Russia and the Napoleonic Wars

Edited by Janet M. Hartley
Paul Keenan and Dominic Lieven

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Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–54532–8 (hardback)
978–0–230–54533–5 (paperback)
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Edited by

Janet M. Hartley
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Paul Keenan
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

and

Dominic Lieven
Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK

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

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-52799-8

First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978-1-349-57171-0 ISBN 978-1-137-52800-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137528001

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

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Acknowledgements

This volume arises from the international conference 'Russia and the Napoleonic Wars', which took place at the former country estate of the Lieven family at Mezotnes (Mesothen), Latvia, 15–18 May 2014. The purpose of the conference was to bring together scholars from Western Europe and North America with scholars from Russia and Eastern Europe to create a forum in which ideas could be exchanged and scholarship on the Napoleonic era taken forward. The combination of the end of the Soviet Union and a number of bicentenaries celebrating key moments in Franco-Russian relations has led to a flourishing of new scholarship in Russia; at the same time, new research in archives has led to new interpretations of this period by scholars in many countries. Language has, however, sometimes been a barrier to the exchange of ideas: Russian scholarship has not always reached a Western audience; new directions in foreign scholarship have not always been accessible to Russian scholars. This was overcome at this conference by translating all the papers in advance and by the use of interpreters. The conference was a great success. Twenty-four papers were given by scholars from eight countries and 17 of those papers have been selected here. All 24 papers were published in Russian by the Russian State Historical Museum in late 2014 as a special volume, entitled *Rossiia i Napoleonovskie voiny* and edited by Viktor Bezotosnyi, in the series *Epokha 1812 goda: Issledovaniia, istochniki, istoriografiia*.

The conference organizers from the United Kingdom were Janet M. Hartley and Paul Keenan from the London School of Economics and Political Science and Dominic Lieven from Trinity College Cambridge (and LSE IDEAS). The conference organizer from Russia was Viktor Bezotosnyi from the Russian State Historical Museum, Moscow. The conference would not have been such a success without the organizational skills of Liza Ryan from LSE IDEAS. Above all, the editors wish to thank Dr Frederik Paulsen, whose generosity set up the Paulsen programme within IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science and funded this conference in Latvia in full.

Note: dates are normally given in the Old style in the papers on Russia, that is, according to the Julian calendar which was 12 days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century. Where there may be confusion, dates are given in both Old and New style.

Notes on Contributors

Viktor M. Bezotosnyi is Doctor of Historical Sciences and Director of a section of the State Historical Museum, Moscow, and the winner of the Russian State award for Culture. He is a military historian of the Napoleonic Wars who has written seven books and more than 300 articles on the Napoleonic era. His books (all in Russian) include *The Don Generalitet and the Ataman Platov* (1999), *1812: Reconnaissance and Military Plans* (2005), *The Cossacks in Paris in 1814* (2007) and *Recollections by Contemporaries of the Epoch of 1812* (2011). He is the compiler and editor of the monumental volume *The Patriotic War of 1812: A Biographical Dictionary* and the main editor of the annual series of volumes entitled *The Patriotic War of 1812*.

Grigorii Bibikov is Candidate of Sciences and a senior researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, and a military historian of the Napoleonic Wars. He is the author of a recent major biography of Benkendorff: *A. Kh. Benkendorf and the Policy of the Emperor Nicholas I* (2009) (in Russian), and a number of articles and chapters on the army and central administration in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

Michael Broers is Professor of Western European History at Oxford University. He has been a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and has written eight books, one of which, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (2005), won the Prix Napoléon in 2006. His most recent book is *Napoleon: Soldier of Destiny*, the first of a two-volume biography, which was published in March 2014.

Alan Forrest is Emeritus Professor of Modern History at the University of York. He works on modern French history, especially the period of the Revolution and Empire, and on the history of modern warfare. Recent publications include *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (2002), *Paris, the Provinces and the French Revolution* (2004), *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (2009), *Napoleon: Life, Legacy and Image* (2011), and *Waterloo* (2015). He is co-author, with Jean-Paul Bertaud and Annie Jourdan, of *Napoléon, le monde et les Anglais: Guerre des mots et des images* (2004). His edited works include: *Napoleon and His Empire*, with Philip G. Dwyer (2007); *The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire*, with Peter H. Wilson (2008); *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820*, with Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (2009);

and *War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture*, with Etienne François and Karen Hagemann (2012).

Janet M. Hartley is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has written extensively on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russian history and Anglo-Russian relations including *Guide to Documents and Manuscripts in the United Kingdom Relating to Russia and the Soviet Union* (1987), *Alexander I* (1994, translated into Russian in 1998), *A Social History of the Russian Empire, 1650–1825* (1999), C*harles Whitworth: Diplomat in the Age of Peter the Great* (2002), and *Russia, 1762–1825: Military Power, the State and the People* (2008). Her most recent book, reflecting her current research interests, is *Siberia: a History of the People* (2014).

Paul Keenan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he has taught since 2004. His research examines the social and cultural development of Russia during the 'long' eighteenth century. He has written recently on the appearance, attitudes and social activities of the Russian court in this period. His first monograph, *St Petersburg and the Russian Court, 1703–1761* (2013), examined the question of Russia's 'Europeanization' in this period through the prism of its new 'European' capital and the cultural life of the ruler's court. His new project studies the Russian court during the reign of Alexander I, with particular emphasis on its role as a (contested) centre of official culture and identity during the Napoleonic Wars.

Dominic Lieven is a Senior Research Fellow, Trinity College, Cambridge (since 2011) and Fellow of the British Academy (since 2001). He was a Lecturer and then Professor at LSE from 1978 until 2011. He is the author of seven monographs and the editor of the *Cambridge History of Russia* vol.2 (Imperial Russia). *Russia against Napoleon: The Struggle for Europe: 1807–1814* (2009), won the Wolfson Prize, the Prix de la Fondation Napoléon and has been translated and published in eleven languages. His recent book is *Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia* (2015). His areas of interest are imperial Russian foreign and military policy, international history, empires and emperors.

Liudmila P. Marnei is Candidate of Sciences and a senior researcher at the Slavonic Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and is a nineteenth-century economic historian. She is the author of *D. A. Gur'ev and the Finances and Policies of Russia at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century* (2001) (in Russian) and a number of articles and chapters on trade and economics in Russia and Eastern Europe in the time of the Napoleonic Wars.

Alexander M. Martin is Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana, USA). He works on the social, cultural and intellectual

history of pre-Reform Russia, and is the author of *Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I* (1997) and *Enlightened Metropolis: Constructing Imperial Moscow, 1762–1855* (2013).

Liubov Melnikova is Candidate of Sciences at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, and is a historian of the Orthodox Church. She is the author of *The Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriotic War of 1812* (2002), *The Army and the Orthodox Church of the Russian Empire in the Napoleonic Wars* (2007), *The Russian Orthodox Church and the Crimean War* (2012) (all in Russian), and many articles and chapters on the Orthodox Church in wartime, on Napoleonic propaganda, and on the diplomacy and personality of Alexander I.

Andrzej Nieuwazny sadly died in June 2015 before the publication of this volume. He was Professor at the Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun. He is a historian of Poland during the Napoleonic period and has a particular interest in the legacy of the wars for Polish identity. He is the author and/or editor of eight books in Polish on the Poland in the period of the Napoleonic Wars. He also wrote, in English, the article 'Napoleon and Polish Identity: How Bonaparte Has Retained His Hold over the Polish Imagination through the Vicissitudes of the last Two Centuries', *History Today*, 48, 1998.

Aleksandr A. Orlov is Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor at the Sholokhov Moscow State University of the Humanities, and is a historian of the diplomatic relations between Russia and Britain. He is the author of *The Alliance between St Petersburg and London: British-Russian Relations in the Epoch of the Napoleonic Wars* (2005) and *'Now I see the English more Closely': Britain and the British in the Impressions of Russians about the World and about Themselves; the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century and the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (2008) (both in Russian). He is researching 'peace projects' from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

Marie-Pierre Rey is Professor of Russian and Soviet History at the University of Paris Pantheon Sorbonne. She has written several books and many articles devoted to Russian and Soviet history. Among her most recent publications: on the tsarist period are: *1814, Un tsar à Paris*, (2014); *L'effroyable tragédie, une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie* (2012) and *Alexandre I^er^* (2009 and 2013) translated under the title *Alexander I, the Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon* (2012) and in Russian (2013); and on the Soviet period: 'Gorbachev's New Thinking and Europe, 1985–1989' in *Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal*, edited by F. Bozo, M-P. Rey, N.P. Ludlow and L. Nuti (2008); 'The Mejdunarodniki in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s: backgrounds, connections and the agenda of Soviet international elites' in *The Making of Détente, Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975*, edited by

W. Loth and G-H. Soutou, (2008). Marie-Pierre Rey has also written extensively on Russia and twentieth-century European politics.

Tatiana Saburova is Professor at the Omsk State Pedagogical University, and is a historian of the social and intellectual life of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. She is the author of *Mythologies of the Russian Intellectual World: Socio-Cultural Representations of the Russian Intelligentsia in the Nineteenth Century* (2005, in Russian). She was a Fulbright visiting scholar at Indiana University in 2011 and a DAAD Fellow in Tubingen in 2013. Her current research is on the identities and behaviour of the Russian intelligentsia in late imperial Russia.

David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye is Professor of Russian history at Brock University, Canada. His research interests focus on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russian cultural, intellectual, diplomatic and military history. He is the author of *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan* (2001) and *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration* (2010). He is writing a book about Russian expansion into Central Asia.

Denis A. Sdvizhkov is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute, Moscow, and is a historian of the intelligentsia in Russia. He is the author of *The Intelligentsia in History: The Educated Man in Representation and Social Reality* (2001, in Russian). He is the co-editor of *The Achievement of an Ideal: A History of Peacemaking and the Intelligentsia* (2005) and *The Concept of Russia: Historical Semantics of the Imperial Period* (2012) (both in Russian).

Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter is Professor of History at California State Polytechnic University in Pomona. She has written six books: *From Serf to Russian Soldier* (1990), *Structures of Society: Imperial Russia's 'People of Various Ranks'* (1994, Russian translation 2002), *Social Identity in Imperial Russia* (1997), *The Play of Ideas in Russian Enlightenment Theater* (2003), *Russia's Age of Serfdom 1648–1861* (2008), and *Religion and Enlightenment in Catherinian Russia: The Teachings of Metropolitan Platon* (2013). Her current research is devoted to Russian diplomacy in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.

General Maps

Extent of Russian Empire c.1812


120°
135°
150°
165°
180°
165°
Siberia
EMPIRE
Okhotsk
Krasnoiarsk
Irkutsk
Gobi Desert
Beijing
QING
EMPIRE
KOREA
JAPAN
Edo
N
alayas
BHUTAN
ASSAM
BIHAR
BENGAL
BURMA
Rangoon
Bay of
Bengal
SIAM
Bangkok
CAMBODIA
Manila
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
PACIFIC
OCEAN

Invasion of Russia 1812

The 1813 campaign to the borders of France

Introduction

Dominic Lieven

This book's focus is on Russia and the Napoleonic Wars. The importance and timeliness of the topic can hardly be questioned. The Napoleonic Wars had a big impact on Russia's state, society and economy. Their immense cost ravaged state finances and played a part in Russia's sharply reduced rate of economic growth in the first half of the nineteenth century. Victory over the seemingly all-powerful foreign enemy provided added legitimacy to the tsarist regime and contributed to the cautious and conservative mind set of Nicholas I when faced with the need to confront serfdom and other obstacles to modernization. Above all war and victory changed the way many educated Russians thought about themselves and their country. When Tolstoi began to work on *War and Peace* he did so with the aim of explaining the impact of the war on Russian mentalities and showing how victory over Napoleon had fed into the Decembrist movement, whose aim it was to replace the absolute monarchy with a constitutional or even republican regime. The Decembrist rising in 1825 and the reaction to it of Nicholas I's regime played a great role in the 'parting of the ways' between state and society which was to dominate much of the subsequent political history of imperial Russia down to the revolution.

Probably even more dramatic was Russia's impact on Europe during and immediately after the Napoleonic Wars. 1812 was the decisive turning point in Napoleon's bid to create lasting French hegemony in Europe. Had he succeeded in his aim of forcing Russia into subservience then his Empire would have been unchallengeable on the European continent. The European order created by French imperialism would no doubt have crumbled in time for internal reasons but the Europe it bequeathed would have been very different – for better or worse – to the one whose origins lay in the victory of the anti-French sixth coalition and the overthrow of Napoleon. In itself 1812 did not determine Napoleon's destruction. Alexander I, imbued with his own vision of Russia's part in a stable European order, seized the opportunity of Napoleon's temporary weakness in the winter of 1812–1813 to invade central Europe and form a new coalition of great powers committed to removing

French rule from Germany. Without the tsar's vision and Russian leadership Germany would have remained under Napoleon's control. Having driven France out of Germany Alexander then played the leading role in taking the coalition forces all the way to Paris and overthrowing Napoleon. He did so out of the conviction – correct in my view – that Napoleon would always seek to subvert any stable European order acceptable to the other great powers. Having played the leading role in Napoleon's overthrow Russia went on to exercise a great influence on the subsequent post-war European order both as regards the territorial settlement agreed at the Congress of Vienna and the principles which underlay international relations until the 1850s.

Given the importance of Russia's contribution to the Napoleonic Wars it is remarkable how little these wars have been studied from a Russian angle. It is fair to state that as regards Western, and especially English-language, scholarship on the era Russia remains the biggest gap. For this there are many reasons. War and diplomacy have not been fashionable subjects for Western academic historians in recent decades and historians of Russia were no exception. They faced the additional obstacle that throughout the Soviet era, Russian military and diplomatic archives were closed to foreigners. Although considerable published sources existed, few historians of the wars who were not Russian specialists could read Russian. Nor did there seem a great incentive to learn the language. Anglophone historians were far more likely to learn French or German which unlocked the secrets of Napoleon's military machine or of the reformed Prussian army of these years, which together were taken as the harbingers of military modernity. Russia by contrast was seen as the embodiment of conservatism and the most powerful pillar of the European old regime. Historians are often inclined to concentrate their attention on the elements of change and modernity in history, so this made devoting time to Russian studies in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras additionally unappealing.

This was compounded by the situation of Russia's own historians in the Soviet era. Their works were very seldom translated into foreign languages and were subject to the 'party line' when it came to interpreting history. Ideological blinkers imposed, for example, far-fetched interpretations of the role of 'the masses' in Napoleon's defeat in 1812 and seriously distorted understanding of Alexander's role in Russian foreign policy and grand strategy. Even before 1917 Russian patriotic narratives were inclined to obsess about the minutiae of the 1812 campaign and to forget Russia's role in 1813–1814. Soviet-era historiography greatly strengthened this bias. With the collapse of the Soviet regime ideological stereotypes weakened and fresh approaches became possible. Western historians were permitted to work in Russian archives. A fruitful exchange of knowledge and perspectives between Russian and Western historians of the Napoleonic era became possible. The present book is the result of these new possibilities both in general and in the more specific sense that it is based on an international conference

held in Latvia in May 2014 in which Russian experts on the Napoleonic era sat alongside their British, American, French, German, Canadian and Polish colleagues. Some of these scholars had long-established reputations in the field but others were young historians just beginning to make their mark. This too contributed to the interest of the discussions. Great thanks are due to Dr Frederik Paulsen who funded this conference so generously.

Three contributions to this book – by Dominic Lieven, Michael Broers and Alan Forrest – seek to put Russia in a broader context. Dominic Lieven takes the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era as a whole and asks to what extent it represented a fundamental break with the past as regards war and diplomacy. To some extent this boils down to assessing the impact of the French and Industrial revolutions, which are generally seen as the key dividing line between the early modern and modern eras of European history. Lieven concludes that although there were major changes in this era – not least in the sheer scale of warfare – on the whole elements of continuity outweighed elements of change. The impact of the Industrial Revolution on warfare began in the mid-nineteenth century. Though the influence of the French Revolution on war and international relations was certainly greater in the Napoleonic era, nevertheless Napoleon was in the end defeated by the European old regime, albeit in somewhat modified form. Part of Lieven's argument is that although in the long run the European old regime was overwhelmed by the power of the forces unleashed by revolution, it proved more formidable, flexible and intelligent than is often believed.

Michael Broers discusses Napoleon's Empire, which he sees as underpinned by the French elite's confidence in the superiority of their own high culture and by their vision of French leadership in the cause of European civilization. Broers makes parallels with Roman imperialism and especially with Cicero's belief that good laws were universally applicable. In this respect Napoleon's Empire was also very much an Enlightenment project. Although Napoleon's Empire embodied French national pride, interests and values it was able to root itself most securely in what Broers calls an inner imperial zone around the axis of the rivers Rhine, Saone and Rhone. In this more developed core region the Empire's institutions functioned more effectively and its ideology had greater resonance than in the outer zone. It is important to note that this outer zone included large areas of western and southern France itself. Napoleon's was an empire of the towns, not the countryside. It was an elitist project which dragged outlying rural areas into the ambit of the state's fiscal, conscription and police agencies. Its most lasting legacy was the greatly enhanced reach and power of the state. But this urban world was in many respects a traditional one. If Catholic peasantries in revolt against the Enlightenment hated the Empire so too did great cities whose values were commercial and whose prosperity was linked to the Atlantic trade routes. So it is too simple just to equate the Napoleonic Empire with a move towards modernity.

Whereas Michael Broers offers a splendid overall conception of Napoleon's Empire, Alan Forrest's focus is more limited. Nevertheless his analysis of why Napoleon chose to invade Russia in 1812 provides an essential context for any book devoted to looking at Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars. Forrest sets out the reasons which inspired Napoleon to go to war with Russia as well as his war aims. He points out that the latter were strictly limited. Napoleon hoped to fight a 'cabinet war' of short duration that would force Alexander I to accept Russia's subordination to French grand strategy. The latter was above all defined by the aims and requirements of France's competition with Britain. Alan Forrest also illustrates Napoleon's under-estimation of Russian power and resolve, and seeks to explain this under-estimate. Finally, Forrest's contribution assesses the strength that Napoleon could bring to bear against Russia as well as some of the weaknesses in Napoleon's military and political machine.

The core of the book is devoted to Russia. Elise Wirtschafter looks at Russian conceptions of what a proper European order should be and how it should be created. To an extent her chapter balances that of Michael Broers. Though broad in conception, Wirtschafter's contribution focuses on Russian thinking after 1815 and concentrates in particular on a document in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive entitled 'Review of the Year 1819'. This review was drafted by top advisers to Alexander I but endorsed by the monarch himself. As Wirtschafter argues, the Russian leadership's views on European order were like Napoleon's in the sense that they were deeply rooted in Enlightenment thought. The review stressed the need for moderation, rationality and reason. It argued that Russian policy had for years embodied all three of these virtues. Underlying this emphasis was a deep desire for tranquillity and opposition to anything that threatened Europe's still fragile peace. Past and present must be reconciled: there could be no unthinking return to the pre-1789 order. On the other hand, the review stressed that stable government had to be rooted in a people's customs and values. The Christian religion was the only solid social and cultural basis for a stable political order. But it contributed not just the stability desired by realist politicians but also the hope for an ethical international system founded on co-operation among the great powers.

The key figure in grand strategy and diplomacy on the Russian side was Alexander I. Marie-Pierre Rey, author of an outstanding biography of Alexander, focuses in her contribution on Alexander's relationship with Talleyrand. Her chapter complements those by Michael Broers and Elise Wirtschafter. Marie-Pierre Rey shows that Alexander and Talleyrand, both children of the Enlightenment, shared a common conception of European order and France's necessary place within it. They both rejected Napoleon's lack of balance or limits. Rey's contribution looks in detail at how Alexander and Talleyrand worked together towards Napoleon's overthrow. She shows that both men sought stability but were also guided by a commitment to

certain liberal principles. Alexander and Talleyrand shared the fear that a restored Bourbon regime would be unwilling or unable to incorporate parts of the revolutionary heritage and would therefore endanger the cause of both liberty and stability. Both statesmen finally accepted Louis XVIII but worked together to ensure that the restored Bourbon regime would guarantee civil and political rights and would accommodate Napoleonic-era French elites.

Aleksandr Orlov studies Russo-British relations from Tilsit until the invasion of 1812. Inevitably such a study cannot avoid also looking at French perceptions of the Anglo-Russian relationship. The main focus of this contribution is on Russo-British commercial relations and the impact on Russian financial and economic well-being of subordination to Napoleon's Continental System. Orlov shows that Alexander was forced to tread an always narrow and ever-shrinking path between infuriating Napoleon and bankrupting the Russian treasury and economy. Both Petersburg and London did everything possible to avoid their 'cold war' turning hot. Both sides understood that they needed each other and might well renew their alliance at some point. The implication of Orlov's argument is that although other factors (including above all Poland) made a big contribution to the breakdown of the Franco-Russian alliance, the needs of Russia's economy were in themselves sufficient to force Russo-British reconciliation and Russia's retreat from the entente with Napoleon.

Once Britain's position becomes an object of study attention shifts from a narrowly European to a global perspective. This is important since the Napoleonic Wars were actually a global struggle. If most of the military action was concentrated in Europe that was because British sea power locked French imperialism into the European continent. The Royal Navy stymied Napoleon's hopes of restoring French Empire in North America or using Egypt as a stepping stone towards a renewed challenge to Britain's position in India. India was indeed the core of the new global empire which Britain succeeded in creating at precisely the same moment that France was making an heroic but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to create an empire in Europe. In this context it is worth noting that the revenues of British India even in 1815 were greater than those of the Russian or Austrian Empires. David Schimmelpenninck provides an insight into Russian thinking about India. Catherine II dreamed of asserting Russian influence in the sub-continent and her son, Paul I, actually sent off a Cossack army to attack India along the traditional invasion route of cavalry armies across the northwest frontier. The attempt proved a fiasco and contributed to the widespread view within the Russian elites that Paul was deranged. Subsequently, Alexander I would have nothing of Napoleon's efforts to lure him into a joint challenge to Britain's position in India, which the tsar considered altogether a fantasy.

Of course the Russian army lay at the core of Russian power and along with skilful and realistic diplomacy played the key role in Napoleon's

downfall. Viktor Bezotosnyi is probably the leading living Russian expert on the Russian army in the Napoleonic era. Not merely has he written a number of outstanding studies of Russian military forces and operations, he also played a key role in setting up in 2012 the fine new museum dedicated to Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars on Red Square in Moscow. His piece in this book investigates the struggles between individuals and factions within the Russian military elite in 1812–1814. These struggles bewildered foreign observers such as Carl von Clausewitz at the time and have continued to baffle foreign historians ever since. Bezotosnyi's chapter includes many insights into the structure of Russian politics and the values of the imperial military and aristocratic elite in this era. The military elite is shown to have had specific characteristics but also to have reflected many features of the social and political elite as a whole. Bezotosnyi shows how Alexander managed the Russian elite. Certain elements were constant factors throughout the period. A vital one was the near obsession with rank and seniority among the generals. Almost as constant was the struggle between so-called Russian and German factions. But the author shows that neither of these factions was either constant in membership or internally united. Allegiances changed according to specific contexts and challenges. In-fighting within the military leadership often reflected disagreements over specific operational choices (e.g. whether to fight at the gates of Moscow in 1812) though this in turn was often intertwined with the ambitions of specific senior generals and their clienteles. Each commander-in-chief (Barclay de Tolly, Kutuzov and Wittgenstein) carried with him his own following. Since to a great extent all major conflicts revolved around attempts to win the monarch's support, it mattered crucially whether (as in 1813–1814) Alexander was with the army in person. Another fundamental difference was between 1812 when Russia fought alone and the coalition war of 1813–1814 when Russian generals might even unite against the common Prussian or Austrian 'foe'.

The other piece which directly studies the Russian army is Denis Svidzhkov's work on Prince Eugen of Württemberg. Eugen's prominence in the campaigns of 1812–1814 would in itself warrant such a study. Eugen was an inspirational leader on the battlefields of Borodino and Leipzig. On two key occasions in these years he also showed exceptional intelligence, insight and coolness. Without these qualities the Russian army might have suffered disaster as it retreated after abandoning Smolensk. Most important was Eugen's vital role in extricating the allies from potential disaster after the lost battle of Dresden in 1813 and opening the way for the decisive victory at Kulm which followed immediately afterwards. This was one of the truly crucial turning points in the collapse of Napoleon's Empire. But Eugen's biography also has much to say about the values that permeated the Russian – and other – military leadership towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The fact that so important a figure has largely been

neglected by historians provides insights into core failings of Russian and Western historiography on 1812–1814. In the Russian case Eugen was largely forgotten because he was a German and not even a subject of the tsar. The leading Russian chronicler of the wars, General Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, for example, played down Eugen's role in order to reserve the laurels of victory for Russians. But it is also symptomatic of Western historians' neglect of Russia's role in the wars that Eugen's memoirs – probably the fullest and most insightful record left by a Russian general of the era – have barely been consulted despite the fact that they are written in German.

Russia's defeat of Napoleon was owed to much more than courageous soldiers and wily diplomats. The Empire's resources were mobilized effectively. These resources were both physical and moral. Liudmila Marnei writes on a crucial but neglected aspect of Russia's war effort, namely her finances. She describes both Russia's potential financial weakness and how the government sought to address it. Russia's fiscal and financial strategy included use of customs revenue, taxes (both regular and emergency), recourse to what amounted to forced loans repayable after the war, borrowing both within Russia and abroad, and schemes for so-called 'federal money' usable by Russian (and later allied) forces operating beyond the Empire's borders but largely guaranteed by Britain. There was a clear distinction between how the war was financed in 1812 and 1813–1814. Fighting on home soil the army largely depended on requisitioning supplies from the population in return for receipts which were later counted off against tax obligations. Also vital were huge and often voluntary contributions of food, money and horses by Russian society. Once the Russian armies moved abroad in 1813–1814 their financing became much more complicated. At this point advantageous agreements with (above all) Prussia, British subsidies, and heavy requisitioning in Poland all contributed mightily to victory.

Some aspects of Russian wartime finance are touched on by other contributors. In her piece on the Russian home front in the provinces Janet Hartley provides a clear guide to voluntary contributions to the war effort in 1812. It is impossible to define the full extent of these contributions in money terms because many donations went unrecorded or were made in kind. Beyond question, however, they were enormous and were vital to the Russian war effort. As with the majority of contributions, Janet Hartley's piece is based on extensive use of Russian (and other) archival sources, as well as on recent Russian scholarship on 1812. As Hartley illustrates, it is often hard to determine whether contributions were indeed voluntary or were in reality demanded and levied by the state despite rhetoric to the contrary. If this is true of donations it is even more the case as regards volunteering for the emergency militias set up in many provinces in 1812. Hartley shows that in the overwhelming majority of cases the rank and file of the militia were conscripts, though even here there were exceptions. Officers were with few exceptions volunteers though often subject to social and governmental

pressure. The motives for entering the militia also sometimes had more to do with personal ambition and financial need than patriotism. Nevertheless, Hartley concludes, in rejecting overly saccharine accounts of patriotic sacrifice one must not move too far towards cynicism. Widespread support for the war effort in Russian society was crucial to the government's ability to mobilize resources on a scale to match Napoleon's much richer and more populous Empire and its satellites.

The chapters by Paul Keenan and Liubov Melnikova go some way towards explaining the sources of Russian support for the war effort and how the government sought to use them. Keenan's piece looks at how the court reacted to Russia's largely unsuccessful war effort in 1805–1807 which included a number of military defeats and culminated in the widely unpopular treaty of Tilsit. He studies official announcements from the emperor's palace, as well as the rituals and celebrations that marked the outer life of the court. These were in part designed to put the best possible twist on events, thereby for instance propagating an official line (the only one which could be expressed in public) on the benefits of peace in 1807. In general court spectacles and rituals were designed to place the monarch and dynasty at the centre of elite society, to cast them in a splendid but also benevolent light, but also through religious ceremonies, military parades and commemoration of dynastic birthdays and anniversaries to link the Romanovs in particular to the two greatest sources of the dynasty's legitimacy, namely its status as protector of Russian Orthodoxy and its role in making Russia a formidable and respected military power.

Whereas Paul Keenan's study of the court studies an institution most visible to Russian elites, Liubov Melnikova's study of the Orthodox Church's support for the war effort has wider implications which stretch throughout society. At all times a key ally of the monarchy, in the crisis of 1812 the Church was vital in mobilizing Russian feeling against the invader. This applied not just to society as a whole but also specifically to the army. In this context it is worth remembering that unlike even the British (let alone French) army of the time, Russian regiments were fully served by priests and deacons, the little world of the regiment being a microcosm of the Orthodox fatherland, whose guardian was the tsar. The Church encouraged the widespread view among Russians that they were engaged in a war between rival civilizations: an ordered, hierarchical and God-fearing Russia faced the onslaught of a de-Christianized, immoral and unruly France. Napoleon was depicted as the Antichrist and the Church appealed to the population to rise up against him in defence of their Orthodox home. French marauding, and particularly the desecration of churches, lent this call additional plausibility.

Andrzej Nieuwazny looks at the Duchy of Warsaw under Russian occupation in 1813–1814. His analysis exposes the differences between Alexander I and his generals on the ground. The emperor was intent on annexing the

territory at the end of the war and was intent on appealing for the Polish nobility's support. The military leadership was concerned with more mundane and immediate issues such as the creation of an effective administration willing and able to mobilize Polish resources to feed and supply the Russian army. Nieuwazny discusses in detail the varied Polish response to Russian occupation. The basic attitude of the Polish masses was exhaustion from the constant demands of armies crossing the country in 1811–1814 and a longing for peace. Part of the Polish elite cooperated with the occupiers with varying degrees of willingness and efficiency. Others remained aloof. Actual resistance in Nieuwazny's analysis was rare and has been much exaggerated by Polish and Soviet historians. Nevertheless wide sectors of Polish educated society longed for Napoleon to conquer the allies and restore Polish independence. With the fate of the campaign hanging in the balance until the battle of Leipzig in October 1813 Polish disaffection was a constant source of concern to the Russian occupiers. Only after Leipzig did Polish elites as a whole accept that Alexander would be the key arbiter of their country's fate. Hopes pinned on his benevolence and liberalism were in fact to a surprising degree well-founded in these years.

Although the core of this book is devoted to Russia during the Napoleonic Wars, three chapters instead cover the long-term impact of the conflict on Russian government, society and memory. Grigorii Bibikov looks specifically at the role of 'heroes' of 1812–1814 from among the Russian military leadership and their subsequent role in Russian government. An important point to note is that many of these 'heroes' were promoted on merit to senior ranks at a very young age in 1813–1814. Thereafter they remained key figures in government and army for many decades. As one would expect, the army itself was dominated well into the mid-nineteenth century by generals who had distinguished themselves in the epic struggle against Napoleon. Especially as they aged, this did not always work to the army's benefit as it struggled to meet new challenges. The military heroes of 1812–1814 drew most ire in Russian society when they occupied key civilian positions for which they were by no means usually well-equipped by temperament or training. The prominence of soldiers in top civil posts also owed much to Nicholas I's unique trust in military men and methods but also to the lack of a well-trained and professional civil bureaucracy. As a civilian bureaucratic elite did begin to emerge from the educational institutions established by Alexander I and Nicholas I it grew increasingly frustrated by its subordination to aging generals-cum-ministers. But the military stranglehold on top positions was only finally broken by the death of Nicholas I and the de-legitimation of his system during the disastrous Crimean War of 1854–1856.

Alexander Martin looks at the impact of 1812 on the process of civilization and refinement in Russia. His piece draws on the concept of civilization created by Norbert Elias. Martin's evidence is overwhelmingly drawn from Moscow, on whose history in pre-revolutionary times he is an internationally

recognized expert. Martin argues that 1812 reflected the civilizing process in Moscow in three ways. It accelerated this process by shocking Muscovites into new and deeper ways of analysing their world and the external forces to which it was subject. By temporarily disrupting normal patterns of urban life it revealed just how much progress had previously been made in turning Moscow into a civilized centre of sociability and the exchange of ideas. More concretely and in the longer term, by ruining many aristocratic grandees 1812 undermined the domination of Muscovite society by the aristocracy and opened the way to the development of a broader and freer civil society in the city. But Alexander Martin is at pains not simply to fit the events of 1812 into some liberal narrative of progress. As he argues elsewhere, the anarchy and widespread impoverishment inflicted on Muscovites in 1812 strengthened an already deeply held conservative longing for order and a distrust of popular 'spontaneity'.

The final chapter is by Tatiana Saburova and is a study of commemorative practices and historical memory of 1812 in Russia. It will be of great interest to the many Western historians specializing in the fields of memory and commemoration. Saburova's piece links up with Paul Keenan's chapter on how the court commemorated the events of 1805–1807 and confirms a key point made by Alexander Martin, namely that the war (and especially 1812) gave birth to a new literary genre, the war memoir. Saburova covers an impressively wide canvas in thought-provoking style. Among the topics covered are: the evolution of the military memoir; changing interpretations of the Napoleonic Wars in the literature of the 1850s and 1860s in light of the Crimean War and the Polish uprising of 1863; commemorative monuments and architecture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special attention going to the battlefield of Borodino; the centenary celebrations of 1812, commemoration of the 'people's war' in the Soviet era, and the 150th and 200th anniversary celebrations in 1962 and 2012.

Although the questions tackled in this book should contribute greatly to an English-speaking readership's understanding of Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars there inevitably remains much work to be done to fill the large gap that currently exists. In some cases this work will be done by contributors to this book whose chapters reflect preliminary findings derived from research that is still underway. One example of this is Elise Wirtschafter's chapter which forms a small part of a research project whose aim is to analyse the theoretical underpinnings of foreign policy in Alexander I's reign by looking at evolving Russian conceptions of international order from 1801 to 1825. Not just the monarch but also a number of highly intelligent advisers contributed to this thinking. Good biographies already exist in English of Prince Adam Czartoryski and Count Ioannis Kapodistrias: the time is overdue for equivalent biographies of Karl von Nesselrode and Count Nikolai P. Rumiantsev. The latter in particular was a fascinating individual who thought deeply and in original ways about

Russia's place in the evolving global economic and political order but was also a major cultural figure.

After reading this collected work it is in fact easy to produce a long list of possible future avenues for research. Comparisons between Napoleon's and Alexander's imperial systems of rule might be an obvious place to start: in this case one could look at the two Empires in terms of effective penetration of society and mobilization of resources. Alternatively, one could compare them as Enlightenment projects. For a military historian, the campaigns of 1813–1814 remain an almost open field for investigation of how Russian military professionalism developed during the Napoleonic era. Deeper study of Russia's war economy would contribute greatly not just to our understanding of how and why Russia won the war of 1812–1814 but also of areas of technological progress and backwardness in Russian industry. An historian of memory and commemoration might usefully pursue the theme of why Russians succeeded in forgetting so much of what happened in the Napoleonic Wars, and not least why the greatest triumphs of imperial Russian arms and diplomacy in 1813–1814 have slipped almost entirely out of the collective memory. No doubt other historians could set out alternative and equally alluring agendas for future research. On one point, however, I think all would agree. Whatever happens to the political climate, fruitful collaboration between Russian and foreign historians must be preserved.

1
International Relations in the Napoleonic Era: The Long View

Dominic Lieven

This chapter will look at international relations in the Napoleonic era from a perspective which is both long in time and global in breadth. It will also interpret the words 'international relations' rather freely, investigating not just diplomacy and inter-state relations but also warfare and the sources of power in this era. Such broad perspectives have clear advantages. Comparative approaches can open up new issues and interpretations. They can also challenge the assumptions and enrich the debates among specialists in any historical field. Since most history-writing – and the history of war in particular – is still national and sometimes even nationalist, global perspectives and international comparisons are doubly useful. Attempting to determine what were the key issues and fundamental trends within a mass of detail is essential to the telling and understanding of history. Like all approaches, however, the broad sweep has its problems. Even the best comparisons can never replace detailed local knowledge based on mastery of the sources. Global perspectives can be little more than vapid bows to contemporary fashion. They can also feed into an inevitable danger when writing history in the *longue durée*, which is to read the present back into the past and to impose master narratives which legitimize contemporary assumptions and ideologies. The great point, in my opinion, is for the historian to be aware and explicit about these dangers.

The Napoleonic Wars occurred in the middle of what historians often call the Era of Revolutions.[1] Though precise boundaries differ, this era is generally taken to include the French and (usually) American Revolutions on the one hand, and the 'First' Industrial Revolution on the other. Together these revolutions are seen to have created the foundations of modernity: in other words liberal capitalism, liberal-democratic ideology and the literate, urbanized, wealthy mass societies which are taken to be its most favourable setting. To put things crudely, the Era of Revolutions has generally been seen as the dividing-line between the early modern and modern ages. The question therefore more or less asks itself whether the spectacular turn taken by international relations – and in particular by warfare – in the age of

Napoleon represents itself a decisive shift towards modernity and break with the past. A basic argument in this chapter is that while major changes did occur in international relations and especially in warfare, on the whole the elements of continuity were greater than those of change. A further conclusion of this chapter is that although in the long term the forces unleashed by the French and Industrial Revolutions were of immense power and destroyed Europe's old regime, one should nevertheless not underestimate either the strength or sometimes the intelligence with which the old regime confronted these forces in the Napoleonic era.[2]

The lack of fundamental change is most obvious when one addresses the impact of economic change – in other words the Industrial Revolution – on war and international relations in this era. It is by now a long time since any serious historian has interpreted the French Revolution as the political counterpart of the triumph of the capitalist bourgeoisie in the economic sphere. Economic historians are in any case often now inclined to play down the word 'revolution' as regards turn-of-the-century Britain's economy. They emphasize instead the longer-term development of British trade and consumption, and stress that the really revolutionary shifts in power-generation, communications and industry came in the first half of the nineteenth century.[3] Clearly this was true as regards those sectors of industry most closely related to warfare. The basic point about war in the Napoleonic era was that it was pre-industrial and in that sense pre-modern. The Industrial Revolution's impact on weapons, communications and logistics lay just over the horizon. The horse was still the key to reconnaissance and transport during military campaigns, to moving the guns on the battlefield, and to the cavalry's pursuit and destruction of a defeated foe.[4] Weapons and equipment had not changed fundamentally in the century before the battle of Waterloo. This ensured that close-order infantry and cavalry formations remained the key to delivering the shock and the firepower which alone could win battles. Light infantry were growing in importance but the emphasis put on them by some historians can itself reflect ideological assumptions. Far too often the light infantryman is assumed to be the citizen-in-arms. His politically-inspired initiative and individualism is juxtaposed to the dumb servility which supposedly kept unwilling conscripts or mercenaries in the closely packed ranks of monarchy's armies. This is a very dubious description of the hard-bitten light infantry veterans who were the pick of Wellington's army, let alone of their Russian jaeger equivalents, whose best regiments had honed their skills as light infantrymen during years of campaigning against those masters of the raid and the ambush, the Ottomans.[5]

The debate over the citizen-jaeger belongs to the wider question of the French Revolution's impact on international relations in the period 1792–1815. Clearly, in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars ideology mattered on both sides. Support for the French counter-revolution was, for example, an important element in British strategy. But geopolitics

and state interest always took precedence. Britain went to war to keep the French out of the Low Countries, not to destroy the Revolution. Catherine II proclaimed her adherence to the counter-revolutionary cause but defined Russia's role in this crusade as the extinction of Polish nationhood. Prussia made peace with the French republic to secure its share of Poland. Napoleon's murder of the Duc d'Enghien in 1804 caused outrage in many European courts but hard-headed *raison d'état* won out on this occasion too. The rulers of Europe's great powers could not afford to be sentimentalists, at least as regards politics. Even in 1814 none of the continental powers were enthusiastic about restoring the Bourbons. If Alexander I in his heart was committed to toppling Napoleon, this had nothing to do with legitimist sympathies. The tsar simply believed that Napoleon would never for long accept a settlement which would secure allied interests and Europe's peace. Of all the allied leaders, however, Alexander was least enthusiastic about restoring Louis XVIII, above all because he did not believe that the Bourbons would be sufficiently flexible and liberal to survive in power. His preferred option would have been the Duc d'Orléans or Jean Bernadotte as king, or even a conservative republic.[6]

As regards the nature of the war that began in 1792 and lasted with only brief intermissions until 1815, it was to some extent influenced by revolutionary ideology, especially in 1792–1794. The thousands of French volunteers who flocked to the colours in the war's early months were unlike the soldiers of any other European army. This was true in both positive and negative terms: on the one hand enthusiastic commitment to a cause, on the other a lack of basic military skills. By the Napoleonic era, however, the French army in most respects resembled its opponents. Its officers' code of honour and behaviour, not to mention their professional training and 'doctrine', on the whole followed common European norms. Its men were mostly veterans or recruits drawn from the lower orders in a conscription system that generally allowed the well-to-do to avoid service and buy substitutes. Their primary loyalty was to their units and monarch, not to any political cause. Many of them were not ethnic Frenchmen. It is true that discipline in the French army was more relaxed, egalitarian and humane than in the armies which they fought. It is a liberal illusion, however, to imagine that this necessarily made the French army more effective in war. The fierce discipline of the Russian army sustained it under the enormous pressures of the long retreat from the border to Moscow, despite the huge losses suffered at the battle of Borodino. On the contrary, the lack of discipline and the marauding tradition inherited from the French Revolutionary army contributed mightily to the disintegration of Napoleon's forces on the retreat from Moscow.[7]

Of the four main allied armies which finally defeated Napoleon, it was the Prussian which was most radically reformed and furthest from the old regime model by 1815. Military historians have concentrated their attention

on the reformed Prussian army because it is rightly seen as the most modern of the allied forces. In particular, the introduction of universal military service and the creation of a remarkable general staff system and cadre are seen as staking out a path which all European armies were subsequently to follow. The Prussian military effort in 1813–1815 was indeed impressive, as was the thorough-going mobilization of Prussia's meagre resources which sustained it and which allowed a relatively small state to regain its place among the great powers. One needs to remember, however, that in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) the Prussian war effort and the mobilization of resources had also been remarkable. A country of five million people had put 5 per cent of its population in arms, had suffered over 160,000 losses, and by stupendous efforts had survived the attack of the three other continental powers, each of which far outmatched Prussia in population, wealth and resources. The contrast is sometimes made between 'total' Napoleonic War and the indecisive and limited nature of eighteenth-century campaigning. In fact there was nothing indecisive or cautious in Frederick II's way of war. Nor was its result of limited significance. Prussia's emergence, and survival, as a great power between 1740 and 1763 was miraculous and of immense long-term significance. The sense of Prussian identity and pride which sustained the country's resurgence between 1807 and 1815 was partly rooted in memory of the earlier struggle.[8]

Despite its impressive efforts between 1813 and 1815, however, Prussia remained the junior and least powerful member of the allied quartet. On land, the main key to victory was the Russian army, which at all times much outnumbered the Prussian forces and was indeed largely responsible for Prussia's liberation from French occupation. The Russian army had undergone significant professional and technical reforms between 1807 and 1812 which often derived from French models and made it more effective. But the main elements of the army, let alone of Russia's state and society, remained unchanged. William Fuller was the first Western historian to note not merely that the Russian army was still unequivocally 'old regime' but that this was one of its great strengths.[9] The resilience, high morale and extraordinary powers of resistance of this army owed much to the fact that it was made up of lifelong veteran soldiers who displayed immense loyalty to their regimental home, which itself was a microcosm of the Orthodox fatherland. Given the size of Russia's population a long-service professional army could nevertheless be of sufficient size to make a big impact on the Napoleonic battlefield. Faced with dire emergency in 1812–1813 the Russian old regime was also sufficiently legitimate and effective to mobilize the Empire's resources for war on an unprecedented scale. Russian grand strategy was intelligently conceived and pursued, with Alexander I exercising effective personal leadership.

It was no coincidence that the most impressive and influential military thinker of the Napoleonic era came from the ranks of the Prussian general

staff. Nor is it surprising that a Prussian officer was inclined to see the transformation of war in his era in more radical terms than was the case with his Russian or Austrian counterparts. Part of Clausewitz's attraction for students of war is precisely the timelessness of his insights. He rose well beyond the confines of his own era, showing great insight into the enormous future potential of the forces unleashed by the Revolution and harnessed by Napoleon. To an extent, Clausewitz spotted the chicken in the egg. In some respects that makes his more conceptual passages better as prophecy than as a comment on the actual campaigns of his day. For those seeking to understand the everyday realities of Napoleonic-era warfare, Antoine de Jomini can sometimes be a better guide. This is not to deny the near-cataclysmic level of the violence which submerged Europe between 1792 and 1815, and which so impressed Clausewitz. Between 1763 and 1792 there had been no significant warfare in the European heartland. For the next 23 years fighting barely ceased, moreover in terms of raw numbers warfare had moved to a new scale. The French mass mobilization of 1792–1794 began this trend and the *Loi Jourdan* of 1798 confirmed it. France's enemies were forced to mobilize their manpower to match French numbers. Vast armies made huge casualties from battle, sickness and desertion both inevitable and more tolerable for generals than in the eighteenth century. This had an impact on the tempo with which warfare was conducted. Huge numbers also made inevitable the reorganization of armies into semi-autonomous all-arms corps and divisions. Without this the tactical co-ordination, movement and strategic direction of the era's huge military machines would have been impossible.[10]

Nevertheless, it is to the point that Napoleon was ultimately defeated by what one might describe as the European old regime. There were of course many reasons for his downfall. His style of warfare was best suited to the rich, densely populated lands of western and central Europe where his troops could feed off the land and find many roads down which to march. Napoleon was also more likely to find supporters for the 'enlightened' and 'rational' principles which his Empire claimed to embody in Europe's heartland. In both military and political terms he had much greater difficulty in applying his principles of war and governance in Europe's more backward periphery.[11] The enmity of Britain, perched beyond his reach across the Channel and able to use its financial power to subsidize France's continental enemies was another major impediment to Napoleon's ambitions.

The key, however, to Napoleon's destruction in 1813–1814 was different and simple. For the first time in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the Romanovs, Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns united against him. As important, the Russian army was already deployed in the theatre of operations when the key campaign of autumn 1813 began. The contrast between 1805 and 1806 when its allies' main armies had already been wholly or partly destroyed before Russia's forces arrived in the field was very important. If at any time between 1792 and 1809 the three eastern great powers had made a

similar united effort, it is likely that the Napoleonic adventure would have been ended years earlier than was actually the case. Above all, they failed to do because of mutual suspicions. These suspicions had far from disappeared in 1813 but the three dynasties had by then learned the lesson that Napoleon's France was a deadly threat to their status as independent great powers, and perhaps to their survival.

Even so, it took the destruction of Napoleon's army in Russia to provide a breathing space during which Russian armies could advance into central Europe before the beginning of the decisive campaigns which would decide Europe's fate. Without this it would have been impossible to create an effective coalition of the eastern powers, given the extent to which Prussia and Austria had been weakened by 1813. Even after the Russian advance into central Europe there was nothing fore-ordained about Napoleon's destruction. The campaigns of 1813 could easily have gone in his favour. It took courage and insight for Alexander to seize the moment of French weakness to end the intolerable threat to Russian security represented by Napoleon's domination of Germany. The Russian commitment to the war was far greater between 1812 and 1814 than had been the case between 1805 and 1807, let alone between 1798 and 1800. In 1813–1814, 500,000 Russian troops were deployed beyond the Empire's borders, an astonishing achievement but also a necessary one if a European coalition were to be created and the still-formidable power of Napoleon's Empire were to be broken.[12]

To describe the victorious coalition which overthrew Napoleon as the European old regime is both largely true and potentially misleading. 'Old regime' is a vague term which glosses over many differences between the societies and political systems of eighteenth-century Europe's great powers. As a term, 'old regime' is a useful way of underlining that these political systems preceded and were untouched by the great political and economic revolutions which ushered in the modern era. It correctly also stresses that there were both structural and cultural commonalities which united the ruling elites of Europe and set them apart both from the bulk of their own peoples and from ruling elites in the Ottoman Empire or China. There was to some extent a common aristocratic military culture which reigned across Europe but there was also a world of difference between the mentality, not to mention competence, of Versailles military courtiers such as Charles, Prince of Soubise, and Louis François Armand du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu, who led French armies to disaster in the Seven Years' War and, to take but one Prussian example, Friedrich von Seydlitz, Frederick's cavalry commander in the same struggle. Also notable was the highly professional and ruthlessly single-minded leadership which took Russian armies to crushing victories over the Ottomans under the command of Petr A. Rumiantsev and Aleksandr V. Suvorov. To describe the carnage of the Russo-Ottoman wars of the second half of the eighteenth century as 'the sport of kings' is

absurd. Nor was there any trace of a polite minuet in the aggression, speed and tactical innovation employed by the Russian commanders to achieve total destruction of their foe in these wars. In many ways the key difference to subsequent French efforts between 1792 and 1815 was that the Russians successfully pursued clearly defined and achievable geopolitical objectives, in this sense making war serve politics in a way preached by Clausewitz but not always practised by Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.[13]

France before 1789 was the core of the European old regime. French culture and the Parisian salons led Europe. Versailles provided a model for all Europe's rulers. Precisely because it was the precursor and model for all subsequent absolutist regimes, by the late eighteenth century the French military-fiscal state was in certain respects out of date and had acquired many barnacles. It had to some extent been overtaken by the great powers to its east as regards the efficient mobilization of resources for war.[14] Neither Prussia nor Russia, for example, had venal offices. The maze of privileges, customs and exemptions which shackled the mobilization of conscripts and taxes in France was much less in evidence in the rawer societies and newer, more rational and more ruthless military-fiscal systems in the east. One key to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras is simply that 1789 broke the shackles which had previously inhibited the French state from mobilizing the resources of what was still potentially much the richest and most powerful country in Europe. What the Revolution began, Napoleon completed. For the first time the French state, in the persons of his gendarmerie, penetrated down to the village level. Napoleonic conscription imposed a much heavier burden on the population than before 1789. This goes far to explain the great upsurge in French power between 1792 and 1814. It explains why Restoration governments in areas previously ruled by Napoleon admired and preserved the Bonapartist state apparatus. But it is also the reason why, after 1814, much of French public opinion welcomed the Bourbons' promise of genuine constitutional and political constraints on the state's power, not to mention the dismantling of Napoleon's system of conscription.[15]

No one doubts that in both military and administrative terms the French state was much more formidable under Napoleon than in the time of the last Bourbons. Whether its grand strategy was wiser or more coherent is a different matter. Once again, the comparison between the old regime and the post-revolutionary polity is by no means entirely in the latter's favour. The basic premise of late-Bourbon grand strategy was that France must abandon any dreams of territorial expansion on the European continent and must concentrate its resources on maritime, commercial and colonial competition with Britain. A key pillar of this strategy was to end the centuries-old struggle between the Bourbons and Habsburgs which lay at the root of so many continental entanglements. This was the logic of the Franco-Austrian alliance whose great symbol was the marriage of the Archduchess Marie Antoinette to the future Louis XVI.[16]

The alliance got off to a bad start by dragging Paris into the Seven Years' War on the continent as part of Austria's drive to destroy Prussia and regain Silesia. This was not in France's interests and distracted her from the far more important goal of defending her position outside Europe and on the seas against British power. Had the French army shown reasonable competence it might even so have occupied Hanover and used it as a bargaining chip to regain overseas colonies at the post-war peace conference. Instead France was humiliated both on the continent and on the seas, a disaster from which the already slim popularity of the Austrian alliance never recovered. In fact, however, after 1763 French grand strategy worked well. Resources were increasingly concentrated on the navy which held its own in the war between 1777 and 1783, in the process making a mighty contribution to American independence and thereby dealing what seemed at the time a major blow to British power. In the 1780s French naval expansion continued and Franco-Spanish naval power equalled that of Britain. With the Netherlands also a French ally during and immediately after the war, British maritime security was under more threat than at any time until the 1930s. Meanwhile France's colonial Empire and maritime trade boomed, Saint Domingue (Haiti) being the richest colony of any European state. In the 1780s France's merchant marine was not far behind Britain's in tonnage. In Europe the Austrian alliance continued to underpin French security and continental peace but Paris was careful to give Vienna no backing for its plans to change the status quo in Germany by acquiring Bavaria and confronting Prussia.[17]

The Revolution undermined this strategy partly because it greatly weakened the navy. It also sparked off revolt in Saint Domingue, which ultimately led to the colony's loss. During the 22 years of war between 1792 and 1814, French overseas trade was crippled. The previously booming port of Bordeaux atrophied. Napoleon's hopes to re-build Empire and influence overseas crumbled in the face of British naval superiority. First his whole army was lost in Egypt as a result of Nelson's destruction of the French squadron at Aboukir in 1798. The Mediterranean once again became a British lake. Meanwhile British domination of the Atlantic stymied Napoleon's hopes of re-asserting control over Saint Domingue and re-building a French Empire in the western hemisphere. Unable to defend the vast Louisiana territory against the British, Napoleon sold it to the Americans. One key reason for the failure of the entire Napoleonic project was indeed that British sea power locked French imperialism into Europe where the costs of imperial expansion and the obstacles which stood in its way were usually much greater than overseas, and the rewards usually much more meagre.[18]

This was not immediately apparent in the era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. At the very time when the French navy was defeated in battle and its remnants pinned into its harbours, the French army went from victory to victory on the European continent, in the process creating

a formal and informal Empire which at its apogee stretched as far as Poland and Illyria, and included all Germany, Italy and the Low Countries. The initial lurch towards war in 1792 owed much to domestic French politics with both the Brissotins and the court seeing – from diametrically opposed points of view – an advantage in international conflict. Once foreign invasion and domestic counter-revolution were defeated expansion to some extent became an end in itself, driven by the army's hunger for sustenance, loot and glory. The incoherence and lack of planning behind French imperialism in this era was an undoubted weakness.

The achievement of the French army in conquering most of Europe by 1809 was spectacular but it was always likely – though not certain – to be ephemeral. Military conquest is only the first stage in the creation of empire. Next and harder comes the task of political consolidation. Lasting imperial institutions and networks have to put down roots and the empire needs to develop a sense of legitimacy among its subjects. Britain itself provided a recent example of how rapidly the acquisition of an empire could turn to dust. After driving the French out of most of North America in the Seven Years' War, British efforts to develop a tighter model of military-fiscal empire alienated its own American colonists and led to the disaster of 1776–1783.[19] In Napoleon's case he never worked out, even in his own mind, a coherent imperial plan for his conquered territories.[20] In the short term, his army's depredations and demands angered his subjects and allies. In the longer term the fact that his Empire was unequivocally dominated by Frenchmen and designed to serve French interests was always likely to alienate non-French subjects and clients. History was against a would-be continental emperor. It was almost a millennium since the death of Charlemagne, the last man who could make a realistic claim to have united Europe. Europe was not yet a continent of nations in the full modern sense but many states and dynasties had evolved with deep roots in local history, society and vernacular high cultures. Uprooting these local institutions, elites and loyalties would be a mighty challenge.[21]

Above all geopolitics made it far easier for Europeans to create empires outside Europe than within it. That is why Europe's greatest empire-builders tended to be countries on the continent's periphery with easy access to the non-European world. The Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, English and Russians all fell into this category. Outside its own continent the European political, fiscal and military machine was often superior to local powers, though frequently this superiority was less a question of better military technology than of deeper pockets and a greater degree of unity at the European state's core. Naval superiority allowed military forces to be deployed widely and rapidly, and the profits of maritime trade to be creamed off. Europeans could move into the vacuum opened up by the decline of some of the great Asian empires – above all the Mughals and Safavids – and could exploit local rivalries and conflicts over dynastic succession. Their advance was helped

by the fact that most of the states that emerged from the wreckage of the great Asian empires were of limited scale and did not have deep roots in the communities they ruled. Meanwhile on the European continent a would-be emperor faced the challenge of the European balance of power. A number of formidable polities existed whose military-fiscal institutions had been honed as a result of generations of ferocious competition with rivals in which the weak were swallowed or marginalized. Given time, these polities were likely to unite against any power which threatened to dominate the continent. For Napoleon to conquer the German and Italian lands, exclude Russian influence from central Europe, and turn Prussia and Austria into French satellites by 1810 was an extraordinary achievement.[22]

It was, however, at this point that any would-be European emperor would meet his biggest challenge in the form of the two great power-centres on Europe's periphery, namely Britain and Russia. Mobilizing sufficient resources in Europe's core to take on these two power-centres simultaneously was very difficult. Matters were worsened because different forms of power were needed to meet this challenge: naval might against Britain, as distinct from a military-logistical strength sufficient to penetrate and control the heartland of the Russian state east and south of Moscow. The Russians and British were always likely in time to unite against any would-be European emperor since his power must threaten their security and ambitions. Even if he was willing to accept a precarious balance of power between his European Empire and their peripheral ones, neither the Russians nor the British were likely to accept such a status quo for long. For Alexander I, the price of peace with Napoleon's Empire between 1807 and 1812 included adherence to a continental blockade of British trade which infuriated Russian elites and threatened the economic, financial and fiscal foundations of Russia's position as a great power. Even without the Continental System Russia must in the medium term bankrupt itself if forced to sustain armed forces sufficient to defend the Empire against a France which controlled Germany, Italian lands and Poland. Meanwhile for Napoleon there was a logic in seeking to destroy the last independent continental power before his own faculties and aura were dimmed or his German clients began to stir. To remove Russia from the equation was to destroy London's last hope of a continental ally and maybe bring her to the negotiating table. In more general terms, unless Napoleon could create some version of European Empire then France would have lost its century-old struggle with Britain, which at this very moment was consolidating a vastly extensive and wealthy Empire outside Europe.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was not doomed to inevitable disaster. Its main premise was that if the Russian field armies could be destroyed then Alexander would be forced to sue for peace since he could never hope to build a new professional army from scratch in war-time. This was probably correct. A further assumption was that if Napoleon offered moderate peace terms then the Russian elites would be unwilling to fight

to the death to regain their Empire's Polish provinces. This view also had merit. Napoleon's plans were thwarted by bad luck, by Alexander's strategy of retreat but above all by the moral courage and determination with which Michael Barclay de Tolly pursued this strategy and the skill, discipline and endurance with which the Russian army executed it. Victory backed by moderate peace terms would have enabled Napoleon to re-create a formidable and loyal Polish client-state, and to compensate his Saxon ally by further dismembering Prussia, thus removing any threat from the Hohenzollerns forever. Particularly if rewarded by part of Illyria, Austria could have become reconciled to its position as France's loyal lieutenant, as it was later to accept dependence on Berlin. Then as later its geopolitical ambitions could have been nudged towards the Balkans and against Russia. On this basis French domination of east-central Europe could have been consolidated for a generation at least. Meanwhile French rule might perhaps put down roots west of the Rhine and through the satellite kingdom of Italy in part of the peninsula. No doubt this construction would have fallen apart in time but the Europe which would have emerged from its ruins would probably have looked very different to the continent of 1815 and this might have changed radically Europe's fate in the twentieth century.

Alexander I was right to take the Russian army into central Europe in 1813 to destroy French control over Germany. He was almost certainly right to lead his soldiers on to Paris, correctly believing that peace and stability in Europe would never be secure so long as Napoleon sat on the French throne. But Mikhail Kutuzov (among others) was also correct in warning that the main beneficiary of Napoleon's demise would be Britain. With its historic rival cut down to size, Britain's domination of the seas and of trans-oceanic Empire was unchallenged. The Franco-Spanish-Dutch naval alliance which seemed so dangerous in 1783 had been shattered. The Royal Navy ruled supreme with the world's most formidable shipbuilding industry, financial system and commercial network to support it. Among the spoils which it had acquired in the course of the wars were key naval bases such as Malta, the Cape and Ceylon; Singapore and Hong Kong were soon to follow. The British had exploited the demise of Asian empires to extend their power. On the whole the decline of these empires owed far more to local factors than to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This was not true of the other region into which British power moved massively in this era, namely Latin America, where the Spanish Empire imploded as a result of Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. A half-hearted attempt at military conquest (at Buenos Aires in 1806) ended ingloriously. In any case Britain's own experience with its North American colonists taught the dangers of attempting to stand in the way of 'white' colonies in revolt. But the informal economic predominance which Britain quickly established across much of Latin America often brought most of empire's benefits without its attendant costs.

The greatest British territorial advance between 1792 and 1815 was in India. Comparisons with French imperialism in Europe are enlightening. Under Richard Wellesley in particular, the British pursued a coherent and planned policy of expansion, partly justified by spurious claims that this was needed to keep the French threat at bay. Napoleon's claims that he was conquering Europe in order to compete with Britain were also largely spurious but somewhat more plausible. British expansion, like French, was partly fuelled by the need of a formidable but expensive army to shift the burden of supporting it on to foreign taxpayers. British plunder of India fully matched the marauding habits of French troops in Europe. In both cases too, the economies of conquered regions were subordinated to the interests of France and Britain, with dire results for many Indian manufacturers and European merchants. Very different, however, was the historical and geopolitical context of French and British imperialism. Napoleon was forced to seek historical legitimacy by invoking memories of the Roman and Carolingian empires. The British moved into the slipstream of the Mughals, for generations maintaining even a semi-fiction that they were ruling some regions in the latter's name. Unlike in Europe, geopolitics ensured that the British had no viable competitors in the sub-continent. The British created a European-style infantry and artillery army on the back of the Indian taxpayer. No Asian cavalry army invading India over the north-west frontier could hope to defeat this force. But geography and logistics ensured that no rival European-style army could reach India by land. Meanwhile the British navy controlled access by sea. By 1815 the revenues of British India were greater than those of Austria or Russia. The locally-funded Indian army became a major factor in extending British power across Asia and into even the Middle East. Indian bases and resources were the springboard for subsequent British intervention in China.[23]

Full understanding both of the issues involved and of the consequences of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars requires this grasp of their global context. Apart from anything else, it avoids a distorted view of the era which paints Napoleon as a wicked imperialist and his British enemies as defenders of the principles of freedom. The reality of the wars between 1792 and 1815 was that they were struggles between rival predatory imperialists, of which the French, British and Russians merely had the sharpest teeth and largest stomachs. A key result of the wars was to usher in a century-long period of British global imperial predominance. The British Empire was for the most part outside Europe but its fate and Europe's were closely entwined after 1815 as much as in the wars between 1792 and 1815. The basic point was simple. A small island off the coast of Europe could not hold a huge overseas empire unless the security of its metropole could be achieved on the cheap. This was the glory of the European balance of power in British eyes. The mutual fears and ambitions of the European powers checked each other, in the process guaranteeing that none of them could mobilize the continent's

resources against the British heartland or its maritime and commercial supremacy. Victorian Britain paid a price in blood and tax for global Empire which was extremely small by historical standards.[24]

As this suggests, in some ways the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era laid the foundations for the global order of the following century. The European system established in 1815 was a prerequisite for British global predominance. British superiority was then enhanced for three generations by an additional post-1815 factor, namely the Industrial Revolution. But in international relations as with warfare the continuities with the past are also both clear and important. Both global and European international relations in the nineteenth century were rooted in the Seven Years' War, which was in many respects the 'first world war'. It was in the Seven Years' War that Anglophone domination of North America and the foundations of the British Empire in India were created. It was that war which made Prussia a European great power. Napoleon challenged the order that emerged from the Seven Years' War but in the end failed. Britain's Indian Empire was consolidated against any possibility of overthrow from without or within. Prussia re-emerged as a great power between 1813 and 1815 and in the peace settlement absorbed the western provinces which subsequently became the basis of her might as a modern industrialized economy.

A similar mix of continuity and change is also evident when one looks at the European international system before 1789 and after 1815. The Congress of Vienna elaborated some important new rules and norms for international relations. The European Concert of Great Powers which the Congress formalized and recognized played a key role in international relations for the next century. Something which one can define as a European system emerged that added up to more than just a temporary balance of power between Europe's rival states. But although the European Concert to some extent existed down to 1914, in other respects the solidarity which underlay great-power relations after 1815 was transient, born of exhaustion, bankruptcy and fear that renewed war would bring further revolutions. To an extent the continental leaders in the generation after 1815 were bound together by what one might describe as an anti-democratic peace theory. By no means wrongly, particularly as regards France, they saw revolution and democracy as the inevitable precursor of expansionist foreign policy and international anarchy. But the British never subscribed to this doctrine, partly out of liberal principle and partly because keeping the continental powers divided maximized British influence and security. After the Revolution of 1830 France too dropped out of the conservative league. The suppression of the 1848 Revolutions was the last hurrah of the Holy Alliance, the split between Russia and Austria in the Crimean War its nemesis. Bismarck then took Europe into a new era by showing how the European old regime could increase its power, enhance its legitimacy and extend its life by harnessing to its chariot some of the forces released in the

Age of Revolutions. But even Bismarck did not change the fundamental nature of European international relations which was rooted in the existence of five competing great powers in a single continent whose security and status ultimately depended on their ability and willingness to defend their interests by military force.

Of course to say this is to set the bar for 'radical change' very high. The Era of Revolutions could not be expected to abolish European geography or the very nature of international relations, unless of course Napoleon had actually succeeded in consolidating his Empire's dominion across the continent. In many ways, however, his efforts in this direction seem much less the wave of the future than the last heroic and spectacular effort by France to play the role of *La Grande Nation*. In the event, many of the underlying elements in European geopolitics and international relations revealed in the Napoleonic era re-surfaced in the twentieth century. Germany's efforts to create its Empire in Europe also collided with the European balance of power and with the challenge of overcoming the two great British and Russian centres of power which existed on the continent's periphery. Britain's concern to sustain a European balance of power dragged her into two world wars in the twentieth century. The costs of this commitment did much to destroy the global Empire which Britain had built in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had consolidated in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era.

A banal conclusion might simply state that strong elements of both continuity and change are visible in warfare and international relations in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era. Whether one stresses change or continuity depends partly on how close or distant is one's focus. An additional point is that even now one cannot come to final conclusions about the era's lasting significance. The Napoleonic Wars, for example, had an enormous impact on South America, destroying the Spanish Empire and causing decades of often devastating conflict in their wake. In the long run, however, perhaps the most important result of the Napoleonic Wars in South America was that whereas the Spanish Empire disintegrated into many states, Portuguese Brazil held together. Above all this was owed to the survival of the Braganza dynasty and of the monarchical state in Brazil in the crucial early decades of the nineteenth century. This was highly contingent and depended on an unpredictable intermingling of events and personalities following Napoleon's invasion of Portugal in 1808 and the flight of the royal family to Brazil. Brazil is still far from reaching its full potential and may never do so, so the long-term implications of South American developments in the early nineteenth century are still unclear.[25]

The same point could also be made in more general terms. Beyond question the greatest long-term consequences of the Revolutionary era lie in the spread of the democratic ideas that powered the French Revolution. It mattered hugely that the claims of revolutionary ideology were made not in the name of Frenchmen (or indeed just Americans) but of humanity. The revolution in Saint

Domingue suggested that these ideas would have global consequences which would surprise and dismay many even of the revolution's sympathizers. By the turn of the twenty-first century the republican values proclaimed in 1789 enjoy something close to global hegemony. But this hegemony was not achieved without enormous struggles and many setbacks. Nor is its survival assured in the face of many challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century. In that sense Zhou Enlai's famous – though probably apocryphal – comment that it is too early to judge the consequences of the French Revolution remains moot.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the term and an attempt to apply it in the global context, see David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760–1840* (Basingstoke, 2010).
2. On the general issue of the arrival of modernity, see Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford, 2004). On international relations, see Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994). On warfare, see Roger Chickering and Stig Forster, eds., *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815* (Cambridge, 2010). For an interesting opposing view, which stresses the revolutionary nature of Napoleonic-era warfare, see David A. Bell, *The First Total War. Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (London, 2007).
3. A recent useful survey of the Industrial Revolution is Robert C. Allen, *The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective* (Cambridge, 2009).
4. Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon. The Struggle for Europe, 1807–1814* (London, 2009), 7–8; Louis Di Marco, *War Horse: A History of the Military Horse and Rider* (Yardley, PA, 2008).
5. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon,* 114–7, Mark Urban, *Rifles* (London, 2003).
6. Apart from Schroeder and Lieven, see Thierry Lentz, *Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire. Tome III. La France et l'Europe de Napoléon, 1804–1814* (Paris, 2007) and Thierry Lentz, ed., *Napoléon et l'Europe* (Paris, 2005).
7. Above all see Ute Planert, 'Innovation or Evolution? The French Wars in Military History', in Chickering and Forster, *War*, 69–84. On the geopolitical and ideological origins of the wars, see: T. C. W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London, 1986). For opposed views on warfare in the 1790s, see Paddy Griffith, *The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789–1802* (London, 1998) and John A. Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic* (Boulder, CO, 1994) and T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787–1802* (London, 1996). For a balanced view of the evolution of the officer corps, see Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750–1820* (Manchester, 2002), chapter 6.
8. On Prussia's Seven Years' War, see Franz Szabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756–1763* (Harlow, 2008), which stresses Prussian ruthlessness, and Dennis E. Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (Harlow, 1996), which emphasizes Prussian skill and commitment. For a broader political perspective, see Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London, 2006).
9. William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York and Oxford, 1992), Chapter 5.
10. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, transl. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976) and Baron Antoine de Jomini, *The Art of War* (London,

1992), a re-print of the 1862 translation with a new introduction by Charles Messenger: Antoine Jomini, *Précis Politique et Militaire des Campagnes de 1812 à 1814* (Geneva, 1975).

11. Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels, and their Pursuers in the Age of Revolution* (London, 2010), illustrates this point as regards policing.
12. These are all key themes in Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon.*
13. On Frederick and the Prussian way of war, see Dennis Showalter, *Frederick the Great. A Military History* (London, 2012). On Rumiantsev, Suvorov and Russian warfare against the Ottomans, see the useful survey by Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London, 1981). This contrasts with the view in Lee Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years War* (Durham, NC, 1967).
14. On the shift in power eastwards, see above all Hamish Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775* (Cambridge, 2001).
15. Two works edited by Richard Bonney provide a comparative background to the evolution of the military-fiscal state: *Economic Systems and State Finance* (Oxford, 1995) and *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200–1815* (Oxford, 1999). For a discussion of the political underpinning of military-fiscalism, see Brian H. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of Autocracy and Democracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ, 1992), Janet M. Hartley, 'Russia as a Fiscal-Military State, 1689–1825', in Christopher Storrs, ed., *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Farnham, 2009), 125–46.
16. On the evolution of French grand strategy, see Jeremy Black, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power* (London, 1999) and Colin Jones, *The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon 1715–1799* (London, 2002).
17. On European naval competition, see Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650–1830* (London, 1999). On the French navy, see Michel Verge-Franceschi, *La Marine Française au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris, 1996).
18. On the navy during the Revolution, see William S. Cormack, *Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789–1794* (Cambridge, 1994).
19. The potential historiography for this comment is immense: Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire* (London, 2007), tackles this from an original perspective.
20. Geoffrey Ellis, 'The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism', in Philip Dwyer, ed., *Napoleon and Europe* (Harlow, 2001), 97–135 (see the comment on page 124).
21. The most detailed and balanced account of Napoleon's imperial project is Thierry Lentz's four-volume *Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire* (Paris, 1999–2010).
22. On the decline of key Asian empires, see chapters 8 and 9 (by Robert Travers and Peter Carey) in Armitage and Subrahmanyam, *Age of Revolutions.*
23. On the evolution of the British fiscal-military state in India, see the chapters by H. V. Bowen and Rajat Kanta Ray in Peter J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998). For comparative European statistics, see Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon,* 33.
24. This is a key theme in John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge, 2009).
25. On the Spanish Empire's collapse, see above all Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ, 2006). On the Portuguese Empire, see Gabriel Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions* (Cambridge, 2013). Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Independence of Latin America* (Cambridge, 1987) remains a very useful introduction.

2

Cicero and Aristotle: Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Geography of Empire

Michael Broers

The character of the Napoleonic Empire is marked by the heterogeneous nature of the many areas it came to rule over, the great variation in the lengths of time it occupied different parts of the territory under its sway, and finally, the relentlessly uniform, uncompromising manner in which it sought to rule its empire. It might be correct to call the Napoleonic Empire more Roman than Rome itself. This chapter seeks to examine the impact of this unyieldingly standardized approach to administration on the shape of the Empire, dividing it into those regions which, more or less, responded well to the Napoleonic system of government, and those which did not, and then to deduce a logic from this pattern, and explore what sort of imperialist ideology may have underlain French attitudes to the varied regions under their rule.

The driving force of my argument rests on the geo-political reality of outer and inner empires which seems to warrant interpretation in a cultural sense – a Braudelian approach couched in post-modernism, perhaps. The Napoleonic Empire made of France, on a vast, imperial scale, a polity part meridional, part Atlantic, part *mitteleuropean*. Napoleonic expansion pushed the French outwards in all these directions, simultaneously. It set French officials down on the peripheries, as well as in the centres, of all three macro-regions. Frenchmen now found themselves 'parachuted' into Florence, Osnabrück and Münster; into Sarazana, Barcelona and Berg, and often found themselves being transferred around and between such widely varied regions. In this very real sense, the Napoleonic Empire was the last great supra-regional European empire to embrace the pre-industrial boundaries as Braudel has defined them. It spanned the new Atlantic highway, the Rhine-Saone-Rhône axis, and the Mediterranean. Each balanced component of France itself was now augmented by vast imperial territories of each kind. Part of my thesis is that a clear French identity emerged from these contacts, or, rather, was sharpened by direct experience, with its newly acquired foreign possessions.

The second crucial element of any attempt to analyse the Napoleonic Empire is the vast disparity in the length of time the French occupied the

many regions under their rule. This is, perhaps, the strongest single argument against giving their presence any significance deeper than that of ruthless military occupation in certain parts of Europe. However it is equally arguable that it is less the length of time one people occupies another that generates colonial attitudes – that shapes a deeply held view of the colonized as 'the other' – than the force and conviction with which these prejudices are held, and they can be held from the outset, and remain unaltered by the experience of occupation.

If any single characteristic of a national identity emerged from the French Revolution among the French elites, it was their belief in the universal significance of their collective experience. The Marquis de Condorcet's bold assertion, following Cicero, that 'a good law is a good law' became axiomatic to them. It is in this sense of the universal goodness of their political culture that the real influence of Rome on the Napoleonic regime should be sought, rather than in its imagery or its *nomenclature*. Seen in this light, Cicero, more than Caesar, provides the guiding influence on French imperialism. His dictum in Book I of *De Legibus* ('The Laws') was at the heart of the *Code civil des Français* (1804), as well as the concept of the 'empire of laws' so often referred to by the agents of Napoleonic imperialism: 'There is one, single justice. It binds together human society and has been established by one, sole law … Someone who does not accept this law is unjust … we can distinguish a good law from a bad one simply by the standard of nature, itself.' There were those under the Code, those still outside it, and those deaf to its virtue who were not yet enlightened. Cicero's view of the Roman polity, as expressed in Book III of 'The Laws', chimed even more with those who rallied to the service of the Napoleonic administration: 'A government is composed of its officials, the men who direct its administration … It was our Roman ancestors who shaped the wisest, most sensible of administrative systems.' This was the core of Napoleonic imperialism, and the essential tenets those who strove to make it work clung to, in the uncertainties and upheavals of a war-torn period: a belief in the universal goodness of their laws and in the universal utility of their administrative system. Law and government were set upon a shared national culture that was rich, deeply rooted but also exportable. This was how the Napoleonic regime confronted the challenge of ruling much of Europe. Its new, rapidly acquired imperial responsibilities put these notions to a very severe test.

Central to this chapter is the rejection by the Napoleonic regime of what the French perceived as a remarkably uniform 'meridional' culture that could not readily accommodate itself to the Code or the vision of society that went with it, at least not without a struggle. It was not the natural territory of the Empire. The urban centres of meridional Europe were populated by degenerate masses, enslaved to Baroque Catholicism by a dependency culture of alms, while their elites had degenerated from their pinnacle in

Roman antiquity to what Edward Said has called 'a trivialized civilization'.[1] The mountain peripheries presented a different set of problems. As Braudel put it, for all time:

> The mountains are as a rule a world apart from civilizations, which are urban and lowland achievements. Their history is to have none, to remain almost always on the fringe of the great waves of civilization, even the longest and most persistent, which may spread over great distances in the horizontal plane but are powerless to move vertically when faced with an obstacle of a few hundred meters.[2]

The Napoleonic Empire was more determined than any previous polity to break down this seemingly eternal foundation of the micro-regions of the western Mediterranean, the division between highland periphery and lowland centre. It set out to achieve this not only by its sheer might, but equally by its clarity of purpose.

This rejection of the meridional did not, of itself, entail embracing the Atlantic. Theirs was not a vision of Anglo-Saxon liberty, and an interesting window on this was their appalled reaction to the commercial, entrepreneurial, a-statist ethos of the Dutch Republic and the Hansa ports, with the sharp distinction these regions posed to the French new regime, with its professional magistrates, codified law and centralizing ethos. It was a world of uncertainty, an over-urbanized world of 'boom-and-bust' economics, as unattuned to the desired military virtues as the south, and it repelled them, if not in so dramatic a way as meridional Europe. The Empire, then, was a world rooted in state service, in codes of Roman law and in a rigidly uniform, centralized public sphere. That is, it was statist, *dirigiste* and centred on a public sphere intensely defended by a professional, deeply respected bureaucracy and magistracy. Its natural home was the Rhine-Saone-Rhône axis, a heartland as alluvial as it was allodial, composed of moderately sized urban centres, surrounded by a tamed, productive countryside. The French ideal was a continental one, a vision that did not face the Atlantic any more than it did the Mediterranean. As such, it corresponded only to one of the three major macro-regions of their own heartland of 'old France'.

Macro-regions: the inner and outer Empires – the Ciceronian empire or the limits of the *polis*?

