Militarized Cultural Encounters in the Long Nineteenth Century

Making War, Mapping Europe

Edited by Joseph Clarke and John Horne

War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850

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Series Editors' Preface

The century from 1750 to 1850 was a seminal period of change, not just in Europe but across the globe. The political landscape was transformed by a series of revolutions fought in the name of liberty—most notably in the Americas and France, of course, but elsewhere, too: in Holland and Geneva during the eighteenth century and across much of mainland Europe by 1848. Nor was change confined to the European world. New ideas of freedom, equality and human rights were carried to the furthest outposts of empire, to Egypt, India and the Caribbean, which saw the creation in 1801 of the first black republic in Haiti, the former French colony of Saint-Domingue. And in the early part of the nineteenth century, they continued to inspire anti-colonial and liberation movements throughout Central and Latin America.

If political and social institutions were transformed by revolution in these years, so, too, was warfare. During the quarter-century of the French Revolutionary Wars, in particular, Europe was faced with the prospect of 'total' war, on a scale unprecedented before the twentieth century. Military hardware, it is true, evolved only gradually, and battles were not necessarily any bloodier than they had been during the Seven Years War. But in other ways, these can legitimately be described as the first modern wars, fought by mass armies mobilized by national and patriotic propaganda, leading to the displacement of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond, as soldiers, prisoners of war, civilians and refugees. For those who lived through the period, these wars would be a formative experience that shaped the ambitions and the identities of a generation.

The aims of the series are necessarily ambitious. In its various volumes, whether single-authored monographs or themed collections, it seeks to extend the scope of more traditional historiography. It will study warfare during this formative century not just in Europe, but in the Americas, in colonial societies and across the world. It will analyse the construction of identities and power relations by integrating the principal categories of difference, most notably class and religion, generation and gender, race and ethnicity. It will adopt a multi-faceted approach to the period, and turn to methods of political, cultural, social, military and gender history, in order to develop a challenging and multidisciplinary analysis. Finally, it will examine elements of comparison and transfer and so tease out the complexities of regional, national and global history.

Acknowledgements

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a fruitful interaction with a sister HERA project, 'Cultural Exchange in a Time of Global Conflict: Colonials, Neutrals and Belligerants during the First World War', led by Dr. Santanu Das at King's College London, who kindly contributed an essay to this volume.

Dublin Joseph Clarke and John Horne

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Peripheral Visions—Militarized Cultural Encounters in the Long Nineteenth Century

Joseph Clarke and John Horne

Charles François's career as a soldier seems a good place to start. Born and raised in Ginchy, a village of less than two hundred souls in Picardy, François enlisted as a teenager in the French infantry on 3 September 1792, and just over two weeks later, he saw his first action at the Battle of Valmy. It is impossible to say whether François shared Goethe's sense that 'a new era in the history of the world' had begun that day, although he did remember it proudly decades later, but enlistment marked the start of a new career for the boy from the backwater by the Somme. That career would carry him across Europe and beyond over the next twenty-three years. In that time he campaigned, unsurprisingly for a Revolutionary soldier, in Holland, the Rhineland and Italy in the mid-1790s. But he also sailed to Egypt in 1798 where, like many later visitors, he carved his name on one of the pyramids. Taken prisoner in 1801, he was despatched to Damascus, where, having already mastered Arabic, he spent the next two

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years in service with the governor of Adrianople, travelling to Baghdad and Jerusalem, Athens and Constantinople along the way. In 1803, with the help of the French ambassador to the Porte, he returned home, rejoined his regiment and campaigned across Europe for another decade. He survived Ulm and Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau and Friedland; he was in Madrid for the *Dos de Mayo* in 1808, and he entered Moscow, or what remained of it, along with what was left of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in September 1812. Nearly three years later, in June 1815, François fought his final battle, at Ligny, and then returned to France to compile the twenty *cahiers* of campaign notes, which, quite remarkably, he had managed to maintain over a lifetime at war.[1]

Admittedly, François's career is unusual. The sheer breadth of his travels; his ability, and willingness, to record his experiences in writing; above all his survival, and surviving a war in which almost a million of his comrades died or disappeared, in which up to seven million lives were lost, was no mean feat: these all mark him out from most of his contemporaries.[2] And yet, Charles François is not exceptional. On the contrary, his career is emblematic, not simply of the generation that went to war in the 1790s and early 1800s, but of this book's subject: the experience of the hundreds of thousands of French and British and German soldiers who retraced at least some of his footsteps in campaigns across and beyond Europe's borders during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and again in the First World War, as well as at various points during the decades between. Over this period, Europe's major powers established or re-established great empires that spanned the globe. That imperial impetus and its cultural consequences have been analysed extensively. But the same powers also mounted military campaigns closer to home, and these expeditions to Europe's southern and eastern frontiers, around the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, the Middle East and over the uncertain borderlands with the Russian Empire, have received less sustained attention, certainly in terms of the soldiers who carried them out. In this sense, Charles François's travels as a soldier encapsulate our focus: the experience of ordinary men uprooted from their ordinary lives who went to the borders of Europe and beyond, and who, in doing so, crossed the limits of what they considered to be 'civilization'.

In order to examine this theme, we privilege the accounts of officers and soldiers themselves, like those of Charles François. Constantly expanding armies and rising literacy rates mean that the sheer volume of soldiers' testimonies increased exponentially between the wars of the Revolution

and the First World War.[3] That transformation can be seen in the nature of the testimonies. As the conventions of military memoir writing and travel literature became more familiar over the nineteenth century, so the soldier's sense of what was expected of him when he put pen to paper evolved. Yet the result is somewhat paradoxical. As Alan Forrest and others have observed, soldiers' letters have always offered a more immediate insight into their experience of war than memoirs and autobiographies subsequently published in peacetime, and that immediacy may even be more intense during the earlier part of our period.[4] Infinitely more soldiers' letters survive from the First World War than remain from the Revolutionary or Napoleonic period. But if the latter are fewer in number, they are also a good deal freer in what they could express about the experiences of war. The Napoleonic *grognard* wrote home, if he could write at all, unencumbered by the *contrôle postal*, the military censorship that oversaw the twentieth-century *poilu's* correspondence, and his accounts may be all the more unconstrained as a result. In addition to soldiers' writings, we look at the reception by home society of those same accounts and to the sense of European civilization that they reflected. In an age marked by the increasingly mass production (and consumption) of images, from prints to film, we pay particular attention to iconography—for the encounters that concern us were constructed by image as well as prose.

In terms of campaigns, for the first great upheaval we take the French expedition to Italy and the French and British expeditions to Egypt, the fighting by both British and French in Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War and the experience of German members of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* as it invaded Russia in 1812. For the parallel epoch of the First World War, we consider German involvement (notionally as advisors) in the Ottoman Empire; the Anglo-French campaign in Greek Macedonia against Bulgaria, Germany and Austria-Hungary; the initial failure of the British and Indian campaign in Mesopotamia, with its defeat at the siege of Kut-al-Amara by Ottoman forces in 1916; and the invasion of Ottoman Palestine and occupation of Jerusalem by a mixed army of British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand troops in 1917–18. In order to explore the trajectories linking these two major periods of global warfare, we consider how the memory of German involvement in the 1812 campaign took literary and popular form across the nineteenth century, helping to shape Germany's military involvement on its own account in the same region during the Great War. We also look at Egypt under permanent British occupation from 1881, and especially at how the British exacted retribution

on the Sudan, which, under the Madhi, had revolted against British control from Egypt, leading to the assassination of the Governor General, George Gordon, in Khartoum in 1885. In 1898, a British expeditionary force under General Horatio Kitchener defeated the Sudanese rebels at Omdurman, site of the Mahdi's new capital, which it destroyed in symbolic revenge for Gordon's 'martyrdom'.

The encounters between expeditionary soldiers and the societies in which they campaigned of course played out in different frameworks, and we have selected some of these in order to structure this book. In the first section, 'Encounters', we give primacy to the soldiers' own written accounts of what they met—from Napoleonic Egypt to Allied Macedonia. Conscious that limitations in language and sources prevent us giving the view from the other side, we nonetheless show in 'Counter-Encounters' that, by definition, such encounters could never be unilateral. If power relations were asymmetric, the indigenous were far from passive, as Zeinab Abul-Magd shows in the case of Napoleonic-dominated Egypt. They had their own views of foreign incursion into their lives, which shaped and limited what the intruders could achieve. The European expeditions to the Levant also involved colonial soldiers from elsewhere (as well as metropolitan troops), especially in the period of the First World War. This gave rise to 'lateral encounters' between the indigenous inhabitants and imperial soldiers for whom the peripheries of Europe were far more remote than they were to Europeans.

The meetings of Europeans (and their more distant subjects) on the margins of their own continent were not just with other human beings but also an alien physical environment. This prompted attempts at 'Capturing Landscapes' (our third section) by graphic means, from drawing to film. Finally, force lay at the heart of the interaction between European armies and the peoples over whom they had temporary or long-term control. It shaped the work they undertook to reorganize them, including the question of what to do with civilizations that not only had ancient roots but were also perceived to be central to European identity. The final section of the book thus examines the 'Power and Patrimonies' on which the ambitions and success (or failure) of the expeditions turned beyond their immediate role in the wars of which they were part.

Our hope overall is that we may better understand what these soldiers and their expeditions experienced as they went to their own continent's peripheries, encountering exotic landscapes and peoples in the context of war and military occupation, and what they did there and remembered of

it afterwards. We also hope at least to pose the question of whether their attitudes and activities were set in essence from the start, and merely amplified by a century of colonialism between two major periods of war, or whether the nature of their encounters changed in substance. What coherence (if any) does the long nineteenth century have in the history of this military mapping of Europe's relationship with itself via its proximate margins? The reader will judge whether what follows lives up to these ambitions. By way of introduction it seems worth sketching what seem to us some conclusions of the book and the three-year research project on which it is based.

The accounts from the margins of Europe are fundamentally self-reflexive. They not only describe what the soldiers experienced but also define (implicitly or explicitly) the selves that underwent that experience. As such, they offer an insight into what it meant to be modern, to be European, to be 'civilized'. In the process they also reveal much about the changing nature of warfare. The conflict that engulfed Europe for a generation from 1792 onwards may or may not represent a rupture in the way that war was waged; it may or may not constitute 'the first total war' as David Bell has argued.[5] Indeed, historians debate whether the even greater conflagration of the First World War, which closed the long nineteenth century, was 'total' compared to its successor twenty years later. Some of the authors in this book have engaged directly with these issues. But it is clear from the contributions of all of them that these expeditions radically transformed Europeans' experience of travel and, with it, their sense of both themselves and the world around them. They also placed soldiers at the heart of that movement. Whereas comparatively small professional forces conducted earlier colonial campaigns, in the Americas or India, the mass mobilization that began with the Revolutionary wars and climaxed in the twentieth century changed that. It did not simply give rise to the largest armies ever seen; it carried them in unprecedented numbers to places like Madrid and Moscow, Alexandria and Jerusalem, places that few of their contemporaries could ever hope to see. These expeditions took men further afield, and in larger numbers, than any conflicts before them, and they exposed them to experiences, landscapes, cultures and languages that had previously been accessible only to an elite of explorers, diplomats and merchant adventurers. In the century and a half before the advent of mass tourism transformed the nature of travel, these soldiers were Europe's most numerous, and most intrepid, travellers.

In some respects, they behaved like any other kind of traveller. Wherever they went, they haggled with traders over prices, hired donkeys to visit places of interests and complained (constantly) about the food. Often, they also arrived in these far-flung places with the most up-to-date travel literature in their baggage. The Comte de Volney's *Voyages en Égypte et en Syrie* was all but required reading for French officers in 1798, and extracts were even made available to their men.[6] A hundred and twenty years later, works like George Adam Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* served a similar purpose among British officers serving in Palestine. Consulting such studies was part of these men's preparation for conducting a campaign on unfamiliar ground, but this pursuit of intelligence, in whatever form, had another effect too. Having read and reflected on the latest geographies and guidebooks, the soldiers' accounts of their experiences abroad sometimes reflect something of the travel-writer's influence. Although some testimonies restrict themselves to stories of camp life or the minutiae of marches and manoeuvres, the vast majority do not, with most offering at least some insight into the men's impressions of the cultures they came into contact with and the spaces they occupied. Like so many civilians experiencing the exotic and unfamiliar abroad, their letters and diaries frequently lavish detail on the sights, sounds and smells they encountered there, just as they recount their struggles with strange languages and their incomprehension of unfamiliar customs. The soldiers sometimes wrote as travellers, but for all that, they were never simply travellers, much less tourists, and their writings reflect a very different point of view from that of the handful of well-heeled and well-connected explorers and ethnographers whose books they often carried with them. As Samuel Hynes astutely observes in *The Soldiers' Tale*:

> war narratives are something like travel writing, something like autobiography, something like history. But different too. They're not travel writing, because a travel book makes the reader feel that he knows the place he is reading about… War narratives don't do that; though they make war vivid, they don't make it familiar.[7]

These soldiers may have expressed similar views on Italy's churches, Egypt's antiquities or Palestine's peoples as the travellers who preceded them to these places, and they might express many of the same prejudices and preconceptions as their civilian counterparts. And yet, despite those similarities, there is a military specificity to what they saw abroad and how

they saw it. This was determined by the fact that they were often reluctant soldiers and even more unenthusiastic travellers, by the fact that they were men with an explicitly gendered perspective, by the fact that their movements were subject to standing orders and their encounters with civilian populations carefully controlled and by the fact that those encounters were often unsympathetic, if not openly antagonistic. Above all it was defined by invasion and occupation. The inescapable violence of campaigning—enduring it as much as inflicting it—distinguishes these men from other travellers in other contexts. And it explains the uniquely military perspective they brought to bear on the cultures they encountered: the soldiers' gaze that many essays in this volume explore.

Certainly, the scale of the expeditions changed dramatically in the century between the Revolutionary wars and the First World War. The 36,000-man *Armée de l'Orient* that landed in Egypt in 1798, for example, pales in comparison to its twentieth-century equivalent, the half-a-million strong Allied *Armée d'Orient* that manned the Macedonian front from 1915 on.[8] Such numbers suggest a dramatic transformation in the scale and scope of these conflicts. And yet, that appearance of a radical evolution from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries may be deceptive, and it is the connections and continuities between these campaigns that strike us most here. In purely military terms, few of the expeditions to the edges of Europe were ever particularly decisive, or at least not for the regimes that embarked upon them. With the exception of the Russian campaign of 1812, they were, to borrow Lloyd George's rather disparaging description of the Salonika front, so many 'side-shows' in the midst of wars that were, for the most part, decided elsewhere.[9] In 1796 and 1798, for instance, the French invasions of Italy and Egypt were never imagined as anything other than diversions by the Directory that launched then, although admittedly Bonaparte had other ideas, and the same might be said over a century later for the German forces sent to bolster Ottoman resolve in the Middle East during the First World War. In comparison to the millions of men Germany mobilized during the war, the 25,000 troops assigned to the *Asienkorps* and the *Deutsche Militärmission in der Türkei* are a measure of how marginal that campaign appeared to the authorities in Berlin.[10] Even Clemenceau's jibe about the 'gardeners of Salonika' suggests how distant the Macedonian front must have seemed when German guns were just forty miles from Paris. These expeditions were, both geographically and strategically, peripheral. And yet, that very quality gave them their wider cultural resonance, their capacity to reflect and refract,

perhaps redefine, what it meant to be modern, 'civilized', even European, as Europe's powers and peoples, embraced modernity.

These questions and concerns are not new. Historians such as Edward Said, Stuart Woolf, Anthony Pagden, Maria Todorova, Larry Wolff and Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius have pioneered the study of Europe's encounter with the wider world during this period by exploring where and how the West defined itself in opposition to its imagined others, in the New World, in the East, in what was perceived as an alien and infantilized Orient.[11] The agenda these scholars have set out informs many of the questions addressed in this collection. And yet, their works have probed these complex problems primarily from the perspective of the continent's cultural elite, its philosophers, poets and artists, its explorers, ethnographers and intellectuals, not its ordinary men and women. There has been little place in these intellectual histories of European identity and 'otherness' for those who never entered Europe's salons and learned societies, and less for the unremarkable likes of François who left school at thirteen after what he admitted was a 'very neglected' education or William Brown, a cobbler's son from Kilmarnock, both of whom criss-crossed the continent in the course of these wars.[12] The largely conscript forces that made up the armies of the First World War dispatched equally ordinary men *en masse* to the margins of Europe without their voices entering decisively into intellectual histories of how Europe simultaneously reached the apogee of its own claim to 'civilization' while profoundly undermining it during that conflict. These soldiers were not the savants that scholars normally turn to when they want to know what Europe was, where it began and ended and how it understood the world beyond its shores, but that is precisely their appeal. For however imperfect their education might have been and however makeshift their letters, diaries and memoirs might seem in comparison to those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' essayists and ethnographers, they carried out their own kind of cultural cartography on campaign, and made and remade their own mental maps of modernity in the process. Through their accounts of their travels to the ends of Europe, these soldiers allow us a glimpse of how the unexceptional, relatively uneducated majority of Europeans arrived at their own conclusions about the relationship between 'civilization' and its 'savage' other.

If, as Edward Said suggested in his scintillating study of Orientalism, there is a 'line that starts with Napoleon' in Egypt that continues on through the nineteenth century 'in similar undertakings' across Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East, there is also a connection between

Charles François and the French or British or German soldiers who succeeded him in Spain in 1823, in North Africa in 1830, in Rome in 1849 or the Crimea in the 1850s, or Egypt (again) in the 1880s or Salonika, Jerusalem or Mesopotamia in the 1910s.[13] Sometimes, that connection is personal. As Fergus Robson points out in Chap. 2, many of the officers who led the French conquest of Algeria in the early 1830s, generals like Anne-Jean-Marie Savary, Bertrand Clauzel or Pierre-François Boyer, had cut their teeth in Napoleonic Italy, Egypt and Spain, and they applied many of the ideas, and employed many of the methods, they had acquired during those brutal campaigns to the colonization of Algeria decades later. Charles Townshend, the general who led the mixed Anglo-Indian force up the Tigris in Ottoman Mesopotamia in 1915–16, only to be besieged and captured at Kut-al-Amara (leading to the Odyssey of Indian prisoners recounted by Santanu Das in Chap. 8), had begun his career thirty years earlier in another failed river expedition down the Nile to rescue General Gordon, besieged by the Sudanese at Khartoum, an episode that helped trigger the retribution levied by the British in 1898 and whose imagery Paul Fox discusses in Chap. 5.

Elsewhere, the relationship between expeditions might be a matter of genealogy. When General Charles-Nicolas Oudinot, another of Napoleon's men, landed his 10,000 French troops at Civitavecchia to quash the newly established Roman Republic in April 1849, he was following a path into Italy that had been traced fifty years before by his father, Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio.[14] The practices and attitudes of many of the British officers and soldiers who campaigned across Palestine had been formed by years of occupation in Egypt and India (Ronald Storrs, the first British Military Governor of Jerusalem, had been a civilian official specializing in Arab affairs in the British administration of Egypt). These continuities in terms of individual careers or family trees suggest the close connections that tie some of these expeditions across time.

But overwhelmingly the continuities between the campaigns are cultural ones at a broader level. They are a matter of common attitudes, aspirations and anxieties, of stories passed on from one generation to the next, of a collective memory of encounters abroad that reaches well beyond the scope of any individual military career or any family tradition of armed service. The French as they landed in Greek Macedonia in 1915, for example, were aware they had been that way before, helping Greece in the Peloponnese during the War of Independence nearly ninety years earlier, from 1828 to 1833. Continuities arose above all from practices rooted

in the imperatives of campaigning in distant lands amidst (or against) indigenous peoples who seemed to occupy a different place in the pattern of human development.

Such continuities can be traced in the assumptions soldiers regularly expressed and the language they repeatedly used, from one end of the long nineteenth century to the other, as they described the contrast between the modern 'civilization' they assumed they embodied and the societies with which they came into contact on Europe's 'violent edge of empire', to borrow Ferguson and Whitehead's term, societies they repeatedly described as 'backward', 'brutal' or 'barbaric'.[15] This continuity can be seen in the commonality of complaints that accompanied their arrival in towns and cities throughout the Mediterranean world or as they crossed the marchlands between German-speaking central Europe and the Slavic east. It is there in their constant carping about dirt, idleness and disease, about the treatment of women and the absence of order, and it is evident in the disillusionment they expressed when they contrasted the past glories of cities like Rome, Alexandria or Jerusalem with what they saw as their present dilapidation, their decadence. However uneducated some of these soldiers were, they were profoundly aware that war had carried them to the cradles of Western civilization on the continent's fringes, and they viewed the cultures they encountered there accordingly.

That historical consciousness naturally varied according to education and rank. Classically educated officers entered Italy or the Aegean with Virgil or Homer in mind (and generally found the discrepancy between the classical ideal and the contemporary reality disenchanting at best), while some, as Catriona Kennedy notes of General Abercromby in Chap. 9, even recalled their reading of Caesar as they conducted their own campaigns. For the men they commanded, by contrast, the Mediterranean world was more often viewed in the light of half-remembered narratives of the mediaeval past, their reading of Scripture or lessons learnt at Sunday school. From 1798, when even ordinary infantrymen like François Vigo-Roussillon repeatedly evoked 'the time of the Crusades' to describe their experiences in Egypt, to 1918 when, as Mahon Murphy shows in Chap. 15, the crusader myth loomed large in British reflections on entering Jerusalem, these soldiers' perceptions of the distant past framed their sense of a present defined by the idea of decline.[16]

The constantly repeated perception of decadence and decline did not just express the condescension or casual contempt these men so often felt when confronted by cultures they did not comprehend and societies they

assumed to have regressed. It inspired a will to reform, rebuild and regenerate, and that will was expressed throughout a Mediterranean world that was seen as ripe for reclamation, as Justin Fantauzzo argues in Chap. 6. Sometimes the soldiers arrived as advisors or allies like the Prussian military experts sent to prop up an ailing Ottoman Empire from the 1830s onwards or the Anglo-French forces that ran Macedonia behind the front in a Greece divided over the war. More often, they came as conquerors and colonizers although, as Zeinab Abul-Magd notes in Chap. 7, that normally meant assuming the guise of liberators. In either case, most of these expeditions implemented what they understood as the West's self-proclaimed 'civilizing mission' when it came in contact with what it saw as backward or barbaric. The scope of that mission is evident in these expeditions' unrelenting efforts to map landscapes and re-shape cities, to count and classify peoples, religions and languages, to improve, enlighten and educate, in short, to civilize, as they saw it, societies that had fallen short of what these men understood modernity to be. From Bonaparte's attempts to clean up Cairo's streets, remodel its public spaces and regenerate its *mœurs* to the Allied armies' campaign to modernize Macedonia's agriculture, infrastructure and public hygiene in 1916–18, the armies repeatedly tried to impose what they saw as progress at the point of a bayonet. Sometimes, when an army was threatened by disease—the plague in Egypt or malaria in Macedonia—or when supplies were short and communications difficult, such measures were a matter of military necessity. More often, however, the proliferation of surveys and censuses, of plans for agricultural improvement and designs for urban renewal, was integral to what these expeditions understood to be their 'civilizing work' (as John Horne puts it in Chap. 14), an almost obsessive insistence on exporting their idea of modernity to Europe's margins.

How permanent did such 'work' prove to be? Some of the expeditions (as already noted) were no more than episodes in a larger war. This was true of the French campaigns in Italy and Egypt, the French and German invasions of the Russian Empire a century apart, the German presence in the Ottoman Empire and the Allied occupation of Greek Macedonia. Even here, a material legacy might well remain. The Russians burned Moscow (in self-defence) in 1812 and in a Russophile reaction rejected French aristocratic *mœurs* under the impact of the invasion (so memorably described by Tolstoy in *War and Peace*).[17] Yet at the same time, French ideas of modernity and political change infused elite movements for reform, which the invasion also generated, contributing to the Decembrist

uprising in 1825. Likewise, as Zeinab Abul-Magd shows, Muhammad Ali Pasha, a young Ottoman officer who helped defeat Napoleon's invasion, had emerged by the 1820s as the modernizing ruler of Egypt. And in this endeavour, he was profoundly influenced by Napoleon's example. He pressed French ideas, organizations and people into support of his reforms, confirming a French cultural pre-eminence in Egypt that would endure until the British colonized the country in 1881.

It was, however, precisely colonialism and the relationship of expeditionary campaigns to more permanent versions of empire that proved the major vector connecting the 'civilizing' enterprise, and all that went with it, from the formative period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to its culmination in the decade of the First World War. As Fergus Robson points out, Algeria (colonized after an initial expedition in 1830) was the crucial link in the French case, since it both drew on the Egyptian precedent and forged colonial practices that would later be applied elsewhere in North and West Africa and to French Indo-China. The French *Armée d'Orient* in Macedonia did not consciously engage in a colonial enterprise, but this makes it all the more telling (as Horne points out) that its activities (including its anti-malarial campaign) and the attitudes of the French soldiers were deeply informed by the intervening century of colonial activity and consciousness, especially around the Mediterranean.

In the case of Britain, as already suggested, Egypt provided a crucial matrix of colonial experience for subsequent engagement in the Levant during and after the First World War. It occupies a central place in this volume in showing how a contingent expedition at the end of the eighteenth century turned into a long-term occupation that became the principal launch pad for the British capture of Palestine in 1917, and a further thirty-year occupation of that country which proved decisive in shaping the modern Middle East. The British went to Egypt in response to Napoleon and his conclusive demonstration that control over the Levant (and also South Africa, which the British acquired at the same time) governed the fate of India. Once the Suez Canal was built, Egypt controlled the main artery of the British Empire, leading to British annexation of what remained (in theory) an Ottoman province in 1881. Neither Britain nor France went to war in 1914 with the intention of taking over the Middle East. This was an unintended consequence of the Young Turks' decision to enter the conflict and of Ottoman defeat.[18] But it produced the last great imperial carve-up, with France taking Syria and Lebanon and Britain controlling Mesopotamia (Iraq) as well as Palestine.

This crucial sequence of expeditions and colonial regimes in North Africa and the Near East across the long nineteenth century supplied the dynamic that made the 'civilizing mission' and the kinds of work it entailed (destructive as well as constructive) central to the encounters of European soldiers with the peoples on Europe's peripheries. The failure of Napoleon's invasion of Russia to achieve any form of French hegemony in that region meant that no such 'civilizing' work could be undertaken there (unlike in Italy and Egypt). But that is just what the German army did begin to undertake during the First World War in the vast reaches of eastern Poland, Bielorussia and the Baltic states, until defeat ended the experiment, at least for the time being.[19]

Whether short-term or lasting in their material impact, European expeditions to the periphery of the continent were concerned with the past almost as much as the present. For, as noted, the very emphasis on a civilizing mission posed the question of their relations with the civilizations of the past. Russia, in this regard, was an exception in French and German eyes both during the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. For all that Russians might consider Moscow the Third Rome, the invaders from the West on both occasions perceived Europe beyond the Pripyat Marsh as a barbaric and alien zone requiring the stamp of civilization and ultimately settlement, as Leighton S. James shows in Chap. 4. Elsewhere, however, the expeditionary armies confronted a fundamental paradox of European 'civilization' itself, namely, that the sites of its founding myths and key imaginary landscapes lay either outside Europe, in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Ottoman Turkey, or if within the continent, beyond the Europe that currently saw itself as embodying modernity and thus inheriting the mantle of classical antiquity or Christendom. This was notably the case with Italy, and especially Rome (as Robson shows for the revolutionary armies) and also with Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the Great War for the Allies and Germans, respectively.

Campaigning armies thus took the preservation of the 'patrimony' of the regions they went to as one of their primary forms of 'work' and one of the principal markers of their own civilized values. Yet this in turn raised the question of whose 'patrimony' it was—that of the indigenous society, so frequently dismissed as decadent and incapable of conserving (or even understanding) its own riches—or that of the current self-appointed guardians of civilization. From May 1796, when the French Directory enlisted some of France's leading artists in a roving commission to assist Bonaparte's army in evaluating, and expropriating, the best of Italy's art,

many of these expeditions arrived with small armies of art experts and archaeologists in tow, intellectuals anxious to exploit the opportunities afforded by a military occupation to survey, excavate, catalogue and, in many cases, commandeer the antiquities and *objets d'art* of the lands they occupied.[20] The savants who accompanied Bonaparte into Egypt two years later served the same agenda.

Over a century on, the *Deutsch-Türkisches Denkmalschutzkommando* (German-Turkish Monument Protection Command), that Oliver Stein describes in Chap. 13, engaged in identical activities, albeit with more sophisticated methods, in the Ottoman Empire. So, too, did the Allied armies in Macedonia and the British in Jerusalem at the same time. Much of this work was impeccably scholarly in intent, but identification and excavation were often a prelude to plunder pure and simple, and many of the *chefs-d'oeuvre* or antiquities these savants uncovered quickly made their way into the collections of a museum—or a general—in Paris, London or Berlin. As Joseph Clarke argues in Chap. 3, the politics of pillage could be as brutally straightforward as it was in Italy throughout the *triennio* or Spain during the Peninsular War; or as Stein notes, it might be complicated by the need to maintain relations with the local authorities. And yet, whether plunder was a matter of premeditated policy, individual enrichment or exuberant iconoclasm, it proceeded from a common assumption, in the 1790s as in the 1910s, that local populations could not, and should not, be entrusted with the preservation of their own cultural patrimony.

Soldiers steal and armies regularly requisition goods. Food, money, church plate, paintings and statues—they have always been subject to the soldier's acquisitive gaze. The comings and goings over seven centuries of the bronze quadriga atop the loggia of Venice's San Marco basilica are proof enough of that, but many of the expeditions we are concerned with elevated expropriation to an art form itself and rationalized it according to a new vocabulary of civilized superiority. Unlike their civilian counterparts, the tourists, connoisseurs and antiquarians who acquired art or artefacts abroad through complex negotiations and cash transactions, these soldiers were in a position to take what they wanted simply because they could and the temptation was often difficult to resist. Looting was, as Gregorian has argued, 'endemic' in nineteenth-century conflicts and this kind of brute force built up both public and private art collections, not to mention regimental museums, in Britain, France and Germany throughout these campaigns.[21] Often, the same force was used to more destructive

ends, and sometimes soldiers simply smashed what they could not easily steal. From Saleieh's mosque, blown up by French troops in 1798 seemingly because the height of its minaret offended an officer, to the British shelling of the Mahdi's tomb in Omdurman exactly a century later, these expeditions may have posed as the protectors of cultural patrimony abroad, but they were its destroyers just as often, and those acts of destruction possessed, as Paul Fox shows in Chap. 5, multiple, complex meanings for both the soldiers themselves and their contemporaries at home.[22]

The obliteration, or expropriation, of indigenous art and architecture may have been one of these expeditions' most enduring legacies, but soldiers created their own visual record too. This was sometimes commissioned at the behest of the authorities, as in the images of Palestine produced by the official war artists, photographers and film-makers that Jennifer Wellington discusses in Chap. 11. Alternatively, it might be composed, like the prints Tom Gretton analyses in Chap. 10, to satisfy (or even unsettle) a domestic viewing public's appetite for images of imperial derring-do. Crucially, however, the images that emerged from these expeditions differ markedly from those produced by civilian travellers during the same period. In some cases, the soldier's gaze was a particularly practised one, and, like the painter Roger Irriera stationed in Salonika in 1916, some soldiers were accomplished artists long before conflict carried them abroad as combatants. Others, like the officer-artists discussed in Catriona Kennedy's chapter on British sketches of the Egyptian campaign of 1801, were soldiers first and foremost, but tellingly, they were soldiers who had acquired some artistic skill as part of their military training. By the end of the eighteenth century, the ability to survey terrain and produce reliable sketches or maps of it was seen as an important part of an officer's training, just as some talent with a set of watercolours was considered increasingly indispensable among refined young gentlemen.[23]

There was an obviously strategic purpose to many of these soldiers' campaign sketches and topographical drawings, but their images also reflect an attempt to subject the exotic to the discipline of a soldier's way of seeing, to master it by making it measurable and to tame it by codifying it within the known, and knowable, conventions of an established aesthetic. And, crucially, as visual subject matter, landscapes (and buildings) proved as important as people. In these officers' charts and sketches, the unfamiliar was moulded to meet the demands of military need and to match prevailing tastes for the antique and the picturesque. But for others, particularly in the ranks, these images were less about imposing order on

the unfamiliar than they were an expression of the ordinary soldier's confusion—and sometimes consternation—when confronted with that unfamiliarity. The young French NCO, Joseph Laporte, for example, was so convinced that 'reading can never produce the same impression as sight' that he included thirty-four sketches of Egypt in the diary of his time there in the late 1790s.[24] Those clumsily drawn, crudely coloured sketches of 'bizarre' costumes, strange landscapes and exotic animals conform to few artistic conventions and possess no strategic value. And yet, for all their naïveté, Laporte's attempts to 'faithfully' record the unsettling otherness of Egyptian life as he saw it reflect something of his sense of having arrived, very abruptly, 'in another world'.[25] For soldiers like Laporte in the 1790s or, a century later, for the amateur photographers that Paul Fox analyses in Chap. 5, the soldiers who arrived in Egypt and the Sudan with cheap Kodak cameras in their kitbags, the desire to visually document their experiences on campaign owed little enough to any strategic imperative and possibly less to an Orientalist aesthetic or the 'imperial picturesque'. Rather, these unschooled sketches and poorly framed photographs represent an attempt to record in memory something of the disorientation the men experienced on encountering the Orient for themselves.

Whether written, sketched or later photographed, soldiers' testimonies were often composed for personal or purely family consumption, but they also played a critical role in constructing a wider collective memory of Europe's relationship with the world around its frontiers. That memory was communicated in soldiers' letters home, in veterans' reminiscences on their return from the front, in the spoils they brought with them and in the press. Military newspapers, from the *Courrier de l'Armée d'Italie* in 1796 to *The Palestine News* in 1918, circulated and sought to shape that memory within the armies themselves, while a host of publications—from Napoleon's assorted *Bulletins*, to the *Illustrated London News*, to the reports of war correspondents embedded within these expeditions during the First World War—conveyed a carefully sanitized version of the same memory back to home audiences. However, even here, as Gretton points out, the complexity of the encounters and glimpses of the 'counter-encounter' from the other side edged into representations of war and military occupation on the exotic margins of Europe—in this case in the form of drawings by perhaps the best-known British illustrator of his generation, Richard Caton Woodville.

Above all, the memory of the expeditions was transmitted from one generation to the next in the vast collections of campaign diaries, soldiers'

correspondence and military memoirs that poured off Europe's presses throughout the long nineteenth century. Leighton S. James and Sheona Davies chart the evolution of that publishing history and the transmission of those memories in print throughout German-speaking Europe in Chap. 12, but it was mirrored across Europe, distinguishing these soldiers' stories from those of the armies that went before them. Soldiers have always told stories, but these soldiers' stories are different because, from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, ordinary soldiers were increasingly able and inclined, as Yuval Noah Harari and others have argued, to write their stories down. Just as importantly, there was an audience at home for their accounts in book and magazine form. The soldier's tale had become everyman's tale.[26]

Presenting the relationship between expeditionary soldiers from Europe and the peoples they met on the periphery (their periphery) as a binary one is, however, too simple, for reasons already alluded to. The colonialism that we have argued underpinned Europe's relations with its margins also meant that colonial soldiers from elsewhere in the British and French empires fought alongside metropolitan troops in those same campaigns. The practice developed gradually (and indeed was a natural extension of the co-option of domestic indigenous forces to administer colonies such as India), but it exploded numerically under the manpower pressures of the First World War, with the British and French employing large numbers of colonial soldiers in Macedonia and the Middle East.

In the case of the Australians whom Jennifer Wellington considers in Chap. 11, self-identification as settler colonists from the other side of the world, but who nonetheless belonged to the imperial motherland, led to a distinctive experience of Palestine (in capturing which they played an important role). More strange and disorienting was the trajectory of French *tirailleurs sénégalais* (troops from West Africa and the Caribbean) or North Africa, who fought in Macedonia and later Syria (as well as in France), let alone the more than a million Indian soldiers and militarized labourers who served mainly in Mesopotamia and Palestine (where they finished up composing the bulk of the British force that finally defeated the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918). As Santanu Das shows in Chap. 8 through the remarkable diary of an educated Bengali medical orderly taken prisoner at Kut-al-Amara, the complexities of empire far beyond the periphery of Europe were an important part of campaigning on that periphery in the Great War. Empire itself, especially in wartime, generated unusual and unlooked for encounters between subaltern peoples.

If the continuities that link these different expeditions to the edge of Europe emerge strongly from this book, that is not to downplay the dramatic changes that occurred in the way the wars were waged and in the nature of soldiers' encounters with the 'other' beyond the continent. The escalation of colonial power, the application of a supposedly 'scientific' terminology of 'race' to describing other peoples, the size of armies and the sheer military force that Britain, France and Germany (and also Italy and Russia) could bring to bear on Europe's margins, all increased decisively over the span of the long nineteenth century. And however much indigenous peoples, elites and leaders (like Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt) internalized aspects of European values and organization, the forcible imposition of alien rule in the long run generated even stronger reactions against it. This started almost immediately after the First World War with the Egyptian revolt in 1919, with the Turkish war of independence at the expense of the victorious Allies in 1920–23 and with Syrian and Palestinian opposition to French and British rule, respectively, between the wars.

Following the Second World War, the reaction became unstoppable as the colonial powers fought their last campaigns in North Africa and the Levant (Palestine, Egypt, Cyprus, Algeria) in a fruitless effort to keep Europe's southern and eastern periphery under their control. Now torture, repression and plans for forced resettlement (in Algeria) became the price of preserving the periphery until, in all the above cases, the tables finally turned, forcing evacuation and retreat.[27] In a more extreme development, Nazi Germany resumed the colonization of Europe's eastern periphery with racial plans for ethnic cleansing, genocide and German resettlement during the Second World War. Whether these later military expeditions deployed different, more brutal, languages of 'civilization', and how far they were (or were not) connected with the military encounters discussed in this book, seem questions worth posing.

Yet the final word should go to the ordinary soldiers who remain our principal focus. Their capacity to inflict and endure extraordinary levels of violence (the brutality Leighton S. James analyses in his essay on German experiences in, and memories of, the retreat from Russia in 1812) is a constant throughout the campaigns we discuss. But so too are the gestures of intimacy and compassion that Santanu Das describes. As his chapter makes clear, kindness could cut across both enemy lines and cultural boundaries, even in the midst of conflict. While the episodes he discusses may be particular to the horrors of the Mesopotamian front in 1915–16, many of the soldiers' testimonies bear witness to something of the same

capacity to transcend, however fleetingly, the immediate circumstances of conflict and offer solace and sympathy to an ostensible enemy or human engagement with occupied peoples. Those moments may be few and far between, but as Clarke suggests in Chap. 3, empathy and affinity can be found alongside enmity in the 1810s as well. Perhaps above all, the soldiers' natural scepticism of officialdom and the officer corps, their cynicism when confronted by grandiose speeches about civilization and civilizing missions, echoes across all of these expeditions. The men who referred, not so respectfully, to Napoleon's propagandist *Bulletins* as the *Menteur* [the Liar] in the 1810s are probably not so very different from the troops who, as Jaroslav Hasek wryly noted in *The Good Soldier Švejk*, a century later, consigned their Austro-Hungarian equivalents to the nearest latrine as soon as they received them.[28] For most of these men encountering the alien and the unfamiliar abroad, their main mission was less to civilize the 'other' than simply to survive.

Notes

1. C. François, *Journal du capitaine François, dit le dromadaire d'Égypte 1792–1830* (Paris, 2003 ed.).
2. For these causality figures, see G. Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870* (London, 1982), p. 114, and C. Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803–1815* (London, 2007), p. 561.
3. M. Lyons, *The Writing Culture of Ordinary People in Europe, c.1860–1920* (Cambridge, 2013).
4. A. Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London, 2002).
5. D. A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleons Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (New York, 2007). For other perspectives on this question, see, for example, M. Hewitson, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands, 1792–1820* (Oxford, 2017), and M. Broers, 'The Concept of 'Total War' in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period', *War in History*, 15 (2008), pp. 247–68; R. Chickering, 'Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept', in F. Boemeke, R. Chickering and S. Forster, eds., *Anticipating Total War; the German and American Experiences, 1871–1914* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 13–28, and U. Planert, 'Innovation or Evolution? The French Wars in Military History', in R. Chickering and S. Förster, eds., *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 69–84; J. Horne, ed., *Vers la guerre totale: le tournant de 1914–15* (Paris, 2010), pp. 11–31.

6. On Volney's appeal in the French army in 1798, see C. de Pelleport, *Souvenirs militaires et intimes du general Vte de Pelleport, de 1793 à 1853*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1857), i, p. 175, and J. Miot, *Mémoires pour server à l'histoire des expéditions en Égypte et en Syrie pendant les années VI, VII et VIII…* (Paris, 1804), p. 91.
7. S. Hynes, *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War* (London, 1997), p. 6.
8. M. Broers, *Napoleon: Soldier of Destiny* (London, 2014), p. 174. On this expedition's composition more generally, see J. Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York, 2007), p. 8, and H. Laurens, *L'expédition d'Égypte, 1798–1801* (Paris, 1997), pp. 44–49.
9. D. Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, *1918* (Boston, 1937), p. 185.
10. For these figures, see H. W. Neulen, *Feldgrau in Jerusalem. Das Levantekorps des kaiserlichen Deutschland* (Munich, 1991), p. 11.
11. E. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978); S. Woolf, 'French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire', *Past & Present*, 124 (1989), pp. 96–120; A. Pagden, *European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism* (New Haven, 1993); A. Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge, 2002); L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994); M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford, 1997); V. G. Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009).
12. François, *Journal*, p. 61; W. Brown, *The Autobiography, or Narrative, of a Soldier* (Kilmarnock, 1829).
13. E. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 2003 ed.), p. xvii.
14. G. Stiegler, *Le maréchal Oudinot, duc de Reggio: d'après les souvenirs inédits de la maréchale* (Paris, 1894), p. 19.
15. R. Ferguson and N. L. Whitehead, 'The Violent Edge of Empire', in Ferguson and Whitehead, eds., *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Peoples* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1–30.
16. F. Vigo-Roussillon, *Journal de Campagne (1793–1837)* (Paris, 1981), pp. 66 and 83.
17. O. Figes, *Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia* (London, 2002), pp. 72–146.
18. R. Johnson, *The Great War and the Middle East* (Oxford, 2016).
19. V. G. Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, 2000).
20. A precedent had already been set for this practice during the French occupation of Belgium and the Rhineland in 1794, but the scale of these operations intensified with the invasion of Italy two years later. M.-L. Blumer,

'La commission pour la recherche des objets des sciences et arts en Italie (1796–1797)', *La Révolution Française*, lxxxvii (1934), pp. 62–88 and 124–50; F. Boyer, 'Les conquêtes scientifiques de la Convention en Belgique et dans les pays rhénans (1704–1795)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 18 (1971), pp. 354–74. See also E. Pommier, *L'Art de la Liberté: Doctrines et débats de la Révolution Française*, (Paris, 1991).

21. R. Gregorian, 'Unfit for Service: British Law and Looting In India in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,* 13 (1990), pp. 63–84, p. 84.
22. M. Vertray, *Journal d'un officier de l'armée d'Égypte* (Paris, 1883), p. 79.
23. J. Black, 'A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe 1650–1815', *Journal of Military History*, 73 (2009), pp. 49–68.
24. J. Laporte, *Mon voyage en Egypte et en Syrie: Carnets d'un jeune soldat de Bonaparte* (Paris, 2008) p. 37.
25. *Ibid*., p. 38.
26. Y. Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450–2000* (Basingstoke, 2008). P. Dwyer, 'Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing: French Military Memoirs and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars', *French Historical Studies*, 33 (2010), pp. 231–58; N. Ramsey, *The Military Memoir and Romantic Literary Culture, 1780–1835* (Farnham, 2011); K. Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars Against Napoleon: History Culture and Memory* (Cambridge, 2015).
27. N. Rose, *'A Senseless, Squalid War': Voices from Palestine, 1890s–1948* (London, 2010); M. Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford, 2012); M. Burleigh, *Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the Modern World, 1945–65* (London, 2013).
28. On the *Bulletin*, see Forrest, *Napoleon's Men*, p. 34. Jaroslav Hasek, *The Good Soldier Švejk and his Fortunes in the World War*, C. Parrott, trans. (London, 1973 ed.), p. 637.

PART I

Encounters

CHAPTER 2

French Soldiers and the Revolutionary Origins of the Colonial Mind

Fergus Robson

The principal philosophic justification for late nineteenth-century French imperialism, the *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission), was founded on the certainty that political, technological and cultural sophistication rendered European, especially French, civilization superior to all others. This imperial ideological paradigm is most strongly associated with the Third Republic (1870–1940), but it can be clearly seen in incipient form during the Revolutionary conquests of Italy and Egypt in the 1790s.

The French thought about civilization in terms of an accumulated heritage.[1] Some of these inheritances were common throughout Europe: the legacy of Classical Greece and Rome, Christianity, the Carolingian Empire and the Enlightenment.[2] More prosaic influences, such as trade, language and a diffuse but discrete political culture, also fed into this set of shared self-images. Nationally specific experiences too played their part; Louis XIV, the Enlightenment, the French role in the American Revolution and France's own Revolution helped shape French conceptions of civilization.[3] All this is important for a socio-cultural history of the influential

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colonial components of French military culture and their legacy. However, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies converted these constructs into cultural encounters on the peripheries of their own world with supposedly less civilized peoples—in Italy and Egypt. Those experiences played a key role in shaping later colonial encounters in the nineteenth century, such as the French invasion of Algeria in 1830.[4] The second and third commanders in Algeria, Generals Clauzel and Savary, were both veterans of Italy, the former also of Haiti, the latter of Egypt, experiences which undoubtedly influenced their approach to colonial warfare.[5] But, it was by no means only senior officers who were shaped by this legacy. The ranks had taken part not just in warfare but in occupation and nation-building. While few of them went on to fight in Algeria, the cultural memory of their experiences—especially as transmitted to subsequent generations of soldiers (and civilians) through their memoirs and recollections—was considerable.[6] These memoirs served as a means of transmission of experiences and modes of thought derived from them throughout the nineteenth century while also reflecting the variety of ways that these experiences were recounted orally. Some were published during the Napoleonic period, many others did not resurface until the July Monarchy rendered them politically acceptable and renewed imperial expansion in Algeria lent them contemporary relevance. Many were published by serving or retired officers and aimed explicitly to influence new and future generations of French soldiers.

The men who fought in Italy and Egypt were not blank slates. Among them were many of the (often) educated volunteers of 1791, as well as former royal troops and the conscripts of 1793, creating a distinctive civilian-influenced military culture. This force provided the core of the officer class for decades to come. Not every soldier in the ranks had imbibed a diet of classics, Enlightenment culture and republican universalism; some memoirists exhibit barely a trace of these.[7] However, in the nearly one hundred memoirs and many hundreds of letters written by officers and subalterns which pertain to these campaigns, the theme of French civilization surfaces repeatedly. Understandings of other people, both European and non-European, were framed by reference to their difference from the French and their 'civilization'. As captain Moiret remarked of the Maltese: 'their character made clear to us that we were already far from the centre of Europe and of civilization'.[8]

I will argue that distinctive developments in the later French colonial imagination were in large measure the product of the militarized cultural

encounters between the Revolution's soldiers and Italians and Egyptians in the 1790s. I shall make the case by examining three interlocking issues: conceptions of civic culture, understandings of religion and rationality, and the cultural expropriation and appropriation of 'patrimony', each of which served to justify later imperial expansion and reinforce the lessons drawn from the two other spheres. The first of these concerns French assumptions of administrative and governmental superiority, which were strongly informed by visions of the young Republic. The second hinges on the emerging duality of religiosity versus rationality, in part a product of the French Enlightenment but tempered in the fires of Revolutionary civil war and foreign conquest. The third, the expropriation of art, antiquities and precious objects of cultural significance by the French, was a means of claiming the cultural production of classical civilization and even contemporary Europe, as their own.

Civic Culture and Civilization

Colonies and imperialism were by no means new to the French in 1796. Conquests in North America, India and the Caribbean had seen hints of the future discourse of the *mission civilisatrice*. Nonetheless, such ideas were by no means widespread as a justification for empire. The 'First European Empires' had been underpinned instead by ideas of universal monarchy, coloured by the legacy of Rome and Charlemagne and structured within Mercantilist economic thought.[9] Influential authors such as the abbé Raynal and the marquis de Condorcet had argued in favour of a gentler civilizing colonialism, based on persuasion, emulation and prosperity derived from mutual mercantile relationships, rather than violence, forced conversion and Mercantilist exploitation.[10] However, these alternative models for empire arose as a reaction against imperial experiences, and while not commonplace in the 1790s, echoes of them are evident in the French expeditions in the Pacific of 1801.[11] These visions of a peaceful civilizing and consensual empire were never realized, mainly due to violent resistance in Haiti, Egypt, Spain and elsewhere.

By 1830 and the invasion of Algeria, however, the advocates and administrators of empire had thoroughly imbibed the idea of a civilizing mission as a rationalization for colonialism and as evidence of French greatness.[12] Michael Shurkin maintains that unlike previous theorists of empire, those of de Tocqueville's generation had come to accept the necessity of extreme violence to create the conditions in which civilized

rule could flourish and begin to benefit the native population.[13] This sanguinary attitude among generally liberal and moderate politicians arose from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars when the brutal pacification of rebellious populations was thoroughly legitimized in government discourse.[14] Nor did such ideas only flow down from government, cultural elites and military command; they also permeated outwards from ordinary military men. Those who had fought in Italy, Egypt, Haiti and Spain, whether as officers or subalterns, also brought a similar perspective as to the need for vigorous force in dealing with 'uncivilized' populations who rejected French domination.[15] In this way, actions which would today be understood as war crimes were instead justified as salutary measures, the birth pains of a regenerated colonial society. An instructive instance of this occurred during the Dahra cave massacre when Colonel Pélissier's troops killed hundreds by setting fires at the entrances to a cave complex in Algeria in 1845.[16] To explore how common soldiers and officers learned to think this way about violence against civilians is important because it helps us to better understand the specific character of French colonial attitudes as a by-product of the wars of the Revolution and Empire.[17] Moreover, the French used the language of cultural and political superiority when campaigning in or conquering and administering French and European territories, a language that is more generally associated with nineteenth-century imperial domination of non-European peoples.[18]

The Revolution and Napoleonic Empire were therefore pivotal periods in the development of the civilizing mission which the French attributed to themselves. Not surprisingly, as Michael Broers has shown, one of the first French attempts to create a regenerated state modelled on the Republic—the Cisalpine Republic based around Milan in 1797—strongly resembled incipient 'cultural imperialism'.[19] Henri Legrot, a corporal at the time, described how the citizens of the new Cisalpine Republic idolized everything French, claiming that they gloried in their new meritocratic army, modelled on the French and saw their republic as the 'eldest son of our beautiful France'.[20] Regardless of whether many citizens of the Cisalpine Republic agreed, Legrot's attitude illustrates his belief in the value of French tutelage in helping other nations to achieve regeneration by imitating the French model. Many of the soldiers who wrote about their experiences of conquest (and defeat) in Italy and Egypt had drunk deep from this cup. Captain Gerbaud recounted the ill will of the Cisalpine authorities when called on to carry out their administrative and civic duties, contrasting this with the 'genius of the French Republic', in a clear

evocation of the need for French tutelage, imposed when necessary by French force.[21] Some were doubtful of the chances of succeeding in regenerating Italians, while others saw Italian culture and the (limited but real) support for the French among certain sections of the population as evidence that the populace could be civilized through increased exposure to French institutions and values.[22] Lieutenant Lecler thought to inculcate improved values and behaviour among the Italians through example, and forbade his men to commit even the most minor infraction, thereby avoiding any encouragement of what he saw as 'the Italians' natural vindictiveness'.[23] This personal discipline and the ambition of self-mastery which underpins it was both a way of imagining and enacting French difference from, and superiority to, Italians. It bears a strong resemblance to the later idealization of the French colonial self, analysed by Alice Conklin, a resemblance which becomes all the more potent when examined beside the myths which enabled the *mission civilisatrice*.[24]

Myths of rationality, superior hygiene and cultural prowess were particularly striking when it came to the Revolutionary soldiers' understandings of civilization and decline in relation to Italy and the Italians—one of the two sources (with Greece) of the classical civilization that influenced French cultural self-conceptions. Here, the juxtaposition of the physical and cultural evidence of past glories with the perceived contemporary decline and degradation inspired much talk of helping Italians regain their former greatness. Louis-Joseph Lahure proudly recounted Championnet's proclamation of the Roman Republic: 'Rome your chains are broken forever, French republicans have lent you their strength and now they rejoice in finding the liberty they love within your walls'.[25] Rome was particularly evocative in this respect; as Antoine Bonnefons insisted: 'Rome was once the mistress of the universe, the passing of centuries however sees everything degenerate and perish, while the revolutions in her government have inevitably resulted in both physical and moral decay'.[26] Sentiments such as this illustrate both the French soldiers' sense of their own superiority and the perceived need for French guidance, while also articulating a vision of history in which France was the torchbearer, bringing light back to this ancient hearth of civilization. However, this was always envisaged as a two-way exchange, and as will be seen below, cultural expropriation was one of the trade-offs the conquered were supposed to accept, while the wealth, raw materials and markets of conquered and colonized lands were also understood to have been gained for France in an imagined 'fair exchange' of civilization for resources.[27]

Similar discourses emerged in Egypt, where one dragoon claimed that 'Egypt will become French in spite of all the efforts of our enemies the English' and that 'the people do not lack intelligence but are reduced to barbarism by centuries of Mameluke despotism'.[28] Similarly, Sub-Lieutenant Vertray saw the French role in Egypt as helping to tear down feudalism and insisted that 'the inhabitants are gentle and good natured, they desire only justice after centuries of oppression'.[29] This is not to say that the soldiers were unaware of the once great civilization of Egypt either. Their sense of awe when describing the pyramids and other remnants of antiquity is palpable in many memoirs, and they often invoked the 'now obscured splendour' (of Cairo) and how 'Alexandria presented a mere shadow of its former glory'.[30] Perhaps the most eloquent of these statements was the contrast Louis Thurman drew 'between this African city and our European towns… Alexandria, once so powerful, now so decayed'.[31] While en route from Malta, Moiret claimed that the soldiers dreamed of glory in 'the cradle of the arts and sciences…the site of the great exploits of the Romans' where they would 'tread the same soil as the Macedonian phalanxes' and 're-establish civilization…abundance, fertility and prosperity'.[32] This theme that the French were returning 'good government', not to mention bringing rationality and an appreciation of cultural patrimonies, to the inhabitants of conquered lands was widespread among the soldiers.

The French conception of good government in Egypt was again, remarkably, similar to that described by Alice Conklin in late nineteenth-century West Africa.[33] Many of the troops emphasized the uncleanliness and insanitary conditions which prevailed in both Egypt and in parts of Italy. Laugier, among others, insisted that the unclean air which he believed emanated from the swamps around Mantua was dangerous to good health, while in Egypt, Pierre Millet made similar observations as to the lagoon at Menzaleh.[34] Among the regulations imposed on the inhabitants of Cairo, some were typically hygenicist in enjoining them to sweep the streets daily, in insisting that butchery take place only in certain designated districts and in demanding the isolation of the ill and use of disinfectants such as vinegar when the plague struck.[35] This falteringly modern discourse of hygiene was strongly juxtaposed to the perceived degeneration of the civilization and even morals of the Egyptians and, coupled with a concern for rational administration, was a central plank of the French mentality of governance in North (and later, West) Africa.[36] Bonnefons (and many of the troops) emphasized the enormity of the task, claiming that in every sphere from

the treatment of women to criminal punishment, food, hygiene, trade, industry and slavery, the Egyptians were far removed from French and European civilization.[37] Some soldiers were highly cynical (or realistic), about these policies' chances of success. Jerome Laugier, for example, mocked the fraternization between French *chasseurs* and the inhabitants of Guastalla in Emilia-Romagna: 'I could only shrug my shoulders at the sight of tailors with glass in hand, who already thought of themselves as the senators of a republic, reforming abuses with fantastical notions'.[38] Such scepticism clearly points to the prevalence of ideas of civic regeneration, even while some privately questioned them.

Among the military memoirists at least, the more cynical were a minority. Bricard enthusiastically described how the inhabitants of Mantua and the French celebrated the birth of Virgil together, while ceremoniously effacing all marks of feudalism from the city, in a multi-layered and symbolic enactment of civilization French-style.[39] Events such as this give a powerful sense of the way the French saw themselves and their revolutionary mission. Notable in this account is the way in which the classical past and civic present were evoked together, eliding, even erasing, the common Christian heritage altogether and instead privileging an increasingly secularized subjectivity in the narrative of a conquering civilization.

Religion and Rationality

As Joseph Clarke discusses in Chap. 3, the attitudes of French soldiers towards the faith of those they encountered during the wars were often condescending in the extreme. This was equally true in both Italy and Egypt where vibrant religious cultures confronted French soldiers who had lived through and often imbibed radical secularization.[40] There is ample evidence for the impact of Enlightenment rationalism and Revolutionary secularization on the way the French perceived the proper place of faith within a civilized society. The relatively recently erected opposition between reason and religion was particularly marked in France, and this fed into the way many soldiers understood the cultures they encountered. In both Italy and Egypt, the soldiers condemned what they saw as the superstitious and fanatical local beliefs. They frequently portrayed this as an impediment to modernity and civilization, whether in the domains of civic culture, technology, hygiene, law or social norms. In touching on all these themes, the soldiers linked religious fervour to cultural backwardness.

Consequently, the French soldiers spoke about re-civilizing the Italians by limiting the influence of the church. They frequently emphasized what they perceived as the inappropriate role of religion in society and culture, and the hypocritical, even un-Christian mores of these supposedly devout Catholics. As Jean-Claude Carrier put it: 'the Italians are faithful observers of the external symbols of religion but there are more chapels and oratories than there are good Catholics'.[41] Maurice Duviquet, in Cremona, claimed that 'one third of Italian men are either priests or monks and a great number of them are also highly immoral', and he recalled the example of a monk who entertained his company with 'passably scandalous tales, which we found perfectly natural', in light of what he saw as the characteristically Italian blending of religion and masculinity.[42] He went on to claim that even in brothels 'one might find a small shrine behind the spot where the priestess of the place sells her pleasurable services'.[43] Such associations served to illustrate the profane, corrupted and corrupting nature of Italian Catholicism and to denigrate the idea that Italians were truly religious. This, when viewed alongside the soldier's general distaste for Italian religiosity, reinforced the widespread perception of religious hypocrisy and the need for reform.

These soldiers' antagonism towards Italian religiosity was bolstered by the often violent clerically inspired resistance they met upon their arrival in Italy in 1796 and which endured and later escalated in response to the concordat imposed by the French from 1801 onwards. The similarities this bore to the resistance to the Clerical Oath of 1791 in France, which divided the clergy into loyal (constitutional) and disloyal (refractory) factions, meant that a framework existed which structured soldiers' perceptions of the role of religion in civilized nations.[44] The divisions in France were mirrored a decade later in Italian reactions to the concordat and attacks on those senior clergy who collaborated with the Napoleonic regime.[45] Many of the French soldiers found the Italian Catholicism they encountered in the late 1790s to be unthinkably uncivilized, and Republican and later Napoleonic administrators tended to agree and implemented policy accordingly.[46] Echoes of these tensions can be seen in later colonial cultural policy vis-à-vis religion in French West Africa where secular state-led 'civilizing projects' sometimes came in conflict with state-sanctioned missionary activity as both sought to shape local cultures and beliefs in their own image.[47] While we should not overstate the extent to which these early tensions between the soldiers and administrators of a secular French republic informed those identified in West Africa during

the Third Republic, it would also be a mistake to neglect these continuities in culture, discourse and practice within the French military and administration. Instead, these continuities suggest that the experiences of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era were important constitutive elements in the elaboration of secular attitudes in French society and culture in general and in military and colonial mentalities in particular. As such the experiences of religiously tinged civil war and insurrection within France, coupled with largely negative encounters with Italian Catholicism and, later, Egyptian Islamic and Christian practice, all contributed to forging a firm (if by no means uniform) secular tendency within the French army.

The space available for cultural compromise and collaboration in Italy was thus slight but it did exist. Under the later Napoleonic administration of Italy, the authorities worked for an alliance with what they understood as civilizing influences within Italian Catholicism.[48] This project envisaged Enlightenment-inspired religious reform, to erase archaic beliefs and practices in conjunction with the educated reforming elements of the clergy, against the supposedly primitive popular culture of the population.[49] During the first invasion of Italy, Captain Laugier provides a useful example of this mindset. He was convinced that the 'priests and monks [who] swarmed across Piedmont' were detrimental to good Christian practices, but believed that the less numerous clergy of Lombardy and the Veneto were a force for good and even praised the Benedictines who ran Padua's university for encouraging progress in the arts and sciences.[50] In sharp contrast, he dismissed the Augustinian friars with whom he lodged in Nizza Monferrato as 'greedy and ignorant'.[51] For Alexandre Ladrix, who went out of his way to attend a Papal mass in March 1797, there was a strong sense that the role of religion was too pronounced in Italian public life and that it was dangerously corrupted. In a revealing letter, he asked in relation to the collapse of the Papal army: 'So where are these ancient Romans who were once so renowned? Their race has been thoroughly bastardized'.[52] He went on to draw an implicit association between this, the alleged cowardice of the Pope himself, and what Ladrix perceived as the perverted Catholicism of the inhabitants of Rome who 'while professing religious principles, will nonetheless kill French soldiers in the name of God'.[53] These examples highlight how encounters with Italian Catholicism were integral to this emerging secular vision of empire, while also pointing towards the pared-back, Enlightenment-influenced version of Christianity with which many of the believers in the French ranks identified. In these and many other accounts, we can grasp the soldiers' sense that religion

and irrationality were the bane of Italian civilization, which in turn reflects the perceived superiority of the French model of limitations upon religion as analysed by Broers.[54]

If the Catholicism of Italians was discomfiting for the French, the unfamiliarity of Islam and the intensity of faith-inspired responses to them in Egypt, as Zeinab Abul-Magd has demonstrated, unsettled the soldiers all the more.[55] Laval, a Lozérien volunteer, maintained that 'the populace are extremely fanaticized and the Qur'an is more strictly followed than the Bible is in France'.[56] The special place occupied by the invasion of Egypt in Edward Said's analysis of Orientalism, supplemented by Stuart Harten and Marie-Cécile Thoral's more recent evaluations of the almost technocratic nature of the *savants*' role, all suggest that the French saw themselves as the representatives of enlightened scientific rationalism, bringing modernity to the superstitious, benighted natives.[57] This theme is prevalent in nearly all the soldiers' accounts of the invasion of Egypt and their experiences there.

This imagined juxtaposition did not quite live up to French ambitions. Bonaparte famously attempted to co-opt the legitimacy of Islam by trying to govern through the *ulema* and a *Grand Divan*, coupled with an outpouring of frequently misconceived printed propaganda in Arabic.[58] This approach to government has been seen as typically Napoleonic, attempting to co-opt local power brokers into a dominant but collaborative relationship, largely devoid of overt ideological concerns.[59] However, we can also catch glimpses of future French policy regarding Islam in North Africa in Bricard's wholehearted approval of Kléber's order not to interfere with Muslim worship or enter their mosques, especially since a number of French soldiers had already mockingly interrupted locals at prayer.[60] This policy embodied the ideal of religious tolerance within the context of a non-confessional state, an ideal which would prove influential in the formulation of Napoleonic policy within Europe and, later, when the army and the Ministry of the Interior administered Algeria. This policy became even more pronounced under the Third Republic, and its roots surely lie in the fusion of Enlightenment, Revolution and pragmatic rule pioneered in Egypt.

The implicit role the French assigned themselves was to lead by what they understood as their own virtuous example of a regenerated rational civilization, animated by the heritage of the Enlightenment as much as the innovations of the Revolution. That they found few imitators in either Egypt or Italy while living off the land, imposing imported values, employing

extreme repression of any resistance and plundering both countries' artistic heritage is not at all surprising. Nor, however, is it surprising that the cultural and institutional memory of these encounters endured and infused later military and civilian conceptions of the role of religion in society, particularly within the colonial sphere. Elizabeth Foster evokes the intertwined tribal, religious and administrative tensions in Senegal, where French Spiritan missionaries regarded 'Muslim's…faith as antithetical to French "civilization"', while the administration preferred to work with those Muslim Wolof aristocrats who had 'eschewed Jihad', were 'literate and multilingual' and 'were used to wielding authority' as opposed to the Sereer who they viewed as helplessly corrupted and totally uncivilized.[61] This revealing treatment of the complex nature of colonial religious politics also echoes French Revolutionary approaches to the problem of religion in Italy and in Egypt, highlighting the enduring and deep-rooted association of certain types of religious belief with irrationality and uncivilized societies. The practice of creating hierarchies of civilized and barbaric was also deployed by the soldiers both in Italy and Egypt, and even within France.[62] Preferential treatment was granted to cooperative, or advanced, groups within this hierarchy throughout Europe and in Egypt, as the French rewarded loyal tribes and repressed hostile ones, just as General Bugeaud would decades later in Algeria.[63] While the 'evolutionary scale' developed by imperial anthropologists in the late nineteenth century had not yet been formalized, it certainly existed in incipient form in these soldiers' amateur ethnographic descriptions of the populations they encountered.[64] These emerging images of a gradation of uncivilized others, in turn, informed and were used to justify the policy of plunder or, as the French soldiers would have had it, the preservation of patrimony.

Cultural Expropriation

Various impulses were at work when, in the name of preserving patrimonies, French armies and administrators compiled inventories of cultural artefacts in conquered territories. This was an escalation of much older practices. While seizing artworks had long been commonplace in intra-European warfare, its predominance had begun to wane in the eighteenth century.[65] The French, however, brought it to a new level during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and infused it with a greater, civilizational significance, albeit one which was highly contested.[66] Wayne Sandholtz argues that the sheer scale of Revolutionary and Napoleonic

plunder, and the discursive opposition it provoked, shifted the norms around cultural expropriation, when the victorious powers of 1815 redefined it in terms of 'patrimony'.[67] This elaboration of the idea of patrimony, cultural property infused with the discursive power of the *patrie*, in fact encapsulates much of the importance of the third strand of this argument. By expropriating art, antiquities and precious objects of cultural significance, the French were claiming the cultural production of classical civilization and even contemporary Europe, as their own. These discourses and acts helped to shape the idea of patrimony and communicated French aspirations to civilizational dominance.

Commissioners and individuals selected the choicest objects to send back to France, imposing a hierarchy of artistic merit on the conquered society's cultural production in an expression of the supposed superiority of the acquiring power. The practice of cultural expropriation, especially on a state-sanctioned level, is also rich in analytic potential as the French armies expressed their dominance by confiscation as well as by conquest. The discourses around these practices and the objects seized by the French help us to better understand how they viewed themselves and the societies they conquered. This was also an important element of the longer-term creation of Paris as a cultural capital of the world, a dream pursued by emperors, monarchs and ministers but also by soldiers, adventurers and civilian administrators.

The future Marshal Marmont, then a captain, expressed this urge to appropriate the legitimacy of classical Rome for contemporary France when describing the amphitheatre of Verona in a letter to his mother: 'The sight of this monument has expanded my mind and heightened my imagination. We are worthy of the same, we must have one in Paris'.[68] The parallels with Patricia Lorcin's description of later French ambitions to import a Roman triumphal arch from Djemila in Algeria to France point towards the Revolutionary roots of a performance of cultural exchange where the French brought (their version of) civilization and seized local cultural artefacts and monuments, thereby bolstering their own civilization.[69] In one sense, the French were exporting their model of civilization and expected conquered territories, especially the Italian Sister Republics, to follow their approach to building a nation and achieving civilization. In a second sense, by seizing Italian territories, art and artefacts, the French were also appropriating the legacy of Italian culture and more importantly Roman civilization to legitimize their own claim to be the centre of the civilized world. Just as soldiers collected souvenirs, art and trinkets, the

regime hoarded masterpieces and antiquities, and the overall effect was to symbolize the two-dimensional exchange whereby France supplied 'modern civilization' and Italy rendered the material patrimony of ancient civilization, an exchange that might have charmed the French but probably enamoured few Italians.[70] There are marked parallels between this practice and later colonial expansion where empire-builders and imperial writers sought to justify their rapacity and exploitation by dint of the virtues of the civilization they felt that they were so generous in exporting.[71]

Where Italians objected to expropriations, the French saw their inventory-taking as patrimonial preservation, and Italian resistance confirmed for them that the items deemed worthy to be sent to France would be better preserved from ignorance and properly appreciated in Paris.[72] Captain Gerbaud's account of the 'spoliation of Venice' was more honest than most when he admitted that the removal of the Triumphal Quadriga of antique bronze horses angered the Venetians even more than the confiscation of artworks and of every object of value in the renowned arsenal.[73] His understanding of why this was so is also revealing as he saw the famous equine statues as a reminder of former glories (the Venetians having looted them from Constantinople in 1204) and as a link to classical antiquity.[74] This extensive pillaging of artistic, architectural and military items by the French mirrored the ideological priorities underpinning this emerging vision of empire. Venice provides an interesting example of the tensions at the heart of this imperial vision as the French had no wish, at this point, to retain the neutral city, and ceded it twice to the Austrians in the following decade, but this did not stop its spoliation. Cases such as this demonstrate the vacuity of the purported exchange, patrimony for civilization, without rupturing the discourse around this idea. Gerbaud himself subscribed to this idea, writing from Livorno to his mother explaining that the objects he sent were precious relics from Loreto, while also diligently noting the precious bronze statues and architectural remains in Rome in the same breath as condemning the disrepair these had fallen into.[75] The complementary discourses around civilization, patrimonial preservation and cultural expropriation emanating from soldiers and the state are striking. Both claimed that the atrophy of the civilization in question justified the expropriation of (and supposedly proper care for) the patrimony of its glorious antiquity in exchange for a civilized modernity resulting from invasion and occupation.

The type of objects the state and soldiers collected varied, but the impulses behind their choices were often similar. While the state (or in

reality the army) emptied the Venetian Arsenal, soldiers frequently seized high-status weapons as trophies of their own conquests.[76] Others preferred to collect relatively recent works of art, artefacts from classical Rome in Italy and objects relating to ancient Egypt and early Christianity when in the Middle East.[77] This schema was mirrored in the state's hierarchy of desires and images of contemporary civilization; Europe was perceived as enjoying a continuity of (differentiated) civilized culture, while Egypt's value (with the exception of fine weaponry) was located millennia ago, reflecting the widespread judgement that it was backward and benighted.

In Egypt too, a recurring and, if anything, more marked narrative among the soldiers was that the French would improve the lives of the locals as part of a bargain from which they expected France to become more prosperous as well. One dragoon claimed that after three months 'the organization of this country where civilization had been extinguished is now progressing rapidly' and that he was proud to participate in Bonaparte's 'estimable enterprise to conquer and civilize Egypt'.[78] The wealth France was supposed to derive from her exploits in Egypt was not solely monetary but was understood by almost all memoirists as cultural too. As they built fortifications at Alexandria, Bricard described how his comrades unearthed a daily trove of coins, vases, inscribed stones as well as tombs, bones and underground buildings.[79] The military engineer, Louis Thurman, charged with constructing coastal fortifications, wrote to his father with a mixture of awe and sadness, of the intermingled Roman and Pharaonic ruins near Alexandria, evoking the loss of civilization, a loss which he felt would be remedied by good government and modern engineering, gifts which the French saw it as their mission to bring.[80] As Bricard put it: 'Egypt, where we have endured such privations and which we conquered twice, was flourishing more and more with each passing day and would have become one of the richest possessions of France'.[81] Many soldiers blamed the British (who were fighting alongside the Ottoman Empire against the French in Egypt) for rupturing this civilizational bargain. In doing so the British and their allies were seen to have deprived Egypt of the blessings of French rule, but also seized from France their rightful conquest and its cultural treasures.

The activities of the *savants*, the intellectuals who accompanied the invasion, are well-known.[82] They assessed, drew, recorded, measured and, where possible, collected the physical patrimony of ancient Egypt, readying a horde of looted artefacts for expropriation, including the Rosetta stone along with thousands of texts, statues and sarcophagi. The most

spectacular items among this haul, thanks to the conditions of the French capitulation in September 1801, eventually went to the British Museum instead, much to the chagrin of the *savants*.[83] The soldiers and the *savants* shared a number of concerns in their interactions with the remnants of Egyptian antiquity. While some military memoirists mocked the intellectuals, many others collected portable items and set about figuratively taking possession of oriental antiquity by measuring and meticulously describing those monuments which they could not carry off. The tendency to note the exact dimensions of famous antiquities was widespread. Moiret, Bonnefons, the *militaire*, Laval and Lucet, among many others, all provided precise descriptions, including measurements, of Pompey's Pillar in Alexandria, Joseph's Well in Cairo, Thebes and the Pyramids as well as lesser known sites such as Arsinoe, Pelusium, Aphroditopolis and Tanais.[84] The consistency with which the soldiers recounted measuring monuments evokes a sense of ownership through generating precise—even scientific—knowledge, a hint that Said's orientalist sensibility was not limited to the *savants* but was shared in subtle ways by the troops.

The soldiers did not, however, merely measure, they also collected. While some were enamoured with the ornate arms of defeated Mamelukes, many also sought out minor antiquities. The potentially embellished, but for the most part reliable, recollections of Colonel Chalbrand include an introduction by Just-Jean-Étienne Roy, who recorded his tales of Egypt. Roy describes the room in Chalbrand's house where he kept his souvenirs from Egypt as 'filled with perfectly preserved mummies, miniature statues of many shapes, utensils and even furnishings used by the Ancient Egyptians, with papyri inscribed with hieroglyphs on the walls'.[85] His aspiration to possess such objects demonstrates how ownership of these, along with cashmere shawls or fragments of buildings with biblical associations, could bestow important cultural capital on the French soldiers who brought them home.[86] Just as the French military command and government hoarded cultural patrimony to bolster the civilizational prestige of France, the soldiers collected and stole items which boosted their status both among their peers and back in France.

Jasanoff has argued that the loss of most of the high-status objects, so carefully amassed by the army and *savants* in Egypt, merely spurred France to greater acquisitiveness in the early years of the nineteenth century.[87] These attempts to compensate for the dual loss of territory and cultural acquisitions were by this stage almost exclusively undertaken outside of Europe in an indication of the increasing power of the European/

non-European—civilized/uncivilized—binary. During the campaigns in question, this cultural plunder was also an important expression of domination. It represented a repudiation of local societies' capacity to preserve their cultural heritage and an assertion of the dominance, superior understanding and most importantly the civilizing mission, even the historic duty, of the invader. In both Italy and Egypt, the French engaged in this wholesale cultural appropriation not just to acquire the material culture of the two societies, but also with a view to asserting France's rightful place as the cultural and civilizational hegemon. These acts, taking possession of the lands of classical civilization, bringing the 'ingredients' of modern civilization and taking away cultural artefacts, consummated France's dominance. They also clearly communicated French perceptions that they had inherited the torch of civilization and that they were remaking and improving that which had been handed down from previous bearers of the flame.

Conclusions

These examples of the French narrative and practice of conquest were the testing ground of an entire array of later colonial imaginations and realities. The discourse of the civilizing mission, while neither entirely new nor unique to France, nonetheless underwent a profound transformation in the way the French understood and deployed it. By fusing cultural achievement, administrative excellence and social meritocracy, it constructed a justification of empire that even socialists would draw upon during the Third Republic.[88] True, the legacy of Enlightenment and Revolution and the coupling of rationalism and scientific progress as opposed to religion and tradition were contested in France itself after the fall of the First Empire in 1815. However, they lingered in the French colonial imagination and occupied an increasingly central—albeit not uncontested—place at the heart of the French colonial discourse later in the nineteenth century and especially during the Third Republic. As elements of the evolving French imperial mindset, these discourses, which had germinated in pre-Revolutionary colonial expansion, were then refined and disseminated due to the wars fought in the west of France, Italy and Egypt, where local cultures found few advocates among the French. Yet the nineteenth century saw further elements added to the imperial narrative, partly inspired by the backlash against the Revolution and Empire. The imperial conception of the conquest of Algeria was also informed by the Catholicism and royalism of the restored Bourbons and the liberal Catholicism of the July

Monarchy. Indeed, the next major French intervention in Italy ran strongly against the grain of these ideas of Revolutionary civilization, when General Charles Oudinot, the son of the Napoleonic marshal, marched into Rome to overturn its Republic and restore the Pope in 1849. Conceptions of the French colonial endeavour were forged in the heat of Revolutionary warfare, and while succeeding regimes experimented with a more pious imperialism, these narratives of French superiority and secularism gradually infused the imperial mentality, coming to maturity almost a century later as official doctrine under the Third Republic.

Taking possession of territories and expropriating material culture were twin expressions of French civilization and its 'mission' for another century and a half. The ways in which both of them were conceived and practised varied significantly. Yet the influence of Italy and Egypt lingered, shaping the nature of French military and colonial cultural encounters; informing attitudes to civilization, religion and patrimony; and supplying scripts of domination whose impact, arguably, continues to be felt in France and its former colonies to this day.

Notes

1. Stuart Woolf, 'French Civilisation and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire', *Past & Present*, 124 (1989), pp. 96–98, 104–108.
2. Astrid Swenson, 'Crusader Heritages and Imperial Preservation', *Past & Present*, 226 suppl. 10 (Heritage in the Modern World: Historical Preservation in Global Perspective, 2015), pp. 29–31 and Emily Greenwood, 'Classics and the Atlantic Triangle: Caribbean Readings of Greece and Rome via Africa', *Forum of Modern Languages*, 40 (2004), pp. 367–368.
3. David Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism 1680–1800* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), pp. 36–43, 66, 75, 164–167, 173–175, and *passim*, for an important discussion of the components of French identity and civilization.
4. Pierre Serna, 'Le massacre au XVIIIe siècle ou comment écrire une histoire de l'in-humain des Lumières aux Révolutions, puis à la conquête de l'Algérie', *La Révolution française*, 3 (2011), pp. 37–38. https://lrf.revues.org/248 14 January 2011.
5. Charles Mullié, *Biographie des célébrités militaires des armées de terre et de mer de 1789 à 1850*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1852), vol. 1, pp. 311, vol. 2, pp. 521–522. Achille Hyppolite Blanc, *De L'Algérie: Système du Duc de Rovigo en 1832. Moyens d'affermir nos possessions en 1840* (Paris, 1840), pp. 8–10,

where a former *aide* to Savary describes his plans for using extreme military violence and a system of tributary local rulers to control Algeria, a model taken directly from the Egyptian expedition.

