

Security, Conflict and Cooperation
in the Contemporary World



Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers, 1943-1957

PABLO DEL HIERRO LECEA



Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers, 1943–1957

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

Edited by Effie G. H. Pedaliu, LSE-Ideas and John W. Young, University of Nottingham

The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to academic and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since 1900. It evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by Professor Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer innovative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, conflict and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nation-building, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of ideology and religion on international relations, as well as the work of international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

Series editors

Effie G. H. Pedaliu is Fellow at LSE IDEAS, UK. She is the author of *Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and many articles on the Cold War. She is a member of the peer review college of the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

John W. Young is Professor of International History at the University of Nottingham, UK, and Chair of the British International History Group. His recent publications include *Twentieth Century Diplomacy: A Case Study in British Practice, 1963–76* (2008) and, co-edited with Michael Hopkins and Saul Kelly of *The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939–77* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

Titles include:

Pablo Del Hierro Lecea

SPANISH-ITALIAN RELATIONS AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MAJOR POWERS,
1943–1957

Aaron Donaghy

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 1974–79

Martín Abel González and Nigel J. Ashton

THE GENESIS OF THE FALKLANDS (MALVINAS) CONFLICT
Argentina, Britain and the Failed Negotiations of the 1960s

Christopher Baxter, Michael L. Dockrill and Keith Hamilton.

BRITAIN IN GLOBAL POLITICS VOLUME 1

From Gladstone to Churchill

Rui Lopes

WEST GERMANY AND THE PORTUGUESE DICTATORSHIP

Between Cold War and Colonialism

John W. Young, Effie G. H. Pedaliu and Michael D. Kandiah

BRITAIN IN GLOBAL POLITICS VOLUME 2

From Churchill to Blair

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–137–27284–3 (Hardback)

(outside North America only)

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above.

Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers, 1943–1957

Pablo Del Hierro Lecea
Maastricht University, the Netherlands

palgrave
macmillan



© Pablo Del Hierro Lecea 2015

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-44866-8

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-49654-9 ISBN 978-1-137-44868-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137448682

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Del Hierro Lecea, Pablo, 1981–

Spanish-Italian relations and the influence of the major powers, 1943–1957 / Pablo Del Hierro Lecea, Maastricht University, Netherlands.

pages cm.—(Security, conflict and cooperation in the contemporary world)

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Spain—Foreign relations—Italy. 2. Italy—Foreign relations—Spain.
3. Spain—Foreign relations—1939–1975. 4. Italy—Foreign relations—
1945–1976. 5. World politics—1945–1955. I. Title.

DP86.L8D45 2014

327.4604509'044—dc23

2014026510

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

To Laura, and to my parents

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xiii
Introduction	1
1 A Question of Pragmatism: Spanish-Italian Relations after the Collapse of the Mussolini Regime, 1943–1945	16
The impossible choice: the Allies, Germany and Spanish policy towards the two ‘Italies’	18
<i>The collapse of the Mussolini regime: a turning point in Spanish foreign policy?</i>	18
<i>Spain and the two ‘Italies’: the struggle for official recognition</i>	22
<i>The RSI offensive for official recognition</i>	39
The first splits in Anglo-American cooperation: the Allies and the problem of the Italian fleet in the Spanish ports	42
<i>Genesis of the problem</i>	42
<i>Ideology or national interests? Spanish foreign policy towards the two Italies</i>	47
<i>Navigating the Anglo-American differences: the agreement between Spain and the Allies</i>	53
<i>The Kingdom of Italy’s diplomatic offensive</i>	60
<i>A present for Ambassador Hayes: the release of the Italian warships</i>	64
Conclusions	66
2 Allies in the Post-war Era? Spanish-Italian Relations and the Major Powers, 1945–1947	69
Towards normalization: the negotiation of the war debt and the Commercial Treaty of 1946	71
<i>The long road towards the normalization of relations: the war debt and the resumption of commercial exchanges</i>	71
<i>The negotiations for the signing of the Commercial Treaty</i>	88
<i>The Commercial Treaty: a political treaty</i>	91
The consolidation of Spanish-Italian relations after the signing of the Commercial Treaty	97
<i>1946: a year of consolidation</i>	97
<i>The appointment of Nenni as Minister of Foreign Affairs</i>	103

	<i>The UN resolution and the withdrawal of the Italian Ambassador: life remains the same</i>	110
	Conclusions	115
3	Towards the Cold War: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Rising Tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union	119
	Spain, Italy and the Marshall Plan: the deterioration of bilateral relations	121
	<i>Italy and the possible inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan</i>	121
	<i>Spanish exclusion from the ERP</i>	129
	<i>The impact of Spanish exclusion from the ERP in bilateral relations</i>	131
	A counterproductive strategy: Spanish-Italian attempts to improve bilateral relations after the 1948 elections	137
	<i>The economic approach</i>	137
	<i>Spanish attempts at diplomatic normalization</i>	141
	Conclusions	144
4	1949: A Year of Important Approaches	146
	Small steps: the limitations of the first attempts to improve bilateral relations	147
	<i>Negotiating a new commercial agreement</i>	147
	<i>Giulio Andreotti visits Spain</i>	151
	<i>The commercial negotiations</i>	159
	<i>The Brusasca–Aldisio mission: another Spanish attempt to normalize relations with Italy</i>	161
	A light at the end of the tunnel: the first accomplishments	167
	<i>The Commercial Treaty</i>	167
	<i>Martín Artajo's trip to Rome</i>	172
	Conclusions	179
5	A 'Flirt' between Madrid and Rome: The Spanish-Italian Rapprochement and the Role of the Western Powers, 1951–1955	182
	The return of the ambassador and the normalization of diplomatic relations	184
	<i>The long path towards normalization</i>	184
	<i>Taliani's arrival in Madrid: a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations?</i>	189
	<i>De Gasperi's visit to Washington: a new phase in bilateral relations?</i>	192
	The rapprochement in Spanish-Italian relations	201
	<i>Setting the ground for industrial cooperation: Merzagora's trip to Spain in 1952</i>	201
	<i>Cooperation in the industrial field</i>	207
	<i>The Italian elections and the end of the De Gasperi era</i>	212

<i>The second step: military cooperation</i>	223
<i>The third step: the Cultural Treaty</i>	231
Conclusions	236
6 The Limits of Rapprochement: In Search of Political Cooperation, 1955–1957	239
The impossible political partnership	240
<i>‘Relaciones a media caldera’: Spain takes the initiative</i>	240
<i>The Mediterranean Pact</i>	242
<i>‘A gentleman’s club’? Spain, Italy and NATO</i>	247
Conclusions	254
<i>Conclusions</i>	256
<i>Bibliography</i>	274
<i>Index</i>	284

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

5.1	Evolution of Spain's trade with the major Western countries, 1952–1957	214
5.2	Evolution of Italy's trade with the major Western countries, 1952–1957	214
5.3	Evolution of Spanish-Italian trade, 1952–1957	215

Tables

4.1	Spanish trade by countries of production (value in thousands of gold pesetas)	171
4.2	Italian trade by countries of production (value in million lire)	171
5.1	Most important Italian industries and their branches operating in Spain, 1965	211
5.2	Spanish trade by countries of production (value in thousands of gold pesetas)	213
5.3	Italian trade by countries of production (value in million lire)	213

Acknowledgements

This book, my first, has been conceived and brought to fruition during the last seven years. During this period I concluded my doctoral studies at the European University Institute (EUI) and started working as a Lecturer in Global History at the University of Maastricht. My first thanks go to these two institutions not only for partially financing this work, but also for providing a stimulating research environment. In this regard, I am also grateful to the Spanish and Dutch Ministries and institutions which also funded my research over the last seven years.

I am most grateful to my former supervisor and now colleague in Maastricht, Kiran Klaus Patel, for his generous support. He has helped me to integrate my Spanish academic background with a more 'Anglo-Saxon' approach, and to find a balance between description and analysis. In other words, he has made me a better historian. Thanks are also due to Fernando Guirao (Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona), Antonio Varsori (Università di Padova), Tony Molho (Emeritus Professor at the EUI), Federico Romero (EUI), and Fernando García Sanz (CSIC), for taking their time to read various stages of my manuscript and to discuss with me Spanish-Italian relations and the Cold War. Their insightful comments and encouragement have greatly contributed to improving this book.

During my frequent visits to the archives in five different countries, I have incurred many debts which I acknowledge here. First of all, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, which provided me with a research grant that made possible my stay in Independence, Missouri. Likewise, Stefania Ruggeri at the archive of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Giuseppe Parlato at the Fondazione Ugo Spirito, and Concetta Argiolas at the Istituto Sturzo, have been extremely helpful in the provision of documents and good advice. Special thanks to Pilar Casado, at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those historians who have worked in Spanish archives in the last decades know how difficult it is to do research there and how necessary it is to have a person that can guide you through. This situation has deteriorated in the last years after the decision made by the Spanish Government to close the archives indefinitely on account of a number of vague excuses. For the good of history, I really hope that this sad situation is solved as soon as possible. In the meantime, people like Pilar Casado and other archivists in the *Archivo General de la Administración* or the *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, remain a fundamental asset for the administration; I am convinced that the Spanish Government owes you a substantial raise because without you it would be literally impossible to conduct proper research in Spanish archives.

I would also like to acknowledge the assistance I received from the staff at the European University Institute and the University of Maastricht, which made my life easier. Special mention must go to the Secretariats of the History Department at the EUI and, in particular, Nicky Koniordos who not only looked after a number of administrative formalities on my behalf, but also helped me to settle into the Institute when I first arrived. Further acknowledgement goes to Françoise Thauvin who has always helped me to fill out the innumerable bureaucratic forms with a smile on her face.

I would also like to express my deepest appreciation to the Language Service at the European University Institute, especially to Nicky Owtram who encouraged me from the beginning to write this book in English and helped throughout the whole process. I have also received very helpful assistance in the correction process by Lucas Lixinsky, Alanna O'Malley, and Aaron Vinnik, three great friends who devoted part of their time to correct my different manuscripts. Concerning the language of the quotations, it should be clarified that the present research has opted for keeping their original languages in French or English, whilst the rest were translated into English.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my friends in Madrid, Florence and Maastricht: Aaron, Alan, Alanna, Antoine, Enrique, Jannis, Lucas, Ludek, Magdalena, Martin, Mats, Matteo, Tess, Thomas, Vincent, Walter, Yannick, it is not possible to express with words how much you have contributed to this work. It has been a privilege to know you and to spend time with you during these last years. And very special thanks to Laura and my parents. Laura. Thank you for your love, your understanding and your patience. I know it has not been easy, but you must know that, without you, this project could not have been accomplished and would not have meant anything. Last but not least, my parents. Thank you for your unconditional support. Your strength, your goodness and your wisdom have been a constant source of inspiration during my whole life, but especially during these last seven years. This book goes to you all.

Pablo Del Hierro Lecea

List of Abbreviations

ACC	Allied Control Commission
BLN	Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (National Bank of Work)
BOE	Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official State Gazette)
CEEC	Committee for European Economic Cooperation
CLN	Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (National Liberation Committee)
CTV	Corpo di Truppe Volontarie (Corps of Volunteer Troops)
DC	Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy)
DGAE	Direzione Generale Affari Economici (General Direction of Economic Affairs)
DGAP	Direzione Generale Affari Politici (General Direction of Political Affairs)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ENSIDESA	Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica, S.A. (National Iron and Steel Company)
ERP	European Recovery Program
FINSIDER	Società Finanziaria Siderurgica (Financial Iron and Steel Society)
IEME	Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera (Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
INA	Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (National Institute of Insurances)
INI	Instituto Nacional de Industria (Institute of National Industry)
IRI	Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction)
MSI	Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)

Pd'A	Partito D'Azione (Action Party)
PDL	Partito Democratico del Lavoro (Democratic Labour Party)
PLI	Partito Liberale Italiano (Italian Liberal Party)
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI	Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist and Democratic Party)
PSLI	Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani (Socialist Party of Italian Workers)
PRI	Partito Repubblicano Italiano (Italian Republican Party)
RSI	Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic)
SAFNI	Sociedad Anónima Financiera Nacional Italiana (Italian National Financial Public Limited Company)
SNIA	Società Nazionale Industria Applicazione (National Society of Industrial Applications)
SNIACE	Sociedad Nacional de Industrias Aplicaciones Celulosa Española (National Society of Industries of Cellulose Applications Spanish)
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WEU	Western European Union

*Hombres de España, ni el pasado ha muerto, no está el mañana –
ni el ayer – escrito.*

Antonio Machado
Campos de Castilla

*I play not marches for accepted victors only, I play marches for
conquer'd and slain persons.*

Walt Whitman
Song of Myself

Introduction

On 24 March 1955, Francesco Maria Taliani, Italian Ambassador to Spain from 1951 to 1954, organized a conference where he discussed the past, present and future of Spanish-Italian relations. For several reasons, this conference became not only a social event of considerable magnitude but also one of the most emblematic episodes in Spanish-Italian relations since the collapse of the Mussolini regime during the summer of 1943. In the first instance, it was held at the Italian Centre for International Reconciliation (nowadays CISCI), a public forum created after the Second World War by the Italian journalist Tommaso Sillani with the aid of the Bonomi Government, to promote political debate about the international situation and the new world order after 1945. The fact that an Italian diplomat delivered a speech discussing the status of bilateral relations with the Francoist regime – one of the last remnants of the inter-war authoritarian Right – in such an international setting, had unquestionable symbolic value. Secondly, was the importance of the interlocutor – a prominent figure inside Italian diplomacy who knew the two countries and their relations during previous years very well. And finally it was a significant event in view of the audience to whom Taliani was speaking. In fact, the conference counted among its attendees some of the most important actors involved in bilateral relations since 1943: high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the Undersecretary Lodovico Benvenuti, members of the Spanish diplomacy, ambassadors from different countries, Italian politicians, military authorities, journalists, representatives from the world of culture, and even members from the highest echelons of the Vatican.¹

Apart from these considerations, Taliani's conference was also important in terms of the content of his speech. In it, the former ambassador in Madrid

¹Archive from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Archivio Storico del Ministero di Affari Esteri (ASMAE): Political Affairs, Affari Politici (AP), Spain, 1955, folder 395. Report from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taliani's conference, without date but not before 24 March 1955.

highlighted the special relevance of the Spanish-American agreement for the international community, also known as the Pact of Madrid, which was signed in September 1953 and in which the United States pledged to furnish the Francoist regime with economic and military aid.² Thanks to the aid from the new hegemonic power in the West, Spain was about to become a crucial actor in the Mediterranean area, and the Italian Government was forced to redefine its strategy accordingly. It was along these premises that Taliani outlined the main characteristics of Spanish-Italian relations during the last years, and concluded with a request to the members of the political class among the audience. Since the signing of the armistice in September 1943 and until that moment, both Italy and Spain had managed to preserve diplomatic relations, and even to develop them in the economic, cultural and military fields. However, Taliani argued, these two countries needed to accelerate the process of rapprochement, leave behind their ideological differences and further develop their cooperation in the political field in order to become the 'main pillars in the defense of the Mediterranean region'.³

This speech might appear paradoxical, especially if one considers the enormous differences which existed between the two countries at the time. Italy was a young democracy that was still struggling to distance itself from its fascist past. Spain was an authoritarian dictatorship, which continued to look for a place in the Cold War international system which would permit its survival. And yet Madrid and Rome managed to maintain diplomatic relations, and even foster them in some spheres, overcoming the fall of the Mussolini regime and adjusting to the post-war international system. The aim of this work is precisely to explain how and why this was done, by studying bilateral relations between Spain and Italy in the period 1943–57. However, and in spite of the fact that the question of Spanish-Italian diplomatic relations between 1943 and 1957 will remain at the heart of this research, this is not merely a history of bilateral relations. In fact, the present work contends that this bilateral relationship cannot be studied in isolation and that a broader context is essential, in order to obtain a full understanding of it. In this way, this research will also focus on how these two countries responded to the challenges of the post-war period, and how they struggled to pursue a more independent foreign policy with respect to the major powers. Hence, it is clearly important to analyse the degree of influence which Great Britain first and the United States afterwards exerted

²Antonio Marquina, *España en la política de seguridad occidental: 1939–1986* (Madrid: Ediciones Ejército, 1986); Angel Viñas, *En las garras del águila: los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003).

³ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1955, folder 395. Report from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taliani's conference, without date but not before 24 March 1955; and Municipal newspaper library of Madrid (MNLN): Julián Cortés Cavanillas, 'Función de España e Italia en la defensa de Europa', *ABC*, Madrid, 26 March 1955.

both within Spain and Italy and over their relations. The role of France will also be scrutinized, although it will be under a different light. In fact, after its defeat in May and June 1940, France had ceased to be a great power and once the war was finished it became evident that the country did not possess the material capabilities to display a hegemonic policy in Western Europe.⁴ However, the French role in Spanish-Italian relations cannot be ignored either, especially after 1950 when the international situation of the country started to improve and the diplomats at the 'Quai D'Orsay' began to intervene more actively in the affairs of the two southern neighbours. Therefore, this research will also address the question of how much room for manoeuvre the Spanish and the Italian Governments really had in the diplomatic field.

By accomplishing these objectives, the present research will make two main contributions to the scholarly literature: on the one hand, it will enrich the existing field of scholarship of both Spanish and Italian foreign policies after the Second World War and, on the other hand, it will contribute to obtaining a better understanding of international relations in Western Europe during the post-war period and especially the role of the major powers.

Regarding Spain, it should be clarified that, contrary to the views of some historians, most notably Juan Carlos Pereira, Italy became, after the Second World War, a primary objective for Spanish diplomats.⁵ As this research will show, once the conflict ended, the Francoist regime did not have many international options left in Europe due to the policies adopted by Great Britain and France which were generally aimed at the exclusion of Spain from the Western defence arrangements. In that context, Italy was regarded as one of the few European countries with which it was possible to establish normal diplomatic relations, a country which had managed to leave its Fascist past behind and therefore could contribute to improving the international situation of the Francoist regime by projecting a patina of respectability on it. However, the perception of Spanish diplomats towards Italy was not only instrumental; in fact, there was the genuine conviction that Italy and Spain shared the same interests and could embark on fruitful cooperation in the political field, especially in the Mediterranean and in South America.⁶ This conviction was maintained at the 'Palacio de Santa

⁴Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1986); Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 113.

⁵Juan Carlos Pereira, 'Franquismo y democracia: el desconocimiento de dos historiografías contemporáneas', in Fernando García Sanz (ed.), *Espanoles e Italianos en el mundo contemporáneo: i coloquio hispano-italiano de historiografía contemporánea* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990), 309–18.

⁶Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, (AMAE): Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Instructions sent to the Spanish

Cruz', the head office of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until the late 1950s and culminated with the Mediterranean Pact, a project designed by Minister Artajo and a number of close advisors, which had Spanish-Italian cooperation as its backbone.⁷

Furthermore, this book will shed light on some issues concerning Spanish foreign policy during the Francoist regime which, in spite of the large number of works published in this field during the last two decades, have not been tackled sufficiently.⁸ First of all, the analysis of Spanish-Italian relations will contribute to challenging the concept of 'international isolation' widely used by historiography to define foreign relations of the Francoist regime between 1945 and 1949. As a matter of fact, this research will contend that the term should be employed with the utmost care, avoiding possible deterministic uses of it. In this regard, historians must be well aware that until December 1946 the international situation of the regime was far from certain and that even after that date the Francoist regime managed to develop diplomatic relations in the economic and cultural spheres with several West European countries.⁹

Ambassador in Rome, José Antonio de Sangróniz from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1946.

⁷ AMAE: Bundle 4.473, folder 6. Report on the Mediterranean Pact written by the Secretary of the Embassy, Manuel Fraga, to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martín Artajo, 3 May 1956.

⁸ Najib M. Abu Warda and Rafael Calduch Cervera (eds.), *La política exterior española en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Ciencias sociales, 1994); Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1999); Paola Brundu Olla, *Ostracismo e realpolitik: gli alleati e la Spagna Franchista negli anni del dopoguerra* (Cagliari: C.E.L.T. Editrice, 1984); Paola Brundu Olla, *L'annello Mancante: il problema della Spagna Franchista e l'organizzazione della difesa occidentale, 1947-1950* (Sassari: Università degli Studi di Sassari, 1990); Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-57: Challenge and Response* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998); Christian Leitz and David Joseph Dunthorn, *Spain in International Context, 1936-59* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999); Encarna Nicolás, *La libertad encadenada: España en la dictadura Franquista, 1939-1975* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005); Juan Carlos Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800-2003): Historia, condicionantes y escenarios* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2003); Borja de Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco* (Barcelona: Crítica/Marcial Pons, 2010); Joan Maria Thomàs, *Roosevelt and Franco during the Second World War: From the Spanish Civil War to Pearl Harbor*, 1st edn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Julio Gil Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939-1975): entre Hendaya y El Aiún* (Barcelona: Flor del viento, 2008).

⁹ José Mario Armero, *La política exterior de Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1978); Manuel Espadas Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior* (Barcelona: Ediciones Rialp, 1988); Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939-1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800-2003)*; Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco*; Juan Avilés, Rosa Pardo and Javier Tusell (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2000).

Secondly, this work will display that, in spite of the limited degree of autonomy with respect to the major powers, Spanish foreign policy during these years was more active and dynamic than historiography has tended to acknowledge. In this regard, the case study of Spanish-Italian relations will show that diplomats at 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' were not resigned to occupying the marginal role to which the country was confined after 1945, and struggled to improve its international situation. Even though the vast majority of the diplomatic initiatives taken by the Spanish Government did not produce the expected results, the dynamism of Francoist foreign policy during these years certainly deserves closer attention.¹⁰

Finally, this book will deal with a period, between 1953 and 1957, which has been almost entirely neglected by the historiography. In this regard, it is noteworthy that most of the studies in the field finish in the early 1950s, using three different events as ending points: the return of the ambassadors in 1951, the Pact of Madrid with the United States in 1953, and Spanish inclusion in the United Nations in 1955.¹¹ Even the more general works focused on Spanish foreign policy throughout the whole Francoist period tend to neglect this phase in Spanish history, or it is covered only superficially.¹² This is mainly due to the fact that these three events have been traditionally interpreted by historiography as the climax of Francoist foreign

¹⁰Abu Warda and Calduch (eds.), *La política exterior Española en el siglo XX*; Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Riquer, *la dictadura de Franco*; Javier Tusell (ed.), *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975): Política y relaciones exteriores* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1993).

¹¹Brundu Olla, *Ostracismo e realpolitik*; Brundu Olla, *L'annello Mancante*; Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Diplomacia Franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica, 1939–1953* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988); Anne Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955: entre idéologie et réalisme* (Paris: Direction des archives et de la documentation, Ministère des affaires étrangères, 2002); Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response*; Fernando Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955: A Case Study in Spanish Foreign Economic Policy* (Florence: European University Institute, 1993); Pedro Antonio Martínez Lillo, *Una introducción al estudio de las relaciones hispano-francesas, 1945–1951* (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 1985); Florentino Portero, *Franco Aislado: la cuestión Española (1945–1950)* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1989); Ahmad Muhammad Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*, *Modern European History* (New York: Garland, 1992); Luis Suárez Fernández, *Victoria frente al bloqueo: desde 1945 hasta 1953* (Madrid: Actas, 2001); Jill Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

¹²Abu Warda and Calduch (eds.), *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

policy, leading to the assumption that during the following years Spanish diplomacy entered a phase of inactivity in which no major changes would be introduced at least until the end of the 1960s, when the Spanish transition began.¹³ The analysis of Spanish-Italian relations will prove that these assumptions are inaccurate and that Spanish foreign policy after 1953 was far from monotonous. Taking all these elements into account, it is easy to understand that the analysis of Spanish-Italian relations will provide a better understanding of Francoist foreign policy.

As far as Italian foreign policy is concerned, an analysis of Spanish-Italian relations also appears as the ideal case study to shed light on some of the gaps present in the field. These oversights were rightly identified by Federico Romero and Antonio Varsori in the introduction to the volume *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, and they can be summarized as follows. In the first place, little research has been conducted on the 1950s, mainly because historians tended to believe that the important choices regarding the Italian foreign policy had already been taken in the previous decade (e.g. participation in the Marshall Plan, membership of NATO and the beginning of the European path).¹⁴ This situation is surprisingly similar to the one which has just been explained concerning the historiography of the Francoist foreign policy. Secondly, there are still important questions regarding the influence of domestic factors in the implementation of foreign policy. Thirdly, there are still unknown elements of bilateral relations with the United States, especially after Italian membership of NATO. In addition, very little has been produced in the field of reciprocal perceptions of the European partners, key in assessing the role of Italy in the Old Continent after 1945. Fourthly, there is still the question of continuities and discontinuities in

¹³Abu Warda and Calduch (eds.), *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*; Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco*; Tusell (ed.), *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975)*.

¹⁴Federico Romero and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione: le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia, 1917–1989* (Roma: Carocci, 2005), 11–23. Even though this first assertion made by both Varsori and Romero was accurate in 2005, it should be nuanced today by making reference to a number of works which have been published in recent years, all focusing on Italian foreign policy during the 1950s. Among these titles, the following stand out: Tiziana di Maio, *Fare l'Europa o morire! Europa unita e 'nuova Germania' nel dibattito dei cristiano-democratici eu, 1945–1954* (Roma: Euroma La Goliardica, 2008); Bruna Bagnato, *L'Italia e la guerra d'Algeria (1954–1962)* (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2012); Alfredo Canavero, *Alcide de Gasperi: Christ, Demokrat, Europäer* (Brussels: EVP-Fraktion, 2010); and Matteo Pizzigallo (ed.), *La politica araba dell'Italia democristiana: studi e ricerche sugli anni cinquanta* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2012). All in all, it is possible to conclude that the assertion made by Varsori and Romero in 2005 still stands nowadays although the increasing interest of scholars specialized in Italian foreign policy for the period of the 1950s is slowly filling the aforementioned gap.

Italian foreign action throughout the twentieth century. And finally, it is still necessary to study the role of Italy in larger processes such as the Cold War or the process of decolonization.¹⁵

As has already been explained, Spanish diplomats viewed Italy as a primary objective of their foreign policy and, therefore, devoted a great deal of attention to Italian affairs, both domestic and foreign. This means that Spain becomes a very important observatory through which to analyse Italian foreign policy after 1945. It should be clarified, though, that the Italian diplomats did not attach the same relevance to bilateral relations with the Francoist regime as did their Spanish counterparts. During the first two years after the Second World War, Italy had other international points of reference, namely London, Washington and Paris, and Spain was viewed as a marginal country of Europe. In this period, the Government in Rome was only interested in defending its large interests in Spain in order to alleviate the delicate economic situation in Italy.¹⁶ However, this positioning started to change in the late 1940s and the early 1950s when the Italian Government realized that its interests in Spain, if adeptly fostered, could contribute not only to improving the Italian economic situation, but also to enhancing its international role. In this way, Italy started to pay more attention and even to intervene in Spanish affairs. This change was facilitated by the fact that many of the officials working at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been active since the Fascist period. As Antonio Varsori has highlighted, the lack of a purge of Fascist elements by the Italian Government in the diplomatic sphere after 1945, allowed for continuity with the previous period, thus facilitating not only the contacts with the Francoist regime, but also the implementation of plans aimed at the improvement of relations with Spain.¹⁷ As a matter of fact, the best example of this new interest was the rapprochement plan constructed by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the 1950s, an ambitious strategy which would culminate in the implementation of political cooperation in the Mediterranean area. Even though this project was not fully implemented because of both internal and external factors, it reflected the increasing interest of Italian diplomats in Spain.

As far as the third contribution of this volume is concerned, the image that will emerge from this work is one of two countries which, in spite of

¹⁵Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, 11–23.

¹⁶Italian Diplomatic Documents, *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (DDI)*: Series X, Vol. II, Doc. No. 87. Report from the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Renato Prunas, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alcide De Gasperi, 12 March 1945.

¹⁷Antonio Varsori, 'Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana', in Ugo de Siervo, Sandro Guerrieri and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *La prima legislatura repubblicana: Continuità e discontinuità nell'azione delle istituzioni: atti del convegno, Roma, 17–18 Ottobre 2002* (Roma: Carocci, 2004), 155–68.

being small powers on the European stage, were very much connected to international reality during the post-war period, to the extent that their relationship cannot be understood without taking into consideration the role of the major powers. Accordingly, I contend that the study of Spanish-Italian relations also constitutes an ideal case study to understand the evolution of international relations in Western Europe after the Second World War and, more specifically, to verify the changing of hegemonies in Europe, from Great Britain to the United States. It is important to consider that this change of hegemonies remains a controversial issue in the international history of the early Cold War period.¹⁸

Even though it is well established that Britain ended up being supplanted as the West's hegemonic power by the United States, there is still no consensus among historians about when this change happened exactly. When and how did the British decline start to affect its external behaviour, thus ceasing to be the major hegemonic power in Europe? When did the United States begin to act as the Western bloc's international point of reference? And maybe more importantly, why did this happen? Was it because the Europeans 'invited' the United States to intervene more directly in their affairs as Geir Lundestad has argued?¹⁹ Or was it because Britain started to

¹⁸Moshe Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949: The Decline of British Influence* (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1996); Philippa Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007); Anne Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895–1956* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Andrew Stewart, *Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War* (London: Continuum, 2008); Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007); Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Geir Lundestad, *The American 'Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); E. J. Hobsbawm, *On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy*, 1st edn (New York: Pantheon Books, 2008); John T. McNay, *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001); Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?*; Donald Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900–1975: A Study of the Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-making in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John W. Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury, 1997).

¹⁹Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1986, 268.

distance itself from European affairs in order to concentrate on its significant global interests, as Martin Lynn has propounded?²⁰ Or maybe was it because, weakened by the economic crisis, London had no other option but to pass the baton to the United States as the Old Continent's new leader?²¹ The debate is still open, and this book will also contribute to it.

For a number of reasons, this study is mainly focused on the analysis of international relations at a governmental level. It is governmental because the centre of attention rests on policy-makers in all the countries involved in this work: Spain, Italy, France, Britain and the United States. Although other actors have been taken into account (politicians, military personnel and businessmen) their role in this research will be marginal. Several factors explain this decision to focus on state interactions at a governmental level. First, a study of Spanish-Italian diplomatic and political relations after 1945 is absent from existing scholarship. This study will thus lay the basic foundations and facilitate future research in other areas and using different approaches, such as a transnational focus.

Secondly, the source material for conducting this research is spread over five different countries and in the Italian and Spanish cases is difficult to collect due to the lack of national archival organization. This makes the work very arduous and time consuming. An analysis of other actors apart from policy-makers would therefore remain very superficial. Otherwise this work would not be feasible at all.

Thirdly, the focus on governmental actors appears as the most adequate to answer the questions that this research has raised. In fact, since the main goal of this study is to examine the evolution of Spanish-Italian diplomatic relations in the post-war period and to describe the nature, subfields, personnel and dynamics of these exchanges, it seems that the most adequate approach is to focus on the actors that clearly dominated these areas, in other words, state actors.

Finally, this work contends that the analysis of non-governmental actors would not provide a substantial contribution to answering the questions that the present research raises. In this regard, it is important to take into account that during the immediate post-war period Spain was a dictatorship characterized by strong domination of the domestic structure and considerable international isolation, at least in the political sphere. As a result of this, Spanish foreign policy was clearly in the hands of governmental actors – mainly Franco himself, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and a reduced number of officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – leaving other actors

²⁰Martin Lynn, *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 8.

²¹Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*; Harold James, *Europe Reborn: A History, 1914–2000* (Harlow: Longman, 2003); Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain*; Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2004).

with very limited room for manoeuvre to influence Spanish decisions in the international sphere.²² Obviously, the Italian case is different since the country was characterized, after 1945, by a fragmented state and a well-organized civil society; in addition, from the end of the 1940s Italy began to participate in different processes of international cooperation (European Integration Process, Atlantic Treaty, etc.). Those conditions facilitated, at least in theory, the participation of other actors in the policy-making process.²³ However, this research will show that, for the case study of Spanish-Italian relations, the main decisions which affected diplomatic exchanges between Madrid and Rome were also made by a narrow group of governmental actors – mainly the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their advisors and, on rare occasions, by the President of the Republic and the Parliament. Only in timely moments will non-state actors – businessmen, members of the different political parties and military personnel – appear in Spanish-Italian relations during these years, but even then their capacity to influence them will be very reduced. The same situation applies to the major powers whose interventions in some of the most crucial moments of Spanish-Italian relations, which constitute the main focus of this research, were previously decided by the policy-makers and carried out through the regular diplomatic channels. As Tony Judt has argued, in spite of the political and social earthquake provoked in Europe by the Second World War, the institutional *status quo* was quickly restored, and the sphere of international relations was no exception.²⁴ If in 1938 the main decisions in Europe were made by a narrow circle of decision-makers, this situation remained substantially unaltered twenty years later.²⁵

This notwithstanding, the present work constitutes, from a methodological point of view, an attempt to go beyond classic diplomatic history and to incorporate some of the new advances in international history.²⁶ In the first instance, the contention that some critical decisions can only be explained thanks to the evidence present in archives of other countries is confirmed here. As Akira Iriye has pointed out, international history 'by definition deals with affairs among a plurality of nations; it would therefore

²² Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*; Antonio Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción Europea (1951–1962): anhelo, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1998).

²³ Enrico Serra, *Manuale di storia dei trattati e di diplomazia* (Milano: ISPI, 1986); Enrico Serra, *La diplomazia in Italia* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1984). Enrico Serra, *Manuale di storia delle relazioni internazionali e diplomazia* (Milano: SPAI, 1996).

²⁴ Judt, *Postwar*, 65.

²⁵ René Girault, 'Decision Makers, Decisions and French Power', in Di Nolfo (ed.), *Power in Europe? II*, 66–83.

²⁶ Patrick Finney (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in International History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

make little sense to study the subject in the framework of just one nation'.²⁷ Therefore, this work takes a multi-archival approach including sources from five different countries: Spain, Italy, France, Britain and the United States.

Secondly, this argument is in accordance with David Reynolds' claims that 'it would be profoundly unfortunate if international historians lost their traditional concerns with the formulation of policy and the making of decisions'.²⁸ In other words, despite the advance and development of new approaches in international relations, questions about states, power, policy and policy-makers still matter. In this way the present research will take into account two crucial factors in the theory of international politics: the position of Spain, Italy, France, Britain and the United States in the post-war international system and their 'relative material power capabilities' which can be defined as the capabilities and resources with which states can influence each other.²⁹

However, the present work also contends that an analysis limited to these two factors alone is bound to be inaccurate much of the time, and that in order to fully understand Spanish-Italian relations and the influence of the major powers after 1943, two other elements must be emphasized: perceptions and human agency. It should be taken into account that 'Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply quantities of physical resources or forces in being'.³⁰ The study of perceptions 'can be used not only to explain specific decisions but also to account for patterns of interaction and to improve our general understanding of international relations'.³¹ Furthermore, the study of perceptions will be crucial in this work not only to explain some of the decisions adopted by these five governments, but also to discuss the decline of British hegemony in Europe and the ascent of the United States as the Old Continent's new leader. As a matter of fact, perceptions are one of the most important tools with which power, as a possession of a state, may be measured.³² Anne Orde has argued in her book *The Eclipse of Great Britain* that the analysis of British decline and rise of the United States 'must include perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic, about

²⁷ Akira Iriye, 'Internationalizing International History', in Thomas Bender (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 47.

²⁸ David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 350.

²⁹ Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, 144–72.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 147.

³¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 3.

³² Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?*

each country's positions and their relations with each other'.³³ This research will continue in this vein in the belief that the analysis of the perceptions held by the political *élites* in other countries about the US and the British roles in international relations after the war will shed more light on the whole process.

Very much connected to the question of perceptions is the issue of human agency in foreign policy-making. There is little doubt that individuals make choices and that these choices influence foreign policies sometimes even against structural forces. As John T. McNay has propounded, 'Diplomacy, in the final analysis, is neither accidental nor impersonal; [...] Although constraints on individual policy makers are often formidable, their decisions are never altogether predetermined.'³⁴ In this regard, the present work contends that the personal influence of Alberto Martín Artajo, Alcide De Gasperi, Dean Acheson, Robert Schuman or Ernest Bevin had a considerable effect on the delineation and development of the foreign policies of their respective countries, which had a significant impact on international relations after 1945.³⁵ This will be particularly important in the Italian case, in which the surviving Fascist elements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs influenced relations with Spain.

Finally, it should be considered that 'leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct national resources as they might wish'.³⁶ The study of international relations must therefore also examine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, 'because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy'.³⁷ This implies that domestic determinants have to be incorporated into the narrative in an attempt to satisfy comprehensive explanations of foreign policy and state interactions. In this regard, this research will also pay attention to the role played by internal politics in all the five countries under study insofar as they exert some influence on their external behaviour.

On the basis of these arguments, the objective of producing a piece of work which is focused on governmental actors and multi-archival in nature is not only justified, but also required in light of the questions that this research intends to answer.

This book is structured, following chronological criteria, in six chapters with each one corresponding to a different phase in bilateral relations. Chapter 1 outlines the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations from the summer of 1943, when the Mussolini regime fell, until the beginning of 1945

³³Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain*, 6.

³⁴McNay, *Acheson and Empire*, 1.

³⁵Donald Cameron Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, 1965).

³⁶Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', 144-72.

³⁷*Ibid.*

when the Spanish Government decided to change its policy towards the Kingdom of Italy and to resume commercial relations. This period represents a sort of parenthesis in bilateral relations in which the Francoist regime was forced to adopt a new foreign policy towards Italy in a highly problematic context with two different states, the Kingdom of Italy and the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI – Italian Social Republic), struggling for survival and demanding official Spanish recognition. This chapter contends that the main decisions made by these three actors were based on material factors rather than in ideological considerations, as part of the scholarly literature has defended. Moreover, this chapter discusses three different questions. In the first instance, the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Italy and the RSI is scrutinized in order to explain why these two regimes attached so much importance to the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime. Secondly, Spanish foreign policy during this period is analysed with a view to assessing the impact of the collapse of the Mussolini regime and challenging the concepts of neutrality and ambiguity traditionally used to describe it. Thirdly and finally, the role of the Allies in Spain and Italy after 1943 is examined in an attempt to show that the adoption of increasingly autonomous policies towards these two countries by the United States produced important splits between London and Washington.

Chapter 2 covers the period from the beginning of 1945, when the two countries decided to normalize diplomatic relations, until the end of 1946, when the United Nations approved a resolution condemning the Francoist regime and urging all the countries that maintained relations with Spain to withdraw their ambassadors. In it, it is emphasized that, even if their motivations were different, both the Spanish and the Italian Governments worked intensely during these two years in order to improve bilateral relations, especially in the economic sphere. This allows for a challenge to the concept of ‘isolation’ which is used by many historians regarding the Francoist foreign policy. Furthermore, it is contended that the different Italian Governments very quickly put aside their ideological differences in order to defend the vast interests present in Spain, which were regarded by the diplomats in Rome as an essential asset to alleviate the difficult situation of the country’s economy. Finally, this chapter also analyses the role of the Anglo-Americans both in Spain and Italy after the war, in an attempt to challenge the general assumptions about the decline of the British hegemony. In fact, it is argued in these pages that Britain’s behaviour regarding several aspects of Spanish-Italian relations (war debt, Nenni’s appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs or withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain) has to be interpreted as hegemonic behaviour. By the same token, both the Italian and Spanish Governments continued to perceive Britain in these years as Europe’s natural leader.

Chapter 3 covers the period between the end of 1946 and April 1948, the latter being the date when Italy held its general elections which saw

the victory of the Christian Democrats. This year and a half period was doubtlessly the most troubled in Spanish-Italian relations since the end of the war. This was partly due to the misunderstandings which followed the announcement of the Marshall Plan and the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Although Italy was not against the inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan, the diplomats in Madrid perceived otherwise and blamed Rome for its final exclusion. The controversy between Spain and Italy was further fuelled during the celebration of the Italian elections in April 1948, which were regarded in Madrid as a strong destabilizing agent for the Old Continent. All in all, this chapter shows that, despite the initial constructive intentions by Madrid and Rome, it was still difficult for the authorities in both countries to find areas to extend cooperation. It also evidences the incompetence of the Spanish diplomats (unable to interpret the Italian foreign policy) and the naivety of the Italian authorities who did not foresee the problems of supporting the Spanish inclusion in the OEEC. Finally, this chapter will show how the two countries were still under the heavy influence of the major powers that continued to dictate their international agendas.

Chapter 4 examines the period between April 1948 and 1951 when the Italian Government finally agreed to send its ambassador back to Madrid and both countries normalized diplomatic relations. The focus of these pages is the study of both the Italian and the Spanish attempts to normalize diplomatic relations. This chapter contends that the diplomats in Rome realized precisely in this period that Spain could be a potential instrument to improve the Italian international status vis-à-vis the major powers. Accordingly, they displayed increasingly ambitious policies aimed at the improvement of bilateral relations. On the other hand, the Spanish Government decided to maintain the basic guidelines which had determined its policy towards Italy since 1945 and which were aimed at the establishment of a political alliance in the Mediterranean region. Finally, in this chapter Spanish-Italian relations function as a case study to assess the decline of British hegemony and the rise of the United States as the new leading power in Europe.

Chapter 5 examines bilateral relations between 1951 and 1955, when Spain and Italy signed the Cultural Treaty of Rome that partially culminated the rapprochement process which had started with the appointment of a new Italian Ambassador in Madrid. This period was marked by a considerable improvement of the international situation in both countries, which was seized upon in an attempt to take bilateral relations to another level. The ambitious plan delineated in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and agreed to by the Spanish authorities, envisaged a progressive strategy starting with the economic and industrial spheres, moving on to military cooperation and concluding in the cultural area. Ideally, this scheme should pave the way for some form of political agreement which was the main objective

of the Spanish Government. The study of this Spanish-Italian rapprochement also allows for a discussion of the degree of independence in both foreign policies vis-à-vis the major powers.

Chapter 6 analyses the factors behind the deterioration of bilateral relations which started at the end of 1957 when the Italian Government definitely confirmed the pro-European orientation of its foreign policy. This chapter contends that, in spite of the initial successes in the *rapprochement* between Madrid and Rome, Spanish-Italian relations could not reach the sufficient degree of political cooperation to form a political alliance or a bilateral partnership. In this regard, this chapter will analyse the reasons behind these limitations in an attempt to comprehend the way the foreign policies of these two countries worked. This chapter will argue that the inability to find a political understanding was mainly due to external factors. The failure to incorporate Spain into a multilateral organization became a fundamental obstacle in the normal evolution of bilateral relations. This failure, which had been motivated by the firm opposition of the major powers, and mainly the United States, left relations between Rome and Madrid in a state of paralysis. In fact, the Spanish exclusion from NATO and the impossibility to create a Mediterranean Pact left the two countries without international spaces in which to implement political cooperation. However, other factors, more related to domestic politics in Italy, will also be taken into account. First, there was the adoption of a new political strategy by the DC Government. The so-called 'opening to the left' policy that envisaged the incorporation of the anti-Francoist Italian Socialist Party into the government coalition had a very negative impact on bilateral relations. And secondly, the intensification of anti-Francoist feelings in Italian society was another element to consider. In conclusion, this chapter contends that these three causes contributed to ending the rapprochement between the two countries which had started in the previous years, thus opening a new phase in bilateral relations which was marked by cold detachment and unfriendly gestures on behalf of the two governments.

All in all, the study of Spanish-Italian relations presented here intends to be more than a simple history of bilateral relations. Even if the analysis of the dynamics, the interactions and the motivations of Spanish-Italian exchanges between 1943 and 1957 remain at the heart of this study, the influence and the role played by major powers in bilateral relations has also been examined in the belief that only a multinational approach can provide a full explanation of international relations.

1

A Question of Pragmatism: Spanish-Italian Relations after the Collapse of the Mussolini Regime, 1943–1945

On 15 November 1944, the Spanish Association of the Press organized a banquet in Madrid to celebrate the 15th edition of the book *Italia fuera de combate*, written by Ismael Herráiz, the correspondent in Rome for the Fascist newspaper *Arriba!* since the spring of 1942. In it, the Spanish journalist narrated the events which took place in Italy during the summer of 1943, from the fall of Mussolini on 24 July, until the signing of the armistice with the Allies on 8 September, but he did it with a very critical tone. According to Herráiz, in fact, the delicate international situation in which the country had been left was caused by the cowardice and the incompetence of the Italian people and the political class, including the monarchy, Marshall Pietro Badoglio and the military elite. The only figure that was somehow exonerated in this diatribe was Mussolini, ‘a man who has managed to earn the love and the recognition of the Spanish people’.¹ Even though the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to distance itself from the celebration of such a pamphlet, the banquet turned into a big social event also thanks to the presence of some of the most prominent figures inside the Francoist regime, including the Vice President of the Parliament, José María Alfaro, and the Undersecretary of Education, Gabriel Arias Salgado.²

Evidently, the magnitude of the banquet and the permissive attitude displayed by some members of the Spanish Government towards it provoked angry reactions from the authorities of the Kingdom of Italy who believed that this kind of event reflected the ‘real attitude – from an ideological perspective – of Franco’s Spain towards the new Italy’.³ However, and despite this unfriendly gesture, the government now headed by Ivanoe Bonomi decided not to modify its policy towards the Francoist regime whose main goal remained the normalization of diplomatic relations. In fact, only one

¹ Ismael Herráiz, *Italia fuera de combate* (Madrid: Ed. Atlas, 1944).

² ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder No. 66. Letter from the Italian attaché in Madrid, Luciano Mascia, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1944.

³ *Ibid.*

day after the banquet in honour of Herráiz, the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Giovanni Visconti Venosta, again requested the Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican, Domingo de las Bárcenas, to rapidly appoint a new ambassador in Rome, a position that had remained vacant since the summer of 1943.⁴

This anecdote is very meaningful and reflects perfectly the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations between the fall of the Mussolini regime and the end of the Second World War. On the one hand, the RSI and the Kingdom of Italy endeavoured to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime. On the other hand, the Spanish authorities rejected these approaches in an attempt to maintain a balanced policy not only towards the two 'Italies', but also towards the Axis and the Allies. This attitude raises a number of questions and perplexities. In fact, it might appear as paradoxical for the Kingdom of Italy to try to normalize diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime when it was struggling to leave behind its fascist past as quickly as possible. At the same time, the Spanish decision to adopt a balanced policy towards both the Kingdom of Italy and the RSI might appear as illogical if one considers the evolution of the Second World War. The main objective of this chapter will thus be to address these questions and explain the motivations behind the main actors involved. In order to do so, the present chapter will analyse two crucial events in Spanish-Italian relations during this period: the struggle between the Italian Kingdom and the RSI for official recognition by the Spanish Government, and secondly the question of the Italian fleet that was interned in Spanish ports from September 1943.

Through the analysis of these two events, this chapter will contribute to understanding the impact of the fall of the Mussolini regime on the Francoist foreign policy towards the two 'Italies' by showing that the latter was mainly not determined by ideological factors, as historiography has traditionally propounded, but by material issues which were mostly related with the evolution of the Second World War.⁵ Secondly, it will show that the Kingdom of Italy needed to improve relations with Franco's regime also for pragmatic reasons: to recover part of their lost sovereignty, to alleviate the catastrophic situation of its economy, and to protect its great number of interests (economic, social and cultural) present in Spain. Thirdly, it will contribute to assessing the room for manoeuvre held by the Spanish and

⁴AMAE: Bundle 1.273, file 1. Telegram from Bárcenas to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Félix de Lequerica, 16 November 1944.

⁵Romano Canosa, *Mussolini e Franco. Amici, alleati, rivali. Vite parallele di due dittatori* (Milano: Mondadori, 2008); Gennaro Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini* (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 2005); Javier Tusell and Genoveva García, *Franco y Mussolini: la política española durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985). Javier Tusell, *Franco, España y la II guerra mundial: entre el eje y la neutralidad* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995).

Italian Governments and to understanding the role played by the Allies in bilateral relations after the armistice. In this regard, this chapter will contend that both Britain and the United States formed a common front to deal with Spanish and Italian affairs, which proved to be crucial in the evolution of bilateral relations during this period. Finally, this chapter will also contribute to the existing historiographical debates about hegemony in Europe and Anglo-American relations after the Second World War. In this sense, these pages will postulate that Britain endeavoured to maintain its hegemony in the south of Europe during the last years of the war. However, this became problematic from the beginning of 1944, the moment in which the US Government started to adopt increasingly independent policies towards Spain and Italy that clashed with British interests in the zone.⁶

The impossible choice: the Allies, Germany and Spanish Policy towards the two 'Italies'

The collapse of the Mussolini regime: a turning point in Spanish foreign policy?

In 1985, Javier Tusell and Genoveva García published their book *Franco y Mussolini: La política española durante la segunda guerra mundial*, where they argued that the collapse of the Mussolini regime had had an enormous impact on the Francoist regime, to the extent of radically modifying Spanish foreign policy.⁷ Ever since, this interpretation has been followed and incorporated by the vast majority of historians working on Spain during the Second World War.⁸

However, the analysis of the Spanish documentation shows that the impact of Mussolini's fall in Spain should be downplayed and, as a result of this, that Tusell and García's interpretation should be reviewed. In this case, what was the real impact of the collapse of the Mussolini regime in Spain? In order to answer to this question, it is necessary to analyse the initial Spanish reactions to the events in Italy during the summer of 1943.

In the first place, the Spanish authorities tried to collect all possible information through their embassies in the Vatican and the 'Quirinale'. Obviously, this was a normal reaction, considering that relations between

⁶Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*; Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*; Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*; McNay, *Acheson and Empire*; Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Books, 2000); Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain*; Stewart, *Empire Lost*.

⁷Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 427 and 431.

⁸Massimiliano Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia: l'incognita spagnola nella seconda guerra mondiale* (Firenze: Manent, 1995); Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

Italy and the Francoist regime had been very close since Mussolini's intervention in favour of Franco's armies during the Spanish Civil War. On the morning of 25 July, the day on which Mussolini was officially removed, General Gastone Gambara, an Italian general during the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, informed the Spanish Ambassador, Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, of the events that would take place that very day in the 'Gran Consiglio Fascista'. It should be remembered that by 1943 Mussolini had lost the support of the Italian population given the disastrous results of the war effort that he had led and which culminated in July 1943 with the invasion of Sicily by the Allies. The gravity of the situation led King Vittorio Emanuele III, and even some members of the Fascist party to support Mussolini's removal. The first stage of his ousting took place precisely when Gambara had announced it, during the Fascist party's Grand Council. On 25 July, Vittorio Emanuele III officially removed Mussolini from the post of Prime Minister and replaced him with Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Upon his forced resignation, Mussolini was immediately arrested. After the news of the arrest, many of Mussolini's fellow Fascist leaders fled Rome. Italians and Germans alike remained silent as the new Badoglio Government proclaimed that the war would continue. Even with this proclamation, many Italians began to cheer the ousting of Mussolini.⁹

The day after these events, Fernández Cuesta telegraphed the Spanish authorities three times in order to report all the news concerning the political situation. On 27 July, the Spanish Ambassador even met the person who was behind the fall of Mussolini and who had become one of the most important figures of the moment, Dino Grandi. The Italian politician tried to transmit a positive image of the change, insisting that it was not a *coup d'état* but a constitutional movement necessary for the country at that juncture, and he asked Ambassador Fernández to transmit these impressions to Madrid.¹⁰ From this moment on, the Spanish Ambassadors to the Vatican and to the 'Quirinale' sent regular telegrams updating Madrid on the evolution of the Italian political situation: it was clear that the Spanish authorities were very interested in the Italian events and put an emphasis on being very well informed.¹¹ It is important to explain that most of this information that was collected by the Spanish diplomats during the summer

⁹Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988* (London: Penguin Books, 1990); Silvio Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana: dalla fine della guerra agli anni novanta*, 1st edn (Venezia: Marsilio, 1992); Aurelio Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008); Philip Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, the Italians, and the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.574/2, folder 17–18. Telegram from Fernández Cuesta to Jordana, 27 July 1943.

¹¹Ibid. Telegrams from the Spanish embassies in Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July and August 1943.

of 1943 came from Dino Grandi himself. In fact, the Italian fascist became in that period a type of unofficial informant to the Spanish Embassy, owing to his political predominance after the arrest of Mussolini and also thanks to his friendship with Ambassador Fernández, with whom he had substantial political affinities.¹² Eventually, these Spanish contacts would become very useful for Grandi; when the Salò Government was constituted and he was sentenced to death *in absentia* on 8 January 1944, Grandi managed to escape the RSI and take refuge in Spain, just like many other Italian fascists during the last years of the Second World War.¹³

During the frequent encounters which the two Spanish Ambassadors held with Grandi and other Italian authorities in this frantic period of diplomatic activity, the latter always tried to present an image of normality: the substitution of Mussolini did not necessarily imply Italy's exit from the war or the alteration of bilateral relations with Franco's regime. Italy was still the same reliable ally that it had been since its intervention in the Spanish Civil War.¹⁴

In spite of the Italian assurances, the Spanish authorities reacted with the utmost caution. Officially, the Spanish Government recognized and accepted the new political situation in Italy.¹⁵ However, there was consternation among the Spanish authorities on the future of Italy, since they did not believe that the new government would last long. This distrust was linked to the fear that military defeat could lead to the signing of a separate peace treaty with the Allies, bringing enormous instability to the country and leaving a delicate situation with the German Government that would not tolerate an Italian withdrawal from the war. Speculations about the future of Italy and a possible signature of a peace treaty with the Allies continued during the rest of the summer of 1943.¹⁶

The only change which took place during the days that followed the collapse of the Mussolini regime had to do with the Allies. In fact, London and Washington took advantage of events in Italy to put extra pressure on Spanish authorities, forcing the Francoist regime into a policy of strict neutrality. At the end of July 1943, Franco held two meetings with Sir Samuel Hoare and Carlton Hayes (British and US Ambassadors in Madrid respectively) where both diplomats, after having coordinated their position,

¹²Paolo Nello, *Dino Grandi* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003); Dino Grandi, *25 luglio: quarant'anni dopo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983), Dino Grandi, *Il mio paese: ricordi autobiografici* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985).

¹³Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, 'A Transnational Network: The Contact between Fascist Elements in Spain and Italy, 1945–1968', *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2014, 82–102.

¹⁴Ibid. Telegram from Fernández Cuesta to Jordana, 27 July 1943.

¹⁵Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 371–2.

¹⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.547/2, folder 17–18. Telegrams from the Spanish Embassies in Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July and August 1943.

demanded strict neutrality.¹⁷ It should be remembered that Spanish foreign policy had been clearly pro-Axis since the beginning of the war and that this position had not been in word only. On 13 June 1940, Spain changed its international status from neutral to non-belligerent, imitating Italy's early conduct and thus opening the door for future offensive action.¹⁸ One day later, Spanish troops had occupied Tangier in spite of the official warnings from the British Government. Indeed, in August 1941, a unit of more than 18,000 Spanish volunteer soldiers, better known as the Blue Division, was sent to the Russian front in order to help the Third Reich fighting against the Soviet armies.¹⁹ This, in addition to the speeches and discourses given by Franco during this period, all showed Spain to be in favour of the Axis.²⁰

Accordingly, both Hayes and Hoare seized the opportunity to request three main changes in the Spanish policy towards the Allies: first, the return to the status of neutrality; secondly, a moderation in the tone of the Spanish press which, so far, had been clearly pro-Axis; and finally, the withdrawal of the Blue Division from the eastern front.²¹ It should be clarified that according to international law, neutral countries were obliged to treat belligerents with strict impartiality and they had the right to trade with both camps and maintain communications with both sides. However, by 1943 the institution of neutrality had been consistently undermined. The practicalities of modern warfare, the experiment in liberal internationalism during the inter-war period, the emergence of aggressive authoritarian ideologies in Russia, Italy and Germany and, more importantly, the barbarity and excess of belligerents in the Second World War, had severely eroded the concept of neutrality. In reality, no country during the Second World War adopted a policy of strict neutrality, not even Switzerland. Therefore, the Allied objective was not Spanish strict neutrality, but benevolent neutrality towards them. The same applied to the Germans.²²

¹⁷Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 375–6.

¹⁸Elena Hernández-Sandoica and Enrique Moradiellos, 'Spain and the Second World War, 1939–1945', in Neville Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251.

¹⁹More details about the Blue Division in Denis Smyth, 'The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4 October 1994, 537–53.

²⁰Balfour and Preston (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*; Manuel Ros Agudo, *La gran tentación: Franco, el Imperio Colonial y el proyecto de intervención española en la segunda guerra mundial* (Barcelona: Styria, 2008); Tusell, *Franco, España y la II guerra mundial*.

²¹Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): 1943, Vol. II. Letter from Hayes to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 29 July 1943, 611–17. Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 376.

²²Neville Wylie, 'Introduction: Victims or Actors? European Neutrals and Non-belligerents, 1939–1945', in Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, 1–27.

In spite of the Allied pressure, by the beginning of September none of their requests had been met by the Spanish Government: Spain maintained its status of non-belligerency, the Blue Division was still fighting the Soviet armies in the eastern front, and the tone of the press continued to be pro-Axis. In fact, none of these issues would be fully tackled by the Francoist regime until the end of September, more than two months after the collapse of the Mussolini regime. Only at the end of that month, the press started to show more impartiality towards the two contenders, Franco announced the disbanding of the Blue Division (although a battalion of Spanish volunteers would fight in the Eastern front until February 1944) and the government decreed the strict neutrality of Spain in the war.²³

Taking all these elements into account, it appears necessary to play down the relevance of the collapse of the Mussolini regime in Spanish foreign policy. If anything, it is possible to argue that the Italian events as a whole, including the collapse of Fascist Italy and the subsequent signing of the armistice with the Allies, contributed to accelerating a process of change in Spanish foreign policy which had already started during the summer of 1942 with the substitution of the pro-Fascist Ramón Serrano Súñer with the pro-Allied Count Jordana as Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁴ In this sense, the Italian armistice and the subsequent division of Italy into two different regimes, were events which had a larger impact on Franco's regime, because at the very least, it was forced to find a new policy towards the two Italies.

Spain and the two 'Italies': the struggle for official recognition

On 3 September 1943, Italy signed an armistice, made public only five days later, with the Allied armed forces, following which the Kingdom of Italy joined the Allies in their war against Nazi Germany. King Vittorio Emanuele III and Prime Minister Badoglio fled Rome and temporarily settled in Brindisi. The Italian Armed Forces became confused and leaderless. They did not know whether to fight the Germans or not. After some weeks of reorganization, Vittorio Emanuele III and Marshal Badoglio managed to establish a more or less stable government.²⁵

²³FRUS, 1943, Vol. II. Letter from Hayes to the President of the United States Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 4 October 1944, 620–2. Hernández-Sandoica and Moradiellos, 'Spain and the Second World War, 1939–1945', 251. The tone in the Spanish newspapers became more moderate in *Ya* and *ABC* while it remained considerably pro-Axis in *Arriba!*

²⁴*Ibid.*, 262–7.

²⁵Elena Aga Rossi, *Una nazione allo sbando: L'armistizio Italiano del Settembre 1943*. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993); David W. Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985); Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*; Lutz Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia: 1943–1945* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007); Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini*.

However, Mussolini's leadership was not over yet. On 12 September the Italian dictator was rescued by German forces from the mountain hotel where he was imprisoned. Adolf Hitler instructed him to establish the Italian Social Republic in German-held northern Italy. This new Italian Social Republic was, however, a German puppet state, in that its armed forces were a combination of loyal Fascists and German allies. Mussolini had, in reality, little power: Hitler and the German-armed forces led the campaign against the Allies and had little interest in preserving Italy as more than a mere buffer zone against an Allied invasion of Germany.²⁶

These events, which are notorious to historians today, were received in Spain through very fragmented reporting in Spanish newspapers, creating great uncertainty among the diplomatic delegation and the Italian ex-patriot community.²⁷ Meanwhile, the interruption of communications between the two countries meant that the Italian Embassy did not receive instructions from the Badoglio or the recently created Fascist Government. Accordingly, chaos and confusion dominated the situation among the Italians residing in Spain during the days which followed 8 September: nobody knew what was going to happen in Italy or what the possible implications for their life in Spain were.²⁸

The uncertainty of the situation was seized upon by Mussolini followers who decided to take action in order to gain control of the Italian diplomatic delegations present in Spain. On 14 September, Fascist elements attacked the Italian Embassy and the House of Italy in the heart of Madrid.²⁹ Four days later, the Italian Vice Consul in Saint Sebastian, with the collaboration of another ten Mussolini followers, attempted to take control of the Italian Consulate in the city.³⁰ Fearing that the escalation of violence among the Italian community would put the Spanish Government in a delicate diplomatic situation, Minister Gómez-Jordana decided to intervene. First he instructed the Ministry of the Interior to protect all Italian buildings from possible attacks, and then he ordered the police forces to vacate the Italian Consulate in Saint Sebastian. It is evident that the Spanish Government wanted to avoid possible incidents before it had decided its official policy towards the two Italies.³¹

²⁶Silvio Bertoldi, *Salò: Vita e morte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*, (Milano: Rizzoli, 1976); Marino Viganò, *Il ministero degli affari esteri e le relazioni internazionali della Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943–1945)* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1991).

²⁷MNLM: ABC, Madrid, September 1943.

²⁸ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Paulucci to the Head of the Italian Government, Ivanoe Bonomi, 18 September 1944.

²⁹Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 406.

³⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 68. Letter from the Italian Consul in Saint Sebastian, Mario Luciolli, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 1944.

³¹AMAE: Bundle 2.193, folder 25. Report from the Direction of Foreign Policy to the Ministry of the Interior, 17 September 1943. ASMAE, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter

Jordana's intervention contributed to calm the situation but it was increasingly clear that the undefined status of the Italian Embassy, and especially the Ambassador, Giacomo Paulucci di Calboli, could not continue for long. In this regard, the positioning of Paulucci appeared to be crucial, not only because he was directly responsible for all the Italian institutions in Spain, but also because he would set an example for the Italian community. However, Paulucci did not make official his position as ambassador of the Badoglio Government until 24 September, sixteen days after the armistice was made public.³² Obviously, this delay gave rise to many questions and speculations among the Italian community residing in Spain and the diplomatic services in Britain and the US about the real allegiances of the Italian diplomat. In fact, Paulucci's positioning after the armistice remains a controversial issue, which has fostered different interpretations depending on the sources consulted. According to the British and US Ambassadors in Madrid, Carlton Hayes and Samuel Hoare, Paulucci was a mendacious person who could not be trusted.³³ According to the Badoglio Government, Paulucci was trustworthy and the delay was only caused by strong pressure exerted by the Germans and technical difficulties in communications.³⁴

It is impossible to know what the Italian Ambassador was thinking during the days that followed the signing of the armistice. However, it is well known that both the Allies and the German authorities, well aware of the relevance of Paulucci's choice, exerted strong pressure in order to bring him to their respective sides. The Italian Ambassador had even received a phone call from Mussolini himself in which the Italian dictator offered him the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Fascist Government if he agreed to take the Axis's side.³⁵ These pressures, together with the interruption of communications between the Italian Embassy and the Badoglio Government contributed to delay Paulucci's decision.³⁶

The lack of definite instructions from Brindisi as to the line of policy to follow, and the increasing pressure from the German authorities, had forced

from Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 September 1943 and folder 68. Letter from Lucioli, to Badoglio, 14 February 1944.

³²DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 16. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 24 September 1943.

³³National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK): Foreign Office (FO) 660/352: Letter from Hoare to the Resident Minister in Algiers, 21 October 1943 and FO 371/43840: Letter from Hoare to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, 28 July 1944.

³⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Report from Italian Consul in Madrid, Marchiori, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1944.

³⁵Ibid. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 23 September 1943.

³⁶Ibid. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 September 1943. DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 13. Letter from Eisenhower to Badoglio and Vittorio Emanuele III, 22 September 1943.

Dwight D. Eisenhower to intervene. On 22 September, the US General himself sent a message to the king and Badoglio urging them to send concrete instructions to Paulucci as soon as possible.³⁷ The Allies had realized very quickly that the Kingdom of Italy and its Embassy in Madrid were in a delicate situation and, as a consequence, would have serious trouble in defending their important interests and assets in Spain. Eisenhower's message very quickly had the desired effect with only one day later Badoglio sending a letter to Paulucci asking him to take charge of the Italian community with the cooperation of the US and British Ambassadors.³⁸ From this moment onwards, Paulucci would join forces with his US and British counterparts in Madrid.³⁹

The struggle for obtaining Paulucci's allegiance reflects very accurately the Allied policy towards the Kingdom of Italy and, at the same time, the dynamics that had been established between London and Washington since 1941.⁴⁰ A major step in this process took place during the Casablanca Conference, held in January 1943, which gave a sort of a priority status to the British Government in Italian affairs. In this way, it was informally acknowledged that Britain, because of its logistic superiority in the Mediterranean theatre of war, should become the senior partner in this relationship.⁴¹ As a result of this decision, when the armistice was signed and the Badoglio Government formed, it was the British Government that assumed the responsibility of delineating a common foreign policy for the Kingdom of Italy.⁴² This policy was clearly influenced by Winston Churchill's imperialistic vision of the situation. The Prime Minister could not forget the belligerent policy carried out by Fascist Italy before the war, especially in the Mediterranean area, and now he expected to obtain important gains for Britain from the Italian defeat. The main goal of the diplomats in London was, therefore, to restore Italy to a second-class power status securing in this way the British predominance in the Mediterranean area which was perceived as vital for the nation's interests.⁴³ At the same time,

³⁷DDI: Series X, Vol. I. Doc. No. 13. Letter from Eisenhower to Badoglio and Vittorio Emanuele III, 22 September 1943.

³⁸Ibid. Doc. No. 14. Letter from Badoglio to Paulucci, 23 September 1943. Although the letter was sent on the 23rd, it did not arrive in Paulucci's hands until the 24th.

³⁹NAUK: FO 660/352. Letter from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 27 October 1943.

⁴⁰Antonio Varsori, 'Great Britain and Italy 1945–1956: The Partnership between a Great Power and a Minor Power?', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 2, 1992, 188–228.

⁴¹Effie Pedaliu, 'Truman, Eisenhower and the Mediterranean Cold War, 1947–1957', *The Maghreb Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1–2, 2006, 3. Charles Reginald Schiller Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy: 1943–1945* (London: HMSO, 1957).

⁴²Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1975).

⁴³John Kent, *Britain's Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1993), 212.

Whitehall wanted to avoid the Kingdom of Italy becoming a focus of political instability, making it possible for the left-wing elements to seize power. As the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent, wrote in 1945, Britain wanted to restore the Kingdom of Italy 'to the position of a second class power incapable of further aggression but able, in case of need to hold her own against her neighbours'.⁴⁴ London's interest in the Badoglio Government was, therefore, purely instrumental and closely related with the fact that the Kingdom of Italy represented a national continuity with the past; it had to remain weak but stable, since it was the only government capable of accepting an 'unconditional surrender', which would assure the goal of restoring Italy to the rank of a minor power and, at the same time, keeping the Italian left-wing sectors at bay.⁴⁵

It is in this context where the policy adopted by the Allies regarding the Italian interests in Spain has to be placed. The Allies realized very quickly that, quite apart from the question of the merits of the Badoglio Government and its representatives in Spain, it was of the utmost importance, since they had chosen to recognize that regime as the legally constituted government of Italy, to do everything possible to strengthen its influence and that of its representatives in relation both to the Spanish Governments and the Italian nationals residing in Spain. It was essential to reinforce the position of the Badoglio Government in Spain so that it could maintain a certain political stability, thus being able to act as a bulwark against the German and the RSI efforts to win over the allegiance of the Italian community and to gain control of the important economic interests which the Kingdom of Italy still had in Spain. Accordingly, both Hayes and Hoare received instructions from their respective governments to support and build Paulucci's confidence and to defend Italian interests in front of the Spanish Government in case there was a German offensive to gain control of them.⁴⁶

Another aspect which should be taken into account even though it is not related with the Kingdom of Italy, is the Anglo-American policy towards Franco's Spain. It should be remembered in that regard, that the Allies had seized upon the fall of Mussolini's regime to increase pressure on the Spanish Government, forcing it into a strict neutral policy. Once the armistice was signed, the Allies wanted to make sure that Spain was not adopting any measures which could somehow benefit the new Mussolini Government.

⁴⁴Minutes by Orme Sargent, 18 May 1945, in Antonio Varsori, 'Great Britain and Italy 1945-1956', 190.

⁴⁵Aga Rossi, *Una nazione allo sbando*, 29; Paolo Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943-1963)* (Roma: Bonacci, 1986), 22 and 56. Ellwood, *Italy 1943-1945*, 55; Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943-1949*, 66.

⁴⁶NAUK: FO 660/352 Letter from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 27 September 1943. National Archives and Records of the Administration (NARA). Central Decimal File 1940-44. Box 3022. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 20 December 1943.

In sum, the policy adopted by both the British and the US embassies in Madrid was a combination of strengthening of the Badoglio Government and preventing Spain from adopting a policy which could move it away from neutrality and benefit the RSI.

In any case, thanks to the Allied support, Paulucci rapidly became one of the key figures of the new Badoglio Government. Not only was he in charge of all the Italian institutions in Spain but also of communicating the orders coming from Brindisi to all the Italian legations. In fact, the practical problems of the Kingdom of Italy made it impossible to maintain direct contact with all its diplomatic agents. As a consequence, Eisenhower had suggested to Badoglio to use the Italian Embassy in Madrid as a switchboard which would pass on all the messages and instructions to its remaining Missions.⁴⁷ Obviously, this would be done with Allied support, as they would be carrying and transmitting these messages, which explains why some of them were written in English.

However, Paulucci's final positioning did not prevent a division of the Italians residing in Spain who split into two factions, Fascists and anti-Fascists. Mussolini's followers were not willing to recognize the authority of the Badoglio Government and immediately started to organize a separate and autonomous diplomatic representation in Spain. Even by September 1943, they formed a Fascist organization called 'Gruppo Fascista e Militare di Spagna Aderente al Governo Repubblicano Fascista'. Integrating both civilians and military personnel, and headed by the former military attaché, Antonio Boserman, this group showed a great dynamism during the first period, until an official agency of the RSI was constituted in Spain.⁴⁸

Despite the dynamism of the Mussolini followers, the new Fascist Government needed a visible leader, someone charismatic who would be able to handle the Italian community and balance Paulucci's alignment with the Kingdom of Italy. The first to be given this mission was Eugenio Morreale, the Italian Consul in Malaga: his role was temporary, however, because the RSI authorities planned to designate a more relevant figure for the position. Morreale travelled to Madrid and contacted the most important personalities of Italian Fascism in Spain. He convinced them that it was better to be prudent and to assume that the Spanish, who were under a great deal of pressure from the Allies to avoid all contacts with the RSI officials, would not adopt any concrete commitments towards the Mussolini regime.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, and in spite of these difficulties, Morreale believed that the Spanish authorities would tolerate the Fascists' existence and

⁴⁷DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 13. Letter from Eisenhower to Badoglio and Vittorio Emanuele III, 22 September 1943.

⁴⁸Viganò, *Il ministero degli affari esteri e le relazioni internazionali della Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943–1945)*, 373.

⁴⁹NAUK: FO 660/352. Letter from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 27 September 1943.

activities on an unofficial level. He even suggested putting pressure on the Spanish authorities by using the economic interests that Spain still had in the north of Italy to try to improve the situation of Mussolini's followers in the country. In addition, he urged the generation of more support among the Italian community.⁵⁰ The increasing tension between the two Italian communities in Spain and the pressures from the Allies and Germany forced the Spanish Government to take a firm decision regarding the recognition of the new government led by Mussolini.⁵¹

Particularly intense was the pressure coming from the German authorities who, on 18 September, officially asked the Spanish Government to appoint an official representative to the new RSI.⁵² It should be understood that Hitler conceived the RSI simply as an administrative instrument which would guarantee order, discipline and provide basic working structures for his soldiers, so that they could deal exclusively with the war. Accordingly, the German authorities needed a government, which, in spite of its weakness, could be perceived by the Italian population as stable and legitimate, in order to avoid any possible discontent. In this sense, recognition by Francoist Spain would greatly contribute to the legitimization of the new government; even more so if it was considered that there were substantial ideological affinities and many economic and cultural ties between the two regimes.⁵³ Well aware that agreeing to the German demands implied the actual recognition of the RSI, the Spanish decided that the Italian question would only be solved in a Council of Ministers meeting set for 28 September.⁵⁴

The Council of Ministers was prepared with the utmost care by Minister Gómez-Jordana, an anglophile who had been pushing inside the Francoist regime since 1942 for a policy of strict neutrality. Gómez-Jordana was convinced that Spain should not recognize the RSI and ordered two international law experts to prepare a legal report on the issue to reinforce his position at the Council of Ministers. The report, which was presented to Franco the day before the Council, was clear on one main point: Spain could not, from a legal point of view, recognize the RSI. The Italian State, which was represented by the monarchy who had appointed Badoglio as the new

⁵⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Morreale to Vittorio Emanuele Terragni, Italian General who headed the Italian agency of the RSI in Lisbon, 8 February 1944.

⁵¹Ibid. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 September 1943. AMAE: Bundle1.371, folder 25. Report from the Direction of Foreign Policy to the Ministry of the Interior, 17 September 1943.

⁵²AMAE: Bundle 1.077, folder 10. Telegram from Bárcenas to Jordana, 18 September 1943.

⁵³Bertoldi, *Salò: Vita e morte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*, 20.

⁵⁴Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 410.

head of government was thus the only legitimate Italian government.⁵⁵ On 28 September, the Council of Ministers was held and the official policy of the Spanish Government towards the Mussolini regime was established as one of non-recognition. Paulucci claims in one letter to Badoglio that José Luis Arrese, the Minister of Falange, had proposed official recognition of the RSI in that council meeting.⁵⁶ On the other hand, and according to Jordana, who narrates the meeting in his personal diary, no Minister defended the recognition of the RSI.⁵⁷ One of the main problems accounting for the decisions made in the Spanish foreign policy during the Francoist period is that the Council of Ministers' meetings were not documented. As a result of this, there is no archival evidence supporting any of these theories. In any case, the final outcome of this meeting is well documented; that is, the non-recognition of the RSI.⁵⁸

Now that the official decision had been taken, it was time to inform the different sides. Franco met with the German Ambassador in Madrid, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff at the beginning of October and explained that Spain was not able to give an immediate answer regarding the recognition of the RSI, arguing that Mussolini was not even half the man he used to be, but just an invalid whose position had been severely weakened by the conspiracy. When Dieckhoff asked if Franco intended to maintain relations with Badoglio's 'Masonic Government', Franco criticized the new government, 'made of masons and traitors', and explained that Spain's tolerance of the presence of the Embassy in Madrid did not mean the establishing of diplomatic relations. In addition, he announced that Spain had no intention of sending its ambassador back to Rome and he stated that the Spanish Government was willing to establish unofficial relations with the RSI, taking into consideration the importance of the Spanish interests in the north of Italy.⁵⁹ It has to be clarified that Ambassador Fernández had travelled to Spain on 23 August, under the request of Dino Grandi, to sound out the

⁵⁵ AMAE: Bundle 2.193, folder 25. Legal report on the recognition of the RSI (without date but not before 8 September 1943).

⁵⁶ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. From Paulucci to Badoglio, 15 January 1944. Falange was a political organization founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in 1933, during the Second Spanish Republic, and inspired by Italian Fascism. The party grew exponentially during the Spanish Civil War becoming a very important pillar of the new Francoist regime. This relevance was evidenced with the creation in 1938 of the position of Minister Secretary General of Falange (or Minister of Falange). More information about Falange in Joan Maria Thomàs, *La Falange de Franco. Fascismo y fascistización en el régimen franquista 1937–1945* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001).

⁵⁷ Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza, *Milicia y diplomacia: diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936–1944* (Burgos: Dossoles, 2002), 212.

⁵⁸ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. From Paulucci to Badoglio, 15 January 1944.

⁵⁹ The interview between Franco and Dieckhoff is narrated in Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 412–13; Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 319.

possibility of signing a peace treaty with the Allies, thanks to the mediation of the Spanish Government. The ambassador's efforts failed in the face of the opposition of the Spanish authorities to such a measure. As a consequence, Fernández tried to return to Italy but remained blocked in Switzerland because of the war. In an attempt to avoid a potential diplomatic controversy, Fernández was ordered to come back to Madrid from Switzerland right after the Franco-Dieckhoff meeting.⁶⁰ This did not imply that Spain was not represented in Rome, it was represented through Bárcenas, the ambassador in the Vatican who multiplied his functions.

The Franco-Dieckhoff secret meeting contained some very strong political statements regarding the situation in Italy, but these must be contextualized and scrutinized more closely. Evidently, Franco did not like the new Italian Government in the south, composed of many of the politicians who had betrayed Mussolini. However, at that time, it looked as if it was the only political option because the future of the RSI was in doubt, given that the progress of the Allied armies advancing from Salerno to Rome seemed to be unstoppable. It should be considered that at the end of September the German army fighting in the south of Italy was withdrawn as far as the Bernhardt line, a bulge in front of the main Gustav line running over the massif of Monte Cassino at the border of Molise, Campania and Lazio. On 1 October the Allied armies entered Naples, the area which had suffered most the ravages of war.⁶¹ In this context, to make such promises to the Germans regarding a government with such an uncertain future was seen as a harmless gesture with considerable political benefits as it could contribute to calm down Hitler's diplomats and to maintain cordial relations with the Third Reich. At the time of the meeting, the Spanish dictator probably did not think that he would have to make this promise real. In any case, Dieckhoff was convinced by Franco's statements and thus suggested that Mussolini should appoint an unofficial representative for the newly created office in Spain as soon as possible.⁶²

To recapitulate, this delicate international situation was solved by using pragmatism in an attempt to defend the national interests, namely to continue with the process of gaining distance from the Axis without jeopardizing relations with Germany. The Spanish regime maintained its official recognition of the Badoglio Government and, even if it refused to designate another ambassador for Rome, it accepted the presence of a pro-Badoglio ambassador in Madrid; at the same time, even if the RSI was not officially recognized, the presence of an unofficial Mussolini representative in Spain

⁶⁰More information about Ambassador Fernández's mission in Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 393.

⁶¹Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia*, 40–7; Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*, 50.

⁶²Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 412–13; Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 319.

was tolerated, and the Consul in Milan was instructed to act as the link with the Saló authorities.⁶³

According to Tusell and García, and Guderzo this solution was a model of ambiguity.⁶⁴ Ambiguity is a term normally applied to describe situations or actions which have more than one possible meaning and, as a consequence, are difficult to interpret and cause confusion. Spanish reaction to the Italian facts was cautious and pragmatic, but there was no room for confusion or misinterpretations. Spanish positioning regarding the RSI was clear and did not differ, in essence, from the one adopted regarding the new Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (CFLN).

The French Committee of National Liberation had been created in June 1943 under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. The committee directly challenged the legitimacy of the Vichy regime and unified all the French forces that fought against the Axis. In August 1943, the CFLN was established in Algiers thanks to the Allied victories in North Africa after the success of Operation Torch. Anxious to improve its international situation, the Committee started negotiations with the Francoist regime in order to appoint an ambassador in Madrid. However, Spain had officially recognized the Vichy regime already in 1940 and was not able to maintain diplomatic relations with another France.⁶⁵ The French situation in August 1943 was very similar to the Italian one in September of the same year. The only difference was that, in the French case, the Allies were exerting pressure over neutral countries in search of official recognition of the CFLN, and in the Italian case, it was the German Government which was demanding official recognition of the RSI. Faced with this situation, the Spanish Government decided to adopt a cautious and pragmatic policy. In August 1943, Spain and the CFLN exchanged unofficial representatives: Jacques Truelle would go to Madrid and José Antonio de Sangróniz to Algiers. When asked by the Germans about this decision, the Spanish answer was that the CFLN was only recognized *de facto* in order to defend the important national interests in North Africa. It was the same solution that the Spanish authorities would adopt for the Italian case one month later. The Spanish authorities eliminated any ambiguity and were determined to maintain relations with both sides in an attempt to defend the national interests in the best possible way.⁶⁶

Apart from these debates on definitions, the Spanish decision regarding the RSI is also important in shedding light on the policy-making process

⁶³AMAE: Bundle 1.574/2, folder 17–18. Telegram from Jordana to Bárcenas, 18 October 1943.

⁶⁴Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 413; Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 325.

⁶⁵Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 329.

⁶⁶Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*, 7; Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 329.

during the Francoist regime, an area of Spanish historiography which still remains controversial. There is little doubt that Francisco Franco, Head of State, Prime Minister, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of the Falange Party, had a significant role in the policy-making process. Nevertheless, this predominance raises the question of the actual influence exerted in this sphere by other important institutions within the Spanish Government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Council of Ministers. Historians have discussed this question extensively over the last decades, creating a never-ending debate fuelled by the general opacity of the regime and the scarcity of sources in the public record offices.

According to Paul Preston, Franco made the crucial decisions on political questions in person, away from the cabinet meetings and away from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁷ However, authors like Fernando Guirao, Antonio Moreno Juste and José Luis Neila contend that, even though Franco was very present in the policy-making process, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs always had freedom to conduct their policies.⁶⁸ Franco was exclusively concerned with main principles, very rarely played an active role in formulating policies and only dictated the general guidelines of Spanish foreign policy. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs dealt with the technicalities and the execution of these guidelines and principles.⁶⁹ As Guirao put it, 'Franco relied very much on his Ministers to define the executive measures to put into practice the main principles with the security that important decisions would be made in consultation with him'.⁷⁰

It should also be pointed out that Franco's interest in foreign policy only lasted until 1953. He was well aware that the past, present and probably the future of the regime were very much linked with the international reality: Franco had won the war and consolidated his regime thanks to the economic and military aid given by Italy and Germany, and this regime could now be overthrown by the Allies if they decided to do so. As a matter of fact, when the regime obtained the definitive source of international legitimization, thanks to the signing of the Pact of Madrid with the United States, Franco started to lose interest in foreign policy.

Finally, the Council of Ministers should also be mentioned as an important organ in the decision-making process of the Francoist regime from the moment of its creation up until the 1950s. This was because Franco, advised by Serrano Súñer, conceived the Council as a political arena where the different factions present in the regime would be able to express their differences and to fight for Franco's favour. The meetings of the Council of Ministers

⁶⁷Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* 369–71.

⁶⁸José Luis Neila, *España y el Mediterráneo en el siglo XX, de los acuerdos de Cartagena al proceso de Barcelona* (Madrid: Sílex, 2011).