The lands of the inner Empire clustered around the eastern borders of France, but they were not synonymous with those of *l'ancienne France*, as contemporary French administrators referred, deceptively perhaps, to 'the interior', for, as time progressed, it became clear that the interior of the Empire was really the Rhine-Saone-Rhône axis. The writ of Paris ran

more surely and was accepted with better comprehension in Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and Piedmont, than in the Vendée militaire, Roussillon, or the Cévennes. This was not only because the roads were safer in these eastern regions than in the west and south, or because these departments came – after periods of ferocious, if successful, pacification – to yield up their sons to conscription more easily than many parts of pre-imperial France. The administrative norms of the centralized, professional state, born in the 1790s and honed in the first half decade of Napoleonic rule, took root more readily in these places, as did the Civil Code. This is seen less through its workings under Napoleon than through the alacrity and facility with which the legal classes of these new provinces adapted to the *moeurs* of the new order. Rhinelanders may have looked down on the new jurisprudence in comparison to their own, but they knew how to absorb and work within it, to the point that they demanded, and received, the right to retain the French Code and court system from their new Prussian rulers in 1814. Several Piedmontese magistrates rose high in the Napoleonic service; some – the most distinguished being Peyretti di Condove and Botton di Castellamonte – chose to remain Paris in 1814 while another – Ferdinando Dal Pozzo – became a highly influential theoretical interpreter and intermediary for the Code among the legal classes of Restoration Italy. It was a Belgian *jurisconsulte*, François-Joseph Beyts, who brought the Code to the Dutch and Hanseatic departments. Neither the Vendean nor the Provençale departments could boast such service to the new regime, at least not in the sphere most fundamental to its ethos.

There is a marked irony about the inner Empire. It was composed of far more than regions annexed directly to France. Indeed, its bulk was not made up of imperial departments – there were far more annexed territories in the outer Empire – nor even of satellite kingdoms under Bonapartes. There were two satellite kingdoms within it – those of Italy and Holland – and the latter was only briefly one such; there were four Rhenish, five Piedmontese, nine Belgian and, eventually, four Dutch departments. The core of the inner Empire may have been eastern and northern France and the annexed regions immediately to its east, but its bulk comprised the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Helvetic Republic. There is a lesson of sorts to be taken from this: with the exception of the Republic/Kingdom of Italy, Napoleonic institutions did not need direct French rule to take root, whatever the French themselves may or may not have come to think.

Above all, the new regime worked best where indigenous cultural mediators introduced the key institutions and laws of the new order, the cardinal example being the Helvetic Republic, the last 'sister republic' still in existence. Here, the centralized administrative system could be mutated almost out of being, to accommodate the traditional cantons, yet this vital compromise, followed by others often disliked by the French at the time, also allowed the essence of the Code to embed itself in the republic. It is arguable

that the Code, certainly, and the centralized administrative system, up to a point, flourished best when introduced by indigenous rulers, more ready to adapt French norms to their own needs, although such rulers were also usually as insensitive as was Napoleon to local conditions of which they disapproved. This emerged in the Tyrolese revolt against Bavarian rule in 1809 and the longstanding, if peaceful, legal wrangles between the Imperial Knights of the ex-*kriese* and the mediatized princes. Such struggles sharpened the minds of the indigenous princes and taught them the need for, not just the utility of, the Code in particular, and the vital role of the centralized ethos of the new regime, in general.

The legacy of Cameralism, in the *longue durée*, and of Josephism, in contemporary terms, played a crucial role in this process, for both were signs that these were, in essence, public spheres similar to that of post-Revolutionary France. The French often sensed this themselves. Norvins de Montbretonne recalled of his time as the French *chargé d'affaires* in Baden, that 'The Grand Duchy became a second Alsace united, rather than separated, by the Rhine, to the point it was impossible to be more in France than in that German state.'[3] For this imperial civil servant, then, Baden was emphatically within the Ciceronian circle. Ironically, the heavy hand of direct rule from Paris excluded local elites from real power in most of the outer Empire. The civil administration and the courts of the imperial departments were everywhere, from Rome to the Baltic, dominated by Frenchmen. If French rule was meant to turn on the twin pillars of *ralliement* and *amalgame*, harnessed together, it did so far more in those states free from direct French control, where indigenous rulers and bureaucracies did the reforming, not men from Paris.

This also serves to underline the essential fact that the inner Empire was an elitist construct. The European masses, from the core of *l'ancienne France* to the furthest flung outposts of the Empire, were subject to conscription, to a newer, more efficient system of taxation, and to all the oppression of an active bureaucracy in time of war. The inner Empire was successful and it laid the foundations for the pattern of government in most of western Europe for the rest of the nineteenth century, but this in no way made it a popular, still less a populist, regime anywhere. Indeed, its support was often limited only to those sections of the elite who served it. Nevertheless, rulers and their bureaucracies became powerful enough to maintain themselves, and the number of rulers who adhered to the Napoleonic vision of the law and the state actually swelled in 1814, rather than diminished. William I, the new King of the Netherlands, did not dismantle what he found, even if he denied its origins. Gradually, even the House of Savoy returned to the Napoleonic template, until by 1831, the state resembled a Napoleonic clone, more than the eighteenth-century absolutism it based its authority upon. Across this band of territory, a vital nerve had been touched by the experience and, above all, the example, of Napoleonic rule.

The keys to understanding the experience of the outer Empire are twofold. In the eyes of the French, the boundaries of where Napoleonic rule foundered mark less where the system was unpopular, for it was always that, beyond a narrow circle, than where it was simply alien and incongruous, where society was not constructed in such a way as to comprehend or adapt to its institutions. Where this happened, imperialists were confronted by serious questions about the Ciceronian nature of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic enterprise and, indeed, about the universalism of the Enlightenment itself. Was the *patrie révolutionnaire* really but an Aristotelian *polis* after all? Did the Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the good laws they gave birth to, have spatial and societal limits after all? Secondly, in the experience of the ruled, the impact of Napoleonic rule was often no less significant for being brief or ephemeral. It was always traumatic, so alien was its nature and so sudden its arrival, for trauma could leave an indelible mark, just as much as prolonged exposure to something eventually accepted.

The most extreme example of this sense of incongruity was most probably the Illyrian Provinces. The young auditor of the Council of State who found himself the Intendant of the Illyrian province of Ragusa, present-day Dubrovnik, wrote thus of the people of its hinterland in 1813:

> We are dealing with peoples who are too ignorant, too estranged from civilisation and, above all, too poor to hope to attain it quickly or without help: In the hopes of giving our laws to these people – who know none – at a stroke, before their levels of intelligence are sufficiently developed, we shall only create a further, hindering source of estrangement between them and our government.[4]

The Intendant of Dalmatia wondered what use were roads, or even the maps he was trying to create, in such conditions. It was obvious that the French system of administration was not tailor-made for such an environment; to make it so, nothing short of a social revolution would be necessary.

The inner Empire also reached its seeming limits where feudalism became the dominant reality of social organization, and so the Code and the whole matrix of social and economic relationships upon which it was predicated, simply became irrelevant to society as it was actually constructed. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Westphalia and even the inland areas of the Hanseatic departments, some as close to France as the great fiefdoms within the department of the Lippe, fall into this category. This very odd department, carved out of parts of the satellite kingdom of Westphalia, inland areas of the Hanseatic republics and some cantons of the southern Netherlands, was a composite of everything the French found strange about their northern march. In such places and circumstances, imperial norms could only succeed if the entire status quo were challenged. In practice, the French, as often as not, yielded to overwhelming local realities, and even

colluded with them, where serfdom proved a good source of conscripts, as in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

Perhaps closer to the reality of the Roman Empire than it actually would have wished, the Napoleonic Empire was an empire of the towns. Their importance became ever more obvious as the Empire pushed into alien territory. The French had had their first experience of this in the Vendée; here, it was obvious that an administrative system based in – and drawn from – urban centres neither represented nor, perhaps more importantly, penetrated the countryside sufficiently. In Illyria, the simple absence of towns dispersed over a given administrative unit made the French system unworkable, even incongruous. Everything hinged on *chefs-lieux* for both the civil administration and the tribunals, just as it was all predicated on a population possessed of a sufficient number of literate individuals at even the lowest levels of government. This had been difficult enough to assure in France; it was all but impossible over much of the outer Empire. This did not mean the French retreated from the government of the countryside, far from it. However, it did mean that their system of government often had to be developed from new foundations in many places and, quite often, they failed to do this.

Towns and small cities on a traditional pattern of market and administrative centres were one thing. Large urban centres of a more modern stamp, and the culture of commerce they bore, could be quite another, however, and the distinction is important in defining the cultural geography of the Empire, most certainly in the eyes of its makers. It is very clear in the thoughts of Louis-Joseph Faure, who had the task of organizing the judiciary of the new Hanseatic departments. Faure never criticized the basic competence or integrity of the native magistrates, but he had little respect for their legal culture or the society he felt it reflected. His reports emphasized the gulf between the people of the Hansa ports and France and, interestingly, Faure did not see their commercial economy as an agent of civilization. Quite the reverse:

> The character of these cities is such that they are dominated by commercial interests, and so they have little liking for Roman law, which they should learn to respect. There are some civil and criminal regulations that, even if they have largely fallen into disuse, are not compatible with the mores of civilised nations.[5]

In contrast, when a dispute arose between the French civil and military authorities in Mainz, a most traditional urban centre, it led to the disruption of an official ceremony for the Mass given in thanks for saving Napoleon from the plot to assassinate him. The magistrates had to march through the streets without the customary military escort, although the Gendarmerie was visible on patrol and in barracks. Amidst his rage, the French *procureur*

made an interesting wider observation on the place of the courts and magistracy in the life of the region, which marks a stark contrast to Faure's view of the Hansa:

> It transpired that the cortège of the tribunals, without a due military escort, had more the appearance of a promenade of people to a masked ball, than an imposing occasion. This made a poor impression on the public, above all in a country where the judicial order has long been held in respect …[6]

Unlike in the 'Atlantic world' of the Dutch and Hansa departments, the French in Mainz felt that this city, like their own culture, had a respect for the magistracy, for the public servant, as well as the law. In this case, bickering within the French ranks had undermined a local culture which they needed to draw upon. The contrast with the coastal cities, only a few miles to the north, could not have been greater in French minds.

It is tempting to speculate that the reactions of a highly trained Roman legist such as Faure to the maritime culture of the Hansa may give an indication of how the French would have regarded Britain, had they conquered it. Less speculative is the spectre of the eternal trope of European history first expressed by Thucydides in the conflict between Athens and Sparta, and writ larger in that between Carthage and Rome. Commerce, the agent of Enlightenment so lauded by Denis Diderot, as much as by Adam Smith, did not impress the Napoleonic heirs of Rome. This was the reaction of Beyts, the Belgian-born judicial commissioner sent into the newly annexed Dutch departments to organize the French courts and to oversee the introduction of the Code in the Netherlands:

> … often, criminal trials were more like financial negotiations to buy off a crime, than a genuine undertaking in the public interest, to apply the penalty of the law to a criminal. This attitude is utterly subversive to the spirit of French law …[7]

They reacted with equal horror to the eventual realization that the former Republic of St George, even after several years as the sister 'Ligurian Republic', had no such thing as a professional magistracy, its highest courts being manned by a rota of senators, of whom only a few had formal legal training. The French then had to seek prospective native magistrates among the leading lawyers of Genoa. Governor-General Lebrun noted that many were reluctant to accept, simply because they could not afford to leave private practice, added to 'a convinced repugnance for (French) criminal law', a set of attitudes remarkably close to what they found in the Hansa and the Dutch departments.[8] In 1811, when asked to supply Paris with the details of magistrates who might be the equivalent of French *parlementaires*, with

a view to appointing them to the new *Cours Impériales*, the Prefect could but reply that Genoa had never had a professional magistracy or anything like a French *parlement*.[9] Carthage was Carthage, be it on the coast of the Mediterranean or the North Sea, in the optic of Napoleonic imperialism.

In the sphere of civil administration, the same gulf of comprehension existed between the official *moeurs* of the Lombard-Bolognese heartland of Eugène's Kingdom of Italy and that other contemporary Carthage, the former Republic of St Mark. As Livio Antonielli has shown, the willingness of Venetian patricians to serve the new regime was not in question, but they refused almost to a man to embrace its professional ethos by becoming prefects outside their own areas. Although Eugène was willing to accommodate this, Napoleon was not, and none of them lasted long in the Napoleonic bureaucracy.[10] The commercial, maritime world, with its emphasis on money, its aversion to public service in terms of a formal career, and its perceived amateurish ethos in the public sphere – to say nothing of the general absence of codified law or centralized, uniform administration – was no more in harmony with the Napoleonic state than Baroque Catholicism or seigneurial tenure.

Several points emerge from the collective experience of those sent to integrate the 'outer' Empire into its core. Few thought seriously of any form of compromise with local mores, save on the most temporary and provisional basis. Only the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was entirely spared their efforts, largely because it was too valuable a source of recruits and serfdom facilitated recruitment. No one ever doubted, publicly or in their private correspondence, the innate superiority of French civilization. Despair came to them from Montesquieu: climate and geography could seem like insurmountable obstacles to the civilizing mission. Hope, however, came from Cicero in the unshakeable belief that 'a good law was a good law', and that theirs was the empire of 'good laws'. It also could come closer to hand, through Voltaire, whose lives of Louis XIV and Peter the Great, as well as the *Histoire des moeurs,* gave a sharp focus to the potential for progress if driven by both the *principe naturale* and the *principe nuovo*. If Voltaire took these definitions to lengths far beyond those originally sketched by Machiavelli, it was evident to the imperial administrators that Napoleon would have to play both roles simultaneously, as Peter, the *principe nuovo* in the outer Empire, and as Louis, the *principe naturale*, in the inner.[11] Those who despaired admitted the triumph of the elements, not the negation of their own superiority; those who did not lose heart clung to the belief that good government could transform lives.

Micro-regions: the centres and peripheries of the inner Empire – *Nuestras Indías*

It would be wrong to assume the consolidation of the inner Empire did not have to be fought for, for it did. It is almost a commonplace in Italian

historiography and social studies to say that 'every north has its south', but this was very true of many of the polities of Italy and, slightly less so, of western Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to say nothing of France itself. Almost all of the states of the 'inner' Empire, with the exception of France, were small and relatively weak; where they were composed partly of mountainous hinterlands, or otherwise difficult topography, this combination of weak state structures and inaccessible terrain fostered the existence of some of the most ungoverned, anarchic regions in western Europe.

It is not an historical coincidence that the Jesuit, Redemptorist and Passionist orders saturated many of these regions with missionary activity from the late sixteenth century onwards, less in fear of heresy than with a sense of bafflement mixed with horror at the ignorance and isolation of such areas – the Italian Apennines, the German Alps, the Vendée – and at how their people had been allowed to remain in truly neo-pagan 'darkness' at the height of the struggle between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. They called these regions *Nuestras Indías*, choosing from their own experience to equate them with the societies of the New World, rather than the consciously heretical, perhaps 'over-advanced' territory of Protestantism.[12] Such areas were the natural home of what Colin Lucas and Réné Dupuy have termed 'anti-' as distinct from 'counter-' revolution, denoting an almost apolitical opposition to government interference. However, the intense evangelizing of just these regions by the Tridentine Church arguably rendered some of them equally prone to genuine counter-revolution, rooted in ideological opposition to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes.[13] In whatever cause, the hinterlands of the small, weak states that would become the inner Empire offered topographical redoubts for resistance of any kind, for whatever motive. These hinterlands were the sources and theatres of relatively successful, prolonged resistance. Even if that resistance proved ultimately futile when set against the full force of the Napoleonic stare, the hinterlands were also the heart of cultural darkness, as distinct from cultural incompatibility.

The Napoleonic Empire, and the independent states energized by its hegemony, resumed this struggle to 'civilize' the Indies within their own borders, but by secular means, and for aggressively secular ends and, indeed, it was largely realized. It should be noted that the rugged peripheries were not the sole theatres of resentment, or even violent reaction, to the demands of the new regime on the masses. During the 1790s, the cities of the Rhône valley had been the foyer of counter-revolution, and the urban centres of northern and central Italy saw anti-French revolts which were crushed swiftly, but required considerable ruthlessness to quell.[14] Recent research on the Dutch departments – the most urbanized region of the entire empire – has revealed the extent and intensity of anti-conscription riots in the large Dutch cities.[15] Topography determined the relative success

and longevity of resistance, but not necessarily its wellsprings. French rule antagonized the ordinary people of very different places to the same degree, be it in the mountain fastness of *Nuestras Indías* or the sophisticated urban, international crossroads of the Dutch conurbations.

The internal conquest of the hinterlands of the inner Empire largely took place in the years of general peace in Europe between 1800 and 1805, and the popular resistance to it bore marked similarities to the disorder that raged continually in the lands of the outer Empire. Two crucial characteristics made it different, however. First, exactly because these areas were removed from the war zones and external intervention by the Allies, their pacification was, in the main, completed; both time and diplomatic-military geography allowed this to happen. In the years of general peace, Napoleon and all his associated regimes could commit significant civil and military resources to this purpose. What really made pacification possible, however, was the newfound power of the new regime to penetrate the hinterlands on a permanent, lasting basis. This was the crucial difference from outwardly similar circumstances in the outer Empire. The French had the support of local centres of power in the pacification of the hinterlands: The old centres of power were either firmly in their hands, and/or fully supportive of these campaigns of internal conquest; local elites wanted to see the state gain a firmer grip on the periphery, whatever wider reservations may have been harboured about Napoleonic hegemony.

The forces of the new regime, spearheaded by the Gendarmerie, wore down overt resistance to conscription and established a disseminated police presence throughout the countryside. In the crude terms of Napoleonic exigencies, the smooth running of conscription and the permanent establishment of the Gendarmerie in settled brigades marked the effective boundaries of the inner Empire.[16] Where these things did not happen – in the Kingdom of Naples, Spain or even the Vendée, where conscription quotas were kept artificially light – the other basic institutions of Napoleonic rule were not effective. In contrast, the hitherto almost ungoverned Apennine hinterlands of southern Piedmont, Liguria and the Piacentino, together with the previously bandit-ridden upper Rhine, saw fundamental changes in the levels of policing and state control. Few of these areas returned to the same levels of lawlessness or open defiance of authority that had been the norm under the *Ancien Régime*. This was not achieved peacefully: all these areas saw major para-military operations in response to major disorder, and even after 1805–1806, there were still massive popular revolts. Central Italy, the Veneto and the Tyrol all saw huge uprisings in 1809, the former against the Kingdom of Italy, the latter against Bavaria, signs that Napoleonic norms were imposed just as tenaciously by satellite and allied governments as by the French themselves. During the 1809 revolts in Italy, the old centres of power, now reinforced by French arms and Napoleonic institutions, held firm and were able to counter-attack and quell the insurrections. The new

regime had its moments of weakness, but it survived and did so with the support of local officials. Other areas saw less spectacular, but very tenacious resistance to the new order. Within France – indeed, at its very heart – the Auvergne represented a virtual fortress for anti-revolution. It was ground down into obedience only by about 1810–1811, in terms of general compliance with conscription and a reduction of banditry to minor crime. This was achieved by the ruthless persistence of the state's local authorities and the Gendarmerie.[17] For most of the Napoleonic period, the northern Auvergne was much more lawless and harboured more *réfractaires* than the Rhenish or Piedmontese departments, to say nothing of the Kingdom of Italy or the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, all of which were, effectively, more part of the Empire than this central region of France.

A new map of Europe

A new map of Europe emerged from this combination of repression and state building, with new contours in terms of law and order, and of the potential power of the state within its own borders, that the frontiers created at the Congress of Vienna disguised. The porous borders of the small states of Italy and Germany had been a paradise for banditry, just as their hinterlands had known little of stable, professional administration. This had changed greatly by 1814, first witnessed by the generally peaceful transition of power as Napoleonic rule collapsed, for there was no return to the violence that had marked the late 1790s. More than this, the restored monarchs in Italy and the Netherlands, and those still on their thrones in the German *mittelstaaten*, either retained the essentials of the Napoleonic state, or soon returned to its practices, when attempts at integral restoration failed. Outward policies of 'forgetting' could not really disguise the fundamental changes wrought in the territories of the inner Empire, most markedly the reduction of their indigenous peripheries to state control. The new regime, however cosmetically disguised after 1814, now functioned in a climate of order unknown before Napoleonic rule.

Conclusion: the 'impossible isthmus' of Lotharingia

On one level, there is a brutal simplicity behind how the French defined the inner Empire; how, where, and around whom they traced the Ciceronian circle. The French looked for people and societies they felt most resembled their own, and this was made easy through the clear vision they had of themselves. They seldom, if ever, looked at the novel characteristics of another society with admiration. It seldom occurred to them to 'borrow' from the institutions or practices of even their close neighbours, unless they were already possessed of something very close to their own ideas, the great example being the educational system built around the University of Turin

under Savoyard absolutism in the eighteenth century, which became the template for the Napoleonic University.[18]

This was their attitude. Their own image of themselves was rooted in the culture of a macro-region, 'the inner Empire' – 'the Lotharingian isthmus' – which was defined ever more sharply and clearly as they came to rule over areas beyond it, within France as well as beyond. It is ironic, but fitting with a Ciceronian view of the world that an international empire should have its self-image rooted in something not far removed from regional particularism. The Vendée Militaire and the Midi lay beyond it, but the complex matrix of Cameralism, Josephism, and a particular sort of urbanism and commerce, enabled it to spread eastwards, and even over the Alps, along the Po valley, at least in the minds of Napoleonic imperialists. This was a world of the commerce of rivers and canals, not of the open sea, of well-trodden routes, not new horizons. It was an urban world, but in a very traditional sense: secular and literate; the world of the *salon*, but not the *caffè*; of the theatre, but not the opera; of enlightenment, yet not of restless innovation.

These were not stereotypes or merely the contents of after-dinner conversational prejudice, but the bases on which the French formed judgments and relationships with those around them, and these benchmarks excluded vast swathes of their *concitoyens*, just as they did many beyond the old frontiers. They allowed a considerable number of the *réunis* in, as well. It all crystallized for the French around the receptiveness of a given society to the fundamentals of the Code, for this determined family structures, concepts of property and its place in social and economic relationships, the ethos of *civisme* and the regard in which society held public service and the innate *honnêté* of a given polity, confirmed by a willingness to accept the world of the open, published trial in place of inquisitorial justice. If the new *administrés* were seen as malleable to the *moeurs* embodied in the Civil Code, they were civilized men who recognized the universal truth of a good law; if not, they had to learn such truths through the good government Napoleonic hegemony would bring them. Above all, Lotharingia was a society governed by reason rather than tradition, and tradition was not there to be respected. This was as necessary to impress upon the advanced, urbanized commercial worlds of the Hansa and Holland as on the hinterlands of the Apennines; it was as big a challenge in the Vendée as in Illyria. Napoleonic 'civilization' had a regional core and beyond that core it had a civilizing mission. In this, the French imperialists readied themselves to make a reality of the empire of laws, in Cicero's terms, when he said 'Among free peoples who possess equality before the law we must cultivate an affable temper and … a loftiness of spirit.' This could serve as the motto of the aspirations of the makers of the inner Empire.

When it failed, there was a retreat to the closed world of the *polis*, and the sense that only France had produced *l'homme régénéré*. Throughout the outer Empire, and often when confronted by the 'Indies' within 'Lotharingia', the

French missionaries lamented that Montesquieu may have been correct in his environmental determinism. Their increasing sense that only the short, sharp shock of conscription might bring the men of the hinterlands into civilization raised the spectre, in their minds, that Aristotle may have been right to believe that some men were, indeed, made to be slaves. The French imperialists wavered in their faith in their vision of civilization, but they did not succumb to self-doubt. They maintained their cultural confidence, even as their sense of 'manifest destiny' deserted them under the hammer blows of the armies of the Sixth Coalition.

Notes

1. The concept runs throughout both his major works: Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1994) and Edward Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London and New York, 1978).
2. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. S. Reynolds, 2 vols. (London, 1977), vol. 1, 34.
3. Jacques Norvins de Montbretonne, *Souvenirs d'un historien de Napoléon*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1896–1897), vol. 3, 62.
4. Archives Nationales de Paris (hereafter ANP), F1e 62 (Pays annexés et réunis, provinces illyriens) Intendant, Ragusa, to Intendant-General, Illyria, 1 March 1813.
5. ANP, BB5 268 (Organisation Judiciaire, dépts. hanséatiques) Faure to Minister of Justice, 26 January 1811.
6. ANP, BB5 260 (Organisation Judiciaire, depts. Rhin) Comm du Gouvt, Crim Trib Mayence, to Minister of Justice, 15 ventôse An XII / 5 March 1804.
7. ANP, BB5 291 (Organisation Judiciaire, depts. Hollande) Beyts to Minister of Justice, 16 July 1810.
8. ANP, BB5 296 (Organisation Judiciaire, Gênes) Lebrun to Minister of Justice, 1 jour complémentaire, An XIII / 18 September 1805.
9. ANP, BB5 296 (Organisation Judiciaire Gênes) Prefect, dept Gênes, to Minister of Justice, 11 March 1811.
10. Livio Antonielli, *I Prefetti dell'Italia Napoleonica* (Bologna, 1983), 68.
11. In this, I am deeply indebted to Pocock's work, especially: J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: Narratives of Civil Government* (Cambridge, 1999), Section 2.
12. Adriano Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza. Inquisitori, confessori, missionari* (Turin, 1996). Adriano Prosperi, '*Otras Indias*: missionari della Contra-Riforma tra contadini e selvaggi', *Scienze, credenze, occulte, livelli di cultura*, Atii del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Florence, 1980 (Florence, 1982), 205–34.
13. Colin Lucas, 'Résistances populaires à la Révolution dans le Sud-Est', *Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale* (Paris, 1985), 147–62. Roger Dupuy, *De la Révolution à la Chouannerie* (Paris, 1988).
14. On the Rhône: Colin Lucas, 'Themes in Southern Violence After 9 Thermidor', in Gwynne Lewis and Colin Lucas, eds., *Beyond the Terror: Essays in French Social and Regional History, 1799–1815* (Cambridge, 1983), 152–94. On the most infamous of the urban risings in northern Italy: Félix Bouvier, 'La révolte de Pavie (23–26 mai 1796)', *Revue Historique de la Révolution française*, 2 (1911): 519–39.
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3

Napoleon's Vision of Empire and the Decision to Invade Russia

Alan Forrest

For the Russians, of course, the campaign of 1812 would always be the Patriotic War, the war which they had so desired and so carefully planned to save their country from Napoleon, and a war that would easily find its place in the country's national mythology. It was depicted not only as an outpouring of patriotic endeavour, both by regular troops and by partisans, but as a victory for Russian ways and traditions pitted against the Antichrist of enlightened Europe with its liberalizing and modernizing reforms. In the short term it allowed Alexander I to turn his back on further reforming measures in favour of the patriarchal traditions of the Russian Fatherland, from the Orthodox Church to the institution of serfdom.[1] In the longer term it fed a dearly-held Russian myth of war, nation and empire that inspired nineteenth-century nationalist writing and lay at the heart of Tolstoi's great novel of the 1812 campaign, *War and Peace*. This emphasized the moral (rather than the professional) qualities of the Russian army and insisted that it was a deeply-held patriotism that motivated the Russian soldier to resist Napoleon's invasion. Implausible as this interpretation is – and Dominic Lieven has shredded it pretty effectively in a recent essay[2] – it would prove a powerful myth, one that appealed to Russians' sense of their nationhood and self-worth. But for the French, 1812 was a painful tragedy that seemed to undermine so much that Napoleon had achieved in the political and imperial arena. Napoleon lost calamitous numbers of both men and horses, losses from which it would be impossible to recover during the following two campaign seasons. French losses during the retreat from Moscow were quite staggering: 300,000 soldiers were killed or died of cold or starvation; 100,000 were captured by the Russians; and a further 50,000 were wounded. Only around 50,000 were capable of fighting another campaign. It was 'one of the most horrific retreats in military history'.[3]

More than that, however, Napoleon lost his aura of invincibility in Russia, an aura which had helped to deter his enemies and overawe opposing forces during the earlier years of the Wars. That alone made it a turning-point, the moment when many of his subject kings and princes, who had supported

him either out of fear or in hope of reward, felt released from any debt they owed him and realized that they had recovered their freedom of action. Defeat in Russia led directly to the next campaign, to the next coalition of rulers against him, and to a more critical defeat the following year at Leipzig, the battle which, perhaps more than any other, brought the Napoleonic Wars to a close and ensured that there would be an Allied victory. For this Alexander could justly claim credit, as Napoleon's decision to invade Russia was shown to have been a disastrous blunder, and one which forced him to impose yet another onerous and increasingly resented round of conscription on his own people and those he had conquered.[4] Of course we have the advantage of hindsight in making such judgements, hindsight that was not available to Napoleon in 1811 and the early months of 1812 when he was planning the campaign. But it is surely legitimate to question why he should have thought of undertaking it at all. Even his generals were not all convinced of the wisdom of such an adventure, thousands of miles from home and in hostile territory. Why spread his resources so thinly across the whole European continent? Why open up a new front to the east when French forces were fighting a costly rear-guard action in Spain, and when any reputation for invincibility he may once have enjoyed was looking increasingly threadbare? What, indeed, was the purpose of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Empire?

The goal was clearly not that of imperial conquest: it was never intended that Russia should be annexed to the Empire, as had been the case with the majority of the territories which Napoleon had previously invaded. That would have been an impossible challenge; the emperor knew very well that Russia was too vast, too distant and too heterogeneous a state to be assimilated into even the most loosely-conceived of imperial structures. And, of course, the Napoleonic Empire was not designed to be loosely structured. It was highly centralized, with a common basis in the French administrative and judicial system which the victorious army imposed: its constitutions were modelled on that of France; the rights of all subjects were upheld by the same Napoleonic Code and French-style courts and tribunals; religious affairs were regulated by a form of the Concordat; it was, in Michael Broers' words, 'a holistic, centrally-driven imperial project' which the military carried with them to the lands they conquered.[5] Thierry Lentz has recently sub-divided the Napoleonic 'system' into what he terms three 'concentric circles' of power and influence, ranging from the inner Empire, through the various kingdoms ruled by his brothers and other family members, to a third circle reserved for the various alliances he contracted as a result of his wars, with Spain (until 1808), Austria, Prussia and (after Tilsit) Russia.[6] Napoleon expected these alliances to be respected, sometimes to the letter; he did not see them as agreements between equals, but rather as a way of exercising indirect power over the continent. In invading Russia, his aim was pragmatic, if still tinged with the arrogance of a man who believed he could

legislate for a continent and impose his will on its rulers. It was a punitive expedition, to punish the tsar for his refusal to enforce the Continental System which now lay at the heart of Napoleon's strategic concern. Tensions between the two countries had been rising since 1810, rather as Napoleon's Anglophobia mounted; and by the winter of 1811–1812, neither side was prepared to compromise.[7] This did not make the invasion any less grandiose in scale or in cost, any more an exercise in power to impose his authority on Europe. But it meant that he had a relatively limited objective. It was a military adventure which Napoleon thought he could win, and with victory in Russia, he believed, would come a much greater victory, in western Europe.

His mind was now turned to Britain, and the commercial embargo which he insisted would bring the British government to its knees. The Continental System had been on the statute book since 1806, but it was unevenly applied by the states of northern Europe, and some regions – notably Russia and her sphere of influence – were largely ignoring it. If he was to enforce the blockade across northern Europe and the Baltic, Napoleon had to force Russia to ban trade with Britain, something that Alexander could not do without harming the economy of his country and the interests of both his merchants and his nobles.[8] British shipping carried a large part of Russia's export trade, with Britain a major destination for Russian timber. The Baltic ports of Denmark-Norway and northern Germany suffered, too, with even Napoleon's allies facing ruin by 1810.[9] Napoleon might not be setting out to add Russia to his Empire, but he had persuaded himself that war was necessary if he was to make that Empire work and if he was to defeat Britain, the dream that still continued to drive and inspire him. He must control the economy of the continent, stopping other states from trading with Britain and tightening of the continental blockade if he was to achieve his stated goal of driving Britain to the negotiating table. Seen in this light, the invasion of Russia was one part of a Europe-wide policy that would allow him to exercise commercial control when, after Trafalgar, he lacked the naval power with which to enforce it at sea. But to achieve this he had to seal alliances: hence the diplomatic flurry that preceded the Russian campaign. He needed the rest of Europe to stand by, to leave him free to attack. As the Comte de Ségur, one of the most perceptive witnesses of the campaign, observed, it was their failure to stand idly by that condemned the campaign to failure. 'Which of us, in the French army', he asked rhetorically, 'does not recall his astonishment, in the midst of the plains of Russia, at the news of the accursed treaties between the Swedes and Turks and Alexander, or how we then looked anxiously around us, at our right flank exposed, our left weakened, and our retreat threatened?'[10]

The tsar clearly understood this, too, and had decided, long before 1812, that the treaty signed at Tilsit, which had been the basis for European peace since 1807, could be no more than a truce in hostilities. By the terms of the treaty Russia was forced to accept the dismantling of Prussia; the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; and the establishment of the

Confederation of the Rhine. In return Napoleon promised to support the tsar in future negotiations with the Porte over the Ottoman territories in the Balkans. And Alexander accepted his obligation to enforce the continental blockade and assist Napoleon's efforts to impose it on the courts of Denmark, Sweden and Portugal. In Napoleon's eyes this was a vital clause which bound Russia to support France against Britain in the wider struggle over diplomatic and military primacy, the battle between two Empires with hegemonic ambitions for the nineteenth century. Alexander knew that this position was unsustainable. The Russian nobility condemned the treaty, and the Orthodox Church declared Napoleon the precursor of the Antichrist. If the tsar signed it, he did so only to gain time in the full knowledge that war with France could only be delayed.[11]

But was the invasion of Russia ever a realizable dream? The French clearly believed that they had the capacity to inflict a rapid defeat on the Russian army that would teach the tsar the desired lesson, and that they would then withdraw. And at first, everything seemed to go perfectly to plan. As the Grande Armée crossed into Russia and advanced on Moscow, it encountered little opposition, the Russian forces pulling back before them; so that in late September, from the heights of Borodino, the emperor was still urging his troops to throw themselves into a battle they were equipped to win. His optimism on the eve of the battle seemed unbridled. 'Conduct yourselves as you did at Austerlitz', he harangued his army, 'at Friedland, at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, so that the most distant of future generations may be able to refer with pride to your performance on this day. Let them say of you: He was there at the great battle beneath the walls of Moscow!'[12] Although he had considerable respect for the Russian army, he regarded his own as far superior: he was a son of the Enlightenment who shared a widespread Western view of Russia as backward, semi-civilized, a country in thrall to feudalism, where soldiers were not free men but serfs who made war because they had no option.[13] They could not fight as well, or with such heart and commitment, as his men. Following the debacle of his retreat Napoleon would continue to insist that his army had not been defeated, that he had lost only to the snows of the Russian winter. His claims were close to delusional. 'The army's march after leaving Moscow should not be called a retreat, since that was a victorious army'; and his troops 'did not pull back towards Smolensk because it was defeated, but in order to winter in Poland before advancing in the spring on St Petersburg'; indeed, 'if Moscow had not been torched' – in an act of destruction which he condemned as barbaric and uncivilized – 'the Emperor Alexander would have been forced to sue for peace'. Nor was the great cold something that he should have foreseen; like any good general, he had done careful meteorological checks, and 'after the torching of Moscow, if the great freeze had not begun a fortnight earlier than usual, the army would have returned unscathed to Smolensk, and there it would have had nothing to fear from the Russian forces'.[14] And so, repeatedly, he

justified himself to the loyal Las Cases as he continued to spin the myth of his own invincibility for posterity.

There is some evidence that Napoleon's advisers sought to warn him of the dangers that lay ahead, of the nature of the terrain and the preparations being made by the Russian army. And he had also received warnings through diplomatic messages from St Petersburg. Armand de Caulaincourt – who had been French ambassador to Russia between 1807 and 1811 before serving in the 1812 campaign[15] – noted the patriotism that was shown by the French officer corps in 1812 and admitted that it may have contributed to the delusional atmosphere in the camp. 'The general sentiment was, one may say, patriotic; one would have blushed to show any other'. As a consequence, though there were dissenting voices among the French, any expression of weakness or uncertainty was liable to be brushed aside by an emperor whose quest for glory and faith in his star were undimmed. In his memoirs, Caulaincourt recorded that 'the men who surrounded the emperor prided themselves on not flattering him. Some even paraded the need of telling him the truth at the risk of displeasing him'. But he went on to explain that Napoleon's reaction to such criticism was always the same:

> Opposition, as the Emperor noticed, did not cause the zeal or devotion of anyone to relax. He paid little attention to it, and attributed it in general to narrow views, and to the fact that few people were capable of grasping his great projects in their entirety. It is certain that this opposition, if I may judge from my own case, arose solely from the wish to protect the interests of the Emperor's peculiar glory. What personal sentiment or interest could have held sway amid such a unanimous concert of devotion?[16]

Napoleon refused to listen. 'Never was the truth so dinned into the ear of a sovereign', sighed Caulaincourt, only to add 'though, alas, to no effect'.[17] His thoughts on this are significant, as Caulaincourt had unparalleled access to Napoleon during much of the campaign; though it cannot be ruled out that his memoir, written between 1822 and 1825, after Napoleon's death, may have sought to justify his own actions as much as to defend the reputation of his emperor.[18]

The army which Napoleon assembled for the invasion of Russia was intended to be seen and to inspire fear in his enemies, and it was the largest and most international of the many armies which he had built for his successive campaigns. Its construction had been a lengthy and painstaking undertaking, which had consumed much of the emperor's energies over the previous 18 months, beginning long before diplomatic relations with the tsar broke down irreparably in 1811. To distract attention from his real purpose, Napoleon had worked furtively, refusing to acknowledge publicly that he was building a single army or to reveal what his next target would

be. Instead of recruiting for a single force – as he had done at the Camp de Boulogne after the Peace of Amiens – he proceeded to form two smaller armies, apparently directed towards the south and east: an *Armée d'Italie* under Prince Eugène; and an *Armée d'Allemagne* commanded by Davout. But this was soon shown to be a mere distraction. In the summer of 1811, both armies were vastly increased in size through the incorporation of that year's conscripts; while a huge reserve was created under Ney which would further bolster its capacity in the event of an attack. In January 1812 Napoleon began the final reorganization of his forces in preparation for a war in the East; by early spring, he could theoretically call upon over a million men for the future campaign against Russia.[19] Of these, over 610,000 marched east towards the Russian frontier.

At the same time he was also preparing diplomatically for a future offensive. On 7 January Davout was sent into Swedish Pomerania with instructions to see that the Continental Blockade was implemented across its territory. On 24 February, France and Prussia agreed to form an alliance, again enforcing the Continental System in the Baltic ports but, more immediately, confirming that Prussia would supply the emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and 15,000 horses and allow French troops to pass through Prussian territory. On 7 March, it was Denmark's turn to sign an agreement with France whereby, in return for promises about future commercial privileges, the Danes agreed to keep some 10,000 troops stationed in Schleswig-Holstein and in Jutland. On 14 March, Napoleon signed a treaty with Austria which again produced significant military gains for the Empire, Austria promising to provide him with 50,000 men under the command of an Austrian general, which could be used in any war other than with Britain and Spain. And on 28 March, the military agreement with the Swiss was modified and the Swiss military contribution to the Empire strengthened. The diplomatic chips were now in place to assure the acquiescence of most of central Europe in Napoleon's military preparations. The French ultimatum to the tsar followed on 25 April, and on 9 May Napoleon left Saint-Cloud to join his army.[20]

On paper, this army was the strongest that Napoleon had ever assembled and it reflected the vast array of nations that constituted the Empire. Scarcely a third of the men who composed it were French, if by that is meant those drawn from the lands that had been part of France before 1789. Annexations had bolstered the military's resources: of the troops that set out for Moscow some 200,000 came from France proper, a further 100,000 from the territories France had seized and made into new departments, men who were by birth Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Swiss or German. But by 1812, the Empire stretched far beyond the frontiers of the annexed departments, and the army recruited wherever the writ of the Empire ran. For the invasion of Russia, there were 130,000 Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine, 90,000 Poles and Lithuanians, 27,000 Italians and a further 30,000 from

Naples, 9,000 Swiss, as well as around 50,000 troops provided by Austria and Prussia.[21] They spoke different languages and fought under different officers, in units that were structured differently in accordance with different military cultures. Most were conscripts, many unwilling conscripts who had little interest in the Empire. And if some fought with undoubted courage and commitment, others impressed more by their indiscipline, their contempt for the local population and their taste for plunder. The largest army in modern history was not necessarily Napoleon's best.

It is difficult to say with any confidence that French conscripts were more committed, or fought more tenaciously, than their comrades drawn from across Europe, though the Russians were generally complimentary about their patriotism and conduct. Even in the anarchy of a Moscow in flames, there is reason to think that the French behaved with more discipline and greater restraint than did the Prussian troops in Napoleon's army, whose violence and pillaging were notorious. And yet Napoleon had placed these same Prussians on the right wing of his army, a key position in their advance and one that left them exposed to enemy attack. But what were the Prussian troops in the emperor's service supposed to be fighting for? To whom or to what were they supposed to show loyalty? Hardly to France; or to an emperor who, following the French victory at Jena in 1806, had pressed home their advantage by humiliating the Prussian King and decimating Prussian territory, to the benefit of Napoleon's pet project in German Central Europe, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw? There was a lack of clarity about the aim of the campaign, and a lack of incentive for the troops of most of the states involved, which could not but be damaging to morale and motivation. Of the mood in his army as the troops marched east, General Bro remarked that 'our auxiliaries, from Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg, began to look behind them; and a number of their officers complained bitterly that they had been dragged so far from their country to serve a cause that meant nothing to them'.[22] Of the foreign troops in imperial service, the Poles might appear to have had most reason to support Napoleon against a Russian tsar whom they counted amongst their historic enemies, and, in their devotion to Napoleon's cause, the Polish soldiers in the Grande Armée appeared to give weight to this belief. Their courage in battle was legendary, and was commented upon by the French themselves. And it was remarked that Polish civilians were often notably more welcoming than the inhabitants of other countries in east central Europe. 'The Poles', wrote one French infantryman, Pouget, at the beginning of the campaign:

> all want the war very badly; they look upon our arrival with pleasure and show us as much friendship as the Spaniards denied us. The peasants are really infused with patriotism, even though our presence here is ruining them. They look with respect and admiration on those who have liberated part of Poland.[23]

The reduced quality of the army did not only reflect its mixed composition, however, or the war-weariness that was engulfing many French communities after 20 years of war. It was a very young army, and the conscripts who had been hastily recruited for the 1812 campaign had had less time to be drilled and prepared. The French corps system was still effective, breaking down the mass into smaller, more manoeuvrable units that were easier to regroup on the battlefield.[24] But in 1812 it creaked under the sheer weight of numbers, while other European armies had developed better staff organization of their own, learning to cope with the French corps largely by dint of imitation.[25] The Grande Armée, as in previous campaigns, lived largely off the lands it passed through, imposing huge burdens on civilians, and in the process creating huge resentment which in turn contributed to resistance, desertion and insurrection. Discipline was often poor, marauding and pillage frequent. Nor were Napoleon and his marshals quite as incisive as they had been in earlier campaigns; indeed, not since 1809, against the Austrians at Wagram, had they beaten their enemy decisively in a major campaign. Yet even here the army had offered little pursuit; and in the words of the French infantry officer Elzéar Blaze, 'Wagram had no great material results. That is to say there was no great haul of the net as at Ulm, Jena and Ratisbon. Scarcely any prisoners were made; we took from the Austrians nine pieces of cannon, and we lost fourteen'.[26] And the campaign in Spain in 1810 and 1811 – a campaign which Napoleon had mostly left to others – was not going well. Even during the early part of the 1812 campaign the emperor seemed hesitant, and in Moscow, as we know, he fatally waited for two weeks to allow his army to recover its energies. His health was not what it had been when he was a younger man. He experienced some breathing difficulties on the eve of Borodino, and his legendary stamina was beginning to suffer, possibly from the first symptoms of the duodenal cancer that would eventually kill him.[27] Throughout his long career he had pounded his body relentlessly; by 1812 there were signs that he could not do so indefinitely.

Napoleon, in other words, could no longer guarantee victory, and his soldiers began to sense this. Criticism began to be heard of his leadership and decision-making from among the ranks of his own army, from men who had not hesitated in the past to follow him through pain, suffering and deprivation. Jean-Baptiste Ricome was of this number, an infantryman and typical *grognard* who survived the campaign to leave a memoir for posterity. Ricome did not turn against Napoleon, for whom he clearly maintained both respect and affection. But he did not pass over his mistakes either, as he reflected on a campaign that had reduced the Grande Armée that had crossed the Niemen to a mere 20,000 exhausted survivors. 'Napoleon', he wrote, 'then at the height of his glory and with courageous soldiers at his command, would have wished to conquer the entire universe, for who would dare to approach an army of 680,500 men inspired by the same sentiments?' But, he continued, it was not only their sentiments that distinguished the imperial

army; it was also the conditions in which they fought, the misery, the cold, the near-starvation:

> For tents we had only the open sky, and to live just the booty that we had taken from our enemies. As for rewards, they were quickly handed out: a few encouraging words and an occasional congratulation were supposed to suffice to raise the spirits of the French. In a word he wanted to teach us to live without eating, to suffer greatly, and in the final analysis to die.[28]

When soldiers like Ricome looked back on the Russian campaign, it was not the glory of victory that was their lasting memory; it was misery, suffering, fatigue and starvation – a campaign that was summed up in images of horror and not by the reflected glory of Napoleon's Empire. 'One thing which they will scarcely believe back in Paris', wrote one soldier to his brother-in-law in France, 'is that all those men who had already been with the army in Spain now look back on that country with a certain nostalgia when they compare it to this'.[29] Napoleon could no longer protect them or bring them the victory that might lead to peace. An important part of the Napoleonic myth, and the part that had left the deepest impression on his troops, now lay in tatters.

When the tone of the letters written by soldiers at the start of the Russian campaign is compared with the writings of the last stragglers to cross the Niemen, the impact of the long march on hope and morale becomes clear. These troops had not left France expecting to be overwhelmed by the Russian army, nor yet to be trapped by the Russian winter. Many were still inspired by speeches, promises, and past history; and they were impressed by the sight of the army and the scale of the force being mustered, just as their morale was boosted by the presence of Napoleon at their head. One soldier, Delvau, of the 6th Tirailleurs, encapsulated their mood of optimism in the camp before the long march began, still uncertain where they were headed, and pledging to follow their emperor to the end of the earth in pursuit of glory. This is the *grognard* of Napoleonic legend, fearless and foolhardy to a fault, intoxicated by dreams of glory and plunder, and utterly dedicated to the man whose exploits and rhetoric stoked these dreams:

> First we shall go into Russia where we will have to knock each other about a bit if we are to make progress. The Emperor must have come to Russia to declare war on this little emperor. … The preparation for war has been famously done. Those who fought before us say that they have never seen anything like it. And it's the truth, for they are taking a huge force and great stocks of food, but we don't yet know whether it is for Russia. Some say that we are headed for the Indies, others that it is to go to Egypt. No one knows what to believe. For me it's all one where we go, as I should be happy to go to the ends of the earth![30]

Such bravado was largely restricted, however, to young soldiers as they set out for Russia, men who had not yet been exposed to the harsh realities of the campaign. It seldom survived the snows of Poland and western Russia. The tone of Delvau and his comrades quickly changed as they recounted the horrors.

The retreat from Moscow, as we know, was a catastrophe for those still dragging themselves through the snow and ice. Most of his comrades, admitted one artillery captain, had either been killed or been taken captive by the Russians, while others had dropped dead at the roadside. It had been a cruel, often harrowing campaign, with atrocities and massacres committed by both sides: the French reported how much they feared falling into enemy hands, while on their return from Moscow, the Russians often exacted brutal vengeance on prisoners-of-war; there were reports of hospitals being set alight by Russian troops and of their patients being burned alive.[31] One survivor of the campaign, Louis de Crèvecoeur, wrote from Leipzig in March 1813 recalling his despair. 'I can only thank Almighty God', he sighed,

> for letting me make such a narrow escape from the frightful fate that seemed to await me when I was stripped by the Cossacks at Vilna. I was in such a miserable, weakened state that I could neither flee, nor resist, nor put up with the violent treatment which I would have had to endure at the hands of those savages.[32]

He was lucky in that he escaped to tell his tale. Some of his companions were not so fortunate, freezing to death by the wayside or, in a final act of desperation, seeking release from their pain in self-mutilation and suicide.[33] Men would steal food from the bodies of the dead to stay alive, and reports of cannibalism – though doubtless exaggerated – were not unknown. The carcasses of dead horses were seized upon as a source of sustenance by men driven by a single desire – to survive. 'The army had no bread on the road', one officer wrote to his mother in Narbonne, 'but it had an abundance of horses that had died of fatigue, and I can assure you that a piece of horse meat, thinly sliced, and passed through a frying-pan with a little butter or fat doesn't make a bad meal'. At Viaz'ma, he added, he and his comrades had dined royally on a stew made from cats. 'Five of us ate three fine cats which were quite excellent'.[34] All vestige of their initial optimism had gone, along with much of the spirit of the army. 'Adieu', wrote François-Louis Réau to his wife in a letter dated November 1812 in which he held out no promise to return, urging her to 'keep calm in your purgatory, which certainly is no match for our hell'.[35]

It is clear that Napoleon had underestimated his opponents, trusting in his numerical superiority and in the quality of his marshals. But the Russians had not stood still in the years since Tilsit, and the Minister of War, Michael A. Barclay de Tolly, had initiated a series of important reforms

which improved morale and revolutionized operational art. Ironically, Barclay de Tolly took the Napoleonic army as his model for reform, but adjusted structures and regulations to fit with Russian tradition and encouraged the development of a peculiarly Russian theory of warfare. On the battlefield he aimed for mobility, and gave a special place to light infantry in the disposition of the army.[36] There were also long-overdue reforms of the disciplinary code. As a result, the army Napoleon encountered in Russia surprised him with its quality and fighting spirit. And that says nothing of the strength of the Russian cavalry or the quality of their horses, which gave them such an advantage on the steppes, allowing their light cavalry, especially their Cossack horsemen, to swoop down on French troops more or less at will. Russia was a natural breeding-ground for cavalry horses and in the last decades of the eighteenth century had overseen a huge expansion of the horse-stud industry.[37] The nimbleness of their riding, the speed of their mounts and the effectiveness of their tactics – especially the surprise attacks they unleashed on the French forces – could only win admirers among their opponents. The French simply could not match them.

Indeed, finding sufficient numbers of horses, both for the cavalry and for draught service with the artillery, posed a major problem for the French. Contrary to popular belief, they could not satisfy their needs from the stud farms of Saxony and northern Germany, and were forced to source their purchases more widely, including, to a significant extent, in France itself. Napoleon inherited an active breeding industry in France, and laws passed during the Empire sought to control horse-breeding to guarantee the quality of the bloodstock. This produced results: by 1812, France had six principal studs and 30 depots, with 1,300 stallions at stud. But if France produced sufficient numbers of horses – and Paul Dawson has recently estimated the French equine population at between two and two and a half million in 1812 – they were not necessarily well suited to the needs of the army, and particularly those of the cavalry. Between January 1811 and June 1812, Napoleon sought to acquire the animals he needed for the upcoming campaign, whether as cavalry mounts or for the artillery and for transport, purchasing almost 170,000 horses in total, 76,000 of them from France and a further 68,000 from Germany. Other major suppliers were Italy and Poland. But many of these horses had no experience of war, and there was insufficient time to prepare them for the noise, the smells and chaos of the battlefield. Losses were hard to make good, as both the horses and the cavalrymen who rode them required patient training: at least six months for the horseman, and up to two years for a cavalry mount. Men would prove easier to replace than horses, something that would be reflected in the performance of the cavalry during the 1812 campaign itself.[38]

The scale of the defeat also raised a problem for posterity: how should, indeed how *could*, France remember and commemorate such a military disaster without destroying the morale on which future military success

was dependent? The army that had set out so full of optimism, comforted by the thought that theirs was the greatest military force in modern history, had been decimated, and those who lived to tell of their experiences were in no doubt about the scale of what had happened. Many followed their Emperor in finding excuses for the defeat: the excessive cold of the winter of 1812, the delay in leaving Moscow, the refusal of the Russians to give battle, the harrying tactics of the Cossacks and of *la petite guerre*. They pointed to the barren wastelands through which they marched and the bleak destruction on all sides: one eye-witness, writing in October 1812, described the 'hundred leagues of still smoking ruins' across which they passed, with no houses, no crops, no animals.[39] But they could not conceal the damage inflicted on their army, which now had to be rebuilt for a new campaign season, and could only clutch at their moments of victory, rare episodes in a bleak military landscape, in which to take comfort. Napoleon claimed Borodino (to the French, La Moscowa) as a victory for the imperial army, and many of his soldiers agreed, dwelling on the one occasion when the French had taken on the Russians in the field. But some were realistic enough to suspend judgement on the extent of their victory. One soldier told his wife that 'the Battle of La Moscowa did not bring the result that we hoped for', adding that 'having been beaten, and before concluding any treaty with us, the Russians want to see whether we can triumph over their bitter climate in the way we triumphed over them'.[40] His caution would prove well-founded, as the battle was the prelude to a miserable retreat in the course of which there was only one gleam of consolation: the crossing of the Berezina.

This was a feat of courage and ingenuity by Napoleon's sappers, which allowed the emperor, his marshals and corps commanders and the Guard – along with around 9,000 other troops who managed to escape the attentions of the Russians – to get across the river to safety. But to call it a victory might seem exaggerated, especially considering the cost in human lives: some 13,000 dead and wounded, compared to 15,000 on the Russian side.[41] The bravery of the men who built the bridge across the river to allow their comrades to escape was not in doubt, and the fact that they did get out of Russia alive was itself a source of much relief and some rejoicing. But it was no victory. The Berezina was simply a glorious moment of human endurance and individual heroism, which alone explains its celebrity in French accounts of the battle. Like the last defence of the Old Guard at Waterloo and the famous (if probably fictitious) *mot de Cambronne* – what Jean-Marc Largeaud calls the 'universal reference' for popular histories and lithographs[42] – it was to become a heroic symbol of a lost campaign, which deflected public attention from the scale of the disaster and from Napoleon's own part in it, and which in turn allowed the Russian campaign to assume its place in France's national narrative and to contribute to the legend of the emperor.[43]

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4

Russian Perspectives on European Order: 'Review of the Year 1819'

Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter

Across the European continent the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) marked the end of a quarter century of revolutionary upheaval, vicious warfare and sophisticated diplomacy. A mélange of old and new regime ingredients, the peace settlement codified in the final acts of Paris and Vienna has occupied the attention of generations of historians. Writing in multiple European languages, scholars have produced high-quality works that incorporate a variety of perspectives – national, international, political, diplomatic, military, strategic and even cultural.[1] Recent English-language scholarship stresses in particular the novelty of France's mobilization for the Revolutionary Wars and the originality of the European peacemakers who brought these wars to an end. From 'total war' to diplomatic protocol to international politics, the impact of innovative ideas and practices dominates current approaches to study of the era.[2]

Among the most momentous of the innovations identified by scholars is the idea that the Vienna settlement represented not a restoration of the old regime or of pre-Revolutionary European arrangements, but rather the codification of new legal principles and procedures for the conduct of European politics and the organization of European affairs. Eloquently and persuasively set forth in the work of Paul W. Schroeder, this interpretation holds that the Vienna Acts replaced eighteenth-century 'balance of power' politics, which had encouraged conflict, greed and aggression, with a new understanding of European order, or 'the European equilibrium' (*l'équilibre européen*), based on benign hegemonies (and sub-hegemonies), mutual restraint, multi-lateral cooperation (the concert), and respect for treaties, international law, the principle of legitimacy and the rights of states and nations.[3]

There are, of course, alternative and rightfully more critical views of the Vienna settlement, such as that of Adam Zamoyski, who highlights the emergence of great power politics in Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe.[4] According to Zamoyski, the new diplomatic edifice ensured that a handful of great powers – in this case Russia, Britain, Austria, Prussia and France – would impose their will on smaller, relatively vulnerable states.

My research on Russian diplomacy following the Congress of Vienna is still at an early stage, but it seems to me that, at least in English-language scholarship, there is little detailed analysis of Russian contributions to and understandings of these new approaches to European order. Beginning as early as 1804, Russia's policymakers, diplomats and intellectuals grappled with the question of how to achieve peace and stability in Europe. In the process of imagining and conceptualizing European order, they also developed ideas about Russia's place in that order and in the world more broadly.

In this chapter I will focus on one document, the 'Review of the Year 1819', that sheds light on how Russia's diplomats understood the European equilibrium. The review is identified in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts as the report of Ioannis Kapodistrias, who from 1815 to 1822 served with Karl von Nesselrode as Tsar Alexander I's 'co-minister' of foreign affairs.[5] The archival identification is misleading, because in a report of 12/24 December 1820 from Aleksandr S. Sturdza to Kapodistrias, Sturdza claims authorship of the review, which, according to the historian Alexander Martin, was based on an outline provided by Kapodistrias.[6] This is not terribly significant for our purposes, given that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly produced professional reports, surveys and instructions that passed through multiple hands before being formally approved by a minister or the tsar. Sturdza, or rather his assistant, writes in the December 1820 report to Kapodistrias that the review was prepared by order of the tsar for anonymous publication abroad. Designed to influence public opinion, the review sought to assume a calm and reflective voice, so that in keeping with a spirit of concord, peace and truth, its judgments could not be identified with the viewpoint of any particular party, sect or government. The report to Kapodistrias also reveals that due to unspecified international developments, the review had lost its political relevance before being disseminated and therefore was not published.[7] The tsar did, however, express approval of the content and analysis provided by Sturdza, and so the review remains a valuable source for historians seeking to understand how Russian policymakers viewed the world of European politics at the end of 1819.[8]

Every first-year student of history learns that post-Vienna Europe was a cauldron of social conflict, cultural ferment, and political instability. Indeed, the chronic churning should be mentioned in any discussion of diplomacy following the final defeat of Napoleon.[9] Despite the tone of reason and moderation that does indeed characterize the 'Review of the Year 1819', it is clear that Sturdza and Kapodistrias produced the document not in a mood of calm deliberation but in a spirit of yearning for tranquillity and for the opportunity to reflect on the promise and progress of peace. The promise was real enough, and the instruments of peace-making constructed at Vienna did indeed help diplomats to navigate a great deal of turbulence. Yet as the review also repeatedly suggested, lofty principles were one thing and harsh realities another.

Although the tension between principle and reality is an ongoing theme of the review, Sturdza began the discussion on an optimistic note. He described the current historical moment as a time of calm following years of crisis, as an opportunity for impartial reflection, and as a moment of change in the 'moral order' of the entire world. In writing the review, he hoped to counter the extremism that threatened stability in Europe, preventing recognition of the truth (however defined). Truth could be advanced, he added, through thoughtful, objective appraisal of the political events of 1819. Even though 'the spirit of party' and 'the banner of belligerent opinion' endangered the fragile peace that had been achieved, it was possible, based on good sense and the examination of past experience, to find the voice of reason. The voice of reason, embodied in the review, could transcend extremist positions and illuminate the truth. If we could begin to understand the past, Sturdza continued, it would be possible to achieve a 'better order of things', a return to moderation, which would then allow 'conscience and religion' to be heard and truth to prevail. Progress, in other words, depended on impartial analysis of the past and on the ability of individuals to get hold of and control their passions.

Historians have long recognized that the European alliance of 1813, the First Treaty of Paris (30 May 1814) and the ongoing negotiations at the Congress of Vienna (November 1814–March 1815) led not to a restoration of the old regime, but to the construction of a new political order in Europe. Schroeder refers to the years between 1815 and 1818 as 'the Recuperation'.[10] The review likewise stressed the novelty of the historical moment and rejoiced in the political reunification of Europe – a unity that had not been seen since 'the Congress of Westphalia.' At the same time, given the difficulty of the political process and the enormity of the task facing the peacemakers, Sturdza concluded that the need to guarantee all the rights, satisfy all the desires and reconcile all the conflicts of the interested parties at Vienna also created problems 'without parallel in the annals of the world'. It was therefore no surprise that complete reconciliation had not been attained or that 'the germs of disorder' remained in play. As Sturdza summed up the complications, could it be said that wishes were the same as rights and hopes were the same as realities?

Although Sturdza praised the effort to create a new world that began with the defeat of France, he went on to explain that the acts of Paris and Vienna failed fully to reconcile the past with the present. Problems arose from the desire to harmonize the old and new 'order of things', which meant that when the Congress of Vienna disbanded in March 1815 much dissatisfaction remained and many issues had not been resolved. At the time, conflict and discontent had to be suppressed in order to confront the danger posed by Napoleon's return. Unity in the face of the common enemy thus produced another treaty of alliance (25 March) and the Second Treaty of Paris (20 November), both of which showed that Napoleon's return and final

defeat, despite calls for vengeance, could not thwart 'the work of God' or undermine the principles of moderation and generosity that the peacemakers previously had adopted. Indeed, three years later, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), the Allies restored France to full participation in the European concert. Still, Sturdza added, notwithstanding this great and worthy achievement, the Congress neglected other critical issues that continued to threaten good order. Among these he mentioned political divisions in France, Spain's relations with her American colonies and with Portugal, relations between Sweden and Denmark, German disquiet, and unilateral British actions to suppress the slave trade and Barbary pirates/corsairs.[11]

The 'Review of the Year 1819' can be described as an expression of the providential beliefs and religious idealism of both Tsar Alexander I and Sturdza. It also, however, provided a realistic overview of European politics. Sturdza understood that the peacemakers at the Vienna Congress could not begin their work with a clean slate: past issues and historical claims could not simply be erased. In addition, the desire, already evident at Vienna, to restore France to great-power status challenged the idea of a general alliance of all European states, one in which every state claimed parity and independence. Indeed, as generations of historians document, and as Sturdza affirmed, at Vienna it became clear that the great powers would be the arbiters of European order. The second-order states, whose representatives were not even invited to Aix-la-Chapelle, had little choice other than to accept decisions affecting their interests but made by others. According to the review, the deep and sincere desire for peace that animated the diplomatic agents of the great powers was undeniable, yet because of contradictory and ambiguous principles, and more important, because of irreligion and uncontrolled human passions, the Vienna settlement and subsequent diplomacy had not been able to resolve all the remaining threats to European order.

At this point in the review, Sturdza began to discuss specific conditions in the most critical parts of Europe. For the moment (at the end of 1819), the situation in France seemed better than expected: although deep political divisions remained, the formation of a new government promised change. Despite the harmful spirit of party, France continued to recover and become stronger.[12] Spain, by contrast, had not been able to restore her position in the European state system, a situation that in the estimation of Sturdza was due to internal political conditions and to the limited wisdom of the government. Although deserving of 'a brilliant destiny' and loyal to the sacred relationship with her king (this soon would change), the Spanish nation, Sturdza believed, was facing terrible dangers. More to the point, danger was evident throughout Europe. Having been freed of a tyrant, the continent was still threatened by revolution. Even Britain, which was more happily situated than her old rivals, confronted challenges emanating from radicalism and calls for reform. In addition, Britain, like Spain, also possessed a colonial system, which remained a source of discontent. If Britain was going to triumph

over the threats at hand – threats attributed to attacks on property, religious dissent, indirect taxation and seditious writings – this would be the result of two factors: first, wise government that included modification of the colonial system, and second, the strength of the British nation's unwritten laws, of its *moeurs*, which were religiously based and preserved in family life.

In the mind of Sturdza, only Russia seemed immune to the pan-European threat of revolution. Deploying some of the proto-Slavophile arguments for which he is famous, Sturdza did not see in Russia the desire for reform and change that was affecting social life in the rest of Europe. Russia would soon experience her own jolt of radicalism in the Decembrist revolt of 1825, but in 1819 Sturdza could still draw attention to the absence of unrest, and he could attribute what turned out to be a deceptive calm to the continuing influence of religion, which, he claimed, served as the guide to social and political behaviour in Russia. Characterized by youth, vigour and savage energy, Russia, Sturdza proclaimed, had been assigned a special destiny – a destiny embodied in the growth of Russian power. Having reached the *apogée* of her physical/material grandeur, Russia was therefore obligated to use these treasures to perfect her own internal condition. Unlike the other states of Europe, Russia had not rejected the dictates of religion, and Sturdza hoped that in exercising her newly- acquired power, she could avoid 'a mortal blow.'

Critical to any understanding of European politics after 1815 were conditions in the reconstituted collective life of Germany, anchored by Prussia and Austria. Here too dangers lurked. Germany, in Sturdza's analysis, was a place where the rapid dissemination of ideas, a phenomenon broadly characteristic of contemporary Europe, threatened good order and undermined the national spirit (*ésprit national*). Because the same ideas could affect different places in different ways, in Germany external influences and irreligion had led to a rejection of reality and to attacks on authority. Sturdza did not mention the murder in March 1819 of August von Kotzebue, an agent of the Russian legation in Mannheim, but he did express outrage over the attacks on Jews that had begun at the University of Würzburg and spread among students, artisans and farmers across the German west.[13] That these attacks could occur in 'the century of tolerance' Sturdza found deeply disturbing. Not surprisingly, he also concluded that Germany needed unity, an assumption that compelled him to evaluate the governments of particular German states and statelets based on whether or not they behaved as members of a federal system. Critical of the repressive Carlsbad decrees, which placed too much faith in the efficacy of police measures, and of the Act of Federation, which created ambiguities and contradictions in the forms of German government (for example, monarchical or constitutional) and in the relationship between federal power and the independence of individual states, Sturdza saw disorder looming in Germany, despite the restoration of Austrian power.

The role of Austria in Germany also led Sturdza to consider political conditions in Italy, where the Habsburg Empire's geographic position had been translated into significant influence. This influence, Sturdza argued, should be exercised in a reasonable manner and within 'natural limits' that did not threaten the general European association. Arguably more dangerous for European order than any abuse of Austrian power was the lack of security and the potential for violence in a territory where individual kingdoms and states had not returned to their 'natural position' and where 'the universal agitation' affecting so much of Europe was evident. Sturdza did not doubt that revolution remained a menace to European order, even though the tyranny of Napoleon and the decades-long state of war had ended. Yet he remained convinced that the state of agitation was not the result of social inequity or competing political interests but rather of uncontrolled passions that having been stirred up for so long were not easily calmed. Religion, reason, wise government and moral order – these were the ingredients that would guarantee the equilibrium of Europe.

After surveying the fragile stability prevailing (but soon to be overturned) in Europe, the review offered perspective on other parts of the world, areas where specific problems and events continued to affect European politics. The discussion began with America, which according to Sturdza, deserved to be called 'the new world,' though it was also a world enriched by European civilization. Sturdza expected America (North and South) to play a moral and political role commensurate with its physical size and natural endowments. For the moment, however, the author focused on the crisis in South America, where the descendants of Spanish conquerors and of African slaves transported across the Atlantic were engaged in a struggle for liberty and independence. Beginning in January 1820, the Spanish revolution would eventually compel Tsar Alexander I to take a more active interest in Latin American affairs, but for the moment, Sturdza could write that neutrality was the appropriate course when geography removed a state – in this case Russia – from direct participation in events such as the revolts in the Spanish colonies. Nor, while critical of Spain and of the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro for their handling of the colonies, did Sturdza see any reason for a European power to support rebellion in the new world.[14] Aggrandizement was the only possible motive, and so, given the absence of a viable Spanish plan to reunite the colonies with the metropolis, he expected the troubles to be protracted. The Spanish colonial system, Sturdza explained, lacked the flexibility needed to survive in modern times. Equally significant, the rebellious Spanish colonies lacked the social maturity of their North American counterparts. Resolution would not come soon, which represented another threat to stability in Europe.

Closely related to conditions in America was the problem of the slave trade, outlawed in principle by the acts of Paris and Vienna. Sturdza acknowledged that the desire to abolish the slave trade was just, but he

remained suspicious of British efforts in that direction. Here the question arose as to when the internal policies and principles of a particular nation, in this case Britain, should become universal. No doubt aware of the parallels between slavery and serfdom, Russia's diplomatic agent contended that in agreeing to eliminate the slave trade, the European powers had taken a position on a matter in which they had no direct interest. Consequently, they had no right (*droit*) or *mérite* to vote on 'this great and important question'. Fortunately, Sturdza continued, the British initiative to organize a joint allied military expedition to suppress the slave trade was being replaced with separate negotiated agreements, such as the treaty with Spain, which as of May 1820 was supposed to end Spanish involvement in the trade. Similar negotiations, the author added, were underway with the Court of Rio.[15]

Questions of interest and legitimate authority also informed Sturdza's discussion of efforts to suppress the Barbary corsairs, another collective international action being pursued by Britain. Again, the desire to end human suffering – specifically the suffering of European captives – represented a noble idea, as did the implied affinity between the traffic in black Africans and the captivity of white Europeans. But the Ottoman Porte, suzerain of the North African cantons, refused to reach agreement on this matter. In Sturdza's opinion, moreover, the effort to protect commerce and other economic interests would never be sufficient to guarantee peaceful navigation. Of greater consequence were the motives that animated the interested parties: to speak and act in the name of suffering humanity was equivalent to an appeal for divine intervention, which could not depend on human actions. Sturdza was reluctant to reject the just principle of eliminating both the slave trade and piracy, but he also refused to condone joint European action or to ignore the legitimate interests of Spain, Portugal and the Ottoman Empire. To reconcile the contradiction, Sturdza retreated into a statement of religious aspiration. Commerce and industry would not civilize Africans, end the slave trade, or suppress the Barbary pirates. Only the Christian religion could civilize Africa and lead the continent to a form of social life that corresponded to the dignity of the human being and the grandeur of God's providence. As he had done earlier to explain the European powers' generosity toward France, Sturdza insisted that the work of God should be distinguished from human schemes and understandings.

Europe's relations with the Ottoman Empire received more direct attention in the final chapter of the review of political events. Sturdza treated Asia – specifically the Ottoman Empire, Persia and India – as part of the European political system, though he also noted that religious differences prevented any fusion of interests and races [sic]. In civilization, commerce and enlightenment, peoples competed; only in religion could they be united. This was precisely the reason that the Muslim states of Turkey and Persia were fundamentally incompatible with Europe. Although both the Ottoman Empire and Persia had a long history of forging alliances

with European powers (Russia, Austria, France and Britain), these alliances were changeable, and as a result, the Muslim states had not been able to attain a stable position in the European system. Commenting further on conditions within the Ottoman Empire, Sturdza characterized the Empire's decline as irreversible; praised the assassinated Sultan Selim III for his enlightened views and commitment to reform, proof that he was worthy of being a Christian; and described the inertia of the Ottoman Empire as both a threat to European order and a form of resistance to the European association.[16] Unable, moreover, to conceal the 'Russian' position for which he spoke, Sturdza also claimed that integration of the Ottoman Empire and of Russia's relations with the Porte into the European system would represent an unwelcome source of disorder. Just as Tsar Alexander I did not wish to get involved in rooting out the trans-Atlantic slave trade, neither did he want his European allies to interfere in Russo-Ottoman relations. The same could be said of Russia's relations with Persia. Thus Sturdza concluded that although the principles of Europe's new political system – equity and Christian fraternity – also applied to Persia and the Ottoman Empire, this had to be done in a manner that would not upset the order of things.[17] The lack of internal change in these societies was something that human action could not currently overcome. Only God's providence, his sovereign care in governing his creation, could bring about the desired outcome.

Close reading of the 'Review of the Year 1819' highlights the uncomfortable mélange of principle and pragmatism characteristic of post-Napoleonic European diplomacy. Of course, almost any complicated diplomatic endeavour can be described in these terms, yet the tension between idea and reality was especially striking in early nineteenth-century Russia. As historians consistently point out, Alexander I's domestic policies also moved uncomfortably between religious idealism, aspirational liberalism, practical possibilities and the heavy-handed exercise of autocratic power. Among the political and philosophical principles articulated in the review, scholars can find a number of possibilities for further study. These include the acceptance of particular interests as a factor in alliance politics and action, the recognition of spheres of influence and authority based on geography, attention to the principle of non-intervention (that is, when is intervention called for and when should it be avoided), ongoing fear of disorder, belief in the rights of nations/states/peoples along with the absence of any reference to dynastic rights, discussion of the rights of nature and the natural position of states, an understanding of European politics as a global affair, the legitimacy of codified gradations among states (an arrangement that easily conflicted with the principle of the independence of each state), a similar distinction between the Grand Alliance of the great powers and the general alliance of all independent European states (and statelets), the idea that irreligion is a source of disorder and that internal disorder leads to war and international conflict, belief in the importance of divine providence in ensuring good

order and finally, strong opposition to radicalism, extremism, popular agitation and the spirit of party or sect.

All of these questions are touched upon during Sturdza's review of political events in Europe, and while they may seem commonplace to specialists, I think it worthwhile to consider how these and other principles or issues played out in Russia's diplomatic and journalistic sources. Although I am just beginning to locate documents and define empirical parameters, for the moment I hope to approach the subject of European order as a history of ideas, concepts and political culture. The omnipresence of Tsar Alexander I illustrates the task at hand. Alexander's contributions to the Vienna settlement and to the reconstruction of European order are indisputable, and they have been effectively studied from a variety of perspectives: the tsar's biography (Hartley and Rey), Russian politics and policy (Grimsted), the military struggle against Napoleon (Lieven, Torkunov and Narinskii), and Russia's crowning contribution to European order, the Holy Alliance (Nadler and Ley).[18] If, however, the Vienna settlement and its implementation are viewed from within the history of ideas, if diplomacy is treated as a form of political thought, additional themes come to mind. For example, from a Russian perspective, the Vienna settlement can be described as the high-point or even the culmination of Enlightenment thinking (though not the full legacy of Enlightenment thought) in the sphere of diplomacy. Similarly, it can be argued that the key architects of Vienna, Russian and non-Russian, generally thought and behaved as men of the eighteenth century, a mind-set that allowed them effectively to adapt to change without abandoning cherished beliefs.

Tsar Alexander I, his diplomatic agents and other Russian policymakers fall comfortably within the parameters of Enlightenment culture and thought. The package of universalistic assumptions, cosmopolitan habits of mind, humanistic sympathies, providential beliefs and moral philosophy that they brought to diplomacy and to the understanding of European order resembles the concerns of eighteenth-century intellectuals. Clearly, their thinking and mores coincided with key aspects of the moderate mainstream and religious Enlightenments, particularly the blending of religious teachings with Enlightenment ideals such as equality, reason, progress, toleration and 'human flourishing'.[19] One need not accept Schroeder's judgments about the originality and efficacy of the Vienna settlement in order to see that like (the) Enlightenment(s), the congress system of 1815–1822 established or gave modern meaning to a set of legal and political principles that allowed change in the present without radical rejection of the past and that to this day continue to define the assumptions, expectations and practical conduct of international relations.[20]

With respect to Russia, there is another dimension to consider, one suggested by Father Georgii Florovskii in his classic *Ways of Russian Theology* (1937). According to Florovskii, Alexander I viewed himself as the carrier of

a holy idea and the Holy Alliance as a foreshadowing of the Thousand Year Kingdom, the reign of Christ and the saints on earth, which is supposed to precede the Second Coming.[21] The signing of the Holy Alliance Treaty on 14 September (26 September new style), the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross, and the subsequent (October 1817) decree establishing the united Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Popular Enlightenment thus represented the fullest realization of Petrine church reform, the religious supremacy of the prince exercising authority over the church.[22] In Florovskii's formulation, 'the regime of the Holy Alliance,' a form of theocratic *étatisme*, constituted the 'enserfment of the conscience and spirit.'[23] This characterization is a subject for further discussion. Here we can note that virtually every account of the Napoleonic Wars and Vienna settlement makes reference to Tsar Alexander I's idealism, religious conversion/fervour and flights of spiritual inspiration. Indeed, it can be difficult to reconcile the monarch's providential and millennial sensibilities with his stubborn and generally effective pursuit of war, peace and Russian interests.[24] Whatever the spiritual qualities, psychological inconsistencies and emotional wavering chronicled by historians (and described with hints of derision by historians of Europe), they did not prevent the Russian monarch from making tough, intelligent and unpopular policy choices, and equally important, sticking to those choices during 15 years of costly combat and exhausting diplomacy. Whatever the divinely inspired mission assigned by Alexander and others to the Holy Alliance, within the framework of Enlightenment thought, the idea of the Holy Alliance also represented a reasonable and pragmatic perspective on European order. In other words, modern historiographical categories such as liberal, conservative, constitutional, romantic and nationalist do not necessarily fit the Russian case or effectively describe the thinking of diplomatic agents such as Alexander I and Aleksandr Sturdza.

The chronological parameters of my research extend from Russian peacemaking at the Congress of Vienna, to the history of the Holy Alliance treaty, to the implementation and legacy of diplomatic agreements throughout the congress era (1815–1823). Alexander I's role as 'tsar diplomat' is well studied in the historiography, though his political intentions both at home and abroad remain difficult to evaluate. Rather than join this discussion, which is for now up to date and thoroughly vetted, I would like to focus more closely on the political principles and vision enunciated by the tsar and by Russia's diplomats during the ongoing negotiations and adaptations of policy that continued from the 'settlement' of 1815 through the Congress of Verona in 1822. Hopefully, study of Russian diplomatic thought during the reign of Alexander I, as opposed to the chess game of actual diplomacy, not only will deepen our knowledge of how the French Revolution, Napoleonic wars and Vienna settlement affected Russian development, but also will shed light on Russia's contribution to European order and on what became Russia's tension-filled and problematic relations with Europe.

It is clear from Russian documents devoted to war and peace in the first quarter of the nineteenth century that Tsar Alexander I and his associates believed in the reality of a 'European political system' and viewed Russia as a fully-fledged member of the system. But what did the relationship entail, and why did Russia end up on the intellectual and psychological periphery of European politics? Is this something that happened later in the nineteenth century, perhaps because of Slavophilism (a form of Romantic nationalism), Church retrenchment, or divergent political development? Or is it simply a conceptual/ideological product of the Bolshevik Revolution or the Cold War? Already in the eighteenth century, and continuing to the present day, Russian foreign policy has baffled, awed, and at times enraged the country's European and Anglo-American allies and competitors. To understand the ideas and practices that have defined modern Russian diplomacy, historians can look more closely at Russia's contribution to and participation in the congress-era European political system.