6. Philip Dwyer, 'Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing: French Military Memoirs and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars', *French Historical Studies*, 23 (2010), pp. 237–238, points to the longevity of the generation who fought in these wars and their considerable reputation as storytellers and creators of culture.
7. Henri Gauthier-Villars, ed., *Mémoires d'un vétéran de l'ancienne armée (1791–1800) siège de Mayence, pacification de la Vendée, campagne d'Égypte* (Paris, 1900). This memoir by Jean-Claude Vaxelaire is a prime example of the limits of this culture among the troops.
8. M. Moriceau, ed., *Mémoires sur l'expédition de l'Égypte: Joseph-Marie Moiret, capitaine dans la 75e demi-brigade de ligne* (2nd edn, Paris, 1984), p. 24.
9. Anthony Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500 – c. 1800* (New Haven, 1995), pp. 4–6, 17–18.
10. Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati, eds, *Condorcet, Political Writings* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 126–128, Christian Donath, *Persuasion's empire: French imperial reformism 1763–1801* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of California at San Diego, 2012), pp. 122–125, 130–152.
11. Carol Harrison, 'Planting Gardens, Planting Flags: Revolutionary France in the South Pacific', *French Historical Studies*, 34 (2011), pp. 244–246.
12. Michael Shurkin, 'French Liberal Governance and the Emancipation of Algeria's Jews', *French Historical Studies*, 33 (2010), pp. 261–263.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 266–268.
14. Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon* (2nd edn. New York, 2015), pp. 59–69, 102–104 and *passim*.
15. Captain Gerbaud illustrates this attitude towards what he viewed as the uncivilized Corsicans, while Sub-Lieutenant Vertray provides a chilling explanation as to why extreme violence was the only way to deal with 'a fanatical, fatalist…ignorant and miserable people' he encountered in Egypt. Maxime Mangerel, ed., *Le capitaine Gerbaud 1773–1799* (Paris, 1910), pp. 96–97, and Henri Galli ed., *Journal d'un officier de l'armée d'Égypte; L'Armée Française en Égypte 1798–1801* (Paris, 1883), p. 81.
16. William Gallois, 'Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria', in M. Thomas, ed., *The French Colonial Mind*, vol. 2, *Violence, Military Encounters and Colonialism* (Lincoln, NE, 2011), pp. 3–13.
17. For a more in-depth discussion of the genealogy of this violence, see Fergus Robson, 'Insurgent Identities, Destructive Discourse and Militarized Massacre: French Armies on the Warpath against Insurgents in the Vendée, Italy and Egypt', in Brian Hughes and Fergus Robson, eds., *Unconventional Warfare from Antiquity to the Present Day* (Basingstoke, 2017).

18. Michael Broers, 'Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy', *Past & Present*, 170 (2001), pp. 155–157; and Stuart Woolf, 'French Civilisation and Ethnicity', pp. 96–98.
19. Michael Broers, *Napoleon; Soldier of Destiny*, (London, 2014), pp. 149–153, 160–163, and *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy; The War Against God, 1801–1814*, (Abingdon, 2002), pp. 2–3.
20. Nizier de Puitspelu ed., *Mémoires des soldats: Les trente années de service du capitaine Legrot* (Nyons, 1891), pp. 2–3.
21. Mangerel, *Le capitaine Gerbaud*, pp. 167–170.
22. Léon G. Pélissier, ed., *De la guerre et de l'anarchie: les cahiers du capitaine Laugier ou Mémoires historiques des campagnes et aventures d'un capitaine du 27e régiment d'infanterie légère, par Jérôme-Roland Laugier* (Aix-en-Provence, 1893), pp. 127, 159–160, 165–166; Broers, *The Politics of Religion*, pp. 18–20, 123.
23. Cyprien Pérathon, ed., 'Journal d'un lieutenant de sapeurs auxiliaires de l'armée des alpes et de l'armée d'Italie, Jean-Antoine Lecler (septembre 1793 à juin 1796)', *Mémoires de la société des sciences naturelles et archéologiques de la Creuse*, 19 (1913), p. 133.
24. Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, 1997), pp. 5–8.
25. Pierre Lahure, ed., *Souvenirs de la vie militaire du lieutenant-général Baron L.-J. Lahure, 1787–1815, publiés par son petit-fils le baron P. Lahure, avec une introduction par M Paul Duplan* (Paris, 1895), p. 152.
26. Léon G. Pélissier, ed., 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte (souvenirs d'Antoine Bonnefons, 7 novembre 1792–21 février 1801)', *Carnet de la Sabretache*, 11/121 (1903), pp. 112–113.
27. An imagined bargain which chimes strongly with Conklin's analysis of the *mise en valeur* project undertaken in French West Africa; Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 40–48.
28. Cmdt. Merruau, ed., *Journal d'un dragon d'Égypte (14e dragons). Notes recueillies par le commandant Merruau* (Paris, 1899), p. 27.
29. Galli, *Journal d'un officier de l'armée d'Égypte*, p. 182.
30. Pélissier, 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte', p. 352; Chanony, ed., 'Journal des campagnes du commandant Rougelin de 1791 à 1814', *L'Impartial*, 30 May 1852, p. 7.
31. Louis George Ignace Thurman, *Bonaparte en Égypte, souvenirs publiés avec préface et appendices par le comte Fleury* (Paris, 1902), p. 27.
32. Moriceau, *Mémoires sur l'expédition de l'Égypte*, pp. 26–27.
33. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 48–54, 59–60.

34. Pélissier, *De la guerre à l'anarchie*, p. 172; Stanislas Millet, ed., *Le Chasseur Pierre Millet, Souvenirs de la Campagne d'Égypte 1798–1801 avec introduction et notes* (Paris, 1903), p. 60. Alain Corbin has insightfully analysed the prevalence of such ideas of hygiene in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France and Europe, in *The Foul and the Fragrant; Odour and the French Social Imagination* (Leamington Spa, 1986).
35. ADD L 430—*Ordres du Jour de la campagne d'Égypte envoyés à Marc Aurel, imprimeur ans VI–VII, Ordre du jour du 10 Fructidor an VI*, SHD B 6135—*Papiers de Général Belliard, commandant du Caire section 2, Ordres de la Place du Caire, 13 Thermidor an VIII*; Thurman, *Bonaparte en Égypte*, pp. 91–94. See also Marie-Cécile Thoral, 'Colonial Medical Encounters in the nineteenth century: The French Campaigns in Egypt, Saint Domingue and Algeria', *Social History of Medicine*, 25 (2012), pp. 613–614.
36. Marie-Cécile Thoral, 'French Colonial Counter-Insurgency: General Bugeaud and the Conquest of Algeria, 1840–47', *British Journal for Military History*, 1 (2015), pp. 11–15, 25–27, and Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 49–53, 139–141.
37. Pélissier, 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte', pp. 352–363.
38. Pélissier, *De la guerre à l'anarchie*, p. 127.
39. Lorédan Larchey, ed., *Journal du cannonier Bricard 1792–1802*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1891), vol. 2, p. 275.
40. There is, however, significant evidence of persistent attachment to aspects of Christianity in many of the memoirs and letters examined.
41. E. Gaillard, F. Vermale, eds., *Jean-Claude Carrier: Mémoires d'un jeune militaire savoyard de 1793 à 1800* (Chambéry, 1930), p. 66.
42. F. Masson, ed., *Souvenirs de Maurice Duviquet* (Paris, 1905), pp. 167–68.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
44. T. Tackett, *Religion, Revolution and Regional Culture in eighteenth-century France: The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 274–281 and *passim*.
45. Broers, *The Politics of Religion*, pp. 98–99.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
47. Kenneth J. Orosz, 'Anticlericalism, French Language Policy and the Conflicted Colonial Mind in Cameroon, 1923–1939', in M. Thomas, ed., *The French Colonial Mind*, vol. 1, *Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters*, pp. 122–124, 130–134, and Elizabeth A. Foster, *Faith in Empire; Religion, Politics and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880–1940* (Stanford, 2013), pp. 41–48.
48. Broers, *The Politics of Religion*, pp. 28–30.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–32.

50. Pélissier, *De la guerre et de l'anarchie*, p. 87.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Jean Barada, ed., 'Lettres d'Alexandre Ladrix, Volontaire de l'an II', *Carnet de la Sabretache*, 29/303 (1926), pp. 81–83.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
54. Broers, *The Politics of Religion*, pp. 32–38.
55. Zeinab Abul-Magd, 'A Crisis of Images: The French, Jihad and the Plague in Upper Egypt, 1798–1801', *Journal of World History*, 23 (2012), pp. 328–333.
56. Gaston Wiet, ed., 'Journal du lieutenant Laval; mémoire inédit sur l'expédition d'Égypte', *Le Revue du Caire*, 29 (1941), pp. 624.
57. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Abingdon, 1978), p. 87; Stuart Harten, 'Rediscovering Ancient Egypt: Bonaparte's Expedition and the Colonial Ideology of the French Revolution', in Irene Bierman, ed., *Napoleon in Egypt* (Reading, 2003) *passim*, and Marie-Cécile Thoral, 'Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign and Nineteenth-Century Orientalism: Perceptions and Memories in Autobiographical Accounts and Novels', in Alan Forrest et al., eds, *War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 121–125.
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59. Henry Laurens, *L'expédition d'Égypte 1798–1801* (Paris, 1997), pp. 131–135, 161–166; Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt*, pp. 73–76, 127–132.
60. Julia Clancy-Smith, 'Islam and the French Empire in North Africa', David Motadel, ed., *Islam and the European Empires*, p. 94, and Larchey, *Journal du cannonier*, vol. 2, pp. 316–317.
61. Foster, *Faith in Empire*, pp. 45–49.
62. Broers, *The Politics of Religion*, and Pélissier ed., 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte', pp. 224, 353–354.
63. M. Barailler, 'Souvenirs d'un marin du légion nautique (expédition d'Égypte ans VII et VIII)', *Carnet de la Sabretache*, 15 (1906), pp. 566–570, provides examples of both approaches. Thoral, 'French Colonial Counter-Insurgency', pp. 10–11.
64. Emmanuelle Saada, 'Nation and Empire in the French Context', in George Steinmetz, ed., *Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline* (Durham, NC, 2013), pp. 326–328.
65. Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Plunder of the Arts in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1970), *passim*; and David Gilks, 'Attitudes to the Displacement of Cultural Property in the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon', *Historical Journal*, 56 (2013), pp. 117.

66. Gilks, 'Attitudes to the Displacement of Cultural Property', pp. 115–119 and *passim*.
67. Wayne Sandholtz, *Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 47–70, 262–263. See also Michael Falser, 'Cultural Heritage as Civilizing Mission: Methodological Considerations', in Michael Falser, ed., *Cultural Heritage as Civilising Mission: From Decay to Recovery* (Heidelberg, 2015), pp. 2–3, 20–21, for a useful definition and discussion of patrimony within European imperialism.
68. Auguste Frédéric Louis Wiesse de Marmont, *Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse, de 1792 à 1841* (Paris, 1857), p. 326.
69. Lorcin, 'Rome and France in Africa', p. 304. See also Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire; Conquering and Collecting in the East 1750–1850* (London, 2006), pp. 213–226 and *passim*.
70. B.M.A. Ms. 4357, Fo. 12, L.A. Boussat to father, 27 Messidor an VIII, where Louis-Antoine Boussat wonders at the amount of money his fellow soldiers spend on trinkets and jewellery. Mangerel, *Le capitaine Gerbaud*, p. 189.
71. John Strachan, 'The Colonial Cosmology of Fernand Braudel', in Thomas ed., *The French Colonial Mind*, vol. 1, pp. 79–84.
72. Pélissier, *De la guerre et de l'anarchie*, pp. 87, 124.
73. Mangerel, *Le capitaine Gerbaud*, pp. 160–161.
74. *Ibid*.
75. *Ibid*., pp. 179–182.
76. Emmanuel Bousson de Mairet, ed., *Souvenirs militaires du Baron Desvernois* (Paris, 1858), pp. 32–34.
77. Pierre Millet stole fragments of stone from a grotto in the Church of the Nativity, while Jean-Stanislas Vivien collected ancient medals and coins and modern paintings and engravings. *Le chasseur Pierre Millet*, p. 96, and Emmanuel Martin, ed., 'Souvenirs de ma vie militaire, (1792–1822) par le commandant Vivien', *Carnet de la Sabretache*, 145 (1905), p. 244.
78. Merruau, *Journal d'un dragon*, pp. 30, 47.
79. Larchey, *Journal du cannonier*, vol. 2, p. 363.
80. Thurman, *Bonaparte en Égypte*, pp. 65–67, 135, 150–151.
81. Larchey, *Journal du cannonier*, vol. 2, p. 473.
82. Thoral, 'Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign', pp. 116–120, Harten, 'Rediscovering Ancient Egypt', 44, Laurens, *L'expédition d'Égypte*, pp. 233–236.
83. Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire*, pp. 217–220.
84. Moriceau, *Mémoires sur l'expédition de l'Égypte*, pp. 36–7; Pélissier, 'Un soldat d'Italie et d'Égypte', p. 364; Paul and Louis Calendini, eds, 'Journal Historique des faits de l'armée d'Orient rapportés par un militaire de cette armée', *Revue d'Anjou*, 44 (Jan–Feb 1902), pp. 74, 77–79; Wiet, 'Journal

du lieutenant Laval', pp. 619, 625–626, 629–630; Édouard Herriot ed., 'Le journal d'un « Quartier-Maître » 1792–1803', *La Vie Contemporaine et Revue Parisienne*, 1 June 1896, p. 445.

85. Just-Jean Étienne Roy, ed., *Les Français en Égypte ou Souvenirs des campagnes d'Égypte et de Syrie par un officier de l'expédition* (Tours, 1875), p. 7.
86. Jacques Jourquin, ed., *Journal du capitaine François, dit le dromadaire d'Égypte 1792–1830* (2nd edn, Paris, 2003), pp. 368, 456–457, Millet, *Le chasseur Pierre Millet*, p. 96.
87. Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire*, pp. 230–233, 240–247, 249–256, 275–282 and *passim*.
88. Naomi Andrews, '"The Universal Alliance of all Peoples": Romantic Socialists, the Human Family and the Defense of Empire during the July Monarchy 1830–1848', *French Historical Studies*, 34, (2011), pp. 475–477.

CHAPTER 3

Encountering the Sacred: British and French Soldiers in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Mediterranean

Joseph Clarke

Médard Bonnart saw a lot of Europe because of war. Having enlisted as a teenager in 1791, he spent the next two decades criss-crossing the continent in French colours, initially as an infantryman in Holland, Germany and Italy and, later, in the *Gendarmerie Impériale*, in Spain. After the war, Bonnart returned home to Damery and wrote his memoirs. In most respects, those memoirs are unremarkable but one trait does mark them out: his 'curiosity' about the new cultures and strange customs he encountered in the world beyond Damery.

Above all, these memoirs reflect Bonnart's curiosity concerning the 'astonishing… mix of religions' he encountered abroad.[1] In the Rhineland, for instance, this curiosity took him into churches, chapels and synagogues to see for himself how different 'nations paid homage to the Creator', and prompted research 'in the greatest detail' to better understand 'the difference between their precepts, their dogmas and our own'.[2] Bonnart even

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consulted the eighteenth century's first great encyclopaedia of world religions, Picart's sprawling *Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde*, to make sense of all this diversity, and while he invariably found these encounters 'astonishing', their cumulative effect was something of an epiphany.[3] Having been brought up to believe that 'outside the church there is no salvation', he cast that belief aside when he realized that the Lutherans, Calvinists and Jews he met were all 'honest people… fulfilling their religious duties with great fervour'.[4] These encounters changed Bonnart, but even the apparently familiar could appear alien abroad and the exoticism of the Catholicism he experienced across southern Europe was just as 'astounding' as anything he observed in the continent's culturally diverse centre. From the clergy he saw relaxing in Turin's cafés or smoking cigars in Spain to the exuberant religious rites he witnessed throughout southern Europe, the Catholicism Bonnart encountered in Italy and Iberia seemed a world away from the altogether more austere, Jansenist Church he had grown up with in Champagne.[5]

Bonnart's memoirs offer a glimpse into one ordinary soldier's experiences in extraordinary times, but they are not unique. Thousands of his contemporaries, both British and French, left their own records of these wars, and many of their letters, diaries and memoirs reveal just as much about this encounter with unfamiliar cultures and alien understandings of the sacred. This chapter draws on these testimonies to examine how these men experienced what was frequently their first contact with religious difference, how they made sense of it and how it in turn shaped their experience of war. The British and French experience of these wars was, in many ways, unique among the European powers. Not only did Britain and France, as Cookson suggests, mount 'the largest and longest sustained military mobilizations after 1789', but that mobilization constituted a climax to the 'second Hundred Years War' the two states had waged, on and off, throughout the eighteenth century.[6] That conflict had been played out on a global stage, across Europe but also in India, the Caribbean and the Americas, spaces where both armies encountered, and exploited, unfamiliar cultures to their own ends. In the course of those encounters, both states had honed their sense of themselves as the embodiments of enlightened civilization, but those wars also sharpened their antagonism towards one another as the antitheses of that civilization. As Colley and Bell have argued, that antagonism was articulated in expressly cultural, and often explicitly religious, terms throughout the century.[7] And yet, however much Anglophobia and Francophobia may have contributed to 'forging

the nation' in both states, the admiring glances that were cast in both directions across the Channel throughout the eighteenth century complicate this too simple narrative of national identities forged in opposition to one other. The Revolutionary wars embody the complexity of this relationship because while they were fought against a backdrop of intensely xenophobic propaganda on both sides, they also brought soldiers from the continent's two most self-consciously modern societies into contact, not just with the exotic abroad, but with one another.[8] For all Britain and France's long-standing enmity, and despite the bitter propaganda campaigns that both nations waged against one another between 1793 and 1815, this encounter with cultural, and particularly religious, difference on Europe's peripheries provoked very similar responses in both armies. Ultimately, those responses came to express affinity in the midst of enmity and an increasingly common sense of what modern civilization should be.

The Soldier's Gaze: Seeing the Sacred Abroad

The Revolutionary wars may or may not represent a caesura in the history of conflict. The jury is still out on that question, but these soldiers' testimonies reveal just how thoroughly these wars transformed the 'sedentary' society of the *ancien régime*, a society where, as Goubert reminds us, most Europeans never moved more than a few miles beyond their birthplace.[9] The mass mobilization generated by Revolutionary warfare did not simply give rise to the largest armies ever seen; it set a whole generation in motion as those constantly expanding armies surged back and forth across Europe's frontiers. Bonnart's travels suggest something of what this meant for young Frenchmen, and the British experience of wartime travel could be just as extensive. By the war's end, three quarters of a million Britons were in uniform, one in six of the adult male population, and in 1798 the Royal Navy launched one of them, James Lowry from Donaghmore in Co. Tyrone, on an odyssey that encompassed those obligatory stops on the aristocratic Grand Tour, Rome, Naples and Pompeii, but also Alexandria, the Pyramids and Jerusalem.[10] This was an antiquity that even the most adventurous Grand Tourist never experienced, and that is the point. Travel on this scale, by these men, would have been inconceivable just a generation before. As late as 1787, the roads around Paris had seemed 'a perfect desert' to Arthur Young, but by 1815 those roads, like roads throughout the continent, had carried millions of men from backwaters like Damery and Donaghmore to billets and battlefields across, and beyond, Europe.[11]

Like Bonnart, Lowry was lucky to survive the war long enough to write about it; up to seven million Europeans did not.[12] However, the essential point is that this generation's experience of travel was unprecedented in Western history, and its encounter with religious difference was equally unparalleled. As the wars' reach extended, these men came in contact, not simply with the various kinds of post-Reformation Christianity that so intrigued Bonnart, but with Orthodoxy, Judaism and, most shockingly for many, with Islam. Certainly, some soldiers were unmoved by these encounters, but most were not. On the contrary, encountering a religious 'other' seemed sufficiently strange to most of these men to merit at least some mention in their diaries or letters home. Some of those mentions are cursory at best, but many soldiers went to great lengths to describe the call to prayer in Cairo, the glories of this or that cathedral in Italy or Spain, or the unfamiliar, or more often 'ridiculous', rites they observed in all of these places.[13] Captain William Bragge, for example, peppered his letters home to Dorset with thoughts on everything from the 'miserable daub of our Saviour' he saw in one Portuguese village to Salamanca's 'truly magnificent' cathedral, while Maurice de Tascher's campaign notes are littered with disparaging comments on the 'detestable' décor of Spain's churches and the degrading 'masquerades' that took place within them.[14] Many of these men were contemptuous of the beliefs and practices they encountered around the Mediterranean, mere 'mummery' as many saw it, or reflected bitterly on the hardships they attributed to the 'difference of *mœurs* and religion' they experienced there.[15] However, others were less dismissive of the religious diversity they observed abroad. Some, Bonnart or Joseph Moyle Sherer of the 34th Regiment of Foot for example, were careful, even sympathetic, commentators on this diversity, and their writings echo, with varying degrees of sophistication, something of what Stuart Woolf has described as the Enlightenment's 'anthropological enthusiasm'.[16]

Amateur anthropologists were rare in these armies, but enthusiastic travellers were not. Many soldiers were reluctant recruits, but some saw soldiering as a chance to satisfy the 'curiosity in seeing foreign countries' William Graham confessed to, and this curiosity, along with ample spare time, inevitably drew these men towards sacred spaces in their pursuit of the picturesque, their search for souvenirs and their quest for the 'characteristic' abroad.[17] Convents, for example, intrigued and appalled British soldiers serving in Iberia just as they had fascinated British tourists in eighteenth-century Italy.[18] And yet, however often these men visited the

same sights, consulted the same guidebooks or entertained the same fantasies about 'black-eyed damsels… buried alive' in gloomy cloisters as their peacetime predecessors, they were never merely tourists.[19] They were soldiers and they saw the world through soldiers' eyes. Sherer recognized as much when he admitted that his view differed from that of most British officers during the Peninsular War:

> Where I had been struck by the fine appearance of some public building or private palace, they had only seen the heaps of dirt lying near the portals; – where I had gazed, with pleasure, on some diversified groups of market peasantry in their national costumes, they had discovered a squalid beggar mingling in the crowd… with such different eyes do men look upon the same scenes.[20]

Sherer thought there was something peculiarly English about this willingness to find fault abroad, and perhaps there was. However, the contrast he described was primarily a matter of professional perspective, the difference between the popular travel writer Sherer eventually became and the soldiers his comrades remained. It was the distinction between the soldier's gaze and the civilian's point of view, and that distinction defined how most of these men approached questions of cultural difference throughout the wars.

That gaze was, more often than not, a cold one. Whether they wore a British or a French uniform, these men looked on the societies they encountered with essentially military objectives in mind, and they evaluated their religious cultures accordingly. That scrutiny might embrace the same sights that Bonnart or Sherer had seen, but it assessed them according to very different criteria and rarely tried to understand, let alone empathize with, them. This was an unsentimental outlook but it was not indifferent. Religion did interest these men, but chiefly in so far as it might be exploited as a resource or could shape civilian responses to an army's presence. This was normally a very matter-of-fact perspective. Italy's churches and Spain's cathedrals could and did inspire reflections on the Gothic or thoughts on the theme of grandeur and decline for some in the officer corps, but for most of their men churches and convents meant plentiful billets, well-stocked cellars and fresh linen instead.[21] These were very practical considerations for any army on the move, but this gaze had a more strategic significance too. That is clear from the almost compulsive counting of churches, convents and mosques that accompanied an army's arrival in towns and cities around the Mediterranean. Few French accounts

of Cairo, for example, failed to include an anxious estimate of the city's 300-odd mosques, and this practice persisted throughout the wars, particularly in Spain where churches, convents and clergy seemed especially thick on the ground.[22] Louis Fantin des Odoards's reaction on reaching Salamanca in July 1810 is typical:

> Thirty-eight vast religious houses… Yes, 25 monasteries and 13 convents for women, I counted them. In addition to so many monks, secular priests flock here in the service of the churches along with seminarians who come here for their instruction… the streets are black with them.[23]

Captain Nicolas Marcel had carried out a similar survey when he entered Salamanca in 1809, and the British army chaplain James Ormsby and William Bragge did the same when they arrived there too.[24] Admittedly, all four ended up with slightly different figures, but however imprecise those estimates, the reasons for making them were essentially the same. Whether British or French, these men counted churches according to an implicit equation between the presence of priests and the welcome or resistance they might expect, an equation Fantin expressed bluntly when he concluded that many priests had already left Salamanca 'to fan the fires of discord elsewhere'. From Italy and Egypt in the 1790s to Spain in the 1810s, most French soldiers saw places of worship as so many citadels of sedition and they appraised them accordingly, as they would an enemy army's ranks, because when trouble came, and experience had taught them it would, this is where they expected it to come from.[25]

Churches and convents meant rich pickings too. Sergeant Maurice Duviquet probably spoke for many of his comrades when he concluded a roll call of the Veroneses, Titians, Raphaels and Tintorettos he had seen in Genoa's churches with a curt 'conquest had made us masters of them all', and that logic applied everywhere the French army went.[26] Liberation French-style came at a price across Europe, and it was a steep one. As Bonaparte boasted to Paris in February 1797, 'we will have all there is of beauty in Italy except for a small number of objects', and if his teams of roving art experts missed the odd Old Master, that was often because senior officers like Masséna or Marmont had already acquired it for their own collections.[27] Bonaparte and his generals skimmed off the cream wherever they went, but places of worship offered their men ample scope for enrichment too. In October 1798, Etienne Saint-Hilaire wrote home listing the booty he had lifted from the wreckage of Cairo's Al-Azhar

mosque, and a decade later sinister scenes like that portrayed in Goya's *Asi sucedió* [*This is how it happened*] were played out across Iberia (Fig. 3.1).[28] French troops descended on Spain, as Esdaile puts it, 'like wolves' and even the resting places of the dead were not spared their rapacious gaze.[29] After the fall of Burgos in November 1808, André Miot recalled his men ransacking coffins in convent crypts in search of hidden 'treasure'.[30] He was incensed by this behaviour but could not stop it, and the debris that Augustus Schaumann of the King's German Legion described following a French retreat in 1811 suggests the scale of this enterprise:

> We… found the plain covered with stragglers, dead Frenchmen, arms and baggage. Gradually they were compelled to abandon upon the high road all the silver, gold, valuables, silks and velvets, costly ecclesiastical vestments, monstrances and crucifixes which they had plundered from the churches…[31]

Fig. 3.1 Francisco de Goya, 'This is how it happened' ['Así sucedió'], *Los Desastres de la Guerra*, no. 47 (c. 1810–13) (Courtesy of the Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, Print Collection, New York Public Library)

The French army's reputation for iconoclasm and pillage was unenviable but entirely deserved, although as Daly suggests, British soldiers could be just as opportunistic when the occasion arose.[32] The 'haversack full of silver plate' that Sergeant Anthony Hamilton left Ciudad Rodrigo with in 1812 pales in comparison to the spoils Duviquet described, but it nonetheless suggests how many in both armies viewed the religious cultures they encountered abroad.[33]

War carried Duviquet and Hamilton abroad as combatants, not connoisseurs, and that inevitably shaped how they viewed the religious cultures they came in contact with. However, war also allowed these men to reflect on the cultures they had come from. In the process, they conducted their own kind of cultural cartography on campaign, an exercise that ranked societies according to their perceived proximity to, or distance from, the civilized modernity they believed they represented themselves. Religion was key to this mental mapping. Just as debates about religion's relationship to society and the state had been central to many eighteenth-century attempts to define what modernity might mean, so religious difference allowed these men to gauge the distance between the places they had come from and the spaces they now occupied. Whether they fought for a Protestant king or a secular Republic, religion mattered to these men as a marker of their own identity, a measure of modernity and, ultimately, as a weapon of war.

'Religious Worship Must Be Respected': Regulating the Soldiers' Encounter with Religious Difference

It would be difficult to overstate how unprepared most of these men were, either experientially or intellectually, for the religious diversity they encountered on campaign. For all the educated elites' tentative embrace of toleration, and this was never more than conditional in either Britain and France, religious difference remained fundamentally foreign to the generation that went to war in the 1790s. It was alien to their experience of lives lived in societies where non-Catholics accounted for just 2% of France's population and non-Protestants a mere 1% of England's, and it was at odds with the political ethos of each state.[34] In both Britain and France, national identity had been elaborated in emphatically confessional terms throughout the eighteenth century, and cultivating mistrust of religious minorities was integral to that process, especially in wartime when

those minorities were frequently viewed as fifth columnists in league with the enemy.[35] Denominational difference remained inherently suspect to most Britons and Frenchmen. It evoked unsettling memories of civil war and sedition in both countries, and those memories could still inspire serious unrest, particularly when both states began the difficult, decades-long process of uncoupling political citizenship from religious conformity at the end of the century. From the Gordon and Priestley riots to the sectarian bloodshed that swept the Midi in 1790, the politics of religious difference plagued both polities well before two profoundly confessionalized civil wars erupted in the Vendée and Ireland.

Inevitably both armies reflected these tensions, albeit in different ways. Despite a significant Irish Catholic presence in its ranks, the British Army remained an uncompromisingly Protestant institution throughout the wars, and the troops' pugnacious anti-popery may even have intensified by the time they arrived, as allies, in Portugal in 1808.[36] Recent events in Ireland and a general election fought, and largely won, on a 'No Popery' platform in 1807 certainly made for a tense backdrop to most soldiers' first contact with Iberian Catholicism.[37] The political culture of the French army was obviously very different, but as the Revolution radicalized in 1793, its soldiers found themselves on the frontline of a Republican crusade to *écraser l'infâme*. The combined experience of civil war and dechristianization transformed France's armies into a ferociously anticlerical force, and it exported this outlook wherever it went.[38] Private soldiers might retain their personal beliefs, and many did, but from 1793 the Republic's armies were at war with 'fanaticism' both at home and abroad.

Mistrust of religious difference, enthusiasm and authority, especially of the Catholic kind, was deeply entrenched in both armies. It was as emotionally ingrained as it was ideologically informed and for that reason it could be problematic in practical terms. A politically motivated army was all very well, but when it came to securing a successful French occupation or, for the British in Iberia, of sustaining effective alliances, the soldiers' religious reflexes were best reined in. As Marc-Antoine Jullien reminded General Championnet on nearing Naples in early 1799, it was advisable to 'deal tactfully with superstitious and fanatical peoples', and that meant avoiding giving unnecessary offence and getting the local clergy to cooperate wherever possible.[39] Bonaparte had pioneered this policy in 1796 when his men entered Italy under 'express orders' that 'persons, property and religious worship must be respected', and the Egyptian campaign began in similar style two years later.[40] His troops had not even set foot on Egyptian

soil on 22 June 1798 when Bonaparte issued a proclamation, and the irony was almost certainly unintentional, explaining:

> The people among whom we will be living are mahometans… Do not contradict them… Show respect for their imams, as you have for rabbis and bishops. Show the ceremonies the Qur'an prescribes, and mosques, the same tolerance you have shown convents, synagogues, the religion of Moses and of Jesus Christ.[41]

More detailed directions soon followed, including a ban on entering or even approaching mosques, but however explicit these instructions were, they proved hard to enforce.[42] It is never a good sign when orders have to be reissued repeatedly, but the fact that General Kléber eventually had to threaten his men with execution for disrupting worship in Alexandria's mosques suggests how ineffective they were.[43] In the end, this policy was effectively abandoned after the revolt of Cairo in October, and sacking the Al-Azhar mosque set an unequivocal seal on that volte-face. However, this should not obscure the essential pragmatism of Bonaparte's policy. In both Italy and Egypt, he faced the same fundamental difficulty: the difficulty of occupying an intensely clericalized society with an army of intensely anticlerical soldiers. The army of Italy, and many of its veterans later served in Egypt, was extravagantly Republican even by Revolutionary standards: its men were, as Auguste Colbert recalled, emphatically 'citizens' first and soldiers second, and while that highly politicized self-image may have been an asset in combat, it unquestionably complicated the politics of occupation.[44] Military discipline, and its sometimes-brutal application, was the only solution to this dilemma.

There may have been a peculiarly Republican edge to the banter cannoneer Bricard described outside Alexandria's mosques, but the problem of ensuring that an army did not offend religious sentiment abroad was not particularly French. Arthur Wellesley faced similar difficulties, and issued very similar orders, when his predominantly Protestant Expeditionary Force landed in predominantly Catholic Portugal a decade later. Like the French in Egypt, the British landed in Mondego Bay in July 1808 under orders forbidding entry to any place of worship 'during the performance of Divine service' and emphasizing the etiquette to observe when encountering local devotions. Officers and men, orders insisted, were to uncover their heads while visiting churches or 'when the Host passes in the street' because Portugal was 'a country friendly to His Majesty' and

local 'religious prejudices' had to be acknowledged accordingly.[45] In the main these orders were obeyed, but it is clear that many soldiers found them hard to stomach. Robert Porter's letters describe his comrades playing along with the locals' 'sacred minstrelsy' out of 'charity and prudence', but even the normally sympathetic Sherer confessed to 'mingled feelings of reverence and shame' when bowing his head before the Host and William Wheeler found the whole spectacle 'degrading'.[46] For others, like the Scripture-reading sergeant John Cooper or the 'loyal Protestant' George Bell, the prospect of pandering, as they saw it, to 'paganism and idolatry' was deeply unsettling, and such anxieties were serious enough for one army chaplain to address the issue head on.[47] Reflecting on the 'tawdry' shrines his men encountered throughout Lisbon, James Ormsby counselled:

> To avoid giving offence to such sore superstition as is here prevalent, I generally salute even the most ridiculous, and should advise any Englishman… in Lisbon, to do the same. Compliance with the customs of the countries we visit is to a certain degree commendable; that is when it can be done with a safe conscience and in this instance, I feel innocent of idolatry…[48]

It is impossible to know whether this very Anglican imprimatur allayed Cooper's misgivings, but Ormsby's advice illustrates both the General Staff's anxiety to ensure 'compliance with the customs of the countries we visit' and the qualms of conscience this could give rise to.

'Babyism and Buffoonery': The Soldiers' Response to Religious Difference

Despite their differences, both armies faced similar problems when their men came in contact with religious difference around the Mediterranean. In both armies, orders were issued to respect the religious cultures they encountered, and those orders went against the grain with many of the men. Grudging obedience might be granted, but in both armies the troops generally viewed the religious cultures they encountered with, as Édouard de Villiers du Terrage wrote in Egypt, 'pity and contempt'.[49] While British and French troops used different terms to express this disdain, and 'idolatry' and 'fanaticism' were the preferred options in each army, their contempt nonetheless converged around a number of common themes. Throughout the Mediterranean, they viewed the different

societies they encountered as hopelessly in thrall to their respective clergies, and this 'priest-ridden' state was held responsible for inhibiting progress, infantilizing belief and brutalizing the people.[50]

Outlandish estimates of clerical population were the starting point for many of these claims. In Lombardy, for example, Maurice Duviquet insisted that 'priests and monks make up almost a third of the population', while in 1812, William Graham claimed that one in eight Spaniards was in holy orders.[51] The real figure was a tenth of that, but this hardly matters because what these soldiers invariably saw were cities 'crowded with lazy young monks' and countrysides 'swarming' with clerics, and that perception was generally a prelude to a wide-ranging critique of Catholicism as a drain on the economy and a scourge on society.[52] George Simmons's description of Spain's clergy as 'drones in the industrious hive' encapsulated many British soldiers' view of a venal church 'prey[ing] upon the vitals… of the people' by exploiting the 'superstitious bigotry' of a 'deluded and infatuated multitude'.[53] This verdict drew on well-worn themes in English anti-Catholicism, but however specific its origins, few French soldiers would have disagreed with its essentials.[54] Jean-Michel Chevalier, for example, described Calabria's clergy in similar terms: 'everything is theirs. They take vows of poverty in order to have everything in abundance, and vows of chastity to enjoy every woman. They poke their noses into every family and govern them all'.[55] For most of these men, the Catholicism they encountered throughout Italy and Iberia seemed little more than a vast exercise in expropriation at the expense of a population 'brutalized by ignorance and superstition' and preoccupied with 'priestly show'.[56]

For some, indeed, the different beliefs and practices they encountered abroad scarcely seemed to warrant the name of religion at all. Over the eighteenth century, evangelical Protestantism in Britain and the increasingly internalized Catholicism that Jansenism fostered in France had both stressed the importance of private devotion over public display, and many soldiers despised the effusive ritual cultures they encountered abroad as a result. Islam presented the greatest challenge to this understanding of belief and Bonaparte's men, with few exceptions, struggled to see anything recognizably religious in it whatsoever. While a few French officers commended isolated aspects of Islam, the majority of their men viewed it as not just alien but abhorrent. From the sight of pilgrims returning from the Hajj, 'legions of bigots… covered in rags' in François Bernoyer's scathing terms, to the appearance of Cairo's Sufi

mystics during Mawlid, so many 'madmen… foaming at the mouth… running the streets… naked as apes' according to Etienne Malus, their encounters with Islam inspired 'revulsion' and ridicule among the rank and file.[57] This mix of incomprehension and contempt, allied to the assumption that Islam engendered a debilitating inertia in its 'fanatical and fatalistic' adherents, reflects a wider tendency among the French to pathologize Islam as a kind of collective madness.[58] A decade earlier, Volney had defined Islam as 'a perpetual delirium', and his widely read *Voyages en Égypte* set the tone for many men's reflections on the 'ridiculous and insane' religious practices they observed there.[59] Islam appeared unreason incarnate to many French soldiers, but the Baroque Catholicism they encountered in Italy and Spain sometimes seemed equally unhinged. For Bonnart, for example, San Sebastien's boisterous celebration of the Epiphany seemed 'to inspire more madness than respect', and many echoed this equation between ritual exuberance and emotional instability.[60] Even when these devotions were not dismissed as disordered, they were still derided as infantile and insincere, a far cry from anything approaching authentic piety as these soldiers understood it. From Maurice Duviquet's reflection that the Genoese he met were 'more fanatical than devout' to George Grieg's dismissal of Spanish Catholicism as 'better calculated to amuse the external senses and dazzle the imagination than to stir up the deeper and more rational sensations of piety', the Catholicism these men described was seen as both excessively sensual and intrinsically superficial.[61] Its devotions were, as John Cooper caustically remarked, so much 'babyism and buffoonery', and Maurice de Tascher was equally contemptuous of a religion that seemed 'disfigured by superstition and degraded by fanaticism' in Spain, a travesty of the 'pure' faith he had grown up with in Orleans.[62]

If these men found it hard to reconcile the beliefs and practices they encountered with their understanding of what religion was, many of them also found it impossible to square these cultures with their sense of civilization too. Predictably, Egypt was the benchmark for barbarism in this scheme of things. After James Lowry left Alexandria in 1801, he recalled a meeting with some local dignitaries: 'No person, to behold these chiefs could avoid remembering the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob for no improvement has ever been made amongst these tribes ever since'.[63] It was a widely held view in both armies. Indeed, for many of these men, Egypt had not merely stood still since Scriptural times; it had regressed into a 'semi-savage' state, and they looked to Islam and 'the moral brutalization'

it supposedly inspired to explain this atrophy, or what Thomas Walsh described as Egypt's 'present degradation'.[64] Something very similar happened within Europe too. On entering Rome, for instance, Jean-Michel Chevalier explained the contrast between the city's illustrious past and its abject present in simple terms: 'What has caused this great decadence? Christianity! Fanaticism!'[65] It was a common view among the French in Italy, and a decade later, Iberia prompted similar reflections. For both the British and French stationed there, Iberia seemed petrified in an archaic past, its people 'creatures of a former age', and the only matter of dispute was precisely how backward it really was.[66]

William Graham was emphatic on this matter. After two years criss-crossing a country 'swarm[ing] with friars and nuns almost beyond belief', he concluded that Spain was a full 'five hundred years behind the nations of France and England as to the general result and good effects of an improved and refined civilization'.[67] Admittedly, few soldiers went quite this far, but their constant references to Cervantes as a guide to contemporary Spanish *mœurs* suggests that most of these men settled on the sixteenth century as the point when Spain had ceased to evolve.[68] This view commanded something of a consensus in both armies, and their explanation for Spain's apparent stagnation was essentially the same too. If Spain had failed to advance into the enlightened modernity these men assumed they embodied, if its economy appeared inert or, as Ormsby insisted, 'there is no such thing as what we call society here', then this was largely due to the stranglehold an omnipotent and avaricious Church exerted upon a superstitious people and a supine state.[69] As Jean-François Boulart wrote home: 'civilisation is several centuries in arrears' here, thanks to 'the domination of the monks with which Spain swarms… the pitiful use of the wealth they devour and the prodigious influence they exercise on a population brutalized by ignorance and superstition'.[70] Few of Boulart's contemporaries would have argued with any part of that analysis, but others went much further and insisted that Spain was not just stagnant but had ceased to be European at all.

Fantin des Odoards's campaign journal illustrates this clearly. By 1808, he had campaigned throughout Europe and felt 'rather cosmopolitan' as a result, but service in Spain still came as a shock.[71] For Fantin, Iberia was not just lost in time, it seemed out of place too and he regularly looked to Europe's borders and beyond to express his conviction that Spain and civilization had parted company several centuries before. Allusions to 'the wildernesses of Poland', the Cossacks, 'cannibals' and

'swarthy shades' pepper his account of the campaign, each one implying that more than mountains separated France from this 'accursed country', and he was not alone in this.[72] Like Fantin, Octave Levavasseur held that '*mœurs* and manners' scarcely differed 'from Paris as far as Warsaw', but he had barely crossed the border into Spain when he felt himself 'a thousand leagues from France'.[73] Auguste Thirion was blunter still. Spain was not like other European nations: it was, he thundered, only European by 'an accident of geography… it is African in its blood, its *mœurs*, its language, its manner of life and of fighting'.[74] Extra-European analogies like this were common in French accounts of Spain and such prejudices were not just expressed privately.[75] The army's official newspaper, the *Bulletin de l'Armée d'Espagne*, regularly editorialized that the Spanish were simply not like other Europeans. Spain's clergy, it insisted, were loutish in comparison to their learned confrères elsewhere, while it put the Spanish peasant on a par with Egypt's 'fellahs' for ignorance.[76] French soldiers fighting a brutal guerrilla war had particular reasons for viewing Iberia in this light, but as Daly suggests, many British troops reached for similar terms to express just how primitive their allies appeared.[77] For Samuel Briscall, Portugal seemed a 'Hottentot country'; for William Wheeler, its Catholics appeared like Chinese kowtowing before their idols, while Jonathan Leach mocked the villagers he encountered in Extremadura for a 'lingo' that 'resembled Hebrew or Arabic quite as much as Castilian'.[78] Educated officers expressed their antipathy in more polished terms, but their sense that Iberia was adrift from the rest of Europe was just as emphatic. In a cosmopolitan, polyglot age, James Ormsby was 'not a little disappointed' by the insularity of Salamanca's university and lamented its ignorance of the outside world: 'Greek is absolutely unknown… French but little cultivated and English not so much as thought of', while Robert Porter compared intellectual life there to 'the ruins of Palmyra… daily mouldering away'.[79] Fantin des Odoards agreed. 'The flame of modern philosophy', he insisted, had passed Salamanca by, leaving little behind but 'barbarous' Latin and mediaeval sophistry.[80] For these men, there was, quite simply, no place for Spain among the civilized nations of Europe.

For all their enmity in battle, British and French soldiers made common cause in deploring the different religious cultures they encountered around the Mediterranean. Indeed, the only point where those views really diverged concerned the clergy's role in conflict. The spectre of clerics wielding 'a dagger in one hand and the crucifix in the other' had

haunted the French from the moment they arrived in Italy, just as it did at home, and this fear of 'fanatical preaching' and 'seditious sermons' followed them into Egypt in 1798 and across Iberia a decade later.[81] As an evidently terrified Laurent Stembert wrote home from Navarre in November 1808: 'The priests lead the armies. The greatest evil comes from the monasteries and the churches… I hope, with God's grace, to get out in one piece'.[82] French attempts to exorcise this 'evil' were often savage and regularly spilled over into atrocity. From L'Aquila in 1799, where Jean-François Boulart came across the bayoneted bodies of a dozen monks his men had left scattered around their church, to the three priests William Tomkinson saw hanging from a tree outside Oliveira in May 1809, the anticlerical violence so graphically depicted in Goya's *Desastres de la Guerra* once again reflected something of the reality of the French army's encounter with the Catholic clergy throughout the Mediterranean world.[83]

Most British troops were appalled by these atrocities, although they were equally aghast at civilian outrages against French soldiers, but while they condemned these killings, their attitude towards other aspects of the enemy's anticlericalism was more ambiguous.[84] Officers' letters and diaries routinely deplored French iconoclasm, but there is more than a hint of *schadenfreude* in some of their accounts of nights spent in sacked churches surrounded by the shattered 'paraphernalia of priesthood' the French had left behind them.[85] More tellingly, many British troops applauded Napoleon's attempts to curb the 'withering tyranny of the priesthood' in Spain and felt precious little sympathy for 'the fat and idle vagabonds' thrown out of their monasteries in August 1809 and still less for those left unemployed by the Inquisition's abolition.[86] This 'gloomy and barbarous' institution loomed large in British accounts of the Peninsular War, and many soldiers welcomed Napoleon's decision to end what Sherer called 'its impious and hellish powers'.[87] Private Wheeler even wrote home offering 'thanks to Napoleon for abolishing it; he has done Spain much harm but this one mighty act has in a great measure counterbalanced all the mischief he has done'.[88] Throughout the 1790s, British fears of Revolutionary politics had been fanned by reports of Republican irreligion, but after their encounter with Iberian Catholicism, some British soldiers were willing to concede that, in this sphere at least, the French had sown 'the seeds of a new and better order of things'.[89]

Civility and Civilization: Religion, Warfare and the Map of Modernity

As Anthony Pagden suggests, Europe has always been an 'unstable term. No one has ever been certain quite where its frontiers lie'.[90] That uncertainty increased dramatically in the two centuries preceding the Revolutionary wars as Christendom's rupture forced educated Europeans to imagine new ways of conceptualizing their continent. For Larry Wolff, the eighteenth century's response to that uncertainty radically reconfigured Europe, recasting the Renaissance image of a cultured south confronting a brutish north to re-imagine a continent divided between an enlightened west and a backward and barbaric east.[91] Wolff's thesis has proved influential, but if Europe's frontiers appeared clearly defined to the Enlightenment's savants, this 'conceptual reorientation' seems less clear-cut in these soldiers' testimonies. Over two decades of war, these men drew their own maps of Europe according to a mix of more or less prejudiced preconceptions and more or less harrowing personal experiences. Like their experiences, these maps were often complex, but if these men's image of Europe can be fixed by anything as straightforward as a single axis, then the fundamental fracture they described was not between east and west. It was between an enlightened and increasingly secularized north and a superstitious southern periphery, a bigoted, backward Mediterranean that, for many of these men, scarcely seemed part of Europe at all.

This sense of a Europe divided between a progressive north and a primitive south crystallized in the war's final stages when, after their encounters with the alien and unsettling in Egypt and Iberia, British troops finally came face to face with a society where everything seemed reassuringly familiar. In December 1813, after fighting his way across Spain for four 'miserable' years, George Simmons wrote home describing the British advance into France. He was understandably jubilant, but he was also surprised that 'the French people do not offer to kill any British soldier and we behave to the people the same as if we were in England'.[92] Simmons stayed six months in France, and in that time, that initial surprise evolved into an unexpected affinity, an empathy expressed in the one word he repeatedly used to characterize his dealings with the 'remarkably civil' French.[93] 'Civil' was not a term Simmons had ever seen reason to use in Spain, so its sudden reappearance after a four-year absence from his letters

is revealing. Britain and France had been at war since Simmons was seven years old, but by March he had been won over. This was, he wrote home,

> the most delightful country and abounds with everything… We behave to them as if we were at home, and… in the towns the peaceable inhabitants have more faith in us, generally speaking, than in their own army. This is a happy way of making war.[94]

His brother Maud, a lieutenant in the 34th Regiment of Foot, was even more enthusiastic. Reunited with George that spring, he concluded one letter home with his own reflections on France: 'You would not be a little surprised to see how happy we live in an enemy's country, as they call it, but I think them friends'.[95]

Doubtless, these raptures owed much to the realization that peace was finally at hand, but there is more to this than that. It certainly helped that everyone the Simmons met seemed to 'detest Buonaparte', but politics per se played little part in this fervour for all things French.[96] On the contrary, the Simmons brothers felt 'at home' in France despite politics, despite the animosity that politicians and propagandists on both sides of the Channel had cultivated for over two decades, and they were not alone in this. Many British soldiers expressed equally fraternal feelings towards the 'very civil and kind' French they met that spring, and these sentiments were frequently reciprocated.[97] For all their animus on the field, French soldiers recognized their British adversaries not just as fellow professionals, but as 'men of honour', a 'generous enemy' who, unlike the 'semi-savage' Calabrians or 'savage' Spanish, could be relied upon to observe the laws, and the courtesies, of war with 'great decency', like civilized men.[98] Francophobia and Anglophobia may have been, as historians have argued, central to British and French nation-building throughout the preceding century, and the mobilization of 'absolute enmity' may, as David Bell suggests, have defined the discourse of this 'first total war', but these soldiers' accounts of their experiences abroad suggest a much more nuanced reality.[99]

Far from echoing Clausewitz's unrestrained 'war of all against all', these soldiers' testimonies reflect instead a realization that, socially and culturally, more united these long-standing enemies than divided them, particularly in comparison to the other societies they had encountered on campaign.[100] For some, that realization was a shock, especially in light of what they had been led to expect by the propaganda that had poured off

presses in London and Paris for decades. Sergeant Joseph Donaldson had clearly seen more than his fair share of prints lampooning knock-kneed, malnourished French soldiers—they were the stock-in-trade of Gillray and the Cruikshanks throughout the war—so when he encountered the real thing in Spain he admitted his surprise:

> I myself must confess, in common with many others, that I was astonished when I came in contact with French soldiers, to find them, instead of pigmy spider-shanked wretches, who fed on nothings but frogs and beef tea, stout, handsome looking fellows who understood the principles of good living as well as any Englishman.[101]

In sharp contrast, he dismissed his Spanish allies as 'vindictive and cowardly…, grossly ignorant and superstitious', and many of his comrades, like Ensign Edmund Wheatley, echoed this distinction between an enemy they admired and an ally they despised.[102] James Lowry had reached a similar conclusion a decade earlier. While he conceded that Britain and France would 'probably be eternal enemies', he recalled his short stay as a POW in Toulon as 'as happy a moment as ever occurred to me' and, like thousands of Britons, seized on the short peace of Amiens to return, as a tourist, to France where he was struck by the 'politeness' he encountered everywhere, 'even [among] the very peasants'.[103]

'Honour', 'decency' and 'generosity', an appreciation of 'the principles of good living' and the virtues of 'politeness': these are not the attributes of 'absolute enmity'. They are all, however, components of the 'civility' George Simmons and so many of his comrades described in France, and that civility, that shared sense of what it was to be civilized, mattered to these men, especially after their other encounters abroad. As a code of conduct, civility prescribed how cultured peoples should behave towards one another, and as a concept, it embodied the link between private virtue and public commerce that underpinned enlightened ideas of progress. Civility was a mark of a society's manners and a measure of its modernity, and for many of these men, it was embodied in an absence. After four years in a 'priest-ridden' peninsula, the 'fat-sided and sleek-faced rascals' who feature so prominently in so many soldiers' testimonies of their time in Spain are conspicuous by their absence from their accounts of France.[104] Civility was an explicitly secular form of social virtue. It was predicated upon the spiritual's subordination to the secular in public life and the restraint of religious enthusiasm in the private sphere because that

enthusiasm was not just out of place in civilized society, it was its very antithesis.[105] By 1814, the France that had emerged out of the Napoleonic religious settlement appeared to embody this civilized, increasingly secular ideal. Unlike Italy or Egypt or Iberia, its people were not the 'dupes of superstition and bigotry' and, more importantly, its priests knew (or appeared to know) their proper place.[106] Certainly, things might have looked rather different if these soldiers had stayed long enough to see the Bourbon restoration bed in, but in early 1814 at least, George Simmons and his comrades felt 'at home' in France because France seemed to be everything that the Mediterranean world was not: it was polite and prosperous, modern and secular, not just civil, but civilized. If these soldiers' encounters abroad taught them anything, it was that familiarity was more important than enmity and civilization mattered more than war.

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CHAPTER 4

Violence and the Barbaric East: Germans and the Russian Campaign of 1812

Leighton S. James

That the experience and memory of the Napoleonic Wars and the so-called *Franzosenzeit* played a central role in the historical memory of Germany until at least the Second World War is unquestionable.[1] The significance of the conflict for modern Germany was succinctly summarized by Thomas Nipperdey's oft-quoted opening sentence to his history of modern Germany—'In the beginning was Napoleon'.[2] The conflict transformed the political landscape of German Central Europe. At the beginning of the war the Holy Roman Empire comprised some 300 or so states. By 1815, the thousand-year-old Empire was no more and the political geography had been drastically simplified to the 39 states that made up the German Confederation in 1820. The old world of petty principalities, Free Imperial Knights, ecclesiastical states and home towns had been ripped apart by warfare, diplomatic horse-trading and the centralizing tendencies of the remaining German polities. On a social level, thousands of German soldiers and civilians had lost their lives to enemy action and disease. Finally, the conflict left an enduring, but contested, collective and cultural memory

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that was instrumentalized by various political groups throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

Much of the historiography on the Napoleonic Wars and Germany has focused on two interrelated issues. The more recent debate concerns the nature of the war itself. Did the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as David A. Bell has argued, represent the first total war in European history? Or, should we regard the conflict as characterized more by continuity with older forms of warfare? For Bell, the wars represented a watershed as the limited warfare of the eighteenth century gave way to a more ideological conflict characterized by the demonization of the enemy, high levels of violence beyond the 'laws of war' and the promotion of nationalist sentiments.[3] Within the German context, Mark Hewitson has also argued that the wars were a watershed moment and that what 'united most commentators was a conviction that the nature of warfare had altered'.[4] In contrast, others, such as Ute Planert, have argued that the role of patriotism and ideology was more limited, that combatants' and civilians' experiences bore strong similarities to earlier wars and that elements of aristocratic forms of war were still evident between 1792 and 1815.[5]

The importance of patriotism and nationalism in the wars dovetails with the second historical debate—the role the generation-long conflict had in shaping German national identity in the long nineteenth century. Most scholarly studies of the memory of the Napoleonic Wars have focused on how it shaped Franco-German relations from the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Michael Jeismann sees the period as consolidating the idea that the French were the hereditary enemy (*Erbfeind*) of the Germans.[6] Karen Hagemann has also pointed to the importance of the contested memory of the Wars of Liberation for the development of gendered notions of the German *Nation* and *Volk*. Crucial to these developments were not only the architectural expressions of liberation, such as the *Völkerschlachtdenkmal* at Leipzig or the national monument to the soldiers of the Wars of Liberty in Kreuzberg, Berlin, but also veterans' memoirs and historical novels set against the backdrop of the struggle against Napoleon that appeared in the course of the nineteenth century.[7]

As noted above, most of the scholarly literature has understandably emphasized German relations with the French. Several scholars, however, have pointed to the importance of interactions with Eastern Europe for the formation of German identity in the nineteenth century. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, for example, has pointed to the emergence of a German 'myth of the East' as a space of dirt and disorder, but also one ripe for settlement

and organization.[8] The East therefore became regarded as a destination for cultural missions and was crucial to the development of German national identity.[9] For Liulevicius the 'East' is not a geographical location, but rather a cultural appellation or, as he puts it, 'a state of being: an alleged condition of disorganization or underdevelopment'.[10] This image was propagated through a range of media from travelogues to historical novels in the nineteenth century. Similarly, Troy Paddock has argued, based on his study of school geography and history textbooks and newspapers in the *Kaiserreich*, that an enduring image of the Russian's Asiatic and backward nature was well-established prior 1914. Paddock quotes Norbert Elias, who served on the Eastern Front during the First World War, as a representative example of German perceptions of Russia when he wrote at the outbreak of war that he knew 'nothing, absolutely nothing [about Russia]. The tsar, and the Cossacks, barbarous. The barbarous east – that was all beyond the pale'.[11] Indeed, Liulevicius has argued that the First World War created a durable image of the East as a 'war land' characterized by extremes of violence unrestrained by any 'laws of war'.

This reputation for barbarity had roots that stretched back to at least the seventh century. Ekkehard Klug has suggested that the idea that Russia was an Asiatic, or at least half-Asiatic, land has its roots in Polish literature of the sixteenth century, from where it spread to the neighbouring German states.[12] More broadly, Larry Wolff has argued that in the course of the eighteenth century the mental map of Europe shifted on a 90-degree angle. During the Renaissance, it was the North that was equated with barbarity and backwardness, whilst the South was civilized, but in the eighteenth century the West became associated with civilization and progress, whilst the East became its antipode, savage and uncivilized. Wolff traces this shift through Enlightenment tracts and the booming travel literature of the time, which, he argues, consolidated the enduring idea of Eastern Europe's uncivilized nature.[13]

Although there is an extensive historiography dealing with Germany's relationship with Russia, the majority tends to focus on how the writings of a political and intellectual elite forged an image of Russia in the popular consciousness.[14] Despite a few notable exceptions, few historians have specifically examined the German experience and memory of the disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812.[15] Whilst a sizeable Russian-language literature on the fate of thousands of prisoners of war captured during the fateful retreat from Moscow exists, there has been no systematic examination of the experience of German prisoners of war.[16] This is despite the fact that,

after the Wars of Liberation, Napoleon's invasion of Russia was the most important campaign in the German memory of the Napoleonic Wars. This chapter will first examine the place of the Russian campaign in German memory in the nineteenth century. It will then argue that the reminiscences of German veterans of the ill-fated invasion of 1812 played a crucial role in consolidating the image of Russia as an uncivilized, barbaric 'war land' prior to the First World War. Depictions of violence and cruelty were stock images in the representations of Russia in the eighteenth century, but Napoleonic veterans drew upon these depictions to frame their narratives of the invasion and retreat, thereby consolidating the supposedly uncivilized nature of Russia in the nineteenth-century German imagination.

The 1812 Russian Campaign in German Memory

The significance of Napoleon's invasion of Russia for German memory is evident at several levels. First, of the estimated 450,000 to 600,000 strong army that crossed the Niemen River in an effort to enforce Napoleon's Continental System on the Tsar, around 100,000 were drawn from the German states that comprised the *Rheinbund* (Confederation of the Rhine), whilst thousands more were conscripted in the German territories annexed to the French Empire served in French regiments. Meanwhile, Prussia and Austria, in uneasy alliance with Napoleon, also contributed military contingents tasked with protecting the northern and southern flanks of the main invasion, respectively. Of the main army, an estimated 120,000 returned, but losses varied greatly between regiments. Many of the *Rheinbund* regiments suffered devastating losses. Of the Bavarian contingent of some 30,000 men, for example, only around 4,000 or 12 per cent returned, whilst the 25,000 strong army of the Napoleonic satellite state, the Kingdom of Westphalia, was almost completely destroyed.[17]

Russian forces captured an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 prisoners, but by 1813 less than half were still alive.[18] In 1816 the Prussian authorities attempted to ascertain the fate of thousands of former Prussian subjects who had gone missing during the Russian campaign. They tasked a Hanoverian officer, Heinrich Meyer, with the job of combing through the Russian military, hospital and civil records in search of the missing. The research revealed that not all had died; some prisoners of war joined the Russian military or the Russian-German Legion. In a continuation of eighteenth-century emigration policies, in July 1813, prisoners of peasant origin were offered the opportunity to settle in the colonies, such as

Saratov, whilst artisans and craftsmen were offered work reconstructing devastated urban centres. Around a quarter of all surviving prisoners opted to become Russian subjects and in 1837 it was estimated that Moscow was home to 1,500 veterans of the *Grande Armée*.[19] The vast majority, however, had perished. One of Meyer's lists of missing Prussian subjects documents 1,910 soldiers. Of these, over 70 per cent died in either 1812 or 1813.[20]

Second, the invasion of Russia and the hardships endured by the soldiers was a pan-German experience in that it involved virtually every German state. Previous Napoleonic campaigns had not touched directly all German states at the same time. Most notably, Prussia had adopted a policy of neutrality between 1795 and 1805. The 1812 invasion, by contrast, involved military contributions from across German Central Europe. Although the Austrian and Prussian contingents managed to extract themselves largely intact, the main invasion force was devastated by a combination of climatic conditions, hunger, disease, particularly typhus, and enemy action. The Russian catastrophe is sometimes seen as something experienced largely by the unfortunate soldiers of the *Rheinbund*. Yet, although the official Prussian contingent saw little combat, thousands of former Prussian subjects did experience the hardships of the campaign, including the horrors of the retreat. The redrawing of political borders as a result of the Napoleonic conquests, coupled with the intensified demand for manpower and career necessity, meant that many former Prussian subjects (many soon-to-be Prussian subjects again after the Congress of Vienna) served in the *Rheinbund* forces. Representative examples can be seen in the figures of Johann von Borcke and Karl von Suckow. Both were former Prussian officers, who joined the army of Westphalia after being cashiered following the reduction of the Prussian army after the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807.[21]

Third, although survivors were few, there is ample evidence that veterans sought to communicate their experiences to a wider audience. Much of this was probably done verbally in stories told to family and friends. Research on French veterans of the war of 1812 by Nikolai Promyslov has suggested that they played an important role in shaping French perceptions of Russia in the nineteenth century.[22] There seems little to suggest that German veterans were any less willing or able to recount their experiences. The extent and scope of the Napoleonic Wars meant that veterans became a source of information about foreign countries and cultures that rivalled those other community purveyors of knowledge, the priest and

the local schoolmaster.[23] These oral testimonies are lost to us, but there are tantalizing hints of the readiness of at least some veterans to impart their experience to eager listeners. The *Kirchenbuch* of St. Johannesburg, for example, records that Johann Peter Buch, a veteran of 1812, 'enjoyed describing the rigours of the campaigns he had experienced'. There is little suggestion of the unwillingness to speak of their war experience that is sometimes ascribed to the veterans of more modern wars. The hardships these soldiers endured were also commemorated in their songs:

Ja, der Russ'	Yes, the Russians
Hat uns gezeigt,	Have shown us
Wie man's machen muß,	What we must do
Im ganzen Kreml	In the whole Kremlin
Nicht eine Semmel	Not a crumb
Und auf den Hacken	And at our heels
Nur Hunger und Kosacken.[24]	Only hunger and Cossacks

Moreover, in the aftermath of the wars, veterans' associations also emerged, particularly in the former *Rheinbund* territories and in the Rhineland. These offered veterans the opportunity to remember their former military lives and commemorate fallen comrades as well as providing a forum for sociability. The organizations played a role in the cultivation of a positive image of French rule in opposition to Prussian control in the first half of the nineteenth century.[25] In some areas, the memory of the Russian campaign was linked to that of the later campaigns against Napoleon. In Munich, the obelisk erected on Carolinenplatz in 1833 commemorates the Bavarian fallen in both the 1812 and the 1813–14 campaigns.[26]

Veterans also published wartime memoirs and autobiographies. Indeed, the literary legacy of the Napoleonic Wars appears to be one of its defining features. Bell and others have argued that the aftermath of the Napoleonic conflict was differentiated from previous European wars by the flood of autobiographies and memoirs, inspired by ideas of the self drawn from artistic trends and movements, particularly Romanticism.[27] These trends focused on the interior life of the individual and encouraged soldiers and officers not only to record their wartimes experience, but also, where their literary ability allowed, their emotional reactions to what they underwent.[28]

As Hagemann has shown, these published accounts found a ready audience in nineteenth-century Germany. Of a sample of 129 war memories and autobiographies published before 1875, 67 (51.9 per cent) describe

the Russian campaign, compared with 63 that focus mainly on the war of 1813 to 1814, and *Rheinbund* veterans produced around two-thirds of the Russian narratives.[29] Their accounts fed a public desire for information about the campaign that had been so costly in human life and provided knowledge of lost loved ones. The combination of war narrative and travelogue also heightened the appeal of the veterans' accounts. In the foreword to several memoirs, the authors record that they were asked to write down their experiences at the behest of friends or family. Thus, Joseph Schrafel wrote in the foreword to the 1834 edition of his memoirs that although he had no pretensions to art he had been encouraged to set down his experiences.[30] Some went through multiple editions. Jakob Meyer's account, for example, was first published in 1836 in a print run of 500, and two more editions quickly followed in 1837 and 1838 because of its popularity.[31] In the course of the nineteenth century, relatives and descendants of veterans posthumously published accounts. Some were ultimately aimed at, or were tailored by later editors to, particular audiences. For example, the memoir of the Westphalian soldier, Förster Fleck, was first published in 1845. It was reprinted four times in an abridged edition between 1907 and 1912. It also appeared as part of the *Deutsche Jugendbücherei* series aimed at young readers published by the Hermann Hillger Verlag.[32]

Finally, the interest the German reading public had in the Russian campaign is also demonstrated by the various French war memoirs that were translated into German during the nineteenth century, sometimes at great speed. For example, Paul Charles de Bourgoing's work *Le prisonnier en Russie* appeared in 1815 and was translated the following year into German as *Der Gefangene in Russland*.[33] Some French accounts also went through several editions in German. The memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne were first published in German translation in 1900, forty-four years after they first appeared in French, but were republished four more times by the end of 1912.[34]

Massacre and Atrocity in the Russian Campaign

A systematic study of the network of publishing and translating Napoleonic wartime narratives across European borders has yet to be conducted, but the invasion of Russia, the fire of Moscow and the subsequent retreat have been presented as a transnational experience and 'media' event.[35] The soldiers of the *Grande Armée* had a plethora of Russian imagery upon which to draw both at the outset of their invasion and as a later framework for their narratives. The invasion was preceded by a propaganda campaign

aimed at legitimizing the war and demonizing the enemy. Charles Masson's *Mémoires secrets sur la Russie* attacked the 'oriental servitude' of the Russian people, whilst Charles-Louis Lesur's *De la politique et des progrès de la puissance russe* depicted a ruthless, superficially Europeanized Russian elite at the head of a mass of 'ignorant, superstitious, nomadic, Asiatic savages '.[36] Napoleon also had Edward Daniel Clarke's *Travels in Various Countries of Europe*, a work that had little good to say about Russia, translated into French.[37] These depictions of Russia as a wild and uncivilized space drew on literary tropes that were already well established by eighteenth-century travelogues and histories of Russia, such as those penned by William Coxe and Louis-Philippe, comte de Ségur. Many French and English travelogues of Russia were translated into German, but there was also a small number of German-language accounts.[38] Although not always negative, these accounts often emphasized the wild, uncultivated nature of the land; the seemingly backward economy and lifestyles of the peasantry; the exoticism of some of the Russian subject peoples, such as the Cossacks and the Bashkirs; and finally, the supposed extraordinary cruelty and violence of everyday life. This last facet of Russian culture was symbolized by the use of the knout, a type of whip, which became an 'emblem of Russian barbarism' in eighteenth-century Western travelogues.[39]

The context of the veterans' experience of Russia was, of course, very different from that of the eighteenth-century travellers. The latter travelled to Russia as part of diplomatic, trade or scientific missions, rather than as invaders, and were not usually the targets of hostile natives or witnesses to armed conflict. The Napoleonic soldiers were both, and the 1812 campaign was characterized by some particularly bloody battles. An already depleted *Grande Armée* lost an estimated 35,000 men at the Battle of Borodino, for example, a clash vividly described in several German memoirs.[40] Yet, as costly in human life as these pitched battles were, they were nevertheless seen by some officers as offering the chance for both personal glory and career advancement. Lieutenant Meerheim of the Saxon Zastrow cuirassier regiment, for example, described Borodino as a 'great day of celebration (*Festtag*)' and claimed even the sick and wounded wanted the chance to fight the enemy.[41] In their emphasis on personal and regimental honour, these descriptions of battles during the Russian campaign are not dissimilar to those of other battles, such as Austerlitz, Wagram and Waterloo.[42] What was more significant for the representation of Russia to the German reading public was the depictions of violence beyond the battlefield, particularly that meted out to the thousands of

prisoners of war. Meyer's lists of the missing did not comment on the manner of soldiers' deaths and many succumbed to a combination of inadequate supplies, the poor road network, the extremes of both heat and cold and disease. Nevertheless, all the French and German narratives also emphasized that many deaths were due to extreme violence at the hands of their captors.

Extreme violence, including the torture and massacre of prisoners, occurred elsewhere during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, most notably in the Vendée and in the Peninsular War. The savagery of the latter, so evocatively and disturbingly depicted in Goya's *Disasters of War*, was also depicted in the narratives of *Rheinbund* veterans. Indeed, some accounts, such as that of the Westphalian artilleryman Jakob Meyer, depict both campaigns.[43] Anton von Wedel, a former Prussian officer but in French service by 1812, made a direct comparison between the campaigns in Spain and Russia, but felt that the latter was worse due to the harshness of the elements and the comparatively sparsely populated countryside:

> The whole nation was fanatical against us. … We had a war not merely against the soldiers; the whole people were in arms against us … We saw all the cruelty of the Spanish war close in on us, but in the most terrible figure, in an unfavourable climate, in a wasted country, ten times as far from the Fatherland, which appeared to us unreachable.[44]

The blurring of distinctions between combatant and civilian evident in the Vendée and Spain, and which has been presented as evidence that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars represented a total war, also occurred in Russia, albeit on a shorter timeline.[45] In the context of the Peninsular War, Philip Dwyer has suggested that the descriptions of massacres and other war atrocities within French narratives served to highlight the horror of war rather than the horror of the event itself and that they underscored the difficulty of the French 'civilizing mission' in Spain.[46] Whether the various German contingents that made up the *Grande Armée* shared French notions of a civilizing mission is questionable and, in any case, the invasion of Russia was too brief for any sort of civilizing activity. Yet, the guerrilla warfare in Spain does provide a useful point of comparison to events in Russia.

Like the Peninsular War, the Russian campaign witnessed the involvement of partisan bands, militia and groups of armed peasants referred to as *Ratniks* (warriors). These had been mobilized in earlier campaigns

against Napoleon, but were extensively deployed only in 1812. Russian and Soviet historiography emphasized the spontaneous activities of the Russian peasantry and characterized the struggle as a 'people's war'.[47] In the veterans' narratives, the militia and partisan bands are often represented as preying on stragglers, baggage trains and foraging parties from the *Grande Armée* upon which, one contemporary noted, they waged 'a war without pity'.[48] They are the object of particular loathing in veterans' accounts. In a similar manner to the guerrilla war in Spain, many accounts claim that those unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of the partisans were not merely killed, but were subjected to prolonged torture before being executed. The Saxon Lieutenant, Meerheim, wrote in his account that those that became separated from the main force were 'murdered in the most terrible manner' and that the Russian peasants had committed the most 'hair raising' cruelties on the road to Smolensk.[49] Sergeant Vollborn of the Saxon army claimed in this diary to have encountered the corpses of two Saxon grenadiers in a wood, with their hearts torn from their chests.[50] Wedel recalled that some soldiers and officers 'found an inglorious death in such skirmishes or worse fell alive into the hands of the peasants, and were killed by the robbers in the most tortuous manner. The soldiers described horrible stories of mutilated corpses, hung by the legs and crucified'.[51] Röder von Bomsdorff's account corroborates these claims whilst also suggesting that the symbolic acts of mutilation, such as castration, that occurred in Spain also happened in Russia. In his narrative, published between 1816 and 1818, he described the following scene:

> Savage was the revenge that the Russian natives took on [foragers] … We, in order to present just one example, passed through a deserted village where three doors had been leant against the last houses on the road. On each one, just as we would nail a bird of prey to a gate, was a crucified man with his genitals cut away. The few remaining torn pieces of clothing and other signs showed that these unfortunates were Portuguese and that the shameful act had been completed while they still lived. So crime heaped on crime and the barbarity reached a stage where even the most unfeeling trembled.[52]

In the above testimonies, this gratuitous violence and acts of mutilation occurred out of sight. The narratives are clear that rumours and tales of Russian cruelty spread quickly amongst the soldiers and we can speculate about the psychological impact of such stories. Stories of Russian barbarity

prior to the invasion also seem to have coloured soldier preconceptions of Russia, as the Austrian cavalryman, Pauliny von Köwelsdamm, noted, writing 'they spoke in advance [of the invasion] of their barbarism so much and imperturbably that I took the utmost caution'.[53] Other veterans, particularly those captured during the retreat, were direct eyewitnesses to these acts of violence. Karl von Schehl provides a disturbing account in his otherwise picaresque narrative. Schehl grew up in Krefeld under French rule and appears to have identified with the Napoleonic state. He claimed he was 'born republican' and 'sans-culotte' and thanked the Revolution for his very birth as without it his father would not have met his mother.[54] Schehl voluntarily enlisted in the French army, but unfortunately the 1812 campaign was his first taste of military operations. Yet, he was one of the lucky ones. Despite being captured by Cossacks, he did eventually return home. He claimed he survived because of his skill with the clarinet, which earned him the protection of the Cossack officers. Others less fortunate or less skilled than Schehl were tortured and murdered. His account contains a litany of the atrocities and barbarous treatment meted out to his fellow prisoners. He claimed that those too sick and wounded to continue were dragged through the snow, their heads striking the frozen rocks until they died. The Russian militiamen and partisans also amused themselves by tying prisoners to trees and administering many shallow wounds with their pikes. After describing these scenes, Schehl speaks directly to the readers of his memoir, asking to be spared the need to relate more atrocities:

> Yes, dear reader, I could describe to you more such outrages, which these cowardly barbarians inflicted on these unfortunate defenceless [men]; I ask you, however, to be content with these few samples as it would really effect me too much to describe all the cruelties that I experienced on that horrific march. I will say only this, that these militiamen, these devoutly Christian defenders of the Fatherland, who would not dare take the tiniest morsel of meat in their mouths during Lent treated the unfortunate prisoners worse than any of the wild Indian tribes were able to do.[55]

Similarly, Wilhelm von Conrady also claimed to have witnessed acts of wanton cruelty when he, with around 100 other sick prisoners, was crammed into a small room. Many suffocated there and the *Ratniks* stabbed those bedridden by fever without mercy. On the twelve-day march from Kaluga to Orel, he claimed they lost some 400 men due to mistreatment at the hands of the *Ratniks*.[56]

Whilst the peasant partisans were feared and loathed, it was the Cossacks who appear to have symbolized the barbarity of Russia above all. In part, the Cossacks were feared as irregular troops, which, like the partisans, had scant respect for the normal practices or restraints of warfare. One memoirist, Karl von Suckow, conflated the two groups by claiming the armed peasants were referred to as 'tame Cossacks'. Fear of the Cossacks proper, however, also predated the Russian invasion, largely due to their depredations in Prussia during the Seven Years' War. Various media, from eyewitness accounts to newspapers, highlighted the 'Cossack Cruelty' in East Prussia in the late 1750s, particularly the destruction of Ragnit and the treatment of the wounded soldier-poet, Ewald Christian von Kleist.[57] Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz's *History of the Seven Years' War in Germany from 1756 to 1763* described the Cossacks as 'in figure human, but in everything else like the predators of the Libyan desert' and decried the 'robbery, mutilation of limbs, murder, arson and desecration of the female sex' that they perpetrated. First published in 1788 Archenholz's work proved very popular and was reprinted nine times by 1812.[58] There was, therefore, a well-established image of Cossack ferocity in the German imagination prior to the 1812 invasion.

The Cossacks are represented in virtually all German memoirs of the campaign. Their swift moving bands caused particular fear amongst the remnants of the *Grande Armée*, so much so that the very cry 'Cossack' was apt to cause panic. Johann von Borcke, another former Prussian officer now in Westphalian service, claimed that a new verb was coined 'kosakirt', which meant to be hunted and robbed by these fearsome troops.[59] The Cossack killing of helpless soldiers even appalled that hardened veteran and theoretician of war, Carl von Clausewitz. He wrote to his wife about the pursuit of the *Grande Armée* that he had witnessed 'ghastly scenes … If my feelings had not been hardened it would have sent me mad. Even so it will take many years before I can recall what I have seen without a shuddering horror'.[60] Some authors recall the Cossacks selling prisoners to partisan bands and groups of peasants in the knowledge that they would be tortured and killed. Even when Cossacks did not directly kill prisoners or hand them over to the partisans, memoirs accused them of displaying a shocking indifference to the suffering of prisoners of war. Memoirists often accused them of stripping captured soldiers naked or near naked and leaving them to perish from the cold as the temperatures dropped to as low as −37 C on 6 December 1812.

