in the impending American Civil War.[19] The analogy between the American and Italian situations would become even greater later on, as the Union faced its first major defeat against the Confederacy at the first battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861,[20] while, in the same period, the Italian government was forced to confront the full-scale rebellion of Bourbon soldiers and pro-Bourbon supporters as the Great Brigandage raged, especially in the region of Basilicata.

Throughout 1861, the Great Brigandage was a civil war whose main aim was to restore Bourbon King Francis II to his former throne, from which he had been deposed with the formation of the Italian Kingdom.[21] Several supporters of the Bourbons and opponents of the newly formed Italian nation and its constitutional monarchy came from abroad to help in the effort to overturn the outcome of Italian national unification and restore the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[22] Among those supporters of the Bourbons, the most famous and talented was Spanish officer José Borjés. A former commander

of Carlist forces in Spain, Borjés was an expert in guerrilla operations and the ideal candidate for the overall command of the pro-Bourbon forces, according to Francis II's advisers. On September 14, 1861, Borjés landed in Calabria, where he joined the legendary head of the largest of a number of peasant bands of brigands—Carmine Donatelli, called Crocco, the anointed leader of his 2,000 men. For most of the previous spring and summer, Crocco—who had previously served in the Bourbon army and had then fought for Garibaldi, until he had become disillusioned with Italy's treatment of its southern subjects—had effectively managed to gather a small army that included many decommissioned Bourbon soldiers. With that army, Crocco and his lieutenant Ninco Nanco had launched a large-scale guerrilla warfare in the central and northern region of Basilicata, focusing on the important town of Melfi, which he had captured and occupied by April 1861, aiming at overthrowing Italian rule in southern Italy.[23]

There is no doubt that Crocco and many other rebels had a genuine wish, at the start, to restore the Bourbon dynasty, but there is also no doubt that others, instead, received some kind of compensation simply for waging civil war against the Italian state. This was an aspect that was understood particularly well by retired English diplomat Peter Brown, who wrote as a freelance agent, reporting on the situation of southern Italy to John Russell, secretary of state in the British government headed by Lord Palmerston, from his residence in Castellamare di Stabia, near Naples. Writing to Russell on September 9, 1861, Brown noticed that the brigands "supporters of the Bourbons . . . take the Bourbon side because they are paid by the Bourbons . . . their fidelity to the Bourbons or any other cause depends solely on the profit they make by it."[24] Irrespectively from the tone and allegations, which are perhaps too cynical, it is undeniable that the link between the brigands' activities and the Bourbon war against the Kingdom of Italy was also one in which covert operations providing a great deal of funding by Francis II to the guerrilla activities played a large part. A few days after this letter, with the arrival of Borjés in Calabria, Crocco widened the scope of his guerrilla warfare, until he parted with Borjés, not wanting to move on the city of Potenza, the largest in the province. Left without an army, Borjés attempted to reach the Papal State, but was captured and shot by the Italian troops without a trial on December 8, 1861. Conversely, Crocco continued to lead the largest band of brigands in the region of Basilicata and continued to wage relentless guerrilla campaigns against contingents of Italian soldiers, moving as far as the neighboring areas of Principato

Citra, Capitanata, Terra di Bari, and Terra d'Otranto. Yet, there is little doubt that the death of Borjés was the episode that effectively signaled the end of a particularly intense phase of pro-Bourbon activities in southern Italy and the end of the most concrete possibility for Francis II to turn the Great Brigandage into a dynastic war for the secession of the *Mezzogiorno* and the recreation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[25]

For the duration of 1861, though, the scale of the phenomenon of pro-Bourbon activities continued to escalate and quickly became unmanageable for Ricasoli's and Cavour's successors in the Italian government. From the beginning, in order to fight the Bourbon guerrillas, the Italian army employed measures and tactics of retaliation in southern Italy that were meant to be effective in their brutality, specifically in order to provide an example of shocking punishment to the rebellious population and thus prevent the occurrence of further anti-Italian action. To illustrate this point, it is best to look at a particularly well-known episode. On the morning of August 14, 1861, Coronel Pier Eleonoro Negri and 400 soldiers of the Italian army reached the small village of Pontelandolfo in Campania, a region that was very close to Basilicata and to the area of Crocco's activities. The village of Pontelandolfo itself was in the middle of an area that was in a state of utter unrest, with a large display of pro-Bourbon activities, and one that had effectively rebelled against Italian authorities. Only a few days earlier, a band of anti-Italian brigands and Bourbon supporters from Pontelandolfo and the nearby village of Casalduni had assaulted a company of soldiers, leaving 45 dead on the ground. In retaliation, General Enrico Cialdini, now commander in chief of the Italian army in the *Mezzogiorno*, ordered Negri to burn Pontelandolfo and Casalduni to the ground.[26]

One of Negri's soldiers at Pontelandolfo, Carlo Margolfo, wrote "we entered the village, we immediately began shooting priests and men, whoever happened to be there, then the soldiers went on the rampage and finally we burned the entire village, inhabited by ca. 4,500 people."[27] In his September 9 letter to John Russell, British diplomat Peter Brown echoed Margolfo's account by saying that "in retaliation . . . troops of the line arrived at the Village, which they burned to the ground, and put to death every human being belonging to it on whom they could put their hands."[28] The number of people effectively killed in Pontelandolfo and Casalduni, several of whom burned alive in their houses, is still subject to debate, but it must have been at least of several hundred, if not more, according to Democrat Giuseppe Ferrari, who denounced the massacre in the

Italian Parliament soon after the event. More important, still, is the fact that the burning of Pontelandolfo and Casalduni is, perhaps, only the most famous among a number of similar episodes of retaliation and massacres that the Italian army committed against southern villages—what led to an exacerbation of the resentment of the southern Italian population against the Italian government and to an escalation of anti-Italian activities, even after the pro-Bourbon cause had mostly died out at the end of 1861.[29]

If it had succeeded, the coordination of pro-Bourbon activities with brigands' action against the Italian Kingdom could have used the state of civil war in those southern Italian provinces where the Great Brigandage was more intense to trigger a phenomenon similar to Confederate secession in the United States, with the consequent separation of southern Italy from the Italian nation. Former prime minister Massimo D'Azeglio captured perfectly the significance of the situation when he wrote confidentially to his friend Carlo Matteucci on August 2, 1861:

> we need sixty battalions to hold southern Italy down, and even they seem inadequate. What with brigands and non brigands, it is notorious that nobody wants us there . . . Our principles and our policy must be wrong. We must get the Neapolitans to tell us once and for all whether they want us there or not . . . we cannot preserve . . . hostility toward Italians who, while remaining Italians, reject union with us.[30]

In his perceptive and accurate analysis, D'Azeglio had seen how the protracting of civil war in southern Italy was a manifestation of the southern Italian population's sentiment of rejection of the union with the Italian Kingdom. Only a few months later, as Francesco Barbagallo has recently noted, "in November 1861, in a speech given at the House, Democrat Giuseppe Ferrari talked of 'civil war'" openly for the first time while referring to the events in the *Mezzogiorno*.[31] While D'Azeglio, and also presumably Ferrari, thought that the best possible solution was to let southern Italians free to decide whether to be part of Italy or not, Prime Minister Ricasoli, following the tradition inaugurated by Cavour, adopted essentially the same approach that Lincoln took in regard to Confederate secession in America, and considered the preservation of Italian unity as crucial as Lincoln considered the preservation of the American Union. While perhaps noble in principle, though, this approach led to an exacerbation of conflict in southern Italy, with the deployment of an increasing number of Italian troops—about which D'Azeglio vividly complained—to fight

the Great Brigandage" which, even with a weaker link to the Bourbon cause after 1861, continued to conjure images of a possible secession of southern Italy throughout the next two years.

1862–63: Secession Averted in Southern Italy

In the summer of 1862, the American Civil War and southern Italy's Great Brigandage were well into their first year; by then, in both cases, the response of the legitimate government—the Union in one case and the Italian monarchy in the other—to the national crisis had led to a rapid escalation in the deployment of men and resources, though in different ways and degrees. Regardless, the Union government seemed no more able to subdue the Confederacy in the U.S. South than the Italian government was able to subdue the brigand and pro-Bourbon activity in southern Italy, and the two civil wars continued, with no end in sight for either conflict. In the United States, despite some important victories—notably at the Battle of Shiloh on April 6–7, 1862—the Union's war record showed clearly the inability to end the Confederate rebellion, especially after the failure of George McClellan to capture Richmond in the Peninsula Campaign (March–July 1862). Thus, in the summer of 1862, after more than a year of hostilities, not only was the Confederacy still independent, but it also seemed that Lincoln's government and armies were not able to reverse the results of Confederate secession. The first important change in this situation occurred with the major Union victory at Antietam, on September 17, 1862, by all accounts a turning point in the conflict and one that led to Lincoln's release of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, in which he announced that slaves in the Confederate areas would be considered free by January 1, 1863. And on that date Lincoln released the final version of the Emancipation Proclamation.[32] The significance of this momentous sequence of events in the United States was not lost either on the Italian public opinion or on the Italian government, at the head of which three different prime ministers—Urbano Rattazzi, Luigi Carlo Farini, and Marco Minghetti, all from Cavour's parliamentary Right—succeeded Ricasoli with little success in confronting the situation of emergency in the *Mezzogiorno*.[33] To all of them, and to the Democrats who were members of the oppositional Left, the parallels between the American Civil War and the civil war that raged in southern Italy were becoming clearer and clearer as the anti-Italian guerrilla warfare of the Great Brigandage neared its zenith.

From the beginning of 1862, with the death of Borjés, there was effectively less of a concrete possibility to restore Francis II and the Bourbons in Naples. Yet, pro-Bourbon activists continued to stage conspiracies and attempts to overthrow Italian rule in southern Italy for the best part of the next two years, even though with less and less success. In the winter of 1861–62, ex-Bourbon general Giuseppe Statella convinced Rafael Tristany, a Spanish officer following in the footsteps of Borjés, to take leadership of the guerrilla warfare that peasants and ex-Bourbon soldiers were fighting on the border between the Papal State and the southern provinces of the Italian Kingdom. In the Abruzzi, where he established his headquarters, Tristany succeeded in putting together a large band of some 3,000 men with whom he planned to move into southern Italy. But the death of Statella in November 1862 caused the disruption of the plan and, later on, Tristany himself was arrested.[34] In mid-1863, though, the danger of a possible conspiracy leading to anti-Italian action by pro-Bourbon supporters was real enough to alarm James Hudson, British ambassador in Turin. On May 5, 1863, in fact, Hudson reported to John Russell that "Francesco II [i.e., Francis II] . . . is preparing with Bosco [i.e., Ferdinando Bosco, another important ex Bourbon general] an expedition against Italy, the headquarters of the force being Corfu, where . . . Francesco's agents have been hatching this plot."[35] Presumably, the idea behind the plot was for Bosco to move from the Greek island of Corfu, facing Apulia, into the *Mezzogiorno* in the name of Francis II and stir the local peasants into creating a large anti-Italian and pro-Bourbon popular movement led by the brigand bands, in which a certain number of ex-Bourbon soldiers were still present; however, the prospect of a restoration of Francis II seemed less and less realistic with the passing of time, and therefore this plot, even more than the previous ones, never really had a chance to succeed.

While pro-Bourbon action against the Italian Kingdom clearly became less of a real threat in the period leading to the early months of 1863, in the summer of 1862 activities against the Italian monarchical government had entered a new and even more dangerous phase with the attempt by Giuseppe Garibaldi to unite the people and the democratic forces in the *Mezzogiorno* toward the conquest of Rome. This event ultimately prompted the Italian parliament to proclaim a state of siege in the south in an attempt to avoid a secession of southern Italy from the Italian Kingdom and a consequent situation similar to the one of the American Civil War in the United States. Interestingly, the previous year, Garibaldi had been contacted by American diplomat Henry Shelton Sanford on behalf of Lincoln's Secretary of

State William H. Seward, with the offer of a high officer commission in the Union army. The episode—thoroughly researched by several Italian and American scholars, most recently by Don Doyle—did not lead to anything concrete because of Garibaldi's ultimate decline, but it is symptomatic of the continuous sympathy and convergence of views between Lincoln's Union government and unified Italy.[36] Seen in this perspective, the fact that, a year after he was approached by the Union to fight against secession in America, Garibaldi ran the risk of becoming a catalyst of secession in southern Italy would seem contradictory. Yet, the reason lies in the fact that, even though clearly comparable, the American Civil War and the southern Italian civil war had some profound differences related specifically to the processes of nation-building. In America, many of the most radical voices—several of whom were abolitionists—had either joined the Republican Party as Radical Republicans or somewhat supported Lincoln's antislavery Union government, but in Italy the Moderate Liberals had hijacked the project of national unification with the creation of a constitutional monarchy guided by the Right and including only those Democrats who were members of the parliamentary Left. This, consequently, excluded the most radical elements among the Democrats (i.e., those who wanted an Italian republic) from the politics of the Italian national government.[37]

Effectively, in southern Italy, the Democrats were a political force whose revolutionary tradition stretched back to the 1830s and had produced notable examples of radical thinkers and activists partly inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini, from Benedetto Musolino to Carlo Pisacane, both of whom had gone as far as proposing socialist reforms that included land redistribution among the peasants.[38] Thus, as Piero Bevilacqua has written, "the democratic elites . . . [were] in the *Mezzogiorno* the only forces with some legitimate tie with the popular strata."[39] Despite his ties to the Italian monarchy, Garibaldi was very much part of the Democrats' tradition, rather than the political tradition represented by the Right governments in Turin. In the spring of 1862, the radical elements of the Democratic Party founded the *Associazione emancipatrice italiana* (Italian Emancipationist Society), whose official aim was to complete Italian national unification with the conquest and annexation of Venice from Austria and Rome from the Pope; yet, at least in the mind of radicals such as Mazzini, the ultimate aim of the association was that of restoring the Democratic Party's leading role in Italian nation-building and creating an Italian democratic republic. In July 1862, though, Garibaldi, determined to march on Rome, went to Sicily—against Mazzini's advice to start

with the conquest of Venice—and, after gathering 3,000 volunteers, moved to the continental part of the *Mezzogiorno*, landing in Calabria in August 1862. Even though Garibaldi's plan was to repeat the exploits of 1860, gathering volunteers along the way and then marching toward the Papal State, the truth is that, with Garibaldi's expedition, the Democrats had their last chance to garner the support of the majority of the southern Italian population and take on the political leadership of a large-scale popular movement—a movement that, when combined with the activities of the brigands' bands in fighting a civil war against the Italian government, could have led to a possible secession of southern Italy from the Italian Kingdom.[40]

All too aware of this potentially explosive situation for the escalation of the southern Italian civil war were the local authorities, such as the deputy prefect of the village of Nicastro, where Garibaldi was about to pass in that August of 1862; the deputy prefect wrote that "if Garibaldi's volunteers managed to reach the continent, a general and simultaneous movement would occur here and it would be very difficult to arrest it."[41] External observers also commented on the situation with increasing weariness. On August 9, 1862, James Hudson wrote to John Russell, "why Garibaldi would create a civil war in Sicily . . . is a policy which I am wholly unable to appreciate."[42] Also, for his part, Hungarian patriot Giorgio Klapca wrote an open letter to Garibaldi on August 23, 1862, in which he exhorted very clearly the general to "keep away from [Italy] all these threats of civil war that scare the good citizens."[43] Naturally, particularly aware of the implications of Garibaldi's actions, and weary of the challenge that, effectively, Garibaldi, launched to Emperor Napoleon III's French troops, which defended Rome and the Pope, was the Italian government, which acted swiftly, declaring the state of siege in the *Mezzogiorno* and giving carte blanche to General Alfonso La Marmora—who had succeeded Cialdini as commander in chief of the Italian army in southern Italy in the autumn of the previous year—to restore law and order. On August 29, La Marmora sent a detachment of soldiers led by Colonel Emilio Pallavicini to intercept Garibaldi and his volunteers shortly after they landed in Calabria. In the mountains of Aspromonte, Pallavicini halted Garibaldi, famously wounding him in the leg, and at the cost of twelve dead and fourteen wounded on the two sides.[44] Effectively, the episode was symptomatic of the civil war that raged all over southern Italy at the time of the Great Brigandage, since it saw, in similar fashion, Italians fighting against Italians, even though in a somewhat different context. Yet, Pallavicini's action succeeded in preempting the possibility that the Democrats' revolutionary leadership

could guide the massive peasant revolt of the brigands' bands against the Italian monarchical government and, therefore, also the possibility of southern Italy's secession with a consequent scenario of a civil war between two politically divided parts of the country similar to the one in America.[45]

Both the state of emergency due to the widespread phenomenon of the Great Brigandage—with its tenuous, but still dangerous, connections to the pro-Bourbon factions aiming at restoring Francis II—and also the Garibaldi expedition to Aspromonte and the popular unrest that accompanied it, provided the excuses that the Italian government sought to further centralize the administration of the southern provinces and install a harsher military regime in the *Mezzogiorno*.[46] Already in November 1861, southern Italy lost every semblance of administrative autonomy with the abolition of the Lieutenancy of Naples, by which provision—in the words of Salvatore Lupo—"the continental *Mezzogiorno* was inserted into the mechanism of customary administration, on a chain of command that went from the Minister of Internal Affairs in Turin to the prefects who resided in the provincial capitals" of the southern regions.[47] At the head of the administrative system, Ricasoli had placed as prefect of Naples General Alfonso La Marmora; thus, from then on, southern Italy would be governed directly from Turin and would be ruled, effectively, by representatives of the Italian army. In this situation, it was certainly easier for both the Italian government and the Italian army to begin implementing extraordinary and illiberal military measures, especially in those southern Italian provinces that the official decrees declared in a "state of brigandage" (*stato di brigantaggio*), by which what was really meant was a state of treasonous revolt against Italian authority.[48] The fruits of this policy were seen with the progressive and swift enlargement of the area declared in a state of revolt and the consequent justification for the enforcement of the state of siege—a policy that was wholly antithetic to Cavour's ideas for governing southern Italy. In fact, only a few months before his death, Cavour had cautioned the Italian government with these words: "we will not change Neapolitans by insulting them . . . no state of siege, none of these measures that absolute governments use. Everybody can rule [a country] with the state of siege. I will rule [the Neapolitans] keeping their liberties . . . no, no state of siege, I warn you."[49] Yet, Cavour's successors, from Ricasoli to Rattazzi to Farini, seem to have had few qualms or reservations about letting the Italian army enforce military rule, and eventually implement the state of siege in large areas of the *Mezzogiorno*.

Even before the official implementation of the state of siege, though, the local military authorities of some Italian regions had enforced harsh laws that violated civil liberties.[50] Thus, according to Franco Molfese, the military commanders of Teramo, in the Abruzzi, and of the Gargano and of Lucera, in Apulia, "published, between 1861 and 1862, draconian orders that practically prescribed the firing squad for anybody who transgressed a plethora of laws," which effectively prevented the majority of the population there from conducting their daily existence.[51] And yet, a large part of the public opinion, especially abroad, clearly believed that the Italian army should take control of the situation, no matter the cost in terms of civil liberties, in order to defeat anti-Italian and brigand activities. This is clear, for example, in a confidential "Report upon the state of brigandage in the Provinces of the Abruzzi and Capitanata," written by British diplomat L. Oliphant on April 19, 1862 and sent to John Russell; after having described the difficult task that the Italian army faced especially in Capitanata, in Apulia, where General Teobaldo Franzini confronted one of the areas with the largest concentrations of brigands' activities, Oliphant stated clearly that "under these circumstances, the Government has two alternatives: either establish martial law . . . or . . . send reinforcements to the troops."[52] Either way, the solution envisioned entailed the further extension of military powers, and this was exactly what happened only a short time later, when, in the summer of 1862, as Garibaldi made his way to Aspromonte, Prime Minister Rattazzi declared the state of siege in the *Mezzogiorno*, which was then placed under martial law. The Italian army thus legally replaced the civil authority in large areas of southern Italy, leading to countless requisitions, arrests, and public executions of suspect brigands and civilians suspected to help them in their anti-Italian activities.[53] Ultimately, this regime of terror installed by the Italian army in southern Italy through the state of siege combined with the increasing support of larger sections of the southern Italian population for the Italian state. These two factors were responsible for the beginning of the end of the Great Brigandage.[54] Likely, this was also the ultimate reason why, despite the continued state of civil war in the *Mezzogiorno*, no more serious threats of a possible secession of the southern Italian provinces from the Italian Kingdom occurred.

Interestingly, as the newly established Italian Kingdom was threatened by the raging civil war and by the possibility of secession of southern Italy, Lincoln's Union government did not overlook the opportunity to reaffirm its support for the Italian government against all attempts by brigands' bands and by revolutionary Democrats to

overthrow Italian authority in the *Mezzogiorno*, as a letter sent by Seward to Marsh in September 1862, shortly after both Aspromonte and Antietam and the release of Lincoln's Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, clearly attests. In the letter, Seward informed Marsh that "the President [Lincoln] has not recognized at all the insurrectionary movements which have recently occurred in Italy . . . we know there only the Government, the authorities and the flag of the Kingdom of Italy."[55] Anthony Shugaar has noticed that, in the same letter, "the term 'insurgents' was used twice in the letter, once for the Italian brigands fighting to restore the Bourbon monarchy, and once for the Confederate troops fighting the Union."[56] Thus, Seward effectively made a comparison, likely thinking along similar lines as Ricasoli and Rattazzi, between the Italian Kingdom's struggle against Bourbon reactionary forces and the Union's struggle against the Confederate armies. From both the American and Italian diplomats' points of view, the two struggles saw two legitimate nations—the United States and Italy—in comparable difficulties because of the civil wars that they were fighting against illegitimate and treasonous enemies.

Yet, there was more to the comparison between the American and southern Italian civil wars, since, even though Seward did not state it clearly, the connection between the two legitimate struggles against illegitimate threats also led to the justification of the Union government's and the Italian monarchy's extraordinary and illiberal measures in defeating their enemies—the Confederates and the pro-Bourbon brigands—guilty of treason. In fact, it is important to remember that, in the same years in which the Italian government enforced the state of siege in southern Italy, violating civil liberties for the sake of ending the civil war caused by the Great Brigandage, in America Lincoln's Union government also adopted illiberal measures in the American South's border states, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The border states were the five southern slave states that were loyal to the Union and that ran the risk of seceding and joining the Confederacy, thus upsetting the balance of power in favor of the latter. Clearly, Lincoln could not afford to allow this to happen, and therefore he adopted illiberal measures to keep possible Confederate sympathizers under control, mostly by implementing mass arrests without trials, and was harshly criticized as a tyrant by the Congressional opposition.[57] This was similar, to a certain extent, to the way the Right-led governments were charged of being authoritarian by the Left parliamentary opposition in Italy. The comparison between the Union and the Italian governments' adoptions of illiberal measures thus assumes particular significance when we think that, effectively, both related to ways of

preventing the possibility of secession where it had not yet happened, in one case in the Union's border states of the American South, and in the other case in vast areas of Italy's continental *Mezzogiorno*.

In sum, in the period 1861–63, both the United States and Italy were engaged in costly civil wars, even though of different scale and significance. The fact that nineteenth-century sources such as the writings of William H. Seward and George Perkins Marsh, on one hand, and those of Giuseppe Bertinatti and Count Cavour, on the other, seem to have hinted at possible comparisons between the American Civil War and the southern Italian civil war should alert us to the fact that important government officials in the United States and Italy were aware of the parallels between the two struggles. Those parallels focused on the reciprocal recognition of two legitimate national governments—the Union and the Kingdom of Italy—fighting against illegitimate enemies—the Confederacy and the pro-Bourbon "brigands." Yet, an important difference was that in the United States, Confederate secession had already occurred and had led to the Union's reaction and the start of the American Civil War, while in early post-Unification Italy, civil war raged as the Great Brigandage spiraled out of control, and this led to a possible threat of secession of southern Italy from the rest of the country. It is in this parallel context—of fear of a situation similar to the contemporaneous American one, with an Italian Kingdom politically divided after the possible secession of the *Mezzogiorno*, and two separate entities engaged in warfare—that we should view the attempts to restore Francis II by supporters of the Bourbon monarchy in 1861–62 and the attempted rallying of the southern Italian masses and democratic forces around Garibaldi in the summer of 1862. It is also from this perspective that we should observe the consequent reaction of the Italian government as an attempt to prevent what amounted, effectively, to two serious threats of secession of the *Mezzogiorno* from the rest of the country occurring in the midst of an already long and costly civil war.

It is not too much a stretch of the imagination to think that awareness and fear of the possibility a southern Italian secession led Ricasoli, Rattazzi, and Farini to adopt increasingly harsh measures in confronting the situation of emergency in the *Mezzogiorno*. Remarkably, in those same years in which the Italian government, pressed by the large-scale guerrilla warfare waged by the brigands' bands against the Italian army and the possible revolutionary insurrection accompanying Garibaldi's march to Aspromonte, enforced the state of siege in southern Italy, in the American Civil War Lincoln's government enforced illiberal measures and suspended civil liberties in the American South's

border states loyal to the Union. This was no mere coincidence, since, in both cases, the threat related to the overthrowing of the authority of the legitimate national government—i.e., the Italian Kingdom in southern Italy and the Union in the American South's border states—with the consequent possibility of their outright secession from the rest of the country. Significantly, as a result, in both cases, the illiberal measures continued to be in force for the entire duration of the civil war. In America, Lincoln's suspension of civil liberties in the American South's border states lasted until the surrender and final defeat of the Confederacy, while in southern Italy, from August 1863 to the end of 1865, a new harsher legislative provision—the *Pica Law*—imposed martial rule throughout the *Mezzogiorno*, leading to the defeat of the Great Brigandage, but at the cost of an even more brutal regime of military terror against both the "insurgent" combatants and the civilian population of southern Italy.[58]

Chapter 6

Inner Civil Wars in the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, 1861–1865

In the previous chapter, we looked at one of two possible ways to compare the American Civil War and southern Italy's Great Brigandage, the civil war that followed Italian national unification—namely, through the emphasis on the north-south divide and the related idea of a secession of the southern part of the country from the national polity based in the north. The comparative perspective in Chapter 5 worked mainly from the northern point of view, and therefore the policies of northern statesmen—Lincoln and the Republicans in the United States and Cavour and his successors in the parliamentary Right in Italy—were the focus of the study, with important additional elements represented by significant transnational connections between American and Italian politicians and by the presence of British observers. In this chapter I focus primarily on the southern regions and emphasize the specific nature of the "inner civil wars" within the Confederacy and the *Mezzogiorno*.[1] In this chapter, the comparative perspective will serve to highlight both the similarities and the differences between the civil wars as internecine struggles that, for different reasons and on different scales, pitched southerners against southerners in the two regions in the period 1861–65.

In establishing the grounds for this second type of comparison, it is important to acknowledge the convergence of two crucial elements in both the Confederacy's experience and the *Mezzogiorno*'s experience of inner civil war during this five-year period. The first element is represented by the struggle between two opposing types of

nationalism, a struggle that, ultimately, was part of a parallel process of national consolidation in the United States and Italy within the wider context of nation-building efforts in the nineteenth-century Euro-American world and beyond, as noted in the Introduction. Thus, while in America, southern supporters of Confederate and Unionist nationalisms fought against each other, in the *Mezzogiorno* southern supporters of Bourbon and Italian nationalisms faced each other in a comparable way. This particular point ties in with arguments put forward by recent studies written by scholars such as Don Doyle, Enrico Dal Lago, Timothy Roberts, Paul Quigley, and André Fleche. These studies have sought to demonstrate, through the comparability of nineteenth-century American history and historiography, the potential for a novel appreciation for issues related to the formation of the U.S. nation-state and of different European nation-states in the Civil War era, focusing particularly on the recognition and analysis of conflicting ideas of nation-building.[2]

The first element of my comparative study in this chapter—the recognition of the existence of conflicting ideas of nation-building—relates specifically to two parallel and continuously growing scholarships on the nature of Confederate nationalism in the Civil War South and of Italian nationalism in post-unification Italy. Stimulated by the idea of nations as modern and artificial social and cultural constructions, both these scholarships have progressively reached a sophisticated understanding of the differences between the images represented by the constructed features of Confederate and Italian nationalisms and the realities of competing interests and views that different historical actors associated to the actual building of nationality on the ground.[3] Thus, the opposing nationalisms whose supporters faced each other on the battlefields in the Confederate South during the American Civil War and in the *Mezzogiorno* at the time of the Great Brigandage were a reflection of opposing and competing interests at the local and regional levels.[4] In one case, both race and class differences, and in the other case just class differences were pervasive within these interest groups.