⁶⁹Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción Europea* (1951–1962), 26.

⁷⁰Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 17.

used to last for hours and Franco tended to stay silent. Only if the Ministers were unable to reach a conclusion on one issue would Franco break his silence and use his prerogatives to impose a decision.⁷¹ As it can be seen, it is not easy to draw definitive conclusions regarding the policy-making during the Francoist period, also because '[...] the Spanish Administration followed non codified ways of reacting to situations'.⁷² However, the analysis of the debates inside the Spanish administration to decide on the RSI recognition constitutes an interesting case study to obtain a better understanding of Spanish foreign policy in this period.

In principle, the Spanish decision not to recognize the Mussolini regime does not seem to coincide with Franco's views on the Italian question. In his memoirs, Count Jordana explains that during the meeting held the day before the Council of Ministers, Franco had received his legal report with scepticism and stated explicitly his personal desire to recognize the RSI.⁷³ Even without considering Gómez-Jordana's account of the facts, the Franco-Dieckhoff meeting held on 2 October clearly shows that the Spanish dictator did not like the Badoglio Government 'made of masons and traitors'.⁷⁴ This notwithstanding, the Spanish Government finally decided not to recognize the RSI. It is evident that Gómez-Jordana had managed to convince Franco and impose his point of view on the question. The analysis of this case study, therefore, suggests a policy-making model which is closer to Guirao and Moreno Juste. Even though Franco was a key actor in Spanish foreign policy, he was flexible enough to accept and adopt policies coming from his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Going back to the main narration, the Spanish decision not to recognize the RSI was received with satisfaction by the Allies.⁷⁵ The *Regno del Sud* authorities were also pleased with the Spanish official decision, even more so after Jordana's statements ensuring that Spain would maintain its official recognition of the Italian monarchy.⁷⁶ The attitude adopted by the Badoglio Government during this early phase was very important because it influenced future Italian policy towards Franco's Spain. That is to say, the *Regno del Sud*, convinced that there was no cause for discord between the two countries, was determined to establish the best possible relations with the Francoist regime. On 15 November, Renato Prunas, General Secretary

⁷¹Ibid., 18; Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 360–71.

⁷²Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 16–17.

⁷³Gómez-Jordana Souza, *Milicia y diplomacia: diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936–1944*, 212.

⁷⁴Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 412–13; Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 319.

⁷⁵FRUS: 1943, Vol. II. Letter from Hayes to Roosevelt, 4 October 1943, 620–2. NAUK: FO 660/352. Letter from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 27 September 1943.

⁷⁶ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. From Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 September 1943.

of the Italian Foreign Ministry and one of the key figures in the Italian foreign policy after the armistice, informed the Spanish Government that the Kingdom of Italy, in spite of its difficulties, was determined to normalize diplomatic relations as soon as possible.⁷⁷

This diplomatic position would not seem to be the most advisable for a government which was struggling to erase, or at least to distance itself from its Fascist past.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, it can be explained with reference to three different factors: political, economic and socio-cultural. The political factors were linked with the situation of the Italian monarchy at that particular time. The signing of the armistice in September 1943 marked the immediate international recognition of the Kingdom of Italy: considered by the Allies as one of the countries that caused the war, the Allied armies occupied the whole territory leaving the king and the premier with very little political authority. It was from that moment that Badoglio and Vittorio Emanuele, aware of this situation, decided to orient Italian foreign policy towards the achievement of two main goals: the Anglo-American recognition of Italy as an 'ally', and the renegotiating of the armistice on a more equitable level.⁷⁹ However, the Allies always refused to use the term 'ally' as its implications were too strong, applying instead cobelligerence, thereby leaving the Kingdom of Italy in a very difficult international situation. The letter written after the war by Visconti Venosta, one of the most important figures in the Badoglio Government, to Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, future ambassador in Madrid, constitutes one of the best descriptions of the delicate situation in which the Kingdom of Italy found itself:

The armistice burnt all the bridges with Germany and the unfortunate countries which were still aligned with it. There was nothing to work with, not a treaty, not diplomatic relations with neutral countries, not a Ministry, not an organized diplomatic personnel, not the means to establish telegraphic or postal communication with other areas, no code book, no archives – in fact the archives contained only two documents, the short armistice and the long armistice, two documents whose meaning can be summarized as follows: they evidenced the degree of our misfortune even though they did not compromise the future of our nation. A few young officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after having walked through the mountains in Abruzzo following their sense of duty, had reached Brindisi, the temporary base of the Government, and formed the

⁷⁷DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 71. Letter from Prunas to Badoglio, 15 November 1943.

⁷⁸Filippo Focardi and Lutz Klinkhammer, 'La difficile transizione: l'Italia e il peso del passato', in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, 113–29.

⁷⁹Ennio Di Nolfo and Maurizio Serra (eds.), *La gabbia infranta. Gli Alleati e l'Italia dal 1943 al 1945* (Roma: Laterza, 2010). Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943–1963)*, 39, 52 and 53.

*embryo of the new Ministry which would soon be enlarged thanks to the arrival of new high officials. There was a building to rebuild but the foundations were missing.*⁸⁰

The diplomats in Brindisi had to build a new foreign policy for the country practically from scratch and, in order to do so, it was necessary to recover lost sovereignty. In this regard, the re-establishing of relations with the neutral countries was one of the few resources left to the Badoglio Government to assert its independence and to obtain international legitimacy. It is true that Francoist Spain was not the most prestigious state in the international community, but the Kingdom of Italy did not have many choices.⁸¹

In addition, Spain had a fundamental advantage, particularly in economic factors. Spain was not only a neutral country, it was a neutral country geographically close to the Italian Peninsula and with the necessary infrastructure to reactivate commercial exchanges. It has to be considered that the economic situation of southern Italy was catastrophic: almost without an industrial sector, with a significant part of the harvest and livestock having been lost because of the war. This, together with the destruction of ports, roads and railroads, was causing the obstruction of the supply of basic necessities: food, drinking water, medicine, clothes, blankets, tents etc.⁸² There was a serious risk of 'impending famine' that could affect millions of Italians, thus provoking a further weakening of the Badoglio Government and maybe its complete collapse. It is important to remember that Spain still had to pay to the Italian Government 5,000 million lire which corresponded to the remaining credit conceded by the Mussolini regime after its intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The authorities in Brindisi believed that the advance payment of the first six instalments from the aforementioned war debt could be used to level the Spanish-Italian clearing, which had registered a deficit in favour of Spain since 1942, to reactivate commercial exchanges. In addition, they expected Spain to return 10,000 tons of grain which the Mussolini Government had given to the Francoist regime in 1940 in place of a loan. The diplomats in Brindisi were well aware that Spain was one of the few countries able to alleviate the situation and prevent a large-scale famine.⁸³

⁸⁰Ambrosian Library, Biblioteca Ambrosiana (BA), Gallarati Scotti Archive, Archivio Gallarati Scotti, Series I, folder No. 9. Letter from Visconti Venosta to Gallarati Scotti, without date but not before 8 September 1943.

⁸¹DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 71. Telegram from Prunas to Badoglio, 15 November 1943.

⁸²Rolf Petri, *Storia economica d'Italia: dalla grande guerra al miracolo economico (1918-1963)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002).

⁸³DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 93. From Badoglio to Paulucci Di Caboli, 8 December 1943 and DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 87. Report from Prunas to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alcide De Gasperi, 12 March 1945.

Apart from these urgent issues, Italy had a large number of companies operating in Spain whose interests needed to be protected. This argument is also important because it would be consistently used by the future Italian Governments to justify the maintenance of relations with the Francoist regime. Among these companies, the most important were the following: FIAT, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, SNIACE, Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, and SAFNI.⁸⁴ In 1919 FIAT had started to penetrate in the Spanish market, thanks to the creation of FIAT Hispania. Between 1925 and 1935, FIAT cars constituted 10 per cent of the total imports of cars in Spain. By the same token, FIAT exports to Spain represented, in 1935, 17 per cent of their total. This implied that, on the eve of its Civil War, Spain had become, after Germany, the second largest destination for FIAT production. During the Spanish Civil War, FIAT changed its business model and started to sell fighter planes and military vehicles to Franco's armies. When the civil conflict was over, the Italian company tried to continue its penetration in the Spanish market, trying to seize national desire to reconstruct the car fleet destroyed during the war. In 1940, FIAT created a car company in Spain (SIAT) with the objective of building the 1100 model. However, this project did not succeed because of the ideological divisions inside the Spanish Ministry of Industry. When the Mussolini regime collapsed, the project was definitively abandoned. In spite of this failure, by autumn 1943, FIAT was still in a good position inside the Spanish car market, and was one of the leading manufacturers of cars, trains and trolley buses.⁸⁵

The 'Banca Nazionale del Lavoro' started its activities in Spain in 1937; although in this period the bank did not have an official agency, it managed to establish a delegation in Madrid which would invest large amounts of money in different industrial and commercial firms. In 1940, thanks to the cordial relations existing between the two countries, the Bank managed to establish an autonomous 'Banca Nazionale del Lavoro' in Spain. This event has an enormous relevance as it was the first time that a foreign bank was allowed to operate in the territory under the same conditions as the Spanish banks.⁸⁶ However, these were not the only Italian companies functioning in Spain. The 'Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni' (INA) was authorized to operate in Spain in 1940 after long negotiations. In two years INA became a successful firm managing to consolidate its position in the Spanish market. By December 1943 it had 25 offices all over the country and had signed insurances for over 26 millions pesetas, circa \$2 million. INA's success set a positive precedent and other insurance companies based in Italy soon

⁸⁴ ASMAE: AP, Spain 1944, folder 68. Italian interests in Spain.

⁸⁵ Andrea Tappi, *Un'impresa Italiana nella Spagna di Franco: il rapporto Fiat-Seat dal 1950 al 1980*, (Perugia: CRACE, 2008), 20–35.

⁸⁶ ASMAE: AP, Spain 1944, folder 68. Letter from commercial commissioner Italo Verrando to Paulucci, 10 December 1943.

followed suit. Five insurance companies managed to open offices in Spain: 'Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e Venezia', 'L'Assicurazione Italiana', 'L'Anonima Infortuni', 'Le Assicurazioni d'Italia' and 'Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà'. Some of them even had very positive results. 'Le Assicurazioni d'Italia', for instance, had sold insurances to the value of 4 million pesetas by the end of 1943, circa \$300.000.⁸⁷

Another company which was operating in Spain was SNIA Viscosa, one of the most important chemical companies in Italy. In 1939, Spain had invested large amounts of money to create the 'Sociedad Nacional de Industrias Aplicaciones Celulosa Española' (SNIACE) which was established in the north of Spain (Santander) and devoted to the production of cellulose. In a few years, SNIACE had become one of the most important firms in Spain, the leader in its sector. Today it still remains a major industry in Spain, though also the most polluting, but there is no Italian capital anymore.⁸⁸

There was also the 'Italcable', a company devoted to the construction and installation of telegraphic cable to communicate with South America. In 1940 it obtained a concession from the Spanish Government to install two radio stations, one in Barcelona and the other one in Las Palmas, which allowed Italcable to consolidate its position in the Spanish market. In fact, Italcable was in charge of establishing communications between the Iberian Peninsula, the Canary Island, and several countries in South America. It has to be noted that this service continued to be active throughout the war.⁸⁹

Finally, there was SAFNI ('Sociedad Anónima Financiera Nacional Italiana') which had been created during the Spanish Civil War as a financial tool to facilitate Italian economic and military aid to Franco. SAFNI was the largest group among the Spanish incorporated concerns controlled by Italian interests and consisted of the following branch companies: SAFNI Ibérica and its subsidiaries, 'Sociedad Anónima de Negocios Españoles', 'Sociedad Anónima Latina Inmobiliaria', 'Fábrica Italiana Automobile Torino', 'Fibra Comercial España', 'Sociedad Anónima de Empresas Marítimas' and 'Azienda Minerali Metallici Italiani', even though this last one had more interests in Portugal than in Spain. It is important to distinguish the status of SAFNI from the one of 'Banca Nazionale del Lavoro'. While SAFNI was a limited company and a

⁸⁷Ibid. Report from Vittorio Zoppi, officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Direction of Economic Affairs (DGAE), 28 August 1944, and letter from Gallarati Scotti, Italian Ambassador to Spain, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DGAE and the General Direction of Political Affairs (DGAP), 21 May 1945.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid. Letter from Ottavio Rossi, Director of Italcable Spain, to Zoppi, no date but after January 1945.

cover for other kinds of business, BNL was an Institute of Public Law which controlled all Italian investments in Spain.⁹⁰

In addition, 'Lancia', 'Olivetti', 'Pirelli', 'Piaggio' and other Italian companies had managed to penetrate the Spanish market, although to a lesser degree. In any case, the amount of Italian industries operating in Spain was remarkable, especially if one took into account that the Spanish legislation regarding foreign investments was extremely restrictive. It should also be noted that most of these companies had their main offices in the north of Italy. The diplomats in Brindisi were well aware of this fact and tried to prevent the German Embassy and the RSI agency in Spain having access to their goods, capital and even employees. At the same time, they understood that the interests of these companies would be tremendously important for the future of the country and therefore tolerated the maintenance of relations between these companies and the Spanish investors or clients.⁹¹ The RSI authorities were also aware of these circumstances and tried to use them to their advantage.

Finally, there are the socio-cultural factors. It is important to remember that there was a considerable Italian 'diaspora' in Spain. Although there are no official records on the number of Italians residing in Spain during this period, it is possible to advance an approximation. According to the reports written by the Italian Consuls, there were more than 10,000 Italians in Spanish territory around 1943, Italians whose status, interests and position needed to be defended.⁹² In addition, Italy had a large network of cultural institutions which had been operating in Spain for decades. Among these, the 'Istituto Italiano di Cultura', an ambitious institution inaugurated in the 1920s which counted 39 employees, stood out.⁹³ Moreover, there were two Italian schools, one in Madrid and the other one in Barcelona, with 25 professors in total, one 'Liceo', and several departments inside Spanish universities all over the territory where it was possible to learn Italian.⁹⁴ Maintaining these cultural institutions, however, was also problematic for the Italian Embassy in Madrid, especially after the signing of the armistice. The expenses of these institutions amounted to 2,850 million pesetas, circa \$135,000 per year, and the Italian representatives in Spain were not able to pay them because of the interruption in the regular deposits coming from

⁹⁰NAUK: FO 660/366. Telegram from Paulucci to Badoglio, 11 November 1943.

⁹¹ASMAE: AP, Spain 1944, folder 68. Report from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 1944.

⁹²Ibid. Letter from Verrando to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the DGAE, no date, but after December 1943.

⁹³ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 February 1944.

⁹⁴ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1945, folder 82. Italian Cultural Activities in Spain.

Rome.⁹⁵ As a result of this, Paulucci was forced to cut these expenses by 80 per cent at the beginning of 1944.⁹⁶

Finally, a technical factor should be taken into consideration. One of the major tasks of the *Regno del Sud* foreign policy following the armistice was the reconstruction of the diplomatic network.⁹⁷ In this sense, the communication with delegations in other countries was essential. Once Paulucci decided to stay loyal to the Kingdom of Italy, he was also able to guarantee one item of correspondence a day from both Brindisi and Madrid. Even though the Allies exerted strict control over these communications, Madrid became the connection point between the new Kingdom of Italy and the foreign representations (Ankara, Buenos Aires) and delegations (Berne, Dublin, Lisbon, Helsinki, Kabul and Stockholm) and the General Consulate in Tangier, key cities to recover lost sovereignty.⁹⁸ Considering all this, it is easy to understand why the Badoglio Government wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime in spite of the ideological differences; Spain had become an important theatre in Italian foreign policy and Badoglio could not afford to lose it.

The RSI offensive for official recognition

At the beginning of October 1943, the advance of the Allied armies through the south of Italy started to slow down as a result of strong resistance by German forces. This show of German strength impressed Franco greatly and also presented him with a new problem: the RSI, whose future had been in question during September due to the Allied advance, was now assured, at least momentarily, by the German resistance.⁹⁹

This new situation was seized upon by the German and the RSI authorities who started to prepare the reorganization of their offices in Spain in order to reinforce their position there. The main goal was to appoint a representative to Spain as a first step in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations. The RSI diplomats were convinced, rather naively, that, now that the future of their regime was guaranteed thanks to the German efforts, Spain would end up changing its foreign policy and officially recognize the Mussolini

⁹⁵Equivalence between pesetas and dollars in Albert Carreras, 'Depresión económica y cambio estructural durante el decenio bélico 1936–1945', in José Luis García Delgado (ed.), *El primer franquismo: España durante la segunda guerra mundial; V coloquio sobre historia contemporánea de España ...* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1989), 10.

⁹⁶ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 25 February 1944.

⁹⁷BA: Gallarati Scotti archive, Series I, folder No. 9. Letter from Visconti Venosta to Gallarati Scotti (no date but before 28 September 1943).

⁹⁸Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943–1963)*, 18.

⁹⁹Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*, 50; Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia*, 40–47. Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 632.

Government. However, the process of appointing a representative in Spain turned out to be difficult: because of the Allied pressure, there were not many suitable candidates willing to travel to Spain to carry out such an underground job.¹⁰⁰

In the end, Mussolini was forced to make a pragmatic choice and appoint Eugenio Morreale for the charge. Even though he was not an important figure of the regime, the ex-Consul of Malaga had already established links with the Fascist elements in Spain and knew the situation very well. On 2 November Morreale received a letter from Filippo Anfuso, ambassador of the RSI to Germany, urging him to travel to Berlin in order to receive instructions. Morreale left immediately for the German capital where he met with Mussolini and Anfuso. They gave him concrete orders: he was to fight for a strong diplomatic position for the RSI in Spain, a diplomatic position which would allow them to protect their favourable community of interests there.¹⁰¹ From Berlin, he went on to Saló where he presented a report to the Deputy-secretary for Foreign Affairs of the RSI, Serafino Mazzolini, and asked for his diplomatic accreditation. He would be appointed 'General Commissioner for the assistance of the Italians in Spain', a title without any political significance and that could be easily accepted by the cautious Spanish regime.¹⁰² He would also have the support of some of the Consuls, like Adolfo Marino, the 'Gruppo Fascista e Militare di Spagna Aderente al Governo Repubblicano Fascista' and the 'Fasci Repubblicani' which had been created in 1943 and that was comprised of 121 members by the end of 1944. Regarding financial support, he could count only on the funds provided by the German Embassy.¹⁰³

Morreale arrived in Spain on 18 December, a date that can be considered as the starting point of the RSI attempt to gain definitive recognition by Franco's regime.¹⁰⁴ In spite of all the operational difficulties, Morreale's presence was really important as he managed to transform the RSI agency in Spain into a very dynamic organization. At the peak of its activity, the RSI agency managed to organize both politically and culturally all the Italians supporting the new Mussolini regime, arrange missions to recruit possible volunteers for the 'Forze armate repubblicane', establish contacts with other RSI agencies in South America, promote RSI propaganda and award diplomatic visas to the members of the agency so that they could move freely in

¹⁰⁰More about the appointment of a RSI representative in Spain in Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 232–8.

¹⁰¹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Morreale to Terragni, 6 February 1944.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Morreale to Terragni, 6 February 1944.

the country. Obviously, none of these activities could be done without the permission, or at least the tolerance of the Spanish authorities.¹⁰⁵

The Fascist Government and the Germans decided to use the presence and dynamism of this agency as the main argument for launching a political campaign in order to achieve their main goal: the recognition of the Mussolini Government. On 20 December, the press and radio announced that the Spanish Government was about to make a decision regarding its foreign policy which would have enormous relevance for the future of the conflict.¹⁰⁶ Five days later, Radio Roma, a radio station controlled by the RSI whose signal could be received in Spain, went even further by broadcasting a transmission assuring that the Spanish Government had already decided to officially recognize the RSI: Morreale who had been about to present his credentials to Jordana and Paulucci had been forced to flee Madrid.¹⁰⁷ A few days later, when the Anglo-Americans realized that Morreale had applied to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be accepted as the unofficial agent of Mussolini's Government, they protested. The only reply they received was that the application was under consideration. The Spanish reaction to these events only contributed to upsetting the Allies even more.¹⁰⁸

It should be remembered that since the autumn of 1943, relations between Spain and the Allies, and especially with the US, had started to seriously deteriorate.¹⁰⁹ The continued exports of wolfram to Germany, the internment of the Italian ships, the tolerance of the Spanish authorities with the German agents operating on Spanish soil, the maintenance of the Blue Legion in the eastern front, and now the friendly attitude shown towards the RSI were all issues which deeply worried the Allies.¹¹⁰

Jordana was again forced to intervene to assert Spain's neutral position. On 5 January, he held an interview with Carlton Hayes, in which he assured the Ambassador that the Spanish Government had not recognized the Mussolini regime and that it did not intend to do so.¹¹¹ At the same time, Jordana protested to the RSI and Mussolini reacted by firing the person responsible for having published this erroneous information in the Stefani

¹⁰⁵Viganò, *Il ministero degli affari esteri e le relazioni internazionali della Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943–1945)*, 376–8.

¹⁰⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.077, folder 5. Telegram from Barcenas to Jordana, 20 December 1943.

¹⁰⁷NAUK: FO 371/39688. Extract from the transmissions made by Radio Roma, 25 December 1944.

¹⁰⁸NAUK: FO 371/39688. Telegram from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 1 January 1944.

¹⁰⁹Paul Preston tends to see the 'Laurel' affair as the turning point of relations. More about this question in Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 562.

¹¹⁰Guderzo, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia*, 379; Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 505.

¹¹¹NAUK: FO 371/39688. Minute from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1944.

press agency.¹¹² This event marked the end of the Fascist offensive for the RSI. From that moment on, the Salò authorities gave the issue of recognition secondary importance and focused on other questions: the defence of their economic interests, the attraction of the Italian ex-patriot community to their side, and the sabotage of the Badoglio Government's affairs in Spain.

In the end, the offensive obtained only some of the results which the RSI authorities had expected by December 1943. Although the Mussolini regime lost prestige because of the press campaign, Morreale managed to consolidate the RSI agency in Spain. In spite of being forced by Allied pressure to work underground, he established important links with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the local police authorities, which helped him to protect Italian interests and the Italian community that was not loyal to Badoglio.¹¹³ In addition, he was allowed to renew passports with the letterhead of the RSI and even to issue provisional passports or certificates, documents which were necessary to travel in Spain. In this way, he was able to create a diplomatic network which, while modest (the General Director of European Affairs and the Governor of Catalonia were its most important members), was extremely useful for his purposes.¹¹⁴

The first splits in Anglo-American cooperation: the Allies and the problem of the Italian fleet in the Spanish ports

Genesis of the problem

As explained above, one of the main demands of the Allies from the Francoist regime in January 1944 was its position regarding the Italian fleet interned in Spanish ports.¹¹⁵ The agreements signed between the Allies and the Spanish Government on 2 May 1944 marked the starting point for the solution of this problem; however, the process was still long and complicated to the extent that the Italian ships were not released until January 1945. The question of the Italian warships, which was the only branch of the Italian army that remained intact after three years of war, became a fundamental point in Spanish-Italian relations of the period. It also attracted the attention of Germany and the Allies, who perceived the question as crucial and therefore made a great effort to obtain a favourable solution to the issue. In order to fully understand this key question, it is

¹¹²AMAE: Bundle 1.272, folder 9. Telegram from García Comín to Jordana, 11 January 1944.

¹¹³ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66. Letter from Morreale to Terragni, 6 February 1944.

¹¹⁴Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 424 and 466.

¹¹⁵ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 27 February 1944.

necessary to adopt a global perspective of the process, starting with a short digression.¹¹⁶

When the Badoglio Government signed the armistice with the Allies, it ordered the Italian war fleet to sail from La Spezia, where it was anchored, for Malta, a port controlled by the British troops. During the crossing, the fleet was attacked by the Germans and forced to divide into two groups. Only the first group managed to reach Malta; the second group, formed of seven warships, was forced to make a short stop in the Balearic Islands.¹¹⁷ These warships were in addition to the merchant vessels which had already taken refuge in Spanish ports since the beginning of the war.¹¹⁸ In total, there were 13 merchant ships, 7 warships and more than 1,000 crewmen, including 47 officers, 124 petty officers and 800 sailors.¹¹⁹

The commanders of all seven warships immediately asked the Spanish authorities to provide them with the necessary oil to continue on their way to Malta. However, the Spanish authorities argued that there was not enough oil to supply the Italian ships and denied the request, creating a deep sense of unease among the Italian commanders who were convinced that it was a mere pretext to intern the ships. This belief was confirmed when the Spanish Government seized the opportunity and, officially considering the entry of the ships as a request for refuge, decided on the internment and blockade of the fleet within 24 hours.¹²⁰ As a result of this decision, two commanders of the Italian fleet decided to sink their warships, believing that the internment could last until the end of the war; the other commanders accepted the Spanish decision even if they expressed their disagreement.¹²¹

Obviously, the Spanish decision regarding the Italian fleet was not taken only for technical or juridical reasons. The control of both merchant and Italian warships provided the Francoist regime with a valuable element to negotiate with both the Allies and the Axis. In addition, it gained a better position from which to demand compensation from Italy. According to the government, Italy had sunk several Spanish ships during the first years of the war. Furthermore, the Spanish authorities were convinced that, thanks to the Nice agreements, Spain was entitled to the ownership of at

¹¹⁶In order to obtain a general overview of the Italian fleet during the Second World War, see Giovanni Bernardi, *La Marina, gli armistizi e il trattato di pace: settembre 1943–dicembre 1951* (Rome: Ufficio storico della Marina militare, 1979).

¹¹⁷ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 85. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 8 September 1944.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Italian ships in Spanish ports.

¹²⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 85. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 8 September 1944.

¹²¹Ibid.

least seven merchant ships. In April 1943, the Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce, Demetrio Carceller, held a secret meeting in Nice with his Italian counterpart, Oreste Bonomi. The main topic of the encounter was the levelling of the balance of trade which would allow the two countries to resume commercial relations. The outcome was the signing of two secret agreements. The first established that the Italian Government would sell seven merchant ships which were interned in Spanish ports since the beginning of the war to the Francoist regime for 120 million pesetas which would be used to purchase Spanish products (raw materials and food stuffs).¹²² Even though this agreement was never enforced because of the collapse of the Mussolini regime, the Spanish authorities argued that it was still valid and therefore they were entitled to buy these ships. It should be considered that, in a world at war, merchant ships were a very important asset, especially in the Spanish case whose merchant fleet had been reduced to almost nothing after the Spanish Civil War.¹²³

The uncertain situation of the Italian fleet forced all sides involved in the conflict to intervene, trying to gain advantage. The Germans wanted the control of these warships as they believed that they could be used for their war effort in the Mediterranean.¹²⁴ The same applied for the Allies, which wanted to use the warships in the Mediterranean so that they could send the US ships in the region to fight the Japanese in the Pacific.¹²⁵ At the same time, the RSI needed control of the warships in order to contribute to the German war effort and to consequently improve their weak international standing. Mussolini understood very quickly that, given the situation of his new regime, the contribution to the German war effort through the reconstruction of the army was the only mechanism at his disposal to recover the sovereignty lost after the armistice.¹²⁶

The Badoglio Government was in a similar situation; as explained above, on 10 September, Italy was a defeated state, internationally weak. One of the few ways in which it would be able to regain part of its sovereignty was by increasing its contribution to the war effort together with the Allies, and the fleet was the best instrument it had. In this regard, it is necessary to explain that the Badoglio Government had tried since September 1943 to build a new

¹²²ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 27 February 1944.

¹²³Joan Rosés, 'Las consecuencias macroeconómicas de la guerra civil', in Enrique Fuentes and Franciso Comín (eds.), *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil: los economistas, las ideas y las propuestas económicas. Las consecuencias de la guerra sobre la economía y los economistas* (Madrid: Galaxia Gutenberg, Círculo de lectores, 2008), vol. 2, 339–64.

¹²⁴Eitel Friedrich Moellhausen, *La carta perdente* (Bergamo: Sestante, 1948).

¹²⁵FRUS, 1943, Vol. II. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 9 December 1943.

¹²⁶Bertoldi, *Salò: vita e morte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*, 20.

Italian army; however, these efforts had been frustrated by the Allies that were reluctant to restore the military capabilities of a country that had been a member of the Axis until very recently. The only exception to this principle was the Italian navy which, under the control of the US and British authorities, could be of considerable help to the Allied operations in the Pacific. This reason alone justified the great interest shown by the authorities in Brindisi to recover the warships. However, there was more. In the autumn of 1943, the Badoglio Government was facing a possible famine extending through the whole of south Italy. The merchant ships interned in Spain were Badoglio's only hope to alleviate this situation by re-establishing commerce with neutral countries.¹²⁷ Taking these arguments into consideration, it is easier to understand the magnitude of the question and all the intense diplomatic activity which surrounded the Italian fleet interned in Spanish ports.

Well aware that the first moments were crucial to obtain a quick release of the Italian warships, and that Vittorio Emanuele III and Badoglio were too busy forming a new government in Brindisi, the Allies decided to take the initiative on this question. As usual, the US and the British Government had previously agreed to present a unified position in front of the Spanish authorities. Already on 11 September, General Eisenhower instructed the State Department to confer with the British Ambassador in Madrid about all the actions aimed at the delivery of Italian vessels to the Allied authorities.¹²⁸ Two days later, Ambassador Hayes sent a letter to Count Jordana requesting the Italian vessels to be allowed to continue their journey towards the nearest Allied port, in this case Algiers. Hayes clarified that, in case the Spanish authorities were not in a position, because of a scarcity of supplies, to furnish these warships with fuel, the US Government was willing to intervene and provide the necessary supplies. This offer shows the great interest which the Allied authorities attached to the Italian warships.¹²⁹ For them, it was not just a matter of contributing to the stability of the Badoglio Government, but also a considerable boost to the war effort. It should be considered that during the autumn of 1943 the conflict was far from over and the acquiring of part of the Italian fleet could be of considerable help for the Allied navies, especially in the Pacific.¹³⁰

¹²⁷Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy: 1943–1945*. Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*; Richard Lamb, *War in Italy 1943–1945: A Brutal Story* (London: Penguin Books, 1995); Victoria Belco, *War, Massacre, and Recovery in Central Italy, 1943–1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). Focardi and Klinkhammer, 'La difficile transizione', 113–29.

¹²⁸FRUS: 1943, Vol. II. Telegram from the Vice Consul in Algiers, Robert McBride to Hull, 11 September 1943, 712.

¹²⁹Ibid. Letter from Hayes to Jordana, 13 September 1943, 713.

¹³⁰Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (London: Pimlico, 1996); Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Obviously, the authorities of the *Regno del Sud* were also very interested in obtaining a quick release of the Italian fleet and, once the political situation had stabilized with the establishment of the government in Brindisi, they too decided to intervene. On 23 September, Marshal Badoglio instructed Paulucci to contact the British and US Ambassadors in Madrid in order to prepare a common strategy aimed at the release of the Italian war and merchant vessels from Spanish ports. The same day, Paulucci held a meeting with Count Jordana where he argued that the ships had been illegally interned and thus should obtain the permission to leave immediately.¹³¹

From this moment onwards, the three ambassadors in Madrid, Paulucci, Hoare and Hayes would harmonize their actions in their negotiations with the Spanish Government concerning the Italian fleet. In reality, and as it has been already explained, this cooperation was not limited to the Italian fleet and it was applied to all the questions which affected the interests of the Kingdom of Italy in Spain. Moreover, it should be clarified that, while Paulucci always participated in the creation of strategies, it was always the British and US Ambassadors who ruled the roost. However, the Spanish authorities were determined not to renounce this important asset. In a meeting held on 21 September with Carlton Hayes, Minister Jordana explained that the situation was 'complicated and delicate' and that it was still not clear if these warships should be considered belligerent or non-belligerent. As a consequence, the Spanish Government had instructed a group of experts to study the question and issue a legal report.¹³²

The increasing pressure of the Allies on the Spanish regime forced the Germans to intervene. Well aware that without Paulucci's support, crucial in this kind of matter, it would be very difficult to gain control of the Italian fleet, they decided to make sure that the Allies would never have it under their control either. At the beginning of October, they asked the RSI authorities to sell the Italian merchant ships anchored in Spanish ports as soon as possible so they would not fall into the hands of the Allies.¹³³ The Spanish authorities refused the proposal arguing that the Allies were now extremely interested in these ships and that a premature sale could have a negative impact on their relations. The German diplomats then realized that it would be almost impossible to recover control of the Italian fleet and therefore decided to change strategy: if Germany could not use the Italian warships, no other country would. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to exert pressure on the Spanish authorities to maintain the Italian fleet interned in their ports until the end of the conflict. At the same time, propaganda had to be spread amongst the crews in order to bring them

¹³¹DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 16. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 24 September 1943.

¹³²FRUS: 1943, Vol. II. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 21 September 1943, 714–15.

¹³³Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 404.

over to the Fascist side, and they even began to look for people who would sabotage the ships in order to prevent their departure.¹³⁴

Ideology or national interests? Spanish foreign policy towards the two Italies

Once again, the Spanish Government was forced to make a decision regarding Italy in a highly complicated context, mainly because of the strong pressures exerted both by the Allies and the German authorities. In the end, the decision was made at the beginning of October and communicated to the Allies through a verbal note addressed to the American Embassy in Spain. In this note, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced officially that, in order to respect The Hague agreement, it was forced to maintain the blockade of the ships, because they had remained in the Spanish ports for more than 24 hours.¹³⁵ The Francoist regime had thus transformed a political question into a juridical problem that, for its resolution, depended on possible interpretations of the law. This decision, however, did not stop the British or the US Ambassadors in Madrid who continued to exert pressure on the Spanish authorities.¹³⁶

Around the middle of November the British Government decided to concentrate its efforts on the merchant vessels in the belief that it would be easier to obtain their release. In reality, the situation regarding the merchant vessels was slightly different, mainly because they were not supposed to participate in the war and, therefore, the German authorities would not regard their departure as a hostile gesture. Accordingly, on the 22 November, Samuel Hoare delivered a verbal note to Jordana requesting him to release the six merchant ships which were not part of the Nice agreements. By way of compensation, the Allies would allow the Francoist regime to hold two merchant ships and use them until negotiations with the Kingdom of Italy could start. Jordana replied immediately rejecting Hoare's request and stressing that the Spanish Government was entitled to the ownership of seven merchant ships and that, unless the Allies recognized that right, none of the merchant ships would leave Spanish ports.¹³⁷

This reply, which irritated both Samuel Hoare and the Foreign Office, convinced the Italian authorities that they had a better chance if they appealed to Franco's generosity without using the Allies as intermediaries. On 8 December, Badoglio decided to write directly to Franco. In this letter,

¹³⁴Moellhausen, *La carta perdente*.

¹³⁵FRUS: 1943, Vol. II. Note Verbale from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Madrid, 6 October 1943, 715–16.

¹³⁶Ibid. Letter from Hayes to Jordana, 12 October 1943, 716–18, letter from Hayes to Hull, 22 October 1943, 719 and memorandum of conversation between Hayes and Jordana, 9 December 1943, 719–21.

¹³⁷ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 68. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 27 February 1944.

Marshal Badoglio explained that the merchant ships were essential for the country's economy. Using a rather emotional tone for an official letter, Badoglio described the difficult situation in the south of Italy and, at the same time appealed to Franco's generosity: 'I cannot believe that during this dark hour General Franco would contribute in any way to aggravate our situation. I therefore personally turn to him with confidence'. The letter concluded with a very strong statement which would have great relevance in the future of Spanish-Italian relations. In fact, Badoglio was not only asking for a rapid solution to the question of the ships, but was also reasserting the adoption of resolute foreign policy towards Spain. As has been explained before, the Kingdom of Italy needed to improve relations with the Francoist regime in order to recover lost sovereignty, alleviate the catastrophic situation of the economy and protect the large number of economic interests present in Spain.

*General Franco well knows that, whatever may be the political vicissitudes, there cannot be between Spain and Italy reasons of discord or motives for quarrelling. He well knows that it is our firm intention to maintain old and traditional friendship with Spain. His personal intervention would immediately solve all difficulties. And this is exactly what I hope for and look forward to.*¹³⁸

This message was transmitted to Franco on 14 December, but it did not alter the situation.¹³⁹ If the Allied pressure was not capable of breaking the Spanish determination to keep part of the Italian fleet, the Badoglio Government, still very weak in the international arena, had even less chance to change things. With the failure of this initiative, the question of the Italian fleet remained completely blocked, in spite of the numerous attempts made by both the Allies and Italian authorities. According to the Italian authorities, the Spanish refusal to come to terms with this question was an unfriendly gesture which had to be added to others which had been taking place since October. The *de facto* recognition of the RSI, the permission conceded to Morreale to operate in the country, the refusal to appoint a new ambassador to the Italian monarchy and to negotiate the war debt pending since 1939, and the hostility shown towards the Badoglio Government by the Spanish media in general all contributed to a souring of relations.

It was at this stage that the officers in the Kingdom of Italy started to think that the Spanish policy towards it had changed radically, regardless of the positive signals received in September. In their view, the Spanish authorities had begun to adopt a position that was antagonistic and dilatory in all

¹³⁸Ibid. Doc. No. 93. From Badoglio, to Franco, 8 December 1943. Original transmitted in English.

¹³⁹Ibid. Doc. No. 106. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 28 December 1943.

aspects regarding the Kingdom of the South.¹⁴⁰ According to the diplomats in Brindisi, the Spanish foreign policy towards the Badoglio Government was clearly influenced by ideological reasons. In their opinion, the Spanish authorities, which included an important number of Falangist elements, did not have any sympathy for the Italian monarchy and maintained a positive opinion of the RSI. There are a large number of documents in which the diplomats from the *Regno del Sud* analysed Spanish foreign policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. They always use the same set of reasons to explain why the Kingdom of Italy was treated with 'hostility' by the Spanish regime. Apart from the material reasons, such as the difficulties in communications between Spain and the south of Italy, and the problems of the monarchic radio being heard in Spain, these diplomats argued that the main question was the hostility of the Falange. According to the diplomats in Brindisi, the influence that Falange exerted over the whole of Spanish society had provoked the failure of the policy of neutrality taken forward by Jordana and had subsequently worsened the Kingdom of Italy's position in Spain.¹⁴¹

All the authors who have dealt with this period of Spanish-Italian relations, Tusell, García, Carotenuto and Canosa, incorporate the reasoning of the Italian diplomats into their narratives, without taking the necessary distance from these sources, and without analysing in detail the motivations behind Spanish policy towards Italy.¹⁴² However, the adoption of a wider and more critical approach leads to a radically different conclusion. In the first place, it is necessary to point out that none of these questions, the non-recognition of the RSI, the Italian fleet in Spanish ports or the war debt, can be understood from a merely bilateral perspective. Since the signing of the armistice, the Allies and the Germans had become part of the equation, which means that none of the Spanish decisions can be understood without considering the implications that these decisions had on its relations with both contenders in the Second World War. In this regard, arguing that the Spanish policy in the Italian fleet question was motivated by its 'hostility' towards the Badoglio Government is reductionist and simply wrong.

Secondly, it is necessary to clarify if the Spanish foreign policy towards the Kingdom of Italy was really as 'hostile' as the Italian diplomats perceived. A thorough analysis of the Spanish archives shows no official document supporting this theory. As far as Falange is concerned, it is also evident that

¹⁴⁰Ibid. Doc. No. 101 Report from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Allied Control Commission (ACC), 2 January 1944. Original transmitted in English.

¹⁴¹Ibid. Doc. No. 106. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 28 December 1943. Doc. No. 123. Report from the Consul of the *Regno del Sud*, Marchiori to Prunas, 15 January 1944. ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1944, folder 66, Letter from Paulucci to Bonomi, 18 September 1944.

¹⁴²Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 431–501; Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini*, 153–91; Canosa, *Mussolini e Franco*, 460–520.

many of its members felt closer to the Mussolini regime and therefore did not sympathize with the Badoglio Government. However, Ismael Saz has shown very clearly in his book *Fascismo y Franquismo* that, by 1943, Falange had a minimal capacity to influence policy-making in the Francoist regime. This does not mean that Falange had disappeared from the Spanish society; it was still an important pillar of the Francoist regime but its role had been reduced to small areas like the press.¹⁴³

On this last point, it should be remembered that, since the end of the Spanish Civil War, Franco had put all media and its management into the hands of elements closer to Nazi Fascism, like Serrano Súñer or José Antonio Jiménez Arnau. They were responsible for the redaction of the order in council that would regulate the informative policy of the Francoist regime from 1938 to 1966. In this way, censorship and the use of slogans became the two faces of media communication in Francoist Spain. It was obvious that these elements would never see the formation of the Badoglio Government as something positive. As a consequence, the Spanish Media adopted a position of contempt, and in some cases frank 'hostility', like *Arriba!*, the official newspaper of Falange, towards the new Italian monarchy.¹⁴⁴ Falange was to blame for the tone of the Spanish press towards the Kingdom of Italy, but it certainly was not responsible for the Spanish foreign policy towards the two Italies.

In fact, the Spanish policy regarding the *de facto* recognition of the RSI, the refusal to appoint an ambassador in the 'Quirinale' and the decision to maintain the Italian ships interned in its ports was primarily motivated by political reasons, not ideological. Since the beginning of 1943, one of the central strategies of Spanish foreign policy had become the quest for an equidistant position between the Axis and the Allies. As Franco had explained to Ambassador Fernández Cuesta on 12 August 1943: 'It is not advisable for Spain to displease any of the factions, nor to appear obliging with issues that can be perceived as unpleasant by one of the sides. [...]'.¹⁴⁵ This strategy relied on the assumption that the Spanish regime would gain more political benefit by adopting a middle position between Germany and the Allies. In this regard, the Spanish authorities did not want the Germans to think that Spain was turning completely against them. In fact, in its long path towards neutrality, Spain had recently been making a number of decisions which could be easily misinterpreted by the German Government: the withdrawal of the Blue Division, the non-recognition of the RSI, the public

¹⁴³Ismael Saz, *Fascismo y franquismo* (Valencia: Publicaciones Universitat de Valencia, 2004), 151–71.

¹⁴⁴More about the press in Jesús Timoteo Álvarez (ed.), *Historia de los medios de comunicación en España: periodismo, imagen y publicidad, 1900–1990* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1989).

¹⁴⁵Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 217.

statement that its relations with Portugal would not be prejudiced by the Azores agreement, the *de facto* recognition of the CFLN, etc. Spain needed to act cautiously in order not to jeopardize its relations with Germany.¹⁴⁶ This desire to maintain a balance between the two sides contributes to explain many of the decisions made by the Francoist regime regarding the two 'Italies': Spain did not recognize the RSI but it allowed the presence of an unofficial RSI representative in Spain; Spain did not send an ambassador to Brescia but gave instructions to the Consul in Milan to act as its unofficial representative; it also recognized Paulucci as the ambassador of the Badoglio Government in Madrid but did not designate a new one for the Italian monarchy.

Secondly, were the political-economic factors. Gennaro Carotenuto points out in his book that this ideological adhesion of the Francoist regime to the RSI was supported by economic factors made more explicit by the disparity between the Spanish interests in the north of Italy and its interests in the south.¹⁴⁷ However, the Italian historian overemphasizes this argument and, at the same time, does not mention that the main economic pressure did not come from the RSI directly, but from Germany, a country which had started to increase its economic presence in Spain since the late 1930s. Although it is true that the vast majority of Italian companies had their offices in the north at that time and were thus controlled by the RSI (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Olivetti, Pirelli, FIAT, Snia Viscosa, Istituto Nazionali delle Assicurazioni, etc.), the activities of these companies in Spain were almost paralysed since the signing of the armistice. As far as the exports from the north of Italy are concerned, the Spanish and the Italian sources only show the accomplishment of a modest operation which involved a small number of FIAT vehicles.¹⁴⁸ On 17 November 1941, the Spanish Government had closed a deal with FIAT to purchase 50 trams and 25 trolley buses. The government had already paid part of the money but, because of the war, could not receive the vehicles. After the collapse of the Mussolini regime, Jordana instructed the Spanish Consul in Milan, Fernando Canthal, to recover the agreed trams and trolley buses. This constituted the principal activity carried out by the Consul in Milan, who, by April 1944, had only managed to obtain export licences for four of the agreed vehicles.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶FRUS: 1943, Vol. II. Memorandum of conversation between the Counsellor of Embassy, Willard Beaulac, and the Spanish Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, José Pan de Soralue, 16 October 1943, 718–19.

¹⁴⁷Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini*, 175.

¹⁴⁸ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 68. Report from Paulucci to Badoglio on the RSI activities in the Iberian Peninsula, 20 February 1944.

¹⁴⁹The negotiation between the two governments for the agreed vehicles can be followed in: AMAE: Bundle 1.271, folder 10. Telegram from Jordana, to Barcenás, 27

This operation shows the modesty of the economic relations between Spain and the RSI which obviously cannot be compared with the important economic interests that Spain had in Germany. It should be considered that, since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, economic relations between Spain and Germany had been fostered by both countries. During the first years of the Second World War, the vast majority of exportable products were directed to Italy and especially to Germany which, by 1942, had become the chief market for Spanish exports, substituting Britain as the main destination of Spanish products. On the other hand, Franco wanted military supplies from Germany because he considered it paramount that Spain should be ready in case the Allies decided to attack Spanish Morocco. These fears partially induced Spain to sign a treaty with Germany, a treaty which would increase the commerce between the two countries. Spain would contribute foodstuffs and raw materials worth 388 million marks, and Germany would contribute with 230 million in manufactured goods and machinery, 130 million of which would be armaments.¹⁵⁰ However, Germany at that time did not have the economic potential to fulfil all the demands of the Spanish economy. Spain still needed access to the British and US markets as they provided products which were essential for the reconstruction of its industrial sector, especially oil and raw materials.¹⁵¹ As a consequence, when the Mussolini regime fell, Spain had become a country with special economic links to both Great Britain and Germany: on the one hand, it depended on Great Britain for the basic products for its survival; on the other, it depended on Germany to obtain military supplies – which could only be obtained through this channel.¹⁵²

Franco was well aware of these facts and had to withstand the pressure coming from both sides. When the Badoglio Government declared war on Germany, the latter decided to intensify its economic pressure on Spain in order to obtain official recognition of the RSI. The Spanish Government would not take any decisions which could turn it against the Germans, and vice versa. This policy can be labelled successful if it is considered that Germany never interrupted its commerce with Spain (at least until the loss of France) and that the Allies did so only once, as discussed above. Taking all these elements into account, the interpretations defended by the

November 1943. Bundle 1.271, folder 9. Telegram from García Comín to Jordana, 6 April 1944 and telegram from Jordana to García Comín, 17 April 1944.

¹⁵⁰Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 635.

¹⁵¹More about the economic links between Spain and Germany in Christian Leitz, *Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Elena Martínez, 'Las consecuencias de la guerra civil en el sector exterior', in Fuentes and Comín (eds.), *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil*, 521–54.

¹⁵²Preston, *Franco: A Biography*.

forementioned authors must be discarded.¹⁵³ This policy was adopted for political and economic considerations that had nothing to do with the ideological differences between the two countries. The *de facto* recognition of the RSI, the refusal to appoint an ambassador to the Badoglio Government and the decision to maintain the Italian fleet interned, were all decisions made to defend what the Spanish authorities perceived as the 'national interests'.

Navigating the Anglo-American differences: the agreement between Spain and the Allies

The beginning of 1944 witnessed an increase in the Allied diplomatic activity to obtain the release of the Italian fleet from Spanish ports. However, this time the issue was placed in a larger context together with a set of demands which the Allies were requesting from the Spanish Government. As has already been explained, relations between the Francoist regime and the Allies had started to seriously deteriorate at the end of 1943. The revival of German imports from Spain, the maintenance of a portion of the Blue Division fighting in the eastern front side by side with the German armies, the permissiveness of the Spanish authorities to the German agents operating in their territory, the refusal to find a quick solution for the Italian fleet anchored in Spanish ports and, more importantly, the negative response given to the Allied request to place a full wolfram embargo on Germany, were all reasons which contributed to increase the Allied frustration with the Francoist regime.

At the beginning of January 1944, the US Government started to reconsider, at the insistence of Ambassador Hayes, its policy towards the Francoist regime. It was becoming increasingly evident to US diplomats that the policy carried out by the Allies so far was not producing the expected results. According to Hayes, the US Government needed to make the Spanish authorities more immediately conscious of their dependence on the Allied economic supplies by announcing the suspension of the February loadings of Spanish tankers.¹⁵⁴ This idea of using the oil shipments to negotiate with the Spanish authorities was studied by the Roosevelt administration throughout the month of January. The main problem was finding a common strategy with the British Government which had a different view on what the Allied policy towards Spain should be. In a conversation held between Hayes and Hoare, the latter explained that Britain believed that economic pressure, if applied at all, should be delayed until the Allies had occupied France.¹⁵⁵ It should be remembered that the Allies were already

¹⁵³Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 431–501; Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini*, 153–91; Canosa, *Mussolini e Franco*, 460–520.

¹⁵⁴FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 4 January 1944, 298–301.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*

preparing a large-scale operation in northern Europe which would open a third front.¹⁵⁶

At the end of January the US Government decided to implement the new policy outlined by Ambassador Hayes, convinced that it would be a matter of time until it found an agreement with the British Government.¹⁵⁷ In this way, on 28 January the US authorities issued a press release in which it was announced that the loadings of Spanish tankers with petroleum products were suspended, starting on 21 February.¹⁵⁸ The Spanish Government protested immediately against this decision, but the US authorities were determined to continue with this new policy. Unless the Spanish Government agreed to re-examine its policy regarding the Allied demands, namely withdrawal of the Blue Legion, the expulsion of German agents operating in Spain, the immediate release of the Italian fleet interned in Spanish ports and, above all, the application of a strict wolfram embargo on Germany, the Roosevelt administration would not restart the regular loadings of petroleum products.¹⁵⁹

By the same token, the new US strategy towards Spain also produced a deep sense of unease in London. According to the British Government, the suspension of oil shipments was a risky decision which could run counter to the united economic front theory regarding Spain.¹⁶⁰ In order to understand the British position in this regard, it should be taken into account that the country was, unlike the United States, economically dependent on Spain. In fact, Britain imported important raw materials such as iron ore and potash from Spain and also had substantial investments in the country. Pushing the Francoist regime too far might have severe negative consequences for the British economy in the short run, but also over an extended period of time, once the war in Europe was over.¹⁶¹ Officially, the British Government decided to support the new US policy in order to maintain the economic front in Spain; unofficially, however, diplomats in London attempted to convince the Roosevelt administration that the adoption of a flexible policy towards Spain would bring more benefits.¹⁶² According to the British diplomats, it was unlikely that the Spanish authorities would accept a complete wolfram embargo on Germany and, therefore, the Allies should accept minor

¹⁵⁶Overy, *Why the Allies Won*; Weinberg, *A World at Arms*.

¹⁵⁷FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Telegram from Hull to Hayes, 25 January 1944, 303–4.

¹⁵⁸Ibid. Letter from Hull to Hayes, 29 January 1944, 307.

¹⁵⁹Ibid. Letter from Hull to Hayes, 29 January 1944, 307–8.

¹⁶⁰Ibid. Letter from Hull to John Winant, US Ambassador in London, 29 January 1944, 308–9.

¹⁶¹Ibid. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 11 February 1944, 335. Leonard Caruana and Hugh Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II', NBER Working Paper No. 12228, May 2006, 29.

¹⁶²FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hull to Winant, 31 January 1944, 317.

concessions from the Spaniards, like a reduction in wolfram exports. As can be seen, the adoption of a new policy towards the Francoist regime produced the first serious disagreements between the British and the Americans.¹⁶³

It should be noted that another crack in Anglo-American cooperation was starting to appear around the same time, provoked by the change in US policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. As it has been explained in the previous section, Winston Churchill was convinced that no major changes should be introduced in the Badoglio Government before the Allied armies had managed to enter Rome. Between October 1943 and January 1944, the Prime Minister had managed to impose his view in this regard, but from that moment the US Government started to adopt an independent policy with respect to the Kingdom of Italy and the changes of government there. The Roosevelt administration was increasingly convinced that the Kingdom of Italy needed a new government, a government which would include the parties from the 'Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale' (CNL) and would govern without Vittorio Emanuele III who should abdicate because of his ties with the Mussolini regime.¹⁶⁴

Obviously, these differences between London and Washington had a negative impact on the defence of Italian interests in Spain since the question of the Italian ships had been closely linked with the wolfram negotiations. The first serious problem appeared on 11 February when Hayes informed the Secretary of State that Ambassador Hoare, following instructions from London, was not exerting the necessary pressure on the Spanish Government to obtain a complete wolfram embargo and the release of the Italian warships.¹⁶⁵ Apart from the considerations about the use of economic pressure, the British Government believed the question of the Italian warships was not of 'paramount importance' and that the Allied case for their release was weak from a legal point of view and it could 'prejudice the far more important issues of securing the internment of German submarines and crews, in which we are vitally interested'.¹⁶⁶ The British lack of interest in the question of the Italian warships contrasted with the numerous actions taken to obtain the release of the Italian merchant ships. According to officials in Whitehall, the Allies had a better chance of obtaining the release of these vessels as international law clearly supported their case and, moreover, they would obtain more important benefits from these merchant ships.¹⁶⁷

The State Department immediately contacted the British Embassy in Washington in search of a common strategy which would satisfy both governments. It was essential that both ambassadors in Madrid presented

¹⁶³Caruana and Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden', 29.

¹⁶⁴Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 45; Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*, 72–3.

¹⁶⁵FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 11 February 1944, 335.

¹⁶⁶NAUK: FO 371/39697. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 29 February 1944.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.* Minutes from the Foreign Office, 18 January 1944.

only one position in front of the Spanish Government in order to reinforce their joint position. However, the Spanish diplomats realized very quickly that there were important differences between the Allies. In an interview held on 16 February between Hayes and the Spanish Ambassador in London, the Duke of Alba, the latter pointed out that the British authorities did not seem especially concerned about a wolfram embargo or about the Italian warships.¹⁶⁸

This was an important setback for the Allies who saw their position in the future negotiations considerably weakened. The split between Britain and the United States was so great, and the issue so important, that Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt were drawn into the fray. In the end, the two governments decided to adopt a new strategy. On the one hand, Sir Samuel Hoare was instructed to give his fullest support to all the actions made by Hayes in front of the Spanish authorities.¹⁶⁹ This new support was stressed in an interview that the British Ambassador held with Minister Jordana where Hoare declared that Britain was determined to support the US demands for a complete wolfram embargo and the release of the Italian warships.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, Washington and London agreed on a tactical division in their demands to the Spanish Government. Even though both governments would support each other in every demand to the Francoist regime, the US Ambassador would lead the negotiations for the Italian warships, and the British Ambassador would concentrate on the release of the merchant ships.¹⁷¹

The increase of the Anglo-American pressure started to take effect around the middle of February. On the 18th of that month, Minister Jordana suggested negotiating the issue of wolfram and showed his willingness to suppress the German consulate in Tangier and to expel its staff, to inform the US Embassy about what the Spanish Government was doing concerning German agents and German saboteurs on its territory, and to withdraw all the Spanish soldiers in the Eastern front. Regarding the Italian fleet, Jordana requested compensation consisting in armaments and gas for its airplanes. Finally, Jordana said that Spain was willing to accept the British proposal concerning the Italian merchant vessels, namely that all except for two would be released as soon as they would be ready to sail. It should be remembered in this regard, that this offer had been made by Hoare already in November 1943.¹⁷²

In spite of Jordana's more transient position, especially regarding the Italian fleet, the US Government rejected this proposal arguing that its main

¹⁶⁸FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 16 February 1944, 338–9.

¹⁶⁹Ibid. Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, 21 February 1944, 345.

¹⁷⁰Ibid. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 18 February 1944, 341.

¹⁷¹NAUK: FO 371/39697. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 18 February 1944. ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 68. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 27 February 1944.

¹⁷²FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV, Letter from Hayes to Hull, 3 February 1944, 341–3.

demand, the complete wolfram embargo on Germany, had still not been implemented.¹⁷³ The only point over which the US authorities gave their conformity was the agreement reached between Spain and Britain regarding the merchant vessels. According to the US officials, this question was not related with the wolfram embargo and, therefore, could be negotiated separately. On 26 February the Spanish Government finally agreed with the British Ambassador to release all Italian merchant ships on condition that two of them would be chartered to Spain pending a future decision by international arbitration. This agreement was immediately transmitted to the US and the authorities of the *Regno del Sud* who gave their consent to the operation.¹⁷⁴ Accordingly, at the beginning of March, the Italian merchant ships started to leave the Spanish ports heading towards Algiers.¹⁷⁵

The release of the merchant ships was one of the first friendly gestures which the Spanish Government made in favour of the Badoglio Government. However, this did not mean that Spain was revising its policy regarding the two 'Italies': the main objective was still the balance between contenders. In fact, the decision to release the Italian merchant ships had been made to please the Allies in general and the British Government in particular, at a time when relationships had become very tense because of the wolfram question. In addition, the issue of the merchant ships reflected very well the paradoxical situation of the Badoglio Government. On the one hand, it had gained room for manoeuvre thanks to the diplomatic support given by the Allies in the defence for its national interests abroad. On the other hand, the episode reflected the small degree of independence it actually had when fostering a foreign policy of its own. After the failure of the Badoglio attempt to recover the merchant ships, in December 1943, the role of the Embassy in Madrid in the Anglo-Spanish talks had been reduced to almost nothing. As a matter of fact, the final agreement had been negotiated with the British Ambassador in Madrid practically without consulting the authorities of the *Regno del Sud*. All the parts were well aware that whatever the agreement was, the Kingdom of Italy would not be able to oppose it.¹⁷⁶

By the time the Italian merchant ships were leaving the Spanish coasts, the Allies had already agreed upon answers to all the pending questions with the Francoist regime except for the wolfram embargo on Germany. The US was even willing to accept international arbitration to decide on the future of the Italian warships, which was a big concession considering the original demand. However, the disagreements on the wolfram question were delaying

¹⁷³Ibid. Letter from Edward Stettinius, Acting Secretary of State, to Hayes, 18 February 1944, 343–4.

¹⁷⁴Ibid. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 28 February 1944, 353–4. ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1944, folder 68. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 27 February 1944.

¹⁷⁵ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 12 March 1944.

¹⁷⁶NAUK: FO 371/39697. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 11 February 1944.

the final agreement, which would include the release of the Italian warships. The Spanish Government had agreed to reduce wolfram exports to Germany to as little as 10 per cent of total exports during 1943, but the Roosevelt administration deemed this diminution as insufficient.¹⁷⁷

As a result of this, negotiations between the Allies and Spain continued throughout the months of March and April. The Spanish regime was in a difficult situation, but Franco managed to handle it adeptly: he used his control over the media in order to manipulate the information about the suspension of oil shipments and disguising it as an example of the external pressure that the Allies were exerting to end Spanish neutrality. The dictator presented himself to his Spanish audience as a victim and as the only person capable of resisting the pressure – the right leader to rule the country at a time of crisis. Franco had managed to reinforce his position in Spain and now it was all a question of playing the field between Britain and the United States and waiting for results. This strategy constituted the main reason for the delay in the signing of the agreement and the subsequent resolution of the crisis.¹⁷⁸

By the end of March it was increasingly clear that the US Government had miscalculated Franco's strengths. In addition, the British authorities were starting to lose their patience with a policy which, so far, had not borne the expected fruits. On 30 March, Churchill sent a telegram to Roosevelt urging him to accept a realistic and reasonable settlement regarding the wolfram quotas. This British warning forced the Roosevelt administration to moderate its demands, but those continued to be regarded as excessive by the Spanish authorities.¹⁷⁹ Why could Spain, a neutral country, not export to both sides, a right the United States had insisted on throughout its history? And there were also business considerations: why should Spain interrupt exchanges which were attracting a great quantity of money to the Spanish economy thanks to the fact that the wolfram prices had skyrocketed since 1942?¹⁸⁰

The obstinacy of the US diplomats convinced the British Government that a different approach was necessary. On 25 April Churchill informed Roosevelt that Britain was ready to find a separate settlement with the Francoist regime and to sponsor the resumption of oil shipments.¹⁸¹ This was not an idle threat. Even though most of the oil going to Spain was normally supplied by Texaco and Standard Oil, since the beginning of November 1942 some supplies had started to come from Britain's Asiatic Petroleum company.¹⁸² The British statement left the US Government in a

¹⁷⁷FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hayes to Hull, 7 March 1944, 356–8.

¹⁷⁸Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 635.

¹⁷⁹FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hull to Hayes, 4 April 1944, 377–8.

¹⁸⁰Caruana and Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden', 28.

¹⁸¹FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV. Letter from Hull to Hayes, 25 April 1944, 402–3.

¹⁸²Caruana and Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden', 30.

very difficult position: either to maintain the economic front with London and renounce its main demand, or break the front with Britain and attempt to obtain a complete wolfram embargo strictly through bilateral relations with Spain. In the end the US Government opted for the first alternative and the final agreement was eventually reached on 2 May. The Anglo-Americans assured the resumption of the regular loadings of Spanish tankers with petroleum products and, in exchange, Spain undertook to reduce its wolfram exports to Germany, to close the German consulate in Tangier, to withdraw the Spanish units from the Eastern front, and to expel the German agents operating in Spanish territory. Regarding the Italian warships it was decided that the question of possible release by the Spanish Government would be submitted to international arbitration as soon as possible.¹⁸³

Several authors have presented this agreement as a clear defeat for the Francoist regime which had succumbed to the Allied pressure and given way to important concessions.¹⁸⁴ However, the analysis of the US and British documents discards this interpretation and provides a very different perspective. In fact, the 2 May agreements have to be regarded as a considerable disappointment for the Roosevelt administration. After long negotiations, it had been forced to accept a middle-ground compromise far from the original requests of a total wolfram embargo on Germany and the immediate release of both the Italian merchant and warships. As Leonard Caruana and Hugh Rockoff have pointed out, this failure reflected 'inability of the Allies to maintain a common front in the face of divergent long-run interests'.¹⁸⁵

On the other hand, Franco presented the agreement as a personal success: even if he had been forced to capitulate on several issues, he had managed to navigate the differences between the Anglo-Americans frustrating the US goal of stopping all exports of wolfram to Germany. In addition, he understood the accord as an implicit statement that the Allies would tolerate his regime after the war.¹⁸⁶ Regarding the Italian ships, the solution was considered an outstanding success: the Spaniards had managed to gain the temporal use of two merchant ships, which constituted a great economic benefit, and to maintain the Italian warships interned in Spanish ports waiting for an international arbitration which might not take place for months. Obviously, this last point was presented to the German Government as a gesture of good will towards the Axis.¹⁸⁷

The *Regno del Sud* Government, by the same token, interpreted the agreements in a positive light: it had obtained a quick solution for the merchant

¹⁸³FRUS: 1944, Vol. IV, 410. Letter from Hayes to Jordana, 1 May 1944.

¹⁸⁴Avilés et al. (eds.), *La Política Exterior De España En El Siglo XX*, 319; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*, 119; Preston, *Franco: A Biography*, 635.

¹⁸⁵Caruana and Rockoff, 'An Elephant in the Garden', 32.

¹⁸⁶Preston: *Franco: A Biography*, 636.

¹⁸⁷NAUK: FO 371/39698. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 8 June 1944.

ships, and the question of the warships was left in the hands of an international arbitration which would eventually be favourable to Italian interests. It was evident that, considering the state of bilateral relations at that time and its weak international position, the Italian authorities could not expect anything better. In addition, the agreement also had a positive effect on the Italian Government: in the context of the expulsion of the German agents in Tangier, the Spanish authorities were also forced to close the offices of the RSI, which were an important centre for Morreale's underground work. The problem of the Italian fleet was apparently heading towards its definitive solution.¹⁸⁸

The Kingdom of Italy's diplomatic offensive

In June 1944, the war turned definitively in favour of the Allies; on the 6th of that month, the Allies opened the third front in Europe with the landings in Normandy. On 25 August, Paris was finally liberated and the German troops left the Spanish border for the first time in nearly four years. The Allies also continued their advance in Italy until they ran into the last major German defensive line there. On 22 June, the Soviets launched a strategic offensive in Belarus known as 'Operation Bagration' that resulted in the almost complete destruction of the German Army Group Centre. In the Pacific, the American forces continued to push the Japanese perimeter back. In mid June 1944, they began their offensive against the Mariana and Palau islands, scoring a decisive victory against the Japanese forces in the Philippine Sea within a few days. From this moment, there was little doubt that the Axis would lose the war, even in Spain, where the media, controlled by the Falangist party, had continued to defend its military superiority.¹⁸⁹

The swing of the war ran parallel with the reinforcement of the Kingdom of Italy. Even though its sovereignty was still overlooked by the Allies, the situation in June 1944 was much better than in September 1943, when the armistice signed with the Allies had made the Kingdom of Italy a defeated state.¹⁹⁰ Three main factors contributed to this new situation: the re-establishing of relations with the Soviet Union, officialized on 14 March 1944, the announcement by Vittorio Emanuele III in April 1944 that he would resign once Rome was taken by the Allies, and finally the formation of the new government in June 1944, which included five of the six main political parties forming the 'Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale' (CLN).¹⁹¹ Particularly important in this context was Palmiro Togliatti's return to Italy in 1944, leading the PCI (of

¹⁸⁸ ASMAE: AP, Spain 1944, folder 67. Letter from Paulucci to Badoglio, 9 May 1944.

¹⁸⁹ Overy, *Why the Allies Won*; Tusell, *Franco, España y la II guerra mundial*; Weinberg, *A World at Arms*.

¹⁹⁰ Stuart Woolf (ed.), *The Rebirth of Italy, 1943–50* (London: Longman, 1972).

¹⁹¹ This coalition of parties was originally formed by the following parties: Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), Democrazia Cristiana (DC), Partito d'Azione (PdA), Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) and Partito Democratico del

which he was the Secretary General) to the so-called 'Salerno Turn'. During the last decades, the 'Salerno Turn' has been at the centre of an intense historiographical debate which mainly revolved around the role of Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union in Togliatti's decision to join the CLN. A key moment in this debate took place in 2011 with the publication of the book *Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War* by Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky. Thanks to the work of these two scholars it is possible to conclude now that Togliatti was less independent from Moscow than historiography has traditionally acknowledged. As both authors prove, none of the major decisions by Togliatti were independent; they all strictly followed Stalin's script or instructions. Accordingly, the 'Salerno turn' has to be interpreted as part of a wider strategy delineated by Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov in accordance with the new logic of the 'spheres of influence'.¹⁹² Paradoxically, this coincides with the interpretations given at the time by the Francoist diplomats in Madrid. In fact, they tended to see the hand of Moscow behind almost every decision made by Togliatti and the PCI at the time. However, it is necessary to clarify that this conviction was not based on reliable sources, but on prejudices and anti-Communist propaganda.¹⁹³

In any event, this compromise between all anti-fascist parties allowed for the setting up of a government of national unity thus helping Italy to progressively recover its sovereignty. On 8 June, Pietro Badoglio was substituted as head of the government by Ivanoe Bonomi, member of the Partito Democratico del Lavoro (PDL) and head of the of the CLN. Bonomi would also be in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These changes marked a turning point in US policy towards Italy, as it started to acquire a profile that could be taken seriously. It was also the beginning of the change in influence between London and Washington. Roosevelt supported Bonomi strongly and convinced Churchill to accept his government. The main reason for this new interest was the elections in the US where the vote of the Italian-American electors could be decisive.¹⁹⁴ On 24 July, Bonomi delivered a speech in which he described the dramatic situation of Italy: Italy was forced to accept the conditions imposed by the victorious nations. These

Lavoro (PDL). The PdA refused to participate in the formation of this first government for ideological reasons.

¹⁹²Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, *Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

¹⁹³There are many archival documents which show the views of the Spanish diplomats on Togliatti and the role of the PCI. However, an interesting example can be found in the alarmist telegrams sent by the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, José Antonio de Sangróniz, on the occasion of the Italian general elections in April 1948. AMAE: Bundle 1.976/1, Folders 7-8, Telegrams from the Spanish Embassy in Italy to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March and April 1948.

¹⁹⁴James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization* (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 1986).

conditions were extremely tough. All life, internal or external, all activities, economic and financial, all administrations, civil or military, were subjected to the will of the United Nations. The only possibility for Italy to improve its international status and recover its sovereignty was to increase its contribution to the war effort. In this sense the battleships in the Spanish ports might be extremely helpful.¹⁹⁵

After these events Churchill was forced to reconsider his policy towards Italy. In the first place, Britain did not have enough power to enforce its policy in the face of opposition by the US Government. Secondly, Churchill realized very quickly that the new government also presented important merits: while it was still willing to accept the general terms of the armistice treaty, it was more stable than the Badoglio Government thanks to the CLN presence. Finally, the diplomats in Whitehall understood that if Britain wanted to maintain its influence in the country, it was necessary to adopt a friendlier policy.¹⁹⁶ On 22 August, Churchill came to Rome to meet with Badoglio and Bonomi already convinced that the option of keeping the Kingdom of Italy in diplomatic isolation was no longer possible. As a matter of fact, one month later, Churchill and Roosevelt issued a joint public statement confirming that they were willing to revise the armistice terms with Italy. In addition, they appointed their respective representatives in Rome as ambassadors, contributing to the process of diplomatic normality which the authorities of the *Regno del Sud* had tried to implement since January 1944.¹⁹⁷

Conscious of the importance of all these events, internal and external, which clearly contributed to reinforcing the new government, the Italian authorities launched a diplomatic effort in order to normalize its relations with Spain. Accordingly, the change in the Italian Government did not imply a change in its position towards the Francoist regime. Ivanoe Bonomi was convinced, like Badoglio, that the Kingdom of Italy had no other choice but to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain in order to defend the important interests which it had there. Bonomi also believed that it was necessary to change the Spanish attitude towards Italy at this new juncture and that it was the right time to eliminate the obstacles that hindered bilateral relations.¹⁹⁸ The offensive was developed on three main fronts: political, economic and organizational.

On the political front, the Italian Government wanted to normalize diplomatic relations through the appointment of new ambassadors. In July 1944, Bonomi decided to renew the Italian diplomatic body, in order to

¹⁹⁵Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*; Agostino Degli Espinosa, *Il regno del sud* (Milano: Biblioteca universale Rizzoli, 1995); Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*.

¹⁹⁶Ellwood, *Italy 1943–1945*, 99–102.

¹⁹⁷Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 92–3.

¹⁹⁸DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 209. Letter from Paulucci to Bonomi, 7 July 1944.

distance itself from its Fascist past; for the Spanish Embassy, Paulucci, who was linked with the Mussolini regime, was substituted by a Catholic aristocrat, Tommaso Gallarati Scotti. This change of diplomats was seized on by the Italian authorities as an opportunity to request the Spanish Government to appoint a new ambassador in Rome.¹⁹⁹

Although the Spanish Government conceded the *placet* to Gallarati Scotti, it discarded the possibility of appointing a new ambassador in Rome by arguing that it was a premature gesture with a regime whose international situation was still too delicate.²⁰⁰ In reality, Jordana, in his determination to follow the policy of balancing between contenders, did not want to make an appointment which would displease both the Germans and the Allies. It should be noted in this regard that the Allies were still convinced that, so long as Italy was occupied by their armies, neutral countries were only allowed to conduct their relations with the Badoglio Government through the Allied Control Commission (ACC).²⁰¹ In any event, Jordana died a few days later, on 2 August, and the question of the diplomatic normalization was momentarily postponed. On the economic front, the Italian Government tried to resume its commercial relations, blocked since 1942, by proposing to liquidate the deficit in the balance of trade between the two countries with the debt from the Spanish Civil War which was still not paid. This ambitious proposal was transmitted by Paulucci in June 1944, but the Spanish authorities responded negatively.²⁰² Finally, on the organizational front, the Italian Government made another attempt to obtain the release of the warships in order to contribute to the war effort with the Allies, thereby improving its weak international situation. The request was advanced in September by the Italian Commercial Attaché, with the support of the British and the American Ambassadors.²⁰³ The Spanish answer was again negative.²⁰⁴

Evidently, this diplomatic offensive had not met the initial expectations of the authorities of the *Regno del Sud*. In spite of the fact that the Allies were winning the war and the new Italian Government had been formed, none of the Italian requests had been accepted by the Spanish authorities. It was evident that Spanish-Italian relations were at a standstill and they

¹⁹⁹ AMAE: Bundle 1.273, folder 1. Telegram from Barcenas to Jordana, 18 July 1944.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. Telegram from Jordana to Barcenas, 30 July 1944.

²⁰¹ FRUS: 1944, Vol. III. Letter from the first Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, Barclay, to Heyward G. Hill, from the Division of Southern European Affairs, 1 May 1944, 1169, and Letter from Hull to the US Consul in Naples, George Brandt, 8 July 1944, 1178–9.

²⁰² ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Report from the Political Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the debt of war with Spain, 18 August 1944.

²⁰³ Ibid. Letter from the Ministry of the Navy to the Commercial Attache, 15 September 1944.

²⁰⁴ NAUK: FO 371/39699 Minutes of the Foreign Office, 14 September 1944.

would continue to be until the Francoist regime decided to change its policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. On 14 November, the Counsellor in the Italian Embassy in Madrid, Luciano Mascia, wrote to Visconti Venosta describing the Italian situation in Spain: 'The atmosphere in which our relations with Spain are developing is extremely heavy [...] And unfortunately, as far as we are concerned, the situation does not augur a quick improvement.'²⁰⁵

A present for Ambassador Hayes: the release of the Italian warships

At the end of October 1944, the Allies, and Carlton Hayes in particular, again increased their pressure on the Spanish Government to find a favourable solution to the problem of the ships. The US Government was worried that the war in Europe could be over before the arbitration procedure was completed. It should be remembered in this regard, that the US Government was still expending a lot of efforts in its war against Japan and that, by agreeing to release the Italian warships, it would be able to send them, or other equivalent tonnage, to the Pacific.²⁰⁶

The Allied pressure started to take effect in about the middle of December, when the Spanish Government decided that the question of the warships should be solved by an arbitrage. This legal process was to be merely formal, under the supervision of José Yanguas, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor of International Law, and it should be clearly tipped towards the Italian monarchy. When notifying the US Ambassador about this decision, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Félix de Lequerica clarified that this procedure was a 'sham' but insisted on it as necessary to maintain Spanish prestige. This argument, very much related to Spanish dignity and international prestige, is very important as it will become a recurrent argument among Spanish diplomats in the post-war period.²⁰⁷

The rumours of the possible departure of the warships spread quickly and Morreale was forced to protest to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 1 December 1944, the RSI agent wrote to Mussolini informing him that a spokesman of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had guaranteed that the warships would stay in the Spanish ports. However, this was simply a strategy to delay the possible consequences of the final decision. In January 1945, it became clear that the Italian ships would leave immediately. On the 3rd, Mascia went to visit the Spanish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Cristobal Del Castillo; during this meeting, the Spanish diplomat assured him that the warships would be released immediately and that this gesture would constitute the Spanish Christmas present to Ambassador Hayes who

²⁰⁵DDI, Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 528. Letter from Mascia to Visconti Venosta, 14 November 1944.

²⁰⁶NAUK: FO 371/39699. Letter from the Acting Counsellor at the British Embassy, James Bowker, to the Foreign Office, 20 October 1944.

²⁰⁷Ibid. Letter from Hoare to the Foreign Office, 2 December 1944.

had meanwhile assumed responsibility for the negotiations. Del Castillo also added that, once the problem of the Italian fleet was finally solved, the normalization of bilateral relations would also take place.²⁰⁸ On the 14th of that month, Yanguas ruled that the warships had stopped in Spain only to obtain supplies and that they could leave in 24 hours. This was important for the Allies and for Italy, because the warships, by leaving quickly, were able to avoid any attacks from the German air force.

The war vessels left Mahón and Barcelona on 15 January with the vast majority of their crews (approximately 30 crew members declared themselves to be Fascists and were left in Spain).²⁰⁹ The representative of the RSI in Spain, Morreale, again protested against the unilateral method of solving the question that had been adopted and because, even though the press had claimed that the battleships would be used in the Mediterranean, this did not seem to be true. José María Doussinague, the Spanish Director of Foreign Policy, answered with a note in which he declared that his government had agreed with the Americans that the ships would only be used in the war in the Pacific, but the Allies, having examined the ships more carefully, had concluded that they were valid only for the Mediterranean. This note is extremely important as it provides the last piece of evidence of the relations between these two governments. Morreale did not reply to the note written by Doussinague and the next decision of the Spanish Government was to expel from the country all the representatives of the RSI months later. In this sense, it can be seen that the unblocking of the Italian battleships question coincided with the beginning of the end of the Mussolini Government in Spain.²¹⁰

The definitive solution of the question of the Italian warships constituted a significant step in the long process towards the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Francoist regime and the Italian monarchy. However, the clarifying of this thorny question was only partially related to the development of Spanish-Italian relations since all the Italian attempts to improve relations and to obtain a rapid resolution of the pending issues, were faced with Spanish refusal. Just as had happened with the negotiations between the Anglo-Americans and Spain during the spring of 1944, the participation of the Italian authorities in the last stage of the warship talks was merely symbolic. In the end, the Italian warships had been released mainly as a friendly gesture towards the Allies, and especially towards the United States, in a moment in which relations were entering a new period of crisis. As the Spanish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Cristobal del Castillo

²⁰⁸ ASMAE: AP, Spain 1945, folder 85. Letter from Mascia to De Gasperi, 7 January 1945.

²⁰⁹ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Française (AMAEF), Archive of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe, 1944–49, Espagne, 65. Telegram from Truelle to De Gaulle, 17 January 1945.

²¹⁰ The solution of the problem of the Italian ships is narrated in Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 483–6.

had said to Luciano Mascia, the departure of the Italian warships was the 'Christmas present' from the Francoist regime to Ambassador Hayes.²¹¹

After the summer of 1944, the war was definitely turning in favour of the Allies who no longer needed to exert strong diplomatic pressure in order to assure Spanish neutrality in the conflict. In the autumn of 1944, both the United States and Great Britain had already decided to suspend the special missions of their respective ambassadors and to call them home by the end of the year. In November 1944, the British Government began to work on the elaboration of a new foreign policy regarding Spain for the post-war period: after long and complicated discussions among the different governmental agencies, the Foreign Office wrote the draft of a letter which should be sent to Franco. This document was approved on 18 December by the War Cabinet and contained the fundamental lines of the new British policy towards the Francoist regime: the British Government could not forget the pro-Axis attitude adopted by the Francoist regime during the war; as a consequence, cordial diplomatic relations between the two countries could not be established as long as Franco and Falange were still ruling the country; by the same token, the British Government could not support Spanish participation in future international agreements nor the new world organization. The position of the United States in this regard was similar to the British: even though it considered the Spanish question as secondary, the Roosevelt administration did not like the Francoist regime and wished its substitution with a democracy. Relations with the Anglo-Americans thus started to deteriorate progressively and Franco, aware of this fact, began to feel isolated. In October 1944, Franco launched a public campaign to gain the favour of the Allies, convincing them that Spain had never cooperated with the Axis and that its only intention was to fight the Soviet Union. From this moment on, the Spanish authorities would constantly play the card of Franco's anti-Communism and started to make small diplomatic gestures to improve the dilapidated international image of the regime. It is in this context that the Spanish decision to release the Italian warships should be fully placed.²¹²

Conclusions

The collapse of the Mussolini regime and especially the signing of the armistice with the Allies brought about important changes in Spanish-Italian relations. Even if the impact of these events on general Spanish foreign

²¹¹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 85. Letter from Mascia to De Gasperi, 7 January 1945.

²¹²Portero, *Franco Aislado*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War*; Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question*; Guderzo, *Madrid E L'arte Della Diplomazia*; Thomàs, *Roosevelt and Franco during the Second World War*; Viñas, *En Las Garras Del Águila*.

policy should not be exaggerated, the Francoist regime was at least forced to find a fresh foreign policy which could be adapted to the new situation created in Italy where two different regimes were struggling to survive: the Kingdom of Italy and the RSI. Since their formation, the two regimes realized that the position of neutral countries was crucial to recover part of their lost sovereignty and as a result they exerted strong pressure on the Spanish authorities in order to obtain official recognition. In addition, they also needed to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain to alleviate their delicate economic situation through the resumption of commercial relations, the reactivation of the war debt payments and the release of the ships interned in Spanish ports.

The Spanish authorities reacted to these pressures by adopting a pragmatic policy which was regarded as the best option not only to obtain diplomatic and economic benefits but also to ensure the survival of the regime after the war. The main goal was the defence of their interests in Italy, which were mainly concentrated in the north of the country controlled by the RSI, and at the same time avoiding any gestures which could jeopardize its relations with both contenders. The main decisions made by the Spanish Government concerning the two 'Italies' – the non-recognition of the RSI or the internment of the Italian ships – have to be interpreted under this light. This clearly contradicts the views defended by some historians, most notably Javier Tusell, Genoveva García and Gennaro Carotenuto, according to whom Spanish policy towards the two 'Italies' was mainly determined by ideological factors. Even though there were important elements inside the Francoist regime that were ideologically close to the RSI and therefore in favour of normalizing relations, they did not have enough power to alter Spanish foreign policy, and their influence was limited to the press or to isolated events like the one described in the introduction to this chapter. By the same token, there is little doubt that Franco would have personally preferred to recognize and improve relations with the RSI rather than with the Kingdom of Italy, but in the end he decided to follow the criterion defended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Count of Jordana, and to adopt a more realistic policy. In fact, according to Minister Jordana, a Spanish recognition of the RSI would not bring substantial diplomatic benefits and, at the same time, would put at risk the future of the Francoist regime by raising further hostility from the Allies.

It should be noted that the Anglo-Americans, who had managed to form a common front to deal with the Spanish and the Italian affairs since the signing of the armistice, also played a crucial role during this policy-making process. As a matter of fact, both Hayes and Hoare succeeded in exerting combined pressure which proved to be considerably effective in preventing the Spanish Government from recognizing the RSI. Until the beginning of 1944, Britain managed to impose its views and to lead the Allied policies towards Spain and the Kingdom of Italy. During the first months after the

armistice, the Roosevelt administration accepted this state of affairs and followed the British guidelines. Obviously, this situation could not go on for much longer. The US Government did not want to remain relegated to a secondary role in the adoption of new policies towards these two countries. It wanted to exert influence also in view of the post-war period. As a consequence, in January 1944 the Roosevelt administration started to adopt a more independent policy towards both Franco's Spain and the Kingdom of Italy, provoking the first cracks in the Anglo-American front.