In the eyes of the soldiers of the *Grande Armée*, some of the enemy not only did not conform to the conventions of European warfare, but seemed relics of an older way of combat. Even more alien than the Cossacks were the Tartars, Bashkirs and Kalmucks, tribal peoples from the Russian interior. As in the case of the Cossacks, representations of these groups prior to the Napoleonic Wars had been generally negative: Prussian propaganda during the Seven Years' War had even accused the Kalmucks and Bashkirs of cannibalism.[61] These groups are much less represented in the memoirs than the Cossacks, but where they do appear they are depicted as particularly uncivilized and much was made of their non-European appearance. Many memoirists often emphasized the Asiatic appearance of the Bashkirs.[62] Such troops, mused Karl Renner, in his account, had never before been seen in a European war and 'many of them were armed with bows and arrows' rather than the more familiar carbines and muskets.[63]

By contrast the regular Russian military were described more positively. Several former prisoners of war ascribed their survival to the protection they received from Russian officers. Eduard von Rüppell, for example, wrote admiringly of a Russian grenadier, who not only gave him food and some money, but also cursed a Cossack for striking him:

> I felt myself so touched by the gallantry of this true Russian soldier that I forgot for a moment all hardship and watched him until he disappeared into the distance. For a poor Russian soldier, who daily received only two *kopeks*, [to give me] this present was something extraordinary'

He also recalled Russian officers and NCOs intervening to prevent Ratniks from murdering prisoners.[64] Cossacks were also depicted in acts of kindness, such as protecting captured soldiers' wives and children, but these representations appear far more rarely in the literature and serve to highlight their brutality elsewhere. No doubt Rüppell's status as an officer meant that his odds of survival once captured were greater than the common soldiers. Indeed, if they were not killed out of hand by their captors or finished off by the privations of their initial capture and march to the interior, officers could enjoy a relatively comfortable captivity. A knowledge of French was particularly useful as it allowed prisoners to communicate with the Russian nobility, and many officers appear to have been entertained by the local nobility and were invited to attend balls and dances before their eventual release. Von Wedel, for example, dined every night with a Russian general.[65]

The narratives also indicate that the soldiers of the *Grande Armée* were not the only victims of cruelty, however. Many memoirists provided graphic descriptions of the violence meted out by the Russian military to their own people. Schehl, for example, claimed that two Russian wardens were put to death by being impaled when a senior officer discovered that they had not provided prisoners with food and water, leading to several deaths. Schehl termed this 'cannibalistic cruelty' and seemed at pains to further distinguish himself from the perpetrators by stressing his repugnance at the pointlessness of the violence. He wrote that although it was difficult to feel sympathy for the two wardens, he nevertheless wondered what good came from their execution.[66]

A less gruesome incidence of violence is referred to by Heinrich Roos. He witnessed a young Russian boy being beaten with a knout after he had stolen some bread from Roos. The beating continued until Roos himself intervened in an act of mercy to end the flogging.[67] Even the feared *Ratniks* might receive some sympathy when mistreated by Russian officers. Rüppell recalled admiring the sword carried by one of his *Ratnik* guards, who drew it and handed it over for closer inspection. At that moment, an officer chanced upon the pair and beat the guard for handing over his weapon.[68] There is more than an echo in both tales of the accounts of extensive corporal punishment in Russia presented in eighteenth-century travelogues. In both accounts, Roos and Schehl seek to distinguish themselves from their Russian captors. They present themselves as more sensitive and empathetic to the pain of others than their Russian wardens and are shocked at the casual and arbitrary nature of the violence. This should also be seen in the context of the military reforms of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period as, under French influence, the use and severity of corporal punishment in the armies of the *Rheinbund* had declined. Even the Prussian army, which had been infamous for the severity of its discipline in the eighteenth century, had sought to introduce more humane conditions in an effort to make a military career an attractive proposition to middle-class sons.[69]

Moreover, despite these authors' claims to greater sensibility, the Cossacks, Russian peasants and Bashkirs were not the only perpetrators of violence. Acts of cruelty and extreme violence by the soldiers of the *Grande Armée* are much less written about, but there are some references to these kinds of violence within the accounts of German officers. Normally, the memoirists do not depict themselves as participants in such violence beyond conventional battles and skirmishes. Whilst incidents of violence

towards Russian civilians are also recorded occasionally, they are again often ascribed to non-Germans, particularly the French. Conrady, for example, describes arriving in a Russian town to find wounded and dead Russians lying in the square, having been thrown out of their field hospitals by the French.[70] Sometimes there is a silence over the perpetrators. Friedrich Gießе, a Westphalian officer, describes a scene that made 'a deep impression' on his fellows when his unit overtook a cart carrying the bloodied corpse of a young Russian woman. The distraught women accompanying the body tried to act out what had happened through gestures, but Gießе claimed not to have understood and rode off.[71] The possibility that soldiers of the *Grande Armée* had raped and murdered the woman is implied in his account, but is not explicitly stated.

Gießе's tale is unusual in its implicit reference to violence, possibly sexual violence, against women. In contrast to French memoirs of the Peninsular War, in which the sexual assault and rape of women is reported in several accounts, such violence towards women is rarely presented in German memoirs of the Russian campaign. This may be in part due to the flight of much of the local population on the invasion route, but violence against the sutlers, soldiers' wives and camp followers of the *Grande Armée* is rarely referred to in the accounts. This may also be due to a reticence amongst the German memoirists. Certainly, both German soldiers and civilians during the Napoleonic Wars rarely discussed rape openly in their narratives, and where they did, it was often clothed in euphemistic language.[72] More comparison needs to be undertaken here between French and other memoirs and the German accounts.

The instances of violence that occurred between the constituent parts of the *Grande Armée* are perhaps more disturbing, because they seemingly revealed the fragility of civilized behaviour. This usually occurred within the context of the retreat. As the temperature dropped and supplies ran short, the desperate circumstances led to a breakdown of discipline in which the army turned on itself. Several memoir writers refer to the fragmentation of the army as different nationalities, linguistic or regional groups competed for scarce resources. Theft, infighting and even cannibalism are reported in the memoirs of the retreat. Wedel wrote that 'personal safety stopped completely. Particularly at night, latecomers crept up and stole from those asleep what they could, pushed near the fires they had not lit. Then there were disputes and fighting, and, sabre in hand, the unfortunates were driven away'.[73] The German veterans again often singled out the French as particularly guilty of using the threat of violence or

the act itself against their former comrades. Gieße wrote that 'even against their comrades in arms, so long as they were not [French], the actions of these degenerates were hostile'.[74] Violence between German soldiers is less evident, but there are some hints at the tensions brought about by starvation and cold. Suckow at least was honest enough to write that he initially refused a comrade's request to share some potatoes he had found.[75] Some accounts hint that the experience in Russia had a brutalizing effect on the men. *Oberstleutnant* Waldenburg, a battalion commander of the Russian-German Legion, which was composed largely of former German prisoners of war, recalled the indiscipline of the troops under his command, and claimed that 'the last campaign in Russia had made them completely wild (*vollkommen verwildert*)'.[76]

Here was the crux of the horror of the war of 1812 and the retreat in particular. It was not the conflict itself, but the excess of violence, the violence carried out with little regard to military necessity, that shocked eye witnesses and vicariously horrified the readers of their accounts. The scale of the losses meant that the campaign would become a key part of the European-wide communicative and cultural memory of the Napoleonic Wars. In Germany, the memory of the campaign was overshadowed to some extent by the subsequent Wars of Liberation, which became a keystone of the German national myth in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, veterans found a ready audience for their experiences, and in some states, such as Bavaria, the campaign became fused to the later struggle against Napoleon. Veteran accounts drew upon, reproduced and reinforced tropes that already characterized eighteenth-century representations of Russia. They overlaid older notions of Russian barbarism with their accounts of the *Ratnik* and Cossack atrocities to consolidate a picture of Russia as inherently less civilized than the West. In so doing, they helped consolidate the myth of the East in the nineteenth century. To be sure this representation was not monolithic. The image of Russia provided in a variety of media shifted according to political realities. The politicized literature of the *Befreiungskriege*, for example, often praised and welcomed the Russians as liberators of Germany, but nationalist disappointment following the restoration after 1815 and liberal antipathy towards Russia as a guarantor of the conservative political order led to a surge of Russophobia in the run up to the 1848 Revolutions. And those Russophobes had to look no further than the veterans' narratives for confirmation of their fears. Indeed, even as August von Kotzebue's *Russisch-Deutsche Volks-Blatt* lauded Russia and its armies as they advanced through Germany in

1813, soldiers' songs and stories spoke of Russia as a savage, unforgiving place, a war land where extremes of violence were commonplace. In doing, so they added to a stock of images, which could be drawn upon to define the newly united Germany against Eastern Europe.

Notes

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7. See Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture and Memory* (Cambridge, 2015).
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13. Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994).

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16. See Alexander Mikaberidze. 'Napoleon's Lost Legions. The Grande Armée prisoners of war in Russia', *Napoléonica. La Revue,* 21 (2015), pp. 35–44. See also Wolfgang Schmidt, 'Das Schicksal der bayerischen Kriegsgefangenen in Rußland 1812 bis 1814', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 42:2 (1987), pp. 9–25.
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18. Vladlen G. Sirotkin, 'La campagne de Russie: le destin des soldats de Napoléon après la défaite', *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, 156 (1991), pp. 56–65.
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CHAPTER 5

Kodaking a Just War: Photography, Architecture and the Language of Damage in the Egyptian Sudan, 1884–1898

Paul Fox

In 1898, war correspondent Francis Gregson returned to Britain from the Anglo-Egyptian operation to recapture the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and made an album of his Kodak photographs. It was an ambitious professional project: copies were presented to Queen Victoria and the senior military officers who had facilitated his work in the field. Included is a photograph taken in the ruins of the Governor's Palace in Khartoum as soldiers explored the site where General Charles Gordon had died 14 years earlier (Fig. 5.1). Gregson had taken his Kodak camera with him when he scaled the sloping pile of overturned masonry surrounding the badly damaged Palace in order to stand on the highest remaining point of the outer wall at approximately first floor level, as close as possible to where Gordon himself had stood to scan the Nile for signs of the relieving force that never came. Gregson's subject is neither the moment of recapture nor the victorious participants, but the materiality of the remains of the building;

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

Fig. 5.1 Francis Gregson, *Remains of the staircase on which Gordon was killed in the ruins of the old governor-general's palace*, 1898. Reproduced with kind permission of Durham University Library Archives and Special Collections: SAD.A27/148

were it not for the head of the soldier in the lower foreground the overall composition tends towards incoherence.

Gregson chose to photograph the properties of the scarred and weathered vertical elevation that fills most of the frame, to the exclusion of the horizon or any other contextualising referent, less the pillar in the right foreground, which, with its partially demolished form and absence of architectural coherence, does little to generate spatial coherence. The properties of the photograph, like the broken remains of the building itself, are conditioned by an act of extreme violence: its meaning is located in what Andrew Herscher calls 'the language of damage'. With reference to images of the Governor's Palace, and of the tomb of Muhammad Ahmad directly across the Nile in the city of Omdurman, this chapter traces the relationship between handheld photography, the material properties of war-torn buildings and the patriotic rhetoric of a necessary war justly fought to an appropriate conclusion. It argues that the unprecedented presence of the recently invented Kodak transformed how armed conflict could be

represented to domestic audiences, and that this was recognised by Anglo-Egyptian leaders, who staged events associated with the conclusion of the campaign with the camera in mind, in pursuit of impression management in Britain.

The Sudan Campaign

In the summer of 1881 Sufi cleric Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself *Mahdi*, the redeemer of the Islamic world, and began a popular uprising against Egyptian rule in the Sudan. Two years later an Egyptian army sent from Khartoum to defeat the Mahdists was destroyed, and British forces deployed to assist it on the Red Sea coast fought Hadendowa tribesmen and their allies for the first time. The encounter came as a shock; Digna's troops attacked aggressively and, with tactical dexterity, punishing Anglo-Egyptian mistakes, despite their lack of modern weapons. British forces withdrew to the Nile Delta, the Egyptian government ceded Sudan to the insurrection—and its outlying garrisons were cut off.

The events of 1883 had a significant impact on the way the insurgency was represented in Britain. The dominant patriotic British construction of Sudanese martial masculinity was ambivalent. The Dervish warrior was upheld as fanatically brave, and bravery was regarded as a common virtue, which therefore served as a yardstick with which to measure one's own moral worth. But fanaticism, typified by weak organisational skills, indiscipline and frenzied behaviour, was a quality attributed to those who rebelled against the blandishments of civilising imperialism.[1] Representations of the Dervish warrior aroused ambivalent feelings of fear, admiration and curiosity in Britain: here was a barbarian opponent apparently without civilised scruples, who nevertheless posed an existential threat to Egypt and, more pertinently to the producers and consumers of these popular images, to the chances of operational success.

The former Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, Alfred Milner, assessed the impact of this course of events in a book that addressed itself, like the illustrated general interest weeklies and popular histories referred to here, to a predominantly conservative, patriotic, broadly based middle-class audience:

> Fifteen years ago it was as safe to go to Khartum…as it was to go to Wadi Halfa and Sarras. Between Alexandria and Sarras there is perfect security still, but south of Sarras, and hence onward to the Equator, there is now no

> security whatever…. I do not suppose there is another point in all the world where the line of demarcation between civilization and the most savage barbarism is more sharply marked.[2]

The Salafist insurgency spread north, across the 'region of storm-swept desert and treacherous scrub' as Milner imagined it, stretching the pathetic fallacy to its imperial limits, until it abutted the southernmost Anglo-Egyptian outpost at Wadi Halfa. General Charles Gordon was seconded to the Egyptian government to oversee the evacuation of Sudan's Egyptian garrisons, arriving in Khartoum in February 1884. Within a month the town was under siege.

A British relief expedition despatched in the autumn of 1884 ground to a halt after desperate fighting in the New Year. Gordon and his garrison were massacred when Khartoum fell on 25 January 1885. The consequent ceding of the Sudan to the insurrection was a political disaster for Britain and Egypt. Public support for the reconquest of the Sudan was motivated by the perceived need to recover personal, institutional and national honour. Gordon was elevated by the British press to the status of a saintly British hero and Christian martyr. In Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad died of typhus in his newly built capital city, Omdurman, in June 1885.

The campaign to restore the Sudan to Egyptian rule was a steady, low-risk affair that lasted another 14 years, during which a new Egyptian army was trained by British forces. In 1898, after a series of calculated preparatory moves and extensive logistical preparation, Egypt's Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief), General Herbert Kitchener, advanced on Khartoum itself. The culminating military event of the reconquest was the Battle of Omdurman (Karari), on 2 September 1898, which resulted in the comprehensive defeat of the massed armies of the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa. 'Remember Gordon!', Kitchener had exhorted his troops before the Battle of Atbara back in April, setting the tone for the final phase of a campaign that succeeded in crushing the military power of the insurgency and bring about regime change.[3]

Anglo-Egyptian forces occupied Omdurman immediately after the battle. Lt Loch of the Grenadier Guards took the opportunity to position his Kodak where he could photograph British shell holes in the superstructure of the Mahdi's Tomb, in the town centre (Fig. 5.2). As Loch demonstrates, using Cavendish and his camel to indicate scale, the Tomb was the most architecturally imposing structure constructed during the *Mahdīa*, comprising an octagonal block on a square base, topped by a dome, to a

Fig. 5.2 Lt Edward Loch, *Captain Cavendish on Camel By the Mahdi's Tomb, Omdurman*, 1898 (Reproduced with kind permission of the National Army Museum, London: NAM. 1973-05-42-151)

height of 26 metres. It towered over a town where few buildings extended to a second storey. The political significance of the tomb of a man whom many Sudanese regarded as the prophesied redeemer of Islam was profound: to his followers it represented the spiritual essence of the *Mahdīa* itself; to its Anglo-Egyptian opponents, it was a provocation signifying the rejection of everything 'Turkish', and the continuation of Muhammad Ahmad's aspirations towards a regional caliphate. It was comprehensively looted when Anglo-Egyptian forces occupied Omdurman, after which the dome was brought down using an explosive charge initiated by a relative of Gordon serving with the Royal Engineers. What was left of the ground floor elevations were subsequently made safe in order to make the Tomb accessible on the European tourist itinerary.[4]

The victors also took possession of Khartoum. Figure 5.3, a near-full page wood engraving published in a popular pictorial history of Egypt soon after the death of Gordon, depicts the Governor's Palace, the architectural expression of Egyptian ('Turkish') power in the Sudan. It was Gordon's headquarters and became an object of heightened significance for both Sudanese and British audiences from moment the siege commenced. Without access to the building itself, the makers of the engraving likely drew on verbal accounts. The hesitant representation of its rectangular form, comprising two-storey whitewashed elevations and a ground floor arcade set in an arid environment including palm trees, mimosa, a camel and figures in 'oriental' dress at their leisure, draws together generic conventions rooted in the values of Orientalist art and picturesque aesthetics in order to make their image familiar. This representational ambiguity—of somewhere remote and dimly sighted, yet seemingly familiar and knowable—draws on a suggestibility that was to resonate strongly ten months later, when the town was overrun. In the immediate absence of eyewitness testimony, highly speculative accounts of Gordon's death circulated in Britain. Every version converged on three



Fig. 5.3 Unknown artist(s) and engraver(s), *The Palace Where Gordon Lived, Khartoum*, in *Pictorial Records of the English in Egypt: With a Full and Descriptive Life of General Gordon, the Hero of Khartoum*, wood engraving, 1885

details at least: Gordon was attacked on the first floor of the Palace; he fell to the foot of the stairs; that was where his body was beheaded.[5] The Palace remained in a ruinous state in territory now inaccessible to Europeans; but for the following 14 years, it existed in the British imagination as it had been: intact, in the moment before it became the site of martyrdom and destruction.

The National Army Museum archive possesses a model of the Palace made during the siege (Fig. 5.4). This Palace is more fortress than residence. It could be assembled, disassembled, garrisoned by toy soldiers, used to negotiate its architectural volumes in the imagination and, subsequently, to invoke the memory of heroic resistance and martyrdom—but never ruined.

George Joy's 1893 history painting, *The Death of General Gordon*, also offered contemporary viewers a glimpse of the intact Palace during the



Fig. 5.4 Unknown producers, *Plywood Model of the Governor's Palace in Khartoum and Ten Model Egyptian Soldiers*, 1884 (Courtesy of National Army Museum: NAM 1905-02-183-1)

Fig. 5.5 George Joy, *The Death of General Gordon, Khartoum, Jan. 26, 1885*, 1893. © Leeds Museums and Galleries (City Art Gallery)

final act, before it and its occupants were overwhelmed (Fig. 5.5). Its meaning is grounded in the pathos of Gordon's principled stand against the 'barbaric' values of the *Mahdīa* and, specifically, its declared intention to slaughter Egypt's beleaguered garrisons. The figure of Gordon occupies a higher, yet paradoxically subordinate position in pictorial depth, behind the Dervish figure group. Joy's restricted tonal range flattens the narrow body, merging it with the shadows above. The architectural form of the Palace orders space into a series of strongly delineated geometric planes, in relation to which Gordon's principled determination not to abandon Egypt's garrisons finds expression in the upright timber support to his right. On the other hand, some architectural detail of the Palace—

the improbably low balustrade, the open staircase offering unimpeded access to the very place where Gordon will be struck down, a veranda without obvious means of egress (no path to take)—suggests a location emptied of Khedival power, a notion reinforced by Gordon's apparent passivity, his unused personal weapons relegated to the status of theatrical props. The staircase and veranda became the defining architectural components of popular accounts of a martyr's death, accounts that were to influence behaviour in the ruins of the Palace itself in 1898. As noted at the outset, Gregson used the fallen Palace masonry to attempt a similar trajectory, from ground floor to the top of the partially destroyed wall, bringing his camera as close as possible to the level of the now destroyed veranda and the presumed site of Gordon's demise.

In 1897, the waxwork company, Madame Tussauds, made a significant commercial investment in a tableau structured around the north-west corner of the Palace, after Joy (Fig. 5.6). All of the salient architectural features that shaped near-mythic accounts of a martyr's death are in place: the

Fig. 5.6 John Theodore Tussaud et al., *Death of General Gordon*, Tableau, 1897. © Madame Tussauds Archive

claustrophobic veranda, Gordon's diminished yet resolute figure, framed by upright pillars, at the receiving end of a torrent of Dervish energy channelled by the walls of the Palace up the infamous staircase. Over a decade after its destruction, the intact Palace still dominated Khartoum's urban landscape in the British imagination.

Herscher offers a way of thinking about the disinclination to represent the damaged structure in British visual culture, suggesting that:

> Architecture fulfils a representational function not only through its construction, but also through its destruction. Damage is a form of design, and the traces of damage inflicted by political violence…the hole where a door or window once was, or a pile of rubble no longer identifiable as architecture at all—are at least as significant as any of the elements from which buildings are constructed for living, for the living. Architecture's representational status is, in fact, often more vivid, intense, and insistent when it is damaged than when it is intact.[6]

After Gordon's death, the damaged remains of the Palace signified political miscalculation, military defeat and the loss of prestige attending the death of a national hero; the scarred architectural remnants were too vivid, too intense to confront, even in representation.

An operative distinction exists here between the language of damage inflicted during armed conflict as defined by Herscher and the aesthetics of ruination, which already had a long art historical trajectory, not least in relation to Egypt. This subject has stimulated a significant historiography, but for these purposes, it is sufficient to recall that the aesthetic of ruination was established as a field of philosophical inquiry during the eighteenth century, in relation to the categories of the beautiful, sublime and picturesque. Significantly, according to Thomas Gilpin, picturesque aesthetics pivoted around ruined Gothic buildings in pursuit of a quality he labelled 'ruggedness'. Art historian James Hicks, who has traced the genealogy of the 'picturesque' in nineteenth-century British culture, argues that: 'the continued use of the term, as a means of describing and approving art works produced post-1815 …denoted an untheorised but tacitly recognised mutation of the term's meaning'.[7] By the 1850s the makers of travel handbooks, print portfolios and illustrated accounts of Egyptian life directed travellers to the Egyptian picturesque. Artist David Roberts' influential multi-volume *The Holy Land, Syria, Idumea, Arabia, Egypt and Nubia* comprised lithographs of salient ancient sites in which the buildings

are drawn with a precision that provides access to architectural detailing, but are set in landscapes as generic as they are formulaic in pursuit of picturesque values. Hicks concludes that Roberts incorporated 'British picturesque tropes in his representations of Egypt [and that] these tropes helped the artist to present Egypt as a backward and unenlightened state [and that] this presentation was widely accepted in mid nineteenth-century Britain…based on the assumption that [Egypt] was a naturally decayed and picturesque place'.[8]

Professional tripod photographers on the Nile bought into the Egyptian picturesque in order to produce aesthetically pleasing, commercially viable work. In 1858, photographer Francis Frith published his commercial album *Egypt and Palestine Photographed and Described*.[9] In the introduction Frith emphasised the documentary qualities of photography, which he claimed promised 'faithful representation' and 'simple truthfulness'. Yet from Frith's commercial perspective, there was 'not enough excitement in it': the picturesque was necessary in order to recreate for the armchair traveller the immersive sense of encounter fundamental to the album's appeal.

As the pictorial values of Fig. 5.3 indicate, anyone who made or looked at Kodak photographs in the 1890s was no doubt conscious of the rhetorical presence of the Egyptian picturesque, understood as a pleasing apperception that also advanced the notion of a backward society, in British popular culture.[10] But Kodak photography made during the 1898 campaign on the Nile reveals a turning away from attempts at picturesque representation in favour of a more explicitly documentary mode of representation, even to the extent that albums of the campaign suggest the demise of the Imperial Picturesque as an amateur picturing strategy.

Conflict-related architectural damage presented to British viewers through the medium of Kodak photography might be considered 'rugged', but not in the weather-worn, decayed, organic sense after Gilpin, no matter how the picturesque as a category had mutated in over a century of British use. All that remained of the badly damaged palace were shattered walls, but the processes of violent unmaking on the one hand and entropy on the other—of damage versus decay—are inimical and cannot be understood as productive of convergent meanings: the Palace in photographic representation was certainly a rugged ruin, but it was not a picturesque one. Rather, the indexing of extreme violence in photographs of the Palace is suggestive of the recent work of war photographers Joel Meyerowitz and Simon Norfolk, whose 'monumental, beautiful [aftermath] photography

of destruction', as art historian Sarah James puts it, has been categorised by them as representative of the 'military sublime'.[11] Immanuel Kant's Enlightenment aesthetics had located the sublime in encounters with unfathomable, awe-inspiring forces: 'The sublime *moves* […] its feeling is sometimes accompanied with a certain dread, or melancholy [this] I shall call the *terrifying sublime*'.[12] Edmund Burke, too, aligned terror with the sublime, arguing that 'When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible'.[13] In January 1885 in Sudan, and in Britain too, terror had pressed very nearly indeed.

Cultural Rules of Engagement

In Sudan, the near-destruction of the Palace affirmed the political, military and religious supremacy of the *Mahdīa*. The war-damaged building served as the pivot in a wider chain of signification that found its meaning for the Mahdists in the levelling of the entire town. Materials recycled from Khartoum's stone-built public buildings were utilised in the construction of a new political capital for the nascent caliphate, at Omdurman.[14] The architect Bogdan Bogdanovich observes that incitement to the programmatic destruction of urban environments—what he calls 'the ritual murder of the city'—is a recurring theme in the world's salient religious texts.[15]

For Bogdanovich, assaults on the built environment amount to nothing less than an attack on civilisation itself, typically by provincial barbarians: 'City destroyers', he suggests, 'haunt more than our books; they haunt our lives'. The enduring preoccupation with urbicide traced here was boosted by photography, which by the end of the nineteenth century 'was a well-established method for documenting different aspects of the city: its streets, people, and monuments'.[16] Khartoum and Omdurman: urbicide haunted the British political imagination continuously, from 1884 to 1898.

Bogdanovich's understanding of conflict as a clash between two cultures, one apparently more civilised than the other, finds expression in Patrick Porter's more ambitious structural study of armed conflict, which he figures as 'a medium through which we judge the calibre of our own and other civilisations'.[17] If, after Porter, representations of architectural damage in visual culture permitted Britons to 'gaze on Eastern war, from morale to morality [and] formulate what it means to be Western or non-Western', the articulation of the language of damage as a behavioural manifestation of values was instrumental in framing the *Mahdīa* as morally

and physically debased, as barbaric.[18] No matter how one may try to nuance a reading of imperial British cross-cultural encounters, patriotic sense-making accounts of this 'small war' of empire pivoted around representations of war-damaged cultural property that give full reign to the values of the military sublime, structured around reductive notions of 'us' and 'them', of good and evil, of a Manichean struggle between the forces of civilisation and barbarism.

Bogdanovich's contention that the act of murdering a city can be understood as a ritualised performance supports the argument, after Porter, that urbicide manifests, or performs, the cultural values of the perpetrator—values that shape the (tacit or explicit) rules of engagement in defining where the acceptable limits of political violence lie. A comparison between contrasting British and Mahdist rules of engagement relating to cultural property, manifest in photographs of buildings damaged or destroyed during the insurgency, offered British viewers the opportunity to judge the relative calibre of their own civilisation.

Culturally determined rules of engagement are discernible all over the British visual archive of the Nile war. From photographs depicting the filing off of the tips of British bullets in order to inflict more cavernous wounds, contrary to dominant European norms, to those depicting the amputation of the hands and feet of men suspected of working for the Anglo-Egyptian intelligence services in accordance with a Salafist interpretation of Sharia jurisprudence, handheld photography was implicated in contrasting the proponents' elected ethical boundaries of political violence.[19]

Photographs of the Governor's Palace and the Mahdi's Tomb (Figs. 5.7 and 5.8) were reciprocally bound up in this sense-making activity through what Herscher names 'the discourse of the attack': any attack is to be understood reciprocally, in relation to a previous act perpetrated by the opponent.[20] Figures 5.7 and 5.8 depict two targets bound up in such a relationship. These photographs, like the buildings themselves, advance meanings that are the product of their symbiotic relationship, an effect reinforced when positioned in proximity to each other in an album, or magic lantern presentation. Tomb and Palace were strategic sites in the political and cultural spaces of both parties because the chain of signification they provoked was shaped by the reciprocal application of the protagonists' rules of engagement: the degree of violence they chose to inflict, the means employed and the limits imposed.

Figure 5.7 was probably taken from the upper deck of the gunboat *Melik*, moored alongside the Palace during the Gordon memorial service

Fig. 5.7 Lt Edward Loch, *Ruins of Governor's Palace, Khartoum, Gordon Memorial Service, 4 September 1898*, lantern slide from Kodak photograph, after 1898 (Courtesy of National Army Museum: NAM. 1970-09-11-20)

(see Fig. 5.10), and depicts the ritual raising of Egyptian and British national flags over the ruined Palace. The mourners are merely glimpsed in truncated detail in the foreground. Although the flags on their poles are starkly presented against a clear sky and occupy almost half the frame, it is nevertheless the horizontal mass of the palace wall, its series of empty windows generating a strong lateral rhythm, that dominates the image, parading the language of damage.

Figure 5.8 is compositionally similar to Fig. 5.2, and it is suggestive to note that Loch chose either to take, or to acquire, more than one Kodak photograph of the damaged Tomb. Like Fig. 5.7, its meaning is activated by the representation of architectural violence. Whether it was physically possible to photograph the Tomb from an angle that concealed the battlefield damage is a moot point: British 'Kodakers' were motivated to



Fig. 5.8 Lt Edward Loch, *The Mahdi's Tomb after 1 September 1898*, lantern slide from Kodak photograph, 1898 (Courtesy of National Army Museum: NAM. 1970-09-11-20)

photograph not so much the Tomb itself, but the damage inflicted on it. It was important that the ruin continued to stand, at least for a while, in order to effect its meaning. After the dome was brought down, Kodak photography ensured its continuing presence in the British visual culture of the campaign.

Herscher reminds us that: 'Victory in violent conflict rests not only on damaging an adversary but also on the representation of this damage as just'.[21] The ruins of the Palace may have been too painful for Britons to look at after Gordon's death, when the boundaries of the military sublime were breached along with Khartoum's defences, but the 1898 reconquest featured a deliberately orchestrated chain of events in which in the language of damage made manifest to a British audience via the Kodak photographs made by military and civilian participants in the expeditionary force underwrote the notion of a just war, fairly fought to a victorious conclusion.

The Kodak Revolution

Kodak cameras were in use everywhere during the campaign. Lt Loch, for example, recorded in his diary how, during the opening phase of the Battle of Omdurman:

> I had just got my camera out to photograph the [Dervish] line with the shells bursting over it when Peri in the 21st [Lancers] who was with me with a small patrol of six shouted look out and I turned round. To my horror there was the overlapping part of the first [Dervish] army coming over the South side of the Gibel Surgham not five hundred yards away. It did not take me long to mount and move off with both camera and helio[graph] in my hand.[22]

Peter Harrington notes that 'the convenient portability of the exposed films back to the factory in Harrow meant that pictures of the campaign… began to appear in books and magazines and articles during and after the campaign'.[23] The result was an unprecedented number of an unprecedented type of campaign photograph, all of which were potentially available for appropriation. Jennifer Tucker writes 'contests over photography [in the nineteenth-century] throw into relief the social contours impressed on technology by the social order that produced…it'.[24] Her concern is the authority assigned to science as an agent of civilisation and imperialism, and an equivalent case is made here about the social contours governing the production and consumption of handheld war photography in the context of this small war of empire, defined by the contemporary military theorist Charles Callwell as an example of both 'campaigns for the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness' and 'campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy'.[25]

Like Tucker's proponents of science, soldiers, correspondents and the organisations they served turned to handheld photography to secure public support for their actions and opinions and, in the case of the military, to promote the wider agenda of cultivating a military-minded public that recognised and responded to their authority. For the overwhelming majority, this involved the imperative to advance the notion of a just war, fairly fought within recognisable and acceptable limits. The occlusion of the picturesque aesthetic in campaign image-making was a consequence of the invention of the handheld camera and of the use of the resulting images towards this aim. These factors established social and aesthetic contours

far removed from Nile Valley artworks and illustrated travel books invested in the Egyptian picturesque and meaning grounded in the notion of a backward, yet benign, Islamic Nile Valley. Suppressing an insurrection and wiping out an insult constituted a different order of experience altogether, one that demanded using the ostensibly matter-of-fact documentation of military activity for the moral imperative of defeating a ruthless enemy who lived and fought 'barbarically'.

Most of the subject matter in veterans' Kodak albums, from sitting in one's tent to steamers on the Nile, is given equal space: the Kodak was used to document events great and small as they occurred. However, the untypical concentration of album prints depicting the ruins of the Mahdi's Tomb and the Governor's Palace suggests that evidence of urbicide was compelling subject matter and that the rhetorical potential of the Kodak camera in the hands of soldiers and war correspondents was recognised and deliberately exploited by the commander of the Anglo-Egyptian force, Herbert Kitchener, who in the closing phase of the campaign staged what today might be termed 'media opportunities' in pursuit of impression management in Britain. What is significant is not merely that that this occurred, but why, and on what terms. The social contours governing the making and appropriation of photography were being manipulated, and in this instance Kitchener set the terms on how this occurred.

Winston Churchill, then a lieutenant attached to the 21st Lancers, provided readers of his veteran memoir *The River War* with an eyewitness account of a ritualised performance of damage inflicted on symbolic cultural property. Amongst the first rounds fired by British howitzers using the new high explosive, lyddite, were long-range shots at the dome of the Mahdi's Tomb, an act that appears today as it surely was then, neither militarily necessary nor a proportionate application of firepower; it was an act of urbicide staged to political effect.[26] Churchill writes:

> The howitzer battery was now landed, and at 1.30 began to bombard the Mahdi's Tomb. This part of the proceedings was plainly visible to us, waiting and watching on the ridge, and its interest even distracted attention from the Dervish army. The dome of the tomb rose tall and prominent above the mud houses of the city. A lyddite shell burst over it—a great flash, a white ball of smoke, and after a pause, the dull thud of the distant explosion. Another followed. At the third shot, instead of the white smoke, there was a prodigious cloud of red dust, in which the whole tomb disappeared. When this cleared away we saw that, instead of being pointed, it was now flat topped.[27]

His phenomenological account offers battle as visual spectacle devoid of moral nuance: there were seemingly no humanitarian constraints on the British rules of engagement that permitted the targeting of a structure of no military consequence in the centre of a densely populated town. The pall of dust and debris thrown up by the shelling provoked a heightened sense of difference in order, as Martin Coward puts it, 'to elaborate the boundary between self and other in order to state what self and other might be'.[28] The shelling of the Tomb was calculated to signal the beginning of the end of the insurgency started by Muhammad Ahmad, and functioned as a repudiation of the values and beliefs the Sufi scholar had stood for.

It also signalled a dramatic shift in the cultural rules of engagement: now—at last—after 14 long years, it finally became possible in Britain to invoke the military sublime and look directly at acts of architectural destruction in representation, of which the majority were Kodak photographs. And, from a political-military perspective, it was highly desirable that people did look, because photographs of the shell-scarred Tomb affirmed the attainment of enduring Anglo-Egyptian battlefield dominance. Such photographs functioned as war trophies, too, because, as Susan Sontag puts it: 'Photographed images [compared with art or graphic practices] do not seem to be statements about the world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality'.[29] What was 'real' in this context—what was taken as a trophy—was not the enemy's personal possessions or warlike materiel, but the built environment (built by the Mahdists) in general, and their most sacred tomb in particular.

Photography notwithstanding, Coward cautions against acceding too readily to a Kantian, 'human-centered' reading of the impact of urbicide; he argues that Enlightenment thinking tends to 'an anthropocentric political imagination in which all other forms of destruction are subsidiary to the death or injury of individuals'.[30] It is possible, he suggests, to accept that in certain circumstances the destruction of cultural property is nevertheless more significant than the death of a human being: people do come first, but 'the survival of architecture and urban life are important to the survival of people'.[31] The presence of so many Kodak-carrying participants in the recapture created conditions in which the political force of the visual language of architectural damage emerged as a pressing, perhaps the dominant, contemporary factor determining how the war was perceived in Britain, more significant even than the representation of the human

casualties of war, of which there were many (some 10,000 Mahdists at Omdurman), and many Kodak photographs of them, too.

A literary exception throws this point into relief: the majority of textual accounts published by both officers and war correspondents make no mention of civilian casualties at the Tomb. But the veteran correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, Bennet Burleigh, was subsequently critical of aspects of the conduct of the campaign. His description of the Tomb in his 1898 memoir, *The Khartoum Campaign*, is unsparing in its description of the human cost of the British rules of engagement, and therefore of the notion that the campaign had been justly fought:

> Around the Mahdi's Tomb were great splashes of human blood. On the previous evening I had seen many dead Dervishes lying in that vicinity. In their credulous faith in Mohammed Achmed they had flocked there for safety, only to be killed by our fire. Of the 120 who were praying around the tomb when a 50-lb Lyddite shell burst, but eighteen escaped alive, and these were sorely wounded.[32]

When the battle was over, Muhammad Ahmad was punished for his presumption. Burleigh explains that:

> To destroy utterly the legend of Mohamed Achmed's mission…the Mahdi's body was disinterred. […] perhaps it may be deplored that Mohamed Achmed's remains were broken up, part being cast into the Nile, whilst the head and other portions of the body were retained for presentation, it is said, to medical colleagues. […] But the Sudan is not Europe, nor are its inhabitants amenable to measures eminently satisfactory to civilised northern races.[33]

The disposal of the body was just one component of the literal and metaphorical 'cleansing' of Omdurman, a systemic process that began with the bombardment of the Tomb, and included a triumphal march through the town by the entire Anglo-Egyptian field force, a ritual performance in which the shared spaces constituted by buildings in the enemy's capital were publically reclaimed for Egypt.[34]

Veteran testimony stressed the materiality of the encounter with Omdurman's streets. War correspondents were quick to portray the town as a physically and morally putrid space, implicitly comparing it with Khartoum, destroyed at the command of the Mahdi on the basis that it, in turn, was an execrable town.[35] George Steevens, for the *Daily Mail*,

described the subsequent entry into the town 'towards the Mahdi's tomb, heaving its torn dome above the sea of mud walls', linking it to the physical and moral squalor he claimed to encounter around its base.

> There were no streets, no doors or windows except holes, usually no roofs. As for a garden, a tree, a steading for a beast—any evidence of thrift or intelligence, any attempt at comfort of amenity or common cleanliness, — not a single trace of any of it. Omdurman was just planless confusion of blind walls and gaping holes, shiftless stupidity, contented filth and beastliness.[36]

William Miller reminds us that 'the disgusting can attract as well as repel'.[37] Passages invoking distasteful sensory experience add a lurid, pseudo-ethnographic tone to memoir literature, which served to locate contemporary photographs of the campaign in a wider sensory field. Sontag writes:

> …it is never photographic evidence which can construct—more properly, identify—events; the contribution of photography always follows the naming of the event. What determines the possibility of being affected morally by photographs is the existence of a relevant political consciousness.[38]

In a photographically unprecedented moment, British reader-viewers were simultaneously provided with both resources with which to order their understanding of the denouement at Khartoum.[39]

The day after the battle soldiers and journalists toured Omdurman. Ernest Bennet told his readers that:

> The moment I had finished breakfast I made for the Mahdi's tomb. The interior was an absolute wreck. Vast quantities of stones and mortar, torn away by the Lyddite shells, were heaped upon the floor, and of the superstructure over the Mahdi's grave only the wooden frame remained. Some pieces of tawdry drapery which had covered the tomb lay on the ground, and these I brought away.[40]

Steevens thought it: 'was shoddy brick, and you dared not talk in it lest the rest of the dome should come on your head. The inside was tawdry panels and railings round a gaudy pall'.[41] Together, handheld photography and veteran literature invoking the politics of disgust were instrumental in the ordering of social and moral hierarchies to political effect in Britain.[42]

The Language of Damage as Apotheosis

The culminating point of the recapture was a church parade whose meaning was given architectural expression via the language of damage. Two days after the Omdurman battle, Kitchener assembled a representative cross-section of his Anglo-Egyptian army under the Palace's ruined river wall, in order to participate in a service of remembrance. Kitchener acted as Gordon's chief mourner, watched by the correspondents whose presence he had uncharacteristically facilitated. This acutely self-conscious *mise en scène* was mounted to commemorate the martyr on the site of his death; and it did so by drawing attention to the material structure of the Palace itself (Fig. 5.7).

Steevens invoked the language of damage in his description of the Palace that day, which should be read alongside his earlier commentary on the 'shoddy' Tomb:

> You could see that it had once been a handsome edifice…. Now the upper storey was clean gone; the blind windows were filled with bricks; the stucco was all scars, and you could walk up to the roof on rubble. […] There was no need to tell us we were at a grave. In that forlorn ruin…the bones of murdered civilisation lay before us.[43]

The event was comprehensively photographed, sketched and written about by the participants, who were afterwards permitted to roam the site.[44] Soldiers were photographed exploring the voids within the remaining structure, 'composing', as Coward puts it, 'relational networks of meaning that orientate[d] their experiences'; inhabiting the spaces Gordon had known; standing where they imagined his attackers had surged towards the now absent staircase; charting the urban terrain at the culmination of their own journey from the Nile Delta, in pursuit of meaning at the end of a pilgrimage in a martyr's footsteps.[45]

Objects excavated from the rubble were also photographed with Kodaks (Fig. 5.9). Gregson extended the raw material of the language of damage to include household objects unearthed from the ruined Palace. In a manner equivalent to Fig. 5.7, Gregson's composition is not so much about Murray-Threipland, or Gordon's candle sconces, as it is about the stack in the foreground. The incoherent jumble of metallic objects the European viewer, with a little close scrutiny, could recognise and name is more visually compelling than Murray-Threipland's pose, or the sconces

Fig. 5.9 Francis Gregson, *Lieutenant Murray-Threipland, Grenadier Guards, Holding Two of Gordon's Glass Candle Sconces in the Ruins of the Governor-General's Palace*, Kodak photograph, 1898 (Courtesy of Durham University Sudan Archive: SAD.A27/148)

themselves. Coward writes that: 'Damage transforms a building from an object with precise uses and meanings into a treasure trove of materiality, into heaps of stuff'.[46] Machine-made objects, many associated with Western domesticity and consequently strangely displaced in the moment of their rediscovery in Khartoum, were made significant by the camera, not just by direct association with Gordon himself, but because, torn from their original site of use and invested in the pathos of their new status as unlikely souvenirs, they were implicated in the wider rhetoric of damage advanced by the photographic image.

Nor was the language of damage limited to the photographic medium. Richard Caton Woodville's 1899 studio painting, *The Gordon Memorial Service*, seen here reproduced as a high-quality art object in its own right, suggests the pictorial values of the Kodak snapshot, with its abruptly truncated borders, all-over focus and mound of rubble in the left foreground

Fig. 5.10 Richard Caton Woodville, *Gordon Memorial Service*, 1899, Photogravure (Courtesy of National Army Museum: NAM 1999-08-18-1)

unhelpfully threatening to dominate the composition (Fig. 5.10). Caton Woodville was not present at Khartoum. The photographic evidence suggests he worked closely out of Kodak prints to frame his composition, aligning the new medium with the rhetorical potential of history painting revealed in the oversized flags, plunging perspective, and the *Melik*, wreathed in smoke and steam, towering over the mourners, the barrel of its forward main armament pointing directly at the viewer. More significantly in this context, Caton Woodville invested his composition in the language of damage, with a typically theatrical articulation of shrapnel and gunshot scarring to the vertical elevations: close scrutiny of Fig. 5.7 suggests that there was, in fact, less noticeable damage to the wall's surface than Caton Woodville represents. Ultimately, the subject of his work too is not Gordon as such, but the rhetorical implications of wartime violence perpetrated against cultural property.[47]

* * *

Gordon's ruined palace and the Mahdi's ruined tomb across the river coexisted reciprocally for a while longer. The Palace was rebuilt, the Tomb more comprehensively destroyed in a symbiotic process that reversed the chain of signification begun when Khartoum was destroyed. This study into the relationship between handheld photography, war-damaged cultural property and notions of a just war fought across cultures suggests that, indeed, an operative notion of enclosure functioned to demarcate the boundary drawn in British culture between Christian civilisation and irrational, Salafist barbarism. That said, the photographs and related artworks presented here, assessed in the context of the rules of engagement and their cultural determinants, suggest that the boundaries of enclosure could also be drawn around, rather than between, the protagonists in this 'small war'. In 1898 the Anglo-Egyptian field force exploited the presence of the Kodak, the indexical quality of photography, and the language of damage, to convey the message that a barbaric enemy had been demonstrably defeated employing legitimate rules of engagement extending to the destruction of a religious shrine in a densely populated city. The destruction of the Tomb and the memorial event in the ruins of the Governor's Palace were tactical components of an information campaign in pursuit of impression management in both Britain and Egypt: for the first time in the history of photography handheld camera technology was constitutive of the visual rhetoric of a just war. The *Mahdīa* along with the corpse of its founder had it coming; but even as the Anglo-Egyptian forces prevailed, it turned out that their rules of engagement were no less destructive of cultural property than anything the 'uncivilised' Mahdists had themselves perpetrated.

Ironically, soon after the dust had (literally) settled, it proved just as necessary to rebuild the Tomb in the British imagination as it had been to preserve the memory of the intact Palace, in order to remember Gordon and to justify the campaign on moral (and financial) terms. Henry Seppings-Wright's reconquest commemorative double-page, pullout montage for the *Illustrated London News*, framing Kitchener as 'Gordon's Avenger', pivots the imperative for revenge around an image of the now safely destroyed Tomb (Fig. 5.11). After the reconquest, the image of the intact Tomb functioned as a palimpsest whose ghostly presence in the centre of this image, and beyond, served to remind reader-viewers of the

challenge posed by the *Mahdīa*, and the imperative to resort to armed conflict in order to address it. As with the Palace, this was a task beyond the scope of photography, this time not merely because it was impossible to access the building, but because it no longer existed. Handheld photography was newly synonymous with the domain of action, damage and destruction; in contrast, graphic art was enlisted in the remaking of cultural property in the collective imagination in order to catalyse remembrance of an attenuated encounter on the periphery of Britain's regional horizons, fought to a satisfactory conclusion.



Fig. 5.11 Henry Seppings-Wright, *Gordon's Avenger*, *Illustrated London News*, 1898 (Courtesy of Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries)

Notes

1. C.f. Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Lincoln, Neb, 1996).
2. Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt* (London, 1893), p. 195.
3. 'Remember Gordon. The men before you are his murderers'. Quoted in Edward M. Spiers, *Wars of Intervention: A Case Study: The Reconquest of the Sudan 1896–99* (Camberley, 1998), p. 24.
4. Karl Baedeker, *Egypt and the Sudan: Handbook for Travellers*, 6th ed. (London, 1908), p. 415.
5. See Douglas Johnson, 'The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 10 (1982), pp. 285–310.
6. Andrew Herscher, 'The Language of Damage', *Grey Room, 7* (2002), pp. 68–71, p. 69.
7. James Hicks, *David Roberts' Egypt and Nubia as Imperial Picturesque Landscape* (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Hertfordshire, 2010), p. 39.
8. Hicks, *David Roberts' Egypt*, p. 36.
9. Francis Frith, *Egypt and Palestine Photographed and Described* (London, 1858), unpaginated.
10. Rose Macaulay, Roloff Beny, and Constance Babington-Smith, *Roloff Beny Interprets in Photographs Pleasure of Ruins by Rose Macaulay* (New York, 1977 ed.), p. 6.
11. Sarah James, 'Making an Ugly World Beautiful? Morality and Aesthetics in the Aftermath', in Julian Stallabrass, *Memory of Fire: Images of War and the War of Images* (Brighton, 2013), p. 118.
12. Immanuel Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764; new ed., Berkeley, 2003), pp. 47–8.
13. Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757; new ed., Oxford, 2008), p. 36.
14. Martin Daly and Jane Hogan, *Images of Empire: Photographic Sources for the British in the Sudan* (Leiden, 2005).
15. Bogdan Bogdanovic, 'Murder of the City', *New York Review of Books*, 40/10, 1993.
16. Jennifer Tucker, *Nature Exposed: Photography as Eyewitness in Victorian Science* (Baltimore, 2005), p. 17.
17. Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (London, 2009), p. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. Bennet Burleigh, *The Khartoum Campaign: A Special Correspondent's View of the Reconquest of the Sudan by British and Egyptian Forces under Kitchener-1898* (London, 2008), pp. 228–9; ibid.

20. Herscher, '*Language of Damage'*, p. 70.
21. Ibid; also Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument* (1977; new ed., New York, 2006), p. 128.
22. Edward Loch, 'War Diary' (1898), p. 33.
23. Peter Harrington, 'Images and Perceptions: Visualising the Sudan Campaign', in Edward M. Spiers, ed., *Sudan: The Reconquest Reappraised* (London, 1998), pp. 82–101.
24. Tucker, *Nature Exposed*, pp. 8–9.
25. Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. 25.
26. C.f. Cyril Falls, military historian, quoted in Brian Bond, *Victorian Military Campaigns* (London, 1967), pp. 299–300.
27. Winston S. Churchill, *The River War* (1899; new ed., Sevenoaks, 1985), p. 253.
28. Martin Coward, 'Against Anthropocentrism: The Destruction of the Built Environment as a Distinct Form of Political Violence', *Review of International Studies,* 32 (2006), pp. 419–37, p. 434.
29. Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (London, 1979), p. 4.
30. Coward, 'Against Anthropocentrism', p. 422.
31. Ibid., p. 423.
32. *Burleigh, The Khartoum Campaign*, p. 178.
33. Ibid.
34. C.f. the account of Hamilton Hodgson, with the Lincolnshire Regiment, in Peter and Frederick Sharf Harrington, *Omdurman, 1898: The Eyewitnesses Speak: The British Conquest of the Sudan as Described by Participants in Letters, Diaries, Photos, and Drawings* (London, 1998), p. 85.
35. C.f. Mary Douglas' treatise on the idea of dirt and contagion in Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo* (London, 2002), pp. xi–xii.
36. George Warrington Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartum*, 8th ed. (Edinburgh, 1898), p. 300.
37. William Ian Miller, *The Anatomy of Disgust* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), p. x.
38. Sontag, *On Photography*, p. 19.
39. C.f. on the wider question of Orientalist travelogues, Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan, *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation* (Los Angeles, 2013), p. 16.
40. Ernest Bennett, *The Downfall of the Dervishes: Being a Sketch of the Final Sudan Campaign of 1898* (London, 1898), p. 222.
41. Steevens, pp. 308–09.
42. Steevens, for example, was a supporter of Kitchener's conduct of the campaign in the face of postwar criticism. His hyperbolic description of Omdurman's putative squalor should be read accordingly.

43. Steevens, *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, p. 312.
44. For example, Harrington, *Omdurman*, p. 84.
45. Coward, 'Against Anthropocentrism', p. 429.
46. Herscher, 'Language of Damage', p. 71.
47. See Hichberger on Caton Woodville in J. W. M. Hichberger, *Images of the Army: The Military in British Art, 1815–1914* (Manchester, 1988), p. 95.

CHAPTER 6

Rise Phoenix-Like: British Soldiers, Civilization and the First World War in Greek Macedonia, 1915–1918

Justin Fantauzzo

Recovering from his second bout with malaria at Mellieha Convalescent Camp in Malta in June 1917, Sapper Albert Barker of the Royal Engineers thought back to the past two years he had spent in Greek Macedonia. Disappointment dominated his thoughts. Barker could not help but feel that Greek civilization, as he saw it, had fallen on hard times. 'Before I went to Salonika', he wrote, 'I had always been given to understand that the Greeks were a noble, highly intellectual race, with many wonderful attainments to their credit'. Especially when compared to its Balkan neighbours, Greece, as Barker had been led to believe, was 'in a fairly advanced state of civilization'. Yet after spending months at the Macedonian front and walking the cobbled streets of Salonika, 'my illusions', he wrote dejectedly, 'were dispelled, and all my ideas about the Greeks were thoroughly revised'.

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The French and British had arrived in Greek Macedonia in October 1915. The region had been part of the Ottoman Empire until 1913 when, as a result of the two Balkan Wars (1912–1913), Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia had annexed and divided all of Macedonia (plus Thrace) before Greece and Serbia stripped Bulgaria of its key gains in both regions, especially Macedonia. Despite Albert Barker's preconceptions, therefore, the region was 'New Greece' and had only been part of the state for a few years. The Allies went to Macedonia in 1915 to help the Serbs in a new and bigger conflict as they faced the last of three invasions from the north since 1914 by Austria-Hungary arising from the quarrel that had triggered the Great War. At the same time the Bulgarians, who had joined the Austro-Germans to recoup their pre-war losses, invaded Serbian Macedonia from the south-east. The Allies could not prevent the fall of Serbia. But they stayed in Greek Macedonia because they had opened up a new front against Bulgaria and its Austro-German allies, a front that lasted until autumn 1918.[1]

The front extended across 200 miles of mountainous territory from Albania along the pre-war Greek-Serb border in Macedonia (the Serbian side now occupied by Bulgaria) before turning south across marshy plains to the Aegean coast inside western Thrace. The population, no more than the territory, was not 'Greek' in any obvious or uniform sense, despite the classical fantasies of Albert Barker and many other soldiers, British, French and Italian, in the Allied 'Army of the Orient'. With Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and 'Turks', as well as Greeks, the region also varied in religious belief—with Jews, Muslims and Orthodox Christians of different kinds. Rural, it was also dotted with small towns. But the regional capital, Salonika, one of the major cities and ports of the eastern Mediterranean, now became the Allied base.[2]

While neither Albert Barker nor many other Allied soldiers were prone to seeing themselves through indigenous eyes, they were no less diverse—no less obviously 'western' or even European—than the inhabitants of the land they occupied, and to whom they must have appeared equally heterogeneous. By 1918 there were half a million troops in Macedonia. Over 40 per cent were French, the largest contingent, although more of these were colonial (North and West African, Indo-Chinese) than on the western front. The British, too, had colonial units, notably Indians. Some 140,000 survivors of the Serbian army, who had escaped as the country fell in 1915, joined the Allies along with an Italian army and two Russian brigades.[3] Soldiers and civilians alike were a Babel of peoples and much of

the exoticism of the teeming streets of Salonika was due to the Allied soldiers. Who of the inhabitants of the city before 1915 would have imagined that they would shortly be rubbing shoulders with Indians in turbans or witnessing traditional festivities by Vietnamese troops? For the city that had been the birthplace of both Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the Young Turk Revolution (1908), it had been an extraordinary transformation in half a dozen years from the major Ottoman city in the Balkans to the regional capital of 'new Greece' and now to the base camp and logistical hub of the Allied army, many of them imbued with images of classical Greece.

But what was it, to return to Sapper Barker, that had so disappointed him during his Macedonian sojourn? 'Have you ever noticed', he asked his reader, 'how the papers in England referred to the "historic old town of Salonika, with its interesting relics of Grecian Architecture, etc., etc.?" Do you remember', he continued,

> how [when our troops first landed there], the papers spoke in such glowing terms of this "interesting people, with their quaint costumes." Even now they speak of it as though it were a holiday resort, or a grand place for a picnic, and publish photographs to show what a fine place it is. But have you ever seen a word about "the smells of Salonika," or the dirty habits of the population, or about its drinking-dens, or its "dens of vice?" The English papers may show the "bright side of the picture," but ask a British soldier of the "Salonika Forces" what is his opinion of the town and its inhabitants, and he will put you on the track of the truth.

'Of one thing I am certain', he concluded, 'no Englishman who has visited Salonika will ever again refer to the Greeks as a "noble race of people." Anyway, if he does, it will be a piece of sarcasm'.[4] As Barker made clear, he was not the only one left feeling a bit curious, confused and disillusioned by the difference between his expectation of Greece and the reality of Greek Macedonia. Soldiers serving as part of the British Salonika Force (BSF) were almost to a man utterly depressed by their interactions with Greeks and Greek civilization.

That the men of the BSF were left equal parts bewildered and disappointed by Salonika and Macedonia is, in fact, consistent with the experience of British soldiers in occupied foreign lands from the nineteenth century onwards. British soldiers during the Peninsular War in Spain and Portugal were appalled by what they found in Iberia, as Joseph Clarke demonstrates in his chapter to this volume. In places like Lisbon, grimy

streets, foreign odours and crowds of dark-skinned Portuguese and Spanish, with what seemed to be a few too many Catholic friars and monks, shocked their post-Enlightenment sensibilities and, according to Gavin Daly, led them to locate the Iberian Peninsula 'on the very margins of "civilized" Europe'.[5] The same held true for British soldiers outside of Europe. During the First, Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars of the nineteenth century, soldiers considered Burma to be the 'opposite of British civilization'.[6] And in India, the empire's crown jewel, soldiers saw their service as part of the empire's wider civilizing efforts.[7]

But Greece was supposed to be different. It was, after all, held to be the birthplace of democracy, logic, reason and history. It was not supposed to be a place where the hallmarks of civilization were in short order. Yet that is what British soldiers found. This chapter argues that encounters between the men of the BSF and the population of Greek Macedonia shaped soldiers' views of Greek civilization as a society in perpetual, and perhaps irrevocable, decline. Soldiers of all ranks and classes—from pre-war clerks turned privates to Oxford-educated captains—pinpointed four markers of civilization, all of which the Greeks, at least in Macedonia, seemed to be lacking: animal welfare, the treatment of women, modern agriculture and modern civil infrastructure (along with an ethnically homogeneous population). Even though the overwhelming majority of soldiers gave Greece a failing grade, some were convinced that twentieth-century Greece could be re-born. But to do so Greece would have to look to Europe for help. With guidance from Britain and France, Greece could once again become a leading light of European civilization. Indeed, discussions about pulling Greece up by its bootstraps mirrored the language of the *mission civilisatrice* expressed by French soldiers in Macedonia, as John Horne shows in his chapter. Macedonia and Greek civilization had to be reformed from without, not from within, although exceptions were made in the case of mountain Greeks, who seemed to better embody the racial purity of Hellenic Greece than those populating the cities. Importantly, though, Greece was different than imperial projects in Africa or India. It was a reclamation project, one where the past had to be retrieved, not created. It was, ironically, one from which Britain and France drew much of their own inspiration. By helping Greece reclaim some semblance of her past glory, British soldiers felt that they would be repaying Greece for the ultimate gift: western civilization.

Animal Welfare

For many men in the BSF, especially those from a rural or farming background, one of the first things that stood out to them was the mistreatment of animals. For F.T. Mullins of the Devonshire Regiment, from a pre-war farming family, the sight of animals being abused by Greek farmers was particularly distressing. 'They used to load their poor animals so heavy', he remembered, 'but [what] we did not like to see was the way they treated their animals'.[8] After maligning the Greeks of Salonika as a band of thieves, W.J. Mussett of the Army Service Corps also turned to the mistreatment of animals. 'The Natives', wrote Mussett in his diary, which he sent home, 'come streaming past our camp daily, both to and from the town, driving their donkeys with the largest load conceivable on their backs'. He admitted that the pack animals bore the weight surprisingly well, but all too often the road to the BSF at Summerhill Camp was strewn with the carcasses of dead donkeys, some just yards away from his Communication Depot. Mussett raged that the Greeks worked the 'poor little animals' to death, and suggested that strict animal welfare laws like those in Britain should be enacted in Greece. When British soldiers had an opportunity to intervene, they did so. On one occasion, they tackled a Greek peasant striking his buffalo with a probe with a nail on the end. 'One or other of our boys would chance to see the native slashing this poor little animal struggling under its heavy burden to regain its feet', when Musset or one of his comrades 'would compel this ignorant native to completely unload the animal and rest it before proceeding'. The difference, he reasoned, between the mindset of the Greek and the Briton was easy to spot: the Greek, like his Balkan neighbours, had no sympathy, no compassion and no understanding of animal welfare. Backing up his argument, Mussett told the story of 'Tommy', a half-starved, abused donkey that had collapsed across from his depot and had been taken in by the men of his company. After one of the soldiers spotted the donkey, 'the sympathetic nature of an Englishman', as Mussett phrased it, 'got to work'. The men surrounded the lame animal, gently petting him, bringing him food and water. They pulled and twisted the donkey's cold ears in an effort to warm them. Next, they built an improvised stable and nursed the donkey for a week until he was able to stand and walk. Over time, the donkey regained its strength and stayed with Musset's company. Whenever the 'natives were near', Mussett boasted, '"Tommy" got snappy and

frisky', and his recovery was 'a fine example of the result of our kindness' in the face of Greek cruelty.[9]

Even the inhabitants of 'Old Greece', argued Captain Percy George Mandley, fighting with the Welsh Regiment, were prone to animal cruelty. At Amfissa, near Delphi, the sight of over-burdened donkeys with Greek girls riding on top and baskets of olives hung on the sides led him to write that: 'It never occurs to an Oriental to spare an animal in the least'.[10] By Mandley's geographic and cultural mapping, Greece and the orient were one and the same.

The Treatment of Women

The treatment of women seemed no better. Even though British suffragettes were campaigning at home for the right to vote and English and Welsh common law discriminated against women in areas such as property ownership, inheritance and marriage rights, soldiers were quick to point out that women in Salonika and Macedonia were treated at best like second-class citizens and at worst like chattel. Captain G.S. MacKay of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders felt out of place when, catching a ride into Salonika, he gave up his seat on a transport bus to a female passenger, 'quite contrary', he wrote to his mother, 'to the rules of Greek ettiquette [sic]'.[11] 'Macedonian manners', as Private J. Hartsilver of the London Regiment put it, remembering the scene of a Greek patriarch leading his family on donkey back while his wife and children walked behind him, made him 'feel like throwing bricks at the man'.[12] For Private George Wilson, who fought with the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Regiment, the way that women were treated in Salonika was confirmation that Greece and the Balkans were stuck in a backward stage of civilization. Wilson remembered watching caravans of Greek refugees and pack-donkeys from the frontline streaming into Salonika as his regiment marched out of it. 'On the leading donkey rode the owner of the line of donkeys. At the end of the line of donkeys', he wrote in amazement,

> walked a woman, presumably, the wife of the owner of the donkeys. It struck me most forcibly at the time that how primative [sic] it seemed. This sight of a woman, a long staff in her hand, clad in some black robe for a garment, plodding along behind that string of donkeys while her husband rode in comparative ease. It seemed to set back the time two thousand years or more to the story of the Holy Land and the Bible.

And in this case, biblical civilization was not worth emulating. 'For whereas we in England were used to treating our Womenfolk with respect', Wilson wrote, 'yet here in a so called civilised country, women were treated with scant courtesy and treated as so much as slaves or cattle'.[13] A French soldier artist, Roger Irriera, portrayed an almost identical scene and in the same spirit in one of the many sketches that he made while in Macedonia (Fig. 6.1).

Douglas Walshe, a driver in the Mechanical Transport of the Army Service Corps, noted the poor treatment of Greek and Bulgarian women on two occasions. In the aftermath of the great fire of August 1917, which razed half of the old city to the ground, he wrote that Greek women, 'unaccustomed to be treated with consideration by men and looked down upon by Muslim and Christian alike as little more than beasts of burden', saw British soldiers as 'a revelation in homely kindness and genuine sympathy'. He recounted a scene where British soldiers were helping women and children onto transport lorries, as Greek merchants stood idly by hocking wares and other goods:

Fig. 6.1 Roger Irriera, 'His wife, his sons and the ass' (Reproduced with permission of Patrick Jouanneau and the Musée d'Histoire Contemporaine, Paris)

> "Come on, mother, up you go!" And a tottering old lady would find herself lifted gently into a lorry, and her bundle politely handed up to her. "Now, now, this won't do! Don't cry, missis! Cheer up – come for a ride and forget all about it. Nice little chap that kiddy of yours."

Even the Muslim Turks of Macedonia were thought to have a better sense of how to treat their women. 'They were cleaner on the whole than the other Macedonians', wrote Walshe, 'and from one thing and another, including the fact that one often saw a Turkish woman riding the ubiquitous donkey while her lord and master walked, we came to the conclusion that they treated their womenfolk better, in spite of the veils'.[14]

Agriculture

Like French soldiers in the *Armée de l'Orient*, British soldiers kept a close eye on the state of agriculture in Greek Macedonia. What they found was a land with rich soil and a lengthy growing season, perfect for cash crops, and natural beauty that could sometimes rival the scenic landscapes of the English and Welsh countryside. Captain Henry Day, a Catholic chaplain with the BSF, was careful to point out that Macedonia was 'not the cameo beauty of England', but was nevertheless 'space and grandeur and glory'.[15] Yet what soldiers also found was a land ignored by modern agriculture and farming, a land where civilization, evidenced by modern farming methods, had not yet made its mark. They looked at Macedonia with the same Lockean worldview of land appropriation, where property rights were contingent upon use and productivity, that colonists in North America had used to trumpet the superiority of western civilization and to disenfranchise Native Americans. As Day, a man who had previously spent time at the Jesuit Zambesi Mission in Rhodesia, wrote, Macedonia was 'space and grandeur and glory', but it was 'the space and grandeur of wide unadorned nature, the glory of prodigal wealth, of a country rich in resources, but neglected by civilization, and untamed by Man's art'.[16] Sapper Barker, too, thought that the Greeks were squandering Macedonia's natural resources. While he praised the region's market gardeners for having lifted small sections of the land 'to a high state of cultivation', even greater, in some cases, than English market gardens, Greek farmers had left too much of their fields barren and wild. 'If the farmers would cultivate their land properly', Barker wrote, and properly meant according to English farming standards, 'Macedonia would soon be a rich country'.[17]

Seeing the potentially bountiful but underdeveloped fields of Macedonia led Harold Lake of the Durham Light Infantry to a far more radical conclusion: Macedonia, not Asia, India or Africa, should have been the focus of a European *mission civilisatrice*. 'There can be, one imagines, few more fertile countries in the world', he argued in his post-war memoir, 'and few indeed in Europe'. Greek Macedonia was a place where 'all sorts of rare, desirable things will grow on its soil in splendid profusion', including maize, tobacco, grapes and wild flowers. 'There does not appear to be any end to the possibilities of Macedonia', Lake wrote. So, why, he wondered, did European countries bother themselves with colonizing Asia, India and Africa? Why not finish colonizing and civilizing Europe instead?

> Civilized nations spend millions, in reclaiming land in far countries, in clearing it of swamps, mosquitoes and malaria, in perfecting systems of drainage and irrigation, and yet here is this rich land, in Europe itself, barren and desolate, given over to thistles and scrub, with the poison of fever haunting every valley, with miserable tracks instead of roads – wasted altogether.

Its hillsides could and should have been 'rich with vineyards', but were instead 'desolate with evergreen oak'; its lakes were allowed to 'wander aimlessly to the sea'; its fields were not occupied by herds of healthy cattle and sheep, only 'a few tiny cows, a few attenuated goats, and a few scraggy, fleshless sheep'. Without saying so, Lake plainly thought that it was the job if not responsibility of the rest of Europe to cultivate and civilize Greece's countryside. For even 'the wildest American millionaire', he explained, 'would shrink from working out development schemes in a country compared with which the average South American republic is a model of stable and constitutional government'. In other words, Lake was advocating for inner (intra-European) colonialism that was sure to have a high rate of return.

Lake was not alone in thinking that Macedonia needed to be reformed. Captain A.J. Mann of the Balloon Company was full of praise for the 'indispensable work' that the French army had already carried out. That work not only included anti-malarial measures in the Vardar and Doiran and the establishment of inter-Allied schools of instruction in Macedonia but also the complete overhaul of Greek Macedonian farming. 'As regards agriculture', he boasted,

> [the Allies] did their utmost by organized supervision to instill sound modern principles into the native Macedonian; they imported modern metal ploughs to replace the antiquated wooden ones hitherto used, also threshing and reaping machines. They gave demonstrations in the utilization of fallow and marsh lands, and in scientific vine-growing, supervising in the areas occupied by their army some 250,000 acres of productive soil.

The '*oeuvre civilisatrice* [civilizing work] of the French Army', Mann concluded, an inspiring and noble work, would have far-reaching effects on the Balkans and Greece once the war ended and reconstruction began.[18]

Urban Squalor in Salonika

If the treatment of animals, women and the region's uncultivated fields were not enough to convince soldiers that there was something wrong with Greek civilization in Macedonia, the streets and storefronts of Salonika erased any doubt. At first glance, Salonika looked like an attractive Mediterranean port-city. But upon closer inspection, much like the disenchantment felt by British soldiers in Iberia during the Peninsular War, its beauty proved to be an illusion. The reaction of T.G. Craddock of the Royal Army Service Corps was typical. 'The first thing to strike you', wrote the former public house owner in his diary, 'was a white tower, the remaining buildings on the front resembling those you would see at any seaside resort'. Craddock found Salonika surprisingly large, and thought that the way the city gradually elevated as it met the hillside behind it, with spires of minarets rising above the city, formed a 'fine panorama'. He thought to himself, 'what a nice clean looking place'. Upon landing, however, he was disillusioned, 'It turned out to be a dirty, stinking hole, sanitation at a premium and the roads and footpaths, if you could call them such, in a terrible state'.[19] After marching through Salonika, Lieutenant H. Birkett Barker of the Royal Garrison Artillery stood at the intersection of the roads leading to Monastir and Seres, paralysed with confusion, wondering 'whether St Paul would recognize the scene of his labours 1900 years ago' and whether or not he 'would be gratified with the results'.[20] The answer, quite obviously, was that he would not. Once again, the French soldier artist, Roger Irriera, conveyed the shock of fly-ridden, unhygienic shops in the city (Fig. 6.2).

With frequent references to the distress that historical figures would have felt if confronted with modern-day Salonika, one might argue that

Fig. 6.2 Roger Irriera, 'Butcher', May 1916 (Reproduced by courtesy of Patrick Jouanneau and the Musée d'Histoire Contemporaine, Paris)

soldiers deliberately embellished their negative impression of the city to spin a good yarn. But that does not seem to have been the case. Even after leaving Salonika, tales of the city's squalor were on the lips of soldiers as far away as Egypt. After meeting a number of British soldiers who had come from Greek Macedonia, Private Culbert Fisher of the Australian (Camel) Field Ambulance, stationed at Ismailia, recorded their impression of Salonika in his diary: 'As a town they had no time for it as it simply stunk + reeked with disease. They would prefer the little town of Isamalia [sic] as it is much cleaner in every way to it. A damp heat is always in the atmosphere there (Salonika)'.[21]

The fact that Salonika had only been captured by Greece during the First Balkan War, ending nearly 500 years of Ottoman rule, and officially annexed after the Second Balkan War as part of the Treaty of Bucharest in

August 1913 was either lost on, or wilfully ignored by, most British soldiers. After all, these were men who, for the most part, would have struggled to find Salonika on a map before the war. Nonetheless, what most bothered men was Salonika's disjointedness, its mishmash of architectural styles and confused national character. 'My God, what a place', wrote C.E. Vulliamy of the Welch Fusiliers in his wartime diary.

> It would take hundreds of depressing pages adequately to build up its tawdry image. It is incoherent, utterly without dignity. Of such a place the journalistic traveler will say, Ah! here you may behold the meeting of East and West. True, but only a meeting of dregs. Everywhere filth and litter; everywhere the stench of abominable decay. Scabrous houses, bulging or cracking under the skins of rubble or stucco. More pretentious buildings try to emulate a shoddy magnificence. On every side is prowling misery and squalor, and a horrible insistent vulgarity. The streets are flagged or cobbled with unequal stones, over which the lorries are crashing and lurching.[22]

Salonika's lack of central planning also bothered Mussett. After driving through the city in October 1915, he found that the 'shops are improvised being little more than sheds, with a good one splashed here and there'. Afterwards, he 'learned there is no Town Council to supervise the Buildings which explains the irregularity of the shop fronts and the shocking condition of the state of the roads and streets'. Even *Rue Venizelos*, Salonika's finest thoroughfare, 'their only West End Street', according to Mussett's diary, 'is a poor effort and little better with its cobbles than the other streets'.[23]

In truth, Salonika was not much different to the poorer parts of Europe or even parts of London, like Whitechapel.[24] Major Vivian Gilbert of the Machine Gun Corps recognized the similarities in his post-war memoir, noting: 'the modern part of Saloniki is about on a par, as regards cleanliness and sanitation, with the slum area of any large European city'.[25] Yet soldiers regularly labelled Salonika's problems not as western or European ones, but as eastern and oriental problems. Harold Lake connected the poor planning of Macedonia's towns and cities to the parochial mindset of 'easterners', and to Lake easterners meant southeastern Europeans, and southeastern Europeans included Greeks. Kireckoj, in particular, a small village along the Seres Road, populated mostly by Greeks and Bulgarians, provided him with no 'better illustration of the contrast between Macedonia as it is and Macedonia as the warfare of today requires

it to be, or as, indeed, modern civilization requires it to be'. Even though the town had well-built, well-sized and clean-looking houses securely tucked away in the hillside, and shops that did not 'wear the general Macedonian air of being utterly ashamed of themselves', its narrow, winding streets bore 'silent witness to that hatred of free movement and development which marks the East, a barrier to trade as well as to war, the symbol of a people who are content only if they are allowed to live in a close-packed little circle remote from the striving of the world'. Sure, Lake conceded, maybe there was some merit in roughing it in the countryside and keeping city life and city people at bay. After all, that way of thinking was the same as the popular anti-urban and back-to-the-land movements in Britain, the Dominions and North America. But for Lake, it was almost as if Kireckoj could not have been developed in any other manner. 'Eastern' people, which, to Lake, included all of the people of the Balkans and Greece, were either biologically or culturally predisposed to halting progress and development, and no better example existed than Greek Macedonia.[26]

The poor state of most of Salonika's civil infrastructure, combined with the multi-ethnic crowds of Allied soldiers roaming its streets—referred to by one Church of England chaplain as a 'human maelstrom'—even led some to question whether or not Britain had erred in going to war against Germany.[27] Private A.J. Peters of the South Lancashire Regiment was one of those men. In correspondence with his mother three months after the great fire, Peters told her that she had 'no conception of the terrible state of affairs'. What the fire had revealed to Peters was Salonika's true character as a seedy, oriental city, devoid of any evidence of proper planning. 'A most filthy place + a dirtier population I hope I shall never see: added to this the narrow streets are choked with transport of all the various Allied Armies', he complained. Not only was Salonika stripped bare by fire reason enough to question Britain's involvement in the Balkans, an up-close look at the BSF's allies made Peters also think about what sort of civilization Britain was backing. 'Every fifty yards you go you meet English, French, Russians, Serbs + Greeks besides Egyptian + Colonial Labour troops', he continued, 'Of course it is an interesting sight, but there is no doubt that here we get the very poorest of the various armies + it makes one feel ashamed to think that we are fighting side by side with such a mongrel crowd against a highly civilized nation whatever the crimes of the Germans may have been'.[28] Remarkably, Peters was willing to look past Germany's invasion of Belgium and, presumably, the atrocity stories that

filled the British and international press to keep Britain on the right side of civilization and, he may have thought, the right side of history.

Civilization and Backwardness

For all the Grecophiles in the ranks of the BSF, and there were some, the Grecophobes vastly outnumbered them. Private T.B. Clark of the King's Royal Rifle Corps captured widespread Grecophobia in his poem, 'Salonica to Blighty – And Back – A Nightmare in 14 Days'. Put off by the exhausting journey from Salonika to Britain, Clark mused that he would rather stay in Salonika till the war's end, 'Altho' I hate the country, just like everything that's Greek/I know that some who read these lines will flatly disagree/P'r'aps they haven't done the journey, or they'd think the same as me'.[29] Often enough, discussions about Greece morphed into commentary on Greek Macedonians as a backward race. Pre-war officers, especially, who likely had experience in the empire's colonial possessions, compared Macedonia to India and Africa. A puzzled Vivian Fergusson, a brigade major with the Royal Field Artillery, explained to his fiancée that 'the curious part about these people – who are by way of being civilized Europeans – is their likeness in many ways to the natives of India'.[30] Brigadier General Sir Hugh Simpson-Baikie and Commander Edgar Allison Burrows saw Macedonia through the same colonial lens that placed Macedonia in the same category as Africa and India. In correspondence with his wife, Simpson-Baikie, who had been previously stationed in India, Egypt, Sudan and South Africa, was taken aback by the small city limits of Salonika and the comparatively large population. 'They must have lived entirely like the Natives in India', he concluded. Writing to his family, Burrows described Kalamariá, a suburb of Salonika, as a 'Kaffir village in darkest Africa'.[31] The skin colour of the villagers stood out most to him. In Burrows' words, the Greek Macedonians of Kalamariá were black enough to 'pass for Arabs'.[32]

Antipathy towards the Greeks became especially strong when soldiers contrasted them to the Serbs. Major Desmond Allhusen, an Old Etonian serving with the King's Royal Rifle Corps, informed his mother in January 1917 that he was 'becoming decidedly Greco-phobe'. The Serbs 'look very nice + clean', he told her, while the 'Greek officers are greasy little bounders, very pleased with themselves, + the men are slavish looking tramps'.[33] Admiration for the Serbs was wholesale and completely out of step. For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, if the

British public and politicians had found any Balkan people worth their salt, it was first the Greeks and later the Bulgarians. Greek independence and rebellion against the Ottoman Empire had inspired the romantic writings of Byron, Keats and Shelley, and garnered widespread support amongst British Liberals.[34] Towards the end of the nineteenth century, anti-Ottoman Gladstonian Liberals threw their weight behind Bulgaria as the Eastern Question seemed to be nearing an answer.[35] Of course, part of what fed into the dislike of Greeks was the country's neutrality. Many soldiers harboured the suspicion that Greece was not only sympathetic to Germany but also outwardly hostile to the Entente. The Serbs, in contrast, had valiantly defended themselves against Austro-Hungarian aggression, and seemed to embody the very best of British manhood. Although somewhat condescending in his appraisal, one soldier wrote that 'There was something about these nobly simple soldiers, who had', he explained:

> given up everything and never talked about it, who could still smile though they had been robbed of their country and their homes and were tortured underneath by a sickly fear of what might be happening to their loved ones in Austrian-Bulgarian hands, that went straight to the British heart. Tommy, a child himself, loves children, and this was a race of brave babies – delightful, unexpected, straight, and transparent, shrewd and simple as babies are; something unique and lovable, and withal strong and "White" all through – a race that meant business and was out to kill but never said so, and grew as glum and dumb as Tommy himself when invited to describe their achievements, or else talked about their friends.[36]

In short, Serbian soldiers were racially acceptable—'White all through'—and displayed all of the characteristics of the resolute, cheery, humble and deadly capable British 'Tommy'.