The second element of my comparison relates to the fact that in both the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the inner civil war had an enormous impact on the dimension of rural labor and on social relations in the countryside. In the Confederacy, the slaves were instrumental in taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the American Civil War for the shattering of the slave system and for gaining their own freedom, helped by the Union government. In southern Italy, the peasants, initially helped by anti-Italian advocates

of the Bourbons, were instrumental in transforming the Great Brigandage into a war against the landowners supported by the Italian government. In both the Confederacy and southern Italy, the ultimate result of the civil war was a social revolution in the countryside, with a fatal irreparable blow to the slaveholding economy in the American South and a near-fatal blow to the landowning economy of the Italian *Mezzogiorno*.[5]

This second aspect also resonates with much current scholarship that has moved increasingly toward an emphasis on comparative and transnational dimensions in the investigation of American slavery and its demise within Euro-American and world contexts of economic, social, and political transformations, as in important studies by scholars such as Edward Rugemer, Brian Schoen, Sven Beckert, and Dale Tomich and Michael Zeuske.[6] In particular, Tomich and Zeuske have argued that a "second slavery"—that is, a new, aggressively capitalist form of enslavement—characterized the American South, Cuba, and Brazil in the nineteenth century, and this idea has done a great deal to open new perspectives of comparison not just between different forms of agrarian labor in the New World and Europe, but also between the endings of different types of labor exploitation in the countryside and the phenomenon of nation-building in different regions of the Euro-American world.[7]

Pioneering comparative studies that have investigated the end of slavery and its aftermath in the U.S. South and in Cuba include those by Rebecca Scott, while Steven Hahn, Michael Bush, and Peter Kolchin have extended the comparison to the end of other forms of unfree labor in Europe, with a particular emphasis on emancipation in the U.S. South and in Russia.[8] The comparison that I introduce in the second half of this chapter is between the ending of slave labor by means of a social revolution in the Confederacy's countryside as a result of the American Civil War and the parallel, devastating, impact that the peasant revolt had on the southern Italian countryside and its labor relations as a result of the Great Brigandage. As such, my study intends to follow in the footsteps of the scholars noted here and build on the crucial nuances of these previous studies, even though it differs substantially from them in that it focuses on the comparison between the impact of inner civil wars on a slave society, the Confederacy, and on a society characterized by nominally free labor, as southern Italy was in the nineteenth century.

In studying the inner civil wars in the Confederate South and in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, I follow historical sociologist Stathis Kalyvas's definition of civil war as an "armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject

to a common authority at the outset of hostilities"—a definition that fits well both the American Civil War and southern Italy's Great Brigandage.[9] My hope is that this particular study might provide a viable example for pursuing what Kalyvas has identified, with specific reference to conflicts in a rural setting, as "the importance of studying closely the interaction of military, social, and political dynamics of civil wars."[10] Significantly, in his groundbreaking monograph *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2005), Kalyvas has used plenty of examples from the American Civil War, especially in relation to the connection between violence and irregular guerrilla warfare in the border regions and the Union-occupied areas of the Confederate South, but he has made no mention of the civil war in southern Italy at the time of the Great Brigandage.[11]

This is all the more striking when we think that irregular guerrilla warfare with a high degree of violence was the common experience of troops and civilians in the post-unification *Mezzogiorno*, and it is amply documented in the sources. Conversely, until relatively recently, the prevalent view of the American Civil War was of a conflict almost exclusively characterized by formal battles between large standing armies; only in the past couple of decades have scholars uncovered a large amount of evidence indicating that irregular guerrilla activities in different regions of the Confederacy played a much less peripheral and more crucial role than previously thought, and Kalyvas's study clearly takes into account this latest scholarship.[12] My aim in this chapter is two-fold: (1) to begin to fill the lacuna in the premier literature on the subject of civil war, well represented by Kalyvas's work, through a preliminary investigation of the similarities and differences between the inner civil wars in the Confederacy and in the Italian *Mezzogiorno* in the period 1861–65; and (2) to build on the recent scholarship on the importance of guerrilla activities in the Confederacy and on irregular warfare in post-unification southern Italy. In this way, I hope to construct a novel comparison between the American Civil War and the Great Brigandage with a particular focus on the two elements noted earlier: the presence of competing nationalisms in the civil wars and the civil wars' nature of violent agrarian and social revolution.

Inner Civil Wars and Conflicting Nationalisms

In both the U.S. South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the initial impulse toward the creation of a new nation—the Confederacy and the Italian Kingdom—came from the peripheral agrarian elites' opposition

to the centralizing policies of the former national government. In the U.S. South, slaveholders opposed the politics of the Republican Party, which in the second half of the 1850s succeeded in gathering the consensus of the majority of the northern antislavery forces, in a crescendo of sectional conflicts that reached its peak with the election of Lincoln, the first declared antislavery president, and the consequent crisis of 1860–61 and the secession of the Confederate South from the Union. In the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, landowners opposed the absolutist politics of the Bourbon dynasty, which, after the failed 1848–49 revolution, had increased the measure of suppression of civil liberties and of administrative centralization, leading eventually to the southern Italian elites' support for the 1860–61 movement for Italian national unification and the consequent end of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In one case, with the creation of the Confederacy, southern slaveholders achieved their ultimate aim of nationalization of slavery, establishing a whole new nation effectively dedicated to protecting the slave system. In the other case, with their support for the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, southern Italian landowners ensured that the new nation would look after their interests and their wish to maintain their control of regional politics.[13]

Yet, the dynamics and processes of creation of the two new Confederate and Italian nations in 1860–61 show that fault lines were bound to appear between the agrarian elites' interests and the divided loyalties of the two southern populations. From the start of the American Civil War, it was clear that in the American South citizens were divided between supporters of the Union and supporters of the Confederacy. Comparably, in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, from the start of the period of the Great Brigandage, the southern Italian people were divided between supporters of the Kingdom of Italy and of the Savoy dynasty and "legitimist" supporters of the Bourbons. As a result, from 1861, both the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno* were caught in inner civil wars, and the divide between the competing groups of southerners in the two regions, and their opposing views of nation-building, increased in the course of the period 1861–63. In fact, even though those members of the southern elites, and also those ordinary citizens, who rejected the new Confederate and Italian nations, for different reasons, were initially a minority, they rapidly grew in number and influence during the first two years of the American Civil War and of southern Italy's Great Brigandage.[14]

In the United States, on December 20, 1860, the South Carolina legislature gathered in a special convention and unanimously approved the "ordinance of Secession," with which South Carolina's

representatives dissolved the state's ties with the Union. The accompanying explanatory document of the "Declaration of the Immediate Causes of Secession" gave as the main reason for the act the election of a president, Lincoln, "whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery."[15] South Carolina's act was, effectively, the catalyst that triggered the process of secession throughout the U.S. South, and yet the unfolding of that process showed clearly that there were numerous fault lines between those southerners who wished to remaining loyal to the Union and those who wished to create a new nation dedicated to the protection of slavery. In fact, those fault lines had appeared in South Carolina throughout the period of the secession crisis. With the excuse of defending the people from potential slave revolts, radical secessionists, the so-called fire-eaters, had established vigilante committees and "paramilitary political associations," whose power was largely unchecked, creating a true "reign of terror," in William Lloyd Garrison's famous expression.[16] Yet, according to Stephanie McCurry, the paramilitary organizations worked in two ways, simultaneously: "as outreach, mobilizing yeoman and poor white voters to make the fire-eaters' cause their own; and as suppression, threatening physical violence and exile to those still disposed to dissent."[17] Thus, the December 8, 1860 popular vote that decided the election of delegates to South Carolina's Secession Convention occurred in this atmosphere of terror in which the fire-eaters had gained the power to silence the pro-Union opposition, also as a result of the state governor's undemocratic use of executive authority. South Carolina's handling of the political opposition was, effectively, a winning model for the fire-eaters of other southern states. In a relatively short time, during the winter of 1860–61, one after the other, the six Lower South states of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas followed South Carolina in seceding from the Union. In all those states, the fire-eaters silenced the pro-Union opposition partly with paramilitary violence and partly with the mishandling of the democratic political process in the making of the Secession Conventions, and through the governors' abuse of power through executive authority. Thus, in the Lower South, the premises for the inner civil war between Confederates and Unionists existed even before the creation of the Confederacy.[18]

On February 4, 1861, little more than a month after South Carolina's secession, delegates of the six seceding states met at Montgomery, Alabama, where they proclaimed the birth of a new nation called Confederate States of America; two weeks later, on February 18, 1861, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated president of the Confederacy.

Yet, despite the best efforts by Confederate southerners to rally the majority of the people, both by consent and by force, even later, at the start of the American Civil War, as Paul Escott has pointed out, "a few pockets of Unionism remained in the Lower South."[19] At the same time, in the Upper South, in Virginia's capital, Richmond, still according to Escott, "pro-Union sentiment, written in chalk, had appeared on walls a few days after Davis's inauguration."[20] Similar manifestations of pro-Union sympathy characterized the other states of the Upper South, and yet, only a few months later, the majority of those states joined the Confederacy in seceding from the Union. The key to understanding the reason for this particular course of events is, for the most part, in the analysis of the siege of Fort Sumter and its significance, as a large number of historical studies has pointed out.[21] In short, Lincoln's decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, and the subsequent siege and battle that ensued, with the Confederacy's first victory over Union forces on April 14, 1861, triggered the secession of Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee, adding four Upper South states to the Confederacy by early June 1861 and creating further and even bigger fault lines between Confederates and Unionists within large areas of the new nation. In fact, in those states, the control that the fire-eaters held over the people and the political process was nowhere as great as in the Lower South, and therefore, in William Freehling's words, "outnumbered secessionists impelled most of the South toward Armageddon by pressing the leverage of one state's disunion on the next state's decision."[22]

Ultimately, those fault lines showed to their full extent when the four Upper South states of Missouri, Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland, together with the Unionist-dominated western part of Virginia, remained in the Union, also as a result of Lincoln's diplomacy, pressures, and the illiberal policies he employed there, as noted in previous chapters. In the border states of the Upper South, the fault lines were at the origins of intense guerrilla activities, as pro-Confederate and pro-Union groups engaged in murderous actions and a type of irregular warfare that was, effectively, more common and more important for the outcome of the war than previously thought, according to the latest scholarship. The northern area of Missouri, in particular, was at the center of a well-documented case of guerrilla warfare from the start of the Civil War, as pro-Unionist "jayhawkers" brought incessant raids against pro-Confederate civilians and fought pro-Confederate "bushwhackers," forcing Union General John Pope, as early as July 1861, "to arrest anyone engaged in 'open acts of hostility' or 'stimulating others to such acts.'" This was similar to the policies implemented by

the Italian army's generals fighting the brigands in southern Italy. and these efforts in both cases had little effect. In Missouri, in particular, guerrilla attacks escalated rapidly as a result of William Quantrill's raids from early 1862.[23]

In general, within the Confederacy, both Unionists and anti-Confederates were active throughout the war in all the southern states, which led Confederate President Jefferson Davis to enforce illiberal policies similar to Lincoln's own in order to suppress them.[24] As a result, in 1861, the Confederate South commenced its epic struggle with Lincoln's Union caught within its own inner civil war between pro-Union and pro-Confederate supporters. The fault lines between the two characterized many different areas, since, even where Confederates were the majority, as in the original seven secessionist states, pro-Union sympathies that dated to the pre-Civil War era and had been suppressed during the secession crisis had the possibility to resurface once the war commenced and the Union looked for support within the Confederacy. In general, though, the regions where Unionist sympathies were strongest were also the most difficult to control, since they were located in the mountainous areas of North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. Here, mostly fiercely independent nonslaveholding yeomen resented the Confederacy as a creation of the planters and of the slave system that guaranteed the latter's wealth.[25]

From the start of the war, in the summer of 1861, until late 1862, the Confederacy succeeded in remaining independent and, also as a result of these initial Confederate successes, pro-Union activities and anti-Confederate sentiments within the Confederacy maintained a relatively low profile, while secret Unionist groups, and even Unionist militias, bided their time organizing themselves. At this stage in the war, the fault lines were strongest in those regions of Virginia, Tennessee, and, above all, Louisiana, where the Union had managed to occupy territory at an early stage in the war. A major turning point came with the Union's resounding victory at the battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862. By then, within the Confederacy, pro-Union activities and anti-Confederate sentiment had literally generated miniature civil wars between Unionist guerrilla forces—which included many disaffected yeomen and southern deserters from Confederate conscription, especially after the enforcement of the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862—and the Confederate authorities in areas of several states, particularly in western North Carolina, in East Tennessee, in northern Alabama and Florida, and in Jones County, Mississippi.[26] In East Tennessee, for example, the area of Greenville was a center of Unionist activities, and there, pro-Union guerrilla forces held their

ground for two years, until most of the region fell under the Union's control in 1863.[27] In all the areas mentioned, though, the fault lines created a situation of inner civil war in which, while the Confederacy as a whole fought the war with the Union over conflicting versions of nationalism, "the Confederate States waged war against . . . [their] domestic enemies and they did not spare women."[28]

In both the United States and Italy, 1860 had been a crucial year in relation to the impending civil wars. In particular, the secession of South Carolina in the United States in December 1860, which triggered a chain of events that led to the creation of the Confederacy and the Civil War with the Union, was mirrored by the culmination of Sicily's separatist movement, which led to the success of Giuseppe Garibaldi's and his Red Shirts' military expedition and their effective control of the island by August 1860. This made it possible for Garibaldi to conquer the entire Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and, as a consequence, all the southern territory was later annexed to the northern-based Kingdom of Sardinia, which was ruled by the House of Savoy. [29] As a result of Garibaldi's actions, though, unlike what happened in the United States, in Italy the inner civil war within the *Mezzogiorno* began in 1860 and can be traced back to processes and events that characterized Garibaldi's rule in Sicily. By June 21, 1860, Garibaldi had established himself as "Dictator" of Sicily, a term that, even though different from its twentieth-century equivalent, meant that he maintained the military command of the island. There is little doubt that in establishing this provisional government, Garibaldi could count on the support of the majority of Sicilian landowners, whose wish to separate from the Bourbon Kingdom was evident. Also, at the start of his expedition, Garibaldi could equally count on the support of the majority of Sicily's peasants, who thought he would have introduced a much needed land reform and other changes. Yet, these hopes vanished quickly when Garibaldi showed he had no intention to alter the status quo in the Sicilian countryside, and therefore opposition to his rule grew and led to episodes of repression of peasant rebellious activities, as in the famous one at Bronte on August 2, 1860. In short, in this little town in eastern Sicily, Garibaldi's lieutenant Nino Bixio ordered the shooting of five peasant rebels who had taken possession of the town defying the landed proprietors. The episode is important particularly because it showed that the new rule that substituted the Bourbons (i.e., Garibaldi, and later on the Italian state) inserted itself into a long-term conflict over land and local power, and mostly sided with the landowners against the peasants.[30] This factor was a major catalyst for the inner civil war that southern Italian peasants would

fight against the Italian army as well as other southerners during the Great Brigandage of 1861–65.

During the entire period from Garibaldi's conquests of Naples and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies on September 7, 1860, to the plebiscites of October 21, 1860, which, among many irregularities, led to the annexation of the *Mezzogiorno* to the Kingdom of Sardinia, peasant activity against the process of Italian national unification consistently increased in intensity and spread into different areas. It was at this point that the "legitimist" circles, which wished to restore Bourbon King Francis II, joined forces with the peasant revolt in the civil war during the first phase of the Great Brigandage. In fact, contemporaneously to the episodes of peasant unrest, other events had led to a different type of resistance to the process of Italian unification in southern Italy. Starting from the moment Francis II was under siege in Gaeta under ruthless shelling by General Enrico Cialdini's Piedmontese troops, between September 5, 1860, and February 13, 1861, the remaining Bourbon soldiers and the rebel peasants had engaged in large-scale guerrilla warfare with the purpose of undoing Italian national unification.[31] Even though the Bourbon army suffered its last irreparable defeats at Volturno and then at Macerone in October 1860, effectively "the obstinate resistance of Francis II had raised to the dignity of a real war what, until September 1860, had been a simple military skirmish," given Garibaldi's relatively untroubled conquest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[32] Thus, the "real war" came only later, in the shape of an inner civil war within southern Italy that began with the fall of the Gaeta fortress and the coordination of pro-Bourbon and peasant activities against the Italian government. In fact, after Gaeta fell, Francis II and his court fled to Rome, from where, under the protection of Pope Pius IX, they attempted to organize guerrilla warfare against the Italian government in the *Mezzogiorno*, as noted in Chapter 5.[33]

As a result, in 1861, similarly to the Confederate South's inner civil war, southern Italy was caught in a conflict between the pro-Bourbon "legitimist" supporters and their ally peasant rebels, and the Italian army and government with the landowners and other southerners who supported them. In both cases, the civil war was fought almost exclusively on southern territory.[34] For the next year and a half, until the end of 1862, Francis II and his advisers hatched different plans to restore the Bourbon king to his throne, according to a pattern that bears some resemblance to the earlier successful restoration of former Bourbon King Ferdinand IV by the *Santafede* movement in 1799. In that year, the Neapolitan Republic, which the French revolutionary

army had helped to create a year earlier and that had forced Ferdinand IV into exile, fell under the combined effect of a number of local revolts in which the church and the peasantry joined in an uneasy alliance in order to defeat the Jacobins and the intellectuals and landowners who supported them. Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo took the lead of the widespread popular revolts, raising the Bourbon royal banner and choosing the name *Santafede*, according to John Davis, "in an attempt to impose some appearance of unity and purpose on insurrections that took many different forms: some were counter-revolutions, others were more institutionalized, while others looked more like civil war."[35] Even though Ruffo only partially succeeded, the arrival of his followers in Naples effectively signalled the end of the republican experiment and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy and Ferdinand IV.[36]

Unlike what happened in 1799, though, in 1861 Bourbon King Francis II found it impossible to provide a similar "appearance of unity and purpose" to the brigands' revolt, and relied in terms of military leadership mostly on experts from abroad such as Spanish officer José Borjés, who—as noted in Chapter 5—coordinated his actions with Carmine "Crocco" Donatelli, and fought, for several months, between September and December 1861, against the Italian army, conquering village after village mostly in the region of Basilicata.[37] Yet, there were several other areas where peasant guerrilla activity had joined forces with the Bourbon "legitimist" efforts, and often the leaders were local peasant commanders who headed mounted bands as if they were part of a regular pro-Bourbon army. This was especially the case of the region of Apulia, which was the center of the activities of a famous leader of mounted brigands, Pasquale Domenico Romano (nicknamed significantly "Sergente Romano").[38]

Similarly to Crocco, Romano had joined the Bourbon army and had held an officer commission in the pre-unification period. After unification, Romano put together a large mounted band of mostly ex-Bourbon soldiers, with which he held sway over the Apulian provinces of Capitanata and Terra di Bari, conquering landed estates, villages, and towns between February 1861, when he joined forces with Crocco, and August 1862.[39] In June 1861, Romano became a member of a Bourbon Committee, which was dedicated to the aim of restoring "Francis II, King by the grace of God, defender of religion and beloved son of our Holy Father Pius IX . . . and [to] defeat the infernal Lucifer Victor Emmanuel and his followers," and thus the Italian Kingdom.[40] Unlike Crocco, who soon became suspicious of

the project of restoration of the Bourbon Kingdom, Romano continued to be a staunch supporter of the "legitimist" cause until his death in battle on January 5, 1863, as even his nickname, Sergente Romano—which reminded one of his former military past in the Bourbon army—clearly testifies.[41] Thus, much more than Crocco's case, Romano's case shows how, in the first phase of the Great Brigandage, the inner civil war within southern Italy involved southern Italians fighting against the Italian army and government and the southern Italian landowners who supported them, mostly over Bourbon "legitimist" pretensions and conflicting versions of nationalism, and with an important component in the alliance between the Bourbons and the anti-Italian peasant guerrilla activities that had started as early as 1860.[42]

There is little doubt that at the time of the secession crisis in America and of national unification in Italy, most American slaveholders in the U.S. South supported the creation of the Confederates States of America, while most southern Italian landowners in the *Mezzogiorno* supported the creation of the Kingdom of Italy. Yet, the parallel processes of creation of the two new nations and the subsequent attempts to establish the legitimacy of the Confederate and Italian governments in the midst of the American Civil War and of southern Italy's Great Brigandage led to increasingly larger movements of opposition to the two agrarian elites' projects of nation-building during the period 1861–63. The consequences of these increasing oppositions showed particularly in the form of anti-Confederate and anti-Italian guerrilla warfare, in which pro-Union supporters in one case and pro-Bourbon supporters in the other case engaged, and whose activities encompassed large areas of the Confederacy and of the Italian *Mezzogiorno*. In the first two years of the American Civil War, anti-Confederate guerrilla warfare characterized especially the states of Tennessee, North Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia, and Florida in the American South, while in the first two years of the Great Brigandage, anti-Italian guerrilla activities characterized especially the regions of Campania, Basilicata, and Apulia in southern Italy. In both cases, the guerrilla movement aimed to destabilize the new national government's authority and reestablish the old one, be it the American Union or the Bourbon Kingdom. From 1862–63, though, the guerrilla movements against the Confederate and the Italian governments were joined on a larger scale by anti-Confederate and anti-Italian activities originally initiated and carried on by the agrarian masses of the two southern regions for different, but comparable, social and political reasons.

Inner Civil Wars and Social Revolutions

In both the American Civil War and the southern Italian Great Brigandage, the period between the autumn of 1862 and the start of 1863 proved a veritable turning point. In the United States the September 1862 Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was followed by the final Emancipation Proclamation, which freed slaves in the Confederacy on January 1, 1863. Conversely, in Italy, the same period saw the effective end of the last realistic plans for the restoration of Francis II as a result of either the death or the arrest of important pro-Bourbon supporters, including Giuseppe Statella, Raffaele Tristany, and Sergente Romano, between November 1862 and January 1863. As a result, within the context of the two inner civil wars that characterized the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the numerous and widespread episodes of unrest caused by the agrarian masses assumed rapidly increasing importance over the struggle between competing projects of nation-building. In both cases, the duration of the agrarian unrest, until the end of both civil wars in 1865, and its geographical extension, which encompassed large areas of both southern regions, make this phenomenon particularly difficult to both conceptualize and analyze. What is clear, however, is that the rebellious actions of American slaves and of southern Italian peasants affected deeply the course of both inner civil wars, creating the preconditions for a social revolution in both regions.

Yet, in the Confederate South, the American slaves' insurrectionary activities led to the consequent shattering of the unfree system of labor related to the "second slavery," while in the Italian *Mezzogiorno* the peasants' revolt shook the power of the southern Italian agrarian elites but did not lead to an end of the system of exploitation related to the landowning economy. The reason for this difference is that the laborers' revolts differed drastically in the two southern regions in terms of modes and possibilities of success. In the Confederate South, the Union army made a crucial contribution to the slaves' insurrection, while in the Italian *Mezzogiorno* the defeat of the pro-Bourbon forces led to a situation in which southern Italian peasants found themselves fighting against the Italian government and pro-Italian southerners without any help. From a historiographical point of view, though, both the slaves' insurrection in the Confederacy and the peasants' revolt in the *Mezzogiorno* are at the center of current controversies. At present, in fact, American historians debate whether it is possible to consider collectively the slaves' activities as a massive

slave rebellion, independently from the issue of the Union government's and army's roles in freeing the slaves. At the same time, Italian historians debate whether the peasant rebellion witnessed during the Great Brigandage can be classified, for all intents and purposes, as a civil war. In both cases, the conditions that are under scrutiny are the scale, duration, and intensity, together with the modalities, of still relatively little-known phenomena at the local level, phenomena which entailed an extensive participation of the agrarian masses of the two regions. Those conditions, for the most part, still await painstaking investigation before a final word can be said on the issues at the heart of the two debates.[43]

In the Confederacy, by the autumn of 1862, the inner civil war within the white South increased in motivation and intensity as the fault lines between Confederates and Unionists showed in increasingly larger areas of most southern states. In particular, in the wildest areas of North Carolina, Florida, and Mississippi, ever-increasing numbers of Unionists and deserters found their refuge, and here the fight with anti-Confederate guerrillas kept the local Confederate authorities occupied for many months.[44] Perhaps most famous was the case of Jones County in eastern Mississippi, where the "Free State of Jones" came close to generating a secessionist movement from the Confederacy. Recently investigated by several historians, the episode of the Free State of Jones is significant in a number of respects, especially in the fact that in Mississippi, one of the most ardent secessionist states, the yeomen of a small county, led by Unionist sympathizer Newton Knight, were strong enough to organize themselves and resist Confederate attacks and pressures on them to join the Confederate army for two years, from 1863 to 1865. Interestingly, in their 2009 work on the Free State of Jones, Sally Jenkins and John Stauffer claimed that Knight believed in racial equality and went as far as forging an anti-Confederate alliance with the county's African Americans; however, Victoria Bynum, who had written a previous work on the topic, has heavily criticized Jenkins' and Stauffer's interpretation of the evidence available.[45]

As far as we know, for the most part the slaves' own anti-Confederate struggle was unrelated to the southern Unionists' fight against the Confederacy, certainly until 1863 and even beyond then. Yet, the slaves' struggle for freedom inserted itself within the Confederate South's inner civil war, and ultimately their activities represented the most important factor that led to Confederate collapse. In fact, within the fault lines that divided different groups of southerners in large regions of different Confederate states, effectively, as Wayne

K. Durrill has argued, "slaves may have been the single largest disaffected group in the Confederacy."[46] Through their anti-Confederate activities, the slaves transformed the Confederacy's inner civil war, unmasking the contradictions of a nation that fought both for its own freedom and for the freedom to keep African Americans enslaved. From the very beginning of the war, slaves had resisted this notion with a variety of anti-Confederate actions, among which the most extreme were the plots leading to open rebellion against the slaveholders. Thus, already starting from 1861, rumors of imminent slave insurrections were heard in different areas of several southern states, as in the famous case of the slave conspiracy investigated by Winthrop Jordan in Adams County, Mississippi. These rumors would continue throughout the Civil War, adding another crucial dimension to the Confederate South's inner civil conflict.[47]

More generally, throughout the Confederacy, slaves "worked less, questioned more, and increasingly took to running away, not only singly or in pairs, as had been common before the war, but in large groups as well," as Peter Kolchin has noted.[48] Especially in the areas bordering Union lines, such as Virginia and Tennessee, and in those areas where the Union had made its first territorial gains, slaves ran away and fled to Union camps. Running away was in itself an act of rebellion, since, as Steven Hahn has argued, in the Confederate South, "the slaves' rebellion properly started not with acts of vengeance against their owners, but rather with small-scale and often clandestine departures for Union lines and the freedom they believed they might find there."[49] But, whether the slaves rebelled by fleeing singly or in groups or by plotting insurrections, the slaveholders and the Confederate authorities clearly feared the new opportunities for freedom that the Confederacy's inner civil war gave to the slaves. Therefore, everywhere in the southern states, the Confederates increased the degree of control of the slaves and of repressive measures against them, as they "endeavoured to stifle rebellious talk, black assembly, and running away," as Justin Behrend has written about Natchez, in Mississippi.[50]

The massive scale of the phenomenon of slaves running away and fleeing to Union camps together with the pressure of Radical Republicans forced Congress to pass a First Confiscation Act in August 1861 (see Chapter 5); the act was about the seizure of all rebel property, and also of the slaves, who, by this time, were called "contrabands of war." In July 1862, a Second Confiscation Act declared all the slaves of Confederate masters free. A few months later, on January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the final Emancipation Proclamation.[51] Lincoln justified this as a war measure, and with it, he declared immediately, "thenceforward

and forever free" all the slaves in areas under Confederate control. The Proclamation also provided the Union army with the legal means to support the freedom of the slaves, thus transforming the northern troops into true agents of liberation. Effectively, in 1863, with the release of the Emancipation Proclamation, the Confederate South's inner civil war between Confederate authorities and Unionist forces entered a new phase, as the slaves became now fully recognized main actors on the side of the Union in the anti-Confederate struggle.[52]