The Spanish authorities immediately perceived these differences between London and Washington and attempted to take advantage of them in order to obtain a better agreement in the negotiations which took place during the spring of 1944. As this chapter has shown, during these negotiations, but also during the struggle for the recognition of the RSI, the Spanish Government obtained small diplomatic successes by navigating the differences between the two contenders and also between the Anglo-Americans. Although these successes should not be overstated, they reflect a larger degree of autonomy in Spanish foreign policy than historiography has traditionally acknowledged.²¹³

The opposite situation applied to the Kingdom of Italy which, most of the time, had witnessed the negotiations between Spain and the Allies from a passive position, being unable to intervene. Moreover, in the few moments when the diplomats in the Kingdom of Italy decided to take the initiative, in December 1943 and during the summer of 1944, they had been faced with an intransigent attitude from the Spanish Government.

At the end of 1944, however, the situation was about to change. An Allied victory in the war was inevitable and the situation of the Francoist regime was becoming more and more fragile due to its links with the Axis. By the same token, the Kingdom of Italy was recovering its sovereignty and consolidating itself little by little thanks to the Allied support, especially coming from the US. The new relation of forces would bring important changes in Spanish-Italian relations and also in relations between these two countries and the major powers, changes which will be analysed in the following chapter.

²¹³Abu Warda and Calduch (eds.), *La política exterior Española en el siglo XX*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*; Tusell, *Franco, España y la II guerra mundial*.

2

Allies in the Post-war Era? Spanish-Italian Relations and the Major Powers, 1945–1947

On 8 March 1946, the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Government in exile, José Giral and Fernando de los Ríos, made an official visit to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Giuseppe Saragat. The aim of the visit was to request the breaking off of relations with the Francoist regime, and to ask for permission to appoint an unofficial representative from the Spanish Government in exile to Italy. The two Spanish Republicans had visited Saragat because they believed that their demands would be better received by a prominent member of the socialist party who, in addition, was famous for his opposition to the Francoist regime. However, Saragat's reply, which had been previously harmonized with the Head of the Italian Government, Alcide De Gasperi, turned out to be very disheartening. In spite of the sympathy towards the Spanish Republican cause, the Italian Government had committed itself to follow London and Washington in their policy towards the Francoist regime and, as a consequence, Italy refused to go any further than the Anglo-Americans in this question.¹

Evidently, the Spanish authorities followed these contacts in great detail, trying to avoid the possible recognition of the Republican Government in exile by Italy, which would have not only weakened the international position of the Francoist regime, but also hindered the process of diplomatic normalization between Madrid and Rome which had started during the spring of 1945 and had very recently started to produce benefits.² It is obvious that the situation had drastically changed with respect to 1943 and 1944. On the one hand, the Spanish Government had finally abandoned

¹DDI, Series X, Vol. III, Doc. No. 253. Telegram from De Gasperi to the Italian Ambassadors in Paris, Giuseppe Saragat, Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, and in London, Nicolò Carandini, 9 March 1946.

²AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2, Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 6 November 1945. AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1, Telegrams from Sangróniz to Artajo, 4 January, 29 March and 5 August 1946.

its ambivalent strategy and decided to implement a friendlier policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. On the other hand, the Bonomi Government continued to work in the improvement of diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime despite the blatant ideological differences. The aim of this chapter will be to understand how this bilateral relationship evolved in the new international context created after the Second World War, a context which did not look very promising for neither Spain or Italy. In order to do so, three main events which took place between 1945 and 1947 in Spanish-Italian relations will be analysed in the following pages: the normalization of diplomatic relations, around the middle of 1945, the resumption of commercial exchanges through the reactivation of the war debt, at the end of 1945, and the appointment of Pietro Nenni as the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his policy towards the Francoist regime, in October 1946.

Initially, the analysis of these three questions will allow for a better understanding of Spanish foreign policy during a period that has traditionally been neglected by Spanish historiography. In fact, the vast majority of historians dealing with the Francoist regime during the first two years after the war have tended to jump from the Potsdam declaration condemning the Francoist regime, in August 1945, to the UN condemnatory resolution, issued in December 1946. In this way, the whole period is deterministically considered within the concept 'international isolation', without taking into account that the Spanish situation after 1945 was completely uncertain and that, while the United Nations decided down an isolationist path with the Francoist regime, a decision which cannot be taken for granted *a posteriori*, several nations, including Italy, decided to maintain normal diplomatic relations with it.³ Furthermore, this chapter will contend that the Kingdom of Italy became at the beginning of 1945 a primary objective of Spanish foreign policy, especially after the appointment of Alberto Martín Artajo in July 1945 as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. The relevance of Italy in the Spanish post-war plans contrasts with the scarce attention paid by the historiography which has traditionally considered that diplomats in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' had a marginal interest in fostering bilateral relations with Rome.⁴

Secondly, these three events will act as a microcosm to show that the real motivations which pushed the Italian Government to maintain diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime were not related with ideology but with the defence of their substantial interests in Spain. Moreover, this chapter

³Armero, *La política exterior de Franco*; Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

⁴Pereira, 'Franquismo y democracia'.

will contribute to assessing the degree of autonomy which the diplomats in Rome had with respect to the United States and Great Britain.⁵

Finally, the analysis of these three moments in Spanish-Italian relations will create a firmer impression of the US policy towards Western Europe in the years immediately after the war and the evolution of Anglo-American relations in the early post-war period. Furthermore, the traditional concept of British decline after 1945, propounded by several historians, will be challenged by showing that Britain actively intervened in Spanish and Italian affairs in order to strengthen its influence in Europe and the Mediterranean. It will also be shown that both Spain and Italy still regarded Britain as Europe's natural leader.⁶

Towards normalization: the negotiation of the war debt and the Commercial Treaty of 1946

The long road towards the normalization of relations: the war debt and the resumption of commercial exchanges

Once the problem of the Italian warships was solved with their departure from Spain in January 1945, the Bonomi Government decided to focus on the remaining important and unresolved question with Spain: the resumption of commercial exchanges and the normalization of diplomatic relations through the exchange of ambassadors. It should be remembered that commercial traffic between the two countries had started to severely decrease at the beginning of 1943 on the account of the high Italian deficit in the balance of trade: since the onset of the Second World War, the Italians had imported much more than they had exported. The Spanish-Italian balance of trade registered a deficit in favour of Spain equal to circa 300 million lire. In that moment the exchange rate was 1.70 lire per peseta, and \$13.25 per peseta which means that the deficit equalled approximately 180 million pesetas and \$13.5 million.⁷ It was not a huge deficit (the deficit of the German-Spanish balance of trade equalled \$140 million in the same period), but sufficiently large to paralyse commercial

⁵Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943–1963)*; Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*; Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*, (Roma: Laterza, 1998).

⁶Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 109; James, *Europe Reborn*, 218; Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 268.

⁷Equivalence between pesetas and lire in ASMAE: General Direction of Economic Affairs (DGAE): Deposit A, 1945, Spain, folder No. 29. Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the Italian interests in Spain, 9 January 1945. Equivalence between pesetas and dollars in Carreras, 'Depresión económica y cambio estructural durante el decenio bélico 1936–1945', 10.

exchange between the two countries.⁸ As it has already been explained, in April 1943 the Spanish and the Italian Government had signed the Nice agreements in order to level the balance of payments and restart commercial exchanges. However, the final collapse of Fascist Italy prevented their application. As a result, the commercial exchanges between Spain and Italy entered a phase of complete blockage.⁹ Diplomats in the Kingdom of Italy, extremely pressed by the economic crisis and anxious to re-establish diplomatic relations with other countries, wanted to put an end to this situation – the debt from the Spanish Civil War appeared to be the best instrument for doing so.¹⁰ At this stage, it is necessary to explain the origins and evolution of this debt.

In 1938, the Mussolini Government and the government headed by Franco signed an agreement establishing the amount of aid that the Italians had given to the General during the Spanish Civil War: this war debt was fixed at nearly 7 billion lire. The uncertainty generated by the war situation, however, delayed the question of payments.¹¹ Nevertheless, once the civil war was over, the new Spanish Government was obliged to pay back that loan; however, the precarious economic situation of the country made it extremely difficult to respect these payments. To solve this situation, the two governments decided to sign a new treaty to regulate the restitution of the debt. According to this agreement, the debt would be reduced to 5 billion lire to be repaid in 50 semesters from 31 December 1942 until 30 June 1967. This agreement was extremely beneficial to Franco's regime and constitutes good proof of the excellent relations which prevailed between the two countries at that time.¹²

The normal functioning of this agreement was altered in April 1943 when, as it has been explained above, Spain and Italy signed a secret treaty which established that the Spanish Government would advance the instalments of the war debt corresponding to the years 1944, 1945 and 1946, which amounted to 180 million pesetas, in order to end the deficit in the balance of trade. However, the vicissitudes of the Second World War changed

⁸German-Spanish balance of payments in Martínez, 'Las consecuencias de la guerra civil en el sector exterior: de la deuda alemana a los pactos de septiembre', in Enrique Fuentes and Francisco Comín (eds.), 535; and Leitz, *Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945*, 137.

⁹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, 1945, Spain, folder No. 29. Letter from Paulucci to the DGAE, 14 August 1944.

¹⁰Ibid.; Pierluigi Ciocca, *Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d'Italia, 1796–2005* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007); Petri, *Storia Economica d'Italia*.

¹¹ASMAE: R. 9.875, folder 8. Report from the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, Alfredo Sánchez Bella to the General Director of Cultural Affairs, Faustino de Armijo, 30 June 1966.

¹²Ibid.

all these plans. The collapse of the Mussolini regime and the subsequent division of the country in two regimes, forced the Spanish authorities to re-evaluate all the agreements concerning the war debt. The question was debated at a Council of Ministers held around the end of 1943 where it was decided to interrupt the regular payments for an indefinite period of time, until the Italian situation became clearer.¹³ This decision, contrary to the perception of the authorities of the *Regno del Sud*, did not mean that the Spanish Government was trying to avoid the payment of the war debt.¹⁴ In fact, at the same Council of Ministers it was decided to pay the agreed instalments but into a special account opened in the name of the Spanish Institute of Foreign Currency. Once the situation in Italy became clearer, the Spanish Government would use this account to continue with the regular deposits as had been agreed in 1940.¹⁵

Faced with this situation, both the RSI and the Badoglio Government exerted strong diplomatic pressure in order to reverse this decision, since the repayments would have contributed to alleviating the difficult economic situation of both regimes.¹⁶ However, all their diplomatic moves met with refusal by the Spanish Government which was determined to maintain the decision adopted by the Council of Ministers at any price. Accordingly, the question of the war debt remained momentarily blocked until the summer of 1944.¹⁷

The swing of the war in favour of the Allies and the improving situation of the Italian monarchy compelled the authorities in the south of Italy to make another attempt to mobilize the war debt, in the context of the diplomatic offensive explained above. In June of that year, once the Allies had entered Rome, Paulucci contacted the Spanish Government and suggested again to use the first six instalments of the war debt to level the balance of payment and resume commercial exchanges.¹⁸ However, the RSI authorities,

¹³AMAE: Bundle 1.272, folder 9. Telegram from Jordana to the Commercial Attaché in Rome, Eduardo García Comín, 10 January 1944.

¹⁴Archive of the Bank of Italy, Archivio della Banca d'Italia (ABI): Bank of Italy papers. Intronà Directory. Practical typologies, Bundle 9, folder 1, file 2. Phonogram from Aldo Fornaciari, Head of Service of the Bank of Italy to the office in Milan, 11 February 1944.

¹⁵AMAE: Bundle 9.875, folder 8. Report from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers, 20 December 1943.

¹⁶DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 285. Letter from Paulucci to the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Visconti Venosta, 4 July 1944. ABI: Bank of Italy papers. Intronà Directory. Practical typologies, Bundle 9, folder 1, file 2. Phonogram from Fornaciari to the office in Milan, 11 February 1944.

¹⁷AMAE: Bundle 9.875, folder 8. Report from the Spanish Direction of Economic Policy to the Spanish Treasury, 24 January 1945.

¹⁸ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, 1945, Spain, folder No. 29. Report from the DGAE to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 August 1944. This report makes reference to a note sent by the Italian Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs on 20 June 1944.

foreseeing the arrival of the Allies in Rome, had already transferred the loan bonds from the Bank of Italy in Rome to their office in Brescia; their main aim was to maintain the possibility of recovering the debt and, in the worst case, to prevent the Italian monarchy from having it.¹⁹ Obviously, the Spanish authorities took advantage of this situation and refused Paulucci's offer, alleging that the third article of the Nice agreements specified that the payment of the rates had to be made through the original bonds.²⁰

It is in this context that the Allies, and especially the British Government, decided to intervene in favour of the Italian monarchy.²¹ In effect, the Treasury Chamber had started to study the problem of Italian commercial relations overseas, and particularly the war debt with Spain, since the summer of 1944. It should be remembered that the Foreign Office was considering, at that precise moment, the possibility of adopting a more flexible policy towards the Kingdom of Italy in order to maintain its influence in Italian affairs. In August, the Allies officially asked the Italian Government for information regarding the war debt; even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now established in Rome, did not want the Allies to be involved in these negotiations with Spain, it did not have many alternatives since the 23rd article of the armistice declared that the Allies could have the control of all Italian foreign currency. Evidently, the diplomats in Rome did not want to lose this valuable money which would contribute to the development of their economy, and the Allied support was the best instrument through which to get it back.²² In October 1944, having studied the question, the British and the US Governments agreed to support all the Italian attempts to recover its war debt through diplomatic channels.²³ This time, at least, the Anglo-Americans had managed to present a common position in front of the Spanish Government. Proof of this agreement were the instructions sent by the Foreign Office, 'anxious to mobilise Italian foreign exchange assets', to the new British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Noel Charles, at the beginning of December. In them, the diplomat was instructed to fully cooperate with the Italian authorities, especially with the Italian Embassy in Madrid, which was supposed to be in charge of the negotiations.²⁴ From

¹⁹ABI: Bank of Italy papers. Relations with other countries. Practical typologies, Bundle 404, folder 2, file 1. Report on the debt of war with Spain.

²⁰ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, 1945, Spain, folder No. 29. Note from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian Embassy in Madrid, 30 June 1944.

²¹NAUK: FO 371/39688. Telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington, E.F.L. Word, Earl of Halifax, to the Foreign Office, 28 October 1944.

²²ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1944, folder 69. Report from the Political Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the debt of war with Spain, 18 August 1944.

²³NAUK: FO 371/39688. Telegram from the State Department to the Foreign Office, 28 October 1944.

²⁴NAUK: FO 371/39688. Instructions from the Foreign Office to Noel Charles, 2 December 1944.

that moment onwards, the Italian Embassy, with the support of the US and British Ambassadors, started to prepare the ground for future negotiations regarding the mobilization of the war debt with the Spanish Government. This situation reveals the limited degree of autonomy which Italian authorities had to carry out their own foreign policy. Paradoxically, the small degree of autonomy also implied a large room for manoeuvre because the Allied support helped to strengthen the Italian position in its negotiations with Spain. This Allied pressure started to take effect at the end of January 1945 when Demetrio Carceller, the Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce, confirmed to the Italian Commercial Counsellor in Madrid, that his government was willing to assist the export to Italy of agreed goods outside the balance of trade and to revise the situation of the war debt.²⁵

This meeting is significant for two reasons: first of all, because it contained the first positive signs from the Spanish Government regarding the resumption of commercial relations with the Kingdom of Italy. Prior to this, all rapprochements attempted by the Italian Kingdom in this regard had been rejected by the Spanish authorities. In the second instance, it was important because Carceller became one of the main links between the two governments and part of the diplomatic network that the Italian kingdom was starting to build in Franco's regime. In addition, it was evident that the Spanish Government was finally starting to change its policy regarding Italy.²⁶

Parallel to these previous explorations concerning the war debt, the Bonomi Government was also trying to normalize diplomatic relations through the exchange of ambassadors with Spain. In reality, this process had already started in July 1944 when the Bonomi Government demanded the substitution of all heads of missions abroad who had previously represented the Fascist regime.²⁷ In the context of this diplomatic reshuffle, Paulucci was called back to Rome in order to be judged for collaboration with the Mussolini regime, and Tommaso Gallarati Scotti was appointed as new ambassador in Madrid in the belief that he was the perfect candidate for the position.²⁸ On the one hand, being a notorious anti-Fascist, he was a tolerable candidate in the eyes of the Allies.²⁹ And on the other hand, as far as the Francoist regime is concerned, he was also one of the main exponents

²⁵NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Telegram from the Italian Embassy in Madrid to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 January 1944.

²⁶DDI: Series X. Vol. I. Doc. No. 528. Letter from Mascia to Visconti Venosta, 14 November 1944.

²⁷NAUK: FO 660/352: Letter from Hoare to the Resident Minister in Algiers, 21 October 1943 and NAUK: FO 371/43840: Letter from Hoare to Eden, 28 July 1944.

²⁸NAUK: FO 371/ 39688. Letter from Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 3 September 1944. BA: Gallarati Scotti's archive, Series I, folder No. 9: Letter from Visconti Venosta to Gallarati Scotti, 6 July 1944.

²⁹NAUK: FO 371/39688. Letter from the High Commissioner of the ACC to Foreign Office, 11 August 1944.

of Italian Catholic world – his nomination even had the Vatican's approval, a factor which was increasingly important for the Francoist regime.³⁰ Moreover, the appointment of such an important person as ambassador to Spain was a firm declaration of intentions: the Bonomi Government was resolved to normalizing diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime as a first step to solving all the pending questions and, perhaps, start a political *raprochement*. On 24 August, the Bonomi Government officially requested the *placet* for Gallarati Scotti, which was conceded only three weeks later without any hesitation from the Spanish authorities. Obviously, the Catholic factor had been crucial in this decision.³¹

Gallarati Scotti's arrival on 15 February coincided with the precise moment in which the Spanish Government officially changed its policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. The very same day on which Gallarati Scotti arrived in Spain, Emilio Navasqués, Director of Economic Policy in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and who would become ambassador in Rome in 1956, well aware of Gallarati Scotti's instructions, sent a complete report on Spain's relations with the Kingdom of Italy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report constitutes an essential document not only in understanding the new Spanish policy towards the Kingdom of Italy, but also to obtain a better comprehension of the Francoist foreign policy in the post-war period, and the problems that the Spanish economy was facing. It should be clarified that the Spanish archives lack in general the kind of documents where the motivations and the possible courses of action of the Francoist foreign policy are explained in detail.

In this report the Spanish official analysed the trade situation of the exchanges between the two countries, blocked for many months as has already been described, and suggested putting an end to the situation by accepting the Italian proposal to use the war debt to balance the clearing. According to Navasqués, the rapid resumption of commercial exchanges with Italy, through the war debt, would be advisable not only for economic reasons, but also for political considerations. On the economic side, it would be a reasonable solution for Spanish exporters and the credit institutions which had financed them. It should be remembered that Spanish exporters were experiencing problems in selling their products in foreign markets, mainly because of the commercial restrictions imposed by the Allies, and the high prices of Spanish goods. In addition, Italy had become the most important market for a number of Spanish products, namely anchovies and

³⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.273, folder 1. Telegram from Bárcenas to Lequerica, 6 September 1944. More about Gallarati Scotti's biography in Fulvio De Giorgi and Nicola Raponi (eds.), *Rinnovamento religioso e impegno civile in Tommaso Gallarati Scotti: atti del colloquio nel centenario della nascita* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1994).

³¹AMAE: Bundle 1.272, folder 9. Telegram from García Comín to Lequerica, 24 August 1944, and telegram from Lequerica to García Comín, 14 September 1944.

salted fish. The stagnation of commercial exchanges between the two countries created a large accumulation of these goods which were now at risk of becoming waste.³²

On the political side, the benefits were even more important. First, Navasqués considered that the distressing alimentary situation of Italy and the eventual consequences that this might have for its political stabilization apart from Communism, justified Spanish aid. Secondly, it was argued that, in spite of the new political orientation of the country, the Kingdom of Italy was not creating the kind of difficulties for Spain which were coming from other countries like Britain, the United States or France. Thirdly, the export of primary need goods with alimentary value to a country like Italy, where the Pope resides, could be, according to the Spanish diplomats, politically useful to the regime, especially considering that the Spanish international situation would become increasingly difficult once the war was over. Finally, Navasqués explained that even if the war debt had its origins in different circumstances, the resuming of its regular payments might bring about important political benefits for the Francoist regime. In fact, Spain could present itself at the front of the international community as a generous country always willing to help another in economic distress, and to honour a debt even if its origins are more than dubious. Spain was eager to show the Allies that it was a reliable partner. Reliability thus became one of the key ideas that the Spanish diplomats attempted to transmit during the first years after the end of the war.³³

The question was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 17 February. This meeting can be reconstructed thanks to Gallarati Scotti who, in a letter sent to Alcide De Gasperi, explained the main details. According to the Italian Ambassador the Council of Ministers mostly dealt with the Kingdom of Italy and the pending questions between the two countries, and had finally decided to adopt 'an attitude of sympathy and practical help towards us – especially towards our economic and financial problems – which would strengthen the existing amicable links between our two countries'.³⁴ This discussion in the Council of Ministers can also shed some light on the policy-making process during the Francoist period. Again there is a report which, after having been defended by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was finally accepted by Franco, thus becoming the backbone of the new Spanish policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. This case study also supports the idea, exposed already in the previous chapter, that the Spanish

³²Francisco Franco National Foundation, Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco (FNFF). Doc. No. 232. Report from Navasqués, then retransmitted by Lequerica to Franco, 16 February 1945.

³³Ibid.

³⁴DDI: Series X, Vol. II, Doc. No. 61. From Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 17 February 1945.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs had more room for manoeuvre inside the Francoist administration than the historiography has acknowledged so far.³⁵

It should be clarified that the Spanish authorities had started to understand that the regime needed to change its policy, both foreign and internal, if it wanted to survive in the new international context that was being created after the war. Accordingly, the Spanish diplomats continued with the public campaign aimed at improving relations with the Allies, a campaign which had already started in October 1944. In this way, in March 1945, Spain would reach an agreement with the US Government allowing the US air forces to use the Spanish airports.³⁶ On 12 April Spain would break relations with Japan and one month later it would do the same thing with Germany. However, the changes were not only related to foreign policy but also with domestic affairs. In July 1945 Franco would form a new government with Falange in a greatly reduced position and therefore made Spain seem more suited to face the new international situation. The most relevant change would be the appointment of Alberto Martín Artajo as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, substituting José Félix de Lequerica. Artajo was one of the most prominent figures in Spanish Catholicism. A member of the 'Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas' (ACNDP), a major catholic organization in the country, Artajo had worked for the Catholic newspapers *Ya* and *El Debate*, and was a lawyer in the Council of State. Franco's main objective with this appointment was to gain some distance from the Fascist past, and stress the Catholic nature of the country. It is in this context, that the Spanish decision to normalize and foster diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Italy must be placed.

In any case, and going back to the main narration, the new ambassador in Madrid received this decision with great satisfaction, convinced that it would bring about a considerable improvement in the atmosphere of the Spanish Government in all matters that related to the Italian monarchy, therefore making it easier to normalize diplomatic relations and to start profitable negotiations between the two countries.³⁷ Gallarati Scotti's optimistic views were confirmed one week later when the Italian diplomat presented his credentials to Franco: the meeting was held in a 'cordial atmosphere' and Franco transmitted the impression that it was the perfect moment to establish 'positive' relations between the two countries.³⁸ All these events contributed to Gallarati Scotti's impression that Spanish-Italian relations were finally entering a different phase – one of cooperation and mutual profit. However, and in spite of the niceties exchanged between Franco and Gallarati Scotti, the process of diplomatic normalization of Spanish-Italian relations was still

³⁵FNFF. Doc. No. 232. Report from Lequerica to Franco, 16 February 1945.

³⁶Marquina, *España en la política de seguridad occidental: 1939–1986*, 112–18.

³⁷DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 61. From Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi. Madrid, 17 February 1945.

³⁸Ibid. Doc. No. 67. From Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 24 February 1945.

incomplete: the new Spanish Ambassador had not yet arrived in Rome, the RSI agents continued to operate in Spain, the Spanish Consul in Milan was still acting as the unofficial representative in front of the Mussolini regime, and commercial exchanges, obviously Gallarati Scotti's main objective, were still stagnated. In fact, this process would not be completed until the end of 1945 with the signing of the new commercial treaty.

There are four reasons behind this delay in the process of diplomatic normalization: the presence of the RSI which was still a factor that conditioned Spanish foreign policy, the political instability in the Kingdom of Italy which provoked deep concern among the Francoist diplomats, the increasingly delicate international situation of the Francoist regime, especially after the German defeat in May 1945, and finally the different views on the new commercial treaty defended by both governments, differences which clearly delayed its signing. These obstacles appeared at different moments during 1945 and they were tackled in different ways by the two governments depending on their interests and needs.

In this regard, the first initiative was taken by the Kingdom of Italy and it was directed against the RSI presence in Spain, a presence which had become an anomaly and a dead weight in the development of bilateral relations. The end of 1944 had witnessed an increase in the Allied pressure on Spain to bring the RSI representation to an end, and this pressure was continued at the beginning of 1945. On 27 January, the Bonomi Government presented another official note protesting against the permissive attitude adopted by the Spanish authorities towards Morreale and his subordinates. According to the authorities in Rome, these agents were fostering support among the Spanish authorities, a fact that could not be justified by any argument, not even by the defence of national interests in the north of Italy. In addition, the note warned that international opinion was becoming increasingly hostile towards the Francoist regime, and that the tolerance of the RSI was not helpful in improving the Spanish image abroad. The note did not provoke any immediate reaction and the Spanish Government, as usual, decided to delay the solution of this conflict.³⁹

It should be considered in this regard that the Allied liberation of France, which had put an end to four years of shared borders between Germany and Spain, did not mark the complete end of commercial relations between the two countries. As Christian Leitz has proved, the last remnants of commercial exchanges were confined to increasingly irregular Lufthansa flights and the occasional blockade-runner. Even though there are no precise figures on this commerce, it is possible to assess that, only during the month of September 1944, goods valued at 22,000 royal marks were exported by air from Germany to Spain (circa \$88,000).⁴⁰

³⁹Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 489–91.

⁴⁰Leitz, *Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945*, 200–18.

The same situation applied to commercial relations between Spain and the RSI. In fact, in December 1944, the Spanish Consul in Milan, Fernando Canthal, was instructed to carry out all the possible economic operations with the RSI which could produce benefits to the country, always without jeopardizing Spanish neutrality.⁴¹ By January 1945, Canthal was still negotiating with the Mussolini regime on the import of machinery (destined for the SNIACE), film materials (destined for Sevilla Films, one of the most important audiovisual production companies in Spain during the 1940s and 50s) and trams (destined for the Madrid Trams Company). These goods would be transported to Spain in one of the flights which continued to traverse the route between the north of Italy and Barcelona.⁴² Unfortunately, there is no archival evidence showing if these operations were finally completed.⁴³

It was clear that, while the Spanish authorities could still obtain economic benefits from Germany or from the RSI, they would not break relations with these two countries. In fact, it was not until 16 April, only nine days before the collapse of the Mussolini regime, that the Spanish authorities sent a note to Morreale urging him to expel from the country all the military attachés of the RSI. This decision had been made, it was argued, because it was better for national interests and had nothing to do with the honour of the mentioned attachés. In addition, all the offices of the RSI in the country were to be closed. On 18 April, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that all Italians working professionally in the country for the Mussolini regime must leave the country as soon as possible or establish a definitive residence in Spain and undertake a renouncement of every kind of political activity. Six days later, the Spanish authorities communicated this news to Gallarati Scotti; however, they clarified that the RSI political office continued with its activities on an administrative level, and that its passports and official documents continued to be valid in the Spanish territory. This decision was justified by the Spanish need to maintain the protection of the Spanish citizens who continued to live in the north of Italy.⁴⁴

On the 30th of the same month, Morreale himself visited Doussinague and informed the Spanish diplomat that he considered his mission over, and that he had therefore closed the consular offices and was leaving the country immediately. This encounter ended relations between the RSI and the Francoist regime and reflects very well the opportunistic attitude which the Spanish authorities maintained with Germany and the RSI until the

⁴¹AMAE: Bundle 2.139, folder 25. Report from the General Direction of Economic Policy, 12 January 1945.

⁴²Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955*, 18.

⁴³AMAE: Bundle 1.071, folder 93. Telegram from Lequerica to Canthal, 6 December 1944.

⁴⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 86. Telegram from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 24 April 1945.

very last moment. In the end, and in spite of the Allied pressure, Morreale was never expelled from Spain. In fact, he decided to abandon his mission only when the Salò Republic had already been disbanded after the partisan revolts in the north of Italy.⁴⁵

Once the problem of dual Italian representation in Spain was solved, everything augured a quick resolution to the question of the war debt and the resumption of commercial relations between the two countries. It is in this context that José Antonio de Sangróniz arrived in Rome to take charge of the Spanish Embassy in Rome, an Embassy which had remained vacant for almost two years. The appointment of Sangróniz, one of the most able diplomats Franco had at his disposal, for the Spanish Embassy in Rome was a firm declaration of intentions: the Francoist regime was determined to normalize diplomatic relations with Italy as soon as possible.⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, Sangróniz arrived in Rome, on 10 May, with clear instructions from his government: he had to work as hard as possible in order to remove all the obstacles which were hindering the resuming of relations. Five days after his arrival, the Spanish Ambassador was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alcide De Gasperi. During this meeting, held in a friendly atmosphere according to the protagonists, the two politicians agreed on the importance of solving the economic questions immediately. At the same time, De Gasperi declared that the intention of the Italian Government was to establish 'good relations' with Franco's Spain, a comment which made Sangróniz declare: '[...] My personal impression is that in Mr. De Gasperi, whether he continues in his task, or takes on the Presidency of the Cabinet, we would have a valuable element to strengthen cordial Spanish-Italian relations'.⁴⁷

The Italian Government tried to take advantage of the favourable situation created after this meeting by requesting the Spanish authorities to start commercial negotiations, including the question of the war debt, and to resume commercial relations as soon as possible. In the middle of May, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to the Spanish Embassy that the Italians were ready to start negotiations. However, at that precise moment, an internal crisis took place in the Italian political life, delaying once more the beginning of negotiations. After the liberation of the north of Italy from the German troops, the head of the Italian Government, Ivanoe Bonomi, decided to turn in his resignation with the purpose of facilitating the formation of the

⁴⁵Bertoldi, *Salò: vita e morte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana*; Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*, 491–5.

⁴⁶There is very little research done on the figure of José Antonio de Sangróniz, one of the most prominent diplomats during the first years of the Francoist regime. This constitutes another example of the big gaps which still remain in the historiography of Spanish foreign policy during the Francoist period. The most interesting information regarding Sangróniz can be found in Armero, *La política exterior de Franco*, 66.

⁴⁷AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 15 May 1945.

new government which had to be stronger and represent the whole country. From that moment on, all the six parties which made up the CLN started talks which would not finish until the month of June 1945.⁴⁸

It is evident that the Spanish authorities were not willing to discuss the war debt and the resumption of commercial relations with Italy, at a time when the left wing parties might take on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 31 May, Sangróniz held an interview with three Ministers of the Italian Cabinet, including Alcide De Gasperi. During this conversation, Sangróniz declared that, taking into account the internal situation of the country, plunged into a severe political crisis, it was better to delay the start of the negotiations.⁴⁹

From this moment onwards, the political instability in the Kingdom of Italy would become a decisive factor in bilateral relations, mainly because of the Spanish fear that the left-wing parties might seize power and break relations with the Francoist regime. This was not idle speculation. Rupture with the Francoist regime, arising from the crucial collaboration of the Mussolini regime, was becoming an increasingly popular question in Italian society and especially among the left-wing sectors. In fact, since the liberation of Rome the press linked with the left-wing parties had started to publish a growing number of articles supporting the Spanish Government in exile, criticizing the Francoist regime and demanding the CLN to break diplomatic relations immediately. So virulent was this campaign that the Bonomi Government was forced to intervene in order to moderate the tone of the press. This was done on the occasion of Gallarati Scotti's arrival in Madrid which proves the great interest that Italy had in normalizing diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime.⁵⁰ However, the governmental pressure only made an impact on the newspapers associated with the centre and right-wing parties and left-wing newspapers continued to publish articles which riled against the Francoist regime.⁵¹ Obviously, this press campaign deeply worried the diplomats in

⁴⁸DDI: Series X. Vol. II. Doc. No. 216. From Prunas to Gallarati Scotti, 24 May 1945. Doc. No. 216. From Prunas to Gallarati Scotti, 24 May 1945. Francesco Barbagallo, *L'Italia Repubblicana: dallo Sviluppo alle riforme mancate, 1945–2008*. (Roma: Carocci, 2009); Simona Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006: partiti, movimenti e istituzioni* (Roma: Laterza, 2007); Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

⁴⁹Archive from the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency, Archivo de la Presidencia y Jefatura del Estado, (APJE): Bundle 6, Telegram from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 31 May 1945.

⁵⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 83. Letter from Prunas to the general director of the Italian press, Rossini, 30 January 1945.

⁵¹A thorough analysis of the three main newspapers linked with the left-wing parties, *Avanti*, *L'Unità* and *La Voce Repubblicana* show that, from the beginning of 1945 and until the end of 1946, there was at least one article devoted to the Francoist regime every three days. Three among the most important examples of this campaign against the Francoist regime are: National Library in Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze (BNF), newspapers library, Pietro Nenni, 'Perchè un ambasciatore nella capitale di

'Palacio de Santa Cruz' to the extent that it became an endemic factor in relations with the Kingdom of Italy during the whole Francoist regime.⁵²

At the end of June, Italy managed to solve the political crisis: after eight weeks of difficult negotiations, Ferruccio Parri, a former partisan leader, member of the 'Partito D'Azione', PdA, was elected as new head of government. Parri decided to leave the control of the Italian foreign policy in the hands of Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Christian Democrat Party and in favour of maintaining relations with the Francoist regime. These changes in the Italian Government were studied by the British and the American Governments, still uncertain about whether they should intervene in Italian affairs and prevent undesirable appointments or not. In the end, it was decided to refrain from possible interferences and to allow the Italians to settle their own internal affairs.⁵³ It is evident that the British policy towards the Kingdom of Italy had changed considerably with respect to the summer of 1943. The British diplomats wanted to avoid any clashes with the United States and, at the same time, to strengthen Britain's influence in Italy in order to avoid the possible fall of the country into the Soviet sphere of influence. As a result of this new positioning, the British Government, already in February 1945, had stated publicly its readiness to bring the Italian armistice regime to a close and to terminate the state of war with Italy.⁵⁴

When De Gasperi received the assignment, he had already decided the main objectives of the new Italian foreign policy: first of all, Italy had to fully recover its sovereignty, to be able to play an independent role in the international system; secondly, Italy had to get back some elements which would contribute to the rebirth of the country as a relevant actor in the international context: partial reconstruction of the army, complete control over its national territory, partial devolution of the colonies overseas. These objectives were linked to the end of the armistice regime and the rapid elaboration of a moderate peace treaty which became, from that moment onwards, the primary goal of the De Gasperi Government and the key to understanding most of its decisions during the following two years.⁵⁵

Franco?', *Avanti*, 9 February 1945; leading article 'Rompere subito col governo di Franco', *L'Unità*, 10 February 1945; Randolfo Pacciardi, 'Nè Franco nè Don Juan', *La Voce Repubblicana*, 20 July 1945.

⁵² AMAE: Bundle 1.272, folder 9. Telegrams from García Comín to Lequerica, 24 October and 1 November 1944.

⁵³ Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 108–9.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 102–9.

⁵⁵ More about the foreign policy developed by De Gasperi in this period, in Piero Craveri, *De Gasperi*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006); Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*; Christopher Wagstaff and Christopher Duggan, *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society 1948–1958* (Oxford: Berg, 1995); Sara Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); Sara Lorenzini, 'Alcide De Gasperi e il reinserimento dell'Italia nella scena internazionale, 1944–1948.

Regarding Spain, the left-wing parties immediately started to put pressure on De Gasperi, so that he would revise the Italian foreign policy towards the Francoist regime. However, the Christian Democrat politician made clear that he intended to maintain relations with the Francoist regime in order to defend national interests: 'It is my conviction that – in the present economic circumstances – it is our duty to explore in depth the concrete possibilities of re-taking what we are owed: in other words, to limit as much as possible the very serious damages which the intervention in Spain has already brought upon the Italian population.'⁵⁶ However, De Gasperi warned that in order to hold off the pressure coming from the left-wing parties, he needed a positive gesture from the Spanish Government, a gesture which would show the country that his positioning was only motivated by pragmatic reasons.

The resolution of the Italian crisis was positively received by the Spanish authorities and the talks to resume the commercial relations between the two countries continued.⁵⁷ On 5 July, a Spanish ship carrying more than five tons of salted fish arrived in the port of Naples. It was the first freight good freely purchased by the Italian Government from a foreign country since the armistice and also the gesture that De Gasperi needed to reinforce his policy towards Spain. It should be remembered that the situation of the Italian economy, especially in the south, continued to be disastrous, and the risk of impending famine was still very real. Well aware of these problems, the Spanish authorities had conceived this gesture as a symbol of the Spanish generosity to the rest of the world, the proof that the Francoist regime was not a threat to the international order, and that it could help to the reconstruction of Western Europe after the war. However, none of the big Italian newspapers, *Il Popolo*, *Il Giornale d'Italia*, *Avanti*, *L'Unità* or *La Voce Repubblicana* published any articles to this end. The Spanish gesture would only have impact on the Neapolitans who were in the port that morning and the Italian Government.⁵⁸

In the middle of July, the two governments reached another economic agreement: the Spanish Government would deliver 700 tons of oil as repayment for the grain lent by Mussolini in 1939; the war debt would be linked to the signing of a commercial agreement that would govern the relations between the two countries. The agreement would be negotiated in Rome during the summer.⁵⁹ On 11 July, the Italian authorities

Introduzione', in Vera Capperucci and Sara Lorenzini (eds.), *Alcide De Gasperi, Scritti e discorsi politici. Edizione critica. Volume III, Alcide De Gasperi e la fondazione della democrazia italiana, 1943–1948* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), 1335–60.

⁵⁶DDI: Series X, Vol. II, Doc. No. 380. Telegram from De Gasperi to Gallarati Scotti, 3 August 1945.

⁵⁷AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 20 June 1945.

⁵⁸Ibid. Telegram from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 5 July 1945.

⁵⁹Ibid. Telegram from Lequerica to Sangróniz, 17 July 1945.

wrote to the Allied Control Commission asking for permission to start negotiations.⁶⁰ Three days later, the Allied Commission, after consulting with the Allied Force Headquarters, suggested starting the negotiations as soon as possible, but warned that they wanted to be kept up to speed.⁶¹ Even though the Anglo-Americans had claimed that they would not intervene in Italian affairs and that they were willing to leave the responsibility of the negotiations in the hands of the Italians, it was clear that they wanted to supervise the process.⁶² It should be remembered that the Anglo-Americans continued to have a considerable interest in supporting the Italian Government regarding the war debt: as two of the powers contributing heavily to the Italian economic relief, both through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and otherwise, the British and the US Government wanted to mobilize her foreign assets and make all possible use of the neutral sources of supply so as to reduce its need for economic aid.⁶³

Everything seemed ready for the resuming of commercial relations, but the attention of both countries was again distracted, this time by the progressive deterioration of the Spanish international position which resulted from the Potsdam declaration. Every time the situation seemed to be perfect for the beginning of negotiations, something happened which delayed it even more. On 17 July, the Potsdam Conference started, and it had an enormous relevance for Spanish-Italian relations, as it might imply the breaking-off of relations with the Francoist regime. The participants were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The three nations were represented by Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and later Clement Attlee, who replaced Churchill as Prime Minister after the Labour Party's victory over the Conservatives in the 1945 general election, and the new US President Harry S. Truman. During this meeting, the Spanish question was raised again, concluding with the international condemnation of the Francoist Regime by all the major powers and the decision that, as long as Franco would stay in power, Spain could not be admitted to the United Nations or any of the international institutions linked with it. However, the Spanish authorities did not perceive the Potsdam agreement as a total failure for the Francoist regime: in spite of the formal condemnation, a military intervention and the adoption of diplomatic or economic sanctions had been discarded.

⁶⁰NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Memorandum for the Allied Control Commission, 11 July 1945.

⁶¹Ibid. Letter from the Allied Control Commission to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 1945.

⁶²ASMAE: Archive of the General Secretary. Archivio della Segreteria Generale (ASG): 1) Italian diplomatic action, 1943–46. Bundle IX. Note for De Gasperi, 4 August 1945.

⁶³NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Letter from the Foreign Office to Victor Mallet, British Ambassador in Rome, 9 October 1945.

In fact, France continued with the commercial negotiations which would conclude with the commercial agreement signed on 15 September 1945.⁶⁴

The British position, in favour of the non-intervention, had prevailed over the Soviet pressures: the Francoist regime was not a good option, but it was better than a Republic controlled by the Communist Party under Soviet influence; the main goal of the British diplomacy regarding Spain was now to force a peaceful transition to a constitutional monarchy through diplomatic channels. Franco understood immediately that Great Britain and the United States would not allow the application of destabilizing measures which might provoke another civil conflict and increase the Soviet presence in the Iberian Peninsula.⁶⁵ It is evident that, in this context, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the new democratic Italy was an even more interesting political option for the Spanish authorities as it could contribute to improving the international image of the regime.

On the other hand, the Italian Government immediately decided to give its support to the Potsdam declaration. The Italian decision was communicated to the Anglo-Americans on 3 August during a meeting held between De Gasperi and the two ambassadors in Rome. In it, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that his Government, in spite of the important economic interests which it had in Spain, fully agreed and was willing to align itself with the decision taken by the three major powers in Potsdam regarding Spain. De Gasperi added that Italy would harmonize its position with the Allies in case they wanted to introduce further modifications. Finally, Minister De Gasperi clarified that, in the meantime, the Italian Government would continue with the negotiations to resume commercial exchanges and to settle the question of the Spanish war debt.⁶⁶

The Anglo-American authorities replied expressing their satisfaction in the Italian positioning and committing themselves to open the channels of communication regarding the Spanish question.⁶⁷ It is evident that Italy did not have any other option but to follow the Anglo-Americans in this issue, especially if they wanted to negotiate a moderate Peace Treaty;⁶⁸ in any case, the situation was intelligently used by De Gasperi to improve relations with the Allies, and at the same time to defend the maintenance of relations with the Francoist regime, repelling all the attacks coming from the

⁶⁴ AMAE: Bundle 6.285, folder 2–3.

⁶⁵ Florentino Portero, 'España, el Reino Unido y la Guerra Fria', in Preston and Balfour (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*, 164.

⁶⁶ DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 393. Letter from De Gasperi to Gallarati Scotti, 7 August 1945.

⁶⁷ DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 463. Telegram from De Gasperi to Gallarati Scotti, 26 August 1945.

⁶⁸ John L. Harper, *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945–48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

left-wing parties which had seized upon the Potsdam declaration to demand the breaking-off of relations.⁶⁹ On the one hand, by harmonizing his foreign policy with the Anglo-Americans in this matter, it was offering proof of the Italian good will and determination to improve its relations with them. On the other hand, whenever the Government was requested to break relations with Spain, it would be able to reply that such a diplomatic move was not possible because Italian foreign policy had to be totally harmonized with the Anglo-Americans; the adoption of any unilateral decision regarding Spain would not bring any benefit, neither political nor economic, and might even slow down the normalization of relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. In this way, the Potsdam declaration became the best shield against possible attacks coming from the left-wing parties. Furthermore diplomats in 'Palazzo Chigi' had two other motivations to express their support for the Potsdam agreement: in first place, they were convinced that the joint action of the Western democracies together with the aid of the geographically closed countries, would bring about a democratic change in the Spanish regime, avoiding an unnecessary and dangerous civil conflict.⁷⁰ Secondly, since the Potsdam agreement did not imply the adoption of economic measures, it permitted the Italian authorities to continue with the negotiations to resume commercial exchanges, which, in a nutshell, was their main objective.⁷¹

The Italian positioning was discussed at the beginning of August at a cabinet meeting where it unofficially agreed the future policy regarding Spain: Italy would not raise any issue which might disturb the normal development of bilateral relations, at least as long as the United States and Great Britain would maintain their policies towards the Francoist regime. This notwithstanding, if the Anglo-Americans changed their position and withdrew their respective ambassadors from Madrid, the Italian Government would immediately reconsider its policy.⁷² This decision, transmitted to Ambassador Sangróniz on 12 August, reassured the Spanish authorities and helped to partially remove one of the biggest obstacles for normalization of diplomatic relations: Spanish distrust in Italian politics. If Italy had adopted an official commitment to align its position with the Anglo-Americans it would be more difficult for the left-wing parties, even if they seized power, to break relations with the Francoist regime.⁷³

⁶⁹ AMAE: Bundle 1.276, Folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 12 August 1945.

⁷⁰ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 83. Letter from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 10 April 1945.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* and DDI: Series X, Vol. II, Doc. No. 410: Letter from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 13 August 1945.

⁷² AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 12 August 1945.

⁷³ DDI: Series X, Vol. II, Doc. No. 477. Letter from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 31 August 1945.

In this way, by the end of August 1945 the vast majority of the obstacles which hindered the diplomatic normalization of Spanish-Italian relations and the resumption of commercial exchanges had been progressively overcome. Since January 1945, the warships had been liberated together with more than 1,000 sailors, the RSI office in Spain had disappeared, the Italian deficit in the balance of trade had been liquidated with part of the war debt, and an agreement had been reached as to how to pay back the grain loaned by Mussolini in 1939.⁷⁴ The Potsdam declaration and the Italian commitment to follow the Allied policy regarding the Francoist regime were the last remaining pieces of the puzzle to connect before the dialogue could begin.

The negotiations for the signing of the Commercial Treaty

On 31 August the Italian commission to negotiate the commercial agreement arrived in Spain. However, the agreement was not signed until December 1945.⁷⁵ The main reason behind this delay is to be found in the Spanish determination to postpone as long as possible the practical realization of the negotiations. According to the Spanish diplomats, the war debt was the most useful instrument Spain had to defend itself from the attacks launched by the left-wing parties. Accordingly, the resolution of this question, even if it was quick and beneficial for Italy, would deprive the moderate elements in government with the only argument they had to stop the initiatives and the verbal excesses taken by socialists and communists in the cabinet meetings.⁷⁶

In addition, some economic factors should be taken into consideration. The main problem in this regard was constituted by the Italian mission who arrived in Spain with extremely unrealistic instructions from their government, especially considering the Spanish economic situation. According to the Italian authorities, the trade discussions had to be subjected to a prior agreement on consolidation of the quantity of the debt which Rome insisted should be on the basis of a conversion rate between the pre-war rate of 20 lire per dollar and the present military rate of 100 lire per dollar. Another controversial point was the Italian proposal that one half of the total amount should be payable in merchandise and the remainder in dollars, sterling or other foreign currency.⁷⁷ The Italian proposals were far removed from reality

⁷⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1945, folder 83. Note on the Spanish-Italian relations written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 July 1945.

⁷⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Note about the financial negotiations between Spain and Italy for the information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent by Sangróniz, 30 August 1945 and MPJE: Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 27 August 1945, Legajo 6.

⁷⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 30 August 1945.

⁷⁷NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 22 September 1945.

for several reasons: first of all, Spain did not possess the necessary resources of foreign currency. As a matter of fact, the shortage of foreign currency was one of the main problems which the Spanish economy had to face when the war ended.⁷⁸ Besides, it was obvious that the Spanish authorities wished to consolidate the debt at a rate favourable to them.⁷⁹ Apart from the unrealistic pretensions of the Italian mission, there was another problem: the two economies were not complementary and it was extremely difficult to find merchandise which could be exchanged; as a matter of fact, the biggest part of the negotiations was devoted to the establishment of quotas which would satisfy both parties.⁸⁰

Finally, another point should be mentioned to explain why the negotiations moved so slowly, and it has to do with another crisis in Italian politics. In November 1945, the Liberals withdrew their support from the coalition government and Parri was forced to resign; the collapse of the Parri Government brought another period of instability which could lead the left-wing parties to leadership of the government. Obviously, this possibility was contemplated by the Spanish Government, which feared that, once the treaty was signed, the Italians would break relations.⁸¹

The different perceptions of these questions blocked the negotiations completely, to the extent that the Italian Commercial Attaché in Madrid, and also the Head of the Mission, went to see the British Ambassador in Spain, Victor Mallet, in order to involve him in the process: '[...] Italian Ambassador seems anxious to keep me informed of the progress of the negotiations and wishes me to tell him that I approve of the basis on which they are being conducted, presumably in order that he may reassure the Spaniards'.⁸² It was obvious that the Italians needed British help in order to resolve this impasse and to obtain a better position in the negotiations. However, it is noteworthy that the Italian Government asked the British Government for support in its

⁷⁸More about the economic problems in Spain, particularly regarding commerce overseas, is in Angel Viñas, *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)* (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979). It must also be noted that the scarcity of hard currency was a major problem all over Europe. Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 9–22.

⁷⁹AMAE: Bundle 2.074, folder 6–8. Letter from the Spanish Commercial Attaché in Rome, Luis García de Llera to Navasqués, 4 August 1945.

⁸⁰A detailed narration of the negotiations regarding the merchandise to be purchased can be found in AMAE: Bundle 2.074, folder 6–8.

⁸¹AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 6 November 1945 and AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Note about the financial negotiations between Spain and Italy for the information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent by Sangróniz, 30 August 1945.

⁸²NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 22 September 1945.

negotiations with Spain and not the United States. This petition clearly supports the idea that the diplomats in Rome still regarded Britain as Europe's natural leader, the hegemonic power which might intervene in international relations and impose its influence. On the other hand, and in spite of the previous decision not to intervene in Italian affairs, the British Government decided to lend its support to speed negotiations up.

*There is no reason why you should not lend your good offices if requested by either side, though we do not of course want to be inveigled into supporting excessive claims of the kind now being made by the Italians. We would like to see Italy come to an advantageous agreement but she is more likely to do so by taking a realistic view of the value of obligations denominated (at her own instance) in lire without any exchange guarantee than by trying at this stage to get payment in currencies which Spain is not bound to give and which in any case she does not possess.*⁸³

It was clear that the British wanted to help the Italians but they could not support proposals which were so unrealistic that they could be clearly counterproductive. They suggested working for a rapid consolidation of the debt in pesetas or in goods, and to be prepared to come to terms on the basis of official sterling-lire-pesetas rates. 'Otherwise it may before long become apparent to the Spaniards they could stand out for even more favorable terms than they can get now.' In this regard, Britain was trying to strengthen its leadership both in Spain and Italy by favouring a rapid conclusion of the negotiations which could satisfy all the parties involved.⁸⁴

At the beginning of November, Alcide De Gasperi also decided to intervene in order to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations. On the 6th of that month, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs convened an urgent meeting with the Spanish Ambassador to discuss the situation. According to the Christian Democrat leader, the sluggishness of the negotiations could be attributed to several different reasons: first of all, to the incompetence of the Italian Mission due to their lack of experience; secondly, to the lack of interest shown by the Spanish authorities; finally, to the suspicion that the Spanish Government was deliberately looking for the failure of the negotiations, because it believed that once the question of the debt of war was solved, it would lose the only instrument which it had to put pressure on Italy. At the same time, De Gasperi assured Sangróniz that the Italian policy would not change once the problem of the war debt was solved; as a matter of fact, the rapid conclusion of the commercial agreement (a great help to the diet of the Italian people in these hard times), could be presented as

⁸³NAUK: FO 371/49937. Letter from the Foreign Office to Mallet, 9 October 1945.

⁸⁴Ibid.

a success of his foreign policy regarding Spain, fracturing the arguments presented by the left-wing parties which wanted to end relations. In addition, the agreement would be strongly supported by the Anglo-Americans. As proof of the Italian good will, De Gasperi explained that the Republican Government in exile had attempted to obtain the Italian recognition, but they had responded that this question could not even be raised.⁸⁵

After the meeting with De Gasperi, Sangróniz was summoned by the Director of Economic Affairs to discuss the practical obstacles which hindered the negotiations. During this conversation, the Italian politician explained that his government was prepared to renounce the obtaining of foreign currency, that they wished to mobilize the greatest part of the debt of war in Spanish goods, and finally that the government accepted the change proposed by the Ministry of Finance (9.13 lire per peseta). The meeting ended with the commitment by both parties to leave the little details aside and to focus on the important issues of the negotiations: the amount of debt which could be mobilized immediately, and the establishment of an exchange rate for the operation.⁸⁶ The British intervention had finally convinced the Italian authorities that without their support of and without adopting a more flexible attitude towards the Spanish authorities, their initial positions in the negotiations were untenable.

The Commercial Treaty: a political treaty

Once the Italian Government gave way in the economic field and reassured the Spanish authorities of its willingness to reach a compromise both politically and economically, the agreement was easily reached. The Treaty was signed on 10 December in Madrid but it could not be made official until it received approval of the Allied Control Commission. The basis of the agreement was the payment of 150 million pesetas (circa \$7 million) at the rate of 9.13 lire per peseta, against the Spanish Civil war debt to Italy. In exchange for these advances, six bi-annual payments due in respect of the debt from the 31 December 1946 to the 30 June 1951, both inclusive, were suspended. The Italian debt of approximately 300 million pesetas (circa \$14 million) in the old commercial clearing was officially cancelled against the debt payments to date. The Commercial Treaty was a very typical bilateral agreement of the period with two accounts (one for exports and the other for imports), but with the peculiarity that it was intentionally unbalanced: the Italian Government was able to import up to the value of 150 million pesetas while the Spanish Government could only do so for 50. Among the Spanish goods to be exported to Italy, were salted fish (especially tuna and anchovies), rosin, iron ore, turpentine, lead, cork and coca beans. The

⁸⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.276, folder 2. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 6 November 1945.

⁸⁶Ibid.

Italian goods to be exported to Spain included machinery, especially trams and trolleybuses, and chemicals.⁸⁷

In addition, the two governments decided that the rest of the war debt should be paid by signing yearly commercial agreements with the imbalance as its most important characteristic. According to the calendar agreed, the negotiations for a new commercial and payments treaty had to begin at the end of 1946 before the agreement just signed would expire.⁸⁸ At the end of December, the Allied Control Commission officially approved the agreement and on 31 December, the Italian Assembly passed the Commercial Treaty which was ratified in Rome on 10 January.⁸⁹

The Commercial Treaty was extremely advantageous for Spanish interests; it is true that Spain had accepted the payment of a debt with doubtful origins which could not have been recognized, but, at the same time, it had obtained a very convenient conversion rate (9.13 lire per peseta) which reduced the debt from 5,000 million lire to a little less than 3,000 million: 'the most beneficial commercial transaction which Spain has done since the Altamira caves' as Sangróniz described it.⁹⁰ In addition, the Spanish recognition of the war debt had a substantial number of benefits for the Francoist regime.

First of all, there was a political benefit: in this sense, it is easy to understand that the re-establishment of political and economic relations with a country that had abandoned the Axis and that was trying to leave behind his Fascist past, like Italy, constituted an enormous diplomatic success for the Spanish Government.⁹¹ Secondly, there were international benefits: as a matter of fact, by paying this war debt the Spanish authorities were transmitting to the international community the clear message that Spain was a trustworthy country which always paid its debts, even when it could easily avoid it.⁹² In addition, the payment of the war debt was also a positive gesture towards the Anglo-Americans that had strongly supported the Italians throughout all the negotiations, as already explained. Thirdly, there

⁸⁷NAUK: FO 371/49937. Telegram from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 13 December 1945. Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 12.

⁸⁸AMAE: Bundle 2.074, folder 6-8. Spanish-Italian Commercial Treaty, 10 January 1946.

⁸⁹Ibid. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 31 December 1945 and Telegram from Martín Artajo to the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, 31 December 1945.

⁹⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 29 June 1945.

⁹¹The Spanish authorities realized very quickly after the war that its economic potential could be used to improve bilateral relations with European countries. This strategy, defined by Fernando Guirao as 'commercial diplomacy', was clearly put into practice in the Italian case. Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 15.

⁹²AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Note about the financial negotiations between Spain and Italy for the information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent by Sangróniz, 30 August 1945.

were economic advantages such as the acquisition of machinery (trams and trolley buses) which could not be bought in other markets, at least at the same prices; besides, the Spanish producers could place some of their products of which they had a surplus (especially salted fish) in a market which was traditionally reliable and which had potential for the future.⁹³ Finally, there were other kinds of benefits, like the improvement in the tone of the Italian press. As a matter of fact, this was one of the main demands which the Spanish diplomats made during the negotiations.⁹⁴ The Spanish authorities were firmly convinced that there was a strong feeling of friendship towards Spain among the Italian population, a feeling which was being altered by the press with its strong anti-Spanish campaign. Stopping this campaign was the first step in order to change Italian perceptions of the Francoist regime.⁹⁵

The Italian evaluation of the agreement was slightly different than the Spanish one. The Italian Government initially had the impression that the mission sent to negotiate the agreement had made too many concessions to the extent that Gallarati Scotti was forced to intervene justifying his action and his achievements. He admitted that the conversion rate accepted was not as good as it could have been, especially considering that the pre-war rate between the two currencies was 1.73 lire per peseta (nearly 8 lire less per peseta than the agreement reached); besides, he acknowledged that the Italian mission had failed to consolidate the biggest part of the war debt in Spanish goods (the agreement included just one quarter of the total amount). However, he claimed that these concessions originated from the delicate situation of the Spanish economy, and agreed with the Italian Ministry of Finance that there were unquestionable advantages which the commercial mission had obtained. First, the Spanish recognition of a war debt conceded for political reasons and whose origins were so controversial that it was not clear whether the Italian Government could demand it or not. Secondly, the Spanish commitment to continue with the regular payments of the war debt even after the application of the 1946 commercial treaty. Thirdly, the resuming of commercial exchanges through an agreement which took into account the limited exporting capabilities of Italy. Fourthly, the inclusion in the treaty of substantial amounts of raw material

⁹³There had been a commercial network between the two countries consisting in the trade of salted fish, since the nineteenth century. To know more about it, see Fernando García Sanz, *Historia de las relaciones entre España e Italia: imágenes, comercio y política exterior, 1890–1914* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994).

⁹⁴AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Note about the financial negotiations between Spain and Italy for the information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent by Sangróniz, 30 August 1945.

⁹⁵Ibid. Letter from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 8 June 1945 and letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, without a date.

and foodstuffs essential for the reactivation of the Italian economy. And finally, the promotion of Italian exports in the sectors in which Italian production was already able to satisfy the demands of the Spanish market. In this regard, the Spanish market had been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, an essential market for Italian manufactured products.⁹⁶ The Italian Government ended by accepting this argumentation provided by Gallarati Scotti and never called the agreement into question; in fact, it always defended the maintenance and respect of the agreement whenever it was attacked by the left-wing parties.⁹⁷

The signing of the Commercial Treaty opened a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations; however, the two governments saw this new phase from different perspectives and, consequently, attributed different meanings to it. On the one hand, the Francoist regime saw the treaty as the beginning of political cooperation with the Italian kingdom. This new conception of Spanish-Italian relations can be easily seen in the instructions which Martín Artajo sent to Sangróniz on 7 January 1946 and that constitute one of the key documents of Francoist foreign policy in the post-war period. According to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the first task of Sangróniz's mission, the normalization of bilateral relations after the period of blockade due to the change of regime in Italy, had already been accomplished thanks to the signing of the Commercial Treaty. It was time to take another step forward and develop the existing relations in the diplomatic and commercial fields which had been settled on solid foundations. It was necessary to enter the strictly political field, synchronizing the path of both countries which were affected by the same international problems. According to Artajo, the Kingdom of Italy was seriously threatened by Soviet expansionism which aspired to occupy a predominant position in the Mediterranean Sea; the ambition to gain Trieste for Yugoslavia, the war in Greece, the invasion of Azerbaijan endangering Turkey and its geostrategical position, and the claim for benefits from the Italian colonies, constituted the best proof of this Soviet danger. The Italian Government had to be aware of the fact that, faced with the Soviet threat, France was not a reliable ally; unfortunately, the French Republic remained unstable and had thus become a hazard for

⁹⁶BA: Gallarati Scotti Archive, Series I, folder No. 10. Letter from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 18 June 1945.

⁹⁷The Spanish-Italian Commercial Treaty fits perfectly in the model described by Fernando Guirao in his work. Italy, like the other European countries, was in need of raw materials to increase its industrial production, and cheap foodstuffs to feed their populations without provoking strong deficits in hard currencies. Spain provided both through this agreement, although foodstuffs in minor quantities. Even without the war debt, these considerations were important enough to convince the Italian authorities of the benefits provided by the Commercial Treaty. Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 9–22.

European peace with its aspirations to modify its borders with Germany and even Italy. In this way, the Kingdom of Italy, instead of counting on French support to stop the Russian advances in the Mediterranean, had to deal with a problem in its rearguard, which aggravated its international position.

In this context, the best solution for Italian diplomacy was the establishment of a solid alliance with Spain and Great Britain, the only two countries capable of stopping the Russian advance in the Mediterranean. Once the alliance had been sealed, the three countries could try to attract France and convince it to change its anachronistic foreign policy. Accordingly, the main objective of Sangróniz was to convince the Italian authorities of the seriousness of these threats and the necessity to cooperate closely with Spain, one of the few reliable partners in post-war Europe, beyond the ideological differences, and to establish the tripartite alliance: '[...] Spain is willing to establish a close friendship with Italy, an harmonious relationship of the policies of both countries, an Anglo-Spanish-Italian alliance which would constitute, doubtless, the most constructive and fruitful achievement in the post-war era'.⁹⁸

These instructions were accompanied by a private letter in which Martín Artajo clarified the guidelines that the new ambassador should follow. In this document, also fundamental to Francoist policy towards Italy, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs warned Sangróniz that his task in Rome would not be easy. According to Artajo, it was difficult to find support in a country which had completely lost its international prestige and which had a small role in the new international system, a country with a limited sovereignty and still shaken by the events of the war. In addition, the misunderstandings and distrust which the anti-Spanish sectors were spreading all over the world could provoke the distancing of the Italian political class. In spite of all these obstacles, Sangróniz had to persevere in his action, conscious that the Italian circumstances were only temporary: in the end, the Italian authorities would comprehend its difficult international situation, and adapt its policies to the new realities. Besides, Spain had a crucial instrument to improve bilateral relations and to face all the attacks originating from the Anti-Spanish campaign: the war debt. Sangróniz had to understand that the project outlined in the instructions could not be conceived on a short-term basis: the Spanish Ambassador had to harmonize all his actions in Italy (the cooperation in the economic and cultural fields, his social relations with the members of the Italian Government, the defence of the Spanish interests in Italy) into one main strategy in order to achieve the main goal.⁹⁹

Taking into consideration the projects explained in both documents, it seems evident that Italy was an important player in the Spanish conception

⁹⁸AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Instructions for the Spanish Ambassador in Rome written by Artajo, 7 January 1946.

⁹⁹Ibid. Letter from Artajo to Sangróniz, 15 January 1946.

of its foreign relations for the post-war period. By the same token, it is noteworthy that the United States was not mentioned once in this key document. At the beginning of 1946, the main points of reference of the Spanish foreign policy were London, Rome and, to a lesser degree Paris, but not Washington. This conception of international relations after the Second World War contributes to strengthen the argumentation that Britain was still regarded as the hegemonic power in Europe. It seems evident that the British decline, so obvious to historians, was not so obvious to the Spanish and Italian Governments.

On the other hand, Italy did not share this ambitious vision. The Italian Government had seen their main goals accomplished with the signing of the Commercial Treaty and considered that no further developments were needed. The Italian diplomats clearly had an instrumental vision of bilateral relations and, therefore, only aspired to preserve and, if possible, to foster the Italian economic interests in the Iberian country. In this sense, cooperation in the international field was not contemplated as an option. It is true that Visconti Venosta and Renato Prunas had considered the possibility of promoting closer cooperation with Spain and France, the three 'Latin nations';¹⁰⁰ however, this project had to be abandoned for three reasons. First, because relations between the Francoist regime and the French Government, which was the main promoter of this project, had started to seriously deteriorate during the winter of 1945. It became evident that cooperation between Latin nations could not be implemented without Paris, which at that time was completely opposed to the establishment of any type of political cooperation with Spain.¹⁰¹ Secondly, because this idea of cooperation between 'Latin nations', was subordinated to the policy dictated by the Anglo-Americans who were focused on other projects. Thirdly, because the left-wing parties, which comprised part of the government, would never have allowed the establishment of a political alliance with the Francoist regime.

In this sense, the foreign policy followed by De Gasperi was very clear: 'The most perfect and loyal adhesion to the Allied policy in Spain (and I must add that they genuinely appreciate our collaboration); but resolute continuation in the defense of our huge interests in that country. [...]'.¹⁰² This did not imply that the Italian Government tolerated the existence of totalitarian regimes; on the contrary; the best way to deal with the Francoist regime was not by breaking relations with it, but by harmonizing the foreign policy with the Anglo-Americans and supporting through diplomatic channels a peaceful transition towards democracy. In the meantime, Italy would

¹⁰⁰DDI: Series X, Vol. I, Doc. No. 421. Letter from Visconti Venosta to Mascia the Italian Counsellor in Madrid, 22 September 1944.

¹⁰¹Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*, 23–6.

¹⁰²BA: Gallarati Archive, Series I, folder No. 10. Letter from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 22 August 1945.

limit its cooperation to the only fields in which the two countries could strengthen their relations: the economic (which had already been arranged with the signature of the Commercial Treaty) and the cultural (which was being cleverly worked by Gallarati Scotti), both of them, freed from the ideological burden.¹⁰³

In spite of the different perspectives, the resolution of the question of the war debt and the resumption of commercial traffic constituted the best proof that Spanish-Italian relations were already in a different period. Until the spring of 1945, relations were marked by the efforts of the Italian Monarchy to seek greater contact with Spain, and the Spanish reluctance towards these efforts. Instead, the new period was characterized by the predisposition of both governments to maintain diplomatic relations and to profit as much as possible from them.

The consolidation of Spanish-Italian relations after the signing of the Commercial Treaty

1946: a year of consolidation

As has just been said, the year 1946 began under positive auspices for Spanish-Italian relations; during that year, bilateral relations were subjected to raw truths and challenges which demonstrated the determination of both governments to continue with their respective policies.

The first challenge came from the worsening of the Spanish situation in the new international context. On 28 February, the French Government, pressed by the left-wing parties and important sectors of the society, decided to abandon the Anglo-American policy regarding the Francoist regime and to adopt a unilateral measure: the closure of the border. A few days later the head of the French Government, Georges Bidault, communicated to the Anglo-Americans that he intended to take the Spanish question to the Security Council of the United Nations so that it could adopt a definitive resolution. It was obvious that the French Head of Government had been forced to radicalize its policy towards the Francoist regime and now wanted to involve the other Western powers to avoid French isolation.¹⁰⁴ Both the British and the US Governments wished to avoid bringing the question before the Security Council because they thought that the Spanish situation would be aggravated if it was turned into an international issue in which the Soviet Union would have the power to intervene. On 4 March, the British

¹⁰³BA: Gallarati Archive, Series I, folder No. 11. Cultural activities developed by Tommaso Gallarati Scotti. ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1946, folder 1. Sketch of the discourse which De Gasperi should pronounce on the Italian Assembly, 1 February 1946.

¹⁰⁴Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*, 121–42; Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955*, 68–9; Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 144–6.

Cabinet accepted an American proposal which suggested the three powers together make a declaration condemning the Spanish regime; in this way, France would not feel isolated and would not present its proposal to the United Nations. On the same day the 'Joint Declaration' was made public: this official statement condemned the Francoist regime and pleaded for the peaceful retirement of Franco, the elimination of Falange and the establishment of a democratic government; according to the aims of the three Western powers, however, this transition had to be made by the Spanish people, without foreign interferences. If this did not happen in a short period of time, then the three governments would study the adoption of stronger measures, including the dissolution of relations.¹⁰⁵

This situation was seized upon by the Italian left-wing parties which wanted to wear down the moderate sectors of the government; on 16 March, Pietro Nenni, leader of the Socialist Party, officially asked De Gasperi during a cabinet meeting to withdraw the ambassador from Spain and to dissolve relations with the Francoist regime. Palmiro Togliatti, Minister of Justice, and Alberto Cianca, member of the Action Party and Minister of the National Consultation, adhered immediately to the demands made by Nenni.¹⁰⁶ De Gasperi was again forced to intervene and to repeat the same arguments he had used in other occasions: he claimed that after the Potsdam declaration the Italian Government had committed itself to follow the policy delineated by the Anglo-Americans regarding the Francoist regime and that now it was not possible to act unilaterally; besides, the maintenance of the ambassador in Madrid did not imply any support of the political situation in the Iberian country since the Italian wish to see democracy restored there was well known. In summation, it was convenient, in the present situation, to maintain the political line established by the Anglo-Americans remaining in contact with both governments, an attitude which they appreciated very much. The debate carried on for days since Nenni did not desist in his intentions, claiming that the duty of the Italian Government was to support the Spanish democracy and continually asked for the official recognition of the Republican Government in exile. In the end, the cabinet meeting accepted De Gasperi arguments and the Spanish question was momentarily settled.¹⁰⁷

These debates were followed with great attention by the French Government which, on 26 February 1946 had decided to close the border with Spain as a signal of protest against the Francoist regime.¹⁰⁸ At that time, this decision

¹⁰⁵Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 153–4.

¹⁰⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from García Comín to Artajo, 16 March 1946.

¹⁰⁷DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 307. Telegram from De Gasperi to Gallarati Scotti, Quaroni, Tarchiani, Carandini and the Comercial Attaché in Paris, Benzoni. No date but after February 1946.

¹⁰⁸Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*, 121–42.

had not been backed by the Anglo-Americans which, afraid of provoking another civil war that could lead to the establishment of a pro-Communist regime, had already shown their determination to not intervene in Spanish affairs. Isolated in its policy towards Spain, the French Government was now looking for possible allies, and they believed that Italy, thanks to the strong influence of the left-wing parties, could be one of them. Although this debate did not provoke the rupture of diplomatic relations, the French Government continued to follow the Italian debates about the Spanish question with great interest.¹⁰⁹

The British Government witnessed the debate without intervening, as it was convinced that De Gasperi would impose his point of view. Eventually Whitehall was satisfied with the final resolution and the subsequent harmonization of both policies regarding Spain.¹¹⁰ It is obvious that Italy was not an important country in the creation of the policies towards the Francoist regime, but it was essential to include the Italians in the process in order to consolidate and give credibility to these policies. The British Government was well aware of this and accurately supervised the evolution of Italian politics during this period, trying to avoid any radical changes concerning Spain. Spanish-Italian relations had thus been subjected to the first big test of the year and De Gasperi had showed his determination to resist the pressure and follow the policy dictated by the Anglo-Americans.

As stated above, one of the key reasons in explaining Nenni's proposal to break off relations with the Francoist regime was his intention to wear down the De Gasperi Government on the eve of the elections for the constituent assembly which were going to be held on 2 June. That day, the Italians would vote in their first general elections of the post-war period with two objectives: to select the members of an assembly which would redact a Constitution and, at the same time, to choose a form for the new State (in this case Monarchy or Republic). As has already been explained, the Spanish question had become a very popular issue in Italy during this period and the left-wing parties had not hesitated to use it as a political weapon to discredit Alcide De Gasperi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had defended the maintenance of relations with Fascist Spain.¹¹¹

The political campaign for the referendum was framed by incidents and was full of tension. It was followed with great interest by the Spanish authorities who feared a possible victory of the Republic and the left-wing

¹⁰⁹AMAEF: Europe 1944–49, Spain, folder 69. Letter from the French Ambassador in Rome, Alexandre Parodi, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, 30 March 1946.

¹¹⁰NAUK: FO: 371/60697. Minutes from the Foreign Office regarding the Italian–Spanish relations, 30 March 1946.

¹¹¹BNF: Newspapers library. Randolfo Pacciardi, 'La Francia contro Franco – e l'Italia?', *La Voce Repubblicana*, 20 January 1946.

parties, events that might have led to a diplomatic break with Italy.¹¹² The referendum returned a republic, with 54.3 per cent in favour of this option and 45.7 per cent against. In addition, the elections for the Constitutional Assembly were won by the Christian Democrats, but with only a slight majority.¹¹³

The results of these elections were received with concern by the Spanish authorities as they were interpreted as a step backwards for the Spanish cause in Italy. According to Sangróniz, the transformation of Italy into a Republic considerably weakened the moderate forces of the country and, as a consequence, the position of Spain itself. The Spanish Ambassador was firmly convinced that right-wing parties were the only forces in Italy willing to maintain the *status quo* in bilateral relations. The victory of the Christian Democrats was seen as a 'lesser evil' and at least a guarantee of the continuity in the foreign policy followed by Italy since the end of the war. However, Sangróniz warned that the majority obtained by the DC was too small and that the left-wing parties would try to gain a predominant position in the government producing a tricky situation for bilateral relations.¹¹⁴ Despite all these facts, the Spanish Government decided to officially recognize the new Republic, becoming one of the first countries to do so. It is clear that the Spanish authorities did not want to complicate the situation even more.¹¹⁵

By the same token, the Spanish concerns were quickly transmitted to the new Italian Government. In June, Sangróniz held a meeting with the General Secretary of the Italian Foreign Ministry, Renato Prunas. During this encounter they discussed the problem of the recognition of the new Italian Republic, the possible candidates to occupy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the perspectives for bilateral relations with Spain.¹¹⁶ One week later, Sangróniz held another meeting, this time with De Gasperi.¹¹⁷ During both encounters the Spanish Ambassador was reassured that the change of form in the Italian state would not have any impact in the development of Spanish-Italian relations; even if the Christian Democrats were forced

¹¹²The Spanish position regarding the Italian elections can be seen in detail through the large number of telegrams sent by the Spanish Embassy in Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1.

¹¹³On the 1948 Italian elections see Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006*; Simona Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia Repubblicana*, 1st edn (Roma: Laterza, 1994); Giorgio Galli, *I partiti politici italiani (1943–2000). Dalla resistenza al governo dell'Ulivo* (Milano: Biblioteca universale Rizzoli, 2001); Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

¹¹⁴AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 16 May 1946.

¹¹⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 20 December 1946.

¹¹⁶Ibid. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 16 June 1946.

¹¹⁷MPJE: Bundle 9. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 23 June 1946.

to leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the hands of a left-wing party member, they guaranteed that said member would not raise the Spanish question. It also has to be considered that the negotiations for the formation of the new government were still ongoing, and nothing was decided yet. De Gasperi, who was in charge of forming the new government, had to come to terms with both the Socialist and Communist Party which had obtained almost 40 per cent of votes in the elections.

After weeks of complex negotiations, an agreement was finally reached: De Gasperi would be the Minister of Foreign Affairs until the signature of the Peace Treaty, at which point he would be replaced by Pietro Nenni. As already explained, the Peace Treaty was an essential step in the Italian path towards diplomatic normalization, a step, however, that no political leader wanted to endorse, fearing that it might have negative consequences in the elections. De Gasperi decided to assume command of the Italian delegation in the next round of negotiations – the third session of the Peace Treaty that would take place in Paris between the months of July and October – also to avoid a possible confrontation between Nenni and the Allies.¹¹⁸ It should be considered, that the Italian Socialist Party was not on good terms with the Anglo-Americans.¹¹⁹

The accord was communicated to the Spanish Government on 3 June during a meeting between De Gasperi and Sangróniz in which the Italian politician assured the Spanish official again that the change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not imply a change in the policy towards Spain; he had even discussed it with Nenni who had promised to follow the guidelines already established by the United States and Great Britain. However, Sangróniz was not convinced by De Gasperi's promises and transmitted to the Spanish Government that, once Nenni became Minister, it would be extremely difficult to maintain normal relations between the two countries. This notwithstanding, the Spanish authorities did not have a choice: they had to believe in the word given by De Gasperi and hope for the best with Nenni.¹²⁰

One of the key points which was raised in all the meetings held during this frantic period of diplomatic activity following the elections, was the problematic application of the commercial treaty. The Italian authorities insisted that the activation of this economic agreement was essential to allow the government, faced with continuous attacks from the left wing parties, to defend its policy regarding the Francoist regime.¹²¹ The main problem was that the Commercial Treaty, which had been signed to resume

¹¹⁸Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947*.

¹¹⁹Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*, 74.

¹²⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 3 July 1946.

¹²¹Ibid. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 9 June 1946; and Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 16 June 1946.

the exchanges and to develop the economic relations between the two countries, had encountered several problems in its application, problems which had changed very little about the situation of blockade that existed after the armistice. As a matter of fact, Spain had not been able to fulfil the vast majority of its commitments and had exported a very small part of the merchandise agreed.¹²²

The main reason behind this apparent impasse can be found in the old-fashioned and the backward nature of the Spanish economy and the irrationality of an economic system, the autarchy, which was completely anchored in the past.¹²³ Furthermore, it became quickly apparent that the Spanish economy was not ready to fulfil the commitments agreed in the Commercial Treaty: the vast majority of the products which Spain had committed to sell to Italy (especially tuna, cast iron and lead) were not available because of their scarcity in the Spanish domestic market; the rest of the products which were available, were too highly priced for the Italian exporters.¹²⁴

Well aware of the risks which this situation might have for the maintenance of bilateral relations, Sangróniz decided to put extra pressure on the Spanish authorities to obtain the rapid solution of the technical problems which prevented the resumption of export trade between the two countries. On 16 June, he wrote to Martín Artajo explaining that the quick activation of the commercial treaty was the best instrument to defend the Spanish cause in Italy from the attacks of the left-wing parties: 'I think that it is extremely urgent to attract the attention of the official organizations which intervene in the application of the agreement, clarifying that it was not signed for economic reasons, but only for political reasons and, consequently, all the political considerations have to take precedence over the others.'¹²⁵ Six days later, Sangróniz wrote another telegram to Martín Artajo warning that Spain was losing day by day the political benefits obtained with the signing of the Commercial Treaty: Spain had not sent a single kilo of the agreed merchandise and the Italian officials were starting to affirm publicly that it did not intend to fulfil its commitments. Even though Spain sent 1,500 kg of tuna at the end of that month, a gesture which was very much appreciated by the

¹²²Ibid. Telegrams from García Comín to Artajo, 7 August 1946 and 22 October 1946.

¹²³For more about the problems which the Spanish economy was facing in that period and its impact in the commercial relations with other countries see Fuentes and Comín (eds.), *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil*; Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*; Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*; Viñas, *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)*.

¹²⁴BA: Gallarati Scotti Archive, Series I, folder No. 10. Report for Gallarati Scotti from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1946.

¹²⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 16 June 1946. Note of the author: the translation is mine.

Italian authorities, the commercial exchanges between the two remained stagnated until the end of the year.¹²⁶

Faced with this situation, the Italian Government had another easy excuse to break relations; it should be remembered that the main argument of the Christian Democrats for the maintenance of relations with the Francoist regime was the economic benefits which Italy could derive from it. Without these benefits, it was hardly possible to defend this policy in a Parliament where the left wing parties had considerable power. However, in spite of the political and social pressure, in spite of the worsening of the international situation of the Francoist Spain and in spite of the application problems of the Commercial Treaty, De Gasperi and his partners were determined to follow the guidelines established by the Anglo-Americans and to avoid a possible rupture with the Francoist regime.

The appointment of Nenni as Minister of Foreign Affairs

On 18 October, Pietro Nenni was appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹²⁷ As it had been agreed in July, his appointment was made official right after the end of the third session of the Paris Peace Conference which had concluded on 9 October with the approval of a text that confirmed the harsh conditions of the 1943 armistice. Despite the great efforts made by the Italian delegation headed by De Gasperi, Italy had not managed to obtain substantial improvements being forced to relinquish important territorial concessions (Trieste, most of Istria, including the provinces of Fiume, Zara and most of Gorizia and Pola to Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and the border with France was slightly modified in favour of France, the Tende valley and La Brigue), renounce its colonies (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland and Libya) and repay the war reparations.¹²⁸

The designation of Pietro Nenni for such an important position provoked strong concerns among the diplomats in both countries since the leader of the Socialist Party was well known for his aversion to the Francoist regime, an aversion that had been evidenced on several occasions. It should be remembered that, on 9 February, Nenni had written an article in *Avanti* protesting against the appointment of Gallarati Scotti as the new ambassador in Madrid. Around the middle of March 1946, the Italian politician, together with Togliatti and Cianca, had officially asked De Gasperi to recall Gallarati Scotti from Madrid and break relations with the Francoist regime.¹²⁹

¹²⁶AMAE: Bundle 2.074, folder 6–8. Commercial relations with Italy, 1946.

¹²⁷On Nenni and his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs see Enzo Santarelli, *Pietro Nenni* (Torino: UTET, 1988); and Antonio Varsori, 'De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign Policy', in Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?*, 89–116.

¹²⁸Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947*.

¹²⁹It is noteworthy that both incidents were transmitted to the State Department by the American Embassy in Rome. NARA: Central Decimal File 1945–49. Letter from

Since his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, relations with Spain became one of Nenni's main concerns. As a matter of fact, during his short stay in the Ministry, the Italian socialist dealt with a limited number of issues, relations with the Iberian country notably being one of them.¹³⁰ In reality, the policy adopted by Pietro Nenni regarding Spain appeared extremely ambiguous since his arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, he claimed publicly that he did not intend to break relations with Francoist regime.¹³¹ On the other hand, he made a number of gestures which could be easily misinterpreted by both the Spanish authorities and the moderate sector of the Italian Government. At the end of October, Nenni called Gallarati Scotti back to Rome in order to discuss the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations. On the 30th of that month, he sent a telegram to the President of the Spanish Republic in exile expressing his best wishes for the re-establishment of a democratic regime in Spain. Finally, the communist and socialist associations launched a violent anti-Spanish campaign in Italy during the month of October, a campaign which had not been stopped by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in spite of the Spanish protests.¹³²

All these confusing signals deeply worried the Spanish authorities, even more if it is considered that the designation of Pietro Nenni as Minister of Foreign Affairs coincided with the discussion of the Spanish question at the United Nations. As explained above, the Joint declaration made by the three

the US Ambassador in Rome, Alexander Kirk, to Secretary of State, 17 February 1945 and letter from the US chargé in Rome, David Key, to the State Department and the US Embassies in Madrid, London and Paris, 19 March 1946. It is evident that the US authorities, just like the British, were concerned about the possibilities of Nenni forcing the Italian Government to a change of strategy in Spain. This position contrasted with the French one which, as it has already been explained, was looking for support from other countries in its policy towards the Francoist regime.