While some looked to the Serbs as the model anti-Greeks, others damned the region's entire population. The problem, they argued, was that the people had become so racially impure and culturally backwards, telling an ethnic Greek from a Bulgarian from a Turk was an exercise in frustration. Vulliamy thought that 'No ethnographer' sent to Macedonia 'could possibly have sorted them out into bundles of separate nationality'. Moreover, the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913 had convinced him that the borders of civilized Europe ended somewhere in the Balkans. 'Let there be no nonsense', he wrote in his post-war memoir: 'You may discriminate in the Balkan States between varieties of barbarism and varieties

of decadence, but civilization (in the western sense of the word) does not exist at all. It is absurd', he concluded, 'to pretend that you can treat the Balkan peoples as you would treat the western European'.[37] Similarly, Lieutenant H.J. Arnold of the Royal Field Artillery struggled to find anything likeable in any of the Balkan peoples, Greek or otherwise. 'There is little to choose between any of the inhabitants of the Balkans', he wrote a day after Bulgaria's surrender. His opinion, and supposedly that of many of his comrades, was that the Balkans 'had best exterminate each other'.[38]

Even though the fire had destroyed much of Salonika, revealing to many men all of the city's ugliness, and few were optimistic about the potential of Balkan peoples, some considered it a blessing in disguise. If Salonika had not been planned properly, if its streets were too narrow, its storefronts too shoddy and unsanitary and its people either unable to see the city's flaws or unwilling to fix them, the fire was an unexpected but welcome solution. Captain D.M.M. Fraser of the Royal Army Medical Corps, attached to the 43rd General Hospital in Salonika, frequently remarked on the shabby state of Salonika in his wartime diary. Excluding the 'fine modern structures' built by German entrepreneurs and commercial businesses in the newer parts of the city, the 'older parts of the town', he wrote, 'are narrow and Eastern'. The smells of the city made Fraser wonder if the 'Salonika Public Health Service must be retired, if it ever existed'. There was one quick fix, one chance to remake Salonika in the image of a modern, twentieth-century metropolis, and the great fire had brought it. As John Horne discusses below, the fire indeed provided the Allies, and in particular the Allied armies, with the chance to engage in urban reconstruction in tandem with the Greek government in Athens. Near Gaza in June 1918, after having been transferred to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force a year before, Fraser thought about the fire and, with a physician's bluntness, concluded that 'Hygienically it is the best thing that could have happened'.[39]

Other soldiers went beyond hygienic concerns to focus on Salonika's earning potential as the region's financial hub. The *Orient Weekly*, a small, two-page soldier newspaper produced in Salonika, considered the fire a turning point in the city's history. 'WHO is there among us who can confidently state that "Salonika is no more"!', wrote its author, under the pen name J.C.W. 'For even the Britisher', wrote J.C.W., 'who either endured, disliked, loved or loathed the place, there was a subtle charm, a mystic Orientalism, he could not analyse'. But what was the next chapter in Salonika's story? Out of Salonika's flames, J.C.W. envisioned a future in

which Salonika, privileged with access to the sea and protected by the mountain ranges behind it, was the lynchpin of the eastern Mediterranean economy. And what he described in his vision of this new Salonika was very much the opposite of the old Salonika. Old Salonika's streets were narrow and rundown, while the new Salonika would have 'streets which would be the pride of commercial citizens'. Old Salonika's architecture failed to inspire, while the new Salonika would have 'new buildings, which by their very aspect, would demand of the foreigner' his 'respect' and 'admiration'. Most importantly, Salonika's second coming would be piloted by 'the prototype of the ancient Greeks' and would be the envy of western Europe and the business world. Realizing Salonika's potential, J.C.W. changed his 'epitaph of "Salonika is no more" to the happier and more victorious shout of "Salonika is dead. Long live Salonika" For just as the King of England never dies, so will Salonika live, and ever will she rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of her dead self'.[40]

But where could J.C.W.'s prototypical Greek be found? He certainly was not in Salonika. Oxford-educated Stanley Casson of the East Lancashire Regiment made that point plain in his memoir. Although Athens, too, had disappointed him, it was only in the capital that he felt he was 'at last in Greece, in the old world'.[41] Hartsilver felt the same. After arriving in Athens, he found that 'one's conception of the real Greeks in Athens was very different from our ideas in Salonika. They were looked upon as civilized'.[42] Famed Scottish poet and Gaelic linguist, Hugh MacDiarmid, attached to the 42nd General Hospital, wrote about Salonika and Greek Macedonia as 'Greece that is not yet Helas [sic]'.[43]

The best of Greece, though, was not to be found in the cities, ancient or modern, of the mainland but (according to Percy Mandley) in the mountains.[44] Again, echoing anti-urban and back-to-the-land movements, Mandley described mountain Greeks as 'entirely different in type from the commercial Greeks of the towns'. The urbanized Greeks of Salonika and even Athens were, in Mandley's words, 'a degenerate mongrel breed, of poor physique and usually dark eyed and swarthy'. But 'the mountain folk', in contrast,

> in whom there is probably more of the ancient Hellenic blood, are often distinctly Nordic in type, tall, blue eyed, and blonde as Scandinavians. Many of them are remarkably handsome the men stalwart, with fierce Viking moustaches, and the young women very slim and graceful, wearing their hair in long fair pigtails.

The proof that this part of the population was Greece's best could be found in the Greek army. The *Evzones*, the army's elite infantrymen, recruited exclusively from the mountains like Italian *Alpini* or German *Alpenkorps*, were the only troops, Mandley claimed, 'on which [the Greek army] can really depend'.[45]

Although some were confident that the right type of Greek could revitalize the country, others argued that Greece could not be left to its own devices, otherwise it would spoil all the infrastructural work that the British and French armies had laboured so hard to accomplish. Private H.E. Brooks of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry was sure that once the Allied armies set sail for home, Greece would fall back into disrepair. The British and French development of Salonika had cost millions of pounds, he guessed, and 'it must be priceless to the Greeks (till they let it go to ruin)'.[46] Even Mandley, so impressed by the hearty Greek mountain people, thought that a return to glory for Greece was wishful thinking. Macedonia's mixed population, he argued, was an example of why it 'will always remain a hotbed of seething unrest and intrigue, no matter how or by whom it is governed. Western politicians who think it possible to "settle" the country on democratic lines are simply talking through their hats'. In language more often associated with the problem spots of the British Empire, places like India, Ireland and Egypt, and foreshadowing much of Greek politics during the Cold War, he decided that Greece could 'only be ruled by strong men and strong measures'.[47]

And the stakes were high. 'The debt we owe to the priceless civilization of Ancient Greece', wrote Lieutenant V.J. Seligman of the 60th (London) Division, 'is immense'. But Greece's future could not be entrusted solely to its own people and politicians, no matter how talented and wise men like Venizelos were. Seligman was certain that what Greece needed was a 'noble example to bring them forth'; what Greece needed was Britain and France. As chaperons to the dance of civilization, Britain and France, the truest products of the enlightenment and the custodians of western civilization, would watch over Greece's national reclamation project and repay the long overdue debt they owed to Greece. Only then, Seligman wrote confidently, like his French comrades-in-arms who viewed the campaign as a *mission civilisatrice*, 'the thousands of Frenchmen and Englishmen who have fallen in Macedonia will not have died in vain'.[48]

* * *

Soldiers serving with the BSF in Greek Macedonia saw everywhere the signs of civilizational decay. Animals were routinely abused and needlessly made to suffer. Women, quite literally, took a back seat to men. Fertile-looking fields, as good as any in Europe, were left unplowed. And the towns and cities of Greek Macedonia, chief amongst them, the port-city of Salonika, were thought to be poorly planned, unhygienic and overflowing with racially suspect people. For most British soldiers, twentieth-century Greece was a far cry from the Greece of their imaginations, the Greece of Homer and St. Paul. Yet most soldiers did not blame the better part of five centuries of Ottoman maladministration or the region's sizeable Slavic minority for Macedonia's shortcomings. They did the exact opposite: they blamed Greece and Greek civilization. For men who had experienced the remote parts of the British Empire, Greece seemed more like Africa or India than Europe. The country could, however, be saved and maybe even become the heart of Mediterranean commerce. Thanks to the great fire, Greece had a blank slate to re-build Salonika. But the Greeks could not do it alone. The poor state of Salonika before the fire, at least in the eyes of British soldiers, suggested as much. What Greece needed was a caretaker, a power or powers that could guide it towards modernity. And who better than Britain and France, the two countries that seemed to be the truest inheritors of the legacy of ancient Greece? Like the civilizing missions that guided their colonial policies throughout the nineteenth century, Britain and France would work to modernize Greece—which, in effect, meant de-Turkifying it, and sometimes de-Hellenizing it—and make it important once again. Captain Fraser already felt a sense of pride in 1916 knowing that 'all the military roads are our own manufacture'. 'One is proud to be British', he confided in his diary, 'It is a joy to see the British Tommy, clean and alert, walking among the decadent Greeks in the streets'.[49] By helping Greece remake itself and 'rise Phoenix-like', as the *Orient Weekly* put it, the Entente would have finally cleared its millennia-old debt to the birthplace of western civilization.

Some bigger conclusions can also be drawn from the experience of the BSF in Greek Macedonia. First, it is clear that all British soldiers, whether from working-class or privileged backgrounds, had a uniform understanding of what constituted modern civilization, at least in part drawn from enlightenment and post-revolutionary European thinking. The treatment of animals and women were part of that, as was modern agriculture, a centrally planned civil infrastructure and an ethnically homogeneous population (the latter as an add-on and by-product of late nineteenth-century

racial theory). Soldiers understood modernity, race and civilization in architectural and ethnographic terms, in the streets, shops, buildings and peoples that were right in front of them. The fact that twentieth-century Greece seemed to be missing these hallmarks of modern civilization was damning evidence of their inferiority at all levels. In short, the experience of British soldiers in Greek Macedonia provides evidence for a trickle-down colonialism or imperialism that could just as easily cast its gaze on Europe itself as it could on Africa or India.

Furthermore, although no soldier used the term, multiculturalism, in the eyes of British soldiers, had failed in the Balkans and in Macedonia. Indeed, one wonders whether or not soldiers saw the decline of Greek civilization and the perils of a pluralistic society as a cautionary tale, as a warning that if Britain was not careful not to pollute its national bloodline the sun could very well set on its own empire. H.C.B. Brundle, a subaltern with the Lancashire Fusiliers, implied as much in his lengthy and often vitriolic letters home to his father in London. The kaleidoscope of nationalities Brundle encountered in Macedonia, especially those in the army, convinced him that there was an obvious pecking order within the British Empire. Of Australians, Brundle hoped that they would not cross the English Channel into Britain, and he wrote that: 'The more I see of the "democratic" + "independent" British colonists, the more Conservative I become'. His interactions with Salonika's large Sephardic Jewish population (nearly half the city) made him contemplate the place of English Jews in British society. To Brundle, Britain was better off letting its Jews realize the goals of Zionism and migrate to Palestine, as 'No Jew can ever hope to become an Englishman'. And of the Welsh, Brundle conceded that: 'They are not unlike Englishmen in appearance, but their customs are still very primitive + uncultured'. When he caught Welsh soldiers stealing from Greek shepherds near Summerhill Camp, Brundle lambasted the Welshmen as a 'snivelling race' and for making 'Foreigners think that you shifty eyed wretches from Wales are English'. Despite the fact that they all wore the king's khaki, he encouraged them to 'behave like Englishmen, in order not to drag our honourable name in the mud'.[50] For men like Brundle, and he was more the rule than the exception, encountering and defining Greek Macedonia went hand in hand with thinking about and defining what made the British Empire British. In his case, at least, the gaze of 'civilization' was truly a self-reflecting mirror.

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Notes

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PART II

Counter-Encounters

CHAPTER 7

A Crisis of Images: The French, Jihad and the Plague in Upper Egypt, 1798–1801

Zeinab Abul-Magd

In the militarized cultural encounters of European soldiers and oriental natives, the other side had their own stories to tell about such intense times. This chapter focuses on the intricate relation between the French soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt and the warriors and inhabitants of Upper Egypt. In 1798, when Napoleon's army landed in Egypt, its declared goal was to liberate the country from the despotic rule of the Ottomans. Among its aims was to grant freedom to the country's minority of Orthodox Christians, the Copts. Upon arriving in Egypt, the soldiers advanced from Cairo into the deep south, where the Coptic population was concentrated in Upper Egypt. As expected, native Christian inhabitants received the French with admiring eyes and tender hearts. The Copts provided the French with extensive logistical support until they defeated the tyrannical Mamluks—the Turkic ruling elite appointed by the

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Ottomans. An Egyptologist who accompanied the troops to the south, Vivant Denon, depicted scenes of passionate Copts aiding the French, crying at the sight of their forces leaving for the battlefields. Of one incident, Denon wrote,

> I was struck with the sincere interest which the sheik [chief Copt] expressed for our fate, who, believing that we were marching on to a certain death, gave us the most circumstantial advice, without concealing from us any of the dangers to which we were exposed, advised us with great judgment on every particular which could render the encounter less fatal to us, followed us as far as he could, and parted from us with tears in his eyes.[1]

Nevertheless, after the French won the wars and established a colony in Egypt, the romantic image of supportive natives awaiting their liberators was soon shattered. The Copts, in fact, were manipulating and exploiting the French for their own interests. As soon as the new administration hired them to run the taxation system, Coptic accountants controlling the colony's finances denied the French access to official files. Copts were not the only native group that acted in this manner, or that manipulated the French with false impressions of welcoming locals. Many Arab tribes, as oppressed by the Mamluks as the Copts had been, similarly showed a friendly, hospitable face and supported the French troops during the battles. They later excluded the colonial administrators from local governing councils and denied them access to decision-making institutions in villages.[2]

The French campaign in Egypt was a failed military expedition that lasted for only three years. By 1801, Napoleon's troops were defeated by an alliance of the British and the Ottoman armies. However, as I shall argue in this chapter, military misfortunes were not the reason behind the rapid failure of the armed expedition. Rather, it was a *crisis of images*. Before and during the campaign, French experts on the Orient forged one image of inferior and oppressed natives waiting for an enlightened nation to liberate them and another image of the colonial self as exactly this liberator. Moreover, the colonial self was imagined as a competent exploiter of the colony's immense resources, which were allegedly under-utilized. As the troops encountered the harsh reality on the ground, these images were demolished, placing the French army in deep crisis.

Upper Egypt, and especially its Qina Province with its rich commercial and agricultural resources at the time of the campaign, was a distinct site where this plight was exposed. The southern population of Qina consisted

mainly of the two groups that the revolutionary French Republic came to liberate: Copts and Arab tribes. Both groups deliberately perpetuated the discursive construction of false images in order to take advantage of the French. When the truth was revealed, it was too late for the confused colonizer to escape. As this chapter recounts in Upper Egypt, the French army faced a fierce holy war of Jihad launched by local and regional Arab insurgents, and the French colonial government had to reinstall the very *ancien régime* they had originally come to depose. Shortly afterward, the failed army brought about the environmental destruction of the south as a massive wave of the plague swept the region.

Postcolonial theory pays much attention to the issue of image making within contexts of modern imperialism. The colonizer—who was in the position of controlling knowledge production—created reductionist visions of the colonized in order to simplify the process of imperial hegemony. This is the problem of 'representation', as theorists of the field refer to it, where voices from the empire authoritatively described silent natives and presented stereotypes that reduced the natives into basic categorization, which assisted in colonial hegemony. Postcolonial theory largely presumes that representation was a unilateral process in which the colonizer solely controlled the production of images and imposed them on the represented natives.[3] In reality, image making was a 'bilateral' process to which the natives equally contributed through deceit and manipulation of the occupying forces.

Edward Said's *Orientalism* is one of the canonical texts that established the concept of representation in postcolonial theory. Said relies on Michel Foucault's vision concerning the inseparable relationship between knowledge and power to argue that European experts on the Middle East created a body of knowledge—in the form of reductionist stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims—that directly or indirectly served imperial ends. He asserts that imperialist Europeans controlled the production of these images with almost no interference from the natives. 'The scientists, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he *could be there,* or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient's part', Said asserts.[4] Thus, Said grants the natives a minimum role in creating these stereotypical representations.

In the case of Upper Egypt, on the contrary, the natives did play an important role in making the stereotypes: the inhabitants of the south perceived Europeans as naïve, and sometimes foolish, foreigners and potential subjects of exploitation. This is precisely what created a crisis of

images in the French army's colonial propaganda in southern Egypt and generated a military crisis. As the holy war of Jihad and the epidemic of the plague in Upper Egypt indicate, the French campaign proved to be an environmentally scarred endeavor of a trapped European army.

In order to investigate how the natives of south Egypt, warriors and civilians alike, interacted in a culturally complex manner with the French troops, I rely on a collection of Arabic and French primary sources. On the native Egyptian side of the story, I use the accounts of the contemporary chronicler and eyewitness of the campaign, Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, who recounted its events on a daily basis. I also use Shari'a Court records, the Islamic court registers that circulated the Ottoman sultan's decrees, and other Arabic monographs. On the French side, I utilize accounts of French travellers and Egyptologists, and the memoirs of officers. I also use French and Arabic translations of correspondences between the campaign's generals and commanders in Upper Egypt and their operational headquarters in Cairo.

Colonial Image Making

During the two decades that preceded Napoleon's campaign, a number of French travellers visited Egypt to produce scientific knowledge which they hoped would help in potential colonization. Their published accounts presented detailed recommendations to the *ancien régime* and later the revolutionary French Republic about how to use the agricultural and commercial resources of northern and southern Egypt. More importantly, their writings served as a foundational tool in an ongoing process of image making about the oppressed, barbarian native and the enlightened, liberating self. These writings portrayed an intelligent Frenchman who was able to go anywhere on earth, quickly learn the culture and investigate the resources of this place, and cleverly develop those resources. These foundational texts served as trusted authorities and propaganda pieces in dispatching the military expedition to the Orient.[5]

A good example of those travellers who also had a military background was C. S. Sonnini. A former officer and engineer in the French Navy and a prominent scientist, Sonnini was commissioned by King Louis XVI to travel to Egypt in 1780, and he published his detailed observations in the voluminous *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt*. During his journey, Sonnini encountered difficult situations, in which he faced 'superstitious and ungoverned barbarians'—both Arabs and Copts—but he managed to

compile his recommendations on creating a future French colony in Egypt.[6] With an unmistakable tone of superiority, Sonnini proposed various possibilities for the colonial exploitation of Egypt's underdeveloped commercial and agricultural resources. He depicted in detail the colossal Pharaonic monuments of Upper Egypt and said that in this region, and under French governance, Egypt could recover its lost glory. More importantly, he forged images of the Arab tribes and Copts of Upper Egypt as potential allies of the French would-be liberators. These two groups, however, viewed things quite differently.

In Qina Province, Sonnini envisioned developing trade at the port of Qusayr. Claiming that the Red Sea port of Qusayr and the Nile port of Qina connected together could be turned into international centers for Indian and Asian commerce, he proposed reviving the ancient canal linking them. He romantically asserted that the possession of this commercial area would place France in de facto control of Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf trade, which would certainly be a great victory against Britain. He pointed out that Qusayr was particularly important for the Parisian coffee drinkers who cared about getting pure mocha—imported from the Yemeni port of Mocha via this Upper Egyptian port city.[7] Moreover, Sonnini elaborated on the immense fertility of the land in Upper Egypt. The land of all Egypt was rich, but 'this uncommon fertility is still more brilliant to the south than to the north'. The south might be hot and dry, but its soil was 'infinitely more fruitful than the moist soil of the Delta'.[8] Then he spoke about the backwardness of cultivation in the region, because the natives were 'ignorant and lazy' and the Mamluks were careless, and the need for the enlightened French to reform it. The hot weather in Upper Egypt might deter the French from inhabiting the future 'colony', but Sonnini affirmed that it was still a proper environment to live in.[9]

Liberating the Egyptians and achieving these great economic goals would entail the collaboration of internal allies, and Sonnini projected the Arab tribes and Copts of Upper Egypt as qualified candidates. The Arab tribal leaders were constantly rebelling against the Caucasian Mamluks, while they were hospitable and generous with Sonnini, while the Copts, although not Catholics, were fellow Christians. Nonetheless, two encounters that Sonnini had with an Arab leader and a Coptic merchant reveal that there was a serious misunderstanding on the part of the French expert. Sonnini the physician assumed cultural superiority over the Arab leader, whereas the latter clearly perceived him as another servant. Sonnini trusted

the Coptic merchant, when the latter obviously thought him a naïve foreigner who could be taken advantage of.

While in Qina Province, Sonnini was hosted by Shaykh Isma'il Abu 'Ali, the Arab governor of a district. Upon his arrival by boat in Luxor, Sonnini heard that the Arab prince was there inspecting his tax farms, so he quickly crossed the river to meet the man of great power. Sonnini described the prince as an ugly, dirty old man, 'disgusting', but he had a clear and intelligent mind. Sonnini witnessed him running administrative matters in a governing council with noticeable justice: 'A concourse of Arabians and of the inhabitants encircled him; he listened to them with attention whilst he was dictating to his secretaries; he issued his orders and gave his dictions with surprising distinctness and regard to justice'.[10] When the shaykh finished this case, he looked with disinterest at the Frenchman—who was patiently waiting at the door of the tent—and asked with a 'voice sufficiently dry' who he was. Sonnini came close and gave him a letter from Murad Bey, the Mamluk ruler in Cairo, recommending him for the job of private physician. The ill shaykh hired him, gave him some instructions and resumed his affairs. Sonnini sat under some trees outside the tent, unaware that he was now considered another one of the shaykh's servants. The next morning, the shaykh woke up and did not find Sonnini by him, so he shouted: Where is the doctor? Where is the doctor? (*Fen hakim*? *Fen hakim*?). Sonnini was in Luxor then, so the shaykh sent him a message ordering him to come back and remain at the prince's disposal: 'He dispatched a messenger after me to say, that Mourat Bey having sent me to his assistance…from that period I was *his physician*. This message was concluded with an order to hold myself in readiness the next day, to accompany Ismain in his journey'.[11]

Another Arab tribal chief, the shaykh of Luxor, gave Sonnini orders 'with much polite condescension', as Sonnini put it. Sonnini sometimes lied in order to maintain his job as a physician. The mayor shaykh of Gurna, for instance, 'was afflicted with a disorder which could not be cured except by a difficult operation. I [Sonnini] took care not to tell him that this cure was beyond my skill; I gave him some medicine which could do him neither good nor bad'.[12] While conducting himself in this unprofessional manner, Sonnini stated that 'it is impossible to depict the customs of a degraded people, of whom barbarism has taken entire possession, without interference of ideas so dishonorable to humanity…'.[13] At any rate, Sonnini's general impression of the Arab shaykhs implied that those dark leaders could be good allies of the Frenchmen.[14]

Sonnini similarly viewed Copts as barbarians whom the French had no choice but to count on as fellow Christians. The Copts of Upper Egypt, in fact, harboured bitter sentiments against European Christians, because Catholic missionaries were spreading throughout the region and denouncing the native Orthodox faith. Sonnini related that:

> The name of *Frank,* which in the East denotes all Europeans of whatever country…was considered with horror by the inhabitants of the Said [Upper Egypt]. This hatred is instilled by the Cophts…They felt sore at the arrival of some missionaries, who came from Italy purposely to preach against them, to expose them openly as heretics and dogs…These pious injuries had perhaps merit in the view of theology; but they were extremely prejudicial to commerce and the increase of knowledge.[15]

In the city of Qus, just north of Luxor in Qina Province, Sonnini met a wealthy Coptic merchant by the name of Mu'allim Boqtor. Although a Catholic convert himself, Boqtor did not hesitate to take advantage of Sonnini, who wanted to embark on a journey to the port of Qusayr. It was a harsh trip of three days in the eastern desert, and Boqtor offered to take Sonnini there safely. Boqtor kept taking money and gifts from Sonnini, but the journey did not take place. In fact, the Copt colluded with a Turkish merchant to rob as much money and other luxuries as possible from the conceited Frenchman, and the pair eventually informed him that the trip was delayed. Then they asked him to leave his luggage with the Turk if he still wanted to go. Foreseeing their intention of robbing his belongings, Sonnini refused and demanded his payments back. Sonnini concluded that the Coptic merchant was just another dark Egyptian thief: 'like all his fellow citizens, [Boqtor was] nothing else but a traitor… the Copht, dark and designing, insinuating and deceitful, distinguished himself by the cringing and submissive deportment of the most abject slave'.[16] Sonnini still insisted that the Copts needed Europeans as enlightened liberators, and condemned the oppressive way Copts were treated in Egypt.[17]

Suffering the illusions of supremacy, Sonnini created fatal misrepresentations that the troops of his country would pay for later. Inspired by his text and those of other travellers, the French soldiers who sailed to Egypt across the Mediterranean carried romantic visions of a country that was simply waiting for the civilized republic to liberate it.[18]

Crisis of Images and Jihad

The French fleet, carrying the Army of the Orient, landed in Alexandria in July 1798. Bloody confrontations with the inhabitants of the port city immediately erupted, and afterward the army proceeded to Cairo, where it faced local resistance and defeated the Mamluks. The French finally advanced to conquer Upper Egypt a few months later, in 1799. Experts who accompanied the troops continued to reproduce the same images of barbarian natives, but the locals now were taking an active role in shaping those images. The Arab tribes and Copts in Upper Egypt indeed did welcome their self-appointed saviours and formed faithful alliances with them, but only to take advantage of the invaders. Moreover, whereas the experts still articulated a vision of the administratively competent 'self' and the backward 'other', military leaders who faced Jihadist resistance and other hard realities produced a completely different discourse.

Ironically, from the beginning Napoleon did not insist on liberating Upper Egypt: he sought to rule it through the old Mamluk despots. As the army of freedom was losing numerous souls to the insurgency in the north, Napoleon secretly negotiated with Murad Bey—the chief Mamluk leader who fled from Cairo to the south—in order to allow him to govern Upper Egypt in return for payment of annual taxes. A month after landing in Egypt, Napoleon sent a neutral envoy, the Austrian consul, to Murad in order to propose a peace treaty stipulating that France would not pursue the occupation of the south and that Murad would rule it in the name of the Republic. The Austrian consul, a legal deputy of Napoleon, was entitled to sign the agreement immediately if Murad accepted its conditions—regardless of what the natives of Upper Egypt thought. Receiving the news of some defeats of the French fleet in the north, Murad refused the proposal and offered Napoleon money to go back to France and save the blood of his soldiers. After the negotiations failed, Napoleon had no choice but to send General Désaix and his troops to take over the south.[19]

Immediately afterward, the Ottoman sultan issued a number of decrees that deployed religious rhetoric and cited Qur'anic verses and the Prophet Muhammad's tradition to ask his Muslim subjects in every province in Upper Egypt to defend the religion of Islam. The ultimate goal of the French atheists and disbelievers in God (*kuffar*), said the sultan, was to destroy the Muslims' places of worship in Mecca and Medina and kill off the Muslim population of these two holy cities. He particularly addressed the Arab tribes, saying that they were not regular believers but by lineage

were the cousins of the Prophet Muhammad and had greater responsibilities to defend the Islamic faith. He warned the Arab tribes against French wicked promises and means of manipulation.[20] Interestingly, the sultan asked Muslims to take care of Copts and treat them as they treated the ruling elite of commanders and the nobility: 'They [Copts] pay the legal poll-tax (*jiziya shar'iyya*) and they have what we have and are obliged to what we are obliged to', the sultan asserted.[21]

The calls from Istanbul for Jihad reached Arabia, and the army of the prince of Mecca, Sharif Hasan, soon crossed the Red Sea to the port of Qusayr and advanced from there to Qina Province. Religious propaganda aside, Sharif Hasan joined the effort because of his commercial interests as the shipping of grain provisions from Upper Egypt through Qusayr to the holy places in Hijaz (Mecca and Medina) would be severed by the French occupation. The prince was also responding to Murad Bey, who successfully mobilized many Red Sea locations on the Arabian Peninsula for Jihad. The Arabian holy warriors—or *mujahidin* and *ghuza* as the sultan called them—included the ruling Arab family of Ashraf that claimed lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the supreme jurist consult (*mufti*) of Medina, a notable Moroccan family that settled in the port of Jeddah, and many merchants whose trade was harmed by the occupation. They organized a large fleet well equipped with guns, swords and food provisions for the *mujahidin* who were poor and could not provision themselves. According to French estimates, the number of Arabian volunteers reached six or seven thousand.[22]

Along with thousands of native Arab peasants, the Arabian volunteers united with the army of Murad Bey against General Désaix. Arab and Mamluk Jihadists fought in Qina Province's villages and towns, including Samhud, Isna, Abnud, Abu Manna' and Qift. When Désaix seized the seat of the province, Sharif Hasan led Hijazi knights and 800 Arab peasants to retake the city. The peasants attacked French Battalion no. 61 and forced the soldiers to withdraw. It was a considerable defeat. The victorious Jihadists plundered munitions and weapons from the French ships and used them in later battles. In the Battle of Abnud, the French committed an unprecedented massacre, burning houses in the town and slaughtering Hijazis and natives. The streets of Abnud were filled with the corpses of local inhabitants and Meccan volunteers.[23]

Amid these bloody scenes, the French experts who accompanied the troops in Upper Egypt still perpetuated the old travellers' false images about the natives. But it was not entirely their fault: deceptive natives

misled them to such conclusions. The Egyptologist, Vivant Denon, who joined the troops, was an eyewitness of the battles that took place in Qina Province. Heartily believing that his compatriots were emancipators, he thought that the Copts and Arab tribes sincerely welcomed and adored the French, as they provided the troops with logistical assistance during the holy war.[24] Denon showed how rich Copts, accustomed to Mamluk raids and plunder, were surprised to see that the French paid for everything they took from them. In one incident, Copts who pretended to like the French gave the title of 'the Just' to General Désaix because he treated them equitably, as Denon alleged. The head of the Copts provided the French with all the information they needed, and he tenderly cried as they were departing for the battlefields.[25]

Similarly, Denon thought that some Arab tribes were fully loyal to the French. After one battle in which the Mamluks were roundly defeated, the 'Ababida tribe realized that they were insufficiently equipped to resist, so they went to Qina in order to make peace with the French. For a battle in Qusayr, the 'Ababida provided the French with camels and guidance in the desert. 'We entirely gained their friendship', said Denon, 'by exercising with them in mock charges, and showing so much confidence in them, as to accompany them all day at a distance from Cosseir, and riding with them at the rate of a league in less than a quarter an hour…'.[26]

Interestingly, Denon noticed that whereas elite Arab inhabitants largely sided with the French, the lower classes joined the Jihadist army of the Mamluks. Upper-class Arabs were used to being dispossessed by the Mamluks, he opined, so they greeted the French as victors. In Qina Province, wealthy Arab shaykhs—especially merchants who sought protection for their caravans during the war—showed obedience and paid tribute to the French. Denon was naïvely happy with this, so he pointed out the good will of those Arabs and wrote, '[this] gave me hopes that, for the future, we might promote at the same time the happiness of the natives and the interests of the colonists'.[27] On the other hand, poor peasants were easily deployed in Murad Bey's holy army. The French Republic supposedly had come to extend rights and equality to these lower classes, but they did not respond gratefully because, Denon guessed, they were accustomed to obedience and the Mamluks seduced them with religious propaganda.[28]

As the months passed, Denon's misinformed presumptions of friendship between Copts and Arab tribes and the French in Upper Egypt proved untrue. Educated Copts had held the positions of finance ministers

and treasury accountants in Egypt for centuries since the Islamic conquest, and they had developed the complicated *qirma* script for Arabic figures and letters in bookkeeping. The French had no choice but to use Coptic services to decipher this complex, coded land survey and tax system. Napoleon instated Mu'allim Jirjis al-Juhari as the minister of finance—a position that elite Cairene Copts had held under the Mamluks—and al-Juhari was commissioned to hire local Coptic accountants (*mubashir*s) in villages and towns. Napoleon also hired French agents to monitor each accountant. In Upper Egypt, Coptic accountants were not pleased by the French officers overseeing the work they had done for centuries.[29]

From the beginning, Coptic local accountants forced the French to deal with them as a collective group, through the Coptic minister of finance in Cairo who acted as their head. This way they managed to maintain their autonomous unity against the French. Copts resented giving away the secrets of their profession or furnishing complete information about the sources of revenue. It was almost impossible for the French ruling generals to learn how to calculate the time of the Nile inundation, how to survey the size of land cultivated after the flood in each village, and how to estimate the revenue of each piece of land. As Nassir Ibrahim, an Egyptian historian, puts it, it was a 'knowledge/power' battle between the French and the Copts, in which the latter controlled information as well as revenue. Daily conflicts broke out between the Copts and the French auditors. In Upper Egypt, when the French demanded records from the Coptic accountants in villages, they only delivered vague and ambiguous data. More importantly, Coptic tax collectors embezzled the revenue of villages that they purposely did not list in the French official registers.[30]

On another front, supposedly friendly Arab tribes excluded the French from the administration of Upper Egypt. Leaders of Arab tribes traditionally governed the daily affairs of villages and towns through democratic councils (*majalis 'arab*). Shaykhs and peasants regularly gathered in these councils to manage cultivation and irrigation matters and to resolve local disputes between individuals or villages. The tribes resumed this governing method after the end of battles with the French in order to discuss the demands of the new colonial regime, but they did not invite the French officers—who anyway did not speak Arabic—to attend and participate in decision-making.[31] Obviously very impressed with those councils, Denon drew a huge sketch of one of them in Qina Province and wrote the following about the meeting: 'I was informed that no innovations were introduced [in the council] without previously consulting with the will of the

inhabitants, to whom every possible encouragement was promised…The consultation was not about arbitrary impositions, but the best means of promoting the public welfare'.[32] Denon proudly credited the French for restoring this system of democracy that allegedly had vanished under the Mamluks, despite Sonnini's elaborate description of similar councils in Qina two decades earlier.

Facing harsh reality at the front, French officers gradually perceived the inhabitants of Upper Egypt in a different light than that of the dreamy scientific and cultural experts. Realizing that some Arabs and Copts were deceiving them and pretending to be loyal, French generals expected treason at any moment and mercilessly punished native allies whom they were suspicious of, as revealed by correspondence between the central command in Cairo and the generals in Upper Egypt. The letters of General Menou, the second commander in chief to succeed Napoleon, ordered the army in the south to keep peace with the Arab tribes but treat them cruelly if they renounced their peace truces. Friendly Arab tribes served as informants about the camps of Jihadists and carried the French officers' mail to Cairo. Two hundred Arabs accompanied Commander Boyer in an expeditionary mission in the desert to look for the Mamluk camps. Boyer, nonetheless, was anxious about his allies' concealed intentions. When he grew suspicious that a certain shaykh was a double agent, he immediately placed him under detention. In addition, Boyer followed a policy of divide and rule with the Arab tribes, using tribes' past animosity and disputes to play the groups against each other. When he expected betrayal from one tribe, he incited an enemy tribe against it.[33]

The French generals believed that the fate of the occupation of Upper Egypt now depended only on the demonstration of military might to the Arabs. Therefore, in Qina Province, the troops destroyed the villages that refused to give them provisions and harshly punished their Arab shaykhs. In one incident, after waiting for four hours for bread to arrive from some villages and realizing that their 'dogs' (i.e. inhabitants) had refused to send provisions, the French soldiers beat the villages' Arab shaykhs with a hundred sticks. Furthermore, the French requested the payment of the cash tax within three hours and the grain tax within six days. When one village tried to escape the grain tax by claiming there was low Nile inundation and water shortage that year, Commander Boyer imprisoned the shaykhs of this village until they paid.[34]

The military regime regularly retaliated against the manipulative natives. General Menou ordered one of his officers in the south, Donzelot, to lie

and pretend that his decisions, even if they did the opposite, were in the best interest of the natives. In one incident, the French troops collected horses and camels from Upper Egyptians but later realized that they no longer needed them. Instead of returning the animals to their original owners, Menou, in a spirit of revenge, ordered Donzelot to burn them and tell the people that this was an action of grace for their benefit. 'Some practices of charlatanism are always needed with those people (*Il faut toujours un peu de charlatanerie dans ce monde*)', Menou affirmed.[35]

The Turn to Despotism and the Plague

With the French colonial image of the self as liberator being dramatically smashed by both the natives' Jihad and deceit, the panicking French Republic soon reinstalled a despotic government. The French military regime hired Murad Bey himself to serve as the autonomous governor of Upper Egypt. The Republic restored the same Mamluk tyrant to rule over the south that Sonnini had condemned and its troops had fiercely fought. The French self-perception of being quick and efficient developers of the crops and commerce of Upper Egypt similarly faded away, and was replaced instead by the rushed seizure of resources by means of oppression. Finally, the occupation brought about massive environmental destruction to the south as an unprecedented wave of the plague broke out in the region.

The French placed great emphasis on coercive control of grain, which the troops needed desperately. Storing 100,000 *ardabbs* of wheat and 150,000 *ardabbs* of beans, barley and lentils was necessary to sustain the army for the year of 1800, so General Kléber ordered that these provisions be collected from the Upper Egyptian provinces and sent for storage in Cairo. Kléber ordered the boat captains of Upper Egypt to ship only the grain of the French Republic and prohibited them from transporting the loads of any native peasants or merchants. The boat captains disobeyed and secretly carried the people's grain. When the French found out, the Food Committee issued orders to confiscate any grain that did not belong to the Republic on these boats in Cairo ports and requiring the boat captain to pay a fine. Military officers inspected the grain boats and protected them from the people's attacks.[36]

Kléber later hired private French companies instead of native boats to carry this grain. The company of Livron et Hamelin was responsible for collecting grain for the Republic's army and transporting it to Cairo. The remaining grain was not to be left for the people, but was sold and its

revenue sent to the colonial treasury. French agents in the provinces of Upper Egypt were ordered to prepare daily registers of the current prices for each kind of grain in the markets of towns and big villages and to send the information to the general financial manager. The same private company was ordered to sell this grain in Upper Egypt on behalf of the military government.[37]

Instead of developing trade in the southern ports, the French ruined it. At the time the troops arrived in Upper Egypt, Denon asserted the Red Sea port of Qusayr and the Nile port of Qina were parts of a vibrant regional market connecting Asia and Africa. Contradicting the negative assessments of Sonnini, Denon described the robust trade from India, Arabia, East Africa, North Africa and Turkey passing through these two linked ports. As he noted:

> We found a number of merchants of all nations. By encountering the natives of very foreign countries, remote distances seem closer… The Red Sea, Gidda, Mecca, seemed like neighbouring places to the town where we were; and India itself was but a short way beyond them.[38]

General Menou and his officers in Upper Egypt paid much attention to the Yemeni coffee and Sudanese commerce, including black slaves, and attempted to control the flow of goods through direct correspondence with the rulers of these places. Menou sent envoys to the sultan of Darfur in order to resume trade with his territory, and he received a gift of three black concubines in return. After reconciliation with the sharif of Mecca, Menou assured him that the French would send the holy places in Hijaz their regular shipments of grain and asked sharif to send the regular shipments of coffee in exchange.[39]

Nonetheless, more than a year after concluding the invasion of Upper Egypt, the French attempts dramatically failed. Commerce in the Qusayr port was interrupted, and the volume of shipping on the Nile decreased daily. In December 1800, the commander of the French Navy informed Menou that 'slowing and hindering trade in Qusayr hurt agriculture and navigation in Upper Egypt'.[40] Furthermore, Denon lamented that the French troops were randomly killing innocent merchants, who were mistaken for Meccan Jihadists, and raiding their caravans:

> The soldiers who were sent out on scouting parties, frequently mistook for Meccans the poor merchants belonging to a caravan, with whom they fell in;

> and before justice could be done them, which in some cases the time and circumstances would not allow, two or three of them had been shot, a part of their merchandize either plundered or pilfered, and their camels exchanged for ours which had been wounded. The gains which resulted from these outrages, fell invariably to the share of the bloodsuckers of the army, the civil commissaries, Copts, and interpreters.[41]

Eventually, in order to contain such chaotic conditions, the French restored the tyrannical regime in the south. General Kléber signed an agreement with Murad Bey in April 1800, according to which the latter was granted an independent authority over Upper Egypt in return for taxes and military support of the French in Cairo. According to al-Jabarti, Murad Bey—a blond with a great beard and a battle scar on his face—was oppressive, reckless, arrogant and conceited. Murad had led a luxurious life in his many vast palaces located outside Cairo, and he collected taxes coercively to sustain this lavish lifestyle and a hefty military. The treaty compelled him to submit an annual tribute of 20,000 *baras* and 15,000 *ardabbs* of wheat and 20,000 *ardabbs* of other grains. Murad was allowed to control the revenue of the port of Qusayr, which suggests that the French had given up on their dreams of controlling international trade through this Red Sea harbour.[42]

Murad Bey died exactly one year after his installation. In April 1801, he was killed by the massive plague epidemic that struck Upper Egypt. The official gazette of the Republic in Egypt, the *Courrier d'Égypte*, published the news of the death of a 'great man', and Menou granted his widow, Nafisa, an annual salary of 60,000 pounds.[43] In fact, it was the French who killed Murad—albeit indirectly—as their troops had carried the plague to Upper Egypt. Contemporary European physicians affirmed that the south of Egypt had been immune to outbreaks of the plague for hundreds of years under Mamluk and Ottoman rule. European observers largely reported that the healthier and hotter air of Upper Egypt made it difficult for the plague to infiltrate the south, whereas Cairo and the Mediterranean coast of Egypt were more susceptible.[44] A French physician asserted that the plague was a natural phenomenon 'almost unknown' in Upper Egypt.[45]

The great numbers of French soldiers transmitted the disease. They passed through northern Egyptian lands and communicated in the most intimate manner with already afflicted native villages and towns. The soldiers then landed in Upper Egypt with their contaminated bodies and luggage, and delivered the epidemic to the region. Around 60,000

inhabitants of Upper Egypt perished out of an estimated population of 750,000 in the south, as whole villages were wiped out during this wave of plague.[46] Al-Jabarti chronicled the horrors of the epidemic using a letter that he received from a friend, Shaykh Hasan al-'Attar, who was residing in Upper Egypt at the time. Al-'Attar relayed '[In] the city of Asyut… more than 600 persons died every day… I think the country lost two-thirds of its population…The streets are deserted…Corpses remain in the houses for days on end, for only after a great deal of trouble can one find biers, washers, and porters'.[47]

In the wake of this massive human and environmental destruction, and by the time the French troops departed from Upper Egypt, any images that the French had of themselves as liberators or competent managers of other countries' resources had vanished. In a similar vein, any images of the natives as inferior barbarians awaiting liberation and progress had become, painfully, much more complex. The French military occupation of Upper Egypt was a relationship of mutual manipulation between the colonizer and the colonized.

A Long Aftermath

The campaign failed, but militarized cultural encounters continued between the French and Egyptian natives for decades to follow in the nineteenth century. Only four years after the army of the republic left, a new Ottoman viceroy took charge of ruling Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha (r. 1805–1848). Although an officer himself who was part of the Ottoman troops sent to fight Napoleon, the Pasha was obsessed with French military advancements. He brought to his court French officers and scientists to take charge of modernizing the Egyptian army, mainly by copying the French military system. Thus, despite the natives' resistance against them, the Egyptian government soon welcomed back the very same colonial officers and scientists to instil French culture in the military and in all other aspects of economic, educational, and social life. Such profound influence would continue until the British military occupied Egypt in 1882.

When the French army departed from Egypt, the prominent Egyptian chronicler al-Jabarti hastily put together a treatise that harshly condemned the campaign. Because he was a member in the council that the French formed to administer Egypt, al-Jabarti sought by writing this book to clear himself from accusations of being a collaborator with the colonial regime. Published in 1801, al-Jabarti's *Muzhir al-Taqdis bi-Zawal Dawlat al-Faransis*

smeared the French 'infidel' soldiers and praised the Muslim Ottomans. However, al-Jabarti revised his criticism after the French army left when he compiled the third volume of his famous chronicles *'Aja'ib al-Athar*, published between 1805 and 1806. In this later volume, he opined that the French policies sometimes were better than those of the Ottomans, and not necessarily every Muslim government was good and all non-Muslim politics were bad.[48]

Muhammad Ali Pasha was fascinated by Emperor Napoleon's military victories elsewhere and sought French help to modernize the Egyptian army and navy. Many French officers remained in Egypt after the campaign, and many others who were opponents of the French monarchy after Napoleon's collapse decided to join them and take refuge in the country. The Pasha hired numerous French experts in prestigious government positions. They accumulated wealth and owned slaves and concubines. As a start, the Pasha recruited Colonel Joseph Anthelme Sève, who had fought in battles with Napoleon's troops, to build the Egyptian army and navy. Commander Sève converted to Islam and gave himself the Arabic name of Sulayman Pasha al-Faranswi, and his offspring intermarried with the royal family. Other French officers and labourers took charge of the industries that supplied the army and the navy. Consequently, the French language dominated the Egyptian bureaucracy next to Arabic and Turkish. Muhammad Ali welcomed Catholic missionary schools opening across the country and he sent native students to be educated in France. The Pasha also used French experts to modernize the Egyptian manufacturing sector, bureaucracy, education, law and more. Meanwhile, French archeologists and artists found Muhammad Ali's Egypt a hospitable place to work in.[49]

In his memoirs on practising in the Egyptian army, the French physician Antoine Barthélemy Clot recalled how the Pasha entrusted him with building military hospitals and medical schools in the 1820s and 1830s. He trained native Egyptians and Turks to serve as surgeons in the army. Granting him the prestigious Turkish title of bey, calling him Clot Bey, Muhammad Ali allowed the French doctor to keep his Christian faith. Clot Bey described in detail how Sève and other officers of Napoléon's empire introduced forced conscription of native peasants and labourers to the Pasha's army. Clot Bey narrated that the natives rebelliously resented conscription, to the extent that many recruits, for instance, cut fingers from their left hands to escape compulsory service. Other less violent

novelties that French officers introduced to the modernized Egyptian army were European military music and its instruments.[50]

Obviously, French military, economic and cultural influence would continue under the successors of Muhammad Ali, who were even fonder of France because they received their education there. Khedive Said granted his French friend, the diplomat Ferdinand De Lesseps, a concession to dig a canal connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean: the Suez Canal in 1854. Khedive Isma'il heavily borrowed from France and other European creditors to build a new Cairo that looked like Paris, bring Parisian fashion to the royal harem, build an opera house, construct railways, manufacture sugar, and so on. French creditors extended loans to the government and peasants alike, and those of them who resided in Egypt formed a foreign elite of capitalists, large landowners and company owners enjoying economic privileges and superior social status over the natives. This era ended with the infamous debt crisis and consecutive bankruptcy that Khedive Isma'il's government fell into, and eventually brought about French-British dual control of the country's finances in 1876. This was soon followed by full British military occupation of Egypt.

To sum up, despite the failure of Napoleon's expedition, the French troops eventually left a profound impact on Egypt. But it was an impact void of the values of the revolutionary republic, and with little of the *liberté* or *égalité* they had initially come with.

Notes

1. Vivant Denon, *Voyage dans le Basse et la Haute Égypte, pendant les campagne du Général Bonaparte,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1802), II, p. 120. The translation is from Vivant Denon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt*, 2 vols. (New York, 1973), II, p. 199.
2. About Copts, see Nasir Ahmad Ibrahim, *al-Faransyyun fi Sa'id Misr: al-muwajaha al-maliyya, 1798–1801* (Cairo, 2005), pp. 135–73. About the Arab tribes, see Denon, *Voyage dans le Basse et la Haute Égypte,* II, pp. 139–40.
3. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, eds., *The Post-colonial studies reader* (London, 2006), pp. 93–116.
4. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1979), p. 66, p. 7.
5. M. Savary probably presented the first systematic account in this regard through his 1779 visit. M. Savary, *Lettres sur l'Égypte* (Paris, 1789 ed.).
6. C. S. Sonnini, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt undertaken by order of the old government of France*, 2 vols. (London, 1799 ed.), I, p. 287.

7. Ibid., 1:192–94. Also see 264–65.
8. Ibid., I, pp. 196–97.
9. Ibid., I, pp. 312.
10. Ibid., I, p. 186.
11. Ibid., I, p. 188.
12. Ibid., I, p. 239. Quote is on 244.
13. Ibid., I, p. 203.
14. Ibid., I, p. 311.
15. Ibid., I, p. 214.
16. Ibid., I, pp. 230–31. Also see 232–33.
17. Ibid., I, p. 204, 215.
18. Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: invading the Middle East* (New York, 2008), pp. 11–12.
19. 'Abd Al-'Aziz Jamal al-Din, 'al-'Amaliyyat al-'askariyya fi Sa'id Misr bayn 'amayy 1798/1799', appendix 1, in 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar fi al-tarajim wa-l-akhbar*, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1958–), IV, pp. 382–85.
20. Isna Court, Sijill Ishhadat 50, pp. 111–14, 21 Rabi' al-Awwal 1213, Archival Code 1169-000050; Isna Court, Sijill Ishhadat 50, pp. 116–118, 3 Jumada al-Awwal 1213, Archival Code 1169-000050, both in Egyptian National Archives (ENA).
21. Isna Court, Sijill Ishhadat 51, p. 284, 35 Dhu al-Qi'da 1214, Archival Code 1169-000051, ENA.
22. 'Izzat Hasan Effendi al-Darandali, *al-Hamla al-faransiyya 'ala Misr fi daw' makhtut 'Uthmani, makhtutat Dianama,* dirasat wa-tarjamat Jamal Sa'id 'Abd al-Ghani (Cairo, 1999), p. 367; Husam Muhammad 'Abd al-Mu'ti, *al-'Ilaqat al-Misriyya al-Hijaziyya fi al-qarn al-thamin 'ashr* (Cairo, 1999), pp. 63–70; Jamal al-Din, 'al-'Amaliyyat al-'askariyya', pp. 382–85.
23. Jamal al-Din, 'al-'Amaliyyat al-'askariyya', pp. 410–27; E. L. F Haut, *Mémoires d'un officier de l'armée Française* (Cairo, 2005), pp. 252–70; D. J. Larrey, *Memoirs of military surgery and campaigns of the French army,* Richard Willmott Hall, trans., 2 vols., (Baltimore, 1914), I, p. 128; Nabil al-Sayyid al-Tukhi, *al-Sa'id fi 'ahd al-hamla al-Faransiyya* (Cairo, 1997).
24. Vivant Denon, 'Discourse du citoyen Denon', in *Mémoires sur l'Égypte, publiés pendant les campagnes du Général Bonaparte* (Paris, 1800), p. 410.
25. Denon, *Voyage dans le Basse et la Haute Égypte,* II, pp. 120–21, 131–32. The translation is from Denon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt,* II, pp. 199–200.
26. Ibid., pp. 230–31, 235–36.
27. Ibid., 191. The translation is from Denon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt,* II, p. 295.
28. Ibid., 197–99.
29. Ibrahim, *al-Faransyyun fi Sa'id Misr*, pp. 135–73.

30. Ibid.
31. See, for example: Isna Court, Sijill Ishhadat 50, p. 286, 5 Shawwal 1214, Archival Code 1169-000051, ENA.
32. Denon, *Voyage dans le Basse et la Haute Égypte,* II, pp. 139–40.
33. Madiha Dus, ed., *Mukhtarat min watha'iq al-hamla al-Faransiyya, 1798–1801* (Cairo, 2006), pp. 78–82, 87–91, 108–9.
34. Ibid., pp. 86–91.
35. Ibid., pp. 118.
36. Ibid., pp. 109–33; Khalid Abu Al-Rus, 'Madinat Isna fi al-qarn al-thamin 'ashr' (PhD dissertation, Cairo University, 2008), p. 56.
37. Ibid.
38. Denon, *Voyage dans le Basse et la Haute Égypte,* 2:195–97. The translation is from Denon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt,* II, pp. 300–301.
39. Dus, *Mukhtarat min watha'iq al-hamla,* pp. 112–13, 136, 144; Jamal al-Din, appendix 10, in al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar,* IV, pp. 433–35.
40. Jamal al-Din, appendix 15, in al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar,* IV, p. 439.
41. Denon, *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Égypte,* II, pp. 151–52. The translation is from Denon, *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt,* II, pp. 243–44.
42. al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar,* IV, pp. 592–601; Jamal al-Din, 'Mu'ahadat al-Sulh bayna Kilibar wa-Murad Bey', in al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar,* IV, pp. 301–3; *The Annual register or a view of the history of politics and literature for the year 1801* (London, 1802), p. 212–17, 225.
43. Jamal al-Din, 'al-Amir Murad Bey', in al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar,* IV, p. 592.
44. Edward Lane, *An account of the manners and customs of modern Egyptians: written in Egypt during the years 1833, 34, and 35,* 2 vols. (London, 1837), I, p. 3.
45. Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, eds., *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 2009), pp. 462–63.
46. Larrey, *Memoirs of military surgery,* I, p. 370; 'The diseases of Egypt, from observations made during the British Expedition in that country under Sir R. Abercromble, K.C.B, in 1801', *Medical Press and Circular, a Weekly Journal of Medicine and Medical Affairs,* July–December 1882, pp. 152–53.
47. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *Muzhir al-taqdis bi-zawal dawlat al-Faransis* (Cairo, 1998), p. 250. The translation is from LaVerne Kuhnke, *Lives at risk: public health in nineteenth-century Egypt* (Berkeley, CA, 1990), p. 76.
48. al-Jabarti, *Muzhir al-taqdis*, introduction of Ahmad Zakariyya al-Shalaq, pp. 9–10; al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar*, vol. III.
49. Nuris Muhammad Sayf al-Din, *al-Jaliya al-Faransiyya fi Misr, 1882–1956* (Cairo, 2012), pp. 21–25.
50. Antoine B. Clot-Bey, *Aperçu général sur l'Egypte*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1840), II, pp. 255–62, 87–89.

CHAPTER 8

'Their Lives Have Become Ours': Counter-Encounters in Mesopotamia, 1915–1918

Santanu Das

Framed by the sun stands a small Arab girl in a slightly frayed *thawb* and sporting a *tarboosh* (Fig. 8.1).[1] Remarkably composed, even slightly quizzical, for someone so young, she stands her ground, as it were, with the right foot thrust forward, hands firmly clasped together and the face slightly askance.[2] Curiosity, suspicion, trepidation, war-weariness: it is difficult to read the expression, but child-like delight or ease is not one of them. It is the knowing look of someone much older than her years. The photograph would have been striking even in the albums of British war photographers, but what makes it rather remarkable is that it is to be found in the 'war album' of Captain Manindranath Das, a distinguished Bengali doctor who served in Mesopotamia in 1916–1918.[3] One of the war's peripheral visions, the photograph of a small Arab girl by an Indian doctor opens up the whole world of counter-encounters during the First World War that goes beyond the East-West axis while being occasioned by imperial networks.

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Fig. 8.1 Album of Captain Dr. Manindranath Das, M.C. Courtesy of Sunanda Das

This chapter explores the world of encounters between soldiers and non-combatants from undivided India, serving as part of the British Indian army, and the local population in Mesopotamia during the First World War.[4] If the First World War is conventionally understood as a military clash between European imperial powers, it can equally be reconceptualized as a turning point in the global history of cultural encounters. During 1914–1918, hundreds of thousands of Indians, Africans, West Indians and Pacific Islanders were recruited into the colonial armies of the European nation-states and voyaged to the heart of whiteness and beyond—from the Middle East to East Africa—to serve in different battlefields. This article focuses on the experiences of a particular racial group in a particular region; the aims are both recuperative and analytical. Here, I wish to recover this shadowy zone of counter-encounters between Indian troops serving as sentinels of the Raj and the local people of Mesopotamia living under Ottoman rule. At the same time, the context and diversity of this lateral contact amidst the tumult of war put pressure on the very term 'encounter' and test its intensities of meaning, varying between 'impressions', 'contact' and 'co-existence'.

In recent years, there has been a powerful turn to 'histoire croisée' as a way of understanding global history with its complex webs and connections.[5] Concepts such as 'zones of contact', 'affective communities' and 'cosmopolitan thought-zones' have opened up the colonial past in fresh ways; 'encounter', 'exchange' and 'entanglement' have emerged as privileged terms, replacing the old model of centre and periphery or the binaries of coloniser and colonized.[6] If 'encounters' are often thought to be contingent and 'exchange' implies a certain reciprocity and equality, the idea of 'entanglement' is often considered to capture the complex nature of the interaction between disparate racial, cultural or religious groups, with their unequal structures of power and asymmetrical alliances. Rather than studying inter-racial interactions in terms of the 'pity of colonial domination' or 'the charms of cross-cultural encounter', a new study of entanglement, notes Kris Manjapra, should ask, 'what do different groups, some stronger, some weaker, get out of their political relations together?'[7] Manjapra also alerts us to the need of taking 'sideways glances towards lateral networks' that transgressed the colonial duality and thereby disrupt 'the hemispheric myth that the globe was congenitally divided into an East and West, and that ideas were exchanged across that fault line alone'.[8] While the East-West entanglement has now become an established field of study, the world of counter-encounters between different subject groups still remains in the shadow, partly because of the paucity of source material. The recovery of this submerged area of experience, involving the majority of the world's population, has singular significance for colonial and subaltern histories as well as for rewriting the very nature of cultural encounters. In theoretical terms, such a shift enables the restoration of agency and affect to the 'other', as encountered by the coloniser, and particularly because the colonized themselves, as we will see in this chapter, were often entangled in the colonization of other areas and peoples. What are the inner histories of such fraught processes?

Imperial expeditions and occupations provide a particularly rich site for the study of such encounters from below. The colonial army was often at the forefront of counter-encounters, as borne out, to an exemplary degree, by the British Indian army. During the long nineteenth century, it was sent on a series of imperial expeditions, both within and outside the British empire, from Somaliland, Egypt and Abyssinia to, more recently, South Africa for the Boer War (1899–1901) and China (1900) to quell the Boxer Rebellion. But the scale of mobilization for the First World War was altogether different. Between 1914 and 1918, over one million Indians served

in different parts of the world in a variety of roles, from guarding the oilfields in Baku to fighting in the battlefields of Tanga, Flanders and Gallipoli to tending to the wounded in Bombay, Brighton and Basra. These in turn resulted in an unprecedented range and variety of encounters across the world but possibly none as diverse, sustained and fraught as in the extraordinarily cosmopolitan theatre of Mesopotamia. This was the main theatre of war for the Indian army: some 588,717, including 7,812 officers, 287,753 other ranks and 293,152 non-combatants—ranging from doctors, ambulance workers and medical orderlies to a substantial number of 'followers' forming porter and labour corps—served here, between 1914 and 1918.[9] During these years, a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious army from undivided India came into contact and built up relationships with people from a vaster but similarly multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious Ottoman empire; the plural identities of Indians—as invaders, fellow Asians, colonial subjects and often co-religionists (for the Muslim sepoys)—interacted variously with an internally divided local population, defying any neat political grid.

The military campaign remained the backbone for cultural encounters. With the Ottoman entry into the war in October 1914 on the side of Germany, a jihad or holy war was declared as early as November 1914 on behalf of the caliphate against the British and French empires and threatened Muslims fighting on the Allied side with 'the fire of hell'.[10] The jihad soon became part of an elaborate German-Ottoman strategy against Persia and British India. At the same time, Britain sent its Indian forces to protect its oilfields at the mouth of Shatt al-Arab and Mesopotamia became a theatre for imperialist conflict. On 6 November 1914, the Sixth Indian (Poona) Division crossed over the bar of the Shatt al-Arab into Turkish waters, captured the Ottoman fort at Fao and, by the end of the month, it had occupied Basra.[11] By September 1915, the British flag flew over Basra, Amara, Qurna, Nasiriyah and Kut as General Charles Townshend continued his unstoppable advance towards Baghdad. But on 22 November, the whole show came to an abrupt halt as his exhausted army faced a numerically superior Turkish army at Ctesiphon. Townshend now retreated to Kut, where he would be faced with one of the longest and most ignominious sieges in British history.[12] He finally surrendered on 29 April 1916. Around 10,440 Indians of the Sixth Division were captured at Kut-el-Amara, including 204 officers, 6,988 rank and file and 3,248 followers.[13] While the officers were treated well, the Indian privates, like their British counterparts, suffered 'two years of horror'.[14] After the fall of Kut, the

campaign was rethought and the overall operational control passed from the colonial Indian government to Britain. Under General Maude, the British forces advanced carefully up both sides of the Tigris, occupied Kut in December and finally entered Baghdad on 11 March 1917.

What were the 'undertones' of such an arduous campaign and what are our sources? While British memoirs provide occasional tantalising glimpses, from accounts of Indian sepoys 'going mad in the heat' and 'dancing in no man's land' to being covered in their own faeces in a hospital ship, Indian testimonies from Mesopotamia have been largely non-existent.[15] Most of the sepoys were non-literate and there is no archive of dictated and censored mail, as we have in France and Flanders. The most 'silent' of the fronts is the world of siege at Kut and subsequent captivity. The chapter examines this shadowy world through freshly unearthed and unusual material—the writings (in Bengali) of a group of educated and largely middle-class Bengali men who served as medical personnel: doctors, orderlies, stretcher-bearers and clerks. These include, among others, a remarkable set of letters by Captain Dr. Kalyan Kumar Mukherjee and an extraordinary memoir *Abhi Le Baghdad* by Sisir Prasad Sarbadhikari, a medical orderly, and are comparable to the finest accounts we have from European officer-writers; in addition, we have rare fragments from sepoy letters sent from Mesopotamia to France and intercepted by the colonial censors there.[16] To suggest the range, I shall focus on three kinds of counter-encounter in which Indians, both educated medical staff and semi-literate sepoys, met Ottoman subjects as part of the British military campaign: occupation, combat and captivity. If there has occasionally been some interest in the social and political dimensions of counter-encounters between subaltern groups, my focus here will be on the testimonial, the cultural and the affective, though obviously informed by the social and the political; the impulse is to move from 'the grey of theory to the green of experience', as Sigmund Freud once noted, and investigate how the specificity of the context interacts with the minutiae of identity politics.[17]

Occupation: Basra, *bazaars* and *Boodhus*

Orientalism, mythic history and muddy reality jostled together in the British soldiers' first impressions of Mesopotamia: space was perceived as deep time. If the mud on the Western Front was the product of industrial artillery, the British soldiers saw the mudflats of Mesopotamia as the natural habitat for the so-called primitive people of 'Turkish Arabia': 'It

is a mud plain so flat that a single heron … looks as tall as a wireless aerial. From this plain rise villages of mud and cities of mud. The rivers flow with liquid mud. … The people are mud-coloured'.[18] Did the Indians too see the land and its people through this lens—myth-fringed but mud-splattered?

Orientals are often most prone to Orientalism. On reaching Basra, Dr. Kalyan Mukherjee wrote to his mother: 'Ahre Ram, is this the Basra of Khalif Haroun Al-rashid? Chi! Chi! There is not even the faintest sign of roses, instead what we have here is a 5–6 hand wide and 20–21 hand deep canal. Inside it lives around two *lakh* [hundred thousand] frogs – small, big and medium-sized. Most of them are bull-frogs. What a racket they make'.[19] The language of the land which housed the Tower of Babel seemed to have degenerated into a cacophony of frogs, but the spry Orientalist humour is free of any racialising discourse. Mukherjee was stationed just outside Basra; the account of his fellow-Bengali Ashutosh Roy of the actual city is very different:

> The town reminds me of our own towns. The shops are quite well-decorated. The *bazaar* is covered so that it does not get wet when it rains. … At the entrance of the canal that leads from Shatt el-Arab to Basra is another *bazaar*, called 'Ashar'. … Most well-to-do people have their own mahellas [boats]. At every lane here, you will find 'Kawakhana' or Coffee-shops; they can be compared to the street-side tea-shops in our country. The big difference is that in our country, only in the morning and in the evening, people crowd around these places to have tea; here, there are hordes of coffee-drinkers for the whole day.[20]

Neither the fantasy town of Haroun al-Rashid nor the site of complete dereliction, as in British accounts, Basra emerges in Roy's account as bustling, stratified, *familiar*. While we have pictures of the *bazaar* of 'Ashar' from British photographers and travellers, such as the intrepid Gertrude Bell, Roy lifts the veil, as it were, and records its daily rhythm: Arabs and Armenians having bread with meat for lunch and drinking strong coffee, Bedouin street dancers, the buildings at Basra or the streetscape of el-Qurna, the 'Garden of Eden' which reminds him of his own native Varanasi.

The accounts of Kalyan Mukherjee and Ashutosh Roy are exceptional. Educated, middle-class and cosmopolitan, there is a close engagement with the land, its people and history which is absent in the few sepoy

letters we have from the region. But their gaze, like that of the British travellers, is often ethnological: the Arabs are described as sturdy and bold but 'lazy', while the Armenians are depicted as intelligent, good-looking, well-dressed ('their food, manners, and dress are far superior than to the Turks'), but somewhat cowardly and untrustworthy.[21] However, the real objects of Roy's fascination as well as of racist opprobrium are the Bedouins or 'Boodhus': 'They are uncivilized. They eke out a living through looting and plunder. They also try to earn a livelihood by raising sheep, goat, bulls, camel, horses and donkey. They have no fixed address – they pitch big blankets like tents and live at one place for two to three months … The Boodhus are very fierce. They do not hesitate to kill people, even without proper reason'.[22] Such comments are echoed in both British and Indian accounts; the 47th Sikhs unit diary refers to them as a 'treacherous and thieving race, whose habit it is to appear to side with the stronger party … Boodhus, flies and dust are the plaguers of the country'.[23] But Roy is also fascinated: he lingers on, and photographs, their manners, clothes and ornaments, reminiscent not just of British travellers in Mesopotamia, but redolent of the influence of *Peoples of India* (1868–1875), the grand ethnological photographic project by John William Kaye and John Forbes Watson. Ethnology did not act on a solely East-West axis; class, as much as race, underpinned these forays.

While the letters and reminiscences by these educated Indians in the early stages of the campaign read like travelogues, the mood darkens progressively. The letters of Kalyan Mukherjee capture this growing sense of disillusionment as he follows Townshend's advance through 1915 from Nasiriyah to Kut-al-Amara. The turning point was October 1915. On 3 October, Townshend reached Aziziyah after his victory at Kut and received an order to 'open the way to Baghdad'.[24] As the nature of occupation changed from a defensive expedition to one of aggressive offensive action, Mukherjee was rent apart by conflict and misgiving. On 13 October 1915, he wrote to his mother: 'I understand that we won't advance any more. But then I have heard that so many times'. Later, from Aziziyah, some sixty miles up the river from Kut, he added: 'We have advanced a lot – why more? It is we who, having tasted victory, are snatching away everything from the enemies; the enemies have not yet done anything'.[25] Consider the following letters, both addressed to his mother, the first from Kut on 4 October:

> I have had my fill of warfare. I have no more desire to see the wounded and the dead. … In the name of patriotism and nationalism, they go on to cut each other's throats. There is nothing as narrow-minded as nationalism in this world. … If the word 'patriotism' (or 'nationalism') did not exist in the European dictionary, there would have been far less bloodshed.
>
> In our country too, in the name of patriotism, many leaders are teaching small schoolchildren how to kill. Murder, the greatest of sins, becomes morally good when committed in the name of patriotism. If a person, by guile or force, takes away another's property, it is burglary or dacoity [banditry] – again a sin. But when a nation snatches away another's land – well then it's empire-building.[26]

and then again on 20 October:

> Great Britain is the teacher. The patriotism the English have taught us, the patriotism that all civilised nations celebrate – that same patriotism is to be blamed for this bloodshed. All this patriotism – it means snatching away another's land. In this way, patriotism leads to empire-building. To show love of one's country or race by killing thousands and thousands of people and grabbing someone else's land, well, that's what the English have taught us. The youths of our country, seeing this, have started to practise this brutal form of nationalism.[27]

The level of intellectual maturity and anti-war fervour here remind one of the missives of war poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon. Mukherjee's letters are, however, very different: they are not just condemnations of violence and narrow patriotism, as in the trench letters of Owen and Sassoon, but complex reflections on the relationship between war, empire and nation. Mukherjee's radicalism is twofold. A colonial subject, he exposes the intimate relationship between patriotism and imperialism. However, his anti-colonial critique, even as he acknowledges the deep educational influence of England upon the Indian bourgeoisie, cannot be equated with Indian nationalism. Through acute reasoning, he associates imperial aggression with its obverse – nationalist terrorism. For Mukherjee, imperialism, revolutionary nationalism and the European war were all implicated in the same vicious cycle of violence.

Such political engagement or ratiocination is wholly absent in the handful of sepoy letters from Mesopotamia that have survived.[28] Priya Satia has argued that, in 1916–1918, Mesopotamia offered the British soldiers the mission of 'developing Iraq': it becomes the key site for the 'redemption

of empire and technology' as a counterpoint to the horrors of both on the Western Front.[29] As early as 1916, Edmund Candler noted that the creation of a military infrastructure was seen as 'bringing new life to Mesopotamia' at a time when 'the war had let loose destruction in Europe'.[30] The main agents in such technological rejuvenation of Mesopotamia were the Indian army—particularly its labourers, sappers, miners, engineers and signallers. They seemed to have been far less impressed with the country and expressed their opinions bluntly, without any of the imperial guilt or humanistic angst of men such as Candler:

> The country in which we are encamped is an extremely bad place. There are continual storms and the cold is very great, and in the wet season it is intensely hot … If I had only gone to France, I could have been with you and seen men of all kinds. We have all got to die someday, but at any rate we would have had a good time there.[31]
>
> The particular part of the world where I am is a strange place. The seasons here are quite different from what you experience anywhere else. We have already experience of the cold and wet. Now the heat is threatening us from afar. It rains very heavily and the entire surface of the land becomes a quagmire. … Except for the barren, naked plain, there is nothing to see.[32]

Experienced or imagined, France becomes the yardstick and obscure object of desire: the difference between France and Mesopotamia, according to another sepoy, is 'between heaven and hell'.[33] Mesopotamia confronted the sepoys with an underdeveloped version of their own country: 'uninhabited', 'desolate' and 'barren' are recurrent adjectives in these translated letters. A comparison of these sepoy letters with those from middle-class medic non-combatants shows how responses to the land were fundamentally split along class lines.

Combat: From Ctesiphon to the Desert March

If the occasional letters, journal articles and photographs give glimpses into the world of counter-encounters during the war years, a very different perspective is opened up by a remarkable testimony that has been unearthed in recent years: a 209-page memoir titled *Abhi Le Baghdad* [*On to Baghdad*] by an Indian medical orderly Sisir Prasad Sarbadhikari.[34] Published only in 1957 but written earlier and based closely on his wartime diary, it provides an extraordinarily intimate account of the Indian experience in

Mesopotamia, from the Battle of Ctesiphon (November 1915) to the siege of Kut to life under captivity. Sisir's memoir is *sui generis*, reading in turns like battlefield notes, nursing memoir, POW diary and travel narrative. The title is taken from the bitter aside of a tired, anonymous, limping Muslim soldier during the retreat to Kut: 'Ya Allah, abhi le Baghdad' [Oh Allah, so much for taking Baghdad!]. The whole memoir, similarly, is a view 'from below': from the non-elite, the non-entitled or what his fellow captive Long calls 'the other ranks of Kut'.[35]

An educated, middle-class Bengali youth from Calcutta, Sarbadhikari had just finished a degree in law when the war was declared. He volunteered as a private in the newly formed 'Bengal Ambulance Corps' (BAC) for Mesopotamia. The Corps comprised four British commissioned officers, three Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs), sixty-four Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and privates (including Sisir) and forty-one followers, including cooks, water carriers and cleaners. They reached Amara on 15 July 1915 and set up the Bengal Stationary Hospital.[36] In September, some thirty-six of them, including Sarbadhikari, were sent to the firing line as part of the 12th Field Ambulance of the 16th Brigade. The story centres on this affective community of educated idealistic Bengali youths as they get caught up in the Battle of Ctesiphon (November 1915) and the resultant siege of Kut (December 1915–29 April 1916) and end up spending the next two years in captivity. As a medical orderly who knew English and learnt Turkish, Sarbadhikari worked in several hospitals, first in Ras-el-Ain briefly and then for a longer stretch at Aleppo and finally in the German camp at Nisibin. The memoir is closely based on his wartime diary which has its own tale of mutilation, trauma and survival to tell:

> It would be a mistake to believe that the diary I have maintained till now or what follows is the original version. After surrendering at Kut, I had torn up the pages of the diary and stuffed the pieces in my boots. I had written a new version at Baghdad from the remnants. This copy, too, was spoilt when we walked across the Tigris – although the writing was not rubbed off entirely since I had used copying pencil. I kept notes about the Samarra-Ras-el-'Ain march and onwards in that copy itself, after I dried it. I had to bury the copy for a few days at Ras-el-'Ein but not much harm had been done as a result. I copied the whole thing again in the Khastakhana at Aleppo. (pp. 156–157)

The diary travelled with him to Calcutta and was converted into a memoir with the help of his daughter-in-law Romola Sarbadhikari.

Such diary-like immediacy is evident in Sarbadhikari's description of the Battle of Ctesiphon when he accompanied the army as part of the Field Ambulance. Indeed, it would be his first proper taste of combat: 'As we kept advancing, bullets were whizzing above our heads and cannon-balls exploding noisily behind us' (35). His colleague in the BAC, Prafulla Chandra Sen, would distinguish between the different kinds of sound: the 'miao miao' sound of the .303 British bullets, the wasp-like 'buzzing' of the bullets fired by the Arab soldiers and the 'hiss' of shells.[37] Sarbadhikari, instead, focused on the aftermath of the attack:

> It is beyond my power to describe what I saw as the 23rd dawned. Corpses of men and animals were strewn everywhere. Sometimes the bodies lay tangled up; sometimes wounded men lay trapped and groaning beneath the carcasses of animals. The highest death toll was in the front of the trenches where there were barbed wire fences. In places there were men stuck in the barbed wire and hanging; some (fortunately) dead and some still living. There might be a severed head stuck in the wire here, perhaps a leg there. A person was hanging spread-eagled from the wire – his innards were spilling from his body. There were spots within the trenches where four or five men were lying dead in heaps; Turks, Hindustanis, British, Gurkhas – all alike and indistinguishable in death.
>
> 'In a death-embrace
> Grasping each other by the neck
> Lay the twain.'
>
> …
>
> We saw a Sikh sitting and grinning by himself in one place – his teeth bright in the middle of his black beard. I wondered what the matter was with him – how could he be laughing at a time like this? I went close to him and understood that he had long since been dead. Perhaps he had grimaced in his death-throes.
>
> It fell to me and Phani Ghose to note down the names and numbers of the wounded. And what a task it was! [pp. 42–43]

'If I live a hundred years, I shall never forget that night bivouac', Charles Townshend would write in his memoirs.[38] Sarbadhikari had to count the casualties and un-entangle the living from the dead and arrange the wounded 'with their own haversacks under their heads and a blanket to cover them'. But the most difficult part was having to show empty bottles

to British Tommies crying out for 'a drop of water for heaven's sake' or being forced to leave behind the seriously injured to be collected later. His BAC colleague Prafulla Sen, who worked alongside him, remembered the eerie silence of the scene, noting 'this terrible chill on top of the injuries – many died of the cold itself'.[39]

Yet, in one of the greatest paradoxes, such extremity also produced rare moments of humanity. Sarbadhikari recalled how Bhupen Banerjee, another of his colleagues from the BAC, took off his British warmer and gave it to a British casualty; Sen, in his account of the night, remembered a young English captain, who had lost part of his leg, gazing forlornly on the cross that hung from his neck: 'As we [members of the BAC] gave him some water and saluted him before lifting him on to the stretcher, he gave us a wan smile which, even after eight years, I remember clearly'.[40] One is reminded of a similar passage in *Kalyan-Pradeep* as Mukherjee recounted how, on his way from Ali Gharbi to Sannaiyat, he encountered a severely wounded British soldier. As he gave him some water, the wounded Englishman tried to kiss his feet and tears rolled down his cheeks; as Mukherjee took him in his arms, he died.[41] A number of images have recently surfaced which show officers from the Royal Army Medical Corps, along with Indian medical orderlies and stretcher-bearers, tending to wounded Turkish soldiers at an advanced dressing station in Tikrit in November 1917 (Fig. 8.2). Such moments are circumscribed by professional duties, and yet, like the accounts of nurses on the Western Front, they point to spaces of contact and contingent intimacy for which, in this case, we have no record.

Such moments of intimacy co-exist with numerous accounts from both British and Indian sources of gratuitous brutality by both Turkish and Arab guards. However, the moment of horror for all those who endured it was the forced march of the privates across the desert. After Townshend's surrender at Kut, the British and Indian officers were relatively well-treated and transported on steamers, but the ordinary soldiers—both Indian and British—were forced to march for 500 miles across the deserts. Post-war British memoirs of Mesopotamia often suggest that the Indian POWs were better treated than their British counterparts because of religious reasons, but in the absence of sufficient records, such claims remain speculative.[42]

In his bitterly titled memoir *Other Ranks of Kut* (1938), P.W. Long, an NCO, has a whole chapter on 'Horrors of the March' during which they suffered 'the tortures of the damned'.[43] Being a member of the Ambulance

Fig. 8.2 Indians sepoys attending to wounded Turks at Tikrit, 1917. Imperial War Museum, London

Corps, Sarbadhikari was transported by a steamer from Kut to Baghdad and, from there, was sent by train to Samarra, some 60 miles away. From Samarra, he was made to march to Mosul via Tikrit and Sargat, and again from Mosul via Nisibin to Ras-el-Ain where he arrived on 25 August: together they had marched for 500 miles over forty-six days. The march is the single most traumatic episode in the whole memoir:

> This march under the torment of the guards, with starved, parched, exhausted bodies, crossing mile after mile of mountainous land or barren desert on foot was horrifying – a nightmare never to be forgotten. I shall remember it forever.
>
> See that White swaying over there? Catch hold of him now before he falls to the ground.
>
> What is the matter with him? A sunstroke?
>
> Whatever it might be, take him along with you somehow, he must not be left here.
>
> You have not had anything to eat for four days? Cannot take another step?