Notes

1. The terminology of old regime and new regime is familiar from the historiography of modern France, particularly the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. See Isser Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994); Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA, 1976).
2. David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Boston, MA and New York, 2007); Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994); Marie-Pierre Rey, *Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon*, trans. Susan Emanuel (DeKalb, IL, 2012).
3. Schroeder, *Transformation*. See also Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York, 2012); Jennifer Mitzen, *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance* (Chicago, 2013).
4. Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna* (New York, 2007).
5. Moscow, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (hereafter RGADA), f. 3, op. 1, d. 47, ll. 83ob–130ob.
6. RGADA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 78, ll. 325–27ob, 345ob–48. Sturdza's role is confirmed by Alexander M. Martin, who discusses the review in *Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I* (DeKalb, IL, 1997), 176–9. Kapodistrias's official title was state secretary for foreign affairs. See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy* (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, 1969), 226–68. On Sturdza, see also Stella Ghervas, *Réinventer la tradition: Alexandre Stourdza et l'Europe de la Sainte-Alliance* (Paris, 2008).
7. In early 1820 the Spanish revolution began as a revolt among troops being readied for an American expedition. Later in the year revolution broke out in Naples, and Russia's elite Semenovskii Guard Regiment rebelled against an abusive commander.
8. The review was divided into two parts; the first, dated 12 December 1819, covered the international political events of the year, and the second, dated 14 January

1820, covered political divisions and ideologies in Europe. The document located in RGADA contains only Part I. Martin briefly discusses the contents of Part II in: Martin, *Romantics*, 175–9.

9. Thirty to forty years on, baby boomers in the United States readily recall R. R. Palmer's description of 'the advent of the Isms': R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, 6th Edition (New York, 1983), 435–45.
10. Schroeder, *Transformation*, 586.
11. The Congress of Vienna outlawed the slave trade in principle, and the British government, which had made the trade illegal in 1807, used its unequalled naval power to search and harass suspect vessels at sea. Unilateral British action ended after the British courts in the *Le Louis* judgment of 1817 rejected the right of the Royal Navy to stop and search the slaving ships of powers that had not requested such intervention. The reference to Sweden and Denmark illustrates the perception that European peace remained fragile: In the Peace of Kiel (January 1814) Denmark was forced to cede Norway to Sweden in return for Swedish Pomerania and Rügen. In June 1815, as part of the Vienna settlement, Denmark accepted the Duchy of Lauenburg in return for Swedish Pomerania, which Prussia then purchased from Sweden. The Norwegians also submitted to Swedish rule at this time. According to Schroeder, the territorial settlement between Denmark and Sweden, mediated by Russia, marked the end of the Northern question and the beginning of a tradition of Swedish neutrality comparable to that of Switzerland. Even so, in 1818 allied (Russian, British, Austrian and Prussian) involvement in Danish-Swedish relations continued with negotiations over Swedish responsibility for Norwegian debts. The allies agreed that Sweden should honour Norway's debts to Denmark based on Article VI of the Peace of Kiel. Brendan Simms, *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present* (New York, 2013), 168 and 181–8; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 487–8, 572, 578, 766–7; Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Seriia vtoraia*, 8 vols (hereafter *VPR*) (Moscow, 1976), 2, 310, 517, 756–8.
12. Concern about instability in France led in 1818 to a final settlement on reparations and to the early withdrawal of allied occupation forces. In 1817 the Bourbon government had introduced a constitutional charter with a franchise restricted to 100,000 voters. Although Bonapartist and Royalist deputies remained critical of the government's willingness to accept allied interference in France's domestic politics, the Bourbons adhered to the terms of the Vienna settlement and resisted popular pressure to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy: Simms, *Europe*, 185–6.
13. The attacks on Jews likewise caused Metternich to conclude that no security existed in Germany: James J. Sheehan, *German History 1770–1866* (New York, 1989), 407–8, 449–50.
14. From 1808 to 1821, the Portuguese royal family resided in Rio. In 1822 Brazil became independent.
15. The agreement with Spain ended the legal importation of slaves into Spain proper; however, Spanish involvement in the international slave trade continued. Nor did Portuguese involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade end at this time. Simms, *Europe*, 199–200. The discussion of the slave trade in Sturdza's review seems to contradict the better known opinion (*mnenie*) of the Russian government, dated 26 October (7 November new style) 1818, which supports the idea of deploying an international expedition of naval vessels to enforce the ban on slaving but opposes a British proposal to allow the commercial ships of any country to be searched: *VPR*, v. 2, 536.

16. Selim III (1761–1808) ruled as sultan from 1789 to 1807. Committed to European-style military organization and training; the reform of Ottoman administration, taxation, and land tenure; and the development of direct diplomatic contacts with Europe, Selim's reforms triggered rebellion among Janissaries and provincial notables, leading to his own imprisonment and assassination.
17. The current order of things refers to Ottoman and Persian relationships with the neighbouring Christian powers, Russia and Austria, that had been codified in the treaties of Sistova (1791), Jassy (1792), Bucharest (1812), and Gulistan (1813). Sturdza also expresses concern about the British protectorate in the Ionian Isles, an arrangement that Russia had encouraged (and Kapodistrias supported) in order to prevent Austrian control, which would have represented a more significant barrier to Russian policy in the Balkans and to Greek national aspirations: Schroeder, *Transformation*, 86–7, 572–4; Thomas Sanders, Ernest Tucker and Gary Hamburg, eds., *Russian-Muslim Confrontation in the Caucasus. Alternative Visions of the Conflict between Imam Shamil and the Russians, 1830–1859* (New York, 2004).
18. This is but a miniscule sampling of the high-quality scholarship that could be cited: Janet M. Hartley, *Alexander I* (London and New York, 1994); Rey, *Alexander I*; Grimsted, *Foreign Ministers*; Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London, 2009); Anatolii V. Torkunov and Mikhail M. Narinskii, eds., *Evropeiskaia diplomatiia i mezhdunarodnye protsessy epokhi napoleonovskikh voin* (Moscow, 2012); Vasilii K. Nadler, *Imperator Aleksandr I i ideia sviashchennogo soiuza*, reprint (Moscow, 2011); Francis Ley, *Alexandre Ier et sa Sainte-Alliance: 1811–1825, avec des documents inédits* (Paris, 1975).
19. This is the subject of my most recent book: Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, *Religion and Enlightenment in Catherinian Russia: The Teachings of Metropolitan Platon* (DeKalb, IL, 2013). On 'human flourishing', see Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), and Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
20. These include, among others: the reconciliation of 'great power demands for influence and control with small-power requirements for independence'; the role of intermediary bodies or independent smaller states and territories in buffering, separating and connecting great powers; the development of rules and concepts for cooperation and concert between the powers; ways to guarantee 'the rights and status of all states while discriminating between their different functions and responsibilities, necessarily conditioned by divergent capacities and interests'; the idea of 'a political equilibrium based on the tacit acceptance by smaller powers of a general great-power hegemony so long as their independence and rights were guaranteed'; innovative regulation of diplomatic precedent and procedure; abolition of the slave trade; and international regulation and navigation of waterways. See Schroeder, *Transformation*, 575–82.
21. The Second Ecumenical Council rejected the literal thousand year reign of Christ described in Revelations 20: 2–3. See *The Orthodox Study Bible* (Nashville, TN, 2008), 1743.
22. The military associations of the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross (*Vozdvizhenie*) are widely recognized. The feast commemorates the Cross 'in a spirit of triumph' and as a ' "weapon of peace and unconquerable ensign of victory" (kontakion of the feast)', *The Festal Menaion*, trans. Mother Mary and Archimandrite Kallistos Ware (South Canaan, PA, 1998), 41–2, 50–1.
23. Protoierei Georgii Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Paris, 1937), 131–6.
24. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*.

5
Alexander I, Talleyrand and France's Future in 1814

Marie-Pierre Rey

At the beginning of June 1814, just after Tsar Alexander I left Paris, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de Bénévent, wrote him a very long letter,[1] in which he asserted:

> Sire, I did not see Your Majesty before Your departure and I dare offer a reproach out of the sincerity of my fondest attachment.
>
> […] You have saved France. Your entry into Paris signalled the end of despotism; whatever your silent observations, if You were called upon again, that which You have done You would do once more, for You cannot fail Your glory – even when You may have glimpsed the Monarchy disposed to reassume a little more authority than You believe necessary, and the French to neglect their independence. […] *The forms, the manners of our Sovereigns have in turn fashioned us, and from this mutual reaction you will see arise a way of governing and obeying that may eventually merit the name of constitution.* The King has long studied our history; he knows us; he knows how to give a royal character to everything that emanates from him, and when we have returned to ourselves, we will come back to this truly French habit of appropriating the actions and qualities of our King. Moreover, liberal *principles are marching with the spirit of the century; although the century's spirit may be dampened for a while, it will have to come back*; *and if Your Majesty deigns to trust my words, I promise that we will have a monarchy linked to liberty*,[2] and that [Your Majesty] will see men of merit welcomed and given posts in France. I guarantee to Your glory the happiness and the liberty of my country.[3]

The tone of this text, the lofty view it expresses and his vibrant plea for the monarchy that he anchors in a very original representation of France and the French – all appear profoundly original. But what is most striking about this document is what it reveals about the relationship that had been forged between Alexander I and Talleyrand. Of course there is some sycophancy in the way the old diplomat, aware of the key role played by the tsar during

negotiations of the first Treaty of Paris, pays homage to him. But beyond the customary flattery, the letter affirms a genuine intellectual and political complicity based on a shared liberal ideal. How did this complicity between the two men take shape, what did it mean and to what political results did it actually lead? These are the questions my chapter will try to answer. To do so, it will be structured into three parts.

The first part will look at how the tsar and his diplomats viewed the political future of France at the start of the military campaign in mid-March. The second part will examine the context – political, diplomatic and personal – for the evolving special relationship between Tsar Alexander and Prince Talleyrand. Lastly, I will look at the concrete results of this political collaboration.

Alexander I's perceptions and goals regarding France's political future

From the end of 1812 Alexander I saw the military defeat of Napoleon as the necessary condition for achieving the dismantlement of the French 'Grand Empire', halting French expansionism that was threatening Russia's traditional zones of influence (the Balkans, Germany and Poland) and returning to a notion of equilibrium among the European powers. For him, and he would repeat it in the course of the French campaign from January to March 1814, this military defeat was the necessary condition for assuring the peace of the European continent. But in parallel, the tsar was also convinced that this necessary condition would not be sufficient and that, to assure a long peace and a sustainable security for the European continent, Napoleon would have to be politically defeated for the benefit of liberal institutions.

This liberal choice corresponded with his own convictions: at this time Alexander I was still emulating his tutor, the Swiss republican Frédéric-César de La Harpe, who had instilled in him the ideas of the Enlightenment and of liberalism. But it also corresponded with his analysis of the French political situation. For the tsar, the last 25 years could not be forgotten or repudiated and only liberal institutions were capable of bringing to France – and beyond it to Europe as a whole – stability and peace. Indeed, in his mind, an abrupt return to absolute monarchy would lead inexorably to revolutionary unrest or even to a civil war that would bring new disorder in Europe.

The analysis was deeply rooted and was not a product of circumstances: back in September 1804, in his instructions to his emissary Nikolai N. Novosil'tsev, who he was sending to London to negotiate an alliance with Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, Alexander specified that after Napoleon's fall, far from seeking to re-establish in France a monarchical order of absolute right, it would be necessary to favour the birth of a regime

that would be respectful of Enlightenment ideas and would promote and guarantee the freedom that the French people had already tasted:

> I would wish the two Governments [Great Britain and Russia] to agree that far from attempting to re-establish old abuses in the countries which will have to be emancipated from the yoke of Buonaparte, these nations should, on the contrary, be assured of liberties founded on a solid basis.[4]

Ten years later, in 1814, the tsar remained attached to this analysis and he shared it with his two main diplomatic advisers. By mid-March Nesselrode was worried about the risk of civil destabilization by returning to the monarchy, as he told his wife in a letter dated 10 March (new style): 'For these unfortunate [royalists] there is no more hope, I sorely fear; I see no real party in their favour, and espousing the cause of the Bourbons would mean plunging us into an endless civil war.'[5] His other adviser, Ioannis Kapodistrias (Capo d'Istria), as a passionate liberal advocated the establishment of a constitution in post-Napoleonic France.

However, if in spring 1814 Alexander I hoped to see liberal institutions in France, on the more precise question of the political regime that France ought to adopt after the fall of Napoleon he remained hesitant. In February 1814, the Russians favoured strict neutrality with respect to the Bourbons and they advocated a swift entry into Paris, after which an assembly of representatives of the French nation would decide the destiny of the country and of the throne. On 13 February Nesselrode sent Prince Klemens von Metternich, Lord Robert Castlereagh and Prince Karl von Hardenberg a memorandum entitled 'Questions to resolve and court opinion in Russia' that asserted that, instead of trying to foster the re-establishment of the Bourbons, the Allies should leave the French free to choose their future government: '[So] we will continue to follow the path we have adopted: consequently the powers will not pronounce in favour of Louis XVIII but will leave the initiative on this issue to the French.'[6]

However, in the days that followed this position statement, the tsar was forced to make concessions or else see the coalition break apart. Without completely abandoning hope of seeing a French assembly decide the destiny of France, he was obliged to support the British views expressed by Lord Castlereagh. Of course, the coalition would not push for the restoration of the Bourbons for fear of provoking a civil war, but if the monarchy had to be restored, the only possible candidate would be the Comte de Provence, the heir of the elder branch of the Bourbons.

If Alexander seemed, however, to rally to British views, he did not do so willingly because he did not approve of the Bourbons, who he reproached for their arrogance, their mediocrity and their small-mindedness. At the end of 1812 he had thought of offering the French throne to Jean Bernadotte, whom he judged to be more open and courageous; at the start of 1813,

when the Comte de Provence (the future Louis XVIII) wrote to him to present his own rights to the throne,[7] the tsar remained deaf to his appeal. Later on his relationship to the future French sovereign remained very frosty. To remedy these tense relations, the heir to the crown of France decided in February 1813 to send an emissary, Pierre-Louis-Auguste, Comte de la Ferronays, to the tsar with a letter. In this document, dated 14 February 1813, the pretender congratulated Alexander I on his victory over Napoleon and asked him to address a proclamation to the French nation in which the title of 'legitimate Sovereign of France' would be granted to himself. The demand remained unanswered. On 7 April 1813, a new attempt and a new courier had no more success;[8] not until 24 April 1813 did Alexander, then in Dresden, resolve to write to the Bourbon heir. Whereas the latter addressed the tsar as 'Monsieur my Brother and Cousin', the tsar's answers went to 'Monsieur le Comte' and he ended his letters with the banal and cool expression: '*Recevez, Monsieur le Comte, les assurances de tous mes sentiments*.'

Thus relations between the two men remained barely cordial, nor did the situation improve. In mid-November, the Bourbon heir again took up his pen to stress that the moment had come to proclaim him King of the French: 'The only way to deprive [Napoleon] of this last opportunity [French fears about allied plans] is to show France, by the re-establishment of a *paternal* and legitimate power, the sure guarantee of its independence and happiness.'[9] But this appeal for the re-establishment of a *paternal* power offended the tsar's liberal ideas and irritated him even more. So at the beginning of February 1814, the tsar mentioned once more in a conversation with Castlereagh the possibility of resorting to Bernadotte, or even a member of the younger branch of the Bourbons, the Orléans, if there had to be a return to a monarchical regime. And in March, he went even further, declaring that he would not mind seeing a republic in France. So, as we can see, equivocations by the tsar and his advisers were not wanting and for them the Bourbons' return was far from certain at the moment Prince Talleyrand entered the stage.

Talleyrand and Alexander I: a league based on shared values

In 1814, the Prince de Bénévent was 60 years old: in the course of a multifaceted career that led him to don an ecclesiastical role and then a diplomatic uniform, the former Bishop of Autun successively served the Monarchy, the Constituent Assembly, Directorate, the Consulate and then the Empire. As intelligent and witty as he was venal, Talleyrand would be included among the most admired and most hated men of Napoleonic France. Under a rather eccentric demeanour was hidden a formidable and experienced statesman, with nerves of steel, wielding the polished wit and irony of the eighteenth century, and a Machiavellian negotiator of great talent but deprived of any moral compass. Count Carlo Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican and enemy of

Napoleon who in 1804 entered the Russian diplomatic service and would later be the first ambassador of Alexander to King Louis XVIII, composed a delicious portrait of him in a letter to Nesselrode:

> He is a man who resembles none other: he spoils people, he arranges things, and he intrigues and governs in a hundred different ways each day. His interest in someone is proportionate to the need he has of him at that moment – including civilities that are usurious investments that will have to be paid back before the end of the day.[10]

Beyond his immorality, Talleyrand had extraordinary intellectual qualities and Napoleon was not mistaken to make him his minister of foreign affairs between November 1799 and August 1807. Although after disagreements in the summer of 1807 Talleyrand lost his ministry, he remained a close diplomatic adviser to Napoleon.

Even before the Russia campaign Talleyrand anticipated the catastrophe and tried in vain to warn the French emperor. At the end of 1812 he exhorted Napoleon to negotiate for peace, and when the latter refused, he declined the offered post of minister of foreign affairs. In the course of 1813, Talleyrand began to foresee the future without Napoleon: through the intercession of his uncle, Archbishop of Reims, then the chief chaplain of the Comte de Provence in exile in Hartwell,[11] he entered into contact with the Bourbon pretender to the throne. The letters that Talleyrand sent to the latter have not been preserved, but we know that they were addressed to 'Louis XVIIII' and began with 'Sire', already seriously challenging Napoleon's legitimacy.[12] When some of these letters were later intercepted by the police, Napoleon, exasperated by the ingratitude of the Prince de Bénévent, envisaged prosecuting him for treason but he gave up the idea because Talleyrand's intelligence, his networks and his *savoir-faire* were too precious to him. On 23 January 1814, Napoleon went so far as to name him a member of the newly-set up Regency Council, a position that would indeed prove strategic.

Despite his cynicism and venality, Talleyrand remained attached to certain principles, and even to some convictions. The first was his liberalism: a child of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, he never renounced his attachment to freedom and to British-style parliamentarianism. At the end of 1813, he envisaged the possibility of profiting from the fall of Napoleon to re-establish the freedoms that had been lost under the Empire and to institute a parliamentary system. His objective was to impose his authority discreetly and to work towards 'an inverse of the 18 Brumaire'. He used this original phrase in a letter to Aimée de Coigny[13] and it referred to a whole programme: nothing less than restoring the civil rights and liberties that he thought had been lost during the Empire. However, like Alexander I, Talleyrand did not yet have a strong conviction about the nature of the

political regime to be established and by the end of 1813, he hesitated between a regency in his favour until the majority of the King of Rome[14], a regency in favour of Marie-Louise, the return of the Bourbon's legitimate heir or the accession of the Duke of Orléans.

Liberal on a domestic level, on the international plane Talleyrand was also 'viscerally hostile to diplomacy of the sword',[15] and instead, like Alexander I himself, was a partisan of a European system comprising balance and consensus among nations. This is this convergence in their views that led the Prince de Bénévent to establish contact with the Russian sovereign at the beginning of March.

The tsar and the prince were not unknown to each other. The two had met during the conference at Tilsit that sealed a bilateral alliance between the two empires, but it was actually after the meetings at Erfurt in September 1808, which Talleyrand attended as the diplomatic adviser of the French emperor, that personal ties were formed between them. It was there that on his own initiative Talleyrand approached the Russian tsar and began to betray Napoleon, motivated by his belief that the expansionist policy of Napoleonic France was imperilling the security of Europe and would only lead to an impasse.

Although the esteem between Alexander I and Talleyrand was mutual after 1807–1808, it was not synonymous with absolute trust: in private, the latter continued to distrust the 'Northern barbarians'; to the alliance with Russia he preferred one with Austria. As for Alexander I, while he appreciated Talleyrand's analytic and intellectual virtues, he was sometimes irritated by his venality. After Erfurt and until October 1811, in fact, in letters of exchange established in his name the prince tried to make money from the information he transmitted to the tsar, not by the intermediary of the Russian ambassador but more discreetly via Karl von Nesselrode, then a young diplomat posted to Paris. But despite this insatiable cupidity, the convergence in their views and the special relationship between them forged since 1808 explain the Prince de Bénévent's plan in March and the collaboration that evolved between the tsar and the old diplomat.

The fruits of the collaboration: towards the adoption of a constitutional regime

In the beginning of March 1814, Talleyrand took the decision to send an emissary to meet the tsar and convey a secrete message to Nesselrode. Undertaken by a statesman who (at least on paper) was still a member of the Regency Council, this step was not without risk – hence the somewhat fantastic precautions taken by Talleyrand in order to contact the tsar's entourage. Since his own handwriting was known and easily identifiable, he used the pen of his friend Emerich Joseph de Dalberg; for even more security, he ordered that the message be written in invisible ink; finally, he had

it sent by the intermediary of Eugène François d'Arnauld, baron de Vitrolles, a convinced monarchist who had returned to France thanks to a consular amnesty. On 11 March, the emissary reached Châtillon to converse with Metternich and Nesselrode, and to give the latter the famous note:

> The person who gives you this merits your total trust. Listen to him and recognise me. It is time to be clear: you are walking on crutches, so use your legs and do what you are able.[16]

There is no doubt that this sibylline note had real influence on the coalition powers by encouraging them to come quickly to Paris; Nesselrode himself, once in Paris, would confide to the Countess de Boigne ('taking out of his pocket a very small piece of torn and raggedy paper') that it was because of this document that he has 'hazarded the march on Paris'.[17] But actually the tsar and his vice-minister welcomed the message because it arrived precisely in time to reinforce their own views and their desire to reach Paris as quickly as possible in order to leave the French their choice of government.

The following days brought new successes to the coalition. Certainly the battle of Paris was costly in human lives, but this could not reverse the course of history. Now events flowed quickly. On the evening of 30 March when Paris surrendered, Talleyrand visited Marshal Auguste de Marmont to ask him to sign the capitulation quickly; there he met Mikhail F. Orlov, the emissary of Alexander I, and 'with a kind of solemnity',[18] charged him with carrying to 'the feet of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the expression of the profound respect of the Prince de Bénévent.'[19] Thus as of the evening of 30 March, divining the pivotal role that Alexander I would unfailingly be called to play, Talleyrand (via Orlov) had extended a hand to the Emperor of all the Russias. And Alexander I had immediately grasped the whole importance of the gesture; Orlov's account as he brought the tsar at dawn the following day the news about surrender of Paris, attests:

> He had me recount all the details of the evening, and manifested some surprise when I told him about the Prince de Talleyrand. 'This is still an anecdote,' he said, 'but it can become History'.[20]

The statement should be underlined as demonstrating (contrary to the common notion that Alexander I was the naïve dupe of Talleyrand)[21] that the tsar immediately understood that the prince was the man of the situation. He now agreed, if not to henceforth support him in all his enterprises, then at least to take account of his analyses.

First thing on the morning of 31 March, receiving the deputation of Parisians who had come to see him in General de Bondy's quarters, Alexander I reaffirmed his firm opposition to any peace with Napoleon and promised to allow the French to adopt a government 'that will give you rest

and all of Europe, too'.[22] However, in this first public declaration the tsar remained silent on the nature and shape of France's future political regime. He was still hesitating, with 'no decision taken'[23] inasmuch as his psychological and political distrust of the Bourbons remained strong; in effect he feared that the king would quickly be overwhelmed by the most uncompromising of his partisans.

Within this atmosphere of uncertainty, when he was about to enter Paris that day, Alexander delegated Nesselrode to contact Talleyrand so they could study together 'the first measures to take'.[24] The two men knew each other well: they had been in regular contact from 1807 to 1811 when the young diplomat, then at the Russian embassy in Paris, served discreetly as a transmission courier between Talleyrand and his sovereign, and so the reunion gave rise to an amusing scene described by Nesselrode himself:

> The weather was superb; I made my entry into Paris alone, followed by a Cossack and accompanied by an Austrian officer […] whom I had met *en route*. […] Monsieur de Talleyrand was at his toilette. He rushed, half coiffed, to meet me and threw himself into my arms, covering me with powder. When the initial emotion passed, he summoned the men with whom he was in conspiracy.[25]

The men in question were Duke Dalberg, Archbishop Dominique Dufour de Pradt, and Joseph Dominique, Baron Louis, and all three tried to persuade Nesselrode that the monarchist option was feasible. But the Russian diplomat had not yet rallied to their point of view. However, this first exchange had a major consequence, for Dalberg and Talleyrand submitted to Nesselrode a proposed proclamation that, without formally mentioning the monarchy, already condemned Napoleon's regime: it affirmed that the Allies would no longer deal with Napoleon or any member of his family and called for the constitution of a 'wise government'.

Several hours later, after having presided over the parade of his troops, Alexander I, accompanied by King Frederick William III of Prussia and General Prince Karl Philipp von Schwarzenberg, met Nesselrode and Talleyrand at the Rue Saint-Florentin for a first working meeting. During this crucial council, Talleyrand intervened to promote, not the pure and simple return of the old order (which for him would result in substituting a new despotism for that of Napoleonic despotism), but the establishment of a Bourbon monarchy on the basis of legitimate power, meaning tempered by a constitution.

To overcome the tsar's reservations, Talleyrand began by developing a skilful argument around the principle of 'legitimacy'. The prince did not invent this concept but 'had adopted it because he appreciated its strength and flexibility'.[26] His arguments were simple: in contrast to the Napoleonic despotism based on benefiting a single person, the new regime had to be

based on a principle, both moral and political, that would be recognized by all the courts of Europe and would constitute within the country a gauge of stability, and outside it a gauge of peace:

> Sire, intriguers of more than one kind will agitate around you, but if you forgive the expression, neither you nor I are strong enough to make an intrigue succeed. […] With a principle we can do anything. I propose accepting that of the legitimacy that recalls to the throne the princes of the House of Bourbon. These princes will soon enter into a community of interest with the other sovereign houses of Europe, and these in turn will find a guarantee of stability in the principle that will have saved this ancient family. With this doctrine we will be strong in Paris, in France, in Europe.[27]

Then, as much out of fondness for liberal ideas as for the desire to reassure Alexander I that he was very sensitive to these questions, Talleyrand proposed that the Senate appoint a provisional government and confirm the downfall of Napoleon and constitutional guaranties, if the tsar agreed to support his initiative by a public declaration. At this precise moment, Talleyrand was taking a huge gamble.

But his force of persuasion was working; that afternoon he managed to obtain from the tsar a text that specified:

> The armies of the Allied Powers have occupied the capital of France. The allied Sovereigns welcome the will of the French Nation. They declare […] that they will recognise and guarantee the Constitution that the French Nation will adopt. They consequently invite the Senate to designate a provisional Government that might furnish the needs of the administration and *prepare the constitution that will suit the French People*.[28]

In other words, the adoption of a constitution was to precede the return of the king and to this key idea, Alexander I gave his agreement. On the same day, a note from Nesselrode to the Prefect of Police, Étienne-Denis Pasquier, invited him, by order of Tsar Alexander, to liberate the Frenchmen 'held in prison for having prevented peasants from firing on our troops',[29] or for having manifested an attachment '*to their former and their legitimate* sovereign'.[30] The expression is important because it showed that the idea of the monarchy was taking root, even if the political situation remained uncertain and if at Fontainebleau Napoleon still had supporters and a faithful army.

On 1 April Talleyrand convened the Senate, quite illegally but in conformity with the wishes expressed by the occupying powers. Of the 140 members comprising the upper assembly in the spring of 1814, 90 were still in Paris on 1 April, and of them 64 responded favourably to Prince de Bénévent's

convocation, the others preferring out of prudence to remain apart from what was becoming *de facto* a coup against Napoleon. Among those present we find 'former *constituants*, former *conventionnels*, men of the Revolution who had rallied to the Empire',[31] who would adopt measures conforming to the expectations of Talleyrand and his objectives: a provisional government over which he would preside was established. Composed of five members,[32] mostly close friends of the prince, it had the task of 'supplying administrative needs and presenting to the Senate a projected institution that might be suitable to the French people'.[33] In parallel, to guarantee the country's tranquillity, to avoid unleashing the *revanchist* passions of royalists and to reassure public opinion, the senators also pronounced in favour of preserving and re-establishing essential rights. The minutes of the meeting stated:

> That the army, as well as retired officers and soldiers, widows and pensioned officers, would keep the grades, honours, and pensions they enjoy;
> That there would be no damage to the public debt;
> That the sales of national property will be irrevocably confirmed;
> That no Frenchman could be prosecuted for the political opinions he might have expressed;
> That the freedom of worship and of conscience will be maintained and proclaimed, as well as the freedom of the press, except for legal action against offences that might arise from the abuse of this freedom.[34]

This enumeration is telling: it was indeed a liberal revolution that was played out on the evening of 1 April.

But for Talleyrand, this step did not suffice and the transition had to be pushed forward. On 2 April, the new provisional government met and that very evening, pushed by both the tsar and Talleyrand, the conservative Senate declared that Napoleon Bonaparte was stripped of the throne, that the right of heredity in his family was abolished (Article 1), that the French people and the army were now released from the oath of allegiance (Article 2).[35] And to give more weight and legitimacy to this text, the legislative body approved in its turn the dethronement of the French emperor. On the Russian side there was satisfaction and even enthusiasm, as attested by a letter from Nesselrode to his wife dated 4 April:

> I send you a couple of words, my dearest, to tell you that I am in Paris, that I am well, that I am overburdened with work, that we are doing enormous things, that the Senate has pronounced the dethronement of Napoleon, that the reestablishment of the Bourbons will follow immediately, and that everything is going marvellously.[36]

And in fact in the following days Talleyrand and the tsar seemed to score more points: on 7 April a constitution was promulgated. Inspired by the

liberal principles dear to Talleyrand and to Alexander, it reaffirmed the political rights revoked under the Empire and it sought to limit the authority of the future king. It pronounced in favour of civil liberties, guaranteed freedom of worship and of the press. Moreover, it used strong symbols: Articles 2 and 29 were written in such a way as to place the people at the heart of the political arrangement. They stated: 'The French people freely *call* [not "recall"] to the throne Louis Stanislas Xavier de France, brother of the last king.' 'The present Constitution will be subject to the acceptance of the French people. Louis Stanislas Xavier will be proclaimed king of the French as soon as he has been sworn to and signed it.'[37] It was the triumph of liberal ideas.

But this triumph would not last long: very quickly the political project of Talleyrand, although confirmed by the tsar, would find itself compromised. For the monarchists who surrounded the heir to the throne of France, and in particular the king's brother, the Comte d'Artois, who returned to Paris on 12 April, there was no question of conceding the least constitutional text.

This refusal aroused an immediate reaction from Alexander. On 17 April, in a letter in which the tsar called the future king 'Monsieur Mon Frère' for the first time and in which he announced he was sending Pozzo di Borgo to him, he tried to convince the king to grant a constitutional structure to the new regime:

> … if my enterprises in this holy and stubborn war have been of some utility to the cause of Your Majesty, if I have thereby acquired the right to his friendship and trust, Your Majesty will listen with some interest to General Pozzo di Borgo. […] There is no doubt that the Kingdom of France expects its happiness and its regeneration from Your Majesty, but it is no less true, too, that there exists a general will. It will subjugate all hearts if it manifests liberal ideas tending to maintain and reaffirm the organic institutions of France.[38]

And a few days later, on 1 May, going to Compiègne to meet the king who had just returned to France, Alexander once more affirmed the necessity of promoting liberal institutions. It was difficult, however to convince Louis XVIII: on several occasions he deplored the condescending attitude of the King of France towards him and his apparent refusal to make concessions. Returning from Compiègne, he expressed his disappointment:

> I am sad. I love France; I desire its happiness and I am afraid that this family of Bourbons cannot provide it. The King showed me his proclamation. He dates it from the nineteenth year of his reign. I advised him to remove this date, but he did not appear disposed to do so. I foresee that he will offend many interests and that this is not what will suit France. This grieves me, for it seems that this is my work.[39]

On 2 May, on the eve of his entry into Paris, the king received in Saint-Ouen the provisional government and the constituted bodies, to share with them the tenor of the declaration he had just prepared and that would appear the following day in the *Moniteur* and immediately be posted on placards in the streets of Paris. The king called himself 'Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre', not 'King of the French' by the will of the people or of its representatives in the Senate. Moreover, he rejected the constitutional text of 7 April, judging that the Senate had put together a hasty plan that was unsuitable due to the 'great number of articles bearing the imprint of the haste with which they were written, and in the current form it cannot become the fundamental law of the State',[40] something which raised great concerns for Talleyrand and Alexander.

However, and this of paramount importance, the liberal hopes of the tsar and Talleyrand would not be totally swept aside, since the Saint-Ouen declaration also specified 'that after having read attentively the Senate's draft constitution [we] have recognised that its bases were good.'[41] This final point is obviously fundamental: it attests that if in the beginning of May 1814, the 'King of France was back', at the same time, the Bourbon monarchy that the French were preparing to restore was no longer by divine right, and that the future king agreed to guarantee the population a certain number of political rights and public freedoms. From this point of view, at least, the struggle jointly conducted by the Russian tsar and Talleyrand had not been in vain. By the beginning of May 1814, and this is a fascinating paradox, it was thanks to a Russian autocratic tsar and to an old man – child of the Enlightened eighteenth century – that the French received a constitutional regime.

Notes

1. Two slightly different versions of this letter have survived: the published one appears in Chancellor Nesselrode's papers – *Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850*, ed. Anatole de Nesselrode, 11 vols. (Paris, 1904–1912), vol. 5 (1907), 191–3 – and is dated 13 June 1814. The second one (manuscript notes by a secretary) was acquired by the French diplomatic Archives in 1975 and is dated 1 June. The latter is the version I am using here. This version bears autograph corrections in the hand of Talleyrand but the date is subject to caution: Alexander having left Paris only on 2 June, the letter could not have been written before this date.
2. My italics.
3. Paris, Archives Diplomatiques (hereafter AD), P. 10542, correspondance politique France-Russie, 1814, volume 155.
4. Secret Instructions to *M. de Novosiltzoff*, *Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre I*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887), vol. 2, 43.
5. Letter from Nesselrode to his wife, 10 March 1814, in *Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode*, vol. 5 (1907), 176.
6. Memorandum from Karl de Nesselrode to Metternich, Castlereagh and Hardenberg, Troyes, 1 (13) February 1814, quoted in *Vneshniaia politika Rossii*

XIX i nachala XX-ogo veka. Pervaia seriia: 1801–15, 8 vols (Moscow, 1960–1972), vol. 7 (1970), 568.

7. Friedrich Martens, ed., *Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennyh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami,* 15 vols. (St Petersburg, 1874–1909), vol. 14 (1905), 234.
8. Ibid., 235–6.
9. Ibid., 236.
10. Letter from Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, 14/26 September 1814, in *Correspondance diplomatique du comte Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie en France et du comte de Nesselrode, depuis la Restauration des Bourbons jusqu'au Congrès d'Aix la Chapelle, 1814–1818,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1897), vol. 1, 79.
11. Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Talleyrand, le prince immobile* (Paris, 2003), 424.
12. Ibid., 425.
13. Ibid., 433.
14. See his letter to Princess Dorothea of Courland, dated 20 March, quoted in Henry Houssaye, *1814* (Paris, 1888), 439: 'If the Emperor were killed, his death would ensure the rights of his son who is today as compromised as he is … As long as he lives everything remains uncertain … With the Emperor dead, a regency would satisfy everybody, because they will appoint a council that would please all stripes of opinion and would take measures so that the brothers of the emperor would have no influence whatever on the country's affairs … Burn this letter.'
15. His own expression, quoted by Waresquiel, *Talleyrand*, 276.
16. Quoted by Houssaye, *1814*, 440.
17. Charles Nicollaud, ed., *Récits d'une tante: mémoires de la comtesse de Boigne, née d'Osmond*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1921–1923), vol. 1, 303–4.
18. Vera A. Milchina and Aleksandr L. Ospovat, eds., *Les Russes découvrent la France, au XVIII et au XIXème siècles* (Paris and Moscow, 1990), 120.
19. Ibid., 121.
20. Mikhail Orlov, 'La capitulation de Paris', quoted in Milchina and Ospovat, *Les Russes découvrent la France*, 131.
21. This idea can be found in Waresquiel, *Talleyrand,* 442 and it is repeated in Emmanuel de Waresquiel and Benoit Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration (1814–1830). Naissance de la France moderne* (Paris, 1996), 35.
22. *Alexandrana, ou bons mots et paroles remarquables d'Alexandre Ier pendant son séjour dans Paris* (Paris, 1814), 40.
23. Comtesse de Boigne, quoted in Waresquiel and Yvert, *Histoire de La Restauration*, 31.
24. See Nesselrode's autobiography in: *Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode*, vol. 2 (1904), 113.
25. Ibid., 114.
26. Ibid., 114.
27. Quoted in Waresquiel, *Talleyrand*, 444.
28. *Déclaration d'Alexandre Ier, empereur de Russie, du 31 mars 1814, sur les intentions des puissances alliées à l'égard de la France* (Paris, 1814).
29. Ibid.
30. J. Mavidal and E. Laurent, eds., *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises. Deuxième série (1800 à 1860)*, 127 vols. (Paris, 1862–1912), vol. 12 (1868), 7 (my italics).
31. Waresquiel and Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration,* 37.
32. Apart from Talleyrand, 'Monsieur le Sénateur comte de Beurnonville, Monsieur le Sénateur comte de Jaucourt, Monsieur le duc de Dalberg, Conseiller d'Etat, Monsieur de Montesquiou, ancien membre de l'Assemblée Constituante', Waresquiel and Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration,* 37.

33. *Sénat Conservateur, Documents divers, Procès-Verbal de séances, Messages*: Waresquiel and Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration*, 115.
34. Ibid., 116.
35. The original of this text figured in the collections of the Senate Library. It is all the more interesting because it includes a number of deletions and corrections in its margins that allows us to follow the reasoning of its authors.
36. Letter from Nesselrode to his wife, 4 April 1814 (new style), in *Lettres et Papiers du chancelier de Nesselrode*, vol. 5 (1904), 184–5.
37. See Waresquiel and Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration*, 45–6.
38. Quoted by Martens in *Sobranie traktatov i konventsii,* vol. 11, 259.
39. Hortense de Beauharnais, *Mémoires de la reine Hortense*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1927), vol. 2, 226.
40. *Le Moniteur,* 3 May 1814.
41. Ibid.

6

Russia and Britain in International Relations in the Period 1807–1812

Aleksandr A. Orlov

In 1807, at Tilsit, Russia signed peace and alliance treaties with France, obliging the country to act alongside Napoleon I,[1] something which inevitably pitted Russia against Britain. This chapter analyses the motivation of Alexander I. Discounting military circumstances, the tsar was counting on receiving support from certain circles of the Russian nobility and from the industrial elite. The tsar reasoned that the scarcity of certain products would increase prices, giving Russian manufacturers an advantage.[2] Some members of Russia's ruling circles, particularly the Minister of Commerce and later Foreign Minister Count Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, had plans to re-orientate Russian overseas trade towards France and its dependent states.

The Tilsit treaties, however, outraged a sizeable section of Russian society.[3] In the words of the journalist and writer Faddei V. Bulgarin, 'a war with Britain could rouse no enthusiasm, having no purpose, offering no prospects, and depriving us of the profit from trade'.[4] Nikolai M. Karamzin, in his *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia*, presented to the tsar in March 1811, noted that 'we should have accepted no peace save on honourable terms, which would not have required us to break our profitable commercial relations with England'.[5] The former ambassador in London, Count Semen R. Vorontsov, was deeply disgruntled, suggesting in a letter that the signatories of the Tilsit treaties should make a ceremonial entrance to St Petersburg, riding on the backs of asses.[6] The Tilsit agreements also put Britain in a difficult position. The government of William Cavendish, the Duke of Portland, had no intention of ending the war with France and therefore decided to respond to Russia and Prussia, France's new allies, by blocking the Baltic coast. This action seriously hindered the maritime trade of both countries and served as a constant reminder of Britain's intention to restore diplomatic relations with both but particularly with Prussia. The British wanted to use any means to encourage dissatisfaction in Russia and were aware that a considerable number of Russians opposed the Tilsit alliance, albeit they represented different interests.

Fearing that Denmark might enter into the alliance, Britain launched a pre-emptive strike against Copenhagen[7] The British attack on Copenhagen

and the refusal to engage in peace negotiations with France led to the suspension of British-Russian relations. On 24 October 1807, Alexander I issued a declaration accusing Britain of repeatedly failing to honour its obligations as an ally, and of sending its troops to remote parts of the world (for example, as far as Buenos Aires or Egypt), but never to the aid of its allies.[8] Nevertheless, the declaration ended with the hope of a future reconciliation, provided that Britain were to make peace with France.

This was followed, on 28 October, by a decree imposing an embargo on British ships and goods and freezing the fixed assets of British subjects living in Russia.[9] The decrees of 24 and 28 October for the first time legally formalized a war between Russia and Britain. The pre-Revolutionary historian Nikolai F. Dubrovin called it a 'smokeless war', because there could be no major battles fought on land.[10] Nevertheless, it brought great hardships to Russia, dealing a powerful blow to the country's economy and maritime trade.

In November 1807, the British government retaliated by issuing the so-called 'orders in council', devised by the Foreign Minister, George Canning. All neutral countries were forbidden from trading with Britain's enemies by the threat of confiscation of their ships and cargo. The only exception was for captains who brought their ships into British ports and paid all of the necessary taxes and duties. According to the eminent historian Evgenii V. Tarle, Napoleon was 'enraged in the highest degree' by the measures and prepared to retaliate. On 23 November and 17 December 1807 (new style), he signed decrees, in Milan, which he claimed were a justified response to the 'barbarous system adopted by the English government'.[11] Their purpose was to strengthen the policy of the continental blockade, introduced one year previously.

The Franco-British *impasse* destroyed the entire system of international commercial relations, seriously harming the maritime trade of neutral countries, and of the United States in particular. The historian Aleksei L. Narochnitskii noted that a number of different kinds of blockade were effectively in place at the same time: Napoleon's 1806 'self-imposed blockade' within Europe; the Royal Navy's seizure of trade ships on the open sea; and the 1808–1810 embargo by the United States on ships leaving for Europe.[12] This had a negative effect on both the French economy and the economy of those countries dependent on France. In contrast, Britain was able to enjoy what was effectively a monopoly on the world shipping market and in the colonies.[13]

The official British policy on Russia was declared on 18 December 1807 (new style).[14] The British government stated that having long hoped to maintain relations with Russia it was now obliged to enter the war and was sending a squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral James Saumarez, a comrade of the celebrated naval commander Horatio Nelson, to the Russian coast. The British fleet seized complete control of the North and Baltic Seas, and, in the process, severely damaged the economy of the Kola Peninsula, the Archangel region, and the Baltic provinces,[15] by burning or confiscating

fishing boats,[16] and impounding cargo and post.[17] They seized a small number of Russian trading ships, confiscated their goods and either took their crews prisoner or abandoned them on the shore.[18] As a result, Russian maritime trade was in danger of being completely ruined. Russia's hopes of developing its commercial ties with France were unrealized, because France had no need of most of what Russia exported and was unable to export to Russia because of British dominance at sea.

After Tilsit, the British government focused its efforts on trying to breach the blockade system wherever possible. In 1808, after the outbreak of war in the Iberian Peninsula, the blockade was in effect no longer in place in Portugal and significantly weakened in Spain. This policy did not, however, always lead to success. The coup in Sweden in March 1809 removed King Gustav IV Adolf from the throne, leaving power in the hands of a noble elite which insisted that the new king, Charles XIII, should approach France for help. This was not, however, a catastrophe for British trade in the North and Baltic Seas; it simply meant that the centre of its Baltic trade shifted from the Swedish ports of Landskrona and Gothenburg to Heligoland, a former Danish island, which lies opposite the mouths of the rivers Elbe and Weser. In 1809, Britain signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, with the result that not only were the French driven from the Ionian Islands but also British merchants were able to sell their goods in south-eastern and central Europe through Turkish intermediaries. The cornerstones of the blockade system (the Iberian Peninsula and the Balkans) had thus been broken, rendering it largely meaningless.

The weaker the blockade became, the more desperate Napoleon was to retain control over Russia. He persisted in his harsh economic measures, convinced, or at least wanting to be convinced, that his main enemy faced imminent, unavoidable, destruction. London was still holding out, he reasoned, because France's allies, and Russia in particular, were not enforcing the blockade. Napoleon ensured that his ambassador at St Petersburg, General Armand de Caulaincourt, continued to remind the Russian tsar of the importance of opposing Britain.[19]

In time, the alliance demanded ever-greater sacrifices of Russia. Napoleon, for example, now insisted that Russia should suspend relations with Sweden,[20] which gave rise to a new wave of discontent. On 20 March 1808, a decree prohibited the transport of British-manufactured goods, both on land and at sea, irrespective of the nationality of the people trading in these goods and whether or not the goods had been confiscated.[21] If British goods managed to reach Russia, they had to be sent to the 'nearest foreign place' within a period varying from three days to two weeks. All Russian ships docked in British ports were ordered to return home without cargo.

The effectiveness of these punitive measures in limiting Anglo-Russian trade was questionable. British goods continued to be imported into Russia, though clearly not at the same level as before, through neutral

intermediaries. Some British ships entered Russian ports flying the flag of the United States. The Russian government was able to exploit this loophole because the Tilsit treaties had not prohibited trade with neutral countries, a point that Alexander I often raised when challenged by the French.[22]

In reality, Russia wanted to restore British-Russian trade to its pre-Tilsit levels, and Britain needed Russia's assistance to beat Napoleon. London therefore decided not to launch a large-scale attack on Russia. It was not the case, however, that Russian and British forces never confronted each other. There were a small number of conflicts at sea in which men were killed, wounded, and taken prisoner,[23] and, as mentioned above, entire communities were ruined and civilians were robbed. But all of this was outweighed by the mutual desire of both countries for a possible reconciliation in the future.

In late 1808 and early 1809, Franco-Russian relations showed the first signs of deteriorating. This was a dangerous development for Napoleon because it came soon after he had learned that Austria was preparing for war with Britain's support. He had also received troubling news of a popular revolt in Prussia and that the uprising against French rule in Spain was gaining ground. These were the first signs that Napoleon's European Empire was not as stable as it had seemed; although it was possible to deal with each of these threats individually, the situation suggested the Empire could be in serious danger.

Napoleon offered to meet Alexander I again in the hope that this would strengthen the alliance with Russia, humble Austria and Prussia and show Britain that a united front of continental states was still in existence. The meeting took place in Erfurt in September–October 1808.[24] Contrary to his expectations, however, Napoleon met a very different Alexander I to the mild and compliant man of the Tilsit agreements. Negotiations at the meeting were difficult and, despite Napoleon's best efforts, the Russian side agreed to only one vague promise: that is, to assist France in the case of a war with Austria.[25] In return, Russia was granted the right to occupy Swedish Finland and the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia).

Nevertheless, even the outward appearance of supporting Russia allowed Napoleon to bolster his failing influence elsewhere in Europe and in November–December 1808, he managed to regain lost ground in Spain. At the same time, however, a Fifth Coalition was formed against him by Britain and Austria. By the spring of 1809, with British money (£4,000,000), Austria had armed its 310,000-strong army and, in April, its troops invaded simultaneously Bavaria, northern Italy, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon rushed back from Spain and was able to disperse the Austrians and take Vienna, followed by victory at the battle of Wagram on 5–6 June 1809 (new style). Alexander I managed to provide only symbolic support for his ally by sending General Prince Sergei F. Golitsyn's corps to the Austro-Russian border and ensuring that his troops took no active part in the hostilities.[26]

The battle of Wagram spelled the end for the Fifth Coalition. The British expedition against the port of Antwerp on the river Scheldt in July 1809

was of little use in the struggle against France,[27] and the failure of the expedition led to the fall of Portland's cabinet. Canning accused the Minister of War, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, of being simply incapable of organizing a successful military operation. The quarrel between them ended in a duel, leading to Castlereagh sustaining an injury, to Canning resigning, and Portland resigning along with him.[28] Pressure from Marshal Nicolas Soult's army forced General Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, to order his troops to retreat from Spain into Portugal. The power of the Napoleonic Empire, it seemed, had increased enormously. The British government was deeply concerned,[29] but the British population was on the whole keen for the war to continue, as shown by the fact a group of 'staunch Tories' remained in power. The new government was headed by Prime Minister Spencer Perceval and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Marquess Richard Wellesley (the elder brother of Arthur Wellesley).

British politicians knew that the blockade was affecting France just as much as Britain, if not more so. They also knew that the campaign of 1809, which had resulted in a narrow victory for Napoleon, had not eliminated all pockets of resistance in Europe, as had happened on previous occasions. Indeed, having defeated Austria, Napoleon was then faced with an increasingly estranged Russia, an unstable Duchy of Warsaw, the stirring of national spirit in the German states, and an intensification of the guerrilla war in Spain. All of this, as the British historian Charles Fyffe argued, largely outweighed the results of any victory over Austria.[30] Relations with Russia worsened further still in late 1809 and early 1810 following Napoleon's clumsy attempt to court Alexander I's sisters. Russo-French relations were increasingly strained. Napoleon's aggression was primarily to blame: he was provoking Alexander I into starting a war although the tsar knew that this would be dangerous. The tsar wrote in a draft of the instructions sent to the minister in Berlin, Count Christoph von Lieven that 'we have decided to avoid a break with France at all costs, and under no circumstances to be the instigator of war'.[31]

A new phase in the struggle began on 19 December 1810, when Russia introduced a tariff that significantly increased the duties imposed on most imported goods.[32] In the following year it was made easier for ships from neutral countries to come to Russia.[33] French trade was hit particularly badly since duties were raised sharply on luxury goods and alcohol. The French government strongly protested and the Foreign Minister, Jean-Baptiste de Nonpère de Champagny, asked the Russian ambassador in Paris whether an exception might not be made for France. The ambassador promised to bring the request to the attention of Alexander I, but explained that he thought it likely to be denied.[34] France once again accused Russia of a secret commitment to Britain; the Russian government responded by reassuring Napoleon that the terms of the blockade would be strictly enforced.[35] France then demanded proof: a tightening of the rules on neutral trade and permission for French customs officials to operate in Russian ports. By this

stage, Napoleon abandoned any semblance of restraint and began to behave like a dictator. As far as he was concerned there was nothing to lose; either the Russian tsar would break the terms of the alliance and be defeated, or the tsar would be the one to start the war, becoming the aggressor and thus could be punished. Russia's recent tactics in the Franco-Austrian war were still fresh in Napoleon's memory.

Alexander I countered this intense pressure by making concessions orally but ignoring Napoleon's demands in practice. Russia's ruling circles, of course, were not in favour of France. Alexander I was beginning to move towards restoring relations with Britain as a way of avoiding commercial and financial collapse. His first step was to lower the penalties for violating the blockade. By this point, it was clear that the Tilsit alliance had no future. It offered Alexander I not even the slightest possibility of realizing his long-held ambition of creating a European security system.[36] For this reason the tsar had decided to break with Napoleon by early 1812. Nevertheless, the tsar did not want to be the one to start the war, wishing to lay bare the aggressive nature of French foreign policy for all in Europe to see.

In fact, the decision to go to war had already been taken in Paris, leaving Alexander I with little time to prepare. He needed to establish relations with Britain but, as far as is known, there had been no direct contact between the two countries. Through the former Neapolitan Ambassador at St Petersburg, Duke Antonio Maresca Donnorso di Serracapriola, and with the assistance of Semen R. Vorontsov and Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, a long-time enemy of Napoleon, Britain was informed of the conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty: Russia demanded financial aid and British assistance in coming to terms with the Ottoman Empire.[37]

From May 1811, the negotiations with the Turks were led by the commander of the Moldovan Army, Mikhail I. Kutuzov, and former Envoy to Constantinople, Andrei Ia. Italinskii.[38] They came into contact with a young British diplomat, the brilliant Charles Stratford Canning, nephew of George Canning, and, later, with the experienced diplomat who replaced him, Robert Liston.

The behaviour of the British representatives in Constantinople demonstrated that Britain wished to assist Russia in making peace with the Ottoman Empire but was also trying to prevent the country from gaining any further influence in the Near East and Central Asia. For this reason, Britain sought to act as guarantor of the treaty. But Kutuzov took decisive action, agreeing, after further reflection, to make concessions on the question of territory. Thus, with Alexander I's approval, the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Bucharest was signed on 28 May 1812 (new style) without the participation of Britain.

In the north, Sweden, which was governed by Charles XIV (i.e. the former Marshall Jean Baptiste Bernadotte) from 21 August 1810 (new style), in place of the ailing Charles XIII, began to consider an alliance with Russia.

Napoleon had thought that Charles XIV would be a trusted ally in the fight against Britain and Russia, but the crown prince had soon realized the danger of supporting France, which would have required him to enforce the continental blockade. So he began to look into the possibility of an alliance with Britain and, by extension, with Russia. The British promised to protect him from France and to restore trade. Alexander I, keen to secure Finland, was prepared to assist Sweden in annexing Norway.[39]

Britain and Sweden understood that Napoleon could not be defeated without Russian support. Thus in early March or late April, through his Adjutant General Count Carl Axel Löwenhielm, Charles XIV offered to act as mediator for Alexander I in the restoration of relations between Russia and Britain. The sides quickly found a common language and Russia and Sweden formed an alliance on 5 April (new style).[40] This was the only alliance that Alexander I managed to form before the War of 1812. Behind Sweden stood Britain, and France's enemies were counting on soon receiving London's mighty military and financial assistance, as well as the support of the Royal Navy.

Napoleon had lost the alliances with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, which is why he attached so much importance to the alliance with Prussia and Austria. But it seemed that these states, which had been drawn into France's sphere of influence by force, were also prepared to listen to offers from Russia. Alexander I did not intend to miss the opportunity to split up the enemy powers. In the autumn of 1811, he sent Lieven a draft of a new treaty of alliance with Prussia.[41] At the very last moment, however, the Prussian King, Frederick William III, refused to sign it and his representative, Colonel Karl Friedrich von dem Knesebeck, told Alexander I that Prussia intended to form an alliance with France. Alexander insisted to Knesebeck that neutral trade was essential to his country, stating that:

> I strictly adhere to the all of the terms of the treaties. Russia has no relations with England and does not conduct any trade with that country. Ask our merchants and landowners how much Russian trade has been restricted. It is not possible to restrict it any further by prohibiting neutral trade, [which is] already so negligible. As the sovereign, I have a duty to my people, and I must fulfil it.

Knesebeck replied that the blockade, the purpose of which was to secure the freedom of the seas, was being jeopardized by Russia's trade with the United States, a situation that was bound to cause a war with France. Alexander I replied that:

> In any case, I was not required to prevent neutral trade and so I will not start a war. The people have their rights, which I must to take into account, and chief among them is the right to exist. To concede in this case, when my troops are ready, would amount to weakness.[42]

Knesebeck's mission did not secure a result; its only significance was to confirm Alexander's decision not to submit to Napoleon. It is also important to note the tsar's liberal statements about his people's rights and a monarch's duties, which present a clear contrast with Napoleon's thunderous speeches.

In March 1812, Frederick William III formed an alliance with France.[43] A few weeks later, Napoleon managed to form an alliance with the Austrian emperor, Francis I. Alexander I had suffered yet another serious diplomatic defeat, but even this event betrayed the signs of a wider distrust towards Napoleon. In a meeting with the Russian Minister to Austria, Count Gustav Ernst von Stackelberg, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, promised that the Austrian army would not exceed 26,000 men. He also said that he was prepared to enter into a secret agreement preventing Austrian troops in Galicia and Transylvania from attacking Russia.[44] This was the network of relations that Alexander I had to accept.[45]

As Britain was preparing for a Russo-French war, the government was hit by a crisis. On 11 May 1812, Perceval was assassinated by the merchant John Bellingham in the lobby of the House of Commons.[46] The new prime minister was Robert Jenkinson, the Earl of Liverpool, a man who, as the English historian John Green noted, was not particularly able but mastered the art of smoothing over disagreements.[47] Castlereagh was made foreign minister, intending to lead British foreign policy single-handedly.[48] His first act as minister, on 23 June 1812, was to revoke the 'orders in council' introduced under Canning. Castlereagh thereby hoped to secure a reconciliation with the United States, but he had already lost his chance.[49] On 18 June (new style), just six days before Napoleon invaded Russia, the United States Congress declared war on Britain. The Anglo-American conflict naturally played to France's advantage and was yet another major setback for its opponents. Russian diplomats tried to prevent the break, but their efforts came to nothing because Castlereagh would allow no intermediary in his relations with the United States.[50]

On the eve of war, Napoleon once again tried to cause a split in the ranks of his enemies. On 17 April 1812, the new French Foreign Minister, Hugues-Bernard Maret, Duke of Bassano, sent Castlereagh a letter offering Britain a peace with France. London not only refused this provocative offer, but, through Edward Thornton, its unofficial representative in Stockholm, immediately informed the Russians.[51] Napoleon then sent Adjutant General Count Louis de Narbonne to Vilnius in May 1812. He was sent to convince the Russian tsar that France was genuinely trying to reach an agreement, thus masking the fact that France was almost ready for war. Furthermore, Narbonne was instructed to give Rumiantsev a note from Maret, informing him of the fact that Britain had offered to make peace with France. The French emperor wanted to sow the seeds of mistrust between Britain and Russia but Narbonne failed in his mission. Alexander I insisted that it was Napoleon who was not respecting the terms of the Tilsit treaties and

he categorically denied that he had any plans for an alliance with Britain, although by that time he had already made a formal offer of peace. He wanted to show Europe who was really the warmonger.

The rapprochement between Britain and Russia became more and more obvious in March–April 1812. The war with France was inevitable, and both sides tried to provoke the other. On 6 April 1812, Alexander I, through his Minister of Naval Military Forces, Admiral Marquis Ivan (Jean) de Traverse, ordered that British ships were not to be attacked and that they were to be allowed to dock. On 19 May, Castlereagh informed Thornton that Saumarez had received an order from the British Admiralty 'to allow all Russian ships to go under the protection of Swedish forces, so that they experience no trouble from English cruisers, and to take measures so as to ensure that Russian boats and military ships receive the greatest attention and protection'.[52]

By this time, Alexander I had worked out his position regarding Britain and France. On 11 June 1812, he wrote to his sister, Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna: 'I hope to be able to inform you of a peace with England in the near future, but until then – say nothing'.[53]

It was possible for the tsar to affect a *volte-face* in his foreign policy because public opinion in Russia was on the whole ready for such a change. Hopes of cultivating trade within the blockade system had been abandoned. People from all social classes (principally, of course, merchants) openly celebrated the rapprochement with Britain. However, although Russia and Britain were both keen to resume relations, the official negotiations proved more complicated than expected. The British government seriously doubted that Russia would be able to withstand Napoleon's onslaught for long.[54] Furthermore, it insisted that commercial relations be restored to their pre-1807 status, that is, that the tariff of 19 December 1810 be removed.[55] The Russian government, for its part, insisted that Britain took responsibility for Russia's debts to Holland, and that it provided Russia with arms and military equipment and Sweden with the necessary subsidies to wage a war.[56]

Napoleon's invasion of Russia put an end to these disputes. Alexander I found himself in an extremely difficult position; he dropped the demands that the British had found unacceptable and signed a treaty with no preconditions. On 14 June 1812 (new style), he sent a personal letter to Prince Regent George from his camp at Drissa, stating: 'This is the final and decisive struggle for freedom from enslavement, for liberal ideas in the face of tyranny.' It became essential for a coalition to be formed between Russia, Britain, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily (the one part of the Neapolitan kingdom that had remained independent from France). 'Anything done for the sake of our aim is beautiful; anything that prevents its successful completion is nothing but evil for the common cause', wrote Alexander I. He again accused Britain of 'egoism', a fault that he thought had given rise to the situation in the first place, but expressed his hope that Britain would

in this case have different priorities. Knowing that Britain had doubts about Russia's ability to resist Napoleon, he asked only for what would help the common cause, also pointing out that British assistance was absolutely necessary to Sweden. He had 'decided to fight to the bitter end and draw it out as long as possible', he told the prince regent at the end of his letter.[57]

The Anglo-Russian peace treaty was finally signed on 18 June (new style) in the Swedish city of Örebro.[58] A corresponding treaty was signed between Britain and Sweden on the same day. Most scholars see this as an unmitigated success for France's enemies. But the historian Vadim V. Roginskii argues that the treaty was a failure for the Russians, because it did not secure them any active assistance from Britain. He noted that British passivity also made it possible for Sweden not to honour the terms of the Russo-Swedish treaties, and to remain effectively neutral in the war.[59] Russia had also failed to convince Britain to honour its 'Dutch debt'.[60]

Russian diplomacy, in my view, could not have achieved any more. The Treaty of Örebro was not only a peace treaty, but effectively also an alliance treaty, since its third article spoke of mutual assistance in the case of one of the sides being attacked by the enemy.[61] Given that the war was already underway, Alexander I expected this to be acted on very soon. At the same time, he did not want to replace French hegemony with British hegemony. This is why the tsar had tried to insist on conditions that would have allowed him to strengthen his country's army and financial system. But in 1812 Russia had no real leverage in its dealings with Britain. In the end, Alexander I withdrew almost all of his demands, insisting neither that the British send troops to the continent, nor that they grant any subsidies and asked only for arms. His plan to form a new coalition had not been successful.

A gruelling war with Napoleon was looming on the horizon. Neither Britain nor Sweden could offer any direct help on land during the hostilities of the campaign. (On 20 June 1812, an alliance treaty was signed with representatives from the Central Junta of Spain. But there was no sense in waiting for Spanish assistance because the country had been ravaged by war.) Alexander I had no less of a difficult diplomatic struggle with British ministers, who constantly demanded that he commit himself to a complete victory over France. Yet the treaties signed at Örebro laid the foundations for the Sixth Coalition, which went on to destroy the Napoleonic Empire in 1814.

Notes

1. For the text of the treaties, see *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v. Dokumenty rossiiskogo Ministerstva inostrannykh del* (hereafter *VPR*), 17 vols. to date (Moscow, 1960–), vol. 3 (1963), 637–42 (No. 257) and 644–6 (No. 258).
2. Nikolai N. Firsov, *1812 god v sotsiologo-psikhologicheskom osveshchenii (obshchaia kharakteristika)* (Moscow, 1913), 57–8, prilozhenie 1: 'Protokol konferentsii ministra kommertsii gr. N P. Rumiantseva, ministra voennykh sukhoputnykh sil i

glavnokomanduiushchego v Peterburge S. K. Viazmitinova i ministra iustitsii kn. P. V. Lopukhina ot 6 noiabria 1807 g' (copy approved on 15 November 1807).

3. For more on this, see Nikolai F. Dubrovin, 'Russkaia zhizn' v nachale XIX v.', *Russkaia starina*, 96, 12 (1898): 493–513; V. V. Pugachev, 'Otnoshenie v Rossii k Til'zitskomu miru', *Uchenye zapiski Molotovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. A. M. Gor'kogo*, 8, 2 (Molotov [Perm'], 1953): 215–24; Aleksandr A. Orlov, 'Dokumental'noe svidetel'stvo o reaktsii russkogo obshchestva na Til'zitskii mir', *Vestnik arkhivista*, 1 (2008): 269–93.
4. Faddei V. Bulgarin, *Vospominaniia Faddeia Bulgarina. Otryvki iz vidennogo, slyshannogo i ispytannogo v zhizni*, 6 vols. (St Petersburg, 1847–1849), vol. 3 (1847), 327, 333.
5. Nikolai M. Karamzin, *Zapiska o drevnei i novoi Rossii v ee politicheskom i grazhdanskom otnosheniiakh* (Moscow, 1991), 54.
6. Petr I. Bartenev, ed., *Arkhiv kniazei Vorontsovykh*, 40 vols. (Moscow, 1870–1895) vol. 17 (1880), 172: Semen R. Vorontsov to his son Mikhail S. Vorontsov, 1 October 1807 (new style).
7. For the British government's declaration of 25 September 1807 (new style), justifying the bombardment of Copenhagen as a response to the danger posed by France, se: Moscow, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi imperii (hereafter AVPRI), f. 133, op. 468, d. 6810, t. 1, ll. 374–75 (Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs papers).
8. For the text of the declaration, see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii. Pervaia seriia*, 45 vols. (St Petersburg, 1830) (hereafter PSZ), vol. 39, no. 22653, 1306–1308. The copy held in AVPRI (in French) is dated 26 October (7 November) 1807: *VPR*, vol. 4 (1965), 98–101 (No. 37).
9. For the text of the decree, see *PSZ*, vol. 29, no. 22664, 1316.
10. Nikolai F. Dubrovin, 'Russkaia zhizn' v nachale XIX v.', *Russkaia starina*, 107 (1901): 449–50.
11. Evgenii V. Tarle, 'Kontinental'naia blokada', in Evegenii V. Tarle, ed., *Sochineniia v dvenadtsati tomakh*, 12 vols. (Moscow, 1958), vol. 3, 199.
12. Aleksei L. Narochnitskii, 'Ob istoricheskom znachenii kontinental'noi blokady', *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 6 (1965): 53.
13. Vladlen G. Sirotkin, 'Kontinental'naia blokada i russkaia ekonomika (obzor frantsuzskoi i russkoi literatury)', in V. I. Shankov, ed., *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii XVIII i pervoi poloviny XIX v.* (Moscow, 1969), 65.
14. For the text of the declaration, see AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 6810, t. 2, ll. 592–4. For a Russian translation, see Ibid., ll. 615–29 ob.
15. Ibid., f. 1, II–6 (1808), d. 7, ll. 66–66ob. (Administrative affairs); Ibid., f. 132, op. 506, d. 1, l. 154 (Vasilii G. Lizakevich's report to the College of Foreign Affairs, 13/25 June 1809); I. F. Ushakov, 'Napadenie angliiskogo voennogo flota na Murman v 1809 g.', in Iu. N. Klimova, ed., *Istoriko-filologicheskii sbornik* (Murmansk, 1959), 3–6.
16. AVPRI, f. 1, I–9 (1812), d. 3, ll. 100–1ob. The papers relating to the Patriotic War of 1812 have been collected and published by Petr I. Shchukin, *Sbornik starinnykh bumag, khraniashchikhsia v Muzee P. I. Shchukina*, 10 vols. (Moscow, 1896–1902), vol. 9 (1901), 119.
17. AVPRI, f. 1, II–5 (1809), d. 10, ll. 1–8; Ibid., f. 132, op. 506, d. 54, l. 312ob; St Petersburg, Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi Natsional'noi Biblioteki im. M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina (hereafter OR RNB), f. 152, op. 1, d. 237, ll. 3–5 (Papers of Konstantin A. Voenskii).
18. AVPRI, f. 1, II–5 (1801), d. 13, ch. I–IV; Bulgarin, *Vospominaniia*, vol. 6 (1849), 124; Aleksandr A. Orlov, 'Dva pis'ma o sud'bakh rossiiskikh moriakov v Anglii

v 1809–1815 gg.', in *Epokha Napoleonovskikh voin: liudi, sobytiia, idei: materialy II nauchnoi konferentsii. Moskva, 29 aprelia 1999 g.* (Moscow, 1999), 16–21.

19. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, *Diplomaticheskie snosheniia Rossii i Frantsii po doneseniiam poslov imperatorov Aleksandra i Napoleona, 1808–1812 gg.*, 7 vols. (St Petersburg, 1905–1914), vol. 2 (1905), 225, 231, 253, 259, 270, 301.
20. For a text of the declaration of the break of 16 March 1808, see AVPRI, f. 161, I–10 (1808), op. 28 (dopolnitel'naia), d. 544, ll. 5–7ob (St Petersburg main archive papers).
21. For the text of the decree, see *PSZ*, vol. 30, no. 22908, 145.
22. On this, see Aleksandr N. Popov, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*, vol. 1*: Snosheniia Rossii s evropeiskimi derzhavami pered voinoiu 1812 g.* (Moscow, 1905), 35, 37, 60, 70–1, 76–7, 80–1, 162.
23. On the hostilities between the Russian and British navies, see Nikolai D. Kallistov, 'Flot v tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra I', in A. N. Griniskii, N. L. Klado, eds., *Istoriia russkoi armii i flota*, 15 vols (Moscow, 1911–1913), vol. 9 (1913), 142–7; [William] D. Dzheims, *Istoriia Velikobritanskogo flota ot vremen Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii po Navarinskoe srazhenie*, 6 vols. (St Petersburg, 1845), vol. 5, 12–18, 186–8; Fred T. Jane, *The Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present and Future* (London, 1899), 124–6.
24. For more on this, see Sergei N. Iskiul', 'Erfurt, osen' 1808 g.: poslednee svidanie imperatorov', *Istoriia v podrobnostiakh*, no. 12, 18 (2011): 28–39.
25. For the texts, see F. F. Martens, *Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennykh Rossieiu s inostrannymi derzhavami*, 15 vols. (St Petersburg, 1874–1909), vol. 14 (1905), 68–73 (No. 498).
26. On the actions, or inactions, of Golitsyn's corps, see 'Zapiski Ivana Stepanovicha Zhirkevicha. 1789–1848 gg.', *Russkaia starina*, 9, 2 (1874): 242–4; N. I. Kazakov, 'Taina russkoi strategii v avstro-frantsuzskoi voine 1809 g.', *Istoriia SSSR*, 6 (1969): 63–80. For Golitsyn's reports to Alexander I of May–September 1809, see Moscow, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA), f. 410 (Collection VUA), op. dopolnitel'naia, d. 126, ll. 1–16 (Collection of the history of the people of the USSR).
27. On the British expedition to Walcheren, see Albert Sorel', *Evropa i Frantsuzskaia revoliutsiia. Tom 7: Kontinental'naia blokada–Velikaia imperiia, 1806–1812* (St Petersburg, 1906), 310–12, 314–15, 317, 321; Dzheims, *Istoriia velikobritanskogo flota*, vol. 5, 137–47.
28. D. R. Grin, *Kratkaia istoriia angliiskogo naroda*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1900), 377.
29. Ibid., 376–77.
30. Charles A. Fyffe, *Istoriia Evropy XIX veka*, trans. from 2nd Edition by M. V. Luchitskaya, ed. I. V. Luchitskii, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1889), vol. 1 (1792–1814), 313–4, 317.
31. As cited in Popov, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*, 389 (draft of 7 February 1811).
32. For the text of the tariff, see *PSZ*, vol. 45 (Book of Tariffs), part 3, 58–62.
33. For the text, see *PSZ*, vol. 31, no. 24464, 486–92.
34. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 683.
35. See Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, vol. 14 (1905), 157, 163; Albert Vandal', *Napoleon i Aleksandr I. Franko-russkii soiuz vo vremia Pervoi Imperii*, 3 vols. (St Petersburg, 1910–1913), vol. 3 (1913), 312, 367–8.
36. For more on this, see Aleksandr A. Orlov, *Soiuz Peterburga i Londona. Rossiisko-britanskie otnosheniia v epokhu napoleonovskikh voin* (Moscow, 2005), 12–5.
37. Vadim V. Roginskii, *Shvetsiia i Rossiia. Soiuz 1812 goda* (Moscow, 1978), 99; Vladlen G. Sirotkin, *Duel' dvukh diplomatii. Rossiia i Frantsiia v 1801–1812 gg.* (Moscow, 1966), 194–5.

38. On this, see A. N. Shapkina, 'Polkovodets M. I. Kutuzov i Bukharestskii mir', in Anatolii V. Ignat'ev, I. S. Rybachenok and Genadii A. Sanin, eds., *Rossiiskaia diplomatiia v portretakh* (Moscow, 1992), 120–34.
39. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 275, (No. 111): Rumiantsev to the Russian chargé d'affaires in Stockholm, Baron P. A. Nikolai, 29 January/10 February 1812. On this, see Roginskii, *Shvetsiia i Rossiia*, 79–80, 102, 104.
40. For the text of the treaty, see *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 324–8 (No. 130).
41. For the text of the draft, see Popov, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*, 424–5 (manuscript written by Alexander I).
42. Cited in Popov, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*, 443–4. On Knesebeck, see also *VPR*, vol. 6, 725 (primechanie 296).
43. For a thorough examination of the Franco-Prussian treaty of 7 March 1812, see Popov, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda*, 449–50.
44. Ibid., 490.
45. For more details, see F. A. Fedorova and T. I. Mikhailova, 'Avstro-russkie otnosheniia nakanune i v period Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4 (1962): 95–120.
46. On the Bellingham affair, see Spencer Walpole, *The Life of R[igh]t Hon[orable] Spencer Perceval including His Correspondence with Numerous Distinguished Persons*, 2 vols. (London, 1874), vol. 2, 295–300; Orlov, *Soiuz Peterburga i Londona*, 189–90.
47. Grin, *Kratkaia istoriia angliiskogo naroda*, vol. 3, 383.
48. Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812–1815: Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe* (London, 1931), 20, 44–5.
49. Grin, *Kratkaia istoriia angliiskogo naroda*, vol. 3, 383.
50. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 541 (No. 227): Russian envoy to Philadelphia, Prince A. Ia. Dashkov to the US Secretary of State James Monroe, 2/14 August 1812. For more on this, see Viktor V. Bolkhovitinov, *Stanovlenie russko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii, 1775–1815 gg.* (Moscow, 1966), 515–62.
51. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 391–3 (No. 157): Sukhtelen to Rumiantsev, 28 April/10 May 1812.
52. St Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voenno-morskogo flota, f. 25 (I. I. Traverse), op. 1, d. 89, l. 24a (Russian translation). On this, see also AVPRI, f. 132, op. 506, d. 56, l. 162 ob. (Russian Consul in Stockholm's report to the College of Foreign Affairs, 10/22 May 1812, no. 3).
53. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, *Perepiska imperatora Aleksandra I s sestroi kniaginei Ekaterinoi Pavlovnoi* (St Petersburg, 1910), 35.
54. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 473 (No. 193): Rumiantsev to Aleksander I, 4/16 July 1812.
55. *VPR*, 440 (No. 175): Rumiantsev to Sukhtelen, 10/22 July 1812.
56. *VPR*, 398–99 (No. 159): Sukhtelen to Rumiantsev, 29 April/11 May 1812; Adolphus W. Ward and George P. Gooch, eds, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919*, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1922–1923) (hereafter: *CHBFP*), vol. 1, 385; Ward and Gooch, Appendix G, 595 (Thornton to Castlereagh, 16 April 1812 new style).
57. *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 465 (No. 189).
58. For the text of the treaty, see *PSZ*, vol. 32, No. 25177, 389–90; Martens, *Sobranie traktatov*, vol. 11 (1895), 162–5 (No. 412); *VPR*, vol. 6 (1962), 491–3 (No. 199).
59. Roginskii, *Shvetsiia i Rossiia*, 118, 158–9.
60. *CHBFP*, vol. 1, Appendix G, 598–9 (Thornton's reports, 31 May to 30 July 1812 new style).
61. For a different opinion on this question, see Leonid A. Zak, *Angliia i germanskaia problema (iz diplomaticheskoi istorii Napoleonovskikh voin)* (Moscow, 1963), 55–6.

7

Russia, Napoleon and the Threat to British India

David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye

This volume is about the monumental struggle between Napoleonic France and Russia at the turn of the nineteenth century.[1] While a fight to the death, its duration pales in comparison to Russia's clash with the Anglo-Saxon world, which spanned large stretches of the past 200 years. Yet unlike the Second World War, except for the Crimea in the mid-1850s, the latter confrontation involved remarkably little direct combat. Whether Eastern Question, Great Game or Cold War, the adversaries were well aware of the terrible cost an armed clash might bring. Rather than meeting on the battlefield, they preferred diplomatic intrigue and military operations against third parties.

During the Victorian era, this rivalry between Slav and Anglo-Saxon focused on Central Asia in a conflict that Rudyard Kipling popularized as the Great Game.[2] The Great Game's playing fields stretched from the ancient Persian Empire in the west, through Afghanistan and the immense uncharted lands that separated Russian Siberia from British India. Despite the sobriquet's gentlemanly connotations, the Great Game was a deadly serious struggle for mastery over the Asian heartland. To Queen Victoria, the stakes were nothing less than a question of Russian or British world supremacy'.[3]

As in the twentieth century's Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, both sides employed similar tactics in the Great Game, including subversion, espionage and covert operations. Count Karl von Nesselrode, Nicholas I's foreign minister, aptly dubbed it 'a tournament of shadows'.[4] Historians still argue about St Petersburg's motives in Central Asia, but there was no question about what drove London; namely, the fear of tsarist designs on India. Britain's prime directive in Asia for much of the nineteenth century was to check the Russian bear's seemingly inexorable advance on what Lord George Curzon called 'the noblest trophy of British genius and the most splendid appanage of the British Crown'.[5]

The Great Game began well after the Corsican parvenu had been banished to St Helena. Like the Cold War, it may simply have been the result of the

inevitable discord that arises when there are two great powers relatively evenly matched in military power in the world. Yet, even if the Great Game took place during the post-Napoleonic era, its origins also partly lie in the Napoleonic Wars. And they constitute a fascinating chapter in the story of Russia's uneasy relationship with Napoleon before the Grande Armée crossed the Niemen River in 1812.

It took France a long time to recover from the trauma of losing most of its South Asian colonies to Great Britain during the Seven Years' War. Giving up New France was much less painful. After all, when the two powers met in Paris to negotiate the peace in 1763, Bourbon diplomats preferred to regain tiny Guadeloupe's sugar plantations rather than Canada's bleak acres of snow.[6] India, with its fabled riches and venerable civilization, was a different matter altogether. During the years after the war Louis XV's energetic foreign minister, Étienne François, duc de Choiseul, endeavoured as best he could to restore Bourbon prestige and avenge Albion's humiliations.