By the summer of 1863, the combined effects of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the consequent changed role of the Union army, which now effectively liberated slaves wherever it passed, together with the Union's momentous victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, were rapidly leading to the shattering of the plantation system in many areas, particularly in those regions where the local masters had left for the front. On August 30, 1863, upcountry South Carolina planter James Henry Hammond significantly observed about his slaves at Silver Bluff plantation: "negroes . . . stealing right and left . . . Frank my driver escaped today and ran away."[53] As the slaveholders' authority became increasingly shaken by the rumors of emancipation spreading among the slaves and by the Civil War's turning of the tide against the Confederacy, thousands of episodes similar to this must have happened, with larger and larger numbers of slaves running away as the Union army advanced through the southern territory. Eventually, many of the slaves who reached the Union camps joined the Union army and donned the Union blue uniform in battles that often saw them fighting against former slaveholders—the logical conclusion to the rebellion they had begun on the plantations and farms of the Confederate South—and, by war's end, almost 200,000 African American soldiers had served in the Union army.[54]

Yet, during the entire period of the Confederate South's inner civil war, the slaves' resistance had expressed itself in many more ways than simply running away and perhaps joining the Union Army. In *A Nation Under Our Feet* (2003), Steven Hahn has clearly shown how "the slaves' rebellion drew . . . on well-established practices of everyday resistance to their masters' power."[55] These practices included mutual solidarity and kinship networks that effectively built, even before the American Civil War, upon traditions of informal political activity through which the slaves put up effective means of resistance to their masters' pretensions to exploit them. As the inner civil war in the Confederate South began, slaves utilized these relationships of mutual solidarity and these kinship networks in order to create the preconditions for a variety of rebellious acts, which included a gamut

of examples of resistance spanning from the slowing of the pace of work to the theft of the masters' property, all the way to running away and setting up massive conspiracies. All these acts contributed in a major way to disrupting the slave system as a whole as they increased in scale and intensity with the progression of the war. Thus, when it came, emancipation effectively acted as a catalyst for a number of rebellious acts that now found their logical conclusion. Significantly, slaves were acutely aware of the meaning of emancipation, and, as a Natchez District freedman, Lewis Jackson, reported, they considered themselves "freed by Abraham Lincoln's Proclamation," which they correctly understood as the official endorsement to their ongoing insurrectionary activities.[56]

The interpretation of the slaves' actions during the American Civil War as motivated by a single overarching reason goes as far back as the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, who, in *Black Reconstruction in America* (1935), talked of "how the black worker won the war by a general strike which transferred his labor from the Confederate planter to the Northern invader," thus bringing to a collapse the entire Confederate slave system. Du Bois believed that the "general strike" that the southern slaves had engaged in had worked as effectively as a general insurrection in destroying slavery, but with much less violence.[57] Several decades later, in *Been in the Storm So Long* (1979), Leon Litwack reflected again on the idea of a collective interpretation of the slaves' actions and wrote that "the extent of black insurrectionary activity during the Civil War remains a subtle question."[58] More recently, in *The Political Worlds of Slavery and* Freedom (2008), Steven Hahn has asked, in a provocative essay, whether we should acknowledge the massive number of slaves' rebellious acts, though mostly unconnected, as if it were a single large-scale slave rebellion that occurred during the American Civil War, and thus similar and comparable to the Haitian revolution; if this were the case, Hahn has reasoned that we might have missed the largest slave rebellion in history.[59]

To be sure, several scholars would disagree with Hahn, not the least because they would argue that he seemingly downplayed the crucial role of the Union government and of the Union army as agents of emancipation, a condition that made the situation radically different from the Haitian case. In *The Fall of the House of Dixie* (2013), for example, Bruce Levine has portrayed a picture of the collapse of slavery in the Confederate South in many ways antithetic to Hahn's own; in fact, for Levine, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was, effectively, the indispensable trigger without which the slaves' resistance would have never transformed into a mass phenomenon and the American

Civil War would have never become a social revolution, while it was the Union armies that "began to put Lincoln's revolutionary policy into action," as they probed deeper and deeper into Confederate territory.[60] Yet, even if the debates and controversies on the collective interpretation of the slaves' actions in the American Civil War will, undoubtedly, continue, it is still important to encourage researchers to investigate better and deeper the slaves' multiform acts of rebellion within the contest of the Confederate South's inner civil war, particularly from 1863 onwards, and also in giving these rebellious acts more significance than has often been the case. In this respect, Stephanie McCurry's recent *Confederate Reckoning* (2010) has broken important ground, providing the first scholarly monograph that has made the slaves' rebellion a central part of a study on the Confederacy—and, significantly, in her treatment, connections and comparisons with Haiti have a special place. On the other hand, McCurry's work really aspired to be a synthesis with a few exemplary case studies that could serve as a starting point for further, more detailed research arguing the case that a massive slave rebellion did take place in the Confederate South during the Civil War.[61] Yet, much more research still needs to be done on this topic at the local level in several southern regions and states before it will be possible to say a final word on the matter of whether the slaves engaged in mass revolt, or whether, perhaps, it is all just a matter of definitions and interpretations.[62]

While in the Confederate South the inner civil war went through a new phase with the transformation of the war to preserve the Union into a war for the liberation of the slaves, in the Italian *Mezzogiorno* the inner civil war went through a new phase with the transformation of the struggle between the Italian Kingdom and the "legitimist" forces supporting the restoration of the Bourbons into a social war mostly between peasant rebels and the Italian army and government and their southern supporters. The result of the end of the "legitimist" phase of the Great Brigandage was the recrudescence of the southern Italian civil war, as the peasants and brigands who had collaborated with the pro-Bourbon forces now fought their own war on their own terms against the Italian state. In this second phase, therefore, the Great Brigandage became a civil war with a clear social, rather than political, aim: that of the peasants' appropriation of the land, which was in the hands of the southern Italian landowners who supported and were, in turn, supported by the Italian government. In this respect, Crocco's life is emblematic of the parable of those southern Italian peasants who first joined the legitimist forces to restore the Bourbon Kingdom, and then, disillusioned, continued their guerrilla

activities against the new Italian state, since they rightly saw in the latter the power behind the very landowners who oppressed them. Crocco's own words—"the exploited poor answered 'also our time has come'"—indicate that the second phase of the Great Brigandage was a struggle of guerrilla peasant bands aiming at subverting the social order maintained by the southern Italian landowners allied with the Italian government.[63]

As it became increasingly a social war, the Great Brigandage increased in size and intensity, enveloping in a spiral of a permanent state of guerrilla warfare the majority of the southern Italian provinces and forcing the Italian government to deploy an increasingly larger number of soldiers to suppress the widespread peasant rebellion. Starting from the summer of 1862, the activities of the brigands moved well beyond the two regions of Basilicata—where Crocco had been active from early 1861—and Capitanata—the center of Sergente Romano's actions—and extended to large areas of Campania and Apulia, where, according to Franco Molfese, "numerous bands organized themselves in the provinces of Bari, Terra d'Otranto, and Taranto, where until then there had been only sporadic brigand activities 'imported' from neighbouring Basilicata," creating the impression of a large-scale "offensive" launched by the brigands against the Italian state.[64] In all these areas, hundreds of brigand bands, many of them mounted and comprising from several hundred to a few thousand men, "set villages on fire, destroyed archives [where the documents that legalized the elites' appropriation of land were located], killed liberal landowners, mayors, and officers of the national guard," who formed the main military unit, together with the Carabinieri, that the Italian government deployed against the brigands.[65] Thus, from 1862 to 1865, the Great Brigandage became "a veritable civil war, which demanded martial law, the deployment of over 100,000 Italian soldiers, and endless brutalities and massacres on both sides before the *grande banditismo* [the large scale outlaw activity] was crushed and government authority restored."[66]

Both the increasing scale of the very effective peasant guerrilla warfare and the emergency situation that Garibaldi's expedition to Aspromonte had caused—with the consequent threat of a southern Italian secession—led the Italian government not just to deploy increasingly larger numbers of troops, but also to promulgate special laws, starting with the enforcement of the state of siege in the *Mezzogiorno*, which in the summer of 1862 was placed under martial law as we have seen in the previous chapter. Then, after General Alfonso La Marmora succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Urbano Rattazzi, who headed

the Right majority government, and the parliament to protract the law a first time until November 1862, the state of siege became the norm in southern Italy and lasted well beyond the situation of emergency initially caused by the Aspromonte episode until new and stricter laws were introduced in late 1863. Thus, I tend to agree with Molfese that the state of siege's "effective duration, even after November 1862, until the introduction of the extraordinary legislation of 1863, must be seen primarily as an 'anti-brigandage' measure."[67]

From the start of the Great Brigandage, the opposition's deputies of the Left, mostly Democrats, had agitated for a debate on the causes of the phenomenon and had asked for a parliamentary inquiry to shed light on the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Right governments. In the summer of 1862, General La Marmora himself presented a secret report to Rattazzi in which he recognized that the main reason for the peasants' revolt was the lower classes' hunger for land and the continuous grip on the latter that the southern Italian landowners had, thanks to the Italian government, while he pointed out the responsibilities of the government's policy of repression for fear of a social revolution in the *Mezzogiorno* as a further cause for the spread of brigandage in southern Italy. Finally, Rattazzi's successor, Luigi Carlo Farini, set up a formal parliamentary commission of inquiry led by Left MP Giuseppe Massari in December 1862.[68] The so-called Massari Commission only cursorily recognized the importance of the land issue and of the peasants' anger at the alliance between the Italian government and the southern Italian landowners, which was voiced clearly by one of the interviewees, who said "the new Government has betrayed the hopes of the people."[69] Instead, in the speech with which he presented the results of the commission's works, on June 1, 1863, Massari deliberately and erroneously attributed the main reason for the Great Brigandage to the "legitimist" plans to restore the Bourbons—plans that, by that time, no longer constituted a major threat. Massari also recommended further repressive measures to defeat the peasants' guerrilla warfare against the Italian army and end the inner civil war in the *Mezzogiorno*.[70]

Following Massari's recommendations, according to John Davis, "on 6 August the government ended prematurely the debate [on the Great Brigandage] approving the law proposed by [MP] Giuseppe Pica, which entailed the establishment of special military tribunals that were to deal with all the issues related to brigandage and were to collaborate with the local powers in the task of punishing with the death penalty whoever was caught rebelling against the authorities or helping the rebels."[71] We can have a glimpse of the effects of the Pica

Law from Count Maffei's contemporary account, in which he wrote that "brigands caught with weapons in their hands had been shot on the spot" by the Italian army, while in some other cases the brigands "were to be brought to trial before court-martial . . . and if proved guilty, the sentence of death should be carried without delay, the punishment being rendered so much the more effective by the certainty and rapidity if its execution."[72] In practice, from August 1863 until December 1865, when it was revoked, the Pica Law placed southern Italy under the jurisdiction of eight major military tribunals, which were located in the capitals of the regions "in state of brigandage." Thus, the law's implementation had the effect of "encircling the provinces of the former Bourbon Kingdom into a repressive web of draconian measures."[73] These measures, in turn, led to countless atrocities and summary executions, and ultimately a number of casualties that oscillated between the official figure of 5,212 deaths found in governmental documents and a figure "between 18,250 and 54,750 shot or killed otherwise," calculated by Roberto Martucci.[74]

In a comparable way to the scholarship on the interpretation of the slaves' actions in the Confederate South during the American Civil War, the scholarship on the Great Brigandage has varied widely in its interpretations of the phenomenon. Following an interpretation that reaches back to the Massari Commission's report and even earlier, some scholars have erroneously interpreted the Great Brigandage almost exclusively as part of a general "legitimist" plan to restore the Bourbon monarchy in the *Mezzogiorno*. On the other hand, several other scholars, especially those who belonged to the Marxian school of thought and embraced the views of Antonio Gramsci, have equally narrowly interpreted the Great Brigandage as an example of pure class warfare in which southern Italy's dispossessed masses fought against the landowners and were brutally criminalized and repressed by the Italian government and army.[75] A third interpretation became increasingly important in the 1980s and 1990s, in connection with a major "paradigm shift" in the historiography of the *Mezzogiorno* that has led to the study of southern Italy in its own right, rejecting earlier preconceived negative judgments on the Bourbon Kingdom and its immediate aftermath.[76] This new interpretation has emphasized a postcolonial view of the Great Brigandage, and it has been particularly useful in demonstrating the importance of hitherto mostly hidden racial prejudices by northern Italian soldiers and civil servants against the southern Italian people. At the moment, though, the increasing consensus among historians who have treated the Great Brigandage in their work is that the phenomenon was a major "civil war"—the first

in the history of unified Italy—which was fought in the *Mezzogiorno* in the aftermath of Italian national unification.[77]

In practice, the Great Brigandage, according to Salvatore Lupo, "assumed more clearly the character of a civil war . . . because the conflict concerned only Italians."[78] In *L'Unificazione italiana: Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Italy's Unification: *Mezzogiorno*, Revolution, Civil War, 2011), Lupo pointed out that, even though the element of peasant revolt was paramount, loyalty to the former Bourbon dynasty was still strong among large sections of the southern Italian population in 1861–65.[79] For his part, in *Darkest Italy* (1999), John Dickie had looked at the civil war at the heart of the Great Brigandage as a way in which the Italian state constructed a perception of "otherness." Thus, from the official documents it seems clear that, instead of trying to understand the causes of the massive peasants' revolt, the Italian government launched a large campaign of repression, which it justified with the characterization of the peasants as "brigands," or as rebellious and treasonous outlaws to suppress.[80] Also Roberto Martucci, in *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita* (The Invention of a United Italy, 1999) had talked clearly of the Great Brigandage as a civil war, and, in particular, in referring to the infamous episodes of Pontelandolfo and Casalduni and to other similar massacres, mostly unnamed, committed by the Italian army, he has written of "the intensity of the evil done to harmless civilians, the dimension of a massacre still not exactly quantifiable today, the depth of pain, blood, and hatred created with an operation of ethnic cleansing."[81] Therefore, it is clear from studies by these and other scholars that the civil war at the heart of the Great Brigandage in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, especially in the period 1862–65, was essentially a mass phenomenon of armed peasant revolt against both the Italian government and those southerners and landowners who supported it. Yet, the particular modes and features of this inner civil war within southern Italian society—and particularly the conflict between different southern Italian factions for the possession of land in different regions and towns—changed from place to place and from time to time, and these factors still need to be investigated thoroughly through specific detailed studies at the local level in order to be properly understood.[82]

In both the Confederate South and southern Italy, thus, the period between 1862 and 1865 saw crucial changes in the ongoing inner civil wars that ultimately created the premises for mass rebellion and social revolution in the majority of the rural areas. As a result of these changes, in both southern regions, the agrarian masses—American slaves and southern Italian peasants—came to the forefront of the

inner civil wars. In the case of the Confederate South, the transformation of the American Civil War into a war for slave emancipation created the conditions for a massive slave rebellion, which was aided by the Union government's policy and by the actions of the Union army. In the case of the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the effective end of realistic "legitimist" chances to restore the Bourbon dynasty led to the transformation of the Great Brigandage into a social war of peasants against the landowners, brutally repressed by the Italian government and army. In both cases, it is possible to say that, within the contexts of the inner civil wars, the agrarian masses rose spontaneously to improve their lot and end their exploitation, but at the same time joined the political and military initiatives of those governmental forces—be they the Union soldiers or the Bourbon supporters—that fought against their oppressors. Yet, while runaway slaves joined the Union Army in increasing numbers and became a major part of the Union effort in the last part of the conflict against the Confederacy, in the southern Italian Great Brigandage, peasants were left fighting against Italian authority without the help of the pro-Bourbon forces after the collapse of the "legitimist" schemes, and in the midst of increasingly repressive governmental and military measures, which culminated with the release of the August 1863 Pica Law. In acting on these very different premises, in the Confederate South's inner civil war African American slaves engaged in a variety of rebellious acts that, collectively, might have been the equivalent of a massive slave insurrection, while in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*'s inner conflict southern Italian peasants kept the Italian army engaged in an increasingly brutal civil war.

In sum, between 1861 and 1865, the Confederate South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno* underwent parallel and horrific inner civil wars. In both these phenomena, it is possible to distinguish two different elements, and in turn two different phases, which overlapped to a certain extent. In the first two years of the American Civil War and of southern Italy's Great Brigandage, between 1861 and 1863, the inner civil wars in the two southern regions focused mostly on competing ideas and intents for nation-building—the first element in both cases. In the Confederate South, supporters of the Confederacy, who included the majority of planters and slaveholders, fought to suppress the minority of supporters of the Union, who were consistently silenced from the time of the secession crisis and waged guerrilla warfare against the Confederate government especially in the mountainous areas of several southern states. Conversely, in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, the Italian government and the supporters of Italian national unification, who included the majority of the landowners, fought to suppress

the minority of "legitimist" supporters of the Bourbon dynasty, who hoped to restore the latter and waged guerrilla warfare against the Italian army in different areas of southern Italy. In one case, supporters of Unionist and Confederate nationalisms faced each other in the Confederacy's inner civil war, while in the other case, supporters of Italian and Bourbon nationalisms faced each other in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*'s inner civil war.

In the latter part of the American Civil War and of southern Italy's Great Brigandage, between 1862 and 1865, the inner civil wars in the two regions saw the transformation of the two conflicts into social revolutions, as a result of the increasing and widespread rebellious actions of agrarian masses—American slaves and southern Italian peasants—fighting against the Confederate and Italian governments and their supporters on their own terms. However, in the Confederacy's inner civil war, the mass rebellion of southern slaves received the help of the Union government's new emancipationist policy and of the Union army. Conversely, in the Italian *Mezzogiorno*'s inner civil war, the mass rebellion of southern Italian peasants received, by that time, little support from the pro-Bourbon forces and was, instead, brutally repressed by the Italian government and army. Yet, in both cases, the end of the inner civil wars in 1865 and the aftermaths of the rebellions of the agrarian masses did not lead to all the changes that either American slaves or southern Italian peasants had hoped for—remaining, therefore, "unfinished revolutions," to adapt a famous expression by Eric Foner.[83] At the same time, within the reunified countries of the United States and Italy, both the elites of the American South and of the Italian *Mezzogiorno* faced, effectively, a situation of lack of power and of enduring opposition to the respective national governments—a situation that would last, in both cases, until 1876, the year that signaled the end of Reconstruction in the United States and the rise of the first Left government in Liberal Italy.

Conclusion

The comparative study of the three themes in the "age of Lincoln and Cavour" that correspond to the three sections of this book shows that there is a great deal of room for research focusing on the identification of significant similarities and differences between the two processes of nation-building that occurred in the United States in the Civil War era and in Italy in the *Risorgimento* era. It is important to point out that the three themes under consideration are just a few of several possible areas that could be selected for sustained comparative investigation. These three themes and the subthemes within them effectively represent three orders of dimension in the comparative study of the age of Lincoln and Cavour: (1) the comparative dimension of ideological and political movements, such as American abolitionism and Italian democratic nationalism; (2) the comparative dimension of individuals, such as Lincoln and Cavour; and (3) the comparative dimension of wider historical processes, such as the American Civil War and southern Italy's Great Brigandage. At the same time, it is equally important to acknowledge that, in the case of synchronic comparisons such as the present one that focuses on the American Civil War era versus the Italian *Risorgimento* era, the additional information yielded by the exploration of links and connections between movements, ideologies, and people enriches and enhances our understanding of the mechanics and significance of specific comparative historical inquiries. Thus, in regard to particular issues, as in the subthemes treated in Chapter 2 on John Brown versus Carlo Pisacane and in Chapter 5 on the specter of Confederate secession in early post-unification Italy, an integrated comparative/transnational approach would certainly allow historians to tackle better the specific issues at the heart of a comparative type of research by building on an already established connection between the two case studies.[1]

When looking at possible historical comparisons in the analysis of the different facets of the American and Italian nation-building processes in the age of Lincoln and Cavour, the parallels between the two radical movements of American abolitionism and Italian democratic

nationalism stand out as particularly worthy of investigation. For a start, they were both essentially minority movements that proposed radical solutions to the main issues at the heart of the two "national questions"—the existence and expansion of slavery in the United States and the fragmentation and foreign occupation of the country in Italy. At the same time, both movements were also characterized by wide divergences in regard to the means to achieve those solutions. One of the most important parallels, though, related to the way in which, despite the fundamental differences in approach, in both cases the more utopian elements and the more concretely militant elements converged to support comparable beliefs in the resolutions of the national questions primarily through a rising of the southern masses prompted by revolutionary actions starting from the north. Thus, in the United States, abolitionists believed that southern slaves either waited for the northern public opinion to change the course of American politics in their favor, or else they expected northern agitators to lead them in a general insurrection against the slaveholders. Comparably, in Italy, Democrats believed that southern Italian peasants were expecting activists from outside the *Mezzogiorno* to come and lead them in the revolution against the Bourbon regime.[2]

When we move from the general level of movements to the specific level of individuals and look at the similarities and differences between the lives of American radical abolitionist John Brown and Italian democrat and socialist Carlo Pisacane, we find that their thoughts and actions reflect that comparability in beliefs with regard to the southern masses of the United States and Italy and their supposed expectations. In relation to the more militant aspects of the type of radical abolitionism epitomized by Brown and of the type of democratic radicalism represented by Pisacane, it is possible to say that, despite the vast differences in cultural formation and historical milieus, both activists expressed their distinctive radicalism through utopian ideas of contribution to the creation of a future with a higher degree of social justice by means of a major revolutionary war. These essentially similar ideas, then, expressed themselves in different ways, as Brown emphasized the importance of interracial cooperation, also with important utopian socialist elements, while Pisacane emphasized the importance of redistribution of property as an important part of his socialist beliefs. At the same time, an equally important element that emerges clearly from this specific comparative study is the existence of indirect transnational connections between the abolitionist and democratic milieus within which the two radical activists operated, as demonstrated by Brown's and Pisacane's common awareness

of widespread doctrines of nineteenth-century guerrilla warfare and revolution, even though this parallel awareness produced ultimately divergent opinions by Brown and Pisacane on Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz's and Giuseppe Mazzini's writings on guerrilla tactics.[3]

Similarly to the case of Brown and Pisacane, parallels and similarities abound, amidst crucial differences, in the comparative historical study of the two most influential individuals in the politics of the United States in the Civil War era and of Italy in the *Risorgimento* era: Abraham Lincoln and Camillo Cavour. This specific comparison, which is the focal center of the book, shows that, in the course of their lives and careers, Lincoln and Cavour came to embrace largely similar elements of a nineteenth-century ideology, which I have termed "progressive nationalism." The main tenets of this ideology were the belief in a strong connection between economic development and sociopolitical progress as the indispensable factor that ensured equal opportunities to the nation's citizens, and the belief in the indissolubility of the tie between nationality and parliamentary representation as the most important guarantee of civil liberties enjoyed by individuals and institutions. It is remarkable that, despite the vast differences in the historical milieus within which they lived and operated, Lincoln and Cavour maintained an unwavering commitment to the two beliefs at the heart of the ideology of progressive nationalism. In short, while Lincoln was essentially a self-made man who was born a citizen of a democratic republic, Cavour was a nobleman raised in an *ancién regime* kingdom that eventually turned into a constitutional monarchy. Yet, they were both men of the nineteenth century, the "age of progress," and they saw a clear manifestation of progress, first and foremost, in the powerful economic changes that the market revolution brought to the United States and in the effects of the industrial revolution on the northern regions of the Italian peninsula. Thus, even though, as a result of different readings and circumstances, Lincoln and Cavour maintained essentially opposite ideas in regard to economic liberalism and protectionism, they both came to believe, naturally, that economic development, epitomized by their similar enthusiasm for the building of railroads, was the key to the creation of a strong nation-state.[4]

Also, for both Lincoln and Cavour, economic development was the indispensable foundation on which to build a political system based on the respect of individual liberty and on the right to parliamentary representation. In respect to the latter, there is no doubt that Lincoln's U.S. Republican belief in universal male suffrage and Cavour's Piedmontese Liberal convictions on the restriction of suffrage to the propertied class diverged sharply; yet, the same could be said about

the strong divergence between Lincoln's initial ambiguous attitudes toward slavery and Cavour's well-known commitment to abolition.[5] The truth is that, while these specific differences are due primarily to particular historical circumstances, Lincoln's and Cavour's general ideas and beliefs in the fundamental tenets of progressive nationalism are, effectively, comparable, also because, in both cases, their beliefs had a strong moderate element. Thus, Lincoln's and the Republican Party's antislavery, rather than abolitionist, politics in the Civil War United States provide a viable comparative counterpart to Cavour's moderate liberal, rather than democratic or republican, politics in *Risorgimento* Italy. The comparable problems that Lincoln and Cavour faced in 1861, therefore, focused, in both cases, on maintaining the process of nation-building—through reunification in one case, and through unification in the other—within moderate parameters. Even though, unlike Cavour, Lincoln eventually took a radical step by enacting slave emancipation, there is little doubt that the republican nation that arose from the American Civil War and the Italian nation that was unified as the Kingdom of Italy had a great deal in common with the two progressive nations that Lincoln and Cavour had originally envisioned.[6]

By mid-1861, however, Lincoln and Cavour faced another type of potentially comparable problem, which related to the centrifugal political forces that were bent on undoing their plans for national unification in the United States and Italy along moderate lines. In the United States, those centrifugal forces were at the origins of the movement for secession in the majority of the southern states and for the formation of the Confederacy, between December 1860 and May 1861, which, effectively, led to Lincoln's war effort toward national reunification. Conversely, in Italy, where national unification had just been achieved, with the creation of the Italian kingdom in March 1861, a possible secession of the southern provinces was a threat and also a distinct possibility that occupied the minds of the members of the post-unification Italian governments, especially because of southern Italy's state of open rebellion against the Italian state at the time of the Great Brigandage. Thus, Cavour and his direct successors as Italy's prime ministers were haunted by the idea of a repetition on Italian soil of a situation similar to the one that had occurred in contemporary Civil War America. It is no wonder, then, that the study of transnational contacts between high administrative officials in the American and Italian governments, and also of documents written by British diplomats, in the period 1861–63, in conjunction with the study of the actual events that occurred in southern Italy in that

period, shows the presence of references to the existence of an actual state of civil war there, possibly conducive to an outright secession of the southern Italian provinces, and with both similarities and differences to the contemporary events in the United States.[7]

Yet, leaving aside the specific study of the transnational contacts between high government officials and the connections that they drew between the situation in the United States and the situation in Italy, an actual comparative research focusing on the Confederate South and southern Italy in the period 1861–65 shows that the parallels that one can draw between the inner civil wars that affected the two southern regions are many. In particular, comparison shows that both the inner civil wars in the two southern regions went through two distinct phases, and that in these two phases different groups acted as main agents of historical change. In both cases, in the first phase, the inner civil wars occurred primarily as clashes between two different groups of supporters of opposite ideas of nationalism—i.e., the Confederates and the Unionists in the Civil War U.S. South and the Italian government and the pro-Bourbon legitimists in southern Italy—and focused on conflicts over the creation of a new nation versus the preservation of an old one. Then, still in both cases, the second phase of the inner civil wars focused on the claims of the previously largely excluded southern agrarian masses—i.e., African American slaves in the Confederate South and southern Italian peasants in the *Mezzogiorno*—to become decisive agents of change in the two conflicts through their potential to tilt the balance in favor of different possible outcomes for the futures of the two nations. Comparison shows also that, in both cases, the two phases partly overlapped, so that, effectively, in the course of the five years of duration of both inner civil wars, the conflict involving the supporters of opposite ideas of nations and the conflict involving the previously largely excluded southern agrarian masses often occurred at the same time, in a particularly complex turn of events to analyze in comparative historical perspective.[8]

All in all, a sustained historical comparison of selected themes within the wider contexts of the processes of nation-building in Civil War America and *Risorgimento* Italy—a comparison that, in some cases, can be enhanced and corroborated by evidence coming from the investigation of previously unknown transnational connections—shows the importance of analyzing and understanding the reasons for the existence of parallels in the making and unmaking of nations in the Euro-American world, and beyond, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. In fact, by looking at the historical record in comparative perspective, it is clear that those decades were, effectively, as

much a time of creation as of disruption of nations, since conflicting versions of nationalism and conflicting projects of nation-building were ubiquitous features in Europe and the Americas, and in the wider nineteenth-century world, as the examples of Ireland and Algeria briefly recounted in the Introduction clearly show. In this perspective, secession and civil war were both likely to occur in the context of processes of nation-building, largely as a result of different influences within the complex web of factors that led to the explosion of nationalism in different degrees and in different regions of the Euro-American and wider world during the long nineteenth century. Thus, the specific comparative historical investigation of the parallel courses of nation-building in Civil War America and in *Risorgimento* Italy, whether it focuses on movements, individuals, or on larger historical processes, not only can help us understand why events occurred in certain ways and led to certain outcomes, but also can offer a possible model for other comparative historical investigations looking at parallel courses either of nation-building, or of unmaking of nations, in other regions of the world during the long nineteenth century.