¹³⁰Italian State Central Archive. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS). Pietro Nenni papers, Carte di Pietro Nenni (CPN), Government series. By reviewing these documents, it is possible to verify the small number of subjects that Nenni dealt with during his stay in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is noteworthy though, that one of these subjects was the revision of the Peace Treaty; in fact, Nenni was convinced that, thanks to his good relations with Moscow, he could convince the Soviet Union to moderate its demands in the Peace Treaty which still needed to be ratified. Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947*.

¹³¹His first declarations in this regard were done to the socialist newspaper *Italia Nuova*, where Nenni claimed that the international situation did not allow adopting this measure. AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from García Comín to Sangróniz, 18 October 1946. Ten days later he confirmed to Tarchiani and Migone that the Italian policy towards Spain would follow the lines decided after the Potsdam declaration. DDI: Series X, Vol. IV, Doc. No. 452: Telegram from Nenni to Tarchiani and Migone, 29 October 1946.

¹³²AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 1 November 1946.

big Western powers had averted France from taking the Spanish question to the Security Council in the United Nations. However, the Soviet Union was not willing to miss a great opportunity to attack capitalist diplomacy, and instructed the Polish representative in the UN to denounce the Francoist regime in front of the Security Council. On 15 April, the Security Council held a meeting and decided to include the Polish proposal in its agenda. The Anglo-American policy had thus failed in its attempts to exclude the Spanish question from the international debate. Now it was in the hands of the United Nations, and the new objective of the British and American diplomats was to avoid the adoption of radical measures which could provoke another civil conflict in the country.¹³³

The Polish proposal was discussed for several weeks in different committees and sub-committees but no conclusion was reached, mainly because both interventionist and non-interventionist states decided to stand firm in their positions. In the end, the Spanish question was left momentarily aside, but remained open for further discussions.¹³⁴ On 24 October, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed to restart the discussion in the General Assembly concerning the relations which the member states should have with the Francoist regime. One week later, the General Committee examined this proposal and decided to include it in the Agenda.¹³⁵

At this stage, the Spanish authorities did not know what to think regarding Nenni: on the one hand, they believed that the socialist Minister would not break relations with the Francoist regime without consulting De Gasperi and the Anglo-Americans, firm defenders of a policy of non-intervention. On the other hand, they could not forget that Nenni had been fighting in Spain during the Civil War in favour of the Republic, and feared that he would be subjected to many pressures from the Socialist and the Communist Party to break relations with the Spanish regime. In addition, if the General Assembly adopted a resolution against the Francoist regime it would be very difficult for Nenni and for the Italian Government to maintain relations.¹³⁶

At the beginning of November, Nenni and Sangróniz decided to schedule a meeting. The official objective was to discuss the situation of five Italians who had been sentenced to thirty years in a Spanish prison, accused of terrorist activities against the regime.¹³⁷ However, the meeting would also serve to measure the status of bilateral relations and solve all the doubts and uncertainties for good. To the surprise of the Spanish Ambassador, the encounter was conducted in 'a cordial atmosphere'. It should be pointed out that Sangróniz had never before met with Pietro Nenni, and taking

¹³³Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 156–7.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 182.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, 206–7.

¹³⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 15 November 1946.

¹³⁷*Ibid.* Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 1 November 1946.

into account his previous attitude towards Spain, he feared a tense reunion which could provoke a diplomatic conflict. Nevertheless, nothing of the sort occurred. The pardon for the five Italians imprisoned in Spain, granted by the Spanish Government on 31 October, obviously contributed to this cordiality, but that was not the only reason for the friendly conduct of affairs.¹³⁸ Nenni was well aware that there was nothing he could do to alter the diplomatic situation and he assured his counterparts that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to continue with the policy delineated by De Gasperi and the Anglo-Americans.

Fortunately Mr. Ambassador [said Nenni] I am not the kind of person who likes to hit a wall. If I could modify the internal regime of Spain I would possibly do it, but I cannot and I am forced to follow the actual policy, unless the Assembly of the UN would adopt collective measures to break off relations with Spain, something which does not seem very likely.

After this strong statement, Nenni added that the Italian Government was determined to send Gallarati Scotti back to Madrid in order to show that Italy was not going to break relations with the Francoist regime. Once the Spanish Ambassador was reassured, the conversation concentrated on the other big unresolved question: the commercial traffic between the two countries. It should be remembered that the Spanish-Italian exchanges were nearly blocked after the signature of the Commercial Treaty. The Italian authorities, understanding the difficulties of the Spanish economy in fulfilling its commitments, proposed a solution which might benefit both parties: Spain would make an effort to export as much as it could until the end of the year and, in the meantime, both governments would begin the negotiation of another commercial treaty, a new treaty which would solve all the problems experienced during the year. The Spanish authorities conceded to the Italian proposal: they also wanted to streamline bilateral commerce, but they needed to be sure that Nenni would not break relations.¹³⁹

The Italian Minister of Foreign affairs declared that he intended to carry on with the negotiations to sign a new commercial treaty which would

¹³⁸AMAE: R. 1.280, Folder 1. Telegram from García Comín to Artajo, 30 October 1946 and telegram from Artajo to García Comín, 1 November 1946. Although the sources do not clarify if the pardon was granted to satisfy Nenni, it remains the most likely explanation. In any case, the Spanish authorities, advised by Gallarati Scotti, had planned since Nenni's appointment to use this pardon as a means to improve the atmosphere during the first meeting between Sangróniz and the socialist Minister. Nenni's handwritten notes show that this question was important to him. ACS: CPN, Government Series, Spain.

¹³⁹AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from García Comín to Artajo, 22 October 1946.

normalize commercial relations for good; however, he added that two changes had to take place: first of all, the negotiations had to be held in Madrid, to avoid possible criticisms from his party partners; secondly, the war debt had to be excluded from the negotiations. It should be clarified that the elimination of the war debt from the commercial negotiations had become one of the most important objectives pursued by Nenni. He believed that, although the present circumstances forced him to maintain relations, some limits and conditions had to be established. In addition, the elimination of the war debt was a gesture which could be sold to the left-wing sectors of Italian society which anticipated the rupture of relations with the Francoist regime. Sangróniz said that both points had to be discussed by the Spanish official organs but that, in principle, he saw no obstacles. The meeting between the two politicians concluded with the commitment to retain close contact, and to work loyally at least until the international circumstances would change. It was evident that the arrival of Nenni at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not brought about the catastrophic consequences that the Spanish authorities had feared.¹⁴⁰

The main reason behind Nenni's decision not to break relations with the Francoist regime is arguably due to the pressure received to maintain the *status quo* in bilateral relations. This pressure came from two different sectors: on the one hand, from the centre and right-wing sectors of the Italian Government which had already started to press hard in July, when the parties were negotiating the composition of the new government; and on the other hand, from the Anglo-Americans who, as already explained, counted on Italian support in the Spanish question.¹⁴¹

The best example of the British attitude can be seen in the meeting held between Prunas and Jack Ward, commercial attaché of the British Embassy in Rome, at the end of October 1946; during this encounter the Italian diplomat said that he was deeply worried about the policy that Nenni might adopt towards Spain. Prunas admitted that he had nothing concrete to go on so far, but that he feared that Nenni could turn towards breaking off relations between Italy and Spain. After consulting the telegrams exchanged between the Embassy and the Foreign Office, Jack Ward sent a letter to the Foreign Office in which he recommended that the Italian Secretary of State

¹⁴⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 1 November 1946. The demands made by Nenni were further discussed in Madrid by the Italian attaché, Francesco Vanni D'Archirafi, and the Spanish Undersecretary of Economy, Navasqués. This conversation clearly supports the idea that Nenni was determined to eliminate the war debt as an element of Spanish-Italian relations, BA, folder No. 10. Report from Vanni to Gallarati Scotti, 27 November 1946.

¹⁴¹AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 3 July 1946.

talked with Nenni about Spain in their next meeting since 'there may be some fire behind his [Prunas] smoke'.¹⁴²

According to the British diplomat, it was important to ensure that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs consulted De Gasperi before proceeding to commit himself to any anti-Franco gesture.¹⁴³ The Foreign Office took note of the suggestions made by Ward and decided that the best way of letting the Italians know the British views about Spain would be if the Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, had a word with Nicolò Carandini, the Italian Ambassador in London, on the occasion of the former's trip to New York.¹⁴⁴ A few days later, Nenni received a report detailing the negotiations held between the representatives of the four major powers on the Spanish question; the document was extremely clear on one point: the adoption of unilateral gestures against the Francoist regime, such as the breaking-off of relations, had to be avoided momentarily.¹⁴⁵ Six days later, 'Palazzo Chigi' received a note from the US Government in which the State Department expressed its wish that all the European countries which maintained normal relations with Spain did not modify their policy.¹⁴⁶ The idea of not intervening in Spanish and Italian affairs had been, by that time, clearly abandoned.

On the other hand, pressure from the left-wing sectors to break relations with the Francoist regime was almost non-existent during this period. The Nenni papers show that the Spanish question was not even raised during the meeting of the leadership of the party on 20 November. At that stage, the Italian Socialist Party was more concerned about its possible internal division than Nenni's attitude regarding the Francoist regime.¹⁴⁷ The analysis of the PCI sources supports a similar assumption: the Spanish question was not raised during this period when Nenni was Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴⁸ In addition, the Italian press of all ideologies maintained a moderate tone in its

¹⁴²NAUK: FO: 371/60475 Letter from Jack Ward to the Foreign Office, 25 October 1946.

¹⁴³Ibid. Letter from Ward to the Foreign Office, 25 October 1946.

¹⁴⁴Ibid. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 6 November 1946.

¹⁴⁵BA: Gallarati Scotti Archive, Series I, folder No. 10. Report for Nenni written by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 November 1946.

¹⁴⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 20 November 1946.

¹⁴⁷ACS: CPN, Party papers, Meeting of the General Direction of the Party (20 November 1946). Folder 88, file 2194. The meeting was entirely devoted to solve the problems inside the party. In the end, it was a big failure and Saragat, with other socialists, left the party and founded the PSLI. This event had an enormous relevance in Italian history. In order to know more about it, see Galli, *I partiti politici italiani (1943–2000). Dalla Resistenza al governo dell'Ulivo*, 57–8.

¹⁴⁸Italian Communist Party Archive, Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano (APCI), Gramsci Foundation, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci (FIG). Moscow papers. Records of the Direction and Italian Communist Party papers.

references to Spain.¹⁴⁹ It is probable that the left-wing parties, aware of the pressure exerted over Nenni, wanted to show him their support especially with a delicate case like the Spanish question.

There is little doubt that, when Nenni took charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was considering breaking relations with Spain. He had already expressed his intention to do it as soon as possible during the meeting he held in Paris in August 1946 with José Giral, Head of the Spanish Republican Government in the exile. Two months later he wrote the following lines regarding Spain in his diary: 'What to do with Spain? I have discussed it today with [Randolfo] Pacciardi who held a public meeting yesterday demanding the breaking off of relations with Franco. I am naturally in favor of the rupture [...] In the meantime I have called back our Ambassador.'¹⁵⁰ At the end of October, Nenni indicated to the French Ambassador in Rome that Gallarati Scotti was not going back to Madrid.¹⁵¹

In spite of this initial determination, Nenni quickly became aware that he did not have many options left in his policy towards the Francoist regime. The Italian socialist was forced to harmonize his actions with the Anglo-Americans, and limit his personal intervention to small gestures like the elimination of the war debt from the commercial negotiations. Nenni tried to impose his criteria and struggled with the Italian officials who did not want to relinquish financial control over assets that could considerably benefit the battered Italian economy. In the end, however, Nenni lost the political battle and the war debt was discussed again by the Italian technicians during the first months of 1947.¹⁵²

It was not possible for Italy, a country which was still struggling to recover its sovereignty, to oppose the Allies and break relations with the Francoist regime unilaterally. This would have severely damaged the country's position in the renegotiation of the Peace Treaty, which still needed to be ratified, and, as already explained, remained a key issue in Italian foreign policy in the post-war period. More particularly, the Italian socialist wanted to revise the conditions regarding Trieste, and influence the discussions in the UN about the future of the colonies.¹⁵³ Nenni almost certainly understood these limitations, and assumed that there was nothing to do apart from

¹⁴⁹ AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 3 November 1946.

¹⁵⁰ Pietro Nenni, *Tempo Di Guerra Fredda: Diari, 1943–1956* (Milano: SugarCo, 1981), 288.

¹⁵¹ AMAEF, Europe 1944–49, Spain, 69. Letter from the French Ambassador in Spain, Georges Balay, to Bidault, 28 November 1946.

¹⁵² AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 20 November 1946 and ASMAE: Deposit A, Spain, 1947, folder 156.

¹⁵³ Saul Kelly, *Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the US and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

waiting for a resolution from the United Nations which could change the policy dictated by the Anglo-Americans: in the meantime, the circumstances obliged him to maintain diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime and thus obtain the maximum benefit out of it.¹⁵⁴

These factors help to explain the surprisingly positive atmosphere which surrounded the first meeting between Sangróniz and Nenni, a meeting which was regarded with satisfaction both by the Italians and the Spanish.¹⁵⁵ However, this encounter also marked the beginning of a phase of tension and uncertainty in their bilateral relations. It is true that Nenni had claimed that he intended to follow the policy delineated by De Gasperi and supported by the Anglo-Americans but, at the same time, he had warned that, in case of a UN resolution in opposition to the Francoist regime, he would be forced to adapt his policy to the decision taken by the international organization. Spanish-Italian relations would be at a stand-still until the Spanish question was solved in the United Nations.

The UN resolution and the withdrawal of the Italian Ambassador: life remains the same

On 12 December, after long and tense discussions, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a resolution condemning the Francoist regime and recommending all the member states to withdraw their ambassadors in Madrid as soon as possible.¹⁵⁶ The UN recommendation was received differently by the various sectors in the Italian Government: on the one hand, the centre and right-wing parties, represented principally by the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, were concerned because it hindered the policy which had been adopted since the end of the war; this sector was well aware of the important interests which Italy still had in Spain and feared that, by withdrawing its ambassador, they might be put in danger. On the other hand, the left-wing parties in the government were reasonably satisfied with the UN resolution, and even though they expected a more radical recommendation (the complete breaking off of relations), the withdrawal of the ambassadors constituted a considerable achievement and was seen as another step in the fight against the Francoist regime.¹⁵⁷

In fact, the Italian Government did not have many options left. Two days after the resolution was approved, Pietro Nenni wrote to Gallarati Scotti announcing that the Italian authorities were discussing their official position regarding Spain but warned that he would be probably called back to

¹⁵⁴Norman Kogan, *Italy and the Allies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956).

¹⁵⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 20 November 1946.

¹⁵⁶Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*, 154–5.

¹⁵⁷AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 26 December 1946.

Rome, abandoning his charge in Madrid definitively.¹⁵⁸ It was evident that the Italian Government needed time to analyse its alternatives and to know the exact position adopted by the other Western countries, especially Great Britain. It should be considered that Britain was the only major Western power which still had an ambassador in Madrid at that time since France and the United States had already withdrawn them. This explains why Italy was so keen to moderate its actions over Spain with a view to currying favour with the British.¹⁵⁹

In this uncertain context, the Spanish authorities decided to immediately mobilize its diplomatic capacity to prevent Italy from adopting a measure which would hinder the positive development of bilateral relations, by using three arguments. In the first place, Italy was not a member of the United Nations and, subsequently, was not legally obliged to follow any of the resolutions issued by the international organization. Secondly, the withdrawal of the Italian Ambassador from Madrid was a hostile measure which would contrast with the positivist policy followed by the Spanish Government, full of friendly gestures towards Italy. Among these gestures, the Spanish authorities underlined the following: the Spanish recognition of the Badoglio Government during the difficult times of the Second World War, the recognition and payment of the debt from the Civil War, the devolution of the grain which the Mussolini Government lent to Spain in 1936, the liberation of five Italian citizens arrested on entering the Iberian Peninsula to fight the Francoist regime with the Spanish resistance and the recognition of the new Republic showing that Spain was willing to develop the bilateral relations without taking the ideological differences between the two countries into consideration. Lastly, the withdrawal of the Italian Ambassador would inevitably harm the many interests which Italy still had in Spain.

All these arguments were repeated constantly during the month of December but they had no effect.¹⁶⁰ On 16 December, Gallarati Scotti was informed that the British Government had finally decided to recall its ambassador by the end of the month.¹⁶¹ It was clear that Italy, which had aligned itself with Great Britain in its policy regarding the Francoist regime

¹⁵⁸DDI: Series X, Vol. IV, Doc. No. 600. Telegram from Nenni to Gallarati Scotti, 14 December 1946.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰On 14 December, Martín Artajo held a meeting with Gallarati Scotti; five days later, Sangróniz paid a visit to Pietro Nenni. On 23 December Sangróniz went to see Nenni again; three days later, Gallarati Scotti visited Martín Artajo for the last time. In spite of the numerous meetings and the cordial atmosphere which characterized them, the Italian decision was immovable. AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1.

¹⁶¹DDI: Series X, Vol. IV, Doc. No. 609. Telegram from Gallarati Scotti to Nenni, 16 December 1946.

since the end of the war, had no other option but to once again follow the British path on this question. On the 20th of that month, the Italian Cabinet decided to recall Gallarati Scotti immediately and one week later he left Madrid after almost two years in his position.¹⁶²

The Italians feared that the withdrawal of Gallarati Scotti could provoke a severe deterioration in bilateral relations thus jeopardizing commercial negotiations and economic interests in Spain. However, the Spanish reaction was more moderate and sensible than the Italian diplomats had expected. On 21 December, only one day after the Italian Cabinet had decided to recall Gallarati Scotti, the Spanish Council of Minister held an extraordinary session to discuss the situation after the UN resolution. In it, it was decided that Sangróniz should remain in Rome in order to preserve the important interests that Spain had in the transalpine country. This decision was extremely unusual, even more so considering that at the same Council of Ministers it was decided to recall the ambassadors from Washington and London.¹⁶³ As a matter of fact, Italy was the only Western country which continued to have a Spanish Ambassador in its capital.

Even though it is not easy to explain such a decision, mainly because of the opacity of Spanish policy-making of the time, it is possible to advance a number of hypotheses to shed some light on the Spanish decision. In the first place, the Spanish authorities believed that Italy had recalled its ambassador only because it had no other option in its present circumstances (given that it was outside the United Nations and with limited sovereignty). There was the conviction that Italy was still a potential ally which would normalize relations once the opportunity to do so arose.¹⁶⁴

Secondly, Spain was still interested in negotiating a new commercial agreement with Italy and, in order to do so under the best conditions, it was convenient to maintain the ambassador in Rome. Although the previous commercial treaty had not worked according to expectations, the Spanish authorities had realized the great export capacity of Italy and the enormous potential of its industry, factors that could considerably benefit the national economy.¹⁶⁵

Thirdly, Spain was starting to develop intense cultural activity in Italy, and the presence of Sangróniz, one of its main ideologists, was necessary. In fact, when Sangróniz arrived in Rome, the Spanish diplomat became conscious very quickly of the large presence of Spanish culture in Italy thanks

¹⁶²ACS, CPN, Government Series. De Gasperi's second term (2 August 1946 to 30 December 1946). Folder 105, file 2334. Telegram from Nenni to Gallarati Scotti, 21 December 1946.

¹⁶³AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 21 December 1946.

¹⁶⁴AMAE: Bundle 1466, folder 23. Letter from Artajo to Sangróniz, 4 January 1947.

¹⁶⁵AMAE: Bundle 2.410, folders 10–11. Report from the Spanish attaché in Rome, García de Llera, to the Undersecretary of Commerce Navasqués, 11 October 1946.

to the many cultural institutions in place there. Especially important were the 'Real Colegio Mayor de San Clemente de los Españoles' in Bologna, which housed students and intellectuals without a break since its foundation in the fourteenth century, and the 'Academia Española de Bellas Artes' in Rome, founded in 1873 to stimulate the study of the Arts.¹⁶⁶ Sangróniz's idea, shared by Minister Artajo, was that, using the prestige of Spanish culture, the dictatorship would improve its image abroad, subsequently obtaining important diplomatic benefits.¹⁶⁷ Behind this strategy lay the genuine conviction that, despite the existence of a strong anti-Francoist sentiment within the Italian society, 'there are infinite people that see us with sympathy'.¹⁶⁸ Accordingly, the best way to channel all that latent friendliness was through the fostering of a dynamic cultural action which reached out to a majority of Italians. Especially important in the overall scheme of things were the more traditional and conservative sectors of the Italian society (former fascists, monarchics and fervent Catholics) which were more predisposed to see Spain under a more positive light. The main core of the Spanish cultural propaganda had to be aimed at these sectors, always stressing the important links which united both countries: Mediterranean, Catholicism and 'Latinità'. In this way these three concepts became not only an essential instrument that would facilitate the diplomatic contacts established between both governments, but also a core element of the cultural underpinnings of the Spanish-Italian relationship.¹⁶⁹

The economic interests that Spain had in Italy constitute another aspect which should be considered in order to understand the Spanish decision not to recall Sangróniz. Even though these cannot be compared to the Italian assets in Spain, their relevance cannot be overlooked either. Around the end of the 1930s, Spain counted an ex-patriot community of circa 1,500 people mainly concentrated in the cities of Genova, Milan, Rome, Turin, Trieste, Palermo and Naples. Among these people, only a minority (around 15 per cent) carried out economic activities in Italy. These activities were mainly conducted in Genova, the centre of the Spanish economy in the transalpine country. As a matter of fact, Genova housed the only Spanish economic organism (the Spanish chamber of commerce) and all the companies with Spanish capital. Among these, the 'Ditta Enrico Balbontin', devoted to the

¹⁶⁶ AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 29 June 1945.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 December 1946. AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 23. Instructions sent by Artajo to Sangróniz, 15 June 1946, and letter from Artajo to Sangróniz, 20 December 1946.

¹⁶⁸ AMAE: Bundle 2.495, folder 123. Letter from Mario Ponce de León to Martín Artajo, 17 January 1947.

¹⁶⁹ More details on Spanish-Italian cultural relations in Pablo del Hierro, 'El tándem Sangróniz-Ponce de León. La acción cultural española en Italia durante el primer franquismo, 1945–1952', *Historia del presente*, No. 21, 2013, 9–28.

metallurgic sector and worth 1,500,000 lire, the 'Casa Saccomanno Palau' and 'Casa Arturo Rahola y Compañía', both devoted to the trade of tinned fish, stood out. Especially important were these two last companies since they managed to control a large part of the tinned fish market in Italy at the beginning of the 1940s. Evidently, the figures of these companies were quasi insignificant, especially if compared with the foreign investments made by other European companies during the same periods. However, these interests still had to be protected by the Spanish Government regardless of their small size.

A more important Spanish interest in Italy was related to religious communities. In fact, the bulk of the Spanish ex-patriot community residing in Italy was associated with religious activities as part of the numerous Spanish Catholic institutions present in Italy (mainly in Turin, Rome and Naples). These people played a very important role not only as divulgators of the Spanish culture in Italy (many of them worked in Catholic schools and universities teaching Spanish language and literature), but also as liaisons with the Vatican and the Italian Church. In this regard, it is important to understand the relevance of the Vatican in Spanish foreign policy after 1945. Accordingly, it was essential that the Spanish Embassy in Rome protected the interests of the religious communities present in Italy which acted as direct mediators with the Holy See and the Italian Catholic hierarchies.¹⁷⁰

Two days after the Spanish decision not to recall Sangróniz, the Spanish Ambassador held another meeting with Nenni in order to update each other on the situation. In it, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs explained that the withdrawal of the ambassador would be conducted with the greatest discretion and through a diplomatic formula, previously agreed to with the British, which would soften the blow. In fact, the official status of Gallarati Scotti would not be withdrawn, but temporarily recalled to hold talks. Finally, it was agreed to extend the commercial agreement for two more months in order to have more time to prepare the imminent negotiations to stipulate a new treaty.¹⁷¹ Evidently, this diplomatic manoeuvre was merely esthetical, an Italian ruse to save bilateral relations and future commercial negotiations. The Spanish diplomats knew this but decided to take no notice of it and work to improve bilateral relations.¹⁷²

As can be seen, very little had changed in Spanish-Italian relations after the withdrawal of Gallarati Scotti. As the Italian attaché explained to Gallarati Scotti in one of his frequent letters on the state of bilateral relations,

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 23 December 1946.

¹⁷²General Archive of the Administration, Archivo General de la Administración (AGA): 54/16814, Inventory of Spanish interests in Italy.

'everything is developing fine here, in order and with harmony'.¹⁷³ The new Italian strategy, which had been partially delineated by Gallarati Scotti, who continued to supervise bilateral relations from Rome, was to avoid new conflicts with Spain and to concentrate on the negotiations for the new commercial treaty.¹⁷⁴ This agreement was finally signed on 20 June, thus becoming the best example that diplomatic relations between the two countries had remained unaltered in spite of the withdrawal of Gallarati Scotti.¹⁷⁵

Conclusions

Spanish-Italian relations entered a new phase at the beginning of 1945. This was mainly due to a change in Spanish foreign policy towards the Kingdom of Italy which was now regarded as a potential ally for the post-war period. The new Spanish policy towards the Kingdom of Italy was further developed during the summer of 1945 with the appointment of Alberto Martín Artajo as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Artajo was genuinely convinced that Spain and Italy shared the same problems and the same interests in the international arena and, therefore, that it would be relatively easy to form a bilateral partnership aimed at defending the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean area. In this regard, this chapter has clearly shown that, contrary to the view of some historians, most notably Juan Carlos Pereira, Italy was viewed in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' as a primary objective of the Spanish foreign policy during the post-war period.¹⁷⁶

On the other hand, and despite the political changes which took place in the country after the end of the war, the Italian Government decided to maintain its policy towards the Francoist regime which had been designed by the Badoglio Government already in the autumn of 1943. Even though political cooperation was not contemplated as an option, both the Parri and the De Gasperi Governments understood that the country still had important interests in Spain which needed to be defended and, if possible, fostered. If the Kingdom of Italy wanted to regain the prestige lost during the war and again play a significant role in the international sphere, it was necessary to mobilize all the assets at their disposal, even if it implied maintaining diplomatic relations with a dictatorship like Franco's. However, that was not the only explanation of the Italian policy towards the Francoist regime.

¹⁷³BA: Gallarati Scotti Archive, Series I, folder No. 12. Letter from Vanni to Gallarati Scotti, 22 January 1947.

¹⁷⁴Ibid. Letter from Vanni to Gallarati Scotti, 6 February 1947.

¹⁷⁵AMAE: Bundle 2.410, folders 10–11. Spanish-Italian Commercial Agreement, 20 June 1947. The agreement was similar to the one signed in 1946. The most relevant modification was the exclusion of the war debt which was decided by the Italian technicians in April 1947. ASMAE, DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1947, folder No. 158.

¹⁷⁶Pereira, 'Franquismo y democracia'.

In fact, as the Nenni example has shown, even if the Italian Government had wanted to adopt a unilateral policy towards Spain, it would not have been possible without the consent of the major powers, thus evidencing the limited room for manoeuvre which the De Gasperi Government had in the international sphere. It should be considered that Italy was still struggling to recover its sovereignty, and that removing itself from the Anglo-American position concerning the Spanish question would have weakened the country even more in the renegotiation of the Peace Treaty, thus decreasing the possibilities to obtain a favourable resolution regarding the questions of Trieste and the future of the colonies, issues that still needed to be discussed by the Allies and the UN respectively.¹⁷⁷

In this regard, this chapter has also shown that Washington and London played a crucial role in the three most important moments in Spanish-Italian relations between 1945 and 1947. During the first months of 1945 the Anglo-Americans exerted pressure on the Spanish Government compelling it to end relations with the RSI representation in Spain (one of the main obstacles in the process of diplomatic normalization) and to revise its economic policy towards the Kingdom of Italy. From the month of July 1945 and until the end of the year, the Anglo-Americans also decided to intervene in the commercial negotiations between Spain and Italy in order to speed up the conclusion of the agreement, an agreement which had to include the settlement of the war debt. Eventually, these interventions, especially the British one, turned out to be crucial for the breaking of the deadlock in the negotiations. In October 1946, finally, the US and British Governments put pressure on Pietro Nenni so that he would avoid adopting a unilateral decision regarding the Francoist regime, in this case, the breaking off of relations. It was evident that, even if the Italian Government was not an important actor in the creation of the policies towards the Francoist regime, London and Washington regarded its support as essential at least to consolidate and legitimize these policies. Again, the Anglo-American intervention was a determinant factor in Nenni's final decision to send Gallarati Scotti back to Madrid and maintain diplomatic relations with Spain.

It should be noted that all these diplomatic interventions were led by the British Government even if they always counted on US support. Contrary to the view of some historians, most notably Moshe Gat and Frederick Samuel Northedge, the analysis of this case study supports the idea that Britain had not abandoned its power policy in Europe after 1945 and that it was still pursuing hegemony in the Old Continent.¹⁷⁸ At the very least it definitely behaved like a hegemonic power when it intervened in Spanish-Italian

¹⁷⁷Kelly, *Cold War in the Desert*.

¹⁷⁸Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 109. Frederick Samuel Northedge, *Descent from Power, British Foreign Policy 1945–1973* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974).

relations. Obviously, this hegemonic behaviour was compatible with its attempts to persuade the United States to continue their involvement in Europe. The British diplomats realized that the country did not have the material capabilities to maintain an exclusive leadership over Europe, but, with US support, it would be able to sustain its hegemonic position in the Old Continent.

This idea is reinforced by the Spanish and the Italian perceptions of the British role in post-war Europe. As the general instructions sent by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Sangróniz prove, Britain, and not the US, was regarded as the main international point of reference and Europe's natural leader. On the other hand, when the Italian Government needed external support to unblock commercial negotiations with Spain, this support was sought from the British Government. Moreover, when the Christian Democrats feared a unilateral decision on Spain from Minister Nenni, they again requested an intervention by the British to dissuade the Italian socialist. In this regard, it should be clarified that, in spite of the limited room for manoeuvre, the Italian Government in general adeptly handled the Anglo-American interventionism. Well aware that the country still had important interests to be defended in Spain, the Christian Democrats used the US and British pressure to maintain diplomatic relations with Spain thus circumventing possible demands for a rupture by the left-wing parties. This was done during the Nenni period as Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also during the debates on the Italian foreign policy at the constituent assembly in March 1946.

Finally, this chapter has also contributed to improving existing knowledge of Spanish foreign policy immediately after 1945, and to challenging the concept of 'international isolation'. During the two first years after the end of the war, there was great uncertainty regarding the Francoist regime. Nobody knew what was going to happen, if Franco was going to resign, if the opposition abroad would overthrow him and substitute the dictatorship with a monarchy, or if Franco would manage to stay in power. There was also uncertainty about the measures to be adopted by the international community: should it forbid Spain from participating in international organizations? Should it adopt economic sanctions towards the Francoist regime? Or should it maybe foster a military action? The only general agreement was that the Francoist regime, the last redoubt of Fascism in Europe, born with Hitler and Mussolini's aid, should disappear from the international arena as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, all the West European countries seized upon the uncertain future of Spain to sign the pertinent commercial agreements that would settle their national interests in Spanish territory. Therefore, between 1945 and 1947, none of these decided to break relations with the Francoist regime. Not Britain, not the US, not Italy, not Ireland, not the Netherlands, nor Denmark. The only government which took a similar action was that of France which, pressed by public opinion,

decided to close the border at the end of February 1946. However, even France had signed a commercial agreement with Spain on 15 September 1945.¹⁷⁹ Taking these elements into account, it appears necessary to qualify the term 'international isolation' when using it to characterize Spanish foreign policy between 1945 and the end of 1946.¹⁸⁰ This chapter also raised questions about the nature of Spanish foreign policy in the following period because, as has been proved, Spanish-Italian relations changed very little after the UN condemnatory resolution and the withdrawal of the ambassador. The implications of such deserve further consideration.

¹⁷⁹AMAE: Bundle 6.285, folders 2–3. Spanish economic relations with foreign countries.

¹⁸⁰Armero, *La política exterior de Franco*; Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

3

Towards the Cold War: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Rising Tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union

By the beginning of 1947, relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had greatly deteriorated. In February 1946 George F. Kennan sent the 'Long Telegram' and just one month later, Churchill delivered his famous 'iron curtain' speech in Fulton Missouri. The idea of actively confronting the Soviet Union started to spread in the Truman Administration. At the same time, the economic crisis was forcing the British Government to revise its strategy in the Mediterranean; in February, it announced that it was no longer possible to maintain the presence of its army and the linked military aid to Greece and Turkey. In March 1947, Truman reacted and demanded \$400 million from Congress for assistance to Greece and Turkey; in addition, he declared in what became known as the Truman Doctrine, that the US Government must contain the expansion of the Soviet power around the globe. Three months later, George Marshall, recently appointed as Secretary of State, announced the administration's readiness to provide substantial assistance for a European Recovery Program.¹ The purpose of the plan was to provide impetus for economic growth and to improve living conditions all over the world, starting in Europe, in order to prevent the expansion of Communism.²

¹Sallie Pisani, *The CIA and the Marshall Plan* (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1991).

²The international context of the Cold War is discussed in Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds.), *British Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); Effie Pedaliu, *Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Peter Hennessy, *Never Again: Britain 1945–51* (London: John Cape, 1992); Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941–1947* (London: John Cape, 1982); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (London: Routledge, 1994); Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945*; Terry H. Anderson,

The aim of this chapter will thus be to analyse how Spanish-Italian relations evolved in an increasingly tense international context which was being delineated between 1947 and 1948. Furthermore, the next pages will discuss the decline of Britain as a hegemonic power in the Mediterranean area. As a matter of fact, the international events described above (especially the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey and the Truman Doctrine), have been traditionally interpreted by historians as a clear sign of the decline of British hegemony which had already started in 1945, and the ascent of the United States as Europe's new leader.³ The analysis of Spanish-Italian relations during this period will contribute to this debate by challenging the classic assumptions on the British 'descent from power', by showing that London continued to exert a determinant influence in the interactions between Madrid and Rome.

Another major element of this chapter will also be the impact of the new Italian foreign policy on bilateral relations. This was, in fact, the period of Italy's big international choices, when it finally decided to align with the Western bloc in an attempt to overcome the negative heritage of the Second World War and to play a more active role in international relations. With the exclusion of the Socialists and the Communists, the new Christian Democrat Government was free to make a series of choices which would otherwise have proven problematic. In this sense, Italy joined the Marshall Plan (1947), advanced a proposal to establish a custom union with France (1947) and became one of the original members of the Atlantic Treaty (1949). At the same time, Italy made a great effort to recover its prestige lost during the war in order to play a significant role in the new international system. As a result of this, the Italian authorities tried to negotiate a revision of the Peace Treaty which had been ratified on 10 February 1947, in order to recover the colonies in North Africa and regain control over Trieste. All these attempts were rejected by the Western Allies showing that, even if the

The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944–47 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981); Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Norton, 1971); John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Tony Judt (ed.), *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939–48* (London: Routledge, 1989); Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); John W. Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993).

³Jeremy Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500* (London: Routledge, 2008); Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997*; Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*; James, *Europe Reborn*; Judt, *Postwar*; Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*; Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*; McNay, *Acheson and Empire*; Porter, *Empire and Superempire*.

international situation of the country had improved since the end of the War, Italy was still far from having a normal and autonomous foreign policy.⁴

As a result of these changes, and even if the main international points of reference for Italian diplomacy remained as London, Washington and Paris, Spain began to be regarded as a potentially attractive option. De Gasperi and Carlo Sforza's foreign policy was aimed at winning for Italy in all fields of international relations, a status similar to that of London and Paris, which implied becoming a regional power, European and Mediterranean. However, in order to achieve this goal, the Italian statesmen understood that they would have to make use of all available means, including the improvement of relations with the Francoist regime. From this perspective, Spain was not only viewed as a country where the Italian economy could obtain important benefits, but also as a region where the Italian Government could display its power policy by exerting significant political influence.

However, it will be shown that this policy had considerable limitations, mainly imposed by the major powers, displaying that the De Gasperi Government had less room for manoeuvre than it had originally thought. As a result of these limitations, the Italian strategy to improve diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime clearly backfired. In fact, the period 1947–8 constitutes a trough in Spanish-Italian relations from which it would not fully recover until the early 1950s.

Spain, Italy and the Marshall Plan: the deterioration of bilateral relations

Italy and the possible inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan

As it has been explained in the previous chapter, the withdrawal of Gallarati Scotti from the Italian Embassy in Madrid did not have a strong impact on Spanish-Italian relations which continued to follow the same general lines as in 1946. On the one hand, the Italian Government would continue to follow the Anglo-American policy regarding the Francoist regime, avoiding any intervention in Spanish domestic affairs, supporting the Spanish participation in international organizations and, more importantly, working to foster commercial exchanges between the two countries. Regarding the appointment of an ambassador, the Italian Government seized every possible opportunity to normalize diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime.⁵ On the other hand, the Spanish diplomats tried to increase

⁴Barbagallo, *L'Italia Repubblicana*; Colarizi, *Storia Politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006*; Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'Unità a Oggi*; Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*; Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*; Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947*.

⁵AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo informing of a meeting with the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlo Sforza, 18 April 1948.

commercial exchanges and to use economic relations with Italy as a tool to foster political cooperation. In this sense, the only new element was the pressure exerted by the Spanish authorities to obtain a rapid normalization of diplomatic relations.⁶

However, this newly acquired routine was suddenly altered by a fundamentally important piece of international policy: the Marshall Plan. Immediately following the speech delivered by George Marshall, the Secretary of State, on 5 June, offering American aid to promote European recovery and reconstruction, Ernest Bevin contacted Bidault in order to prepare a quick response to the Secretary of State's proposal. Both Ministers agreed that the Soviet Union had to be invited, and a Three Powers conference was arranged for late June. The major subject to be discussed in the conference was the possible participation of the Soviet Union, but there were others; among them, the potential inclusion of Franco's Spain.⁷

In the opening address to the conference on 27 June, Georges Bidault proposed the temporary exclusion of Spain. Six days later the British and the French Governments agreed to publish a note explicitly excluding the Francoist regime from the European Conference for Economic Cooperation convened in Paris to determine the resources and needs of Europe.⁸ This decision was immediately backed by the State Department which, in that moment, continued to state publicly and in front of the Spanish diplomats that no economic aid would be given as long as Franco remained in power.⁹

Even though it was obvious that participation in the European Recovery Program (ERP) would bring important benefits both in the economic and political fields, the Spanish first reaction to its exclusion 'was one of pride and feigned ignorance'.¹⁰ Spain would participate in the Paris Conference only if it was officially invited and was not willing to jeopardize its sovereignty just to receive economic aid from the US. This reaction, so typical of the policy of dignity adopted by Minister Artajo, would be repeated in other moments, such as the negotiations for the Atlantic Treaty Government.¹¹

⁶Ibid.

⁷Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*; Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*; Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51*; Viñas, *En las garras del águila*; Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question*.

⁸Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 61.

⁹NARA, Central Decimal File, 1945–49, box 3320. Letter from the US attaché in Madrid, Paul Culbertson, to Outerbridge Horsey from the Western European Division in the State Department, 2 July 1947.

¹⁰Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57*, 107.

¹¹Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Portero, *Franco Aislado*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

In this way the 16 future OEEC members met in Paris without Spain in July 1947 to detail their needs for recovery and the conference established a Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). In that moment, everything indicated that there would be no further discussions about the possible inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Marshall Plan.

However, the situation started to change at the end of 1947. In October of that year the Policy Planning Staff, recently created and headed by George F. Kennan, issued a report revising US policy towards Spain where it was argued that 'in the National interest the time has come for a modification of our policy towards Spain with a view to the early normalization of US-Spanish relations both political and economic'.¹² This paper was immediately approved by the Secretary of State thus becoming the backbone of the US policy towards the Francoist regime.¹³ It should be noted that this revision of US foreign policy had been done without consulting the British Government, which is revealing in view of the increasing autonomy with which the Truman administration was starting to handle West European affairs.¹⁴

In this new context, the possible participation of Spain in the ERP was regarded by the US diplomats as the most important incentive that they had at their disposal to convince the Spanish Government of the necessity to introduce radical political and economic changes in the regime. In this sense, if the Spanish Government agreed to introduce democratizing measures and to liberalize the economy, and if arrangements between Spain and the 16 future OEEC members could be brought about, the further steps required as far as the United States was concerned could be adjusted.¹⁵ This new strategy was made public on 11 February 1948 by George Marshall himself who declared at a press conference that the US Government had no objection to Spain joining the ERP, as long as the 16 ERP countries allowed Spain to do so.¹⁶

On the other hand, in the beginning of 1948 the French Government also introduced an important change in its policy towards the Francoist regime: the reopening of the border. It should be remembered that the French authorities had decided in February 1946 to close the border with Spain as a gesture of protest against the Francoist dictatorship. However,

¹²NARA, Central Decimal File, 1945-49, box 3320. Letter from Kennan to Marshall, 24 October 1947.

¹³Ibid. Note written by Carlisle Humelsine, officer at the State Department, 28 October 1947.

¹⁴NAUK: FO 371/73334. Letter from Douglas Howard, British Ambassador in Washington, to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1948.

¹⁵FRUS, 1948, Vol. III. Letter from the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Theodore Achilles, to Culbertson, 5 January 1948, 1017-20.

¹⁶Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945-1955*, 220.

two years later, the Bidault Government adopted a more realistic policy convinced that the international sanctions so far had only served to consolidate Franco's power.¹⁷

The change in US foreign policy and the reopening of the French border convinced the Spanish Government that it was the right moment to abandon the policy of dignity and make serious attempts to participate in the Marshall Plan. In this way, the Francoist regime launched a diplomatic offensive right after the Committee of European Economic Cooperation presented its general report for discussion in Washington, at the beginning of January. Since the US Government had stated that it would not oppose Spanish participation in the Marshall Plan as long as the 16 ERP nations did not, the Spanish diplomats focused their attention on these 16 countries which would be present at the Paris Conference: Italy was one of them.

The first approach was made on 23 January, when García Comín, Counsellor of the Spanish Embassy, went to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform it that Spain was looking forward to being invited and participating in the preparatory works for the Marshall Plan. In addition, García Comín explained that similar approaches had been taken in other European countries receiving a receptive and positive attitude. The Spanish Counsellor concluded that the Spanish authorities would greatly appreciate Italian support on a question that was very important to the government in Madrid.¹⁸ The Italian authorities reacted with interest and asked for information with regard to the French and British positions. Clearly, the Italians wanted to know if there had been any changes in the general policy towards the Francoist regime, and did not want to be excluded, in case the major powers decided that Spain should participate in the Marshall Plan.¹⁹

The French authorities argued that they had not received any petition from the Spanish Government and, even if they had, the 'Quai D'Orsay' would have been unable to take any initiatives to support Spain in the Conference of Paris, mainly because of the delicate internal situation of the French Government. However, they expressed their conviction that the Americans were eager to include Spain in the ERP and, therefore, European countries should start as soon as possible to set the ground for the unavoidable 'misfortune'.²⁰ It should be clarified that, even if the French

¹⁷AMAEF: Europe 1944–49. Spain, 83. Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on relations with Spain, 19 February 1948.

¹⁸ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1948. AMAE: Bundle 2.039, folder 4. Telegram from García Comín to Artajo, 23 January 1948.

¹⁹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Telegram from Francesco Fransoni, General Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Italian Ambassadors in Paris, London and Washington, 29 January 1948.

²⁰Ibid. Telegram from Quaroni to Fransoni, 31 January 1948.

authorities were revising their policy towards the Francoist regime after the reopening of the border, they were genuinely opposed to the Spanish inclusion in the ERP.²¹

On the other hand, the British had been sounded out discretely by the Spanish Ambassador in London, who received a rather negative response. In fact, the British Government was arguably the most reluctant among the future 16 ERP countries to include Spain in the Marshall Plan. According to diplomats in London, the only conditions in which the removal of Franco could become feasible would be if the other countries in Western Europe achieved economic and political stability as a result of the ERP whilst Spain met with increasing economic difficulties as a result of its exclusion.²² Considering the fact that the US Government had left the responsibility for selecting the participants in the ERP in the hands of the 16 European countries, and the clear hostility of their public opinion, it was impossible for the Foreign Office to change its official position regarding the Francoist regime.²³

In this way, the Italian Government had sounded out the position of the most relevant countries in Europe on the subject, finding a very clear response: Franco's Spain was not welcome to participate in the ERP. Considering these reactions, it would have been reasonable for the Italian authorities to reject the Spanish petition. However, the Italians did not want to take any hasty decisions, and decided to collect more information on the issue. They wanted to know the real intentions of the Francoist regime, and the potential contribution that it could give to the process of inter-European cooperation. If the Spanish inclusion in the Marshall Plan was going to be discussed, Italy wanted to play an important role.²⁴

After ten days of studying the issue, the Italian diplomats reached the following conclusions: in the first place, the interest shown by the Spanish authorities in participating in the Marshall Plan was sincere; secondly, the obtaining of economic aid from the United States would considerably help to reorganize the dilapidated Spanish economy; thirdly, the international situation was evolving in a way which clearly benefited the Francoist regime, especially considering that the US attitude was increasingly favourable; fourthly, in spite of its sincere will to enter the Marshall Plan, Spain was not yet ready to face the consequences of getting involved in such a vast process of inter-European cooperation, mainly because of the predominance

²¹ AMAEF, Europe 1944–49. Spain, 83. Report by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Spain, 19 February 1948.

²² FO 371/73333. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 February 1948.

²³ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Telegram from Gallarati Scotti to Fransoni, 31 January 1948.

²⁴ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 15. Telegram from Fransoni to Vanni D'Archirafi, 14 February 1948.

of autarchic and nationalistic figures in the economic administration; and, finally, in case the rest of the European countries managed to force the Francoist regime to liberalize its economy, the whole continent could gain by the inclusion of a country with important stocks of raw materials and a remarkable agricultural potential. Accordingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the adoption of a line of action favourable to the Spanish inclusion in the Marshall Plan. By doing so, the Italian Government would obtain three main benefits: first, the improvement of bilateral relations; secondly, Italy, by supporting the Spanish admission in the ERP, which was likely to happen in a short period, would be able to play an active role in the European cooperation process; and finally, the Spanish Government might, in exchange, adopt a positive position in the pressing issues which existed between Spain and Italy.²⁵

The Spanish Government seized this opportunity and redoubled its pressure. On 17 February Sangróniz held a meeting with one of the most influential diplomats in Italy, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Francesco Frasoni. In it, the latter argued that his government deemed the Spanish participation in the ERP as essential and that, therefore, the Italian delegation in Paris had already received instructions to support the Spanish candidacy whenever the subject was discussed.²⁶ Even though the Italian archives do not clarify if these instructions had been sent, as Frasoni had argued, there is little doubt that something was going on among the diplomats in 'Palazzo Chigi' regarding Spain. As a matter of fact, only two days after the Sangróniz-Frasoni meeting, the US Ambassador in Rome, James Dunn, wrote to Marshall warning that within the Italian Government, or at least among certain sectors of the Italian Government, some thought was being given to the improvement of relations with Spain. According to the US Ambassador, supporting its inclusion in the Marshall Plan was one of the mechanisms which was being taken into consideration. After having consulted with a contact in 'Palazzo Chigi', they have concluded that Italy, 'as always', would like to see normal relations between Spain and its Mediterranean neighbours, and was convinced that it would be helpful to find a formula to do so without embarrassing Great Britain, France or the United States.²⁷ This news alarmed Marshall who replied immediately with the following telegram:

You might if suitable opportunity offers [...] inject note of caution and suggest restraint, saying that, apart from obvious advantage to Extreme Left propaganda of too hasty action in this direction, we too would like to see

²⁵Ibid. Report from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza and Frasoni, 24 February 1948.

²⁶AMAE: Bundle 1.892, folder 8. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 19 February 1948.

²⁷NARA: Central Decimal File 1945-49. Box 39993. Telegram from the US Ambassador in Rome, Clement Dunn, to Marshall, 19 February 1948.

*relations with Spain improved but feel this will be difficult if not impossible to accomplish without substantial political and economic changes within Spain.*²⁸

As has already been explained, the State Department was using the possible inclusion of Spain in the ERP as a lever to force the Francoist regime to introduce economic and political reforms. In this regard, no diplomatic action could take place until the Spanish Government had undertaken some serious reforms of the political and the economic systems. In addition, Marshall did not want the Italian Government to get involved in this question as it might jeopardize the Christian Democrat victory in the elections which would be held in April of that year. The adoption of this diplomatic initiative should be interpreted as hegemonic behaviour since the US Government was trying to impose its influence and to assert its leadership in Spanish-Italian affairs.

Neither the US nor the Italian archives clarify if Dunn transmitted this message to the Italian authorities, although it is probable that he did. In any case, Marshall's intervention did not alter the Italian position. In fact, on 20 March, Blasco Lanza D'Ajeta, Deputy Director of the DGAE, informed Attilio Cattani, the Italian representative to the Paris conference that, after repeated requests from the Spanish Government to obtain the Italian support in Paris, the Italian Government was still studying the question.²⁹ In this case, Spain was asking the Italian Government to support at the Paris conference the adoption of a confidential, majority vote for the election of possible new members in order to obtain adhesions which would become difficult in a public vote. D'Ajeta added that 'always in a private capacity and conditionally to official instructions which will be decided in the following days, I inform you that our initial reaction is, for now, favorable, even though we do not want to be the first country taking the initiative for obvious reasons'. The letter ended with a handwritten note clarifying: 'I confirm once again that this communication is not official.'³⁰

It should be explained that at the end of March the European Economic Cooperation Committee was supposed to hold a meeting in order to decide the method which the new organization would adopt for the selection of new members. In this sense, the Spanish proposal, transmitted to all the participants in the meeting, consisted of favouring the adoption of a system of decision-taking requiring a majority of two-thirds, instead of unanimity, and to carry out a secret vote. In this way, according to the Spanish diplomats, the countries which favoured the inclusion of Spain in the ERP would

²⁸Ibid. Telegram from Marshall to Dunn, 25 February 1948.

²⁹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Note redacted by the DGAE on the Admission of Spain to the Marshall Plan, 19 March 1948.

³⁰ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Letter from D'Ajeta to Cattani, 20 March 1948.

be able to vote without having to justify their decisions publicly, thus avoiding the outright exposition of the opposition of a few countries which had expressed since the beginning their refusal to include Spain in the Marshall Plan (essentially the Scandinavian countries and Belgium).³¹

After two months of discussing and pondering the situation, the Italian authorities had finally agreed to support the Spanish inclusion in the Marshall Plan. Although the initiative taken was not very compromising, it has great relevance, especially if one considers that the State Department had expressed its opposition. In order to understand the reasoning behind it, it is necessary to take into account a number of issues. In the first place, during the spring of 1948 the Italian diplomats were truly convinced that the Francoist regime had a good chance of being included in the Marshall Plan. If this was going to happen, Italy, the country which shared the Mediterranean, religion, culture and history with Spain, had to play an important role, and, if possible, obtain diplomatic benefits. This idea, which could be regarded as naïve, was based on three main arguments: the conviction that the US Government would accept the decision adopted by the future 16 ERP members, the certainty that Spain had considerable support among these countries, and finally the belief that this support could be expressed through a positive vote for Spain at the Paris conference if the adopted system of voting was secret and based only on a two-thirds majority.³² It should be added that Italy was not the only country in Western Europe which was convinced that Spain could eventually be admitted to the Marshall Plan. During the month of February, in the context of the reopening of the French border, and after having learnt that the US Government was changing its policy towards the Francoist regime, Britain also started to consider that possibility.³³

Secondly, there were economic reasons; as a matter of fact, the Italian authorities believed that Europe in general and Italy in particular would greatly benefit from Spanish inclusion in the ERP. Obviously, the Italian Government was well aware of the difficulties that the Spanish economy was experiencing at the time, but there was the conviction that, if Europe and the United States provided the necessary aid, Spain could eventually become a valuable player in the post-war European economy.³⁴ The inclusion of Spain would have a twofold importance for Italy. On the one hand, 'This participation has to be linked with the French-Italian customs

³¹DDI, Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 489. Letter from the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Pietro Quaroni, to Sforza, 26 March 1948.

³²ASMAE: Deposit A, 1948, Spain, folder No. 280. Report from the DGAE to Umberto Grazzi, General Director of Economic Affairs and Sforza, without date but not before 31 March 1948.

³³NAUK: FO 371/73334. Minutes from the Foreign Office, 11 March 1948.

³⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 15. Report from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza and Fransoni, 24 February 1948.

union, which would be further developed thanks to the Spanish adhesion. Naturally, it would be necessary to maintain the equidistance between the three countries in order to avoid finding ourselves in an unfavorable situation.' And on the other hand, 'In the framework of a larger European Union, collaboration with Spain would strengthen the role of the Mediterranean countries, counterbalancing the actual tendency of the 16 ERP members to establish their equilibrium around a centre maladjusted to the North of Europe.'³⁵

Finally, Italian support for Spanish participation in the Marshall Plan would bring about a substantial improvement in bilateral relations. If Spain was included in the ERP without Italian support, there was a serious risk of Italy losing the predominant position which it had reached after decades of intense activity between the two countries. This had become more important since France had decided to change its policy towards the Francoist regime, open the border with Spain and start negotiations to sign a new commercial treaty. The Italian Government was worried that France could take the lead in West European relations with Spain leaving Italy aside. Obviously, this would also have negative consequences in the economic sphere: some of the products which Italy was exporting to Spain, especially heavy machinery, could also be exported from France. The Spanish authorities became well aware of these fears and tried to play on them in order to garner Italian support at the Paris conference.³⁶

Spanish exclusion from the ERP

As has already been explained, the Italian delegation arrived at the meeting of the European Economic Cooperation Committee which had to decide the mechanism of admission of members to the ERP, with the idea of supporting the two-thirds majority. Italy defended this method, but its proposal was not backed by either France or Britain and met with direct opposition from Belgium and Norway. The Italian delegate, left to defend it alone, soon dropped the proposal.³⁷ Admission to the Marshall Plan, which had been left in the hands of the 16 participants countries by the US administration, would be decided unanimously.³⁸ This was bad news for the Francoist regime, as there were several countries, especially Belgium and Norway, which had now publicly demonstrated their direct opposition

³⁵ ASMAE: Deposit A, 1948, Spain, folder No. 280. Report from the DGAE to Grazzi and Sforza, without date but not before 31 March 1948; and AMAE: Bundle 1.892, folder 8. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 19 February 1948.

³⁶ ASMAE: Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Letter from Vanni to Sforza and Grazzi, 24 February 1948, and Report from the DGAE to Grazzi and Sforza, no date but not before February 1948.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 489. Letter from Quaroni, to Sforza, 26 March 1948.

to Spanish participation in the Marshall Plan and would have always voted against it.³⁹

The acceptance of this system of voting prevented Italy from adopting other initiatives to support the Spanish inclusion in the ERP. Clearly, the Italian authorities were well aware that it was almost impossible to obtain a unanimous vote in favour of the Francoist regime at the Paris Conference. This explains why, when José Caeiro da Mata, the Portuguese representative at the CEEC's meeting on 16 March, proposed to discuss the possible incorporation of the Francoist regime to the ERP, no delegation accepted this invitation, in spite of the pressure exerted by the Spanish Government the day before.⁴⁰

However, the adoption of the unanimous system did not mean the end of discussions about the possible adhesion of Spain to the Marshall Plan. The rise of the tension in the international arena, especially after the events in Prague, contributed to feed the communist hysteria all over Europe and the United States. On 30 March, at the annual congressional debate to approve the funds for the Marshall Plan, Alvin E. O'Konsky, a conservative Senator and member of the Spanish lobby in Washington, succeeded in having the House of Representatives approve an amendment to allow Spain to receive similar treatment to the other West European countries through Marshall funds. Spain received the O'Konsky amendment with unhidden satisfaction. Martín Artajo then, asked for a general diplomatic mobilization to request and to obtain ERP membership. Italy was again approached to shoulder the proposal.⁴¹

On the morning of 1 April García Comín, following Artajo's orders, went to visit Count Zoppi, the Italian General Director of Political Affairs in order to gauge the Italian reaction to the O'Konski resolution, and to transmit a message from Franco. The Counsellor at the Embassy, García Comín, assured that Franco had always shown great sympathy for Italy and the Italians, and that he, personally, would very much appreciate a positive response from Italy. Zoppi stated very clearly that Italy was not able to take any initiative in this respect, the elections being so close; in addition, the Director of Political Affairs argued that the Italian diplomacy was unable to support Spanish inclusion in the ERP without the agreement of the three major

³⁹ ASMAE: Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 280. Telegram from Guglielmo Rulli, Italian Ambassador in Oslo, to Sforza, 1 April 1948.

⁴⁰ Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 112. On 16 March the Spanish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, José Sebastián de Erice, visited the Italian chargé in Madrid, Vanni D'Archirafi, insisting that a receptive attitude from the Italian delegation regarding the Portuguese proposal would be very much appreciated in 'El Pardo'. During this meeting, Erice added that the same manoeuvre had been done in front of the other ERP members. DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 448: Telegram from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 17 March 1948.

⁴¹ AMAE: Bundle 1.892, folder 8. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 1 April 1948.

powers, and warned that, in the future, Italy would continue to harmonize its policy towards the Francoist regime with them. Only if the question could be raised again, and the French Government distanced itself from the British position of intransigence, would the Italian Government be able to adopt a more positive attitude.⁴² Even though this is not a definitive sign of the British decline as a hegemonic power in Europe, it is still noteworthy that, for the first time since the end of the war, Italy was aligning its policy towards Spain with another country that was not Britain.

The Italian authorities had gone as far as they could in their support of the Spanish adhesion to the Marshall Plan. Proposing a change in the voting system at the CEEC's meeting in March was a gesture which had almost no political consequences (although everybody involved knew that a change in the voting mechanisms would benefit the Francoist regime), and that could have produced important diplomatic benefits, as has already been explained. Openly supporting Spanish participation in the Marshall Plan constituted a different gesture, much more dangerous for the DC Government, considering that it would have to be done publicly, that the general elections were very close, and that it could turn France and Britain against Italy.

In any case, the position of the European countries in this matter lost its relevance a couple of hours later, precisely when the White House announced that Truman had expressed his opposition to the O'Konsky amendment and, therefore, to the inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Marshall Plan. The next day, the joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives meeting to produce the final text of the Foreign Assistance Act officially rejected the O'Konsky proposal. On 3 April Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act which, finally, did not include the Spanish clause.

The impact of Spanish exclusion from the ERP in bilateral relations

Truman's statement excluding Spain from the Marshall Plan seemed to put an end, at least momentarily, to a problem which had been discussed all over Europe and the United States for more than a year. The exclusion from the ERP was a huge disappointment for the Spanish authorities and undoubtedly the biggest setback since the end of the war. Spain immediately demanded an explanation from the US attaché in Madrid, Paul Culbertson, who argued that Truman's decision to exclude Spain from the ERP had been motivated by a message sent the previous day by the US Ambassador in Rome, James Dunn.⁴³ In this message, apparently, Dunn warned that the

⁴²DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 506. Letter from Zoppi to Sforza, 1 April 1948. Retransmitted on 10 April to the embassies in Madrid and Washington and AMAE: Bundle 1.892, folder 8. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 1 April 1948.

⁴³DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 519. Note from Zoppi to Sforza, 3 April 1948. Retransmitted on 13 April to the embassies in London, Madrid, Moscow, Paris and Washington.

inclusion of Spain would have greatly benefited the left-wing parties in the Italian elections in mid-April. This information caused serious consternation among the Spanish diplomats who now began to wonder if the DC Government was behind that diplomatic manoeuvre.

On 3 April, García Comín went to visit Count Zoppi to verify the information provided by Culbertson. Zoppi explained that the Italian Government had aligned his position in the matter with the other European countries since the beginning of the discussions, but denied that any diplomatic approach in that sense had been made to the US Ambassador in Rome. If the Spanish Government was looking for the authorities responsible, it should look at the Foreign Office which had taken similar steps towards the State Department.

It should be clarified that Britain had indeed been the most active country against the O'Konsky amendment. Worried that the Spanish inclusion in the Marshall Plan could provoke a split in the future 16 ERP countries, Ernest Bevin sent a telegram to George Marshall, who was in Colombia at that time, asking him to take immediate steps both in the Senate and the House of Representatives to remedy the situation. According to Bevin, the inclusion of Spain would have multiple negative effects: it would cause a complete revolt within the Labour party; it would make the whole Marshall Plan appear as a 'line-up behind Fascism and reaction'; it would cause great distress among the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries which were clearly opposed to any kind of collaboration with the Francoist regime; and finally, it would have a negative impact on the centre and right-wing parties for the elections which were about to take place in Italy.⁴⁴

It should also be pointed out that all these actions had been previously discussed with France. In fact, the two governments had agreed to harmonize their claims and make separate representations in front of the US Government, protesting against the O'Konsky amendment. However, this last initiative was abandoned right after Truman's public statement.⁴⁵ It should be clarified though, that these diplomatic initiatives were not the main reason for Spanish exclusion from the Marshall Plan. Indeed, it is not the intention of this work to discuss the real causes which determined the Spanish exclusion from the Marshall Plan. The present pages deal with the perceptions which existed in both countries and that influenced bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the documentation analysed so far coincides with the explanation given by Fernando Guirao. The Spanish historian

⁴⁴NAUK: FO 371/73335. Letter from Bevin to Howard Douglas (to be transmitted to Lovett) and to the British Ambassador in Colombia (to be transmitted to Marshall), 1 April 1948. Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945-1951* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984).

⁴⁵Ibid. Letter from the British Representative at the CEEC in Paris, J. E. Coulson, to the Foreign Office, 2 April 1948.

argues that the main reasons can be found in the reluctance of the State Department and Truman himself to include the Francoist regime, together with the firm opposition of several European countries (especially Great Britain and France) to start a process of cooperation with the Spanish dictatorship. In this sense, the Italian elections or the Bevin telegram would have had a minimum impact on Truman and his administration, only confirming that they were correct in their impressions of the damage Spanish participation would do to European relations. This interpretation is also confirmed by a conversation held between Vanni D'Archirafi and Culbertson where the latter argued that Truman's decision had been made not only because of the Italian elections, but because of the political impact which the O'Konsky amendment had in the United States and in several European countries.⁴⁶ Taking all these elements into account, it is therefore possible to assert that if the Spanish authorities were looking for someone to blame, they should have started with France and Britain, not Italy.

In any event, the Italian Government started to complain of the 'acidity' and 'hostility' shown by the Spanish press towards it right after the exclusion of the Francoist regime from the Marshall Plan. According to the Italian attaché, the change in the tone of the press had been ordered by the highest hierarchies, frustrated because Italian instability on the verge of the elections had forced the Truman administration to exclude Spain from the ERP.⁴⁷ It is obvious, then, that the Italian authorities perceived further deterioration in bilateral relations due to Spanish disappointment following its failure to join the ERP. Now one might wonder if this perception was correct or not. First of all, it has to be clarified that there is no evidence in Spanish archives displaying a change in the official policy towards Italy after 1 April 1948; nor is there evidence showing a change in the guidelines given to the press. However, by analysing the Spanish newspapers in that period (from the beginning of March until the end of April) it is readily apparent that there was a radical mutation regarding their positions towards Italy.⁴⁸

⁴⁶DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 577. Telegram from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 17 April 1948. More about this subject in Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 109–13.

⁴⁷DDI: Series X, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 560: Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 13 April 1948.

⁴⁸Obviously, it is not possible in these pages to make an exhaustive analysis of the attitude of the Spanish press during these days. However, it seems adequate to give some basic notions in order to understand better this point. In the first place, it has to be considered that the press in Spain was still under the control of Falange. Therefore, the publication of articles criticizing the Italian situation was not a coincidence, nor a free decision made by the owner of the journals; secondly, the Italian political evolution during those years stirred up a strong interest in Spain and the press devoted a lot of 'ink' to inform the public of it; thirdly, the change of attitude was especially noteworthy in the Falangist newspaper *Arriba!*, although it could be perceived in all

The question is whether or not that 'hostility' stemmed from the Spanish exclusion from the ERP or if it could be explained by other reasons. Evidently, Truman's decision on 1 April was a big disappointment for the Spanish diplomats, especially if one considers the unrealistically high expectations which they had.⁴⁹ It is also evident that the confidences made by Culbertson to Martín Artajo regarding the telegram sent by Dunn to Truman must have provoked a negative reaction from the Spanish Government, especially if they believed that the telegram was motivated by official Italian intervention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assume that the Spanish authorities, even if they had a distorted vision of international affairs, really believed that its exclusion from the Marshall Plan was only or mainly motivated by the Dunn telegram. Following the Spanish sources, it is possible to assert that the most important reason behind this change in the Spanish attitude towards Italy has to be found in the Italian elections and the particular way in which they were interpreted in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz'.

The Italian elections, to be held on 18 April 1948, were the second democratic elections with universal suffrage in Italy, after the 1946 elections for the Constituent Assembly, responsible for drawing up and adopting the Italian Constitution. The elections, heavily influenced by the increasing tension in international relations (especially after the Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia), attracted a lot of attention all over the world, mainly because it was one of the first general elections in a European country after the war where the left-wing coalition (formed by the PCI and PSI) had a real chance to obtain a majority. The Italian elections were thus perceived as an experiment, a test which would reveal the real strength of democracies in Europe after the war.⁵⁰ The Spanish authorities followed the Italian voting with great attention, but their view was quite particular. Obviously, they were convinced of the relevance which these elections had for the future of Europe, but they were also well aware that they might have an impact

the major papers; fourthly, the change of attitude was more evident in the editorials and leading articles in the front page than in the articles sent by the foreign correspondents in Italy; finally, it is necessary to quote the most significant articles in this regard: MNML: 'La democracia a la sombra de las espadas', leading article in *Arriba!*, 7 April 1948 (this editorial was unsigned although Italian authorities believed it was written by Ismael Herraiz, author of the famous libel 'Italia fuera de combate' which had provoked resentment among the Italians in 1944); 'Las elecciones italianas, una batalla sin esperanza par las democracias', leading article in *Arriba!*, 17 April 1948; Julián Cortés Cavanillas, 'Hora de posiciones claras', *ABC*, 1 April 1948.

⁴⁹As a matter of fact, the 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' was convinced, on the verge of the CEEC's meeting, that eleven countries would support its inclusion. AMAE: Bundle 2.309, folder 4.

⁵⁰Barbagallo, *L'Italia Repubblicana*; Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006*; Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

on the Spanish regime as well. It has to be considered that one of the main arguments used by Franco and his ideologists to justify the regime was its usefulness in containing the communist threat. The message was very clear: democracies, unlike dictatorships, were weak and could not contain the expansion of the Communist movement. The instability of the Italian Republic was used as proof of this, but if the Christian Democrats obtained a large victory in the elections, it would greatly undermine one of the main arguments put forward by the regime. As Sangróniz wrote to Artajo on 8 April, 'The advantages which we would be able to obtain from 18 April onwards, will largely depend on whether the Italian problem is still in a state of latent agitation [...]'.⁵¹

This reasoning here is complex. The assertion that a DC failure in the elections would greatly benefit the Francoist regime (both in the internal and the external spheres) did not mean that the Spanish authorities wanted a victory for the left-wing coalition. This is just one of the many questions in which the Francoist regime was victim of its internal contradictions. Personally, Franco believed that the Italian elections of 1948 were similar to the ones held in Spain in 1936 which saw the victory of the Popular Front, another left-wing coalition. As a consequence, he considered that the only solution was to postpone the elections and outlaw Communism in Italy as soon as possible.⁵² However, as this vision was unrealistic and unworkable, the Spanish authorities harboured other aspirations. In this sense, the best result would be a close victory for the Christian Democrats, with a raise in votes for the right-wing parties (Monarchics and MSI) which would maintain the state of bustle in Italy (not a victory for the left-wing coalition and not an overwhelming victory for the Christian Democrats).⁵³ These elements, taken together, contribute towards an understanding of the precarious position of the Spanish press, more so than the exclusion of the Francoist regime from the Marshall Plan.

The elections were won by the Christian Democracy by a margin more comfortable than many analysts and politicians had predicted. As a matter of fact the DC obtained 48.5 per cent of the votes and 305 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the Popular Democratic Front (PCI-PSI) only obtained 31 per cent of the votes and 189 seats. In the Senate the DC victory was equal with almost double the number of seats (131 and 72). The electoral results allowed the continuation of the Alcide De Gasperi premiership,

⁵¹ AMAE: Bundle 2.042, folder 9. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 8 April 1948.

⁵² Truman Presidential Library (TPL), White House Central Files (WHCF), State Department, Myron Taylor [1938] – 1947 [7 of 8], box 46. Memorandum for the President from the Honourable Myron C. Taylor on his visits to Lisbon, Madrid and Rome, March–April 1948. Outline of a memorandum of conversation with the Caudillo, General Franco, at the palace of The Pardo, 1 April 1948.

⁵³ AMAE: Bundle 2.042, folder 9. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 8 April 1948.

under the centrism formula. Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats joined the Christian Democratic Party in the government.⁵⁴

The reaction of the Spanish authorities to these results was lukewarm. Sangroniz was the person in charge of transmitting the news of the recount. He did it using a descriptive style without adding any comments. He did not receive any reply from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The victory of the DC meant that Spanish-Italian relations would maintain their *status quo* with the possibility of working towards diplomatic normalization and improvement of relations, which was, of course, a positive outcome. However, the victory of De Gasperi's party also meant, as it has been previously explained, that the main justification for the existence of the Francoist regime lost validity and legitimacy, if it ever had it. In the meantime, the Spanish press continued to display blatant hostility towards Italy and the new Italian Government.⁵⁵

Taking all these elements into consideration, it is possible to assert that the Italian plan to improve relations with Spain through the Marshall Plan had completely backfired. Not only had Spain been excluded from the ERP, but also, even if it was only momentarily, the Spanish authorities had thought that Truman's public statement had been motivated by an Italian action in front of the US Government. It is evident that the Italian Government had overplayed its hand by misinterpreting the international situation and ignoring the strong opposition of the French and the British Governments towards the Francoist regime.

On the other hand, this whole question had proved that the French and especially the British influence over European affairs could not be underestimated. Once again, and despite the economic crisis or the political problems, British behaviour had been clearly hegemonic, succeeding in imposing its view on European matters, even if it drew on US support. Even though the Truman administration would have intervened to disavow the O'Konsky amendment anyway, the British complaints had forced the President to make a public statement, an unusual gesture which clarified without a shadow of doubt that Spain would not participate in the ERP and at the same time a sign of special consideration towards its main ally in Europe, Britain. In addition, by urging the Italian Government to harmonize its policy towards the Francoist regime with the rest of the Western countries the US Government had shown its determination to exert some influence over Spanish-Italian affairs. In the future, these initiatives would

⁵⁴Barbagallo, *L'Italia Repubblicana*; Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006*; Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

⁵⁵ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 15. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 27 April 1948. The message was also placed in all the Italian consular offices and associations in Spain.

become more numerous and have more weight in the decision-making process of both countries. Finally the crisis worsened with the Italian elections, regarded by the Francoist hierarchy as a threat to the ideological bases of the regime. Accordingly, the general elections in Italy constituted the lowest point in bilateral relations since the end of the Second World War. However, this situation would not last long: once the electoral hangover passed and the Italian situation went back to normal, both governments started to work again to 'defreeze' bilateral relations.

A counterproductive strategy: Spanish-Italian attempts to improve bilateral relations after the 1948 elections

The economic approach

The outcome of the Italian elections did not fully satisfy the Spanish authorities for the aforementioned reasons; however, there was a positive side to those results. The Christian Democrats had won by a comfortable margin that allowed them, at least in theory, to form a stable and more right-wing oriented government without relying on the support of left-wing parties. This meant that the Spanish Government would have in the DC an interlocutor willing to negotiate and find formulas to improve bilateral relations. Well aware of this fact, the diplomats in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' started a process of rapprochement, that would start in the economic area, and culminate, ideally, in the political field and coincided with a new discussion of the Spanish question at the UN.

The Spanish authorities worked intensely to improve relations with Italy in the economic field. On 1 June, Martín Artajo held a meeting with Vanni D'Archirafi. In it, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his feelings of sympathy towards Italy and clarified that the Spanish Government was happy with the brilliant victory of the Christian Democrats. Immediately after this declaration, Martín Artajo made reference to the stagnation in Spanish-Italian trade and asserted that he was willing to talk with the new Undersecretary of Foreign Commerce, Tomás Súñer, in order to revise the situation and adopt the necessary measures to abolish the obstacles which were hindering commercial relations.⁵⁶ Tomás Súñer had been appointed new Undersecretary of Foreign Commerce in May 1948, substituting Mariano Yturralde. According to the Italian authorities, Súñer might be more biased towards the Italian Government because of the friendly relations established with the Embassy in Madrid in 1946, when he was

⁵⁶ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 15. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 1 June 1948. In this letter the commercial attaché added that he had recently verified a change in the tone of the Spanish press which started to include articles with positives references on Italy.

Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and both governments were negotiating the commercial agreement. In addition, Súnier seemed to have a more liberal vision of the Spanish economy than his predecessor.⁵⁷

A second initiative was taken in July 1948 when the Spanish Government proposed to place part of the Spanish agricultural surplus in the markets of Central Europe and the Balkans, through the Italian networks; by way of compensation, Italy could place some of its industrial surplus in Spain, where those products were urgently needed. The preliminary condition for this kind of cooperation was, however, the normalization of diplomatic relations.⁵⁸ The Spanish strategy had thus become evident. Well aware that the Italians were more interested in the economic cooperation than in the normalization of diplomatic relations, the Spanish authorities were offering a basic *quid pro quo*: the possibility of beginning a serious plan for mutual aid in the commercial sphere, on condition that the Italian Government would normalize relations with the Francoist regime.

The Spanish proposal was received with scepticism by Vanni D'Archirafi who knew very well the limits of the Spanish economy as he had been struggling for several months to remove the obstacles which hindered full application of the Commercial Treaty. However, the Italian diplomats in Rome were not so sceptical and took the Spanish approach more seriously. Vanni's letter had a meaningful handwritten note made by Zoppi in this regard. In it, the Italian diplomats said: 'It seems to me that Sangróniz is working hard for a Spanish-Italian "rapprochement" at least in the economic sphere. After all, France has already opened the way in this regard. It also seems to me, unofficially, that the Spanish are complaining about the indifference of our Embassy in Madrid.'⁵⁹

It has to be clarified that the Italian authorities had been analysing and revising commercial relations with Spain since May. The appointment of Súnier, rumours of a possible devaluation of the 'peseta', and the signature of commercial treaties with France and Great Britain, led the Italian diplomats to consider updating the commercial agreement signed in 1947 which was still in force.⁶⁰ In the end the idea was rejected by the DGAE which was convinced that the main obstacle for the commercial agreement to work

⁵⁷ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 242. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 18 May 1948.

⁵⁸ Ibid. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Zoppi, 7 July 1948.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ On the one hand, the signature of commercial treaties with France and Britain alarmed the Italians because they might lose their predominant position in the Iberian market; on the other hand, they showed that there might be a way to normalize commercial exchanges with the Francoist regime saving the obstacles represented by the rigid economic system. ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 242. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 16 June 1948, telegram from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza and the DGAE, 18 May 1948 and letter from Grazzi to Dall'Oglio, 28 May 1948.

properly was the unrealistically high rate of the 'peseta' confronted with the 'lira'; in this regard, until the Spanish Government could solve the problem, finding a more realistic balance between the two currencies became a priority. As a consequence, economic talks were not started and Spanish-Italian trade continued to be stagnated.⁶¹

In contrast, with this failure, however, bilateral relations registered great success in the industrial field thanks to the agreement signed between FIAT and the 'Banco Urquijo'. As has already been explained, the idea of establishing a FIAT branch in Spain was not new and its origins can be traced back to the early 1920s when the Spanish fleet of cars was beginning to be developed. However, proper negotiations did not start until the beginning of the 1940s when the 'Banco Urquijo' together with the INI (Instituto Nacional de Industria) rescued the old projects and offered the Italian company financial and material aid to establish a modern car industry in the country. Preliminary talks started in June 1947; after long and difficult negotiations the agreement between FIAT and a financial group which included the INI and Banco Urquijo, was finally signed on 26 October. According to it, FIAT would provide technical assistance, initially to build the 1100 model in Spain, and the 1300 model later. On the other hand, the Spanish financial group would contribute an annual capital payment to cover part of the expenses plus the capital necessary to build the factory, near Barcelona. During the first six years, approximately, this factory would not be able to produce the new model on its own; as a consequence, in that period of time the space would be devoted to the assembly of the manufactured pieces coming from FIAT Italy. After that period, FIAT Barcelona should be able to produce the new models on its own, although the most delicate pieces would continue to be imported from Italy. Finally, the sale of the completed cars would be in the hands of the current sales organization of FIAT Spain.⁶²

Spain was given the necessary tools to construct a car from start to finish in its own country, fulfilling one of the most pressing problems of its deteriorated economy. In this regard it has to be remembered that FIAT was one of the most important suppliers of cars, trams and trolley buses since the twenties, and that the Francoist regime had since the war found it extremely difficult to secure these products in commercial agreements. On the other hand, FIAT also obtained two main advantages: in first place, it managed to occupy a predominant position in a market with notable potential, in a moment of uncertainty as French car companies were also trying to expand into the Spanish market after the opening of the border; and in second

⁶¹ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1948, folder No. 242. Report from the DGAE to Grazzi and Sforza, 20 August 1948.

⁶² *Ibid.* Letter from the Italian Commercial Attaché, Capomazza, to Sforza, 27 October 1948.

place, the Italian company managed to do it without making all the investments, as the Spanish financial group was obliged to undertake a substantial part of the expenses generated. The agreement was also advantageous for the Italian Government. Obviously, everything which benefited FIAT also benefited the Italian State which was a major investor in the company, but there were other reasons. In the first place, FIAT became the second big national industry (after SNIA Viscosa with SNIACE) to establish itself in Spain in order to produce *in situ*, with the cooperation of Spanish companies; this happened precisely when France had just reopened its border and was beginning an aggressive campaign to consolidate the presence of the French car companies in the Spanish market. Secondly, the agreement was very important from a commercial perspective, because the Spanish Government would have to import substantial quantities of machinery from Italy, thus being forced to create a mechanism in order to create the means of payment for that machinery.⁶³ The operation can be considered even more successful if the minor degree of liberalization of the Spanish economy, which had legislation specifically created to avoid the penetration of foreign investors, is taken into account.⁶⁴

The company created with this agreement became operational in 1950 and it counted a fixed capital of 600 million pesetas (circa \$55 million). After several delays caused by financial problems, the first car, a FIAT 1400, was produced in the car plant of Barcelona in 1953. However, it was not until 1957 that the car production of SEAT became broadly successful, thanks to the production of the '600' model. In fact, between 1953 and 1955, SEAT only manufactured 7,281 cars while in 1960 it produced 31,116. The growth in the SEAT production continued unabated throughout the 1960s and 70s, reaching the number of 337,078 manufactured cars in 1975. In that period, SEAT was also the largest company in Spain, employing more than 30,000 workers. It should be clarified that, at that time, only two companies operating in the country counted more than 500 workers. Taking all this data into account, there is little doubt that the collaboration between FIAT and SEAT became crucial in

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴It has to be clarified that the law of regulation and protection of defence and industry issued in November 1939 was still in force at that time. According to this law, 'At least three quarters of the active social capital of a company will be owned by Spanish citizens. The remaining fourth part can be admitted as foreign capital investments on condition that it is provided in currency quoted in Spain, or in tools and machinery which cannot be obtained through the national production and valued according to the prices of international markets.[...]' Official State Gazette, Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) 1 December 1939, 7034–40. Two Italian industries operating in Spain were exempt from this restrictive legislation: SNIACE (branch of SNIA Viscosa) and SEAT (branch of FIAT). This notwithstanding, the Spanish legislation made it very difficult to stipulate large-scale protocols on industrial cooperation. More about this subject in Viñas, *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)*, 865.

the increase of car ownership in Spain and, as a result of this, in the modernization of the country.⁶⁵ In conclusion, this agreement must be regarded as the most important outcome of the Spanish-Italian attempts to improve bilateral relations during this period. Despite the tensions in the political field, the creation of SEAT became the cornerstone of the industrial cooperation between the two countries, a cooperation which would be fully developed in the late 1950s, playing a fundamental role in the rapprochement of relations.

Spanish attempts at diplomatic normalization

In spite of the important step taken in the economic field with the FIAT-SEAT agreement, in the political sphere, relations continued to be almost non-existent. As the date for the next meeting of the United Nations was approaching (it would be held in December in Paris), the Spanish diplomats started to revitalize its political action by intensifying their pressure on the Italian Government to appoint a new ambassador in Madrid and normalize relations before the UN could withdraw the condemnatory resolution of December 1946. At this stage it has to be explained that the Spanish Government, with its usual myopia for international relations, was firmly convinced that the General Assembly would decide in Paris to rehabilitate the Francoist regime.⁶⁶

The first move in this direction was made around the middle of September when Martín Artajo ordered José Sebastián de Erice, General Director of Foreign Affairs, to arrange a meeting with Vanni D'Archirafi. The plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to transmit to the Italian Government a series of ideas regarding the status of bilateral relations: first, that the Spanish authorities regretted that Italy, which was not a member of the United Nations, had decided to follow the United States and Great Britain in its policy; secondly, that Spain was ready to start mutually beneficial cooperation in the Mediterranean, an area of major interest for both countries; thirdly, being that the United Nations was about to rehabilitate the Francoist regime, Italy would lose important diplomatic benefits unless it delegated an ambassador to Madrid as soon as possible. Vanni D'Archirafi seized the opportunity to complain about the hostility of the Spanish press during the Italian elections back in April, and the negative attitude of the government regarding the issues pending. As a sign of good will Erice promised to intervene personally in order to solve those questions as soon as possible.⁶⁷ The meeting with Erice

⁶⁵Valerio Castronovo, *FIAT, 1899–1999: Un secolo di storia*, (Milano: Rizzoli, 1999); Tappi, *Un'impresa Italiana nella Spagna di Franco*; Elena San Román López, *La industria del automóvil en España: El nacimiento de la SEAT* (Madrid: Fundación Empresa Pública, 1995); Pedro González de la Fe, *SEAT: Fundación, desarrollo y privatización de una empresa automovilística en España* (Madrid: Fundación Empresa Pública, 2001).