Choiseul understood that a direct assault on the British East India Company's possessions in the subcontinent was impractical. But Egypt, which offered more direct access to South Asia than the lengthy voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, would be a good stepping-stone. Furthermore, as Choiseul pointed out, the land could serve as an '*entrepôt* of a universal commerce' to supplant British primacy in the India trade.[7] Egypt was then a vassal of France's long-standing Ottoman ally. Nevertheless, King Louis XVI's foreign office sent a diplomat with extensive experience in the Near East, François, baron de Tott, on a reconnaissance in 1777. Tott reported back that Egypt's weak military and chaotic politics made it an easy prey. Indeed, he was certain that its population would welcome French rule.[8]

If the time was not ripe for the king to undertake an expedition to the Nile, during the more ambitious years that followed his beheading the young republic reconsidered the idea. Within a fortnight of his appointment as foreign minister in July 1797, Charles de Talleyrand-Périgord urged the five-man Directory, then France's rulers, to invade Egypt and aim for India. At first the quintet did not jump at the idea. However, when early in the following year a rising general who had just won fame in the Italian campaign also proposed an 'expedition to the Levant as a menace to the British trade in the Indies', the Directory gave its consent.[9]

According to his biographers, Napoleon had already developed a passion for the East during his youth.[10] His brother Lucien recalls that, as a frustrated 25-year-old artillery subaltern in May 1793, the future emperor had startled his family when he announced that he might well offer his services to the British East India Company. He reasoned 'There was a land where a man can make his fortune', promising to 'return within a few years as a rich nabob bearing generous dowries for your sisters'.[11]

With Napoleon in command, the mission's orders were to invade and occupy Egypt. Once the Isthmus of Suez was safely in the republic's hands, a fleet would assemble in the Red Sea. While the orders did not state it explicitly, the navy's eventual destination was understood to be India, where French troops would join their native allies.[12] Most prominent among the latter was Tipu Sultan, who ruled over the independent Muslim Kingdom of Mysore in southern India. Having already waged three wars with the East India Company, the Sultan was a fierce Anglophobe; one of his favourite possessions was a life-size automaton of a tiger about to devour an English officer that a Frenchman had given him.[13]

Napoleon's new campaign was no military success. While it took less than a month to defeat Egypt's Mameluk defenders at the Battle of the Pyramids and occupy Cairo, Admiral Nelson soon sank the French fleet at Aboukir Bay. For the French, now entirely isolated, there was no hope of success. In little over a year Napoleon abandoned his *Armée de l'Orient* to an uncertain fate as he quietly scurried back to France. As for his Indian ally, Tipu Sultan had already met his end in May 1799, when the British stormed his fortress of Srirangapatna.

The setback did not discourage the Corsican from his ambition to plant the *tricolor* on South Asian soil. In later years, during his banishment on St Helena, he mused: 'For a long time I dreamt of successfully invading India, but I was always thwarted.'[14] Napoleon was not the only emperor to entertain such reveries.

Catherine II possibly also thought of invading India. Even more than Napoleon, Catherine's imagination was seduced by the Orient.[15] She repeatedly sought to establish overland commercial links with the subcontinent, albeit without any success. And in 1796, the last year of her life, she had ordered the brother of her current favourite, Valerian A. Zubov, to occupy Persia and 'open up the routes to India'.[16] According to a possibly apocryphal account, five years earlier the empress had even seriously considered the scheme of a certain 'Monsieur de St Germain' to invade the colony during a time of heightened tension with Britain. While Catherine warmed to the idea, her former intimate, Prince Grigorii A. Potemkin, convinced her that it was hopelessly impractical.[17]

More firmly rooted in historical fact was the remarkable plan by her son, Paul I, to send 20,000 Cossacks from Orenburg via Khiva, Bukhara and Afghanistan to the Indus River during the War of the Second Coalition.[18] Like his mother, the tsar had initially endeavoured to stay aloof from the revolutionary turmoil that was engulfing Western Europe when he acceded to the throne in 1796. But when Napoleon seized Malta on his way to Egypt two years later, he felt obligated to intervene. To Paul, who saw himself as the patron of the Catholic knights who had been based on the island, the French invasion was a clear *casus belli*.[19]

Russia now joined Austria and Britain, among others, in the war against Revolutionary France. Although General Aleksandr V. Suvorov led a brilliant campaign in Italy, the arrogance of his Austrian allies alienated the tsar. He was also enraged by Britain's refusal to honour its promise to yield Malta after the Royal Navy had expelled the French. Therefore, by 1800 Paul was more than open to Napoleon's entreaties to switch sides.[20] Although he stopped short of formally declaring war on Britain, the tsar restored Catherine II's League of Armed Neutrality against the island kingdom together with Denmark, Sweden and Prussia. In response, the Royal Navy hastened to make sail for the Baltic Sea.[21]

Paul decided on a different theatre to confront his new foe. On 12 January 1801, he issued an order to Cavalry General Vasilii P. Orlov, the Ataman of the Don Cossack host, to gather his men and proceed from Orenburg through the Kirghiz Steppe, Khiva and Afghanistan to the Indus River. According to the imperial rescript:

> The English are planning to attack me as well as my Swedish and Danish allies with their fleet and army. I am ready to take them on, but I must go on the offensive and attack them where the pain will be greatest and their expectations least. Their dominions in India are best of all. It will take us three, four months at the most, to march from Orenburg to India – All India's riches will be your reward.[22]

A second decree explained that the Ataman's mission was to: 'destroy all [British political and economic domination], liberate the oppressed from their overlords, gently bring them under our dependence, and divert their trade to us.'[23]

Some have suggested that the campaign had actually been Napoleon's idea. Sometime before 1840, notes for a planned 'expedition by land organized by the First Consul and Paul I' were discovered among the papers of the Swedish ambassador to the Russian court at the time, Count Curt von Stedingk. The project called for the two rulers to assemble an army of 70,000 troops that would rendezvous in northern Persia and proceed south via Afghanistan to India. There was also a copy of correspondence between Paul and Napoleon in which the former reassuringly explained that these lands were abundant with food and fodder. The tsar added that 'the second Alexander', Nader Shah of Persia, had successfully attacked the Moghul emperor six decades earlier by the same route. Paul confidently expected that the advance would take little more than a month.[24]

There appears to be no such plan in any French or Russian archive.[25] Furthermore, the chronology is inconsistent with the actual Russian expedition. Napoleon's envoy, General Géraud Duroc, only arrived in St Petersburg with the French plan towards the end of May 1801, five months after the tsar's command. The relevant archival documents all indicate that Paul was acting entirely on his own when he ordered his Cossacks to India.[26]

Russian intelligence about the route to India was limited. According to the tsar, 'my maps only go as far as Khiva and the Amu Darya'. He reassuringly told the Ataman 'Gathering details [about the way beyond] is your affair.'[27] Nevertheless, Orlov duly gathered a force of 22,507 cavalry and horse artillery, including some 500 Kalmyks. Translators competent in Khivan, Bukharan, Persian and Hindi also joined the group.[28] Meanwhile, Paul freed the disgraced Major-General Matvei I. Platov to command the first echelon.[29]

By 27 February, the Cossacks were on the move. They initially rode at about 30 to 40 kilometres a day, but the harsh winter weather soon slowed the pace. Because of the previous year's poor harvest, for several days the men went without any food. A fortnight into the operation the group reached the Volga. A sudden thaw accompanied by a steady drizzle had dangerously weakened the ice and it took some time to cross the waterway.[30] But there were no more obstacles, since during the night of 11 March Paul was assassinated in his bedchamber. One of the first orders of the new tsar, Alexander I, was to recall Orlov and his men. They had barely advanced 700 kilometres.[31]

Napoleon did try to tempt Alexander I into diverting his army to India. Already in 1805, Talleyrand advised his master 'not to spare any effort in encouraging Russia into Asia, to hasten the inevitable clash between this power and Great Britain'.[32] However, he did not take the bait. Alexander's geopolitical ambitions in the East were much closer to home. Like his grandmother, Catherine II, as well as every Romanov tsar who followed him, they were fixed on Tsargrad (Constantinople) and the Straits that would give the Russian fleet access to the Mediterranean.[33]

Napoleon's own plans did not have any place for a potential rival in that strategically important body of water. While there are no records of their private conversations, when the two emperors met at Tilsit in summer 1807 to plan their alliance, they undoubtedly discussed the fate of the ailing Ottoman Empire. By all accounts, the monarchs discussed a possible partition of Turkey, but Napoleon refused to yield on the question of who would ultimately control Constantinople. Nevertheless, he did hold out the prospect of dividing the Oriental realm between France and Russia. As one biographer put it: 'on the basis of a common hatred of England and a common desire to secure the spoils of Ottoman Power, the stately fabric of the Franco-Russian alliance was reared.'[34]

One way to take Alexander's mind off Tsargrad, Napoleon reasoned, might be to dangle the prospect of another march on India before him. On 1 January 1808 he had a long conversation with Talleyrand about the fates of the Ottoman Empire and the British colony.[35] The outcome was a long letter to Alexander on 2 February. 'Your majesty will have read the latest debates in the English Parliament and its decision to launch a full-scale war', Napoleon began. He humbly asked if the tsar might accept the advice of someone who professed his 'tender and true devotion.' First, Russia

should seize Finland from Sweden, which was then allied with Britain. But there was a more glorious possibility too:

> … an army of 50,000 men, Russian, French, maybe even a little Austrian, that marches via Constantinople to Asia will not even have reached the Euphrates River before it makes England tremble and brings the continent to its knees. I am ready in Dalmatia, Your Majesty is on the Danube. One month after we have made the decision, the army might well be on the Bosporus. The blow will resound in India, and England will submit.

There was no time to tarry: 'everything can be signed by 15 March. By 1 May our troops could be in Asia.'[36]

According to the Habsburgs' ambassador to Paris, Count Klemens von Metternich, Talleyrand confided to him that: 'the emperor nurtures two projects; one has real foundations, the other is a fantasy. The first is dividing up Turkey, the second an expedition to the East Indies.'[37] Alexander was not fooled. If the French emperor had thought that his Russian 'brother' had the same passion for India as his father, he was very much mistaken.

The topic was very much an afterthought during the intense negotiations that followed between Napoleon's representative in St Petersburg, Armand, marquis de Caulaincourt, Russia's foreign minister, Count Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, and the tsar. Already in January, when Caulaincourt had hinted about attacking India, Alexander dismissed the notion as impossible.[38] Meanwhile, the foreign minister made it clear that his tsar didn't have the slightest interest in South Asia. As he told the marquis, 'the Indian expedition is entirely yours'. Both Alexander and Rumiantsev steadfastly maintained that their top priority was control over Constantinople and the Straits, but Napoleon proved entirely unyielding on this score.[39]

After weeks of fruitless talks the emperors decided to postpone any decisions until their planned congress in Erfurt that autumn. But when they met in the German town to reaffirm their alliance in late September, Napoleon had far more important pressing matters on his mind – such as the revolt that had meanwhile erupted in Spain.[40] During the increasingly troubled years leading up to 1812, neither apparently raised the matter again.

If the Great Game between Britain and Russia for Central Asia arguably ended with their accord of 1907, the year of its onset is harder to pin down.[41] Nevertheless, the rivalry clearly started at least several decades after the Napoleonic Wars. During much of that struggle, Russia and Britain joined forces to oppose France in various coalitions. Even when the Treaty of Tilsit obligated Alexander to declare war on his erstwhile ally, his heart was never in it. Napoleon's attempts to goad him into a more active role invariably had little success. Thus when the former suggested a joint strike against India in 1808, the tsar ignored the proposal. Russia's principal ambition in the East focused on the Straits.

Paul I's impetuous decision to hurl a Cossack host across Central Asia's forbidding deserts at the British colony were the actions of an autocrat with, at best, a tenuous grip on reality. Russia's archives have yet to yield any proof that even one of his heirs seriously contemplated a similar operation. Yet even if the assault on India was ordered by a madman on the very eve of his overthrow, it would arouse fears for among many level-headed Englishmen for much of the nineteenth century.

Notes

1. My research for this chapter was generously funded by a Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada. I am grateful to Aleksei A. Vigasin for his comments about an earlier draft.
2. The best account of this rivalry, albeit from a British perspective, remains Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game* (Oxford, 1990). For a recent archivally-based study that sheds some light on Russia's motives, see Evgeny Sergeev, *The Great Game, 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia* (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD, 2013).
3. Gerald D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli* (London, 1967), 139.
4. Karl Meyer and Shareen Bryssac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (New York, 1999), xviii.
5. George Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London, 1889), 14.
6. Helen Dewar, 'Canada or Guadeloupe?: French and British Perceptions of Empire, 1760–1763', *Canadian Historical Review*, 91, 4 (2010): 637–60.
7. Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture and Conquest in the East 1750–1850* (New York, 2005), 131.
8. J. Christopher Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (London, 1962), 6.
9. Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York, 2007), 18.
10. Philip Dwyer, *Napoleon: Path to Power, 1769–1799* (London, 2008), 340–1; John Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I*, 2 vols (London, 1935), 1, 78.
11. Théodore Iung, ed., *Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires, 1775–1840*, 3 vols (Paris, 1882), 1, 74.
12. Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt*, 20; Emmanuel-Auguste-Dieudonne, comte de Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, 7 vols (Paris, 1824), 6, 397.
13. Seized by the British as war booty when they stormed Tipu's capital in 1799, the device is now on display at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. For more details, see Susan Stronge, *Tipu's Tiger* (London, 2009).
14. Las Cases, *Mémorial*, 3, 342.
15. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind* (New Haven, CT, 2010), 44–59.
16. Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780–1828* (Minneapolis, MN, 1980), 32.
17. Pierre Lehautcourt, *La Russie et l'invasion de l'Inde* (Paris, 1892); Sir William Thorn and Sir John Macdonald Kinneir, *Voyage dans l'Inde britannique* (Paris, 1818), 333; William Eton, *Tableau historique, politique et modern de l'empire Ottoman*, 2 vols (Paris, 1801), 2, *passim*. The only mention I have found in Catherine II's correspondence is a message of 18 December 1783 to Prince Potemkin ordering him to deny entry to a certain Monsieur de St Génie, a Frenchman in Constantinople.

As she added, 'I find the presence of such people undesirable': *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (hereafter *SIRIO*), 27 (1880): 290.

18. Portions of this section are based on my article, 'Paul's Great Game: Russia's Plan to Invade British India', *Central Asian Survey*, 33, 2 (2014): 143–52.
19. Roderick McGrew, 'Paul I and the Knights of Malta', in Hugh Ragsdale, ed., *Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign* (Pittsburgh, PN, 1979), 44–75; I. A. Nastenko & Iu. V. Iashnev, *Istoriia maltiiskogo ordena*, 2 vols (Moscow, 2005), 2, 56–161; Cyrille Toumanoff, *L'Ordre de Malte et l'Empire de Russie* (Rome, 1979); Vladimir A. Zakharov, 'Mal'tiiskii orden i nekotorye aspekty evropeiskoi politiki Pavla I,' *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 5, 153 (2002): 271–94.
20. Napoleon, *Correspondence de Napoléon I*, 32 vols. (Paris, 1864), 16, 538–9.
21. Roderick McGrew, *Paul I of Russia* (Oxford, 1992), 282–321; Paul W. Schroeder, 'The Collapse of the Second Coalition,' *Journal of Modern History*, 59, 2 (1987): 244–90; Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la revolution française*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1885–1904), 6 (1903), 1–118; Al'bert Z. Manfred, 'Poiski soiuza s Rossiei, (1800–1801),' *Istoriia SSSR*, 4 (1971): 38–59.
22. Moscow, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno–istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA), f. 846, op. 16, d. 323, l. 1: Paul I to Orlov, Rescript (12 January 1801).
23. RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 323, l. 2: Paul I to Orlov, Rescript (12 January 1801)
24. 'Projet d'une expédition dans l'Inde par terre', in M. de Hoffmans, *Mémoire de Leibnitz à Louis XIV sur la conquête de l'Egypte* (Paris, 1840), 39–56.
25. According to Edouard Driault, 'le mystère n'a pas encore été pénétré': Edouard Driault, *Napoléon et l'Europe: La politique extérieure du premier consul, 1800–1803* (Paris, 1910), 149. Aleksandr A. Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiiu', *Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii,* 23 (1886): 40. See also Viktor. M. Bezotosnyi, 'U istokov neosyshchestvlennogo geopolitich-eskogo proekta veka: "Indiiskii plan" Napoleona Bonaparta', in Vasilii B. Kashirin, ed., *Velichie i iazvy rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow, 2012), 52–75.
26. The relevant documents are in: RGVIA, f. 26, 'Voenno-pokhodnaia kantseliariia e.i.v.', and 846, 'Voenno-uchennyi arkhiv.' They have also been republished, beginning with 'Proekt russko-frantsuskoi ekspeditsii v Indiiu', *Russkaia starina*, 7 (1873): 401–10. See also Nikolai K. Shil'der, *Imperator Pavel Pervyi* (St Petersburg, 1901), 417–9; Petr M. Shastiko, ed., *Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v XIX v.: Sbornik arkhivnikh dokumentov i materialov* (Moscow, 1997), 27–34, among others.
27. RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 323, l. 1: Paul I to Orlov, Rescript (12 January 1801). According to Aleksei Vigasin, there were no Russian maps of India before the nineteenth century, although the tsar's cartographical depot may have had some British or French maps. See Shastiko, ed., *Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v XIX v.*, 36 fn. 10.
28. RGVIA, f. 26, op. 1/152, d. 104, l. 546: Orlov to Paul I, report (10 February 1801); Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiu', 55–6.
29. RGVIA, f. 26, op. 1/152, d. 104, l. 547: Platov to Paul I, report (10 February 1801).
30. Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiu', 60–61; Denisov, 'Zapiski donskogo ata-mana', 239–42.
31. Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiu', 61.
32. Lehautcourt, *La Russie*, 7.
33. The classic English-language survey of the broader story is Matthew S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question* (London, Macmillan), 1966.
34. Rose, *Life of Napoleon*, 1, 130–1 (see also 128–37); Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London, 2009), 50–3; Marie-Pierre

Rey, *Alexander I: the Tsar who defeated Napoleon* (DeKalb, IL, 2012), 185; Serge S. Tatishcheff, *Alexandre 1er et Napoléon d'après leur correspondence inédite, 1801–1812* (Paris, 1891), 303–5; Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, 7, 167–87.

35. Albert Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre 1er. L'Alliance russe sous le premier empire*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1891), 1, 229.
36. Napoleon, *Correspondence*, 16, 498.
37. Vandal, *Napoléon*, 1, 229.
38. Tatishchev, *Alexandre et Napoléon I*, 270–3.
39. Ibid., 270–371; Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, 7, 237–43; Vandal, *Napoleon*, 1, 223–58.
40. Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, 7, 312–22.
41. *Pace* Jennifer Siegel, who argues that the rivalry continued right up to the outbreak of the Great War. See: Jennifer Siegel, *Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia* (London, 2002).

8

Factions and In-fighting among Russian Generals in the 1812 Era

Viktor M. Bezotosnyi

The chapter studies the relationships and the balance of power within the Russian high command in the 1812 era. It sheds light on the professional, social and ethnic backgrounds of Russian generals, as well as on the factions they formed at key moments in the war of 1812–1814. The importance of this subject is clear. The army was the institution which in 1812 defended Russia against a major threat to its existence as a great power and a truly sovereign polity. But the army was also crucial as a domestic political factor. Both of Alexander I's male predecessors on the throne had been overthrown in military coups. Given the highly charged national feeling in the face of Napoleon's invasion, managing the army was a key element in both the foreign and domestic policy of Alexander. The chapter is divided into two sections. Firstly, it investigates the structure and membership of the Russian high command. Secondly, it looks at the conflicts that occurred within the high command in 1812–1814 but with particular reference to 1812.

The Tsar and the military command structure

The tsar was the supreme commander of the army and the arbiter of disputes among its generals. Alexander I made the key strategic decisions in 1812–1814 and also played an important role in operational level planning of individual campaigns. The tsar chose the defensive strategy of deep retreat in the first half of the 1812 campaign. He formulated the plan to trap Napoleon on his retreat between the armies of Mikhail I. Kutuzov, Ludwig Adolph Peter zu Wittgenstein and Pavel V. Chichagov. He decided to advance into central Europe in 1813 and played the leading role in the formation of the Sixth Coalition that defeated Napoleon. It was the tsar too who took the allied armies across the Rhine and played the major part in Napoleon's overthrow. But if the monarch devised strategy he was necessarily dependent on his generals to execute it. This was all the more the case because Alexander shrank from taking overt responsibility for commanding the Russian, and later allied, armies. Instead he delegated command

to his generals, though he sometimes stood behind them and exercised well-disguised influence on military operations. There was a pattern here to Alexander's *modus operandi*: in politically delicate moments and matters he often found it convenient to allow subordinates to shoulder the overt responsibility for risky or unpopular decisions. This was most obviously the case in the extremely dangerous context of the Russian retreat into the interior in 1812 and the abandonment of Moscow. Generals Karl von Pfuhl and Michael Barclay de Tolly became scapegoats who could be blamed and sacrificed when this policy aroused too much fury in the Russian elites.

No one could question the monarch's authority or challenge his decisions once announced. For the generals the key battle was to win his ear and his support during the decision-making process. Alexander I was an intelligent man, a skilled politician, and a leader who well understood the nature of the political system over which he presided and the men who filled its upper ranks, both military and civilian. Intrigue was second nature to him. He avoided dependence on anyone, played off his generals against each other and cultivated many sources of information. Typically, when a new force, the so-called Internal Security Forces (*vnutrannaia strazha*) was set up in 1812, Alexander subordinated it neither to the Minister of War Barclay de Tolly nor to the Minister of Police Aleksandr D. Balashov which in administrative terms would have been the most logical arrangement: instead he made the Security Troops an autonomous institution under the command of one of his adjutants-general, Evgraf F. Komarovskii.[1]

Apart from the formal chain of command set out in the 1812 'Law on the Field Army', which made commanders of armies in the field directly subordinate to the monarch, the tsar's 19 adjutants-general also had the right to address Alexander directly. By definition these were men with whom the tsar had a personal relationship and whom he trusted. Over the course of 1812–1814 probably the most important of these adjutants-general was Prince Petr M. Volkonskii, who was head of the quartermaster-general's section of His Majesty's Suite, in other words the closest thing Russia possessed in 1812 to a chief of the general staff. Apart from these open and regular sources of information, Alexander privately encouraged a number of key second-echelon generals in the field armies to communicate with him directly. His main informants at this level were the chiefs of staff of the main armies who thereby provided a check on the activities of the top commanders. These included General Aleksei P. Ermolov, who was chief of staff to General Barclay de Tolly, the commander of Russia's First Army. Apart from intercepting and reading the private letters of his generals, Alexander also used Sir Robert Wilson, the British liaison officer at headquarters, as an additional source of information about goings-on within the high command. Typically, Alexander both encouraged Wilson to communicate with him directly and 'perlustrated' the general's official and private correspondence with London.[2]

Among the chief characteristics of Russian generals was a near obsessive concern for rank. Though during the war it sometimes happened that senior generals were subordinated to more junior ones this always caused resentment and sometimes resulted in resignations or – more dangerously – half-hearted execution of orders. The concern for rank overlapped with acute sensitivity to public honour and reputation. Great jealousies were aroused by the distribution of promotions and medals. Alexander's power to appoint, promote and reward was indeed one of his main weapons when it came to controlling and motivating his generals.

Furthermore, the Russian officer corps cultivated and respected a warlike and aggressive spirit. This made it all the harder to accept the strategy of retreat deep into the Russian interior in 1812. In addition, the generals of 1812 had grown up in the era and on the legend of generals Petr A. Rumiantsev, Aleksandr V. Suvorov and Grigorii A. Potemkin, when the army had pursued with great success a consistent offensive strategy. When planning how to resist Napoleon's invasion, Alexander had to take all these realities into account. A real danger existed that the strategy adopted by the monarch would inflame Russian national pride and resentment within the army. This danger was all the greater as, in the run-up to the war, Alexander had accepted back into the army in senior positions a number of retired generals, some of whom had left the army under a cloud because of acts of insubordination and other misdemeanours. Most of these generals were drawn from the Russian aristocracy and were sometimes much inclined to criticism both of the monarch and his policies. Summoning these retired aristocratic generals back to the army was the equivalent in the military sphere of the dismissal of his key political adviser, the liberal and supposedly pro-French Mikhail M. Speranskii, and his replacement by the strongly Muscovite and Russian nationalist Aleksandr S. Shishkov and Fedor V. Rostopchin. The scale of the danger represented by Napoleon's invasion made it essential to mobilize all the resources at Alexander's disposal in Russia's defence. Above all that meant ensuring the wholehearted support of conservative elites who controlled many of these resources and exercised a great influence on public opinion.

The great retreat: Pfuhl, Barclay de Tolly and the 'Russian Party'

Many individuals within the Russian high command submitted suggestions and even detailed plans in 1810–1812 for how best to resist Napoleon's forthcoming invasion. In all, forty such plans were sent to Alexander. The basic division was between generals who advocated defensive and offensive strategies. Even before the campaign began, the battle lines within the high command which existed throughout the first half of the 1812 campaign therefore already existed. Those who had called for a pre-emptive attack on Napoleon's gathering armies before June 1812 were also usually the

same generals who resisted most stubbornly the subsequently-adopted strategy of retreat into the Russian interior. But as regards planning before June 1812, the only general who really mattered was Barclay de Tolly, who served as minister of war from 1810 to 1812. Only he had access to the top-secret intelligence on the immense size of Napoleon's forces and on the strengths and weaknesses of Napoleon's military and political machine. It was Barclay de Tolly who, with Alexander's support, devised the Russian strategic plan for retreat into the interior. The attention usually paid by historians to the role of the monarch's semi-official adviser, the former Prussian general Karl von Pfuhl, is largely misplaced. Alexander was never committed to Pfuhl's plan to base Russian operations around the fortified camp at Drissa. When the time came he was happy to throw the hapless and wholly isolated Pfuhl to the Russian patriotic wolves, who regarded both the general himself and the camp at Drissa with contempt. In their eyes Pfuhl's proposed strategy was a particularly egregious example of German pedantry and theorizing.[3]

The case of Barclay de Tolly, minister of war and commander-in-chief of Russia's largest army, was much more serious. A number of factors came together in creating the opposition to Barclay de Tolly, which erupted especially after the battle of Smolensk, 16–18 August (new style) 1812. War as usual heightened emotions and fuelled professional disagreements and competition among the generals. Deep retreat and the abandonment of Russian lands to Napoleon's marauding hordes offended most Russian generals' pride, their military instincts and their patriotism. But opposition also had its roots in the dislike of Barclay de Tolly that existed even before the war among much of the Russian military elite, which was still mostly drawn from well-established families of the aristocracy and gentry.

Barclay de Tolly's meteoric rise in 1809–1810 caused much jealousy, especially in the ranks of the Russian aristocracy where he was regarded as an upstart, lacking a noble background and manner. Though he was a third-generation Russian subject he was nevertheless still viewed as a foreigner. His most vociferous enemy, General Prince Petr I. Bagration, called him a 'Finn', though in fact he was a Baltic German from Livonia. Feeling against 'Germans' in the army was owed in large part to the disproportionate role they played in its top ranks. Only 60 per cent of the tsar's generals in 1812 had Russian surnames, though 66.5 per cent were Orthodox by religion. Roughly one in three generals had a foreign surname and religion. Most of these men were ethnic Germans, whether Baltic German subjects of the tsar or German émigrés, including some of Alexander's German relatives. Since men with non-Russian surnames made up roughly 10 per cent of the whole officer corps, it is not surprising that foreigners in general and Germans in particular were resented. When, moreover, the Russian army was ordered to abandon Russian territory in 1812 by a 'German' commander-in-chief on the basis of a plan of operations seemingly designed by Germans (Pfuhl and

Barclay de Tolly), the emergence of a so-called 'Russian party' in the army's high command is understandable.[4]

This 'Russian party' had no formal structure. Most officers regarded the retreat as a disgrace and tacitly supported the line taken by the 'Russian party' but only senior ones played an active role in the divisions within the high command. These senior generals – in most cases members of the ethnic Russian aristocracy – were united by a close network of family relationships and friendships. They shared a common mentality and in the context of August 1812 a sincere sense of deep alarm for their country. A key figure in the Russian party was General Aleksei P. Ermolov, the chief of staff of Barclay de Tolly's First Army. But the standard-bearer of the 'Russian party' was the commander of the Second Army, Petr Bagration. Descended from the former Georgian royal family and a core member of the Russian aristocracy, Bagration had argued for an offensive strategy even before the campaign began. By the time the retreat had reached and passed Smolensk he was in despair. Barclay de Tolly's decision to retreat after the successful defensive battle of Smolensk and to abandon the city was one reason for opposition from the 'Russian party' to erupt. Another was simply that at Smolensk the First and Second armies at last united so the head of the 'Russian party', Bagration, was now on the scene to lead the opposition to Barclay de Tolly.

A plot by the generals or legitimate opposition among the military?

The historian Andrei G. Tartakovskii, who made an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the 1812 campaign, called the activities of the 'Russian party' a plot against the commander-in-chief.[5] In reality matters were not so simple and the actions of the 'Russian party' were mostly legitimate within the rules and norms of Russian military and political life at the time. A key point was that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration commanded separate armies which had, however, joined on the battlefield at Smolensk. By the terms of the 1812 'Law on the Field Army', both men were directly subordinated to the tsar, who was by now far removed from headquarters and engaged in mobilizing the home front. On departing the front-line well before the two armies joined, Alexander had not appointed a commander-in-chief. Neither the fact that Barclay de Tolly's army was much the larger nor its commander's simultaneous position as minister of war implied any right to give orders to Bagration. On the contrary, Bagration was unequivocally senior in rank to Barclay de Tolly. If he temporarily placed himself under his orders at Smolensk in order to facilitate co-operation, this was a generous but entirely informal concession which could be withdrawn at any time, as both he and Barclay de Tolly fully recognized.

Bagration personally, and other leading members of the 'Russian party', quite legitimately made every effort to persuade Alexander I to alter what

they considered to be a disastrous strategy and to replace Barclay de Tolly. Bagration and Ermolov wrote directly to Alexander, as was their right. Attempts were also made to influence the monarch through his adjutants-general (Pavel V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov and Count Petr A. Shuvalov) who were at army headquarters but who reported back to the monarch, sometimes in person. Letters were also written to key figures in Alexander's entourage who would, as the authors knew, pass the correspondence on to Alexander. A key figure here was General Aleksei A. Arakcheev, Barclay de Tolly's predecessor as minister of war. When Barclay de Tolly succeeded to the ministerial post in 1810, Arakcheev had been side-lined, something for which he never forgave his successor. During 1812, however, Arakcheev regained his influence with the monarch and was put in charge of mobilizing the rear to provide new recruits, supplies and weapons for the army. Arakcheev's position beside Alexander, his ties to General Ermolov (Barclay de Tolly's chief of staff) and his vengeful personality made him a very dangerous enemy for the embattled Barclay de Tolly.

However only in one way did the tactics of Barclay de Tolly's enemies truly over-step the legitimate norms of tsarist politics. This was when they tried to use Robert Wilson as their spokesman to exert pressure on Alexander to dismiss his foreign minister, Count Nikolai Rumiantsev, whom the conspirators considered to be pro-French and an advocate of peace. Alexander rightly rejected this entirely 'unconstitutional' move though he did not censure his generals for acting this way and he went out of his way to reassure them of his total commitment to continuing the war until Napoleon's expulsion from Russia. This in itself is a telling indication of political realities in Russia in 1812, at least as Alexander perceived them, though it is also true that Alexander's commitment to war until victory was entirely genuine and by no means just a concession to elite opinion.[6]

Kutuzov as commander-in-chief

Even before the fall of Smolensk, Alexander and his advisers in St Petersburg had already recognized the need to appoint a commander-in-chief. Alexander chose a small committee of civilian grandees to shoulder responsibility for making a recommendation. The choice almost inevitably fell on Mikhail I. Kutuzov. Despite the fact that he had limited faith in Kutuzov's ability and no liking for him personally the tsar not only agreed the choice but had in fact already signalled his approval for it in advance. An important factor was that at this moment of supreme crisis Kutuzov had the solid backing of the St Petersburg and Moscow noble assemblies, whose sympathies the tsar could not afford to lose. He was also an ethnic Russian, a major advantage when the need later arose to sacrifice Moscow without fighting a second and potentially fatal battle after Borodino. As important was that Kutuzov was senior in rank to all the serving generals in the field armies and was in fact

the most senior conceivable candidate. To increase his authority, Alexander not only appointed him overall commander-in-chief but also elevated him to the highest rank in the Russian titled nobility, namely *svetleishii kniaz'* (prince with the predicate Serene Highness), a title held by no other general.

Although on the surface Kutuzov's appointment might seem a concession to the 'Russian party', in reality the nomination of the new commander-in-chief left its leaders frustrated but powerless. Neither Bagration nor Ermolov were close to Kutuzov nor had they any great faith in him. But the army was now commanded by a Russian, a follower of Suvorov and his doctrines, and a figure very popular among both the officer corps and the conservative nobility of St Petersburg and Moscow. Kutuzov's unequivocal position as commander-in-chief also meant that further attempts to petition the monarch against the army's leader would be clear insubordination in the face of the military chain of command and the emperor's authority. In addition, Bagration, the leader of the 'Russian party' was mortally wounded at the battle of Borodino and thereby removed from the scene.

Dissension and intrigue were, however, to re-emerge again soon after the battle of Borodino when the issue arose as to whether to abandon Moscow without a further battle. In the decisive council-of-war at Fili, Kutuzov stayed out of the debate and chose for himself the safer role of arbiter. An interesting aspect of the debate at Fili was that the leaders of both camps, Barclay de Tolly and Levin August, Count von Bennigsen, were 'Germans'. This does not, however, seem to have aroused comment or criticism from the ethnic Russian generals which suggests that ethnicity was a less important factor in disputes among the generals in 1812 than is often imagined. Although most generals supported Bennigsen's call to defend Moscow, some took Barclay de Tolly's side, partly because Bennigsen was far from universally popular and partly because Barclay de Tolly's case was more sensible. Kutuzov was therefore not forced to impose his decision to abandon Moscow on a united front of Russian generals.

Nevertheless, once the army had come to rest at Tarutino and the generals had time to draw breath, criticism of Kutuzov mounted. Indignation at the abandonment of Moscow, stoked by the city's governor, Rostopchin, was a common source of criticism but there were others.[7] Matvei I. Platov, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, had specific grievances against Kutuzov, who had never held his ability in high regard and who blamed him for incompetent leadership both on the field at Borodino and subsequently when in command of the Russian rear guard. Platov was one of the few senior generals to receive no recognition for his part in the battle of Borodino and this rankled badly. Platov's 'disgrace' combined with other resentments of the Cossack generals at the disdainful attitude of 'regular' commanders resulted in a widespread campaign of non-cooperation by the Cossack leaders who feigned illness as an excuse for their inactivity. Given the great importance of the Cossacks during the subsequent French retreat from Moscow the

alienation of their generals from the high command could have become a very serious matter. Fortunately, the dispute between Kutuzov and Platov was resolved. This occurred partly through the good offices of Wilson, a man whom Kutuzov could not afford to alienate both because he represented Russia's most important ally and because he had a direct line to the tsar.

Kutuzov was equally cautious in dealing with Ermolov, whom he might justifiably have chosen to disgrace for his dereliction of duty on the eve of the battle of Tarutino. Ermolov's drinking bouts caused what could easily have proved a fatal postponement of the Russian attack and threw Kutuzov's plans into disarray. But Ermolov had the ear of Arakcheev, himself now at the tsar's side and very much back in favour: for that reason he was a dangerous man to antagonize. Since Alexander was clearly dissatisfied with Kutuzov's performance both during and after the battle of Borodino, and might even be looking for an excuse to replace him, the commander-in-chief needed to operate against his critics with caution and patience, qualities he possessed in abundance. When faced with opposition from his generals to a proposed one-to-one meeting with Napoleon's envoy, General Jacques-Alexandre-Bernard Law, marquis de Lauriston, between the lines of the two armies, Kutuzov gave way. One factor here was that the opposition was led not just by Wilson but also by Alexander's uncle and brother-in-law (both Germans) and by Prince Petr M. Volkonskii, the emperor's most trusted adjutant-general who was currently on a mission to Kutuzov's headquarters.[8]

The most consistent critic of Kutuzov among the senior generals in 1812 was Bennigsen. Bennigsen, the former commander-in-chief against Napoleon in the East Prussian campaign of 1806–1807, was the most prominent of all the generals whom Alexander called back out of retirement and semi-disgrace in the face of Napoleon's invasion. Like many others of this group, he had a justified reputation for being a very difficult subordinate. It was the tsar who insisted that Bennigsen should serve as Kutuzov's chief of staff when he appointed Kutuzov commander-in-chief of the armies. Neither Kutuzov nor Bennigsen was enthusiastic about this move despite the fact that they had been friends for forty years. Bennigsen subsequently recalled that 'ambition and a special kind of pride, which an officer cannot and should not lack, prompted my reluctance to serve under the command of another general after I had previously served as commander-in-chief of an army facing Napoleon'.[9]

Bennigsen's comment goes to the core of why his 'co-habitation' with Kutuzov failed and turned the two men into bitter rivals. The two generals were proud men when it came to status and public recognition and neither enjoyed sharing the laurels of victory. Their relationship got off to a bad start in 1812 because, although Bennigsen was nominally chief of staff, Kutuzov actually preferred to work through Petr P. Konovnitsyn and Karl von Toll (Tol'), the latter a hot-headed but brilliant staff officer whom Kutuzov considered to have been one of his most brilliant students from the

days when he had served as director of the First Cadet Corps. In a manner typical of the disputes between generals in 1812, personal jealousies and resentments became intertwined with disagreements on specific tactical and operational decisions. In the case of the conflict between Kutuzov and Bennigsen, these included the deployment of the Russian army at Borodino, the abandonment of Moscow and the mismanagement of the battle of Tarutino in October 1812. The argument came to a head during the Russian armies' pursuit of Napoleon in the late autumn and winter of 1812 when Bennigsen believed that Kutuzov was moving far too slowly and missing a golden opportunity to destroy Napoleon's army. Alexander in fact came to share Bennigsen's view but in the context of the patriotic euphoria of late 1812 it would have been impossible to remove the commander-in-chief. Bennigsen's tactics in trying to undermine Kutuzov in any case endangered military discipline and effectiveness and irritated Alexander. The tsar therefore allowed – and even to an extent encouraged – Kutuzov to rid himself of Bennigsen. Typically, however, Alexander kept his errant but competent senior general in reserve. After Kutuzov's death in 1813, Bennigsen was recalled to service as commander-in-chief of the so-called army of Poland, playing a key role in the decisive campaign of autumn 1813.

Behind the curtain of the campaign of 1812: the generals' intrigues and insults

The final and most notable occasion for violent conflicts between the generals was linked to the failure of the Russian commanders to fulfil Alexander's plan for the entrapment of Napoleon and his army at the river Berezina. Three Russian armies were involved, commanded by generals Kutuzov and Wittgenstein and by Admiral Chichagov. None of the three commanders performed satisfactorily and the blame for the failure of Alexander's plan should have been shared between them. Instead it was showered on Chichagov by military and public opinion. There were many reasons for this. In political terms it was harder to blame Wittgenstein, 'the saviour of St Petersburg', let alone Kutuzov, 'the vanquisher of Napoleon'. Whatever the conflicts within the army 'family', almost all Russian generals could agree that a naval officer had no right to be commanding an army hundreds of kilometres from the sea. In addition, Chichagov's independent character and – above all – his open contempt for Russian customs and values had made him many enemies, who seized the opportunity to destroy him. In the heightened patriotic mood of 1812, his sneering at aspects of Russian backwardness and a justified reputation for admiring French manners – not untypical in pre-war St Petersburg drawing rooms – were deeply unpopular and offensive.

At the end of the campaign Alexander I met Wilson in Vilnius (Vil'na) and told him that he had several complaints against Kutuzov: 'he avoided, as much as this was in his power, any action against the enemy … but the

Moscow nobility supports him and wishes him to lead the nation to a glorious ending of this war … and I must bow to circumstances'.[10] If Wilson's account is reliable then the tsar must in fact have meant the whole of the Russian nobility since most Moscow nobles followed Rostopchin in blaming Kutuzov for the abandonment and subsequent destruction of their city. It is worth remembering the words of Joseph de Maistre, diplomat in Russia and the brother of a general serving in the Russian army:

> all decisions were made by ethnic Russians, who were reluctant to share the glory with foreigners. They chose Kutuzov themselves, they wanted to create a huge reputation for him and this required that all achievements be attributed to him; they vastly inflate these achievements but they also shift the blame for his mistakes on to others.[11]

Undoubtedly there is some truth in these words. Kutuzov was immortalized in public opinion as the saviour of the Fatherland, while Alexander had to content himself with being the liberator of Europe.

In the winter of 1812 there were also more banal but still crucial reasons for tensions between the Russian generals. At Vilnius, Alexander showered rewards and promotions on his military commanders. Inevitably not everyone was satisfied either by his own reward or by the attention given to others. Aleksandr M. Rimskii-Korsakov wrote that headquarters was 'a den of intrigue where some were decorated too much and others too little'. General Nikolai N. Raevskii commented in similar terms: 'they give out many decorations but at least some are awarded with an ulterior purpose.' After listing those generals who had deserved special rewards, he added that he had toiled more than most others and had deserved something better than he received. This response was typical among Russia's jealous generals with their thirst for public recognition and status. Many of their letters written at the end of the campaign express dissatisfaction that, whereas others had been rewarded well beyond their merits, their own achievements had been ignored.[12]

The campaigns of 1813–1814 beyond Russia's borders: the generals under the command of 'the Meekest of Tsars'

The tsar arrived at main army headquarters in Vilnius in December 1812 and stayed there until the army reached Paris in March 1814. This inevitably greatly enhanced his control over the high command. With Alexander came Arakcheev, who remained at his side until the end of the war. Arakcheev's remit remained to control the army's rear, meaning above all the conscription, training and equipment of reserve armies and their despatch of reinforcements to the armies in the field. He also supervised the mobilization of Russia's temporary militias. Although he exercised little influence on

military operations Arakcheev did retain some say on appointments, especially in his specific area of competence, that is, the artillery. When Kutuzov attempted to appoint General Dmitrii P. Rezvoi as overall commander of the combined armies' artilleries, he was opposed by Arakcheev, who insisted on the confirmation in this post of his old client, Ermolov. With Alexander's support, Arakcheev prevailed in this dispute.[13]

With Arakcheev beside him Alexander's control over the mobilization of the home front for the war effort was assured. Managing military operations was more complicated. Alexander could not have removed Kutuzov, the hero of 1812 in society's eyes, even had he wished to do so. Moreover the field marshal's status as 'conqueror of Napoleon' was important for attracting allies for the new anti-French coalition. But Alexander was quick to seize the first opportunity to replace Kutuzov's chief of staff, Konovnitsyn, with his own favourite, the efficient but also wholly dependable adjutant-general, Volkonskii. Kutuzov was not happy about this appointment but could do nothing to stop it. Henceforth no operational decisions were made without consulting Volkonskii.[14]

When Kutuzov died in late April 1813 he was replaced as commander-in-chief by Wittgenstein. The emperor's appointment was based on Wittgenstein's performance in 1812 and on the support for him in elite St Petersburg circles. But Wittgenstein was junior to a number of Russian (and Prussian) generals so his appointment caused some discontent. The most senior general serving with the field army, Aleksandr P. Tormasov, resigned because he refused to serve under someone of inferior rank. Another senior general, Mikhail A. Miloradovich, on occasion refused to obey Wittgenstein's orders and even actually reprimanded the commander-in-chief in the midst of a battle for sending out confusing instructions to his subordinates. To do Miloradovich justice, part of the problem was that the whole army had quickly come to realize that 'the position to which he [Wittgenstein] had been elevated was not commensurate with his talents'. Wittgenstein's failings were both cause and effect of Alexander's increasing intervention in decision-making. The spring campaign of 1813 to some extent witnessed a recurrence of the pattern of behaviour witnessed at the battle of Austerlitz when it was unclear who in reality commanded the army – the monarch or the nominal commander-in-chief.[15]

Barclay de Tolly had removed himself from active service in the autumn of 1812 in the face of insulting treatment by Kutuzov and, especially, Bennigsen. He was wounded by Alexander's failure – for political reasons – to defend him against his tormentors. But the tsar lured Barclay de Tolly back to the army to replace Chichagov as commander of the former army of the Danube in early 1813. On 29 May 1813, after the allied setbacks at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, Barclay de Tolly replaced Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the field, retaining this status until the fall of Paris and the end of the war. Barclay de Tolly's two main

assistants came to be the ablest staff officers Russia produced during the campaigns of 1812–1814, Karl von Toll and Hans Karl von Diebitsch (Ivan I. Dibich), the former from the Baltic gentry and the latter the son of a senior Prussian staff officer who had himself transferred to the Russian service. As we have seen, Toll was a protégé of Kutuzov, while Diebitsch had risen through his close association with Wittgenstein. The two men were among the most spectacular examples of a phenomenon which to some extent changed the nature of the Russian high command, namely the rapid rise to key positions of a much younger generation of generals who had proved their ability during the campaigns of 1812–1813. Together with Alexander himself and Barclay de Tolly, Diebitsch and Toll formed the foursome who directed the Russian army in the autumn campaign of 1813 and the campaign in France in the spring of 1814.

In these two campaigns the position of the Russian high command was, however, transformed by the fact that Russia was now fighting as part of a coalition. Of the four main allied armies, only the smallest – Bennigsen's army of Poland – was commanded by a Russian. Perhaps if Barclay de Tolly had really been operational commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, some of the old antagonism towards him among the Russian generals would have re-surfaced. The new reality was that, subordinated to foreign commanders-in-chief in the three main armies, Russian generals could now concentrate their frustrations and resentments against their Austrian and Prussian allies. On occasion this could even encourage a sense of solidarity among the Russian generals, not least when they were subordinated to foreigners of what appeared to them to be inferior rank. But the formal hierarchy of command which subordinated Russian generals to Austrian, Prussian and 'Swedish' (that is, Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, former Marshal of France who became heir to the Swedish throne and the head of the Swedish forces in 1810) army commanders in many ways gives a false impression of Russia's part in the allied war effort. At the very centre of the allied top command stood Alexander I, who not merely played the leading political role for much of 1813–1814 but in practice exercised a veto on Prince Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg's exercise of operational command even over the main allied army (the so-called army of Bohemia). Alexander's status as sovereign and his authority among the allied monarchs even on occasion allowed him to intervene decisively at a tactical level. One crucial intervention by Alexander was on the first day of the battle of Leipzig when it is arguable that, without his efforts, the allied reserves would have arrived too late to stop Napoleon achieving a decisive victory and thereby altering the outcome of the autumn 1813 campaign. Armed with vital information about Napoleon's intentions by his Cossack forces, Alexander also played the key role in persuading Schwarzenberg to march directly on Paris and topple Napoleon, thereby bringing his own strategy to successful fruition and completing the final triumph of the allied coalition in March 1814.[16]

Notes

1. Evgraf F. Komarovskii, *Zapiski grafa E. F. Komarovskogo* (Moscow, 1990), 112–13.
2. Some of these letters are reproduced in Nikolai V. Dubrovin, *Otechestvennaia voina v pis'makh sovremennikov* (St Petersburg, 1882).
3. Clausewitz's comment about Pfuhl's total isolation within the Russian high command and his lack of any detailed intelligence or other materials about the two armies is very much to the point: Carl von Clausewitz, *1812 god* (Moscow, 1937), 30–1.
4. For the statistics, see: Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, 'Natsional'nyi sostav rossiiskogo generaliteta 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 7 (1999): 60–71. D. G. Tselerungo, *Ofitserskii korpus russkoi armiii epokhi 1812 goda po formuliarnim spiskam,* unpublished thesis (Moscow, 1996); D. G. Tselerungo, 'Voennaia kar'era ofitserov russkoi armiii 1812 goda – ykhodtsev iz razlichnykh regionov Rossii i stran zarubezh'ia', in *185 let Otechestestvennoi voiny 1812 goda* (Saratov, 1997), 101–9.
5. Andrei G. Tartakovskii, *Nerazgadannii Barklai: Legendi i byl' 1812 goda* (Moscow, 1996), 79–93.
6. Robert T. Wilson, *Dnevnik i pis'ma 1812–1813* (St Petersburg, 1995), 50, 136, 255–8.
7. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, 'Zhurnal 1813 goda', in Andrei G. Tartakovskii, ed., *1812 god: Voennye dnevniki* (Moscow, 1990), 314; Dmitrii S. Dokhturov, 'Pis'ma D. S. Dokhturova k ego supruge', *Russkii arkhiv*, 5, (1874): 1098–9.
8. Wilson, *Dnevnik,* 86, 148, 267–70; Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, *Donskoi generalitet i ataman Platov v 1812 gody* (Moscow, 1999), 75–108.
9. Levin L. Bennigsen, *Pis'mo o voine 1812 g.* (Kiev, 1912), 70–1.
10. Wilson, *Dnevnik*, 95.
11. Joseph de Maistre, *Peterburgskie pis'ma, 1803–1817* (St Petersburg, 1995), 240.
12. Dubrovin, *Otechestvennaia voina,* 401; *1812–1814: Sekretnaia perepiska generala P. I. Bagrationa, lichnye pis'ma generala N. N. Raevskogo, zapiski generala M. S. Vorontsova, dnevniki ofitserov* (Moscow, 1992), 236.
13. Moscow, Otdel rukopisei, Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, f. 41, kn. 86, d. 8, l. 6; Nikolai Dubrovin, *Pis'ma glavnikh deiatelei v tsarstvovanie Aleksandra I* (St Petersburg, 1883), 78–89.
14. S. I. Maevskii, 'Moi vek ili istoriia generala Maevskogo', *Russkaia starina*, 8 (1873): 161, 165 and *Russkaia starina*, 9 (1873): 253–4; *1812–1814: Sekretnaia perepiska generala P. I. Bagrationa,* 238.
15. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, 'Zhurnal 1813 goda', Tartakovskii, *1812 god*, 332–7, 340, 346; A. A. Sherbinin, 'Voennyi zhurnal 1813 goda', Tartakovskii, *1812 god*, 268, 273, 275–7.
16. Sergei M. Solov'ev, *Imperator Aleksandr I: Politika – diplomatiia* (St Petersburg, 1877), 237–8; T. A. Kapustina, 'Aleksandr I i zagranichnye pokhody russkoi armii', in *Epokha napoleonovskikh voin: liudi, sobytiia, idei* (Moscow, 1999), 26–35.

9

The 'Maid of Orleans' of the Russian Army: Prince Eugen of Württemberg in the Napoleonic Wars

Denis A. Sdvizhkov

In the Winter Palace's War Gallery, next to Alexander I's portrait, second row from the floor, the visitor's attention is caught by the image of a tousled young man. Even alongside the relative youth of Alexander's other generals, George Dawe's substantial portrait conveys the vitality of his subject: Prince and, from 1822, Duke Eugen of Württemberg.

The painting's prestigious location at the right hand of the tsar has done little to publicize its subject. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii did not even include it in his commemorative album of War Gallery heroes.[1] Over the years, Eugen of Württemberg has received only fleeting attention in Russia.[2] He has attracted slightly more attention in Germany,[3] and has recently begun to be discussed for his important contributions during the campaigns between 1812 and 1814.[4] However, on the whole, the significance of this individual in the context of the Napoleonic Wars has been underappreciated.

On the surface, Eugen's career is simply that of a foreign (Prussian) general in the service of the Russian crown during this period. However, to paraphrase Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, although he was a Prussian – as prince of Württemberg, he was born and raised in Prussian Silesia – he was 'a Prussian in the best sense of the word'.[5] The aim of the present study is to reveal much that remains unknown but illuminating in the life of this interesting and attractive individual.[6]

In 1812, a knowledgeable witness, Gabriel de Longuerue, aide-de-camp of the French ambassador Armand Caulaincourt, summarized the 24-year-old prince's situation in the following way: '*Très brave au feu … peu fortuné*' – (that is, brave under fire, and boasting other laudable characteristics, but of restricted means).[7] However, Eugen's 'poor fortune' can be read more widely; had history taken a different turn, the prince's remarkable talents could have made him more than just a 'starlet',[8] but a true 'star' player in the Napoleonic Wars.

Regarding his 'restricted means', with the 1500 guilders a year he received from Württemberg and his humble estate, Eugen was hardly a fairy-tale

prince. The 'Russian' Eugene, as he was nicknamed by his family, was born on 8 January 1788 in the Duchy of Oels in Silesia. The duchy had been ruled by the house of Württemberg since the seventeenth century but, by the early nineteenth century, it had become *de facto* Prussian territory. During his lifetime, the official residence of this branch of the Württemberg family became the Silesian Carlsruhe (now Pokój in Poland), a former hunting lodge built to resemble its Baden namesake.

Le petit prince

As the youngest son of the Duke of Württemberg, with no hope of inheriting his father's estate, the boy's career was already predetermined at birth. He was destined to become a soldier in the service of a foreign military power. As a rule, the latter would generally be Prussia, as in the case of his father, Eugen senior. However, everything changed in 1776 with the marriage of Grand Duke Paul, the heir to the Russian throne, to Sofia Dorothea of Württemberg, who had been selected for this purpose by Catherine II and Frederick II. Sofia, later rechristened Maria Fedorovna, was Eugen's aunt. The marriage created the possibility of careers in Russian service for Sofia's unmarried Württemberg relatives. In addition to Eugen, four of his uncles subsequently served in Russia, amongst them the fat Duke Alexander of Württemberg, nicknamed 'the Pine Cone' (*Shyshka*), who fought alongside Eugen against Napoleon in 1812.[9]

Aided by a healthy dose of nepotism from his aunt, Eugen became a colonel in 1796, at the age of eight, and a year later was a major-general and 'chief' of a dragoon regiment transferred to the Cavalry Guards, before promotion and transfer to the Pskov dragoons regiment in 1799. At the same time, he began learning Russian from a clerk who had escaped from French captivity. In the winter of 1801, Eugen finally arrived in St Petersburg, and was taken under the wing of General Hans Ehrenfried von Diebitsch, father of the future Field Marshal Hans Karl von Diebitsch (Ivan I. Dibich).

The events that followed would define the entirety of Prince Eugen's career, including his participation in the Napoleonic Wars, and therefore a short summary is necessary at this point. There were rumours that Tsar Paul was planning to circumvent the laws of succession by arranging Eugen's marriage to Grand Duchess Catherine, and thereafter adopting him as the heir to the throne, although there is an understandable lack of documentary evidence for such a plan. However, the prince's own autobiographical materials contain allusions to it, some more frank than others:[10]

> [After dinner], General Diebitsch was called to the emperor. When he returned at last … he fell to his knees and grabbed my hands, drowning them in tears. 'My dearest good sir! The things I heard! Is it possible, is it conceivable, is it probable? … The title of Grand Duke awaits you, the

> position of stadtholder and viceroy!' … He let out the final, evocative statement, one which would disturb me even in my dreams: He wishes to adopt you![11]

A more convincing explanation is that the Empress Maria Fedorovna was behind the 'Eugen I' project as part of her ambition to assume the role of a new Catherine II.[12] Later, during the Napoleonic Wars, the dowager empress was able to rely on Eugen, whom she regarded as an 'adopted son', as her man in the army during the well-known friction between her 'Pauline' court and the 'young' court of Tsar Alexander I. 'Emperor Alexander', wrote the prince to the Prussian General Georg Wilhelm von Valentini, 'was never able to rid himself of the suspicion that his mother still harboured her ambitious schemes and was attempting to acquire supporters within the army'.[13]

In any event, it is clear that Eugen gained great favour with Tsar Paul. In the wake of Paul's assassination in March 1801, Eugen's proximity to the former tsar and, undoubtedly, rumours of his bright future had a negative effect on his career prospects under the new administration. Later the same year, the prince left Russia and continued his education in Breslau, Erlangen, and Stuttgart.

After Napoleon's defeat of Prussia at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Eugen joined the Russian army in late 1806 as an adjutant to Count Mikhail F. Kamenskii, and then Levin von Bennigsen. He subsequently fought in the battles of Pułtusk and Preussisch-Eylau; at the battle of Guttstadt-Deppen, during the same campaign, Eugen distinguished himself by risking his life to save the life of a prisoner of war.[14]

Having been put in command of a regiment in Riga, Eugen compiled a sober assessment of the recent campaign. While praising the Russian army's courage, he also described the chaos that followed Kamenskii's mental illness and the terrible organization of the quartermaster corps, which resulted in looting and desertions in the winter of 1806–1807, a weakness addressed by the Russian army by 1813.[15]

Disillusioned by the Tilsit treaties, Eugen asked to leave the Russian army, with the intention of joining the Austrian ranks to continue the fight against Napoleon. However, at his aunt's insistence, he was only given a leave of absence. Back in Silesia, Eugen largely kept to the company of his former tutor, the Prussian officer Ludwig von Wolzogen who, in 1807, had entered Russian service as a staff officer, again a result of Maria Fedorovna's efforts. In October 1809, impressed by yet another French victory over the Austrians, Wolzogen wrote a treatise for the prince that contained a strategy for a future campaign, entitled '*Napoleon und die Art, gegen ihn Krieg zu führen*' ('Napoleon and the way of waging war against him'), which, through his commanding officer Petr M. Volkonskii, was later forwarded to Alexander I.

This strategy was first published as an appendix to Prince Eugen's memoirs on the 1812 war.[16] Both the prince, and subsequently his biographers,

stressed the key role played by Wolzogen's plan, and the prince's familiarity with it, during the campaigns between 1812 and 1814. In his memoirs, Eugen contrasted the perception of 1812 as a situational and often irregular war with the deliberate 'strategy of the Tsar [Alexander]' which, in his opinion, became established through the efforts of the German-Württemberg circle (consisting of Wolzogen, Karl Ludwig von Pfuhl, Egor Kankrin (Georg von Cancrin),[17] and others), and was apparently developed with the help of the prince himself, and then applied during 1812.[18]

Eugen claimed that he had envisaged the main aspects of this strategy, namely a tactical retreat into familiar territory, in the early 1800s, before discussing them with his tutor, who then codified them in his treatise.[19] Wolzogen, by this stage terminally ill, wrote to Eugen regarding the publication of his treatise in the prince's memoirs: 'You *acted*, while I *wrote*, therefore please, for the sake of fairness, just state that I wrote thanks to You'.[20]

Meanwhile, in 1810, Prince Eugen's brigade was transferred to Vilnius (Vil'na), where he met General Mikhail I. Kutuzov, then military governor of Lithuania, whom he later referred to as his 'patron'.[21] Kutuzov's patronage was logical, given Eugen's strained relations with Grand Duke Constantine and General Michael A. Barclay de Tolly, though the latter had every right to see the tsar's cousin as an unprofessional.[22] By the beginning of 1812, the prince was at the head of the 4th Infantry Division of the 2nd Infantry Corps of the First Western Army, directly under the command of Lieutenant-General Karl F. Baggovut. At this stage, this 'puny young lad' did not inspire confidence, even from his future adjutant.[23]

1812

'Restoring historical justice' by examining the role played by Prince Eugen in the Napoleonic Wars, and particularly the 1812 campaign, hardly means to emphasize his involvement in the realization of the grand strategy of the war, though this was stressed first and foremost by the prince himself, as well as his adjutants and staff officers.[24]

A French appraisal, written in 1812, described Eugen as a 'good general', with 'great talents', who had 'extensively studied the art of war'. However, Aleksei P. Ermolov, a critic of the 'Germans' in general – the tsar's protégé among them – gave a harsher verdict: 'loved by his troops, fearless, but with little ability for reasoning, even of the simple kind.'[25] As always, the truth lies somewhere in between the two accounts. Ermolov's judgements of his contemporaries were often harsh and prejudiced, and his assessment of Eugen is no exception. But it is true that the fine reputation that Eugen earned among the soldiers owed more to his sometimes reckless courage in battle than to his intellect.

Undoubtedly, however, the prince played an important role in some critical situations that called for quick thinking and decisive action. The first of

these was the engagement of the rearguard at the battle of Smolensk, during which the commitment of Eugen's troops to the battle was the decisive turning point that ensured continued resistance to the advancing French troops on 5 August (17 August new style) 1812:

> At 4 in the afternoon […] on all sides our forces were battered and pressed by the enemy […] when Prince Eugen of Württemberg and his division […] with fearlessness in his eyes and on his young, gentle face, stood at the front of his troops and led them. He repelled the advance of the French columns …[26]

It is unclear if this action resulted from the prince's own initiative or Barclay de Tolly's orders. Eugen played an even more important role in covering the withdrawal of the First Western Army from Smolensk to join up with the Second Army on 7 August (19 August new style) 1812, resulting in the battle of Valutino. As a result of a miscommunication during a night march, the columns retreating along the Dnieper River were exposed to attack by pursuing French forces. Eugen's divisions found themselves near the village of Gedeonovo and facing the entire French corps of Marshal Ney, who was well positioned to inflict substantial losses on the retreating Russians. Over the next few hours, Eugen's men resisted Ney's advance long enough for Russian cavalry to arrive from the rearguard. With their support, the Russian forces were able to rout the French, with Eugen 'personally fighting hand-to-hand, like an ordinary hussar'.[27] The prince's consternation upon reading Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii's official history is therefore understandable since, although he had consulted a record of Eugen's 2nd Infantry Corps's military manoeuvres, he refers to this battle as an insignificant skirmish with Ney's forces, with the latter described as 'not having pressed too hard'.[28]

Throughout 1812, fate continued to bring troops commanded by Eugen and Ney into contact with one another. The latter contained a division from Württemberg. Yet, if this confrontation with his own people had an impact on Eugen, it is not revealed in his commentaries. Oaths, honour, service and camaraderie were the traditional values that appear to have driven the prince, while 'innate national sympathies', as Eugen later described them, gave way to a 'more cosmopolitan world view, and loyalty to mankind in general'.[29] His notes on the year 1813 are similarly devoid of any sense of nationalism and he writes of the 'conflicts and brawls in which the Württembergers were also involved'.[30] Eugen was equally critical of the 'puffery' of the Prussian officers. To him, their 'bouts of Gallophobia were just as repulsive as the exorbitant overconfidence of the Prussian army' on the eve of their defeat in 1806.[31] The same can be said for his position in relation to Russian patriotism. Despite all his musical and literary talents, or perhaps as a result of them, Eugen was estranged from the ancient civic pathos and the

theatrical, lofty phraseology embraced by many during these decades, and most commonly deployed during the war.[32] He refused to tolerate pathos and theatricality in anyone, whether Napoleon, whose 'Roman' pretences he ridiculed in 1812,[33] or his friend General Mikhail A. Miloradovich, whom he accused of 'boasting even on his deathbed' in 1825.[34]

At the most critical moment in the battle of Gedeonovo, Alexander F. Klinger, Barclay de Tolly's adjutant, rushed to Eugen to hand him a note simply telling him that 'the fate of the army [was] now in his hands'.[35] Klinger saw it necessary to expand on the note by way of a flowery speech, drawing comparisons between the Spartans at Thermopylae and leading figures in the Russian army. However, 'the eloquent references to certain historical figures seemed even more laughable to me', wrote Eugen, 'when one of the sharper men around me interrupted him with the question: "So, will all these gentlemen soon join us as reinforcements?"'[36]

Later in the campaign, at Borodino, Eugen's division was in the thick of the fighting, situated between the centre and left flank of the Russian army. Two-thirds of his men were taken out of action, and Eugen himself lost three horses; 'however, even then the presence of mind of such a brave and fearless general was not shaken', as Baggovut wrote in his recommendation of Eugen for promotion to lieutenant-general.[37]

Despite his later assertions that he fully supported the tactic of retreating and luring Napoleon deeper into the country, his actions during 1812 tell a different story. At the battle of Smolensk, he was one of the fiercest supporters of maintaining the siege and defending the city. As Robert Wilson wrote in his diary, the night before the city was abandoned: 'Prince Eugene of Württemberg … engaged with eight thousand men to defend the city ten days and begged of me to assure the General [Barclay de Tolly] of the necessity of further defence.'[38]

After the battle of Borodino, in the deliberations over the surrender of Moscow, Eugen was once again on the side of the 'patriotic' party. Although he was not present at the military council in Fili, he later called Kutuzov to one side, and, according to Bennigsen, all but fell to his knees, begging him to join battle with the enemy just one more time.[39] The field marshal sighed and whispered to him: 'here my head, be it good or bad, must direct matters' (*Ici ma tête, fut elle bonne ou mauvaise, ne doit s'aider que d'elle-même*).[40]

Following the death of his commander and friend Baggovut at the battle of Tarutino, in mid-October, Eugen was given command of most of the corps and entered the second period of the war in the vanguard of the Russian army under General Miloradovich. In this position he played an important role at the battles of Viaz'ma and Krasnoi, maintaining his eagerness for action throughout. Miloradovich was always compelled to restrain him, citing Kutuzov's well-known strategy of 'building golden bridges for the enemy',[41] while Ermolov 'strongly reprimanded' the prince for joining battle against orders.[42]

Shortly after Krasnoi, Eugen again met with Kutuzov. In response to the prince's allegations of indecisiveness, the 'old man' replied that 'circumstances do more than our weapons, and we cannot ourselves reach the border in tatters'.[43] It was during this meeting that Kutuzov christened Eugen the 'Maid of Orleans' of the Russian army, adding: 'I am an old man, but this one will rise like a meteor over my ashes.'[44] The prince's career was indeed on a meteoric rise. The tsar issued a rescript placing Eugen, 'who has proven his military talents in the course of this campaign', at the head of the entirety of the late Baggovut's former 2nd Infantry Corps.[45]

Eugen was an example of a new type of officer, especially during the 1812 winter campaign. He typified the 'friend of the soldiers' (*ami des soldats*) and was 'a regular in their camp'. According to a 'manual for infantry officers for the day of battle' from June 1812, this epithet was 'very prestigious for a warrior':[46]

> In various circumstances during '12 … we became accustomed to seeing one man always first into battle, and last to occupy warm quarters, which he often willingly traded for a soldier's shelter. His genuine attachment to the bivouacs was clear from his overcoat, which was always dirty, powdered with the cherished ash of the campaign fire … The men became wonderfully accustomed to this man in the grey overcoat and uniform cap! He loved being among them: slurping their porridge and feasting on their rusks … On seeing him in the rain, in the mud, lying side by side with the soldiers, one cannot but think: 'what a fine front-line officer!' Then with a flash of the cross from beneath his coat, one will know: 'A knight as well! Young, but has not he earned it!' Suddenly, the reveille … and the division … is ready to follow him through fire and water! This is not just an officer, this is a general – and what a general! … And yet, it seems, greater still? This is Prince Eugen of Württemberg …[47]

Soviet literature had a habit of attributing these characteristics to the Decembrists, but this archetype is actually closer to that of the 'person born to war',[48] as the army was particularly conducive to its development, being a projection of a patriarchal, rather than liberal society. In Russia in 1812, these characters were defined first and foremost in the Suvorov tradition – the knight of honour, ascetic and 'close to the people' ('radiant … eating rusks; sleeping on straw, keeping watch until dawn …').[49] Prince Eugen, however, was critical of the 'increasingly common fashion in Russia for drawing comparisons with Suvorov's qualities' and, in his case, he was more drawn to the example of Frederick the Great, and, of course, the influence of the French army, which had created the model of the *ami des soldats* in the first place.[50] This French characteristic was, in fact, used to describe a number of Russian generals in 1812, who were 'loved by the lower ranks'.[51]

Unlike many foreigners in the Russian service, Eugen had studied Russian from childhood. He understood the importance of Russian national feeling and realized that, as a 'German', he had to be particularly tactful in this regard. This strongly influenced his attitude towards military honours, a very important consideration in the context of army politics. When listing those that had distinguished themselves on the battlefield, he generally tried to strike a balance between 'natural' Russian and foreign names, a task complicated by the large contingent of Baltic Germans in his corps.[52]

At the same time, Eugen's reputation as a 'friend of the soldiers' and a 'regular in their camp' was a considered strategy on the part of the prince, who was keen to distance himself from any involvement in the intrigues of the Russian headquarters. Kutuzov, according to Eugen, was 'more a politician than a general' and was 'forced to take into consideration the opinions of others, and it would have been unpleasant to me to behave in a manner appropriate to my status. … Despite Kutuzov's reproaches … I always stayed on the march or in camp with my division'.[53]

A related aspect of this strategy was his reputation as a 'friend of mankind' (*l'ami de l'humanité*), which, aside from his relations with the lower ranks, was expressed through his determination to minimize the excesses of war. This behaviour was particularly evident in his treatment of captive prisoners. As noted above, Eugen had saved a number of them at the very beginning of his military career. Although conscious of the exigencies of war, he nevertheless viewed the horrors of the so-called 'people's war' as conclusive evidence of the dangers of strong national sympathies, or 'patriotism' as he called it, for both Russia and other countries. In his memoirs, attempting to avoid any hints of disloyalty when discussing this sensitive issue, he quoted a letter from an anonymous Russian acquaintance from the autumn of 1812:

> When passions are inflamed, it is impossible to predict the true extent of their effects … In their fury, our peasants are now bordering on cruelty, which offends human sympathy. The educators of the young ought to draw a curtain to hide this chapter in our history, and thank God on bended knee when these times that were brought upon us with Napoleon are over, and our inhabitants, otherwise kind and peaceful, have recovered from this madness …[54]

Robert Wilson, with whom the prince maintained a friendly relationship, and who consistently praised him in both his published accounts and private correspondence with Alexander I,[55] noted how he and Eugen together saved some captive Spanish soldiers.[56] Eugen placed even greater importance on saving the lives of German prisoners of war.

His rapidly growing popularity within the army encouraged the prince to consider his long-term plans, particularly concerning the imminent

campaign in Germany. With the annihilation of Ney's corps at Krasnoi, Eugen's troops took a large number of German captives:

> On 20 November [1812], an entire military orchestra (*Musikchor*), newly reformed and consisting of Germans from the French ranks, was marching at the head of my column, followed by whole crowds of Germans, who had joined me willingly, and whose number was growing by the hour. I must admit that I hoped then that a strong army would grow from that first core of new German troops.

However, as demanded by Miloradovich and then Kutuzov, in accordance with the tsar's orders, all prisoners were to be sent to the St Petersburg region to join Prince Oldenburg's new Russo-German legion and so 'these cheerful hopes would soon disappear'. In the harsh conditions of the winter of 1812, only a few of them would reach their destination, whereas Eugen estimated that, before the arrival of the Russian army in Kovno, he had seen up to 10,000 German prisoners of war.[57]

During 1812, everyone was 'looking to become a Napoleon', and Eugen certainly had grounds for this. By the end of the winter campaign in 1812, his 'political expectations peaked'. The prince's ambitions stretched to not only becoming commander of the Russian vanguard but, in this capacity, becoming a key figure in organizing the mobilization of all German patriots, in Prussia and elsewhere, against Napoleon. Eugen anticipated that he would command 'the core of the German imperial army' (*des deutschen Reichsheeres*) in order to ultimately bring about the 'restoration of the [Holy Roman] Empire'. He went even further, asserting that no less than 'European union (is) a necessary condition for the security and prosperity of our civilised world'.[58] While some of these ideas were later additions by the memoirist, it is clear that Eugen harboured hopes of this kind even before the start of the 1812 campaign.

In November 1812, after the battle of Krasnoi, Kutuzov promised Eugen the command of the main vanguard. However, the 'Silesian dreamer's' rising popularity within the army also earned him new enemies. Eugen's chosen strategy of maintaining his distance from the Russian headquarters, the dirty soldier's overcoat, his selflessness – all of these qualities could scarcely have brought great dividends for his career. In Vilnius, the prince met with the tsar, accompanied by Kutuzov. The latter spent the meeting singing Eugen's praises. While Alexander spoke evasively of rewarding merit, the field marshal informed Eugen that 'the vanguard is in your pocket' and proposed a toast to the 'prince's health, out of love for whom some are willing to die'. Throughout the exchange, Eugen sat in 'a tattered jacket because [his] campaign luggage had gone astray'.[59] Even putting aside this social *faux pas* and the inevitable intrigues surrounding promotions, the prince's reputation as a risk-prone general with political commitments would not

have recommended him to the tsar as a suitable candidate for the role to which he aspired.

Eugen's boldness in his vanguard's skirmishes in pursuit of the retreating French contradicted the definition of 'military talent', set out in an imperial rescript, and further impacted negatively on his standing. Moreover, the 'people's movement' in the German lands had to be carefully planned and controlled, therefore the role of the vanguard's commander was as much political as military. Although, as the young Princess Charlotte – later Empress Alexandra Fedorovna – informed him, in Berlin Eugen was viewed as a crucial link in the new alliance between Russia and Prussia, history took a different turn.[60] In late December 1812, command of the main Russian vanguard was given to Adjutant-General Ferdinand von Wintzingerode, who had almost been shot by Napoleon in Moscow, and had recently been sprung from captivity, rather than to Eugen.[61] Therefore, just as he had failed to become 'Eugen I', the prince had to abandon his plans to become the liberator of Germany and the architect of a Europe-wide peace. Despite Eugen's complaints, the fact that this promotion violated the rules of seniority was hardly extraordinary at this time.[62] Nevertheless, speaking to the Dowager Empress in Weimar in 1818, Alexander I reportedly confessed: 'I admit all my errors towards him, but one cannot measure sovereigns against the same yardstick as individuals'.[63]

The 1813–1814 campaigns

The start of 1813 was a turning point in the prince's career. Visiting his Silesian domains, he believed that his 'life's purpose [had] gone up in smoke, and [his] best hopes [had been] shattered'.[64] Kutuzov's death in April 1813 also deprived Eugen of an important supporter, while Maria Fedorovna's patronage had now become more symbolic than helpful in advancing his career. The prince was involved in the battles of 1813 and 1814 as the commanding officer of the 2nd Infantry Corps, now under the aegis of the Army of Bohemia, under the command of General Wittgenstein. In the spring and summer of 1813, when the allies had suffered a series of setbacks in the campaign, Eugen once again distinguished himself by his quick thinking and personal bravery in certain critical scenarios – indeed, it was these situations that brought out his best qualities. 'Who is this Russian smart aleck (*Windbeutel*)?' asked the stunned Prussian General Johann Yorck when, in the battle of Lützen in May 1813, Eugen's corps masterfully repelled the French and seized an important position. When told it was the prince, Yorck muttered: 'the little devil …'[65]

Eugen played an important role before and during the crucial battle of Kulm in late August 1813, one that was very similar to his actions in the rear guard after the battle of Smolensk in 1812. Without the intelligence, coolness and courage he showed in these days the whole autumn

1813 campaign of the Army of Bohemia could have ended in disaster. On 29 August, the prince's divisions were at Priesten, together with the Guards, defending the allied main army's retreat through the Bohemian mountains after their defeat at Dresden. Confusion was caused both by the mental illness of Count Aleksandr I. Osterman-Tolstoi (who had been parachuted in as commanding officer), and by discord between Osterman-Tolstoi, Eugen, and Ermolov, then commander of the 1st Infantry Guards.[66]

Unlike at the battle of Smolensk, however, Eugen's involvement and that of 2nd Corps would long go overlooked. Both in Russian printed works and in the ceremony for the unveiling of the Kulm Memorial in 1835, the glory was shared between Osterman–Tolstoi and Ermolov. The former would receive most of the praise, even though, according to Eugen, he spent the battle 'sitting on a drum staring at the ground'. For both Osterman-Tolstoi and Ermolov, a key priority was preserving the Guards regiments from destruction. As noted above, there was no love lost between Ermolov and Eugen, and, at the critical moment in the battle, the former was reluctant to send the last reserves of the Izmailovskii Guards Regiment into the fray, hissing through clenched teeth that 'the prince is too profligate with the blood of the Imperial Guard'.[67] Ermolov was even more direct with his chief of staff: 'You are a German! Traitor! What do you care if the emperor has a 1st Guards Division …?'[68]

Eugen's actions during the 'people's battles' at Leipzig in October 1813 were very similar to his involvement at the battle of Borodino and, once again, his reputation for being 'good under fire', was vindicated. Eugen's forces were in the midst of the fighting in the battle for Wachau and at the centre of the famous French attack at Gulden-Goss on 4 (16) October 1813, during which all the watching allied monarchs were almost captured. The intensity of French fire, previously 'unseen in the history of war', and the mass cavalry attack caused heavy casualties among Eugen's 2nd corps. The losses were huge, even compared with Borodino, as almost two-thirds of his corps were lost.[69] Eugen invited Barclay de Tolly's aide-de-camp, who refused to believe these figures, to see the number of bodies lying on the battlefield.[70] Grand Duke Constantine wrote to Maria Fedorovna shortly afterwards: 'Eugen has risen from the dead. His extraordinary luck complements his incomparable courage' (*Eugène s'est relevé des morts. Son bonheur inouï l'emporte encore sur sa valeur incomparable*).[71]

On the eve of the final 1814 campaign in France, Eugen was once again encouraged by the prospect of promotion to command a larger contingent by Tsar Alexander I and Prince Schwarzenberg. However, as before, on this occasion the prince was simply not trusted to fulfil the duties of this role. The final stages of Eugen's war in spring 1814 saw nothing as dramatic as the events of the previous two years, although the long list of his exploits on the battlefield was nevertheless significantly extended. When the fall of Paris in March 1814 ended his active military service, he

had participated and distinguished himself on the battlefield on almost 100 occasions.

During the battle for Paris, Eugen's forces once again found themselves in the midst of the allied attack and the prince, as previously, personally led the charge against the French. On this occasion, however, he was fighting alongside, rather than against 'his fellow' Württembergers. On the morning of 31 March 1814, Barclay de Tolly ordered him to be the first to enter the city at the head of a thousand-strong cohort, ahead of the arrival of the monarchs, to impose order and to occupy the Hôtel de Ville.