> There is no use saying that, you must march. The guards will not wait for you, nothing will sway their stony hearts.
>
> You sold off your boots in Baghdad because you were starved. Your feet are bleeding, scarred after walking barefoot over sand and stones and thorns, you are walking with strips of cloth tied around your feet…
>
> Your chest is parched, your tongue is hanging out, you cannot speak from the thirst after walking since morning till noon. …
>
> That means that it is not too long before you go insane – even so, walk on you must. You cannot lie here. Surely you know what the consequences are of lying here alone? Dying bit by bit in the hands of the Bedouins.
>
> There goes the scream of the guards 'Haidi, iyalla!' ['Get up, get moving']
>
> Those yells of 'Haidi, iyalla!' by which the guards drove us on are never to be forgotten. You would wake up with a start – are they not screaming 'Haidi, haidi? No? Well, let us fall back asleep, then.
>
> When will this march end? Will it ever? (pp. 134–136)

Reminiscence, flashback, hallucination, reportage and testimony are fused and confused as he refers to the march as 'bhayabhaho' ('horrifying'), 'dwushapno' (nightmare) and 'bibhishika' ('terror'). He seems to relive the moment as he reverts to the present tense—the eternal now—of the trauma victim who, as Sigmund Freud noted with reference to the accident survivers and war veterans in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), is 'doomed to a compulsion to repeat past experience as present'.[44] The string of rhetorical questions, the sudden intrusion of the second person pronoun ('take dharo'—'please hold him', 'chalte parcho na'—'you can't walk anymore', 'tomake cholteyei hobe'—'you have to keep walking'), or the claim on the body—feet, tongue, chest—cancel the gap between the past and the present. Bhatta's account is more descriptive as he remembers the hallucinatory nature of the march, interrupted by beatings by the Turks with whips, rifle butts and shoes, and with casualties on the way.[45] If both Sarbadhikari and Bhatta dwell on the horrors, Long records an extraordinary act of friendship: 'a sepoy, who had been helped for several miles, finally collapsed and could not rise again, not even when the Onbashi tried kicking him to his feet. He was a Hindu and a *naik* [corporal] of his regiment pleaded to stay with him'.[46] But the request was denied and the man was left to die. Such moments were contingent, but they seared themselves on the consciousness of the soldiers.

Captivity: Cosmopolis in Extremis?

On 20 November 1916, Sarbadhikari was sent on a mail train to the Aleppo General Hospital or 'Markaz Khastakhana', as it was known, with fifty seriously injured patients. In contrast to the daily degradation and cruelty at Ras-el-Ain, the Aleppo Khastakhana, overseen by the Germans, was a more civilized space:

> Aleppo is not like the cities we have seen so far – Baghdad and Mosul. The houses are nice to look at; the roads are not bad. We hear it looks like towns in Europe. The people on the streets look cultured; their clothes are nice; European costume predominates. There are people of many communities – Turks, Syrian Christians, Rums (i.e. Greek Orthodox community members) and Jews…
>
> I was at Aleppo's Markaz Khastakhana (hospital). We were, on the whole, friendly with the Turkish soldiers who used to say – 'You are not at war now, so we are all kardas. 'Kardas', meaning 'brother', was an oft-used word….
>
> There were one or two Indians here, and a Romanian named Alda Sava. The rest are all Turkish soldiers. The Armenian doctor Shagir Effendi is a great man, he cares very much for his patients. There were two khadamas in the kaus: one was an Armenian woman called Maroom, the other a Syrian Christian man called Musha. The two of them looked after us very well. Their responsibilities were to make the bed, sweep the wards etc. In some wards the khadama-s were Turkish sepoy orderlies, there the patients were not well-cared for…
>
> There was another man at the Markaz khastakhana with whom we were quite intimate. He was an Armenian, named George. His home was in Diyar Bakr, his children had all been killed—he was the only one to escape with his life to Aleppo. George was given the task of cleaning the toilets. He cooked, slept – all at one spot. On cold days we used to go to him and we would chat while warming our hands over his *angithi* [coal-fire brazier]. We had only a single stove in our ward and we received very little fire for kindling. (pp. 145–159)

If Kut was a zone of daily hunger and Ras-el-Ain a place of trauma, the hospital in Aleppo was, to borrow the title of Fawaz's study, 'the land of aching hearts': a place of temporary refuge for the displaced, the wounded and the derelict.[47]

The core of the memoir is the web of encounters, exchanges and relationships that developed in this hospital through the way Sarbadhikari's multiple, often contradictory, identities—as POW, as a British colonial subject, as fellow Asian, as educated and middle-class, as both friend and

enemy—intersected with the multi-ethnic fabric of an empire in the process of modernization, with its own hierarchies, alliances and tensions. The patients in the hospital were largely Turkish; there were also a few German and Austrian soldiers and British POWs from Kut, Gaza and even Gallipoli. The staff comprised Armenian doctors and *muhajirs,* Turkish and Arab *chaoush*, as well as Kurds, Syrian Christians, Jews and Rums. The racialising discourse that we find in English POW memoirs around the 'barbaric Turk' is wholly absent in *Abhi Le Baghdad* though Sarbadhikari does not shy away from giving us regular doses of brutality. He mentions how the Turkish barber spat on his face when he went for a shave and yet, when he fell seriously ill, the Turkish *chaoush* or foreman physically lifted him and carried him to the toilet. Hierarchies were further reversed when he gave the *chaoush* ten piastres and the latter broke down in tears. It is this sympathy and attention to the 'mixed yarn' of human nature, rather than any reductive racial discourse, which makes *Abhi Le Baghdad* such an exceptional piece of writing. We meet, for example, a thirty-year-old Turkish soldier who had lost his wife and was thus forced to take his five-year-old daughter to the war zone with him; when he went to the front line, he would leave her with an acquaintance. When Sarbadhikari asked him what would happen to her if he got killed, he would say: 'Allah Biliyor' ['Allah knows'] (155). Similarly, he records how an elderly Turkish soldier had come to his ward to collect discarded cigarette butts, and as he stooped to collect one, he broke out in a yell: the man lying on next bed was his own son whom he had lost for three years and had assumed dead. The hospital functions as a microcosm of the greater society wholly displaced and disoriented by the war.

In the hospital, Sarbadhikari was assigned to the ward of wounded Turkish soldiers; conversations started:

> We spoke of our lands, our joys and sorrows. If we said that something was there in our country which we did not find here, they would say, 'How is our land to progress? We have only ever been fighting wars, and that too with large and powerful nations. … One thing that they always used to say was, 'This war that we are fighting—what is our stake in this? Why are we slashing each others' throats? You stay in Hindustan, we in Turkey, we do not know each other, share no enmity, and yet we became enemies overnight because one or two people deemed it so.' Is this on the mind of every soldier of every nation?

> Another thing that was notable about them was their hatred for the Germans. All of them used to despise the Germans—they used to say that Germany was responsible for getting them into this war. The particular cause of dissatisfaction was that the Germans would receive the best of all of Turkey's produce. Eggs, for example, would be sent first to the German hospitals, and after their requirements were met, what remained (if anything did) would go to the Turks. It was the same with everything else. We used to think that the situation was the same in our country, but our consolation was that we were actually under British domination, but Germany and Turkey were allies! (p. 158)

What brings captive and captor together here as 'kardes' [brothers] and triumphs over political hostility is a shared sense of subjugation and resentment against European imperialism and a sense of being caught up in a war that is not theirs. In contrast to the conscious 'politics of anti-Westernism' that Cemil Aydin has uncovered among Asian intellectuals during the war years or even the 'anti-colonial cosmopolitanism' that Kris Manjapra detects among the South Asian intellectual elites, this is an international brotherhood of the dispossessed and the displaced premised on the vulnerability of being.[48] What gives Sarbadhikari's memoir its singularity is its poignant undertow of raw experience: he captures with eerie precision people coming together not with highly articulated internationalist imaginations or anti-Western political convictions but united by their common dereliction caused by European powers.

Such Indo-Turkish 'brotherhood' is contrasted with Sarbadhikari's relationship with his British fellow workers and superiors—cordial but distant. He records individual pockets of friendship between the Indian captives and their coloniser-turned-fellow captives, as when Sarbadhikari cooked a spicy curry for Corporal Shaw, but the institutional hierarchies, the memoir suggests, remained intact:

> The discrimination that is always practised between the whites and the coloured is highly insulting. The white soldier gets paid twice as much as the Indian sepoy. The uniform of the two is different – that of the whites are better… In fact, whatever little provisions could be made is made for the Tommy. Even the ration is different – the Tommies take tea with sugar, we are given only molasses. (p. 188)

His account is inadvertently corroborated by Major Sandes in *In Kut and Captivity* (1919) when he writes that, on reaching Baghdad, 'our first

business was naturally to get separate accommodation for the Indian officers': 'we explained also that Indian officers … were always of inferior ranks to British officers'.[49]

If *Abhi Le Baghdad* plunges us into the minutiae of life within the hospital, it also registers the larger currents of history outside. It is one of the few South Asian works that bears witness to the Armenian genocide. Sarbadhikari notes: 'From what we hear these terrible mass killings were not perpetrated by the Turkish soldiers; they were done by Chechens and Kurds' (pp. 176–177). Sarbadhikari uses the word 'hatyakanda' ('massacre'). At Ras-el-Ain, one of the epicentres of the genocide, he provides an eye-witness account from his friend Sachin: 'A group of Armenians were made to stand up, with their hands tied, and their throats were slit one by one' (p. 177). On the way from Ras-el-Ain to Aleppo, Sarbadhikari met two boys of around ten, with crucifixes around their neck, who told him in broken Arabic that their parents had been killed by the Turks; as he went past a well, a hornet of flies greeted him: 'It is not at all advisable to drink from these wells; there are Armenian corpses rotting in most of them' (p. 129–30). His journey through abandoned villages reminded him of Oliver Goldsmith's famous 1770 poem 'The Deserted Village' where the latter had addressed the rural depopulation in Ireland: 'Along thy glades, a solitary guest/Amidst the bowers, the tyrant's hand is seen' (p. 129). The quotation opens up the whole complex work of colonial education and the wayward ways of sympathy and identification. Goldsmith's deliberately obscure lament for the rural poor gets transferred by a Bengali colonial subject to Armenians fleeing in the face of massacre. Defying the reductive categories of 'indigenous' and 'hybrid', it shows how perception and understanding of even the most fraught kinds of encounters outside the East-West axis were still entangled with colonial knowledge.

Only a few hundred kilometres away from Ras-el-Ain, the hospital in Aleppo was still a relatively safe space: the chief doctor was Armenian and there was a significant Armenian presence. Sarbadhikari's closest friends are his Armenian fellow workers: an Armenian *mohajer* looked after him like a 'mother' (170), while his closest friend is the fifteen-year-old orderly Elias whose parents have been killed. Sarbadhikari records how a Punjabi sweeper found an Armenian orphan whose parents had been killed, named him Babulal and brought him up; it is possibly the same child that Major E.A. Walker refers to when he mentions 'a small Armenian boy about ten or so', the sole survivor of thousands of Armenians massacred, in the Indian sepoy camp at Ras-el-Ain.[50] At one point, Sarbadhikari observes: 'Their lives have become ours'.

Can the above milieu at the Aleppo Markaz Khastakhana [General Hospital] be called 'cosmopolitanism from below'? In *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (1986), the anthropologist Paul Rabinow notes that the term should be extended to transnational experiences that are particular rather than universal, experiences that are unprivileged, even coerced, defining the concept as 'an ethos of macro-interdependencies, with an acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories, and fates'.[51] In Sarbadhikari's account of the hospital, Indians, Turks, Armenians, Syrian Christians, Rums, British and Russians co-habit and share life stories, heat and food; George the Armenian receives temporary refuge and Armenian doctors tend to Turkish patients, while the genocide occurs only a few hundred kilometres away. However, these men and women come together not because of a commitment to some ethical or socio-political ideal in times of war but through the 'unbearable vulnerability' produced by historical and geopolitical circumstances.[52] The most moving encounters in the text are between Sarbadhikari and Elias whom the author gives his most precious possession—his only warm coat—as Elias flees one night. Thinking beyond yourself and giving your only warm coat to an Armenian orphan, as Sarbadhikari does, may be the first powerful gesture, more than any ideological exercise, towards 'feeling and thinking beyond the nation'.[53]

To conclude, Mesopotamia was a singular site of counter-encounters. The range and complexity that emerge put pressure on the term 'encounter' itself during wartime: are they voluntary or involuntary, forced or unforced? How do the structures and asymmetries of power influence such moments and intersect with a deeper history of feeling? If race and nationality are conventionally taken as categories of analysis, can emotional vulnerability provide a more nuanced language to prise open and investigate its uneven and mottled texture? *Abhi Le Baghdad* remains a powerful example for several reasons. First, it shows the extra-European 'lateral' encounters were distinct and yet enmeshed in networks of European imperialism. Second, through its range and richness—from the brutality of the Turkish and Arab guards during the march to the subaltern cosmopolitanism of the Aleppo hospital—*Abhi Le Baghdad* testifies both to gratuitous cruelty and the kindness of strangers that such a concept must necessarily accommodate. Each encounter has its own 'atmosphere', where the racial, political or religious identities of the participants in turn intersect with another set of variables, such as class, combatant/non-combatant status, gender and age, among others—but is never wholly

circumscribed by them. There is often an incalculable or a 'fine excess' to use a Keatsian phrase, to such encounters in which lie our greater identity as human beings—as when the *chaoush* breaks down or meets his long-lost son or when Sarbadhikari gives to Elias his only coat. Finally, what makes a more psychologically and culturally nuanced investigation of encounter possible in this case is the richness of the observation and the writing. Literature, Novalis famously said, fills in the gaps of history. Sarbadhikar's magnificent memoir creates a powerful affective space in which the encounter can be interrogated in its intimacy and intricacies as he helps to reconceptualise the war as a precarious zone of contact and emphasise everydayness of life in extraordinary times.

Notes

1. A *thawb* is an ankle-length Arab garment, akin to a robe, while a *tarboosh* is a close-fitting, flat-topped brimless hat.
2. Personal photograph album, owned by Mrs. Sunanda Das, Kolkata.
3. Interview with Mrs. Sunanda Das, daughter-in-law of Captain Dr. Manindranath Das, 18 December 2014.
4. 'India' and 'Indian' are used throughout the chapter to refer to undivided India which today would comprise India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. The term is used rather than 'South Asia' as being more historically sympathetic and congruent with how the various persons addressed here saw themselves.
5. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, 'Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity', *History and Theory*, 45 (February 2006), pp. 40–50.
6. See Wolf Lepenies, ed., *Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals* (Frankfurt/New York, 2003); also see Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton ed. *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham, NC, 2005).
7. Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2014), p. 6.
8. Kris Manjapra, 'Introduction', *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas* (London, 2010), p. 2.
9. *India's Contribution to the Great War* (Calcutta: Government of India, 1923), p. 97. There have been a number of important works on the Mesopotamia campaign, of which A.J. Barker, *The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914–1918* (London, 1967) remains one of the best. Also see Kaushik Roy, 'From Defeat to Victory: Logistics of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918', *First World War Studies* 1 (March 2010),

pp. 35–55; Charles Townshend, *When God Made Hell: The British Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq 1914–1921* (London, 2010).

10. Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (New York, 2003), p. 100. See his chapter on 'Global Jihad', pp. 95–124.
11. Leila Fawaz, *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War* (Cambridge, MA, 2014), p. 63. See her wonderful chapter 'South Asians in the War', pp. 205–32.
12. For a detailed history of the siege using British sources, see Nikolas Gardner, *The Siege of Kut-al-Amara* (Bloomington, 2014).
13. The figures are quoted in Major E.W.C Sandes, *In Kut and Captivity* (London, 1919), p. 261. These figures are also used by Barker, *The Neglected War*, p. 286. The Table of Prisoners in *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire* (London, 1920) mentions a separate category for 'Indian Native Kut' but gives only the combined figure for 'Indian Native' (captured elsewhere on the Mesopotamia campaign) and 'Indian Native Kut' at 200 Indian officers, and 10,486 'other ranks' (p. 330).
14. Patrick Crowley, *Kut 1916: Courage and failure in Iraq* (Stroud, 2009), p. 181.
15. Quoted in Barker, *The Neglected War*, 137.
16. A fine selection of sepoy letters written in France can be found in David Omissi, ed., *Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers' Letters, 1914–1918* (London, 1999).
17. Sigmund Freud, *Neurosis and Psychosis*, in *Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud* (London, 1924), IX, p. 149.
18. Robert Byron, 'Road to Oxiana', quoted in Townshend, *When God Made Hell*, pp. 7–8.
19. Letter dated 13 April 1915, quoted in Mokkhada Devi, *Kalyan-Pradeep: The Life of Captain Kalyan Kumar Mukhopadhyay I.M.S.* (Calcutta, 1928), p. 250. My translation. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
20. Ashutosh Roy, 'The Autobiography of a POW', *Bharatbharsha*, March 1920, Volume II, No. 2, p. 195.
21. Roy, 'Autobiography', *Bharatbharsha*, March 1920, Volume II, No. 2, p. 197.
22. Roy, 'Autobiography', *Bharatbharsha*, March 1920, Volume II, No. 2, p. 197.
23. *47th Sikhs: The Great War*, 1914–1918 (Chippenham, 1992), p. 121; also see Barker, *Neglected War*, p. 242.
24. Holdich to Moberly, 16 October 1922, National Archives, CAB, 45/91; *Mesopotamia Commission Report* (London, 1917), 27, The National Archives, WO 106/911.
25. Letters dated 13 October 1915 and 28 October 1915, in *Kalyan-Pradeep*, pp. 330, 336.

26. Letter dated 4 October 1915, in *Kalyan-Pradeep*, pp. 317–318.
27. Letter dated 20 October 1915, in *Kalyan-Pradeep*, pp. 333–334.
28. These letters were sent to fellow sepoys in France and have survived as part of the sepoy mails, as translated and extracted by the colonial censors in France.
29. Priya Satia, 'Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology', *Past & Present*, 197 (2007), p. 217 (pp. 211–255).
30. Edmund Candler, *The Long Road to Baghdad*, 2 volumes (New York, 1919), p. 183.
31. Sowar Jivan Mal, 28th Cavalry, Persian Gulf, to Lance Daffadar Ganda Singh, 28th Cavalry, France, 17 November 1915, British Library, IOR, MSS Eur E420/10.
32. From _, Field Ambulance, Force 'D', Mesopotamia, to _, Dafadar, 21 May 1916, BL, IOR, L/MIL/828, Part 2, p. 345.
33. From Sub-assistant surgeon, Force 'D', Mesopotamia to _ Dafadar, France, 21 May 1916, BL, IOR, L/MIL/828, Part 2, p. 344 (v).
34. Sisir Prasad Sarbadhikari, *Abhi Le Baghdad* (Kolkata, 1957). Page references will be in the text. The translation of this particular text is by Upasana Dutt.
35. P. W. Long, *Other Ranks of Kut* (London, 1925).
36. The Bengal Ambulance Corps was masterminded by Dr. S.P. Sarbadhikari and did important medical work in Mesopotamia. See 'The Bengal Ambulance Corps', Confidential File 312/16, West Bengal State Archives, Kolkata.
37. Prafulla Chandra Sen, 'The Story of the Bengal Ambulance Corps', *Manashi o Marmabani Chaitro*, March 1925, 1:2, p. 175. My translation.
38. Charles Townshend, *My Campaign* (New York, 1920), p. 176.
39. Prafulla Chandra Sen, 'The Story of the Bengal Ambulance Corps', p. 177.
40. Sen, 'The Story of Bengal Ambulance Corps', p. 177.
41. Devi, *Kalyan Pradeep*, p. 303.
42. See Heather Jones, 'Colonial Prisoners in Germany and the Ottoman Empire', in Santanu Das, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge, 2011), p. 187. Moreover, it is only at Ras-el-Ain, as Sarbadhikari notes, that the sepoys were separated on the basis of religion, and the Hindus were subjected to back-breaking labour for constructing the railhead.
43. *Long, Other Ranks*, p. 66.
44. Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in *Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. James Strachey (London, 1920–22), Vol. XVIII, p. 27.
45. Krisna Behari Roy, 'The Story of a Bengali Prisoner of the Turks in Kut', as narrated by Shitanath Bhatta, Supply and Transport Department, 6th

Division, *Manasi O Marmabani*, Ashwin [1326], September 1919, vol. ii issue 2, p. 123.

46. Long, *Other Ranks*, p. 62.
47. Fawaz, *Land of Aching Hearts*, esp. pp. 205–32 ('South Asians in the War').
48. Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (New York, 2007); Manjapra, *Cosmopolitan Thought-Zones,* p. 2.
49. Sandes, *In Kut and Captivity*, pp. 285, 287.
50. IWM, 76/115/1, Diary of E.A. Walker, 17 July 1916. Also see Jones, 'Colonial Prisoners in Germany and Mesopotamia', pp. 187–188.
51. Paul Rabinow, 'Representations Are Social Facts', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus, ed., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Minnesota, 1986), p. 258.
52. Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London, 2006), p. xi.
53. Pheng Cheng and Bruce Robbins ed. *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation* (Minnesota, 1998), pp. 1–19.

PART III

Capturing Landscapes

CHAPTER 9

Military Ways of Seeing: British Soldiers' Sketches from the Egyptian Campaign of 1801

Catriona Kennedy

In the preface to his illustrated *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt* (1803), Captain Thomas Walsh observed that while he could not make any claims for the aesthetic merits of the 41 plates based on sketches he had made during the expedition, he could vouch for their accuracy. As he explained to his readers: 'Taken in perfect security and with all necessary deliberation; they are at least, not the sketches of a solitary traveler, who holds the pencil with a trembling hand'.[1] While European travellers produced a number of accounts of Egypt over the course of the eighteenth century, their efforts to see and describe the country had often been frustrated by the harshness of the environment and the hostility of the local population.[2] In the wake of Napoleon's invasion in 1798, however, a new group of travellers in uniform descended upon this 'antique land'. Bearing arms and enjoying safety in numbers, they were able, as Walsh's remarks suggest, to sketch and survey Egypt to an extent that had not been previously possible.

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The visual record of the British expeditionary force that landed in Egypt in March 1801 has, understandably perhaps, not received the same attention as the extensive illustrated surveys of Egypt produced by the *savants* who accompanied Napoleon's expedition. Vivant Denon's *Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt* and the monumental *Description de l'Égypte* published between 1809 and 1828, with its 894 plates made from over 3,000 drawings of the Egyptian landscape, its peoples, architecture, flora and fauna, are both considered landmark publications in the history of Western geographic imperialism.[3] The British army had no equivalent official scientific mission, but its soldiers also produced a number of unofficial illustrated narratives, prints and sketches of Egypt. Many of these focused on the isthmus between Aboukir Bay, where the British landed under heavy French fire on 8 March 1801, and the modern city of Alexandria, a strip of largely flat terrain sandwiched between the Mediterranean Sea and Lake Aboukir.

Through an analysis of selected views of the Alexandrian coast, this chapter explores how British soldiers understood, responded to and presented this landscape. In so doing, it engages with a well-established critical literature that has emphasized the ideological work performed by 'landscapes' and their function, described in Mitchell's influential analysis as the 'dreamwork' of imperialism'.[4] It also draws upon a related scholarship that stresses the close connections between cartography and topographical drawing and the development of modern warfare and systems of military control.[5] Yet, while the visual archive of the Egyptian campaign can be understood as reflecting a commanding and confident military vision, one concerned with the mastery and possible appropriation of territory, it can also be read in terms of the personal preoccupations and professional aspirations of the amateur soldier-artists who produced it. The fantasy of the imperial archive may have rested on the projection of a unitary, disembodied and objective 'eye', but in practice, as this chapter suggests, it was often composed of plural, embodied and subjective ways of seeing.

Military Topographies

In the decades immediately preceding the Egyptian expedition, European warfare underwent a topographical turn. This reflected a broader transition away from a mode of warfare largely focused on the attack and defence of cities to a much more mobile form of warfare which took place across a more expansive territorial space. This shift can be tracked in the

changing meanings of the term 'terrain' in military discourse. In the first half of the eighteenth century, terrain was narrowly conceived as the ground directly surrounding a fortification. By the end of the century, terrain, in a military sense, had, as Anders Engberg-Petersen notes, 'come to be a shorthand for topographical space', denoting open stretches of land that had to be understood in terms of natural features hindering or allowing military movement and evaluated for its impact on logistical, strategic and tactical considerations.[6]

This shift was also reflected in the training in drawing provided to European military officers. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the focus was on geometrical, arithmetical plans of fortifications, siege artillery and ballistic trajectories, but by the end of the century, topographical and landscape drawing had been added to the curricula of most military academies. While Britain tended to lag behind France and Prussia in the provision of formal military education for its officers, the increasing emphasis on drawing and topographical understanding can be seen in the training provided by various military academies by the turn of the century. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, there were five drawing masters at Woolwich and at least one at each of the Royal Military Colleges at Marlow, Sandhurst and High Wycombe.[7]

The figure who best exemplifies the close connections between landscape art and the military in this period is the landscape painter Paul Sandby. Drawing master at Woolwich Academy between 1768 and 1799, Sandby had also been involved in the military survey of Scotland following the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. His innovative and evocative depictions of the British landscape would earn him a reputation as 'the father of British watercolours' and contributed to the vogue for picturesque views and domestic tourism from the 1770s onwards.[8] Under the tutelage of Sandby and others, British soldiers became perhaps the largest and most prolific group of amateur artists in Britain during this period.[9] At Woolwich, Sandby taught his gentlemen cadets perspective, shading and the art of 'breaking ground' (analysing a landscape in terms of its tactical features) in order to prepare them for examination for a commission in the Royal Corps of Artillery and Engineers. They began by copying Sandby's landscapes in Indian ink, before reproducing more complex coloured landscapes and various views around Woolwich.[10] The aim of this training in topographical drawing was 'to form the eye to the knowledge of' landscape.[11] In treatises on military reconnaissance, the superiority of visual over textual descriptions of landscape was asserted on the grounds that, as

the first superintendent of the British Royal Military College, General Francis Jarry, put it: 'everything which is put down in writing of necessity takes on some colour from the opinion of the writer. A sketch map allows of no opinion'.[12]

The increasing emphasis on landscape and topographical drawing in military curricula supports the emphasis that many cultural historians of modern warfare and imperialism have placed on vision and technologies of perception in territorial acquisition and domination.[13] As Mary Louise Pratt has observed in relation to nineteenth-century travel writing, it was often characterized by a 'panoramic scope' that elided the presence of both indigenous peoples and imperial explorers and presented the latter as an impassive 'collective moving eye on which sights/sites register'.[14] Recent scholarship, however, has called into question a straightforward 'projection' model of imperial vision, in which a commanding and confident European system of observation and classification was imposed onto distant landscapes. As Luciana Martins and Felix Driver observe in their study of the early nineteenth-century coastal surveyor, John Septimus Roe, the immense technical effort, physical costs and professional aspirations invested in such work should not be completely overlooked. They suggest a different reading of the imperial archive: 'rather than simply a story of power and information, it also becomes one of anxiety and esteem'; and they urge historians of the visual archive to 'restore the eye to the body: to acknowledge the physical labour – the labouriousness – of making or taking observations'.[15] In her analysis of landscapes produced by British military draughtsmen in India in the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Mysore War (1789–1792), Rosie Dias has similarly concluded that such works were often marked 'not only by military encounter and political strategy, but also by aesthetic processes and by collective and personal memories'.[16] She discerns an elegiac quality in many of the Indian landscapes produced by British officers that derived from their personal experiences of loss, disease and suffering on the sub-continent. For these officers, the Indian landscape was not just a projecting screen for imperial ambitions, it was also a repository for painful and personal memories.

The visual archive associated with the British campaign in Egypt might, at first glance, seem to offer a classic example of military topography's role in the projection of European power. The contest in Egypt came at the culmination of what has been described as a 'cartographic revolution' in the history of European warfare. For Napoleon Bonaparte, mapping was a key strategic tool, and he maintained an extensive topographical bureau

dedicated to surveying the lands in which he campaigned. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 resulted in the most extensive and accurate map of the country yet produced, with the French army conducting a trigonometric survey of the Nile Valley, and the Mediterranean coasts of Sinai and Palestine.[17] By contrast, the British Army's campaign in Egypt was beset by insecurities regarding their visual command. Before the expedition landed in Egypt, there were serious concerns about the lack of accurate knowledge of the terrain, and the expedition's commander, Sir Ralph Abercromby, was forced to rely on naval veterans of Nelson's Battle of the Nile (1798) who had some familiarity with the Egyptian coast to determine where the British force should land. He ultimately settled on Aboukir Bay, situated roughly 18 miles from Alexandria, which the British hoped to capture from the French.

In preparing to land on 'the barren shores' of Egypt, the British had to keep several considerations in view, considerations that would be critically shaped by the nature of a terrain of which they had little knowledge. 'It is vain to refer you to maps', wrote Col. Robert Anstruther to his brother before the landing, 'There are none but what the French may now have that are not the greatest botchpennies possible, and perfectly erroneous'.[18] There was uncertainty whether the waters of Aboukir Bay were sufficiently deep to allow British ships to approach close enough to speedily disembark under enemy fire. Once the troops had landed and established a bridgehead at Aboukir, they did not know how they would be supplied with water and provisions. With Egypt under French control, the army's access to local informants with knowledge of the country was severely restricted. It was doubtful whether any drinking water was available on the isthmus, although it was hoped, and later proved to be the case, that water could be found by digging at the foot of date palm groves. Attempts to ascertain the 'lay of the land' prior to the landing at Aboukir were further frustrated when two officers sent to reconnoiter the coast were captured by the French.[19] Deprived of their reconnaissance reports, the British were landing in Egypt effectively blind, and this metaphorical blindness was compounded by the very real problems with vision that afflicted the army. There were even serious doubts about Abercromby's visual acuity; he was extremely short-sighted and could see little without the assistance of a telescope. According to General 'Jack' Doyle: 'his blindness which was nearly total, obliged him to depend upon the eyes of others'.[20]

Even more serious was the painful eye condition, ophthalmia, that struck British troops in large numbers as soon as they landed and left many

temporarily and some permanently blind. Ophthalmia was caused by a bacterial infection, but many soldiers believed, in line with contemporary medical theories, that it was a result of the harsh Egyptian landscape: the unrelenting glare of the sun and the particles whipped up by desert storms.[21] In her study of the *Description de l'Égypte*, Liza Oliver suggests that the French army's experience of ophthalmia manifested in a particular way of representing the country's antique monuments. The *Description's* engravings of Egyptian antiquities 'created an aesthetic of decay in the form of hyper-real contrasts of light and dark' and evoked a 'sense of persistent, inescapable, and bleaching sunlight'.[22] This mode of representation, she argues, connected the lived experience of visual discomfort and disorientation in Egypt to a broader imperial discourse which attributed the decay of Egyptian monuments and, by extension, the Egyptian race, to the enervating effects of the climate. It is difficult to discern any equivalent registering of the effects of ophthalmia in British visual representations of the Egyptian landscape and its antiquities. The media used in most of the topographical sketches and prints, watercolour and aquatint, tended to produce a softer, more muted tonality.[23] In military memoirs, however, the landscape's impact on the observer's eyes was frequently used to evoke intense psychological and emotional responses to different phases of the campaign. The army's march from the bleak plains of Alexandria to Rosetta on the banks of the Nile in early April was repeatedly narrated in terms of its restorative effects on the eye. As one staff officer related, on the Alexandrian coast 'the eye ranged over a vast space of country, yet met nothing but a continuation of that dreary, glaring, white sand, which fatigued and oppressed the eye'. By contrast, the verdant, fertile scene which Rosetta presented to his 'all-devouring eye, gave such a fillip to exhausted and desponding nature, that … I involuntarily rose up in the boat, and felt a degree of strength for a long time quite unknown to me'.[24] In these passages military vision was not confident, commanding or disembodied; rather it was located in a vulnerable soldier's body, one that had recently endured the ravages of battle and the privations of desert heat and extreme thirst.

Picturesque, Topographical and Antiquarian Views

Much of the scholarship on military landscape art in North America, the West Indies, India and the South Pacific has focused on the picturesque as the dominant framework for the representation of distant geographies. This highly conventionalized aesthetic, theorized in the late eighteenth century

by writers such as William Gilpin, tended to emphasize the rugged, irregular features of the physical and cultural landscape. Paintings composed in the picturesque mode usually depicted a landscape scene in which a darkened foreground directed the viewer's gaze towards a highlighted middle ground, and then outwards to a dimmed, receding background. The depth effect produced by these three divisions of ground was further enhanced by a framing or *repoussoir* device: trees, hills or other physical features placed on either side of the view.[25] Painters such as William Hodges and Thomas and William Daniells applied this technique to landscapes as diverse as Tahiti and the Himalayan foothills to depict artfully curved palm trees, decoratively decayed temples and pagodas, and exotically costumed or gracefully unclothed local peoples. While the picturesque originated as a technique for representing the British landscape, as pioneered by figures such as Paul Sandby, it has come to be seen as a crucial visual discourse of empire. The picturesque was an aesthetic which could occlude the violence and tensions of extra-European encounters, make unfamiliar landscapes intelligible to metropolitan audiences and lend coherence to Britain's diverse and expanding empire. In emphasizing the fertility of the natural landscape and the atrophy of the built environment, it could present faraway lands as ripe for British cultivation and civilization.[26]

While certain elements of British soldiers' sketches of Egypt might be identified as picturesque, their depictions of the physical landscape did not tend to conform to this aesthetic. The most obvious explanation for this is that the flat, sandy plains upon which the army landed and encamped were judged to lack the irregularity and variety required by that aesthetic. Writing of Egypt, the French *philosophe* and travel writer, Constantin-François Volney, declared 'no country is less picturesque, less adapted to the pencil of the painter'.[27] As Captain Francis Maule recalled in his memoir of the expedition, the Alexandrian coastline presented to the eye 'to the north the inconstant element the sea; and to the south and west nothing but a void still more discouraging, of sterile sands … a boundless horizon of barrenness'.[28] For some, this terrain's apparent featurelessness could be positive. Captain F.K. Leighton, who aspired to the position of aide-de-camp, but feared his poor graphic skills might hold him back, wrote to his father:

> I should feel very awkward if accident should carry me to serve in my present situation in a country abounding with bold and intricate features. Luckily Egypt is with a very, very few exceptions totally flat, & does not demand a trial of my talents in that particular.[29]

This is not to say that the area around Alexandria was unamenable to picturesque representation. In 1801, Luigi Mayer's *Views in Egypt*, a collection of engravings based on watercolours commissioned by Sir Robert Ainslie, the British ambassador to Constantinople during the 1790s, included a number of plates of Alexandria's environs rendered in a picturesque style.[30] Similarly, the picturesque would become the dominant mode for representing Egypt in nineteenth-century British art and photography.[31] As a visual discourse, however, the picturesque was consciously artificial. According to its leading theorist, William Gilpin, the variety and irregularity that made a view picturesque was not necessarily an inherent property of the landscape. As he noted in 1792, sometimes nature 'must be a little assisted…I take up a tree here and plant it there. I pare a knoll or make an addition to it'.[32] It was therefore a style at odds with military topographical drawing's aspirations to factual accuracy. This military mode of vision, in which terrain was to be accurately delineated rather than transformed into an idealized landscape, was most fully exemplified by the reconnaissance sketch. *A View of Alexandria in Egypt, while possessed by the French in 1801*, a commercially produced print based on a reconnaissance sketch by Col. Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner, offers an expansive, horizontal view of Alexandria from the east during the British siege of the city (Fig. 9.1). It is laid out in three sections designed to be cut out and reassembled to provide a continuous panoramic view. In terms of the physical terrain, it depicts the undulations in the sand, small clumps of date palms and the marshy ground before Lake Mareotis, a dried-up lake flooded by the British in April 1801. The sketch pinpoints the location of a French detachment of cavalry, but it also identifies a number of significant antiquities as well: in the right hand of the top section, Pompey's Pillar; to the left of the middle section, Cleopatra's Needle; and in the bottom horizontal section, what is identified as 'a statue of a Roman soldier found by Col. Turner in the entrenchments and placed in the lines'.

In terms of military intelligence, the original sketch would have asserted visual control by 'segmenting and immobilizing' perceived space, identifying transient details such as the location of enemy positions, as well as fixed reference points such as trees and antiquities.[33] As a printed lithograph, complete with illustrative key, it assumed a narrative and commemorative function. The numbered key identifies the principal sites of engagement between the French and the British in the Battle of Alexandria that preceded the siege. It also singles out *L'Egyptienne* from among the mass of ships' masts faintly visible behind the Heights of Nicopolis in the



Fig. 9.1 Col. Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner, *A View of Alexandria in Egypt, while possessed by the French in 1801.* National Army Museum, London

middle section. This was the captured French ship, which, along with the *Madras*, would transport the army's haul of Egyptian treasures back to Britain, a cargo that included the Rosetta stone, the key to deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphics.

Turner, along with Edward Daniel Clarke, had been responsible for overseeing the Rosetta stone's transfer from the French and for escorting it to Britain where it would ultimately be deposited with the British Museum. The bare reconnaissance sketch, otherwise lacking in visual or aesthetic interest, acquired its significance from its association with British military triumph as symbolized in the rich collection of Egyptian antiquities seized from the defeated French forces. The Rosetta stone was, in the words of Turner, 'a proud trophy of the arms of Britain (I could almost say *spolia opima*), not plundered from defenceless inhabitants, but honourably acquired by the fortune of war'.[34] Here Turner referenced the classical tradition of *spolia opima* or 'choice spoils', the armour seized from the body of a slain enemy commander and dedicated to the temple of Jupiter,

that constituted ancient Rome's highest military honour. While this suggests a distinctively military conception of antiquities, which understood them as 'trophies of war' rather than objects of scientific inquiry, Turner's career also highlights the scholarly and antiquarian interests certain members of the British army brought to bear on their encounters with the culture and landscape of Egypt. Turner himself was a keen antiquarian and published *A Short Account of Ancient Chivalry and Description of Armour* in 1799. He was also, as his biographer notes, 'no mean artist and engraver' and his antiquarian and artistic work seems to have played an important role in his career advancement.[35] Throughout the Egyptian expedition he was in regular correspondence with the Prince of Wales regarding possible artefacts for the Royal armouries at Carleton house. Following his return to Britain with the Rosetta stone, he failed in his bid to be appointed to the board of trustees at the British Museum, but was appointed keeper of prints to King George III, a post he held alongside a series of prestigious military appointments as he ascended to the rank of Lieutenant General.[36] As Turner's example suggests, antiquarian research and the collection of artefacts could function as an important currency in the complex economy of Georgian military patronage.

The visual archive of the expedition to Egypt attests to a deep engagement with Egypt's ancient cultural heritage. The army was encamped in a location rich in antiquities. At Alexandria, it was stationed on the site known as Cleopatra's Caesareum, the ruins of a Roman temple reputedly built in memory of Cleopatra's lover Julius Caesar, and while the British army in Egypt did not have the official scientific or scholarly aims of Napoleon's expedition, soldiers spent a good deal of their time exploring and sketching these ruins and monuments. Thomas Walsh's *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt*, for example, included meticulous engravings of Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle based on Walsh's sketches. This interest derived from more than an effort by British officers to occupy their time during the tedious intervals between engagements. It also reflects the military's close involvement in antiquarian research as it developed over the eighteenth century and in particular the relationship between the military survey and efforts to excavate and map the historic landscape of Britain. Major William Roy, the founder of the Ordnance Survey who, alongside Paul Sandby, was responsible for the military survey of Scotland between 1747 and 1752, also produced one of the century's most authoritative accounts of Britain's Roman antiquities. According to Roy, military men's knowledge of the art of the war gave them a particular insight into

the character of the Roman conquest and occupation of Britain and questions of logistics, supply and fortification.[37] Archaeological discoveries were often an unintended by-product of military activity: both the Rosetta stone and the Roman statue identified by Turner had been found while digging entrenchments. Antique military structures and infrastructures could also be of great practical utility to European armies campaigning in the Levant and North Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Michael Greenhalgh observes in his study of French military reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire, European soldiers frequently occupied the remains of ancient fortifications or dismantled them for other uses.[38] Furthermore, officers' knowledge of the history of Roman intervention in the region could inform solutions to the challenges of this unfamiliar landscape. It was claimed, for example, that General Abercromby determined that drinkable water could be found on the shores of Egypt by digging when he recalled a passage in Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* recounting how the Roman army in Egypt had found water by this method.[39]

Over the course of the eighteenth century, antiquarian practice and military science would both increasingly affirm the importance of the visual in the acquisition and communication of knowledge. As with landscape drawing, antiquarian illustration was often torn between providing evocative renderings of historic monuments that engaged the imagination and emotions and a more scientific commitment to objective notation which aimed to 'preserve' such artefacts through precise delineation and to advance historical knowledge through empirical observation.[40] A pendant lithograph to Turner's *A View of Alexandria* typifies the latter mode of representation by offering a detailed illustration of the Roman statue found while digging entrenchments during the siege of Alexandria.[41] Whereas in the expansive, panoramic view of the reconnaissance sketch the statue constitutes a stable reference point within a broader set of military co-ordinates, the landscape recedes in this latter sketch as it focuses in on the antique sculpture, carefully detailing its salient features and marks of decay. The statue, recently identified as a high relief figure of an 'oriental barbarian' made sometime between the first and third century CE, was carried back to Britain and displayed for a period at the Royal Laboratory Woolwich before being placed outside the Royal Brass Foundry where, exposed to the elements, it suffered further deterioration.[42] Soldiers' sketches and engravings of other antiquities, such as Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle, which, despite the army's efforts, proved too monumental to transport to Britain, can be understood as proxies for the material object, a form of trophy-taking.

In providing detailed measurements and transcriptions of Greek inscriptions as well as the still mysterious Egyptian hieroglyphs, the visual image also functioned as a medium for knowledge acquisition.

The entwining of military and antiquarian topographies and modes of seeing would continue after the surrender of the French at Alexandria, when Captain Charles Hayes of the Royal Engineers and Colonel William Leake, both graduates of the Military Academy at Woolwich, and Lord Elgin's antiquary and secretary, William Richard Hamilton, were charged with producing a survey of Lower and Upper Egypt. While the textual account of the three men's travels published as *Aegyptica or Some Account of the Ancient and Modern State of Egypt* (1809) was written by Hamilton, the accompanying images—a map of Egypt and a series of etchings of Egyptian antiquities—were the work of Leake and Hayes, respectively.[43] For both men, the training they had received at Woolwich in topographical drawing, architectural elevations and cartography proved indispensable in surveying and mapping the classical topography of Egypt. Indeed, Leake used the tension between an aestheticized, picturesque depiction of landscape and a more 'truthful' topographical delineation to argue for the necessity of government-sponsored topographical surveys by trained military draughtsmen. In an application to the government in 1803, Leake pressed the case for a full geographical survey of Greece. It was essential, he claimed, that the British government acquire a fuller knowledge of a region that looked likely to become a new theatre of war. Key to such a project would be the production of a visual survey of the area by an officer from the Corps of Royal Military Surveyors and Draftsmen that could accompany Leake's textual report. Such a military topography was required, Leake insisted, 'because all former travellers seem to have been exclusively attentive to the collecting of picturesque views of particular scenes which are of little or no kind of utility either in a geographical or military point of view'.[44]

Looking Inwards and Homewards

Samuel Walker's 'Descriptive Sketch of a Panoramic View taken from the Centre Battery of the British Lines before Alexandria' (Fig. 9.2) depicts many of the same features in a similar fashion to Turner's panorama. This version, printed three years after the campaign, also has a narrative and commemorative function, noting in the first quadrant the



Fig. 9.2 Capt. Samuel Walker, *Descriptive Sketch of a Panoramic View taken from the Centre Battery of the British Lines before Alexandria* (1804). National Army Museum, London

'Ruins near which General Sir Ralph Abercromby received a mortal wound in the memorable Battle of the 21st March 1801'.

The specification that the view was taken from the vantage point of the British battery immediately suggests an instrumental way of seeing, one that is concerned with identifying targets and determining arcs of fire. The descriptive sketch accompanied a much more fully realized coloured panoramic print of the view.

What is immediately striking about the full-scale, hand-coloured aquatint is the development from a sketch with a clear military rationale, and which is chiefly concerned with delineating the terrain and its physical landmarks, to one where the primary interest is human. The groups of figures that populate the fore and middle ground of the image offer a richly detailed representation of the British encampment. The artist, Captain Samuel Walker, was a member of the 3rd Regiment of Guards, part of the detachment of troops that remained near Alexandria for nearly six months until the French capitulation in September 1801, and the sketch captures something of the leisured tedium of a largely uneventful guard duty. The Roman statue found by Turner while digging entrenchments appears once

Fig. 9.3 Detail from *A Panorama of the British Encampment at Alexandria in 1801*. Coloured aquatint by Joseph Powell after Capt. Samuel Walker 3rd Guards, published by Mr. Thompson, London, 1804. National Army Museum, London

again, but here the presence of a small group of private soldiers makes a visual connection between these men and their antique forebears (Fig. 9.3).

In one of the tents, a small drama unfolds as a camp follower, sweeping brush in hand, remonstrates with another woman who reaches tenderly towards a soldier, his body turned away and face hidden by the canvas. The soldiers are shown lounging and conversing, reading and sleeping, but also looking (Fig. 9.4). Indeed, this is perhaps the most obvious form of military labour in which the troops are engaged; though it is unclear whether this is a purposeful looking or a more wistful, homesick gaze out across the sea. The only figures who appear to be engaged in more gruelling toil are a woman and what appears to be an Egyptian labourer, being directed by a redcoat (Fig. 9.5).

The panorama clearly has a picturesque quality that derives less from the landscape than from the variety of figures wearing different uniforms, of different ranks and of different nationalities. It was understood at the time that military life could be rich with picturesque interest. As William

Fig. 9.4 Detail from *A Panorama of the British Encampment at Alexandria in 1801*

Fig. 9.5 Detail from *A Panorama of the British Encampment at Alexandria in 1801*

Henry Pyne commented in his *Microcosmia*, a volume of scenes from British life published in 1806, there was something particularly picturesque about a military assemblage and the combination of figures and objects which it contained forming 'a motley scene, abounding in objects well calculated to call forth the powers of the artists'.[45] Indeed, Walker's sketch appears to have more in common with the domestic costume books and microcosmia that were published during this period and which offered a visual survey of the heterogeneity of British social life, than with the ethnographic or topographic concerns of other British imperial artwork. That suggestion may seem more plausible in light of the fact that Captain Walker's brother was the artist George Walker, whose *Costume of Yorkshire*

was published in 1814. *The Costume of Yorkshire* presented a series of coloured plates representing the customs, costumes and occupations of the county, as well as its soldiery, in picturesque detail.[46] Both Samuel Walker's representation of the British army on campaign and his brother's depiction of the labouring communities of northern England can be interpreted as offering a patriotic and harmonious vision of British national identity.[47] Yet the Walker brothers were also members of the Leeds' Unitarian community, Protestant dissenters known for their reformist politics and ambivalent attitudes towards the war with France.[48] While Samuel Walker's view of the encampment at Alexandria presents an affectionate portrait of the quotidian experience of soldiers on campaign, it is not a triumphalist depiction of a conquering army.

Nor is it a scene obviously marked by the conventions of the imperial picturesque. Walker's panorama largely eschews any evocation of the 'exotic' and historic locale in which the army had been placed. The fifteenth-century Fort of Qaitbay, built on the site of the Lighthouse of Alexandria at the eastern point of the Pharos harbour, and Pompey's Pillar are only vague, indistinct points on the horizon. Instead, the aquatint directs the viewer's gaze inwards to glimpses of camp life within the tents and outwards across the Mediterranean; it is less concerned with extending the gaze across the Egyptian landscape. Apart from the Egyptian labourers and, in the distance, a pair of camels, the interest derives almost entirely from the diversity of the British military. Walker's panorama bears a close resemblance to Paul Sandby's views of the British encampments at Blackheath and St James' during the American war, not least because of the shared medium of the aquatint, a technique pioneered by Sandby that was considered particularly well adapted to topographical, military and marine subjects.[49] This comparison is sustained by the emphasis in Sandby and Walker's sketches on military sociability within the encampment. As Gillian Russell has recently noted, the military tent frequently featured in Georgian Britain's sites of domestic recreation and pleasure. From the 'Turkish tent' erected at Vauxhall Pleasure Gardens in the 1740s to the encampments, depicted by Sandby, which sprang up throughout England in the late 1770s and early 1780s, the tent symbolized the army's 'transience and itinerancy' as well as its theatricality: soldiers were frequently likened to 'strolling players'.[50] As in Sandby's sketches, the tents in Walker's panorama are irregularly scattered across the landscape. In contrast to depictions of British colonial campaigns from the later nineteenth century, in which regimented rows of white tents often symbolized the

imposition of organizational order and discipline upon a rugged and untamed landscape, the tents here, with their loose folds and tattered edges, seem to suggest the impermanence and fleeting character of the British military encounter with Egypt.[51] It was a representation that, arguably, resonated with the view of Egypt and its landscape expressed by many British troops. Egypt was not necessarily a repository for imperial ambitions and fantasies of expropriation; rather it was a country that most soldiers, once victory had been secured, were anxious to quit. As one Highland soldier recalled, as their ship sailed out of Aboukir Bay, he and his comrades felt no pangs at departing 'the celebrated land of Egypt' for 'the country itself had no charms to make us regret leaving it'.[52]

William Porter and Biblical Egypt

The final set of military views of Egypt that I wish to consider provide a very different perspective on the Alexandrian coast, that is, from the viewpoint of the rank-and-file. They are a pair of images of Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle at night from an album of watercolours by Private William Porter of the 61st regiment (Figs. 9.6 and 9.7). The album had been commissioned by Porter's captain, Charles Hicks, to commemorate the regiment's involvement in the expedition which had seen them sail from their garrison at the Cape of Good Hope to the Mediterranean. There is little available biographical information for Porter. A copy of his will indicates that he was still a private in the 61st regiment in 1809, but was taken prisoner after the Battle of Talavera and detained in the French fortress at Briançon probably for the remainder of the war.[53] Although Porter's sketches of the campaign suggest some skill in colouring and composition, they have an untutored quality and originality that distinguishes them from other sketches of Egypt more schooled in the conventions of topographical art. It is difficult to determine how a private soldier like Porter acquired these skills in painting, but he may have worked as a sign-painter, the most common form of artisanal artistic employment in the period. Some sense of the circumstances that might have led to the production of Porter's album of sketches can be derived from the case of John Elliott Woolford. Like Porter, Woolford was a private soldier, though he later went on to be a successful and accomplished landscape painter in Canada. During the Egyptian campaign, his talents as an artist were spotted by Lord Dalhousie, who charged him with producing sketches of the Egyptian landscape, antiquities and key episodes in the campaign. At the

Figs. 9.6 and 9.7 Private William Porter, Watercolours of Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle at night. Soldiers of Gloucestershire Regimental Museum, Gloucester

end of the campaign, Woolford returned with Dalhousie to his castle near Edinburgh, where he worked up the album of watercolours based on sketches he had made in Egypt. It seems likely that Porter's views were similarly worked up at a later date from pencil sketches taken on the spot.[54]

The frontispiece to Porter's album declares that the views were taken 'by Porter for Hicks', and it is likely that Captain Hicks was responsible for selecting the scenes depicted in the album. It is possible too that he may have shown Porter published prints of Egypt by professional artists to use as a model. Certain images, such as his view of Pompey's Pillar in daylight, bear a close resemblance to plates of similar scenes in Luigi Mayer's *Views of Egypt* of 1801. It seems probable that Porter drew on stock views and figures either taken from prints like Mayer's or from drawing manuals in some of his pictures. While Porter may have had little say as to which scenes he was directed to depict, he insistently flagged his authorship of several of the album's images nonetheless. In various scenes Porter's signature is

faintly visible, inscribed on an antique fragment lying before Pompey's Pillar, or on a piece of driftwood floating in Alexandria harbour.

Porter's two images of Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle at night are strikingly different from any other images of Egypt from the Napoleonic campaigns, or the period more broadly. The choice of a night-time setting and the elemental drama of the scene mark them out. The sea, which in most of the other views of Egypt tends to be unruffled and unremarkable, churns with intensity. In the background, a lightning bolt strikes the Fort of Qaitbay upon which the union flag and the crescent moon of Britain's Ottoman allies are flying. Reading the image from the point of view of an officer like Porter's captain and patron, Charles Hicks, we might note that the British redcoat stands sentinel in front of the classical Roman column, while the Pharaonic-era monument is approached by a hunched, meagerly dressed Egyptian figure. It is a pairing that seems to emblematize the division between a European, Greco-Roman derived civilization on the one hand and a more primitive Egyptian civilization on the other.[55] The shafts of light that illuminate both monuments similarly can be interpreted as celebrating the British expedition's contribution to the scholarly understanding of Egypt.

Seen from Porter's point of view, from the perspective of the rank-and-file, however, the scene might assume a different set of meanings. The two watercolours recall the imaginative, visionary quality of William Blake's biblical engravings. The thunderous sky and lightning storm immediately evoke the Old Testament Plagues of Egypt, and the Seventh Plague, a hugely destructive thunderstorm, in particular. Unlike their officers, who were more likely to draw on classical history to read the Egyptian landscape, the dominant framework for ordinary soldiers' encounter with Egypt was scriptural. With the establishment of Sunday Schools in the 1780s, there appeared a raft of cheap print publications designed to familiarize labouring-class children with the Old Testament story of the Israelites. While the ideas of Egypt and the Holy Land that circulated in such materials tended to have little to do with geographical realities, British involvement in the region in the 1790s triggered a more intensified engagement with the Levant in popular religious and millenarian discourse.[56] British soldiers' presence on the 'scripture-ground' of Egypt, it was claimed, also led to a revival of Protestant piety among the ranks.[57] Private soldiers' memoirs of the campaign were particularly concerned with the meteorological conditions to be found in the region and whether they affirmed the Biblical prophecy that no rain would fall in Egypt as

punishment for its infidelity. They very quickly found that rain did fall in Egypt: a little over a month after they landed in Egypt, the British camp was flooded by a torrential thunderstorm.[58] Sergeant Nicol of the Gordon Highlanders concluded in his memoir of the expedition that 'the plagues of Moses exist here yet' as he recounted the swarms of flies, fleas, frogs and locusts with which the soldiers contended, as well as the boils which erupted on long marches in the desert heat.[59] Wrenched from his home community and signed on to serve for life with little prospect of promotion, the experience of the private soldier was often likened to a state of slavery. The possible parallels between their experiences and those of the Israelites under the Pharaohs were readily invoked by the rank-and-file during the campaign. As one soldier wrote, 'from Egypt, the land of bondage, I cast a longing eye to my native home, and wished myself there'.[60] For the ordinary soldier, subject to disease, discomfort and severe military discipline, Porter's watercolours might suggest how Egypt and the army itself could be, as it was for the Israelites, a 'house of bondage'.

In his influential study of the British surveys of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Matthew Edney observes that: 'The gaze, or concerted observation, is always appropriative, domineering and empowered'.[61] While this chapter does not deny the crucial work performed by technologies of vision in both the ideology and infrastructure of empire, restoring a human dimension to the 'imperial eye' potentially reveals a vision that is more fragile, more kaleidoscopic than such characterizations allow. The increasing emphasis placed on draughtsmanship in the training of British officers towards the end of the eighteenth century attests to an enhanced appreciation of visual command and topographical knowledge in modern warfare. British soldiers' tendency to eschew the picturesque in their sketches of the Egyptian landscape can be understood as a product of military topography's aspiration to factual representation rather than aesthetic contrivance. Yet the rejection of the picturesque, we can speculate, also spoke to a deeper sense that the Egyptian campaign should not be the prelude to a more permanent engagement in the region and to soldiers' personal experiences of a terrain and climate that was physically and emotionally gruelling.

In a very literal sense, the British Army's experience of ophthalmia during the Egyptian campaign underlined the vulnerability of military vision. Soldiers' topographical and reconnaissance sketches comprised an effort to address perceived deficiencies in the army's visual command, but while shared military imperatives often underpinned these images, they could

produce quite different ways of seeing and reading the landscape. A topographical panorama of the coast along Alexandria could form the basis for either, in the case of an antiquarian scholar like Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner, a detailed sketching and understanding of antiquities, or, as in the case of Samuel Walker, a picturesque rendering of quotidian life in a British encampment. These works were often shaped as much by personal preoccupations and professional aspirations as by military objectives. Such images do not necessarily reflect a hegemonic or 'empowered' point of view. Seen through the eyes of a British officer, the view of Pompey's Pillar at night could affirm the historic grandeur of the military expedition, but from the vantage point of an ordinary soldier, it might reflect the disorientation and discomforts of military life and overseas campaigns. As these examples suggest, the visual record of British military and imperial encounters in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries does not necessarily reveal a coherent, corporate 'way of seeing' but often records a more personalized, particular set of experiences and responses.

Notes

1. Thomas Walsh, *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt: Including Descriptions of that Country and of Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, Marmorice and Macri…* (London, 1803 2nd ed.), p. vii.
2. See Nigel Leask, *Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770–1840* (Oxford, 2002), p. 116.
3. A claim made most influentially in Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 2003 ed.), pp. 84–85. See also Anne Godlewska, 'Map, Text and Image: The Mentality of Enlightened Conquerors a New Look at the *Description de l'Egypte*', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 20 (1995), pp. 5–28.
4. W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Imperial Landscape', in W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.), *Landscape and Power* (Chicago, 2002 ed.), p. 10.
5. See, for example, Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire. The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago, 1997).
6. Anders Engberg-Petersen, *Empires of Chance. The Napoleonic Wars and the Disorder of Things* (Cambridge, Mass., 2015), pp. 43–44.
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CHAPTER 10

Edgy Encounters in North Africa and the Balkans: R. C. Woodville's Pictures of Conflict-Zone Life for the Illustrated London News, 1880–1903

Tom Gretton

Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind.
(Paraphrased from Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* 1781)[1]

This chapter is about some pictures intimately connected to, but distinct from, the encounters discussed elsewhere in this collection. It concerns a handful of pictures made for the *Illustrated London News* (*ILN*) by Richard Caton Woodville (1856–1927), the most prolific of the many artist-journalists working for the magazine in its imperial heyday.[2] These prints, and others by Woodville and his colleagues and competitors in this and other magazines, suggest that at least some of the big, highly finished pictures from conflict zones in North Africa and the Balkans that the *ILN* and its ilk produced did not unambiguously reinforce ready-made ways of seeing

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subaltern others and reinforce cultural stereotypes. Immanuel Kant rejected Platonic ideas of the relationship of detached observation between our ideas about the world and our sense data, arguing for a two-way feedback loop between what we perceive and what we conceive of the world. Schemata (ready-made concepts) are constantly necessary in order to perceive the world; perceptions of the world may force schemata to adapt. Some of Woodville's *ILN* pictures served to destabilize and subvert received ideas of 'the other': in modernized-Kantian terms they provided 'percepts' that put pressure on reach-me-down concepts. In this way, pictures such as those discussed here turned into a target of resistance and redressed the 'bias-confirming' reporting (both of 'subaltern' cultures and of gender relations) which was unavoidably a core aspect of the business model of magazines of the *ILN* sort at the time (and not only then).

Such a reading of the evidence depends on the sort of detailed interpretation that is given to easel paintings more often than to magazine pictures. It also depends on an understanding of the repetitive nature of the subjects and treatments of the images published by the *ILN*. The magazine produced around 15 editorial pictures each week in 1880, around 30 in 1890 and around 40 in 1900, in a repetitious and rather formulaic diet. This iterative flow obliges us to think about the habits and habituations that link percepts and concepts, about the force of stereotypes and cognitive schemata and about what cognitive neuroscientists call 'truth effects' and 'confirmation bias'.[3] This chapter thus addresses the flow of visual images of militarized peripheral contact zones that was available to those about to enter them in the 1880s, 1890s and beyond, written in the knowledge that the stock scenarios and characters deployed in these pictures tended to stabilize schemata, reinforce biases and confirm the validity of stereotypes for their reader-viewers. I have chosen a group of pictures which can be interpreted against these tendencies, by a producer working at the heart of industrialized metropolitan visual culture, in a magazine whose growth and longevity was due in large part to its success in producing and reproducing authoritative narratives of nation, race, class and gender.

Ecology supplies the idea of the apex predator, the culminating consumer of resources and dominant producer of relational power, and the agent that keeps its ecosystem healthy.[4] This idea seems useful in thinking about the ecology of visual production and consumption in late Victorian culture. The *ILN* was one of a small group, a 'guild' in ecology's terms, of apex visual representers in British culture in the last third of the nineteenth

century. Its imitator and competitor, the *Graphic*, was also at that apex, and other, cheaper titles tried to exploit this market for illustrated magazines as well. In the quarter-century discussed here, the best visual information and the best technical resources flowed into the *ILN*'s picture factory, the best visualizers worked in it or its peers, and the most beguiling and effective visual representations flowed from it across the globe.[5] At the *ILN*, Woodville was at the apex of this apex. He was one of a handful of star visualizers whose primary job was to turn the sketches and photographs that flowed into the magazine's editorial offices, there to be discarded or selected, into summarizing action pictures or genre pictures, encapsulating and memorializing the stories they embodied.

The re-circulation and re-use of Woodville's pictures is a measure of the *ILN*'s global reach. His 21 March 1885 picture of the Battle of Kerkeban in the Sudan, for example, was reprised a decade later in Japan as a woodcut battle picture of the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War. That borrowing was noticed, photographed and published in Paris in 1895; otherwise the debt might have gone untraced.[6] In late 1893, J. G. Posada, working for a down-market occasional newspaper in Mexico City, the *Gaceta Callejera*, was asked to produce a picture of the war in Northern Morocco between the occupying Spanish and the Rif (Kabyle) independence fighters. The *ILN* had published a front-page picture on the conflict, Caton Woodville's 'Defiance' (after a lithograph by J.-A. Gros of 1817) on 21 October 1893, and Posada copied it directly as 'Sucesso: un Moro del Rif', coarsening Woodville's treatment in his usual mannered and vivid style. During the course of an American expedition of 1878 and 1879, searching for evidence of Franklin's ill-fated 1847 voyage to find the north-west passage, copies of the *ILN* were shown to the local inhabitants ('esquimaux'). The expedition's artist made a drawing of that moment. The drawing got back to the *ILN* where it was made into a front-page picture on 1 January 1881: it is Woodville's cover picture from the *ILN* of 28 December 1878 that is shown. Woodville's reach was global and he continued to be one of the *ILN*'s star visualizers right through the First World War. Between 1879 and 1920, he published something like 1,800 pictures in its pages.[7] His way of representing the world, of populating it with people and things, of relating action to local colour, must have come to be utterly familiar, naturalized, to the *ILN*'s wide and loyal reader-viewership, the 'reality' effects of his pictures strengthened by repetition, familiarity, vivid staging and the authority of his name.[8]

It is easier to invoke than to pin down the *ILN*'s reader-viewership. Its price, its high-society, high-culture, high-political, empire-orientated subject matter and the range of advertisements it carried all suggest that the *ILN* was aimed at the UK's ruling classes and the Empire's governing elites. The country-house bred, clubbable officers who led the Empire's expeditionary forces came from this target audience; but the *ILN* and its advertisers also knew that they had a wider reader-viewership even beyond the middle classes. Many of the 'other ranks' who served in Egypt and elsewhere may have seen the *ILN*, perhaps in sergeants' messes, or passed on down the chain of command from the officers' mess, or from west-end clubs to east-end pubs. The existence of this extended reader-viewership suggests that members of the Great Powers' expeditionary forces, after the successful emergence of magazines of the *ILN* genre in London, Paris or Leipzig, were fully equipped (which is not to say well equipped) with stereotypes and visual-narrative tropes with which to see and understand the cultures and situations they encountered when fighting or pacifying the peoples on Europe's periphery. Thus when the British invaded Egypt in 1882, a wealth of representations of scenes and figures, costumes and customs, from the Ottoman Empire was already available to the invaders. Many of the troops being rotated thereafter into Egypt could have seen, and very likely had seen, imagery from the current campaign that the *ILN*, the *Graphic* and imitative magazines were producing. The troops may not have had any idea what Alexandria or Cairo or their hinterlands would sound or smell like, but plenty of them would have had a well-nourished (which, once again, is not to say 'good') idea of what they would look like.

Caton Woodville and the *Illustrated London News*

Except as a gentleman amateur, Richard Caton Woodville was never a soldier.[9] He was never embedded with the British army, or with any army, on campaign either, except for one brief episode as a special artist with semi-regular forces in the Balkans early in his career. So, in some ways the attitudes I explore in this chapter are incommensurable with those documented and demonstrated elsewhere here. However, the attitudes and reactions that members of the British, French or German armies were able to communicate depended, to a considerable extent, on their prior exposure to the representational machine, the *ILN* genre and its imitators and competitors, whose achievements may reasonably be represented in the British case by Woodville's work.

The great majority of Woodville's almost 1,800 pictures in the *ILN* were full pages or centrefolds. The exceptions were mostly fiction illustrations: around a third of his pictures were illustrations for serials and short stories, not discussed in this chapter. Around a quarter of Woodville's contributions were 'feature' pictures of various sorts, and more than two fifths were directly related to ongoing or recent news stories. Almost 400 of these images represent 'news' or 'feature' scenes set in North Africa, the Balkans and the Asian Ottoman empire, or in the British Indian Empire and Afghanistan. The 90 or so Indian or Afghan pictures are a minority in this group, and they represent different versions of otherness and subalternity from those projected onto, and through, the pictures set in that long crescent around the Mediterranean from Montenegro to Morocco. From Woodville's first picture for the magazine until 1916, there was a persistent though fluctuating flow of subjects dealing with the Balkans, North Africa and the Asian Ottoman Empire. Despite some anomalous highs (21 such images in 1887 and 32 in 1888) and lows (there were none in either 1899 or 1900), the *ILN* might publish between three and a dozen Woodville pictures set in these places in any given year. As the years went past, he must have felt that he could do them in his sleep; sometimes they look that way.

Out of this mass of pictures, it is bound to be tendentious to select out for discussion the few that a chapter in a book can illustrate. Choosing what I consider to be the most interesting images from the 310 relevant *ILN* pictures inevitably involves some bias, as interesting, for me, often equates to unusual, disruptive, in some way against the grain. However, such a picture must, to my mind, also carry the imprint of the grain against which it goes: it must be both typical and atypical. I hope, at any rate, that *my* confirmation biases are anti-stereotypical.

This chapter discusses nine pictures from the *ILN*: eight signed by Woodville and one in a style which, at the least, closely resembles his. The first dates from 1880, the last from 1903. Four are set in Egypt, three in the Balkans and two in Morocco; there is only one picture of actual conflict (the anonymous one). That choice may seem capricious, given Woodville's reputation as a battle painter, but it should be remembered that there are almost three 'military genre' pictures for every two 'military conflict' pictures (328 to 222) among Woodville's pictures of the British and other modern armies for the *ILN*. Alongside this mass of campaign and mission genre images, there are nearly 60 genre scenes from these regions in which local inhabitants appear without the presence of Europeans. Woodville was a genre painter at least as much as he was a military painter.

It seems to me that my selection of evidence raises two related issues. The first is precisely that selection of 9 images out of 310, because that selection individuates each image and asks the reader to consider them worthy of extended and focused attention. Art history proceeds primarily by individuation, treating the objects of study that it selects as monuments rather than as documents, in Panofsky's terms.[10] Both the conventions of the essay form and the pictures-on-paper technology of an illustrated book chapter impose similar constraints. This focus, these constraints, tends to obscure the way magazines of the *ILN* genre worked, raising the second issue, which is in some respects simply the negative of the first. Cognitive effects arising from individuation, that is to say, the effect of focusing on an individual picture from a particular issue, were not the only, or even the most powerful, of the effects produced by looking at the *ILN* every week for a month, a year or a lifetime. The iteration of casts of characters and of treatments, the repetition involved in looking, in merely glancing, at the represented actions and settings in over 300 images, and at similar imagery from other artists, has powerful effects in establishing or normalizing iconographies of, and formal metaphors for, social structures and social dynamics. A magazine such as the *ILN* is produced and reproduced by the flow of articles and pictures that it vectors. It is this flow, at least as much as any one or handful of its instances, which works to supply and inculcate the concepts, to condition the percepts, which both enabled and constrained the encounters which the *ILN*'s reader-viewers could have with 'others' on Europe's contested peripheries.

Woodville produced his *ILN* pictures predominantly as a London-based work-up artist. He also acted as a 'special artist' for the magazine, mostly in the first dozen years of his career, travelling both in the UK and in Europe and Africa to record wars, civil unrest, diplomatic missions, military displays or royal visits. The most significant of these 'special artist' visits were to the Balkan borderlands of the Ottoman Empire in 1879–1880, to Ireland in 1880 and to Morocco in 1887. He also travelled to Egypt in 1883 to do research for his painting of the Battle of Tel el Kebir (RA 1884, UK Royal Collection) and to record local colour for one of the same subject by his French battle-painter friend Alphonse de Neuville (1883, National Museums of Scotland). In 1889–1890, he travelled to the Indian Empire, in the suite of the Duke of Clarence, rather than as a 'special artist', although he still sent pictures back to the *ILN* from the visit. A flow of big-game-hunting pictures from the Americas, Asia and Africa continued to appear in the *ILN* well into the twentieth

century, suggesting that he continued to travel extensively.[11] Thus though only one of the pictures discussed here depicts something Woodville had seen while a special artist on campaign (Fig.10.7), all of them represent theatres of war or of low-intensity conflict that he had visited.

The magazine tended to report the full-scale deployment of British regiments on active service much more extensively than it did low-intensity conflicts or wars where there was no involvement of troops from its major customers. In a given volume, this meant there could be many relevant pictures. In the second half of 1882, for example, the *ILN* published around 500 pictures in its 26 regular numbers, and about 220 of them focused on the British intervention in Egypt, representing battles, life in the army and the campaign's wider cultural context: Egypt's customs, costumes, monuments and landscapes. Nine of these are by Woodville: seven double-page spreads and two full-page pictures. In the months of July, August and September rather more than half the magazine's pictures, and considerably more than half its picture space, showed the campaign in Egypt, but once the bulk of the invading forces had come home, the *ILN*'s interest quickly faded. Only 20 of the almost 400 pictures in the first volume of 1883 had the campaign, or the current events or culture of Egypt, as their theme.

By 1898, the *ILN*'s visual style had changed in response to the much greater supply of photographs from campaigns and other sites of news and to the triumph of the half-tone screen for reproducing both photographs and artists' wash drawings or sketches (Fig. 10.2).[12] The magazine now printed many more pictures (mostly small), both portraits and topographical images, though it continued to offer plenty of whole pages and centrefolds composed by artists on the basis of sketches and photographs. In September 1898, a British-Egyptian expeditionary force brought a Sudanese Sufist army to battle at Omdurman, just outside Khartoum. Around 40 out of the more than 900 pictures in the July-December volume represent the march on Khartoum, a thousand miles up the Nile from Alexandria, then the battle, and then its aftermath. Six of these were by Woodville: one double-page spread and five full-page pictures, including a full-page half-tone wash drawing of the memorial service to General Gordon held under the walls of the Mahdi's palace, a picture which led on to the production of an intaglio print of the same scene, discussed by Paul Fox in Chap. 5.[13]

Ambiguous Encounters: Caton Woodville's North Africa

The discussion that follows deals with a range of different sorts of picture. Five are closely connected to current news stories: three from Egypt and two from the Balkans. The two from the diplomatic mission to Morocco of 1887 offer genre scenes remote from the encounters between king and ambassador, and seem like 'features' work, but are, for all that, directly connected to a recent news story; two, one from Egypt and one from Albania, are 'features', uncoupled from any direct connection to the news.

On 29 July 1882, the *ILN* carried on its front page a picture of the British naval contingent using a Gatling gun while 'clearing the streets' of Alexandria, so much of whose port area had recently been reduced to rubble by the British naval bombardment that began the long history of British imperial military involvement in Egypt and the Sudan (Fig. 10.1). There is a curious discrepancy between the caption and the picture. The one suggests the clarification of space and the imposition of order; the other offers a pressing close-up of furiously active men in a confined setting, pouring devastation upon an unseen tumult, with burning buildings immediately behind them, sticks aflame on the street in front of them. The only 'local colour' in the picture is the grille over the window above the Gatling gun. The *ILN*'s target viewer will have recognized the grille from paintings and prints of 'oriental' interiors, but for the most part, the 'local' has been utterly obliterated in the action depicted. The contradictions, both between the caption's pacifying and clarifying claims and the image's violent and congested action and between the 'first contact' agenda of the picture and its absolute negation of any contact, seem to destabilize the reader-viewers' expectations of the processes and results of imperial military action, to call the schemata invoked into question. In achieving this destabilization, the disconnect between picture and caption produces another. Faced with this front page, reader-viewers will be less confident that the meanings of the *ILN*'s pictures can be reduced to the meanings of their captions.

Having insisted on the authoritative authoriality of Woodville's pictures for the *ILN*, it is awkward to acknowledge that this unsigned picture may not be by him; it may be by another prominent *ILN* illustrator with a similar style, W. H. Overend (1851–1898). Perhaps the picture was made to be printed on an inside page, and then promoted to the front page, where it had to be cropped of its signature to fit below the masthead; in any case, it was unusual for Overend's pictures, or for Woodville's, to be published anonymously.



THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS

REGISTERED AT THE GENERAL POST-OFFICE FOR TRANSMISSION ABROAD.

No 2256.—VOL. LXXXI. SATURDAY, JULY 29, 1882. WITH TWO SUPPLEMENTS | SIXPENCE. By Post, 6½d.

THE WAR IN EGYPT: NAVAL BRIGADE CLEARING THE STREETS OF ALEXANDRIA WITH THE GATLING GUN.
FROM A SKETCH BY OUR SPECIAL ARTIST.

Fig. 10.1 *Illustrated London News*, 29 July 1882, front page 'The War in Egypt: Naval Brigade clearing the streets of Alexandria with the Gatling Gun. From a sketch by our Special Artist'. Drawn by an anonymous work-up artist, wood engraved by J. Taylor (304 × 228 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

To produce such a picture, an artist first made a wash or gouache drawing—almost certainly according to a brief—using material including sketches of the place and, usually, the event, to be represented, and library pictures. The sketch might be altered after negotiation with the magazine's art editor, and upon approval, it would be photographed onto a block of sensitized white-coated end-grain boxwood of the size agreed by the editor. That on-wood photograph would be turned into a relief printing surface by a wood engraver, gouging through the photographic image. Often in the 1890s, and almost by default in the new century, such worked-up editorial artists' news pictures would be turned into half-tone screened photomechanical printing blocks rather than wood engravings.[14] In either case, the action, the point of view, the iconography, the staffage and the final appearance of the picture are all constrained by the expectations and decisions of the editorial team, required each week not only to produce a new issue but also to maintain and promote a brand.

These collaborative inception and production processes demand that pictures by a named artist, or by an unnamed one, be understood to have a corporate authorship, that of the magazine itself. The *ILN*'s public was the imperial ruling class, both in the UK and overseas, and the magazine had to manage its brand and produce its content so as to meet the needs and expectations of that group, as well as to form the expectations and cultural competences of the wide range of candidate members of the ruling class who also saw the paper.[15] In these circumstances of editorial control over commissioning, oversight at the moment of presentation of a worked-up sketch and then control over the size of the picture and of the technology used to turn it into a printing surface, part of the work of any *ILN* artist must inevitably have been to make pictures that reinforced the norms to which the magazine's editors were committed, recycled the stereotypes on which it relied week by week and reproduced both the narratives and the look with which its brand was identified.

'Clearing the Streets' does that, to perhaps deliberate excess. It is indeed this image's very excess of commitment to the magazine's schemata and stereotypes that presents a challenge to their stability. Here the encounter between Westerners and Egyptians is represented both brutally and with Egyptians in absentia, as the Naval Brigade and the Royal Marines make pacifying mayhem in post-bombardment Alexandria. There is a rule of thumb in Linda Nochlin's foundational 1983 text of revisionist Art History's engagement with Orientalist art that such art never shows the observer-audience group, the Westerners, in the same picture frame as the

Arabs, or Berbers, or Turks, or Persians (battle pictures excepted).[16] This cover picture reverses, while it preserves, the terms of Nochlin's generalization.

In this period, magazines of the *ILN* genre actively and (at least arguably) successfully asserted that their pictures, not least those by Woodville, synthesized the demands of art and the demands of reportorial fidelity.[17] Thus Nochlin's rule is relevant, in different ways, to the *ILN*'s output both of major reportorial pictures and of 'feature' pictures. It is evidently obeyed in the work of other artists for such magazines, such as the many pictures of Egypt that George Montbard made for the *ILN*.[18]

Woodville did indeed produce pictures conforming to Nochlin's rule for the *ILN*.[19] However, he also made, and the *ILN* published, pictures in which non-violent encounters between the invading or occupying or informally imperial power and the local inhabitants become some part of the subject of the picture, rather than a precondition of it.[20] Thus the largest proportion of his pictures with these settings, whether associated with news stories or largely detached from them, unsettles Nochlin's 'orientalist' prescription rather than confirming it. The intervention in Egypt had started with the shelling of Alexandria and then its occupation after the anti-European rioting and looting whose aftermath 'Clearing the streets' represents. Later, Egyptian city streets became the space of other varieties of encounter between the locals and the occupying power, and other tactics of representing those encounters.

In 'The Guards in Cairo', which Woodville worked up from a sketch by Frederic Villiers, a newly arrived Guards regiment marches past Lieutenant General Francis Grenfell, Sirdar of the Egyptian army, in front of the British barracks, as the 1898 Sudan expedition gathers momentum (Fig. 10.2). In one sense, this is a reach-me-down 'street-scene with parade' picture; a fine body of troops in the middle ground march past a commanding officer in the background, with the foreground occupied by a varied group of spectators. One could find many such, and indeed the first thing to be noticed about this picture is its normalizing charge. Its narrative is simple, its picture space secure and stable, its subject, a march past between a crowd and a reviewing officer, utterly routine in the *ILN*'s reporting of the militarized late Victorian Empire. But one may also read the picture against its normalizing features. The composition has removed almost all the mounted authority of the reviewing officers, permitting us just a glimpse of two sets of horses' ears. The picture also changes the marching soldiery from dynamic to static. The Guards' arms do not swing,



Fig. 10.2 *Illustrated London News* 27 August 1898 'The Soudan Advance. The Guards in Cairo: General Grenfell receiving the regiment at the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks. *From a sketch by our Special Artist, Mr. F. Villiers'*. Drawn by R. C. Woodville. Half-tone screen, anonymous process engraver (320 × 232 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

their rifles mark vertical stop signs across the picture space: their only evident movement is in their legs poking back in space. They march, indeed, against the flow of standard left-to-right narrative direction. The dynamic elements of the picture, the free forms, are all in the foreground, in the space the army does not occupy, in counterpoint to the command presence of the British. There is a small boy, such as always follow troops on parade: he is out of step, and his swirling white robe and swinging arms give his figure a movement that the Guards cannot share. There is a girl in a black robe, not swirling but swaying, with a tray of fruit on her head. Her face is hidden from us and we can see only an arm and a foot: her reality is veiled. There is also an upright turbaned figure in a long robe, and behind him a 'Europeanized' Egyptian wearing a fez and a suit. Perhaps the two are watching the march-past together: we cannot tell. In the middle ground and background nothing is unclear; there is no mystery in the figuration, whereas the Egyptian spectators of this imperial display offer plenty of room for imaginative engagement and speculation. Are we then to see the army as a screen onto which are projected two sorts of gaze, the one legible and static, the other veiled and dynamic? Who, and from whom, is this wall of soldiers protecting?