⁶⁶Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 325–6.

⁶⁷The meeting with Erice is described in DDI: Series XI, Vol. I, Doc. No. 448. Letter from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 21 September 1948.

made a positive impression on Vanni D'Archirafi who suggested the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlo Sforza, to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain before the US or Britain decided to do so: 'In any case, we would be arriving before other states, a condition which might benefit in the future our interests in this country, also because this regime, for internal reasons, tends towards a political evolution rather than a radical change.'⁶⁸

The suggestion made by Vanni D'Archirafi implied a diplomatic manoeuvre which was not a new initiative for the Italian Government. It had already been executed in March of that year when Italy had tried to distance itself from France and Britain in the discussion regarding the Spanish membership in the Marshall Plan, in order to obtain political benefits from the Francoist regime. Similar concepts were raised personally by Martín Artajo who received Vanni D'Archirafi on 10 October in order to express his concern that the Italian chargé had been called back to Italy, being substituted by Benedetto Capomazza di Campolattaro.⁶⁹

There is no archival evidence showing a direct reaction from the Italian Government to the Spanish pressure to normalize relations; however, it is significant that, from this moment onwards, there was an increase in the number of reports analysing the international situation of the Francoist regime (especially at the United Nations) and the position of the other countries in this regard (especially the United States).⁷⁰ From this, it could be deduced that the Italian authorities wanted to have all available information before making a decision which could have a great relevance for Italian foreign policy and for bilateral relations.

Among these reports, one written by Capomazza on 24 November stands out. In it, the Italian diplomat made an exhaustive analysis of the Spanish question at the United Nations since 1945 discussing the present perspectives on the verge of the Paris meeting and reaching the following conclusions: firstly that, considering the important support given to the Francoist regime from Arab and South American countries, it was probable that the United Nations would overturn the resolution of December 1946; secondly that the US Department of State was eager to rehabilitate the Francoist regime in the international system; and finally, after a conversation with the French Commercial Attaché, that the Quay D'Orsay would not oppose the normalization of relations with Spain.⁷¹ It should be pointed out that, since the reopening of the border and the signing of the commercial treaty on 15 May 1948, the French Government had adopted a more pragmatic

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Doc. No. 501. Telegram from Vanni D'Archirafi to Sforza, 10 October 1948.

⁷⁰ All these reports can be found in ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 15: Political reports on Spain; and in ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1948, folder 16: Relations with other countries.

⁷¹ DDI: Series XI, Vol. I, Doc. No. 663. Report from Capomazza to Sforza, 24 November 1948.

policy towards the Francoist regime, showing its willingness to make small political gestures in order to improve bilateral relations.⁷² It seemed that, if the Italian Government wanted to obtain diplomatic benefits from the normalization of relations with the Francoist regime, it would be necessary to speed things up.

In parallel with these events, De Gasperi travelled to Paris and Belgium in order to discuss questions related with the Brussels Treaty and the customs union with France. It is not unlikely that, during his meeting with Robert Schuman, considering the fact that France and Italy continued to have an ambiguous relationship with the Francoist regime, in light of the forthcoming UN meeting at which discussion of the Spanish question was likely, the two diplomats reviewed the situation. Upon his return from Paris, De Gasperi met with Sangróniz and assured him, *de motu proprio*, that his purpose was to appoint a new ambassador to Madrid as soon as possible, adding that he had already discussed it with the elements in his government less favourable to this action. Informed of this interview, first to Martín Artajo and then to Franco himself, Sangróniz concluded: 'I have deduced that De Gasperi has decided to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain even if some of his closest collaborators disagree', and announced that he would seize a favourable moment to put more pressure on the Christian Democrats. However, he warned that this diplomatic manoeuvre might be delayed as the Italian Government wanted to first solve the question of its colonies.⁷³

Although De Gasperi's statement has to be taken with the utmost caution, it is evident that the idea of adopting a pragmatic and positive policy towards the Francoist regime was starting to spread and take root among the various elements of the Italian Government. At the end of 1948 there was little doubt that Franco had managed to strengthen his position as the Spanish Head of State and that, therefore, he was going to stay in power for a long period of time; in addition, it was increasingly evident that the US Government was willing to change its policy towards the Francoist regime and include it in the Western bloc. In the Policy Statement on Spain prepared by the State Department on 26 July 1948, it was already stated that the primary objective of US policy towards Spain was its reintegration politically, economically and militarily into the Western European community. Of course this had to be done with the consensus of the Western European countries and important previous changes in the Francoist regime (democratization of the political system and liberalization of the economy). However, and in spite of these demands, this was already an important modification in the US policy towards Spain, especially if compared with

⁷²Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*, 235–98.

⁷³NFFE, Doc. No. 18689. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 5 December 1948. Transmitted afterwards to Franco.

previous years.⁷⁴ The Italian diplomats understood the new reality and started to redress foreign policy in this light; however, this manoeuvre had to be carefully and discretely executed, without falling out with the major powers or the left-wing parties, which were still important elements in Italian policy-making.

The Spanish diplomatic offensive which had started in May, was finally achieving small benefits. De Gasperi had communicated that Italy was willing to normalize relations with Spain once the future of its colonies was solved and the United Nations would overturn the condemnatory resolution of December 1946. The agreement signed between FIAT and Banco Urquijo-INI had given a new dimension to economic relations between the two countries, laying the first stone in the path of industrial cooperation which would be fundamental in the evolution of relations in the 1950s. In addition, this agreement consolidated FIAT as one of the most relevant actors in bilateral relations; its role, which had been really active during the Second World War had faded away between 1945 and 1946, but now re-emerged with renewed vigour. Taking these results into account, it is possible to assert that, after a period of political crisis, Madrid and Rome had finally managed to get bilateral relations back on track. The Spanish authorities then decided to continue with their strategy during 1949, firmly convinced that it would greatly help to achieve the main objective: the appointment of a new ambassador and the subsequent normalization of bilateral relations.

Conclusions

As it has been seen, the period 1947–48 marked a low point in Spanish-Italian relations after 1945. This period of crisis might appear as paradoxical, especially if one considers the great efforts put by both governments to improve diplomatic relations. Of course, both Madrid and Rome had different motivations to do so: while the Spanish authorities wanted to normalize diplomatic relations as soon as possible in order to start a possible political cooperation, the Italian diplomats regarded a possible rapprochement with Madrid as a way to achieve economic cooperation, thus fostering the interests of the Italian companies operating in Spain. Particularly noteworthy were the first attempts made by the De Gasperi Government, which seized the improvement in its international situation to adopt increasingly ambitious and independent policies from the Anglo-Americans. At the heart of this new policy lay the conviction that the country would regain part of the international prestige lost during the war by adopting a medium-size power policy in Europe and the Mediterranean. In this context, the Italian

⁷⁴FRUS: 1948, Vol. III. Policy Statement by the Department of State, 26 July 1948, 1041–5.

Government attempted to improve diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime, especially during the negotiations over the Marshall Plan, convinced that it could yield political and economic benefits.

However, this policy did not produce the expected results, also because it had important limitations. It was impossible for Italy to undertake a new policy towards the Francoist regime without having previously harmonized it with its Western allies. The De Gasperi Government wanted to improve diplomatic relations with Spain at the end of 1948 in the same way as at the end of 1947, but the problem was that it was unable to do it first nor unilaterally. Faced with this reality, the Italian Government continued with the old strategy adopted since the end of the war. It worked intensely to eliminate the possible obstacles in development of commercial relations, and to foster the role of Italian industries in the Spanish market, which after all was the main reason for improving relations with the Francoist regime.

As it can be seen, then, the major Western powers played a major role in the failure of the Spanish-Italian attempts to improve bilateral relations. Progressively more important was the position of the United States which banned the participation of the Francoist regime in the Marshall Plan, played a fundamental role in the DC victory during the 1948 Italian elections, and continued to delay the normalization of diplomatic relations between Madrid and Rome. However, it should be clarified that the increasing weight of the US did not mean that, for the period covered in this chapter, Britain had abandoned its hegemonic role in Europe or that it was not capable of exercising influence over European affairs. The increasing involvement of the US in European affairs did not mean that the joint Anglo-American front in dealing with Spanish or Italian matters was broken either. As this chapter has shown, Britain continued to be a crucial actor in Spanish-Italian relations between 1947 and 1948. During this period, and contrary to the views of some historians, most notably Moshe Gat, and Frederick Samuel Northedge, the British Government managed to prevail in its position regarding some of the most important questions concerning Spain and Italy. That was the case with the exclusion of the Francoist regime from the Marshall Plan. This major diplomatic victory was achieved also because the British Government managed to maintain the Anglo-American bulwark regarding Spain and Italy, thus obtaining US diplomatic support in most of the related questions.

4

1949: A Year of Important Approaches

Spanish-Italian relations progressively started to improve at the end of 1948, putting an end to a period of crisis which had lasted for more than a year. Aware of this new context, the Spanish authorities decided to take the initiative during the year 1949 with one goal in mind: the normalization of diplomatic relations between Madrid and Rome. As a matter of fact, the Spanish authorities were firmly convinced that Italy would be receptive to these approaches thus becoming the first European country after the condemnatory UN resolution of December 1946 to appoint a new ambassador in Madrid. Accordingly, the main aim of this chapter will be to analyse the different initiatives taken by the Spanish authorities during that year in an attempt to assess the actual impact that those had on the evolution of bilateral relations.

This analysis will provide a better understanding of the Spanish foreign policy of the early post-war period, challenging the traditional interpretations put forward by scholars that defined the years between 1946 and 1950 as years of 'international isolation'. In this sense, this chapter will postulate that, in spite of its difficult international situation created after the exclusion from the Marshall Plan, the Spanish Government displayed a dynamic foreign policy aimed at the normalization of diplomatic relations with Italy, in clear contrast with the image of inactivity predominant throughout the historiography.¹ Furthermore, these pages will examine the limitations of Spanish policy towards Italy. As a matter of fact, and even though the Spanish initiatives undertaken during this year managed to improve the tone of bilateral relations, they failed to produce the one expected outcome: the Italian appointment of a new ambassador. At the base of this failure, lays the opposition of the major powers which were still reluctant to integrate

¹ Abu Warda and Calduch (eds.), *La política exterior Española en el siglo XX*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*; Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

the Francoist regime in the new international system. From the crucial effect which this opposition had on the Spanish attempts to normalize relations with Italy it is possible to extract two conclusions: on the one hand, the small room for manoeuvre which Spain had in the international sphere, and on the other hand, the naivety and lack of foresight by the Spanish diplomats at 'Palacio de Santa Cruz'.

Small steps: the limitations of the first attempts to improve bilateral relations

Negotiating a new commercial agreement

In spite of the advances obtained in 1948, 1949 started with another disappointment for Spanish-Italian relations. In a meeting held on 14 January, Sforza explained to Sangróniz that the solution of the Spanish question was intrinsic to the evolution and the reality of international relations, and declared that the Italian policy towards the Francoist regime continued to be closely aligned with the British one, thus clarifying that no action would be taken without a previous agreement. Sangróniz asked then if the Italian Government would be willing, at least, to distance themselves from the British policy, in case the United States would decide to normalize relations. Sforza replied that the Italian sense of loyalty, which characterized its foreign policy since the end of the war, prevented any dissociation from its British ally. It was a considerable disappointment for the Spanish Government, especially taking into account the high expectations raised by De Gasperi's statement in December where he assured Spanish authorities that a new ambassador to Madrid would be appointed as soon as possible.² It has to be remembered that Britain, at that moment, had adopted the most negative policy towards the Francoist regime among the major powers. If the Italian Government took their cues from Whitehall, it meant that the Spanish objective of normalizing relations with Italy before the United Nations overturned the condemnatory resolution of 1946 would be unattainable.

Nevertheless the Spanish Government continued to push its diplomatic offensive and a couple of days later, Sangróniz went to visit Count Zoppi. It is clear that the Italian diplomat, now General Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had become a fundamental figure in Spanish-Italian relations, the person both governments turned to whenever there was a difficult problem to solve. During their meeting, Sangróniz repeated the strategy of using relations between Spain and other Western countries as a lever to convince the Italian Government to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain. In fact, according to the Spanish Ambassador, France, Britain and the US were

²DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 68. Report on the colloquium between Sforza and Sangróniz, 14 January 1949.

already carrying out ambitious policies in Spain, both in the economic and the political fields. If the Italian attitude did not change soon, warned Sangróniz, there was a serious risk of the Italian companies losing their networks and privileged positions earned after decades operating in the Spanish market. Accordingly, Ambassador Sangróniz suggested that the Italian Government appoint a new ambassador in Madrid immediately, and wait to send him until the United Nations had decided to withdraw the condemnatory resolution of December 1946. Finally, the Spanish Ambassador claimed that in several meetings with De Gasperi, the latter had shown his wish to see the situation solved as soon as possible. Zoppi explained that this would be a very unfortunate solution: the appointment of ambassador would raise severe criticism from international allies and the left-wing parties and, in addition, the delayed departure of the ambassador would be interpreted as a sign of weakness of the Italian Government showing that it had given in to the pressure coming from the socialists and the Communists.

Most of the arguments defended by Sangróniz during this meeting have to be taken with a pinch of salt: in essence, the official position of the major powers regarding the Francoist regime remained unaltered, and Spanish-Italian relations, after the low points marked by the appointment of Gallarati Scotti to the Embassy in London and the Italian elections, had experienced a slight improvement. However, the meeting with Sangróniz did have an impact on Zoppi who decided to send Sforza a report summarizing the most relevant points; in it the Italian diplomat made the following suggestion:

In any case, it seems advisable to defreeze the present situation of Spanish-Italian relations, also to avoid the danger of being overtaken by others in a Mediterranean country in which we have important interests (which could be further developed). This could be done on the occasion of the commercial negotiations which will begin in Rome. However, they could be concluded in Madrid and we might seize the opportunity to send a prominent figure there to sign the agreement, establish contacts and 'warm up' the atmosphere.³

It is clear that the Italian authorities had started to perceive a greater dynamism in the economic policies carried out by the major powers regarding Spain (especially France). It should be considered that the Franco-Spanish commercial agreement signed in May 1948, envisaged exchanges valued at 1.500 million pesetas (circa \$137 million) for the following 12 months. By the same token, the Anglo-Spanish commercial agreement signed on 23 June 1948 envisaged an exchange rate for £83 million. Both agreements

³Ibid. Doc. No. 152. Report from Zoppi to Sforza, 25 January 1949.

were substantially bigger than the one signed between Spain and Italy in 1947 which only amounted to 280 million pesetas (circa \$25.5 million).⁴

In addition, the French Government was again revising its policy towards the Francoist regime. On 24 March, the General Direction of Political Affairs, after verifying that the policy adopted by the UN in December 1946 had only served to consolidate Franco in power, proposed that the Bidault Government avoid discussing the Spanish question in the next session of the United Nations in order not to hinder the process of diplomatic normalization with Spain which started in February 1948 with the reopening of the border.⁵

Well aware of these agreements, the Italian authorities perceived that ideological differences with the Francoist regime had been put completely aside and the most important objective was now to penetrate the Spanish market as much as possible while simultaneously developing political relations. Evidently, the consolidation of their positions jeopardized the privileged position which Italy had occupied in the Spanish economy since the Civil War, and this was unacceptable. The Italian diplomats did not want to appoint an ambassador to Madrid nor to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain, at least until the other allies would proceed along the same lines, but they knew that a political gesture was necessary at that time in order to maintain the possibilities of obtaining a substantial share of the Spanish market. It has to be considered that the Spanish Government was extremely interventionist in economic questions, and had the power to decide which country was going to obtain more economic advantages by applying the existing legislation to varying degrees of severity for the different commercial agreements that had been signed. In the vast majority of the cases these decisions were adopted for political reasons. In any case, the DGAP realized that there was a great opportunity to consolidate, and even foster, its economic position in Spain, through the signature of a new commercial treaty. The appointment of an important political figure to sign the agreement when it was ready could be the necessary political gesture in order to obtain a favourable attitude from the Spanish authorities in the application of the aforementioned treaty.⁶ The idea was studied in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a week later Sforza wrote a telegram to Capomazza informing him that the Italian Government was ready to start negotiations in the month of May. The telegram concluded with the following remark: 'When contacting the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you shall underline our sincere intentions concerning these

⁴AMAE: Bundle 6.285, folder 3. Commercial agreements signed by Spain 1946–60.

⁵AMAEF: Europe 1944–49. Spain, 71. Report from the General Direction of Political Affairs to Bidault, 24 March 1949.

⁶ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42 Report from D'Ajeta to Sforza, 2 February 1948.

commercial negotiations, and that we expect to reach positive results which, once obtained, could be reciprocally highlighted.⁷

On 2 May, D'Ajeta held a meeting with the new Spanish Commercial Attaché, Juan Schwartz y Díaz Flores to explain and to stress the great relevance the Italian authorities gave to the new negotiations, to the extent that, if they succeeded, the DC Government would be willing to sign the agreement in Madrid, sending a prominent political figure to do so.⁸ Obviously, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had positively received Zoppi's idea and was willing to satisfy the Spanish desire of using these commercial treaties as political propaganda, showing that the regime was not isolated and maintained fruitful relations with other countries. The proposal was also positively received by the Spanish authorities who were eager to take advantage of the enormous potential of Italian industry by purchasing machinery and installations through agreements of cooperation.⁹ Besides, a new commercial treaty would be sold to the public as another diplomatic victory for the regime. However, resolving the economic problems was not going to be an easy task.¹⁰

The Spanish Government wanted to apply the economic measures which had just been adopted in order to improve commercial exchanges with other countries. At the end of 1948 the Spanish Government had approved a series of reforms in order to improve the situation of the economy; among them, the most important concerning commerce with foreign countries was the introduction of the so-called 'multiple exchanges' system. This new arrangement had been conceived to soften the negative effects which the over-valuation of the 'peseta' was having on the balance of payments, without actually devaluing the currency. It consisted of the application of more moderate changes to certain products which might be considered important by the importers. In this case, for instance, if Italy was interested in buying anchovies from Spain, a more adequate change between 'lira' and 'peseta' could be established in order to make the product more affordable and thus facilitating the transactions. According to the Spanish authorities, the new system of 'multiple exchanges' would greatly contribute to revitalizing commercial traffic between Spain and Italy and, as a consequence, it would be a spur to revise the existing commercial treaty as soon as possible.¹¹

⁷DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 231. Telegram from Sforza to Capomazza, 3 February 1948.

⁸ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42. Letter from D'Ajeta to Grazzi and Sforza, 2-February 1949.

⁹AMAE: Bundle 3.242, folder 1. Report written by the attaché for foreign economy on the commerce between Spain and Italy, 18 January 1949.

¹⁰AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 8. Telegram from Juan Felipe de Ranero, Consul at the Spanish Embassy in Rome, to Artajo, 2 February 1949.

¹¹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza and the DGAE, 12 January 1949.

Negotiations were thus set for 25 April. In addition, Sforza and other political figures who sympathized with the Spanish cause, proposed to seize the opportunity and also negotiate to sign an air agreement which would contribute more political content to the new treaty which was one of the most important objectives of the Francoist diplomacy.¹² Accordingly, meetings started under positive auspices, even more if it is considered that Giulio Andreotti had started a five days official visit to Spain the previous day, on 25 March, in what was a thinly veiled coincidence.

Giulio Andreotti visits Spain

The visit of Andreotti was, as already explained, part of the Italian new strategy outlined by Zoppi at the end of January, a strategy that sought to improve relations with the Francoist regime through the execution of small gestures with political connotations. The ultimate objective of this new policy was to defend and develop the Italian economic interests in the Iberian Peninsula, in a context where the major powers were increasingly expanding into the Spanish market.

The designated person to accomplish this task was Giulio Andreotti, a choice which raises a number of important questions. When one thinks of Giulio Andreotti today, the image that comes to mind is one of the most important political figures in post-war Italy, the man who was the Head of Government for six separate terms, Minister of Foreign Affairs three times, and had a predominant position over Italian political life for the last forty years. This image has been reinforced by the many obituaries published right after his death on 6 May 2013, and also by *Il Divo*, the wonderful film directed by Paolo Sorrentino which narrated the 'amazing life of Giulio Andreotti'.¹³ But in May 1949 the image of Andreotti was very different: he had a minor position, at least formally as Undersecretary of the Presidency in the DC Government, and was not well known abroad, as he had not carried out any function related with foreign policy. *In strictu sensu*, the appointment of Andreotti for this trip meant that the Italian Government had opted for a political figure of lower profile, with minor political implications, at least compared with Francesco Maria Taliani, the other candidate to visit Spain. In fact, historians have neglected the first years of Andreotti's political career, focusing almost exclusively on the later stages of his life.¹⁴

¹²AMAE: Bundle 2.935 folder 8. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 26 March 1949. The agreement was actually denounced on 2 April. AMAE: Bundle 2.935, Folder 8. Telegram from Ranero to Artajo, 2 April 1949.

¹³Paolo Sorrentino, *Il Divo* (Lucky Red, s.d.).

¹⁴Dealing with Giulio Andreotti is not an easy job for the historian. In spite of his relevance as a public figure, he has always been surrounded by an aura of mystery, and part of his political activity is still not well known or unknown. It will be an important task for future historians to write an exhaustive and accurate biography on

However, other factors should be taken into consideration when analysing the political relevance of his designation for the trip. In first place, Giulio Andreotti was already a rising star in the political life of Italy, managing to give popularity to a position, Undersecretary of the Presidency, which traditionally had a low profile; secondly, he had by now become De Gasperi's right-hand man, receiving assignments which involved a great deal of responsibility; and thirdly, he had very good connections with the Vatican, to the extent that, according to some historians, he was in charge of guiding relations between the DC and the Papal State (as a matter of fact, he was known as 'the man of the Vatican' or 'the foreign cardinal').¹⁵ If one considers all these elements, it is possible to argue that the designation of Andreotti to travel to Spain had more political significance than Taliani's after all. Maybe the Italian Government miscalculated the relevance of the Italian politician when it made this decision. Or maybe it was well aware of these circumstances and made a conscious effort to obtain the maximum benefits from this diplomatic manoeuvre. Unfortunately, the documents provide a lot of information on the task of Andreotti while in Spain and very little on why was he appointed, and in this aspect, it is possible only to draw quite thin conclusions.

The Italian authorities decided that Andreotti would be the person designated to visit Spain in order to provide an impetus for bilateral relations with the Francoist regime. The excuse for the occasion was the soccer match between both national teams to be played in 'Santiago Bernabeu' on 27 March. The Undersecretary of the Presidency wanted to give his visit an exclusively cultural nature, 'although it would be possible to exchange opinions and establish contacts with the Spanish political elites with the objective, always according to Andreotti, of strengthening bilateral relations'.¹⁶ In spite of this fact, the Spanish authorities were pleased about the visit of a young, upcoming Italian politician, who, in addition, was willing to establish contacts with political elites of the regime. As a matter of fact, the visit of any political figure in the difficult context of the Francoist regime was perceived by the Spanish authorities as a great diplomatic success which should be highly publicized.¹⁷

him. In this case, in order to outline this description I have consulted his personal archive and used the following two books: Mario Barone and Ennio Di Nolfo (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti: l'uomo, il cattolico, lo statista* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010); Massimo Franco, *Andreotti: la vita di un uomo politico, la storia di un'epoca* (Milano: Mondadori, 2008).

¹⁵Andrea Riccardi, 'Il Cardinale estero: Giulio Andreotti e la Roma dei papi', in Barone and Di Nolfo (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti*.

¹⁶FNFF. Doc. No. 7152. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo transmitted afterwards to Franco, 13 March 1949.

¹⁷ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Letter from Capomazza to Taliani, 4 March 1949.

The main objective of Andreotti's visit was thus to improve bilateral relations and to create a favourable atmosphere for Italy and the Italian companies at this particular juncture. Contacts with political figures from the Francoist regime should not be avoided, but encouraged in order to obtain the maximum benefits from this diplomatic manoeuvre. However, the Italian Government had to proceed with the utmost care, avoiding the possible risks that Andreotti's visit entailed. The major task was avoiding any misinterpretations by the Spanish Government: this political gesture did not mean that Italy was going to normalize diplomatic relations or to appoint a new ambassador to Madrid. Diplomatic relations would remain unaltered, although Italy was ready to improve them within the limits imposed by the international reality. In addition, everything had to be done discretely in order to not raise hostile reactions from the left-wing parties or from the Western allies.

In this regard, Luis Suárez Fernández has written that the Italian Government was, already in March 1949, willing to normalize relations with the Francoist regime, and quotes an article that appeared in the Italian newspaper *Il Tempo*.¹⁸ However, Suárez's vision of Italian politics is excessively simplistic. He does not take the complexity of Italian political life into account nor the international situation, mainly because he has not consulted archives outside from Spain. As the papers on Andreotti's trip prove, the Italian Government was not yet ready to take a unilateral decision regarding the Francoist regime and appoint an ambassador in Madrid. In fact, it wanted to avoid any discussions on this subject with the Spanish authorities.¹⁹

Andreotti arrived in Madrid on 27 March, accompanied by the Italian team, national sports authorities, and José Antonio de Sangróniz. The Spanish Ambassador had received unofficial indications from the Italian authorities about the importance of being present for the time Andreotti was going to be in the country.²⁰ This is crucial; displaying the relevance with which Sangróniz was considered in Spanish-Italian relations, in contrast with the marginal role played by Capomazza.

Andreotti stayed in Spain for five days, time which he used, apart for seeing the football match, to meet with some of the most relevant figures of the Francoist regime. Among them, the following should be underlined: Martín Artajo (at least twice), José Ibáñez Martín (Minister of Public Education), Luis Carrero Blanco (Undersecretary of State), Sebastián Erice (General Director of Foreign Policy), Muniain, Valcarcel, Escudero, Sirvent,

¹⁸'Anche la Spagna è parte viva dell'Europa', *Il Tempo*, 14 March 1949.

¹⁹Luis Suárez Fernández, *Victoria frente al bloque: desde 1945 hasta 1953* (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2001), 283.

²⁰AMAE: Bundle 2.017 folder 6-12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 22 March 1949.

Rodríguez Ponga and Ussía (who were very important businessmen).²¹ On the political level, Andreotti avoided discussing concrete initiatives but reaffirmed the positive attitude of the Italian Government which, in spite of not being able to appoint an ambassador in Madrid because of the internal and external problems of his country, was willing to improve bilateral relations within the limits imposed by its Western allies. In the economic sphere, the Undersecretary of the Presidency, defended the pressing need of improving commercial exchange and championed progressive industrial cooperation between the two countries.²²

There is little doubt that Andreotti's visit to Spain was a political gesture very much appreciated by the Spanish authorities. In spite of not having secured its main objective – the normalization of relations – receiving a relevant figure of Italian political life was an important achievement for Francoist diplomacy.²³ The Italians were also satisfied with the match. In fact the Italian national team played great football and obtained a victory, 3 goals to 1.²⁴ On 31 March Capomazza wrote a report in a fit of passion analysing the political and social impact of the football match in bilateral relations together with Andreotti's visit. According to the Italian attaché, the game represented a brilliant success for Italian propaganda in Spain, to the extent, he argued, that it had surpassed the rest of the activities carried out by the Italian Embassy since the war (including cultural exhibitions, conferences, visits of students and concerts). Adding to this was the performance of the Italian national team, the arrival of 5,000 'tifosi' to support it (who had displayed exemplary behaviour) and, of course, the presence of Giulio Andreotti. In fact, Andreotti's trip had convinced the Spanish authorities to adopt a less aggressive stance regarding the normalization of political relations to the extent that Sangróniz and Artajo had assured that, 'Even if Spain wished for a rapid normalization of diplomatic relations with Italy, they became aware of our difficulties, both internal and external, and decided to rely on the good sense of the Italian Government also to avoid creating any embarrassment. They only wished that the appointment of a new Ambassador could be done soon.'²⁵

²¹ AMAE: Bundle 3.035, file 8. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 March 1949.

²² Istituto Sturzo Archive. Archivio dell'Istituto Sturzo (AIS), Giulio Andreotti papers, Fondo Giulio Andreotti (FGA). Giulio Andreotti's trip to Spain. Folder 235/1. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, transmitted afterwards to Giulio Andreotti, 31 March 1949.

²³ Following Italian wishes, the Spanish press had focused on the football match which appeared in all the main journals. MNLM: *ABC*, *Ya* and *Arriba!*, 29 March 1949.

²⁴ A résumé of the match can be found at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaUSIvI3PsY> (accessed on 17 November 2010).

²⁵ AIS, FGA, Giulio Andreotti's trip to Spain, Folder 235/1. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, transmitted afterwards to Giulio Andreotti, 31 March 1949.

Taking into account the report made by Zoppi at the beginning of January, it can be argued that the visit of Andreotti had achieved the main political objectives outlined and could be considered, without falling for Capomazza's exaggerated tone, a notable success of the Italian diplomacy. However, there was an aspect of Andreotti's trip which did not evolve according to the plans. It has to be remembered that this diplomatic manoeuvre had to be done discretely, without attracting excessive attention from the actors which might adopt a hostile attitude. Nevertheless, once the visit of Andreotti was made public, in the very moment that he arrived, it inspired a whirl of rumours and speculation both in Italy and abroad.

In Italy, the trip and its political implications were expounded upon by United Press and appeared in *Il Paese*, an Italian newspaper linked with the PCI, on 29 March; in this article, it was asserted that Andreotti was about to meet Carrero Blanco in a fundamental step to improve relations with the Francoist regime.²⁶ The next day, Andreotti's trip appeared in all the Italian newspapers. The event was seized by the press attached to the left-wing parties in order to wear down the government, stressing the hidden political intentions behind the visit: several interpretations were given but all concluded that the main purpose of the trip was to reaffirm Italian friendship with Spain and discuss the question of the Italian representation in Madrid.²⁷ The controversy went quickly beyond the sphere of the press, even penetrating into the Senate where De Gasperi was questioned about the real reasons behind the trip. The Head of Government replied curtly that Andreotti was just a soccer fan.²⁸ Nevertheless, the question of Andreotti's visit to Spain did not end there and it was raised again around the middle of June. On that date, Umberto Terracini, Senator of the PCI, asked Andreotti what the real duties entrusted to him by the President of the Council on the occasion of his recent trip to Madrid actually were. The Undersecretary of the Presidency assured that his trip did not have political purposes, but was forced to admit that, due to formal reasons, he had established contacts with important figures of the Francoist regime and members of the Catholic Action.²⁹

The impact of Andreotti's visit to Madrid also extended to other countries, mainly France, Britain and the US. On 21 April, the Western Department of the Foreign Office, alerted by the big quantity and the tone of the

²⁶AMAE: Bundle 3.035, folder. 8. Telegram from Ranero to Artajo, 29 March 1949.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸NARA: Central Decimal File 1945–49, Box 39993. Telegram from the US Ambassador in Rome, Clement Dunn, to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 4 January 1949.

²⁹AMAE: Bundle 3.035, folder 8. Telegram from Ranero to Artajo, 23 June 1949. NARA: Central Decimal File 1945–49, Box 39993. Letter from the Minister – Counsellor in Rome, Homer M. Byington, to Acheson, 1 July 1949.

information appearing in the Italian press, wrote a letter to the Chancery in Madrid asking to know more details about the visit of the Undersecretary of the Presidency.³⁰ The controversy in the press and the subsequent debates in the Senate were also followed with great attention by the US authorities.³¹ However, it was the French Government which devoted most attention and managed to obtain more information regarding the visit of Andreotti and its impact on Spanish-Italian relations.

In general, the French diplomats tended to downplay the relevance of the trip arguing that no concrete agreements had been reached and that the Italian Government would still follow the criteria of the major powers regarding the Francoist regime. However, they were forced to admit that the De Gasperi Government was also determined to improve diplomatic relations with Spain within the limits of their formal agreements. For instance, according to the French Ambassador in Rome, Jacques Fouques Duparc, Italy was not able to carry out a 'grande politique' with Spain, even though there were elements among the right-wing sector of the DC and the 'Azione Cattolica' which would like Italy to join the Francoist regime in its anti-Communist crusade. In spite of this wish to maintain healthy political relations, the French diplomats concluded that there was little possibility that Italy would unilaterally decide to appoint an ambassador in Madrid, even though they admitted that the situation could change if the equilibrium inside De Gasperi's Government would swing towards the right-wing elements of the DC.³²

The fact is that the Italian diplomatic manoeuvre, which had to be executed with great discretion, had aroused strong reactions both in Italy and the Western allies. This was due to the personality and the role of Giulio Andreotti, but also to the fact that he stayed five days in Spain when he could have come back to Italy after one or two days, and the general secrecy which surrounded his visit; all these were elements which attracted the attention of many interested parties both in Italy and the Western world. However, the main reason underlying the great interest which it aroused has to be found in the international context. In this regard, it has to be remembered that the spring of 1949 was a period when the Western countries were

³⁰NAUK: FO 371/79326. Letter from the Western Department of the Foreign Office to the British Chancery in Madrid, 21 April 1949. It is curious that the letter received no answer or, if there was, it has disappeared.

³¹NARA: Central Decimal File 1945-49, Box 39993. Telegram from Dunn to Acheson, 4 January 1949, Telegram from Dunn to Acheson, 9 April 1949 and Letter from Byington, to Acheson, 1 July 1949.

³²AMAEF: Europe, 1944-49, Spain, 71. Telegram from the French attaché in Madrid, Bernard Hardion, to Schuman, 25 March 1949 and letter from the French attaché in Italy, Geoffroy de Courcel, to Schuman, 1 April 1949, and Europe 1949-55, Spain, 185. Letter from the French Ambassador in Rome, Jacques Fouques Duparc, to Schuman, 1 July 1949.

discussing the possible inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Western security system. During the conversations held throughout 1948, the major powers had decided that, in spite of the strategic interest of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain should not participate in any multilateral organization to defend Europe.³³ Nevertheless, the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union after the events of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade had brought about a change of positions, especially among the US military institutions (the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which were reconsidering the geo-strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula and the possibility of involving the Francoist regime in the defence of the Old Continent.³⁴ The Spanish authorities realized very quickly that the negotiations for the Atlantic Treaty constituted a great opportunity to improve the international situation of the regime. Around the middle of January, Carrero Blanco sent a report to Franco concluding that the inclusion of Spain in the Atlantic Treaty, under certain conditions, would be beneficial for the country and the future stability of the government. According to the Undersecretary of the Government, Spain should negotiate directly with the United States and use Portugal as an intermediary.³⁵

The offensive of Spanish diplomacy aimed at participating in the Atlantic Treaty started precisely in the month of March and it was conducted through the Portuguese Government. The main objective was the renunciation of participating in the Atlantic Treaty which would mean the abandoning of the Iberian Pact; in addition, Spain could use its neighbour country to put pressure on the Western countries in order to be invited into the security arrangement.³⁶ On 21 March, Nicolás Franco, Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, delivered a memorandum redacted in the 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' to Caeiro da Mata, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs; in it, the Spanish authorities expressed their concern about the possible inclusion of Portugal in the Atlantic Treaty. The Spanish pressure achieved rapid results as the Portuguese Government decided to postpone *sine die* the final decision regarding its participation in the defence of Europe.³⁷ However, this diplomatic success was not enough to grant the Spanish an invitation. As a matter of fact the Spanish manoeuvre had negative consequences in the long term because it irritated the US Government which decided to sustain the exclusion of the Francoist regime from the Atlantic Treaty, and toughened its position in the next General Assembly of the United Nations.³⁸

³³Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 313.

³⁴Marquina, *España en la política de seguridad occidental: 1939–1986*, 221–9.

³⁵Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 314–16.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 317.

³⁷Marquina, *España en la política de seguridad occidental: 1939–1986*, 234–8.

³⁸Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 318.

It is easy to understand that Andreotti's visit to Madrid, which coincided precisely with the Spanish diplomatic offensive to grant its inclusion in the Atlantic treaty, aroused enormous interest both in Italy and among the major Western powers. However, and as it has already been pointed out, the Undersecretary of the Presidency did not discuss this issue with the Spanish authorities. The Spanish Government had not even contacted the Italians to obtain their support, being well aware that the question was in the hands of the major powers and that Italy could have done very little to improve the international situation of the Francoist regime. In addition, there was the general belief that, in the event that Spanish participation in the Atlantic Treaty was accepted by the US, Britain and France, Italy would not oppose it.³⁹

In fact, the Italian Government had not expressed a definite position regarding the possible inclusion of Spain in the Atlantic Treaty. During the month of March, the Italian diplomats had limited their actions to an analysis of Spanish intentions regarding the defence of Western Europe and the monitoring of the major powers' attitude towards such.⁴⁰ The conclusion was that Italy would not oppose the possible inclusion of Spain in NATO, but this position should not be made public in order to avoid problems with the left-wing parties.⁴¹

In conclusion, it can be argued that Andreotti's visit to Spain had been a notable success for diplomacy. The Undersecretary of the Presidency had managed to reverse the dynamics of bilateral relations, creating a positive atmosphere in Spain which was deemed essential to obtain a more ambitious commercial treaty in the negotiations which were about to start and that could have an enormous relevance for the future of Italy in the Spanish market. Though the visit had aroused more reactions than expected, there had not been negative consequences for the DC Government as the major powers had not protested (they had only shown interest and curiosity) and De Gasperi and Andreotti had managed to handle their respective questionings in the Senate. Another important consequence of the trip was the inclusion of Giulio Andreotti in the political networks of the Francoist regime. From this moment onwards, the Christian Democrat would be one of the crucial figures in bilateral relations, alongside Taliani and Zoppi.

As far as Spain was concerned, Andreotti's trip was also considerably successful. It is true that the main objective of the Spanish diplomacy, the normalization of diplomatic relations, remained elusively out of reach but

³⁹FNFF: Doc. No. 7183. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, transmitted afterwards to Franco, 10 March 1949.

⁴⁰DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 485. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 4 March 1949.

⁴¹AMAE: Bundle 2.036, folder 2. Letter from Ranero to Artajo, 4 April 1949.

it has to be remembered that a visit of political figures from other European countries already constituted a great victory for the regime in their fight against international isolation. In addition, the Spanish Government had won an important ally in the Italian Government; as a matter of fact, from this moment onwards, Giulio Andreotti would become one of the most active defenders of normalization and improvement of relations with the Francoist regime, especially in the late 1950s and 60s.

The commercial negotiations

The productive and cordial atmosphere created by Andreotti's trip was seized upon by both the Italian and the Spanish Government to speed up the beginning of the commercial negotiations. However, the delegations of the two countries were well aware that in spite of Andreotti's intervention, the negotiations which were to start on 26 April would not be easy. In fact, many of the problems which had encumbered commercial relations since the end of the war were still present: the similarities between the two economies which complicated the establishment of, for example, lists of exchangeable products, the over-evaluation of the Spanish currency and the new system of 'multiple changes' which seemed excessively arbitrary. In spite of these difficulties, Palazzo Chigi believed that it was very important for Italian industries to place their products in a rapidly expanding market, even more so if the Spanish Government was finally receiving loans from the United States. It is important to consider that the US Government had been studying the possibility of giving economic aid to Franco's Spain since its exclusion from the Marshall Plan; still, the reluctance of the State Department and Truman himself to sponsor financial agreements with a dictatorship had prevented the concession of such loans. This notwithstanding, 'the US congress seemed willing to curve the attitude adopted by the Truman administration'.⁴² As a matter of fact, during the summer of 1949 a political battle on the possible concession of loans to the Francoist regime had started between the House of Representatives on the one hand, and the US Senate and the State Department on the other. This struggle would only conclude in August 1950 with the concession of a \$62.5 million loan to Spain. This loan would eventually become the only United States aid programme granted and (politically) delivered to Spain before the signing of the Pact of Madrid.⁴³ The Italians were well aware of this possibility and did not want to miss a great opportunity to obtain important benefits.⁴⁴

⁴² Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 275.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 283.

⁴⁴ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza and the DGAE, 15 April 1949.

As was foreseen, the commercial negotiations were tough and difficult. The two delegations had arrived with concise instructions and the direction not to concede on the important questions. In short, the main differences were focused around three main points: the Italian demand to establish the dollar as the currency of reference for the new commercial treaty, a demand which was seen as unacceptable by the Spanish diplomats who believed that the adoption of the dollar would not solve the problem represented by the under-valuation of the lira; the Italian refusal to exchange industrial products (heavy machinery) for salted fish; and, linked to the previous point, the Spanish insistence in eliminating the 'operaciones de reciprocidad', counter trade operations which implied the exchanging of goods which are paid with other goods rather than with money.⁴⁵ The only big advances were the agreement to start negotiations as soon as possible to sign a cinematographic treaty, and a convention that would regulate air transport between the two countries.⁴⁶ The position of both delegations on these three questions became irreconcilable, and around the middle of May negotiations were at a dead end. Conscious of the impact that an interruption in the negotiations might have on public opinion in both countries, the Spanish authorities decided to make an effort to reinvigorate negotiations.

It should be considered that, at some point, the two governments were more concerned about the political implications of a possible rupture in the negotiation than the negotiation itself. Commercial exchanges between the two countries had been almost non-existent since 1947 and, therefore, a delay in the signing of a new treaty would have a minimum impact in the economic sphere. On the political side, however, if the situation was not handled with the utmost care, the interruption of negotiations could provoke further deterioration in bilateral relations, negating the positive effects of Andreotti's visit. Accordingly, it was agreed on 19 May to dismiss cordially the Joint Commission, postponing the agreement *sine die*.

The reasons for this failure cannot be found in the political sphere of bilateral relations, but in the great differences between the two governments in their economic approaches, which have already been explained. Proof of this assertion is the way in which the negotiations were interrupted and how careful the authorities of both countries were in explaining the situation to their respective publics and interest groups. This was particularly

⁴⁵ AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 8. Telegram from Artajo to the President of the Spanish delegation, 13 May 1949, telegram from Artajo to the President of the Spanish delegation, 15 April 1949 and Telegram from the President of the Spanish delegation to the Undersecretary of Economy, 4 May 1949. ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42 Report from Emilio Prato, Undersecretary of Economic Affairs, to Grazzi, 22 May 1949.

⁴⁶ AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 8. Telegram from Artajo to the President of the Spanish delegation, 15 April 1949.

true in the case of Italy which had important economic interests in Spain, interests jeopardized by the dynamic economic policies of its rivals. Faced with the rupture of negotiations, both delegations agreed to issue a joint press release (published on the 22nd) minimizing the consequence of this interruption and stressing the possibility of continuing with them in the future.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the attention of Spanish-Italian relations had to turn again to the political arena, leaving the pending issues in the economic field momentarily aside. Around the middle of May, the General Assembly of the United Nations reopened the Spanish question, and the diplomats in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' seized the opportunity to launch another diplomatic offensive in order to normalize relations with the Italian Republic.

The Brusasca–Aldisio mission: another Spanish attempt to normalize relations with Italy

As explained above, the Spanish question at the United Nations had been pending since 1947. At the end of 1948 there had been another attempt to discuss it but the overburdened agenda of the General Assembly resulted in a further delay. At the beginning of 1949, this notwithstanding, the Brazilian and the Polish delegates were determined to find a definitive solution for the Spanish problem and presented two different proposals: the Polish one sought to condemn the Francoist regime and urge the UN countries to break relations with it, whereas the Brazilian proposal aimed at the withdrawal of the UN condemnatory resolution of December 1946. After long and difficult discussions motivated by the reluctance of the major powers to include Spain in the list of debates, it was decided that the General Assembly would deal with the Spanish question on 16 May. This process was followed with great interest by the Italian authorities who were uncertain about the success of the Brazilian proposal (there were at least five South American countries opposed to the rehabilitation of the Francoist regime), but were firmly convinced that the Polish resolution would be rejected by a great majority. According to the Italian delegation at the UN, this rejection could be interpreted by several countries as a tacit consent to normalize relations with the Francoist regime, a possibility that the 'Farnesina' had to take into account.⁴⁸

As was foreseen, both proposals were rejected: the Polish one by a great majority and the Brazilian by only one vote. Obviously, the decision of the General Assembly caused profound dissatisfaction in a Spanish Government who had made rehabilitation at the United Nations one of its main objectives. However, the tightness of the results (only one vote), and the support shown by important countries such as Brazil, Greece, Turkey and the Arab

⁴⁷ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit B, Spain, 1949, folder No. 42. Report from Prato, to Grazzi and Sforza, 22 May 1949, and Joint Press Release, 22 May 1949.

⁴⁸ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1949, folder 18. Report from the DGAP to Sforza, without date.

bloc, were seized by the Spanish Government to start a press campaign in order to convince the public that the result was in reality a moral victory for the regime.⁴⁹ The press campaign was very intense, to the extent that, on 23 May, Spanish journals published that the Italian Government, impressed by the results in the vote of the General Assembly, had decided to normalize relations with the Francoist regime and send an ambassador immediately.⁵⁰ When the US Government learned about this information, it asked the Italian Ambassador in Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, for confirmation.⁵¹ Zoppi was forced to intervene assuring that Italy was not and did not intend to appoint a new ambassador to Madrid.⁵² It was evident that the Spanish Government wanted to put more pressure on the Italian authorities, convinced that it would force them to normalize relations before the major powers did so. Nevertheless, the main focus of the Spanish diplomatic offensive coincided with the visit of Giuseppe Brusasca, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, and Salvatore Aldisio, Vice-President of the Senate, to South America.⁵³

The Italian Government had already decided at the beginning of 1949 to organize a delegation, led by two prominent figures of political life, that would take a tour through South America in order to accomplish several objectives: first, to acknowledge the support shown by the vast majority of the South American Republics when the question of the Italian colonies was being discussed at the United Nations in May 1949; secondly, to sign treaties of friendship with the aforementioned republics with a view to the future discussion of the Italian membership to the United Nations; thirdly, to negotiate an agreement concerning Italian migrants to South America; and fourthly, to establish bases for future cultural penetration into the continent. The delegation would visit Río de Janeiro, Montevideo, Santiago, Lima, La Paz, Quito, Bogotá and Mexico and would be headed by Aldisio, and Brusasca. This tour, which was set for the end of July, has to be considered in a context in which the Italian Government, following the loss of its former colonies, was anxious to improve its international role by strengthening relations with other minor countries (especially the Arab countries in the Mediterranean area and the South American countries).⁵⁴

⁴⁹DDI: Series XI, Vol. VII, Doc. No. 958. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 20 May 1949.

⁵⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1949, folder 18. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 25 May 1949.

⁵¹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Telegram from Tarchiani to Sforza, 3 June 1949.

⁵²Ibid. Telegram from Zoppi to Tarchiani, 3 June 1949.

⁵³More about the debates at the United Nations in Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 318–38.

⁵⁴Raffaele Nocera, 'Italia y América Latina: una relación de bajo perfil, 1945–1965. El caso de Chile', in Fernando Purcell and Alfredo Riquelme (eds.), *Ampliando miradas: Chile y su historia en tiempo global* (Santiago de Chile: RIL, 2009), 261–305.

It should be remembered that the question of the Italian colonies, crucial for the De Gasperi Government, had been left unresolved in the 1947 Peace Treaty. After several discussions between the major powers, it was finally decided that the future of these colonies would be determined by the United Nations in a special session that would be held during the spring of 1949. The Italian Government prepared for this session with the utmost care in an attempt to maintain control of at least part of its old colonial empire. However, the Italian delegation met with opposition by the British Government which regarded the loss of the colonies as the just price Italy should pay for having caused the war. After long negotiations between Sforza and Bevin, the two politicians reached a compromise which put the issue to a vote at the United Nations on 13 May. However, the Anglo-Italian proposal was defeated by only one vote and the General Assembly decided to postpone the issue one more time. In spite of this result, the support of the Italian position shown by the South American republics had deeply impressed the De Gasperi Government, which decided to organize this trip as a sign of good will and gratitude.⁵⁵

While informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this trip, Sangróniz suggested that it might be an interesting opportunity, if some of these South American countries, obviously those which displayed more pro-Spanish sentiments, would defend the convenience of normalizing relations with the Francoist regime as soon as possible. According to the Spanish Ambassador, this diplomatic manoeuvre 'would create here a good impression and give new impetus to the more pro-Spanish sectors inside the Government'.⁵⁶ After studying the question in detail, the 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' decided that Spain might obtain diplomatic benefits by using its South American allies as intermediaries with the Italian delegation. On 26 July, one day before the departure of the mission headed by Brusasca and Aldisio, Martín Artajo wrote a telegram to all the Spanish Chiefs of Mission in South America. In it the Minister of Foreign Affairs revealed that in the farewell dinner organized by the Italian Government in Palazzo Madama, Senator Aldisio had spoken cordially of Spain, claiming that Italy should not forget how important the concept of 'Hispanidad' and relations with Spain were for South American countries. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aldisio had asserted that 'Italy does not echo the US or the British policy mainly because it believes that no country should intervene in the affairs of other countries. Italy does not ignore that Spain exists in Europe and that it is part of the Latin countries.'⁵⁷ Evidently, these kind words pronounced by

⁵⁵Kelly, *Cold War in the Desert*; Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943–1963)*, 334–46.

⁵⁶AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 17 July 1949.

⁵⁷AMAE: Bundle 2.046, folder 8. Telegram from Artajo to the Chiefs of Mission in South America, 27 July 1949. This information had been transmitted by Sangróniz

the Vice-President of the Italian Senate considerably spurred on the Spanish Government, which attentively followed the stages and the evolution of the Aldisio/Brusasca mission.⁵⁸ In addition, these statements reinforced the idea, already transmitted by the French diplomats on the occasion of Andreotti's trip to Madrid, that there was a sector inside the DC which was eager to distance Italy from the British policy towards Spain and normalize diplomatic relations with it.

In the meantime, the Spanish authorities continued to exert pressure over the Italian Government; on 19 August, Sebastián Erice went to visit Capomazza insisting that the De Gasperi Government should appoint a new ambassador to Madrid as soon as possible. During this meeting the Spanish Director of Foreign Policy, apart from the usual references to spiritual and sentimental elements between the two ('latinità', 'cattolicesimo' and 'Mediterraneo'), defended this decision by resorting to two different motivations. In the first instance, Erice reminded the Italian attaché that several South American countries (Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia) had already expressed to Aldisio and Brusasca during their stay, their wish to see Italy normalizing relations with the Francoist regime; by doing so, Italy would thus improve relations with the South American countries in a particularly important moment as it wanted to negotiate its inclusion in the United Nations. Secondly, Erice made reference to the recent visit of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to several European countries in order to arrange the defence of the Old Continent. In case Italy would be put in command of one of the regional groups, together with Portugal, it would be necessary to include Spain in order to have a more coherent organization for the Mediterranean area.⁵⁹ The second line of argumentation did not have any effect on the Italian Government, as it was convinced that Franco did not really want to participate in the Atlantic Treaty in particular, nor the defence of Europe in general. However, the argument related with the South American countries did provoke a reaction from the Italian diplomats; on 29 August, Zoppi wrote a telegram to Brusasca asking how many governments had expressed during their tour, the wish to see Italy normalizing relations with the

four days before. AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folder 6–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 23 July 1949. According to these documents, Martín Artajo had already sent to the Chiefs of Mission in South America other telegrams, which I could not find, instructing them to publicize the Italian visit and getting in contact with their respective governments in order to exert some pressure on the Italian delegation.

⁵⁸The evolution of the Italian mission can be followed exhaustively thanks to the telegrams sent by Martín Artajo to Sangróniz, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave him the most important updates. AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegrams from Artajo to Sangróniz, 10 August 1949 (2); 11 August 1949; 25 August 1949; 29 September 1949.

⁵⁹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1949, folder 18. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, then transmitted to the DGAE, 19 August 1949.

Francoist regime.⁶⁰ There is no archival evidence of Brusasca's answer but the documents present in the Spanish archives provide a response: at least five countries had expressed their desire to see a normalization of Spanish-Italian relations (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Dominican Republic and Bolivia).⁶¹ It is evident that Spanish pressure was forcing the Italian Government, at least, to analyse the situation from a South American perspective.

At the end of November the Italian delegation arrived in Santo Domingo, one of the most pro-Spanish countries in the South American continent, mainly because of the rule of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a dictator and personal friend of Franco. Trujillo repeated the same arguments that other South American countries had expressed to Brusasca and Aldisio, thus complementing the Spanish diplomatic manoeuvre. Even though there is no archival evidence of the impact that all these statements of support had on Brusasca and Aldisio, it seems clear that they had some effect, mainly because Brusasca proposed a short stop in Madrid on his way back to Italy. The idea was received with great enthusiasm by the Spanish authorities who perceived for the first time since the two Italian politicians started their trip, the possibility of obtaining important diplomatic benefits from their manoeuvre.⁶² However, the Italian Government, fearing the political repercussions of that change of plans, rejected the idea and the Brusasca-Aldisio delegation came back through New York.⁶³ In this way, a new Spanish offensive to normalize relations with Italy had failed again, showing the limited effect of Francoist diplomacy, and the Italian's firm intention to harmonize every decision in this regard with its Western allies.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic manoeuvre was not a complete failure. On 9 October, Sangróniz held a meeting with Zoppi in order to discuss the outcome of the Brusasca-Aldisio mission; in it, the General Director of Foreign Affairs was forced to admit that five countries had revealed pro-Spanish inclinations, referring to the clear convenience that the normalization of bilateral relations would bring.⁶⁴ In this way, the pressure exerted by those countries had shown the Italian authorities that the influence of Spain in South America could not be underestimated, and that, if Italy wanted to penetrate and extend its influence in the continent, that was an element to take into consideration.

Furthermore, this was not the only benefit obtained by the Spanish diplomacy. The return of the Brusasca-Aldisio mission, at the beginning of October,

⁶⁰ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Telegram from Zoppi to Brusasca, 29 August 1949.

⁶¹AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 9 October 1949.

⁶²Ibid. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 29 September 1949.

⁶³Ibid. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 9 October 1949.

⁶⁴Ibid.

coincided with the parliamentary debate on new perspectives and strategies of the Italian foreign policy. The adhesion to the Atlantic Treaty and the loss of the colonies after the UN resolution had forced the Italian Government to find new guidelines for its foreign action. During this debate, the politicians in Palazzo Chigi tried to avoid any reference to the Spanish question in order not to inflame a controversy which was still very present in the Italian society; nevertheless, on 22 October, Roberto Mieville, a deputy of the Neofascist party MSI, raised the question and, after delivering a long speech defending the Spanish rehabilitation in the international arena, directly asked Sforza if and when the Italian Government was going to normalize relations with the Francoist regime and appoint a new ambassador to Madrid.⁶⁵ Mieville countered that Italy should normalize relations as soon as possible and argued that Spain had not withdrawn its ambassador in Rome and had always maintained its feelings of friendship towards the Italian Republic. Finally, the MSI deputy added, in a clear reference to the Aldisio-Brusasca mission, that Spain was the mother of all South American countries, nations which had supported Italy in recent times and still had an important role to play; the government had to revise its policy in this regard, given that these countries expressed their wish to see Spanish-Italian relations normalized.⁶⁶ Apparently, this intervention added to other questions which had been posed by a group of deputies from the Monarchic Party.⁶⁷ It is not clear if this initiative was taken after having consulted with the Spanish Embassy in Rome, or if it was taken *de motu proprio*; the Italian right-wing parties had established relations with the Spanish authorities since the end of the war, at least at an unofficial level; in addition, the Francoist regime had become a political point of reference for these parties after the collapse of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana.⁶⁸

The interventions made by Mieville and the Monarchic deputies put Sforza on the spot, even more when they started a press campaign discussing the Spanish question. As a part of this campaign, the newspapers linked with the right-wing parties (*Lettera Quotidiana*, *Il Nazionale*, *Lotta Politica*, *L'Italia Monarchica* and *La Libertà*) defended the normalization of relations with the Francoist regime, whereas the newspapers linked with the left-wing parties (*L'Umanità* and *Avanti*) seized the opportunity to criticize Mieville, De Gasperi and Sforza for sponsoring a policy of rapprochement with a

⁶⁵AMAE: Bundle 2.046, folder 8. Telegram from Ranero to Artajo, 27 October 1949 and AMAE: Bundle 2.036, folder 2. Summary of the Italian press, especially dedicated to the intervention of Roberto Mieville, without date but not before 22 October 1949.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Giuseppe Parlato, *Fascisti Senza Mussolini: Le Origini Del Neofascismo in Italia, 1943–1948* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006).

dictatorship.⁶⁹ Sforza replied to Mieville at the end of October, and he did it in a considerable pro-Spanish tone:

*As far as the question raised by the Honorable Mieville, I must state that there has never been a breaking-off of relations between Spain and Italy. The best proof of this is the permanence of the Spanish Ambassador in Rome and that of the Italian attaché in Madrid who normally develop their diplomatic activities. Besides, the Italian Government wishes to intensify the economic relations with Iberian Peninsula, as the commercial treaty which is about to be signed will bear witness to.*⁷⁰

It should be added that this debate was attentively followed by the French authorities who, as usual, were concerned that the De Gasperi Government would go ahead of the rest of Western allies in the process of normalization of diplomatic relations with Spain. They even consulted some members of the Italian Embassy in Madrid who assured them that, in spite of Sforza's words, no ambassador would be appointed without the consensus of the European allies.⁷¹ In this way, the Spanish diplomatic offensive had only brought about part of the results which the diplomats in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' had expected when delineating their plan. It is true that the Italian Government continued to reject the normalization of relations with the Francoist regime, but at the same time, it had been shown that Spain was a relevant actor in South America, and Sforza had been forced to make a public statement defending the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Spain. Once the impact of the Brusasca-Aldisio mission started to fade away, the attention of bilateral relations was directed again to the economic questions, as Sforza had pointed out in his reply to Mieville. The interest of both countries in commercial relations forced the two countries to revise their positions and restart the negotiations which had been interrupted in June.

A light at the end of the tunnel: the first accomplishments

The Commercial Treaty

On 16 November, Carlo Sforza and José Antonio de Sangróniz finally stamped their signatures on the new commercial treaty which would regulate the exchanges between the two countries for at least one year. It is noteworthy that this agreement was signed almost six months after the interruption of the previous negotiations, a period of time which had been

⁶⁹ AMAE: Bundle 2.036, folder 2. Summary of the Italian press, especially dedicated to the intervention of Roberto Mieville, without date but not before 22 October 1949.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Telegram from Ranero to Artajo, 31 October 1949.

⁷¹ AMAEF: Europe, 1944–49, Spain, 158. Letters from Hardion to Schuman, 22 November and 10 December 1949.

characterized by the almost complete stagnation of exchanges. In order to understand this delay, it is necessary to follow the evolution of economic relations since late May. After the breaking off of the negotiations, relations between the two governments in the economic sphere became a little tense. Although this situation did not benefit either country, neither the Spanish nor the Italian authorities wanted to take the first step towards normalization of commercial relations as it was feared that this would be perceived as a sign of weakness. On 13 June Umberto Grazzi, wrote to Capomazza with the following guidelines: 'It does not seem useful to show excessive haste to sign a new agreement after the interruption of negotiations in Rome.[...]'.

In this document, the Director of the DGAE acknowledged the relevance of the Spanish market for Italy, especially if the Francoist regime was going to be diplomatically rehabilitated and receive loans from the United States, but, at the same time, he pointed out that Italy was an important economic partner for Spain as well. '[...]On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Italy has become the main importer of Spanish sardines and anchovies, products which are essential for an important sector of Spanish economy. If this element is adeptly used, we could persuade the Spaniards to review their lists.'⁷²

In the end, both governments decided to abandon their initial stiffness and agreed to restart negotiations in July 1949. Spain had finally accepted the establishment of the dollar as the currency of reference for the new commercial treaty. On the other hand, Italy had accepted an increase in its export quotas of industrial products (especially heavy machinery) in exchange for salted fish and raw materials, and to eliminate the counter trade operations. In essence, both governments had decided to give way in some of their initial demands in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.⁷³ As a matter of fact, these negotiations went better than could be expected, considering the previous problems. In two weeks the two governments had already agreed upon a preliminary list of exchangeable goods; according to the Italian attaché, this list, although it could be improved, already represented substantial progress and a good starting point for future negotiations as the Spaniards had agreed to increase the quota of raw materials and to include certain products which Italian industries were anxious to export (motorcycles, electric machines and engines of internal combustion, cars and trucks, etc.).⁷⁴

⁷²DDI: Series XI, Vol. II, Doc. No. 1066. Telegram from Grazzi to Capomazza, 13 June 1949.

⁷³AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 9. Records of the commercial negotiations, 1949.

⁷⁴DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 49. Telegram from Capomazza to Sforza, 19 July 1949 and AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 9. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 20 July 1949.

In October the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened urging the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce to save the final obstacles and speed things up. 'This Ministry thinks that political interests prevail over technical considerations and, therefore, that commercial negotiations should be concluded as soon as possible mainly so that the present phase in economic relations between Spain and Italy can be put behind us.'⁷⁵ 'Palazzo Chigi' underlined that the most dangerous competitors to Italy in the fight to penetrate in the Spanish market had already concluded important agreements with the Francoist regime, and that it was increasingly clear that the US Government would very soon give permission to financial institutions to grant important loans to Spain. Taking all this into account, Italy could not afford to lose more time, especially discussing minor questions.

However, 'Palazzo Chigi' was not the only actor exerting pressure in this direction; the industrial groups which had important interests in Spain were also demanding that the Italian Government provide a rapid solution of the problem. On 14 September, the President of FIAT, Vincenzo Valletta, wrote a letter to Grazzi explaining the huge losses which the Italian industry was suffering due to the stagnation of the Spanish-Italian traffic, in a moment particularly delicate for the company as it was trying to put into practice a model of industrial cooperation which could produce important benefits also for the Italian state.⁷⁶ Similar actions were taken around the same dates by Ducatti, another big company that wanted to expand in Spain.⁷⁷ This shows the great interest that the Italian companies had in penetrating the Spanish market and also the degree of influence which they had over the Italian Government. On the other side, the Spanish authorities, also eager to sign the agreement, had decided to send Alejandro Bermúdez, deputy director of the 'Instituto de la Moneda' and one of the most relevant figures in the Spanish economy, to Rome in order to remove the remaining obstacles.⁷⁸ The adoption of these measures by both governments sped everything up and a preliminary agreement had been reached by 20 October. Four days later the two governments gave their consent to sign the agreement, although the official act was postponed until 16 November because of bureaucratic and propagandistic reasons.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Letter from Zoppi to the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, 6 October 1949.

⁷⁶ ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Letter from Valletta to Grazzi, 14 September 1949.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Letter from the Director of Ducati Italy to Grazzi, 20 September 1949 and AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10. Telegram from Artajo and the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Juan Antonio Suanzes, to Sangróniz, 8 October 1949.

⁷⁸ DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 284. Telegram from Capomazza to Sforza, 8 October 1949. AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10.

⁷⁹ Ibid., and ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Letter from the DGAP to Sforza, 24 October 1949.

The treaty was divided in two parts: one dealing with the commercial aspects and the other one with financial parts (payments agreement). It envisaged, for the period from 1 December 1949 until 30 November 1950, an exchange of 265 million pesetas (circa \$24 million) in both directions. Spain would export ferrous minerals (150,000 tons), fresh and deep-frozen fish (1,000 tons), salted anchovies (3,000 tons), tuna in oil (3,000 tons), cocoa in grains (1,500 tons), potash (5,000 tons), leather products and others. On the other hand, Italy would export machine tools and machinery (for the production of electricity, for power plants, for the textile industry, tyre industries and for chemical industries), railway material, auto vehicles, barrel staves (1.2 million), dyestuffs, chemical products, coke (1.5 million), hemp, silk and silk yarns, rayon, sulphur, etc. Reciprocal quotas were also agreed for books, wine and pharmaceutical products. The payments agreement established two clearing accounts in dollars, one for the commercial operations (\$2 million) and the other for financial transfers, and expenses related with diplomatic representatives, tourists, subventions, copyrights, salaries, etc. (\$200,000).

In addition, it was stipulated that the dollar-peseta conversion would be done in Spain, on the basis of the patterns of sales and purchases applied by the 'Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera' (IEME), according to the decree of 3 December 1945. Regarding the war debt, both governments decided to regulate the remaining quantity according to the Treaty signed in Madrid in 1940, which meant that Spain should resume regular payments in 1954 taking into account that part of the debt had already been paid through the 1946 commercial agreement.⁸⁰ Finally, the treaty stipulated that the expenses generated by the Spanish pilgrims who would visit Rome next year for the Holy Year, would be compensated with funds destined to the Italian companies in Spain.⁸¹ In fact it was a modest agreement, especially if one compares it with the exchanges which both Spain and Italy had with other countries in the same period (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

In spite of its modesty, the signing of the agreement was received with satisfaction by both governments. Although the Italian authorities acknowledged that it was modest compared with the treaties signed with other countries in the same period, they underlined the political relevance of it in the framework of Spanish-Italian relations, and the benefits which would

⁸⁰ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Report from the DGAP to the Office of Treaties, 17 November 1949, and AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10, Commercial Treaty with Italy signed on 16 November 1949. It is noteworthy that this commercial agreement aroused the attention of the Foreign Office, which requested their Embassy in Rome to send a copy for the government's perusal. FO 371/79399, Spanish-Italian commercial agreement, 1949.

⁸¹ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Report from the DGAP to Grazzi and Sforza, 24 October 1949.

Table 4.1 Spanish trade by countries of production
(value in thousands of gold pesetas)

Countries	Imports			Exports		
	1948	1949	1950	1948	1949	1950
France	9,080	88,558	94,010	57,177	124,910	78,974
Germany	309	12,281	49,359	8,342	28,639	27,417
Italy	22,616	25,526	12,899	28,449	23,885	15,790
United Kingdom	129,680	116,864	84,848	165,037	184,008	176,174
United States	96,247	125,529	157,578	104,850	65,469	186,710

Source: Yearbook of Spanish Statistics, year 1948 and Anuario de Estadística de España (AEE) years 1949 to 1951.

Table 4.2 Italian trade by countries of production
(value in million lire)

Countries	Imports			Exports		
	1948	1949	1950	1948	1949	1950
France	7,893	21,470	41,673	23,058	36,188	65,276
Germany	17,590	39,726	75,576	16,577	54,284	73,765
Spain	3,565	3,719	2,152	3,097	2,931	2,135
United Kingdom	27,812	34,593	50,973	45,490	67,018	85,748
United States	317,701	311,041	216,413	51,337	26,392	47,724

Source: Yearbook of Italian statistics year 1948 and Annuario Statistico Italiano (ASI), years 1948 to 1951.

be derived by the Italian industries in the Iberian Peninsula. As the DGAP put it, the agreement 'is very modest, given the competing characteristics of production in both countries; however, it should be considered that we have important Italian companies which work in Spain and that we can help with financing obtained through the tourist revenue coming for the Holy Year'.⁸²

The Spanish authorities were also satisfied with the signature of the treaty, which was highly publicized by the press and very well received by the commercial spheres.⁸³ Thanks to this favourable coverage, the Spanish economy would receive important products for its process of modernization (especially machine tools and auto vehicles) and, at the same time, it would place some of its surplus products in a market traditionally relevant for them (anchovies and tuna). Nevertheless, the most important aspect of the treaty was political. It has to be remembered that, in a context of international isolation, commercial

⁸²Ibid. Report from the DGAP to Grazzi and Sforza, 24 October 1949.

⁸³Ibid. Telegram from Capomazza to Sforza, 17 November 1949.

treaties substituted for diplomatic relations in the political field.⁸⁴ As a consequence, this commercial treaty was publicized as a great victory for Francoist diplomacy, even more so after the public statement made by Sforza on the day of the signature in front of the press. In it, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted: 'This agreement is a first step towards the resumption of economic relations between the two countries and it creates the premises for further developments.'⁸⁵ It is evident that the Italians had kept their promise when, in February of that year, they had assured the Spanish authorities that once the treaty was successfully signed, it could be used for political purposes.

The good atmosphere created by the signature of the treaty and the public statement by Sforza were rapidly seized upon by the Spanish Government as a reason to intensify its diplomatic offensive for the normalization of relations. The same day that the agreement was signed, Ambassador Sangróniz asked the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs if his government would receive Martín Artajo, who was planning to visit Rome on the occasion of the Holy Year, with the usual courtesy.⁸⁶ Artajo would be the person in charge of convincing the Italians to appoint an ambassador to Madrid.

Martín Artajo's trip to Rome

The trip of Alberto Martín Artajo to Rome in December 1949 is one of the most important events of Spanish-Italian relations during the post-war period as it created an atmosphere of great expectation both in Spain and Italy and aroused the attention of the major powers. In this sense, it was even more relevant than the trip made by Giulio Andreotti as the political aspects of the visit were not treated with such secrecy and the details of it were granted more publicity. It was the best example that bilateral relations were entering a different phase.

Although the main purpose of the visit was related with the Holy See, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs did not want to deal exclusively with relations between Spain and the Vatican during his trip, but also intended to pay some attention to the Italian Republic.⁸⁷ It has to be remembered that Martín Artajo attached great importance to Spanish-Italian relations in the international context of the post-war period, as it had been expressed in the instructions sent to Sangróniz in January 1946.⁸⁸ Those instructions reflected a series

⁸⁴ Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*.

⁸⁵ AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 16 November 1949.

⁸⁶ DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 405. Note from Sforza on the colloquium held with Sangróniz, 16 November 1949.

⁸⁷ Javier Tusell, *Franco y los católicos: La política interior Española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid: Alianza, 1984).

⁸⁸ AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 9 November 1949.

of projects of collaboration between the two countries that Martín Artajo had not forgotten, and that could be resumed once the diplomatic situation was normalized. In this sense, the main objective of the trip was to put more pressure on the Italian Government and speed up the normalization of diplomatic relations. Sangróniz took advantage of the good atmosphere created by the signature of the commercial treaty to discuss the question with Sforza and sound out his reaction. The Italian Minister answered that his government would not discriminate against Martín Artajo and that his visit could be seized for a confidential exchange of impressions in political matters. However, Sforza clarified that it was too soon to go into details and said 'right now let's just congratulate us because we have created a pact'.⁸⁹ The Italian Minister was well aware that the visit of Martín Artajo had been planned by the Holy See and did not want to interfere, creating unease in the Vatican spheres.⁹⁰ In addition, adopting a negative attitude towards this issue would be counterproductive for the Italian Government which had just signed an extremely important agreement with the Francoist regime. The most important objective of the Italian diplomacy at that moment was to maintain the *status quo* of bilateral relations and work to obtain the maximum benefits of the commercial agreement. Receiving Martín Artajo in Rome should not be too problematic (there was always the excuse that he had come to Italy because the Holy See wanted it) and it might be useful to exchange points of view on the status of bilateral relations. Accordingly, the Italian Government ruled that any visiting Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers who came to have an audience with the Pope during the Holy Year should be privately received by the Italian Foreign Minister if they expressed such a desire.⁹¹

Once the Italian Government agreed to grant a courteous welcome to Martín Artajo, the Spanish authorities started to prepare his visit to Rome with the utmost care. By the middle of December, almost every single detail of the visit had already been decided: the dates, the places to visit, the political figures to meet and even the strategy to follow.⁹² On the other hand, the

⁸⁹The conversation can be exhaustively reproduced thanks to documents of both countries: FNF: Doc. No. 13784. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo. Transmitted afterwards to Franco, 16 November 1949. DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 405. Note from Sforza on the colloquium held with Sangróniz, 16 November 1949. Transmitted afterwards to De Gasperi and Capomazza.

⁹⁰FNF: Doc. No. 13784. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, transmitted afterwards to Franco, 16 November 1949. NAUK: FO 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 26 January 1950.

⁹¹FNF: Doc. No. 12417. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, transmitted afterwards to Franco, 16 December 1949 and NAUK: FO 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 26 January 1950.

⁹²FNF: Doc. No. 13784. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, transmitted afterwards to Franco, 16 November 1949 and AMAE: Bundle 2.045, folder 14. Confidential report from Artajo on the visit to Rome, 13 December 1949.

Italian Embassy in Madrid also made a great effort to prepare Artajo's trip and obtain the maximum diplomatic benefits from it. Through two different reports, Capomazza tried to make the Italian Government aware of the potential of this trip for Italian interests in Spain. If the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs returned with a favorable impression from the contacts established with the members of the Italian Government, it could have a positive effect on bilateral relations, creating an even more productive atmosphere, fundamental to resolve the pending questions (namely, the payment of damages for the merchant ships and the Italian officers in Tangier), and implement the industrial cooperation outlined in the recent commercial treaty.⁹³

However, this time, the Italian authorities did not attach too much importance to the visit of Martín Artajo. In fact, they had already achieved their main objectives regarding relations with Spain, thanks to the signing of the commercial treaty. Until the UN decided to withdraw the condemnatory resolution regarding the Francoist regime, the Italian Government's primary objective was to improve relations with it as a means to consolidate and foster the national interests present Spain. Thus, diplomatic relations remained unaltered, and an ambassador would not be appointed until the Western allies decided to take that step. This explains why Capomazza's reports did not receive an answer and were not fully taken into consideration, at least by Sforza. There was no need to design a special strategy for Artajo's visit: the main objective was to fulfil the protocol duties, receive the Spanish Minister with natural courtesy and leave him with a positive impression, in order to please the Vatican and maintain the productive atmosphere in bilateral relations, essential for the full implementation of the commercial treaty. This attitude of the Italian Government clearly contrasts with the one described by Luis Suarez Fernandez; after depicting an idyllic portrait of Spanish-Italian relations in this period, the Spanish historian claims that Sforza was enthusiastic about being able to meet Martín Artajo and offers as a proof a number of telegrams from Paris and Brussels which revealed jealousy on the part of the French for the future Spanish-Italian agreement.⁹⁴ Not only do the Italian sources completely dispel this explanation, they offer a fuller and more substantial account of what was really taking place behind the scenes.

⁹³DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 426. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 24 November 1949, transmitted on 9 December to De Gasperi, and Doc. No. 487: Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 17 December 1949. This report was received by Sforza a few hours after the meeting with Martín Artajo, a factor which minimizes its relevance. DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 511: Telegram from Sforza to Capomazza, 6 January 1950. ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1949, folder 18. Letter from Capomazza to Zoppi, 17 December 1949.

⁹⁴Fernández, *Victoria frente al bloqueo*.

The only member of the Government who did not follow these guidelines was Giulio Andreotti. On 18 December, during the Christian Democrat Party's National Council, the Undersecretary of the Presidency gave a speech in which he advocated for the adoption of a more cooperative policy between the Latin-Mediterranean powers. This declaration, held at a policy-making meeting of the majority party, contended that 'new fields must be ploughed, with the development of Latin-Mediterranean solidarity and with the exploitation to the fullest, on the international plane, of the Christian Democrat Government'.⁹⁵

This statement was naturally interpreted in light of Artajo's visit and, therefore, as referring to plans for collaboration with Francoist Spain, producing a whirlwind of rumours and speculations, also within the government coalition. From this moment onwards, the Italian press was riddled with articles discussing Artajo's trip and the impact that it would have on bilateral relations.⁹⁶ Neither De Gasperi, nor Sforza reacted to this press campaign, and no explanatory statement or communiqué was issued. Probably, the two politicians did not want to intensify the controversy by making a public declaration which, in addition, could offend the Spanish Minister of the Vatican. It is difficult then, to explain what the objective pursued by Andreotti was when he made that speech three days before the arrival of Martín Artajo in Rome. The role played by Andreotti in the government, his closeness to De Gasperi, and the audience he addressed it to, would indicate that this speech could not have been delivered without the consent, or at least the knowledge of the Head of Government. However, the attitude adopted by De Gasperi later when he met the Spanish Minister contradicts this reasoning, as will be explained. Perhaps De Gasperi and Andreotti wanted to sound out the other parties and considering their decisively negative reaction then decided to back down. It is hard to confirm these theories, as Italian documents do not provide a proper answer. In any case, this event proved two things: that Andreotti had become, after the trip to Spain in March, one of the most important supporters in the De Gasperi Government of adopting a more pro-Spanish policy, and that the Christian Democrats were divided regarding the Francoist regime, a division which became increasingly sharp as Spain was gradually rehabilitated in the international arena.

Martín Artajo arrived in Rome on 21 December. That same day he held a meeting with Sforza, the next day with De Gasperi and Andreotti, and on Christmas day with the Pope. In general terms, all the meetings were held in a friendly atmosphere. However, nothing in particular was discussed and the talks were limited to a superficial analysis of general questions. Martín

⁹⁵NAUK: FO 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1950.

⁹⁶Ibid.

Artajo, who had been instructed by Spanish officials to tackle the most delicate issues very discretely and without getting down to specifics, merely expounded upon the positive characteristics of the Francoist regime, and pointed out that bilateral relations would benefit from rapid diplomatic normalization.⁹⁷ Obviously, this low tone adopted by the Spanish Minister pleased the Italian authorities who had already planned to avoid all the controversial discussions of any depth. Thus the Italian authorities just declared what the Spaniards already knew: that their government was ready to normalize diplomatic relations once the Western allies had taken the first step in that direction.⁹⁸

The friendliest words were again expressed by Giulio Andreotti who went to the airport to see Martín Artajo off and seized the opportunity to express his best wishes to Sangróniz. During this conversation, the Undersecretary of the Presidency claimed that Artajo had made a magnificent impression among the members of the Italian Government and that his trip had constituted an important step along the path towards the normalization of relations. Andreotti finally added that, one year ago, it would have been impossible for the pro-Spanish elements of the government to express those feelings of friendship and cordiality.⁹⁹ This statement left a great impression on the Spanish authorities. Already on 23 December, right after the meeting with De Gasperi, Martín Artajo had declared 'I hope Spanish-Italian relations continue to be perpetually cordial, because there has always been an intimate understanding between us.'¹⁰⁰ Immediately after his return to Madrid, Martín Artajo went to visit Capomazza and asked him to pass on his 'best wishes' and his 'gratitude' for the 'courtesy and the kindness' with which he was received.¹⁰¹ The fact that he did not mention Sforza constitutes the best proof that the meeting with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs was the least cordial of all, and supports the British thesis that the Italian diplomat was among the most reluctant members of the government

⁹⁷Ibid. Confidential report Confidential Report on Artajo's visit to Rome, 13 December 1949.

⁹⁸An exhaustive description of the meetings held between Martín Artajo and the Italian authorities can be found in the following files: NAUK: FO: 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 5 January and 26 January 1950. DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 499. Letter from Sforza to Quaroni, 29 December 1949, AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1949, and AMAE: Bundle 2.045, folder 14. Telegrams from Sangróniz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 and 25 December 1949.

⁹⁹AMAE: Bundle 2.017, folders 6–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 30 December 1949.

¹⁰⁰AMAE: Bundle 2.045, folder 14. Report of the Diplomatic Press Office, 23 December 1949.

¹⁰¹DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 547. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 19 January 1950.

to normalize relations with the Francoist regime.¹⁰² Six days later the Italian journal *Relazioni Internazionali* published an interview given by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs during his stay in Rome. In it, Martín Artajo predicted a rapid normalization of bilateral relations.¹⁰³

During this stage of international isolation, being able to organize a trip of this magnitude and being received cordially by the national authorities was already a great success for the Francoist regime. In addition, Martín Artajo had come back convinced that bilateral relations had entered a different phase and that the DC Government was about to appoint a new ambassador in Madrid.¹⁰⁴ Taking all these elements into consideration, it is easy to understand why the Spanish authorities considered the trip a grand diplomatic success. Of course, these particular perceptions of Spanish-Italian relations were also proving once again the naivety of Spanish diplomats when analysing international relations in Western Europe. In spite of Andreotti's words, the Italian Government had not changed its policy towards the Francoist regime and was not going to appoint an ambassador in Madrid.

Although the analysis made by Martín Artajo after his trip to Rome might seem exaggerated, it has to be clarified that he was not the only diplomat convinced that Spanish-Italian relations had entered a different phase, more cordial and constructive. On 23 December the French newspaper *Le Monde* published an article claiming that the meeting held between Sforza and Martín Artajo could be interpreted as the beginning of a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations.¹⁰⁵ Four days later, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Manuel Aguirre de Cárcer, wrote a letter to Martín Artajo informing him that his trip was being analysed by some members of the French Government as the initial act of the Spanish-Italian new intelligence.¹⁰⁶ The visit of the Spanish Minister was thus followed with attention by the diplomats in the 'Quai D'Orsay', arousing diverging theories on the new status of Spanish-Italian relations.¹⁰⁷ However, the French diplomats immediately downplayed the relevance of Artajo's trip assuring that it had not produced any changes in the Italian policy towards the Francoist regime. According to a report written by the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de contre-espionage (SDECE) for Georges Bidault and Robert Schuman, Artajo's trip

¹⁰²NAUK: FO 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 5 January and 26 January 1950.

¹⁰³AMAE: Bundle 2.045, folder 14. Letter from Ranero to Artajo, 25 January 1950.

¹⁰⁴DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 547. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 19 January 1950.

¹⁰⁵AMAE: Bundle 2.045, folder 14. Clipping from *Le Monde*, 23 December 1949.

¹⁰⁶FNFF: Doc. No. 12474. Letter from Manuel Aguirre de Cárcer to Artajo, transmitted afterwards to Franco, 27 December 1949.