Notes

Introduction

1. The "transnational turn" in American history and Risorgimento history is well represented by the following works: for the United States, see Thomas Bender, *Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006), and Ian Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York: Palgrave, 2007); for Italy, see Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, eds. *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (New York: Palgrave, 2012).
2. W. Caleb McDaniel and Bethany L. Johnson, "New Approaches to Internationalizing the History of the Civil War Era," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 2:2 (2012), 146. See also Michael E. Woods, "What Twenty-First Century Historians Have Said about the Causes of Disunion: A Civil War Sesquicentennial of the Recent Literature," *Journal of American History* 99:2 (2012), 415–439; and Don H. Doyle, "The Global Civil War," in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2014), 1103–1120.
3. Maurizio Isabella, "Review Article: Rethinking Italy's Nation-Building 150 Years Afterwards: The New Risorgimento Historiography," *Past & Present* 217 (2012), 267. See also Maurizio Isabella, "Nationality before Liberty? Risorgimento Political Thought in Transnational Context," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 17:5 (2012), 507–515; and Oliver Janz and Lucy Riall, "Special Issue: The Italian Risorgimento: Transnational Perspectives: Introduction," *Modern Italy* 19:1 (2014), 1–4.
4. See David Potter, "Civil War," in C. Van Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 138–143. Previously, in 1962, Potter had mentioned some of the comparative themes he would elaborate on in the following years; see David Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," *American Historical Review* 67 (1962), 924–950.
5. Even though he never published a comparative historical monograph, in his acclaimed study on the origins of the American Civil War, *The Impending* Crisis, Potter hinted at the importance of a wider perspective including contemporaneous events in Europe; see David Potter, *The*

Impending Crisis, 1848–1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), especially 1–17.

6. For an overview of the historiography of American exceptionalism and comparative history's contribution to its dismantlement, see George Fredrickson, "From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History," *Journal of American History* 82 (1995), 587–604; and Rick Halpern and Jonathan Morris, eds., *American Exceptionalism: U.S. Working Class Formation in an International Context* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
7. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Raimondo Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile americana* (Turin: Enaudi, 1966). See also Raimondo Luraghi, "The Civil War and Modernization of American Society: Social Structure and Industrial Revolution in the Old South before and during the War," *Civil War History* 18 (1972), 230–267; and, more recently, Raimondo Luraghi, "Il significato storico della Guerra Civile americana centoquarant'anni dopo," *TuttoStoria* 2001, 24–31, in which the author claims once more that "the Civil War took its rightful place among the nineteenth-century national revolutions" (p. 25).
8. Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Invention of Tradition," in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence N. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14. See also Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
9. See especially Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1987); Peter Kolchin, *A Sphinx on the American Land: The Nineteenth-Century South in Comparative Perspective* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003); Shearer Davis Bowman, *Masters and Lords: Mid-19th-Century U.S. Planters and Prussian Junkers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Enrico Dal Lago, *Agrarian Elites: American Slaveholders and Southern Italian Landowners, 1815–1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005).
10. See Drew Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Susan-Mary Grant, *North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Civil War Era* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000); Melinda Lawson, *Patriot Fires: Ideology and National Identity in the Civil War North* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Paul Quigley, *Shifting Grounds: Nationalism and the*

American South, 1848–1865 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Paul Quigley, "Nationalism," in Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War*, 1056–1072.

11. See Timothy M. Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); André Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: the American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); and W. Caleb McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013). See also Patrick J. Kelly, "The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Transnational Turn in Civil War History," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 4 (2014), 431–443; and Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).
12. See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Lloyd Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). See also James M. McPherson, *Is Blood Thicker than Water? Crises of Nationalism in the Modern World* (New York: Random House, 1998).
13. Steven Hahn, "Class and State in Postemancipation Societies: Southern Planters in Comparative Perspective," *American Historical Review* 95 (1990), 75–98; and Carl N. Degler, "One Among Many: The United States and National Unification," in Gabor Boritt, ed., *Lincoln, the War President: The Gettysburg Lectures* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 89–120.
14. Stig Forster and Joerg Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
15. See especially Philip Pomper et al., eds., *World History: Ideologies, Structures, and Identities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Anthony G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (New York: Norton, 2002); and Jerry H. Bentley, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also on the influence of the new history of globalization on scholarship on the U.S. South, Peter Kolchin, "The South and the World," *Journal of Southern History* 75 (2009), 565–580.
16. In this respect, particularly important in the European and Italian context, is Tiziano Bonazzi and Carlo Galli, eds. *La guerra civile americana vista dall'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004).
17. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolutions, 1789–1848* (London: Abacus, 1962); *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875* (London: Abacus, 1975); and *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (London: Abacus, 1983).
18. See C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); and Jurgen Osterhammel,

The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

19. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 162.
20. See Marc Bloch, "Pour une histoire compare des societies europeennes," *Revue de synthese historique* 46 (1928), 15–50; Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980), 174–197; and Kolchin, *Sphinx on the American Land*, 3–4.
21. See George Fredrickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 47–65. On the influence of the transnational method of research specifically on the history of the United States, see especially David Thelen, "The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History," *Journal of American History* 86 (1999), 965–975; Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation*; and Carl Guarneri, *America in the World: United States History in Global Context* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007).
22. See Michael Werner and Benedict Zimmerman, "Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et reflexivité," *Annales HSS* (2003), 7–36; and Benedict Zimmerman et al., *Le travail et la nation: histoire croisée de la France e de l'Allemagne* (Paris: Maison des Sciences de l'homme, 1999).
23. On this debate, see Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, "Introduction: Comparative History, Cross-National History, Transnational History—Definitions," in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, eds., *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2004), ix–xxiv.
24. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jurgen Kocka, "Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems," in Cohen and O'Connor, eds., *Comparison and History*, 32.
25. See Jurgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," *History and Theory* 42 (2003), 39–44.
26. Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 42–43.
27. See the works cited in Bender, *Nation among Nations*, 321–331.
28. On these themes, see, in particular, Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. "Peculiar Institution" in International Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012). See also the works cited in Kolchin, *Sphinx on the American Land*, 75–115; the important comparative works by Don Doyle, *Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003) and by Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, *Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006).
29. See, on some of these links, Axel Körner, "Barbarous America" in Axel Körner, Nicola Miller, and Adam I. P. Smith, eds., *America Imagined: Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 125–160.

30. On these themes, see Tiziano Bonazzi, "Postfazione. La guerra civile americana e la 'nazione universale'" in Galli and Bonazzi, eds., *La guerra civile americana vista dall'Europa*, 463–502; and Tiziano Bonazzi, "Un americanista di fronte all'unita d'Italia, ovvero l'Atlantico *mare nostrum*," *Giornale di Storia Costituzionale* 22:2 (2011), 73–90.
31. On the United States, see especially Doyle, *Nations Divided*; on Italy, see Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy* (London: Longman, 2002), 7–13.
32. See Christine Kinealy, "Politics in Ireland," in Chris Williams, ed., *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 473–488.
33. See Theodore Hoppen, *Ireland since 1800: Conflict and Conformity* (London: Longman, 1999), 30–35.
34. D. George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland* (London: Routledge, 1995), 149. See also Thomas Bartlett, "The Emergence of the Irish Catholic Nation," in Alvin Jackson, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 517–543.
35. Senia Paseta, *Modern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.
36. See Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland*, 176–179.
37. On these issues in relation to the United States, see Angela Murphy, *American Slavery, Irish Freedom: Abolition, American Citizenship, and the Transatlantic Movement for Irish Repeal* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); and Paul Quigley, "Secessionists in an Age of Secession: The Slave South in Transatlantic Perspective," in Don H. Doyle, ed., *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 151–173.
38. For connections and comparisons between nationalism and nation-building in nineteenth-century Ireland and Italy in particular, see Colin Barr and Anne O'Connor, "Introduction," in Colin Barr, Michele Finelli, and Anne O'Connor, *Nation/Nazione: Irish Nationalism and the Italian Risorgimento* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2014), 1–16. For an interesting comparison between Ireland and Italy in the 1860s, see Niall Whelehan, "Youth, Generations, and Collective Action in Nineteenth-Century Ireland and Italy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56 (2014), 934–966.
39. On some of these issues, see Roisin Healy and Enrico Dal Lago, "Rethinking Colonialism within Europe," and Enrico Dal Lago, "Italian Unification and the *Mezzogiorno* [the Italian name for southern Italy]: Colonialism in One Country?" both in Roisin Healy and Enrico Dal Lago, eds., *The Shadow of Colonialism on Europe's Modern Past* (New York: Palgrave, 2014), 3–22; and 57–72.
40. See Robert Aldrich, *The Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
41. M. H. Cherif, "New Trends in the Maghrib: Tunisia, Algeria, and Lybia," in J. F. Ade Ajayi, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa*, vol. 6:

Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 183.

42. See Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters: Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 65–91.
43. See Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, *Africa since 1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 47–49.
44. See N. A. Ivanov, "New Patterns of European Intervention in the Maghrib," in Ajayi, ed., *Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, 201–205.
45. See Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10–18.
46. See Orville Vernon Burton, *The Age of Lincoln* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007); and Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, 3 Vols. (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 1969–84).
47. See Howard R. Marraro, *American Opinion on the Unification of Italy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933); Giorgio Spini, "Le relazioni politiche fra l'Italia e gli Stati Uniti durante il Risorgimento e la Guerra Civile" in A. Lombardo et al., *Italia e Stati Uniti nell'età del Risorgimento e della Guerra Civile* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 121–185; and Giorgio Spini, *Incontri europei e americani con il Risorgimento* (Florence: Sansoni, 1986).
48. See Paola Gemme, *Domesticating Foreign Struggles: The Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2005); and Daniele Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia, 1848–1911* (Rome: Gangemi, 2013). See also Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 14–45.
49. See Roland Sarti, "La democrazia radicale. Uno sguardo reciproco tra Stati Uniti e Italia," in Maurizio Ridolfi, ed., *La democrazia radicale nell'Ottocento europeo. Forme della politica, modelli culturali, riforme sociali* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2005), 133–158; Joseph Rossi, *The Image of America in Mazzini's Writings* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954); and Enzo Tagliacozzo, "Lincoln e il Risorgimento," in Lombardo et al., *Italia e Stati Uniti nell'età del Risorgimento e della Guerra Civile*, 313–335.
50. See Glauco Licata, "Il messaggio di Lincoln e la prospettiva dei patrioti italiani," *Il Risorgimento* 17 (1965), 73–90.
51. Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile americana,* 212. See also Raimondo Luraghi, *La Guerra civile americana. Le ragioni e i protagonisti del primo conflitto industriale* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2013), 52–53.
52. Tagliacozzo, "Lincoln e il Risorgimento," 313–314. See also, among the few studies that have hinted at this particular comparison, Potter, "Civil War," 138–143.
53. On Lincoln, see especially David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Richard Carwardine, *Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power* (New York: Vintage, 2006); and Eric Foner, *The Fiery*

Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: Knopf, 2010). On Cavour, see especially Luciano Cafagna, *Cavour* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999); Adriano Viarengo, *Cavour* (Rome: Salerno, 2010): and Umberto Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). For recent comparative and transnational approaches, see Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 145–172; Gilles Pecout, "Cavour visto dagli Stati Uniti" in Daniele Fiorentino and Matteo Sanfilippo, eds., *Gli Stati Uniti e l'unita d'Italia* (Rome: Gangemi, 2004), 125–132; and Eugenio Biagini, "The Principle of Humanity: Lincoln in Germany and Italy, 1859–1865" in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 76–94.

54. See especially Peter Parish, *The North and the Nation in the Era of the Civil War* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); Lawson, *Patriot Fires*; John A. Rawley, *Abraham Lincoln and a Nation Worth Fighting For* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); Adam I. P. Smith, *No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Gary Gallagher, *The Union War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
55. See especially Faust, *Creation of Confederate Nationalism*; Gary Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Anne Sarah Rubin, *A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861–1868* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*; and Quigley, *Shifting Grounds*.
56. All the studies mentioned are representative of the recent interest among Civil War historians, in different degrees, in the importance of symbols and culture in the interpretation of nationalism and nation-building in the Union and the Confederacy.
57. See especially Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento," in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 22: *Il Risorgimento* (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. xxiii–xli; Lucy Riall and Axel Körner, "Introduction: The New History of Risorgimento Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 15 (2009), 396–401; and Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, "Introduction: Revisiting the Risorgimento," in Patriarca and Riall, eds., *The Risorgimento Revisited*, 1–17.
58. See especially the essays in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento* (Turin: UTET, 2008); Lucy Riall, *Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 117–146; and Isabella, "Rethinking Italy's Nation-Building," 250–257.
59. Interestingly, in Italy, the recent historiographical rediscovery and acknowledgment of conflicting views of the nation in the Risorgimento has led to an important phenomenon of reevaluation of alternative types of nationalism

that were defeated in the process of Italian national unification, with a specific regard to southern Italy. While there are valuable scholarly studies on this topic—such as, especially, Salvatore Lupo's *L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Rome: Donzelli, 2011) and several essays by Carmine Pinto in the review *Meridiana*—there is also a strong nonscholarly production on these issues, best represented by Gigi Di Fiore's *I vinti del Risorgimento. Storia e storie di chi combattè per I Borbone di Napoli* (Turin: UTET, 2004). The latter, however, has also led to several amateurish studies, mostly published by the Neapolitan press *Controcorrente*, which have mostly praised a-critically the pre-unification Bourbon Kingdom in southern Italy and condemned equally a-critically the creation of the Italian nation. A possible comparison with the United States in this vein could focus on the plethora of counterfactual narratives of the American Civil War—many of them at the heart of novels with a certain impact on contemporary American culture—in which the Confederacy is victorious over the Union. For a scholarly approach to the counterrevolutionary history of the Confederacy, see specifically Roger L. Ransom, *The Confederate States of America: What Might Have Been* (New York: Norton, 2005).

60. For comparisons between contexts and ideological influences in nineteenth-century America and Italy, see Enrico Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013), 1–14.
61. See Cohen and O'Connor, "Introduction," pp. ix–xxii; and Jurgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Preface: Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History," in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jurgen Kocka, eds., *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
62. Kolchin, "The South and the World," 577, 579.
63. For more on the combined comparative-transnational approach, see Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 1–16.

CHAPTER 1

1. "Prospects of Italy—Italian Liberalism," *Russell's Magazine* 3 (1858), 459–460.
2. Paul Hamilton Hayne, "Editorial," *Russell's Magazine* 1 (1857), 178. For more information on *Russell's Magazine*, see Richard J. Calhoun, "The Antebellum Literary Twilight: *Russell's Magazine,*" *The Southern Literary Journal* 3:1 (1970), 89–110; and Alton Taylor Loftis, "A Study of *Russell's Magazine*: Antebellum Charleston's Last Literary Periodical," PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1973.
3. See Enrico Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013), 1–14.

4. See Joseph Rossi, *The Image of America in Mazzini's Writings* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954); Howard Marraro, *American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1848–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Giorgio Spini, *Incontri europei e americani col Risorgimento* (Florence: Sansoni, 1986); Don H. Doyle, *Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003); Roland Sarti, "La democrazia radicale. Uno sguardo reciproco tra Italia e Stati Uniti" in Maurizio Ridolfi, ed., *La democrazia radicale nell'Ottocento europeo. Forme della politica, modelli culturali, riforme sociali* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2005); Paola Gemme, *Domesticating Foreign Struggles: The Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005); Timothy M. Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); and W. Caleb McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013).
5. Giuseppe Mazzini quoted in Rossi, *The Image of America in Mazzini's Writings*, 124. See also Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini*, 128–138.
6. On connections between the United States in the Civil War Era and Italy in the Age of the *Risorgimento*, see especially Daniele Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia, 1848–1901* (Rome: Gangemi, 2013).
7. Matteo Sanfilippo, "Il Risorgimento visto dal Canada e dagli Stati Uniti," *Il Risorgimento* 47:1/2 (1995), 490–493.
8. Daniele Fiorentino has explained the reasons for this important parallel by stating that "the achievement of Italian unification and the reconstitution of the North American Union ushered in the definitive affirmation of a liberal bourgeoisie no longer willing to allow compromises with the traditional authorities that prevented the thorough development of men's freedom and creativity"; see Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*, 199.
9. Giuseppe Mazzini quoted in "Prospects for Italy," 460. On these points, see Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. "Peculiar Institution" in International Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 123–144.
10. See David Brion Davis, *Slavery and Human Progress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) and *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation* (New York: Knopf, 2014); Seymour Drescher, *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Robin Blackburn, *The American Crucible; Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights* (London: Verso, 2011).
11. On nationalism, see especially Stuart J. Woolf, "Introduction" in Stuart J. Woolf, ed., *Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1996), 1–39; and Stefan Berger, "National Movements" in Stefan Berger, ed., *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 178–192.

12. David A. J. Richards, *Italian American: The Racializing of an Ethnic Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 116. On these issues, see also Roberts, *Distant Revolutions*; and Andre M. Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
13. See David Brion Davis, *Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 74–75; and McDaniel, *Problem of Democracy*, 34–51.
14. See R. S. White, *Natural Rights and the Birth of Romanticism in the 1790s* (New York: Palgrave, 2006).
15. On Romanticism and American abolitionism, see especially Ronald G. Walters, *American Reformers, 1815–1860* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1997), 81–85; and John L. Thomas, "Romantic Reform in America, 1815–1865," *American Quarterly* 17:4 (1965), 656–681. On Romanticism and nationalism in Europe with particular reference to the Italian case, see especially Alfredo De Paz, *Europa romantica. Fondamenti e paradigmi della sensibilità moderna* (Naples: Liguori, 1994), 170–187.
16. Mazzini's 1854 letter is quoted in William Lloyd Garrison, "Introduction" in Emily Ashurst Venturi, ed., *Joseph Mazzini: His Life, Writings, and Political Principles* (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1872), p. xvi.
17. See Enrico Dal Lago and Rick Halpern, "Two Case-Studies in Comparative History: The American South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*," in Enrico Dal Lago and Rick Halpern, eds., *The American South and the Italian* Mezzogiorno*: Essays in Comparative History* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3–25.
18. Eric Foner, "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions," *Civil War History* 20 (1974), 206.
19. See especially Susan-Mary Grant, *North over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000).
20. See especially Marta Petrusewicz, *Come il Mezzogiorno divenne una questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud prima e dopo il Quarantotto* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 1998).
21. On specific issues of comparison between the agrarian worlds of the antebellum U.S. South and southern Italy, see Enrico Dal Lago, *Agrarian Elites: American Slaveholders and Southern Italian Landowners, 1815–1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); and Peter Kolchin, *A Sphinx on the American Land: The Nineteenth-Century South in Comparative Perspective* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003). See also Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 95–122; and Dale Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and the World Economy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
22. On Garrisonian abolitionists and Mazzinian Democrats, see McDaniel, *Problem of Democracy*, 130–133; and Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini*, 113–139.

23. See Robert H. Abzug, *Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 64–75.
24. William Lloyd Garrison, "The American Anti-Slavery Society's Declaration of Sentiments (1833)," in Rick Halpern and Enrico Dal Lago, eds., *Slavery and Emancipation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 299–301. See also William E. Cain, "Introduction: William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight against Slavery," in William E. Cain, ed., *William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight against Slavery* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 11–13; and Henry Mayer, *All On Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery* (New York: Macmillan, 1998). On Garrison's religious view of abolition, see James B. Stewart, *William Lloyd Garrison and the Challenge of Emancipation* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1992), 56–78; and William L. Van Deburg, "William Lloyd Garrison and the 'Pro-Slavery Priesthood': The Changing Beliefs of an Evangelical Reformer, 1830–1840," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 43 (1975), 224–237.
25. See James B. Stewart, *Holy Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), 51–74.
26. Don H. Doyle, "Slavery, Secession, and Reconstruction as American Problems," in Larry J. Griffin and Don H. Doyle, eds., *The South as an American Problem* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 106. On Garrisonian nonresistant abolitionism until 1840, see especially McDaniel, *Problem of Democracy*, 45–64; and Aileen S. Kraditor, *Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1830–1850* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).
27. Ronald G. Walters, *The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism after 1830* (New York: Norton, 1978), 141.
28. McDaniel, *Problem of Democracy*, 114.
29. Correcting this basic historical distortion, which was the fruit of much abolitionist propaganda, Herbert Aptheker has written that "if the slaves had embraced their 'natural' status, there would have been no abolitionist movement. Slavery induced slave unrest, and slave unrest induced abolitionism"; see Herbert Aptheker, *Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1989), 59. On Garrisonian Abolitionists' struggle against racial prejudice, see Paul Goodman, *Of One Blood: Abolitionism and the Origins of Racial Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 233–260.
30. Amos Phelps, *Lectures on Slavery and its Remedy* (Boston, MA, 1834). On slave rebellions in the U.S. South also in the wider context, see Douglas R. Egerton, "Slave Resistance" in Mark M. Smith and Gabriel L. Paquette, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 447–464.
31. William Ellery Channing's quote in George Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro–American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Prejudices, 1971), 106. On "Romantic

Racialism," see Fredrickson, *Black Image in the White Mind*, 97–129; and Mia Bay, "Remembering Racism: Rereading the Black Image in the White Mind," *Reviews in American History* 27:4 (1999), 646–656.

32. Denis Mack Smith, *Mazzini* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 16.
33. On Garrison's and Mazzini's friendship, Enrico Dal Lago, "*We Cherished the Same Hostility to Every Form of Tyranny*: Transatlantic Parallels and Contacts between William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini, 1846–1872," *American Nineteenth-Century History* 13:3 (2012), 293–319.
34. Roland Sarti, "Giuseppe Mazzini and his Opponents," in John A. Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 81.
35. Giuseppe Mazzini's quote in Stuart J. Woolf, "La storia politica e sociale," in Ruggero Romano and Corrado Vivanti, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 3: *Dal primo Settecento all'Unità* (Turin: Einaudi, 1973), 311–312.
36. See Roland Sarti, *Mazzini: A Life for the Religion of Politics* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1997); and Simon Levi Sullam, "The Moses of Italian Unity: Mazzini and Nationalism as a Political Religion" in C. A. Bayly and Eugenio Biagini, eds., *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism, 1830–1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 107–124.
37. Clara Lovett, *The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830–1876* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 48–52. On Mazzini's utopianism, see also Lucio Perini, "Gli utopisti: delusioni della realtà, sogni dell'avvenire," in Ruggero Romano and Corrado Vivanti, *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 4: *Intellettuali e potere* (Turin: Einaudi, 1981), 409–412. See also Emilia Morelli, *Mazzini, quasi una biografia* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984); and Giovanni Belardelli, *Mazzini* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).
38. Mazzini's quote in Franco Della Peruta, *Politica e società nell'Italia dell'Ottocento. Problemi, vicende e personaggi* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1999), 18. See also Franco Della Peruta, *Mazzini e i rivoluzionari italiani. Il Partito d'Azione, 1830–1845* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974). Although Mazzini was much more interested in urban artisans than peasants, his idea of social justice applied to all classes of people, as he made clear in "Agli Italiani, e specialmente agli operai italiani" (To Italians, and especially to Italian Workers, 1842): "there must not be on this earth either *masters* or *slaves* but only *brothers* in the same faith, associated, each according to their calling, in a task to which all must contribute"; Mazzini's quote in Lovett, *Democratic Movement*, 56.
39. On northern and southern Italian Democrats and their relationship with the Bourbon Kingdom in southern Italy, see Giuseppe Berti, *I Democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale nel Risorgimento* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962); and Giuseppe Galasso, *La democrazia da Cattaneo a Rosselli* (Florence: Sansoni, 1982), 20–23.

40. See Della Peruta, *Politica e società*, 12–13.
41. See Della Peruta, *Mazzini e i rivoluzionari italiani*, 30–40.
42. Paul Ginsborg, "Risorgimento rivoluzionario," *Storia & Dossier* 6 (1991), 80. See also Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. 2: *Dalla Restaurazione alla Rivoluzione nazionale* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958), 380–383.
43. On 1850s US militant Abolitionism and Italian Democratic nationalism, see John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Franco Della Peruta, *I Democratici e la rivoluzione italiana. Dibattiti, ideali e contrasti all'indomani del 1848* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958).
44. See Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, "Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s," *Journal of American History* 58:4 (1972), 923–937.
45. Stewart, *Holy Warriors*, 155. See also Merton Dillon, *The Abolitionists: The Growth of a Dissenting Minority* (New York: Norton, 1974), 219–243; and James B. Stewart, "From Moral Suasion to Political Confrontation," in David Blight, ed., *Passages to Freedom: The Underground Railroad in History and Memory* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2004), 235–272.
46. James Redpath, *The Roving Editor, or Talks with Slaves in the Southern States* (New York, 1859), pp. iii–iv.
47. Redpath, *The Roving Editor*, 129–130.
48. James Redpath, *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, November 11, 1854. On Redpath, see especially James R. McKivigan, *Forgotten Firebrand: James Redpath and the Making of Nineteenth-Century America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
49. On Haiti's influence on antebellum and Civil War America, see especially Matthew J. Clavin, *Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War: The Promise and Peril of a Second Haitian Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
50. See Raimondo Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile americana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 132–133. See also Giulio Schenone, "John Brown e il pensiero insurrezionale italiano," in Raimondo Luraghi, ed., *Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Storia americana* (Genova, 26–29 Maggio 1976). *Italia e Stati Uniti dall'indipendenza Americana ad oggi (1776–1976)* (Genoa: Tilgher, 1978), 356–366; and Timothy M. Roberts, "The Relevance of Giuseppe Mazzini's Ideas of Insurgency to the American Slavery Crisis of the 1850s," in Bayly and Biagini, eds., *Mazzini and the Globalization*, 311–322.
51. Aptheker, *Abolitionism*, 123–124.
52. On Brown, see especially David S. Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Human Rights* (New York: Knopf, 2006); and Robert E. McGlone, *John Brown's War against Slavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
53. See Ginsborg, "Risorgimento rivoluzionario," 67–69.

54. See Victor Douglas Scotti, "La guerriglia negli scrittori risorgimentali italiani prima e dopo il 1848–49," *Il Risorgimento* 27:3 (1975), 106–110; and Candeloro, *Dalla Restaurazione*, 367–370.
55. See Franco Della Peruta, "La guerra di liberazione spagnola e la teoria della guerra per bande nel Risorgimento," *Il Risorgimento* 40:3 (1988), 156–157.
56. On the reasons for the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions in the Bourbon Kingdom, see Lucy Riall, "Garibaldi and the South," in Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, 133–137; Angelantonio Spagnoletti, *Storia del Regno delle Due Sicilie* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997); and Antonino De Francesco, "Ideologie e movimenti politici," in Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 1: *Le premesse dell'Unità* (Rome: Laterza, 1994), 270–294.
57. On Pisacane, see especially Luciano Russi, *Carlo Pisacane. Vita e pensiero di un rivoluzionario senza rivoluzione* (Naples: Edizoni Scientifiche Italiane, 2007); and Cosimo Pascarelli, *Il Risorgimento incompiuto: La tensione rivoluzionaria e l'iniziativa di Carlo Pisacane nell'Itaia meridionale* (Pavia: Iuculano, 2009).
58. See Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. IV: *Dalla rivoluzione nazionale all'Unità* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964).
59. See Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile*, 141–144.

CHAPTER 2

1. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, vol. 5: *Jean Valjean* (New York: Carlton Publisher, 1863), 44.
2. Elaborating on Victor Hugo's initial intuition, in 1912 George Macaulay Trevelyan wrote that "Pisacane's expedition against the Bourbons is related to Garibaldi's successful expedition three years later, exactly as John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry is related to the American Civil War. . . . Like John Brown, he [Pisacane] exacerbated the feud, made compromise impossible, and so helped to bring on the final struggle . . . and above all else he had known how to die"; see George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 70.
3. On the events at Harpers Ferry, see especially Tony Horwitz, *Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid that Sparked the Civil War* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2011), 127–187. See also Jonathan Earle, ed., *John Brown's Raid on Harpers Ferry: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008).
4. On responses to Harpers Ferry, see especially John Stauffer and Zoe Trodd, eds., *The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 2012); and Paul Finkelman, ed., *His Soul Goes Marching On: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).