This task was not simply a military one: the prince's adjutant, who was less reserved in his appraisal of the behaviour of the Russian army, wrote that the main problem with the occupation of the city was the abundance of local vineyards. By late morning, 'the Tobol'sk Infantry Regiment was lying scattered around the cellars, drunk on Burgundy'.[72] Their uniforms worn through, the sorry state of Eugen's corps by the end of the war is evidenced in Barclay de Tolly's orders concerning the dress and equipment of his detachment: 'Boots, or at least no wooden footwear … no blouses, women's skirts, or nun's overalls, and, most determinedly, no French uniforms'. The last prohibition was the most difficult to comply with, since 'after the battles of Arcis-sur-Aube and Fère-Champenoise, the entire corps was dressed either in clothes taken from the Guard Voltigeurs, or after Bar-sur-Aube, in those taken from French line regiments, so that the only means of telling us from the French were the huge spruce branches on our shakos, and the white bands on our sleeves … at nine, our walking forest moved out into the streets of Paris to the wonderful music of the Volhynia regiment's band.[73]

Confused by the fact that the French thought he was one of the allied rulers, Eugen retired to the Pantin gate to wait for the chief architects of the triumph, in order to welcome them on behalf of his infantry, and at last to hear Alexander I utter the words that he had long deserved: 'without you, we would not be here' (*sans vous nous ne serions pas ici*).[74]

'Why should a German not be a friend of Russia'

What followed is merely a long epilogue to the events of these years. Convinced that his promotion prospects were slim, Eugen nevertheless remained in Russian service until his death in 1857, whether to fulfil a promise to his aunt Maria Fedorovna (as later German authors stressed), driven by his own loyalties (as suggested in the prince's personal writings), or because of more mundane material circumstances (not recorded anywhere but just as likely).

During 1816 and 1817 Eugen remained a company corps, before being granted official leave, during which he returned to Silesia. After the death of his father in 1822, he inherited the title of Duke of Württemberg, and subsequently only travelled to Russia on occasional infrequent business. One of

these occasions came during the interregnum of 1825; Eugen found himself drawn into the events when, following the death of his first wife, he was invited back to Russia by Maria Fedorovna. He then took an active part in the suppression of the uprising against Nicholas I, shuttling between Senate Square and the Winter Palace, and bade farewell to the fatally-wounded Miloradovich on the tsar's behalf.[75]

In the wake of this chance encounter, Eugen undoubtedly hoped to restore his career under a more favourable ruler, who would at last be responsive to his talents. Nicholas I gave Eugen the task of developing a strategy for the forthcoming Russo-Turkish war.[76] Again, however, others were put in command during the war of 1828–1829 – this time these commanders were the new favourites Ivan F. Paskevich and Diebitsch, the latter being the offspring of one of Eugen's former tutors. Eugen's conflict with Diebitsch brought an end to his Russian military career. By way of consolation, Nicholas I awarded him the prestigious Order of St Andrew.

Subsequently, Eugen's main preoccupation was the critique of studies of the Napoleonic Wars and the publication of his own works on the subject. Despite his disappointment with his Russian military career, Eugen proved himself to be an inveterate Russophile. He saw the task of publishing his perceptions of the Napoleonic Wars as 'the responsibility of those foreigners that, in tough times, had found their second home in Russia'.[77] He wanted his memoirs to ensure that 'the influence of 1812 on the political fate of the world should be given its due acknowledgement in every respect'.[78]

Epilogue

In the words of Viktor M. Zhivov: 'it is not only what history remembers that is important, but also what it endeavours to forget'.[79] The main drama of Eugen's story is not, perhaps, that his role was consciously side-lined. As nation states became entrenched, as political borders divided memory and history, the memory of Eugen's deeds fell through the cracks between them and found itself in no man's land. The prospect of writing his biography, as the story of a hero of the Patriotic War or the War of Liberation, had very limited potential in either Russia or Germany. 'princes have no Fatherland', noted Theodor von Bernhardi after his conversations with Eugen.[80] Unlike in his war-time battles, therefore, in the struggle for historical recognition Eugen was completely defeated.

However, Eugen's elimination at the hands of history is reversible, as the rise of revisionism has focused increasing attention on such figures as the Silesian prince. Growing fascination with the diversity of imperial societies and the realization of individual ambitions within them has given life to various research projects that can be described as 'imperial biographies'. Within this historiographical context, Eugen can and should be viewed differently. The same can be said within the context of Europe as a whole, as

changing perceptions of the Napoleonic Wars have moved away from the concept of the Wars as a sum total of individual state or national struggles and towards the concept of a pan-European civil war, which defined the lives of a generation across the whole continent.

Notes

1. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, *Imperator Aleksandr I i ego spodvizhniki v 1812, 1813, 1814 i 1815 godakh: voennaia galereia Zimnego dvortsa*, 6 vols. (St Petersburg, 1845–1849).
2. A. A. Eliseev, 'Zabytye geroi minuvshikh voin. Prints Evgenii Viurtembergskii', in *Epokha Napoleonovskikh voin: liudi, sobytiia, idei* (Moscow, 1999), 58–70; Zhanna Maleeva, *Predstaviteli dinastii Viurtembergskikh v politicheskoi istorii Rossii, konets XVIII – seredina XIX vv.* (Candidate of science thesis) (Piatigorsk, 2001), 100–92.
3. H. Scheunchen, 'Herzog Eugen von Württemberg, Feldherr und Komponist', in *Ostdeutsche Gedenktage 2007. Persönlichkeiten und historische Ereignisse* (Bonn, 2008), 246–50; M. Weber, *'Mein Gott war der gute und sanfte Kaiser Alexander': Württembergisch-Russische Beziehungen im Spiegel der Memoiren Herzog Eugens von Württemberg* (Tübingen, 2002); M. von Ow, *Herzog Eugen von Württemberg. Kaiserlich Russischer General der Infanterie 1788–1857* (Potsdam, 2000); Denis Sdvizkov, 'Très brave au feu, peu fortuné. Der russische General Eugen von Württemberg im Porträt', in Nicole Bickhoff and Wolfgang Mährle, eds., *Armee im Untergang. Württemberg und der Feldzug Napoleons gegen Russland 1812* (Stuttgart, forthcoming).
4. Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807–14* (London, 2010); Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, A. A. Smirnov, et al., eds., *Zagranichnye pokhody russkoi armii. 1813–15 gg.: Entsiklopediia*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 2011).
5. Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, 'Gruppirovki rossiiskikh generalov v 1812–14 gg.', in *'Tsep' nepreryvnogo predaniia...': Sbornik pamiati A. G. Tartakovskogo* (Moscow, 2004), 52.
6. Eugen von Württemberg, *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812 in Russland von dem Herzog Eugen von Württemberg* (Breslau, 1846); Eugen von Württemberg, *Memoiren des Herzogs Eugen von Württemberg*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Oder, 1862); J. M. Freiherr von Helldorff, ed., *Aus dem Leben des Kaiserlich Russischen Generals der Infanterie Prinzen Eugen von Württemberg aus dessen eigenhändigen Aufzeichnungen sowie aus dem schriftlichen Nachlass seiner Adjutanten gesammelt und herausgegeben von Freiherrn von Helldorff,* 4 vols. (Berlin 1861–1862). A substantial volume of information, including evidence that did not make its way into the above publications, is also contained in various German periodicals and studies of the Napoleonic era published between 1830 and 1860.
7. Pantaleimon N. Simanskii, ed., *Pered voinoi 1812 goda: opisanie kachestv i sposobnostei rossiiskikh generalov* (St Petersburg, 1906), 9.
8. 'My God! Prince Eugen of Württemberg, our little shining star … the soldiers' idol', wrote a 'Russian invalid' in 1839, describing the Borodino triumphs: Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 1, 31.
9. Annemarie Röder, Harald Schukraft, Andreas Henning et al., eds., *Maria Feodorowna als Mittlerin zwischen Württemberg und Russland* (Stuttgart, 2007).
10. There are several extant versions of the memoirs concerning this period in his life; however, the most detailed and interesting have never been translated into Russian and are almost unknown: 'Jugend-Erinnerungen des Prinzen,

von Letzterem an den General-Leutnant v. Valentini gerichtet', in Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 1, 74–160.

11. Eugen von Württemberg, 'Jugend-Erinnerungen', 114–15; Valentin P. Zubov, *Pavel I* (St Petersburg, 2007), 106.
12. On this, see Eugen himself: 'Bemerkungen über vorstehende Dispositionen von dem Herzoge Eugen v. Württemberg, datiert aus Carlsruhe in Schlesien im Dezember 1836', in Theodor Schiemann, ed., *Die Ermordung Pauls und die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus I* (Berlin, 1902), 83–9. A Russian translation is provided in: Zubov, *Pavel I*, 90–1.
13. Eugen von Württemberg, 'Jugend-Erinnerungen', 152–3.
14. Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 1, 21.
15. This was later published as: 'Die Feldzüge von 1806 und 1807 in Polen und Preußen. Von einem Augenzeugen im kaiserlich-russischen Heere, geschrieben zu Riga 1808', *Streffleurs [Österreichische] Militärische Zeitschrift*, 7 (1842): 3–28 and 8 (1842): 115–40.
16. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 191–207
17. [Egor Kankrin (Georg Cancrin)], *Fragmente über die Kriegskunst nach Gesichtspunkten der militärischen Philosophie* (St Petersburg, 1809).
18. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 190; Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 1, 24–5.
19. Eugen, *Memoiren*, vol. 1, 24–5.
20. 'L. von Wolzogen an Eugen von Württemberg, Berlin, 18 März 1845', in Friedrich-Carl Esbach, ed., *Das Herzogliche Haus Württemberg zu Carlsruhe in Schlesien* (Stuttgart, 1906), 30–1.
21. Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 3, 4.
22. Ibid., vol. 1, 26.
23. Ibid., vol. 1, 23.
24. Cf. [Eugen von Württemberg], 'Vertrauliche Erklärung über die Verhältnisse von 1812', in Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben,* vol. 3, 3–10.
25. Aleksei P. Ermolov, *Mémoires du général Yermolow sur la campagne de 1812* (Paris and London, 1863), 120.
26. Pavel Kh. Grabbe, 'Iz pamiatnykh zapisok grafa Pavla Khristoforovicha Grabbe: Otechestvennaia voina', *Russkii arkhiv*, 3 (1873): 444–6.
27. N. Gerbel, 'Iziumskii gusarskii polk v voinakh 1812, 1813 i 1814 godov (epizod iz istorii polka)', *Voennyi sbornik*, 7 (1875): 10; V. M. Voronovskii, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 g. v predelakh Smolenskoi gubernii* (St Petersburg, 1912), 135–43.
28. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, *Opisanie Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda*, 4 vols. (St Petersburg, 1843), vol. 2, 124. The journal of Eugene's 2nd Infantry Corps from 1812 to 1814 are published in: C. G. F. [le Capitaine Georges Fabry], ed., *Journal des campagnes du prince de Wurtemberg, 1812–1814: avec une introduction, des notes et des pièces justificatives* (Paris, 1907), 1–185.
29. Eugen, *Memoiren*, vol. 1, 79
30. Ibid., vol. 3, 62.
31. 'Jugend-Erinnerungen', 158.
32. Iurii M. Lotman, 'Teatr i teatral'nost' v stroe kul'tury nachala XIX veka', in Iurii M. Lotman, *Izbrannye stat'i v trekh tomakh*, 3 vols (Tallinn, 1992), vol. 1, 269–86.
33. 'Disposed to imitating the Romans in everything he did, this time he will follow the example of Crassus against the Parthians', 'Letter from Empress Maria Feodorovna from Vil'komir, spring 1812', in Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben,* vol. 1, 28.

34. Eugen was sent to him with a letter of farewell from Nicholas I, 'E. von Württemberg an A. von Hofmann, St Petersburg 18/30 März 1826', in Alfred von Hofmann-Chappuis, ed., *Die nachgelassene Correspondenz zwischen dem Herzog Eugen von Württemberg und dem Chef seines Stabes während der Kriegsjahre von 1813 und 1814, dem damaligen Obersten in russischen, und späterhin General in preußischen Diensten, von Hofmann sowie ein skizzirtes Lebensbild des Letzteren* (Cannstatt, 1883), 24.
35. Voronovskii, *Otechestvennaia voina*, 140–2.
36. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 48.
37. [Karl Fedorovich Baggovut], *Imiannoi spisok 2-go pekhotnogo korpusa generalitetu, shtab i ober-ofitseram, otlichivshimsia muzhestvom i khrabrostiiu v srazhenii protiv nepriiatel'skikh voisk v 26 den' avgusta pri Borodine (7 sentiabria 1812)*: http://wardoc.ru/newwin/show.htm?what=170 [accessed on 24 December 2013]
38. Robert Wilson, *Private Diary of Travels, Personal Services, and Public Events: During Mission and Employment with the European Armies in the Campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814. From the Invasion of Russia to the Capture of Paris* (London, 1861), 148.
39. Levin–Auguste Bennigsen, *Mémoires du Général Bennigsen*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1907–1908), 3: 94.
40. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 99.
41. Ibid., 154–5.
42. Denis V. Davydov, *Voennye zapiski* (Moscow, 1982), 191.
43. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 171–2.
44. Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben,* vol. 1, 33.
45. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, f. 1409, op. 1, d. 6375, chast' 1, l. 181, (rescript), 25 October 1812; 'Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Alexander I, 20 November 1812', in Liubomir G. Beskrovnyi, ed., *M. I. Kutuzov: sbornik dokumentov*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1951–1954), vol. 4/2, 431.
46. 'Nastavlenie gospodam pekhotnym ofitseram v den' srazheniia [1812]', *Voennyi sbornik*, 7 (1902), 244; Lidia L. Ivchenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn' russkogo ofitsera epokhi 1812 goda* (Moscow, 2008), 357–401.
47. Fedor N. Glinka, *Ocherki Borodinskogo srazheniia (vospominaniia o 1812 gode)* (Moscow, 1839): http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/glinka/borodino.html [accessed on 20 August 2012].
48. 'Nastavlenie gospodam pekhotnym ofitseram', 243.
49. Gavriil R. Derzhavin, 'Snigir' (1800)', in Gavriil R. Derzhavin, *Stikhotvoreniia*, ed. Dmitrii D. Blagogo (Leningrad, 1957), 283
50. Eugen, *Memoiren*, vol. 1, 102.
51. *Pered voinoi 1812 goda*, 30.
52. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 17.
53. Ibid., 101.
54. Ibid., 108–9.
55. 'R. Vil'son [Wilson] lordu Katkartu [Cathcart], Viaz'ma, 24 oktiabria/ 5 noiabria 1812'; 'R. Vil'son Aleksandru I, Dorogobuzh, 27 oktabria/ 7 noiabria 1812', in Nikolai M. Dubrovin, ed., *Otechestvennaia voina v pis'makh sovremennikov* (Moscow, 2006), 264, 283.
56. 'R. Vil'son lordu Katkartu, Iamel'tsa 3 oktiabria 1812', *Voenno-istoricheskii sbornik*, 1 (1913): 205.
57. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 166–7.
58. Eugen, *Memoiren*, vol. 3, 1–3.
59. Ibid., vol. 3, 5–6.

60. Ibid., vol. 3, 13–4.
61. Beskrovnyi, *Kutuzov*, vol. 5, 20–2.
62. A. Kartsov, *Voenno-istoricheskii obzor voiny 1813 goda* (St Petersburg, 1858), 17.
63. 'Je conviens de tous mes torts envers lui, mais on ne peut taxer les souverains d'après l'échelle des particuliers': Eugen von Württemberg an A. von Hoffmann, Carlsruhe in Silesia, 16 März 1844', *Correspondenz*, 61.
64. 'Eugen von Württemberg an A. von Hofmann, Carlsruhe, 15 November 1842', *Correspondenz*, 56.
65. Memoirs of the Prussian Lieutenant-General G. W. F. von Valentini (Yorck's chief of staff), as quoted in: J. M. von Helldorff, *Zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei Kulm. Aufklärung verschiedener bis jetzt unrichtig dargestellter Thatsachen über die Tage vom 25–30 August 1813* (Berlin, 1856), 10–11.
66. Some of Eugen's notes on Kulm have been translated into Russian: 'Deistviia pravogo kryla soiuznykh armii ot 25-go do 30-go avgusta 1813 goda (iz zapisok printsa Evgeniia Virtembergskogo, komandira 2-go russkogo korpusa)', *Voennyi sbornik*, 8 (1875): 169–88.
67. For more detail, see Helldorff, *Zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei Kulm*, passim.
68. This view is expressed in: Theodor von Bernhardi, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben der kaiserlich-russischen Generals von der Infanterie Carl Friedrich von Toll*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1857), vol. 3, 217.
69. Bezotosnyi, *Zagranichnye pokhody rossiiskoi armii*, vol. 1, 712, 714.
70. E. Burckhardt, 'Ein vergessener Held der Befreiungsjahre', *Gartenlaube*, 37 (1863): 584.
71. Helldorff, *Aus dem Leben*, vol. 1, 40.
72. 'Der Einzug der Alliierten in Paris am 31. März 1814', in Helldorff, ed., *Aus dem Leben*, 3: 114; *Journal des campagnes*, 185.
73. Ibid., 115.
74. *Correspondenz*, 88; Bezotosnyi, *Zagranichnye pokhody rossiiskoi armii*, vol. 2, 201.
75. Further details in Russian translation are provided in: Ia. Turunov, ed., *14 dekabria 1825 goda. Izvlecheno iz vospominanii gertsoga Evgeniia Viurtembergskogo Ia.Turunovym* (St Petersburg, 1867).
76. *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv*, f. 846, d. 4611, 4623 (reports and notes by Eugen).
77. 'Eugen von Württemberg to A. von Hoffman, Carlsruhe in Silesia, 28 May 1823', *Correspondenz*, 7.
78. *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des Jahres 1812*, 235.
79. Viktor M. Zhivov, *Razyskaniia s oblasti istorii i predystorii russkoi kul'tury* (Moscow, 2002), 707.
80. Theodor von Bernhardi, 'Aus den Tagebüchern Theodor von Bernhardi's (1847 bis 1887). I', *Deutsche Rundschau*, 74 (1893): 262.

10

The Finances of the Russian Empire in the Period of the Patriotic War of 1812 and of the Foreign Campaigns of the Russian Army

Liudmila P. Marnei

Despite nearly two centuries of research on the era of the Napoleonic Wars, the task of discovering and publishing previously unknown sources on the history of the so-called Patriotic War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns of the Russian army remains an important one, and a number of other features require further research. One of these is the history of Russian finances in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

As early as the end of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire laid the foundations for the modernization of its financial system, soon to endure the trial of the fight against Napoleon at the beginning of the following century. Indeed, the outcome of the war depended in no small part on the stability of the financial system. After the Tilsit peace treaties, and with a fresh war against Napoleon on the horizon, the Russian government and the minister of finance directed all their efforts towards an eventual victory.

The minister of finance's main aim was to provide enough money to cover emergency military spending and prevent financial disaster. Mikhail M. Speranskii and Dmitrii A. Gur'ev's finance policy, which had aimed to maintain an effective financial system and liquidate the state budget deficit, had not been realized by the summer of 1812. Wars with Persia, Turkey and Sweden and participation in the coalitions against Napoleon, resulting in the signing of the Tilsit peace treaties and accession to the continental blockade, damaged the state budget and the system of money circulation, led to the formation of external and internal state debts, and had a negative impact on trade and the Russian Empire's tariff and credit systems.[1] It was during this period that Napoleon invaded.

The most eloquent testimony to the difficulties faced by the Ministry of Finance at the beginning of the war comes from direct participants in the events, that is, those who worked at the ministry. Petr I. Golubev, who

served in the finance department from 1811 until 1863, recalled the time as follows:

> After the enemy invasion, we suddenly had much more work on our hands: with the rapid advance of the Napoleonic hordes, sixteen provinces stopped sending money to the main treasuries (at the time, this meant St Petersburg for ordinary [*shtatnye*] and 'residual' [*ostatochnye*] sums); every day, millions were needed to meet unforeseeable military costs; cash was sent from one province to another to protect it from looters; crowds of unfortunate citizens came running from the enemy masses, needing shelter and bread; it was necessary to arm the people, since, in terms of numbers, the Russian forces were far from equal to those of Napoleon. […] Various unforeseeable costs were incurred; indeed, the costs could not even have been imagined: provisions and supplies for hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, arrangements for those who had been living in areas taken by the enemy, warm clothing and footwear for Russian troops pursuing the French in freezing conditions, the need to burn the corpses of men and horses blocking roads from Moscow to the border in order to avoid infectious diseases.[2]

At the beginning of 1813, Tsar Alexander I granted loans of six million roubles to the inhabitants of Smolensk province, 15 million to Moscow province, and moreover, he granted five million roubles to the newly-established Construction Commission in Moscow.[3]

The existing tax system, based primarily on the poll tax (head tax) and taxation on a number of goods such as alcohol and salt, could not raise enough to meet the ever-increasing expenditure, primarily by the Ministry of War, amounting to between 53 per cent and 62 per cent of state revenue in 1812–1815.[4] Military spending became an unbearable burden for the state budget. However, Gur'ev repeatedly insisted that the solution to the financial problems, including the allocation of funds for the conduct of hostilities, should not involve an increase in taxes or the introduction of new ones. Instead, the deficit was covered through external and internal borrowing.

Ever since the eighteenth century, the Russian government had financed emergency spending with the help of external loans secured in Britain, Prussia, Holland and the Republic of Genoa. External debt and British subsidies (between 1792 and 1816, Russia was granted £9,533,329) had allowed the tsar to finance the participation of his government in the wars against Revolutionary France and Napoleon.[5] A comparatively small loan from Genoa was paid off by Russia in 1808 after the conclusion of the Tilsit peace and Austria's defeat at the hands of Napoleon, at which point Austria was fully within the orbit of French policy and Italy was effectively ruled by the

French emperor.[6] In 1798, Russia's debts to Holland had been combined into a single 'Dutch debt' of 88.3 million Dutch guilders (with 5 per cent interest per year), a very large sum even by comparison with the British subsidies. Initially, it had been agreed that the debt was to be repaid between 1 January 1811 and 1 January 1830. In 1810, the repayment of the 'Dutch debt' was extended by 71 years and 11 months, and, in consequence of the decree of 14 October 1815, another 18 million guilders were added to the sum, that is, the unpaid interest accrued on the loans in the period 1812–1815. According to the convention of 7 May 1815, Britain and Holland were to pay off 'part of the capital and interest unpaid by 1 January 1816' on the Dutch debt at 25 million guilders each.[7]

Foreign trade remained a significant source of income for the Russian government. Between 1812 and 1813, against a backdrop of active fighting, an increase in foreign trade contributed to an increase in customs revenue from 19,800,000 roubles in 1812 to more than 31,700,000 roubles in 1813, evidence of the relative effectiveness of the government's finance policy.[8]

Apart from foreign subsidies and loans, as well as customs takings, internal borrowing was also used to finance the conflict. The government's main creditors in the period of the Patriotic War were the Loan Bank (*Zaemnyi bank*), the Appanage Department (*Udel'nyi department*), Lombard, the Discounting Offices (*Uchetnye kontory*) and the 25-Year Expedition (*25-letniaia ekspeditsiia*). Further evidence of the extent to which the assets of these institutions were mobilized can be found in the request made by Empress Maria Fedorovna for the transfer of capital from the Bureau for Social Welfare to the State Treasury, with the exception of funds for foundling hospitals in both St Petersburg and Moscow.[9] The funds of the Debt Commission (*Komissiia pogasheniia dolgov*) were forfeited to the state.

The unstable political situation in Europe and Napoleon's taking of Holland – Russia's main creditor – necessitated a shift towards internal credit. Despite the modest results of the internal borrowing of 1809–1810 – only five million of the 20 million roubles offered had been received in *assignats* – this first attempt showed that the finance department had at its disposal an untapped source of monetary resources, more profitable than foreign loans.[10] Thus, support was given to a proposal put forward by the Swiss economist François D'Ivernois, who had suggested that emergency military spending in 1813 could be met by releasing 6 per cent state debt obligations, which were intended to be accepted only 'as a deposit and guarantee on treasury agreements relating to contracting, procurement and tax farming' and 'by mutual consent', 'in all transactions and payments between individuals'.[11] The obligations were intended for use by merchants and the nobility. For this reason, it was essential to allow them to be accepted 'on payment of debts to the state Loan Bank and in customs offices on payment of duties on goods brought into or out of the country'. Furthermore, during 1813 and 1814, the obligations could also be turned

into a state debt, with no fixed expiry, accruing 8 per cent annually 'until proof had been received of payment of the full capital'.[12] However, Gur'ev's suggestions along these lines were not approved.[13] D'Ivernois and Gur'ev's plans amounted not so much to a strategy to reduce the national debt and increase the stability of state obligations as they did to an attempt to find new funds to finance military spending.

The significant human and material resources that European states spent on the fight against France made it clear that it was necessary to unite forces against the common enemy, and not only in the military sphere. Proposals were written for a sort of emergency loan in the form of a parallel monetary system. Such a system could have operated either within one country (Nikolai I. Turgenev's proposal) or internationally, plans for a 'European currency' from 'foreign credit papers' to 'federative money' (Gur'ev and Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein's proposal).

The pitiful condition of the people living in the territory that had been occupied by the enemy in 1812 led Turgenev to put forward a draft for subsidiary *assignats* (paper roubles) in late 1813 or early 1814.[14] The idea was that a special commission would release into circulation in the form of a loan (without interest and deposit) two or three million paper notes, which were intended to 'serve to subsidize those ruined by war'. According to Turgenev, the new notes, which were supposed to look different from *assignats*, were to have an explanation of the purpose of their release – that they were 'subsidiary *assignats*' – printed on them. The government was to make sure that these subsidiary *assignats* circulated equally with the existing *assignats* and that they were accepted as payment for taxes. Turgenev knew that the very idea of increasing the quantity of paper money in circulation was 'objectionable', but, if certain conditions were met, he maintained, 'the new *assignats* would do no damage to the old and would have but a minor effect on state credit'.[15]

Between December 1812 and February 1814, Gur'ev developed plans for a 'European currency' for the tsar. The minister took stock of the difficult condition of the Empire's finances and worked with information provided by Baron vom Stein. It is highly likely that the brilliant Prussian politician wrote some of the proposals himself. The minister explained the necessity of introducing a currency of this sort by the fact that the requisitions of fodder and provisions for the needs of the army had ruined the population, who were not able to provide for the troops. It was also not wise to rely on requisitions for an extended period of time because it gave rise to a dangerous animosity among the population towards the government. They did not trust the various receipts and bills issued for their confiscated property 'because of the endless re-calculations' to which they were 'subjected and the abuses which it was not possible to prevent'. Finally, Gur'ev did whatever he could to limit the issuing of coin to the army, having replaced it with new paper money or credit bills based on the 'monetary

system of Prussia'. They were to be exchanged for obligations or coin at the end of the war.[16]

In May 1813, Gur'ev prepared a new paper in which he proposed that 'federative money' be used to pay Russian troops abroad. The release of this special paper currency was to be 'agreed with the government of the country in which the fighting is taking place'. The minister of finance proposed that the 'issue of and all transactions in the "federative money" should take place under the auspices of an allied commission'. Furthermore, it was essential to:

> agree with the allied powers their participation in the distribution and means of collective withdrawal of the money, which could take place either with the aid of a loan in agreed proportions, or on the conclusion of the peace by means of an exchange into the currency of each of the powers.

At the same time, it was noted in the paper that 'Russia should without delay introduce "federative money" into circulation in Prussia and agree with Britain what part of the total sum of the "federative money" released into circulation it would like to withdraw for its treasury after the conclusion of a peace'. It was noted in the paper that 'if Prussia sides with Russia and England, then it will also be able to join the agreement'. If Austria wanted to join the coalition against Napoleon, it would be necessary to agree with that country 'the line of demarcation for the diffusion of its currency, which would circulate in southern Germany and in Italy'.[17] Gur'ev insisted that the quantity of 'federative money' circulating in Russia be kept low in order not to affect the exchange rate of promissory notes.[18]

The introduction of special credit bills was also mentioned in the convention and subsidy agreement between Russia and Britain, signed at Reichenbach in June 1813, and in the British-Russian convention on the British government's introduction of special credit bills to cover Russian and Prussian military expenses, signed in London in September 1813. According to these agreements, the British monarch, 'in order to ease the insufficiency of coin, which is making itself felt across the continent', was to propose that parliament introduce special credit bills, the sum of which was at the first convention set at no more than £5 million, and at the second at £2.5 million, or 15 million Prussian thalers. Federative notes were introduced on behalf of Britain, Russia and Prussia, and were intended only 'for military expenses and for the payment of troops' in the following proportions: two-thirds to Russia and one-third to Prussia. It was planned that Britain would clear the credit bills monthly after the ratification of a general peace agreement.[19]

Historians have offered various opinions on the proposal. Leonid A. Zak argued that the British government acted in order to find a way of 'avoiding having to exchange real gold pounds through the invention of a substitute'

and to save itself from a separate peace agreement between the continental allies and France.[20] According to Aleksandr A. Orlov, it was the only way for Britain to help the European states at war with Napoleonic France without damaging its own credit.[21] In January 1813, Nikolai N. Novosil'tsev prepared a draft for a 'Federative System of Finance and Trade with the Foundation of a Corresponding Bank'. According to the text, trade deals between the allies were to be made in paper money. A central trade bank was to be established in St Petersburg, with departments in Moscow and Riga, to issue 'bills for the payment of customs duties of a total corresponding to the volume of Russian exports, and to accept in exchange Russian and foreign coin and paper money'. Bank bills were to be accepted 'at their nominal value throughout the Russian Empire'. The next stage was to be the abolition of all prohibitions 'on the import into Russia of goods from countries participating in the "federative system"'.[22]

In 1815, with enormous sums being spent on maintaining the army abroad, Gur'ev came up with various ideas for a means to cover emergency spending and save coin. On the whole, these ideas were similar to the proposals discussed above, but there were a number of differences between them in terms of detail. Thus, the minister of finance proposed that 'emergency expenditure on the army and the troops' salaries could be paid with coin, and the provisions and the commissars could be covered by releasing 6 per cent [interest on] two-year obligations'. The payment of troops, in his opinion, had to be entrusted not to the war ministry but to the finance department, which was to appoint special commissars. The troops abroad were to be given 'double – instead of quadruple – pay at the rate of four *assignat* roubles to one silver rouble, and for the other half of the salary to be paid in obligations from the State Treasury to be issued' on their return to the territory of the Empire 'at the first border treasury chamber'.[23]

The most interesting among these proposals was the idea of a fundamental change to the system of financial provision for the army, and its monetary allowance, which, although it was approved, was never realized and therefore had no influence in practice either on the war offices or on the finance offices.

To cover the military expenses of 1812–1815, more than 244 million roubles of paper money were released into circulation, leading to a fall in the exchange rate of *assignats*,[24] on which the entire system of the Empire's finances was based.[25] The release of paper money was not halted, and in January 1813, Russian *assignats* entered into circulation beyond the Empire's borders. Initially, the government thought it likely that they would eventually return to Russia. However, after foreign speculators, using the promissory note, had begun to exchange them at a significant discount, the decision was taken with the support of the tsar to forbid the exchange of Russian *assignats* from abroad. This was helped by widespread rumours that the French had released some 20 million forged *assignats* in Warsaw.[26]

The counterfeiting of banknotes was a serious crime, but many European governments used this illegal means to undermine the finances of their enemies. France, where counterfeiting was punishable by death, suffered from a flood of English forgeries and Frankfurt craftsmen's 'creations'. But Paris was itself a centre for the counterfeiting of many European currencies.[27] From 1809 until April 1810, during the war with Austria, the paper money of the Viennese court was forged (though only in small quantities). This was followed by Russian *assignats* and English banknotes. In 1813, alongside a renewal in the release of forged Austrian money, forgeries of the so-called *papiers de coalition* (evidently, we are talking about 'federative money') began to appear in small quantities.[28]

According to some historians, Napoleon's decision to release forged *assignats* was an attempt to undermine the economy of his enemies and to deal a crippling blow to finances and credit. Others conclude that he wanted to maintain his army at the expense of his enemy. Perhaps Napoleon – like the Russian government, which had, since the eighteenth century, minted special coins for circulation in particular regions (the Livornese, Siberian and Tauridan coins) – planned to use forged money after victory in annexed territories.[29] The Napoleonic forged *assignats* were of very high quality, and even officials were not always able to tell them apart from genuine *assignats*. For this reason, it was not so much the scale of the forgery as it was rumours about what might happen that scared people and led peasants to refuse all *assignats*. Gur'ev's successor as Russian minister of finance, Egor F. Kankrin (George Cancrin), noted that, of the old *assignats* presented for exchange into new ones, 'it emerged that only a relatively small number were forgeries'.[30]

The problem of forged paper notes was closely connected with the extensive introduction of fiat paper money, which occurred in every European state in the period of the Napoleonic Wars.[31] For example, it was said that there were ten billion roubles of 'French Revolutionary *assignats*'. Such figures, as Illarion I. Kaufman noted, created such a 'panic' that, up until the Crimean War, 'the release of credit tokens in general, even for hard money, was seen as some sort of poison, best avoided, and, as for the release of fiat paper money, there was nothing of the sort whatsoever'.[32] Thus, whereas European states, including Russia, made use of internal borrowing after the Napoleonic Wars, they stopped releasing paper money and tried by various means to withdraw it from circulation subsequently.

As the years went by, it became ever more difficult to finance the war without increasing taxes. In May 1815, Minister of Finance Gur'ev proposed the introduction of a temporary war tax to cover 'all [social] estates equally'.[33] It was necessitated by the fact that the 'disorder' of the Russian financial system had 'made it impossible for funds to be sent on time for the payment of Polish troops in 1815', which had forced the high command to 'borrow from the funds of Field Marshal Michael Barclay de Tolly'. And although the

necessary sums were soon sent, the minister of finance was only able to do so by 'halting other expenses'. Gur'ev wrote to Alexander I in August 1815 to explain that, without an additional 'temporary war tax', the Ministry of Finance would not be in a position to cover any new expenses, and even 'some existing expenses'.[34] The temporary war tax, in his opinion, was one of the few remaining ways of covering the shortage in regular state spending and the growing spending for 1815.

The introduction of a temporary war tax, half of which was to be levied from the nobility and appanage estates, contradicted preceding legislation, particularly the manifesto of 11 February 1812 concerning the levy on landowner income.[35] Since the levy had proved 'inconvenient and difficult' to collect, because it was dependent 'on the goodwill of those paying', it had in fact raised fewer than two million roubles. Furthermore, on the basis of the manifesto of 30 August 1814, 'all arrears in the collection of interest on landowner income [...] not deposited for 1812, 1813 and 1814 [were] to be forgiven, as [were] any fines for late declarations', and any 'proceedings relating to such matters' were to be 'consigned to oblivion'.[36] Thus, the minister of finance proposed to 'forgive' all arrears on the levy from the second half of 1814, introducing a war tax instead. The replacement of the voluntary contribution of the nobility with a new tax, with the help of which Gur'ev hoped to raise up to 55 million roubles, was not implemented.[37] The government's attempt to have the nobility ease the financial difficulties collapsed.

Gur'ev's efforts to stabilize finances during the war did meet with some success, but it is nevertheless impossible to estimate how much money the Russian government spent on the so-called Patriotic War and the foreign campaigns. Irregularities in the data can be explained by the fact that one of the peculiarities of the Russian state apparatus in the first half of the nineteenth century, not uncommon in other European countries, was the creation, alongside official organs of the higher state administration, of secret committees in which the most important problems of state life were discussed – behind closed doors – by a narrow circle of the most trusted individuals. The budgets for 1813–1815 were examined not by the State Council, but by a secret finance committee.[38] The absence of uniformity in the annual financial statements and the reports on their implementation made it possible for the budget to be falsified. With this aim, significant expenditure was excluded from the general financial accounts, a separate estimate being drawn up for it instead, as a result of which the deficit was underestimated in the general budget.[39] In accordance with a State Council resolution, the budget for 1812 was split into two parts: one for 'state credit and debit', and another for the 'settling of debts'.[40]

This practice continued for some time. The budget, founded on the principle of matching expenses to revenues, was not published and was not enshrined in law. There was no 'budgetary unity, every ministry had its own

mini-budget, its extra sources of income from special funds', which were not included in the general statement.[41] The State Treasury continued to issue its annual spending report only after a long delay.[42] Wherever the fighting was taking place, the main commander was able – at his discretion and without authorization – to call on the funds of any government institution.[43] The collection of provisions and fodder from the inhabitants of those provinces caught in the fighting occurred either by loan or by requisition. In exchange, they were paid not in cash but in treasury obligations with an annual yield of 6 per cent. The following year, these notes could be exchanged for *assignats* or taxes could be paid with them as with cash. In December 1816, a commission to investigate the work of the Provisions Department was set up to examine the receipts and meet obligations on them, closing in January 1820.[44] As for the losses of the Russian population – those who ultimately bore the full weight of the Patriotic War and the foreign campaigns – they cannot be accurately calculated, according to the historian Aleksandr A. Kornilov, but can be estimated at some one billion roubles.[45]

Thus, in most cases, the government's financial policy during the Patriotic War and the foreign campaigns came down to an attempt to raise money to cover emergency military expenditure, both with voluntary contributions made by the people and with the loans of state credit institutions, including the *Assignat* Bank. The opinion of contemporaries working in the Ministry of Finance was correct when they considered that Gur'ev 'saved us from financial trouble magnificently'[46] and 'bore the full weight of 1811, 1812, and 1813 without negotiating a new loan or introducing new taxes'.[47] Not all the measures that he proposed came to fruition. However, the minister used the need to fund the war as an opportunity to stabilize and reform the entire financial system, which had to be able to provide essential funds in the case of unforeseen – principally military – expenses. Indeed, the task of facing up to this extreme situation went hand in hand with the Russian government's strategy of modernizing the Empire's financial system and integrating it into the broader financial system of European states.

Notes

1. The Tilsit peace agreements dealt a serious blow to the Russian economy. The foreign trade turnover contracted from 120 million roubles in 1806 to 83 million roubles in 1808, and trade with the Empire's main trading partner, Britain, was lost. The losses were not compensated by illegal trade, which was not policed very strictly, or by the attempts to increase demand for Russian goods in France. The rouble fell. Most historians consider the blockade to have had an extremely negative effect on the economic, financial, industrial and commercial development of Russia. One positive effect of the continental blockade, in the opinion of Gur'ev, was an increase in 1808 and 1809 in deposits made in credit institutions. 'Foreign capitalists', he wrote, 'in the context of a nearly universal reduction in commerce, turned with their capital to our Loan Bank, attracted in particular by the rate of return on interest': St Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi

istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), f. 560, op. 11, d. 9, l. 40. The same could not have been said of Russian subjects, who demanded their capital from the bank and the brokers: *Zhurnal Komiteta ministrov. Tsartvovanie Aleksandra I*, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1891), 2, 493–7. See also: Mikhail F. Zlotnikov, *Kontinental'naia blokada i Rossiia* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1966), 227–46; Ivan S. Bliokh, *Finansy Rossii. XIX stoletii: istoriia – statistika* 4 vols. (St Petersburg, 1882), 1, 111–6; Anatolii V. Predtechenskii, 'K voprosu o vliianii kontinental'noi blokady na sostoianie torgovli i promyshlennosti v Rossii', *Izvestiia AN SSSR*, series 7, Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk, no. 8 (Leningrad, 1931): 895, 900–1; Evgenii V. Tarle, *Sochineniia v dvenadtsati tomakh*, vol. 3: *Kontinental'naia blokada* (Moscow, 1958), 350; Vladlen G. Sirotkin, 'Kontinental'naia blokada i russkaia ekonomika (obzor frantsuzskoi i sovetskoi litaratury)', in V. I. Shtrunkov, ed., *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii XVIII i pervaia polovina XIX vekov* (Moscow, 1969), 54–77; Mikhail I. Tugan-Baranovskii, 'Voina 1812 g. i promyshlennoe razvitie Rossii', in *Otechestvennaia voina i russkoe obshchestvo*, 7, 110; Konstantin N. Lodyzhenskii, *Istoriia russkogo tamozhennogo tarifa* (St Petersburg, 1886), 148–68; V. N. Storozheva, ed., *Istoriia Moskovskogo kupecheskogo obshchestva, 1863–1913*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1913–1916), 2:1 (1916), 170; Aleksandr A. Kornilov, 'Epokha Otechestvennoi voiny i ee znachenie v noveishei istorii Rossii', *Russkaia mysl'*, 11 (1912): 143; Vladlen G. Sirotkin, 'Kontinental'naia blokada i "ob'edinenie Evropy"', *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 3 (1964): 135; Aleksandr A. Orlov, *Soiuz Peterburga i Londona: rossiisko-britanskie otnosheniia v epokhu napoleonovskikh voin* (Moscow, 2005), 33.

2. 'Thousands of peasants were involved in the removal of corpses, paid 50 kopecks per day. […] In Moscow, 7,188 roubles and 38 kopecks were spent on the removal and burning of nearly 12,000 human and 12,600 horse corpses': Boris Ts. Urlanis, *Istoriia voennykh poter'* (St Petersburg, 1994), 81.
3. Petr I. Golubev, 'Zapiski peterburgskogo chinovnika starogo vremeni (Petra Ivanovicha Golubeva)', *Russkii arkhiv*, 1, 4 (1896): 524–7. See also Urlanis, *Istoriia voennykh poter'*, 345–8.
4. *Ministerstvo finansov. 1802–1902*, 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1902), 1, 620–1, 624–9.
5. Illarion I. Kaufman, 'Gosudarstvennye dolgi Rossii', *Vestnik Evropy*, 1 (1885): 193; *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, First Series, 8 vols. (hereafter *VPR*) (Moscow, 1963), 3, 657 (primechanie 28); Zlotnikov, *Kontinental'naia blokada*, 338–9; Orlov, *Soiuz Peterburga i Londona*, 28–45, 253–75; Dominic Lieven, *Rossiia protiv Napoleona: bor'ba za Evropu, 1807–1814* (Moscow, 2012), 432–3.
6. *VPR*, 5, 673 (primechanie 150).
7. Friedrich F. Martens, *Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennykh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami*, 15 vols. (St Petersburg, 1874–1909), 11 (1895), 222–37; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. Sobranie pervoe*, 40 vols (hereafter *PSZ*) (St Petersburg, 1830), vol. 33, no. 25840, 108–10; *VPR*, 5, 673 (primechanie 149); *VPR*, 7, 782–3 (primechanie 305); I. K. Geiler, *Sbornik svedenii o protsentnykh bumagakh Rossii* (St Petersburg, 1871), 24–5; N. K. Brzheskii, *Gosudarstvennye dolgi Rossii. Istoriko-statisticheskoe issledovanie* (St Petersburg, 1884), 166; Petr P. Migulin, *Russkii gosudarstvennyi kredit, (1769–1899)*, 3 vols. (Khar'kov, 1899), 1, 63–4.
8. RGIA, f. 560, op. 10, d. 71, ll. 33, 37, 44ob.
9. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25254, 446–8.
10. *PSZ*, vol. 30, no. 23808a, 1110–; *PSZ*, vol. 31, no. 24244, 197–200; *PSZ*, vol. 31, no. 24116, 53–60; *PSZ*, vol. 31, no. 24287, 235–40; *PSZ*, vol. 31, no. 24346, 347–50; *Ministerstvo finansov*, 1, 57; Bliokh, *Finansy Rossii*, 99–100; Aleksandr N. Gur'ev, *Ocherk razvitiia gosudarstvennogo dolga Rossii* (St Petersburg, 1903),

15; Petr P. Migulin, *Nasha bankovaia politika, (1729–1903): opyt issledovaniia* (Khar'kov, 1904), 21–2; K. V. Sivkov, 'Finansovaia politika imp. Nikolaia I', in *Kniga dlia chteniia po istorii novogo vremeni*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1914), 4:2, 120–1; V. V. Strakhov, 'Rossiiskie vnutrennie gosudarstvennye zaimy XIX – nachala XX v.', in *Aktual'nye problemy novoi i noveishei istorii Rossii XIX – XX vekov* (Riazan', 2002), 76–9; V. V. Strakhov, 'Vnutrennie gosudarstvennye zaimy Rossiiskoi imperii', *Ekonomicheskaia istoriia Rossii: problemy, poiski, resheniia. Ezhegodnik*, 8 (Moscow-Volgograd, 2006): 119–22.

11. 'Baron vom Stein', *Istoricheskii vestnik*, 101, 9 (1905): 903; Aleksei N. Korsakov, 'Vospominaniia Moskovskii kadet A. K.', *Russkii arkhiv*, 1, 2 (1880): 465.
12. St Petersburg, Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki (hereafter OR RNB), f. 484, d. 106, ll. 25–31ob.
13. OR RNB, f. 484, d. 54, ll. 2 ob.–4 ob.; RGIA, f. 560, op. 11, d. 7, ll. 34–35ob.
14. *Dnevniki Nikolaia Ivanovicha Turgeneva za 1811–1816 gody, v 2 chastiakh. Arkhiv brat'ev Turgenevykh*, 4 vols. (St Petersburg, 1913), 3:2, 453.
15. Ibid., 259–62.
16. OR RNB, f. 484, d. 50, ll. 2–5; *VPR*, 7, 578–81 (document 229), 783–4 (primechanie 309); Nikolai F. Dubrovin, ed., *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, izvlechennykh iz arkhiva pervogo otdeleniia Sobstvennoi e.i.v. kantseliarii*, 13 vols. (St Petersburg, 1876–1906), 1:2 (1876), 56–7; Dubrovin, *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov*, 2 (1889), 421–3; I. S. Poznanskii, *Istoricheskii ocherk ekonomicheskogo polozheniia Pol'shi* (St Petersburg, 1875), 11.
17. *VPR*, 7, 709 (primechanie 29).
18. *VPR*, 7, 758 (primechanie 224).
19. Martens, *Sobranie traktatov i konventsii*, 11, 165–9, 176–80, 189–95; *VPR*, 7, 132–7 (document 55), 250–4 (document 105), 429–431 (document 171), 386 (annotations), 709 (primechanie 29), 758 (primechanie 224); *VPR,* 8, 268–70 (document 117).
20. Leonid A. Zak, *Angliia i germanskaia problema (iz diplomaticheskoi istorii Napoleonovskikh voin)* (Moscow, 1963), 120–4.
21. Orlov, *Soiuz Peterburga i Londona*, 257–8.
22. *VPR*, 7, 23; G. H. Pertz, *Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein* (Berlin, 1851), vol. 3, 634–40.
23. *VPR*, 8, 668–9 (primechanie 145); Dubrovin, *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov*, 1:2, 47–63; Lieven, *Rossiia protiv Napoleona*, 432.
24. *Ministerstvo finansov*, 1, 65–8; Sivkov, *Finansy Rossii posle voiny s Napoleonom*, 128–9; A. N. Liakhov, *Osnovnye cherty sotsial'nykh i ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii v Rossii v epokhu imperatora Aleksandra I* (Moscow, 1912), 56.
25. Dubrovin, *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov*, 1:2, 59.
26. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25315, 505–6; Dubrovin, *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov*, 3 (1890), 11; *VPR*, 7, 54–5 (document 20); Nikolai F. Dubrovin, *Pis'ma glavneishikh deiatelei v tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra I, (1807–1829)* (Moscow, 2006), 77–9; Sivkov, *Finansy Rossii posle voiny s Napoleonom*, 128–9.
27. 'K istorii 1812 goda', *Russkii arkhiv*, 4 (1865): 491–3; I. P. Liprandi, 'Eshche o fal'shivykh assignatiakh 1812 goda', *Russkii arkhiv*, 7 (1865): 880–2; V. Blos, *Bumazhnye den'gi v epokhu frantsuzskoi revoliutsii* (St Petersburg, n.d.), 6.
28. 'Zagranichnye istoricheskie novosti i melochi', *Istoricheskii vestnik*, 136, 5 (1914): 745–7; Nikolai K. Shil'der, 'Prigotovlenie po prikazaniiu Napoleona I angliiskikh i russkikh fal'shivykh assignatsii i bankovskikh biletov', *Russkaia starina*, 11 (1900): 323–30; M. B. Marshak, 'Napoleonovskie poddelki russkikh assignatsii', *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo ordena Lenina Ermitazha*, 26, 6 (Leningrad, 1986): 50–2.

29. Frantsua de Izarn, 'Vospominaniia Moskovskogo zhitelia o prebyvanii fratsuzov v Moskve v 1812 godu', *Russkii arkhiv*, 9 (1869): 1457–9; S. Farforovskii, 'Napoleon Pervyi i nashi poddel'nye assignatsii', *Russkii arkhiv*, 1 (1912): 129–30; Shil'der, 'Prigotovlenie po prikazaniiu Napoleona I', 323–30; Alla S. Mel'nikova, Vasilii V. Uzdenikov and Irina S. Shikanova, *Den'gi v Rossii: istoriia russkogo denezhnogo khoziaistva s drevneishikh vremen do 1917 g.* (Moscow, 2000), 139–45. See also: P. von Vinkler, *Iz istorii monetnogo dela v Rossii* (Moscow, 2005); G. N. Pol'skoi, *Rytsari fal'shivykh banknot* (Moscow, 1982), 47–9; G. Vermush, *Afery s fal'shivymi den'gami* (Moscow, 1990), 87–9.
30. 'Zagranichnye istoricheskie novosti i melochi', 745–7; Farforovskii, 'Napoleon Pervyi i nashi poddel'nye assignatsii', 129–30. However, some historians claim that, when the 832 million *assignats* in circulation were exchanged, more than 70 million turned out to be forgeries: D. Ia. Mirskii, 'Titulovannye fal'shivomonetchiki', *Nauka i zhizn'*, 10 (1969): 53; Pol'skoi, *Rytsari fal'shivykh banknot*, 47–9.
31. According to Kaufman's data, in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 8,326 million francs of paper money were issued in France, 3,935 million francs in Austria, 3,344 million francs in Russia, and £30 million in England (750 million francs): Illarion I. Kaufman, *Nerazmennye banknoty v Anglii, 1797–1819* (Petrograd, 1915), xviii.
32. Illarion I. Kaufman, 'Gosudarstvennye dolgi Rossii', *Vestnik Evropy*, 1 (1885): 204–5.
33. RGIA, f. 560, op. 11, d. 7, ll. 33ob–34.
34. *VPR*, 8, 686 (primechanie 231).
35. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 24992, 181–93.
36. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25671, 908–9. The levy on landowner income was abolished by the decree of 12 December 1819: *PSZ*, vol. 36, no. 28028, 416.
37. RGIA, f. 560, op. 11, d. 7, ll. 34–35ob.
38. *Ministerstvo finansov*, 1, 179; Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, *Napoleonovskie voiny* (Moscow, 2010), 359–60; Viktor M. Bezotosnyi, *Rossiia i Evropa v epokhu 1812 goda: strategiia ili geopolitika* (Moscow, 2012), 189–99.
39. Mikhail I. Bogolepov, 'Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo i finansovaia politika pravitel'stva', in L. Martov, P. Maslov and A. Protasov, eds., *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX veka*, 4 vols. (St Petersburg, 1904–1909), 1 (1909), 151.
40. RGIA, f. 560, op. 10, d. 71, ll. 2ob–28.
41. N. P. Drozdova, 'Proekty finansovykh preobrazovanii M. M. Speranskogo i ikh realizatsiia', in I. N. Baranov and A. L. Dmitriev, eds., *Istoriia izucheniia obshchestvennykh finansov v Sankt-Peterburge* (St Petersburg, 1997), 48–53.
42. 'Finansovye dokumenty tsarstvovaniia Aleksandra I', in *Sbornik imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 126 vols. (St Petersburg, 1867–1916), 45 (1885), 419–598.
43. Bezotosnyi, *Napoleonovskie voiny*, 359–60; Bezotosnyi, *Rossiia i Evropa v epokhu 1812 goda*, 189–99.
44. *PSZ*, vol. 33, no. 26060, 429–30; *PSZ*, vol. 37, no. 28076, 4. See also: D. P. Zhuravskii, *Statisticheskoe obozrenie raskhodov na voennye potrebnosti s 1711 po 1825 god* (St Petersburg, 1859), 187, 216–17.
45. Kornilov, 'Epokha Otechestvennoi voiny', 147–8; *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25671, 906–10.
46. Golubev, 'Zapiski Peterburgskogo chinovnika, 527.
47. 'Zapiski grafa Aleksandra Ivanovicha Ribop'era', *Russkii arkhiv*, 5 (1877): 5.

11

Patriotism in the Provinces in 1812: Volunteers and Donations

Janet M. Hartley

Tsar Alexander I appealed in July 1812 to his subjects to defend the fatherland 'with the cross in your heart and weapon in your hand'. It was expected that loyal subjects, from all corners of the Empire, would sacrifice themselves on the battlefield but also that they would sacrifice goods and money to help the war effort. But how convincingly can the reaction in Russian provinces to events in 1812 be labelled as 'patriotism'? This chapter will address this issue by looking at two areas: volunteers for the temporary militias and donations.

Alexander's appeal has to be seen in both a domestic and an international context. At home, the Russian state needed additional recruits and additional sums of money because it could not sustain the strains imposed by the Napoleonic Wars, strains which reached a peak in 1812.[1] Russia recruited over 1.6 million men in the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the year 1812 was the heaviest year of conscription when three levies took place, each being a 'take' of 20 per 500 men. In 1806, and again in 1812, the shortage of active soldiers led the state to levy additional, temporary, militias to act, at least initially, as an internal defence force. A greater problem for the state than the supply of conscripts was finding the resources to fund almost constant warfare in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Russia lacked the attributes which enabled other states to sustain conflict: the ability of the French government to raise taxes and to live off conquered lands or the ability of the British government to tax all social groups (income tax was introduced in 1799), and to develop a strong banking system, and a sustainable national debt. Russia had to resort to traditional means for supporting warfare: foreign loans and increasing the supply of paper money.

Alexander I's appeal to his subjects also has to be seen within an international context: warfare naturally stimulates patriotic reactions, and this is particularly the case when military activity is conducted within the borders of a country by an invading force, and can lead to the involvement in military activities of social groups which were normally excluded from this

sphere. This occurred in the American War of Independence, when women formed patriotic societies on their own initiative and collected funds and materials to help with the war effort.[2] Part-time volunteer defence militias were formed in Britain to defend the country from the threat of invasion between 1803 and 1805; it was estimated that over half a million men were raised by 1805.[3] Frederick William III's appeal to the German nation in March 1813 was similar to the appeal by Alexander I and called on Germans to volunteer for the regular army and defence forces and to donate goods and cash. Young, educated, men in the German states volunteered and local urban defence forces were raised in towns like Hamburg. By 1815, almost 600 patriotic societies had formed in Prussia and some 6.5 million thalers had been collected in donations. Donations came in from people in all walks of life – female domestic servants donated over 10,000 thalers in Hamburg. Jewish societies played a particularly prominent role in patriotic societies – 160,000 rings, earring and necklaces were said to have been donated by Jewish women in Berlin.[4]

Volunteers for the militias

Joining militias was portrayed by Russian pre-Revolutionary and Soviet historians as a 'patriotic act'. The most thorough study of the militias was written by the Soviet historian Vasilii I. Babkin in 1962 (commemorating 150 years since the 1812 invasion) who portrayed the militias as part of the 'people's war' against the invading forces. His 'class' analysis emphasized the role of ordinary people as volunteers for the militia and downplayed the role of the nobility.[5] The assumption that peasants – serfs and state peasants – could, and did, volunteer for the militia, and that this was a 'patriotic act' to defend the fatherland, became a standard interpretation in Soviet historiography, but it has also been adopted by some Western historians. This is a quotation by Nigel Nicolson: 'In 1812, 190,000 *serfs* [my emphasis] willingly joined the militia, thousands more the partisans.'[6]

This analysis of militias has been challenged in recent Russian scholarship. An impressive recent account of the militias is by Irina Iu. Lapina, published in 2007.[7] Lapina regards the militias as a 'tragedy' for the Russian people, in part because the militias were so poorly equipped, so many lives were lost, and so many men were wounded and maimed, that very few members of supposedly temporary militias ever returned to their homes and resumed their previous occupations. She is also, however, rightly sceptical of the 'patriotic', or voluntary, characterization of the militias, which I will discuss more fully below. A detailed analysis of the militias can be found in another recent publication on the militias in the Penza and Simbirsk provinces by Sergei V. Belousov, although his careful reconstruction of the activities of militias is marred in places by reiterations of Soviet historical assumptions that, for example, the shortage of officers indicated a lack of patriotism on

the part of the nobility or that peasants sought to become soldiers as part of the feudal protest against serfdom.[8]

In Russia, militias were formed from above – by the state – and not from below, that is, not from initiatives from individuals or social groups in the provinces. The Russian government instructed that temporary militias should be raised, and it had done so in 1806 as well as in 1812. The government divided the country into three categories and determined the number of men who were to be raised in each province within each category. The state needed additional recruits at these key moments in the Napoleonic Wars, but it also needed to control the numbers of men raised, and ensure that a balance was achieved across the country so that too many men were not lost from any one region, which could impact on agricultural production and risk peasant disturbance. The mechanism for conscription to the militias was the same as that for regular troops in wartime or peacetime: nobles were obliged to conscript a certain number of serfs from their estates. Landowners in Kaluga, for example, supplied five recruits for every 100 male serfs on their estates.[9]

Can the response of nobles to militias in 1812 be seen as patriotic? There was certainly an atmosphere of heightened patriotism amongst the nobility in 1812. Nobles formed militias on their own initiative: Major-General Evgenii I. Olenin in Smolensk formed his own militia of 60 men.[10] In Kaluga, 22 pupils at the School for the Nobility joined the militia, almost certainly an act of patriotism and enthusiasm.[11] A student at Khar'kov University asked to be allowed to join the militia, stating that 'I am both a son of Russia and also love my fatherland'.[12] Other nobles came out of retirement to join either militias or regular regiments. Vladimir I. Shteingel', for example, had retired in 1810 on the grounds of poor health but came out of retirement and served in the St Petersburg and Novgorod militias.[13] Five volunteers from Irkutsk who joined the Moscow militia included a retired officer.[14] A recent study of the Tula militia listed several officers in their late 40s: Sergei Pavlov, aged 44, had retired from service in 1802 but came out of retirement to join the Tula militia in 1812; one ensign in the militia, a certain Matvei Bel'skii, was aged 60, although it is not clear what his military career had been.[15]

Patriotic sentiment may well have motivated these men; indeed, nobles had an obligation to serve in the armed forces when the country was threatened. Volunteering for the militias also, however, gave young nobles opportunities to advance their careers or to gain a foothold in a military career as officers, as, indeed, war often gives advancement for those of less privileged backgrounds. This was at a time when, even in warfare, there were fewer vacancies for the sons of nobles in the officer corps than there were applicants. Sons of impoverished provincial nobles often had to settle for less prestigious posts in local administration and now had the chance to follow a more glamorous military career. Mikhail M. Spiridov joined the Vladimir

militia and moved from there to a more prestigious grenadier regiment.[16] Three young pupils from the College of the Mines, aged between 14 and 16, joined the militia: one of them remained in the army.[17]

Furthermore, non-nobles may have viewed service in the militias as an opportunity to move into a military career from their present occupation. Karl Hoffman, working in the Department of Manufactories, joined the Novgorod militia.[18] Aleksandr A. Kriukov, working as an actuary, joined the Nizhnii Novgorod militia, with the rank of cornet, and later transferred to a hussar regiment.[19] There were no militias in Siberia, but Nikita Popov and Ivan Zalesov, who were employed in the Kolyvan' mines, 'voluntarily' joined the St Petersburg militia.[20] Twenty volunteers from industrial enterprises joined the Penza militia.[21] The militias provided opportunities in particular for sons of clergy to escape from their social estate. It has been claimed that, in all, 412 members of the clergy joined the militia.[22] Nineteen members of the clerical estate – either school pupils or in lowly positions – joined the Novgorod militia; all of them perished.[23] 82 pupils in the school of the Tver' Bishopric joined the militia, some of whom were as young as 15 and 16 and one who was aged only 13![24] Teachers in national schools were almost all the sons of clergy, and some of them also volunteered to join militias as a way to escape their lowly status and poor prospects.[25]

A recent study has demonstrated that the Viatka militia in October 1812 included 45 volunteers, among them 35 members of the clergy and nine officials. In fact, 41 sons of clergy had applied to join the militia but some were rejected because they were too young. The officials included two noble assessors in courts who might have seen this as an opportunity to move from less prestigious civil service to military service. The Viatka militia comprised 411 state peasant conscripts, which included some 30 'volunteers' in three districts.[26]

The composition of the Viatka militia raises an important issue about 'volunteers' in the militias and the extent to which joining a militia could be seen as patriotic. Viatka was a region populated primarily by state peasants. Serfs could not volunteer at all for the militias; they were conscripted to militias as they were for the regular army. It is true that Babkin in his work cited a peasant who apparently enlisted his three sons in a militia with the words 'We shall not let the enemy drink our Orthodox blood; we will leave only bones',[27] but such stories are hard to confirm and fit uneasily with the reality of the practice of conscription in Russia. Serfs who presented themselves as 'volunteers' for the militia could be regarded as fugitives and returned to their landowners; a certain Egor Arkhipov from Pavlovsk, for example, was not allowed to join the militia but became a fugitive before he could be returned to his owner.[28] The reality was that peasant communes – both serf and state peasant communes – dispatched their least useful members to the militias, as they did at the time of regular levies to the army in

wartime or peacetime. In Simbirsk, peasants were conscripted to the militia for 'poor behaviour', including theft and failure to pay dues.[29]

The situation for the unprivileged members of the urban community, that is those liable for regular conscription, is less clear-cut. Some artisans did volunteer for the militia: their motives were not recorded. Other artisans or urban labourers were clearly selected by the urban community and at least some of these were 'undesirables', like the peasants conscripts selected by their communes. In St Petersburg, 199 of the 746 artisans who became members of the militia were described as 'volunteers' but 70 of them were German. Four artisans were recruited from a district town in St Petersburg province: two were conscripted 'by their own desire', one by normal lots and one 'for the non-payment of dues'.[30]

The practice of forced conscription seems to be confirmed by a comment by Sergeant Adrien Bourgogne, who recalled meeting ethnically Polish peasants (very unlikely, of course, to have patriotic sentiments towards Russia):

> They made us understand that they had to go to Minsk to join the Russian army, as they belonged to the militia; they had been forced to march against us by blows from the knout, and Cossacks were stationed in the villages to drive them out.[31]

The issue of 'volunteering' for the militias raises a number of questions about the composition of the non-officer corps of the army more generally. The Russian army was a conscript army, where men were chosen by lots, but there was significant scope for conscripts to be bought out for cash or for substitutes to be purchased in their place, either by landowners on behalf of their serfs or by peasants themselves. Prices for substitutes rose along with the intensity of military campaigns. In 1814 serfs on the Kurakin estate paid 8,595 roubles for five recruits; three years later, 20 substitutes were bought for 40,000 roubles, that is, 2,000 roubles per man. That figure is matched by peasants on the Lieven estate of Baki, in Kaluga province, who paid 500 roubles for a quarter of a recruit in the early nineteenth century.[32] The practice of purchasing of substitutes, to my mind, provides an important clue to understanding the 'volunteers' from the unprivileged classes to the militias in 1812.

I can draw some tentative conclusions on volunteers and substitutes from my own research. In 1788 a peasant recruit seemingly enrolled 'voluntarily' (*dobrovol'no*) into the Sofiia regiment as a regular soldier.[33] No explanation was given in the records as to why or how this occurred. There are also intriguing references to the purchase of substitutes for the militia in Penza province. A serf called Trofim Rogozhin on an estate of V. G. Orlov asked for 100 roubles from the peasant commune for his son to be conscripted into the militia.[34] An artisan, Nigabidulin, in Kazan' 'volunteered' his son as a member of the militia.[35]

I have made a special study of conscription to the Russian navy from Old Finland (that is, the lands of southern Finland which were acquired by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century) between 1801 and 1811, where the documentation, held in Mikkeli archive in Finland, is particularly rich and has not been used before by historians. These documents make references to 'voluntary' conscription. Some 'volunteers' in Old Finland took the place of other family members who had been selected. In 1801, for example, the landless peasant Stepan Puz 'wanted to enter service voluntarily, in place of his brother Ivan'.[36] Some Finnish 'volunteers' seemed to have sold themselves as a substitute for others for a sum which was paid to their families. In Keksholm in 1810, the peasants Reinhold Anderson and Iakov Ivanin sold themselves with the agreement of their families for 250 roubles each in the place of another peasant. Another landless peasant, Ivan Savel'ev, sold himself for 100 roubles and two *chetverti* (a grain measure equivalent to 57.33 kg) of rye.[37]

These 'volunteers' were from unprivileged classes including urban artisans and peasants. What is noticeable, however, is that they included a large number of landless peasants (*bobyli)*, that is, the poorest and most vulnerable members of the community.[38] Also significant in the Finnish case was that several of the 'volunteers' were very young, even by standards of entry to the navy where recruits could be younger than for the army (naval conscripts could be as young as ten, but conscripts to the army had to be at least 17 years old). In 1809, 'volunteers' from Vyborg included two 11-year olds – Mats Matson, a serf, and Heinrich Anderson, a landless peasant – and three ten-year olds – Gabriel Raianen, a serf, and Iogan Tomasen and Elias Khentoinen from landless peasant families.[39] It is hard to imagine these were genuine volunteers; almost certainly they were 'volunteered' as young, vulnerable boys, most likely orphans. Another ten-year old 'volunteer' recruited in 1809 from Keksholm – Nikifor Iazyrin – was from a landless peasant family and also illegitimate, that is, particularly vulnerable.[40]

Was it the case that the most vulnerable, at least from the villages, were also 'volunteered' to join the militia in 1812? The materials of the Finnish archives suggest that this is an area which merits further research.

Donations

Volunteering for the militia and donating money or goods for the war effort (including for the militias) went hand in hand. Assemblies of local nobility in the summer of 1812 agreed on the allocation of conscripts for the militias and at the same time donated goods and money for the militia and for the general defence of the country. In Kaluga, for example, Ensign Andrei Bogdanov donated 2,000 roubles to the militia and the landowner Shchepochkin donated guns, pistols, sabres, picks and gunpowder to the militia; other nobles donated grain.[41]

Donations in 1812 have to be seen in the context of Russian charity and philanthropy. There was a strong tradition of private charity towards the poor and the sick that was regarded as a moral duty by the Orthodox Church. Local communities supported religious communities and this continued after the secularization of Church lands in 1764.[42] Donations to churches and religious communities by merchants and other social groups continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Traditionally, vulnerable members of society were looked after within the immediate or the extended family, or, for an overwhelmingly rural society, within the village. As a result, state involvement in philanthropy developed slowly and almost exclusively in towns.[43] In 1775 Catherine II set up a whole range of welfare institutions in towns – including hospitals, asylums, alms-houses, orphanages and work-houses – under the auspices of newly-established provincial Boards of Social Welfare (*prikazy obshchestvennogo prizreniia*). Boards were given an initial capital of 15,000 roubles, which they were supposed to increase from donations from local inhabitants and by operating as local banks for the nobility.[44]

Philanthropic donations were made to the Boards after 1775, but these were often designated for particular, local, institutions, perhaps reflecting the fact that these donations often replaced or supplemented previous donations to build or maintain particular churches and religious communities. The degree of activity often depended on the energy and generosity of the governor. In Iaroslavl' the charitable activities of Governor Aleksei P. Mel'gunov encouraged others: the family of the merchant Ivan Ia. Kuchumov donated over 23,000 roubles to charitable institutions.[45] Merchants in Tula supported a foundling home, donating 300 roubles a year from 1783,[46] and collegiate assessor Liventsov (a noble) funded a home for sick and incurables. An alms-house was set up in Tobol'sk as a result of donations from a merchant, D'iakonov.[47] At the same time, freemasonic groups, which flourished in the 1780s and early 1790s, supported charity schools and other philanthropic activities. There was therefore a tradition of Christian charity and philanthropic donations, and official groups – urban and noble assemblies, government institutions – had been established and had supported welfare institutions.

The appeal by the tsar in 1812, however, was for donations to defend the country, rather than to support vulnerable individuals locally. And there is no doubt that this appeal was extraordinarily successful. Figures are not robust, but considerable donations in cash and kind came from all Russian provinces. Some of the largest cash donations came from the western provinces (*gubernii*), which were most immediately threatened with invasion: over 10 million roubles came from Smolensk province alone. There were also substantial cash donations from other provinces near or directly affected by the invasion: Tula (over 4.5 million roubles), Moscow (over 4 million roubles) and Penza (2.5 million roubles). Donations came from all levels of society. In Moscow,

the Counts Orlov gave over 100,000 roubles each, and wealthy merchants contributed significant sums. At the other end of the social scale, post-drivers in two Moscow regions donated 5,000 roubles between them, an artisan called Gerasim Berdnikov donated 50 *arshins* of cloth, a peasant called Fedor Andreev donated 68 *arshins* of cloth, and artisans in the Urals gave small cash sums, varying from one to over 40 roubles.[48]

I have analysed the cash donations in two very contrasting regions – Kaluga (on the edge of the invasion route) and distant Siberia. Donations from individuals could be considerable: in Kaluga province for example, significant donations were received from Ia. I. Bilibin, who donated 35,000 roubles and I. T. Usachev, who donated 25,000 roubles.[49] Town dumas also donated considerable sums although this varied according to the size of the urban community (merchants and artisans). The main provincial town, Kaluga, donated over 200,000 roubles but smaller towns contributed under 100 roubles.[50] Kaluga was a town of over 17,000 inhabitants but Kozel'sk, for example, which contributed just over 10,000 roubles, was much smaller with only 810 registered merchants, and Tarusa, which contributed only 440 roubles, had a merchant estate numbering only 562 men.[51] Clergy donated 9,204 roubles and also silver vessels.[52]

There were poor harvests in 1812, but nevertheless the three Siberian provinces of Tobol'sk, Tiumen' and Irkutsk donated a total of 461,723 roubles 67 ¼ kopecks in 1812, as well as cloth, armaments and gold and silver objects. The level of donations varied considerably by region – the relatively populous Ilim region in western Siberia contributed over 40,000 roubles but other regions contributed far less and Petropavlovsk region – a border territory where the Russian presence was limited to garrisons – contributed only 842 roubles, collected from three retired soldiers.[53]

In Kirensk one high-ranking noble donated 25,000 roubles, but in a region with few noble landowners it is not surprising that senior officials donated the largest amounts, and almost certainly had to set an example for other officials and merchants. The Tobol'sk civil governor donated 1,000 roubles.[54] In western Siberia, the breakdown of 499 donors was as follows: 37 officials, 80 artisans/townspeople, three retired soldiers, two post-drivers and 377 peasants. The Tomsk urban institutions (merchants and artisans) donated 25,000 roubles but those of Kuznetsk only 3,545 roubles (and noted that there had been a poor harvest in Kuznetsk which accounted for smaller collection).[55] Siberia was essentially a state peasant society and it is therefore significant that peasants donated money in 1812. In Tomsk, state peasants from the Krasnoiarsk okrug donated 24,000 roubles in 1812. Retired soldiers and a deacon donated five roubles each in Kirensk district.[56] How these donations were solicited, and what motivated the donors, remains unknown.

Donations in Siberia also included 'tribute-payers' or pagans. In Tomsk, tribute-payers donated 17,000 roubles;[57] tribute-payers in Kuznetsk

contributed 23,710 roubles;[58] the town of Iakutsk, inhabited by mainly Iakut tribute-payers, donated over 10,000 roubles.[59] Individual pagans contributed small sums – Iakuts donated sums of up to 25 roubles and pagans in Kirensk donated five roubles each. Donations were recorded by individuals, some of whom had Russified names, that is, they were almost certainly converts to Orthodoxy, but not all 'tribute-payers' had Russified names: eight members of the family of Shulengi (that is not a Russified surname) in Nerchinsk gave 2,150 roubles.[60]

Although there is data on the amount and origins of these donations, some questions remain which parallel those that I asked of 'volunteers' to the militias. Namely, to what extent were these donations genuinely voluntary and what was the value of these donations in comparison to income and other expenses? It is impossible to establish with certainty how far a donation was 'voluntary'. We have seen that nobles were obliged to provide conscripts for the militia, as well as for the regular army and that their serfs were obliged to serve – and that there was no choice in the matter. Nobles, and peasant communes, were also expected to provide food and clothing for recruits, for the regular army and for the militias, when they were dispatched to the recruiting stations. There was also considerable pressure on urban assemblies to contribute additional money in 1812, which may be seen as a form of tax, in particular as they were less able to provide goods in kind, such as grain and armaments. Certainly, larger urban communities, as we have seen in Kaluga province, donated more than smaller ones, which suggests that sums were expected from individuals that roughly corresponded to their status or capital, but I have no evidence that this was done formally.

Officials and wealthy merchants, in Siberia and elsewhere, seemed to donate round sums, which suggests that there was an expectation, if not a formal obligation, to contribute. In Verkhneudinsk, the town head (*gorodskoi golova*), who was a merchant, gave 100 roubles. In the town of Kirensk, sums of 50 or 100 roubles were received from officials and merchants. In Irkutsk, similar fixed, if smaller, donations were received from officials including 50 roubles from the town's chief police official (*gorodnichii*) and 25 roubles from the judge of the district (*uezd*) court. In Nerchinsk, the judge of the district court donated 100 roubles and the land captain (*ispravnik*) donated 75 roubles.[61] Holders of all these posts in Irkutsk and Nerchinsk would be nobles. Evidence suggests that state peasants were also expected by their commune to donate fixed sums. The Kainsk district, for example, reported that 1,385 souls had contributed donated ten roubles each – a total of 13,850 roubles.[62]

Groups within the Russian Empire were traditionally expected to display loyalty to the Empire and that might have encouraged donations, even if this was technically a voluntary act. Bashkirs 'donated' 4,139 horses, and this has been interpreted by some historians as an indication of their 'patriotism'.[63] Horses were in many ways more valuable than recruits, and there

were other cases when provinces were required to supply horses instead of men. In 1812 the provinces of Podolia and Volhynia were required to supply over 10,000 horses from each province: this was a requirement and not a donation and, in practice, was more onerous to fulfil than supplying conscripts.[64] In reality, the Bashkirs, famed for their horses and horsemanship, were simply being required to 'donate' horses for the army, albeit for a limited period.

The same may have been true for other non-Russian communities. German colonists in Saratov were not wealthy but nevertheless donated small sums.[65] In Astrakhan', the wealthier Armenians gave 72,765 roubles, Tatars gave 2,100 roubles and Persians and 'Indians' gave 28,850 roubles.[66] In the Zabaikal area in Siberia, the Great Lama, the leading Buddhist, donated 1,000 roubles, and his brothers donated 3,000 roubles – probably also in effect a requirement to assert loyalty to regime.[67] Some of the 'tribute-payers' in Siberia who had Russified names may well have had official positions, which might explain the level of their donations: Krasikov and Zimin, for example, in Nizhneudinsk gave 300 and 200 roubles respectively.[68]

The level of donations also has to be seen within the context of contemporary salaries. Top officials had high salaries – the governors of Tomsk and Irkutsk earned 2,250 and 2,500 roubles a year respectively (salaries in eastern Siberia were set at a higher rate). Middle-ranking officials earned far less, in the region of 350 to 600 roubles a year, and their donations were therefore a significant proportion of their annual income. A town chief police official (*gorodnichii*) earned 300 or 450 roubles, a judge in a district court 300 roubles, and a land captain (*ispravnik*) 250 or 375 roubles. The salaries of lower officials were far lower – from 80 to 120 roubles a year.[69] The director of the Irkutsk (state) cloth factory earned 12,000 roubles a year in 1804 (and one factory director in Siberia donated 400 roubles),[70] but the treasurer in the factory only earned 375 roubles.[71]

Peasants who contributed in Siberia in 1812 were poorer, of course, but their donations have to be seen in light of their other dues – ten roubles a year for the *obrok* tax in 1812. But the ability of peasants – serfs and state peasants – to find large sums to purchase substitutes for the army should not be underestimated. We have already seen that peasants paid up to 2,000 roubles to purchase substitutes for the army and their donations have to be seen in this context. The 'price' of a body is relevant here. When Count Aleksei A. Arakcheev, the war minister, was trying to establish military colonies at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he had to purchase peasant settlers from serf owners. The cost of purchase was fixed at 22 roubles for an infant, 300 roubles for a ten-year old and 3,000 roubles for an 18-year old, although in practice children were purchased for less – in December 1824, 14 children were purchased for 4,881 roubles and the maximum paid was 930 roubles for 17-year old boys.[72] In this light, the sums donated by individuals in 1812 were considerable but far greater sums were spent on purchasing

people, either as substitutes for the army or for other purposes. Although not the subject of this chapter, this also demonstrate the not inconsiderable purchasing power of at least some members of Russian society in the early nineteenth century, and this was not exclusive to wealthy members of the nobility.

Conclusion

I have challenged the assumptions that either the militias or donations in 1812 can simply be seen purely in terms of an outburst of 'patriotism' and showed that the motivations and the practice in both cases are more complex than that. This does not mean, however, that I am suggesting that these activities in 1812 were not significant in the evolution of provincial society or to the relationship between the provinces and the centre.

Philanthropic activity continued after 1812. The Women's Patriotic Society was formed specifically to give relief to families in Moscow. In 1812 and 1813, they distributed 103,462 roubles of this relief from a total expenditure of 187,201 roubles. Poor relief dropped after 1816 but that led to more money being given to educational institutions.[73] The Imperial Philanthropic Society was given considerable financial support from the tsar and his family. In Moscow, donations to public relief continued after 1815; a widow, Mariia Kir'iankova, donated over 20,000 roubles to wounded soldiers.[74] Donations were also received from individuals in the provinces. In 1819, the nobleman Shaposhnikov donated 10,000 roubles for an alms-house in Orenburg. In 1826, a merchant in Kaluga, Zolotarev, donated enough capital to maintain 10–15 people in a hospital. The merchant Roman Ovodov donated 500 roubles in Tula.[75] Furthermore, philanthropy was not restricted to nobles and merchants. Peasants in Vladimir province donated 1,000 roubles in 1815 for a home for 'poor girls'. It is striking how many donations were received from peasants in Siberia after 1815: Khudiakov and Poliakov in Tomsk, Samsonov in Enisei and Burmakin in Kainsk were all peasants who donated buildings to be used as alms-houses. Another peasant – Chubarov – donated 150 roubles for an alms-house in Tobol'sk.[76]

The words of Kalashnikov, an official in Irkutsk, as the Russian troops entered Paris in 1814, were exaggerated, but nevertheless had some basis:

> Despite the remoteness, the hearts of the Irkutsk [inhabitants] did not beat with any less joy than those in the centre of Russia. Siberia looks to Russia, as to its mother, and a Siberian has never separated, never separates and never will separate himself from the common fate of the fatherland.[77]

The feeling of shared suffering of the Napoleonic invasion and shared pride in the final victory was an important legacy of the 1812 campaign. I will

conclude by suggesting that the experience of collective and national action in 1812, be it raising temporary militias or donating goods or cash, was a significant step in developing a sense of public responsibility and the evolution of what we would call 'a civil society' and 'civic consciousness' in the Russian provinces.