¹⁰⁷AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 183. Letter from Hardion to Schuman, 28 December 1949, and letter from Fouques to Schuman, 30 December 1949.

had two main objectives. On the one hand, the Spanish Minister intended to sound out if the Vatican was willing to accept a visit by Franco to Rome on the occasion of the Holy Year; this idea had of course been rejected, explained the report, because the Holy See did not want to give too much political support to the Francoist regime and because it wanted to avoid any possible events which could weaken the De Gasperi Government. On the other hand, the Spanish Government wanted to strengthen bilateral relations with a view to the possible signing of a Mediterranean Pact with Italy.¹⁰⁸

The discussions on a possible Mediterranean Pact were confirmed by Minister Sforza during a meeting held with the French Ambassador, Jacques Fouques-Duparc, in Rome. However, the Italian diplomat assured Fouques-Duparc that the DC Government deemed this project to be unworkable, an impression which had been transmitted to Artajo during their talks: 'si on les suivait, ils ne pourraient meme pas le signer: leur opinion ne leur permettrait pas de se lier par une pacte (regional)'.¹⁰⁹ The idea of a Mediterranean Pact was not new and was not a Spanish initiative. In fact, it had first been proposed by Turkey and Greece in 1949 as an alternative to their participation in the Atlantic Treaty.¹¹⁰ Even though the project was not very defined – it was supposed to be a sort of military branch of NATO for the Mediterranean area – it attracted the attention of the Spanish diplomats who regarded it as a suitable alternative to Spanish participation in NATO. The Spanish archives do not clarify if this issue was actually brought up by Martín Artajo in his conversations with Sforza and De Gasperi, but it seems probable considering the degree of interest within the Spanish Government and the relevance which the Spanish diplomats in general, and Artajo in particular, attached to the cooperation with Italy in the Mediterranean.¹¹¹

The French diplomats had thus informed their government that although the Italians were eager to normalize relations with the Francoist regime, they had avoided reaching any political commitments with Martín Artajo mainly because they did not want to make gestures which could provoke a conflict with the major powers. However, in their conclusions they acknowledged that there was an increasing number of Christian Democrats who objected to Sforza's passive policy and wanted to start a process of political rapprochement

¹⁰⁸ AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 185. Report from the SDECE to Bidault and Schuman, 5 January 1950.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Letter from Fouques to Schuman, 7 January 1950.

¹¹⁰ FRUS: Vol. IV, 1949. Memorandum of Conversation between Acheson, the Turkish Ambassador, Erkin, and the Chief of the GTI, John Jernegan, 17 February 1949, 117–20.

¹¹¹ AMAE: Bundle 4.785, folder 30. Mediterranean Pact 1949.

with Spain. This would be done even without British support: they were only waiting for the Truman administration to take the lead.¹¹²

Similar comments were made by the Foreign Office, which also paid considerable attention to the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations at the beginning of 1950. The British diplomats also tended to minimize the relevance of Artajo's trip and believed that the Italian Government would not change its policy towards the Francoist regime. But, more importantly, they agreed with their French counterparts that the Italians no longer felt obliged to harmonize their policy with the Foreign Office. According to Sir Victor Mallet as soon as the US Government decided to normalize relations with Spain, the Italian Government would follow, with or without British consent.¹¹³

Conclusions

These considerations made by the French and the British diplomats are closely related to the initial questions posed at the beginning of this chapter about the declining role of Britain after 1947 and the ascent of the United States as Europe's new hegemonic power. As these pages have shown, the US Government continued to gain weight and presence in Spanish-Italian relations after 1948. In this regard, the US interventions during the negotiations for the Atlantic Treaty and the debates on the Spanish question at the United Nations in 1949, constituted good proof of this new trend. In addition, some of these diplomatic initiatives were taken without previous consultation with the British Government, showing not only that the Truman administration was determined to play a more active role in Spain and Italy, but also that its policies towards these two countries started to diverge from the British ones.¹¹⁴ In fact, the progressive deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union began to convince officials in Washington that it was necessary to accelerate the inclusion of Spain and Italy in the Western defence arrangement, a view that was not fully shared in London.

On the other hand, the perceptions of the British hegemonic role by some of the European actors were indeed starting to change by the end of 1949. If in 1946 there was little doubt that the Italian, French and Spanish Governments regarded Britain as Europe's natural leader, at the end of 1949, coinciding with Artajo's visit to Rome, this perception was not so clear. That is why the French diplomats had argued that the Italian point of reference on the Spanish question was no longer London, but Washington. In this sense, even the British self-perception as a hegemonic power in the Old

¹¹²AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 185. Letter from Fouques to Schuman, 30 December 1949.

¹¹³NAUK: FO 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 5 January and 26 January 1950 and minutes from P. H. Lawrence, 26 January 1950.

¹¹⁴Pedaliu, *Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War*. Miller, *The United States and Italy*.

Continent was starting to change by admitting that, if the Truman administration decided to normalize relations with the Francoist regime, it was probable that other countries, not only Italy, would follow regardless of the British position.

This chapter has also determined the existence of another important actor in Spanish-Italian relations: France. Until 1949, France had played a minimal role in Spanish-Italian relations mainly because of its domestic problems. However, from that moment onwards, the French Government started to recover part of its international prestige, thus adopting more dynamic and ambitious policies towards both Spain and Italy. It is in this context that the reopening of the border with Spain and the negotiations for a customs union with Italy should be placed. Even if the French Government could not adopt a hegemonic policy towards Italy and Spain, unlike Britain or the US, its participation in some of the most relevant questions in Spanish-Italian relations has to be taken into account.

As far as Italy is concerned, it has been shown here that the De Gasperi Government continued to have important limitations in its policy towards the Francoist regime. Apart from a few members of the DC who wanted to normalize diplomatic relations right away (especially Andreotti), the Italian Government understood that no unilateral action could be taken in this regard without having previously harmonized the position with the Western allies. The De Gasperi Government wanted to normalize relations with Spain at the end of 1949 in the same way as at the end of 1947, but the problem was that it did not want to do it first nor unilaterally. Faced with this reality, the Italian Government continued to focus on the economic side of the relationship.

Finally, the Spanish position has to be scrutinized. The years between 1946 and 1949 are interpreted by the historiography as a time of international isolation, an isolation which, always according to that historiography, had started right after the end of the Second World War. The assumption of this interpretation has led to a neglect of Spanish foreign policy during these years, taking for granted that it had been limited to the adoption of passive and defensive strategies. These strategies have been summarized as follows: repel all the incoming pressures from other countries, reinforce power in the interior by joining together all the political sectors present in Spanish society, pretend that the transition towards the monarchy had already started, and wait until the conflict between the capitalist powers and Communist Russia would explode. In order to support this interpretation, historians have used the famous sentence pronounced by Carrero Blanco in a memorandum sent to Franco at the beginning of August where the former argued that 'The only formula for us cannot be other than: order, unity and to withstand.'¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Espadas Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior*, 169. Abu Warda and Caldach (eds.), *La política exterior Española en el siglo XX*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del*

International historians tend to highlight these grandiose statements where diplomats or politicians pontificate about the foreign policy adopted by a given country (in this regard, Henry Kissinger is one of the most representative examples). Despite the unquestionable appeal of these statements, historians must use them with the utmost care being well aware that sometimes they can be misleading. In this case, for example, the Spanish diplomats did not adopt a passive policy towards Italy after the Potsdam conference. As this chapter has proved, Spanish diplomacy was intensely active and numerous attempts were made to normalize diplomatic relations with Italy. Good examples of this policy are the commercial negotiations, used as a lever to convince the Italian Government to appoint an ambassador in Madrid, the Brusasca-Aldisio mission to South America, or the trip made by Martín Artajo to Rome. However, these attempts did not manage to change the Italian determination to harmonize its policy with Western countries, highlighting the immovable obstacles which Spanish diplomacy had to face during this period.

franquismo (1939–1975); Pereira (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800–2003)*; Avilés et al. (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*.

5

A 'Flirt' between Madrid and Rome: The Spanish-Italian Rapprochement and the Role of the Western Powers, 1951–1955¹

On 30 April 1957, the French Ambassador in Madrid, Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, sent a report to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, analysing the status of Spanish-Italian relations. In it, the French diplomat argued that, in spite of the ideological differences, there had been, 'une resserrement des liens entre le Pardo et le Quirinal'.² Three days later, the US counsellor at the Embassy in Madrid, Richard Johnson, sent a letter to the State Department which went along the same lines. According to Johnson, during the past months there had been intense activity (militarily, cultural, commercial and informational), 'and an impressive degree of public cordiality' between the two governments.³ Finally, on 31 May, it was the turn of the British Ambassador in Madrid to write a similar report. In it, Sir William Ivo Mallet explained that Italy had recently made a considerable effort to promote better relations with Spain.⁴

The fact that three different diplomats from three different governments were highlighting a Spanish-Italian rapprochement in all spheres reflects that something had changed between Madrid and Rome since 1949. It should be remembered that in December of that year, when Martín Artajo had visited Rome, Sforza had declared that his government was not even able to appoint a new ambassador in Madrid.⁵ The main goal of this chapter will thus be to analyse the reasons and the ways in which Madrid and Rome

¹The term 'flirt' was used by the French Ambassador in Madrid, Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, to describe Spanish-Italian relations between 1955 and 1957. AMAEF, Europe 1956–60, Spain, 239. Letter from Tournelle to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, René Pleven, 13 October 1958.

²Ibid. Letter from Tournelle to Pineau, 30 April 1957.

³NARA: Central Decimal File, 1955–59, Box 2631. Letter from Richard Johnson, Counsellor at the US Embassy in Madrid, to the State Department, 3 May 1957.

⁴NAUK: FO 371/139414. Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 31 May 1957.

⁵DDI: series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 499. Letter from Sforza to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Pietro Quaroni, 29 December 1949.

managed to complete this rapprochement. In this regard, it will be essential to assess the room for manoeuvre which both the Spanish and the Italian Governments had at their disposal vis-à-vis the major powers. Furthermore, the role played by the new international system and the logics of the Cold War in this rapprochement will also be considered. Let us not forget that this new international context had already forged 'unlikely' alliances, forcing countries with different regimes to downplay their ideological differences by stressing their anti-Communist nature.⁶

In order to accomplish these objectives, the present chapter will focus on the different stages and areas in which Spain and Italy managed to introduce changes and improvements. This will show that the two countries had a significant degree of independence with respect to the major powers, at least in their policies concerning the economic, cultural and even military spheres. Accordingly, attention will also be paid to the role of the Western powers, the three main actors capable of exercising some kind of influence on bilateral relations: Britain, France and the United States. In this regard, the focal point of this chapter will also reflect the present debates in historiography about the decline of the British hegemonic role in Europe, the ascent of the US as the Old Continent's new leader, the evolution of Anglo-American relations, and the increasing importance of France which started to challenge the Anglo-Saxon supremacy in international relations.⁷

The analysis of these questions will provide a better understanding of not only international relations in the post-war years, but also of both the Spanish and the Italian foreign policy in a period which, in spite of its relevance, has not been studied in depth. Until very recently, historians tended to neglect Italian foreign policy in the 1950s, mainly because there was the conviction that after the Italian inclusion in the Western bloc, the country had already made most of its critical international choices, thus sinking into a recurring diplomatic routine without any major deviations in its foreign policy.⁸ The same applies to the Spanish case, where historians have tended to view the Pact of Madrid and the Concordat of the Vatican as the climax of the Francoist foreign policy, playing down the relevance of the following period.⁹ As a result of this, the state of the art in the field for this period is very limited, and addressing this gap is the final objective of the chapter.

⁶Leffler and Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*.

⁷Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 268.

⁸Romero and Varsori, 'Introduzione', in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*.

⁹Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question*; Portero, *Franco Aislado*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War*.

The return of the ambassador and the normalization of diplomatic relations

The long path towards normalization

As already explained, the trip made by Artajo to Rome in December 1949 greatly contributed to improving the atmosphere in bilateral relations to the extent that Martín Artajo shared his conviction that the problem of the Italian diplomatic representation in Spain would be rapidly solved.¹⁰ However, the Spanish Minister was again being excessively naïve and optimistic. It is true that both De Gasperi and Sforza had expressed the desire of the Italian Government to normalize relations with the Francoist regime as soon as possible; however, they also had stated very clearly that no action would be taken without the prior consent of the major Western powers. As Sforza had expressed in a letter sent to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Pietro Quaroni: 'Generally speaking, Madrid's policy is only aimed at a modest achievement: the appointment of new ambassadors. We would be very ready to do this as soon as someone else begins.'¹¹

This notwithstanding, the British Government had interpreted the Artajo trip in a different light. According to the diplomats at the Foreign Office, the Italian Government was about to change its international point of reference regarding the Spanish question. Until that moment, the Italian authorities had followed the British guidelines regarding the Francoist regime. From that moment onwards, the Foreign Office feared that Rome would harmonize its policy with Washington, regardless of the British position. At the beginning of 1950, the British fears were realized when the Italian Government informed the State Department that it would henceforth harmonize its policy towards the Francoist regime with the US Government.¹²

This change became more important a few days later, when Dean Acheson, under increasing pressure from the Pentagon and the Senate, sent a letter to Senator Tom Connally, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission, announcing that the State Department had revised its policy towards Spain and was willing to support all the initiatives oriented towards the normalization of relations with the Francoist regime at the United Nations. At the beginning of January 1950, increasing pressure from the House of Representatives and the different foreign relations committees in the Senate started to persuade Truman and Acheson that it was time to change the US policy towards the Francoist regime. This idea was strengthened by the deterioration of the

¹⁰AIS, FGA, Artajo, Folder 235/15. Letter from Capomazza to Andreotti, 28 January 1950.

¹¹DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 499. Letter from Sforza to Quaroni, 29 December 1949.

¹²NARA. Central Decimal file 1950-54, Box 2929: Memorandum of conversation with Bettini, Third secretary of the Italian Embassy in Washington, 10 January 1950.

international situation. In August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear weapon, ending the atomic monopoly held by the United States since 1945. In autumn 1949, the People's Liberation Army, headed by Mao Ze Dong, defeated Chiang's US-backed Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Government in China, thus giving birth to the People's Republic of China. Immediately after Mao's success, the Soviet Union hurried to establish relations with the new Communist country which was bound to become, at least at this point, one of Russia's main allies. These events provoked deep concern in the Truman Administration which reacted by expanding its containment policy. In 1950, the National Security Council issued a document, known as the NSC 68, proposing to reinforce pro-Western alliance systems and quadruple spending on defence. This document would become the backbone of US foreign policy during the 1950s. While US officials were finalizing the last details of NSC 68, a major conflict broke out in South-East Asia: the Korean War. In June 1950, the North Korean Army started the invasion of South Korea altering the *status quo* which had prevailed over the area since the end of the Second World War. The North Korean invasion was immediately condemned by the United Nations which recommended military assistance to South Korea. The same day, President Truman ordered US air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. China's intervention produced a substantial escalation of the conflict.¹³ The deterioration of the international situation greatly benefited the Francoist regime which had been playing the anti-Communist card since 1945.

However, this statement did not imply the immediate resolution of the problem as Acheson also stated very clearly that no action would be taken without the full approval of the UN and explained that this change did not imply the automatic incorporation of Spain into the Western bloc, a prospect contrary to the desires of most of the major powers. The Spanish question would be solved through the regular diplomatic channels, in this case at the United Nations, and the US Government was unwilling to take any unilateral decisions in this regard. This meant that the international rehabilitation of the Francoist regime would take some time as the Spanish question still had to be discussed in the General Assembly. Although the new US policy was a determinant factor at the United Nations, there was a group of countries opposed to the normalization of relations with the Francoist regime (mainly Mexico, Uruguay, Guatemala, Israel and the Eastern bloc), and another group of countries (headed by Great Britain) which were determined to abstain. In any case, it was clear that the Spanish question would not be solved immediately.¹⁴

¹³For a discussion of the international context of the Cold War, see Leffler and Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: The Origins*.

¹⁴FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, Letter from Acheson to Connally, 18 January 1950, 1549–55. More about the US policy towards Spain in this period and the intense debate within the Truman administration in Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 364–78.

The Spanish question was finally discussed by the General Assembly on 4 November at the request of the Dominican Republic and Peru. During this session, member states debated a project drawn up by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Dominican Republic and Philippines, which aimed at the international rehabilitation of the Francoist regime. According to this proposal, the resolution approved in December 1946, which consolidated the international isolation of the Francoist regime, had to be revoked allowing the member states to appoint new ambassadors in Madrid, thus resuming normal diplomatic relations. In addition, Spain should be allowed to join the international agencies created or linked with the United Nations since 1946. The project, which depended upon the support of the US Government, was approved by a vast majority (37 votes in favour, 10 against and 12 abstentions) with the sole opposition coming from Eastern bloc countries, Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay and Israel. France and Great Britain, among others, abstained. However, the 1946 resolution was not completely revoked: the paragraphs dealing with the history of the regime and the official UN condemnation were still in force, although they had little political weight or meaning.¹⁵

It should be added that the French and British policy regarding the Spanish question at the United Nations was similar. In principle, they did not want the issue to be raised, convinced that the withdrawal of the current sanctions would strengthen Franco's position even further. However, if the question was finally raised, their delegations were instructed to abstain. In fact, both the British and the French Governments had realized that the UN condemnatory resolution passed in December 1946 had only made the Spanish problem worse. In addition, they understood that, with the US support of this diplomatic initiative, any opposition would harm their relations with Washington and their international prestige.¹⁶ This was one of the first examples of the new hegemonic role of the United States in Europe.

The whole process was followed with great interest by the Italian Government.¹⁷ As has already been explained, in 1946 it had decided to follow the UN condemnatory resolution and had withdrawn its ambassador from Madrid, even though it was not legally obliged to do so since Italy was not a member of the international institution at the time. During the three years in which the resolution was in force, the Italian Government showed a strict determination to harmonize its policy with its Western allies, especially with Britain. The adoption and implementation of this policy, however, had

¹⁵Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question*; Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo*; Portero, *Franco Aislado*.

¹⁶AMAEF: Europe, 1945–49, Spain, 71. Report by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Spain, 24 March 1949. Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 379–89.

¹⁷ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Report from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to De Gasperi, 15 December 1950.

not been smooth. The DC Government was well aware that Italy had important interests in Spain, interests which required the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime in order to be properly defended. In addition, it was subjected to strong pressures from the Spanish authorities (which continued even in late 1950), and important conservative sectors in Italy (including sectors of the DC).¹⁸ In this sense, the new UN resolution was received in Rome with relief and satisfaction: the international rehabilitation of the Francoist regime allowed the Italian Government to carry out the pragmatic policy which would allow the improvement of relations with Spain subsequently, protecting and fostering the important interests present in the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁹

This notwithstanding, once the UN resolution was made public, the Italian Government decided to act cautiously and maintain the principle of aligning its actions with the Western allies, especially with the US which had become the new international point of reference for the Spanish question. However, the Spanish authorities were not willing to slow things down and immediately started to put pressure on the Italian Government so it would appoint and send its ambassador to Madrid as soon as possible.²⁰ It is evident that, after four years of international 'isolation', the diplomats in Spain were anxious to see bilateral relations return to normal. In this sense, similar moves were made in other countries in order to accelerate the process.²¹

Faced with this situation, the Italian Government, also eager to improve bilateral relations, decided to communicate, although at an unofficial level, that a new ambassador would be appointed within a short period. The

¹⁸On 18 October, Sangróniz held a meeting with Sforza, at the request of Martín Artajo. In it, the Spanish Ambassador, after making reference to the Spanish question which was being debated at the UN, explained that Italy was missing a great opportunity and that if an ambassador in Madrid was appointed before the final vote, that gesture would be greatly appreciated in Spain. AMAE: Bundle 2.216, folders 5–6. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 28 September 1950 and telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 9 October 1950.

¹⁹ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from the Italian Representative in front of the UN, Gastone Guidotti, to Grazzi, 13 January 1950 and DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 527. Letter from Grazzi to Guidotti, 14 January 1950.

²⁰Right after the UN resolution, Sangróniz, who had come back to Spain for a few days, held two interviews with Capomazza in order to transmit the idea that a delay in the appointment of an ambassador would be perceived in Spain as an unfriendly gesture which could jeopardize the cordial relations which had prevailed during the whole year. ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 11 November 1950. Transmitted later to the embassies in Paris, London, Washington and Lisbon.

²¹Dulphy, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War*; Carlos Sanz Díaz, *España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949–1966): Política, economía y emigración, entre la guerra fría y la distensión* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2005).

Italians added that Francesco Maria Taliani would be appointed to the position, but warned that this diplomatic move had to be in harmony with the rest of the Western powers and, therefore, would not be immediate. As a matter of fact, the normalization of diplomatic relations would not become official until the end of December, when the major powers had already done so. It is obvious that the Italian authorities did not want to rush into this issue, at least without being absolutely certain that the Western allies were following the same steps.²²

This precaution, which might appear excessive, cannot be explained only by external factors. The Italian Government wanted to improve its image and prestige in front of the international community by following France, Great Britain and the United States in this question, but this was not the sole reason. It has to be considered that the Francoist regime was still a highly topical subject which offended the sensibilities of a large part of the Italian society which had been affected by the Spanish Civil War. The left-wing parties (PCI, PSI, PSLI and PRI) were well aware of this situation and did not hesitate to use the Spanish question to wear down the Christian Democrats. In addition, there was in this period an important fight inside the DC, between the two main sectors of the party: the conservative right, represented by Attilio Piccioni, and the reformist left, headed by Giuseppe Dossetti and later by Amintore Fanfani.²³ In this sense, the Italian Government was forced to proceed with the utmost care in the Spanish question, trying to avoid possible reactions from the parties outside the coalition (PCI and PSI), inside the coalition (PRI and PSLI), and even inside the DC. This was not an easy task; De Gasperi and Sforza were conscious that the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime would always give rise to criticism. However, it would be easier to handle if it was done quietly and at the same time as the Western allies.

By 15 December the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew that the United States had already appointed Stanton Griffis as the new ambassador in Madrid, and that Great Britain was about to do the same with John Balfour. The French Government had not taken any decisions in this regard, but there were persistent rumours indicating that a new ambassador would be appointed soon.²⁴ The Italian Government, fearing possible isolation

²²Capomazza, at the request of Sforza, went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to communicate the Italian position in this regard. AMAE: Bundle 3.028, folder 52. Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Artajo, 21 November 1950.

²³For more about the internal politics in Italy during this period, see Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*; Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia Repubblicana*; Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*; Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

²⁴ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to De Gasperi, 15 December 1950.

in this particular subject, decided to follow these countries and appointed Francesco Maria Taliani as the new ambassador in Madrid on 20 January 1951. This decision was received with concern by the leftist elements of Italian society but their reaction was limited to three articles in different newspapers (*Voce Repubblicana*, *Avanti* and *Il Paese*) and the organization of a press conference where the left-wing parties protested against the new Italian policy towards the Francoist regime. In reality, the appointment of Taliani did not provoke a strong reaction in Italian society and, in general, it was viewed with indifference, as the inevitable evolution of the situation. Without further problems, Taliani arrived in Madrid at the beginning of April, giving rise to the perception in both countries that a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations had just started.²⁵

Taliani's arrival in Madrid: a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations?

Taliani's arrival in Madrid was received with great satisfaction by the Spanish Government.²⁶ Francesco Maria Taliani, who had become related to the Spanish aristocracy through marriage with the Archduchess of Habsburg, was a diplomat with many years of experience behind him. He became ambassador in Peking in 1935 where he remained until 1943 when the Mussolini regime fell. Crucially, he decided to remain loyal to the king, a decision which led to his imprisonment in China. He was released by the allies in 1945 and returned to Italy where he resumed his diplomatic career. When De Gasperi and Sforza decided to appoint him as the new ambassador in Madrid he was Chief of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking all this information into consideration, it is easy to understand why the Spanish authorities were satisfied with his designation: Taliani was one of the most prominent diplomats in Italy by 1951, he was related to the Spanish aristocracy through marriage, and his past connections with Fascism exonerated him from any possible links with the left-wing parties.²⁷

Right after his arrival, Taliani held two important meetings, one with Martín Artajo (on 2 April) and the other one with Franco (only three days

²⁵ AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 25 January 1951 and AMAE: Personal File 304, folder 30.013, Personal file of Taliani.

²⁶ ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 24 February 1951. MNLM: 'Los póstumos', *Arriba*, 24 February 1951. This article was more critical of the Italian Government, but it also acknowledged that the political circles in Spain received with satisfaction the appointment of Taliani.

²⁷ AMAE: Personal File 304, folder 30.013. Personal file of Taliani. AMAE: Bundle 1.892, folder 8. Letter from Sangróniz to Erice, 18 November 1948. In this letter, Sangróniz gave his personal opinion on Taliani. The reaction of the Spanish press to the appointment of Taliani can be seen in MNLM: Julián Cortés Cavanillas, 'El Embajador que nos manda Italia', *ABC*, 23 February 1951 and 'El Marqués Taliani, Embajador de Italia en España', *Pueblo*, 23 February 1951. The article of Cortés Cavanilla is even more interesting if one considers that he worked in the Spanish Embassy in Italy.

later), in order to present his credentials and discuss the status of Spanish-Italian relations. Both interviews were held in a very positive atmosphere (the meeting with Franco lasted for 40 minutes, longer than usual) and went along the same lines. The three actors expressed their great satisfaction with the diplomatic normalization and concurred that a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations was about to start. They also agreed that this new phase ought to be characterized by an intense cooperation between the two countries in all fields (especially in the economic), starting as soon as possible.²⁸

Finally, they discussed the international situation in Europe and the role of Spain in the Western security system. This subject had been brought up by Taliani who had been specifically instructed by Sforza to gather information in this regard. The Italian Ambassador had also been instructed to reassure the Spanish authorities that the Italian Government was willing to support Spain's inclusion in the Atlantic Treaty.²⁹ This is an extremely important development reflecting a complete turnaround in Sforza's previous position. It should be remembered that on the occasion of Martín Artajo's visit to Rome, Sforza had expressed his opposition to Spanish participation in NATO. At that time, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs considered Spain to be an unreliable ally (it had not been reliable in the past either), and its inclusion in the Atlantic Treaty with Franco still in power 'would be an offense to the democratic peoples in Western Europe and a useful talking point for the Communists on either side of the Iron Curtain'.³⁰

As has already been explained, there were other members of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who wanted Spanish participation in the defence of Western Europe, especially Zoppi and Grazzi, but the opinion of Sforza prevailed at that moment. This radical change in Sforza, who one year later instructed his new ambassador in Madrid to assure the Spanish authorities that Italy was in favour of its participation in NATO, has to be interpreted in the light of the international events. The outbreak of the Korean War, the strong implications for the United States, and the increasing tension in international relations had forced West European countries to revise their policies regarding the Francoist regime. The Truman administration had started its struggle against Communism on a global scale, which meant that Western Europe was neither its sole nor primary concern. The European

²⁸ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Martín Artajo), letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Franco).

²⁹ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Martín Artajo), letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Franco). The instructions given by Sforza can be deduced from these two letters.

³⁰NAUK: FO 371/89492. Letter from Victor Mallet to Hector McNeil, 26 January 1950. This letter reproduced a conversation held with Count Sforza right after Martín Artajo's trip to Rome.

countries were forced to make an effort and be able to defend themselves and, from this perspective, the Francoist regime, with all its geo-strategic value, might prove a useful ally. In addition, the Spanish situation in April 1951 was not the same as in late 1949: the condemnatory resolution of the UN had been withdrawn, ambassadors from the major powers had returned to Madrid, and Washington was considering starting direct negotiations in order to include Spain in the Western security system.³¹

One day after his meeting with Franco, Taliani organized a press conference at the Italian Embassy in order to publicize his main objectives as the new ambassador. The press conference attracted the attention of the most important Spanish newspapers and had an enormous media impact.³² The Italian Ambassador claimed that he would work intensely to improve Spanish-Italian relations, in such a way as to fortify the issue from the prevailing political winds on either country. Taliani stated that there were invisible links between the two peoples which were always active: the identities of the Catholic religion, the common culture and civilization shared throughout several centuries. Although Taliani made no specific reference to politics, he asserted that Spain and Italy had to initiate mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields, underlining the urgency of increasing commercial exchanges and the implementation of industrial collaboration. Finally, Taliani argued that in the cultural sphere Spain and Italy also had many opportunities to begin fruitful cooperation.³³

In this way, everything seemed to point to a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations which had started with the normalization of diplomatic relations. This raises the question regarding the actual importance of the appointment of Taliani as new ambassador in Madrid and whether or not this decision could be considered as a turning point in bilateral relations. The complexity of the issue at stake requires a broad view of the international context but also of the differing perspectives which influenced the development of relations between the two states at this time. In fact, if one takes a short-term perspective and analyses bilateral relations during the following five months, evidence will show that the most important dynamics remained unaltered

³¹On the effects which the Korean War had in the international perception of the Francoist regime see Portero, *Franco Aislado*, 357–9.

³²Proof of this impact can be found in the fact that the most important newspapers published the following day detailed articles reporting Taliani's words. MNLM: 'Recepción de la prensa en la Embajada de Italia', *Ya*, 7 April 1951; 'Factores permanentes determinan la amistad y comprensión de España e Italia', *ABC*, 7 April 1951; and 'Las contingencias políticas no deben influir en las relaciones hispano-italianas', *Arriba!*, 7 April 1951. The press conference was also covered by several foreign correspondents: ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Taliani to Sforza, 7 May 1951.

³³The whole intervention made by Taliani can be found in ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. It was sent to Sforza.

and that no major changes had taken place. In April 1951, political cooperation was a distant objective that the Italian authorities did not really take into consideration and that was only mentioned, in a very vague way, to please the Spanish diplomats. It is true that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was now willing to accept the inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Atlantic Treaty, but that did not really change things. The Italian Government was unable to take any official initiatives aimed at Spain's adherence to NATO; in this sense, Italian support was limited to a meaningful silence whenever the Spanish question was discussed by the major powers.

The situation was not different in other fields. Commercial exchanges continued to be reduced to the minimum possible expression and, in spite of serious efforts on behalf of both countries, an adequate solution would not be found until late 1952. Industrial cooperation, which was the great aspiration of the Italian Government, had been limited to the agreement between Montecatini and the Spanish Ministry of Industry to defray the expenses generated by the Spanish pilgrims travelling to Rome for the Holy Year with machinery coming from the Italian company.³⁴ This situation would persist until 1952 when the new commercial agreement created new ways to implement cooperation in this area. Military relations had been limited to isolated contacts between the two armies, armies which had traditionally had important contacts since the 1920s. Military relations only started to improve very slowly at the end of 1951, but it was not until 1954 that they were greatly intensified.

Accordingly, if one takes a short-term perspective it seems evident that the return of the Italian Ambassador did not constitute a turning point in bilateral relations. However, if one adopts a middle-term perspective, the conclusion might be slightly different. By 1957 Spanish-Italian relations had vastly improved, an improvement which could be noticed in all the spheres; this improvement could not have happened without the normalization of diplomatic relations. The appointment of Taliani was not a turning point *per se* in Spanish-Italian relations, but it was a major event and the necessary precondition that allowed the subsequent changes, which were possibly more important. However, a more pivotal turning point can be better distinguished with the visit of De Gasperi to Washington in September 1951.

De Gasperi's visit to Washington: a new phase in bilateral relations?

Alcide De Gasperi visited Washington from 24 to 28 November. By this time, the US Government was determined to give full support to the DC Government in order to 'preserve Italy as an independent, democratic state, friendly to the United States and capable of effective participation

³⁴ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Guidotti to Grazzi, 13 January 1950; and DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 527. Letter from Grazzi to Guidotti, 14 January 1950.

in the resistance to communist expansion'.³⁵ In this regard, the purpose of the visit was to gather favourable public opinion towards the De Gasperi Government by demonstrating that Italy and the United States were now side by side as 'co-equals among the free nations', especially those united through the Atlantic Treaty. In addition, the visit would afford De Gasperi an opportunity to counteract the criticism in Italy that he and his government had not been sufficiently aggressive in putting forward Italy's policies and aspirations in its relations with the Western allies.³⁶

The US authorities were well aware that De Gasperi's success in the following elections, essential to prevent the Italian Communists from seizing power, would largely depend on how the Italian population perceived relations with the Western powers. In this regard, it would be easier to convince them to vote for the Christian Democrats if the US displayed a friendlier policy towards De Gasperi and his government. Of course, this was a diplomatic strategy adopted to ensure a DC victory in the elections. Nobody at the State Department thought that the United States and Italy could actually collaborate as 'co-equals'.³⁷

On the other hand, De Gasperi wanted to give the impression of soundness of the new government which had been formed in July after another internal crisis. The new government had important changes, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the retirement of Count Sforza, who was temporarily replaced by De Gasperi, along with the appointment of Paolo Emilio Taviani, a prominent figure in the DC who belonged to the moderate sector of the party, as Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs. These modifications also had an impact on Spanish-Italian relations: in fact, the Spanish authorities showed their satisfaction towards the removal of Sforza and the designation of Taviani who had never hidden his sympathy for Spain.³⁸

Finally, both the US and Italian Governments wanted to discuss the international situation with particular emphasis on the communist threat, the defence of Western Europe, the Atlantic Treaty and the rearmament of Germany.³⁹ During these conversations, the problem of Spain and its participation in the Western security system was also discussed.⁴⁰ As has

³⁵FRUS: 1950, Vol. III, NSC 67/1. The position of the United States with respect to Communism in Italy, 21 April 1950, 1486–91.

³⁶TPL, PSF, Subject File 1940–53. Conferences File, Box 143. Letter from James Webb to Truman, without date, but not before 20 November.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folder 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 26 July 1951. From this moment onwards, Taviani will be another key figure in Spanish-Italian relations, adding to Sangróniz, Zoppi and Andreotti.

³⁹Timothy Smith, *The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947–52* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

⁴⁰TPL, PSF, Subject File 1940–53. Conferences File, Box 143. Memorandum of topics to be discussed, written by James Webb to the President, without date.

already been explained, the outbreak of the Korean War had changed the perspective of the Truman administration, and other governments, on the Francoist regime. The State Department was now convinced that it was necessary to urgently develop the military potentialities of Spain's strategic geographic position for the common defence of the NATO area. The problem was in obtaining diplomatic support among some of the NATO members to enforce this new policy towards the Francoist regime. The US diplomats were well aware that while Britain and France were reluctant to support Spanish involvement in Western defence, the Italian Government was more flexible, as the first interview between Franco and Taliani had shown.⁴¹ As a consequence, the Spanish issue was included in the agenda of conversations in order to reflect something of the nature and the objectives of the talks which Admiral Forrest Sherman and Ambassador Griffis had just started with the Francoist regime, and to attract the Italian Government to the US position.⁴²

It should be clarified that the Truman administration had informed London and Paris of its intentions 'to explore with the Spanish Government what they might be willing to contribute to the defense of Western Europe', already during the month of February 1951.⁴³ The British Government reacted by requesting that the State Department suspend these instructions so that it could have an opportunity for a preliminary discussion. According to the British diplomats, these negotiations would be highly publicized by the Francoist regime, leaving the NATO countries in a delicate position with their respective publics. Moreover, the negotiations could be used by the Spanish authorities to 'play off' the Americans against Britain and France by emphasizing that the US Government was more forthcoming in its attitude towards the regime. Finally, a US unilateral action in this question would break the common front which both countries had managed to present in

⁴¹FRUS, 1951, Vol. IV (part 1). Statement of policy by the National Security Council on Spain, 1 February 1951, 789–90.

⁴²TPL, PSE, Subject File 1940–53. Conferences File, Box 143. Memorandum prepared by Dunham (WE) and Garnett (EE) for use in the conversations with the Italian Prime Minister and the Italian delegation, 19 September 1951. It is noteworthy that, when the Italians informed the Spanish authorities about these conversations, they claimed that the Spanish question was not planned and it was included as a special demand of the Italian delegation (AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 8 October 1951). However, the analysis of the US documentation shows very clearly that the discussion of the Spanish problem had been carefully planned and arranged by the US diplomats.

⁴³FRUS, 1951, Vol. IV (part 1). Memorandum of conversation between William Dunham from the office of Western European Affairs, and the Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washinton, Jamieson, 17 February 1951, 798–9.

Spain since the Second World War, and provoke an extra problem for NATO, already troubled by the possible admission of Greece and Turkey.⁴⁴

The French Government also received the US communication unenthusiastically, and decided to contact the British Government immediately in order to find a common position. At the same time, it transmitted to the State Department that such an approach in front of the Francoist regime would be neither useful nor opportune. The French authorities were already experiencing problems with public opinion due to the German rearmament, and adding another source of friction, in this case Spanish participation in the Western defence arrangement, would only make things worse.⁴⁵ On 7 March, however, Washington reported that, after considering the British and the French positions, it had been decided to go ahead with the exploratory talks with Spain. Out of consideration for its two Western allies, the Truman administration was willing to avoid discussing any detailed military questions with the Spanish authorities prior to further consultation with Paris or London.⁴⁶ The British Government though, deemed this concession insufficient and sent another letter to Dean Acheson warning that the US unilateral approach would be publicized by the Francoist regime to strengthen its position, and destroy 'our united front towards Spain'.⁴⁷ However, and in spite of these requests, the Truman administration was determined to go ahead with the exploratory talks.

Faced with this situation, the French and British Governments decided to follow the US-Spanish negotiations, keep open the communication channels with Washington, and maintain the contacts between them so that they could present a common position in front of the Truman administration in the event that this would become necessary.⁴⁸ It is evident that the Anglo-American front towards Spain was being substituted, at least momentarily, by an Anglo-French front which could ensure that these two countries could continue to exercise some influence over Spanish affairs.⁴⁹ It is also

⁴⁴NAUK: FO 371/96172, Minutes of the Foreign Office, 4 March 1951, and FO 371/96181. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 February 1951 and memorandum on a conversation with Dean Acheson from Oliver Franks to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1951.

⁴⁵Ibid. Minutes of a conversation between the Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, William Strang, and the French Ambassador in London, René Massigli, 16 February 1951.

⁴⁶FRUS, 1951, Vol. IV (part 1). Memo for the files by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, James Bonbright, 2 March 1951, 801-2.

⁴⁷Ibid. Letter from the British Ambassador in Washington, Walter Gifford, to Acheson, 8 March 1951, 803-6.

⁴⁸AMAEF: Europe, 1949-55, Spain, 155. Report from the French direction of Europe about Spain, 24 October 1951 and report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Schuman, 14 December 1951. NAUK: FO 371/96181. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 June 1951.

⁴⁹More about Anglo-French cooperation after 1945 in Sean Greenwood, *The Alternative Alliance: Anglo-French Relations before the Coming of NATO* (London: Minerva Press, 1996).

evident that the hostility shown by the British and the French Governments vis-à-vis the exploratory talks, was forcing the Truman administration to find other supporters among the NATO members to enforce its policy. In this regard, the Italian Government was a suitable candidate which had shown a more flexible policy regarding the Spanish inclusion in Western defence.⁵⁰

Although the issue of Spain was included in the agenda of the meeting, it was not regarded as sufficiently relevant to be discussed at the highest level by the two Presidents. First of all, De Gasperi and Truman had more important questions to discuss, like the adoption of a common policy towards Yugoslavia, the inclusion of Germany in the Western security system, and the future of the Atlantic Treaty. In addition, the US officials were already convinced that, in case the Truman administration decided to start bilateral negotiations with the Francoist regime, Italy would not present an obstacle, unlike Britain or France. Accordingly, the Spanish problem was left in the hands of two technical delegations headed by George Perkins, from the division of Western European affairs at the State Department, George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and Ambassador James Dunn from the US, and Vittorio Zoppi, Pasquale Jannelli and Mario Lucioli from the Italian side. The conversation was mainly carried out by George Perkins and Pasquale Jannelli. Perkins started by explaining the US position regarding Spain and the nature and objectives of the talks which had just been started on the issue. Jannelli replied that the Italian Government was firmly convinced that, in the long run, Spain could not be ignored when considering Western defence. However, and taking into account the proliferation of anti-Francoist sentiments still present in Italian society, the De Gasperi Government believed that the United States should proceed with the utmost care in its handling of the Spanish problem. According to the Italians it was first necessary to encourage Spain to evolve into some form of democracy thus facilitating Western efforts to integrate the Iberian country in Western defence.⁵¹

To be sure, the Italian Government was in favour of Spanish inclusion in the Western defence arrangement. However, it was afraid that if the subject was not handled with the utmost care by the US authorities, it could end up having negative consequences for the government as the left-wing parties might seize the opportunity to launch a mutiny. It has to be considered that the general elections were not so distant (they would be held in 1953) and the communist threat was still very vivid in Italy. As a consequence, the De Gasperi Government wanted to handle the negotiations calmly, considering

⁵⁰ ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Martín Artajo), letter from Taliani to Sforza, 5 April 1951 (meeting with Franco).

⁵¹ TPL, PSF, Subject File 1940–53. Conferences File, Box 143. Minutes of the Second Meeting held on 25 September 1951.

that the inclusion of Spain did not have to be tackled immediately (it was inevitable only 'in the long run'). In the meantime, the Italian delegation urged Washington to continue encouraging the Spanish Government to democratize the region so that it would be easier for the West European countries to tolerate its inclusion in the Western security system. In essence, the Italian reply had been only slightly less intransigent than the ones provided by France and Britain.

Given the complexity of the issue, it seems necessary to clarify even further the Italian position regarding the participation of Franco's regime in Western defence, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and inaccuracies. This is not an easy task, especially if one considers that Italian policy in this matter was not monolithic, which means that there were different visions and opinions inside the Italian Government. There was a group, whose most prominent figures were Andreotti, Taviani, Zoppi and Grazzi, who were clearly in favour of Spanish inclusion in the defence of Western Europe, as well as the new international organizations created after the end of the war. In their view, Spain was a strong pillar in the fight against Communism and had a geostrategic value that should not be underestimated by the European countries. In addition, there was among these politicians the firm conviction that, if Italy supported the Francoist regime in these questions, it could obtain important benefits in the economic field, especially privileges for the Italian industries operating in the Iberian Peninsula.

It should be clarified that the vast majority of the diplomats in 'Palazzo Chigi' who played a crucial role in the delineation of Italian foreign policy towards the Francoist regime, had started their careers during the fascist period. That was the case for Lanza D'Ajeta, Vittorio Zoppi, Umberto Grazzi and Francesco Maria Taliani. Even though all of them remained loyal to the monarchy and refused to move to the north of Italy and participate in the RSI diplomacy after the signing of the armistice, it is evident that they shared a fascist ideological background. This notwithstanding, there was no actual purge inside the Italian diplomatic sector at the end of the Second World War, and Zoppi, D'Ajeta, Grazzi and Taliani managed to maintain their positions in the democratic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵² In this context, it is obvious that these diplomats did not feel a particular hostility towards the Francoist regime, a regime with which Fascist Italy had maintained more than friendly relations between 1936 and 1943.⁵³ In that regard, they perceived Spain as an important part of the Old Continent which could not

⁵²Varsori, 'Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana'.

⁵³Canosa, *Mussolini e Franco*; Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini*; Tusell and García, *Franco y Mussolini*.

be left aside, and were more willing to include it in the Western bloc than diplomats in other countries who did not have a Fascist past.⁵⁴

On the other hand, there was a group, represented by Saragat, leader of the PSLI, and Pacciardi, leader of the PRI, who were strongly opposed to the inclusion of Spain in the Western bloc at any level (political or economic). This view was also based on ideological principles and on the conviction that the Italian democratic state should not be involved with a dictatorship like the Spanish one. Although the DC had obtained absolute majority in the 1948 elections, De Gasperi had always tried to include the lay and moderate parties, the PRI and the PSLI, in the government. In fact, if the PRI and the PSLI decided to abandon the coalition the whole government would collapse, forcing De Gasperi to redefine his strategy and find new allies, perhaps among the right-wing elements.⁵⁵ It is difficult to ascertain to what extent these two leaders were willing to abandon the government because of Italian policy towards the Francoist regime, but there is little doubt that both of them put pressure on De Gasperi and tried to impose their views in this regard. Another actor that has to be taken into account is the DC itself. After the Congress of April 1950, the left-wing sector, now led by Amintore Fanfani, had consolidated its position forcing the moderate and the conservative groups to stipulate an agreement which had brought about their participation in the government.⁵⁶ Although Fanfani was friends with Artajo since they had worked together in Pax Romana during the war, the Italian politician represented a sector of the party which was resistant to the incorporation of the Francoist regime in the defence of Western Europe.⁵⁷ The influence of the party was not decisive in these questions, but it has to be taken into consideration in order to understand the conduct of the government, especially in official public acts like a visit to Washington.

The person in charge of reconciling these different perspectives and defining a coherent policy was Alcide De Gasperi, Head of the Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs since June 1951. The Italian Christian Democrat, who represented the moderate sector of the party, was not sympathetic to the Francoist regime and believed that it should start a process of democratization before participating in the Western bloc. In addition, he was afraid that a hasty inclusion of Spain in the defence of Western Europe might provoke a political crisis in Italy, jeopardizing his political project and consolidating the position of the left-wing parties. At the same time,

⁵⁴DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 527. Letter from Grazzi to Guidotti, 14 January 1950.

⁵⁵More about De Gasperi's foreign policy in Craveri, *De Gasperi*; Galli, *I partiti politici italiani (1943–2000)*.

⁵⁶Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*, 137–8.

⁵⁷AMAE: Bundle 1.453, folder 2. Telegram from the Italian Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 June 1947.

De Gasperi, a very pragmatic politician, was well aware that Franco had consolidated his position since the end of the war and that it was now very difficult to force him out of the power. At that juncture, the best way to promote the democratization of the country was by progressively including it in the new international institutions, especially the economic ones. De Gasperi also knew that it was essential to maintain cordial relations with the Francoist regime in order to protect and potentially develop the important economic interests which Italy had in the Iberian country. Showing publicly opposition or reservations regarding the inclusion of Spain in the defence of Western Europe was a risky manoeuvre that might provoke a fatal deterioration in bilateral relations with considerable subsequent damage to the Italian interests in Spain.⁵⁸

As a consequence, De Gasperi opted for a cautious policy which changed, depending on the interlocutor. Officially, the Italian Government did not oppose the negotiations between Spain and the US, although it tried to avoid the question and did not make any public statement in this regard. For the sake of saving face in front of the Spanish authorities, Italy underlined that, although no public initiative could be taken because of the internal situation, it was clearly in favour of Spanish inclusion in the Western bloc. In private conversations with the Western allies, however, Italy stressed the need to handle this question with restraint and caution, explaining that the previous democratization of the Francoist regime would facilitate its inclusion in the defence of Europe. In this sense, the trip that De Gasperi made to Washington, and his subsequent reaction to the Spanish protests, constitute the best example of the Italian attitude.

The trip made by De Gasperi to Washington is also important because it brought about important changes in Italian policy towards the Francoist regime. As a matter of fact, the Italian delegation came back from Washington convinced that the negotiations between Spain and the United States would be successful. As a result, the Francoist regime would be included in the defence of Western Europe, even without the agreement of the European countries, and start receiving important economic aid to rebuild its economy and modernize its army. The Italian authorities realized that it was necessary to adapt their policy to the new reality in order to obtain the maximum benefits for themselves. On 13 October, the Spanish Ambassador held two meetings, one with De Gasperi and another one with Taviani and Francesco Dominè, the two undersecretaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In both cases, the Spanish Ambassador received assurances of the Italian determination to consolidate bilateral relations in all fields: first in the economic and cultural and, later on, in the political. The

⁵⁸Craveri, *De Gasperi*; Daniele Palazzo, *La politica estera di De Gasperi: Dal Gennaio 1945 al Maggio 1947* (Roma: Prospettiva, 2006); Giuseppe Petrilli, *La politica estera ed Europea di de Gasperi* (Roma: Cinque lune, 1975).

Italian authorities had even prepared a concrete plan in order to regulate this process of rapprochement between the two countries: the first step would be the creation of a Commission, made up by prestigious Italian experts in the economic area (Grazzi, Emilio Dall'Aglio and others). The Commission would be in charge of coming into contact with the proper Spanish authorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Commerce) and sounding out the possibility of formulating a project of economic and industrial cooperation, independent from the Commercial Treaty which should be renewed at the beginning of 1952. In this sense, Italy was willing to invest considerable amounts of money in Spain, in order to drum up the hard currency which should be used by the Spanish authorities to purchase Italian machinery.⁵⁹

This project was not new: it had been first proposed by the Italian delegation during the negotiations to sign a commercial treaty during the spring of 1949. In the end, it had been abandoned because of the important political implications which it had at the time, and the Spanish reluctance to open its economy to foreign investors. At the end of 1949, coinciding with the visit of Martín Artajo to Rome, the project had been revived by the Italian attaché in Madrid and the DGAP, but this time the reluctance of the DGAE, convinced that this plan was not viable unless diplomatic relations were normalized, paralysed it again.⁶⁰

By the end of 1951, however, the ground was ready to reconsider the old project of industrial cooperation between the two countries thanks to the appointment of Taliani in February 1951. At the same time, the negotiations between Spain and the US were proceeding well, which meant that Spain would soon receive considerable economic aid from the Truman Administration. This aid implied that Spain would have more stocks of hard currency to spend in other markets, and, at the same time, that the Spanish economy would start a slow process of liberalization that might finally allow foreign investments.⁶¹

In addition, 1951 had also witnessed a very important cabinet reshuffle. As a consequence, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce had been divided in two different ministries, leaving commerce in the hands of Manuel de Arburua. Although Arburua was not a liberal economist, he had a far more liberal take on the Spanish economy than his predecessor, Juan Antonio Suñer. ⁶² The situation was more propitious than ever, and the Italians

⁵⁹AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 October 1951.

⁶⁰ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1950, folder 22. Letter from Guidotti to Grazzi, 13 January 1950 and DDI: Series XI, Vol. III, Doc. No. 527. Letter from Grazzi to Guidotti, 14 January 1950.

⁶¹Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 346–445.

⁶²More about how the cabinet reshuffle affected the Spanish economy in *ibid.*, 383–5; Viñas, *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)*, 868–82.

knew it. However, they also knew that the project of industrial cooperation alone might not be enough to convince the Spanish authorities. It had to be framed in a wider plan of rapprochement between the two countries in all fields: first in the economic and the cultural, then in the military and finally in the political. Political cooperation with Italy was the great aspiration of Spanish diplomacy since the end of the war (as it had been expressed by Martín Artajo in his instructions to Sangróniz in January 1946), a source of international legitimization worth the stipulation of agreements of industrial cooperation. The Italian proposal was studied by the Spanish authorities during the month of October and finally accepted, giving birth to a new phase in bilateral relations.⁶³

The rapprochement in Spanish-Italian relations

Setting the ground for industrial cooperation: Merzagora's trip to Spain in 1952

As it has just been explained, the Italian plan of rapprochement had been positively received in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly by Martín Artajo who saw the project as the perfect occasion to start working towards political cooperation.⁶⁴ However, the Italian proposal did not receive the same positive reception in the Ministry of Industry, which was the ministry most crucial for the development for these kinds of agreements. It should be noted at this point that, in spite of the substitution of Suanzes as Minister of Industry, the ministry was still ruled by politicians and bureaucrats who were very much in favour of maintaining an autarchy. Suanzes was replaced with his personal friend, Joaquín Planell, a military man and politician who was in favour of the autarchic system, although with less enthusiasm than his predecessor. For his part, Suanzes was appointed as Director of the 'Instituto Nacional de Industria' (INI), a Spanish governmental entity created in 1941 to promote industrial cooperation, also a very relevant and important position during this period.⁶⁵ As a consequence, these plans, which involved the investments of large sums of foreign capital in the Spanish industrial fabric, were not positively received.⁶⁶

⁶³ AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 27 October 1951.

⁶⁴ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1951, folder 72. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi, 15 November 1951. Transmitted to the embassies in Washington, London, Paris and the Legation in Lisbon, 27 November 1951.

⁶⁵ More about the Spanish making of foreign economic policy in Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*; Gabriel Tortella Casares, *The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

⁶⁶ BOE: 1 December 1939, 7034–40.

In fact, Minister Arburua transmitted to the Italian authorities that it had been decided to leave aside industrial cooperation and focus on the commercial negotiations which were going to take place in February. According to Arburua, Spain was interested in improving economic relations with Italy but, at that precise moment, the Spanish technicians were mainly involved in negotiations with the United States. Launching talks with the Italians would clearly interfere with these negotiations which appeared very promising and, therefore, could produce important benefits, not only for Spain, but also, even indirectly, to Italy. Nevertheless, Arburua suggested to Taliani the inclusion of some industrial technicians in the Italian delegation so, while the new commercial agreement was being negotiated, new contacts with the most prominent figures of the Spanish industrial sector could be established, thus preparing the ground for future cooperation in that area.⁶⁷

It has to be remembered that the commercial exchanges between the two countries were still reduced to the minimum expression, with subsequent damage to both economies. As a result of this, the two governments had agreed to start negotiations in February in order to sign a new commercial treaty which might unblock the situation. Evidently, there was some truth in the explanation given by Arburua as the negotiations with the US required Spain to use the vast majority of its resources. In addition, the Spanish authorities ranked the negotiations with other countries lower than the negotiations with the US, mostly because, at that time, they did not exactly know the true amount of American aid. Only after understanding how much was realistically at their disposal, could the Spanish authorities assess the possibilities of stipulating this kind of agreement with other countries. However, the main reason behind this refusal is deeply rooted in the presence of the autarchic ideas within the Spanish administration, ideas which tended to reject all the projects involving the participation of foreign capitals in the Spanish economy. Even though the bilateral commercial agreements signed during these years represented the first steps away from national autarchy and towards the resumption of international trade and payments, industrial cooperation and the investments of foreign capitals were regarded with hostility by the Spanish administration.⁶⁸ Of course this does not mean that there were no investments of foreign capital during this period. This has been shown by Julio Tascón and corroborated by the present volume. However, this does not imply that the Spanish Government

⁶⁷ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1952, folder 159. Telegram from Taliani to De Gasperi and the DGAE, 17 January 1951.

⁶⁸ Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 348. Juan Carlos Jiménez, 'Las consecuencias económicas de la Guerra Civil', *Revista de Historia Económica*, No. 1, 1987 (Madrid: Universidad Carlos III), 121–30.

in general and the Ministry of Industry in particular, were enthusiastic about accepting these foreign investments.⁶⁹

Faced with this situation, the Italian Government decided to change strategy. The Commission of experts would not be sent to Spain; instead, the delegation in charge of negotiating a new commercial agreement, would be headed by a prominent figure from the Italian financial world, capable of coming into contact with the most important exponents among the Spanish industrialists, thus setting the ground for future cooperation between the two countries in this field. In addition, the presence in Spain of such a relevant figure would provide the commercial agreement with a significant political relevance. As can be seen, the Italian Government placed grave importance on the realization, even if it was on a preliminary basis, of this project for industrial cooperation; maybe even more so than the commercial treaty itself.⁷⁰

The person designated to lead the Italian delegation was Cesare Merzagora. Merzagora was one of the most relevant figures not only in the Italian financial world, but also in Italian politics. Minister of Commerce from 1948 to 1950, he was now a Senator and President of the 'Banca Nazionale del Lavoro' as well as the Body for Industrial Financing. Merzagora was also well known in Spain as he had publicly defended a pro-Spanish policy since 1949 when he had published an article in *Il Corriere della Sera* defending the commercial treaty signed with Spain and the relevance of commercial exchanges with the Iberian country.⁷¹ A couple of months later, Merzagora had published another article, again in *Il Corriere della Sera*, this time defending the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Francoist regime. The designation of Cesare Merzagora for the mission constitutes the best proof of the Italian ambition to put its plan into operation.⁷²

The Spanish authorities understood very quickly that the negotiation of a commercial treaty, so modest in its volume and objectives, did not justify the visit of such a relevant figure. It was clear that Merzagora was heading

⁶⁹Julio Tascón, 'Capital internacional antes de la "internacionalización del capital" en España', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio and Julio Tascón, *Los empresarios de Franco: Política y economía en España, 1936–1957* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), 281–306.

⁷⁰ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1952, folder 158. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi, 9 July 1952, and AMAE: Bundle 6.612, folder 5. Report for Artajo by the General Direction of Economic Policy about the conversations between Sangróniz and Taviani, 16 January 1952.

⁷¹AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9–10. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, including Merzagora's article, 17 December 1949. The article had been published on 4 December 1949.

⁷²AMAE: Bundle 4.232, folder 12. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo including Merzagora's article, 10 September 1950.

the delegation in order to set the ground for future industrial cooperation.⁷³ In any case, the Spanish diplomats were not displeased with the appointment of Merzagora: he was a very important figure in Italy, famous for his pro-Spanish attitude, and his appointment reflected the Italian interest in improving relations with the Francoist regime. In addition, these visits were always used by the regime as political propaganda, reinforcing the idea that Spain was recovering part of the international prestige 'unjustly' lost during the war. As a sign of good disposition towards Italy and Merzagora, the Spanish authorities were willing to discuss the possibilities of future industrial cooperation, but it should be done with a low profile, acknowledging that the most important part of the negotiations had to be devoted to the negotiation of a new commercial treaty capable of unblocking the situation. In fact, the Spanish authorities faced the commercial negotiations with considerable doses of pessimism. The instructions sent to the Spanish delegation by the General Director of Economic Policy were thus characterized by a marked degree of conformism vis-à-vis the Commercial Treaty signed in 1949. The most important proposals made by the Spanish authorities was the regulation of the Italian participation in international trade fairs held in Spain, the establishment of new quotas, the elimination of operations of private compensation and, finally, an increase in the limits of both accounts. Evidently, these modest proposals did not introduce sufficiently significant changes to solve the structural problems which had characterized commercial relations since the end of the war.⁷⁴

In spite of this negative scene, Merzagora arrived in Madrid on 20 March, conscious of the relevance of his mission and convinced that it could be successful.⁷⁵ During his stay, until 26 March, Merzagora held several meetings with Martín Artajo and Arburua as well as the most relevant figures in the economic, banking and industrial worlds in Spain: 'Banco Urquijo' (which had already reached an agreement with FIAT), 'Banco Hispano-Americano', 'Banco Español de Crédito' and 'Banco de España'.⁷⁶ On 26 February, Merzagora signed, on behalf of the Italian Government, the new Commercial Agreement which would regulate the exchanges between the two countries for one year. The new treaty envisaged exchanges with a value of \$26 million, \$4 million less than the 1949 agreement. This reduction in

⁷³AMAE: Bundle 4.231, folder 10. Note for Artajo on the commercial negotiations with Italy, 25 February 1952.

⁷⁴AMAE: Bundle 5.107, folder 3. Instructions to the Spanish delegations written by the General Director of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 1952.

⁷⁵AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo telling about a conversation held with Merzagora right before his departure for Spain, 20 February 1952.

⁷⁶ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1952 folder 159. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi, 26 March 1952.

the total value of the agreement had been decided in order to rationalize commercial traffic, as there had been important quotas of products, agreed in the previous treaty, which still remained untouched. It was necessary to be more realistic and adjust the quotas to the realities of both economies. As a consequence, the quotas of cocoa, wolfram, rosin and turpentine were severely reduced; as a way of compensation, the Spanish authorities agreed to increase the quotas of anchovies, tuna, salted fish, iron oxide, potash, pyrites, iron, vitamin oil, and other types of merchandise.⁷⁷

On the other hand, the Italians reduced their quotas of tool machinery and railway materials, but maintained high quantities of electric materials, agricultural machinery and tractors, general machinery, vehicles, internal combustion engines, crucibles and electrodes of graphite, in order to export them to Spain. Ultimately, the Italians also included quotas of new products such as nylon, fibres and other textile products. As far as the payment agreement was concerned, it was similar to that stipulated in 1949, with only one relevant difference: instead of two accounts (A and B), there was only one with a mutual overdraft equal to \$2 million, double the sum stipulated in 1949. This new account allowed the Spanish authorities, always short of hard currency, to carry out commercial operations debited against it more and more quickly, thus facilitating the development of exchanges. Finally, the agreement regulated the participation of both countries in international trade fairs, where their respective products were exchanged with increasing regularity.

In general, it was a more rational agreement since it recognized the structural limitations of bilateral exchanges. In fact, as had happened with the 1947 and 1949 commercial treaties, it could not be compared with the exchanges which both Spain and Italy had with other countries in the same period (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In spite of its modesty, the new commercial treaty was received with satisfaction by both governments; it was more realistic than previous agreements and better reflected the realities of both economies.⁷⁸ However, the most important aspect of the negotiations was not the treaty itself, but a small additional protocol at the end of the text which dealt with industrial cooperation between the two countries. In reality, it was not an actual agreement but a generic declaration on behalf of the

⁷⁷This reduction was imposed by the Spanish delegation, aware that the Spanish economy was not capable of producing sufficient amounts of these goods in order to export them massively.

⁷⁸The unabridged text of the Commercial Agreement can be found in AMAE: Bundle 5.107, folder 3. The Spanish reaction to the agreement can be found in AMAE: Bundle 5.017, folder 3. Report from the General Director of Economic Affairs to Artajo and Arburua, 28 March 1952. The Italian opinion on the treaty can be found in ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1952, folder 159. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi and Einaudi, 26 March 1952.

Spanish Government committing itself 'to examine with the most positive disposition' all the proposals aimed at the development of bilateral cooperation in the industrial sphere.⁷⁹

The introduction of this additional protocol in the Commercial Treaty constituted a great victory for the Italian Government in general and for Cesare Merzagora in particular. Taking into account the strong reservations which still prevailed inside the Spanish Government to promote industrial cooperation, the additional protocol was a great achievement which had to be mainly attributed to the presence of Cesare Merzagora. However, this was not the only accomplishment reached by the Italian Senator during his Spanish trip. Merzagora also worked successfully to create an important network among the most relevant exponents of the financial and industrial world in Spain. This network would be very important in the development of industrial cooperation between the two countries in later years. Finally, during his conversations with Martín Artajo, he agreed with the Spanish Minister on the following criteria to regulate bilateral relations during the next years:

*a) on the common interest to give a wider Mediterranean Latin and Catholic content to the policies of the two countries which are destined to come to terms and to closely cooperate in the defense of the Western civilization; b) on the Italian need, being a democratic Government, to proceed gradually in the aforementioned direction following the pace of the public opinion and the international circumstances; and c) on the opportunity to prepare the ground in the meantime by activating a collaboration plan in the cultural and economic spheres aimed at the creation of concrete agreements and connections.*⁸⁰

Taking all these elements into account, it is possible to assert that Merzagora's trip had fulfilled the main aspirations of Italian diplomacy by laying the first stone of its main project aimed at regulating Spanish-Italian relations during the following years. Both countries were well aware that in the context of the Cold War it was necessary to cooperate at all levels, stressing concepts like Mediterranean, 'Latinità' and Catholicism. However, the political differences between the two regimes forced the Italian Government to face the process of rapprochement with calm and precaution in order to avoid possible reactions from the left-wing parties and the more progressive elements of the society. In the meantime, both countries had to work intensely in other fields, especially the economic and the cultural, with a view to political

⁷⁹AMAE: Bundle 5.107, folder 3. Commercial and Payments Agreement between Spain and Italy, 26 March 1952.

⁸⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1952, folder 159. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi and Einaudi, 26 March 1952. In this document, Taliani reproduces a conversation between Merzagora and Martín Artajo, which had taken place in his presence.

cooperation which should be developed gradually. The new Commercial Treaty, with the additional protocol, was the cornerstone of this plan, the best proof that Spanish-Italian relations were now in a different phase.

Cooperation in the industrial field

Since Merzagora's visit to Spain, the Italian Embassy in Madrid and the technical authorities in Rome (Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, the Treasury and the DGAE in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) started to work relentlessly in order to seize upon the friendly atmosphere which had been created by the DC Senator, and put industrial cooperation into practice. As a consequence, the Italian authorities worked intensely on the project during the period of autumn–winter 1952. The main objective was to discuss it officially with the Spanish Government on the occasion of the meeting of the Joint Commission which was to take place in January 1953 to revise the recently signed Commercial Treaty.⁸¹ However, the Italian delegation received the anticipated reaction when talks started in Rome. In fact, the Spanish delegation had been instructed to refuse any offers regarding the implementation of large projects of industrial cooperation. In this sense the Spanish refusal was clear: collaboration on a large scale in the industrial sphere was regarded as too premature, especially considering that economic aid from the US was still being negotiated.⁸²

It is evident that the support given by Martín Artajo in this question had proved insufficient. The Minister of Commerce, Manuel Arburua, and the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, clearly opposed to this kind of economic operations, showed their predominance in this area of Spanish policy-making and managed to block the Italian proposal. This constitutes new proof that, in spite of the changes which were taking place in the Spanish administration, the autarchic elements were still very present and exerted considerable influence.⁸³ In spite of the Spanish opposition to start

⁸¹The Italian authorities had persistently demanded a Joint Commission in order to discuss a number of questions regarding the Commercial Agreement of March 1952. On the other hand, the Spanish diplomats believed there was very little room to improve exchanges between the two countries and, therefore, that the meeting was unnecessary. Although there is no archival evidence in this regard, it is not unlikely, given the great interest of the Italians in the matter, that the meeting was mainly demanded in order to put into practice the project of industrial cooperation. AMAE: Bundle 3.242, folder 2. Proposal of instructions to the Spanish Delegation for the conversations which will take place in February 1953 (Joint Commission) written by the Director of Economic Affairs and Head of the Delegation, Alberto Núñez Iglesias, to Arburua, 31 January 1953. The instructions were confirmed by Arburua (handwritten note).

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*Ibid.* and ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from the Italian attaché in Madrid to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1953.

industrial cooperation on a large scale, the Italian officials did not give up on their initial project.⁸⁴ The question of industrial collaboration was left in the hands of Gastone Gambara who had become one of the key figures in Spanish-Italian relations since the end of the Second World War.⁸⁵

A former General of the Italian Army, Gambara had actively participated in the Spanish Civil War by heading a division within the 'Corpo di Troppe Volontarie' which fought next to General Franco. Once the Spanish Civil War was finished, Gambara was appointed Brigadier. He also participated in the Second World War both in the campaigns in North Africa and the Balkans. After the armistice, Gambara remained loyal to Mussolini, a choice which took him to jail once the war was over. He spent a few months in prison, but then he was released thanks to the amnesty issued by Palmiro Togliatti in 1946.⁸⁶ It was at this precise moment when Gambara seized the positive relationship which existed with many of the members of the Francoist regime (including Franco), to become a liaison between Spain and Italy. Already in 1947, Gambara was contacted to negotiate the question of the war debt on behalf of the Italian Government, although in the end, the project was abandoned.⁸⁷ In 1952, Gambara sponsored a triangular operation between the Italian, Spanish and Argentinean Governments to exchange Argentinean wheat for Spanish raw materials.⁸⁸ The success obtained by Gambara in the latter operation convinced both the Spanish and Italian Government that he was a very useful middle-man. As a consequence, he was entrusted with the negotiations to speed up the most important projects of industrial cooperation between the two countries. In particular, he had to unblock the agreement between Finsider ('Società Finanziaria Siderurgica') and Ensidesa ('Empresa Nacional Siderurgica') to exploit the iron deposits in el Conjuero (Huelva). Industrial cooperation in the mining industry was an old aspiration of Italy, and one of the main goals when the general plan was designed.⁸⁹

In the end, the confidence placed in Gambara proved to be a sensible choice for Italian interests. Between May and June 1953, Finsider and

⁸⁴AMAE: Bundle 3.242, folder 2. Letter from the Head of the Italian Delegation, Angelo Corrias, to José Núñez Iglesias, attached to the Spanish-Italian Commercial Protocol signed on 21 February 1953.

⁸⁵More about Gambara and his role in Spanish-Italian relations in Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, 'A Transnational Network: The Contact between Fascist Elements in Spain and Italy, 1945-1968'.

⁸⁶AMAE: Personal File 375, folder 26902. Personal file on Gastone Gambara.

⁸⁷ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit A, Spain, 1947, folder No. 156. Report from the DGAE on the war debt, 14 April 1947.

⁸⁸More details about this operation in ASMAE: DGAE, Deposit C, Spain, 1950, folder No. 55. Letter from Capomazza to Sforza, 22 April 1950. AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folder 11.

⁸⁹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1952, folder 159. Report from the DGAE to the DGAP and Taliiani, 13 August 1952.

Ensidesa reached an agreement to exploit the iron deposits in el Conjuero, in the south of Spain (Granada). According to this, Finsider would buy all the shares of 'Minas de hierro de el Conjuero S.A.' for 10 million pesetas (circa \$326.000). In addition, Ensidesa would provide machinery, the mining facilities worth \$1.2 million – all the machinery had to be exported from Italy – and all the expenses generated by actual exploitation of the mines. One-third of the minerals extracted would cover the repayment of the loans conceded both by Finsider and Ensidesa; another third would be exported to Italy in exchange for Italian iron products; the last third, finally, would be sold in the international market, Finsider having the right of pre-emption.⁹⁰ Apart from the technicalities, the fact that this agreement was reached only three months after the meeting of the Joint Commission where the Spanish authorities had shown their reluctance to cooperate in this particular field, is very indicative of Gambara's influence in Spain.

The Ensidesa–Finsider agreement had a great impact on Spanish-Italian relations. In the first instance, it represented a promising first step towards closer cooperation in the industrial field between Spain and Italy. In fact, it showed that industrial cooperation with the Francoist regime was possible, in spite of all the obstacles, and, therefore, further development could be achieved. Secondly, it was a major economic operation which took place at a very particular moment, right when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was taking its first steps. It should be considered that the establishment of the ECSC had gone almost unnoticed in the Spanish press and had provoked a minimal reaction among Spanish diplomats who were more interested in the political aspects of this plan than in the effects it could have on the economy.⁹¹ In addition, since trade with the ECSC members was maintained bilaterally, the Spanish authorities immediately lost any interest in participating. As Fernando Guirao has argued, 'The Spanish Government [...] reacted to the initiative by not reacting at all.' On the other hand, the Schuman Plan raised little interest for the Spanish iron and steel sectors which were already weak and isolated, producing only to satisfy the small domestic demands.⁹²

The Italian case was different. At the end of the 1940s, the Italian Government had already targeted the modernization of the iron and steel sectors – significantly with the cooperation of Finsider – where the Italian state continued to play a predominant role. In this way, when the Schuman Plan was officially launched on 9 May 1950, the Italian Government

⁹⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from the Italian Embassy in Madrid to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30April 1953, re-sent afterwards to the Ministry of Industry, the DGAP and the DGAE, 28 May 1953.

⁹¹Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción Europea (1951–1962)*, 94–6.

⁹²Guirao, *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955*, 434–77.

adhered immediately.⁹³ From an economic perspective, the Italian coal and steel industry was more solid than the Spanish one but it appeared weak when compared with the German and the French. During this period, Finsider was in favour of opening the markets, applying the logic of free international competition. Moreover, Finsider was making important investments to create new facilities and modernize the existing ones.⁹⁴ It is in this context that the Finsider–Ensidesa agreement should be placed, with the Italian company in the midst of an expansion and modernization process aimed at competing under more equal conditions with Germany and France. It should be clarified, though, that the operation was not as successful as the two companies had foreseen. In fact, the mines were closed in 1974 due to the exhaustion of iron ore. Between 1954 and 1974 almost 3 million tons had been extracted, a low figure compared with the production of the mines at the Ruhr basin.⁹⁵ In spite of these poor results, the Ensidesa–Finsider agreement was very important and contributed to smoothing the path for future industrial agreements.

As a result of the positive feedback received from these first steps, a protocol of industrial cooperation was finally signed in May 1957. This protocol, which was an Italian aspiration since its participation in the Spanish Civil War, envisaged the creation of a Joint Committee, composed of the most important figures of the private industrial sector in both countries and in charge of fostering cooperation between the two countries and improving Spanish-Italian exchanges.⁹⁶ This initiative contributed to make industrial cooperation the most fruitful area of Spanish-Italian relations. By the middle of the 1960s, and despite the political problems resulting from the opening to the left, Italy was the country with more companies and more private capital invested in Spain. In fact, there were around 1,400 Italian companies operating on Spanish soil, and their investments hovered around 800 billion lire (circa \$1.8 billion). In addition, the Italian industries had managed to sign numerous agreements of co-production with Spanish firms, in order to manufacture in Spanish territory commodities, tools and machinery which would be exported afterwards to other markets in Africa and South America (see Table 5.1). The Italian authorities were well aware of the relevance which the Spanish market had for the Italian economy in general and the Italian industries in particular.

Spain has represented over the last 25 years the foreign market in which the Italian economy has found the most favorable and profitable possibilities of

⁹³Antonio Varsori, *La cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione Europea dal 1947 a Oggi* (Soberia Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 77.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 77–88.

⁹⁵Information provided by the El Conjuero city hall.

⁹⁶AMAE: Bundle 6.612, folder 5. Report on the final meeting of the Spanish-Italian Protocol written by the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Italy, 18 May 1957.

Table 5.1 Most important Italian industries and their branches operating in Spain, 1965

Italian companies	Branches operating in Spain
Assicurazioni Generali	Assicurazioni Generali, Spain
Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA)	Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA) Spain
RAS Assicurazioni	Compañía Adriática de Seguros
Finsider	Siderexport Ibérica
FIAT	SEAT
Alfa Romeo	Fadisa
Piaggio	Moto Vespa
Moto Guzzi	Moto Hispania
Innocenti	Lambreta locomociones
Snia	SNIACE
Pirelli	Pirelli Spagnola
Carlo Erba	Carlo Erba Española
Bombridi Parodi Delfino (chemical Company, supplier of aeronautic components)	U.S.E.
A.N.I.C. (Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazione Cobustibili)	Unión Española de Explosivos
Necchi (sewing machines)	Hyspano Olivetti
Olivetti Italia	Hyspano Oliveti
Borletti (sewing machines)	Brescel
Ansaldo	Bazán
Breda (ammunition company)	Talleres Mercier
Marconi G.C.E. (machinery)	Autovox
Ferrania (producer of photographic films, papers, and equipment)	Ferrania España
Microlambda (first radar industry in Italy)	Marconi Española
Campari (drinks company)	Campari España
Martini & Rossi (drinks company)	Martini & Rossi España
Cinzano (drinks company)	Cinzano España

Source: AIS, FGA. c) Spanish-Italian agreements, folder 235/6. Report to Giulio Andreotti Ministry of Defence, on the visit of Laureano López Rodó, Minister of the Development Plan, to Italy, in 1965. Report to Giulio Andreotti on Spanish-Italian relations, 5 May 1964. Report from Mario Pedini, Head of the Foreign Affairs office at the DC, to Giulio Andreotti, no date but after 1964.

*development. In addition, the Italian industrial initiatives have managed to occupy extremely solid and prominent positions in this market, thus confirming the pertinence of this strategy and, at the same time, producing important benefits for the country.*⁹⁷

Secondly, the plants established in Spain had contributed to create new export flows, allowing the country to have a new source of hard currency.

⁹⁷Ibid. Report to Giulio Andreotti on Spanish-Italian relations, 5 May 1964.

Thirdly, Spanish-Italian cooperation in the field had contributed to diversify industrial activities in Spain, thus creating a significant amount of employment. Finally, it had also contributed to the construction of an increasingly large sector of specialized workers who, very often, had started their training in Italian industries.⁹⁸

It is evident that both countries were obtaining important benefits from this cooperation, but they did not limit it to this industrial sphere. In fact, the creation of Spanish industries with Italian capital and technical assistance had helped both countries to intensify the commercial exchanges. This was due to the fact that the Spanish Government controlled many of the new industries and therefore made an effort to include a large part of the Italian machinery in the commercial agreements. In this way, the Spanish authorities were forced to find new products which could be exported to Italy in exchange for said machinery. This new trend was consolidated in 1956 when Spanish exports to Italy doubled, reaching the sum of 9,556 million lire, circa \$16 million.⁹⁹ The same year, Italian exports had risen to 15,495 million lire, circa \$24 million, almost three times more than in 1954. Spanish-Italian trade continued to be very modest compared with the volumes of exchanges in the rest of Europe during the same period, but it is important to remember that it had been very limited since the end of the Second World War (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). In relative terms, the increase in Spanish-Italian commerce was very substantial and it would continue to grow exponentially during the 1950s and 60s (see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).

The Italian elections and the end of the De Gasperi era

Around the middle of 1953 a series of events took place in Italy that had an enormous impact on the country and, subsequently, on Spanish-Italian relations. In June 1953 general elections were held in Italy. The results of this election were a big let down for the Christian Democrats who lost the absolute majority earned in April 1948. As a result of this, the political panorama in Italy changed drastically, inaugurating a period of instability and uncertainty. In spite of the negative results, De Gasperi made a final attempt to form a new government only with the votes of the DC; however, the Christian Democrat leader was clearly defeated in Parliament and was forced to present his resignation. De Gasperi's departure from the Italian political scene marks the end of an era for the country. In fact, the Christian Democrats had governed Italy for the last eight years, assuming a predominant role in the most important choices which the country had had to face

⁹⁸Ibid. Report to Andreotti, on the visit of Laureano López Rodó to Italy, in 1965.

⁹⁹FNFF: Doc. No. 26590. Telegram from Navasquês to Artajo, later transmitted to Franco, 22 February 1956.

Table 5.2 Spanish trade by countries of production
(value in thousands of gold pesetas)

Countries	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Imports							
France	118,441	152,269	188,755	163,700	205,063	155,585	140,251
Germany	50,058	149,765	213,177	121,193	191,648	245,863	218,540
Italy	10,078	36,778	43,164	33,898	45,480	52,492	77,620
United Kingdom	85,032	132,527	189,919	194,843	192,258	214,906	229,086
United States	192,215	264,938	220,038	345,571	350,830	614,523	688,015
Exports							
France	117,640	140,039	115,859	96,307	109,994	89,459	100,052
Germany	70,987	113,755	192,252	157,153	198,488	159,474	200,796
Italy	20,283	26,018	19,254	21,138	27,999	42,577	41,947
United Kingdom	227,471	164,516	231,417	236,598	222,705	204,682	245,689
United States	199,107	144,574	152,729	143,565	137,243	180,805	134,300

Source: AEE.

Table 5.3 Italian trade by countries of production
(value in million lire)

Countries	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Imports							
France	58,511	58,942	75,467	97,534	108,367	100,203	121,425
Germany	99,472	13,5485	178,286	203,679	214,733	247,558	281,161
Spain	3,453	5,643	4,216	3,277	5,758	9,556	8,234
United Kingdom	50,075	83,384	115,882	102,633	90,545	107,163	121,845
United States	284,477	307,529	196,735	186,510	253,094	325,368	465,833
Exports							
France	92,656	56,734	42,209	60,449	67,539	95,912	101,087
Germany	79,740	86,685	103,745	115,159	145,664	179,983	224,706
Spain	2,319	8,604	8,768	6,248	11,896	15,495	20,842
United Kingdom	138,551	71,153	67,640	80,967	84,065	86,621	99,224
United States	70,535	87,135	89,880	80,221	99,585	125,897	143,594

after the war: economic reconstruction, the link with the Western world, the European path, etc.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera Italiana (1943–1963)*, 420–2; Federico Romero, 'La scelta atlantica e americana', in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, 156–8.




Figure 5.1 Evolution of Spain's trade with the major Western countries, 1952–1957
Source: AEE, years from 1953 to 1959.




Figure 5.2 Evolution of Italy's trade with the major Western countries, 1952–1957
Source: ASI, years from 1953 to 1958.

After De Gasperi's attempt, Luigi Einaudi, President of the Republic, entrusted Giuseppe Pella with the formation of a new government. Giuseppe Pella belonged to the moderate sector of the DC and had held important positions in different De Gasperi's Governments (Minister of the Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning). Pella formed a single-party DC Government (although he included a number of independent technicians like Bresciani Turrone who became Minister of Foreign Commerce), with the support of the Monarchic Party, the Republican Party and the Liberal Party, and the abstention of the PSDI and the MSI.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006*; Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia Repubblicana*; Galli, *I partiti politici italiani (1943–2000)*; Ginsborg, *A History*




Figure 5.3 Evolution of Spanish-Italian trade, 1952–1957

Source: ASI, years from 1953 to 1958.

Officially, the appointment of Pella as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (a position that he decided to keep for himself, just like De Gasperi had done during the last two years) did not imply a caesura with De Gasperi's traditional foreign policy. In his first speech as Prime Minister on 19 August, Pella stressed Italian loyalty to the Atlantic Treaty and its adhesion to the European project, the two main pillars which had sustained the actions of De Gasperi in the international sphere. However, Giuseppe Pella adopted a new style and a new approach in dealing with the international problems which affected Italy. This was particularly evident in the case of Trieste. It is important to remember that the question of Trieste was still unsolved and remained one of the most important issues in Italy. Pella was determined to find a definitive solution to this problem by showing a stronger and more resolute attitude towards Yugoslavia and the Western Allies. In his view, by solving the question of Trieste, he would be able to consolidate his new government, consolidation which was not easy especially if one considers that he did not have substantial support from his own party. In the same first speech as Prime Minister, Pella stated that Italy was determined to defend its 'national interests' in clear reference to the problem of Trieste and relations with Yugoslavia. It is evident that the precaution and moderation which had characterized De Gasperi's way of conducting politics were substituted by an attitude more resolute, more radical, but also less reflective and less open to dialogue.¹⁰²

of Contemporary Italy; Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*; Lepre, *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*.

¹⁰²Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera italiana (1943–1963)*; Giuseppe Mammarella, *La politica estera dell'Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 2010); Romano, *Guida alla politica estera italiana*:

The same was true for relations with the Francoist regime. Pella did not introduce new elements in bilateral relations and followed the path which had been designed and partially covered by Alcide De Gasperi. Pella was convinced that a political rapprochement with Spain would greatly benefit Italy; he also believed that this rapprochement had to be done progressively, following different steps (economic, cultural and, finally, political), just like De Gasperi. However, Pella faced bilateral relations in a more resolute way, soon being ready to make significant gestures of friendship towards the Francoist regime. It should be pointed out that the existing literature, even the biographies devoted to Giuseppe Pella, do not deal with the policy adopted by Pella regarding the Francoist regime. Even though the Spanish case was not one of the main concerns in Pella's mind, an analysis of such adds to the understanding of the Italian politician and the changes which he introduced with respect to his predecessor, Alcide De Gasperi.¹⁰³

On the other hand, the Spanish authorities had followed with great attention the elections and the subsequent process of government formation. The amount of editorials, special reports and articles in general which the Spanish press devoted to the Italian elections is noteworthy. The results were received in Spain with considerable surprise and a little bit of concern. In spite of the fact that the Spanish newspapers supported the Monarchic Party and the MSI, there was a general belief that the DC and its coalition would manage to obtain the absolute majority once again. After the elections, the DC failure was not attributed to Alcide De Gasperi, whose image remained extremely positive, but to the party itself, which had moved towards leftist positions in search of political allies, instead of looking towards the right-wing spectre.¹⁰⁴

When Pella formed his government, the Spanish reaction was extremely positive. In general, the Spanish media transmitted the image of an intelligent man who would be capable of showing great determination in the most important issues of Italian foreign policy. The Spanish were also satisfied with the appointment of Paolo Emilio Taviani as Ministry of Defence; it has to be remembered that Taviani was one of the designers of the rapprochement plan and thus considered by the Spanish diplomats as a 'good friend'.¹⁰⁵ However, it was still too soon to measure the impact of these

da Badoglio a Berlusconi (Milano: BUR Saggi, 2006); Varsori, *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra*.