5. Victor Hugo, "Letter to the Editor of the London *Daily News*" in *Letters on American Slavery* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1860), 5. On responses to Harpers Ferry in Europe and Victor Hugo, see Seymour Drescher, "Servile Insurrection and John Brown's Body in Europe," *Journal of American History* 80:2 (1993), 499–524.
6. On Pisacane's Sapri expedition, see Francesco Fusco, *Carlo Pisacane e la spedizione di Sapri* (Casalvelino: Galzerano Editore, 2007); and Carmine Pinto, "1857. Conflitto civile e guerra nazionale nel Mezzogiorno," *Meridiana* 69 (2010), 171–200.
7. On the aftermath of the Sapri expedition and its impact on the Italian democratic movement, see Alfonso Scirocco, *I democratici da Sapri a Porta Pia* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1969), 15–40, and Carmine Pinto, "Progettare la nazione. Il movimento democratico meridionale tra il 1857 e il 1860" in Carmine Pinto e Lucio Rossi, eds., *Tra pensiero e azione. Una biografia politica di Carlo Pisacane* (Salerno: Plectica, 2010).
8. Raimondo Luraghi, *Storia della guerra civile americana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 141–142.
9. Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra civile*, 131–135; and Giulio Schenone, "John Brown e il pensiero insurrezionale italiano" in Raimondo Luraghi, ed., *Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Storia americana* (26–29 Maggio 1976). *Italia e Stati Uniti dall'indipendenza americana ad oggi (1776–1976)* (Genoa: Tilgher, 1978), 356–366.
10. See Timothy M. Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 188–189. See also Timothy M. Roberts, "The Relevance of Giuseppe Mazzini's Ideas of Insurgency to the American Slavery Crisis of the 1850s" in C. A. Bayly and Eugenio Biagini, eds., *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism, 1830–1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 311–322.
11. Eugenio F. Biagini, "The Principle of Humanity: Lincoln in Germany and Italy, 1859–1865" in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 81.
12. See especially W. Caleb McDaniel and Bethany L. Johnson, "New Approaches to Internationalizing the History of the Civil War Era: An Introduction," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 2:2 (2012), 145–150. For transnational histories of the United States, see especially Thomas Bender, *Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006); and Ian Tyrrell, *United States History in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York: Palgrave, 2007).
13. See especially Richard Blackett, "And There Shall Be No More Sea: William Lloyd Garrison and the Transatlantic Abolitionist Movement" in James B. Stewart, ed., *William Lloyd Garrison at Two Hundred* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 13–40; Mischa Honek, *We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American*

Abolitionists after 1830 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); Caleb McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013); and Enrico Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013).

14. See especially Maurizio Isabella, "Nationality before Liberty? Risorgimento Political Thought in Transnational Context," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 17:5 (2012), 507–515. On the "new" history of the *Risorgimento*, see Alberto Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 22: *Il Risorgimento* (Turin: Einaudi, 2007); and Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, eds. *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (New York: Palgrave, 2012).
15. See especially Salvo Mastellone, *Mazzini scrittore politico in Inglese. Democracy in Europe (1840–1855)* (Florence: Olschki, 2004); Roland Sarti, "La democrazia radicale. Uno sguardo reciproco tra Stati Uniti ed Italia" in Maurizio Ridolfi, ed., *La democrazia radicale nell'Ottocento europeo. Forme della politica, modelli culturali, riforme sociali* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2005), 133–157; Baly and Biagini, eds., *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization*; and Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigres and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
16. The exceptions are Paul Finkelman, ed., *His Truth Goes Marching On: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995); and David S. Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights* (New York: Vintage, 2005).
17. See especially W. E. B. Du Bois, *John Brown* (New York: The Modern Library, 1996, orig. pub. in 1909); and C. Van Woodward, "John Brown's Private War" in Daniel Aaron, ed., *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History* (New York: Knopf, 1952).
18. See especially Stephen Oates, *To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography of John Brown* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984); John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Louis De Caro, *Fire from the Midst of You: A Religious Life of John Brown* (New York: New York University Press, 2002); Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*; and Robert E. McGlone, *John Brown's War against Slavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On Brown's historiography and legacy, see also Robert Blakeslee, *John Brown still Lives! America's Long Reckoning with Violence, Equality, and Change* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
19. Evan C. Rothera, "How and in What Balance Weigh John Brown? The Current State and Future of John Brown Historiography," *Essays in History: The Annual Journal Produced by the Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia*, 4 (Winter 2013), available at www.essaysinhistory.com/content/"how-and-what-balance-weigh-john-brown".

20. See Alfredo Oriani, *La lotta politica in Italia* (Florence: Soc. Anonima editrice "La Voce," 1921); Nello Rosselli, *Carlo Pisacane nel Risorgimento italiano* (Turin: Einaudi, 1932); Antonio Gramsci, *Il Risorgimento* (Turin: Einaudi, 1949); and Giuseppe Berti, *I democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale nel Risorgimento* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962).
21. See Carlo Vetter, *Carlo Pisacane e il socialismo risorgimentale* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1984); Leonardo La Puma, *Il pensiero politico di Carlo Pisacane* (Turin: Giappichelli, 1995); and Luciano Russi, *Carlo Pisacane. Vita e pensiero di un rivoluzionario senza rivoluzione* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2007).
22. Graziano Palamara, *Patrioti a confronto. Carlo Pisacane, Beneetto Musolino e Giovanni Nicotera* (Soveria Mannelli, CZ: Rubbettino, 2012), 23. See also Berti, *I democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale*; and Russi, *Carlo Pisacane*, 33–46.
23. See Louis A. DeCaro, Jr., *"Fire from the Midst of You": A Religious Life of John Brown* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 43–80.
24. See Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 29–94.
25. Stauffer and Trodd, *The Tribunal*, p. xxiv.
26. See Rosselli, *Carlo Pisacane nel Risorgimento italiano*, 3–28.
27. See Palamara, *Patrioti a confronto*, 22–23.
28. Luciano Russi, *Studi su Carlo Pisacane. Realtà e utopia di un rivoluzionario* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2012), 167.
29. Herbert Aptheker, *Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1989), 131.
30. William A. Phillips quoted in Aptheker, *Abolitionism*, 131.
31. W. Caleb McDaniel, "His Brother's Keeper: John Brown, Moral Stewardship and Interracial Abolitionism," *Slavery & Abolition* 32:1 (2011), 29. On John Brown's religious vision, see especially DeCaro, Jr., *"Fire from the Midst of You,"* 83–120.
32. On the North Elba community, see especially Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men*, 134–158. See also De Caro, *"ire from the Midst of You*, 163–176, on the religious element, and on North Elba as a promised land.
33. McDaniel, "His Brother's Keeper," 37–42.
34. Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 127.
35. Gerry Smith quoted in Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men*, 139.
36. John Brown quoted in Louis Ruchames, ed., *John Brown, the Making of a Revolutionary: The Story of John Brown in His Own Words and in the Words of Those Who Knew Him* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969), 75.
37. John Brown, Jr. quoted in Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 82.
38. See Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 82–83. See also Jonathan Beecher, *Charles Fourier: The Visionary and his World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); and Sterling F. Delano, *Brook Farm: The Dark Side of Utopia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard Press, 2004).
39. Horwitz, *Midnight Rising*, 80.
40. De Caro, *"Fire from the Midst of You*, 245.

41. On the *Provisional Constitution* and its meaning and context, see especially Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 249–264; and Stauffer and Trodd, "Introduction," 29–30. For a critical view, see Daniel Littlefield, "Blacks, John Brown, and a Theory of Manhood" in Finkelman, ed., *His Soul Goes Marching On*, 78–80.
42. John Brown, "Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States, May 8, 1858" in Stauffer and Trodd, eds., *The Tribunal*, 27.
43. Brown, "Provisional Constitution," 33.
44. Brown, "Provisional Constitution," 36.
45. It is also important to acknowledge that, together with the interracial and utopian socialist elements, John Brown's 1858 *Provisional Constitution* also included "the fundamental principles of Puritan life, as illustrated by the emphasis on family, school, and church as an integrant part of the state," and "a strong moral code"; see DeCaro, "*Fire from the Midst of You*," 245.
46. Pisacane quoted in Lucio Perini, "Gli utopisti: delusioni della realtà, sogni dell'avvenire," in Ruggero Romano and Corrado Vivanti, *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 4: *Intellettuali e potere* (Turin: Einaudi, 1981), 412–413.
47. See Russi, *Carlo Pisacane*, 141–156.
48. Among the different editions, see especially Franco Della Peruta, ed., *Pisacane, La rivoluzione* (Turin: Einaudi, 1970).
49. Russi, *Carlo Pisacane*, 148.
50. Della Peruta, ed., *Pisacane, La rivoluzione*, 62.
51. Della Peruta, ed., *Pisacane, La rivoluzione*, 179.
52. Palamara, *Patrioti a confronto*, 84–85. See also Franco Della Peruta, "La nazione dei democratici," in Umberto Levra, ed., *Nazioni, nazionalità, stati nazionali nell'Ottocento europeo* (Rome: Carocci, 2004).
53. Carlo Pisacane, *Vita e scritti scelti* (Milan: Dalai editore, 2011), 25.
54. Pisacane, *Vita e scritti scelti*, 27. See also Cosimo Pascarelli, *Il Risorgimento incompiuto. La tensione rivoluzionaria e l'iniziativa di Carlo Pisacane nell'Italia meridionale* (Pavia: Iuculano, 2009).
55. Carlo Pisacane, *Testamento politico* (24 Giugno 1857), in Pisacane, *Vita e scritti scelti*, 74–79.
56. Russi, *Carlo Pisacane*, 157.
57. Pisacane, *Testamento politico*, 74.
58. See particularly the important analysis in Rosselli, *Carlo Pisacane nel Risorgimento italiano*, 199–229.
59. Pisacane, *Testamento politico*, 75.
60. See Russi, *Studi su Carlo Pisacane*, 93–108. See also the important studies by Luigi Bulferetti, *Socialismo risorgimentale* (Turin: Einaudi, 1949); by Aldo Romano, *Storia del movimento socialista in Italia* (Milan: Bocca, 1954), vol. I; and by Mario Leonardi, "Insurrezione nazionale e rivoluzione sociale nel pensiero di Carlo Pisacane," *Critica storica* 10 (1973), 79–113.

61. See Schenone, "John Brown," 356–366.
62. On this point, see Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini*, 153–154.
63. On Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz and his writings, see especially Piero Pieri, *Carlo Bianco, conte di Saint Jorioz, e il suo trattato sulla guerra partigiana* (Turin: Deputazione Subalpina di Storia Patria, 1958).
64. See Victor Douglas Scotti, "La guerriglia negli scrittori risorgimentali italiani prima e dopo il 1848–49," *Il Risorgimento* 27:3 (1975), 106–110.
65. Interestingly, according to Raimondo Luraghi, "it is difficult to avoid being impressed by the fact that the similarities between the ideas of Bianco, of Mazzini and his followers [among whom Pisacane], and those of John Brown are very tight"; see Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile Americana*, 133.
66. Roberts, "The Relevance of Giuseppe Mazzini's Ideas," 314.
67. See Schenone, "John Brown," 356–366; and Roberts, "The Relevance of Giuseppe Mazzini's Ideas," 314–315.
68. Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist*, 262–263. According to Matthew Clavin, the fact that fellow militant abolitionist James "Redpath and Brown discussed the Haitian Revolution is apparent," while Brown himself "impressed [his supporter Richard J.] Hinton by also reciting the history of the Haitian Revolution"; see Matthew Clavin, "A Second Haitian Revolution: John Brown, Toussaint Louverture, and the Making of the American Civil War," *Civil War History* 54:2 (2008), 141, 142.
69. See Du Bois, *John Brown*, 273–307. See also Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men*, 255–256.
70. Du Bois, *John Brown*, 274.
71. On the Roman Republic, see Giuseppe Monsagrati, *Roma senza il Papa. La Repubblica romana del 1849* (Rome: Laterza, 2014).
72. Richard Realf quoted in Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile Americana*, 134. See also Schenone, "John Brown," 359–361; and Richard Boyer, *The Legend of John Brown: A Biography and a History* (New York: Knopf, 1973), 409–411.
73. Roberts, "The Relevance of Giuseppe Mazzini's Ideas," 315.
74. Horwitz, *Midnight Rising*, 66. See also Hugh Forbes, *Manual of the Patriotic Volunteer* (New York: W.H. Tinson, 1854).
75. Significantly, according to Timothy Roberts, Brown was acquainted with a small group of Europeans, aside from Forbes, who had been active in the 1848–49 revolutions, and who included Polish revolutionary Charles Leonhardt, Bavarian Charles Kaiser, and August Bondi, who had been in Lajos Kossuth's Hungarian revolutionary force, and the already mentioned British Chartist Richard Hinton; see Roberts, *Distant Revolutions*, 187.
76. Albert J. Von Frank, "John Brown, James Redpath, and the Idea of Revolution," *Civil War History* 52:2 (2006), 145. Conversely, Robert

McGlone has argued that Brown thought of Harpers Ferry mostly as a symbolic act "that would gain him and his cause national attention and spread confusion, even panic, among slaveholders," and there is no doubt that these elements also must have loomed large in Brown's mind; see McGlone, *John Brown's War against Slavery*, 245.

77. See especially Russi, *Studi su Carlo Pisacane*, 153–192.
78. See Franco Della Peruta, *I Democratici e la rivoluzione italiana. Dibattiti, ideali e contrasti all'indomani del 1848* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958); and Antonino De Francesco, "Ideologie e movimenti politici" in Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, Vol. 1: *Le premesse dell'Unità* (Rome: Laterza, 1994), 270–294.
79. See Monsagrati, *Roma senza il Papa*; and Carlo Pisacane, *Guerra combattuta in Italia negli anni 1848–49* (Genoa: Pavesi, 1851).
80. Russi, *Studi su Carlo Pisacane*, 187.
81. Pisacane, *Guerra combattuta in Italia*, cited in Denis Mack Smith, ed., *The Making of Italy, 1796–1866* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 160.
82. Andrea Del Corno has elegantly paraphrased Pisacane by writing that "revolutions, to succeed, had to find their foundations in profound social innovations, not simply in institutional change"; see Andrea Del Corno, Review of Richard Mann Roberts, ed., *Carlo Pisacane's La Rivoluzione. Revolution: An Alternative Answer to the Italian Question*, *Modern Italy* 17:1 (2012), 141.
83. For a recent analysis, see Pinto, "1857," 171–176, which analyzes Pisacane's Sapri expedition within the context of ongoing internal political and social conflicts within the Bourbon Kingdom. See also Leopoldo Cassese, *La spedizione di Sapri* (Rome: Laterza, 1968).
84. See Carmine Pinto, "Una storia del Cilento borbonico. Michele e i fratelli Magnoni nella Rivoluzione meridionale (1848–1860)," in Carmine Pinto et al., *Oltre la torre d'avorio. Studi di storia contemporanea in onore di Luigi Russi in occasione del suo sessantesimo compleanno* (Salerno: Plectica, 2008), 79–108. See also especially Salvatore Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Rome: Donzelli, 2011), 73–74.
85. Antonino De Francesco, *La palla al piede. Una storia del pregiudizio antimeridionale* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2012), 68.
86. On these issues, see especially Berti, *I democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale*; and also Russi, *Carlo Pisacane*, 148–157.

CHAPTER 3

1. See Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006), 116–181; Ian Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation: United States in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 84–93; and Carl Guarneri, *America in the World: United States History in Global Context* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), 148–165.

2. David M. Potter, "Civil War," in C. Van Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 138. See also Timothy Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2009).
3. On comparison between the American Civil War and the Italian *Risorgimento*, see Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. "Peculiar Institution" in International Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 145–172.
4. See Glauco Licata, "Il messaggio di Lincoln e la prospettiva dei patrioti italiani," *Il Risorgimento* 17 (1965), 73–90; Raimondo Luraghi, *La Guerra Civile Americana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966); Enzo Tagliacozzo, "Lincoln e il Risorgimento" in A. Lombardo et al., *Italia e Stati Uniti nell'età del Risorgimento e della Guerra Civile* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 313–335; and Eugenio Biagini, "The Principle of Humanity: Lincoln in Germany and Italy, 1859–1865," in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 76–94.
5. Raimondo Luraghi, *Pensiero e azione economica del Conte di Cavour* (Turin: Museo Nazionale del Risorgimento, 1961); Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, 3 vols. (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1969–1984); Luciano Cafagna, *Cavour* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999).
6. Gabor S. Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream* (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1978); Olivier Frayssé, *Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 1809–1860* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994).
7. See, for example, the early chapters in David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Random House, 1995); in Allen C. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President* (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdsman Publishing, 1999); in Richard Carwardine, *Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power* (New York: Vintage, 2003): and in Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010). On Lincoln's early life, see Douglas L. Wilson, *Lincoln before Washington: New Perspectives on the Illinois Years* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997); Douglas L. Wilson, *Honor's Voice: The Transformation of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Knopf, 1998); and Kenneth J. Winkle, *The Young Eagle: The Rise of Abraham Lincoln* (Dallas, TX: Taylor, 2001).
8. An important study on Lincoln's early years for this purpose is Don Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), since its first chapter is a thorough analysis of the economic context of Lincoln's adoptive state of Illinois in the 1850s.
9. Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness*, 7.
10. Daniel Walker Howe, *'What Hath God Wrought': The Transformation of America, 1815–1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 567.

11. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 83. On economic changes and the market revolution in the Midwest, particularly in Illinois, see especially John Mack Faragher, *Sugar Creek: Life on the Illinois Prairie* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); Bernard H. Sieracki, "Order and Opportunity: The Development of the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2008; and Andrew R. L. Cayton and Peter S. Onuf, *The Midwest and the Nation* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1990).
12. Lucy Riall, *Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 105.
13. On proto-industrialization and economic development in nineteenth-century Piedmont and northwestern Italy, see specifically Guido Quazza, *L'industria laniera e cotoniera in Piemonte dal 1831 al 1861* (Turin: Museo nazionale del Risorgimento, 1961); Franco Ramella, *Terra e telai. Sistema di parentela e manifattura nel Biellese dell'Ottocento* (Turin: Einaudi, 1983); Luciano Cafagna, *Dualismo e sviluppo nella storia d'Italia* (Venice: Marsilio, 1989); and Franco Bonelli, "Il capitalismo italiano. Linee generali di interpretazione" in Ruggero Romano and Corrado Vivanti, eds, *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 1: *Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 1978).
14. In general, on the market revolution in the United States, see especially Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds., *The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800–1880* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997); and John Lauritz Larson, *The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the Eclipse of the Common Good* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On proto-industrialization in Europe and Italy, see Sheilagh C. Ogilvie and Markus Cerman, eds., *European Proto-Industrialization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and John S. Cohen and Giovanni Federico, *The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
15. On proto-industrialization in Spain and Brazil, see especially Julie Marfany, "Is It Still Helpful to Talk about Proto-Industrialization? Some Suggestions from a Catalan Case Study," *Economic History Review* 63:4 (2010), 942–973; and Douglas C. Libby, "Proto-Industrialization in a Slave Society: The Case of Minas Gerais," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23:1 (1991), 1–35.
16. The latter was, initially, an informal political alliance, since parties were not allowed until 1848 in Piedmont.
17. On Clay's "American System," see especially Harry L. Watson, "Introduction: Old Hickory, Prince Hal, and the World of the Early Republic," in Harry L. Watson, ed., *Andrew Jackson vs. Henry Clay: Democracy and Development in Antebellum America* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's,

1998), 1–118. On the Moderate Liberals' economic program, see Luciano Cafagna, "Libertà del mercato e modernizzazione economica in Cavour," in Umberto Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 113–128.

18. On southern settlers in nineteenth-century Illinois, see Nicole Etcheson, *The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1787–1861* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996); and Douglas M. Meyer, *Making the Heartland Quilt: A Geographical History of Settlement and Migration in Early Nineteenth-Century Illinois* (Carbondale: University of Illinois Press, 2000).
19. Allen C. Guelzo, *Lincoln: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.
20. See Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 44–52; and Robert Gudmstead, *Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).
21. On these issues, see especially Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
22. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 9, and 10–14.
23. See Catherine Clinton, "Abraham Lincoln: The Family that Made Him, the Family He Made" in Eric Foner, ed., *Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World* (New York: Norton, 2008), 253–256.
24. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 35.
25. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 34.
26. Richard Carwardine, "Lincoln's Horizons: The Nationalist as Universalist," in Carwardine and Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln*, 32.
27. See Kenneth J. Winkle, *The Young Eagle: The Rise of Abraham Lincoln* (Dallas, TX: Taylor Trade, 2001), 112–120.
28. See Morton J. Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Press, 1977).
29. See Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 70–88; and Guelzo, *Lincoln*, 38–41.
30. See David H. Donald, *Lincoln* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), 94–142.
31. Abraham Lincoln quoted in Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 31; Guelzo, *Abram Lincoln*, 36. See also Paul Simon, *Lincoln's Preparation for Greatness: The Illinois Legislative Years* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).
32. Sellers, *The Market Revolution*, 63.
33. See James Ramage, *Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture from Early Republic to the Civil War* (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 17–60.
34. See Eric Foner, "Lincoln and Colonization," in *Our Lincoln*, 137–143.
35. Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 99.
36. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 41. See also Robert Remini, *Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).
37. On some of these issues, see especially Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1978); see also Robert V. Remini, *Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union* (New York: Norton, 1993).

38. Henry Clay, *In Defence of the American System, against the British Colonial System, with an Appendix of Documents Referred to in the Speech* (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 26.
39. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 34. See also John Ashworth, *Agrarians and Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837–1846* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 255.
40. Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 137. See also John R. Van Atta, "Western Lands and the Political Economy of Henry Clay's American System," *Journal of the Early Republic* 21:4 (2001), 633–655.
41. See Watson, ed., "Introduction," 21–22.
42. See Paul Simon, *Lincoln's Preparation for Greatness: The Illinois Legislative Years* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).
43. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 138.
44. See Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 51–62.
45. Michael C. Meyer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 311. See also Michael P. Costeloe, *The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835–1846: Hombres de Bien in the Age of Santa Anna* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
46. See especially Michael A. Morrison, *Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 66–96; and Brian Schoen, *The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
47. See Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 51–62.
48. See Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 129–133.
49. Mark E. Neely, "Lincoln's Lyceum Speech and the Origins of a Modern Myth," in Kenneth L. Deutsch and Joseph R. Fornieri, eds., *Lincoln's American Dream: Clashing Political Perspectives* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 171–173. See also Allen C. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln as a Man of Ideas* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009), 111.
50. Abraham Lincoln, "Speech in the United States House of Representatives on Internal Improvements," June 20, 1848, quoted in Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 132.
51. Abraham Lincoln, "Eulogy on Henry Clay," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln*, 41.
52. See Adriano Viarengo, *Cavour* (Rome: Salerno, 2010), 19–50. On the Piedmontese aristocracy, see Anthony L. Cardoza, *Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy: The Piedmontese Nobility, 1861–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
53. Rosario Romeo, *Vita di Cavour* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1985), 13.

54. Giuseppe Talamo, "La formazione di Cavour. La rivoluzione di Luglio e i primi anni trenta," in A. Mango, ed., *L'età della Restaurazione e i moti del 1821* (Savigliano: L'Artistica Editrice, 1992), 245.
55. Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 36.
56. See Adriano Viarengo, "La formazione intellettuale di Cavour," in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 15–36.
57. See especially Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 78–82, 112–119; and Pierangelo Gentile, "L'amministrazione delle tenute di famiglia," in Silvia Cavicchioli, ed., *Camillo Cavour e l'agricoltura* (Turin: Carocci, 2011), 21–64. See also Carlo Pischedda, *Camillo Cavour. La famiglia e il patrimonio* (Vercelli: Società storica vercellese, 1997).
58. See Marta Petrusewicz, "Agromania: Innovatori agricoli alla periferia dell'Ottocento," in Piero Bevilacqua, ed., *Storia dell'agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea*, vol. 3: *Mercati e Istituzioni* (Venice: Marisilio, 1991), 295–343. On northern Italian landowners in particular, see Alberto M. Banti, "I proprietari terrieri nell'Italia centro-settentrionale," in Piero Bevilacqua, ed., *Storia dell'agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea*, vol. 2: *Uomini e Classi* (Venice: Marsilio, 1990), 45–103.
59. On Spanish commercial agriculture, see Carlos Lopez Fernandez and Pedro Marset Campos, "La agricoltura cientifica en la prensa del siglo XIX a traves de los autores autoctonos," *Dynamis* 17 (1997), 239–258; and Eloy Fernandez Clemente, "La enseñanza de la agricoltura en la España del siglo XIX," *Agricoltura y Sociedad* 56 (1990), 113–141. On silk and Catalan proto-industrialization, see Llorenç Ferrer, "The Diverse Growth of 18th-Century Catalonia: Proto-Industrialization ?" *Catalan Historical Review* 5 (2012), 67–84.
60. On some of these themes in comparative perspective, also with the slaveholding elites in the Americas, see Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 117–118.
61. See Carl Levy, "Lords and Peasants" in Stefan Berger, ed., *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 75–98.
62. Camillo Cavour, *Thoughts on Ireland: Its Present and Future* (London, 1868) [originally published as: "Considerations sur l'etat actuel de l'Irlande et sur son avenir," *Bibliotheque universelle de Geneve* 49 (1844), 5–47, 201–254]. See also Enrico Dal Lago, "Count Cavour's 1844 *Thoughts on Ireland*: *Liberal Politics and Agrarian Reform through Anglo-Italian Eyes*" in Niall Whelehan, ed., *Transnational Perspective on Modern Irish History* (London: Routledge, 2014), 88–105; Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 131–134; and Nicholas Mansergh, *The Irish Question, 1840–1921: A Commentary on Anglo-Irish Relations and on Social and Political Forces in Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution* (London, 1965), 88–102.
63. Kristin Hoganson, "Meat in the Middle: Converging Borderlands in the U.S. Midwest, 1865–1900," *Journal of American History* 98:4 (2012), 1042.

64. See Luciano Perini, "Gli utopisti: delusioni della realtà, sogni dell'avvenire," in Corrado Vivanti, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 4: *Intellettuali e potere* (Turin: Einaudi, 1981), 406–407.
65. See Viarengo, *Cavour*, 77–80; and Giuseppe Talamo, *Cavour* (Rome: Gangemi, 2010), 34–36.
66. See the essays in Cavicchioli, ed., *Camillo Cavour e l'agricoltura*; and Enrico Dal Lago, "Society, Economy, and Politics in Restoration Italy: Toward a Regional Synthesis," *Historical Journal* 45 (2002), 182–183.
67. Constitution of the *Associazione agraria subalpina* quoted in Cardoza, *Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy*, 50. See also Dal Lago, "Society, Economy, and Politics," 179–193.
68. Enrico Faccenda, "Tra accademia e associazionismo," in Cavicchioli, ed., *Camillo Cavour e l'agricoltura*, 73 [quote], and 72–76.
69. Cardoza, *Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy*, 50. See also Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo,* vol. 1: *1810–1842* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1968), 690–716.
70. Faccenda, "Tra accademia e associazionismo," 73.
71. Cavour's quote is in Narciso Nada, "Istruzione e cultura agraria nel Piemonte preunitario," in Giuliana Biagioli and Rossano Pazzagli. eds., *Agricoltura come manifattura. Istruzione agraria,professionalizzazione e sviluppo agricolo nell'Ottocento* (Florence: Olschki, 2004), 290.
72. Antonio Chavistelli, "Agricoltura come politica. Il dibattito sulla stampa e in Parlamento," in Cavicchioli, ed., *Camillo Cavour e l'agricoltura*, 139.
73. Faccenda, "Tra accademia e associazionismo," 74–75.
74. Camillo Cavour, "Considerazioni sulla poca convenienza di stabilire poderi-modello in Piemonte," *Gazzetta dell'Associazione Agraria* 22 (1843), 186–194.
75. Cavour, "Considerazioni," 193.
76. See Cardoza, *Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy*, 155–161. According to Cardoza, Cavour was particularly representative of the Piedmontese moderate aristocrats' blend of noble values and bourgeois attitudes; see Cardoza, *Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy*, 114–115.
77. See particularly Ramella, *Terra e telai*, and Guido Pescosolido, "Economia, società e territorio" in Piero Craveri, ed., *L'Italia al tempo di Cavour* (Turin: Centro Studi Piemontese, 2012), 15–46.
78. See John Ashworth, "Free Labor, Slave Labor, and the Slave Power: Republicanism and the Republican Party in the 1850s," in Stokes and Conway, eds., *The Market Revolution in America*, 138–141.
79. On the Whigs and the political implications of the Wilmot Proviso, see James L. Huston, *Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 153–189; and Richard H. Sewell, *Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837–1860* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980).