Notes

1. The historiography is too large for me to list and has been covered in other chapters, but my own contribution to the debate is: 'The Patriotism of the Russian Army in the "Patriotic" or "Fatherland" War of 1812', in Charles J. Esdaile, ed., *Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates* (Basingstoke, 2005), 181–200. On the strains of the war, see my 'Russia as a Fiscal-Military State', in Christopher Storrs, ed., *The Rise of the Military-Fiscal State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P. G. M. Dickson* (Farnham, 2009), 125–46 and *Russia 1762–1825: Military Power, the State, and the People* (Westport, CT and London, 2008), 69–107.
2. See, for example, Mart Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: the Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800* (Boston, MA and Toronto, 1980), 179–80.
3. Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1833* (London, 2003), 287–88; Kevin B. Linch, 'A Citizen and not a Soldier': The British Volunteer Movement and the War against Napoleon', in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall, eds., *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (Basingstoke, 2009), 206–7.
4. Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London, 2006), 374; Jean H. Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women of the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813–1916* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2001), 29–33; Deborah Hertz, *How Jews became Germans: The History of Conversion and Assimilation in Berlin* (New Haven, CT and London, 2007), 113; Katherine B. Aaslestad, *Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2005), 276, 279, 288; Katherine B. Aaslestad, 'Patriots in Practice: War and Gender Roles in Republican Hamburg, 1750–1815', in Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mettele and Jane Rendall, eds., *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775–1830* (Basingstoke, 2010), 235–8; Karen Hagemann, '"Desperation to the Utmost": The Defeat of 1806 and the French Occupation in Prussian Experience and Perception', in Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson, eds., *The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806* (Basingstoke, 2009), 201–2. I am grateful to Dr Leighton James for his advice on sources on philanthropic and patriotic activities in the German states during the Napoleonic Wars.
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22. Iurii A. Bakhnykin, 'Uchastie dukhovenstva russkoi tserkvi v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda', in Nazarian, ed., *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 i rossiiskaia provintsiia*, 136.
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31. Adrien Bourgogne, *The Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne*, trans. and ed. Paul Cottin and Maurice Hénault (London and New York, 1975), 165.

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36. Mikkeli, Mikkelin Maakunta-Arkisto (hereafter MMA), Viipurin Rekryyttivirasto (hereafter VR), Journal of the Vyborg recruiting board, 1801, folio 13.
37. MMA, VR, Vyborg and Keksholm recruit book, 1810, folios 11, 44, 55,
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44. Hartley, 'Philanthropy', 178; Janet M. Hartley, 'The Boards of Social Welfare and the Financing of Catherine II's State Schools', *SEER*, 67, 2 (1989): 211–27.
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54. Tsvetkova, 'Sibir' i Otechestvennaia voina', 43.
55. GAOO, op. 1, d. 1563, ll. 16–16ob (Main Administration of Western Siberia, information on Siberia in 1812).
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12

The Russian Imperial Court and Victory Celebrations during the Early Napoleonic Wars

Paul Keenan

'There is no place duller but more magnificent than the court of the Russian Emperor.' While the precise source of this well-known quotation from the early nineteenth century remains vague, it encapsulates an established perception of the Russian court of this period, and subsequently, as glittering but uninteresting. This perception may help to explain the relative paucity of serious academic studies on the court in general, despite the central role of the ruler and the elite in the pre-modern state apparatus. Yet, despite this importance, it took until the late twentieth century for the royal court to become the focus of scholarly attention.[1] In the Russian case, scholars of the late imperial period produced significant compilations and archival extracts on the rulers and their courts in the preceding century, but little meaningful analysis.[2] However, on the basis of extensive work in Russian archives – now more accessible than ever before – modern scholars have a great deal of previously unused material and can examine the question of the Russian court's evolution as an institution during its transitionary period in the eighteenth century. For example, Ol'ga Ageeva has produced two complementary monographs, dealing with the Russian court's 'Europeanization' in its titles and regulations, often informed by courtly practices elsewhere, alongside an exhaustive examination of its administration, chief offices and financial affairs.[3] Such studies have begun to challenge previous assumptions or oversights about these subjects and provide a means to compare Russia with its other European contemporaries.[4]

Given the revival of interest in the Russian court, it is somewhat surprising that the reign of Alexander I remains relatively understudied in comparison to his eighteenth-century predecessors. To be sure, his reign has attracted scholarly attention, not least in a considerable number of fundamental studies from the nineteenth century.[5] Contemporary historians have sought to explore the complex nature of his personality, the major reform initiatives (and piecemeal nature of their implementation) during his reign and the divisive legacy that he bequeathed to his successors.[6] Much of this work has made a point of exploring the variety of influences upon

the tsar throughout his reign and the overlapping spheres or networks that surrounded him, whether institutional, intellectual, or personal.[7] The major ceremonies and celebrations of his court are described, albeit in passing, in the leading modern biographies, since they form the context for other major turning points in Alexander's life, such as his accession to the throne or his self-portrayal as 'saviour of Europe'.[8] The most focused work on this topic remains Wortman's ground-breaking work on the 'scenarios of power' at the imperial court from the early eighteenth to the early twentieth century, two chapters of which examine the ceremonies of Alexander's reign, with particular emphasis on leading occasions like the tsar's coronation.[9]

The importance of Wortman's contribution for further studies of the Russian court in this period can be seen in three respects. Firstly, as with Ageeva for the eighteenth century, he studies the court and its various ceremonial outputs in terms of their evolving nature, rather than as a static institution. Secondly, he discerns several important themes, in common with other historians of Alexander's reign, such as the desire for order and the growing importance of spiritual authority, which can be traced through court ceremonial and other official presentations of power during the period. Finally, he draws attention to the need to compare Alexander to his contemporaries, such as Napoleon and Frederick William III. Wortman, however, draws much of his evidence from the aforementioned voluminous works of the nineteenth century and key published contemporary accounts, albeit in a sophisticated and wide-ranging manner. This leaves open the important question of what else can be learned from an examination of other contemporary sources and the extant archives.[10] One such under-used source informs the content of this paper; the journals of the Court Chamber stewards recorded the daily activities and ceremonial occasions of the court throughout this period.[11] While official in tone and with particular emphases in their content, they nevertheless provide an important window on court life and a fascinating source of details for this period.

This chapter examines two related aspects of the Russian court's activities in the years between 1805 and 1807. The first section establishes the broad outline of the court's calendar and the role that military victories played within it during Alexander I's reign. Very little has been written on the victory celebrations in Russia during this period yet it was a well-established part of official culture and one of the tsar's personal passions.[12] The second section then focuses on the specific campaign events associated with this period, namely the departure and arrival of the tsar from the court and the official celebrations for the peace of Tilsit. The negotiations between Alexander and Napoleon have been covered extensively in the historiography of the period, with particular interest focusing on the symbolic setting and the complex relationships between the leading protagonists.[13] Likewise, the subsequent reaction to the resulting alliance with France has provoked much discussion, not least its place in the broader narrative of

the subsequent breakdown of this relationship in the build-up to 1812. The nature of the celebrations for Alexander's return to St Petersburg in the summer of 1807, and the subsequent commemoration of Russia's fallen heroes in the early autumn, has not been explored. In my view, there is more to be said on the subject of Alexander I's attempt to 'promote the peace' in its immediate aftermath.

The court calendar and victory celebrations between 1805 and 1807

By the start of Alexander I's reign, the Russian court calendar represented a hybrid of traditional and innovative elements. The foundation of the monarchy's symbolic power and authority continued to be resolutely Orthodox and the festive cycle of the Church remained an essential component in the court calendar. Examples included Epiphany (6 January old style), Candlemas (2 February old style), the Annunciation (25 March old style), the moveable feasts associated with Easter (including the Ascension), the Dormition (15 August old style) and the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September old style).[14] Another traditional aspect of the calendar were the celebrations associated with the ruler and the dynasty, such as name days, birthdays and significant anniversaries, such as the ruler's coronation day. The motivation for such celebrations was to emphasize the continuity and legitimacy of the dynasty, which was particularly significant for those rulers who were keen to assert their (sometimes questionable) claim to the Russian throne.[15] The innovative elements came in the greater emphasis on state-centric occasions and, in particular, military successes, both of which were important legacies of the Petrine era.[16] Such celebrations added many new elements, like the use of classical symbolism, military parades and large-scale illuminations, to the repertoire of the regular court celebrations.[17] In this manner, Alexander's reign was influenced by the strong emphasis on the parade-ground and the annual celebrations for the feast days of the Russian military orders during Paul I's reign.[18]

Comparing the calendar of Alexander's court by 1807 with that of his father's court by 1799, it is clear that their principal court and public holidays remained the same, a total of approximately 60 days per year. Purely religious feasts accounted for just over a third of these celebrations, a third were celebrations for members of the imperial family, and the remaining third were chivalric or state occasions. There were seven military (or peace treaty) celebrations annually: the battle of Poltava (27 June old style); the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainairdzhi (10 July old style); naval victories at Hangö udd (Gangut) and Grengam (27 July old style); the capture of Narva (9 August old style); the battles of Gross-Jägersdorf (19 August old style) and Lesnaia (28 September old style); and the capture of Schlüsselberg fortress (11 October old style).[19] This list highlights the ongoing strong influence of the Petrine victories during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) in the

Russian court calendar and, significantly, the centenary of these victories formed part of the backdrop to Alexander I's reign. On a more occasional basis, there were naturally celebrations for major victories in the wars against Russia's rivals, such as during the Seven Years' War and the wars against the Ottoman Empire. Alexander's reign was no exception but most work has focused on the celebrations in the later Napoleonic Wars, particularly on the ceremonial entry of Russian troops into Paris.[20] In the earlier campaigns, it could be reasonably argued that there was not much victory to celebrate, but nevertheless the Russian court took every opportunity to highlight its successes against the French between 1805 and 1807.

The victory against the French at the battle of Dürrenstein (known in Russian as the battle of Krems, after the local town) on 30 October provides the only examples of a victory celebration at the Russian court during the 1805 campaign. News of the victory arrived in St Petersburg by means of a military courier (*fel'd''eger'*) who arrived around 9 a.m. on 17 November (29 November new style). The court immediately issued an announcement of a Mass of Thanksgiving at the Grand Church in the Winter Palace later that day. The Court Office was responsible for sending these notifications to all members of the court elite and informed the Holy Synod to contact its members, while the resident foreign ministers were sent word 'privately', most likely by means of court servants.[21] At 3 p.m., the imperial family processed to the Grand Church, following behind the assembled members of the Knightly Orders, and were joined by the assembled dignitaries outside the church. The mass was conducted by Metropolitan Amvrosii. After the liturgy, Ivan A. Veidemeier, head of the Permanent Council, read an account of the victory at Dürrenstein. The mass was followed by proclamations of praise for the longevity of the imperial dynasty and the Orthodox faith of the Russian army. Afterwards, there were no other court celebrations that day. The empress retired to her private apartments with her sister and later dined with members of the committee of ministers that evening.[22]

There would be no further Russian victories to celebrate during the wars of the Third Coalition. Instead, ironically, just three days after the aforementioned victory celebrations took place in St Petersburg, the battle of Austerlitz on 20 November (2 December new style) effectively ended Russia's participation in the campaign.[23] By contrast, the East Prussian campaign of 1806–1807 provides rather more examples of victory celebrations at the Russian court. Under the command of General Count Levin von Bennigsen, who had taken control of the situation on the ground owing to the inadequacies of the original commander Field-Marshal Mikhail F. Kamenskii, despite his difficult relationship with a number of other senior officers,[24] the Russians enjoyed a measure of success against the French. The court held official celebrations for the confrontations at Pułtusk and Golymin at the end of 1806, the inconclusive but strongly-fought battle of Preussisch-Eylau in late January (February new style) 1807 and the tactical victory

at Heilsberg in late May (June new style).[25] These celebrations generally followed a similar pattern to those held for Dürrenstein although, unlike that occasion, the tsar was present to participate, before his departure for Bartenstein in mid-March 1807.

News of the Russian army's (admittedly limited) success at Pułtusk and Golymin arrived in St Petersburg on Christmas Eve 1806, presumably late as there was no attempt to organize anything on the same day, as had been the case with Dürrenstein. One of the Court Chamber stewards, Egor Antin, immediately issued notifications to order a Mass of Thanksgiving, which noted that the victory had come against Napoleon himself.[26] The notification sent to the members of the Holy Synod, through their Ober-Procurator Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, also included a requirement for such a Mass of Thanksgiving to be held in every cathedral and church in the city.[27] A complication with this victory celebration was, of course, its coincidence with Christmas Day. The gathering of the court elite and other dignitaries at the Winter Palace to congratulate the tsar and the imperial family, followed by a major state banquet that evening, was hardly unusual for that occasion.[28] However, three elements highlighted the celebration of a victory. Firstly, the Mass held in the Grand Palace Church was one of Thanksgiving, in addition to the normal liturgy. Secondly, during the Mass, Minister of War General Count Sergei K. Viazmitinov read aloud Bennigsen's report of the battle. Finally, at the conclusion of the mass, with the singing of 'We praise to you, O God' (*Tebe Boga khvalim*) both Peter and Paul and Admiralty fortresses fired a 101-gun salute.[29]

The celebrations for the Russian 'victory' at Preussisch-Eylau the following month were similar in their component elements, but there is more detail on their conduct. Word of the victory reached St Petersburg on 2 February (14 February new style), shortly after 6 p.m. The marginalia in the journal of the Court Chamber stewards notes that, upon receiving the news, Alexander promoted the messenger, Flügel-Adjutant Lieutenant-Colonel Stavitskii, to full colonel.[30] The details of the battle were left quite vague, but the entry noted the bloody nature of the two-day engagement and the capture of 12 French standards.[31] At 10.30 p.m., the Court Office issued two notifications to the Holy Synod, again through Golitsyn, and to the court elite, senior military officers and foreign ministers. The first of these notifications was the standard order to attend a Mass of Thanksgiving at the Grand Palace Church the following day and again specifically noted that the victory had come against Napoleon himself. The second notice serves to highlight the importance of these victory celebrations, as it postponed the name day celebration for Grand Duchesses Anna Fedorovna and Anna Pavlovna, as well as (by inference) those of the Order of St Anna, until 4 February (16 February new style), which then coincided with the birthday of Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna.[32] This interruption of the established court calendar was very unusual and was not noted in any other official publication of the period.[33]

Events on 3 February began with a military review by the tsar, members of the Generalitet (senior officials with the service rank of general and above) and other senior army staff officers on Palace Square and surrounding streets. During this review, two squadrons of Life Guard cavalry paraded six captured French standards, sent by Bennigsen with his report, past all of the assembled troops and then took them to the Peter and Paul fortress.[34] The Mass of Thanksgiving took place at 12 p.m. in the usual manner, with Viazmitinov again reading an account of the battle after the liturgy and both fortresses firing a 101-gun salute at its conclusion. The foreign ministers, unusually, were invited by the tsar, through the court ceremony-master, to listen to Viazmitinov's account from a side-room through a lattice on the left-hand side of the church.[35] The tsar and the imperial family then took the congratulations and blessings of the Holy Synod in the church, before leaving to process through the state apartment. Different groups were assigned to different rooms along this route, with Guards and senior army officers in the guardroom, the foreign ministers in the Imperial Audience Chamber, and the remaining Russian dignitaries in the Knight's Hall.[36]

Later that afternoon, there was a grand banquet for 57 distinguished guests, comprising the civil, court and military elite, which was hosted in the apartments of the dowager empress. The only foreign minister invited to attend this banquet was the Prussian envoy, August Friedrich Count von der Goltz. The banquet was accompanied by music performed by musicians from the Guards regiments. Before dessert was served, there were toasts to the health of the victorious Russian army.[37] Later that evening, between 8 p.m. and 11 p.m., the tsar, the dowager empress, Grand Duchesses Anna and Catherine, and Duke Alexander of Württemberg attended a performance in the Hermitage Theatre with invited members of the court and military elite (a total of 235 tickets were issued to guests for the event). Somewhat ironically, but not surprisingly, the production was French: an opera, 'The Wandering Comic Actor' (*Stranstvuiushchii komediant*) and a ballet, 'Rolande'. Finally, the city was illuminated for the occasion.[38]

Finally, the Russian court celebrated the remaining battles of the 1807 campaign – Guttstadt-Deppen (24–25 May; 5–6 June new style), Heilsberg (29 May; 10 June new style) and Friedland (2 June; 14 June new style) – but did so all on one day, the day after the news reached St Petersburg by courier on 7 June (19 June new style). These celebrations occurred despite the costly nature of the defeat at Friedland. The journal entry naturally stressed the Russian army's successes at the first two battles and their significant impact on French forces at Friedland, but adds that they were forced to retire to Tilsit because of fresh French reinforcements. One of the Court Chamber stewards, Sergei Krylov, then issued the usual notifications, ordering a Mass of Thanksgiving the following day in the Grand Palace Church, to the Holy Synod, Russian dignitaries and foreign ministers (through the Office of Ceremonial Affairs).[39] The celebrations followed a similar pattern as others

when the tsar was not present in St Petersburg, but with a more limited extent than previous occasions, with no cannon salutes or illuminations after the mass. Instead, the day ended quietly, as the imperial family then returned to the Tauride palace to dine with their suites that afternoon.[40]

Overall, the celebrations for the victories against France during this period adhered to a well-established eighteenth-century model. The court lay at the heart of these events, which blended military and religious elements at every turn. This was embodied in the stress placed on the faith of both the ruler and the Russian army, which was a common feature of the blessings by the metropolitan. However, in itself, the presence of the tsar did not make a major difference to the conduct of events, bar his role as a focal point for processions and congratulations, as might be reasonably expected. Rather, this leading role was reserved for the ceremonies devoted to Russia's involvement in the campaigns overall and the resulting peace in 1807, the subject of the next section.

Celebrations for the beginning and ending the 1805–1807 campaigns

In 1805, as part of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, Alexander I was the first monarch since Peter the Great to campaign with a Russian army in the field and, unlike his illustrious predecessor, one that was operating a considerable distance beyond Russia's territorial boundaries. Alexander's reign was characterized by travel, whether within his Empire or to foreign states, and such occasions had to be marked with the appropriate ceremonial trappings in keeping with his elevated status.[41] There were more recent precedents for the triumphal return of troops from a campaign and the celebration of major peace treaties, as indicated by their regular commemoration in the court calendar in the preceding century. Russia had staged triumphal entries for major military victories from the reign of Ivan IV onward and the army's extensive activities during the eighteenth century meant that it became an established feature of the court's ceremonial repertoire.[42]

The departure of Alexander I from St Petersburg in early September 1805 to join his army was therefore a significant moment for the Russian court and the occasion was marked accordingly. The journal of the Court Chamber stewards for 1805 sheds some light on the various aspects of this event. On the morning of 9 September (21 September new style), members of the Senate, the Generalitet and other members of the military and civil elite gathered to pay their respects to the tsar at the Tauride Palace, where the imperial family had been resident since 2 September. The tsar and his suite, consisting of his Chief Marshal of the Court Count Nikolai A. Tolstoi, Prince Adam Czartoryski, Count Christoph Lieven, Prince Petr M. Volkonskii and Nikolai N. Novosil'tsev, then travelled to Kazan' Cathedral. They were formally met at the entrance by Metropolitan Amvrosii and other leading

clerics, who blessed them with the Holy Cross and holy water, before they processed into the cathedral to begin the mass. Afterwards Alexander spent time praying beneath the icons of the Holy Mother of Kazan' and Christ the Saviour, before receiving a further blessing from the Metropolitan and departing in his carriage at 11.30 a.m.[43]

Alexander I's emotional return to St Petersburg after the defeat at Austerlitz in late November 1805 occurred in several stages, rather than a single event.[44] Although initially restricted in nature, involving only members of his family and close circle, it was then essential to have a much more high-profile public display to demonstrate the tsar's safe return from the campaign. The court received word on 7 December (19 December new style) that the tsar would arrive the following day, having left his army on 23 November (5 December new style) to return to the capital via Riga.[45] He reached Gatchina, with Count Tolstoi, shortly after midnight on 8/9 December (20–1 December new style) and was greeted by members of the imperial family and their entourage, who had waited there since the previous day. At 2 a.m., after taking tea in their private apartments, the tsar travelled with his wife, his mother and his sister Catherine in one carriage to St Petersburg, with the other members of the court following in their own carriages. At 4 a.m., they arrived at the Kazan' Cathedral, where they heard a mass from Archpriest Simivskii and venerated the holy icons, before departing for the Winter Palace at 5.30 a.m.[46]

Later that morning, the civil, clerical, court and military elite gathered at the Winter Palace to greet and congratulate the tsar upon his return. Each group was given a distinct room within the palace in which to gather – the Permanent Council, the Senate and the leading courtiers were placed in the Grand Dining Room, for example. At midday, the tsar met each group in turn, receiving a short speech of praise from Metropolitan Amvrosii when he met with the Holy Synod, and then proceeded outside to review his troops, who were arranged in parade in front of the palace. Behind them, on Palace Square, large crowds had gathered in order to welcome back the tsar with cheers of 'Ura', then echoed by the troops. Later that afternoon, the tsar toured the city by carriage and, that night, the whole city was illuminated, with many buildings displaying illuminated monograms of the initials of the tsar and members of the imperial family.[47] The following day, and indeed the remainder of the month, indicates a return to the normal pattern of court events. As it was a Sunday, it was the occasion for the regular court *entrée* (or *s''ezd*), a privilege extended to members of the court and military elite. After Alexander made his regular review of the troops by the palace, he attended mass with the imperial family in the Grand Church in the Winter Palace. That evening, the tsar and his wife dined in the dowager empress' apartments with his close circle, other leading courtiers and court ladies.[48]

In March 1807, Alexander again travelled abroad in order to oversee (but importantly this time not to command) the Russian army's ongoing

campaign against Napoleon and to demonstrate his support for his friend and ally King Frederick William III of Prussia. This decision to support Prussia was contrary to the advice from both members of his family, most obviously his mother, and leading advisers.[49] While the broad outline of events was similar to his previous departure in 1805, there were some important differences and additional details in the available accounts. On 15 March (27 March new style), he held discussions with the Prussian emissary von der Goltz and then dined privately with him, his wife, Tolstoi, the empress and one of her ladies-in-waiting Countess Ekaterina de Litta.[50] The following day, the tsar took leave of his wife, mother, and other members of the imperial family at the Winter Palace at midday. He took mass with his suite at the Kazan' Cathedral in the usual manner, preceded by the usual blessings as Alexander arrived at the cathedral's entrance, but after the mass Metropolitan Amvrosii also gave a short speech about the tsar's departure to accompany a second blessing with the Holy Cross. Unlike the previous occasion in 1805, a large crowd gathered outside the cathedral during the mass. As the tsar left the church and then departed in his sledge with his suite, the cathedral bells tolled and the crowd acclaimed him three times.[51]

The end of the 1807 campaign was less clear-cut. Word of the negotiations with France and subsequent peace of Tilsit arrived at the Russian court in various stages, initially through the correspondence of Alexander and other members of the Russian delegation, then confirmed with an official proclamation (discussed below). The court journals note this gradual process in a short note for the entry on 27 June. It stated: 'it became known after a few days' that this was the date when the treaty was signed and included an overview of some of the main articles, namely those affecting Prussia and the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.[52] Somewhat ironically, in view of the later negative reaction, it arrived during a period of official mourning (lasting six weeks from 15 June; 27 June new style) to mark the death of Emperor Francis I's wife, Maria Theresa.[53] A more serious symbolic resonance was that the peace had been signed on the anniversary of the victory at Poltava. From the outset, then, the significance of the Tilsit treaties would be weighed against its illustrious predecessor and its foundational role in the rise of the Russian Empire. Therefore it was imperative that Tilsit and the sacrifice of the Russian army be celebrated in a major, public and demonstrative fashion.

When official confirmation of the peace between Russia and France arrived in the Russian capital on 2 July (14 July new style), the Court Chamber steward, Sergei Krylov, immediately sent out the usual notifications to the relevant institutions and personnel about its official celebration the next day. Many details are typical – a Mass of Thanksgiving in the Kazan' Cathedral the next morning, followed by an *entrée* at the Tauride Palace – but some are not – like the 21-gun salute from the Peter and Paul fortress at sunrise to announce the news.[54] Events on 3 July began in the early hours

of the morning with vigil masses held in all of the city's cathedrals and churches, ended by the cannon salute. At midday, there was a ceremonial procession of carriages (14 in total) from the Tauride Palace to the cathedral, containing the members of the imperial family, their personal suites, and leading court office holders.[55] When the imperial family entered the cathedral, a rocket signal prompted a 101-gun salute from both fortresses. Similar cannon salutes accompanied Viazmitinov's reading of the official declaration of peace and then the conclusion of the mass. After the mass, the imperial family returned to the Tauride Palace while, for the remainder of the day, all cathedrals and churches in the city sounded their bells. At 4 p.m., there was a banquet for the imperial family and 55 invited Russian dignitaries (that is, no foreign ministers) in the Grand Hall. That night, the city was illuminated.[56]

The tsar returned to the city very late the following day, arriving at the Tauride Palace with Tolstoi shortly before midnight. He visited only his wife and mother that night.[57] On 5 July (17 July new style), the tsar and the imperial family travelled to the Kazan' Cathedral shortly after 11 a.m. for the usual Mass of Thanksgiving, attended by the Holy Synod and leading courtiers. Their arrival was greeted by the ringing of the cathedral's bells. Unlike previous occasions, there was no cannon fire during or after the mass. A large crowd had gathered on Nevskii prospekt and greeted the imperial family with shouts of 'Ura' as they left the cathedral. The conclusion of the mass signalled the start of the tolling of all church bells throughout St Petersburg and the city was also illuminated that night. There were, however, no other court celebrations that day.[58] The following six weeks saw a return to the regular round of court events, as in 1805, with only a handful of events that were out of the ordinary. Firstly, Grand Duke Constantine returned from the army on 8 July (20 July new style) but there was no formal celebration for his arrival.[59] Secondly, on 12 July (24 July new style), General Anne-Jean-Marie-René Savary arrived in St Petersburg and had his first audience with Alexander, albeit as 'officer-general attached to the person of the tsar', rather than as French ambassador.[60] Finally, the British plenipotentiary extraordinary, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower (previously an ambassador to Russia), had his first audience with the tsar on 18 July (30 July new style).[61]

Instead the next major ceremonial occasion linked to Tilsit, and the preceding conflict, came with the return of the Guards regiments in late August. On 22 August (3 September new style), the tsar and Grand Duke Constantine travelled to the temporary military encampment around Krasnoe selo. They undertook a ceremonial review of the Chevaliers Guards, Guard infantry and Guard cavalry regiments, to the accompaniment of music and beating of drums from the regimental musicians. The tsar then ordered that they would march from Krasnoe selo into St Petersburg on 24 August (5 September new style).[62] On the day itself, the tsar travelled with General-Adjutant Fedor P. Uvarov to meet the troops on the Petergof road

in order to accompany the march with Grand Duke Constantine and his senior staff officers on horseback. Meanwhile the empress, her sister and one of her ladies-in-waiting, Countess Anna S. Protasova, travelled to the palace of Senator Petr P. Mitusov, which was situated around ten *versts* (one *verst* is 0.7 of a mile or just over 1 kilometre) from St Petersburg along the Petergof road. They were joined there by the dowager empress and the other members of the imperial family, then resident at Pavlovsk. They travelled together by coach to the outskirts of the village of Krasnyi kabachok, from where they watched and were saluted by the passing troops, with the infantry regiments headed by the tsar and the cavalry headed by Grand Duke Constantine. The march continued into St Petersburg and culminated on Palace Square, outside the Winter Palace, where the colours and standards of each regiment were paraded before the imperial family. The regiments then dispersed to their barracks.[63]

The final major ceremonial occasion concerning the early wars against Napoleon and France was held in early September. On 5 September (17 September new style), amidst the major celebrations for the name day of the Empress Elizabeth, Court Chamber steward Sergei Krylov issued a notification to the usual institutions and dignitaries that ordered the holding of a requiem mass for all Russian casualties in the recent wars against the French and the Turks. This requiem was to take place in the Cathedral of St Isaac of Dalmatia, in a break from the norm, and the order stipulated the wearing of mourning garb, both for the ceremony and for the remainder of the day.[64] At 9 a.m. the following morning, Grand Duke Constantine oversaw the drawing-up of the Guards and other regiments (approximately 16,000 troops) in parade along the route from the Winter Palace to the cathedral and around the cathedral itself. At 10 a.m., Metropolitan Amvrosii, Archbishops Irinei and Mefodii, and other leading clerics arrived at the cathedral as the other Russian dignitaries began to gather in front of it. At 11 a.m., the tsar took a carriage from Kamennyi Island to the Winter Palace, where he visited his mother. He then rode on horseback onto Palace Square, accompanied by Prince Eugen of Württemberg, members of the Generalitet and his staff officers, in order to meet Grand Duke Constantine and other senior officers. There was then a parade past the assembled troops, accompanied by music and drums, with the regimental colours and standards.[65]

At 1 p.m., the imperial family, accompanied by their personal suites, travelled from the Winter Palace to the cathedral in ceremonial carriages in a procession similar to that on 3 July. A notable difference was that the leading court ranks did not participate, having already gathered in the cathedral itself.[66] This procession was led by the tsar, Grand Duke Constantine and other senior military figures, with the aforementioned regimental colours and standards, and it accompanied by the musicians and drums of the assembled regiments along the route. The tsar and the imperial family were met and blessed in the usual manner at the entrance to the cathedral before the

commencement of the requiem. After its conclusion, two proclamations were made before the assembled troops: the first was to the eternal memory of Peter the Great, founder of the regular Russian army and navy, and the second to the victorious Russian army. These proclamations were followed by three musket salutes from all troops present. Shortly after 2 p.m., the empress, dowager empress and the personal suites travelled to the Senate building where, from a balcony, they watched another parade of troops on Senate Square around the monument of Peter the Great before accompanying them back to the Winter Palace. The troops then returned to their barracks and the members of the imperial family dispersed to the various imperial residences, marking the end of the official celebrations.[67]

Conclusion

Despite the considerable ceremonial output of the court in the first two months after the conclusion of the 1807 campaign, the justification and legitimization of the Tilsit peace proved a difficult process. While the usual official and spiritual mechanisms were deployed to bolster support for it, with sermons and *belles-lettres* focussing on the importance of peace.[68] Unfortunately, in the case of the Church, its problematic relationship with Napoleon made this a mixed blessing at best.[69] While it took some time for the exact details of the Tilsit peace to emerge – the official manifesto was published just over a month after the tsar's return – it was not long before the implications for Russia were being actively discussed.[70] Dissenting voices emerged throughout Russian society, including around the dowager empress, which reflected the earlier Francophobic atmosphere of 1806.[71] The commemoration of the army's sacrifices in early September 1807 was considerably more straightforward, yet it also fostered a growing sense of frustration, wounded pride and resentment of French military dominance amongst the Russian army, particularly the Guards.[72] By 1808, there was clearly no desire to commemorate this 'great peace' and there was no official mention of it in the court journals, where it would typically have appeared.[73]

While as unsuccessful in the medium- to long-term as the very treaty itself, these events to celebrate the Tilsit peace and the earlier celebrations of Russia's military activities during these campaigns are nevertheless an important source of information about the official narrative on such occasions. They reflect the strategy that Alexander employed to support his position in both 1805 and 1807 – public military spectacle, couched in religious rhetoric – which had its origin in the eighteenth century. However, such an approach requires further work to explore how this strategy was constructed and the process by which is was received, processed and responded to by contemporary observers. Likewise, the overall question of the role played by Alexander's court and its ritual during this period suggests that it bears

comparison with other contemporaries, whether allies like Prussia and Austria or opponents, like the revivified French court under Napoleon. The international discourse of power has been very well explored in military and diplomatic terms for this period, while the symbolic language and activities of institutions like the royal courts is a developing field. Russia's place on this part of the international stage merits further investigation along these lines.

Notes

1. An excellent introduction is provided by John Adamson, ed., *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien Régime, 1500–1750* (London, 1999), 7–41.
2. One such work, Nikolai E. Volkov, *Dvor russkikh imperatorov v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem, v 4-kh chastiakh* (St Petersburg, 1900), is a standard reference point for many modern studies. Similarly, major historical journals like *Russkii arkhiv*, *Russkaia starina* and *Otechestvennaia istoriia* frequently included documents and other notes on the court.
3. Ol'ga G. Ageeva, *Evropeizatsiia russkogo dvora, 1700–1796 gg*. (Moscow, 2006); Ol'ga G. Ageeva, *Imperatorskii dvor Rossii, 1700–1796 gody* (Moscow, 2008).
4. See, for example, Paul Keenan, *St Petersburg and the Russian Court, 1703–1761* (Basingstoke, 2013).
5. Nikolai K. Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie* (St Petersburg, 1897), 4 vols.; Modest I. Bogdanovich, *Istoriia tsarstvovania Imperatora Aleksandra I i Rossii v ego vrem'ia* (St Petersburg, 1869), 6 vols.
6. See, for example, Allen McConnell, *Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer* (Northbrook, IL, 1970); Janet M. Hartley, *Alexander I* (London and New York, 1994); Andrei N. Sakharov, *Aleksandr I* (Moscow, 1998).
7. Such individuals and institutions are explored in: Marc Raeff, *Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839*, 2nd edition (The Hague, 1969); Alexander M. Martin, *Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I* (DeKalb, IL, 1997); Dominic Lieven, *Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London, 2009).
8. See, for example, Alan Palmer, *Alexander I: Tsar of War and Peace* (London, 1974); Marie-Pierre Rey, *Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon* (DeKalb, IL, 2012).
9. Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy* (Princeton, NJ, 1995), vol. 1, 193–243.
10. Rey's recent work on Alexander I has demonstrated the value of such a concerted archival approach to the subject, in her case finding relevant and previously unused correspondence.
11. The *kamer-fur'erskie zhurnaly* (hereafter *KFZh*) were initially published privately in a series *Iurnaly i kamer-fur'erskie zhurnaly 1695–1774 godov* between 1853 and 1855, then the remainder up to 1817 were published at regular intervals until 1916.
12. Hartley provides a useful overview on such cultural expressions of military success, albeit in a broader chronological period, in: Janet M. Hartley, *Russia, 1762–1825: Military Power, the State, and the People* (Westport, CN, 2008), 169–89.

13. For two such examinations in recent years, see Rey, *Alexander I*, 178–86 and Philip Dwyer, *Citizen Emperor: Napoleon in Power* (New Haven, CT, 2013), 246–51.
14. The best treatment of this aspect of the court calendar is Simon Dixon, 'Religious Ritual at the Eighteenth-Century Russian Court', in Michael Schiach, ed., *Monarchy and Religion: The Transformation of Royal Culture in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford, 2007), 217–48.
15. On such celebrations in the eighteenth century, see Ageeva, *Evropeizatsiia russkogo dvora*, 170–207.
16. These developments are analysed in Elena Pogosian, *Petr I – arkhitektor rossiiskoi istorii* (St Petersburg, 2001).
17. For more detail on the eighteenth-century development of such aspects in official celebrations, see Stephen Baehr, 'From History to National Myth: *Translatio Imperii* in Eighteenth-Century Russia', *Russian Review* 37 (1978): 1–13 and Dmitrii D. Zelov, *Ofitsial'nye svetskie prazdniki kak iavlenie russkoi kul'tury kontsa XVII – pervoi poloviny XVIII veka* (Moscow, 2002).
18. A detailed discussion of Paul's predilections is provided by Wortman, *Scenarios of Power*, vol. 1, 172–88.
19. This information is drawn from one of the series of published calendars from the period: *Mesiatsoslov na leto ot rozhdestva Khristova 1799 …* (St Petersburg, 1799), 127–31; *Mesiatsoslov na leto ot rozhdestva Khristova 1807 …* (St Petersburg, 1807), 153–59.
20. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power*, 226–29.
21. *KFZh*, 1805, 295–96 (17 November).
22. Ibid., 296–99.
23. For detailed discussions of the battle of Austerlitz, see David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (London, 1995), 381–441 and Christopher Duffy, *Austerlitz* (London, 1977). The official Russian account, as included in official calendars, unsurprisingly praises the tsar and his brother, who fought bravely, took many prisoners and were only forced to withdraw by the onset of night: *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1807*, 100.
24. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon*, 44–45.
25. On these battles and the 1806–1807 campaign in general, see F. Lorraine Petre, *Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806–1807*, 3rd edition (London, 1907) and Chandler, *Campaigns of Napoleon*, 509–91.
26. The text of the notification is recorded in: *KFZh*, 1806, 692–93 (24 December). Compare with the version published in official calendars: *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1808*, 107.
27. *KFZh*, 1806, 413–14 (24 December).
28. The specifics of the court celebrations for Christmas can be compared with those from the preceding and succeeding years to suggest the general outline of events: *KFZh*, 1805, 385–91 (25 December) and *KFZh*, 1807, 443–48 (25 December).
29. *KFZh*, 1806, 416–17 (25 December).
30. *KFZh*, 1807, 82–83 and 425 (2 February).
31. Again, compare with *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1808*, p. 109.
32. The text of these notifications is reproduced in *KFZh*, 1807, 425–27 (2 February).
33. See, for example, the listings in: *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1807* (St Petersburg, 1807), 7, 153 and 159; *Mesiatsoslov s rospis'iu osob … 1807* (St Petersburg, 1807), part 1, xxv.
34. *KFZh*, 1807, 86 (3 February).
35. Ibid, 87.

36. Ibid., 88–89 and 428–29.
37. Ibid., 89–92. The entry in the court journal for the dowager empress also includes the seating order for the banquet: *KFZh*, 641–44 (3 February).
38. Ibid., 93–94, 430 and 644–45 (3 February).
39. *KFZh*, 1807, 320–21 (7 June). This description, particularly of Friedland, was then reproduced exactly in calendars, such as *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1808*, p. 113.
40. *KFZh*, 1807, 322–27 and 939–42 (8 June). One exception was that the British ambassador Alexander Hamilton, Marquess of Douglas, took his official leave of the Russian court that day, with final audiences with the empress, the dowager empress and other members of the imperial family.
41. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power*, 238–42.
42. Keenan, *St Petersburg and the Russian Court*, 69–70.
43. *KFZh*, 1805, 190–91 (9 September). The event was also noted in other official publications. See, for example, its inclusion in the list of significant events for this period in one of the popular calendar series: *Mesiatsoslov na leto … 1807*, 96.
44. These events are also briefly described in Palmer, *Tsar Alexander I*, 112–14.
45. *KFZh*, 1805, 334–35 (7 December).
46. Ibid., 336–39 (8 and 9 December).
47. Ibid., 339–40 (9 December).
48. Ibid., 342–47 (10 December).
49. Rey, *Alexander I*, 175.
50. *KFZh*, 1807, 162 (15 March).
51. Ibid., 164–68 and 736–39 (16 March).
52. Ibid., 354–55 (27 June).
53. Ibid., 336 and 952 (14 June).
54. The notification is reproduced in: Ibid., 470–71 (2 July).
55. The list of participants, the order of the carriages and their attendant personnel is recorded in: Ibid., 9–11 and 722–24 (3 July).
56. Ibid., 14–18 (3 July). The seating plan was recorded in the journal of the dowager empress's Chamber Steward: Ibid., 727–29 (3 July).
57. Ibid., 19–20 (4 July).
58. Ibid., 20–24 and 478–80 (5 July).
59. Ibid., 32 (8 July)
60. The point about his title and its translation is from Rey, *Alexander I*, 189.
61. The ceremonial for these two audiences garnered only cursory mention: *KFZh*, 1807, 42–43 and 489–90 (12 July); 54–55 and 498–99 (18 July).
62. Ibid., 135–36 (22 August).
63. Ibid., 139–41 and 550–51 (24 August).
64. Ibid., 576–77 (5 September).
65. Ibid., 192–94 and 910 (6 September)
66. The list of participants, the order of the carriages and their attendant personnel is recorded in: Ibid., 195–97 and 911–13 (6 September).
67. Ibid., 197–201 (6 September).
68. Several such sermons on the conclusion of peace with France, by Archbishops Augustine and Feofilakt, were then published in Moscow and St Petersburg in late 1807.
69. Some priests refused to read the manifesto in church, prompting Golitsyn to take action to enforce it in 1807: Nikolai M. Dubrovin, 'Russkaia zhizn' v nachale XIX veka', *Russkaia starina*, 96 (1898): 493.

70. *Mirnyi dogovor mezhdu Rossiei i Frantsiei, podpisannyi v Tilzite 25 iiunia (7 iiulia) 1807 g.* (St Petersburg, 1807).
71. Martin, *Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries*, 48–49.
72. Dubrovin, 'Russkaia zhizn'', 498–99.
73. Caulaincourt dined with the tsar on that date in 1808, but there is no indication if the two events are related: *KFZh*, 1808, 454 (27 June).

13

Orthodox Russia against 'Godless' France: The Russian Church and the 'Holy War' of 1812

Liubov Melnikova

The so-called Patriotic War of 1812 was not only a military and political clash between states, but also a conflict between two civilizations. Many contemporaries saw the events as a struggle to defend Orthodox, monarchist, and aristocratic Russia from the onslaught of a 'godless' and 'de-Christianized' post-Revolutionary France. The impression of a spiritual and religious attack by Napoleon on Christianity was created: the persecution of the Church and the clergy during the French Revolution, the introduction of the new Republican calendar and the ascendancy of the new cult of Reason; Napoleon's overly pragmatic and unscrupulous stance on religion; and, despite the 1801 Concordat with Rome, the frequent clashes with Pope Pius VII that ended in 1809 with the excommunication of the French emperor and the imprisonment of the Roman Pontiff.[1] Perceived as having soaked half of Europe in blood, and having plundered and desecrated the Orthodox churches, the Grande Armée was seen by many in Russia as an evil force with the Antichrist at its head – Satan's henchman who was prophesied to appear on earth shortly before the Second Coming of Christ to unite all the forces of evil in war against the Christian Church.

This perception was encouraged by the actions of Tsar Alexander I, who unleashed a veritable 'propaganda war' against Napoleon, placing great emphasis on the 1812 conflict as a struggle of the people and the Orthodox religion against the invading forces of the Grande Armée, and by the actions of the Orthodox Church itself, which imbued the war with religious and spiritual significance. Unlike the French emperor, Alexander I not only avoided conflict with the Church, but appeared to act in close unity with it.

The union between the Church and the crown dated back to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy and was then codified in Peter I's 'Spiritual Order', which merged the ecclesiastical structure with the state apparatus. The Orthodox Church, referred to in statutes simply as the 'dominant [religion] in the State', was the spiritual and cultural backbone of the Russian Empire, and one of the most important factors influencing the

political life in Russia and the national identity of Orthodox Christians. The ceremony of crowning and anointing the new tsar reinforced the sacred nature of the monarchy and its connection with the divine; in popular perceptions, the concepts of religion, tsar, and country were closely linked. The Church, in one form or another, had been involved in every military engagement conducted by the State. Despite the prohibition on murder contained in the Ten Commandments, the Church did not consider killing the enemy in battle a sin; what is more, it not only approved defensive warfare, but sanctified it, preached its holy character, and branded the fallen as martyrs. The Church not only sanctioned the legitimacy and righteousness of using military force, but also defined the military's spiritual aspects and behavioural norms through a religious and patriotic education campaign led by clergy attached to the armed forces. However, the most obvious co-operation between the Church and the State would come during the so-called Patriotic War of 1812.

Alexander I had involved the Russian Church in the war with Napoleonic France long before the Grande Armée had crossed the Russian border, as part of Russia's involvement in the Fourth anti-French Coalition in 1806. The defeat of the Russian and Austrian forces at the battle of Austerlitz on 20 November 1805,[2] the resulting collapse of the Third Coalition, and the fear that military involvement would spread into Russian territory forced the government to pursue its first anti-Napoleonic propaganda campaign in 1806–1807 and, in the process, made active use of religious terminology. Propaganda was used by both sides during the Napoleonic wars as an ideological weapon: this was a war of words that Russia was ultimately able to win. Military propaganda was used in an attempt to convince the army and the people of the aim and purpose of the war, to unite them in their struggle against a common opponent, as well as being intended to drive enemy soldiers to defect. The 'perception of the enemy' was an important part of this activity, which in Russian anti-Napoleonic propaganda (both spiritual and secular) was characterized by a reliance on historical facts, though it was often twisted through exaggeration, hyperbole, grotesque distortions and irony to fit with the requirements of the genre.

In the early years of Alexander I's reign, before relations with Napoleonic France had been characterized as hostile, Russian censorship would occasionally permit the publication of Napoleonic panegyric literature, in the form of translations or arrangements of treatises circulated through Europe by Bonapartist propaganda. The Russian reading public took a great interest in Napoleon Bonaparte, as a man who had risen from obscurity as an army lieutenant to the position of a world-renowned general and absolute ruler of France, and these works satisfied the mass demand for information on the subject.[3] However, after the execution of the French Prince Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon-Condé, duc d'Enghien, on 21 March 1804 (new style),

and the cessation of diplomatic relations with France, this type of literature was banned, and three years later the process of actively deconstructing the former positive image of Napoleon began.

In 1806–1807, numerous anti-Napoleonic pamphlets and brochures were published, both of Russian origin and translations of foreign works. All of these works presented a critique of Napoleon's internal and external politics, presenting him as an aggressor possessed by an 'insatiable thirst for expansion', and as a 'tyrant and usurper', and including attacks on his character and on the French nation as a whole, along with justifications for aggressive military coalitions against him.[4] In 1806, in response to the dissemination of Napoleonic propaganda, which threatened to disrupt Russia's efforts to create a new anti-French coalition, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed works challenging this propaganda, including its own weekly French language newspaper, the *Journal du Nord*, to maintain a regular flow of counter information.

As well as using the printed word, Alexander I thought it necessary to demonstrate to the Russian people that the war, though not yet being fought within Russian territory, was one of liberation. Setting out the reasons for war in the Supreme Manifesto of 30 November 1806 'on the Creation and Establishment of Temporary Militias', the tsar cited the 'ambition and greed of the government that has taken power in France', and the consequent threat of the 'devastation of all Europe'. Stressing that Napoleon was threatening the integrity of the Russian borders in his own audacious proclamations, Alexander expressed his hope that the Russian people, moved by 'fervent love of the Fatherland' would support the extraordinary measures adopted by the government.[5] By a special decree on 6 December 1806, the tsar appealed to the Holy Synod to explain to the people the extent to which 'this levy [of militias] is necessary in order to save the Fatherland'.

In accordance with the tsar's edict, the Russian Orthodox Church immediately adopted a strident denunciatory tone, and ascribed a religious character to the struggle between Russia and France. In the Holy Synod's Special Proclamation of 15 December 1806, which was read in every church throughout the Russian Empire, Napoleon was presented not only as a usurper, oppressor of mankind, and 'furious enemy of peace and blessed calm', but also as the godless persecutor of the Christian Church. The proclamation cited Napoleon's numerous religious malpractices, including his alleged participation in 'idolatrous celebrations' and his desire to convert to Islam during the Egyptian campaign. Particular attention was paid to the forthcoming meeting of the Great Sanhedrin in Paris:

> Finally, to the great shame of Christ's Church, he [Napoleon] has summoned the Jewish synagogues in France, and openly ordered that their

> rabbis be honoured, and called a new Great Sanhedrin of the Jews, that same temple that forsook God and once dared to condemn our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ to crucifixion; and now he is mindful to unite the Jews, who God's wrath had scattered across the whole face of the earth, to set them to the task of overthrowing Christ's Church and (Oh, terrible impudence that has surpassed all other atrocities!) to denounce [Him] as a false messiah.[6]

On 25 January 1807, the Roman Catholic Metropolitan in Russia, Stanislav Bogush-Sestrentsevich (Stanisław Bohusz Siestrzeńcewicz), made an analogous statement.[7]

Napoleon hoped that the calling of the Great Sanhedrin, officially announced on 6 October 1806 (new style) and held in Paris between 9 February and 9 March 1807 (new style), would end the isolation of the French Jews from the rest of the French nation. Whether or not it achieved this effect, this decision played an important role in propagating the legend of Napoleon's demonic nature. In the eyes of Napoleon's opponents, the Great Sanhedrin had been the highest religious body in ancient Judaism, which had sentenced Jesus Christ to crucifixion, and had not been convened for one and a half centuries. The popular view was that the meeting of the Sanhedrin would signal the coming of the Antichrist; the latter, in Christian eschatology, would be accepted as the true Messiah by the Jews, who had rejected the true Saviour, Jesus Christ. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Christian world looked upon the summoning of the Sanhedrin by Napoleon with some concern. However, while most European states simply chose to ignore the event, the Russian Orthodox Church spoke about it openly, and in a negative manner.

This period also saw the infiltration of religious motifs into Russian poetry, in a response to military and political events. Thus, in the winter of 1807, a leading poet of the time, Gavriil R. Derzhavin, wrote the ode 'Perseus and Andromeda' to mark the battle of Preussisch-Eylau.[8] He began the work with the plot of the famous ancient Greek myth: Andromeda, chained to a rock, was saved from a gruesome death by the courageous Perseus, who flew down from Olympus on a winged horse. Before its defeat by the 'blessed sword' of Perseus, the monster attacking her was instilled with the most fantastic, almost 'apocalyptic' qualities: it was a hell-born

дивий вол, иль преисподний зверь	wild ox, or creature from beneath
Стальночешуйчатый, крылатый,	With scales of steel, winged,
Серпокогтистый, двурогатый	Crescent-clawed, two-horned

Derzhavin then went on to explain the allegorical meaning of the ode, with Andromeda as Europe, Perseus as Russia, and the monster as Napoleon:

Не зрим ли образа в Европе Андромеды,	See we not Andromeda's likeness in Europe,
Во Россе бранный дух, Персея славны следы,	In Russia – the martial spirit, the glorious marks of Perseus
В Наполеоне баснь живого Саламандра,	In Napoleon – the myth of the living Salamander,
Ненасытима кровью	Ever thirsty for blood.[9]

It is interesting that the name of the French emperor was only used directly in the first edition of the ode, published on its own in 1807. In later editions, produced after the conclusion of the Tilsit treaties, 'Napoleon' was replaced with 'Destroyer' ('In the Destroyer – the myth of the living Salamander'). The poet was certainly deliberate in his choice of alternative words: the ancient Greek word for 'destroyer' is very similar to 'Apollo' – a name which assonates with Napoleon, and in Christian belief connotes ruin, destruction, and death (including, for instance, in 'Apocalypse'). The poem ends with the repeated refrain:

Знайте, языки, страшна колосса:	Know ye, peoples, the terrible colossus:
С нами Бог, с нами, – чтите все Росса!	God is with us, He is with us, and you all do honour to the Russian![10]

Also in wide circulation were some satirical poems, written in popular folk language. For instance, an anonymous author wrote of the same victory at Preussisch-Eylau:

Лже-Мессия угоревший	The false Messiah, sick and tired,
Лыжи тотчас навострил	Was immediately straining at his lead
И, грибка два у русских съевши,	And, having eaten two or so Russian
Рыло прочь отворотил	mushrooms, Turned his snout away.[11]

Another poet, who has also remained anonymous, expressed himself in a similar way:

Белины он обожрался:	Having filled his belfry with bats,
Против Бога поднял нос,	He turned his nose up at God,
И Мессиею назвался.	And called himself the Messiah.
Экой змей-горыныч-пес!	What a snake-dragon-mongrel!
…	…

Право, братцы, – Бог будь с нами!	Truly, brothers, God be with us!
Дыбом волосы встают,	It makes the hair stand on end,
Видно, дружен он с чертями,	It is clear that he is friends with the devils,
В рудокопнях что живут	That live down in the mines.[12]

Following the agreement of the Treaty of Tilsit, the anti-Napoleonic propaganda was put on hold, but was renewed with fresh vigour at the start of the so-called Patriotic War of 1812 when Napoleonic armies invaded Russia. At the same time, the idea of Napoleon's demonic origins once again recurred. The extent of the foreign invasion and the level of threat required a presentation of the nature of this incursion in order to develop the most resistance. In this period, the idea that Providence itself was calling on Russia to stop the atrocities of the godless Napoleon, and to free Europe from his grip, attained great importance. In the first days of the war, the regimental clergy distributed among the soldiers of the First Western Army excerpts from a letter written by Johann Wilhelm Friedrich Hezel (Getsel'), a professor at the University of Dorpat, to the Minister for War Barclay de Tolly. The letter was a cabalistic elucidation of two verses in the 'Apocalypse'. Applying the 'Jewish alphabet numbering system' to the French alphabet, in which the first ten letters were the numbers one to nine, and the others were multiples of ten (10, 20, 30 and so on), Hezel calculated that the sum of all the numbers thereby created by the letter sequence '*L'Empereur Napoléon*' was 'the Number of the Beast, 666'. In Christian eschatology, 'the Beast of the Apocalypse' is identified with the Antichrist, whose reign, as explained in 'Apocalypse', would last 42 months. Hezel therefore explained Napoleon's invasion of 1812 on the basis that Napoleon was 42 years old at the time. Applying the same numbering system to '*quarante deux*' (42), Hezel also reached 'the Number of the Beast'.[13]

Such calculations and suppositions regarding the similarity between the sounds in 'Napoleon' and the 'apocalyptic' Apollo had a relatively wide circulation in Russia in 1812. The idea appears to have resonated not only with the lower socio-economic classes, who, in the words of one contemporary, Lieutenant Il'ia T. Radozhitskii, 'thought of him [Napoleon] as non-other than the Antichrist', but also frequently had currency among the nobility. For instance, Radozhitskii also recalled an instance before the Grande Armée's crossing of the Niemen where a non-combatant officer serving with him, after reading the Holy Scriptures, preached that:

> … the Antichrist, that is to say Apollo or Napoleon, has drawn together the great forces of evil near Warsaw … for the sake of destroying mother Russia; and with the help of Satan Beelzebub, who assists him from beyond, the enemy will surely seize Moscow, conquer the entire Russian people, and the Day of the Lord and the Last Judgment will follow.[14]

In the same way, in 1812 Derzhavin once again endowed Napoleon with 'apocalyptic' traits. In his lyric epic hymn 'For the banishment of the French from the Fatherland', the war between Russia and Napoleon's Empire was described as a battle between light and dark, good and evil, righteousness and wickedness. Napoleon was presented as a 'creature of mysterious form' from the abyss, 'in the flesh of the seven-headed Lucifer, crowned with ten horns', as a dragon or 'snake-like demon'.[15] Finally, 'the calculations of the Dorpat professor Getsel' were directly cited in an analysis of Napoleon's name in 1814 by the author of the popular pamphlet 'The Soul of Napoleon Bonaparte…'.[16] Half a century later, Lev N. Tolstoi's *War and Peace* would refer to these public perceptions directly, when the presence of the 'Number of the Beast, 666' in the name of the French emperor was uncovered by his favourite character, Count Pierre [Petr] Bezukhov.

Cabalistic calculations and interpretations of Napoleon as the Antichrist were common during the 1812 war, or shortly after, in a whole series of manuscripts written by Old Believers – who had rejected the reforms of the official Orthodox Church in the mid-seventeenth century. Eschatological concerns, which had always played a major part in the Old Belief, became all the more acute in the early nineteenth century with the arrival of such a grandiose and terrifying figure as Napoleon. A noticeable influence was exercised by the writings of the German Protestant mystic Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling, whose works had become popular in Russia. He predicted the imminent end of the world and the forthcoming battle with the Antichrist in the wake of the Revolution in France and regarded the Napoleonic campaigns as the eastward advance of the Antichrist from the West.[17] Relying on Jung-Stilling's works, the writer and Old Believer Ia. V. Kholin also uncovered the 'Number of the Beast, 666' in Napoleon's name (though on the basis of the form 'Napoleontii').[18] Another Old Believer, S. S. Gnusin, saw Napoleon as the 'Beast of the Apocalypse' in the context of the Old Belief theory of the 'spiritual' Antichrist, under which the signs that people had abandoned the true faith were evidence of the coming of the Last Kingdom:

> The Beast is the spirit of independent thought, independent action, and ambition. And also the Beast is secular power that seeks dominion over the whole world, over all peoples, that seeks to replace God, and creates its own followers.[19]

On 6 July 1812, Alexander I issued the manifesto 'On the mobilization of the national militia'. The tsar appealed to all of his subjects 'of all spiritual and worldly estates and circumstances' to 'work together in unanimous and common uprising against all the ploys and machinations of our foe'. He called on them to strike the enemy 'at every step', 'with all force and means, without heed of his guile and deception'. The manifesto contained the famous phrase: 'Unite, one and all: with the Cross in your heart and weapon in your hand no earthly force can defeat you'.[20]

The tsar's call received the support of the Church. The Holy Synod released an appeal, which was read alongside the manifesto in all churches across the country, developing on the ideas expressed in the 1806 special proclamation. It stressed the links between current events and the 1789 Revolution, the root of all present disasters, during which the French people, 'blinded by dreams of liberty', executed King Louis XVI and desecrated their churches, thereby earning the wrath of God, which would be extended to those countries that followed in France's footsteps. Napoleon was 'the ambitious, insatiable enemy, who keeps not his vows, and respects not the altars', who 'threatens our freedom, our homes, and casts his greedy hand at the splendour of God's churches'. The war was perceived as a 'trial' that had befallen Russia, which had to be overcome with God's help, so that the nation would become even more established 'in His favour'. The Church called upon the congregation to 'take up arms and shields' and 'protect the religion of your forefathers'.[21] The role of the clergy was to reinforce the people in their beliefs, help them resist enemy propaganda, and to appeal to them to participate in the organization and work of the militia.

The main precepts of the Synod's appeal – the righteousness of, and God's approval for, the war in defence of the Fatherland, Napoleon as the enemy of Russia and the Orthodox Church, and the important liberating mission with which Russia had been entrusted by God – were reflected in the speeches, sermons and prayers of the clergy, which were directed at the army, the militia and ordinary people.

These sermons were read in all the parishes across the country. In Moscow, the homilies given by Augustin (Vinogradskii), Bishop of Dmitrov, were particularly authoritative as, at the time, the illness of Metropolitan Platon (Levshin) made him the *de facto* head of the Moscow diocese. In his pastoral address of 28 July 1812 at the Uspenskii cathedral, Augustin appealed to all classes and estates to repel the enemy. He called on the clergy to 'multiply their prayers' for the Fatherland, the nobility to organize and lead the militia divisions ('under the standards of the God of Power and His Anointed'), the merchant classes to donate funds to the war effort, and the people to take up arms 'to defend the shrines', 'protect the altars', and to 'save their patrimony, their wives, and their children'. All were charged with remaining loyal to the tsar, and to trust in God: 'If you are with God, God will be with you'.[22] On 17 July 1812 Augustin wrote the prayer 'For Victory over the Enemy', containing a passionate plea to God to 'reinforce our ruler, Tsar Alexander I', 'bless his undertakings and deeds', 'sustain his rule', 'maintain his army', and 'grant him victory over the enemy'.[23] The text of the prayer was approved by the tsar, and printed by the Moscow Synodial press to be distributed to the monasteries and churches of the Moscow diocese for daily reading in their liturgies. Earlier, towards the end of June 1812, a 'Pastor's Call to Prayer' by Amvrosii (Podobedov), the Metropolitan of Novgorod and St Petersburg, was disseminated to the churches of the St Petersburg diocese.

The 'Call to Prayer' entreated the 'sons of the Fatherland' to share in the 'holy emotions' of Alexander I, who had entrusted 'his righteous cause to Providence', and to turn to God with 'heartfelt prayer for aid'.[24]

According to contemporary accounts, these pulpit addresses had a significant impact on wider popular opinion. For instance, the mayor of Rostov, Mikhail I. Marakuev, noted that these sermons 'were very pleasing to the public, while the Holy Synod's proclamations were particularly eloquent, forceful, and genuine'.[25] Tsar Alexander I also appreciated the effect of these sermons on the public, and appealed to the ecclesiastical hierarchy on a number of occasions with requests to sustain religious and patriotic fervour among the people. In July 1812, during preparations for the defence of Smolensk province, the emperor sent a rescript to Irinei (Fal'kovskii), Bishop of Smolensk, which referred to the need for the clergy, through 'admonitions and exhortations, to encourage' the citizens within the province not only to:

> abhor fear and flight, but to convince them of how much their duty and the Christian faith demand that they band together, try to arm themselves as best they can, give the enemy no quarter, pursue him wherever he is, and instead of fearing him cause him great injury and terror.[26]

The parish ministry also took an active role in fighting the enemy. Both regular and secular clergy not only appealed to their congregations to defend their churches, but also took part in the resistance movements, in some instances taking it upon themselves to organize and lead peasant defence divisions. For example, those listed among the leaders of such divisions are: priest and friar Grigorii Leliukhin of Krutaia Gora, Smolensk province; priest Ioann Skobeev of the Nativity Cathedral in the Verei township of Moscow province; and archpriest and friar Iakov Chistiakov of Liubun' in the Mosal'sk district, Kaluga province, to name a few.[27]

The main elements in the Church's message, namely the godlessness of the enemy and the need to defend the holy faith from them, were confirmed as far as the inhabitants of the Russian Empire were concerned by the actions of the invaders. The soldiers of the Grande Armée looted Orthodox churches and monasteries from the moment they entered the Empire. Perhaps the contempt for religious traditions stemmed from the ambivalence of some soldiers in the Napoleonic armies towards religion.[28] These were largely isolated incidents in Lithuania and Belarus, but pillaging became more prevalent as Napoleonic troops entered central Russia (in the provinces of Smolensk, Moscow and Kaluga). Simple plundering frequently developed into complete desecration of Orthodox shrines, as soldiers chopped icons into firewood, used saints' images for target practice, and turned churches into provision stores, stables and slaughterhouses. In total, more than half of all churches located in the occupied central regions

were ransacked.[29] The vandalism met with widespread indignation, and helped to stiffen popular resistance to the invasion, which was in many ways of a religious nature.

The fate of Moscow had a particular impact on Russian society. Following the fall and desecration of the ancient capital, Russian propaganda showed no restraint in its characterization of the enemy. For example, in the special 'News of the Situation in Moscow' of 17 October 1812, compiled from reliable evidence and publicized in churches by imperial decree, it was directly stated that the usual term 'adversary' (*nepriiatel'*) was too 'ordinary and inadequate' to describe the Grande Armée satisfactorily, since their behaviour was not only unworthy of an enlightened people, but even of savages, who in similar situations had shown 'only lust for plunder, as opposed to lust for destroying that which they could not take with them'. The pre-war habit of emulating France was now rejected, and talk now turned to the need to sever 'all ties between our habits', and to return to the purity and integrity of 'our practices'. France and Russia were juxtaposed as embodiments of 'godlessness' and 'piety', 'vice' and 'virtue', and the war between them had to be pursued to ultimate victory.[30] In the 'posters' distributed by Fedor V. Rostopchin, Governor-General of Moscow, which, according to contemporaries, had an 'incendiary, insuperable effect' on the population, Napoleon is referred to as 'foreign filth', 'enemy of the human species', 'God's punishment for our sins', 'a devilish apparition', 'unbaptized enemy', whose soul was to be condemned to hell to 'burn in the fires, like our Mother Moscow burned'.[31] Following the great Fire of Moscow, S. Novikov wrote the treatise 'A vision of reality and the conversation between N[apoleon] and S[atan]…' which was published under the pseudonym of 'a retired Russian in the steppe' and enjoyed a wide circulation.[32] In his work, even the Devil himself was surprised, albeit pleasantly, with Napoleon's machinations, and admitted that the emperor had surpassed all his previous choices: Caligula, Nero, among others. Particular emphasis was placed on the godlessness and unbridled pride of Napoleon, who allegedly claimed:

Ни Бога, ни людей я не щажу никак;	I pity neither God nor people;
Один хочу быть я, – а прочее – пустяк.	I wish to be alone, and the rest – nothing but frippery
…	…
На Бога даже зол! – Пред Ним ли унижаться?	I am even angry at God himself! Should I grovel before him?
Что я не Он, за то готов и с ним сражаться	That I am not He, and am prepared to fight him for it.[33]

Numerous caricatures showing Napoleon in demonic guise, with horns and a tail, or standing next to Satan and his demons, were published at this time. These were not confined to Russia, as similar depictions were created during the Napoleonic wars in Britain and Germany. A coloured print showing the burned homes on a map of Moscow featured the French emperor as Satan with a burning torch in his hand.

An attempt to understand the nature of the events, to subject the personal qualities of the two warring rulers – including their religious sympathies – to comparative analysis, as well as a consideration of the principles behind their politics, was undertaken by the authors of numerous pamphlets and other journalistic treatises between 1812 and 1814. The most popular works were 'the Soul of Napoleon Bonaparte' and 'the Russians and Napoleon Bonaparte',[34] among others. Almost all such pamphlets were published anonymously or pseudo-anonymously; however, their authors were frequently members of the Russian aristocratic intellectual elite: Sergei S. Uvarov, Aleksandr Ia. Bulgakov, and so on. As a rule, they first addressed the different social origins of the two monarchs and the legitimacy of their rule. Napoleon was a rootless Corsican, a 'child of poverty', an 'heir of the Revolution', as only a 'godless revolution' that had overthrown religion and morals could beget 'such a monster'. His accession to the ancient French throne was an anomaly in the proper course of events. By contrast, Alexander I was the lawful ruler, God's anointed, whose authority was derived not from conquest, but from ancient law and tradition. The author of the pamphlet 'A Conversation between a hundred-year-old resident of the Moscow region and a captured French soldier' gave the following speech to his main character:

> Our people have their tsar, and their tsar is not an upstart, coming from nothing, but a Tsar of royal birth, granted by God and deriving his power from none other than God, who has his own laws, his faith, his lands, his rights and privileges, and his glory, obtained through centuries of military prowess and civic deeds.[35]

Almost all pamphleteers commented on Napoleon's immorality, his excessive ambition, hypocrisy, tyranny, aggression, cynicism and lack of principle. In the pamphlet 'Napoleon's written instructions to his biographer', the French emperor states: 'I am a great magician, and keep the most reliable charms on my person; these are my rules: divide and conquer; give, then take everything; my business is power, and the other is money.'[36] In his treatise 'The Emperor of All Russia and Bonaparte', Uvarov contrasts Napoleon's iniquities with the good deeds of the Russian ruler, whose policies accord with the principles of Christian ethics:

> To be victorious, to burn towns, to seed discord, to incite civil war, and to impose accord – these are the prerogative of ordinary conquerors!

> To liberate nations, to topple odious tyrants, to restore lawful rule, to act as a tsar, having fulfilled the knight's duty on the battlefield, to sit on the most powerful throne in the universe, to bow before Providence at the height of greatness, to reject flattery in humility and modesty, and to sidestep one's own glory – these are the deeds of Alexander.[37]

The author of the pamphlet 'Napoleon's thoughts upon entering Moscow' presents godlessness as one of Napoleon's main 'passions', helping him silence and banish his conscience: 'Away from our eyes, weak counsel, all your efforts are powerless to shake our resolve. Go to the Russians, whose Godliness relies on you.'[38] This contrast between the godlessness and immorality of Napoleon's France, and the conscience-driven Orthodox Russia, is consistent throughout nearly the entire body of Russian anti-Napoleonic literature.

The same sentiments also pervade wartime poetry, although in their characterization of the enemy the authors of lyric epics often replace the term 'godless' with 'demonic', and attribute Russia's victory over the French to the involvement of Divine Providence. In the above-mentioned hymn 'For the banishment of the French from the Fatherland', in the path of Napoleon, the 'snake-like demon' who, accompanied by his viper servants, tormented the earth and sowed death wherever he went, Derzhavin placed Tsar Alexander, presented as a 'white skinned lamb, humble, meek, yet *cheloperunnii* [lit. thrower of lightning bolts]'. The tsar rouses his people to fight for their faith against 'the enemies of Christ'.

Александров глас наш дух вознес:	Alexander's voice raised our spirit:
Прибег он в храм – и стал бесстрашным Росс.	He ran into the temple, and the Russian became fearless.
Упала демонская сила.	The demon's strength fell.

Seeing 'the holiness of Alexander's throne', and 'Napoleon's sycophancy', God helps the Russians, and determines the fate of the campaign.[39] Similar portrayals of the 1812 Patriotic War as the dawn of the apocalypse, an image summoned by the French emperor's expansionist policies, could be found in numerous other works. What is more, this was not merely an exercise of poetic licence; it was a genuine perception of events among the brightest minds of early nineteenth-century Russia. In 1814, in his unfinished poem 'Bova', Aleksandr S. Pushkin presented Napoleon's crimes in 'cosmic' proportions:

Мир крещеный потопил в крови,	He drowned the baptized world in blood,
Не щадил и некрещеного,	He spared not even the unbaptized,
И, в ничтожество низверженный	And, cast down to nothing
Александром, грозным ангелом,	By Alexander, the fierce angel,
Жизнь проводит в унижении	He spends his life in disgrace,
И, забытый всеми, кличется	And, forgotten by everyone, now is called
Ныне Эльбы императором	The emperor of the Elbe.[40]

Associations between Alexander I and angels were drawn often; in fact, this was his sobriquet within the imperial family. However, by adding the epithet 'fierce' to 'angel', Pushkin was expanding on the religious connotations of the 1812 war, as the 'fierce angel' was the Archangel Michael, leader of the heavenly army in the cosmic battle with the enemies of God, and guardian angel of all Christians.

Immediately following the French emperor's fall from power, Nikolai M. Karamzin proclaimed the victory of light over darkness:

Конец победам! Богу слава!	An end to victories! Glory to God!
Низверглась адская держава:	The hellish sovereignty has fallen:
Сражен, сражен Наполеон!	Defeated, defeated is Napoleon!
…	…
Есть правды Бог: тирана нет!	There is a God of truth: the tyrant is no more!
Преходит тьма, но вечен свет.	Darkness is transient, but light is eternal.[41]

The victory over Napoleon was accepted by many contemporaries as the work of Divine Providence, acting through Russia and its ruler. Alexander I himself, who underwent a spiritual experience in 1812, was heavily influenced by religious sympathies at this time. On his orders, the back of a medal made in February 1813 to commemorate the victory in the Patriotic War in 1812 was inscribed with the biblical quotation 'Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name', instead of the traditional imperial portrait.[42] On 30 August 1814, 'for the saying of heartfelt and assiduous prayers to Almighty God in gratitude for the deliverance of our sovereignty from our fierce and powerful enemy, and so that God's mercy and providence be glorified for all generations', Tsar Alexander decreed that Christmas day would

be celebrated annually, and be officially termed the celebration of 'the Birth of Our Saviour Jesus Christ, and in memory of the deliverance of the Church and our Russian sovereignty from the incursions of the Gauls and twelve other nations'.[43] On 3 August 1814, the State Council, Senate, and Holy Synod jointly awarded Alexander the title 'the Blessed'. The main contemporary monuments to the victory were the Church of Christ the Saviour, built in Moscow under orders from the tsar 'to signify our gratitude … for God's Providence, which has saved Russia from imminent ruin',[44] and the Alexander Column in the Palace Square in St Petersburg, crowned with an angel with cross in hand, as an indication of the sacred nature of the war and the holy nature of the victory.

The active participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1812 conflict, which undoubtedly instilled it with a religious character, along with anti-Napoleon propaganda, and, most importantly, the general difference between the world views and mentalities of the opposing sides – or rather the differences between the two civilizations – all led to this war becoming ingrained in the historical and cultural memory of the Russian people not merely as a patriotic, but also as a holy war. Russia's victory over Napoleonic France was seen by many as a victory for Christianity, for conservative and traditional values over European 'godlessness' and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment ideas that had given rise to the French Revolution. Aleksandr Ia. Bulgakov, author of the popular contemporary treatise 'The Russians and Napoleon Bonaparte', wrote that the French army had suffered defeat in Russia because it had been 'surrounded by a people in every respect unique: in religion, language, customs, and morals; which neither Napoleon, nor his unrivalled army of *illuminati* could sway with their devious and harmful teachings'.[45] This theme of national exclusivity, and the messianic destiny of the Russian people, enjoyed a wide circulation, and developed throughout nineteenth-century Russian philosophy.

The Holy Patriotic War paradigm thereby created in 1812 was frequently in demand during periods of military engagement. The religious component would occupy an important place in the ideological reasoning behind the Crimean, First and Second World Wars as a result of its encouragement by the secular authorities and the Church; moreover it responded to the general religious consciousness of Russian society. The example of 1812 would also be called upon during peacetime, as the memory of the Patriotic War in Russia would become a pillar of its national pride, a stimulant for a variety of expressions of patriotic zeal, and a standard reference point for united popular resistance to an external threat or foreign incursion.[46] However, over the course of the next two centuries, the core perceptions of the events of 1812 in historical and cultural memory were consistently subjected to revision and redefinition in light of changing patterns of international relations, and the internal cultural and political life of the country.

The perception of the 1812 war as more than a simple military and political struggle, but also as a spiritual and religious conflict between two

civilizations resonated with the greatest minds of the time. It was reflected not only in the manifestos of Tsar Alexander I and in the proclamations of the ecclesiastical authorities, but also in poetry, journalism, philosophy and art. All of these, combined with an understanding of the war as a just struggle for liberation, and the active participation of all social classes in it, gave life to the concept of the Holy Patriotic War.

Notes

1. For further detail, see: Liubov V. Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkov': Rossiiskoi Imperii v epokhu Napoleonovskikh voin* (Moscow, 2007), 60–83.
2. All dates are in the old style unless otherwise specified.
3. This included such works as: *Zhizn' i podvigi Buonaparte, nachinaia s pervykh ego uspekhov v voinskom iskusstve do sovershennogo pokoreniia Egipta, s prisovokupleniem opisanii pokhoda ego v Siriiu, osady Akry i s izobrazheniem kharaktera i svoistv Buonaparte, s portretom* (2nd edition, Moscow, 1801); *Istoriia pervogo konsula Bonaparte so vremeni ego rozhdeniia, do zakliucheniia Liunevil'skogo mira* (St Petersburg, 1802); *Nekotorye zamechaniia o pervykh letakh Bonaparte. Sobrannye i vydannye na Aglinskom odnim iz ego souchenikov* (Moscow, 1802); *Anekdoty i kharakteristicheskie cherty iz zhizni Bonaparte, otkryvaiushchie dukh i svoistva ego, vybrannye iz vsekh tekh pisatelei, kotorye tol'ko kogda-nibud' pisali o sem Geroe* (Moscow, 1803). The first three books are translations from the French original.
4. These works include: *Napoleon Bonaparte i narod frantsuzskii. V dvukh chastiakh* (Moscow, 1806); *Frantsuzy v Vene ili opisanie vsekh proisshestvii i postupkov Bonaparte i voiska ego v Avstrii, ikh tam prestuplenii, opustoshenii, obmanov i grabitel'stv* (St Petersburg, 1807); *Vot kakovy Bonaparte i narod frantsuzskii. sochineno v Anglii* (St Petersburg, 1807); *Tainaia istoriia novogo frantsuzskogo dvora i liubopytnye anekdoty, otnosiashchiesia do Sent-Kludskogo kabineta v Parizhe* (St Petersburg, 1807). The first two books are translations from German originals.
5. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. Pervoe sobranie*, 45 vols (hereafter *PSZ*) (St Petersburg, 1830), vol. 29, no. 22374.
6. *PSZ*, vol. 29, no. 22394; Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkov'*, 301.
7. Nikolai K. Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr I. Ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie*, 4 vols (St Petersburg, 1897), vol. 2, 359–61.
8. In the manuscript, the full title was 'Persei i Andromeda: Kantata na pobedu frantsuzov russkimi 1807 goda' [Perseus and Andromeda: Cantata for the victory of the Russians over the French in 1807]. In fact, the battle was inconclusive, but both sides claimed victory. Moreover, Napoleon's reputation as a military commander was by then so esteemed, that any battle that he failed to win conclusively was considered a defeat.
9. Gavriil R. Derzhavin, *Persei i Andromeda: kantata na pobedu frantsuzov russkimi 1807 goda* (St Petersburg, 1807).
10. Gavriil R. Derzhavin, 'Persei i Andromeda', in Gavriil R. Derzhavin, *Sochineniia Derzhavina*, ed. Iakov Grot, 9 vols (St Petersburg, 1865), vol. 2, 612–7.
11. Quoted in Nikolai K. Grunskii, 'Napoleon I v russkoi khudozhestvennoi literature', in *Russkii filologicheskii vestnik*, 40, 3–4 (1898): 208.
12. Ibid., 207.
13. St Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), f. 806, op. 1, d. 2156, ll. 2–3; see also: Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkhov'*, 307–8.