Pictures, more so than texts, are highly permissive in the way they may be understood. We may thus choose to see in this picture an essay about the limitations at least, and perhaps the failures, of contact. It is impossible to know now what Woodville transcribed from Villiers, what he adapted, what he added or nuanced. It surely makes sense to think of Woodville, in 1898, 20 years into his fabulously successful career with the *ILN*, as knowing perfectly well how to 'open' a closed picture, how to disconcert a confident imperialism, how to keep the ritual of looking at each week's issue interesting, how to deliver edge even in a full-frontal picture like this.

Woodville's 'news' role at the *ILN* was to take the drawings or photographs sent to the *ILN* and to turn them into pictures fit to print. Such work would involve significant transformations of viewpoint and iconography even of the work of prestigious on-the-spot 'special artists', and when he was working with material sent in by freelance sketchers or photographers, his discretion was wide. In the summer of 1886, some mummies were unwrapped by Professor Maspero in the Boulak Museum at Cairo. One particularly spectacular unwrapping had been drawn by Gérardin from sketches and published in the *Monde illustré*, a Parisian magazine of the *ILN* genre, on 10 July 1886.[21] Both Woodville and Gérardin worked to arrange the documents in their possession to make the points they wanted

to make. In the *Monde illustré* picture, which Woodville would almost certainly have seen, this may well have included deliberately putting the British at the back of the large, and entirely male, audience.

In 'Unwrapping Ancient Egyptian Mummies', Woodville shows an undraped table resting on trestles, whereas Gérardin had shown a draped table with legs, and Gérardin's three dozen spectators are reduced to seven (Fig. 10.3). The scene represents work rather than Gérardin's spectacle—three Army officers, three (perhaps four) mummy cases, three curators, the wrapped mummy and one woman, breaking into the male ranks enclosing the Pharaoh, and resting her hand on the table. The officer beside her stands in contrapposto, his legs rhyming with the trestle. This figure enlivens, rather than disrupts, the respect and studious calm with which the task is undertaken, as well as acting as a surrogate for us, the spectator, making this an intimate rather than a spectacular moment. This act of laying ancient and exotic history bare both for science and for the eyes of contemporary Europe is an asymmetrical encounter, of course, but Egyptian culture's right to be given the greatest consideration is surely central to its agenda and its effect, albeit in an episode scripted and dominated by first-world mindsets and agendas.

This woman's presence in this scene is unexpected, and it is hard to know how to read her, except perhaps as a second reader-viewer inscribed in the picture: civilian, quietly fashionable, calmly present and somehow hands-on. She is probably the traveller and Egyptologist Amelia B. Edwards, who supplied photographs of the mummy of Ramesses II to the *Graphic*, published also on 31 July. Whoever she may be, and however we are to interpret her female presence in this male space, she stands, at least, for the possibility that a third position could emerge in relations between the occupiers and Egyptian state and society, the idea that the occupation could be demilitarized, domesticated, turned into a process of discovery.

Woodville deploys such female figures repeatedly. Their effect is to problematize simple readings of power and difference. Sometimes that destabilizing job is done more directly than in the unwrapping scene. Shepheard's Hotel was the social and informal intelligence hub of the European occupation of Egypt. In this centrefold feature picture (Fig. 10.4), not prompted directly by any particular news story, Woodville offers his own composition, not a reworking of a correspondent's sketch, though such sketches, as well as his own, may have been one of his sources for this picture. He focuses the action on a woman coming down steps out



UNWRAPPING ANCIENT EGYPTIAN MUMMIES IN THE BOULAK MUSEUM AT CAIRO.

Fig. 10.3 *Illustrated London News* 31 July 1886 half-page picture, p. 125. 'Unwrapping ancient Egyptian mummies in the Boulak Museum at Cairo'. Drawn by R. C. Woodville, wood engraved by G&M (164 × 235 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

of a 'European' space and into an Egypt occupied by a policeman and some semi-Westernized loungers, but also donkeys, a monkey, snake charmers and the throng of the streets of Cairo. In its invocation of the metropolitan boulevard, where private recreational spaces jostle with the whole range of city life, Woodville's Cairene scene converges with the urban landscapes of Jean Béraud, Giuseppe de Nittis or a dozen other painters in Paris or in London. It seems to me that Woodville has found a powerful and disconcerting expression of the intrepidity and anxiety of Europeans encountering—what is represented as—the anarchistic onslaught of the Cairo street, which had been so very nearly tamed in the 1898 image (Fig. 10.2), by exploiting the gap between the expectations set up by the genre he has mobilized and the local colour with which he populates it. Dangling her parasol, buttoning her glove, sure that her pug



Fig. 10.4 *Illustrated London News* 9 February 1884 pp. 140–41. 'Shepheard's Hotel, Cairo'. Drawn by R. C. Woodville, wood engraved by E. Froment (319 × 456 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

will follow her into the mayhem, the woman is both confident and vulnerable. It is also worth noting that the space between the magazine viewer and the intrepid walker has been emptied out, of humans at least. It is impossible to locate the agent of this clearing of the street: is it part of the power of this mini-metropolis hotel, or a projection of the *ILN*'s ordering gaze? It is, at any rate, no longer the Gatling guns that clear the street. But nor does the picture in any sense offer a panoptic mechanism: the *ILN* reader-viewer and the woman on the steps share a vision tunnel.[22] Contemporaries evidently thought this picture of a woman on the edge, between worlds, something special, as I do. In Paris, the *Illustration*, perhaps the most successful of any magazine of the *ILN* genre anywhere beyond Britain, republished it on 9 September 1884, and it rarely republished work from London or anywhere else.

Woodville accompanied the 1887 British diplomatic mission to Morocco for the *ILN*. From late August to late October 1887, it published 17 of his pictures of diplomatic contacts and of Moroccan life, especially palace life in Marrakesh. His 'A Visit to the Harem', the third and last centrefold picture in the set, was published two months after the others (Fig. 10.5). It seems at first glance to do the schema-confirming, stereotype-recycling work of the *ILN* without many ironies of character or narrative. Inquisitive and very well-dressed European women visit the harem and, we suppose, report to their menfolk, whereupon Woodville makes a picture. The harem here depicted references those that Woodville's first reader-viewers would have been familiar with through the work of Delacroix, G. F. Lewis, Gérôme or a score of other orientalist painters or

Fig. 10.5 *Illustrated London News* 17 December 1887 pp. 726–27 'A visit to the harem in Morocco. Drawn by Mr. R. Caton Woodville, our Special Artist with the British Mission to the Sultan of Morocco'. Wood engraved by R. Laudan (312 × 465 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

illustrators. However, the picture goes very much against the grain of standard orientalist odalisquery. No one is lounging on cushions or divans, no one is smoking a hookah, no one is anything less than fully dressed, and there are plenty of Moroccan men in the picture, none evidently either eunuchs or personal servants of the king. The significant action takes place behind and beside a square pool, which has against its left-hand edge a derisory single small cushion and in front of it a female black slave, serving refreshments. The right side of the composition has a tight cluster of women, one British and two Moroccan, accompanied by a young girl. A female figure sits behind them, her back to us; her status is as hard to determine as her role in the scene. This cluster's attention is focused on the British woman's long glove. The group in the centre and left-hand side of the picture is much more widely spread. There is a line of four richly dressed women. Two stand, half facing us, looking at the two who sit on the edge of the square pool: a British woman with her back to us, a Moroccan woman facing out of the picture, looking at her British companion; the two interacting, it seems, as equals.

In almost every respect, this picture works like an eighteenth-century conversation piece: a specified and symbolically freighted interior peopled with groups of figures who, though divided by age and circumstance, participate together in a social situation.[23] However, the picture resists straightforward interpretation as an example of the genre. The fact that two of the participants, one British and one Moroccan, have turned their back to the viewer suggests that, in this scene of invasive inspection, perhaps even more than in the unwrapping of the mummy, there are things that the metropolitan spectator cannot quite see, let alone understand.

The strangeness of social relations between Europeans and local populations, and the inscrutability of these populations, is much more evidently the subject of Woodville's picture of a mixed group of European tourists, who we may take to be members of the British diplomatic mission party, visiting the 'Caves of Hercules' (Fig. 10.6). Most immediately, it evokes tourism's occasional inability to master its object of appropriation, even though tourism was, in the pages of magazines of the *ILN* genre, via an iconography of attractive destinations, a close companion of the military expedition both in instigating and in enriching 'peripheral vision'. These caves, on the Atlantic coast about ten kilometres west of Tangier, had long been used as a millstone quarry and were occasionally squatted by migrants and the indigent. In the 1870s, their destiny changed. They were brought onto the tourist itinerary as the very caves in which Hercules had lived



Fig. 10.6 *Illustrated London News* 8 October 1887 p. 445 'The British Mission to Morocco: The caves of Hercules, Tangier'. Drawn by R. C. Woodville, anonymous wood engraver (317 × 235 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

when on the labour of acquiring the golden apples of the Hesperides. In Woodville's hands, this touristic visit becomes a scene about disconnects rather than encounters. I do not know how the inarticulable story embodied in that group of Moroccans sitting on the far-right ledge may be integrated with that told to and by the party of tourists; but I am sure I am meant to share my inability to connect with the spectator-subjects of the picture, the group of bored and self-absorbed Britons that fills its foreground. These visitors look as though they have come with no serviceable stereotypes or narratives to deploy, and their Moroccan guides and servants do not seem to be helping. There is an associative link between the child in the sailor suit, the Atlantic Ocean, and Home, but faced with the other occupants of the cave, the British party is on the edge of what they can know or understand.

Ambiguities in Ottoman Borderlands: Caton Woodville and the Balkans

Woodville's Egyptian and Moroccan pictures did not do much to trouble the process of identifying 'us' and 'them', but they did make the simplifications and the contingency of such choices edgily evident. His pictures of conflicts in the Balkans raise different sorts of issues. The British army never intervened there until the First World War; the area was much more a zone of peripheral encounters for the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires than for Woodville's first reader-viewers. Both local and international politics in the Balkans were tense and tangled as armed conflicts between emergent-nation Christian groups, emergent-nation Muslim groups and the Ottomans were frequent, and European powers often became involved. The structures of difference and solidarity here were complex, and the ability of reader-viewers in London or Cape Town to discriminate between the parties in any given conflict uncertain. The problems of picking sides in complex conflicts between unfamiliar others are apparent in the following three pictures, albeit in different ways, and Woodville's images of these Balkan conflicts illustrate the edginess involved in picking sides.

'Transporting Supplies' (Fig. 10.7) shows the business of getting supplies up a mountain track to Montenegrin soldiers fighting against Albanian insurgents in support of the settlement of the 1876–1878 war. That settlement had been imposed on the Ottoman government by the

Fig. 10.7 *Illustrated London News* 18 September 1880 p. 277. 'Transporting supplies for Montenegrin troops at Podgoritza'. Drawn by R. C. Woodville, wood engraved by E. Froment (284 × 218 mm). *ILN* 10 March 1895 p. 256. 'Her Lord and Master: a scene in a north Albanian house'. Drawn by R. C. Woodville, half-tone screen by Meisenbach (314 × 214 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

temporarily united Western powers, who were in September 1880 trying to enforce a revised transfer of territory to the Montenegrins via a 'naval demonstration' on the Adriatic coast. Woodville's image depicts a Montenegrin soldier holding his Austrian Wenzel breech-loading rifle behind his neck, while two women and a packhorse haul ammunition and food up the mountain he guards. The image's representation of a barbarous patriarchy is shockingly clear, and the lengthy text below the picture reinforces the message, with a contemptuous critique both of the masculinity and of the civility of the Montenegrin soldiery who 'employ their womenfolk as pack animals'. Both the text and the picture, for all its exotic picturesque, ask why it should be these people that 'we' are helping.

In 'Her Lord and Master' of 1895, an Albanian Muslim wife kisses her returning husband's hand. The picture demonstrates how few signs of difference between Christian and Muslim emergent nations magazine artists had to work with, how indeed their pictures may produce a perception of cultural interchangeability between these warring groups, and a sense that the hierarchy of civilization between Christian and Muslim is by no means to be taken for granted. The scene is idyllic. In stark contrast to the representation of gender relations among the Montenegrins, the prosperous nuclear family in its garden with its servant is not perceptibly ironized or critiqued in terms of its structures of domesticity or authority. The picture, not immediately triggered by any specific flare-up in relations between Balkan states, encodes the scene so that we may identify with the values that it projects: the inclusion of the minaret disrupts and complicates such an easy identification.

Woodville's centrefold from the *ILN* of 17 October 1903 is provocatively captioned 'The Cross Descends, Th[e] Minarets Arise' so as to trigger the reader-viewer's Islamophobia (Fig. 10.8). The image portrays the Turkish army reoccupying a Christian village in Macedonia in the final stages of the unsuccessful Bulgarian-Christian uprising that year. The same issue carried a short piece on the border tensions between Bulgaria and the Ottomans, describing the insurgents as 'revolutionary bands', and a page of snapshot photographs, laid out as though in an album, of 'the disturbed districts'.[24] In Woodville's picture, fighting has taken place and the Turkish troops move through a devastated village where houses burn, two old men lie dead, another is being helped by a dismounted cavalryman, while in the foreground a woman who may be dead holds a baby, perhaps dead too. These are victims of the insurgency, but they may be victims of the insurgents. As in Fig. 10.7, a minaret appears in the background, and through this sign, Woodville shows us an already Muslim village. The bearded, tunicked, fur-hatted and ammunition-pouch-chested horseman dominating the composition closely resembles a Kuban Cossack of the Tsar's army, but his appearance also corresponds to another *ILN* double-page spread of the bashi-bazouks, the Ottoman army's mercenary irregulars, from earlier coverage of unrest in the Balkans.[25] Woodville may very well have referred to that picture when making this one: the two share some iconographical elements. However, neither the 1878 figures nor the mounted horseman in the 1903 picture looks much like those in Woodville's gruesome Egypt-set picture of 'Bashi-bazouks on the March: a Halt for Prayer' from December 1883.[26] But the fact that the dominant



Fig. 10.8 *Illustrated London News* 17 October 1903 pp. 580–81. '"The cross descends, thy [sic] minarets arise": Turkish troops reoccupying a Macedonian village after the rout of the insurgents. Drawn by R. Caton Woodville'. half-tone screen, anonymous process engraver (320 × 480 mm). Kensington and Chelsea Public Libraries, photo author

figure in Woodville's picture immediately matches the 'Cossack' stereotype of nomads from the steppe, usually at the service of the Tsar, seems part of the willed ambiguity of this picture, notwithstanding its coercive title. Christians here have been defeated; a village has been both ravaged (by unspecified combatants) and reclaimed, rather than reoccupied, by Muslims. The iconography of this picture tells a story that is both immediately involving and reticent as to action or agency, and consequently much harder to follow or categorize than its caption. The composition pivots around the Cossack/bashi-bazouk, a figure whose ambiguity reinforces the mixed and muffled messages of the rest of the image as the 'oriental' figures and detritus on the left stand in contrast to the orderly body of troops, led by an officer on a white horse, on the right. As this

recognizably 'modern' army enters a scene in which the 'oriental' has been dominant, the effect of Woodville's picture is to empty out all the crusading rhetoric of the caption, once more making difference easy to see but hard to understand.

* * *

Woodville was not the only artist working for the *ILN*, and these unsettling distantiations from unquestioning imperialism, cultural arrogance and 'forward' foreign policies do not encapsulate the magazine's position. There is no doubt that the *ILN*'s editors thought of the magazine as part of the beneficent apparatus of imperialism, and that they found many writers and artists, including on many occasions Woodville, who would promote that platform without evident nuance or reservation. On 5 November 1892, for example, the *ILN*'s front page, captioned 'Our Occupation of Egypt', carried a picture of two teenage Egyptian girls standing in front of a hanging oriental carpet, their heads together sharing a viewing of a copy of the *ILN*. I do not think Woodville would have rejected outright the arrogant and narcissistic cultural imperialism that this font page communicates. It is, however, not impossible that the double-edged suite of pictures of conflict-zone encounters that I have discussed offers evidence of personal reservations about the project of the British Empire. Woodville was a Catholic, raised in Russia, born to American and Russian-German parents, and English was his fourth language—enough there to provide a foundation for distance and dissent. But it seems to me that the edginess is just as likely to be a manifestation of Woodville's professional intelligence. The *ILN* needed to stay interesting in order to sell copies and advertising space. 'Interesting' is a function not only of newsworthy and picturesque pictures but of pictures that will make you look again, beyond the information content of their reported actions and their recorded locations. The pictures I have discussed provoke and reward such second glances, and as such, they not only satisfy the magazine's editors but also provide a resource for its reader-viewers, suggesting that Woodville would have been able to say, on behalf of the many civilians and soldiers who had looked at them, when faced with 'Our occupation of Egypt', 'Things are not quite as simple as that'.

Notes

1. 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauung ohne Begriffe sind blind' (KrV B 75.16). Modern cognitive neuroscience says more absolutely: no percept without concept; for example, Robert Solso, *Cognition and the Visual Arts* (Cambridge, Mass, 1996), esp. pp. 110–22.
2. P. Sinnema, *Dynamics of the Pictured Page: Representing the Nation in the Illustrated London News* (Aldershot, 1998) mostly discusses the first decade of the *ILN*'s existence. See the essay on the *ILN* in L. Brake and M. Demoor eds., *Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century Journalism in Great Britain and Ireland* (London and Ghent, 2009).
3. For the effect of repetition on the convincingness of propositions, the foundational study is L. Hasher, D. Goldstein, T. Toppino, 'Frequency and the conference of referential validity', *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*, 16 (1977), pp. 107–112. For 'confirmation bias', see D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (London, 2012), esp. pp. 80–1; for cognitive schemas J. Piaget, trans. M. Cook, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York, 1952), pp. 210–46.
4. A. Wallach, et al. 'What is an apex predator?', *Oikos,* 124 (2015), pp. 1453–61.
5. P. Hogarth *The Artist as Reporter* (London, 1967); P. Hodgson *The War Illustrators* (London, 1977); P. Johnson *Front Line Artists* (London, 1978). On Woodville's life, see R. Stearn, 'Richard Caton Woodville 1856–1927', *ODNB.*
6. L'*Illustration*, 5 January 1895, p. 8.
7. T. Gretton, 'Richard Caton Woodville (1856–1927) at the *Illustrated London News*', *Victorian Periodicals Review*, 48 (2015), pp. 87–120, esp. pp. 94–98.
8. M. Meisel discusses the 'realistic' in *Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-Century England* (Princeton NJ, 1983).
9. R. T. Stearn, 'Boer War image-maker: Richard Caton Woodville', in J. Gooch ed., *The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image* (Abingdon, Oxon 2013), pp. 213–223, p. 223.
10. E. Panofsky, 'History of art as a humanistic discipline' (1940), in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (New York, 1955), pp. 1–25, esp. pp. 8–11.
11. The Duke of Clarence (1864–1892) was the Prince of Wales's eldest son.
12. P. Fox, 'An unprecedented wartime practice: Kodaking the Egyptian Sudan' forthcoming in *Media, War and Conflict*, T. Gervais, 'L'Illustration photographique: naissance du spectacle de l'information (1843–1914)' (unpublished thèse de Doctorat, Paris, 2007), esp. pp. 105–93.
13. *ILN,* 1 October 1898, front page.

14. G. Beegan, *The Mass Image: A Social History of Photomechanical Reproduction in Victorian London* (Basingstoke, 2008), esp. pp. 72–98.
15. P. Bourdieu, *Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, R. Nice, trans. (London, 1984), pp. 318–345.
16. L. Nochlin, 'The imaginary orient', in Nochlin, *The Politics of Vision: Essays on Nineteenth-Century Art and Society* (New York, 1989) pp. 33–59, esp. pp. 36–7. For a different view, see J. MacKenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester, 1995).
17. T. Gretton, 'Industrialised graphic technologies in symbiosis with the world of art: the *Illustrated London News* and the *Graphic* c.1870–90', in K. Nichols, R. Wade and G. Williams eds., *Art* Versus *Industry? New Perspectives on Visual and Industrial Vultures in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Manchester, 2016), pp. 140–57, esp. pp. 151–5.
18. See, for example, *ILN*, 22 April 1882, p. 380, and *ILN*, 16 January 1886, p. 61.
19. See, for example, his pictures of the Balkans on 8 May 1880, p. 449 'Sketches in Albania: A street scene in Scutari', or 5 December 1885, unpaginated, 'On the castle at Scutari, Albania', and of Morocco on 7 February 1892, front page 'The revolt in Morocco: reading dispatches in the Kasba', or 27 June 1891, p. 849 'Morocco slave traders returning from Timbuctoo'; of India, 4 April 1891, p. 445 'A nautch girl dancing', 19 December 1891, p. 809, 'The morning dew: watering the maharajah's garden in Mysore'; of Egypt, 1 March 1890, p. 272 'In the desert'.
20. After Woodville's death, no sketchbooks were found (Tony Woodville, personal communication 2014); sketches, many 'camera-ready' and many with dedications from the artist, turn up in the art market, but they do not permit us to reconstruct Woodville's working methods.
21. Gérardin, 'Le dépouillement de la momie de Sésostris (Rhamsès II)… en presence du Khédive', *Monde illustré,* 10 July 1886, p. 28.
22. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish,* A. Sheridan, trans. (New York 1977), pp. 202–203.
23. K. Retford, 'From the Interior to Interiority: The *Conversation Piece* in Georgian England', *Journal of Design History,* 20 (2007) pp. 291–307, and *The Conversation Piece: Making Modern Art in 18th-Century Britain* (London and New Haven, 2017).
24. *ILN,* 17 October 1903, pp. 566 and 577.
25. William Simpson, 'The war: Bashi-bazouks burning a village, from a drawing by Mr. William Simpson', *ILN,* 19 August 1876, pp. 176–77.
26. *ILN,* 'Bashi-bazouks on the March: A Halt for Prayer', 12 December 1883, p. 577.

CHAPTER 11

Imagined Landscapes in Palestine During the Great War

Jennifer Wellington

British and colonial troops in Palestine during the Great War participated in militarized cultural encounters between individual soldiers and civilians, between armies and between empires. These encounters were in turn represented both by soldiers creating private cultural records of the war and by officially sanctioned war correspondents, artists, photographers and cinematographers travelling with British imperial forces. This chapter will discuss the creation of some official representations of Palestine and their reception by British and colonial (especially Australian) audiences during and after the Great War. The Palestine campaign was depicted through a series of narrative or imaginative lenses: of crusaders, of Biblical landscapes and events, of Empires (including the Romans), of imperial adventure and of the generalised exoticism of encountering the Orient and its peoples. These tropes fulfilled, however, differing mythmaking needs in Britain and its settler colony, Australia. The Australians related to Palestine differently both temporally and spatially: they travelled from the fringe of Empire to the centre, to the birthplace of Western civilization; the British travelled

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both to the lands of the Bible and to the peripheral field of colonial adventure. At the same time, the Australians, travelling from the far colonial periphery, saw the Middle East (through which they had to pass to reach Europe) as a 'periphery' to their assumed or inherited colonial Europeanness. British propaganda incorporated the Palestine campaign into crusader analogies heavily influenced by Victorian mediaevalism and adventure romance, as well as narratives of Britain's descent from, and continuance of, Biblical and Christian civilization. The supposed romance of the campaign was additionally transformed in Australian mythmaking into a narrative in which the experience of the hardy antipodean Briton, the bush horseman, battling the colonial frontier, transmuted into a talent for engaging in romantic imperial warfare, enabling Australia to join the glorious sweep of British imperial civilization and history.

Britain, Palestinian Landscapes and Official Wartime Propaganda

On 9 December 1917, Jerusalem fell to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), the multinational British Imperial Army consisting of British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand units which had fought their way there over the previous months. Unwilling to risk damage to the holy city, the Ottoman forces and their German allies retreated between nightfall on 8 December and sunrise the next morning; the last act of the Ottoman governor was to draft a formal letter of surrender to the British government, leaving it in the hands of the English-speaking Mayor of Jerusalem, Husayn Salim al-Husayni.[1] The capture of Jerusalem, in the eyes of the British government, moved the Palestine campaign from sideshow to propaganda coup. Aware of the profound propaganda potential of liberating Jerusalem, the War Cabinet had already decided, on 21 November 1917, to strictly control the press coverage of the capture of the city. Its enormous symbolic significance was to be carefully managed: 'No announcement of the city's fall was to be made until the British government had had the opportunity to give assurances that its holy sites would be protected'.[2] Lloyd George referred to the capture of the city as a 'Christmas present for the British nation' and believed that it vindicated his support for operations that others, such as General William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, felt were a peripheral distraction from the crucially important Western Front.[3] Taking Jerusalem, moreover, came against the backdrop of a series of setbacks for the Allies, including the collapse of the Russian war effort with the Bolshevik

Revolution, Italian defeat at Caporetto and Germany's counteroffensive at Cambrai. As Adrian Gregory has pointed out, '[t]he low point in [British] public confidence was between October 1917 and February 1918. The prospects never seemed bleaker'.[4] In this context, the remobilization of public opinion in support of the war, entailing increased control over media and cultural production, became a matter of existential urgency.[5] A part of this heightened control in support of remobilization thus included increased government control over representations of war.

Britain's propaganda machinery had developed in stages over the course of the war, beginning with the establishment of the War Propaganda Unit, or 'Wellington House', in 1914. At that time, it was specifically charged with the dissemination of official propaganda to foreign—and especially neutral—countries.[6] Before 1917, where the government directly engaged in domestic propaganda, it promoted specific campaigns, such as war loans, industrialization and recruitment.[7] Domestic mobilization was largely led from below, and many propaganda campaigns were organized by civil society.[8] Mobilization in support of the state, as John Horne has pointed out, 'naturally drew on the broader legitimacy' of that state; hence, as a liberal democracy, support for the nation's war effort in Britain 'came from persuasion – and self-persuasion – much more than from coercion'.[9] The state gradually began to assert more control over representations of war, appointing official artists to paint and draw the conflict from 1916, and the same year banning personal cameras from the Western Front and appointing official photographers to take photographs. These images went into an official pool of photographs which were then drawn upon by the illustrated press.[10] By 1917 increasing war weariness drove the government to initiate an ongoing 'broad-fronted campaign to sustain civilian morale for outright military victory'.[11] That campaign was orchestrated both domestically, through sponsoring fundraising campaigns, exhibitions and lectures at home, and through the production of visual and print propaganda from the front.[12]

The Middle Eastern theatre in particular offered opportunities for the creation of a more positive vision of the war for audiences at home. In some ways, this theatre operated imaginatively precisely as an *anti*-front, as an antidote to the stalemates of the European fronts, and in particular the Western Front. That is, it was visualized as a space in which mobile, more romantic warfare could occur, and feats of courage and conquest could be performed. To this end, George Westmoreland, a commercial photographer in civilian life who was serving with the Queen's Regiment on the Palestine Front, was promoted to sergeant and assigned to produce

photographs for publicity purposes.[13] He began work in July 1917, the same month General Allenby took over the British imperial forces on that front. He joined a few professional press photographers who were able to operate in Palestine in a much less restricted fashion than in other theatres of the war, although their numbers were limited by logistical difficulties.[14] Officers, including nurses stationed in military hospitals, also had more freedom to photograph here than those on the Western Front, where such activities were officially curtailed, although these photographs tended to remain in private or personal collections, rather than being forwarded anywhere for publication.[15] Despite Westmoreland's appointment, however, images of Palestine remained comparatively scarce in British coverage of the war. British media were devoting space and screen space to coverage of multiple fronts. British photographers and writers also had to report on the forces of the entire empire, rather than only strictly 'British' units.

Additionally, as the theatre was a reasonably mobile one, places showing the clear (and photographable) signs of battle were more difficult to locate. Instead of combat or images of the kind of 'Front' viewers were used to seeing in photographs of France and Belgium, Westmoreland photographed the colourful troops fighting in the theatre (Indians, men in Arab headdress, members of the Imperial Camel Corps), as well as scenic landscapes: ruins, cacti, palm trees, mosques, churches, street scenes, Biblical vistas. As Tom Gretton has argued in Chap. 10, this visual vocabulary was already extant. It had developed through the nineteenth century in the presentation of imperial warfare within a colonial imaginary in which exotic animals, landscapes and peoples were all constituent parts of places where hardy colonial sons might go and have an adventure. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, partly propelled by the burgeoning tourism industry, there developed in Europe a vision of Palestine in which notions of colonial adventure, pilgrimage and tourism combined. Catering to this, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Cook and Baedeker published an avalanche of Palestine guidebooks.[16] Unlike the pilgrims of previous centuries, who saw going to the Holy Land as journeying from the periphery to the centre—to the most holy place on earth, or the '*umbilicus mundi*… the axis around which all else revolved'—modern tourist pilgrims visiting Palestine from Europe during the decades prior to the Great War envisioned themselves as moving from the centre to the periphery, to a place that was mysterious, romantic and backward.[17] Editors in Britain operated within this imaginative field of reference when selecting illustrations to accompany war news, as well as

for reasons of sheer practicality. Exotic landscapes were published as an accompaniment to war news, as well as what seemed to be, but actually were not, up-to-date battle pictures. As Jane Carmichael points out: 'Given the time needed for the transmission of photographs, the illustrated press frequently resorted to the use of "stock shots", older material which could be re-captioned to make it relevant, or employed artistic drawings done with a fairly liberal addition of imagination'.[18] Thus, in November 1917, the *Daily Mirror* printed a photograph of Gurkha pipers under the headline 'With Our Indian Troops in Palestine' illustrating news of the Third Battle of Gaza, even though this battle had occurred only a week earlier, and photographs were taking several weeks to reach Britain from the front.[19] Images of the exotic could be used to stand for the whole *idea* of fighting in the Holy Land, framed within an imaginative field of colonial adventure, as well as the specific event they were supposed to illustrate (Fig. 11.1).

Fig. 11.1 George Westmoreland, 'The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade outside Beersheba, 1st November 1917'. Imperial War Museum, Q13159

Britain did not only support the production of still photographs of the front: government agencies also commissioned art and films designed for broad circulation. Controlling the filmed representation of war in particular gave the War Office a powerful tool: it allowed it to present the public with a seemingly unmediated vision of the actions of the Empire's men in arms in an exciting new medium. This power was fully realized by the newly established War Office Cinematograph Committee, chaired from 1917 by the Canadian media magnate and propagandist Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) which aggressively pursued the propaganda possibilities of film. It was this body that oversaw the creation of the official newsreel *General Allenby's Entry into Jerusalem*.[20] It was shot by two cameramen present at that formal event on 11 December 1917—a ceremony that was carefully designed by the British diplomat Sir Mark Sykes (co-creator of the Sykes-Picot agreement)—and released in February 1918.[21] Beginning with framing shots of the old city, the film depicts exotically dressed crowds of mixed ethnicity (who are shown as happy and enthusiastic, presumably greeting the British as liberators), followed by Allenby entering Jerusalem on foot through the Jaffa Gate. This was a gesture of humility intended to contrast with Kaiser Wilhelm II's arrival in Jerusalem in 1898, when a wider opening had to be made in the city wall in order to allow him to ride in, clad in field marshal's ceremonial white, on his horse. *The Illustrated London News* emphasized that the 'simplicity and reverence' of Allenby's entry contrasted with Wilhelm's 'bombastic display' dressed like a 'Crusader as seen in pantomime'.[22] The film depicts Allenby heading a multinational procession in a display of Allied strength, including the commanders of the Italian and French contingents (and their delegations' military attachés) and a group of British officers (including T. E. Lawrence, who eschewed his Arab robes in favour of a khaki officer's uniform for the occasion), followed by soldiers of the 60th London Division.[23] The film also recorded the performance of Britain's magnanimity as liberators: it is visually clear that the city had not been damaged. Further, it shows a proclamation which was later issued in Arabic, English, French, Greek, Hebrew, Italian and Russian being read to an assembled crowd reassuring the people of Jerusalem (and through the film, the world) that all of the city's religious sites would be protected.

The British government chose to promote energetically the success it had achieved in Palestine around the world. *General Allenby's Entry into Jerusalem* was very popular in Britain and was subsequently exported overseas with appropriate subtitles inserted, including Hebrew text for the Grand Rabbi at Salonica, and over 50 locations in China and Hong Kong,

where it was apparently the one British war film that actually *did* arouse enthusiasm.[24] Lloyd George's government evidently intended to capitalize on Allenby's success as much as possible, and continued to advertise and screen it well into 1918. The ceremonial Allied entry into the city of Jerusalem was also preserved in officially commissioned art designed to be exhibited and reproduced at home, such as James McBey's *The Allies Entering Jerusalem, 11th December 1917*.[25] McBey's work, painted in muted tones, is framed somewhat stiffly, in some ways reflecting the artificiality of the carefully arranged ceremony, but nonetheless, it demonstrates the clear desire of the British authorities to immortalize the capture of Jerusalem. This event continued to be promoted by official bodies as the most significant event in this theatre of the war. In the 1920s, although the Imperial War Museum (whose collections also began to be compiled in 1917) focused heavily on the fronts considered to be much more important, one of the few items on display dealing with Palestine was a Mutoscope machine through which visitors could view the newsreel of this event (Fig. 11.2).[26]

Fig. 11.2 James McBey, *The Allies Entering Jerusalem, 11th December 1917: General Allenby, with Colonel de Piépape Commanding the French Detachment, and Lieut-Colonel d'Agostio Commanding the Italian Detachment, Entering the City by the Jaffa Gate* (1917/1919). IWM ART 2599

Romantic tales of daring and adventure came to dominate the narrative of how the EEF's campaign was perceived in descriptions of its operations in late 1917, leading up to the capture of Jerusalem. Stories of adventure, and the rich historical contexts of Palestine, gave the EEF's Middle Eastern campaigns a romanticism absent from the mechanized slaughter so characteristic of the Western Front.[27] Lloyd George described the British capture of Jerusalem to Parliament in a speech laden with Biblical metaphor, referring to that 'famed land' of Palestine, in which 'Beersheba, Hebron, Bethlehem, the Mount of Olives are all names engraved on the heart of the world'.[28] Lloyd George here reached for a set of images that would have been familiar to him from his background in Welsh chapels, and which, for many Britons, would have conjured up a 'Jerusalem' which was associated, somewhat self-reflexively, with vernacular religious traditions, with hymns and sermons, Sunday school classes and the family Bible; in a word, with *Home*.[29] Here were landscapes which were at once exotic and familiar, against which could be staged a romantic imperial adventure and pilgrimage that contrasted markedly with the gloom of France and Flanders.

Eight other films were produced on the Palestine campaign with titles that referred to one of the other historical referents of the campaign: the Crusades. This occurred despite the Department of Information issuing a D notice to the press in December 1917 alerting them to the 'undesirability of publishing any article paragraph or picture suggesting that military operations against Turkey are in any sense a Holy War, a modern Crusade, or have anything whatever to do with religious questions'.[30] This was an especial concern given that large numbers of the Indian Expeditionary Force were Muslims, who the Department of Information thought might not be best pleased to be depicted as participating in a crusade against their coreligionists. These films included *With the Crusaders in the Holy Land – Allenby the Conqueror* and *The New Crusaders – With the British Forces in Palestine*.[31] It was not only official photography and film that did this: the British entry into Jerusalem was depicted as a liberation in numerous newspaper reports on the events of 11 December which made it very clear that the holy city had been liberated from oppressive Turkish rule. In December 1917, *Punch* published a cartoon depicting Richard the Lionheart looking down on Jerusalem saying, 'My dream comes true!', while newspapers published images of Allenby's entry headed 'Twentieth Century Crusaders'.[32]

Some public figures had, of course, already extended the notions of holy war used to justify Britain's involvement from the outset to rhetoric of the war as a whole as a crusade. It was, however, 'only in the aftermath of the British victories in Palestine in 1917–18 [that] the term gradually become shorthand for the First World War'.[33] This imaginative construction of the campaign as Crusade lingered after the war; a number of war memorials were constructed in Britain featuring soldiers as crusaders, and numerous books were published referring to the Crusades in their titles, such as *Khaki Crusaders* (1918), *The Last Crusade* (1920) and *With Allenby's Crusaders* (1923).[34] Two national memorial projects—the 'Cross of Sacrifice' featuring a sword within a white stone cross placed in all British imperial war cemeteries and the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey's burial with a sword donated by the King, which national media quickly termed a 'crusader's sword'—assisted in further embedding this symbolism.[35]

Eitan Bar-Yosef has argued that this crusading rhetoric was very much socially and culturally confined to British officers, and that rank-and-file British soldiers instead reverted to a biblical vernacular culture derived from hymns, Sunday school classes, sermons and the family Bible, in order to comprehend the war in Palestine. He claims that this approach ultimately undermined the crusading image as constructed by the officer class, which appeared overly imperialistic, and that the rank and file, or the 'homesick crusaders', chose to focus on their homes in England as their primary motivating factor.[36] Likewise, James Kitchen's analysis of letters and diaries of British soldiers posits that only a small minority of soldiers perceived themselves to be engaged in any kind of crusade, arguing instead that the soldiers wrote with interest about their encounters with Islam, evidencing a powerful rank-and-file 'vernacular orientalism'.[37] While this may be the case, I would argue that many soldiers' experiences were recounted through a prism more of a generalized exoticism than any explicitly religious framework, and consequently that *all* these types of tropes were used in propaganda aimed at galvanizing support for the war at home. Moreover, the way these narratives were constructed in Britain and in her antipodean settler colonies differed according to the needs of each place.

Australia and Romantic Imperial Adventure

The tropes of the outback, and the frontier horseman battling the elements (not to mention the natives) on the imperial periphery, were deployed as part of a project of Australian self-fashioning: of creating a new national myth out of the war. In this myth, the new young nation Australia's efforts in Europe and the Bible lands—in the ancient seat of civilization—earned it the right to a more significant place in the imperial federation. Australia would further be a contributor to the glorious sweep of British imperial history, rather than merely an inheritor of it. This impulse to glorify the British military tradition and imagine Australia within a framework of the progress of Empire was not new. It is worth recalling that W. H. Fitchett's 1896 bestseller, *Deeds that Won the Empire*, often used as an example of the apogee of the popular culture of British imperialism, was in fact first written as a series of articles for the *Argus*, a Melbourne newspaper.[38] In a sense, in travelling from the periphery of the empire to the (for the British) peripheral space of the Levant, Australians were also represented as travelling to an imaginative centre as well as a physical one, as playing a crucial role in the central political and military events of the time.

One such set of representations was a series of colour photographs of picturesque Palestinian landscapes and a romanticized Jerusalem by the Australian official photographer Frank Hurley, which were exhibited in London in 1918. Hurley's fascination with the Middle East, and with the symbolic resonance of the landscape, derived partly from a sense that the Holy Land belonged to the cultural heritage of the British peoples. The symbolic associations of the Holy Land fired Hurley's imagination, and were also later reflected in Australia's official history of the conflict. In this narrative, the Australians who partook in this action were part of a hardier British colonial type who could invigorate the Empire. The landscapes of the Near East were further appropriated in support of this narrative in official war art and films, which placed these British colonial troops at the centre of the imperial effort, set against a symbolically charged historical geography, thereby increasing their status and significance in the world.

During the war, exhibitions of Australian war art, war photographs and war trophies were staged in Britain. Like exhibitions staged by the British government for domestic consumption, Australian displays sought to remobilize an exhausted British populace for the continued prosecution of an arduous and costly war. Australian exhibitions, however, also served a

second purpose: they were a testament to the importance of the Dominion's contribution to the imperial war effort. It was to this end—the promotion of Australia's war effort in Britain—that an official exhibition of Australian war photography, underwritten by the Australian government, was staged in the Grafton Galleries, London in 1918. It featured a wealth of images by the Australian official photographer, Frank Hurley, depicting the war as something exotic and far away, removed from ordinary existence, as well as a number of composite enlargements he created to dramatize battle or aestheticize the front.

As a war photographer, Hurley displayed talent and hubris, as well as a romantic, pictorial sensibility. His photographic works were infused with this sensibility and with his instinct for the exotic and the picturesque. In both his diary and photographic interpretation of war landscapes, Hurley turned to the 'conventions of the sublime to make sense of the chaotic scenes of urban destruction', seeing, for example, in the ruins of Ypres, Belgium, a 'somehow wildly beautiful' character in that 'weird, awful and terrible sight' which was 'aesthetically… far more interesting than the Ypres that was'.[39] Hurley had spent the years leading up to his employment as an official war photographer in the Antarctic, quarantined from modernity. He was a proponent of pictorialism, not a modernist, and with a 'commercial photographer's keen instinct for public taste', he saw 'with and for those masses who, after 1914, 'could no longer believe their eyes'.[40] Pictorialism, an early twentieth-century movement in art photography, aimed to imitate traditional art forms such as paintings; pictorialists were particularly interested in the transcendent or the sublime, and often manipulated images to create dramatic effects.[41] In this, Hurley was a very different kind of photographer to other official photographers on the front. Most, like his fellow Australian, photographer Hubert Wilkins, or the Canadian official photographer, Ivor Castle, were drawn from the ranks of newspaper photojournalists working in Britain.[42] Hurley, by contrast, already had a degree of personal fame as an adventurer and explorer, having been the photographer on both Sir Douglas Mawson's and Sir Ernest Shackleton's Antarctic expeditions between 1911 and 1917, a fact emphasized in contemporary journalism about his work and exhibitions.[43]

Photographing the First World War was one of Hurley's many adventures, which continued after the war with expeditions to Papua New Guinea and numerous touring exhibitions of which he was the showman and star.[44] By the early 1920s, Hurley had become 'not only the ringmaster but also the leading attraction in his own travelling, international, multi- and mass-

media circus'.[45] Already in 1918, the exhibition of his war photographs attracted around 600 visitors a day, with a military band playing throughout the day and colour slides of scenes 'on the Western Front, Flanders, and also in Palestine' 'elicit[ing] applause at every showing'.[46] *The Times* reported that '[t]he best results, for observers who prefer the beautiful to the tragic', were available in Hurley's colour photographs of Palestine rather than images of Belgium and France. These colour images were projected onto a screen at intervals: their luminous, transient quality heightening the sense of the exotic. *The Times* described these as follows (Fig. 11.3):

> The deep colour of the East comes out with rich effect. The marble glory of the Mosque of Omar is conveyed as vividly as the hue of the wild purple iris of Palestine or that anemone which brightens the road to Jerusalem. Many who will never visit them can gather a true notion of the Judean hills from these pictures.[47]

Fig. 11.3 Frank Hurley, 'An unidentified soldier standing in front of the Mosque of Omar, in the Old City of Jerusalem' (1918). Australian War Memorial, AWM B01726

Hurley had spent time in 1918 recording the activities of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine, and in addition to recording numerous exotic landscapes, he turned to creating staged images of military dash and excitement. In February that year, for example, he observed '[i]t is amusing what the troops will do for the camera', and described how, with the keen participation of the troops and battalion commanders, he 'had the 2nd Regiment paraded through the narrow laneways and in many other pictorial settings'.[48] He made a 'programme of stunts which I require doing' and photographed them, including a 'battery going into action, machine-gun drill and ambulance turnout' and 'two regiments turned out and re-enacted their famous charge at Beersheba'.[49] The images he created of 'stunts', 'action' and 'pictorial settings' were highly romanticized, and particularly glamorized the Australian Light Horse and the Flying Corps, groups whose dashing reputation persisted long after the war. As observed by an array of British artists and troops, the landscapes of the Holy Land amidst which these events took place were replete with Biblical and mediaeval (crusader) associations.[50] The symbolic associations of the Holy Land thus provided a backdrop to the actions of the Australians which imbued them with a deeper, apparently more significant, historical resonance. Henry Gullett's official history of Australia's participation in the war in the Sinai and Palestine reflected that resonance. Published in 1923, it depicted the campaigns 'as a modern crusade in which the British peoples reclaim the Bible Lands from the Turk and make good Richard the Lionheart's failure in the twelfth century'.[51]

The official Australian photograph exhibition, which also featured a number of Hurley's dramatic photomontages supposedly depicting Australians going into battle, subsequently toured a number of British provincial towns. The largest picture, titled 'The Raid', but which was subsequently known as 'An episode after the battle of Zonnebeke' or sometimes 'Over the Top', was made of a combination of 12 negatives, measured about 21 feet by 15 feet, and depicted soldiers heading into action against an exciting—and 'real'—backdrop of explosions and new military technology.[52] These spectacular images of daring and the exotic aimed to show the British public the value of the Australian contribution to the war. Images of thrilling bravery and the Middle Eastern exotic knit the Australian forces into a narrative not just of the Great War but also into a long-established series of tropes about the romance of Empire. In this story, as constructed in Hurley's photographs (and later in Gullett's history), the Australian mounted troops become the elite vanguard of the

Empire, embedded in a long history of imperial warfare. Australia also focused heavily on exhibiting its deeds to the British public as a way of emphasizing their importance to the imperial war effort. Australian officials asserted in curating a series of exhibitions (and in the creation of unique national collections of war photographs, as well as other war-related items) that their distinctive national character was a crucial part of the fabric of the Empire.

This energetic portrayal of the supposed distinctiveness of the Australian forces continued after the war when the war objects and images collected and displayed by the Australian War Records Section (which operated as part of the army) during the conflict were organized into the Australian War Museum. This new national museum both staged travelling exhibitions of its collections and was carefully built around a narrative of a particularly Australian experience of the First World War as a national awakening. In 1922, for example, a number of Hurley's Palestine images were exhibited in Melbourne as part of a widely publicized Australian War Museum photographic exhibition. They were advertised as being part of a record for posterity. As the front page of the exhibition's catalogue stated, the viewer was there to see an exhibition of enlargements of official war photographs in 'Sepia and Natural Colour', 'The Official Collection which the Commonwealth Government is Preserving to Hand Down to Future Generations'.[53] The Palestine images focused heavily on landscapes peopled with locals posed picturesquely among ruins or desert foliage or with Australian and imperial troops moving through exotic scenery. Images 75 and 77 from this exhibition exemplify this: the first, captioned 'Passing through Jerusalem', depicts smartly dressed Australians of the Anzac Mounted Division riding through Jerusalem in January 1918.[54] Overgrown ancient stonework and part of the old city wall are visible behind them; to the side, veiled women observe their progress; and in the foreground, a barefoot local child stares into the camera. The second, 'The Desert Trail', shows 'Australians of the Imperial Camel Corps on the march across the sand hills, near the Mediterranean Sea, in Palestine, early in 1918'.[55] A line of men mounted on camels winds its way through the sand dunes, the rear of the ribbon of riders disappearing beyond the horizon. In each image, mounted Australians move with purpose through an exotic landscape—and any violence or battle which they may have engaged in is invisible (Figs. 11.4 and 11.5). (It may, however, be imagined in similar terms of dash and the exotic.)

Fig. 11.4 Frank Hurley, 'Passing through Jerusalem' (1918). AWM B01520

These kinds of images were framed within a specific narrative of Australian heroism and achievement in the Australian War Museum exhibitions mounted in the 1920s in Melbourne and Sydney. Here, they were displayed alongside objects collected during and after the campaign: captured weapons (or war trophies), exotic-seeming curiosities such as 'Arab "Throat Piercers"', campaign maps, and paintings and dioramas commissioned to depict landscapes or significant events.[56] Detailed placards described these artefacts and narrated the Australians' role in the war. Items from the Palestine campaign were displayed together in a dedicated 'Palestine Gallery', meaning the story of this particular theatre was developed as a distinct part of the Australian war experience.[57] An introductory placard composed in the 1920s and headed 'THE CAMPAIGN IN THE HOLY LAND' declared that:

> Against the picturesque background of the Holy Land the Australian Light Horse Regiments achieved their most spectacular successes. Fighting a brilliant but arduous cavalry campaign they played a decisive part in the

Fig. 11.5 Frank Hurley, 'The Desert Trail' (1918). AWM B01443

> overthrow of the despotic Turkish regimes that had ordered the destiny of Arab and Jew for 300 years.
>
> As hard as nails and as free as the air they breathed they crossed the Suez Canal in 1916 and headed their horses into the Sinai Desert knowing full well that, sired by thoroughbreds under their own Australian skies, these walers would see them through.[58]

Here, tropes of the hardy Australian bushman, developed in tales of British colonists taming the Australian wilderness, are redeployed in a military context. The Australian Light Horsemen are 'hard as nails and free as air'; their Australian-bred horses ('walers') trusty and dependable. Simultaneously, they act as (significant) agents of British civilization in fighting this 'brilliant but arduous' campaign in a land suffering under supposedly unenlightened Ottoman rule—playing a 'decisive part in the overthrow of the despotic Turkish regimes'. The themes of participating in bringing civilization and liberation and of the backwardness of both

Ottoman rule and the local peoples appeared repeatedly in these museum exhibits and placards. For example, a signboard inscribed 'To Jerusalem' collected by the 10th Australian Light Horse, 'the only Australian mounted regiment to play an important part in the operations which resulted in the capture of this city', was displayed with a museum label describing Jerusalem as indescribably filthy: 'Its oldest section, with its covered streets, into which purifying sunlight could not penetrate, had been for centuries one of the most nauseating and verminous areas in the world. Even the open and pretentious new town beyond the walls was scarcely less revolting'.[59]

Conclusion

The Palestine campaign was depicted both during and after the war through a series of imaginative frames which fulfilled differing mythmaking needs in Britain and its settler colony, Australia. These different emphases were consolidated after the war. In particular, they helped solidify the narrative of Australia entering the glorious pages of British imperial history but forging a distinctive identity in doing so, something made clear retrospectively in the 1940 blockbuster *Forty Thousand Horsemen*. This film, produced during the Second World War with the cooperation of the Australian Department of Defence and directed by Harry Chauvel (the nephew of Charles Chauvel, who commanded the Anzac Mounted Division then the Desert Mounted Corps during the Palestine campaign), and shot in part by Frank Hurley, features a scene in which three Australian Light Horsemen discuss why they are fighting in Palestine:

> LARRY "You know fellas, it's funny when you come to think of it. They used to pass through this way in chariots in the early days. Now we're travelling the same track. The road of kings, they called it. Yeah. Darius, Saladin, Napoleon. They all passed through this way before us."
>
> JIM "Times don't change much, Larry. Whether you're wearin' flowin' robes or duds like these. You know we might be in the history book ourself one of these days. That's if there's any room in that big book of England's for a couple of extra pages."
>
> RED "Pretty big book. Blenheim. Flodden field. Waterloo and Balaclava. We're always fighting about something."[60]

Australians travelled from the fringe of Empire to its centre and into history; the British travelled both to the lands of the Bible and to the colonial periphery. Both, however, saw Palestine as a landscape steeped in history and romance. British propaganda incorporated the Palestine campaign into crusader analogies heavily influenced by Victorian mediaevalism and adventure romance, as well as narratives of Britain's descent from, and continuance of, Biblical and Christian civilization. Australian mythmaking drew on these tropes too, but it also created distinct narratives about the uniqueness of the hardy antipodean Briton. This was, as I have suggested, an amalgam of ideas about what made Australia unique, and what made it essentially similar to, and integrally part of, the British Empire.[61] The Australian forces, honed by their experience of the colonial frontier, made talented troops who had proved themselves worthy of a place in the unfolding—and glorious—history of British civilization and military victory. They had, after all, written that page in Britain's 'pretty big book'. In these contrasting ways, both British and Australians drew on heavily stereotyped military encounters with the cultures and peoples of Palestine in order to sharpen the definition of the imperial centre and of a geographically even more 'peripheral' colony whose settlers nonetheless felt themselves deeply connected to their British heritage.

Notes

1. Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 1914–1920* (London, 2016), p. 350.
2. James E. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns, 1916–18* (London, 2014), p. 68.
3. Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, p. 351; Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East,* p. 69.
4. Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 213.
5. See John Horne, 'Remobilizing for 'total war': France and Britain, 1917–1918', in John Horne, ed., *State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 195–211.
6. Meirion and Susie Harries, *The War Artists: British Official War Art of the Twentieth Century* (London, 1983), p. 5.
7. Horne, 'Remobilizing for 'total war', p. 198.
8. 'Civil society' may be understood to refer to the intermediate space between people and the state and here refers specifically to the case of

sponsors of these self-mobilizing propaganda efforts, including groups like churches, the press and 'a host of semi-official and private agencies'. Ibid., pp. 198, 195.

9. Ibid., p. 195.
10. See Jennifer Wellington, *Exhibiting War: The Great War, Museums and Memory in Britain, Canada, and Australia* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 38–46.
11. Gregory, *The Last Great War*, p. 213.
12. The National War Aims Committee, which was intended to organize domestic propaganda campaigns and local events, also began its work in 1917. See David Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda in First Word War Britain: The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale* (Liverpool, 2012).
13. Mark Connelly, 'The British Media and the Image of the Empire in 1917', in Douglas E. Delaney and Nikolas Gardner, eds., *Turning Point 1917: The British Empire at War* (Vancouver, 2017), pp. 188–213, p. 204.
14. Jane Carmichael, *First World War Photographers* (London, 1989), p. 85.
15. Although the British ban on cameras on the Western Front did not prevent numerous soldiers from privately taking photographs: see Jay Winter, *War Beyond Words: Languages of Remembrance from the Great War to the Present* (Cambridge, 2017), chapter 2. However, due to the official restrictions, these images remained in private collections and were not published, so did not become part of the publicly circulated visual lexicon of the war in the United Kingdom and the empire (the situation was quite different in France).
16. Doron Bar and Kobi Cohen-Hattab, 'A New Kind of Pilgrimage: The Modern Tourist Pilgrim of Nineteenth-Century and Early Twentieth-Century Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39 (2003), pp. 131–148, p. 141.
17. Bar and Cohen-Hattab, 'A New Kind of Pilgrimage', pp. 133–134.
18. Carmichael, *First World War Photographers,* p. 84.
19. Connelly, 'The British Media and the Image of the Empire in 1917', p. 204.
20. Imperial War Museum, FILM 2327.
21. See Luke McKernan, '"The supreme moment of the war": General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 13 (1993), pp. 169–180, p. 179 (in note 10), and also M. L. Sanders and Philip Taylor, *British Propaganda During the First World War 1914–1918* (London, 1982).
22. *Illustrated London News* 19 January 1918, cited in Carmichael, *First World War Photographers*, p. 83.

23. *General Allenby's Entry into Jerusalem* (1917) IWM FILM 2327. For a detailed description of this, see also McKernan, '"The supreme moment of the war": General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem', pp. 171–177.
24. See Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, pp. 69–70.
25. James McBey, *The Allies Entering Jerusalem, 11th December 1917: General Allenby, with Colonel de Piépape Commanding the French Detachment, and Lieut-Colonel d'Agostio Commanding the Italian Detachment, Entering the City by the Jaffa Gate* (1917/1919) IWM ART 2599.
26. EN1/1/REPD/6/1-2: Reports. Departmental 1924-25. IWM – General Report on Exhibits – Month of January 1925.
27. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, p. 61.
28. See Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, pp. 67–68.
29. Eitan Bar-Yosef, 'The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917–18', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36 (2001), pp. 87–109, p. 89.
30. Notice D.607. Notice the Press. Private and Confidential. 15 November 1917. FO/395/152, no. 218223. The National Archives, Kew. This notice is cited at length in Bar-Yosef, 'The Last Crusade?', p. 87.
31. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, p. 70. See also, for example, the film listed as "With the Forces of the Palestine Front (The New Crusaders or The Palestine Front) England – April 1918" in the list of films in Nicholas Reeves, *Official British Film Propaganda During the First World War: published in association with the Imperial War Museum* (London, 1986), p. 270.
32. *Punch*, 19 December 1917, p. 415.
33. See Stefan Goebel, 'Britain's 'Last Crusade': From War Propaganda to War Commemoration, c. 1914–1930', in David Welch and Jo Fox, eds., *Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age* (London, 2012), p. 161.
34. Stefan Goebel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 115.
35. See Goebel, 'Britain's 'Last Crusade'.
36. Bar-Yosef, 'The Last Crusade?' and Eitan Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture 1799–1917: Palestine and the Question of Orientalism* (Oxford, 2005).
37. James E. Kitchen, '"Khaki Crusaders": Crusading Rhetoric and the British Imperial soldier during the Egypt and Palestine campaigns, 1916–18', *First World War Studies,* 1 (2010), pp. 141–160.
38. After being printed in book form in Melbourne in 1896, it was published in London in 1897, and then went into numerous reprints. W. H. Fitchett, *Deeds that Won the Empire* (London, 1897).

39. Dixon, *Photography, early cinema and colonial modernity*, p. 53, citing Hurley.
40. Dixon, *Photography, early cinema and colonial modernity*, p. 51.
41. 'Pictorialism' entry in Anne Lee Morgan, ed. *The Oxford Dictionary of American Art and Artists,* (Oxford, 2007), p. 379.
42. William Ivor Castle, born in Bristol, was aged 39 and manager of the photographic department of Lord Rothermere's *Daily Mirror* when he was appointed an official photographer. Peter Robinson, 'Canadian Photojournalism during the First World War', *History of Photography*, 2 (1978), p. 42.
43. See, for example, 'Australian Battle Pictures In Natural Colour. Exhibition At The Grafton Galleries', *The Times,* 22 May 1918, p. 3.
44. In some ways Hurley's approach resembled that of the American Lowell Thomas, who photographed T. E. Lawrence during the war and later popularized the "Lawrence of Arabia" myth with a post-war travelling magic lantern show, and the film *With Allenby in Palestine and Lawrence in Arabia* (1919)—which had total ticket sales of over four million. See Justin Fantauzzo, 'A Tribute to the Empire: Lowell Thomas's *With Allenby in Palestine and Lawrence in Arabia*', in Andrekos Varnava and Michael Walsh, eds., *The Great War and the British Empire: Culture, Identity, Memory* (London, 2017), pp. 199–213.
45. Robert Dixon, *Photography, Early Cinema and Colonial Modernity: Frank Hurley's Synchronized Lecture Entertainments* (London, 2012), p. 3.
46. Frank Hurley, diary entry for 25 May 1918 in Dixon and Lee, eds., *The Diaries of Frank Hurley,* (London, 2011), 104. See also 'Australian Battle Pictures', *The Times*, 22 May 1918, p. 3.
47. 'Colour Photographs. Capt. Hurley's Work in Palestine', *The Times,* 6 June 1918, p. 9; and 'Australian Battle Pictures', *The Times*, 22 May 1918, p. 3.
48. Frank Hurley in Dixon and Lee, eds., *The Diaries of Frank Hurley*, p. 91. 'The exotic locations and multicultural character of the Middle East also provided Hurley with unlimited opportunities to indulge his interest in travelogue photography, a genre that might be characterised as Great War Orientalism'. Robert Dixon, *Photography, early cinema and colonial modernity: Frank Hurley's synchronized lecture entertainments* (London, 2012), p. 54.
49. Frank Hurley, diary entries for 5 and 7 February 1918 in Dixon and Lee, eds., *The Diaries of Frank Hurley*, p. 94.
50. Dixon, *Photography, Early Cinema and Colonial Modernity,* p. 54.
51. Dixon, *Photography, Early Cinema and Colonial Modernity,* p. 54. For more on this, see Christopher Lee, '"War is not a Christian Mission": Racial Invasion and Religious Crusade in H. S. Gullett's *Official History of the Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine*', *Journal of the*

Association for the Study of Australian Literature, 7 (2008), pp. 85–96. For Gullett's work itself, see H. S. Gullett, *The A.I.F. in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918* (Sydney, 1923).

52. Frank Hurley, diary entry for 25 May 1918 in Dixon and Lee, eds., *The Diaries of Frank Hurley,* p. 104.
53. *Descriptive Catalogue. Exhibition of Enlargements. Official War Photographs. Sepia and Natural Colour. The Official Collection which the Commonwealth Government is Preserving to Hand Down to Future Generations. The Photographs Depict the Work of the A.I.F. on Gallipoli, and in France, Belgium and Palestine. Arranged by the Australian War Museum (Commonwealth Government)*. (Melbourne, 1922).
54. Frank Hurley, '75. PASSING THROUGH JERUSALEM. (Official Photo No. B1520). Australians of the Anzac Mounted Division passing through the ancient city of Jerusalem on January 22nd, 1918'. *Descriptive Catalogue. Exhibition of Enlargements. Official War Photographs* (Melbourne, 1922).
55. Frank Hurley, '77. THE DESERT TRAIL. (Official Photo No. B1443)'. *Descriptive Catalogue. Exhibition of Enlargements. Official War Photographs* (Melbourne, 1922).
56. 'A.W.M.432A. ARAB "THROAT PIERCERS" This instrument, carried by the Arab, was often used to settle personal differences. Should an opportunity occur during an argument he would put an end to the quarrel by stabbing his opponent in the neck with such a weapon as this. For this reason members of the Australian Light Horse, who had ample opportunities of studying the Arab and his little idiosyncrasies, dubbed these weapons "throat piercers". – Presented by the Military Governor of Molakah'. AWM 333 2/5/12 Palestine Gallery captions.
57. See, for example, the maps of the exhibition mounted in Sydney from 1925 filed in AWM 93 6/1/15. Layout of Collections in Exhibition Building, Sydney.
58. AWM 333 2/5/38 Part 1 captions for exhibits.
59. A.W.M.440. 'TO JERUSALEM'. AWM 333 2/5/12 Palestine Gallery captions.
60. Harry Chauvel (dir.) *Forty Thousand Horsemen* (Famous Feature Films: National Film and Sound Archive, 1940), minutes 21.07–22.19.
61. For more on this in other films depicting the First World War before 1940, see Chapter 4, 'The Empire's Last Laugh' in Daniel Reynaud, *Celluloid Anzacs: The Great War through Australian Cinema* (Melbourne, 2007).

PART IV

Power and Patrimonies

CHAPTER 12

Constructing a Literary Memory of the 1812 Russian Campaign in German Central Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century

Leighton S. James and Sheona Davies

Up to a hundred thousand people gathered to watch re-enactments of the 1812 Battle of Borodino in 2012. This was the largest re-enactment of a battle from the bicentenary of the campaign, but it was not the only one. The same year also saw re-enactments of the battles of Smolensk, Pavlovsky, Posad, Tarutino, Maloyaroslavets and Berezina. After 200 years, the historical significance of these battles was such that multinational re-enactment armies massed to 'perform' them. Like Napoleon's *Grande Armée* that crossed the Niemen in the summer of 1812, the re-enactors of 2012 were drawn from a variety of European nations and countries. For under Napoleon's command, an invading force not just of French, but also of Italian, Swiss, Portuguese, Spanish, Polish, German and Austrian soldiers marched east to Moscow to confront a Russian army composed of ethnic Russians, Poles, German Balts, Cossacks, Bashkirs and Kalmucks.

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The 1812 campaign was, thus, a European experience. For the French and other participants from Central and Western Europe, it also marked an odyssey to the eastern margins of the continent that bore comparison with the other great Napoleonic expedition 14 years earlier to Egypt and the Levant. Both, as we have seen in Chaps. 2 and 4, proved crucial episodes for mapping an imaginary Europe and what lay beyond as, in their own way, did the parallel Napoleonic and British expeditions to the opposite corner of Europe in Portugal and Spain (Chap. 3). The historical significance of the Russian campaign, and the wider Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, was not lost on the European participants in the Grande Armée, and as we have seen, many literate veterans took up the quill to write their own accounts of them. Their eyewitness narratives played a crucial role in communicating and commemorating the 1812 campaign across Europe throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the centenary in 1912 was also marked by the republication of memoirs and histories of 1812 as well as by new volumes commissioned for the increasingly sophisticated and fast-paced European book market. Memoirs, diaries and letters also provided the raw stuff for new media representations. To coincide with the centenary, for example, a joint Russian-French film depicting the invasion entitled *1812* was produced and premiered simultaneously in all the cities of the Russian Empire on 25 August 1912, the eve of the anniversary of the Battle of Borodino.[1]

This suggests, together with the comparable interest a hundred years on in the Egyptian and Peninsula campaigns, that the cultural encounters and mental mapping of Europe's margins at the turn of the nineteenth century provided a rich and influential matrix of European self-awareness that not only helped shape colonial military ventures across the century but remained a strong influence on European powers like Britain, France and Germany on the eve of further, even larger military movements to the same regions in the east and south-east (the Russian Empire, the Balkans, Italy and the Levant) during the First World War. The German memory of the 1812 campaign is especially interesting in this regard, for it provides evidence of the longevity of this first set of cultural encounters in an area where, from late 1914 to 1918, the Imperial German army would take the same paths as its Napoleonic predecessor (though without ever reaching Moscow) and engage on a new but parallel set of encounters in the Russian borderlands.

This chapter takes up the eyewitness accounts of the 1812 Russian campaign already discussed in Chap. 4 and examines them as a literary genre that can be used to map changing attitudes to Germanness, Germany's

eastern neighbours and the Russian enemy across the nineteenth century. In doing so, it charts the shift from a communicative to a cultural memory as the veterans' lived contact with the experience of the Russian east gave way to what Aleida and Jan Assmann have termed 'cultural memory', a memory constructed from a selected repertory of images and accounts that traced the changing place of 1812 in the collective and institutional awareness of Germany from the process of unification down to the onset of the Great War.[2] It argues that the representation of the campaign in German autobiographical literature was essentially stable throughout most of the century. Moreover, whilst the cultural and institutional memory of the 1812 campaign was elided with that of the struggle against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814 in the southern German states, veterans' narratives nevertheless resisted any easy incorporation into a political discourse structured around Prussian triumphalism and Francophobia after 1870. This was partly due to the origins of many of these veterans, who came from the states of the Confederation of the Rhine. Yet it also stemmed from the fact that many were disappointed with their place in the German Confederation and still looked with pride on their military service under Napoleon's command.

The chapter surveys the publication history of these soldiers' eyewitness accounts and provides a typology of their narratives. The generic conventions of this corpus of accounts of the 1812 campaign developed concomitantly with the technological and economic conditions of German and European book markets in the nineteenth century. The interaction between the paratextual elements of an increasingly commercial and sophisticated book market, and the inherent authenticity and authority with which these authors imbued their accounts, created a tension that exposes some of the underlying currents of memory politics in the long nineteenth-century memory as this related to a German sense of 'the east'.

German Narratives of the Russian Campaign and the Literary Market

The main narrative of the campaign and tropes of its representation were established fairly early on in the popular consciousness. After advancing into Russia, Napoleon's army chased the Russian forces all the way to Moscow. In the process the *Grande Armée* and the Russian forces clashed at Smolensk and Borodino, but neither battle produced the decisive

victory that Napoleon craved. Rather than defend Moscow, the Russian army abandoned it to Napoleon, but the French Emperor's expectations that occupying the city would force Tsar Alexander I to negotiate were dashed. Clinging to this hope Napoleon waited too long in a fire-ravaged Moscow before ordering the retreat. His plans to withdraw along the southern route were thwarted in a battle at Maloyaroslavets, and so the remnants of the *Grande Armée* were forced to return along the same route that still bore the scars of the advance only a few months earlier.

Veterans' narratives, published or unpublished, are unanimous on the hardship of the retreat. The provision of supplies and food, which had been difficult on the advance, now became impossible. The first snows had fallen as the army departed Moscow and the harsh winter continued to take its toll on the troops. Many froze to death, or weakened by the lack of food and the prevailing cold, succumbed to illness or injury. The memoir of Carl Sachs, an officer in the army of Baden, provides a representative description of the suffering the soldiers endured. In his entry for the 8 December 1812, he wrote:

> We saw death lying everywhere around the burnt out fires, and often noticed a trail of blood through the snow until one finally came upon one or more people without footwear and whose toes had been turned to lumps of bleeding flesh. Such unfortunates staggered on until they laid down. Others were blind or became foolhardy. The latter could be seen playing with the fires and watching with a friendly air as the embers burnt their hands. Those affected most severely bowed their heads over the fire and roasted themselves while giving a friendly grin … The misery created by the cold, hunger and uninterrupted march had reached the highest degree.[3]

All the while, Russian forces and irregular Cossack troops pursued the retreating soldiers, who were also threatened by pious, vengeful peasants who believed in, and had witnessed, barbarous French secularism. Karl von Suckow, an officer in the Württemberg army, recalled the fear that the name Cossack struck into the fleeing soldiers. The Cossacks were blamed for every misfortune, whilst those soldiers captured risked summary execution or, worse, torture and mutilation.[4] Those fortunate to survive being captured remained, for the most part, in Russia and would slowly make their way back, if at all, in the following years. Cold, Cossacks, hunger, suffering and extraordinary violence: these were the topoi that would characterise both the communicative and cultural memory of the campaign throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.

Their accounts also served another purpose, however. The scale of the invasion was such that few could escape its effects. The campaign drove deep into Russia; supply lines were stretched to breaking point, and the supply of information did not fare much better. Throughout the campaign civilian populations desperate for news of loved ones had to rely on a series of official *Bulletins* issued by the French army and reports in the local press. These official sources of information were notoriously unreliable. A common phrase of the time was 'to lie like a Bulletin'; losses were minimized, gains exaggerated and each battle represented as a victory. The final bulletin, the 29th, reported on 3 December 1812 that Napoleon had returned safely to Paris and 'the health of his majesty has never been better'.[5] These dry official reports were not enough to satisfy the civilian populations from whom the various armies of the German states had for the most part been conscripted. Moreover, whilst some soldiers, particularly officers, were able to send letters back to families during the campaign, the means by which they did so in previous conflicts, be it via existing postal networks or through returning comrades and couriers, were undermined by the comparatively under-developed Russian road network, the devastation caused by the invasion and retreat, enemy action and the breakdown of military discipline. Rumours concerning the extent of the army's losses were rife, and in Westphalia, for example, false death notices appeared.[6] When the men finally began to return home, the few who did felt it part of their duty to record and report what had happened to their fallen comrades. As argued elsewhere in this volume, the memory of the Russian campaign was second only to that of the Wars of Liberation in nineteenth-century Germany. Contemporaries also recognized the importance of the event. The *Allgemeiner Anzeiger und Nationalzeitung der Deutschen* declared in 1817 that the 'Russian campaign in the year 1812 is and remains in every sense one of the most extraordinary events in history. Not only in the present but also in posterity will this campaign, in which many hundreds of families lost their sons, brothers and relatives, remain in inextinguishable memory'.[7] It is within this vacuum of information and the desire to remember that the soldier-authored eyewitness accounts appeared.

German accounts of the 1812 campaign can be broadly divided into three groups. The first are eyewitness accounts of those fortunate to have returned with the remnants of the *Grande Armée* in 1812/1813. The second group encompasses those who were captured in Russia and survived to return to their homeland. Often these former prisoners of war only returned home years after their capture. A third group includes regi-

mental or group histories which report the fate of regiments and units and deal more in generalities than individual encounters and beliefs. What follows concerns those accounts in which the author was present on the campaign and eyewitness to events.

The chronology of the publication of these eyewitness accounts can also be divided broadly into three periods. The first extends from the end of the campaign to roughly the 1830s. Many of these narratives were produced by veterans, or were written by more literate members of the community, who wished to preserve a record of their experiences and were based on diaries or collections of letters. The second phase, from the mid-nineteenth century to 1870, was a period in which the memory of 1812 was instrumentalized and contributed to the formation of state and national loyalties. The final period, from the 1870s to the start of the First World War, bears the fruit of a combination of rising nationalism and militarism against the background of fighting old enemies coupled with increased historical literacy. These later two phases include the republication of works that appeared in the first phase, particularly around the fiftieth and hundredth anniversaries of the campaign. They also encompass posthumously published works produced by veterans' families or by historians, both amateur and professional.

As already suggested, the prefaces to these eyewitness accounts of the Russian campaign of 1812 broadly correlate to the shift from communicative to cultural memory identified by Aleida and Jan Assmann. They support the idea of a shift from embodied to canonical knowledge over time as the generation of eyewitnesses passes away.[8] This shift can also be seen in the way authors and publishers chose to title these accounts and in the evolution of this genre from predominantly autobiographical works to an array of different texts, such as posthumously published works, compilations and anthologies.

These publications' impact on the reading public is difficult to assess precisely. Nevertheless, there does appear to have been a growing appetite and audience for war narratives throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In marked contrast to earlier conflicts, the Napoleonic Wars witnessed an explosion in the number of autobiographical accounts written by veterans. Moreover, rising literary rates in the eighteenth century meant that increasing numbers of ordinary soldiers, not just officers, were able to record their experiences.[9] In the German case, a sample of 269 autobiographical texts dealing with the Napoleonic Wars published between 1815 and 1915 points to a surge in first editions of autobiogra-

phies in the 40-year period between 1830 and 1870. Of the sample, 19 were published before 1829, while 61 were published between 1830 and 1849. Another 66 were published in the period up to 1850 and 1869. The increase, as Karen Hagemann has pointed out, 'followed the memory booms of the twenty-fifth, fiftieth and one-hundredth anniversaries and also steadily increased, reflecting the more general expansion of the literary market'.[10]

A book written and published in German in the nineteenth century could be expected to find a relatively large and expanding audience. Friedrich Sengle has argued that the German states experienced an 'allgemeine Leselust' (a general desire to read) in the first half of the century, something that manifested itself in an increasing number of lending libraries, literary societies and reading circles.[11] Libraries provided access to greater quantities of books, although access to these was only for those who could afford the subscription fees and books remained expensive until the second half of the nineteenth century.[12] Nevertheless, German speakers were a comparatively literate group. Literacy rates are notoriously unreliable; reading and writing were taught separately and consecutively and are difficult to measure with any accuracy. Most studies of historical literacy rates have measured writing ability, but James Brophy has argued for the 1870s that 'although exact numbers will never be established… ideas circulating in print had penetrated well beyond the small fraction of Germany's elite circles'.[13] Cultural competition between Protestant and Catholic denominations, particularly in areas characterized by high levels of religious pluralism, such as the Rhineland, had already contributed to relatively high literacy rates by the beginning of the nineteenth century.[14] A series of educational reforms throughout the nineteenth century meant that by the beginning of the twentieth century virtually the entire German population was literate, whilst the industrialization of book production led to lower prices. Book production fell during the Napoleonic Wars, but by the eve of the First World War more books were published in Germany than in France, Great Britain or the United States.[15]

It should also be noted that being able to read was not a necessary requirement for being involved in a literate or literary society. The printed volumes, which are the focus of this chapter, are but distillations of individual stories, and a strong oral storytelling culture still pervaded public spaces in nineteenth-century Germany.[16] Prose was also not the only way in which the Napoleonic period, including the Russian campaign, could be remembered. Folk songs such as *Bei Smolensk war die erste Schlacht*

(*The First Battle was at Smolensk*) also commemorated the catastrophic invasion and were distributed as song sheets by itinerant peddlers.[17] Similar accounts exist in manuscript and these unpublished works would have been circulated in this format amongst family and friends. Such narratives were still being discovered in the twentieth century. For example, excerpts from the diary of one Bavarian officer who served in Russia, Michael Antlsberger, were typed up in the 1930s. Similarly, Wilhelm Gruber, another member of the Bavarian contingent, wrote an account of his experiences entitled *Erlebnisse auf dem Rückzuge aus Rußland 1812* sometime between 1813 and his death in 1821. A copy was made of the manuscript in 1867. Excerpts from his narrative were published alongside those of another 1812 veteran in the *Regensburger Almanach* in 1994.[18]

These types of accounts interact in broader nineteenth-century memory culture in an interesting manner. They were produced and sometimes published at one point in time as a result of the author's desire to record their experiences and/or because of the existence of a commercial market or audience for the book. However, they also persisted beyond this moment in time. They sat physically on shelves and in libraries and some were republished or repackaged at a later date. As will be discussed below, some books were re-issued with prefaces claiming that very few alterations had been made to the text, whilst others were dramatically refashioned to produce a more commercially viable text different in appearance, style, content and length. Of the latter sort, the abridged and re-written accounts produced for children show the most obvious variance with the original source material. However, as the centenary approached, and indeed in response to waxing nationalism and growing international tensions, prevailing trends in the framing and naming of these narratives indicate shifts in both the sort of memory work these texts were undertaking and how authors and publishers responded to the requirements of a maturing marketplace and the broader political context.

Early German Accounts of the 1812 Campaign

Accounts of the Russian campaign began appearing less than a year after its conclusion. One of the earliest German-language accounts, *Rückzug der Franzosen* (*Retreat of the French*) by Ernst von Pfuel, was first published anonymously in St. Petersburg in December 1812 and then reprinted in Berlin in March 1813 as a 'rechtmäßiger Abdruck' ('authorized copy'). Pfuel was a former Prussian officer and military reformer who

had links to Baron Friedrich Karl von und zum Stein and Heinrich von Kleist. He had entered service in the Austrian army in 1810 and joined the Russian military in 1812, accompanying it during its pursuit of the *Grande Armée*. The edition printed in Berlin was expanded and updated to include *Rückzug der Franzosen bis zum Niemen* (*Retreat of the French to the Niemen*).[19] As might be expected, the work was critical of French military preparations and juxtaposed the imaginative excesses of the French *Bulletins* with the destruction of the *Grande Armée* and all the human suffering that entailed.[20] This account was also written to encourage the Russians to continue the war, a decision that divided the Russian command.[21] The speedy addition of a second edition in 1813, followed by further editions later on, situates this text more as reportage than memoir literature. The author, however, used his authority as an eyewitness to lay down facts that were of use to later nineteenth-century accounts of the campaign. A later edition was reviewed in the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* in 1814 and several later histories referred to the text.[22]

French- and English-language accounts of the campaign were also quickly translated into German to feed a desire for knowledge. A weekly journal was launched on 8 January 1814 under the title *War Stories from the Years 1812/13 or Representations and Narratives from the Campaigns of the French and Allied Troops* (*Darstellung und Schilderungen aus den Feldzügen der Franzosen und der verbündeten Truppen*).[23] Printed in Breslau by the city and university publishing house, this journal eventually ran to 108 issues and remained in print until 27 January 1816. The editor, Friedrich August Nösselt, a history teacher in Breslau, was concerned to prevent the deeds of the previous years from disappearing into certain 'oblivion' (*Vergessenheit*). 'Sparing neither trouble nor expense', he had sought contributions from all over Silesia. Most of the essays concerned the 1813 campaign, but issues 14 to 17 also included the translated account of an unnamed English officer attached to the Russian army. Each edition contained three or four pieces, unsigned, that typically covered two to three pages before promising to continue in either the next or an unidentified future issue.[24]

German veterans of the campaigns also began producing accounts soon after their return from Russia. In the period immediately after the campaign, their narratives tended to be epistolary in nature or were transcriptions or write-ups of diaries. The advantage of working with diaries and letters was that the raw text was already written. They also reflected the popularity that epistolary novels had enjoyed in Europe in the last quarter

of the eighteenth century.[25] The prefaces to these accounts frame the editing process, such as it was, as an exercise in curating rather than the creation of a whole body of text. Rarely, it appears, were unedited, 'raw' autobiographical texts published. In the case of letters, private details were often cut out to focus the narrative more firmly on the war experience, whilst diaries were often 'written up' rather than presented unchanged to the reader.