80. See Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 51–62; and John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic*, vol. I: *Commerce and Compromise, 1820–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 160–161.
81. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 38.
82. Michael P. Johnson, "Work," in Michael P. Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery and the Civil War: Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's 2001), 33.
83. Abraham Lincoln, "Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (September 30, 1859)," quoted in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln*, 35.
84. Peter Parish, *The North and the Nation in the Era of the Civil War* (New York: Fordham University Press), 226. See also Sean Wilentz, "Abraham Lincoln and Jacksonian Democracy" in Foner, ed., *Our Lincoln*, 62–78.
85. Parish, *The North and the Nation*, 218.
86. Richard Franklin Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 64–66.
87. On nineteenth-century national consolidation and nation-building, see especially Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
88. Daniel W. Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 268.
89. William G. Thomas, *The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 40.
90. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln*, 169. See also Sandra K. Lueckenhoff, "A. Lincoln, a Corporate Attorney, and the Illinois Central Railroad," *Missouri Law Review* 61 (1996), 393–428; and Charles Leroy Brown, "Lincoln and the Illinois Central Railroad," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 36 (1943), 121–163.
91. Lincoln's quote is in Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 3.
92. See Donald, *Lincoln*, 154–156, 168–169.
93. Thomas, *The Iron Way*, 39. See also Richard White, *Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America* (New York: Norton, 2011); and, particularly for the competing visions of railroads and modernization North and South, John Majewski, *A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia before the Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

94. See Maria Malatesta, *Le aristocrazie terriere nell'Europa contemporanea* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1998).
95. Camillo Cavour, "De la question relative a la legislation anglaise sur le commerce des cereales," *Bibliotheque universelle de Geneve* 50 (1845); Camillo Cavour, "Dell'influenza che la nuova politica commerciale inglese deve esercitare sul mondo economico e sull'Italia in particolare," *Antologia italiana* (1847).
96. Camillo Cavour, "Des chemins de fer en Italie," *Revue novelle* (1846). See also Viarengo, *Cavour*, 106–129.
97. Cafagna, *Cavour*, 99; Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 111. See also Cafagna, "Libertà del mercato e modernizzazione economica in Cavour," 118–120; and Massimo Salvadori, "Il liberalismo di Cavour," in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 71–112.
98. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 34.
99. Lincoln's quotation is in Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*, 209. See also Heather Cox Richardson, *The Greatest Nation on Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
100. On these issues, see Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 101–142.
101. Cafagna, *Cavour*, 99.
102. Marco Meriggi, "Liberali/Liberalismo" in Alberto M. Banti et al., eds., *Atlante culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all'Unità* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2011). 112.
103. Camillo Cavour, "Influenza delle riforme sulle condizione economiche dell'Italia," *Il Risorgimento*, December 15, 1847.
104. Camillo Cavour, "Difesa e osservazioni allo Statuto Albertino," *Il Risorgimento*, March 10, 1848, quoted in Adriano viarengo, ed., *Camillo Benso di Cavour: Autoritratto. Lettere, diari, scritti e discorsi* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2010), 522.
105. See Alfonso Scirocco, *L'Italia del Risorgimento (1796–1870)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 353–354.
106. See Chiavistelli, "Agricoltura come politica," 149–151.
107. Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, vol. II: *1842–1854* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1977), 686. See also Georges Vilorgeux, "L'immagine di Cavour in Francia," in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 201–224.
108. Cavour's quotation is in Scirocco, *L'Italia del Risorgimento*, 355.
109. See especially Cafagna, *Dualismo e sviluppo nella storia d'Italia*.
110. Pescosolido, "Economia, società e territorio," 39. As Giuseppe Talamo has reminded us, largely as result of Cavour's wide-ranging economic initiatives, which included also a major enlargement of the industrial port of Genoa—one of the largest in the western Mediterranean—"starting from 1850 until 1853, the Piedmontese economy went through a strong cycle of expansion"; see Talamo, *Cavour*, 66. See also Frank M. Murtaugh, *Cavour and the Economic Modernization of the Kingdom of Sardinia* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1991).

111. Camillo Cavour, "Cavour on Railroads and National Independence," in Denis Mack Smith, ed., *The Making of Italy, 1796–1866* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 109.
112. See A. Schram, *Railroads and the Formation of the Italian State in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 32–33.
113. Cavour's quote is in Gilles Pecout, *Naissance de l'Italie contemporaine (1770–1922)* (Paris: Editions Nathan, 1997), 92.
114. See Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 201–203, 236–239.
115. See Cox Richardson, *The Greatest Nation on Earth*, 105.

CHAPTER 4

1. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Tradition," in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14.
2. Mark E. Neely, "Lincoln, Slavery, and the Nation," *Journal of American History* 96:2 (2009), 458.
3. See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); James McPherson, *Is Blood Thicker than Water? Crises of Nationalism in the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Don H. Doyle, *Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003); and Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006). For other important works that take into account the new scholarship on nationalism in dealing with the United States during the Civil War era, see especially Robert E. May, ed., *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995); Susan-Mary Grant, *North over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000); and André Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in an Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). For other important general works on nationalism that incorporate some aspects of the U.S. Civil War era, see Don H. Doyle and Marco Pamplona, eds., *Nationalism in the New World* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006); Don H. Doyle, ed., *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From the America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); and Lloyd Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe & America: Politics, Culture, and Identity since 1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

4. See David M. Potter, "Civil War," in C. Van Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 147–158. On the wider Euro-American perspective, see especially Peter Kolchin, *A Sphinx on the American Land: The Nineteenth-Century South in Comparative Perspective* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003); C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. "Peculiar Institution" in International Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); and Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
5. See Potter, "Civil War," 147–158; Raimondo Luraghi, "The Civil War and the Modernization of American Society: Social Structure and Industrial Revolution in the Old South before and during the War," *Civil War History* 18 (1972), 230–250; Bender, *A Nation among Nations*, chapter 3; and Tiziano Bonazzi, "Postfazione. La guerra civile Americana e la 'nazione universale,'" in Tiziano Bonazzi and Carlo Galli, eds., *La Guerra Civile Americana vista dall'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 463–502. See also Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 1966); and, more recently, Felipe F. Armesto, *The Americas: The History of a Continent* (New York: Phoenix, 2003).
6. Bonazzi, "Postfazione," 463–502. On transnational connections, rather than comparisons, between the American Civil War Era and the Italian *Risorgimento*, see especially Paola Gemme, *Domesticating Foreign Struggles: The Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005); Daniele Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia, 1848–1901* (Rome: Gangemi, 2013); and Enzo Tagliacozzo, "Lincoln e il Risorgimento," in A. Lombardo et al., *Italia e Stati Uniti nell'età del Risorgimento e della Guerra Civile* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 313–335.
7. See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955).
8. See Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1992), and *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Joyce Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986), 23–26; Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986), 12–14; Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: Norton, 2005); Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1970); and J. David Greenstone, *The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

9. David Ericson, *The Shaping of American Liberalism: The Debates over Ratification, Nullification, and Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 2.
10. For an earlier comparison of Lincoln and Cavour, see Glauco Licata, "Il messaggio di Lincoln e la prospettiva dei patrioti italiani," *Il Risorgimento* 17 (1965), 73–90.
11. Interestingly, recent scholarly works by prominent American and Italian historians have argued that Lincoln's preeminent objective was always the abolition of U.S. slavery and Cavour's preeminent objective was always Italy's national unification. See James Oakes, *Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865* (New York: Norton, 2013); and Roberto Martucci, "Cavour e la 'scommessa italiana,'" *Quaderni Costituzionali* 2 (2012), 339–368.
12. See Brian Schoen, *The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
13. See Lucio Villari, *Bella e perduta. L'Italia del Risorgimento* (Rome–Bari: Laterza, 2009).
14. On these points, see Licata, "Il messaggio di Lincoln," 74–78.
15. Important recent works that have stressed Lincoln's and Cavour's roles in this sense are Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); and Roberto Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita, 1855–1864* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1999).
16. Scholars have pointed out that, until the end of the nineteenth century, the common usage of "the United States" was of a plural noun, reflecting perhaps the rather loose conglomeration of states that formed the country. It was only in 1902, nearly forty years after the end of the Civil War, and at a time of American nationalist fervor and imperial expansion, that the House of Representatives' Committee on Revision of the Laws ruled that "the United States" should be treated once and for all as a singular noun. See Ben Zimmer, "The United States Is . . . or Are?" available at http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/1907/.
17. On America's divisions and sectional conflicts over slavery in the 1850s, see especially William E. Gienapp, "The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political System and the Coming of the Civil War" in Gabor S. Boritt, ed., *Why the Civil War Came* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 79–124; Michael Holt, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (New York: Norton, 1983); Bruce Levine, *Half Slave & Half Free: The Roots of the Civil War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2003); John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Early American Republic*, 2 Vols. (new York: Cambridge University Press, 1995–2007); and Stampp, *The Imperiled Union*, 223–231.

18. See Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 983–984; and Robert W. Johansen, *Lincoln, the South, and Slavery* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).
19. Peter Parish, *The North and the Nation in the Era of the Civil War* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 207.
20. Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010), 66.
21. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 72. See also James L. Huston, *Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 143–145.
22. Thus, according to James Oakes, Republicans advanced, effectively, a program of nationalization of freedom, or "freedom national"; see James Oakes, *The Scorpion's Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York: Norton, 2014), 28–32.
23. See Parish, *North and Nation*; and Oakes, *Scorpion's Sting*.
24. See Parish, *The North and the Nation*; Potter, "Civil War"; Richard Carwardine, "Lincoln's Horizons: The Nationalist as Universalist," in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 28–44; and Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 149–154.
25. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government Relationship with Slavery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 295–297.
26. See Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*. See also William Gienapp, *The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852–1856* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
27. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
28. See again Oakes, *Scorpion's Sting*, 22–72.
29. Abraham Lincoln, "Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois," in Michael P. Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery and the Civil War: Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's 2001), 49.
30. Carwardine, "Lincoln's Horizons," 37.
31. On these points, see especially Eugenio Biagini et al., "Interchange: The Global Lincoln," *Journal of American History* 96:2 (2009), 462–499.
32. See David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Random House, 1995), 162–195; and Michael Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), vol. 1.
33. See Fehrenbacher, *Slaveholding Republic*, 285–288, and Allen C. Guelzo, *Lincoln and Douglas: The Debates that Defined America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).
34. Abraham Lincoln, "Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the American Civil War*, 79.

35. Ericson, *Shaping of American Liberalism*, 160. See also George Fredrickson, *Big Enough to be Inconsistent: Abraham Lincoln Confronts Race and Slavery* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 43–84.
36. See Massimo Salvadori, "Il liberalismo di Cavour," in Umberto Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 71–112.
37. Carwardine, "Lincoln's Horizons," 37–38. See also Brian Schoen, "The Fates of Republics and Empires Hang in the Balance: The United States and Europe during the Civil War Era," *OAH Magazine of History* 27:2 (2013), 41–47.
38. David Potter, *The South and the Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 294.
39. On some of these issues, see Richard H. Sewell, *Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 304–310.
40. Dorothy Ross, "Lincoln and the Ethics of Emancipation: Universalism, Nationalism, Exceptionalism," *Journal of American History* 96:2 (2009), 393.
41. Gary Gallagher, *The Union War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 6.
42. Abraham Lincoln, "The 'House Divided Speech' at Springfield, Illinois," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the American Civil War*, 63. See also Carwardine, *Lincoln*, 67–89.
43. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 100. See also see also Donald, *Lincoln*, 196–229; and James Oakes, *The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics* (New York: Knopf, 2008).
44. On some of these issues, see Grant, *North Over South*, 30–31; and Parish, *The North and the Nation*, 222–223.
45. See Greenstone, *The Lincoln Persuasion*.
46. See especially Shearer Davis Bowman, *At the Precipice: Americans North and South during the Secession Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 261–288.
47. Robert J. Cook, "The Shadow of the Past: Collective Memory and the Coming of the American Civil War," in Robert J. Cook, William L. Barney, and Elizabeth R. Varon, *Secession Winter: When the Union Fell Apart* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 85. See also Russell McClintock, *Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 234–276; and David Potter, *The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 514–584.
48. On the parallelisms of the developments in the United States and Italy, see Raimondo Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra civile americana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966); Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*; and Tiziano Bonazzi, "Un americanista davanti all'Unità d'Italia, ovvero

l'Atlantico *mare nostrum*," and Enrico Dal Lago, "La Guerra Civile americana, il Risorgimento italiano e i nazionalismi dell'Ottocento: *histoire croisée* e *histoire comparée*," both in *Giornale di Storia Costituzionale* 22 (2011), 73–88 and 143–161.

49. Urbano Rattazzi to Michelangelo Castelli, May 1, 1870 in Denis Mack Smith, ed., *The Making of Italy, 1796–1866* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 176. On the *connubio*, see also especially Adolfo Omodeo, *L'opera politica del Conte di Cavour* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1940), 91–114; and Adriano Viarengo, *Cavour* (Rome: Salerno, 2010), 221–235.
50. See Romano P. Coppini, "Il Piemonte sabaudo e l'unificazione (1849–1861)," in Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, vol. I: *Le premesse dell'Unità* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1994), 337–431; and Narciso Nada, "Il Piemonte sabaudo dal 1814 al 1861," in Narciso Nada and Paola Notario, *Il Piemonte sabaudo dal periodo napoleonico al Risorgimento* (Turin: UTET, 1993), 343–441.
51. See Rosario Romeo, *Vita di Cavour* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1985), 359–379.
52. See especially Giuseppe Galasso, "Il pensiero italiano di Cavour" in Adriano Viarengo, ed., *Camillo Benso di Cavour: Autoritratto* (Milan: BUR, 2010), i–xxvi.
53. Camillo Cavour, "Cavour on Railways and National Independence," in Mack Smith, ed., *The Making of Italy*, 109. See also Viarengo, *Cavour*, 305–314.
54. D'Azeglio's quote (1867) is in Doyle, *Nations Divided*, 39. In fact, instead of focusing on the positive features of nation-building as related to progress, Don Doyle's work stresses the difficulty in conceptualizing nations in countries profoundly divided between a north and a south, as both the United States and Italy were. Similarly, other works—such as, especially, the essays in Enrico Dal Lago and Rick Halpern, eds., *The American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History* (New York: Palgrave, 2001)—have looked at the history and construction of the north-south divide in the two countries within the contexts of the respective national histories.
55. Cavour's quote, from an 1847 article in *Il Risorgimento*, is in Maria S. Quine, *Italy's Social Revolution: Charity and Welfare from Liberalism to Fascism* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 18.
56. See Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. 2: *1842–1854* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1977), 645–752; and Mack Smith, *Cavour*, 94–106.
57. See Luciano Cafagna, "Libertà del mercato e modernizzazione economica in Cavour in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 118–120.
58. On some of these issues, see Alberto M. Banti, *Storia della borghesia italiana. L'età liberale* (Rome: Donzelli, 1996), 3–22; and Rosario Romeo, *Dal Piemonte sabaudo all'Italia liberale* (Turin: Einaudi, 1963).
59. Raffaele Romanelli, *L'Italia liberale, 1861–1900* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 22. See also Banti, *Storia della borghesia italiana*, 3–50.
60. Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 20–21.

61. On these points, see Sergio Romano, "Cavour and the Risorgimento," *Journal of Modern History* 58 (1986), 669–677; and Luciano Cafagna, *Cavour* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 219–242.
62. Cavour's quote in Omodeo, *L'opera politica del Conte di Cavour*, 70. On Cavour and the Siccardi Laws, see also Silvano Montaldo, "Dal vecchio al nuovo Piemonte" in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 37–41.
63. For a detailed analysis, see Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 291–303. See also Omodeo, *L'opera politica del Conte di Cavour*, 285–300.
64. See Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 435–443.
65. See Franco Della Peruta, *I democratici e la rivoluzione italiana. Dibattiti ideali e contrasti politici all'indomani del 1848* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958); and R. Ugolini, "La via democratico moderata all'unità. Dal 'Partito Nazionale Italiano' alla 'Società Nazionale Italiana,'" in R. Ugolini et al., *Correnti ideali e politiche della sinistra italiana dal 1849 al 1861* (Florence: Leo S. Olshki Editore, 1978), 185–211.
66. See especially Marta Petrusewicz, *Come il Meridione divenne una questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud prima e dopo il Quarantotto* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 1998).
67. See Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. IV: *Dalla rivoluzione nazionale all'unità (1849–1860)* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), 215–243.
68. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 447.
69. Roberto Romani, "Reluctant Revolutionaries: Moderate Liberalism in the Kingdom of Sardinia, 1849–1859," *Historical Journal* 55:1 (2012), 45. See also Anthony Cardoza, "Cavour and Piedmont," in John A. Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108–131.
70. See Marco Meriggi, "Liberali/Liberalismo," in Alberto M. Banti et al., eds., *Atlante culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all'Unità* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2011), 101–114.
71. Cavour's quote is in Mack Smith, ed., *Making of Italy*, 200.
72. See Candeloro, *Dalla rivoluzione nazionale*, 315–326. On Cavour and La Farina, see especially Viarengo, *Cavour*, 339–343.
73. Lucy Riall, *Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 141. See also Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity*, 101–123.
74. On Cavour and the *National Society*, see especially Omodeo, *L'opera politica del Conte di Cavour*, 361–373; and Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, vol. 3: *1854–1861* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1969).
75. On Lincoln, see Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 234–246; on Cavour, see Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 340–343.
76. Adam I. P. Smith, "The Stuff Our Dreams Are Made Of: Lincoln in the English Imagination" in Carwardine and Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln*, 128.

77. Anonymous, "Bismarck and His Work," *The San Francisco Call*, July 31, 1898.
78. Anonymous, "Bismarck and His Work." Interestingly, in October 1862, Gladstone considered himself "a warm advocate of the new Italian Kingdom, founded on the right of the States to choose the rulers and nationality they prefer"—perhaps the same principle that led him, instead, to be strangely favourable to the Confederacy rather than Lincoln's Union, going as far as remarking, as if it were an obvious fact, that "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South . . . have made a nation," by which he meant a legitimate nation; the first Gladstone quote is in Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861*, 97, while the second Gladstone quote is in Amanda Foreman, *A World on Fire: An Epic History of Two Nations Divided* (London: Penguin, 2012), 319.
79. On Lincoln, Cavour, and Bismarck, see especially Carl Degler, *One among Many: The Civil War in Comparative Perspective* (Gettysburg, PA: Gettysburg College, 1990).
80. On the Civil War in an age of nation-building, in both comparative and transnational perspective, particularly with nineteenth-century European nationalism, see especially Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861*; Bender, *A Nation among Nations*, 116–182; Ian Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation: United States in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 84–93; Carl Guarneri, *America in the World: United States History in Global Context* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 148–165; Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 145–172; Edward L. Ayers, "The American Civil War, Emancipation, and Reconstruction on the World Stage," in Gary W. Reichard and Ted Dickson, eds., *America on the World Stage: A Global Approach to U.S. History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 125–137; Don H. Doyle, "The Global Civil War," in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2014), 1103–1120; and Schoen, "The Fate of Republics and Empire," 41–47.
81. Allen C. Guelzo, *Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 407.
82. Lawson, *Patriot Fires*, 161.
83. Abraham Lincoln, "Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861)," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the American Civil War*, 135.
84. Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, *Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 2, 3. See also Gallagher, *The Union War*, 33–74.
85. Abraham Lincoln, "Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation (1863)," in Rick Halpern and Enrico Dal Lago, eds., *Slavery and Emancipation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 381. See also Louis P. Masur, *Lincoln's Hundred Days: The Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012); Ira Berlin et al.,

Freedom's Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Michael Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), vol. 2.

86. Lawson, *Patriot Fires*, 168, 169.
87. See especially Ira Berlin et al., *Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 190–196; Steven Hahn, *A Nation under our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 89–102; and Stephanie McCurry, "War, Gender, and Emancipation in the Civil War South," and Michael Vorenberg, "Abraham Lincoln's 'Fellow Citizens': Before and After Emancipation," both in William A. Blair and Karen Fisher Younger, eds., *Lincoln's Proclamation: Emancipation Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 120–150 and 151–169.
88. Parish, *The North and the Nation*, 223–226. See also James Oakes, "Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States' Rights, and Black Rights: Another Look at Lincoln and Race," in Eric Foner, ed., *Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World* (New York: Vintage, 2008), 109–134; and, on the Thirteenth Amendment, especially Michael Vorenberg, *Final Freedom: The Civil War and the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
89. Hahn, *A Nation under Our Feet*, 105. See also Eric Foner, "Lincoln and Colonization" in Foner, ed. *Our Lincoln*, 135–166; and LaWanda Cox, *Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981), 112–139.
90. Abraham Lincoln, "Letter to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863)," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War*, 249.
91. Mark E. Neely, *Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 163. See also Mark E. Neely, *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
92. Abraham Lincoln, "The Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863," in Johnson, ed., *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War*, 263.
93. Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 268.
94. Susan-Mary Grant, "From Union to Nation? The Civil War and the Development of American Nationalism," in Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The American Civil War: Explorations and Reconsiderations* (New York: Pearson Education, 2000), 350.
95. On the Gettysburg Address, see especially Gallagher, *The Union War*, 82–87; Carwardine, *Lincoln*, 247–297; Gary Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); and George P. Fletcher, *Our Secret Constitution: How Lincoln Redefined*

American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 41–42, particularly in relation to Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address, and national unification. It is worth noting that, recently, Robert Meister has argued that "many of Lincoln's Old World contemporaries, such as Bismarck and Cavour, had linked national resurgence and victimary identity in order to justify the use of military force to 'reunify' the nation," but Lincoln went further, "by portraying the Union itself as the victim of slavery and the war against secession as its struggle for redemption and rebirth"; see Robert Meister, *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 89.

96. See Martucci, "Cavour e la 'scommessa italiana'," 339–368.
97. See Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 149–150; and Harry Hearder, *Cavour* (London: Longman, 1994), 136–155.
98. Camillo Cavour to Massimo D'Azeglio. July 16, 1859, in Carlo Pischedda and Rosanna Roccia, eds., *Camilllo Cavour: Epistolario*, vol. 16: *1859* (Florence: Leo Olschki, 2000), 1130.
99. See Umberto Levra, "Cavour dalla nazione piemontese alla nazione italiana," in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 160–162; Romeo, *Cavour e il stuo tempo,* vol. 3, 622–626; and Viarengo, *Cavour*, 355–395.
100. See Derek Beales and Eugenio Biagini, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy* (London: Longman, 2002), 129–130.
101. See especially Lucy Riall, "Garibaldi and the South," in Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, 132–153; Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi: A Study in Political Conflict* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1954); and Roberto Balzani, "Cavour e le vie della Guerra," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia, 1790–1870* (Turin: UTET, 2008), 342–356.
102. Camillo Cavour to Costantino Nigra, August 29, 1860, in Carlo Pischedda and Rosanna Roccia, eds., *Camilllo Cavour: Epistolario*, vol. 17: *1860* (Florence: Leo Olschki, 2005), 1799.
103. See Levra, "Cavour dalla nazione piemontese alla nzaione italiana," 165–166; and Candeloro, *Dalla rivoluzione nazionale*, 315–326.
104. Giuseppe Galasso, "Cavour e il Mezzogiorno," in Levra, ed., *Cavour, l'Italia e l'Europa*, 178.
105. See Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. V: *La costruzione dello stato unitario (1861–1870)* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), 356–389; and Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*.
106. See Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*; Viarengo, *Cavour*, 443–444; and Alberto M. Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome–Bari: Laterza, 2004), 115–116.
107. Camillo Cavour to Vittorio Emanuele II, December 14, 1860, in Pischedda and Roccia, eds., *Camilllo Cavour: Epistolario*, vol. 17: *1860*, 2992.
108. Cavour's quote is in Mack Smith, ed., *Making of Italy*, 346.
109. Cavour's quote is in Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 500. On these issues, see also Raffaele Romanelli, "Centralismo e autonomie," in Raffaele

Romanelli, ed., *Storia dello stato italiano dall'Unità ad oggi* (Rome: Donzelli, 1995), 130–133.

110. See Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, 498–504; and Salvadori, "Il liberalismo di Cavour," 105–108.
111. On one particularly important proof, and also result, of the effective convergence of ideologies guiding Lincoln's United States and Cavour's Italy represented by the mutual, though not publicly proclaimed, support between the two nations at the time of the American Civil War and Italian national unification, see Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*, 143–220.
112. On some of these issues, see Doyle, *Nations Divided*; and Enrico Dal Lago, "States of Rebellion: Civil War, Rural Unrest, and the Agrarian Question in the American South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, 1861–1865," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47 (2005), 403–432.
113. On Seward, see Jay Sexton, "William H. Seward in the World," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 4 (2014), 398–430; on D'Azeglio, see Claudio Gigante, "Fatta l'Italia, facciamo gli Italiani. Appunti su una massima da restituire a D'Azeglio," *Incontri. Rivista europea di studi italiani* 26 (2011), 5–15.
114. On some of these issues, see especially, on the American side of the comparison, Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard of Racial Justice* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Vorenberg, *Final Freedom*; and Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolutions* (New York: Harper, 1988). On the Italian side, see especially Clara Lovett, *The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830–1876* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Candeloro, *La costruzione dello stato unitario*; and Giuseppe Berti, *I Democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale nel Risorgimento* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962).
115. See Nicola Miller, "That Great and Gentle Soul: Images of Lincoln in Latin America," in Carwardine and Sexton, eds., *The Global Lincoln*, 206–222. See also, on nineteenth-century Argentine politics, Jeremy Adelman, *Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). On Cavour and nineteenth-century liberalism, see Gilles Pecout, "Le moment Cavour: Cavour politico nella storiografia," *Ricerche di storia politica* 3 (2003), 389–408.
116. For Peter Kolchin's scholarship on American and Russian emancipation in comparative perspective, see Kolchin, *Sphinx on the American Land*, 94–114. On Lincoln and Alexander II, see Marylin Pfeifer Swezey, *The Tsar and the President: Alexander II and Abraham Lincoln, Liberator and Emancipator* (New York: American Russian Cultural Cooperation Foundation, 2009); and Michael Knox Beran, *Forge of Empires: Three Revolutionary Statesmen and the World they Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007). On Lincoln and Bismarck and the American Civil War and the wars for German unification in comparative perspective, see especially Degler, *One among Many*; and Carl Degler, "The American Civil War and

the German Wars of Unification: The Problem of Comparison," in Stig Forster and Joerg Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 53–73. Curiously, Cavour's and Bismarck's leadership and efforts at nation-building have been the object of a recent comparative study; see Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Cavour e Bismarck. Due leaders fra liberalismo e cesarismo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

117. On some of these issues, see Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond*, 145–172; Onuf and Onuf, *Nations, Markets, and War*; and the important essays in Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson, eds., *What is a Nation? Europe, 1789–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

CHAPTER 5

1. On Cavour's role in the process of Italian national unification and, in general, his life, see especially Rosario Romeo, *Vita di Cavour* (Rome: Laterza, 1984); and Anthony Cardoza, "Cavour and Piedmont," in John A. Davis, ed., *Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108–131.
2. On Garibaldi's conquest of southern Italy and the process of Italian national unification with specific reference to the South, see Paolo Macry, *Unità a Mezzogiorno. Come l'Italia ha messo assieme i pezzi* (Bologna: Il Mulino), 82–89.
3. Cavour's quote is in Sergio Romano, "Le ultime parole di Cavour sulla Guerra Civile Americana," *Corriere della Sera*, May 14, 2011. On Cavour's last days, see also Rosario Romeo, *Cavour e il suo tempo*, vol. III: *1854–1861* (Rome: Laterza, 1969); Adriano Viarengo, *Cavour* (Rome: Salerno, 2010), 474–484; and Italo De Feo, *Cavour: L'uomo e l'opera* (Milan: Mondadori, 2011), 495–511.
4. On the events of 1861 in America, Lincoln, and secession, see especially Robert J. Cook, William L. Barney, and Elizabeth R. Varon, *Secession Winter: When the Union Fell Apart* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); and Shearer Davis Bowman, *At the Precipice: Americans North and South during the Secession Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
5. On the reception of Confederate secession and the start of the American Civil War in Europe, and, in general, on transnational connections and comparisons, see André M. Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); and Don H. Doyle, "The Global Civil War," in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2014), 1103–1120.
6. Tiziano Bonazzi, "Postfazione. La Guerra Civile Americana e la 'nazione universale,'" in Tiziano Bonazzi and Giorgio Galli, eds., *La Guerra Civile americana vista dall'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 471.