14. Il'ia T. Radozhitskii, *Pokhodnye zapiski artillerista, s 1812 po 1816 god* (Moscow, 1835), 16–7
15. Gavriil R. Derzhavin, 'Gimn liro-epicheskii na prognanie frantsuzov iz Otechestva', in Derzhavin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 3, 137–64.
16. *Dukh Napoleona Bonaparte ili zhizn' i uzhasnye deianiia ego, nachinaia so dnia rozhdeniia do 1814 goda. Sobrano s pokazanii ochevidtsev i dostoverneishikh politicheskikh inostrannykh i otechestvennykh avtorov*, Parts 1–3 (St Petersburg, 1814), 8.
17. Lidiia I. Sazonova, 'Skazanie o Napoleone-Antikhriste: staroobriadcheskii variant antinapoleonovskogo mifa', *Slavianovedenie*, 3 (2012): 48.
18. Ibid., 49.
19. Quoted in: Elena M. Iukhimenko, 'Moskovskie staroobriadtsy v 1812 godu: mify i fakty', in *Epokha 1812 goda v sud'bakh Rossii i Evropy: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Moskva, 8–11 oktiabria 2012 g)* (Moscow, 2013), 321.
20. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25176.
21. RGIA, f. 796, op. 93, d. 627, l. 15; Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkov'*, 303–5.
22. *Sochineniia Avgustina, arkhiepiskopa Moskovskogo i Kolomenskogo* (St Petersburg, 1856), 51–6.
23. *Sochineniia Avgustina*, 47–9.
24. RGIA, f. 786, op. 93, d. 565, ll. 1–3.
25. 'Zapiski Marakueva', in Igor' Zakharov, ed., *Napoleon v Rossii glazami russkikh* (Moscow, 2004), 36.
26. Nikolai F. Dubrovin, *Otechestvennaia voina v pis'makh sovremennikov (1812–1815)* (St Petersburg, 1882), 45.
27. For more detail, see: Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkov'*, 110–5, 183.
28. The French soldiers' attitude towards religion is clearly evidenced in a letter written by an abbot, who served in the church of St Louis the French in Moscow between September and October 1812. During the entire period of the French occupation of Moscow, only four or five officers belonging to the senior families in France attended the Abbot's church; of the 12,000 Grande Armée soldiers who died in Moscow, only two were given a Christian burial. According to him, the only contact the soldiers had with religion was their desire to christen their children; 'otherwise, for them religion was just empty noise': Antony Brett-James, *1812: Eyewitness Accounts of Napoleon's Defeat in Russia* (London and New York, 1966), 190. The memoirs of numerous French officers present similar attitudes when they commented on the service before the icon of Our Lady of Smolensk, which took place in the Russian camp on the eve of the battle of Borodino, and comparisons of the attitudes of both armies in their preparations for battle in general. They saw themselves as the carriers of reason and civilization in a barbarian country, and regarded the public expressions of religious feeling as an indication of their ignorance. For instance, A. J. Fain wrote: 'Kutuzov directed a procession of all ranks to see the famous miracle kept in Smolensk. Every soldier appealed with prayer to the symbols of martyrdom, and all of them fell to their knees, repeating some religious poem, so that they might be filled with the Spirit'. L. F. Lejean recounted how the 'Russian general' encouraged religious fanaticism among the soldiers, and 'carried before the army an image of the miracle-working holy Muscovite Bishop'. 'When the Russian general saw that his soldiers were moved by this unusual spectacle', wrote Philippe-Paul, comte de Ségur, 'he raised his voice and began speaking of heaven, the slaves' last remaining refuge. In the name of religion and equality, he called upon these serfs to defend the livelihood of their masters'. Comparing the French and Russian camps, Ségur noted that: 'the French had no military or

religious parades, no pomp, and did not resort to any such attempts to rouse their soldiers. The French looked for strength within themselves, being sure in the fact that true power and heavenly ferocity live within the hearts of men'. These examples are taken from Vladimir N. Zemtsov, ed., *Bitva pri Moskve-reke. Armiia Napoleona v Borodinskom srazhenii* (Moscow, 1999), 67–8.

29. In Moscow, 22 of the 24 active monasteries were sacked, as were 227 of the 264 churches; in Moscow province, four monasteries and the majority of churches suffered the same fate. The same fate befell six monasteries in Smolensk province, and sources differ as to whether 252 or 323 churches were damaged. In Kaluga province, the figures were: two monasteries, and either 24 or 27 churches. For more details see: Mel'nikova, *Armiia i Pravoslavnaia Tserkov'*, 158–86.
30. *Sobranie Vysochaishikh manifestov, gramot, ukazov, reskriptov, prikazov voiskam i raznykh izveshchenii, posledovavshikh v techenie 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 i 1816 godov* (St Petersburg, 1816), 50–7.
31. N. V. Borsuk, *Rastopchinskie afishi. Tekst s primechaniiami i predisloviem* (Moscow, 1912), 94–6.
32. [S. Novikov], *Otstavnoi russkii na stepi. Videnie naiavu i razgovor N… s S… posle sozhzheniia Moskvy i podorvaniia chasti Kremlevskikh sten pri ukhode Napoleona s voiskami iz onoi, kuda on byl dopushchen bez boiu i pochti v pustuiu* (St Petersburg, 1816), 9.
33. S. Novikov, *Otstavnoi russkii na stepi*, 9.
34. Aleksandr Ia. Bulgakov, *Russkie i Napoleon Bonaparte* (Moscow, 1813).
35. *Beseda stoletnego podmoskovnogo zhitelia s plennym frantsuzskim soldatom* (St Petersburg, 1812), 10.
36. *Pis'mennoe nastavlenie Napoleona svoemu istoriografu, kak on dolzhen pisat' ego istoriiu. Naideno na doroge vo vremia puteshestviia Napoleona iz Leiptsiga v Parizh* (Moscow, 1814), 21–2.
37. Sergei S. Uvarov, *Imperator Vserossiiskii i Bonaparte* (St Petersburg, 1814), 41–2.
38. *Mysli Napoleona pri vstuplenii v Moskvu ili razgovor sovesti s razlichnymi ego strastiami* (St Petersburg, 1813), 47.
39. Derzhavin, 'Gimn liro-epicheskii', 137–64.
40. Aleksandr S. Pushkin, 'Bova', in Aleksandr S. Pushkin, *Sobranie sochinenii A. S. Pushkina*, ed. S. M. Bondi, 10 vols (Moscow, 1960), vol. 3, 382–3.
41. Nikolai M. Karamzin, 'Osvobozhdenie Evropy i slava Aleksandra I', in Nikolai M. Karamzin, *Polnoe sobranie stikhotvorenii* ed. Iurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii (Leningrad, 1966), 300.
42. Vitalii V. Bartoshevich, *V borenii s Napoleonom. Numizmaticheskie ocherki* (Kiev, 2001), 8.
43. It was decided that the usual Christmas day service would be followed by a special litany of gratitude, with genuflection during the reading of an official new prayer written for this occasion by Archimandrite (later Metropolitan of Moscow) Filaret (Drozdov). The prayer was named the 'Service of grateful and supplicatory song to Lord God, to be sung on the day of the Birth of Our Saviour Jesus Christ, and in memory of the deliverance of the Church and our Russian sovereignty from the incursions of the Gauls and twelve other nations': RGIA, f. 797, op. 97, d. 226, l. 1; f. 796, op. 95, d. 789, ll.6, 63–5, 105.
44. *PSZ*, vol. 32, no. 25296.
45. Bulgakov, *Russkie i Napoleon*, 52–3
46. For more detail, see: Liubov V. Mel'nikova, Sergei S. Sekirinskii, Aleksandr A. Podmazo, A. V. Golubev, N. N. Aurova, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda v kul'turnoi pamiati Rossii* (Moscow, 2012).

14

The Enemy behind Our Backs? The Occupation of the Duchy of Warsaw 1813–1814

Andrzej Nieuwazny

While the fate of Europe was being decided in Silesia and Saxony, a blot began to spread across the military and political maps of Europe, one that added another unknown dimension to the Napoleonic equation. This unknown was the Duchy of Warsaw, located far behind the front line of the advancing Russian and Prussian armies, and watched closely by the Austrians, who were then vacillating between aligning themselves with Napoleon or Alexander I.

It must be remembered that Napoleon had not given up on returning to the banks of the Vistula; however, a prerequisite for this was the annihilation of the allied forces during the spring campaign of 1813. His plans centred on the fortresses on the Vistula itself, and those along the Oder – Stettin (Szczecin), Küstrin (Kostrzyn), and Glogau (Głogów). Although the two weakest fortresses, Częstochowa and Toruń, fell in April, Modlin and Danzig (Gdańsk) could still function as bases for garrisons of several thousand men, which were able to conduct military operations against the Russian rear. Several thousand Russian soldiers had to be committed to the blockade of Zamość.

Disease and the exhaustion of the last few months' struggle had decimated and depleted the Russian army; however, reserves from the far reaches of the Russian Empire had reinforced its ranks, and it was moving steadily forward. Efficient intelligence, as a result of which the Russians already knew on 11 December 1812 (old style) that Napoleon had arrived in Warsaw a day before, as well as contact with the Austrians and the Cossack raids on the enemy's communication lines – which intercepted couriers and mail – meant that the Russians were aware of the dissatisfaction and uncertainty among the local population, including the surviving Poles who had fled Russia, and the foreign soldiers tasked with defending the Duchy. Propagandists from Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov's staff attempted to use these elements in the Polish ranks, and put to work their 'campaign press' under the direction of Professor Andrei Kaisarov of Dorpat (Tartu) University (successor to Professor Friedrich Rambach) to battle the French

propaganda – from the bulletins of the Grande Armée to propaganda in its wider form. More than ten officers were engaged by the 'press', including writers and publicists, to print official statements, journals recording military movements, leaflets, pamphlets, and counter-pamphlets, all with print runs of up to 10,000 and lengths of up to 20 pages. These were published in Russian, French, German and Polish, occasionally in more than one language at a time, as the situation required.[1]

The Russian army, occupying East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw, distributed many leaflets as it progressed, and left them along the route of its advance. Many were also distributed behind the enemy's front line. According to the Soviet historian Boris Abalikhin, in 1812 the campaign press published no less than 36 leaflets aimed at the residents of Lithuania and Warsaw, and the Polish soldiers stationed there; 18 of the 27 leaflets addressed to the Germans in East Prussia were published in 1813, the rest were published at the end of the previous year.

The leaflets distributed in the Duchy highlighted the close proximity of the Polish and Russian peoples, reminded the Poles how the French army had ransacked the country and how Napoleon had annihilated the Polish army, while also promising benevolence on the part of the Russian forces. The people were told not to fear Russia, 'which would be magnanimous in victory and never vengeful'. Among these leaflets were also copies of Tsar Alexander's proclamation of 24 December 1812 (12 December, old style) in Vilnius (Vil'no, Wilno), in which he declared that anyone who returned to their home within two months would be granted clemency; on the other hand, those who failed to do so by the expiry of this term 'would not be accepted into the Russian bosom', and their property would be confiscated. At the same time, Field Marshal Mikhail I. Kutuzov ordered the population to hand over the supplies and weapons left behind by the French, as well as to betray any deserters and to ensure the maintenance of public order. Officials were instructed to remain in their positions under threat of sequestration of their property. In return, however, the Russian high command promised to treat the populations of occupied territories in a fair and judicious manner.[2]

This propaganda had little effect on the illiterate majority of the peasant population of the Duchy of Warsaw (but was effective in East Prussia). However, it certainly had an effect on its true target – the nobility and officials – especially in Warsaw, full as it was of refugees and where the atmosphere was uneasy at best. Most of all, the tsar's proclamations fuelled doubt among the Lithuanians, whose government, the Lithuanian Commission, was based in Warsaw and was largely formed of survivors from the Polish army. Leaflets and notices proclaiming the tsar's mercy found their way through various channels to the Duchy's rulers, who became familiar with their content as they searched for a means of avoiding catastrophe. On the streets, the proclamations sparked speculation and rumour – Chinese

whispers in which Alexander's promises consistently mutated and took on some new form.[3]

More often than not, although there were no signs of resistance, as the Russian forces advanced through the Duchy they were met with locked doors,[4] rarely encountering any of the local residents, who were already well acquainted with looting by the Bavarians, Saxons, Austrians, French, and the myriad other nations that had arrived in Napoleon's armies. The reports received by Kutuzov reveal a neutral approach to the invading army among the local population, exhausted by the ravages of war, which is confirmed in eyewitness accounts. The future historian of the Patriotic War, Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii noted:

> We had advanced more than three hundred miles from our borders, but no one greeted us as their liberators. Only the Jews, dressed in their ridiculous outfits, came out before every city in our path bearing their sacred vessels and with colourful banners on their pipes and kettledrums. From time to time, we saw some Poles. In general, they themselves did not know what they wanted: some said they were tired of the French; others stared at us in a threatening manner, which can be explained by their deep rooted feelings towards us and the fact that every step forward by the Russian army was a step away from the restoration of Polish independence.

A more concise exposition of these sentiments was contained in a letter written by the 22 year old Lieutenant Vasilii F. Timkovskii to his mother: 'the Poles greet us as their conquerors, the Jews as their saviours, and the Prussians as their friends and allies.'[5]

Field Marshal Kutuzov, the *de facto* commander of the Russian army, was unimpressed with the tsar's relatively soft approach towards the Poles, and was keen to neutralize any unco-operative sympathies in Lithuania and the Duchy. However, the leader of the Russian forces was also aware of the circumstances: the depletion of the Russian army, rumours of thousands of Polish partisans arming themselves with axes, and the close proximity of enemy forces meant that his commanders and their subordinates needed to exercise some restraint. The Russian regular troops were careful, and there were no recorded incidents of excessive force. Kutuzov was keen to avoid further complicating the situation by causing riots and inciting resistance among the local population, and strictly ordered his officers to respect the personal property of local inhabitants, forbidding them from levying cash contributions, and to maintain discipline among their men. The memory of Tadeusz Kościuszko's *kosynierzy* (peasant scythe-bearers) was still very much alive among Russian veterans.[6]

Anti-Polish sympathies were certainly prevalent among a large portion of the Russian officers. Polish soldiers in the Grande Armée were largely

blamed for the looting in Russia, particularly the sack of Orthodox churches. Moreover, in the context of the preceding 200 years of Russian history, the recent arrival of Polish troops in the Kremlin was particularly humiliating. Many were convinced that Alexander's Polish subjects in Lithuania had *en masse* engaged in misbehaviour towards women the previous summer, which was no less influential for only being partially true. In addition, as Vladislav M. Glinka calculated, of the 332 Russian generals that fought in the war of 1812–1814 whose portraits adorn the War Gallery of the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, although only 39 fought against the Poles in 1792 and 1794, their number included such influential leaders as Michael B. Barclay de Tolly, Ivan S. Dorokhov, Aleksandr P. Ermolov, Petr P. Konovitsyn, Dmitrii P. Neverovskii, Nikolai N. Raevskii and Kutuzov himself. Many of these generals shared the views expressed by the partisan and poet Colonel Denis V. Davydov who was renowned for his strong anti-Polish sympathies and who saw no reason for restraint when dealing with this defeated enemy, this constant nemesis whose capital was the 'hotbed of conspiracy, enmity, and hatred towards Russia'.[7]

Politically, the Duchy appeared to have been pacified. The government and the army left Warsaw at the beginning of February with Prince Józef Poniatowski, and then were expelled by the Russians and 'their allies', the Austrians, from Cracow (Kraków) in May. The Confederation Council, formed before the war with Russia, was disbanded, and the ministers left to join the king in Dresden. The prefects and a fifth of the sub-prefects followed suit. All were requesting permission from the government in Cracow to emigrate in the event that the city was captured, and, despite threats from Kutuzov, who feared that their exodus would bring about administrative paralysis, many ministers abandoned their duties in early 1813.

The Polish government was either replaced or positions were duplicated and filled with more desirable ministers. In March, the tsar formed the Temporary Supreme Council (*Rada Najwyższa Tymczasowa*') in place of the government, with Senator Vasilii S. Lanskoi at its head; on the prefecture and sub-prefecture level, the Polish authorities were mirrored by a system of 'regional' (*oblast'*) and 'district (*okrug*) authorities'. A Central Committee was created to help co-operation with the Polish elite, with members chosen from each department by the Departmental Councils. It met on 11 May 1813 as a consultative body attached to the Temporary Supreme Council.[8]

Some ministers resisted the changes, taking leave and (for a time) ignoring notices to return, while those who did work undermined the new regime by, for instance, hiding official seals. Some judges refused to carry out sentences on behalf of the new authorities, and it seems some ministers did likewise when it came to implementing decisions. The Duchy was still formally ruled by King Frederick Augustus I of Saxony. Even the election of the Central Committee was met with resistance from some Departmental Councils, which refused to replace what they saw as the legitimate authorities.

However, although these acts of civil defiance were important in driving popular opinion, they had little effect on the work of the occupying Russian regime, whose objectives were order, taxes and the requisitioning of supplies for the Russian army.

According to Leon Dembowski, the author of a contemporary journal, the local elite was divided into four political parties. The first, only numbering roughly ten people, was made up of fervent supporters of the new regime. The second, referred to as the 'Lithuanian-Russian' party, trusted Alexander and believed in the reunification of the Duchy and the territories of the former *Rzeczpospolita*. It was made up of a mix of idealists and other more level-headed individuals, who appreciated the differences between the tsar's assurances and reality, but together they adopted Adam Czartoryski as their voice and leader, in whom they placed complete, unbridled trust. Dembowski labelled their opponents the 'French' party, which was convinced even in 1813 that French forces were again deploying on the banks of the Nieman river, just as many Poles would believe in the winter of 1939 that 'as the sun sits higher in the sky, Sikorski moves closer'. The largest and most popular party among the landowners and officials was the 'French-Saxon' party, which awaited Napoleon's upcoming victory and the maintenance of the Duchy in its pre-war form.[9]

These hopes and expectations, however, were only expressed in private, and, in reality, the Russians were in complete control. Being aware of the charged atmosphere among the elite, they did not feel comfortable in the Duchy. This was particularly the case during Easter, as the Russians remembered the massacre of their garrison in 1794. This 'Sicilian Vespers' syndrome was continually fuelled either by the Prussians, or by those Russian generals who aligned themselves with the 'patriotic' party and remained wary of Poland. In any event, both groups hoped that Alexander would adopt a more hostile approach towards these 'unruly Poles'.[10]

The Prussian General Friedrich von Bülow scared the Russians with stories of peasant *kosynierzy* (scythe-bearers, who had fought in the 1794 insurrection); the High President of Königsberg could already see the saddles, shoes and pipes collected from homes across the land. These obviously false rumours, and the potential for cruelty by the Russian forces, were aimed at provoking the Poles into taking desperate measures, as a pretext for introducing 'Russian rule in the Russian way' (*gouverner par un Russe à la russe*), as described by a member of the 'patriots', Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich.[11]

On Good Friday, the military governor of Warsaw, General Peter von der Pahlen, brought 2,000 soldiers into the city, while Lanskoi, chairman of the Supreme Council, ordered the arrest of Jan Kiliński, a cobbler (but also a commander in the Kościuszko uprising), among other known potential 'ringleaders', acting on information provided by spies and informants. The 'Polish uprising' ended with a conciliatory meal and a note in Adam

Czartoryski's journal: 'the spies wanted to reveal themselves'. The only outbreak of violence in the city was a fight between some drunken Cossacks.[12] This did not prevent rumour changing the date of the revolt to the anniversary of the Constitution of 3 May 1791; however, this date also passed without incident under the watchful eye of the police.

Evidence of the unease with which security within the Duchy was viewed can be seen, for instance, in a letter written by the young Aleksandr N. Murav'ev (the future Decembrist), who was conscious that when he crossed the river Nieman at the end of April 1813 in possession of documents from Staff Headquarters he was leaping 'into fire and water'. In a letter to his brother-in-law he confirmed the perception (most likely one he had overheard) that 'robberies are common in the Duchy of Warsaw, and since I will be forced to travel at night, I expect to be attacked by thieves and killers'; he would, however, arrive at his next interim destination, Königsberg, without incident.[13]

Despite misinformation in the press regarding Napoleon's spring campaign, which presented even the Battle of Lützen as a French defeat, Warsaw remained hopeful. 'Most officials, and almost all landowners, were living in hope that the Duchy would continue to survive', noted Leon Dembowski.[14] The aristocracy in the western Russian provinces were even more irrationally optimistic. Czartoryski wrote in bemusement that:

> … they still await the return of Napoleon…, such opinions are widespread in Lithuania. Even in Volhynia the sentiment is more hostile to Moscow, and more congenial to the French, than in the Duchy. It is easy to guess as to the reasons, as they do not like to suffer and see the cause so close'.[15]

Not only was the Polish capital peaceful, but the peasantry was also not ready for partisan resistance. The vast majority had neither personal property nor any sense of national consciousness, and, despite their poverty and destituteness, showed no desire to rise up in revolt. When the danger period had passed, Warsaw breathed a sigh of relief, and on 5 May bade an amicable farewell to the departing Pahlen, awarding him a ring with the inscription 'Grati Cives Varsoviae 1813 Petro Pahleno'.[16]

The atmosphere in Warsaw, as in the rest of the country, was, however, far from jubilant. The city was dead: people did not receive guests, and there were no organized balls or dances, since there was no one to organize or attend them. Prince Poniatowski's palace 'pod Blachą' (Copper-Roof) was closed, though Lanskoi would later stay there temporarily.[17] The theatre remained open, apart from a brief period between 3 and 9 February 1813, but was no longer the capital's cultural centre, as it had become popular among the Russian officers. Only after several months had passed, when emigrants and refugees began to trickle back into the city, did people begin

to 'be social'; however, their gatherings were sad affairs, and social interaction with Russians resembled more an acknowledgement of their status as occupiers than a genuine social relationship. Those of more generous means left the city to join their wives or to avoid contact with the new regime. Even those Russians who sympathized with the Poles did not feel comfortable in Warsaw. As Czartoryski wrote:

> This mess is no good, too many different emotions, something is always being held back when they are around, something gets in the way of complete trust. The astute among them [the Russians] must feel the same around us.[18]

General Dmitrii Dokhturov wrote to his wife in mid-April:

> You would not believe the life I lead here; I am always alone, and I see no one apart from military personnel. It seems that the locals do not want to meet us, but I leave them alone as well; some of our men know people here, but their acquaintance is motivated by cold politics, and I have decided not to bother them anymore. There are many women, but they are all quiet, and sometimes one does not see them at all, only in the theatre, but even then very rarely; there is only one house, which I visit, which belongs to Madame Rosse. She is a strange Dutch woman, but she largely associates with the Russians, one would not meet a single Pole in her home; she treats us to excellent lunches and her wine is magnificent, she leads a clean and good life; this woman is not young. That is the only house I know, and even it I visit rarely.[19]

Two weeks passed, and little had changed:

> The young among us visit several houses, but they say that the atmosphere there is cold and boring; although, it is true, I must make a few visits, but You, my friend, know my attitude towards these people, especially when they look at us the way they do. The Countess Chodkiewicz comes here occasionally; her dear husband is in Modlin, where he commands something or other; she does not meet any of our lot, they say she hates us; it is her loss – she will not gain anything in this way. There are lots of Potockis here as well; their husbands are God knows where, and when they could not go with them, they stayed where they were; I am told that I should leave visiting cards at some of their homes, just as a simple formality. However, only the Dutch house of our great admirer Madame Rosse remains welcoming to Russians; she receives all Russians with open arms. I paid her a visit as a gesture of gratitude; she lives with great taste and cleanliness. One would never meet a Pole there; as a result the whole city hates her.[20]

Even in October 1813, before news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig reached Warsaw, Madame Nakwaska, wife of the recently reinstated Prefect of Warsaw, said:

> the governor's family is very proper, his wife is a sociable lady, his daughter is pretty and witty, I like this house, and would visit it often if I could; however, this is impossible – my heart breaks every time I go in there, I am so nervous. We had them over for a nice lunch, which they were happy with, and so we have paid our dues for the whole winter.[21]

On 8 June, Warsaw received the news that the coalition had agreed to a ceasefire with Napoleon, and many among the Russian military hoped that this would eventually turn into a permanent peace. The ceasefire went some way toward removing the patriotic restraint that posed a barrier to effective social communication, and calmed relations between the Poles and the Russians.

A special place in this system was occupied by Nikolai N. Novosil'tsev, who, at the direction of Prince Czartoryski, was immediately well received in the city's best houses upon his appointment to the Temporary Supreme Council as well as in Countess Anna Potocka-Wąsowiczowa's salon. In her memoirs, written in her twilight years, she admitted that initially (at the beginning) she was enchanted with this Russian, and thought of him as a friend and ally. 'People more experienced than I were caught, and recovered less quickly', she noted many years later. This obsession with Novosil'tsev, whom many believed was a friend of Czartoryski, is evidenced in numerous accounts (for instance, as Prince Adam wrote: 'May God grant that such a sympathetic and ardent supporter of Poland be found among the Poles'). Although people slowly came to their senses, this refined, clavichord-playing translator of the poet Anacreon, who was so different from the other Russians they had encountered, particularly military personnel, gained celebrity status in society despite his unfortunate physical attributes. 'I like him very much', sighed Teresa Kicka, the sister-in-law of the Napoleonic general Antoni Sułkowski, 'he gives the impression of being a sweet and genuine man, although the spasms of his face would scare Taidka [Sułkowski's daughter] more than Konstantin Tiesenhausen'.[22]

In the countryside, relations differed from place to place and depending on the local Russian commander. Some locals, usually the ethnic Poles, openly expressed their discontent at the Russian presence, others collaborated with the newcomers, while yet others simply survived. In Kalisz, the city deputy prefect wrote:

> when the ladies that had been invited to the ball failed to attend, the officers told them that next time they would be invited by ordinary

> soldiers and compelled to turn up. It is a truly Muscovite concept, and may even encourage the men, and not just the women to show proper obedience to their masters.[23]

Suspicion was particularly prevalent in the regions surrounding the blockaded fortresses. General Louis Alexandre Andrault de Langeron, a French emigrant in the service of the Russian crown who served in Barclay de Tolly's 3rd Army besieging the Toruń fortress, noted the hatred towards the Prussians among 'the local nobility, which had remained loyal to Napoleon', and its hostility towards the Russians, which manifested itself, for instance, in noblewomen dressing themselves in black mourning clothes after the fall of Warsaw. The Russian authorities feared that the locals were hatching plots against them, and believed that the nobility was preparing peasant *kosynierzy* to massacre everyone in Russian quarters.[24]

These fears were exacerbated by the discovery of several weapons stockpiles in a few rural homes in the Bydgoszcz region and in a Bernardine monastery in the city, among which (according to Langeron) was found a gun taken from a Russian soldier. In April two Bernardines were arrested. Some Poles were also accused of spying for the besieged Toruń fortress, including Sub-Prefect Jakub Winnicki, who was arrested for refusing to co-operate with the authorities, and removed to Königsberg.[25]

On the other hand, Russian officers who spent weeks, and sometimes months living on country estates tried to maintain good relations with their owners, and not simply because their superiors consistently reminded them of the importance of doing so. The Russians' dignified behaviour soon dispelled the initial tensions between the two sides, while their prolonged residence, for instance of young officers tediously besieging the remaining fortresses, brought them closer to the locals, and in some cases blossomed into romance.[26]

Natalis Sulerzyski remembered a ball in Pluskowęsy organized by one of Langeron's subordinates, Colonel Konstantin Poltoratskii,[27] who had been quartered very close to his parents' estate. 'It was difficult to decline this invitation to a home in a not very decent neighbourhood', wrote the author of the memoirs, 'because this "genuine", and very polite Muscovite was very insistent'. This politeness was a stark contrast with the experience the previous year of the arrival of Napoleon's Hessians and Bavarians, 'who mercilessly plundered and inflicted great losses on our parents, taking all four work horses with them', and was now being retold as a horror story. The culmination of the Pluskowęsy ball was a polonaise, performed by the landed nobility and the officers, and accompanied by a military orchestra.[28]

Poltoratskii was one of hundreds of colonels that passed through the Duchy between 1813 and 1814, and belonged to a class of Russians that maintained a good relationship with the locals. Such good relationships, despite later patriotic traditions, certainly did exist. In a country ravaged

by war and by the movement of troops, and exhausted by constant fear for loved ones and the future fate of the nation, there was still a need for occasional entertainment, a need encouraged by the customs and traditions of the nobility. These pastimes, however, only truly developed and grew in frequency in 1814.[29]

There was also widespread anxiety regarding the safety of friends and loved ones fighting in Napoleon's ranks in Saxony, as there had been no news of them for several months. This was fuelled by a vainglorious press, which regularly reported on either real or fictional victories over Napoleon, 'who grew more attractive [according to Dembowski] the more fate endowed him with misfortunes'. Despite the lack of information from Germany (correspondence was monitored, and therefore needed to be cautious), any news was welcome, and was discussed and interpreted in accordance with the sympathies of the people involved.

Prussia's geopolitical game to recover those territories it had previously annexed was a further aggravating factor. The Prussians actively tried to collaborate with the Russians in eliminating Polish resistance. At its most basic level this took the form of feeding provocative information to the Russians, with the aim of maintaining suspicion between the Russians and the Poles, and ultimately of reaffirming the Prussians' position as a close ally. The Prussians sent emissaries into Polish territory, which sowed fear among the populations of former annexed territories that they would again be brought under the yoke of Frederick William III. This was particularly the case in the borderlands, which, like the rest of the Duchy, were being guarded by Russian forces. The royal decree mobilizing the *Landwehr* on 17 March 1813 in Breslau (Wrocław) sparked a mass exodus of Polish Prussian subjects – through the cordon and into the Duchy's borderlands. The Russian governors helped capture the refugees – in some cases, as in the Bydgoszcz region, they actively hunted and pursued them. After the decree of 13 June 1813, in which the Prussian king authorized the use of force against those resisting conscription, patrols of Prussian soldiers and officials began crossing the border on a regular basis. The kidnap of five Polish fugitives from Kalwaria County by an official named Bredauer, reported by the prefect of Łomża to the Temporary Supreme Council in July 1813, was very typical of this time.[30]

In early October, a Prussian chamberlain by the name of Troschke was acting alongside the occupying forces in the Bydgoszcz and Poznań regions, requisitioning supplies and running a propaganda campaign under the authority of the Prussian Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg. The Supreme Council ordered his arrest; however, pressure by influential Germans in St Petersburg would eventually guarantee his release. In April 1815, the Prussians were already calling for emigrants from and recruiting in a country that was not yet, formally speaking, their domain.

To what extent the Duchy resisted its occupiers, however, is debatable. Pre-Second World War Polish historians described a society bonding together to

resist the invaders,[31] a thesis that, somewhat paradoxically, was supported by some Soviet academics. According to Boris Abalikhin, 140 people were arrested in the Duchy between 1812 and 1813 for political crimes, most of them from the ranks of the nobility, with the exception of the above-mentioned Bernardine monks who stockpiled weapons and ammunition. In the surviving documents, Abalikhin found the following causes for arrest: 43 for stockpiling weapons, 25 for harbouring prisoners, 18 for spreading malicious rumours, 29 for disobeying the orders of the military authorities and 25 for armed resistance.[32] Most arrests were made in autumn 1813, when all the signs suggested that Alexander was not intending to honour the vague promises he had made at the beginning of the year.

The bilingual 'Police Control Committee Report to His Majesty', a report now contained in the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow and originally made by a Committee formed under the initiative of Novosil'tsev to reduce the number of arbitrary arrests, questions the above accounts of politically-motivated resistance and suggests that the authorities were pursuing a far wider range of often non-political offences.[33] The list includes alleged weapon stockpiling and harbouring of fugitives; however, it also refers to officials detained on suspicion of corruption, locals that had been involved in brawls with Russian soldiers, failure to produce a passport, and people who had (in a brazen act of political defiance!) 'covertly brought to the fortress [of Modlin] and sold to the men there very small amounts of sniffing tobacco, onions, vodka, tobacco etc.'. Of the 43 surnames on the list that had been arrested and sent to Russia, which included 20 citizens and Sub-Prefect Świeżawski from Hrubieszów County, kidnapped during the raids on the Duchy in 1812, the vast majority were detained 'for unknown reasons'. Similarly, five citizens from Łomża County were apparently arrested under 'unknown authority and for unknown reasons'. In the case of those that that had not yet been transported from the Duchy – for instance, ten citizens from the Poznań region and four from Siedlce County – the annotations next to their names read: 'released by the arresting authorities'. It is also unclear into which category the Soviet historian would have placed the fugitive Salemon Justin Balsamin, arrested in Siedlce County 'with no passport, and passing himself off as a French officer and the son of an Indian duke'.

The Committee considered 144 cases, of which 43 resulted in the arrestee's release by order of the tsar on 30 August 1814. Three detainees escaped, but subsequently surrendered themselves willingly to the Duchy authorities. The tsar's edict also released 17 other detainees whose files were still under review. On the whole, therefore, the number and variety of cases considered in the Committee's documents does not support a conclusion that the period saw mass repression, and, moreover, negates the thesis of widespread Polish resistance.

The English general Robert Wilson, who was present in Warsaw in mid-1813, wrote an account on the spiritual condition of the Poles to William

Cathcart, 1st Earl Cathcart (the ambassador of Great Britain in Russia and participant in the war of 1812–1814 as a member of the tsar's retinue): 'since the crossing of the Vistula in January of the current year, Polish opinion has changed significantly – at the moment, everyone wishes for peace, but if preparations for war began again, and the enemy approached, the Poles would join him.' Wilson advised the Poles to remain passive and avoid siding with anyone, reminding them of their duties to the Saxon king, and assured his audience of the European position: 'be passive for now, and when the time comes, hope for that which you ought to hope for – independence.' He was seen as a conniver, but his advice was noted with some satisfaction.[34]

The shifting feelings of delusion, resistance and hope continued until the end of October, when news arrived of the outcome of the Battle of Leipzig and the death of Prince Józef Poniatowski, the Polish commander. Reports of Napoleon's defeat cast down hopes for a future for the country aligned with Napoleon, which, despite any resentment towards the French, were widespread among the local population. On 30 October, the *Warsaw Gazette* (*Gazeta Warszawska*) reported on the battle of Leipzig and the death of the Polish commander. Even so, accounts from 10 November claimed that 'one cannot be certain of the fate of Józef Poniatowski', despite confirmation of his demise by his adjutants, who returned to Warsaw on 8 November. Even in the midst of these shocking reports, the censors incorporated a false account of the defection to the Allies of eight Polish regiments, designed to undermine the glory of the commander's honourable death in battle. The publication of the adjutants' reports in the press crushed any hope of finding the prince alive, and ushered in a period of public mourning. Alexander Linowski, who, according to Kajetan Koźmian's account, 'was very partial to the new established order, and was already carving out for himself a path to significance within it, cried: "the last star of Poland has been extinguished"'.[35]

'Poland is in mourning … Sleep is impossible … It seems everything disappeared at once – watching the defeat of individuals, peoples, humanity, one desires nothing now …' wrote Adam Czartoryskii. Poniatowski's death, however much it had shocked Czartoryski, completely swept the carpet from under the feet of the pro-French group within the elite. In the case of others, the tragedy did not break their spirit, but opened their eyes to political reality, and focused their attention and hopes on Prince Adam.[36] Koźmian, a particularly astute eyewitness, noted the detachment of some from reality, and the 'disposition of many others to fresh hopes'. These were expressed in a poem written for Czartoryski for his birthday in December:

> 'Prince! Henceforth, You will concern yourself with our fortune.
> You will do with your head what the knight could not do with his sword.[37]

After the battle of Leipzig it became clear that the Napoleonic era in Poland had finished, and it became necessary for the nation to hold on to the only hope for the survival of their state, which in reality, was the tsar – however unlikely a candidate he may have seemed. The first half of 1814 would be a prolonged period of waiting in suspense for the inevitable news of Napoleon's defeat. The second half was spent in anticipation of the outcome of the Vienna Congress, softened by the tsar's order to rebuild the Polish army, and the work of the Civil Organization Committee. This would continue, broken only by a short period of unease during the 'Hundred Days', until the proclamation of the Polish Kingdom in May 1815. Relief, however, would be tainted with frustration at the loss of the Poznań and Bydgoszcz regions, as well as Cracow and Wieliczka.

Notes

1. N R. E. Al'tshuller, *Listovki Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1962), 3–20; Iurii M. Lotman, *Pokhodnaia tipografiia shtaba Kutuzova i ee deiatel'nost'*, in *1812 god. K 150-letiiu Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1962), 215–32; Andrei G. Tartakovskii, 'Iz istorii russkoi voennoi publitsistiki 1812 goda', in *1812 god. K 150-letiiu*, 233–54.
2. Boris S. Abalikhin, 'Pokhod russkoi armii v Pol'shu v kontse 1812–1813 gg.', in Vasilii I. Babkin, ed. *Iz istorii klassovoi i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noi bor'by narodov dorevoliutsionnoi i Sovetskoi Rossii* (Volgograd, 1975), 68 onwards; Boris S. Abalikhin, 'Russkaia armeiskaia propaganda v Pol'she v 1812–nachale 1813 g.', in Militsa V. Nechkina, ed., *Materialy XXI nauchnoi konferentsii Volgogradskogo Ped. Instituta* (Volgograd, 1966), 3–5.
3. Julian Ursyn-Niemcewicz refers to the circulation of Alexander I's aforementioned proclamation in Warsaw in his *Pamiętniki 1809–1820*, 2 vols (Poznań, 1871), 1, 422
4. Abalikhin, *Pokhod russkoi armii*, 72.
5. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, 'Zhurnal 1813 goda', in Andrei G. Tartakovskii, ed., *1812 god: Voennye dnevniki* (Moscow, 1990), 317–18; Nikolai K. Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie*, 4 vols (St Petersburg, 1897), 3, 140; [Vasilii Timkovskii], 'Pis'mo Vasiliia Fedorovicha Timkovskago (1813 goda)', *Russkii arkhiv,* 12 (1871): 2118–20. Accounts of the relatively enthusiastic reception of the Russians in the Duchy of Warsaw, 'liberated from the yoke of Napoleon', which pervade the works of Abalikhin and other Soviet historians, are not substantiated in any other sources.
6. Kutuzov to F. Osten-Saken, 2 January 1813 (21 December 1812, old style), in *M. I. Kutuzov*: *sbornik dokumentov*, 5 vols (Moscow, 1956), 5, 14.
7. Vladislav M. Glinka, A. V. Pomarnatskii, *Voennaia Galereia Zimnego Dvortsa* (Leningrad, 1981), 26; Denis V. Davydov, *Voennye zapiski* (Moscow, 1982), 241.
8. For a more complete consideration of the Temporary Supreme Council, see: J. Przygodzki, *Rada Najwyższa Tymczasowa Księstwa Warszawskiego 1813–1815. Organizacja i działalność* (Wrocław, 2002).
9. For Leon Dembowski's memoirs, see: Cracow, Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich (hereafter B. Czart.), Cracow, rękopis (manuscript) 3810, 126 and 309–10 (Leon Dembowski, 'Pamiętnik').

10. S. Askenazy, 'Polska a Europa 1813–1815 podług Dziennika Adama ks. Czartoryskiego', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 2 (1909): 15; B. Czart., rkps 6164/III (Notes in Czartoryski's journal for 1813–17, 22 and 26 March 1813)
11. E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska 1813–1815* (Warsaw, 1919), 31; J. Zdzitowiecki, *Książę minister Franciszek Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki 1778–1846* (Warsaw, 1948), 96; S. Askenazy, *Szkice i portety* (Warsaw, 1937), 135.
12. B. Czart., rkps 6164/III (Notes in Czartoryski's journal, 11, 14 and 15 April 1813).
13. 'A. Murav'ev to A. Bakunin, 25 April (13 April old style) 1813', in Andrei N. Murav'ev, *Sochineniia i pis'ma* (Irkutsk, 1986), 182–3.
14. *Gazeta Warszawska*, 14 May 1813; B. Czart., rkps 3809, 734.
15. B. Czart., rkps 6164/III (Note in Czartoryski's journal, 13 March 1813).
16. *Dodatek do Gazety Warszawskiej*, 11 May .1813.
17. B. Czart., rkps 3809, 39 (Memuary L. Dembowskiego).
18. B. Czart., rkps 6164/III (Note in Czartoryski's journal, 17 March 1813).
19. D. S. Dokhturov, 'Pis'ma D. S. Dokhturova k ego supruge', *Russkii arkhiv*, 5 (1874): 1115.
20. Ibid., 1116.
21. 'Letter by Nakwaska 22 October 1813', in J. Falkowski, *Obrazy z życia kilku ostatnich pokoleń w Polsce*, 5 vols (Poznań, 1886), 5, 504.
22. K. Koźmian, *Pamiętniki*, 3 vols (Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow, 1972), 2, 258; 'T. Kicka to Ewa Sułkowska 12 June 1813' (Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk – PTPN), Warsaw, rękopis [manuscript]' 1378, 193 (mislabelled 183); Anna Potocka, *Memoirs of the Countess Potocka* (New York, 1901) 1965), 228. In her memoirs – the popularity and wide circulation of which was ensured by their publication in France, United States and Germany – Potocka took revenge on Novosil'tsev by endowing him with some cruel characteristics: Nature has disfigured this man, as though she had planned the repulsive expression of his face to act as an advertisement to those whom his cunning and duplicity might lead into error. He squinted in a very singular manner: while one of his eyes fawned, the other searched the bottom of the soul for the thoughts one attempted to hide from him. (op cit., 228)
23. J. Staszewski, *Kaliski wysiłek zbrojny 1806–13* (Kalisz, 1931), 95.
24. Louis Alexandre Andrault de Langeron, *Mémoires de Langeron, général d'infanterie dans l'armée russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814* (Paris, 1902), 145–6.
25. Details on the arrest of the Bernardines can be found in: Moscow, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, f. 103, op. 208b, sv. 113, d. 32, l. 9; on the Winnicki affair, see RGVIA, f. 103, op. 208b, sv. 113, d. 13,. 48–49ob (the Sub-Prefect's complaint regarding his incarceration) and l. 51 (the order transferring him to Königsberg signed by Barclay de Tolly, dated 15/27 April 1813).
26. For instance, some documents have survived concerning the voluntary marriage between a Lieutenant Orlov and Miss Jakubowska from Lublin in August 1813. They were married in a Catholic ceremony, after which the bride's father petitioned the military authorities to allow them to repeat the ceremony in accordance with the Orthodox rite, to ensure that the Lieutenant would be able to avoid any undesirable consequences of the marriage: St Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, f. 1409, d. 1187, ll. 26–8 (Letter from A. A. Arakcheev to Lanskoi, 21/14 October 1813).
27. Konstantin Markovich Poltoratskii, who was promoted in September 1813 to Major-General.

28. N. Sulerzyski, *Pamietnik byłego posła ziemi pruskiej na sejm berliński* (Warsaw, 1985), 67; it seems that the memoirist only attributes a proclivity for young Russian men to local German girls.
29. Kazimierz Girtler, *Opowiadania*, 2 vols (Cracow, 1971), 1, 125.
30. É. Bourgeois, 'L'irredentisme polonais en 1813 dans le Royaume de Prusse. D'après les études et documents du grand état-major prussien', in *Pologne et la Baltique* (Paris, 1931), 54–60; Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, f. Rada Najwyższa Tymczasowa, v. 149, 322–4 (session for 21 July 1813).
31. W. Nagórska-Rudzka, 'Opinia publiczna w Księstwie Warszawskim w 1813', *Przegląd Historyczny* (1928), 1.
32. Abalikhin, *Pokhod russkoi armii*, 90.
33. Moscow, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 728, d. 919.
34. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia*, 32–3.
35. *Gazeta Warszawska*, 30 October 1813 and 11 November 1813; Koźmian, *Pamiętniki*, 2, 346.
36. B. Czart., rkps 6164/III (Note from Czartoryski's journal, 13 November 1813).
37. W. Mejbaum, 'Galicja po klęsce Napoleona', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 2 (1913): 121.

15

Heroes of the Napoleonic Wars in the Ruling Elite of the Russian Empire

Grigorii Bibikov

Fate took the Russian generals who had participated in the Napoleonic Wars in different directions. Many transferred to the civil service, became provincial governors or central government ministers, or held other top positions. This chapter aims to open up a scholarly debate on the position and role of military men in the political elite of the Russian Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century. In particular, an attempt is made to shed light on the following: first, to show how military men, particularly those who participated in the Napoleonic Wars, were represented in the ruling elite of the Russian Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century; second, to situate these findings within the broader context of the history of the ruling elite; third, and more broadly, to clarify the question of the reputation of minister-generals in society.

In the Soviet period, much was written about the role played by the experience of the so-called Patriotic War of 1812 and of the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813–14 in the evolution of the world view of those who would later become Decembrists, as encapsulated in Matvei I. Murav'ev-Apostol's famous saying: 'We were children of 1812.'[1] Although there are no studies dedicated exclusively to the involvement of members of the ruling elite in the Napoleonic Wars, the topic has been examined from various angles by a number of different historical schools of thought, and principally by historians with a focus on the governmental apparatus of autocracy in Russia.[2] Particularly significant are the works of W. Bruce Lincoln, who charted the changing composition of the empire's higher state institutions in order to evaluate the extent of 'militarization' of the political elite, and Walter M. Pintner, who studied the records of officials from the first half of the nineteenth century.

As one contemporary recalled:

> The general of the era of Nicholas I and the latter years of Alexander I's reign was of a particular type. He enjoyed unparalleled status in every sphere of our social and administrative life. There was no high post or

> position for which preference would not be given to someone with heavy silver or gold epaulettes. These epaulettes were seen as the surest guarantee of wisdom, knowledge and ability, even in areas where one might think that special training was needed. Assured of the magical power of his epaulettes, their wearer could hold his head high.[3]

This was the popular perception but statistics on appointments made to the higher state institutions allow us to sketch a general picture of the involvement of former participants in the Napoleonic Wars in the political elite of the Russian empire.

The State Council, established by Alexander I in 1801 and reformed by Mikhail M. Speranskii in 1810, was the empire's supreme organ for the enactment of laws in the nineteenth century. The State Council examined the budgets and staffs of state institutions and the drafts of the most important laws, though the tsar could ignore the opinion of the majority in his final decision. The tsar approved the Council's president and its members, who included distinguished imperial officials and all ministers. In 1810, the State Council comprised 35 people; in the era of Nicholas I, the number rose to 40–50 people. In the State Council, along with acting ministers and those managing individual offices, the heads of departments were officials who had been appointed in recognition of their former service to the state rather than their important role in political life. In 1831, General of the Infantry Aleksei P. Ermolov was made a member of the Council, but took no part in its work. A few military men became members of the Council after first having held other positions outside the army hierarchy, but this was exceptional – General of the Infantry Mikhail I. Kutuzov in 1812, General of the Cavalry Peter Wittgenstein (Petr Kh. Vitgenshtein) in 1818, and General of the Infantry Fabian Gottlieb von der Osten-Sacken (F V. Osten-Saken) in 1818.

The Committee of Ministers was established by Alexander I in 1802 and, in the words of the historian Petr A. Zaionchkovskii, occupied the 'first place among the higher institutions'.[4] Its members included, *ex officio*, all ministers, some of their deputies, the heads of State Council departments, the military governor of St Petersburg, the state comptroller, the imperial secretary, the head of the post department, the main director of transport and, from 1824, the chief of the General Staff. In the era of Nicholas I, the chief of the gendarmerie became a member of the Committee of Ministers: at that time about 25 men sat on the Committee.

The State Council and the Committee of Ministers included the top of the ruling elite of the empire. Membership of the Committee of Ministers was, however, narrower, comprising those state officials who played a key role in determining the political affairs of the empire.

Quantitative analysis (see Tables 15.1 and 15.2) shows that military men made up a high proportion of the Russian empire's ruling elite. As many as half of the higher officials had begun their service in the army

Table 15.1 Appointments to the State Council in the period between 1801 and 1881[8]

Years	Military men*	Civil servants	Of which participants in the war with rank of officer	Of which participants in the war with rank of general
1801–12**	33	29	1	9
1812–25	19	8	1	9
1825–40	27	25	2	22
1841–55***	17	32	20	5
1855–63	35	20	11	1
1864–81	30	49	–	–

Notes:
* Included among the 'military men' are officials who had reached the rank of general before becoming members of the State Council.
** Before the beginning of the war.
*** Before the death of Nicholas I.

Table 15.2 Appointments to the Committee of Ministers in the period between 1802 and 1855

Years	Military men*	Civil servants	Of which participants in the war with the rank of officer	Of which participants in the war with the rank of general
1802–12**	8[9]	24	–	3
1812–25	13	2	–	7
1825–40	14	9	3	10
1841–55***	7	9	8	3

Notes:
* Included among the 'military men' are officials who had reached the military rank of general before becoming members of the State Council.
** Before the beginning of the war.
*** Before the death of Nicholas I.

(almost exclusively in the prestigious Guards regiments) and had reached one of the military ranks of general (ranks four and above in the Table of Ranks, that is, a ranking of all military, naval and civil posts into 14 ranks, established by Peter I in 1722, which in effect determined the status of an individual in society as well as their service grade). Nevertheless, the 'militarization' of the higher state institutions was not a regular process, but increased sharply after the campaigns of 1812–14 and the Crimean War of 1853–6. Of the 79 members of the State Council included in our analysis, all of whom served in the period between 1812 and 1840, 46 were military men[5] and only 33 were civil servants, that is, men with civilian and not military ranks whose career had been spent in administrative posts. In the second half of Nicholas I's reign, however, the proportion changed:

of the new members of the State Council, 42 were civil servants and 17 were military men. An almost identical pattern can be observed for the reign of Alexander II; in the early years of his reign, the State Council was replenished more often than not by military men; and after 1864, by civil servants. Of the 549 generals who took part in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns, 48 became members of the State Council.[6] Generals made up 30 per cent (38 of 124) of the members of the Senate, the highest judicial organ in the empire.[7] The statistics for appointments to the Committee of Ministers show a similar pattern, but with particular features. Before 1812, the number of military men heading ministries and central offices was significantly fewer than the number of civil servants (24 military men as opposed to eight civil servants), but the situation was reversed after the Napoleonic Wars. In the era of Nicholas I, the number of military men in the Committee of Ministers increased further still. Thus, the relative proportion of military men increased nearer the top of the bureaucratic pyramid.

The largest influx of Napoleonic War participants into the ruling elite occurred in the first half of the reign of Nicholas I, when appointments made to the State Council were mostly of military men who had reached the rank of general in the years 1805–15. 22 generals who had participated in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns of 1813–14 became members of the State Council and ten became members of the Committee of Ministers. In 1841–63, members of the State Council included 31 who had participated in the 1812–14 campaigns as military officers and six of those had been generals. In total, 30 of Nicholas I's ministers had been participants in the major battles of 1812–14.

In addition to the participants in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns included in the table, three members of the State Council took part in the campaigns of 1805–7 and another three members fought in 1812 in Napoleon's army (with the rank of general). Not included here are nine members of the State Council, all members of the imperial family, who were appointed at a young age. It should also be noted that three of the 'non-military' members of the State Council had commanded provincial temporary militias in 1812.

Not included in the table is one member of the Committee of Ministers, a member of the imperial family, who was appointed to the Committee at a young age. Count Pavel A. Stroganov's career path was exceptional. In the early years of the nineteenth century, he was a chamberlain and entered the Committee of Ministers in 1802. In 1807 he transferred to military service, in 1812 he received the rank of lieutenant-general and became one of the heroes of the campaigns of 1812–14.

Thus, from the very beginning of Nicholas I's reign, a significant proportion of the ruling elite was made up of military men who had participated in the Napoleonic Wars with the rank of general. Having replaced the majority

of Alexander I's ministers,[10] the young tsar pinned his hopes on army generals who had seen active service. He hoped that men with military experience might be able to bring attitudes towards discipline and hierarchy into the civilian world, since, as Nicholas I himself said, 'there is order in the army'. It is characteristic that, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the governors in the Russian provinces were also largely drawn from military men, which 'can be attributed to Nicholas I's policy of the militarization of the state apparatus'.[11] Governors were appointed, first and foremost, from the prestigious Guards regiments, having been given the rank of major-general on their transfer to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[12]

The overall influence of military generals on government policy was significantly greater than their average representation in the higher state institutions might suggest. The tsar's most trusted circle, in which key political decisions were made, was made up of men from precisely this background.[13] This circle began to form even before Nicholas I's accession to the throne. The diary that the Grand Duke kept in 1822–25,[14] though extremely laconic, allows us to sketch a picture of his entourage in those years. It included members of the imperial family, high-ranked courtiers, and military men. Commanders from the Guards regiments and divisions who had served on the staff of the Guards dominated the latter group. Among them were future associates of the tsar: Ivan F. Paskevich, Alexander von Benckendorff (A. Kh. Benkendorf), Aleksei F. Orlov, Illarion V. Vasil'chikov, and Hans Karl von Diebitsch (I. I. Dibich). It is characteristic that among those with whom the Grand Duke kept company at the time, there were almost none of Alexander I's ministers. Many historians note that Nicholas I had had a largely military education and had been commander of a Guards brigade until his coronation. The army was therefore 'the only area of state that he trusted and had any inclination for'.[15]

There are no studies dedicated exclusively to the history of the ruling elite in pre-reform Russia, but many contemporaries wrote about the generals who made up the inner circle of the tsar's advisers. Nicholas I's own correspondence of the period 1838–9 shows that the statesmen to whom he was closest included Benckendorff, Petr M. Volkonskii, Pavel D. Kiselev, Aleksandr I. Chernyshev, Aleksei F. Orlov, Ivan F. Paskevich, Karl Nesselrode (K. V. Nessel'rode), Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, and, to a lesser extent, Illarion V. Vasil'chikov and Egor F. Kankrin (George von Cancrin).[16] Most of these minister-generals were personal friends of the tsar. When they were in the capital, Benckendorff, Paskevich and Orlov visited the tsar almost every day to discuss matters of state, accompanied him on trips, and dined with the imperial family.[17] Benckendorff, Orlov and Vasil'chikov were with the tsar during the Decembrist uprising, and subsequently sat on the Investigative Committee on the uprising in 1826. The Bavarian envoy to Russia wrote that 'the tsar calls Count Orlov his friend, addresses him accordingly, and confides in him his innermost intentions, on which the count then

acts'.[18] Vasil'chikov, 'in his capacity as president of the State Council, was often rather blunt with the sovereign, regularly disagreeing with him quite openly, but this earned him the tsar's eternal respect.'[19]

For the duration of the tsar's reign, his inner circle comprised a small number of people. The core of these advisers, already in place in the early years of his reign, went on to define the direction of his domestic and foreign policies up until the Crimean War. In the late 1840s, Nicholas I remarked: 'In twenty-four years, I have lost so many of those close to me that I now have great difficulty finding someone I can trust.'[20] Historians note that, at the time of Nicholas I's coronation, the average age of a minister was 64.5 years. By 1830, after the marked overhaul of the elite, it fell to 56.5, rising again to 65 by 1854.[21]

A closer analysis of the careers of the generals illustrates these points.

Prince Illarion V. Vasil'chikov (1775–1847). In 1812, he commanded a cavalry corps, being promoted to lieutenant-general in October of that year. In 1833, he headed the State Council's Department of Laws. In 1838, he became chair of the State Council and of the Committee of Ministers.

Prince (Serene Highness) Ivan F. Paskevich (1782–1856). In 1812–14, he commanded a brigade and a division and, in October 1813, was promoted to lieutenant-general. From 1829, he was a field marshal; from 1831, Viceroy of the Kingdom of Poland; and from 1832, president of the State Council's Department of the Affairs of the Kingdom of Poland.

Count Alexander Benckendorff (Aleksandr Khristoforovich Benkendorf) (1781–1844). In 1812–14, he fought in the 'flying detachment' of Ferdinand von Wintzingerode (F. F. Vintsingerode), heading the vanguard of Mikhail S. Vorontsov's corps. In July 1812 he was promoted to major-general. In 1826, he was put in charge of the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery and the Corps of Gendarmes.

Count Vasilii V. Levashov (1783–1848) fought in the Chevalier Guard Regiment in 1812 and was promoted to major-general. From 1816, he was head of the First Cuirassier Division; from 1832, military governor of Kiev, head of the civil administration, and governor-general of Podolia (Podol'e) and Volhynia (Volyn') provinces; from 1839, chair of the State Council's Department of State Economy; from 1847, chair of the State Council and Committee of Ministers.

Prince (Serene Highness) Aleksandr I. Chernyshev (1785–1857), commander of the famous 'flying' detachment in 1813, was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1814. From 1827 until 1852, he was head of the Ministry of War. From 1848, he was chair of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers.

Prince (Serene Highness) Prince Petr M. Volkonskii (1776–1852), Chief of the General Staff, was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1813. From 1826, he was Minster for the Imperial Court and Appanages.

Count Karl von Toll (1777–1842), quartermaster-general of the First Army in 1812, was made quartermaster-general of the General Staff in 1813, keeping this position until after the war. He was a lieutenant-general from 1813. In 1833, he was appointed head of the Department of Transport and Public Buildings.

Count Arsenii Andreevich Zakrevskii (1786–1865). He participated in the major battles of 1812–15. A major-general and adjutant-general from 1813, he was made duty general of the General Staff in 1815. In 1828–31, he served as Minister of Internal Affairs; in 1848–55, he was Governor-General of Moscow.

Some of Nicholas I's closest advisers had been direct participants in the Napoleonic Wars but, because of their age, did not reach the rank of general before the end of the conflict:

Prince Aleksei F. Orlov (1786–1861). He participated in the campaign of 1805–7, the Patriotic War and foreign campaigns, by the end of which he had reached the rank of colonel. After the war, he commanded the Horse Guards regiment. From 1844, he was chief of the Corps of Gendarmes and head of the Third Section; from 1856, president of the State Council and Committee of Ministers.

Prince (Serene Highness) Aleksandr S. Menshikov (1787–1869). By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he had reached the rank of colonel, serving subsequently on the General Staff. At the beginning of the 1820s, he decided to study seamanship. From 1828, for 25 years, he headed the Naval Office of the Russian Empire. From 1853, he was commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces in the Crimea.

Count Pavel D. Kiselev (1788–1872). A participant in the campaigns of 1812–14, he finished the war as a cavalry captain (*rittmeister*) and an *aide-de-camp* to the tsar. In 1815, he was promoted to colonel. From 1818, he was chief of staff of the Second Army. In 1829, he was made plenipotentiary representative of the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1835, he headed the Fifth Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery and, in 1837, the newly created Ministry of State Property.

Some members of Alexander I's entourage continued to have importance under his successor: Diebitsch (Dibich) (1785–1831), one of the best staff officers of the Napoleonic era headed the General Staff from 1824; Prince Dmitrii V. Golitsyn (1771–1844) was Military Governor-General of Moscow from 1820; and above all Count Egor F. Kankrin (1774–1845) was appointed intendant-general of the field army in 1813 and remained in the position after the war. In 1815, he was promoted to lieutenant-general, and in 1823, he was made Minister of Finance. Almost all of the aristocratic titles mentioned were not granted until Nicholas I had come to power, which provides further evidence of his favour towards these men.

What do these people have in common? By and large, we are not talking about functionaries in the Ministry of War, but generals who had seen active service in the campaigns of 1812–14, and who rapidly advanced through the ranks. Paskevich and Vorontsov were promoted to lieutenant-general in 1813 at the age of 31; Chernyshev was promoted in 1814 at the age of 28; Vasil'chikov was promoted in 1812 at the age of 36. Paskevich, Benckendorff, Orlov, Levashov, and Vasil'chikov were all well known for their bravery in battle, while Diebitsch and Toll enjoyed deserved reputations as the best staff officers in the Russian army.

Nevertheless, at the time of their appointment, many of these military men already had extensive experience of service in the civil offices. These posts reflected the experience and personal preferences of the military generals. Thus, Benckendorff became interested in the establishment of a secret police service during his service in France, and in 1821 put forward the idea of reorganizing this office in Russia. As early as 1816, Kiselev proposed a programme to abolish serfdom. Kankrin excelled as intendant-general of the Russian army, and Menshikov decided to study seamanship. A period of service in the staff of the armies and of the Guards corps became an important platform for launching a career in the civil service. A detailed analysis of the social origin, education, and career paths of the Nicholas I-era minister-generals lies beyond the scope of this article. However, a preliminary analysis of the records allows us to conclude that a significant proportion of generals represented the titular aristocracy, the majority having served in the prestigious Guards regiments: the Semenovskii Guards (Benckendorff, Diebitsch, Volkonskii), the Preobrazhenskii Guards (Paskevich, Golitsyn, Viceroy to the Caucasus Mikhail S. Vorontsov), and the Chevaliers Guards (Chernyshev, Levashov, Kiselev). Indeed, service in the Guards regiments was an excellent platform for a career, including establishing informal contacts with members of the imperial family, the highest dignitaries and adjutant-generals.

The Napoleonic Wars had a significant influence on the generals (*generalitet*) of the Russian army but this should be the subject of separate research. In 1819, Kankrin wrote to Kiselev: 'We must start every new war by looking back at our experience of previous wars, so that we do not always have to take on its trials afresh, like a young man in life… These days, the military is beginning to imagine that it won the last war by throwing away the rulebook.'[22] But as late as early 1854, when a military confrontation with a coalition of European powers seemed inevitable, Field Marshal Paskevich gave Nicholas I the following message:

> Napoleon's unquenchable desire for power made it clear that 1812 was inevitable, giving us half a year to prepare. Even in 1810, we were able to begin forming new regiments; all of 1811 was spent preparing reserves and magazines in the rear and thus, in 1812, having begun the retreat to

> Moscow, we were able to replenish our losses with reserves. Fortunately, our flanks were open and all of England's resources were at our disposal. Russia was able to achieve glory in its fight against Napoleon… This time, circumstances have changed so fast that we have not had time to prepare.[23]

Four decades later, the experience of the Napoleonic Wars was fresh in the minds of the generals who had participated in them, continuing to serve as the basis on which they made sense of the grand strategy of the Russian empire.

As early as the 1810s, many of Nicholas I's future ministers were already in close contact with one another. Andrei P. Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, who served in the Ministry of State Property, wrote the following in his famous work, *Graf P. D. Kiselev i ego vremia* (*Count P. D. Kiselev and His Times*):

> It was then that Adjutant-General A. A. Zakrevskii was appointed duty general, a man very close to Kiselev: they addressed each other in the familiar [form] and sent each other the most heartfelt letters. Kiselev had a similar relationship with Prince A. S. Menshikov, the manager of affairs under Prince Volkonskii, and A. F. Orlov, whom even then Tsar Alexander I had singled out and brought close. Furthermore, from the time of his appointment as an imperial *aide-de-camp*, Kiselev became close to P. M. Volkonskii. All of these figures, very different in terms of character, had one thing in common: an honesty and a desire to serve the state.[24]

Of course, there are no grounds to think of these people as identical in their attitudes. In particular, several of them were disrespectful, if not downright dismissive, of the civil service, especially the court service. Aleksei P. Ermolov, who was close to this group, once complained to a friend: 'Rumour has it that I am being made, as they are all saying, a minister for war… I have not long left to live, and if someone wants to take my place, let them put me wherever they want, only spare me the ministries.' Denis V. Davydov offered the following advice to one of his military comrades: 'Let the frenzy of the court pass you by. It has swallowed up so many people whom I know and once respected.'[25] It is probably not coincidental that neither Ermolov nor Davydov became statesmen, and that both retired in the reign of Nicholas I.

The predominance of military men in the higher state offices did not escape the notice of contemporaries, one of them mentioning it in his diary of 1843:

> Looking over the list of the members of the Committee of Ministers and State Council the other day, I was surprised to see just how many figures in our administration were military men or, at least, wore a military uniform. In this, as in much else, is evident the military character of our administration and the preference that we show in all matters to the military over the civil service.[26]

Given the influence of generals who had been on active service, it is interesting to consider how the phenomenon is situated within the broader context of the history of the ruling elite and of the development of a system to train staff for the civil service. In the eighteenth century and, to a significant degree, even under Alexander I, the higher offices had been dominated by grandees (*vel'mozhi*), aristocrats by birth. In 1755, only 22 per cent of the highest bureaucrats had begun their careers in the civil service, and 'almost the same type of career was predominant even in the local institutions'.[27] In 1730, only five per cent of the presidents of the colleges had not begun their service in the army. Service in the Guards regiments was considered the best preparation even for managing the civilian institutions. The division between military and civil service was not rigid: 68 per cent of the highest-ranked officials had commanded military units during their military service, and transfer from military to civil service would often happen several times during a career. In the mid-eighteenth century, 67 per cent of employees in the higher and central institutions had not studied at educational establishments.[28]

Walter M. Pintner, who studied the Russian bureaucracy of the first half of the nineteenth century, isolated the three main groups that made up the ruling elite: court circles, generals, and professional officials. The civil service was undergoing significant changes at this time. With the establishment in the early nineteenth century of a network of universities, the elite Alexander (Tsarskoe Selo) lycée and, in 1834, the Imperial School of Jurisprudence in St Petersburg, the group of 'professional bureaucrats' had grown rapidly and begun to dominate the higher ranks of the civil service by the middle of the nineteenth century. The government's efforts to professionalize the civil service also had profound consequences. The famous decree of 1809, 'On the Rules for Awarding Ranks in the Civil Service and on the Examinations in the Sciences for Appointment to the Ranks of Collegiate Assessor and State Councillor', put forward by Mikhail M. Speranskii, and also the decree of 1833 requiring officials to know basic grammar and arithmetic, among other things, gave graduates of the universities and of the lycée at Tsarskoe Selo a major advantage in the competition for entry to the civil service.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the previously widespread practice of signing up the offspring of aristocratic families for service when they were still children was curtailed. A minimum age restriction was put in place in 1827: 14 years of age. As such, the average age of entry to the civil service rose from 13.5 years of age in 1790–9 to 20.3 in 1830–9.[29] Students at the universities included, alongside aristocrats, the children of modest provincial noblemen and representatives of other social classes. Unlike in Prussia, entry to the civil service was not associated with any onerous financial or other costs. In the 1820s–50s, the qualitative and quantitative growth of the professional bureaucracy accelerated rapidly, the civil service roughly quadrupling in size between 1801 and 1855.

As a result, by 1850, 67 per cent of those in the ranks of the higher bureaucracy (ranks one to four according to the Table of Ranks) had studied at university or lycée level and only 14 per cent came from court circles. The proportion of military men in administrative positions was also falling steadily. Of those in the first five classes in the Table of Ranks in 1794, 58 per cent had begun their service in the army, and in 1855 only 25 per cent (for ranks five to eight, the proportion falls from 36 per cent to 13 per cent).[30] As Richard Wortman noted, professional qualities held ever-greater weight over status in the appointments made to positions in the office of the Ministry of Justice.[31] The same tendency was observed at the level of local institutions.

Bruce W. Lincoln examined the formation of the so-called 'liberal' or 'enlightened' bureaucracy in his monograph on the subject. As a famous representative of this group said:

> ... their ideal was – to instil truth in the areas of life in which they had to operate… They saw themselves as the instruments of morality. These people were deeply offended by any injustice that they encountered; but this feeling of offence did not lead them to despair, since they believed in the power of truth… And this is why these people were in the front ranks… They got to know one another, got along like old friends.[32]

At the same time, the second quarter of the nineteenth century is marked by a further intensification of ministerial power, and its concentration in the figure of the minister and the reduced role played by ministries as collective institutions for making political and administrative decisions. This explains the attempt to make the administration more efficient and flexible, and to reject the system of ministries largely divorced from their ministers. The other side of this process was the emasculation of regular institutions, as the tsar's faith in his ministers became more important than formal status and individual departments. Nicholas I saw his ministers principally as his adjutants, calling, for example, Kiselev, Minister of State Property 'chief of staff of the peasant section'.[33]

As a result, the higher bureaucracy was gradually professionalized in the first half of the nineteenth century. The State Council and the heads of the ministries were dominated by generals of the 1770–80 generation, titled aristocrats who had been educated at home and had begun their service in the Guards regiments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but the ministerial departments were more often headed by officials with higher education, who had begun their careers in the 1820s. The former group, however, determined government policy. One could even argue that Nicholas I saw the appointment of generals to the higher administrative posts as a counterweight to the increased role of the professional bureaucracy.

In the years immediately after the conflict, the generals of the Patriotic War of 1812 enjoyed deservedly wide popularity in all segments of Russian

society, preserving something of the lustre of heroes of antiquity in the Russian imagination. For this reason, the conclusion drawn by one contemporary historian seems entirely correct: 'during Nicholas I's reign, the highest echelons of power were dominated by people of the generation of veterans of 1812, bathed in the glory of the victory over Napoleon, whose high moral authority was put to good use in raising the youth of the day in the spirit of limitless faith in the regime.'[34] For the more conservative members of Russian society, the war symbolized the triumph of the principle of autocracy. In the 1830s, interest in the history and memory of the war intensified, becoming part of the government's idea of the unity of altar, throne, and people.[35] This was how one contemporary wrote about Paskevich: 'The general, though still young, but having earned enormous fame as one of heroes the of the Patriotic War, was wonderfully modest, even reticent, as reflected in every inch of his beautiful appearance, all of which endeared Paskevich to his troops and to society.'[36]

While the treatment of the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Russian society of the nineteenth century is not the main subject of this chapter, I should like to make a further observation.

In the educated society of St Petersburg, the adulation of the semi-legendary models of the heroes of 1812 soon gave way, as early as the 1830s, to a rather critical attitude towards those of them who had become statesmen. Given the country's growing professional bureaucracy, it was increasingly seen as an anachronism for a general to become a minister. The diary of Baron Modest Andreevich Korff (1800–76) is of particular interest in this respect. After studying at the lycée in Tsarskoe Selo, he found a position in the office of the Minister of Justice, subsequently obtaining a position in the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery under Mikhail M. Speranskii, the Prime Minister, and, under Alexander II, became head of the Second Section. Korff belonged to the elite of professional officials. He is best known for his caustic, sometimes spiteful, comments about his contemporaries, but it is the general tone of his comments that is significant. This is what he had to say about Count von Toll:

> Those who had followed his military career, and seen him on the battlefield, were unanimous in recognizing him as one of the leading generals of our century. With the fearlessness of a lion, he was a brilliant strategist, very knowledgeable in tactical matters, and had all of the fire, the genius, of a true leader.

In 1833, Toll was made chief administrator of Transport and Public Buildings and, according to Korff: 'in his new position, he sullied his former glory… Despised by his subordinates for his bad temper and coarse manner, led by the whims of his favourites, and deceived on all sides, Toll was living proof

of the fact that it is possible to be simultaneously an excellent commander and an incompetent administrator.'[37] This is a rather typical example of how the image of the 'hero' changed in the eyes of an educated St Petersburg functionary. Boris N. Chicherin said something rather similar:

> Count Zakrevskii entered the ranks in the reign of Alexander I, and enjoyed the reputation of a wise, practical and courteous man. Reading his correspondence with Count Kiselev, printed in the latter's biography, one cannot help but ask: can this really be the same Count Zakrevskii who later became governor-general of Moscow? With a new tsar, and new demands, he underwent a transformation and, in 1848, he arrived in Moscow the perfect type of a Nicholas I-era general, the embodiment of the grossest arrogance, ignorance and abuse of power.[38]

Some officials, while remembering their superiors fondly, were nevertheless blunt in their assessments of their administrative abilities. Aleksei F. L'vov, who served under Benckendorff from 1826, wrote the following in his memoirs: 'He was brave, clever, and clear and direct with other people, it would have been impossible for him knowingly to do wrong, he was good to his subordinates, if rather bad-tempered, but he was ignorant of affairs; in fact, I would go as far as to say that he was completely incapable of conducting affairs.'[39] A. Ia. Storozhenko, who knew Paskevich well recalled:

> He should not have compared himself to Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Kutuzov, let alone have deemed their victories – even their military ones – to be worth less than his own. Indeed, in doing so, he does not elevate himself but, by repeatedly insisting on the genius of his ideas, undermines his true merit as a man who achieved a great deal.[40]

The generals of 1812 who did not enter the civil service, however, were able to rest on their laurels. Korff wrote:

> Yet another of the heroes of our national glory has died, a Cossack famous in our military chronicles, General of Cavalry Count Vasilii Vasil'evich Orlov-Denisov… Abroad, he flew everywhere with his detachments of brave Don Cossacks like a whirlwind, striking and triumphing wherever he went.

He also commented favourably on the 'first among the stars of 1812 who was still with us and has died: Prince Petr Khristianovich Vitgenshtein [Wittgenstein], the defender of St Petersburg'.[41]

The censor, government official, and famous diarist Aleksandr V. Nikitenko wrote that 'young men who have worn a military uniform with

heavy epaulettes consider themselves to be statesmen on a par with the Metternichs and Talleyrands',[42] and came to an uncomfortable conclusion:

> At first, they were educated in the spirit of tough military discipline, subsequently imposing it on their own troops. But they then imported the same principles of unconditional obedience to the management of peaceful, civilian society. Their behaviour, however, only furthered the cause of the government, which, it seemed, had set itself the task of disciplining the state, that is, to ensure that no man in it would think or act out of line. By virtue of this, so to speak, barrack-like system, the primary concern of every general, whatever outpost of the administration he had been called upon to lead, was to strike the greatest fear into the hearts of his subordinates. He would thus frown and glare, speak sharply, and use any excuse – or even none at all – to give everyone and anyone a dressing down.[43]

A literary critic and governor-general's deputy for special assignments shared this scepticism:

> Our grandees [*vel'mozhi*] – the Stroganovs, the Iusupovs, and a few others – were all of the Catherine era and still bore the marks of that type in the reign of Alexander. But under Nicholas I, although there were some important people who had come from nothing, as under Paul, there were no more grandees… These people made riches for themselves; they had no noble passion for the arts; other classes of people did not see in them the intermediaries between themselves and the highest power.[44]

The philosopher and man of letters Aleksei S. Khomiakov, leader of the Moscow circle of Slavophiles, mentioned the military men explicitly in his invective against Nicholas I's system:

> Do these various generals and even admirals… really not understand anything about the current state of affairs? Do they really not understand that to silence independent thought is the equivalent of prohibiting the manufacture of gunpowder in the run-up to a war for fear that it might fall into the hands of mutineers?[45]

In the 1870s, the Rector of Moscow University and eminent historian, Sergei M. Solov'ev, made the following judgement on pre-reform Russia: 'The military men, like a stick, accustomed not to discuss, but to execute [orders], and able to train others to execute [orders] without discussion, were considered as the best, the most able superiors, irrespective of whether they had any ability....'[46]

Educated St Petersburg society made a symbolic distinction between the heroes of the Napoleonic Wars who had continued their military careers

or retired (Barclay de Tolly, Raevskii, Davydov, Ermolov, Wittgenstein) and those who had entered the ruling elite. As the British historian Dominic Lieven writes:

> ... there were [...] important differences between Wellington and the Russian leaders. Although the duke had many political enemies in the 1820s and 1830s, by the time he died he was a national icon. The same was far from true of the Russian generals who lived as long as him.[47]

A shadow fell over the Nicholas I-era minister-generals in educated society, where they stopped being heroes even before their death. The non-military reputation of the generals who played a part in Nicholas I's government has outweighed their military reputation. They are all tarnished in the eyes of their descendants and researchers. After Russia's battles in the Crimean War and the subsequent reaction against Nicholas I's regime in society, their names became closely associated with the fate of that tsar and his politics. The generals became symbolic remnants of a bygone era. From the late nineteenth century onwards, liberal – and subsequently Soviet – historians have effectively excluded Nicholas I's ministers from the list of the heroes of the Napoleonic Wars.

Notes

1. Liia Ia. Pavlova, *Dekabristy – uchastniki voin 1805–1814 gg.* (Moscow, 1979); Anastasiia G. Gotovtseva, '1812 god i zagranichnye pokhody v otsenke dekabrista Matveia Murav'eva-Apostola', in *Epokha 1812 goda v sud'bakh Rossii i Evropy: materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii (Moskva, 8–11 oktiabria 2012 g.)* (Moscow, 2013), 421–28.
2. These issues were dealt with in the early twentieth-century works celebrating the 100-year anniversary of the higher and central state institutions, and also in the biographies of individual statesmen. The following works merit particular attention: John Shelton Curtis, *The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825–1855* (Durham, NC, 1965); Petr A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978); W. Bruce Lincoln, 'The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers', *Russian Review*, 34, 3 (1975): 308–23; Idem, *Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias* (Bloomington, IN and London: 1978); Walter M. Pintner, 'The Russian Higher Civil Service on the Eve of the "Great Reforms"', *Journal of Social History*, 8, 3 (1975): 55–68; Walter Pintner and Don Karl Rooney, eds., *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980).
3. Aleksandr V. Nikitenko, *Zapiski i dnevnik*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2005), 118.
4. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii*, 134.
5. Here and subsequently, the term 'military man' is used to designate officials who reached the rank of general in military service (the following translations have been used throughout: 'military man' for *voennyi*, 'civil servant' for *grazhdanskii*, 'official' for *chinovnik*).