Some early accounts appear to have been supported by subscription and received the patronage of high-status individuals and families. For example, the *Merkwürdige Tage meines Lebens: Feldzug und Kriegsgefangenschaft in Rußland* (*Strange Days of My Life: Campaign and Captivity in Russia*), published in 1817, listed around 323 subscribers, amongst them the Duke of Württemberg. The Württemberg army had suffered enormous losses during the campaign, with only a few hundred of the 15,800-strong contingent returning home. Indeed, veterans appeared to be the primary audience for the work. A review of the book that appeared in the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* suggested that it was of little use to readers interested in the history of the campaign. Instead of commenting on Russia and its people, the author focused on 'what he suffered, did, ate and drank'. The reviewer continued that 'for the comrades whom had lived through the same the book may be interesting enough, [but] for the general public it is not particularly recommendable'.[26] Despite these criticisms, the book was fully subscribed and several subscribers purchased more than one copy. Of the latter, eight were either merchants or booksellers, possibly indicating that they intended to add the volume to their stock.[27] Subscribers could get the book with black and white illustrations for 1 *Gulden* 48 *Kreuzer*. An illuminated copy cost 2 *Gulden* 30 *Kreuzer*. Those seeking to buy it from a book merchant would have to pay 2 *Gulden* 30 *Kreuzer* or 3 *Gulden* 15 *Kreuzer*.[28]

Many accounts were also published anonymously, at least initially. Anonymous or unnamed accounts reduced the exposure of private lives, and may also have been an attempt to circumvent censorship. The political structure of the German Confederation after 1815 meant that the degree of state oversight of the press and publishing industry varied by state, allowing authors and publishers the opportunity to circumvent legal restrictions in one area by publishing elsewhere. The Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, however, tightened censorship throughout the German-speaking territories. Newspapers and pamphlets of fewer than 20 pages now required previous consent from the public authorities, as did books of

fewer than 320 pages. In this earliest phase anonymity enabled the authors to write with less concern and to make more explicitly political and critical statements than found in the more biographical works.[29]

The anonymously authored *Briefe von der baier'schen Armee: geschrieben im französischen Feldzuge* (*Letters from the Bavarian Army: written during the French campaign*), for example, appeared in 1814. Motivated by the desire to 'explain the fate of my compatriots (*Landesleuten*)', the anonymous Bavarian letter-writer was careful to note the limited nature of his account, but also its proximity to events. The author wrote in his foreword that 'these letters, by the way, are entirely the work of the moment. Unconcerned into whose hands they might fall, they were written mostly on the field of battle, [or] in a camp'.[30] Similarly, another anonymous author's letters, this time to his sister rather than a friend, were published in 1813.[31] The immediacy of the transmission of the information from eye, to hand, to paper, to the reader was meant to foster a sense of palpable proximity. The format of the letter has changed from a loose sheet of paper to a bound, printed volume, but the visceral experience of reading is common to both the first and to later readers of this text.

Other accounts purported to be written up from diaries, such as the anonymously published *Merkwürdige Tage mines Lebens* referred to above. Karl Theuss's account, entitled *Memories of my days as a Russian Prisoner of War: From the diary of a German* (*Rückblicke und Erinnerungen aus den Tagen meiner russischen Gefangenschaft: Aus dem Tagebuch eines Deutschen*), was initially published anonymously by the Bruder and Hoffmann publishing house in Leipzig in 1816. Although the title suggests that the narrative was a diary, the published account was written up from contemporary notes and contains examples of reported speech. Nevertheless, the work bears hallmarks of its origins as a diary, as illustrated by the numerous short dated entries. Like others, the author claimed he had been motivated to record his experience because so few had returned from Russia to communicate their 'frightful incidents' of the campaign to those at home.[32]

Although epistolary accounts characterized the immediate phase of publishing after 1812, compilations of contemporary letters continued to appear later in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Wilhelm von Loßberg was a former Hessian officer who had served in the army of the Kingdom of Westphalia during the invasion of Russia. In 1844 he published an edited collection of his letters home and, in his foreword, claimed to have spent the intervening years ordering and transcribing his letters. Like

many other veterans, he declared that he had been moved to publish the letters at the behest of former comrades. Loßberg, however, also had another goal; he regarded his work a corrective to the 'inadequate and often mistaken' existing accounts. Like earlier accounts, Loßberg claimed to have made few editorial changes, except for cutting out some 'private matters', and insisted that 'the fresh language of the diary has been preserved'. He also pointed to the immediacy of the letter form, writing 'I have kept the letters unchanged, too, because this way of telling the story seems to me the most appropriate way to bring to the reader, especially the non-military reader, all the true and faithful situations of a war which to this day is without precedent in the history of the civilised world'.[33]

Mid-century Memoirs

Both types of account, epistolary and diary, tended to stop rather suddenly as resources dwindled and the keeping of a diary or sending of letters became inconceivable in the context of the conditions of the retreat. These sudden cessations speak to a larger experience of absence and loss, one that could not be supplemented by archival research or reports from others so soon after the events themselves had happened. A steady flow of soldiers' memoirs and autobiographies of the Napoleonic Wars was published in the period between the 1830s and 1870 throughout Germany. As both Hagemann and Mark Hewitson have suggested, many accounts written by the leading officers and generals often focus on the military details of manoeuvre, camp, attack and counter-attack, rather than providing descriptions of the everyday experiences of the soldiers. Interested readers could, however, turn to the accounts of junior and non-commissioned officers for more vivid and visceral depictions.[34] Many of these later accounts related the experiences of soldiers who had been captured during the campaign and transported to the interior of Russia. These soldiers, particularly those who had been captured by either the Russian regulars or the Cossacks, lost their diaries and papers. The chaotic nature of the retreat was not conducive to the preservation of personal documentation. No doubt many letters and diaries fed the flames of campfires *en route*, whilst those soldiers who were captured were relieved of their few possessions, if not their lives. Karl von Schehl, for example, specifically noted in the introduction to his memoirs that his story was based on memory as the diary in which he kept details of this march had been destroyed when he was captured by Cossacks.[35]

Schehl wrote his memoirs in 1862, but earlier examples of accounts based solely on memory include the works of Friedrich von Lindemann, Joseph Schrafel, Friedrich Peppler and Büttner.[36] Authors drawn from the educated officer class wrote many of these accounts, but some, such as Büttner and Schrafel, were of humbler origins. These accounts were often self-published or printed by small local publishing houses, although running to multiple editions. Few were reviewed in the pages of the literary magazines and periodicals and they seem to have been aimed at local readers.[37]

Unlike earlier accounts, these made no explicit claim to be based on contemporary writings. Instead, they drew on the veterans' memories of events. Nevertheless, these narratives shared many features of the earlier works. The forewords also reveal the same desire as the early works to write about and record their experiences, often with the encouragement of friends and families. Many deprecated their ability to provide systematic descriptions of the campaign or detailed analyses of the Russian state, agriculture, culture or mores. Büttner pointed to the fact that he had been brought up in a poor family and had received little education before being apprenticed and then conscripted.[38] Büttner's humble origins made him something of a rarity as officers and soldiers drawn from the German middle classes and aristocracy dominated the communicative memory of the Napoleonic Wars. Not only were these individuals better able to express their experiences, their memories were also deemed more interesting and marketable by commercial publishing houses.[39] Even high-status authors, however, were often circumspect about the completeness of their work. For example, Peppler, despite being an officer and better educated than Büttner, echoed the latter's modesty. He wrote that he was conscious that this 'little work' might not meet the expectations of those who had encouraged him to write it. In his defence, he wrote that 'in such conditions scholarly observations, even those of wise and knowledgeable men, can only be sparse and meagre. The wretched, despised, mistreated beggar must be satisfied when he can drag his sorrowful life from one day to the next'.[40] Like the anonymous *Merkwürdige Tage*, Peppler's and Büttner's narratives, therefore, focused on personal experiences, rather than any wider overview of the campaign.

A systematic examination of the readership for these volumes has yet to be undertaken, but there are some hints that suggest that these war narratives attracted a wide cross section of the population. Some memoirs and autobiographies included lengthy lists of subscribers, some of which give

a sense of the audience for the work. Büttner's memoir, for example, includes a list of 202 subscribers. Of these more than half (107) were members of the military. The majority were officers, but the subscribers included several cadets, a sergeant and four corporals. Some examples appear to have been destined for regimental libraries. The 4th, 7th and 13th Bavarian infantry regiments subscribed to multiple copies, whilst four cavalry squadrons of the 5th *Chevaux-légers* Regiment also received a copy each. The remaining subscribers, however, were a diverse group drawn from a wide range of social and occupational backgrounds including brewers, schoolteachers, priests, scribes and civil servants. Several artisans and craftsmen were also listed, including a shoemaker, a master mason and a button maker.[41] The advertisements for the book indicate a retail price of 9 *Groschen* or 36 *Kreuzer*, making it significantly cheaper than *Merkwürdige Tage*.[42] It is plausible that some subscribers were also former veterans of the campaign or had family members who had served in Russia.

Whereas many of the earlier published accounts focused exclusively on the Russian campaign, many of these later narratives covered multiple theatres of war. The works of Joseph Schrafel and Jakob Meyer provide representative examples. Schrafel, a sergeant from Nuremberg, had served first in the Tyrol against the Austrians before participating in the invasion of Russia, whilst Meyer had fought in Spain from 1808. Increasingly, the campaign was therefore being represented as part of longer life narratives that encompassed the individual soldier's entire participation in the Napoleonic Wars. Their forewords, however, were largely the same as the earlier works in that the authors claimed that they were concerned to represent only their experiences. The content, by contrast, was much more expressive and usually focused on the hardships that they endured on campaign. They were also much more influenced by literary trends than the earlier accounts, and the dominant mode of these later works was picaresque as the authors described their adventures, narrow escapes and suffering. Karl von Schehl's account provides a representative example as he describes his baptism of fire at Borodino, the burning of Moscow, his capture by Cossacks, Russian service and eventual homecoming.[43]

Many of these later autobiographies and memoirs also provided much more detailed descriptions of the various peoples they encountered, from ethnic Russians to Jews, Cossacks and Bashkirs. These representations generally served to confirm already negative stereotypes about Eastern Europe. Whilst the Russian peasantry were presented as backward and vengeful, the Cossacks and Bashkirs were presented as barbaric and wild,

even inhuman. The Jews, meanwhile, were particularly vilified. Representations of the Jews were coloured by anti-Semitism inherited from the early modern period; they were also condemned for allegedly profiteering from the desperation of the fleeing soldiers.[44]

Some accounts, particularly those from Bavaria, exhibit a sense of state loyalty or *Landespatriotismus*, and Büttner, for example, repeatedly referred to his longing for his Fatherland.[45] Those works published in the 1830s and beyond appeared against the background of attempts by the southern German states to make use of the memory of the Napoleonic Wars as a force for state integration. Whilst the official narrative in Prussia focused on the Wars of Liberation as the moment of German rebirth under Prussian leadership, the memory of the wars was more complex for the southern German states that had been formerly allied to and expanded by Napoleon. Over the course of the nineteenth century, ruling dynasties, therefore, sought to elide the experience of fighting for and against Napoleon in official memory. On the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig on 18 March 1833, for example, an obelisk was erected in Munich to commemorate the Bavarian fallen of both the Russian campaign and the subsequent Wars of Liberation. As Ute Planert has argued, this created continuity between the two events, whilst a religious interpretation saw the sacrifice in Russia as a pre-requisite for the defeat of the French and the resurgence of the German nation. The military defeat of 1812 was therefore reworked as a political victory. References to the Fatherland in the anniversary literature and other commemorative buildings, such as the *Feldherrnhalle* in Munich and the *Walhalla* near Regensburg, conflated German and Bavarian patriotism.[46] Expressions of German nationalism or national identity found little echo in contemporaneous Bavarian soldiers' diaries and letters, however. Instead, where loyalty was expressed, it was directed towards the Bavarian army or the Kingdom of Bavaria.[47]

The issue of patriotism and loyalty was particularly problematic for those soldiers and officers who had served in the armies of other states, such as France, Württemberg or Westphalia. The emergence of veterans' associations in the Rhineland suggests a desire to commemorate, even celebrate, their wartime service in the French armies. Pro-Napoleon sentiments also continued to be expressed in popular culture.[48] For others, particularly officers who had voluntarily enlisted in another state's army in order to continue their military career, questions of loyalty were more fraught. Johann Borcke served first in the Prussian army before fighting in Spain and Russia as a Westphalian officer. His memoirs, written sometime

in the mid-nineteenth century and published in 1888, reveal a tension between his sense of Prussian patriotism and his loyalty to the Westphalian military. Borcke condemned his fellow officers who deserted Westphalian service for Prussia as soon as the tide turned against Napoleon, but he nevertheless celebrated the moment he would once again become a Prussian soldier:

> The seven years behind me were like a dream. I had experienced much, good and evil, but more melancholy than pleasing. I had changed in many relationships under the pressure of the time, but I had held to my principles and with reasonable enthusiasm I longed for the time when I, as a Prussian soldier, was allowed to participate in the great work of liberation which had begun but was far from finished.[49]

In a personal sense, Borcke represented therefore the same integration of the campaigns for and against Napoleon as the official commemoration of states like Bavaria. He could claim to have done his military duty honourably and diligently as a Westphalian officer, yet at the same time celebrate the end of French hegemony in Germany.

The Russian Campaign in the Kaiserreich

By 1870 very few veterans were left alive. Nevertheless, memoirs, autobiographies, diaries and letters continued to be published in Wilhelmine Germany, often by veterans' family members or by historians. The centenary of the campaign saw a high point in the publication or republication of such works. There were also new outlets for these books as the number of publishing houses proliferated. Some produced a series of memoirs, which included accounts from the Napoleonic Wars. The George Wiegand Verlag publishing house, meanwhile, produced a series specializing in the Napoleonic period. Many works had already been published prior to 1870, but in contrast to earlier editions, these reprints were often heavily edited and sometimes tailored to specific audiences. During this period, editors also produced more extensive forewords in an effort to provide a wider context for the narrative account. As we have seen, veterans had been generally careful in their prefaces to circumscribe that upon which they could comment with authority, and they tended to keep their experience and their writing personal. These qualifications became less pronounced throughout the nineteenth century as editors became more

interventionist. Hagemann points to Fleck's memoir as a particularly good example. Originally published in 1845, it was edited by the local historian August Tecklenburg and re-issued by the Hildesheim Verlag in 1907. Against the background of rising tensions between Germany and France, Tecklenburg built on the existing Francophobic sentiment in Fleck's narrative and hoped it would inspire patriotism amongst Germany's youth.[50]

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German historians, such as Heinrich von Treitschke and Friedrich Meinecke, looked to the Wars of Liberation as a period of rebirth for Prussian and German nationalism. The conflict also consolidated the image of the French as the hereditary enemy of Germany (*Erbfeind*) in political and cultural discourse. This image, which had its roots in Louis XIV's destruction of the Palatinate, could be mobilized during subsequent periods of conflict, such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1871.[51] Indeed, the resumption of hostilities with France and the emergence of the German Empire on the back of a war with another Napoleon added impetus to the publication of memoirs, autobiographies and diaries that dealt with the Napoleonic Wars. The war memoirs of Prussian volunteers and former *Landwehr* soldiers who served during the Wars of Liberation often provided a handy medium through which to transmit these Francophobic sentiments.

The war memoirs of the 1812 campaign, Fleck's example notwithstanding, often sat uneasily with any Francophobic discourse, however. Despite the suffering veterans had endured during the campaign, surprisingly few were condemnatory of the French or Napoleon. Indeed, many, particularly those published by veterans from the Rhineland and the southern German states, often reflected positively on their war experiences either in the French army or in the armies of allied states. This posed a challenge to nationalist-minded editors in Wilhelmine Germany. An interesting example is provided by the memoir of Eduard Rüppell. Born in 1792 in Cassel, Rüppell attended the Westphalian Military School established in 1808 and later served in the 2nd Hussar Regiment. Captured on 19 August 1812, he was released in 1814. He failed to find a military position in the restored Hessian state and eventually entered service in the Austrian army. His memoirs were in the possession of his daughter-in-law, Therese Rüppell, and appear to have been unpublished before 1912. That year, they were edited by the historian and librarian, Friedrich Clemens Ebrard, and published by the Berlin-based Paetel Brothers publishing house. In his foreword to the memoirs, Ebrard strikes an almost apologetic note over Rüppell's political sympathies:

> Rüppell's political stance was and remained definitely and decidedly Napoleonic. If we are fair, we should not apply our patriotic Prussian standards here. On the contrary, we will understand that an officer who had joined the French-led military school of King Jerome at a very young age enthusiastically followed the flags of the great emperor, like so many others, and we cannot blame him, if he afterwards turned his back on his own fatherland and his ruler, who had forgotten nothing and had learned nothing in exile, and who had finally turned his back with ingratitude on the numerous sacrifices which his faithful people had made for him. Incidentally, Rüppell's admiration for Napoleon had as its innermost reason his truly soldierly sensibility and, on the other hand, he always expressed himself with a remarkably objective and unreserved acknowledgement of the advantages of the enemy wherever he perceived them with a clear eye.[52]

A further example is provided by the memoir of Friedrich Gieße. Gieße, like Rüppell, served in the Westphalian army, but was denied a position in the Hessian army. His memoir was also published in 1912. The editor, a family member, claims that Gieße received the news of the declaration of the German *Reich* with mixed feelings, commenting: 'Now no-one will speak any more about the deeds and suffering of our youth'.[53] In both of these cases the narrative appears deeply influenced by the subsequent experience of the authors. Unable to find a place in the restored German states or to continue their military careers, they looked fondly and proudly on their service as allies of the French. Consequently, their accounts do not fit easily into a Francophobic framework, whatever the intentions of the editor.

These attitudes were also found elsewhere. The *Kaiserreich* saw the publication of memoirs in various forms, such as anthologies. Paul Holzhausen played a particularly prominent role in editing and publishing narratives of the 1812 campaign. Holzhausen had been involved in editing and publishing veteran accounts from the late nineteenth century and in 1912 published an anthology entitled *Die Deutschen in Russland, 1812: Leben und Leiden auf der Moskauer Heerfahrt* (*The Germans in Russia, 1812: Life and Suffering on the March to Moscow*).[54] The work is remarkable for a number of reasons. Unlike the other narratives examined here, Holzhausen's book performed an interesting function of quoting and citing liberally from numerous first-person narratives, whilst submitting to the pressure of providing an over-arching narrative of the campaign. In his foreword, he emphasized the importance of the 1812 campaign for the peoples of Europe, arguing that it overshadowed the Frederican wars of

the eighteenth century, the Wars of Liberation and even the Franco-Prussian War. In those later campaigns, he claimed, families knew where their fathers, husbands and sons had fallen, but the same was not true for 1812. He highlighted the tragic nature of the invasion, pointing to the 'deep wounds this war inflicted on our people'. Yet he also emphasized that the men had followed Napoleon into Russia out of 'soldierly loyalty' and had done their duty. This aspect of the war, he believed, had been 'overshadowed by the events of the Wars of Liberation' and 'overlooked by posterity'. Germans, in Holzhausen's view, had the 'right to be proud of these men', despite the fact they had fought for Napoleon.[55]

Conclusion

The examples of Rüppell, Gieße and Holzhausen illustrate the complexity of the war narratives of 1812. Interest in the campaign in the years immediately after 1812 had been intense, partly because the fate of so many soldiers remained uncertain. Many of the early accounts were collections of letters or published diaries, but soon veterans were writing memoirs based principally on their own memory, although they were no doubt able to draw on already published accounts as well as any personal papers or mementos that may have survived. Most of the early memoirists were keen to point to the limited nature of their narratives, indicating to the reader in their forewords that they were only able to describe what happened to them. Whilst the earliest accounts were often very factual, the narratives published after the 1830s were more expansive and included often lengthy descriptions not only of the invasion but also the peoples and cultures encountered. All highlighted the suffering and hardship of the campaign, features simultaneously commemorated in other forms, such as song. As argued in Chap. 4 in this volume, reports of war atrocities during the Russian campaign helped consolidated the image of Russia as a savage, uncivilized land. The representations of the extreme climate and exotic peoples, such as the Cossacks, transmitted through a variety of media also helped confirm an image of Russia as beyond the civilized frontiers of Europe. During the first half of the nineteenth century, this image of Russia formed part of the communicative memory of the veterans. There is ample evidence that veterans talked readily about their experience. Later, in the second half of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the image became part of the cultural memory of the campaign via the publication and republication of deceased veterans' accounts. The

dissemination of their works was aided by the falling cost of book production and the expansion of the literary market.

The depiction of Russia remained relatively stable throughout the long nineteenth century whatever the changing relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbour. The veterans' narratives therefore provided a useful vehicle through which to present the differences between the two states as tensions grew before the Great War. The same was not true in the case of France, however. True, the official memory of the campaign was instrumentalized by the southern German states so they could claim to be part of the struggle for German freedom. In the southern German states, particularly Bavaria, official commemoration transformed 1812 into a necessary precursor to freedom from the French. Yet, there were limits to the extent to which veterans' accounts could be used as a vehicle to promote German national identity. Many narratives were not necessarily critical of Napoleon or the French. Indeed, some remembered their service in the French army or in the *Rheinbund* contingents with a great deal of pride, and in some areas veterans' associations continued to celebrate their service under Napoleon. The common refrain was that they had suffered much, but they had done their duty. The difficulties that some, such as Rüppell and Gieße, faced in the restored German states also led some to look back on the conflict with something close to nostalgia despite what they had suffered in Russia. These sentiments could pose problems for editors in the *Kaiserreich* as they meant that these narratives were difficult to elide easily into a Francophobic discourse. In this they reflected a more complex attitude in Germany towards France and Napoleon than the official histories of the Prussian School of historians ever allowed for.

Notes

1. Jay Leyda, *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film* (London, 1960), p. 60.
2. On communicative and cultural memory, see Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich, 1992), and Aleida Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses* (Munich, 1999). For an application of their ideas to the Napoleonic Wars, see Jasper Heinzen, 'Transnatonal Affinities and Invented Traditions: The Napoleonic Wars in British and Hanoverian Memory, 1815–1915', *English Historical Review*, 127 (2012), pp. 1404–1434.

3. Carl Sachs, *Erinnerungs-Blätter eines badischen Soldaten an den Russischen Feldzug von 1812 bis 1813*, ed. Michael Sauner (Ulm, 1987), pp. 43–44.
4. Karl von Suckow, *Aus meinem Soldatenleben* (Stuttgart, 1862), p. 261. On the torture of prisoners, see Chap. 4.
5. See Joseph J. Matthews, 'Napoleon's Military Bulletins', *Journal of Modern History*, 22 (1950), pp. 137–144.
6. See Claudie Paye, "*Der französische Sprache mächtig". Kommunikation im Spannungsfeld von Sprachen und Kulturen im Königreich Westphalen 1807–1813* (Munich, 2013), pp. 314–317.
7. *Allgemeiner Anzeiger und Nationalzeitung der Deutschen*, 21 May 1817.
8. Jan Assmann, 'Communicative and Cultural Memory', *Knowledge and Space*, 4 (2011), pp. 15–27.
9. See Yuval Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450–2000* (Basingstoke, 2008).
10. Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars Against Napoleon: History, Culture and Memory* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 304. See also Mark Hewitson, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands, 1792–1820* (Oxford, 2017), p. 161. Hewitson draws on Hagemann's figures.
11. Friedrich Sengle, *Die Biedermeierzeit: Vol. II Die Formenwelt* (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 27.
12. See Martino's extensive study of the development and literary interests of German lending libraries. One consequence of the secularization and mediatization of monastic lands was that their library holdings were dispersed to courts, universities and gymnasia. Throughout the nineteenth century court libraries gradually became publicly funded and added *Landesbibliothek* to their titles, although public access followed only decades later. Wolfgang Schmitz, Alexander Greguletz and Rupert Hacker, 'Germany', in Wayne A. Wiegand and Donald G. David, Jr. eds., *Encyclopedia of Library History* (London, 1994), pp. 235–243.
13. James M. Brophy, 'The public sphere', in Jonathan Sperber, ed., *Germany 1800–1870. Short Oxford History of Germany* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 185–208, p. 188; Lynne Tatlock (ed.), *Publishing Culture and the 'Reading Nation': German Book History in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Rochester, N.Y., 2010).
14. See Etienne François, 'Die Volksbildung am Mittelrhein im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert. Eine Untersuchung über den vermeintlichen 'Bildungsrückstand der katholischen Bevölkerung Deutschlands im Ancien Régime', *Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte* (1977): 277–304.
15. By the 1850s literacy rates in Prussia had reached 85 per cent. See Richard L. Gawthrop, 'Literacy Drives in Preindustrial Germany', in Robert F. Arnove and Harvey J. Graff, eds., *National Literacy Campaigns: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Boston, MA, 1987), pp. 29–48. Reinhard Wittmann, *Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels: Ein Überblick* (Munich, 1991), p. 271.

16. See Chap. 4.
17. James Brophy, *Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800–1850* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 62.
18. Michael Antlsberger, Vor hundert Jahren. Aus den Tagebüchern eines Bayerischen Offiziers 1794–1818, Bavarian Hauptstaatsarchiv (BayHStA) Kriegsarchiv (KA), HS 441/1 and 442/2. Wilhelm Gruber, *Erlebnisse auf dem Rückzuge aus Russland 1812*, BayStA, KA, HS 696. Gruber's account appeared in Hans-Heinrich Vangerow, 'Kriegserlebnisse anno 1812/13 in Russland und ihre Folgen. Berichte von zwei Regensburger Zeitzeugen' *Regensburger Almanach* 27 (1994), pp. 180–187.
19. The text was originally written in French, but very quickly translated into German: Bernhard von, Gersdorff, *Ernst von Pfuel, Freund Heinrich von Kleists, General, Preußischer Ministerpräsident 1848* (Berlin, 1981), p. 57.
20. Ernst Heinrich, Pfuel, *Rückzug der Franzosen bis zum Niemen* (Berlin, 1813), pp. 2–3.
21. Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace* (New York, 2010), pp. 285–290.
22. *Jenaische Allegemeine Literatur-Zeitung,* March 1814. Pfuel was cited, for example, in the work of the theologian and historian, Carl Venturini, *Russlands und Detuschlands Befreiungskriege von der Franzosen* first published in 1816, whilst former *Freikorp* volunteer and historian Friedrich Christoph Förster called the work an 'unsurpassed' account of the campaign. See Förster, *Napoleons I russischer Feldzug* (Berlin, 1856), p. 118.
23. The full title was *Darstellung und Schilderungen as den Feldzügen der Franzosen under der verbündeten Truppen, Sitten- und Charakterzüge aus Schlachten und Belagerungen, ausführliche Beschreibung einzelner anziehender Begebenheiten, aus den Berichten der Augenzeugen geschöpft.*
24. Nösselt, *Darstellung und Schilderungen*, pp. 115–112; pp. 118–120, 126–128, and 132–133.
25. See Thomas O. Beebee, *Epistolary Fiction in Europe, 1500–1850* (Cambridge, 1999).
26. *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, March 1821.
27. Anon, *Merkwürdige Tage mines Lebens. Feldzug und Kriegsgefangenschaft in Rußland. Auster Tagebuch eines deutschen Offiziers* (Stuttgart, 1817), pp. ii–xvii.
28. *Allgemeine Zeitung München*, 1817 and *Allgemeiner Anzeiger und Nationalzeitung der Deutschen*, 21 May 1817.
29. Kirsten Belgum, 'Censorship and Piracy: Publishing and State Control in Early Nineteenth Century Germany', in Johanna Hartmann and Hubert Zapf eds., *Censorship and Exile* (Göttingen, 2015), pp. 121–137.

30. Anon, *Briefe von der baier'schen Armee. Geschrieben im französischen Feldzuge von einem baier'schen Officiere an seinen Oheim A. P. in A.* (Speyer, 1814), p. ii and p. iv.
31. Anon, *Briefe eines Offiziers an seine Schwester, geschrieben während des Feldzugs 1812 in Rußland*, (Vilinius, 1813).
32. Karl Theuss, *Rückblicke und Erinnerungen aus den Tagen meiner russische Gefangenschaft. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Deutschen* (Leipzig, 1816), p. 3.
33. Wilhelm von Loßberg, *Briefe in die Heimat geschrieben während des Feldzuges 1812 in Rußland* (Cassel, 1844), pp. iii–iv.
34. Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, p. 314, and Hewitson, *Absolute War*, pp. 161–162.
35. Karl Schehl, *Vom Rhein zu Moskva 1812: Erinnerungen des jüngsten niederrheinischen Veteranen der Großen Armee an seine Krefelder Jugendjahre, die russischen Feldzug, seine dreijährige Kriegsgefangenschaft, glückliche Heimkehr und an seine anschließende Dienstzeit als preußischer Allterist, vom ihm selbst erzählt.* ed. Jürgen Olles (Krefeld, 1957), p. 20.
36. Friedrich von Lindemann, *Meine Gefangenschaft in Rußland in den Jahren 1813 und 1814. Ein Blick in Rußlands Größe und Herrlichkeit* (Gera, 1835); Friedrich Peppler, *Schilderung meiner Gefangenschaft in Rußland vom Jahre 1812 bis 1814* (Darmstadt, 1832); Joseph Schrafel, *Des Nürnbergers Feldwebels Joseph Schrafel merkwürdige Schicksale im Kriege gegen Tyrol, 1809, im Feldzuge gegen Rußland 1812 und in der Gefangenschaft 1812–1814. Von ihm selbst 1834* (Nuremberg, 1835); Büttner, *Beschreibung der Schicksale und Leiden des ehemaligen Korporals Büttner, jetzt Aufschalgs-Untereinnehmers in Nennsling, während seiner 19. monatlichen Gefangenschaft in Rußland, in den Jahren 1812 und 1813* (1828).
37. Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, pp. 314–315.
38. Büttner, *Beschreibung*, p. iii.
39. Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, p. 308.
40. Peppler, *Schilderung meiner Gefangenschaft in Rußland*, p. iii. See also Hewitson, *Absolute War*, p. 160.
41. Büttner, *Beschreibung*, pp. v–xvi.
42. *Jenaische Allegemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, December 1830 and *Allgemeine medizinische Annalen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,* 1830. Average wages are difficult to calculate with any precision as they varied by region, state, sector and payment structure. In 1839 the authorities in Hanover estimated a weekly wage of 1 *Reichsthaler* or 90 *Kreuzer* hand workers. See Reinhold Rath, *Lohn und Leistung: Lohnformen im Gewerbe, 1450–1900* (Stuttgart, 1999), pp. 392–393.
43. Schehl, *Vom Rhein zu Moskva*. See also James, *Witnessing*, pp. 100–101.

44. See James, *Witnessing*, pp. 103–108; Julia Murken, *Bayerische Soldaten im Russlandfeldzug 1812. Ihre Kriegserfahrungen und deren Umdeutungen im 19. und 20. Jahrundert* (Munich, 2006), pp. 110–126.
45. Büttner, *Beschreibungen,* p. 14.
46. Planert, *Mythos*, p. 628; Julia Murken, 'Von "Thränen und Wehmut" zur Geburt des "deutschen Nationalbewusstseins". Die Niederlage des Russlandfelzugs von 1812 und ihre Umdeutungen in einen nationalen Sieg', in Horst Carl, ed., *Kriegsniederlagen. Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 2004), pp. 107–122; Hewitson, *Absolute War*, pp. 217–218.
47. Murken, *Bayerische Soldaten*, pp. 131–134.
48. Brophy, *Popular Culture*, p. 62; Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780–1830* (Cambridge, 2003), 280.
49. Johann von Borcke, *Kriegerleben des Johann von Borcke, weiland Kgl. Preuß. Obrestlieutenants, 1806–1815*, ed. v. Leszczynski, (Berlin, 1888), p. 285.
50. See Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, p. 305.
51. Heinrich von Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte* (Berlin, 1886). Friedrich Meinecke, *Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung, 1795–1815* (Leipzig, 1906). See also Hagemann, *Revisiting*, pp. 115–120 and pp. 293–296; Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde*; Frank Becker, *Bilder von Krieg und Nation: Die Einigungskriege in der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands, 1864–1913* (Munich, 2001), pp. 306–321.
52. Eduard Rüppell, *Kriegsgefangen im Herzen Rußlands, 1812–1814*, ed. Friedrich Clemens Ebrard (Berlin, 1912), p. 9.
53. Friederich Gieße, *Kassel-Moskau-Küstrin, 1812–1813. Tagebuch während des russischen Feldzuges geführt*, Karl Gieße, ed. (Leipzig, 1912), p. 339.
54. See Paul Holzhausen, ed., *Tagebuch des Hauptmanns Joseph Maillinger in Feldzuge nach Russland 1812* (Lindauer, 1912).
55. Paul Holzhausen, *Die Deutschen in Russland, 1812: Leben und Leiden auf der Moskauer Heerfahrt* (Berlin, 1912), pp. xi–xii.

CHAPTER 13

Archaeology and Monument Protection in War: The Collaboration Between the German Army and Researchers in the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918

Oliver Stein

In the midst of World War I, while many researchers in the humanities had to set their studies to one side, the German archaeologist Theodor Wiegand (1864–1937) delighted in working conditions in the Middle East that no other European scholar had experienced.[1] According to Wiegand, it had been extraordinarily difficult to access various areas before the war but, 'now, in uniform, one gets through everywhere'.[2] The exceptional situation of war and the German military presence in the Ottoman Empire opened up new opportunities for German researchers in archaeology and monument protection and therefore the possibility of a new kind of cultural encounter. By examining the relationship between the military and academic research in wartime, as well as archaeology's ideological and propagandistic implications, this chapter explores how and why World

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War I became such a catalyst for German archaeological and art historical pursuits in the Ottoman Empire.

Beginning in the 1890s, the Ottoman Empire, with its Babylonian, Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine and Islamic heritages, constituted German archaeology's main sphere of interest. Germans were involved in a variety of major excavation at Babylon, Assur, Milet and Priene, and Prussian-German officers regularly took part in research expeditions where their knowledge of military cartography proved particularly useful.[3] Although such collaborations were generally a matter of individual officers' initiatives, the High Command was also involved. In response to an archaeological request in 1906, for example, the Prussian War Ministry ordered three officers to spend three years mapping the landscape between Milet and Ephesus, and Kaiser Wilhelm II's personal interest in archaeology promoted this kind of receptiveness.[4] On both a personal and an institutional level, the links between the military and archaeological research had been developing in Germany for decades.

After the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war in October 1914, German archaeologists attempted to continue their excavations as much as possible. While this was largely successful at the major excavation in Babylon, many other digs had to be restricted or completely abandoned as researchers were drafted into military service.[5] From the war's outset, the German military command had recognized that archaeologists were of particular value for military tasks, and there was a striking number of them among the first German forces dispatched to the Middle East. The archaeologists' knowledge of foreign countries and languages made them particularly well-suited for special missions as well as for propagandistic tasks.[6] To take one example, nearly a quarter of the participants in Captain Fritz Klein's expedition were archaeologists in civilian life.[7] Klein's goal, which is comparable to the undertakings of the British archaeologist T.E. Lawrence, was to persuade Arabic and Persian tribes to change their loyalty to the German side. General Field Marshal Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who commanded a Turkish army in Mesopotamia, also deliberately brought archaeologists with previous experience of the Middle East to his headquarters. These men, the excavators of Babylon and Assur, thus found themselves once again in the region at the end of 1915 as officers.[8] In this way, researchers' linguistic skills and regional knowledge were made available to the military from early in the war.

Germany's increasing military presence in the Ottoman Empire from 1916 on raises the possibility that it was not only the military that benefit-

ted from the presence of researchers, but research that benefitted from the German military and the specific wartime conditions. Theodor Wiegand, the Director of Antiquities in the Royal Museum in Berlin, was the first to recognize this opportunity and developed a plan to have the war serve his institution's interests. Wiegand was one of the most prominent German archaeologists of his time and had access to important networks of political, academic and military influence, not to mention direct access to the Kaiser himself.[9] Wiegand knew the Ottoman Empire well, he had worked on excavations there for many years, and had served as a reserve officer in peacetime, so early in the war he was entrusted with intelligence collection from the Ottoman Empire as a captain in the *Kriegspresseamt* (the military public relations office). Beginning in 1916, he tried to get himself relocated to the Levant in order to be able to conduct research there as well, and his personal networks played a part in this. It was particularly helpful that his friend Major Hans von Ramsay—a former explorer—had just become advisor for the Middle Eastern war theatre in the Prussian War Ministry, and in the following years, Ramsay supported Wiegand from his position in Berlin, while Wiegand, in return, delivered thorough reports on Turkey's political situation to the War Ministry.[10]

Wiegand's plan was to travel with two other researchers in the guise of military cartographers in order to conduct research and collect antiquities for museums in Berlin. Their intended areas of investigation had been previously quite difficult to reach, but the military's presence in the Ottoman Empire had now facilitated access. In the official application to War Minister Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, Wiegand's superior and the General Director of the Royal Museums in Berlin, Wilhelm von Bode, promised a 'careful consideration' of Turkey and its legislation.[11] In actuality, however, Bode, Wiegand and Ramsay were first and foremost concerned with the covert transport of antiquities back to Berlin.[12] This illegal procedure, initiated by Wiegand, should be seen in light of a long-standing struggle between Germany and the Ottoman authorities over the acquisition of excavation findings. With the 1906 antiquities law, the Ottomans had prohibited any further exports of antiquities, and this ban, from the German viewpoint, violated previous bilateral agreements for the division of finds.[13] Those responsible on the German side were indignant that Germany, which had invested millions of marks in excavations over the years, now ceased to receive objects for its own museums.[14] Europeans had to progressively acknowledge that the heritage of ancient cultures increasingly became objects of national prestige for the Turks as well.[15] Over

many years, and even up until the last months of war, the Royal Museums and the Prussian Ministry of Culture lobbied to have the 1906 Ottoman antiquities law amended, with sometimes bizarre proposals for quid pro quos. As compensation for the envisaged division of finds in the Ottoman Empire, Bode proposed that Turkish archaeologists could be allowed to keep half of their finds if they were excavating in Germany.[16] To contemporaries, this idea of Turkish excavations in Germany must have seemed absurd, and all of these attempts to water down the 1906 antiquities law were rejected by Halil Edhem Bey, the General Director of the Imperial Ottoman Museums, who largely determined the Ottoman position.

For the acquisition-oriented German museum representatives, the war provided a convenient opportunity for an illegal, yet from their perspective legitimate, export of antiquities under cover of military cooperation. In particular, Wiegand's superior, Wilhelm von Bode, viewed the presence of German soldiers in the Ottoman Empire as a unique opportunity to export finds inconspicuously and without interference. However, this approach encountered opposition among many German researchers, among them archaeologists Friedrich Sarre and Georg Karo, who viewed the museums' confrontational approach towards the Turks as detrimental to their research interests.[17] In this internal German conflict, the German military in the field tipped the scales. Colonel Friedrich Kreß von Kressenstein, the German Commander of the 1st Turkish Expedition Corps in Sinai, had received orders from the war ministry in Berlin to support Wiegand logistically when he arrived in September 1916, but he viewed this as a breach of trust towards the Turks.[18] If discovered, it could damage the alliance. Therefore, Kreß von Kressenstein and the German consul in Damascus, Julius Löytved-Hardegg, urged Wiegand to personally introduce himself to the Commander of the Ottoman 4th army and autocratic Governor of Syria Djemal Pasha and to give the mission a purely research-oriented character from that point on. Wiegand agreed. Covert initiatives, like those planned by Wiegand and the War Ministry, collided with the German army's interests on the ground as well as diplomats' goals in the Middle East. Both of these groups wanted to avoid exacerbating pre-existing tensions with their Ottoman allies over archaeological matters because it had been precisely these kinds of disputes that provoked Turkish mistrust in peacetime. Thus, the war and, specifically, the military alliance, provided a pragmatic basis for cooperation with the Turks in the archaeological field as well. Museum representatives could therefore only hope for a time after the war, when—as one wrote—'the nonsense with

the Turkish friendship', which had condemned the museums to restraint in wartime, would come to an end and when 'our real politics of exploitation would be aggrandized again'.[19]

The encounter between Wiegand and Djemal Pasha on 1 November 1916, initiated by Colonel Kreß von Kressenstein, became a key moment for wartime German archaeology in the Ottoman Empire. Djemal gave Wiegand and both of his attendants the official assignment of investigating and preserving the historic sites in Syria and Palestine and pledged his full support for these endeavours.[20] For Wiegand, who kept the interests of research and museums equally in mind, it was not difficult to engage with the opportunities and goals negotiated with Djemal Pasha. Henceforth, he was 'General Inspector of the Antiquities of Syria and Palestine' and official leader of the German military formation with the name *Deutsch-Türkisches Denkmalschutzkommando* (German-Turkish Monument Protection Command) that the Prussian War Ministry placed under Djemal Pasha's command. As a German officer in this position, Wiegand saw himself as a loyal employee of the Turkish Governor Djemal Pasha and, accordingly, ceased to take acquisitions for Berlin's museums for the duration of his military activity.[21] To dispel the Ottoman antiquity authorities' persistent mistrust, Wiegand designated Halil Edhem Bey's associate as his new adjutant and thereby took care to create the greatest possible transparency towards the Turks. Upon Wiegand's request, the Prussian War Ministry in the following months arranged for the command of at least ten further researchers in the German-Turkish Monument Protection Command. There were probably, however, far more.

The primary task of the Monument Protection Command was twofold. On the one hand, it was concerned with the comprehensive investigation and documentation of historical sites and, on the other, with their protection and preservation. German researchers had also performed analogous tasks in other war theatres of war, often on the initiative of art historians, archaeologists, archivists and librarians, but these were later supported by the German military command.[22] At the same time, official German positions on the Western Front felt a need to take effective measures for the protection of cultural monuments, while the aspect of their scholarly documentation came later.[23] The Supreme Army Command charged the art historian Paul Clemen as lieutenant with this task.[24] The impetus for art protection, however, also originated with German base commands as on the Italian front or, alternatively, with the German civil administration, as was the case with the General Government in Warsaw. Such art protection

units or commissions were initiated on nearly all fronts but were never centrally organized. Directly after the war, the researchers responsible for this work gave an overview of their activity under the scope or protection of the German and Austrian-Hungarian armies in a two-volume work called 'Kunstschutz im Kriege'.[25]

During the two years of its existence, Wiegand's *Deutsch-Türkisches Denkmalschutzkommando* undertook many investigative trips through the Negev Desert, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. The archaeologists were primarily concerned with protecting the historical structures from destruction and neglect, but they also explored and mapped the sites across various locations. They investigated, for instance, the Via Dolorosa in Jerusalem and the ruins of Petra, elaborately mapped out the municipal area of Damascus, and researched the Citadel of Aleppo. In April 1917, they inspected the necropolis in Palmyra and were appalled at the destruction grave robbers had wrought there. Here, at Palmyra, they were directly confronted by the clash of interests between researchers and museums, for they knew that western museums' possession of objects from Palmyra was due to grave robbers' plundering.[26] The triumphal arch in Palmyra, which was close to collapsing at the time, was secured with a new foundation from the command so that, as Wiegand wrote in a report, 'the immediate danger has been removed for a long time'.[27] Almost a hundred years later, in October 2015, militias from the 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIS) bombed and destroyed the monument completely.

Researchers of the Monument Protection Command, as members of the allied German army, found themselves in an extraordinarily privileged situation working in the service of the commander of the Ottoman 4th army and general governor of Syria. They had access to all places; received all necessary tools, means and funds; and had power to direct local authorities.[28] Invoking Djemal Pasha's orders removed all obstacles, for his name was feared everywhere. By his own account, Wiegand only had to threaten sending a telegram to Djemal Pasha for his opponent to feel 'the rope of the gallows at his throat', and the members of the Monument Protection Command always enjoyed the cooperation of the local authorities as a result.[29] The Ottoman civil and military authorities placed all necessary aid at the archaeologists' disposal, so that, despite the limitations of wartime, they could easily move throughout the country. The researchers were fully aware of their unparalleled position and the unique opportunities that this afforded, particularly as many of them knew from personal

experience how difficult working conditions had been before the war. As Wiegand wrote to Bode, it was 'of great investigative importance' that

> German scholars of this wartime, with the energetic support of the greatest power of command, reach every corner, learn everything, make new observations and records, and are authorized to collect an overview and expert knowledge for future undertakings, which are otherwise only rarely achievable and only so with the use of major state and private resources.[30]

While the German-Turkish Monument Protection Command was the most extensive German scholarly undertaking in the fields of archaeology and art protection, it was by no means the only one. There were a multitude of other initiatives, and typically these were also carried out within a military framework. Prominent German archaeologists like Professors Ernst Herzfeld and Friedrich Sarre were deployed in their military assignments as officers in the Ottoman Empire and Persia where they pursued research alongside their official service. Herzfeld, for example, used his many trips to Iraq to finish a study of Islamic monuments he had begun before the war.[31] Major Friedrich Sarre, whose service as military attaché in Persia offered him ample freedom, ultimately assumed a task similar to that of Wiegand in Syria and Palestine: to provide for the protection of monuments and excavation sites in Eastern Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the border areas of Persia. At the Imperial Archaeological Institute's request, the German Military Mission in Constantinople deployed Professor Georg Karo and numerous assistants to carry out this same task in Asia Minor in March 1917.[32]

The archaeologists were also able to avail of aid from German military units. In addition to support from Ottoman soldiers, German sappers were made available for their work.[33] However, support from German aviation units proved to be especially important, and this particular collaboration between researchers and the military led to a significant innovation in the archaeological field. After his appointment in November 1916, Wiegand undertook an expedition to the Byzantine cities in the Negev desert to document them photographically and cartographically. Wiegand also recruited the head of the German aviation units in the field, Captain Hellmuth Felmy, for his plan to photograph these sites from the air afterwards. These aerial photographs were to serve as a comparison to the maps made on the ground and, in certain cases, to correct these.[34] By and by, similar photographs were also made of Jerusalem and other ancient

sites in Palestine and Transjordan.[35] For the first time, aerial photographs were deliberately and systematically used for archaeological purposes, and consequently, the discipline of aerial archaeology was founded. While Italian pilots had already photographed historic cites during the war in Libya in 1911, archaeologists did not utilize these images, but in 1916, military planes recorded historic areas directly in accordance with the archaeologists' instructions.[36] By facilitating an overview of historic sites and revealing connections that would not have been detectable from the ground, these aerial photographs proved enormously important for archaeology and historical geography.[37] In this way, Wiegand enhanced archaeological documentation by opening up a new perspective on the past.

Almost a year later, Wiegand asked the War Ministry to expand this programme of aerial archaeological photography, and on 11 October 1917, the Prussian War Ministry assigned all German flying units in the Ottoman Empire, 'as far as the wartime situation allows', to photograph historical sites according to a list compiled by Wiegand.[38] The pilots had to fill out image reports recording detailed information as to the place, time, altitude and focal distance, and as a supplement to their aerial work, the aviation units' photographers also recorded historical buildings with their cameras on the ground.[39] Thus, the military prepared comprehensive visual documentation of sites for archaeologists during the war. The aviation officers entrusted with the recording of these locations were fascinated by their task and accomplished a significant amount of work.[40] First Lieutenant Erich Serno even felt grateful for being able to collect aerial photographs of Babylon for German research and for the famous archaeologist Robert Koldewey.[41] These aviators quickly developed a sharp eye for archaeological remains in the landscape. The previously unknown Roman port of Caesarea, for example, was discovered when its piers' contours in the sea were detected from the air, and one of these pilots, Lieutenant Rudolf Holzhausen, later reported how his comrades hoped that, after the war, 'a special brigade would be established to carry out a systematic archaeological investigation of the Middle East'.[42]

Retrospectively in 1960, however, Holzhausen recounted how despite piecemeal British efforts in the interwar period, this hope had not been realized, and four decades later, the many opportunities that aviation could have offered archaeology remained unutilized.[43] However, during the Great War, this aerial archaeological photography proceeded on a grand scale and under the War Ministry's orders. In the process, these

aviation units covered an area extending well beyond the Ottoman Empire's territory to produce images not only from the Levant, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia but also from Egypt, the Greek islands, Macedonia, Romania, Ukraine, the Crimea and Georgia.[44] To this day, the inventory of just one of these units, the Bavarian *Fliegerabteilung 304*, contains 3000 glass plate negatives of these shots.[45] These images were presented at a conference for German geographers and interested civilians in 1921, and soon afterwards, sales lists appeared for reproductions of these images as well as an illustrated book aimed at a broad public, *Hundert deutsche Fliegerbilder aus Palästina*.[46] Even today, these aerial photographs remain a valuable basis for research.

The massive deployment of German planes in the service of archaeology is all the more astonishing given that German resources were limited in this war zone. Supplying airplanes and replacement parts was particularly difficult, whereas the British could operate with many planes in Egypt. In the summer of 1918, when only a single German plane was operational in the Aegean, it was repeatedly deployed to produce aerial photographs of historical sites.[47] In addition to planes, the military regularly supplied personnel and material resources for research. Sailors and a submarine's dinghy, for example, were assigned to Professor Eckhard Unger to investigate the subterranean vaults of the Byzantine Hippodrome in Constantinople.[48] Similarly, a numismatist and an archivist in military service were placed under the command of the Imperial Ottoman Museums to scientifically record its collections.[49] In 1919, Wiegand, Sarre and Karo issued progress reports demonstrating the diversity of military members' assignments in the different regions they observed in the Ottoman Empire. The German military administration in Berlin and Constantinople, as well as commanders in the field, displayed a real interest in supporting these assignments, or, in the case of private initiatives, in tolerating them. Wiegand's influence in the War Ministry and his good relations with the Kaiser were likely to have been instrumental here, but above all, the officers appreciated the archaeologists' work, which was anchored in the bourgeois-humanistic cultural ideal of the time.[50]

In this context, a kind of competition often arose among German institutions, and the military was frequently drawn into it. The Bavarians, for example, tried to launch their own archaeological research society in the Ottoman Empire under the protectorate of Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria. Without informing the Prussian institutions, the Bavarian War Ministry dispatched an archaeologist, Lieutenant Georg Dehn, to an excavation site in

Panderma (now Bandirma). Wiegand saw this as unacceptable competition, and at his instigation, the Prussian War Ministry began a petty dispute with its Bavarian counterpart as to whether Dehn was entitled to an orderly for the support of his studies.[51] Wiegand then upset the Bavarians when he sent two members of his Monument Protection Command to Panderma and used his connections with the Prussian War Ministry to shut down his competitors. With Ramsay's help, for instance, Wiegand prevented his colleague Friedrich Sarre, who had been deployed in the Middle East for almost the entire war, from returning to the Ottoman Empire in the summer of 1918 after a short absence.[52] Turkish politics could also prove problematic as Germans had to decide whether they should align themselves with Enver Pasha or Djemal Pasha, Wiegand's chief supporter in the field. The German naval attaché Hans Humann, who, as the son of a famous archaeologist and as Friedrich Sarre's son-in-law, had an abiding interest in archaeological research, embraced Enver Pasha's party emphatically and this resulted in an open feud with Wiegand. Humann tried to discredit Wiegand as 'Djemal Pasha's court archaeologist', while Wiegand, in turn, stirred up public opinion against Humann and worked with others for his removal.[53]

Especially in the war's last year, civilian researchers sent proposals to the Prussian War Ministry as private individuals or as part of an institution to attain project funding. They were primarily interested in being temporarily sent to a German unit in Turkey with a military rank. The War Ministry repeatedly proved willing to transform civilians into military members for a limited time, as when, for example, the Orientalist Professor Gotthelf Bergsträßer was hired as a high military official so that he could travel for linguistic research.[54] In 1918 a military command ordered Bergsträßer to march again, but this time with the German-Turkish Monument Protection Command where he photographed the writings of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.[55] Similarly, another scholar was to photographically record manuscript collections in Mesopotamian churches and thereby make them accessible to the academic world.[56] The end of the war, however, impeded the realization of both pursuits. The Prussian War Ministry typically gave such applications to Wiegand for evaluation, who then decided whether they were worthy of support and also, occasionally, had the applicant sent to the Monument Protection Command. The War Ministry, however, had to turn down many of these proposals for financial reasons or due to lack of personnel, as was the case when the botanist Walter Siehe sought to be hired as an army captain.[57] Siehe wanted to continue two research projects he had begun before the war, which were devoted to photographing

Seljuq buildings in Asia Minor and compiling a botanical collection for the Royal Botanical Museum in Dahlem. In this case, Wiegand turned to the Foreign Office in order to provide Siehe with the necessary uniform and then to the Botanical Museum, in order to supply him with the necessary financial means.[58] Thus Wiegand addressed civilian researchers' two central motivations for wanting to be incorporated into the army: the uniform and the funding. Dressed as civilians, researchers would have quickly aroused suspicion, particularly if they were conducting photographical documentation or survey work, but a German uniform lent researchers an automatic authority vis-à-vis the Turkish authorities and the native population. Similarly, these researchers' incorporation into the military's infrastructure vastly reduced their expenses in terms of transport, provisions, accommodation and aid.

This myriad of special missions and archaeological investigations was executed without any overarching organization or even any coordination of individuals and institutions. The Prussian War Ministry or the German Military Mission, and either could have undertaken such a role, was content with simply accepting, rejecting, or supporting proposals, but never assumed a coordinating function. The Ottoman view of these missions could also be problematic as the allied partner tended to view this steady increase in German archaeological activity with scepticism and mistrust. According to Martin Schede, who was active as an archaeologist and liaison officer in Asia Minor, the Turks never got involved with matters that were unclear to them, and this worked to the detriment of the entire ensemble of archaeological activities. Schede believed that a solution would have been to give Wiegand unitary leadership over monument protection in the Ottoman Empire.[59] But even if Wiegand had commanded this influence, the conflict of interests between the Reich, Prussian and Bavarian institutions was too great. The lack of a unified coordination also undermined the scientific and geological enterprises in the Ottoman Empire that pursued economic ends. It was only in September 1918 that the Military Mission established a position to centrally register all enterprises and collect their material.[60]

The war had provided researchers with their privileged position, but the war also contributed to problems in their work. The rapid wartime development of transport routes and buildings throughout the Ottoman Empire led to the ongoing destruction of ancient sites as their stones were quarried for new constructions. The key player in this process was the Ottoman army, which built streets and fortifications all over the country,

but with Djemal Pasha's support, Wiegand repeatedly succeeded in preventing such destructive building measures. By contrast, Georg Karo, who supervised monument protection in Asia Minor, complained that his attempts to preserve historical structures fell on the authorities' deaf ears and that even the army's orders went unheeded.[61] Comprehensive modernization measures in larger cities also carved out wide boulevards through historic city centres. The archaeologist, Ernst Herzfeld, whose pessimistic assessment of the wartime situation in the Ottoman Empire resembled Karo's therefore compared Damascus, Aleppo and Mossul to the 'bombed streets of Poland or France'.[62] Ultimately many ancient temples, Byzantine churches and early Islamic mosques fell victim to this wave of new building.

Simultaneously, archaeologists in uniform were repeatedly confronted with the Ottoman government's violence against minorities. In his diary, Wiegand noted with irritation how Djemal Pasha used large sums of money to renovate a mosque in Damascus, while people were simultaneously suffering from hunger.[63] Germans also frequently encountered the suffering of Armenians. In Amman's Roman theatre, for instance, officers found half-starving Armenian women and children, whose makeshift dwellings there had damaged the second-century structure, but instead of driving them out, the archaeologists attempted to provide them with food.[64] At another location, the art historian Karl Wulzinger photographed ragged Armenian forced labourers and sent the image to Djemal Pasha in the hope that he would intervene.[65] German archaeologists in uniform also witnessed the Turks' continued repression of the Greek population. In 1918, Georg Karo's attempts to help Greeks attracted adverse attention, and the Turkish authorities started to suspect that his archaeological work was really a cover in order to spy on the Turkish treatment of minorities.[66]

Despite such difficulties with the Turks, the Germans were aware that the current wartime situation was exceptionally convenient for their archaeological research in the Ottoman Empire. Looking towards the future, however, they assessed the situation far more sceptically. On the one hand, they feared that the Turks would again close their country to scholarly research after the war. At the same time, regardless of the current German-Ottoman alliance, they remained concerned that British and French competition would be reinstated after the war. After all, the European powers had engaged in archaeological rivalry partly to enhance their national prestige in peacetime, so it seemed especially urgent to make

the most of Germany's privileged position during the war. With this in mind, German archaeologists obtained not only access to places that Ottoman authorities had previously kept closed off but also access to sites that had previously been controlled by other powers, such as British and French excavations or churches under the aegis of French or Italian congregations.[67]

The archaeological competition that had existed between the powers in peacetime continued during the war and this involved increasingly radical methods on both sides. When the Turks, despite German protests, destroyed a French monument from 1799 in Palestine, a French armoured cruiser attacked the German consulate in Beirut in retaliation, mistakenly thinking that the Germans had ordered the destruction of their monument.[68] Excavation sites were not safe from shelling and aerial attacks either. On 26 May 1916, two British planes attacked the German excavation building in Didyma in the belief that it housed weapons. British officer and archaeology professor Sir John Myers gave the order and even flew in one of the planes to oversee the attack and to prevent further damage to ancient sites.[69] Believing, mistakenly, that the French were responsible for this attack, Wiegand personally convinced the Kaiser to have French artworks confiscated in retaliation and shipped to German museums.[70] This would have led to a further escalation in an already emotionally charged conflict over cultural goods, and it was only thwarted on the Foreign Office's intervention. All sides viewed art and archaeological finds as pawns or even as loot; when about 500 boxes of German excavation findings from Babylon fell into British hands in 1916, Bode attempted to seize all English excavation findings in the Ottoman Empire as collateral.[71] The German embassy in Constantinople, however, hindered these efforts.

Cultural heritage and its preservation had an important propaganda role to play for all the parties involved in World War I. That role varied, however, from case to case. Djemal Pasha, for instance, aimed to exploit art protection and his links with Wiegand to consolidate his own authority. His measures for the protection of particularly exceptional historic sites were inspired by the same motives that inspired his large-scale urban modernization programme, which paradoxically destroyed many historic structures during the war. Both programmes were intended to symbolically underscore Ottoman rule and strengthen its authority over the Syrian population.[72] Djemal's decision to assign Wiegand to monument protection should therefore also be understood in an ideological context: Wiegand's work references a common cultural heritage of the indigenous

population and, in this sense, could serve to reinforce Ottoman identity. In return for his support, Djemal Pasha accordingly required the German archaeologists to produce a popular work on Syria's ancient and Islamic monuments, which was to be widely distributed among the population to 'awaken an understanding of their own past'.[73] The idea was to give the Arab population, which was increasingly dissatisfied with Ottoman rule, a religious and cultural identity that transcended Arab culture. This illustrated book, which in Wiegand's eyes was simply a by-product of his work, was even published before the end of war.[74]

For Germany, the protection of monuments also had propaganda potential during World War I. The burning of Leuven's library and the shelling of Rheims cathedral in the autumn of 1914 had badly damaged Germany's reputation as a cultured nation, and these two events featured prominently in Entente propaganda depicting Germans as anti-cultural Huns. Germany's official art protection initiatives in Belgium and northern France were largely set in motion in 1915 to prevent further damage to artworks and monuments, but they were also exploited extensively by Germany's foreign propaganda to proclaim German innocence through the documentation of damages and to portray Germany as a guardian of culture.[75] While this propaganda extensively addressed its own art protection measures in the west, the preservation and investigation of historic sites in the Ottoman Empire were barely discussed in public. The public first learned of the Monument Protection Command's activity in September 1917 when Wiegand spoke at the German Monument Protection Day in Augsburg after obtaining permission from Djemal Pasha.[76] Beyond this, however, there was scarcely any coverage of this activity in either the German press or newspapers in neutral countries. In view of the long-standing German-Turkish dispute over the division of finds, the Foreign Office most likely wanted to downplay the topic of German archaeological activity in the Ottoman Empire to avoid provoking further Turkish mistrust. Besides, the chief threat to historic monuments in the Ottoman Empire was not exposure to conflict where the enemy could be blamed, as on the Western Front, but rather the construction measures of the allied army. However, in 1919, these reservations were set aside as German propagandists turned their attention to the Ottoman-German illustrated book *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien*, which Djemal Pasha had commissioned. This book, which Wiegand had originally dismissed due to its popular character, assumed great importance for German cultural propaganda after the war.

While the investigative results were first published between 1920 and 1924 in six detailed volumes,[77] the Foreign Office sent copies of this book to all neutral countries in 1919 with a request that they be given to important cultural figures for review. From the Foreign Office's perspective, disseminating the message that 'we conducted such admirable cultural acts during the war' was the best propaganda imaginable for Germany.[78] By 1919, a mission that had begun as a covert attempt to acquire antiquities illegally had become an important element in Germany's post-war propaganda and a shining public example of alleged German altruism.

The history of German archaeology and monument protection in the Ottoman Empire during World War I makes it clear that the war did as much to destroy historical buildings as it did to catalyse research and monument protection. However, the archaeologists' aims and activities also reveal four complex themes at work during the war, acquisition, investigation, monument protection and cultural politics, and the role these priorities played changed significantly over time. At the outset of the war, acquisition was the overriding objective. Leading figures in the museum world, and Bode and Wiegand led the way in this, viewed Germany's military presence in the Middle East as a convenient opportunity for the covert export of antiquities, that is, for art theft. Military and diplomatic representatives, on the other hand, intervened in order to avoid confrontation with the Turks with the result that this early focus on acquisition was set aside during the war in favour of research and monument conservation. The investigation and documentation of historic sites, as well as their preservation and protection, was the raison d'être of the newly formed German-Turkish Monument Protection Command, and it was supported by both the Ottoman authorities and the German military in this role. At the same time, German archaeologists' privileged position here was also used to enhance Germany's standing in the Ottoman Empire, both politically and culturally, although this aim was undermined by the absence of any overarching coordination and the competition of the various institutions involved. Finally, the protection of historic monuments assumed an increasing importance in both German and Ottoman propaganda. In post-war Germany, the archaeologists' work in the Middle East was seen as a means of re-establishing Germany's reputation abroad, while in the Ottoman Empire the authorities had already started to use the work of the Monument Protection Command during the war to encourage a sense of Ottoman identity among the Arab population.

The close collaboration between the military and academic research is one of the defining features of these archaeologists' wartime activity in the Ottoman Empire. The German military's support for investigative studies was beneficial in many respects. Researchers in uniform acquired an authority that markedly enhanced their position with both the Ottoman authorities and the civilian population. In many cases, the researchers' newfound rank enabled unobstructed access to important sites for the first time, while their incorporation into the military also significantly reduced costs as their research projects could draw upon the military's pre-existing resources. The military's readiness to support German research predated World War I, and the networks that arose out of these peacetime collaborations continued to exert an influence during the war, particularly as many senior officers were very receptive to this kind of archaeological research. Ultimately, it was precisely the German military's presence and willingness to support the archaeologists that made its work during the war so significant in scholarly terms. Moreover, the military's innovations in aerial photography advanced archaeology in important ways. Work such as this, in fact, would not have been possible in peacetime there.

Notes

1. Diary entry, 2 Nov. 1916, in Gerhard Wiegand, ed., *Halbmond im letzten Viertel. Briefe und Reisebericht aus der alten Türkei von Theodor und Marie Wiegand 1895–1918* (Munich, 1970), p. 202.
2. Wiegand to his wife, 2 Dec. 1916, in Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 208.
3. These figures included Major Benno Regely (1825–1888) and Walhter von Diest (1851–1932) or Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Steffen (1844–1891). See Walther von Diest, *Von Tilsit nach Angora. Forschungsreise zweier preußischer Stabsoffiziere im Frühjahr 1896* (Gotha, 1898).
4. See Carl Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand. Ein deutscher Archäologe (1864–1936)* (Munich, 1944), pp. 147–154. Nicola Crüsemann, "Ja! Wir werden das Licht des deutschen Genius auch dorthin tragen'. Der Beginn der Ausgrabungen in Assur im Spiegel preußisch-deutscher Orientpolitik unter Wilhelm II.', in Joachim Marzahn and Beate Salje, eds., *Wiedererstehendes Assur. 100 Jahre deutsche Ausgrabungen in Assur* (Mainz, 2003), pp. 35–44.
5. See Suzanne L. Marchand, *Down from Olympus. Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany* (Princeton, NJ, 1996), p. 246.
6. Employing archaeologists for covert missions was also a common practice among the British and Americans in both world wars. See Pyria Satia, *Spies in Arabia. The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert*

Empire in the Middle East (Oxford, 2008); Susan Heuck Allen, *Classical Spies. American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2011).

7. Veit Veltzke, *Unter Wüstensöhnen. Die deutsche Expedition Klein im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 2014), p. 16.
8. Walter Andrae, *Lebenserinnerungen eines Ausgräbers* (Stuttgart, 1988), p. 226; Franz von Papen, *Der Wahrheit eine Gasse* (Munich, 1952), p. 88.
9. Städtisches Museum Bendorf/Rhein, ed., *Auf den Spuren der Antike. Theodor Wiegand, ein deutscher Archäologe* (Bendorf, 1985).
10. See the correspondence between Hans von Ramsay and Theodor Wiegand, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Archiv, Berlin (DAI Berlin), Wiegand papers, box 8; see also Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 279.
11. Wilhelm von Bode to Prussian War Minister Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, n.d. [June 1916], DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 23.
12. Hans von Ramsay to Theodor Wiegand, 31 May 1916, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8.
13. Nicola Crüsemann, 'Vom Zweistromland zum Kupfergraben: Vorgeschichte und Entstehungsjahre (1899–1918) der Vorderasiatischen Abteilung der Berliner Museen vor fach- und kulturpolitischen Hintergründen', in *Beiheft zum Jahrbuch der Berliner Museen 2000*, vol. 42 (Berlin, 2001), pp. 197–8.
14. See letters of Prussian Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs August von Trott zu Solz to the Reich Chancellor, 1 May 1917, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (PAAA) Konstantinopel 429.
15. For more on Ottoman antiquity laws between 1880 and 1906, see Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology: Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 113–18; Wendy M.K. Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Berkeley, 2003), pp. 126–130.
16. See the correspondence from the Secret Civil Cabinet to Reich Chancellor, 5 Apr. 1918, PAAA R 64441.
17. Theodor Wiegand's diary, 25 July 1917, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 23; Martin Schede to Theodor Wiegand, 4 July 1918, ibid., box 8.
18. Friedrich Frhr. Kreß von Kressenstein, *Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal* (Berlin, 1938), p. 198; Kreß von Kressenstein, diary, 12 Oct. 1916, Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nuremberg, archive.
19. Martin Schede to Theodor Wiegand, 21 May 1917, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8. As early as February 1915, Schede had expressed thoughts of keeping activity to a minimum during the war and expanding influence first after the conflict was over (see Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, p. 254). Their hopes were aimed at the demands they wanted to make on

Turkey after the war when the Ottoman Empire's considerable debt would be negotiated (see records regarding Royal Museums' wishes for the future peace negotiations from 1918, PAAA R 64594).

20. See consul Julius Löytved-Hardegg to Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 13 Nov. 1916, PAAA R 64593; Wiegand, *Halbmond*, pp. 98–9.
21. Heinrich Graf von Waldburg to Reich Chancellor Georg Michaelis, 12 Sept. 1917, PAAA R 64593.
22. Christoph Roolf, 'Eine "günstige Gelegenheit"? Deutsche Wissenschaftler im besetzten Belgien während des Ersten Weltkrieges (1914–1918)', in Matthias Berg, Jens Thiel and Peter Th. Walther, eds., *Mit Feder und Schwert. Militär und Wissenschaft – Wissenschaftler und Krieg* (Stuttgart, 2009), pp. 137–154, pp. 151–2; Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, p. 249.
23. Christina Kott, 'Der deutsche "Kunstschutz" im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg: Ein Vergleich', *Pariser Historische Studien*, 81 (2007), pp. 137–153, p. 145.
24. Günther Haase, *Kunstraub und Kunstschutz: Eine Dokumentation* (Norderstedt, 2008), pp. 56–7.
25. Paul Clemen, ed., *Kunstschutz im Kriege: Berichte über den Zustand der Kunstdenkmäler auf den verschiedenen Kriegsschauplätzen und über die deutschen und österreichischen Maßnahmen zu ihrer Erhaltung, Rettung, Erforschung*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1919).
26. Theodor Wiegand, 'Denkmalschutz und kunstwissenschaftliche Arbeit während des Weltkrieges in Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien', in *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst*, 54 (1918/19), pp. 278–93, at p. 283; Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 303.
27. Wiegand to foreign office, 21 Sept. 1917, PAAA R 64594.
28. Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 319.
29. Wiegand, 2 Dec. 1916, in Wiegand, *Halbmond*, pp. 208–9. See Wiegand's report from 21 Sept. 1917. Wulzinger and Dehn's excavation report from Panderma in Asia Minor on 19/20 Oct. 1918 attests to how Ottoman authorities also worked cooperatively with German archaeologists outside of Djemal's sphere of influence (PAAA R 64594).
30. Wiegand to Bode, 12 May 1917, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 38.
31. Friedrich Sarre, 'Kunstwissenschaftliche Arbeit während des Weltkrieges in Mesopotamien, Ost-Anatolien, Persien und Afghanistan', *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst*, 54 (1918/19), pp. 294–304, p. 299.
32. Georg Karo, 'Deutsche Denkmalpflege im westlichen Kleinasien' (1917/18), in *Kunstschutz im Kriege*, pp. 167–73, p. 170.
33. Hans Guhr, *Als türkischer Divisionskommandeur in Kleinasien und Palästina: Erlebnisse eines deutschen Stabsoffiziers während des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1937), p. 165; Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 303.

34. Wiegand to his wife, 6 Dec. 1916, in: Wiegand, *Halbmond*, pp. 210–211.
35. Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 293.
36. Stefan Altekamp, 'Luftbildarchäologie in Libyen 1911/12', in Charlotte Trümpler, ed., *Das große Spiel. Archäologie und Politik zur Zeit des Kolonialismus (1860–1940)* (Essen, 2008), pp. 77–83.
37. Regarding the worth of aerial photographs for various branches of Palestinian research, see remarks from P. Evarist Mader in the introduction to Gustaf Dalman, ed., *Hundert deutsche Fliegerbilder aus Palästina* (Gütersloh, 1925), pp. 113–15. Charlotte Trümpler, 'Das Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutz-Kommando und die Luftbildarchäologie', in Trümpler, ed., *Das große Spiel*, pp. 474–83, p. 478; Charlotte Trümpler, 'Aerial Photography in Archaeology and its Pioneers', in Charlotte Trümpler, ed., *The Past from Above: Aerial Photographs of Archaeological Sites by Georg Gerster* (Los Angeles, CA, 2005), pp. 9–23, p. 14; David L. Kennedy, Derrick N. Riley, *Rome's Desert Frontier: From the Air* (Austin, TX, 1990), p. 48.
38. Trümpler, 'Deutsch-Türkisches Denkmalschutz-Kommando', pp. 477–8.
39. Lothar Saupe, *Palästina von oben. Luftbilder der bayerischen Fliegerstaffel 304 im Ersten Weltkrieg aus Beständen des Bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchivs: Begleitausstellung des Bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchivs zur Ausstellung 'Mission Palästina'* (Munich, 2006), p. 5.
40. See Martin Schede to Wiegand, 10 July 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8.
41. Erich Serno, *Erinnerungen eines 'Alten Adlers'*, manuscript, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg i.Br., MSg 2/10873, p. 99.
42. [Rudolf] Holzhausen, 'Deutsche Flieger im Dienste der Archäologie', in *Luftwelt. Zeitschrift für alle Gebiete der Luftfahrt*, 2 (1935), pp. 487–89, p. 488.
43. Rudolf Holzhausen, *Die deutschen Truppen im Gebiet der heutigen Staaten Israel, Jordanien und Syrien während des Ersten Weltkrieges*, manuscript (1960), PAAA NL Holzhausen 18, p. 42.
44. Trümpler, 'Deutsch-Türkisches Denkmalschutz-Kommando', p. 481.
45. Saupe, *Palästina*, p. 6. "Bildsammlung Palästina"in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munich (BayHStA). This collection is accessible at: http://www.gda-old.bayern.de/findmittel/ead/index.php?fb=478
46. Martin Riemensperger, Michael Unger, 'Mit der Digitalkamera zurück in die Jahre 1917/18: Die Überlieferung einer bayerischen Fliegereinheit in Palästina', in *Archivalische Zeitschrift*, 92 (2011), pp. 175–208, pp. 189–90. Dalman ed., *Hundert deutsche Fliegerbilder*.
47. Karo to Wiegand, 27 June 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 5.
48. Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 325.

49. See letters from the Minister for Education and Cultural Affairs to the General Director of the Imperial Ottoman Museums Halil Edhem Bey, 19 Jan. 1918, PAAA R 64441.
50. Here it is typical that the leader of the Yildirim Army Group, Colonel-General Erich von Falkenhayn, had Koldewey's writings about Assur sent to him directly after taking over his commando in the Middle East (see note from Professor Koldewey, 19 July 1917, PAAA Konstantinopel 429). Many examples like this, where German officers deployed in the Ottoman Empire demonstrate a particular interest in archaeology and art, could be added.
51. Lieutenant von Manz to his father Lieutenant-General von Manz, 7 July 1918; file note from Bavarian War Ministry, 24 June 1918, BayHStA MKr 1957.
52. Ramsay to Wiegand, 26 July 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8.
53. Wiegand, diary, 25 July 1917, 2 Sept. 1917, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 23.
54. See letters from Gotthelf Bergsträßer, 1 June 1918, PAAA Konstantinopel 423.
55. See letters from 1 June 1918 and 10 Sept. 1918, PAAA Konstantinopel 423.
56. See letters from the German consulate in Mosul to the Reich Chancellor from 19 July 1918, PAAA Konstantinopel 429 and letters from 27 July 1918, PAAA R 64441.
57. Ramsay to Wiegand, 26 July 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8; letters from the German military commissioner in Constantinople to Wiegand, 18 Mar. 1918, PAAA R 64594.
58. See Wiegand's response to the German military commissioner in Constantinople, 18 Mar. 1918, PAAA R 64594.
59. Schede to Wiegand, 21 May 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8.
60. See newsletter of Prussian War Ministry, 9 Sept. 1918, BayHStA MA 95027.
61. Karo, 'Deutsche Denkmalpflege', p. 169.
62. Herzfeld to Wiegand, 18 July 1916, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 23.
63. Wiegand, 2 Nov. 1916, in Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 202.
64. Wiegand to his wife, 9 Dec. 1916, in Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 211.
65. Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 190. Kreß von Kressenstein gave him this assignment.
66. Schede to Wiegand, 18 Sept. 1918, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 8.
67. Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 208.
68. Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 196.
69. Wiegand, 'Denkmalschutz', p. 293.
70. Wiegand, diary, 24 Aug. 1916, DAI Berlin, Wiegand papers, box 23.

71. Bode to state secretary of the foreign office Richard von Kühlmann, 29 Dec. 1917, PAAA Konstantinopel 429.
72. Hasan Kayah, 'Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria in World War I', in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler, eds., *The Syrian Land. Processes of Integration and Fragmentation. Bilād Al-Shām from the 18th to the 20th Century* (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 295–305; M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria. Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I: 1914–1917* (London/New York, 2014), pp. 194–196.
73. Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 289; see also Wiegand to foreign office, 21 Sept. 1917, PAAA R 64594.
74. Ahmed Djemal Pasha, ed., *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien – Süria wa-Falasṭīn wa-ǧarbī ʿArabistan abidāt-i-ạtiqasy* (Berlin, 1918).
75. Christina Kott, 'Die deutsche Kunst- und Museumspolitik im besetzten Nordfrankreich im Ersten Weltkrieg. Zwischen Kunstraub, Kunstschutz, Propaganda und Wissenschaft', in *Kritische Berichte. Zeitschrift für Kunst- und Kulturwissenschaften*, 2 (1997), pp. 5–25, pp. 8–9, 19 ff.; Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, p. 249.
76. Watzinger, *Wiegand*, p. 313. The Foreign Office first found out about this through participant Prof. Paul Schumann's report from 11 Oct. 1917, PAAA R 64594.
77. Theodor Wiegand, ed., *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalsschutz-Kommandos* (6 vols., Berlin, 1920–1924). The Prussian War Ministry had approved large sums for the publication of this study (see preface to: Theodor Wiegand, 'Sinai' (*Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalsschutz-Kommandos*, vol. 1, Berlin/Leipzig, 1920)).
78. Dr. Naumann (Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office) to the embassies in Stockholm, Bern, Kristiania, Copenhagen, The Hague; also see the responses, Bundesarchiv Berlin R 901/71590.

CHAPTER 14

A 'Civilizing Work'?: The French Army in Macedonia, 1915–1918

John Horne

In October 1915, the French and British arrived in Salonika in the circumstances described by Justin Fantauzzo in Chap. 6. Macedonia was the last major front that locked Europe into a gigantic mutual siege during the First World War (along with the western, eastern and Austro-Italian fronts). While Britain and France devoted most of their effort to the Western Front, they sent expeditionary forces to other fronts—Gallipoli in European Turkey in 1915 and Italy in late 1917 (after the Italians had suffered defeat at Caporetto), as well as to Macedonia. The British also deployed armies further afield against the Ottoman Empire, in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Britain and France thus renewed—on a greater scale and at a century's remove—the expeditions to the edges of 'Europe' and the Levant which had marked the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the intervening century, though this time they did so as allies, not enemies.