¹⁰³Gabriella Fanello Marucci, *Giuseppe Pella: un liberista cristiano* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007).

¹⁰⁴MNLM: Julián Cortés Cavanillas, 'No importa errar en lo menos si se acierta en lo principal', *ABC*, 11 June 1953. AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Series of telegrams from Sangróniz to Artajo, March–August 1953.

¹⁰⁵AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 July 1953. MNLM: Julián Cortés Cavanillas 'El nuevo Jefe del Gobierno es una figura que puede crecer hasta la altura de los grandes estadistas', *ABC*, 26 August 1953.

changes and the Spanish authorities decided to wait and see what the attitude of the new Italian Government was. After all, there was no particular hurry: as the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vittorio Zoppi, had put it, 'There are no unresolved questions with Spain in these moments'.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the Pella Government decided to show its determination to improve relations with Spain at an early stage. On 22 September 1953, Sangróniz held a meeting with Pella where the latter claimed that it was his intention to strengthen relations with the Francoist regime as soon as possible.¹⁰⁷ Two weeks later, Pella transformed his words into facts and during his speech in front of the Cabinet to revise the Italian foreign policy he made the following reference to Spain:

*The maintenance of good relations with Spain constitutes not only a political requirement but also a spiritual need for the Italian people. Beyond the differences between the two regimes, there are permanent geographical and historical factors and common interests which are so evident that I do not need to explain them here. The recognition of the Spanish role in the general framework of European stability has already been unanimously recognized by all the Western countries.*¹⁰⁸

This official statement made by Pella has enormous relevance in the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations. In reality, this declaration did not differ from the official discourse which the Italian authorities had been constantly repeating to the Spanish authorities since the end of the war. There were even the same references to permanent ties and spiritual links between the two countries, references which were obviously introduced in order to please the Francoist regime. Gallarati Scotti had propagated the same form of discourse when he presented his credentials to Franco back in 1945, just like Giulio Andreotti when he travelled to Madrid in 1949 or De Gasperi when he encountered Martín Artajo in Rome also in 1949. However, these declarations had been done off the record, in private meetings and therefore without public repercussions. This time it was different: Pella was claiming the necessity to improve relations with the Francoist regime in front of the whole country. It was the first time since the end of the war that the head of the Italian Government had done something similar. Actually, it was also a unique moment if compared with France and Britain where these kinds of

¹⁰⁶ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report from Zoppi to Pella, 21 August 1953.

¹⁰⁷ AMAE: Bundle, 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 22 September 1953.

¹⁰⁸ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Telegram from the DGAP to Taliani, 6 October 1953.

actions were still inconceivable. In addition, Pella was not only championing a rapprochement with the Francoist regime, he was also defending the necessity to include Spain in the Western sphere. It is evident that Pella had introduced a new approach to Spanish-Italian relations, more resolute, less precautionous.

Probably, De Gasperi would have never taken this step, concerned with the repercussion that such a declaration might have with the left-wing parties. However, in this case, determination proved to be a fruitful strategy to the Pella Government. In fact, his declaration only provoked mild reactions from the left-wing parties. Among them, on 10 October 1953, *La Voce Repubblicana*, the newspaper linked with the Republican Party, published an article criticizing Pella for his statement on Spain but conceding that the left-wing parties were willing to accept the establishment of economic relations with the Francoist regime. This statement contrasted with the articles published by the same paper in 1946 on the occasion of the signing of the Commercial Treaty, or in 1948 when the possible inclusion of Spain in the ERP was being discussed, and this possibility was severely criticized. It was increasingly evident that the so-called 'Spanish question' did not have the same appeal anymore.¹⁰⁹

The Italian Embassy in Madrid made sure that Pella's words became well known not only among Spanish policy-makers but also among Spanish society as a whole. Accordingly, they were reproduced in almost every newspaper and on every radio station.¹¹⁰ However, in their effort to spread the declaration made by Pella, the Italian authorities underlined that this was not a new strategy: Italy had always maintained a friendly policy towards Spain. It is clear that they did not want the Spanish authorities to believe that they were being opportunistic on the occasion of the agreement recently signed with the United States.

It is important to remember that Spain was still excluded from the Western security system thus becoming what Paola Brundu has defined as 'the missing ring' in the security of Western Europe.¹¹¹ However, the increasing tension in the international arena within the context of the Cold War convinced the US diplomats that the strategic value of Spain was more important than other ideological considerations. The two countries started negotiations in 1952; they concluded with the so-called Pact of Madrid signed on 26 September 1953 which took the form of three separate executive agreements in which the United States pledged to furnish economic

¹⁰⁹BNF: Newspapers library, Randolfo Pacciardi 'La Francia contro Franco. E l'Italia?' and 'Paladini Scornati', *La Voce Repubblicana*, 20 January 1946 and 2 April 1948. AMAE: Bundle 3.050, folder 22. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 7 October 1953.

¹¹⁰ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from Taliani to Pella, 8 September 1953.

¹¹¹Brundu, *L'anello mancante*.

and military aid to Spain. The United States, in turn, was to be permitted to construct and utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory.¹¹² This agreement was received with considerable satisfaction in Italy for several reasons. Initially, the US-Spanish agreements entailed a greater involvement of the United States in the Mediterranean region which had been an Italian objective since the end of the war. In fact, the establishment of US bases in Spain, together with the ones that already existed in Italy and North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya) guaranteed better defence of the Mediterranean area. In the new panorama which was being designed for the Mediterranean region, therefore, the Italian military positions were clearly acquiring more relevance to the detriment of France and Great Britain.¹¹³ Secondly, the Pact of Madrid facilitated a rapprochement between Spain and Italy aimed at the adoption of a common policy in the area, especially towards the Arab countries. Finally, the US-Spanish agreement implied, at least in theory, the concession of substantial aid, both economic and military, to the Francoist regime, circumstances that could be seized by Italian industry to obtain important benefits through investments and exports of military material.¹¹⁴

This raises the question of the French and the British reactions to the signing of the Pact of Madrid. It should be remembered that, when the Truman administration announced its intention to start exploratory talks with Spain in February 1951, their response had been lukewarm, to say the least. However, their position had evolved ever since. Already in November 1951 London and Paris informed the State Department that they viewed with favour a Spanish-American agreement provided that there was no detriment to the assistance being given to the NATO countries.¹¹⁵ A key element in this new attitude, apart from US determination to go ahead with the negotiations even with Paris and London's opposition, was the change of government in Whitehall. On 25 October, the Conservatives had won the elections and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister again. This implied a more flexible policy towards Spain and its inclusion in Western defence.¹¹⁶ This change was immediately noticed by the French Government which did not want to remain isolated in their position on the Spanish question.

¹¹²More about the US-Spanish agreements in Viñas, *En las garras del águila*.

¹¹³Elena Calandri, *Il Mediterraneo e la difesa dell'occidente, 1947-1956: eredità imperiali e logiche di guerra fredda* (Nuoro: Il Maestrale, 1997).

¹¹⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from Taliani to Pella, 21 December 1953. The original report on the impact of the Pact of Madrid in Spanish-Italian relations could not be retrieved. However, it is possible to rebuild the Italian reaction thanks to this letter where the Italian Ambassador reflected upon the whole question.

¹¹⁵AMAEE: Europe 1949-55, Spain, 155. Minutes from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Spain, 14 December 1951. NAUK: FO 371/102017. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 February 1952.

¹¹⁶Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945-1955*.

Moreover, the French authorities had concluded that it was better to give the State Department as much diplomatic backing as possible so that it would impose its views on the role of Spain in the Western defence system vis-à-vis the Pentagon which was more ambitious and wanted a Spain to be more integrated with the West European countries.¹¹⁷

Despite the adoption of a more positive attitude towards the US-Spanish agreements, the British and French Governments were still worried about the possible implications that these agreements could have on the European scenario. In particular, London and Paris were worried that the Eisenhower administration, even more in favour of including the Spanish in the Western defence arrangement than the Truman administration, would raise the question of Spanish membership in NATO once the negotiations were concluded. This was a concern shared by both Britain and France. However, each country had its own particular problems. On the one hand Britain feared that the agreement would be seized by the Francoist regime to strengthen its international position and raise the question of Gibraltar. It should be explained that Gibraltar, a crucial geo-strategic site in the Mediterranean, had been in British hands since 1713. From that moment onwards, the recovery of Gibraltar, which is still a territorial dependent of the UK, became one of the main demands of Spanish foreign policy and also a permanent feature in Anglo-Spanish relations.¹¹⁸

On the other hand, France was worried that the US-Spanish agreements could weaken its position in Morocco vis-à-vis the Americans. According to the French diplomats, it was dangerous that the US military forces could use bases between North Africa and France that the rest of NATO members could not use. That is why the French Government requested that the Spanish authorities include a clause in the agreements which would allow NATO countries the use of those facilities. Despite the French requests, the clause was not added.¹¹⁹ These Anglo-French concerns were transmitted by the British authorities in a meeting held on 4 February with the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. In it, Dulles assured that the State Department was not contemplating Spanish membership in NATO, at least under the present regime. However, these assurances did not convince the French or the British diplomats who continued to follow the negotiations with great attention.¹²⁰

It should be pointed out that both London and Paris had managed to present a unified front regarding Spain to the US Government since 1951.

¹¹⁷AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 155. Minutes from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Spain, 14 December 1951.

¹¹⁸NAUK: FO 371/102017. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 February 1952.

¹¹⁹AMAEF: Europe, 1949–55, Spain, 157. Report on the US-Spanish agreements by the General Direction of Political Affairs, 20 October 1953.

¹²⁰NAUK: FO 371/197676. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 5 February 1953.

As the Foreign Office stated on 11 February, 'We and the French have kept well in step our policy towards Spain. Our unity of purpose is valuable.[...] It is by harmonizing a common front with the French that we stand the best chance of impressing the Americans in their present mood of benevolence towards Franco, with the forces of our reservations.'¹²¹ It is evident that the Anglo-American front towards Spain, active until 1951, had been broken. The British Government was well aware that that split entailed the loss of its hegemonic position, but it still wanted to exercise some influence. In this way, by harmonizing its policy with France, which had managed to recover a primary role in European matters, it was still possible for them to exert some kind of leadership, thanks to their capacity to influence the United States.

In the end, the Eisenhower administration fulfilled its commitments and did not raise the question of Spanish membership in NATO after the Pact of Madrid. This does not mean that joint Anglo-French pressure had managed to change the US position in this regard, even though their demands were not completely irrelevant either. The US Government deemed Spanish participation as premature and, even if it remained a medium-term objective, it was already satisfied with the Pact of Madrid.¹²² In any case, the US-Spanish agreements convinced London and Paris that it was time to revise their policies towards Spain. Even though they still did not want its participation in Western defence, there was still room for improvement in the economic, military and cultural fields. As a result of this, both governments had started a process of rapprochement with the Francoist regime by the end of 1953.¹²³

Taking all these elements into consideration, it is also easy to understand how the diplomats in Palazzo Chigi regarded the situation as propitious to the granting of a further boost to Spanish-Italian relations. In spite of the fact that Pella had adopted a more resolute approach for Italian foreign policy, it is more than probable that the Pact of Madrid played a fundamental role in his decision to make explicit the government's intention to strengthen relations with the Francoist regime. This notwithstanding, the Italian Government tried to downplay the importance of the US-Spanish agreement, emphasizing that Italy had adopted a friendly policy towards the Francoist regime since the end of the Second World War. It was important to convince the Spanish diplomats that Italy was not an opportunistic country in order to obtain the maximum benefit from its diplomatic manoeuvre.¹²⁴

¹²¹NAUK: FO 371/107682. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 11 February 1953.

¹²²Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL): The White House Office: Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), NSC Series, box 10. NSC report. US policy towards Spain, 12 May 1954.

¹²³AMAEF: Europe, 1949–55, Spain, 157. Report on French–Spanish relations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 September 1954. NAUK: FO 371/107682. Proposal for improving Anglo-Spanish relations by the Foreign Office, 8 December 1953.

¹²⁴AMAE: Bundle 3050, folder 82. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 7 October 1953.

However, the Spanish authorities realized immediately that Pella's gesture was not innocent and that behind it there was the Italian ambition of trying to obtain important diplomatic gains after the Pact of Madrid, but it did not really matter.¹²⁵ In the eyes of the Spanish diplomats, the US-Spanish agreements marked the end of international isolation, thus opening a new phase for the country. According to Martín Artajo, it was now possible to adopt a more firm and independent foreign policy aimed at the reinsertion of Spain in the Western sphere. In this regard, strengthening relations with Italy and starting a profitable cooperation in the Mediterranean, an old aspiration, was now becoming more realistic and plausible.¹²⁶

The new impetus which the declarations made by Pella gave to bilateral relations found its best opportunity for success in the Spanish support of the Italian position over the question of Trieste. Although it is true that the Spanish Government had always adopted an anti-Yugoslavian position in the question of Trieste, there is little doubt that this position became even more resolute and more pro-Italian during the last months of 1953.¹²⁷ It was not a coincidence, especially if one takes into account that the defence of the Italian interests in Trieste had become the hobby-horse of the Pella Government. This was not the first time that the Spanish authorities had publicly adopted a pro-Italian position in a clear attempt to improve bilateral relations. In 1946, on the occasion of the negotiations for the Italian Peace Treaty, Minister Artajo had offered the support of the Spanish media 'Concerning the questions which particularly lie at our heart.' The Spanish offer was rejected by the Italian authorities who argued that Spanish support in that matter would be counterproductive.¹²⁸ Having the support of the Francoist regime, so linked to Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, was not the best way to defend a 'fair' Peace Treaty in front of the Allies. Six years later, however, Spanish-Italian relations had changed dramatically, and the Pella Government was more than willing to accept the political support

¹²⁵ AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Amezua to Artajo, 7 October 1953.

¹²⁶ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from Taliani to Artajo, 21 December 1953.

¹²⁷ In a meeting held on 15 October between Minister Artajo and Ambassador Taliani, the former stated the Spanish sympathy for the Italian cause in Trieste and the urgent need to adopt a firm position which could end for good with Tito's threats. ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from Taliani to Pella, 15 October 1953. The Spanish firmness in the Trieste question can also be seen in the press: MNML: 'La pésima política Triestina de Occidente', *La Vanguardia*, 7 November 1953 and 'Tito, el mimado', *ABC*, 20 October 1953.

¹²⁸ DDI: X Series, Vol. IV, Doc. No. 155. Telegram from Gallarati Scotti to De Gasperi, 14 August 1946 and Doc. No. 211. Telegram from Prunas, to Gallarati Scotti, 16 August 1946.

coming from the Francoist regime, at least over the question of Trieste.¹²⁹ The Italian authorities were well aware that Spanish support would not count decisively in the international arena, but, at least, it would have added a resolute anti-Yugoslavian voice in Washington.¹³⁰

The public statement made by Pella and the subsequent position adopted by the Spanish authorities towards the question of Trieste had given a decisive impulse to Spanish-Italian relations, an impulse which went beyond economic or industrial cooperation. On 21 December 1953 Minister Artajo held a meeting with Ambassador Taliani. In it, Artajo discussed the foreign policy that Spain intended to adopt after the signature of the Pact of Madrid with the United States. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spain was bound to play a decisive role in the Mediterranean area, both in the military and political field, seizing the clear decline of Britain and France. In order to do so, Spain aimed at the strengthening of relations with Italy, a primary partner in the defence of the common civilization and religion, but also with Turkey and Greece.¹³¹ There is little doubt that the analysis offered by Artajo during this meeting was excessively optimistic, optimism derived from the euphoria which had invaded the 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' after the signature of the Pact of Madrid. Even with US support and the supposed decline of France and Britain in the region, it was impossible for Spain to play a decisive role in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it was possible to improve relations with Italy and initiate fruitful political cooperation; in fact, the Italian Government had been studying this possibility since 1951, with the delineation of the four-step plan which has already been discussed. When Pella was appointed Prime Minister he resolutely gave stimulus to this plan which now entered in the second phase: military cooperation.

The second step: military cooperation

Of all the steps which the Italian Government had designed in its plan of rapprochement towards the Francoist regime, cooperation in the military field was probably the least problematic. In effect, relations between the armies had been particularly friendly during the Spanish Civil War when the armed forces headed by Franco had fought together with the *Corpo di Truppe Volontarie* (CTV) against the Republic. This military cooperation during the Spanish Civil War was not exempt from tensions and national rivalries, especially in the most complicated moments of the conflict. However, there is little doubt that it created important bonds between the

¹²⁹ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Telegram from Zoppi to Taliani, 21 December 1953. This telegram contained a message to be transmitted to the Spanish Government thanking its support in the question of Trieste.

¹³⁰ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report written by the DGAP on Spanish-Italian relations, 31 July 1953.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* Letter from Taliani to Pella, 21 December 1953.

two armies, bonds which became more apparent during the Second World War.¹³² In reality, the traditional ties of cordiality which had existed between the two armies continued after the parenthesis represented by the signature of the armistice in 1943. The Italian Government had not replaced many of the officials from its army, and as a consequence, there were a number of military men who felt sympathy towards the Francoist regime: they had fought together with the rebel army and they shared some of the authoritarian ideas at the core of the Spanish regime.¹³³

That was the case of Efisio Marras, the Italian Chief of Staff between 1950 and 1955 who had been appointed head of the Italian military mission in Germany in 1940. General Marras was one of the first Italian military men to directly suggest to the Spanish authorities the need to intensify relations in the military field.¹³⁴ Marras was replaced by General Giuseppe Mancinelli, who had occupied important positions inside the Italian army since 1922.¹³⁵ Mancinelli, would become one of the key actors in the Spanish-Italian military rapprochement in 1956 and 1957, a process which culminated with his official visit to Spain in January 1957.¹³⁶ The expressions of this continuity were the periodic visits (at least once a year) of Italian vessels to the Spanish ports where they had always been received with great friendliness and sympathy.¹³⁷

Contacts between the two armies started to become more frequent thereafter and thanks to the normalization of diplomatic relations. In July 1951, the Italian vessel *Vespucci* anchored in the port of Barcelona where it was received with great celebration by the regional authorities and the Mayor of the city, thus becoming a grand event.¹³⁸ Only one month later, the Spanish vessel *Juan Sebastián Elcano*, one of the most important ships in the Spanish navy, made an official visit to the city of Naples where it was enthusiastically received by the Italian authorities.¹³⁹ It was the first time since the end of

¹³²Giuliana di Febo and Renato Moro (eds.), *Fascismo e franchismo relazioni, immagini, rappresentazioni* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2005)..

¹³³Leopoldo Nuti, *L'esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945–1950: la sua ricostruzione e l'assenza militare alleata* (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 1989).

¹³⁴MPJE: Bundle 15. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 3 December 1952.

¹³⁵Biographical references can be found on the webpage of the Italian Ministry of Defence: <http://www.difesa.it/SMD/CaSMD/Capi-SMD/Luigi+Efisio+MARRAS.htm> and <http://www.difesa.it/SMD/CaSMD/Capi-SMD/Giuseppe+MANCINELLI.htm> (accessed on 8 March 2011).

¹³⁶AMAE: Bundle 4.676, folder 15. Visits of Italian military missions to Spain, 1957.

¹³⁷ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report from the DGAP to Zoppi, 10 September 1953.

¹³⁸ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1951, folder 72. Report from the DGAP to Zoppi, 22 August 1951.

¹³⁹AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 28 August 1951.

the war that a Spanish vessel made an official visit to Italy, and the Italian authorities made a serious effort to make a good impression.¹⁴⁰ It was not only a question of courtesy, as the *Elcano* visit had been treated the way the Spanish authorities had treated all the Italian vessels which had visited the Spanish ports since 1945; it was a larger attempt to improve military relations between the two countries. The increased frequency of these visits, together with the periodic exchange of officers to follow training courses, played a fundamental role in bilateral relations by maintaining the contacts between the militaries.

In spite of the relevance of these contacts, the Italian Government regarded them as insufficient, at least in the larger perspective of the rapprochement plan. Moreover, in June 1952 the French and British Governments, with US support, had agreed to withdraw the embargo over military material which had applied to the Francoist regime since 1945. In this secret treaty, the two governments agreed to export 'common-use' and obsolescent military material.¹⁴¹ However, the Pact of Madrid was about to change the *de facto* situation since the Francoist regime would have the economic capacity and the US backing to purchase new material to modernize its army. It should be noted, that all the operations involving military materials with Spain had to be previously agreed with the US Government.¹⁴² Well aware of the Spanish potential, in July 1953, the DGAP suggested granting further impulse to Spanish-Italian relations in the military field by facilitating regular and periodical contacts between the two general staffs.

*Those contacts could greatly facilitate our participation in future industrial combinations, also involving the United States as soon as the Spanish-American agreements come into force. In this way, a larger practical collaboration between the two countries could be achieved, and this would allow us to give the adequate prominence to political relations between Spain and Italy – whenever we consider it is the right time – following the desire expressed by Ambassador Sangróniz the previous year.*¹⁴³

Again, the proposal made by the Italian diplomats was very much related to the Pact of Madrid recently signed between the United States and Spain. As a matter of fact, this agreement, which envisaged the concession of

¹⁴⁰ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1951, folder 72. Report from the DGAP to Zoppi, 22 August 1951.

¹⁴¹NAUK: FO 371/107682. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 May 1953. AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 156. Report from the General Direction of Political Affairs, 12 January 1953.

¹⁴²NAUK: FO 371/107682. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 May 1953.

¹⁴³ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report from the DGAP to Zoppi, 10 September 1953.

substantial US aid to modernize Spanish military forces, was regarded by the Italians as a great opportunity for the national military industry. In essence, the DGAP was proposing a different form of industrial cooperation between the two countries, whereby Italy would provide military material to modernize the Spanish army (obviously the US Government could not be the only supplier of these goods). However, if the Italian authorities wanted to obtain the maximum benefit from this situation, it was necessary to act fast and with determination as there were other countries which were interested in becoming suppliers to the Spanish army. In this regard, the visit of General Hans Speidel to Madrid during the spring of 1953 was particularly relevant. During this trip, the German General had officially expressed the wish of the German Government in Bonn to intensify cooperation in the military field between the two countries.¹⁴⁴ Evidently, this event had provoked deep concern among the Italian authorities, especially in Minister Taviani, who had publicly expressed the need for Italy to act fast on this question.¹⁴⁵ It had also worried the DGAP, which had reacted quickly by submitting this report where it was suggested that the next visit of a Spanish military mission, which had been scheduled for 20 September, should be used to emphasize the potentialities of cooperation in the field.¹⁴⁶

The suggestion of the DGAP was positively received by the Italian Government as it arrived at a very propitious moment: the determination shown by the Pella Government to improve bilateral relations with the Francoist regime, the presence of Paolo Emilio Taviani in the Ministry of Defence (he had been one of the designers of the rapprochement plan itself), together with the positive atmosphere created after Pella's public statement, were all elements which contributed to overcome all the possible problems.

Accordingly, the Spanish military mission, headed by Francisco Fernández Longoria, an Air Force General, was received by the Italian authorities who made a great effort to show the potentialities of their military industry. This warm reception met with satisfaction in the Spanish Embassy in Rome which concluded that the mission 'can be regarded as a huge success since it has managed to reactivate the traditional friendship between the two military forces'.¹⁴⁷ Apart from the mission itself, the Spanish authorities were also extremely pleased with the reaction of the Pella Government faced with the criticism of the left-wing press. On 9 September, the *Avanti* published a harsh article reproaching the government in its attitude towards this mission in general and towards the Francoist regime. The Pella Government reacted very quickly and made clear, through a press release written by

¹⁴⁴Sanz Díaz, *España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949–1966)*, 252–3.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 29 September 1953.

Zoppi, that military relations between the two countries had been maintained since the end of the war and that it was the intention of the government to foster them, especially after the attitude shown by the Spanish Government regarding Trieste.¹⁴⁸

There is little doubt that the success of this mission and the reaction of the government to the *Avanti* article played a fundamental role in the positive reception in Madrid of the Italian project to increase military cooperation between the two countries. However, it has to be clarified that the Spanish Government was already considering the possibility of improving military relations with Italy in 1952. In fact, in October of that year, a new naval attaché was dispatched to Rome; this choice was not a coincidence and it was aimed at the execution of two main objectives: strengthening relations with the Italian Navy, and establishing closer contact with Robert Carney, the US admiral recently appointed commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Europe, who had established his residence in Naples.¹⁴⁹ Although the Spanish mission did not produce any concrete results, it managed to give further impulse to military relations between Spain and Italy. In fact, it became the first serious cooperation between the two armies, thus setting the groundwork for future periodic meetings, just like the DGAP had suggested already in July 1953. The second meeting was then scheduled for the month of April 1954.

By that moment, however, another political crisis had broken out in Italy, this time overthrowing the Pella Government and beginning a new period of uncertainty. As a result, Giuseppe Pella, who had lost the support of his own party, was forced to present his resignation. The task of forming a new government was assigned to Mario Scelba, a Sicilian lawyer who had been Minister of the Interior from 1947 until 1953 earning a reputation as a tough politician and fierce anti-Communist.¹⁵⁰ The most relevant modification in the government was the appointment of Attilio Piccioni as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs although he was replaced a few months later by Gaetano Martino due to a political scandal. Scelba and Martino ended up forming a stable duo who determined the course of Italian foreign policy for almost two years. These changes in the Italian Government did not have a negative impact on bilateral relations.¹⁵¹ Even though Scelba would probably not be as determined as Pella to improve relations with the Francoist

¹⁴⁸Ibid. Telegram from Amezua to Artajo, 11 September 1953 and ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report from the DGAP to Zoppi, 10 September 1953.

¹⁴⁹ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1952, folder 158. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi transmitting a report from the Italian military attaché in Madrid, 15 October 1952.

¹⁵⁰Giuseppe Carlo Marino, *La Repubblica della Forza: Mario Scelba e le passioni del suo tempo* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1995).

¹⁵¹ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1954, folder 313. Letters from Taliani to the Ministry Foreign Affairs, 21 April 1954 and 18 February 1954.

regime, the Spanish authorities were convinced that the Sicilian leader 'is sentimentally sympathetic towards us mainly because of his temperament and Sicilian origins'.¹⁵² A few months later, and to endorse this conviction, Sangróniz wrote to Martín Artajo assuring him that 'Mister Martino's presence at the Ministry marks the moment of maximum cordiality towards Spain in the almost ten years which I have been occupying the position of Ambassador in Rome. That is displayed in all the branches of the Administration [...]'.¹⁵³

Taking all these elements into account, there is little doubt that the formation of the Scelba Government did not produce negative consequences for bilateral relations. Accordingly, the plan to improve relations with Spain by using the military channels remained unaltered, also because Paolo Emilio Taviani, one of the designers of the project, remained as Minister of Defence. In March 1954, the Italian Government decided to appoint in Madrid and Lisbon a new aeronautic attaché, Major Mario Rovere. The objective of this diplomatic manoeuvre was to intensify the Italian military presence in the Iberian Peninsula right after the inclusion of Portugal in NATO and the signature of the Pact of Madrid. The Italian authorities were thus acknowledging the increasing relevance of the Iberian Peninsula in the general strategy of NATO and, at the same time, they were making another friendly gesture towards the Francoist regime. As the head of the Ministry of Defence's Cabinet, General Mario Pezzi, put it: 'It cannot be excluded that existing friendly relations with the Spanish military forces, if conveniently developed, could lead to the purchasing of military material from our industry.'¹⁵⁴

In April 1954, the Italian military mission arrived in Spain just as scheduled. This mission, headed by Aldo Urbani, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stayed in Spain for the 12-day period during which it visited military facilities in Seville, Bilbao and Tetuan. Obviously, the mission was aimed at identifying the most important flaws in the Spanish army, especially in the aeronautic sector.¹⁵⁵ Only three months later, the Director of

¹⁵²AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 10 February 1954. This telegram was sent by the Spanish Ambassadors in order to deny a rumour which had spread in Madrid regarding the new Scelba Government. According to this rumour, Saragat had obtained from Scelba the guarantee that Spanish-Italian relations would remain in a state of cold courtesy. There is no archival documentation to prove this information which was quickly denied by the Spanish Embassy in Rome arguing precisely that Scelba was sympathetic towards the Francoist regime. AMAE: Bundle 3.050, folders 22. Report from the General Direction of Foreign Policy to Artajo, 4 March 1954.

¹⁵³Ibid. Report from Sangróniz to Artajo, 15 December 1954.

¹⁵⁴ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1954, folder 313. Letter from Pezzi to Piccioni and the DGAP, 27 March 1954.

¹⁵⁵Ibid. Letter from Taliani to Piccioni, 25 April 1954.

Finmeccanica, Giuseppe Lojacono, visited Spain establishing contacts not only with the most important representatives of the Spanish industries, but also with General Julián Rubio López, member of the General Staff. As usual, these talks were oriented around the possibilities of modernizing the Spanish army by buying military equipment from Italy with US aid.¹⁵⁶

Such intensification of the military contacts was bound to produce concrete results and the first one arrived in December 1954 when Finmeccanica and 'Empresa Nacional Bazán' signed a preliminary agreement to cooperate in the process of the modernization of 24 vessels from the Spanish fleet. 'Empresa Nacional Bazán' was a state corporation created in 1947 on the INI initiative. It was devoted to the construction of the navy, although by 1954 it was still beginning its process of expansion. Finmeccanica, on the other hand, was a sub-holding of mechanical industries created in 1948 and owned by IRI. During these first years, it held some of the most important industries such as Alfa Romeo, Ansaldo or Aeritalia. It should be noted that Finmeccanica even today remains the second largest industrial group and the largest of the hi-tech industrial groups based in Italy. According to this agreement, Finmeccanica would provide machinery in order to produce anti-aircraft cannon 72/62 (automatic). In addition, the Italian industry would prepare other preliminary projects which, once accepted by all the parties involved (including the US authorities) would be carried out in Bazán's facilities always using Finmeccanica's technical assistance. Finmeccanica would also become Bazán's official advisor when purchasing other components necessary for production. Finally, Finmeccanica could provide other Spanish industries, which made up part of INI, with manufacturing licences and technical assistance so that they could reinvigorate their own levels of production. The whole operation would be paid for with undirected dollars coming from the military aid which the US Government had left at Spanish disposal after the Pact of Madrid.¹⁵⁷

The second result was another preliminary agreement reached in 1954 between the 'Marconi Española S.A.' and 'Microlambda S.A.E.' to produce the radars needed by the Spanish navy, army and the air force. According to this agreement, Microlambda would provide Marconi with machinery and technical assistance to produce the radars already in Spanish territory. In the meantime, the Spanish army would buy the first radars directly from the Microlambda plant in Italy. It should be noted that this operation was also

¹⁵⁶Ibid. Letter from the military attaché in Madrid, Corradino Galletti, to the General Staff and Taliani, 12 August 1954.

¹⁵⁷ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1955, folder 395. Letter from the General Director of Industrial Production, to Martino, DGAE, DGAP, Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Ministry of Defence, 22 March 1955.

sponsored by General Gambara who was still a key actor in Spanish-Italian relations.¹⁵⁸ Finally, the third result was another preliminary agreement between the Spanish Government and several Italian industries to start general works of modernizing the Spanish fleet.¹⁵⁹

It should be noted that all three agreements between the two countries were preliminary. This particular condition was due to the fact that, in order to carry out the three operations, it was necessary to count on the previous consent of the US Government. This consent was not only necessary because the financing of the Spanish fleet would be done with US money, but also because these operations had to be discussed by international organizations (especially by NATO) and it was really convenient to have the support of the most powerful member.¹⁶⁰ In this sense, the first contact between the Italian and US authorities took place during the spring of 1955 and was extremely positive. According to the General Director of Industrial Production, the US officials had received with great interest and satisfaction the agreement between Finmeccanica and Bazán.¹⁶¹ The only problem was the production of the 76/62 cannon which was also produced in the US.¹⁶² In any case, the necessity to start official negotiations in this regard with the US Government slowed the whole process down and by 1957 none of these projects had started. It is noteworthy that the US Government was contributing to rebuilding military relations between two countries which had shared an authoritarian past.

Apart from the concrete agreements signed between the two countries, the intensification of military cooperation between the two armies produced two main beneficial effects for Italy. In the first place, it had created a very positive and friendly atmosphere between the armed forces of both countries, mainly through the personal relationships established by the high-ranking officers. The levels of camaraderie achieved after these meetings went beyond ideological or political differences and echoed the friendship which existed between the two armies before the Second World

¹⁵⁸FNFF: Doc. No. 24710. Report on the operations of industrial cooperation achieved by General Gambara, March 1955.

¹⁵⁹ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1955, folder 395. Letter from Galletti to the General Staff, 8 March 1955.

¹⁶⁰NAUK: FO 371/107682. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 May 1953.

¹⁶¹Ibid. Letter from the General Director of Industrial Production, to Martino, DGAE, DGAP, Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Ministry of Defence, 22 March 1955.

¹⁶²FNFF: Doc. No. 24710. Report to Franco on industrial cooperation between Spain and Italy arranged through General Gambara, March 1955. Although there is no evidence in the Italian archives on the particular role played by Gambara in these agreements, this document found in the Franco Foundation leaves no doubt that the former general had been a key figure. This should not be a surprise if one takes into account that he had already been fundamental in other commercial operations.

War.¹⁶³ From this moment onwards, the military sphere in general will be a fundamental element of Spanish-Italian relations.

Secondly, the Italian authorities had convinced the Spanish Government that the process of the modernization of its army could also be done with Italian aid. In this regard the Italian discourse was very clear: it was preferable to purchase military material from Italy not only because it was a Catholic and Latin country, but also because the international situation had displayed the correlation and interdependence of both Peninsulae.¹⁶⁴ This kind of discourse provoked a bigger effect from the Spanish Government than one may think. In fact, the preliminary agreement reached between Marconi and Microlambda envisaged the purchase of sonars from Italy instead of Great Britain as had been previously agreed.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, the Spanish army could count on the support of yet another Western country in order to speed up its process of modernization.

The third step: the Cultural Treaty

The signature of the Cultural Treaty was an old aspiration of both countries. In fact, it was one of the priorities assigned to Taliani when he was appointed as new ambassador in Madrid in 1951. However, the treaty was not signed until the summer of 1955. It is ironic that Ambassador Taliani, even though he fought really hard to get the agreement signed, could not stamp his signature on the final treaty as he left his position in Madrid during the summer of 1954 under unclear circumstances.¹⁶⁶ Taliani was substituted by Alberto Rossi Longhi, a diplomat with a short career (he had been plenipotentiary minister in Lisbon, ambassador in Teheran and Italian representative in NATO) but with a brilliant future ahead.¹⁶⁷ Pro-European

¹⁶³ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1954, folder 313. Letter from Taliani to Piccioni, 25 April 1954.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1955, folder 395. Report from the military attaché Galletti to the General Staff, 28 February 1955.

¹⁶⁶The withdrawal of Taliani from Madrid remains a controversial issue. There is no archival evidence explaining the reasons to call him back. The only documents related are two articles published in the right-wing paper *Il Nazionale*. In the first one that appeared on 20 April 1952, the author harshly criticized the work carried out by Taliani since 1951 arguing that he had opted for a low profile mission and moved progressively away from the Spanish public life. In the second one, appearing on 24 May 1953, the author, who used the pseudonym 'Italicus', described Taliani as an ambassador-poet only worried about publishing his books, and defined the Italian embassy in Madrid as 'the mausoleum'. It was precisely at that moment when the Spanish Embassy in Rome received information regarding Taliani's possible substitution (AMAE: Bundle 3.154 folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 26 May 1953). Although there are no official documents in this regard, it seems plausible that the Italian Government was not entirely satisfied with the work carried out by Taliani and decided to replace him with a more active person, in this case Rossi Longhi.

¹⁶⁷AMAE: Personal File 403, folder 30.014. Personal file on Alberto Rossi Longhi.

and pro-NATO, Rossi Longhi would only stay in Madrid for four months although this time the reasons for his departure are well known. In November 1954, the Scelba-Martino partnership decided to undertake a huge reorganization of Italian diplomacy. With the only exception of Paris and Moscow, all the remaining Italian embassies changed their ambassadors. The staff from Palazzo Chigi was also subject to important changes. As a result of this general reorganization, Rossi Longhi was appointed as the new General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replacing Giulio del Balzo.¹⁶⁸ Other important changes which affected Spain were the appointment of Zoppi as the new ambassador in London, and Umberto Grazzi as ambassador in Brussels. It is important to remember that both figures, the former from the General Direction of Political Affairs and the latter from the General Direction of Economic Affairs shared a Fascist past and had always maintained a friendly policy towards Spain, defending the necessity to improve relations with the Francoist regime.¹⁶⁹

In general these changes were positively received by the Spanish authorities who were convinced that Gaetano Martino, an energetic figure, was only trying to rejuvenate the Italian diplomacy in order to carry out a more efficient foreign policy.¹⁷⁰ It is true that the Spanish cause had lost two relevant figures in Palazzo Chigi, Grazzi and Zoppi, but at the same time it had won over Rossi Longhi, who had already been ambassador in Madrid and knew the Spanish reality very well, and Massimo Magistrati, the new General Director of Political Affairs (DGAP) who had clearly expressed his desire to improve relations with the Francoist regime.¹⁷¹

It should be pointed out that all the new diplomats who were going to deal with Spanish-Italian affairs also shared a Fascist past. Alberto Rossi Longhi was already working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome when the armistice was signed; he decided to stay loyal to the Kingdom of Italy and feigned health problems to avoid being sent to the North of Italy. The case of Magistrati, a very close collaborator with Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1936 and 1943, was slightly different. Even though he also decided not to adhere to the RSI, his links with Ciano provoked suspicions in the Parri Government which decided to suspend him temporarily in 1945. However, he was immediately allowed to resume his diplomatic career. Finally, Giulio del Balzo was part of the Italian

¹⁶⁸Cacace, *Venti anni di politica estera italiana (1943–1963)*, 457–58, 501 and 508.

¹⁶⁹In 1946 the Spanish Government even proposed to award Count Zoppi with a special award in recognition for his friendly attitude towards Spain. AMAE: Bundle 1.280, folder 1. Telegram from attaché García Comín to Artajo, 22 October 1946.

¹⁷⁰AMAE: Personal File 430, folder 32076. Telegram from Amezua to Artajo, 30 October 1954.

¹⁷¹AMAE: Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 29 November 1954.

delegation in Paris when the armistice was signed. Although he also stayed loyal to the Kingdom of Italy, the Spanish authorities regarded him as a prominent diplomat (he had been Plenipotentiary Minister in Canberra in 1951 and General Director of Political Affairs between 1952 and 1954) and a real Fascist.¹⁷² Taking all these elements into account, it is easy to deduce that these changes did not provoke important modifications in bilateral relations. The new wave of diplomats had the same views and the same interests regarding Spain as their predecessors in their charge, even from the Fascist time. One of these interests was the stipulation of a cultural agreement, an agreement which was about to be signed, four years and three ambassadors later, when Giulio del Balzo arrived in Madrid in January 1955.

The idea of signing a cultural treaty was first proposed by the Italian attaché in Madrid, Capomazza, through a letter sent to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1950. The initiative of the Italian authorities consisted of setting all the cultural activities carried out by both countries within a legal framework. In addition, the Italians proposed finding a formula that could regularize the financial situation of all the charity and cultural institutions present in both territories. Until that moment, cultural relations between the two countries were regulated by the 1867 consular convention, the agreement of literary and artistic property signed in 1880 and the treaty of friendship and conciliation stipulated in 1926. As already explained, Italy had a very important cultural structure in Spain since the early 1920s, and this group of treaties, old and anachronistic, did not suffice to fully develop its potential in the post-war period, especially after the normalization of diplomatic relations and the return of the ambassador to Madrid.¹⁷³

The Spanish Government received the Italian proposal with enthusiasm and started to work on it immediately. First of all, there was the conviction that the big number of cultural and charity institutions present in Italy could benefit from legal regularization. In addition, signing a treaty with a democratic country, even if it was a cultural one, always represented diplomatic success for the regime, which was still looking for sources of international legitimization. The moment was also propitious: if negotiations could be finished as quickly as possible to coincide with the return of the ambassador, it would be a double success for the regime.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷²AMAE: Personal File 430, folder 32076. Personal file on Giulio del Balzo. Biographical data on the Italian diplomats in Varsori, 'Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana'.

¹⁷³ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1956, folder 470. Report on the Spanish-Italian cultural treaty, without date.

¹⁷⁴AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 4 January 1951 and reply from Sangróniz to Artajo, 6 January 1951.

All these considerations augured for a rapid resolution of the cultural question to the extent that, when Taliani finally arrived in Madrid in April 1951, his first public statement was very optimistic. The new ambassador assured that, taking into account the various positive examples of cultural cooperation between the two countries during previous centuries, it would not be hard to sign a cultural agreement.¹⁷⁵ This notwithstanding, Taliani was proved wrong and the cultural agreement would not be signed until the summer of 1955, four years after his arrival in Madrid. The explanation of this delay though, is clear and surprisingly simple: the Spanish College of Bologna. The Spanish College of Bologna was a particular institution which had enjoyed several privileges since the fifteenth century. Among these privileges was the exemption of taxes, not only for the institution itself but also for its income. It should be clarified that the College owned land in the region, land which was producing substantial benefits. Obviously, the Spanish Government was determined to maintain the privileges of this institution central to the cultural diplomacy of the regime. On the other hand, the Italian Government wanted the College of Bologna to pay regular taxes at least according to its incomes.¹⁷⁶ In the end the discussion was only centred on the College of Bologna. None of the other institutions, the 'Istituto Italiano di Cultura', the CSIC in Rome, the School of Archaeology also in Rome, were part of the negotiations. The whole argument revolved exclusively around the College of Bologna and was always hindered by the inflexibility shown by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand and the Italian Treasury on the other hand.¹⁷⁷

The deadlock was finally solved in the spring of 1955 partially thanks to the intervention of Giulio Andreotti who had become Minister of Finance after another political crisis. In April 1955, President Scelba and the General Secretary of the DC, Amintore Fanfani, reached an agreement to support Cesare Merzagora's candidacy for the presidency of the Republic. However, Merzagora was defeated in the final election by Giovanni Gronchi, President of the Italian Congress and head of the Catholic trade unions, who counted among his supporters, the socialists, the communists and the progressive sectors of the DC. Scelba felt betrayed by his own party and presented his resignation. Scelba was substituted by Antonio Segni, a moderate politician, former Minister of Agriculture who counted on the support of DC, PSDI, PLI and PRI. These changes did not alter the essence of bilateral relations. Gronchi had always shown a friendly attitude towards Spain. In addition, Martino remained as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finally, 'New Minister of

¹⁷⁵ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1951, folder 71. Letter from Taliani to Sforza, 7 April 1951.

¹⁷⁶ ASMAE: AP, Spain 1952, folder 158. Letter from Taliani to De Gasperi, 17 April 1952.

¹⁷⁷ ASMAE, AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from the General Direction of Cultural Relations to Taliani and the DGAP, 10 December 1953.

the Treasury, Mister Andreotti, and the Minister without portfolio in charge of the administrative reform, Mister Gonnella, can be regarded as good friends of Spain.¹⁷⁸ The first positive effects of these changes could be seen in the unblocking of the Cultural Treaty. In the end, both governments were forced to give way, at least partially. The Spanish College of Bologna would be finally submitted to taxation by the Italian Government, but under a special regime. This meant that the College of Bologna would be paying taxes but not as much as other cultural institutions present in Italy. It should be noted, that the final agreement was greatly facilitated by the personal influence of Giulio Andreotti.

The treaty was finally signed on 11 August 1955 in a very formal act which took place in Palazzo Chigi in Rome. Relevant figures from both the political and the cultural world witnessed how Sangróniz on the one hand and Rinaldo del Bo, the Undersecretary of State, on the other, stamped their signatures on the document. The ceremony received significant coverage by the Italian media and even the television broadcasted the entire event. Once the act was finished, both del Bo and Sangróniz delivered speeches emphasizing the relevance of the treaty and how it would contribute to strengthen relations between the two countries.¹⁷⁹ The whole organization of the ceremony constituted the best proof that the cultural treaty also had a strong political component.

Its main objective was the intensification of cultural relations between the two governments at all levels through different actions. In the first place, the two governments agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of the pre-existing cultural institutions and schools, and the promotion of each other's languages through chairs, and special courses. In addition, the treaty envisaged the intensification of exchanges for professors and students. There was also an effort to find a legal way to recognize the Spanish qualifications as equivalent to the Italian ones and *vice versa*. The treaty also envisaged an increase in the exchange of scientific publications, journals, books, newspapers, movies and music, between the two countries. Regarding the taxes, the treaty stipulated that all cultural institutions present in both countries and their goods (not their incomes) would be exempt from taxation. Finally, the treaty envisaged the creation of a joint commission, similar to the one which was created after the 1949 commercial treaty, in charge of solving the remaining questions and resolving possible issues that might arise during the application of the agreement. In the end this resolution turned out to be a useful choice because several problems came up during the first months

¹⁷⁸AMAE: Bundle 3.657, folders 13, 14 and 15. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 6 July 1955.

¹⁷⁹AMAE: Bundle 3.656, folders 13–15. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 11 August 1955.

in the implementation of the treaty, problems which delayed its ratification until May 1957.¹⁸⁰

The signing of the treaty was received with great satisfaction and regarded as a great success by both governments. In fact, it established the basis for closer and more fruitful cooperation in the cultural field by intensifying the exchanges of people (both students and professors), the exchanges of material (books, movies, journals, etc.) and the promotion of the languages and the artistic patrimony (schools, special courses, etc.). However, the relevance of the treaty was not limited to the cultural sphere; it also had a strong political impact, which was very much stressed by the authorities in both countries. It cannot be forgotten that, after all, it was another step in the rapprochement project which the Italian Government had designed already in 1951.

Conclusions

By the end of 1955, Spanish-Italian relations had considerably improved, especially in the economic sphere. Both the Italian and the Spanish authorities perceived already in 1951 that the international situation of their respective governments had progressed to the extent of being able to adopt increasingly independent policies with respect to the major powers. In this context, the Spanish and the Italian Governments started to take more ambitious initiatives aimed at a process of rapprochement between the two countries. The Italian Government was more interested in the implementation of projects of industrial cooperation, projects which would contribute to an expansion of the Italian industries in the Spanish market which had already started in the 1920s. In this regard, the Italian Government perceived political cooperation as a middle-term objective. The Spanish case was different. Due to the presence of autarchic elements in the administration, industrial cooperation with Italy was not regarded as a priority, but as a means to a more important end: the development of political relations. Martín Artajo and other diplomats in Palacio de Santa Cruz were convinced that Madrid and Rome had similar interests in the Mediterranean area and, therefore, they could collaborate and become the mediators between the United States and the Arab countries. In spite of the different goals, the two governments worked intensely during this period to improve bilateral relations, showing that their foreign policies in the 1950s were more dynamic than the historiography has traditionally shown.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ AMAE: Bundle 10960, folders 11–12. Spanish-Italian Cultural Treaty, 11 August 1955.

¹⁸¹ Romero and Varsori, 'Introduzione'; Portero, *Franco Aislado*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*.

The process of rapprochement was thoroughly supervised by the major powers which exerted a decisive influence on it. Increasingly preponderant, though, was the role of the United States which even set the agenda for the bilateral relationship. To be sure, this did not mean that Spanish-Italian relations were a top priority for diplomats in Washington; in fact, only occasionally did they pay attention to them or meddle directly. This clearly supports the idea that the US ascent as a hegemonic power in Europe already began in the early 1950s, since it was able to determine the evolution of foreign policies in Madrid and Rome even without directly intervening. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that it was the US decision to reintegrate Spain in the post-war international system and in the Western security formula that paved the way for the first steps in the Spanish-Italian rapprochement. This decision was communicated to the Italians during the visit made by De Gasperi to Washington in 1951. In it, the Truman administration officially communicated the US decision to start exploratory talks to involve the Francoist regime in the Western defence system. In this way, the US Government was not only looking for further support in Europe to enforce its new policy towards the Francoist regime, but were also encouraging the De Gasperi Government to improve relations with Spain.

Two years later, the process of rapprochement received further impulse after the signing of the Pact of Madrid. Thanks to these agreements, Spain was officially rehabilitated and inserted in the Western bloc. Well aware of the political and military implications which this agreement had for Europe and the Mediterranean area, the Italian diplomats rushed to foster cooperation both in the industrial and military fields. Spain was not regarded anymore by Italian diplomats as an uneasy ally, but as a potentially useful partner that could bring important diplomatic benefits. These considerations led to Giuseppe Pella's famous statement in favour of the Francoist regime and Minister Taviani's project to intensify contacts between the two military forces. Probably, none of these gestures and decisions would have taken place without the US official backing of the Francoist regime.

In any case, it is important to consider that the United States was never opposed to a possible rapprochement between Madrid and Rome. As a matter of fact, it was consistent with the new foreign policy adopted by the Eisenhower administration. Included in what has been labelled as the 'New Look', this new policy stressed the importance of collective security; the fundamental idea was to delineate a reasonable and respectable defensive strategy without bankrupting the country's economy. Consequently, it was increasingly important to rely on the Western allies and foster cooperation between them. In this sense, it was crucial for the Eisenhower administration that Western Europe assumed the primary responsibility for its defence, which would allow the US to withdraw large numbers of troops from European soil and send them to other 'hot areas'. Another major change introduced during this period, has to do with the strategic value of

the Mediterranean area.¹⁸² If Truman regarded the Mediterranean as part of the periphery, in Eisenhower's strategy this became a region of vital interest to strengthen US military power, both naval and aerial. Taking all these elements into consideration, it is easy to understand why the diplomats in Washington did not oppose the Spanish-Italian rapprochement; it coincided almost completely with the US objectives for Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

The rising role of the United States as a hegemonic power in Europe did not mean that Britain and France were completely out of the picture. It is true that their influence in Spanish-Italian affairs had considerably diminished, but they still followed the rapprochement process with great attention. If they decided not to meddle in Spanish-Italian affairs it was mainly because they regarded that improvement in relations between Madrid and Rome as a positive development. This was particularly clear in the British case; in fact, London's priority was to strengthen its dominant position in the Mediterranean region, especially the Eastern part, which was seen as a fundamental link between the mother country and the dominions. In order to do so, it was crucial to contain the Soviet expansionism in the region which was seen as the primary threat for British interests. Accordingly, London did not have major problems with Spain and Italy (two anti-communist countries) improving their relations in the economic, cultural or even military fields.¹⁸³ A very different question was the rapprochement in the political sphere; as it will be shown in the next chapter, this was seen in Whitehall as a more problematic outcome, forcing it to intervene.

¹⁸²Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961*.

¹⁸³Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); David Dilks (ed.), *Retreat from Power*, Vol. 2 (London, Macmillan, 1981); Kent, *Britain's Imperial Strategy*; Northedge, *Descent from Power*; David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century* (London: Longman, 1991).

6

The Limits of Rapprochement: In Search of Political Cooperation, 1955–1957

On 5 May 1964, Giulio Andreotti, at that time the Minister of Defence, received an extensive report discussing the status and evolution of Spanish-Italian relations. According to this report, the relationship between Madrid and Rome had progressively deteriorated during the previous years to the extent that it had come dangerously close to the verge of a complete rupture. As a result of this, Italy's predominant position in the Spanish market was seriously jeopardized. As a matter of fact, the report warned, for the first time Spanish authorities were weighing the possibilities of ending all forms of industrial cooperation between the two countries.¹ Similar conclusions were reached this time by Mario Pedini, Head of the Foreign Affairs office at the DC, who wrote another report also addressed to Giulio Andreotti asking him to intervene in order to improve relations between Madrid and Rome.²

It was predictable that the Italian diplomats resorted to Giulio Andreotti whenever there were problems involving the Francoist regime. In fact the DC politician had become the crucial figure in the bilateral relationship since 1949. More important, however, is the analysis of the tone and content of the two reports. They show very clearly that the rapprochement started in 1951 and which had reached its peak in 1955 with the signing of the Cultural Treaty, had abruptly come to an end in less than ten years. The aim of this chapter will thus be to analyse the reasons behind the failure of a plan which was regarded by both governments in 1955 as promising and full of potential. In order to do so, the following pages will analyse the limitations faced by the rapprochement plan, mainly in the political sphere. In fact, it will be here defended that the inability to find areas and arenas

¹AIS, FGA. c) Spanish-Italian agreements, folder 235/6. Report to Andreotti on Spanish-Italian relations, 5 May 1964.

²Ibid. Report from Mario Pedini, Head of the Foreign Affairs office at the DC, to Andreotti, no date but not before 1964.

whereby to implement elements of political cooperation put an end to the Spanish-Italian strategy to improve relations and marked the beginning of their progressive deterioration.

Furthermore, the role played by the major powers will also be analysed. In fact, the inability to find arenas in which to cooperate was mainly due to the refusal of the United States, France and Britain to include the Francoist regime in the major multilateral organizations of the post-war period. If the Pact of Madrid had fostered the Spanish-Italian rapprochement, the US refusal, supported by London and Paris, to include the Francoist regime in NATO emphasized its limitations and started its decline. This analysis will allow for a better understanding of the actual room for manoeuvre which both the Italian and the Spanish Government had during this period. It will also shed light on the Anglo-French decline in the Mediterranean area, especially after the Suez crisis, and the ascent of the US as the new hegemonic power.

The impossible political partnership

‘Relaciones a media caldera’: Spain takes the initiative

Important advances had taken place in different areas of Spanish-Italian relations (especially in the economic sphere) since Merzagora’s visit to Madrid in 1952. However, and in spite of the continuous assurances made by the Italian authorities, by 1955 no serious advances had been made in the political field. In this sense, the only form of cooperation which existed between the two countries was the mutual support to enter international organizations. Of course, this support was very important in bilateral relations and it had produced positive results on several occasions (UNESCO and ICAO). However, this mutual support had begun in 1946 and had continued right up until this point. In this sense it was not part of the Italian plan to improve relations with the Francoist regime and it was definitely not what the Spanish Government was expecting. In May 1955, Martín Artajo decided to take the initiative and declared to the Italian journalists: ‘Our relations with Italy lack business in common. They are good but very few. ¡We are working at medium power (= ‘media caldera’)!’³

This public statement reflected very well the general thoughts of the Spanish diplomats at that time. Bilateral relations were good but they could and they should be further improved, hopefully by considering new issues in common, questions like the political collaboration in the Mediterranean area. According to the officials in Palacio de Santa Cruz, the moment was more propitious than ever. In the first instance, the agreements reached in the other areas had contributed to create an atmosphere of great cordiality.

³AMAE: Bundle 3.657, folders 13–15. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 3 May 1955.

Secondly, the diplomatic duo of Scelba and Martino was perceived in Madrid as extremely pro-Spanish, and was willing to make important gestures to improve bilateral relations.⁴ Finally, the arrival of the Scelba-Martino duo coincided with a very peculiar moment for Italian foreign policy. On 5 October 1954 the memorandum that resolved the problem of Trieste was finally signed. 18 days later, the Western European Union was considering putting an end to the EDC project. In this way, the two questions which had attracted most of the attention of Italian diplomacy were now solved. As Sergio Romano has argued in his book *Guida alla Politica Estera Italiana*, the Italian diplomatic agenda had not been so free since the end of the war. The fundamental decisions (Marshall Plan, NATO, ECSC and WEU) had already been made, the colonies had been lost and the question of Trieste had been momentarily settled.⁵ If Italy was freer to carry out an independent foreign policy, without the burdens of the past, maybe this could bring about an intensification of the political cooperation with Spain.

On the other hand, the situation was also propitious for the Spanish Government. With the signature of the Pact of Madrid and the Concordat with the Vatican, both in 1953, the Francoist regime had gained a small patina of respectability. Like Italy, the Spanish diplomats perceived that they had more autonomy to carry out a more independent policy with respect to the major powers and Artajo thought he finally was in a position to work on his Mediterranean policy. In fact, the Spanish Minister had already expressed his plans to Taliani in a meeting held in December 1953. Considering the weakening of the British and the French positions in the Mediterranean area, Spain was willing to assume a more important role. In order to do so, Artajo intended to strengthen relations with Italy, Turkey and Greece and, of course, the United States.⁶ In 1946 Artajo's main goals stated explicitly in the instructions sent to Sangróniz, were the creation of an alliance with London and Rome which could prevent Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. Nine years later, Britain was not even mentioned in Artajo's plans. It was becoming clear that it had been substituted in the Spanish perceptions by the United States as Europe's new hegemonic power. This does not mean that Britain was not able to exercise any influence over Spanish-Italian affairs. It was thanks to the new common front established with France, which allowed the two countries to strengthen their positions in the area. In any case, Artajo's conversation with Taliani was just a mere declaration of intentions; the real approach arrived three years later when the Spanish Government prepared a project for a Mediterranean Pact.

⁴AMAE: Bundle 3.050, folder 23. Report from Sangróniz to Artajo, 15 December 1954 and Bundle 3.154, folders 11–12. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 3 March 1954.

⁵Romano, *Guida alla politica estera italiana*, 97–8.

⁶ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Letter from Taliani to Pella, 23 December 1953.

The Mediterranean Pact

As it has already been explained, the possibility of a Mediterranean Pact was discussed by several countries for more than two years, from 1949 to 1952, but in the end it was decided to abandon the project, especially when Greece and Turkey finally agreed to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952.⁷ In spite of its initial failure, the idea of a Mediterranean Pact had a considerable impact on Minister Artajo who regarded the project as a great alternative to link Spain to the Western security system. Already in 1952, during his trip to the Arab countries, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had touched upon the question, making it clear that Spain would be willing to take part in such pact if it was organized.⁸ The Spanish initiative did not go any further, as it was understood in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' that the circumstances were not propitious: without the support of Greece and Turkey, which had just joined NATO, neither Spain nor the Arab countries had the international weight to drive that sort of project.

Martín Artajo again proposed the idea of a Mediterranean Pact at the beginning of 1956 as a way of responding to the changes which were taking place in the international system. First, it was a response to the loss of Morocco. It is important to remember that Spain and France had been forced to give independence to the North African country in April 1956.⁹ Secondly, it was a response to a general perception that the international position of Spain had improved in recent years thanks to the conclusion of the Pact of Madrid, the signature of the Concordat with the Vatican and the inclusion in the United Nations. According to the Spanish diplomats these events were legitimizing the regime which was now entitled to carry out a more independent foreign policy. Finally, it was a response to the general perception that the situation was in a clearly transitional phase opening the possibilities for new approaches to the region. The decolonization of North Africa, the failure of both the Balkans and the Baghdad Pacts, the weakening of the British and French position in the area, together with the intensification of a number of conflicts (the Israeli-Palestinian, the Anglo-Greek position towards Turkey, the Anglo-Egyptian conflict surrounding the Suez Canal) were all elements which contributed to the belief that a new period was starting. It was the end of the so-called 'British Empire' in the Mediterranean and the beginning of a pluralist and dynamic stage which created a large margin of political action and diplomatic initiative.¹⁰

⁷FRUS: Vol. III (Part 1). Working paper prepared in the State Department for the Washington Foreign Ministers meetings, 28 August 1951, 568–72.

⁸AMAE: Bundle 5.123, folder 23, Report on the Mediterranean Pact, without date but not before January 1958.

⁹Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975)*, 223–50.

¹⁰AMAE: Bundle 4.473, folder 6. Report on the Mediterranean Pact written by the Secretary of the Embassy, Manuel Fraga, to Artajo, 3 May 1956.

It is in this context that Martín Artajo instructed Manuel Fraga, at that moment only a young diplomat with a brilliant career ahead, to write a report on the Mediterranean Pact. This report had to be based on the considerations expressed during a previous meeting held between Ambassador Sangróniz, Fraga and Artajo himself. The report delivered by Fraga on 3 March 1956 constitutes one of the most relevant documents in understanding Spanish foreign policy in the 1950s. It included a general study of the problems in the Mediterranean area, a project of agreement which would set the basis for future negotiations with all countries interested in the idea, and a proposal of instructions to send to the embassies of the different countries potentially involved in the project. The Spanish idea was to convene a high profile conference between the main Mediterranean powers in order to discuss the most important issues which were taking place in the political, economic and cultural fields in the Mediterranean area. It would be during this conference that Spain and Italy would assume the initiative and propose the formation of a permanent organ, an 'Organization of Mediterranean States'. The main objectives of the organization would be, initially, to maintain the general peace in the Mediterranean area. Second, the defence of common interests and, more particularly, the territorial rights of the member states. Third, the adoption of a joint action in case another country undertook an aggressive policy against one of the members. Fourth, the establishment of a system of permanent political consultation, and another one of informative, economic and cultural cooperation. Fifth, the settlement of a non-discrimination regime for persons and goods between the member states aiming at the equality of rights between their citizens. Sixth, the promotion of the intellectual and cultural cooperation between the participant countries, thus strengthening the moral and spiritual links between them. And finally, putting the moral and spiritual values of the member states, together with all their resources, at the disposal of international relations, as a means to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations.¹¹

This organization would be formed by the following countries: France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. The incorporation of Portugal, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was contemplated as well. In a second stage the organization could also include Britain and the United States. Yugoslavia, Albania and Israel would be deliberately excluded from the Spanish plan.¹² The magnitude and the relevance of the project would deserve a more in-depth analysis but the limits of the present project only allow a quick comment on its most important aspects. First, it was the first time and probably also the last, that the Francoist regime would take the initiative to launch a large-scale project which would involve a lot

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

of countries. This consideration is even more shocking if it is noted that, in spite of the Pact of Madrid and the inclusion in the UN, the regime was still in an abnormal situation inside the international system. Secondly, it has to be pointed out that the military aspects were not paramount in the Spanish project. Contrary to what happened to the Turko-Greek plan in 1949, which had been designed as a substitute or a branch of NATO, the Spanish organization was much wider, dealing with economic, social and cultural aspects. Thirdly, the Spanish Government took as a starting point the assumption that the Baghdad Pact and the Atlantic Treaty had failed to secure the Mediterranean area. As a result of this, the creation of a new organization was deemed as essential to maintain the peace and prevent the Soviet expansion into the region. Fourthly, the pre-existing international engagements and the organizations which shared the same objectives with the Mediterranean project, like NATO or the Arab League, were not considered as incompatible for participation in the new organization of Mediterranean states.¹³

Finally, and also more importantly for this research, Italy was a key actor in the future organization to the extent that it was supposed to give a definitive nod to the Spanish initiative. It was not only that Italy and Spain had similar interests in the area. According to the Spanish authorities, Italy, after the signature of the Peace Treaty and the loss of its colonies, was eager to improve its international situation, especially in the Mediterranean area. This urge to regain part of the political prestige lost after the Second World War, Fraga argued, was felt by the Italian Government now more than ever, and this made Italy the perfect ally with which to launch such a project. As Fraga put it, 'In this situation there are two countries which have at their disposal *extraordinary possibilities* of action, as long as they *harmonize their policies*. These two countries are Spain and Italy. Our interests are obvious and our *effective strength* in the Western Mediterranean is indisputable, since we dominate its accesses [...].'¹⁴ This is why Fraga suggested establishing preliminary contacts with the Italian Government to try to convince it of the advisability of supporting the Spanish Project (rather than following the French lead). Spain would even be willing to cede the whole initiative and the venue of the Conference.¹⁵ The Spanish diplomats were well aware that, in spite of the improvement in its international situation, the Francoist regime was not yet able to take a public initiative and lead the formation of an international organization. However, with US support and Italian collaboration, they were convinced that the regime could play an important role, especially by mediating with the Arab countries.¹⁶

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid. Project of order to the Spanish Ambassador in Rome.

¹⁶AMAE: Bundle 4.460, folder 11. Letter from Navasqués to Artajo, 17 May 1956.

This project has also to be situated in the wider context of Spanish-Italian relations; it is evident that the friendly atmosphere created after the Italian plan of rapprochement played a decisive role in the Spanish decision to look for Italian support. Although the Spanish Government launched the idea of a Mediterranean Pact for a number of reasons, it was also seen as the perfect arena in which to garner the desired political cooperation with Italy. The first contacts with the Italian Government were established at the beginning of 1956, coinciding with the arrival of the new Spanish Ambassador to Rome. José Antonio Sangróniz, after more than ten years in the position, had decided to put an end to his diplomatic career and return to Spain. During this period, Sangróniz had become a fundamentally important figure in Spanish-Italian relations, building key networks and actively participating in all the important operations between the two countries. Sangróniz was replaced by Emilio Navasqués, a diplomat with experience in the field as he had already been ambassador in Argentina and General Director of Economic Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ Right after his arrival in Rome and following instructions by Artajo, Navasqués gave an interview to *Il Giornale d'Italia*, where he discussed the Mediterranean Pact. In it, the Spanish Ambassador argued that such a pact would be extremely beneficial for all Mediterranean countries and added, 'Taking into consideration that Italy is the Mediterranean country par excellence, and the sympathy and the commonalities of all kinds which bind it with Spain, this project becomes even more interesting for us.[...]'.¹⁸ The relevance of the interlocutor, together with the clarity of the message, attracted the attention of the Italian Government which started to study the question.

It was not the first time that the Spanish authorities suggested the advisability of cooperation in that particular area. Sangróniz had argued for it several times, in 1953 and in 1954, and it had received a positive reception in the DGAP.¹⁹ The Italian Government, especially during the Pella and the Scelba periods, was not against it either, but all the projects had been paralysed due to considerations related with internal politics and the attitude of the major powers. As a result of this, the Italian authorities had opted to stick to the initial plan of rapprochement which was more progressive and had already yielded important results.²⁰ This time the reception of the Mediterranean project was not very different. The Italians acknowledged that the idea was extremely interesting and that it was necessary to

¹⁷ AMAE: Personal File 342, folder 24219. Personal file on Emilio Navasqués.

¹⁸ BNF: newspapers library, Interview by Leo Negrelli to Emilio Navasqués in *Il Giornale d'Italia*, 22 February 1956.

¹⁹ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1953, folder 246. Report by the DGAP on Spanish-Italian relations, 31 July 1953 and ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1954, folder 313. Instructions from the DGAP to Martino to prepare the meeting with Sangróniz, 7 October 1954.

²⁰ Ibid.

follow future developments in this regard. At the same time, however, they believed that it was too soon to discuss in depth a Mediterranean Pact and that Spain was not the right country to present the initiative.²¹ As a consequence, the Italian Government decided not to react to Navasqués' statement and waited for further developments.

On 6 August, Giuseppe Mancinelli, Italian Chief of Staff, met with the Spanish naval attaché in Rome and they again discussed political cooperation. During this conversation the Italian General claimed that it was necessary to improve bilateral relations and made a reference to the Mediterranean Pact. According to Mancinelli, there were too many political prejudices in the Italian Government and it was necessary to start dealing with the project through military channels. Finally, Mancinelli suggested arranging a meeting between the two general staffs. This conversation proves two main things: first, that military cooperation was producing important results also by creating a network of contacts and personal relations; and secondly, that the Italian Government wanted to take political cooperation slowly and leave it to the channels established by the original plan of rapprochement.²² The Italian reaction was received in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz' with disappointment, mainly because that was not the approach which Artajo wanted to follow. Although a meeting between the two general staffs was more than welcome, especially if it counted with the figure of Mancinelli, it was necessary to avoid the Mediterranean Pact to be born with a military character. A military pact would only scare away that group of Arab countries which were equally opposed to NATO and the Baghdad Pact.²³

The cold reception given by the Italian Government to the Mediterranean project and the substitution of Martín Artajo by Fernando María Castiella as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs one year later, caused the Spanish authorities to abandon the adoption of a possible initiative in this regard. This did not mean that Spain had lost interest in the project. Castiella was also eager to participate in an organization of Mediterranean countries, but he believed Spain could not take a similar initiative. This did not entail the end of the project either; the idea of a Mediterranean Pact was very well received in the Arab countries, especially in Morocco and Tunisia and they discussed it with the Eisenhower administration which saw it as a suitable opportunity to participate in Western defence without participating in NATO. It also attracted the attention of the French, the British and the US Governments which regarded the project as an interesting alternative to

²¹ ASMAE: AP, Spain, 1956, folder 469. Letter from Magistrati to Del Balzo, 17 March 1956.

²² AMAE: Bundle 4.207, folders 43 and 44. Telegram from Navasqués to Artajo, 8 June 1956.

²³ Ibid. Telegram from Artajo to Navasqués, 11 June 1956.

maintain and extend their influence in the north of Africa in the context of decolonization.²⁴

Once again, the discussion and the debates which took place among the major powers in this regard between 1957 and 1960 would deserve a more detailed analysis, also because it has been completely neglected by the historiography, but this discussion will not be possible here.²⁵ It should be added, though, that the Italian response was a disappointment for the Spanish aspirations which were still aimed at further political cooperation. This issue was also very present in the discussions which took place around the same time about the possible participation of the Francoist regime in the Atlantic Treaty.

'A gentleman's club?' Spain, Italy and NATO²⁶

Spain had already been excluded from the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 due to political reasons. However, at the beginning of the 1950s the US Government started to reconsider the question, increasingly convinced that Spain was an essential element in the defence of Western Europe. As a result of this, the Truman Administration began negotiations in order to link the Francoist regime to the Western system through a bilateral agreement with the United States. The outcome of these negotiations was the Pact of Madrid which has already been discussed. In spite of the relevance of this agreement for the defence of Western Europe, the possible inclusion of Spain in NATO was still on the US agenda. During the 201st meeting of the NSC held in June 1954, the issue was discussed again and the US President recommended that the ultimate objective of Spanish membership in NATO to be postponed since it was highly improbable that it would be achieved in the foreseeable future. According to Eisenhower, there was no use in discussing Spanish membership in NATO when taking into account the hostile attitude of many of the other NATO members, especially the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries.²⁷ It should be clarified that Italy was not one of these countries; although the position of the Italian Government was not monolithic, as has

²⁴NAUK: FO 371/124143. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 22 February 1956. AMAE: R. 5.123, Exp. 23. Report on the Mediterranean Pact by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NARA: General records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain 1953–62, Box 4. Mediterranean Pact.

²⁵The only exception to this gap in the literature can be found in Elly Hermon, 'A propos du plan Félix Gaillard de pacte méditerranéen', in *Revue d'Histoire diplomatique*, April 1995, 3–28. However, this text only deals with the French proposal and leaves out the role of other countries key in the evolution of the project, such as Spain, Italy, Morocco or Tunisia.

²⁶NAUK: FO 371/117873. Minutes from John C.W. Bushell, Assistant Head, Western Organisations Department, 13 July 1955.

²⁷DDEL: Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5, 201st meeting of the NSC, discussion on the US policy about Spain, 1 June 1954.

already been shown, in general it is possible to assert that it was not against the inclusion of Spain in NATO.

The question of Spanish inclusion in NATO was thus set aside from the agenda in the belief that it was premature to discuss it. However, it was raised again in June 1955 when the US Senate passed a motion urging the State Department to favour Spanish membership in NATO.²⁸ Although this resolution had no binding force, it obliged the Eisenhower administration to reopen the debate. In addition, the Operations Coordinating Board issued a progress report on Spain in May 1955 arguing that the US Government should make Spanish membership in NATO one of the clear objectives of its policy. This report was discussed at the 247th meeting of the NSC held on 5 May 1955. In it, Eisenhower again expressed his scepticism regarding the advisability of putting the Spanish membership in NATO as a concrete objective of the US. This decision would only put more pressure on the administration, in a very adverse context taking into account the hostility of other members, especially Britain and France. The outcome of this discussion was the reaffirmation that 'the primary interest of the United States with respect to Spain lies in the improvement of relations between Spain and the NAT [*sic*] nations in order to tie Spain as closely as possible to Western plans for regional defense and to obtain Spanish participation in NATO at an appropriate time'. In addition, the Secretary of State was authorized to explore the problem of a propitious time for obtaining Spanish membership in NATO. Obviously, these events were well received by the Spanish Government. If there had previously been doubts about the Spanish interest in joining NATO in the period 1949–50, there were none now. Spain was really interested in becoming a member of this organization.²⁹

During the spring of 1956 the NATO members agreed to discuss the extension of Article 2, which held the promise of more than a military alliance, extending its activities to other areas like economy and culture, an idea which also loomed large in the early days of the organization.³⁰ On 23 April, Secretary Dulles commented on this new approach of the organization adding that the cooperation of Spain in orienting NATO in these new directions would be very much appreciated. Artajo took note of this public statement

²⁸NARA: Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Western European Affairs, Spain 1953–62, Box 4, Letter from Dulles to Senator Walter George, 21 June 1955.

²⁹DDEL: DDE papers 1951–62. Ann Whitman File, NSC series, Box 6, 247th meeting of the NSC, 5 May 1955.

³⁰Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

and instructed Ambassador Navasqués to secure Italian support in the next meeting in Paris where these questions were to be discussed.³¹

It should be clarified that Italy was the country which had raised the initiative and therefore Spain was counting on its continued support. Italy reacted to this proposal with great caution: it would not give particular instructions to its representatives in Paris, but they would follow the discussions in the conviction that they would favour Spain as it carried additional weight with the US support. This was a way of saying: Italy will not take any initiative in this matter but if a positive resolution is found during the discussion, the representatives will support it.³² As a result of the NATO meeting in Paris, the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation was created, which came to be known as 'Committee of Three' or the 'Three Wise Men'. This committee was instructed to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. It was formed by Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada, Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway and, more importantly for this research, by Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy. The first meetings took place in June and by the beginning of July the three politicians had already produced a memorandum which also concerned the possible participation of non-NATO members. This memorandum was immediately transmitted to the Spanish Government.³³

A couple of days later Martino even contacted Artajo to invite him to a meeting in Switzerland where the Italian Minister was supposed to meet Max Petipierre, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and discuss the possible participation of Spain in this plan.³⁴ Artajo refused the offer arguing that if Martino was not willing to visit Madrid, then he refused to travel to Switzerland.³⁵ The Spanish Minister was again prisoner of the so-called policy of dignity, a policy which had been applied when Spanish participation in the most important international organizations was being discussed by the major powers. It had happened with the Marshall Plan in 1947, and the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and now in 1957. Spain would never openly ask for its inclusion in any international organization, it should always be invited by others. This was the last time that the two countries discussed the possibility of Spain participating in NATO through cultural or economic channels. However, the full participation of Spain in the organization continued to be taken into consideration.

³¹AMAE: Bundle 4.460, folders 7-14. Telegram from Artajo to Navasqués, 25 April 1956.

³²Ibid. Telegram from Navasqués to Artajo, 2 May 1956.

³³Ibid. Telegram from Navasqués to Artajo, 11 July 1956.

³⁴Ibid. Telegram from Navasqués to Artajo, 20 July 1956.

³⁵Ibid. Telegram from Artajo to Navasqués, 23 July 1956.

At the beginning of 1957 the discussions in the Western countries regarding the possible participation of the Francoist regime in NATO were considerably intensified. On 20 March the US House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution urging the State Department to continue using its 'good offices' in an attempt to include Spain in NATO.³⁶ Again, this resolution had no binding force but it reopened the question. Two weeks later, the First Secretary of the US Embassy held a meeting with the Deputy Director of General Affairs, Carlo Alberto Straneo, and the Chief of the Office of NATO Affairs, Paolo Pansa. In it, the Italian officials made a proposal: in principle, Italy would like to see Spain joining NATO in spite of the strong opposition from France, Norway, Denmark and Belgium. Taking into account that situation, and if the US Government was really interested in the Spanish membership in NATO, Italy would be willing to mediate in an attempt to persuade the other countries. It is evident that the diplomats at Palazzo Chigi, convinced that the inclusion of Spain in NATO was imminent after the motion passed by the US House of Representatives, wanted to obtain political benefits. Moreover, this manoeuvre would not only bring benefits with the Francoist regime, supporting its participation in the alliance, but, even more importantly, with the United States by representing themselves as a loyal ally always willing to cooperate.³⁷

It is evident that the Italian Government perceived an improvement in its international situation and, therefore, more room for manoeuvre to carry out increasingly ambitious policies, like mediating between the US and NATO members. The question that arises here is whether this self-perception was realistic or not in that particular context. If the US Government was looking for a mediator to persuade some of the NATO members to include Spain, Washington did not have many options. Particularly problematic was the position of Britain. In fact, the traditional ally was still in a debate about the possible inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Atlantic Treaty. This debate had been reopened in January 1957 after a conversation held between the Spanish representative at the United Nations with Sir Pierson Dixon, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. In it, the Spanish diplomat assured Dixon that Spain was seriously considering its participation in NATO and that it already counted on Portuguese, French and US support.³⁸

This statement was very important, especially if it is considered that the NATO countries were holding a meeting in Bonn at the beginning of May of that year. The question was studied by the British diplomats during the weeks

³⁶NAUK: FO 371/130434. Letter from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, 27 March 1957.

³⁷NARA: General Records of the State Department. Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain, 1953–62, Box 4. Letter from Lansing Collins to the State Department, 6 March 1957.

³⁸NAUK: 371/130343. Letter from Dixon to the Foreign Office, 22 January 1957.

prior to the meeting and they reached one main conclusion: the time was not ripe to raise that question. Even though Britain would obtain important benefits by the Spanish incorporation into the international organizations, namely an improvement in bilateral relations and the Spanish abandonment of its pro-Arab policy, the cons continued to outweigh the pros. In the first place, it would cause a row inside NATO where there were countries with strong objections to the Spanish participation (mainly Belgium and Norway). Secondly, the Spanish Government might be tempted to readdress the sore question of Gibraltar. And, finally, Britain had 'the best of both worlds. NATO is supported by Spanish bases (via Spanish agreements with the United States) but does not have to contribute to Spanish defenses'.³⁹ However, the British position was less dogmatic and inflexible than it had been in 1951 or 1953. In fact, the British delegation was instructed to adopt a low profile in case the Spanish question was raised at the meeting. It should let other countries, like Belgium, take the lead in opposing Spanish membership. The British opposition should only be stressed informally in private talks with other delegations.⁴⁰ In the end, the Spanish question was not raised at the Bonn meeting, but these instructions show that the British had a more flexible position.⁴¹

However, the debate inside the Foreign Office on Spain and NATO did not finish after the Bonn meeting. At the beginning of July, the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Ivo Mallet, worried that the deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relations could have a negative impact on Britain, proposed to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, to communicate to the NATO countries that the United Kingdom would not object to Spanish membership in NATO if the other countries desired it.⁴² This proposal created a huge debate inside the different departments of the Foreign Office. In the end, Selwyn Lloyd opted for a middle-ground policy: on the one hand, Britain stated in front of its NATO allies that it was not opposed to Spanish membership as such. On the other, it argued that because of the opposition of certain other governments, (mainly the Low countries and Scandinavia), there was the conviction that it would be against the interests of NATO or the West as a whole for Spain's candidature to be pressed at that stage. This positioning could be transmitted to the Spanish Government as a sign of the British will to improve bilateral relations.⁴³

This policy contrasted with the main principles which had guided British policy vis-à-vis the Spanish participation in NATO since 1949. These principles had been clearly expressed by John Bushell in July 1955: 'NATO is much

³⁹NAUK: 371/130343. Report from the Foreign Office to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, on the position of the British delegation in the Bonn meeting, 30 April 1957.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 3 May 1957.

⁴²Ibid. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 11 July 1957.

⁴³Ibid. Briefs for the NATO meeting of Paris, 19 December 1957.

more than a mere military alliance. It is as is often said a gentleman's Club and if Portugal is perhaps not quite a gentleman, in the sense of not having full qualifications for membership, at least it is a country which does not offend blatantly or cause trouble inside the Club. Would the same be true for Spain?'⁴⁴ It is evident that NATO was ceasing to be a gentleman's club if the British Government was no longer opposed to Spanish participation in it.

A similar situation applied to the French Government which was trying to improve relations with the Francoist regime, without raising the question of its NATO membership. Even though the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had favoured Spanish participation at the United Nations and the OEEC as a sign of good will, incorporation into NATO was regarded as a much more delicate question. However, if other countries would raise the question and support its inclusion, France would not oppose.⁴⁵ It should be clarified that the Anglo-French front formed in 1951 to deal with Spanish issues was not used this time, mainly because there was no common position to defend in front of the US Government. Both countries were starting to change their policies towards the Francoist regime but they did not yet know what the new objectives and characteristics were.⁴⁶

Taking all these elements into account, it is evident that neither France nor Britain would be willing to become mediators and persuade the Scandinavian countries or Belgium of the necessity to include Spain in NATO. From this perspective, Italy's aspirations to become US mediator might not be excessively unrealistic. However, it should be considered that the Eisenhower administration was not looking for a mediator, mainly because it did not need one. As a matter of fact, the Italian offer, which came as a big surprise, was not even taken into consideration by the State Department. In fact, the US officials were convinced that the proposal reflected exclusively the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had to be distinguished from the position adopted by the Italian Government, which appeared much more conservative in the subject. The whole incident was confusing and therefore a thorough analysis of the Italian position vis-à-vis the Spanish membership to NATO must be done in order to avoid possible misinterpretations.

The first noteworthy element comes from the fact that the Straneo-Pansa proposal is not registered in the Spanish, Italian or the British archives. In fact, if one analyses the documentation present in these three archives, the picture obtained is slightly more complicated. Of course Italy would be happy to see Spain as a NATO member; that had been the general position

⁴⁴NAUK: 371/117873. Minutes of the Foreign Office by Bushell, 13 July 1957.

⁴⁵AMAEF, Europe, 1956–60, Spain, 242. Report from the General Direction of Political Affairs on French–Spanish relations, 21 August 1957.