7. See Carmine Pinto, "Tempo di guerra. Conflitti, patrottismi e tradizioni politiche nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia (1859–66)," *Meridiana* 76 (2013), 57–84.
8. On these issues and on the years 1861–62 in southern Italy, see especially Salvatore Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Rome: Donzelli, 2011), 99–135; and Macry, *Unità a Mezzogiorno*, 91–100.
9. Gigi Di Fiore, *Gli ultimi giorni di Gaeta. L'assedio che condannò l'Italia all'Unità* (Milan, 2010), 15.
10. The pope was Francis II's strongest ally, both because of the latter's strong Catholic religiosity and also because Pius IX himself had similarly been deprived of the largest part of his territories in central Italy as a result of Piedmontese King Victor Emmanuel II's military operations and of Cavour's diplomatic manoeuvring toward Italian national unification. Catholics all over Europe were outraged at this turn of events, including those in Ireland where Dublin's Archbishop Cardinal Paul Cullen significantly called Cavour "the revolutionary minister of Piedmont," referring to the revolutionary upturning that Cavour's decisions and actions had brought upon the papacy; see Paul Cullen, "Sympathy with the Pope," *Catholic Directory Almanac and Registry of the Whole Catholic World* (Dublin: John Mullany, 1860), 248. Cullen had also, famously, provided for the recruitment of the Irish Battalion of St. Patrick, whose men fought for the pope and lost against Victor Emmanuel II's Piedmontese Army in 1860; see Anne O'Connor, "The Pope, the Prelate, the Soldiers and the Controversy: Paul Cullen and the Irish Papal Brigade," in Daire Keogh and Albert McDonnell, eds., *Cardinal Paul Cullen and His World* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2011), 329–349.
11. "Good News from Italy," *Chicago Press and Tribune*, September 19, 1860, quoted in Daniele Fiorentino, "Stati Uniti d'America," in Fulvio Cammarano and Michele Marchi, eds., *Il mondo ci guarda. L'Unificazione italiana nella stampa e nell'opinione pubblica internazionali (1859–1861)* (Milan: Mondadori, 2011), 279.
12. Daniele Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia, 1848–1901* (Rome: Gangemi, 2013), 158. On Horace Greely and the *New York Daily Tribune*, see also especially Harold Holzer, *Lincoln and the Power of the Press: The War for Public Opinion* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 376–415.
13. "Capitulation of Gaeta," *New York Times*, March 1, 1861.
14. William H. Seward to Giuseppe Bertinatti, April 13, 1861, Archivio Storico-Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome.
15. Cavour's quote is in Gilles Pecout, "Cavour visto dagli Stati Uniti," in Fiorentino and Snfilippo, eds., *Gli Stati Uniti e l'unità d'Italia*, 127.
16. See Gaetano Arfè, "Un diplomatico italiano interprete della guerra di secessione: Giuseppe Bertinatti," in A. Lombardo et al., *Italia e Stati Uniti nell'età del Risorgimento e della Guerra Civile* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 201–212. Writing at a significant time, when Lincoln was

starting his first term as president of a highly divided American nation, "in March 1861—according to Daniele Fiorentino—Cavour had affirmed, in a letter to Minister Bertinatti, that Italy's efforts toward [national] unification had been possible also thanks to the inspiration coming from the United States"; see Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*, 189.

17. Raimondo Luraghi's quote is in Maria Laura Lanzillo, "Unità della nazione, libertà e indipendenza. Il Risorgimento italiano e la guerra di secessione americana," in Bonazzi and Galli, eds., *La Guerra Civile americana vista dall'Europa*, 194.
18. Axel Körner, "Barbarous America," in Axel Körner, Nicola Miller, and Adam I. P. Smith, eds., *America Imagined: Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 136.
19. Albin J. Kowalewski, "Mr. Marsh's Italian Job," *New York Times*, June 22, 2011. See also Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*, 187–191; and David Lowenthal, *George Perkins Marsh: Prophet of Conservation* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 220–242.
20. On the significance of the first battle of Bull Run, see especially Gary Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 67–71.
21. See Marco Meriggi, "Dopo l'Unità. Forme e ambivalenze del legittimismo borbonico," *Passato e Presente* 83 (2011), 37–56; Salvatore Lupo, "Il Grande Brigantaggio. Interpretazione e memoria di una guerra civile," in Walter Barberis, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 18: *Guerra e pace* (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 465–504; and Alessia Facineroso, " 'Con l'armi nuove della politica.' L'emigrazione borbonica e le sue trame cospirative," *Meridiana* 78 (2013), 155–176.
22. See Simon Sarlin, *Le légitimisme en armes. Histoire d'une mobilisation internationale contre l'unité italienne* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013).
23. See Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 112–118; Franco Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'unità* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), 57–106; and Andrea Albonico, *La mobilitazione legittimista contro il Regno d'Italia. La Spagna e il brigantaggio meridionale postunitario* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1979). On the Great Brigandage as a civil war, particularly in Basilicata, see Pierre-Yives Manchon, "Guerre civile et formation de l'État dans le Midi d'Italie (1860–1865): histoire et usages du 'Grand Brigandage' en Basilicate," PhD Dissertation, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, 2011.
24. Peter Brown to Lord John Russell, September 9, 1861, Lord John Russell Papers, The National Archives (from now on T.N.A.) 30/22/72, Kew, U.K.
25. See especially Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'unità*, 57–106; and Alessia Facineroso, "La dimora del tempo sospeso. Il governo borbonico in esilio e le sue trame cospirative," PhD Dissertation, Università degli Studi di Catania, 2011. According to ex-Papal Irish soldier and

pro-Bourbon writer The O'Clery, in 1861, Spanish Officer José Borjés had gone "to Calabria to fight for the cause of the Neapolitan monarchy and for the independence of the South of Italy against the Piedmontese invaders," and thus hoping to cause the South's secession from the Italian Kingdom and the return of the Bourbons; see O'Clery, *The Making of Italy*, 297. On O'Clery, see Michele Finelli, "Intersections: The Historiography of Irish and Italian National Movements," in Colin Barr, Michele Finelli, and Anne O'Connor, eds., *Nation/Nazione: Irish Nationalism and the Italian Risorgimento* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2014), 23–25.

26. See Christopher Duggan, *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796* (London: Penguin, 2007), 217–224.
27. Carlo Margolfo, *Mi toccò in sorte il numero 15*, quoted in Gigi Di Fiore, *Controstoria dell'Unità d'Italia. Fatti e misfatti del Risorgimento* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007), 255. See also Gigi Di Fiore, *1861: Pontelandolfo e Casalduni, un massacro dimenticato* (Naples: Grimaldi & C. editori, 1998).
28. Peter Brown to Lord John Russell, September 9, 1861, Lord John Russell Papers, T.N.A. 30/22/72, Kew, U.K.
29. See Roberto Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita, 1855–1864* (Florence: Sansoni, 1999), 287–295.
30. Massimo D'Azeglio to Carlo Matteucci, August 2, 1861, in Denis Mack Smith, ed., *The Making of Italy, 1796–1866* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 367.
31. Francesco Barbagallo, *La questione italiana. Il Nord e il Sud dal 1860 a oggi* (Rome: Laterza, 2013), 37.
32. See especially James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 392–489; James McPherson, *Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Louis P. Masur, *Lincoln's Hundred Days: The Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012), and Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010), 206–247.
33. See especially Fulvio Cammarano, "La costruzione dello stato e la classe dirigente (1861–1887)," in Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto, eds., *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 2: *Il nuovo stato e la società civile* (Rome: Laterza, 1997), 3–112.
34. See Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'Unità*, 415. See also Simon Sarlin, "Fighting the Risorgimento: Foreign Volunteers in Southern Italy (1860–63)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 14:4 (2009), 476–490.
35. James Hudson to Earl Russell, May 5, 1863, Lord John Russell Papers, T.N.A. 30/22/70, Kew, U.K.
36. See Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 15–26. See also especially Raimondo Luraghi, "Garibaldi e la Guerra Civile americana," in Gaetano Cingari, ed., *Garibaldi e il Socialismo* (Rome: Laterza, 1984); and Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia*, 111–119.

37. On this particular comparative point, see especially Enrico Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013). On the Radical Republicans and Lincoln, see especially Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard of Racial Justice* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); on the Democrats in Italy, see especially Giuseppe Berti, *I Democratici e l'iniziativa meridionale nel Risorgimento* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962).
38. See especially Franco Della Peruta, *I Democratici e la rivoluzione italiana. Dibattiti, ideali e contrasti politici all'indomani del 1848* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2004).
39. Piero Bevilacqua, *Breve storia dell'Italia meridionale dall'Ottocento a oggi* (Rome: Donzelli, 1993), 34.
40. See Alfonso Capone, *Destra e Sinistra da Cavour a Crispi* (Turin: UTET, 1981), 55–57; and Alfonso Scirocco, *Il Mezzogiorno nell'Italia unita (1861–1865)* (Naples: Società Editrice Napoletana, 1979).
41. Quoted in Alfonso Capone "L'età liberale," in Giuseppe Galasso and Rosario Romeo, eds., *Storia del Mezzogiorno*, vol. 12 (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1991), 105.
42. James Hudson to Lord John Russell, August 9, 1862, Lord John Russell Papers, T.N.A. 30/22/69, Kew, U.K.
43. Giorgio Klapca, "In risposta all'indirizzo del generale Garibaldi agli ungheresi," annexed to Lord John Russell Papers, T.N.A. 30/22, Kew, U.K.
44. See Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 317–325; and Alfonso Scirocco, *Garibaldi. Battaglie, amori, ideali di un cittadino del mondo* (Rome: Laterza, 2001), 316–323.
45. See Enrico Dal Lago, "'States of Rebellion': Civil War, Rural Unrest, and the Agrarian Question in the American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno, 1861–1865," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47 (2005), 403–432.
46. Still in November 1862, Democrat Giuseppe Ferrari addressed the members of the Italian Parliament seeking to point out to them the true nature of the brigandage by telling them "you may call them brigands, but they fight under a national flag; you may call them brigands, but the fathers of these brigands twice restored the Bourbons to the throne of Naples . . . what constitutes brigandage ?"; Ferrari's quote in The O'Clery, *The Making of Italy* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1892), 294.
47. Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 118.
48. See especially John A. Davis, "Le guerre del brigantaggio," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento* (Turin: UTET, 2008), 739–752; and John Dickie, *Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860–1900* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 25–52.
49. Cavour's quote is in Barbagallo, *La questione italiana*, 33.

50. According to O'Clery, already in 1861, "Cialdini and his lieutenants took it upon themselves to proclaim a kind of local martial law, each in his own district. The commanders, in fact, placed themselves above the law, and when, during the Garibaldian rebellion of 1862, martial law was proclaimed in the South, it really made no difference in the conditions of the country"; see O'Clery, *The Making of Italy*, 299.
51. Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio*, 189.
52. L. Oliphant, "Report upon the state of brigandage in the T.N.A.vinces of the Abruzzi and Capitanata," Foreign Office Records (Confidential), FO881/1060, Kew, U.K.
53. See Daniela Adorni, "Il brigantaggio," in Luciano Violante, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 12: *La criminalità* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 283–319; and Roberto Martucci, *Emergenza e tutela dell'ordine pubblico nell'Italia liberale. Regime eccezionale e leggi per la repressione dei reati di brigantaggio (1861–1865)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1980).
54. On some of these issues, see John A. Davis, "The South and the Risorgimento: Histories and Counter-Histories," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 19:1 (2014), 53–61. I will return to the point of an internal conflict between southern Italians in the post-unification *Mezzogiorno* in Chapter 6.
55. William Seward's quote is in Anthony Shugaar, "Italy's Own Lost Cause," *New York Times*, May 2, 2012.
56. Shugaar, "Italy's Own Lost Cause."
57. See especially Mark E. Neely, *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
58. On the Pica Law and its consequences for the Great Brigandage, see Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 132–133; and Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*, 333–337.

CHAPTER 6

1. On the concept of "inner civil war" with specific reference to the Confederacy, see David Williams, *Bitterly Divided: The South's Inner Civil War* (New York: Norton, 2008). For an analogous concept with reference to post-unification southern Italy, see especially John Davis, "The South and the Risorgimento: Histories and Counter-Histories," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 19:1 (2014), 53–61.
2. See Don H. Doyle, *Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), and Don H. Doyle, ed., *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010); Enrico Dal Lago, *Agrarian Elites: American Slaveholders and Southern Italian Landowners, 1815–1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); Timothy Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); Paul Quigley, *Shifting*

Grounds: Nationalism and the American South, 1848–1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Andre Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

3. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Among the most important studies that have applied the ideas of the above scholars to Confederate and Italian nationalisms, see especially Drew Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Ann Sarah Rubin, *A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861–1868* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Alberto Mario Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome: Laterza, 2008); and Lucy J. Riall, *Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
4. See, for the most important recent studies that have highlighted this dimension, Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), and Bruce Levine, *The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil War and the Social Revolution that Transformed the South* (New York: Random House, 2013), on the Confederate South; and Salvatore Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Rome: Donzelli, 2011), and Carmine Pinto, "Tempo di guerra. Conflitti, patrottismi e tradizioni politiche nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia (1859–66)," *Meridiana* 76 (2013), 57–84, on southern Italy.
5. The concept of revolution is at the heart of two of the most important recent studies on the Confederacy and the *Mezzogiorno* in 1861–65: Levine, *The Fall of the House of Dixie*, and Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*. On these issues, see also Enrico Dal Lago, "States of Rebellion: Civil War, Rural Unrest, and the Agrarian Question in the American South and the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, 1861–1865," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47:2 (2005), 403–432.
6. See Edward Rugemer, *The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Origins of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008); Brian Schoen, *The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Sven Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the World Wide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War," *American Historical Review* 109 (2004), 1405–1438. See also Robin Blackburn, *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights* (London: Verso, 2011).

7. See Dale Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and the World Economy* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2004), 56–74; Dale Tomich and Michael Zeuske, "Introduction, The Second Slavery: Mass Slavery, World-Economy, and Comparative Microhistories," *Review* 31:2 (2008), 91–100. See also Anthony Kaye, "The Second Slavery: Modernity in the Nineteenth-Century South and the Atlantic World," *Journal of Southern History* 75:3 (2009), 627–650; and Enrico Dal Lago, *American Slavery, Atlantic Slavery, and Beyond: The U.S. Peculiar Institution in International Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 63–92.
8. See Rebecca Scott, *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); Steven Hahn, "Class and State in Postemancipation Societies: Southern Planters in Comparative Perspective," *American Historical Review* 95:1 (1990), 75–98; Michael L. Bush, *Servitude in Modern Times* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); and Peter Kolchin, "Some Controversial Questions Concerning Nineteenth-Century Abolition from Slavery and Serfdom," in Michael L. Bush, ed., *Slavery and Serfdom: Studies in Legal Bondage* (London: Longman, 1996), 42–68. See also Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987); Shearer Davis Bowman, *Masters and Lords: Mid-Nineteenth Century Prussian Junkers and U.S. Planters* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Mark Smith, "Old South Time in Comparative Perspective," *American Historical Review* 101 (1996), 1432–1469.
9. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Civil Wars," in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 417.
10. Kalyvas, "Civil Wars," 425.
11. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
12. On guerrilla warfare in the post-unification *Mezzogiorno*, see especially Franco Molfese, "Il brigntaggio meridionale," in Bartolo Anglani et al., eds., *Storia della società italiana*, vol. 18 (Milan: Teti, 1981), 73–103. On guerrilla in the Confederacy and in the American Civil War in general, see especially Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Interesting suggestions for comparisons are in Carmine Pinto, "Guerre civili. Un percorso teorico," *Meridiana* 76 (2013), 31–56.
13. On these two parallel processes, see especially Dal Lago, *Agrarian Elites*, 180–270.
14. On these themes, see Enrico Dal Lago, "The End of the 'Second Slavery' in the Confederate South and the 'Great Brigandage' in Southern Italy: A Comparative Study," in Javier Lavina and Michael Zeuske, eds., *The Second Slavery: Mass Slaveries and Modernity in the Americas and in the Atlantic Basin* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2014), 77–83.

15. "South Carolina's Declaration of the Immediate Causes of Secession (1860)," in Rick Halpern and Enrico Dal Lago, eds., *Slavery and Emancipation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 349.
16. William Lloyd Garrison's quote is in McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 48.
17. McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 48–49.
18. On the secession of the Lower South, see especially William Freehling, *The Road to Disunion*, vol. 2: *Secessionists Triumphant* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 427–499; and McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 38–63. On South Carolina in particular, see Manisha Sinha, *The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 221–253.
19. Paul D. Escott, *The Confederacy: The Slaveholders' Failed Venture* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 14.
20. Escott, *The Confederacy*, 31.
21. See Shearer Davis Bowman, *At the Precipice: Americans North and South during the Secession Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 261–288. See also Russell McClintock, *Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).
22. Freehling, *Secessionists Triumphant*, 532, see also 499–530. See also Aaron Sheehan-Dean, *Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
23. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 21. See also Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
24. See Mark E. Neely, "Abraham Lincoln vs. Jefferson Davis: Comparing Presidential Leadership during the Civil War," in James McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., *Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 96–111.
25. See Margaret M. Storey, "Southern Dissent," in Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2014), 867–890. See also especially William W. Freehling, *The South vs. the South: How Anti–Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and John C. Inscoe and Robert Kenzer, eds., *Enemies of the Country: New Perspectives on Unionists in the Civil War South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
26. See Aaron Sheehan-Dean, "Southern Home Front," in Sheehan-Dean, ed., *A Companion to the U.S. Civil War*, 909–926; and Victoria Bynum, *The Long Shadow of the Civil War: Southern Dissent and its Legacies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

27. See especially Noel C. Fisher, *War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860–1869* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
28. McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 117. See also Paul D. Escott, *After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978).
29. See Dal Lago, *Agrarian Elites*, 336–339. See also Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, vol. 5: *Dalla rivoluzione nazionale all'Unità (1849–1860)* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964).
30. See Lucy Riall, *Under the Volcano: Revolution in a Sicilian Town* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 94–110. See also Lucy Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy, 1859–1866* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
31. See Alfonso Scirocco, *Il Mezzogiorno nella crisi dell'unificazione (1860–1861)* (Naples: Società Editrice Napoletana, 1981).
32. Roberto Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita, 1855–1864* (Florence: Sansoni, 1999), 158–159. See also Gigi Di Fiore, *Gli ultimi giorni di Gaeta. L'assedio che condannò l'Italia all'Unità* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2012).
33. See Simon Sarlin, "Fighting the Risorgimento: Foreign Volunteers in Southern Italy (1860–63)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 14 (2009), 476–490; and Aldo Albonico, *La mobilitazione legitimista contro il Regno d'Italia. La Spagna e il brigantaggio meridionale postunitario* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1979).
34. See Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, and Alfonso Scirocco, *Il Mezzogiorno nell'Italia unita (1861–1865)* (Naples: Società Editrice Napoletana, 1979).
35. John A. Davis, *Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1780–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 108.
36. On the *Santafede*, see also Angelantonio Spagnoletti, *Storia del Regno delle Due Sicilie* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).
37. See Aldo Albonico, "Lights and Shades of the Carlist Mobilization against the Kingdom of Italy, 1860–66," *Mediterranean Studies* 6 (1996), 107–112. See also Alessia Facineroso, "La dimora del tempo sospeso. Il governo borbonico in esilio e le sue trame cospirative," PhD Dissertation, Università degli Studi di Catania, 2011; Simon Sarlin, *Le légitimisme en armes. Histoire d'une mobilisation internationale contre l'unité italienne* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013); and Gigi Di Fiore, *Controstoria dell'Unità d'Italia. Fatti e misfatti del Risorgimento* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007), 199–201.
38. See Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 99–106.
39. On Sergente Romano, see especially Antonio Lucarelli, *Il Sergente Romano. Il brigantaggio politico in Puglia dopo il 1860* (Rome: Laterza, 1922).
40. The quote is in Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 100.

41. See especially Pasquale Soccio, *Unità e brigantaggio in una città della Puglia* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1969).
42. See Marco Meriggi, "Dopo l'Unità. Forme e ambivalenza del legittimismo borbonico," *Passato e Presente* 29 (2011), 39–56.
43. See Dal Lago, "The End of the 'Second Slavery' in the Confederate South," 83–92.
44. See especially Gary Gallagher, "Disaffection, Persistence, and Nation: Some Directions in Recent Scholarship on the Confederacy," *Civil War History* 55 (2009), 329–353; and the essays in John C. Inscoe and Robert C. Kenzer, eds., *Enemies of the Country: New Perspectives on Unionists in the Civil War South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001).
45. See Sally Jenkins and John Stauffer, *The Free State of Jones: The Small Southern County that Seceded from the Confederacy* (New York: Random House, 2009); Victoria Bynum, *The Free State of Jones: Mississippi's Longest Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and Bynum, *The Long Shadow of the Civil War*, 101–116.
46. Wayne K. Durrill, "Review of John C. Inscoe and Robert C. Kenzer, eds., *Enemies of the Country* and Victoria Bynum, *The Free State of Jones*," *Journal of American History* 89 (2002), 1050.
47. See Winthrop Jordan, *Tumult and Silence at Second Creek: An Inquiry into a Civil War Slave Conspiracy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).
48. Peter Kolchin, "Slavery and Freedom in the Civil War South," in McPherson and Cooper, eds., *Writing the Civil War*, 245.
49. Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggle in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 69.
50. Justin Behrend, "Rebellious Talks and Conspiratorial Plots: The Making of a Slave Insurrection in Civil War Natchez," *Journal of Southern History* 77 (2011), 40.
51. See especially Ira Berlin et al., *Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–76; and Louis Gerteis, "Slaves, Servants, and Soldiers: Uneven Paths to Freedom in the Border States, 1861–1865," in William A. Blair and Karen Fischer Younger, eds., *Lincoln's Proclamation; Emancipation Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 170–194.
52. Abraham Lincoln, "The Emancipation Proclamation (1863)," in Rick Halpern and Enrico Dal Lago, eds., *Slavery and Emancipation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 380. See also Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010), 166–206; and James Oakes, *Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865* (New York: Norton, 2013), 340–393.
53. James Henry Hammond's quote is in Carol Bleser, ed., *Secret and Sacred: The Diaries of James Henry Hammond, a Southern Slaveholder* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 297.
54. See Berlin et al., *Slaves No More*, 187–234.

55. Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet*, 68.
56. Lewis Jackson's quote is in Anthony E. Kaye, "Slaves, Emancipation, and the Powers of War: Views from the Natchez District of Mississippi," in Joan Cashin, ed., *The War Was You and Me: Civilians in the American Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 65. On the slaves' networks in the antebellum and Civil War south, see also Anthony E. Kaye, *Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). On the Emancipation Proclamation and slave insurrection, see James Oakes, *The Scorpion's Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York: Norton, 2014), 102–107.
57. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: Toward a History of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1935), 49.
58. Leon F. Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery* (New York: Knopf, 1979), 46. See also Armstead L. Robinson, *Bitter Fruits of Bondage: The Demise of Slavery and the Collapse of the Confederacy, 1861–1865* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005).
59. See Steven Hahn, *The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 55–114.
60. Levine, *The Fall of the House of Dixie*, 153.
61. See McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 239–262.
62. See the important synthesis of these issues in Steven Hahn, "But What Did the Slaves Think of Lincoln ?" in Blair and Younger, eds., *Lincoln's Proclamation*, 102–119; and also, more recently, Thavolia Glymph, "Rose's War and the Gendered Politics of a Slave Insurgency in the Civil War," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 3:4 (2013), 501–532.
63. Crocco's quote is in Maria Grazia Cutrufelli, *L'Unità d'Italia. Questione meridionale e nascita del sottosviluppo nel Sud* (Rome: Bertani, 1974), 259.
64. Franco Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'Unità* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), 171.
65. Raffaele Romanelli, *L'Italia liberale, 1860–1900* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 33. See also Franco Molfese, "Il brigantaggio meridionale," in Bartolo Anglani et al., *Storia della Società italiana*, vol. 18: *Lo stato unitario e il suo difficile debutto* (Milan: Teti, 1981), 73–103.
66. Derek Beales and Eugenio Biagini, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy* (London: Longman, 2002), 159.
67. Molfese, *Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'Unità*, 167. On Aspromonte, see Alfonso Scirocco, *Giuseppe Garibaldi. Battaglie, amori, ideali di un cittadino del mondo* (Rome: Laterza, 2001), 293–295; and Lucy J. Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 317–325.
68. See especially Tommaso Pedio, *Brigantaggio meridionale (1806–1863)* (Cavallino di Lecce: Capone Editore, 1997), 110–135.
69. The quote is in Pedio, *Brigantaggio meridionale*, 125.

70. See Tommaso Pedio, ed., *Inchiesta Massari sul brigantaggio* (Manduria: Lacaita, 1983); and Pedio, *Brigantaggio meridionale*, 128–130.
71. John A. Davis, "Le guerre del brigantaggio," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento* (Turin: UTET, 2008), 746.
72. The quote is from Count Maffei, *Brigand Life in Italy. A History of Bourbonist Reaction*, vol. II (London, 1865) in Beales and Biagini, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, 284.
73. Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*, 336.
74. Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*, 314. According to Irish pro-Bourbon author The O'Clery, only in the period from May 1861 to February 1863, the number of brigands who were either shot or killed in battle was of 3,451 men, with an additional 3,700 men who either surrendered or were made prisoners; see The O'Clery, *The Making of Italy* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1892), 306. See also Daniela Adorni, "Il brigantaggio," in Luciano Violante, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 12: *La criminalità* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 283–319.
75. See Alfonso Scirocco, "Il giudizio sul brigantaggio meridionale. Dallo scontro politico alla riflessione storica," in Loretta De Felice, ed., *Fonti per la storia del brigantaggio postunitario conservate nell'Archivio centrale dello Stato. Triunali militari straordinari* (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1998), xiv–xxxviii.
76. See Enrico Dal Lago, "Rethinking the Bourbon Kingdom," *Modern Italy* 6 (2001), 69–78.
77. See Jonathan Morris, "Challenging *Meridionalismo*: Constructing a New History of Southern Italy," in Robert Lumley and Jonathan Morris, eds., *The New History of the Italian South: The Mezzogiorno Revisited* (Exeter, U.K.: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 1–19; and Davis, "Le guerre del brigantaggio," 738–752.
78. Salvatore Lupo, *Il passato del nostro presente. Il lungo ottocento, 1776–1913* (Rome: Laterza, 2010), 107. See also especially Salvatore Lupo, "Il Grande Brigantaggio. Interpretazione e memoria di una guerra civile," in Walter Barberis, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, Annali 18: *Guerra e Pace* (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 465–504.
79. See Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana*, 99–150; and Pinto, "Tempo di guerra," 57–84.
80. See John Dickie, *Darkest Italy: The Nation and the Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860–1900* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); and John Dickie, "A Word at War: The Italian Army and Brigandage, 1860–1870," *History Workshop Journal* 33 (1992), 1–24.
81. Martucci, *L'invenzione dell'Italia unita*, 295.
82. On some of these issues, see Dal Lago, "States of Rebellion," 403–432; and Pierre-Yves Manchon, "Guerre civile et formation de l'État dans le Midi d'Italie (1860–1865): histoire et usages du 'Grand Brigandage' en Basilicate," PhD Dissertation, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Università di Napoli Federico II, 2011.