German officers also 'advised' their Ottoman allies at Gallipoli and in the Middle Eastern theatres (as Oliver Stein has shown in the preceding chapter) as well as aiding the Bulgarians in Macedonia. On the Eastern

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Front, German soldiers marched once more into the vast spaces of European Russia like their forebears in Napoleon's *Grande Armée*.[1] The aim of this chapter is to explore (through the French case in Macedonia) how much the language and attitudes of these encounters owed to a century of imperial and military development or were in fact new, determined by the kind of work required by modern, industrialized warfare conducted by mass citizen-soldier armies.[2]

For three years the Allies faced Bulgaria in the mountains along the former Greek-Serbian border (Bulgaria now occupying Serb Macedonia) and across the plains of Thrace to the Aegean Sea inside the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. In the vast area behind the front, amounting to the bulk of the new territories acquired by Greece in 1913, they conducted what they saw as a more or less 'friendly' occupation. However, the political context was highly charged for they had stumbled into the third Balkan War as well as into a major crisis in Greek political development.[3] In the 'national schism', democratic nationalists of the Liberal Party, led by the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, supported the Allies, whereas King Constantine and the officer corps, favouring Germany and Austria-Hungary, bitterly opposed them. The result was continued neutrality, though Venizelos set up an interventionist counter-government under Allied protection in Salonika. In June 1917, Venizelos forced the king to abdicate and the country officially joined the Allies on the Macedonian front. But for nearly two years, France and Britain fought the Bulgarians (who were stiffened by a strong German and Austro-Hungarian presence plus some Ottoman units) as allies of the Serbs from what was technically still a neutral country. Many Greeks (especially in the army) resented and even contested their presence, a situation not entirely resolved by Greek entry into the conflict.

From their arrival, the Allies imposed military rule over the 'new territories', including Salonika. But those they controlled had sentiments that were hard to read and harboured elements (Bulgarian, Turkish) rife with the potential for espionage or worse. The Allies also had to deal with Greek officials, civil and military, who were often less than friendly. And all this in a land which many Allied soldiers on arrival had (as Justin Fantauzzo has shown) imagined both as the Greece of classical antiquity, fountainhead of western 'civilization', and/or the Orient, with all the exoticism that implied. For both the French and the British, this was a classic imperial expedition to the Levant, but one that had occurred almost absent-

mindedly in response to the unforeseen circumstances of the war, and which only turned into a prolonged front due to Serbia's collapse in 1915.

It is on this paradox that I shall focus—an Allied expeditionary corps which arrived with a stereotyped mindset towards the local inhabitants for what was envisaged as a short-term, mobile campaign but which stayed to organize a front. For the Allies advanced into Serbia in autumn 1915 but were forced to retreat into Greek Macedonia, turning Salonika into their redoubt. Although both sides attempted subsequent offensives, the front remained blocked until the final months of the war, from September 1918. For three years, therefore, the Allies organized a front in a land that seemed familiar in the imagination but proved foreign in reality. I shall look in particular at how the French used the code of the 'civilizing mission' in response to the tough work involved in organizing such a front in an exotic setting far from home.

A 'Civilizing Mission'?

Arriving in Salonika, with its crowded quays, crammed streets, domes, minarets and the striking *tour blanche* (white tower), French soldiers, like the British, reached for classical and orientalist stereotypes. 'What a multi-coloured crowd on the quayside! Caftans, turbans, western suits in the latest style, black tents and scarlet fezzes like poppies', exclaimed Etienne Burnet, a military medical officer on reaching the port. As he strolled through the tumble-down streets with their magnificent ruins, he commented: 'wretched and splendid, just like the orient'.[4] Burnet's reaction was repeated endlessly in the diaries, correspondence and photographs of French officers and soldiers as they encountered the inhabitants of a Macedonia who so often failed to live up to their preconceptions.[5] More than just allies, the French and British shared an understanding of 'civilization' against which they judged both Greece and the Macedonians.

However, the soldiers were there as more than tourists, though in their leisure moments behind the front and in Salonika, they were that, too, as they sought distraction, peered at strange people, visited, photographed and bought postcards of monuments and churches, and perhaps above all imagined (or experienced) what it would be like to have sex with local women. Primarily, they were there to fight; but organizing a front in a distant land where the infrastructure and conditions were so different from France and Belgium meant an extraordinary effort in amassing supplies, building facilities and generally creating the conditions that could

sustain a military population of half a million men, equivalent to a medium-sized city. The front, in short, had to be constructed. In order to fight the enemy, the Allies needed to engage in all manner of work behind the front, much of it affecting the local population. This in turn helped shape their attitudes to the latter, with the work being presented as beneficial to the local inhabitants. For the French and British, work provided hard evidence of superior Allied efficiency and development and thus demonstrated the benefit of their 'civilizing' influence, despite the fact it was they who had inflicted war on the region.

In late 1918, as the front dissolved and the Allies at last advanced northwards into Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania (though the French would continue to administer Thrace until 1920), a resident of Salonika by the name of E. Thomas summed up this perspective in a French-subsidized newspaper, and later a book entitled *L'Oeuvre civilisatrice de l'armée française en Macédoine* (*The Civilising Work of the French Army in Macedonia*).[6] The French, wrote Thomas, had resumed the 'Romans' task' in building roads (the Via Egnatia had passed through Salonika as it crossed Macedonia to Byzantium). They had secured water supplies while tackling malaria and establishing a new public health regime against infectious diseases. They had engaged in 'modern' agriculture, especially market gardening, replacing 'prehistoric implements' (notably wooden with metal ploughs), and had shown the locals how to use 'scientific' methods. They had manufactured items on their own account and set up brickworks and a tobacco factory. They had also conducted a geological survey and organized mining (with military engineers exploiting newly discovered reserves of lignite in the region).[7]

Nor was culture neglected. Thomas pointed out that the French commander-in-chief of the Allied expedition until the end of 1917, Maurice Sarrail, established an archaeological service as construction of a long fortified position around Salonika began to turn up historical remains. Sarrail told all French units that: 'Faithful to the French tradition in Egypt and Morea [a reference to the expedition to the Peloponnese of 1828–1832 in support of the Greek War of Independence], the Armée de l'Orient will have the honour of laying the first foundations of a scientific study of Macedonia, and of leaving to those who come after them a precious tool'.[8] The French Army excavated tumuli, exposed the different strata of Salonika's past and also renovated the Byzantine basilica of St. George, in which they set up an archaeological museum. The army's Photographic Service recorded not only the campaign but also the artistic

patrimony of the region, including the Byzantine churches and Turkish decorated slabs of Salonika. In addition, it catalogued what Thomas called 'the population types, so varied and curious [… constituting] an inexhaustible mine of information for geographers and ethnographers'.[9] The war photographers and artists exhibited in Salonika and later in Athens where the Ecole Française d'Athènes (EFA), a research institute established in 1846, shortly after Greek independence, helped display their work. The army also promoted French cultural influence by supporting several French-language schools in Macedonia.

In short, according to Thomas, the grief and misery of war had found some recompense in how the Allies (and especially the French) had, in this backward part of the world, 'made civilization move two centuries forward'.[10] His portrait was factually not inaccurate but it was idealized and uncomplicated. The question is whether we can discover the dynamics that drove such 'work'. It is also how and why, after a long nineteenth century marked by many such expeditions, 'work' had become a way for soldiers to see themselves as 'civilizers' of those among whom they fought and laboured—protagonists of a 'civilizing mission'. I shall look first at work generated by the front, then at work to do with the cultural 'patrimony' of Macedonia and lastly at the urban renewal of Salonika.

The Front as Work

Because Greek Macedonia was a front with up to half a million soldiers facing nearly as many enemy troops, the Allies took control not just of the combat zone but also of the entire hinterland, including Salonika, its lifeline to the outside world, and organized it (despite tensions with the Greek authorities) so as to ensure their own security and supplies. Since the Mediterranean was the second main theatre of the naval war, in which the Allies blockaded the Austrian Adriatic coast and the Ottoman Empire while the Austrians and Germans attacked their shipping with mines and submarines, links with home were difficult. Indeed, when the Germans resumed unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1917, supply lines (for men and material) became perilous, and the French established a tortuous land route via Corfu and Brindisi in order to minimize the sea crossing.[11] Clemenceau's notorious (and unfair) jibe that the French soldiers in Macedonia were the 'gardeners of Salonika' reflected the reality that they needed to supplement their food reserves, along with much else. As with

earlier expeditions to the edges of Europe, the Allies had to organize economic support locally, with co-dependence on the natives.

The Allies used local labour (bringing a welcome boost to the local economy) as well as Bulgarian prisoners and deserters (the latter formed into units under military control), but they also introduced militarized workers from the French colonies of Madagascar and Indochina and, in the British case, from India and Egypt.[12] Along with the high proportion of colonial soldiers in both Allied armies, this led to many 'counter encounters' between ordinary Macedonians and 'exotic' troops from as far away as West Africa and Vietnam. This heterogeneous workforce built the defensive ring around Salonika (a vast undertaking some 70 kilometres long), made roads to the front and dug trenches. They enlarged the port, installing a light railway system, and also laid railway lines to the front. They engaged in agriculture on a large scale. But 'work' was not (and never is) purely functional. It involves habit, organization, cultural assumptions and innovation, not to mention fundamental power relations. All of these shaped the relationship of Allies and Macedonians as they created the front and its hinterland.

Let me explore four ways in which this happened. The first is food production. Many of the French infantry were peasants who had the same critical attitude as some British soldiers towards local agrarian methods, which were seen as backward and neglectful of the fertile soil of the plains. Etienne Burnet, our medical officer who travelled up and down the front, noted the *poilus*' disapproval: 'Ah! If only we had land like that', they would say, deploring in particular the quality of the wine. One soldier wrote in a letter home about the latter that 'it is sold to us at 2frs 50 a litre and is vitriol'.[13] In 1917, older French territorial soldiers were put in charge of the harvest in Thessaly, between Mount Olympus and Macedonia, for the Allies' benefit. But as Burnet ruefully asked: 'Have the French territorials conquered Thessaly or has Thessaly conquered the territorials?'[14] Of course, soldiers on all fronts grumbled about prices behind the lines and rural soldiers habitually commented on farming in the lands to which the war brought them. Men from the *Midi* and elsewhere did so behind the front in northern France. Nor were the Allies in Macedonia alone in growing food. The British Army set up farms in France to boost food supplies.[15] However, in Macedonia, the French Army not only produced crops and vegetables on its own account but also sought to introduce modern equipment and teach 'scientific' methods to local farmers, as Thomas had observed, though the output was above all for the Allies'

needs. In short, perceived 'backwardness' defined the encounter and reinforced the soldiers' sense of their superiority, although this is not to say that there were no lasting benefits to Macedonian farmers.

Second, public works: as indicated, the infrastructure required by the front meant that the French and British armies engaged in engineering and building which, even if it was determined by military needs, often benefited the population in addition to providing employment. For example, in addition to building barracks, hospitals and aerodromes, the French constructed 900 kilometres of new roads and upgraded 1200 kilometres of existing ones. They piped water to Salonika and restored artesian wells originally sunk under Ottoman rule. If they were motivated above all by the need for clean, running water for military camps and hospitals, the region as a whole also benefited.[16]

Just how intimately such public works were entwined with the activities of an ordinary military unit is shown by a report which the 227th Infantry Regiment (IR) compiled in December 1918 on its *oeuvre* ('work' in the sense of achievement) in 'the Orient', including photographs.[17] The regiment (raised in Dijon) had arrived early in 1917, having been re-formed as an Alpine unit, and spent most of the campaign in the mountains near the Albanian frontier. According to its official history, the men had been 'surprised' as they marched there via the provincial capital, Florina, at the 'costumes and customs of these oriental populations'.[18] The impetus for the work in question was the 'front' itself and the need to hold this 'sub sector' with the fewest losses possible. But this had implications for the hinterland. The soldiers set up their own brickworks so they could build defences on the front line and facilities (such as fountains) in the rear. They established a kiln to make earth pipes to conduct water and large jars to hold it. The more artistic among them baked clay models, 'a hobby that was as artistic as it was beneficial to a balanced mind in a war where simply holding on was to win'.

If the work of the 227th IR was above all about its own survival (before leaving, they built a brick memorial to their dead comrades), the report felt that it had also benefited the villages behind the front, where the regiment had piped water, upgraded and repainted houses and encouraged the inhabitants 'by following our example, to improve the hygiene of their land'. The regiment built bridges and turned mule tracks into roads suitable for cars and, by means of irrigation, set up market gardens. Finally, it eliminated the stagnant pools that bred mosquitoes and included civilians in the battle against malaria. All this, according to the colonel, had helped make 'this Macedonian population, initially so mistrustful, come to love France'.

French military intelligence reports in fact show that Macedonians (who of course were not one people) by no means 'loved' the Allies, in part because whatever the latter brought to them was offset by the hardships of the war as well as by displacement and death. Parts of Greece verged on famine by 1917, while refugee flows, already substantial in the two Balkan Wars, continued as a result of the fighting, particularly on the plains of western Thrace. Nonetheless, the 227th IR clearly saw the war as 'work' not only in the sense of physical labour but also of 'achievements' which had changed the country while demonstrating the civilizing benefits of its presence.

A third area in which 'work' structured relations with the inhabitants and shaped stereotypes was hygiene. Just as public health measures against contagious diseases had become accepted as a function of government in more developed countries from the late nineteenth century on, so the mass armies of the Great War required equivalent medical protection. Vaccinations, hygiene and proper treatment of the infected were the reverse side of a wartime medicine more readily known for surgery and the treatment of battlefield wounds. 'Public health' was vital for armies in the field and served to distinguish those with a 'modern' medical regime from those with one redolent of an earlier period. The British and French placed themselves firmly in the former category.[19]

Colonial expeditions, however, had always exposed armies to exotic diseases in especially pathogenic conditions—and Macedonia was no exception. The valleys and plains where the Allies fought were among the largest reservoirs of malaria in Europe, and in 1916 the French experienced an epidemic of the illness that compromised their military capability. Crucially, while the disease was transmitted between humans by the mosquito, its carriers were the long-infected local inhabitants. Malaria, in short, epitomized (and symbolized) the threat of an apparently disease-ridden population living in insanitary conditions to the soldiers who worked and fought in their midst.

When the leading French researchers on the malady (the two Sergent brothers from Algeria) were recruited to organize an 'anti-malaria mission', they decreed that compulsory use of quinine by the entire expeditionary force was not enough; the army had to include the civilian population in its prophylactic programme and drain the swamps and ponds where the mosquitoes bred.[20] That in turn required medically mapping Macedonia in order to identify the worst reservoirs of the disease by examining the health of the population, especially children (Etienne Burnet as

he travelled up and down the front was engaged on precisely this task).[21] With more than 20 military doctors plus a support staff, the mission produced propaganda, treated civilians and organized drainage works to destroy the larvae (carried out by ordinary units like the 227th IR). The battle had largely been won by 1918, but the Sergent brothers had struggled to impose medical lessons learned in the 'rough school' of the African Army since the French conquest of Algeria in 1830—lessons which had everything to do with managing the relationship between Europeans, natives and a harsh environment.[22]

The fourth kind of work shaping relations with the people of Macedonia was that of administering them. As Thomas noted in his book, the French tried to categorize a population that did not easily fit ethno-national terms, a problem they shared with the new Greek authorities. Military intelligence intercepted a report from the Greek governor of western Macedonia which remarked how the diverse peoples of the region were made up 'firstly of persons who have no sense of national belonging'.[23] In some ways, the Allies and the new Greek administration shared a feeling of being strangers among an exotic, backward and pre-national population. The first step was thus to establish the nature of the land and its occupants by that anthropological reflex which (since the expeditions to Egypt in the 1790s and early 1800s) had become an indispensable tool for western European armies in charting and managing encounters with native peoples.

This was above all the work of military intelligence, though it was not necessarily identified as a formal or predominant function. As in any theatre, French (and British) military intelligence performed many roles including espionage and counter-espionage, propaganda, assessing enemy plans and capabilities, monitoring politics and public opinion, censoring military and local civilian mail, and so on. Military intelligence at General Headquarters (in the French case, the Second Bureau) bore the burden of this work, though it was shared by the naval and military attachés in Athens and specialists at the Ministry of War in Paris.[24] However, officers able to read Greek were at a premium as were those who knew Bulgarian, Turkish, Albanian and Ladino (nearly half the population of Salonika was descended from Spanish Jews expelled from their homeland in the sixteenth century), among other tongues.[25] French classicists formed a natural pool of recruitment, with the EFA supplying some of the most talented.[26] They included Charles Picard, a classical archaeologist who later became the School's first post-war president and who, having served on the Western Front, was sent back to Greece in 1916 where he eventually became director of the Second

Bureau. Others were sociologists, geographers and historians. Five of the EFA's staff died in the war, and when Picard commemorated their sacrifice shortly after the conflict he did so, almost inevitably, by referring to Pericles and the French debt to classical Athens.[27]

In all, a talented array of young, university-educated officers staffed the Second Bureau in Salonika, and they brought both a passion for classical and Byzantine Greece and also a fascination (and often deep knowledge) of the contemporary Balkans to their activities, which included charting the nature of the society in which the Allied armies had to live and work. Part of the function of the Second Bureau was ethnographic, in the sense of mapping and investigating the peoples of Macedonia, especially where this related to operations on the front, economic production or the tangled politics of the borders. Charles Picard spent some of the summer of 1918 at Korytsa (Albanian Korçë), a city of mixed ethnicity disputed by Greece and Albania, which the French ran from 1916 to 1920 as an autonomous Albanian republic despite claims by Venizelos and local Greeks that it belonged to Greece. It was in this context that Picard produced an ethnographic survey of Korytsa/ Korçë for the French Army replete with an analysis not just of ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliations (including a significant 'Aromanian' group speaking a Latin-derived language akin to Romanian) but also of the historic and folk tales from which the communities drew their different identities. Photographs of family groups or individuals posing in what was referred to as 'national' costume and drawings of typical dwellings completed the survey.[28] It is not clear how it was used, though it contained information on mining. It may have fed later deliberations by the League of Nations and the Conference of Ambassadors on the fate of the region, which was awarded to Albania in 1922. Borders became a burning issue post-war, and at least one of the Second Bureau officers (and head of its political section), the geographer Jacques Ancel, became an expert on both the Balkans and 'geo-politics'.[29]

While the contested nature of Korytsa (it was close to the front and also claimed by Bulgaria) made it a particular candidate for such treatment, the French army seems to have conducted such ethnographic surveys in a more routine fashion. In mid-1918, it carried out a census in the central section of the front around Monastir/ Bitola (straddling the border of Greek and Serb Macedonia) in order to establish its resources. This listed for each locality the number of men, women and children (again with ethnic categories and religious affiliation), the livestock, farm implements and kinds of housing (often with drawings). It also itemized archaeological

and historic sites.[30] We do not know how the army used this survey either, but the anthropological (and colonial) impulse seems clear. All information was to be gathered in order to supply a portrait of an entire society, the better to secure military operations, govern it, exploit its resources and modernize it. The well-established tradition of using academic and scientific expertise to establish the best basis for conducting a campaign, and dealing with the local population, was brought to bear on Macedonia. Not only did universal military service mean that the French could draw at will on the talent and expertise they needed for this, they could also mobilize a long commitment to classical Greece, including the EFA, in order to construct the front.

Culture as Work

The German term *Kulturträger* (culture bearers) has no equivalent in English or French. But it describes a key activity of European armies in the Levant which, in a crucial twist, saw themselves as the preservers and transmitters not just of their own culture to the 'natives' but of the ancient or classical culture of the region, usually deeply resonant for Europeans, which the natives were often held to have neglected. The armies, whose expertise extended to archaeology and art history, engaged in cultural work ostensibly on behalf of the natives but also as part of their own self-appointed—and self-defining—role as agents of European civilization. In effect, they were imperial *Kulturträger*. While this had been true of colonial expeditions throughout the nineteenth century, as we have seen elsewhere in this book, the First World War brought European armies to cities (Salonika, Constantinople, Jerusalem, Damascus, Baghdad) which embodied 'civilization' as such, from the Babylonians to Byzantium. It did so, moreover, just as the invasions in Europe itself, and the destruction of monuments such as Louvain university library and Rheims cathedral, heightened the contemporary sense of what the French term 'patrimony' actually consisted of, and of the ways in which wars threatened it with destruction.[31]

Macedonia was no exception. But the French (like the British) had more complex and conflicting motives than the simple altruism described by Thomas for carrying out their cultural activities—in which both archaeology and art history loomed large—and which constituted an additional, more specific kind of work to that of constructing the front. In the first place, attention to the Macedonian past aroused suspicion among the Greek authorities who themselves had had little time to appropriate the

history of the territory. This was especially so in the monarchist camp, which saw the entire Allied presence as illegitimate. Already in January 1916, shortly after the Allied arrival, Prince Nicholas of Greece sent the Director of the Byzantine Museum in Athens to check rumours that the French were trading art objects or sending them to their museums.[32] In February 1916, Sarrail had to 'rigorously forbid soldiers from appropriating objects with an archeological or artistic character which are discovered in the course of making defensive works'.[33] It was a key motive for setting up the Army Archaeological Service.

Yet Sarrail was also a hellenophile who felt it an honour that the army should, in the tradition established since Napoleon, conduct cultural work such as archaeology. Both the French and British armies formally agreed to become the custodians of Greek antiquities in their zone of occupation and to gather and display in a temporary museum in the White Tower 'all the objects of an artistic or antiquarian nature coming from the excavations and digging of the Allied forces in Macedonia'—along with the names of those who discovered them.[34] The soldiers were thus at least in principle turned from souvenir hunters into amateur archaeologists.

But this cultural work went much further. Both armies used the considerable means at their disposal—expertise, cartography, technology (including aerial photography) and cheap labour—to conduct excavations that were more than a response to the random effects of the war.[35] The French and British fixation on classical Greece as a source of the civilization of which they took themselves (as did the Germans) to be the modern inheritors meant that cultural involvement in Greece was nothing new, as the history of the EFA (and equivalent British School in Athens) attests. But the war both militarized this interest and extended it to Macedonia. In the French case, mobilized staff from the EFA led the Army Archaeological Service and ensured that its results were published in the appropriate scientific journals, notably that of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.[36] The army also published a *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* (later *Cahiers d'Orient*) which showcased the cultural activities of the French expeditionary force more generally.[37]

Yet the cultural work was double-edged. It was closely connected to the broader ethnographic reflex, which as we have seen included antiquities and archaeology because they provided clues about the origins and identity of localities and their inhabitants. Yet it also helped establish a 'patrimony' that was deemed to be Greek and thus European. Léon Rey, an archaeologist who requested (as a mobilized officer) to be assigned to

Salonika and who contributed to the archaeological service, concluded that the army's excavations (which covered the Neolithic, Classical, Byzantine and Ottoman periods) showed that Macedonia shared a common central European (rather than oriental) heritage.[38] Yet in a region which, though once part of classical Greece, had undergone many subsequent influences, and which now posed a challenge of cultural re-appropriation to the Greek state and especially Venizelos, such cultural work could scarcely be neutral. The driving ideology of the pro-war camp was *megali*, or the 'recovery' of the Greek world in Asia Minor and Byzantium as the long-term goal of national liberation. To the extent that the French and British emphasized the classical and Byzantine characteristics of Greek Macedonia, they served this cause. But establishing the 'patrimony' of Macedonia also served their own interests, amounting to a kind of expropriation of it in the name of their 'civilizing mission'—many of the artefacts they excavated found their way to the Louvre and the British Museum.

Mount Athos illustrates the tensions involved. The fabled isthmus with its cluster of Orthodox monasteries (with monks from many countries) lay just inside Allied-controlled Greek Macedonia, overlooking the submarine-infested Aegean Sea. Not only did it harbour Bulgarian monks, but as a religious site defying national categorization it clearly troubled French military security, which felt that 'the monks of Mount Athos enjoy a reputation that justifies every suspicion'.[39] By late 1917, the French military had taken it over. But this allowed the expansion and completion of pre-war attempts to document the extraordinary riches (in icons, mosaics and vestments) of the various monasteries, something that both French and Russian specialists on Byzantine art history had begun in the nineteenth century. In particular, the leading French scholar in the field, Gabriel Millet, was able to undertake a systematic inventory of frescos using the substantial resources of the French Army's Photographic Service, which the EFA completed with a civilian mission just after the war. The plates went back to France and were added to the Athos Archive which Millet established at the Collège de France.[40]

Nothing illustrates better how war allowed expeditionary Europeans to enter sacred spaces with a 'scientific' purpose, something expressed by the very style of their photography, which de-contextualized and objectified the art and artefacts. Was the resulting record made for the monks (who did not object to photographs being taken pre-war), for the Greek state, which wished to Hellenize this quintessentially non-national space, or for

the glory of Byzantine studies in France?[41] Whatever the answer, the inventory would not have existed without the military expedition to Macedonia.

Salonika and Urban Renewal

Salonika, a city of 160,000 and the hub of the Allied effort, entailed work of a different kind again, constituting the final category I wish to discuss—urbanization. As the largest Ottoman city in Europe before the Balkan Wars and reputedly the most modern in the empire, it stood for a kind of Ottoman modernity (it was the birth place of the Young Turk movement). Yet its boulevards, western-style buildings and port coexisted with a tangle of dense traditional districts with domes and minarets, and it is those which made it seem to Allied soldiers distinctly 'eastern'. Indeed, they often used 'Turkish' as an epithet to describe the city and region, meaning by this the opposite of modern. As we have seen, 39 per cent of the inhabitants were in fact Jews originally from Spain.[42] But their dress and wooden housing only added to the sense that Salonika was an oriental city, distilling the essence of the surrounding countryside (such as strange clothes and untouchable women) while also containing 'western' features, such as streets, squares, cinemas and brothels. If German soldiers during the war saw Brussels as a proxy for Paris, Salonika likewise hinted to the Allies at the mysteries and pleasures that awaited them in Constantinople, which remained one of the goals of their effort.[43]

The Allied armies ran Salonika as a city at war, which indeed it was. They not only enlarged the port but ringed it with anti-submarine nets and built airfields (e.g., at Thassos), for Salonika was bombed by German aircraft and even, on one occasion, by a zeppelin.[44] Camps sprang up within the new defensive line alongside hospitals, supply dumps and workshops. Soldiers on leave mingled with townsfolk. The different religious and ethnic communities (each with its own press), the danger posed by Bulgarian and Turkish 'enemy aliens', the influx of wartime refugees and the divisions of Greek politics, all meant that the Allies had to establish a full military administration. Nor were they themselves united. The Serbs, whose government-in-exile was in Salonika (and 140,000 of whose soldiers fought on the front), and the Italians, who had a smaller force and who coveted southern Albania, pursued their own interests. But as the largest element and with overall command in Macedonia, the French army led the occupation regime.

The military government faced a major catastrophe (making international headlines) when in August 1917 a fire destroyed some 40 per cent of the city, especially the wooden-built Jewish quarter, rendering 70,000 people homeless (52,000 of them Jews).[45] The Allies did what they could to control the blaze, though the local Greek-language press and Greek-speaking inhabitants (in letters censored by the Second Bureau) felt that the British had acquitted themselves far better than the French, who were accused of pillaging and, who in the view of some, had even started the fire deliberately (including by bombardment from battleships in the bay).[46] In fact, British, French and Greek official sources agreed that the fire was an accident, and both the British and French armies helped deal with its immediate aftermath, providing the victims with food and shelter.[47] However, it was a potentially divisive event in addition to being a numbing calamity for a population already suffering the effects of the war.

As it turned out, the fire gave the Allies a unique opportunity to collaborate with the Venizelos government and the mayor of Salonika in rebuilding the city. Within a week of the blaze, Venizelos and his Minister of Transport and Communications, Alexandros Papanastasiou, had set up an international committee to that end composed of a small number of international experts, including the British town planner, Thomas Mawson, and the French architect and archaeologist, Ernest Hébrard, as well as two Greek architects, Aristotelis Zahos and Konstantinos Kitsikis. Although Mawson's Greek contacts were royalist, he was invited to contribute his vision of open spaces and garden design to the new city. However, the key figure who rapidly imposed his vision was Ernest Hébrard, who had already been conducting excavations in the city as an officer in the French army. He was, moreover, a member of the influential Société Française des Architectes et Urbanistes which had published a booklet in 1915 defining the principles of modern 'urbanization' (such as wide streets, squares and zones of different usage) that were to be used in reconstructing the towns and villages of the Western Front.[48] Rebuilding the city as a whole meant the collective expropriation (with compensation) of the destroyed properties, something that created a good deal of anguish in the Jewish community (and resulted in protests on their behalf from leading French Jewish organizations) but on which both the French military administration and the Greek government (especially Papanastasiou) insisted. The effect was to allow a single master plan for the centre of Salonika which Hébrard, supported by the French military technical and engineering services, was largely responsible for delivering on 29 June 1918 (Figs. 14.1 and 14.2).[49]

Fig. 14.1 Aerial photograph of Salonika before the fire taken by a French military photographer, from the Musée d'Histoire Contemporaine, Paris (album VAL GF07). (Reproduced with permission of the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris)

The history of Salonika's reconstruction is well known, not least through the work of Alexandra Yerolympos at the Aristotle University in the city.[50] However, what concerns us here is the opportunity that it gave to the Allied armies for the work not just of urban rule but also of urban renewal. Rebuilding towns was an important activity between the wars in northern France and Belgium, along the former Western Front, and to a lesser degree on the Austro-Italian front. But, uniquely, one of the biggest urban renewal projects resulting from the war began while the conflict was still in progress—in Salonika. In the person of Ernest Hébrard, the Allies enjoyed an almost colonial-style freedom in this work (Hébrard went on in the 1920s to become one of the main architects rebuilding Hanoi in French Indochina). Yet this was not independent of the Greek authorities. On the contrary, Hébrard helped turn Ottoman Salonika into the capital of the new Greek territories by an architecture which consciously reinvented its classical and Byzantine past, thus serving the needs of the new Greek ally in the war.

Fig. 14.2 Reconstruction of the (now lost) original plan for Salonika drafted by Ernest Hébrard (1919). (Reproduced from Alexandra Yerolympos, *Urban Transformations in the Balkans (1820–1920): Aspects of Balkan Town Planning and the Remaking of Thessaloniki* (Thessaloniki, 1996), by permission of the author)

Despite the absence (thus far) of the records of the international committee, which would allow us to trace the cultural politics of this process in more detail, even a cursory glance at Hébrard's plan reveals what it entailed.[51] For Hébrard replaced the city centre and dense Jewish neighbourhood with a grid plan and hierarchy of streets that pivoted on two squares connected by a boulevard on a north-south axis in order to frame the distant view of Mount Olympus, southwards across the harbour. The square at the top end of the boulevard incorporated the archaeological find of the original *agora*, while Hébrard aligned other axes on Byzantine monuments. Thus, the French provided the architect who designed modern Thessaloniki in tune with the Hellenization sought by the Venizelos government. By an irony of history, this cultural vision was fulfilled socially

in the 1920s (even though Hébrard's plan was never fully realized) when Venizelos' failure to achieve *megali* and create a 'Greater Greece' in Anatolia resulted in forced population transfers under the Treaty of Lausanne. As Greek Muslims left for Turkey, Greeks expelled from Anatolia (especially Smyrna) flooded into the city and many Jews went to France or Palestine, Salonika became ethnically more 'Greek'.

* * *

When European expeditionary forces went to the peripheries of their own continent and beyond in the long nineteenth century, they saw the indigenous peoples and cultures they encountered there through the lens of their own preconceptions. They also caught sight of themselves in the reflection of what they saw. In both senses, these amounted to peripheral vision, but such visions nonetheless had the power to reinforce, and also modify, their subjective centre—the expeditionary soldiers themselves. For much of the century, those peripheral visions were expressed in terms of a 'civilizing mission'. This set down the unequal relations of force on which the encounters were based but also dressed them up as being of benefit to both sides. The other, 'indigenous' side rarely endorsed the European view in these terms, even when it accepted some or even much of the civilizing endeavour. On occasions it repudiated the latter, and did so with growing intensity after the First World War, as the sentiment of decolonization gathered strength.

The 'civilizing mission' was never just rhetoric. It turned on activities conducted during invasions, battles and occupations. The activities included work of different kinds, which was carried out with varying degrees of coercion and mainly for the benefit of the European armies. Yet such work also altered the landscape, brought change, led the occupied to see themselves differently and changed their relationship with the occupiers. However, because the occupiers perceived a gulf between their own 'civilized' state and the backwardness of their 'beneficiaries' (a perception expressed by the anthropological impulse to categorize and explain the 'natives'), work was a one-way street to modernity decreed by the military—farming 'scientifically', saving 'civilization' or transforming cities.

'Civilization', however, proved a brittle construct. There was a paradox in the fact that for Europeans many of its fountain heads originated outside Europe (or at any rate outside modern and 'civilized' Europe), on those same peripheries to which their armies went, especially in the Levant

(in which they included Greece). Was ancient civilization to be rescued for the indigenous societies which often seemed unworthy of it or for the sake of 'civilized' Europe, its modern inheritor? The Allies resolved the conundrum in the Macedonian case by helping the Greek regime 're-hellenize' Salonika. Yet this appropriation of 'civilization' was being called into question by the end of the nineteenth century. Not only were emergent nationalisms on the 'periphery' claiming the ancient civilizations as their own (the Venizelist myth of *megali* meant re-claiming Macedonia and, from 1919 to 1922, western Anatolia for 'Greek civilization') but the Great War, whose ideological struggle turned on notions of 'civilization' and 'culture', undermined Europe's own status as 'civilized'.[52] The Bulgarians, for example, bombarded the Allied lines in Macedonia with propaganda that rejected the 'civilizing' mission of the French, inviting them to defend their own territory against a superior Germany rather than try to 'liberate' a Macedonia that belonged to Bulgaria.[53] Even as they sought to carry it out, the 'civilizing work' of the French was rejected by those on the other side of the front.

That the Allied expedition to Macedonia was a by-product of the Great War, became an occupation only due to the creation of the front and had no longer-term goal makes it all the more telling that the 'the work of civilization' should so readily have become a key trope in the Allies' own understanding of what they were doing. Military expeditions in the long nineteenth century had engendered languages to govern encounters with peoples seen as marking the periphery of Europe proper. Arguably, these reached their climax in the First World War and marked just how far ideas and practices of 'civilizing work' or the 'civilizing mission' had evolved since the 1790s.

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Notes

1. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, 2000).
2. For the recent historiography of the Macedonian front, see the proceedings of two conferences held in Thessaloniki in 1989 and 2002: *La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre. Actes du colloque tenu en novembre 1989 à Thessalonique* (Thessaloniki, 1992) and *The Salonica Theatre of Operations*

and the Outcome of the Great War (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 277, 2005).

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7. SHD, 20 N 155, Ministère de la Guerre, 20 September 1917, authorizing the AFO to use military manpower for mining.
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11. Guy Pedroncini, Les Alliés et le problème du commandement naval en Méditérranée de 1914–1918', in *La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre*, pp. 13–24.
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13. Burnet, *La Tour blanche*, p. 62 (1 May 1917); SHD, 20N 79, AFO, 2e Bureau, rep. 10 January 1916.
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31. Jean-Marc Hofman, ed., *1914–1918. Le Patrimoine s'en va-t-en guerre* (Paris, 2016); Thérèse Krempp, 'L'Armée française d'Orient: nouvelle expedition militaro-scientifique?', in Le Naour, *Front d'Orient*, pp. 63–82.
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(MAE), 1 CPCOM Guerre 1914–1918/Balkans/Grèce, Graillet (French consul in Salonika) to Minster for Foreign Affairs, 8 and 16 September 1917. For the Greek government, see Johannes Saïas, *Salonique en reconstruction* (Athens, 1920), a justification by a self-described lawyer and publicist of the expropriation measures; also Papastathis, 'Fire of Salonica', pp. 258–59.

50. Alexandra Yerolympos, 'Thessaloniki before and after Ernest Hébrard' (Department of Architecture, Aristotle University of Thessalonika, 2007, www.academia.edu/5943884/ Thessaloniki before and after Ernest Hébrard, consulted 25/05/2016).
51. As confirmed to me by Professor Yerolympos and by my own search of the Franco-Greek diplomatic correspondence for 1917–1918 in the MAE archives in Paris. For the current state of knowledge, see Yerolympos, 'La Part du feu', in Veinstein, ed., *Salonique, ville des Juifs*, p. 263.
52. Georgios Agelopoulos, 'Contested Territories and the Quest for Ethnology: People and Places in Izmir 1919–1922' in Diamandouros et al. (eds.), *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation*, pp. 181–91. The Greeks used their own ethnography in the Izmir region.
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CHAPTER 15

The 'Hole-y' City: British Soldiers' Perceptions of Jerusalem During Its Occupation, 1917–1920

Mahon Murphy

A Modern Odyssey
[second last verse]:
Through passes and hills rough and frowning,
Of Judea, we pushed on to the prize,
The goal of our aims and the crowning
Of Allenby's high enterprise;
Till we rested at length, where in glory
The Temple had once reared its fame,
Saw the church of the Sepulchre hoary,
In the hands of the Christian again.[1]

Introduction

On the 9 December 1917, General Edmund Allenby marched through the Jaffa Gate and formally began the British military occupation of Jerusalem, and what T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) famously hailed

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as the 'supreme moment of the war'. This was perhaps no understatement: the British capture of Jerusalem was the greatest prize of any European military expedition in the long nineteenth century. This victory gave Britain custody of the holiest city in Judaism and Christianity and of one of the holiest sites of Islam. Coming at the end of perhaps the worst year of the war for the Allies, the capture of Jerusalem provided a huge propaganda coup for Britain and helped to rally the Empire for the push to victory in 1918. Even Britain's main enemy, Germany, noted the value of the capture of Jerusalem: 'This is doubtless a success for the English, though more moral than military… the conqueror of the city, of course, gains a halo'.[2]

The war between the Ottoman Empire (with strong German military support) and the British and French Empires brought more western European and colonial soldiers to Palestine than at any time since the French and British incursions during the Napoleonic campaign in Egypt (though Jerusalem had escaped capture on that occasion). Tens of thousands of British and white Dominion soldiers, predominantly from working-class backgrounds, were exposed to Middle Eastern culture and heritage *en masse*, as were soldiers from elsewhere in the Empire, notably India.[3] Traditionally, historiography has treated the military occupation as a transitional period between Ottoman and British Mandate rule; however, more recent studies judge it as a formative period in Jerusalem's twentieth century with its own long-term consequences. However, rather than giving an account of the takeover of the city, this chapter will focus on Jerusalem as an occupied city from 1917 to 1920 and ask how ordinary British soldiers perceived themselves and the supposedly occupied enemy population.

To this end I shall explore two strands. The first is the soldiers' personal experience and memories of the city during wartime as recounted in their diaries and memoirs. It is important to keep in mind that the encounter with Jerusalem was experienced and imagined through the lens of war, and it was war that allowed the majority of these soldiers to be in Palestine in the first place. Historians have challenged the idea of soldiers perceiving the Palestine campaign as a neo-crusade arguing that for most ordinary soldiers, the goal was to see the world not dominate it.[4] Entering Jerusalem, therefore, was not merely about defeating an enemy or an encounter with the other, it was also a moment of personal reflection and an experience that was to be related to those at home. British soldiers made use of mainly biblical and sometimes crusader vocabulary to give meaning and depth to

operations during the Palestine campaign, and through this they articulated their grievances, challenged the myth of Palestine as a 'Holiday Front' and also reconnected with home.[5] Soldiers' attitudes towards the local population, while varied, were very much at odds with their encounters with the enemy on the battlefield, and although accounts of encounter remind us of nineteenth-century travel literature, there is a noticeable martial element.

The second strand is official military control of the city. The Foreign Office attempted to carefully stage-manage the takeover in an attempt to divorce Jerusalem from its Christian significance and present the conquest as a secular victory for the British Empire. The capture of Jerusalem was a key propaganda victory in remobilising Britain's war effort and proved timely, coming at the end of the most difficult year of the war with increasing domestic malaise for the war effort.[6] The military governor, Ronald Storrs, enacted his own propaganda offensive that was often at odds with the British Foreign Office's plans. Storrs used the occupation and his position as military governor to recreate and 're-sanctify' the biblical Jerusalem. However, Storrs and imperial planners in London had common goals—to shape the narrative of the surrender and occupation of Jerusalem for propaganda purposes with an emphasis on British humility; respect had to be shown for the Holy City and it was to be liberated rather than conquered.[7] However, these competing designs for Jerusalem had the effect, intended or unintended, of drastically restricting soldiers' access to religious sites and even the old city itself, and dramatically reshaped the spaces for cultural encounter.

Imagining the Landscape

During the nineteenth century, curiosity about the Holy Land could be satisfied through first-hand experience aided by the rise in popularity of the *Cook's tour*. Travel to the Holy Land, however, remained the preserve of the rich, but the desire to see the country for oneself did not necessarily mean a physical visit to Palestine. Rising attendances in Sunday school and the proliferation of illustrated bibles meant that by the First World War, Palestine and especially Jerusalem did not have to be introduced into the British army's imagination. The holy sites were ingrained as an idea or an imagined landscape in the minds of the vast majority of British and Australian soldiers from all strata of society.

For European Christians, whose primary religious references lay outside their own continent, Jerusalem has always been a disembodied city on a hill. The notion of Jerusalem existing in a 'celestial' space as popularized by William Blake's celebrated poem of that name ('And did those feet in Ancient Times') divorced the imagined Jerusalem from its geographic reality.[8] The notion of a new Jerusalem, as a symbol of purity, virtue and divinity, began to overshadow its physical other. Blake's exhortation to build Jerusalem on British soil was popularized throughout the nineteenth century and was an integral part of the British imperial vision. British imperial planners viewed Jerusalem as the model capital of spirituality and religion, matched to that of Rome as the imperial embodiment of secular power and martial prowess—as both had also done for other European states.[9] The 'liberation' of Jerusalem during the First World War could occupy two narratives: the occupation of a physical location with its religious sites and a voyage of discovery, and a retracing of footsteps of crusader legends. After the war, the official history of the Palestine campaign went so far as to claim that 'half-forgotten lessons of childhood were recalled and given new significance'.[10]

Once in Palestine, British soldiers thus felt they were on familiar ground. Many attested that they were witnessing a 'literalisation' of familiar biblical images and parables.[11] The occupation of Palestine during the First World War thus allowed British troops, especially artists and writers, to rediscover the Holy Land through a blend of nineteenth-century imagery and modern innovations in aerial photography.[12] Campaigning there gave them the chance to be tourists in a land whose geography was already familiar to them from the Bible and crusader legends. To further help soldiers associate their current positions with biblical geography, the YMCA prepared a special pocket-sized Bible containing maps of the country.[13] *The Palestine News*, an educational army newspaper set up in February 1918, carried advertisements for books dealing with Palestine's geography and history such as Smith and Bartholomew's *Historical Atlas of Palestine* and Bryant and Rice's *History of Jerusalem*.[14] General Allenby is said to have especially valued George Adam Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, using it along with the Bible as a reference point. He received his copy of this text from Lloyd George who explained that it was 'a better guide to a military leader whose task was to reach Jerusalem than any survey found in the pigeon holes of the War Office'.[15]

The corroboration of Scripture in the never-changing landscapes of the East was, as Eitan Bar-Yosef states, an Orientalist commonplace. But this impression was reinforced by life as part of a mobile army; especially when

crossing the Sinai Desert on foot to enter Palestine, soldiers came more and more to identify with this biblical imagery.[16] With the goal of delivering Jerusalem to Britain by Christmas, the war in Palestine in some ways represented a pilgrimage and soldiers could relate their voyage in a number of ways—as a biblical pilgrimage, Crusader fantasy or even a reminder of the French revolutionary army in Egypt (some soldiers took particular delight in noting that not even the military of genius of Napoleon was able to deliver Jerusalem). The precedent of the French expedition to the Middle East was certainly a reference. The Palestine Exploration Fund commissioned a guidebook so that troops 'might get a more general idea as to the sites and ancient localities in the places where they are'. Published in November 1917 and written by Lieutenant Commander Victor Trumper, the guidebook *Historical Sites in Southern Palestine* was mostly taken up with an account of Napoleon's Syrian campaign in 1799.[17]

Encounters with local Bedouins created images that were all too familiar for soldiers steeped in biblical narratives. Sergeant Donald Pitchford Appleby (Royal Army Service Corps) in his diary on 23 November 1917, after commenting on the 'picturesque' clothing of Arabs, noted that they practised camel herding in much the way an Englishman herds his sheep and that this was 'a typical scene of Eastern Life, as described in the Bible'.[18] The image of Palestine was so ingrained in the popular British imagination that Major E. B. Hinde, of the East Anglian Field Ambulance, on visiting an unnamed town on the way to Jerusalem noted: 'We visited the market and found it most interesting. The costumes were so picturesque, especially the men's. I won't attempt to describe them. Pictures of them are common'.[19]

This imagined following in the footsteps of biblical characters meant that soldiers fought on two different plains; the fields of combat were converted into scenes from the Bible, crusader myth, or Napoleonic fantasy especially when discussed in letters to wives and mothers back home in Britain. Anthony Bluett in his published memoirs noted that: 'There was a sense of being on familiar ground, of having witnessed the whole scene before somewhere'.[20] This is further displayed in a letter from Private R. H. Sims (Royal Sussex Regiment) to his mother: 'isn't it nice to know that we are treading on exactly the same ground as Our Lord trod on… before he was sacrificed on the cross to redeem the whole earth'.[21] This imagined geography served to relate their surroundings to loved ones, to sanitize the harsh realities of fighting in Palestine, and to suppress any feelings that Palestine was essentially a sideshow to the main events of the war

on the Western Front. However, not all accounts of Jerusalem were painted in such terms, Private Douglas H. Calcutt of the London Regiment, on the battle to take the city, sarcastically noted in his memoirs: 'How romantic a death for a conscientious objector to die at Christmas time fighting for the Holy City'.[22]

Soldiers in Jerusalem

Once in Jerusalem, soldiers painted Jerusalemites not as an enemy but as a people waiting for liberation. C. R. Hennessy of the London Regiment, although noting that the inhabitants of Jerusalem could have 'done with a good scrubbing', nevertheless maintained it 'must have been really exciting for them to realize that after many centuries of oppression by the Turks, they had at last got rid of them'.[23] On entry to the city, he and his comrades greeted the locals warmly with shouts of *mazel tov* delivered 'with more gusto than correct pronunciation'.[24] J. Wilson of the Machine Gun Corps felt that the British were 'bringing a great light once more into this darkened land'.[25] To some extent this was true. The war had deprived Jerusalem of one its main sources of income: pilgrims. The war had also meant a depreciation of paper money, which had a disastrous effect on the city and was to some extent relieved with the introduction of the Egyptian piastre during the occupation. The negative effects of the war really began to take hold from 1916 as the Allied naval blockade of the Ottoman Empire took effect and after locust swarms had ravaged the previous year's harvest. It was no wonder then that *The Palestine News* described Jerusalem as 'Holy but Hungry'. An editorial in the same paper remarked that in view of the war, 'is it surprising that the people of the Holy City fell an easy prey to disease and that on our occupation we found a hollow eyed bleak looking race flitting uneasily among closed shops and strangely silent streets…?'[26] Shortages can further be seen in an advertisement for the *Hotel Fast*, which noted that while it had hot baths, clean beds and armchairs, visitors should bring their own food rations.[27] The previously mentioned Major Hinde had made sure to plan ahead for his stay at the Grand New Hotel and brought his own bread.[28]

The pre-war pilgrims and tourists that had been a mainstay of Jerusalem's economy may have been missing, but they were replaced to some extent by Khaki-clad figures participating in services in both the Protestant and Latin churches, particularly during Easter 1918. According to *The Palestine News*, the change in dress presented a visual reminder that, when

coupled with the increased opportunities for local employment on engineering projects, a new era had 'dawned'.[29] This new beginning can be best highlighted through the opening up of a branch of Lipton in the city to cater for the new inhabitants' needs.[30]

Once the British arrived, the Occupied Territories East Administration (OTEA) enlisted existing institutions such as the American Red Cross, the Hadassah or Women's Zionist Organisation of America, and the Syria and Palestine Relief Committee to help improve sanitation and deal with orphans and refugees. The Royal Engineers pumped water to the city from several reservoirs, public security returned, highways improved, and streets were cleaned up. Water was naturally a key concern for the occupying army, but the increased flow of water into the city also represented an important facet of the British civilising mission in Palestine. Sanitation and clean water would be the first steps in winning over the local population. An extract from the *Egyptian Gazette* noted: 'as one drives into Jerusalem, the finest thing that strikes the mind is the miles of water piping that is being laid in the streets and lanes of the city'.[31] Commerce was kick-started in one way with the arrival of troops wishing to spend their wages on souvenirs and entertainment. More importantly, British financial grants to local entrepreneurs, especially those wishing to develop local crafts such as glass making, helped to boost the economy. A temporary ban was imposed on the import of salt, printed matter, cotton and copper to encourage local industry. The economic stimulus for the city did not directly come from the soldiers themselves, but the fruit stalls and shops which developed to serve the new 'tourists' added a new character to Jerusalem.

Soldiers were naturally eager to buy items of religious significance and postcards or books of pressed flowers to send home. While crucifixes and other Christian mementoes were of particular interest, they were also keen to purchase antiquities. 'Roman' coins or glass vases were a relatively cheap and easily transportable piece of the city's history. While the authenticity of these artefacts is questionable, coin collecting was popular and the front cover of an issue of the 'Jerusalem Pictorial Plan' displayed coinage dating from Rome up to George V surrounding an image of the Jaffa Gate. In this regard, Ronald Storrs as military governor was not so different from his own soldiers. Responding to the same collecting passion, he established a significant personal collection of antiquarian objects. Interestingly, local musician Wasif Jawhariyyeh was inspired to begin his own collection of cultural artefacts after a visit to Storrs' residence.[32] Storrs's collection was unfortunately lost when most of his possessions, along with

his diaries, were burned in a fire at the government house in Cyprus (his posting after Jerusalem).[33] He did, however, plan a museum of important objects to be funded by the Pro-Jerusalem Society that would include items of clothing from the city.[34]

The official entertainments of the army offered, albeit in a limited fashion, further opportunities for soldiers to interact with the local population. Concert parties organized by divisional musical groups flourished and, according to the *Palestine News*, were as essential a feature of modern warfare as the 'Gas-Mask'. The same newspaper noted that: 'Concert troops grow like fungi in these war-days, when entertainment is so necessary, and the growth has proved, from the harvest point of view, good, bad, and indifferent'. The most popular of these concert troupes were *The Roosters*, attached to the 60th Division, who performed all over the Middle East and Salonika throughout the war to favourable reviews in the *Palestine News* and soldiers' diaries. *The Roosters* staged a run of their popular comedy show 'Cinderella in Army Boots' at the Palestine Pavilion near the Jaffa Gate from Christmas 1917, which they would eventually go on to record for the BBC in 1924.[35] While most of these entertainments did not differ from the standard fare performed in British and Dominion music halls, there were adaptations to suit local conditions such as the staging of the original comic play 'The Rose of Gaza', with the heroine, Evelyn Fare, held prisoner in a harem waiting for her rescuer, Lancelot Toogood. E. B. Hinde commented favourably on the 'ripping falsetto' of the Rose, although he did note that the mystery was somewhat ruined by the 'enormous – monstrous hands' of the actor playing the part.[36]

Locals were not barred from these entertainments, and it is surprising to see how many of Jerusalem's elite mixed with their British counterparts at the various concert parties and social events. To encourage this cultural interaction and with a view to not offending local sensibilities, Storrs strictly forbade the representation of anti-Semitic stereotypes (ironically, Storrs himself had previously played Shylock in productions of *The Merchant of Venice*). In one embarrassing incident, an actor, filling in for an ill cast member, failed to get the order and appeared on stage as a 'music hall Jew', resulting in mass walkouts of the Jewish audience. Appealing to local sentiment was of paramount importance for the occupation authorities; General Allenby had to backtrack quickly on his victory speech when he declared that 'only now have the crusades ended'. Muslim leaders protested and some withdrew from the victory celebrations.[37]

While there were interactions between the soldiers and the inhabitants, the encounter with the physical Jerusalem left many of the former disillusioned. Although praising the abundance of fresh fruit which greeted them on their arrival, soldiers still viewed the local population through an orientalist lens. Among photographs of the city's walls and churches, one soldier found it worthwhile to photograph a local vagrant to highlight the filth of the city. The shops hidden among Jerusalem's winding streets were compared to dog kennels and the wares for sale (apart from figs) were seen as worthless.[38] One soldier noted that three weeks into the occupation the local population had 'realised that the British Tommy has plenty of money to dispose of so the native of Jerusalem is making every effort to capture his wealth'.[39] However, it was not merely a case of the soldiers being gouged by local businessmen. After spending many months fighting in the desert, British troops were 'carried away in an orgy of spending'.[40] Small efforts were made to teach the soldiers some basics of Arabic and local weights and measures to aid them in their attempts to bargain in the marketplaces. The *Palestine News* regularly published a table of weights and their British conversions and also short language lessons for those whose Arabic did 'not extend past Imshi, Yaller and Iggory'.[41]

Disillusionment when faced with the reality of Jerusalem, especially after generally favourable impressions of Alexandria and Cairo, is notable in many diaries and memoirs. Even Salonika compared positively with Jerusalem; the buildings there may have been 'dirty and unwholesome' but the inhabitants were at least 'cosmopolitan'.[42] Jerusalem's locals were generally viewed negatively: 'Rabbis, Monks, cripples, beggars, wailing, Petticoat lane of little fritters, greasy cakes'.[43] Private C. T. Shaw of the London Field Ambulance wrote: 'Jerusalem as you all know is known as "Jerusalem the Golden"…. The first glimpse does not give anyone the opinion that it is a golden city – far from it – change golden into filthy or muddy, and there you have the correct name. The Holy City, certainly I agree with you is both holy from a religious side and it is "hole-y" from a general standpoint'.[44] Ronald Storrs shared these sentiments, leading to a strenuous process of urban renovation.

'Re-sanctification'

Fighting for control of Jerusalem was consciously limited to the outskirts of the city: 'Our troops had some hard fighting around the city before it was entered, but no shells were fired into the city. Everything sacred was

spared destruction and Jerusalem was occupied undamaged'.[45] The liberation of the city was meant as a victory for the Empire and to present Britain as a benevolent secular power that would safeguard the status quo in Jerusalem; this was best represented by the stationing of Muslim troops to guard the Temple Mount. This was an important piece of propaganda but it was also necessary in order to avoid Franco-Italian antagonism; Storrs was attempting a balancing act between French and Italian interests over custody of holy sites.[46] However, politically holding the ring did not deter Storrs from launching a radical architectural overhaul of Jerusalem, with profound repercussions for its urban landscape.

Storrs' town plans, a blend of innovation and preservation, attempted to recreate the apparently historical features of Jerusalem as these had been imagined in the nineteenth century. Storrs's project is a variant on the Allied role in the reconstruction of Salonika after the fire of August 1917 and echoes the way in which this and other activities in Macedonia (as explored by John Horne in Chap. 14) allowed expeditionary armies to see their role as beneficent civilizers with a blend of urban work and cultural patrimony. In an interesting hint as to how much power he wielded, Storrs claimed he could rule the city much like his predecessor Pontius Pilate. While this no doubt reflected Storrs's own self-image and not inconsiderable ego, it was really meant to remind Storrs's local audience that Britain, a secular empire much like its Roman predecessor, was now in charge of the city, while to his British audience he could demonstrate that he was re-establishing historical links to antiquity.[47]

Storrs intertwined imperial interests and his personal views in his very style of government. Using his position as military governor, he was able to transform Jerusalem according to a blueprint that reflected his own aesthetics, as well as a high civic and religious sense coupled with a desire to involve the communities of the city in this grand scheme.[48] To implement this plan, Storrs established the Pro-Jerusalem Society with the official purpose of protecting 'the old city of Jerusalem and the Holy places in its vicinity from modern encroachments and to preserve their amenity' and to mark a return to its religio-historical roots.[49] The Society was composed of the mayor of Jerusalem, the consular corps, the chiefs of the Christian denominations, and other leading members of the Arab and Jewish communities.[50] However, local participation in the processes of street naming and town planning was nominal.[51] Recent local developments were to be stripped away to reveal the old city's idealized past.

The city was to be divided into four zones: the first contained the old city where new constructions were prohibited and a 'medieval' aspect was to be maintained. The second zone involved an area of non-construction around the old city: a green belt. Building in zone three in the north and east of the city was heavily restricted. Only in zone four to the north and west were modern developments to be allowed. The plan was not uncritically accepted, even by Storrs himself, and went through various revisions but the basic outlines remained the same. The planners were acutely aware of the problems of British architects redesigning a Middle Eastern city. A Pro-Jerusalem Society memorandum in 1921 voiced these concerns: 'The policy of planning Oriental towns by Western brains was likely to be experimental only, and to produce interesting but painfully artificial and inappropriate results'. However, even after the military occupation, the grand schemes for Jerusalem were not abandoned but modified: 'Too much control breeds discontent; The process indicated by the letter of the law would involve long delay and untold expense, which cannot be met, and the results might be disappointing. Let indigenous tendencies prevail. Let the spirit of the east inspire and lead. Use the forces on the spot. In a word, safeguard public health, military necessities, ancient and public monuments, and modern amenities, but let the people of Palestine in all other respects build their own towns in their own way, without hindrance, or unnecessary restriction'.[52]

Initially, work focused on David's Citadel and the Jaffa Gate. Storrs deployed refugee labour to clean up the citadel, clear the rubble from the moat and make the ramparts accessible. During the war, a number of refugees had fled to Jerusalem and were gathered around the citadel. Putting them to work on the clearance of the moat and restoring the citadel itself would all be part of what the chief architect of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, Charles Ashbee, referred to as 'tidying up their own house'.[53] The prime example of this redesigning of Jerusalem to fit the perception of its new occupants was the dismantling of the clock tower that had been built in 1903 above the Jaffa Gate. Storrs found the clock tower jarring to his sensibilities and out of keeping with what the Holy City *should* look like. Interestingly, a rumour spread to soldiers that the clock tower had been planned and built by Kaiser Wilhelm himself. This perhaps served as justification for the British military presence in Palestine; they were fighting the global spread of German influence, which was, after all, an extension of the fighting in Europe and not merely a 'Holiday Front'.[54] The musician Wasif Jawhariyyeh noted that while he understood Storrs's reasons for

dismantling the clock tower, he was disappointed that it was not relocated elsewhere in the city, so much so that he constructed a wooden replica of it for his own garden.[55] It was not enough to preserve the city's architecture; it was also necessary to remove any modern or, more importantly, Oriental influences that took away from the biblical aesthetic.

Controlling Cultural Encounters

Storrs's effort to 're-sanctify' Jerusalem interrupted the city's natural rhythms. British planners and administrators were agents of cultural transfer, but were not only transferring their own culture to Jerusalem, they also wanted to reshape the city according to their specific purposes, with the real absentees from these activities being the Jerusalemites themselves.[56] The bars, dance halls and brothels within the old city walls were closed down, areas that were declared archaeological sites were made off limits, and the prohibition of major industry and businesses within the walls shifted Jerusalem's commercial centre to the northwest. Before the British occupation, as noted by Wasif Jawhariyyeh, Jerusalem was a vibrant city with much interaction across religious divides as neighbours participated in each other's ceremonies and festivals regardless of creed. Wasif's memoirs challenge our pre-conceptions of Jerusalem as being strictly segregated among confessional quarters and chart the changes in social and cultural interactions from 1917 to 1920. The divisions created, echoed in the present Jerusalem, were to a certain extent the product of British planners who wished to map their own conception of the city onto the existing living space and a nineteenth-century desire to 'rescue' the Holy City from Islam.

Inevitably, the reforming zeal of Storrs's plans to both re-plan and re-sanctify the city itself influenced the relationships of British soldiers with Jerusalem and its inhabitants, starting with sex. Women were, of course, a prominent topic of soldiers' conversation in diaries, memoirs and poetry, and it seems that a number of romances or at least fantasies developed with 'poets' expressing their feelings in the *Palestine News*. An advertisement for Mormums Oriental Stores (based in Egypt) in the same paper reflected the common usage relating to Egyptian and Palestinian women (*bint* being the Arab for a woman): 'If you want a cork-screw, a sleeping bag or a present for the "bint" at home; WRITE TO MORUMS Cairo or Alexandria'.[57] Words transferred from the military to Britain, and also militarized language transferred onto the locals. The poem below, with the

endearing title of 'Bint' by a Dr. Davies, sums up some of the general attitudes towards local women during the Egypt and Palestine campaigns.

> **Bint**
> Bint with alluring eyes!
> Thou hast held me, woman-wise
> By a bond of Memory's weaving.
> Radiant-hued as any flower,
> In my life but one short hour,
> Tingled with Passion, winged with Power,
> Now my heart is vainly grieving.
> Nightly, I behold thy face
> Sense thy sinuous Eastern grace,
> Can I e'er forget thee?
> Yet, I wonder, had I stayed –
> Seen the painted beauty fade-
> Guessed thine age, by day displayed-
> Should I now regret thee?[58]

Other poems also played on adaptations of military language to suit the new circumstances. VAD, the acronym of the nursing corps, the Voluntary Aid Detachment, was adapted to mean vivacious, artless and demure when discussing the women of the Levant. The image of women in Jerusalem as somewhat mysterious figures, who were initially wary of interacting with the soldiers, fits the classic Orientalist perception.[59] As C. R. Verner put it in his memoirs: 'Some of the men are very finely built and many of the girls are wonderfully graceful… but their appearance belies them, and among other drawbacks they badly want washing and sterilizing'.[60] However, the perceived lack of personal hygiene did not deter soldiers from creating relationships.

In fact, sex in the city was highly regulated. Less than a month into his tenure as military governor, Storrs decreed that all brothels were to be shut down and then forbidden within the walls of the old city. This decision was taken under pressure from local Jewish women's groups who pressured Storrs into action, but it also fitted with his vision for the future of the old city.[61] Prostitutes who attempted to solicit outside the regulated areas of Feingold Street and Mea Shearim (beyond the city walls) were punished. A public proclamation stated that: 'Every common prostitute who for the purpose of prostitution loiters in any public place, or who, by

word or gesture, solicits any member of His Majesty's forces or who displays herself in doorways or at windows or on balconies shall be liable on conviction to the penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven days or to a fine not exceeding L.E.2'.[62] The penalty for young males between the ages of 7 and 16 caught engaged in solicitation was even harsher with a penalty of whipping (6 to 12 strokes).[63]

The military practicality of such measures was obvious; it would not do to have soldiers running amok in the city and it was also necessary to regulate prostitution due to the damage inflicted by disease on the ranks. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force's medical services were burdened with high incidences of venereal disease. The problem was particularly prevalent in 1915–1916 when troops were stationed in Cairo and Alexandria with 14,153 hospital admissions for venereal disease in 1916 alone, around 75.31 cases per 1,000 men.[64] Cases of infection dramatically decreased as the soldiers moved away from the pleasure quarters of Egypt and into the battlefields of Palestine. However, British and especially Australian soldiers gained an unhealthy reputation for fornication and consequent infection.

Unsurprisingly, this clampdown on vice also entailed severe restrictions on the sale of alcohol and the complete ban on the sale or distribution of marijuana (hashish).[65] Restricting soldiers' access to the old city caused much bitterness and resentment, but the authorities did make efforts to allow excursions to sites of worship. Soldiers also had to remind themselves that they were in Jerusalem in a military capacity. As one letter to the editor in *The Palestine News* noted: 'are we here to fight Turks or to mark down jackals […]?' The same letter remarked that the paper's recommendation of local inns was 'a direct incitement to the consumption of strong drink'.[66]

The 're-sanctification' of Jerusalem served to break up pre-existing places for cross-cultural interaction that were taken for granted by its citizens. This decreased chances for local encounters with British troops but also restricted and regulated how Jerusalemites would interact with one another. The initial enthusiasm of the takeover of the Holy City as evidenced in the poem, 'The Modern Odyssey' quoted at the beginning of this chapter, gave way to frustration as troops' access to the sites they had fought so hard to deliver was severely restricted. A poem appearing in *The Palestine News* in February 1918, very early in the occupation, voiced this dissatisfaction.

Out of Bounds by Pip Beer:
[Last verse]
If you wear a pip or two;
Or if you are a German Jew,
A non-combatant infidel,
A Magdalene or Jezebel,
You are free to enter in.
But if you are a fighting man
From whom the Turk at Gaza ran,
Who starved in the rain at Ramleh,
Who suffered septic sores at Gamli,
That Jerusalem be free,
You are debarred, without a Pass,
From going through the gate, Alas!
You Soldier![67]

As part of the re-sanctification process, soldiers were not allowed to stay within the city walls and all troops except for medical personnel were bivouacked in tents on the Mount of Olives.[68] Soldiers were transferred to the Mount of Olives on the pretext of a typhoid epidemic.[69] The transfer of soldiers to the Mount of Olives while distancing them from the actual city further helped to reinforce the nineteenth-century view of Jerusalem as the Mount of Olives was the preferred spot from which to depict the city. It allowed for a panorama of the Holy City but all the while keeping it at arm's length. Military photographers such as (honorary) Captain Frank Hurley of the Australian Imperial Force famously captured this panorama, recreating and re-enforcing this common perception of the city. Indeed Hurley, in his diaries, noted that, while every inch of the ground leading up to Jerusalem was interesting in its biblical associations: 'The entry into Jerusalem is as disappointing as entering a mansion by way of a scullery door. The way is through modern buildings and a densely populated thoroughfare, dusty and commonplace, that it quite disappointed me'.[70] Hurley preferred to view the city from a distance to fully capture its biblical essence. Private Calcutt also noted how the city walls were an imposing sight and created a 'well arranged picture'.[71]

The troops 'fresh from hospitals and convalescent depots, soaked, fed up and blasphemous wound their way along the long curving road from Jerusalem to the Mount of Olives, where according to Verner's report, tents had been pitched for the comfort and convenience of all drafts re-joining their regiments'.[72] While noting that Jerusalem looked 'much

better from afar than close up', H. Empson remarked that the controlling of soldiers' movements and the increasing regulation of street traders would have a negative effect on the social structure of the city.[73] Soldiers were still allowed to enter the city but under very strict circumstances. Tours of the old city required the company of an officer or brigade chaplain, with one-day passes permitting entry until 4 pm. Churches and mosques were not to be entered on any account. Some soldiers were of course able to enter the city through bluff or bribery.[74] Restricted access to the old city was seen as an affront to men who had fought so hard to enter Jerusalem. Some believed they were not allowed into the old city in case they desecrate an Islamic or Jewish site: 'In the new Jerusalem, thank God, one will not have to write the word "desecrating" in inverted commas, so that it will not be a forbidden city even to us common soldiers'.[75]

One exception to these restrictions was Indian soldiers. Indian troops were critical to British successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia during 1917–1918. From December 1917, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) underwent a process of *Indianisation* in order to provide troops for the Western Front, while at the same time the Britain increasingly relied on India to sustain the burden of combat in the extra-European theatres of the war. The large numbers of Indian soldiers required a reworking of the EEF's administration to deal with the requirements of the Indian Army. *Indianization*, as Santanu Das has discussed in Chap. 8, also introduced a considerable number of Muslim troops into the war against the Ottoman Empire in Palestine. Twenty-nine per cent of Allenby's infantry, for example, were Muslim and there was a fear that they would desert and side with their co-religionists.[76] While these fears would prove to be unfounded, they had previously led to severe disciplinary crackdowns. Forty-seven sepoys were executed for their part in the Singapore mutiny of November 1915, which was wrongly interpreted as an act of refusal to fight against Muslim troops in the Middle East.[77]

While the Turkish Army attempted to exploit these perceived morale difficulties, there were very few desertions. As James Kitchen points out, *Indianization* did not exist in a cultural vacuum, and while the Singapore Mutiny was a significant lapse, Britain's previous experience of organizing and running imperial armies was of critical importance in ironing out potential problems.[78] To this end, Indian troops in the EEF were allowed passes to visit the Dome on the Rock and the Mosque of Omar, while non-Muslim troops were strictly kept out. Storrs was particularly keen to make a public display of Indian soldiers visiting holy sites in the city as this

would further help to dispel rumours of the mistreatment of Indian troops.[79] This policy also complied with a wider aspect of cultural propaganda, the British Empire needed to portray itself as caring for the wider Islamic heritage of the areas in which it was fighting.

Conclusion

'On the whole the Old City of Jerusalem made a deep impression on all of us despite its noise and smells, and we came out at the Damascus Gate in a very solemn mood. Scenes of men with donkeys and carts might still have presented the same picture as was being presented fifteen of twenty centuries ago at the same spot'.[80] The British military occupation of Jerusalem 1917–1920 had a huge impact on the cultural interaction of the city's inhabitants with the physical city. The character of Ronald Storrs was an important factor in how the city was transformed during and immediately after the war. According to his admirers, he used the military occupation for 'the preservation and safeguarding of the amenities of the Holy City without favour or prejudice to race or creed'.[81] However, this claim was not supported by the facts.

The sea change in cultural encounters in Jerusalem and Palestine would of course come with British support for Zionist immigration. The Balfour Declaration had already set the inhabitants of the city on edge. Official support for the Zionist cause, mainly from the Foreign Office and politicians in Britain, also alarmed military planners who feared the effect of an influx of new arrivals on the stability of the city. The divisive effects of Zionism on the city led to the *Nebi Musa* riots of 1920, when crowds led by Muslim-Christian associations protested strongly against British support for Zionism. They signalled the end of military occupation and the beginning of civil administration. These associations, which had grown as a direct response to Jewish immigration, helped reshape the traditional alliances of notables and residents in the city.[82] The failure of the military administration to prevent the outbreak of the riots seemed to confirm for the British Foreign Office that the military authorities in Palestine openly opposed the Zionist project.[83] The transfer from military to civil administration thus meant a reallocation of political values, with the civil administration being markedly pro-Zionist. Encounters in Jerusalem would never revert to their pre-war ease as the city became increasingly physically divided.

While plans for the city's architectural overhaul only took effect under the civil administration, Britain's military occupation of Jerusalem immediately redrew the cultural map of the city. The *confessionalization* of the city into four quarters enacted by Storrs was shaped by an Orientalist vision of Jerusalem that failed to take into account the cultural overlaps that had existed under the Ottoman regime. Within this project of cementing a secular British imperial control over the city to protect its 'sanctity', the space for cultural encounter for ordinary British soldiers was severely restricted. The soldiers themselves wished to interact with the city and see the sites that they and their families back home knew so well from the Bible. However, soldiers who applied to go on leave to visit the city were generally not doing so to experience a cultural encounter, rather a desire to recover a sense of normality during wartime.[84] The military occupation of Jerusalem did not merely replace one regime by another but also represented the renegotiation of political and economic values, alliances, cultures and expectations—both in Jerusalem and abroad.[85] The British militarized encounter with the Holy City during the First World War significantly altered the cultural landscape of twentieth-century Jerusalem as its urban landscape was shaped by an occupying authority with its vision heavily tinted by nineteenth-century images of the Holy Land.

Notes

1. *The Palestine News*, 25 April 1918.
2. Kristen Coates-Ulrichsen, *The First World War in the Middle East* (London, 2014), p. 113.
3. James Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns, 1916–18* (London, 2014), p. 98.
4. Eitan Bar-Yosef was at the forefront of the deconstruction of the ordinary soldiers' perception as crusader. See Eitan Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture 1799–1917: Palestine and the Question of Orientalism* (Oxford, 2005).
5. Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land*, p. 289.
6. See John Horne, 'Remobilising for "Total War": France and Britain, 1917–1918', in John Horne (ed), *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 195–211.
7. Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British* (London, 2009), p. 132.

8. It is worth noting here that Blake's famous poem was set to a musical score in 1916 and also that Blake would probably have been appalled at the expropriation of his poetry into an imperial anthem.
9. Eric M. Resienauer, 'Between the Eternal City and the Holy City: Rome, Jerusalem, and the Imperial Ideal of Britain', *Canadian Journal of Modern History*, XLIV (2009), pp. 237–260, p. 243.
10. Cyril Falls, *History of the Great War; Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (London 1930), p. 256.
11. Eitan Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land*, p. 272.
12. Antoine Capet, 'Views of Palestine in British Art in Wartime and Peacetime, 1914–1918', in Rory Miller (ed), *Britain Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years* (Farnham, 2010), p. 88.
13. Victor L Trumper, *Historical Sites in Southern Palestine* (Cairo, 1917), back-page advertisement, p. 21 (Trumper also regularly published articles on Palestinian customs in *The Palestine News*).
14. *The Palestine News*, 7 March 1918.
15. David Faulkner, *Lawrence of Arabia's War: The Arabs and the Remaking of the Middle East in WWI* (New Haven, 2016), p. 354.
16. Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land*, p. 272.
17. Trumper, *Historical Sites in Southern Palestine*.
18. The Imperial War Museum (IWM) 08/131/1 DP Appleby, 23 November 1917.
19. IWM 11178 EB Hinde, 17 December 1917.
20. Bluett, *With our Army in Palestine*, p. 94.
21. IWM 77/130/1, RH Sims, letter dated 6 February 1918.
22. IWM 38/56/2 DH Calcutt, 4 December 1917, p. 141.
23. IWM 03/31/1 CR Hennessey, pp. 204–205.
24. Ibid.
25. IWM 84/52/1 J Wilson.
26. *The Palestine News*, 14 March 1918.
27. *The Palestine News*, 7 March 1918.
28. IWM Hinde, 3 February 1918.
29. *The Palestine News*, 19 April 1918.
30. *The Palestine News*, 9 May 1918.
31. *Egyptian Gazette*, 31 April 1918, extract from 'The Egyptian Labour Corps', reprinted in *The Palestine News*, 11 July 1918.
32. Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar, *The Story Teller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh* (Northampton, MA, 2014), p. 125.
33. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 159.
34. Central Zionist Archives, Z4/40567, The minutes of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, 20 January 1919.

35. The Roosters were pioneers of radio comedy and performed until the early 1950s. For more, see http://stanbutler5.moonfruit.com/the-roosters-concert-party/4587356126 (accessed 07/12/2016).
36. IWM, Hinde, 17 September 1917.
37. Tamari and Nassar, *The Storyteller of Jerusalem*, p. 104.
38. IWM 81/23/1 CT Shaw.
39. IWM 02/12/1 H Empson, 2 January 1918.
40. IWM 03/31/1 CR Hennessey, p. 206.
41. *The Palestine News*, 30 May 1918. (Imshi (go away) in particular became a staple of Australian military slang).
42. IWM 02/12/1 Hempson 16 June 1916.
43. IWM 28/56/2 DH Calcutt 16 December 1917, p. 148.
44. IWM 81/23/1 CT Shaw.
45. IWM 08/131/1 DP Appleby, 16 December 1917.
46. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 149.
47. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 158.
48. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 159.
49. Nicholas E Roberts, 'Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42 (2013), pp. 7–26, p. 9.
50. For a breakdown of the society's membership, see: Mahon Murphy, 'The Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Society during the Period of British Military Administration', http://www.mwme.eu/essays/british-french-egypt/_Murphy_Pro-Jerusalem_Society/index.html.
51. Mazza. *Jerusalem*, p. 161.
52. Central Zionist Archives Z4/40567, The Minutes of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, Memorandum 16/07/1921.
53. Charles Ashbee (ed), *Jerusalem 1918–1920: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the period of the British Military Administration* (London, 1921), https://archive.org/stream/jerusalembeingre00proj#page/n7/mode/2up (accessed 07/12/2016).
54. IWM Surry.
55. Tamari and Nassar, *The Storyteller of Jerusalem*, p. 140.
56. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 165.
57. *The Palestine News*, 9 May 1918.
58. *The Palestine News*, 24 October 1918.
59. IWM 03/31/1 CR Hennessey, p. 205.
60. IWM 03/15/1 CR Verner, p. 28.
61. Margalit Shilo, 'Women as Victims of War: The British Conquest (1917) and the Blight of Prostitution in the Holy City', *Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women's Studies and Gender Issues*, 6, *Women, War and Peace in Jewish and Middle East Contexts* (2003), pp. 72–83, p. 77.

62. Israel State Archives (ISA), 3/48-M Proclamations Ordinances and Notices Issued by OTEA (South) To August 1919.
63. ISA Ibid.
64. James Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns, 1916–18* (London, 2014), p. 58.
65. ISA, 3/48-M.
66. *The Palestine News*, 25 April 1918.
67. *The Palestine News*, 18 July 1918.
68. IWM 02/12/1 H Empson, 4 February 1918.
69. IWM J 84/52/1 Wilson.
70. Robert Dixon and Christopher Lee (eds), *The Diaries of Frank Hurley 1912–1941* (London, 2011), diary entry 21 January 1918, p. 93.
71. IWM 28/56/2 DH Calcutt 16 December 17, p. 148.
72. IWM 03/15/1 CR Verner, p. 25.
73. IWM 02/12/1 H Empson, 25 April 1918.
74. Justin Fantauzzo, 'British Soldiers' Experience and Memory of the Palestine Campaign 1915–1919', (PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge), p. 108.
75. IWM J Wilson.
76. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, p. 197.
77. For an account of the Singapore Mutiny, see Sho Kuwajima, *Mutiny in Singapore: War, Anti-War and the War for India's Independence* (Ahmedabad, 2006).
78. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, p. 198.
79. Coates Ulrichsen, *The First World War in the Middle East*, p. 102.
80. IWM 03/31/1 CR Hennessey, p. 208.
81. Ashbee, *Jerusalem 1918–1920*, p. 71.
82. Roberto Mazza, 'Churches at War: The Impact of the First World War on the Christian Institutions of Jerusalem, 1914–20', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45:2 (2009), pp. 207–227, p. 222.
83. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 177.
84. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, p. 96.
85. Mazza, *Jerusalem*, p. 178.

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

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