⁴⁶NAUK: 371/130343. Letter from Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in Paris to William Hayter, Deputy Undersecretary of State, 9 February 1957.

of the Italian authorities since the early 1950s. However, there were substantial differences within the government and within the DC itself on the way to approach this subject. On the one hand, there were figures like the Italian Minister of Defence, Paolo Emilio Taviani, or Giulio Andreotti who believed that NATO would not be able to accomplish its goals for Europe both at military and economic levels without the inclusion of Spain. Accordingly, it was necessary to obtain the Spanish membership as soon as possible and Italy had to play a pivotal role in that process.⁴⁷ On the other hand, there were other members of the government and the DC, like Gronchi, Martino and Pella that, while acknowledging the strategic value of Spain, they defended that Italy was not ready to assume any initiative in this regard. In this sense, it is very significant that when Alberto Folchi, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, visited Spain in April 1957, he was personally instructed by President Gronchi to avoid the question of NATO. When he was directly asked about the matter, Folchi replied that 'Italy has always been in favor of Spanish participation in NATO, even though the solution to this problem did not depend exclusively on us.'⁴⁸ In the end, it is possible to assert that, with the exception of the Straneo-Pansa initiative, the more conservative position defended by Gronchi, Martino and Pella, became the predominant one. This is also the conclusion that stems from the US documents. In fact, the same day that Lansing Collins sent his report, James David Zellerbach, US Ambassador in Rome, sent another telegram clarifying that the Italian position on the subject remained unchanged and that no initiatives to include Spain in NATO would be taken from Rome.⁴⁹

Therefore, the analysis of these documents leads to the conclusion that the Straneo-Pansa statement was an isolated initiative, taken in a very peculiar moment (probably by the Ministry of Defence), right after the House of Representatives' resolution. It reflected very well the ideas and the considerations which prevailed in 'Palazzo Chigi', and it counted on the support of some members of the Government like Taviani and Andreotti, but it had no future since it did not have the backing of the Segni Government as a whole. There is little doubt that Italy would be happy to see Spain as a member of NATO; however, this did not mean that Italy would unqualifiedly give active and wholehearted support to Spanish membership in NATO. International and domestic considerations required the Italian Government to allow the evolution of its relationship with Spain to slowly

⁴⁷AGA: 54/16608. Letter from Navasqués to Castiella relating the meeting held with Paolo Emilio Taviani, 28 October 1957.

⁴⁸AIS: Gronchi papers, Series II. International relations. Relations with European countries, folder 7. Spain. Report from Folchi to Gronchi, 9 April 1957.

⁴⁹NARA: General Records of the State Department. Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain, 1953-62, Box 4. Telegram from Zellerbach to State Department, 6 March 1957.

and progressively develop, just as it had been delineated in the rapprochement plan. This view was shared by the US officials who rejected the Italian idea. In addition, it is unclear that the US Government was willing to take the initiative and start the diplomatic procedure to include Spain in NATO; discussions were still taking place inside the Eisenhower Administration. Finally, and assuming that the US decided that Spain should participate in the organization right away, it is dubious that Italy, a very unstable partner, would be chosen as a mediator; in that case, Germany might have been a better interlocutor.⁵⁰

The possible adhesion of Spain to NATO was studied again by the Eisenhower Administration during the summer of 1957. In the end, it was decided not to speed things up. As Secretary of State Christian Herter put it, 'The United States will continue as appropriate to discuss the question of Spanish membership with other NATO members. Although it does not appear wise for us to press openly the question of Spanish membership at present, it is a question to which we are devoting a great deal of thought.'⁵¹

The question was still studied by the Eisenhower administration for several years, although it gradually faded away due to the relentless opposition shown by the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. As a matter of fact, Spain would not join NATO until 1982 when it was already a democratic country. The Spanish exclusion from NATO deprived Spanish-Italian relations of another arena in which to implement political cooperation. In reality, with the failure of the Mediterranean Pact and the Spanish exclusion from NATO, both Spain and Italy had run out of international arenas to collaborate in. Political cooperation would have to wait.

Conclusions

As this chapter has displayed, the final stage of the Spanish-Italian process of rapprochement was related and to a large extent dependent on the evolution of international relations and the role of the Western powers. This shows that, in reality, Italian and Spanish foreign policies had less of a degree of independence, principally in the political sphere, than the diplomats in both countries had originally thought. As a matter of fact, the Spanish exclusion from NATO and the failure of the Mediterranean Pact had deeply conditioned the process of rapprochement, defining its boundaries with great clarity. Both the Spanish and the Italian Government were looking for international arenas, essential to implement political cooperation. However, the reluctance of the Western powers to support these projects left bilateral relations on the sidelines.

⁵⁰Ibid. Letter from Collins to the State Department, 6 March 1957.

⁵¹Ibid. Letter from Herter to the US Ambassador in Madrid, John Davis Lodge, 25 October 1957.

Taking all these events into account, it is evident that the United States had definitively become the main international point of reference in Spanish-Italian relations. In fact, not only the US Government was deciding their agenda, but also establishing its limits. Again, however, the increasing role of the US did not imply that the British influence had completely disappeared from the European scenario. The British authorities understood that the common Anglo-American front which both countries had formed to deal with the Italian and the Spanish matters since 1943 was coming to an end, but they made a strong effort to continue exercising some degree of influence in these areas. As a result of this, Britain formed a new common front with France which had managed to recover part of the prestige and the leadership lost during the Second World War. This front was able to present a louder voice in front of the United States, thus maintaining a presence in European matters which cannot be ignored when dealing with Spanish-Italian relations. However, the relevance of this joint position cannot be exaggerated either. The US Government listened to its Anglo-French allies but their capacity to influence its decisions was minimal. This did not occur the other way round. The US Government was able to exercise a strong influence over the French and the British Governments even on the most important questions. Otherwise it would not be possible to understand the Anglo-French change of policy at the end of 1957 regarding Spanish membership in NATO, or the gentleman's club as it was called at the Foreign Office.⁵² There was no doubt now: the United States was the unquestionable new hegemonic power in Europe.

⁵²NAUK: 371/117873. Minutes of the Foreign Office by Bushell, 13 July 1957.

Conclusions

The year 1943 marked not only the opening of a new phase in Spanish-Italian relations, but also the beginning of the transition to the post-war era, an era which would be characterized by profound changes in the international system and in the balance of power in Europe. In fact, the world which emerged from the Second World War witnessed the decline of the European powers and the rise of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which started a global struggle for hegemony. In this new international context the situation of both Spain and Italy appeared extremely delicate. On the one hand, Italy was the very embodiment of powerlessness. The country was not only divided but also occupied by foreign powers, Germany in the case of the RSI, and the Allies in the case of the Kingdom of Italy, which held almost absolute control over these two regimes. The end of the war, despite the disappearance of the RSI, did not substantially alter the situation and the Kingdom of Italy continued to depend on the Allies both politically and economically.

On the other hand, the Spanish situation was not much better. When the tide of the Second World War turned against the Axis during the spring of 1943, Spain was regarded by the Allies as a Fascist country which, even if it had not directly participated in the war, was so linked to the Axis that there could be no room for it in the post-war era. Apart from the hostility of the major powers, the Francoist regime also had to deal with an economy in ruins whose resources had been almost completely depleted during the Spanish Civil War.

Faced with this difficult situation, both the Spanish and the Italian Governments decided that, even though there were important ideological differences, the two countries could obtain important benefits and mitigate some of their problems by normalizing diplomatic relations, or even by developing them in certain spheres. Evidently, this was not an easy task mainly because this policy needed the support of the major powers which were attentively monitoring all the steps taken by Madrid and Rome. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, in spite of the limited amount of room

for manoeuvre left by the major powers, the Spanish and the Italian Governments always tried to nudge out small areas in which to develop independent policies aimed at the improvement of bilateral relations. As this research has shown, these attempts to improve bilateral relations produced some results and important letdowns, but the question that arose here was how and why did these two countries with very different government systems (one a democracy and the other a dictatorship), manage to maintain diplomatic relations, or even to develop them in certain spheres.

In order to answer this question, the present work has contended that the two governments had different objectives, and considered bilateral relations from different perspectives. The Spanish regime, and especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Martín Artajo, was convinced that even if Spain could not aspire to enter power politics, it was still possible to play an active role in international relations within the context of the Cold War. In this sense, Italy was seen already at the end of 1945 not only as an instrument to improve the international situation of the Francoist regime, but also as a country with which it was possible to establish a bilateral partnership that would allow Madrid and Rome to play a more active role in Europe and the Mediterranean. According to the diplomats in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz', both Spain and Italy shared the same problems and the same interests, and therefore, they should be able to cooperate as equals in order to defend their national interests and prevent Soviet expansion. Moreover, they had the genuine conviction that the Italian authorities shared this vision and, for that reason, they would not oppose the eventual formation of a political alliance with the Francoist regime. In this regard, the Spanish Government attached great relevance to its diplomatic relations with Italy. In fact, more than the other way round.¹ This conclusion has to be emphasized since it clearly contradicts the traditional interpretation of the historiography which claims that Italy was a secondary objective for the Spanish diplomacy.²

As far as Italy was concerned, the main international points of reference for the diplomats in 'Palazzo Chigi' after 1943 were London, Paris, Washington and, later on, Bonn. In that scheme of things, Madrid had only marginal relevance. However, this did not mean that the Italian authorities did not pay any attention to their Mediterranean neighbours. This research has shown that they considered Spain to be highly significant, certainly much more than historiography has acknowledged so far. In fact, the Italian diplomats realized very quickly after the war that the age when Italy could be considered as an international power was over. However, there was also the conviction that, even if the country was diminished in military might and power, it would still be able to act effectively, through the means offered

¹AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Instructions sent to Sangróniz from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1946.

²Pereira, 'Franquismo y democracia'.

by diplomacy, to defend Italian national interests. As Antonio Varsori has pointed out, De Gasperi and Sforza's foreign policy 'had as a point of reference an Italy which was a "regional" power, European and Mediterranean'.³ In order to achieve this goal, though, it was necessary to use and take advantage of all the diplomatic assets which the country had at its disposal. In this sense, Spain was viewed as one of these assets, a means by which to increase Italy's power in Europe. On the one hand, if Italian companies could penetrate the Spanish market, this could produce important benefits essential to modernize the economy and gain international prestige. It should be considered that in post-war Europe, economic recovery was regarded by the European governments as a key aspect in regaining leadership in international relations.⁴ On the other hand, Italy could improve its international status, moving closer to Britain and France, by showing that it was able to exert influence over Spanish matters. That is why the different Christian Democrat governments always tried to play up anti-Communist beliefs as the main characteristic which bound Madrid to Rome. Obviously, these attempts were reciprocated by the Spanish authorities who had been playing the anti-Communist card since late 1944. It is important to remember that since the Truman Doctrine, the US Government had increasingly privileged anti-Communism over its democratic sympathies, although a combination of both was preferred. In this way, the United States established links with regimes of questionable popularity and even those internationally discredited, like Franco's Spain.⁵

Apart from the anti-Communist factor, both the Spanish and the Italian Governments stressed the importance of a common culture and common origins. To start with the obvious, it counted that the two countries shared a religion (Catholicism), and also an origin in the ancient Latin world. In this way, politicians in both Spain and Italy often referred to concepts such as 'Latinità' 'Mediterraneo' of 'Cattolicesimo' to explain or justify their decisions concerning bilateral relations in front of their public audiences.

It should be pointed out that this reasoning had some validity, at least with respect to the diplomatic bodies and the military forces in both countries. As this research has shown, there was a clear continuity of the Fascist period in these two pillars of the new democratic Italy. Hence, it is important to consider that many of these officials were in active service when the Mussolini regime intervened in the Spanish Civil War in favour of Franco's armies. For them, the Francoist regime was not an anachronism which had to be excluded from the international community, but a bulwark against Soviet expansionism and an important piece of the Western defence arrangements

³Varsori, 'De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign Policy', 114.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 504; and Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 272.

due to its geostrategic relevance. As a result, all the projects studied by the Italian Government during this period which envisaged the improvement of diplomatic relations with Franco's Spain originated from, or at least counted on the support of an important part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the predominance of elements with a Fascist background both in Italian diplomacy and in the military forces, facilitated contacts with the Francoist regime, contacts which proved to be essential during the commercial or the military negotiations. In this regard, it is noteworthy that some of the most important agreements signed by the two countries, were achieved thanks to the active mediation of Gastone Gambarà, commander-in-chief of the 'Corpo Truppe Volontarie' during the Spanish Civil War, and one of the key figures in bilateral relations ever since.⁶

By the same token, the fact that the Italian and the Spanish regimes were dominated by Catholic and conservative elites also made the communication between governments easier. That was the case with José Antonio de Sangroniz, Giulio Andreotti, Alberto Martín Artajo, Alcide De Gasperi or Paolo Emilio Taviani. If these figures had not been in power, it would have been more difficult to improve, or even to maintain diplomatic relations.

But, if the policy-makers in both countries were eager to improve bilateral relations, the question of why their policies did not produce more tangible results remains. In fact, if the diplomats and politicians in both countries were interested in a rapprochement, it is logical to ask why these two governments were unable to form a political alliance or, at least, a bilateral partnership. As this research has revealed, the most important reason behind this failure has to be found in external factors, and more concretely, in the influence exerted by the major powers, especially Britain and the United States, over Spanish-Italian relations. In this regard, even though France had managed to intervene at pivotal moments, it had never really managed to challenge the Anglo-Saxon hegemony over these two countries. The meddling of the major powers in Spanish-Italian relations poses the question of the actual degree of independence which Madrid and Rome had to implement their respective foreign policies. To be sure, if the intervention of the US, France and Britain was crucial in preventing a possible Spanish-Italian political alliance, it is just as critical to ask whether the influence of these major powers was so overwhelming that Madrid and Rome did not have a minimum degree of independence to implement their respective foreign policies.

In answering these questions, it is necessary to consider that the major powers only intervened directly whenever they perceived that bilateral relations were entering a crucial moment and, therefore, the room for manoeuvre of Spain and Italy varied depending on the fields and the periods of

⁶AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10. Commercial Treaty with Italy signed on 16 November 1949. FNFF: Doc. No. 24710. Report on the operations of industrial cooperation achieved by General Gambarà, March 1955.

time. Until the end of 1946, both the Spanish and the Italian Governments had very little independence when making decisions in almost every sphere of bilateral relations. Through these pages, several examples of the Spanish-Italian dependency with respect to the major powers have been provided. Among these examples, three stand out as the most evident and meaningful: the Allied monitoring of the commercial negotiations throughout the whole of 1946, the pressure exerted by the Anglo-Americans on the recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pietro Nenni, so that he would not unilaterally break relations with the Francoist regime, and the demands from Washington and London to the Italian Government to follow the guidelines dictated by them at the United Nations regarding the Spanish question. In all three cases the intervention of the major powers, and especially the Anglo-Americans, proved to be crucial, reflecting that the Italian and the Spanish policies had very little room for manoeuvre at least in the political and economic fields. In fact, the only sphere where Madrid and Rome were able to display a more independent policy during this period was the cultural one, a situation which was adeptly seized upon by the respective ambassadors to launch ambitious plans. It was evident that the Anglo-Americans were mainly concerned with the political and the economic aspects of Spanish-Italian relations, deeming the cultural policies as irrelevant and therefore not worthy of a direct intervention.⁷

This situation started to change in 1947, especially in the economic field where the two countries managed to sign two commercial treaties and to establish the basis for future industrial cooperation without the interference of the major powers.⁸ At the same time, small but significant advances were also made in the political sphere. In March 1949 Giulio Andreotti visited Spain and held meetings with some of the most prominent members of the Francoist regime. Nine months later, it was the turn of Minister Artajo to visit Rome and establish contacts with the highest levels of the Italian Government. Even though both visits were closely monitored by the major powers which were interested in the evolution of Spanish-Italian relations, they decided not to intervene and to wait for further developments. In essence, they were convinced that, as long as no major unilateral changes were introduced in their relationships, there was no harm in allowing Spain

⁷AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Letter from Sangróniz to Lequerica, 29 June 1945. Letter from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 December 1946. AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 23. Instructions sent by Artajo to Sangróniz, 15 January 1946, and letter from Artajo to Sangróniz, 20 December 1946 and BA: Gallarati Scotti Archive, Series I, folder No. 10. Report from Gallarati Scotti to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without date but not before 15 February 1946.

⁸AMAE: Bundle 2.410, folders 10–11. Spanish-Italian Commercial Agreement, 20 June 1947 and AMAE: Bundle 2.935, folders 9 and 10. Commercial Treaty with Italy signed on 16 November 1949.

and Italy to intensify their contacts.⁹ However, the Spanish and the Italian Governments interpreted these events differently. According to them, the non-interference of the major powers in these trips, together with the improvement of their international situation, were clear signs that from that moment onwards Rome and Madrid would have a larger room for manoeuvre in the conduct of their relations, even in the political sphere.

In this context, Spain and Italy decided to launch a plan of rapprochement which envisaged the intensification of relations in the economic, cultural and military spheres, as an initial step towards forming a political alliance or a bilateral partnership in Europe and the Mediterranean.¹⁰ The first successes obtained by this plan between 1952 and 1956 – the improvement in the commercial exchanges, the setting up of a number of cooperation projects in the industrial sphere, the intensification of encounters between the two military forces, and the signing of a cultural treaty – convinced the diplomats in the two countries that the situation was ripe for the full development of the rapprochement plan.¹¹ This shows how dynamic and ambitious these foreign policies actually were, which sits uncomfortably with the scarce attention paid to these developments by historiography which has almost completely neglected the period.¹²

In any case, in 1956 the Spanish authorities decided to take the initiative and sounded out the Segni Government regarding the possibility of creating an organization of Mediterranean states. It is noteworthy that the main pillars of this organization should be, according to the Spanish diplomats, Italy and the US, thus confirming a total change of perceptions in 'Palacio de Santa Cruz'. If in 1946 the main goal of Spanish diplomacy was the construction of an alliance with London and Rome, ten years later Britain played only a minor role in Spanish plans.¹³

⁹NAUK: FO 371/79326. Letter from the Western Department of the Foreign Office to the British Chancery in Madrid, 21 April 1949, NARA: Central Decimal File 1945–49, Box 39993. Telegram from Dunn to Acheson, 4 January 1949, Telegram from Dunn to Acheson, 9 April 1949 and Letter from Byington, to Acheson, 1 July 1949, NAUK: FO: 371/89492: Letter from Mallet to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1950 and 26 January 1950 and minutes from P. H. Lawrence, 26 January 1950, AMAEF: Europe 1949–55, Spain, 183 and Letter from Hardion to Schuman, 28 December 1949, and letter from Fouques to Schuman, 30 December 1949.

¹⁰AMAE: Bundle 2.717, folders 15–16. Telegram from Sangróniz to Artajo, 13 October 1951.

¹¹AMAE: Bundle 3.657, folders 13–15. Telegram from Artajo to Sangróniz, 3 May 1955.

¹²Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, 11–23. Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*; Portero, *Franco Aislado*.

¹³AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Instructions sent to Sangróniz from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1946 and AMAE: Bundle 4.473, folder 6. Report on the Mediterranean Pact written by Fraga, to Artajo, 3 May 1956.

One year later, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the possibility of becoming a mediator between the US Government and the NATO countries to negotiate Spanish participation in the Western defence arrangement.¹⁴ In fact, diplomats at 'Palazzo Chigi' had started to discern a growing antagonism between the French and British Governments, which were opposed to the Spanish participation in NATO, and the Eisenhower administration, which was more eager to include Spain in the Atlantic Treaty, and harboured the ambition of developing diplomatic benefits from such mediation. This constitutes further proof that the Italian self-perception had changed during the late 1940s. The Italian Government was now ready to participate more actively in the European situation to the extent of becoming a mediator between the US and the rest of the NATO members.

However, these two diplomatic initiatives failed mainly because both the Italian and the Spanish Governments had miscalculated their room for manoeuvre in the diplomatic sphere. Spain, in spite of the US backing of the Pact of Madrid, was certainly not capable of taking the lead in the creation of an international organization like the Mediterranean Pact. This was an initiative which needed to be fronted by the new hegemonic power in the area, the United States, or at least one of the regional powers like France or Britain. Spanish participation could only be contemplated at this point. Italy, on the other hand, had considerably improved its international situation and was now able to participate more actively in European affairs, but it certainly was not powerful enough to mediate between London and Washington or to push successfully for Spanish membership in NATO, at least not without US support. It should be clarified for the Italian case that the international constraints were the primary but not the sole reason behind the limitations of its policy towards the Francoist regime. Domestic factors were also important especially due to the presence in the government of the 'Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano' (PSDI). It should be considered that the PSDI was for ideological reasons absolutely opposed to the incorporation of Franco's Spain in the Western defence arrangement and therefore exerted pressure on the Segni Government to avoid taking any initiatives aimed at the inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Western security system. Only if the Western powers decided to include the Francoist regime in the Atlantic Treaty would the left-wing parties in general and the PSDI in particular accept this event without protesting or attempting to stir up an internal crisis within the government. Furthermore, the political instability in Italy was regarded with contempt by the Eisenhower

¹⁴NARA: General Records of the State Department. Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain, 1953-1962, Box 4. Letter from Collins to the State Department, 6 March 1957.

administration. In this regard, even if the US Government had been looking for a mediator, it would not have opted for an unreliable ally like Italy.¹⁵

The main conclusion that can be drawn from these events is that, despite the self-perceptions of both governments, Spanish-Italian relations continued to be greatly influenced by the major powers which decided their agenda and set their boundaries at least within the political sphere. Italy had been forced to withdraw its ambassador from Madrid in 1946 after the UN condemnatory resolution because the major powers did so. In spite of the Spanish efforts, diplomatic relations were not normalized until the end of 1950, when the Western powers had agreed to do the same. The first successes of the rapprochement process at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s convinced both the Italian and the Spanish Governments that they had a degree of independence in the diplomatic sphere which they did not really have. In fact, the United States was setting the boundaries in bilateral relations. Accordingly, Italy and Spain were allowed to improve relations in the economic, cultural or even military fields mainly because Washington had decided to encourage cooperation between the Western European countries, including the Francoist regime.¹⁶ However, forming a bilateral partnership or taking large-scale initiatives in the political field were diplomatic manoeuvres which crucially, would not prove successful without attaining the prior support of the United States.

This takes us back to the beginning of this book and the questions regarding the reasons behind the British substitution by the United States as the main hegemonic power in Europe. As it was explained in the Introduction, it is well established that the British decline in Europe was paralleled with the ascent of the United States to the position of a super-power. However, this research has shown that the relationship between the decline of Britain and the ascent of the US was not one of simple cause and effect. In fact, between 1943 and 1949 Britain continued to play a pivotal role in the policies adopted by the Western powers towards both Spain and Italy. However, and in spite of the maintenance of a substantial influence, it was becoming clear after 1945 that, even though various British Governments had a definite strategy for both Spain and Italy in the post-war period, they did not have the material means to implement it. Faced with this situation, officials in the Foreign Office, who were convinced that Britain could still play a political role in the affairs of these two countries in spite of its problems, designed a new strategy: take the initiative in Spanish-Italian affairs and then rely on Washington's backing to strengthen it.

¹⁵NARA: General Records of the State Department. Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain, 1953–62, Box 4. Telegram from Zellerbach to State Department, 6 March 1957.

¹⁶Ibid. Letter from Herter to Lodge, 25 October 1957.

The main aim of the British policy towards Spain and Italy was to preserve its leadership and its influence in two countries where London still had important interests. On the one hand, Italy had to be reduced to the level of a small power incapable of adopting again an aggressive policy in the Mediterranean area, but, at the same time, it had to be strong enough to defend itself from the Soviet threat and to revive its own economy.¹⁷ On the other hand, Spain was viewed in London as an anachronism, a dictatorship which needed to introduce important political reforms in order to be readmitted into the international community. However, diplomats in Whitehall were convinced that these changes could not be obtained thorough the imposition of diplomatic sanctions. According to them, taking actions against the Francoist regime could provoke a renewal of internal strife which would benefit the Spanish Communist Party and, at the same time, jeopardize the important economic interests which Britain had in Spain.¹⁸

Taking these objectives as a point of reference, it is possible to assert that the new British strategy proved to be considerably effective. As a matter of fact, the British Government managed not only to obtain US backing for its policies towards Italy and Spain until 1947, but also to impose its vision on Spanish-Italian affairs with only a few exceptions – the question of the wolfram embargo on Germany, and the permanence of Vittorio Emanuele III and Badoglio as the Heads of the Kingdom of Italy. Good examples of this new influence can be found in the negotiations to reactivate the payments of the war debt from the Spanish Civil War, or the appointment of Pietro Nenni, General Secretary of the PSI, as the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the first case, the British Government played an active role throughout the negotiations and the pressure exerted on both governments was crucial so that an agreement could be reached. In the second case, Whitehall decided to intervene themselves and exert pressure on Minister Nenni preventing him from breaking off relations with the Francoist regime without the previous consent of the Western powers. In each case, London managed to garner the support of Washington and to impose its vision.

So far, these findings clearly back the conclusions presented by several British historians such as Anne Deighton, John Kent and David Reynolds. According to these authors, Britain did not only regard itself as a 'Great

¹⁷Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War*; Dilks (ed.), *Retreat from Power*, Vol. 2; Kent, *Britain's Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–49*; Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*; Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*; Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*.

¹⁸Florentino Portero, 'Spain, Britain and the Cold War', in Balfour and Preston (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*; Qāsim, *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*.

Power' during the decade that followed the end of the Second World War, but it also acted like one.¹⁹ However, this book has gone beyond these interpretations, proving that Britain not only acted as a hegemonic power, but was considerably successful in doing so. In fact, between 1943 and 1949 Britain managed through both direct and indirect interventions to reorient Spanish-Italian affairs to London's benefit. Furthermore, the idea of a leading role played by the British was consistent with the perceptions which prevailed in the mentalities of the diplomats both in Madrid and Rome. As a matter of fact, the Spanish and the Italian Governments continued to regard Britain as Europe's natural leader during the first years after the Second World War. In the Spanish case, this was clear in the instructions sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martín Artajo, to the Ambassador in Rome, José Antonio de Sangróniz. According to these instructions, the main goal of Spanish diplomacy was to forge an alliance between London, Madrid and Rome which could contain the Soviet threat and protect their interests in the Mediterranean area.²⁰ It is noteworthy that the United States was not even mentioned once in this document, showing that its participation in the affairs of the Old Continent after the war was not taken for granted. In the Italian case, this was clear in the commercial negotiations with Spain during the last months of 1946. In fact, when the negotiations were completely paralysed due to the resilient positions of both delegations, the Italian authorities asked London, not Washington, to intervene and act as a mediator in front of the Francoist regime.²¹

In order to understand these views of the international system, it is important to consider that US involvement in European affairs was far from clear in 1945 or 1946. In fact, the United States had already refused to take the lead in international relations after the First World War, and both the Spanish and the Italian Governments were not sure whether this would happen again. This was not an idle question since there were still important elements in favour of isolationism inside the Truman administration.²² Taking all these elements into account it is easy to understand why both Spain and Italy turned to Britain in search of political leadership once the war was over. Britain was not only the other main victor in the war, but also

¹⁹Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War*; Dilks (ed.), *Retreat from Power*, Vol. 2; Kent, *Britain's Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–49*; Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*.

²⁰AMAE: Bundle 1.466, folder 24. Instructions sent to Sangróniz from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1946.

²¹NAUK: FO: 371/49937. Letter from the Foreign Office to Mallet, 9 October 1945.

²²Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 268; and Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

a country which had traditionally shown, and was still portending, a strong determination to participate in European affairs.

These two cases are the best examples of what Anne Orde has referred to as the 'intangibles of power' of the British hegemony.²³ Even though Britain did not have the material capabilities, economic or military, to carry out a hegemonic policy after 1945, its influence, prestige and the fact that it was still regarded by other countries as a leader in international relations were enough to grant it a place among the major powers. This clearly contradicts the views of some historians, most notably Moshe Gat and Geir Lundestad, who argue that Britain was no longer a great power after 1945.²⁴

This situation did, however, start to change in 1947. During the winter of 1946–7, after the decline of manufacturing output, the British Government decided to abandon India and Palestine and to terminate aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman and his advisers understood that they had miscalculated the British economic crisis: the country was weaker than they had thought. The precarious position of Britain, together with the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, forced the US Government to change its strategy and adopt a more interventionist policy in European affairs. In this way, US officials responded to the new situation with new policies focusing on massive economic assistance and limited military aid, in other words, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

This did not mean that the United States had not been involved in European affairs between 1945 and 1947. Melvyn Leffler has argued in his famous book *A Preponderance of Power* that, at the end of the war, US officials had no desire to retain substantial military forces overseas, to incur strategic commitments, or to supplant the traditional European colonial powers in large parts of the Third World. US officials were ready instead to assume Britain's traditional role as a financial hegemon. In this regard, the US strategy during the first years after the war was, according to Leffler, mainly based around economic considerations.²⁵ There is little doubt that the economic factors were key in US post-war planning, but, as this research has shown, there were also other influential factors. In fact, the US Government was involved at all times in Spanish and Italian political affairs, especially at crucial moments like the discussions of the Spanish question at the United Nations, and the appointment of Pietro Nenni as the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In both cases, officials in Washington decided to intervene, always in agreement with the British Government, in order to defend its interests.

In any case, the fact remains that in 1947 the US Government decided to step up and assume more international responsibilities. However, this

²³Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain*.

²⁴Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*, 109. Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 268.

²⁵Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 16.

change in US strategy did not imply that Britain ceased to exert a strong influence in Western Europe. This influence has become evident thanks to two main examples provided: the possible inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan, and the debate over the future of the Italian colonies at the United Nations. In the first case, Britain exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Truman and the State Department so that Spain would be excluded from the European Recovery Programme. This pressure brought about considerable results, especially when it is considered that Truman immediately issued a special declaration clarifying that the Francoist regime would not be included in the Marshall Plan.²⁶ In the second case, Britain managed to impose its view at the United Nations which was a deciding factor in the Italians losing possession of their colonies, even the ones obtained before the Fascist period.²⁷

These two cases show that Britain was not only behaving as a hegemonic power but also that it was still able to influence Spanish-Italian affairs. However, it was more and more evident that the policies of the United States in the Old Continent would end up clashing with British interests in these two countries. This became clear when the Truman administration decided to change its policy towards the Francoist regime at the end of 1947 without consulting the British Government, or when it was decided that Italy should be included in the Atlantic Treaty at the beginning of 1949 regardless of the British position.²⁸

The new role assumed by the US Government also started to change the perceptions about European leadership shared by both the Spanish and Italian Governments. During his trip to Rome, Minister Artajo sounded out his Italian counterpart, Carlo Sforza, about the possibility of establishing a Mediterranean Pact. This idea, which had been first proposed by Greece and Turkey as an alternative to their participation in the Atlantic Treaty, had been received with interest by the Spanish diplomats who wanted to know what the position of the De Gasperi Government was. Even though the idea was rejected by Sforza, the fact that the project was discussed with the Italians and not with the British is very meaningful. Britain was no longer perceived as the main international point of reference in the 'Palacio

²⁶NAUK: FO 371/73335. Letter from Bevin to Howard Douglas (to be transmitted to Lovett) and to the British Ambassador in Colombia (to be transmitted to Marshall), 1 April 1948 and NAUK: FO 371/73335. Telegram from the British Ambassador in Colombia to Bevin, 4 April 1948.

²⁷Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*.

²⁸NAUK: FO 371/73334. Letter from Douglas to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1948. Antonio Varsori, 'Gran Bretagna e Italia 1945–1956: il rapporto tra una grande potenza e una piccola potenza?' in Varsori, *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943–1957)*. Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949*.

de Santa Cruz'.²⁹ Only one week after Artajo's trip to Rome, the Italian authorities officially declared that their government was ready to harmonize its policy towards the Francoist regime with Washington, regardless of the British position.³⁰ Also for the Italian authorities the main international point of reference had moved from London to Washington. It was evident that Britain was progressively losing the aforementioned intangibles of power, or at least the perception of such, essential to maintain its position as a great power in Europe.

The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc at the beginning of 1950 brought about more changes in the international system and contributed to the acceleration of the US ascent as the new hegemonic world power as well as the British decline in Europe. It also accelerated the expansion of the United States which not only increased its presence in the economic sphere, but also in the military field with the establishment of a large number of bases in many different corners of the world.³¹ As Melvyn Leffler has argued, the United States had not only become the world's bank but also the world's policeman, whose main objective was now 'preponderant power'.³² Evidently, these changes in the US strategy also had a considerable impact on relations between Spain and Italy which witnessed a larger involvement of Washington in their affairs. This renewed interest in Spanish-Italian relations was mainly motivated by strategic factors. On the one hand, diplomats in Washington realized that Spain's strategic geographic location was extremely important not only to the immediate defence of Western Europe and the Middle East, but also to the security of the NATO area and that of the United States. In fact, including Spain in the Western defence arrangement would allow the US Government to build military bases essential to launch operations against major Soviet aggression and, at the same time, to exert a stronger control over the strait of Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean.³³

On the other hand, Italy was regarded in Washington as an essential bulwark in the fight against the Soviet expansion. Even though the Italian forces were not expected to make any great contribution to the defence of Europe, the loss of Italy to the Communist control 'would result in profound political, psychological and military damage to the free world'.³⁴

²⁹AMAEF: Europe 1949–55. Spain, 185. Report from the SDECE to Bidault and Schuman, 5 January 1950.

³⁰NARA. Central Decimal file 1950–54. Box 2929: Memorandum of conversation with Bettini, Third secretary of the Italian Embassy in Washington, 10 January 1950.

³¹Leffler and Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: The Origins*.

³²Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 19.

³³DDEL: The White House Office: OSANSA, NSC Series, Box 10. NSC report. US policy towards Spain, 12 May 1954.

³⁴Ibid. NSC report. US policy towards Italy, 12 March 1954.

Taking all these elements into consideration, it is easy to understand that the US Government, while expanding its leadership all over the world, also intensified its presence in the affairs of two countries which were deemed as essential in the Western defence arrangement.

However, this research has propounded that the US involvement did not imply that Britain was completely left out of the picture of European affairs. Even though both the Spanish and the Italian Governments had ceased to regard Britain as the main hegemonic power in Europe, London still had a say in their relations and in their foreign policies. The best example of this influence was the debate about the possible inclusion of Spain in Western defence. At the beginning of 1951, the Truman administration decided that it was time to involve Spain in the defence of Western Europe, and announced to its allies that the new ambassador in Madrid was about to start negotiations with that objective. Well aware that the new US policy towards the Francoist regime clashed directly with its national interests, the British Government appealed to the Anglo-American front established since 1943 and tried to talk the US officials into abandoning the project. However, the Truman administration was determined to continue with its new policy towards the Francoist regime and rejected all the British attempts.³⁵

In this regard, it is possible to assert that the famous special relationship which has lured the attention of a large number of historians, does not work in this case study.³⁶ In fact, even though the US Government showed some instances of special consideration with London, like Truman's public statement on the occasion of the O'Konsky amendment, it is doubtful whether the friendly intercourse ever directly caused the US Government to act other than it would have done anyway. Officials in Washington were willing to support British policies in Spain and Italy as long as they were also favourable for their own interests. In fact, the moment the interests of both countries clashed, such as over the inclusion of Spain in the Western

³⁵NAUK: FO 371/96172. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 4 March 1951, and FO 371/96181. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 13 February 1951 and memorandum on a conversation with Dean Acheson from Oliver Franks to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1951.

³⁶Luca Bellocchio, *L'eterna Alleanza?: La special relationship angloamericana tra continuità e mutamento* (Milano: F. Angeli, 2006); Robert M. Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990); William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War*; Michael F. Hopkins, *Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: Anglo-American Relations, 1948–1952* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Daniel C. Williamson, *Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-American Relations, 1953–1955* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Chris Patten, *Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain, and Europe in Anew Century*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2006).

defence arrangement, the US Government disregarded the British needs and adopted a unilateral policy.³⁷

Officials in Whitehall understood very quickly that the Anglo-American front was broken, and they decided to change their strategy in order to preserve at least part of their political influence in Spain and Italy. Accordingly, they attempted to form a new common front this time with the French Government which was also opposed, although for different reasons, to the inclusion of the Francoist regime in the Western security system.³⁸ This strategy was nothing new to Britain which had consistently used the power of others to strengthen its position since the eighteenth century.³⁹

Even though France did not have the capabilities to display hegemonic behaviour after the end of the Second World War, this research has shown that it played an active role in Spanish-Italian relations. It is important to consider that France was not only an important actor in the Mediterranean due to its vast interests in the area – including colonies – but also a country which continued to maintain intense contacts with both Spain and Italy in the economic, cultural, military, and even political spheres after 1945. All these factors made France an ideal observatory through which to analyse the evolution of bilateral relations. Furthermore, France started to intervene more actively in Spanish-Italian affairs at the very end of the 1940s.

Until that moment, the 'Quai D'Orsay' had played a minor role in Spanish-Italian relations for a number of reasons. First, just like Britain, the country had to face a deep economic crisis during the first years after the war. Secondly, the French diplomats had to also grapple with the reality that the country did not have the means to carry out a power policy anymore. And thirdly, French diplomacy during this period was almost completely absorbed by the German question, to the extent that it had almost become an obsession for the 'Quai D'Orsay'. During the first years after 1945 the French foreign policy was mainly interpreted under this light and therefore prevented France from adopting more ambitious policies in other areas. However, its international situation had improved since 1949 when it was finally understood that Germany would have to be rearmed and included in the Western defence arrangement. In order to deal with this eventuality, the French authorities used the Atlantic Treaty negotiations and the European

³⁷FRUS, 1951, Vol. IV (part 1). Memo for the files by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Bonbright, 2 March 1951, 801–2. NAUK: FO 371/ 96181. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 June 1951.

³⁸AMAEF: Europe, 1949–55, Spain, 155. Report from the French Direction of Europe about Spain, 24 October 1951 and report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Schuman, 14 December 1951. NAUK: FO 371/96181. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 June 1951.

³⁹Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*, 295–6.

integration process to present itself in a new guise as the West's third great power. French diplomats realized that in the post-war world, real power was exclusively in the hands of the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. There was no question about competing with them, but France could play a part in the world within the bounds of its ability to do so.⁴⁰

Taking all these elements into consideration, it is easy to understand that the French authorities received the idea of forming a common front with Britain with clear enthusiasm, since it would allow them to play a more important role in Europe and at the same time to preserve the country's influence in a region which was of vital importance.⁴¹ The new Anglo-French front managed to project a louder voice in front of the State Department and obtained some results. Among them, the most important was the commitment adopted by Acheson not to raise the question of Spanish membership in NATO during the negotiations. Diplomats in Paris and London had realized that it was necessary to adopt a more realistic perspective with Washington. If the United States were determined to start negotiations with the Francoist regime it was fine, but the negotiations should be done on an exclusively bilateral basis and without discussing the possibility of Spanish participation in NATO. This objective was achieved.⁴²

However, the relevance of this new front should not be exaggerated either. If the US Government decided not to raise the question of the Spanish membership in NATO, it was mainly because it was not in its interests to do so, at least at that moment. It was clear that Britain and France together could make their voices more audible in Washington but they had very little influence on American strategic decisions. Actually, it was more a question of the influence that the United States exerted over France and Britain rather than the other way round. The best proof of this was that the British and the French Governments, which had been completely opposed to Spanish

⁴⁰Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?*; Jean-Rémy Bézias, *Georges Bidault et la politique étrangère de la France (Europe, Etats-Unis, Proche-Orient), 1944–1948* (Paris: Harmattan, 2006); William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); H. R. Kedward, *France and the French: A Modern History*, 1st ed. (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2006); John F. V. Keiger, *France and the World Since 1870* (London: Arnold, 2001); Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (eds.), *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation* (London: Routledge, 2000); Sergio Romano, *Storia di Francia: dalla comune a Sarkozy* (Milano: Longanesi, 2009); John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990).

⁴¹AMAEF: Europe, 1949–55, Spain, 155. Report from the French direction of Europe about Spain, 24 October 1951 and report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Schuman, 14 December 1951.

⁴²Ibid. Minutes from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Spain, 14 December 1951. NAUK: FO 371/102017. Minutes of the Foreign Office, 18 February 1952.

inclusion in that 'Gentlemen's Club' which was NATO since its formation in 1949, started in 1957 to reconsider their positions. Even if Paris and London did not want to rush the Spanish participation in the Atlantic Treaty, they were finally convinced that their opposition would not change US attitude in this regard and, at the same time, would only contribute to deteriorating their relations with the Francoist regime.⁴³ However, this change did not produce any results either. In the end, Spain was not included in the Atlantic Treaty because the US Government decided that the situation was not the most suitable in which to take such an initiative.⁴⁴ It had become evident that the main decisions concerning the Western bloc were made in Washington regardless of the voices echoing across the Atlantic from London or Paris. France was no longer a great power and Britain had definitively been substituted as Europe's hegemonic power by the United States.

It should be stressed that this process took place against the will of the different British Governments which, as this research has shown, did everything they could to maintain Britain's role as a point of reference for Spain and Italy. This contradicts the theories of Geir Lundestad and Martin Lynn who argued that Britain had started to hold back from European affairs right after the war in order to focus on its wider world interest.⁴⁵ This also calls for a revision of the widespread theory defended by Lundestad in his famous article 'Empire by Invitation', where the Norwegian historian claimed that the United States had been 'invited' by the European countries to intervene more directly in their affairs. It is true that Britain attempted to influence the Americans to take a greater, not lesser, interest in the Old Continent's matters, but the main objective behind this diplomatic manoeuvre was the maintenance of its leadership in the Old Continent.⁴⁶ Britain had no intention of withdrawing from its dominant position in European affairs, but it needed US material capabilities and political support to strengthen this stance in both Italy and Spain.

To conclude, it is possible to assert that both the Spanish and the Italian Governments worked resolutely between 1943 and 1957 in order to improve their relations in all spheres. Even though they had different starting points, different ideologies and different goals, diplomats in Madrid and Rome shared the conviction that the development of bilateral relations would not

⁴³NAUK: 371/117873. Minutes of the Foreign Office by Bushell, 13 July 1957 and AMAEF, Europe, 1956–60, Spain, 242. Report from the General Direction of Political Affairs on French–Spanish relations, 21 August 1957.

⁴⁴NARA: General Records of the State Department. Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Spain, 1953–1962, Box 4. Letter from Herter to Lodge, 25 October 1957.

⁴⁵Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 39; and Lynn (ed.), *The British Empire in the 1950s*, 1.

⁴⁶Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation', 268.

only alleviate the difficult situation of their respective countries, but also bring important diplomatic benefits. By 1957, this policy had produced significant results in the economic, cultural and military fields, results which contrasted with the problems to form a bilateral partnership or a political alliance. The main reason behind this failure has to be found in the limited room for manoeuvre which these two countries still had in the diplomatic sphere with respect to the new hegemonic power, the United States. In the end, it was Washington that decided the agenda and set the boundaries of bilateral relations. Even though diplomats in Madrid and Rome thought at some point that they had a bigger degree of independence, in the end they had to accept that, ultimately, Spanish-Italian relations were still heavily influenced by the major powers.

Bibliography

- Abu Warda, Najib M., and Rafael Calduch Cervera, eds. *La política exterior española en el siglo XX*. Madrid: Ciencias sociales, 1994.
- Aga Rossi, Elena. *Una nazione allo Sbando: L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943. Collana di storia contemporanea*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993.
- . and Victor Zaslavsky. *Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Agudo, Manuel Ros. *La gran tentación: Franco, el Imperio Colonial y el proyecto de intervención española en la segunda guerra mundial*. Barcelona: Styria, 2008.
- Albanese, Matteo and Pablo del Hierro. 'A Transnational Network: The Contact between Fascist Elements in Spain and Italy, 1945–1968', *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2014, 82–102.
- Álvarez, Jesús Timoteo. *Historia de los medios de comunicación en España: periodismo, imagen y publicidad, 1900–1990*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1989.
- Anderson, Terry H. *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944–47*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981.
- Armero, José Mario. *La política exterior de Franco*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1978.
- Avilés, Juan, Rosa Pardo and Javier Tusell, eds. *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX*. Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2000.
- Bagnato, Bruna. *L'Italia e la guerra d'Algeria (1954–1962)*. Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2012.
- Balfour, Sebastian, and Paul Preston, eds. *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Barbagallo, Francesco. *L'Italia Repubblicana: Dallo Sviluppo alle riforme mancate, 1945–2008*. Roma: Carocci, 2009.
- Bargoni, Franco. *La participación naval italiana en la guerra civil española (1936–1939)*. Madrid: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 1995.
- Barone, Mario, and Ennio Di Nolfo, eds. *Giulio Andreotti: L'uomo, il cattolico, lo statista*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.
- Becker, Josef, and Franz Knipping, eds. *Power in Europe?* Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1986.
- Belco, Victoria. *War, Massacre, and Recovery in Central Italy, 1943–1948*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.
- Belforte, Francesco. *La guerra civile in Spagna: La campagna dei volontari italiani e la vittoria di Franco*. Roma: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939.
- Bellocchio, Luca. *L'eterna Alleanza?: La special relationship angloamericana tra continuità e mutamento*. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2006.
- Bender, Thomas, ed. *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002.
- Bernardi, Giovanni. *La Marina, gli armistizi e il trattato di pace: settembre 1943-dicembre 1951*. Rome: Ufficio storico della Marina militare, 1979.
- Bertoldi, Silvio. *Salò: Vita e morte della repubblica sociale italiana*. 3rd ed. Milano: Rizzoli, 1976.
- Bézias, Jean-Rémy. *Georges Bidault et la politique étrangère de la France (Europe, Etats-Unis, Proche-Orient), 1944–1948*. Paris: Harmattan, 2006.

- Black, Jeremy. *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Bond, Martyn. *Council of Europe*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Brendon, Piers. *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997*. London: Jonathan Cape, 2007.
- Brogi, Alessandro. *L'Italia e l'egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo*. Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1996.
- Brundu Olla, Paola. *L'anello mancante: Il problema della spagna franchista e l'organizzazione della difesa occidentale, 1947–1950*. Sassari: Università degli Studi di Sassari, 1990.
- . *Ostracismo e realpolitik: Gli alleati e la spagna franchista negli anni del dopoguerra*. Cagliari: C.E.L.T. Editrice, 1984.
- Burgos, Manuel Espadas. *Franquismo y política exterior*. Barcelona: Ediciones Rialp, 1988.
- Cacace, Paolo. *Venti anni di politica estera italiana (1943–1963)*. Roma: Bonacci, 1986.
- Calandri, Elena. *Il Mediterraneo e la difesa dell'occidente, 1947–1956: Eredità imperiali e logiche di guerra fredda*. Nuoro: Il Maestrale, 1997.
- Canavero, Alfredo. *Alcide De Gasperi: Christ, Demokrat, Europäer*, Brussels: EVP-Fraktion, 2010.
- Canosa, Romano. *Mussolini e Franco. Amici, alleati, rivali. Vite parallele di due dittatori*. Milano: Mondadori, 2008.
- Carotenuto, Gennaro. *Franco e Mussolini*. Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 2005.
- Carreras, Albert. 'Depresión económica y cambio estructural durante el decenio bélico 1936–1945', in José Luis García Delgado (ed.), *El primer franquismo: España durante la segunda guerra mundial; V coloquio sobre historia contemporánea de España ...* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1989), 10.
- Caruana, Leonard and Hugh Rockoff. 'An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II', in National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 12228, May 2006.
- Castronovo, Valerio. *FIAT, 1899–1999: Un secolo di storia*. Milano: Rizzoli, 1999.
- Ciocca, Pierluigi. *Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d'Italia, 1796–2005*. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007.
- Colarizi, Simona. *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia Repubblicana*. Roma: Laterza, 1994.
- . *Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943–2006: Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni*. Roma: Laterza, 2007.
- Coverdale, John F. *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (July, 1936–March, 1937)*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1971.
- . *La intervención fascista en la guerra civil española*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1979.
- Craveri, Piero. *De Gasperi*. Biblioteca storica (Bologna, Italy). Bologna: Il mulino, 2006.
- De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
- De Siervo, Ugo, Sandro Guerrieri, and Antonio Varsori, eds. *La prima legislatura Repubblicana: Continuità e discontinuità nell'azione delle istituzioni: Atti del convegno, Roma, 17–18 Ottobre 2002*. Roma: Carocci, 2004.
- Deighton, Anne, ed. *Britain and the First Cold War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.
- Del Hierro, Pablo. 'El tándem Sangróniz-Ponce de León. La acción cultural española en Italia durante el primer franquismo, 1945–1952', in *Historia del presente*, No. 21, Madrid, UNED, 2013, 9–28.
- Delgado, José Luis García, ed. *El primer franquismo: España durante la segunda guerra mundial; V coloquio sobre historia contemporánea de España ...* Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1989.

- Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Lorenzo. *Diplomacia franquista y política cultural hacia iberoamérica, 1939–1953*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988.
- . *Imperio de papel: Acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992.
- Di Febo, Giuliana and Renato Moro, eds. *Fascismo e franchismo relazioni, immagini, rappresentazioni*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2005.
- Di Maio, Tiziana. *Fare l'Europa o morire! Europa unita e 'nuova Germania' nel dibattito dei cristiano-democratici eu, 1945–1954*. Rome: Euroma La Goliardica, 2008.
- Di Nolfo, Ennio, ed. *Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, and the Origins of the EEC, 1952–1957*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1992.
- and Maurizio Serra, eds. *La gabbia infranta. Gli alleati e l'Italia dal 1943 al 1945*. Rome: Laterza, 2010.
- Dilks, David, ed., *Retreat from Power*, Vol. 2. London: Macmillan, 1981.
- Dockrill, Michael and John W. Young, eds. *British Foreign Policy 1945–1956*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
- Dockrill, Saki. *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
- Dulphy, Anne. *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne de 1945 à 1955: entre idéologie et réalisme*. Direction des Archives et de la documentation, Ministère des affaires étrangères, 2002.
- Edwards, Jill. *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
- Ellwood, David W. *Italy 1943–1945*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985.
- Espinosa, Agostino Degli. *Il regno del sud*. Milano: Biblioteca universale Rizzoli, 1995.
- Esteban, Luis de Llera. *Relaciones culturales italo-hispánicas: la embajada de T. Gallarati Scottan en Madrid, 1945–1946*. Milano: Cisalpino-Goliardica, 1985.
- and José Andrés Gallego. *La España de posguerra: un testimonio*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992.
- Fanello Marcucci, Gabriella. *Giuseppe Pella: Un liberista cristiano*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007.
- Feis, Herbert. *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950*. Norton: New York, 1971.
- Ferguson, Niall. *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. London: Penguin, 2004.
- Finney, Patrick, ed. *Palgrave Advances in International History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Focardi, Filippo and Lutz Klinkhammer. 'La difficile transizione: l'Italia e il peso del passato', in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, 113–29.
- Franco, Massimo. *Andreotti: La vita di un uomo politico, la storia di un'epoca*. Milano: Mondadori, 2008.
- Fuentes, Enrique, and Francisco Comín, eds. *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil: Los economistas, las ideas y las propuestas económicas. Las consecuencias de la guerra sobre la economía y los economistas*. Madrid: Galaxia Gutenberg, Círculo de Lectores, 2008.
- Franco, John L. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- . *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

- Galli, Giorgio. *I partiti politici italiani (1943–2000). Dalla resistenza al governo dell'Ulivo*. Milano: Biblioteca universale Rizzoli, 2001.
- García Sanz, Fernando. *Historia de las relaciones entre España e Italia: Imágenes, comercio y política exterior, 1890–1914*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994.
- , ed. *Españoles e Italianos en el mundo contemporáneo: I coloquio hispano-italiano de historiografía contemporánea*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990.
- Garosci, Aldo. *Los intelectuales y la guerra de España*. Oviedo: Júcar, 1981.
- Gat, Moshe. *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949: The Decline of British Influence*. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1996.
- Gill, Stephen. 'Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1986.
- Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Ginsborg, Paul. *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988*. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
- Giorgi, Fulvio De, and Nicola Raponi, eds. *Rimozione religioso e impegno civile in Tommaso Gallarati Scotti: atti del colloquio nel centenario della nascita*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1994.
- Girault, René. 'Decision Makers, Decisions and French Power', in Di Nolfo (ed.), *Power in Europe?* II, 66–83.
- Giura, Vincenzo. *Tra politica ed economia: l'Italia e la guerra civile spagnola*. Roma: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1993.
- Gómez-Jordana Souza, Francisco. *Milicia y diplomacia: diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936–1944*. Burgos: Dosssoles, 2002.
- González de la Fe, Pedro. *SEAT: Fundación, desarrollo y privatización de una empresa automovilística en España*. Madrid: Fundación Empresa Pública, 2001.
- Grandi, Dino. *25 luglio: quarant'anni dopo*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983.
- . *Il mio paese: ricordi autobiografici*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985.
- Greenwood, Sean. *The Alternative Alliance: Anglo-French Relations before the Coming of NATO*. London: Minerva Press, 1996.
- Guderzo, Massimiliano. *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia: L'incognita spagnola nella seconda guerra mondiale*. Firenze: Manent, 1995.
- Guiotto, Maddalena, and Johannes Lill. *Italia-Germania = Deutschland-Italien: Wiedervereinigungen: 1948–1958: Riavvicinamenti*. Collana della Villa Vigoni. Firenze: L. S. Olschki, 1997.
- Guirao, Fernando. *Spain and European Economic Cooperation, 1945–1955: A Case Study in Spanish Foreign Economic Policy*. EUI PhD theses. Florence: European University Institute, 1993.
- . *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1998.
- Harper, John L. *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945–48*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Harris, Charles Reginald Schiller. *Allied Military Administration of Italy: 1943–1945*. London: HMSO, 1957.
- Hathaway, Robert M. *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990.
- Heiberg, Morten. *Emperadores del Mediterráneo: Franco, Mussolini y la guerra civil española*. Barcelona: Critica, 2003.

- Hennessy, Peter. *Never Again: Britain 1945–51*. London: John Cape, 1992.
- Hermon, Elly. 'A propos du plan Félix Gaillard de pacte méditerranéen', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, April 1995, 3–28.
- Hernández-Sandoica, Elena and Enrique Moradiellos. 'Spain and the Second World War, 1939–1945', in Neville Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 251.
- Herráiz, Ismael. *Italia fuera de combate*. Madrid: Ed. Atlas, 1944.
- Hitchcock, William I. *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2008.
- Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Hopkins, Michael F. *Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: Anglo-American Relations, 1948–1952*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Hyam, Ronald. *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Ikenberry, John G. 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 3, Autumn 1989.
- Iriye, Akira. 'Internationalizing International History', in Thomas Bender (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002, 47.
- James, Harold. *Europe Reborn: A History, 1914–2000*. Harlow: Longman, 2003.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Jiménez, Juan Carlos. 'Las consecuencias económicas de la Guerra Civil', *Revista de Historia Económica*, NO. 1, 1987, 121–30.
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2006.
- , ed. *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939–48*. London: Routledge, 1989.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Kedward, H. R. *France and the French: A Modern History*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2006.
- Keiger, John F. V. *France and the World since 1870*. London: Arnold, 2001.
- Kelly, Saul. *Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the US and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
- Kent, John. *Britain's Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Kindleberger, Charles. *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*. Rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987.
- Klinkhammer, Lutz. *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia: 1943–1945*. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007.
- Kogan, Norman. *Italy and the Allies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Lamb, Richard. *Mussolini and the British*. London: J. Murray, 1997.
- . *War in Italy 1943–1945: A Brutal Story*. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Lanaro, Silvio. *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana: Dalla Fine Della Guerra agli Anni Novanta*. 1st ed. Venezia: Marsilio, 1992.

- Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- and David S. Painter, eds. *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*. Re-writing Histories. London: Routledge, 1994.
- and Odd Arne Westad, eds. *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Leitz, Christian. *Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945*. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- and David Joseph Dunthorn. *Spain in International Context, 1936–59*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999.
- Lepre, Aurelio. *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*. Biblioteca storica. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008.
- Levine, Philippa. *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset*. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007.
- Lorenzini, Sara. *L'Italia e il Trattato di Pace del 1947*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007.
- . 'Alcide De Gasperi e il reinserimento dell'Italia nella scena internazionale, 1944–1948. Introduzione', in Vera Capperucci and Sara Lorenzini (eds.), *Alcide De Gasperi, Scritti e discorsi politici. Edizione critica. Volume III, Alcide De Gasperi e la fondazione della democrazia italiana, 1943–1948*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008, 1335–60.
- Louis, William Roger, and Hedley Bull. *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Lundestad, Geir. *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- . *The American 'Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- . *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- . 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1986, 263–77.
- Lynn, Martin, ed. *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Mammarella, Giuseppe. *La politica estera dell'Italia*. Bari: Laterza, 2010.
- Marino, Giuseppe Carlo. *La Repubblica della Forza: Mario Scelba e le passioni del suo tempo*. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1995.
- Marquina, Antonio. *España en la política de seguridad occidental: 1939–1986*. Madrid: Ediciones Ejército, 1986.
- Martínez, Elena. 'Las consecuencias de la guerra civil en el sector exterior: de la deuda alemana a los pactos de septiembre', in Fuentes and Comín (eds.), *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil*, 535.
- Martínez Lillo, Pedro Antonio. *Una introducción al estudio de las relaciones hispano-francesas, 1945–1951*. Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 1985.
- Mazower, Mark. *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin Books, 2000.
- . *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe*. London: Penguin, 2009.
- McNay, John T. *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001.
- Miller, James Edward, *The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*, Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 1986.
- Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51*. London: Methuen, 1984.
- Moellhausen, Eitel Friedrich, *La carta perdente*. Bergamo: Sestante, 1948.
- Moreno Juste, Antonio. *Franquismo y construcción Europea (1951–1962): Anhelos, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1998.

- Morgan, Philip. *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, the Italians, and the Second World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Nassaes, José Luis Alcofar. *La marina italiana en la guerra de España*. Barcelona: Editorial Euros, 1976.
- . *Los legionarios italianos en la guerra Civil Española 1936–1939*. Barcelona: Dopesa, 1972.
- Neila, José Luis. *España y el Mediterráneo en el siglo XX, de los acuerdos de Cartagena al proceso de Barcelona*, Madrid: Sílex, 2011.
- Nello, Paolo. *Dino Grandi*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003.
- Nenni, Pietro. *Tempo di guerra fredda: Diari, 1943–1956*. Milano: SugarCo, 1981.
- Nicolás, Encarna. *La libertad encadenada: España en la dictadura franquista, 1939–1975*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005.
- Nocera, Raffaele. 'Italia y América Latina: una relación de bajo perfil, 1945–1965. El caso de Chile', in Fernando Purcell and Alfredo Riquelme (eds.), *Ampliando miradas: Chile y su historia en tiempo global*. Santiago de Chile: RIL, 2009, 261–305.
- Northedge, Frederick S. *Descent from Power, British Foreign Policy 1945–1973*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1974.
- Nuti, Leopoldo. *Gli stati uniti e l'apertura a sinistra: Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*. Roma: Laterza, 1999.
- . *L'esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945–1950: La sua ricostruzione e l'assenza militare alleata*. Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 1989.
- Orde, Anne. *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895–1956*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.
- Ovendale, Ritchie, ed. *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945–1951*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984.
- Overy, Richard. *Why the Allies Won*. London: Pimlico, 1996.
- Palazzo, Daniele. *La politica estera di De Gasperi: Dal gennaio 1945 al maggio 1947*. Roma: Prospettiva, 2006.
- Parlato, Giuseppe. *Fascisti Senza Mussolini: Le origini del neofascismo in Italia, 1943–1948*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.
- Patten, Chris. *Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain, and Europe in a New Century*. New York: Times Books, 2006.
- Pecharromás, Julio Gil. *La política exterior del franquismo (1939–1975): entre Hendaya y El Aíun*. Barcelona: Flor del viento, 2008.
- Pedaliu, Effie. 'Truman, Eisenhower and the Mediterranean Cold War, 1947–1957', *The Maghreb Review*, Vol. 31, Nos. 1–2, 2006, 2–20.
- . *Britain, Italy and the Origins of the Cold War*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
- Pereira, Juan Carlos. 'Franquismo y democracia: el desconocimiento de dos historiografías contemporáneas', in Fernando García Sanz (ed.), *Españoles e Italianos en el mundo contemporáneo: I coloquio hispano-italiano de historiografía contemporánea*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990, 309–18.
- , ed. *La política exterior de España (1800–2003): Historia, condicionantes y escenarios*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2003.
- Petri, Rolf. *Storia economica d'Italia: Dalla grande guerra al miracolo economico (1918–1963)*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002.
- Petrilli, Giuseppe. *La politica estera ed Europea di De Gasperi*. Roma: Cinque lune, 1975.
- Pisani, Sallie. *The CIA and the Marshall Plan*. Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1991.
- Pizzigallo, Matteo, ed. *La politica araba dell'Italia democristiana: studi e ricerche sugli anni cinquanta*. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2012.

- Porter, Bernard. *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Portero, Florentino. *Franco Aislado: la cuestión española (1945–1950)*. Madrid: Aguilar, 1989.
- . 'Spain, Britain and the Cold War', in Balfour and Preston (eds.), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*.
- Preston, Paul. *Franco: A Biography*. London: HarperCollins, 1993.
- Purcell, Fernando and Alfredo Riquelme, eds. *Ampliando miradas: Chile y su historia en tiempo global*. Santiago de Chile: RIL, 2009.
- Qāsim, Ahmad Muhammad. *Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*. Modern European History. New York: Garland, 1992.
- Reynolds, David. *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*. London: Longman, 1991.
- . *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Riccardi, Andrea. 'Il Cardinale estero: Giulio Andreotti e la Roma dei papi', in Barone and Di Nolfo (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti*.
- Riquer, Borja de. *La dictadura de Franco*. Barcelona: Crítica/Marcial Pons, 2010.
- Romano, Sergio. *Guida alla politica estera italiana: da Badoglio a Berlusconi*. Milano: BUR Saggi, 2006.
- . *Storia di Francia: Dalla comune a Sarkozy*. Milano: Longanesi, 2009.
- Romero, Federico. 'La scelta atlantica e americana', in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, Interdipendenza, Integrazione*, 156–8.
- and Antonio Varsori, eds. *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione: Le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia, 1917–1989*. Roma: Carocci, 2005.
- Rose, Gideon. 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, 144–72.
- Rosés, Joan. 'Las consecuencias macroeconómicas de la guerra civil', in Fuentes and Comín (eds.), *Economía y economistas españoles en la guerra civil*, 339–64.
- Rothwell, Victor. *Britain and the Cold War, 1941–1947*. London: John Cape, 1982.
- Sabbatucci, Giovanni and Vittorio Vidotto, eds. *Storia d'Italia*. Vol. 5, Roma: Laterza, 1994.
- Salgado, Luís M. Calvo. *Historia del instituto Español de emigración: La política migratoria exterior de España y el IEE del franquismo a la transición*. BPR Publishers, 2009.
- San Román López, Elena. *La industria del automovil en España: El nacimiento de la SEAT*. Madrid: Fundación Empresa Pública, 1995.
- Sánchez Recio, Glicerio and Julio Tascón, *Los empresarios de Franco: Política y economía en España, 1936–1957*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2003.
- Santarelli, Enzo. *Pietro Nenni*. Torino: UTET, 1988.
- Sanz Díaz, Carlos. *España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949–1966): Política, economía y emigración, entre la guerra fría y la distensión*, PhD thesis. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2005.
- Saz, Ismael. *Mussolini contra la II República: Hostilidad, conspiraciones, intervención (1931–1936)*. Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim, Institutió Valenciana d'Estudis i Investigació, 1986.
- . *Fascismo y Franquismo*. Valencia: Publicaciones Universitat de Valencia, 2004.
- and Javier Tusell. *Fascistas en España: La intervención italiana en la guerra civil a través de los telegramas de la «missione militare italiana in Spagna» (15 Diciembre 1936–31 Marzo 1937)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1981.
- Schmidt, Gustav, ed. *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

- Serra, Enrico. *La diplomazia in Italia*. Storia diplomatica. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1984.
- . *Manuale di storia dei trattati e di diplomazia*. Milano: ISPI, 1986.
- . *Manuale di storia delle relazioni internazionali e diplomazia*. Milano: SPAI, 1996.
- Sharp, Alan, and Glyn Stone, eds. *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Smith, Timothy. *The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947–52*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
- Smyth, Denis. 'The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4, October 1994, 537–53.
- Stewart, Andrew. *Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War*. London: Continuum, 2008.
- Suárez Fernández, Luis. *Victoria Frente al bloqueo: Desde 1945 hasta 1953*. Franco, crónica de un tiempo 7. Madrid: Actas, 2001.
- Tappi, Andrea. *Un'impresa Italiana nella Spagna di Franco: Il rapporto Fiat-Seat dal 1950 al 1980*. Perugia: CRACE, 2008.
- Tascón, Julio. 'Capital internacional antes de la 'internacionalización del capital' en España', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio and Julio Tascón, *Los empresarios de Franco: Política y economía en España, 1936–1957*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2003, 281–306.
- Tedeschi, Mario. *Chiesa cattolica e guerra civile in Spagna nel 1936*. Napoli: Guida Editori, 1989.
- Thomàs, Joan Maria. *Roosevelt and Franco during the Second World War: From the Spanish Civil War to Pearl Harbor*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- . *La Falange de Franco. Fascismo y fascistización en el Régimen franquista 1937–1945*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001.
- Tortella Casares, Gabriel. *The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Tusell, Javier. *El dictador y el mediador: Las relaciones hispanoinglesas durante la dictadura de primo de rivera*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1986.
- . *Franco y los católicos: La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957*. Madrid: Alianza, 1984.
- . *Franco, España y la II guerra mundial: Entre el eje y la neutralidad*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995.
- and Genoveva García. *Franco y Mussolini: La política española durante la segunda guerra mundial*. Barcelona: Planeta, 1985.
- and Ismael Saz. *Mussolini y Primo de Rivera: Las relaciones políticas y diplomáticas de dos dictaduras mediterráneas*. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1982.
- , ed. *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975): Política y relaciones exteriores*. Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1993.
- Varsori, Antonio. *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*. 1st ed. Roma: Laterza, 1998.
- . 'Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana', in de Siervo, Guerrieri and Varsori (eds.), *La Prima Legislatura Repubblicana*, 155–68.
- . 'De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign Policy' in Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?*, 89–116.
- . *La cenerentola d'Europa?: l'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.
- . *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943–1957)*. Milano: LED, 1993.
- . 'Gran Bretagna e Italia 1945–1956: il rapporto tra una grande potenza e una piccola potenza?' in Varsori, *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943–1957)*.

- . 'Great Britain and Italy 1945–1956: The Partnership between a Great Power and a Minor Power?' in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 2, 1992, 188–228.
- Viganò, Marino. *Il ministero degli affari esteri e le relazioni internazionali della Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943–1945)*. Milano: Jaca Book, 1991.
- Viñas, Angel. *En las garras del águila: Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2003.
- . *Guerra, Dinero, Dictadura: Ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco*. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1984.
- . *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)*. Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979.
- Wagstaff, Christopher, and Christopher Duggan. *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society 1948–1958*. Oxford: Berg, 1995.
- Watt, Donald Cameron. *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900–1975: A Study of the Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign Policy-making in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- . *Personalities and Policies, Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*. London: Longmans, 1965.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Williamson, Daniel C. *Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-American Relations, 1953–1955*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006.
- Woodward, Llewellyn. *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*. London: HMSO, 1975.
- Woolf, Stuart, ed. *The Rebirth of Italy, 1943–50*. London: Longman, 1972.
- Wylie, Neville, ed. *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977.
- Young, John W. *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990.
- . *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century*. London: Bloomsbury, 1997.
- . *Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993.
- Zartmann, William I., ed. *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009.
- Zubok, Vladimir M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Index

Note: 'n' after a page reference denotes a note on that page.

- ABC, 22n, 133n
Acheson, Dean, 184–5, 195, 271
Aeritalia, 229
Aga Rossi, Elena, 61
Aglío, Emilio Dall', 200
Aguirre de Cárcer, Manuel, 177
Aldisio, Salvatore, 162–7, 181
Alfa Romeo, 229
Alfaro, José María, 16
Allied Control Commission (ACC), 63, 92
Andreotti, Giulio, 151–9, 172, 175–7,
180, 197, 217, 234–5, 239, 252–3,
259–60
Anfuso, Filippo, 40
Anonima Infotuni, L', 37
Ansaldo, 229
Arburua, Manuel de, 200–2, 204, 207
Arias Salgado, Gabriel, 16
Arrese, José Luis, 29
Arriba!, 22n, 133n, 134n
*Asociación Católica Nacional de
Propagandistas (ACNDP)*, 78
Assicurazione Italiana, L', 37
Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e Venezia,
37
Assicurazioni d'Italia, Le, 37
Atlantic Treaty, 120, 122, 157–8, 164,
166, 178–9, 190, 192–3, 196, 215,
242, 244, 247–50, 262, 267, 270, 272
Attlee, Clement, 85
Avanti, 82n, 84, 189, 226
Badoglio, Pietro, 16, 19, 22, 27–9, 34,
39, 42, 45–8, 57, 61–2
Balfour, John, 188
Balzo, Giulio del, 232–3
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), 36,
38, 51, 203
Banco de España, 204
Banco Español de Crédito, 204
Banco Hispano-Americano, 204
Banco Urquijo, 139, 144, 204
Bárceñas, Domingo de las, 17
Benvenuti, Lodovico, 1
Bermúdez, Alejandro, 168
Bevin, Ernest, 108, 122, 132, 163
Bidault, Georges, 97, 122, 177
Blue Division, 21–2, 50, 53
Bo, Rinaldo del, 235
Bonomi, Ivanoe, 16, 61–2, 70, 81
Bonomi, Oreste, 44
Boserman, Antonio, 27
Brundu, Paola, 218
Brusasca, Giuseppe, 162–7, 181
Bushell, John W. C., 251
Caeiro da Mata, José, 130, 157
Canosa, Romano, 49
Canthal, Fernando, 51, 80
Capomazza di Campolattaro, Benedetto,
142, 149, 154–5, 164, 168, 174, 176,
187–8, 233
Carandini, Nicolò, 108
Carceller, Demetrio, 44, 75
Carotenuto, Gennaro, 49, 51, 67
Caruana, Leonard, 44
Casa Arturo Rahola y Compañía, 114
Casa Saccomanno Palau, 114
Casablanca Conference, 25
Castiella, Fernando María, 246
Castillo, Cristobal del, 64–5
Carney, Robert, 227
Carrero Blanco, Luis, 153, 155, 157, 180
Cattani, Attilio, 127
Charles, Sir Noel, 74
Churchill, Winston, 25, 55–6, 58, 61–2,
85, 119, 219
Cianca, Alberto, 98, 103
Ciano, Galeazzo, 232
Collins, Lansing, 253
Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN),
55, 60–2, 82
*Comité Française de la Libération
Nationale (CFLN)*, 31, 51

- Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), 123
- Connally, Tom, 184
- Corpo di Truppe Volontarie (CTV)*, 223
- Corriere della Sera*, II, 203
- Cortés Cavanillas, Julián, 189n
- Count Jordana, 22–4, 28, 33, 41, 45–7, 51, 56, 63, 67
- Count Zoppi, 130, 132, 138, 147–8, 150–1, 155, 158, 162, 164–5, 190, 196–7, 217, 227, 232
- Culbertson, Paul, 131, 133–4
- Debate*, El, 78
- Deighton, Anne, 264
- Dieckhoff, Hans-Heinrich, 29–30, 33
- Ditta Enrico Balbontin*, 113
- Dixon, Pierson, 250
- Dominedò, Francesco, 199
- Dossetti, Giuseppe, 188
- Doussinague, José María, 65, 80
- Ducatti*, 168
- Dulles, John Foster, 220, 248
- Dunn, James, 126, 131, 196
- Einaudi, Luigi, 214
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 25, 27, 45, 237, 247–8
- Elcano, Juan Sebastián*, 224–5
- Empresa Nacional Bazán*, 229–30
- Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica Sociedad Anónima* (Ensidesa), 208–10
- Erice, José Sebastián, 130n, 141, 153, 164
- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 209
- European Recovery Program, *see* Marshall Plan
- Falange Española de las JONS* (Falange), 29, 32, 49–50, 66, 98, 133n
- Fanfani, Amintore, 188, 198, 234
- Fernández Cuesta, Raimundo, 19–20, 29–30, 50
- Fernández Longoria, Francisco, 226
- FIAT, 36, 51, 139–41, 144, 168, 204
- Fimmeccanica*, 229–30
- Folchi, Alberto, 253
- Fouques Duparc, Jacques, 156, 178
- Fraga, Manuel, 243–4
- Franco, Francisco, 20–1, 29–30, 32–3, 39, 47–8, 50, 52, 58–9, 66–7, 72, 77–8, 85–6, 98, 109, 122, 125, 130, 135, 143, 157, 164–5, 178, 185, 189, 199, 223
- Franco, Nicolás, 157
- Fransoni, Francesco, 126
- Gallarati Scotti, Tommaso, 34, 63, 75–80, 82, 93–4, 97, 103–6, 109–12, 114–16, 120, 217
- Gambara, Gastone, 19, 208, 230, 259
- García, Genoveva, 18, 49, 67
- García Comín, Eduardo, 124, 130, 132
- Gasperi, Alcide de, 69, 77, 81–4, 86, 90–1, 96, 98–101, 103, 105–6, 110, 116, 120, 135, 143–4, 147–8, 151–2, 155, 159, 163, 166–7, 175, 178, 184, 188, 192–9, 213, 215–18, 237, 258–9
- Gat, Moshe, 116, 145, 266
- Gaulle, Charles de, 31
- Giornale d'Italia*, II, 84, 245
- Giral, José, 69, 109
- Gómez-Jordana Sousa, Francisco, *see* Count Jordana
- Gonnella, Guido, 235
- Grandi, Dino, 19–20, 29
- Grazzi, Umberto, 168–9, 190, 197, 200, 232
- Griffis, Stanton, 188
- Gronchi, Giovanni, 234, 253
- Guirao, Fernando, 32–3, 92n, 94n, 132, 209
- Hayes, Carlton, 20–1, 24, 26, 41, 45–6, 53–6, 64, 66–7
- Herráiz, Ismael, 16, 134n
- historiography
- British decline/US ascent, 8–9
- Italian foreign policy, 6–7
- Spanish-Italian relations, 3–8
- Spanish foreign policy, 4–6
- Hitler, Adolf, 23, 28
- Hoare, Sir Samuel, 20–1, 24, 26, 46–7, 53, 55–6, 67
- Ibáñez Martín, José, 153
- Iriye, Akira, 10
- Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI)*, 139, 144, 201, 229

- Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni*
(INA), 36, 51
- Italcable*, 37
- Italia Monarchica, L'*, 166
- Italia Nuova*, 104n
- Italy
1948 elections, 134–6
investments in Spain, 35–8, 210–12
peace treaty, 101, 103, 162–3
question of Trieste, 215–16, 222–3, 241
referendum Monarchy-Republic, 99–100
relations with the United States, 192–3
signing of the armistice, 22
- Janelli, Pasquale, 196
- Jiménez-Aranu, José Antonio, 50
- Johnson, Richard, 182
- Judt, Tony, 10
- Kennan, John F., 119, 123
- Kent, John, 264
- Lancia*, 38
- Lange, Halvard, 249
- Lanza D'Ajeta, Blasco, 127, 150, 197
- Le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, 182
- Leffler, Melvyn P., 266–7
- Lequerica, José Félix de, 64, 78
- Leitz, Christian, 79
- Lettera Quotidiana*, 166
- Libertà, La*, 166
- Lloyd, Selwyn, 251
- Lojacono, Giuseppe, 229
- Lotta Politica*, 166
- Lucioli, Mario, 196
- Lundestad, Geir, 8, 266, 272
- Lynn, Martin, 9, 272
- Madrid Trams Company, 80
- Magistrati, Massimo, 232
- Mallet, Sir Victor, 89, 179
- Mallet, Sir William Ivo, 182, 251
- Mancinelli, Giuseppe, 224, 246
- Marconi Española, S.A.*, 229, 231
- Marino, Adolfo, 40
- Marras, Efisio, 224
- Marshall, George, 119, 122–3, 126–7, 132
- Marshall Plan, 119–36, 142, 144–6, 159, 241, 249, 266–7
- Martin Artajo, Alberto, 70, 78, 94–5, 102, 111n, 113, 115, 122, 130, 134–5, 137, 142–3, 153–4, 163, 172–9, 181–4, 187n, 189, 198, 200, 204, 206–7, 217, 222–3, 228, 236, 240–3, 245–6, 248, 257, 259–60, 265, 267
- Martino, Gaetano, 227–8, 231–2, 234, 241, 248, 253
- Mascia, Luciano, 64, 66
- Mazzolini, Serafino, 40
- McGhee, George C., 196
- McNay, John T., 12
- Mediterranean Pact, 178, 241–7, 254, 267
- Merzagora, Cesare, 201, 203–7, 234, 240
- methodology, 9–12
- Microlambda S.A.E.*, 229, 231
- Mieville, Roberto, 166–7
- Molotov, Vyacheslav, 61
- Monde, Le*, 177
- Montecatini, 192
- Moreno Juste, Antonio, 32–3
- Morreale, Eugenio, 27, 40–2, 48, 60, 64–5, 79–81
- Mussolini, Benito, 16, 19–20, 22, 24, 30, 41, 44, 64, 84, 88
- Mussolini regime (collapse of), 18–20, 23, 40
- Navasqués, Emilio, 76–7, 107n, 245, 249
- NATO, *see* Atlantic Treaty
- Nazionale, Il*, 166, 231n
- Neila, José Luis, 32
- Nenni, Pietro, 82n, 98–9, 101, 103–11, 114, 116–17, 260, 264, 266
- Nice Agreements, 43–4, 47, 72–4
- Northedge, Frederick Samuel, 116, 145
- O'Konski, Alvin, E., 130–1
- Olivetti*, 38, 51
- Orde, Anne, 11, 266
- Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 123
- Pacciardi, Randolpho, 109, 198
- Pact of Madrid, 218–22, 225–6, 229, 237, 240–1, 247
- Paese, Il*, 155, 189
- Palacio de Santa Cruz, 4

- Pansa, Paolo, 250, 252–3
 Parri, Ferruccio, 83, 89
 Paulucci di Calboli, Giacomo, 24–7, 29,
 39, 41, 46, 51, 63, 73–5
Pax Romana, 198
 Pearson, Lester B., 249
 Pedini, Mario, 239
 Pella Giuseppe, 214–18, 221–3, 226–7,
 237, 253
 Pereira, Juan Carlos, 3, 115
 Perkins, George, 196
 Petipierre, Max, 248
 Pezzi, Mario, 228
Piaggio, 38
 Piccioni, Attilio, 188, 227
 Pineau, Christian, 182
Pirelli, 38, 51
 Planell, Joaquín, 201
Popolo, Il, 84
 Potsdam Conference, 85–8, 98
 Potsdam Declaration, *see* Potsdam
 Conference
 Preston, Paul, 32
 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 29n
 Prunas, Renato, 33, 96, 100, 107–8
- Quaroni, Pietro, 184
- Relazioni Internazionali*, 177
 Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian
 Social Republic: RSI)
 formation of, 23
 agency in Spain, 27–8, 39–42
 collapse of, 79–81
 Reynolds, David, 11, 264
 Ríos, Fernando de los, 69
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà, 37
 Rockoff, Hugh, 44
 Romano, Sergio, 241
 Romero, Federico, 6
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 56, 58, 61–2
 Rossi Longhi, Alberto, 231–2
 Rovere, Mario, 228
 Rubio López, Julián, 229
- SAFNI, 36
 Salerno Turn, 60–1
 Sangróniz, José Antonio de, 31, 81–2,
 87, 90–2, 94–5, 100–2, 105–7,
 110–14, 117, 126, 135–6, 138, 143,
 147–8, 153–4, 163, 165, 167, 172–3,
 176, 187n, 189n, 200, 217, 225,
 228, 235, 243, 245, 259, 265
 Saragat, Giuseppe, 69, 108n, 198, 228n
 Sargent, Sir Orme, 26
 Saz, Ismael, 50
 Scelba, Mario, 227–8, 231, 234, 241
 Schuman, Robert, 134, 177
 Schwartz y Díaz Flores, Juan, 150
 SEAT, 140–1
 Segni, Antonio, 234
 Serrano Suárez, Ramón, 22, 50
 Sevilla Films, 80
 Sforza, Carlo, 120, 141, 147–9, 163,
 166–7, 172–8, 182, 184, 187–8, 190,
 193, 258, 267
 Sillani, Tommaso, 1
 SNIACE, 36, 80, 140
 SNIA Viscosa, 37, 51, 140
*Sociedad Anónima Financiera Nacional
 Italiana* (SAFNI), 37
Società Finanziaria Siderurgica S.p.A.
 (Finsider), 208–10
 Sorrentino, Paolo, 151
 Spain
 commercial relations, 148–50
 discussion at the UN on, 104–5,
 110–11, 161–2, 185–7
 neutrality during the Second World
 War, 20–2
 oil embargo against, 53–9
 participation in the Atlantic Treaty,
 157–8, 247–54
 policy-making process, 31–3, 77–8
 war debt towards Italy, 35, 72–5, 84–5,
 91–2, 107, 170
 Spanish College of Bologna, 234–6
 Speidel, Hans, 226
 Stalin, Joseph, 61, 85
 Straneo, Carlo Alberto, 250, 252–3
 Suanzes, Juan Antonio, 200–1
 Suárez Fernández, Luis, 153, 174
 Suárez, Tomás, 137–8
- Taliani, Francesco Maria, 1, 151–2, 158,
 188–92, 197, 201, 223, 231, 234, 241
 Tarchiani, Alberto, 162
 Tascón, Julio, 202
 Taviani, Paolo Emilio, 193, 197, 216,
 226, 228, 237, 252–3, 259

- Terracini, Umberto, 155
Terragni, Vittorio Emanuele, 28n
Togliatti, Palmiro, 60–1, 98, 103, 208
Truelle, Jacques, 31
Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas, 165
Truman, Harry S., 85, 119, 131–4, 159,
184–5, 196, 237, 266–7, 269
Tusell, Xavier, 18, 49, 67
- Unità, L'*, 82n, 84
Urbani, Aldo, 228
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 157, 164
- Valletta, Vincenzo, 168
Vanni D'Archirafi, Francesco, 107n, 133,
137–8, 141–2
Varsori, Antonio, 6–7, 258
- Vespucci*, 224
Visconti Venosta, Giovanni, 17, 34, 64,
96
Vittorio Emanuele III, 19, 22, 34, 45,
55, 60
Voce Repubblicana, La, 82n, 84, 189,
218
- Ward, Jack, 107–8
- Ya*, 22n, 78
Yanguas, José, 64–5
Yturralde, Mariano, 137
- Zaslavsky, Victor, 61
Zellerbach, James David, 253
Zoppi, Vittorio, *see* Count Zoppi