83. See Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

CONCLUSION

1. On the integrated comparative/transnational historical approach, see especially Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jurgen Kocka, "Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems," in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, eds., *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2004), 23–40.
2. On these themes, see also Enrico Dal Lago, *William Lloyd Garrison and Giuseppe Mazzini: Abolition, Democracy, and Radical Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013).
3. See especially Raimondo Luraghi, *Storia della Guerra Civile Americana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 127–155.
4. See especially Gabor S. Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream* (Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1978); and Luciano Cafagna, *Cavour* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999).
5. On this point, see Daniele Fiorentino, *Gli Stati Uniti e il Risorgimento d'Italia, 1848–1911* (Rome: Gangemi, 2013), 187–190.
6. See especially Maria Laura Lanzillo, "Unità della nazione, libertà, indipendenza. Il Risorgimento italiano e la guerra di secessione americana," in Tiziano Bonazzi e Carlo Galli, eds., *La guerra civile americana vista dall'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 185–260.
7. See J. Kowalewski, "Mr. Marsh's Italian Job," *New York Times*, June 22, 2011.
8. See Enrico Dal Lago, "'States of Rebellion': Civil War, Rural Unrest, and the Agrarian Question in the American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno, 1861–1865," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47 (2005), 403–432.

Index

AAS (Associazione Agraria Subalpina or Subalpine Agrarian Association), 78–80, 89–90
abolitionism (nineteenth-century American)
  "cultural imperialism," 27
  idea of northern "liberators" of southern slaves, 25–26
  John Brown as militant abolitionist, 32–33, 42–48
  militant abolitionists, 32–33
  "moral suasion," 27–28, 32
  "non-resistance," 28
  progress and, 24
  Romanticism and, 24
  "Romantic Racialism," 28, 31
  utopian solutions, 26–28
  violent solutions, 31–33
abolitionism (nineteenth-century American) and democratic nationalism (Italian), 21–36
  American and Italian national questions and, 24, 36
  comparisons of utopian solutions, 26–31
  comparisons of violent solutions, 31–36
  parallel ideas of northern "liberators" of southern laborers, 21–24, 35–36
The Age of Capital (Hobsbawm), 5
The Age of Empires (Hobsbawm), 5
Age of Lincoln and Cavour, definition of, 12–15
The Age of Revolution (Hobsbawm), 5
al-Kadir, Abd, 11
Algeria, French colonization/invasion of, 10–11
"Ameliorative nationalism," 82
American Anti-Slavery Society, 27
American Civil War (*see also* Confederate South)
  comparative history and transnational history and, 1–2, 6–7
  compared to Italian *Risorgimento*, 1–3, 14–17, 61–62, 93–95
  compared to "Great Brigandage," 141–144
  historiography, 4, 12–14
  nation-building and, 1–18
  nineteenth-century European nationalism and, 2–7
  perceptions of, in early unified Italy, 123–140
  progressive nationalism and, 111–114
  slavery and, 111–113, 156–158
American Civil War era, 62, 165
"American System," 65–66, 68–69
Ancien Regime, 105–106
Anderson, Benedict, 3, 93
Antislavery Committee (England), 24
Appleby, Joyce, 94
Aptheker, Herbert, 33, 43
Austria, 1859 Franco-Piedmontese war against, 115

Banning, Lance, 94
Banti, Alberto, 15

Bayly, C. A., 5
Beard, Dr., 24
Beckert, Sven, 143
Behrend, Justin, 155
Bender, Thomas, 61, 93–94
Bensel, Richard, 82
Bentham, Jeremy, 74–75, 77
Bertinatti, Giuseppe, 127, 139
Bevilacqua, Piero, 134
Biagini, Eugenio, 62
Bianco di Saint Jorioz, Carlo, 33–35, 50–57
The Birth of the Modern World (Bayly), 5
Bismarck, Otto Von, 110, 120
Bixio, Nino, 149
Blackburn, Robin, 23
Black Reconstruction in America (Du Bois), 157
Blackstone, William, 68
Bloch, Marc, 6
Bolívar, Simon, 50
Bonazzi, Tiziano, 94, 124
Bonelli, Franco, 64
Boritt, Gabor, 62–63, 69, 72, 85
Borjés, José, 128–129, 133, 151
Bosco, Ferdinando, 133
Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Italy)
  Bourbon plans for restoration of, 125–132, 149–152
  Carlo Pisacane and, 38–40, 54, 107
  Francis II and Maria Sofia, fleeing of, 125–126
  Giuseppe Garibaldi's conquest of, 116, 123, 149
  Italian Democrats' plans for insurrection in, 29–31, 34–36
  perceptions and reality of southern laborers in, 24–25, 29–31
  Santafede movement, 150–151
  social justice, guerrilla warfare and, 38–39, 43
Boyce, D. George, 9
Brown, John
  as militant abolitionist, 32–33, 43–48
  abolitionist attitudes, departure from, 43–44
  Bianco di Saint Jorioz, Carlo, application of principles of, 50–57
  compared to Carlo Pisacane, 42–43, 48–50, 55–57
  death of, 37
  early life, 42
  European democrats, transnational links with, 55–57
  farming in North Elba, 44, 47, 49
  Forbes, Hugh, betrayal by, 52
  guerrilla warfare and revolution, views on, 51–53
  historiography on, 39–41
  Harpers Ferry raid, 38–40, 45, 51–53, 55
  Harpers Ferry and Sapri compared, 38–40
  Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States, 45, 48, 49, 53
  social equality, radical commitment to, 42–46
Brown, John, Jr., 44
Brown, Peter, 129–130
Buchanan, James, 38
Bugeaud, General, 11
Bull Run, Battle of, 128
Burton, Orville Vernon, 12
Bush, Michael, 143
Bynum, Victoria, 154

Cafagna, Luciano, 62, 86, 105
Cagliari (ship), 39
Cantabrian Economic Society, 76
Cardoza, Anthony, 78
Carwardine, Richard, 68, 99
Catholic Church, power of, 106

Cavour, Camillo Benso, Count of (1810–1861),
compared to Abraham Lincoln, 12–15, 61–66, 89–91, 95–97, 109–111, 118–120
compared to Henry Clay, 87
death of, 118, 124
early career of, 61–65, 73–81, 84–91
economic progress and, 73–80, 84–91
estate management, model of, 77–78
Italian National Society and, 96–97, 108–109, 115–116
Italian national unification and, 107–109, 115–116, 123
Italian prime minister, 2, 123
liberal reforms, 84–91
Moderate Liberals and, 8, 65–66, 107–108
nation-building, 8, 12–13, 103–109, 115–118
national unification and progressive nationalism, post-1850, 95–97, 103–112, 114–120
perception of Confederate Secession and American Civil War, 123–124
Piedmontese prime minister, 87–89, 95, 103–106
railroads and, 88–89
Channing, William Ellery, 28
Charles Albert (Savoy King), 86
Chateaubriand, 74
Chiavistelli, Antonio, 79
Chicago Press and Tribune, 126
Cialdini, Enrico, 125, 130, 150
Clay, Henry, 65, 68–70, 72–73, 87, 89
Cohen, Deborah, 16
Colton, Calvin, 68
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Blackstone), 68
Comparative history
American Civil War and, 1–2, 4–5, 93–94
integrated comparative/transnational approach, 16–17, 165–166
Italian *Risorgimento* and, 1–2, 4–5, 93–94
methodology, 5–6
nation-building and, 12–16
transnational approaches and, 6–7, 16
Comte, Auguste, 74
Condillac, 74
Confederate Reckoning (McCurry), 4, 158
Confederate South (*see also* Confederate States of America, or Confederacy)
conflicting nationalisms in, 144–149
inner civil war in, 144–149
inner civil war compared to Great Brigandage, 141–145, 153–154, 162–164
perceptions of Secession in post-unification Italy, 123–140
Secession, 102, 112, 114, 124
slave rebellion and social revolution in, 154–158
Confederate States of America, or Confederacy, 4, 14, 102, 112–114, 124–126, 132, 138–140, 146
Constant, Benjamin, 74
Cook, Robert, 102
Corio, Giacinto, 75
Corning, Erastus, 114
Corn Laws, 85
The Creation of Confederate Nationalism (Faust), 4
Czar Alexander II, 120

Dal Lago, Enrico, 142
Daniel, John, 126
Davis, David Brion, 23

Davis, Jefferson, 124, 146, 148
Davis, John, 151, 160
D'Azeglio, Massimo, 104, 106, 115, 118, 131
DeCaro, Louis, 45
Declaration of Independence, 80, 95
Deeds, Susan, 71
De Francesco, Antonino, 55
Degler, Carl, 4
democratic nationalism (Italian)
  Carlo Pisacane and the Italian Democrats, 35–36, 53–55
  Cavour and the Italian Democrats, 115–116, 119
  comparison with abolitionism (nineteenth-century American), 21–36
  distorted perceptions of southern Italian peasants, 25–26
  Garibaldi and the post-unification Italian Democrats, 133–135
  utopian solutions to national question, 28–31
  violent solutions to national question, 34–35
Delaney, Martin, 45
Dickie, John, 162
Di Fiore, Gigi, 125
Distant Revolutions (Roberts), 4, 40
Domesticating Foreign Struggles (Gemme), 13
Donatelli, Carmine "Crocco," 129–130, 151–152, 158–159
Douglas, Stephen, 97, 100–101
Doyle, Don, 22, 27, 93, 133, 142
Drescher, Seymour, 23
Du Bois, W. E. B., 51–52, 157
Durrill, Wayne K., 155

Economic progress
  Cavour and, 73–80, 84–91
  liberal reforms in nineteenth-century Piedmont and, 84–91
  Lincoln and, 66–73, 80–84
  Lincoln and Cavour compared on, 64–65, 89–91
  nineteenth-century Illinois and, 66–73
  progressive nationalism and, 61–63, 65–66, 89–91
  railroads and, 83–84, 90–91
Emancipation Proclamation, 113, 120, 155–158
England Antislavery Committee, 24
Ericson, David, 94, 100
"Eulogy on Henry Clay," 73–74
Euro-American world, 2–3, 7–8, 48–51, 169
Europe
  1848 Revolutions, 2–5, 52–53, 61
  Enlightenment and Romanticism, 23–24
  European agronomic culture, 76–79
  European liberalism and Cavour, 74–75
  European nationalism and American Civil War, 2–7
  transnational links with nineteenth-century United States, 6–8, 12–13

Fabrizi, Nicola, 34–35
Faccenda, Emanuele, 78
Facundo (Sarmiento), 119–120
The Fall of the House of Dixie (Levine), 157–158
Farini, Luigi Carlo, 132, 160
Faust, Drew, 4
Fehrenbacher, Don, 98
Ferdinand IV (Bourbon King), 150–151
Ferrari, Giuseppe, 130–131
Finney, Charles G., 26
Fiorentino, Daniele, 13, 126
First Confiscation Act, 112–113
Fleche, André, 4, 142
Foner, Eric, 24, 64, 67, 69–70, 81, 85, 94, 97–99, 102, 105, 114, 164
Forbes, Hugh, 52

Fort Sumter, siege of, 124, 127, 147
France, colonization/invasion of Algeria, 10–11
Francis II (Bourbon King)
  at the fortress of Gaeta, 125–127
  plans to restore Bourbon Kingdom, 125–132, 149–152
  support for "Great Brigandage," 128–130, 133, 150–153
Franzini, Teobaldo, 137
Frayssé, Olivier, 62–63
Fredrickson, George, 6, 28, 31
Freehling, William, 147
Free Soil Party (U.S.), 32
Free state of Jones, 154
Fulton, Robert, 66

Gaeta, siege of, 125–127
Gag Rule (America), 27
Galasso, Giuseppe, 116
Gallagher, Gary, 101
Garibaldi, Giuseppe
  Aspromonte expedition, 133–135, 137, 139
  at Bronte, 149
  conquest of Bourbon Kingdom, 116, 123, 149–150
  in 1848–1849 revolutions, 52–53
Garrison, William Lloyd,
  Daniel O'Connell and, 10
  Giuseppe Mazzini and, 22, 26
  utopian abolitionism of, 26–28
Gellner, Ernest, 3, 93
Gemme, Paola, 13, 22
Germany
  1870–1871 Franco-German War, 11
  German national unification and American Civil War, 4–5, 120
  German national unification and Italian national unification, 7–8, 123–124
Gettysburg Address, 114
Ginsborg, Paul, 30–31
Gladstone, William Ewart, 110
The Global Lincoln, 119
Gramsci, Antonio, 30, 161
Grant, Susan-Mary, 4, 114
Grattan, Henry, 9
Grayson, William, 21
"Great Black Way," 51–52, 55
Great Brigandage (southern Italy)
  as southern Italy's inner civil war, 150–152, 158–162
  Cavour and, 118
  comparison with the American Civil War, 8, 10, 16, 124, 132, 138–140
  comparison with the Confederate South's inner civil war, 141–145, 153–154, 162–164
  Francis II and, 125–130
  peasant rebellion and repression, 158–162
Great Postal Campaign (America), 27
Greely, Horace, 126
Greenfeld, Liah, 4, 93
Greenstone, J. David, 94, 102
Grimshaw, William, 68
Guarneri, Carl, 61
Guelzo, Allen, 66, 67–68, 71, 83, 111
Guizot, Francois, 74

Hahn, Steven, 4, 113, 143, 155–157
Haitian revolution, 50
Hammond, James Henry, 156
Habsburg Austria, 104, 107–108
Harpers Ferry raid, 38–40, 45, 51–53, 55
Hartz, Louis, 94
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, 6
Hayne, Paul Hamilton, 21
History of the United States (Grimshaw), 68
Hobsbawm, Eric, 3, 5, 93
Horwitz, Tony, 45, 52
"House Divided" speech (Lincoln), 101–102

Howe, Daniel Walker, 63, 70
Hudson, James, 133, 135
Hugo, Victor, 37–39

Illinois
  Illinois Central Railroad, 64, 70–71, 76, 83–84
  Lincoln's life in, 63–73
  Market Revolution and, 63–65, 68–70
  Whigs and, 67–72, 81–84
Illinois Central Railroad v. County of McLean, 83–84
Il testamento politico (Pisacane), 47–48
Internal Improvements Act (1837), 71
Ireland
  Cavour on Ireland, 76, 79
  Daniel O'Connell and Repeal, 9–10
  nineteenth-century nation-building, 9–10
  Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), 10
  Young Ireland movement, 9–10
Isabella, Maurizio, 1
Italian Legion, 34
Italian National Society, 107–108, 115–116
Italian National Unification (*see also Risorgimento*)
  American public opinion and, 125–126
  Cavour and, 107–109, 115–116, 123
  comparison with American Civil War, 2, 12–14, 61
  Mazzini and, 29

Jackson, Lewis, 157
Jenkins, Sally, 154
Johnson, Bethany, 1
Johnson, Michael P., 81
Jordan, Winthrop, 155
Journal of the Civil War Era, 1

Kalyvas, Stathis, 143–144
Kansas-Nebraska Act, 81, 97
Kingdom of Sardinia (*see also* Piedmont)
  Cavour and, 73, 86–87, 91, 104–106
  Italian national unification and, 123–124, 126, 149–150
Klapca, Giorgio, 135
Knight, Newton, 154
Kocka, Jurgen, 6–7, 16
Kolchin, Peter, 4, 6, 16, 120, 143, 155
Körner, Axel, 128
Kramer, Lloyd, 4

La Farina, Giuseppe, 108, 139
La Marmora, Alfonso, 135–136, 159–160
La rivoluzione (Pisacane), 46–47, 54
Latin America
  independence movements, 2
  liberalism and progressive nationalism, 119–120
Lawson, Melinda, 4, 112–113
Lee, Robert E., 38
Les Miserables (Hugo), 37–38
Levine, Bruce, 157–168
Liberalism
  American Civil War and, 61, 94–95, 100
  Cavour and, 74, 79, 86, 104, 107
  Italian, 21
  Latin America, 119
  Lincoln and, 100, 102, 105, 111
  Lincoln and Cavour and, 167
The Liberator (Garrison), 26, 28–29
Licata, Glauco, 13, 62
Life of George Washington (Weems), 68
Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865)
  American Civil War and, 111–114, 132, 155–156
  compared to Bismarck, 4–5, 110, 120

compared to Camillo Cavour, 12–15, 61–66, 89–91, 95–97, 109–111, 118–120
death of, 118
early career of, 61–73, 80–85, 88–91
economic progress and, 66–73, 80–84
Emancipation Proclamation, 113, 120, 132, 155–156
"Eulogy on Henry Clay," 73
Gettysburg Address, 114
"House Divided" speech, 101–102
Illinois, life in, 63–73
Liberalism, 100, 102, 105, 111
national unification and progressive nationalism, 95–103, 105–114, 117–120
"new birth of freedom" and, 111–114
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 113, 120, 132, 138, 153
railroads and, 80–84
Republican Party and, 2, 8, 13, 61, 81–84, 96–103, 105, 118–119
Special Message to Congress (1861), 111
slavery and, 8, 14–15, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 80–81, 97–102, 112–113, 120, 132, 155–156
Whig Party and, 67–72, 81–84, 97, 99
Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream (Boritt), 62, 72
Lincoln, Land, and Labor (Frayssé), 62
L'invenzione dell'Italia unita (Martucci), 162
Litwack, Leon, 157
The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Kalyvas), 144
Lorenzo, Enrichetta Di, 43
L'Ouverture, Toussaint, 50
L'unificazione italiana (Lupo), 162
Lupo, Salvatore, 136, 162
Luraghi, Raimondo, 3, 13, 39–40, 62, 94, 127

Machiavelli, 74
Margolfo, Carlo, 130
Maria Sofia (Bourbon Queen), 125
Markets. *See* Economic progress
Marraro, Howard, 12, 22
Martucci, Roberto, 161–162
Massari, Giuseppe, 160–161
Matteucci, Carlo, 131
Mazzini, Giuseppe
Beard, letter to Dr., 24
guerrilla warfare and, 50–55, 57
revolutionary insurrection and, 29–30
social equality and, 39–40
utopian solutions to national question and, 26, 28–30
William Lloyd Garrison and, 22, 26
McClellan, George, 132
McCurry, Stephanie, 4, 146, 158
McDaniel, Caleb, 1, 4, 22, 23, 44
McPherson, James, 93
Meriggi, Marco, 86
Mexican War, 71–72, 97
Mexico, abolition of slavery, 71–72, 81
Meyer, Michael, 71
Mezzogiorno (*see also* Southern Italy)
Bourbon plans on, 123–132
Cavour and, 116–118, 123–124
nationalisms, conflicting, 144–152
secession averted, 136, 139–140
social revolution and, 153–164
Militant abolitionists, U.S., 32–36
Miller, Nicola, 119
Minghetti, Marco, 132
Moderate Liberals (Italy)
national unifications and, 98, 107–108, 116, 119
nation-building and, 8, 13

Molfese, Franco, 137, 159
Montesquieu, 74
Montgomery, Alabama
  meeting of delegates of seceding states, 146–147
Moore, Barrington, Jr., 2
"Moral suasion," 27–28, 32
Musolino, Benedetto, 134

Nanco, Ninco, 129
Napoleon III, 115, 135
Nation-building
  competing national projects and, 8–9
  in Civil War America, 4, 14, 97
  in Ireland, 9–10
  in *Risorgimento* Italy, 14–15, 104
  in the Euro-American world, 5–6, 61–62, 93–94, 111, 119–120
  in the United States and Italy, 1–2, 7–8, 12–14, 95–97, 112, 142, 153, 165, 168–170
Nationalism (*see also* Progressive Nationalism *and* Democratic Nationalism)
  competing nationalisms, 9–10, 144
  Euro-American, 5–6, 61–62, 93–94, 111, 119–120
  historiography, 4–5, 14–16, 61–62, 93–94
  in Ireland, 9–10
  in Civil War America, 4, 14, 97
  in *Risorgimento* Italy, 14–15, 104
  progress and, 23
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Greenfeld), 4
Nationalism in Europe and America (Kramer), 4
"Nationalization of slavery," 98
"National questions," American and Italian, 109–111
National unification
  American Civil War and, 111–114
  Cavour and, 95–97, 103–12, 114–20
  German national unification, 4–5, 7–8, 120, 123–124
  Italian national unification, 115–20
  Lincoln and, 95–103, 97–103, 111–114
  "national questions," American and Italian, 109–111
  United States and Italy compared, 1–2, 7–8, 12–14, 95–97, 112, 142, 153, 165, 168–170
A Nation Under Our Feet (Hahn), 156
Neely, Mark, 72, 93, 114
Negri, Pier Eleonoro, 130
New York Daily Tribune, 126
New York Tribune, 43
Nigra, Costantino, 116
North Elba farm, 44, 47, 49
North Over South (Grant), 4

Oakes, James, 98
O'Connell, Daniel, 9, 10, 77
O'Connor, Maura, 16
Oliphant, L., 137
On the Road to Total War (Forster and Nagler), 5
Onuf, Nicholas, 112
Onuf, Peter, 112
Osterhammel, Jurgen, 5

Palamara, Graziano, 41, 47
Pallavicini, Emilio, 135
Palmerston, Lord, 129
Parish, Peter, 82, 97–98, 112
Patriot Fires (Lawson), 4
Pease, Jane, 32
Pease, William, 32
Perkins Marsh, George, 128, 139
Pescosolido, Guido, 88
Phillips, William, 43
Pica Law, 161, 163
Piedmont (*see also* Kingdom of Sardinia)
  agriculture, 74–80, 84–90

Cavour and, 74–80, 84–90, 103–108
economic change and, 62, 64–66
economic progress and, 73–80
political developments, 103–108
proto-industrialization, 64–65
Pisacane, Carlo
1848–1849 Revolutions, 43, 53–55
as a democrat and socialist, 17, 35, 38, 40–41, 47–49
compared to John Brown, 42–43, 48–50, 55–57
death of, 39
early life, 43
guerrilla warfare and revolution, views on, 53–55
historiography on, 39–41
Mazzini and, 53–55
on Bianco di Saint Jorioz, 53–55
La rivoluzione, 45–46, 49, 54
Sapri expedition, 35–36, 47, 54–56
Sapri and Harpers Ferry compared, 38–40
social equality, radical commitment to, 45–49
Il testamento politico, 47–49
Pius IX, 125, 151
The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom (Hahn), 157
Polk, James K., 71
Pontelandolfo, burning of, 130–131
Potter, David, 2, 61, 94, 100, 111
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 113, 120, 132, 138, 153
The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery (McDaniel), 4
Progressive Nationalism
American and Italian national questions and, 96
as a transnational ideology, 94–95, 99
Cavour and, 84, 87, 104–106
defined, 61–63
economic progress, 66–91
Lincoln and, 72–73, 82–84
Lincoln and Cavour and, 61–63, 65–66, 89–90, 98, 99–102, 109–112, 118, 167–168

Quantrill, William, 148
Quigley, Paul, 4, 142

Radical Republicans, 111, 119, 126, 134, 155
Railroads (*see also* Illinois Central Railroad)
Cavour and, 88–89
Lincoln and, 80–84
Ranger, Terence, 93
Rattazzi Law (1851), 106
Rattazzi, Urbano, 103, 106, 132, 137–139, 159–160
Realf, Richard, 52
Redpath, James, 32–33, 35
Red Shirts, 116, 149
Repeal of the 1801 Act of Union (Ireland), 9–10
Republican Party (America)
compared to Moderate Liberals, 4, 8, 13
ideology of, 97–103
influence of, 100–101
Lincoln and, 2, 8, 13, 61, 81–84, 96–103, 105, 118–119
national progress and, 81–82
"Railroad Republicans," 84
slavery and, 97–103
Review of Practical Agriculture, 76
The Revolution of 1861 (Fleche), 4
Reynolds, David, 44, 51
Riall, Lucy, 64, 108
Ricardo, David, 77
Ricasoli, Baron Bettino, 128, 130–131, 136, 138–139
Richards, David, 23
Richardson, Heather Cox, 90
Richmond, capture of, 132

Risorgimento (Italy)
American public opinion and, 125–126
Cavour and, 107–109, 115–116, 123
comparison with American Civil War, 2, 12–14, 61
historiography, 1–2, 13–15
John Brown and, 40–41
nation-building and, 1, 7, 11–16
Il Risorgimento (Cavour), 86
Roberts, Timothy, 4, 22, 40, 51–52, 142
Romanelli, Raffaele, 105
Romani, Roberto, 107
Romano, Pasquale Domenico, 151–153
Romanticism, 24
"Romantic Racialism," 28, 31
Romeo, Rosario, 12, 62, 87
Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 120
Ross, Dorothy, 101
Rossi, Joseph, 22
Ruffo, Fabrizio, 151
Rugemer, Edward, 143
Russell, John, 129–130, 135, 137
Russells Magazine, 21–22
Russi, Luciano, 46–47, 53–54

Saint-Simon, Henri de, 29
Sanfilippo, Matteo, 22
Sanford, Henry Shelton, 133
The San Francisco Call, 110
San Martín, 50
Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, 71
Santafede movement (Italy), 150–151
Sarmiento, Domingo, 119–120
Sarti, Roland, 22, 29
Schenone, Giulio, 51
Schoen, Brian, 143
Scott, Paul, 147
Scott, Rebecca, 143
Secession, Confederate South (America)
Fort Sumter, 147
independence of confederacy, early, 148–149
Montgomery, Alabama meeting of delegates of seceding states, 146–147
perceptions in Italy, 123–132
South Carolina, "ordinance of secession," 145–146, 149
Upper South states, 147–148
Second Confiscation Act, 113
Sellers, Charles, 69
Seward, William H., 118, 127, 133, 138–139
Sherman, William, 71
Shifting Grounds (Quigley), 4
Shugaar, Anthony, 138
Siccardi, Giuseppe, 106
Skocpol, Theda, 6
Slavery
American Civil War and, 111–113, 156–158
Confederate South and, 154–158
Lincoln and, 8, 14–15, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 80–81, 97–102, 112–113, 120, 132, 155–156
"nationalization of slavery," 98
Republican Party and, 81–84, 96–103, 105, 118–119
"second slavery," 143, 153
Whigs and, 81–84, 97, 99
Slaves
rebellions, 29–30, 154–158
runaways, 155–156
wrong perceptions of, 26–28, 31–33
Smith, Adam, 77
Smith, Denis Mack, 29
Smith, Gerry, 44, 47
Social equality
John Brown and, 42–46
Carlo Pisacane and, 46–49

The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore), 2
Social revolutions
  American slaves and, 154–157
  Southern Italian peasants and, 158–163
Somers, Margaret, 6
South Carolina, "Ordinance of Secession," 145–146, 149
Southern Italy (*see also* Mezzogiorno)
  Confederate South compared to, 141–145, 153–154, 162–164
  Great Brigandage as inner civil war, 150–152, 158–162
  Italian Democrats and, 24–25, 30, 34–36
  Pisacane and, 46, 54–55
  secession averted, 136, 139–140
Spini, Giorgio, 12, 22
Statella, Giuseppe, 133, 153
Stauffer, John, 42, 154
Stewart, James B., 32
Story, Joseph, 68
Stuart, J. E. B., 38
Stuart, John Todd, 68

Tagliacozzo, Enzo, 13, 62
Taiping Rebellion (China), 5–6
Talamo, Giuseppe, 74
Texas, independence, 71–72
Thomas, William, 83–84
Thoughts on Ireland: Its Present and Its Future (Cavour), 76
Tomich, Dale, 143
Tone, Wolfe, 9
The Transformation of the World (Osterhammel), 5
Transnational history
  American Civil War and, 1–2, 4–5, 93–94
  comparative history and, 6–7
  Italian *Risorgimento* and, 1–2, 4–5, 93–94
  methodologies (*histoire croisée* and *transfergeschichte*), 6–7
  transnational links, 8, 12–16, 22, 39–41, 55, 57, 61, 123, 143
Tristany, Raffaele, 133, 153
Trodd, Zoe, 42
Tubman, Harriet, 51
Tyrrell, Ian, 61

Underground Railroad, 51–52, 55
Upper South states (America), secession, 147–148
Utopian social experiments, 45

Victor Emmanuel II (Piedmontese King), 116–117, 127
Von Frank, Albert J., 53

Walters, Ronald, 27
Watson, Harry, 94
Weems, Mason L., 68
Werner, Michael, 6
Whig Party, 71–72, 81, 99
Wilentz, Sean, 94
Wilmot Proviso, 81
Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, 81
Wood, Gordon, 94
Woolf, Stuart, 107

Young Ireland movement, 9–10
Young Italy (Mazzini), 50, 53

Zeuske, Michael, 143
Zimmermann, Benedicte, 6