6. Calculated from the following publications: V. M. Bezotosnyi et al., 'Slovar' russkikh generalov, uchastnikov boevykh deistvii protiv armii Napoleona Bonaparta v 1812–1815 gg.' *Rossiiskii arkhiv: Istoriia Otechestva v svidetel'stvakh i dokumentakh XVIII – XX vv.)*, vol. 7 (1996): 288–645; *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda. Entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 2004).
7. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii*, 138.
8. The data have been compiled from the analysis given in the following reference works: Denis N. Shilov, *Gosudarstvennye deiateli Rossiiskoi imperi: glavy vysshikh i tsentral'nykh uchrezhdenii 1802–1917* (St Petersburg, 2001); Denis N. Shilov and Iu. A. Kuz'min, *Chleny Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Rossiiskoi imperii. 1801–1906: biobibliograficheskii spravochnik* (St Petersburg, 2006); *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda: entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 2004); *Zagranichnye pokhody rossiiskoi armii, 1813–1815 gody: entsiklopediia*, 2 vols (Moscow, 2011).
9. Included among the members of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers are military and naval ministers, and also the heads of the military and naval staffs, 15 men in total in 1801–55. There was not a tradition in the nineteenth century of appointing civil servants to these positions. The military and naval ministers, however, unquestionably became part of the ruling elite of the empire.
10. Thus, Major General Alesksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii made the following observation on his arrival at Petersburg in 1829: 'I spent only ten days more in St Petersburg and found everything much changed; most of those who had had influence in the time of Alexander were there no longer, their places taken by others:' Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, 'Zapiski A. I. Mikhailovskogo-Danilevskogo. 1829 god', *Russkaia starina*, 7 (1893): 177.
11. O. V. Moriakova, *Sistema mestnogo samoupravleniia v Rossii pri Nikolae I* (Moscow, 1998), 42. According to Moriakova's statistics, based on her study of the administrative cadres in the 15 provinces of central European Russia at the time of Nicholas I, 64.5 per cent of those appointed as civil governors were from a military background.
12. Petr A. Zaionchkovskii, 'Gubernskaia administratsiia nakanune Krymskoi voiny', *Voprosy istorii*, 9 (1975): 38.
13. For more detail on this, see Lincoln, 'The Ministers of Nicholas I', 159–66.
14. *Zapisnye knizhki velikogo kniazia Nikolaia Pavlovicha: 1822–1825* (Moscow, 2013).
15. Dominic Lieven, *Aristokratiia v Evrope, 1815–1914* (St Petersburg, 2000), 264.
16. See Larisa G. Zakharova and Sergei V. Mironenko, eds., *Perepiska tsesarevicha Aleksandra Nikolaevicha s imperatorom Nikolaem I, 1838–1839* (Moscow, 2008).
17. See, for example, Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, 165; *Perepiska tsesarevicha Aleksandra Nikolaevicha s imperatorom Nikolaem*, 48, 130, 142, 145–9, 158–60.
18. Otto de Bray, 'Imperator Nikolai I i ego spodvizhniki (vospominaniia gr. Ottona de Bre. 1849–1852)', *Russkaia starina*, 109, 1 (1902): 128.
19. Petr M. Zaionchkovskii, *Vostochnaia voina v sviazi s sovremennoi ei politicheskoi obstanovkoi*, 2 vols (Moscow, 2002), 1, 62.
20. Modest A. Korf, *Zapiski* (Moscow, 2003), 493.
21. Lincoln, 'The Ministers of Nicholas I', 320.
22. Ivan N. Bozherianov, *Graf Egor Frantsevich Kankrin, ego zhizn', literaturnye trudy i dvadtsatiletniaia deiatel'nost' upravleniia Ministerstvom finansov* (St Petersburg, 1897), 40.
23. As cited in Alexei A. Krivopalov, 'Fel'dmarshal I. F. Paskevich i problema strategii Rossii v Vostochnoi voine 1853–1856 gg', *Russkii sbornik: issledovaniia po istorii Rossii*, 7 (Moscow, 2009): 254.

24. Andrei P. Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Graf P. D. Kiselev i ego vremia*, 3 vols (St Petersburg, 1882), 1, 21.
25. As cited in Mikhail A. Davydov, *Oppozitsiia ego Velichestva* (Moscow, 2005), 62–3.
26. Modest A. Korf, *Dnevnik. god 1843-i* (Moscow, 2004), 279.
27. Richard Wortman, *Vlastiteli i sudii: Razvitie pravovogo soznaniia v imperatorskoi Rossii* (Moscow, 2004), 67–8.
28. Brenda Meehan-Waters, 'Social and Career Characteristics of the Administrative Elite, 1689–1761', in Pintner, *Russian Officialdom*, 76–105.
29. Walter M. Pintner, 'The Evolution of Civil Officialdom, 1755–1855', in Pintner, *Russian Officialdom*, 222. Considered here are those who served, subsequently reaching one of the highest four ranks according to the Table of Ranks. For other officials the average age of entry to the service was higher.
30. Walter M. Pintner, 'The Russian Higher Civil Service on the Eve of the "Great Reforms"', *Journal of Social History*, 8, 3 (1975): 63–6.
31. Wortman, *Vlastiteli i sudii*, 121–4.
32. 'Pamiati A. P. Zablotskogo', *Russkaia starina*, no. 2 (1882): 543–4.
33. W. Bruce Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform. Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861* (DeKalb, IL, 1986), 7.
34. M. M. Shevchenko, 'Istoricheskoe znachenie politicheskoi sistemy imperatora Nikolaia I: novaia tochka zreniia', in Liubov' I. Skripkina, ed., *XIX vek v istorii Rossii: sovremennye kontseptsii istorii Rossii XIX veka i ikh muzeinaia interpretatsiia* (Moscow, 2007), 288.
35. See, for example: Alexander M. Martin, 'Russia and the legacy of 1812', in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 2006); Vadim S. Parsamov, 'K genezisu politicheskogo diskursa dekabristov; ideologema "narodnaia voin"', in Oksana I. Kiianskaia, Mikhail P. Odesskii, eds., *Dekabristy: aktual'nye problemy i novye podkhody* (Moscow, 2008), 159–94.
36. Aleksandr S. Gangeblov, 'Vospominaniia', *Russkii arkhiv*, book 2, no. 6 (1886): 258.
37. Modest A. Korf, *Zapiski* (Moscow, 2003), 175–7.
38. Boris N. Chicherin, *Moskva sorokovykh godov* (Moscow, 1997), 77.
39. Alexei F. L'vov, 'Iz vospominanii Alexeia Fedorovicha L'vova', *Russkii arkhiv*, no. 4 (1884): 240–1.
40. A. Ia. Storozhenko, 'Otryvki iz vospominanii', in *Storozhenki. Famil'nyi arkhiv*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1902), 424, 428.
41. Korf, *Dnevnik. God 1843-i* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 93, 240.
42. Nikitenko, *Zapiski i dnevnik*, vol. 1, 360.
43. Ibid., 118.
44. Mikhail A. Dmitriev, *Glavy iz vospominanii moei zhizni* (Moscow, 1998), 502.
45. Aleksei S. Khomiakov, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 8 vols (Moscow: 1900), 8, 179.
46. Sergei M. Solov'ev, 'Iz zapisok S. M. Solov'eva', in *Sorokovye gody XIX veka v memuarakh sovremenikov. Dokumnetakh epokhi i khudozhestvennykh proizvedeniakh* (Moscow, 1958), 26.
47. Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London, 2010).

16

The 1812 War and the Civilizing Process in Russia

Alexander M. Martin

When Russian memoirists after about 1850 looked back on the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which was as far back as living memory extended, they detected a change in the way middling and elite Russians thought and behaved. The priest Filipp F. Ismailov, recalling his own childhood and education, wrote that:

> There was much that was dark [in the early nineteenth century], but at the time, Russia itself was dark. Coarseness, foolishness, and vulgarity prevailed in everything.[1]

Nikolai P. Vishniakov (born 1844) noted something similar when he recalled his parents. His father, born around 1781, had grown up in a merchant *milieu* that had internalized the coarse manners, the anti-intellectualism, and the culture of despotism, grovelling and lawlessness that pervaded the entire serf-based Russian social order. Vishniakov's mother, born around 1808, also came from the merchantry, but unlike her husband she read Russian literature and 'retained in her mental outlook the spirit of the age of Karamzin'. Hence she brought a certain culture into the home:

> She had a penchant for all that was sensitive and sentimental … these were the germs of that humaneness that was missing in the average merchant family, which was absorbed entirely with material considerations. My mother had tremendous influence on the character of my father and did him considerable good.[2]

Ismailov, Vishniakov and many of their contemporaries felt that since the late eighteenth century, Russians had become more refined, restrained, inhibited, humane and calculating. They had become, to use Norbert Elias's term, 'civilized'. Elias argues, in his classic *The Civilizing Process*, that a change occurred in the European upper classes from the Renaissance period. With the rise of centralized monarchical states, formerly independent

feudal knights became royal courtiers. A monarchical court was a far more complex social and political system than a feudal castle, so courtiers had to learn sensibilities and behaviours that suited their new environment: refined manners, to help them modulate their emotional self-expression and restrain their physical impulses; a lowered threshold of repugnance with regard to filth, violence and coarse behaviour; and a style of reasoning that encouraged a nuanced analysis of other people's psychology and of the causal linkages among seemingly remote events. This 'civilizing process' initially touched the nobles and bourgeois who were connected with the court, but by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it spread more widely throughout society.[3]

These ideas have been developed, and sometimes modified, by many subsequent historians. In particular, the mechanism driving the civilizing process has been the subject of much discussion. In Elias's view, it operated from the top down: 'civilized' behaviour served the needs of courtiers engaged in competition for social status, and from the court it spread downward through a process of emulation. Others have proposed alternative interpretations. Some have argued that new behaviours and sensibilities arose independently in the middle classes as a result of improved material living conditions. According to others, the rise of modern capitalism, by creating economic processes of unprecedented complexity, accustomed people to analysing the world around them in increasingly sophisticated ways.[4]

By the late eighteenth century, the forces of the civilizing process had penetrated Russian society in ways too numerous to be analysed here in detail. For example, greater delicacy of feeling and manners was encouraged by the spread of education and reading; everyday violence receded somewhat thanks to the abolition of the death penalty and the exemption of certain social strata from corporal punishment; and the spread of consumer goods made people's material life a little less coarse and uncomfortable.

In my view, the 1812 war forms an important moment in the unfolding of the civilizing process in Russia. Drawing principally on the experience of civilians in Moscow, this chapter will propose three arguments: the war *accelerated* the civilizing process by changing how Russians analysed their world; by disrupting the normal patterns of urban life, it *revealed* a civilizing process that was already unfolding; and, by undermining the domination of society and culture by the aristocratic elite, it *inflected the trajectory* of the civilizing process in Russia.

War memoirs: accelerating the civilizing process

In one important regard, the war experience accelerated the civilizing process. As we have seen, becoming 'civilized' entails learning to analyse the complex cause-and-effect connections that shape the individual's relationship with the wider world. One way in which this manifests itself is

through the construction of narratives that analyse the life of the individual in the context of larger historical events. This was something that the war prompted Muscovites to do on an unprecedented scale.[5]

It is instructive in this regard to compare 1812 with the most recent major disaster that Moscow experienced, the plague epidemic of 1771. The plague was similar to the war in important ways. Plague, like war, was a type of calamity with which early modern societies were grimly familiar and for which long-established interpretive templates existed; at the same time, neither had reached the Russian interior in living memory, so Muscovites had no personal experience to draw on when disaster struck. The war destroyed more property, but as a humanitarian and socio-political crisis, the plague – which killed 50,000 Muscovites and triggered a bloody popular revolt – was no doubt the worse of the two.

For a calamity of such magnitude, the plague is recorded by surprisingly few Russian ego documents (memoirs and collections of letters). The few that exist testify to its devastating impact. Andrei T. Bolotov wrote about it at length in his memoirs.[6] A merchant from Tver' recorded with shock how the army suppressed the plague revolt in central Moscow: 'They fired at the people with cannons, like at an enemy [army],'[7] and Fedor V. Rostopchin recalled it in 1810 as proof of the common people's propensity for revolt.[8] However, such documents are remarkably few in number: John Alexander's book on the plague cites only eight such sources,[9] and I have seen no additional ones. Likewise, it does not loom large among the stories that later memoirists recalled hearing orally from their elders.

The Napoleonic occupation, by comparison, triggered a veritable outpouring of memoirs, and these appeared in print over the course of the entire nineteenth century. Andrei Tartakovskii identifies more than 450 Russian ego documents about the 1812 war[10]; these include at least 50 about the events in Moscow, and a further 31 or so oral histories, most of them about the events in Moscow, that were collected by T. Tolycheva (pseudonym of Ekaterina V. Novosil'tseva).[11] Memoirists who were too young to have experienced the war also recorded stories about 1812 that they heard from eyewitnesses. N. I. T – v, a Moscow deacon's son born in 1819, recalled near the turn of the twentieth century that when he was a boy, 'everywhere, in homes and in the streets, there was talk of nothing but the year '12, and whenever people met, once they had exchanged greetings, the conversation shifted at once to the hated French'.[12] The plague of 1771, by comparison, seems to have left no comparable legacy of written or oral memory.

According to Elias, an important aspect of the civilizing process consists in acquiring the habit of analysing the world around us in terms both of complex causal connections and of the psychology of other people.[13] We see this in the memoirs about 1812. The war inspired a new geopolitical awareness, interest in military operations and patriotic pride – all factors that led people to try to relate their own personal experience to wider forces

governing the social and political system. For example, some recalled that when the war broke out, they knew little about international events,[14] and others mistakenly expected foreign armies to come to Russia's aid.[15] Memoirists analysed the behaviour of social and ethnic groups, including the panic that seized the civilian population,[16] the class hostilities among Russians,[17] and the differences in behaviour among the various nationalities composing Napoleon's army.[18] They were also attentive to the thought process of individuals in the war. The deacon's son N. I. T – v, writing at the time of Nicholas II, heard from his parents that after Borodino: 'My father … tarried to leave [Moscow], for he lacked accurate information about the enemy's approach and trusted Rostopchin's promises not to let Napoleon into Moscow – promises that confused everyone.'[19] They also critically examined their own feelings. K. Bauer, who was ten years old in 1812, recalled that 'I felt very happy amidst the ruins of Moscow' because he was free to play where and when he wished.[20] Fedor Bekker, who was eight in 1812, wrote in 1870 that his dreams still often carried him back to the ruined streets and houses where he and his friends had played Cossacks and Frenchmen.[21]

Urban living conditions: the civilizing process revealed

Besides accelerating the civilizing process, the war also, by temporarily reversing important developments associated with the civilizing process, threw into sharp relief the progress that had already been made.

One such development was the loss of easy, safe, access to public spaces. As we have seen, there exist two basic models of how the civilizing process might have reached the broad middle stratum of society: either change came from without, with courtly society providing an example that the middle classes emulated, or it came from within, with the culture and psychology of the middle classes evolving in response to new conditions of urban life. Both models contributed to a phenomenon that Craig Koslofsky refers to as 'nocturnalization'.

Building a thesis proposed by the sociologist Murray Melbin,[22] Koslofsky argues that in the towns of early modern Europe, the night was 'colonized' through the expansion of daytime activities into the hours after dark. This movement emanated both from the monarchical courts and from society itself. Nocturnalization had two consequences of importance for the civilizing process. By opening up new opportunities for sociability, it 'created a "bourgeois public sphere" whose location in daily *time*, in the evening and at night, was at least as important as its physical sites in coffeehouses or clubs'.[23] At the same time, artists, poets and mystics reimagined the dark, hitherto associated with evil and metaphysical menace, as a time propitious for spiritual interiority.[24] A more secular version of this evolution has been studied by historians of cities in the modern era. For example, Joachim Schlör argued that in nineteenth-century Europe, darkness, by temporarily

weakening social controls, created the 'possibility of widening one's own horizons, of transgressing boundaries' that in turn promoted the 'internal urbanization' of the individual.[25]

In Moscow, nocturnalization seems to have begun under Catherine II. Before her time, in Moscow, as in most European cities before the introduction of street lighting, the streets were closed to most respectable inhabitants after nightfall. Shops and offices closed at dusk,[26] and barriers, manned by conscripted neighbourhood residents, were erected at night to minimize circulation in the streets. Aside from aristocrats, who could travel safely and easily in their carriages, the people who were abroad after dark were, or were assumed to be, mostly vagrants, prostitutes or criminals, or else rowdy clutches of young men in search of drink, commercial sex or other disreputable entertainment.

All of this began to change under Catherine II. She replaced the night time barriers with a professional night watch, whose purpose was no longer to obstruct night time movement but to provide security for it. She also undertook the expansion of street lighting, which grew from a mere 600 lanterns in 1766 to 3,500 by 1782 and 7,000 by 1801. Most of these were concentrated in Moscow's central districts.[27]

The combination of policing and street lighting gave respectable middling Russians an unprecedented opportunity to experience commercialized leisure and consumerism. For instance, the elegant foreign stores on the street of Kuznetskii Most remained open late into the evening.[28] In the context of the European-wide eighteenth-century luxury debate, cultural conservatives were alarmed that nocturnalization undermined public morals and blurred the distinction between social strata. For example, a few years before the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, the writer Aleksei I. Golitsyn lamented that:

> in all the streets [of St Petersburg and Moscow] we have restaurants in which the music and lighting make you think they are the houses of great lords … All who habitually frequent these magnificently lighted restaurants disdain the swings and other amusements that Russian merchants used to enjoy twenty years ago; now these are left to the lowest tier of the populace.[29]

Petr I. Shalikov, the editor of the *Moscow Spectator*, made a similar observation. One evening, he wrote, his attention was drawn to the 'brilliant lighting and thunderous music' emanating from a restaurant that held Sunday 'balls' in its 'large round hall'. Such elaborate after-dark entertainments were associated with upper-class life, but when he entered and surveyed the scene, he wrote with dismay, all he saw was a crowd of servants, clerks, gypsy dancers and prostitutes.[30]

Other observers valued the opportunity for personal freedom and a deeper individuality that nocturnalization opened up. People could expand their

horizons by visiting sites of culture and sociability, but they could also just amble in the street, unburdened by their daily business, unmarked by strangers, alone with their thoughts, and free, for a few hours, from the rigid controls of the day.[31] A sense of what such freedom meant to a later generation that took it for granted is offered by Nikolai P. Vishniakov. Because Vishniakov (born 1844) was born when his father (born *c*. 1781) was 63 years old, his memoirs about his father look back across an entire century. Writing around 1900, he imagines what his father experienced as a young man when Paul I came to power and newly restrictive police controls were temporarily imposed:

> Petia saw with his own eyes how Moscow became virtually lifeless by night, how gates were closed toward evening and locked with sturdy bolts, how barriers were erected in the streets to block the passage of peaceful inhabitants. There was no staying out late or getting lost in conversation with acquaintances. At the appointed hour you had to rush home and sit as though under siege. No one knew why this was necessary. But that lack of knowledge is precisely what was terrible.

Vishniakov associated these controls with Paul I's persecution of dissidents, but he also argued that such experiences were the reason for the typical Russian commoner's civic passivity and cowering timidity before authority.[32]

Nocturnalization thus created the opportunity both to participate in public life and to deepen one's own interiority. The Napoleonic invasion made this development evident by temporarily and dramatically reversing it. People long remembered the gloomy nights of the period immediately following the withdrawal of the French army. Boarded-up windows blocked the dim light emanating from the surviving houses, ruined neighbourhoods lay abandoned, street lights were broken, and few carriages (which commonly carried lanterns) circulated in the streets, so the long, overcast autumn and winter nights were even darker than before. Dmitrii I. Zavalishin later recalled that in large areas 'there was no glimmer from even the smallest flame' and it was dangerous to go out after dark. The sense of insecurity, especially at night but also by day, was also noted by the German physician Anton Wilhelm Nordhof, who blamed the many uprooted peasants from the devastated countryside who survived as squatters in burned-out houses.[33] Many found this collapse of urban civilization deeply disturbing. According to the noblewoman Anna G. Khomutova:

> wandering among the snow-covered ruins, we did not hear the rumble of carriages, or for that matter, any noise at all: it was the silence of a burial vault. In the evenings, all of a sudden, a pistol shot would ring out; whether it was a chance occurrence or a crime, no one knew.[34]

Aside from nocturnalization, another aspect of the civilizing process that was abruptly reversed in 1812 was deodorization. Early modern cities (Moscow included) smelled bad, mainly because of malodorous industries and the haphazard disposal of human and animal waste. When and how such conditions began to arouse revulsion has been the subject of historiographic discussion. As with other aspects of the civilizing process, there is debate about the mechanisms of cultural change, but there is consensus that educated Europeans in the Enlightenment ceased to find the smells of organic decay and excrement normal and acceptable. According to Norbert Elias, courtly society internalized a sense of repugnance at the sight and smell of excrement as a mark of social distinction, similar to the way it embraced ever more refined table manners or rules of politeness.[35] Alain Corbin takes a somewhat different tack: he argues that in France in the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, smells associated with organic decomposition, including not only excrement but also sweat and certain perfumes, became repulsive to educated society because they aroused both medical anxieties and anxieties about the threat to the social order posed by the 'unwashed masses'.[36] At the same time, the French acquired a growing appreciation of 'the power of odours to stir the affective memory' and thereby to 'ma[k]e the "I" feel its own history and disclose it to itself'; what Corbin calls the 'olfactory revolution' thus also stimulated a deeper individual interiority, much like the nocturnalization studied by Koslofsky and Schlör.[37]

In the area of deodorization, as in that of nocturnalization, the era of Catherine II marked a turning point. Laws passed after the Moscow plague of 1771 required cemeteries and slaughterhouses to be moved away from the city centre, and efforts were undertaken to clean polluted waterways in the city. In part to dispel dangerous miasmas, regulations called for good ventilation in public buildings. Demolishing obsolete fortifications within the city (the White and Earthen walls) served the same purpose of facilitating airflow, while the paving of streets served the purpose, among others, of blocking dangerous emanations from the soil.[38] Prevailing medical thought did not encourage washing with water, but in other ways, much was done to reduce the prevalence of foul smells from excrement, rotting flesh, or other forms of organic decomposition.

The war of 1812 undid this progress. Occupied Moscow was littered with thousands of corpses and animal carcasses that decomposed in the unseasonably warm weather. The stench was suffocating: the aristocrat Mariia A. Volkova reported that 15 kilometres from Moscow 'it is already hard to breathe'.[39] The prevalence of digestive illnesses aggravated matters. The Napoleonic army used the Foundling Home as a hospital for sick soldiers, most of whom suffered from diarrhoea. Ivan A. Tutolmin, the director of the Foundling Home, was outraged when he reported that 'they fouled everything: where they slept, they ate and defecated'.[40] They trashed the 'the floors, doors, windows, stoves, and walls' and their excrements soaked into

the floors and littered the hallways. The only way to make the rooms habitable again was to leave the doors and windows open for the entire winter.[41]

Defecation was also perceived by the Russian elites as a weapon in a broader assault on order and propriety. Accounts by nobles report that enemy soldiers defecated in churches and threw icons into latrines.[42] Nobles wrote that in upper-class homes, Napoleon's men broke what they could not steal – furniture was smashed, mirrors shattered, books ripped apart – and defecated in the refined interiors. Even officers used ballrooms, libraries, and the like as latrines.[43] According to Volkova:

> If you wish to form an idea about that most educated of nations, who call us barbarians, take note of the fact that in all the houses where French generals and senior officers lived, their bedrooms also served as larders, stables, and something even worse. At the Valuevs', in this respect, they fixed up the house in such a way that you can't breathe, and everything has to be demolished, and yet those swine lived in there.[44]

If excrement represented the enemy's lack of true civilization, it was also symbolic of his inglorious defeat: when Russian civilians overpowered stray soldiers, they often dumped the bodies – some of them still alive – into latrines.[45]

A third manifestation of the civilizing process, aside from nocturnalization and deodorization, was the 'consumer revolution' of the eighteenth century. Norbert Elias, as we have seen, located the driving force of the civilizing process in courtly society's need to display its own social superiority. Scholars of the consumer revolution, by contrast, emphasized the growing desire of the middle classes both for conspicuous items that would publicly elevate their status, and for elegance, comfort, and decorum in their private domestic world.[46] People increasingly wore underwear, draped curtains around their conjugal bed, hung pictures on their walls, and ate from individual dishes instead of a shared communal pot. Dmitrii I. Rostislavov, the son of a village priest from Riazan' province, recalls in his memoirs how the consumer revolution took place in his parents' house when he was a child at the time of Alexander I. His parents bought a samovar and spent scarce cash on tea and sugar; by serving visitors tea instead of alcohol, they discouraged the drunkenness that otherwise characterized family entertainments. They also acquired tin plates; family dinners still consisted of everyone helping themselves out of a communal pot, but when they entertained prominent guests, decorum could be maintained because each person had an individual plate.[47]

The fire that destroyed Moscow in 1812 must have marked a massive, albeit temporary, setback for the consumer revolution. The petitions for government aid submitted after the war show that Moscow's middle strata – petty nobles, civil servants (*chinovniki*), merchants, clergymen, townspeople (*meshchane*) – lost a large share of their possessions in the fire, including the

kinds of objects that were central to the consumer revolution: status symbols such as fur coats and elegant dresses, as well as private domestic items such as wall clocks, dining tables and underwear.[48] (Some of these claims may have been inflated in hopes of obtaining more money, but petitioners had an incentive to make their claims appear at least plausible.) I have seen no evidence about the war's long-term effect on the living standard of the middle strata in Moscow, but at a minimum the war must have served as a stark reminder that the consumer revolution's achievements could be easily reversed.

At the same time, there is anecdotal evidence that the war actually hastened the consumer revolution, at least in rural areas near Moscow. Before the war, Nikolai M. Karamzin had detected, among the peasantry, a connection between what we might term the consumer revolution and the civilizing process. In one prosperous village, he claimed to have seen peasants living 'in pretty little houses, no worse than the wealthiest peasants in England and other European lands'.[49] Near Moscow, peasants who made money from the textile trade, according to him 'have begun to live like lords, with cleanliness, good taste, and even luxury'.[50] If in addition they were given access to education, they would become akin to those German, Swiss and English rustics who were 'hard-working but enlightened farmers, living with elegance and good taste, peaceful and contented – the more enlightened they are, the more contented they become'.[51]

Ironically, the looting of Moscow in 1812 seems to have accelerated these processes. Peasants participated in various ways – by taking direct part in looting the city, by conducting barter trade with hungry city residents, and by seizing booty from the retreating French army. Aristocrats who observed this were outraged. Fedor N. Tol', a former Moscow police chief (*ober-politseimeister*), wrote in November 1812 that he had 'lost everything'; the French had looted less than had peasants, domestics 'and other scum' and the villages were now filled with stolen furniture and other goods.[52] Similarly, Volkova remarked in a letter to a friend that no one had ever seen such prosperity and expensive houses in the villages around Moscow: 'You won't believe it until you see it for yourself.'[53]

As we have seen, the drama of 1812 both *accelerated* the civilizing process, by encouraging political awareness and the writing of memoirs, and *highlighted* its accomplishments, by disrupting the advance of nocturnalization, deodorization and the consumer revolution. It also *inflected the trajectory* of the civilizing process in Moscow by displacing the aristocracy as its driving force.

The decline of the aristocracy: inflecting the civilizing process

In the eighteenth century, the civilizing process in Moscow was driven by the aristocratic elite. Wealthy aristocrats took their cue from the Westernized

culture of the imperial court, which they sought to replicate on their country estates and in the city. It was notorious that Moscow, compared with other major European cities, had few sites of genteel public sociability such as clubs, coffee houses, restaurants, theatres or parks. Substitutes were instead provided on a private basis by aristocrats, who established serf theatres, opened their gardens to the public, sponsored concerts and fireworks and so on. The civilizing process thus spread downward from courtly society and the aristocracy, just as one might have predicted based on the model proposed by Norbert Elias.

To some extent, contact with the aristocracy promoted the civilizing process by allowing other social groups to learn new attitudes and behaviours. For example, the clergyman Filipp F. Ismailov (1794–1863) was a tutor in an aristocratic home when he was an adolescent. 'I was like family' he later wrote. 'I often dined there, spent evenings, learned to play Boston whist, and discovered the theatre; in the summer I would go for rides with the children and their mother, and visit Kuzminki, Liublino, Kuskovo, Ostankino, and other suburban places beloved of the Moscow public.'[54] On one visit to Kuskovo, 'I happened to meet some prince, no longer a young man, who taught me how to meet girls'; the episode seemed significant enough that decades later, Ismailov included it in his memoirs.[55]

In important ways, however, the aristocracy's privileged social position acted as a brake on the civilizing process. According to Elias, one of the principal purposes that courtiers pursued when they acquired 'civilized' manners was to demonstrate their own superior social status. This mechanism sometimes limited the civilizing process's spread rather than accelerating it. This effect was strongly in evidence in pre-war Moscow. Fireworks on aristocratic estates inspired awe in non-nobles, but the observers were mere passive spectators, not active participants in a shared cultural process.[56] Laws dictated that the livery of one's servants and the number of horses hitched to one's carriage were linked to one's own service rank; this encouraged a high level of conspicuous consumption and thereby discouraged emulation by the middle strata. In dealing with subordinates, aristocrats were either despotic or patronizingly gracious; either way, their style was difficult for others to emulate. Emulation was also hampered by their extravagant number of servants and habit of speaking French. The point of aristocrats' 'civilized' behaviour was more to emphasize social distance than to encourage emulation. The retardant effect that this had on the civilizing process is documented by the research of Aleksandr Kupriianov, who has shown that local cultural life – libraries, theatres, clubs, and the like – was livelier in the towns of western Siberia, where aristocrats played little or no role, than in the district (*uezd*) towns around Moscow.[57]

This changed after the 1812 war. As Moscow was reconstructed, the aristocracy did not fully recover either its socioeconomic dominance or its cultural hegemony. Moscow's economy became dominated by merchant

entrepreneurs (many of them Old Believers or former peasants), the government apparatus was increasingly controlled by career bureaucrats and the education system produced a socially more diverse reading public. Rebuilding the city also made possible the creation of truly public spaces of sociability, such as the Kremlin Garden (later renamed the Alexander Garden), that were not aristocratic property. The aristocracy's weakening social position was widely noted by contemporary observers, including Aleksandr S. Pushkin and Vissarion G. Belinskii,[58] and was discussed in some detail in the statistical study of Moscow by Vasilii P. Androssov.[59] In fact, to people who came to Moscow after 1812, the lifestyle of the pre-war aristocracy quickly became the stuff of legend, to be described with Orientalizing language. Mikhail N. Zagoskin, who moved to Moscow in 1820, wrote fondly of the 'utterly Asiatic' luxury of the pre-war aristocracy.[60] Belinskii, who arrived in 1829, wrote (less fondly) that stories of the old-time extravagance 'sound like excerpts from *The Thousand and One Nights*'.[61] In 1865, Prince Petr A. Viazemskii – who actually had known the old Moscow – likened the war to the biblical Flood when he entitled one of his reminiscences 'Moscow before the Deluge, or before the Fire'.[62] This conception persisted right down to the end of the nineteenth century, when we find it again in Pyliaev's *Old Moscow*, a popular history of the city since the late eighteenth century.[63]

The decline of the aristocracy gave a powerful boost to the civilizing process in Russia by allowing a more broadly-based Russian national culture to flourish. The wars against Napoleon had provided an initial boost for this development. Propaganda images of heroic wartime patriotism rarely made reference to the cosmopolitan elites of the capitals; instead, the focus was on strata that ranked lower on the social scale. For instance, the writings of 'patriotic' propagandists such as Rostopchin declared that middling country squires, not French-speaking aristocrats, embodied true Russianness, and there is evidence that rural landowners who came of age during the war years shared that view.[64] Wartime cartoons, meanwhile, presented peasants and Cossacks as the visual personification of patriotic heroism. Fighting peasants, drawn with body shapes and in poses that corresponded to the aesthetic norms of the Europeanized nobility, were symbolically incorporated into the civilized national community. As Elena Vishlenkova put it, 'the mere act of rendering the peasants visible, of placing them in works of art, already made them civilized and cultured.'[65]

After the war, long-term sociological changes further displaced the aristocracy from centre stage and drew the middling strata into the civilizing process. Cultural activities that had earlier been the domain principally of aristocrats and their retinue of serfs – such as education, libraries, theatre or fine dining – became professionalized, institutionalized, in some cases commercialized, and accessible to larger segments of the population. In addition, once literature, the arts and education freed themselves from the need to

cement the exclusive social dominance of the aristocracy, they found a new purpose in the construction of a national identity that connected wide segments of Russia's middling strata. The French language became increasingly peripheral to the life of literate Russians: literature and theatre portrayed Russian national types; painters depicted Russian landscapes; cookbooks presented Russian national dishes.[66] In these and many other ways, Russian culture shifted its focus from the cementing of aristocratic supremacy to the integration of a broad middling stratum in a unified national culture.[67]

In *The Civilizing Process*, Norbert Elias contends that the modern national cultures of Germany, France and Great Britain took shape when the civilizing process spread beyond the confines of courtly society and was embraced by the wider middle class. An important determinant of the character of these countries' modern culture was the nature of the middle class's encounter with courtly society. In France and Great Britain, according to Elias, the middle class largely embraced the values and sensibilities of courtly society, whereas in Germany it rejected them. In Russia, the war against Napoleon helped bring about a comparable transitional moment, as cultural leadership increasingly passed to groups outside the aristocratic elite. How the circumstances of this development shaped the character of modern Russia's national culture is an important topic for further historical study.

Notes

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2. Nikolai P. Vishniakov, *Svedeniia o kupecheskom rode Vishniakovykh*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1903–11), vol. 2, 29–37, here: 52.
3. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (Oxford and Malden, MA, 2000).
4. Thomas L. Haskell, 'Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility', *American Historical Review*, 90, 2 (1985): 339–61 and 3 (1985): 547–66.
5. On the extraordinary significance of 1812 in the history of Russian memoir writing, see Andrei G. Tartakovskii, *1812 god i russkaia memuaristika: Opyt istochnikovedcheskogo izucheniia* (Moscow, 1980), 15–16.
6. Andrei T. Bolotov, *Zhizn' i prikliucheniia Andreia Bolotova, opisannye samim im dlia svoikh potomkov*, 3 vols (Moscow, 1993), vol. 3, 19–20.
7. Mikhail M. Tiul'pin, 'Letopis', in Anna V. Semenova et al., eds., *Kupecheskie dnevniki i memuary kontsa XVIII – pervoi poloviny XIX veka* (Moscow, 2007), 273.
8. 'Novo-naidennyia bumagi grafa F. V. Rostopchina', *Russkii arkhiv*, kniga 3, vypusk 1 (1881), 215–27, here: 220–1.
9. John T. Alexander, *Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia: Public Health and Urban Disaster* (Baltimore, MD, 1980). The primary accounts listed in Alexander's bibliography are those by Alekseev, Bantysh-Kamenskii, Bolotov, Dolgorukii, Karzhavin and Sablukov, as well as 'O morovoi iazve'and 'Pis'mo ochevidtsa'.
10. Tartakovskii, *1812 god i russkaia memuaristika*, 18.
11. On the history of this memoir literature (including an exhaustive bibliography), see Tartakovskii, *1812 god i russkaia memuaristika*.

12. T—v, 'O 1812 gode', in Petr I. Shchukin, ed., *Bumagi, otnosiashchiiasia do Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda*, 10 vols. (Moscow, 1897–1908), vol. 4, 332.
13. Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 400.
14. See, for example: F. P. Leont'eva, 'Zapiski F. P. Leont'evoi (1811, 1812 i 1813 gody), *Russkii vestnik* 168/12 (December 1883): 878–902, here: 878–9.
15. Anna G. Khomutova, 'Vospominaniia A. G. Khomutovoi o Moskve v 1812 godu' *Russkii arkhiv*, 3 (1891): 309–28, here: 323; A. Lebedev, 'Iz razskazov rodnykh o 1812 gode (Izvlechenie iz semeinykh zapisok)', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 3, 260.
16. See, for example: Anna I. Zolotukhina, 'Dvenadtsatyi god v zapiskakh Anny Il'inishny Zolotukhinoi (1812 g.)', *Russkaia starina*, 64 (October–December 1889): 257–88, here: 260, 262, 264; see also 274; [Archimandrite Lavrentii], 'Zapiski ochevidtsa o sokhranenii dragotsennostei Nikolaevskago Perervinskago monastyria, i o dostopamiatnykh sobytiiakh v sei obiteli v 1812 godu', *Maiak*, vol. 2, kniga 4 (1842), section 'Zamechatel', 53–67, here: 57–8; Tat'iana A. Iakovleva to Ol'ga Petrovna, 12 November 1812, in 'Gore moskovskikh zhitelei v 1812 g. (sovremennyia pis'ma)', *Russkaia starina*, 154 (April–June 1913): 61–5, here: 61–2; 'Razkashchik rannii sviashchennik tserkvi Filippa mitropolita na 3-i Meshchanskoi, Fedor Ivanovich Levitskii', in [T. Tolycheva], 'Razskazy ochevidtsev o dvenadtsatom gode', *Russkii vestnik*, 102 (November 1872): 266–304, here: 300.
17. See, for example: 'Razskaz meshchanina Petra Kondrat'eva', in [Tolycheva], 'Razskazy ochevitsev', 276. See also: 'Griboedovskaia Moskva v pis'makh M. A. Volkovoi k V. I. Lanskoi 1812–1818 gg.', *Vestnik Evropy*, kniga 8 (August 1874): 572–666, here: 607; Glushkovskii, Adam, 'Moskva v 1812 godu: Iz zapisok Adama Glushkovskogo', *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 4 (1937): 121–59, here: 156; 'Razskaz nabilkinskoi bogadelenki, Anny Andreevny Sozonovoi', in [Tolycheva], 'Razskazy ochevitsev', 291; Lebedev, 'Iz razskazov rodnykh', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 3, 257; 'Razskaz popad'i Mar'i Stepanovny Nikol'skoi', in [Tolycheva], 'Razskazy ochevitsev', 292; Lebedev, .Iz razskazov rodnykh', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 3, 259; [V. I. Lebedev], 'Kratkoe opisanie proizshestvii, byvshikh pri Pokhval'skoi, chto v Bashmakove, tserkvi v 1812 godu', *Chteniia v Obshchestve liubitelei dukhovnago prosveshcheniia*, god 36 (March 1914): 54–76, here: 71; 'Razskaz Nikolaia Dmitrievicha Lavrova, sviashchennika tserkvi Spiridoniia, chto na Spiridonovke', in T. Tolycheva, ed., *Razskazy ochevidtsev o dvenadtsatom gode*, 2nd Edition (Moscow, 1912), 110.
18. See, for example: Lebedev, 'Kratkoe opisanie', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 3, 63; 'Moskva v 1812 godu: Opisanie moego prebyvaniia v Moskve vo vremia Frantsuzov, s 1-go po 21-e Sentiabria 1812 goda', *Russkii arkhiv*, 8 (1896), 521–40, here: 525; T—v, 'O 1812 gode', 339; [Bauer] B . . . r, K., 'Vospominanie o dvenadtsatom gode v Moskve', *Atenei*, 2 (1858): 119–34, here: 128.
19. N. I. T—v, 'O 1812 gode', 333.
20. [Bauer], 'Vospominanie', 129.
21. Fedor Bekker, 'Vospominaniia Bekkera o razzorenii i pozhare Moskvy v 1812 g.', *Russkaia starina*, 38 (April–June 1883): 507–24, here: 519.
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23. Craig Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2011), 17.
24. Koslovsky, *Evening's Empire*, 47.
25. Joachim Schlör, *Nights in the Big City: Paris, Berlin, London, 1840–1930*, trans. Pierre Gottfried Imhoff and Dafydd Rees Roberts (London, 1998), 16, 241, 287, quotation on 241.

26. On the closing hours of shops, see I. Slonov, *Iz zhizni torgovoi Moskvy (polveka nazad)* (Moscow, 1914), 166.
27. Ivan E. Zabelin, *Opyty izucheniia russkikh drevnostei i istorii: izsledovaniia, opisaniia i kriticheskiia stat'i*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1872–1873), vol. 2, 357; N. M. Bychkov, 'Istoricheskii ocherk osveshcheniia goroda Moskvy', *Izvestiia Moskovskoi Gorodskoi Dumy*, vypusk 1 (October 1895), otdel 2, 1–52; G. Le Cointe de Laveau, *Guide du voyageur à Moscou* (Moscow, 1824), table facing 86.
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29. [S. N. Glinka], 'Vypiska iz Ruskoi knigi, nazvannoi: Sobranie otryvkov, vziatykh iz nravstvennykh i politicheskikh Pisatelei, i izdannoi G… 1811', *Ruskoi vestnik*, chast' 6 (June 1811): 73–86, here: 77–8.
30. 'Smes', *Moskovskii zritel'*, chast' 4 (December 1806): 74–5.
31. Schlör, *Nights in the Big City*, 274.
32. Vishniakov, *Svedeniia*, 1:34–5.
33. Dmitrii Zavalishin, 'Tysiacha vosem'sot dvenadtsatyi god (Iz vospominanii sovremennika)', *Moskovskiia Vedomosti* (25 March 1884); Anton Wilhelm Nordhof, *Die Geschichte der Zerstörung Moskaus im Jahre 1812*, eds. Claus Scharf and Jürgen Kessel (Munich, 2000), 106, 276.
34. Khomutova, 'Vospominaniia', 327.
35. Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 116–17.
36. Alain Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination* (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 47, 55, 56, 60–1, 67.
37. Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant*, 82.
38. Ibid., 90.
39. 'Griboedovskaia Moskva', 613.
40. 'Moskovskii Vospitatel'nyi Dom v 1812 godu', *Russkii arkhiv*, 3 (1900): 457–75, here: 461.
41. 'Podrobnoe donesenie Eia Imperatorskomu Velichestvu, Gosudaryne Imperatritse, Marii Feodorovne, o sostoianii moskovskago Vospitatel'nago Doma v bytnost' nepriiatelia v Moskve 1812 goda', Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossisskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 33, 2 (April–June 1860): 161–92, here: 179.
42. 'Griboedovskaia Moskva', 601; 'Otryvok iz chernovago pis'ma neizvestnago litsa', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 3, 262; 'Kopiia s vypiski iz pis'ma chinovnika moskovskago pochtamta, Andreia Karfachevskago, 6 noiabria 1812 goda', in Shchukin, *Bumagi*, vol. 5, 166.
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44. 'Griboedovskaia Moskva', 615–16.
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51. [N. M. Karamzin], 'O novom obrazovanii narodnago prosveshcheniia v Rossii', *Vestnik Evropy*, 8/5 (March 1803): 49–61, here: 52.
52. 'Moskva v 1812 godu,' *Russkaia starina*, 8 (July–December 1873): 992–4, here: 994; see also 'Griboedovskaia Moskva', 643.
53. 'Griboedovskaia Moskva v pis'makh M. A. Volkovoi k V. I. Lanskoi 1812–1818 gg.'' (part 2), *Vestnik Evropy*, kniga 9 (September 1874): 115–68, here: 118.
54. Ismailov, *Vzgliad*, 48.
55. Ibid., 150–1.
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57. Aleksandr I. Kupriianov, *Gorodskaia kul'tura russkoi provintsii: Konets XVIII – pervaia polovina XIX veka* (Moscow, 2007), 471.
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65. Elena Vishlenkova, *Vizual'noe narodovedenie imperii, ili 'Uvidet' russkogo dano ne kazhdom'* (Moscow, 2011), 190–95, quotation on 195.
66. See, for example: Christopher Ely, *This Meager Nature: Landscape and National Identity in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, IL, 2002); Alison K. Smith, *Recipes for Russia: Food and Nationhood Under the Tsars* (DeKalb, IL, 2008).
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17

The Patriotic War of 1812 in the Commemorative Practices and Historical Memory of Russian Society from the Nineteenth to the Early Twenty-First Centuries

Tatiana Saburova

In recent years, much work has been done on historical memory and the commemorative practices used by society and by those in power. This has been connected both with broader changes that have taken place in the conceptual and methodological field of contemporary scholarship and with the attempts of those in power to use the historical experience of commemoration to address contemporary political challenges.[1] Contemporary studies of the role played by the Napoleonic Wars in historical memory and historical interpretations have shown that the period has always been used for political purposes, particularly during times of social transformation and of active empire or nation building.[2] Since the images of 'hero' and 'enemy' are so easily created and transposed, and the notions of 'us' and 'them' are so easily juxtaposed, the formation, or actualization, of particular collective 'memories' of war has been able to serve, *inter alia*, as an effective tool in the creation of an 'imagined community', the upholding of traditions and the overcoming of trauma.

Over the last two centuries, the so-called Patriotic War of 1812 has gradually been turned into a 'place of memory' for Russian society. A range of commemorative practices have caused some aspects of memories of the war to be preserved in communicative memory from the very beginning and to become firmly rooted in the institutions of cultural memory. Furthermore, fragments of personal reminiscences have steadily crept into the bigger picture of 'collective memories', being used in the process of commemoration, and, *vice versa*, personal memories have been supported by collective social practice. According to David Lowenthal, personal memories always need to be reinforced by the memories of others and expand at their expense, so that personal history thus combines with collective history.[3] The formation of a collective memory or 'memories' of the Patriotic War

of 1812 went hand in hand with a process of a selective 'forgetting', both as a part of commemorative policy and as a part of the natural process of individual memory.

First and foremost, let us address *communicative memory*, which is able to survive in the personal reminiscences of those who were direct participants in or witnesses to the historical events themselves. The *oral tradition* of transmission is particularly important. Drawing on work done in the field of oral history, Jan Assman argues that, in literate societies, events are preserved in living memory for no longer than eighty years, after which 'memories' are formed through textbooks and monuments, that is, an official tradition.[4]

In the first half of the nineteenth century, memories of the Patriotic War of 1812 were formed principally within families, based on stories told by relatives, acquaintances and servants, combined with partial and often hazy childhood impressions, all of which gradually acquired distinct features, often many years later being put down on paper in the form of memoirs.[5] Alexander Herzen (Aleksandr Gertsen, born 1812) starts *My Past and Thoughts* with a section, entitled 'My Nanny and the Grand Armée', in which he includes his nanny's account of the events in Moscow. He goes on to take over the narration himself ('Allow me to take the old woman's place and continue her narrative'),[6] describing his father's well-known meeting with Napoleon and the letter to Tsar Alexander. The nanny's reminiscences become Herzen's own, gradually appropriated and expanded.

It should be noted that the encounter between Herzen's father and Napoleon also found reflection in works by Agathon Jean François Fain and Aleksandr Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, something which Herzen himself mentions, comparing his own memories, based on family stories, with their historical works. But a comparative analysis of the texts reveals disparities between the descriptions of the episode. The permit given to Herzen's father by the French was preserved as a family relic, reinforcing existing memories and reaffirming their authenticity.

According to Herzen, his nanny used to tell the story of 1812 over and over again. It thus lingered in his memory:

> 'Vera Artamonovna, come tell me once more how the French came to Moscow […].' 'Oh! What's the use of telling you? You've heard it so many times; besides it's time to go to sleep. You had better get up a little earlier tomorrow', the old woman would usually answer, although she was as eager to repeat her favourite story as I was to hear it.[7]

Note the characteristic mnemonic practice of repeating the story often, but not word for word, such that variations can be introduced to the text as new details are added.

Herzen noted that those who had served with his father, and later came to stay with the family, would tell stories of combat and heroism, evoking what Herzen saw as a strong feeling of national, patriotic pride:

> Tales of the fire of Moscow, of the battle of Borodino, of the Berezina, of the taking of Paris were my cradle-songs, my nursery stories, my *Iliad* and my *Odyssey*. My mother and our servants, my father and Vera Artamonovna were continually going back to the terrible time which had impressed them so recently, so intimately, and so acutely. [8]

Just as in pre-literate societies mythological tradition needed to be constantly repeated, so too did the oral narratives of the War of 1812 need to be repeated in order to keep the communicative memory of the events alive.

In his diary, Alexander A. Leslie (born 1810) included stories by his relatives from the war, which were then expanded by his own reading of books on the subject. For example, he noted in 1851: 'we spoke over tea of [the battle of] Maloiaroslavets, of the battle, of 1812, of how father and granddad had been in the militia'; and that of 1856: 'father was telling us how he first thought of the militia', 'father was saying a lot of things, some of which I have already written down, some not, but it was all very interesting'.[9]

Until the 1860s, then, the oral tradition was made up of stories told by participants in the war, which helped to keep the communicative memory of the event alive. In 1860, for example, Petr A. Viazemskii wrote in his *Notebook* of a conversation that he had had with Aleksei P. Ermolov about the engagements of the First and Second Armies, the withdrawal of troops, and Generals Petr I. Bagration and Barclay de Tolly: 'I went to Ermolov's twice. His mind is still sharp and his memory fresh, but he sometimes has trouble speaking, tending to express himself somewhat cumbersomely and unclearly. […] Yesterday, we discussed the War of 1812.'[10]

It should be noted that after the 1860s stories from the War of 1812 were told less and less often in the memoirs and, when they were, usually only in reference to family history. For example, Petr P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii (born 1827) wrote in his memoirs about his father, who had fought at the battle of Borodino and had been an officer in the famous Izmailovskii regiment, but based his description on stories told by his grandmother (his father died in 1832) and other relatives, who would speak of how Petr N. Semenov had been miraculously saved at Borodino or how he had told his future wife about the battles at Borodino and Kulm (Chlumec), the French occupation of Moscow, his capture and entry to Paris. At the same time, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii's mother, who was 11 in 1812, was able to recall the Fire of Moscow and her family's escape.[11]

Ekaterina V. Novosil'tseva (pseudonym T. Tolychova) took an interest in the oral tradition, writing that 'even the smallest scrap of evidence from that

period is precious to us because, in a few years from now, it is unlikely that there will be a single witness left from that dramatic and glorious chapter in our country's history'.[12] We should note, however, that even Novosil'tseva subjected the testimonies that she collected to a certain literary reworking. At the beginning of the twentieth century, works in the style of oral folk-tale reminiscences began to be published in connection with the anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812.

The memoir tradition and communicative memory

The Napoleonic Wars gave rise to a genuinely new literary genre, the war memoir. For the first time, the shared military experience of an entire generation found reflection in a large number of memoirs, which also became part of Russian society's collective memory culture, and which continue to generate interest.

As demonstrated by the brilliant research of Andrei G. Tartakovskii,[13] the first 1812 memoirs were written and published in the period immediately after the war (1812–1819), and some of them even before the war had ended. The second wave came in the 1830s, triggered by an active policy of commemoration, with state propaganda stoking nationalistic and patriotic feelings within Russian society, and by the November Uprising in Poland (1830–1831), resurrecting the image of the 'enemy' in the consciousness of contemporaries.

An exceptional collection of first-hand accounts, some of them only brief extracts, including reminiscences of the War of 1812, was compiled by Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii in 1836–1837, which formalized the process of remembrance, and also helped to shape future perceptions about the War of 1812. However, there is evidence to suggest that responses to the questionnaires sent out by Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii were difficult to gather and that they did not always reflect the reality of the situation. In his book *Orenburgskii krai v 1812 godu* (*Orenburg Region in 1812*), for example, Stolpianskii showed that Governor Vasilii A. Perovskii edited his response for the historian twice 'in order to stop the scratching of the bureaucratic quill, which tends only to depict the positive aspects, seeing events through a civil servant's eyes'.[14] The correspondence between provincial and district marshals of the nobility in Smolensk province reveals their attempt 'to embellish several chapters of the published account of the War of 1812 by highlighting the selflessness of the inhabitants of Smolensk province and their love for and devotion to their country'.[15]

The third wave of interest in the War of 1812 came towards the end of the 1850s and 1860s, a period associated with the introduction of reforms, the political 'thaw' and the inevitable interest in the historical past on the part of the intelligentsia, the merging of the celebrations for the thousand-year anniversary of Russia and those for the 50th anniversary of the War of 1812 in state commemorative policy, and the return from exile of the Decembrists

who had fought in the War of 1812. The Crimean War also played an important role in how the War of 1812 was perceived, since the former was initially seen as a continuation of the heroic traditions of the latter, only later becoming symbolic of military and foreign policy defeat, that is, of the polar opposite of the War of 1812. During the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland, the clear juxtaposition between 'us' and 'them' came to the fore once again. Political rhetoric was dominated by the image of the 'enemy' and patriotic stereotypes, some appealing directly to memories of the War of 1812.

Of course, we must not forget the impact of Lev Tolstoi's *War and Peace*. Literature often has an effect on the formation of historical memory, but the novel also courted controversy, earning a harsh reaction from those who had fought in 1812 and who claimed an exclusive right to authentic testimony of the event, rejecting Tolstoi's interpretation (Avraam S. Norov and Petr A. Viazemskii). Polemics with authors of 'histories of the Patriotic War' are not uncommon in memoirs (such as the polemic between, on the one hand, Nikolai N. Raevskii and Sergei G. Volkonskii and, on the other, the military historian Dmitrii P. Buturlin).

The formation of memories is also associated with visual images, which localize images by anchoring them in a specific place. This is particularly true of memories of the fire of Moscow in 1812, since the traces of the fire could still be seen in the 1820s which merged in the memory with stories of the event. As Herzen noted, 'I still remember, as in a dream, the traces of the fire, which remained until early in the '20s: great burnt-out houses without window frames or roofs, tumble-down walls, empty spaces fenced in, with remains of stoves with chimneys on them'.[16] Since the image of the fire of Moscow was widely disseminated,[17] the 'memory' of the fire took root as one of the symbols of the War of 1812.

Evidence of the urge to visualize memory in the nineteenth century can be found in the creation of monuments, the erection of the Triumphal Arch in Moscow (1834) and the Alexander Column in St Petersburg (1834), as well as the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour and the creation of the military gallery in the Winter Palace, among other projects. In the run-up to the centenary of the War of 1812, plans for a museum of 1812 were being finalized, the film *1812* was shot (directed by Vasilii M. Goncharov), and monuments were unveiled on the battlefield at Borodino. In the 1960s, to mark the 150th anniversary, the Triumphal Arch was erected (1966–1968), a monument was unveiled in honour of Mikhail Kutuzov and the heroes of the War of 1812 and the Museum-Panorama Battle of Borodino was opened. To commemorate the bicentennial of the War of 1812, reconstruction was completed on the Triumphal Arch. At the unveiling, Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev said that it 'marks the return of our cultural heritage and, of course, the restoration of our patriotic spirit and the historical memory of our people'.[18] However, the event did not receive a great deal of media attention, and online discussions of the unveiling of

the newly reconstructed monument tended to be critical, as reported in the analysis published on the website *Uroki istorii. XX vek* (Lessons from history. The twentieth century). The opening of a museum dedicated to the Patriotic War of 1812 in the former Lenin museum represented yet another form of visual commemoration of the Patriotic War.

As Vladimir Lapin has shown, images of the Patriotic War of 1812 were being used widely on various commercial products as early as 1912, creating a distinct visual repertoire through the labels on alcoholic drinks, baked goods, confectionary, cigarettes, scarves, and the production of souvenirs of various kinds.[19] The military symbolism of commemoration increasingly found its way into the names of everyday items and food products. The direct link with memory was thus lost, and the symbols of the War of 1812 began to exist independently, acquiring new meanings in everyday culture. Examples include Borodino ice cream and Borodino bread. In contemporary Russia, the chocolate bars Gvardevskii and Borodino have images of the Patriotic War of 1812 printed on their wrappers. It is interesting to note the range of historical figures and events depicted on chocolate bars, and also how they are represented.

Furthermore, in 2012, the Ekaterinburg Art Foundation began a project, the 'material embodiment' of the events of 1812, the aim of which was to bring historical memory to life, linking the popular Borodino bread with the memory of the War of 1812. As those behind the project explained, memorials can be sent from Ekaterinburg to any corner of the country where the authorities wish to 'make the Russian people feel part of their own national history and their victory in the Patriotic War of 1812'.[20] The memorial depicts a loaf of Borodino black bread draped in a banner and the ribbon of Saint George, bearing the inscription 'Bread of our Memory' and the date '1812–2012'. According to the co-ordinators of the project, contemporary Russian society has lost living memories of the war, which had previously been passed from generation to generation through family legends. For this reason, the War of 1812 is seen merely as a beautiful story, the product of literature and cinema, without any real understanding of the sheer scale of human suffering and civil upheaval involved. The inclusion of the Borodino bread on the monument is connected with the legend of General Aleksandr A. Tuchkov's widow, who allegedly devised the recipe as a sign of her grief and the coriander seeds that it contains as symbols of grapeshot. There is no concrete evidence to support the legend and, according to one version of events, the name and recipe of the Borodino bread in fact originate in 1920s and 1930s Moscow. The commemorative practice of using well-known things which long ago became separated from the events that originally gave them their names is of interest in itself; the events are nevertheless still capable of once again actualizing or forming historical 'memory'.

Anniversaries have always played an important role in the formation of 'memories', since, as Konstanin N. Tsimbaev notes, unlike other annual

celebrations, 'anniversaries by definition force us to construct a historical perspective and to draw the line of historical development not only from the past to the present, but also from the present into the future'. [21] The traditional forms of celebration have remained virtually unchanged for two centuries, reflecting the persistence of commemorative practices (parades, fireworks, performances, reconstructions, exhibitions, publications etc) and also a certain degree of continuity in terms of how the might of the country has been articulated. Tsimbaev maintains that the authorities have always played an important role in organizing the anniversary celebrations. They stipulate what should be celebrated, when and how.[22]

The commemorative events in 1912 were carefully scripted, standardizing the celebrations throughout most of the Russian Empire. Thus, the organizers hoped that the 'collective memory' of 1812 would unite Russian society around the throne and demonstrate the strength and might of the Empire. According to Chris Chulos, although 'the participants in the celebrations used the same language, symbols and rituals, they used them differently, giving them different meanings, thereby allowing the imperial court and certain representatives of the elite to believe that the empire was in good health and continued to flourish despite the worrying symptoms of its approaching collapse'.[23]

The memorialization of Borodino and the formation of a 'Place of Memory' for the war of 1812

The battle of Borodino occupied pride of place in the centennial celebrations for the Patriotic War, and the main commemorative events were timed to coincide with the date of the battle. This was entirely in keeping with the imperial tradition, both in terms of the timing of the celebrations and the memorialization of the battlefield at Borodino itself, its transformation into a symbol of the war, the heroism of the Russian army, and the sacredness of the very space itself. Mikhail Iu. Lermontov's 'Borodino', the erection of monuments to Russian and later also French soldiers, the construction of a church, and commemorative events held on the battlefield: all these things heightened the symbolic status of Borodino in the representation of the War of 1812.[24] Indeed, Borodino can be seen as a 'place of memory' in the original sense of Pierre Nora's term, since 'the place of memory is double; a place of excess closed unto itself, unto its identity and name, but always open to the expanse of its meanings'.[25]

The patriotic discourse of the early twentieth century placed considerable emphasis on the heroism and bravery of Russian soldiers and also made use of the theme of sacrifice and suffering, which was a part of the military narrative of 'triumph'. Later, in the mid-twentieth century, attempts were made to make the military narrative even more triumphant. However, Borodino and Napoleon's subsequent retreat from Moscow were not able to claim the

central place in the Soviet military narrative of triumph. By preserving the memorial status of the Borodino battlefield in the Soviet Union, the 1962 commemorative events were associated not so much with the battle itself, but with the 'start of the expulsion of the aggressor' at the battle of Tarutino, the major 'turning point' in the war.

It is revealing that many articles featured in the newspaper *Pravda* in 1962 included statistics of how many men the Napoleonic army had lost, but Russian losses were never mentioned, which is fully in line with the objective of creating and transmitting a triumphal narrative in which the people, fighting with such heroism, wiped out the French army, as they would any other foreign invader. The losses sustained by the Russian army and in the fire of Moscow were not mentioned. In all probability, in the wake of the Great Patriotic War, efforts were made not to mention losses and victims, even in relation to the War of 1812.

This 'silent' strategy is not unlike the commemorative policy of the reign of Alexander I, whose concept of 'holy war' was built neither upon the ritualization of grief for those who had died, nor upon an acknowledgment of the cost at which victory had been won. As Elena A. Vishlenkova has demonstrated, the rulers of the Russian Empire hindered the democratization of the memory of the war, replacing it with an ideological version of recent history, the aim being to legitimize the monarchy rather than to mourn those who had died.[26] The traditional treatment of the memory of the Patriotic War of 1812 was preserved, with similar practices being used after the Great Patriotic War. The universal military narrative and the memory of the war were both created gradually, differing at various stages only in terms of how they were recoded ideologically, but they nevertheless shared a common language and commemorative practices. The 'holy', 'popular' War of 1812, just like the 'holy', 'popular' War of 1941–1945, was supposed to remain a 'heroic victory', and representations of the War of 1812 facilitated the mythology which arose over the War of 1941–1945.

At the bicentennial of the War of 1812, although the main commemorative events were held on the Borodino battlefield, an attempt was once again made to alter how the war was represented and to provide a new angle from which to shape 'memory'. In President Vladimir Putin's speech, the battle of Borodino was referred to as the battle of Moscow and a spectacular victory:

> Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov Smolenskii was a great commander and the victory over Napoleon was truly great, and we can even specify the victory with great precision: Maloiaroslavets. The victory of the Russian army over the French was the victory at Maloiaroslavets.[27]

Nevertheless, the commemorative practices used for the bicentennial were in many respects reminiscent of those used for the centennial, including the

main commemorative events on the Borodino battlefield and on the day of the Battle of Borodino.

The patriotic war of 1812 as a popular war

It was not new to emphasize the role played by the people in the War of 1812 and its popular character more broadly; indeed, this reflected the traditional way in which the war had been represented in the nineteenth century, which had taken its lead from the patriotic discourse that had begun to emerge even before the war had ended, and was subsequently perpetuated by the theory of 'official nationality' in the reign of Nicholas I, the ideological foundation of the idea of a 'people's monarchy', and also the interest of the Russian intelligentsia in populism and nationalism. The popular character of the war was also emphasized in the early twentieth century, reflecting the attempt to demonstrate the unity of state and people in the commemorative events of 1912, and to strengthen social solidarity and national consciousness.[28] On the other hand, in the early twentieth century, the intelligentsia also sought to use the anniversary as a means of broaching the question of 'the people', that is, the peasants and other unprivileged members of society, a discussion of their needs and even a new way of looking at the debt that the intelligentsia owed them.

In Soviet patriotic discourse, 'the people' were represented as the decisive force in the War of 1812, alone responsible for victory, the collective actor in the historical process, defining the course of history: 'Once again, the masses demonstrated – and very convincingly – that they determined the great questions of history.'[29] This complete domination of the question of 'the people' also reflected the political context of the period of the 'thaw' in the Soviet Union at the 150-year celebrations in 1962, that is, the overcoming of the 'personality cult' after the death of Stalin. The publications of *Pravda* showed that a profound ideological change had taken place in respect of the role of individuals; emphasis was placed instead on the role of 'the people', meaning that Kutuzov received only a modest level of coverage, even though historians of the 1940s had seen him as the central figure in the war. Moreover, the new direction in historiography was made even clearer in a commemorative issue of the journal *Voprosy istorii* (*Questions of history*) in 1962, as part of a discussion of the problems of the history of the War of 1812, asserting the rejection of the 'personality cult' as a factor in historical events:

As is well-known, during the time of the 'personality cult', Russian military historians focussed largely on Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov. The same angle was adopted in a number of works of the period on the War of 1812. To some extent, Stalin's idea that Kutuzov, the genius field-marshal, 'crushed Napoleon and his army with a well-prepared counter-offensive' has determined the general direction of research on the War of 1812.[30]

The commemorative publications included in *Voprosy istorii* place emphasis precisely on the popular character of the War of 1812.[31] The fact that it has been represented as a 'popular war'[32] helps to explain the widespread use of extracts from Tolstoi's *War and Peace* in commemorative publications. At the same time, Vadim S. Parsamov suggests that:

> for all the brilliance of his novel, Tolstoi's conception of the War of 1812 as a people's war would not have stood the test of time if it had no basis in fact. However, this basis must be sought not in documents reflecting the behaviour of the Russian peasants, but in the many texts of the war period that form the general impression of the war.[33]

For this reason, the idea of the popular character of the war has remained one of the most persistent of all, actively invoked in commemorative publications and events, and, consequently, of great interest to scholars. It must not be forgotten that the very idea of the people and the popular war fully reflected not only the specificity of commemoration, but also the particularities of an ideology and historical era, acquiring various meanings.

The people who defeated Napoleon were seen as *working* people, including serfs (who were, more often than not, 'long-suffering' and oppressed by the landowners), craftsmen, and tradesmen. Criticizing 'bourgeois' historians for paying so little attention to the role of the people in the war, Pavel A. Zhilin argued that the people 'and, in particular, the long-suffering serfs, who made up the bulk of the army and the militias – it was this decisive force that destroyed the most powerful army of the day and ultimately led to the destruction of Napoleon's Empire'.[34] In the description of the combat in *Pravda*, the people are presented as peasants who took up arms to destroy the French (the term 'popular uprising' is even used, once again evoking the historical memory of the events of another war), as participants in the partisan movement and the popular militia, as soldiers in the Russian army and 'home front workers'.[35] Noblemen were not celebrated for having vanquished Napoleon, despite having served in the army and been involved with militias and partisans, and nor was anyone else who had little to do with 'the working people'. Thus, the class-based approach to history was strongly in evidence in the representation of the War of 1812.

The idea of 'the people' as the victors of the War of 1812 was associated with the idea of the people as the victors of the Great Patriotic War, as well as with the idea of the 'Soviet people' more broadly, which was a particularly important ingredient in the formation and strengthening of the collective identity of Soviet society. Publications dedicated to the anniversary of the war repeatedly mention that *all* Soviet people preserve the memory of the glorious past and of the heroes of 1812, that *every* Soviet person knows the history of his country and the Patriotic War, that *not one* Soviet person does not remember the heroes of the War of 1812, has not felt a feeling of pride

and awe, and so forth. The following is an example of this characteristic rhetoric: 'Who among the Soviet people, reading the glorious pages of their history, is not awe-struck by the heroism, the bravery, the resilience of Russian warriors…'[36] Thus, the commemoration of the War of 1812 was supposed to reveal the communal spirit of the Soviet people, their unity, shaped by a single memory of the past, a single relation to the present and a single vision for the future. The expanded application of the idea of a unified Soviet people (as a particular social community, united with the Party) was intended to reinforce social solidarity and form a new type of collective identity, the 'Soviet people'. The formation of the conception of a united past, present and future, the creation of a common memory, in relation to 1812 in particular, was one of the conditions for the effective construction of an identity.

During the 2012 commemorative events, the popular character of the war was accentuated once again, and the idea of national unity emerged as the main expression of patriotism and the key to victory in the War of 1812, as indeed it had been in every other war. Vladimir Putin said the following in his speech:

> Only when the people of Russia united, joined together, were they able to achieve the greatest victory that their fatherland has ever known. Ultimately, the Russian people are united by patriotism, which has always been at the basis of our great victories.[37]

The authorities' attempts to find a new basis on which to strengthen social solidarity led patriotic rhetoric to be used in its traditional way, which, just as 50 years previously, evoked the invincibility of a united people (of course, this is clearly related to the ideology of unity expressed in the name of the United Russia Party).

The idea of the people (an extremely vague and ambiguous concept, particularly in Russian discourse) as a unified community was closely linked to the 'national question' both in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union. In the aptly named book *The Popular War of 1812*, issued for public readings in 1883, representations of the War of 1812 as a popular war became associated with representations of 'truly Russian' conduct (heroism, bravery, readiness to die for the homeland, the ability to outwit the enemy and show compassion). Kutuzov was identified as a true Russian in terms of both his ethnic origin and his spirit (although even Barclay de Tolly was in general depicted as a wise leader, 'a true son of the fatherland'). In one of the publications of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Books, the following was included: 'When their foe attacks, all Russians tend to unite, ready to fight, to defend their fatherland, which any Russian loves deeply.'[38] The anniversary publications have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the memory of the War of 1812 lives on in the hearts of all Russians, thus functioning as a symbol of identity. Hence, in the context of the multi-national Russian

Empire, the concept of 'Russian' in commemorative texts did not have any ethnic overtones; rather, it coincided with the semantics of the concept in the early nineteenth century, when the words *russkii* (ethnic Russian) and *rossiisskii* (more official, of Russia) were used synonymously, largely in the sense of 'subjects'. In Soviet commemorations, the people involved in the War of 1812 were portrayed largely as a community of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians fighting to liberate their homeland, but there were also references to Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, Tatars, and other peoples who had taken part in the 'national fight for freedom from the foreign invaders'.

For 200 years, the War of 1812 has been part of a heroic, triumphal historical narrative, included within the unified heroic past of the country (let us note that the past is generally represented exclusively as glorious and heroic), alongside the battles of Lake Peipus, Kulikovo and Poltava. In 1962, publications in *Pravda* repeatedly stressed the connection between the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War,[39] the battles of 1941–1945 becoming not simply a repetition, but an enhancement of its glory and heroic traditions:

> The traditions of the Patriotic War of 1812 are preserved in the hearts of soldiers serving in the Soviet Army and Navy. They were enhanced on the battlefields against Hitler's invaders.[40]

This was because during the War of 1812 'the people' had often fought in spite of the authorities, and had not yet reached the heights that the Soviet people later did under the direction of the Communist Party. The War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War were closely linked by a similar descriptive language[41] and similar monuments, but, for the 150th anniversary celebrations, emphasis was placed on the greater heroism of the people during the Great Patriotic War. Oleg Proskurin is of the opinion that:

> … from as early as the mid-1940s, the functions of the main war – the war that saved the country and the world from enslavement and destruction, the war that was supposed to signify Russian glory, the power of the state and the Russian nation itself – were transferred to another war, which had only recently come to an end. However, the undeniable and timeless success of the myth of the Great Patriotic War – which continues to this day – can be explained not so much by the fact of its being less distant from the 'consumer' and contemporary historical memory chronologically (indeed, this would seem to work against it), as by the fact that the principal devices by which the war has been mythologized (from its very name – 'Patriotic' – to its exceptionality in an international military-political context as the one, unparalleled event that saved the world) were successfully copied from the mythologization of 1812.[42]

However, it should be remembered not only that both wars have been subjected to myth making on the same basis, there being some continuity in how the events have been framed, but also that the War of 1941–1945 has influenced the character of the representation of the War of 1812. This retrospective perception is clear from the language used to describe the fighting of 1812, which appealed to the persistent images formed during the War of 1941–1945, evoking associations with the more recent conflict, and thus bringing the past into the present, making the War of 1812 part of a general, accessible, military past by placing the two wars on the same discursive level.

For the bicentennial celebrations, the War of 1812 was again linked with the War of 1941–1945, 'and both Patriotic Wars have gone down in history as affirmations of the incomparable patriotism of our people, who defended their country and secured its role as a great world power'.[43] And when Maloiaroslavets and Mozhaisk were awarded the title of 'City of Military Glory' in 2012, stress was laid on the heroic traditions and patriotism shared by the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War of 1841–1845.

Conclusion

It can thus be concluded that the War of 1812 became a permanent component of historical memory in nineteenth-century Russian society, and that the memory of 1812 became a characteristic element of political discourse, used by the authorities and society alike to distinguish 'us' from 'them', to discuss current political problems (both domestic and foreign), and as a means to reinforce identity and to consolidate society. This has long prevented the War of 1812 from being seen as part of the historical past. Its presence continues to be felt today, forever invested with new meanings.

Notes

1. Aleida Assman and Linda Shortt, eds., *Memory and Political Change* (Basingstoke, 2012); Julia Buckler and Emily D. Johnson, eds., *Rites of Place: Public Commemoration in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Evanston, IL, 2013); Christian Jouhaud, ' "Camisards! We Were Camisards!" Remembrance and the Ruining of Remembrance through the Production of Historical Absences', *History & Memory*, 21, 1 (2009): 5–24; Aaron J. Cohen, 'Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the Russian Emigration and the Soviet Union', *Slavic Review*, 62, 1 (2003): 69–86; Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Bloomington, IN, 2011).
2. Karen Hagemann, 'Occupation, Mobilization, and Politics: The Anti-Napoleonic Wars in Prussian Experience, Memory, and Historiography', *Central European History*, 39, 4 (2006): 580–610; Ute Planert, 'From Collaboration to Resistance: Politics, Experience, and Memory of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany', *Central European History*, 39, 4 (2006): 676–705; Alan Forrest, Étienne François and Karen Hagemann, eds., *War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture* (Basingstoke, 2012).

3. See David Lowenthal, *Proshloe – chuzhaia strana* (St Petersburg, 2004), 308–12.
4. Jan Assman, *Kul'turnaia pamiat': pis'mo, pamiat' o proshlom i politicheskaia identichnost' v vysokikh kul'turakh drevnosti* (Moscow, 2004), 54.
5. See, for example, the memoirs of A. I. Koshelev, born in 1806, who described Muscovites fleeing: *Russkoe obshchestvo 40–50-kh godov XIX v.*, part 1. 'Zapiski A. I. Kosheleva' [Moscow, 1991], 45–6.
6. Alexander Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen*, trans. Constance Garnett, 4 vols. (New York, 1968), vol. 1, 5.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. 'Rasskazy o 1812 gode (Otryvki iz dnevnika A. A. Lesli)', *Smolenskaia starina*, 2 (Smolensk, 1912): 326, 337–8.
10. Petr A. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki* (Moscow, 1963), 335–6.
11. *Russkie memuary: izbrannye stranitsy, 1826–1856* (Moscow, 1990), 398, 413.
12. *Rasskazy ochevidtsev o dvenadtsatom gode*, collected by T. Tolychova (Moscow, 1912), 3.
13. Andrei G. Tartakovskii, *1812 god i russkaia memuaristika: opyt istochnikovedcheskogo izucheniia* (Moscow, 1980).
14. P. Stolpianskii, *Orenburgskii krai v 1812 godu* (Orenburg, n.d.), 16.
15. 'Rasskazy o 1812 gode', 4.
16. Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts*, 10.
17. See, for example, the '1812' series of pictures by Vasilii V. Vereshchagin, including *Fire in the Kremlin*, *Through the Fire* and *The Glow of Zamoskvorech'e District*.
18. http://urokiistorii.ru/51483 [Accessed on 08 February 2014]
19. Moscow company-owner V. Zimulin had a clever marketing trick, releasing Anniversary cognac, poured into bottles with labels depicting seven scenes from the events of 1812. Thus, to collect the entire patriotic 'picture gallery', you had to buy nearly four litres of the drink. Sweetshop owners were at the greatest advantage, since chocolate boxes and sweet wrappers provided the ideal setting for 'anniversary' pictures. The renowned firm Abrikosov and Sons tempted buyers by making sweet wrappers with pictures of portraits of the heroes of 1812 and of various episodes from the Patriotic War of 1812.
    This description can be found in Vladimir V. Lapin, 'Pamiat' kak tovar: kommercheskaia sostavliaiushchaia stoletnego iubileia Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 118 (2012): http://www.magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2012/118/l21.html [Accessed on 01 February 2014].
20. http://exf.ru/?page=regions, http://www.urokiistorii.ru/51377 [Accessed on 12 February 2014] For more on this, see http://www.r89.ru/novosti/1003.php, http://muzeyos.ru/museum/informatsionnyj-sbornik/228-pamyatniki-i-pamyatnye-znaki-v-gorode-gubkinskom, http://www.smolensk2.ru/story.php?id=30876.
21. Konstantin N. Tsimbaev, 'Fenomen iubileemanii v rossiiskoi obshchestvennoi zhizni kontsa XIX – nachala XX veka', *Voprosy istorii*, 11 (2005): 98.
22. Konstantin N. Tsimbaev, 'Rekonstruktsiia proshlogo i konstruirovanie budushchego v Rossii: opyt ispol'zovaniia istoricheskikh iubileev v politicheskikh tseliakh', in *Istoricheskaia kul'tura imperatorskoi Rossii: formirovanie predstavlenii o proshlom* (Moscow, 2012), 482.
23. Chris Chulos, 'Slavia mestnoe: torzhestva v Rossiiskoi imperii i poreformennye avtory provintsial'noi pressy', *Ab Imperio*, 1–2 (2001): 283.
24. For more on the place of the battle of Borodino in commemorative practices, see Julie Buckler, 'Taking and Retaking the Field: Borodino as a Site of Collective Memory', in Buckler and Johnson, eds., *Rites of Place*, 203–24.

25. Pierre Nora, Mona Ozuf, Gérard de Puymège, *Frantsiia-pamiat'* (St Petersburg, 1999), 48.
26. Elena A. Vishlenkova, *Vizual'noe narodovedenie imperii, ili 'uvidet' russkogo dano ne kazhdomu'* (Moscow, 2011), 222–3.
27. http://urokiistorii.ru/51468 [Accessed on 5 February 2014]
28. See Richard Wortman, *Stsenarii vlasti: mify i tseremonii russkoi monarkhii*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 2004), vol. 2, 586.
29. R. Malinovskii, 'Znachenie pobedy Rossii v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda', *Pravda*, 7 September 1962.
30. Pavel A. Zhilin, 'Nekotorye voprosy izucheniia istorii Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 6 (1962): 61.
31. See, for example: P. Ia. Aleshkin, V. K. Golovnikov, 'Moskovskoe narodnoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 9 (1962): 22–33; Liubomir G. Beskrovnyi, 'Nekotorye voprosy istorii Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 10 (1962): 50–60; L. N. Bychkov, 'O klassovoi bor'be v Rossii vo vremia Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 8 (1962): 43–58; Nikolai M. Druzhinin, 'Istoricheskoe znachenie Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 12 (1962): 48–59.
32. 'The concept of the popular war is a complicated and ambiguous one. The army was made up of organized, fighting people, and the rear was made up of people helping the army, filled with the very same patriotic fervour. But if the enemy penetrates deep into the country and tramples the native soil – some people remain behind the front. Their behaviour, their struggle gives us the third important component of the concept of the popular war.' Quoted in Militsa V. Nechkina, 'Vsia Rossiia v pokhod poshla…', *Pravda*, 16 October 1962.
33. Vadim S. Parsamov, 'Konstruirovanie idei narodnoi voiny v 1812 godu', *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 6 (2012): http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/2894 [Accessed on 28 December 2012]
34. Pavel A. Zhilin, 'Nekotorye voprosy izucheniia istorii Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda', *Voprosy istorii*, 6 (1962): 59.
35. R. Malinovskii, 'Znachenie pobedy Rossii v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda', *Pravda*, 7 September 1962.
36. 'Relikvii slavy. K 150-letiiu Borodinskogo srazheniia', *Pravda*, 14 July 1962.
37. http://urokiistorii.ru/51468 [Accessed on 4 February 2014]
38. *Nasha Otechestvennaia voina 1812 g.*, 3.
39. 'At the same positions where the Russian army had struck a fatal blow to Napoleon's undefeated hordes, Soviet troops shielded Moscow from the fascist invaders.' Stated in *Pravda*, 24 June 1962.
40. I. Ponomarev, 'Relikvii boevoi slavy', *Pravda*, 28 July 1962.
41. 'After the victory at Maloiaroslavets, the Russian army began the counter-offensive and reversed the pursuit of Napoleon's army on a broad front. […] Over two months of active engagements, in the harsh autumn-winter conditions, the Russian warriors fought them more than 1000 kilometres back and, at the battles of Viaz'ma, Krasnoi and Berezina, completely destroyed the enemy.' Stated by Pavel Zhilin, A. Sumin, 'Gibel' agressora', *Pravda*, 18 October 1962.
42. 'Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda: 200 let sobytiiu i mifu', *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 6 (2012): http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/2892 [Accessed on 28 December 2012]
43. http://urokiistorii.ru/51468 [Accessed on 4 February 2014].

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